    [Senate Hearing 117-889, Part 1]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                    S. Hrg. 117-889, Pt. 1

                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
                    APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
                    AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2792

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
    TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                           U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

                U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

             U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

             U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                 U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. SPACE COMMAND

                  U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA CAMMAND

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                                  ARMY POSTURE

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

                                  NAVY POSTURE

    THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATIONON
                        ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                   ----------

        MARCH 9, 16, 25; APRIL 13, 20, 22; JUNE 10, 15, 17, 22, 24, 2021

      [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                                   ----------
                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    56-721 PDF               WASHINGTON : 2026
    =======================================================================
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts	        THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
                                         	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama

     		Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
      		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S
    _________________________________________________________________

                                 march 9, 2021

                                                                       Page

    United States Special Indo-Pacific Command.......................     1

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     1

    Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker.............................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Davidson, Admiral Philip S., USN Commander, United States Indo-
      Pacific
      Command........................................................     5

    Questions for the Record.........................................    61

                                 march 16, 2021

    United States Southern Command and United States Northern
      Command........................................................    83

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................    83

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................    85

                               Witness Statements

    Faller, Admiral Craig S., USN Commander, United States Southern      86
      Command.

    VanHerck, General Glen D., USAF Commander, United States Northern    96
      Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   147

                                 march 25, 2021

    United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber    171
      Command.

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   171

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   173

                               Witness Statements

    Maier, Christopher P., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense For    174
      Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

    Clarke, General Richard D., USA Commander, United States Special    180
      Operations Command.

    Nakasone, General Paul M., USA Commander, United States Cyber       186
      Command; Director, National Security Agency; and Chief, Central
      Security Service.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   224

                                     (iii)

                                 april 13, 2021

                                                                       Page

    United States European Command and United States Transportation     233
      Command.

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   233

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   235

                               Witness Statements

    Wolters, General Tod D., USAF Commander, United States European     236
      Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied
      Commander
      Europe.

    Lyons, General Stephen R., USA Commander, United States             246
      Transportation Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   288

                                 april 20, 2021

    United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command..   307

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   307

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   308

                               Witness Statements

    Richard, Admiral Charles A., USN Commander, United States           309
      Strategic Command.

    Dickinson, General James H., USA Commander, United States Space     323
      Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   372

                                 april 22, 2021

    United States Central Command and United States Africa Command...   387

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   387

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   389

                               Witness Statements

    McKenzie, General Kenneth F., Jr., USMC Commander, United States    390
      Central Command.

    Townsend, General Stephen J., USA Commander, United States Africa   400

      Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   438

                                      (iv)

                                 june 10, 2021

                                                                       Page
    The Department of Defense Budget Posture.........................   447

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   447

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   449

                               Witness Statements

    Austin, The Honorable Lloyd J., III, Secretary of Defense........   450

    Milley, General Mark A., USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of        462
      Staff.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   533

                                 june 15, 2021

    Army Posture.....................................................   549

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   549

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   551

                               Witness Statements

    Wormuth, The Honorable Christine E., Secretary of the Army.......   551

    McConville, General James P., USA Chief of Staff of the Army.....   553

    Questions for the Record.........................................   590

    Appendix--Army Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Overview..................   610

                                 june 17, 2021

    Air Force Posture................................................   623

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   623

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   624

                               Witness Statements

    Roth, The Honorable John P., Acting Secretary of the Air Force...   626

    Brown, General Charles Q., USAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force..   644

    Raymond, General John W., USSF Chief of Space Operations.........   645

    Questions for the Record.........................................   683

                                      (v)

                                 june 22, 2021

                                                                       Page
    Navy Posture.....................................................   703

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   703

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   705

                               Witness Statements

    Harker, The Honorable Thomas W., Acting Secretary of the Navy....   706

    Gilday, Admiral Michael M., USN Chief of Naval Operations........   715

    Berger, General David H., USMC Commandant of the Marine Corps....   727

    Questions for the Record.........................................   783

                                 june 24, 2021

                                                                       Page
    The Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security              811
      Administration on Atomic Energy Defense Activities.

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   811

    Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   812

                               Witness Statements

    Granholm, The Honorable Jennifer M., Secretary of Energy.........   813

    Questions for the Record.........................................   848

    Appendix--Special Report
      Meeting Medical and Research Needs for Isotopes Derived from      854
      Uranium-233.

                                      (vi)

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin,
    Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst,
    Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
    Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
        This morning the Committee will receive testimony from
    Admiral Davidson, the Commander of the United States Indo-
    Pacific Command. Admiral, I understand this is likely to be
    your last appearance before the Committee prior to your
    retirement, and I want to thank you and your family for your
    decades of service to the country. We also ask that you extend
    our thanks and gratitude to the men and women under your
    command who each day sacrifice and serve the Nation. Thank you
    very much, sir, for your distinguished service.
        Due to the coronavirus pandemic, you have not appeared
    before the Committee since February 2019. There have been many
    regional developments since that time, and we look forward to
    your updates.
        At his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin accurately
    described China as the ``pacing threat'' for the Department of
    Defense (DOD). Under President Xi Jinping, China has moved away
    from greater integration with the liberal world order and
    instead created a style of authoritarian capitalism that it now
    seeks to export throughout the region and the world.
    Additionally, China seeks to co-opt into national institutions
    or create parallel organizations to supports its strategic
    interests.
        The challenges posed by China require a truly whole-of-
    government approach, but the Department of Defense and Indo-
    Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), in particular, play a key role in
    seeking to deter increasingly aggressive behavior by the
    Chinese military.
        China seeks to use its superior military power to suppress
    smaller countries' sovereignty claims in key regions. Nowhere
    is this more evident than in the South China Sea, which is why
    international freedom of navigation operations, including
    regular passage by United States warships through strategic
    waterways, are essential for maintaining internationally
    recognized transit routes and pushing back against China's
    excessive claims.
        Recognizing the challenges posed by China, on February
    10th, President Biden announced the establishment of a China
    task force to examine the Department's strategy, operational
    concepts, technology and force structure, posture,
    intelligence, United States alliances and partnerships, and
    other matters relating to China. Admiral Davidson, I look
    forward to hearing your thoughts on this task force and the
    wide range of issues it is considering.
        Deterrence is key to avoiding an unnecessary and costly
    armed conflict with China. Unfortunately, as has been widely
    recognized by national security leaders and scholars alike, the
    foundations of United States deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
    have steadily eroded over time. That is why this Committee led
    the way in the creation of the Pacific Defense Initiative, or
    PDI, in last year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
    We created the PDI to better focus DOD resources on key
    military capabilities necessary to deter China, reassure United
    States allies and partners, and send a strong signal to the
    Chinese Communist Party that we are committed to defending
    United States interests in the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining
    momentum behind the PDI will be a key focus of this Committee
    as we begin work on this year's NDAA. Admiral Davidson, we look
    forward to hearing your assessment of the PDI, how it is being
    implemented, and what additional requirements you have
    identified for the upcoming fiscal year and beyond.
        At the same time, we must guard against treating the
    Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and China as ten feet
    tall. As an emerging power, China faces a number of challenges
    that it must contend with, both domestically and
    internationally. Deterring aggressive military action should
    certainly be our objective, but we must also seek to exploit
    China's weaknesses in other areas, including by exposing its
    suppression of human rights at home and lack of alliances and
    partners abroad. The world is rightly alarmed by Chinese human
    rights abuses and threats to democratic movement.
        Earlier this year, the State Department appropriately
    labeled the wide-scale abuse of Uyghur and other predominantly
    Muslim ethnic minorities by Chinese security forces as a
    genocide. Additionally, Chinese anti-democratic crackdown in
    Hong Kong signals an increasing willingness by the Chinese
    Communist Party to impose its will through force. These
    actions, coupled with continued rhetoric and aggressive
    military exercises directed at Taiwan, should give us pause.
        While I expect to hear separately from the Commander of
    United States Forces Korea in a few weeks, it is important to
    note the near-term threat posed by North Korea to the region,
    and potentially the United States. Many observers believe Kim
    Jong Un may seek to test the Biden administration with
    provocative actions in the coming weeks or months. The
    challenge posed by North Korea can only be addressed through a
    unified strategy with our allies, and particularly with South
    Korea and Japan.
        We must also seek to coordinate, to the extent possible,
    with China, if possible, and that is something we should
    investigate. Admiral Davidson, I look forward to hearing your
    assessment of the security situation in the Korean Peninsula
    and your assessment of what more can be done to effect a change
    in North Korea's course.
        Perhaps most importantly, our network of regional allies
    and partners is critical to confronting the challenges posed by
    China and North Korea. The Biden administration is rightly
    focused on re-invigorating our alliances with Japan, South
    Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. These
    alliances certainly are not without challenges but remain
    indispensable to our efforts to ensure a stable and open Indo-
    Pacific region. At the same time, we must continue growing
    sustainable partnerships with India, Indonesia, Singapore,
    Vietnam, and others. These allies and partners are our
    comparative advantage in the region and will be critical to
    protecting and advancing our collective interests in the coming
    years.
        I would also like to take a moment to stress my concern
    about the recent military coup and ongoing violent security
    crackdown in Myanmar. President Biden has made clear that
    respect for human rights will be a centerpiece of United States
    foreign policy, and I strongly support efforts to achieve a
    return to democratic governance, peace, and rule of law in
    Myanmar as soon as possible.
        Finally, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and climate
    change will continue to shape INDOPACOM's operations in the
    region and engagement with partners and allies for the
    foreseeable future. We are interested in hearing more about how
    each of these challenges is impacting INDOPACOM activities in
    the region today and how you are working to prepare the command
    to better prepare and address them in the future.
        Again, Admiral Davidson, thank you for your service, and we
    look forward to your testimony.
        Senator Wicker, please.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson,
    Senator Inhofe has duties in Oklahoma this morning and wanted
    me to enter a statement on his behalf. He also wants me to
    thank you for your decades of service and leadership that you
    have provided for the Department of Defense, and also to
    observe that this may be your last appearance before the
    Committee. From my standpoint, I hate to see you go, and I
    think these will be big shoes to fill.
        This is Senator Inhofe's statement:
        The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority over the
    last 3 years has been to ensure the effective implementation of
    the National Defense Strategy (NDS). To implement the NDS,
    Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks said China is the
    pacing threat for the Department of Defense, and General Milley
    said the Pacific is the number one regional priority for the
    United States military. Competition with China is our top focus
    and has overwhelming bipartisan support.
        As Commander of INDOPACOM, you are on the front lines of
    military competition with China. Your job is to ensure that
    there never comes a day when the Chinese Communist Party
    leadership concludes it can achieve its goals through the use
    of military force.
        However, even with the progress our military has made over
    the past 4 years to rebuild readiness, the reality is that the
    conventional military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is
    getting worse, not better. General McMaster told us last week
    that since the Cold War, China has undertaken the largest
    peacetime military buildup in history.
        At the same time, America grew more complacent. For
    example, under Obama, from 2010 to 2015, while Chinese military
    spending grew by 83 percent, we decreased our military spending
    by 25 percent. As China invested in military capabilities, many
    Americans naively assumed that China's entry into the World
    Trade Organization (WTO) and the global integration of its
    economy would somehow make the Chinese Communist Party more
    friendly and open to the West.
        The result now is America's military advantage and the
    credibility of our deterrent is eroding. That is why the 2021
    NDAA was the toughest bill on China ever, with several national
    security committees involved, and that is specifically why this
    Committee put the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI, into
    last year's NDAA, to stop aggression from the Chinese Communist
    Party.
        In Europe we have made a lot of progress on posture through
    the European Defense Initiative, or EDI, by investing over $20
    billion in the last 5 years. We need to apply a similar level
    of focus, effort, and resources to our posture in the Pacific
    through PDI. We know we need advanced capabilities like
    hypersonics and artificial intelligence (AI), but that is not
    enough. It is clear we need the right posture to ensure our
    forces can be in the right place, at the right time, with the
    right stuff. This is what PDI was designed to accomplish.
        In reading your assessment of what we need PDI to do, some
    other focus areas include integrated air and missile defense,
    hardened and dispersed bases, expanded training ranges,
    improved joint exercise, and increased security cooperation
    with the allies and partners. Admiral Davidson, we hope you
    will expand on this today and give us details of exactly what
    you need and where we must invest.
        It is a dangerous time in the world but especially in the
    Indo-Pacific. For example, at last week's hearing, General
    McMaster told us that ``Taiwan may represent the most dangerous
    flashpoint for war.'' That is a quote. Admiral Davidson, we
    must win this competition for the security of our Nation as
    well as our partners and allies.
        I look forward to hearing from you about strengthening
    deterrents and regaining the advantage in the Indo-Pacific. So
    thank you very much for your attendance and your leadership and
    your great service to the United States of America, and thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
        Admiral Davidson, you are recognized for your testimony.

    STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                      STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Davidson. Chairman Reed, Senator Wicker,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Indo-Pacific
    region today.
        Today I am joined by Indo-Pacific Command's senior enlisted
    advisor, Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter, a Special Forces
    warrior with decades of experience in the Indo-Pacific Theater,
    operating and training alongside our most critical allies and
    partners.
        I can report that Indo-Pacific Command is laser-focused on
    the Secretary of Defense's immediate five priorities, beginning
    with the initiatives centered on the health and well-being of
    our people. Indeed, investing in our most critical and
    resilient resource, our people, is a national security
    imperative.
        For the past 12 months, we have worked to support the
    protection and sustainment of our Joint Force readiness while
    mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally,
    our team has worked extensively with local, state, and national
    leadership to help defeat the disease and minimize the impact
    on our ability to perform our missions. We also remain deeply
    focused on cultivating a safe environment for our DOD
    professionals to learn, to thrive, to execute their mission,
    and to fulfill their oath to the Constitution.
        In doing so, we must also work to eliminate sexual assault,
    sexual harassment, racism, and extremism, which have no place
    within our ranks. Such abhorrent behaviors are inconsistent
    with our values and the principles we are sworn to defend. Our
    greatest military strength is our people. Therefore, operating
    in an environment free of discrimination, free of hate or
    harassment, while accomplishing our mission, is paramount to
    our success. Indeed, it is paramount to ensuring we can
    accomplish our mission to meet the greatest challenges of the
    21st century.
        The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for
    America's future and remains the United States' priority
    theater. The region itself contains four of the five priority
    security challenges identified by the Department of Defense--
    China, Russia, North Korea, as well as violent extremist
    organizations. The Indo-Pacific region also experiences
    frequent natural and man-made disasters--the negative impacts
    of climate change, rapid population growth, drugs and human
    trafficking, and, of course, disease and pandemics.
        That said, the region accounts for 60 percent of the
    world's current gross domestic product, and it contributes more
    than two-thirds to the present global economic growth. In 10
    years, the region will host two-thirds of the world's
    population and two-thirds of the global economy.
        Our nation's vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific serves
    as an important reminder to all nations that the United States
    remains committed to free, fair, and reciprocal trade, shared
    access to global markets, good governance, and human rights and
    civil liberties.
        Now, if you would, let me focus my remarks on the greatest
    long-term strategic threat to security in the 21st century,
    China. In stark contrast to our free and open vision, the
    Communist Party of China promotes a closed and an authoritarian
    system through internal oppression and external aggression.
    China's pernicious approach to the region includes a whole-of-
    party effort to coerce, corrupt, and collapse governments,
    businesses, organizations, and the people of the Indo-Pacific.
        As China continues to increase the size of the People's
    Liberation Army and advance their own joint capabilities, the
    military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more
    unfavorable for the United States and our allies. With this
    imbalance, we are accumulating risk that may embolden China to
    unilaterally change the status quo before our forces may be
    able to deliver an effective response.
        The greatest danger the United States and our allies face
    in the region is the erosion of conventional deterrents, vis-a-
    vis the People's Republic of China. Absent a convincing
    deterrent, China will be emboldened to continue to take action
    to supplant the established rules-based international order and
    the values represented in our vision for a free and open Indo-
    Pacific.
        Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must demonstrate
    the capability, the capacity, and the will to convince Beijing,
    unequivocally, the costs of achieving their objections by the
    use of military force are simply too high. Indeed, we must be
    doing everything possible to deter conflict. Our number one job
    is to keep the peace, but we absolutely must be prepared to
    fight and win should competition turn to conflict.
        I want to thank this Committee for your deep commitment to
    defending United States values and interests in the Indo-
    Pacific through your efforts to establish the ground-breaking
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI. PDI provides the
    foundation for establishing a forward-deployed, defense in-
    depth posture that defends the U.S. Homeland and our interests
    abroad, deters aggression, assures our allies and partners, and
    provides the flexible response options should deterrence fail.
        So on behalf of the men and women of the United States
    Indo-Pacific Command, I thank you for your time today, for your
    continued support, and for your desire to improve the
    prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific, indeed, the most
    critical region on the planet. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral Philip S. Davidson
                                  introduction
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
    discuss the Indo-Pacific Region. The Indo-Pacific is the most
    consequential region for America's future and remains the Department of
    Defense's priority theater. This region contains four of the five
    priority security challenges identified by the Department of Defense
    and includes frequent natural and man-made disasters, the negative
    impacts of climate change, rapid population growth, and of course,
    disease and pandemics.
        The Indo-Pacific accounts for 60 percent of the world's current
    Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and contributes more than two-thirds to
    the present global economic growth. Trade and investment in this
    dynamic region are vital to the security and prosperity of the United
    States and reflective in more than $1.9 trillion in two-way trade with
    the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), serving as the
    number one destination for United States foreign direct investment
    (FDI). In 10 years, the region will host two-thirds of the world's
    population and two-thirds of the global economy.
        Our Nation's vision for peace and prosperity in a Free and Open
    Indo-Pacific continues to resonate in the region and serves as an
    important reminder to all nations that the United States remains
    committed to free and fair trade, shared access to global markets, good
    governance, and human rights and civil liberties. The region's economic
    prosperity and security are inextricably linked and part of the
    competitive landscape.
        The greatest danger for the United States in this competition is
    the erosion of conventional deterrence. A combat-credible, conventional
    deterrent posture is necessary to prevent conflict, protect U.S.
    interests, and to assure our allies and partners. Absent a convincing
    deterrent, the People's Republic of China (PRC) will be emboldened to
    take action to undermine the rules-based international order and the
    values represented in our vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The
    combination of the PRC's military modernization program and willingness
    to intimidate its neighbors through the use, or threatened use of
    force, undermines peace, security, and prosperity in the region.
        United States Indo-Pacific Command's approach for addressing Great
    Power Competition centers on advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific by
    focusing on four critical areas:
          1.  Increasing Joint Force Lethality
          2.  Enhancing Design and Posture
          3.  Strengthening Allies and Partners
          4.  Modernizing our Exercises, Experimentation, and Innovation
    Programs
        In 2019, I reported to this Committee we had lost a quantitative
    advantage and our qualitative advantage was shrinking across several
    domains as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) fields higher quality
    systems.
        However, with this Committee's efforts to establish the Pacific
    Deterrence Initiative (PDI), along with resourcing our advanced
    undersea warfare capabilities and 5th generation fighters, I am
    optimistic you have created the opportunity to Regain the Advantage,
    but we must remain diligent. PDI provides the foundation for
    establishing a forward-deployed, defense-in-depth posture that defends
    our interests abroad, deters aggression, assures allies and partners,
    and provides flexible response options should deterrence fail. PDI also
    provides the requisite budget transparency and oversight to ensure
    resources are prioritized appropriately. Thank you for your continued
    support.
        On top of PDI support, investing in our most critical and resilient
    resource--our people--is a national security imperative. USINDOPACOM is
    staunchly committed to promoting the health and well-being of our
    teammates. In addition to providing necessary warfighting tools, we
    remain deeply focused on cultivating a safe environment for our DOD
    professionals to thrive, execute their mission, and fulfill their oath
    to the Constitution. We must take deliberate action to protect and
    sustain the force to meet the demands of strategic competition. Indeed,
    our Defense-wide priorities--dedicated to combating COVID-19,
    extremism, and sexual assault and sexual harassment within our force--
    are at the foundation of our efforts to Regain the Advantage.
        For the past twelve months, protecting and sustaining joint force
    readiness began with our efforts to mitigate the effects of the COVID-
    19 pandemic. We have worked extensively with the local, state, and
    national leadership to combat this contagion and successfully minimized
    the impact on USINDOPACOM's ability to perform its mission in the short
    term. However, COVID-19 has had a moderate effect on the readiness and
    budgets of our allies and partners. We will continue to support their
    efforts to maintain readiness and minimize any further negative impact.
        USINDOPACOM conducted a Headquarters-wide Stand-Down to address
    extremism within the ranks of our force in line with guidance from the
    Secretary of Defense (18 Feb). The program included virtual training
    modules featuring subject matter experts, presentations by our most
    senior leaders, and facilitated small-group discussions to build
    awareness and help prevent actions associated with extremist behaviors
    that go against the fundamental principles of our oath. The message
    provided a clear reminder that we are required to obey all lawful
    orders, support civil authorities to protect lives and property, and
    ensure public safety in accordance with the law. There is more to be
    done in our endeavor to eradicate extremism and the corrosive impact it
    has on our entire force. The senior leaders at USINDOPACOM will
    continue to host regular one-on-one listening sessions with volunteers
    from across the Headquarters to perpetuate this meaningful dialogue. We
    will capitalize on well-established, routine activities to broadly and
    frequently communicate/interact with our workforce to better educate
    our team about the scope of this problem and to develop sustainable
    solutions. Indeed, operating in an environment free of discrimination,
    hate, and harassment while accomplishing our mission is paramount to
    our success.
        USINDOPACOM is fully committed to the prevention of sexual assault
    and sexual harassment--something we absolutely must get right and
    cannot afford to fail. Over the past 3 years, we have improved our
    sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention efforts through a
    number of initiatives based on feedback received from several Command-
    wide surveys. To fully back-up this leadership imperative, I committed
    Headquarters resources and established a fully dedicated, on-site
    Sexual Assault Prevention Response (SAPR) program and a newly created
    Equal Opportunity (EO)/Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program. This
    novel approach is unique to USINDOPACOM and it transforms the
    traditional design--which relies on individual services to provide
    external SAPR and EO/EEO support to combatant command personnel--into a
    more immediate, more insightful, and more involved response mechanism.
    As a result of these initiatives, we have built trust, credibility, and
    awareness in these vital programs throughout the Headquarters. We
    continue to seek every opportunity to combat, prevent, and eliminate
    sexual assault, harassment, and violence to keep safe all those who
    keep America safe.
        For the future, combat credible deterrence depends on our ability
    to achieve four specific outcomes: 1) develop an agile and distributed
    Joint Force designed to deter and deny our adversaries of their
    objectives in the first and second island chains; 2) regain positional
    advantage by evolving our posture and balancing key capabilities across
    South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania resulting in a more dynamic and
    distributed presence; 3) establish a network of compatible and
    interoperable allies and partners who are willing and able to protect
    their sovereignty from coercion; and 4) reassure our allies and
    partners of our commitment by revealing the capacity to conduct complex
    operations and concealing capabilities that provide a decisive
    advantage. A strategy of deterrence supported by a command climate that
    places the dignity and respect of each individual as a vital aspect in
    how we train, maintain, and sustain the force is an imperative for the
    Joint Force's ability to deploy and perform assigned missions.
                         increase joint force lethality
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense
        For the past 3 years, I have repeatedly stated the most important
    action we can take to increase the joint force's lethality is to
    introduce a 360-degree, persistent, air and missile defense capability
    on Guam (Guam Defense System (GDS)). This system and the associated
    architecture must be robust enough to address the emerging threats,
    including hypersonics and the ability to integrate existing weapon
    control systems within this decade.
        The GDS could be established cost effectively with mature Programs
    of Records consisting of Aegis Baseline (B/L) 10, solid-state radar
    (SPY-6 or SPY-7 variant), MK-41 VLS, Aegis Ashore, and SM3/SM6. This
    system is critical for defending the Homeland, including our most
    important American operating location in the western Pacific. America's
    day begins in Guam, and it is not only a location we must fight-from,
    but one we must also fight-for given the threats we face in the near
    term and the foreseeable future.
        NDAA-2016 directed the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Army, and Navy
    to evaluate Aegis Ashore (A.A.) capabilities and costs worldwide to
    provide the Homeland's adequate protection. The MDA report identified
    several Indo-Pacific locations where fixed and persistent integrated
    air and missile defense (IAMD) are desired. Of the four sites
    identified, one is a test site (Hawaii), two are facilities in Japan,
    and the fourth site is Guam.
        Any recommendations for additional studies, including a requirement
    for only mobile systems, disregard the immediacy and complexity of the
    threat (2026) and the absolute need to integrate fires across the
    region from a forward multi-domain command and control node west of the
    International Date Line (IDL).
        The GDS would provide a foundation for a joint solution to this
    warfighting problem. No individual service can include decentralized
    architecture, automated processes using standard fire control functions
    across the Joint Force, and a force-wide perspective in managing
    resources. In January 2021, the MDA was directed by the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense to reprogram up to $29 million in fiscal year 2021
    RDT&E funding to begin the architecture design for the GDS. The
    critical metric of success is the ability to shrink the decision-to-
    execution cycle for U.S. Forces fighting inside--or close to--the
    enemy's traditional safe-havens, thus improving the joint force's
    survivability.
        The Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System
    (IBCS) and the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) are
    not yet fully developed and do not currently enable joint
    interdependencies or satisfy the requirement to integrate fires across
    domains, services, or weapon platforms.
        Funding provided by Congress in 2021 for Homeland Defense Radar-
    Hawaii as a fixed sensor capability supports the best-programmed
    solution to enable a credible, in-depth, under layer defense for our
    forces in Hawaii. This perspective is consistent with independent
    assessments from the MDA and supported by U.S. Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM) and requires sustained funding throughout the FYDP.
        The persistent Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar
    (TACMOR), located in Palau will dramatically increase our air domain
    awareness by providing persistent, long-range, detect and track
    capability of air and surface targets in the western Pacific and
    increase our ability to ``shoot the archers.''
    Long Range Precision Strike
        In addition to Homeland defense in Hawaii and Guam, USINDOPACOM
    requires highly survivable, precision-strike fires featuring increased
    quantities of ground-based missiles and improved air and long-range
    naval fires capable of ranges over 500 km. These fires must be
    supported by electronic warfare, space, cyber, and over-the-horizon
    radar capabilities. They must also be operationally decentralized and
    geographically distributed to provide a credible, offensive, and
    conventional deterrent to assure U.S. freedom of action.
        Our adversaries continue to field advanced Anti-Access Area Denial
    (A2AD) systems, aircraft, ships, space, and cyber capabilities that
    threaten the U.S. ability to project power into the region. Increasing
    joint force lethality means developing and fielding systems and
    capabilities to ensure U.S. freedom of action or access to vital
    waterways and airspace, while preserving our critical asymmetrical
    advantages to deter aggression and prevail in armed conflict should
    deterrence fail.
    Joint Fires Network
        The advances being made in long-range, precision fires are
    significant and will require an integrated cross-service/cross-system
    network architecture to exploit the full spectrum of capability these
    programs provide the Joint Force. The desired end state is a combined/
    joint-integrated environment where ubiquitous battle management and
    automated engagement decision-making using standard target, track-
    quality, control functions, and a joint force approach for managing
    weapons resources can occur.
        A network of sensors that fuse information using actionable and
    distributed fire control data must support Integrated Air Missile
    Defense (IAMD) and long-range, precision-strike weapons systems. This
    Joint Fires Network enables any sensor from any platform (air, land,
    sea, space, and cyberspace) to provide targeting guidance to any
    weapon.
        USINDOPACOM requires a warfighting architecture that fuses the
    maritime, land, air, cyber, and space domains to enable timely and
    actionable delivery of our emerging weapons. This capability, coupled
    with the lethality of current and future munitions, underpins
    conventional deterrence and provides the Joint Force with the necessary
    distributed lethality to maintain combat credibility in a contested
    environment.
                        enhance force design and posture
        Our enhanced force design must enable the convergence of
    capabilities from multiple domains, and our posture must create the
    virtues of mass without the vulnerability of concentration. This
    scenario is accomplished by distributing a forward-deployed, joint
    force across the battlespace while balancing lethality and
    survivability. It requires a deterrent posture that possesses the
    sustainment and force protection to be resilient, survivable, and
    supportable.
        Persistent presence through forward-based and rotational joint
    forces is the most credible way to demonstrate our commitment and
    resolve to potential adversaries while simultaneously assuring allies
    and partners.
        A force posture and joint force laydown west of the IDL correctly
    positioned to defend in-depth while possessing the capabilities and
    authorities is needed to decisively respond to contingencies across the
    region. More distributed combat power increases survivability, reduces
    risk, and ensures our ability to Fight and Win.
        Infrastructure projects must enhance resilience and support multi-
    domain, joint operations vice service-prioritized activities. U.S.
    ground formations must have long-range weapons in the western Pacific
    to include SM6 and Maritime Strike Tomahawk. Additionally, the Army and
    Marine Corps should employ High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
    (HIMARs) outfitted with Precision Strike Missiles (PSM) and Naval
    Strike Missiles (NSM) specifically for the Army and Marine Corps,
    respectively.
        The ability to deploy an integrated Joint Force capable of
    employing the full spectrum of capabilities across all domains remains
    the joint requirement. The repositioning of Marines from Okinawa, Japan
    is ongoing and must ensure a preponderance of combat power remains west
    of the IDL. Continuing the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative
    (DPRI), while understanding how USMC modernization will affect its
    foundations, should proceed without delaying execution based on the
    dynamic nature of the theater.
        Additionally, forward-based air and naval forces need to be able to
    disperse to expeditionary airfields and ports as part of a distributed
    force posture. This requires adequate command and control, munitions,
    and fuel distribution to create temporary windows of localized air and
    maritime superiority to enable maneuver, while amphibious and ground
    forces create and exploit temporal and geographic opportunities to
    impose costs.
        The critical investments necessary to provide adequate dispersion
    to preserve deterrence options include:
          United States Territories. Key strategic locations to
    project power, deter adversaries, and respond to crises across the
    Indo-Pacific. Investments are focused on divert and dispersal locations
    as part of a distributed joint force laydown and new training
    facilities.
          Oceania and the Pacific Island Countries (PIC).
    Investments focused on alternative facilities for training and
    dispersion opportunities that increase airpower capacity.
          Southeast Asia. Investments focused on alternative
    facilities to support modernized and dispersed power projection
    airfields, sustain forward forces, and enhance logistics capability
    with prepositioned stores and infrastructure.
        These specific requirements are outlined in USINDOPACOM's
    Independent Assessment directed by the Committee report accompanying
    Section 1251 of NDAA-21.
                  strengthening allies and enhancing partners
        Strong alliances and partnerships represent the most essential
    components of U.S. national power beyond our Nation's economic and
    military strength. One of the significant advantages these
    relationships provide is a common foundation based on the core
    principles of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This foundation fosters
    long-term mutual trust, understanding, respect, interoperability,
    information sharing, and a common view of the regional security
    landscape.
        Our relationships are the building blocks for establishing an
    enhanced, networked security architecture that promotes
    interoperability and coordination from the strategic to tactical
    levels. The critical investments necessary to strengthen our alliances
    and enhance our partnerships to enable this increased interoperability
    include:
          Mission Partner Environment (MPE). In fiscal year 2021,
    PDI authorized $50M as the critical investment for providing resilient
    and redundant joint/multinational command and control that delivers the
    same functionality of a data center and hosts multiple, unique mission
    sets. MPE provides universal battle management and automated decision-
    making by accessing a multi-domain sensor network. This environment
    uses cloud-based technologies, integrated systems, and secure access
    controls to command, control, and communications (C3).
          Fusion Centers. In fiscal year 2021, PDI authorized $2M
    for partial funding of the fusion centers needed to improve information
    sharing and build trust. We are amplifying these resources to one of
    three fusion centers identified by USINDOPACOM as part of Regain the
    Advantage. Each of these fusion centers is a crucial enabler for
    strengthening our alliances, enhancing partnerships, and utilize MPE
    for contextual analytics and computing model assessments to extrapolate
    conclusions and identify patterns of life associated with transnational
    threats and other pernicious behavior.
          -  Southeast Asia (Counter Terrorism Information Facility, CTIF),
    hosted by Singapore, represents USINDOPACOM's first participation in an
    operational partnership in Southeast Asia to identify trends and
    anomalies that could lead to a terrorist event or other transnational
    threat. The multi-lateral facility has commenced operations and has
    brought together like-minded countries to share information and provide
    early warning, monitoring and analysis capabilities in a centralized
    and coordinated manner.
          -  Indo-Pacific Maritime Coordination. Navy is exploring
    additional concepts with allies and key partners to increase
    situational awareness in the maritime domain across the Indo-Pacific
    and Indian Oceans.
          -  Oceania Fusion Center represents an initiative to provide
    Pacific Island nations, including the Freely Associated States--the
    Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the
    Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)--a means to improve common
    understanding of challenges such as climate change; illegal,
    unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing; transnational crime; and
    other specific Oceania-based challenges.
        For almost 36 months, I have spent much of my time focused on
    strengthening our current alliances and enhancing our emerging
    partnerships across the region. This effort begins with the five
    bilateral treaty alliances where we have mutual defense
    responsibilities:
          Japan. The United States-Japan Alliance is the
    cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific Region. The
    alliance reassures the region by setting the example through our
    operations and collaborative efforts to build partnership capacity with
    other like-minded partners. As the most recent National Defense Program
    Guidelines (NDPG) indicate, Japan has embarked on expanding its
    military capabilities to better align United States and Japanese
    defense strategies by liberalizing rules for military equipment export,
    expanding the scope of possible Self Defense Force (SDF) missions to
    facilitate integration and interoperability, and advancing the DPRI.
    Increased defense spending purchasing some of our most advanced systems
    is a clear indication Japan seeks to improve its national defense
    posture and the United States-Japan alliance.
          Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States and ROK
    alliance remains the linchpin in maintaining a stable, security
    environment and ready to address the North Korean regime's threats. The
    ROK's purchase of advanced platforms and munitions, such as F-35A,
    Global Hawk, P-8A, and upgraded PAC-3 missiles improves our combined
    interoperability and enhances ROK's defense posture. Seoul has made
    progress toward transitioning wartime operational control (OPCON) to a
    Future-Combined Forces Command led by a ROK Commander. The United
    States and ROK are currently addressing a lapse in the Special Measures
    Agreement (SMA), which we expect to be finalized in the near term. The
    lack of an SMA negatively impacts USFK's ability to ``fight tonight.''
          Australia. Australia is a critical ally, partner, and
    leader contributing to international efforts promoting a Free and Open
    Indo-Pacific. Australia actively supports U.N. Security Council
    Resolution (UNSCR) enforcement operations to curb illicit North Korean
    activity while making substantial efforts to improve relations with
    India and increase engagement to build open and resilient societies in
    ASEAN. Under its ``Pacific Step-Up'' policy, Australia is enhancing its
    assistance and infrastructure investments in Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
    and the Solomon Islands. They also assist the United States in
    maintaining a strong force posture, hosting the seventh Marine
    Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) deployment and Enhanced Air
    Cooperation, where we reached the agreed upon deployment number in 2019
    (2500) and a reduced target in 2020 (1290) due to COVID-19. This has
    provided the U.S. Marine Corps opportunities to train and integrate
    while displaying significant combat power west of the IDL. In July
    2020, Canberra released two major national security documents that
    complement U.S. national security objectives: the 2020 Defence
    Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan. Along with the
    subsequent release of the classified Defence Planning Guidance, these
    documents confirm our strategic alignment, highlight the challenges in
    competition, and place greater emphasis on deterrence across the Indo-
    Pacific.
          The Philippines. The Republic of the Philippines remains
    a strategic treaty ally and partner. The Government of the Philippines'
    decision to temporarily suspend the termination of the Visiting Forces
    Agreement (VFA) presents opportunities to address mutual concerns and
    reinvigorate joint and interoperability training opportunities as we
    seek full reversal of the VFA termination process, which would
    facilitate deeper military cooperation and integration. The AFP is
    committed to investing in high-quality U.S. defense equipment as they
    modernize their force and conclude a General Security of Military
    Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The Philippines are partnered with the
    Guam and Hawaii National Guards in the State Partnership Program.
          Thailand. The United States-Thai alliance has the
    opportunity to expand in substantial ways since a democratically
    elected government took seat in 2019, as outlined in the United States-
    Thai co-signed ``Joint Vision 2020.'' To modernize its force, Thailand
    has purchased more than $2.5 billion in United States foreign military
    sales with over 200 active foreign military sales cases. Additionally,
    the reinstatement of international military education and training
    funding (IMET) encourages increased mil-mil engagements as our
    militaries train and exercise side-by-side. Our exercise program
    provides an opportunity to explore new access agreements as part of our
    bilateral and multilateral exercises such as COBRA GOLD, HANUMAN
    GUARDIAN, COPE TIGER, and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
    (CARAT). Even during COVID-19, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) conducted
    Exercise COBRA GOLD 2020 supporting readiness training for
    approximately 6,560 U.S. troops along with 26 participating nations.
    Thailand is also partnered with the Washington State National Guard in
    the State Partnership Program.
        Enhancing multilateralism is a critical aspect of USINDOPACOM's
    engagement in the region. We operate with Australia and Japan
    extensively during multilateral exercises and are working diligently to
    expand this collaboration to other like-minded nations to increase
    their level of interoperability and cooperation.
        We also continue to advance strategic partnerships with India and
    Singapore:
          India. The current state of the United States-India
    relations presents a historic opportunity to deepen ties and solidify
    what I consider the ``defining partnership of the 21st century.''We
    concluded several agreements, including the Communications
    Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, which has
    greatly enhanced information sharing and interoperability; the
    Industrial Security Annex (ISA), signed in December 2019 that allows
    for the transfer of technologies in support of defense production; the
    Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) to share unclassified
    geospatial information; and the agreement on Navy-to-Navy Information
    Sharing in October 2020. The United States and Indian navies are now
    securely sharing information, and India has substantially increased its
    acquisition of United States defense equipment. Defense sales are at an
    all-time high with India operating United States-sourced platforms such
    as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, AH-64s, CH-47s, Precision Guided-Excalibur
    Munitions, and M777 howitzers. In February, India agreed to acquire
    Apache and MH-60R multi-mission helicopters worth $3.1 billion and is
    considering other United States systems. The United States strongly
    supports India's establishment of an information fusion center focusing
    on maritime domain awareness, which will improve maritime security in
    the Indian Ocean Region and Bay of Bengal. USINDOPACOM defines the
    security relationship with India as a strategic imperative. We expect
    substantial progress on interoperability and information sharing,
    service-level and joint military-to-military cooperation and exercises
    like TIGER TRIUMPH and MALABAR, and an increase in quadrilateral
    collaboration between India, Australia, Japan, and the United States as
    the relationship continues to mature.
          Singapore. Military to military relations with Singapore
    are excellent, with an average of 300 Distinguished Visitor engagements
    and 40 operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) taking place
    annually. Over the last 20 years, no other Southeast Asian country has
    done more to facilitate United States presence in the region. In
    December 2019, the United States and Singapore announced the
    establishment of a permanent Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF)
    fighter detachment on Guam and foreign military sales exceeding $7
    billion, including Singapore's request to purchase F-35s. Singapore and
    the United States worked together multilaterally with five other ASEAN
    nations, Australia and New Zealand, to establish a fusion center
    focused on countering terrorism. In 2019, the United States and
    Singapore reinforced their commitment to this partnership when they
    renewed the Memorandum of Understanding regarding Facilities' Use in
    Singapore. The combination of continued support for a United States
    presence in Southeast Asia, a deep and broad defense relationship based
    on shared principles, and a strong desire for continued defense
    diplomacy enables the United States and Singapore to focus on shared
    regional challenges.
        Other Indo-Pacific Nations (Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom,
    France). USINDOPACOM is working with the FVEY-Plus (United Kingdom,
    Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and France) to explore how we can build
    on bilateral and multilateral relationships to align our various
    efforts to assist Oceania in addressing the transnational challenges
    that present a significant threat to their way of life.
          Canada. Canadian policy in the Indo-Pacific focuses on
    expanding cooperation and partnership building throughout the region.
    Through consistent engagement with its regional partners and allies,
    Canada is advancing relationships in the region, especially with the
    other FVEY-Plus construct participants to assist in Oceania and
    Vietnam. Ongoing support and troop contributions to the Republic of
    Korea and North Korea-focused UNSCR enforcement operations remain
    priorities for Ottawa.
          New Zealand (N.Z.). New Zealand remains a steadfast and
    key partner that continues to increase investment, foreign assistance,
    and infrastructure support in the South Pacific. Wellington's ``Pacific
    Reset'' policy highlights a reinvigorated focus in the Southwest
    Pacific. These efforts provide valuable leadership and expertise to the
    region. New Zealand also provides ongoing support to North Korea-
    focused UNSC Reinforcement operations in the region. We are committed
    to deepening our partnership to advance the vision for a Free and Open
    Indo-Pacific.
          United Kingdom (U.K.). The U.K. remains committed to the
    region as a champion of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. They continue
    to sustain a healthy defense posture in the region, having renewed the
    Brunei Garrison Agreement to maintain around 700troops in the Sultanate
    (at H.M. Sultan's expense) since September 2019 and establishing a
    Royal Navy presence with HMS Enterprise. The U.K. also continues to be
    a primary contributor of personnel and assets for North Korea-focused
    UNSC Reinforcement operations. This year, the U.K. will deploy a
    Carrier Strike Task Group spearheaded by its new aircraft carrier, HMS
    Queen Elizabeth, with United States Marine Corps F-35s embarked,
    joining an international group of ships that includes the Five Eyes
    Defense Arrangement, Netherlands, Denmark, Japan, Republic of Korea,
    and Indonesia.
          France. France has increased operational activities
    across the Indo-Pacific under their own Indo-Pacific strategy
    emphasizing rule of law and freedom of movement. It is a pivotal
    contributor to FVEY-Plus multilateral efforts on IUU fishing; drug and
    human trafficking; and community resilience related to natural
    disasters and climate change. France maintains an active role in
    regional security, protecting fisheries, and countering transnational
    crimes, including narcotics destined for Australia and New Zealand.
    Additionally, France exercises and operates in the South China Sea and
    supports North Korea-focused UNSCR enforcement activities.
          Germany. In 2020 Germany adopted new guidelines for
    engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. These guidelines include a
    willingness to support the international rules-based order. In the most
    visible demonstration of this commitment, the German Ministry of
    Defense announced the 2021 to 2022 deployment of a German frigate to
    the region. This frigate will support UNSCR sanction enforcement
    activities against North Korea and cooperate with the United States
    Navy.
          Oceania. Oceania is critical to ensuring a Free and Open
    Indo-Pacific, as it contains strategic sea lines of communication
    linking us with our allies and partners in the Oceania region and Asia.
    We prioritized key leader engagements during the pandemic to offer
    assistance to Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and ensure coordination
    on pressing challenges including IUU fishing; drug and human
    trafficking; addressing the effects of climate change; natural
    disasters; and a range of health issues that plague these nations. We
    have also used security cooperation programs, such as Woman, Peace, and
    Security (WPS) assistance, to build resilience across the region. In
    contrast, the PRC is actively engaged in coercive economic and
    diplomatic tactics in Oceania. These predatory activities undermine
    good governance and promote corruption. While we continue to strengthen
    our bilateral relationships with countries that have militaries (Fiji,
    Tonga, and Papua New Guinea), our engagement begins with the Freely
    Associated States (FAS)--the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the
    Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau
    (heretofore Palau), with which the United States has signed Compacts of
    Free Association (COFA). We are also working on an additional
    multilateral effort with like-minded nations (FVEY, France, and Japan)
    to synchronize and improve the alignment of our security cooperation
    efforts across Oceania.
          Compacts of Free Association. The FAS are small island
    countries located along our strategic lines of communication and are
    critically important to the U.S. ability to project power, sustain
    forward presence, conduct commercial trade, defend the Homeland, and
    ensure access. The 2019 meeting between the United States President and
    the Presidents of Palau, Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of
    Micronesia, and the subsequent visits by several cabinet members and
    senior United States officials to these countries, demonstrate the
    importance our Government places on these relationships and our
    commitment to greater cooperation to ensure a Free and Open Indo-
    Pacific.
          Papua New Guinea (PNG). USINDOPACOM's engagement with PNG
    improves regional posture and demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the
    region. PNG plans to grow its defense force from 3,600 troops to an end
    strength of 10,000 by 2030. The USINDOPACOM team and State Partnership
    Program (SPP) partner (Wisconsin National Guard) will help the PNGDF
    achieve this goal by identifying force development, enlisted training,
    and education opportunities.
          Fiji. We are expanding the defense relationship with Fiji
    through exercises, ship visits, defense dialogues, and the ongoing
    discussions with the Nevada National Guard to formalize a State
    Partnership Program relationship. United States and Fijian forces are
    collaborating with Australia and New Zealand to develop the Black Rock
    Integrated Peacekeeping Center to help advance the capabilities of
    Fiji's armed forces. United States support to Fiji includes helping to
    build a more capable, resilient force by supporting the State
    Department's provision of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for small
    patrol boats and dive equipment. Additionally, DOD established two
    seats each at West Point and Annapolis for Fijian candidates, expanded
    the Defense Attache Office and the Office of Defense Coordination in
    Suva, and added a Ministry of Defense Advisor. In 2019, USINDOPACOM
    hosted a defense dialogue with Fiji in Suva to solidify our defense
    relationships and provide guidance for security cooperation efforts
    over the next 5 years. In 2020, Fiji co-hosted the USINDOPACOM Chief of
    Defense (CHOD) Conference, held virtually, and will co-host the 2021
    CHOD Conference in Suva.
          Tonga. In 2019, USINDOPACOM hosted the first formal
    Trilateral Defense Talks between the United States, Tonga, and Fiji.
    Both Tonga and Fiji expressed a clear desire for increased United
    States engagement tailored to their needs, scaled to their capacity,
    and coordinated with Australia and New Zealand. Tonga is partnered with
    the Nevada National Guard in the State Partnership Program.
          Southeast Asia. We must strengthen the region's ability
    to deny adversaries' attempts to dominate or disrupt the gateway
    between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The DOD defines Southeast Asia
    as the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member
    states, plus Timor Leste. The ASEAN member states under Brunei's
    leadership in 2021 continue to seek ways to improve multilateral
    security engagements and advance stability in the Indo-Pacific.
    USINDOPACOM participates in ASEAN exercises, key leader engagements,
    and practical multilateral cooperation related to the spectrum of
    shared transnational challenges such as the ASEAN-United States
    Maritime Exercise conducted in 2019. USINDOPACOM also co-chairs, along
    with Thailand, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus Experts'
    Working Group on Maritime Security from 2020 through 2023. We continue
    to express our concern over the PRC's pressure on ASEAN members to
    conclude negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in
    a way that contradicts international law and accedes to Beijing's
    territorial and maritime claims, and pressures ASEAN member states to
    limit activities with third-country partners. We are working with the
    State Department on the United States-Mekong Partnership to address
    environmental degradation and the related concerns with water and food
    insecurity caused by upstream damming operations. Our engagement with
    Southeast Asia and with ASEAN strengthens relationships and conveys the
    United States' commitment to the region.
          Burma. The United States stands firmly with the people of
    Burma in their aspirations for democracy, peace, and respect for human
    rights. We are alarmed regarding the military's coup against the
    democratically elected government in Burma, and the detention of State
    Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other government
    officials, as well as political leaders, journalists, human rights
    activists, and members of civil society. Prior to the military coup,
    USINDOPACOM had minimal interaction with Burma's military due to a
    number of restrictions based on Burma's human rights record, and
    USINDOPACOM will continue to monitor the developing situation, and
    specifically how the Burma military responds to the peaceful protests.
          Indonesia. Indonesia's status as the globe's third-
    largest democracy, the world's largest Muslim population, the fourth
    most populous country, and its significant economy all underscore its
    essential role in the regional security architecture. USINDOPACOM is
    committed to enhancing its partnership with Indonesia through robust
    exercise and training programs that take advantage of our shared
    interests and common platforms. We continue to support the Indonesian
    military's focus on external threats to national defense, particularly
    maritime domain awareness and security regarding Beijing's excessive
    maritime claims around Natuna Island. USINDOPACOM is well-positioned to
    support increased demand for enhanced military-to-military bilateral
    cooperation and emerging multilateral training opportunities in 2021.
    Indonesia is partnered with the Hawaii National Guard in the State
    Partnership Program.
          Laos. After decades of stagnation in the bilateral
    relationship following the Vietnam War, we have seen some signs of
    progress since the United States and Laos signed a Comprehensive
    Partnership. Engagements focus on unexploded ordnance clearance, POW/
    MIA recovery, and military medicine. Laos actively supports the DPAA in
    the search for 286 missing United States servicemembers to conclude war
    legacy issues honorably, and aims to address unexploded ordnance issues
    by 2030. In October 2020, the United States Government delivered Laos'
    first FMF case for field ambulances, building trust and confidence in
    the relationship. To continue building trust, we will focus on English
    language training and work to expand security cooperation.
          Malaysia. Last year marked our 35th iteration of the
    Bilateral Training and Consultative Group discussions between
    USINDOPACOM and the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF). This forum continues
    to serve as the bedrock for security cooperation between our two
    militaries. USINDOPACOM continues to execute essential exercise and
    training opportunities with Malaysia. We have a robust security
    cooperation relationship with over $850 million in ongoing U.S. foreign
    military sales cases. USINDOPACOM engagements in Malaysia focus on
    maritime security, counterterrorism, Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster
    Relief (HA/DR), peacekeeping, transnational crime and border
    protection, and educational exchanges such as the International
    Military Education and Training program (IMET). We support OSD and the
    Malaysian Ministry of Defense's effort to develop a Memorandum on
    Defense Cooperation and future opportunities to support the new
    administration's security priorities. Malaysia is partnered with the
    Washington State National Guard in the State Partnership Program.
          Cambodia. In early 2017, Cambodia suspended all military-
    to-military exercises with the United States. However, USINDOPACOM
    continues to cooperate in: humanitarian mine clearance actions, medical
    research, and MIA personnel accounting engagements through the DPAA.
    During these limited engagements, the command reaffirms the importance
    of Cambodia strengthening its democratic institutions and maintaining
    an independent foreign policy. In September 2020, Cambodia razed a
    United States-built facility on Ream Naval Base that served as the
    headquarters for the National Committee on Maritime Security,
    reportedly in order to make way for a PRC naval base. The United States
    and other countries in the region are concerned about the expansion of
    PRC influence in Cambodia and its implication for regional security.
          Vietnam. USINDOPACOM's defense partnership with the
    Vietnamese military is among the most substantial aspects of our
    growing bilateral relationship. In 2019, USINDOPACOM and the Vietnam
    Ministry of National Defense (MND) agreed to renew our terms of
    reference; update our 2011 Memorandum of Understanding; and finalize
    negotiations for our GSOMIA. Our military-to-military engagements
    prioritize enhancing Vietnam's maritime capacity to include the
    delivery of 24 Metal Shark boats, the upcoming delivery of the Scan
    Eagle unmanned aerial system, and the imminent completion of the Region
    3 Coast Guard center. Vietnam sent a cadet to the Air Force Academy who
    will graduate in 2024 as the first-ever Vietnamese cadet to attend a
    Service Academy. Vietnam shares our concern with PRC actions in the
    South China Sea, and remains a vocal supporter of United States Freedom
    of Navigation operations. Vietnam is partnered with the Oregon National
    Guard in the State Partnership Program.
          Timor-Leste. While not a part of ASEAN, Timor-Leste
    remains strategically located as a bridge between Southeast Asia and
    the Pacific. The Government of Timor-Leste has formally requested
    United States co-development of Baucau Airfield, which will offer the
    opportunity to build partner capacity with Timor-Leste to support its
    nascent air component and maritime security capabilities. To date,
    funding for project scoping, approval, and global training and
    equipment has been allocated to support the completion of minor
    improvements. Timor-Leste was selected for the State Partnership
    Program and is assisted by the Rhode Island National Guard. The SPP
    will help Timor-Leste build capacity to address transnational threats
    and counterterrorism, as well as help them to provide maritime
    security, and deliver HA/DR.
          Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia continues to benefit from
    long-term economic growth, and this prosperity remains dependent upon
    free trade, free navigation, and open communication. At the same time,
    Northeast Asia is at a crossroads where historical and geopolitical
    forces weigh on mutual security cooperation. As the region becomes more
    stable, we will encourage Japan and South Korea to take a more
    significant role in the alliances related to their security and
    contribute to the broader security efforts across the Indo-Pacific
    region.
          Mongolia. Mongolia is a strong partner and contributor to
    United States regional and global policy objectives. Mongolia supports
    missions in Afghanistan and other regions of the world through United
    Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO), making Mongolia a model for
    emerging democratic countries that want to be more active globally.
    Ulaanbaatar's ``Third Neighbor Policy'' intends to balance Russian and
    PRC influence by developing relationships with the United States and
    other like-minded countries. In the past two decades, more than 50
    percent of Mongolia's senior leadership attended International Military
    Education and Training courses creating an influential cadre of United
    States educated officers. USINDOPACOM components and Mongolia held
    inaugural Land Forces Talks and Airman-to-Airman Talks, while also
    developing a five-year security cooperation plan. The United States is
    helping Mongolia improve its special operations forces, peacekeeping
    operations, and air mobility. Mongolia is partnered with the Alaska
    National Guard in the State Partnership Program.
          Taiwan. The United States and Taiwan maintain a
    substantive relationship consistent with the One China Policy, based on
    the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), three United States-China Joint
    Communiques, and the Six Assurances. Taiwan's values reflect our own--
    an open economy with a free and democratic society that respects human
    rights and the rule of law. The United States continues to support the
    peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner consistent with
    the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. The United
    States provides Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantity
    to allow Taiwan to main sufficient self-defense capabilities---and in a
    manner commensurate with the threat that Taiwan faces. To help
    accomplish this, USINDOPACOM focuses on improving the Taiwan military's
    joint interoperability, training, readiness, and professional
    development. Beijing is pushing across the globe to diplomatically
    isolate, economically constrain, and militarily threaten Taiwan. Taiwan
    has only fifteen diplomatic partners remaining, recently losing
    Kiribati and Solomon Islands in 2019. General Secretary Xi Jinping's
    2019 New Year's speech made it clear that Beijing is focused on
    achieving unification as a part of the PRC's national plan of
    rejuvenation, stating ``We do not promise to renounce the use of force
    and reserve the option to use all necessary measures.'' The United
    States has a deep and abiding interest in peace and stability in the
    Taiwan Strait and welcomes steps from the PRC to reduce tensions and
    improve cross-Strait relations. The cross-Strait situation is of
    increasing concern given the harsh rhetoric from Beijing toward Taipei.
    Taiwan is strengthening its reserve forces and continues to fund
    foreign and indigenous acquisition programs and near-term training and
    readiness.
          South Asia. USINDOPACOM's goal in South Asia is to
    identify and seize opportunities to broaden critical partnerships and
    ensure that shared domains remain free of coercion and open to all. In
    conjunction with India's contributions to regional security and the
    free and open international-based order, United States actions are
    aimed to prevent adversaries from establishing an adequate military
    presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Bay of Bengal.
        USINDOPACOM will continue to help these nations develop
    economically, resist threats to their sovereign interests, provide
    sufficient security to their land borders and maritime boundaries, and
    contribute to global peace and stability.
          Bangladesh. Bangladesh is an important security partner
    with the potential to enhance regional stability and advance United
    States interests in South Asia on maritime security, counterterrorism,
    HA/DR, and support to UNPKO. Over the past decade, steady and
    significant economic growth has enabled more foreign military sales as
    it pursues middle-income status by 2024. Transnational terrorism and
    crime remain internal security issues, as evidenced by five ISIS-
    claimed IED attacks in 2019. In August 2019, Bangladesh took receipt of
    the first of five C-130J aircraft from the United Kingdom. Bangladesh
    also signaled its interest in buying advanced United States military
    aircraft in the near future. Over the next year, there is potential to
    expand United States-Bangladesh maritime security cooperation through
    navy-to-navy engagement and security cooperation programs that enhance
    Bangladesh's maritime domain awareness. We intend to deepen our
    interoperability with Bangladesh once our two countries move forward on
    two important foundational agreements: a General Security of Military
    Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA) and an Acquisition and Cross Services
    Agreement (ACSA). These would strengthen our bilateral relationship,
    deepen defense cooperation, and generate opportunities for
    interoperability. Bangladesh is partnered with the Oregon National
    Guard in the State Partnership Program.
          The Maldives. The Maldives sits along crucial sea lines
    of communication. A highly dispersed population spread across 200
    islands and an immense exclusive economic zone (twice the size of
    California) make the Maldives vulnerable to transnational threats and
    illicit trafficking. The United States executed nascent security
    cooperation activities and engagements with the Maldives from 2015 to
    2018, and the PRC substantially increased economic and security
    investments during this time. The Solih Government is a strong
    supporter of upholding the international rules-based order and desires
    improved relations with the United States, especially related to
    addressing transnational crime. USINDOPACOM's areas of interest for
    engagement include counterterrorism, maritime domain awareness, IUU
    fishing, counternarcotics, and combatting human trafficking. In
    September 2020, we signed the ``Framework for United States Department
    of Defense-Maldives Ministry of Defense and Security Relationship''
    setting forth both countries' intent to deepen engagement and
    cooperation in support of maintaining peace and security in the Indian
    Ocean. The most significant United States-Maldives military interaction
    occurs during the Joint Combined Exchange Trainings that take place
    twice a year to enhance Maldives' ability to respond to terrorism.

          Nepal. The United States maintains a robust and growing
    relationship with Nepal's security apparatus. Internal unrest
    continues, owing in part to unresolved grievances from the 1996 to 2006
    Maoist insurgency. PRC influence is growing, with Nepal agreeing to
    become a member of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Also, natural
    disasters such as earthquakes, flooding, and melting glaciers threaten
    the livelihood of this democracy. USINDOPACOM orients our programs
    against these challenges. The Nepal Army continues to improve its
    institutions and professionalize its force. Through capacity-building
    programs from the DOD and USINDOPACOM, the Ministry of Defense,
    historically separate from the Army but now responsible for it, is
    growing its ability to lead and improve civil-military relations.
    USINDOPACOM's primary focus areas for engagement remain HA/DR capacity
    building, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and strengthening the military
    and civil security institutions. Nepal is the world's sixth-largest
    contributing nation to United Nations Peacekeeping, deploying over
    5,600 troops to 13 different missions. Nepal hosts an UN-certified
    international PKO training center, primarily funded by the State-DOD
    Global Peace Operations Initiative. In December 2019, the State
    Department delivered the first two C-146J Skytrucks to Nepal, a small,
    fix-winged cargo aircraft that immediately improved their HA/DR
    capacity. Nepal is partnered with the Utah National Guard under the
    State Partnership Program.
          Sri Lanka. Maintaining, and in certain areas expanding,
    military-to-military engagement with Sri Lanka will continue to be an
    area of USINDOPACOM focus. Sri Lanka shows a continued willingness to
    seek security cooperation with the United States; however, the
    bilateral defense relationship will encounter challenges, particularly
    given allegations of senior military officers' involvement in gross
    violations of human rights during the country's civil war. The United
    States must continue its defense cooperation with Sri Lanka and assist
    in professionalizing its military and further building its maritime
    security capacity. There is potential to increase collaboration with
    maritime and air forces on various issues, including counterterrorism,
    counter narcotics, human trafficking, HA/DR, and maritime domain
    awareness. The transfer of an excess United States Coast Guard cutter
    to Sri Lanka in August 2018 and additional platforms from the United
    States, Japan, and India, provides the Sri Lankan Navy greater
    capabilities to contribute to regional maritime domain awareness
    initiatives. Sri Lanka is partnered with the Montana National Guard in
    the State Partnership Program.
               modernize exercises, experimentation, & innovation
        Currently, the Joint Force lacks the training capacity to integrate
    Service recommended weapons and capabilities into a warfighting concept
    that deters the adversary and aligns positional advantage. U.S. Forces
    must be capable of fighting in highly contested environments against
    technologically advanced opponents while also preserving our freedom of
    action across all domains. We must continue to expand the capability of
    our ranges the same as we advance our platforms and weapons.
        NDAA-21's $2 million authorization for the Pacific Multi-Domain
    Test and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) clarifies the requirements
    for the development of the necessary, fully--instrumented, live-virtual
    training areas throughout the Indo-Pacific by networking the test and
    training ranges from the west coast of the United States, across the
    Pacific, to Japan and Australia.
        This capability begins the process to develop the training capacity
    to integrate Service recommended weapons and capabilities into a joint
    warfighting concept that deters the adversary and trains our most
    capable warfighting force while expanding the breadth and scale of
    experimentation.
        Many of the ranges in the Indo-Pacific have the potential for
    addressing USINDOPACOM's requirements:
          Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), Elmendorf,
    Alaska, U.S. Air Force--allows for all domain integration.
          Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands,
    Kauai, Hawaii, U.S. Navy--the world's largest instrumented multi-
    environmental range complex capable of supporting surface, subsurface,
    air, and space operations simultaneously.
          Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), Hawaii Island, Hawaii,
    U.S. Army--provides a quality joint/combined arms facility that
    supports company level live-fire and battalion level maneuver training.
    If we prioritize further investments here, PTA could support battalion-
    sized live-fire, brigade maneuver, and most importantly provide a
    training environment for a Division to synchronize joint and multi-
    domain effects.
          Kwajalein Ranges, Kwajalein Atoll, United States Army--
    provides missile and missile-interceptor development, space
    surveillance, and satellite tracking.
          Combined/Joint Military Training (CJMT) Commonwealth of
    Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), United States Marine Corps--would
    allow company size units to conduct training. We continue to work with
    key CNMI leaders to develop a way ahead.
        PDI also authorized $128 million in fiscal year 2021 for
    USINDOPACOM's Joint Exercise Program that will begin to transition into
    Operation Pacific Resolve--a series of coalition and joint exercises
    deliberately linked over time and space in the western Pacific to
    provide a persistent presence in the form of an Integrated Joint Force.
        Operational Pacific Resolve will provide the platform to integrate
    the existing ranges, training areas, and test facilitates to support a
    coherent Joint Exercise Program. This platform will generate force
    readiness, test emerging capabilities, and drive theater-appropriate
    requirements in a fully instrumented live-virtual training area.
    Special Enablers and Authorities.
          Building Partner Capacity (BPC) Authorities. USINDOPACOM
    relies on these authorities to support security cooperation initiatives
    or activities, such as counterterrorism and bolstering our partners'
    land, maritime, and air forces to resist coercion and protect their
    people's critical information. We also rely on State Department
    authorities such as FMF, IMET, and the Global Peace Operations
    Initiative (GPOI) to meet capacity-building requirements that promote
    the tenets of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
          Title 10, Section 333--Global Man, Train and Equip. In
    fiscal year 2021, USINDOPACOM received $254.6M for building partner
    capacity for our allies and partners. This amount accounted for
    approximately 26 percent of the total funding for global Title 10
    (Section 333) activities. While the United States is still the
    preferred partner of choice for the vast majority of countries, PRC's
    soft power will continue to negatively influence Indo-Pacific
    governments without additional direct investment. Congress' continued
    advocacy, support, assistance, and constructive oversight are critical
    for these tools to be used to their maximum potential.
          Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). MSI continues to be
    one of the most popular enablers with partner nations and is currently
    over prescribed based on the associated progress partner countries are
    now making. Security cooperation in the maritime domain remains one of
    our highest priorities. MSI is our primary tool for building
    partnership capacity with governments to advance our allies and
    partners' ability to sense a threat, share the information, and
    contribute to a coordinated interagency and sometimes multilateral
    responses.
          Joint Interagency Task Force--West (JIATF West).
    Transnational organized crime (TOC) has strategic implications for
    United States national interests and for our allies and partners. I am
    concerned about the destabilizing impact of organized crime, its impact
    on our Nation, and indications that China is using TOC to
    surreptitiously advance its agenda across the region and beyond. In
    response to the growing TOC threat in the Indo-Pacific, JIATF West has
    expanded its counter narcotic operations and activities and is well-
    positioned to carry out broader counter TOC activities. Through the
    Section 1022 authorities, JIATF West works with an interconnected
    network of U.S. and foreign partners to counter networks that traffic
    illicit drugs, goods, and commodities, to include precursor chemicals.
    However, I am concerned with the potential lapse of DOD's Section 1022
    authority, which will expire at the end of fiscal year 2022. This
    authority allows our counter-threat finance analysts at USINDOPACOM to
    continue helping our law enforcement partners disrupt the finances of
    terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations, including
    those that operate in Asia and the Pacific. Congress has provided
    annual extensions of the Section 1022 authority ever since it first
    provided the authority in the fiscal year 2004 NDAA.
          China's unwillingness to address the illicit trade and
    distribution of fentanyl into the United States represents a clear and
    present danger to our national security. JIATF West is now using new
    processes that analyze, illuminate, and identify threat networks for
    U.S. and foreign law enforcement for action. The drug trafficking and
    transnational crime supply routes pass through multiple countries in
    Southeast Asia and across the vast Oceania region before reaching
    destinations in Mexico and the United States. JIATF West is a vital
    instrument in aligning a significant interagency effort--not only to
    counter drugs--but to fine-tune our ability to disrupt transnational
    criminal networks that are inflicting immense harm on our country.
          Center for Excellence on Disaster Management (CFE-DM).
    USINDOPACOM works with other nations to build partnership capacity to
    engage where our unique military capabilities can help develop our
    partners' military capacity in the area of HA/DR. A U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID) Mission Civilian-Military Coordinator
    is paired with our Security Cooperation Officers to ensure security and
    development activities are aligned in each country they operate in.
    Infectious diseases like the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), Tuberculosis
    (the most significant global killer), Dengue Fever, and Measles are
    examples of growing threats to stability in the region. USINDOPACOM's
    efforts in health security promote the U.S. Government's commitment to
    the Global Health Security Agenda for promoting community health and
    capacity through numerous engagements and interactions.
          Natural & Man-made Disasters. The Indo-Pacific remains
    the most disaster-prone region in the world. More than 75 percent of
    the earth's volcanoes and 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the ``Ring
    of Fire'' surrounding the Pacific Basin. The U.N. estimates economic
    losses in the region due to disasters could exceed $160 billion
    annually by 2030. Other regional and global threats, including climate
    change, pandemics, and IUU fishing, further threaten our precious
    shared natural environments and economic sustainability. Many countries
    across the region still lack sufficient capability and capacity to
    manage large-scale disasters; however, some have made steady progress
    building capacity to deal with small-scale events. USAID leads federal
    responses to international disasters and preparedness and mitigation
    efforts. A key element of USINDOPACOM's global engagement strategy in
    the region, through the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management
    and Humanitarian Assistance, is building capacity with our allies' and
    partners' militaries to improve their resilience capability to conduct
    their HA/DR.
          Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Program. USINDOPACOM is
    grateful for Congress' continued support for WPS programming, and
    USINDOPACOM remains committed to integrating WPS goals into
    USINDOPACOM's framework for security cooperation. From conflict
    prevention, stabilization, peacekeeping, to HA/DR, WPS is a unique
    smart power asset that advances a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. In
    support of the DOD's WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan,
    USINDOPACOM's Office of WPS promotes a gender perspective across our
    theater plans, programs, and policies to develop security strategies
    inclusive of the entire population. WPS builds resilience capacity,
    particularly through civil-military disaster response planning,
    coordination, and response. USINDOPACOM and partner nations highlight
    the significance of a gendered security approach to both steady state
    and emergency operations through programs such as the Women's
    Mentorship Program and the Rural Women Changemakers Program. These
    programs emphasize the unique protection needs of women, children, and
    other vulnerable populations but also underscore women's distinctive
    contributions to strengthening disaster preparedness and response.
    Furthermore, USINDOPACOM continues to engage with our Pacific Island
    Nation Partners through WPS and recently held a virtual summit focused
    on the nexus of gender, climate, and disaster risk and resilience
    through a Pacific lens. WPS promotes the values and norms desired by
    all people: dignity, human rights, and equality under the law. The
    meaningful inclusion of women in peace processes has led to longer
    lasting peace agreements, and factoring the perspectives and needs of
    an entire population into INDOPACOM's security cooperation framework
    ensures a sustainable and practical approach to achieving lasting
    security outcomes.
          COVID-19 and Infectious Disease Response. Natural and
    man-made disasters do not recognize national boundaries, as evidenced
    by the measles outbreak in Samoa, an outbreak of Dengue Fever in the
    Freely Associated States in 2020, and the global COVID-19 pandemic.
    These events remind us how interconnected and dependent the world is
    and the need to work together to solve some of our most challenging
    humanitarian problems.
        We continue to carefully evaluate all operations, exercises, and
    training events to ensure we can safeguard our personnel, maintain the
    joint force's readiness, and conduct our defense support to civilian
    agencies and foreign humanitarian assistance missions. The proactive
    actions of the USFK and USFJ commanders' led to the mitigation of risks
    commensurate to their circumstance. Our forward-deployed personnel work
    closely with national and local governments to coordinate definitive,
    enforceable actions to combat the Coronavirus spread. Within the
    Department and across the Department, we have taken many far-reaching
    measures to slow the virus's spread by closing schools, restaurants,
    and on-base businesses. We implemented preventive measures to restrict
    the virus's spread with a telework program and flex schedules, modified
    meeting protocols, and increased sanitation in communal areas. We have
    also implemented aggressive quarantine measures that range from
    individual Restriction of Movement procedures to hospitalization in a
    local treatment facility if a servicemember tests positive. To date,
    our forward stationed troops in Korea and Japan are maintaining
    appropriate levels of readiness.
        This is an unprecedented effort, and we remain flexible to meet the
    evolving challenges the spread of this virus presents. Lab-testing was
    established in Tripler Army Community Hospital (Hawaii), Brian Allgood
    Community Hospital (South Korea), United States Naval Hospital (Japan),
    and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Science (Thailand).
    We will continue to proactively mitigate the negative impacts of this
    and all future cases.
        The COVID-19 outbreak is a staunch reminder a ready medical force
    should not be exclusively designed to manage traumatic injuries;
    indeed, even in armed conflict, disease, and non-battle injuries still
    comprise the most significant number of casualties.
                           key adversarial challenges
        As we pursue a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, we face significant
    challenges from four key adversaries. The PRC represents our greatest
    strategic threat. Its rapidly advancing capabilities and increasingly
    competitive posture underscore its drive to become a regionally
    dominant, globally influential power. Beijing is growing increasingly
    confident, and PRC leaders have demonstrated a willingness to accept
    friction to pursue a more expansive set of political, economic, and
    security interests. This growing assertiveness is particularly acute
    concerning sovereignty disputes, as Beijing seeks to steadily and
    incrementally shift the regional status quo to their advantage.
        The United States' other great power competitor, Russia, also seeks
    to assert itself as a significant military, economic, and diplomatic
    power in the Indo-Pacific Region. Moscow pursues broad regional
    engagement, including military engagement, to advance its strategic
    interests and oppose, challenge, and thwart United States and allied
    interests.
        Meanwhile, until the nuclear situation is resolved on the Korean
    Peninsula, North Korea will remain our most immediate threat. Pyongyang
    continues to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction and asymmetric
    capabilities-- including nuclear weapons and associated delivery
    systems, as well as advanced cyber operations--that threaten our allies
    and the United States Homeland.
        Finally, the regional threat from terrorism and violent extremism
    continues to evolve with global conditions. Global networks such as the
    Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) inspire attacks motivated by
    ISIS' ideology or tactics remain a significant concern.
        People's Republic of China. The PRC is pursuing rapid,
    comprehensive military modernization across land, sea, air, space,
    cyber, and information domains, with a clear focus on systems intended
    to expand its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) envelope across the
    region and enhance the country's force projection and strategic
    deterrence. This far-reaching strategy aligns with the stated goals for
    People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization, which PRC leaders remain
    highly resolved to achieve. In October, Beijing announced it would seek
    to accelerate military modernization initiatives in time for the PLA's
    100th anniversary in 2027, advancing the PRC's progress toward its
    previously-stated milestones of completing military modernization by
    2035 and transforming the PLA into a ``world-class'' military by the
    end of 2049. The PLA is pursuing several initiatives toward this end,
    including developing highly capable, advanced weapons systems,
    enhancing its training and exercise program's scope and complexity, and
    expanding the breadth of its operational space across the Region.
        PLA Modernization. The PRC focuses particular attention on PLA Navy
    (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) modernization, which it sees as key to
    projecting power and achieving great power status. The PRC maintains
    the world's largest naval force, which has tripled in size over the
    past two decades. The PLAN commissioned more than 25 major ships in
    2020 alone, including combatants, amphibious warfare ships, and two
    nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
        The addition of these new platforms--which include two new classes
    of modern warships, the RENHAI guided-missile cruiser, and the LUYANG
    III MOD guided-missile destroyer--provides the PLAN greater
    maneuverability and flexibility to perform a diverse set of missions,
    ranging from littoral warfare to far-seas operations. Meanwhile, the
    PLA has operationally fielded its first 5th generation stealth fighter,
    the J-20. It is advancing the development of its first aerial-
    refuelable bomber, the H-6N, which will complete the country's nuclear
    triad's final leg. The PLAAF's Y-20 heavy-lift transport aircraft also
    conducted its first overseas missions in 2020, advancing the PLA's
    ability to quickly deploy forces and sustain operations across multiple
    fronts.
        PLA Long Range Weapons Development. The PRC is simultaneously
    developing several modern, long-range weapons intended to strengthen
    the PLA's standoff precision strike and nuclear deterrence and
    counterattack capabilities. The PRC is pursuing a range of advanced
    weaponry, including electromagnetic railguns, hypersonic glide
    vehicles, and land-attack and anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles, and
    the PLA Rocket Force conducts more ballistic missile live-fires every
    year than the rest of the world combined. The PRC is also expanding and
    maturing its space and counterspace programs. Beijing continues to grow
    its space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
    constellation and is developing reusable launch vehicle and heavy space
    lift capabilities that facilitate the insertion of more and larger
    satellites into orbit. The PLA is also pursuing counter-space
    technologies such as satellite jammers and directed-energy and direct-
    ascent kinetic weapons. Significantly, the PRC's Beidou-3 global
    satellite system reached full operational capability in June 2020,
    providing the PLA an indigenous system for global positioning,
    navigation, and timing coverage. Collectively, these developments--
    particularly as they reduce the PRC's reliance on the United States'
    space-based infrastructure--facilitate the militarization of space and
    increase the threat that the PRC will employ counter-space weapons that
    deny the U.S. and allied access to space during a conflict or crisis.
        PLA Training and Exercises. Notably, the PRC is not merely
    developing advanced weapons systems but is increasingly employing them
    in training and exercise scenarios to hone PLA warfighting skills and
    send an unmistakable message to regional and global audiences. In
    August 2020 for example, the PRC conducted coordinated DF-21D missile
    launches into the South China Sea. These mid-range, anti-ship ballistic
    missiles are capable of attacking aircraft carriers in the western
    Pacific, and their employment during a large-scale PLA exercise
    demonstrates the PLA's focus on countering any potential third-party
    intervention during a regional crisis. Likewise, the PLA conducts joint
    amphibious landing and maritime strike training to simulate a Taiwan
    invasion scenario and performs large-force maneuvers to demonstrate its
    ability to intervene in a Korean peninsula crisis. Through complex,
    realistic training and exercises that emphasize joint tactics and
    incorporate advanced technologies, the PLA continues to refine
    organizational and process changes initiated as part of 2015's sweeping
    reforms. These reforms compensate for the lack of recent combat
    experience, both critical steps as the PLA prepares for modern warfare.
        PRC Threats in the Region. The PRC has adopted an increasingly
    assertive military posture to exert pressure and expand its influence
    across the region. This is particularly stark concerning Taiwan. Over
    the past year, Beijing has pursued a coordinated campaign of
    diplomatic, informational, economic, and--increasingly--military tools
    to isolate Taipei from the international community and if necessary,
    compel unification with the PRC. Throughout 2020 the PLA has amplified
    its force posturing near and around Taiwan, to include using H-6
    bombers to circumnavigate the island and conduct Taiwan Strait
    centerline crossings and flying military aircraft into Taiwan's air
    defense identification zone (ADIZ) at the highest rate in nearly 25
    years. Over the past 2 years, the PRC has incorporated highly-
    publicized amphibious assault training into national-level exercises,
    almost certainly to exert pressure and signal resolve.
        Beijing's authoritative messaging has also grown increasingly
    confrontational and has linked the PLA's military activities near the
    Taiwan Strait to ``separatist'' activities in Taiwan. On the diplomatic
    front, Beijing continues to impede Taiwan's meaningful participation in
    international organizations. In 2020 for example, Taiwan was blocked
    from participating as an observer in the annual World Health Assembly
    despite its success in managing the COVID pandemic. Such consistent
    employment of pressure tactics undermines the Chinese Communist Party
    claims that it desires a peaceful unification with Taiwan.
        Hong Kong experienced a significant decline in autonomy following
    the PRC's imposition of the Hong Kong National Security Law in June
    2020. At Beijing's behest, Hong Kong authorities used mass arrests to
    silence pro-democracy activists and curb further dissent by eroding the
    pro-democracy movement's political power, weakening Hong Kong's free
    press and promoting pro-Beijing education in Hong Kong's schools.
    Meanwhile, PRC security organizations have established an official
    presence in the city under the auspices of the Office for Safeguarding
    National Security, enabling Beijing to closely monitor Hong Kong
    residents and enforce the National Security Law. Through these heavy-
    handed efforts to impose authoritarian control over Hong Kong affairs,
    the PRC has demonstrated the hollowness of its ``one country, two
    systems'' model.
        The PRC's expansionary territorial ambitions are also on display
    along its western border, where the PLA has been engaged in a standoff
    with Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since May
    2020. The standoff was predicated by clashes over construction
    activities near the disputed border PLA ground maneuver and support
    elements subsequently forward-deployed roughly 50,000 soldiers along
    the LAC, leading to a counter-deployment by the Indian Army.
        The PLA has not yet withdrawn from several forward positions it
    seized following the initial clash, and the consequent escalation of
    tensions between the PRC and India has resulted in casualties on both
    sides. This large-scale PLA mobilization--which is particularly notable
    considering the elevation, terrain, and distance involved--has stoked
    regional concerns that the PRC will increasingly use force to achieve
    desired outcomes.
        The South China Sea (SCS) situation remains unsettled in light of
    the PRC's provocative behavior and expansive and unlawful maritime
    claims. The PRC continues to militarize the region, deploying new
    equipment to its artificial outposts in 2020 and using forward
    airfields to support a growing level of military operations by heavy
    transport, intelligence, and anti-submarine aircraft. The PLA also
    conducts large-scale exercises in the SCS with an emphasis on
    amphibious landing, joint fires, and maritime strike scenarios. PLA
    ships and aircraft maintain a consistent SCS presence and are augmented
    by an armada of China Coast Guard ships, fishing boats, and other para-
    military forces that serve as force multipliers. These actions--which
    are inconsistent with President Xi Jinping's and Defense Minister Wei
    Fenghe's assurances that the PRC would not militarize the SCS--threaten
    our allies and partners' autonomy, jeopardize freedoms of navigation,
    overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and compromise regional
    peace and stability.
        Meanwhile, the PRC continues to use intimidation to inhibit other
    claimant nations' access to offshore resources. Beijing maintains its
    excessive and unlawful maritime claims over a massive area in the SCS,
    contrary to international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea
    Convention. The PRC sought to further bolster its unlawful maritime
    claims last April, unilaterally renaming over 80 SCS geographic
    features and establishing two administrative districts with alleged
    jurisdiction over the region. The PRC is also attempting to solidify
    its claims by imposing domestic laws across the disputed waters of the
    SCS. In April, its Coast Guard led an eight-month campaign-- dubbed
    ``Blue Sea 2020''--that seized nearly 700 vessels for violations of PRC
    laws, and in early 2021, the PRC passed legislation that expanded the
    Coast Guard's legal authority to use force against foreign vessels and
    destroy other countries' economic structures in disputed areas.
    Moreover, PRC ships and aircraft continue to harass and disrupt other
    nations' commercial fishing and resource exploration and extraction
    activities, even when conducted in areas where China cannot assert a
    lawful maritime claim within the respective countries' exclusive
    economic zones (EEZs). The PRC's pursuit of excessive maritime claims
    at the expense of neighboring states' EEZ rights negatively affects the
    economies of Southeast Asian nations and threatens to weaken the
    effectiveness of international laws and norms.
        Beijing similarly seeks to advance its territorial ambitions in the
    East China Sea (ECS), and consistently uses its Air Force, Navy, and
    Coast Guard to press its sovereignty claims vis-a-vis the Japanese-
    administered Senkaku Islands, test Japanese and United States resolve,
    and ratchet up tensions in Northeast Asia. China Coast Guard vessels
    routinely enter the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands to assert
    PRC sovereignty, despite lacking international standing on the dispute.
    PRC ships conducted presence operations in the contiguous waters around
    the Senkakus for a record 333 days in 2020, an increase of nearly 20
    percent from 2019. In a reprise of its earlier SCS maneuvering, in June
    2020, Beijing unilaterally renamed 50 geographic features in the East
    China Sea, a number of which are near the Senkaku Islands. The PRC's
    simultaneous employment of military and administrative measures to
    pursue its ECS claims is indicative of its broader efforts to steadily
    and incrementally shift the regional status quo in Beijing's favor.
    Beijing is increasingly using all instruments of national power to
    fundamentally remake the rules-based international order into one more
    aligned with, and amenable to, the PRC. Its signature ``One Belt, One
    Road'' (OBOR) strategy, is predicated on building a global economic
    system that enforces PRC preferences and ideologies while eschewing
    transparency and internationally-accepted investment practices. Beijing
    utilizes loans, grants, and monetary gifts to establish economic
    dependence, corruptly capture elite allegiance, and in some cases,
    consolidate control. The PRC also leverages OBOR projects and economic
    pressure as part of a broader strategy to develop overseas PLA bases
    and support facilities; the naval base currently under redevelopment at
    Ream, Cambodia, is the latest example of the PRC's global basing
    ambitions.
        To foster a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the United States,
    alongside our allies and partners, must stand up to Beijing's coercive
    economic strategies while providing viable assistance and alternatives
    to borrowing countries.
        Russia is building a better, more capable force in its Far East
    that is increasingly active across the Indo-Pacific Region. Ongoing
    Russian Federation Navy improvements include new platforms with
    advanced weapons systems, and we expect the Russian Pacific Fleet will
    add its first Kalibr cruise missile-capable ships and submarines to its
    inventory in 2021, giving it substantially increased anti-ship
    capabilities and the ability to conduct long-range strikes against land
    targets for the first time. Russia is also modernizing its Eastern
    Military District capabilities with air defense and land-based anti-
    ship cruise missiles, advanced fighters, and upgraded bombers capable
    of delivering improved and longer-range strikes. These improvements are
    designed to restrict access to regions of the Pacific Ocean near
    Russia's coast, while simultaneously expanding Russia's ability to
    project power across the Region and into the Arctic.
        In the Arctic, Russia seeks to increase and routinize its presence
    through exercises and increasing military deployments. During Naval
    exercise Ocean Shield 2020, Russia tested its ability to defend the
    Eastern Arctic via amphibious landing training and a series of coastal
    defense cruise missile and artillery live-fire events. Russian
    strategic bombers regularly conduct long-range flights off the Alaskan
    coast and across Russia's northern periphery. In mid-2020, it flew for
    more than 25 hours in the most prolonged continuous bomber operation
    over the Arctic.
        By late 2020, Russia deployed MiG-31 fighters and associated
    infrastructure to Anadyr airfield in the far northeast, enabling a
    continuous air defense, alert, and duty posture in the Arctic. This
    dynamic military posture underscores Moscow's determination to
    establish itself as the preeminent Arctic power, capable of controlling
    foreign access to Arctic resources and transportation routes.
        Russia is pursuing military, political, and economic engagement
    across the Indo-Pacific Region, though the PRC is increasingly Russia's
    most important partner. This relationship has grown steadily closer
    since 2019, when the pair agreed to pursue a ``comprehensive strategic
    partnership for a new era.'' In late December, Presidents Putin and Xi
    reaffirmed their desire to maintain strong bilateral ties in 2021,
    which marks the 20th anniversary of the pair's ``Treaty of Good-
    Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.'' The PRC and Russia conducted
    a combined bomber patrol over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea in
    late 2020, representing the second such mission for the two countries,
    following an initial patrol in July 2019. In mid-2020, the PLA also
    participated in Russia's capstone strategic exercise for the third
    consecutive year, demonstrating both countries' commitment to messaging
    bilateral military ties despite COVID concerns. Notwithstanding these
    symbolic engagements, we have yet to see true integration between
    Russian and PLA elements. We have no evidence Moscow and Beijing seek
    to build an interoperable military capability, and both nations have
    stated publicly they do not intend to create a formal, mutual defense
    alliance. Instead, we expect Russia and the PRC to continue pursuing
    limited, coordinated military operations that support both nations'
    interests.
        North Korea poses a significant security risk to the United States
    and our partners in the Indo-Pacific Region. The country has taken no
    meaningful steps toward denuclearization, despite promising signs of
    de-escalation in 2018, and it continues to advance its strategic
    weapons program. Pyongyang maintains a diverse and growing missile
    inventory, and North Korea unveiled several new ballistic systems
    during military parades in late 2020 and early 2021, including two
    SLBMs and an ICBM. Meanwhile, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has re-
    adopted a bellicose posture toward the United States. In December 2019,
    Kim declared he was no longer bound by a self-imposed moratorium on
    nuclear and long-range missile tests. In early 2021 he characterized
    the United States as the North's biggest or principal enemy as he vowed
    to strengthen its nuclear arsenal. Kim also identified several new
    weapon modernization goals in early 2021, to include developing
    tactical nuclear weapons and hypersonic glide vehicles and improving
    the readiness and accuracy of North Korea's ICBMs. Pyongyang's missile
    research and development efforts, coupled with its ongoing pursuit of
    nuclear material and technology, are consistent with the regime's
    stated objective of being able to strike the United States Homeland.
        Kim Jong Un has historically shown a willingness to undertake
    provocative, escalatory behavior that foments persistent regional
    tensions. In 2020, Pyongyang increased its bellicose rhetoric and
    posturing by destroying the inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office and
    threatening further retaliation for perceived South Korean
    transgressions. North Korea pursued a more moderated approach later in
    the year as it diverted attention toward flood recovery and COVID
    mitigation efforts.
        Nonetheless, it continues to develop new--and upgrade existing--
    conventional weapons systems that threaten our regional partners'
    safety and security. At its October 2020 military parade, North Korea
    unveiled an anti-tank guided missile system, self-propelled artillery,
    a new SAM system and accompanying radar, and large-caliber rockets/
    missiles. Further, Kim continues to call for unilateral South Korean
    adherence to the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement--and has
    reiterated a reduction of United States-South Korean military ties as a
    precondition of improved inter-Korean engagement--while maintaining a
    provocative stance toward the South.
        In defiance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution
    (UNSCRs), North Korea continues to import refined petroleum through
    illicit ship-to-ship transfers and unreported direct deliveries by
    foreign-flagged vessels. USINDOPACOM supports UNSCR enforcement and
    works closely with our partners and allies to disrupt the illicit ship-
    to-ship transfers.
        Unfortunately, Pyongyang has been able to mitigate this effort's
    effects due to Beijing and Moscow's relatively lax sanctions
    enforcement. Pyongyang's sanctions-evasion strategy relies heavily on
    PRC shipping networks, and many of the illicit transfers occur in or
    near PRC territorial waters.
        Further, North Korea mitigates the effect of UN-imposed sanctions
    through a variety of other illicit evasion tactics. Pyongyang exports
    coal in contravention of U.N. prohibitions, and North Korean laborers
    continue to work around the world, including in the PRC and Russia--
    either illegally or through visa loopholes--beyond the December 2019
    repatriation deadline provided in UNSCR 2397. Additionally, malicious
    cyber activity remains a significant source of revenue for the regime.
    Through cyber-enabled financial theft, extortion campaigns, and
    cryptojacking--wherein North Korea uses compromised computing resources
    to mine digital currency--North Korea raises illicit revenue to support
    its weapons development programs.
        Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). The Islamic State of Iraq
    and Syria (ISIS) remains the most active and deadliest terrorist threat
    in the region, with branches in the Philippines and India and networks
    of supporters in Indonesia, Maldives, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Sri
    Lanka. The group's Philippines-based branch, ISIS East Asia, has
    conducted several high-profile attacks in recent years, including
    August 2020 twin suicide bombings in Jolo that killed at least 15
    people. However, the group lacks the operational capability to plan
    sophisticated attacks, and its
        loss of key leaders caused it setbacks in 2020. Notably, these
    disparate ISIS and ISIS-inspired groups are not cohesive; they do not
    collaborate or fall under the same command and control structure. They
    lack substantial connections to the ISIS core in Iraq and Syria.
    Although ISIS is the most pervasive VEO in the region, al Qaeda (A.Q.)
    has historical ties to and followers in several countries. However, the
    group's priorities remain concentrated in Afghanistan, and regional
    A.Q. supporters mostly refrain from operational planning due to limited
    capabilities and a focus on facilitation and recruitment activities.
    Local groups--such as Indonesia-based Jemaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) and
    Jemaah Islamiyah (J.I.), who are aligned to ISIS and A.Q.,
    respectively--continue to operate in the region, but pose a limited
    threat to United States interests.
        However, self-radicalized, ISIS- or AQ-inspired extremists remain a
    cause for concern.
        Meanwhile, regional counterterrorism (CT) capabilities continue to
    improve. Several countries have modernized their CT legislation,
    empowering law enforcement to conduct more arrests that lead to
    convictions. Additionally, in places like the Philippines, host-nation
    security forces have maintained consistent pressure on extremist
    networks, further degrading the groups and disrupting planning and
    attacks. Looking ahead, regional cooperation initiatives, such as the
    Singapore-based Counterterrorism Information Facility (CTIF), will be
    critically important to lessening the threat from violent extremism on
    a multilateral basis.
                          conclusions and implications
        The greatest danger for the United States is the erosion of
    conventional deterrence. Without a valid and convincing conventional
    deterrent, the PRC will be emboldened to take action in the region to
    supplant United States interests. As the military balance in the Indo-
    Pacific becomes more unfavorable to the United States, we are
    accumulating additional risk that may embolden our adversaries and
    competitors to attempt unilaterally changing the status quo.
        USINDOPACOM's focus is to ensure access, freedom of maneuver, and
    our ability to project power in the shared domains, which enables
    USINDOPACOM to deter and deny our adversaries' and competitors' ability
    to engage in acts of aggression, coercion, or other malign behavior
    towards our allies and partners along the First Island Chain.
    Ultimately, the steps we take must convince our adversaries and
    competitors they simply cannot achieve their objectives with force.
        PDI provides a pragmatic and economically viable approach for
    implementing a deterrence strategy for defending U.S interests in the
    Indo-Pacific while mitigating risk and avoiding escalation. Funding
    levels in PDI for fiscal year 2021 equates to seven-tenths of 1 percent
    of the DOD's Total Obligating Authority in fiscal year 2021, and just
    two-thirds the amount spent on the European Defense Initiative in
    fiscal year 2020 ($5.9 billion).
        USINDOPACOM must field an integrated Joint Force with precision-
    strike networks along the First and Second Island Chains; an integrated
    air and missile defense in the Second Island Chain; and an enhanced
    force posture that provides the ability to preserve regional stability,
    and if needed, disperse and sustain combat operations for extended
    periods.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral. Before we begin
    questions let me remind everyone how we will proceed with
    remote participants. Since it is impossible to know exactly
    when our colleagues who will be joining via the computer
    arrive, we will not be following our standard early bird timing
    rule. Instead, we handle the order of questions by seniority,
    alternating sides, until we have gone through everyone. Once we
    reach the end, if there is anyone we missed we will start back
    at the top of the list and continue until everyone has had
    their turn.
        We will do the standard five-minute rounds. I ask my
    colleagues on the computers, and at their desk, to please keep
    an eye on the clock, which you should see on your screens.
        Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in the
    room or on the computer, I ask all colleagues to please mute
    your microphone when not speaking.
        Admiral, again, thank you for your service and thank you
    for your testimony. As you indicated, one of the principal
    initiatives of this Committee over the last several years was
    the PDI, and I would ask you, in your view, how is the
    Department, and in particular the services, responded to the
    establishment of PDI?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I
    am quite encouraged, as you know, the budget for fiscal year
    2022 alone is under review by the new administration, and I was
    quite encouraged by the Deputy Secretary of Defense's memo of
    two weeks ago, where she articulated that the PDI was
    absolutely a priority that would be addressed during the budget
    review.
        I think the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, funded in fiscal
    year 2021 for about $2.2 billion, was a good first start. I
    recognize that the Committee has put a cap of $5.5 billion on
    the fund going forward. I understand from the draft budgets
    that there is certainly recognition of the funds that need to
    go into PDI. I have been encouraged by much of the draft
    material I have seen, but there is a long way to go before the
    budget is finalized, and we'll continue to engage with the
    Department to see it through.
        Chairman Reed. Let me shift focus. How have our allies and
    partners responded to PDI?
        Admiral Davidson. I think quite positively. Our allies and
    partners in the region are looking for the surety that the
    United States is a reliable partner in the region and is here
    to stay. The investments that we make specifically towards the
    PDI will be recognized, and I think are being recognized, at
    least as we have talked about them, in their own advances and
    their own defense budgets, where you see Japan, Korea, and
    Australia, for example, all increasing their defense budgets.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Admiral. In your
    independent assessment, you suggested a $4.7 billion Federal
    funding level. Would that be sufficient for all your needs?
        Admiral Davidson. As we have articulated for fiscal year
    2022, sir, if that was to be fully resourced it would assess
    our needs to put in place the deterrent posture that I am
    advocating for.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. One of the big
    challenges, not just in the Pacific but across the military
    services is joint capabilities, particularly secure and
    uninterrupted communication. I do not think it takes a lot of
    expertise to understand that the first wave of assault will
    probably be cyberattacks on communications and other sensitive
    instruments. We have problems getting our services jointly
    connected, and you can allude to them, but our greatest
    comparative advantage in the Pacific is our allies, and so not
    only do we have to solve the problem of joint communications
    with our forces, we have to extend that to our allies. If we
    do, that investment, I think, would probably be the most
    fundamental one we could make, because a fully integrated force
    that can fight together is probably the greatest deterrent in
    the Pacific.
        Can you comment on that, sir?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. Indeed, I agree. One
    of the things that we have advocated for in the PDI and our
    1251 assessment that we submitted last week is the need for a
    mission partner environment, which is information technology
    that is available to us today, that extended to our allies and
    partners in the region would give us confidence in the
    cybersecurity of all those systems and the resiliency against
    attack, and it would greatly enhance our ability to plan, our
    ability to collaborate in operations and planning, certainly in
    peace time but then in crisis and conflict as well.
        Chairman Reed. Is that your number one priority?
        Admiral Davidson. After the defense of Guam, Mission
    Partner Environment (MPE), and then advancement for our ranges,
    absolutely, sir. Those are the three big requirements I have
    for this fiscal year.
        Chairman Reed. Just a final question and a quick response.
    Most of our relationships, going back several decades, have
    been bilateral in the Pacific, and we have to move to a
    multilateral approach. Is there any progress in that direction?
        Admiral Davidson. I am quite encouraged by the potential
    power of an organization like the Quad might bring. In my view,
    India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, that is a
    diamond of democracies that could bring so much more, not only
    to the region but to the globe, not in terms of security alone,
    but in terms of how we might approach the global economy,
    critical technologies like telecommunications and 5G,
    collaboration on the international order. Just much to be done
    diplomatically and economically, and I have great hope that our
    ministerial-level meetings with the Quad, as it is known and
    returned, will build into something much bigger for the sake of
    the globe.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Senator
    Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, and at this, Mr.
    Chairman, I want to enter into the record three unclassified
    documents which amount to Appendix 1 of the 1251 report.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Wicker. Basically, Admiral, we talked about this
    earlier, it shows, in an unclassified way, the balance between
    the communist Chinese and the United States in 1999, currently,
    and projected for 2025, four short years from now. With regard
    to the projected 2025, it shows that at that point, China will
    have three aircraft carriers to our one in the region. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. With regard to amphibious assault ships, it
    is projected in 2025 that they will have six to our two.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Then with regard to modern multi-warfare
    combatant ships, 54 to our 6. Is that correct?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. What is the significance of that last
    figure, Admiral?
        Admiral Davidson. Really, the three charts work together,
    Senator, one to show the change in capability and capacity that
    the Chinese have undertaken during the course of the 21st
    century, and the relatively static nature of our own forward-
    positioned forces. As I described, our effort to do a
    deterrence, to sustain a deterrence posture in the region is so
    important on our ability to respond in time, and without
    question, you know, as an old novel in the 1970s used to say,
    the importance of United States presence forward is incredibly
    important. Perfect speed is being there. It is to show that if
    we do not make changes in our posture forward, it will
    demonstrate that the Chinese have much greater capacity than we
    have.
        Senator Wicker. Now let's look at it on a little brighter
    side. If you take everything projected that our allies in the
    area will have, and also you consider what we have in Alaska,
    which is not west of the International Date Line but it is
    still fairly close, can you tell us what that does, say, to the
    amphibious assault ships, which is projected to be six Chinese
    and two for us?
        Admiral Davidson. Certainly that gap closes with us and the
    Japanese, with our ambition, but the important factor here is
    time. It takes almost 3 weeks to respond from the West Coast of
    the United States and 17 days to respond from Alaska, to get
    all the way to the first island chain and to conduct operations
    within the second island chain.
        Senator Wicker. Now----
        Admiral Davidson. So--go ahead, sir.
        Senator Wicker. No, go ahead.
        Admiral Davidson. But clearly, Japan brings amphibious
    capability. They have combatant capability, fighter aircraft,
    maritime patrol aircraft. To me, the Japanese are the number
    one ally in the region and they are critically important to the
    security of the region as well.
        Senator Wicker. Can you supply us then with another map,
    taking those considerations that I mentioned into account?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
        Senator Wicker. You will do that for the record?
        Now the Chinese are projecting a 6.8 percent defense budget
    increase for the next fiscal year. Is that correct?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. We are not prepared to match that, are we?
        Admiral Davidson. Not from what I have heard so far, sir.
        Senator Wicker. So we are going to have to spend our money
    smarter.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wicker. I am afraid to get what you say you need in
    the PDI, we are going to have to take money from somewhere else
    in the defense budget, at this point. Is that correct? Is that
    your assessment?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. The way the PDI is constructed,
    it will have to come out of the base budget, yes.
        Senator Wicker. With regard to the PDI, I think you are
    telling us there are three things that are yet unfunded in the
    budget plan. Is that correct?
        Admiral Davidson. Again, sir, the budget is not final, it
    is undergoing a review, but I am certainly advocating for Aegis
    Ashore in Guam, the mission partner environment as well as the
    Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC)--the Pacific Missile--excuse
    me, the Pacific Range improvements that I seek for our
    structure in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and so forth.
        Senator Wicker. In a nutshell, how do you feel about our
    ability, right now, to defend Taiwan?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, sir, as I articulated in my opening
    comments, I think our conventional deterrent is actually
    eroding in the region, and it is because of the vast advances,
    on the charts that you were just looking at, that the Chinese
    have undertaken in both terms of capacity over the last 20
    years, and then in the next few years, the improvements they
    will make in their capabilities as well. We need to work more
    forthrightly.
        We have described, in that 1251 assessment that you
    referenced, which is reflective of our regaining advantage
    brief, that improvements in capability, our joint lethality out
    there, enhancements in our design and posture, where we are,
    our ability to operate from more dispersed places, a
    strengthened, allied and partnered network, and improvements in
    our exercises, experimentation, and innovation will make vast
    improvements for really less than 1 percent of the defense
    budget, going forward, and help regain the advantage for us,
    put that conventional deterrent in the field, and prevent
    Chinese designs on its neighbors.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Now, via Webex,
    Senator Shaheen is recognized.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully you can
    hear me at this point.
        Chairman Reed. We can hear you, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Great. Admiral Davidson, thank you for
    your testimony this morning and for your amazing service to the
    country.
        I would like to change the topic a little bit and talk
    about information and the challenges that information warfare
    presents. In Europe, disinformation, cyber hacking has been so
    important in Russia's ability to make inroads that North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has developed a center to
    respond to that.
        Can you talk about what you are seeing in the Indo-Pacific
    region with respect to cyber warfare and disinformation, from
    both Russia and China, and how INDOPACOM is responding to that?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much for that question,
    Senator. Without question, China has a vast disinformation
    machine. They use both regular media and social media, and have
    nearly a million people in their propaganda machine, to
    undermine United States interests, to capture the narrative to
    their own benefit, and to, as I mentioned in my opening
    remarks, you know, corrupt the environment in a way that
    creates doubt amongst our allies and partners in the
    reliability of the United States.
        Russia, in the region, acts much more like a spoiler. As
    opposed to putting forth their own vision, they look to deny
    the visions of others, and are very active as well, especially
    in the diplomatic space but in social media. We see the same
    kind of effects that, you know, the rest of the globe has seen
    from the Russian machine.
        In terms of our INDOPACOM capability and return, you know,
    we are highly dependent on what is a military function, the
    Military Information Support Operation (MISO) operations. We
    are engaged deeply with the State Department on the kind of
    messaging that would reinforce what the United States does in
    the region, and as opposed to providing disinformation, would
    highlight the ills that others have in the region. I think
    that's supportive of the kind of normalized information needs
    that any nation has. Back to you.
        Senator Shaheen. So as you are talking about the effort
    that is underway, do we need to do more? Should there be more
    collaboration with the State Department? You and Senator Reed
    discussed the Quad as being one of the multilateral potential
    institutions that could respond to particularly the Chinese
    threat. Is this something that the Quad should take up in a
    major way, as we look at the threats? Because as you describe
    it, our threats are not just from conventional weapons. They
    are also from that cyber warfare and disinformation space.
        Admiral Davidson. To your point, Senator, you know,
    disinformation is part of the new geostrategic fabric that is
    making the competition so difficult. So a return of capability,
    to the State Department primarily, but certainly to the
    interagency, and what it's able to message across the globe I
    think is critically important. It has immense power, just as a
    historical example, back during the Cold War. I am not trying
    to imply that this is--and I don't want you to infer that this
    is a Cold War advocacy again. But truth, as it moves around the
    globe, is critically important in everything we do and should
    be part of this competition that is being articulated from the
    White House. Back to you.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I am out of
    time. But thank you also to INDOPACOM for your support for the
    Women, Peace, and Security Act. I hope we will hear more about
    next steps in that area.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Let me recognize
    Senator Fischer via Webex.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Admiral, for your dedicated service to this country and your
    constant vigilance in defending our security and keeping us
    safe.
        Last year, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee authorized an
    additional $77 million to begin fielding a persistent air and
    missile defense on Guam. Unfortunately, this funding was
    removed in conference and replaced with language requiring the
    Department to study the issue. Can you walk us through the need
    for this system?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. I
    am a key advocate for persistent, fixed, 360-degree air and
    missile defense that would be capable of meeting cruise missile
    threats, ballistic missile threats, certainly anything to be a
    cruise missile launched from a bomber, from the land, from the
    sea, and from the air in the region. The structure that is out
    there right now, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD) radar, is not capable of meeting the current trajectory
    of threats from China, as I have articulated, nor the size of
    those raids. A persistent capability, given what we are
    observing in the theater, advancements in Chinese capability,
    are critically important, and it must be delivered in a 360-
    degree fashion to protect from the kind of activities we are
    seeing China conduct, which is circumnavigations of Guam, the
    Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana, et cetera.
        Most importantly, we all have to understand, Guam is a
    United States territory. We have 170,000 United States citizens
    living on Guam. Their defense is homeland defense. We have
    21,000 U.S. service men and women and DOD employees as well,
    plus their families. It is a deep-water strategic port, major
    fuel stores, munitions stores, command and control. It is a
    major power projection airfield for us in the region. It has
    been evidenced, by me, and displayed by the Chinese, in a
    propaganda video of their own bomber forces attacking Andersen
    Air Force Base on Guam.
        Guam is a target today. It needs to be defended and it
    needs to be prepared for the threats that will come in the
    future, because it is clear to me that Guam is not just a place
    that we believe that we could fight from, as we have for many
    decades. We are going to have to fight for it in order to be
    able to do that.
        Senator Fischer. We've already developed systems that can
    meet this need. Is that right? We are not talking about any
    kind of new development program here, are we?
        Admiral Davidson. In partnership with the Missile Defense
    Agency, we believe that the Aegis Ashore system, as is being
    put to sea right now, and has been constructed previously in
    Romania and Poland, delivers the kind of capabilities that
    would meet the threat that is extant here, by mid-decade, and
    will help us pace the threat into the future. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. We always talk about missile defenses as
    having a deterrence by denial effect. Do you see that applying
    here, and would this make the conflict less likely by
    undermining the adversary's confidence that they could achieve
    their goals?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. We have to demonstrate that
    any ambition that China might have, and any threat it might put
    forth towards Guam, would come at cost, and that would be
    really by the collection of not only this defensive capability,
    which I think is so critical because it prevents a cheap shot,
    but also the rest of the capabilities that I have described in
    the 1251 assessment, which includes some offensive
    capabilities, to let China know that the costs of what they
    seek to do are too high and to give them doubt in their
    success.
        Senator Fischer. Admiral Davidson, in 2018 you testified,
    quote, that ``PACOM only has about a quarter of the
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) it needs
    in the area of responsibility (AOR)''. Does that remain the
    case today? I can say that in visiting with all of our
    combatant commanders there is never enough ISR to meet the
    needs in your area. Is that true? Can you compare what we have
    to the investments that China is making in their ISR?
        Admiral Davidson. We have a continued need for ISR to
    monitor the day-to-day activities in the region, certainly, but
    also to understand Chinese designs in the region, what they are
    doing in the training sphere, and things like that. My ISR
    posture has improved slightly since 2018. There has been some
    action taken in just the last few months to restore some of
    that ISR capability. But if Indo-Pacific Command is indeed the
    priority theater, we need to continue to look at our total
    intelligence apparatus--signals intelligence, communications
    intelligence, our imagery that comes from space, for airborne
    assets and all that we gather there--to make sure that we have
    the warning that is required to get our forces to respond,
    alert our allies and partners, and prevent any kind of Chinese
    external attack in the region.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for your
    service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Let me recognize
    Senator Gillibrand via Webex.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, the
    Department of Defense has recently outlined China's military
    strategy known as Military-Civil Fusion, aka Civil-Military
    Integration, to develop the PLA into a world-class military by
    2049. The 2019 DOD report on China stated that, quote, ``China
    uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-
    use technologies, including targeted foreign direct
    investments, cyber theft, in expectation of private Chinese
    nationals' access to these technologies, as well as harnessing
    its intelligence service, computer intrusions, and other
    illicit approaches.''
        Because these efforts by China will certainly affect
    business and people across the region, what would you recommend
    we work with, with our allies, to counter this strategy while
    maintaining the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you for your question, Senator. To
    your point, the Chinese Military-Civil Fusion approach, which
    is underpinned by Chinese law that says any state or commercial
    business enterprise with concerns in China must provide any
    information that the state seeks for its benefit. That has made
    for particularly, you know, complex global engagement and
    global economic scenario, I think, for not only the United
    States, but as you said, our allies and partners.
        It has been very important that, you know, laws like
    Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), the
    Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
    process that has been established in the United States, is
    meant to help deny that fusion within China. I know that many
    of our allies and partners in the region have begun to pass
    laws in that direction and are debating them as well.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, related, in last year's NDAA we
    included language requiring the DOD to look into better
    cooperation with our allies in the Pacific. Specifically, we
    recognized our cooperation is to, quote, ``enhance through more
    proactive planning and cooperation with allies and partners
    that capitalize on each country's comparative strengths.'' The
    study requires determining what comparative advantages our
    allies have and what barriers exist to fully realize them.
        So what barriers did you face in working with our allies,
    and what could Congress to do facilitate these relationships?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, one, there has to be not just an
    explanation from the security side but on the economic side as
    well, you know, complete clarity in what China's military-civil
    fusion threat does to partnered multinational companies and
    things like that, that might have a presence or subsidiaries in
    China. So I think there needs to be, you know, clear dialogue
    about that.
        Transparency and the kind of laws we have passed and the
    rationale for them, like CFIUS and FIRRMA, and we need to drive
    understanding with our allies and partners that this threat is
    real and that if we do not see change from our allies and
    partners that we may have to determine whether many of our
    technologies can be shared with them, to prevent their just
    outright conveyance to China alone.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. I also want to continue on
    this line of question from Senator Shaheen. As new technologies
    have been developed rapidly, and nontraditional threats such as
    COVID and climate change begin to bear greater relevance, it
    has been crucial that we are able to work in a proactive manner
    to coordinate and respond to their allies. What lessons would
    you say the COVID-19 pandemic has taught INDOPACOM about
    coordinating with allies in the face of emerging nontraditional
    and transnational threats? Further, do we balance our approach,
    or how do we balance our approach to these particular threats
    in contrast to the traditional ones that we face in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. I absolutely agree
    there's opportunity for deepened relationships with our allies
    and partners on transnational issues. This is a whole-of-
    government opportunity for us, because, you know, there are
    economic components of the government, law enforcement, health
    and human services, et cetera, when combined with some of the
    capabilities we can bring to deliver, add capacity in
    diagnosing and delivering vaccines, for example, collaborating
    with our allies and partners in the region for those nations in
    need is hugely powerful. I think there should be deepened
    relationships across the whole U.S. Government with their
    counterparts in these other countries.
        I am finding, just, you know, in the transnational threat
    alone, that some nations have legal means and relationships
    with countries that would be incredibly effective to help
    undermine things like Chinese corruption on the Belt and Road
    Initiative, for example. So deepening partnerships there with
    our allies and partners across our whole-of-government I think
    is a key part of the competition that we are all talking about.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
    Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Davidson, thank you for your
    appearance again here today. Thanks for your service to our
    Nation. I want to talk a little bit about the balance of power
    in the Western Pacific when it comes to missiles. For decades,
    the United States belonged to something called the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which
    prohibited us and Russia, the only two parties, from building
    ground-based, intermediate-range missiles, roughly speaking
    like 300 to 3,000 miles of range.
        China was never a party to this. That is why they have
    stockpiled thousands of these missiles that, as you have
    testified, can threaten not only our allies in places like
    Taiwan and Japan and South Korea, but also our own troops and
    citizens in places like Guam and other islands in the Western
    Pacific.
        We finally left the INF Treaty a couple of years back, in
    part because Russia was cheating on it for years, in part
    because of this imbalance of power. How important is it that
    the United States continues to build up our missile forces so
    that we can hold China, you know, in deterrence and at risk in
    the Western Pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. I think it is very important, Senator. I
    think a wider base of long-range precision fires, which are
    enabled by all our terrestrial forces, not just sea and air but
    by land forces as well, is critically important to stabilizing
    what is becoming a more unstable environment in the Western
    Pacific.
        I have been encouraged by the enthusiasm by the Army and
    the Marine Corps to embrace some of the capabilities that Navy
    and Air Force have already developed. I think that is a low-
    cost way to quick capability that can be fielded potentially in
    the region and I think we ought to stay after it.
        I say to people all the time, missile defense is the
    hardest thing we do, and if I am the manager of a baseball
    team, you know, I could have the best defenses in the world,
    but if I cannot score some runs I cannot win the game. We have
    got to have offensive capabilities that threaten--you know,
    that cause a potential adversary to think twice about any
    malign activities that they might take in the region,
    militarily, and that is where offensive fires come into play.
        Senator Cotton. To drive this home again, the importance of
    ground-based precision fires. The Navy and the Air Force have
    great capabilities, but you can only put so many missiles on a
    ship or on an aircraft. Ground-based fires allow you to build
    up a stockpile, the same way China has done on its mainland,
    where they have thousands of missiles aimed at Taiwan or Japan
    or Guam, and that is one reason why it is so important to
    continue to build up those ground-based fires. Is that correct?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, Senator. The U.S. fights as a joint
    force, and long-range precision fires delivered to the ground
    force I think are critically important to enhance the maneuver
    and positional advantage of U.S. forces in the theater.
        Senator Cotton. Let's turn from missiles to payloads. Do
    you agree with Admiral Richard at Strategic Command that China
    could triple or even quadruple its nuclear weapon stockpile in
    the years ahead?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator Cotton. Presumably, if they are going to build all
    those nuclear warheads they are also going to build the
    delivery systems for those warheads as well. Correct?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. They have quadrupled their
    nuclear capability since the turn of the century and they will
    at least double it during the course of this decade, and I have
    seen the same estimates that Admiral Richard is talking about.
        Senator Cotton. Whereas the United States, because we just
    gave a no-strings-attached extension to the New Strategic Army
    Reduction Treaty (START), is limited to 800 deployed nuclear
    weapons. So China, unconstrained by this treaty, if they triple
    or quadruple their stockpile, could possibly have nuclear
    overmatch against the United States before the end of this
    decade. Is that correct?
        Admiral Davidson. If they were to quadruple their
    stockpile, yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. When you combine the strategic forces of
    both Russia and China, then they certainly would have overmatch
    against the United States when it comes to our nuclear arsenal.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. It is very expensive and hard work to win
    an arms race, but it is much better to win an arms race than to
    lose a war.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
    Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that
    the thrust of this hearing and your testimony is to emphasize
    the ongoing and increasing threat and danger of Chinese
    military buildup and potential aggression. We have been
    talking, I guess, mainly about the conventional threats and
    nuclear threats, but recently the Chinese launched a
    cyberattack on this country. What should the American public
    know about that attack involving Microsoft, recently disclosed?
        Admiral Davidson. I am sorry. I will have to take that one
    for the record, sir. I have not had direct conversations with
    Microsoft about that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that China represents a
    threat in the cyber domain?
        Admiral Davidson. Oh, absolutely.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree also that what you just
    said about nuclear capacity applies to cyber as well, namely
    that defense is not enough. You need offense and you need to
    draw lines so that adversaries will know what they cannot do,
    lines they cannot cross, and offense is necessary to deter them
    from crossing those lines.
        Admiral Davidson. I absolutely agree, Senator. China is
    advancing its cyber capability in leaps and bounds. I do not
    think I could articulate it in a quantified manner like the
    discussion we just had with Senator Cotton. But they are vastly
    improving that cyber capabilities, and we are witnessing some
    of that malign activity amongst our own capabilities here in
    the country, as you implied.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you continue to believe, as you said
    in 2019, shifting to another domain, the undersea domain, that,
    quote, ``Continuing to build submarines is critically
    important,'' end quote, and, quote, ``It is our most
    significant advantage in all domains right now,'' end quote,
    referring to submarines.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. Our advantage in the undersea,
    our submarine force, absolutely. But also what we can do in
    what we call anti-submarine warfare to deny other nations use,
    and that is the use of maritime patrol aircraft, that is the
    kind of sonars and sensors we put on our surface ships, we have
    to absolutely sustain that advantage going forward.
        Senator Blumenthal. So you would strongly endorse, I hope,
    the continued construction of two Virginia-class submarines a
    year, and the continued development and construction of the
    Columbia-class as well?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. The Virginia-class, what is
    coming with the Virginia payload module, I think are critically
    important to continue U.S. deterrence in the theater, and there
    is no doubt that the strategic deterrent needs to be
    recapitalized, and the Columbia is the way to do that for our
    Ohio-class submarines.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. You know, I would like to
    turn to a nontraditional source of concern, first of all, the
    COVID pandemic. I understand that the ship, the USS Theodore
    Roosevelt has had several coronavirus cases recently, following
    the outbreak that occurred. Is that true? To what extent is
    COVID a continuing danger in your command?
        Admiral Davidson. Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, a few
    weeks ago the Theodore Roosevelt identified three positive
    cases out of their normal surveillance testing. Those three
    positive cases were sent ashore in Guam. There were some 40-odd
    close contacts that were in quarantine. They have continued to
    test negative in that time frame, and the ship remains at sea,
    and continues at sea. In the meantime, we have tested the whole
    of the crew and there are no other positive cases.
        Senator Blumenthal. So it is a relatively contained,
    isolated outbreak.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. Yeah, the three positive cases
    are off the ship and ashore at this point.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, and in the closing short
    time I have left, do you regard climate change as a security
    threat in the command that is under your control?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. It is something I hear about
    quite frequently from my peers, particularly in the Pacific
    Island chain, who can describe for you, during the course of
    their own lifetimes, you know, the changes that they observe
    and have observed in their island nations.
        Much of what we do at Indo-Pacific Command helps enable
    their ability to combat some of the ill effects that are
    immediately manifested, whether it is severe storm. We have an
    organization called the Center for Excellence in Disaster
    Management that helps train not only our military folks,
    certifying my own military folks to do disaster management, but
    we make it available to non-governmental organizations as well
    as other governments, and we do it virtually, we do it in
    person, we bring them to Hawaii, all kinds of methods. It is
    very important for us.
        Senator Blumenthal. I thank you for your testimony today
    and for your service to our Nation. I am not going to be able
    to follow up now on the climate change question but I will
    submit more for the record. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Admiral, for your service. You mentioned about deterrence
    eroding in the region, and in your testimony this morning in
    the classified session and then also in this focused on the
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative. That was a bipartisan initiative
    that came out of this Committee, actually. So I think most of
    the Members of this Committee, Democrats and Republicans, are
    certainly supportive.
        So is it your testimony today that you need full funding of
    that $4.6 billion as something that can help with regard to
    this eroding deterrence? Can you explain about that a little
    bit more?
        Admiral Davidson. I would say absolutely yes, sir. I think
    it fulfills what the law has asked for in the entablement of
    the PDI.
        Senator Sullivan. That was in last year's NDAA, so we all
    agreed to it.
        Admiral Davidson. In last year's NDAA, and meets the
    strategic vision that I have in the theater to present a
    conventional deterrent that would give China pause from any
    malign military activity that they would undergo against any of
    our allies and partners in the region.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I really appreciate that. If there
    was one kind of takeaway from this hearing, you have the Indo-
    Pacific Commander, the entire Armed Services Committee, the
    NDAA, all pushing for this. I certainly hope the Biden
    administration is focused on this hearing and recognizes that
    they should fully fund the PDI, which is what most of us wanted
    and what we all voted for last year when we passed the NDAA.
        Let me next talk about the issue of the force posture in
    the region. You know, I just started my second term here as a
    senator and I was asked, 6 years ago, by our former chairman of
    this Committee, Senator McCain, to really focus on this issue
    of force posture, which I have been doing a lot. I just got
    home from Alaska, so that is actually being out in the region,
    as you know, when I am home in the great state of Alaska.
        One of the things I have noticed is that our force posture
    seems to be somewhat, I would say, stale, when you look at
    where our forces are--Okinawa, Korea, Guam--because they have
    been there for so long, and we have this issue that you have
    talked about, first and second island chain, the
    vulnerabilities. What is the right mix as you look at dispersal
    of forces, wanting them to be there quickly, in the region, but
    also the vulnerabilities that you have, first, second island
    chain?
        I will give you an example. Alaska will soon have over 100
    fifth-generation fighters stationed there. If you have the
    right mix of tankers, those assets could be in, for example,
    the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait within hours, with the
    right tankers. How do you think about dispersal of forces and
    the different vulnerabilities that we have when it comes to
    force posture?
        Admiral Davidson. Thanks, Senator. I think about it much
    like I have described in the Regain the Advantage, that a more
    dispersed design and posture in the region is going to be
    required in order to achieve the positional advantages that we
    seek. That is done through permanently based forward-deployed
    forces--Japan, Korea, Guam, and elsewhere in the theater--and
    the use of contiguous United States-based forces, Hawaii and
    Alaska forces, that will rotate through the theater.
        That combination of rotating presence and permanent
    presence has to be robust enough in order buy us the time to
    deny any quick action going forward. That is a mix of
    capabilities, and certainly the fifth-gen fighters, I would
    tell you, are the backbone of any of our planning for a crisis
    forward in the theater, and would be needed at dispersed
    locations within the first and second island chain.
        But it also means maritime forces, it means ISR, you know,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces, things
    like that, that have to be made available as well.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask, you know, when I talk to
    officials, and I would love your view on this, our intel
    community, the common theme I hear with regard to China's
    actions under Xi Jinping's leadership is alarm. That is a
    phrase that is used a lot--alarm, and they point to things,
    just within the last year, the COVID outbreak and the non-
    cooperation that China has had with the rest of the world; the
    border conflict with India, and cyberattacks that were probably
    launched by China against India, major cyberattacks; an
    economic embargo against one of our most important allies in
    the region, Australia; crushing dissent in Hong Kong; very
    aggressive military actions in the Taiwan Strait, South China
    Sea; Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Do you agree these
    are alarming maneuvers? This is within the last year.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. What does this kind of do to your
    timeline if you are extrapolating out with regard to any
    potential conflict or timeline in the Taiwan Strait, when you
    look at how aggressive Xi Jinping's leadership has been?
        Admiral Davidson. I think our concerns are manifest here
    during this decade, not only on the development, the numbers
    of, you know, ships, aircraft, rockets, et cetera, that they
    have put in the field, but the way they are advancing those
    capabilities as well, in combination with everything that you
    just cited--Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and the Line of
    Actual Control, and the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
    I worry that they are accelerating their ambitions to supplant
    the United States, and our leadership role in the rules-based
    international order, which they have long said that they want
    to do that by 2050, I am worried about them moving that target
    closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then,
    and I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact,
    in the next 6 years.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me
    recognize Senator Hirono via Webex.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson,
    welcome. This is probably going to be the last time that you
    will be testifying before our Committee, so I want to add my
    thanks to you for your service, and, of course, we will miss
    you in Hawaii.
        Admiral Davidson, do you support Homeland Defense Radar-
    Hawaii as an important part of the region's layered missile
    defense system to protect Hawaii from long-range missiles fired
    from rogue states such as North Korea?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely, Senator. It raises the
    confidence of any employment of a ground-based interceptor, and
    will help as any advancement in North Korean capabilities might
    put forth. It is critically important to the overall defense of
    the country.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. You focused on two areas in your
    recent PDI report that, in my opinion, are vital to our
    national security strategy in the Indo-Pacific area. One,
    strengthening our allies and partners, and two, funding joint
    coalition military exercises and updating and networking our
    tests and training ranges in this area of responsibility,
    including two major training areas in Hawaii, the Pacific
    Missile Range Facility, or PMRF, and the Pohakuloa Training
    Area, PTA.
        I noticed that you significantly increased the requested
    amount from last year's PDI report to this year's report to
    strengthen our allies and partners over the next 5 years in the
    region, from over $300 million to about $2.8 billion. Can you
    discuss your rationale for this significant increase and what
    that additional funding is intended to do, or where will it go?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, you highlighted the key aspects,
    ma'am. It is to enhance and make improvements in our joint
    exercise program, and that is principally because not only the
    United States but our key allies and partners--Japan, Korea,
    Australia, as just three examples--are buying important
    capabilities that match ours--integrated air and missile
    defense, for example, fifth-generation fighters like the F-35.
    They are being actually delivered in the theater.
        We have got to advance our exercise program in a way that
    allows us to exercise those capabilities deliberately. That is
    going to require not only changes in our joint exercise
    program, and I will come back to that in a minute, but also
    changes in our range structures, to make sure that we can put
    forth the threats in a live, virtual, constructive format, that
    will stress the force and stress a coalition force, if it were
    to come about.
        But additionally, that joint exercise program needs to be
    improved to do precisely what Senator Sullivan was talking
    about, to help us put more robust forces quickly in the field,
    to test them under concepts like contested logistics, in which
    we might have our cyber connectivity restricted and things like
    that. We have really got to advance from what I view as kind of
    20th Century exercises into the 21st century capabilities and
    concerns we need to be worried about.
        Senator Hirono. I assume that some of the money that you
    are requesting to enhance or exercise capabilities will, of
    course, go to PMRF and PTA in Hawaii.
        News reports have indicated that around 15 percent of the
    persons involved in the recent riots at the Capitol had
    military experience, either currently or were on active duty,
    retired, or recently separated. Secretary Austin recently order
    a 60-day stand-down to address troubling reports of extremism
    in the ranks, and the DOJ IG is currently investigating violent
    extremism within the armed forces after myself and several of
    my colleagues sent a letter asking for action.
        As you finish over 35 years of service, Admiral Davidson,
    in your opinion, are there steps, other steps that the DOD
    should take to root out violent extremism in the ranks?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, I think certainly, Senator, the
    stand-down was intended just to be the first step on this.
    There is absolutely no place for extremism in the United States
    military.
        I can tell you, at my own headquarters, we have already
    conducted the stand-down. We came together not only to have the
    leadership discuss what our expectations are, which is, you
    know, well guided by DOD instruction alone, you know, beyond
    the oath, but also to bring in other experts. We even had the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Joint Terrorism Task
    Force come in to talk to us about the kind of behaviors we
    might see, as leaders and as peers, and as subordinates and
    others, that might indicate extremist behaviors. We also
    recommitted to our oaths, and then we broke down to small
    groups.
        We are going to have to continue to communicate on this
    with the force, to make sure that our expectations are well
    known. There is just absolutely no place for that in the United
    States military.
        Senator Hirono. I am considering legislation to create a
    standalone punitive article in the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice to address violent extremism in the ranks, and to send
    a message of deterrence that this kind of conduct will not be
    tolerated in the military. Do you think that this kind of
    legislation is warranted?
        Admiral Davidson. I think it should be certainly part of
    the discussion to examine. You know, I would have to defer to
    the Department, ma'am, about the approaches that we would take
    going forward.
        Senator Hirono. Yeah. I just want to note that there are
    certain entities such as the Oathkeepers who actively recruit
    from the military to join their extremist ranks.
        I think I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me recognize
    now Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Davidson,
    thank you for being here and for your years of service. Just a
    question, and I apologize. I have three hearings going on at
    the same time, so if someone has covered this it probably still
    bears repeating.
        Talking specifically about protection of U.S. troops and
    bases in Indo-Pacific and our low-density, high-demand
    rotational capabilities are what we are relying on today. So if
    China were to initiate a kinetic operation somewhere in the
    Indo-Pacific, do you believe the relatively short notice and
    the warning timelines would make it particularly either very
    difficult or virtually impossible to defend critical locations
    like Guam?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. One of the reasons that we have
    made a point of advocating for sufficient ISR--intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance--that buys us that warning in
    order to respond, is critically important. We have capacity
    needs there, and our war gaming has shown that if it is
    insufficient we cannot respond in time.
        Senator Tillis. In the INDOPACOM report, section 1251 of
    the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, you all state, ``The most important
    action the U.S. can take to increase joint forces' lethality is
    to introduce a 360-degree persistent and integrated air defense
    capability in Guam. Guam is our most crucial operating location
    in the Western Pacific and its defense remains the number one
    unfunded priority.'' I think you are requesting somewhere
    around $350 million for that purpose.
        Can you explain how China's missile arsenal threatens
    Taiwan and why Guam is so important to defend, and how a
    missile defense system permanently stationed in Guam, would
    help towards that end?
        Admiral Davidson. I think the most visible means that we
    have seen is China's own air force has put out a propaganda
    video showing their H-6 bomber force attacking Andersen Air
    Force Base at Guam, and distributed that quite publicly. We are
    seeing Chinese naval deployments of surface task groups and
    submarines that make circumnavigations of Guam and the
    Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and, of course, you
    know, we see the vast asymmetry, the very large ballistic
    missile force that China has.
        As one component of our deterrence strategy, but again, my
    number one priority, because it has been unfunded and I think
    critical to our needs, is a defensive system that would defend
    against all those threats. In our work with the Missile Defense
    Agency, only one system can do that, meet the threats as they
    will be evident in mid-century, and help us leap to the future
    as well, and that is an Aegis Ashore-like system there on Guam.
        You know, I am not Pollyanna-ish about this. It is not the
    sole solution. We had discussions about offense capabilities,
    earlier warning, the ability to disperse fighter aircraft--all
    that is critical components as well. But I have been very
    encouraged by the individual services' transformation
    approaches, what their support is in the theater, but one of
    the key shortcomings is not having this defensive system, and
    we need it going forward.
        Senator Tillis. Maybe in my time remaining you can talk a
    little bit about the need for permanently stationed forces in
    the region. Do you think it is adequate now? I think the answer
    is no, but what does it look like if we were at some level of
    critical mass with actually personnel west of the International
    Date Line?
        Admiral Davidson. Because so much dialogue would have to
    happen with allies and partners in the region, sir, although
    there is one modification in effect that would result in more
    troops, Marines, actually relocating from Japan to Guam and
    elsewhere, I am pretty satisfied with the permanent stationing
    of forces in the region right now.
        If situation were to avail us, I think more capabilities in
    Southeast Asia and South Asia would be a priority. But in the
    meantime, what is achievable is to help with dispersal
    locations and with the accommodation of rotational forces
    within U.S. territories and the freely associated states in the
    region, principally, as well as our key allies in the region.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Admiral Davidson,
    I want to echo Senator Hirono's comments. We will miss you. I
    have really enjoyed working with you, being on this Committee,
    and in your various capacities.
        You answered a number of great questions this morning in
    our classified briefing that my colleagues put on the table and
    so I am not going to repeat those.
        In your military judgment, would it be in the United
    States' security interest if we were to ratify the U.N.
    Conference on Law of the Sea?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. I am on record saying that that
    would be good for us. I think you would be hard-pressed to find
    a Navy admiral that's said otherwise.
        Senator Kaine. The convention would allow us to assert, for
    example, defensive claims in international tribunals to Chinese
    island-building or Russian activity in the Arctic, and it would
    also allow us to assert some offensive claims to, for example,
    mineral rights in the Arctic, that we cannot currently do. I
    would hope that the Committee might revisit whether we should
    finally do this, to try to gain a better footing in the
    INDOPACOM and elsewhere.
        Second, with respect to China and the competition with
    China, as much as they are worried about any innovation,
    weapons system that the United States is developing, wouldn't
    you say that in some way their greatest worry about the U.S. is
    the network of allies and alliances we have, in their region
    and elsewhere?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. I think the network of
    alliances, the partnerships that we have, not only in the
    region but across the globe, are hugely powerful, and the
    potential of deepening relationships strategic to defense
    partnership with a country like India, or in a multilateral
    formation like the Quad--India, United States, Japan, and
    Australia--I think is a key strategic opportunity for the
    United States, and those three other countries. But it could be
    so much more than just a security apparatus, and I think we
    ought to be thinking about it in terms of all the capabilities
    that it might help the globe with.
        Senator Kaine. It is interesting because I think China and
    Russia, though very different nations, both are very afraid of
    the United States' network of alliances, and they have not yet
    been able to cobble together the kinds of alliances that are
    based upon mutual regard and mutual work. You know, China uses
    debt diplomacy to get folks in hock to them, but that is not
    the same thing as a significant alliance, and Russia uses, you
    know, availability of natural gas in sort of the same way. But
    the networks of alliances, they just are not anywhere near
    where we are.
        So I hope as we are trying to maintain strategic match or
    overmatch in tactical weapons systems, we never lose sight of
    the fact that strengthening alliances is ultimately about the
    best guarantee we have against aggression by China.
        The last question I will ask you is this. Sometimes on this
    Committee, and in Congress generally, we get into a mindset
    where we think about the defense budget as very different than
    the non-defense budget, and on budgetary matters we assume that
    the sort of non-defense budget is not as critical in national
    security as the defense budget. I was struck by your testimony
    in the classified setting this morning--this is not classified.
    Again and again you said it is not just defense. If we are
    going to be strong in the INDOPACOM, vis-a-vis China, it has
    got to be defense, and diplomacy, and humanitarian aid, and
    trade, and economic aid. These are items that are not included
    in the defense budget but I gather you think they are every bit
    as important to maintaining a robust American presence and
    leadership in the INDOPACOM, they are as important as the
    defense budget.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. When I engage with any of the
    countries in the region, whether they are an ally or it is part
    of the partner network, their assessment of U.S. reliability is
    not based on the military presence alone. It is based on our
    interactions, diplomatically, in the information sphere, where
    we are economically, our foreign direct investment, our trade.
    All those elements is how the allies and partners want to
    engage with the United States and how they view our
    reliability.
        Indeed, to do a competition like we are talking about with
    China, it is going to take a whole-of-nation approach, not just
    a whole-of-government approach, and all of those elements come
    into play.
        Senator Kaine. One program that I was not really aware of,
    but I am sure other Members of the Committee were, the
    Department of Interior has a program that provides financial
    assistance to American Samoa, Guam, Virgin Islands,
    Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and the freely
    associated states of the Federated States of Micronesia,
    Republic of Marshall Islands, and Palau. The compact with Palau
    will expire in 2024. These are non-defense budget items within
    Interior, but they can have a significant effect upon this
    question that you mentioned, our reliability, which is really,
    really important.
        So as if we did not have enough work to do on this
    Committee, we have to also pay attention to the non-defense
    budgetary items that are strong evidence of America's desire to
    be a leader in the region.
        Again, thank you, Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Let me recognize
    Senator Cramer via Webex.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Admiral, for your service and for being with us today. This has
    been most interesting.
        I am going to drill down maybe a little bit on some of the
    things related to the allies and their trust in us and how we
    build a stronger alliance of free people that are concerned
    about China. I do not think there is any question China is the
    topic of the day in lots of places, not just here. But I also
    know that a lot of these matters get out there on the fringe a
    little bit, sometimes things we may not think about.
        So I want to ask you specifically, there was a recent
    Reuters story that said Iran has quietly moved record amounts
    of crude oil to its top client, of course, China, in recent
    months, at the same time that India, India's state refineries
    added Iranian oil to their annual import plans on the
    assumption that the United States is going to lift their
    sanctions.
        Does INDOPACOM, do you guys track Iranian oil shipments
    within your area of responsibility, and if so, does that
    information get back to the Pentagon, the White House,
    decision-makers that are making lots of big decisions about
    things domestically and around the world that might have an
    impact on our relationships?
        Admiral Davidson. Certainly, Senator. We track the Iranian
    trans-shipment of oil across the theater. You know, the
    interactions with China are indicative of China's willingness
    to ignore sanctions and international norms to do that kind of
    thing.
        Senator Cramer. But with regard to India, then, do you see
    a risk if we lift the sanctions on Iran, that they are able to
    now sell oil to an important ally, I mean, obviously very much
    in the region. I am just, again, thinking about all of the
    relationships and all of the factors that enter into the
    relationship. I know I am asking you now to probably opine on a
    policy question as opposed to whether or not you are tracking
    it. But it seems to me that these decisions, things like
    lifting sanctions on Iran, could have ramifications that we
    maybe have not thought of yet. If you want to comment, you can.
    Otherwise, I can move on.
        Admiral Davidson. No. Sir, it is an important policy issue
    for the United States. Iran is, no doubt, a net exporter of oil
    and it will have to be considered.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you. I want to follow up on a line of
    questioning that Senator Fischer asked as well, about ISR and
    the importance of it, and I will probably just skip some of the
    easy stuff that she was asking about, easy for me, not
    necessarily for you.
        I will just ask this. Adding on to her line of questioning,
    do you think that the sale of ISR platforms to allies in the
    region might help our ISR needs in the region? In other words,
    I know that there have been some restrictions, there are some
    sales pending, there is, I know, a lot of desire by both allies
    and some of our American contractors. Could we help the ISR
    picture a little bit by opening up sales, maybe speeding them
    up a little bit to allies in the region?
        Admiral Davidson. I would say it depends on some of the
    exact capabilities that we are talking about. But I will tell
    you, broadly, we share information with our allies in the
    region and many, many partners. They benefit from the
    information that we generate. I can tell you, in the East China
    Sea, in the South China Sea, we, the United States benefit from
    much of what our allies and partners do there as well.
        So it would certainly add capacity to the picture, and as
    we deepen our information-sharing agreements, which is
    dependent on a lot of factors, we will share that information
    amongst us. It is going to make us better.
        Senator Cramer. I do not know if you are hearing me but I
    stopped hearing you suddenly. I will ask one more question, in
    case you are listening and can hear it, and it is a pretty
    basic one. Do you consider China a developing country or a
    developed country? That is a question I just started exploring.
    What is the difference, whether we consider it developing or
    developed?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, I imagine economists, you know, have
    a standard for that description. I mean, certainly they have
    lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty just since
    the turn of the century, but I would say that they still have
    hundreds of millions to go. But I would have to defer to an
    economist to give you the exact characterization.
        Senator Cramer. Yeah, and you are right. There are some
    standards that economists use relating to, you know, gross
    versus net and all these economic points. They are relevant--do
    not get me wrong. But what I am more concerned about is how the
    rest of the world treats a developing nation versus a developed
    nation, and I guess I would submit to you whether they are
    considered developed or in transition, they are, as the
    chairman said in his opening comments, an emerging threat and a
    near-peer ally prepared for some pretty serious confrontations.
        So anyway, all of that said, again, thank you for your
    service and thank you for being with us today, and I see my
    time is up, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Let me recognize
    Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, you spent a
    lot of time in this region in the last several years. You have
    thought a lot about China, as you have indicated today. Here is
    a kind of mind-reading question. Why are they militarizing? Why
    are they suddenly spending so much money? Is it because of
    paranoia about being attacked or is it because of preparing for
    aggression? Do you see the difference?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, absolutely. I appreciate the
    question. That is exactly the issue at hand. I see them
    developing systems, capabilities, and a posture that would
    indicate that they are interested in aggression, and what they
    have committed, in their nearest abroad--Hong Kong, Line of
    Actual Control, Xinjiang, the kind of pressure they are putting
    on Tibet and others in the region--I think it is dramatically
    misplaced. The West has greatly assisted in the development of
    China, to the last conversation that we have had, over the
    course of the last 35 years or so. I cannot, for the life of
    me, understand some of the capabilities that they are putting
    in the field unless it is an aggressive posture, and frankly, I
    think they have told us that with their ambition to supplant
    the rules-based international order and replace it with one
    with Chinese characteristics, which they said they intend to do
    by mid-century.
        Senator King. I think that is a key question we have to
    continue to examine--what does China want?
        Next question. What do you see, strategically, militarily,
    technically, in terms of cooperation between Russia and China?
    In the '50s and '60s, they were considered a monolith. Then
    they split. Are they moving toward a greater degree of
    cooperation? Is that something we should be concerned about?
        Admiral Davidson. In a tactical and operational space I
    have seen some collaboration there. China has participated in
    Russia's Pacific/Eastern Military District capstone exercise
    for three straight years. We have seen co-bomber flights as
    recently as last fall, where Chinese and Russian bombers joined
    on each other and flew through the Sea of Japan, East China
    Sea, and into the Philippine Sea. We are seeing some exchanges
    like that.
        I think that there is less cooperation, although frequent
    discussion, at the strategic level. Through all of it, I view
    it with some alarm. While we could consider some of the
    tactical and operational cooperation nascent, they are building
    towards improvement. There is no doubt in my mind.
        Senator King. Which it seems to me, if that continues is a
    matter of serious concern.
        Admiral Davidson. I would agree, absolutely.
        Senator King. Developing a higher level of cooperation.
        Speaking of alliances, I spent some time in Asia a few
    years ago and met, bilaterally, with a whole range of countries
    in that region. I came away with the conclusion, we have
    allies; China has customers. One of my questions is, you have
    mentioned India several times. India has always been a neutral
    country, if you will. Are we developing a stronger alliance
    with them? You mentioned them as part of the Quad. Do they
    consider themselves a member of something of that nature?
        Admiral Davidson. India has long had an approach called
    strategic autonomy, you know, a non-aligned approach with
    others. But I think certainly the activities along the Line of
    Actual Control with China has opened their eyes to what
    cooperative effort with others might mean for their own
    defensive needs. We have provided some information to India in
    that crisis--cold weather closing, clothing, some other
    equipment, some things like that--and over the last several
    years we have been deepening our maritime cooperation.
        I think you will see India, in the very near term, you
    know, remain committed to their non-aligned approach, but I
    think they will deepen their engagement with the Quad, and I
    think that is a key strategic opportunity for us, Australia,
    and Japan.
        Senator King. That would be a geopolitical major
    development if India were closely aligned with those other
    countries.
        One final short question. My concern is accidental
    conflict. A destroyer is in the South China Sea. A Chinese
    pilot miscalculates and runs into the destroyer. There is
    escalation from there. What do we have in place in the way of
    mil-to-mil contact or other mechanisms for defusing accidental
    conflict? Some very serious worldwide conflicts have begun with
    accidents.
        Admiral Davidson. Thanks, Senator, for that. You know,
    first, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and all of our service
    chiefs, as well as the Secretary of Defense, have routine
    communications with their counterparts in China. There is no
    doubt about it. But I would assure you that, you know, 99.xx
    percent of the encounters we have with the Chinese, at sea and
    in the air, are safe and professional. That goes down all the
    way to the communications that transpire between our two
    nations when we are occupying the same tactical space. Those
    remain safe and professional.
        The repeated narrative of miscalculation, you know, was
    really borne from China, because I hear it through diplomatic
    means. They are threatening other nations of a miscalculation
    in order to deter us from doing what is rightfully the
    international operations that we do in the East China Sea and
    South China Sea. We will continue to endeavor to keep our
    aviators and our mariners properly informed of the risks that
    were out there. But make no mistake about it, our expectation
    is that China conduct themselves safe and professionally at
    sea, and should going forward.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
    please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Admiral, thank you
    for your service and the men and women you command for what
    they do every day to defend the freedom of this country.
        My first question is about Taiwan. I think you agree that
    we have got to prevent Communist China from controlling Taiwan.
    It is a strategic necessity for the United States, and the loss
    would devastate our ability and the ability of Japan to counter
    China's aggression. You agree with that, right?
        Admiral Davidson. As a combatant commander out there in the
    Indo-Pacific, I have an obligation to support the Taiwan
    Relations Act, and in a geostrategic sense I think it is
    critically important to the United States' global status, yes.
        Senator Scott. I introduce the Taiwan Invasion Prevention
    Act to end the United States strategic ambiguity about Taiwan.
    I think it is time for the United States to state clearly that
    we are not going to allow Communist China to invade and subdue
    Taiwan, and that both in Taiwan and the United States we have
    got to invest the right resources--weapons, training, and
    dialogue--to ensure that General Secretary Xi understand that
    he is not going to gain anything.
        So what are your thoughts on that?
        Admiral Davidson. Sir, I wake up every day, you know,
    trying to assess the dynamic nature of the geostrategic
    environment, and, you know, frankly, we ought to be thinking
    about these things every day. I would submit that we have got
    more than 40 years of the strategic ambiguity has helped keep
    Taiwan in its current status. But, you know, these things
    should be reconsidered routinely. I would look forward to the
    conversation.
        Senator Scott. Do you feel comfortable that both the United
    States and Taiwan are moving forward in a manner that they are
    going to be able to defend, with our support, if there was an
    invasion?
        Admiral Davidson. I think it takes our continued support,
    Senator, and key to that is consistent and persistent arms
    sales to Taiwan in order for them to continue their capability
    going forward.
        Senator Scott. How much effort or time do you put into
    Indonesia, and can they be a check on Communist China's
    aggression?
        Admiral Davidson. I am sorry. Could you say the question
    again?
        Senator Scott. On Indonesia, can they be much of a check on
    Communist China's aggression?
        Admiral Davidson. I have cooperative efforts with
    Indonesia, in the maritime especially, and a deepening
    relationship. We do a number of exercises together. I would say
    Indonesia is very concerned about Chinese activities,
    particularly when they infringe in or around the waters of
    Indonesia going forward, and I think that Indonesia is an
    opportunity for the United States to deepen our relationship
    with. With China, it is just one of the things we need to be
    thinking about together.
        Senator Scott. How well is the ability to communicate being
    done with our allies there, whether it is Taiwan or South Korea
    or Japan? I mean, like what Senator King was talking about, the
    chance that there would be an inadvertent mistake, and is there
    the ability to, even on our side, share information well enough
    to help prevent something?
        Admiral Davidson. We proposed, in our 1241 assessment for
    the PDI, a multi-partner environment, which is information
    technology (IT) that I think would raise the surety of the
    cybersecurity of what we transmit back and forth between our
    allies and partners in the region. It would enable us to, as
    well, not only protect information but deepen collaboration on
    key strategic and military issues like this as well, yes.
        Senator Scott. How well is Huawei or other companies,
    Chinese companies, been able to infiltrate the communications
    systems in these countries that we rely on as allies? Or are we
    giving China the ability to be able to shut down communications
    pretty easily, which would impact our own ability for our
    military to discuss things with our allies?
        Admiral Davidson. That is certainly something that we have
    to be on the lookout for. We have been deeply engaged over a
    couple, 3 years about the vulnerability that Huawei equipments
    would present in any kind of allied structure. To be frank,
    given what I know of the threat I would want to withhold any
    information-sharing or equipments that would rely on that.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me now call on
    Senator Peters via Webex.
        Senator Peters. Admiral, thank you for being with us today.
    Thank you for your continued service to our country, as well. I
    appreciate all of your efforts.
        Admiral, Chinese hostility towards Taiwan and of aggression
    in the South China Sea and certainly the military growth that
    we are seeing from the Chinese requires a conventional
    deterrent. But unrestricted warfare also requires comprehensive
    deterrence, as you know. I think Admiral Mullen described it as
    ``two challenges and one fleet.''
        So to my question to you, Admiral, is, where do information
    warfare and low-intensity conflict fit into your priorities
    within your command? I ask because the PDI does not appear to
    project growth for the Joint Task Force Indo-Pacific (JTFIP),
    and the question, is it simply a low-cost endeavor or does it
    reflect a more limited role in the overall strategy that you
    are pursuing?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, it is not meant to be a limited
    role at all, Senator. I do think it is a low-cost effort. That
    said, much of what we have accomplished with Joint Task Force
    Indo-Pacific, looking backwards, in the years past, has been
    taken out of hide in order to properly man it and equip it. I
    am trying to round out the investments there so that the
    shortcomings I have taken in the rest of the portfolio, you
    know, that JTFIP does not come at that expense into the future.
    But I think it is actually key to our deterrent approach going
    forward.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral. You know, a partner of
    government that shares our view on regional security landscape,
    that may not necessarily reflect the majority view of its own
    society, even when it is combined with security cooperation, so
    a constant tension for those governments. So my question is
    related to how INDOPACOM can actually bridge this gap through
    civil-military initiatives. So my question for you, Admiral is,
    to what extent do you see initiatives such as Pacific Angel and
    the Embassy Civil-Military Support elements playing a role in
    your command strategy towards China, specifically?
        Admiral Davidson. I think they are key efforts as well,
    Senator. We were talking earlier about a whole-of-nation
    approach to meet these challenges, and those two organizations
    you highlighted help knit together multi-agency efforts in that
    particular regard.
        Senator Peters. So a U.S. Army Pacific element, Task Force
    Oceana, has a continuous presence on ten Pacific islands, using
    two-person augmentation teams that kind of shape the physical
    and the informational environments in those places. How do you
    believe we can better enable these units to make sure that our
    strategic message is having the impact that we would like it to
    have?
        Admiral Davidson. Well, it is an element in my 1251 request
    for the PDI. We call it Operation Pacific Resolve writ large.
    But the proper resourcing of it is to do precisely what you
    have asked for, to deepen, first, our interagency
    relationships, and then, as well, to deepen our partnerships
    with other nations on matters of concern to those other
    nations, because that is really the basis of our relationships
    across the region. The Army's involvement, and indeed, all the
    service components have an approach out here that is very
    similar. Their execution of it is critical to our overall
    strategy in the region, and frankly, it is the day-to-day
    connectivity with counterparts on the ground, in the air, and
    in the maritime, and all those places.
        Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Admiral. I appreciate
    those responses. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters. Now let
    me recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.
        [No response.]
        Chairman Reed. It appears that we have some communications
    issues, and I will recognize Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank
    you for your testimony today. I am glad to hear you call it
    Indo-Pacific. You know, I am sure China would prefer we not use
    that word because of a democracy and how big of an ally they
    are for us. I have heard several people, even in this building,
    call it something else.
        But, you know, we heard for years the United States needs
    to turn its attention to the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S. has
    invested $20 billion since 2014 in the European Deterrence
    Initiative, but we have not done much in the Pacific.
        Here are my questions. Explain very briefly, the Aegis
    Ashore system. Could you explain that, explain the Aegis Ashore
    system? Could you explain that?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    Aegis Ashore is a system that has, in fact, already been
    developed. We have built and are employing one actually already
    in Romania, and there is one building and imminently
    operational in Poland as well, and it is to help NATO with the
    defense of Europe. It is, essentially, a radar. The command and
    control, the information technology, communications
    connectivity, and the interceptors, missiles, that are capable
    of defeating ballistic missile, cruise missile threats in and
    around today.
        You know, an Aegis Ashore system on Guam, a fixed site on
    Guam, would enable 360-degree defense of Guam from any military
    attacks from China, whether they come by sea, by air, or by
    ballistic missile, in the future. It is technology that is
    available today. We have built it ashore, we have built it at
    sea, and it is our number one priority for funding in Guam.
        Senator Tuberville. I am sure Putin is real fired up about
    us putting one in Poland, but that is all right. That is one of
    your priorities. Is that still going to be your priority for
    Guam?
        Admiral Davidson. We need to have a mix of operational and
    defensive capability out there, and in my own analysis and my
    work with the Missile Defense Agency it is the key shortcoming
    for the defense of Guam at this point.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah. Thank you, Admiral. I yield.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville. I
    will now call upon Senator Manchin. Senator Manchin, please.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Admiral, for your service, and I am sure you are looking
    forward to your retirement. That has to be good for your
    family, but I know we will be seeing more of you in a different
    light, I am sure.
        Sir, basically on Japan, has Japan changed its position on
    Aegis?
        Admiral Davidson. Japan has reconsidered its pursuit of two
    Aegis Ashore sites. It has already committed funds to it. They
    are still working their way through really a base of
    alternatives that I think include both a disaggregated posture
    between land and sea as well as sea and land options.
        Senator Manchin. Was it mostly from just public opinion,
    public discourse with it, more so than military decisions?
        Admiral Davidson. The reason to roll it back?
        Senator Manchin. Uh-huh.
        Admiral Davidson. The siting of the initial Ashore sites
    that they established I think ran into some local political
    concerns that had not been worked through before they made the
    decisions, so they are trying to work through those local
    politics.
        Senator Manchin. Beyond the Aegis Ashore system in Guam,
    what further missile defense capabilities do we need in the
    Pacific, and where do you believe they should be located?
        Admiral Davidson. You know, for fixed sites, I mean, that
    is the one I am advocating for. You know, one of the benefits
    it provides us is it frees up our sea-based assets, our
    destroyers, to move with the maneuver forces, protect the
    carriers, protect the amphibious forces, and to protect more
    widely dispersed land sites that we might be operating from, on
    behalf of the Air Force, the Army, the Marines, et cetera. That
    is why I am pursuing that, and that is the sole major structure
    at this point.
        We do have existing capabilities, as do our allies and
    partners, when it comes to some shorter-range air defense
    threats.
        Senator Manchin. Hypersonic weapons may be one of the
    biggest threats, based on Russian and Chinese development and
    the lack of defenses against these types of weapons.
    Acknowledging that we are not in the classified portion of our
    hearing, which we were this morning, can you tell us, are
    United States capabilities in hypersonic weapons sufficient,
    based on the capability of Chinese defenses against our
    conventional assets? How are we able to defend ourselves
    against hypersonics?
        Admiral Davidson. If you do not mind, Senator, I would like
    to take that one for the record and do it in a classified way,
    so that it is clear.
        Senator Manchin. So I do not know whether this might be in
    the same category. How vulnerable are we to Russia and Chinese
    hypersonic weapons in the Pacific theater, and are you
    satisfied with the capabilities being developed to counter the
    threat? Do we consider that a threat in the Pacific theater,
    and are we developing anything that we can help protect in that
    area?
        Admiral Davidson. Both China and Russia are developing
    hypersonic weapons. We are in the research and development
    (R&D) stages of development as well, and much more work needs
    to be done to provide for the defenses, you know, an
    operational system that would provide for the defenses.
    Frankly, it is going to take a mixture of what we put on land
    and at sea as well as what we can put in space to actually
    defend against those going forward.
        Senator Manchin. According to the World Economic Forum, by
    2030, your area of responsibility, or that you have had, your
    area of responsibility, will be home to many of the world's
    megacities, that will continue to present vast, complicated
    governance issues, and my fear is that these governments will
    look to an authoritarian China as a model, rather than the
    United States. So my question would be, from a military
    perspective, what are some meaningful steps that can be taken
    to help leaders in India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines
    so that they don't start looking at authoritarianism as the way
    to go?
        Admiral Davidson. I think we have to recognize we are in a
    competition here, Senator. China's Belt and Road Initiative
    actually has a component that is trying to enable smart cities
    globally, where all cyber connections would lead back to China,
    which we have to highlight the threat that that presents to
    others. Again, a whole-of-government approach--have to be
    willing to compete in that environment to help the
    infrastructure and advances in these other cities, even if it
    is only advice.
        Senator Manchin. Where do we need to expand the programs to
    ensure allies are capable and that we have appropriate
    interoperability in the case of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific
    region?
        Admiral Davidson. My key objective in this year's budget is
    to pursue this mission partner environment, to help raise the
    information technology connections between our allies and
    partners in the region, build collaborative efforts in
    operations and planning, highlight concerns to these individual
    nations, and have the kind of resiliency in the networks that
    we need.
        Senator Manchin. Has any thought been given to increasing
    those programs with India and our partners in the Indo-China
    peninsula, to provide a barrier and distraction to China's
    efforts in the South China Sea?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. That is at the core of our
    effort.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Now I would like
    to recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Admiral,
    thank you for your time this morning. I know that we are
    talking a lot about the Indo-Pacific and China and the problems
    that we have there, and I am going to stay kind of with the
    same line of questioning that you have had with Senator
    Manchin.
        Our nuclear triad, do you agree that we should be
    modernizing, that that would be a valid and convincing
    deterrent?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, absolutely, ma'am.
        Senator Blackburn. Taiwan, let's talk a little bit about
    that. I know you mentioned that earlier, in one of your
    responses. What should we be doing to increase our bilateral
    military exercises with Taiwan, or multilateral exercises with
    others in the region or professional military development?
        Admiral Davidson. You know, to your last point first,
    ma'am, I think there is opportunity to help in professional
    development when it comes to Taiwan. We think that they have
    some specific issues that could help provide for their defense,
    you know, better reserve corps, for example, better response. I
    can tell you, Sergeant Major Shorter, who is sitting behind me
    here, has had a longstanding professional development dialogue
    with his counterparts in Taiwan as well.
        When it comes to exercises, we at U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command, we do periodically provide--actually, it is annually
    provide some exercise support to Taiwan's major exercise, Han
    Kuang, during the course of the year. We help provide some
    observers to help understand how Taiwan thinks about their
    defense, what their exercises exercise, you know, what that
    exercise contribution is to the advancement in their doctrine
    within Taiwan, and then to deepen our relationships as well.
        Senator Blackburn. On the fusion centers, I had included
    some language in the 2021 NDAA to support an increased funding
    for these regional fusion centers. I would like for you to talk
    just a little bit about what opportunities arise for China if
    we do not continue an aggressive support for these, and then if
    you want to highlight the changes that you think we should be
    making as we look at the Indo-Pacific region in helping to
    strengthen our allies using these fusion centers.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
    Setting China aside, which really is not at the core of these
    fusion centers, what we envision in the region is three
    collaboration networks, one focused mostly on the Indian Ocean,
    one focused on counterterrorism and centered in Southeast Asia,
    and then one to be sited somewhere in the Pacific as well. But
    it is really to knit together--as we have articulated earlier,
    we do not have a multilateral alliance network. We have a
    series of bilateral alliances and partnership, and some of the
    concerns of the Nations that would be involved in these
    individual centers, you know, there is kind of a common concern
    that would enable dialogue and cooperation.
        So, you know, just speaking of the Counter-Terrorism
    Information Facility (CTIF) in Singapore, the Counter-Terrorism
    Information Facility, they are concerned about Islamic State of
    Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in East Asia, ISIS in the Philippines,
    the potential of some ISIS foreign fighters returning to that
    area. It is just an opportunity for military and civilian
    entities in Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei,
    with United States and Australian support, to come together and
    speak about it.
        In the Pacific, as just one other example, it is really to
    focus on illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing and other
    trafficking threats in the region, like narco-trafficking and
    human trafficking and things like that, and to provide a
    reliable network where multiple bilateral partners can come
    together and speak in these area.
        You know, because of the very bilateral nation-to-nation
    nature of the region, finding areas of common cause I think are
    critically important, and we are trying to fill that need.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn, and now let me
    recognize Senator Duckworth via Webex.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
    Davidson, it is good to see you again. I am sorry I was not
    able to come visit in 2020, but hopefully 2021 I will be back
    in the Indo-Pacific region.
        I don't have to tell you about the unique challenges, the
    tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific's geography and great
    power competitors and what they present to our supply chain and
    logistics enterprises. I know we have to invest in long-range
    fires and other critical capabilities, but I hope that you
    share my concern that we will not be able to build a combat-
    credible deterrence if we do not have the logistics capability
    and capacity to realistically support our complex military op
    plans.
        Admiral Davidson, please elaborate on your request for
    funding for a Pacific movement and coordination center. What
    would this funding provide for you and why is it critical for
    achieving your objectives in the Indo-Pacific region?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Senator. We had
    hoped to see you out in the Indo-Pacific as well.
        You have laid the basis for this quite well. We have added
    a fifth pillar into the 2022 budget because we did not think
    that joint logistics and sustainment was getting the requisite
    focus as we talked about all these other issues.
        So the movement center, in and of itself, is to enable our
    ability to work with the tyranny of distance, have more
    resiliency in all the multiple processes that go into
    logistics, from multiple sources. Some are governmental, some
    are commercial, et cetera, and then to start to deal in the
    contested environment, the kind of threats that we might see
    disrupting our logistics writ large.
        So we have highlighted it in the 1251 report for this year
    and we will keep joint logistics on there as a pillar that we
    need to focus on, going forward.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. So let's go further into
    this. How can the military services and other DOD agencies play
    a role in developing the logistics systems capabilities and
    capacity required to support these op plan? You know, I am
    thinking of everybody can play a part in this. Can you speak a
    little bit to what the other agencies can do? What can we do
    right now to address these issues?
        Admiral Davidson. Well----
        Senator Duckworth. I speak to things like, you know, U.S.
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and we do not have enough
    tanker aircraft, we do not have enough hulls in the water, that
    sort of thing.
        Admiral Davidson. Yeah, no, you have got it exactly right.
    I mean, there is deep need to recapitalize the military sea
    lift and anything that--plus those assets, not anything, those
    assets that Maritime Administration provides. I think
    recapitalization there is necessary. We are closely partnered
    with TRANSCOM on the tanker network around the globe. I think
    writ large you will see the Air Force and TRANSCOM working
    together, trying to figure out where new capability like the
    KC-46 should be added, what is the best positioning for it in
    order to make its availability and sustainability sound while
    contributing to the overall transportation network as well. You
    know, that needs to be recapitalized--excuse me, examined. The
    posture needs to be examined as it goes forward as well.
        There is a deep focus on the issue of contested logistics
    as well. It is one of the doctrinal concepts that the Joint
    Staff is trying to advance. We are deeply involved in that
    conversation and look forward to its output here during the
    course of this year.
        Senator Duckworth. Could we carry out the op plans for the
    Indo-Pacific region without the fifth pillar that you are
    proposing?
        Admiral Davidson. Oh, ma'am, all the combatant commands
    depend highly on logistics. In our theater, I do not have the
    benefit of internal lines of communication. We have got to be
    able to protect these external lines of communication, you
    know, deliver some actually to our allies and partners in the
    region as well, and then defend it all in order to maintain the
    posture that we have out there in the region.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth. Let
    me recognize Senator Hawley via Webex.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral,
    thank you for being here and congratulations on your many
    decades now of outstanding service. On behalf of your fellow
    Missourians I just want to say thank you for all that you have
    done for the country, and we are very proud of you in the state
    of Missouri, so thank you for your service.
        Let me ask you a question that I posed to Deputy Secretary
    of Defense Kathleen Hicks in her testimony a couple of weeks
    ago. She testified that it is essential for the United States
    to maintain the ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli
    against Taiwan in order to strengthen deterrence against China.
    Do you agree with Deputy Hicks on this point?
        Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
        Senator Hawley. Do you agree with Deputy Hicks that a
    strategy of denial is essential for deterring Chinese
    aggression?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, and that is core to our approach in
    the 1251 report.
        Senator Hawley. Yes, it is. Let me just give you a second
    to explain to the Committee why it is important you think to
    strengthen our forces west of the International Date Line in
    order to effectively achieve deterrence by denial.
        Admiral Davidson. Thanks, Senator. You know, our posture in
    the region must be demonstrative of the capabilities that the
    United States could and would bring to bear in a crisis--its
    capacity, numbers, and the will of the United States to prevent
    the fait accompli that you highlighted.
        We fulfill that not only through--and this goes back a
    little bit to what Senator Duckworth had to say--not only
    through people focused so much on fires and platforms, but it
    is the whole of the apparatus that makes that sound. It is the
    logistics, it is the intelligence and warning, it is all that
    stuff that buys you the time in order to present options to the
    national security apparatus here, and the Nation, should the
    day-to-day competition turn to crisis.
        Importantly, what we are trying to do is every day that
    China gets out of bed and peels back the curtain and sees the
    United States and its allied and partner network out there in
    the Western Pacific, assuring its own access, that it thinks I
    do not want to mess with that capability and that capacity and
    what I know to be the will, and closes the curtains, and is not
    going to fight. You know, that is what we are trying to
    achieve.
        Senator Hawley. Yeah, let me just ask you about the window
    of conflict with regard to China. Some are saying that we do
    not really need to worry about potential conflict with China
    until 2035, or even later. You said last week China could
    achieve military overmatch in the region as soon as 2026, and
    that if it does--and I am quoting you now--it could like choose
    to forcibly change the status quo in the region.
        Can you just elaborate on those comments?
        Admiral Davidson. Yeah. We have indication that the risks
    are actually going up. I have to be a little delicate here,
    Senator, because of the classified nature of some of the
    material, but I think, demonstratively, what you are seeing
    China do in the region--in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea,
    and the East China Sea, some of the malign military actions
    that have taken in and around Taiwan and elsewhere in the East
    China Sea and South China Sea, are indicative that China's pace
    is quickening, and we need to be postured to prevent that
    quickening from happening.
        Senator Hawley. You also said that if China does succeed in
    changing the status quo that that change would likely be
    permanent. Tell us what you meant by that.
        Admiral Davidson. Well, they have made it quite plain that
    they would wish to supplant U.S. leadership around the globe. I
    am seeing a whole-of-government effort in trying to fulfill
    that ambition, and they are trying to do that by mid-century.
    They are knocking down waypoints that they think stand in their
    way of achieving that. I would say the most waypoint that they
    have knocked down is the establishment of the--or the
    revocation of the national security law in Hong Kong, and the
    obliteration of one country and two systems there. That,
    fundamentally, is, you know, I think sending a chill across the
    region about what Chinese ambitions might be and who might fall
    ill of Chinese design.
        Senator Hawley. I have got just a few seconds here. Let me
    ask you--actually, give you the opportunity actually to comment
    about the Guam defense system. You have spoken about the need
    for this on a number of occasions. Just give us a sense of what
    will happen to our ability to deter Chinese aggression if we do
    not strengthen Guam's air and missile defense systems.
        Admiral Davidson. It is the key piece that we are missing
    that signals to the region that the U.S. is a reliable and
    committed security partner, that we are there to defend not
    only U.S. territory but our interests abroad, and in
    combination with other capabilities. A more distributed
    posture, a higher level of lethality in our air and maritime
    and ground forces that might be rotating or present in the
    region puts forward that total deterrent posture that helps the
    deter-by-denial objective, that they cannot knock Guam out with
    an easy shot and keep us out of the fight to present that fait
    accompli that Deputy Secretary Hicks talked about.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now via Webex I
    would like to recognize Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Admiral, for being here, for your service, you and your team,
    all the work that you have done.
        I would like to focus today a little bit on how using
    technology can potentiate our strategic planning and, of
    course, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. So let's talk about
    regional data-sharing for a moment. America's longstanding
    advantage in the Indo-Pacific relies on our network of
    alliances with regional democracies. These partnerships are the
    cornerstone of promoting a free and open region. As part of the
    mission partner environment, U.S. INDOPACOM seeks to develop an
    integrated architecture to expand data-sharing amongst like-
    minded nations through the use of information fusion centers,
    joint centers where allies can share information using cloud-
    based technologies, integrated systems, and secure access
    control.
        So, Admiral Davidson, can you outline your plans to
    establish an interoperable, digital network in the Indo-
    Pacific, and how does an integrated IT architecture strengthen
    our ability to share information and really fight together with
    our allies and partners?
        Admiral Davidson. Thank you for the question, Senator, very
    much. We have described the MPE in our 1251 assessment, and we
    hope it will be resourced by the PDI initiative. It is
    technology and capability that is actually evident, you know,
    now. It is not new development that we need to do.
        But sharing with our allied and partner network around the
    region would do a few things, to your last point. One, raise
    the cyber resiliency of the information that we share and
    others share with us and with each other, and then, in turn,
    provide reliable connectivity for us to collaborate, to
    cooperate, to plan, to highlight threats in the region to the
    level of concern that the Nations participating would have, all
    the way from illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing on to
    the higher threat concerns in the region with other partners.
    But it would give us the assurance that the information that
    were being shared couldn't be disrupted or could not be shared
    outside the confines of the network as well.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move to, and we
    spoke about this a little bit earlier, but virtual military
    exercise, because we have to overcome the challenge of joint
    training across long distances in the Indo-Pacific. So U.S.
    INDOPACOM, I know that you are seeking to initiate Pacific
    Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability, or PMTEC.
    This initiative would include creating virtual coalition
    training complexes, linking together testing and training
    ranges in the United States, like Nellis Air Force Base and
    Fallon Range Training Complex in my home state of Nevada, with
    allies like Japan and Australia.
        So can you talk a little bit about how the virtual training
    environment can transform the way U.S. Forces train with allies
    in the region, how it allows us to model and try different
    things out in a virtual setting with our allies and partners,
    and maybe even increase the frequency of these training
    missions.
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much. As our
    own joint force has brought in now what we call multi-domain
    capabilities, meaning space and cyber capability as well as
    what we see in the terrestrial environment, right--air, land,
    and sea--as well as adapt the capabilities, or modernize the
    capabilities in the terrestrial environment, fifth-generation
    fighters like the F-35 and the F-22, integrated air and missile
    defense like our Aegis ships, THAAD radars, and things like
    that. We need to be able to stress the joint force in a dynamic
    training range in a way that cannot occur in what was 20th
    century-developed ranges.
        Each one of these ranges that we have talked about--Alaska,
    what you have highlighted in Nevada at Fallon and Nellis, what
    we have in Hawaii, for example, at PTA and PMRF in Kauai, and
    what we hope for at the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
    Islands, Joint Military Training Initiative (CJMT), the
    training range out in Guam, and Commonwealth of Northern
    Mariana Islands (CNMI)--we want to deliver some connectivity,
    range to range, and the ability to inject, you know, computer-
    generated, virtual and constructive, as we call it,
    capabilities in there so that we can more widely stress the
    joint force, test it, train it, and, oh, by the way, if we
    wanted to keep anything secret that we did not want a satellite
    or an intelligence-gathering ship to observe, do it in an
    entirely virtual environment.
        We need to extend PMTC as we have developed it to these
    ranges. We think it is transportable, we think it is sharable
    between these ranges, and we think it will bring a much higher
    level of fidelity of training to the very disparate forces we
    have over vast areas, from Alaska to California to Hawaii and
    westward, going forward.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I look forward
    to working with you on developing all the new skill sets that
    our military needs to perform these operations. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Now let me
    recognize Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Admiral, for joining us today. I have got a couple of questions
    here about command and control and communications, and we rely
    heavily on satellites to do that.
        In January of 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite test
    against one of their own nonoperational weather satellites with
    a kinetic kill vehicle, and it has been reported that in the
    years since China has an operational capability that can attack
    satellites in low-earth orbit and that they are developing the
    capability that goes all the way out to geosynchronous orbit.
        So how does this affect the strategic balance of power in
    the region, from your perspective?
        Admiral Davidson. Thanks for that, Senator. Yes, both China
    and Russia have demonstrated capability to disrupt satellites,
    you know, testing capabilities on their own assets in the past,
    as you have articulated. It clearly, I think, demonstrates that
    space, which we have long considered a domain in which would be
    unthreatened for the United States, the potential is there,
    actually, for it to be threatened.
        We have to build resiliency into our space apparatus. That
    happens with other space assets, it happens with creating
    airborne and other terrestrial alternatives to fulfill that,
    and it changes the calculus in space as well. We have to
    recognize that, again--and this goes back to some earlier
    comments I made about deterrence theory. We are not going to be
    able to play defense alone in this particular regard. If we
    cannot demonstrate to others that their capabilities in space
    might be at risk, then we run the risk of a deterrence failure.
        That said, the space layer is critically important to how
    we sense in the strategic nuclear deterrent, how we communicate
    across the joint force, and even how we sense and distribute
    information to the conventional forces as well. Its resiliency
    is incredibly important to us.
        Senator Kelly. As you are gaming out scenarios with the
    PLA, do you consider this capability that they have obtained?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, absolutely.
        Senator Kelly. Okay, and then do you have sufficient
    intelligence and surveillance capability to keep up with the
    changes that they are making with regards to their space
    systems now?
        Admiral Davidson. I would have to allow General Raymond at
    the Space Force and General Dickinson to respond at Space
    Command (SPACECOM) as well. But writ large, over all the
    capabilities that we see China developing there is a need for
    more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of their
    test and development, in particular, and then, you know,
    observing what they are doing in the training and exercise
    realm as well, writ large. I would be surprised if General
    Raymond and General Dickinson did not agree that that was
    necessary in space too.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly. Admiral
    Davidson, thank you again for your distinguished service in the
    Navy and the Nation, to your family who endured as much as you,
    in many cases, and once again, please convey our appreciation
    and profound respect for the men and women under your command.
    Thank you, Admiral Davidson. This is the end of the hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                   submarines
        1. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, how important is it for
    your forces to have the most advanced technological capabilities in the
    undersea domain?
        Admiral Davidson. It is critical for USINDOPACOM to remain on the
    leading edge of advanced undersea technology. The Virginia and
    Columbia-class submarines ensure the United States maintains its
    advantage in undersea warfare for the foreseeable future. The Virginia-
    class represents our most advanced asymmetrical advantage in countering
    the PRC's anti-access area denial strategy, guaranteeing the United
    States ensures access to the sea-lanes of communication in the first-
    island chain. The Virginia-class submarine's advanced technology is
    difficult to detect and has the offensive capability to hold any
    maritime or terrestrial target at risk.
        Meanwhile, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine provides
    the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad and provides an invaluable
    multi-mission platform as a replacement for the aged Ohio-class
    submarine.

        2. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, what has China been doing,
    that you are aware of, to close the technological gap in undersea
    capabilities with the United States?
        Admiral Davidson. China recognizes the importance of the undersea
    domain and is pursuing a range of capabilities to close the gap. China
    is fielding and integrating dedicated anti-submarine patrol aircraft
    and surface ships, installing and operating undersea monitoring
    systems, and investing heavily in unmanned I autonomous sensors to
    improve situational awareness. Many modem PLA Navy multirole surface
    warships feature advanced anti-submarine weapons and sensors.
    Additionally, the PLA Navy continues to field improved submarines, such
    as the Type 039A/B Yuan-class diesel-electric air-independent-powered
    attack submarine, and will add its first guided-missile nuclear attack
    submarine by the mid-2020s. In combination, these developments provide
    the PRC with improved undersea awareness, more lethal anti-submarine
    warfare capabilities, and a greater offensive strike capability.

        3. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do we have the capability
    to counter these emerging threats from China?
        Admiral Davidson. Based on current threat reporting, USINDOPACOM is
    poised to counter the emerging threats from China provided we fulfill
    our current requested force requirements within the AOR. Currently,
    United States Anti-Submarine platforms are more technically advanced
    and provide the ability to counter Chinese submarine emerging threats.
    The United States must continue to resource all Anti-Submarine warfare
    platforms, including submarines, cruisers, destroyers, and maritime
    patrol aircraft. The United States must also maintain funding for new
    platforms such as the Virginia-class submarines to ensure adequate
    margin as new Chinese threats emerge.
                   non-traditional national security threats
        4. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, what steps would you
    recommend the Department of Defense (DOD) take in the Indo-Pacific to
    swiftly respond to emerging nontraditional national security
    challenges, including global health and climate change issues?
        Admiral Davidson. The United States should leverage DOD
    capabilities as an important player to address the global health
    security issues we currently face. While DOD can provide unique
    capability for rapid response to a global threat, this must be
    carefully regulated with our capacity to maintain the readiness of the
    joint force. This requires the United States to leverage existing
    global health security mechanisms such as the Global Health Security
    Agenda (GHSA) and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
    and Materials of Mass Destruction with U.S. national security
    priorities.

        5. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, in your view, are the
    installations in your area of responsibility (AOR) prepared to face
    non-traditional threats such as extreme weather due to climate change?
        Admiral Davidson. Our installations need work to mitigate the
    impacts from natural disasters and extreme weather. In particular, the
    DOD must invest in critical infrastructure that is used to store and
    maintain our most critical weapon systems and platforms.

        6. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, DOD's 2019 Climate Change
    report mentioned that ``at Naval Base Guam, recurrent flooding limits
    capacity for a number of operations and activities . . . that support
    mission execution.'' How does this flooding jeopardize U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) operations?
        Admiral Davidson. The 2019 DOD Climate Change Report states that
    recurrent flooding impacts operations and activities in Guam not only
    at the Naval Base, but also at Andersen Air Force Base.
        Degraded mission capacity can affect submarines, air mobility and
    combat aircraft, security forces, and communication units. Guam is a
    critical element for United States Homeland defense in terms of
    deterrence, crisis planning, and response to potential adversary
    actions. Climate change mitigation, protection, and preparedness
    measures are essential in supporting DOD mission assurance and
    minimizing the impact to INDOPACOM operations.

        7. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do you require additional
    resources to effectively combat the effects of climate change?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes. The Indo-Pacific region experiences frequent
    natural and manmade disasters, including the negative impacts of
    climate change. Our Center for Excellence and Disaster Management
    collaborates with our partners throughout the Inda-Pacific to increase
    disaster resilience, to include climate change resilience, through
    humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). I welcome
    additional resources to expand science and technology (S&T) in areas
    such as food, water, environmental security, waste treatment, marine
    environmental management, renewable energy, and HADR.

        8. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, what can be done to
    further increase that resiliency of critical installations, such as
    those in Guam?
        Admiral Davidson. To increase resiliency, the DOD must fund
    critical infrastructure projects on installations consistent with
    service-prioritized installation MILCON requirements. In addition, the
    DOD must leverage Energy Savings Performance Contracting (ESPCs) and/or
    Utility Energy Service Contracts (UESC). These services enable budget-
    neutral facility improvements options that build resilient base load
    co-generation power plants to sustain critical mission loads in the
    event of outages.
                                     china
        9. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, recently the Chinese
    launched a large scale cyber-attack on Microsoft's email service, what
    should the American Public know about that attack and what does that
    tell you about China's ability and intent to attack the United States?
        Admiral Davidson. [Deleted.]

        10. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, you recently stated that
    by 2026 the Chinese military could reach the point of ``strategic
    overmatch'' with the United States--what do you think needs to be done
    to counter that projection?
        Admiral Davidson. My 1251 assessment lists five focus areas to
    counter PRC ``strategic overmatch'':
        1)  Increase joint force lethality, including investments in
    integrated Air and Missile Defense, like the Guam Defensive System,
    which is my number one priority; long-range precision fires; and ISR
    augmentation.
        2)  Enhance design and posture, including investments in strategic
    locations to project power, and dispersal locations to distribute
    forces.
        3)  Strengthen our allies and partners, principally by increasing
    interoperability and information sharing.
        4)  Modernize exercises, experimentation, and innovation to
    integrate Service recommended weapons and capabilities that deters
    adversaries and trains the force.
        5)  Improve joint logistics and sustainment, including munitions
    provision, fuel distribution, recapitalization of lift assets, and
    command and control of those capabilities.

        11. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, how can we prepare to
    counter the potential threat of Chinese aggression in all domains,
    including less kinetic domains such as cyber and disinformation?
        Admiral Davidson. Great Power Competition requires USINDOPACOM to
    compete across multiple domains simultaneously, and none are more
    competitive than the information and cyber domains. This requires
    USINDOPACOM to provide a resilient, secure, adaptable, and
    interoperable information architecture for the United States and its
    Allies and Partners. This can be achieved by fully resourcing the
    Mission Partner Environment and accelerating the pursuit of information
    advantage to include, but not limited to: technologies and concepts
    that embrace artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML),
    quantum computing, and more discretion with regard to executing
    Military Information Support Operations (MISO).
                        f-35 and strategic capabilities
        12. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, when you look at the
    strategic challenges in the INDOPACOM area of responsibilities, is a
    5th generation fighter capability like the F-35 is critical to mission
    success?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, 5th generation fighters, in particular the
    F-35, are critical for USINDOPACOM to deter its adversaries. 4th
    generation fighters do not provide the capabilities needed in combat
    against a near peer adversary or the multi-domain superiority required
    in the Western Pacific. The integration of stealth and advanced sensors
    provided by 5th generation fighters is essential in an Anti-Access/Area
    Denial (A2/AD) environment. Additionally, 5th generation fighters
    contribute to the necessary multi-domain superiority and increased
    interoperability with allies and partners.

        13. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do you believe the Joint
    All-Domain Command and Control concept is going to be the most
    effective way to counter China's emerging technology and enhanced
    defense posture?
        Admiral Davidson. The DOD is still developing the Joint All-Domain
    Command and Control concept and Services are rapidly developing
    required capabilities. However, the joint force will likely not fully
    implement the concept by 2026, which is when China could achieve
    military overmatch within the region. Regardless of system, USINDOPACOM
    requires the capability to sense, make sense, and act at all levels
    across all domains with allies and partners to maintain an advantage
    over adversaries.

        14. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, what role does the Air
    Force play in strategic deterrence, including within the Pacific
    Deterrence Initiative?
        Admiral Davidson. The Air Force plays a significant role in
    strategic deterrence, most notably in the context of the nuclear triad.
    Within the context of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), the
    requirements I identified in my Independent Assessment enhance key
    strategic power projection locations, and improve survivability through
    divert locations that enhance a distributed force posture. The
    Independent Assessment also identifies improvements to ranges in the
    Indo-Pacific that will provide fully instrumented, live-virtual
    training areas that will enhance all domain integration and improved
    functional ranges.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                      free and open indo-pacific strategy
        15. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, China's navy has rapidly
    grown in recent years--they currently have two operational aircraft
    carriers in their fleet with a third under construction. At the same
    time, they have undertaken increasingly provocative actions in the
    South China Sea, after decades of building artificial islands there.
    Can you talk about the importance of routine freedom of navigation
    operations in the South China Sea to support our ``Free and Open Indo-
    Pacific'' strategy?
        Admiral Davidson. Implemented in 1979 to protect U.S. navigation,
    overflight, and related interests on, under, and over the seas against
    excessive maritime claims, the Freedom of Navigation (FON) program
    combines diplomatic action and non-confrontational, operational
    assertions of navigation and overflight rights to maintain U.S.
    operational flexibility around the globe. FON operations, including
    regular passage by U.S. warships through strategic waterways, are
    essential for maintaining internationally recognized rights at sea.
    U.S. national security and commerce depend upon the freedoms of
    navigation and overflight of the seas and international law. A
    significant number of coastal states assert maritime claims that are
    inconsistent with international law, which-if left unchallenged-could
    evolve into customary use and thereby limit navigational freedoms that
    are vital to U.S. national security and global economic prosperity.
                         pacific deterrence initiative
        16. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, in what ways does the Pacific
    Deterrence Initiative (PDI) incorporate environmental security issues
    into its relationships with key regional allies and partners?
        Admiral Davidson. PDI requirements incorporate environmental
    security objectives in the Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives
    (SSCI) with our key regional allies and partners. SSCis include
    capacity building activities as the primary vehicle to inform and
    educate the intended audience. Typically these activities consist of
    symposiums, training forums, and subject matter exchanges. PDI
    requirements will also include fusion centers that promote advanced
    information sharing and interoperability intended to address common
    security challenges, including environmental issues.

        17. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, how would proposed PDI
    spending address the range of environmental challenges facing the
    United States and our allies and partners, to include sea level rise,
    coastal erosion, destructive invasive species, and illegal, unreported,
    and unregulated fishing in the AOR?
        Admiral Davidson. According to the NDAA, the PDI intends to enhance
    deterrence and defense posture in the Indo-Pacific. Current
    requirements identified in my 1251 Independent Assessment include a
    networked architecture of fusion centers to address common challenges,
    such as the effects resulting from climate change and illegal,
    unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. Reinvigorating funding for
    the Defense Environmental International Cooperation (DEIC) and aligning
    within PDI would enhance and strengthen our Environmental Security
    Program that influences partner nations in the competition sphere. DEIC
    has been without funding since 2017 causing our Environmental Security
    Program to compete with Security Cooperation efforts under the Asia
    Pacific Regional Initiative.

        18. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, thank you for emphasizing the
    importance of our allies and partners in the AOR--as a follow-up to
    your answer during our colloquy on this subject in the hearing, can you
    also discuss in detail how the PDI funding you are requesting would
    support the Freely Associated States (FAS) and why our FAS partners are
    so critical to our collective security in the region?
        Admiral Davidson. The Freely Associated States (FAS) are
    strategically located across our economic and defense sea lines of
    communication. The requirements I identified for PDI effecting the FAS
    include the Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon-Radar (TACMOR) and
    multiple facilities at airfields and ports. Identified PDI requirements
    will improve information fusion and data-sharing initiatives that
    address the effects of climate change; illegal, unregulated, unreported
    (IUU) fishing; human and narcotics trafficking; transnational crime;
    and other security threats that are key security challenges for our
    regional partners. Finally, identified PDI requirements will provide
    for Security Cooperation programs to build ally and partner
    capabilities.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                          intermediate range missiles
        19. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, you recently submitted a
    report of your investment priorities for the INDOPACOM theater that
    included $3.3 billion for ``highly survivable, precision-strike fires''
    with a range greater than 500km. You were recently asked at the
    American Enterprise Institute about access to allied territory west of
    Guam for these missiles and you said, ``there would have to be a policy
    interaction to do these things going forward.'' I recognize that the
    State Department would be formally responsible for leading these
    negotiations, but have you had any discussions, formal or informal,
    with your counterparts amongst our Western Pacific allies and partners
    specifically on their willingness to host a new class of intermediate
    range missiles? Based on your experience working closely with our
    allies and partners, do you believe that there are any who will be
    willing to host this new missile system(s)?
        Admiral Davidson. Expanding ground-based fires helps to enable the
    maneuver of our maritime and air forces in the Western Pacific, deters
    our adversaries, improves the stability in the region, and,
    operationally, forces our adversaries to work harder to find, fix, and
    finish our maneuver forces. Any formal negotiations to posture ground
    based long-range precision fires west of Guam is Department of State
    led. USINDOPACOM routinely conducts military-to-military consultations
    with allies and partners and welcomes conversations about specific
    posture initiatives in the Western Pacific. Japan's leadership is
    anticipating approval of a new missile defense policy that might open
    the door to increased deterrence cooperation with the United States. It
    is too early to determine if Japan will host United States missiles;
    however, any increase in opportunities with Japan for bilateral
    defense, deterrence, and combined capability development supports
    efforts to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.

        20. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, among possible ground-
    launched missile options with a range beyond 500 km, do you believe
    that missiles with a longer-range and higher speed capable of striking
    deep within China would be more contentious with allies than shorter-
    range anti-ship missiles?
        Admiral Davidson. For allies and partners potentially interested in
    hosting missile strike capability, short-range anti-ship systems are
    less contentious because these largely represent coastal defense -
    defending a nation's territory and territorial waters. My 1251
    Independent Assessment does include the requirement for long-range
    strike capabilities to establish a credible deterrent in the Indo-
    Pacific. Long-range precision strike capabilities, when combined with
    defensive capabilities, reassures our allies and partners and gives our
    adversaries pause.
                                     china
        21. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, during your testimony you
    asserted that China ``quadrupled their nuclear capability since the
    turn of the century and they will at least double it during the course
    of this decade.'' You also said that if China were to ``quadruple their
    stockpile'' they could possibly have nuclear overmatch over the United
    States by the end of this decade. The United States maintains a total
    of approximately 3,800 nuclear warheads in its active stockpile
    according to open source estimates, approximately 1,500 of which are
    deployed in accordance with New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty]. According to last year's China military power report, China
    currently has an operational nuclear warhead stockpile in the ``low
    200s''. Can you clarify what you meant in stating that China has
    ``quadrupled their nuclear capability since the turn of the century''?
    Has China quadrupled the size of its warhead stockpile? Has China
    quadrupled the number of nuclear or nuclear-capable delivery systems?
    Has China quadrupled the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles
    (ICBM) that can target the United States Homeland?
        Admiral Davidson. China has at least tripled and probably
    quadrupled its nuclear warhead stockpile since 2000, from 70 to 200-
    300. According to a Congressional Research Service report, in 2000 the
    PRC had approximately 70 nuclear warheads. The China military power
    report estimate of ``low 200s'' would represent a three-fold increase.
    United States Strategic Command estimates the PRC has up to 300 nuclear
    warheads, representing a four-fold increase.
        China has tripled the number of nuclear delivery systems since
    2000, from 70 to 210. The same CRS report estimated China had
    approximately 70 delivery systems (50 silo-based nuclear-capable ICBMs
    and 20 mobile nuclear-capable MRBMs). Since then, the PRC has greatly
    expanded the number of mobile missile launchers and added ballistic
    missile submarines. The China military power report states China's
    current nuclear arsenal includes all of its land-based ICBMs, some
    nuclear-capable IRBMs and MRBMs, and JIN-class SSBNs. This equals an
    estimated 210 delivery systems.
        China has doubled the number of ICBMs that can target the Homeland
    since 2000, from 50 to 100.
        During my Senate Armed Services Committee appearance, the terms
    ``stockpile'' and ``delivery systems'' were used, sometimes
    interchangeably. To clarify, over the next 10 years, the PRC will
    substantially increase both its nuclear stockpile (i.e., warheads) and
    delivery systems. However, it is only in the latter category that China
    could exceed the United States.
        Stockpile (Warheads): If China quadruples its warhead inventory
    (800-1200), it would remain below the U.S. total of 1500 deployed
    warheads under New START.
        Delivery Systems: If China quadruples its inventory of delivery
    systems (840), it would exceed the United States total of 675 deployed
    systems under New START by 165.

        22. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, do you believe that China
    intends to at least double the size of its warhead stockpile? If so,
    why do you assess that leaders in Beijing feel the need to pursue a
    larger store of nuclear warheads?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, I agree with DOD estimates that China will
    at least double its nuclear capability over the next decade. This is
    part of Beijing's broader focus on expanding and diversifying its
    nuclear force, to include developing a nuclear triad with land-, sea-,
    and air-based delivery platforms. These developments highlight China's
    strategic intent to maintain a survivable nuclear force as a global
    power and may portend a shift away from what it has previously termed
    as a ``minimum deterrent'' capability.
        Beijing's lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its
    nuclear program should be a concern to all nations. I strongly support
    continued efforts to encourage Chinese participation in nuclear arms
    control discussions.

        23. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, given your assessment of
    China's nuclear force plans over the next decade, do you believe the
    United States should increase the number of nuclear warheads in its
    stockpile? If so, how do you think leaders in Beijing would respond?
        Admiral Davidson. Any reduction in U.S. nuclear delivery
    capabilities to include reduction from a triad, stagnation of the
    development of modern delivery systems, or reductions in the United
    States nuclear stockpile could prompt China to question our commitment
    to safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent capabilities. As the
    threat and associated defenses evolve, our capabilities to defeat those
    targets must evolve as well.
        Beijing believes the United States is pursuing a strategy of
    containment, and will evaluate any change to U.S. strategic force
    posture, placement, or quantity through this lens as it determines
    whether and how to reconfigure its own nuclear forces. Regardless of
    U.S. actions, China will continue its nuclear modernization
    initiatives.

        24. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, you have repeatedly said,
    including in your hearing testimony, that the greatest danger to the
    future of the United States continues to be an erosion of conventional
    deterrence with respect to China. In its fiscal year 2021 Budget
    Request, the Trump administration proposed to cut the Navy's
    shipbuilding account--in particular a second Virginia-class attack
    submarine--to fund an unplanned, multi-billion dollar cost overrun for
    the National Nuclear Security Administration's nuclear weapons program.
    Did you support that decision?
        Admiral Davidson. Maintaining the build rate for the Virginia-class
    submarine should remain one of the United States' top DOD priorities.
    The Virginia-class submarine provides significant conventional
    deterrence through its capability to help control the seas and project
    power in a highly contested environment and has a high rate of
    survivability, which is absolutely necessary in an Anti-Access/Area
    Denial (A2/AD) environment. These innovations must be balanced with
    other top DOD priorities such as the erosion of the United States'
    nuclear deterrence capability.

        25. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, you believe that mitigating
    an erosion of conventional deterrence with respect to China should be
    the Defense Department's top priority?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, I do. The erosion of conventional deterrence
    is the greatest danger for the United States in its strategic
    competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC). History shows
    that the People's Liberation Army typically undertakes military
    operations when it has a size and capability advantage. As we see U.S.
    conventional deterrent erode, the PRC will likely take on more risk to
    challenge the United States and its allies in the region.

        26. Senator Warren. Admiral Davidson, do you believe that the
    United States can safely mitigate an erosion of conventional deterrence
    by relying more heavily on nuclear weapons?
        Admiral Davidson. No, the United States needs to reestablish its
    conventional deterrence capacity. A conventional deterrent posture is
    necessary to prevent conflict, protect U.S. interests, and to assure
    allies and partners. The PRC has a growing nuclear arsenal. The
    expansion and modernization of their nuclear arsenal carries with it a
    growing risk of inadvertent escalation, underscoring the need to
    maintain and improve conventional deterrence. To simply rely on nuclear
    deterrence could effectively remove all other options short of nuclear
    exchange, should conflict occur.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                      role of f-35 in indopacom scenarios
        27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, some Members of Congress have
    recently expressed skepticism on the need for and value of 5th
    generation fighter aircraft--specifically the F-35. Meanwhile, China
    has established a formidable integrated air defense network,
    particularly across the Taiwan Strait, and has operationally fielded
    its first 5th generation stealth fighter, the J-20. Your written
    testimony highlighted 5th generation fighters as helping create the
    opportunity to ``Regain the Advantage'' vis-a-vis China. Given China's
    expanding anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, can you tell us
    what you've seen in the intelligence estimates and/or war game results
    when 4th generation vice 5th generation aircraft attempt to operate
    inside of the A2/AD bubble. In your estimation, how important are 5th
    generation aircraft like the F-35 to deterring Chinese aggression?
        Admiral Davidson. In war-gaming, 5th generation fighters
    exceedingly out-perform 4th generation fighters in an Anti-Access/Area
    Denial (A2/AD) environment and suffer significantly less losses. The
    lack of advanced sensors and stealth in 4th generation fighters makes
    them vulnerable in the A2/AD environment. 5th generation fighters,
    specifically the F-35, are therefore vitally important in deterring
    Chinese aggression. Furthermore, Japan, Korea, Australia, and Singapore
    have all purchased F-35s, which will inevitably increase
    interoperability with the United States and the ability to share
    information in time of crisis.
                         pacific deterrence initiative
        28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, Secretary Lloyd Austin,
    Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks, and General Mark Milley have all said
    the Indo-Pacific is the priority theater. If that is true, you would
    expect the Biden administration budget to fully fund the $4.6 billion
    PDI request for fiscal year 2022 as outlined and justified in the
    section 1251 report you submitted this year. In your opinion, if the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2022 in early May does not
    reflect the priorities you've said you need for PDI, does that
    undermine the policy that the Indo-Pacific is the ``priority theater''?
        Admiral Davidson. I am encouraged by the Armed Services Committees'
    efforts to establish and resource the PDI. I am equally encouraged that
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense articulated that PDI is a priority and
    that the Department will address this initiative during the budget
    review. I provided recommended capabilities and a funding profile in my
    Independent Assessment to inform PDI. We will continue to provide the
    prioritized requirements for PDI to inform the fiscal year 2022 budget.
    I anticipate that the Department will take deliberate action to
    resource the needed investments.

        29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, some Members of Congress have
    publicly commented they are undecided about what, if any, additional
    investments need to be made to improve U.S. military posture in the
    Indo-Pacific. The worry expressed is that improving our posture in the
    Indo-Pacific overemphasizes that the only way to deal with China is to
    build a military large enough to dominate them, which is
    ``unnecessarily provocative'' and impossible in the modern era of
    warfare. Meanwhile, the Associated Press (AP) reported that China
    announced last week an increase in defense spending by 6.8 percent. How
    do you answer the question from skeptics that we don't need PDI to
    improve our posture in the Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. PDI requirements focus on vital military
    capabilities needed to deter China. Deterrence is the combination of
    will and capability, communicated in such a way that the adversary
    assesses the cost of initiating hostilities outweighs potential gains.
    PDI requirements modernize capabilities required for 21st century
    warfare and communicate the United States' dedication to the region.
    The investment cost is much less than the costs should deterrence fail
    and conflict result. Diplomatic leaders must be able to rely on the
    strength of the U.S. military and collective militaries of allies and
    partners as a credible last resort to complement diplomacy,
    development, and economic statecraft.

        30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, if we maintain our status quo
    posture rather than improving, in your opinion, does that make military
    conflict more likely or less likely?
        Admiral Davidson. Maintaining our status quo posture makes military
    conflict more likely because we will cede the initiative to our
    competitors and adversaries in the region and fail to deter aggression.
        Conversely, increasing our persistent presence through forward-
    based and rotational joint forces inside the first island chain is the
    most credible way to demonstrate our commitment and resolve to
    competitors, deter unwanted aggression, and assure allies and partners.
        Current capacity and capability gaps related to force protection,
    homeland defense, joint force lethality, long range fires, ISR,
    training, and logistics enablers should be a part of our future efforts
    to make military conflict less likely in the Pacific.
                              guam defense system
        31. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, the top item on your unfunded
    requirements list is missile defense capability for Guam, which you
    call the ``Guam Defense System''(GDS) and that you requested $350
    million to begin acquiring in fiscal year 2022. Can you please explain:
    A) why protecting Guam is important to defending allies and partners
    like Taiwan; B) how China's missile arsenal threatens Guam, and C) how
    the Guam Defense System would provide protection?
        Admiral Davidson. A) Guam is a United States Territory and is part
    of the United States Homeland. Guam provides the most capable and
    important force projection and logistics capabilities in the Western
    Pacific. Guam enables our ability to mitigate the tyranny of distance
    in the Indo-Pacific' s geography as a critical hub in our supply chain
    and logistics enterprise. It also provides a deep-water strategic port,
    major fuel stores, munitions stores, command and control, and is a
    major power projection airfield for the United States in the region.
    Guam is essential to deterring China's aggression and assuring United
    States allies and partners in the region.
        B) China understands the importance of Guam to the United States'
    ability to project power in the Westem Pacific and has developed a
    credible missile force capable of attacking Guam and all of the United
    States' major allies in the region. In September 2020, the PRC
    showcased this capability in a propaganda video of their own bomber
    forces attacking Anderson Air Force Base in Guam.
        C) The nucleus for the Guam Defense System is the Aegis Combat
    System (ACS). ACS provides point and area defense. It can integrate
    Navy and Army current Programs of Record land-based sensors,
    interceptors, and command and control systems to provide 360-degree
    defense of Guam from the full range of PRC threats.

        32. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, your Fiscal Year 2021
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) section 1251 report proposes
    to use a version of Aegis Ashore as the solution to defend Guam against
    Chinese ballistic, cruise, and advanced cruise missiles. What are the
    reasons you selected the Aegis Ashore system over other options?
        Admiral Davidson. The solution I recommend represents the only
    capability within our current inventory of systems that will meet a
    2026 delivery timeline.

        33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, the cost of the Guam Defense
    System as proposed in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA section 1251 report is
    about $1.65 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), $350
    million of which would be in fiscal year 2022. What components of a
    full missile defense capability does the cost include (e.g. does it
    include the interceptors, launchers, and other components)?
        Admiral Davidson. The Guam Defense System (GDS) initial
    configuration, includes Aegis Baseline (B/L) 10, solid state radar
    (SPY-6 or SPY-7 variant), MK-41 VLS, Aegis Ashore, and SM3/SM6 missiles
    to mitigate known defensive and offensive gaps for the defense of Guam.
    It also incorporates a separate elevated sensor, Naval Integrated Fire
    Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) capability, and Cooperative Engagement
    Capability (CEC) that provides a baseline architecture to set the
    'standards and protocols' for a 21st century Joint Fires Network (JFN).
                                     taiwan
        34. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, Xi Jinping has been clear he
    does not rule out the use of force as a potential means of achieving
    the unification of Taiwan. Oriana Mastro, a respected scholar on China,
    recently wrote that ``For the first time in Chinese history, Xi will
    have at his disposal a military capable of forcing unification.'' She
    goes on to say that while many Western observers think China will able
    to take the island in the next 5 to 8 years, Chinese military leaders
    have told her that they will be ready within a year. When does the
    Communist Party leadership in Beijing believe the Chinese military will
    be ready to invade and successfully occupy Taiwan?
        Admiral Davidson. We do not know when Xi or other Party leaders
    believe the PLA will be ready; however, they are clearly pressing the
    PLA to be ready ``sooner'' rather than ``later.'' The recent
    announcement that 2027 is a new milestone for PLA modernization may be
    a reflection of increased urgency. 2027 is a notable year because it
    will mark the centennial of the PLA and the end of Xi Jinping's
    presumed third term. Xi also stated that they cannot prolong the Taiwan
    issue indefinitely, and the only acceptable resolution is unification.
        PLA leaders are undoubtedly looking at all aspects of the problem--
    capacity, capability, readiness, level of training, and will to fight
    for the PLA, Taiwan, and the United States--to determine when
    conditions are likely to lead to PLA success. Under certain
    circumstances, the PRC would almost certainly order military action
    immediately, regardless of assessed risk, such as a Taiwan declaration
    of independence.

        35. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, how is China using its
    exercises to prepare for a Taiwan conflict?
        Admiral Davidson. China focuses much of its training on preparing
    for a military contingency against Taiwan. PLA leaders, especially
    those in the Eastern Theater Command--which is responsible for Taiwan--
    design exercises to rehearse and improve critical aspects of a Taiwan
    contingency, including amphibious landings, air and missile support,
    maritime interdiction, electronic warfare, and space and cyber support.
    Many of these exercises occur in the Taiwan Strait or nearby for
    realism and to familiarize PLA forces with the operational environment.
    China attempts to amplify such training with heavy media coverage,
    touting PLA proficiency and overmatch against Taiwan. PRC state media
    said a September 2020 event was ``not a warning, but a rehearsal for a
    Taiwan takeover.''

        36. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, as General H.R. McMaster said
    last week at a hearing on global security challenges, ``Taiwan may
    represent the most dangerous flashpoint for war''. He then went on to
    say because of that very real threat, ``it is immensely important to
    keep forward positioned capable forces [in the Indo-Pacific]''. As Co-
    Chair of the Taiwan caucus, I'm worried that a Chinese invasion of
    Taiwan would present a hard test for United States military response
    times. Can you talk about why United States forward positioned forces
    are so important, and what you mean by forward positioned--where do
    those forces need to be?
        Admiral Davidson. Forward positioned forces includes permanently-
    based and rotational joint forces that are west of the International
    Date Line. The combination of forward-based and rotational forces
    provides persistent presence that is the most credible way to
    demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve to potential adversaries while
    simultaneously assuring allies and partners. In the event of crisis or
    conflict, forward forces are able to respond more quickly.

        37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, at a Senate Armed Services
    Committee hearing last week on global security challenges, General
    McMaster said ``There's a race ongoing right now to help Taiwan harden
    its defenses to make itself indigestible prior to the period of . . .
    greatest danger which is from 2022 onwards, based on the conclusion of
    the Beijing Winter Olympics and based on the Communist party
    congress.'' The Trump administration removed many obstacles to
    cooperation and engagement with Taiwan. It's now up to the Biden
    administration to build on this new opportunity. What kind of
    activities and arms sales should be pursued to help Taiwan ``make
    itself indigestible''?
        Admiral Davidson. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the
    United States provides Taiwan defense articles and services to allow
    Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities commensurate
    with the threat that Taiwan faces. Given the growing disparity in the
    cross-Strait balance of military power, we encourage Taiwan to purchase
    large quantities of asymmetric systems that are highly mobile, lethal,
    and survivable, to include coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs),
    short-and medium range air defenses, and sea mines. I also believe
    Taiwan needs to modernize and sustain critical conventional
    capabilities like F-16V; Patriot missiles; and modem ships, submarines,
    and aircraft. We also encourage Taiwan to expand Reserve Forces
    integration, improve irregular warfare capabilities, prioritize service
    interoperability, and develop and implement joint doctrine and a
    professional non-commissioned officer corps.
                         indopacom security assistance
        38. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Davidson, on 4 February 2021, President
    Biden said ``our alliances are our greatest asset'' and that they have
    ``atrophied'' over the past few years. One of the primary PDI lines of
    effort is to strengthen allies and partners. As I understand it, you've
    requested about $425 million for security assistance in fiscal year
    2022 to help strengthen allies and partners. We have been ``pivoting to
    the Pacific'' for many years now. There is bipartisan support for the
    statement that ``allies and partners are our asymmetric advantage''
    against China. But somehow the percentage of security assistance that
    goes to Indo-Pacific to strengthen allies and partners has, at best,
    remained level. Do you agree it ought to be growing? Why do you think
    it hasn't?
        Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM works closely with our allies and
    partners on proposals and potential solutions that address their
    security concerns in an achievable and maintainable way. The annual
    requested amount for USINDOPACOM security assistance increases at a
    measured rate year to year, in keeping with what our allies and
    partners can take on, and what USINDOPACOM can reasonably execute in
    one to two fiscal years. As our ally and partner political, military,
    and/or logistics infrastructure situations improve, USINDOPACOM
    requests will increase commensurate with the security challenges.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
    graphic depicting force laydown of united states and pacific allies vs.
                                     china
        39. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, Appendix 1 to Enclosure (1)
    of your section 1251 report includes a graphic comparing Chinese forces
    and United States Forces (stationed west of the International Date
    Line). Can you provide a similar graphic that contrasts Chinese forces
    with both United States and Pacific ally forces?
        Admiral Davidson. I provided the requested graphic to SASC staff on
    16 March 2021. They will control or disseminate the document in
    accordance with the appropriate procedures for the applicable
    classification.
                                     taiwan
        40. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, your third command focus area
    is ``strengthening allies and partners.'' A key strategic partner who
    shares our interest in deterring Chinese aggression is Taiwan. Although
    they benefit from foreign military sales, we do not conduct bilateral
    training exercises or personnel exchanges with Taiwan that we do with
    other important partner nations. Admiral, would you like to see greater
    official coordination between our military and Taiwan?
        Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM will continue to advise Taiwan on
    military capabilities, interoperability, readiness, and professional
    development through security cooperation and foreign military sales in
    accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. Greater official coordination
    between the United States and Taiwan through bilateral or multilateral
    military exercises could prove beneficial. I would look forward to the
    discussion.

        41. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, what measures do you think
    could be taken in the near term to strengthen the United States-Taiwan
    military partnership?
        Admiral Davidson. Consistent with the Taiwan Relation Act, in the
    near term USINDOPACOM will provide Taiwan defense articles and services
    that allow Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities.
    Given the growing disparity in the cross-Strait balance of military
    power, we encourage Taiwan to purchase large quantities of asymmetric
    systems that are highly mobile, lethal, and survivable, to include
    coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), short- and medium-range air
    defenses, and sea mines. I also believe Taiwan needs to modernize and
    sustain critical conventional capabilities like F-16V; Patriot
    missiles; and modem ships, submarines, and aircraft. We will also focus
    on improving the Taiwan military' sjoint interoperability, readiness,
    and non-commissioned officer corps professional development through
    subject matter expert exchanges, key leader visits, steering groups and
    working groups.
                              amphibious warships
        42. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, the Marine Corps is shifting
    their operational concepts to focus on smaller, more distributed
    forces. Part of their proposal includes building large numbers of what
    is being called the Light Amphibious Warship--a much smaller, lightly
    armed ship than our current amphibious classes. I'm concerned that
    these shorter range vessels, in addition to being less survivable, will
    create a need for more forward bases. These forward bases would
    themselves be vulnerable to attack, especially by ballistic missiles.
    This vulnerability seems to be exactly one of the concerns the Pacific
    Deterrence Initiative (PDI) is trying to address. Are you comfortable
    with your ability to protect these widely dispersed Marine Corps
    forces?
        Admiral Davidson. With the right investments we can protect our
    forward-based and rotational forces. Operating from dispersed locations
    requires a sophisticated balance of distributed locations to sustain
    the Joint Force. A more distributed, smaller footprint is better to
    defend against adversary efforts to find, fix, track, and ultimately
    target our forces operating from large, fixed bases in contested
    environments.

        43. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, what role do you foresee the
    larger amphibious classes of ships playing in future competition with
    China?
        Admiral Davidson. U.S. amphibious ships are key enablers. They
    provide a specific capability that can be used both during peacetime,
    such as to enable Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
    operations, and in armed conflict, to provide a rapidly deployable
    forcible entry capability and visible deterrent. Based on the large
    number of island and archipelago nations in the AOR, the large
    amphibious ships will support operations across the spectrum of
    conflict. The United States must continue to procure new large
    amphibious ships, while also modernizing our existing platforms.
                                   destroyers
        44. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, you have established the Guam
    air and missile defense system as your top priority for PDI funding. I
    understand that at present we rely on the DDG 51 class ships to provide
    much of the missile defense in that area. The terrible collisions
    involving the destroyers USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain in
    2017 highlighted how hard we are working those ships and their crews.
    With the quantitative imbalance growing every year between our naval
    forces and China's, have we been able to reduce the operational demands
    on the crews of our forward deployed ships?
        Admiral Davidson. The Comprehensive Review on USS Fitzgerald and
    USS John S. McCain collision led to an Optimized Fleet Response Plan
    Japan (OFRP-J) for the Forward Deployed Naval Force Japan (FDNF-J)
    ships assigned to Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. OFRP-J mandates
    dedicated time for maintenance, training, and certification prior to
    operational employment. OPNAV has issued updated PERSTEMPO I OPTEMPO
    policy for all operational units to include FDNF-J ships. The OFRP-J
    and PERSTEMPO I OPTEMPO Policy supports the overall readiness of an
    FDNF-J ship that is sustainable. However, it does not reduce the
    overall operational demand for ships.
        The deployment of a fixed Guam Defense System would help alleviate
    the operational demands that ships now undertake in their ballistic
    missile defense of Guam mission, and the three likely required during
    any conflict.

        45. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, do you have enough DDGs to
    carry out your missions today?
        Admiral Davidson. No. We have some shortfalls in availability, and
    there are challenges to scheduling because of worldwide requirements.
                        electronic warfare improvements
        46. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, what is the importance of the
    Navy Growler to the survivability of our forces and the fielding of the
    Next Generation Jammer to the Indo Pacific Theater?
        Admiral Davidson. The Navy EA-18G Growlers are a critical part of
    our airborne electromagnetic attack (AEA) capability supporting
    Operation Plan (OPLAN) and scheme of maneuver survivability. The
    complex threat of emitters produced by near-peer competitors contest
    freedom of maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The Growler
    and Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) are required AEA capabilities for the
    foreseeable future, to include supporting 5th and 6th generation
    aircraft. To maintain U.S. military overmatch in the EMS, NGJ provides
    new capabilities to ensure spectrum dominance.

        47. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, are you concerned about the
    extended use of the legacy jammer system (ALQ-99)?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes, I am concerned. The sole Airborne
    Electromagnetic Attack Tactical Jamming System replacement -Next
    Generation Jammer (NGJ) -must not fall behind in fleet delivery. NGJ
        will provide new capabilities to the fleet to ensure spectrum
    dominance. The Airborne Electromagnetic Attack community has been
    relying on the ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System for decades but is facing
    material and technological obsolescence that cannot counter all current
    threats.

        48. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, is there an acceptable level
    of risk between continuing to operate the legacy system and
    accelerating new technology deliveries like the ALQ-249 mid band pod?
        Admiral Davidson. There is always a balance between fiscal
    realities and developing/fielding advanced capabilities. Our current
    schedule for the ALQ-249 (Next Generation Jammer [NGJ]), if it remains
    on-plan, will balance the risk against our adversary's pace of
    technological development and our advantage in airborne electromagnetic
    tactical jamming capability. The Engineering and development for the
    NGJ includes three increments: #1 mid-band, #2 low-band, #3 high-band.
    The three increments take into account assessed capabilities of
    developing threats, shortfalls of the legacy system, and risk
    mitigation.

        49. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, would you support a more
    accelerated and cost effective solution to field the high band
    technology?
        Admiral Davidson. Yes. I would support a cost-effective approach
    that accelerates the timeline for the Next Generation Jammer increment
    #3 high-band capability. I do not support changing the order of
    increments, delaying the current schedule, or reducing capability of
    mid-band or low-band to accelerate high-band. While the high-band
    capability remains a priority to cover a portion of the threat, mid-
    band and low-band remain the preeminent capability to cover the most
    critical threats.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                                  force design
        50. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, noted China scholar Oriana
    Skyler-Mastro postulates that ``if Beijing thinks the U.S. will
    intervene on Taiwan's behalf, then time becomes crucial. Chinese
    military strategists believe that if you let the United States fight
    the way it is used to, which includes time to mobilize and amass
    firepower in theater, then victory is unlikely.'' Given that Chinese
    strategists do not intend to let the United States build up military
    power in the Indo-Pacific if they decide to use military force in the
    region, how important are U.S. Forces west of the international
    dateline and can you defend those forces as currently postured?
        Admiral Davidson. My primary responsibility is to deter adversary
    aggression and prevent conflict. Persistent presence through forward-
    based and rotational joint forces is the most credible way to
    demonstrate our commitment and resolve to potential adversaries and
    deter aggression. With the right investments we can protect our
    forward-based and rotational forces. In the most austere environments,
    forces may rely more on inherent capabilities and passive defensive
    measures. In more established environments, forces may rely on a
    balanced mixture of passive defensive measures, active defenses, and
    hardening of critical infrastructure. Finally, we are implementing many
    measures to allow for more agile and distributed operations from
    multiple smaller locations to increase survivability.

        51. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, the Department of Defense is
    prioritizing contested logistics as part of the forthcoming Joint
    Warfighting Concept. From your seat as commander of INDOPACOM, how big
    of an issue is contested logistics and can you give us some examples of
    how investments could improve our ability to conduct contested
    logistics operations?
        Admiral Davidson. Current INDOPACOM posture and Joint Logistics
    Enterprise capabilities are neither agile nor resilient enough against
    a peer competitor, such as the PRC. The Indo-Pacific is a vast,
    archipelagic theater with long lines of communication (LOC). We must
    transition from an obsolete North East Asia-heavy posture to a more
    forward, lethal, distributed and robust presence throughout the region,
    ideally including the Philippines and Oceania. This will require
    significant investments in basing infrastructure especially at key
    ports of debarkation.
        We must invest in intra-theater airlift, sealift, and land-based
    distribution that utilize an array of capabilities to include a mix of
    autonomous, shallow draft, and surface and submersible vehicles, as
    well as the ability to rapidly and selectively self-discharge. Intra-
    theater sealift must be able to swiftly facilitate cargo transfers to
    other vessels, and ground transports.
        These vessels also must be able to onload and offload in degraded
    or non-existent infrastructure and must have resilient, secure
    communication and navigation suites to mitigate cybersecurity
    vulnerabilities. Finally, more flexible and responsive bulk fueling
    capabilities is required. Refueling vessels must conduct fast
    replenishment at sea, and delivery to port fuel terminals and units
    over the shore.

        52. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, Marine Corps Force Design
    would possibly reduce the number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters per
    squadron from 16 to 10. There has been no official change to the
    program of record, however, General David Berger is signaling to the
    industry that we have to be prepared to adjust as the operating
    environment adjusts. Facilitation of contested logistics depends
    largely on operational enablers that allow maneuver within the
    battlespace. One such enabler in the region is the 5th generation
    fighter, specifically Marine Corps F-35s. Service level force design
    initiatives look to reduce the number of Marine Corps F-35s per
    squadron. Can you address how this reduction in aircraft may affect
    operations within your area of responsibility?
        Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM maintains the requirement for the F-
    35, in all its variants. 5th generation aircraft provide the most
    advanced ability to access, maneuver, and survive in Anti-Access and
    Area-Denial (A2/AD) environments. We incur severe risk to executing
    joint operations without 5th generation capability.
                    ground-based long-range precision fires
        53. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, one of your top unfunded
    priorities is ground-based, long-range precision fires. Can you discuss
    why this is a key priority and explain some of the specific
    capabilities you believe the new system will need to have?
        Admiral Davidson. Long-range Chinese air-to-air, air-to-surface,
    and surface-to-surface weapons currently challenge United States
    freedom of maneuver. Ground-based, precision fires will help enable
    maneuver in the air and maritime domain. New capabilities must include:
    anti-ship capabilities; survivable ISR that can track large numbers of
    mobile targets; resilient Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2);
    new, Joint, advanced, distributed battle management systems with rapid
    sensor-to-shooter timelines; and a range of land, sea, and air deployed
    long-range weapons able to target ships and mobile and fixed land
    systems.

        54. Admiral Davidson, which of the current service long-range
    precision fire research and development (R&D) programs do you believe
    hold particular promise in meeting your combatant command requirements?
        Admiral Davidson. We support all the Services' R&D efforts for
    long-range and hypersonic weapon systems. Critical for the Army and
    USMC long-range fires capability is the development of Tomahawk and SM6
    missiles, capabilities advocated for by USINDOPACOM since the
    introduction of Regain the Advantage. USINDOPACOM's priority for
    hypersonic systems include Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW),
    Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), and Long Range Hypersonic Weapon
    (LRHW). Other systems of interest in development are the Hypersonic
    Air-launched Cruise Missile (HACM); Southern Cross Integrated Flight
    Research Experimentation (SCIFiRE), a bilateral partnership with
    Australia; Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile (GBASM); and Contender
    Torpedo. In addition to R&D programs, we are strong proponents for our
    Pacific Multi-Domain Test and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) to
    enable advanced experimentation, testing, training, and coupling of
    capabilities.
                 defense posture realignment initiative (dpri)
        55. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, DPRI is the program of record
    negotiated with the Government of Japan, which also provided $3.1
    billion, to relocate Marine Corps Forces from Okinawa to Guam. The
    executive summary of the INDOPACOM report for section 1251 of the
    Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA indicates that getting INDOPACOM's force design
    and posture `` . . . begins with completing the Defense Posture
    Realignment Initiative (DPRI), the current program of record enables
    sustainment operations and provides the necessary lift for Marine
    forces scheduled to relocate from Okinawa to Guam.'' Japan is providing
    $3.1 billion in contributions (in fiscal year 2012 dollars) or about 1/
    3 of the estimated cost. On 6 January 2021, the Navy awarded $990
    million of Government of Japan funded multiple award construction
    contract for work primarily in Guam. INDOPACOM has indicated that
    forward-based forces within the second island chain are important to
    deterring Chinese aggression, and if necessary, responding to it. From
    your interaction with the Japanese, how important is the execution of
    the DPRI program as negotiated with and partially funded by the
    Government of Japan--how closely are they watching the execution of
    this program?
        Admiral Davidson. The Government of Japan (GOJ) strongly supports
    the DPRI program's relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, and has
    committed significant financial contributions toward this end. Since
    its inception, successive GOJ administrations have prioritized
    execution of the DPRI program. The GOJ views DPRI's moves as critical
    to improving local support for the Alliance in Okinawa. The GOJ works
    collaboratively with all USG execution and planning agencies to include
    United States Forces Japan, Naval Facilities Command, U.S. Army Corps
    of Engineers, and Marine Corps Installations Command, among others.

        56. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, there are some concerns about
    the ability of Marine Corps to train for full spectrum combat when they
    are moved to Guam. Does the program of record adequately addresses this
    concern and mitigate potential issues from your perspective?
        Admiral Davidson. Relocating Marines from Japan to Guam requires
    significant investment in training ranges for full-spectrum training.
    Those requirements include all forms of training, from static small
    arms to aerial gunnery and convoy live fire. To address these
    requirements, USINDOPACOM developed the Combined Joint Marianas
    Training (CJMT) concept and the Pacific Multi-Domain Test and
    Experimentation Capability (PMTEC). These two efforts, when resourced
    and complete, combined with training in Northwest Australia provided by
    Marine Rotational Forces-Darwin (MRF-D), will adequately meet the full-
    spectrum training requirements for the Marines in Guam.

        57. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, so the Committee can better
    understand some of the tradeoffs involved, what would be the impact, in
    your opinion, of moving those 5,000 marines and their dependents to
    locations east of the international date line rather than putting them
    in Guam on: a) deterrence, b) their ability to do full spectrum
    training, and c) the confidence of our partners and allies in the
    region?
        Admiral Davidson. Time and lift capacity are critical for enabling
    the Joint Force with a Marine force capable of responding to a crisis.
    Allies and partners would likely interpret moving the Marines and their
    dependents east of the International Date Line as a lack of United
    States commitment to the region given the distances to the South and
    East China Sea. Meanwhile, our adversaries could be emboldened by
    decreased United States presence. Keeping expeditionary training in
    Guam while maintaining a solid footprint in Japan provides for
    responsible, politically stable, and timely options to maneuver inside
    the First Island Chain during crisis. Presence matters--both permanent
    and rotational.

        58. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, what is the current status of
    Futenma base relocation, the current challenges as you see them, and
    how worried are you that the construction won't be successfully
    completed?
        Admiral Davidson. The 2013 Okinawa Consolidation Plan designates
    the target date for completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility
    (FRF) program as 2022 or later. In 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau
    estimated completion in 2032, but that is a best-case estimate given
    current progress and anticipated obstacles. Currently, the FRF has
    approximately 10 percent of an estimated 206 projects complete. Another
    13 projects (6 percent) are currently under construction. Approximately
    4 percent of the total landfill required is complete. The Government of
    Japan is also resolving local construction and engineering issues. We
    are confident in the Government of Japan's ability to complete the
    project and the Government of Japan has repeatedly and publicly
    committed to doing so.

        59. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, what would be the impact if
    the project is not completed?
        Admiral Davidson. The FRF will have significant deterrence
    capability in the AOR and will also provide for enhanced defense of
    Japan. This FRF gives USINDOPACOM a substantial power projection
    platform for Marine forces. Any barriers to completion inhibit United
    States treaty obligations with Japan and negatively impact credible
    deterrence in the region.
                                     taiwan
        60. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, due to People's Liberation
    Army's (PLA) escalating military coercion against Taiwan over past
    years, this Committee has strongly supported maintaining the stability
    and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the exchange of
    senior officers and military personnel in all levels between the United
    States and Taiwan are critical to the development of Taiwan's
    asymmetric defense strategy and capability. Does INDOPACOM plan to
    support future personnel exchanges?
        Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM will continue engagements with Taiwan
    that focus on improving joint interoperability within Taiwan's
    military, enhancing Taiwan training and exercises, improving Taiwan's
    readiness, and supporting Taiwan's military professional development.
    Current and planned engagements include virtual key leader engagements,
    senior leader visits, institutional dialogues and steering groups at
    the Flag/General Officer level; academic and professional military
    education exchanges; subject matter expert working groups; conferences
    and symposia. Taiwan personnel also attend a variety of United States
    intermediate and senior service schools and enlisted professional
    military education courses.
                             5th generation fighter
        61. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, can you confirm that 5th
    generation airpower is a requirement for your mission in INDOPACOM, and
    can you explain how 5th generation aircraft, like F-22 and F-35, meet
    that requirement?
        Admiral Davidson. The F-35 and F-22 aircraft are vital to our
    USINDOPACOM mission to counter a near-peer's highly advanced, multi-
    dimensional, integrated defense networks. Stealth technology, combined
    with other formidable 5th generation capabilities, increases
    survivability and effectiveness in an A2/AD environment. The F-35
    combined with the F-22's air dominance allows the US the ability to
    achieve air superiority in a contested environment.

        62. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, many of our key allies in the
    Indo-Pacific region are participants in the F-35 program. In your
    opinion, has the F-35 program had a positive impact on both military
    and diplomatic relations with these key allies?
        Admiral Davidson. The F-35 program demonstrates the positive
    impacts of working with allies and partners on modem weapon platforms.
    The F-35 program has allowed the United States to increase its level of
    collaboration and interoperability, which is also increasing ally and
    partner willingness to be net security providers. Furthermore, this
    level of shared technology improves interoperability with our allies
    and partners, which will enhance our combined exercises, training,
    operations, and ability to enhance coalition and joint force readiness.

        63. Senator Tillis. Admiral Davidson, China's advanced air defenses
    and fighter capabilities are rapidly increasing in capability and
    capacity. These capabilities are pushing 4th generation aircraft to
    greater stand-off ranges, often times beyond the targeting ranges of
    their weapons and sensors. Can you explain the importance of stand-in
    capabilities, such as 5th generation aircraft, and what advantages they
    provide if an engagement with China were to occur?
        Admiral Davidson. 5th generation fighters provide deterrence and
    operational capabilities like stealth and advanced avionics
    specifically designed to operate in an Anti-Access and Area-Denial (A2/
    AD) environment. 5th generation capabilities allow for better
    detection, targeting, and jamming of threats to achieve air
    superiority, suppression of enemy air defenses, and precise air-to-
    surface targeting. All of these requirements are essential to minimize
    losses if an engagement with China were to occur.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                       operating in an a2/ad environment
        64. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, the People's Republic of
    China has the capability, capacity and reach to employ thousands of
    missiles within the first island chain and hundreds of missiles in the
    second. This vast, asymmetrical arsenal will likely increase over the
    next several years. With that in mind, what do you consider to be the
    right mix of forward, blunt forces west of the International Date Line
    (IDL) and surge forces east of the International Date Line?
        Admiral Davidson. The force posture recommendations identified in
    the Section 1251 Independent Assessment provide the foundation for
    fielding an integrated joint force west of the IDL and a sophisticated
    improvement in interoperability with our regional allies and partners.
    The permanent forces currently located in Japan; rotational forces
    sequenced through viable locations in the Philippines and the Ryuku
    islands; and command and control, logistics, integrated air missile
    defense and Marine Littoral Combat Regiments in Guam provide the
    foundation for blunt forces needed west of the IDL.

        65. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, considering the robust Anti
    Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment of the Indo-Pacific, and the
    over 100 combat coded 5th generation fighter aircraft postured in
    Alaska, does it not makes sense to also base the next generation tanker
    (e.g. KC-46) in that state to serve as an air bridge to rapidly surge
    those fighters to the forward edge of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM needs the most modem, capable
    platforms strategically positioned to best support forces west of the
    International Date Line to ensure a ready and responsive deterrent
    force posture. This includes a distributed force posture that ensures
    rapid employment and survivability of joint forces. Given the force
    posture and robust training activities in Alaska, which will be further
    enhanced by the Pacific Multi-domain Training and Experimentation
    Capability (PMTEC), the need to distribute logistics capability as well
    as the 5th generation fighters also exists.

        66. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, what concerns do you have
    regarding our ability to resupply and sustain operations--especially
    across a distributed posture--in an A2/AD environment?
        Admiral Davidson. The tyranny of distance requires a distributed
    capacity to sustain the Joint Force across the islands and archipelagos
    of the first island chain and the Pacific Island Nations in the second
    and third island chains. The right composition of logistics platforms,
    nodes, ports, and supplier networks, along with appropriate protection
    is critical. The Joint Force must have sufficient visibility and
    interoperability within the network to prioritize and sustain the Joint
    Forces. We must achieve the same level of integration and
    interoperability with our allies and partners to conduct anticipatory
    logistics sustainment in every domain.

        67. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, what recommendations do you
    have to mitigate those concerns?
        Admiral Davidson. PDI requirements provide the foundation for
    establishing a distributed posture designed to deter aggression, assure
    our allies and partners, and if needed, transition to crisis or combat
    operations. We should continue to increase our joint force lethality by
    fielding systems and capabilities such as highly survivable, precision-
    strike networks along the first island chain, 5th generation F-35
    capabilities, resilient and redundant joint/multinational command and
    control networks, enhance logistics capability with prepositioned
    stores and Service agnostic infrastructure, and investments to re-
    posture fuel in the theater at point of need. These investments are key
    to ensuring U.S. freedom of action or access to vital waterways,
    airspace, and other lines of communication in an A2/AD environment.

        68. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, what concerns do you have
    regarding operational concepts--such as agile combat employment--the
    Services are developing to achieve a theory of victory in the region?
        Admiral Davidson. I am encouraged by the Service operational
    concepts but concerned with the ability of the Joint Force to integrate
    the Service-specific capabilities. The three functional areas we must
    address to close the gaps and make these Service operational concepts
    viable include the need to address the joint iterdependencies in the
    areas of command and control, integrated fires (offensive and
    defensive), and theater logistics.

        69. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, what risk are we assuming
    provided the services cannot execute those concepts for a sustained
    period of time today?
        Admiral Davidson. As the Indo-Pacific's military balance becomes
    more unfavorable, the United States is assuming significant risk of an
    outcome that is unfavorable to the United States and our allies and
    partners.
                 defense posture realignment initiative (dpri)
        70. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, DPRI is the program of
    record negotiated with the Government of Japan, which provided $3.1
    billion or about 1/3 of the estimated cost, to relocate Marine Corps
    Forces from Okinawa to Guam. The executive summary of the INDOPACOM
    report for section 1251 of the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA indicates the
    force design and posture effort: `` . . . begins with completing the
    Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI) . . . '' From your
    interaction with our host nation counterparts, how important is the
    execution of the DPRI program to the Government of Japan?
        Admiral Davidson. The Government of Japan (GOJ) strongly supports
    the DPRI program's relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, and has
    committed significant financial contributions toward this end. Since
    its inception, successive GOJ administrations have prioritized
    execution of the DPRI program. The GOJ views DPRI's moves as critical
    to improving local support for the Alliance in Okinawa. The GOJ works
    collaboratively with all USG execution and planning agencies to include
    United States Forces Japan, Naval Facilities Command, U.S. Army Corps
    of Engineers, and Marine Corps Installations Command, among others.

        71. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, there are some concerns
    about the ability of Marine Corps to train for full spectrum combat
    when they are moved to Guam. Can you outline what shortfalls currently
    exist if the move were to occur today?
        Admiral Davidson. Relocating Marines from Japan to Guam requires
    significant investment in training ranges for full-spectrum training.
    Those requirements include all forms of training, from static small
    arms to aerial gunnery and convoy live fire. To address these
    requirements, USINDOPACOM developed the Combined Joint Marianas
    Training (CJMT) concept and the Pacific Multi-Domain Test and
    Experimentation Capability (PMTEC). These two efforts, when resourced
    and complete, combined with training in Northwest Australia provided by
    Marine Rotational Forces-Darwin (MRF-D), will adequately meet the full-
    spectrum training requirements for the Marines in Guam.

        72. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, does the current DPRI
    program of record adequately address these shortfalls?
        Admiral Davidson. The current DPRI program includes development of
    the CNMI Joint Military Training (CJMT) complex. The Government of
    Japan is contributing approximately $300M (33 percent cost sharing with
    the United States) to the development of CJMT. Upon completion, CJMT
    will provide the joint force its most robust, multi-domain training
    capability in the Western Pacific. In an unprecedented way, it will
    build readiness while simultaneously retaining viable deterrent forces
    west of the International Date Line. CJMT will address forty-two joint
    training opportunities, to include amphibious assault, combined arms
    maneuver, and individual skills training, including military operations
    in urban terrain. This training, along with the lift capabilities
    described in my 1251 report, will improve current-training capabilities
    and will introduce all-new joint and multi-national training
    opportunities in the Western Pacific.

        73. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, so that I can better
    understand some of the tradeoffs involved with respect to: a)
    deterrence, b) ability to do full spectrum training, and c) the
    confidence of our partners and allies--what would be the impact, in
    your opinion, of moving those 5,000 marines and their dependents to
    locations east of the International Date Line--say for instance,
    Alaska?
        Admiral Davidson. Time and lift capacity are critical for enabling
    the Joint Force with a Marine force capable of responding to a crisis
    or conflict. It would take approximately 15 days to move 5,000 Marines
    from Alaska to East Asia by sea compared to approximately five days
    from Guam. Allies and partners would likely interpret moving the
    Marines and their dependents east of the International Date Line (IDL)
    as a lack of United States commitment to the region given the distances
    to the South China Sea. Meanwhile, our adversaries could be emboldened
    by decreased U.S. presence. Keeping expeditionary training in Guam
    while maintaining a solid footprint in Japan provides for responsible,
    politically stable, and timely options to maneuver inside the First
    Island Chain during crisis or conflict. Presence matters -both
    permanent and rotational.
           north korea missile capabilities and cooperation with iran
        74. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, in your statement for the
    record, you highlight: `` . . . North Korea will remain our most
    immediate threat.'' You go on to state: ``Pyongyang maintains a diverse
    and growing missile inventory, and North Korea unveiled several new
    ballistic systems . . . including two SLBMs [submarine-launches
    ballistic missiles] and an ICBM.'' Finally, you conclude that:
    ``Pyongyang's missile research and development efforts . . . are
    consistent with the regime's stated objective of being able to strike
    the U.S. Homeland.'' Can you broadly discuss how North Korea's missile
    program has advanced over the course of your assignment as the
    INDOPACOM commander?
        Admiral Davidson. When I assumed command in May 2018, the tensions
    that had spiked in 2017 when North Korea conducted a series of long-
    range missile launches had subsided greatly. However, at no time did
    Kim Jong Un reduce his support for his missile program or continued
    ballistic missile development. North Korea resumed short-range missile
    tests in mid-2019, likely for research and development purposes and to
    remind the international community of the North's capabilities. During
    parades in October 2020 and January 2021, North Korea displayed several
    previously unseen new missiles, including several short-range missiles,
    two submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and a larger, possibly
    longer-range ICBM, as well as several previously tested missiles. In
    all, North Korea paraded 10 ballistic missile systems, all of which
    they have developed in the past 5 years.

        75. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, how would you characterize
    North Korea's missile program advancement--in terms of risk--to both
    our regionally based forces and the U.S. Homeland?
        Admiral Davidson. North Korea's missile program is a clear threat
    to the region and a growing threat to United States Homeland, including
    Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States. The risk to regionally
    based United States Forces and our allies and partners has increased in
    recent years with the testing and fielding of short-, medium-, and
    intermediate-range ballistic missiles. North Korea has demonstrated
    improved mobile missile launch tactics, improved missile accuracy, and
    rapid-fire capabilities. Kim Jong Un maintains modest, but almost
    certainly growing, inventories of theater-strike missiles. His
    intercontinental-range missile program is still only partially proven,
    but Kim Jong Un is committed to developing a nuclear-armed ICBM capable
    of threatening the continental United States.

        76. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, provided you are able to
    answer in this forum--how long would you estimate until North Korea's
    missile capability and range can reach the continental United States?
        Admiral Davidson. North Korea is committed to developing a nuclear-
    armed ICBM capable of posing a direct threat to the continental United
    States. Pyongyang conducted its inaugural series of ICBM flight-tests
    in 2017, marking a significant developmental milestone, and during an
    October 2020 military parade unveiled a new and larger ICBM that has
    not yet been flight-tested.
        ICBMs are complex systems that require multiple flight tests to
    identify and correct defects and ensure the survivability and
    operational performance of the reentry vehicle and warhead. As such,
    while we lack confidence in the reliability and accuracy of North
    Korea's ICBMs, we must assume that they are capable of reaching the
    continental United States and plan accordingly.

        77. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, the United Nations provided
    a report to the Security Council in February that confirmed North Korea
    and Iran resumed cooperation on development of long-range missiles last
    year. This reporting followed shortly after North Korea showcased their
    largest ICBM, believed capable of carrying a nuclear warhead across the
    United States. To me this is exceptionally concerning as both countries
    would greatly benefit from the leveraged gained in being able to strike
    our Homeland. In your personal opinion, are we doing enough to develop
    and field both regional/homeland missile defense systems?
        Admiral Davidson. The ballistic missile threat facing United States
    interests in Northeast Asia remains significant and we are well
    postured to protect against existing threats from North Korea. However,
    we must prioritize investments in capabilities that address the
    aggregated challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Guam Defense System, an
    integrated air and missile defense capability on Guam, is required to
    defend against both North Korea and PRC missile threats. The Homeland
    Defense Radar-Hawaii is the most capable sensor available to defend
    Hawaii against North Korea's advanced long-range ICBM.

        78. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, how would you suggest we
    blunt the corrosive cooperation between these rogue nations?
        Admiral Davidson. The best way to blunt this sort of cooperation is
    to strengthen and expand the security architecture with our allies and
    partners to expose malign behavior and coercive tactics. These efforts
    increase information sharing and reinforce the common understanding of
    the regional security landscape.
                  india: high-altitude, cold-weather training
        79. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, the U.S. Army will host
    Indian forces in Alaska this year to exercise high-altitude, cold-
    weather combat skills. A Chinese military expert recently claimed that
    the Indian Army: ``has the world's largest and most experienced troops
    trained for high-altitude battles''. From my understanding, the same
    exercise will occur in the Himalayas in 2022. First, let me commend the
    efforts of INDOPACOM and U.S. Army in Alaska (USARAK) for cultivating
    this strategic partnership. Second, how can we advance it further to
    continue rebuilding robust Arctic capabilities that have atrophied
    significantly over the past decade?
        Admiral Davidson. We have much to learn from the Indian Army, which
    has a long history of operating at high altitudes and in extremely cold
    conditions. In 2018, for example, USARAK deployed personnel to visit
    the Indian High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS), the primary training
    institution for the Indian Army in cold and mountainous regions.
    Opportunities such as these allow United States and Indian forces to
    exchange best practices and lessons learned, improve interoperability,
    and further develop the United States-India bilateral relationship. We
    intend to seek similar exchanges and training in the future to improve
    our capabilities in austere mountainous environments.
                   fostering indo-pacific military expertise
        80. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, given the Department of
    Defense's shift in priorities from violent extremist organizations in
    U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to great power competition in
    INDOPACOM--as laid out in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and
    expressed by incoming DOD officials in the Biden administration--do you
    think Service Academies and other DOD educational institutions are
    adequately focused on educating our military officers and enlisted
    members to best understand and operate in the Indo-Pacific region? If
    not, in your personal opinion, how do we get after this knowledge and
    expertise shortfall?
        Admiral Davidson. The 2018 National Defense Strategy acknowledged a
    gap in professional military education (PME). In May 2020, The Joint
    Chiefs published ``Developing Today's Joint Officers for Tomorrow's
    Ways of War,'' and the Service Academies and other DOD educational
    institutions have been adjusting and aligning PME and talent management
    systems to further develop our military leaders for 21st century
    challenges.
        I believe there is still more to be done. Military leaders require
    more education on topics such as deterrence theory, innovation and
    experimentation, and a deeper understanding of the logistical and
    sustainment challenges operating in the Indo-Pacific Theater.
                     section 1251 report and range upgrades
        81. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, in your section 1251
    report, you identified range investments--which included the Pacific
    Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC)--with the
    objective of creating a fully instrumented, live-virtual constructive
    (LVC) training areas throughout the Indo-Pacific. How would upgrading
    ranges--like the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex--with a Secure,
    Synthetic Inject to Live LVC (SITL LVC) air combat training capability
    help INDOPACOM meet its requirement to provide forces capable of
    fighting in highly contested environments against technologically
    advanced opponents?
        Admiral Davidson. PMTEC is critical for developing the training
    capacity to integrate Service-recommended weapons and capabilities into
    a joint warfighting concept that deters the adversary and trains our
    most capable warfighting force while expanding the breadth and scale of
    experimentation.
        LVC is integral to PMTEC and will offer the Joint Force more
    effective, realistic, all-domain training and experimentation training
    at the tactical and operational levels. Fully modem range complexes and
    analytical tools will provide the foundation of the Joint Fires
    Network.

        82. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Davidson, how would providing SITL-
    LVC at the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, or other ranges, help
    increase overall readiness and combat capability of both INDOPACOM and
    allied forces?
        Admiral Davidson. LVC capability is critical to large scale,
    distributed training and enables our warfighters to train in a threat-
    representative environment. LVC simulates the highly contested threat
    environment of a near-peer conflict or operation. LVC is a must for
    enabling real threat emulation and live force-on-force training and
    provides the efficient means to increase and improve threat-
    representative, high-end training.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                            china's nuclear capacity
        83. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, in testimony you said that
    ``China has quadrupled their nuclear capability since the turn of their
    century, and they will at least doubled it during the course of this
    decade.'' Assuming no nuclear modernization and no additional
    production, when would you approximate a credible Chinese nuclear
    overmatch?
        Admiral Davidson. At its current pace of development, China's total
    nuclear arsenal will remain below United States levels over the next
    decade. However, China's improvements to effectiveness, reliability,
    survivability, and technical performance-including hypersonic
    capabilities--of nuclear forces, coupled with Beijing's lack of
    transparency, underscore the threat China's capabilities pose to the
    United States and our allies and partners.
        When considering the issue of overmatch, it is important to assess
    more than just the number of warheads. China continues to make rapid
    progress in training, command and control, operations, doctrine, and
    strategic intent while also increasing the number of warheads and
    launchers.
                             independent assessment
        84. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, you mentioned that
    ``Taiwan is the immediate ambition of the Chinese'' and that this would
    be a problem ``within the next 6 years''. What components of your
    Independent Assessment would prioritize addressing this ambition?
        Admiral Davidson. To address the Chinese ambitions, the most
    important action the United States can take is increase Joint Force
    lethality by introducing a 360-degree persistent and integrated air
    defense capability in Guam (Guam Defense System). This system must be
    able to integrate existing weapons control systems and must be robust
    enough to address emerging threats, including hypersonics. The defense
    of Guam remains USINDOPACOM' s number one unfunded priority.

        85. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, as aptly stated in your
    testimony, ``Partner Forces' assessment of U.S. reliability is not
    based on the military presence alone . . . It's going to take a whole
    of nation approach.'' How are we pursuing concentric lines of effort
    with other Federal Agencies in a ``whole-of-government approach''?
        Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM coordinates and leverages the unique
    expertise from 60 interagency and intra-DOD Liaison Officers embedded
    in the USINDOPACOM Headquarters. We routinely integrate interagency
    representatives into steady-state operations, joint military operations
    and strategic planning, the USINDOPACOM Joint Exercise Program, and
    contingency and crisis response. We also conduct outreach to the
    interagency teams embedded in each U.S. Embassy in the Indo-Pacific and
    in the National Capital Region for those agencies who do not have
    Liaison Officers in the Pacific.
                                 law of the sea
        86. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, can you please frame what
    ratification of United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
    (UNCLOS) would mean for you generally as the INDOPACOM Commander and
    what it would enable the joint force to do in that AOR?
        Admiral Davidson. Accession to UNCLOS will put the Joint Force in a
    better position to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
    allows, including throughout the Indo-Pacific. China is asserting its
    interests off its coast and in the South China Sea in ways that
    threaten foundational standards for the world's oceans as reflected in
    UNCLOS. China's attempts to restrict the rights, freedoms, and lawful
    uses of the sea available to commercial and military naval and air
    traffic is inconsistent with customary international law as reflected
    in UNCLOS. Accession to UNCLOS would help our position legally across
    the globe and would do nothing to limit our military operations in the
    manner in which we're conducting them now.
                              logistics/ mobility
        87. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, with respect to rotational
    forces under your command; do you assess the current amount of intra-
    theater mobility to be adequate?
        Admiral Davidson. No. USINDOPACOM requires new, smaller, and more
    distributed intermediate staging bases across the theater. Doing so
    allows for sea and air trans-loading to smaller intra-theater platforms
    that are more survivable and readily available.

        88. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, are we resourced to
    maximize bi-lateral and multi-lateral engagement opportunities in the
    AOR given our current connectors?
        Admiral Davidson. No. By law, approximately 75 percent of Security
    Cooperation funds go to USCENTCOM for Israel and Egypt, leaving the
    other five geographic combatant commands to compete for the remaining
    25 percent. To supplement, USINDOPACOM leverages Asia Pacific Regional
    Initiative (APRI) resources and the National Guard's State Partnership
    Program with 15 Indo-Pacific nations to further enable military-to-
    military and military-to-civilian activities in the region.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
    Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
    Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
    Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Good
    morning. Today the Committee will receive testimony from
    General VanHerck, Commander, United States Northern Command and
    North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, and from
    Admiral Craig Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command. General
    VanHerck is appearing for his first posture hearing in his
    current command, and Admiral Faller is returning to testify as
    Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Commander, and this could be your
    last hearing before the Committee, Admiral. Thank you for your
    dedicated service to the Nation and the Navy. We appreciate it
    very much.
        I want to thank both of you, indeed, for your decades of
    service and also, obviously, thank your families for the
    sacrifices that they have made to support you. On behalf of the
    Committee, I also want you to thank the men and women under
    your commands for their selfless dedication and service to the
    Nation.
        The security environment we face today is fundamentally
    different than even a decade ago. Near-peer competitors China
    and Russia have significantly narrowed the technological
    advantages that the United States military previously enjoyed,
    and they threaten to contest our military operations across all
    domains, including land, sea, air, cyberspace, and space. The
    2018 National Defense Strategy shifted our defense priorities
    to focus foremost on strategic competition with China and
    Russia, but we need to better define what our objectives are
    for out-competing our adversaries in this geopolitical rivalry.
        General VanHerck, you are responsible for protecting the
    Homeland, and over the last year that mission has centered on
    the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the request of the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM) has deployed more than 2,200 personnel at part of 25
    vaccination support teams at 17 sites in nine states,
    administering more than 50,000 doses daily. I understand that
    FEMA has discussed with you ramping up to 100 vaccination
    support teams, with the capacity to vaccinate over 400,000
    people per day. This is in addition to the more than 30,000
    National Guard members supporting civil authorities across 46
    states and 3 territories. General VanHerck, I hope you will
    share your views on the challenges in scaling up this effort
    and any lessons learned regarding what we need long-term for
    addressing future pandemic threats to our Nation's health
    security.
        NORTHCOM is also tasked with operating our Homeland
    ballistic missile defense, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
    system, to protect the United States against an
    intercontinental ballistic missile attack from rogue states.
    The threat from North Korea has only grown in recent years, and
    I would be interested in hearing your assessment of what
    additional steps can be taken to better integrate our domain
    awareness and modernize our missile defense systems, including
    plans for the Next Generation Interceptor, and the so-called
    ``underlayer'' of missile defense protection for the Homeland.
        NORTHCOM is designated as the advocate for capabilities in
    the Arctic, and plays a leading role in bringing together the
    combatant commands that share responsibilities for this
    increasingly critical region. As Russia and China become more
    assertive in the Arctic, it is essential that we develop a
    unified response across combatant commands and across the
    interagency, as well as in coordination with our allies and
    partners. General, I would appreciate any updates you can
    provide on this critical region.
        The situation along our southern border has implications
    for both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. Despite President Biden's
    termination of the declaration of a national emergency along
    the border, and ending of the diversion of funds for the border
    wall, roughly 3,600 military personnel remain deployed in the
    region in support of the Customs and Border Patrol. This raises
    questions about what the Defense Department's role should be in
    a whole-of-government response to the situation at the southern
    border. In addition, recent weeks have seen an increase in the
    number of unaccompanied children arriving at the southern
    border seeking to escape instability and violence in their home
    countries. While these children need to be cared for in a human
    and safe manner on a case-by-case basis, I also believe we need
    to address the migration problem at its source, including the
    conditions causing adults and children to seek asylum at our
    border. Admiral Faller, I would be interested in your thoughts
    on how the Department can use security cooperation
    strategically to build partner capabilities and institutional
    capacities to counter the drivers of instability in Central
    America.
        SOUTHCOM's traditional mission has focused on countering
    the scourge of narcotics and the threat from transnational
    criminal organizations. The growing influence of China and
    Russia, however, threatens to further destabilize the region,
    as these geopolitical rivals take advantage of corrupt
    governance in the region to advance their own strategic
    interests. China's malign financial influence, and Russian
    disinformation amplified on Russian-controlled Spanish language
    media outlets, threatens to undermine democratic governments.
    In Venezuela, the Maduro regime, propped up with external
    support from Russia, China, and others, has caused millions of
    Venezuelans to flee into neighboring countries, with Colombia
    bearing the brunt of this exodus. Admiral Faller, I am
    interested in your assessment of the threat from near-peer
    competitors in the SOUTHCOM area, and how we might work
    strategically with partners in the region to build resilience
    to China and Russia's malign activities.
        I want to thank you again for being here this morning and I
    look forward to your testimony. I also just want to note, for
    my colleagues, that there will be an informal classified
    briefing by Admiral Faller in SVC-217 immediately following
    this session, until 12:30, when we must cease, and the subject
    will be the increasing Chinese influence in the SOUTHCOM area.
        With that, let me recognize Senator Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    calling this important hearing. I want to also thank our two
    witnesses, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. As you know, my top priority
    remains ensuring the effectiveness and implementation of the
    National Defense Strategy--we have all agreed this is our
    roadmap. This is what we are supposed to be doing. It is as
    true today as it was 2 years ago--which identifies competition
    with China and Russia as the central challenge to the United
    States' prosperity and security.
        However, the growing influence of China and Russia is not
    limited to Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Most people, when they
    think about that they talk about the South China Seas and other
    places where there are problems. Both countries have shown
    their way that they view the Western Hemisphere as critical
    terrain for fulfilling their global ambitions in challenging
    the United States. Admiral Feller, China and Russia are
    expanding their access and influence in your area of
    responsibility (AOR), through increasing arms deals, military
    deployments, and economic and diplomatic coercion.
        At the same time, much of the drugs poisoning American
    cities are coming from Latin America through the vast illicit
    networks operated by multi-billion-dollar criminal
    organizations. General VanHerck, you have operational
    responsibility for the defense of the United States Homeland.
    We are facing a lot of challenges from the growing Chinese and
    Russian missile capabilities, including advanced cruise
    missiles and hypersonic missiles. I hope you will discuss any
    emerging gaps you foresee in our Homeland defense and offer
    your recommendations for addressing these challenges.
    Specifically, I am interested in your views on whether waiting
    another decade for a new ground-based interceptor makes any
    sense or if we need to act sooner, given the growing threat
    from our adversaries.
        Meanwhile, we are seeing a new crisis brewing on the
    southwest border. According to The New York Times,
    approximately 78,000 immigrants tried to cross the border in
    January. That is double the number that were there from the
    year before. So we know that is happening. We know that his
    increasing. We do not have the numbers yet of the--I tried to
    get them this morning--of February. We do not have those
    numbers yet, but we will get them, and we see that this thing
    is getting worse.
        I have always said border security is a national security,
    and my visit to the border in August of 2019 confirmed this
    belief. These new statistics are alarming, so I hope you will
    address whether NORTHCOM's border support mission is sufficient
    and what we can do to better ensure that our laws are enforced.
        You know, we talk around this thing, and nobody wants to
    talk about it. No one wants to admit it. We have got a new
    President now and the new President has a different mission.
    You know, he wants everyone to love him, and I understand that.
    I have a picture here that I want to be made part of the
    record. This is all these people coming across illegally,
    wearing their Biden t-shirts. Now this is going on, you guys.
    Do not act like it is not. Anyway, we need to face this
    problem.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe, and now
    let me recognize Admiral Faller for his testimony.

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

        Admiral Faller. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, distinguished Members of the Committee. I thank you for
    the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to be
    here with my friend and shipmate, General Glen VanHerck from
    the United States Northern Command.
        Now more than ever, I feel a sense of urgency about the
    global threats we face here in our neighborhood, this region,
    our home. This neighborhood is our home. It is a shared
    neighborhood. It is a hemisphere which is of vital national
    interest to the United States.
        Two of the most significant threats we face are China and
    transnational criminal organizations. The Chinese Communist
    Party, with its insidious and corrupt influence, seeks regional
    and global economic dominance, in its own version of a rules-
    based international order. Our strategic competition with China
    is global, not just in the Taiwan Strait or the South China
    Sea. China is quickly growing its influence here, in our
    hemisphere, working on over 40 port deals, dishing out
    significant loans for political and economic influence, pushing
    for information technology (IT) structure, and engaging in
    predatory practices like illegal, unregulated, and unreported
    fishing. We have seen many of these tactics in Asia and Africa,
    and we cannot let them prevail here in our neighborhood.
        Transnational criminal organizations pose a direct threat
    to our national security. They traffic in arms, humans, drugs,
    and they claim tens of thousands of lives in America every
    year. These murderous tactics have resulted in 43 of the 50
    most violent cities in the world being here in this hemisphere,
    and they drive illegal migration and they allow bad actors like
    China to gain influence.
        COVID-19 has hit this hemisphere hard. According to the
    International Monetary Fund (IMF), the economies of Latin
    America and the Caribbean shrunk 7.4 percent in 2020. The
    impacts of the pandemic, like a perfect storm, will alter the
    hemisphere for years to come.
        In the midst of all this, two back-to-back hurricanes
    devastated Central America, causing even greater instability.
    The pandemic and these unprecedented storms struck on top of
    this already vicious circle of threats, creating strong push
    factors for people in the region seeking a better life, seeking
    security, to come with their families to the United States.
    Despite an economy in a tailspin, more than five million
    refugees have fled Venezuela and the illegitimate Maduro
    regime. Maduro continues to cling to power with the support of
    Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China.
        We cannot face such daunting challenges alone. The only way
    to counter these influences, these threats, is to strengthen
    partnerships. That is how we will in the strategic competition.
        I have been impressed with nations who have worked
    shoulder-to-shoulder with us, despite the pandemic, to counter
    threats. Nations like Colombia, whose professional forces have
    stepped up in the midst of the pandemic to conduct counter-
    transnational criminal organizations with dozens of other
    nations, and nations like Brazil, who sent their airborne
    company to our high-end training with the United States Army at
    Fort Polk, Louisiana.
        Good neighbors are here when you need help, and that is
    what the United States did in SOUTHCOM when COVID hit. We
    stepped up with our humanitarian assistance program,
    contributing over 450 projects in 28 countries. Overall, the
    United States is the leader in humanitarian assistance in COVID
    in Latin America and the Caribbean.
        SOUTHCOM works every day to build readiness with our
    trusted military and security partners. We do this through
    security cooperation. This includes institution capacity-
    building, legal training, education, international military
    education and training (IMET), and exercises. We focus on
    developing professional military forces that know how to fight
    and use the lawful use of military force. We focus on human
    rights training, Women, Peace, and Security programs, and non-
    commissioned officer (NCO) development. Modest investments in
    these programs and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance, and our presence, our posture, go a long way in
    this hemisphere and will help our partners counter these global
    threats.
        Finally, our success would not be possible without the men
    and women of our SOUTHCOM team. We are taking proactive steps
    to protect them from unacceptable behaviors, like sexual
    assault and harassment, racism and extremism. We take these
    threats seriously. They are a cancer to our readiness, and it
    is the right thing to do.
        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Inhofe, on behalf of the
    SOUTHCOM team thank you for the trust you place in us, and I
    look forward to our discussion and questions today.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Faller follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Admiral Craig S. Faller
        Over 2 years ago, you entrusted me with the great responsibility of
    leading the men and women of the United States Southern Command
    (USSOUTHCOM) in working with our partners to secure our hemisphere. At
    the time, our region faced a seemingly insurmountable crisis of illicit
    drugs killing tens of thousands of Americans every year, institutional
    instability and corruption in the region, and external state actors
    (ESA), like the People's Republic of China (PRC), looking to exploit
    the conditions posed by these threats. I committed to tackling these
    challenges by building trust with the Nations of this region and within
    our own interagency--by being the best partner we can be and by
    strengthening and complementing U.S interagency and partner nation
    capabilities to address these threats together. With your support, we
    have made notable strides, but much work remains to be done. I welcome
    this opportunity to discuss the significant national security
    challenges and opportunities we still face in Latin America and the
    Caribbean. This region is our neighborhood, directly tied to us in
    every domain. A threat to our neighbors is a threat to the United
    States; and an opportunity for our neighbors is an opportunity for us
    to make our neighborhood stronger together.
        In fact, after 2 years in this position, I feel an incredible sense
    of urgency. This Hemisphere in which we live is under assault. The very
    democratic principles and values that bind us together are being
    actively undermined by violent transnational criminal organizations
    (TCOs) and the PRC and Russia. We are losing our positional advantage
    in this Hemisphere and immediate action is needed to reverse this
    trend. The intervention goes well beyond economic influence, the PRC's
    strategic outlook with over 40 ports in progress, significant loans
    that are used as political leverage and predatory practices
    demonstrated in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing are
    weakening democratic institutions and leveraging the future of this
    Hemisphere. We have seen many of these same tactics in Asia and Africa
    over the last few decades and we are well aware of the results. We must
    act now to avoid those same results in our own hemisphere.
                             strategic environment
        The National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies defending the
    Homeland as a critical defense objective and recognizes that our
    Homeland cannot be safe without a stable and secure Western Hemisphere.
    USSOUTHCOM's primary mission is to keep our neighborhood safe from
    those seeking to do us harm so that our home remains secure. The
    threats in the Western Hemisphere are persistent, they're real, and
    they represent a formidable risk to our national security. Perhaps most
    urgently, this region has been one of the hardest hit by COVID-19; the
    health, economic, and social impacts of which will alter the hemisphere
    for years to come. In the midst of this pandemic, two back-to-back
    major hurricanes devastated Central America creating even greater
    economic strain. The pandemic and these unprecedented storms struck on
    top of an already challenging vicious circle of threats that jeopardize
    a secure, stable, and democratic Western Hemisphere. These threats
    include ESAs like the PRC, Russia, and Iran that actively seek to take
    advantage of the nascent, fragile democracies in this region and look
    to exploit the region's resources and proximity to the United States;
    TCOs that run all forms of illicit activities to turn a profit, at the
    expense of the rule of law, and more importantly, of the lives of all
    who are impacted along the way; and malign regional state actors--those
    countries within our own neighborhood, like Cuba, Venezuela, and
    Nicaragua, that perpetuate corruption and challenge freedom and
    democracy by opening the door to ESAs and TCOs at the expense of their
    own people. TCOs are a direct threat to the United States Homeland. We
    cannot face such daunting challenges on our own. The only way to
    counter these threats is to strengthen our partners in the region--we
    must build OUR team to win this strategic competition. If our neighbors
    are stronger, we're all stronger.
                           threats and opportunities
        COVID-19 and Fragility in the Hemisphere. There is an accelerating
    spiral of instability gripping the region as the pandemic has increased
    the region's fragility. Latin America and the Caribbean have suffered
    among the highest COVID-19 death rates in the world, and during my
    trips to the region, I witnessed the profound physical and emotional
    strain nations are experiencing. With only about 8 percent of the
    world's population, Latin America and the Caribbean are
    disproportionately impacted with nearly one fifth of global cases.
    Though nothing compares to the toll on human life, there will also be a
    significant socioeconomic impact on our neighbors for years to come.
    According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), per capita income
    in Latin America will not recover from the pandemic until 2025--later
    than any other region in the world. Coming on the heels of widespread
    public protests against governments throughout the region at the end of
    2019, these COVID-19 losses coupled with longstanding socioeconomic
    grievances and corruption have created the conditions for even greater
    instability and unrest among our partner nations. These conditions
    create a more fragile region that serves as fertile ground for our
    competitors to advance their own interests, both malign and legitimate,
    making this challenge even more complex. Even some of our strongest
    partners are at risk of instability due to this confluence of factors.
        Our partners' military and security force budgets are facing
    extreme pressure as governments use their limited resources to address
    the pandemic. Security forces are increasingly focused on the very
    near-term need for tactical items such as fuel, food, personal
    protective equipment (PPE), and vaccines at the expense of security
    operations. They are concerned that TCOs will gain even more freedom of
    action in their countries as conditions for corruption and illicit
    activity grow.
        In order to gain more access, presence, and influence in the
    region, the PRC and Russia are taking advantage of the pandemic,
    deploying medical diplomacy and disinformation campaigns--often
    overpromising and under delivering. The PRC is offering $1 billion in
    loans to the region for their COVID-19 vaccine and improvements to
    medical infrastructure, securing agreements with Argentina, Brazil,
    Peru, and Venezuela. This will further indebt the region to the PRC,
    which already holds $165 billion in loans. The PRC aims to enhance
    medical exchange programs, exploiting the pandemic to advance its One
    Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in trade, technology, and
    infrastructure. Beijing is also using COVID-19 as a pretext to donate
    Huawei technology that integrates with its 5G networks and Safe City
    programs--touting its social monitoring model as an effective and
    inexpensive contact tracing solution.
        Russia, too, is seizing the pandemic as an opportunity to increase
    its influence in countries where it previously had limited access.
    COVID-19 has also provided Russia with another avenue by which to
    expand its campaign to outcompete the United States in the information
    domain, pushing narratives about United States mismanagement of COVID-
    19 and claiming United States Government sanctions are choking the
    Venezuelan people at their most vulnerable time.
        What we're doing about it: Good friends are consistent and
    committed. While maintaining force health protection as a priority,
    USSOUTHCOM immediately responded to the needs of our partners in this
    crisis by providing humanitarian assistance to alleviate the burden on
    health systems throughout the region. Since April 2020, USSOUTHCOM has
    executed over 485 of these projects in 28 countries, with a total
    investment of more than $56 million, in addition to the humanitarian
    assistance delivered by State and USAID. Our efforts range from
    deploying field hospitals to providing critical PPE. \1\ The U.S.
    Government has delivered $226 million worth of aid, with an additional
    $35 million on its way, which is more than double what the PRC has
    donated. As part of overall U.S. Government humanitarian efforts, DOD's
    humanitarian assistance program is making an important difference in
    these nations and helping to build trust and bring stability to the
    region. In every conversation with my counterparts in the region, they
    lead with ``your assistance has been critical as we face COVID-19.'' If
    the U.S. wants to be the partner of choice--that means being first to
    respond in a crisis. Missions like the 2019 deployment of the USNS
    Comfort provided world-class medical care to over 68,000 people in 12
    countries and enhanced the medical readiness of our U.S. and partner
    medical personnel. We work closely with State and USAID to find
    innovative ways to deliver this kind of relevant and timely support to
    our partners and demonstrate our commitment to the region.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Only PPE that was available within the partner nation or for
    purchase from a third party were donated due to the simultaneous
    shortage we faced in the United States.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            external state actors (esas) and malign regional actors.
        People's Republic of China. The NDS's central idea of ``expanding
    the competitive space'' must be applied globally, not only in the
    Pacific, but also in our own neighborhood. The NDS requires us to
    ``sustain our advantages in the Western Hemisphere'' and maintain a
    favorable balance of power in this region, while bolstering partners
    against coercion.
        The PRC continues to increase its self-serving activities to gain
    global influence and leverage across all domains in the USSOUTHCOM AOR:
    cyber, space, extractive and energy industries, transportation hubs,
    roads, infrastructure, telecommunications, legal and illegal fishing,
    agriculture, and military training--Spanish and Portuguese-language
    military education modeled after United States professional military
    education. The PRC is also ``gifting'' security supplies and equipment
    as a way to gain access and win favor with regional security forces. As
    already discussed, COVID-19 has brought on a new era of medical
    diplomacy that the PRC seeks to leverage to its advantage. All of these
    overtures, to include the OBOR initiative, are part of a concerted
    effort by Beijing to indebt fragile countries in the region, impinge on
    our partners' and allies' sovereignty, and use its influence to extract
    concessions when needed. The PRC also thrives on and enables the
    corruption and lack of transparency in business and political deals
    exhibited in some of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
    Beijing pairs these engagements with aggressive information operations
    that spread disinformation--emblematic of how the PRC's actions are
    guided by different values than those of the United States and our
    regional partners.
        The PRC is rapidly advancing toward their goal of economic
    dominance in the region within the next ten years. In 2019, the PRC
    surpassed the United States as the leading trade partner with Brazil,
    Chile, Peru, and Uruguay and is now the region's second-largest trading
    partner behind the United States. From 2002 to 2019, PRC trade with
    Latin America soared from $17 billion to over $315 billion, with plans
    to reach $500 billion in trade by 2025.
        The PRC is also seeking to establish global logistics and basing
    infrastructure in our hemisphere in order to project and sustain
    military power at greater distances. Outside our region, Beijing
    consistently abuses commercial arrangements at host country ports to
    support military functions and obfuscate the true purpose of its
    overseas installations.
        Chinese Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing just
    outside or within the outer limits of South American Economic Exclusion
    Zones (EEZ) is another predatory practice that poses a threat to the
    livelihood of coastal nations. The Chinese Government admittedly
    subsidizes this activity and is reluctant to curtail it because of its
    importance to PRC's food security and economy, with IUU fishing costing
    the region about $2.7 billion in lost revenue annually. In August,
    activity of a fleet of approximately 350 Chinese operated vessels posed
    a threat to the Galapagos Marine Reserve and endangered species
    resulting in an international outcry, exposing this malign activity.
        Russia. Russia is increasingly asserting itself in Latin America
    and the Caribbean, pursuing a strategy intended to grow Moscow's
    influence and undermine United States leadership in the region over the
    long term. Russia is actively engaging in this region to counter what
    it views as the United States meddling in its near-abroad. Expanding
    air and sea access to project military power, it has agreements with
    Venezuela and Nicaragua that allow Russian warships to visit on short
    notice. Moscow has executed three strategic bomber deployments to the
    region since 2008 and made more than 40 port calls since 2010. Russia
    doubled its naval deployments in this region, going from five (2008-
    2014), to 11 (2015-2020). Russia is trying to make inroads in the
    hemisphere by providing security training and has conducted $2.3
    billion in weapons and military equipment sales in the last 10 years.
    At the same time, Moscow is working to discredit the United States by
    flooding the region's information space with disinformation, to include
    hundreds of articles distorting United States security actions. In
    2020, Russian Spanish-language media outlets more than doubled their
    social media followers from 7 million to over 18 million.
        Iran. Iran uses both formal and informal instruments to expand its
    influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and prepare for any
    potential contingencies. Tehran seeks to expand its economic ties to
    the region, and leverages its security expertise and well-established
    diaspora in the region to expand trade and its overall influence. The
    Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, Tehran's primary external
    operations unit for exporting the Islamic Revolution, maintains
    operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious and cultural
    institutions to enhance ties globally. In the past year, Iran has
    expanded economic and security cooperation with Venezuela on fuel
    transfers, food staples, and military assistance, possibly expanding
    the Qods Force's presence in the region. Tehran also relies on a system
    of Iranian state-sponsored and non-state facilitated media outlets to
    shape the information domain to generate empathy for Iran and Shia
    Islam and diminish Western influence in the hemisphere. Tehran
    maintains a Spanish-language channel that reaches 17 countries in the
    region.
        Venezuela. The Venezuelan people continue to suffer under the
    illegitimate Maduro regime. They lack basic services, clean water,
    food, and health care. The impacts of COVID-19, gas shortages,
    increasing levels of unemployment and inflation (at over 3000 percent),
    and human rights violations all compound one of the most severe
    humanitarian crises in the history of this hemisphere. The illegitimate
    regime is even struggling to provide basic services within Caracas, to
    which it previously diverted most of its resources to avoid threats to
    its control. Venezuelan migration continues to destabilize the region,
    straining the health systems and economies of Venezuela's neighboring
    countries. As of December 2020, approximately 5.5 million refugees and
    migrants from Venezuela were displaced globally, with some 4.6 million
    remaining in Latin America and the Caribbean. Venezuela is also the
    primary foothold and access point in the region for ESAs, enables TCO
    activities, and gives refuge to regional terrorist groups.
        Cuba. Cuba remains a regional corrosive influence that enables and
    inspires autocratic regimes in the hemisphere and is the primary
    supporter of the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela. Cuba is the
    entry point for ESA influence in the region and its reach extends
    beyond this hemisphere. Like the PRC, Cuba uses medical diplomacy to
    build international goodwill and gain back door access to undermine
    fragile democracies. Havana has fully exploited the COVID-19 pandemic
    to reinvigorate its medical outreach, a key revenue generator for the
    island at a time when it is desperate for income.
        Nicaragua. Nicaragua's current political crisis that began in 2018
    continues, with President Ortega's policies still leading to calls for
    his resignation. We are already seeing a concerning suppression of the
    opposition, in advance of this year's election. Managua maintains close
    ties with Moscow, whose security assistance to Nicaragua focuses on
    Professional Military Education, donations, and the provision of
    humanitarian assistance in a strategy to subjugate the Nicaraguan
    Government and counter United States regional goals. Over the past
    decade Russia built a joint counternarcotic training center in
    Nicaragua, trained at least 500 Latin American and Caribbean officers,
    and conducted multiple maritime and air deployments to the country.
        What we're doing about it. We work to effectively posture U.S.
    Forces to ensure we can achieve NDS objectives. USSOUTHCOM remains
    committed to maintaining our advantage and to our allies and partners
    to protect and advance mutual security interests. We, along with State
    do this through a wide range of security cooperation and assistance
    activities aimed at building partner capacity such as DOD's Joint
    Exercise and Humanitarian Assistances Programs and State's Foreign
    Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education Training
    (IMET) programs, as well as information and intelligence sharing. To
    put it simply, we outcompete bad guys by being the good guys. While our
    adversaries look for opportunities to extract, we look for ways to
    build up. We work with partners to understand where their capability
    gaps are and how we can help fill those in--stronger partners are
    better equipped to secure our hemisphere, our neighborhood. Our
    training is responsive to the needs of our partners, it's the highest
    possible quality, and includes emphasis on professionalism to include
    values like respect for human rights and the rule of law as an inherent
    element of professional military and security forces. It emphasizes the
    importance of a strong non-commissioned officer corps and empowering
    women as part of the entire force. At USSOUTHCOM, we are committed to
    integrating gender perspectives into all of our activities, and we
    encourage our partners to create structural changes in their militaries
    to allow for the same through our Women, Peace and Security in the
    Western Hemisphere Initiative. For a nation's defense and security
    forces to be sustainable, legitimate, and respected, the meaningful
    inclusion of women is imperative. Our Human Rights Office, the only
    such program at any Combatant Command, actively promotes building
    stronger military human rights programs with partner nation militaries.
        Our exercise program is designed to counter threats, build
    readiness, and enhance our partners' capabilities, interoperability,
    and domain awareness. This is a vital component of our strategy,
    allowing us to conduct multi-domain exercises with our partners and
    build interoperability and readiness that improve our collective
    ability to secure the region.
        Being on the field, with a presence at Cooperative Security
    Locations in El Salvador, Colombia, and Curacao, and a Forward
    Operating Site in Honduras, home of Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-Bravo),
    enables us to answer the call and build trust, when our neighbors ask
    for help in a crisis, as they did following the back-to-back major
    hurricanes that devastated Central America late last year. In the
    aftermath of Hurricanes Eta and Iota, our forces at JTF-Bravo, with
    support from our components and allies, responded immediately,
    conducting search and rescue operations and delivering lifesaving aid
    to areas isolated by the storms, delivering over 1.2 million pounds of
    life-saving humanitarian aid and rescuing 852 people. There is no
    better way to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region than to respond
    to our neighbors' needs in times of crisis.
        Through our security cooperation program, we focus on building our
    partners' capacity to conduct ground and maritime interdiction, defend
    their cyber networks, secure their borders and sovereignty, and
    maintain domain awareness. The Near Coastal Patrol Vessel (NCPV)
    program is a USSOUTHCOM initiative to address selected Caribbean and
    Central American partners' requirements for a maritime patrol vessel
    with the capacity to conduct sustained Maritime Interdiction
    Operations. Fielding these vessels in key partner nations will increase
    interoperability and regional ability to counter regional threats, the
    nefarious activities of which pose an existential threat to many of our
    partners.
        Another important capability to outcompete our adversaries in the
    region is intelligence-driven--we must gather information across all
    domains and share it as widely as possible with our partners. We shine
    a light on the PRC's predatory and corrupt actions so our partners can
    recognize the PRC's malign activities and make well-informed decisions
    on engaging Beijing. We continue to convey to our partners and allies
    that Beijing and Moscow seek to undermine their national sovereignty
    and fosters instability that allows TCOs a foothold within their
    borders. We also highlight that partnering with the PRC requires
    turning a blind eye to malign behavior that ranges from corruption and
    human rights abuses to environmental degradation and natural resource
    depletion.
       transnational criminal organizations (tcos) and violent extremist
                             organizations (veos).
        TCOs. TCOs are violent and they pose a national security threat to
    the United States Homeland. They share the goal of PRC, Russia, and
    other malign actors to advance their self-interests at the expense of
    our partners' sovereignty. TCOs engage in a wide array of illegal
    activities including drug and weapons trafficking, human smuggling and
    trafficking, and money laundering. TCOs make up an approximately $90
    billion a year life-threatening enterprise through cocaine profits
    alone and are responsible for thousands of deaths in the United States
    each year, forging a trail of violence, corruption, and instability
    through our region in route to our Homeland. In many cases, TCOs are
    better funded than partner nation security forces. In 2020, drug
    traffickers likely attempted to move an estimated 2,300 metric tons of
    cocaine, departing from the source zone toward the United States,
    Europe, and other markets. Their efforts persist despite combined
    security operations and COVID quarantine measures (such as border and
    port closures), indicating these traffickers are bent on undermining
    security and prosperity for us, our allies, and partner nations all for
    the sake of profit. The COVID-19 environment has caused some
    traffickers to stockpile cocaine, and complicated coca eradication
    operations in the Andean Ridge. Traffickers have adapted to the COVID
    environment, cocaine flow has increased and rebounded to pre-pandemic
    levels. We must remain ready with increased U.S. and partner nation
    presence and pressure to stem this flood.
        Narcotrafficking is a scourge throughout the hemisphere and TCOs
    aren't the only ones who benefit--the Maduro regime is heavily involved
    in trafficking narcotics, overtly supporting narcoterrorism while the
    innocent citizens of Venezuela continue to suffer under extreme
    oppression and grinding poverty. From 2015 to 2019 the known drug flow
    out of Venezuela increased by 145 percent. Over the last few years, the
    illegitimate Maduro regime has collaborated with National Liberation
    Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Dissidents
    (FARC-D) to move hundreds of metric tons of cocaine from Colombia
    through Venezuela via non-commercial aircraft and commercial cargo
    ships. This relationship also extends to illicit gold mining, a
    critical commodity that Maduro uses to sustain his illegitimate regime
    and military loyalty at the expense of the Venezuelan people.
        Regional Terrorist Organizations. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia Dissidents (FARC-D) and National Liberation Army (ELN) are the
    two main organized armed terrorist groups and drug trafficking
    organizations in the region whose actions pose a direct threat to our
    Homeland and partners. The FARC-D is composed of remnants of the FARC,
    who traffic drugs and engage in extortion and illegal mining to
    generate revenue. The FARC-D targets Venezuelan nationals for
    recruitment, using money, food, and safe passage to encourage or coerce
    desperate Venezuelan migrants to support their cause. The ELN also
    remains committed to fighting the Colombian Government and does so
    violently through the use of improvised explosive devices and vehicle-
    borne explosives. This group fundraises primarily through the drug
    trade and illicit mining, as well as by imposing ``war taxes'' on drug
    labs and other businesses in its control. The ELN and FARC-D benefit
    from unchallenged freedom of movement and protection in Venezuela, with
    much of their leadership operating with impunity from within Venezuelan
    borders. Venezuela has become a paradise of impunity for
    narcotraffickers, while the Venezuelan people are forced to endure a
    nightmare of insecurity.
        Al Qaeda and ISIS maintain some sympathizers in the region. After
    ISIS's intense propaganda campaign from 2014 to 2017, as many as 200
    Trinidadians left the Caribbean islands to join the fight in Iraq and
    Syria. Several family members who traveled with the fighters are still
    in the Middle East and seek to return to the region, which will
    challenge the region's security services at a time when they are
    already overstretched due to the pandemic. Hizballah leverages the
    region's Lebanese diaspora throughout Latin America and the Caribbean
    for fundraising, recruiting, and logistical support. Operationally,
    Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), its external operations
    arm, is responsible for at least three high-profile attacks in the
    region and three other planned operations that were disrupted.
        Special Interest Aliens (SIAs). In 2020, United States and partner
    law enforcement, with support from the intelligence community, arrested
    66 Latin American human smuggling facilitators involved in moving non-
    United States citizens who potentially pose a national security risk to
    the United States or its interests. These facilitators move SIAs from
    countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen--
    areas with pronounced VEO activity--through Latin America and toward
    the United States for fees ranging from $10,000 to $50,000 per person.
    This business is dangerous, but lucrative, generating between $150 to
    $350 million a year for the facilitators.
        What we're doing about it. Our regional partnerships are vital to
    security and prosperity in this hemisphere and to our collective
    ability to confront global challenges including ESAs, TCOs, and VEOs.
    The men and women of USSOUTHCOM work hard every day alongside our
    strong interagency and international partners to disrupt and degrade
    these adversaries, while maintaining U.S. presence, access, and
    influence in our hemisphere. The Joint Interagency Task Force-South
    (JIATF-S) in Key West, conducts our statutorily-directed mission to
    detect and monitor illicit narcotics, delivering a high return on
    modest investments. Last year, this international and interagency
    ``team of teams'' helped keep 264 metric tons of cocaine off U.S.
    streets. JIATF-S-facilitated interdictions historically account for
    almost four times the cocaine seized by all domestic and border
    enforcement efforts combined. In an operating area that is 11 times
    larger than the United States, JIATF-S provides the best bang for the
    taxpayer buck when it comes to keeping drugs from arriving on our
    shores.
        Last year, recognizing the seriousness of the TCO threat to the
    United States Homeland, the Secretary of Defense authorized an all
    domain enhanced counternarcotic operation to reduce the flow of illicit
    drugs, degrade TCOs, and increase interoperability and readiness. In
    the past year, the U.S. Navy stepped up, providing more ship presence
    and maritime patrol aircraft. These assets have achieved significant
    return on investment as well as provided readiness building
    opportunities for our Fourth Fleet and Navy crews. This initiative
    included an increase in surface and air platforms, other intelligence
    assets, and a Security Forces Assistance Brigade to work with our
    partners. We are putting these assets to good use, integrating with
    interagency and international partners across all domains to ensure
    long-term success. Through the employment of these additional assets we
    increased the targeting of known air and maritime illicit trafficking
    events by 65 percent. Our whole of Government and partner nation
    approach has disrupted over 240 metric tons of cocaine and almost
    100,000 pounds of marijuana. We have detained over 700 suspected drug
    smugglers, denied almost $6 billion of profits to TCOs, and most
    importantly, saved the lives of more than 2000 Americans. A Security
    Forces Assistance Brigade is currently training Colombian and Honduran
    forces to more effectively fuse their intelligence to inform manual
    eradication and lab destruction efforts----helping to stop the drug
    threat closer to the source, before it begins its journey to the United
    States. We plan on expanding this effort into other nations in Central
    America with a focus on capabilities to counter TCOs.
        With this increase of U.S. all domain presence and pressure--a sign
    of U.S. leadership and commitment to the region--our partner nations,
    who could have easily turned inward to focus on the COVID-19 crisis,
    instead stepped up their participation to counter TCOs, demonstrating
    their commitment to countering this threat. Key partners like Colombia,
    Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, and others have been
    involved in almost 60 percent of drug disruptions during this
    operation. Years of sustained security cooperation with our partners
    throughout our hemisphere is really paying dividends--we have helped
    build the capability of these nations to operate with us to disrupt
    drug shipments before those loads enter the Homeland.
        We have very willing partners in this hemisphere, and they
    demonstrated their commitment throughout the year, despite the
    increased challenges of COVID. Colombia kicked off Operation Orion V in
    April 2020, just as COVID was beginning to impact their country,
    stating that if the United States is committed to the drug fight during
    COVID, they would stand with us. Operation Orion V was a multi-national
    (26 countries), all-domain operation that resulted in 50 metric tons of
    cocaine disrupted, 72 drug labs destroyed, and $1.5 billion in profits
    denied to TCOs. The U.S. provided maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and
    analyst support to this operation. Colombia just concluded the follow-
    on Operation Orion VI, in which this coalition disrupted another 76.5
    metric tons of cocaine and detained over 400 traffickers. This is just
    one example of the large return on investment gained by combining a
    willing and able partner with a committed United States presence in the
    Western Hemisphere.
        While the Secretary of Defense agreed to continue sourcing this
    mission with traditional military assets, this mission also benefits
    from non-traditional resources. Congressional support to the
    counternarcotic mission has been instrumental in the success of these
    operations. We are filling capability gaps through innovative solutions
    like the Multi Mission Support Vessel (MMSV). The MMSV has supported
    the disruption of almost 8 metric tons of cocaine and 15,000 pounds of
    marijuana, denied over $180 million in profits to TCOs, and detained 48
    drug traffickers, while also keeping three low profile vessels carrying
    tons of narcotics from reaching our shores. It also extends the reach
    of our partner nation interdiction vessels as they launch in support of
    these counterdrug operations. We are applying commercially-available
    technology like unmanned aircraft systems to increase the MMSV's
    ability to conduct detection and monitoring and provide information to
    partner nation interdiction assets.
        SOUTHCOM employs less than 1 percent of DOD Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) resources to counter ESAs and
    TCOs in this region. To meet the mission, we are pushing the envelope
    with innovative techniques, focusing on a 21st century, non-traditional
    approach to intelligence that integrates publicly available
    information, advanced analytics, artificial intelligence and machine
    learning, and open collaboration with allies and partners to disrupt
    threats. These emerging tools offer persistent, AOR-wide coverage
    without risk to personnel at a relatively low cost and puts us in a
    position to better compete against adversaries. Our Technical Network
    Analysis Cell (TNAC) and Asymmetric Target Acquisition Center (ATAC)
    are just two examples of our approach. For an investment of $1.2
    million the TNAC at JIATF-S denied TCOs of $817.1 million in revenue by
    providing actionable intelligence, in cooperation with our law
    enforcement partners, that is shared with partner nations and
    interagency partners leading to numerous disruptions. The ATAC, run by
    our Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), is supporting law
    enforcement efforts to counter TCOs. The Congressional support we have
    received for ISR has been critical to sustaining the innovative
    capabilities that support our unique mission, making our non-
    traditional approach to ISR possible. USSOUTHCOM ISR activities are
    optimized for return on investment with a mix of traditional platforms,
    purpose-built sensors, and increasingly non-traditional collection
    methods. USSOUTHCOM will continue to work with the Department to ensure
    we can meet our vital mission to disrupt transnational criminal
    organizations, as well as work in concert with regional partners to
    confront shared threats.
        While we are making strides, we are but one part of the solution.
    This problem set requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society
    solution to address both the supply and demand sides of this threat.
    Drugs have killed 840,000 Americans since 1999, \2\ and continue to
    kill 70,000 Americans a year. Drugs cost our Nation billions each year
    in criminal justice, healthcare, and productivity losses--in addition
    to the suffering caused by shattered and lost lives. We must continue
    and further enhance the tremendous interagency and international
    cooperation we have fostered over recent years against this common
    enemy.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/trends-statistics/costs-
    substance-abuse
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As the U.S. Coast Guard provides the bulk of our counterdrug
    forces, the acquisition and deployment of their Offshore Patrol Cutter
    will be critical to keeping drugs off our streets and countering TCOs.
    Each additional force package (maritime patrol aircraft, flight deck
    capable ship, embarked helicopter, small boat (US Coast Guard over-the-
    horizon boat or U.S. Navy 11 meter RHIB), and law enforcement
    detachment) enables the disruption of 35 more metric tons of cocaine
    and the strong presence reinforces to our partners that we are all-in
    with them--building trust.
        On the counterterrorism (CT) front, our Special Operations
    Command--South (SOCSOUTH) maintains persistent presence in several
    countries in the region, working and training with partner militaries.
    Our focus is on improving partner nation CT response capabilities,
    interoperability, and information sharing. The DOD Rewards Program has
    again provided tremendous return on investment in the fight against
    terrorism. In 2020, USSOUTHCOM paid $979,000 in rewards to 54
    informants that resulted in the neutralization of a record 107
    individuals who were terrorists or force protection threats and seizure
    of 26 weapons/explosive caches and $952,000 in cash. Although this is a
    counterterror and force protection program, it also yielded significant
    counternarcotic effects including the seizure of 14 metric tons of
    cocaine and the destruction of 12 drug labs. We also continue to focus
    efforts on assessing the financial underpinnings of national security
    threats in the region and have deepened our counter-threat finance
    related collaboration with the U.S. Treasury Department and interagency
    partners. This includes providing direct analytic support to the
    development of sanctions against Central and South American-based
    transnational organized crime groups that launder money, traffic drugs,
    and corrupt government officials in the region. An area requiring more
    emphasis is TCO network mapping and holistic interagency and partner
    nation efforts to dismantle key TCO centers of gravity such as
    logistics and finances.
        USSOUTHCOM also takes a total force approach to these challenges,
    taking full advantage of the Reserve component, composed of Guard and
    Reserve Forces. With fewer apportioned forces and a smaller budget than
    most regional combatant commands, I have a great appreciation for the
    importance and critical support they provide to our interagency and
    international partners. The ability of the National Guard, to work
    directly with host nations and local institutions through the State
    Partnership Program is a force multiplier for engaging our partners.
    Over one third of those State partnerships are in our AOR,
    strategically complementing our security cooperation efforts.
        Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO). JTF-GTMO continues to
    conduct safe, legal, and humane detention operations. In an effort to
    do so in a more efficient manner, the JTF has taken steps to right-size
    its force and consolidate operations. To date, we have safely reduced
    military personnel by over 20 percent. This is part of an ongoing
    effort to continually assess all USSOUTHCOM operations to ensure we are
    maximizing use of resources.
                       what more can be done/what we need
        Quality of Life. People are our most important resource and our
    absolute priority. None of the initiatives described above would be
    possible without the tremendous work of our men and women. South
    Florida, including Miami and the Florida Keys, is a high cost-of-living
    area that poses many challenges to our personnel. The housing market is
    so competitive that personnel pay upwards of $10,000 of up-front fees
    in order to secure a rental unit. We are working with the supportive
    local community to find immediate relief options for our servicemembers
    and civilians on housing and other factors that contribute to the high
    cost of living. We are also appreciative of the Department of the
    Army's support to find a permanent, cost effective housing solution
    here in Miami. We have also established TEAM SOUTHCOM, a family
    readiness group, to support all of our families, especially as they
    transition to this high-cost area and a non-standard military
    installation.
        Congressional Support. We appreciate your support of our security
    cooperation program in the USSOUTHCOM AOR as a continued recognition of
    the importance of these programs in our hemisphere. We also appreciate
    the increased flexibility that Congress included in the Fiscal Year
    2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act by increasing the percentage of
    333 funds that may be used over 2 years. Greater funding flexibility
    increases our ability to plan and execute multi-year programs to build
    partner capacity. Congress also continued support to USSOUTHCOM's ISR
    program and the MMSV--two investments that will increase our domain
    awareness and ability to stop threats bound for our Homeland.
        Infrastructure. The Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization
    Act authorized planning and design funding for a new Command and
    Control Facility for JIATF-S, recognizing what the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers determined was a compelling need to replace its current
    1950's constructed facility. We appreciate this support and are working
    to complete the design for a resilient facility built to enable
    interagency and international collaboration for this critical mission.
    USSOUTHCOM is also working closely with the Defense Health Agency to
    replace the hospital at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (NSGB), which is
    experiencing severe structural deterioration. This medical treatment
    facility (MTF) is the only strategic medical hub to support the full
    spectrum of mission personnel operating in the USSOUTHCOM AOR! It is
    also the only MTF for personnel at NSGB, as there are no civilian
    options available. It is also important to note that NSGB is a
    strategic asset as the only U.S. base in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
        Supporting our Partners. The U.S. military has established programs
    that help our partners develop diverse and inclusive militaries that
    respect the rule of law and human rights. These are the characteristics
    of a professional force that has legitimacy in the eyes of its
    population. Consistent engagement with our partner militaries and
    security forces through programs like our human rights training and
    women, peace, and security programs, as well as through the range of
    security cooperation and assistance programs, is essential to our
    ability build their institutional capacity and resiliency to the range
    of threats we all face together.
                                   conclusion
        The security threats in the Western Hemisphere, our shared
    neighborhood, demand a sense of urgency. TCOs threaten our United
    States Homeland. We also see the rise in the PRC's leverage and
    influence is not just a South China Sea problem, it is a global
    problem, and it requires a solution that includes our partners and
    allies. When our neighborhood is strong, so is our national security.
    We no longer have two oceans to keep our adversaries at bay--their
    malign activity is knocking on our door, creating instability in an
    already fragile region, enabling TCOs to take hold in an attempt to
    weaken democracies and perpetuate corruption. We must stand by our
    partners.
        We hold ourselves to a high standard. We have strong values as
    Americans. We ensure our partners respect human rights; we train them
    on the responsible use of military equipment; we help build the
    institutional capacity to maintain professional military and security
    forces; and we operate transparently and in accordance with civilian
    leadership, international norms, and the rule of law. U.S. security
    cooperation with our partners ultimately bolsters our own national
    security and has done so for over 70 years. Investing in our
    neighborhood is an investment in national security and we are at a
    critical juncture where focus and attention are essential to
    maintaining positional advantage.
        I look forward to discussing our efforts to capitalize on the
    opportunities for shared security that exist in strengthening our
    partnerships.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral. General VanHerck,
    please.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
     STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
                                COMMAND

        General VanHerck. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    the distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a privilege
    to testify with you here today. I am honored to serve as the
    Commander of the United States Northern Command and North
    American Aerospace Defense Command, and I am grateful to appear
    alongside Admiral Faller, as SOUTHCOM is a crucial partner in
    Homeland defense.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands charged with the
    critical mission of defending the United States and North
    America, respectively. USNORTHCOM is the United States
    geographic combatant command responsible for the defense of the
    Homeland, defense and support of civil authorities, and theater
    security cooperation for Canada, the Bahamas, and Mexico. NORAD
    is the bi-national command that provides aerospace warning,
    airspace control, and maritime warning for the United States
    and Canada.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD's servicemembers and civilians are
    executing the Secretary of Defense's top priority by standing
    watch to defend our Nation against all threats, whether posed
    by competitors, natural disasters, or a pandemic. Over the last
    year, NORAD fighters, tankers, and airborne early warning
    aircraft responded to multiple incursions into our Air Defense
    Identification Zones, multiple ships sortied under USNORTHCOM
    Operation Control to defend our maritime approaches, and
    USNORTHCOM synchronized the Department of Defense's support to
    lead Federal agencies as thousands of servicemembers deployed
    within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility to aid states and
    local communities in the fight against coronavirus.
        Today, thousands of servicemembers are providing lifesaving
    vaccinations to our citizens. No matter the threat, we are
    always ready to defend the lives of our citizens and our
    Homelands.
        Right now, as we confront the scourge of this pandemic, the
    threats we face and the pace of change in the geostrategic
    environment continue to advance. We have entered an era of
    renewed global competition, and this time we are facing two
    peer competitors, both nuclear armed. We must adapt to the
    challenges posed by this reality.
        Since the first Gulf War, the United States military has
    focused on projecting power forward to confront rogue regimes,
    violent extremist organizations, and other potential
    adversaries who threated American interests. We trusted in our
    nuclear deterrent and an assured power project capability, as
    well as the blessings of geography, to prevent an attack on our
    soil.
        In parallel, our competitors expanded the definition of
    competition into economic and informational areas, and have
    aggressively advanced their own military capabilities to hold
    our Homelands at risk, both kinetically and non-kinetically.
    Those efforts were predominantly focused on long-range strike,
    improved delivery platforms, cyber capabilities intended to
    circumvent our defenses from all directions and in all domains,
    and exploiting a perceived gap between our foundational nuclear
    deterrent and our conventional Homeland defense deterrent
    capabilities.
        Concurrently, the rise of transnational criminal
    organizations and the subsequent strains on governance and the
    instability they create has created additional opportunities
    for our competitors that they are working to exploit today.
        We must outpace our competitors by accelerating our own
    efforts to transform our culture, investing in our people to
    grow both talent within the ranks and counter extremist and
    destructive behaviors anti-ethical to our values. We must
    invest early and often in relationships with allies and
    partners to develop a global team of like-minded nations, and
    we must factor Homeland defense into every strategy, plan,
    force management, force design, as well as all aspects of
    acquisitions and budget, so we deter in competition, de-
    escalating crisis, and defeat in conflict. To do this both
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are concentrating efforts on building our
    capability to deter, and, if needed, defend against
    increasingly advanced all-domain threats.
        Together with the Canadian Armed Forces we are in the early
    stages of NORAD modernization and building additional military
    capabilities in the Arctic. In coordination with the Missile
    Defense Agency, United States Strategic Command, and United
    States Space Command (SPACECOM) we are maintaining and
    improving our ballistic missile defense capability.
        In order to balance our readiness for crisis and conflict,
    while also staying in global competition, we are placing
    significant emphasis on left-of-launch framework. This
    framework will increase decision space, uncovering more
    deterrents and de-escalation options vice end-game defeat. We
    are advocating for investment in all-domain awareness, to
    generate a layered sensing grid and a layered defense approach
    that emphasizes the use of an open sensor data architecture and
    machine-enhanced processing in order to achieve information
    dominance and decision superiority. Through information
    dominance, we will grant decision-makers increased decision
    space and build flexible response options to deter, deny, and
    defeat every threat to the United States and Canada.
        I am grateful for the trust that you place in United States
    Northern Command and NORAD, and both commands take solemn pride
    in our responsibility to defend our Homelands. We will forever
    have the watch.
        Thank you for your support and time, and I look forward to
    answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General VanHerck follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by General Glen Vanherck
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and for
    allowing me the honor of representing the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
    Marines, Guardians, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians of United States
    Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD). I am especially privileged to represent the members of
    the Canadian Armed Forces who are a vital and essential part of the
    NORAD team.
        USNORTHCOM is the U.S. geographic combatant command responsible for
    defense of the United States Homeland. USNORTHCOM is also tasked with
    providing defense support of civil authorities and engaging in theater
    security cooperation with regional allies and partners. NORAD is a
    distinct, bi-national command responsible for three missions in defense
    of the United States and Canada: aerospace warning, aerospace control,
    and maritime warning. Canadian Armed Forces personnel, to include my
    three-star NORAD Deputy Commander, are essential to our NORAD missions.
        Since I assumed command of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, each day has
    afforded me the opportunity to lead a workforce of dedicated,
    innovative, and resilient warfighters and public servants. That
    fundamental commitment to our vital missions is clearly evident as
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD have kept the watch and defended our Nations in
    what is certainly the most dynamic and complex strategic environment I
    have encountered in my 33 years in uniform.
        Our competitors continue to take increasingly aggressive steps to
    gain the upper hand in the military, information, economic, and
    diplomatic arenas. USNORTHCOM meets each of those challenges head-on--
    and we have done so while supporting whole-of-government efforts to
    safeguard our citizens through the coronavirus pandemic and
    historically severe hurricane and wildfire seasons, and also
    simultaneously synchronizing the deployment of troops to support
    federal law enforcement personnel on the southwest border. The
    cascading events of the past year placed unprecedented strain on our
    people, our interagency partners, and our institutions, and I am proud
    that we overcame each of those challenges and emerged more resilient.
        That steadfast commitment is more important than ever as our
    competitors continue to target the Homelands through multiple means in
    all domains. Defending our Nations, our citizens, and our way of life
    requires constant vigilance, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD have demonstrated
    time and again that our commands remain determined, focused, and ready.
    But we must keep moving forward. Looking to the future, we will
    continue to pursue innovative new capabilities and strategies to
    detect, deny, deter, and, if necessary, defeat the mounting threats
    posed by peer competitors, rogue nations, transnational criminal
    organizations, and foreign and domestic violent extremists. No matter
    the challenge or circumstance, this Committee should rest assured
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are always on guard.
                                    threats
        The global geostrategic environment continues to evolve rapidly.
    While the United States has spent the last 30 years projecting power
    forward to combat rogue regimes and violent extremists overseas, our
    global competitors pursued capabilities to circumvent our legacy
    warning and defensive systems and hold our Homeland at risk. Peer
    competitors like Russia and China are undermining the international
    rules-based order and challenging us in all domains. Further, rogue
    states like North Korea and Iran are also pursuing capabilities to
    nullify our military advantages, threaten our networks with cyber
    weapons, and--in the case of North Korea--develop nuclear weapons.
    Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations continue to devise plots to
    attack our citizens and our way of life.
        During the Cold War, we were overwhelmingly focused on defending
    the United States and Canada from a single nation-state threat. After
    the Soviet collapse, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and later the September
    11, 2001 attacks shifted our focus to non-state and rogue actors.
    Today, we don't have the luxury of focusing regionally or on only one
    threat at a time. In the last decade, we've seen a sharp resurgence in
    the Nation-State threat as our global competitors deploy increasingly
    sophisticated capabilities to hold the United States and Canada at risk
    and limit our options in a crisis. Concurrently, the terrorist threat
    continues to evolve in ways that challenge our Homeland defense
    capabilities. As a result, today's threat environment is likely the
    most complex we have ever faced, as potential adversaries threaten us
    in all domains and from all vectors.
    Russia
        Russia presents a persistent, proximate threat to the United States
    and Canada and remains the most acute challenge to our Homeland defense
    mission. Russian leaders seek to erode our influence, assert their
    regional dominance, and reclaim their status as a global power through
    a whole-of-government strategy that includes information operations,
    deception, economic coercion, and the threat of military force.
        In peacetime, Russian actors conduct sophisticated influence
    operations to fan flames of discord in the United States and undermine
    faith in our democratic institutions. In crisis or conflict, we should
    expect Russia to employ its broad range of advanced capabilities--non-
    kinetic, conventional, and nuclear--to threaten our critical
    infrastructure in an attempt to limit our ability to project forces and
    to attempt to compel de-escalation. Offensive capabilities Russia has
    fielded over the last several years include advanced cyber and
    counterspace weapons and a new generation of long-range and highly
    precise land-attack cruise missiles--including hypersonics. These
    capabilities complicate our ability to detect and defend against an
    inbound attack from the air, sea, and even those originating from
    Russian soil.
        Russia also continues to modernize all three legs of its nuclear
    triad. In December 2019, Russia fielded the world's first two
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with a hypersonic
    glide vehicle payload that will challenge our ability to provide
    actionable warning and attack assessment. In the coming years, Russia
    hopes to field a series of even more advanced weapons intended to
    ensure its ability to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States.
    These include the Poseidon transoceanic nuclear torpedo and the
    Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, which--if perfected--could
    enable strikes from virtually any vector due to its extreme range and
    endurance.
        Finally, Russia continues to conduct frequent military operations
    in the approaches to North America. Last year, NORAD responded to more
    Russian military flights off the coast of Alaska than we've seen in any
    year since the end of the Cold War. These Russian military operations
    include multiple flights of heavy bombers, anti-submarine aircraft, and
    intelligence collection platforms near Alaska. These efforts show both
    Russia's military reach and how they rehearse potential strikes on our
    Homeland. Last summer, the Russian Navy focused its annual OCEAN SHIELD
    exercise on the defense of Russia's maritime approaches in the Arctic
    and Pacific. The multi-fleet exercise, intended in part to demonstrate
    Russia's ability to control access to the Arctic through the Bering
    Strait, included amphibious landings on the Chukotka Peninsula opposite
    Alaska, as well as anti-submarine patrols and anti-ship cruise missile
    launches from within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone.
    China
        China continues to pursue an aggressive geopolitical strategy that
    seeks to undermine United States influence around the globe and shape
    the international environment to its advantage. In the USNORTHCOM area
    of responsibility, China has made deliberate attempts to increase its
    economic and political influence with our close partners in Mexico and
    The Bahamas. While the United States remains the economic and military
    partner of choice in the region, China is seeking to grow its trade and
    investment in Mexico and, over the past few years, has invested in The
    Bahamas' vital tourism sector through marquee infrastructure projects.
    Militarily, China is rapidly advancing a modernization program that
    seeks to erode our military advantages and deter us from intervening in
    a regional conflict.
        China remains among the world's most capable and brazen cyber
    actors, stealing volumes of sensitive data from United States
    Government, military, academic, cleared defense contractors, and other
    commercial networks each year. In a crisis, China is postured to
    transition rapidly from cyber exploitation to cyber attack in an
    attempt to frustrate our ability to flow forces across the Pacific, and
    globally. China also continues to advance its counter-space
    capabilities that could threaten our space-based communications and
    sensors. In the foreseeable future, China will likely be able to
    augment its cyber-attack capabilities with a new family of long-range
    precision-strike weapons capable of targeting key logistical nodes on
    our West Coast that support United States mobilization and sustainment.
        China also continues to expand and modernize its strategic nuclear
    forces to rival those of Russia and the United States in
    sophistication, if not in numbers. Over the last decade, China fielded
    dozens of road-mobile ICBMs and several ballistic missile submarines
    designed to enhance the survivability of China's nuclear deterrent and
    ensure its ability to retaliate following any attack. In the next
    decade, China will deploy a new generation of advanced weapons--some of
    them hypersonic--that will further diversify their nuclear strike
    options and any attack. In the next decade, China will deploy a new
    generation of advanced weapons--some of them hypersonic--that will
    further diversify their nuclear strike options and any attack. In the
    next decade, China will deploy a new generation of advanced weapons--
    some of them hypersonic--that will further diversify their nuclear
    strike options and
    North Korea and Iran
        The Kim Jong-un regime has achieved alarming success in its quest
    to demonstrate the capability to threaten the United States Homeland
    with nuclear-armed ICBMs, believing such weapons are necessary to deter
    U.S. military action and ensure his regime's survival. In 2017, North
    Korea successfully tested a thermonuclear device--increasing the
    destructive potential of their strategic weapons by an order of
    magnitude--as well as three ICBMs capable of ranging the United States.
    In October 2020, North Korea unveiled a new ICBM considerably larger
    and presumably more capable than the systems they tested in 2017,
    further increasing the threat posed to our Homeland. The North Korean
    regime has also indicated that it is no longer bound by the unilateral
    nuclear and ICBM testing moratorium announced in 2018, suggesting that
    Kim Jong-un may begin flight testing an improved ICBM design in the
    near future.
        Iran continues to advance its military technologies and threaten
    the security of United States Forces and allies throughout the Middle
    East. Iran adheres to a self-imposed range limit on its ballistic
    missile force that prevents it from directly threatening the United
    States. Nonetheless, Iran is developing and testing ICBM-relevant
    technologies through its theater missiles and space launch platforms--
    including its first successful orbit of a military satellite in April
    of 2020--that could accelerate the development of a Homeland-
    threatening ICBM should Iran's leaders choose to pursue such a system.
    Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks via covert operations,
    terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber-attack capabilities, which it
    has already employed against United States financial institutions.
    Violent Extremist Organizations
        The terrorist threat has grown more diffuse, typified by simple
    attacks inspired from afar and carried out by individuals or small
    networks that are difficult for our law enforcement partners to detect
    and interdict. Foreign terrorist groups remain committed to attacking
    the United States, either directly or by inspiring homegrown violent
    extremists (HVEs) to act in their stead. Despite their territorial
    losses over the last several years, ISIS leaders--along with their more
    patient counterparts in al-Qa'ida--remain highly adaptive foes who are
    largely immune to traditional means of deterrence. Commercial and
    general aviation persist as preferred targets due to the
    disproportionate economic and psychological impact of such attacks.
    Meanwhile, foreign terrorists and HVEs continue to target U.S. military
    personnel both on and off base, as exemplified by the December 2019
    shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola.
    Transnational Criminal Organizations
        Transnational Criminal Organizations undermine the security of the
    United States, and that of our allies and partners, through
    increasingly violent and destabilizing activities that threaten the
    rule of law and our shared democratic institutions. These organizations
    have increased their collaboration with criminal groups beyond North
    America, which has increased their resilience. In our interconnected
    Western Hemisphere and globally, we must minimize the negative effect
    of organized criminal activity by aligning strategies, policies, plans,
    and authorities with the associated personnel and resources--across the
    United States Government and with allies and partners--to significantly
    diminish this proximate threat. All of this requires a coordinated
    whole-of-government effort to understand and manage these networks, as
    well as shared domain awareness across our government, allies, and
    partners. This national security imperative is integral to contesting
    peer competitors.
                             defending the homeland
        USNORTHCOM's defense of the Homeland provides the foundation for
    the full spectrum of the Department of Defense's worldwide missions and
    supports the missions of every other combatant command. The ability to
    deploy forces overseas, support allies, deliver humanitarian
    assistance, and provide presence and reassurance around the globe
    relies on our ability to safeguard our citizens, as well as national
    critical infrastructure, transportation nodes, and leadership. As
    competitors field highly advanced and agile long-range weapons systems
    and seek to act on growing territorial ambitions, we are adapting our
    thinking, evolving our own capabilities, and enhancing our operations
    and exercises to accurately reflect a changing world while remaining a
    relevant force.
        The United States has long relied on our nuclear arsenal to serve
    as the strategic deterrent against an attack on our Homeland. In
    today's threat environment, strategic deterrence remains foundational
    to our national defense. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear force
    remains the most credible combination of capabilities to deter
    strategic attack and execute our national strategy. The U.S. strategic
    deterrent has helped to maintain a careful balance between nuclear
    powers and remains the bedrock of our national defense, as the
    longstanding doctrine of deterrence by punishment makes clear to
    potential adversaries that a large-scale attack on the United States or
    our allies would result in an overwhelming and devastating response.
        However, over the last decade, our competitors have adapted new
    techniques and fielded advanced weapons systems with the potential to
    threaten the Homeland below the nuclear threshold. Simply stated, the
    missiles and delivery platforms now in the hands of our competitors
    present a significant challenge to our legacy warning and assessment
    systems and defensive capabilities. Advanced systems posing threats to
    the Homeland have already been fielded in large numbers, and our
    defensive capabilities have not kept pace with the threat. The notion
    that the Homeland is not a sanctuary has been true for some time, and
    that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we
    must ensure effective nuclear and conventional deterrents are in place
    to defend the Homeland and ensure our ability to project power where
    and when it is needed.
        Highly advanced cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and stealthy
    delivery platforms provide our competitors with the ability to hold
    targets in the Homeland at risk with conventional weapons. That fact
    has led us to emphasize improved all-domain awareness and the
    development of a layered sensing grid to provide warfighters and
    decision makers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels with
    increased awareness and decision space.
        The reality of a vulnerable Homeland and the risks associated with
    rising global competition are driving our commands to collaborate with
    interagency and industry partners to find and deliver smarter, more
    affordable technology. To outpace our competitors, we cannot be
    satisfied with incremental steps; instead, we must continue to increase
    the pace and tempo of our technological advancements. This work is
    essential, and we are proud of our close collaboration with a host of
    interagency and industry partners and international allies as we work
    together to outthink our competition, outpace threats, and defend what
    we hold most dear. That global focus and cooperation is also reflected
    in our growing wargaming capacity, including major Homeland defense
    exercises such as VIGILANT SHIELD and our participation in the Large
    Scale Global Exercise series.
                        the path to decision superiority
        I believe our future success in USNORTHCOM, our fellow U.S.
    combatant commands, and NORAD requires all-domain awareness,
    information dominance, and decision superiority. Our competitors have
    invested heavily in weapons systems that can be launched against
    distant targets with little to no warning, as well as stealthy delivery
    platforms specifically designed to evade detection by existing sensors.
    As a result, the successful execution of USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions
    in the digital age relies on significantly improving global all-domain
    awareness through the development of a fused ecosystem of networked
    sensors extending from space to the seafloor.
        This network will pull data from an array of repurposed systems,
    legacy sensors enhanced through low-cost software modifications, and a
    limited number of new sensors to provide robust indications and warning
    and persistent tracking of the full spectrum of potential threats to
    the Homeland from the seafloor to on orbit. Integrating and sharing
    data from this global sensor network into common platforms will allow
    leaders to observe potential adversaries' actions earlier in the
    decision cycle, providing more time and decision space at all levels.
        That decision space is where the true value of improved domain
    awareness resides. Harnessing the capability of distributed multi-
    domain sensors, machine learning, and artificial intelligence will
    provide military leaders, the intelligence community, and senior
    civilian officials with the information necessary to anticipate, rather
    than react to, competitors' actions.
        All-domain awareness is the first critical step on the path to
    decision superiority, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD require and have
    prioritized capabilities that improve our domain awareness and global
    integration with our fellow warfighters. Sensors and systems such as
    Over the Horizon Radars, polar satellite communications, Integrated
    Underwater Sensor Systems, and space-based missile warning and tracking
    sensors are essential to our missions. While the benefits to
    continental defense are clear, these capabilities will also help every
    U.S. combatant commander around the world while enhancing USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD's collective ability to defend the United States and Canada.
        In September 2020, just after I assumed command of USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD, the commands partnered with the United States Air Force and
    United States Space Command in the second onramp demonstration of the
    Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). This large-scale
    joint force demonstration established a network with embedded machine
    learning and artificial intelligence to rapidly detect, track, and
    positively identify a simulated cruise missile threat, while providing
    a common operating picture and all-domain awareness for commanders at
    multiple levels.
        The ABMS onramp demonstration provided a brief but exciting glimpse
    into the future of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. By creating potential pathways
    for accessing and distributing data in ways that allow leaders to
    think, plan, and act globally rather than relying on outdated regional
    approaches, we are significantly amplifying the capability of the joint
    force. Through these and other efforts, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
    actively working to deliver information dominance by fusing new
    technologies to increase decision space for commanders and senior
    civilian decision makers. Ultimately, our objective is to enable
    leaders and commanders all over the world to quickly assess any
    situation and take the steps necessary to stay well ahead of an
    adversary's next moves in order to deter and deny in competition, de-
    escalate in crisis, and defeat in conflict.
        The prototype Pathfinder data analytics project provides another
    example of how USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working to leverage existing
    but stovepiped data streams to the benefit of both operational and
    strategic decision makers. In our ongoing prototype efforts, Pathfinder
    gathers data from multiple distinct military and civilian air domain
    sensors and, through automation and machine learning models, produces a
    fused common operating picture to improve the reliability of the data
    and increase the decision space that will someday soon be available in
    real time to our assessors and watch-standers. This low-cost, rapidly
    developed system will have long-term benefits for our domain awareness
    and has already shown some of the advantages that information dominance
    will provide to warfighters around the world.
        Information is power, but only if it is accessible, sharable, and
    actionable. Unlocking the enormous potential of the data currently
    being collected by a global layered sensor grid will allow us to gain a
    decisive advantage over competitors and potential adversaries.
    Currently, vast quantities of data are trapped by incompatible systems
    and antiquated organizational structures. Breaking down these
    stovepipes is achievable, but doing so will require innovation and
    coordination across various agencies, to include technology that allows
    for timely exploitation of the massive volume of data collected by our
    sensor networks. More importantly, it will also depend on breaking away
    from a culture that favors compartmenting and isolating information, in
    order to fully realize the full potential of our capabilities--
    including those that reside with our allies and partners. As the
    defense and intelligence communities connect systems and sensors,
    consideration of national electromagnetic spectrum management policies
    is needed to ensure that necessary connections and bandwidth are
    accessible.
        As our competitors rapidly develop and deploy advanced capabilities
    with clear intent to overcome the U.S. technological advantage, the
    Department of Defense and the U.S. Government as a whole must also
    modernize our requirements and acquisition processes to stay ahead.
    Given the current pace of technological advancement, the limitations of
    the 2-year budgeting process and protracted acquisition timeframe
    simply do not allow us to take full advantage of the forward-thinking
    solutions our industry partners can offer. To succeed in this era of
    Great Power Competition, it is essential to rapidly deliver
    capabilities to the warfighter by streamlining the processes for
    prototyping, testing, and moving promising technologies into
    production.
        The success of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's Pathfinder program, along
    with much of the work done by DOD's Defense Innovation Unit, show what
    is possible when we provide innovators and technical experts the
    resources and flexibility to tackle even the most daunting challenges.
    The same approach should also be applied to software development and
    acquisition. Success in competition and in conflict will increasingly
    depend on the ability to field software-based capabilities faster than
    our adversaries. For that reason, I am encouraged by the new model
    championed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Sustainment that will enable the Department of Defense
    to acquire software through modern development practices and deliver
    needed capability at the speed of relevance.
        Armed with timely and accurate information, equipped with modern
    sensors and software, and backed by a flexible and responsive
    conventional deterrent that provides defeat mechanisms below the
    nuclear threshold, commanders will achieve decision superiority with
    the options and time necessary to allocate resources wherever needed to
    deny or deter aggression in competition, de-escalate potential crises,
    and defeat adversaries should conflict arise.
                                missile defense
    Ballistic Missile Defense
        The need for a robust and modern ballistic missile defense system
    has been strongly reinforced over the past year. Despite United States
    efforts in 2020 to reach an agreement with Kim Jong-un, North Korea
    continued its development of ICBMs capable of striking targets in the
    United States. As North Korea continues its pursuit of advanced long-
    range strategic weapons--including the new systems displayed during
    their 10 October 2020 parade--USNORTHCOM remains committed to
    maximizing the capability and capacity of our ballistic missile defense
    systems.
        USNORTHCOM is focused on developing and fielding advanced sensors
    capable of tracking potential missile threats and providing improved
    discrimination capability to our warfighters and assessors.
    Simultaneously, USNORTHCOM is collaborating with our partners in the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to ensure that the Next Generation
    Interceptor (NGI) is fielded and operational as soon as possible. Of
    note, USNORTHCOM worked hand-in-hand with MDA to ensure all of our
    operational requirements are addressed in the NGI acquisition process.
    When fielded, NGI will add 20 interceptors to the current inventory,
    and will provide greater reliability and capability.
        As competitor missile technology advances, USNORTHCOM is also
    working with MDA toward a layered missile defense capability that will
    allow for a more flexible and responsive defense of the Homeland
    against both ballistic missile and cruise missile threats. The
    successful engagement of an ICBM-class target by an SM3-IIA interceptor
    on 16 November 2020 was an historic achievement and a critical step
    toward establishing this layered capability. Defending the United
    States Homeland against the ballistic missile threat remains a complex
    and technically challenging endeavor, and I am grateful to the
    Committee for your continued support as we take the steps necessary to
    ensure the success of this critical mission.
    Cruise Missile Defense
        NORAD is devoting significant attention and resources toward
    mitigating the current and emerging threat presented by advanced, long-
    range cruise missiles. These sophisticated weapons are difficult to
    detect and can be launched from significant distances against targets
    in the United States and Canada from launch sites on Russian soil and
    by long-range bombers, attack submarines, and surface vessels. Whether
    subsonic or hypersonic, these missiles can range targets in the
    Homeland and present a very real challenge for our defensive
    capabilities. Russia has already amassed an inventory of both nuclear
    and conventional variants, while China is expected to develop similar
    capabilities in the next decade.
        The proliferation of these systems creates all the more incentive
    for focused investments in improved sensor networks, domain awareness,
    and information dominance capabilities. Those investments, coupled with
    the development of layered denial, deterrence, and defeat mechanisms
    capable of addressing current and emerging threats, are fundamental to
    the defense of our Homeland.
                                   the arctic
        The Arctic provides an avenue of approach to North America as well
    as a representation of the changing physical and geostrategic
    environment that is actively shaping our future plans and requirements.
    The escalation of Russian activity and Chinese ambitions in the region
    demonstrates the strategic importance of the Arctic. Competition will
    only increase as sea ice diminishes and competition for resources
    expands. Now and into the future, meeting the full scope of our mission
    requirements will require USNORTHCOM, our Service and fellow combatant
    command partners, and NORAD to devote attention, resources, and
    capabilities to the Arctic.
        Improving our domain awareness, communications systems, and our
    ability to conduct and sustain multi-domain operations in the high
    north are all important priorities for both USNORTHCOM and NORAD. We
    are fortunate to be able to draw on the experience and expertise of the
    Arctic warriors found in the Canadian element of NORAD, as well as the
    soldiers and airmen of Alaskan Command and the Alaska National Guard.
    Multi-command Arctic exercises like ARCTIC EDGE, ICEX, and NORTHERN
    EDGE provide valuable experience and lessons learned for conducting
    multi-domain operations in the high north, while the Joint Pacific
    Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) offers expansive and demanding training
    opportunities for the Total Force.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD are expanding our knowledge base and ensuring
    that warfighters and partners are developing the skills and experience
    needed to overcome the significant challenges presented by the extreme
    climate and physical environment of the high north. We are also moving
    forward with our Canadian partners to fulfill mutual objectives to
    modernize NORAD by leveraging industry advances in infrastructure and
    expeditionary capabilities that will strengthen our ability to sustain
    operations in and through the Arctic.
        Every successful military endeavor is dependent on reliable
    communications. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working closely with United
    States Space Force, each of the other military Services, United States
    Space Command, and industry partners to establish space-based
    communications networks that will provide greater reach, more
    flexibility, and the ability to communicate with every element of the
    joint force operating in the high north.
        I want to thank the Committee for your support for improving Arctic
    communications though a commercial constellation of proliferated low
    earth orbit communication satellites. This effort is well underway and
    will dramatically improve communications for military users in the
    Arctic, as well as for civilians in remote, high latitude communities.
    The capability will pay lasting dividends for all users and will
    enhance our defense of the Homeland, as well as our ability to provide
    defense support of civil authorities.
                                  partnerships
        Our successes as a nation have long been due in large part to close
    collaboration with partners and allies. With history as our guide,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are building and fostering the critical
    interagency, interdepartmental, and international relationships that
    are so vital to any strategic endeavor. Just as we are knocking down
    stovepipes that impede the flow of critical data between organizations,
    we are also striving to expand our collaboration and communication with
    our partners.
        Canada remains our essential ally in the defense of North America.
    For over 62 years, the extraordinary and irreplaceable relationship
    between the United States and Canada has been demonstrated through the
    constant vigilance of the world's only bi-national command, NORAD. That
    bond remains as vital as when the command was first established in
    1958. Meeting NORAD's crucial missions to provide aerospace warning,
    aerospace control, and maritime warning in the United States and Canada
    has required the command to adapt and evolve to address new challenges
    and emerging technologies that threaten our Homelands. Canada remains a
    true and trusted partner in our common defense and continues to share
    the economic and manpower costs associated with sustaining and
    modernizing vital NORAD capabilities.
        Over the past year, our competitors repeatedly tested NORAD, but we
    have stood firm in our resolve and capability to defend the United
    States and Canadian Homelands. The year 2020 saw Russian military
    aircraft entering the Canadian and Alaskan Air Defense Identification
    Zones (ADIZ) on multiple occasions to measure our responses to
    increasingly complex operations. As Russia continues to modernize its
    bomber fleets and improve the proficiency of its long-range aviation
    units, NORAD must maintain the ability to detect and respond to all air
    domain competitors.
        In addition to our aerospace control mission, NORAD provides
    warning of potential maritime threats to the United States and Canada.
    This critical mission requires uninterrupted contact with U.S.
    geographic combatant commands, the intelligence community, and NATO
    partners to detect and track maritime vessels of interest well before
    they cross into the NORAD area of operations.
        The importance of this mission was illustrated in September 2020
    when Russia conducted portions of its Exercise OCEAN SHIELD in the
    Bering Sea off the coast of Alaska. NORAD (and USNORTHCOM) monitored
    the exercise, noting that although the Russian vessels remained in
    international waters, they were in close proximity to United States
    civilian fishing boats operating in the United States Exclusive
    Economic Zone. That Russia would conduct a complex military exercise so
    close to our shore demonstrates the necessity for a robust and capable
    NORAD today and well into the future.
        As further evidence of both the global nature of the threat and the
    implicit trust in our bi-national command, NORAD is developing the
    requirements for the defense of the United States and Canada against
    advanced cruise missiles. In this capacity, NORAD works closely with
    the U.S. Military Services, the Canadian Joint Operations Command, and
    a host of other dedicated DOD and Canadian Defence Ministry partners to
    share costs and ensure a clear, common understanding of the threat and
    what will be required to mitigate the risk to our Nations.
        Mexico is a vital partner in our cooperative defense, and the
    USNORTHCOM relationship with our Mexican military partners remains
    robust. While the COVID pandemic has forced both countries to cancel a
    number of in-person engagements and planned training events, USNORTHCOM
    and our Mexican military counterparts have ensured we maintain routine,
    close contact through virtual engagements. From leaders at the tactical
    level, to the Mexican military liaison officers assigned to our
    headquarters, and up to the Secretaries of National Defense (SEDENA)
    and the Navy (SEMAR), USNORTHCOM is proud of the military-to-military
    cooperation and the personal relationships fostered over the years with
    our Mexican counterparts. Through well-established forums such as the
    Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable, USNORTHCOM and our Mexican
    partners have remained in close contact throughout the pandemic, and we
    continue to make substantive progress toward mutual security goals. The
    Mexican military faces significant challenges from violent drug cartels
    and from the effects of the pandemic, but USNORTHCOM and our Service
    components will continue to stand by our partners and work to enhance
    our domain awareness in the common defense of North America.
        The Bahamas is an important partner that has faced extraordinary
    challenges over the last 18 months. The Bahamas continues to address
    the severe economic impacts resulting from Hurricane Dorian in 2019 and
    markedly decreased tourism resulting from the coronavirus pandemic.
    Even so, we continue to work closely with our Royal Bahamas Defence
    Force (RBDF) partners to improve regional maritime security in the
    southeast approaches to the United States. USNORTHCOM directly supports
    RBDF efforts by enhancing their domain awareness with maritime
    surveillance system radars currently being deployed across The Bahamas
    island chain. USNORTHCOM is firmly committed to our lasting
    collaboration with the RBDF and will continue to support our neighbors
    and valued partners.
        USNORTHCOM has also worked with our partners in Mexico and The
    Bahamas to address our shared challenges in responding to the impacts
    of COVID-19. Since April, USNORTHCOM has been actively supporting
    response efforts to COVID-19, using Overseas Humanitarian Disaster
    Assistance and Civic Aid funds approved by Congress. To date, we have
    conducted 63 projects in support of the Mexican and Bahamian COVID-19
    response, totaling $7.29 million. A portion of that amount consists of
    reprogrammed CARES Act funds which Congress approved for that purpose.
    USNORTHCOM and United States Embassy support to Mexico and The Bahamas
    solidifies our position as the partner of choice for these nations and
    is critical to countering nation states, especially China, which
    continues its attempts to make inroads in both countries through offers
    for COVID-19 medical support, large-scale economic investments,
    information campaigns, and material support for infrastructure
    projects. Our relationships with Mexico and The Bahamas enhance
    regional security and stability and directly strengthen our ability to
    defend the Homeland through continued close cooperation with these key
    partner nations.
                      defense support of civil authorities
        USNORTHCOM provided defense support of civil authorities at an
    unprecedented pace in 2020, and many of those support missions continue
    today. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I serve as the DOD synchronizer
    for the federal pandemic response led by the FEMA and the Department of
    Health and Human Services. In that role, we remain tightly integrated
    with the interagency effort to assist health care providers and our
    fellow citizens around the country. As we have supported our federal
    interagency partners throughout this difficult national effort, members
    at every level of our command have demonstrated extraordinary
    commitment to meeting every mission requirement while diligently
    safeguarding the health of our own civilian and military workforce.
        The 2020 hurricane season saw 11 hurricanes make landfall in the
    United States, impacting countless Americans, while catastrophic
    wildfires ravaged millions of acres and displaced entire communities in
    multiple western states. The Commander of USNORTHCOM was designated as
    the DOD synchronizer for the federal responses to each of those
    disasters, and the Command stood ready to support FEMA and the National
    Interagency Fire Center with title 10 assets.
                                   conclusion
        As USNORTHCOM and NORAD look to a future marked by rapid shifts in
    the geopolitical environment and technological advancement, we are
    guided by the lessons of the past. Key among those is that we cannot
    overcome challenges in isolation. By viewing changing conditions and
    competitor actions from a global perspective, our problems become more
    solvable and the solutions more affordable. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will
    continue to build our partnerships, collaborate with fellow
    warfighters, and work toward overcoming shared problems rather than
    continuing to focus on point solutions to isolated threats.
        To that end, I look forward to working with the Committee and with
    all of our innovative industry and interagency partners as we move
    quickly to develop and field the systems required to defend our Nations
    now and well into the future. Together, I believe we can eliminate
    outdated barriers that only serve to stifle information sharing, and
    simultaneously foster a mindset that favors creative, forward-looking
    approaches over unproductive reliance on legacy systems.
        Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we will continue to
    prioritize our most vital asset: our people. With that in mind, I would
    like to take this opportunity to publicly recognize the select group of
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD personnel responsible for standing the operational
    watch 24 hours a day, every day. Their mission is crucial to our
    defense, and these military and civilian watch-standers have spent much
    of the last year under strict but necessary isolation protocols to
    mitigate the risk of a COVID outbreak. They and their families have
    endured long periods of separation during an already difficult time,
    and they have done so without any expectation of public recognition. I
    am honored to lead men and women of such selflessness and
    professionalism, and our citizens should rest assured these
    extraordinary defenders have the watch.

        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, General, and
    before we begin I want to remind my colleagues of the
    procedures.
        Since it is impossible to know exactly when our colleagues
    who will be joining via the computer arrive, we will not be
    following our standard early bird timing rule. Instead, we
    handle the order of questions by seniority, alternating sides,
    until we have gone through everyone. Once we reach the end, if
    there is anyone we missed we will start back at the top of the
    list and continue until everyone has had their turn.
        We will do the standard five-minute rounds. I ask my
    colleagues on the computers, and at their desk, to please keep
    an eye on the clock, which you should see on your screens or
    right before you.
        Finally, to allow for everyone to be heard, whether in the
    room or on the computer, I ask all colleagues to please mute
    your microphone when not speaking. Thank you.
        Admiral Faller, again, thank you for your distinguished
    service over many years. The Northern Triangle--Guatemala,
    Honduras, and El Salvador--is a particular unstable region, and
    many of those who are seeking relief and moving towards our
    border are coming from this area. Security and human rights
    have deteriorated there significantly, increased violence by
    criminal organizations and narcotics distributors. We can
    continue to provide security assistance to these countries, yet
    corruption remains rampant and international efforts to build
    capabilities are not effective.
        In Honduras, in particular, the corruption appears to have
    reached the highest level of the government. The criminal trial
    in the Southern District of New York of the Honduran
    President's brother unearthed evidence of the Honduran
    President and other senior officials taking millions of dollars
    in bribes from drug traffickers. Honduran security forces are
    also documented as having engaged in gross human rights
    violations for years.
        Given all of this, Admiral, do we need to reconsider
    whether our approach to security assistance in the Northern
    Triangle countries is achieving our national objectives?
        Admiral Faller. The perfect storm of conditions that you
    outlined, Senator, of violence, the impact of the pandemic, the
    impact of the hurricanes has created untenable security for the
    citizens, and that is why we are seeing this flood of migrants
    to our borders.
        Our focus at SOUTHCOM should and remains in support of U.S.
    Government hold efforts. Our diplomats in our embassies, and
    that security cooperation is a long-term investment on the
    professional militaries. So institutional capacity-building, we
    have a longstanding human rights training program that has been
    effective in developing forces that know how to use force in a
    professional manager.
        Our Women, Peace and Security Program (WPS) has proven to
    be a game-changer. Those nations want to model and emulate our
    success. Our NCO development, our IMET, there is an appropriate
    place, moving forward, Senator, for our long-term engagement
    with our partners. They model their professionalism after us,
    and I can trust elements of the Honduran and Guatemalan forces.
    We vet them. We work with our interagency.
        Chairman Reed. It seems, in those areas, and other areas
    around the world, we have invested a great deal in the
    military, and we have developed effective military forces, but
    so much of this is a law enforcement issue and a judicial
    issue. Again, this is outside your lane, but a whole-of-
    government approach would seem to need more of an investment in
    training police, in providing judicial remedies that are
    actual, not fictitious. Is that your view also? Do we need more
    help through our other agencies?
        Admiral Faller. One of the successes I have seen is
    watching our other agencies actually engage in judicial
    training programs and moving that forward. One of our own
    programs is the Defense Legal Security Cooperation Program, the
    Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
    program, out of Newport, Rhode Island, where we work with
    partners on how they can develop and effective judicial system.
        I think these programs are effective, Senator. It takes
    time to see the results of that effectiveness. But in the past
    year, when there was a lot of opportunity for our partner
    militaries to commit human rights violations because they were
    deeply involved in helping with internal security, they stayed
    on the field in a professional manner, and they did model their
    professional behavior after the training that we have been able
    to provide.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. General VanHerck, I am sorry, I
    have but a few minutes, but could you give us quickly sort of
    your takeaways from the COVID virus situation, what fundamental
    changes we might have to make?
        General VanHerck. Chairman, absolutely. COVID has given us
    great opportunity to reflect and learn on our planning, as we
    were ready. What we have done is continued to adapt. What we
    have found is that the support functions, the emergency support
    function process through the interagency is crucial, working
    with local and state authorities to ensure that we are synced
    up to provide that response. We worked closely with Department
    of Homeland Security (DHS). We worked closely with Health and
    Human Services (HHS), public health services, to ensure we are
    ready.
        In addition to that, we are going back and changing and
    updating our global pandemic and infectious disease plan to
    ensure that we are ready and have adapted the lessons learned,
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, General. Thank
    you both for your service.
        Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, there is
    a crisis on the border. I think we all know that. The number of
    migrants trying to cross more than doubled in January 2021 from
    the year prior to that, and the number of migrant children in
    custody has tripled.
        Now we have come a full circle. We do not like to talk
    about it. We had weak enforcement of our immigration laws under
    President Obama, and strong enforcement under President Trump,
    and now the expectation of a weak enforcement under President
    Biden is driving a surge of illegal migrants. That is where I
    have this picture here. They are all coming across the border,
    you know, they are coming fast, and they are all wearing Biden
    t-shirts.
        So we have got a problem down there, and I just have to ask
    the question. Admiral Faller, do you agree that a strong
    enforcement of the immigration laws serves as a deterrent
    against illegal migration?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, all nations deserve secure
    borders, and our focus has been on the heinous insecurity in
    Central America, caused by transnational criminal organizations
    that have no respect for the rule of law, rain violence on
    their population. They market in drugs and people and guns and
    illegal mining, and one of the prime sources that underwrites
    their efforts is Chinese money-laundering.
        So our focus has been on the source, working with----
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, but just a specific question. Do you
    agree that strong enforcement of immigration laws serves as a
    deterrent against illegal migration?
        Admiral Faller. The number one deterrent that I hear, when
    I speak to all our partner nations, is the United States
    judicial system. I agree, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, and do you agree with that also,
    General? Simple question.
        General VanHerck. Chairman, as previously stated, border
    security is national security. I agree that we must consider
    our laws that are in place. What we are doing right now is we
    are supporting the lead Federal agency from NORTHCOM, which is
    Homeland Security, that allows them to enforce the laws that
    are on the book. We are providing support in the form of
    aviation support, ground support through detection and
    monitoring as well.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. But you do agree then----
        General VanHerck. I do----
        Senator Inhofe.--strong enforcement of those laws. You can
    have all the laws on the books you want but if you do not
    enforce the laws, it is not going to work. Do you agree with
    that?
        General VanHerck. I do agree with that.
        Senator Inhofe. Very good, and Admiral Faller, I am a
    little concerned about something in terms of resources down
    there. In your opening statement, or it was in the written
    statement, I guess it was, you said that you only receive less
    than 1 percent of all Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), only 1 percent of all
    DOD ISR. Is that right?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, intelligence drives everything.
    That allows us to have the domain awareness that General
    VanHerck spoke about, so we can then inform our other
    interagency partners what the threats are up to, and we have
    less than 1 percent of the ISR.
        Senator Inhofe. You know, I read that some time ago, and we
    had a visit. I tried to figure out how that could be. Maybe I
    am missing something here. Less than 1 percent of ISR comes
    into that area, and I do not understand. That is not adequate,
    right?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, we are short in ISR, in
    intelligence assets and security cooperation, and we have, in
    general, our posture is thin. We have got to be on the field to
    compete, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Mm-hmm. Yeah, I agree with that.
        You know, I know the border. Back in the days when I was
    enjoying life I can remember I was a builder and developer down
    there. People on the East Coast do not understand this, but
    there is an island down there called South Padre Island. It is
    actually--now do not leave because you need to hear this--the
    island down there is 140 miles long and one block wide. I was a
    builder and developer down there. I know the border, and they
    talk about the tough border security and what is necessary.
        So I just want you to know I am familiar with that down
    there, and I think it is doing a disservice not to talk about
    it. We need to enforce the border, and I do want to have this
    picture made a part of the record at this point.
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        Senator Inhofe. With that I will yield the floor.
        Chairman Reed. Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    both of you for your service and for being here this morning.
        Admiral Faller, I want to start with you because I find the
    maps that you have given us and the statistics on these
    alarming, to say the least. On the map that shows Chinese
    influence, if you were going to give us a map that said
    ``United States influence,'' how many, for example, countries
    could we site that are hosting American infrastructure
    projects, and how many countries are enjoying training and
    military support or other economic support from the United
    States, and how many heads of state meetings could we cite
    since 2015?
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        Admiral Faller. Senator, our influence is eroding, and that
    margin is shrinking, and we would be best able to show that
    with arrows that have downward trends. It is important that we
    remain engaged in this hemisphere. It is our neighborhood that
    proximity matters, and as you pointed out, the Chinese see
    that.
        We hosted a conference last week at SOUTHCOM with our
    allies--United Kingdom (U.K.), Canada, France, and the
    Netherlands--who have significant interest in ensuring a
    stable, secure neighborhood. One of the foreign participants
    said that the region is in a lifeboat and it is sinking in the
    violence and it is sinking in Chinese influence.
        What I hear from my partners is, ``We hear you, Admiral
    Faller. We know that the United States military is the best. We
    want to partner with you, but when you are drowning and you
    need a life ring, you are going to take the life ring from
    whoever throws it.''
        Senator Shaheen. That is disappointing. I appreciate what
    you are saying and that was my reason for the question, because
    it is very clear that we are not keeping up in the way that we
    should in terms of influence and support in Latin America.
        Can I ask, when you talk about--Senator Inhofe raised the 1
    percent of resources that you have for SOUTHCOM, and one of the
    operations that you are responsible for is counternarcotics
    operations. In New Hampshire we have been dramatically impacted
    by the opioid epidemic, and obviously drugs coming in across
    our southern border come up Interstate 95 all the way to New
    Hampshire and northern New England. If you were going to define
    what percentage of your operations are counternarcotics, can
    you describe that, and if you had more resources would you be
    able to address more of what is happening with the
    transnational criminal organizations?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I would like to start by thanking
    the New Hampshire National Guard, our state partner for El
    Salvador, a critical partner, and National Guard across our
    region. That is our number one force provider. They have stayed
    engaged despite the pandemic in a way that builds trust and
    partners, and helps train them. What our real goal is here is
    to train our partner nations to take care of their own security
    problems.
        We cannot interdict our way out of the narcotics problem.
    We have got to get our partners in the game, and this past
    year, despite a pandemic, they actually increased their
    performance, their involvement up to 60 percent of all our
    disruptions.
        But that is still not enough. We have got to focus on the
    source and the destination. One of the key areas that needs
    more emphasis--and we have really worked hard this past year
    with our partners--is in countering the money supply. I talked
    about the importance of that, really getting to break the back
    of these organizations. I would that, in that regard, the Drug
    Enforcement Agency (DEA) has cited Chinese money-laundering as
    the number one underwriter of transnational criminal
    organizations.
        So it has got to be a whole-of-government effort, and we
    have got to work to build our partners' capacity.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, and thank you for your
    nice comments about the New Hampshire National Guard. I agree,
    they have had an excellent partnership with El Salvador.
        General VanHerck, I only have a little bit of time left,
    but I wanted to ask you about the impact that you are seeing
    from climate change on the Arctic, which we know is melting a
    lot of the ice there and opening up routes through the Arctic.
    What potential impact is that having on our national security,
    and what do we need to do to respond?
        General VanHerck. Senator, environmental change is having a
    significant impact, as it creates opportunities and it also
    creates vulnerabilities. The question is, are we postured to
    seize on opportunities and to defend against potential
    competition and vulnerabilities. This creates access, access to
    resources. Twenty-five percent of Russia's gross domestic
    product (GDP) is dependent upon resources in the Arctic, and
    both Russia and China are trying to establish new norms and
    rules and behavior for international law.
        I understand the time is out here. I would love to talk
    more to you about this subject.
        Senator Shaheen. I would love to hear that, and I would bet
    if we joined the Law of the Sea Treaty we might be able to
    better address some of the influences that China and Russia are
    doing. You do not need to respond to that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Wicker,
    please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Faller,
    could you supplement, on behalf of Senator Shaheen and me, the
    three charts that she mentioned? There is a Chinese influence,
    Russian influence, and Iranian influence. Can you get back on
    the record and just do one that says ``U.S. influence"?
        Admiral Faller. The U.S. remains a partner----
        Senator Wicker. No. Will you supplement, on the record, a
    chart? I am asking you to do that.
        Admiral Faller. Yes, Senator.

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        Senator Wicker. Okay. Very good. Let me ask you then,
    Admiral, about the involvement of the Coast Guard in what you
    do. I am also on the Commerce Committee where we have oversight
    there, and I have grown concerned that the Coast Guard is not
    sufficiently resourced to conducts its own missions, much less
    support what seems to be a growing demand for having Coast
    Guard units supporting DOD missions to SOUTHCOM and other AORs.
        Do I have correct information there? How much do you rely
    on the Coast Guard not just to counter drug and illegal fishing
    missions but also for theater engagement with us and our
    allies?
        Admiral Faller. The Coast Guard is a tremendous asset for
    us, and they are on the field in a meaningful way. They are a
    top priority for all our partners, building capacity and
    countering the threats. Despite the pandemic, the national
    security cutters, the fast response cutters, these are well-
    manned, well-trained ships, making a difference, day in, day
    out, including their aircraft. We could not do our mission
    without the United States Coast Guard. They are a principal
    source to counter threats in this hemisphere.
        Senator Wicker. Do we have enough ships to meet your
    theater requirements?
        Admiral Faller. We do not. We do not have sufficient Coast
    Guards or Navy ships to meet the requirements. We need
    additional assets and planes.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. General VanHerck, let's transition
    then to NORTHCOM, and once again I have the same interest as
    Senator Shaheen about the Arctic. I was pleased that the
    previous administration released an updated strategy for the
    Arctic. I am afraid that we lag behind our peers, particularly
    Russia. Is that correct?
        This year the Coast Guard begins construction of the first
    of a new class of icebreakers, the Polar Security Cutter. Six
    total ships have been authorized, a vast improvement over the
    two aging ships we have, but a far cry from Russia's fleet of
    40.
        Can you explain why icebreaking capability is so critical,
    and do you believe it is important to advocate for a larger
    fleet of Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers?
        General VanHerck. Senator, yes, thank you, and I agree with
    your assessment. We are lagging behind. Why it is so important
    is you have to be on the field to play. It is about
    persistence. Not only do we need to have access through
    persistence to break ice, to ensure that we can have Coast
    Guard cutters or potentially Navy destroyers or cruisers in the
    area, we have to have communications as well for persistence.
        I am thankful to the Committee for $46 million that got us
    started with polar communications. North of 65 latitude it is
    really tough to communicate. That will get us an initial start.
    But I also have a require for fuel north of Dutch Harbor,
    Alaska, which will also contribute to the persistence of
    competing in the Arctic.
        This is about persistence. We are in competition, as I said
    in my opening statement, and to be competitive with Russia and
    China, specifically in the Arctic, you have to be part of the
    on-the-field, if you will. So it is crucial that we do that and
    continue producing capabilities that will allow us to be in the
    Arctic.
        Senator Wicker. So fuel capabilities and communications
    capabilities are not where they ought to be. Last year the Navy
    was investigating the possibility of establishing a new base in
    the Arctic. Have you been involved in any discussions with the
    Navy regarding establishing a permanent base in the Arctic, and
    how could a Navy base improve your ability to execute U.S.
    Arctic strategy?
        General VanHerck. Senator, to answer your question directly
    I have not been involved in any discussions with the Navy. I am
    aware of the study that was done for a potential port,
    specifically with regards to Nome, Alaska, which will get after
    the requirement for fuel north of Dutch Harbor. That report was
    completed by the Army Corps of Engineers and submitted for
    congressional awareness.
        Senator Wicker. Would this be helpful?
        General VanHerck. Yes.
        Senator Wicker. Do you have an opinion?
        General VanHerck. It would be helpful to meet my
    requirement to have fuel for that persistence to compete with
    the Nations that are interested in the Arctic.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Now via Webex,
    Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
    Faller, as you noted in your written testimony, Russia has
    eagerly flooded online communities in Latin America with
    disinformation intended to undermine faith in democratic
    institutions and in the United States. Separately, China is
    investing heavily in information technology that can be easily
    manipulated by the Chinese Government through discretion for
    espionage or cyber intrusions.
        Do you feel that SOUTHCOM is adequately equipped to do its
    part to handle the separate but overlapping risks posed by
    these efforts?
        Admiral Faller. Recently, in a visit to one of our partner
    countries, I had the leader of that country lean over and say,
    ``How do I get rid of the Chinese information technology that
    was sold to get after the violence in the city, but then oddly
    appears outside the United States Embassy and other places,
    which are in the most secure parts of the city?'' These efforts
    have got to require a whole-of-government, whole-of-world
    approach where we offer safe technology and safe, affordable
    solutions, moving forward.
        For our part, we have really participated with U.S. Special
    Operations Command in standing up appropriate information
    capabilities to counter in the information space, and I think
    that effort is nascent. It is having some effect, but is very
    small scale, given the volume. In Russia alone, they had over
    17 million disinformation hits last year in social media.
    Outside Russian language, their Spanish language social media
    is their biggest effort, and they increased it three-fold last
    year, particularly trying to discredit everything the United
    States did to help our partners recover from the pandemic.
        Senator Gillibrand. Admiral, as you pointed out earlier,
    while China's economic coercion practices are only one element
    of its strategy to exert influence in the region, it is
    certainly an important one. Is there a way for SOUTHCOM and
    other U.S. entities to facilitate opportunities for economic
    engagement, where we can highlight the benefits of working with
    the United States as opposed to China?
        Admiral Faller. There are some great efforts that Congress
    has championed, the Developmental Finance Corps and others, in
    support of that. I think it is incumbent on all professionals
    like myself to learn as much about the economic elements as
    power as possible.
        But then to focus on what we do best, which is working with
    our partner militaries, supplying them professional training,
    professional education, and exercise programs. They want to
    partner with us. That is their North Star, and we have got to
    have the right security conditions so that we can have
    sustainable economics. Businesses are fearful when they cannot
    invest in a safe environment.
        Senator Gillibrand. Understood. General VanHerck, as the
    Admiral noted, it is clear that one of our biggest challenges
    in the Western Hemisphere will be China's technological
    engagement that threatens our security. Are we beginning to see
    any signs that China's growing technological presence in the
    SOUTHCOM region is forcing NORTHCOM to rethink its strategy of
    how it defends its domain, given the close proximity between
    the two regions?
        General VanHerck. Senator, we look closely at China's
    influence. They are absolutely in the NORTHCOM AOR, attempting
    to influence in the Bahamas, working through 5G, for example,
    the same thing in Mexico. We continue to defend all domains.
    NORTHCOM defends our critical cyber infrastructure with
    allocated cyber protection teams, and we work closely with
    Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and National Security Agency (NSA) as
    well. We are the disc synchronizer for cyber if there is a need
    to provide defense support of civil authorities. We continually
    work with civil authorities as well to assess the needs for
    homeland security, as well as other agencies across the
    government.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. In your written statement
    you indicated Russia and China had developed hypersonic and
    nuclear warhead-tipped cruise missiles. North Korea is also
    advancing its intercontinental ballistic missile program. These
    weapons put our allies and our own national security at risk.
    The current missile defense is based at the Ground-Based
    Interceptor, or GBI, which was fielded 16 years ago.
        Since that time we have improved the system and grown the
    size of the available arsenal. Last year, we appropriated money
    for the Next Generation Interceptor, the NGI system, to improve
    our defenses.
        While I am clear-eyed about the threat posed by enemy
    states' missiles, it is currently a time of competing
    priorities, particularly in light of COVID. In your opinion,
    can we still rely on the GBI for the foreseeable future, and
    two, assuming we need to push back on the NGI system, how long
    can we rely on the current arsenal?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I am comfortable with my ability
    to defend the Homeland, including Hawaii, against a limited
    state actor such as Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    (DPRK), which the system is designed for, for the foreseeable
    future. The key thing is to maintain the timeline of no later
    than 2028 for NGI, to ensure that we maintain capacity and
    capability to defend against a ballistic missile threat.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now via
    Webex, Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General VanHerck,
    I appreciated our discussion last week and I would like to
    revisit our conversation on the NGI. Senator Gillibrand was
    just touching on some points of that as well.
        When you talk about the threat that we are facing and the
    advancing threat that we are seeing, do you believe that the
    additional capabilities that NGI will provide the warfighter
    over our current interceptor fleet are absolutely necessary?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I do. It gives us extra capacity
    to go against threats that are developed that could exceed our
    current GBI inventory. In addition to that, it will give us
    capability, because the threat continues to advance their
    capabilities, such as decoys and diversion with that
    capability. So the NGI is crucial to give us that capability.
    It also provides us a foundation for our deterrence. It
    provides deterrence by denial. The nuclear deterrent is the
    foundation, but the NGI and the GBI give us deterrence by
    denial, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Also, you and I discussed
    the increasingly capable cruise missile arsenals that our
    adversaries possess and the very real threat they pose to the
    Homeland. In your opening statement you talk a lot about the
    concept of domain awareness. Can you talk about what that means
    for you, how it relates to the threats that are posed, say, by
    cruise missiles?
        General VanHerck. Senator, yes. Thank you for the
    opportunity. Cruise missiles challenge our legacy warning
    system significantly. They have generated very long-range
    capabilities. They can actually shoot cruise missiles--they,
    being Russia--today from over their homeland, which will
    challenge our legacy systems.
        We do not want to be in a situation, my personal opinion,
    where end-game defeat is our only option. We need to get
    further left, and that starts with domain awareness, left of
    the archer, if you will, before they take off, whether that be
    in a submarine, whether that be in a sea vessel, or whether
    that be in a bomber, to have decision space for our senior
    leaders.
        Decision space starts with that domain awareness. Once you
    take that domain awareness, whether that be from undersea, to
    space, to cyberspace, and everything in between, and you use
    machine learning and artificial intelligence capabilities, what
    I call information dominance, now we are able to get further
    left and give our decision-makers deterrence capabilities
    beyond the foundation, which is our nuclear deterrents, and an
    end-game kinetic attack, which would require a response, very
    escalatory in either one, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. You know, you are using all sorts of
    technologies now that you are applying on your demonstrations
    that NORTHCOM has conducted in this area. Do you have other
    examples you can share with us?
        General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator. So we have a program
    called Pathfinder that we have moved out on over the last year,
    that takes information data. I am a believer that the future of
    competition, crisis, and conflict, he or she with the data and
    the information will win.
        What we have taken is an example. So you will remember, in
    2015, when the gyrocopter actually flew down from north here in
    the National Capital Region and landed on the Capitol lawn,
    that situation, none of the sensors in the area, whether they
    be the NORAD sensors that we have or other sensors alone
    detected that target. But when we took the Pathfinder
    capability and we analyzed the information, we took information
    that was left on the cutting room floor that was not previously
    analyzed, there that gyrocopter was.
        That is what I am talking about, information today that
    exists in stovepipes in government agencies, even within the
    Department of Defense, that is not shared more broadly. We have
    to take advantage of data and information going forward,
    Senator.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Faller, Nebraska's RC-135s are frequent guests in
    your part of the world, and we know that the Air Force is doing
    what it can, but there are shortfalls. Last year, you told the
    Committee you only have 20 percent of the ISR that you need,
    and the bulk of that amount comes from Customs and Border
    Protection assets.
        As a commander, you said that only 8 percent of SOUTHCOM's
    overall ISR need is met by military assets. Is that still the
    case?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, compounding that 8 percent figure
    we received a 46 percent cut to our ISR-related budget this
    year, in year, so that will significant challenge our ability
    to understand the threats of all types in the hemisphere.
    Intelligence drives everything.
        Senator Fischer. So what gets left on the table as a result
    of your inability to get that ISR coverage?
        Admiral Faller. A significant amount of movement of
    transnational criminal organizations, our understanding of what
    our competitors are up to--Russia, China, Iran. A lot gets left
    on the table that is contributing to this violence, that is
    driving the instability here in the United States and in our
    partner nations.
        Senator Fischer. We see their presence growing in your
    combatant command area, so I understand the need for that.
    Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
    Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
    for your service and for being here today. As you know, the
    COVID-19 pandemic has hit the Caribbean and South America very
    hard. I am concerned that we need to continue to stay vigilant
    against attempts by Russia, and most especially China, to
    exploit the suffering of our neighbors to the south to increase
    their influence in the region.
        Admiral Faller, in your posture statement you stated that
    China and Russia are using the COVID-19 pandemic to gain
    greater influence in South America. Can you explain how that is
    occurring, and what would you recommend the United States do to
    maintain American influence in the region in the face of that
    public health threat during that time?
        Admiral Faller. The conditions that the pandemic has caused
    in Latin America and the Caribbean rival those of the Great
    Depression here in the United States. It will take years for
    the region to recover. The IMF has estimated it as the region
    with the longest recovery time.
        We have seen, and there was a New York Times article today
    on this, China particularly move in with a heavy-handed mask
    and vaccine diplomacy, that they are using the vaccines to
    leverage deals for their IT, their 5G, and they are using it to
    try to drive a wedge between some nations like Taiwan and
    others in the region. This is indicative of Chinese global
    coercive, insidious behavior. We are seeing it play out. We
    need to stay on the field, with a whole-of-government effort,
    and once we have taken care of the United States, be first with
    a concerted plan to take care of our neighborhood with the
    vaccines here.
        Senator Blumenthal. I hear you saying that we need a much
    more aggressive and, frankly, humanitarian effort in this part
    of the world, our neighboring region, in fact, part of the
    Western Hemisphere family, to take care of people in our own
    enlightened self-interest.
        Admiral Faller. Senator, to date I have been very proud of
    the U.S. Government effort in personal protective equipment
    (PPE) and other COVID-related supplies. We are not taking much
    credit for it, but by far and away the single donator in this
    hemisphere, and the Department of Defense using our
    humanitarian assistance authorities, we moved out with small
    projects at speed, over 400 projects, $54 million, and it made
    a real impact. But the next phase is going to be in vaccines
    and long-term recovery, and we have got to be as aggressive and
    forward-leaning in that phase, I would say particularly in this
    hemisphere, because the proximity here matters to the security
    of the United States.
        Senator Blumenthal. It is not only a public health crisis,
    it is really a very deep-seated economic crisis linked to the
    pandemic, I hear you saying.
        Admiral Faller. Senator, in October I traveled with my
    Civilian Deputy Commander, Ambassador Jean Manes, a wonderful
    diplomat, great civ-mil relationship, in our headquarters. We
    went on our first multiple-day trip. We traveled to Central
    America, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. The
    hollow look in the eyes of our partners, they are struggling to
    fill their gas tanks and find food for their security forces,
    because of the stress the pandemic, and the violence, has
    placed. This creates real opportunities for our competitors who
    are more than willing to step into that violent sauce and take
    advantage of it for their own interests.
        Senator Blumenthal. It has ramifications in terms of
    generating flow of migrants, the drug trade, all kinds of other
    ramifications that are disruptive to our country, potentially.
        Admiral Faller. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, I want to speak about the
    legal conditions on the ground in the Northern Triangle--
    Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Do the governments of
    those three countries systematically persecute their own
    citizens on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, political views,
    religious beliefs, or other such categories?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, when I go I am lockstep with our
    embassies, and we have got great diplomats. We do not see a
    systematic exploitation. I work with the militaries, and the
    elements we work with are vetted and trusted, and I find they
    are doing the right thing, whether it is Honduras, Guatemala,
    or El Salvador.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I think that is a very important
    point. The governments of Honduras and El Salvador and
    Guatemala do not persecute their own citizens systematically on
    the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, religion, or political
    views, which is the basis for asylum and refugee status under
    our laws. An economic migrant is not eligible for asylum. They
    are not eligible for refugee status. Asylum is designed for
    people, let's say, a Hong Konger whose student visa expires and
    does not want to return to Hong Kong now that the Chinese
    Communist Party has cracked down on that country.
        The reason we have a crisis at our border is because
    President Biden and his administration opened the border and
    ended the policies of the Trump administration that made it
    clear you could not make the very dangerous journey across
    Mexico, you could not pay smugglers and traffickers thousands
    of dollars to get to our southern border and then expect to be
    let in. If you let them in, more will come. That is why we have
    a crisis at the border.
        General VanHerck, we have been supporting the Department of
    Homeland Security at the border for some time now with DOD
    personnel. The most major adjustment of numbers was in 2018. Is
    that right?
        General VanHerck. That is correct. In 2018 and this year we
    are up to nearly 4,000, total numbers.
        Senator Cotton. Has the status of the border changed from
    2018 to March of 2021?
        General VanHerck. When you say ``status of the border,''
    can you clarify?
        Senator Cotton. The conditions there and whether or not we
    are closer to having a secure border or do we have a less
    secure border now than we did when this major personnel change
    first started.
        General VanHerck. I would defer to Homeland Security for
    the security of the border. We are in direct support of
    Homeland Security for that mission. I can tell you the numbers
    of migrants coming across had dramatically increased here in
    recent months.
        Senator Cotton. What kind of strain does that put on our
    personnel at the border?
        General VanHerck. Our personnel being DOD?
        Senator Cotton. DOD personnel.
        General VanHerck. DOD continues to provide support to
    Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection, mainly in
    the detection and monitoring. Total number of 4,000 does not
    place an incredible strain on the force, and has not shown
    significant strategic readiness of our ability to accomplish
    our missions.
        Senator Cotton. I have seen some media reports that suggest
    in addition to economic migrants, who are not eligible for
    asylum, showing up at our border from Latin America, that we
    are now beginning to see foreign nationals from other countries
    in Africa and Asia. To you knowledge, is that correct?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I am aware of intelligence
    reports that corroborate exactly what you just said.
        Senator Cotton. What kind of threat does it pose to our
    country that persons might be traveling from the old world to
    the new world to join these migrant flows?
        General VanHerck. I believe that we must continue to
    monitor anybody who has nefarious desires for our country.
    Homeland defense, border security is national security which
    equals Homeland defense. There will be people take advantage of
    the opportunity to come across that border.
        Senator Cotton. Yeah, I could not agree more, General
    VanHerck. I mean, if our border is open, anyone from around the
    world could get to Mexico and try to cross our border, not just
    to seek a better life here but to harm or ultimately try to
    kill our own people. I go back to this simple point: if you let
    them in, more will come.
        All the controversy you see in the media are misplaced,
    talking about how faster we are processing migrants through
    these detention facilities, or whether they have enough showers
    or beds or cots. If you do not let them in in the first place,
    you do not have to worry about the conditions in the detention
    centers.
        The Biden administration has to reverse course. There are
    three simple solutions. First, it should reapply the public
    health declaration under title 42 to all foreign nationals, to
    include minors, just like the Trump administration did, as the
    Biden administration still does for adults. Second, it should
    renegotiate a new migrant protect protocol with Mexico, which
    it tore up for no reason on its first days in office. Third, it
    should re-enter a safe third country agreement with Guatemala.
    If you are seeking asylum at our border, there is no reason you
    cannot seek asylum in Guatemala. That was the lesson of the
    last administration. Those three things alone will solve our
    crisis at the border, and they could all be done tomorrow.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Admiral Faller, I
    want to follow up on the comments made about the border crisis.
    It is a crisis and there are important things that we must do.
    I want to puncture the partisan finger-pointing that has been
    done, because it is a crisis, I think that we all have to
    solve. The notion that this was bad under the Obama
    administration, fine under the Trump administration, and now
    bad again is just not realistic.
        During the Obama administration, we worked together in
    Congress on a comprehensive immigration reform bill that would
    have poured tens of billions of dollars into border security.
    It was bipartisan in the Senate. It could go nowhere in a
    Republican-dominated House. It would not even get a Committee
    hearing.
        During the Trump administration, we came up with a plan
    that was bipartisan in February of 2018, that would have
    protected Dreamers and put $25 billion into border security,
    every penny that the President had asked for, and when the bill
    was introduced with 16 co-sponsors--8 Democrats, 8
    Republicans--the Trump administration, having said that they
    would sign the bill--"You put it on my desk, I will sign it,''
    is what the President told many of us--they decided, within a
    day, that they so did not like Dreamers that they were willing
    to turn away $25 billion in border security.
        We missed an opportunity in 2013 to put about $40 billion
    into border security because of a Republican House. We missed
    an opportunity in 2018 to put $25 billion into border security
    because the President did not like Dreamers.
        Now I do not say that to suggest that the problem at the
    border is the fault of one party or another. It is a challenge,
    we all have to deal with it, and we have to find solutions. I
    share my colleagues' views that one of the solutions is putting
    some tough laws in place and enforcing them. I think the asylum
    rules maybe need to be tightened up.
        I want to correct my colleague. He asked you a question
    about asylum rules, and asked if there was persecution for
    another reason, but he left out persecution based on political
    status. I can assure you, in the Northern Triangle, having
    lived there, there is significant persecution in the Nations in
    the Northern Triangle against political dissidents, against
    journalists, against environmental activists, and there has
    been a history of persecution against indigenous people. There
    are some other groups--my colleague is right. They are not
    being persecuted directly now, but political opponents are.
        In Honduras, where I lived, the Organization of American
    States (OAS) said, after the last presidential election, that
    the election should be re-run because they were so corrupt.
    Instead, the U.S. recognized the corrupt government and then
    cut off aid to the corrupt government, and then what we see
    today, as you said, Admiral Faller, is sort of a perfect storm.
    If we do not invest in security and economics there will be
    economic refugees, and my colleague is right, an economic
    refugee is not entitled to asylum status. But nevertheless, if
    we are not working to promote security and economic
    improvement, there is a natural consequence to that.
        So we need tougher border security, we need to increase
    investments in security assistance in the region, and we need
    to hold authoritarians accountable rather than turn a blind eye
    to their misdeeds. These are things that we can do and we can
    do together.
        General VanHerck, I want to ask you a question. Canada is a
    pretty good ally of the United States militarily, aren't they?
        General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. In my conversations with the Canadian
    Foreign Minister and the Canadian Minister of Defense, it has
    been a sore point with them that the U.S. uses national
    security waivers against them to impose tariffs. We have trade
    disputes with Canada over milk, over lumber products, over all
    kinds of things. That is not unusual given the sizeable border
    that we share. But they expressed to me a particular concern
    when the previous administration labels them a national
    security threat, and they point out, ``Hey, we fight with you
    in every war. We are side by side with you in military
    hospitals, at Landstuhl and elsewhere.''
        Have you heard a similar concern expressed, dissatisfaction
    from the Canadian side about United States using national
    security, labeling them a national security threat in order to
    impose tariffs?
        General VanHerck. Senator, my discussions with the Minister
    of National Defense, the Deputy, and also the Chief of the
    Defense Staff, I have not been engaged or had that discussion.
        Senator Kaine. Okay. Thank you for sharing that. Thank you,
    Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Now via Webex,
    Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, good
    morning. I thank you for both of your continued dedication to
    our country and for your previous service.
        Let me begin. I would like to start with Admiral Faller.
    Understanding and combatting Russian and Chinese influence
    operations truly is critical to our national security. Senator
    Gillibrand began this discussion with you a little while ago,
    talking about what is happening in our southern regions.
    Admiral Faller, I would like to talk a little bit about what
    our options are, what the tools are that are available to you
    to counteract that misinformation, and what tools you may need
    right now, or what additional assistance you need, in order to
    be able to counteract some of the misinformation that currently
    is occurring.
        Admiral Faller. I cannot stress enough the full-court press
    that China has on to gain their economic dominance in their
    version of a world order globally and in this hemisphere, which
    I look at this hemisphere as the front line of competition, and
    we have to approach that as such, as a United States
    Government, across all elements of power, with the diplomats
    and in the lead, clearly.
        Military plays a role. Our principal method to block
    Chinese military interests, the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
    is by staying engaged with our partners in our exercise
    program, our IMET program. These are world class. China has
    tried to copy them. They have tried to replicate Leavenworth in
    Spanish and Portuguese. We need to remain the best at what we
    do and ensure we provide the volume that is needed to allow our
    hemisphere partners to be professional and partner with us.
        In the IT space, we have to stay engaged to understand what
    they are up to. That goes back to intelligence resources.
        So I would sum this up by saying additional intelligence
    assets, continued security cooperation, and increased volume of
    IMET and exercises, and then enough assets to stay on the
    field. That includes our small special operations force teams,
    which are very effective. Last year we received great support
    from the United States Army to put some small security force
    assistance teams in places like Colombia and Honduras, which
    are having great effect, to train, and it is only training, not
    accompany, our partners.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Admiral. General VanHerck, right
    now you have got, on a day-to-day basis, you clearly have more
    individuals trying to cross the border into the United States.
    There is no question about that, and clearly that is something
    which most certainly, in your supporting role, will take up a
    fair part of your day. But at the same time you have one of the
    most critical responsibilities out there, defending the
    Homeland against those possibilities of strategic attack.
        Today we have this discussion going on about the need for
    the triad, the continuation of our triad, and also the need to
    provide specific defense protection against incoming weapon
    systems. Can you talk about the connectivity, or the connection
    between having all three legs of a triad available and also
    needing to still have the ability to defend the Homeland, and
    if we were to take away any one of the legs of the triad what
    that would do, in terms of increasing the challenge for you of
    defending the Homeland with missile systems set up to protect
    against incoming weapon systems?
        General VanHerck. Sure, Senator. First, the nuclear
    deterrent and the triad remains the foundation of homeland
    defense. I would defer to Admiral Richard on specifics about
    the triad. I know that the triad today was designed for
    specific capabilities to basically take the calculus of any
    threat and create deterrence options because of the flexibility
    that the triad creates. The most reactive forces are
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the most flexible
    force is the bombers, and certainly the most survivable force
    is the submarines. Each of those contributes significantly to
    homeland defense. We have not had a great power conflict since
    World War II, and the triad and the nuclear deterrent has been
    part of that.
        With that said, our competitors today are trying to
    circumvent the nuclear triad and have developed, and stated
    intent, to attack the Homeland because they assume they can be
    successful to destroy our will, below the nuclear threshold. I
    am concerned about having the ability to give decision-makers
    key decision space in that realm, but not all end-game defeat.
        So deterrence by denial is what I talk about, and that is
    giving options to senior leaders to create doubt in a
    competitor or adversary's mind about their ability to achieve
    their objectives with a strike on the Homeland, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Now let me
    recognize Senator King via Webex.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General, I would
    like to follow up on a comment made at the end of her question
    by Senator Shaheen, and ask in your professional military
    opinion, would it be in the interest of the United States to
    accede to the Law of the Sea treaty?
        General VanHerck. Senator, yes, it would be. It gives us a
    better posture, a seat at the table, more credibility when we
    work many of the issues that we have to work around the globe
    with allies, partners, and potential competitors.
        Senator King. That is particularly true in the Arctic,
    isn't it? That is where the Russians are staking claims as we
    speak.
        General VanHerck. Senator, I agree with your assessment,
    and as Russia takes over the Arctic Council in May, it has
    never been more crucial for us, with our like-minded nations
    and allies and partners that we come to agreement to not allow
    Russia and China to exploit any seams and gaps.
        Senator King. Thank you. I would like to turn for a moment
    to the immigration question and the crisis at the border, which
    everyone recognizes. Admiral Faller, I think at the beginning
    of your testimony you pointed out that there were significant
    what I call push factors as well as the change of
    administration, which is a pull factor. But the combination of
    the impact of COVID, the two major hurricanes, and the
    transnational gangs is making life intolerable for people in
    those Northern Triangle countries. Is that not also true?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I have met with folks who have
    walked all the way to the border and come back, and their drive
    was the violence, the fear for their life, their lack of food
    for their families, the insecurity. In this past year, we have
    had that perfect storm of additional factors, COVID and then
    back-to-back major hurricanes. The region is fragile, the
    conditions are on par with our Great Depression, and our
    engagement is critical to help our partner nations overcome
    this challenge.
        Senator King. It strikes me that whatever we do on border
    security, and I am fully supportive of a secure border, as long
    as we have these three countries near our border that are in
    such terrible shape, people are going to continue to try to
    find ways to escape. I have heard the term ``we need a Marshall
    Plan'' for that region in order to try to stabilize these
    countries in terms of their own internal security, their own
    economies. Does that ring any bells for you?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I think a Marshall Plan would be a
    wonderful model as we look at the entire hemisphere, really,
    and look at the sources of instability across the hemisphere.
    In addition to Central America, we see Haiti, Cuba, and
    Venezuela, all sources of illegal migration to the United
    States, and Venezuela alone, five million migrants now have
    swelled out of their borders. We need the big ideas. We need
    the sustained engagement of the all-of-nations and whole-of-
    government of the United States, and the Department of Defense
    plays a role, particularly in that professionalism and
    institutional capacity-building so their security forces do the
    right thing and contribute to overall sustainable security.
        Senator King. You mentioned in your testimony the Russian
    and Chinese disinformation campaigns in these countries. Are
    they also encouraging migration as a way to undermine the
    United States? Do they see this as a weapon, just as they did
    with the Syrian migration into Europe several years ago?
        Admiral Faller. The disinformation by Russia seeks to
    discredit every act of goodness, and we do many that the United
    States provides in the hemisphere, and to the extent that
    drives migration there is no doubt. China seeks their own
    influence, their own economic dominance, and they seek clients
    while we seek friends and partners. I think their information
    campaign, best exhibited by a recent visit to a country where I
    was asked about the illegal and unregulated, unreported fishing
    in the region, and I cited the example of Chinese involvement
    off of Ecuador, where their fleets would, for great periods of
    time, go silent and sweep into the ecological preserve. Then
    within minutes after my facts-based statement, which is based
    on various credible sources, the Chinese proceeded to attack me
    and the media. That is just typical of their disinformation
    globally, Senator.
        Senator King. Well, I am out of time, but I think your
    testimony that you (a) do not have adequate ISR resources, and
    (b) there are not enough ships to interdict the drugs that are
    coming and killing Americans, including more than one a day in
    my home state, is very powerful, and that is within our
    control. That is a matter of allocation of resources, and I
    hope this Committee can bring some pressure on the
    administration to allocate adequate resources for ISR and for
    interdiction, because we are not even interdicting the drug
    shipments we know about, let alone finding ones that additional
    ISR could provide. So that is something that I hope this
    Committee can work on.
        Gentlemen, thank you both for your testimony. It has been
    very illuminating today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me recognize
    Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank
    you so much for being here today and for your service to our
    great nation and the men and women within your commands. We
    truly appreciate everything they do for us every day.
        Admiral Faller, we had a great conversation last week, and
    you really stressed to me the importance of our neighborhood,
    and I want to continue visiting about that today because we do
    need to be very aware, and I think this Committee is, but that
    we have a lot of nefarious influencers within our own
    neighborhood, and I would like to talk a little bit about those
    transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as well as those
    that maybe influencing those TCOs and where that is coming
    from.
        You have provided the placemats for us today--China, Iran,
    Russia. They are all influencers in our neighborhood, and they
    are all operating. We see the TCOs as well. They are operating
    to our south, and they are bringing about $90 billion of
    revenue annually. That is very concerning to me. Then the
    increase of movement across our borders is something troubling,
    that we have all been talking about today, and we have to make
    sure that we are defending that border and pushing back against
    these influencers.
        So let's talk a little bit about the TCOs and what they are
    doing in the SOUTHCOM AOR, and are they working alongside
    China, Russia, and Iran?
        Admiral Faller. The transnational criminal organizations
    are just murderous, violent organizations. They are murdering
    people, driving migration, and they are fueled on corruption,
    and so when I look at the interconnection of these
    organizations and the China-Russia players in our hemisphere, I
    look at corruption as a common element. It fuels both. Then we
    look at lack of regard for human rights, and there is a
    commonality there. Then we look at lack of regard for rules-
    based international order, or rules in general, and there is a
    commonality there. So there is an interconnection.
        The money-laundering connection is the most significant,
    where Chinese money-laundering underwrites TCOs a significant
    portion, and that is something that we are tracking as part of
    all interagency effort here in the United States. This
    corrosive influence undermines our democracies and contributes
    to the fragility and the security concerns we have right in
    proximity to the United States. Location, location, location
    drives everything, and that location is so important in this
    neighborhood.
        Senator Ernst. So Senator Shaheen was asking about Chinese
    influence. So there is above-the-board operations going on with
    China, where they may be engaging in legal activities. But then
    you are saying they engage in these criminal activities as
    well, and under the radar type of criminal organizations.
        Admiral Faller. So the National Defense Strategy and our
    Secretary's guidance cites China as the pacing challenge, and I
    side with what the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) commander
    said. It is the most significant threat we face in the 21st
    century. We want this competition to work out peacefully and
    not end in conflict and not be adversarial. But Chinese, in
    addition to the illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing is
    involved in illegal mining, illegal logging. They are at least
    tacitly supporting the money-laundering. They are using COVID
    and vaccines as a hammer to further Chinese Communist Party
    interests, particularly to get better deals for Huawei and 5G,
    and to try to drive a wedge between the remaining countries
    that support Taiwan, and the majority of those are here in this
    hemisphere.
        So yes, Senator, their corrosive, insidious influence is
    being felt right here in our neighborhood.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Admiral, and I appreciate our
    discussion to that effect last week. General VanHerck, in the
    remaining time that I have, we have had a number of our own
    troops working the southern border, which I think has been
    extremely important. They have been supporting United States
    Customs and Border Patrol. Are they still playing a vital role
    in the defense of our Nation at our southern border?
        General VanHerck. Senator, probably answered by customs and
    border protection (CBP) and DHS. My recent visit would tell you
    that we are playing a role to enable them to do their law
    enforcement role by providing support.
        When I look at the challenges the transnational criminal
    organization create on the border, the symptoms that we are
    seeing are the migration, the human trafficking, the
    counternarcotics. From a homeland defense perspective, Mexico,
    being in the United States NORTHCOM AOR, and two major
    transnational criminal organizations with the Sinaloa and New
    Jalisco, we have a national security imperative with regards to
    the instability that they create, the tragedies they create,
    and the opportunities they create for nefarious actors such as
    China or Russia, right on our own southern border, to have
    access and influence, and so it concerns me very much, Senator.
        Senator Ernst. Yeah. Thank you, gentlemen, very much, and I
    appreciate you safeguarding our neighborhood.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Let me recognize
    Senator Warren via Webex.
        Senator Warren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    thank you to Admiral Faller and General VanHerck for being here
    today. We appreciate the work that you are doing.
        General VanHerck, COVID-19 vaccinations are well underway
    all across our country, and the DOD is helping people get
    vaccinated. Each day, millions more Americans are receiving
    hope in the form of these vaccines as we move closer to
    defeating this pandemic.
        But the data show that the vaccines are not reaching every
    community equally. Death rates for Black Americans and Native
    Americans, Native Alaskans are nearly twice as high as the
    death rates in white communities. But the vaccines have
    disproportionately gone to white Americans. Although vaccine
    demographic data are incomplete at this point, it appears that
    only about 7 percent of the 65 million administered doses have
    gone to Black Americans.
        So, General VanHerck, several thousand of the troops you
    command have been deployed to assist the Federal Government's
    vaccination efforts. Can you explain how Northern Command made
    decisions about the deployment of vaccine teams to ensure that
    communities of color are getting the vaccines that they
    desperately need?
        General VanHerck. Senator, absolutely. The United States
    Northern Command does not make the decision where teams go.
    That is done through the FEMA process, and we answer to their
    mission assignment and go to the locations determined by that
    interagency process.
        Senator Warren. Fair enough. Do you know if FEMA is
    prioritizing communities of color?
        General VanHerck. In my discussions with the Acting
    Director, Mr. Fenton, they do take all considerations in, from
    state and local officials, governors that are asking for
    support, and factoring in those specifics, and based on the
    need of where the transmission rates are the highest they do
    take all that in, from my discussions.
        Senator Warren. Well, it is hard then to explain why we are
    down at 7 percent vaccination rate for Black Americans. Can I
    ask you to commit that in future discussions, as you are
    talking about how to deploy these teams, that you will support
    making sure that we are making adequate vaccination efforts in
    communities of color?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I commit to you that I am
    agnostic with regards to where we provide support, and I will
    work closely with the FEMA team to make sure we do that.
        Senator Warren. Well, I would like to hear that you are not
    agonistic but that you are really committed to helping in the
    communities of color that are being hit hardest, and where we
    are seeing the highest death rates.
        General VanHerck. I apologize----
        Senator Warren. I am sorry. Go ahead.
        General VanHerck. I apologize. I am fully committed. I
    thought I said that, the second part.
        Senator Warren. Okay.
        General VanHerck. Absolutely.
        Senator Warren. I hope so. I am also concerned about
    reports of Russian misinformation campaigns against the vaccine
    that are aimed at reducing the number of Americans willing to
    get vaccinated. Can you just say a word about what strategies
    is Northern Command using to combat this misinformation?
        General VanHerck. Senator, it is an information and
    education campaign, primarily within our own forces. I am happy
    to report to you that we have approximately 85 percent
    acceptance rate within the command. In my discussions with the
    Secretary of Defense and within the interagency we have talked
    and shared the lessons learned about how to educate and also
    exploit or expose the disinformation. So I think that is
    crucial to combine both the education aspect and exposing the
    disinformation.
        Senator Warren. Well, thank you. This pandemic has not
    affected all Americans equally. Black and brown communities
    have disproportionately suffered from COVID-19, and its effects
    will likely be felt for years. Northern Command and the Federal
    Government's vaccination efforts must prioritize the hardest
    hit communities, and I hope that you will continue to work hard
    to ensure that the vaccine goes to those who need it most.
        Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Tillis,
    please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your decades of service.
        General VanHerck, I want to go back and just finish, or
    make sure I understood, with respect to any DOD resources
    supporting local mission objectives around vaccine
    dissemination. You are there to basically provide personnel
    support after the decisions about where to administer the
    vaccines, which populations should be prioritized. You are not
    actively involved in that prioritization process. Is that
    correct?
        General VanHerck. Senator, that is exactly correct.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. Thank you. Admiral, I had just maybe
    an addendum to the request that Senator Wicker made, following
    on to Senator Shaheen's comments. This one graphic that shows
    China influence, I think what would be helpful in there is just
    to show American influence but also to show the trend lines. My
    guess is based on a comment you made, they are trending in the
    wrong direction. So I think it would just be helpful, when you
    provide that graphic, to show us the heat map on where we
    really need to muster more resources.
        On the TCO graphic, you all summarized the disruption in
    terms of narcotics, I think 313 metric tons in fiscal year
    2020. How does that compare to fiscal year 2019, and what are
    the trend lines for fiscal year 2021?
        Admiral Faller. In overall amounts, Senator, it is
    comparable. But what is significant about fiscal year 2020 is
    the impact of the global pandemic. So we know that, for a time,
    the narco traffickers went to ground and did not push as much
    of their product, and then when they did, because a lot of
    border controls were tighter and the methods of delivery were
    harder because economies had shut down, they ride their
    traffics on the backs of the economies so they were having
    difficulty getting precursor chemicals and so on. When they did
    start pushing it, it was in smaller loads, in different routes.
        What is significant about the DOD's performance, and as
    part of the whole-nation effort, really what we do is we detect
    and monitor and pass that off to law enforcement is that we
    never step back. We stepped up on the face of pandemic. We
    accounted for a significant increase of the amount that we
    targeted. So while the total amount was the same, our
    percentage of getting at effective targets was up, and that was
    because we did have a modest increase in resources throughout
    the year. The United States Navy stepped up, at the direction
    of the Sec-Def, with Navy ships, additional P8's, and the Coast
    Guard sustained their always excellent support. What we saw is
    when the U.S. stayed on the field, our partners stayed on the
    field.
        So overall we held the line, as part of the effort. We will
    never interdict our way out, but we have got to keep pressure
    on that part of the supply chain. The Colombians did their
    part. They had a record eradication year. Where we need to go
    next is in the finances, into their data, into that source of
    their power, and really break the center of gravity of these
    organizations, and I think we can do that more effectively with
    a better, effective targeting and whole-of-government approach
    here in the U.S., and training our partners to do the same.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. Something that would be helpful,
    if you do not have it available I would also be interested in a
    similar update on human trafficking disruption. If we could
    just get that submitted for the record I would appreciate it.
        At the southern tip of your area of responsibility, General
    VanHerck, and Admiral, the northern, what is the change in
    posture? What is the environment like now as compared to, say,
    this time last year? I mean, military presence--I know even at
    the southern border, the southwest border of the United States,
    we had stepped up Mexican military presence. How would you
    summarize that today, and then also the southern Mexico border
    and our border states, what is their posture there, trying to
    manage flow of immigrants moving across those borders, now
    compared to a year ago?
        General VanHerck. I will go first. From Mexicans'
    perspective, they are tremendous partners. We have a fantastic
    military----
        Senator Tillis. Are they maintaining the same sort of
    operations tempo that they have for the past year or so?
        General VanHerck. They are. They have been great partners.
        Admiral Faller. Same for Guatemala. They are committed,
    they are committed to doing the right thing here, but they are
    stressed with COVID and the other insecurity by the
    transnational criminal organizations. So their ability to surge
    more in the migrant problem set is limited.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. As we move forward with funding
    and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) this year I would
    also be interested in maybe you submitting for the record key
    funding flow that are trending in the wrong direction that we
    should focus on when we get back to appropriations discussions,
    and any sort of authorities you may need in the NDAA. Thank you
    very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Let me recognize
    Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of
    our panelists for their service to our country, and we
    appreciate very much you being here today.
        Admiral Faller, I do not think it is possible to overstate
    the threats are adversaries are posing in your area of
    responsibility and Africa Command (AFRICOM), because they know
    whatever investments they make in South America and Africa are
    cheap and will pay dividends in the future.
        At the end of February, United States Army South finished
    pre-deployment training for Operation Alamo Shield, to prepare
    1st Security Force Assistance Brigade personnel for future
    missions in Colombia, Honduras, and Panama. In addition to our
    state partnership program's ongoing training and advising,
    operations like this one are crucial for promoting
    interoperability and relationship-building in your area of
    responsibility.
        So my question would be, what specific training programs in
    SOUTHCOM are you going to develop to increase the capabilities
    and the capacity and to further combat the growing concern for
    corruption within the ranks of our partners, and especially
    with the migration that we have going on right now? Can't they
    play a bigger role in that, sir?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, I would like to commend the West
    Virginia Guard, which does fantastic work through the state
    partnership program with Peru, and has been an active
    participant in our exercise program. You cited the security
    force assistance teams that the United States Army has
    developed. That is exactly the right capability. It is small.
    It is small teams that focus on training, think four or five
    people, and our partners want to emulate the professionalism of
    the United States Army, the United States Navy, the Coast
    Guard, Air Force, Marines, and that is the way forward, staying
    engaged on the team, on the field, with the small teams that
    train our partners' trainers in the professional use of force,
    that involve Women, Peace, and Security training, that involve
    human rights training. This is the way to go, and we continue
    to emphasize and strengthen those programs, Senator.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir, and to General VanHerck,
    our current major ballistic missile defense assets around the
    globe include the ground-based midcourse defense (GBMD),
    thermal high altitude area defense (THAAD) batteries, Aegis
    systems, and PAC-3 missile capability. As China and Russia
    continue to increase their influence abroad I am concerned that
    their objectives provide them with the ability to deny us
    access, break apart our relationships, further corrupt
    governments, and ultimately place threats closer to the United
    States.
        However, as we begin to think in terms of hypersonic
    threats, geographical location does not mean much anymore, and
    the importance of early detection and coordination between the
    combatant commandments becomes an even more crucial concern.
        So my question is, as we continue to develop space-based
    sensor layers, what role do you see for NORTHCOM and NORAD in
    tracking threats in North America as well as interfacing with
    other combatant commands to track threats such as hypersonics?
        General VanHerck. Senator, wearing my NORAD hat, we are
    directly responsible for integrated threat warning and attack
    assessment, so that is crucial. We will continue to play a
    crucial role for assessment of threats to the Homeland,
    specifically from missile threats. I am concerned about the
    ability going forward to track and assess hypersonics, and so
    we must go to space, and in my recent discussion just this
    Friday, talking with Jon Hill at the Missile Defense Agency,
    they are moving out.
        What we have to provide is space-based capabilities to
    track hypersonics, especially as they maneuver, and those
    space-based capabilities have to provide fire control
    capability data to systems that will be able to engage
    hypersonics. That is crucial for that deterrence by denial
    aspect that I mentioned earlier, that also contributes to
    overarching deterrence.
        Senator Manchin. Is there a requirement for [inaudible] at
    each of our combatant commands that represents the other
    commands in order to build situational wellness to coordinate
    the efforts?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I believe homeland defense
    starts forward, and that means all combatant commands must be
    engaged and part of the overarching solution for homeland
    defense and missile defense.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Let me now
    recognize Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your service. Good to see both of you again. Admiral,
    it has been a while. Thank you for all you are doing down
    south.
        General, I want to focus on some issues I know that have
    already been mentioned. First, on missile defense. One, I
    think, a good news story, that does not make a lot of press.
    But in the last few years this has been a strong bipartisan
    support in this Committee, in this Congress, on building up our
    missile defense I think, in part, because of the threats from
    North Korea. However, there have been challenges. Right now we
    have 20 empty silos at Fort Greely, which makes no sense. Some
    estimates are it is going to be 10 years before we have
    missiles in there.
        Can you talk to me about that, and why in the world aren't
    we filling those silos as soon as possible?
        General VanHerck. Senator, my goal would be to have
    additional capability and capacity as soon as possible. I
    continue to work closely with Jon Hill at the Missile Defense
    Agency. My top priority is to stay on timeline, to field
    additional capabilities against ballistic missiles that could
    attack our Homeland.
        Senator Sullivan. Isn't that in part because there is intel
    that given the rate of what North Korea is producing in terms
    of nukes and intercontinental ballistic missiles that their
    capability could overwhelm our capabilities as early as 2025?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I would like to have that
    conversation in a classified environment. I remain extremely
    concerned about the capacity of the ballistic missile defense
    system going forward.
        Senator Sullivan. Would quickly fielding the NGI help with
    addressing that challenge?
        General VanHerck. The sooner we can field the NGI, the
    better for addressing that challenge.
        Senator Sullivan. There was an article in a defense media
    news source recently saying that the NGI decision is on the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense's desk and yet it is being delayed.
    Some are thinking that she might kind of use this as a budget-
    cutting tool to say maybe we do not need it. Is that a good
    idea to delay this and have the Pentagon say we do not need NGI
    right now?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I will stay out of the policy
    aspect of that.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, you kind of are already dumped into
    it, so let me get your personal opinion on that. Is that a good
    idea for the Deputy Secretary, or the Secretary, to say let's
    figure out where we can cut the budget. Let's cut the budget on
    the system that protect the entire United States of America
    from a clear and growing threat. Is that a good idea?
        General VanHerck. Again, that is a policy decision. My
    perspective is about the risk, and I remain very concerned
    about the risk of having a capable ballistic missile defense
    system against future capacity changes and capability changes
    by threats.
        Senator Sullivan. Would the risk increase if we cut the NGI
    program----
        General VanHerck. My assessment----
        Senator Sullivan. In your personal opinion?
        General VanHerck. In my opinion, cutting that would reduce
    our capability to defend against increased capacity and
    capability of any threats.
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, this is a huge issue and I
    think we, as a Committee that has been very bipartisan, need to
    send a message to the Pentagon, like, hey, fund this now. It is
    clear it would be a risk to the country.
        Let me turn to the Arctic. I know there has been a number
    of discussions already. The good news is, in his confirmation
    hearing, Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Dr. Hicks, both
    said they were committed to this Committee to fully fund new
    Arctic strategies--I think the Army is going to introduce it
    today--with regard to fully funding the different service-
    oriented strategies.
        Senator Wicker talked about icebreakers. It is good we are
    finally building them. It is taking too long. There is this
    leasing option that the Trump administration was looking at, at
    the end of the administration, and now the Biden administration
    is looking at. Do you think that is a good idea to close this
    icebreaker gap with the opportunity to lease icebreakers, get
    them homeported in America's Arctic, which is Alaska? What is
    your thought on that?
        General VanHerck. Senator, that is a policy decision. I
    have a requirement for capability. I am agnostic to what
    provides that capability.
        Senator Sullivan. But you think we need the capability.
        General VanHerck. Absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. So do I. So does this Committee, by
    the way.
        Let me ask one final thing. There is going to be a high-
    level meeting between our diplomats and Chinese diplomats in
    Anchorage Thursday and Friday. We talk about Alaska in terms of
    the Arctic, but as you know, General, Alaska also is critical
    for the Asia-Pacific, particularly as we look at dispersing of
    our forces. We had the Pacific Command (PACOM) commander here
    last week talking about challenges, perhaps in the Taiwan
    Strait, as early as 5 to 6 years from now.
        Now important is it, do you think, that the Chinese, when
    they come to Alaska, see that there is, within the end of this
    year, going to be over 100 fifth-generation fighters based in
    Alaska, that can get to the Taiwan Strait probably in 6 hours?
        General VanHerck. Senator, Alaska is a strategic location.
    It is a strategic location for homeland defense, something that
    we must preserve and preserve that capability. I think it is
    important that they see our capabilities. It is part of our
    overarching deterrence.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me
    recognize Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen,
    thank you for your testimony here today and for your service
    every day.
        General VanHerck, a seldom-discussed area of the civil
    support mission is chemical, biological, radiological, and
    nuclear response, and this is good considering the subject
    matter, but as long as supporting units are resourced
    appropriately we can be more assured.
        So my question to you, sir, is, the Command and Control
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response
    Element B has experienced a cumulative 25 percent decrease in
    funding over the past 3 years, and I understand these are title
    32 funds, and I know that you do not control those funds. But
    the effect should at least be of concern to you because the
    unit augments Northern Command for CBRN, and Defense Security
    Cooperation Agency (DSCA), more broadly.
        So my question to you, General, is, does the decrease for
    the Guard and Reserve C2 element reflect your priorities or
    those of the Army North and Joint Task Force Civil Support?
        General VanHerck. First I would say I remain confident in
    my ability to provide support in case there is an incident--
    chemical, biological, radiological--in the continental United
    States, and with regards to the specific prioritization, I
    would say that I need to get further detail on the cut for
    title 32. I am not tracking that. But we are well integrated
    with state and local authorities and have our capability ready
    to go, some of it on an hour's notice, others on a day's
    notice. So I am confident in my ability to perform that
    mission.
        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that, and you are
    willing to take a look at that and get back to us? We could
    follow up with you?
        General VanHerck. I will.
        Senator Peters. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General VanHerck. Well, first, I would say I remain confident in my
    ability to provide support in case there's an incident chemical,
    biological, radiological, in the continental United States. With
    regards to the specific prioritization, I would say that I need to get
    further detail on the cut for title 32. I'm not tracking that, but
    we're will--well integrated with state and local authorities in have
    our capability ready to go some of it on hours' notice others on days'
    notice. I'm confident in my ability to perform that mission.

        I understand that National Guard Title 32 funding for Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Element B (CBRN Response
    Element B) has been slightly reduced, but I maintain full confidence in
    the National Guard's ability to perform this critical mission.
    USNORTHCOM is in routine contact with the Department of the Army and
    the National Guard Bureau regarding CBRN Response Element B's mission
    and associated requirements, and I will continue to place heavy
    emphasis on ensuring their ability to respond quickly and effectively.

        Admiral Faller, the Southern Command takes a nontraditional
    approach to intelligence, integrating public information with
    advanced analytics, artificial intelligence, and machine
    learning. My question is, is this in-house research,
    development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) effort unique to the
    Southern Command?
        Admiral Faller. The nontraditional efforts that you speak
    of, through our special operations force, looks at big data and
    what the enemy is doing in big data's commercially available
    information and machine learning, artificial intelligence. It
    is a unique effort that is now being replicated, and it is a
    key area that we need to emphasize in our intelligence efforts
    going forward, appropriately working within the U.S. whole-of-
    government.
        This data, it is data that my shipmate, General VanHerck,
    talks about, and stovepipes in that data that we create with
    our own policies have to be broken down so we can leverage that
    to understand what the threat is doing. Certainly our malign
    actors that are working in this hemisphere, China and Russia,
    they do not respect laws when they look at exploiting that type
    of data for their own benefit.
        Senator Peters. You mentioned some of that is being
    replicated. Are you aware of some similar successful methods
    with other combatant commands or the intelligence community?
        Admiral Faller. We have a pilot program that we have
    worked, to look at cryptocurrency. In this hemisphere, with
    only 8 percent of the world's population, 60 percent of the
    cryptocurrency is being leveraged, and that is because of the
    plethora of transnational criminal organizations that are
    wreaking violence in the hemisphere. So that is a concern.
        So how do we get at that center of gravity to break the
    backs of these threats, working with Treasury and other
    partners, in support of. We are not looking to take the lead
    here. We are looking to play the appropriate role. So there are
    efforts, and those efforts are, frankly, funded every year on
    the unfunded request or through additional support from
    Congress. So we need to appropriately sustain that going
    forward.
        Senator Peters. Thank you. On Thursday, NORTHCOM will begin
    Global Information Dominance exercise, and I understand that 9
    of the 11 combatant commands are planning to participate in
    this exercise, which is meant to prototype and test a set of
    artificial intelligence (AI) tools, and I know there was some
    discussion about Pathfinder earlier. But the intent is to
    support joint all command and control implementation.
        So my question for you, General, is, can you explain why
    these types of exercises are absolutely critical to our
    modernization and readiness efforts and why NORTHCOM is leading
    this initiative?
        General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator. From the NORTHCOM
    and NORAD perspective, we view data and information as a
    strategic asset. So we are conducting these exercises to bring
    everybody together to show the true value and importance of the
    strategic ability that we can utilize information and data. So
    we look forward to continuing to partner with the combatant
    commands, the services, and bringing them together to
    demonstrate capabilities that can not only help us in conflict
    but, more importantly, help us de-escalate in crisis and to
    deter in competition.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Cramer,
    please.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both of
    you for being here. I appreciate your service, Admiral and
    General.
        I am going to start with you, Admiral, because early on, in
    a response to a question from Senator Inhofe, you had cited the
    fact that you only get 1 percent of the ISR, and that was
    fairly stunning to me, especially since the Air Force has been
    trying to retire their RQ-4's and cut the production of the MQ-
    9's, two systems that we are very familiar with in North
    Dakota, of course. They are operated quite effectively out of
    our state, one by the Air Force and the other by our Guard in
    Fargo.
        One of the reasons that they use for wanting to cut
    production or retire, and realizing some of it is that they
    want to save money for new systems, and that is noble. We need
    to make some tough decisions about that. But one of the reasons
    they use is these platforms are not survivable in near-peer
    competition.
        So my question to you, Admiral, is could you use our RQ-4's
    and MQ-9's in your theater, and is there significant threat to
    the survival of these platforms in SOUTHCOM?
        Admiral Faller. As you mentioned, Senator, we receive less
    than 1 percent of the DOD ISR, and it is a prioritization, and
    there are global challenges and I recognize how that plays out.
    But this is a good environment in SOUTHCOM for unmanned. We
    have had, for the first time ever, an MQ-9 through the past
    year, and we have Customs and Border Protection MQ-9 as well.
    They have proven their utility because they can stay on station
    for a long time and stare at the threats. They can also learn,
    in general, about the environment beyond the transnational
    criminal organization threat, so we have the understanding that
    we need to ensure that we are appropriately postured moving
    forward.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Admiral. General, thank you for
    our discussion last week. I enjoyed it very much. I found it
    very interesting, and I learned a lot, as is often the case,
    and one of the things that you and I talked about, of course,
    was the fact that NORAD and NORTHCOM participated with the Air
    Force Research Laboratory in an over-the-horizon study that
    included some testing at Camp Grafton, North Dakota, our
    National Guard Camp. That is part of the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) Coalition Warfare Program-funded
    Arctic high frequency (HF) surveillance program. We were told,
    of course, that the results exceeded expectations.
        My question to you is, do you still the need for an over-
    the-horizon radar system and capability, and do you expect
    further, more advanced testing any time soon?
        General VanHerck. Senator, my focus and top priority is
    domain awareness, and over-the-horizon radar would certainly
    contribute to domain awareness. My understanding is right now,
    with regards to the test that you are talking about, the
    current Northern Strategic Approach's study is with the Air
    Force. We are waiting for that to come out. I talked to General
    Brown on Friday about that. Once that report comes out we will
    in a better position to see, on the way forward, with the
    Research Lab, or however we are going to pursue that. But
    domain awareness is at the top of my integrated priority list.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you for that and thanks for that
    answer, and thanks for following up with General Brown.
        One other question for you, General VanHerck. There is a
    lot less military presence between Michigan and Montana,
    obviously along the northern border, than there used to be
    during the Cold War, even though, I mean, one could argue that
    there are more threats in the Arctic and from missiles coming
    over the Arctic even than there were during the Cold War.
        If there was a threat coming over the Pole, through
    Saskatchewan, say, do have enough fighters, tankers, missile
    warning, missile defense systems to meet that threat?
        General VanHerck. Senator, day to day I am confident in my
    ability to defend against the threat that we have. Day to day,
    I am postured primarily against a 9/11-type of response. If
    indications and warning or a crisis evolved, I would go ahead
    and ask for additional forces. At that time, if I was allocated
    additional forces or not I would have to make a broader
    assessment in my ability to defend.
        Senator Cramer. Well, and as you mentioned, obviously
    domain awareness is the critical aspect of being prepared. Is
    the radar coverage for that area modern enough to track any
    threat reliably, do you believe?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I remain concerned about domain
    awareness in the north, with the legacy North Warning System.
    If we apply capabilities such as Pathfinder, that will increase
    my capability. But more broadly, we need to get after it with
    more modern systems, systems not designed to go after a
    stovepipe, single domain, single threat. We need systems
    capable of going after everything from small counter-unmanned
    aircraft systems (UAS) to ballistic missiles, that are able to
    be efficient and effective.
        Senator Cramer. Excellent. Thank you. You are both awesome.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Now I would like
    to recognize Senator Rosen via Webex.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and I want to
    thank the witnesses for being here and for your great service
    to our Nation. I would like to speak a little bit about
    Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, because for decades Iran's
    proxy has long maintained an active presence in the Western
    Hemisphere, engaging in terrorist activities, drug trafficking,
    and money-laundering. In 1994, Iran and Hezbollah bombed Jewish
    community center in Argentina, killing 85 civilians and
    injuring more than 300. The Treasury Department has sanctioned
    numerous Hezbollah-linked operatives and entities in the
    Western Hemisphere for links to transnational organized crime.
        So, Admiral Faller, in your written testimony you stated
    that Hezbollah's external operations are responsible for at
    least three high-profile attacks in the region and three other
    planned operations that were disrupted. Can you elaborate on
    the threat that Hezbollah poses to United States interests in
    the Western Hemisphere, and if its presence is growing where do
    you see it growing?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, these threats go right back to
    Iran, the single largest state sponsor of terror in the world
    and the long arm or Iranian malfeasance is felt globally and in
    this hemisphere. Significant Lebanese diaspora. Lebanese
    Hezbollah receives funding support, and they are intertwined
    with Iranian state-sponsored terrorist in ways that undermine
    global security and security in this hemisphere.
        We have seen an increase in presence of Iran activities in
    Venezuela to support the illegitimate Maduro regime, increasing
    the readiness of some of their defense systems, and we have
    seen the continued involvement with the diaspora and economic
    fundraising particularly down in the tri-border region,
    neighboring Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil.
        Senator Rosen. Well, you know, you are speaking of the
    diaspora that is extremely important. So how can we improve
    information sharing with our regional partners to identify and
    disrupt Hezbollah's activity in Latin America?
        Admiral Faller. One of the very positive things that I have
    seen over the last couple of years is the extent to which we
    have increased our information sharing with key partners,
    Brazil and Colombia. We rely on them, they are like-minded
    democracies, to share information so that we understand the
    threat. We have expanded that information sharing significant
    this year. It is key to moving forward and it is built on
    longstanding trust that we have, that is borne out of
    professional military education.
        We have security cooperation programs that work to build
    professional intelligence services. We do this through our 333
    program, and sustaining those programs are very important.
        During the past year we have been able to expand, modestly,
    those programs in cybersecurity, and that will really be
    critical to understanding both the threat that is posed by Iran
    and their state-sponsored terrorist organizations and other
    nation-state actors like China.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move on and ask
    General VanHerck a little bit about our COVID response and
    support. You have been so terrific. You have deployed Navy
    hospital ships at the start of the pandemic. You have cared for
    coronavirus patients at Army field hospitals. Now, of course,
    President Biden is directing states to open up vaccination
    appointments to all American adults by May 1st.
        So I am curious what your role may be in this new mission.
    How is NORTHCOM generating and deploying forces to support the
    vaccine distribution and administrative mission, and
    specifically, as members of the military and their families get
    vaccinated, and once military installations are covered, do you
    have coordinated plans or have you had preliminary
    conversations with local civil authorities to leverage the
    capacity you have on the bases and refer to local communities
    to get the vaccines deployed?
        General VanHerck. Senator, we work with not only the local
    communities, state authorities, and our local bases to ensure
    that we follow the DOD's published guidelines along with the
    Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as well. I am
    confident going forward that we will continue to provide that
    support. We have worked with the Department. I have put in a
    request for 100 teams, 50 Type 1 teams, the most capable,
    capable of delivering about 6,000 shots per day, and also 50
    Type 2 teams. As far as sourcing those, the Joint Staff works
    with the services and the departments to calculate and come up
    with sourcing solutions. The Secretary approves those and
    allocates them to me, and we work through Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) for the actual location and mission
    assignment on how we are going to continue executing President
    Biden's mission to get where he needs to be on 1 July.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Scott,
    please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Admiral Faller,
    thank you for the conversation last week. As we all know, the
    fundamental problem in our hemisphere is Cuba. They are the
    root of all the instability in Latin America. They terrorize
    their own citizens, they steal from their own citizens, and
    they support dictators in Latin America, such as Maduro in
    Venezuela and Ortega in Nicaragua.
        How important is it, in your role, for the Cuban regime to
    not have resources, to do everything we can as a country to
    make sure that the Castro regime does not have the resources to
    terrorize their own citizens and be involved in these other
    countries?
        Admiral Faller. In addition to the nefarious activity you
    cite, Senator, Cuba and Russia and China are actively engaged
    just miles from our home state, and it is concerning as we see
    that relationship going forward. So to the extent to which we
    can prevent those kinds of relationships from developing and
    from Cuba enhancing its capabilities, it is very important. One
    of our assets, one of our real strategic toeholds in that
    effort is our naval station at Guantanamo Bay.
        Senator Scott. Is it important that they do not have
    resources?
        Admiral Faller. I think it is extremely important that we
    prevent the Cubans and the communists from doing what they are
    doing in Venezuela, where they are keeping Maduro in power, and
    where they are undermining. We see them actively undermining
    free and fair elections in democracies across the hemisphere.
    So yes, Senator.
        Senator Scott. What is their involvement in Venezuela now,
    and are they part of provoking Venezuela's aggression against
    Guyana?
        Admiral Faller. Cuba's Praetorian Guard keeps Maduro in
    power. They are there in the thousands. They own the
    intelligence service alongside Russia primarily, and Iran, and
    China to a lesser extent. They are supporting, maintaining
    Maduro's defense systems and security forces, and undoubtedly
    that then gives Maduro the capacity and capability to rattle
    the saber and threaten the neighbors, and also, frankly, allows
    a safe haven for narco traffickers and narco terrorists, which
    is what Venezuela has become. It is hell for its citizens and
    it is heaven for the terrorists.
        Senator Scott. So what can your command do to confront the
    reports of illegal shipping activity out of Venezuela?
        Admiral Faller. We are actively involved with all of our
    interagency partners to track that and learn as much as we can
    about it, and then provide that information to our diplomats
    who can call it out and come up with solutions that support the
    whole-of-government efforts to shift Venezuela to a democracy.
        Senator Scott. Have you or our government through sanctions
    been able to do much to stop the flow of oil from Venezuela to
    Cuba?
        Admiral Faller. The pressure has worked. The Maduro regime
    has been denied resources. But in any of these things they are
    very clever. When you have no regard for rule of law and
    corruption fuels everything you do and you are supported by
    nation-state actors like Russia and China, you can circumvent
    rules and laws, and they have been able to keep the follow up
    just enough to maintain their economy, particularly the
    regime's grip on that economy and its people on life support.
        Senator Scott. Can you talk a little bit about the
    humanitarian crisis, both in Cuba and in Venezuela, as a result
    of the Castro and Maduro regimes?
        Admiral Faller. Well, the United Nations Human Rights
    Report lays it out. The atrocities that the regime has
    committed on the people are beyond compare in this hemisphere,
    and they have created the largest migrant crisis this
    hemisphere has ever seen, some five million migrants that have
    swelled the services, of all the social services. That is why
    we deployed Hospital Ship Comfort twice in a year's period
    prior to the pandemic. It is a credit to Colombia and Brazil
    and other democracies that they have been able to handle it as
    effectively. I commend them.
        Similarly, in Cuba, we have had past migrant crises and we
    have a mission set to prepare with Homeland Security for that.
    We have seen a slight uptick this year in migrants coming out
    of Cuba. We are watching it very closely, and undoubtedly,
    again, it is due to the brutal economic conditions and the
    repression that we see. We study that intensely in our
    intelligence and information-sharing efforts.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Admiral Faller. Thank you,
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me recognize
    Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Faller, you
    and I had an extended discussion last week about activity in
    the region as well as some of the push factors contributing to
    migration flows that are exacerbating the challenging situation
    at the southern border. I would like to focus on the strength
    of criminal organizations in the region.
        A recent report by the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies found that the countries of the Northern
    Triangle lose more than 3 percent of their GDP to organized
    crime each year. These TCOs also contribute to outsized
    homicide rates and undermine governance and security in the
    region. The bottom line is they are, in some ways, better
    resourced than state actors, and have proven capable of
    trafficking guns, money, drugs, and people. It is a major
    problem.
        Given these dynamics, do you feel you have the authority
    necessary to conduct operations that will effectively disrupt
    their activity in the long term?
        Admiral Faller. As you mentioned, Senator, they control
    territory. They are well funded. They have a strength of close
    to 200,000 when you look across the region, which is on par
    with all the police and military forces in total. So a powerful
    enemy to host nations' democracies and direct impact on our
    homeland defense here in the United States.
        Our role is appropriately in support, detection, and
    monitoring, which means we find out as much as we can, and
    where we have authorities we pass that off to law enforcement
    to interdict, and then we work at building our host nation
    partners' capacity. We are short in intelligence assets. We
    have less than 1 percent of those assets. We need additional
    capacity to build our partners so that they can take care of
    this problem themselves. We have received about the right
    amount of presence, but it is important we stay on the field.
        An example of that is our Joint Task Force-Bravo, which is
    a small team of about 700 soldiers and airmen and Marines at
    Soto Cano, Honduras, that can support law enforcement with
    lift, with some intelligence, but more importantly can rapidly
    respond. We saw it this past fall with two back-to-back
    hurricanes, major hurricanes, and we saved hundreds of lives
    rapidly. What that does is it builds trust and actually helps
    us build the case for these partnerships in sustainable
    security long term.
        Senator Kelly. Earlier you stressed, and you did again,
    that the 1 percent of ISR funding goes to SOUTHCOM. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Faller. It is 1 percent of the overall----
        Senator Kelly. Of the overall.
        Admiral Faller.--assets and capabilities, Senator.
        Senator Kelly. But beyond that, if you wanted to ramp up
    the effectiveness of disrupting their activity, what other
    resources would you need?
        Admiral Faller. Senator, we have got to come up with a more
    effective whole-of-government effort in the United States and
    really get at mapping these networks. We are doing that but it
    is nascent. It needs more effort, and then finding the center
    of gravity, what is key to each organization, and then going
    at, disrupting, defeating or deterring that. Most of that is
    law enforcement or judicial or a partner nation effort with
    SOUTHCOM in support. So we play a critical role but it has got
    to be more holistically designed in the U.S. We cannot
    interdict our way out of this.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, Admiral. General VanHerck,
    you mentioned in your testimony the Pathfinder program as a
    complement to the work done by the Defense Innovation Unit, and
    also the importance of being able to rapidly field capabilities
    of the future. As Chair of the Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities Subcommittee, this is something I have been
    thinking a lot about.
        Are you looking into technologies like artificial
    intelligence to asset in processing the increasingly large
    volumes of data that come from our sensor systems?
        General VanHerck. Senator, absolutely. As a matter of fact,
    Pathfinder does exactly that, uses machine learning and
    additional capabilities. We must go down that path to operate
    in a timely and efficient and effective manner.
        Senator Kelly. Any sense if our adversaries are doing the
    same thing, using these technologies?
        General VanHerck. Absolutely, Senator, especially China.
    They are actively moving forward with artificial intelligence.
        Senator Kelly. Then finally, are there any research gaps
    that you see that you think we should be investing more in?
        General VanHerck. Not specific to research. I would say we
    must go to space sooner, and space-based capabilities that give
    us persistent domain awareness. That is where I would be
    focusing my efforts right now.
        Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Let me recognize
    Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here.
        General VanHerck, let me start with you, and let me thank
    you on behalf of all Missourians. It is great to see a fellow
    Missourian here, as before, and we are very proud of you and
    your service, so thank you for being here.
        Let's come back to this question of the border. Customs and
    Border Patrol issued a new batch of operational statistics last
    week that showed that CBP had encountered more than 100,000
    persons attempting entry across the southern border in
    February. That is about a 200 percent increase over this time
    last year. They also show that the number of unaccompanied
    minors attempting to cross our border--that is children--has
    doubled since January, and the number of family units has more
    than doubled from January to February.
        Give us a sense of how this surge of migrants is helping or
    hindering the cartels' operations along the border.
        General VanHerck. Senator, I am not aware of necessarily
    how it hinders or helps. I think it is a symptom of the
    transnational criminal organization problem that we actually
    see. As Admiral Faller pointed out, you know, hurricanes,
    transnational criminal organizations, all the murders,
    contribute directly to what we are seeing on the border, which
    includes the migration that you are alluding to.
        Senator Hawley. I think it is today that the Secretary of
    Homeland Security said that we are on pace now for a 20-year
    high in border encounters, a 20-year record, which is pretty
    astounding considering some of the previous surges we have
    seen, for instance in 2014. Is it fair to say that we have got
    a crisis now at the southern border, General?
        General VanHerck. Senator, I will stay out of the politics
    of whether it is a crisis or not. It is absolutely a homeland
    defense issue that I am concerned about. I am concerned because
    it creates opportunities, it creates vulnerabilities, and we
    have to be postured for each of those. The vulnerabilities that
    it creates for us is instability, and it creates instability in
    governance, it creates instabilities in the rule of law, if you
    will, in neighboring countries. Those will be exploited by
    countries such as China, Russia, and Iran. So for me it is a
    Homeland defense and a national security imperative to take a
    look at that.
        Senator Hawley. Yeah, I think you are absolutely right. It
    is also a humanitarian crisis, and I, for one, am not afraid of
    the word ``crisis.'' I cannot understand why this
    administration is afraid of the word ``crisis.'' Given the
    unbelievable humanitarian issues we are seeing at the border
    and record surge that we are on pace for, I think this
    administration's inability to admit that their own policies are
    causing this crisis, and the effect it is having in terms of
    emboldening the cartels, as you are saying--we know that nobody
    crosses that southern border without the permission and indeed
    without the profit of the cartels. Nobody. It is a wholly run
    criminal enterprise on the southern end of the border, and this
    administration's inability to grapple with that and do
    something about it I think is frankly astounding. We are seeing
    it just day on day on day grow worse and worse.
        Let me ask you this, General. We sent billions of dollars
    in security and money, security assistance, to the Mexican
    Government over the past 14 years, yet we are seeing, as you
    just alluded to, escalating violence. Even more drugs headed
    northward. Those drugs make their way into every state of the
    union, including our home state, my home state of Missouri. In
    your assessment, why has our security assistance to Mexico
    fallen so short of its security objectives? I mean, why have
    not we been able to achieve more, considering the prodigious
    sums that we have invested?
        General VanHerck. First, I would talk to Homeland Security
    about the problem. It is a law enforcement issue, much of it
    coming across the border. But I would tell you that the Mexican
    military, we have an incredibly close partnership and they are
    doing incredible things down there.
        With that being said, I think, as Admiral Faller alluded
    to, we need a whole-of-government strategy. You know, the arms
    that are arming these transnational criminal organizations come
    right here from the United States of America and they flow
    south. In addition to that, the money that they are creating is
    being generated by precursors coming from Asia, from China
    businesses and industry, if you will, that flows in there.
        So we have to take a broader approach to get after this,
    which includes a whole-of-government effort and prioritizing
    and putting resources to the problem.
        Senator Hawley. Speaking of China, Admiral, let me come to
    you in just the little bit of time I have got remaining. You
    wrote in your testimony that China is seeking to establish
    global logistics and basing infrastructure in our hemisphere in
    order to project and sustain military power. What kind of
    presence do the Chinese forces maintain in the Western
    Hemisphere today, that we ought to be concerned about?
        Admiral Faller. We have to ask ourselves the question, why
    is China trying to achieve deep-water ports in the Dominican
    Republic, Jamaica, El Salvador, Panama--Panama Canal is a key
    strategic ground--Argentina. They are using economic influence
    and access to set the conditions for the blue-water navy that
    they have built.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. I think we are going to have
    closed session, aren't we, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. We are planning that, yes.
        Senator Hawley. Okay. I will have a few more questions for
    you then. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me
    recognize Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
    for being here today and what you have done for our Homeland
    and our hemisphere. General, it has been 20 years since we have
    had an attack on our Homeland. Thank you for that, and
    everybody at NORTHCOM, the hard work that you have done. I very
    much agree with you, what you said about outpacing our
    competitors. I am proud to say that in Alabama we are working
    to leap ahead in the area of hypersonics. We are working very
    hard on that, and right now the world's largest and fastest
    hypersonic wind tunnel is under construction in Huntsville, and
    I know they are working at a fast pace.
        Admiral, I enjoyed our conversation last week and I enjoyed
    your straight talk. I hope the American people will start
    getting a sense of urgency. You have your hands full in
    SOUTHCOM, no doubt about it. Between transnational criminal
    organizations and Russia and China you are a busy man.
        I do believe, for a moment, that the People's Republic of
    China (PRC)'s plan in our hemisphere are benign, and I hope
    that it will not take a Chinese aircraft carrier sailing
    between Florida and the Bahamas for Americans to wake up to the
    fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wish to dominate
    the world stage. I hope it does not take something like that.
        You know, the work that both of you have done for SOUTHCOM
    and NORTHCOM for our Nation is incredible, important to
    maintaining our strategic military objectives. Many of the
    items for both of you in the areas of responsibility strongly
    impact my home state of Alabama.
        Admiral, following the 2018 National Defense Strategy is
    something I personally believe in a good way to position our
    forces to thinking towards the future. Can you explain how
    SOUTHCOM is important to this strategy, and specifically, how
    would you describe China's strategic objectives in a 5- or 10-
    year timeline?
        Admiral Faller. Well, I think China seeks economic
    dominance globally, and their strategic objective is to be the
    dominant global power, unquestionably, and they will do that in
    whatever way possible to ensure they have the preeminence of
    the Communist Party.
        In this hemisphere it is across all fronts. It is not just
    economics. Typically we think about that and we have this
    fallacy that it is just economics. In the military realm, they
    have recognized that partners in this hemisphere cannot afford
    a lot of equipment, so they have upped the game in gifts. When
    they do offer military equipment it is often through corrupt
    deals that we cannot compete with.
        They have replicated our professional military education.
    They have ubiquitous IT solutions. They have created
    engineering and cyber scholarships for military personnel that
    goes beyond the kind of education and training that we offer in
    our IMET programs. They have expanded their defense attache
    presence. They have at least turned a blind eye to a range of
    illegal activity, unregulated fishing, unreported fishing,
    illegal mining and logging. All this is done in an environment
    fueled by corruption, with no regard, or little regard for
    human rights, in trying to write their version of the rules of
    the game.
        We have got to stay on the field to compete. We do that
    well. No one is better than the United States military,
    Department of Defense. But we have got to work hard and
    tirelessly, with a sense of urgency that you mentioned, to stay
    number one in the game and to be the best.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General, in regards to our
    southern border security we hear all the negatives. What do you
    think has improved the most in the last four years, and then
    what worries you most looking forward at the southern border?
        General VanHerck. I think the coordination between the
    Department and the interagency with regards to since 2018, has
    been probably the biggest improvement. With regards to what
    worries me most, it is about having domain awareness and the
    opportunities and vulnerabilities that I already talked about,
    in our own Western Hemisphere, for state actors such as China,
    Russia, or Iran, in our own neighborhood, due to instability,
    due to ungoverned areas and spaces. So I am significantly
    concerned about what is going on right here in our own
    hemisphere and neighborhood.
        Senator Tuberville. Do you think we need a wall?
        General VanHerck. I will stay out of the politics of a
    wall. Border security----
        Senator Tuberville. Not politics. Do you think we need one?
        General VanHerck. Border security is national security. We
    need to ensure that we have policies in place, laws are
    enforced to ensure that homeland defense does not become a more
    strategic issue from the borders.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah. One thing I noticed coaching for
    40 years and being in education is just the influx of drugs.
    You know, just take away everybody coming across the border, it
    is just the influx of drugs are killing our kids. We are losing
    60,000 a year to overdose. I mean, that right there should be
    just an alarm that we have got to have something different.
        General VanHerck. Senator, I agree with you. Actually, I
    believe the number this past year was approximately 80,000.
    That is unsatisfactory, and we have to get after that, and that
    is a symptom of that broader problem that I talked about,
    transnational criminal organizations, that we can apply
    priority and resources to, to get after it.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Now let me
    recognize Senator Blackburn via Webex.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We so
    appreciate having the hearing today and getting the update, and
    Admiral Faller, thank you for the time that you spent with me
    on the phone last week.
        General VanHerck, I want to go back to your statement on
    Pathfinder, the prototype Pathfinder data analytics project.
    This is the kind of project that I think attacks two primary
    concerns with DOD data streams. One is the stovepiping and the
    other is the need for modernization, and many times I sound
    like a broken record, if you will, by talking about what has
    happened with DOD through the years as things have become so
    stovepiped, and the need for this modernization, because
    information is power. We all know that. But you have to be able
    to analyze to share and to make actionable that data.
        So my question for you is, how could the Pentagon better
    utilize some of these emerging technologies such as artificial
    intelligence, such as the data that we are getting via ISR, and
    the AI that is used by Pathfinder to really make that
    information accessible, sharable across platforms and
    divisions, and actionable when you are looking at how you
    implement plans for the future, how you change plans based on
    the information that you are getting?
        General VanHerck. Senator, first I would tell you that I am
    encouraged by the joint warfighting concept, which also has a
    supplement for information advantage that will help us move
    down this.
        As far as utilizing the data, I agree, it is a strategic
    asset, if you will, data. We can utilize it to not only
    dominate in conflict but to create deterrence day to day. So,
    for example, as an operational commander, this data that is
    available to me, if I utilize it, with applying artificial
    intelligence and machine learning, and then disseminate it to
    key decision-makers, I am able to position forces ahead of a
    competitor or adversary's actions, which creates deterrence. It
    is deterrence by denial.
        But we must go faster in the Department. Thirty years ago,
    the Department led the way with innovations. Today, I think
    that paradigm has flip-flopped to where much of industry and
    Silicon Valley is leading the way forward, especially with
    regard to data, and so we need to take a look at our
    acquisition processes, our modernization processes, and
    potentially flip the paradigm to stay competitive.
        Senator Blackburn. Do you feel like that the Pentagon
    itself is flexible and agile enough to make these changes,
    utilize this data, make a change in a game plan immediately,
    and apply what they are learning from that intel?
        General VanHerck. I believe that the Pentagon has proven,
    over history, to be incredibly successful in adapting when we
    need to. It has not always been as fast, and that is one of the
    reasons I talk about it. We have to have some culture change.
        I would also tell you this may require some looks at
    policy. It may even require some looks at law, to utilize data
    differently as we go forward. What we do not want to do is
    create capabilities that we can utilize, and the policies that
    we have and the laws that we have do not allow us to be
    successful with the data and the information that is available.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you for that. I may come back to
    you for some specifics.
        Admiral Faller, we have talked a lot about China this
    morning and the transnational organizations. But as you look at
    dealing with China, whether it is through fentanyl and drugs or
    Belt and Road or great power competition, what do you not have
    access to in SOUTHCOM that you need?
        Admiral Faller. As we have discussed, China is a global
    threat and we have got to address that challenge holistically
    across the United States Government. In the SOUTHCOM AOR we
    have to be appropriately postured, so we need the right
    footprint of forces, working with our embassies and our
    interagency team to stay engage with our partners. So
    additional locations for presence, not permanent, but access is
    really critical moving forward.
        Senator Blackburn. So it is the teamwork concept with our
    allies. Correct?
        Admiral Faller. Correct, Senator.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Thank you all for that. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator, very much, and
    gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and your service to the
    Nation. Let me remind my colleagues that upon adjournment we
    will immediately move to SVC-217 for a classified briefing by
    Admiral Faller about increasing Chinese influence in the
    SOUTHCOM area. There also is a vote scheduled for noon, so we
    will accomplish both. I will see you shortly over there,
    Admiral Faller, and General, thank you for your distinguished
    service at NORTHCOM.
        No further business before the Committee, I will adjourn.
        [Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                        women, peace and security (wps)
        1. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, as your command continues the
    promotion of gender inclusion with allies and partner nations, can you
    share the overall impact you have witnessed across the region?
        Admiral Faller. As we have started holding gender-focused
    roundtables and events in Colombia, Honduras, and El Salvador, and
    numerous other countries, leaders from across the region have seen how
    powerful it is to integrate gender perspectives and are requesting that
    we collaborate and assist them with gender integration. We have seen
    more women fulfilling key roles and positions and they have achieved
    greater presence in decision-making spaces as a result. Notably, we
    have seen more female International Military Education and Training
    (IMET) graduates taking leadership roles within their countries.

        2. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, how has implementation of the
    program contributed to the advancement of U.S. Southern Command's
    (SOUTHCOM) long term mission within the region?
        Admiral Faller. Part of our mission within the region is to work
    with our partner nations to build professional military and security
    forces that are legitimate in the eyes of their populations. This
    includes fostering respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the
    importance of integrating all perspectives--to include NCOs and women.
    A legitimate and professional force will be resilient to any threats it
    faces--transnational criminal organizations, corruption, violence, and
    meddling from external state and non-state actors.

        3. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, what gender programs have you
    seen be successful, and what has been learned from those successes?
        Admiral Faller. In addition to creating standalone WPS events,
    SOUTHCOM demonstrates its commitment to WPS by ensuring it is part of
    every key leader engagement in the region. We seek ways to collaborate
    with, and assist, partners in their own efforts to advance WPS, such as
    our support to Colombia as they work to meet NATO WPS standards.
        One key success that stands out is our new ``Breaking Barriers''
    podcast, hosted by our Civilian Deputy to the Commander, Ambassador
    Jean Manes. The purpose of this podcast is to amplify WPS principles
    and recognize women leaders in defense and security forces across our
    Hemisphere. The most senior woman in the Trinidad and Tobago Defense
    Force, Lieutenant Colonel Jozette McLean was the first guest featured
    on the podcast. In addition to the regional partners, SOUTHCOM has
    strengthened academic partnerships as well. In collaboration with the
    William J. Perry Center, SOUTHCOM published a book called ``Twenty
    Years, Twenty Stories: Women, Peace, and Security in the Western
    Hemisphere,'' which included essays from 25 authors from 13 countries
    in our hemisphere. Themes from the book included cyber security,
    peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. I have
    personally distributed this book to Ministers and Chiefs of Defense
    across the region. SOUTHCOM uses all social media platforms to
    regularly highlight the achievements and contributions of women across
    the Western Hemisphere, part of the overall effort to ``make the
    invisible, visible.'' We are also working toward increasing the number
    of women participating in the IMET program and in our multilateral
    exercises.
        Breaking Barriers Podcast: https://www.southcom.mil/Lines-of-
    Effort/Strengthen-Partnerships/SOUTHCOMs-Women-Peace-and-Security-WPS-
    Program/?audioid=6 5826

        4. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller and General VanHerck, WPS is
    intended to not only foster foreign and defense policies that proscribe
    the incorporation of women for partner countries, but it is also
    designed to ensure that our own systems, chains of command and
    decision-making processes include gender-oriented considerations. The
    2021 defense appropriations act included funding for full-time gender
    advisors across the combatant commands (COCOM). Can you discuss how you
    are utilizing those funds?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM elevated this program and made it a
    strategic priority under the leadership of AMB Jean Manes, Civilian
    Deputy to the Commander. We allocated a field grade officer to lead the
    program and a contractor, who is a lawyer, to assist with its
    implementation.
        SOUTHCOM has three WPS priorities for fiscal year 2021: 1) Train
    our force; 2) Increase women participation in IMET; and 3) Integrate
    WPS into exercises. For example, in January 2021, WPS was injected into
    Exercise MERCURY conducted by JTF-Bravo and the Panamanian National
    Border Service. WPS is also being integrated into exercises TRADEWINDS
    and UNITAS, hosted by Guyana and Peru, respectively.
        SOUTHCOM has received $250,000 for fiscal year 2021. This funding
    is directed to pay for one full-time gender advisor as well as the
    development of training and strategic messaging initiatives.
        General VanHerck. Funding for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) in
    fiscal year 2021 enabled USNORTHCOM to hire a full-time contract WPS
    subject matter expert, while also supporting the training of a network
    of military and civilian gender advisors who are responsible for
    Command implementation of the WPS Act and DOD WPS Strategic Framework
    and Implementation Plan. In addition to these efforts, USNORTHCOM
    utilized fiscal year 2021 WPS funds to conduct a WPS-focused analysis
    of USNORTHCOM mission sets, sponsor WPS events tied to USNORTHCOM
    missions, promote training and awareness regarding how WPS informed the
    USNORTHCOM responses to COVID-19, and develop WPS training content in
    collaboration with our partners in Canada and Mexico. USNORTHCOM is
    also proud to have partnered with eCornell University and USSTRATCOM on
    training that resulted in over 20 military and civilian personnel
    receiving a certificate in Gender and Women in Leadership. Finally, the
    funding is providing the opportunity for USNORTHCOM to begin WPS data
    collection and reporting.

        5. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, how has U.S. Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM) incorporated gender advisors into the structure of decision-
    making and the chain of command?
        General VanHerck. In December 2020, I signed WPS implementation
    guidance for USNORTHCOM that established a gender network of 20+
    formally appointed representatives from USNORTHCOM directorates and
    component commands. These advisors, called Gender Focal Points, also
    include a NORAD volunteer, and are trained and empowered to advance
    implementation of WPS principles and approaches in all areas and
    functions. In March 2021, USNORTHCOM's WPS leadership team, with
    support of the Joint Staff, delivered the Level 100 Operationalizing
    WPS course throughout our USNORTHCOM WPS network. This network convenes
    monthly to discuss initiatives, identify opportunities and
    requirements, and also to track and implement WPS guidance; it provides
    progress reports to me semi-annually.
        counter-narcotics and transnational criminal organizations (tco)
        6. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller and General VanHerck, given the
    scope and persistent nature of the drug trafficking threat, how are
    your combatant commands prioritizing its limited enforcement resources
    to effectively target the trafficking activity that may be most
    detrimental to U.S. interests?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM works hard to make sure that 1+1=3. This
    means we look for innovative approaches to acquire information and
    intelligence on transnational criminal organization (TCO) activities,
    applying advanced analytics, artificial intelligence and machine
    learning techniques. We then share that information as quickly as
    possible with our strong and willing partners--both U.S. Law
    Enforcement Agencies and partner nations--to target the greatest
    threats. We also focus our limited assets in areas where the
    preponderance of drugs are flowing toward the US, currently the Eastern
    Pacific. We know that we will never be able to interdict our way out of
    the drug crisis, so we also focus on understanding the TCOs themselves
    so we may work with law enforcement to dismantle the organizations that
    will traffic in any commodity to turn a profit at the expense of
    American lives.
        General VanHerck. In a support role to federal partners, USNORTHCOM
    prioritizes resources based on law enforcement partner requests and
    assessments of significant threats. At this time, Mexican cartels are
    increasingly focused on trafficking synthetic drugs such as fentanyl
    that are fueling record numbers of drug overdoses in the United States.
    In response, I directed our Joint Task Force North and Special
    Operations Command North to support law enforcement and regional
    partners by identifying new approaches, in coordination with law
    enforcement, to reduce the trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs. To
    fully get after the resourcing process, I believe the United States
    needs a whole-of-government strategy with directed prioritization to
    enable optimum resource application of limited resources.

        7. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller and General VanHerck, can you
    discuss how your combatant command coordinates with the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS), civil law enforcement, State governments and
    other Federal Agencies to respond to an evolving drug threat that
    requires aggressive enforcement to interdict illicit narcotics and root
    out TCOs?
        Admiral Faller. USSOUTHCOM works very closely with the interagency
    on the counternarcotic mission, as this is a true team effort. DHS, and
    specifically the US Coast Guard (USCG), working with Joint Interagency
    Task Force-South (JIATF-S), is our primary law enforcement partner for
    drug interdictions at sea. The USCG regularly provides USSOUTHCOM with
    surface and air assets for this mission, with their medium endurance
    and fast response cutters being critical to this fight. In return,
    USSOUTHCOM provides regular support to USCG movements and Panama Canal
    transits through designated authorities. We have increased our support
    to US and partner nation law enforcement by sharing information and
    intelligence to help develop law enforcement target packages aimed at
    dismantling the TCOs and their leadership. We supported the State
    Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
    Affairs with the movement of 13 helicopters to Colombia and Peru, moved
    80 MTs of cocaine from Costa Rica to a destruction site in Florida in
    support of the Drug Enforcement Agency, airlifted four INL interdiction
    boats for delivery to Guatemala, and moved the Customs and Boarder
    Protection Unmanned Aircraft System into Panama to support regional
    counter narcotics, detection and monitoring efforts. We also continue
    to focus on efforts to assess the financial underpinnings of national
    security threats in the region and have deepened our counter threat
    finance support with the Department of Treasury Office of Foreign
    Assets Control (OFAC) with intelligence analysis as they work to impose
    sanctions on drug kingpins.
        While we must continue to prevent as many drugs from entering our
    Homeland as possible, we must also look toward a whole-of-society
    approach to address this scourge. For our part, USSOUTHCOM can directly
    impact the supply side by continuing to work with our partners to stop
    the TCOs who will traffic in any commodity to turn a profit. It's not
    just about stopping the flow of drugs, we must go after their logistics
    chains, their profits, and all sources of their power.
        General VanHerck. At the national level, I engage with my DHS and
    law enforcement (LE) counterparts through regular personal meetings and
    through semi-annual meetings of The Interdiction Committee (TIC). This
    senior interagency forum provides opportunities to discuss and resolve
    issues related to drug interdiction efforts from an interdepartmental
    perspective. At the Command level, USNORTHCOM hosts liaison officers
    (LNOs) at USNORTHCOM headquarters and also embeds LNOs across the
    interagency community. These open lines of communication assure my team
    understands DHS and LE requirements, and that DHS and LE in turn fully
    understand the support UNORTHCOM can provide. It is only through a
    whole-of-government approach that identifies transnational criminal
    organizations (TCOs) as a priority and National Security imperative
    that the United States can successfully counter TCOs and their illicit
    activities.

        8. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller and General VanHerck, despite
    decades of interdiction and diligent enforcement efforts by military
    forces and Federal Agencies, the drug threat has gotten worse not
    better. Do you believe we need any new and innovative capabilities and
    strategies to address this problem?
        Admiral Faller. As I stated earlier, we will never interdict our
    way out of the drug crisis. TCOs are constantly innovating and changing
    their tactics to avoid disruption. Theirs is a lucrative business with
    almost limitless resources. TCOs make approximately $90 billion a year
    so we must continue to innovate--looking for non-traditional ways to
    crush their money. Capabilities like our operation Mortal Mint
    (artificial intelligence/machine learning program for foreign adversary
    financial targeting) that focuses on following the money, Asymmetric
    Target Acquisition Center that looks to harness publicly available
    foreign information and Technical Network Analytics Cell that uses data
    analytics for actionable intelligence are low-cost, high-return
    activities in which we should be investing more.
        General VanHerck. Yes. I believe countering transnational criminal
    organization (TCO) activities and their influence is a national
    security imperative because of the impact on U.S. citizens and the
    pressures they create in partner nations, as well as the opportunities
    they create for exploitation by our strategic competitors. TCOs
    continually adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures, which
    undermine U.S. Government and USNORTHCOM efforts to degrade them, and I
    believe the U.S. Government must become more agile and adaptable to
    meet this challenge. Existing tools and applied resources are not
    enough, and it is increasingly necessary to leverage emerging
    technologies and non-traditional partners, such as the U.S. Postal
    Inspections Service to track and identify illicit drug shipments, as
    well as to leverage local law enforcement interdiction of precursor
    materials or supplies originating in the United States. We must have
    unity of effort across defense, law enforcement, and policy
    organizations to effectively address the TCO threat to the Homeland.
        I also believe the United States needs a whole-of-government
    strategy with directed prioritization to enable optimum resource
    application of limited resources. This will enable the Federal
    Government to go after the TCOs and their network enablers that are the
    true source of the problem, rather than a focus on drugs, human
    trafficking, and migration challenges that are just symptoms.

        9. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, similarly, do you think there
    is an opportunity to partner more closely with the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation and the Department of Justice broadly to track the money
    that funds these operations?
        General VanHerck. Yes. Closer partnerships with the FBI and other
    federal law enforcement agencies are critical to defending our
    Homeland, but that is only part of the answer. I view countering
    transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) from a homeland defense
    perspective and also as a national security imperative, and I believe a
    whole-of-government strategy addressing illicit TCO funds and the TCO
    activities generating those funds is absolutely essential. This effort
    requires a single lead organization that can bring the whole-of-
    government together to prioritize and manage requisite resources to
    tackle Transnational Organized Crime, as USNORTHCOM and the Department
    of Defense in a support role cannot do this alone. I am encouraged by
    the plan to establish the U.S. Council on Transnational Organized Crime
    (USCTOC) to streamline and align law enforcement requests with
    available DOD support. USCTOC, once formalized, could provide a whole-
    of-government approach to denying criminal organizations the proceeds
    of their illicit activities while simultaneously helping to counter
    their activities and influence.

        10. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, what are some of the
    capabilities or authorities that you think would allow your combatant
    command in partnership with DHS and others to stem the flow of illicit
    narcotics?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM is pursuing non-traditional approaches to
    go after TCOs' money and logistics. Working closely with our partners
    in this hemisphere is also critical to stemming the flow of illicit
    narcotics--both to prevent them from ever beginning the journey north,
    as well as to stop them once they're already on the high seas. SOUTHCOM
    leverages the security cooperation program to increase the capacity of
    our partner nations to operate alongside us and counter our shared
    threats. Our significant security cooperation initiatives focus on
    developing critical functional areas that include improving maritime
    domain awareness and information sharing; increasing interoperability
    between partner nations and U.S. Forces, and building institutional
    capacity through professional military education. Programs like those
    commonly referred to as section 333 are key to increasing our partners'
    capacity and capability, making them force multipliers in our
    counternarcotic efforts and integrating them seamlessly into our
    operations. As an example of how we can successfully integrate our
    partners into our operations, at the end of March, a United States
    maritime patrol aircraft detected a suspect vessel 15 nautical miles
    from the Costa Rican and Panamanian border. JIATF-S notified the Costa
    Rican and Panamanian Coast Guard, who then launched maritime vessels in
    pursuit. Panamanian forces intercepted the vessel with Costa Rican
    support. Panama seized 900 kgs of cocaine and detained 3 persons.
        While one might expect to see a decrease in partner nation
    participation in counternarcotic operations due to increased domestic
    demands created by COVID-19, our partners have stayed in the drug fight
    with us. The modest increase in DOD resources and assets during our
    enhanced CN operations last year demonstrated US leadership in the
    region and our partners responded to that by increasing their presence
    as well. Key partners like Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, El
    Salvador, and others have been involved in 60% of drug disruptions
    during the operation.
        In order to ensure our trusted partners in the region are able to
    continue to support to our enduring Counter Transnational Criminal
    Operation, I believe we will need to provide additional economic
    support to those countries that are still willing to conduct counter-
    narcotics operations while experiencing economic pressures imposed by
    COVID-19. In order to stay on pace with China and other authoritarian
    regimes who are increasing their investments in the region, we will
    look to strengthen our already solid relationships by providing
    resources to the security sectors, enabling them to conduct all-domain
    operations with the equipment (Boston Whalers, Maritime Patrol
    Aircraft, Midnight Express boats, helicopters) that have been donated
    or procured through the United States Foreign Military Finance system.
                               russian influence:
        11. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, Russia received a positive
    review of their vaccine by Britain's leading medical journal, ``The
    Lancet'' and Russia is a provider of COVID-19 ``SPUTNIK V'' vaccines to
    Latin America. Six countries across the region--Argentina, Bolivia,
    Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela--have authorized use of the
    Sputnik V vaccine and others are considering authorization requests.
    What consequences does this have as we approach a post-pandemic world,
    and how does it impact our overall influence in the region?
        Admiral Faller. We are rightly focused on getting our own
    population vaccinated to the greatest extent possible. However, once we
    offer all Americans the vaccine, we, too, should offer our partners
    help, because it's the right thing to do. Countries like Russia and
    China offer vaccines to gain advantage. Since our partners are
    desperate to protect their populations against COVID, they will turn to
    Russia and China for help and perhaps become beholden to them once the
    pandemic is behind us. If we can provide vaccines, we can prevent
    Russia and China from gaining undue influence here in our hemisphere.
    This is about being a good neighbor.

        12. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, you stated that, ``Russia
    presents a persistent, proximate threat to the United States and Canada
    and remains the most acute challenge to our Homeland defense mission.''
    I am in agreement with that statement. You also shared that, ``Last
    year, NORAD responded to more Russian military flights off the coast of
    Alaska than we've seen in any year since the end of the Cold War.'' Are
    we postured with the necessary capabilities to anticipate and
    effectively defend against Russian hostilities?
        General VanHerck. I am concerned about my ability to defend the
    Homeland as our competitors continue to develop capabilities to hold
    the Homeland at risk. Specifically, during crisis or conflict,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD will require significant additional capabilities
    to defend North America and our Homeland. Many of these capabilities
    are the same as those that would be sought out by other combatant
    commanders for operations overseas, creating an internal competition
    for resources within the Department. Additionally, as Russian and other
    competitors' capabilities grow, it will be increasingly important to
    establish global all-domain awareness and increase our sustainable
    presence in the Arctic. These capabilities will allow us to achieve
    information dominance and decision superiority to provide leaders at
    all levels with the options, time and space necessary to deter
    competitors in competition, de-escalate in crisis, and if necessary,
    defeat in conflict.

        13. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, have our defensive
    capabilities kept pace with the threat? If not, what are the primary
    concerns with our legacy warning and assessment systems and defensive
    capabilities?
        General VanHerck. No. The Department's warning, assessment, and
    conventional defense systems have not kept pace with the threat. In
    particular, legacy systems are challenged by competitor advancements in
    systems designed to avoid detection, including low radar cross section,
    long-range cruise missiles and bombers, and a new generation of very
    quiet submarines. While nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of
    homeland defense, the challenges posed by competitor conventional
    advances have created a growing gap between U.S. nuclear and
    conventional deterrent capabilities that could be exploited by our
    competitors to hold the Homeland at risk below the threshold of nuclear
    war.
        Investments in persistent homeland defense and deterrent
    capabilities are needed to close the gap between the United States'
    nuclear and conventional capabilities, which will force competitors to
    question the efficacy of their strategy, and ultimately to change their
    calculus. DOD homeland defense investments must begin with improving
    domain awareness sensors in the approaches to North America from below
    the surface of the ocean to space, and in the cyber domain.
        Investments must then continue with development of artificial
    intelligence networks enabled by machine learning to fuse data from
    military, intelligence, partner nation, and commercial sources in order
    to create information dominance and provide awareness of competitor
    intent and action much sooner than today. Through all-domain awareness
    and information dominance, military commanders and senior civilian
    decision makers will gain decision space and the ability to employ a
    greater range of options to deter in competition, de-escalate in
    crisis, and deny and defeat in conflict.
        While USNORTHCOM and NORAD are responsible for defending certain
    non-DOD assets and infrastructure in the United States, designating and
    prioritizing potential targets that must be defended with kinetic
    systems must be determined through an interagency process that is not
    solely a DOD responsibility. To ensure that our commands' defensive
    planning accurately reflects national priorities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    have requested Department policy guidance and are seeking unity of
    effort within the interagency regarding vulnerable critical assets. The
    commands are working to ensure that those defensive requirements are
    appropriately resourced to ensure continuity of operations and a
    deterrent effect.
                           north warning radar system
        14. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, during your confirmation
    hearing last July we discussed the importance of new technologies that
    can improve our military's ability to operate in cold weather
    environments. A few years ago, I had the opportunity to visit with then
    NORTHCOM commander General Lori Robinson in Colorado and I was briefed
    on the North Warning System. I was pleased that section 1651 of the
    Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires a
    report to Congress that includes an assessment of the North Warning
    System, including the operational integrity of its infrastructure and
    of its current technology compared with technology deemed necessary, as
    well as a plan for mitigating vulnerabilities and modernizing the
    capabilities of the North Warning System. Can you speak to the
    importance of the North Warning System in the defense of the United
    States and the need to develop modernization plans outlined in the
    report required by the NDAA?
        General VanHerck. NORAD is the United States and Canadian bi-
    national command charged with the missions of aerospace warning,
    aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. These
    missions require air and maritime domain awareness to detect and track
    potential air and maritime threats, including Russian long-range
    bombers and cruise missiles. NORAD's legacy North Warning System
    provides radar coverage of the northern approaches to North America in
    support of aerospace warning and aerospace control missions. However,
    the current architecture is a Cold War-era design with radars that are
    limited to line-of-sight range coverage with minimal capability to
    detect or track small radar cross section, low-altitude, long-range
    maneuverable weapons and their associated delivery platforms.
        A modernization plan for all approaches to North America is
    critical to achieve all-domain awareness against the advanced threats
    we face today. NORAD is aggressively working within the DOD, along with
    Canada and other partners, to assess and identify new capabilities to
    provide domain awareness. Capabilities include over-the-horizon-radars
    that may complement terrestrial, airborne, and space-based technologies
    to improve early warning capabilities against current and future
    threats. NORAD looks forward to continuing efforts to achieve the
    modernization required in support of NORAD missions.

        15. Senator Shaheen. General VanHerck, can you discus the need to
    utilize new technologies that can operate more efficiently and cost
    effectively in cold environments, such as new composite radomes, which
    are protective covers that house the actual radars?
        General VanHerck. NORAD requires continuous domain awareness in
    support of our aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
    warning missions. The current North Warning System utilizes radar
    surveillance and has radomes designed to withstand harsh climates that
    are regularly inspected and evaluated for integrity and necessary
    repairs to meet mission requirements. Cold environments provide unique
    radome challenges and NORAD strongly supports ongoing industry efforts
    to develop new compounds for increased sustainability and resiliency of
    legacy North Warning System radars and for the development of future
    capabilities.
                    countering russian and china influence:
        16. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, your maps of Russian and
    Chinese influence in Latin America asserts that Moscow is executing
    military training assistance, port calls, strategic operations and
    engagements with head of states in regional countries. Is United States
    influence across the Latin American region increasing or declining in
    comparison to previous years, in particular prior to COVID-19?
        Admiral Faller. Although the United States still maintains a
    stronger relationship with most nations in the region than China and
    Russia, some metrics show US influence waning. For example, US trade
    with the region declined from a high point of 354 billion in 2012 to
    $270 billion in 2019. Conversely, trade between China and Latin America
    was up from $188 billion in 2015 to $254 billion in 2019. Overall, I
    assess our strategic advantage and influence in this region is eroding.

        17. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, what strategic actions are
    being taken to not only deter Russian and Chinese influence across the
    region, but also enhance United States influence?
        Admiral Faller. United States leadership, presence, and time are
    absolutely critical in countering Russian and Chinese influence and
    strengthening our own relationships in the region. I have personally
    been engaging with regional leaders, emphasizing the risk of dealing
    with countries who do not share like values and principles. To maintain
    connectivity in the COVID environment, our Command has been resourceful
    using methods commonly available such as video teleconferencing and
    even instant messaging to reinforce our regional relationships. Now
    that vaccinations are becoming more common and testing is readily
    available, I've traveled more in the AOR visiting partners and seeing
    for myself the positive impact we are having. SOUTHCOM has used the
    Humanitarian Assistance Program to provide donations to help fill
    critically needed shortages with PPE, ventilators and field hospitals
    at the speed of relevance to our partners. To date, we have executed
    498 projects, in 28 countries, totaling $72 million. This is saving
    lives and winning hearts and minds.
        SOUTHCOM's joint exercise program enables the U.S. to maintain
    access, presence, and influence in the region, not just during the
    execution of these events but throughout the entire planning process
    that spans 12 to 18 months. Our exercises are critical in building
    readiness, interoperability, domain awareness, and enhance our ability
    to share information and intelligence with our partners. Over the last
    6 months we have been able to demonstrate that we can operate in a
    COVID environment through the execution of our UNITAS, CENTAM GUARDIAN,
    and RESOLUTE SENTINEL exercises. The commitment to planning and
    executing in this challenging environment is a testament to the resolve
    and resiliency of the U.S. and our partners. Over the next few months
    we plan to fully execute our remaining exercises to include TRADEWINDS,
    PANAMAX, FUERZAS COMANDO, FUSED RESPONSE, and second UNITAS exercise.
    These events will train thousands of United States, Partner Nation
    forces and regional organizations sending a strategic message to Russia
    and China that we stand ready with our partners even during the most
    difficult of times.

        18. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Faller, please provide an updated map
    of United States influence in Latin America noting humanitarian
    assistance, military training assistance, medical diplomacy, WPS
    Engagement, port calls and visits to head of state.
        Admiral Faller. Below is an updated map of U.S. influence focused
    on recent humanitarian assistance to the region to include COVID
    response; military education and training; equipment sales and
    transfers; and women, peace, and security engagements. Because port
    calls can many times involve minimal engagement with the host nation,
    we have included information on assistance provided by hospital ships,
    to include the USNS Comfort. These naval deployments have made a
    significant impact in the nations visited. We have also include
    security agreements as an indication of the level of cooperation and
    partnership with the nations of this hemisphere.

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal

                        DOD ROLE AT THE SOUTHERN BORDER

        19. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, why do we still
    have active duty military personnel and National Guardsmen
    deployed to our Southern Border?
        General VanHerck. DOD personnel are deployed to the
    southwest border in fiscal year 2021 in response to a request
    from the Secretary of Homeland Security that was subsequently
    approved by Secretary of Defense authorization for up to 4,000
    total DOD personnel on the border. All are currently National
    Guard members in title 10 status providing support to the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S Customs and
    Border Protection's (CBP) homeland security mission, enabling
    DHS and CBP personnel to focus efforts on law enforcement.

        20. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what is the
    criteria for withdrawal of troops from the border?
        General VanHerck. I defer to the Secretary of Defense
    regarding criteria for ending the current title 10 DOD mission
    on the southwest border.

        21. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what feedback are
    you getting from subordinate Commanders on the impact of border
    deployments on mission readiness and concurrent deployment
    commitments?
        General VanHerck. Service assessments indicate a slight
    reduction in unit readiness at the tactical level. This is
    likely due to individual members of some units operating below
    unit level across a large geographic area, whereas previously
    most units were able to deploy together. Unfortunately, the
    unique requirements for southwest border support somewhat limit
    the opportunity for units to operate together and conduct
    recurring training on unit-level mission essential tasks.

                               FOREIGN INFLUENCE

        22. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller and General
    VanHerck, in both of your testimonies, you note that China and
    Russia are increasingly competing with the United States for
    influence in your areas of operation. Do you believe military
    partnership programs can be a cost-effective tool to counter
    the spread of Russian and Chinese ideology and influence?
        Admiral Faller. I absolutely do believe military
    partnership programs can be a cost-effective tool to counter
    Russian and Chinese in the region. I believe that the best way
    to counter Chinese and Russian influence is to always model
    what ``right'' looks like and strive to be a good partner. That
    means working with partner nation military and security forces
    to build their institutional capacity and resilience against
    all threats, to include external malign influence. At
    USSOUTHCOM, we strive to be the partner of choice (or trusted
    partner) for the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Security
    cooperation and assistance programs are our main battery in
    that effort. Programs like those commonly referred to as
    section 333 aimed at building partner nation capacity enable us
    to train and equip our partners to counter regional and
    external threats, to include cyber and disinformation threats
    that are increasingly becoming a concern for our partners,
    especially those with upcoming elections. International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) is also a critical
    program for building and strengthening long-term military
    partnerships. When a foreign officer or NCO attends a U.S.
    school, they learn more than just military strategy; they learn
    our democratic values and take that back to their countries.
    These programs are all low-cost, high-return tools that
    strengthen our partners' democratic institutions and ability to
    counter malign influence and ideology.
        General VanHerck. Yes. I believe effective military
    partnership programs are a low-cost and highly effective means
    to counter the growing influence of global competitors. I
    regularly engage with the military leadership of Canada, Mexico
    and The Bahamas to advance shared military objectives. Our
    commands also conduct military exercises with allies and
    partners in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility and NORAD
    area of operations to enhance interoperability, hone common
    operational skills, and send a strong signal to our competitors
    regarding the strength and durability of the relationships we
    have with our closest neighbors.
        The United States Professional Military Education (PME)
    program is another effective tool for countering Russian and
    Chinese ideology and influence in the region by integrating
    future senior international leaders into United States Service
    war colleges, staff colleges, and senior enlisted courses. Most
    courses run for an entire academic year, thus creating lasting
    friendships between future senior military leaders and
    fostering greater mutual understanding of participating
    countries and cultures. International PME programs also permit
    our partners to bring their families to the United States,
    where they often form strong bonds with both military families
    and within the local community. These programs pay lasting
    dividends and allow us to demonstrate our values,
    professionalism, and commitment to our allies and partners.

        23. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller and General
    VanHerck, what can Congress do to support your efforts to
    compete with Russia and China in the realm of military exchange
    and education programs?
        Admiral Faller. Security cooperation and assistance
    programs truly are the key to building military partnerships
    and strengthening our partners against external influence.
    Increasing support to these programs in the Western
    Hemisphere--the front line of competition--would be critical to
    preserving our competitive advantage. A little goes a long way
    in this region. Modest investments in section 333 and IMET, as
    well as in multilateral exercises and training would pay
    dividends in our efforts to compete with Russia and China.
        General VanHerck. Congress can continue to support programs
    and funding associated with military exchange and education
    programs as we balance priorities in this new era of strategic
    competition. As competitors seek to increase their influence
    globally, especially in the western hemisphere, USNORTHCOM's
    theater security cooperation (TSC) mission plays a key role in
    ensuring that the United States remains the partner of choice
    for nations in our area of responsibility. Military exchange
    and education programs supplement our TSC efforts by fostering
    personal relationships between international participants,
    exposing attendees to outside cultures and perspectives, and
    demonstrating the widespread national benefits of inclusive,
    rules-based societies and governments. These programs are
    crucial to maintaining trusted relationships and demonstrating
    the United States' commitment to regional safety, security, and
    cooperation. Continued congressional support is vital to
    efforts to deny competitors influence and access in the
    approaches to our Homeland.

                               RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

        24. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, in your posture
    statement you stated that North American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD) has responded to more Russian military flights
    off the coast of Alaska than we've seen in any year since the
    end of the Cold War--can you speak to the nature of these
    flights and the associated responses?
        General VanHerck. In the last year, Russian military
    flights off the coast of Alaska involved heavy bombers, anti-
    submarine aircraft, and intelligence assets. The Russians
    frequently penetrate the Alaskan Air Defense Identification
    Zone and they have demonstrated increasingly integrated and
    sophisticated operational tactics including multi-axis
    approaches. NORAD forces consisting of ground-based radars and
    aviation assets--including fighters, tankers, and Airborne
    Warning and Control Systems--detect, monitor, identify, and
    intercept these aircraft at the time and place of our choosing
    in accordance with my stated guidance.

        25. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what do you think
    the strategic advantage is for Russia's growing investment in
    the Arctic?
        General VanHerck. More than 20 percent of Russia's gross
    domestic product is derived from the Arctic, making the region
    of critical strategic importance to Russian leaders.
    Diminishing Arctic sea ice could lead to faster and more
    efficient shipping routes; access to the region's largely
    untapped hydrocarbon, mineral, and protein resources; and
    greater operational maneuver space for maritime forces. As
    such, Russia continues to invest in capabilities and
    infrastructure--both defensive and offensive in nature--to
    secure its 13,000-nautical mile Arctic coastline and conduct
    influence activities throughout the region, including potential
    military operations directed toward North America.
        The ability to regulate activity in the Arctic has long
    been a challenge given its extreme environment and the lack of
    established rules and adopted norms for the region. Russian and
    Chinese activities in the Arctic, including the recent increase
    in Russian military aircraft incursions into the United States
    and Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones, Russian bomber
    missions into the Arctic Ocean, Russian maritime exercises that
    have included operations within the United States Exclusive
    Economic Zone, and deployment of Chinese icebreakers to the
    Arctic Ocean--are a concerted effort to shift these norms and
    patterns of behavior to demonstrate Russian and Chinese intent
    to compete in the northern approaches to North America.
        On 21 May 2021, Russia will assume the Chair of the Arctic
    Council, an official multi-lateral body that attempts to
    establish a set of international measures and standards in the
    Arctic region. Russia's continued military build-up in the
    northern region, its intent to claim a considerable expanse of
    the Arctic seabed, and its desire to increase the influence of
    observer states like China with the Arctic Council, leaves me
    very concerned that Russia will seek to introduce security
    initiatives via the Arctic Council and potentially drive a
    wedge between Arctic allies and partners. Such actions could
    alter the strategic balance in the region and shift the
    advantage toward our strategic competitors.

        26. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what would you
    recommend that the United States be doing to support NATO
    [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] activity in the Arctic?
        General VanHerck. The asymmetric advantage the United
    States has over Russia and China is our network of allies,
    partners, and like-minded nations. NATO operations in the
    Arctic are critical to demonstrating the alliance's capability
    and commitment to deter and respond to regional threats.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are fully integrated with NATO member
    operations, activities, and investments in this vital region.
    One of the major tenets of my recently published USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD Strategy is that our commands strengthen Arctic
    partnerships to include NATO members, interagency partners, and
    Indigenous peoples and governments by building Arctic
    awareness; enhancing Arctic operations, capabilities and
    infrastructure; and ensuring a credible defense presence.
    Improved interoperability and timely information sharing with
    allies and partners is critical to establishing global all-
    domain awareness, information dominance, and decision
    superiority. As such, USNORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to
    partner with NATO in pursuit of a global approach to an
    integrated and layered homeland defense that starts abroad.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD also routinely collaborate with NATO
    members on strategic messaging to ensure alliance intent is
    clear and to reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding or
    miscalculation.

                                     CYBER

        27. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, how does NORTHCOM
    and NORAD see itself in our common mission to defend the
    Homeland against cyber security threats?
        General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM is the designated Department
    lead for defense support of civil authorities. I see the
    primary common mission for USNORTHCOM as working with the
    whole-of-government to determine priorities for critical
    infrastructure defense and, if needed, responding in support of
    civil authorities in support of crisis or contingency
    management. On a daily basis, USNORTHCOM's two allocated Cyber
    Protection Teams defend USNORTHCOM and NORAD cyber terrain and
    mission systems against cyber threats to provide mission
    assurance for both Commands, and also closely coordinate with
    USCYBERCOM and the Canadian Forces for additional support if
    required.

        28. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, how does the DOD
    ensure that our geographic COCOMs, especially NORTHCOM, are
    coordinated on cyber security threats and defending COCOM
    infrastructure?
        General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM and USCYBERCOM coordinate
    daily on potential cybersecurity threats to ensure that we are
    at the ready to defend DOD and United States infrastructure
    whenever needed. In addition, USNORTHCOM has USCYBERCOM
    personnel embedded in our headquarters to further align our
    collective cyber threat response actions. USCYBERCOM's
    Cyberspace Operations Integrated Planning Element is resident
    in our headquarters and synchronizes with USCYBERCOM multiple
    times daily on cyber threats to aid in the defense of
    USNORTHCOM cyber terrain and command and control
    infrastructure. Finally, USCYBERCOM facilitates cyber threat
    discussions several times a week with all of the combatant
    commands to ensure cyber threat visibility.

        29. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, you stated in
    your posture statement that you were deeply concerned about the
    development of Chinese capability in transitioning from cyber
    exploitation to cyber-attack--what do you think is the relative
    threat level of additional Chinese cyber-attacks on the United
    States Homeland?
        General VanHerck. We have seen the impact cyber-attacks can
    have on our domestic critical infrastructure in crisis or
    conflict, and I believe the threat level of additional cyber-
    attacks on the U.S. Homeland and North America is high. Today,
    China routinely conducts cyber espionage against United States
    military, government, corporate, and academic networks to steal
    sensitive data and aid its weapons programs, inform its
    diplomacy, and advance its online influence operations. In a
    crisis or conflict, China almost certainly will launch cyber-
    attacks on military and civilian infrastructure in an attempt
    to delay or disrupt a United States response and to destroy
    United States will and public support for intervention.

        30. Senator Blumenthal. General VanHerck, what are we
    currently doing, and what do we need to be doing in order to
    successfully counter and deter this threat?
        General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM continues to employ allocated
    cyber forces to defend our cyber terrain and critical mission
    systems. In addition, if a lead federal agency requests DOD
    support, as the Defense Support of Civil Authorities
    Synchronizer I will provide DOD capabilities as needed to
    support whole-of-government efforts to defend U.S. critical
    infrastructure. In order to do this, I need a whole-of-
    government approach to prioritize U.S critical infrastructure
    so I can employ allocated forces needed to protect and defend
    critical non-DOD assets against cyber threats. In addition, I
    believe cybersecurity and cyber threat information sharing must
    continue to increase between the Federal Government and private
    sector. Although some progress has been made, improved
    information sharing will provide all-domain awareness to
    support a whole-of-government approach to countering and
    deterring the cyber threat.

                                  ----------

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono

          INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) ASSETS

        31. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, in your statement to
    the Committee you point out that SOUTHCOM employs less than 1
    percent of DOD's ISR resources to counter external state actors
    (ESAs) and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in the
    Region, and then go on to mention your team's embrace of
    increasingly non-traditional intelligence collection efforts to
    bolster these efforts. In an era of increasingly constrained
    DOD resources, are there any additional procurement authorities
    or support Congress could grant you in the area of ISR to
    increase your collection capabilities, especially via non-
    traditional means?
        Admiral Faller. We will be submitting a UFR list to
    Congress shortly after the President transmits the fiscal year
    2022 budget to Congress that will include both traditional and
    non-traditional ISR capabilities.

             COUNTERING CHINA, RUSSIA, AND OTHER ESAS IN THE REGION

        32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, you highlight all the
    additional malign activities China, Russia, and other ESAs are
    taking in the area of responsibility (AOR) to undermine United
    States credibility and partnerships in the Region. With that,
    and similar to ongoing efforts with the European Deterrence
    Initiative (EDI) and Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI),
    should Congress consider a similar approach to focus lines of
    effort and align a whole-of-government approach to address
    increasing security threats in your AOR?
        Admiral Faller. As I have testified to my increasing
    concerns about the challenges in our own hemisphere, various
    Members of Congress have raised this concept of a regional
    initiative for the Western Hemisphere. Given the perfect storm
    of threats I see facing our neighborhood, I would agree that
    it's time for a big idea for this region. The President has
    publicly voiced concerns about the root causes of migration--
    the violence, corruption, and instability in Central America--
    and has pledged to work with those countries to address those
    challenges.
        Many of those root causes are driven by transnational
    criminal organizations (TCOs) that traffic in drugs, humans,
    arms, and any other commodity that will turn a profit for them.
    The corruption, instability, and human suffering that is
    fostered by these illicit organizations opens the door for
    competitors like China to leverage the dire circumstances in
    these countries for their gain. TCOs are violent--43 of the 50
    most violent cities in the world are in this hemisphere. With
    the added pressure that COVID-19 and two back-to-back major
    hurricanes have placed on the region, a whole-of-government
    strategy that includes all U.S. elements of national power will
    be critical to ensuring security and stability in the Western
    Hemisphere--our shared home.

             DOD'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN THE AOR

        33. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, President Biden
    introduced the United States Citizenship Act recently, which if
    passed, would include $4 billion over 4 years to address root
    causes of migration in the Northern Triangle countries of El
    Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. How might DOD be involved in
    this?
        Admiral Faller. I believe that DOD does have an important
    role to play in such an initiative, in support of greater
    diplomatic and development efforts. Any strategy aimed at
    stability and prosperity will require basic security in order
    to be successful. One of the primary root causes of migration
    from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is the violence and
    insecurity facing that region, created mostly by the murderous
    TCOs that operate with impunity in those countries. TCOs also
    use the incredible profits they earn from trafficking in
    humans, drugs, and arms to foster corruption and instability
    that drives people from their homes in search of a safe place
    for their families.
        The military brings capabilities to the table that are
    critical to building our neighbors' institutions and resiliency
    to the threats they are facing. DOD has established programs to
    help partner nations develop diverse and inclusive militaries
    that respect the rule of law and human rights. Our programs
    help develop the professional forces necessary to secure and
    stabilize our hemisphere. Our security cooperation programs
    include institutional capacity building in which we assist our
    partners in strengthening their basic security institutions to
    plan and manage resources. Our exercise program develops
    readiness, interoperability, and the ability to respond
    regionally to counter these threats. USSOUTHCOM also has the
    only Human Rights Office among Combatant Commands and has over
    25 years of experience working with partner nations to
    institutionalize respect for human rights in military and
    security forces. Through professional military education, we
    teach our partners what ``right'' and professional forces look
    like. If the U.S. military is not present to model the values
    of a strong democracy and respect for civilian authority,
    others, with less desirable values, will step in.

        34. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, has your office done
    any pre-planning on the U.S. Citizenship Act?
        Admiral Faller. USSOUTHCOM has not been part of the
    planning effort for this initiative. However, the work we do
    every day in this hemisphere--our shared home--is completely
    aligned with the goal of addressing root causes of illegal
    migration. Our efforts could easily be incorporated into a
    whole-of-government effort to assist our neighbors as they face
    the perfect storm of threats all colliding in our hemisphere--
    violent TCOs fostering corruption, China and Russia taking
    advantage of that corruption, the long-term economic impacts of
    COVID-19, and two back-to-back devastating hurricanes.
    USSOUTHCOM stands prepared to play a supporting role in this
    important effort.

                 SECURITY COOPERATION WITH ALLIES IN THE REGION

        35. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, thank you for
    emphasizing the importance of our allies and partners in the
    AOR--you specifically mention the flexibility to spend a
    greater share of title 10 section 333 funds over multiple years
    as an important tool to continue building partner capacity. Are
    there any other legislative changes that would further assist
    you in the important area of marshaling a stronger coalition of
    allies and partners in the Region to counter ESAs and TCOs in
    the AOR?
        Admiral Faller. USSOUTHCOM is working within current
    authorities and will engage the Congress if we find a need for
    further legislative changes.

                         SERVICEMEMBER QUALITY OF LIFE

        36. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, I am pleased you
    mention in your posture statement a continued focus on quality
    of life challenges directly affecting the force like finding
    adequate, affordable housing in the Miami area for SOUTHCOM
    servicemembers. Can you expound upon some of the efforts you've
    taken to combat this issue, including outreach with the local
    community, and the status of the Army's efforts to find a
    permanent, cost-effective housing solution in Miami?
        Admiral Faller. While Miami is a wonderful home for
    SOUTHCOM, it is a high cost of living area, which presents
    challenges for Servicemembers and civilians alike. Housing in
    the local area has been particularly challenging, with some
    landlords requiring 3-months rent up front, totaling 8$10,000.
    We are working with local communities to create exemptions to
    these high up-front costs for Servicemembers. While we work to
    alleviate the immediate financial burden, we are also working
    closely with the Department of the Army to find a low-cost,
    long-term housing solution near our Headquarters on already
    federally-owned land.
        In addition to these efforts in direct support of lowering
    housing costs, we also pursuing other quality of life
    initiatives to further mitigate financial burdens on our
    Servicemembers. This includes working closely with the Army on
    initiating a review of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rates
    for our local area as well as participating in a DOD cost of
    living allowance data collection to ensure our Servicemembers
    are receiving adequate compensation for this area. Finally, we
    are working with the State of Florida to seek tollway relief
    for those Servicemembers who are priced out of living near our
    headquarters and instead must commute over 20 miles each way to
    work via tollways.

             CLOSING THE DETENTION FACILITY AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

        37. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, the New York Times
    reported in the last year or so that keeping detainees at
    Guantanamo Bay costs approximately $13 million per detainee per
    year, or over $500 million per year total to house 40
    detainees--compare that to the $78,000 per year the United
    States spent in 2012 to hold individual prisoners at the ADX
    `Supermax' Facility in Florence, CO. Should we finally close
    down Guantanamo Bay and use those funds for additional
    operations to combat drug traffickers and TCOs in your AOR,
    thereby saving hundreds or even thousands of American lives per
    year?
        Admiral Faller. USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Guantanamo are
    responsible for the safe, legal, and humane care and custody of
    law of war detainees. Closing the detention facility at
    Guantanamo Bay would be a policy decision, as would be any
    decision on how best to use any money saved if it were to be
    closed.

                          CYBERATTACKS ON THE HOMELAND

        38. Senator Hirono. General VanHerck, you talk about the
    increasing sophistication of cyberattacks on our networks and
    infrastructure from a variety of adversaries, particularly
    Russia and China. You coordinate Defense Support to Civil
    Authorities (DSCA) in this area for the Homeland--are you
    confident your command has the authorities and tools necessary
    to ensure our state and local partners are protected from the
    increasing threats posed by nation-state cyberattacks?
        General VanHerck. I have the authorities and tools
    necessary to execute my role as the DSCA Synchronizer to ensure
    that DOD responds appropriately to any approved Request for
    Assistance we receive from lead federal agencies. I remain
    concerned about whole-of-nation preparedness for attacks from
    peer competitors or adversaries in a future crisis or conflict.
    We need a whole-of-government approach to prioritize U.S
    critical infrastructure in order for me to employ allocated
    forces to defend critical non-DOD assets against cyber threats
    that place mission assurance at risk. We are also working with
    USCYBERCOM to identify where new capabilities may be needed;
    for example, the interagency-approved standardized information
    template that facilitates rapid sharing of critical information
    from state and local levels to the DOD about possible threats
    to elections infrastructure is now a core element of our
    toolkit.

        39. Senator Hirono. General VanHerck, cyberattacks blur the
    line between traditional offensive military operations and
    operations short of war. What steps is NORTHCOM taking, in
    partnership with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), to continue to
    convey to our adversaries how we view cyberattacks and,
    specifically, what our significant responses might be in order
    to deter future attacks?
        General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM closely coordinates with
    USCYBERCOM to ensure our strategic messaging efforts and target
    audiences are aligned, and to assess possible competitor
    reactions and repercussions. We are unlikely to completely
    deter all malicious cyber activities, but the Department's
    ``Defend Forward'' and CDRUSCYBERCOM's ``Persistent
    Engagement'' strategies are specific responses that signal that
    malicious cyber activities against the United States cannot be
    conducted without cost. Even so, Russian and Chinese cyber
    activity against the Homeland in the competition phase remains
    a significant concern.
        I believe national-level policy engagement, beyond DOD,
    with Russia and China is needed to establish rules and norms of
    expected behavior in cyberspace to reduce the potential for
    unintentional escalation or failure of strategic deterrence.
    USNORTHCOM and USCYBERCOM are not in the lead for cyber defense
    and response, but both commands provide policy inputs regarding
    cyber rules and norms to key agencies in the U.S. Government.
    The Cyber Response Group--with participation from federal
    departments and agencies such as the Department of State, the
    Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland
    Security, and the Department of Justice--leads policy and
    strategy development, coordination, and implementation
    procedures for responding to significant cyber incidents.

                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

        40. Senator Hirono. General VanHerck, while I realize
    Hawaii technically falls within the geographic bounds of U.S.
    Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), can you talk about the
    importance of getting the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H)
    operational to support our overall layered ballistic missile
    defense system?
        General VanHerck. I believe an operational HDR-H could
    contribute to an overall layered defense capability as one of
    several potential options that could be considered to provide
    additional capacity and capability--in this case, a layered
    defense specific to Hawaii--pending a Department decision on
    layered defense. I am confident I can defend all of the United
    States, including Hawaii and Alaska, with the missile defense
    system capability that we have today against a limited number
    of intercontinental ballistic missile threats from rogue
    nations. I remain concerned about my ability, specifically
    regarding future capacity and capability, to provide ballistic
    missile defense as the threats continue to adapt and evolve.

                                  ----------

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

                         HOMELAND DEFENSE RADAR--HAWAII

        41. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, during your
    testimony, you highlighted the increasing risks posed by North
    Korea's advancing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
    program, and the importance of continuing to update and evolve
    Homeland missile defenses in order to meet this threat.
    However, in its fiscal year 2021 budget request, DOD proposed
    eliminating funding for the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii.
    While Congress ultimately restored this funding, could you
    explain the impact to Homeland missile defense capabilities
    should the radar ultimately not be completed?
        General VanHerck. Please see response to #40.

                           MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY

        42. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, in your written
    testimony, you outlined the growing threat to the United States
    Homeland posed by Russia's and China's investments in large
    numbers of long-range precision strike weapons, and North
    Korea's continued development of larger and more complex ICBMs.
    While you highlighted the range of efforts your command and DOD
    are taking to address these issues, are you concerned that we
    may be on the wrong side of the cost curve, especially since
    these countries can produce strike systems faster and cheaper
    than we can produce defensive interceptors?
        General VanHerck. Yes, a bullet-for-bullet strategy to
    kinetically defeat precision strike and ballistic missile
    threats to the Homeland is fiscally challenging. Although
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD require effective defensive capabilities
    to address threats faced by USNORTHCOM and NORAD today, my
    belief is that the focus should not solely be on kinetic kill
    capabilities. Policy makers must determine what USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD must defend with kinetic capabilities, as it is neither
    affordable nor realistic to defend every potential target in
    the Homeland.
        It is my belief we need to change our perspective beyond
    kinetic kill to emphasize deterrence by denial. We do this by
    drawing attention left of enemy launch by identifying adversary
    delivery platforms and preconditions for actions. As part of
    this strategy, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are pursuing a globally
    integrated defense approach that emphasizes the use of domain
    awareness sensors, data and information, and an open data
    architecture utilizing machine enhanced processing and
    artificial intelligence. This approach is designed to move
    decision space left and provide military commanders and senior
    civilian decision makers time to assess and act well ahead of
    our competitors.

        43. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, are there defensive
    technology areas where you would like to see greater
    investment--areas where progress might help the United States
    offset the cost imbalance without sacrificing operational
    effectiveness?
        General VanHerck. Yes. I recommend investments in multi-
    mission, all-domain awareness capabilities and capitalizing on
    modern processing (machine learning and artificial
    intelligence) that is commercially available today to provide
    civilian decision makers and military commanders with
    information required to quickly assess situations and if
    needed, take action. I have communicated my integrated priority
    list to the Department, which emphasizes investment in these
    priorities. The ability to deter in competition, de-escalate in
    crisis, and deny or defeat in conflict requires all-domain
    awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority.

                      MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGY

        44. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, in response to
    questions posed during his confirmation, Secretary of Defense
    Lloyd Austin committed to conducting a review of missile
    defense policies as part of the administration's overall
    defense strategy development. In the context of such a review,
    what would you consider your top three most critical capability
    shortfalls that DOD should work to address over the next
    several years?
        General VanHerck. Our ability to deter in competition, de-
    escalate in crisis, and deny or defeat in conflict requires
    significant improvements in all-domain awareness, information
    dominance, and decision superiority--these are my top three
    critical capability shortfalls. A capable and persistent
    defense at home is a prerequisite to projecting power to a
    globally integrated forward fight. The integration and sharing
    of data for a global, layered sensing grid will provide
    warfighters and decision makers at strategic, operational, and
    tactical levels with increased awareness and decision space
    needed to make timely, well-informed decisions. It is my
    recommendation that such a missile defense review be part of an
    overall strategic deterrence review. Missile defense is
    integral to overall strategic deterrence and should be aligned
    with the nuclear posture review. If conducted independently,
    separate reviews will lead to separate solutions or decisions
    that have broader implications, and thus should be considered
    as part of overarching strategic deterrence.

               INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT

        45. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, over the past several
    years, DOD has clearly articulated the urgent need to modernize
    and replace all aspects of the Nation's nuclear triad, as well
    as the associated nuclear command, control, and communications
    systems. However, a critical component that supports our
    strategic deterrent, the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack
    Assessment (ITW/AA) system, is often overlooked. Could you
    provide us your assessment of the condition of the ITW/AA
    system?
        General VanHerck. The ITW/AA system provides strategic
    warning and attack assessment as originally designed against
    legacy threats. However, even with the current and future
    planned improvements to the ITW/AA system, my ability to
    provide threat warning and attack assessment in the future lags
    behind our adversaries' rapid development of low radar cross
    section, high-speed, maneuverable, long-range weapon systems.
    As our competitors' capabilities continue to improve,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD require timely and accurate information
    across all domains to counter their advancements in weapons
    systems, global influence, and actions.

        46. Senator Inhofe. General VanHerck, are there portions of
    the ITW/AA system that you believe are in urgent need of
    modernization in order to ensure its continued effectiveness?
        General VanHerck. Yes, I believe the ITW/AA system has a
    pressing need to enhance all-domain awareness through
    integrating already-available sensor data. In addition, the
    Department must continue investments in service-life extensions
    of aging, but still-viable capabilities; development of new
    capabilities to include capabilities to hold hypersonics at
    risk; and inclusion of non-DOD capabilities to ensure
    effectiveness against current and future threats.

                                  ----------

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

         GRAPHIC DEPICTING U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
                   (USSOUTHCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

        47. Senator Wicker. Admiral Faller, you submitted graphics
    depicting Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the
    SOUTHCOM AOR. Please provide a similar graphic that shows U.S.
    economic and diplomatic engagement in your AOR.
        Admiral Faller. Attached is an updated map of U.S.
    influence focused on recent humanitarian assistance to the
    region to include COVID response; military education and
    training; equipment sales and transfers; and women, peace, and
    security engagements. Because port calls can many times involve
    minimal engagement with the host nation, we have included
    information on assistance provided by hospital ships, to
    include the USNS COMFORT. These naval deployments have made a
    significant impact in the nations visited. We have also include
    security agreements as an indication of the level of
    cooperation and partnership with the nations of this
    hemisphere.

                                  ----------

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan

                                MISSILE DEFENSE

        48. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, the National
    Defense Strategy articulates the top defense objective as:
    ``defending the Homeland from attack;'' a vital component of
    meeting this is robustly investing in our Nation's missile
    defense capabilities. Unfortunately, we are trending in the
    wrong direction regarding this issue: North Korea and Iran
    continue to expand the quantity, range, and lethality of their
    arsenals, as do our top great power competitors. Yet, as these
    threats trend upward, the budget allocated to missile defense
    trends flat or downward. In your personal opinion, how soon do
    you think the missile capabilities of rogue nations -North
    Korea and Iran--will outpace NORTHCOM's ability to defend the
    Homeland?
        General VanHerck. There are many variables that challenge
    my ability to pinpoint a specific time when our ballistic
    missile defenses might be outpaced. While I currently have the
    ability to defend against a limited number of ballistic missile
    threats from these rogue nations, I am very concerned about
    their ability to exceed my defensive capacity and capability in
    the near future. My intelligence team keeps me continuously
    apprised of North Korean and Iranian efforts to advance their
    missile programs. Without improvements to our current system--
    such as fielding of the Next Generation Interceptor, on time or
    sooner, and a Department decision about a layered missile
    defense capability--our defensive capacity will remain
    constant, while the threat continues to grow, eventually
    exceeding my defensive capacity and capability.

        49. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in a 2020 House
    Armed Services Committee hearing, former Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy (USD-P) John Rood agreed with the NORTHCOM
    assessment that North Kora's ballistic missile threat could
    challenge the capability of the ground-based midcourse defense
    (GMD) system as soon as 2025. Unfortunately, the Next
    Generation Interceptor (NGI) is not expected to be fielded
    until 2030 on the current timeline. How important is it that we
    field the NGI?
        General VanHerck. While ultimately this will be a policy
    decision, I believe that it is extremely important to field the
    NGI. My top priority as I work with VADM Hill at the Missile
    Defense Agency is to maintain the schedule, and if possible,
    seek ways to accelerate the fielding of the NGI to provide much
    needed capacity and additional capabilities to maintain or
    outpace adversary capability development.

        50. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, what level of risk
    does NORTHCOM (and by extension our Nation) take on if the
    current timeline is not accelerated to keep up with the missile
    capability, capacity and reach of rogue nations?
        General VanHerck. My top priority for ballistic missile
    defense is to maintain or accelerate the fielding of the Next
    Generation Interceptor (NGI). While today USNORTHCOM can defend
    against a limited number of intercontinental ballistic missile
    threats from rogue nations, without NGI, current capability or
    capacity could be exceeded in the future and the risk to our
    Nation, and overall strategic deterrence failure, will increase
    as countries like North Korea continue to advance their missile
    programs. The DOD is continuing to evaluate additional options
    to mitigate potential capability challenges prior to the NGI
    being fielded.

        51. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, the missile
    capabilities possessed by rogue nations--North Korea and Iran--
    continue to rapidly evolve. The New York Times recently
    reported that North Korea showcased the country's ``largest-
    ever'' ICBM just over a month ago, and revealed a new
    submarine-launched ballistic missile even more recently.
    Provided the presence of these very real and capable threats to
    our Nation's Homeland, are the 44 ground-based interceptors
    (GBI) currently postured enough to present a credible defense
    of the American people?
        General VanHerck. I defer to OSD and the SECDEF on the
    overall policy for the total number of ground-based
    interceptors. Although I maintain the capability to defend the
    Homeland against the current threat today, I remain very
    concerned about USNORTHCOM's ballistic missile defense capacity
    and capability being exceeded in the future as rogue nations
    continue to develop ICBM technology.

                              POLAR COMMUNICATIONS

        52. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in your statement
    for the record, you highlight NORTHCOM's focus on improving
    Arctic communications through a commercial constellation of low
    earth orbit (LEO) satellites. You describe this effort's
    ability to: `` . . . dramatically improve communication for
    military users in the Arctic, as well as for civilians in
    remote, high latitude communities.'' Congress appropriated $50
    million of the $130 million requested for this program in
    NORTHCOM's Unfunded Priority List. Can you describe for me the
    current status of this program and why LEO satellites--in
    support of polar communications--are so important,and, what the
    impact would be to NORTHCOM if unfunded?
        General VanHerck. I am grateful to the Committee for the
    funding authorized in the fiscal year 2021 National Defense
    Authorization Act for improved polar communications. In early
    May 2021, the Air Force awarded contracts to two commercial
    vendors, presenting the opportunity for competition to test
    Arctic capability between two different contract providers.
    This will enable initial testing of commercial Arctic
    communications capabilities, with the testing likely to
    commence by late summer 2021. In coordination with the Air
    Force Research Laboratory, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have already
    deployed terminals to Arctic locations and will begin testing
    as soon as the commercial satellite providers are ready. My
    expectation is to have reliable capability from multiple
    commercial vendors with near-24/7 Arctic coverage in the spring
    2022 timeframe.
        Commercial proliferated low earth orbit (LEO) satellite
    constellations are essential to the Homeland defense mission
    due to their high data rates, low latency, and expected lower
    costs--particularly in the polar region where there is
    currently little to no communications capability. Low latency,
    which can only be achieved using satellites in LEO orbits, is
    critical to fusing data from the North Warning System, applying
    advanced analytics via artificial intelligence/machine learning
    capabilities, and maximizing the detection capability of the
    system used to protect the United States and Canada. When I
    talk about domain awareness and information dominance, and
    being able to perceive and respond to complex threats, this
    system enables USNORTHCOM and NORAD to achieve those
    objectives. If unfunded, extremely limited SATCOM accessibility
    and bandwidth will continue to hinder Arctic persistence and
    military operations by restricting the ability to provide early
    warning and other important communications to USNORTHCOM and
    NORAD command and control systems.

                              ARCTIC CAPABILITIES

        53. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in your statement
    for the record, you identify: ``Improving our domain awareness,
    communications systems, and our ability to conduct and sustain
    multi-domain operations in the high north are all important
    priorities for both NORTHCOM and NORAD.'' With this in mind--in
    your personal opinion, what capability gaps presently exist
    that inhibit your ability to effectively 1) project and sustain
    power in the Arctic, 2) compete with Russia and China in the
    northern latitudes, and 3) implement the National Defense
    Strategy?
        General VanHerck. My capability gaps related to
    establishing a persistent, sustainable presence in the Arctic
    include maritime fueling capability north of Dutch Harbor,
    which is necessary to expand the Navy's and Coast Guard's
    operational reach; improved infrastructure for our air assets
    (e.g. fighters, tankers, and ISR platforms); reliable,
    resilient communications systems; and modernized high-north
    domain awareness systems developed in coordination with our
    Canadian allies.
        Additionally, USNORTHCOM and NORAD must have a dedicated
    allocation of Arctic-trained forces and Arctic-proven
    capabilities via the Global Force Management (GFM) process in
    order to effectively implement the National Defense Strategy
    and successfully execute the commands' assigned missions in the
    Arctic. Recent USNORTHCOM and NORAD exercises in the Arctic
    have been accomplished through support of units volunteering
    for the training opportunity and expending Military Personnel
    Appropriation (MPA) days, instead of being supported through
    assignment by the GFM process. In order to deliberately build
    capability in the Arctic, the Department must increase the
    prioritization of homeland defense and Arctic exercises and
    training against other requirements within the larger GFM
    process. We cannot execute the Strategy without adequately
    trained, equipped, and allocated forces.

        54. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, what level of
    resourcing would you need to close these gaps?
        General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM and NORAD's collaboration with
    the Services and industry partners shows we can achieve
    affordable but significant capability advancements and
    innovative solutions to our most pressing challenges. In a key
    recent example, I am grateful for the Committee's support for
    initial efforts to operationalize emerging commercial space
    internet systems. However, I still require concurrent,
    coordinated binational, bilateral, and unilateral investments
    by the United States and Canada in NORAD warning systems to
    meet current and future threats, as well as NORAD modernization
    efforts focused on all-domain awareness in support of achieving
    information dominance and decision superiority.

        55. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in your personal
    opinion, do we have the necessary infrastructure--like
    Strategic Arctic Ports and expeditionary airfields--to project
    power and effectively compete in the Arctic?
        General VanHerck. No. USNORTHCOM and NORAD do not have the
    necessary infrastructure to execute the National Defense
    Strategy and Canadian Defence Strategy, compete with peer
    competitors day-to-day, or respond in crisis and conflict. Fuel
    is necessary for persistence and to support maritime power
    projection and sustainment. I am agnostic about what solution
    mitigates that capability gap. I do know that if the Port of
    Nome expansion as recommended by the 2019 U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers feasibility study comes to fruition, it will increase
    Navy and Coast Guard reach and persistence in the Arctic. In
    addition, testing and developing Arctic Expeditionary Air Base
    Sets are also essential to meeting force laydown and shelter
    requirements. Finally, it is also necessary to fix
    deteriorating infrastructure in the high north (e.g. hangars,
    runways, distribution facilities, and storage for petroleum,
    oil, and lubricants) and update communications systems to
    modern standards.

        56. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, what risk do we
    assume if we continue to forego adequate investments in these
    types of infrastructure?
        General VanHerck. Access to adequate infrastructure in the
    Arctic is critical to our ability to effectively defend the
    Homeland by deterring adversaries in competition, de-escalating
    in crisis, and defeating threats in conflict. Our competitors
    are making national investments in their Arctic operational
    capabilities; we must make similar smart, targeted investments
    to ensure the Joint Force's continued ability to operate
    effectively in this critical region while continuing to invest
    in training, personnel, and equipment readiness to operate in
    this challenging environment.

        57. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, in your personal
    opinion, do we have the right mix of U.S. Navy surface ships to
    visibly contest illegal maritime claims, provide maritime
    warning and defense, and ensure a free and open maritime domain
    YEAR-ROUND--with surface freedom of navigation operations
    (FONOP)--in the Arctic? If yes, please explain how this could/
    will be executed with the current inventory.
        General VanHerck. I defer to the Navy and DOD regarding
    specific Naval force structure. With that said, I believe the
    Arctic continues to be an emerging global area of interest with
    many unique challenges which require us to constantly review
    and improve our technologies, tactics, techniques and
    procedures. The demand for future global naval capacity is
    likely to increase, not decrease.

                         INTEGRATING ARCTIC STRATEGIES

        58. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, the Department of
    Defense released its Arctic Strategy in June 2019, the Air
    Force followed suit with its own strategy in July 2020, the
    Department of the Navy published their Arctic Blueprint in
    January 2021, and the Army's Arctic Strategy was released just
    this week. Can you describe to me--as the advocate for Arctic
    capabilities and one of two combatant commands with primary
    responsibility for Arctic military operations--how you are
    integrating these strategies and ensuring their implementation?
        General VanHerck. My USNORTHCOM and NORAD Strategy covers
    the Commands' entire area of responsibility, including the
    Arctic, and aligns with objectives identified in the Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance, the National Defense
    Strategy, and the 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy. It directs
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD elements to defend the United States and
    Canada in and through the Arctic with allies and partners,
    including Indigenous peoples and governments, by building
    Arctic awareness; enhancing Arctic operations, capabilities,
    and infrastructure; and ensuring a credible defense presence.
        This Strategy will be implemented through the forthcoming
    USNORTHCOM Combatant Command Campaign Plan, which adds fidelity
    to my strategic guidance. The Combatant Command Campaign Plan
    includes specific objectives and tasking for USNORTHCOM Service
    components regarding development and implementation of Arctic-
    related Service capabilities and concepts, including
    operational test and evaluation for Arctic operations. Because
    these objectives and tasks align with, and are enabled by, the
    implementation of Service Arctic strategies, USNORTHCOM will be
    able to advocate more effectively for resourcing Arctic
    requirements.

        59. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, do you believe each
    Service is assigning adequate attention and focus toward the
    Arctic?
        General VanHerck. Yes, for now, I am encouraged by the
    Services' development of Arctic strategies and attention toward
    the Arctic. However, I look forward to reviewing the Services'
    Program Objective Memoranda (POM) and the fiscal year 2022
    President's Budget to gain a better sense of how the Services
    plan to resource those strategies.

                     RUSSIA'S ``DEFENSIVE'' ARCTIC POSTURE

        60. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, several senior
    defense officials and nominees have recently characterized
    Moscow's approach in the Arctic as: ``largely from a
    territorial defense perspective.'' Yet, Russia has increased
    its incursions of the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone
    markedly over the last year. In fact, the average number of
    intercepts of Russian aircraft from 2007 to 2019 was six to
    seven. In 2020--through October--there were a total of 14.
    Further, Russia has also increased the frequency and scale of
    military exercises in the region. Last August, the Russian navy
    conducted a major exercise consisting of more than 50 warships
    and 40 aircraft in the Bering Sea; which, also encompassed them
    expelling United States fishing fleets from our own exclusive
    economic zone. Do you view these activities as defensive in
    nature?
        General VanHerck. No. The Arctic is key terrain for both
    Russia and the United States, and Russian military forces
    regularly conduct exercises in the region that are likely
    designed to accomplish multiple objectives--including training
    in the harsh Arctic environment and directing strategic
    messaging at the United States, NORAD, and the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization. More specifically, Russian heavy bombers
    are inherently offensive platforms, so I view any of their
    flights near Alaska as Russia messaging that it can hold North
    America at risk with its inventory of advanced air-launched
    cruise missiles. Further, Russia's naval exercise in the Bering
    Sea in August 2020 was its first such exercise in that area in
    decades and included launches of anti-ship and coastal defense
    cruise missiles against targets near the Russian coastline. I
    believe these activities are primarily intended to demonstrate
    the Russian Pacific Fleet's ability to destroy naval surface
    platforms in the North Pacific in the event of escalation of
    conflict with the United States.

        61. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, what, in your
    opinion, would constitute military activity in the Arctic that
    could be characterized as offensive?
        General VanHerck. In my role as the Commander of USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD, I view actions that threaten the United States and
    Canadian Homelands as potentially offensive in nature--
    including those in the Arctic. In recent years, Russia has
    developed and demonstrated advanced air-, sea-, and ground-
    launched land-attack cruise missiles, and I see any military
    activity that simulates the employment of these systems in the
    Arctic as demonstrating offensive capability. This includes
    flights by Russian heavy bombers into the Alaska Air Defense
    Identification Zone and the Canada Air Defense Identification
    Zone. I see large-scale demonstrations of offensive assault
    capabilities using airborne or amphibious troops and activities
    that threaten to sever or significantly restrict legitimate
    access to the Arctic in a similar light.

                               TED STEVENS CENTER

        62. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, last year Congress
    appropriated $10 million for the Department of Defense (DOD)
    Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies which was
    authorized in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA. The Ted Stevens Center
    will be the first DOD regional center in the Arctic and will
    seek to support defense strategy objectives and policy
    priorities through an academic forum, while also fostering
    strong international networks of security leaders. As the
    advocate for United States Armed Forces capabilities in the
    Arctic, how do you see this center supporting NORTHCOM
    objectives in the Arctic and what topics would you like to see
    the center focus on?
        General VanHerck. I see a Center for Arctic Security
    Studies as having the potential to support USNORTHCOM's
    homeland defense objectives by improving cooperation with
    allies and partners, promoting shared understanding of Arctic
    security challenges, and facilitating international
    collaboration on matters of common interest. A center could
    also provide significant value in research and development of
    software and systems that advance my top priority of providing
    global all-domain awareness, improving information sharing with
    allies and partners, and creating open architectures for Arctic
    sensor and data feeds. Finally, it could also be helpful for
    such a center to analyze environmental, strategic, and economic
    issues in the region; foster international cooperation; and
    promote the value of the Arctic as an international commons.

                   WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH IN THE ARCTIC

        63. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, the Arctic
    encompasses a wide range of government institutions to include
    the U.S. State Department's role on the Arctic Council and
    coordination with allies, the U.S. Intelligence Community's
    role in maintaining Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance operations, and the numerous Federal Agencies
    involved in research, infrastructure, commerce, and natural
    resource development in the Arctic region. Would you agree with
    me that the United States must use a whole-of-government
    approach to address issues in the Arctic? If so, how would you
    suggest the DOD better include other Government agencies in
    their approach to Arctic issues?
        General VanHerck. Yes. A whole-of-government approach is
    critical to success in the Arctic, and I believe the United
    States must implement all elements of national power to keep
    pace with the rapidly evolving strategic and environmental
    situation in the region. To ensure success, the DOD must work
    with partners from across the interagency, and with our allies
    and partners, to develop a whole-of-government framework for
    rising to the challenges of strategic competition, which would
    certainly include challenges in the Arctic. Further, continued
    interagency participation in international forums such as the
    Arctic Council, Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and the Arctic
    Security Forces Roundtable, along with close coordination
    between the State Department, the DOD, and the intelligence and
    scientific communities, are necessary to maintain unity of
    effort, consistent messaging, and consensus among our Arctic
    allies and partners.

                        ARCTIC FORCES COMMAND STRUCTURE

        64. Senator Sullivan. General VanHerck, as you know,
    NORTHCOM is the advocate for capabilities in the Arctic, United
    States European Command (EUCOM) contains much of the threat in
    the Arctic, and INDOPACOM is assigned the forces that operate
    in the Arctic. In your personal opinion, given its convoluted
    nature, what changes would you recommend, if any, to improve
    the organization of the command structure to better address
    threats in the Arctic? Please elaborate.
        General VanHerck. I believe current command structure and
    relationships require adjustment to maximize the Joint Force's
    ability to operate under a globally integrated construct and
    provide effective military options in the Arctic during periods
    of competition, crisis, and conflict. In order to develop and
    field a modernized defense design for the continent and our
    Homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are developing a series of
    focused table top exercises and senior leader seminars to
    examine the current command and control structure and its
    effectiveness in supporting Arctic operations. I have also
    directed USNORTHCOM and NORAD to examine and modify our
    internal command and control constructs wherever possible under
    current authorities. Once that analysis is complete, I intend
    to convene a series of discussions with USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM,
    the functional combatant commands, the Services, and the Joint
    Staff to examine options for adjusting the current construct.
        I would add that I welcome opportunities to explore
    potential benefits associated with Service retention of Alaska-
    based forces to ensure timely and effective employment of
    assets wherever they might be needed globally in the event of a
    crisis or contingency. My intent is to better support the Joint
    Force's ability to conduct integrated operations across the
    Arctic region, which, as you note, involves the operational
    interests of three geographic combatant commands.

                                  ----------

                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn

                         MODERNIZATION AND STOVEPIPING

        65. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, what specific
    policy changes would be required for the Department of Defense
    (DOD) to improve its efforts to leverage emerging
    technologies--e.g., the artificial intelligence used by
    Pathfinder--to make data accessible, shareable, and actionable?
        General VanHerck. I believe acquisition policies that can
    accommodate innovative software and cloud-native approaches
    will be increasingly important as technology rapidly improves.
    Pathfinder showed us that current acquisition policies, which
    are oriented to fielding physical systems, inhibit the agile
    development and evolution necessary to fuse data from many
    sources and provide the warfighter with actionable information.
    As a Department, I believe we can improve the ways in which we
    approach security, acquisition, development, and costing in
    order to capitalize the strength of cloud-native approaches.
        I would also note that USNORTHCOM and NORAD have made huge
    strides in our modernization efforts by utilizing direct hiring
    authority for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
    (STEM) positions. By using this authority, our Pathfinder
    effort mirrors the hiring standards of industry, allowing the
    team to rapidly hire information technology experts from
    outside the Department and embed those personnel with the
    warfighter. As a result, the work on data feed integration and
    artificial intelligence that was originally scheduled to take a
    year was completed in less than six months.

        66. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, what specific
    culture changes would be required for DOD to improve its
    efforts to leverage emerging technologies--e.g., the artificial
    intelligence used by Pathfinder--to make data accessible,
    shareable, and actionable?
        General VanHerck. I believe the Department should stop
    developing a DOD data standard and instead re-vector efforts
    towards DOD data governance. The time it takes industry
    partners to decode and parse data is measured in days, hours,
    and minutes, vice the weeks and months that it often takes
    within the Department. Industry has an agnostic approach to
    data format and so should the Department--it is what gives
    industry their speed and agility. The Department should
    standardize governance across the combatant commands and
    Services to ease restrictions on data transfer, usage, access,
    and sharing.
        A two-pronged approach is needed to affect culture change:
    top-down and bottom-up. For the top-down effort, combatant
    commanders need to work closely with Department support
    agencies to articulate how important global integration is to
    approaching our greatest threats. Few threats stop at a
    geographic boundary or are contained within a domain. This type
    of thinking must infuse policy guidance. For the bottom-up
    effort, Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, Guardians, and Marines need
    to participate in cloud-native development environments,
    allowing and encouraging them to explore and experiment without
    over-burdensome rules, to leverage technology and deliver
    warfighting capability at the speed of relevance.

        67. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, does DOD have the
    knowledge base necessary to optimize modernization through
    emerging technologies? Please explain your answer.
        General VanHerck. Yes. The DOD continues to grow its
    knowledge base of emerging technologies through partnerships
    with commercial, private, and academic groups to ensure the
    Department stays abreast of promising developments. Examples
    such as the Defense Innovation Board; Defense Innovation Unit;
    Space Development Agency; Defense Advanced Research Projects
    Agency; and Service innovation centers, labs, and sponsored
    groups like AFWERX help optimize modernization throughout the
    DOD.

        68. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, what immediate
    actions could Congress take to enhance the roles of public-
    private partnerships, our national and defense labs, and the
    National Guard in supporting DOD's modernization efforts--
    especially those relating to emerging technologies and data
    science? Please explain your answer.
        General VanHerck. Immediate actions Congress could take are
    to ensure sufficient research and development funding for
    emerging technologies and data science developments, while
    continuing to create opportunities for partnerships between DOD
    and outside experts. Also, Congress can help to create and
    support a culture where failure, when properly managed, is okay
    and a natural part of accelerating capability development--the
    Department learns the most from failures. Those collaborative
    efforts are critical to achieving all-domain awareness,
    information dominance, and decision superiority. As threats
    continue to advance, it is increasingly important to foster
    public-private partnerships, as well as collaboration with
    national and defense labs and the National Guard to outpace our
    competitors.

                              INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS

        69. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Faller, how is SOUTHCOM
    especially adept at ``doing more with less'' to implement the
    National Defense Strategy?
        Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM continues to learn how best to
    leverage capabilities that are not within DOD programs of
    record or assets/capabilities in order to stay innovative. We
    have very willing partners in this hemisphere, who with a
    little assistance via security cooperation become an integral
    part of our regional approach to counter regional threats. Our
    partners have proven to be an integral part of regional
    security--having been critical participants in 60% of our TCO
    disruptions over the last year. Our efforts through programs
    like section 333 have demonstrated clear return on investment,
    building interoperability and operational capacity of our
    partners to operate shoulder-to-shoulder with us.
        SOUTHCOM will look to continue expanding and investing in
    non-traditional ISR utilizing 21st century social media
    tradecraft as a means of illuminating and limiting
    disinformation/misinformation in a whole-of-government approach
    that includes engaging with industry to best compete in a
    competitive information environment.

        70. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Faller, which of these high-
    return-on-investment activities are most effective in
    countering Chinese influence campaigns in the SOUTHCOM AOR?
        Admiral Faller. Intelligence drives everything. Small
    investments in our non-traditional intelligence programs can
    help inform us and, just as important, our partner nations, on
    the activities of the PRC in this region. With capabilities
    like COGINT (Commercial + Open Geointelligence) and Open Source
    Intelligence, we are able to understand the impact Chinese
    influence campaigns are having in the SOUTHCOM AOR and do so
    rapidly, leveraging automated machine learning. For instance,
    we have a better understanding of which Chinese companies and
    vessels are conducting illegal, unreported, and unregulated
    fishing, and are constantly monitoring patterns of activity.
    This information is key to help strengthening relationships and
    for maritime sovereignty and security throughout the region.
        IMET and other International Training Programs build
    professionalism and trust, which helps ``box out'' the
    competition. The opportunity to bring our partners to the
    United States for training provides an invaluable experience
    for them and their families and build lifelong friendships with
    future regional leaders.
        The National Guard State Partnership Program is a low-cost
    program that is a tremendous force multiplier for SOUTHCOM. We
    have the most State Partners of any region in the world,
    recognizing the power of the long-term, habitual relationships
    and engagements that this program brings to the table.
        The tools available through Security Cooperation allow for
    maximum engagement with our partner nation military and
    security forces. These tools include Key Leader Engagements,
    Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, Conferences, Workshops, Mobile
    Training Teams, and Institutional Capacity Building at the
    Ministry level, to name a few. A little bit goes a long way in
    this theater, time invested through engagements whether in
    person, virtual, or a hybrid are invaluable.

                                MISSILE DEFENSE

        71. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, the Strategic
    Homeland Integrated Ecosystems for Layered Defense (SHIELD)
    will employ repurposed legacy systems and newer technology in
    tandem. How do you assess the desirability of combining these
    systems to address threats from strategic competitors and rogue
    regimes?
        General VanHerck. I believe the ability to get more
    capability out of legacy systems while folding in new
    technology is key to the overall capability and affordability
    of proposed architectures in a credible layered defense against
    strategic competitors and rogue regimes. The architectures
    developed must capitalize on current systems to address current
    threats, but must also be adaptable to integrate new and
    developing systems to counter evolving threats across the full
    spectrum of conflict from the tactical to strategic level, from
    peer nations to rogue actors. Our nation can no longer afford
    stove-piped capabilities that cost billions of dollars and take
    decades to deliver. Several current technologies can be
    modified or improved to help create a persistent, capable area
    defense at home, while also preserving the Department's ability
    to contribute to the forward, globally integrated fight.
    Building upon our existing legacy systems allows the Services
    to maintain current programs of record, as well as increasing
    their interoperability with new technology to address the
    evolving threats.

        72. Senator Blackburn. General VanHerck, are there
    additional roles or niche areas in which Canada could take a
    more offensive role within the SHIELD ecosystem--e.g., non-
    kinetic disruptive capabilities in the cyber domain? If so,
    please identify them and explain their desired impacts.
        General VanHerck. The United States and Canada have
    complementary roles in homeland defense. In the near term,
    systems improving all-domain awareness are the top priority for
    NORAD modernization, and Canada plays a key role in that
    effort. For example, Canada is the leader in polar over-the-
    horizon radar (POTHR) research, and recently began work on a
    prototype system in the Canadian Archipelago. When fielded,
    POTHR will provide an ability to detect approaching aircraft
    and missiles at extremely long ranges, closing gaps in our
    current legacy warning and assessment systems, and denying the
    Arctic as an avenue of approach.

                                  ----------

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley

              CHINA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

        73. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, you wrote in your
    testimony that China seeks to ``establish global logistics and
    basing infrastructure in our hemisphere in order to project and
    sustain military power.'' Are you worried that China may one
    day seek to establish a more regular or permanent military
    presence in the Western Hemisphere?
        Admiral Faller. Examples exist around the world of the PRC
    establishing dual-use facilities that it initially touted as
    strictly commercial, but later used for government/military
    purposes. Likewise, the PRC is moving out methodically on its
    stated goals in the Western Hemisphere--to expand trade,
    presence, and influence--goals that will increase investments
    in this region in critical infrastructure like deep water ports
    and space tracking facilities.

        74. Senator Hawley. Admiral Faller, what would it mean for
    United States national security if China were able to regularly
    deploy or permanently station forces in the Western Hemisphere?
        Admiral Faller. From experience in other regions, when the
    PRC comes to town it is rarely ``just economic'' and the PRC
    envisions dual use capability. Greater port access will provide
    strategic locations for future military presence. We are
    currently seeing PRC influence across the full spectrum in this
    hemisphere - political, economic, and military.
        As the Department's most recent report to Congress on
    military and security developments related to China notes, the
    PRC is working to establish a robust global network of overseas
    bases and logistics nodes to allow its military, the People's
    Liberation Army (PLA), to project and sustain military power
    globally. A persistent PLA presence in the Western Hemisphere
    would present both a broad challenge to U.S. access, presence,
    and influence in our own neighborhood and a threat to the
    ability of the Department to operate in our own neighborhood.

        75. Senator Hawley. General VanHerck, Admiral Faller
    testified that China seeks to ``establish global logistics and
    basing infrastructure in our hemisphere in order to project and
    sustain military power.'' Are you worried that China may one
    day seek to establish a more regular or permanent military
    presence in the Western Hemisphere?
        General VanHerck. Yes. I am concerned China will attempt to
    establish a permanent military presence in the Western
    Hemisphere. Over the past decade, Chinese naval ships visited
    regions very distant from China's shores, including multiple
    countries in the Western Hemisphere. The Chinese actively
    compete with the United States in this Hemisphere for influence
    and economic advantage, pursuing investments in natural
    resources and energy to meet demands at home and to finance
    interests abroad. China uses its One Belt-One Road initiative
    to modernize port facilities worldwide to ostensibly support
    trade, and could leverage an expanded presence in this
    Hemisphere to deepen its regional influence and to broaden its
    security cooperation relationships.

        76. Senator Hawley. General VanHerck, what would it mean
    for United States national security if China were able to
    regularly deploy or permanently station forces in the Western
    Hemisphere?
        General VanHerck. From a homeland defense perspective, a
    permanent or semi-permanent Chinese military presence in the
    Western Hemisphere would be a significant concern. It would
    erode and undermine U.S. global leadership, constrain our
    options in crisis, and create significant challenges during a
    conflict. Moreover, it would amplify the influence China has
    gained through trade and investment by offering an alternative
    to United States security guarantees.

        77. Senator Hawley. General VanHerck, you wrote that China
    is augmenting its offensive cyber capabilities with ``a new
    family of long-range precision-strike weapons capable of
    targeting key logistical nodes'' in the continental United
    States. What should the United States prioritize doing in the
    next five years to strengthen deterrence against Chinese
    attacks, kinetic or otherwise, on our critical infrastructure?
        General VanHerck. To deter competitors like China, it will
    be increasingly important to prioritize our protection of
    critical capabilities for homeland defense and power
    projection. Our current doctrine of deterrence by denial will
    be increasingly challenged by competitors that possess the
    capability to strike the Homeland from multiple avenues of
    approach and in multiple domains. To outpace these advanced
    threats, we must get ahead of our competitors' decision making
    by establishing global all-domain awareness and working toward
    information dominance and providing our leaders at all levels
    with decision superiority.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2022 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND UNITED STATES CYBER
                                    COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin,
    Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
    Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
    Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Just to
    make everyone aware, we have four votes scheduled to begin at
    10:45, so we will have to be, yeah, we will be very flexible.
        But let me make my opening remarks, and then recognize
    Senator Inhofe, and then recognize our panel.
        Good morning. Today, the Committee meets to receive an
    update on the readiness and posture of both the U.S. Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Cyber Command.
        Our witnesses are Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Christopher
    Maier; Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, General
    Richard Clarke; and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, National
    Security Agency Director, and Chief of the Central Security
    Service, General Paul Nakasone.
        Both Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, and Cyber
    Command, are at the forefront of addressing the asymmetric
    information and technical challenges that transcend the
    boundaries of the geographic combatant commands. I hope our
    witnesses will convey our appreciation to the men and women you
    represent and their families, for their dedication and
    sacrifice in carrying out many of our Nation's most difficult
    and complex missions.
        In 1986, when Congress created SOCOM, to ensure the
    readiness of Special Operations Forces, or SOF, it also
    established the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD SO/
    LIC, to be the service-like secretary tasked with day-to-day
    advocacy and oversight of SOF.
        In recent years, Congress has sought to further empower the
    ASD SO/LIC and optimize the partnership with the commander of
    SOCOM through the annual National Defense Authorization Act.
    Unfortunately, the Department has not made sufficient progress
    in implementing these reforms, particularly with respect to
    hiring appropriate personnel and establishing a strong role for
    the ASD SO/LIC and all decisions relating to the organization,
    training, equipping, and readiness of SOF.
        We are pleased Mr. Maier is joining us today as the acting
    ASD SO/LIC and look forward to receiving a nominee so the
    Department can have a fully empowered, Senate-confirmed
    civilian in this important position.
        Mr. Maier and General Clarke, I hope you will provide your
    assessment of how this Committee can help to ensure that the
    SO/LIC reforms are both, fully implemented and effective, in
    their ultimate goal of supporting the SOF enterprise.
        In recent years, there have been several incidents and
    allegations of misconduct involving special operators that, as
    General Clarke has noted, jeopardized the trust placed in SOF.
    I applaud SOCOM for taking a hard look in the mirror by
    completing a comprehensive review of SOF culture and ethics
    last year.
        Among other things, the review concluded that SOCOM
    disproportionately focused on SOF employment and mission
    accomplishment at the expense of training and development of
    our force. In some cases, this imbalance has set conditions for
    unacceptable conduct to occur due to a lack of leadership,
    discipline, and accountability.
        General Clarke, I am interested in hearing more about the
    specific actions you have taken to address the findings of the
    comprehensive review and what more must be done.
        Turning to Cyber Command, General Nakasone, you have been
    working to mature the cyber force, ensuring their readiness,
    and overseeing the development of capabilities to conduct
    defensive, offensive, and supporting intelligence operations. I
    understand there are positive trends in all of these areas, but
    the threat to our cybersecurity may be advancing at an even
    faster rate.
        Indeed, recent disturbing cyber intrusions and attacks,
    likely conducted by Russia and China, will command attention in
    today's hearings.
        In the SolarWinds incident, hackers conducted a
    sophisticated operation that installed a backdoor and a
    software update that left approximately 18,000 enterprises
    vulnerable to exploitation and attacks, including many
    government agencies and companies that provide essential goods
    and services. We have recently learned that a Chinese entity
    exploited multiple previously unknown vulnerabilities in the
    software running Microsoft Exchange email servers and there are
    hundreds of thousands of these servers around the world. After
    Microsoft announced the breach and issued methods to protect
    it, multiple Chinese Government-sponsored hacking groups rushed
    to compromise thousands of vulnerable servers before they could
    be patched.
        A third event that merits attention is the reporting that
    China attacked the power grid in India during recent physical
    clashes the Himalayan border regions.
        General Nakasone, in the first two events, paid actors
    exploited vulnerabilities to steal data. While some may
    consider this tolerable and expected behavior from a competitor
    nation, others view the scope and scale of these operations as
    reckless and a different class that merits a sharp response,
    and I am interested in your views in this matter.
        In the matter of China's attack on the Indian power grid,
    which followed multiple Russian cyberattacks on Ukraine's power
    grid, there is a sense of growing willingness of adversaries to
    attack critical infrastructure in any serious confrontation;
    again, I am interested in your perceptions on this matter and
    if we need to be concerned about our Nation's critical
    infrastructure.
        I, again, want to thank the witnesses for their service and
    willingness to be here today, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        Senator Inhofe, please?

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Great
    statement. I appreciate that and for calling this important
    hearing to examine the posture of the U.S. Special Operations
    Command and the U.S. Cyber Command.
        I also want to thank our witnesses for being here with us
    today. They are the right guys for this hearing.
        My top priority continues to be ensuring the effective
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy. We have been
    talking about that at almost every meeting that we have. It
    prioritizes competition with China and Russia, while
    maintaining pressure on global terrorist groups like ISIS, and
    I will have some specific questions on that at question time.
        As I said on the floor on Tuesday, we need to match the
    budget with strategy. It takes at least 3 to 5 percent real
    growth in the defense budget above inflation. It doesn't look
    like it is going to be easy to get to that point. We are going
    to have to keep trying.
        Military advancements and the expanding global ambitions by
    China and Russia pose new and increasingly complex challenges
    to our national security. In addition to growing their
    conventional military capabilities, China and Russia are
    expanding their use of irregular warfare tactics, involving
    cyber disinformation, proxy forces, and economic blackmail
    around the world.
        They have proven these tactics are effective in places like
    Ukraine, in Syria, in the South China Sea, and now they are
    exporting them to Africa and to the Western Hemisphere. As we
    discussed before, this reality makes implementation of the
    irregular warfare annex to the National Defense Strategy (NDS)
    critically important. It also requires that Special Operations
    Forces are organized, trained, and equipped to compete in this
    domain of warfare.
        At the same time, ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria] and al Qaeda have proven resilient and still pose a
    threat. History has shown us that without sustained pressure,
    that threat will grow. I think we all understand that.
        I understand that President Biden is reviewing the U.S.
    counterterrorism policy, and according to media reports, has
    issued interim guidance, requiring the White House to sign off
    on operational military decisions that were previously
    delegated to the DOD [Department of Defense]. Let me be clear,
    I have serious concerns with the decision to return to the
    Obama era policies that tied the hands of our military
    commanders and made it harder to keep pressure on ISIS and al
    Qaeda. I expect this Committee will be consulted often during
    the administration's review. I have talked to the President
    about this and I believe that is going to happen.
        Another critical component of implementing the NDS is
    developing robust capabilities to counter growing threats in
    cyberspace. The 2018 Cyber Strategy provides a roadmap on how
    we are going to do this. Significant efforts have occurred in
    recent years across the DOD to implement the strategy and to
    build the capabilities of Cyber Command and the cyber mission
    forces.
        Today, I look forward to our witnesses' testimony in
    addressing these critical problems that are out there, and we
    are going to do all that we can to try to solve that. So, I
    appreciate this hearing and I think we will all benefit from
    it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Mr. Maier, please?

     STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
      OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

        Mr. Maier. So, good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to testify on our global posture for
    America's Special Operations enterprise.
        I would also like to thank Congress and especially this
    Committee for its strong support for the SOF community and its
    mission. I am honored to testify alongside General Clarke and
    General Nakasone, who have dedicated their careers to
    safeguarding our Nation from complex and unconventional
    threats.
        I would like to begin by acknowledging the service and
    sacrifice of our special operations soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and civilians. Although SOF make up only about 3
    percent of the joint force, over the past 2 years, this
    community that has bore over half of all U.S. combat
    casualties. Many more have sustained life-altering injuries and
    suffer psychological trauma.
        As we look forward, Secretary Austin has outlined his three
    principle priorities for the Department of Defense. Those are:
    defend the Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through
    teamwork. The SOF community will measure ourselves against
    these priorities.
        Representing just 2 percent of the overall DOD budget, SOF
    played an essential role within the joint staff in advancing
    multiple strategic priorities for the Department and the
    Nation. We continue to adapt the unique capabilities and
    problem-solving expertise of our special operators through the
    challenge of great power competition with Russia and China,
    while strengthening the alliances and partnerships that enhance
    our ability to compete.
        As we innovate to compete more effectively below the level
    of armed conflict, we recognize that our counterterrorism
    operations, while still critical to protect Americans from the
    likes of ISIS and al Qaeda, must become even more sustainable
    and focused on the most pressing threats to our citizens and
    interests.
        Enhancing the readiness and resilience of our SOF warriors
    and their families remains a top priority. Despite the COVID-19
    pandemic, SOF have continued to maintain a high level of
    operational readiness. We remain focused on, and are making
    progress in, easing the strain of high rates of overseas
    deployments.
        I look forward to working with you and your staff to
    collectively continue to build the resiliency and culture of
    this community that has given so much in protecting us for
    nearly a generation.
        I also remain concerned about incidents of serious moral
    and ethical failings within the SOF community, a concern I know
    General Clarke shares. I commend him and Special Operations
    Command for leading a comprehensive review of SOF culture and
    ethics last year.
        Civilian-military partnership on all of these issues
    remains a key priority for me and my team. In response to
    Secretary Austin's challenge to us, we are also committed to
    enhancing diversity within the SOF community. As we compete
    against different and more capable adversaries, a more diverse
    force empowers us to draw upon broader perspectives, different
    lived experiences, and new ideas.
        Finally, we recognize the strong interest in Congress in
    empowering civilian leadership in the Department. We appreciate
    legislation in the most recent National Defense Authorization
    Act to codify and strengthen ASD SO/LIC's role. It is our
    collective duty to ensure these reforms meet your intents and
    serve the interests of the Department and the men and women of
    our SOF community.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking the
    Committee, again, for its strong support for our Special
    Operations team. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Maier follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Mr. Christopher P. Maier
                                  introduction
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and other distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
    our global posture for DOD's Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    Enterprise. As Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), my remarks will focus
    on ASD SO/LIC's statutory responsibilities for administrative oversight
    of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am honored to testify
    alongside General Clarke and General Nakasone. I greatly appreciate
    their decades of leadership and service in protecting the Nation's
    national security interests.
        I would like to begin by acknowledging the service, sacrifice, and
    success of our Special Operations soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    and civilians. U.S. SOF have played a critical role in every major
    conflict since the Second World War, and they remain in the fight
    today--conducting operations against ISIS, al Qaeda and its affiliates;
    working alongside partners and allies; and providing our Nation's
    leaders with flexible and rapid response options to a wide range of
    national security emergencies. Since the terrorist attacks of September
    11, our SOF community has established a remarkable record of
    achievement. From the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in
    December 2001, to the complex operations targeting the world's most
    notorious terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden, and to the
    extraordinary effort to eliminate the ISIS caliphate in Syria and Iraq,
    we owe our SOF community our deepest gratitude.
        Despite recent reductions in deployments, SOF remain at the
    forefront of U.S. combat operations, often operating in remote and
    hostile environments. Over the past 2 years, 15 members of the SOF
    formation were killed in combat operations. Although SOF make up only
    approximately three percent of the Joint Force, they have endured more
    than half of U.S. combat casualties during that period. Many more have
    sustained life-altering injuries or suffer from psychological trauma.
    The service and sacrifice of these men and women challenge us to live
    up to the high standards they embody.
        I would also like to thank Congress for your strong support of the
    SOF community as well as your predecessors and their foresight in
    recognizing the need to build and sustain special operations
    capabilities to respond to an increasingly complex threat environment.
    The Nunn-Cohen amendment that established USSOCOM and the position of
    ASD SO/LIC in 1986 was prescient in recognizing that future conflicts
    would be fought by both state and non-state actors and often through
    unconventional and irregular means. The authors of these reforms
    rightly understood that dedicated resources for Special Operations-
    specific purposes were essential to promoting and sustaining these
    capabilities within the Department.
        My statement this morning will focus on how the SOF community is
    supporting Secretary Austin's three principal priorities as outlined in
    his March 3, 2021, ``Message to the Force''--1) Defend the Nation, 2)
    Take Care of Our People, and 3) Succeed through Teamwork. In the nearly
    two decades following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, SOF have continued
    to develop new technologies and capabilities to become the most
    effective counterterrorism (CT) force in history. Today, the SOF
    Enterprise is in the midst of a critical period of transition as the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance (INSSG) challenges us to conduct counterterrorism
    operations more sustainably as we also adapt to the challenges of great
    power competition. At the same time, I am pleased to report that we
    have continued to improve the readiness of the force and reduce the
    strain of deployment on our SOF warriors and their families. Your
    leadership and support and have been, and will continue to be,
    essential in this effort.
                               defend the nation
        Representing approximately two percent of the DOD budget, SOF play
    a crucial role within the Joint Force in support of multiple DOD
    priorities, and the SOF community continues to make progress in
    adapting its capabilities to the challenge of great-power competition
    with Russia and China. I emphasize the word ``competition'' because
    just as the National Defense Strategy calls on us to develop
    traditional military capabilities to deter and respond to threats, we
    are also called to strengthen alliances, innovate, and compete more
    effectively below the level of armed conflict. Revisionist powers,
    rogue states, and non-state actors are actively pursuing
    unconventional, irregular, and asymmetric strategies to undermine U.S.
    strategic interests, erode democratic institutions, and destabilize and
    re-shape the post-WWII world order to their advantage, without
    provoking a U.S. conventional military response. Indeed, as the
    Department continues to strengthen our traditional military
    capabilities, we can expect that our adversaries will increasingly
    employ indirect and irregular approaches to achieve their strategic
    objectives to capitalize on asymmetries that work to their advantage.
        Thus, winning the competition is essential to achieving our near-
    term strategic objectives, and to precluding a major conflict. This is
    not a theoretical battle to prepare for in the future. This is today's
    fight, and the SOF capabilities we have nurtured over the past 30 years
    are essential to successfully competing--and winning--in today's
    unconventional and irregular battlespaces. In close coordination with
    the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commands, including USSOCOM,
    my office is leading the implementation of the Irregular Warfare (IW)
    Annex to the NDS to institutionalize the Department's approach to IW
    throughout the Joint Force and to operationalize it for great power
    competition and resource-sustainable counterterrorism. The IW Annex
    directs the Joint Force to embrace the potential for irregular warfare
    to shape great power competitors' behavior proactively to our
    advantage, create dilemmas to deter future aggression, and strengthen
    alliances and partnerships.
        As we adapt to meet the challenges of great power competition, we
    remain focused on ensuring CT operations are sustainable and focused on
    the most relevant threats to United States national security interests
    such as ISIS and al Qaeda and their affiliates that continue to pose a
    threat to Americans and United States interests around the globe.
    Continued U.S., allied, and partner nation pressure has helped prevent
    these groups from attacking the Homeland.
        Within this strategic context, and consistent with the INSSG, we
    continue to adapt our global posture and develop SOF-unique
    capabilities that enable our operators to compete and win in a wide
    variety of contingencies, including CT, crisis response, competition
    below the level of armed conflict, and as a force multiplier to the
    Joint Force if deterrence fails. Although our adversaries increasingly
    employ irregular warfare tactics, SOF support can ensure the
        Department does not depend only on high-end warfighting and
    deterrent capabilities. Today, approximately 40 percent of SOF deployed
    forces are tasked with countering malign influence of our great-power
    adversaries.
        Central to our irregular warfare efforts is a suite of legislative
    authorities that underpin our efforts to address these challenges
    alongside our international and interagency partners. We appreciate
    Congress's support for the extension and expansion of ``Section 1202''
    authority to conduct irregular warfare operations and for the
    establishment of a new Title 10 funding authority for operational
    preparation of the environment activities in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Authorities such as these and
    Section 127e of Title 10 are cost-effective, agile ways for the United
    States to advance our security interests working by, with, and through
    partners.
        We continue to invest in technologies and capabilities to empower
    SOF to operate in denied areas and conduct high-risk operations in
    remote and austere environments, operate seamlessly with our general
    purpose force counterparts, and produce scalable precision effects. For
    instance, USSOCOM is developing next-generation Intelligence
    Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities to enhance situational
    awareness for the SOF warfighter, even in contested areas. Similarly,
    we are making investments to enhance SOF maritime capabilities,
    including surface combatant craft, submersibles, and unmanned
    underwater vehicles, and working with the Department of the Navy to
    ensure integration of SOF operational concepts and capability
    investments related to great power competition.
        USSOCOM is pursuing technological advancements designed to enhance
    network interoperability, enable secure communications for command and
    control, and employ data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI) and
    machine learning (ML) to enable our SOF to operate more effectively. In
    close collaboration with the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center,
    USSOCOM is adapting and employing AI to streamline a wide range of
    activities, such as intelligence analysis and operational functions.
    For instance, USSOCOM is leveraging AI/ML to optimize preventive
    maintenance for aircraft of the Army's 160th Special Operations
    Aviation Regiment (SOAR) that has demonstrated significant potential
    for increasing the operational readiness rate of the unit's fleet of
    aircraft.
        USSOCOM has also employed innovative acquisition pathways,
    including mid-tier acquisitions to execute tailored acquisition
    strategies and to streamline capability delivery to the warfighter.
    Additionally, USSOCOM is leveraging public-private partnerships and
    deepening relationships with academic institutions and non-traditional
    partners, including through its pilot project to expand small business
    participation in technology development to enhance SOF warfighting
    capabilities.
                            take care of our people
        Consistent with the clear priorities outlined in the NDS and the
    INSSG, we continue to invest in the readiness of the force and the
    resiliency of our SOF warriors and their families. Despite the unique
    challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic over the past year,
    SOF have continued to maintain a high level of operational readiness in
    support of strategic priorities. COVID-19-related restrictions on CONUS
    and OCONUS movements have reduced flight hours and training
    opportunities, particularly alongside our overseas partners. Although
    the number of forces deployed overseas is down approximately 15 percent
    over the past year, nearly 5,000 SOF are currently deployed to 62
    countries.
        In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the
    high demand for SOF resulted in a near-constant cycle of deployments
    for some capabilities. To address the strain caused by that operational
    tempo, we have taken a hard look at the forces that we can responsibly
    and sustainably provide to support global demand amid multifaceted and
    simultaneous mission requirements. Over the past several years, we have
    made considerable progress toward meeting the Department's requirement
    of a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio across the force, meaning that a
    typical service member would expect to spend twice as much time at home
    station as on deployment. We continue to make progress toward achieving
    this target with now more than 90 percent of the force at a 1:2 ratio
    or better.
        The additional dwell time spent at home station is not only
    contributing to increased predictability for the force and improved
    work-life balance, it is also enabling additional time for training,
    screening, rest, refit, and reintegration. USSOCOM has also continued
    to meet the Department's goal of fewer than five percent non-deployable
    military personnel.
        In addition to monitoring metrics of SOF readiness, we are closely
    evaluating how SOF posture relates to our ability to sustain CT and
    crisis response operations along with high-priority missions. We are
    also focused on limiting SOF deployments to those that require SOF-
    specific capabilities and training. For instance, the establishment of
    the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade has provided a capable
    General Purpose Force option for training and mentoring foreign
    security forces. The combination of these efforts has helped ease the
    strain of a high and unsustainable rate of overseas deployments for SOF
    personnel.
        In addition to reducing the strain on the force due to high
    operational tempo, the SOF Enterprise is further enhancing readiness by
    taking a holistic approach to caring for SOF warriors and their
    families. With the strong support of Congress, USSOCOM has continued to
    develop its Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) program to
    address SOF-unique challenges and to optimize physical, psychological,
    social, and spiritual performance. The POTFF program leverages a
    combination of USSOCOM, Service, and DOD resources to meet the needs of
    the various SOF components and individual unit commanders. These
    programs include injury prevention/strength training, performance
    nutrition, rehabilitative care, improved access to behavioral health
    and suicide prevention, family and community programs, promoting
    healthy living, and reinforcing resiliency and spiritual fitness.
        Participation in the POTFF human performance program and
    neurocognitive baselining are now mandatory for all USSOCOM personnel.
    Our SOF warriors recognize POTFF as an invaluable resource for their
    readiness and career longevity, and data collected from our SOF
    commanders indicates that the program is having a significant and
    positive impact on the mission readiness of their units. SO/LIC is
    currently collaborating with the command to develop standardized and
    quantitative outcome metrics to help inform future resourcing
    decisions, and we look forward to working closely with the Committee to
    ensure we are achieving a solid return on this investment in our
    personnel.
        Similarly, USSOCOM's Warrior Care program continues to provide
    specialized care for soldiers who have suffered physical or
    psychological trauma by providing SOF members and their families
    support through recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. We have no
    greater responsibility than to care for our SOF warriors and to provide
    them with a path to return to service and/or transition to civilian
    careers following their years of service. We appreciate the strong
    support of Congress for each of these efforts.
        I remain concerned about instances of moral and ethical failings
    within the SOF community, and I know General Clarke shares this
    concern. Incidents such as these have no place in the military or our
    Department, and if not tackled head-on can erode morale and undermine
    trust and our moral authority with our partners and allies. I commend
    General Clarke for his initiative in directing a comprehensive review
    of SOF culture and ethics beginning in August 2019. The review was
    directed to address shortfalls and limitations of multiple previous
    studies and to build upon them to address enterprise-wide issues and to
    analyze data from across the SOF Enterprise.
        SO/LIC strongly supported this effort, and SO/LIC personnel
    actively participated in the review, which entailed conducting in-depth
    interviews with approximately 2,000 personnel of all ranks within more
    than 50 SOF commands. Although the comprehensive review did not
    identify evidence of a systemic ethics deficiency, it did note that
    ``in some instances USSOCOM's cultural focus on SOF employment and
    mission accomplishment is to the detriment of leadership, discipline
    and accountability,'' and it outlined concrete recommendations. My
    office is now helping to guide the Comprehensive Review Implementation
    Team, established to drive implementation of the review's
    recommendations. These recommendations address training and
    organization of the force, leader development, and the prevention of
    over-exertion on the force that we believe contributes in part to
    ethical lapses.
        As we address challenges related to SOF culture and ethics,
    Secretary Austin has placed special emphasis on combatting sexual
    assault and addressing actions associated with extremist or dissident
    ideologies within the Department. The men and women who make up the SOF
    Enterprise deserve nothing less than a safe and supportive work
    environment--free from intimidation, harassment, and racial and
    cultural bias of any kind. We recognize that extremist ideology exists
    within our military, and we must ensure that our service members honor
    the oaths they have taken to uphold and defend our Constitution against
    all enemies--foreign and domestic. For this reason, Secretary Austin
    directed a Department-wide stand-down to allow senior leaders to
    discuss the importance of our oath of office, impermissible behaviors,
    and procedures for reporting extremist behaviors. I am committed to
    working hand-in-hand with General Clarke in leading this effort on
    behalf of the SOF community, ensuring that our efforts are closely
    aligned with top-level guidance and actions and policies taken by the
    Department and the Military Services.
        We recognize that many of the solutions have not yet been fully
    implemented and that true cultural change will require a sustained and
    focused effort over many years. I look forward to working with you and
    your staff as we strengthen the foundation of our culture and ethics
    throughout the SOF Enterprise. SO/LIC will continue to support this
    effort by focusing on those actions that fall within our administrative
    role overseeing the organization and training of SOF personnel and
    ensuring these efforts are adequately resourced. Working closely with
    USSOCOM and each of the Services, we will continue to develop and
    sustain a SOF culture of personal accountability that is worthy of the
    men and women that constitute our force.
        We are similarly focused on enhancing the diversity within our SOF
    formation. As it stands today, our force is not adequately reflective
    of the American people. In addition to the moral imperative of
    addressing this challenge, we recognize that a more diverse force makes
    us more effective operationally by allowing us to draw upon diverse
    perspectives and talents and new ideas to enable us to prevail in the
    global contest for influence and legitimacy we are faced with today.
    Enhancing diversity within the force will become increasingly important
    as the Department places greater emphasis on operations in the
    information environment against foreign disinformation and malign
    influence.
        Over the past year, ASD(SO/LIC) served on the Executive Working
    Group as part of the Department of Defense's Board on Diversity and
    Inclusion. A SOF officer on my staff sat on the DOD Board on Diversity
    and Inclusion to ensure that special operations-unique issues were
    reflected and considered as part of the overarching DOD efforts. Last
    year, SO/LIC, in partnership with USSOCOM's Commander and Senior
    Enlisted Leader, issued a memorandum to all SOF personnel emphasizing
    that diversity and inclusion is a strategic imperative to the mission
    of SOF. I co-chair, along with the USSOCOM Vice Commander, the SOF
    Executive Committee on Diversity and Inclusion to oversee and drive the
    development and execution of the USSOCOM Diversity and Inclusion
    Strategic Plan. I am pleased that USSOCOM has recently hired its first
    Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, and I look forward to working
    with the command as we collectively address this challenge.
        In addition to addressing racial and cultural diversity within the
    SOF formation, we are also working to ensure that all SOF career fields
    are open to all who have the desire and meet the rigorous standards.
    Women have filled vital roles within the SOF community for many years,
    and we are proud that in the past year, two women have for the first
    time successfully completed the Special Forces Qualification Course and
    are currently serving as Green Berets. Although we recognize that we
    have much more progress to make in this area, these talented soldiers
    have blazed a path that we expect many others will follow.
        Addressing each of these challenges will require a multifaceted,
    sustained approach, with a clear strategy, concrete objectives, and
    measurable benchmarks. Additionally, the continued institutionalization
    of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the administrative chain of command will
    provide additional avenues to highlight policy and resource issues
    affecting SOF, including diversity, ethics, and accountability. For
    instance, regularly occurring readiness briefings from USSOCOM to
    ASD(SO/LIC) now address sexual assault and harassment prevention and
    response, domestic violence, suicide prevention, COVID-19 vaccination
    rates, and accession/promotion by sex and ethnicity. SO/LIC brings
    unique perspective to these challenges, and you have my commitment that
    we will remain fully engaged.
                            succeed through teamwork
        Secretary Austin's Message to the Force challenges us to join
    forces with our partners and allies; work in partnership across U.S.
    Departments and Agencies, with Congress, and with private industry; and
    to build unity of effort and missions throughout the Department,
    including strengthening civil-military cooperation. The men and women
    of the SOF community excel in building strong and lasting partnerships,
    including with our foreign, interagency, and private industry partners.
    SO/LIC and USSOCOM continue to deepen our civilian-military
    collaboration across a wide range of issues, including SOF personnel
    and readiness, budget and acquisitions, special access programs, and
    legislative affairs.
        Civilian control of the military is a bedrock principle of our
    democracy, and strengthening civilian institutions within the
    Department is a key priority of Secretary Austin. As the Secretary
    testified before this Committee in his confirmation hearing, ``the
    safety and security of our democracy demands competent civilian control
    of our armed forces . . . the subordination of military power to the
    civil.'' We also recognize and appreciate the Congress's strong
    interest in empowering civilian leadership, both within the Special
    Operations community and throughout the Department.
        The continued institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role in the
    administrative chain of command, as codified in Title 10, is one of
    many examples where the Department is making progress in empowering
    civilian leadership, oversight, and advocacy within the Department's
    decision-making mechanisms. Over the past year, we have made progress
    in strengthening civilian oversight of SOF, but we recognize that more
    remains to be done to realize the full intent of recent legislative
    reforms to strengthen the ASD(SO/LIC)'s role and to establish the
    Secretariat for Special Operations. Recent actions include designating
    ASD(SO/LIC) as a Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
    for Special Operations administrative matters, establishing a position
    of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to lead the Secretariat and to
    assist the ASD with those responsibilities. The ASD(SO/LIC) also has
    been added to numerous senior Departmental decision-making bodies, in
    many instances marking the first time the SOF Enterprise has had
    representation and a voice in these discussions and decisions.
        Enhanced civilian leadership and oversight are essential to
    advocating for SOF within the Department and tackling key issues
    affecting the SOF Enterprise. These elements also help ensure an
    independent and objective assessment of military capabilities and
    policy issues. Further institutionalization of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s
    administrative chain of command responsibilities will require continued
    close coordination with senior DOD leadership, USSOCOM, and Congress. I
    fully embrace this role, and I also recognize that there is more work
    ahead as we fulfill Congress's intent. As these efforts mature, I look
    forward to working with you, General Clarke, and other DOD senior
    leaders to ensure that these reforms meet the intent of Congress and
    serve the interests of the Department and the men and women of our SOF
    community.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking the Committee
    again for its strong support for our special operations personnel, who
    serve as a critical linchpin in safeguarding our national security--in
    wartime and peacetime. As an integral component of the Joint Force, SOF
    bring unique capabilities that complement and strengthen those of our
    general purpose forces as well as our interagency and international
    partners.
        I thank the Committee again for the opportunity to testify, and I
    look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Mr. Maier.
        General Clarke, please?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD D. CLARKE, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                   STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        General Clarke. Chairman Reed, Senator Inhofe, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity, and I am honored to testify with Mr. Chris Maier
    and General Paul Nakasone. Also joining me is Chief Greg Smith,
    my command senior enlisted leader. Greg marked his thirty-first
    year in uniform this month and I am thankful for his continued
    counsel and leadership as he represents the almost 50,000
    enlisted operators in our force.
        USSOCOM, our structure, our authorities, and our purpose
    are the direct outcome of Congress and, in particular, this
    Committee. We strive to honor Congress' vision by training and
    employing the world's finest Special Operations Force, a team
    that is inclusive and professional, supremely competent and
    trusted, and reflective of American diversity and values, and
    most of all, committed to our constitutional oath.
        The incredible women and men of this command employ their
    unique skills globally, fully integrated with the joint force,
    and aligned with national priorities. SOF continue to deter and
    disrupt persistent threats by terrorist and extremist
    organizations. Twenty years of this fight have honed our
    capability and, most importantly, our resolve.
        We remain oriented on these threats with approaches that
    are both, effective and sustainable, to defend the Homeland and
    our American people; additionally, we are well-postured within
    the joint force to compete against malign state influence. SOF
    provide unique value in this critical endeavor.
        Below the level of armed conflict, SOF teams support a wide
    range of United States policy objectives and generate options
    to counter China, Russia, and other competitors. Often, our
    activities to counter violent extremist organizations have
    tangible, derivative value to counter terrorist, extremist
    organizations.
        As SOF forged partnerships and built partner capacity, we
    gain access, placement, and influence in contested regions.
    Should future conflicts arise, our modernization priorities
    will provide interoperable forces that are able to win as part
    of the joint war-fighting concept.
        Your continued support and the vital trust of the American
    people allow this command to support the Nation now and prepare
    for the challenges of tomorrow. Today, as we sit here, nearly
    5,000 special operators stand vigilant in almost 60 countries.
    Their commitment to American security and prosperity is
    inspirational, and their enthusiasm to learn, adapt, and serve
    is infectious.
        It is my honor to lead them and I look forward to answering
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Clarke follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General Richard D. Clarke
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for providing this opportunity to discuss the
    posture of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). I am proud to
    testify alongside Mr. Christopher Maier, Acting Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/
    LIC)), and General Paul Nakasone, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command
    (USCYBERCOM).
        The unwavering support of Congress, particularly this Committee,
    has ensured that our Nation's special operations forces (SOF) are the
    most capable in the world. Your support remains essential to our
    efforts to defend the Nation, care for our people, and strengthen
    alliances and partnerships. Your SOF remain engaged globally, ensuring
    violent extremists have no respite, while setting advantageous
    conditions across all domains to compete with adversaries. We are ready
    to meet today's requirements, while adapting to address tomorrow's
    challenges.
        Today, I present an account of USSOCOM priorities, activities, and
    investments to provide the Nation with peerless SOF talent, tactics,
    and technologies. Each of you are keenly interested in how we are
    building a professional force, caring for our people, defending our
    Nation forward, and modernizing for the future. I will address each of
    these concerns.
        The current strategic landscape comprises a complex set of problems
    presented by nation-state competitors and violent extremist
    organizations. Overmatch in strategic deterrence, conventional military
    force, and space and cyberspace capabilities are unequivocal
    necessities. However, our overmatch compels competitors to seek
    asymmetric avenues to attack, erode, or undermine the advantage and
    interests of the United States, our allies, and partners. Many of these
    challenges take place in the information space, with disinformation
    employed as a political weapon at unimaginable speed and scale without
    regard for geopolitical boundaries. These concerns are further
    amplified by disruptive, destabilizing impacts of climate change,
    diminished influence of international institutions, and shifts in
    global power dynamics.
        SOF are problem solvers, and their enduring value resides in their
    ability to adapt and combat asymmetric threats; employ precision and
    surprise to achieve strategic effects in conflict or crisis; and build
    access, placement, and influence through sustained partnership with
    foreign forces--all providing discrete options when conventional action
    is impractical. Our team extends beyond operators in the field, to a
    wide array of military and interagency support, as well as our
    unassailable partnership with ASD(SO/LIC). The oversight, policy
    guidance, and advocacy within the DOD provided by ASD(SO/LIC) are
    essential for the modernization, readiness, and wellbeing of SOF and
    their families.
        The COVID-19 pandemic challenged our readiness in unexpected ways.
    Disciplined enforcement of DOD risk mitigation strategies has largely
    protected our uniformed, civilian, and contractor populations. The
    postponement of several major exercises and a majority of fiscal year
    2020 Joint Combined Exchange Training events has been unfortunate, but
    barring long-term disruption, our joint interoperability and
    multinational partnerships remain strong. We appreciate the CARES Act
    funding from Congress that enabled us to reduce immediate risk through
    distribution of protective equipment and improved telework systems.
        To address current and future strategic challenges, SOF are aligned
    with the priorities set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy
    (NDS) and newly published Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.
    The full range of USSOCOM's operational and institutional efforts
    coalesce within three broad objectives: strengthen our force and their
    families, enable the Joint Force to compete and win globally, and
    innovate to transform for the future.
                       strengthen our force and families
        The primacy of our people is central to the success of every
    endeavor. These competent and creative men and women stand ready to
    adapt and evolve to be the SOF the Nation needs to meet any challenge.
    Our commitment to advancing professionalism, improving policy to
    acquire and groom the right talent, and caring for the health and
    welfare of our teammates underpins every organizational decision.
                   advancing professionalism and credibility
        Last year, USSOCOM and ASD(SO/LIC) provided Congress the results of
    our Comprehensive Review which identified opportunities to improve our
    force and address lapses in leadership, accountability, and discipline.
    Our Comprehensive Review Implementation Team used that assessment to
    make institutional adjustments that promote active and engaged
    leadership at all levels accountable for force governance, leader
    development, sustainable tempo, and behavior reflective of
    Constitutional and Service values. Our forthcoming report submission to
    Congress will provide details on each of our actions thus far. This is
    a long-term, institutional approach, and we will see this process
    through to make our force better.
        Furthermore, the urgent need to remove the scourges of sexual
    assault and extremism within the force has our full attention. USSOCOM
    supports DOD and Service policies on sexual assault and harassment that
    have improved reporting processes and victim advocacy. With maturing
    response and victim support systems, we are applying focused leadership
    toward prevention. Our SOF components are implementing tailored
    programs to promote a climate and culture intolerant of these abuses,
    committed to identifying and removing predators, and able to rapidly
    identify and address shortfalls.
        Extremist and dissident ideologies conflict with our Constitutional
    obligations and corrode cohesion, discipline, and public trust. USSOCOM
    is fully engaged in DOD's effort to remove behaviors that promote
    discrimination, hate, or harassment. We are working closely with the
    DOD and Services to engage service members at all levels to ensure the
    force is undivided in their commitment to defend the Constitution
    against all enemies foreign and domestic.
                     managing and welcoming diverse talent
        In 1999, a RAND study identified barriers to the participation of
    women and minorities. Since that study twenty-two years ago, we have
    made limited progress in fully opening those doors. The past few years
    have provided the momentum and support to correct this problem for
    future generations. We continue to see positive movement with the
    contributions of women leaders in all four Service Component Commands
    and the selection of the first African American officers to command a
    Navy SEAL Team and a Ranger Battalion. However, these steps are not
    sufficient as we envision a force that better reflects the society it
    defends.
        We need men and women of all ethnicities and races along with a
    diversity of backgrounds and beliefs in our formation. Improving
    diversity and inclusion in our force is an operational imperative. In a
    force charged with solving multifaceted problems in a complex global
    environment, service members who are included, respected, and empowered
    are more ready to deter aggression and win wars. We developed a five-
    year Diversity and Inclusion Strategy and hired a Chief Diversity and
    Inclusion Officer. Together, USSOCOM and ASD (SO/LIC) chair the SOF
    Executive Committee on Diversity and Inclusion ensuring senior leader
    oversight and engagement to keep us accountable for tangible progress
    over time. We are absolutely committed to finding and removing barriers
    where they exist, and welcome all service members who have the desire
    and aptitude to pursue a career in SOF.
        In addition to diversity of background, the current and next era of
    competition and conflict require different skills, specifically in
    artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technologies. In fiscal year
    2020, our AI-Ready Workforce initiative took two steps forward in
    growing data-savvy leaders and technology experts inside SOF. First, in
    collaboration with Carnegie Mellon University and the DOD's Joint AI
    Center, we educated hundreds of senior and midgrade SOF leaders on
    basic AI principles and ethics. Second, USSOCOM welcomed our first
    cohort of data science interns. The program exposes talented students
    and graduates to SOF problems and harnesses their creativity and
    technical skill in developing AI solutions for the force. We are
    working with DOD to expand these programs and find flexible means to
    exchange talent with industry and academia to supplement the organic
    growth of AI-ready service members.
                      growing a healthy and resilient team
        USSOCOM continues to build on the successes of the Preservation of
    the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative and the Warrior Care Program
    (WCP). The POTFF program gained early traction and notice through its
    work with physical readiness; however, 62 percent of the POTFF team's
    manpower now supports the psychological and cognitive performance of
    SOF. Today, the program continues to increase its focus on brain health
    and cognitive performance to address the growing cognitive load on
    operators facing technologically advanced adversaries and information-
    rich battlespaces. Not only must we build resilience, we must care for
    those in need, and we have no more sacred duty than to care for our
    wounded, injured, and ill teammates.
        Since 2005, the USSOCOM Warrior Care Program (WCP), also referred
    to as the Care Coalition, has led this vital effort. Over the WCP's 16-
    year lifespan, 72 percent of wounded SOF have been retained in military
    service, with 61 percent returning to duty inside their original
    occupational specialty. This remarkable achievement has only been
    possible with Congress's continued support for these programs.
        Lastly, USSOCOM has not diverted our attention from the crucial
    problem of suicide within our ranks. In 2020, we lost teammates to
    suicide and saw teammates hospitalized for suicide attempts. We are
    seeing a slight reduction in suicides among SOF; however, any suicide
    is an unacceptable loss of life. We continue to work closely with DOD
    and the Services to apply engaged leadership, education, and training
    resources to prevent these tragedies.
                            compete and win globally
        Special operations capabilities are essential tools to address both
    violent extremist threats and strategic competition with other states.
    Counterterrorism (CT) and Countering Violent Extremist Organizations
    (C-VEO) remains a priority mission for SOF, but we do not allow these
    missions to prevent us from also responding to the other threats facing
    the Nation. USSOCOM fluidly prioritizes force employment to build
    readiness, strategic flexibility, and apply unique SOF capabilities
    judiciously, in concert with the Joint Force and Interagency, to
    counter and impose cost on the malign activities of adversaries.
        Today, we have nearly five thousand SOF deployed to 62 countries.
    We continue to streamline direct C-VEO investments abroad and rebalance
    SOF to force generation, modernization, and Great Power Competition
    (GPC) activities. Our deployed forces are down 15 percent from last
    year--the lowest since 2001, and in fiscal year 2021, nearly 40 percent
    of our deployed forces will focus on GPC requirements. In the coming
    year, we expect to achieve a sustainable balance of deployed forces
    across both C-VEO and GPC mission sets and reach the DOD's directed 1:2
    deployment-to-dwell ratio for all SOF.
                           sustainable c-veo pressure
        Violent Extremism remains a threat to our national interests and
    the safety of our people. Drivers of extremist violence exist in deep,
    multigenerational ideological divisions that cannot be overcome quickly
    or with military force. This problem will persist, and USSOCOM is
    committed to a sustainable approach to C-VEO focused on threats that
    exhibit both intent and capability to export violence transregionally,
    specifically against the Homeland, while building burden-sharing
    partnerships that enable local and regional leaders to manage others.
    Additionally, USSOCOM fulfills our role as the DOD's Coordinating
    Authority for C-VEO by producing a quarterly VEO threat assessment that
    uses our inherently global outlook C-VEO engagement across multiple
    Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) areas of responsibility (AORs) to
    inform department-wide policy, priorities, and activities.
        Over the past year, USSOCOM has assumed moderate but acceptable
    risk to C-VEO capacity as we rebalance the force for modernization,
    readiness, and strategic competition. Despite these constraints, our
    unified action with joint, interagency, and multinational partners
    continues to illuminate terrorist attack planning, track illicit
    financing, and sustain pressure on transregional networks, all while
    meeting directed reductions in troop presence across multiple theaters.
    In Afghanistan, our forces continue to dismantle remnants of al-Qaeda
    (AQ) and Islamic State (ISIS) leadership and support the ongoing peace
    process. In Iraq, we continue to support multinational pressure on
    pockets of ISIS leaders and fighters while building the capacity of our
    partners in the Iraqi Security Forces. The information sharing model of
    Operation Gallant Phoenix continues to enable allies and partners to
    prosecute violent extremists. While we realize success on multiple
    fronts, challenges linger.
        Capable terrorist leaders continue to operate in portions of
    Afghanistan. Despite losing territory and momentum, ISIS has avenues to
    reconstitute and spread transregional violence if pressure is abated.
    Violent extremism among internally displaced persons is a major
    security concern in the Middle East. In east Africa, VEOs remain a
    destabilizing force, reliable local partners are limited, and remotely
    delivering sustainable, effective pressure is problematic. In many
    remote areas, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and
    close air support assets are stretched thin and come at high cost, and
    we continue to work with DOD to address this issue.
                          sof in strategic competition
        Competition among states remains a constant strategic consideration
    across multiple regions, and we must adapt to maintain advantage. Since
    their inception, modern SOF have contributed to this contest through
    the aperture of irregular warfare. These capabilities are as relevant
    today as they were at the onset of the Cold War. USSOCOM continues to
    rebalance SOF training, activities, and investments to better enable
    the Joint Force to compete below the threshold of armed conflict. For
    SOF, this requires us to reinforce core competencies in irregular
    warfare, foreign partner capacity building, clandestine activities, and
    information operations.
        As the United States seeks to reinvigorate and modernize our
    alliances and partnerships to counter China, Russia, and other powers,
    SOF will play a central role. The ``by, with, and through'' approach
    inherent in SOF operations, coupled with our global C-VEO partnerships,
    information operations, and Counter Threat Finance authorities and
    expertise, present opportunities to maintain advantage. Our C-VEO
    activities provide cross-cutting value as SOF illuminate adversary
    activities, interests, and illicit finances and inform U.S. strategy
    and whole-of-government efforts. With U.S. SOF as the partner of choice
    for C-VEO, we will continue to capitalize on these investments that
    build credible partners and gain access and influence abroad to counter
    competitor ambitions and malign activities.
        Information technology is another instrument used by our
    competitors, allowing countries like China and Russia to exploit and
    manipulate populations across the globe. As the DOD's Joint Proponent
    for Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Coordinating
    Authority for Internet-based MISO, USSOCOM is positioning our
    psychological operations forces for today's environment. The Joint MISO
    WebOps Center (JMWC) is our flagship effort to coordinate MISO
    conducted via the internet and actively engage foreign audiences to
    expose, counter, and compete with hostile propaganda and disinformation
    online. In 2021, we will incorporate our first foreign partners and
    interagency liaisons.
        The collaborative, mutually supporting relationship among the
    functional combatant commands is essential to maintaining U.S.
    advantage. These commands have global perspective and are well-
    positioned to observe our competitors' regional activities and goals
    across all domains. One example is USSOCOM's role as DOD's Coordinating
    Authority for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), in which
    we focus on improving Joint Force readiness to mitigate risk posed by
    WMDs and supporting unified approaches to countering proliferation of
    WMDs and related technologies, materials, and expertise.
        Finally, we are grateful for a range of authorities granted by
    Congress that allow SOF to have outsized impact across multiple mission
    sets. Operations conducted under 10 USC Sec.  127e (CT) provide
    flexible options to apply CT pressure in otherwise inaccessible or
    contested areas, and operations under fiscal year 2018 NDAA Sec.  1202
    (Irregular Warfare) are essential for applying SOF capabilities to
    illuminate and impose cost on malign actors. Additionally, authorities
    under 10 USC Sec.  127f (Intelligence / Counter-Intelligence) and
    fiscal year 2020 NDAA Sec.  1057 (Clandestine Operational Preparation
    of the Environment) replaced the Emergency and Extraordinary Expense
    authorization allowing application of SOF capability with greater
    efficiency and transparency.
                             innovate to transform
        Our SOF must modernize to compete and win. Guided by DOD priorities
    and operating concepts, SOF are divesting of legacy platforms that fail
    to provide increased value across GPC and C-VEO mission sets. Over the
    last five budget cycles, USSOCOM has realigned 14 percent (roughly $9B)
    of its Total Obligation Authority to modernizing SOF. We are focused on
    capability development improvements, digital age changes, and business
    administration reforms.
              modernizing capability development and acquisitions
        The acquisitions authorities given to USSOCOM by Congress are
    indispensable in modernizing SOF capabilities. Our SOF Acquisitions,
    Technology, and Logistics team works tirelessly to improve the
    lethality, survivability, and sustainment of our operators and special-
    operations-peculiar equipment. Our research, development, and
    acquisition priorities center on adapting emerging technologies to
    empower hyper-enabled operators and teams. Our initiatives seek to
    accelerate gains in our ability to provide power, protection, and force
    projection at the tactical edge.
        Over the years, SOF have been an incubator and testbed for new
    technology, and USSOCOM continues as a pathfinder for select
    capabilities. In fiscal year 2020, we achieved notable returns across
    multiple programs, including modernization of AC-130 and MC-130
    platforms, fielding of next-generation software-enabled tactical
    radios, and successful combat tests of suitable Precision Strike
    missile prototypes. For future combat platforms, USSOCOM is working
    closely with the Services to introduce SOF requirements into the
    development process. Our collaborative work with the U.S. Army's Future
    Vertical Lift initiative is an exceptional example. By synchronizing
    requirements early, SOF will receive next generation systems that
    require minimal modification, and the Joint Force will save on
    sustainment and upgrade costs.
        Critical SOF capability gaps still exist, and Congressional support
    is essential in delivering these assets to reduce risk for our
    operators and bolster SOF's ability to complement conventional
    capabilities in competition. To provide sustainable support to C-VEO
    operations, we are working with the U.S. Air Force to develop the Armed
    Overwatch program. This program will provide cost-effective,
    multipurpose aircraft to support operations in remote, austere areas
    for the foreseeable future. Additionally, we are working with the U.S.
    Navy to modernize Naval Special Warfare undersea warfare capabilities
    central to GPC. These include wet and dry submersibles, unmanned
    options, and offshore delivery solutions to provide coastal subsurface
    clandestine activities and access.
                        modernizing a digital age force
        To compete in the current environment, we need world-class talent
    enabled by cutting-edge data management, software, and AI. USSOCOM is
    committed to serving as a vanguard for the integration of AI in mission
    command, intelligence analysis, and operations processes. Our newly
    published strategies for data and digital network architecture align
    with DOD's vision and advance a path toward greater data processing,
    network interoperability, and security in contested environments.
    Digital transformation, multi-domain data search and discovery, and
    cross-domain data solutions are USSOCOM critical priorities.
    Incorporating these capabilities with AI at the tactical edge within a
    secure, reliable cloud-computing framework is essential for competing
    with our adversaries across multiple domains. We are working closely
    with USCYBERCOM, DOD leadership, and the Services to develop and
    implement these solutions.
        We are building a wide range of partnerships to explore the
    potential of data-driven technologies. Our work with the DOD's Project
    Maven and multiple service-led initiatives have expanded our
    understanding of data collection and algorithm development to support
    the warfighter and lay the initial groundwork for future AI
    integration. Some of our newest partnerships focus on using AI to study
    cognitive performance and brain health. We are investing in AI
    technologies with goals to boost intelligence analysis and reduce
    overhead for ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination;
    accelerate identification and response to online disinformation;
    improve reporting and decision making at the tactical level; enhance
    predictive maintenance and logistics; and optimize human performance.
                      modernizing business administration
        USSOCOM is steadfast in improving efficiency, costs, and
    transparency in business administration, auditability, and capability
    development. In fiscal year 2020, we completed our third financial
    statement audit and developed a roadmap aligned with DOD and Service
    plans to obtain a clean audit opinion by fiscal year 2028.
    Additionally, USSOCOM continues to reduce low-return activities and
    reallocate funds toward SOF, Joint Warfighting, and DOD strategic
    competition priorities.
        We have also taken action to balance the SOF portfolio to address
    national priorities and SOF capabilities that will remain in high
    demand. In depth reviews of deployed forces and regionally aligned
    headquarters are reducing pressure on the force and allowing our teams
    to focus on priority tasks to build long-term readiness, assist the
    joint force in competition, and experiment for greater
    interoperability. Most importantly, these reviews are now integrated
    with the DOD's routine force management processes. These changes better
    posture USSOCOM to meet the full range of national priorities.
        Our acquisitions team continues to be a defense leader in applying
    Middle Tier Acquisitions and Other Transactional Agreement authorities
    provided by Congress, and we have had continued success in leveraging
    our SOFWERX platform via a Partnership Intermediary Agreement. SOFWERX
    enhances USSOCOM's ability to collaborate and connect with a diverse
    network of small, non-traditional companies, labs, scientists and
    academia. The fiscal year 2020 NDAA Sec.  851 authorization to use this
    platform to improve our interactions with Small Businesses through the
    Small Business Innovation Research pilot program has been especially
    effective. Since the pilot implementation, we have awarded 17 contracts
    with results that matter to both DOD and industry: a 200 percent
    increase in small business participation, 80 percent reduction in total
    contracting time, and 60 percent decrease in the time from initial
    award to prototype delivery.
                                   conclusion
        In closing, USSOCOM is committed to providing the best trained and
    equipped SOF to support the Nation. We are actively realigning our
    operations, activities, and investments to align with NDS priorities
    and the operational needs of the GCCs, maintaining sustainable pressure
    on priority C-VEO threats while enabling the Joint Force to maintain
    advantage in competition, respond in crisis, and win in conflict. We
    are modernizing and innovating for the future, updating our
    organizational structures and processes for improved performance and
    affordability. Most importantly, we are staying true to our first SOF
    Truth--``Humans are more important than hardware''--by investing in our
    people, ensuring a trusted, capable, diverse, and committed force that
    is ready to meet any challenge. We are thankful to Congress for the
    foresight in creating USSOCOM many years ago, for trusting and
    sustaining this command as we developed a peerless force, and for your
    continued support for this truly special cohort of men and women who
    volunteer to undertake the most complex, challenging, and dangerous
    missions in defense of our great nation.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Clarke.
        General Nakasone, please?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
     CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; AND CHIEF,
                        CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

        General Nakasone. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to be here
    and to testify beside Acting Assistant Secretary Maier, and my
    good friend, General Rich Clarke. I am joined today by
    CYBERCOM's senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant Major
    Sheryl Lyon.
        Entering our Army as an Arab linguist, Command Sergeant
    Major Lyon's 30-year career with airborne, special mission, and
    intelligence and cyber units makes her uniquely qualified to
    serve as USCYBERCOM and NSA's senior enlisted leader.
        Over the past year, I emphasized the importance of
    defending the election against foreign interference. We did
    this through the Election Security Group, a combined team from
    U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. We built
    on the lessons from earlier operations and honed partnerships
    with the Federal Bureau of Investigations and Department of
    Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
    Agency, sharing information with those who needed it as fast as
    possible.
        We also worked with the National Guard Bureau to create a
    mechanism that enabled Guard units to share information about
    incidents quickly, easily, and uniformly.
        U.S. Cyber Command conducted more than 2 dozen operations
    to get ahead of foreign threats before they interfered or
    influenced our elections in 2020. Three points stand out to me.
    First, U.S. Cyber Command must be, and is, able, ready, and
    willing to act. Second, USCYBERCOM's partnership with NSA
    remains the foundation of our success, and thirdly, we enable
    our domestic industry allies and partners by providing
    critical-threat information and insights which improve their
    ability to act under their unique authorities.
        I am proud of the work the command and the Election
    Security Group performed as part of a broader government effort
    to deliver a safe and secure 2020 election.
        CYBERCOM is building on a recent guidance from the
    Department seeking to promote readiness, improve training, and
    attract and retain high-end talent. Regarding readiness,
    CYBERCOM is improving its ability to monitor the status of
    forces provided by the services down to the team, mission
    element, and even individual levels.
        CYBERCOM is expanding, enhancing the training that our
    personnel receive.
        As the trailblazer for the Department of Defense's Cyber
    Excepted Service, the Command benefits from flexible hiring
    authorities to recruit civilian talent. Even with COVID-19
    impacts and lengthy security-clearance timelines, that impact
    to the entire Department, CYBERCOM has offered and was able to
    attract a number of high-end talent to our force.
        Diversity is what makes us better. Extremism can tear us
    apart. Last week at Cyber Command, we held a Secretary of
    Defense-directed stand-down day. Extremism has no place in the
    Armed Services and must not be allowed to affect our cohesion
    or impact the security of the United States.
        At CYBERCOM, I have strived to cultivate an environment
    where personnel are empowered to report abuses and reject
    participation in activities that demean or harass their co-
    workers or neighbors. We owe it to ourselves, our workforce,
    and our Nation to set and be the example.
        In closing, the cyberspace environment has changed
    significantly over the past 10 years. Adversaries are
    demonstrating a changed risk calculus. They are undertaking
    malign activities in cyberspace at greater scope, scale, and
    sophistication. They desire to take on the U.S. cyberspace
    below the level of armed conflict.
        To defend our security and our interests in this
    environment, U.S. Cyber Command must continue to adapt,
    innovate, partner, and succeed against such adversaries. The
    men and women at Cyber Command are truly grateful for the
    support this Committee and Congress has given to our command.
        Again, thank you for your support, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Paul M. Nakasone
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today and to represent
    the men and women of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 2020
    presented some unique challenges to USCYBERCOM that will inform our
    actions over the next year. Indeed, 2021 is offering opportunities for
    USCYBERCOM to build upon.
        USCYBERCOM was established in 2010 and became a unified combatant
    command in 2018. Our mission is to plan and execute global cyberspace
    operations, activities, and missions to defend and advance national
    interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners
    across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. We direct,
    synchronize, and coordinate cyber planning and operations. Our three
    enduring lines of operation are as follows:
          Provide mission assurance for the Department of Defense
    (DOD) by directing the operation and defense of the Department of
    Defense Information Networks (i.e. the DODIN) and its key terrain and
    capabilities;
          Defeat strategic threats to the United States and its
    national interests; and
          Assist Combatant Commanders to achieve their missions in
    and through cyberspace.
        In January 2021, our Cyber Mission Force (CMF) comprised roughly
    6,000 service members and civilians out of an authorized a total of
    6,187 positions. This includes Guard and Reserve personnel on Active
    Duty serving at our headquarters and on our CMF teams. For comparison,
    the 2018 DOD Cyber Posture Review counted about 238,000 personnel in
    the Department's cyberspace operations forces, including the CMF,
    USCYBERCOM's subordinate command elements, cybersecurity service
    providers (CSSPs), special capability providers, and specialty units.
        The DOD depends on USCYBERCOM and its performance. Every
    operational plan and every mission across the Department builds from
    the assumption that we will be able to assure that the bandwidth and
    data that military forces require will be accessible and trustworthy.
    A Look Back at 2020
        In 2020, USCYBERCOM made progress in the face of significant
    challenges.
        Operationally, we helped to lead the successful defense of the 2020
    elections and played a key role in the Government-wide response to the
    SolarWinds breach. We also gained Departmental commitments to enhanced
    resources and a better alignment of cyberspace responsibilities and
    authorities for the Command (including the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA
    elimination of the $75 million cap on funds available for acquisition
    activities).
        We saw increasingly capable cyber adversaries target the United
    States via influence operations, efforts to compromise sensitive data,
    and attempts to gain access to our weapons systems. Adversaries still
    seek to exploit gaps and seams between our organizations and
    authorities:
          China is a sophisticated cyber adversary. Beijing
    conducts effective cyber espionage and other operations and has
    integrated cyber activities into its military and national strategy.
    Despite public exposure and indictments of Chinese cyber actors, China
    remains focused on shaping the global narrative and exploiting American
    networks and cyber systems.
          Russia is a sophisticated cyber adversary. It has
    demonstrated its ability to conduct powerful influence campaigns
    utilizing the medium of social media. Moscow conducts effective cyber-
    espionage and other operations and has integrated cyber activities into
    its military and national strategy. Despite public exposure and
    indictments of Russian cyber actors, Russia remains focused on shaping
    the global narrative and exploiting American networks and cyber
    systems.
          North Korea has demonstrated the capability and intent to
    strike the United States in cyberspace. Its regime sponsors cyber
    exploitation of international finance via cyber means to evade United
    Nations sanctions.
          Iran has demonstrated both the capability and intent to
    strike the United States in cyberspace. Iranian cyber actors are
    growing adept at exploiting systems as well as delivering disruptive
    and destructive attacks, and have attempted to execute a series of
    influence campaigns.
          Finally, non-state actors and criminal cartels remain
    threats to us and our interests, whether by financing, recruiting, and
    advertising violent extremist tactics, or through the exploitation of
    data for theft or ransom.
        All of these actors felt the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic - as
    did we. Fortunately, we saw their operational tempo briefly diminish at
    roughly the same time that we had to restrict access to our facilities.
    COVID-19 mitigations remain in full effect across our enterprise, and
    we are vaccinating our personnel as fast as vaccine supplies and local
    conditions allow. Overall, I am pleased that the pandemic has not
    limited the force's readiness or posture to fulfill its missions.
        Last year, I emphasized the importance of defending the election
    against foreign interference, in part through the Election Security
    Group (ESG), a combined team from USCYBERCOM and the National Security
    Agency (NSA). The ESG ensured that intelligence informed whole-of-
    nation efforts to harden defenses and prevent or disrupt threats to the
    U.S. elections. We built on lessons from earlier operations and honed
    partnerships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
    Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), sharing
    information with those who needed it as fast as possible. We also
    worked with the National Guard Bureau to create a mechanism that
    enabled Guard units to share information about incidents quickly,
    easily, and uniformly. We called it the Cyber 9-line, given the nine
    lines of information a reporting entity would complete. As the election
    approached, every state had joined this program. I am proud of the work
    the Command and the ESG performed, as part of a broader government
    effort, to deliver a safe and secure 2020 election.
        USCYBERCOM conducted more than two dozen operations to get ahead of
    foreign threats before they interfered with or influenced our elections
    in 2020. Three points stand out for me:
          First, USCYBERCOM must be ready and able to act. Threats
    can arise rapidly, and opportunities can be fleeting. Our ability to
    operate successfully in cyberspace is a function of streamlined
    processes, mission readiness, and the trust of our various mission
    partners.
          Second, USCYBERCOM's partnership with NSA remains the
    foundation of our success. Working together under one leader again
    demonstrated the ability of both organizations to operate with speed
    and agility to achieve outcomes for the Nation.
          Third, we enable our foreign allies and partners, just as
    they remain crucial to our ability to act. Operating with allies and
    partners allows each to magnify each other's unique strengths. Our
    efforts over the last year highlight the value of not only operating
    but training together as well.
        USCYBERCOM supported the combatant commands with a wide range of
    other operational accomplishments over the last year. Counterterrorism
    operations in cyberspace are continuous, helping to protect the force
    and prosecute targets in Afghanistan and other regions on behalf of
    USCENTCOM and USSOCOM. We are also shifting JTF-Ares' focus (though not
    all of its missions) from counterterrorism toward heightened support to
    great power competition, particularly in USINDOPACOM's area of
    responsibility. Finally, we are working across the board to ensure that
    the data links that our warfighters rely on are protected and
    resilient.
        In recent months our priority has been mitigating the threat to
    federal systems from malicious cyber actors compromising widely-used
    SolarWinds software and exposing thousands of public and private
    systems to targeted exploitation. The U.S. Government learned of the
    compromise in December 2020. As an immediate response to this threat, I
    directed the creation of a combined USCYBERCOM-NSA team in support of
    the U.S. Government's efforts, through the Unified Coordination Group,
    to mitigate the compromise. To date, we have yet to identify any
    compromise of DOD information networks in the unclassified or
    classified domains.
        My teams have provided almost 100 days of continuous support to the
    whole-of-government mitigation effort. I have organized our efforts
    across three lines of effort:
        1. Bound the Problem. Using both automated and manual processes, we
    worked to determine the scope of SolarWinds Orion software products
    employed across the DODIN. Each instance was immediately isolated and
    disconnected from DOD networks. Meanwhile, NSA worked to understand the
    adversary's intent and illuminate additional tradecraft and
    infrastructure to inform threat detection and asset response
    activities. Finally, we prepared to support and assist other federal
    departments and the Defense Industrial Base in bounding their
    respective problems.
        2. Expel the Adversary. This is a continuous process driven by
    USCYBERCOM's Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information
    Networks (JFHQ-DODIN), which has directed network administrators to
    enumerate, isolate, and remediate all affected systems before they are
    reconnected to the DODIN. We have yet to find any adversary presence on
    the DODIN as a result of the SolarWinds compromise. We continue to work
    with federal partners to share best practices and expertise to expel
    the adversary from affected systems.
        3. Impose Cost. USCYBERCOM and NSA are both planning and informing
    the whole-of-government response options to the SolarWinds supply-chain
    compromise and the adversary's associated campaign. Policymakers are
    considering a range of options, including costs that might be imposed
    by other elements of our government.
        The SolarWinds incident occurred because highly skilled,
    sophisticated actors inserted a malicious cyber capability into a
    commercial product that was then downloaded and installed world-wide.
    The nature of the tradecraft employed by this actor reinforces the
    imperative for government and industry to collaborate in detecting and
    responding to malicious cyber activity. We in the U.S. Government,
    together with our industry partners, must improve our defensive posture
    to prevent and minimize the impacts and the cost in time and money of
    remedying such vulnerabilities and incidents, and we must rapidly
    expose and respond to malicious cyber activity in the future.
    Our Focus for 2021
        My focus for the coming year is to broaden the foundation for
    operational progress. In particular, we are building on recent guidance
    from the Department, seeking to promote sustainable readiness; to
    improve training; and to attract and retain high-end talent across our
    military, civilian, Active Duty, and Reserve workforces.
        Cybersecurity and defensive cyberspace operations mean mission
    assurance for the DOD and thus are integral to our Nation's security.
    For 2021 and the years ahead, there are several areas where USCYBERCOM
    plans to improve. Our growth to date has highlighted certain
    misalignments between the responsibilities I have as Commander and the
    resources and authorities to execute those responsibilities. The
    following initiatives reflect the Department's guidance to align
    mission, responsibility, and accountability for the Command:
        Accountability: The Secretary of Defense in late 2020 issued a
    directive emphasizing accountability by aligning cybersecurity efforts
    with operational risk decisions.
        USCYBERCOM will improve risk management while also holding
    commanders and directors accountable for their risk decisions.
        Budget Control: USCYBERCOM's fiscal year 2021 budget is roughly
    $605 million, which covers the headquarters staff and the Cyber
    National Mission Force. Meanwhile, 27 different components shape the
    Department's overall Cyber Activities Budget, which averages about $10
    billion a year. USCYBERCOM is working with the Services and the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense to direct CMF funding in a more
    collaborative effort while allowing for informed tradeoffs (across the
    Services) based on operational needs.
        Team Realignment: The CMF's original force structure was set in
    2012, and several teams were originally aligned to support the counter-
    terrorism fight. With the return of great power competition, USCYBERCOM
    is realigning some teams to focus on key nations.
        Force Growth: Recent demand across DOD has demonstrated that the
    original 133 teams in the CMF are not enough. The strategic environment
    has changed since the original CMF was designated in 2012. Added forces
    will ensure USCYBERCOM can fulfill its responsibility as both a
    supported and a supporting command.
        Training: USCYBERCOM is centralizing the provision of advanced
    training. The Army will serve as the executive agent for advanced
    cyberspace training. This will ensure that each Service presents well-
    trained personnel to USCYBERCOM who can contribute to our missions as
    soon as they arrive in the Command.
        Sustainable Readiness: We are improving our ability to monitor the
    status of forces down to the team, mission element, and even individual
    levels in order to identify and remedy challenges to gaining and
    maintaining necessary readiness. We are working to better provide
    commanders with the situational awareness they require to assess risks
    and make informed decisions, not just in operations but also in
    maintaining the force as a whole. I am pleased with the progress here,
    but more needs to be done.
        Domestic and International Partnerships: Such ties collectively are
    a force multiplier when it comes to cyber operations. USCYBERCOM is
    enhancing its existing relationships and forging new ones based on U.S.
    Government priorities. We have been sending teams to ``hunt forward''
    at the invitation of foreign governments, helping them find adversary
    malware on their governmental systems. Such persistent engagement in
    cyberspace lets the Command deliver outcomes in competition with
    adversaries, both by enabling our partners and by acting when called
    upon.
        Realigning Cyber Protection Teams: USCYBERCOM is working with the
    combatant commands to ensure they have dependable defensive support for
    their missions while we retain forces to deal with global challenges to
    the DODIN.
        USCYBERCOM executes its operations employing the Joint Cyber
    Warfighting Architecture (JCWA), which is a cyber capabilities
    architecture that enables us to act against our adversaries in
    competition, crisis, and conflict in cyberspace. When fully realized,
    JCWA will provide unified capabilities for Cyberspace Operations
    Forces, integrating the data from offensive and defensive cyberspace
    operations in ways that help commanders gauge risk, make timely
    decisions, and act.
        To help drive operational needs and capability development,
    USCYBERCOM activated a JCWA Capability Management Office (JCMO). This
    promoted unity of effort across the Command, the Services, and
    Department in building the many and varied components that together
    comprise the JCWA. Those components include:
          Improved operational architectures that give our forces
    the ability to operate at-scale from multiple locations;
          Data sharing and analytics (the Unified Platform) that
    provide insight for offensive and defensive operations;
          Command and control features that display the readiness
    of our forces as well as operational status. One tool in this suite,
    Project IKE (soon to be Joint Cyber Command and Control), has ensured
    we can measure readiness down to the individual level while informing
    exercises, training, recruiting, and even retention;
          Tool development capabilities that are responsive to
    operational needs and increasingly able to focus talents and
    innovations when and where they are needed most;
          Realistic collective training (via the Persistent Cyber
    Training Environment, or PCTE) that lets us rehearse missions and even
    exercise with Reserve Component and foreign partners.
        Last year's operational successes would not have been possible
    without the Department's Total Force, which includes the National Guard
    and the Reserves. Before the 2020 elections, the Guard provided local
    connectivity and insight on key events like Super Tuesday. They also
    played vital roles during the pandemic. For example, the National Guard
    and Reserve provided cyber forces in response to a Defense Support to
    Civil Authorities (DSCA) request from the Department of Homeland
    Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in support
    of Operation Warp Speed, providing cybersecurity support to the
    pharmaceutical industry as it developed COVID-19 vaccines in record
    time.
        Finally, the Reserve Component's ability to hire qualified cyber
    warriors who decide to leave Active Duty upon completion of their
    service commitment has proved invaluable. Members of the National Guard
    and Reserve have relevant private-sector experience in fields of strong
    interest to the Department, and many of them work for some of the
    Nation's top-tier technology companies. The Air National Guard, for
    example, has built both offensive and defensive cyber units in which
    members departing Active Duty can transfer to part-time status while
    they pursue careers in the civilian sector.
        As the trailblazer for the DOD's Cyber Excepted Service (CES)
    personnel authority, the Command benefits from flexible hiring
    authorities in filling civilian vacancies and recruiting top cyber
    talent. Even with COVID-19 impacts and security clearance timelines
    that continue to challenge the whole Department, USCYBERCOM offered
    competitive compensation and incentives to our best candidates. We are
    also partnering with the National Security Innovation Network (NSIN), a
    Defense Innovation Unit program office, to conduct a virtual hire-a-
    thon that runs through this month. The most recent hire-a-thon garnered
    more than 260 resumes from people eager to join our team, and similar
    events are planned for the future. Civilians continue to play an
    important role for USCYBERCOM, providing vital continuity in several
    areas.
    Conclusion
        USCYBERCOM is actively engaged in addressing the Nation's
    challenges from sophisticated and evolving adversaries in cyberspace.
    The Command supports other combatant commanders in every geographic and
    functional area of responsibility, while implementing the Department's
    Defend Forward strategy and enhancing our capabilities.
        For the year to come our priorities are set. We will focus on great
    power competition through persistent engagement, especially in support
    of USINDOPACOM, and particularly through improving the efficiency and
    effectiveness of DODIN operations and defensive cyberspace missions. To
    prepare for the approved growth in the CMF, we will enhance our control
    over resources for the force, improve its readiness (including the
    metrics we require in doing so), and consolidate CMF training. We will
    integrate the development efforts ongoing in support of the JCWA. We
    will also improve recruitment and retention of top military and
    civilian performers. All of these measures will enhance the proficiency
    of USCYBERCOM and boost its ability to provide defensive security
    assurance and options for policymakers and commanders at the senior
    levels of the government and the Department of Defense.
        The men and women at USCYBERCOM are grateful for the support this
    Committee and Congress in these efforts. I thank you for that support
    in the important work that we have undertaken together, and now I look
    forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Nakasone.
        Let me make a few points as reminders. Again, at 10:45, we
    are scheduled to have four votes and we will continue the
    hearing as we go back and forth and vote. There is a closed
    session after this hearing in SVC-217 and we will, as soon as
    we conclude, go to SVC-217.
        This is a hybrid hearing, so the questions will be by
    seniority, not by arrival time, 5-minute standard questions,
    and please mute your mics so that we can have no disruption of
    the questioning.
        Mr. Maier, again, what is the status today of the
    Department's efforts to empower ASD SO/LIC and what additional
    resources or authorities do you believe we need from the
    Congress?
        Mr. Maier. Thank you, Chairman.
        So, the current status is one that is SO/LIC, as a
    standalone organization, both its policy components and its
    service secretary-like our 922 component outside of Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy, Secretary Austin and
    Deputy Secretary Hicks are re-looking that to see if that
    continues to make sense. I think one of the potential options
    is to determine a way to better integrate the policy components
    that were removed from SO/LIC towards the end of the last
    administration, back more integrated into policy, but under no
    circumstances, am I aware of any Courses of Action (COAs) that
    are being discussed that would remove the service secretary-
    like responsibility from remaining a principal staff assistant
    and a direct-report up to the Secretary of Defense. So, I think
    your legislation has been very clear on that point.
        As to progress to date, we continue to make progress, I
    think, on building the capability, in many cases, in the form
    of expertise and people, on the components in that
    administrative chain of command. So, the SSO, or Secretariat
    for Special Operations, that was explicitly directed in the
    2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is something we
    built to about 40 people at this point and it includes a cross-
    section of experts from the budgeting world, the legislative
    world, the acquisitions world, really, the, if you will, the
    nascent or core group of people that will perform that service
    secretary-like function.
        But we are not at the point, Chairman, of irreversible
    momentum at this point and we are not at the point of having
    something that is probably sufficient to do the roles that have
    been described in multiple NDAAs at this point.
        The last thing I will say is, I do think the relationship
    with Special Operations Command is very strong. One of the
    things that General Clarke and I benefit from is having worked
    together on multiple occasions in the past, and I think that
    leadership connection helps to ensure our staffs are proceeding
    in that direction of collaboration, partnership, and civilian-
    military relationships.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        General Clarke, let me, again, commend you from conducting
    the review of culture and ethics. These are issues that every
    organization and, particularly, military organizations have to
    confront. Sixteen recommendations were generated by the panel.
    Without going into detail on every recommendation, can you
    highlight the key ones and the overall status of those
    recommendations, implementation-wise.
        General Clarke. Yes, sir, I can, if I can get the mic
    working. Sir, the primary finding, as you pointed out, was, in
    fact, that the focus on overemployment and mission
    accomplishment led to the detriment in leadership
    accountability and discipline. To that end, with those 16
    recommendations and the findings from that, our focus, first,
    was to the overall employment and how many forces were deployed
    as we looked at, and we conduct our own zero-baseline review of
    forces employed. Through that, have reduced the approximate SOF
    employment by about 20 percent.
        But we also, probably most importantly, have reduced the
    amount of headquarters that were forward that put leadership
    forward, therefore, you didn't have the leadership that was
    back during the force generation so that the leadership was not
    engaged and present.
        The other specific aspects that we have looked at is the
    training of our forces as they go through the various
    pipelines, but also our assessments to improve those. But at
    the end of the day, Senator, it's about engaged leadership to
    reduce the amount of incidents that SOF has had in the past.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
        General Nakasone, SolarWinds, the Microsoft hack, they
    don't appear to be the garden-variety type of back-and-forth
    that we have seen from nation states.
        Are we into a new era in which our adversaries are
    conducting more and more aggressive attacks that are designed
    to be just short of a redline that would trigger some type of
    conventional response? Are we in new terrain?
        General Nakasone. Chairman, I think that, as you point out,
    what we have seen from both, the SolarWinds and the Microsoft
    intrusions, is an increasing level of sophistication. This is a
    scope, a scale, a level of sophistication that we hadn't seen
    previously. This isn't, simply, you know, email phishing
    attempts; this is the use of supply chain or this is the use of
    vulnerabilities we hadn't seen before.
        In terms of this changing risk calculus for our
    adversaries, their intent, obviously, we continue to monitor,
    but for us, I think it is the clarion call for us to look at
    this differently. How do we ensure we have, as a nation, both
    the resiliency and the ability to act against these types of
    adversaries?
        Chairman Reed. We have structurally a gap between our
    civilian authorities and our military authorities that is being
    exploited by our adversaries?
        General Nakasone. Chairman, for both of the intrusions,
    what we have seen, I think I would point out would be two
    critical areas that we need to address as a nation. First of
    all, as you point out, it is not the fact that we can't connect
    the dots; we can't see all of the dots. So, my authorities and
    my responsibilities, both as the commander of U.S. Cyber
    Command and as the director of the National Security Agency,
    are rightly outside of the country.
        But in terms of internal to our Nation, our adversaries
    understand our policies and our laws and the timing to be able
    to use our infrastructure to achieve access to these companies
    and have an impact.
        Thank you very much, General.
        Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am going to go back to a couple of things that I referred
    to in my opening statement, and I know that, Mr. Maier, in your
    opening statement, you addressed this. I would like to have a
    little more detail and maybe aim this at both General Clarke
    and at you.
        We all understand what history has taught us, that if we
    take our pressure off of the terrorist groups, they are going
    to rebuild and threaten and all that, so things have to be done
    at the same time. The two things that I am concerned with
    still, and specifically getting into resources and
    capabilities, trying to balance the NDS, and of course we know
    what we are supposed to be doing there, the requirements to
    modernize our forces to compete with China and Russia, that is
    on one hand, but against the need to maintain the pressure on
    ISIS and al Qaeda, especially in places like Africa.
        Do you really think that you have the resources necessary
    to accomplish both of these?
        This is a place where you would want to come to, because if
    you don't, we need to know about it. Would you respond to that
    in some detail.
        Mr. Maier. Ranking member, yes, I very much agree with the
    idea that we have got to be able to do both and as I think
    General Clarke referred to, in some cases, we can do both with
    the same forces, but in a lot of cases, we can't.
        I mean, in the case of Somalia, there were, as you know, a
    lot of changes made over the last few months, including moving
    forces out and there is a policy-review underway now, looking
    at not only that decision, but how we ultimately posture our
    forces to ensure we have the right capabilities there and in
    other places.
        I think one of the benefits of the beginning of a new
    administration is, there are a number of posture reviews and a
    lot of assumptions are underway. One of the key elements of
    that is just as you described, how do we weigh the need to
    continue to protect the American public, citizens, our
    interests against the al Qaedas, and ISIS, and their affiliates
    that are still out there, even as we look to, in some cases,
    change our capabilities or our posture or our focus towards the
    peer competitors that we face.
        So, this is something that I think I would be happy to
    drill down in more specifics as we go issue by issue or place
    by place, but I think my take on this is the counterterrorism
    fight is not over. The NDS says that, and I think that has been
    reinforced in the early reviews coming out of these policy
    reviews.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Now, General Clarke, do you
    essentially agree with this?
        General Clarke. Senator, I----
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, I think we have a mic problem
    there.
        But let me go back. You brought up Somalia. Now, this
    taking some of our resources out of Somalia, going into Kenya
    and some other areas, that was actually a policy of the
    previous administration and I disagreed with it at that time.
        Now that we have already done this, Mr. Maier, what is your
    feeling now, was that the right move or was that not the right
    move? What kind of results are we getting now?
        Mr. Maier. Ranking Member, I think we have a review
    underway right now that is weighing all of this. I think from
    my perspective, there are probably significant downsides to the
    pull-out from the perspective of cost and effectiveness, but
    that is my initial look, and this will have to be an
    interagency look, but that is something that is being looked at
    both, from the counterterrorism perspective and the broader,
    regional objectives we have in the Horn of Africa.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, I would like to be in on that because
    I was pretty outspoken when that decision was made and I would
    like to see how we are doing on that.
        This was brought up already by the Chairman, the Russian
    SolarWinds cyberattack to the Chinese hack into Microsoft, and
    all that. We know those problems are there.
        DOD began building a total of 133 CMF teams in 2012 and
    reached full operational capacity with over 6,200 cyber
    personnel in May of 2018.
        General Nakasone, SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange
    cyberattacks demonstrate we are vulnerable, we have
    vulnerabilities out there. What authorities or resources do you
    need, again, it is kind of the same question I asked Mr. Maier,
    what resources do you need to accomplish what we have to
    accomplish, because this is the place you go to for resources.
        General Nakasone. Ranking Member, thank you very much for
    the question.
        I think, first of all, just taking a step back, we as a
    nation right now, are taking a very hard look at both of these
    intrusions. I think there are two gaps that are being addressed
    right now that have to be addressed and one of them is this
    idea of information sharing. These attacks took place within
    the United States, these intrusions, and there are, right now,
    legal barriers and disincentives for the private sector to
    share information with the Government.
        We have a difficulty, as a government, understanding the
    totality of the actual intrusion, so that is being worked. The
    second piece is, as I mentioned to the chairman, we have an
    inability to see everything. So, we, as U.S. Cyber Command or
    the National Security Agency may see what is occurring outside
    of the United States, but when it comes into the United States,
    our adversaries are moving very quickly. They understand the
    laws and the policies that we have within our Nation, and so
    they are utilizing our own infrastructure, our own internet
    service providers to create these intrusions.
        The resourcing of U.S. Cyber Command right now to include
    the 133 teams has been instrumental in us being able to have an
    ability to act. Certainly, we are looking as a department, if
    further growth is necessary, we will come back to the Committee
    if that is a requirement.
        But I would say the first two pieces, being able to
    identify and being able to fix those areas, are part of the
    resilience of the Nation that has to be addressed.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is very good.
        My time has expired, but we are interested and is it a
    work-in-progress right now and you are making headway, I
    assume.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please?
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    each of our witnesses.
        General Nakasone, I want to congratulate you on the work
    that Cyber Command did on the elections in 2020 and your also
    mentioning of the National Guard. The Guard in New Hampshire
    were very helpful in securing our election there.
        But as you point out, we still have challenges ahead and
    the Defense Intelligence Agency's defense intelligence officer
    for Cyber, James Sullivan, recently asserted that Russia right
    now is clearly ahead and the more aggressive and practiced
    operator in information operations.
        So, how should we, do we need more authorities to allow
    Cyber Command to respond to what is happening in Russia?
        You talked about the gaps between the private sector and
    the public sector. Do we need a cyber security czar, someone
    who is going to coordinate the activities on both, the defense
    side and the private sector side?
        What else do we need to do in order to respond to this
    threat?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I think there are two pieces
    that are really important for us to continue to focus on
    regarding the threat. First of all, as I mentioned, the
    resiliency piece. We can have all the capabilities that we
    want, all the teams that we want, but if there is a hole in the
    bucket, and we are filling water, and the water is coming out
    faster than we can fill it in, there is a problem. That is the
    analogy I would use in terms of our resiliency right now. We
    have to be able to see what is happening in terms of the broad
    depth of our Nation.
        The other piece is that we should understand what our
    adversaries are doing. They are no longer just launching their
    attacks from different parts in the world. They understand that
    they can come into the United States, use our infrastructure,
    and there is a blind spot for us not being able to see them.
    Those are critical pieces.
        The other piece that I would come back to, in terms of your
    information operations question, that is something that both
    General Clarke and myself have taken on, and I think that you
    rightly point out that there is work that we have to do here.
    We have done a tremendous amount in terms of understanding and
    operating against adversaries to our election, but now we are
    in the area of great power competition. Is it the ability for
    multiple combatant commands, not just U.S. Cyber Command, but
    our geographic commands like European Command and U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command
    to harness the abilities that we have collectively against
    adversaries that are using information against us.
        Senator Shaheen. So we have had, I remember several years
    ago we had a discussion in this Committee about whether
    cyberattacks were an act of war and at what point we should
    consider them an act of war and we never resolved that
    discussion.
        Is that a discussion we should get back to and should we
    change policy, with respect to cyberattacks on the United
    States?
        General Nakasone. So, that is obviously a policy question
    that I would leave to, you know, the policy experts in the
    Department of Defense and the administration.
        In terms of my role in being able to ensure that the Nation
    has capabilities and capacities, what we are focused on is
    ensuring we understand our adversaries, understand what our
    adversaries are attempting to do, and having the capabilities
    and the capacity to be able to get after those adversaries.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that we should revisit that
    discussion in this Committee.
        General Clarke, there is a lot of debate right now about
    whether according to the agreement we made in Afghanistan with
    the Taliban, that we should withdraw our troops by May 1 and I
    have been an opponent of doing that because I question whether
    we have the capacity right now within the Afghan forces to be
    able to respond to the Taliban.
        Can you give us an update on where you think the Afghan
    security forces are in terms of their ability to respond to the
    threat.
        General Clarke. Senator, I was recently in Afghanistan and
    met with the head of their new, what they have stood up as a
    joint special operations command. While progress has been made,
    and I found a very dedicated commander in General Aziz, I think
    the capabilities that the United States provides for the
    Afghans to be able to combat the Taliban and other threats that
    reside in Afghanistan are critical to their success.
        Senator Shaheen. I find it particularly troubling that
    violence has increased on the part of the Taliban and in the
    last couple of months, we have had directed assassinations
    against civil society leaders in the country in a way that is
    clearly designed to take out the potential for leadership in
    the country if western forces withdraw.
        Do you think that presents an added risk to Afghanistan?
        General Clarke. Senator, it is clear that the Taliban has
    not upheld what they said they would do and reduce the
    violence. While, on the positive side, they have not attacked
    U.S. forces, it is clear that they took a deliberate approach
    and increased their violence since the peace accords were
    signed.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Now, via Webex, Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    gentlemen, for being here today.
        General Nakasone, I recall the 2015 Rose Garden
    announcement with President Obama and President Xi that a
    common understanding had been reached to halt China's state-
    sponsored cyber theft of intellectual property. Over 5 years
    later, how would you assess that commitment and has China's
    actions matched its words?
        General Nakasone. Senator, based upon what I have seen over
    the past several years that I have been in command of United
    States Cyber Command and as the director of the National
    Security Agency (NSA), I have seen the Chinese continue to
    utilize cyber activities below the level of armed conflict to
    steal our intellectual property, to steal our personal
    identification, and at times, attempt to influence our
    populous.
        Senator Fischer. More specifically, did this agreement have
    any impact on cyberattacks against our defense industrial base?
        General Nakasone. Senator, if I might, I would like to take
    that question for the record just because we are learning
    things every single day and I want to make sure that it is a
    fulsome answer.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
        What lessons have you learned from the experience,
    especially on how we can reduce this hostile cyber activity
    that we are seeing in cyberspace?
        General Nakasone. I think the first lesson is that we
    should all take this as a wake-up call. That this is not
    business as usual, as the chairman had mentioned.
        These are adversaries that are operating with increased
    sophistication, scope, scale, and I mentioned sophistication of
    what they are doing.
        The second piece is that this is about partnerships for us
    as a nation. How do we drive a better partnership between what
    the public needs and what the private sector can offer?
        That information sharing that I mentioned is really
    critical for us to have success in the future.
        Then the last piece is that we truly need to look at the
    ability for us to see ourselves and right now it is difficult
    for us to see ourselves because we have adversaries that are
    coming into our Nation and being able to utilize our
    infrastructure very timely and very effectively against us.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        General Clarke, your predecessor testified that, quote, our
    effectiveness over the last 15 years does not necessarily
    equate to success against near-peer competitors. We also
    require urgent investments in capabilities necessary for denied
    battlefields of the future. This includes submersibles,
    terrain-following avoidance and all-weather radar, advanced
    electronic attack capabilities, countermeasures, and precision
    munitions. We must enhance our effectiveness in partnership
    with these services, end quote.
        Do you agree with that?
        General Clarke. Senator, I do agree with that and I will
    tell you since General Thomas, my predecessor, made those
    remarks, SOCOM has been on that path to, in fact, ensure that
    we are cementing things in place that will allow our force to
    modernize for both, competition and for future conflict.
        Senator Fischer. What progress has SOCOM made in developing
    these higher-end capabilities?
        General Clarke. Senator, both team with both, academia and
    with industry. We are making sure, first, that we are not
    procuring capabilities that can't be used in a sustainable
    extremist fight, but that can also be used in near-peer, and we
    are focused very highly on next-generation, ISR, mobility, and
    putting a significant amount of effort into data and our
    networks to ensure that we have precision strike and effects
    into the future.
        Senator Fischer. In light of the priorities that have been
    laid out in the NDS, how is SOCOM balancing its investments to
    operate against those near-peer competitors, like China and
    Russia, with efforts to fulfill its global counterterrorism
    requirements?
        I would like to know where, if you could answer that, and
    then let me know where you are willing to accept risk.
        General Clarke. Senator, first, on the acceptance of risk,
    intel drive ops, and where we put our focus on are those most
    virulent threats that could actually come back to our Homeland
    and the persistent threat against threats like al Qaeda and
    ISIS and those networks.
        But then as we have looked at those sustainable
    capabilities against those threats, what else can come back,
    and that goes with both access and placement in other countries
    around the globe where counterterrorism can also equate to
    great power competition in someplace like the Philippines where
    our access and placement in helping the Filipinos fight ISIS
    allows us, also, to be involved in great power competition.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. Thank you both very
    much.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Now, let me recognize Senator Gillibrand via Webex.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, for General Clarke, we entrust the special
    operations community with some of our most important missions
    and they have truly been the tip of the spear over the last
    decade. I wonder if these units are not being overtaxed or
    undersupervised. In recent years, we have heard troubling
    stories about SEALs [Sea, Air, Land] and Marine Raiders, a
    murder of a Green Beret, and allegations of war crimes by Navy
    SEALs.
        So, first, should we be more concerned about good order and
    discipline problems in this community and, second, even if
    these cases are being prosecuted appropriately, are we taxing
    the operators with too heavy a load?
        The chronic stress of these missions lead to post-traumatic
    stress, anxiety, and other mental health challenges.
        Third, are you adequately resourced to provide the
    necessary mental health treatment for these servicemembers and
    their families?
        General Clarke. Senator, the items that you bring up are
    exactly why I directed last year a comprehensive review to look
    at our forces, and while, yes, I do believe that we are
    overfocused on employment and mission accomplishment, I do
    believe that through that comprehensive review, we have taken a
    hard look at ourselves and are making the corrective steps to
    ensure, I think most importantly is that we have the engaged
    leadership present throughout the force at the right time to
    reduce those incidents from occurring that have been
    highlighted.
        I think one specific area that you mentioned which is
    important, is in the resources in our preservation of the force
    and family, which Congress allocates to us, today, more than 40
    percent of our manpower that is associated with that is
    actually going to the cognitive and, most importantly, the
    psychological efforts to ensure that our special operators and
    their families are cared for.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Mr. Maier, as you know, the current special operations
    force structure is largely derived from counterterrorism and
    foreign internal defense operations in Iraq, in Afghanistan.
        Do you think that this structure has created gaps in
    Special Operations capabilities to win against global rivals
    like Russia or China?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it has and I think that has
    been recognized, and I think that is where we are laser-focused
    on closing that gap. Whether that gap is, as General Clarke
    alluded to, having higher-end capabilities that is more data-
    driven, more technology, more cutting-edge, but also at the
    same time, as has already been highlighted, being able to do
    our counterterrorism mission in a sustainable fashion and reap
    some of the benefits of those partnerships that give us,
    frankly, an asymmetric advantage over our peer adversaries,
    because we do work with so many countries in so many different
    ways.
        So, this is absolutely something that I think the NDS has
    highlighted for us and within the SOF enterprise, continue to
    be very focused on.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        General Nakasone, I really appreciate your leadership, and
    it was great to see you last week. I want to talk a little bit
    about sort of where we are, because in February 2020 when you
    were at a hearing, you said that you were understanding our
    adversaries better than our adversaries understand themselves.
    Well, obviously, we just had the SolarWinds hack. Experts
    estimate that maybe a thousand software engineers executed that
    operation.
        What did we get wrong? What do we need to do to make sure
    we don't miss those kinds of assaults in the future, and what
    do you propose to address long-term concerns?
        Specifically, we talked a lot about cyber workforce, about
    how to make sure we have the best and the brightest working for
    us so that we don't have intelligence gaps like this in the
    future.
        General Nakasone. Senator, with regards to our adversaries
    and understanding them, the comment I was making there was in
    reference to what we are seeing with their election influence.
    But I agree with you, we have to understand our adversaries
    better, particularly, given the recent intrusions that are
    ongoing.
        Part of understanding our adversaries, though, is being
    able to see our adversaries, So, again, if we have a problem
    where we only see our adversaries when they operate outside of
    our country and we don't see them when they operate inside our
    country, it is very difficult for us to be able to, as I say,
    connect those dots.
        That is something that the administration and obviously
    others are addressing right now. In terms of what we are doing
    at U.S. Cyber Command, we are very much focused on how do we
    ensure that our capacity, our capability remains the best in
    the world, and that gets back to your point on people what we
    have learned over the past couple of years is that the services
    bring in incredible talent for us. We are able to see these
    young soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen come
    into our force, train them, but then our great challenge is,
    how do we retain them?
        That is something that certainly I give a lot of attention
    to every single day, and it is retaining the best of the people
    that we are able to bring in. Now, we have been able to
    leverage a number of the authorities that this Committee has
    been able to generate for us, and so that is one of the areas
    that we are focused on right now, so as we continue to improve
    being able to see the adversary in its totality, we have the
    people that are able to apply, obviously, the capacity and the
    capability to defend the Nation.
        Senator Gillibrand. I would like to work with the Committee
    on getting you those authorities.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
        Let me recognize Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, good morning, and I thank you all for your
    service to our country. I would like to thank your families, as
    well, for their sacrifice, as you continue that service.
        General Nakasone, I want to work through this issue a
    little bit more about whether or not we see our adversaries,
    and I would like to just have a discussion with you. I
    understand that you have always made it very clear in all of
    our discussions that you are not here to tell us how to do
    public policy, but in order to make the public policy, we
    really do need your professional advice in terms of what is
    working and what is not.
        You have alluded to it a couple of times today and I would
    really like to flush this out. Right now, we have provided the
    ability for Cyber Command to use cyber activities as
    traditional military activity, and so you can work outside of a
    war zone, as long as it is not within the United States. Our
    country has always said that our Armed Forces are not designed
    to be utilized within our country; they are designed to be used
    outside and to defend our country.
        Yet now, we face cyberattacks where adversaries, near-peer
    adversaries, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, have figured out
    that because of the laws that we have in place to protect our
    personal privacy, that they are using internet connections to
    literally get into the United States and then to launch attacks
    probably from systems that are found within the United States.
        It seems to me that most Americans would suggest that if we
    have the ability or we have a desire to stop those attacks, we
    either have to be able to defend forward, to go on out to find
    them and to literally provide a very active cyber defense
    outside in an offensive capability, or we have to have the
    ability, as I think you are suggesting, to be able to see
    inside of our own country and to find where they are actually
    launching those attacks at.
        I want to take a few minutes here and just allow you to
    expand on that and to share with us a little bit so that we
    have a better understanding of what the public policy
    challenges are that limit your ability to be able to see our
    adversaries here within the country.
        General Nakasone. Senator, thank you.
        So, in terms of my authorities as both, the commander of
    U.S. Cyber Command and the director of the National Security
    Agency, I operate outside the United States, our forces do. It
    is not just a matter of policy; it is also law in terms of we,
    as a nation, rightly so, have a very, very determined balance
    between privacy and security. So, the authorities within the
    United States reside with the Federal Bureau of Investigations
    and others to do that type of surveillance.
        What I am identifying right now, though, is our adversaries
    understand that they can come into the United States and
    rapidly utilize an internet service provider, come up and do
    their activities and take that down before a warrant can be
    issued, before we can actually have surveillance by a civilian
    authority here in the United States. That is the challenge that
    we have right now.
        Now, I would, again, would offer that there are probably a
    number of different ways that we can look at this: whether or
    not it is greater public-private partnership; whether or not it
    is, you know, laws in terms of private sector, understanding
    who their customers are. But these are all areas that I think
    we, as a nation, have to be able to address.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General Nakasone.
        I just really think it is important that we share with the
    American public, this is not a case of where we are not
    technically adept. This is a case of where we have made laws
    that we think are correct and that we don't use our resources,
    our military uses within the United States, but we do expect
    that our other law enforcement capabilities are able to
    coordinate and to rapidly assist you so that you can go on out
    and find and take these folks out before they do it again, so
    to speak.
        Is that a fair way of looking at it?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I would offer this is at the
    heart of our Fourth Amendment, and so being able to obviously
    look at that in terms of why it is so important that we have
    that right balance between privacy and security that is
    maintained, so being able to address that, obviously, is the
    challenge that we have going forward.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Maier, I just want to bring up an issue that I think is
    really important. Secretary Mattis implemented a close-combat
    lethality task force in 2018. This was an organization
    dedicated to providing resources and policy solutions to the
    force who have accounted historically for nearly 90 percent of
    all the casualties, yet constitute only 4 percent of the force,
    and receive only 1 percent of institutional investments.
        This has been and will remain a very important legislative
    priority for my office. Nevertheless, despite its noble goals,
    this task force has floundered in the bureaucracy over the last
    year and I would like to see it get back on track.
        Can you give me your perspective on the need for an
    effective cross-functional team, such as this task force, that
    would be focused on our special operations forces, as well as
    Army and Marine infantry units and their enablers.
        I know that I am 30 seconds over my time allotted, so I am
    asking the question now, but I would ask if you would respond
    for the record to that request.
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I would be happy to.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Mr. Maier. I fully support enhancing the lethality,
    mobility, and situational awareness of our tactical forces that
    most directly engage with the enemy, those being U.S. Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) and infantry. The U.S. Army has
    partnered with the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and U.S. Special
    Operations Command (USSOCOM) representatives since the former
    Secretary of Defense directed the transfer of the CCLTF to the
    U.S. Army in March 2020, culminating in a 1-star general
    officer/flag officer steering committee. Going forward, the
    CCLTF will operate as a U.S. Army-led cross-functional team,
    with joint governance maintained through the U.S. Army-USMC-
    USSOCOM Tri-Service Chairs under the direction of the Secretary
    of the Army, with reporting requirements to the Secretary of
    Defense. This effort is critical to accomplishing our strategic
    priorities, minimizing casualties, and increasing combat
    effectiveness; particularly among SOF personnel who often
    operate in remote, austere, and hostile environments. My team
    continues to engage directly with the CCLTF to develop,
    evaluate, and recommend improvements to SOF and other squad-
    level close-combat formations to ensure an advantage in close
    combat. Maintaining an appropriately resourced and effective
    cross-functional team ensures that innovative and tailored
    technology is fielded to meet these warfighter-unique
    requirements.

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Now, let me recognize Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Ranking Member
    Inhofe.
        It is great to have these great public servants before us.
    General Nakasone, I would like to begin with you. First, just
    congratulations. I just have been so impressed with the work of
    Cyber Command over my time on this Committee both, in the 2018
    election cycle and the 2020 election cycle, I think that you
    have just done a magnificent job and I just wanted to state
    that up front.
        Here is a concern that I have. I am on the foreign
    relations committee and I am the chairman of the subcommittee
    that oversees the Western Hemisphere. We had a hearing
    yesterday on sort of democracy backsliding in the Western
    Hemisphere, and one of the areas of concern is that the next
    two years, 2021 and 2022 are kind of, I think one of the
    witnesses described it as sort of an avalanche of elections or
    a tsunami of elections in Central and South America in nations
    where we are partners.
        I spoke to the Colombian ambassador to the United States
    recently and he talked about increasing cyberattacks that they
    are suffering to delegitimize elections, to promote chaos and
    division. Most of these cyberattacks seem to emanate from
    Venezuela, from probably Cuban or Russian actors in Venezuela,
    and other nations in the region that are aligned with the
    United States, are seeing the same thing. The Colombian
    ambassador to the United States asked if SOUTHCOM and CYBERCOM
    could be of assistance in this significant wave of elections in
    the next couple of years.
        I wanted to ask you, we had our posture hearing with
    SOUTHCOM last week, what are you doing or what might Cyber
    Command do, together with SOUTHCOM, to try to help our allies
    in the region, avoid this escalating trend of disinformation
    that destabilizes democratic elections?
        General Nakasone. Senator, let me begin by, first of all,
    thanking the Committee. What you refer to our successes in 2018
    and 2020 are based upon the work that this Committee did in the
    fiscal year 2019 NDAA to identify cyber as a traditional
    military activity. That allowed us to operate outside of our
    networks. It allowed us to do things like hunt-forward
    operations, of which, we did 11 hunt-forward operations in nine
    different countries for the security of the 2020 election.
        In terms of working with Admiral Faller and SOUTHCOM, both
    the admiral and I have discussed a series of countries that are
    coming up. We have worked together to identify teams that can
    assist these countries to provide advice. We know a lot about
    what our adversaries are doing in terms of influence and
    interference when it comes to elections. So, we want to make
    sure that we share that with our allies as well.
        Senator Kaine. I think the U.S. has played a good role.
    United States European Command (EUCOM) has played a good role
    with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European
    nations with, you know, cyber defense. It is often centered in
    Estonia, a great center there of cyber defense, and I hope that
    we might explore what we can do in the Americas, as well. Thank
    you for that.
        Senator Shaheen asked some questions about war powers that
    we have to grapple with and I am going to have one question for
    each, General Nakasone and General Clarke.
        In the War Powers Resolution, basically, it requires, and
    there is some confusion and some good faith argument about the
    legality of portions of the 1974 War Powers Resolution, but it
    requires notice from the administration to Congress when the
    U.S. military is engaged in hostilities or situations that can
    lead to hostilities.
        One of the things I have noticed on the Committee is over
    time, even recently, we will get a notice letter from the
    administration, for example, about the strikes that were
    carried out in Syria. If my memory is not playing tricks on me,
    I don't believe we have ever gotten a notice letter about a
    cyber, an offensive cyber action carried out by Cyber Command.
        Am I right about that?
        General Nakasone. So, we do have a very strict
    congressional notification that we do adhere to. I think we had
    just recently had published a congressional notification for
    the Committee. I will go back and check, though, just to make
    sure on that, Senator.
        Senator Kaine. Okay. It may be that it goes to some on
    intel or other committees and may not go to all the Members of
    this Committee, but I would like to explore that.
        Secondly, to General Clarke, the War Powers Resolution does
    have a reporting exception for deployments which relate solely
    to the supply, replacement, repair, or training of forces in a
    foreign nation. So, if we deploy forces to do those things,
    there is not a reporting requirement under the War Powers
    Resolution and yet sometimes those activities, as in the sad
    case of the loss of four servicemembers in Niger, I think it
    was in 2017, they can lead to military action and even loss of
    United States life, and that is something, again, I just think
    we need to grapple with.
        The notion of what hostilities are might be quite a bit
    different than it was in 1974 when Congress drafted the
    resolution and passed it, and it may require that we sort of
    get into what is the current nature of hostilities and warfare
    and grapple with that a bit.
        Last, I will just say to you, General Clarke, not a
    question, but thank you to you and Secretary Maier. The special
    forces community is a really important and valued portion of
    our commonwealth and we thank you for the work that you do.
        I will yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        I would like to recognize Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
        General Clarke, on January 20, President Biden and his
    national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, issued a derivative
    that withdrew authority to conduct certain military operations
    outside of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, from our combatant
    commanders and reserved it to the White House, itself.
        Has that affected Special Operations Command, or is that
    simply affecting our regional geographic combatant commands?
        General Clarke. Senator, I am aware of that, as it was
    reported in the open-source. I would respectfully submit or
    request that we talk about that in a closed hearing.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. It has been confirmed by the National
    Security Council on the record, but I understand the
    hesitation.
        Maybe I will ask Mr. Maier, do you know the problem that
    that decision was designed to solve, because it is not apparent
    to me what problem was raised by having combatant commanders or
    their subordinate commands make the decision to conduct
    military operations outside of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq.
    Let's just get down to brass tacks here, we are talking
    primarily, I think Yemen, Somalia, and the African Sahel.
        Mr. Maier. Senator, I think it is meant to be an initial
    review of this administration in the use of a series of
    different actions that, again, we should probably talk about it
    in closed session. But I think like a lot of the reviews that
    are underway, I already alluded to everybody on the Committee
    certainly knows about Afghanistan, Somalia, the posture
    hearings and reviews that are underway, those are all part of
    an overall series of looking at what has been done and whether
    this administration would continue to proceed with those.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. We will discuss it in the closed
    session. Again, this has been reported and confirmed by the
    National Security Council.
        To make a point, I will relay a story the past President
    told me. I don't think he will be offended if I share his
    thoughts. He said early in his administration, he was doing
    some reading late one night and he got a call from an action
    officer about approving a strike and his response was, well,
    what do they expect me to know about it? Don't they have some
    captain on the ground near this country that has been following
    this target and knows that this is a bad guy and that we should
    conduct this strike?
        I agree with that sentiment.
        General Clarke, I have the highest confidence in you and in
    General McKenzie in Central Command and General Townsend in
    Africa Command to know whether or not we should smoke a bad guy
    overseas. That doesn't need to be decided by civilians at the
    White House.
        General Clarke, I want to turn to Special Operations
    Command and something we discussed in our visit yesterday, and
    I just want you to elaborate for us on the record here.
        What specific changes in force design and capabilities do
    you believe are necessary to attain the force that you need to
    accomplish your mission going forward and what do you believe
    are the most pressing of those needs?
        General Clarke. Senator, in order for us to compete
    effectively in the future, we have to modernize both, our
    precision strike and ISR. We particularly have to look at data
    and data management so that the most specific requirements
    enabled at the tip of the spear where our operators are, so
    that they can quickly see and sense the battlefield that they
    may have to be fighting in, into the time of crisis.
        Then we also have to have encrypted and electronic warfare
    capabilities so that our forces that could be forward in a
    joint war-fighting capacity, reduce the probability for them to
    be targeted. So, we are looking at all of these, Senator.
        I, personally, changed our modernization priorities and
    restructured some of our funding to modernize those
    capabilities.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        General Nakasone, in the time we have remaining, I want to
    ask a question that may seem to be a boring bureaucratic matter
    to some people watching, but it is an important question that
    this Committee has addressed in the past and that the
    intelligence committee has addressed, as well, and that is the
    so-called dual-hat. In addition to being the commander of the
    Cyber Command, you are also the director of the National
    Security Agency; is that right?
        General Nakasone. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. That is the so-called dual-hat that you
    command this military combatant command and also that you run
    an intelligence agency.
        What do you think are the positive things that result from
    wearing that dual-hat?
        General Nakasone. Senator, over the past 3 years, what I
    have learned as being both, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command
    and the National Security Agency is that the ability for myself
    to operate in both roles provides the Nation, speed, agility,
    and flexible responses to adversaries that are increasingly
    modernizing, getting quicker, and getting more sophisticated.
        We operate in a domain that changes rapidly and this change
    is measured in weeks, perhaps months. Being able to rapidly
    react to that, as we have been able to prove in such things as
    securities of elections in 2018 and 2020, is empowered by that
    relationship.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. Thanks, gentlemen. I will see
    you in the closed session.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Let me now recognize Senator King via Webex.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Nakasone, a couple of quick questions about your
    staffing. Would it help, in terms of recruitment and retention
    if you had the authority, as part of this process, to forgive
    student loans, would that be a factor that you think might be
    effective in helping to retain and bring on the people that you
    need?
        General Nakasone. Senator, certainly, that would.
        The services have that power as they recruit talent for our
    force. We have utilized it also with our civilians, but that is
    one mechanism that we get feedback that is very attractive to
    our workforce.
        Senator King. The second specific question, we have had a
    real backup problem in the past with the security-clearance
    process. Is that improving or has that been a barrier?
        I have heard of people that just get so discouraged they
    move on even though they have been accepted for a position.
        General Nakasone. Senator, it has improved and it has
    improved significantly over the past couple of years. I applaud
    the work that has been done by the Department toward that, but
    even with that said, for those that operate at U.S. Cyber
    Command, it does require a full security investigation. So,
    there are times that there are a fraction of our workforce that
    takes longer than others.
        Senator King. I think that is something we have to continue
    to work on, because we don't want to lose good people who are
    making the commitment but can't set their lives aside for a
    year or more for that process to carry-forward.
        You used the term at one point, to change the subject, you
    used the term ``risk calculus.'' You have used the new
    authorities very effectively in the elections of 2018 and 2020
    in terms of defending forward and engaging with the adversaries
    in their systems.
        Has that had a deterrent effect that you have observed, do
    you believe that the adversaries are thinking twice about some
    of the things they may be planning against us because they know
    of the capacity that you have demonstrated?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I continue to see our
    adversaries operate rapidly in terms of being able to try to
    operate below the level of armed conflict. We have effectively
    gone from being a very static to a very active force, as you
    refer to, ``defend forward'', the Department's cyber strategy
    of 2018 and our instantiation at U.S. Cyber Command of
    persistent engagement, how do you both, enable your partners
    and act?
        We continue to do that. We are operating in a space where
    our adversaries are not going to stop. They are going to
    continue to look for ways to steal our intellectual property,
    to steal our identification, and to try to influence our
    populous.
        We, at the same time, have to be forward. We have to be
    operating, and we have to be engaged with our adversaries, and
    that is what has been my focus over the past couple of years.
        Senator King. Well, would you agree that we need to develop
    a cyber doctrine, if you will, of declared deterrences,
    because, as you say, they are going to continue to do this
    until they have a risk calculus that tells them that there will
    be a price to be paid that they are not willing to undertake.
        General Nakasone. So, certainly, Senator, the policymakers
    continue to look at this type of doctrine and I know that is
    being worked. From my perspective or my responsibilities, I am
    very, very focused on operationally how do we ensure that we
    can operate against these adversaries that continue to try to
    operate below the level of armed conflict.
        Senator King. I think there is one point that has been
    discussed repeatedly today that really bears a lot of policy
    discussion, and that is the gap that you have identified where
    you aren't able, either in Cyber Command or NSA, to operate
    within the United States, but our Vice President Harris have
    learned that if they can hop and use a server or an internet
    service provider (ISP) in the U.S., they can evade your
    surveillance, and then we have the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI), as you mentioned. We are dealing with the
    fundamental issue of protection of privacy.
        But would you agree that this is a serious issue?
        SolarWinds is a perfect example where they operated in this
    country for something like a year, 9 months to a year, and were
    picked up by the private sector, not by our services.
        So, I take it from your prior discussion, this is something
    we really need to focus upon; isn't that correct?
        General Nakasone. I do think we need to focus on it,
    Senator. The only alteration I would make to it, it is not
    necessarily that it is U.S. Cyber Command or the National
    Security Agency that needs to be doing this. I am saying that
    the Nation needs an ability to be able to see what is going on
    within the United States.
        Senator King. I agree. I am not saying that it is your job,
    necessarily, but what I am saying is this gap is an issue that
    we have to address and SolarWinds points it out.
        I think one other point, and my time is expired, but that
    needs to be emphasized is the relationship with the private
    sector. You have already mentioned that and that is something
    that we are going to be working on, I hope, in this session of
    Congress. That is a key part of cyber defense.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator King.
        Let me now recognize Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today and for
    your command teams and, as well, the men and women within your
    commands.
        General Clarke, certainly, our Special Operations Force is
    probably the most capable military element on the face of the
    planet, and as well, General Nakasone, the men and women within
    Cyber Command have proven essential to us over the past number
    of years. So, thank you very much for being here today.
        Mr. Maier, I appreciate the opportunity to sit down with
    you recently and discuss our SO/LIC forces. We think it is
    really important and General Clarke, as well. I will start the
    questioning with you. I appreciate you sitting down a couple of
    weeks ago and visiting about our shared commitment to the men
    and women of SOF, so thank you.
        Senator Inhofe and Senator Fischer touched a little upon
    some of the gray zone activities where our SOF covers down and
    we know how important that is. As we have seen counterterrorism
    actions in the past, and as we move to, you know, the near-peer
    competition under the guise of our National Defense Strategy,
    we understand there needs be a little shift, but if you can,
    just reinforce how important it is that we continue not only to
    adjust to that near-peer competition with our special
    operators, but also to continually focus on counterterrorism
    efforts.
        General Clarke. Senator Ernst, as you know, SOCOM has to
    enable the joint force in both, crisis, competition, and if
    necessary, conflict. In this space, there will remain that
    persistent threat and we have to prioritize towards that
    persistent threat and that would be groups like al Qaeda and
    ISIS.
        But there are SOCOM and SOF unique capabilities that can be
    used in competition that the rest of the joint force doesn't
    have, and that could be things like undersea, seabed warfare
    and only we provide, the strategic reconnaissance that our
    forces are extremely capable of. So, as we look at that
    competition area and as we look to modernize our force for the
    future, those are the specific capabilities that we will
    continue to work with this Committee to move forward on.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, sir.
        Just as a reminder to this Committee, as we are looking at
    potentially flat budget for DOD in the future, we just need to
    understand the role that SOF plays, that SOCOM has around the
    globe, and that we do get a lot of bang for our buck when it
    comes to the men and women within your command.
        You know quite well that my heart and soul is behind
    Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) and how important
    it is, and I know, sir, the fifth pillar of your command
    philosophy is health of the force, but we go back to the SOF
    truth that humans are more important than hardware. So, this is
    something that I have long been involved in.
        If you could, please explain a little bit about what your
    focusing on in the area of brain health.
        General Clarke. Thanks, Senator.
        I think it is important that the entire Committee
    understands when we started POTFF, we focused on the physical,
    our men and women who were physically wounded where you could
    see the wounds, and in the last couple of years, we have
    refocused those efforts towards cognitive and the
    psychological, as we saw suicides go up. But then we looked at
    the health of our force for 20 years of engaged combat, and now
    we have put more than 40 percent of our resources and our
    capability specifically to the brain health and the cognitive
    domain and the psychological domain to be able to ensure that
    our operators are both, physically and mentally capable. So, we
    baseline all of our operators with their cognitive piece, so if
    there are reductions in their capabilities, if they actually
    have some type of concussive event, we can then go back later.
    We are working with industry academia and even elements like
    the National Football League in this space so we can make sure
    that we take care of our operators.
        Senator Ernst. Right, and I think it is just important to
    stress that the investment into these activities is extremely
    important for, again, the preservation of our force. I have had
    the opportunity to visit a number of those types of activities
    in Coronado with Admiral Green a number of years ago, as we
    kind of dove into behavioral health activities, as well as
    spiritual activity is very important for our force, but then
    also the Tactical Human Optimization Rehabilitation and
    Reconditioning (THOR3) facilities that are available for our
    men and women of the force and making sure that they are
    physically strong and capable of what is expected of them by
    the American people.
        Again, I will continue advocating on behalf of SOCOM and I
    certainly appreciate your wonderful efforts.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Let me recognize Senator Blackburn, via Webex. Senator
    Blackburn?
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Clarke, thank you for the time and the conversation
    yesterday. We talked about 40 percent of SOCOM's forces are
    aligned to support the great power competition fight. That is a
    big increase. So, for the record today, I would like for you to
    talk about the resourcing standpoint of what do you need from
    this Committee in terms of authority; advocacy, what do you
    need to engage in near-peer competition from Beijing; and then
    let's talk a little bit about the posture that SOCOM has to
    counter these nefarious activities from the Chinese Communist
    Party (CCP) and where you are positioned there.
        I think you can really do more with a lower dollar amount
    than the regular force, so I would love to just get your
    comments for the record.
        General Clarke. Senator, thank you.
        You know, as pointed out, with about 2 percent of the
    Department of Defense budget, I think we are a very good return
    on our investment, with about 3 percent of the force.
        The continued resourcing, specifically, you know, for SOCOM
    so that we can modernize in this area, where we can provide
    unique capabilities for our forces is critical.
        We have to balance both, operations, readiness and
    modernization, and the continued support of this Committee
    remains critical.
        You specifically asked about our employment and our
    capacity at 40 percent. That is exactly right. We have, in
    fact, adjusted our forces to a sustainable presence against the
    persistent terrorist threats, while, at the same time,
    rebalancing those forces across the globe. Some of our
    competitors are now global threats and not necessarily specific
    to Europe or INDOPACOM, and so we continue to look at where our
    forces are located across the globe so they can counter, you
    know, those specific threats.
        Then the last thing I would hit in this area is the
    specific authority for our forces to conduct unconventional
    warfare in this space.
        While I can take specific points in closed session, that
    authority that allows us to work with partner forces to
    increase both, the resistance and resilience, working in the
    information space, is absolutely critical.
        So, Senator, thank you.
        Senator Blackburn. Yes, and we talked a little bit about
    the term that you and Admiral Davidson use about slowing down
    China's clock. I would like for you to hit just quickly on what
    that means and then what we have, what we can do with
    operations within that gray zone.
        General Clarke. Senator, as you are well aware, we
    established the joint task force, Indo-Pacific. It is the first
    task force that went and is actually west of the International
    Date Line that we developed with INDOPACOM to ensure that we
    work with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific. I think
    part and parcel of that is that that element is focused on the
    information operations so that China, who works very well in
    the space of creating false narratives and not always being up
    front with the messages that they send, that we actually are
    able to tamp down some of the disinformation that they
    continuously sew, and that is an important part to SOCOM and to
    CYBERCOM, is working in this information space.
        Senator Blackburn. With the time remaining, we talked a
    little bit about Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and the changes
    there and the comprehensive review from 2019. Where have you
    seen holistic improvement across the force and where would you
    like to continue to see improvement?
        General Clarke. Senator, through our comprehensive review,
    we have now ensured that by this year, all of or forces will be
    above a 2:1 deployment to dwell ratio. That will be the first
    time that that has happened since September 2001. We continue
    to strive toward meeting the 3:1 dwell ratio for all of our
    forces, and some of our forces already there and we will
    continue to strive in that.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, sir.
        General Clarke. Thank you.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blackburn.
        Before I recognize Senator Hawley, I will depart for the
    vote. Senator Inhofe will preside, and I will return, and we
    will switch off.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. It is good to see you
    again.
        General Nakasone, let me start with you. Many companies use
    Chinese hardware like printed circuit boards in their
    information systems they provide to the Department of Defense,
    including systems that are used to store and to transmit
    information. At the same time, DOD and others have warned that
    the Chinese Government might be able to tamper with these
    Chinese-made products in order to create cyber vulnerabilities
    that they can exploit and use against us.
        My question is, do you think it is important for the
    Department to at least know which systems contain Chinese-
    printed circuit boards so that it can address potential cyber
    vulnerabilities and contain any exposure or any danger that is
    identified?
        General Nakasone. Senator, in light of the recent
    SolarWinds intrusion, I think this is, as you point out, an
    area that we, as a Department, continue to look at very hard.
    There are procedures and processes that the Department utilizes
    to verify this, but I agree that this is an area that we have
    to obviously shine a light on in the future.
        Senator Hawley. Do you agree that further steps would be
    useful in order to identify vulnerabilities here and, as you
    just said, shine a light on this?
        General Nakasone. So, Senator, I am a person that every
    single day is worried about the vulnerabilities that our
    adversaries might exploit, so you can well-imagine that this is
    an area that I have a great deal of, you know, focus on right
    now.
        Senator Hawley. Good. Well, I look forward to working with
    you on that.
        General Clarke, let me come to you. The Baltic nations have
    spent some years honing their ability to conduct irregular
    warfare in the event that Moscow attempts to seize a Baltic
    territory, so it won't be able to hold it. It has become a key
    part of their deterrent strategy, as you know, in the Baltic
    region.
        What I am asking about this is, do you wonder, do you think
    that the Baltic model could be applied in Taiwan; in other
    words, would helping Taiwan improve its irregular warfare
    capabilities help it deter potential Chinese aggression?
        General Clarke. Senator, bottom line, yes.
        We have worked closely with the Baltics. I have met with
    every Baltic SOF commander personally and we have been engaged
    in the Baltics for a long time, but we also, and I can talk
    more specifically in closed hearing, we remain close with
    capabilities for Taiwan.
        Senator Hawley. Do you think that it would be helpful to us
    and should we be prioritizing helping Taiwan develop its
    irregular warfare capabilities?
        General Clarke. Yes, Senator, I do think we should help
    them.
        Senator Hawley. Let me, still with you, General Clarke, but
    switching topics. President Obama's former acting special
    representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan recently wrote
    that, and I am quoting now, for the long term, the United
    States will need a counterterrorism capability in that region
    that doesn't depend on a permanent United States military
    presence in Afghanistan, which I completely agree with.
        My question is, what options has SOCOM provided to the
    secretary to allow us to achieve counterterrorism objectives in
    Afghanistan without a permanent military presence in the
    country?
        General Clarke. Senator, we will always provide options. As
    you well know, al Qaeda and ISIS are not just in Afghanistan,
    but they are a global threat, and we will always provide the
    secretary and the Department and the National Command Authority
    with options so that if there is a threat, that we can actually
    deter or actually disrupt or defeat that threat.
        Senator Hawley. Specifically, you are saying, and we can
    discuss this more in closed session, as appropriate, but just
    to be clear, you are working on providing options to deal with
    the counterterrorism threat and with--for counterterrorism
    measures that do not rely on a permanent standing military
    presence in country; is that right?
        General Clarke. Senator, there has been no decision made
    for Afghanistan, so I think it would be, you know, a
    hypothetical to know what we are going to do at this time, but
    we will always provide options, you know, for the Department of
    Defense.
        Senator Hawley. Good. Well, I look forward to following up
    with you more on that.
        General Nakasone, I am going to come back to you here in my
    few remaining seconds. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) in
    their writings often refer to cyber capabilities as the
    strategic commanding heights of future warfare.
        I am wondering how the PLA's emphasis on information
    operations and maintaining the information advantage influences
    CYBERCOM strategy for detering China.
        General Nakasone. Senator, I think this whole discussion in
    terms of where our adversaries are going and in the influence
    spaces is among the most important areas that we are taking on
    at Cyber Command, and I know General Clarke is addressing at
    U.S. Special Operations Command.
        This is really the competition that we are involved with
    today where our adversaries are, again, trying to influence
    ourselves and our people through a number of different means.
    So, we have work ongoing today, ongoing both, in our commands
    and with other commands trying to address that, as well.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. I will look forward to following
    up with you on that, as well.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Kelly is recognized.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Senator.
        I understand that in January of 2020, nine combatant
    commanders, including you, General Clarke, sent the letter to
    the Director of National Intelligence requesting more
    assistance from the intelligence community in being able to
    publicly illuminate, malign influence, and coercive activities
    by China and Russia.
        So, to all the witnesses, starting with General Clarke,
    what, if anything, has been done in response to this request
    from the nine combatant commanders?
        General Clarke. Senator, from that request, SOCOM, with the
    other combatant commanders, continues to look specifically in
    the information space and where we can best effect to provide
    capacity against our adversaries. I think that specific memo
    led to some sort of concurrence requirements being lifted for
    the Department.
        Senator Kelly. In your view, would the illumination of
    these malign activities help to dissuade or deter China and
    Russia?
        General Clarke. Senator, at this point, I cannot point to
    specific deterrents or detraction of that. I would tell you we
    would continue to look, but I think it is most important that
    we continue to develop the capacity required to work in the
    information space.
        Senator Kelly. General Nakasone?
        General Nakasone. Senator, to your second point there, I
    think that is a really important question. In terms of what our
    adversaries are doing today, our most effective response is
    being able to respond to what they are doing. We have a number
    of different ways upon which we respond. Sometimes we respond
    to other means of the power in our government, whether or not
    it be diplomatic or sanctions or other ways, but I think it
    begins with the idea that we are competition right now and our
    adversaries are operating below the level of armed conflict in
    a matter of trying to influence us.
        Senator Kelly. But in downgrading the classification of
    this intelligence, is that helpful in meeting the goal of
    dissuading more aggressive action from China or Russia?
        General Nakasone. I think we have to think broader than
    that, Senator. I think that it is more than just writing to
    release or perhaps even downgrading.
        It is as General Clarke alluded to, there are other means
    upon which we gather intelligence these days. How do we take
    the best tools, the best techniques, not only from our
    Government, from also from the private sector, to look at what
    is occurring and being able to shine that spotlight.
        I think a lot of times we look and just say, hey, we will
    simply go ahead and downgrade intelligence and provide that
    rapidly. Sometimes the better answer is, okay, where are the
    other streams of information, how can we use that most
    effectively with an audience.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, General.
        To Mr. Maier, so, Section 1202 of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
    sought to provide a new tool to counter these challenges by
    authorizing the Secretary of Defense to provide support to
    regular forces, the regular forces, and individuals supporting
    U.S. special forces, but that irregular warfare operation part,
    last year's NDAA raised the annual cap on funding for this
    authority from ten to $15 million.
        Mr. Maier, how would you characterize the demand for this
    authority across the geographic combatant commands?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, that is a, I think, a very important
    tool we have that we haven't yet talked about in the great
    power competition. The demand is high. It takes some time, as
    you can understand, to build those partnerships to be able to
    operate in that partnership-driven approach.
        We view this very much as the successful 127 Echo or the
    1208 program, where there is a crawl, walk, run element to it,
    and I think that started very small. As the progress, and in
    many respects, the high return on investment in terms of
    dollars and deployments in dwell and impact started to become
    apparent to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), and
    became more and more in demand, we see a similar model for
    1202, sir.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, good to see you again. Thanks for all your work.
        General, let me start with you. General Clarke, how are you
    feeling, with regard to the resources that you have for your
    no-fail mission, you have a lot of no-fail missions, but your
    Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD) mission that SOCOM
    was, a couple of years ago, given that mission, as well. It is
    not like you didn't have a lot of missions on your plate. That
    is a big one.
        A number of us, myself, in particular, were concerned that
    the Special Operations Command does a lot of things right,
    really well, but being given the lead on that one was a whole
    other area that is really, really important, but also needs
    resources. Are you resourced enough for that mission?
        That is a mission that, of course, there is no doubt, you
    can't fail on.
        General Clarke. Senator, the bottom line is we do have
    sufficient resources to do that. The resources from United
    States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), that had that coordinating
    authority for C-WMD were moved from STRATCOM over to SOCOM. I
    will continue to assess if additional resources are required
    going forward, but as you point out, the WMD threat is
    something that we must pay continuous attention to, because if
    we don't, we do it at our own peril.
        Senator Sullivan. As I know you know, and you and I have
    discussed this, we are reorienting. I think it is the
    appropriate orientation for our military and national security
    to great power competition with China as a rising threat, but
    the WMD threat continues regardless of great power competition
    and that could be from violent extremist organizations, which
    clearly want to get their hands on that. It could be from North
    Korea, who is a well-known proliferator. Pakistan.
        Are there any areas, in particular, that you are focused
    on, as it relates to the Counter-WMD that is not in the
    headlines, but we should be sure we are focused on here, as
    well?
        General Clarke. Senator, one thing that we put some strong
    recommendations for is that is ensuring that our joint forces
    actually train to work in a contested environment, so that our
    adversary is well aware that they will be denied the benefit of
    use of these capabilities. That deterrent principle, I think is
    critical.
        As you and I discussed yesterday, there are those that
    would like to wish this problem away, but we don't think we can
    and we have to be prepared for its potential use.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another issue, which I think
    this Committee is very focused on.
        You know, the SOCOM enterprise, our Special Operations
    Forces have been very focused, appropriately, Post-9/11 in the
    Middle East. They have done a great job, a heroic job. Many
    have lost their lives in their service to their country.
        How are we starting the transition from the focus there,
    which we still need to do, but we need to also start focusing
    on China and the Asia Pacific and the INDOPACOM region. Are we
    doing enough there? Do we have enough experience with special
    operators?
        It is a very different battlefield, as you know. It is
    probably less kill and capture and more gray zone operations.
    What is your thinking on that, General?
        General Clarke. Senator, this is going back to the future
    for SOF. Many of our forces were regionally aligned prior to 9/
    11 that had both, the cultural and language understandings and
    now as we have actually reduced forces in the places that you
    have named, some of these forces are going back to where they
    do have that understanding and those capabilities.
        So, we have aligned, in one case, I think important for the
    employment of our forces, but I think the second and really key
    aspect from a SOCOM perspective is that we have actually
    reallocated our budget for the modernization towards the
    capabilities that are required. So, I have adjusted 14 percent
    of my budget in modernization towards great power competition
    for those unique SOF capabilities.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. That is good to hear.
        General Nakasone, I just want to compliment you, sir. I
    think you have been doing a phenomenal job. You probably don't
    get complimented enough because you can't talk about what you
    do, but in my own experience here, I am just starting my second
    term in the Senate, there was a hearing that I really remember
    in 2015, 2016. It was the Cyber Command. It was some of the
    others who were, I called us the cyber punching bag of the
    world. The witnesses admitted that we don't retaliate when we
    are attacked from a cyber perspective.
        I don't think we are the cyber punching bag of the world
    anymore and I think it is because of your work. You can't talk
    about a lot of that work, but can you just let the American
    people know that whether it is on elections or other
    cyberattacks, we are not just taking blows; we are going on
    offense, we are preemptive. I think it is really important for
    people to know that.
        That was not the posture 5 years ago. We were just getting
    pummeled and we wouldn't do anything about it. Can you talk a
    little bit about that, to the extent that you can, in an
    unclassified session.
        General Nakasone. Senator, I appreciate the question and,
    importantly, I appreciate the support of this Committee,
    because as I was mentioning, really, 2018 was a watershed year
    for us, as we had looked at the future to a midterm election
    and knowing that we did not want to experience what we had
    experienced two years previously, the ability for this
    Committee to pass the NDAA that year that allowed us to operate
    outside of our networks, cyber as a traditional military
    activity. Moved us from being a static to an active force.
        This idea of persistent engagement, always being involved
    with your adversaries, whether or not you are enabling our
    partners or acting against our adversaries is critical in
    underlying to our support in 2018, 2020, and today.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Let me now recognize Senator Duckworth via Webex.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I do join my colleague, the senator from Alaska, in his
    admiration for the work that we have done, especially under
    your leadership, General Nakasone.
        General Clarke, I appreciate our call yesterday and I
    wanted to express my support for Special Operations Command's
    diversity and inclusion strategic plan. As we discussed on our
    call, bringing more people from diverse backgrounds into the
    Special Operations community will make it stronger. By infusing
    teams with different ideas and perspectives and enabling them
    to engage more effectively around the world.
        I agree with you that greater diversity in the Special
    Operations community is an operational imperative. That is why
    I sponsored the ELITE Act in last year's NDAA to identify and
    remove barriers to underrepresented groups' participation in
    elite communities of the Armed Forces.
        I am glad to see that you have taken on the challenge of
    increasing diversity and inclusion in Special Operations
    Command and it is an important first step in strengthening our
    military, and I really look forward to working together with
    you on this issue in the future.
        My first question, I believe that being able to tap into
    the full talent of every perspective of our population makes
    our military stronger. I also believe that in order to build
    the most capable military possible, we need to capitalize on
    the natural advantage of our National Guard and Reserve forces,
    namely, that those servicemembers are highly trained in their
    civilian jobs, as well as their military jobs.
        If we viewed this as a strength, we can benefit from the
    expertise that our Guardsmen and Reservists bring from civilian
    life, especially infuse in fields that require advanced
    technical skills like cyber.
        General Nakasone, can you please describe how the National
    Guard and Reservists like members of the Illinois National
    Guard who are currently working the 176th Cyber Protection Team
    are contributing to your mission at U.S. Cyber Command.
        General Nakasone. Senator, thank you, and thank you for the
    question. The 176th Cyber Protection Team is a team well-known
    to us at U.S. Cyber Command. They mobilized, came on Active
    Duty, and did a tremendous job in protecting our
    infrastructure, the actual capabilities, upon which we utilize
    every single day to engage our adversaries, led by, you know,
    Major Jaime Marlock, who is the Cyber Protection Team leader.
        Really, it starts at the top with the Illinois National
    Guard, in general, Brigadier General Neely, who has been
    instrumental in being out front, being very supportive of our
    efforts, and I think key to your point, attracting those that
    leave Active Duty service and continue to want to serve. So,
    the 176th is a great example of our partnership with the Guard.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        How will increasing National Guard and Reserve components
    participation in cyber operations improve our national
    readiness and capacity to combat cyberattacks and how can
    Congress support this effort to increase the Reserve forces
    participation in our cyber activities?
        General Nakasone. Senator, if I might use just an example,
    and I would say it is from the state of Connecticut. As we were
    operating with the Connecticut National Guard in the early fall
    of 2020, on the 2nd of September, Connecticut faced a
    ransomware attack on their public school systems. Operating
    with the Connecticut National Guard, they provided us
    information via a capability that we called a Cyber 9-Line.
    That is utilizing a common ID card, being able to obviously
    share that and unclassified with us back at U.S. Cyber Command,
    we could use the power that we have at U.S. Cyber Command and
    at the National Security Agency to look at this malware and to
    rapidly provide assistance.
        But at the end of the day, it was the Connecticut National
    Guard that did the work and, you know, taking an ability to
    look at a situation where your school has been shut down
    because of ransomware and then in a matter of days, being able
    to bring that back up, I think it shows the power of the Guard
    and the power of the partnership between the private and the
    public sector.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        When I think of complex cyber missions, I do think, in
    particular, about the challenges that U.S. Transportation
    Command faces in securing its network and safeguarding
    sensitive information about our troops, our capabilities, and
    our postures, and movement plans while also working with
    numerous commercial partners, whether it is ocean-going or
    within the aviation community.
        General Nakasone, please describe your current work with
    U.S. Transportation Command and explain why it is important
    that Congress fully resource and support this and future
    initiatives like it.
        General Nakasone. Transportation Command is really a unique
    capability for our Nation. It provides us global logistics. We
    are perhaps the only nation that can do that so readily and so
    well.
        Under General Lyons' leadership at U.S. Transportation
    Command, he approached us and said, hey, we operate primarily
    off of the private sector with unclassified networks. How can
    you help?
        There has been a partnership ongoing for the past year and
    a half where both, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Cyber
    Command, and the National Security Agency have taken a look at,
    how do we improve that public-private partnership, how do we
    ensure the security of the data that is being transmitted, and
    then, also, how do we look to the future?
        Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        I am out of time.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
        Let me recognize Senator Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for being here today. General
    Nakasone, Space Force has already taken great steps in
    advancing U.S. national security. In order to provide the
    effectiveness needed, it is going to continue to need a strong
    backing from our cyber intelligence community.
        What role will the cyber mission force and CYBERCOM play in
    Space Force?
        General Nakasone. Senator, it has been an early and active
    role already. General Dickinson has been out to U.S. Cyber
    Command to talk about how do we secure the networks upon which
    he operates. How do we work, obviously, as we take a look at
    our overhead constellation, what are the threats that
    USSPACECOM is going to approach in the future, and so, we have
    been actively engaged with him over a period of several months
    to identify those.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        General Clarke, section 922 of the 2017 NDAA, which was
    signed into law by President Obama, made clear that the
    administrative chain of command for the Special Operations
    community runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense,
    to ASD SO/LIC, and then to you, the SOCOM commander.
        Prior to conducting congressional engagements, do you
    obtain approval from ASD SO/LIC?
        General Clarke. The secretary, we work very closely with
    ASD SO/LIC in that administrative chain of command for
    oversight, particularly for our budget, and acquisition.
        Mr. Maier and his predecessors provide that oversight. But
    it also clear that my chain of command, and Secretary Austin
    made this very clear to me, that my chain of command as a
    combatant commander runs from the Secretary of Defense to the
    President.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        That is kind of my next question. Do you support the
    implementation of the law and, specifically, ASD SO/LIC's
    absolute control over administrative matters, such as
    legislative engagements, budgetary resource decisions,
    acquisitions, public affairs, personnel, legal accountability,
    and other related authorities held by the traditional military
    service?
        General Clarke. Senator, what I believe is a key role for
    ASD SO/LIC is actually to be an advocate for SOCOM within the
    Department. So, when decisions are made about services and
    service budgets and service personnel decisions, I think ASD
    SO/LIC in the room to be able to be that advocate for us, to
    me, is the most important aspect that ASD SO/LIC can do for
    SOCOM.
        It goes back to the old adage if you aren't at the table,
    you become the lunch, and having ASD SO/LIC in and at that
    table, which has occurred, has been very helpful.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        Mr. Maier, I noted a moment ago the law mandates that the
    administrative chain of command for SOCOM passes from the
    President to Secretary of Defense, ASD SO/LIC, SOCOM commander.
    In light of the clear chain of command, have you met with the
    Secretary of administrative matters related to SOCOM?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, yes, I have, and I participate in the
    Secretary's regular service secretary meetings. I also
    participate, or my staff participate, in the series of
    governance meetings that the Deputy Secretary runs in order to
    do, just as was already said by General Clarke, to both
    advocate, but for the administrative chain of command.
        We are responsible for both, setting direction and ensuring
    execution and implementation, consistent with the law.
        Senator Tuberville. How often do you all meet, do you
    think?
        Mr. Maier. The service secretaries meet at least twice a
    month. Obviously, a new administration, so a different series
    of meetings, but every day, sir, there are meetings that I am
    representing ASD SO/LIC in that service secretary-like hat with
    the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or their direct reports.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        Thank you for your service.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to each of our witnesses here today.
        Mr. Maier, in General Clarke's words, if I may use your
    words here, General Clarke, they are good words, he says SOF,
    quote, strengthens alliances and creates diplomatic options.
        These strategic effects ultimately, clearly begin with
    actions undertaken by people in those areas. It is our number-
    one assets.
        I would like to hear from you how you are modernizing
    professional development in a way that really reflects this
    very unique role of your personnel, how you are basically
    bridging the gap between direct action and working in an
    embassy across the span of training and education, a very
    obviously complex set of skills that are necessary.
        Specifically, my question is, how are you broadening mid-
    level SOF leaders and how much of that focus is on senior-
    enlisted personnel?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, that is a very important part of this
    pivot, as we described it from being able to still do the
    counterterrorism missions that we have been involved in for the
    last, really, generation to be able to do that both, and then
    be competitive at that level below armed conflict.
        A critical component of that, as we have talked about
    already, is not only the ability to speak languages and really
    engage at the right level of cultural awareness, with not only
    the adversaries, but also those third parties, third countries
    that those adversaries are attempting to influence.
        A lot of that happens in the information space, social
    media, as we know. So, a critical component of a professional
    military education, but even more specifically, the operational
    imperatives that we have to evolve that force. This is the key
    part of this.
        It was alluded already at the opening statement of General
    Clarke, that over 50,000 members of Special Operations Command
    are enlisted members. That is where the rubber meets the road.
    These individuals, especially in the SOF world, are often
    called upon to do things well above what their conventional
    counterparts, whether that is operating embassies,
    participating on interagency teams, or engaging with partners.
    So, we see that as really the crux of progress and where we are
    going to be successful in this great power fight.
        Senator Peters. So, Mr. Maier, does the SOCOM talent
    management then emphasize regional experience, is that
    something that you are really seeking out and trying to develop
    further?
        Mr. Maier. Senator, yes, sir, and I think, specifically,
    evolving to those great power concerns, we often forget at
    times that a lot of what we have been doing over the last years
    in the counterterrorism fight was really focused on fairly
    narrow set of adversaries. So, I think as we look more broadly
    and diversely at the adversaries we are going to confront, and
    in some cases, more importantly, those entities that they are
    trying to influence, it is important for us to be able to
    engage in those languages with that cultural awareness.
        Senator Peters. Yeah, absolutely. Well, that is good to
    hear.
        General Nakasone, on Tuesday, I asked Admiral Aquilino how
    he plans to align security assistance in INDOPACOM with the
    nature of our competition with China and Russia and if he
    believes that security assistance should include cybersecurity
    assistance to help our partners protect their critical
    infrastructure or enhance their resilience against information
    warfare.
        My question to you, sir, is, do you believe that security
    assistance to partner nations should include cybersecurity and
    information warfare measures, first off, and second, do you
    believe we should pursue these types of relationships outside
    of the traditional Five Eyes nations that we have talked about
    mostly?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I believe that in terms of the
    theater engagement that you discuss right there, our most
    effective means is to begin with the discussion with the
    combatant commander. So, if confirmed, we will look forward to
    obviously working very closely with Admiral Aquilino.
        I do take your point on the idea of a broader partnership.
    We do need broader partnerships. We have tremendous
    relationships with our Five Eyes. It is a critical capability
    that we have as a nation, but we are also looking at how do we
    expand those partnerships to bring a degree of competitive
    advantage against our adversaries in the future.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for your service, all three of our witnesses
    today.
        General Nakasone, I appreciated our discussion before this
    hearing about the contributions of the National Guard in
    Connecticut and you were mentioning them in your testimony.
    Across the country, the National Guard have really been
    integral to many of our cyber efforts. Before this last
    election, the Connecticut National Guard, in particular, was a
    really invaluable resource to many local officials in
    preventing cyberattacks and taking action to deter them, and
    then more recently, as you know and we discussed it, the
    National Guard was an immense resource to Connecticut in
    responding to ransomware attacks against Hartford schools and
    in preparing for responses to particular attacks, but also,
    again, detering them.
        I am also very expedited about the grant that the
    University of New Haven received to train more National Guard
    members on cybersecurity skills under Project Ironclad. Not
    only will the University of New Haven help us train more
    cybersecurity talent in New Haven and Connecticut, but it could
    also help create a national pipeline to recruit and retain the
    expertise in our country that we so desperately need.
        Could you explain how the University of New Haven's Project
    Ironclad training program fits with our need for more
    cybersecurity talent.
        General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator, but let me take a
    step back and just talk a little bit about the work of the
    Connecticut National Guard, because I think that in my previous
    statement, I wasn't specific enough on how big a deal this was.
        So, if you think about it, a ransomware, and as I
    indicated, ransomware on the 2nd of September that is impacting
    the school system, but it is also impacting fire, and police,
    and emergency medical services. Think about that, if you are
    losing that from a capability within your community,
    Connecticut National Guard, 24 hours, working with us at U.S.
    Cyber Command and National Security Agency, utilizing a
    capability called the Cyber 9-Line where they are able to
    leverage our expertise back at Fort Meade, and then being able
    to deal with the problem.
        This is the Connecticut National Guard though that is
    solving the problem. They are just getting a bit of assistance
    from us. That is a huge deal and I think it is really a great
    exemplar of how powerful the National Guard can be not only in
    a situation like this, but also, I want to point out the work
    that they did during the 2020 election in ensuring its success.
        Also, most importantly, and I don't think it is well-known,
    their work with the Department of Homeland Security in ensuring
    the security of Operation Warp Speed, our ability to bring a
    vaccine for COVID-19 to the American populous. This is the work
    that the National Guard has done over the past 9 months and I
    think it is critical.
        In terms of New Haven, this is really a great news story
    and being able to, again, generate interest, generating
    context, generating an ability for those that have, you know, a
    desire, a knowledge, an inkling of what they want to do in the
    future and bringing them with the capability to train and then
    being exposed to cyber for the future.
        Senator Blumenthal. I think that your points are so well
    taken. Our National Guard has been such a critical resource in
    Connecticut in the elections, in countering ransomware, in
    building the kind of intellectual infrastructure that we need.
    As I remarked to you in our conversation, the National Guard
    draws on the expertise of citizen soldiers who are in civilian
    jobs involving information technology (IT). They are experts in
    major corporations and they are providing their expertise now
    to not only our Nation's military, through the National Guard,
    but also to civilian election officials, to local education
    efforts to deter ransomware, and I think your point about the
    University of New Haven is so well taken, the Ironclad project
    offers tremendous promise of recruiting, training, and
    retaining the talent that we need in our military, as well as
    in our civilian lives for cybersecurity and cybersecurity is
    our future.
        I thank you for the work that you are doing and that you
    are encouraging and promoting by the National Guard. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Now via Webex, let me recognize Senator Rosen.
        I thank Senator Kelly for his patience.
        Senator Rosen?
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed.
        Thank you to our witnesses for your service and, of course,
    always for being here today.
        As a former computer programmer, I am interested in
    learning how DOD's cyber strategy can really strengthen our
    Nation's ability to withstand and respond to cyberattacks.
        I would also like to recognize today, the role that Nellis
    Air Force Base plays in supporting SOCOM mission in the
    battlefield. It is really, really important and I am proud of
    our men and women there at Nellis Air Force Base.
        But I want to talk about information warfare. Despite an
    unprecedented level of foreign influence campaigns, we know
    they are targeting the United States and other democracies. We
    lack a clear strategy to combat information warfare.
        As the National Security Strategy makes clear, our
    autocratic adversaries are using aggressive, aggressive
    information warfare tactics to interfere in our democratic
    elections around the world, exploit the pandemic, and erode
    trust in the rules-based international order.
        So, General Nakasone, and then General Clarke, what is the
    appropriate role for the military to play in this environment
    of heightened information warfare?
        General Nakasone. Senator, I think the appropriate role is
    the role that we have begun playing since 2018, which is the
    perspective of how do we defend forward. The idea of operating
    outside of the United States, being able to both, enable our
    partners with information and act when authorized.
        This is an active approach to our adversaries. It has been
    most effective, as we have seen, with the 2018 and 2020
    elections with adversaries attempting to influence us,
    attempting to interfere, but not being able to do that. That is
    based upon the strategy of defend forward and the instantiation
    of persistent engagement. That is the start of it.
        As I mentioned earlier today, I also think there is a
    broader piece that is being worked right now by the
    administration in terms of how do we improve the further
    resilience of the United States as we look at adversaries
    continuing to avoid our laws and policies and try to use our
    own infrastructure in their own attempts.
        This is a continual effort that we have to be at. This is
    not going to be episodic. This is something that U.S. Cyber
    Command and the other combatant commands need to continue to
    work at.
        Senator Rosen. So, perhaps, General Clarke, you can speak
    to this. I want to add one more thing to this question now that
    you talk about defend forward.
        How do we deter our adversaries' cyber aggression by
    changing their cost-benefit analysis? How do we make it not
    worth their while to attack us and what policies are we doing
    there? When you speak about defend forward, isn't that part of
    this equation, too?
        General Clarke. Senator, you raised a great point.
        Number one, I think we have to work closely with our
    Department of State and other agencies in this space. Number
    two is that while General Nakasone talks about forces forward,
    which I agree with, we also have SOCOM forces for it that are
    absolutely the MISO [Military Information Support Operations]
    professionals that work closely with the embassies and with
    foreign partners, and that ties this ecosystem of forward all
    the way back to the capabilities and capacities that exist in
    the U.S.
        I think by working closely with those partners to ensure
    that our adversaries or competitors are not getting that free
    pass and to recognize what is truth from fiction and continue
    to highlight that through using our intel communities is
    critical.
        General Nakasone. Senator, if I might add on to that, to
    your point with regards to imposing costs, this is not just the
    Department of Defense. As General Clarke rightly points out,
    this is a Whole-of-Government effort. This is what the power of
    Treasury brings to it, the Federal Bureau of Investigations,
    Justice, Department of Homeland Security. This is the lesson
    that we have learned is that we have to operate together,
    because the partnership is where the power is.
        Senator Rosen. Well, that is great.
        I want to continue on that. We do have a Cyber Strategy. We
    have had a lot of cyber espionage.
        How often should our cyber strategy be updated to reflect
    current threats and the current challenges? How often do you
    envision that we need to do that in order to stay relevant?
        If it is 2 years old, 3 years old, it is not being
    responsive, and so I was wondering what you think would be
    appropriate for these kinds of cyber strategy reports to be
    updated.
        General Nakasone. So, we have an interim National Security
    Strategy guidance that is out, that the administration has put
    out, that has been very effective for us to start our guideline
    with it. It talks about cybersecurity as a key enabler in that.
    That is an important piece of what our Nation needs to do.
        Senator Rosen. Yeah, but actual threats, how do we let
    people stay up to date on actual threats?
        General Nakasone. Obviously, that is through the continuing
    dialogue in terms of what our intelligence community is talking
    about, obviously, what our Government is talking about, and
    also, really importantly, what the private sector is talking
    about, because they are seeing so many of these threats,
    Senator.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I believe my time has expired,
    Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and
    thank you for your testimony today.
        This will conclude the open portion of the hearing. We will
    reconvene in SCV-217 as quickly as possible.
        Thank you very much, again. The open hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
             civilian oversight of u.s. special operations command
        1. Senator Reed. General Clarke, at the hearing, you stated, ``What
    I believe is a key role for [the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict] (ASD SO/LIC) is actually to
    be an advocate for [Special Operations Command] (SOCOM), you know,
    within the department, and so when decisions are made about services
    and service budgets and service personnel decisions, having ASD SO/LIC
    in the room to be able to be that advocate for us, to me is the most
    important aspect that ASD SO/LIC can do for SOCOM.'' Do you also
    support the ASD SO/LIC's role as the ``service secretary-like''
    civilian responsible for the oversight of SOCOM? If so, why?
        General Clarke. I absolutely support the intent of Congress for
    civilian oversight of USSOCOM from across the Department, including
    from the ASD(SO/LIC) for those Special Operations-peculiar
    administrative matters relating to the organizing, training, and
    equipping of Special Operations Forces (SOF).
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                      department of defense cyber strategy
        2. Senator Rosen. General Nakasone, to address the challenge of
    establishing deterrence in cyberspace, the Department of Defense's
    (DOD) 2018 Cyber Strategy outlined the ``defend forward'' approach--
    meaning identifying our adversaries' cyber campaigns early on and
    engaging in offensive operations to disrupt the attacker's
    infrastructure. How often should U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) be
    assessing DOD network vulnerabilities to ensure that fixes have been
    made in a timely and adequate fashion?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        3. Senator Rosen. General Nakasone, the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy
    calls for retaining the current cyber workforce and finding talented
    new people to recruit. Legislation that I introduced authorizing a
    Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps science, technology,
    engineering, math, and cyber program was included in last year's
    National Defense Authorization Act. More needs to be done if we are to
    remain competitive on the global stage. Would you support the
    establishment of a civilian cybersecurity reserve to cultivate a
    qualified cyber workforce that supports the DOD mission?
        General Nakasone. Although that is a question for policy makers, I
    support any national initiatives that better leverage existing cyber
    talent in defense of the Nation or contribute to the expansion and
    further development of the Nation's cyber workforce. A talented cyber
    workforce is essential to maintaining our competitive edge and our
    Government should be proactive in its development.

                        cyber collaboration with allies
        4. Senator Rosen. General Nakasone, our allies are essential to
    enhancing U.S. cybersecurity. We rely on our partners to conduct threat
    hunting, enable early warning, and harden our collective defenses. How
    are you collaborating with our allies to use their unique cyber
    capabilities to support our military cyber operations, and use those
    capabilities to our collective advantage?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        5. Senator Rosen. General Nakasone, how will you enhance
    information-sharing and cooperation with NATO partners to prevent,
    mitigate and recover from cyberattacks?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                               illicit drug trade
        6. Senator Rosen. Mr. Maier and General Clarke, through the illicit
    drug trade, transnational criminal organizations are fueling
    instability in the Western Hemisphere by crippling the rule of law
    through corruption, eroding good governance, and hindering economic
    development, which also can serve as root causes of migration in the
    region. To counter these threats, I am curious what more U.S. Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM) can do to counter the illegal drug trade.
    What are the largest gaps in U.S. efforts to reduce the foreign supply
    of illicit drugs, and does SOCOM have the adequate resources to
    effectively supplement present interdiction operations?
        Mr. Maier. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) supports U.S.
    law enforcement partners' efforts to interdict illicit drugs, disrupt
    the flow of illicit revenue to criminal networks, and counter other
    forms of transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere,
    including human trafficking and smuggling and illicit mining. USSOCOM
    provides this support by use of the Department of Defense's counterdrug
    authorities and appropriated funds for such purposes. In addition to
    providing intelligence analysis support to U.S. law enforcement
    partners to illuminate illicit threat networks, U.S. special operations
    forces regularly support U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S.
    Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) efforts in the region by conducting
    training of, or alongside, partner-nation units that are responsible
    for combatting drug trafficking and transnational organized crime that
    fuel violence and instability in the region.
        USSOCOM is currently resourced appropriately to continue providing
    intelligence analysis and other support in the Western Hemisphere.
    However, I want to highlight that Section 1022 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, which authorizes USSOCOM's
    counterdrug-funded support to counter terrorism and other forms of
    transnational organized crime, is set to expire at the end of fiscal
    year 2022, if not reauthorized before then.
        General Clarke. USSOCOM assists in countering illegal drug trade by
    providing analytical support to U.S. law enforcement (LE) agencies
    through U.S.C. title 10 sect 284(b). Within USSOCOM, Counter Threat
    Finance (CTF) analytical resources can shift from supporting current
    National Defense Strategy threats to countering drug trafficking
    organizations, if directed.

        7. Senator Rosen. General Clarke, can you describe how cooperation
    with our partner nations supports our mission to weaken transnational
    criminal organizations? How can we increase the interoperability with
    our partner nations?
        General Clarke. USSOCOM supports respective Geographic Combatant
    Command Theater Campaign Plans to include approved Security Cooperation
    and Security Force Assistance activities (Sec. 333) with our partner
    nations. These activities promote interoperability with partner nations
    and increase their institutional capability and capacity to weaken
    transnational organized crime. Through support to law enforcement
    (Sec. 284), combined training (Sec. 321/322), and continued and
    enhanced focus on regional interoperability and institutional capacity
    building (Sec. 332), USSOCOM assists in enabling our partners to
    identify, generate, lead and sustain operations, in coordination with
    U.S. Forces, regional partners, or unilaterally.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                            hunt forward operations
        8. Senator Inhofe. General Nakasone, how do ``Hunt Forward''
    Operations complement cooperation with our allies and partners?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        9. Senator Inhofe. General Nakasone, how are these operations
    aligned with the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and European Deterrence
    Initiative?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                                     china
        10. Senator Cotton. General Nakasone, when you appeared before this
    Committee in 2019 you said that you saw Artificial Intelligence as a
    critical enabler of CYBERCOM operations and there should be no doubt
    that our competitors also recognize the importance of Artificial
    Intelligence for their own military use. Can you describe how the
    People's Liberation Army is currently militarizing Artificial
    Intelligence and Machine Learning, and explain any significant areas we
    are already lagging behind China in those technologies?
        General Nakasone. As Commander of USCYBERCOM, I would defer to the
    Intelligence Community's China and AI experts to provide specific
    answers to this question. However, speed, agility, and the ability to
    adapt rapidly are critical to operational effectiveness in cyberspace.
    China's advances in AI are therefore a significant concern.

        11. Senator Cotton. General Nakasone, China has historically been
    willing to sell military technology, which in the future will include
    artificial intelligence (AI) and AI-enabled weapons, to state actors
    with authoritarian aspirations and to non-state actors with anti-
    American views such as ISIS. What potential issues do you see the
    United States having to contend with from a national security
    perspective over the next decade, both strategically and ethically?
        General Nakasone. Although I must defer to those elements of the
    Department of Defense more closely involved with threat assessment,
    policy development and acquisition of autonomous weapons, I do see this
    as a significant area of interest, particularly when U.S. cyber
    capabilities could be employed as a remediating response.

        12. Senator Cotton. General Nakasone, the Chinese military (PLA)
    currently recognizes several areas where it lags behind the US, two of
    which are technical expertise and semiconductor manufacturing. As the
    Chinese Communist Party shores-up these capability gaps, how big a risk
    is it to the United States that the industrial base providing us with
    the most advanced semiconductor technology is located within range of
    PLA weapons?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        13. Senator Cotton. General Nakasone, China has declared their
    desire to become the World's leader in AI by the year 2030. What would
    that mean for the United States' future should Beijing surpass our own
    abilities to develop, field, and responsibly control the use of AI?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                              commercial industry
        The recent Sunburst and Hafnium hacks have exposed programs that
    are clearly operating in a seam in between commercial and governmental
    networks and property. We know you have made major progress sharing
    with commercial industry.
        14. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, what more can be done, and
    what legislation is needed, to make sharing with the commercial
    industry more effective?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                  capabilities
        15. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, do you need more human
    capital to execute your mission?
        General Nakasone. Yes, the strategic environment has changed since
    the Cyber Mission Force was designed in 2012. In summer 2020,
    USCYBERCOM conducted a force growth study as part of the Secretary of
    Defense Combatant Command Review. The Command has made recommendations
    for.force growth, which were approved by the Department of Defense.
    Specific details can be released after the President's Budget is
    approved.

        16. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, if so, how many more people
    would you need in order to meet your operational goals?
        General Nakasone. Yes, the strategic environment has changed since
    the Cyber Mission Force was designed in 2012. In summer 2020,
    USCYBERCOM conducted a force growth study as part of the Secretary of
    Defense Combatant Command Review. The Command has made recommendations
    for force growth, which were approved by the Department of Defense.
    Specific details can be released after the President's Budget is
    approved.

        17. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, what avenues do you recommend
    we pursue to get you more long-term forces to execute your missions?
        General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM and the Services have made progress in
    recruiting and retaining the talent we need to deliver joint force
    objectives for the Nation. At this time, we are moving forward to
    source and field additional teams as approved in the Department's 2020
    Combatant Command Review.

        18. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, some suggest that ``cyber vs
    cyber'' actions do not work. What do you say to that?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        19. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, if we refrain from acting in
    a ``cyber vs cyber'' framework to disincentive these behaviors, what do
    you think we should be doing?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

        20. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, how do you see the balance
    between collection opportunities in cyberspace and the need to use
    cyberspace for defensive or deterrent activity?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                             persistent engagement
        The Cyber Strategy lays out an ambitious vision for the Cyber
    National Mission Force in particular: disrupting adversary
    cyberattacks, providing indication and warning to potential targets at
    home, and engaging with adversaries below the level of armed conflict
    on a daily basis.
        21. Senator Tillis. General Nakasone, nation state actors are
    becoming bolder and more destructive within cyberspace. What do you see
    as the right strategy to stop these acts?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
           special operations command as a model for the joint force
        22. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, I understand that the JAIC
    and SOCOM are working together to deliver AI-enabled predictive
    maintenance capabilities. Can you describe that partnership, and
    whether it has proven effective?
        General Clarke. USSOCOM and the JAIC formed the USSOCOM Incubator
    in fiscal year 2019 consisting of technical experts from the teams at
    the JAIC Joint Logistics Mission Initiative and the 160th Special
    Operations Regiment's (SOAR) Digital Integrated Maintenance Environment
    (DIME). The USSOCOM Incubator enables rapid development of AI-enabled
    capabilities in an agile environment where warfighters and developers
    work collaboratively together.
        The USSOCOM Incubator orchestrates testing, evaluation,
    operationalization, and retraining of AI-enabled capabilities, as well
    as developing extensive Technical Solutions documents in support of a
    broader playbook within the DOD for AI development. The Work Unit Code
    (WUC) Corrector is an example of a powerful AI capability that uses
    Natural Language Processing (NLP) to analyze user-generated text within
    maintenance records to assign an appropriate WUC to each record. More
    than 3 million records have been processed by the WUC Corrector and
    routed through the reliability business intelligence (BI) tools,
    focusing engineering services to the highest priority issues.
        Additionally, the Model at the Edge (MaTE) Kit is designed for
    units operating in locations with limited bandwidth networks for all
    communications. The MaTE Kit was developed as an ``all-in-one''
    solution to enable AI and analytics at the edge, including moving large
    aviation maintenance data sets across a network. The MaTE Kit is a
    specialized laptop computer running the required processes and services
    to conduct data collection, processing, storage, prediction, and a
    visualization of the AI-enabled predictions in a custom browser-based
    user interface. This capability provides leadership with near real-time
    predictions to make timely maintenance decisions that decrease
    maintenance downtime, while increasing both capital efficiency and
    aircraft readiness. The MaTE Kit was developed to support current AI
    models and future AI-enabled capability development. All processes and
    services within the MaTE Kit are government-owned and developed by
    USSOCOM.

        23. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, as a proof of concept, do
    you think this is something that could be applied to the joint force?
        General Clarke. Yes. The predictive maintenance partnership between
    USSOCOM and the JAIC demonstrates the value of collaboration to solve
    complex problems that are designed to scale. The capabilities developed
    to address maintenance challenges at the 160th SOAR have numerous
    applications and both USSOCOM and the JAIC are committed to scaling
    these capabilities to the larger joint enterprise.
        The JAIC selected the MH-60 platform as the initial focus area for
    predictive maintenance because variations of that platform are used
    extensively across USSOCOM, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Coast Guard.
    The software and models developed for USSOCOM's MH-60 are just one
    example of joint proofs-of-concept with potential to scale across the
    global DOD Enterprise. Internally, USSOCOM is already leveraging some
    of these scalable AI-enabled capabilities within Air Force Special
    Operations Command to develop software and models applied to the CV-22
    aircraft while concurrently exploring similar capabilities for ground,
    sea, and surface vehicles.
        USSOCOM and the JAIC are also pursuing transition from the USSOCOM
    Incubator at the 160th SOAR to a production ready, globally scalable
    AI-enabled capability available to the entire Department. The intent of
    the USSOCOM Incubator is to rapidly develop AI-enabled capabilities
    that scale in a joint environment. The Technical Solutions documents
    serve to guide other DOD organizations down the path to a successful
    predictive maintenance program.

        24. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, how do you see AI predictive
    maintenance applications changing the role of asset management within
    some of our technical and man-hour intensive platforms?
        General Clarke. Asset management across the Department will
    transform significantly through the broad application of predictive
    applications. Maintenance issues on our technical and man-hour
    intensive platforms are often more reactive than predictive, at times
    resulting in significant costs to repair and impacts to downtime.
    Simply following a prescribed schedule of maintenance based on time is
    no longer sufficient. The more effectively and accurately USSOCOM can
    leverage data, analytics, and AI-enabled capabilities, the greater the
    opportunity to minimize expenditure and increase readiness. Predictive
    maintenance is becoming an integral part of USSOCOM's asset management
    strategy, especially for complex and technically intensive platforms
    where repairs are cheaper and faster when identified earlier than when
    a part or system had already failed.
     special operations command talent retention and work force development
        25. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, do those personnel that
    comprise ``non-SOF support'' generally receive SOF-specific training to
    enable them to perform their support role? What about pay and
    entitlement incentives that exceed what their conventional force
    counterparts?
        General Clarke. USSOCOM ``non-SOF support'' personnel receive SOF-
    specific training tailored to support various SOF missions in their
    respective units and based on their assignments. Additionally, these
    members may receive monetary compensation beyond their conventional
    force counterparts depending on assignment location. A few examples are
    in U.S. Army Special Operations Command and Air Force Special
    Operations Command, where qualified ``non-SOF support'' NCOs receive
    Special Duty Assignment Pay or reenlistment bonuses based assignment
    location, and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, where
    Specialty Operator Capability Specialists receive $150 in Assignment
    Pay based on their role on the tactical team.

        26. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, when recycled back into the
    conventional forces after their SOCOM tour is done, do you believe
    these types of personnel are inclined to remain in service and why?
        General Clarke. USSOCOM nor its Service Components have the ability
    to determine whether personnel returning to conventional forces are
    inclined to remain in service. However, we encourage all who have
    served in the Special Operations enterprise to continue to serve our
    Nation and to share and employ the skills they have acquired during
    their tenure with USSOCOM.
               unconventional warfare in great power competition
        27. Senator Blackburn. General Clarke, does SOCOM have the
    resources and authorities necessary to pursue the application of
    unconventional warfare measures in countering China?
        General Clarke. USSOCOM has the forces and authorities available to
    conduct congressionally funded and authorized operations such as 1202
    projects, Section 333 Security Cooperation / Build Partner Capacity
    efforts, and some Military Information Support Operations initiatives.
    However, most of our operations conducted by SOF are funded through
    USSOCOM Major Force Program-11. As far as the authorities to apply
    unconventional warfare measures are concerned, I assess USSOCOM has the
    needed authorities to operate within the recently released Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance and current National Defense
    Strategy guidelines. USSOCOM would require the commensurate authority
    to expand our efforts should the environment change to allow expanded
    measures in countering China.
      assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity
                                    conflict
        28. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Maier and General Clarke, what have been
    the effects of ASD SO/LIC serving in a ``service secretary-like'' role?
        Mr. Maier. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) provides oversight
    of the SOF enterprise through the administrative chain of command for
    USSOCOM. ASD(SO/LIC) oversight has been particularly important in
    addressing complex challenges related to special operations forces
    (SOF) personnel and the development, resourcing, and sustainment of
    SOF-unique capabilities. Senior civilian leadership that is outside a
    uniformed chain of command provides an independent voice to the
    Secretary of Defense, with DOD senior leadership in the Pentagon, and
    with USSOCOM leadership and staff.
        Since the Secretariat for Special Operations was established in
    2018, the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) has deepened its relationship with
    USSOCOM at all levels and has made progress in gaining membership in
    senior Departmental policymaking bodies, including participation in the
    bi-weekly Military Department Secretary meeting with the Secretary of
    Defense. The Department is currently updating relevant guidance
    regarding ASD(SO/LIC)'s oversight and management of SOF-related
    administrative matters, through which the office reports directly to
    the Secretary of Defense as a Principal Staff Assistant, and ASD(SO/
    LIC)'s role as a policy advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy and to the Secretary of Defense for special operations,
    counterterrorism, and irregular warfare matters.
        These efforts strengthen the authorities of the office of ASD(SO/
    LIC) and help ensure civilian oversight of the most critical issues
    facing the SOF enterprise, including diversity and inclusion within the
    SOF community, SOF culture and ethics, and investments in technologies
    and capabilities that will enhance our ability to compete more
    effectively with great-power adversaries and conduct counterterrorism
    operations more sustainably.
        General Clarke. The inclusion of ASD(SO/LIC) allows SOF equities to
    maintain readiness and ensure SOF is linked with the Joint Force in
    support of national strategic objectives. ASD(SO/LIC)'s voice in the
    development of national defense strategic guidance will ensure the
    inclusion of SOF's unique capabilities as part of the Joint Force.
    Likewise, ASD(SO/LIC)'s participation in Service-level fora on the
    Department's priorities for countering extremism, prevention of sexual
    harassment and assault, and diversity and inclusion enhance USSOCOM's
    actions in these areas. Longer-term, I foresee enhanced readiness of
    SOF with ASD(SO/LIC)'s inclusion in Department-level fora discussing
    joint capabilities given SOF's reliance on the Services as partners in
    developing our unique organizations, training, and equipping.
                            critical infrastructure
        29. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what exercises and
    activities do you assess to be most important to the success of the
    Guard's provision of cybersecurity assistance?
        General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM conducts extensive exercises to
    prepare for Total Force support to civil authorities and responses to
    cyber incidents of national consequence. For example, USCYBERCOM has
    partnered with the National Guard in a broad span of exercises--Cyber
    Flag, Cyber Guard, and Cyber Shield--for almost a decade. Such
    exercises are designed to ensure the cyber Total Force, both Active
    Duty and National Guard, are trained to the same standard, able to
    share best practices, and are prepared to work in mutual support and
    collaboration in defense of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
    USCYBERCOM also sets the training standards and has leveraged the
    National Guard in critical real-world missions, such as securing
    critical cyber infrastructure and defending the 2020 elections from
    foreign interference.

        30. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, in what way could the DOD
    better develop common architectures, tool suites, and practices for the
    National Guard and Cyber Mission Forces to provide cybersecurity
    assistance to critical infrastructure companies?
        General Nakasone. USCYBERCOM is focused on ensuring that forces
    across the Total Force are interoperable. Active duty and Reserve
    Component Cyber Protection Teams operate within similar mission
    platforms and with similar tool suites. Additionally, we also worked
    with the National Guard Bureau to create a mechanism that enable Guard
    units to share information about cyber incidents quickly, easily, and
    uniformly (the Cyber 9-line). We work in conjunction with sector-
    specific agencies to understand requirements and prepare for responses
    to appropriate requests for support to civil authorities when required.
                                defense forward
        31. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what good is CYBERCOM's
    Cyber National Mission Force doing for the private sector?
        General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                  afghanistan
        32. Senator Hawley. General Clarke, since you took command in March
    2019, has SOCOM provided the Secretary of Defense with options for
    pursuing United States counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan
    following the withdrawal of all United States and Coalition forces from
    Afghanistan, including in the event of Afghan state collapse?
        General Clarke. USSOCOM is a supporting command to United States
    Central Command (USCENTCOM) for the conflict in Afghanistan, and
    USSOCOM would assist Commander, USCENTCOM to provide options to the
    SECDEF. USSOCOM has worked and continues to work closely with the Joint
    Staff, OSD, Interagency and fellow Combatant Commanders to develop
    United States counterterrorism options in Afghanistan post-withdrawal
    of all United States and Coalition forces.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND
                      UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Manchin,
    Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
    Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn,
    Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
        This morning, the Committee will receive testimony from
    General Wolters, Commander, United States European Command
    (EUCOM), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and General Lyons,
    Commander, United States Transportation Command, TRANSCOM.
        Thank you both for the many decades of military service and
    please extend our appreciation to the men and women serving
    under your command.
        General Lyons, this is likely your last hearing before the
    Committee and on behalf of my colleagues, I want to thank you,
    and your family, for a lifetime of dedication and service to
    the Nation, which continues with your son, who is now a cadet
    at West Point. So, the tradition goes forward. Thank you.
        The security challenges in the EUCOM area of responsibility
    grow more complex each year. Russia continues to subvert the
    rules-based international order, including using military force
    to intimidate and coerce its neighbors and to undermine their
    sovereignty. Russia is also engaged in an ongoing hybrid
    warfare campaign just below the threshold of conflict that
    would provoke a military response, including disinformation
    campaigns targeting democratic processes and formenting
    discourse, extensive cyber espionage efforts, and the continued
    use of proxy groups to further Russian interests in numerous
    countries around the world. Combating the Russian hybrid threat
    requires a whole-of-government effort.
        General Wolters, I will be interested to hear your views on
    the military means required as part of that whole-of-government
    effort, as well as what support we can provide our allies and
    partners as they seek to counter Russian malign influence.
        Last week EUCOM raised its watch condition level in Ukraine
    from ``possible crisis'' to ``potential imminent crisis'' in
    response to significant Russian military activity in Ukraine
    and across Europe. The Committee will benefit from your
    assessment of the current security situation and an update on
    EUCOM's engagements with partners and allies in response to the
    Ukrainian situation.
        Consistent with the 2018 National Defense Strategy, EUCOM
    continues to refine the operational concepts, plans, and
    programs necessary to counter Russia in the strategic
    competition that defines this theater. The United States must
    ensure a combat-credible military deterrent against Russia's
    ambitions to threaten the sovereignty of our allies and
    partners.
        General Wolters, the Committee would like to hear your
    views on the posture and investments necessary to attain and
    maintain deterrence.
        Turning to TRANSCOM, the men and women of TRANSCOM perform
    duties that sustain the whole of the Department of Defense, in
    protecting our Nation's security. With the competitive edge in
    its ability to deploy and sustain America's armed forces,
    TRANSCOM provides Department of Defense (DOD) with unique
    capabilities that we have come to expect and, perhaps too
    frequently, take for granted. TRANSCOM forces are busy
    supporting all of the combatant commanders every day, and
    without them, the United States would be at a significant
    disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
        General Lyons, last year you were adamant about retaining
    air fueling capability because you felt that TRANSCOM was at
    the minimum acceptable levels for meeting peacetime demand for
    tanker capacity. This year, I understand the Air Mobility
    Command believes that TRANSCOM can rely on some contribution of
    the KC-46 tankers, even though the KC-46 is not able to conduct
    unrestricted operations. I would be interested in any
    information you can share on this situation.
        Our global transportation capability, owned or managed by
    TRANSCOM, has been one of our asymmetric advantages for many
    years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries
    will allow us free rein in this area in the future. Two years
    ago, the Committee decided that the Department needed to
    continue the analytical effort to identify requirements because
    the studies presented at that time did not reflect
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy. General Lyons,
    perhaps you could give us an update on where TRANSCOM stands in
    updating this analysis.
        General Lyons, you have initiated a program to contract out
    management of the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) that
    handles the movement of household goods for DOD.
        Under this plan, a contractor team would be responsible for
    issuing contracts to individual movers and carriers, rather
    than the U.S Government.
        After a competition last year, TRANSCOM awarded the
    contract, but the losing bidders protested the award, and
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) upheld the protest.
    General Lyons, I would be interested in hearing about the
    status of this program.
        Finally, TRANSCOM also faces a unique set of cyber threats
    because of the command's extensive work with private-sector
    entities in the transportation and shipping industries. General
    Lyons, the Committee would appreciate an update on TRANSCOM's
    effort to improve its cybersecurity posture.
        Again, thank you both again for being here this morning,
    and I look forward to your testimony.
        Before I turn it over to Senator Inhofe, I would just note,
    for my colleagues, that there will be an informal classified
    briefing immediately following this session in the Senate
    Security Building Office in the Capitol.
        Senator Inhofe, please?

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would just acknowledge both of our witnesses as very good
    friends and I would say to General Lyons, it is not too late to
    change your mind.
        As stated, many times before, this Committee's top priority
    is to ensure the effective implementation of the NDS, the
    National Defense Strategy, which focuses on China and Russia as
    the primary threats to our national security.
        That means that we have to ensure that our combatant
    commands have what they need to address the challenges in this
    strategic competition. We are going to be talking about that
    with both of our witnesses, and you have got to be really, and
    I am sure you will be, very straightforward with some of the
    reductions that, as I see, are not going to be desirable.
        I want to highlight that Russia's recent activities
    regarding Ukraine are very concerning. At the same time, Russia
    and Chinese threats are converging in Europe with an ever-more
    aggressive China seeking influence and threatening security
    through the economic coercion.
        These growing threats, there are three that highlight the
    value of our 2018 NDS and, secondly, they illustrate why we
    should not be reducing defense spending, and, thirdly,
    demonstrate the critical need for more advanced capabilities
    like the F-35, to deter Russia, particularly since there have
    been some controversy over that from some of the leadership of
    this administration.
        TRANSCOM is focused on a full-spectrum mobility operations
    to meet requirements needed to combat both, Russia and China,
    as well as support any other global engagements, from training
    to force projection to forward deployed forces.
        I encouraged to hear the administration's voice's strong
    support for NATO, but, you know, the rhetoric is easy. We want
    to make sure we have the resources to support those statements
    that are being made.
        General Wolters, I look forward to hearing about the
    priorities for the European Deterrence Initiative and where
    else we need to bolster our defenses to address threats you see
    growing every day.
        General Lyons, I would like to know the status of our
    refueling capability that the chairman has always addressed, as
    well as, he has addressed the global household goods contacts.
    We have some specific questions about that.
        Finally, whether this morning or in our classified session,
    I would like to hear from both of you as to how this contested
    environment impacts mobility operations.
        General Lyons, you have been a friend for a long time, and
    as I said, it is not too late.
        Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Now, let me recognize General Wolters for your opening
    statement.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL TOD D. WOLTERS, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
      STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
                    SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

        General Wolters. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, on behalf of the men,
    women, and families who serve the Nation in the Euro-Atlantic,
    we want to thank you one more time for your steadfast support.
    It remains a privilege to serve alongside these patriots and
    our like-minded allies and partners.
        It is great to be lying abreast with our distinguished
    USTRANSCOM commander, General Steve Lyons. He has led with
    distinction for the last 2\1/2\ years in his capacity and over
    the last year, he has been pivotal in not allowing the pandemic
    to transform into a security crisis, and we thank him for his
    blood, sweat, and tears to the Nation.
        We would also like to pass our condolences to those
    impacted by COVID-19. The battle against the virus continues
    and we must remain vigilant.
        We are fully aligned with Secretary Austin's priorities to
    defend the Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through
    teamwork. Via NATO, we work closely with our allies and
    partners to address the evolving challenges posed by our
    adversaries to secure peace, and protect our interests abroad.
    NATO remains the strategic center of gravity and the foundation
    of deterrence and assurance in Europe.
        Everything we do is about generating peace. We compete to
    win. We deter, and if deterrence fails, we are prepared to
    respond to aggression with the full weight of the Transatlantic
    Alliance.
        The United States' relationships with European allies and
    partners remains a key, strategic advantage and we must defend
    it. We live in an increasingly complex and contested world.
    Political uncertainty, energy competition, and diffusion of
    disruptive technology are stressing the established rules-based
    international order. Threats and challengers seek to take
    advantage of these conditions through aggressive action using
    all instruments of national power and they are backed by
    increasingly capable military forces. Adversaries amplify these
    malign activities and foster instability with disinformation.
        Success in 21st century warfare demands that we embrace
    competition and all of its associated activities below the
    level of armed conflict. This is actually as critical as our
    preparation for crisis or conflict, themselves. We are in an
    era of strategic competition and winning in this era is all
    about ensuring that strategic competition does not morph into a
    global conflict.
        One notable example of operations, activities, and
    investments contributing to competition and deterrence, it is
    our robust exercise program. This summer, when we execute our
    Defender series exercises, composed of USEUCOM's Defender
    Europe, and NATO's steadfast defender, 30,000 United States
    servicemembers, allies, and partners from all warfare domains,
    will demonstrate their ability to lift and shift massive forces
    over large swaths of territory at speed, and at scale, from the
    Atlantic, to the eastern periphery of the European continent.
    Once our troopers are on station, they will sharpen their
    responsiveness, resiliency, and lethality.
        Our current security posture is strong, yet challenged, as
    evidenced by actions in the vicinity of Ukraine. We possess
    combat-credible capability across all domains: air, land, sea,
    space, and cyber. We will maintain and work to hone this
    capability to deter our adversaries and defensive partners in
    our interests.
        The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, coast
    guardsmen, and civilians of USEUCOM, appreciate your support to
    defend the Homeland forward and preserve peace for the one
    billion citizens living in the Euro-Atlantic.
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, thank you, again, for
    this opportunity, and I look forward to fielding your
    questions.
        [The prepared of General Wolters follows:]

     Prepared Statement by General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force
        Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the dedicated men, women,
    and their families preserving peace in the European theater, it is an
    honor to testify before you today a second time as United States
    European Command (USEUCOM) Commander. It is a privilege to continue to
    serve alongside our dedicated patriots in a mission essential to
    national security. Their selfless service and determined commitment is
    an inspiration. Together, with likeminded allies and partners, our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, guardians, and
    civilians work tirelessly to deliver peace and secure the United
    States' interests.
        For the last eight decades, many European nations have been key
    allies and partners for the United States and today they collectively
    serve as exporters of global peace and security. The interim National
    Security Strategy articulates how a free, and prosperous Europe,
    defended by Allied nations and a credible North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) Alliance, remains foundational to our security in a
    competitive geopolitical environment. USEUCOM aligns operations,
    activities, and investments to meet the challenges of Strategic
    Competition with Russia and the People's Republic of China. Through our
    strategy, we compete for long-term sustainable advantage, deter attacks
    from potential aggressors, and prepare our Allies and Partners to
    respond decisively. Standing alongside our Allies and Partners, USEUCOM
    remains ready, should deterrence fail, to fight now and win. We value
    the collaborative work across the Joint Force to implement this
    strategy and express gratitude for continued Congressional interest and
    support.
        In Europe, political uncertainty, energy competition, malign
    activity, and the global pandemic stress the rules-based international
    order and strain European states' resources. Strategic competitors seek
    to exploit these conditions using all instruments of their national
    power to gain advantage and create instability. This nexus challenges
    national governments and multi-national institutions like NATO and the
    European Union (EU). To address these issues, USEUCOM strategy
    prioritizes supporting NATO's deterrence and defense of the Euro-
    Atlantic United States global operations.
        Risks and Challenges in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
        The USEUCOM AOR encompasses 51 countries and territories, including
    Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. It contains significant
    maritime domains, encompassing the Arctic Region, the North and Central
    Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea. COVID-19 has presented challenges
    for nations across the globe, including those in Europe, and our
    deepest condolences are offered to all those impacted by this pandemic.
    In USEUCOM, we continue working diligently alongside Allies and
    Partners to ensure this health crisis does not become a security
    crisis. Thus far, our collective team has been successful, and we are
    buoyed through recent developments in vaccine production and
    distribution across the USEUCOM AOR.
                                     russia
        Russia's nuclear arsenal and strike capability provides Russia an
    opportunity to remain an enduring, existential threat to the United
    States, our Allies, and our Partners. A central concern is Russia's
    non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile and the Kremlin's potential to
    use these weapons in crisis or conflict. President Biden agreed with
    President Putin to conduct a Strategic Stability Dialogue, which will
    allow the United States to raise our concerns about Russia's nuclear
    forces and doctrine. Beneath this threshold, Russia engages in malign
    activities across the globe, attempting to create instability,
    undermining the rules-based international order, and failing to meet
    obligations under international agreements. These activities continue
    despite widespread international condemnation and economic sanctions.
    Russian President Vladimir Putin and his regime's coercive and
    aggressive policies suggest Russian leadership will take risks to
    maintain power, counter Western influence, and seize international
    opportunities to increase the perception of Russia as a great power.
        Russia seeks to maintain a sphere of influence by retaining and
    employing capabilities above and below the level of armed conflict to
    coerce neighboring sovereign nations and fracture its responsibilities
    under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and retains an
    active presence on sovereign soil in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia
    against the will of those countries. To support their efforts at
    political subversion and economic intimidation, Russia employs
    unconventional tools, ranging from disinformation campaigns, malicious
    cyber activities, and the use of private military companies. These
    tools support a range of semi-covert, malign actions to intimidate,
    weaken, and divide our Allies and Partners in the European theater and
    beyond. By probing Western response thresholds to expand the space
    below the level of armed conflict, Russian leadership habitually risks
    misinterpreting warnings and creating unintended escalation.
        Over the past decade, Russia consistently remained among the
    world's top five military spenders. Despite a forecasted decrease in
    Russian Gross Domestic Product due to the pandemic, Russia will
    continue its military modernization efforts. These robust capabilities
    and modernized forces have been displayed during operations in Ukraine,
    Syria, and Libya. As a result, the Kremlin has growing confidence in
    its military leadership and menu of hybrid, conventional, strategic,
    and non-strategic nuclear capabilities needed to underwrite its 21st
    century security approach. Today, Russia underpins its military force
    posture with Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), cyber and
    electronic warfare systems, counter-space, and long-range precision
    fires capabilities; all critical to seizing and maintaining the
    initiative across the competition to conflict spectrum.
                        people's republic of china (prc)
        The PRC's aggressive economic and diplomatic activities in the
    USEUCOM AOR signal Beijing's desire to build influence in Europe and
    challenge the established rules-based international order with an
    alternative model. Beijing pursues economic leverage over targeted
    nations through bilateral deals to build infrastructure, and secures
    agreements to its advantage in global trade and market access. Chinese
    foreign direct investment and government-backed business ventures
    provide Beijing an avenue to assert influence at the expense of
    enduring United States, Allied, and Partner interests. Seventeen
    Central and Eastern European nations participate in the China-led, 17+1
    Cooperation Framework though there are indications that participants
    are more skeptical about its merits. Many European countries, including
    the 17+1, take part in China's One Belt One Road Initiative.
        The PRC is focused on seizing the ``high ground'' in critical and
    emerging technology sectors with military application, including
    Artificial Intelligence, advanced robotics, quantum technologies, and
    hypersonics. In addition, the PRC's efforts to expand 5G networks into
    Europe through state-backed firms like Huawei and ZTE pose security
    risks. These networks place intellectual property, sensitive
    technology, and private personal information at heightened risk of
    acquisition and exploitation by the Chinese Government. This ongoing
    initiative, coupled with China's growing interest and investment in
    European ports and critical infrastructure, complicates steady state
    and contingency operations. We articulate this risk to our European
    defense counterparts and highlight shared values, interests, and
    equitable business practices that distinguish the United States as a
    partner of choice. European nations are becoming increasingly aware of,
    and concerned about, the risks associated with Chinese capital and
    investment from the PRC. We must hold the PRC accountable for its
    predatory and unfair practices and make sure that our technologies are
    not facilitating the PRC's military buildup or human rights abuses.
                             poland and the baltics
        Poland and the Baltics remain a strategic focal point. For NATO,
    this region remains at risk of Russian aggression based on historical
    grievances and geographic position. Polish and Baltic geopolitical
    alignment with the West reminds the Kremlin of its limited sphere of
    control, isolation of its Kaliningrad exclave, and NATO's appeal to
    regional states. The Kremlin considers the Baltic's ethnic Russian
    population as justification for intervention. Russia actively targets
    this population with extensive propaganda and malign influence
    operations, while also conducting cyber operations to weaken Alliance
    resolve. Because Russian forces in the Western Military District and
    Kaliningrad hold a geographic and numerical advantage over regional
    NATO forces, it is critical that timely indications and warnings are
    available to position combat-capable forces to deter and, if deterrence
    fails, blunt attack.
        Regional Allies continue to demonstrate their commitment to
    collective defense. Enhanced Forward Presence bolsters NATO's posture
    in the east with four multinational battle groups in Estonia, Latvia,
    Lithuania, and Poland. NATO air and missile defense forces reinforce
    collective security and stability through Baltic air policing
    operations and air defense exercises. Poland demonstrates resolve to
    meet Alliance commitments through defense budget increases, burden-
    sharing with the United States via the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
    Agreement, and ongoing modernization efforts, to include Patriot and F-
    35 weapon system acquisitions. Poland also hosts the United States
    Army's V Corps forward headquarters in Poznan, Poland, providing a
    needed level of command and control to synchronize United States Army,
    Allied, and Partner nation tactical formations operating in Europe.
                                black sea region
    Ukraine
        Following the purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and
    its proxies continue to undermine Ukrainian defense, economic, and
    political sectors, attempting to pull Ukraine back into the Kremlin's
    sphere of influence and obstruct its integration with Western
    institutions. The ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, instigated by
    Russia, continues to destabilize Ukrainian security. Ceasefire
    violations occur often despite the established Minsk agreements. Russia
    continues to subvert the Ukrainian Government through malicious cyber
    activities, supports illegitimate elections in Eastern Ukraine, and
    remains postured for the use of force in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.
    Contrary to Russia's intent, these coercive actions energize Ukrainian
    society and reinforce aspirations to membership in Euro-Atlantic
    institutions. Ukraine continues to fight corruption and enact defense
    reform to meet conditionality requirements associated with the Ukraine
    Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).
    Turkey
        Despite political tensions and disagreements, Turkey remains a
    strategic United States Ally, critical to NATO and United States
    interests in Europe, Eurasia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Turkey
    possesses the second largest military in NATO and borders a volatile
    region. In addition to hosting thousands of United States personnel at
    sites across Turkey, the Turkish Armed Forces contribute to NATO
    missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the Mediterranean Sea. United
    States forces in Turkey also support NATO ballistic missile defense and
    facilitate regional counter-terrorism operations.
        Ankara continues to view the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), the
    Democratic Union Party (PYD), and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as
    security threats. United States support for the SDF remains an area of
    difficulty in our bilateral security relationship. Turkey's purchase of
    the Russian produced S-400 air defense system ended Turkey's F-35
    acquisition, further integration into NATO's IAMD Command and Control
    network, and resulted in sanctions for conducting significant
    transactions with Russia's defense industry through the Countering
    America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
        However, Turkey retains a pivotal role in countering Russia.
    Ankara's relationship with Moscow remains competitive and
    transactional, with Turkish engagement often aimed at constraining
    Russian behavior. Both nations view the Black Sea region within their
    natural spheres of influence, and each continues to oppose the other in
    Libya. Turkey can best counter Russia through bilateral cooperation
    with the United States and multilateral cooperation with NATO.
                                 south caucasus
        The Kremlin exerts influence over South Caucasus countries through
    the manipulation of regional tensions and unresolved military
    conflicts. The Kremlin believes chronic instability in this area
    enables Russian regional hegemony. Russia maintains leverage over
    Georgia by occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia, blocking free movement
    of people and goods within Georgia's territory, detaining and harassing
    civilians living in and near occupied areas, and undermining Georgia's
    NATO membership aspirations. After brokering a ceasefire arrangement
    between Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2020, Russia increased its
    military presence in the region by deploying 2,000 troops to Nagorno-
    Karabakh as peacekeepers. Russia continues to sell military systems and
    hardware to both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh.
                                    balkans
        The Balkans remain a strategically significant region where
    Russian, and now Chinese, malign influence and existing ethnic tensions
    foster instability. Russia uses social and political tensions to impede
    Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. China's emergence as an
    alternative patron for economic and defense cooperation, under suspect
    terms, further disrupts the region. Nonetheless, North Macedonia's NATO
    accession in March 2020 is a regional success story.
        Despite Kosovo declaring independence in 2008, Russia, China, and
    other states (including some EU and NATO members) have yet to recognize
    its sovereign nation status. Kosovo and neighboring Serbia have yet to
    normalize relations. We encourage both parties to maintain dialogue
    towards a peaceful solution. Kosovo's principal stabilizing force
    remains NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), which includes a small, but
    significant United States contribution that bolsters United States
    political leverage in the region. KFOR enables the security conditions
    required for normalization of Serbia-Kosovo relations and the planned
    10-year transition of the Kosovo Security Force from 2018 to 2028.
        Serbia seeks balance between East (Russia and China) and the West,
    but finds its EU ambitions hindered by Russian-stoked internal
    corruption, structural and economic challenges, EU-Russia sanctions,
    and the requirement to normalize Kosovo relations. Bosnia and
    Herzegovina continues to face political and ethnic instability. Fueled
    by Russian influence, obstructionists seek greater autonomy for Bosnia
    and Herzegovina's Serb-majority political entity, Republika Srpska, to
    weaken state authorities and frustrate further alignment with Western
    institutions. Nationalist politics and entrenched ethnic divisions
    between Bosniaks, Bosnian-Croats, and Bosnian-Serbs challenge Bosnia
    and Herzegovina's ability to chart a path of lasting stability and
    eventual NATO membership.
        Chinese investments focus on large-scale transportation, energy,
    and information infrastructure. USEUCOM is concerned about Chinese
    motives as these initiatives expose EU and NATO member states to
    coercion and adversely affect the security of critical infrastructure.
    Furthermore, China continues to expand its defense and security ties
    with Serbia, particularly via high-level visits, unmanned aerial
    vehicle technology dependency, and joint exercises.
                     central atlantic and the arctic region
        The Central Atlantic encompasses the maritime approaches to the
    Homeland and the transatlantic Sea Lines of Communication. Rarely
    navigated by Russia since the 1990's, advances in its submarine fleet
    and expanding maritime strategic goals have reinvigorated Russia's
    access to the broader Atlantic Ocean. As a global common, the Atlantic
    Ocean must remain open and free to facilitate commerce between Europe,
    the United States, and other international markets. It is imperative
    that we maintain our competitive advantage in the Central Atlantic
    through bolstered U.S. and Allied presence to defend the Homeland
    forward and maintain free and open transatlantic sea lines of
    communication.
        We ensure these vital sea lines of communication remain open by
    securing the Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom gap, enabling
    access between the Atlantic and Arctic. USEUCOM coordinates with
    USNORTHCOM in these regions to provide a comprehensive approach to
    regional and homeland security. In the Arctic, Russia continues to
    militarize the region by introducing offensive capabilities that pose
    risks to United States and Allied forces and limit regional access.
    Collaborating with Allies and Partners, we work to enhance
    interoperability and proficiency, while demonstrating collective
    resolve to counter malign behavior. The Arctic remains a geopolitical
    zone of competition, driven by the opening of commercial shipping
    routes and increased access to resources including energy, minerals,
    and fisheries. We expect these activities and region focus to increase
    as the effects of climate change continue to be realized.
        The existing rules-based order benefits all Arctic nations by
    facilitating sustainable economic development, fostering cooperation,
    and ensuring a stable conflict-free region. As a strategic corridor, a
    more open and active Arctic region will increasingly connect the United
    States Homeland, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. China, declaring itself
    a ``near-Arctic'' power, invests in both Russian energy and the
    Northern Sea Route and seeks economic footholds among Arctic nations to
    gain influence over regional governance. In concert with our Allies and
    Partners, via a whole-of-government and whole-of-nations approach,
    USEUCOM must continue to maintain a credible Arctic deterrence to
    ensure that growing competition in this dynamic region does not lead to
    conflict.
                     violent extremist organizations (veo)
        We continue to support United States interagency counter-VEO
    initiatives. These organizations remain a transnational threat with
    decentralized command and control, finance, and facilitation networks
    spreading from conflict zones into Europe. In particular, VEOs threaten
    to attack the
        United States and European Allies, including through weapons of
    mass destruction. Extremists exploit instability in North Africa, Iraq,
    and Syria to husband resources in the face of coalition counter
    efforts. VEO inspired and organized attacks in Europe further
    complicate integration efforts, potentially isolating refugee and
    migrant communities and making some members of these populations more
    vulnerable to recruitment. Despite diminished capabilities, the Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria and other VEOs desire to conduct external
    operations, requiring global vigilance to prevent a resurgence and
    preclude future attacks against the United States Homeland, Europe, and
    our Allies and Partners.
                                     israel
        Israel remains a critical United States partner facing complex and
    evolving security challenges. Iran continues to expand its regional
    influence, to provide lethal support to regional partners including
    Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militant groups, and to develop
    options to threaten and attack Israel. Iran and its partners have made
    significant gains in asymmetric capabilities, including advanced
    ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and armed unmanned aerial systems.
    Tehran remains committed to modernizing its military and continues to
    improve the range, lethality, and accuracy of its ballistic missile
    systems. However, Tehran's malign influence also presents opportunities
    as regional actors find common ground with Israel in the face of a
    common adversary. Recent bilateral agreements with the United Arab
    Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan represent notable progress in
    normalizing relations and improving the regional security environment.
        In compliance with the 2020 Unified Command Plan, we continue close
    coordination within the Department of Defense to ensure an orderly and
    deliberate transfer of the operations, activities, and investments
    focused on Israel to USCENTCOM. Ongoing initiatives include a robust
    series of exercises, senior leader engagements with the Israeli Defense
    Forces (IDF), coordination with the IDF to maintain Israel's
    qualitative military edge over any military threats to Israel, and
    naval support to defend Israel against growing Iranian ballistic
    missile threats. This assistance demonstrates the United States'
    unwavering commitment to Israel, enhances regional stability in the
    Levant, and deters the Iranian ballistic missile threat. Ultimately,
    our focus on a seamless transition will support United States interests
    and assist in the defense of Israel.
         USEUCOM OPERATIONS, ACTIVITIES, INVESTMENTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES
                            strategy implementation
        Along with Allies and Partners, USEUCOM confronts challenges by
    competing to secure long-term sustainable advantage, deterring
    potential aggressors, and preparing to respond decisively. As the
    coordinating authority for the Russia Problem Set, USEUCOM advises the
    Secretary of Defense on force structure, resources, and synchronization
    of Department of Defense activities to deter Russia and counter its
    global malign activities. We work tirelessly with Allies, Partners, and
    the U.S. interagency to address the evolving challenges posed by our
    adversaries. Despite the COVID-19 global pandemic, we display vigilance
    in this complex security environment, and--should deterrence fail--
    should deterrence fail--remain ready to respond with lethal and
    resilient force in all domains.
        Congress provides critical support to the USEUCOM AOR through the
    European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). EDI enhances our theater posture
    to deter adversaries and compete in a contested logistics environment,
    while assuring Allies and Partners. Increases in forward-stationed and
    rotational forces strengthen our contact, blunt, and surge layer
    capabilities, providing us the ability to compete and win in a multi-
    domain crisis or conflict. EDI investments improve our response using
    more robust theater infrastructure and prepositioned stocks. Funding
    for exercises, training, and building partner capacity bolster the
    readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Alliance forces. Together,
    these advances enable our deterrence and defense efforts through rapid
    deployment and sustainment of forces. Support NATO's Deterrence and
    Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
        USEUCOM's primary mission is to compete, deter, and respond to
    aggression with the full weight of the NATO Alliance. NATO continues
    adapting to meet the challenges and complexities of our dynamic
    security environment. Together, we continue improving our speed,
    posture, transparency, and alignment. Through new strategic concepts,
    establishing new commands, continuing investment in critical military
    capabilities, implementing enhanced readiness, and pursuing a robust
    array of operations, missions, and activities, we demonstrate our
    combined ability to deter and defend. The cohesion of these efforts has
    not waned during our collective response to the global pandemic.
        In 2020, NATO released the Concept for the Deterrence and Defense
    of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), NATO's first deterrence and defense
    concept since 1967. Nested with the 2019 NATO Military Strategy, this
    concept guides Alliance approaches towards threats from Russia and
    international terror groups. To support this effort, NATO bolstered
    deterrence efforts in the space and cyberspace domains by establishing
    a cyberspace operations center at the Supreme Headquarters Allied
    Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium and integrating its Space Center into
    Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
        Two new commands, Joint Forces Command Norfolk and the Joint
    Support and Enabling Command, enhance Alliance adaptation to the
    dynamic geopolitical environment. These headquarters focus on
    transatlantic lines of communication and coordinating support
    functions, enabling the deployment and sustainment of NATO forces
    during crisis or conflict. The EU, NATO, and USEUCOM continue to
    sustain progress improving infrastructure and transit permissions
    facilitating the rapid movement of forces and logistic support across
    the Euro-Atlantic.
        NATO nations continue to invest in critical military capabilities,
    contributing to common defense and supporting the Alliance. For the
    past six years, European NATO nations consistently increased defense
    expenditures and future projections remain positive despite the COVID-
    19 pandemic. NATO is increasing interoperable combat power through
    major acquisitions to include cyber capabilities across the Alliance;
    High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) long range fires
    capability in Romania; fourth and fifth-generation aircraft in
    Bulgaria, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Poland; along with embarking
    the United Kingdom's aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth.
        NATO's ability to compete and win through crisis and conflict
    continues to improve with implementation of the Readiness Action Plan
    and NATO Readiness Initiative. This effort provides an improved ready,
    responsive, and reinforced posture. Complementing the NATO Response
    Force, the Readiness Initiative provides additional ready forces able
    to respond rapidly to aggression by designating 30 battalions, 30 air
    squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels for potential use in 30 days.
        NATO members contribute to theater anti-submarine warfare
    operations and provide critical host nation support to forward-
    stationed U.S. Forces across the region. Allies and Partners contribute
    forces to ongoing NATO and United States-led coalition missions
    advancing our common interests in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria.
    Furthermore, Allies and Partners underwrite infrastructure investments
    and defray costs of U.S. military construction through the NATO
    Security Investment Program. Additionally, we expect improvements by
    individual European nations and the EU to enhance military mobility,
    increasing their responsiveness and combat capability. The EU, in
    consultation with NATO, projects to invest 1.69 billion euros over the
    next 7 years for civilian and military dual-use transportation
    infrastructure improvements across the continent.
        Our Allies responded in solidarity to alleviate suffering during
    the COVID-19 pandemic, providing airlift, field hospitals, medical
    expertise, ventilators, and other critical supplies. The Alliance
    established a NATO Pandemic Response Trust Fund to stockpile medical
    equipment and supplies necessary during the second COVID-19 wave in
    Europe. Multiple Allies received critical ventilators and medical
    supplies from this initiative in late 2020.
        USEUCOM plans to demonstrate joint capabilities during the upcoming
    United States-led exercises DEFENDER-Europe and ASTRAL KNIGHT. These
    multi-domain exercises directly complement NATO-led exercises such as
    STEADFAST JUPITER that maintain maritime air defense, antisubmarine
    warfare, and maritime interdiction capabilities. Ongoing enhancements
    to multinational information sharing systems enable USEUCOM execution
    with NATO and non-NATO partners. Ultimately, military exercises with
    our Allies remain an integral part of demonstrating Alliance readiness,
    interoperability, and capability.
        The participation of USEUCOM forces in NATO operations and
    activities demonstrates U.S. commitment to the Alliance. Our soldiers
    serve in Poland as part of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence mission in
    one of four battlegroups deterring Russian aggression in Poland and the
    Baltics. United States Air Forces in Europe support NATO Enhanced Air
    Policing missions, safeguarding the sovereignty of Allied airspace
    against Russian incursions. We plan to support Standing NATO Maritime
    Group Two in 2022 with U.S. naval capability to counter maritime
    challenges in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea.
    Operation ATLANTIC SENTRY, conducted by United States Aegis destroyers
    based in Rota, Spain, and the Aegis Ashore system in Romania provides
    the foundation of NATO's ballistic missile defense capability.
        We leverage Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) to demonstrate
    operational unpredictability to adversaries, improve deterrence, and
    support our Allies. Recent DFE operations include posturing USS
    Roosevelt to the High North, Bomber Task Force missions throughout the
    AOR, a combined arms battalion deployment for DEFENDER Europe 20, and
    an F-35 deployment to exercise with Allies. Additionally, USS
    Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group presence in European waters this spring
    is a tremendous message to Allies and Partners about our commitment to
    deter and a critically important interoperability and training
    opportunity. Each force presence and operation demonstrates our ability
    to generate significant combat power across the AOR, while improving
    posture and warfighting readiness. This operational flexibility
    enhances cross-combatant command coordination and resource sharing,
    allowing for seamless transition and handover across Unified Command
    Plan boundaries to quickly deploy forces for emerging requirements.
        Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
    maintain a presence in strategic locations across the theater. These
    forces work alongside Allies and Partners to deter aggression, counter
    malign activities, build host nation defense capability, and enhance
    interoperability. For example, in Eastern Europe a rotational armored
    brigade combat team and combat aviation brigade participate in
    Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE to hone Alliance warfighting skills.
    Additionally, rotational Marine Forces in Norway reinforce NATO's
    Northern periphery while training in Arctic conditions with our
    Norwegian allies. Rotational forces are critical to our ability to
    deter Russia and assure Allies.
                counter russian activities and malign influence
        Every day, USEUCOM and NATO compete to deter the increasingly
    capable military underwriting Russia's power and counter the malign
    behavior that guides efforts to enhance perceptions the Kremlin is a
    responsible actor. Aside from USEUCOM's own capabilities, weleverage
    our Allies and Partners and the unique attributes our U.S. interagency
    team brings to deterrence and defense.
        As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO must remain a nuclear
    Alliance. NATO's nuclear capability preserves peace, prevents coercion,
    deters aggression, and instills confidence in the transatlantic bond.
    The Alliance's strategic forces guarantee security and backstop United
    States operations in Europe. NATO continues to adapt its nuclear
    posture to ensure these capabilities remain credible, resilient, and
    adaptable. USEUCOM fully supports modernization and recapitalization of
    our nuclear forces. Sustained Congressional funding for these programs
    demonstrates commitment to our operations and solidarity with NATO.
        In the ground domain, we expect to establish a U.S. division-sized
    capability through the combination of forward-stationed forces,
    rotational forces, and Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). APS equipment
    facilitates increased agility and lethality by enabling rapid
    integration of rotational combat units into operations. During Exercise
    DEFENDER-Europe 20, United States Army Europe and NATO Allies
    successfully exercised at the battalion and brigade levels, and we plan
    to assemble a divisional formation on NATO's Eastern flank in Exercise
    DEFENDER-Europe 24, the first since the end of the Cold War.
        In the maritime domain, Carrier Strike Group and amphibious
    presence are key elements of a lethal and agile theater posture. U.S.
    Sixth Fleet provides maritime command and control capability across the
    USEUCOM AOR, while U.S. Second Fleet complements and contributes to
    reinforcing NATO's Western, Northern, and Southern flanks. Last fall,
    the guided missile destroyer USS Roosevelt completed a 50-day patrol in
    the High North where it joined five other nations in NATO's Allied
    Maritime Command-led anti-submarine warfare exercise DYNAMIC MONGOOSE
    20. Additionally, United States and U.K. warships conducted exercises
    in the Barents Sea, the first of its kind since the mid-1980s. While
    Russia attempts to impose costs with increased out of area deployments
    not witnessed since the Cold War, the reality is our crews are gaining
    invaluable real-world operational experience, demonstrating operational
    flexibility, and developingtactical undersea warfare advances for the
    next generation of sailors. The $539 million EDI investments in wide
    area search systems, new sonobouy capabilities, and improved
    communications systems are enhancing our competitive advantage. This
    enables the U.S. and Allies to meet Strategic Competition objectives in
    the maritime environment and improve our overall maritime domain
    awareness.
        In the air domain, we are improving our mix of fighter aircraft to
    enhance Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), support Allies'
    efforts to enhance their air defense systems, and increase long range
    strike capability for deterrence. For example, Exercise ASTRAL KNIGHT
    20 integrated United States air and missile defense capabilities with
    the Polish Air Force. In Bomber Task Force missions, U.S. bombers
    launched from bases in the United States and Europe, fly vast distances
    across the AOR while integrating with NATO and partner nation forces.
    We seek to enhance current posture, complicate adversary decision-
    making and impose costs while assuring our NATO Allies via Agile Combat
    Employment. Agile operations supported by Combined Joint All Domain
    Command and Control, and domain awareness capabilities with improved
    communications infrastructure, demonstrate a credible combat deterrence
    force network from potential airfields across the continent. This
    expansion of European contingency air operation and deployable air base
    sets enhances the survivability of our forces.
        We remain laser focused in space, a domain whose importance to
    USEUCOM, NATO, and the globe cannot be overstated. Leveraging U.S.
    Space Command capabilities, we ensure our ability to plan and execute
    multi-domain operations. Additionally, we work with the U.S. Space
    Force, allies, and partners to further integrate space capabilities
    into joint and combined operations and activities.
        In the cyber domain, USEUCOM's Joint Cyber Center coordinates with
    Joint Forces Headquarters Cyber and United States Cyber Command to
    counter Russian malign cyber activities and enhance our Allied and
    Partner capabilities. Recognizing the worldwide cyber capabilities of
    China, Iran, and North Korea, we work with other combatant commands and
    interagency partners to enhance global cyber defenses and our ability
    to impose costs on malicious adversary behavior. In the information
    environment, the Russian Influence Group (RIG) provides a key platform
    for competing with Russia. We co-chair this effort with United States
    Department of State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.
    Congressional funding for these unique cybersecurity and hybrid warfare
    programs (i.e. electronic warfare, special operations, and information
    domain operations), particularly through the State
    Department's Countering Russian Influence Fund--Foreign Military
    Financing (CRIF-FMF), enables the RIG to challenge adversary narratives
    and disinformation. Congressional funding for these unique information
    operations enables USEUCOM to challenge adversary narratives and
    disinformation.
        Our Special Operations forces work with European Allies and
    Partners to build capacity, counter malign activity, and improve
    resilience. These unique capabilities enable USEUCOM to identify,
    attribute, and counter Russian malign influence. Furthermore, our
    Special Operations personnel provide invaluable contributions in
    sensing the operational environment, enhancing our ability to deter
    through enhanced indications and warnings.
        Along Russia's border, key United States partners see a brighter
    future to the West and resist Moscow's efforts to hold them in the
    Russian sphere of influence. Ukraine seeks a closer partnership with
    the United States despite an ongoing Kremlin-sponsored malign influence
    campaign and violence by Russian supported forces in the Donbas region.
    The United States supports the Ukrainian Armed Forces through
    mentorship and advice from the Joint Multinational Training Group-
    Ukraine and with military and civilian advisors embedded across
    Ukraine's defense sector. With Ukraine a recognized operational partner
    to NATO, Allies and Partners also assist Ukraine's defense efforts,
    including the U.K.'s Operation Orbital and Canada's Operation Unifier.
    The United States, U.K., Canada, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden
    comprise the Multinational Joint Commission, which coordinates Allied
    and Partner FMF and USAI security cooperation funding. This funding,
    along with the Joint Military Training Group-Ukraine effort, help build
    Ukrainian military capability, competence, and interoperability.
    Continued USAI and FMF funding enables Ukraine to defend its
    sovereignty against well-armed Russian-backed forces. Department of
    State and Department of Defense continue working closely on resource
    coordination.
        As part of a whole-of-government approach, our Joint Interagency
    Counter Trafficking Center supports interagency efforts to combat
    Russian malign activities, primarily by assisting federal law
    enforcement activities. This initiative provides USEUCOM with
    additional areas for competition. Through these partnerships, USEUCOM
    leverages a range of interagency driven effects including criminal
    investigations and convictions, seizures, sanctions, and designations.
        Our approach in competition considers escalation management and
    control to maximize deterrence and defense. In conjunction with this
    emphasis, we make extensive use of authorized military-to-military
    channels with Russia to safely deconflict activities, when necessary,
    and maintain strategic stability.
                 advance and strengthen strategic relationships
        Our strong bilateral and multilateral ties with European Allies and
    Partners enable advancement of our shared interests. Our military-to-
    military relationships across the Euro-Atlantic area remain strong,
    signaling the resilience of our collective defense.
        Turkey remains a key United States and NATO Ally. We recognize
    Turkey's leadership role as a strategic NATO ally. Turkey hosts United
    States servicemembers conducting a wide array of NATO, bilateral, and
    unilateral missions including radar and tanker support to ongoing
    operations. Additionally, Turkey contributes forces to NATO missions in
    Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 in the
    Mediterranean Sea. In 2020, Turkey supported a United States Bomber
    Task Force with tanker and fighter assets.
        In the South Caucasus, Georgia remains a steadfast partner and
    contributor to global security. Georgia's commitment of approximately
    860 soldiers to the Resolute Support Mission, the largest non-NATO
    contributor to NATO's Afghanistan mission, indicates the enduring
    strength of our strategic partnership. We assist Georgian forces in
    preparing for this mission through the Georgia Deployment Program.
    Georgia hosted NOBLE PARTNER 20--a Georgian Defense Force and United
    States Army Europe exercise--to entrance Georgian, regional partner,
    and United States force readiness and interoperability in a realistic,
    multinational training environment. We support Georgia's efforts to
    generate and sustain capable defense forces through the Georgia Defense
    Readiness Program, which enables Georgia to defend its sovereignty and
    territorial integrity.
        In the Arctic, changing environmental conditions present new
    opportunities for exploration, trade, and interaction. USEUCOM supports
    whole-of-government efforts to preserve the region, address shared
    challenges with other Arctic nations, and secure United States
    interests. We leverage close relations with European Arctic nations and
    our coordination with USNORTHCOM to build awareness while strengthening
    the call for open and non-invasive impacts in the region. These
    bilateral and multilateral strategic relationships enhance Alliance
    efforts to deter Russian aggression and advance shared interests.
        We strengthen our strategic relationships through security
    cooperation initiatives. U.S. National Guard forces maintain vibrant
    relationships and unique access with Allies and Partners through the
    State Partnership Program (SPP). With more than 500 engagements through
    22 active programs annually, the SPP cultivates regional expertise and
    strengthens personal relationships to improve readiness and alignment
    across the AOR. Programs such as the Black Sea Maritime Initiative and
    enhancing Baltic IAMD represent potent, regionally-focused components,
    of a resilient theater posture.
                     enable united states global operations
        Europe and the United States remain the foundation for upholding a
    free and open international order. Our unique geographic location
    enables global operations, including United States interagency and
    multinational operations, through synchronization and agreements for
    access, basing, and overflight permissions within Europe. We work
    within the whole-of-government approach to maintain these permissions
    under bilateral agreements and to resist Russian and Chinese strategic
    investments. Absent these agreements, the United States could not meet
    treaty obligations or effectively protect vital national interests. The
    shared values, trust, civilian leadership of the military, and
    longstanding relationships we have in Europe enable the United States
    to generate coalitions for worldwide operations in support of shared
    national interests.
        Last year, Allies and Partners proved essential in our efforts to
    deter Iranian aggression. European support enabled the rapid posture
    shift of United States forces in response to potential contingencies in
    the Levant. Key partners provided indispensable access, basing, and
    overflight permissions enhancing our protection of American citizens
    and diplomats. This highlights how allies and partners enable U.S.
    global operations that preserve and defend our national interests.
                                   conclusion
        Maintaining a capable United States presence in Europe strengthens
    our national security by encouraging peace, unity, and cohesion between
    Europe's individual nations. Competitors, notably Russia and China,
    present formidable, enduring challenges to preserving a Europe that is
    free and peaceful. United States servicemembers in Europe continue to
    generate global peace alongside our Allies and Partners in the face of
    these obstacles. Our strategy addresses the dynamic security
    environment by ensuring we effectively compete for long-term
    sustainable advantage, deter attacks from potential aggressors, and
    prepare our Allies and Partners to respond decisively.
        We appreciate Congressional interest in these challenges and your
    continued pledge to meet them through engagement, funding, and
    authorities; particularly your efforts to support the European
    Deterrence Initiative and International Security Cooperation Programs.
    These authorities enhance U.S. and alliance readiness and posture to
    respond in crisis or conflict. We sit in a strategically significant
    part of the world and the dedicated men and women of the command
    continually remember the trust our Nation places in us. Together with
    the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, guardians, and
    civilians of USEUCOM, your support demonstrates our Nation's continued
    commitment to defend the Homeland forward and preserve peace for the
    one billion people living in the Euro-Atlantic region.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Wolters.
        Now, let me recognize General Lyons.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                     STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        General Lyons. Chairman, can you hear me okay?
        Chairman Reed. Great. Yes, sir.
        General Lyons. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my distinct
    pleasure, once again, to represent the members of the United
    States Transportation Command that are operating around the
    globe every day, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
        I have the privilege today to be joined by our new senior
    enlisted leader, Fleet Master Sergeant Myrick, and it is great
    to have him onboard.
        Let me just say again that our enduring purpose at TRANSCOM
    is to project and sustain military forces globally at our time
    and place of choosing. Providing our national leadership with
    the strategic comparative advantage and a wide range of options
    to enable the advancement of U.S. national interests, assure
    our allies and partners, and if necessary, respond with a
    decisive force to win.
        Given the unprecedented challenges amid the COVID-19 global
    pandemic, I could not be more proud of the men and women of
    TRANSCOM, who have continued their impressive support to the
    joint force and support to whole-of-government efforts to help
    American citizens at home.
        I would particularly like to highlight our air component's
    rapid fielding capability to move highly infectious patients,
    which was nation prior to the pandemic.
        I appreciate the Committee's continued support on important
    global mobility issues, including sealift recapitalization,
    aerial refueling, defense personal property, as well as your
    acknowledgment of the future challenges and logistics
    operations under all domain persistent attack.
        Today, I am absolutely honored to join General Tod Wolters
    and pleased to play a supporting role in his wide-ranging
    European defense initiatives. Thank you for your leadership and
    support for our impressive TRANSCOM teammates, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Lyons follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General Stephen R. Lyons
                             strategic environment
        The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance acknowledges an
    increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by
    overt challenges to the free and open international order and the
    reemergence of long term strategic competition between nations. These
    changes require a clear eyed appraisal of future threats, the changing
    character of warfare, and how the Department of Defense (DOD) will
    retain the ability to project forces globally to advance security
    interests and respond decisively to win if necessary.
                           delivering for our nation
        TRANSCOM's enduring purpose is to project and sustain military
    forces anywhere on the globe at the time and place of our Nation's
    choosing. Our ability to rapidly move forces transoceanic distances is
    a strategic comparative advantage, providing a wide range of options in
    support of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) while creating multiple
    dilemmas for our adversaries. As 1 of 11 Combatant Commands, TRANSCOM
    is responsible for operating the Defense Transportation System and
    integrating the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE).
    Our Unified Command Plan tasks are executed through three assigned
    component commands (U.S. Army's Military Surface Deployment and
    Distribution Command, U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command, and U.S.
    Air Force's Air Mobility Command) and one major subordinate command
    (Joint Enabling Capabilities Command). Our key mobility mission areas
    include airlift, air refueling, aeromedical evacuation, sealift, and
    domestic rail and motor freight, all of which are enabled by a global
    posture that provides the U.S. with positional, temporal, and
    psychological advantage to respond across the operational spectrum.
        The DOD's ability to project military forces is inextricably linked
    to commercial industry, which provides critical transportation capacity
    as well as global networks to meet day-to-day and wartime requirements.
    TRANSCOM manages several emergency preparedness programs that call on
    industry to specifically support wartime requirements. They include the
    Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
    (VISA), Strategic Seaport Program, Strategic Corridor Rail Network and
    the Strategic Highway Network. On behalf of the Department, TRANSCOM
    spends approximately 7 billion dollars with industry partners each year
    in transportation services to execute DOD mission requirements.
                                 year in review
        The COVID-19 pandemic posed significant challenges to TRANSCOM's
    continual efforts to project and sustain the joint force. At the
    beginning of last year, TRANSCOM rapidly deployed a Brigade Combat Team
    of the 82d Airborne Division to United States Central Command,
    delivering 800 soldiers within 18 hours of notification to deter
    Iranian aggression. In total, the Brigade of 3,000 soldiers closed in
    under five days. This no-notice deployment underscored the impressive
    capability of the Global Mobility Enterprise. In the year that ensued,
    TRANSCOM transported 33 brigade-sized units overseas in support of all
    six geographic combatant commands. TRANSCOM operated from all seven
    continents, delivering over 95 million gallons of fuel during air-to-
    air refueling operations resupplying nearly 60 thousand aircraft and
    directly supporting 38 Bomber Task Force missions. On short notice, our
    Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) established a JTF command
    post in support of Special Operations Command--Africa to reposture
    forces from Somalia. Additionally, TRANSCOM transported over 790,000
    passengers, 315,000 tons of cargo and 24.2 million barrels of DOD
    petroleum products, all while complying with COVID-19 preventative
    measures, testing and restrictions.
        TRANSCOM aeromedically evacuated 6,324 patients (71 having
    sustained battle injuries), 350 of whom were COVID-positive. Given the
    emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are grateful for the exceptional
    efforts of the USAF, industry, and academia to deliver a material
    solution within 90 days to safely airlift highly infectious patients. I
    am extremely proud of the resilience and ingenuity of the aeromedical
    evacuation enterprise to meet these challenges this past year.
        In support of the whole-of-government response to COVID-19,
    TRANSCOM repatriated 3,915 American citizens stranded worldwide and
    facilitated movement of over 2,000 ventilators, 4.4 million COVID test
    kits, 150 million needles and syringes, and continues to support
    vaccine distribution to DOD beneficiaries. TRANSCOM collaborated with
    the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, USAF, and United Airlines
    to perform aerosol testing onboard commercial passenger airframes to
    determine the transmission risk of COVID-19 between passengers. The
    findings revealed a 99.7 percent reduction in aerosolized pathogens
    through aircraft ventilation and HEPA filtration systems thereby
    informing decisions on cabin occupancy, seating assignments, and
    contact-tracing procedures for the Patriot Express contracted rotator
    flights.
        Throughout the pandemic, TRANSCOM frequently consulted with
    industry partners to assess their viability to support National Defense
    requirements. Cargo partners within the surface, sealift, and airlift
    industries appear to be on the path to recovery. However, the airline
    passenger industry will likely take many years to recover given 60
    percent reduction in volume, resulting in over $30 billion in lost
    revenue, as well as the divestment or parking of over 20 percent of
    aircraft inventories.
                         transcom warfighting framework
        The success of DOD's power projection capability is contingent on
    three critical elements of TRANSCOM's organizational warfighting
    framework: Global Mobility Posture; Global Transport Capacity; and
    Global Command, Control, and Integration.
    Global Mobility Posture
        Global Mobility Posture is the foundation of power projection,
    enabled by a robust network of allies and partners, which includes
    access to global networks maintained by industry to support our
    Nation's ability to mobilize and deploy. Diplomatic alignment with our
    allies and partners enables access, basing, and overflight for mobility
    forces, critically important to the rapid deployment of personnel and
    equipment across the globe. Our robust and resilient network also
    provides the U.S. positional advantage to rapidly advance our national
    security interests, deter adversaries, and when necessary, win
    decisively.
        On the domestic front, TRANSCOM works closely with the U.S.
    Department of Transportation on numerous domestic transportation
    programs to include the administration of three National Defense
    Programs: Highways, Railroads, and Ports for National Defense. In order
    to ensure national security needs are recognized in civil highway
    policies and programs, TRANSCOM is working with the Federal Highway
    Administration to encourage investment to enhance infrastructure
    critical to national security.
    Global Transport Capacity
        Our Global Transport Capacity includes conveyances and platforms to
    move troops, supplies, fuel, and equipment through global
    transportation networks. These include rail, motor transport, sealift,
    air refueling, and airlift. More than 60 percent of TRANSCOM's organic
    transport capacity resides in the Reserve Components, underscoring our
    reliance on the Total Force.
        Mobility force sizing and shaping are informed by Mobility
    Capability Requirements Studies (MCRS). TRANSCOM is conducting the
    Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA-directed MCRS-20 to assess airlift force
    sufficiency, as well as air refueling and sealift capacities to meet
    NDS missions. In addition, we are conducting a concurrent study to
    determine requirements for U.S. flagged fuel tanker vessel capacity and
    to assess the necessity of assured access provided by the Fiscal Year
    2021 NDAA-authorized Tanker Security Fleet. We will submit reports on
    these studies by June 2021.
    Transport Capacity Modernization Priorities
      Sealift
        We are pleased with the progress over the past year working with
    OSD, USN, and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) on codifying a viable
    strategy to recapitalize the Department's sealift fleet. 33 of 50 USN
    Roll-On/Roll-Off sealift ships are forecasted to retire in the next 10
    years. DOD, USN, and TRANSCOM endorse a strategy to acquire used
    sealift vessels from the open market. The Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA,
    authorizes the procurement of the first four used ships, decoupled from
    a requirement to build new ships. We are working with MARAD on
    selecting a Vessel Acquisition Manager and plan to procure the first
    used vessel in CY 2021.
      Aerial Refueling
        TRANSCOM is aligned with the USAF on the way ahead for the air
    refueling portfolio. The fleet is critical to rapid global mobility and
    the lifeblood of the joint force's ability to deploy and employ the
    immediate and surge forces across all NDS mission areas. The current
    air refueling fleet is comprised of the aging KC-135 and KC-10
    aircraft, and the new KC-46. We support the USAF's plan to adjust its
    force structure in order to meet day-to-day and crisis requirements.
    Global Command, Control, and Integration
        Global Command, Control, and Global Integration remains central to
    our ability to align scarce mobility resources consistent with the
    highest strategic priorities. Enabled by a portfolio of information
    technology systems, our ability to control mobility forces is
    contingent on secure networks and continuous modernization efforts to
    retain the competitive edge against our adversaries in the cyber
    domain.
        TRANSCOM is pursuing several initiatives in the area of cyber
    resiliency and digital modernization to mitigate the rapidly evolving
    threat in the cyber-contested environment. Mitigation initiatives
    include increasing cyber hygiene to harden our terrain and decrease
    adversary attack vectors, modernizing and optimizing our IT portfolio
    by taking advantage of technical advancements such as cloud services,
    and investing in critical data encryption to create trusted
    transactions. Additionally, we partnered with the U.S. Cyber Command to
    implement a DOD proof of principle using, ``Zero Trust'' on our network
    environment to further bolster defenses from capable adversaries. We
    also continue to collaborate with our commercial transportation
    providers, sharing information as able and facilitating the performance
    of annual cybersecurity self-assessments based on National Institute of
    Standards and Technology guidelines.
                 defense personal property program (dp3) reform
        TRANSCOM, on behalf of the Department, is leading a number of
    efforts to improve the relocation experience for DOD and Coast Guard
    personnel and their families. Together with the Services, TRANSCOM
    implemented COVID-19 protection protocols to keep families safe while
    relocating; enacted common-sense rule changes to address customer
    priorities `at the curb,' and published a strategic plan to guide our
    collective action in the years ahead. TRANSCOM is currently addressing
    the issues the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlighted
    regarding the award of the Global Household Goods Contract (GHC), and
    will re-award the contract no earlier than September 2021. While
    TRANSCOM has charted a clear path to restructure its relationship with
    the moving industry, we are also taking initial steps to restructure
    our relationship with storage providers.
        At the close of 2020, TRANSCOM recorded a 96 percent customer
    satisfaction rate--five points above 2018's score and above the
    Department's target of 95 percent. While I am pleased with this initial
    progress, there is still much work to do and it is still early in our
    journey to reform the $2.5 billion Defense Personal Property Program.
    This initial progress is the product of incredible work from DOD
    personnel around the globe, from an active network of military family
    volunteers, and from many of our moving and storage providers. However,
    the foundation of this progress is leadership. I believe the program's
    multi-billion dollar value, consequential impact on servicemembers and
    their families, and continual interface with Congress, industry, and
    the Services warrant sustained executive leadership to ensure the
    success of the reform effort and deliver the quality and accountability
    military families deserve.
                                 space mobility
        As we look to the future, TRANSCOM has established Cooperative
    Research and Development Agreements with leaders in the space industry
    to explore the delivery of cargo and personnel via space anywhere on
    the globe in less than an hour. While rocket cargo will not replace
    current mobility capacity, it has the potential to offer unique and
    disruptive capability in the areas of rapid force deployment and
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We look forward to
    continued development of space mobility and logistics in the coming
    year.
                                   conclusion
        TRANSCOM provides the DOD the ability to project and sustain
    military forces at a time and place of the Nation's choosing; a
    strategic comparative advantage that allows us to achieve national
    security interests. By maintaining favorable global posture, sufficient
    transportation capacity, and the ability to command and control global
    mobility operations, DOD retains the ability to project immediate and
    surge forces required to compete, deter, respond, and win in order to
    meet U.S. strategic objectives. We continue to evolve and adapt to a
    rapidly changing security environment and address cyber security
    challenges. I thank Congress for the staunch and continued support of
    the U.S. Transportation Command and the Joint Deployment and
    Distribution Enterprise as together we work to defend the Nation and
    advance American interests.
        Underwritten by our dedicated soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen,
    coast guardsmen, civilians, and commercial partners performing
    TRANSCOM's mission, I am confident in our ability to deliver, and am
    proud to stand with them in commitment to our Nation's defense.
                            Together, We Deliver!

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Lyons.
        Before we begin the questioning, let me just remind my
    colleagues, due to the nature of the hybrid format we are using
    today, we will handle the order of questions by seniority,
    alternating sides until we have gone through everyone, and if
    there is anyone we have missed we will go back.
        We will use the standard 5-minute rounds. I am going to ask
    my colleagues to keep a watch on the clock.
        Finally, if you aren't engaged, please keep your
    microphones muted. Thank you very, very much.
        General Wolters, today, it was reported that Secretary
    Austin announced an additional 500 troops going into Europe,
    which seems to be a reversal of the Trump administration's
    proposals to reduce forces in Europe.
        Can you comment on this increase in forces.
        General Wolters. I can, Chairman.
        We are very excited. They are part of the previous tranche
    of forces that were nest underneath DP2, Decision Program 2,
    and its focus is to deliver a multi-domain task force in a
    joint-theater spy organization to Wiesbaden, Germany, and that
    will be approximately 500 soldiers. That will improve our
    ability, in all domains, to bring fires from the surface-to-
    surface dimension to increase our ability to deter.
        Chairman Reed. From your first review of the proposed
    budget, do you feel that you will have adequate resources to
    meet all of your obligations?
        General Wolters. We do, Chairman, but as you well know, we
    are always interested in working to increase our competitive
    advantage. But we do have the adequate resources.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        General Lyons, as I indicated in my opening remarks, we
    have asked for the mobility requirement study. It is still in
    the works. When will we see that report and can you give us
    some initial reactions to date as to what your prognostication
    is about the report.
        General Lyons. Chairman, let me first say thank you for
    your continued advocating and support, as you have directed
    multiple Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study. The 2020
    study is due to be delivered in June, mid-June.
        I can tell you, you know, as a task for the study, it was
    to assess the program force. We are looking at that in the
    context of our current demands in terms of war plans, but also
    in future concepts. As we look at that, there are some areas we
    see will require some work in some areas of elevated risk.
        I would just ask for your continued support for example,
    for sealift modernization, which this Committee has been very
    supportive in our efforts to do so, thus far.
        Without getting too far ahead of the analysis, because I
    want the analysis to drive the conclusions, that report is due
    to you soon, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, sir.
        One of the issues, and it represents the transition from
    benign areas of operations, particularly for logistics to
    contested operations, is the problem of potential attrition
    during wartime.
        Do you feel that that will be adequately addressed in the
    study?
        General Lyons. Senator, we certainly are looking at
    contested environments. There is no question that we can't
    assume that we can deploy when we want, and how we want, where
    we want, perhaps as we have been able to do in the last several
    decades.
        But as we look to attrition, per se, in terms of force-
    sizing, as a departmental policy, we don't include attrition in
    the force-sizing construct, but we do understand the
    implications for contested environments on our ability to
    support a particular combatant command (COCOM) or the
    Department's priorities, and so, we will see that in elevated
    risk.
        I would just offer, though, that and often is the case, the
    solution may not be in more capacity, in mobility capacity, but
    may come in better integration of our warfighting functions,
    like protection, fires, intelligence, sustainment, et cetera.
        So, as we look to the future, we know we have to move in
    that direction, and I am very pleased to see the chairman and
    the Department, you know, identifying that as a major line of
    effort in our joint warfighting concept.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you.
        General Wolters and also General Lyons, this goes to a
    point of our effective connectivity that every part of the
    operation can talk uninterruptedly and hopefully encrypted.
        Is that something that you and General Nakasone are working
    on with others, General Wolters?
        General Wolters. We are, Chairman.
        One of our key pillars in our overall campaign to
    effectively win in competition is to continually improve our
    command and control and communications, and to do so in all
    domains. We are really pleased to report that with General
    Nakasone being the sole military commander in United States
    military cyber domain. The direction and guidance has been much
    clearer over the course of the last 24 months and we have been
    able to make improvements in Europe, with respect to our
    ability to command and control.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you.
        General Lyons, quick comments, please.
        General Lyons. Yes, sir. I would just reenforce cyber
    resiliency continues to remain a top priority for the command.
        General Nakasone, the National Security Agency (NSA), Cyber
    Command (CYBERCOM) has been extraordinarily supportive; in
    fact, we are his test bed for Zero Trust principles, and we
    have taken many other initiatives to buy down cyber risk.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
        Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Wolters, I would just like to ask, I have three
    questions that I am going to try to get around in this short
    period of time.
        In the book, and we have all been talking about this now,
    ever since 2018 when this came out, the recommendation said it
    is going to take 3 to 5 percent real annual defense spending
    growth to implement the NDS and I really believe that is true.
        Now, the current budget doesn't even keep even, keep up
    with inflation. Now, this is kind of an ``if'' question,
    General Wolters. If the defense budget shrinks and the European
    Deterrence Initiative gets cut, what would be the impact to
    your efforts in Europe, just off the top, if that happens.
        General Wolters. Senator, it would slow down our campaign
    momentum that we have been able to sustain for the last 4 years
    in improving our indications and warnings, our command and
    control, and our readiness.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Okay. Thank you very much.
        Now, General Wolters, I also mentioned, you and I talked
    about this in my office, it is unfortunate, but a lot of people
    in this administration are talking about the F-35 and some
    don't think it is worth the resources that it is detracting
    from other areas.
        I am so thankful that I have the memory of what happened
    back in, actually, it started out when I was in the House of
    Representatives, on The House Armed Services Committee, on the
    F-22. The F-22 and the F-35 are the only two vehicles out there
    in the fifth generation. So, the F-22 was the first one.
        We started out with, the goal was 700 copies were going to
    come and they started whittling down. It started, actually,
    when I was still over in the House side, and it went down to,
    from 700 to, incrementally reduced to, ultimately, it got down
    to, what was it, 187 F-22s. We knew that was a mistake at that
    time, and the reason I bring that up is that right now we have
    Russia and China pursuing their own fifth generation programs
    like the J-20 and the Su-57.
        How concerned are you about our great power competitors'
    fifth generation capabilities, and how important is the F-35 to
    deter these threats in Europe?
        General Wolters. Senator, the F-35 is very important.
        As I mentioned in my opening comments, our disposition,
    from the military perspective, is strong, yet challenged, and
    part of that challenge is the evolution of the Su-37, fifth-
    generation aircraft, on behalf of the Russians, and we, in the
    United States, need F-35s in Europe, which will begin to show
    up in the fall of 2021, to ensure that we have the competitive
    advantage necessary to protect our sovereign territory.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. That is good.
        During last year's posture hearing, General Lyons, you
    testified that the Air Force's divestment of the KC-135 and the
    KC-10 would put TRANSCOM below its minimum requirements, and
    that is in light of the fact that the KC-46 didn't come out the
    way we wanted it to, and yet, it took action from the National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) from 2021 to reverse the
    number of those divestments to ensure that TRANSCOM has enough
    refueling capacity to meet the requirements.
        Now, I would have to say, and you may want to elaborate on
    this maybe for the record, but I look at this and say, what is
    wrong with our requirements process when Congress has to step
    in to ensure they have enough tanker aircraft to stay the
    mission ready.
        I mean, your observation was right, that it took us action
    to make sure that that happened in our Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA.
        Does anything come to your mind as in terms of why it is
    necessary for us to do this and why this couldn't have been
    done before our action was necessary?
        General Lyons. Well, Senator, first, I want to thank you
    for your support on the issue of aerial refuel, which is such a
    critical force element, and basically the lifeblood for the
    joint force, in terms of our weapon systems.
        Last year, you asked the question, what was the
    implications operationally to delay the Boeing KC-46 delivery?
        Based on the retirement profile, the war implications, and
    the Active Duty component to respond to day-to-day crisis, I am
    happy and pleased to report to you this year that we are in a
    much better position. We have a very good alignment between the
    Department, between Air Force, and TRANSCOM. The Air Force has
    stepped forward with interim capability with the KC-46.
        We still have a long way to go, but I am very, very
    comfortable with where we are with the Air Force. The Air Force
    has really stepped into position.
        Senator Inhofe. So, you think that that has been corrected?
        General Lyons. I do, sir. It has been.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you to both of you, General Wolters and General
    Lyons, for your service and for being here this morning.
        General Wolters, I specially appreciated our conversation
    yesterday, and one of the things you mentioned in your opening
    remarks that we discussed briefly, is the buildup of Russian
    forces on the border of Ukraine.
        Do you have any view about what Russia is doing, are they
    preparing for potential offensive? Is this consistent with past
    Russian posturing? What are they doing?
        General Wolters. Senator, we have categorized their actions
    into four separate categories and I would enjoy the opportunity
    at a different security environment to be able to address that.
        But what I can say is, number one, there has been an inject
    of a very sizable ground domain force on behalf of the
    Russians, a notable Air Force injection, and a notable maritime
    force injection. It is of the size and scale and scope that is
    of great concern, and it mirrors the size and scope and scale
    of the infiltration of forces that occurred back in 2014.
        So, we are remaining very, very vigilant, keeping as many
    options open as possible, and obviously very concerned.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I look forward to hearing your
    comments in the classified session.
        As the administration considers the best way forward in
    Afghanistan, can you tell us what you think would be the most
    significant impact of the withdrawal of American troops by May
    1 or shortly thereafter. How would that influence both, NATO's
    role and what we might expect on the ground in Afghanistan?
        General Wolters. Senator, our number one concern at
    USEUCOM, and my number one concern with my NATO head at SACEUR
    is the force protection considerations for all of our U.S.
    servicemembers and all of our NATO servicemembers in whatever
    transaction that we engage in.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I would, again, urge NATO and
    everyone who is part of our mission, to include women at the
    negotiating table, because we know that has a positive impact
    on the stability of negotiations.
        General Lyons, last spring, this is really to follow-up on
    Senator's Inhofe's comments about the KC-46, because last
    spring, you expressed real concerns about the retirement of
    legacy refueling tankers, due to the delays with the KC-46, and
    you had a brief exchange just know about that. But it sounds
    like you may begin to assign KC-46 air crews to operational
    missions as early that has summer.
        So, what has changed and why do you feel like we should
    begin doing that as early that has summer?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, a couple of things have changed since
    we talked about this last year. The first and probably most
    important is that Boeing acknowledged and agreed that they had
    the responsibility to fix the category (CAT) 1 deficiencies on
    the jet on the weapons system.
        So, in that context, the Air Force has gone to work to
    deliver interim capability. It will be fully operational, but,
    again, certainly conduct missions. They have presented that
    capability over time, so that is important. Plus, with an
    additional plus-up of Reserve Guard augmentation in a slight
    adjustment in the retirement profile against the KC-10, I am
    comfortable that we are in a good position, based on the work
    the Air Force has done to support day-to-day and crisis
    operations today.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I think that is very good news. That
    is, obviously, welcomed news to all of the KC-46 crews,
    including those at the Pease National Guard Base, where we were
    the first recipients of the KC-46. But I want to ask you,
    because I understand there is an issue that I had not heard
    about with respect to the transportable gallery lavatory
    system; essentially, the bathrooms that make missions
    problematic.
        Is this a new problem or have we known about this and what
    is the prospect to fix it?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, on those kinds of issues, I don't
    want to get in front of the Air Force. I will defer the program
    manager.
        There is a range of category deficiencies that are being
    worked by both, the Air Force and Boeing. I don't know enough
    to comment on that particular issue.
        Senator Shaheen. Will it impact our ability to fly missions
    with the KR-46 as early as this summer as you are hoping?
        General Lyons. I am not aware of any impact on initial
    capability release, but that doesn't mean that there aren't a
    wide range of deficiencies that still need to be remedied you
    know, by Boeing, before the jet is fully operational and
    capable.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Wolters, in a question from Senator Shaheen about
    Russia, you mentioned they were increasing their ground, air,
    and maritime efforts. In light of that, do you continue to
    support the additional two destroyers based in Rota?
        General Wolters. I do, Senator.
        As you well know for the last 12 months, the activity of
    the four destroyers that we have had access to, have been
    pivotal in securing deterrence.
        We also see increased maritime activity in the Arctic, in
    the Barents, to the central portion of the Atlantic Ocean, and
    the need for two additional destroyers in the area of
    indications and warnings and command and control, as well as,
    the lethality that they bring is what we need to continue to
    work for to have that competitive edge to ensure that we can
    continue to deter effectively.
        Senator Wicker. Let's expand on the Arctic.
        Now, China is an issue for us there, is it not, and can you
    elaborate on that.
        General Wolters. They are, Senator. Their investments in
    ports is significant.
        Senator Wicker. Do we have the capabilities we need to
    deter Russia and China in the Arctic presently?
        General Wolters. We do, and they are adequate, but our
    growth isn't matching theirs.
        Senator Wicker. Yeah, I heard you say adequate, in response
    to Senator Inhofe's question, also, and you mentioned an answer
    to a question that the recent budget numbers will slow down
    readiness.
        Let me just emphasize that we have in front of us the
    leading expert in this area of the world and that sort of
    merely adequate response and slow-down readiness is of concern,
    I think, to members on both sides of the dais here.
        One more thing. General Wolters, with regard to the Coast
    Guard, they have a statutory mission, but, also, they are very
    vital in assisting you with our national defense requirements;
    is that correct?
        General Wolters. It is, Senator. As you know, the Coast
    Guard actually recently produced an Arctic strategy.
        I will tell you as the commander of USEUCOM, there were
    many identifications in that strategy that were very, very
    helpful for future security in the Arctic region.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        Let's, then, shift, General Lyons, to military sealift and
    let you elaborate on an answer that you gave to Senator Reed.
    The GAO reported last year that, ``the U.S. flag, fleet
    shipyards and workforce have been in decline and the industry,
    as a whole, faces significant economic sustainability
    challenges.''
        Do you agree with this assessment and can you discuss how a
    diminished maritime industry impacts sealift during both,
    peacetime and conflict.
        General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question, and more
    importantly, thanks for being a strong advocate for sealift
    modernization and the acknowledgment of how important sealift
    is to deliver decisive force.
        I think you know that 33 of 50 of our roll-on/roll-off
    ships will reach end of life over the next 10 years. Industrial
    base is absolutely of critical importance and, you know, we
    have advocated for an acquired-use strategy, largely based on
    cost. There is a significant difference in cost differential,
    but there is also work required in conversion. So, we work
    closely with the Navy. I think the Navy has got the best pulse
    on the industrial base with regard to sealift.
        Senator Wicker. How helpful in your judgment, are the
    maritime security programs, stipends, and cargo-preference laws
    in supporting the maritime industry?
        General Lyons. Senator, I think they are critically
    important. We must maintain a U.S. flag that is reliable and
    accessible to support the Defense Department needs. So, those
    are critical programs.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Mr. Chair, I would yield back 23 seconds.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. We will
    put that on your account.
        Now, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. For General Wolters, I want to just
    continue along the questions that Senator Wicker and Senator
    Shaheen asked about Ukraine.
        The United States began providing lethal aid to Ukraine
    based on a 2014 authorization, The Support for Sovereignty,
    Integrity, Democracy, Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of
    2014. Do you believe that this lethal aid has helped Ukraine to
    deter Russian aggression and what changes would you make to our
    current lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine to help
    further a deterrence?
        General Wolters. Senator, I think those contributions have
    been very helpful. The other very notable change that has
    occurred in the environment was the establishment of the
    Multinational Joint Commission, which provided us an
    architecture to be able to take an all-domain, whole-of-
    government approach to some of the challenge that has occurred
    in Ukraine. From that, we were able to establish the Joint
    Military Training Group Ukraine that has afforded the Nations
    that are signators to the Multinational Joint Commission, and
    many NATO allies and partners, to contribute military training
    teams to episodically enter Ukraine and help train some of
    their forces to better defend their sovereign soil.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        In the EUCOM domain and in many other places, we have seen
    over the last decade, an increase in the strength and
    engagement with illiberal political forces, including the rise
    of totalitarianism, authoritarians, increasing popularity of
    far-right political groups and leaders, and we have seen
    significant democratic backsliding.
        How do you see these forces affecting our efforts to
    effectively deter Russia, strengthen our allies, and protect
    the values we have shared with our European allies for decades?
        General Wolters. They are an impact, Senator, and think we
    have to take a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance, whole-
    of-nation approach, and I think inside of NATO, we have done a
    better job with that. Number one, we are responsible, given our
    support to democratic values to tell the truth and we continue
    to profess the truth in the information environment and we are
    gaining campaign momentum with nations that want to be part of
    the alliance of NATO.
        Senator Gillibrand. For example?
        General Wolters. Precisely what is going on today in
    Ukraine with President Zelensky's open comments with respect to
    his desire to look westward and assist towards NATO.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        General Lyons, I want to ask a question about COVID. In the
    early stages of the pandemic, some of the early problems were
    faced were supply chain issues, including getting personal
    protective equipment (PPE) distribution, early-stage vaccine
    distribution.
        Based off your testimony, TRANSCOM has been instrumental in
    ensuring vaccine distribution was able to ramp-up through a
    functioning supply chain. As we continue vaccine distribution,
    what are some lessons learned that we can apply to, improve our
    success to prepare for another pandemic or other world
    emergency?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, thanks for the question.
        I have to say a large portion of the credit goes to General
    Perna and the lead at Warp Speed and the Federal Government
    effort. They worked through most of those issues. We were a
    supporting effort where they needed additional support.
        I think there is a task force now, looking from a national
    security perspective, that supply chain and implications to
    national security and national defense, and I think that is a
    worthy effort just to understand the source of many of the
    critical manufacturing and supplies and where they come from
    and where that supply chain might be vulnerable.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Another question on supply chain. TRANSCOM is the largest
    user of oil for the Federal Government and President Biden's
    interim national strategic guidance lists the climate crisis as
    one of our primary national security threats. From increased
    major weather events to migration crisis, due to climate
    change, fossil fuels should be at the front of our minds for
    strategic planning.
        What is TRANSCOM doing to mitigate these massive
    expenditures of fossil fuels?
        General Lyons. Well, ma'am, I first stated, to your point,
    I think the Department clearly understands, we all understand
    that climate is a driver of instability. Where there is
    instability, there is potential implications for the Department
    of Defense and for TRANSCOM.
        The Secretary has been clear. He is focused on climate as a
    priority and has stood up, a lead in that area. I think most of
    the efforts, to date, you know, you can appreciate the level at
    the installation, base level.
        I think in the operational energy realm, the sheer
    consumption of liquid energy is going to be a challenge for us,
    but it is something that we are going to have to take a look
    at.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Now, let me recognize Senator Fischer, via Webex.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
        General Wolters, as you know, the 55th Wing is
    headquartered in my state and the [inaudible] 135s and their
    crews provide a valuable contribution to EUCOM's mission from
    their base in Mildenhall. These planes provide a unique
    capability, but I am concerned that our overall demand for
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is greater
    than the capability that we currently possess.
        For that reason, I believe that it is essential that we not
    only continue investing in new ISR networks, but also that we
    maintain and modernize the high-end capabilities that we
    currently have in the RC-135 fleet.
        In light of that, how does the RC-135 fit into your current
    need for ISR, and if you could tell me overall what the
    percentage of EUCOM's ISR requirements are currently being met.
        General Lyons. Senator, the RC-135 is pivotal in our
    campaign with respect to indications and warnings and what it
    does from an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    standpoint to see the environment. As you pointed out, and we
    discussed yesterday, I think the concern we all have is when
    legacy systems go out and new systems come onboard, it has the
    potential to create a vacuum that the enemy can exploit. We
    have to be rock-solid in that transition to ensure that we have
    the requisite ISR to be successful.
        At USEUCOM, we have been very, very pleased over the course
    of the last several years with the improvement of the
    percentage of ISR that we have received. A lot of that is due
    to this Committee and the support through the European Defense
    Initiative (EDI).
        Right now, we are hovering at about 33 to 35 percent of our
    requirements being supported and compared to my brothers and
    sisters in other geographical COCOMs, we are in good shape.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
        General Lyons, in prior testimony, you said, ``we expect
    power projection will be contested in all domains.''
        Your mission is uniquely challenging to perform in
    contested spaces. Given that fact, what steps are you taking to
    make TRANSCOM more resilient to these threats?
        General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question.
        We fully acknowledge that the way we deployed in the past
    isn't the way that we will deploy and sustain the force in the
    future, and that we must be prepared to operate under all
    domain persistent attack. In that realm, we have looked at a
    wide range, as we look at the global mobility enterprise, we
    look at our potential vulnerabilities and how to buy down that
    risk.
        One such area, of course, is cyber, but there is a full
    range of areas, and to my point earlier about the integration
    of protection and fires and intelligence with the sustainment
    warfighting function will be critical as we, you know,
    understand that the Homeland is no longer a sanctuary.
        I have been very, very pleased with joint staff work on the
    joint warfighting concept. That includes an entire line of
    effort to elevate the importance of joint contested, a joint
    concept on contested logistics.
        Senator Fischer. Do you think it is vital that we a start
    to rethink or continue to rethink some of the fundamentals that
    are out there on how we operate logistics support?
        General Lyons. Senator, I believe that is----
        Senator Fischer. Really, if you could continue on with that
    train on examining the existing platforms and methods that we
    are currently using and looking at what is needed in the
    future.
        General Lyons. Yes, ma'am.
        I think what is critical as we look to the joint
    warfighting concept, so the character of warfare, as it changes
    as we continue to evolve, will drive changes in the character
    of logistics in the way that we are able to deploy and sustain
    the force on a global scale. We have got to continuously adapt.
        As we look at that and we understand those implications, we
    may find ourselves changing the way we fight, and I think, you
    know, in an all-domain set, we will, and that will change the
    character logistics. But we must be able to, as an imperative,
    to be able to project and sustain the force over global
    distances as a strategic comparative advantage.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Wolters, one aspect of the previous
    administration's realignment plan announced last year was an
    increase in forces around the Black Sea. I know the broader
    plan is currently under review, but can you talk about the
    importance of the Black Sea region and the rationale for
    increasing our presence there.
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator. We produced a NATO military
    strategy that stresses comprehensive defense and shared
    response in all geographical regions, in all domains, and
    seeking assistance from a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation.
    In Europe, what we discovered is we have, over the course of
    the last 3 years, had placed appropriate interests in the
    vicinity of the Baltics and we needed to make sure that we were
    giving the same due interest in the vicinity of the Black Sea,
    because we had to shore up in all geographical areas.
        So, that has been our approach. It has been successful and
    we will continue to comprehensively defend with shared
    response.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Let me recognize Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for your service and thank you for being here
    today.
        Let me ask, first, on the topic of vaccines, I want to
    follow-up on a couple of the questions that have been asked,
    most recently, Senator Gillibrand. Do you know how many of the
    men and women under your command, General, have been
    vaccinated?
        General Wolters. I do. Senator. We have a Tier 1
    vaccination plan; Tier 1 constitutes those in military uniform.
    We are at about 46 percent of that force being completely
    vaccinated, those that needed two shots.
        We are forecasted, based on the arrival of future vaccines,
    that have the entire Tier 1 force, those in military in Europe,
    vaccinated by the middle of July.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Have you encountered resistance or hesitancy?
        General Wolters. I'm sorry, Senator. I didn't catch all
    your question.
        Senator Blumenthal. Have you encountered resistance or
    hesitancy among the men and women in your command, to being
    vaccinated?
        General Wolters. We have not. We have the traditional
    deferral rate that we have seen across all of DOD, but our
    percentages are within the norms and, actually, slightly less.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask both of you, as you well
    know, the Secretary of Defense ordered that there be a review
    internally of white supremacists and extremist ideology. Could
    you give us your assessment of whether there is evidence of
    that impact or influence or adherence among the men and women
    under your command.
        General Lyons. Senator, I will take that, and I appreciate
    the question, because I think this is a critically important
    issue, not just for today, but into the future.
        Anything, I think, right, that degrades or violates our
    oath to the Constitution is incompatible with good order and
    discipline and military service. I think these first steps that
    the secretary has taken, regarding the stand-down, it may
    represent a very small percentage, and I guarantee it is a very
    small percentage, but it is something that we must contend
    with.
        I think the leadership of the Department is concerted and
    focused to deal with it long term. We are taking early steps
    now, and I think we will continue to persist on this issue.
        Senator Blumenthal. How widespread do you think it is?
        You say it is a small percentage. What is it your evidence?
        General Lyons. Senator, you know, my evidence is just 38
    years in uniform and now on the force. I am not at all
    dismissive of the problem, and I acknowledge that it does
    exist, but I would not characterize it as prevalent.
        We have an incredibly talented force of volunteers, the
    best America has to offer, but even with a small percentage, it
    is worthy of our leader effort to eliminate it from the force.
        Senator Blumenthal. What steps do you think should be
    taken?
        General Lyons. Well, Senator, as I mentioned, the stand-
    down, I think, is the first step, but out of that, I know the
    secretary got briefed just this past week on some of the
    insights from the services.
        I think there are other activities in terms of how we do
    selection and recruitment, how we transition military members
    out of the military so they are not susceptible to being
    recruited. I think there is a wide range of activities like
    that, that will develop over time as concerted lines of effort.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you think recruits or enlistees
    should be taken if they are members of organizations that
    espouse views associated with white supremacy or violent
    extremism?
        General Lyons. Senator, I would say, you know, when you get
    into some of the finer policy issues, there is a lot there.
    There is a lot packed in and I will defer to the policy experts
    on that.
        I do know clearly though, as a commander in the force, it
    is not consistent, an extremist behavior activity is not
    consistent with the values or the good order and discipline of
    what we need as a warfighting organization.
        Senator Blumenthal. I agree that it may be a small
    percentage, under 10 percent, but that is a large percentage in
    terms of its potential impact on the readiness and capability
    of our military and public support for our military.
        I welcome your focus on it and your characterization of it
    as a very important issue of policy.
        So, thank you for being here today and thank you for your
    continuing work on this issue, as well as so many others. Thank
    you.
        General Lyons. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking both of you for your
    service to our country, as well as your family's sacrifices.
    You dedicate your time to our country.
        I would like to begin by just talking a little bit about
    the challenge that we see right now, or the possible
    challenges, with regard to regional conflicts that could occur,
    Let me begin by just pointing out that most recently we have
    seen some very aggressive posturing by both, China, their
    incursions within Taiwan's airspace with larger and larger air
    groups, and second of all, within the European treater and
    Russia's aggression that we have been talking about earlier in
    the Committee meeting.
        Can you describe, briefly, the impact on the ability of
    your command in your professional military judgment, to execute
    its missions, if the United States became engaged in two
    conflicts and was forced to defend friends and allies in the
    Pacific and in Europe simultaneously.
        General Wolters?
        General Wolters. I can, Senator, and it starts with the
    appropriate approach. We have been very aggressive in Europe in
    making sure that we understand the importance of allies and
    partners in the process, and the importance of a comprehensive
    approach to regions, and the importance of not getting myopic
    in one region and forgetting what is happening in another
    region.
        Today, when you ask most military members in Europe if they
    have a concern, for example, about Russia, it will take at
    least 5 seconds to where the follow-on question is, do you have
    a concern about China?
        So, in the military, and in our Nations, we have don't to
    think big and we have to take a whole-of-government, whole-of-
    nation, whole-of-alliance approach to the security challenges
    that we face, and we have to be willing to look up and out of
    each one of our areas of responsibility.
        Senator Rounds. General Lyons?
        General Lyons. Sir, I think there should be no question to
    our commitment, as General Wolters mentioned, to our
    longstanding values-based international order, whether that is
    in the East or the West.
        From a TRANSCOM perspective, we assess, continuously, a
    full range of plans and contingencies that we might have to
    respond to. We look within the construct of the planning
    guidance and the plans themselves.
        I would be happy to discuss any of those kinds of questions
    in a closed hearing if you would like, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Both of you would agree that prior planning
    for the appropriate concerns or the different situations is
    critical, fair enough?
        General Lyons. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
        General Wolters. Yes, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Let's talk a little bit about what happens
    if we actually do have conflicts with either Russia or China.
    They would almost certainly attack the ports and the airfields,
    where we would load and unload troops and equipment.
        General Lyons, what are the implications of a contested
    environment on bulk fuel capacity distribution and storage, as
    well as traditional lines of communication. Are we effectively
    working contested logistics in our planning and taking into
    account the attrition into our war games yet?
        General Lyons. Senator, we have begun that journey and I
    appreciate the support of this Committee on that effort. Again,
    I am pleased with the joint staff's work, particularly as a
    concept, a joint concept for contested logistics that is under
    development to address these kinds of issues that we will then
    subsequently, you know, shape forces on, enforce capability
    work down the road.
        We know that we must be able to sustain and project a force
    under all domain persistent attack. That is fundamentally
    different than the way we have operated and integrated
    logistics in the past.
        Senator Rounds. General, the way that you answered my
    question, and I appreciate the way that you positioned your
    answer, saying that we have begun to look at it, I presume that
    would suggest there is a concern about the way that we have
    either done it in the past or that we are improving on our
    planning for that type of a contested environment.
        General Lyons. Well, Senator, I think that is accurate. I
    think, you know, as the character of warfare changes, so should
    the character of logistics and that we have to adapt to be able
    to continue to be successful.
        What made us successful previously won't necessarily make
    us successful in the future, so we have work to do.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
        Let me recognize Senator King, via Webex.
        Senator King. General Wolters, within the last hour since
    this hearing has been going on, a story broke about a leading
    spokesperson for the Russians, who is also known as an advisor
    to Putin, saying that war in Ukraine is inevitable. That it
    will start with a major cyberattack that could extend to this
    country, and that they have overwhelming conventional forces
    and that there is no way that they could be repelled from
    taking over the Donbas, if not, the entire country. I view this
    situation as extremely concerning.
        I guess my first question is, what is your reaction to the
    assertion that a Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine would be
    unstoppable. Do the Ukrainians have the weapons, the manpower,
    the training, the wherewithal to stop such an attempt at
    annexation?
        I have got to say, I am mightily reminded of 1938 and the
    Sudetenland and the German planes of liberating German-speaking
    people, and very similar things we are hearing from Russia.
        Talk to me about the preparation and the readiness of the
    Ukrainians and our readiness to assist them.
        General Wolters. Senator, as we discussed yesterday in our
    phone conversation, we are very concerned in Ukraine and their
    partners in the region are doing all that they can to improve
    their posture with each and every second as we go forward. So,
    if, in fact, an incursion does occur there, their best position
    for success, not only within their forces, but within their
    partners within the region.
        Senator King. But, do you believe they could repel an
    invasion that started next week?
        General Wolters. I certainly do, over time, Senator.
        Senator King. Well, I think they, let me follow-up a moment
    about the political situation in Eastern Ukraine.
        There are many Russian-speaking people there. What is the
    political mood in terms of loyalty to the country of Ukraine
    versus loyalty to Russia?
        General Wolters. Senator, I would categorize it as high
    loyalty to the country of Ukraine.
        Senator King. So, the claim that Russia would be liberating
    these people from Ukrainian control would not resonate in that
    region?
        General Wolters. I agree, Senator.
        Senator King. Have we communicated to the Russians, the
    fact that this, an invasion of this type would be met with a
    response that would serve as a deterrent?
        It seems to me the only thing we have right now is
    deterrence.
        General Wolters. Senator, I know that our senior civilian
    leadership have had conversations with their colleagues in
    Ukraine and at the senior level with Russia. I am not privy to
    all of the words that were exchanged, but I know that our
    senior leaders expressed deep concern about the robust
    activities in the Donbas and Crimea.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Let me turn for a moment. We mentioned China and Russia
    numerous times in this hearing. Do you see evidence in your
    area of responsibility (AOR) of increasing relationship
    cooperation, if you will, between Russia and China?
        Traditionally, at least in the recent past, they have been
    adversaries, or at least suspicious of one another. Do you see
    a developing cooperation, which would be inamicable to our
    interests?
        General Wolters. Senator, I see cooperation that is
    superficial at best. I think it is higher at the tactical
    level, soldier-to-soldier, and I think it is pretty close to
    phony at the strategic level.
        Senator King. Well, that is reassuring. I hope that is
    correct.
        General Lyons, you and I had an exchange last year about
    the potential gap in coverage for refueling. You have testified
    this morning that you feel that that is resolved.
        I just want to sort of nail that down, that if called upon,
    whether it is in the next 2 years or the next 5 to 7 years,
    which is, as I recall, the potential gap was identified, that
    we will have sufficient refueling resources to project power.
        General Lyons. Senator, I am comfortable and aligned with
    the Air Force's position on this. I think that we have to be
    clear that Boeing has a long way to deliver a full,
    operational, capable weapon system. But in the interim, I am
    confident with the capability that exists to meet day-to-day,
    competition, and crisis.
        Senator King. I am just about out of time, but does Boeing
    have, do we have a date for final delivery and deployment of
    the KC-46?
        General Lyons. Senator, on that, I will defer to the Air
    Force from a programmatic perspective. The latest estimate was
    in anticipation of at least a remedy for the remote visual
    system, next, which is a [inaudible] sometime in the 2023 time
    frame, at the earliest.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        General Lyons. It would take some time to field the
    capability after that.
        Senator King. Thank you, gentlemen, both for your
    testimony.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Let me recognize Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. We
    certainly appreciate your commitment, not only to the men and
    women within your commands, but to the furtherance of our
    objectives.
        So, I will start with you, General Wolters. Thank you very
    much. Let's talk a little bit more about our force posture in
    Europe.
        Senator King had just mentioned Russia and the conventional
    forces that they have available, but beyond just their human
    resources, they have other capabilities. They continue to
    modernize their military. They have a number of advanced
    capabilities like ballistic and cruise missiles; certainly,
    sophisticated air defenses, as we know, antisatellite weapons,
    electromagnetic, and cyberattacks. I could go on and on and on
    in this area.
        But these capabilities do pose a challenge to the United
    States, as well as our allies in that region, and, certainly
    our partners in the EUCOM AOR.
        They also continue with their operations, short of open
    conflict. So, they are operating in that gray zone area.
        So, how are we adapting our forces to those capabilities,
    to those challenges to push back on Russia and what they might
    be able to do in the future?
        General Wolters. Thank you, Senator.
        We are maximizing our focus to win in the competition phase
    and we are doing it through a very deliberate fashion to
    continue to improve our ability to see the environment with
    indications and warnings, our ability to respond with solid
    command and control, and our mission command, which
    characterizes the readiness of our forces forward being able to
    conduct all domain operations that take into account the
    desired effect, at the appropriate time and place of our
    choosing, to ensure that we can be most effective. That
    approach affords us the opportunity to counter many of the
    issues that you just mentioned.
        We are also, in accordance with the National Defense
    Strategy, working very diligently to increase our competitive
    edge in the areas of indications and warnings, command and
    control, and mission command.
        Senator Ernst. So, with that deliberative approach, you are
    working with our allied forces, as well, to make sure that we
    are nested, and each able to lean on one another, our strengths
    and for our weaknesses to provide pushback?
        General Wolters. Absolutely, Senator.
        The strategic alignment that is required is also outside of
    the military dimensions, so from a whole-of-government, whole-
    of-nation approach, whole-of-ally approach, we are doing the
    same.
        Senator Ernst. Great, and one thing, of course, being a
    National Guard member and being, of course, very aware and
    supportive of our State Partnership Program, you have mentioned
    the Baltics, but I was heavily involved in the Balkans with our
    State Partnership Program with Kosovo. I would just like to
    hear about how this program has been beneficial through your
    area of responsibility and how we can maybe further strengthen
    those partnership programs.
        General Wolters. Senator, we are very proud of the State
    Partnership Program, essentially yours in Kosovo, and as you
    well know, the 632 members of the United States that we rotate
    into K-4, many come from your state.
        It is a success area in NATO. The NATO secretary general is
    very, very fond to ensure that we keep a laser focus on the
    Balkans. But the biggest challenge that we face, and one that
    we have achieved a success with, is to make sure that the lanes
    in the road are perfectly understood between K-4 and the
    evolving Kosovo security force. The exist on our Kosovo force
    has been instrumental in ensuring that we each understand our
    lanes.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, very good.
        Just very briefly, and thank you, sir, General Lyons, I am
    going to push on the KC-46s, as well. I was able to go out on a
    flight yesterday in a KC-46 with a number of others in a
    delegation, and it was a great opportunity to really see this
    aircraft in motion and work.
        We refueled some F-15s. We have got some great boom
    operators that are training a lot of really wonderful airmen
    out there.
        This is very important to the Iowa National Guard, as well.
    We still have the KC-135s. We are anxious to move into the KC-
    46, as soon as Boeing does a little more work.
        How important are your planning moves involving the
    National Guard, are you considering the rotation for the
    Reserves, the National Guards, their deployments, and so forth,
    as we move those 46s into those areas?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, first of all, thanks for taking time
    out on Andrews yesterday on the ramp there; really, it just
    acknowledges what an important capability aerial refueling is.
        I would just say it is largely misunderstood or
    underappreciated how much the Guard, and the Reserve, but
    especially the Air Guard, contributes every single day to the
    output of the aerial refueling force element, whether that be
    overseas or here in the Continental United States on short
    script alert, day-in and day-out.
        I think my own opinion is that the Air Force does this best
    in terms of total force integration. It is completely
    integrated today. It is absolutely seamless to me. When I see
    units out there in the field, I can't tell the difference which
    component they belong to.
        Senator Ernst. Fantastic.
        Gentlemen, again, I appreciate it very much.
        Mr. Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Chairman.
        I want to thank both of you for your service and your
    family's commitment and service to allow you to have the
    opportunities you have to serve our country.
        General Wolters, the European Union and Russia have built a
    strategic partnership in trade, energy, climate-change,
    research, education, culture, and security. The crisis in
    Ukraine in Crimea increased sanctions from both, the United
    States and the European Union (EU) for various violations, but
    they seem to have limiting effects.
        So, my question would be, understanding that the EU is
    Russia's biggest trading partner, and Russia is the EU's
    fourth-largest, are sanctions in their current forms, a viable
    solution to shaping Russia's actions?
        General Wolters. Senator, I certainly agree that they
    contribute in shaping Russia's actions. I will also say that
    living in Europe, that there is a high degree of convergence at
    the strategic level between what the EU does and what NATO
    does, and for a military member in charge of military
    operations, I will tell you that the EU contributions in the
    area of transportation are a significant boost in our ability
    to effectively deter.
        Senator Manchin. A threat that I have been essentially
    concerned with the continuing development of the Nord Stream
    Pipelines. Not only do they create a further dependence, they
    inure on Russia gas and oil, but they also bypass transit
    countries like Ukraine and our former Soviet NATO members,
    which could hold them hostage.
        Your thoughts on that?
        General Wolters. I share your concerns, Senator. It is
    disconcerting to see what happens with the Nord Stream 2
    Pipeline and to the countries that it reaches out to, and the
    fact that several of those countries are going to potentially
    be put in the position to where their reliance on Russian fuel
    is far higher than it should be. It is of grave concern to me.
        Senator Manchin. Do you have any thoughts on how you would
    see a potential armed conflict playing out with our allies,
    whose economies are closely tied to Russia?
        General Wolters. Well, I would promote those nations to do
    what we do in the United States, which is to store fuel
    appropriately, and we do with other nations within Europe, to
    ensure that we have the resources within to be able to execute
    whatever it is we need to do to effectively deter and defend.
        Senator Manchin. You all are coordinating with them on
    that?
        General Wolters. We are, Senator.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        General Lyons, the level of coordination, fleet readiness
    in response to combatant commanders in light of the COVID
    pandemic that TRANSCOM provided is nothing short of amazing.
    You all have done an unbelievable job.
        The global threat from rational and irrational states and
    actors is ongoing and the rise of humanitarian support and
    crisis mitigation is enduring.
        What are your concerns, if called today, to support an
    armed conflict, force projection, sustainment, and redeployment
    in a contested environment, while also potentially called to
    support humanitarian missions on opposite sides of the world?
        General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question.
        We know that the security environment is changing quite
    rapidly. We know that the character of war is changing quite
    rapidly, and so should the character of logistics.
        So, our ability to project the force and sustain the force
    over global distances is a key strategic comparative advantage
    that we all understand that we must maintain. As we look at
    that ability and we look at it from the lens of a potential
    adversary and where there might be vulnerabilities,
    particularly vulnerabilities of consequence, we are, in fact,
    addressing those and buying down the risk associated with
    those.
        I am confident in our ability today to continue to project
    the force and support the force at our time and place of
    choosing. But I do acknowledge that we have work to do, too, in
    anticipation of a more sophisticated adversary.
        Senator Manchin. Let me follow-up on my final question.
    General Lyons, you spoke about the success of the DOD's power
    projection capabilities being contingent on three critical
    elements: global mobility posture, global transport capacity,
    and global command and control integration.
        So, what allied shortfalls currently exist to support these
    critical requirements if called to surge forces in support of
    the EU?
        General Lyons. Senator, I have to say I am very pleased
    with the enormous constellation of like-minded allies and
    partners that support the United States security interests
    abroad. We could not operate the global mobility enterprise
    successfully without the access, base, and overflight that they
    provide in the extension of our broad and far-reaching
    logistics networks. So, I am very pleased with our allies and
    partners and I am very grateful for their continued support.
        Senator Manchin. I know you spoke about Russia's moving on
    Ukraine and Crimea, again, and everything, and we wish all of
    our allies and under your all's leadership the most success,
    because that would be severely critical for all of us if they
    continue to do what they are doing right now.
        But, again, thank you, both, for your service.
        General Lyons. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Now, let me recognize Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, welcome. Thanks for your service.
        I wasn't planning on raising this question, but since it
    came up from Senator Blumenthal, you know, I just got back from
    a week in Marine Corps Reserve training. It is great to serve
    with such fine men and women, but this notion of extremism in
    the military, which is thrown about as if we know numbers,
    Senator Blumenthal thought 10 percent.
        I think that is irresponsible. I have asked from the
    military, data. I want data before we besmirch the entire
    military.
        The under secretary nominee came before this hearing and
    said he was going to, ``stamp out systemic racism within the
    ranks of the military.''
        I asked him, have you ever served in the ranks?
        No.
        Sir, we need to be careful with this. I am just going to
    ask you 2 generals, who have served your whole career, do you
    think that we have this giant group of extremists in the
    military?
        I think it is one of the best group of Americans who aren't
    racist. You have knuckleheads in every organization in the
    world, including the Congress of the United States, by the way,
    but there is this narrative now that we have all these
    extremists in the military. I think it is ridiculous and we
    need to see data before we start throwing out issues like 10
    percent.
        How the hell does he know it is 10 percent?
        What do you think, gentlemen, do you think you serve in the
    military with a bunch of extremists?
        General Wolters. Senator, I concur with you. I don't see a
    giant portion of the population.
        Senator Sullivan. It really makes me mad.
        The Washington Post, U.S. Senators besmirching the whole
    damn force irresponsibly.
        General, what is your experience?
        We have bad people, of course, idiots in any organization,
    but this is getting ridiculous when a U.S. senator is saying 10
    percent. Where the hell did he get that number?
        One in ten, is that your experience, General?
        General Lyons. Senator, let me be perfectly clear. I think
    we have the finest military our world has every known. I think
    we----
        Senator Sullivan. Me, too. I believe that, and I serve with
    them. I just got done serving with them.
        General Lyons. Sir, I appreciate that.
        We have the best that America has to offer. There is no
    question in my mind, after 38 years of service. I believe that
    in my heart. I know it to be true.
        A very small, very small, and----
        Senator Sullivan. Ten percent? Do you think it is 10
    percent?
        General Lyons. Senator, I don't think it is 10 percent.
        Senator Sullivan. Not even close, is it?
        General Lyons. As a matter of fact, I don't think there has
    been any data on the topic. I can just tell you from
    experience, it is extremely small, and even though it is
    extremely small, and it might be less that 1 percent, I don't
    want to be dismissive of----
        Senator Sullivan. No, of course, not.
        General Lyons.--potential degradation in the ranks. But it
    should not characterize the joint force.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you think it is 10----
        General Lyons. We have an enormously powerful and
    professional joint force.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General.
        Do you think it is 10 percent, General? Anything in your
    experience, in your 30, 40-plus years as a general officer in
    the military?
        General Wolters. Senator, I certainly agree that number is
    too high.
        Senator Sullivan. Yeah. So, here is what I think the
    Secretary of Defense needs to do. Enough of this. We need data.
    We need data, okay, and besmirching the whole damn Force,
    Reserve or Active Duty, whether it is a U.S. senator, the
    Washington Post, which writes a story on this once a day with
    no data, or the under secretary, who wants to be under
    secretary. I hope he is not going to be under secretary for the
    Pentagon.
        We need to start using data and not this BS. That is
    shameful, because I don't even think it is close to 10 percent.
        You know what we are going to do?
        This is going to make people not want to join the military.
    So, anyway, I was not going to even go on this topic, but when
    I hear a U.S. senator throw out 10 percent, it is ridiculous.
    Ridiculous. It is really pissing me off.
        Sorry, Mr. Chairman. I have had enough of this.
        General, can I talk about the Russian Arctic buildup and
    what we need to be doing about it. You know, we have this
    strange scenes of COCOMs.
        The actions in the Arctic, which is kind of EUCOM, but
    Pacific Command (PACOM) owns a lot of the forces. Strategic
    Command (STRATCOM) has a big responsibility in the Arctic, as
    well, with missile defense.
        What is happening there, it is even more than what has
    happened recently, and what should we be doing about it and how
    to think about it?
        General Wolters. Senator, I think the campaign momentum is
    traversing in the correct direction with your great work over
    the source of the last several years, all of the services,
    U.S., DOD, and the NATO military strategy, and the NATO concept
    for deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic, specifically,
    points to the fact that we must have an Arctic strategy of, and
    nations' militaries are constructing strategies that must
    include considerations for activities in the Arctic.
        So, the focus and the architecture and approving the
    resources are growing. As you well know, through your
    initiatives, we were able to house P-8s and F-35s at Keflavik
    for the first time, and most of what they did was contribute to
    indications and warnings (I&W) in the vicinity of the Arctic.
    Getting the NATO nations, not just the ones that are about the
    Arctic, but all involved in the process, is occurring through
    the good work of the secretary general.
        So, I believe that our campaign momentum is going in the
    correct direction from strategy all the way down to
    requirements.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
        Let me recognize via Webex, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate this hearing, and thank you, gentlemen, for
    your lifetime of service to this nation. We really appreciate
    everything that you do every day and to all of the servicemen
    and women that are under your command.
        I would like to speak a little bit today about
    cybersecurity. Our NATO allies, of course, are essential to
    ensuring U.S. cybersecurity. We rely on our allies to Harden
    our collective defenses against frequent and sophisticated
    cyber threats.
        Cybersecurity has increasingly become an area of focus for
    NATO. They are holding the largest cyber exercise in the world
    to operating a cyberspace operations center in Belgium.
        General Wolters, what are the most significant cyber
    threats that the NATO alliance is facing and can you
    specifically describe to us the cyberthreat our European allies
    are facing from Russia.
        General Wolters. Thanks for the question, Senator. It is a
    great topic.
        I will tell you that I excited about the fact that from a
    U.S. perspective, our force presentation by selecting one
    military commander to lead military cyber, as General Nakasone,
    has allowed us to deliver clear direction and guidance to the
    Nations that assist us in the cyber arena.
        Our manning is much better for all of the organizations and
    the organizations have continued to perpetuate the Nations, the
    importance of improving the Nations' cyber hygiene in the
    network.
        As you well know, we still have a long way to go in that
    area, but nations have to make sure they understand what it
    takes and how to defend their networks, and then they can start
    to get into other areas of cyber deliverance of forces. I am
    very, very pleased to report that the manning across NATO
    nations, with respect cyber activity has improved and the focus
    on improving our cyber hygiene has improved across the European
    nations.
        Senator Rosen. That is terrific, because that was one of my
    next questions. What are you doing to prevent, mitigate, and
    recover from cyberattacks?
        But how can we help you? How should we be coordinating or
    what do you think you need to coordinate better with our allies
    in this realm?
        General Lyons. In Europe, we have had the opportunity to
    lead from the front with respect to the U.S.C. 2 in cyber. We
    have had the opportunity with the assistance of other European
    nations to educate the masses on the appropriate steps forward
    in the cyber domain, and we are getting great support from all
    nations who want to protect their networks.
        I think what we have to do is just continue the campaign
    momentum that we are currently on and continue the advocacy
    from NATO and the EU in the cyber domain.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        General Lyons, I want to kind of continue on this and talk
    a little bit about cloud migration. TRANSCOM was, of course,
    the first DOD organization to move its cyber capabilities and
    command and control applications to a commercial cloud
    environment.
        So, General Lyons, can you provide us with an update on the
    migration to the services to the cloud. Are you experience the
    benefits and what are you feeling about this?
        What are your best practices? Again, what do you think you
    need going forward as you move everything to the cloud and
    begin to work there?
        General Lyons. Well, Senator, thanks for the question, and
    I appreciate the topic here because I think we all acknowledge
    that cyber is a warfighting domain and the adversary does get a
    vote, particularly, across a global mobility enterprise. We
    know we have a very large and sometimes vulnerable attack
    surface, and so we are working very diligently for that.
        One of the areas, as you mentioned, Senator, is our digital
    modernization effort, and part of that is moving to the cloud.
    We have been able to move well over 20 systems into the cloud.
    We are still working on virtualization in some of these areas,
    but we are making progress.
        I think the cloud does offer some capability and some
    security that we don't have today, and so I am pleased with the
    progress we have started, but we still have a ways to go.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I actually
    would like to move on and talk a little bit about TRANSCOM
    COVID-19 operations.
        So, General Lyons, can you describe the short-term and
    long-term impacts that COVID-19 has had on TRANSCOM's
    operations as you are moving forward, and how have you
    supported DOD's mission to respond to COVID-19?
        General Lyons. Thank you, Senator. I have to say I couldn't
    be more proud of the entire TRANSCOM team at the way that they
    have been continuing to operate throughout the entire past
    year, despite COVID, while taking the appropriate mitigation
    measures.
        You know, early on, we really didn't know what we didn't
    know, but I am so proud that the folks were able to continue
    operations. We were able to continue to support the force.
    Things like Defender Europe continued to a lesser degree, in
    supporting General Wolters. We were able to support the whole-
    of-government effort. We were able to conduct aerosol testing
    for commercial aircraft, for example, to determine that the
    probability for viral spread aboard a commercial airliner with
    high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration and high
    velocity air exchange is extraordinarily low.
        So, we have been able to work a wide range of things to
    include trading capability to move highly infectious patients.
    So, I really am incredibly grateful for the team to be able to
    face that level of adversity and just continue to drive on.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Cramer?
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Senator.
        Thank you, Generals, both for being here, for your service,
    of course.
        Right up front, let me just associate myself with the
    statements and the questions from Senator Sullivan, and I
    appreciate your direct responses.
        It is time for Members of this Committee and leaders
    throughout our Government, as well as, well we can't expect
    much from the media, but to start being accurate in
    representing that you represent the best of us, not the worst
    of us, the absolute best of us, and that is my observation with
    the vast, vast majority of the military men and women that I
    encounter. So, thank you for your service.
        I will pass on asking you, General Wolters, about ISR. I
    appreciate your previous response to that. I have some concern
    about the gap being created between the legacy and new
    programs. I want to be a part of the solution, so I appreciate
    your balanced answer.
        I will ask you about our outstanding nuclear deterrent and
    its role currently, as well as going forward. We know that our
    credible deterrent is our Triad and it is the backstop for most
    of our operational plans around the world.
        My question for you is, if the United States didn't have
    this credible, nuclear umbrella, would that change Europe's
    conventional and nuclear posture?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator. I think that it would.
        Senator Cramer. What could be the ramifications of them not
    feeling safe under our umbrella?
        General Wolters. I think that is the precise issue. We are
    not certain to the degree that we would be compromising safety
    and security.
        Senator Cramer. If that happens, could we see, as they
    changed their posture, you know, the build-out of more allies,
    of course, I guess?
        General Wolters. That is possible, Senator.
        Senator Cramer. All right. Then, I am going to shift gears
    to a question of energy and ask you, specifically, do you
    believe that completion of Nord Stream 2 would affect the
    leverage that Russia has over our allies in Europe?
        General Wolters. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cramer. Because one of the other peripheral issues
    that we sometimes get into around here, besides our military
    and posture and lethality and readiness is climate, and these
    aren't unimportant issues. I don't want to make the case that
    they are.
        But I want to give you just one example that concerns me a
    little bit. I have asked many of your peers about the
    monitoring, for example, of Iran's tankers and the movement of
    energy, fossil energy in unsafe parts of the world.
        But in Europe, we know of a situation a few months ago
    where ENGIE Power in France, it made a large contract of
    liquid, natural gas from the United States. The French
    Government intervened in that.
        The French Government used to be a wholly-owned, the sole
    owner of ENGIE Power, now they are just like a 49 percent
    owner, but they intervened and said, no, we want to continue
    buying natural gas from Vladimir Putin. I am not sure that a
    lot of people around here grasp the magnitude of a decision
    like that.
        Now, your issue, of course, is national security, as is our
    Committee's, but for those people who want to sort of transfer
    their climate guilt to other parts of the world, they should
    know that Vladimir Putin's natural gas, sent by pipeline, to
    places like France and other European countries and allies of
    ours, emits about 40 percent more greenhouse gases than liquid
    natural gas produced and shipped from the United States of
    America.
        So, I guess what I would just request, and you give very
    good, direct answers to questions, but we need to help our
    public better understand the ramifications of climate change,
    globally, and the ramifications of hurting America's domestic
    production of fossil fuels that are in high demand around the
    world, and not let our allies, much less adversaries, be
    dependent more on not as clean, and certainly not as secure
    energy resources as the alternatives, the American, clean, good
    energy is.
        So, with that, I thank you and yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Lyons, I have a series of questions for you
    regarding sealift recapitalization. In your statement to the
    Committee, you point out that 33 of our 50 roll-on/roll-off
    sealift ships are scheduled for retirement in the next 10
    years.
        In last year's NDAA, Congress took steps to bolster the
    government's ability to purchase additional, used foreign
    vessels currently on the market to augment the ready reserve
    force.
        First question. How do you assess the progress of
    recapitalizing our sealift fleet?
        General Lyons. Senator, thanks for that we.
        We spent a lot of time on this issue with the Secretary of
    Defense over the last year and, in fact, the Cost Assessment
    and Program Evaluation (CAPE) issue team was formed around this
    specific issue. I think we are headed in the right direction.
    We have got good alignment on the strategy. We have good
    support here on the Hill with the authorizations, and we have
    some money in the program by the Navy.
        We are, quite frankly, about a year behind where I wanted
    to be. Where I wanted to be is, at the end of last fiscal year,
    to be able to buy the first two authorized ships. Those ships
    that were authorized by the NDAA a couple of years ago.
        So, due to some GAO protest issues with the Maritime
    Administration, that has been delayed a little bit, but they
    are on track for the end of this year to deliver those first
    two ships.
        Senator Hirono. Same question, General.
        Do the current sealift recapitalization plans sufficiently
    address the potential for attrition during a conflict with a
    near-peer competitor like China or Russia?
        General Lyons. Senator, as we work through the Mobility
    Capabilities and Requirements Study, as directed by Congress,
    one of the things that we are doing is we are considering the
    future joint concepts, as well as the contested environments
    that we know in the future that we will face. We were able to
    assess and do assess some level of elevated risk in terms of
    our ability to deliver the force on the timelines that the
    combatant commanders desire, and so we are evaluating that now.
        By policy, we don't force size based on attrition, but we
    do acknowledge the significant implications of attrition in any
    environment and the need to mitigate that largely through the
    integration of more warfighting effects.
        Senator Hirono. Therefore, is your answer that the
    assessments that you are doing currently address the attrition
    issue that I asked you?
        General Lyons. Senator, we do. We address losses. We do.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        The last question for this series, Section 3511 of last
    year's NDAA provided authority to establish a tanker security
    program, subject to the results of a mobility requirements
    study.
        Do you have sufficient results from the study to determine
    whether the tanker security program needs to be implemented?
        General Lyons. Ma'am, we do. We have looked at this as,
    again, a congressionally directed study in concert with some
    other agencies.
        We do support, and I appreciate the congressional interest
    initiative here to create a tanker security program. We think
    there is value in that. We think it is important that we have
    assured access to U.S. flag tanker capacity in the event we
    have to surge the mobility enterprise and the liquid energy
    enterprise.
        Senator Hirono. Again, General Lyons, I have a question
    relating to the fact that TRANSCOM is working closely with
    industry partners like SpaceX on the viability of using space-
    based vehicles to rapidly deliver time-sensitive logistics
    anywhere in the world.
        Now, this technology is a potential game changer,
    especially in the Indo-Pacific AOR where commanders are
    confronted with the [inaudible] of distance and time when
    moving people and parts from one location to another.
        General Lyons, can you provide me with a general overview
    of the progress being made in space mobility and what
    additional authorities you need from Congress to help you
    accelerate this technology.
        General Lyons. Thank you, ma'am, for highlighting this. We
    are working closely with a couple industry partners to include
    SpaceX, as well as the Air Force and the Space Force on this
    particular issue.
        If you think about the possibility, and it is a real
    possibility, to be able to take a C-17 load, let's say 18 short
    tons, and lift it off and deliver it anywhere on the face of
    the global in less than 60 minutes, that is a real possibility
    in the near term.
        Senator Hirono. Uh-huh.
        General Lyons. While we can't scale that to the entire
    requirement of the mobility enterprise, to your point, Senator,
    it offers us great flexibility and I think it creates a
    powerful dilemma for potential adversaries to move very, very
    rapidly.
        Senator Hirono. You will let us know if you need further
    support or authorization to move us on this use of this,
    development of this technology?
        General Lyons. I will, ma'am, and we do not at this time
    but thank you for that.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator.
        Let me recognize Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed.
        General Lyons and General Wolters, thank you for your
    service. Thank you for your willingness to defend the integrity
    of the men and women that put on the uniform and defend the
    freedoms of this country.
        General Wolters, while my primary concern is our military's
    readiness to deal with the threat of Communist China I remain,
    of course, concerned about Russia's attempt to destabilize
    NATO, harbor allies, harm the United States through
    cyberattacks, and catch up to some advanced weaponry, like
    hypersonic weapons.
        I am also aware of the potential for Communist China and
    Russia to cooperate to try and harm us.
        How ready do you believe your command is to deal with these
    threats and do you have all that you need, and are you
    concerned, as I am, about a potential cut to the defense budget
    under President Biden?
        General Wolters. Senator, we are concerned about all of
    those threats. I would certainly agree with every one of the
    categories that you pointed out.
        As a traditional commander, I will tell you that I have a
    force that is getting faster every day and is better postured
    every day, but I am never satisfied with our speed and posture.
    So, in that light, our current resourcing is adequate to
    continue the campaign momentum to improve our indications and
    warnings, our command and control, and our readiness.
        With a reduction in those resources, from a monetary
    perspective, there would be a corresponding degradation in our
    capabilities in those areas, but as we speak, it is adequate
    and my suspicion going forward is we will have adequate
    resources to effectively win in competition, if called upon to
    do so, but we must continue to improve our competitive
    advantage in all of the areas that you point out and I have
    pointed out from an I&W and C2 perspective.
        Senator Scott. So, if you saw a cut in the defense budget,
    where would you, what could you cut? If you had to cut things,
    what would you reduce?
        General Lyons. I would have to take an incremental
    reduction in ISR that supports I&W and an incremental reduction
    in C2 that supports our ability to respond. I would make sure
    that we are adequately resourced in the mission command/
    readiness area.
        Senator Scott. How long would you be able to do that before
    you have to say to yourself, you have to say that you are not
    ready?
        General Lyons. It just depends on the magnitude of
    reduction, and I don't have the specifics on what the budget
    looks like, but based off the evidence I have today, I think
    from an adequacy standpoint, we are in good shape for the near
    term, between now and the next 5 years.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        General Wolters, it is clear that Turkey and their
    President Erdogan is not our ally and not a helpful member of
    NATO. I met with Erdogan during the Trump Administration, along
    with some of my Republican colleagues to question him about
    Turkey's ongoing relationship with Russia.
        I also introduced legislation calling for sanctions against
    Turkey for purchasing the S-400 air and missile defense system
    for the Russian Federation and questioned their membership in
    NATO.
        It seems like only Erdogan has gotten worse. So, what are
    your thoughts about the value of our relationship, is there any
    value today in that relationship with Turkey, and where do you
    see it going?
        General Wolters. There is, Senator.
        I must tell you, they remain a vital NATO partner, and I
    will tell you from a military perspective, Turkey being the
    second-largest military in NATO, they do assist greatly in the
    area of deterrence and competition.
        One of the reasons we have such trust, mil-to-mil, is the
    fact that the 2300 United States military members that live and
    work each day on Turkish soil are appointed and given
    tremendous force protection consideration on behalf of the
    Turkish military, and that trust, from a mil-to-mil
    perspective, remains very, very high.
        But, as you said, they are no longer part of the F-35 parem
    with the United States. We understand the decisions that they
    made with respect to the S-400. We understand that sanctions
    are working. We will continue to work with our military
    counterparts, but as we move forward, mil-to-mil, they remain a
    very vital NATO military partner.
        Senator Scott. Did you ever understand why they did the S-
    400. I mean, does it make any sense to you?
        General Wolters. Senator, it doesn't, unless it was for the
    purpose of an easy way out with respect to money.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to both of you for your service to our country.
        General Wolters, I would like to begin with Nagorno-
    Karabakh and what has happened there. In your opening
    statement, you alluded to the conflict only in the context of
    Russia's role in brokering a cease-fire agreement in November.
        But I would appreciate your thought as the Supreme Allied
    Commander in Europe on some of the broader implications for
    regional stability. Foremost on my mind is the fact that
    Azerbaijan is still reportedly holding an estimated 200
    Armenian prisoners of war and civilian captives.
        Now, I understand that is a diplomatic endeavor, outside of
    your area, but as someone who is in charge of watching that
    area very closely, I would like your view on this unresolved
    issue.
        General Wolters. Nagorno-Karabakh has remained a frozen
    conflict. Obviously, the activities over the course of the last
    90 days were concerning to all.
        One of the things that I will mention, Senator, that I was
    proud to report on was the active involvement of many NATO
    nations on the periphery to assist in calling for
    reconciliation and calming of tensions. When it was all said
    and done, I think most of us believed that this was curtailed
    sooner, rather than later, as a result of the interests of
    nations in the region to be part of the solution in rectifying
    the situation.
        There still is an unfortunate set of circumstances that
    remain with result to the territorial disputes, but there is
    goodness in the fact that observation posts have been created
    jointly by nations in the region and our ability to see the
    environment is greater than it was in the past.
        We still have a lot of work in front of us to make sure
    that from an observation perspective, nations agree that the
    contracts that they signed up to, so that we can achieve more
    productive campaign momentum with respect to achieving peace in
    the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK).
        Senator Peters. Thank you, and from a military perspective,
    Azerbaijan's drone fleet certainly highlighted the
    vulnerabilities of sophisticated weapons systems, tanks, radar,
    surface-to-air missiles. They did not have specific drone
    defenses.
        Has that affected how you prioritize counter-UAS [unmanned
    aircraft system] capabilities in your area of responsibility
    and what more do we need to do?
        General Wolters. I would tell you, Senator, I wasn't
    surprised with any of the actions that took place in the
    vicinity of Nagorno-Karabakh with respect to small UAS, and as
    you know, based off of many of your good efforts in the past,
    we have a dedicated DOD lead with respect to countering small
    UAS. I think the campaign momentum, with respect to
    comprehensive missile defenses improving so that we can counter
    that kind of capability against us.
        So, we are traversing in a productive direction with
    respect to countering small UASes.
        Senator Peters. Well, I had an opportunity to see some of
    that just recently down at the Yuma Proving Ground, where I
    know you are testing those defenses and opening up a process
    from the Department of Army, at large, but clearly, you are
    weighing in heavily in the need for that type of technology to
    be developed and I appreciate that.
        General Lyons, your opening statement reported a
    partnership with Cyber Command to implement Zero Trust on your
    network environment. But TRANSCOM relies heavily on commercial
    shipping, in fact, if I look at the numbers, 95 percent for
    steady state sealift operations, 90 percent for ground steady
    state and contingency operations, and 90 percent for air
    passenger.
        So, my question to you is, how do you ensure that your
    network environments for your commercial partners are secure?
        General Lyons. Yeah, Senator, it is a great question. We
    spend a lot of time both, on the Department of Defense
    information networks (DODIN) and off the DODIN, non-DODIN
    activities that were relied upon to understand the full
    spectrum and potential vulnerabilities of the mobility
    enterprise.
        We work closely with our industry partners. We have
    consistent cyber hygiene language in all of our contractual
    relationships, but more importantly, we are talking to the
    senior leadership of all of these companies. They submit self-
    assessments on their own cyber scorecard. We provide insights
    on best practices. We are developing a proof of principle for a
    third-party verification. Basically, this would be a new
    venture for the Department to be able to confirm or deny cyber
    compliance.
        So, a lot of work going on in that area. The industry
    partners are coming along, but I don't want to mislead anybody
    to think that we some magic ability to protect commercial
    partners, you know, from an advanced, persistent threat.
        I would say, though, that it is bigger than cyber. So,
    resiliency is bigger than just the network's piece; it is
    always the physical redundancy that we have to ensure that we
    have many readiness providers. I am confident with our approach
    on that.
        Senator Peters. I realize you facilitate annual self-
    assessments based on just guidelines.
        Where do those assessments lead and is there more work that
    we need to do?
        General Lyons. Senator, there is always more work to do.
    They come in at an executive level. We share those assessments.
    You know, for example, a concern might be multi-factor
    authentication from a cyber hygiene perspective. So, we have
    those conversations.
        I find that inside the boardrooms today, they are very
    cyber savvy and committed and want to improve their cyber
    posture. So, we are pushing on an open door.
        Senator Peters. All right. Thank you.
        General Lyons. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters, and
    now, via Webex, Senator Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        To each of you, I say thank you for your service. We are
    greatly appreciative of the work that you do every single day.
        General Lyons, let me stay with you there on the
    cybersecurity issue. TRANSCOM does have a high volume of
    strategic mobility missions on a daily basis. There are varying
    levels of detail, and so as we move personnel and equipment in
    and out of the different theaters, how much of that information
    is communicated across classified versus unclassified networks?
        General Lyons. Senator, I think you are aware that a great
    deal of our information is moved across unclassified networks,
    both inside the DODIN and, of course, outside the DODIN. That,
    unto itself, isn't the risk, as long as we take the proper
    procedures and we take the proper measures of defense and
    encryption. But a large volume of our information does move
    across unclassified networks.
        Senator Blackburn. Yes. I think it would be helpful if we
    had a percentage and kind of a threshold at which we need to
    classify some information for force protection purposes, but
    not others for communicating pertinent details to uncleared
    personnel. That is an area that, in my opinion, would deserve a
    little bit of a deeper dive and a bit more attention.
        General Wolters, the NATO 2030 Report identifies China as a
    full-spectrum systemic rival, and that is something that I
    agree with.
        It is not only, China is not only a security threat, a
    national security threat, they are an economic threat. The way
    they are pushing the belt and road initiative, the way they are
    pushing debt diplomacy, is something that should give us pause,
    because it all feeds in to the civil military fusion that they
    practice and live every single day.
        So, since the last time you were before us at this
    Committee and we discussed this issue, what has, and I am
    quoting now, your comment, expanding the competitive space,
    meant to EUCOM, specifically, for competition with China, and
    how does this affect the work we do, the mobility,
    interoperability with our NATO allies?
        General Wolters. It has a large effect, Senator, and I
    think it is an imperative as a result of the way that China
    conducts activities for us to take a whole-of-government,
    whole-of-nation, whole-of-military, all-domain approach, with
    the activities of China, as they bear on the European
    continent.
        We are obviously very concerned with respect to Huawei 5G.
    We are obviously very concerned with respect to the
    proliferation of their involvement with sea ports and air
    aerial ports, and we are paying very, very close attention to
    all of those areas.
        In the information environment, as a nation who supports
    democratic value as being part of an alliance that supports
    democratic values, we have told the truth about some of the
    sacrifices that nations would make if they continue to endeavor
    in 5G. We have actually seen a little bit of the turning of the
    tied with respect to China and 5G Huawei; nations electing to
    go in different directions.
        As you well know, Senator, the United Kingdom made that
    call recently and ran a position on the European continent
    where several other nations are doing the same. So, vigilance
    remains sky-high and there must be an all-domain approach and a
    whole-of-government, whole-of-nation approach to this
    challenge.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, I agree with you on that, and I
    fully believe that if we look at China as a problem set that we
    need to solve, that we are going to have to have our allies
    working with us as we look at this as a problem set.
        So, talk with me for just a couple of minutes, if you will,
    about any physical roadblocks that may be there or any
    regulatory roadblocks that would prohibit movement of our
    forces within your AOR or participation with NATO allies or
    their working with us on the China issue.
        General Wolters. No roadblocks at this time, but what we
    are anticipating is an increase in our demand to share across
    secret information lines. As you know, Senator, we are working
    very, very hard to make sure that we can open up the aperture
    from a policy perspective with our NATO allies and partners to
    be able to share certain classified information.
        We are achieving success in that area with the assistance
    of this Committee, and I would ask for your continued
    endorsement in that area to make sure that we can you
    adequately share information so that we can make headway
    against malign influence on behalf of China.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, I agree with you on that issue,
    and that goes back to the first question for General Lyons
    about the amounts of information that we are communicating over
    classified and secure versus unclassified and secure networks
    and the dangers that that may put our men and women who are
    currently deployed in various areas, that that may open them
    to.
        Again, we will continue to work with you all on these
    issues. I have got a couple of other questions that we will
    submit for the record.
        But I see Senator Duckworth is there waiting, so I will
    yield back my time and allow her to get her questions in, also.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
        Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to my good friend from Tennessee.
        I have discussed a portion of our supply chain and
    logistics enterprise with the Department's civilian leadership
    like Secretary Austin; Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kath Hicks;
    and former Under Secretary of Defense, Ellen Lord.
        I have discussed it with service chiefs like the commandant
    of the Marine Corps and with combatant commanders, like Admiral
    Davidson. I have discussed advancements and we need to make it
    a logistics capabilities in order to face the unique challenges
    of the Indo-Pacific's geography and the threat of real great-
    power competitors.
        I have been dogged in my insistence that we will not be
    able to build a combat credible deterrence if we do not have
    the logistics capability and capacity to realistically support
    our complex military operation, no plans.
        My takeaway from all of my conversations with these many
    senior defense leaders is that they do recognize the problem
    and they do agree with me, and yet, it still doesn't seem to me
    like we are adequately investing in Transportation Command and
    our strategic logistics capabilities.
        General Lyons, it is good to see you today. In this
    setting, as much as you can, in this unclassified setting, what
    are your biggest capability and capacity challenges,
    shortfalls, and how can Congress best resource Transportation
    Command to provide the power projection and sustainment
    necessary for our operational plans?
        General Lyons. Senator, let me just say, thank you for your
    strong, unwavering advocacy in understanding the combat
    credible deterrence assurance, and really to be able to respond
    to when, that is so critical in our logistics enterprise. So, I
    really do appreciate that.
        I know you are aware of several ongoing initiatives that we
    are getting support from the Hill on to include sealift
    recapitalization that we talked about. We have alluded to some
    work inside the Department on the joint concept for contested
    logistics.
        I think this begins a very important journey for us across
    the joint force as a Department to fully integrate the
    logistics just the same, a warfighting function amongst all
    warfighting functions that will be critical as we move forward
    and evolve to support both, the changing character of warfare
    and adjust the character of logistics to support the changing
    character of warfare. So, a lot going on there to include some
    of discussions you just heard on cyber.
        So, we are, in fact, getting good support and good
    collaboration across the combatant commands, across the
    services, and inside the Department on the things that I think
    are most important, and we will continue to push on these kinds
    of issues, whether they be mobility or liquid energy to ensure
    that we can continue to project and sustain the force well into
    the future.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
        I want to also follow-up on the discussion on cyber that
    you just had with my good friend from Michigan, Senator Peters.
    I would like to take it a little bit further and ask, does
    TRANSCOM currently have systems in place that will evaluate
    compliance with, you know, the cyber requirements in terms of
    your civilian partners, and how do you enforce cybersecurity
    measures with commercial partners?
        General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
        For the commercial partners, which, we have many, and good
    partnerships, that is currently done through a self-assessment
    and self-reporting. We are working a proof of principle for a
    third-party to be able to validate compliance. That is a
    relatively new initiative. We have to work through the
    feasibility of that, but we are working in that regard.
        I would say, though, today, we have a very transparent and
    a good level of coordination with our industry partners.
        As I mentioned, I think we are pushing on an open door when
    it comes to cyber risk and cyber coaching. So, we are getting
    good cooperation, and at the end of the day, we ensure we don't
    have any single points of failure inside of our industry
    networks.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
        By the way, I just want to congratulate you on your
    remarkable career, and I happen to think that leaving from the
    TRANSCOM is a capstone. It is my personal interests, my
    personal, or I consider it critical to our force and I just
    want to thank you for how well you have done there and how well
    you have moved our capacity, both capacity and capability
    forward, when it comes logistics for our national security, and
    I just, you know, can't thank you enough for your dedication,
    and I hope you have a wonderful early part of your retirement,
    where you said you are going to go underground and hide for a
    little while. Enjoy that, but then I am sure that we will see
    you around again sometime soon.
        Thank you so much.
        General Lyons. Thank you, ma'am.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you for your services.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
        Now, via Webex, let me recognize Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, both for appearing in front of us.
        General Wolters, I want to ask you a couple more questions
    about Ukraine. An alumni of your organization, General Ben
    Hodges, recently said in a television interview on a Ukrainian
    television network, that he believes Russia's buildup in the
    Donbas area is not specifically about Donbas, but more about
    control over the Black Sea coast, and, in particular, trying to
    take control of Mariupol and maybe the Sea of Azov to stage
    Russia for further incursions onto the northern Black Sea
    coast.
        Have you seen that interview and, if so, what do you think
    about General Hodges' comments?
        General Wolters. Senator, I haven't seen the interview, but
    I, too, am concerned about the protection of sovereign activity
    in the vicinity of the Black Sea.
        Senator Cotton. This was a concern back in 2015, was it
    not, after Ukraine first made its incursion into the Donbas,
    that they were going to try to establish just a little land
    bridge to Crimea?
        General Wolters. It was, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. That would be deeply harmful, not only to
    Ukraine, but also to American interests in the Black Sea region
    and to Europe, more broadly?
        General Wolters. I concur, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        I know that you were asked a question earlier about the
    Javelin missiles that we had provided to Ukraine, but to be
    very exact, those are in possession of the Ukrainian Armed
    Forces and they are entitled to use those anywhere in their
    country and in any manner that they need to defend their
    territory?
        General Wolters. That is correct, Senator, for defensive
    purposes, to defend their sovereign territory.
        Senator Cotton. The Javelin is, by definition, really, a
    defensive weapon, wouldn't you say?
        General Wolters. I would, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. I will relay one story from the summer of
    2015. I was with the former Chairman of the Committee, Senator
    McCain in Eastern Ukraine, about as close as they would let us
    get to the Donbas, and we met with some troops from there and
    then irregular militia forces that had rallied to come to
    Ukraine's defense. One had been a former tank commander. He was
    a lieutenant in the Red Army and now he was a battalion
    commander of this new unit.
        He was pleading with us at the time to convince the Obama-
    Biden administration to provide Javelins, which they never did,
    and he said to us, Mr. Senators, we do not need a hundred
    Javelins to use against Russian tanks. We only need one Javelin
    to use against a Russian tank and then Russian tankers will
    think twice.
        Would you agree with that, is that a folk wisdom, from the
    battlefield, General Wolters, that one Javelin used in Eastern
    Ukraine against a Russian tank would make a lot of Russian
    tankers think twice?
        General Wolters. I would, Senator, and I think you have
    accurately characterized the spirit of the Ukrainian Armed
    Forces.
        Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you.
        Let's move on to another matter about making Russians think
    twice. In the wake of Russia's development of new intermediate-
    range nuclear forces capabilities, and also our long overdue
    departure from the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty,
    how should NATO posture our forces to adapt to Russia's missile
    threat and what, in particular, should we do to focus on
    missile defense and long-range strike capability in the
    European theater?
        General Wolters. Senator, as we talked before, we have to
    continue to improve in indications and warnings and command and
    control so that we can see deeper into the environment and
    respond quicker, and if we will continue to improve those
    areas, with respect to the integrated air and missile defense
    programs that we have in work today, we will keep the campaign
    momentum traversing in a productive direction.
        Senator Cotton. Are our NATO partners comfortable with the
    development of those kind of long-range strike capabilities
    that can hold at risk, Russian targets that previously would
    have been within the INF prohibited range of missiles?
        General Wolters. Senator, I would characterize the
    environment as the Nations are becoming more comfortable as
    they gain greater understanding of the operational environment.
        Senator Cotton. It sounds to me like that is a pretty
    strong asymmetric advantage in our favor, isn't it, unless we
    think that Russia is going to start putting intermediate-range
    missiles in Cuba or the Bahamas or Canada or Mexico, since we
    can put them up against Russia's border, and they have a much
    harder time doing it on our border?
        General Wolters. I concur, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. It seems to me like there should be a lot
    more of them [inaudible].
        Thank you, General.
        Thank you, General Lyons, as well, for your service.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Let me now recognize Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    General Wolters and General Lyons.
        I want to talk a little bit about Defender Europe 2020.
        You know, we trained, so we are prepared to fight and
    prepared to win and, you know, this exercise is one to test our
    power projection. I want to hear directly from the two of you,
    what were the top lessons learned from Defender Europe 2020,
    and then how does that translate into changes in the exercise
    in, well, coming up in this year?
        General Wolters. Senator, the number one lesson learned was
    the value of Army pre-positioned stockpiles and deployable air
    base systems. We have studied this issue for a long time.
        Moving at speed with large formations across the Atlantic
    and getting to point, ultimately, to the appropriately foxhole
    with a ready force member is a challenge. Having those pre-
    positioned stockpiles in place was very beneficial, more so,
    than we could have possibly imagined and Defender Europe 2020
    verified that.
        Senator Kelly. General Lyons?
        General Lyons. Senator, thanks.
        It is such a critical exercise. We got a lot out of it. I
    would say a couple of things. It demonstrated, clearly, in my
    own view that we do, as a nation, have the ability to move
    immediately, if required, and as well, as follow it with a
    decisive force.
        Now, as I looked at that operation and I looked at what
    General Wolters was trying to do and our ability to get the
    force to him, I felt very confident in our ability to support
    his efforts and deliver the decisive force, when needed.
        Senator Kelly. So, the sealift capability, was that tested?
        I know we had more Air Force and Navy resources. I assume,
    some Military Sealift Command (MSC) resources involved. Do you
    feel you have the sealift capability you need if this was not
    an exercise, but was, if we wound up in a real fight?
        General Lyons. Senator, I think you are aware, I mean, we
    have a lot of work to do on sealift. On sealift
    recapitalization, we have an aging fleet, a fleet that has some
    readiness challenges, and we have a plan to remedy that over
    the next decade.
        But in this particular exercise with multiple vessels
    underway, some commercial, some organic, some, frankly, being
    integrated in the handoff between the second fleet and the
    sixth fleet in Europe, it was a great test of our ability to
    coordinate the transatlantic crossing, and I think very
    successfully so.
        But, to your point, we have work to do on the broader
    sealift capacity, because in a surge environment, we are making
    quite literally hundreds of turns, as opposed to dozens of
    turns, as in this case.
        Senator Kelly. General Wolters, further, in Eastern Europe,
    the infrastructure was designed for Warsaw Pact, you know,
    nations, Russian tanks, vehicles, troops. That infrastructure
    was designed for things to be travelling east to west.
        Did that come up in part of the exercise in transporting
    our equipment and troops to the east through infrastructure
    that was not designed for this?
        General Wolters. It did, Senator, and with the
    contributions of the European Deterrence Initiative over the
    course of the last 3 years, we have had the opportunity to
    specifically work on road and rail from west to east, Central
    Germany to the Baltics, and down to Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,
    and we have made improvements in those areas, but it is still a
    challenge and it is something we will continue to work on, but
    we were much faster than we had been in the past.
        Senator Kelly. Finally, how, in the remaining minute, how
    would you like to see this exercise change to make sure we are
    as prepared as possible for, you know, real engagements?
        General Wolters. We are in the process of executing
    Defender Europe 2021, and one of the changes that we are making
    is a cyber red team and we want to improve our cyber defensive
    posture for the duration of the exercises involved with
    Defender Europe 2021.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, and I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Let me recognize Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thanks for your
    service.
        General Wolters, let me start with you. Secretary Austin
    has reaffirmed the position from the prior administration that
    China is our pacing threat. Given that, what is your view on
    what you could do in EUCOM to free up military resources that
    the Department can use in the pacing theater.
        General Wolters. Senator, my first response is, what we do
    to effectively compete and deter against the nearest peer
    competitor in Europe, Russia, is effective in deterring China,
    because of the connectivity between the two nations and the
    willingness of both nations to engage in malign influence
    against the United States and against NATO.
        So, those activities that allow us to continue to be
    successful in the competition phase against Russia are also
    helpful against China. Whether it is pointing out the poor path
    that a nation could take with respect to Huawei 5G or whether
    it is pointing out what China is doing, with respect to
    equities in sea ports and aerial ports investment in Europe.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you a little bit about NATO.
    There has been a lot of talk about NATO's role in helping
    confront China.
        Wouldn't it be helpful if European allies did more to bear
    the burden of confronting Russia so that we could focus on what
    has been identified as our pacing threat, the pacing theater?
        General Wolters. No argument that here, Senator, and I am
    pleased to report the Nations are. They are very fixated on
    Russia. There is no hesitancy on their part, and I say that as
    a result of producing the first NATO military strategy in over
    six decades. I am finalizing the concept for deterrence and
    defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, all of those codify the
    challenges that we face against a malign Russia, and the
    Nations have been very willing to produce national plans that
    take into account Russia as a malign influencer in the region.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you about our NATO allies
    spending in 2014, I think it was, that NATO members agreed to
    spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP),
    respective GDPs on defense by uh 2024.
        Now, the world has changed a lot since 2014 and, then,
    particularly, again, our own assessment of what is now our
    pacing threat, from a military standpoint and given the changed
    security environment, do you think that 2 percent is still the
    right target?
        General Wolters. I do, Senator.
        I will tell you that from 2016 to 2020, the 10 nations
    today that meet the 2 percent minimum, all the Nations involved
    have allowed us the opportunity to get our hands on $130
    billion extra and that makes a big difference with our ability
    to effectively compete.
        Senator Hawley. Has EUCOM done any analysis as to that 2
    percent number, why you still that that 2 percent is still the
    right number?
        General Wolters. Sir, EUCOM has done an analysis, Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has done analysis, and NATO has
    conducted analysis. The feedback we get is the [inaudible]
    pledge of 2 percent is still viable with respect to our ability
    to build a competitive edge against near-peer competition in
    Europe.
        Senator Hawley. Would you be willing to share that
    analysis, General, in the appropriate setting with this
    Committee?
        General Wolters. Yes, sir.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
        Let me just ask you before I move to General Lyons about
    ISR, you mentioned in your opening statement that timely
    indications and warning would be key for deterring or blunting
    any Russian attack in the Baltics.
        Of course ISR is a very scarce commodity. Our forces in the
    Pacific also need a timely indication to warnings of possible
    Chinese attacks. They are particularly with regard to Taiwan.
        So, my question is, how do we minimize the amount of
    American ISR that is needed in your AOR so we can monitor
    Russian forces effectively, but also continue to bolster our
    deterrent posture in PACOM?
        General Wolters. Continue to communicate to our allies and
    partners that the criticality of ISR and what it contributes
    and indications and warnings, and what it affords you the
    opportunity to do in the competition phase before you get to
    crisis or before you get to conflict. In NATO, we are having
    success with that.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
        General Lyons, in my remaining seconds here, let me ask you
    a logistics question. Admiral Davidson has recently warned that
    China might attempt a fait accompli with regard to Taiwan, much
    sooner than we might otherwise previously have anticipated.
        Just from a logistics standpoint, what do we need to do,
    what do we need to have in place in the Indo-Pacific in order
    to blunt such an offensive as quickly as possible, in your
    view?
        General Lyons. Well, Senator, you know, Admiral Davidson
    has done some great work out there. It still has to continue in
    terms of the posture, not just in the Pacific, but the global
    posture. So, it is so critical that we think of things globally
    and not just Indo-Pacific.
        Our global posture that offers us a physical, a temporal,
    and a psychological advantage to be able to come when we are
    told to come. I have a high degree of confidence that we can do
    that.
        I know that there is still work to be done as we evolve and
    look at the future character of warfare, but I think we are on
    the right path to support Admiral Davidson's initiatives.
        Senator Hawley. Very good.
        My time had expired. I will have another question or two
    for you for the record.
        General Lyons. Thank you.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you both, gentlemen, for your
    service.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Real quick, I know we are running out of time, but I want
    to thank you for being here today and your service. Just real
    quick, Redstone Arsenal, you know, we have quite a bit of
    things at Redstone and you have done a great job for the
    American people. It looks like we have a great chance to have
    the Space Command (SPACECOM).
        General Lyons, how important is that, how important is us
    to move up in Space Command? I know we are on the infant ages
    of that, but what do you think about Space Command?
        General Lyons. Senator, I think space is clearly a
    warfighting domain and I think that the creation of SPACECOM,
    as well as Space Force was critically important to the way we
    are going to operate in the future and, you know, the character
    of warfare as we see it.
        I really can't comment on the basing issue, whether it is
    Huntsville or some other location. I will confirm, just being
    an Army officer and knowing what is at Huntsville, how critical
    that installation is to Army operations and other operations
    and such.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
        General Wolters?
        General Wolters. I couldn't agree more. Space is a
    warfighting domain. It is a pretty large domain, compared to
    all the others, and it is important that we understand how to
    effectively compete and deter and defend in space.
        Senator Tuberville. What do you think about laser warfare?
    I have seen some examples of that in Huntsville and what we are
    developing.
        Do you see a future for that?
        General Wolters. I do, Senator, and I think we need to
    continue down that path. It is not cheap, but the return on
    investment due to accuracy and lethality is very powerful and
    very compelling.
        Senator Tuberville. General Lyons?
        General Lyons. Senator, I would just say, you know,
    anything that provides us an opportunity to bring lethal
    effects on an adversary to compel them to our will on aware
    national security, that just has to remain on the table.
        Senator Tuberville. Yeah. Thank you very much.
        Just a quick comment about earlier about some things that
    were said in here. I was disturbed a little bit about using the
    word white supremacists.
        You know, I am a football coach in trade and I build teams,
    and that is what you are doing, you are building a team, and we
    have people in here that has never been on a team. They don't
    understand, you recruit people and you make something out of
    them and you bring them together. You fight together. You live,
    you eat, you breathe, and they come from all economic
    backgrounds, every culture in the world.
        Some people don't understand that. They don't understand
    it, and you will eliminate them, as I did when I was coaching.
    If you had somebody that wasn't a teach member, they were gone.
        You do the same thing in the military. We need to stay out
    of that. We need to leave it to the generals, which, to me, are
    the coaches, the people that do it, that get it done, that know
    these young men and women. Because, listening to our people the
    other day that we were interviewing about a draft in the
    future, which, you know, we want to draft women. We think they
    serve a great purpose, and we are going to need it.
        You know, this is a dangerous world. A dangerous world, and
    we can't sit back and try to tear our military down from people
    that really know nothing about it, about building a team. So, I
    want to apologize for that. I mean, that was not a good
    selection of questions, I don't think, for this Committee,
    because we are here to help. We are here to give advice if you
    want advice, but not give you advice so you have to take that.
        You know, I was disappointed in Secretary Austin. You know,
    he is a Army guy, and first thing we do is we stand-down, stay
    out of it, personally.
        In terms of publicly, you know, I know being a coach, there
    are a lot of things you didn't bring up publicly. You kept it
    within, because you have got to build, because you divide if
    you start bringing it up publicly.
        So, we need a killing machine and we are going to need one,
    just looking at what is coming. So, thanks for your service and
    your building, and hopefully, we can keep people out of what
    you all do and do great, because you are the defense of the
    world, not just the defense of this country.
        Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
        It is the intention now to adjourn the public hearing and
    quickly move to SVC-217 for a classified session.
        Senator Inhofe. Can I make one?
        Chairman Reed. I will yield to Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, let me just thank the coach for his
    comments. Right on.
        Chairman Reed. If there are no further comments, then the
    hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                 cybersecurity
        1. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, in your posture statement, you
    acknowledged both the advantage of partnering with civilian carriers to
    meet U.S. Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) missions, but also the
    risks that come from partnering with companies who primarily use
    unclassified networks. What is the current status of TRANSCOM's efforts
    to harden its networks to defend against cyberattacks?
        General Lyons. TRANSCOM has implemented a layered defense-in-depth
    construct to harden our networks. We are focused on quickly mitigating
    critical vulnerabilities across our portfolio and have invested in data
    encryption capabilities to create trusted data transactions, which have
    decreased adversary attack vectors. Additionally, our robust network
    intrusion detection system, continuous network monitoring program, and
    access to third party threat intelligence from industry experts, allow
    our intrusion detection analysts to better deter, detect, and respond
    to incidents.
        In addition, TRANSCOM's continued investment in cloud services led
    to a more robust infrastructure, increased our security posture, and
    improved the resilience of our mobility systems. TRANSCOM, in
    partnership with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), is implementing a Zero
    Trust security model that will enhance TRANSCOM network traffic
    visibility and better position the command to secure sensitive data,
    systems, and services. TRANSCOM's efforts are informing the way forward
    for architecture standards, data analytics development, and assessment
    criteria for future Zero Trust security model implementations across
    the DOD.
        To reduce cybersecurity risks with our commercial partners,
    TRANSCOM incorporated the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
    Supplement Clause 252.204-7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense
    Information and Cyber Incident Reporting, language in all Readiness
    Transportation Service Provider (TSP) contracts. The contract language
    requires Readiness TSPs to implement National Institute of Standards
    and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171, ``Protecting
    Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems
    and Organizations,'' to safeguard covered defense information processed
    or stored on their internal information system or network.
        The contract language also requires each of our Readiness TSPs to
    complete an annual cybersecurity self-assessment of the NIST security
    controls. 2020 marked the third year of contractually requiring our
    Readiness TSPs to submit self-assessments, and self-reporting
    compliance has continued to improve each year. Overall, we assess that
    most of our TSPs are taking cybersecurity seriously and the NIST
    standards will help them improve their security. However, TSPs will
    always be challenged to keep out advanced persistent threat actors.

        2. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, is your command coordinating with
    U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) on this effort?
        General Lyons. Yes, TRANSCOM is aligned closely with CYBERCOM on a
    wide array of cyber security initiatives designed to harden networks
    against malicious cyber activities. We are partnering with CYBERCOM on
    a Zero Trust security model implementation. In addition, we routinely
    combine efforts on joint defensive cyber operations in response to
    emerging threats. We are also members of various CYBERCOM working
    groups, such as the Comply-to-Connect and the Operationalizing Cyber
    Security Service Providers working groups, focused on improving the
    Department's cybersecurity posture.
                                 military moves
        3. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, last November, the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) overturned DOD's multi-billion dollar
    contract award to move servicemembers' household goods around the world
    because of pervasive errors in the contracting process. Can you provide
    an update on the status of re-awarding that contract?
        General Lyons. [Deleted.]

        4. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, will the delay negatively affect
    any military servicemember and family movements during peak season this
    summer?
        General Lyons. Yes. The contracting delays translate into delays to
    TRANSCOM delivering a more professional, higher-quality moving
    experience than is possible in the current program. Whereas we
    originally intended to begin operating under the GHC in 2021, we now
    don't expect to begin operating under GHC until 2023.
        While we've made some marginal improvements to the current program
    and incorporated many GHC rules into the existing program, our current
    model limits the quality improvements we can make. Our current
    construct is a constraint to innovation, as we are tied to the
    capabilities of `the lowest common denominators' in the program. The
    current model prevents us from capitalizing on existing capabilities in
    industry such as near real-time event status updates as shipments are
    in-transit and mobile applications to provide Families modern tools to
    manage all aspects of the move process (including claims). Indeed, the
    GHC is an opportunity to raise the standard for DOD Families, attract
    additional quality capacity to the program, and incorporate modern
    capabilities (which we take for granted in every aspect of our personal
    lives) into the Personal Property Program.
        So yes--because the delays prevent us from delivering a better
    experience to DOD personnel and their families sooner, I can only
    characterize the delays as having a negative effect.

        5. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what steps are you taking to
    ensure the contracting errors committed last year don't happen again?
        General Lyons. [Deleted.]
                          vaccinating troops in europe
        6. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, last month, shipping delays to
    Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany slowed vaccination efforts
    in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) for servicemembers, DOD civilians, and
    their families. Can you give me an update on the current status of
    vaccination efforts in EUCOM?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM is vaccinating rapidly across the theater.
    Our vaccination efforts are aligned with the Department of Defense
    population prioritization schema and over 46,000 eligible (19%) have
    been fully vaccinated with almost 51,000 (21%) having received their
    first shot.

        7. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, will EUCOM be able to meet the
    April 19th date set by President Biden and offer vaccinations to
    servicemembers, DOD civilians, and adult family members who want one?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM is on pace to meet the 19 April date set
    by President Biden to offer vaccinations to all eligible adult
    beneficiaries. We are also on pace to meet the Department of Defense
    (DOD) milestone to vaccinate 70% of the total eligible DOD population,
    including beneficiaries, by 15 August.
                                     russia
        8. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, Russia has continued engaging
    in malign activities across all parts of Europe. Alarmingly, Russian
    troops are massing forces along the border of Ukraine while Ukrainian
    forces are fighting Russian-backed separatists in the country.
    Furthermore, Russia's Navy has deployed additional warships to the
    Black Sea in its escalation of aggression and is posturing to gain a
    strategic naval advantage in the Arctic. What steps are the U.S. taking
    to counter renewed Russian aggression in and around Ukraine?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM works within the whole-of-government and
    alongside our NATO Allies and Partners to develop response options as
    Russia increased its force posture and aggressive stance towards
    Ukraine. We remain vigilant and focused on activities in the region as
    well as amplify messaging for major exercises. Recent options executed
    included Bomber Task Force flights, destroyers operating in the Aegean
    Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and a fly-in of High Mobility
    Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) into Romania. We are monitoring Black
    Sea region activities and able to modify and add options as
    environmental changes necessitate.

        9. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, how are EUCOM naval assets
    responding to Russia's recent activity?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM's maritime assets routinely operate across
    the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, as well as in the Black Sea
    consistent with the Montreux Convention and international law. Four
    destroyers recently participated in a Romanian-led NATO exercise. The
    USS IWO JIMA Amphibious Readiness Group with the 24th Marine
    Expeditionary Unit embarked will operate with the HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH
    Carrier Strike Group and other maritime nations throughout the theater.
    Through our robust array of operations, missions, and activities with
    Allies and Partners, we demonstrate our combined ability to deter and
    defend. Russia's recent activities underscore the importance of
    conducting these assurance measures, increasing our alignment and
    strengthening relationships with like-minded nations.

        10. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, is anything additional
    required to ensure we can adequately respond to Russian naval
    initiatives?
        General Wolters. Dedicated Carrier Strike Group and amphibious
    presence are key elements of a lethal and agile theater posture. Two
    additional destroyers will enhance our seapower projection and
    deterrence in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, and all the way up to
    the Arctic. Persistent Indications and Warning across the Greenland,
    Iceland, U.K. Gap is critical for high-end subsurface threat detection
    and defense of the Homeland. Increasing our unmanned systems to allow
    us to better surveil critical areas with speed and clarity will
    strengthen our ability to defend and deter across the Euro-Atlantic
    area.

        11. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, in your statement to the
    Committee, you highlighted the importance of your partnership with the
    State Department on the Russian Influence Group (RIG), which is
    designed to counter Russian disinformation. Can you provide additional
    information on this program?
        General Wolters. The Russia Influence Group (RIG) is a United
    States interagency forum focused on taking coordinated actions that
    counter Russian malign influence. It is co-led by the Department of
    State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs and USEUCOM. This
    collaborative program supports U.S. national strategy, including
    executive and legislative branch policy and guidance.

        12. Senator Hirono. General Wolters, do you think more funding for
    the RIG program would be beneficial?
        General Wolters. Yes, the RIG is currently funded through July
    2021. USEUCOM has submitted a request for $2 million of the required
    funding to fund the RIG beyond July 2021. This additional funding
    request will expand interagency collaboration and enable the RIG to
    better contribute towards holistic solutions. This program provides
    tremendous value-add towards countering Russian malign influence
    through a whole-of-government approach.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                                 cyber security
        13. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, how are you preparing the
    Alliance to better defend its networks and operations against the
    growing sophistication of cyber threats and attacks, and what more
    should the U.S. and our allies be doing?
        General Wolters. NATO continues to adapt to the evolving cyber
    threat landscape. In 2020, NATO released the Concept for the Deterrence
    and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area. To support this effort, NATO
    bolstered deterrence efforts in cyberspace by establishing a cyberspace
    operations center at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in
    Mons, Belgium. Integrating cyber and information effects in joint U.S.-
    NATO exercises enhances transparency and alignment and advances
    security cooperation. These combined efforts contribute to the
    Alliance's ability to address malicious cyber activity in a 21st
    century security environment.
        The U.S. must continue to support NATO's cyber adaptation efforts
    in order to maintain Alliance relevance in Cyberspace. USEUCOM works
    routinely with the Alliance to normalize cyberspace operations through
    combined exercises that build readiness and a foundation for
    deterrence. USEUCOM delivers support to Allies and Partners who are
    developing their cyber capabilities through ``train, advise, and
    assist'' missions that build cyber capability and capacity. USEUCOM
    also invests in Alliance cooperation in cyberspace. The recent Solar
    Winds attack illustrates the importance of sharing actionable and
    timely information with our Allies to minimize exposure to
    vulnerabilities we know our adversaries exploit.

        14. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, are we providing assistance to
    vulnerable allies to develop and maintain capabilities they could not
    afford to develop or procure alone? If so, can you talk about how the
    vulnerability of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners
    impacts U.S. national security?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM trains, advises, and equips Allies and
    Partners through security cooperation programs to bolster our
    collective self-defense across the Alliance, protecting both NATO and
    U.S. national security. For example, USEUCOM assists in provisioning
    defensive cyber capabilities to modernize and harden Ally and Partner
    networks. USEUCOM also provides assistance on critical gaps in cyber
    incident response and cyber workforce recruitment, training, and
    retention which is key to developing and maintaining those delivered
    capabilities.

        15. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, in 2014, NATO made cyber
    defense a core part of collective defense by declaring that a cyber
    attack could lead to the invocation of NATO's collective defense
    clause, or Article 5, meaning that an armed attack against one is
    considered an armed attack against all. What is the threshold for a
    cyber-attack that could lead to invoking Article 5?
        General Wolters. The Alliance stands ready to compete in all
    domains, including cyber. Secretary General Stoltenberg has highlighted
    the negative impact cyber attacks can have on our Allies' security. His
    comments, in light of the increasing threat posed by malign cyber
    actors, continues to drive Allied investment in cyber preparedness. The
    Alliance focuses on improving resourcing, training, and growing
    personnel commitments that enable the collective to compete below the
    threshold of war, deter, and prevail in the cyber domain today. Whether
    a particular cyber attack rises to the level of an ``armed attack''
    would be decided during Article 4 consultations. The Allies maintain a
    degree of ambiguity with respect to their national level red-lines
    which might invoke an Article 4 request for consultations. In this
    regard, it is worth noting that events must reach a threshold that
    threatens the security of NATO or a NATO Ally individually.
         vaccine distribution to united states servicemembers in europe
        16. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, can you describe the challenges
    with vaccine distribution at our installations in Europe?
        General Wolters. The initial supply-constrained environment
    required USEUCOM to follow the Department of Defense (DOD) population
    schema to maximize vaccine utilization. As the United States and DOD
    increase vaccine supply, we will be able to more rapidly inoculate our
    eligible population. USEUCOM is on pace to meet the 19 April date set
    by President Biden to offer vaccinations to all eligible adult
    beneficiaries. We are also postured to meet the milestone of 70% of the
    total eligible DOD population, including beneficiaries, to be fully
    vaccinated by 15 August.

        17. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, have there been any recent
    delays in vaccine shipments? If yes, can you name the installations
    that have been most affected by such delays?
        General Wolters. There are no current delays in shipments of
    vaccines to the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility.
                                  f-35 program
        18. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, can you confirm that 5th
    generation airpower is a requirement for your mission in EUCOM, and can
    you explain how 5th generation aircraft, like F-35, meet that
    requirement?
        General Wolters. The F-35 is the cornerstone of our global fighter
    fleet going forward. This is especially true in Europe as we work
    alongside our five currently equipped F-35 Allies to deter and prepare
    to respond to adversary aggression. The F-35's integrated, battlespace
    information-sharing, and hardened sensors and weapons enable rapid
    decision-making and extend the range of integrated off-board systems
    across the Joint Force. As more Allies and Partners purchase the F-35A,
    with approximately 460 aircraft are expected in theater by 2030, its
    high commonality with the U.S. F-35B and C variants allows USEUCOM to
    leverage common maintenance practices enabling rapid mobility across
    the continent with minimal footprint.

        19. Senator Rosen. General Wolters, has the F-35 program had a
    positive impact on both military and diplomatic relations with these
    key allies?
        General Wolters. As more nations partner to invest in the F-35, it
    broadens our cooperation and strengthens our ties with key Allies in
    Europe. Through this shared platform, maintenance practices,
    intelligence preparation, and alignment of tactics, techniques, and
    procedures, we are stronger, better prepared, and more lethal together.
    The F-35 will reach its full potential, with the inclusion of our
    partners, to enhance our deterrence capabilities and better defend the
    Euro-Atlantic. Seven countries have purchased the F-35, and with even
    more nations within USEUCOM Area of Responsibility expressing interest
    in the program.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                    ukraine
        20. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, you testified that the lethal
    aid the United States has provided to Ukraine through the Ukraine
    Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) has been ``very helpful''. What
    specific elements of USAI have advanced Ukraine's ability to deter
    further Russian aggression?
        General Wolters. USAI enables procuring critical equipment and
    enhancing Ukraine's combat capability and credibility. Ukraine's
    ability to field a combat capable force serves as the greatest
    deterrence against further aggression in the region. Under the category
    of lethal aid, USAI is funding armed Mark VI patrol boats, counter-
    artillery radars, sniper capabilities, and Precision Shoulder-fired
    Rocket Launchers. Non-lethal assistance under USAI includes
    capabilities across domains such as secure communications, electronic
    warfare systems, counter-unmanned aerial systems, cyber and information
    technology capabilities, and night vision devices, all of which are
    necessary in 21st century warfare.

        21. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, what specific elements of USAI
    have supported EUCOM's objectives in the Black Sea Region?
        General Wolters. In the Black Sea region, USAI is improving
    Ukraine's ability to defend against ongoing Russian aggression, most
    notably by funding armed Mark VI patrol boats and armaments for Island
    Class Patrol Boats. This fleet of modernized patrol boats enables the
    Ukrainian navy to improve its maritime patrol capabilities and
    situational awareness, serving as a deterrent to Russian aggression.
                                      f-35
        22. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, you testified that the F-35 is
    necessary for you to ``have a competitive advantage necessary to
    protect our sovereign territory.'' Please describe in specific detail
    how this platform contributes to that competitive advantage.
        General Wolters. The F-35 is the cornerstone of our global fighter
    fleet going forward. This is especially true in Europe as we work
    alongside our five currently equipped F-35 Allies to deter and prepare
    to respond to adversary aggression. The F-35's integrated sensors and
    ability to share critical information throughout the battlespace enable
    rapid decision making, extend the range of integrated off-board weapons
    systems, and allow greater degree of maneuverability in contested
    environments. The F-35 is a critical enabler of our ability to fight in
    the air and target enemy ground systems that would contest our access
    to any domain we deem necessary. As more Allies and Partners purchase
    the F-35A, with approximately 460 aircraft are expected in theater by
    2030, its high commonality with the U.S. F-35B and C variants allows
    USEUCOM to leverage common maintenance practices enabling rapid
    mobility across the continent with minimal footprint.
                         european deterrence initiative
        23. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, you testified that reductions
    to the defense budget and to the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
    funding would ``slow down our campaign momentum that we've been able to
    sustain for the last 4 years in improving our indications and warnings,
    our command and control, and our readiness. What investments through
    EDI have improved capabilities in each of these?
        General Wolters. EDI enables USEUCOM to meet U.S. national security
    requirements in concert with our Allies and Partners. Stable,
    predictable, and consistent EDI funding is needed to maintain and
    improve our ability to succeed in this strategic competition era.
        An example of success is building and procuring Army pre-
    positioning stock equipment sets and Air Force basing equipment to
    increase our speed across the theater to effectively posture at a time
    of need. EDI funds continue to improve our Theater Undersea Warfare
    operations and build Mission Partner Environment (MPE) command and
    control (C2) networks. MPE networks (including the Atlantic Resolve
    mission network, Enhanced Forward Presence mission network, Maritime
    Mission Enclave, and the Maidan network) facilitate coalition multi-
    national C2, training, exercises, and execution at the tactical and
    operational levels throughout the USEUCOM AOR.
        USEUCOM continues to improve our indications and warning and
    intelligence sharing with NATO Allies and European Partners across the
    AOR, most recently with Poland and Romania. We are requesting
    approximately $84 million to enhance cross-domain interoperable
    solutions for air and ground operations in support of theater
    requirements. The ability to increase the number of manned and unmanned
    platforms based on the changing environment improves situational
    awareness and support to Joint and Coalition operations.
        An investment of $209 million in European Deterrence Initiative
    exercises and training focused in the southern portion of USEUCOM will
    provide dedicated opportunities to refine Command and Control (C2)
    architecture, increase interoperability, and develop a more ready,
    lethal, combat-capable force.
                            multi-domain task force
        24. Senator Inhofe. General Wolters, you testified that the
    addition of 500 United States troops to Wiesbaden, Germany will be
    focused on a ``multi domain task force in a joint theaters fire
    organization . . . that will improve our ability in all domains, to
    bring fires from the surface to surface dimension to increase our
    ability to deter.'' Could you provide more detail about the elements of
    this task force, their capabilities, and how they will integrate into
    EUCOM planning and operations?
        General Wolters. The Multi-Domain Task Force--Europe (MDTF-E) will
    provide Mission Command of forces, integrate and liaise with applicable
    organizations, conduct targeting, and synchronize efforts in alignment
    with the USEUCOM objectives. MDTF-E will compete for influence and
    access to counter malign actors, prepare the environment, enable
    defense of friendly forces and critical nodes in competition and armed
    conflict, and conduct deliberate targeting. In a conflict, the MDTF-E
    will neutralize enemy forces, defend lines of communication, and
    provide support to dynamic and deliberate multi-domain targeting.
                   service budgeting and requirements process
        25. Senator Inhofe. General Lyons, the tanker divestments were a
    very concerning issue last year. What is wrong with our requirements
    process when Congress has to step in to ensure you have enough tanker
    aircraft to stay mission ready?
        General Lyons. Last year, based on KC-46 delays, the Committee
    asked for an assessment of programmed retirements of KC-10 and KC-135
    aircraft. At that time, planned aircraft retirements, combined with KC-
    46 delays, resulted in a 30% reduction in Active Component capacity,
    which would be insufficient to meet day-to-day needs across the Joint
    Force.
        This was a change from the USAF initial fleet program position,
    which retained sufficient air refueling capacity to mitigate risk.
    However, in the final days of budget formulation, the USAF was forced
    to absorb a significant reduction in funding. In order to protect
    future programs, the USAF opted to accept risk in the air refueling
    portfolio. This process, as designed, illuminates different risk
    perspectives of Services and Combatant Commanders.
        Since that date, technical solutions emerged and the Department has
    settled on an agreed upon force presentation plan that meets Joint
    Force requirements. Overall, though we have taken some ``lessons
    learned'' from this experience, I assess no systemic deficiencies in
    the requirements process.

        26. Senator Inhofe. General Lyons, why can't the Pentagon seem to
    provide resources for joint mission requirements, and do you have
    similar concerns with any other platforms today?
        General Lyons. Unfortunately, the President's Budget 2021
    submission adjusted air refueling fleet program quantities at the last
    minute, which did not allow for collaboration between stakeholders.
    This was an exceptional case. Generally, the budget process adequately
    balances risk and resources with involvement of relevant stakeholders.
    For the Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget, the capabilities and
    capacity the Military Departments presented meet our needs, avoid
    significant risk in the near term, and allow for future mobility force
    shaping to meet modernization and operational requirements.
                        global household goods contract
        27. Senator Inhofe. General Lyons, I am concerned about the
    household goods contract because, according to reports, it would have
    cost taxpayers billions more for a ``best value'' Household Goods
    contract. As we have already seen this administration take the first
    steps to cut the defense budget, can you say why TRANSCOM felt these
    additional costs were worth such an increase in contract value?
        General Lyons. As outlined in the cost savings report directed by
    last year's Consolidated Appropriations Act, USTRANSCOM projected $210
    million in savings across the Future Years Defense Program as compared
    to DOD's spending in the current program. Many reports in the public
    domain--to potentially include the reports referenced in the question--
    compared prices between bidders and did not consider the more than $2
    billion DOD spends today in a program no one is satisfied with. While
    our first award of the Global Household Goods Contract was not to the
    lowest bidder, it was to the company we assessed most capable of
    delivering the quality improvements we seek for military families at a
    lower cost than DOD spends on today's flawed program. I acknowledge--
    and will comply with--the DOD Appropriations language to provide a
    report on the impact of the newly awarded contract to Service budgets.

        28. Senator Inhofe. General Lyons, what measures has TRANSCOM put
    in place to address the concerns that were upheld in the GAO protests?
        General Lyons. Last year GAO sustained 6 unique allegations of the
    75 total allegations made by two protestors. USTRANSCOM is in the
    process of addressing GAO's recommendations, which largely focused on
    better documenting the technical aspects of the proposal analysis
    process. None of the GAO's protest-related recommendations challenged
    the single move-manager construct, nor has GAO recommended any changes
    to the acquisition strategy or timeline.
        The contracting team significantly heightened its documentation of
    proposal evaluations. For instance, USTRANSCOM recorded and transcribed
    the in-person oral presentations to satisfy GAO's recommendation to
    document that aspect of the proposal evaluation process.
        Three offerors submitted new written proposals on 2 December 2020,
    and all three offerors are being evaluated from a ``clean slate,''
    fully considering all of GAO's recommendations. In addition, three
    periods of ``third party'' peer reviews by Defense Pricing and
    Contracting professionals and the Department of the Air Force Judge
    Advocate General's Acquisition, Fiscal Law, and Litigation Directorate
    are woven into the acquisition's process and timeline. While TRANSCOM
    is disappointed in the protest-related delays, GAO's findings will make
    this acquisition stronger and the protest process underscores
    industry's interest in partnering with DOD to deliver this capability.
    We expect to award the Global Household Goods Contract in October 2021.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                                      nato
        29. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, the ``4 30s by 2020'' NATO
    Readiness Initiative is one of the most important commitments allies
    have made in recent years. How are allies progressing in fulfilling the
    commitments they've made?
        General Wolters. The NATO Secretary General's 2020 Annual Report
    stated, ``Allies delivered on the commitment to having 30 mechanized
    battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combat vessels ready to use within
    30 days or less. Allies are now working on the implementation of the
    initiative by establishing larger formations.''
        NATO Allies have continued to improve their readiness of national
    forces in support of the Alliance's collective defense, enhancing
    NATO's ability to reinforce its Allies with the ``right forces in the
    right place at the right time.''

        30. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, of naval, air, and land
    forces, which readiness commitments are farthest along?
        General Wolters. Across all domains, NATO continues adapting to
    meet the challenges and complexities of our dynamic security
    environment. Since 2020, when all thirty Defense Ministers endorsed
    NATO's concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
    (DDA), we continue to make great strides in driving NATO reform,
    primarily through the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI). In the last two
    years, the Alliance has nearly tripled its naval and air activities to
    roughly 120 days of operations in the Black Sea region executed by NATO
    flagged forces. In the air domain, five Allied and Partner nations are
    now equipped with the F-35, broadening our cooperation, increasing the
    integration and complexity of national air capabilities into Bomber
    Task Force missions, and enhancing our deterrence capabilities while
    leveraging common maintenance and support enablers. On land, Allies
    deter aggression as part of NATO's four multinational battle groups, as
    does our enhanced forward presence in the Black Sea region. We
    strengthen these 21st century warfare pillars in events like the
    integration of the U.S. DEFENDER and NATO STEADFAST DEFENDER Series
    exercises to demonstrate all domain convergence across land, sea, and
    air. We will bring together 28,000 U.S. Allied and Partner
    servicemembers from 26 countries across 16 nations and for six weeks
    will develop future capabilities, build Alliance readiness, and improve
    our operational and strategic alignment.

        31. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, which do we need to focus on
    more?
        General Wolters. We continue to improve readiness across all
    domains and all regions. There are always some challenges with
    supplying high demand, low density capabilities which have readiness
    implications. Although each nation maintains responsibility for their
    own readiness, USEUCOM works bilaterally, regionally, and through the
    Alliance to increase readiness and interoperability to better deter and
    defend the Euro-Atlantic. We will continue to pursue a robust exercise
    program as funding allows to improve readiness in all domains with
    Allies and Partners.

        32. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, another key initiative from
    the 2018 Summit was to improve NATO's military mobility, which
    addresses physical and regulatory roadblocks to movement of U.S. and
    Allied forces across the area of responsibility (AOR). What more can we
    do, and in what ways can we encourage our allies and European partners
    to do more to facilitate our forces' faster movement across the
    continent?
        General Wolters. Our robust exercise program, including the U.S.
    DEFENDER Europe and the NATO STEADFAST DEFENDER series, ensures that
    our forces are trained, interoperable, and ready to conduct combat-
    credible movement across the European continent. Multilateral forums,
    active participation across several NATO committees, and numerous
    Allied and partner bilateral engagements serve as our best means to
    incorporate lessons learned from these exercises and our rotational
    deployments to continue advancing freedom of movement in Europe.

        33. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, allied Ministers of Foreign
    affairs recently directed NATO to address climate change, including
    potentially reviewing the Alliance's operational plans and
    capabilities. How will you balance this against ongoing key efforts to
    deter Russia and address emerging threats from China?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM acknowledges the challenges presented by
    climate change and the guidance from the Secretary of Defense. In
    today's complex security environment, relations with like-minded
    partners across the globe are increasingly important to address cross-
    cutting security issues and global challenges, as well as to defend the
    rules-based international order. Our European Allies and Partners will
    be directly affected by instability, resource competition, and
    humanitarian and migration crises caused by climate change. These
    threats add to the security challenges in Europe. Maintaining peace on
    the European continent is USEUCOM's purpose and we must compliment the
    whole-of-government approach to combating climate change.
        We will continue to assess the operational environment to determine
    the security implications of climate change, such as the opening of the
    Arctic Region. USEUCOM will continue to counter aggression by
    demonstrating robust capabilities and through extensive collaboration
    with our Allies and Partners. Our distinct advantage against any threat
    is our unmatched network of Allies and Partners across the European
    region. Addressing climate change together provides an even greater
    opportunity to bring the United States and our European Allies and
    Partners into closer alignment.

        34. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, what allies or regions within
    the Alliance do you see the U.S. military directing more focus?
        General Wolters. USEUCOM continues a balanced focus on security in
    several geostrategic regions including the Arctic / High North, Baltic
    Sea Region, and the Black Sea Region as well as space and cyber. As the
    Arctic continues to open, this region has emerged as a stage for
    political, economic, and military competition. Our initiatives in the
    Baltic Sea Region defend and deter aggression and enhance
    interoperability with our NATO Allies. In the Black Sea Region, we
    continue to support Ukraine's sovereignty and work closely with our
    Allies in the region to bolster regional stability.
                                     turkey
        35. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, as a NATO ally, Washington has
    committed America to come to Turkey's defense if Turkey is attacked.
    This has not only failed to moderate Turkey's behavior, it has allowed
    Turkey's Government to aggressively pursue its own interests at the
    expense of American interests. Are Turkey's national objections counter
    to NATO and its allies? If so, what are EUCOM and NATO doing to deter
    this situation?
        General Wolters. The principle of collective defense, often called
    Article 5, is at the very heart of NATO's founding treaty. Collective
    defense remains a unique and enduring principle that binds NATO
    members, committing them to protect one another, and setting a spirit
    of solidarity within the Alliance. Turkey, like all sovereign nations
    within NATO, pursues its own national interests in addition to those of
    the Alliance. They have a pivotal role in regional security and remain
    a strategic United States Ally and critical to NATO and US interests in
    Europe, Eurasia, North Africa, and the Middle East. They possess the
    Alliance's second largest military and contribute to NATO missions in
    Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and the Mediterranean Sea.

        36. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, what thoughts do you have on
    United States and the European Union (EU) ``whole-of-government''
    actions?
        General Wolters. The challenges we face today require a whole-of-
    government, whole-of-nation and whole-of-alliance approach. One major
    benefit of democracies working together is how these governments can
    generate peace, both within their borders and abroad. Ultimately, the
    NATO Alliance underpins security for the Euro-Atlantic, the European
    Union, and the United States.
                          nato anti-submarine warfare
        37. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, in your role as NATO's Supreme
    Allied Commander Europe, you have one of the strongest grasps on
    military capabilities of our allies and the threats that we all face in
    the European theater. It is my understanding that adversarial submarine
    threat--in particular from Russia--continues to take significant ally
    and U.S. resources. I also understand that the NATO coalition is
    considering investments in new anti-submarine warfare capabilities,
    which would be a welcome way to relieve some of the burden from U.S.
    efforts. Can you talk about the seriousness of the adversarial
    submarine threat in the European theater, and do you think it would be
    helpful if NATO invested in additional anti-submarine warfare
    capabilities?
        General Wolters. The Alliance actively deters and competes with
    Russia under the sea. Russia has recently demonstrated more significant
    submarine capability than any time in the past 30 years. Many of our
    NATO Allies recognized this threat and responded by investing in their
    anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The United Kingdom and France have
    already deployed significant capabilities while Norway and Denmark
    continue to explore additional opportunities. Iceland routinely
    supports basing of our maritime patrol aircraft. All of this
    contributes to the Alliance's ever-increasing capability to deter and
    respond to threats.

        38. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, the U.S. Navy has a fleet of
    P-8A Poseidons supporting the anti-submarine warfare mission in Europe.
    Are there ways that the U.S. leadership could encourage or support NATO
    investment in a similar capability, either through synergies in
    logistics, basing, or training?
        General Wolters. Many of our Allies support U.S. P-8 operations in
    Europe, most significantly through host-nation support to basing of the
    patrol aircraft. The United Kingdom and Norway have P-8 programs of
    their own and Germany may potentially develop one as well. United
    States leadership and advocacy for European Allied investments in
    maritime patrol and anti-submarine capabilities is always beneficial
    and contributes to campaign momentum within the Alliance.
                          joint strike fighter (f-35)
        39. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, can you confirm that 5th
    generation airpower is a requirement for your mission in EUCOM, and can
    you explain how 5th generation aircraft, like F-35, meet that
    requirement?
        General Wolters. The F-35 is the cornerstone of our global fighter
    fleet going forward. This is especially true in Europe as we work
    alongside our five currently equipped F-35 Allies to deter and prepare
    to respond to adversary aggression. The F-35's integrated, battlespace
    information-sharing, and hardened sensors and weapons enable rapid
    decision-making and extend the range of integrated off-board systems
    across the Joint Force.

        40. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, many of our key allies in
    Europe are participants in the F-35 program. In your opinion, has the
    F-35 program had a positive impact on both military and diplomatic
    relations with these key allies?
        General Wolters. The F-35 program success in Europe has definitely
    made a positive impact. Allied F-35s routinely play a critical role in
    generating peace in the Euro-Atlantic through support to bomber task
    force missions by escorting B-52s and B-2s. These missions increase our
    interoperability, hone our tactics, techniques, and procedures, bolster
    deterrence, and validate our integrated approach.
        In addition to sharing a common airframe, sharing best practices
    and common understanding of employment enhances our transparency and
    alignment to train and operate alongside our Allies and Partners. One
    example of a long term success story is the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot
    Training Program (ENJJTP), soon celebrating its 40th anniversary, which
    trains over 50 European pilots a year. The specific capabilities of the
    F-35, our partnership with F-35-equipped Allies and Partners, and our
    combined investments allow us to effectively compete and defend in the
    Euro-Atlantic.

        41. Senator Tillis. General Wolters, Russia's advanced air defenses
    and fighter capabilities are rapidly increasing in capability and
    capacity. These factors are pushing 4th generation aircraft to greater
    stand-off ranges, often beyond the targeting ranges of their weapons
    and sensors. In addition, in Europe, we see a threat density that
    creates a far greater capacity requirement for legacy platforms and
    weapons. Can you explain the importance of stand-in capabilities, such
    as 5th generation aircraft, and what advantages they provide if an
    engagement with Russia were to occur?
        General Wolters. The F-35 delivers weapons in highly contested
    environments, opening the door for wider access to other air systems.
    The platform's combined low observable capabilities (most advanced
    fighter aircraft sensor suite) and communication abilities enables the
    F-35 to fuse inputs from across the theater. This enables better
    indications and warning, providing a more cohesive operating picture
    for a whole of alliance action. The strengths the F-35 platform brings
    to the fight enable multi-domain operations elsewhere, including on the
    ground, in space, and at sea.
                              air-to-air refueling
        42. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, the KC-46A Pegasus aircraft has
    yet to achieve full rate production and lacks a remote visual system
    that is fully functional during all light levels. Moreover, a KC-46
    carries only 2,000 lbs more transferable fuel than a KC-135 and carries
    140,000 lbs less than a KC-10. In an effort to reduce cost at the risk
    of mission failure, the Air Force seeks to retire legacy aircraft with
    fully functional and approved fuel transfer systems; specifically, KC-
    10s. In your opinion, are cost savings more important than strategic
    mission success? Put differently, should a legacy platform with proven,
    capable systems be maintained and utilized over a future system that
    has yet to meet primary mission requirements?
        General Lyons. While it is true that fully-operational KC-46s are
    not available until fiscal year 2024, the Air Force developed an
    interim capability release (ICR) process that will make KC-46s
    available for tasking as early as this year. This is a critical step to
    advance KC-46 fielding and maintain credible capacity. Further, the
    global strategic environment has significantly changed. As recently as
    2017, USTRANSCOM supported 70 air refueling aircraft deployed to
    USCENTCOM. By 2022, this support will drop to about 35 aircraft. That
    reduction in demand coupled with the recently developed KC-46 Interim
    Capability Release (ICR) process, allows for the measured divestiture
    of KC-10s and KC-135s. This allows aircrews to transition to the KC-46,
    which is a critical step to advance KC-46 fielding and grow capacity in
    that airframe. The KC-135s and KC-10s remain critical as we build
    capacity in the KC-46, and even with the fielding of the KC-46, there
    will remain 300 KC-135s in the air refueling fleet. Our Mobility
    Capability Requirements Study (MCRS)-20 study, which was delivered to
    the Congress on 30 June 2021, clearly shows the air refueling mission
    absolutely is critical to cover every one of the five NDS wartime
    missions, and the air refueling fleet is at elevated risk to performing
    those missions in simultaneous timeframes in contested environments.
    USTRANSCOM agrees with the U.S. Air Force on a retirement profile for
    KC-10s and KC-135s in fiscal year 2022. I assess this is the best
    approach to retain sufficient capacity for combatant command support,
    provide for full-spectrum readiness training, and hasten use of the KC-
    46 for those missions it is capable of supporting without increasing
    risk to certain receiver aircraft or high-priority missions.

        43. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how many KC-46A air-to-air
    refueling missions are being sourced outside continental United States
    (OCONUS) by TRANSCOM?
        General Lyons. The following numbers reflect the number of OCONUS
    sorties flown for each of the last few years. It includes Active Duty
    AMC tails only (not Air National Guard (ANG), Air Force Reserve Command
    (AFRC), Air Education & Training Command (AETC), United States Air
    Forces in Europe (USAFE), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), Air Force
    Materiel Command (AFMC), or Air Force Special Operations Command
    (AFSOC)) that either took off or landed outside of the United States:
        Calendar Year 2018: 0 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
        Calendar Year 2019: 25 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
        Calendar Year 2020: 123 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
        Calendar Year 2021: 83 OCONUS KC-46 sorties (thru 31 May)

        44. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how many KC-10 air-to-air
    refueling missions are being sourced OCONUS by TRANSCOM?
        General Lyons. The following numbers reflect the number of OCONUS
    sorties flown for each of the last few years. It includes Active Duty
    AMC tails only (not ANG, AFRC, AETC, USAFE, PACAF, AFMC, or AFSOC) that
    either took off or landed outside of the United States:
        Calendar Year 2018: 4,319 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
        Calendar Year 2019: 4,546 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
        Calendar Year 2020: 2,927 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
        Calendar Year 2021: 983 OCONUS KC-10 sorties (thru 31 May)

        45. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, do you support the Air Force's
    expedited retirement initiative of KC-10s?
        General Lyons. TRANSCOM currently has sufficient capacity to meet
    day-to-day and crisis response demands. I support the KC-10 adjusted
    retirement profile outlined by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Legislative
    Proposal (FY22), which slows the original retirement profile. With
    exceptional support from the USAF, three additional positive
    developments occurred over the last year, that allowed TRANSCOM to
    retain sufficient capacity to meet mission requirements. First, Boeing
    came to terms with the responsibility to fix the KC-46 Category 1
    deficiencies, enabling the USAF to present a KC-46 Interim Capability
    Release. Second, the USAF funded additional MPA to increase the
    Reserve/Guard air refueling capacity/contributions. Finally, we are
    seeing a reduction in air refueling demand in the CENTCOM AOR.

        46. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how important is it that
    ``warfighters train like they fight'' and prepare for future
    deployments by tanking from platforms that they will encounter overseas
    and in combat?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's top priority is warfighting readiness
    and ensuring our component commands are capable of supporting their
    wartime missions. As such, training for a high-end warfight is an
    absolute necessity. As operational activity decreased in Southwest
    Asia, a greater focus across the entire Mobility Air Force, including
    air refueling forces, shifted to full-spectrum readiness. Since 2015,
    the average daily number of global air refueling missions was 139, and
    by the end of 2020, the average dropped to 100. This created
    opportunity for aircrews to conduct necessary high-end training. Tanker
    crew training is certainly necessary, but receiver pilot training
    presents a priority in order to maintain their combat edge. Looking to
    the future, air refueling workload appears balanced with expected
    capacity, especially with the KC-46 interim capability release process.
    With the projected balanced workload, the air refueling fleet will be
    postured to support global taskings, but also execute the necessary
    training to prepare for potential future contingencies.

        47. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, the Air Force and TRANSCOM have
    previously stated that more than 25,000 hours of aerial refueling
    missions are not being supported annually. Given that the KC-46 is
    still not fully operational, and the Air Force has already begun
    retiring some of the KC-10 fleet, I assume that there is still a
    significant shortfall in TRANSCOM's aerial refueling capacity. What is
    the current shortfall?
        General Lyons. In April 2020, The Secretary of the Air Force
    provided the Congress with a report titled, ``Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA
    Contractor-Operated Aerial Refueling Aircraft.'' That reported
    extrapolated ``as many as 30,000 hours of aerial refueling missions are
    not being supported annually.'' That assessment resonates with the
    Joint Force's insatiable appetite for aerial refueling. However,
    requests for air refueling capability vary in criticality and are often
    unconstrained by resources. That said, the air refueling fleet remains
    stressed. USTRANSCOM manages the tension between available resources
    and requests for capability in order to prevent mission failure.
        The transition to the KC-46 created an air refueling capacity
    bathtub, meaning the air refueling enterprise is at a low point in
    available capacity. However, acceptance of the KC-46 will ameliorate
    this capacity low point. Additionally, as forces withdraw from
    Southwest Asia, air refueling demands also decrease. As recently as
    2017, USTRANSCOM supported 70 air refueling aircraft deployed to
    CENTCOM. By 2022, this will drop to about 35 aircraft. Additionally,
    the KC-46 crew ratio is higher across the Total Force when compared to
    both the KC-135 and about the same as the KC-10. When fully delivered
    and manned in 2029, roughly 160 more air refueling crews across the
    Total Force will exist, providing 10% more taskable aircraft on a daily
    basis than we had in 2019, before any aircraft were retired. While we
    have a shortfall today, the trajectory is improving over time and will
    accelerate as the KC-46 reaches full operational capability.

        48. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, how does this impact training
    for aircrews and tanker availability for combatant command (COCOM)?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's top priority is warfighting readiness
    and ensuring our component commands are capable of supporting their
    wartime missions. As such, training for a high-end warfight is an
    absolute necessity. As operational activity decreased in Southwest
    Asia, a greater focus across the entire Mobility Air Force, including
    air refueling forces, shifted to full-spectrum readiness. Since 2015,
    the average daily number of global air refueling missions was 139, and
    by the end of 2020, the average dropped to 100. This created
    opportunity for aircrews to conduct necessary high-end training. Tanker
    crew training is certainly necessary, but receiver pilot training
    presents a priority in order to maintain their combat edge. While the
    number of tasked air refueling missions was about 100 a day in 2020,
    USTRANSCOM committed an additional 68 aircraft to receiver training.
    Looking to the future, air refueling workload is balanced with expected
    capacity, especially with the relief gained through use of the KC-46
    interim capability release that can support many non-deployed and lower
    priority missions, freeing up fully capable KC-10 and KC-135 units to
    provide necessary support and refocus on training.

        49. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, last year you testified before
    this Committee that the KC-10 and KC-135 legacy tanker retirements
    proposed in fiscal year 2021 would ``create a capacity bathtub with
    significant impacts to Combatant Command (COCOM) daily competition and
    wartime missions, and negatively impact senior leader decision space
    for mobilization when confronted with a crisis.'' Congress prevented
    some, but not all, of these retirements in the Fiscal Year 2021
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Given that the KC-46 is
    still not fully operational, and aerial refueling requirements have
    presumably either increased or remained the same, would you support
    efforts to increase tanker capacity in order to meet aircrew training
    and daily COCOM operational requirements?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM supports the USAF initiative to employ
    Interim Capability Release (ICR) process for use of current KC-46
    aircraft with some restrictions, adjustments to the KC-10 and KC-135
    retirement profile, and increases to Reserve Component contributions to
    mitigate the air refueling ``capacity bathtub'' identified last year.
    As you recall, last year there was no agreed upon technical solution to
    fix the KC-46 Remote Visual System (RVS) Category 1 Deficiency or a
    path forward on usable KC-46 capacity. Both of these issues have been
    resolved and given these USAF initiatives, I assess sufficient air
    refueling capacity remains to meet global Joint Force demands during
    the transition to a fully operational KC-46. No additional air
    refueling capacity is needed beyond the President's Budget 2022
    position to meet aircrew training and daily Combatant Command
    requirements.

        50. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, I have serious concerns
    regarding the Air Force's desire to retire a significant number of
    legacy tankers prior to the KC-46 becoming fully operational. I am
    particularly concerned by the potential loss of the KC-10, which
    provides significantly more fuel offload than both the KC-135 and the
    KC-46. I understand that the KC-10 fleet has many more years left in
    terms of potential service life, and am concerned that prematurely
    retiring such a strategic asset would result in a loss of warfighter
    capability that cannot be regained for many years to come. Please
    describe the importance of the KC-10 to TRANSCOM's aerial refueling
    capability, and the potential impact to missions for Air Force, Navy,
    and Marine Corps pilots and aircrews if we cut additional KC-10s.
        General Lyons. The KC-10 delivers necessary and relevant capability
    for all NDS wartime missions. Unfortunately, these aircraft are
    expensive to maintain. A value-assessment of air refueling systems must
    incorporate current utility, future capability and cost. USTRANSCOM
    concurs with the USAF decision to divest the KC-10 in order to
    facilitate the fielding of a fully operational KC-46 weapon system,
    which appears to be on track. In the near-term, the USAF is making KC-
    46s available for USTRANSCOM missions via the KC-46 Interim Capability
    Release process to ensure sufficient capacity to meet global AR
    demands, in combination with existing KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft.

        51. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, I understand that, although the
    KC-46 has been cleared to conduct some aerial refueling missions, the
    aircraft will not be considered to be fully operational until major
    deficiencies such as the Remote Visual System are resolved, which
    likely won't be until 2023 at the earliest. I was surprised to learn
    that, despite this non- or semi-operational status, the KC-46s being
    delivered are being coded into the Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory
    (PMAI). Please explain why these aircraft are given the same inventory
    status as fully operational KC-10s or KC-135s.
        General Lyons. Aircraft are coded as PMAI to signify the airframe
    has resources to support flying operations, such as weapon system
    support, maintenance and flying crews, and flying hours programmed
    against it. Using the established PMAI criteria, it is appropriate to
    code the aircraft as PMAI especially as the U.S. Air Force looks to
    generate the crew force necessary to operate the aircraft. With the
    U.S. Air Force making limited KC-46 capacity available for USTRANSCOM
    tasking, it is important that weapon system has the resourcing to
    sustain and grow operational capacity over time. A trained crew force
    allows the growth of the KC-46 capacity to execute additional taskings
    to support the Joint Force in the future.

        52. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, I understand that there have
    been conversations regarding possible uses for KC-10 aircraft prior to
    being fully retired and sent to the boneyard. I understand that one
    option is to provide the aircraft to industry, either through sale or
    as Government Furnished Equipment, for use in a commercial air
    refueling program. I understand that the Navy and Marine Corps have
    been successfully utilizing a commercial air refueling program for the
    last 20+ years. What is the status of those discussions?
        General Lyons. As I understand, discussions regarding commercial
    air refueling are ongoing and potential options are currently
    undergoing further study by the Air Force. I would defer to the Air
    Force on the results of their study and whether or not it determines
    commercial air refueling as a viable means to meet USTRANSCOM's air
    refueling requirements.

        53. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, shouldn't KC-10 retirements be
    halted until a decision is made on commercial air refueling?
        General Lyons. No, in coordination with the Air Force, we have
    developed a sustainable way forward that maintains sufficient air
    refueling capacity to meet requirements as we bridge to the KC-46. The
    Air Force Interim Capability Release (ICR) process that makes KC-46
    capacity available for limited USTRANSCOM tasking is a key step forward
    that will help with the transition to that platform. USTRANSCOM
    supports the KC-10 divestment profile submitted by the Department of
    Defense which slows retirement pending KC-46 outcomes.

        54. Senator Tillis. General Lyons, do you believe TRANSCOM and the
    Air Force should be pursuing a commercial air refueling program to
    address current and future aerial refueling shortfalls?
        General Lyons. USTRANSCOM will continue to monitor and evaluate
    operational requirements. However, we would differ to the U.S. Air
    Force, as the force provider, to determine cost-effective, legal, and
    operational credible alternatives to their current air refueling
    construct.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                     china
        55. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what specific
    vulnerabilities--economic, security, or otherwise--is China exploiting
    amongst our European partners and allies that it was not exploiting
    before the COVID-19 pandemic?
        General Wolters. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) aggressive
    economic and diplomatic activities in the USEUCOM AOR signal Beijing's
    desire to build influence in Europe and challenge the established
    rules-based international order with an alternative model. Since the
    onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, China has attempted to exploit needs
    across Europe for critical health supplies and vaccines, which were
    less viable avenues for influence before the pandemic. Beijing has used
    the pandemic to expand exports to the region and attempt to elevate its
    status as a global power. Beijing has delivered COVID-19 vaccines to
    Hungary, North Macedonia, and Serbia, all countries the Chinese Defense
    Minister visited in March. Beijing is also publicly advocating for EU
    approval of its vaccines, which would allow the vaccines to be used
    across the region. China has also paired this economic engagement with
    an aggressive disinformation campaign. Chinese officials used
    disinformation and state-owned media to counter negative press and
    criticism in Europe and are spreading propaganda about its vaccines in
    the region.
        Coupled with China's growing interest and investment in European
    ports and critical infrastructure, these activities complicate our
    steady state and contingency operations. We articulate this risk to our
    European defense counterparts and highlight shared values, interests,
    and equitable business practices that distinguish the U.S. as a partner
    of choice. European nations are becoming increasingly aware of, and
    concerned about, the risks associated with Chinese capital and
    investment from the PRC.

        56. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what actions could the
    United States take to achieve better buy-in from European partners and
    allies to cooperatively deter Beijing and to negotiate from a position
    of strength?
        General Wolters. In Europe, we work on multiple fronts through NATO
    to develop a common framework to respond to the challenges posed by
    China, which includes engaging with Allies and Partners on the Indo-
    Pacific, and working with Allies and Partners to strengthen resilience
    in the areas like critical technology and infrastructure. We share
    information, discuss common risks, and create a shared understanding of
    the challenges to global security and the rules-based international
    order which increases U.S. alignment with our Allies and Partners.
        In NATO, there is increasing recognition of the impact of China on
    the changing international security environment. The NATO 2030 Report
    notes that ``[NATO] must show political cohesion and remain a platform
    for consultation on China's actions and Allies' reactions; defending
    Allies' values and an international order based on rules.''
        Active United States engagement with European countries has also
    led to a more guarded posture in Europe on 5G and Huawei, balancing and
    limiting Chinese influence in USEUCOM. Multiple European nations
    enacted restrictions last year on the use of equipment by untrustworthy
    Chinese manufacturers in the rollout of mobile networks that use 5G
    technology. We continue to emphasize to European nations that the
    United States is the security partner of choice.

        57. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what high-return-on-
    investment activities do you identify for the United States and NATO
    allies to deter Chinese aggression?
        General Wolters. In terms of military return-on-investment, our
    first priority is to defend the Euro-Atlantic and deter adversaries.
    Many NATO Allies have taken impactful actions to support a free and
    open Indo-Pacific and to strengthen cooperation with Partners in the
    Indo-Pacific as well. Specifically, France, Germany, and the
    Netherlands sent ships to the Indo-Pacific this year to support a
    rules-based international order and in some cases conduct multinational
    training with the U.S. and Indo-Pacific partners. As part of the UK's
    tilt to the Indo-Pacific, the UK Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21),
    headed by the HMS Queen Elizabeth, will deploy to the Pacific with
    stops in India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
        Economically, there is increased awareness among Allies of the
    threats posed by Chinese investment and infrastructure in Europe, with
    industries and governments expressing concerns over doing business with
    China and limiting Chinese commercial transactions that threaten
    national security respectively. The Baltic nations have all signed 5G
    security agreements with the United States, and downgraded their
    participation in the annual 17+1 forum with China this year.

        58. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, what are the ``lessons
    learned'' from implementing the European Deterrence Initiative that
    could inform implementation of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative?
        General Wolters. EDI funding has allowed USEUCOM and the Services
    to resource key programs needed to deter Russia and support our NATO
    Allies, facilitate planning, and greatly enhance our preparedness. As
    the EDI program matured, we developed a process to repurpose and shift
    funding from contracts or otherwise challenged programs to those that
    were ``ready-to-execute''. The repurposing process requires scrutiny
    from our EDI planners, including a legal and comptroller review prior
    to being sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for
    approval. This process ensures efficient and effective use of funding.
    The OSD Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's (CAPE)
    review and oversight of the EDI program heightened its credibility
    within the department and Congress. Additionally, our direct
    coordination with the Services is important, as the majority of EDI
    procurement initiatives for prepositioned equipment sets is executed at
    the Service vice the Component level.

        59. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, how would you characterize
    the current China-Russia security partnership in your area of
    responsibility? Please explain.
        General Wolters. Ongoing interactions between Russia and China
    suggest the emergence of a partnership of convenience to advance their
    mutual interests, rather than a true alliance such as NATO. The
    expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in the Euro-Atlantic region
    is detrimental to both United States and European interests. Moscow
    continues to sell Beijing high-end fighter aircraft and surface-to-air
    missile systems and has announced plans to develop a joint missile
    warning system despite the historical distrust between them. Russia
    remains sensitive to Chinese activities in the Arctic, Central Asia,
    and Eastern Europe. USEUCOM remains vigilant to any changes in this
    relationship and utilizes a whole-of-alliance approach to deter and
    defend the Euro-Atlantic.
                             nato security threats
        60. Senator Blackburn. General Wolters, in practice, what
    activities must NATO implement to satisfy NATO 2030's recommendation to
    ``enhance the fight against terrorism as part of the hybrid and cyber
    conversation''? As necessary, please identify threat assessments,
    exercises, lessons learned, etc.
        General Wolters. NATO 2030 highlights NATO's role globally, which
    is based on working even more closely with like-minded Partners to
    defend our values in a world of increased global competition, to
    include terrorist activity in cyber and hybrid tactics. We must help
    strengthen NATO with building greater cohesion and consultation within
    NATO and among Allies. Increased information and intelligence sharing
    will enhance situational awareness and a common understanding to
    counter terror groups' malign hybrid and cyber actions. A cyber red
    team is currently integrating into exercise DEFENDER Europe 2021 to
    help strengthen our cyber defensive posture.
                             transcom cybersecurity
        61. Senator Blackburn. General Lyons, in what specific ways has the
    implementation of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC)
    mitigated cybersecurity risks within TRANSCOM's commercial provider
    base?
        General Lyons. Per the interim DFARS case 2019 D-041 Assessing
    Contractor Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements, DOD
    implemented a phased rollout of CMMC and the requirement for
    contractors to have a current certification for the required CMMC level
    will not start until on or after October 1, 2025.
        To reduce cybersecurity risks with our commercial partners in the
    interim, we have incorporated Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
    Supplement (DFARS) Clause 252.204-7012, ``Safeguarding Covered Defense
    Information and Cyber Incident Reporting,'' in all Readiness
    Transportation Service Provider (TSP) contracts. The DFARS clause
    requires our Readiness TSPs to implement National Institute of
    Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171,
    ``Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal
    Information Systems and Organizations,'' to safeguard covered defense
    information processed or stored on their internal information system or
    network.
        The DFARS clause also requires each of our Readiness TSPs to
    complete an annual cybersecurity self-assessment of the NIST security
    controls. 2020, marked the third year of contractually requiring our
    Readiness TSPs to submit self-assessments. Self-reporting compliance
    has improved over the last three years, and the process continues to
    prove beneficial in giving us greater insight into our TSPs'
    cybersecurity posture. USTRANSCOM is also in the process of awarding a
    proof-of-principle contract to have a third-party assess our commercial
    partner's compliance with CMMC Level 3 security criteria. This proof-
    of-principle will provide an indication of compliance, identify gaps,
    and provide an understanding of our commercial partner's cybersecurity
    posture.
        In conversations with our TSPs, we know our TSPs are aware of the
    DOD's interim rule to amend the DFARS to implement a DOD Assessment
    Methodology and CMMC framework to assess contractor implementation of
    cybersecurity requirements. Our TSPs are very cognizant of the emerging
    requirements and have demonstrated motivation to prepare for the
    compliance assessment.
                                  air mobility
        62. Senator Blackburn. General Lyons, with respect to Air Mobility
    Command--specifically, inter-theater lift missions--what percentage of
    the time is TRANSCOM meeting required delivery dates (RDDs) from
    requesting units?
        General Lyons. Numbers broken out by calendar year:
        ULN = Unit Line Number
        2019 All-29,115 ULNs (74.1 percent On-time)
        2019 Deploy Only-16,715 ULNs (80.6 percent On-time)
        2019 Redeploy Only-12,400 ULNs (65.3 percent On-time)
        2020 All-28,115 ULNs (78.3 percent On-time)
        2020 Deploy Only-14,988 ULNs (81.3 percent On-time)
        2020 Redeploy Only-13,127 ULNs (74.8 percent On-time)
        2021 All-12,696 ULNs (78.2 percent On-time)
        2021 Deploy Only-6,731 ULNs (82.6 percent On-time)
        2021 Redeploy Only-5,965 ULNs (73.3 percent On-time)

        63. Senator Blackburn. General Lyons, in instances of missed RDDs,
    what are the headlining trends with respect to mission variables, such
    as weather, maintenance, and crew rest?
        General Lyons. For the one-year period beginning 1 April 2020 and
    ending 31 March 2021, 1,018 of 2,722 (37.4%) of contingency airlift
    missions delivered past the required delivery date (RDD). The top three
    drivers for these were aircraft availability (248), efficient asset
    utilization (224), and a delay based on the customer's request (177).
    Aircraft maintenance accounted for only 109 of the late missions,
    weather 36 missions, and crew rest 15 missions.

        64. Senator Blackburn. General Lyons, does the inventory and
    availability of grey-tail aircraft adequately support the present
    demand for inter-theater transportation?
        General Lyons. Yes, our grey-tail aircraft adequately support the
    present demand for inter-theater transportation. Mobility Capability
    Requirements Study (MCRS)-20 will be delivered at the end of June,
    provides extensive details on this force element when viewed through
    the lens of NDS demands.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                     taiwan
        65. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, Admirals Davidson and Aquilino
    both warned that China might attempt a fait accompli against Taiwan
    much sooner than previously anticipated, perhaps even before the end of
    this decade. How do the logistics requirements for blunting a Chinese
    fait accompli against Taiwan differ from the logistics requirements for
    fighting and winning a protracted war against China in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        General Lyons. Long, contested lines of communications and the
    tyranny of distance in the Indo-Pacific region creates dilemmas that
    will require the integration of logistics planning across all
    warfighting functions to support the joint warfight. The growth in
    demand from increasingly dispersed operations, increasingly complex and
    lethal kinetic platforms, and extended adversary anti-access/area
    denial capabilities place immediate stressors on the Joint Deployment
    and Distribution Enterprise to support forward forces immediately, as
    we rapidly build capacity to deploy a decisive force.
        With the distances involved and geography in the INDOPACOM AOR, the
    core mobility assets remain critical in both instances. Our strategic
    sea and air lift are crucial and allow us to present a sizeable Joint
    Force around the globe. Additionally, air refueling is a key enabler
    that allows this enterprise to deploy fighters and bombers rapidly as
    well as employ those combat aircraft across great distances. Intra-
    theater sea and air lift is also critical to sustain and support the
    force across great distances to meet volume and time-sensitive
    requirements for cargo, passengers, and fuel.
        Both the Mobility Capability Requirements Study (MCRS)-20 and POL
    Tanker Study will be submitted to Congress at the end of June and both
    studies provide details on this challenge.

        66. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, what are the most important
    investments we need to make to ensure we have the logistics support
    required to blunt a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan and then
    prevail in a protracted war, if necessary?
        General Lyons. Two investments come to mind: assets and access.
    With the distances involved and geography in the INDOPACOM AOR, core
    mobility assets remain critical. Our strategic sea and air lift forces
    present a sizeable and credible capability to move Joint Forces around
    the globe. We need to sustain efforts to recapitalize our sealift fleet
    to improve our readiness and capacity to project the Joint Force.
    Additionally, air refueling is a key enabler that allows this
    enterprise to deploy fighters and bombers rapidly as well as employ
    those combat aircraft across great distances. The KC-46 is another key
    investment to recapitalize the aging air refueling fleet. Even when the
    179th KC-46 is delivered, 300 KC-135s at 65 plus years of age will
    remain. Investments in air refueling will remain necessary. Enhancing
    the readiness of our key mobility platforms is crucial to ensure we
    maintain the necessary capacity to deploy and sustain the Joint Force
    around the globe when needed. In terms of access, our regional posture
    enhances the flexibility and warfighting effectiveness of USTRANSCOM
    assets. Investments in partnerships that expand access and support
    adaptive basing initiatives will remain critical for success. Overall,
    we must continue to invest in the readiness of our sealift, strategic
    airlift, and air refueling fleets.
                                china in europe
        67. Senator Hawley. General Lyons and General Wolters, how might
    Chinese investments in European infrastructure, ports, and
    telecommunications impact America's ability to move forces quickly and
    reliably across Europe?
        General Lyons. It is important to note that strategic competition
    with the PRC does not mean confrontation or conflict. The DOD seeks a
    constructive, stable, and results-oriented defense relationship with
    the PLA that helps put US-PRC relations on a path of transparency and
    non-aggression. That said, the DOD remains mindful of the PRC's overt
    challenge to the long standing values-based international order. The
    DOD monitors Chinese infrastructure investments in Europe and does not
    currently assess them to be a significant obstacle to the ability of
    the US to move forces rapidly across Europe. USTRANSCOM intentionally
    maintains many resilient paths and nodes that would enable us to work
    around areas that may be denied or disrupted for any of a wide range of
    reasons.
        General Wolters. In coordination with our regional Allies and
    Partners, United States Forces continue to execute unhindered movements
    to, from, and across Europe in support of collective security.
        We remain vigilant to the risk of non-European ownership or control
    of ports, telecommunications, and critical infrastructure. While these
    foreign investments do not currently impede U.S. and NATO operations
    and activities, if left unchecked they could pose a threat in the
    future. The U.S., in conjunction with our European Allies and Partners,
    must continue to execute an all-domain, whole-of-government, whole of
    nation and whole of alliance approach to this emerging issue.
                                russia and china
        68. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, there are concerns that the
    Russian and Chinese militaries may be growing closer in ways that
    suggest a broader and more enduring alignment between those two
    countries. How would you describe changes in Russian and Chinese
    military cooperation over the last several years?
        General Wolters. Our adversaries have increased their military
    engagements in recent years, both bilaterally and with other partners
    through multilateral partnerships--including members such as the
    Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Notably, China has participated in
    Russia's annual capstone military exercise since 2018, they have flown
    two bomber patrols they characterized as ``combined'' in the Pacific
    region, and the Nations periodically conduct naval maneuvers together.
    These events have been highly scripted and probably did not include
    combined command and control. Even with these developments, however,
    their military integration remains limited and neither Moscow nor
    Beijing currently appears interested in forming a military alliance.
          intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) assets
        69. Senator Hawley. General Wolters, you stated during the hearing
    that the United States must ``communicate to our allies and partners
    the criticality of ISR and what it contributes in indications and
    warnings'' and that ``in NATO, we are having success with that.'' How
    are our European allies contributing to meeting our shared ISR
    requirements in the EUCOM AOR, and how have their contributions changed
    over the last several years?
        General Wolters. NATO Allies and Partners continue to increase and
    improve their theater ISR support to Indications and Warning in the
    USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). NATO invested in five Allied
    Ground Surveillance (AGS) aircraft (RQ-4 Block 40 platforms) and
    associated systems to remotely operate this aircraft and analyze the
    associated indications and warning intelligence data collected. These
    AGS aircraft are actively conducting ISR operations and integrating
    direct ISR support and coordination, specifically during focused
    collection events in the AOR. NATO Allies and Partners continue to
    increase theater airborne collection processing, exploitation, and
    dissemination capacity in support of a more federated approach to
    addressing mission requirements while also decreasing reliance on U.S.
    exploitation nodes.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
    Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
    Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
    Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. Today, the Committee will
    receive testimony from Admiral Charles Richard, Commander, at
    U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, and from General James
    Dickinson, Commander, at U.S. Space Command, or SPACECOM.
        I want to thank Admiral Richard and General Dickinson for
    their service to our Nation. I would also like to extend my
    thanks to the men and women serving under your commands and
    their families.
        Maintaining our nuclear deterrent or preserving our ability
    operate in space are fundamental to today's great power
    competition with Russia and China. There is a reason that we
    have asked the commanders of STRATCOM and SPACECOM to testify
    together today.
        Until 2019, Space Command was part of Strategic Command. As
    Space Command stands up as an independent command, I would like
    to understand what gaps or seams remain exposed as this
    transition moves forward and ensure these gaps are being
    addressed; in particular, General Dickinson, I would like to
    make sure that SPACECOM is fulfilling the space and ground
    functions you inherited from STRATCOM, with respect to missile
    warning and nuclear command, control, and communications.
    Ensuring we can accurately warn both, Strategic and Northern
    Commands and our senior leadership of a missile attack on the
    homeland is of the utmost priority.
        General Dickinson, I understand that you are also
    responsible for integrating and tasking both, ground and space
    sensors for better space situational awareness. In essence,
    your command has become the DOD's sensor command. I hope you
    will share your vision to integrate this myriad number of
    sensors, which range are radars on the ground and at sea, to
    sensors aboard satellites. Finally, General Dickinson, I would
    like to know how your command is standing up and how you are
    finding and retaining personnel with the specialized skill sets
    associated with the SPACECOM operations.
        Admiral Richard, your command is undergoing an intense
    period of modernization that began with the ratification of the
    new START Treaty. This will be the third modification cycle
    since 1960, as part of each leg of our triad ages out. I look
    forward to your views on modernizing the entire triad and
    implications of altering that plan, especially with respect to
    our near-peer competitors.
        In addition, I would like to know your views on the efforts
    by the National Nuclear Security Administration to recapitalize
    their infrastructure to handle uranium and plutonium. Some of
    these facilities date to the Manhattan Project and are single
    points of failure in supporting your mission. It is essential
    that we understand from you the impacts, if any, on your
    operations. Finally, Admiral Richard, we have been informed
    that STRATCOM will require a submarine warhead in twenty
    thirties to replace one of the two you have now. The
    replacement warhead is a joint program with the United Kingdom,
    as their single warhead begins to age out and it is important
    to our NATO Article V commitments. I hope you will explain this
    system to the Committee.
        Thank you, again, for appearing today and we all look
    forward to your testimony. Before I turn it over to Ranking
    Member Inhofe, I would like to note for my colleagues that
    there will be a classified briefing immediately following this
    session in SVC-217 to continue our discussion.
        Senator Inhofe, please.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I also want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for
    their service. Over the past few years, this Committee's top
    priority has been ensuring to implement the National Defense
    Strategy, which identifies competition with China and Russia as
    the central challenge to United States prosperity and security.
    I agree with that more so today than in 2018 when it was
    established.
        If we are serious about the security of our Nation, we have
    got to maintain the capabilities required to deter China and
    Russia and we need to be realistic about the level of resources
    needed to make that happen, because we have not been in the
    past. Two critical pieces of those objectives are modernizing
    our aging nuclear deterrent and improving our space capability
    in an evolving contested domain.
        Admiral Richard, and commander of the U.S. Strategic
    Command, your primary job is to ensure that our nuclear forces
    continue to deter the most severe threats to the survivability
    of our Nation and the security of our allies'. Admiral Davidson
    told us some pretty worrying things about Chinese nuclear
    expanses just last month. You have been a big supporter of
    nuclear modernization and rightly so. We have delayed critical
    investments in DOD and the NNSA for too long and now we are
    almost out of time.
        General Dickinson, as SPACECOM commander, you are
    responsible for the planning and execution of the global space
    operations and missions. In most DOD war games, the first acts
    of aggression from our adversaries occur in the space domain
    and directly impact outcomes. This makes improving our
    capability to fight and to win in space critical to deterring
    China and Russia.
        Both of you are responsible for missions with zero margin
    for failure, but I am considered that the administration's
    defense budget cuts may undermine your ability to develop those
    capabilities. It would be important for us to hear your best
    military advice as to what resources you need to accomplish
    this mission. I look forward to your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Admiral Richard, please.

    STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Richard. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    distinguished Committee Members, good morning.
        I am pleased to testify with General Dickinson today and
    appreciate the collaborative efforts our commands undertake in
    the defense of the Nation. I thank the President, Secretary of
    Defense Austin, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Milley for
    their leadership and support to the mission of strategic
    deterrence. I assure you the command is committed to work the
    priorities set forth by the secretary to defend the Nation,
    take care of our people, and succeed through teamwork.
        We succeed each and every day through the teamwork of
    150,000 men and women performing STRATCOM's missions and I will
    remind the command it is our diversity, resilience, and
    professionalism that sets us apart and makes us even stronger.
    It is truly a privilege to represent them here today.
        I also thank the Committee for its enduring support to our
    national defense and active engagement and interest in the
    command's missions.
        Strategic deterrents enables every U.S. military operation
    around the world. Every operational plan in the Department and
    every other capability we possess rests on an assumption that
    strategic deterrence and, in particular, nuclear deterrence is
    holding. If that fails, nothing else in the Department of
    Defense works as planned. STRATCOM sets the most foundational
    of operating conditions to allow the rest of the Joint Force to
    accomplish its mission.
        As a Nation, I would assert, until recently, we have not
    fully considered the implications of engaging in competition
    through crisis or possible direct-armed conflict with a
    nuclear-capable adversary in nearly 3 decades. For the first
    time in our history, the Nation is facing two nuclear-capable,
    strategic-peer adversaries at the same time, both of whom have
    to be deterred differently.
        Chinese and Russian advances are eroding our conventional
    and strategic deterrence. China, in particular, I submit,
    cannot be considered anymore, a lesser-included case in this
    context. The remarkable expansion of nuclear and strategic
    capability is evidence of their drive to be a strategic peer by
    the end of the decade. I would describe this as the strategic
    complement to the conventional capability growth that has been
    reported by INDOPACOM.
        To me, they are at some kind of inflection point and are
    rapidly expanding their strategic capabilities. This has
    happened within the last year. They are well ahead of the pace
    to double their stockpile by the end of the decade, and I would
    further submit that the size of a nation's weapons stockpile by
    itself is a very crude measure of what they can do with that
    capability.
        To fully assess the China threat it is necessary to
    consider the capability, range, accuracy of their delivery
    systems, command and control, readiness, posture, doctrine in
    training. In the very near term, China will possess a credible
    nuclear triad, rapidly expanding road-mobile capability and
    these are intercontinental ballistic missiles on trucks that
    they drive around. It is a big country. They can be hard to
    find.
        They are moving to solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic
    missiles, silo based, very responsive, compared to a liquid-
    fueled one. They are deploying a strategic bomber and they
    possess now, six second-generation, Jin-class ballistic missile
    submarines and they are capable of continuous at-sea deterrent
    patrol. Developing a dedicated nuclear command and control
    capability that includes launch under warning and launch under
    attack. By these measures, China is capable of executing any
    plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally now and will
    soon be able to do so at intercontinental ranges.
        I offer for China, it is important to look at what they do,
    not what they say, and where they are going, not where they
    are. I have no choice but to view China as a significant
    strategic threat and share Secretary Austin's assessment, China
    is the pacing threat for the Nation and DOD at large.
        Russia, however, remains the pacing nuclear strategic
    threat, aggressively engaged in conventional and nuclear
    capability development and modernization, and are now roughly
    80 percent complete, while we are at zero. It is easier to
    describe what they are not modernizing, nothing, than what they
    are, which is pretty much everything, including several ``never
    before seen'' capabilities and several thousand non-treaty
    accountable weapons systems.
        They have a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic
    missile that has the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,
    Poseidon nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater vehicle,
    and the Skyfall nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise
    missiles, examples of asymmetric strategic weapons
    capabilities, designed to deter us and our allies, offset
    perceived conventional inferiority in an effort to terminate
    events on Russian terms.
        So, given all that, we can no longer assume the risk of a
    strategic deterrence failure and crisis or conflict is always
    low. The days of power projection in a permissive operational
    environment without regard to a possible nuclear response are
    over. This is why Secretary Austin testified during his
    confirmation, nuclear deterrence is our highest priority.
        Given that threat, the Nation requires a fully modernized
    strategic force and supporting infrastructure. Every
    presidential administration over the past 60 years has
    reaffirmed a safe, secure, effect nuclear force, most credible
    combinations of capabilities to deter strategic attack, assure
    allies. Each element has unique capabilities, but it is the
    combined elements of the triad that allow us to execute our
    assigned national strategy.
        We are at a point where ``end of life'' limitations and
    cumulative effects of underinvestment in our nuclear deterrent
    and supporting infrastructure against the expanding threat
    leave me no operational margin. The Nation simply cannot
    attempt to indefinitely life-extend leftover Cold War weapon
    systems and successfully carry out the assigned strategy. They
    are at risk of losing credibility in the eyes of our
    adversaries and if they continue to work at all, they will
    likely not be able to pace the threat that they are intended to
    deter.
        I will just end with, in particular, it is the nuclear
    weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure I think is
    hitting the wall first. Without the recapitalization of the
    existing weapons, we risk obsolescence and we could reach a
    point where no amount of money will adequately mitigate the
    operational risks we will be facing.
        Final point. The Nation has a longstanding, flexible,
    tailored strategy with a ``well thought out'' family of
    policies, capabilities, and postures. I welcome and call for a
    strategic review, but I advise against any individual policy or
    capability decision made, absent a complete understanding of
    the overall effects on that strategy, as it could risk a
    deterrence failure, which is the underpinning of everything we
    do.
        Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you again for the opportunity
    to be here today and I look forward to your questions.
        [The statement of Admiral Richard follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral Charles A. Richard
                                  introduction
        United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is a global
    warfighting command, and as the Commander, I am privileged to lead the
    150,000 Sailors, Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, and Civilians
    who dedicate themselves to the Department of Defense's highest priority
    mission. I thank the President, Secretary of Defense Austin, and
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Milley for their continued leadership in
    this vital mission area. The command is focused on and committed to the
    Secretary of Defense priorities to defend the Nation, take care of our
    people, and succeed through teamwork. I also thank Congress for your
    continued support to ensure USSTRATCOM is equipped with the required
    resources necessary to achieve strategic deterrence in any situation on
    behalf of the Nation.
        USSTRATCOM enables Joint Force operations and is the combatant
    command responsible for Strategic Deterrence, Nuclear Operations,
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Enterprise
    Operations, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Global Strike,
    Missile Defense, Analysis and Targeting, and Missile Threat Assessment.
    Our mission is to deter strategic attack and employ forces as directed,
    to guarantee the security of the Nation and assure our allies and
    partners. The command has three priorities. First, above all else, we
    will provide strategic deterrence for the Nation and assurance of the
    same to our allies and partners. Second, if deterrence fails, we are
    prepared to deliver a decisive response, decisive in every possible
    way. Third, we will do this with a modern resilient, equipped, and
    trained combat-ready force. To execute our assigned responsibilities,
    the men and women of USSTRATCOM operate globally, as a joint force, in
    all warfighting domains, and with our allies and partners to address
    strategic challenges facing our Nation.
        As Congress is well aware, the past year's pandemic challenged us
    in ways we never expected. Within days, the command transitioned from
    approximately 30 teleworking personnel to thousands, without missing a
    beat. I am pleased to report USSTRATCOM remained, and continues to be
    fully mission capable. This is a true testament to the resilience of
    our workforce, our command and control (C2) systems, and the support
    from our base and local community.
        Peace is our profession . . . continues to be the USSTRATCOM motto.
    It serves as an acknowledgement that the Nation leads first with
    diplomacy as military force should be the last resort. The three dots
    are intentional to remind potential adversaries that if tested, the
    command enables the President to lead the Nation from a position of
    strength. Fundamental to our survival as a nation is a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear triad; a reliable and modern nuclear command,
    control, and communications (NC3) architecture; and a responsive
    nuclear weapons infrastructure. These elements deter adversaries from
    conducting nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks against our
    Nation, and assure our allies and partners. As Secretary Austin
    testified, strategic deterrence, and within that nuclear deterrence, is
    the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense.
        Strategic deterrence is the foundation of our national defense
    policy and enables every U.S. military operation around the world. Any
    individual strategic policy or capability decision made absent an
    understanding of the effect on the overall strategy could potentially
    increase the risk of deterrence failure. If strategic deterrence fails,
    little else . . . no plan or capability, works as designed.
        USSTRATCOM will fully support ongoing reviews of strategic and
    nuclear policy with a goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in
    our defense strategy while adjusting to the operational implications of
    policy choices. Presidential and Departmental guidance defined by the
    National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and
    by our nuclear policy depend on a strategic deterrent required to meet
    the challenges of the changing global security environment. This is not
    possible without stable, consistent, and on-time appropriations and
    support to program modernization by Congress. Sustainment and
    modernization of our nuclear forces, weapons complex, and requisite NC3
    capabilities has transitioned from something we should do, to something
    we must do. Based on current programmatic and acquisition timelines, if
    we find out we were wrong, decisions to divest or delay could take ten
    to fifteen years to recover and render the Nation unable to respond to
    advancing threats. Any decision to delay or defer recapitalization
    requires us to be absolutely sure, for the next 40 years, that we won't
    need that capability to deter threats, many of which we can't predict.
                                   our people
        USSTRATCOM's military and civilian professionals are the driving
    force behind Strategic Deterrence. The command is committed to building
    a diverse and inclusive workforce with the needed skills to meet
    current and future security environment demands, as we pursue
    innovative ways to recruit and retain top talent. Workforce
    enhancements through internships, development and mentorship programs,
    academic partnerships, and our Women in Leadership program are just a
    few examples of ways the command attracts software, nuclear
    engineering, scientific, and strategy and policy skill sets into
    service.
        USSTRATCOM works closely with world-class universities and
    education systems, through our Academic Alliance--a partnership of over
    60 institutions. The command advocates to incorporate deterrence
    history and theory, allied perspectives, the importance of treaties and
    alliances, an understanding of capabilities, delivery systems, weapons,
    and C2 capabilities into curriculums. The aim is to enhance
    understanding of our mission and the importance of strategic deterrence
    while further developing the Nation's next generation of national
    security professionals. Together with Professional Military Education,
    this creates a strategic advantage necessary for interoperability
    across Joint and Allied forces.
        Joint Force interoperability is further enhanced through
    USSTRATCOM's joint exercises and wargames. Despite the challenges posed
    by the pandemic, the command completed over 350 events specifically
    designed to produce trained and ready forces capable of operating
    across the spectrum of conflict. Whether done virtually or in person,
    exercises and wargames are critical command enablers to sustaining
    readiness and enhancing our ability to rapidly project national
    military power globally. They are also a primary mechanism in
    strengthening relationships with allies and partners.
                         dynamic strategic environment
        Strategic Competition demands we be ready for any threat, in any
    domain, at any time. Potential adversaries are building advanced
    nuclear capabilities, fielding increasingly capable conventional
    forces, and exploiting seams below the level of armed conflict, in an
    attempt to gain strategic advantages in pursuit of their national
    objectives. China and Russia are challenging our strength through a
    wide array of activities that warrant a concerted and integrated whole-
    of-government response. For the first time in our history, the Nation
    is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer
    adversaries at the same time, who must be deterred differently. We can
    no longer assume the risk of strategic deterrence failure in conflict
    will always remain low.
        This is not to say strategic competition will end in armed
    conflict; rather, in the event of conflict with a near-peer, nuclear-
    armed adversary, the risk of a strategic deterrence failure increases.
    We must maximize our ability to prevent strategic deterrence failure
    and find ways to reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis, by
    engaging all elements of national power to effectively communicate our
    resolve to potential adversaries. The command stands ready to support
    diplomatic efforts as a tool of first resort, utilizing innovative and
    reliable ways to deter strategic threats and set favorable conditions
    to shape the global environment.
    China
        Under a veil of secrecy, China continues to advance comprehensive
    military modernization programs for the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
    building a robust lethal force with capabilities spanning all domains.
    This modernization includes nuclear weapons and forces, and supports
    longstanding goals to establish regional hegemony, deny U.S. power
    projection in the Indo-Pacific region, and supplant the United States
    as the security partner of choice. While China's nuclear stockpile is
    currently smaller (but undergoing an unprecedented expansion) than
    those fielded by Russia and the United States, the size of a nation's
    weapons stockpile is a crude measure of its overall strategic
    capability. To fully assess the China threat, it is also necessary to
    consider the capability of the associated delivery system, command and
    control, readiness, posture, doctrine and training. By these measures,
    China is already capable of executing any plausible nuclear employment
    strategy within their region and will soon be able to do so at
    intercontinental ranges as well. They are no longer a ``lesser included
    case'' of the pacing nuclear threat, Russia.
        These capabilities bring into question China's stated ``No First
    Use'' policy declaration and implied minimum deterrent strategy. Behind
    a complete lack of transparency, China is rapidly improving its
    strategic nuclear capability and capacity, with rapid growth in road
    mobile production, doubling the numbers of launchers in some ICBM
    brigades, deployment of solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missile
    (ICBM) silos on a potentially large-scale, an added air leg, and are
    well ahead of the pace necessary to double their nuclear stockpile by
    the end of the decade. This is all in keeping with Chinese President Xi
    Jinping's 14th Five-Year Plan's (2021-2025) call to ``strengthen
    strategic forces'' and ``accelerate the creation of high-level
    strategic deterrence.''
        In the very near-term China will possess a credible nuclear triad,
    supported by its growing stockpile and weapon systems capable of
    multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The PLA is
    developing and fielding precision strike nuclear delivery systems such
    as the dual use DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and
    survivable road-mobile ICBMs with the CSS-10 mod 2 (DF-31A) class
    missile capable of striking locations within the continental United
    States. The CSS-20 (DF-41) became operational last year, and China has
    stood up at least two brigades. Enhancing the PLA Air Force's newly
    reassigned nuclear mission, the redesigned H-6N is capable of carrying
    a nuclear capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and conducting
    air-to-air refueling for greater range and flexibility. China's six,
    second-generation JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with
    JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) provide a viable sea-
    based deterrent capable of maintaining continuous at-sea presence.
        While China keeps the majority of its forces in a peacetime status,
    increasing evidence suggests China has moved a portion of its nuclear
    force to a Launch on Warning (LOW) posture and are adopting a limited
    ``high alert duty'' strategy. To support this, China continues to
    prioritize improved space-based strategic early warning, and command
    and control as specific nuclear force modernization goals. Their
    networked and integrated platform advancements will enable skip-echelon
    decision-making processes and greater rapid reaction. This shifting
    posture is particularly unsettling, considering the immature nature of
    Chinese strategic forces and compressed timelines needed to assess and
    frame a response, increasing the potential for error and
    miscalculation. Collectively, China's strategic nuclear modernization
    expansion raises troubling concerns and complements the conventional
    capability growth reported by INDOPACOM and other Combatant Commands.
        Their conventional and strategic initiatives across the air and
    missile defense, anti-surface, anti-submarine, cyber, and space
    increase its ability to project counter-intervention and control
    further from their mainland throughout the Indo-Pacific region. To
    deter and deny foreign regional force projection, China is developing a
    range of new ballistic missile defense technologies in support of anti-
    access/area denial (A2AD) and tested a mid-course interceptor in
    February 2021. Within the last two years the PLA launched over 400
    ballistic missiles (more than the rest of the world combined for non-
    wartime uses) to test and evaluate weapon system performance, and
    improve combat force effectiveness.
        China recognizes the necessity of survivable command and control
    capabilities to more robustly support joint operations, speed of
    decision making, and cyber operations in modern warfare. The PLA placed
    a high priority on modernizing joint C2, logistics, and command,
    control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems in part to resemble Western-style joint
    C2 systems. The PLA Strategic Support Forces (SSF) are taking steps to
    combine and restructure cyber forces into reconnaissance, attack, and
    defense capabilities to better support military operations. Then, while
    Beijing insists that the Chinese military does not engage in
    cyberespionage, continued theft of intellectual property translates to
    significant wealth losses with significant strategic implications.
        My best military advice is to offer caution, observe their actions
    which speak louder than words, take steps to credibly deter armed
    conflict, and reject Chinese policies or actions that threaten the
    international rules-based order or undermine regional and global
    stability. We must remain postured to counter Chinese coercion and
    subversion, assure our regional allies and partners, and protect our
    national security interests as international law allows.
    Russia
        Russia continues to seek ways to enhance and reinforce its great
    power status through actions designed to polarize and erode United
    States leadership in international affairs. It continues to pursue a
    sphere of influence over and beyond its periphery and interfere with
    regional states' sovereignty, especially in matters of military
    security and economics. Over the last decade, Russia also focused on
    national preparedness through strategic civil defense readiness
    exercises, demonstrating interoperability between civil and military
    organizations through wartime scenarios.
        Russia pursued a strategic partnership with China through bilateral
    and multi-lateral military exercises such as KAVKAZ-2020, focused
    primarily on improved military-to-military relations at the highest
    levels. Prudence dictates military planners consider and account for
    the complex threat environment, enabled by the strategic cooperation of
    these two nuclear-armed States with global military reach and shared
    multi-domain offensive capabilities.
        Russia's determined military and nuclear modernization campaign
    across its strategic triad and dual-use systems is close to completion.
    Over the last decade, Russia has recapitalized roughly 80 percent of
    its strategic nuclear forces, strengthening its overall combat
    potential with an imposing array of modernization efforts and novel
    weapons programs designed to ensure a retaliatory strike capability by
    all three triad legs. Upgrades incorporate new technologies into
    weapons systems, such as the nuclear-armed ICBM launched Avangard
    hypersonic glide vehicle. Other weapons programs, such as the Poseidon
    nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater vehicle, and the Skyfall
    nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, threaten to redefine
    Russia's nuclear force with asymmetric strategic weapons capabilities
    never before fielded. In October 2020, Russia successfully tested its
    multi-role Tsirkon hypersonic anti-ship missile with land attack
    capability. These new capabilities are specifically designed to thwart
    ballistic missile defenses, challenge deterrence, and target our
    capabilities, increasing risk to allies, partners, and the United
    States Homeland.
        Russia's strategic force includes a broad range of weapons, many of
    which are dual use or multi-role, and can be rapidly modified to be
    nuclear capable. As many as 2,000 nuclear weapons are not captured by
    existing arms control agreements; theater and tactical nuclear weapons
    are entirely outside of any treaty framework. While the extension of
    New START provides helpful transparency and predictability for much of
    Russia's deployed strategic arsenal, a considerable level of
    uncertainty remains regarding the scope and disposition of Russia's
    nuclear arsenal, including non-deployed nuclear weapons and its novel
    systems that are not accounted for under the treaty. This is troubling
    given a robust nuclear weapons production complex capable of producing
    hundreds of warheads per year, enabling Russia to increase its overall
    nuclear stockpile--driven primarily by projected increases in
    unconstrained nuclear weapons--while our production capacity remains
    essentially non-existent. I stand ready to offer my best military
    advice in support of DOD and State Department efforts to make progress
    on follow-on arms control agreements.
        Clearly, nuclear weapons remain a critical element of Russia's
    security strategy and its willingness to contemplate first-use, serves
    as a core strategic consideration. Russia's 2020 nuclear deterrence
    policy declared it may use nuclear weapons in response to a
    conventional attack, if the state's existence is threatened. A
    determined pursuit of non-strategic nuclear capabilities indicates a
    troubling readiness to rely on these weapons in a conventional
    overmatch situation. The aim is to deter the United States and our
    allies by offsetting its conventional inferiority and attempt to
    terminate conventional conflict on terms acceptable to Russia.
    Therefore, our nuclear forces must include a sufficient range of
    capabilities and attributes such that Russia never mistakenly perceives
    any advantage from using nuclear weapons at any threshold of violence.
    North Korea and Iran
        North Korea: North Korea remains a security challenge to the United
    States and our allies. It continues conducting activities that threaten
    regional stability and defy international norms. North Korea has tested
    ICBMs designed to strike the entire continental United States and has a
    large inventory of theater ballistic missiles. USSTRATCOM supports DOD
    and State Department efforts to coordinate with regional partners,
    reduce military tensions, and engage diplomatic efforts towards
    achieving the complete denuclearization of North Korea.
        Iran: Iran's policy of arming and employing proxy forces with
    advanced conventional weapons ensures it will remain a destabilizing
    force in the Middle East. Iran possesses the largest ballistic missile
    force in the region. Robust research and development continues to
    extend the range and improve performance of various ballistic missile
    types, several of which can range Israel and the Gulf countries. In
    April 2020, Iran conducted a space launch incorporating and testing
    technology interchangeable with ballistic missiles. It also continues
    to exceed low enriched uranium stockpile limits and resumed enriching
    uranium at higher than acceptable levels. Iran's actions threaten
    global commerce, security, and stability.
                    strategic deterrence in the 21st century
        Deterrence fundamentals against such threats have not changed. We
    drive to deny any adversary their aim, or impose a cost greater than
    what they seek, such that the benefit of restraint outweighs the
    perceived benefit of their possible action. These deterrence
    fundamentals apply from gray zone activities through nuclear use. The
    spectrum of conflict today, however, is neither linear nor predictable.
    We must account for the possibility of conflict leading to conditions
    which could very rapidly drive an adversary to consider nuclear use as
    their least bad option.
        To avoid strategic deterrence failure we must reinstitute a
    critical forgotten lesson that deterrence operates continuously from
    peacetime, through the gray zone, worldwide, across all domains, and
    into conflict. It requires an integrated approach from the entire
    Department, across the whole-of-government, and in cooperation with
    allies and partners. USSTRATCOM works with the other Combatant
    Commands, Services, and Allies to integrate deterrence into all plans
    and operations. In 2020, USSTRATCOM executed six combined Bomber Task
    Force (BTF) deployments and included Allied participation in our Tier 1
    Globally Integrated Exercises, giving us the best opportunity to
    strengthen communications, operational relationships, and overcome
    unforeseen issues.
               safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear force
        USSTRATCOM's requirements are based on what is needed to meet
    Presidential direction. As reaffirmed by every Presidential
    Administration over the past sixty years, a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear force remains the most credible combination of capabilities to
    deter strategic attack. Current programs of record have been repeatedly
    shown to be the best way to meet those requirements.
        The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear force and supporting
    infrastructure to ensure the solemn obligation to protect the security
    of the American people is upheld. Each element of our nuclear force has
    unique capabilities, but it is the combined attributes provided by each
    leg of the triad that together allow the command to execute our
    national security strategic guidance. I want to be clear, each piece of
    the triad is essential . . . but they are also complementary,
    underpinning U.S. military operations around the world.
        Every Operation Plan (OPLAN) in the Department and every capability
    assumes that strategic deterrence will hold. Therefore, we must
    recapitalize the triad to ensure the Joint Force can operate when,
    where, and as required to defend our national interests. We have
    reached a point, however, where end-of-life limitations and
    underinvestment in our strategic deterrent and supporting
    infrastructure--coupled with adversaries who are modernizing and
    fielding increasingly capable forces--leave no remaining margin for
    capability replacement. We cannot continue to life-extend our leftover
    Cold War era weapons and systems indefinitely, and successfully prevail
    in strategic competition--their credibility will be questioned. I stand
    ready to offer my best military advice to support Secretary Austin in
    accomplishing strategic and policy objectives, to ensure strategic
    reviews on sustainment and modernization are well informed of the
    impacts to strategic deterrence and stability.
                           land-based triad component
        The nation's ICBM force is and remains the most responsive leg of
    the triad. ICBM geographic dispersion presents an intractable targeting
    problem, complicating adversary strategies. For example, without United
    States ICBMs China becomes a strategic nuclear peer. These missiles are
    capable of holding a wide range of targets, to include emergent and
    time sensitive targets, at risk. They are survivable to all but a
    massive nuclear exchange. They are also the least expensive to maintain
    and possess the highest day-to-day readiness.
    Requirement for Minuteman III (MM III) Sustainment
        The MM III continues to provide a highly reliable and secure
    deterrent capability. While Minuteman has successfully served our
    Nation since 1962, delaying needed modernization for the past 20 years
    resulted in aging components, asset attrition, and declining
    infrastructure requiring a comprehensive weapon system replacement.
        Air Force analysis concluded another life extension would be more
    costly than recapitalization and would not address future technical
    challenges and threats. USSTRATCOM supports ongoing sustainment
    programs necessary to keep the MM III viable and effective until its
    replacement, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), begins
    fielding in 2028 and reaches full operational capability in 2036.
    Requirement for Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
        USSTRATCOM is confident GBSD will meet requirements, reduce
    sustainment costs, and maximize day-to-day readiness. It is the best
    approach to ensure the most responsive leg of the triad remains
    reliable and credible in response to the evolving strategic
    environment. During a recent visit to the GBSD Program Office, I was
    impressed with the Air Force's pursuit of innovative development
    approaches to deploy GBSD on time, as it remains a USSTRATCOM priority.
                           air-based triad component
        Bombers are among the most flexible, visible, and versatile leg of
    our Nation's delivery platforms. Bombers offer both nuclear and
    conventional deterrence and employment options, enhancing force
    availability and execution. As demonstrated by successful BTF missions,
    this stabilizing capability provides a wide variety of deterrence
    options to the President, signals unwavering resolve to our
    adversaries, and assures the Nation's allies and partners.
        Over the past year, USSTRATCOM utilized BTF missions as the iconic
    example of Dynamic Force Employment. In doing so, we dramatically
    increased the operational readiness of the crews, improved integration
    with the Joint Force, Allies and partners, practiced procedures for
    nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure employment, and regularly
    exercised our NC3 enterprise. Full funding for these strategic
    aircraft, and associated weapons and communications systems is
    imperative, as many approach or are beyond their planned service life.
    Requirement for B-52 and B-2 Sustainment
        B52: The B-52H is a 60-year-old platform, projected to remain in
    service for another three decades. To address both maintenance and
    operational challenges, it must undergo critical modernization upgrades
    in response to evolving threats. Its 1960s-era TF-33 engines are
    scheduled for upgrade through the Commercial Engine Replacement Program
    (CERP), enabling longer unrefueled range while eliminating parts
    obsolescence issues plaguing the current engines. The B-52 Radar
    Modernization Program (RMP) will replace its increasingly inoperative,
    legacy radar with a digital phased array system to allow continued
    operations in GPS denied environments. Modernized NC3 systems are also
    critical to B-52 operations to ensure communications continuity. Both
    RMP and NC3 upgrades require continued support and funding to remain on
    schedule.
        B-2: The B-2 provides unmatched capability as the only heavy-
    payload, penetrating stealth bomber in the world able to hold at risk
    heavily defended, hard, and deeply buried targets. These unique
    attributes require the execution of planned sustainment programs to
    ensure survivability, reliability, and mission effectiveness until the
    B-21 is fielded. Ongoing sustainment activities include planned
    communication upgrades and low-observable maintenance. In particular,
    the Air Force must accelerate integration with advanced enabling
    capabilities to support the B-2 in denied environments.
    Requirement for B-21
        The B-21 Raider will be the future bomber force. When fielded, the
    B-21 will provide warfighters with increased survivability and
    flexibility to attack high-value strategic targets worldwide. The
    Raider will deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons in support of
    national objectives. It is critical this major recapitalization effort
    remains on schedule and on budget to prevent operational shortfalls
    within the bomber force structure.
    Long Range Standoff (LRSO) and B61-12
        The air-delivered nuclear weapon portfolio enables deterrence of
    strategic attack via our bomber force. Currently composed of the Air
    Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the B83 gravity bomb, and the B61
    family of weapons, this portfolio provides both standoff and direct
    attack munitions to meet operational requirements. Continued monitoring
    and stockpile surveillance is necessary to ensure these weapons remain
    reliable until replaced.
        LRSO: The LRSO missile will replace ALCM as the Nation's only air-
    delivered nuclear cruise missile. I want to be clear, this capability
    must be protected as it is vital to USSTRATCOM's ability meet mission
    requirements. I view LRSO as the most cost-effective approach to ensure
    a credible and effective triad. It offers the best opportunity to hedge
    against operational risks in the event other triad modernization
    efforts are delayed. It will penetrate and survive against advanced air
    defense systems to which its predecessor, the ALCM, is losing ground.
    When fielded it will outpace threat technologies, enhance deterrence
    and assurance, and achieve a wide array of targeting objectives for the
    foreseeable future. LRSO allows a single bomber to cover larger
    geographic areas which would otherwise require additional B-21 bombers,
    KC-46 tankers, B61 gravity bombs, and decades of supporting
    infrastructure. Eliminating this critical capability would require
    additional land and sea based ballistic missiles to hold required
    targets at risk. A calculated yet rapid transition from ALCM to LRSO is
    planned to optimize deterrence, service life, and the capabilities of
    both weapons.
    Tanker Requirements
        All bomber missions require a robust and reliable tanker force. The
    KC-46 is planned to replace a portion of the aging KC-135 fleet in the
    coming years. Despite fielding delays USSTRATCOM strongly supports
    ongoing Air Force efforts to correct and mitigate manufacturing and
    technical deficiencies, and efforts to modernize and recapitalize the
    entire tanker force in response to mission needs.
                           sea-based triad component
        The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is the
    Nation's most survivable and enduring nuclear strike platform. The SSBN
    contributes to deterrence and assurance messaging through partial or
    full generation of our fleet. With the intercontinental range Trident
    II D5 missile, our SSBNs patrol the world's oceans virtually
    undetected, providing an assured response capability in any scenario.
    This assured second-strike capability address deterrence gaps in ways
    unique from other legs of the triad. When paired with its
    survivability, this crucial capability gives the President significant
    latitude for response options.
    Requirement for Columbia-class SSBN
        The Ohio-class SSBN cannot be further extended and will begin
    retiring from service in just six years. This submarine class has
    already been extended to an unprecedented 42 years (no individual U.S.
    Navy submarine has been in service longer than 37 years) and will
    continue to face sustainment and readiness challenges until it is
    replaced by the Columbia-class SSBNs. While the command could use more,
    procurement analysis determined at least 12 Columbia-class SSBNs are
    absolutely required. This minimum capability allows USSTRATCOM to meet
    our at-sea requirement during the most limiting maintenance intensive
    times throughout its service life. On-time delivery of the Columbia-
    class SSBN remains the Navy's number one shipbuilding priority.
    Requirement for Trident Sustainment and Modernization
        Given the importance of an uninterrupted sea-based strategic
    deterrent, investment in the future SSBN Strategic Weapon System (SWS)
    is vital. The Trident II D5 weapon system has been life extended (D5LE)
    to support the remaining years of the Ohio-class SSBN and enable
    deployment on the first Columbia-class hulls. A second D5 life
    extension (D5LE2) ensures continued sea-based strategic deterrence
    through the 2080s. D5LE2 will utilize reliable high performing design
    elements and components from the first life extension, to mitigate cost
    and technical risks.
    SLCM-N
        To enhance flexibility and diversity of our nuclear forces,
    USSTRATCOM supported the reintroduction of a modern nuclear sea-
    launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to address regional deterrence
    challenges from Russian and Chinese nuclear capability advancements.
    The SLCM-N complements the low-yield SLBM to provide assurance to our
    allies through tailored response options in vast operating areas where
    forward basing may not be possible. Limited and graduated United States
    response options, such as SLCM-N and low-yield SLBM, provide a more
    credible deterrent to limited attack against the United States and our
    Allies and partners than relying primarily on the threat of large-scale
    nuclear responses. Without this capability adversaries may perceive an
    advantage at lower levels of conflict that may encourage limited
    nuclear use. An analysis of alternatives (AOA) is underway for SLCM-N.
    I anticipate that this AOA will inform discussions in the context of an
    anticipated new posture review.
    Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)
        To ensure the viability of our current and future SSBNs, it is
    imperative to address security threats in the undersea domain.
    Advancement in Russian submarine stealth and detection necessitates
    continued Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)
    recapitalization efforts. This capability is vital to maintaining
    advantages in the undersea domain, ensure survivability of our sea-
    based strategic deterrent, and protection of the homeland.
               nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
        NC3 is the critical link required to provide assured communications
    between the President and the forces. In 2018, the Secretary of Defense
    consolidated and delegated lead NC3 responsibility to the commander,
    USSTRATCOM. As the NC3 Enterprise Lead, I execute increased authority
    for operations, requirements, systems engineering, and integration
    oversight through the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC). The NEC, operating
    as a separate but aligned organization, oversees and manages NC3 to
    ensure mission readiness through data-driven, risk-informed operations,
    while propelling accelerated development and delivery of a threat-
    informed ``next generation'' NC3 enterprise.
        Substantial progress has been made in the two years following
    designation, in what has been a team effort across the entire
    Department. Specifically, the NEC improved the ability to ensure NC3
    supports the Nation's Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) at any time, by
    improving operational reporting and building a culture of readiness.
    The team laid the groundwork for the future enterprise by directing
    investments in NC3 programs and cyber defense, creating an engineering
    framework for designing and testing new architectures, engaging
    industry on best practices and technology, and advancing a broad
    intelligence community focus.
        The enterprise focus for the coming year remains on sustaining
    readiness while pursuing the next generation of NC3 by capitalizing on
    integrating concepts, revolutionary changes in technology, innovative
    practices, and cyber resilient and protected capabilities.
    Strategy to Modernize NC3
        The NEC is developing the next generation NC3 system by executing a
    multi-pronged strategy approach, organized by four vectors. The first
    focuses on programs of record encompassing budget and acquisition
    lifecycle processes to deliver, modernize, and sustain future core
    capabilities. The second assesses demonstrations, experiments, and
    tests aimed at enhancing discovery and development of innovative
    technology approaches, to transform existing NC3 programs and
    operations. The third reviews and revises policies, postures, Tactics,
    Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to streamline enterprise guidance and
    efficiently achieve operational outcomes. The fourth expands the use of
    critical technology enablers such as artificial intelligence, digital
    engineering, and modeling and simulation.
        It is important to understand NC3 modernization is not a product or
    a ``thing'' with a long service life like a delivery platform or
    warhead--rather it is a process of rapid continuous, incremental
    network capability improvements. The first evolution is referred to as
    ``NC3 Next Generation Increment 1'' and represents currently funded
    programs of record. This first increment improves our posture in space,
    improves hardness to emerging cyber and cryptographic threats, shifts
    our dependency on unsustainable legacy systems, and increases
    resilience by enabling dynamically reconfigurable architecture.
    Survivable NC3 Legacy Modernization
        USSTRATCOM and the NEC are aligned with the Services to modernize
    our survivable legacy NC3 systems integrated with our aging airborne C2
    platforms such as the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC)
    and E-6B Airborne Command Post (LOOKING GLASS)/Take Charge and Move Out
    (TACAMO) aircraft. Other efforts include our space-based protected
    satellite communication (SATCOM) capabilities such as Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) that provides survivable communications
    for Presidential voice conferencing and nuclear force direction.
        Upgrading Very Low Frequency (VLF) and Low Frequency (LF)
    survivable communications is also necessary to provide extended range,
    greater protection, and more rapid transmission times in response to
    emerging adversarial threats. Current efforts seek to modernize and
    transform traditional VLF/LF systems to state-of-the-art capabilities
    which are interoperable across Service lines and infuse improved
    protection features for tactical and strategic applications. The
    challenge is rapidly incorporating VLF/LF architecture enhancements to
    ensure robust and layered communication services from the President to
    fielded forces during all phases of conflict.
    NC3 Cybersecurity
        I want to be clear, I am confident in today's NC3 enterprise
    cybersecurity posture and resilience. However, as recent events
    demonstrate, the adversary continues to seek new avenues of attack on
    our Nation's critical infrastructure. USSTRATCOM is aligned with
    USCYBERCOM, USSPACECOM, NSA, and the Service components to respond to
    and operate through adverse cyber conditions. We are taking actions to
    enhance cybersecurity resilience for systems under development by
    adopting advanced technologies and best practices, and designing in
    cyber protections from the start. This forward facing cyber protection
    approach enables persistent defense throughout the lifecycle of these
    systems.
        Cybersecurity must be a prioritized investment to ensure ongoing
    modernization initiatives remain operationally relevant. When cyber
    protections are complemented with dedicated enterprise-level sensing
    and monitoring capabilities, they provide a holistic cybersecurity
    posture enabling timely, data-driven responses to emerging threats.
                 nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure
        I look forward to working with the Department of Energy (DOE) and
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure our weapons
    complex and supporting infrastructure remains viable into the future.
    Although safe, secure, reliable, and effective today the nuclear
    weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure are rapidly aging into
    obsolescence. Today the majority of our weapons exceed or will soon
    reach their planned retirement dates. Projected modernization efforts
    provide a path to maintain a reliable and effective force, but are not
    expected to complete until well into the 2040s. Failure to execute
    these programs will continue to transfer programmatic risk to the DOD
    as operational risk to fielded forces, adding to the risk the Nation
    already faces. If this trend is not reversed, I am concerned the
    command will be unable to meet national-level policy objectives.
    Infrastructure Improvements
        Stockpile modernization depends on the Nuclear Security Enterprise
    (NSE) infrastructure. Annual budget deliberations increasingly elevate
    concerns about the ability of the NNSA to meet the Nation's nuclear
    force requirements. After the closure of the Rocky Flats Plutonium pit
    fabrication facility in the early 1990s, the Nation no longer had the
    capability to produce key components, turning instead to limited
    warhead refurbishments to sustain the stockpile. As a result, component
    and materials manufacturing needed to produce new nuclear weapons
    effectively stopped and much of the infrastructure atrophied. Then,
    shifting budget priorities over the past 30 years delayed needed
    weapons and infrastructure modernization programs, contributing to
    erosion of critical nuclear force capabilities and capacities. Today's
    NSE infrastructure, which the command relies on to sustain strategic
    deterrence, continues to decline and requires investments for
    sustainment and immediate modernization. Facility condition, loss of
    key capabilities, and constrained capacities also limit the NNSA's
    timely response to unforeseen technical, geopolitical, programmatic, or
    operational developments. As such, the NNSA is now challenged to
    simultaneously complete one limited refurbishment (B61-12 LEP) and one
    maintenance activity (W88 Alteration). This is concerning as
    recapitalizing the remaining force will require the capacity to
    concurrently execute up to four modernization programs to meet
    operational requirements.
        Progress has been made with close NNSA collaboration and budget
    transparency, but much of the damage to the infrastructure and
    personnel has already been done. As a result, many of the modernization
    and sustainment efforts (which typically require 10-15 years to
    execute) have zero remaining schedule margin and some are already late-
    to-need. If the Nation does not continue to address these concerns, no
    amount of money will be able to adequately mitigate operational risks
    associated with key stockpile and infrastructure capability losses.
    Long lead times needed to field modern replacement infrastructure
    require continued investments in future and enduring facilities and
    capabilities.
        Today's nuclear complex relies on single production points and
    vendor sources, putting at risk our plutonium and uranium processing,
    high explosives manufacturing, and production of radiation hardened
    electronics. This provides few to no alternatives in the event of an
    unplanned production facility or vendor shutdown. In such an event,
    recovery of those production efforts could take many years.
        Plutonium pit production is the biggest stockpile modernization
    issue--pits have not been produced at scale since Rocky Flats ceased
    production in 1989. As a point of comparison, our adversaries produce
    new pits in modern facilities at a rate many times greater than 80 per
    year; while most of our stockpile depends on pits that are, on average,
    over 50 years old and well past their design life. Accurately
    predicting aging plutonium performance with today's facilities and
    modeling capabilities is limited at best. We cannot study our way out
    of this problem. If we fail to recapitalize plutonium pit production
    now, we risk catastrophic failures given an infrastructure incapable of
    responding in a timely manner. Bottom line, re-establishing plutonium
    pit production is a ``must do'' and is foundational to stockpile
    modernization.
        Additionally, while uranium component processing limitations are
    being remedied by the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project, we
    must also address facilities needed for manufacturing uranium
    components and radiation cases, producing lithium, and manufacturing
    trusted non-nuclear components.
    Updated Stockpile Strategy
        I applaud NNSA's initiatives to execute programs of record and W76
    modification efforts. Their investment in advanced diagnostics, and key
    research and development activities reduce operational risks resulting
    from technical issues. Most warheads in today's stockpile are now
    scheduled to remain in service well beyond original design lives,
    thanks to engineering feats, ingenuity, and NNSA stewardship.
        USSTRATCOM appreciates Congressional actions to fund NNSA's Fiscal
    Year 2021 Stockpile Management and Production Modernization programs
    (fully funding B61-12 life extension, W88 alteration, W80-4 life
    extension, W87-1 modernization, and W93 development). I specifically
    want to emphasize the importance of the W93 warhead modernization
    program. While the command could use it earlier, the W93 is a ``just-
    in-time'' development program to mitigate risk to the triad's sea leg.
    USSTRATCOM identified operational requirements including a modern
    warhead with reduced mass properties that improves operational
    flexibility and enables more efficient loading on Columbia with fewer
    numbers of missile tubes. Currently fielded SLBM warheads will begin to
    simultaneously age-out in the late 2030s, putting the DOD and NNSA in a
    position of having to modernize the entire SLBM warhead stockpile at
    the same time. To avoid this convergence, starting the W93 program now
    is key to maintaining our sea leg capabilities. It is also vital to our
    long-standing cooperative relationship with the United Kingdom.
                      nuclear weapons safety and security
    MH-139A Helicopter
        I appreciate Air Force efforts to deliver the MH-139A Grey Wolf.
    With support from Congress, the Air Force is poised to replace the
    existing UH-1N helicopter fleet with improved speed, range, endurance,
    and payload capabilities to ensure safe convoy escort and Emergency
    Security Response to the ICBM force.
    Counter-unmanned Aircraft System
        Rapid proliferation and growing technological sophistication of
    small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) are an increasing threat to the
    Nation's nuclear enterprise. Technology trends easily transform sUAS
    into increasingly capable weapons in the hands of state and non-state
    actors, and criminals with hostile intent. The Department continues to
    field counter-sUAS capabilities and are refining tactics, techniques,
    and procedures to address this developing threat.
                                 global strike
        Hypersonic weapons show promise to be the conventional complement
    the nuclear force needs to continue deterring adversaries and offers an
    opportunity to take further steps to reduce the number of nuclear
    weapons in our national security strategy. Developing and fielding
    hypersonic weapons has long been a USSTRATCOM requirement and a
    Department priority.
        Conventional hypersonic weapons will fill an important role by
    providing options to hold high-value, time-sensitive and other targets
    at risk without crossing the nuclear threshold. They will enable
    responsive long-range, conventional strike options against distant and
    defended threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or
    not preferred.
        Programs such as the Army Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), Navy
    Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), the Air Force Air-launched Rapid
    Response Weapon (ARRW), and the complementary intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) field a family of hypersonic
    weapon systems in the early-to-mid 2020s. I am pleased with the
    progress to field a capability in the near-term and encourage continued
    commitment to accelerate production and fielding.
        USSTRATCOM is prepared to command and control conventional
    hypersonic weapons immediately at initial operational capability. We
    will leverage existing planning organizations to integrate and
    synchronize hypersonic capabilities with other joint fires across all
    domains. Maturing concepts of operation, mission planning, and other
    system enablers are underway to ensure this transformational
    warfighting capability supports the NDS.
                                missile defense
        Missile defense endures as a critical component for comprehensive
    strategic and tailored regional deterrence. USSTRATCOM executes its
    responsibilities for coordinating global missile defense planning and
    operations support, including advocacy for capabilities and
    enhancements, and joint training and education in coordination with
    other Combatant Commands, Services, and Agencies. While current
    capabilities provide defense of the homeland against a rogue ballistic
    missile threat, a concerted effort and commitment is required to expand
    and improve existing capabilities for both homeland and regional
    missile defense. Potential adversaries continue to improve threat
    system capabilities and capacities, blurring missile defense operations
    across traditional regional boundaries. Mitigating trans-regional
    threats with increased range and lethality requires more than just
    active missile defense. Navigating this environment requires a broad
    approach and renewed emphasis on leveraging opportunities to negate
    missile threats prior to launch, during all phases of flight, and after
    impact.
        Challenges remain in the Department's efforts to integrate limited
    defense resources and architectures for allied and partner
    interoperability. These critical assets protect against missile attacks
    on deployed U.S. Forces, preserve freedom of action by countering
    adversary anti-access/area denial tactics, and assists allies and
    partners to better defend themselves through traditional and asymmetric
    means. USSTRATCOM's NIMBLE TITAN wargame with participants from 24
    countries and three international organizations, continues to advance
    multinational collaboration and operational integration efforts aimed
    at enhancing deterrence and defense concepts against potential attack.
                 new missile warning framework and requirements
        Two essential elements of strategic deterrence are detection (early
    warning of ballistic and advanced missile threats) and integrated
    global planning. We are challenged to fully achieve these with current
    or planned terrestrial-based radar architectures alone due to
    geographic constraints and characteristics of future missile threats.
    Advanced Russian platforms challenge our sensor networks and are
    designed to operate without regard for the boundaries between United
    States combatant command areas of responsibilities. Therefore, it is
    essential to move beyond regional approaches to addressing adversaries
    and challenges that are increasingly global in nature.
        The command in coordination with USSPACECOM, USNORTHCOM, and the
    Services continues to examine, evolve, and exploit advanced technical
    and operational concepts, and break down institutional barriers
    inhibiting information flow. The command is focused on increasing
    decision space through a resilient joint all-domain architecture
    capable of correlating data from any sensor and using the best C2
    system to employ the best-positioned shooter. This highly distributed
    and resilient architecture leveraging future space-based sensors, may
    be able to provide end-to-end detection, tracking, and discrimination
    of hypersonic glide vehicle, cruise and ballistic missile threats
    globally.
    Layered Missile Defense
        I applaud Congress's continued support for active defense
    capabilities to pace the threat and exploration of new capabilities
    like the Hypersonic Glide Phase Interceptor, high energy laser, and
    other directed energy technologies. As the Department pursues
    development of complements to existing Ground-based interceptor (GBI)
    capabilities, work continues using novel, cost effective options to
    counter the ICBM threat. The intercept of an ICBM by an Aegis ship
    utilizing the SM-3 Blk IIA missile in November 2020 highlights one
    opportunity to recapitalize existing technology. Additional examples
    include integrating existing sensors for tracking ballistic,
    hypersonic, unmanned aerial systems, and cruise missile threats.
    Missile Defense Review--Progress
        In accordance with the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) the
    Department updated policies, responsibilities, and procedures for
    missile defense research, development, test and evaluation,
    procurement, operations, and sustainment. USSTRATCOM, working with the
    community of interest re-wrote the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP)
    to incorporate MDR findings. Revisions align with the Department's
    budget process to maximize warfighter input to capability development
    and acquisitions, and seek timely delivery of missile defense
    capabilities. USSTRATCOM will continue to advocate for missile defense
    requirements through capability and utility assessments, and ensure
    operational tests and evaluations meet warfighter demands.
    Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
        USSTRATCOM's responsibility for Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
    Operations (JEMSO) includes advocacy for electromagnetic warfare
    capabilities, contingency support, and joint planning and training for
    electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) operations. The Spectrum is an infinite
    battleground enabling all warfighting domains and functions.
    Adversaries like China and Russia have observed our use of and
    dependence on the EMS, and seek to challenge us by investing heavily in
    counter radar, navigation, communications, and data link technologies
    to erode our advantages. To counter this threat, the United States must
    regain technological advantages for our EMS systems and execute
    capabilities through dedicated organizational elements.
        USSTRATCOM coordinated with the Secretary of Defense's
    Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Cross Functional Team, in
    developing the EMS Superiority Strategy Implementation Plan to
    ``Establish Effective EMS Governance.'' We are actively engaged to
    strengthen support and build an EMSO proponent organization for the
    Department. Efforts include establishing JEMSO Cells at Combatant
    Commands, creating an electromagnetic battle management (EMBM) system,
    and integrating fused data into the EMBM through a DOD enterprise
    database. The Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center (JEWC) at USSTRATCOM
    established the first-ever Information Analysis and Fusion capability
    necessary to provide specific data for combatant command operational
    JEMSO cells to conduct battle management in spectrum operations.
    Continued Congressional support and sustained investments are critical
    to these initiatives.
                                   conclusion
        As a global warfighting command, USSTRATCOM integrates strategy and
    capabilities to achieve strategic deterrence in today's dynamic threat
    environment. The command will continue to pursue success using globally
    integrated plans and operations within the Department, the whole-of-
    government, and with our allies and partners. I look forward to working
    with Secretary Austin to continue to maintain a safe, secure and
    reliable nuclear force into the future, and to ensure we strengthen
    strategic stability.
        USSTRATCOM is home to the majority of the Department's Strategic
    Deterrence workforce intellectual capital. These professionals are
    dedicated to our national defense and we must continue to foster and
    grow this resource. With continued Congressional support and stable
    funding, USSTRATCOM will continue pacing the growing threats and
    develop the future force needed to execute the Department's top
    priority mission.
        Efforts to sustain and modernize deterrent forces must continue.
    Our strategic forces underpin every military operation around the
    world, and we cannot afford to delay given the increasing threats
    facing our Nation. Today, we are at a tipping point where the cost of
    modernizing our strategic forces is negligible compared to the cost we
    will likely incur if our triad and supporting infrastructure are
    allowed to age-out completely. Strategic force modernization is an
    every-other-generation responsibility . . . today is our generation's
    turn to lead.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral Richard.
        General Dickinson, please.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                          STATES SPACE COMMAND

        General Dickinson. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and
    thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of
    the Senate Armed Services Committee for the chance to speak
    with you today.
        In describing the accomplishments of the Nation's newest
    combatant command, I am pleased today to represent the nearly
    18,000 military, civilian, and contractor personnel supporting
    the United States Space Command's mission. In the United States
    Space Command, our power is absolutely our people. Having just
    finished the command's celebration of the Women's History
    Month, we proudly recognize our many female warfighters, one of
    whom came to us from the 16th Space Control Squadron, where she
    performed remarkably in our space superiority mission set.
    Another, a Navy aviator, now part of the Navy's new space
    cadre, built U.S. Space Command's analytic foundation for the
    development of our space architecture enterprise. A third
    established the joint fires element for our Joint Task Force-
    Space Defense, to integrate and synchronize space efforts for
    combatant commanders, and there are countless others that I
    could go on and on and on about this morning, but I will not,
    because of time.
        Our diverse force will continue balancing combat readiness
    in preparing for the future. We will provide our people a
    working environment and culture that allows them to thrive
    while reaching their full potential. Our ideals reflect those
    of our oath to the Constitution of the United States and we
    remain committed to providing for the common defense, promoting
    the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty for
    ourselves and our posterity.
        Today, I will offer you some insights into our plans for
    the future, which are aligned with the President's new Interim
    National Strategic Guidance. When I took command of U.S. Space
    Command last August, we were still filling out the structures
    of our new warfighting combatant command for space.
        As I outlined in my written statement, we have made
    tremendous progress since then, to include further development
    of our two functional component commands and establishment of
    all of our service component commands, significantly advancing
    warfighting capability in space domain, all while continuing to
    support the Joint Force with exquisite space capabilities.
        While largely focused from the geosynchronous build to the
    last tactical mile on Earth, we are expanding our focus to keep
    pace with our Nation's push into the cislunar region and to the
    Moon and Mars and beyond.
        China's space enterprise continues to mature rapidly,
    presenting a pacing challenge for us. They invest heavily in
    space with more than 400 satellites on orbit today. China is
    building military-space capabilities rapidly, including sensing
    and communications systems and numerous anti-satellite weapons,
    all the while, China continues to maintain their public stance
    against the weaponization of space.
        Similarly concerning, Russia's published military doctrine
    calls for the employment of weapons to hold United States and
    allied space assets at risk. For example, similar to the
    Russian space-based weapons test in 2017, Russia recently
    conducted another test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon.
    Additionally, the December 2020 test of a direct-assent anti-
    satellite weapon demonstrates that even as Russia aims restrict
    the capabilities of the United States, they clearly have no
    intention of halting their own ground-based or on-orbit
    counter-space weapons systems. Russia currently has close to
    200 satellites on orbit and could double that by 2030.
        In addition to this activity, on the part of our
    competitors, we are observing exponential growth in the
    commercialization of space. We currently track a challenging
    32,000 objects in space. Nearly 7,000 of those objects are
    active or retired satellite payloads. Among the roughly 3,500
    active satellites, the three largest single constellations
    belong to the commercial companies: SpaceX's constellation for
    broadband internet capabilities, Planet Labs' Earth-imaging
    constellation, and Spire Global's space-to-cloud data analytics
    constellation.
        Overlaying this new global security landscape on the
    already complex operating environment of space demands a new
    level of awareness on our part. Given that the President's
    Interim National Security Strategic Guidance calls for, and I
    quote, ensuring the safety, stability, and security of outer-
    space capabilities, USSPACECOM is focused on my number-one
    priority of enhancing existing and developing new space-
    awareness capabilities. Space domain awareness gives us the
    insight into activity throughout the space domain, including
    potential adversary activities, but perhaps more importantly,
    insight into the intent of those potential adversaries, too.
    Space domain awareness provides decision-quality information to
    combatant commanders and the national command authorities to
    ensure we can provide viable military options with the
    appropriate decision space throughout the spectrum of
    operations from deterrence to warfighting.
        In order to most effectively accomplish our assigned
    missions, U.S. Space Command has assessed our current
    capabilities and developed the requirements necessary to expand
    that capability where needed to meet our mission imperatives.
    We have passed those requirements along to the services and the
    Department of Defense, in general. Our intent is to build the
    appropriate space operational architecture designed to achieve
    full operational capability, backed by a team of warfighters,
    who can outthink and outmaneuver our adversaries.
        While engaging daily in a competitive environment, our
    primary goal remains to deter a conflict that begins in or
    extends into space. So, with the help of this Committee and all
    of Congress, we will achieve that ultimate objective and ensure
    that the United States and our allies will never have a day
    without space.
        Thank you very much this morning. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The statement of General Dickinson follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General James H. Dickinson
                                  introduction
        The establishment of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) as
    the Combatant Command solely focused on protecting and defending U.S.
    space operations and the American way of life demonstrates the priority
    America places on space. Our mission is to assure the delivery of
    space-based services to the Nation, our allies and global security
    partners, and warfighting superiority for conflict extending to space.
    An incredibly talented Joint Force and interagency team operating
    around the world accomplishes this unique and critical task. I am
    honored and thankful to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the
    Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrusting me with leading this
    team of warfighters. I am also thankful for the unwavering support of
    Congress in providing the USSPACECOM team with the necessary resources
    for this critical mission.
        President Biden described his priorities in the March 2021 Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance, including defending the
    underlying sources of American strength and promoting a favorable
    distribution of power to deter adversaries. I have outlined my key
    tasks to support the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and
    accomplish the USSPACECOM mission in my Commander's Strategic Vision.
    As always, underpinning this vision is our focus on caring for our most
    important asset--our people and their families. Our command attracts
    the best and brightest across the Department of Defense, intelligence
    community, and civil society, resulting in a dynamic and diverse team
    of space professionals. In fact, during International Women's month we
    featured many of the amazing women of USSPACECOM--both military and
    civilian, including operations leaders, division chiefs, senior
    enlisted leaders, and many other key roles. The diversity in our ranks
    is one of our greatest strengths. Our people will advance our critical
    mission through innovative approaches to accomplishing those key tasks,
    which include: (1) understanding our competition; (2) building the
    command to compete and win; (3) maintaining key relationships; (4)
    maintaining digital superiority; and (5) integrating commercial and
    interagency organizations. With our focus on these priorities, we will
    achieve our end state goal of a team of warfighters who outthink and
    outmaneuver our adversaries and enemies, and if necessary, win through
    space combat power--so that there is never a day without space.
     the u.s. must respond to a rapidly changing space security environment
        The American way of life depends on reliable access to the space-
    based capabilities that provide the foundation of our economic security
    and enable our Joint Force to conduct sustained military operations in
    all domains. Every lever of national power in the new Joint Doctrine
    Note 1--18 ``MIDFIELD'' model--Military, Informational, Diplomatic,
    Financial, Intelligence, Economic, Law, and Development--is reliant
    upon space-based capabilities. Every element of our Joint Warfighting
    Concept as executed through Joint, All-Domain Operations is dependent
    on space-based capabilities. The ever-increasing challenge posed by
    adversaries against those capabilities led to the necessary creation of
    USSPACECOM and the United States Space Force. We must continue to grow
    the capabilities of these new organizations charged with protecting and
    defending our interests in space.
        This extensive reliance on space creates potential vulnerabilities
    that competitors and adversaries actively seek to exploit. These
    adversaries and competitors are increasing their capabilities in space
    by developing and demonstrating counter-space systems, and, similar to
    what we have seen in the other domains, by engaging in deliberately
    provocative behavior to advance their plans to gain control of space.
    To safeguard our national interests at home and abroad and to support a
    rules-based international order, the U.S., along with our allies and
    partners, must promote and protect the peaceful and responsible use of
    space.
                         understanding our competition
        The number one priority for the Command is to understand our
    competition, which relies on a deep understanding of the space
    environment. To achieve this, we prioritize space domain awareness,
    which encompasses tracking, identifying, and characterizing objects in
    space in a way that enables real-time understanding of potentially
    threatening activities. Through this perception of activities that
    affect our domain, we can better protect and defend our assets when
    there may be only minutes to act. This is our highest priority and we
    need Congress's continued support to achieve comprehensive space domain
    awareness.
     china desires to use space to supplant the united states as a global
                          economic and military leader
        Over the past two decades, an increasingly assertive China and a
    resurgent Russia worked to develop advanced technologies to erode core
    United States military advantages, such as power projection and rapid,
    global, space-enabled precision fires. Their militaries actively
    integrate advanced space and counterspace technologies into multi-
    domain warfighting strategies to challenge U.S. regional superiority,
    position themselves as space powers, and create improved balance of
    power dynamics in their near abroad. Both countries reorganized their
    militaries to develop deeper competency in technical military fields
    such as electronic warfare, cyberspace and space operations. China and
    Russia each weaponized space to deter and counter United States and
    allied intervention and military effectiveness in future conflicts.
    Today, space is a warfighting domain not because we desired it to be;
    it is a warfighting domain because our competitors made it so.
                            the pacing threat--china
        China poses a major security challenge and remains a long-term
    strategic competitor to the United States. Beijing views the
    international environment and China's relationship with Washington as
    increasingly adversarial. China continues its decades-long military
    modernization campaign in order to build what it terms a ``world-class
    military.'' Chinese leaders characterize China's long-term military
    modernization program as essential to achieving great-power status.
    People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization focuses on developing and
    fielding advanced military capabilities in all warfighting domains--
    emphasizing long-range precision strike, cyberspace, electronic
    warfare, space, counterspace, and a modern, effective nuclear deterrent
    while restructuring the PLA into a combat-capable global joint force.
    Looking forward, an increasingly capable and lethal Chinese joint force
    will almost certainly be able to hold United States and allied forces
    at risk at greater distances from the Chinese mainland.
        China developed robust and capable space services, including space-
    based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Moreover,
    they are making improvements to existing systems, including space
    launch vehicles and satellite navigation constellations. Their current
    BeiDou navigation system is now globally operational. These
    capabilities may mask potential military activities and may be
    considered dual-use in nature. Operated collectively, these
    capabilities provide their military with the ability to globally
    command and control their forces, enhance their situational awareness,
    as well as enable them to monitor, track, and target adversary forces.
    Today China's ISR satellites are capable of providing electro-optical
    and synthetic aperture radar imagery, as well as electronic
    intelligence and signals intelligence data. Beijing has a goal of
    becoming a broad based, fully capable space power. China's rapidly
    growing space program is second only to the United States in the number
    of operational satellites.
        Beijing actively seeks space superiority through space and space
    attack systems. One notable object is the Shijian-17, a Chinese
    satellite with a robotic arm. Space-based robotic arm technology could
    be used in a future system for grappling other satellites. China also
    has multiple ground-based laser systems of varying power levels that
    could blind or damage satellite systems. China is developing a broad
    complement of jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy
    weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based antisatellite missiles
    that can achieve a range of effects. China will attempt to hold United
    States space assets at risk while using its own space capabilities to
    support its military objectives and overall national security goals.
     russia seeks to degrade united states space capabilities in order to
                          prevail in future conflicts
        The Russian military remains an existential threat to the United
    States and a potent tool designed to maintain Russia's influence over
    the states along its periphery. Russia sees space as integral to
    winning modern wars and reorganized their Aerospace Force in 2015 to
    incorporate space operations and counterspace capabilities. Russia
    views its space program as a longstanding example of its leadership on
    the international stage. Moscow concluded that gaining and maintaining
    supremacy in space has a decisive impact on the outcome of future
    conflicts and is developing space attack systems to hold United States
    and allied space assets at risk.
        Russia considers United States dependency on space to enable
    military power projection as a vulnerability it can exploit in a
    conflict. Concurrently, Russia pursues counterspace weapon systems that
    can deny, damage, and defeat United States space-based systems in order
    to reduce United States military effectiveness and control conflict
    escalation if deterrence fails. Russia is also developing and testing
    space-based and direct ascent anti-satellite weapon systems.
        The Nudol is a Russian mobile ground-based missile designed to
    destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. Additionally and already on
    orbit are COSMOS 2504 and COSMOS 2536, prototype Russian antisatellite
    weapons that could kinetically destroy satellites in low Earth orbit.
    Russia also has several ground based low-power lasers designed to
    temporarily blind United States missile warning and imagery satellites,
    and high-power lasers developed to damage United States satellites.
        In 2020, Russia conducted several counter-space weapon systems
    tests while also exhibiting unsafe and irresponsible maneuvers on
    orbit. It tested an improved, highly survivable ground-based anti-
    satellite missile system, and a space-based weapon system that released
    a projectile designed to target other satellites on orbit. Both weapon
    systems could damage or destroy a satellite, creating a cloud of debris
    that would endanger every space-faring nation's satellites, to include
    the International Space Station. Such activities are inconsistent with
    the safe and peaceful use of space. Meanwhile, Russia continues to
    update and modernize terrestrial alternatives to space systems,
    creating asymmetries that could enable them to hold United States
    space-based capabilities at risk.
    iran and north korea continue to develop and expand their counter-space
                                  capabilities
        Iran and North Korea continue to advance their own counter-space
    threats through cyberattacks, jamming, and electronic warfare. Having
    closely observed our ability to harness the advantages from space, Iran
    and North Korea actively seek asymmetric approaches to negate our power
    projection capabilities.
        Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and counterspace
    capabilities. Tehran claims to have developed sophisticated
    capabilities, including space launch vehicles and communication and
    remote sensing satellites. Iran's simple space launch vehicles are
    currently only able to launch microsatellites into low Earth orbit.
    Iran proclaimed the April 2020 launch of the NOUR-01 satellite to be a
    ``start of the formation of a global power.'' While Iran claims the
    NOUR-01 has imaging capabilities, our persistent observation efforts
    prove that it is actually non-operational, tumbling through space, and
    unlikely to provide any useful intelligence. However, Iran is using
    improvements in the missile launch technology used to put the NOUR-01
    satellite on orbit to develop longer-range, more accurate strike
    weapons. Iran's counterspace capabilities have centered around jamming
    satellite communications and global positioning system (GPS), and Iran
    is reportedly making advancements in these areas.
        North Korea also maintains a threat to space operations through its
    electronic warfare capabilities, with an emphasis on deception
    operations and GPS jamming. The technology to evolve and mature their
    cyberattack capabilities continues to improve, along with their ability
    to develop more advanced long-range missile launch systems.
        One way that these less developed adversaries seek to leapfrog or
    negate our advantages is by leveraging commercially available
    capabilities. These capabilities provide them with partially effective
    military support that helps them to navigate, gather intelligence,
    communicate, and otherwise achieve competencies that until very
    recently were the exclusive purview of more advanced space powers. We
    should not assume that our current qualitative advantage in these areas
    necessarily ensures the space superiority we previously held.
    other nations and commercial expansion are increasing opportunities and
                              challenges in space
        With more than 50 space-faring nations and commercial entities,
    space is one of the most interconnected and interdependent operational
    domains. Interestingly, as of 2020, six of those nations and one
    alliance of nations have demonstrated an inherent Mars exploration
    capability through attempts to place a vehicle on its surface. Those
    countries include the United States, Russia, China, the United Arab
    Emirates, Japan, India, and the European Union. While this is a
    positive indication of a rapidly accelerating interest in space that
    can benefit a greater number of people, it also highlights the need to
    prioritize space development. More significantly, it highlights the
    need for good stewardship of the domain, which demands responsible
    behavior; a mistake by one could have catastrophic consequences for
    all.
        Commercial growth in space provides both significant opportunities
    and potential challenges to overcome. The commercial space sector
    continues to grow, with global revenue exceeding $366 billion in 2019
    and 60-satellite per launch missions or advancements in commercial
    space tourism from companies like SpaceX and Virgin Galactic
    highlighting the importance of the domain. Commercial opportunities
    open new possibilities, but can also complicate access to the domain
    with the proliferation of mega constellations. As commercial satellite
    constellations expand and begin pushing out beyond geosynchronous
    orbits, it becomes increasingly important to understand the domain and
    to manage burgeoning traffic.
        Underpinning this growing congestion is the ability to understand
    the environment through shared space situational awareness--tracking
    objects in space--and space domain awareness--tracking, identifying,
    and characterizing space objects with the appropriate fidelity to
    identify threats. USSPACECOM continues to develop partnerships with
    allies, within the U.S. Government, and with commercial partners to
    advance mission capability in both space situational awareness, and
    space domain awareness. As part of this overarching effort, the
    Department of Commerce is increasing its role in promoting spaceflight
    safety standards and the coordination of space traffic, a critical
    component to safe operations in the domain. I appreciate the Department
    of Commerce's enthusiasm and dedication to effectively develop,
    maintain, and use space situational awareness data from a variety of
    governmental, commercial, and international sources in an Open
    Architecture Data Repository. I urge Congress to afford the Department
    of Commerce the resources they need to accomplish the civil and
    commercial spaceflight safety mission. This transition allows
    USSPACECOM to concentrate on developing the more precise space domain
    awareness capabilities essential to characterizing threats in space
    and, in turn, enabling a whole-of-government response. A continuing
    partnership between USSPACECOM and the Department of Commerce is a key
    enabler of U.S. and allied space superiority, not to mention a
    necessary element of a vibrant space economy.
                      build the command to compete and win
      united states space command has unique space domain responsibilities
        Where the U.S. once enjoyed a profound technological lead in
    developing and fielding space capabilities, strategic competitors now
    compete for space dominance. As these potential adversaries have
    evolved and proliferated an increasing array of counter-space
    capabilities, USSPACECOM relies on its service and interagency partners
    to outpace the threats. This requires continued emphasis and focus on
    correctly identifying threats and responding rapidly in a threat-
    relevant timeframe.
        USSPACECOM has two essential tasks--first, to enable the Joint
    Force by providing unmatched, dependable space capabilities; and
    second, employing combat power in the space domain. Our mission is to
    conduct operations in, from, and to space that deter conflict and, if
    deterrence fails, deliver decisive space combat power for the Joint and
    Combined Force. Our ability to accomplish this mission effectively is
    contingent on amassing a variety of capabilities and effectively
    integrating them across all domains and in concert with the Joint force
    and our allies and partners.
       usspacecom is increasing its operational reach and expanding its
     capabilities through participation in joint, combined, and integrated
                                   exercises
        USSPACECOM continues to grow its operational capability with our
    two functional components and five service components. These functional
    and service components provide warfighting capabilities for joint
    execution in support of USSPACECOM. Through Joint Task Force--Space
    Defense, we protect and defend our on-orbit assets, and through
    Combined Force Space Component Command, we provide support to
    terrestrial forces and integrate with commercial partners, while
    defending the domain against aggression. To task these organizations
    efficiently and effectively, USSPACECOM published its first campaign
    plan and operating order that aligns joint operations and achieves
    unity of effort.
        To test our plans and operating concepts, USSPACECOM regularly
    participates in advanced, coalition-integrated global and regional
    exercises and wargames, such as Global Lightning, Austere Challenge,
    and Pacific Fury. These events prepare our Joint Force, allies, and
    partners to protect and defend our space assets while providing combat
    effects in, from, and to space. Through these multiple exercises and
    senior level war games, USSPACECOM demonstrates its ability to work
    with other Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and international
    partners to execute globally integrated operations across the spectrum
    of warfare.
        Warfighting exercises require a multi-service, multi-domain, and
    globally integrated approach to national security objectives,
    consistent with the Chairman's Joint All-Domain operations directive.
    We are also preparing to execute our own tier one multi-combatant
    command exercise in fiscal year 2022. In future exercises, we will
    continue to integrate fully across regions and domains to protect and
    defend U.S. and allied space interests globally.
       the united states must improve its defensive and offensive space
      warfighting capabilities to deter adversaries and prevail in future
                                   conflicts
        The DOD's legacy space architecture and organizations were designed
    for a relatively benign and uncontested environment. In past decades,
    we invested in vulnerable, space-based platforms while our adversaries
    invested in relatively low-cost methods to counter these capabilities.
    Our focus was engineering redundancy rather than warfighting
    reliability. This left us vulnerable to exploitation--particularly as
    our dependence on space-based capabilities to advance U.S. interests
    continued to grow. This changing strategic environment resembles the
    environment experienced by the United States in the Vietnam War, where
    conventional strength dependent on vulnerable supply lines and
    centralized forces left troops pursuing a defense strategy, vulnerable
    to asymmetric and decentralized attacks.
        Today, even as potential adversaries continue their effort to
    achieve parity in space capability, they also employ asymmetric
    capabilities to deny us the advantages of space. The U.S. must continue
    to build resilience in the vital space capabilities the Joint Force
    requires to fight and win in space, as well as in the air, land, sea,
    and cyber domains, while strengthening its space warfighting capability
    to counter these rising peer, near-peer, and asymmetric threats. Such
    warfighting capability provides a credible deterrent against
    belligerent actions in the space domain as part of a broader U.S.
    strategy for deterrence and defense.
        USSPACECOM aims to advance our capability and capacity aggressively
    by coordinating with the services, leveraging innovative space systems,
    and by developing joint warfighters who have the expertise, judgment,
    and will to fight and win against a determined adversary. To this end,
    USSPACECOM provides warfighter requirements to the Department, which
    leads the acquisition of the capabilities we need to achieve our
    mission. This is critical to revitalize our aging space architecture,
    remaking older, less flexible, and vulnerable systems into a resilient,
    redundant, and survivable architecture to cope with evolving threats.
    Consequently, we need the continued support of Congress for the
    Services as they acquire components of this architecture and work to
    streamline acquisition processes and shorten the time from concept to
    fielding. USSPACECOM also strongly supports any economical, innovative
    solution that increases the defensibility of our space systems and
    provides the means to maintain space superiority.
        Moreover, in today's threat environment, strategic deterrence
    remains the bedrock of our national defense. Every Operational Plan
    across the Department begins with the assumption that strategic
    deterrence will hold. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear force,
    enabled by space-based assets, remains the most credible combination of
    capabilities to deter strategic attack and execute our national
    strategy. We must stay the course with nuclear and conventional force
    recapitalization commitments to ensure the Joint Force can operate
    when, where, and as required to defend our national interests.
    Moreover, we must defend our space assets and improve our space domain
    awareness to present viable options to the Joint Force across the
    spectrum of operations.
        Just as we must revise our systems and processes, we must also
    develop the most critical component of our enterprise--our warfighters.
    USSPACECOM is laying the foundation for a warfighting organization and
    is reinforcing a spirit of excellence, character, and resolve in our
    space experts. In so doing, we will promote coordination across the
    entire enterprise and empower our warfighters to act decisively and
    win.
        United States Space Command is a joint warfighting organization
    with uniformed and civilian representatives from all services and the
    Nation's Intelligence Community. A year and a half after
    reestablishment, we have approximately 430 military and civilian
    personnel assigned to the Headquarters, or just over one third of our
    authorized end strength. We need the continued support of Congress to
    help us achieve our full strength, especially with regard to funding
    our civilian personnel, who comprise two-thirds of our workforce and
    provide critical diversity, continuity, and skills. This is critical to
    our ability to prevent capability gaps in support of the National
    Defense Strategy and missions assigned to us in the Unified Command
    Plan. To this end, we continue to align our work force to bolster
    operational capabilities presented by our joint centers. We use these
    forces to achieve our key tasks: understanding our competition,
    building the command to compete and win, fostering and maintaining key
    relationships, maintaining digital superiority, and integrating
    commercial and interagency organizations. By achieving these key tasks,
    we will accomplish our mission.
    usspacecom focuses on personnel development as a key enabler of mission
                                    success
        USSPACECOM works with our joint force providers to acquire the best
    and the brightest personnel, helping develop our future space leaders
    through training, education, and other aspects of human capital
    development. In partnership with the National Security Space Institute,
    USSPACECOM develops a cadre of joint space warfighters that ensures an
    enduring focus on space power as part of a more lethal and ready force.
    This interactive classroom instruction, coupled with individually
    tailored online training, allows newcomers an opportunity to build upon
    their knowledge base in the context of our directed missions.
    Additionally, we continue to integrate space into professional military
    education, other combatant commanders' conferences, and throughout
    joint education. Investment in human capital improves the development
    of joint space warfighters and our lethality in the space domain.
      to remain a space power requires consistent and continued resources
      commensurate with the value that space provides and that the threat
                                    demands
        USSPACECOM's ability to execute its assigned mission depends on the
    services' continued rapid development and timely delivery of critical
    space warfighting capabilities. Specifically, we require the sensor
    architecture necessary to detect and characterize activity in space; a
    unified and distributed command and control family of systems that
    enable synchronized space effects; flexible capabilities to deter
    aggression and deliver decisive effects; and the ability to protect and
    defend U.S. and allied interests.
                         maintaining key relationships
      usspacecom is strengthening alliances and attracting new partners,
       while working with private enterprises to improve space awareness
        As President Biden lays out in the March 2021 Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance, strengthening our relationships with
    allies and partners is crucial to maintaining a secure, safe, and
    sustainable space environment. To this end, we are expanding our
    network of partner nations, international organizations, and commercial
    entities that bring situational awareness, mutual support, and
    technological innovation to the space enterprise. We are enhancing our
    interoperability with allies and partners and sharing information to
    unite around a compelling narrative.
        In 2020, USSPACECOM expanded space related data sharing agreements,
    including new partners Luxembourg, Peru, and Portugal. To date,
    USSPACECOM has agreements with 26 nations, two intergovernmental
    organizations, three academic institutions, and over 90 commercial
    satellite owners, operators, and service providers. By providing this
    advanced information and services to space-faring partners, we display
    American leadership in the space domain, promote transparency in the
    responsible and peaceful use of space, and support the planned
    transition of civil and commercial spaceflight safety services to the
    Department of Commerce in 2024. In 2020, in coordination with
    USSOUTHCOM, we implemented our first ``space-centric'' security
    cooperation initiative focusing on institutional capacity building with
    Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru.
        The safety and sustainability of an increasingly crowded space
    domain grows more complex as commercial entities plan to launch
    thousands of satellites in the next few years. The explosive growth of
    nano, micro, and small satellites will further stress our existing
    space surveillance networks. Working closely with companies as they
    plan, launch, and operationalize these new mega-constellations is key
    to our continued ability to provide comprehensive space situational
    awareness. As a priority, USSPACECOM warfighters in the Combined Space
    Operations Center (Vandenberg AFB), the National Space Defense Center
    (Schriever AFB), the Joint Operations Center (Peterson AFB), and at a
    variety of other key nodes are working tirelessly with interagency
    partners to build and leverage complete and timely space domain
    awareness. Along with this battle space awareness, we are also
    prioritizing the associated and necessary space command and control
    capabilities.
        Space domain awareness remains the bedrock of many partnerships and
    the top priority for USSPACECOM. The command seeks to develop a more
    complete, big picture understanding of activities in the domain. This
    goes beyond merely tracking space objects for situational awareness to
    a space domain awareness that identifies, tracks, and characterizes
    objects that can threaten U.S. and allied space capabilities. This is a
    necessary element of acknowledging space as a warfighting domain, which
    includes its enabling computer networks, terrestrial sites, and the
    electromagnetic links between space and ground systems.
       achieving the desired effects in the space domain requires close
                   coordination with other combatant commands
        The command continues to evolve Combatant Command integration and
    establish normalized relationships to coordinate, integrate, and
    synchronize operations extending beyond geographic areas of
    responsibility. To facilitate cooperation, interoperability, and unity
    of effort, USSPACECOM created Space-Integrated Planning Elements
    comprised of space and intelligence planners embedded within the staffs
    of our sister Combatant Commands. These experts integrate space
    capabilities and effects into their respective Combatant Command plans
    while mutually informing USSPACECOM's operational plan development.
    Furthermore, each Combatant Command's space warriors integrate space
    effects across all warfighting functions, enhancing the Joint Force's
    ability to achieve military objectives rapidly and decisively.
                        maintaining digital superiority
        Underpinning all of these must be a robust cybersecurity
    environment that secures our intellectual and technological advantages
    from cradle to grave. It is critical to keep building this momentum by
    funding these fundamental capabilities: battle space awareness, command
    and control, deterrent space capabilities, cybersecurity, and protect
    and defend capabilities. Additionally, we must capitalize on machine
    learning and artificial intelligence developments to secure our
    systems, advance our capabilities, and increase the speed of our
    decision-making process. Accordingly, within our efforts to maintain
    digital superiority, USSPACECOM is determined to innovate for
    competitive advantage, evolve cyber operations for an agile and
    resilient posture, and invest in game-changing technologies. The
    research and development, acquisition, and operationalization process
    relies on innovation at every level, and we must streamline this
    process to operate at the growing pace of decision-making. Future years
    will require additional resources to accomplish all of this, and to
    ensure the U.S. can adequately address the evolving and expanding cyber
    threats posed by our strategic competitors and adversaries.
              integrating commercial and interagency organizations
     usspacecom provides mission assurance for interagency and commercial
                                space operations
        The rapidly accelerating interest in space and associated growth in
    the technically oriented industrial base is a key part of continued
    U.S. economic prosperity. U.S. commercial space growth aids our
    mitigation efforts against threats. One example includes the effort
    with commercial partners to design and field a United States-built
    engine to power our largest space launch vehicles, thus decreasing our
    need for reliance on the Russian RD--180 to propel our Atlas V launch
    vehicle. In our interagency space mission assurance role, USSPACECOM
    supported NASA and SpaceX for contingency rescue operations for both
    the Demonstration Mission Two launch in August and the SpaceX Crew-1
    launch in November--the first crewed space launches from U.S. soil in
    nearly a decade. USSPACECOM is committed to assuring the safe
    exploration of space and is supporting the planned lunar missions.
    USSPACECOM is preparing to provide crew and spacecraft recovery for the
    upcoming Artemis missions and associated training events to begin late
    2021.
                                   conclusion
        USSPACECOM plays a crucial role in guaranteeing the American way of
    life through the delivery and defense of U.S. and allied space
    capabilities and services. We make daily gains in our ability to
    protect and defend our assets from our adversaries, and we stand ready
    to provide advanced space-based capabilities to our warfighters. Under
    the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, and with the
    support of Congress, USSPACECOM is prepared to safeguard our access and
    operations outside our atmosphere so that there is never a day without
    space.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Dickinson.
        Before we begin, let me remind my colleagues that since
    this is a hybrid hearing, we will not use the early Byrd rule;
    instead, we will ask questions in order of seniority.
        They are 5-minute rounds. Please stick as closely as you
    can to the 5 minutes. You will see the timer before you, and I
    would ask all colleagues to mute their microphones when they
    are not speaking. Thank you.
        General Dickinson, let me begin with what I think is a
    fundamental question. As I suggested in my opening remarks, you
    could also be called sensor command, as well as Space Command,
    because your responsibilities extend not only to space-based
    sensors, but also to many ground-based sensors, and to
    integrate them into a system, a coherent system.
        So, bottom-line question, what are you doing to ensure that
    missile-warning infrastructure of radars and satellites are
    capable of determining whether there is a ballistic or a
    hypersonic missile attack on the United States?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, thank you for that question.
        So, what we are doing at U.S. Space Command over the past
    20 months or so since we stood up was looking at all the
    sensor, the entire sensor architecture worldwide in an attempt
    or in terms of understanding what sensors we have doing what
    specific missions. What we have done over the past year or so
    has been, we have taken the opportunity to take terrestrial-
    based sensors that traditionally do missile-defense type of
    activities from the different services, the Army and the Navy,
    and we have looked at them from the perspective of how can they
    contribute to our ability to understand what is going on in the
    space domain?
        While this is just the beginning of it in terms of making
    those sensors interoperable in our architecture, we are driving
    towards the future of where we will actually have those
    integrated. So, in other words, Senator, we are taking current
    capabilities that used to traditionally do missile defense and
    seeing if they have capabilities to help us in the space domain
    in terms of doing our space domain-awareness type missions. As
    we look to further refine our requirements, adding requirements
    to those capabilities through the Department to enhance their
    ability to do space domain awareness.
        So, we have had good success over the last 19 months in
    doing that and we have demonstrated a couple of times, with
    regards to some of the actions that our competitors have been
    doing on orbit with a relative degree of success. So, we have
    taken the first step. The steps after that will be further
    integration of those capabilities and, again, working with each
    of the combatant commands in terms of prioritization of those
    sensors to be able to do both, space domain awareness, as well
    as missile-defense missile warning.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Richard, why do we need to build a ground-based
    strategic deterrent, rather than simply extend the life of the
    Minuteman-III ICBM?
        Admiral Richard. So, Senator, the answer to that
    fundamentally starts with the idea that nothing lasts forever.
    You cannot indefinitely life-extend anything, and I cannot
    deter with the leftovers of the Cold War forever into the
    future. That is the fundamental reason here.
        I am different from the other combatant commands in that I
    don't come up with my own objectives; they are directed by the
    President, and as interpreted by the Secretary of Defense and
    the Chairman. So, I have a stack of things I have been ordered
    to do. I need a certain amount of capability to go do that and
    I need weapons systems that will actually work and actually
    make it to the target.
        So, there are any number of reasons. The ultimate authority
    on whether or not Minuteman-III can be extended is the
    Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air
    Force, as just by the Secretary of Defense. So, I am not the
    ultimate authority on that.
        I think we have repeatedly reported to Congress why it is
    not cost-effective to do that, and from my viewpoint, I am not
    sure how they are going to be able to do it at all. It is in
    the details. What they are doing to keep that weapons system
    functioning, remember, that is a 1970s-era weapons system that
    I am going to have to employ against 2030-level threats. We are
    down to two of a particular type of switch that is required to
    go in the launch-control centers. Nobody knows how to make it
    anymore; it is obsolete. It is not worth a company to put their
    effort into that. They have repeatedly been pulling rabbits out
    of the hat to work through those types of issues.
        A simple one, Senator, is if you try to life-extend a
    weapons system that was built before the invention of the
    internet and then turn around and ask me why it is not cyber
    secure, I don't know how to retrofit a full cybersecurity
    capabilities forever into the future on a system that wasn't
    even designed when we had an internet. So, fundamentally,
    nothing lasts forever and we eventually have to get new stuff,
    sir. All right.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
        Just one final question in my remaining time. Would a more
    robust arms control effort by the United States and, obviously,
    other countries, particularly the United States, complement
    your mission to deter an atomic attack or a nuclear outbreak?
        Admiral Richard. Absolutely, Senator. I have said I will
    support any arms control agreement, less formally, I will take
    all I can get, right. If we actually have arms control and we
    are confident in it and it is verifiable it reduces the threat,
    it simply makes my job easier.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In my office, we talked about this, Admiral Richard and I.
    I think you covered it so well in your opening statement. I
    keep thinking, I am not sure what you might have left out, but
    you have done a great job.
        We know what Russia is doing. We know what they have been
    doing. We know what China has been doing. North Korea, now, is
    presenting a growing risk to the United States and our allies,
    and yet, our nuclear forces are decades past their designed
    lives and will need to be retired soon.
        So, I just think it is important that when we are seeing
    our primary adversaries, as outlined in our dais, that we are
    not doing what we should be doing. We are actually behind our
    primary adversaries.
        So, I would like to have you, you know, restate. Russia, we
    know what they are doing. They have already modernized over 80
    percent of its force, and China's nuclear programs are
    accelerating.
        So, I would like to know how important is it that we
    complete the U.S. Nuclear Modernization Program as quickly as
    possible. You have outlined that we are not, and where we are
    relative to our adversaries, but tell me how important it is
    that we do it now.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I will start with--
        Senator Inhofe. Mic, we need your mic.
        Admiral Richard. I will start with, I want to expand on one
    point. I said in my opening statement that China could no
    longer be a lesser-included case. What that means is they are
    at the point that what it is going to take to deter them is
    going to start to be additive to what we have to do with
    Russia.
        I don't have the luxury of deterring one country at a time.
    I am expected to deter all countries all of the time, and then
    on top of that, I don't have any remaining operational margin,
    right. We have exhausted the operational margin to allow us to
    delay this recapitalization as far as we went. I think it is
    important to remember that a lot of the quantities that we are
    talking about in these requirements were set many years ago
    when the threat level was actually much more benign than what
    we have seen now, and we have simply no operate, you are
    counting now on more and more things having to go right, and we
    are counting on more and more that we precisely understand the
    threat we are at, and that is a standard we have never allowed
    in our history to happen inside the strategic deterrent force.
        Then the final point, is we have never had to deter two
    opponents at the same time that are different. Most of our
    theory doesn't even account for that. We are working very hard
    on that, but that is why we have to have these capabilities in
    order to execute the direction the President gave me.
        Senator Inhofe. That is good.
        I know there are a lot of people that are leaning on our
    President, a lot of anti-nuke people that are wanting to
    minimize the concern that we, that we are expressing today. One
    of the things is the no-first-use policy. Now, that is one that
    I can't remember one Secretary of Defense who shares, who
    doesn't share your view on the no-first policy. I mean, it is
    there. It is real, and so, I think even Secretary Gates was
    quite outspoken in that area. Can you think of anyone who
    doesn't have that policy? One quick word, then, on the no-
    first-use, since that is going to come up, that is going to be
    a very prominently portrayed and discussed.
        What is your feeling on that?
        Admiral Richard. Well, Senator, what I would offer on this,
    is, and I have testified to this effect before, look, the
    Nation can have any policy it wants, right. The Nation can have
    any----
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah, you did testify. You said, my best
    military advice would be to not adopt a no-first-use policy.
    You are strong on that.
        Admiral Richard. Right, and I still stand by that statement
    and here is why. One, we have already run an excursion of what
    that would do to strategic deterrence. It will diminish it. You
    will remove a level of ambiguity now that has a deterring
    effect, short of employment of nuclear weapons. We won't have
    that anymore. That will be mitigated by the fact that nobody is
    going to believe it anyway, right, it won't be credible.
        We already have assurances that cover all, but about 10
    nations or so, half of which are our allies. So, you are only
    talking to folks who are probably not going to find it
    credible. It will have no more credibility than our current
    missile-defense policies do.
        The catch is some of the allies will believe it. So, it
    will have a corrosive effect on our assurance and extended
    deterrence commitments.
        I think the commander of EUCOM, General Wolters, mentioned,
    you will get a mixed response. I think he is correct. But I
    don't see the upside to it, is my point, and so, I continue to
    recommend we not adopt that.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, unfortunately, my time is expired,
    but let me just ask you, General Dickinson, all these documents
    that we have here that directly address your area, do you think
    that those, that the 2018, that was back in 2018, that the NDS
    still accurately assesses the strategic environment as it
    pertains to space domain?
        General Dickinson. Senator, I do. I do, in fact, believe it
    does because, you know, space is a warfighting domain. We have
    seen the activities by our competitors, both Russia and China,
    as they have expanded their capabilities, in particular, China
    in the space domain. We see their capabilities from direct-
    assent ASAT. Anti-satellite capabilities to on-orbit activity
    that they have done with that capability. We have seen the
    increase or proliferation of their directed-energy efforts in
    terms of electronic warfare in terms of jamming, as well as
    laser technology. So, I believe it is absolutely a warfighting
    domain that we need to continue to work very closely with.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and Admiral Richard and General
    Dickinson, thank you for being here this morning and for your
    service.
        General Dickinson, I want to begin with you. The Air Force
    is currently responsible for space traffic management for both,
    military and civilian satellites, and as we look at the
    proliferation of commercial satellites, that has become more
    and more challenging with situational awareness.
        But over the next few years, the Department of Commerce is
    going to assume responsibility for managing the civilian
    component.
        Senator Moran and I, as the ranking member and chair of the
    Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations Subcommittee have
    asked for additional information about the funding and
    personnel requirements that that kind of transfer would
    require. We have not yet received a definitive answer from the
    Air Force about how much it spends on the functions that will
    be transferred to the Commerce Department.
        The fiscal year 2021 omnibus provides $10 million for the
    Commerce Department to begin to assume those responsibilities.
    Can you talk about how this compares to what the Air Force is
    currently spending.
        General Dickinson. Senator, thank you.
        The space traffic management, as I mentioned in my opening
    remarks, you know, we, on a daily basis, we are tracking close
    to 32,000 pieces of debris, objects, satellites, whether they
    are active or old dead satellites, and that is quite a, that is
    a big mission area within U.S. Space Command.
        Today, the resources that I use on that provide what I
    would term a very administrative type of function in terms of
    identifying objects in space so that we are able to provide a
    secure and safe space environment for activities on orbit, in
    particular, the International Space Station, for example, in
    low-Earth orbit----
        Senator Shaheen. I am sorry to interrupt, but I understand
    that. I think that is a very important function.
        That is why we are trying to get some information about how
    much you are actually spending so we can figure out as we look
    at the budget for the Commerce Department.
        I would say that I had a certain amount of skepticism about
    whether this should be moved to the Department of Commerce and
    there was a study done that came to the conclusion that maybe
    it does make sense to move that function there.
        So, do you know or can you provide in committee in the
    future, with the amount of money that you are currently
    spending on that function?
        General Dickinson. I certainly can. I can take that back
    and get you an answer from the Air Force on how much they
    spend.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Dickinson. Based on input from USSF, fiscal year 2020
    expenditures totaled $60 million for Operations, Depot and Special
    Program Office (SPO) expenses. Included in that figure is $12.4 million
    to sustain legacy space capabilities.

        Senator Shaheen. Thanks very much.
        You also talked in your opening comments about the
    importance, you said power is our people, and I certainly agree
    with that. But as we look at the proposed relocation of Space
    Command headquarters from chief restructuring officer to the
    Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, I am some concerns, based on our
    past experience with a similar transfer of operations from the
    National Capital Region to Huntsville, Alabama, of the Missile
    Defense Agency. In that move, the agency lost 80 percent of its
    civilian workforce because employees refused to move.
        Do you have any estimate as to how much it is going to cost
    to move to Redstone from the current location and how many
    employees you might lose in that process?
        General Dickinson. Senator, so, I don't have exact numbers
    on estimates on the cost for the move to Huntsville.
        That is actually being determined now by the Department of
    the Air Force as the basing decision authority.
        With regards to the civilian workforce, I would categorize
    that as I don't have a good feel for that right now, because it
    will depend. I think the military, we can all agree, we are
    somewhat nomadic and we move where the military tells us to.
    When dealing with civilians, and I have done that in two
    previous jobs at the Missile Defense Agency, actually, in my
    last job at Space and Missile Defense Command, it is a little
    bit different when you are talking about civilians. They have
    made life choices and where they are currently living, and so,
    we will do everything we can to incentivize them to make the
    move, but I can't give you a percentage on how many that will
    be.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I will defer basing process questions to the SecAF, who has the
    authority for selecting the permanent location for USSPACECOM
    Headquarters. Analysis to understand the impact of a transition to
    Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL is underway. My staff is looking
    hard at timelines, anticipated impacts to human capital, facilities,
    and mission with a goal of minimizing risk to mission while being good
    stewards of the taxpayers' money. Once we have a final basing decision,
    we will be able to provide and discuss the full analysis.

        Senator Shaheen. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we
    would get some more information before this proposal becomes
    final about how many employees we might lose and about what the
    difference in cost is, which I think is significant.
        Admiral Richard, I was very pleased to see the new Biden
    administration agree to extend the New START Treaty for 5 more
    years. Can you talk about how STRATCOM uses the information
    from New START channels, the inspections and data exchanges and
    how they are important to you.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, we were also pleased to see the
    New START Treaty get extended and it is for that----
        Chairman Reed. Your microphone, Admiral.
        Admiral Richard. I'm sorry. You would think I have done
    this before.
        We were also pleased to see the New START Treaty be
    extended, right, and so, you are pointing to one of its primary
    benefits. In addition to the limits, it is the transparency and
    the confidence now that we have in understanding what that
    piece of the threat looks like. What I would further encourage
    his efforts to get a similar degree of control and
    accountability on the remainder of the Russian arsenal, all of
    which is something I have to deter.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen for being here today.
        Admiral Richard, I would like to thank you for your honesty
    and your bluntness of your opening statement in explaining the
    expanding nuclear programs of both, China and Russia. Last
    week, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee held a classified
    briefing on these threats and yet, we continue to hear renewed
    calls for unilateral cuts to our nuclear forces, abandoning the
    triad, and delaying or cancelling modernization programs.
        Sir, are you aware of any intelligence or threat
    assessments that would support these courses of action?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I am not. In fact, the threat is
    only getting worse rapidly.
        Senator Fischer. So, it is your view that taking such
    actions would reduce our ability to deter the threats that we
    face?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, yes.
        Senator Fischer. Microphone.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, yes.
        It is not just the nuclear component. Part of what I am
    trying to show is the relationship in all of our elements of
    national power and how nuclear underpins that.
        Senator Fischer. What about the future, because, as you
    know, the impact of cutting modernization programs now, it
    wouldn't be felt until the 2030s when our force begins to age
    out, as you spoke about, and replacements aren't ready.
        Do you see any reason to believe that the world is going to
    be a lot safer in 2030 and we won't need a viable deterrent
    then?
        Admiral Richard. I see no indications of that. That will be
    an unprecedented threat that we face in 2030. Hopefully,
    perhaps we can change that trajectory, but I can't count on
    hope in terms of having the capabilities needed to do my
    mission.
        Senator Fischer. Admiral Richard, what are your views on
    the current distribution of warheads across the three legs of
    our triad?
        Right now we see about 70 percent of our treaty-accountable
    warheads. They are on our submarines, and if significantly cut
    the ICBM leg, as some advocates have urged, what number would
    go up further, and, of course, our bombers are not on alert.
        Do you think there are risks with leaning too heavily on
    one part of the triad?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, the answer is yes, and I will
    give you just one example of that. What is not often recognized
    is we don't have a triad day-to-day, right, the bombers are not
    available to us. We chose to take them off alert as a type of
    peace dividend after the Cold War.
        So, day-to-day, all you have is, basically, a dyad. Basic
    design criteria in the triad is that you cannot allow a failure
    of any one leg of the triad to prevent you from being able to
    do everything the President has ordered you to do. If you don't
    have intercontinental ballistic missiles, we can't meet that
    criteria. You are completely dependent on the submarine leg. I
    have already told the Secretary of Defense that under those
    conditions, I would request to re-alert the bombers.
        Senator Fischer. Sir, you have also talked about counting
    the number of strategic nuclear warheads a nation has, that can
    be a crude way to measure their capability. Your posture
    statement mentions this, as well.
        Can you elaborate on why this is such an incomplete way to
    assess an adversary and talk a little bit about the other
    elements that we need to also be considering.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, fundamentally, you don't deter by
    accounting. We don't hold up cards and say, I have more, I win.
        It is important to know what they can do with that
    capability to understand, operationally, the threat that you
    face. It is important to remember that both, Russia and China
    have a unilateral ability to go to any level of violence that
    they choose to if they perceive that the stakes are high
    enough. There is a point beyond which unlimited conventional
    capability will not be a sufficient deterrent.
        So, unless you have a strategic deterrent that will deter
    them from that, then everything else in the Department of
    Defense is simply going to get escalated past. Knowing what
    they are capable of doing is what causes you to come to that
    conclusion.
        Senator Fischer. Our capability, our production capability
    is basically nonexistent, isn't it----
        Admiral Richard. Yes, ma'am. That is absolutely----
        Senator Fischer.--especially when you compare it to China
    and Russia. Can you speak to that.
        Admiral Richard. Both China and Russia have significant
    capability in their nuclear weapons complexes, I can give you
    the numbers in a closed session, to produce more warheads. We
    are just barely able right now to life-extend our weapons and
    we are just starting to get to the point, we use the two terms
    interchangeably, just to be able to re-manufacture the ones we
    have. We have no capability right now to actually make a new
    weapon.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dickinson, I would like to turn to statements made
    by Secretary Blinken, where he said that the United States will
    focus on developing standards and norms of responsible behavior
    in outer space. The DOD Defense Space Strategy also noted our
    need to promote favorable standards and norms of behavior in
    space.
        Can you please discuss SPACECOM's role in developing and
    practicing those norms and what you specifically believe those
    norms should be.
        General Dickinson. Thank you for the question.
        So, SPACECOM's role in that is, one, our ability to
    understand what is going on in the space domain is fundamental
    to establishing and deciding what those norms of behavior are.
    I mentioned a little bit earlier the fact that our ability to
    increase our space domain awareness capabilities on orbit is
    very important to just what I described in terms of
    understanding what our competitors may be doing in the space
    domain.
        I believe that, from a military perspective, that the norms
    of behavior and what we do in space is very important.
        We have seen activity over the last 19, 20 months since
    this command has been established, that has shown that we have
    had some behaviors in space that are inconsistent with
    providing a safe and secure environment for our military
    activities, as well as our commercial.
        So, in terms of norms of behavior and how we are working,
    we work very closely with the Department of Defense and, in
    particular, our OSD policy folks, on determining our
    recommendations to that process. The developing norms of
    behavior is a whole-of-government idea and approach, if you
    will, that will dictate our position on what those norms of
    behavior should be.
        But, in sum, I would tell you that we have to have safe
    activities in orbit. We understand those by space domain
    awareness, along with what that means in terms of where folks
    put, where our adversaries and competitors put their space-
    based capabilities and what they are doing.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        In last week's cyber architecture hearing, the subcommittee
    discussed the interoperability between our cyber capacity and
    space operations. Given that your command and CYBERCOM are both
    operating in highly complex and ever-evolving environments, how
    integrated would you say your efforts are with theirs, and how
    do you plan to maintain a high level of integration with
    CYBERCOM as the threat landscape continues to change?
        General Dickinson. That is very important in terms of our
    integration of space and cyber. We do that through several
    means, if you will. General Nakasone has provided to us, as we
    has done to the other combatant commands, a cyber-integrated
    planning element that is currently residing within my
    headquarters that provides us a very integrated approach to
    cyber and space operations.
        In addition to that, we are standing up a joint cyber
    center within the command, as we speak. I also have, as a
    result of the command standing up, I have five service
    components provided by each of the services to the combatant
    command with two of those, my Navy component, as well as my
    Marine component, who are dual-hatted for me in space, as well
    as cyber. So, I have two service components that cyber is one
    of their core competencies, along with space, and in addition
    to that, General Nakasone has given me some support from the
    16th Air Force.
        So, in other words, I have three general ops or
    headquarters that provide cyber capabilities to me. I have an
    integrated planning element in my headquarters and I also have
    a joint cyber center. So, I believe that we are very well
    integrated in terms of space- and cyber-type of operations.
        We are moving very quickly right now in terms of providing
    our requirements for activities in the cyberspace domain, as
    well as General Nakasone providing me with requirements of what
    he will need in his mission areas, as well.
        Senator Gillibrand. In your written testimony, you
    mentioned that our adversaries have taken a number of
    provocative actions in space in order to test us. One concern
    from the Pentagon's 2020 Defense Space Strategy was that it did
    not explain in clear, full terms how we would deter adversaries
    in space. I am concerned an overemphasis in offensive space
    operations would destabilize space as a contested domain,
    rather than deter our adversaries.
        What do you believe our best tools are to achieve
    deterrence in space?
        General Dickinson. Thank you. That is a great question.
        I would tell you one of our biggest deterrence
    opportunities is with our allies and partners. We have, just
    since this command has stood up, we have just seen a bow wave,
    if you will, of allies and partners who want to come and be
    part of the U.S. Space Command and part of the space
    enterprise. I think as we have seen in other domains, one of
    the greatest deterrence that we have is our allies and partners
    and how we can all come together in a very coordinated and
    synchronized manner in order to do deterrence.
        One example, in particular, was the messaging that we did
    last year in 2019 and 2020, in response to Russian on-orbit
    activities, as well as their direct-assent ASAT tests that they
    did last year. What I mean by that is when we developed our
    messaging strategy for that particular, or those events, we had
    tremendous participation and integration with our allies and
    partners that we had never seen before.
        So, one of the powers of this command or one of the
    strengths of this command is that we are able to do that 24
    hours a day in terms of holding our adversaries and competitors
    accountable in the space domain and our allies and partners
    provide a big piece to that deterrent message.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I will submit my questions for Admiral
    Richard for the record. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
        Let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, first, let me begin by just saying thank you
    very much for your service to our country.
        Admiral Richard, I believe that our traditional national
    defense rests on bedrock of the nuclear triad. I know that you
    have hit this a couple of times, but just in plain English so
    that folks that don't discuss nuclear triads on a regular
    basis, the hard-working Americans that are out there that are
    wondering why we have literally hundreds, if not thousands, of
    nuclear warheads, can you explain to the average guy that is
    working out there why it is that the triad is so important to
    our national security and why it is critical to invest in its
    modernization.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, the simple answer to that
    question is that strategic deterrence doesn't hold, nothing
    else in the Department of Defense is going to work the way it
    was designed. That is it, plain and simple.
        I get anxious that somehow, and remember, nuclear and
    strategic are two different things. All nuclear is strategic.
    Not all strategic is nuclear.
        But we want to put it into a box by itself that has its own
    threat. You can decide how credible you think that threat is
    and somehow there is this independent [inaudible] that we can
    take risks over here and somehow that has nothing to do with
    what the rest of the Department does, when, in fact, it
    underpins it and enables it.
        Yes, we like to throw a lot of numbers around. The bottom
    line is, what is available to the commander to deter and what
    am I deterring against?
        We are treaty-limited to 1500 and 50 accountable nuclear
    weapons by the New START Treaty. That is what is available to
    me to accomplish all of the objectives the President has given
    me, and the consequence of failure in this mission is enormous.
    That is fundamentally what we are trying to accomplish, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Interesting that that particular treaty
    applies to one of our adversaries, but not necessarily all of
    our adversaries, correct?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, that is quite correct.
        Senator Rounds. So, let's just talk about one of those
    other competitors or challengers in this particular case. I
    know that this may be one that may be difficult to do in open
    session, but can you talk a little bit about what China's
    civilian nuclear-production capabilities are and whether or not
    we are factoring that in with regard to their ability to
    produce nuclear material and the number of warheads that they
    are capable of producing in a very short period of time. I
    guess what I am thinking about are the fast reactors that they
    have available to them right now.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, that is actually a great example
    of how rapidly China is changing, or at least how rapidly we
    are figuring it out, right. So, the answer to your question is,
    yes, but that is only as of about a week ago that we became
    aware of that and started the process to understand the
    implications of that.
        Obviously, with a fast-breeder reactor, you now have a very
    large source of weapons-grade plutonium available to you. That
    will change the upper bounds of what China could choose to do
    if they wanted to in terms of further expansion of their
    nuclear capabilities.
        We haven't yet run all the numbers. You are right, the
    answers would have to come back in closed session, but it has
    only been within the last week that we became aware that this
    limitation on them has changed in an upward direction.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        General Dickinson, we have been competing against our
    adversaries, air, land, sea, cyberspace, and now we see them
    most certainly challenging us in space. While they may talk
    about having an interest in a military-free space, or at least
    one in which we are not actively participating in a military
    matter in space, clearly, the threats are there.
        I would like to hear your thoughts on our ability to defend
    against these new threats and what you need in order to
    maintain unfettered access in space. Do you currently have the
    equipment and the resources necessary to protect the assets
    that we have in space right now from the threats from both,
    Russia and China?
        General Dickinson. Senator, so I agree, Russia and China
    are proliferating in the space domain and one more than the
    other in terms of capabilities on space, not just numbers, but
    the capabilities, as well, and that, in particular, is China.
    So, China is absolutely our pacing challenge right now in the
    space domain.
        In terms of how I protect and defend on orbit or in the
    space domain really boils down to my ability to actually see
    and understand what is going on in the space domain. So, in
    other words, being able to use a combination of satellites, as
    well as terrestrial assets to understand activities on orbit,
    not only from an administrative perspective, in terms of
    knowing where things are, but actually having the ability to
    analyze those capabilities to understand what the threat is or
    what those capabilities could do and their intent.
        So, space domain awareness, again, my number-one priority
    in terms of the command, and we have identified that as a
    requirement to both, the Department of Defense and the
    services, as well. But in order to do my ``protect and defend''
    mission, I must fully understand what is going on in the space
    domain.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
        Let me now recognize Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and Ranking Member
    Inhofe.
        Just today, I am going to be paying a compliment to our
    staff at every hearing I am doing. The staffs have really done
    a great job of putting these hearings together, where we
    combine people attending in person and people, senators and
    witnesses, attending virtually, and I don't think we should
    take it for granted. So, I just wanted to offer my thanks to
    the hard work to make this challenging time work as seamlessly
    as possible, and to all the staff involved in that, thank you
    for that.
        To the witnesses, thank you.
        My colleagues have asked very good questions, many of which
    I was going to ask, and I am actually just sort of going to
    follow-up on Senator Rounds, where he was ending with space
    awareness. General Dickinson, we had a posture hearing with
    SOUTHCOM recently and Admiral Faller talked about the lack of
    dedicated ISR. He has not unique in that.
        Anytime we have a posture hearing with combatant commands,
    this is a very common theme. Sometimes, it makes me think of,
    you know, the old joke about the CEO that said, I gave my legal
    counsel an unlimited budget and they overspent it.
        I think the demand for ISR is sort of endless, but ISR is
    so critical, obviously, to our combatant commanders really
    getting a handle on and successfully executing any missions
    that they have.
        I have a large collection of commercial satellite providers
    in Virginia who, when these issues come up, they often say that
    they think that they can provide ISR to combatant commanders in
    a way that would complement and combine with our DOD ISR
    capacities to help us out.
        General Dickinson, I am kind of interested to hear your
    perspective on whether commercial satellite providers could be
    woven into the architecture of ISR to be provided to combatant
    commands in a way that would be helpful or do you see
    challenges or limitations that would make that difficult?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
        I am an advocate for the commercial ISR capabilities. I
    think when we look at the total, as you mentioned, the ISR
    requirements, that we may never have enough and we will always
    ask for more. I agree with that comment, particularly, as we
    look at some of our competitors, in particular, China and how
    they are developing themselves into a global projection
    capability around the world and the fact that our ISR or our
    ability to see them and understand what is going on, not only
    them, but other competitors, as well, is very, very fundamental
    to our military operations.
        I think the intertwining or interweaving the commercial
    industry into that is absolutely necessary and I think gives us
    a great advantage. I will tell you right now that we do rely on
    commercial ISR in terms of what we do each and every day in the
    U.S. Space Command. So, I look forward to that. It is very
    exciting to watch to see how the commercial market, not only
    with ISR, but with other space capabilities, is actually, you
    know, developing, maturing, and in my words, kind of exploding.
        I mean, if you just look at SpaceX, for example, with the
    Starlink constellation, where they are able to put out 60
    satellites on one rocket shot. To build a constellation of now,
    I think over 1300 satellites in low-Earth orbit is amazing and
    really shows what the commercial industry can do in support of
    the space domain operation. So, I agree, I think it should be
    part of the, or it is today and it should continue to do so.
        Senator Kaine. General Dickinson, I am heartened to hear
    that, and I will just conclude and yield by time back by saying
    that Senator Gillibrand's question about creating norms in
    space becomes very important. The more we use either state-
    based satellites or commercial satellites, nations all over the
    world are doing it, the more the prospect of collisions and
    then space debris affecting everybody else's investments become
    a real challenge.
        It is hard to imagine us continuing to be vigorous
    investors in space satellites all around the world without some
    kind of international norms where these investments are
    protected. So, the DOD's involvement, along with other parts of
    the U.S. Government in creating those norms is really
    important, and I was glad to hear your answer to Senator
    Gillibrand on that topic, as well.
        So, with that, thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Let me recognize Senator Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and, gentlemen, thank
    you so much for being here today and sharing your testimonies
    with us. Your commands do represent very crucial capabilities
    for our national defense, so thank you, again, for your input
    as we continue to develop different policies, whether it is
    strategic, nuclear deterrence, or, of course, space.
        So, making sure that we have the resources necessary is
    extremely important and, recently, Chief of Naval Operations,
    Admiral Mike Gilday, recently said, we need to innovate and we
    need to modernize. Early adoption of emerging and disruptive
    technologies, as well as the need to protect our infrastructure
    and technologies from strategic competitors is absolutely
    critical.
        I believe that is true, not only in the Navy, but also to
    our nuclear and space programs.
        So, Admiral Richard, as we are looking at the modernization
    of our nuclear triad, again, going back to those resources,
    there is going to be a tremendous price tag. I think we all
    recognize that, but can you discuss for us the margins for
    delay and the potential costs that we would face if we try to
    spread out these recapitalization efforts over a period of
    years within the nuclear triad, not really getting to the heart
    of the issue.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, thank you for the question,
    and, two, what I would start with is, we don't have an
    opportunity to spread these costs out, right. We have life-
    extended to the maximum extent possible. So, to maintain the
    level of defense that we have historically assumed in this
    mission, right, to not take any further risks in this area, I
    need the first of these recapitalizations to start showing up
    on time. We don't have any further opportunity to do that.
        I do want to present that we can afford this as a nation,
    right. We only do this every 40 years. If you look at the
    context of what these decisions are and costs relative to all
    the other things this nation chooses to spend its money on,
    these are trivial, compared to that. This is a choice this
    nation makes as to how much risk it wants to take in this
    mission issue.
        I think this exactly what Secretary Madison meant when he
    said, we can afford survival.
        Senator Ernst. I think that is so brilliantly put.
        Not only can we afford it, we must afford this. I think
    that is a great way to say that, Admiral.
        So, talking a little bit more about the ICBMs, and if we
    were allowing the ICBM legs to atrophy, such that it is no
    longer a credible leg of the triad, what would that then mean
    to Russia and China, but also for our allies, and can you
    describe how our allies would react if we no longer had that
    viable ICBM leg.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, let me put it this way in terms
    of what it would do relative to Russia and China. I said that
    China is not yet able to execute every plausible nuclear
    employment strategy at intercontinental range. If I were to
    build a list of the top-five things the United States could do
    to accelerate China becoming a strategic peer of ours, number
    one or number two on the list is to get rid of our ICBMs,
    because you will have solved a problem that they can't
    currently solve right now. That would be the implication for
    that, and they can do the math and our allies can do the math
    and they will see that we are not backing up our words with our
    actions. We will lose credibility, and it will affect our
    extended-deterrence insurance.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, sir.
        General Dickinson, as well, as we talk about, you know,
    congestion in space, there are over 50 different space-faring
    nations and a number of space ventures, as you outlined in your
    opening remarks. Those will continue to climb.
        So, the risks and opportunities, what are those risks and
    opportunities that space congestion presents to the command and
    how do we overcome them?
        General Dickinson. Thank you.
        So, the risks to the command are that it is becoming more
    congested in terms of what I mentioned with the over 1300
    satellites, which is a good thing in terms of, you know, free-
    market economy, commerce, space commerce, but it is becoming a
    more challenging problem. So, the risk becomes that it could
    become more unpredictable in space, more things to look at,
    more things to make sure that don't collide as they are in each
    of the orbits. But the benefit to that, I think, we can see,
    you know, the world economy, in particular, for space, is
    booming, and so, we need to do that, but we need to look at it
    as a domain like we looked in other domains in terms of how do
    we manage that to make sure that we have a safe and secure
    space domain.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
        I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
        Let me recognize Senator King, via Webex.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dickinson, I would like to follow-up on Tim Kaine's
    question to a little bit about the security of our space
    assets. It seems to me that in a conflict, the very first thing
    that an enemy will try to do is a major cyberattack and to try
    to blind us.
        Senator Kaine talked about commercial satellites. Is
    redundancy, itself, a strategy for protecting the assets; in
    other words, lots and lots of small satellites rather than
    these large, multi-billion-dollar satellites that we have
    traditionally depended upon, but a redundant constellation of
    small satellites that would be harder to disable.
        Because, do you agree with me that going after our
    satellites would be one of the first things an adversary would
    do in a conflict?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
        So, my opinion on that is I believe the small satellites,
    many satellites in orbit provides us a very redundant,
    resilient capability. That would be very difficult to degrade
    once we have it established. It will provide us the ability to
    do many different types of missions, whether it is
    communications, whether it is ISR, whether it is missile-
    warning; those types of activities, I think, will absolutely be
    more redundant, more resilient if we have, what I would call a
    mesh network, if you will, in a constellation.
        In terms of what would happen first, I believe we are in
    competition each day both, space and cyber, and for us, our
    ability to compete on a daily basis in the competition phase is
    very important to what we are doing. That could very well be
    the first, that you mentioned, could be a cyber attack followed
    by something in space. But we are watching that each and every
    day, and like I said, I think in terms of the redundancy, that
    is a great technique or opportunity.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Admiral Richard, one of the scariest terms I have heard
    recently is escalate to de-escalate, which I understand is a
    stated policy of the Russians in terms of the use of tactical
    nuclear weapons in order to chock everyone into backing off.
        Is that something that concerns you in terms of our
    relationship to Russia and their relationship to nuclear
    weapons?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, the short answer is yes.
    Actually, it may be thought of more as escalate to win, but not
    to mince words, and so, the whole idea here is for that and
    anything else they consider doing, to show that that won't
    work, right, that the costs that we could impose are greater
    than what they may gain by attempting that strategy, that is
    the essence of deterrence here and, in fact, the introduction
    of the low-yield ballistic missile weapon, I remind, we have
    always had a low-yield capability inside the arsenal. We just
    added one now that has a much higher probability of facing the
    threats that we have today. We think that that has successfully
    improved deterrence against that very strategy.
        Senator King. Well, to go back to Senator Rounds' question,
    the fundamental strategy here, and a lot of people, we have
    gone 25 or 30 years and not thought too much about nuclear
    weapons, but the whole idea is that those other countries that
    have nuclear weapons know that we do, too, and that we have the
    capability to inflict enormous damage on them if they use the
    nuclear weapons. That theory of deterrence has worked for 70
    years.
        I take it from your comments that you believe that
    modernization is critical to maintaining the credibility of the
    deterrent. It is not a deterrent unless your adversaries
    believe it will work, and isn't that the essential case for
    modernization?
        Admiral Richard. Absolutely, sir.
        Fundamentally, a deterrent is not credible unless the
    opponent or the other side does the calculation and comes up
    with, we can either deny that, missile defense is a good
    example of it, or we can impose a cost.
        It doesn't have to be a nuclear cost. We are thinking very
    hard. We are the only nation that can go all domain worldwide.
    I applaud the Secretary's efforts at improving cross-domain
    deterrence, but in the end, given the threats that we face,
    there has to be a nuclear component to it, because we don't
    have a combination of other things, yet, that can deter that.
        Senator Kaine. Well, the fundamental theory is that you
    have nuclear weapons in order to never have to use them. That
    is what it is all about, isn't it, Admiral?
        Admiral Richard. It is, and I have said that before, in
    that it is the only weapons system you don't have to pull the
    trigger on for it to work. The mere destructive potential of
    the system changes the way people think. It changes the
    decisions they make. That is what we mean by, we use it every
    day.
        Senator King. A very quick question, I am out of time, but
    a very quick question. If there were some serious threat, how
    long would it take to get the bombers aloft?
        Admiral Richard. Sir, it is a short period of time. I would
    prefer to answer that in closed session, if I could.
        Senator King. We will follow-up later. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and
    for your appearance.
        Admiral Richard, I want to speak about the Nuclear Posture
    Review, which is underway, as is the custom of administrations.
    I am concerned that low-level political appointees, a Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense and Deputy Assistant Secretary
    of State may be subverting the integrity of Secretary Austin's
    review.
        Earlier this month, those political appointees gave an
    interview in Japanese media, implying the reduction of funding
    for our nuclear forces and, perhaps, even the enactment of a
    sole-purpose nuclear policy. Neither of those appointees, of
    course, have been confirmed by the
        United States Senate.
        Were either you or Secretary Austin consulted before they
    made these public comments?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, no. No one at STRATCOM or myself
    was consulted.
        Senator Cotton. Do you believe that it would be in the best
    interest of our Nation to go to a sole-purpose nuclear policy?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, no. I think, again, that that
    would remove a level of ambiguity that has had useful deterrent
    value to us. We have never, as a nation, chosen to do that.
        Senator Cotton. That would undermine our ability to deter,
    for instance, chemical or biological attacks if we use the
    sole-purpose policy?
        Admiral Richard. By policy, we would not consider a nuclear
    response to those types of threats.
        Senator Cotton. Do you think allies like the United Kingdom
    or Japan would like the United States to move to a sole-purpose
    policy?
        Admiral Richard. Sir, you know, in the end, I would have to
    defer to OSD policy, but my indications, conversations is there
    would be apprehension. It would depend on exactly how we worded
    it.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you for that.
        I hope the integrity of that Nuclear Posture Review is not
    subverted by low-level appointees who have never been reviewed
    by the Senate.
        I want to move to China. I know you have probably touched
    on some of these points, but I think there are a few questions
    that are more vital today. We know what Russia has. We know the
    threat Russia poses. They have posed it for 60 or 70 years.
        But I think China is a menacing and rapidly growing threat
    both, in terms of the quantity and the quality of their nuclear
    forces. Give a sense just how fast their increasing the
    quantity of their nuclear forces.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I just gave an order at STRATCOM
    2 weeks ago that any threat brief or any brief that is
    discussing China that is more than a month old must be updated
    with our intelligence folks because it is probably out of date.
    I can't get through a week right now without finding out
    something we didn't know about China.
        Senator Cotton. In terms of the quality of these forces, it
    is true that they are moving rapidly towards having a
    functioning nuclear triad, just like the United States and
    Russia, which is to say, bombers, submarines, and missiles; is
    that right?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct.
        Senator Cotton. On those ground-based forces, in some ways,
    their quality is more survivable and less detectible than ours
    since they are moving towards, say, sold-fuel rockets, which
    give you less warning, since you don't have to stand up the
    missiles and fill them with liquid fuel or road-mobile and
    road-mobile missiles, which can be moved around on the back of
    a tractor-trailer or a train, something this country doesn't
    use; is that right?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct.
        The road-mobiles of both, Russia and China are challenges
    to make sure that you can maintain accountability of them.
        Senator Cotton. It is hard to find a tractor-trailer with a
    missile on it in a country the size of China, which is as big
    as the United States, right?
        Admiral Richard. Both countries are very good at hiding
    them.
        Senator Cotton. You spoke something a few moments ago, and
    I just want to point out that you said that eliminating our
    ground-based missiles would be one of the best things that
    could happen to Chinese planners, and is that because the
    number of our missile systems complicate their targeting?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, that is correct. You would solve
    a problem right now that they don't have an answer to.
        Senator Cotton. Which is, to use a colloquial term, the
    missile sync, with all of our, I know you may not like to use
    that term, but with all of those missiles that we have out in
    the Midwest and the Rocky Mountain states and just the sheer
    quantity of targeted sites if you are Russia or China is very
    complicated to hit.
        Admiral Richard. It certainly requires a scale of attack
    that is, makes it very obvious what is going on, and part of
    why I don't like the term missile sync is there are a lot of
    things where we have forgotten how we got here. An example is
    bolt out of the blue, right. Highly improbable. We all agree
    with that. We would be the first to tell you that. We look at
    this risk every day.
        But we forget why it is improbable, right. We made it
    improbable as a nation. We invented the ballistic-missile
    submarine. We invented launch under warning, launch under
    attack. It is improbable because it probably won't work.
        We can easily take steps to make it more probable if we
    forget what it is that got us here.
        Senator Cotton. That is right, and that would be the case,
    not just if you took the radical step of eliminating an entire
    leg of our triad, the ground-based missiles, but even if you
    substantially reduced the amount of ground-based missiles; is
    that correct?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, fundamentally, I have got to have
    enough capacity, right, and I am now about to face an additive
    threat from China. These numbers that we have were based on a
    threat situation from years ago.
        So, I am apprehensive right now. Well, I certainly need
    everything that is in the program of record, if you want me to
    do what the President ordered me to.
        Senator Cotton. So, I will just conclude with a point I
    often make. We hear from some misguided and misinformed people
    on the left who might want to eliminate a leg of our triad or
    eliminate the entire nuclear forces. This fanciful idea that
    somehow we can rid the world of this weapons system.
        It is often said we spend so much on weapons we never use;
    to the contrary, we spend very little on these nuclear forces
    as a percentage of our Defense budget, certainly as a
    percentage of our overall economic. Second, we use these, every
    single day and we have used them every single day for 76 years
    to deter another war like the terrible wars of the first half
    of the 21st century.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton, via Webex.
        Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses for being here.
        President Biden has expressed some concerns about the need,
    the affordability, and the safety of the Trump administration's
    nuclear weapons policy, and for good reason. The previous
    administration's modernization plans including items like a new
    sea-launched cruise missile and a low-yield warhead. Like any
    new administration, the President's team is taking some time to
    conduct its own review.
        So, Admiral Richard, you are the commander of U.S.
    Strategic Command. Whose job is it to determine the nuclear
    policy of the United States, your job or the President's job?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, it is the President's job. I am
    obligated to provide my best military advice.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that.
        Do you agree that the new administration should be allowed
    to conduct its own review and that it shouldn't feel obligated
    or pressured to rubber-stamp the previous administration's
    plans?
        Admiral Richard. Ma'am, I absolutely agree with that.
        I also request an opportunity to make sure that that
    review, and in fact, I would broaden it. I, again, state that I
    think it is a mistake to think of deterrence in pieces, that
    nuclear is somehow separate from conventional, is somehow
    separate from space and cyber. You have to look at all of that.
    I would ask that it be fully threat-informed, and that I have
    an opportunity to provide the operational implications of
    potential policy choices.
        Senator Warren. But you are going to do the operational
    part here. The President does the policy part.
        I appreciate your saying this, because you made some
    comments early in January that puzzled and, frankly, concerned
    me on this score. On January 5, after President Trump had lost
    his bid for re-election, you told some reporters that the
    purpose of a forthcoming Biden administration review of nuclear
    weapons policy should, quote, validation that we like the
    strategy that we have.
        It also sounded like to me that you were saying that there
    was no reason to change course. You stated, quote, this nation
    has had basically the same strategy dating back to the Kennedy
    administration, end quote.
        So, now, it is your job to provide input and recommend
    options to the President and the Secretary if you are asked,
    but that doesn't mean making public comments to try to box in
    the President's decision-making. I understand that you believe
    you are operating well within the scope of your
    responsibilities, but I am concerned and I want a commitment
    from you that you are not going to infringe on or undermine the
    administration's review.
        Do I have your commitment on that?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, you absolutely do, and my
    reference to our strategy was not in relation to any one
    administration. I also said I can trace the lineage of our
    current strategy back to the Kennedy administration.
        The Nation can have any strategy that it wants and then
    that leads to a commensurate need for a stack of capabilities,
    policies, and postures to execute that strategy. I would just
    like to make sure that the Nation----
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that----
        Admiral Richard.--understands the risks it is taking in
    those decisions.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that you will make that risk
    clear so that the President and the Secretary can work together
    to make a decision on this.
        You know, we are currently spending $44 and a half billion
    a year on nuclear weapons and I know that STRATCOM likes
    spending that money, but I don't. The purpose of the ongoing
    review is to, quote, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our
    defense strategy, end quote. I agree with that goal and I think
    it is incompatible with that staggeringly high level of
    spending.
        Every administration makes administration makes strategic
    decisions about our force structure and modernization and when
    it comes to nuclear weapons, those decisions carry tremendous
    weight. As STRATCOM commander, your role is to support the U.S.
    Nuclear Doctrine that is set by the leaders elected to grapple
    with those decisions, not by military officials alone.
        So, I look forward to seeing the results of the
    administration's review and I know you will swiftly implement
    whatever they determine.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Tillis, via Webex.
        Okay. Now, Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Generals, both for your service and for being
    here.
        I might just, well, I guess I feel compelled to follow-up
    on what Senator Warren was just talking about. One of the
    things that I have found frustrating often times is that the
    self-governed in this country, don't know what we know. A lot
    of times that is okay, but a lot of times it is not so okay.
        So, Generals, both of you, I appreciate the fact that you
    are both, that you both travel a lot throughout the country.
    You have both come to my state in your current positions, and
    that you both are willing to speak openly, but always, always
    respectfully about the threats that we face, because, quite
    honestly, I think one of the great threats in this country is
    when the people assume we know what we are talking about aren't
    aware of the threats. So, thank you for doing that. A well-
    informed, several-governed country is the best.
        I guess I don't feel the need to ask any more questions
    about whether you support a triad versus something else,
    Admiral. I have appreciated your opening statement, as well as
    your answers to several questions, reaffirming the importance
    of all three legs of the triad.
        We have talked a lot. You have answered questions,
    specifically, of course, about the ground-based strategic
    deterrent and I appreciate that, and the fact that a delay in
    the modernization will cost both, money and perhaps security.
        So, let's move over to the LRSO. You know, our B-52s are
    incredible weapons, especially in the hands of our great airmen
    like we have in [inaudible], but I am afraid that we will be
    risking too much and asking too much of those airmen if we take
    away the LRSO and get it off-track.
        So, if the LRSO were cancelled or delayed beyond the
    service life of the legacy air-launch cruise missile, do you
    think our air leg of the triad would be viable or would it be
    compromised?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, the short answer is no. The
    bottom line is that without an LRSO, you, in effect, don't have
    an air leg or you have at least put it back to sort of a 1950's
    version of an air leg with much less capacity than they had
    back then.
        I do want to go a bit further. It is not only that it is
    almost a miracle that they all can fly, I think my predecessor
    General Hyten testified to that a couple of years ago. To think
    that a weapons system designed to go against Soviet analog
    defenses is going to be able to get through sophisticated
    Russian and Chinese defenses, I think is optimistic, and the
    outcome on its first day wasn't good enough for what we are
    going to need for it to do today. I can give you the details on
    that in closed session.
        It was designed for a different era. I need a modern weapon
    in order to do what I have been ordered to do.
        Senator Cramer. With limited time, I am wondering which of
    these last questions I want to ask, but I am going to continue
    on with the strategic deterrent commander. I know you are
    acutely aware that credible U.S. nuclear deterrence relies on
    uninterrupted nuclear command, control, and communications, the
    NC3 system, and that the mission depends on secure operational
    technologies, as well.
        The recent hack of the Florida water treatment facility
    certainly highlighted the cyber vulnerabilities of our OT
    system, a threat that is only exacerbated when you add in the
    NC3 component.
        Can you update the Committee on efforts of STRATCOM to
    ensure that cyber protection both, to the infrastructure and
    NC3 are on track.
        Admiral Richard. Sir, that is a very extensive answer.
        The things that we are doing, I will answer this, and I
    have a separate responsibility as the commander of the Nuclear
    Enterprise Center with the Department-wide responsibilities for
    nuclear command and control. Fundamentally, I am confident in
    our NC3 cyber resiliency. It exists in relative isolation. It
    has tremendous redundancy. It gets the best intelligence. We
    have an intelligence fusion center, thank you Congress for
    directing that, General Nakasone.
        So, everything that Space Command just mentioned that they
    get support for, we get that and additional abilities to
    maintain the standards here. The number-one thing I need to do
    to be able to say that in the future is that I have to
    modernize the system, right. I have to get it out of legacy
    modes of operation in order to pace this threat going into the
    future, but I am confident today.
        Senator Cramer. To both of you, and I will start with you,
    General Dickinson, in addition to the Bomber Wing and the
    Missile Wing at Minot, of course, North Dakota contributes by
    having the 10th Space Warning Squadron at Cavalier. Maybe this
    is a good opportunity for me to ask both of you, but, again,
    starting with General Dickinson, how do the two commands work
    together to enhance the credibility of U.S. deterrence against
    adversaries who are competing with us, really, in every domain?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
        So, that missile-warning architecture is a very integrated
    capability within U.S. Space Command. We provide that missile
    warning to U.S. Strategic Command on a daily basis and we work
    very closely together. I mean, in general, as you know,
    Senator, we respond out of U.S. Strategic Command when we stood
    up U.S. Space Command, and so, our daily interaction, our daily
    operations together is very nested and synchronized.
        Senator Cramer. I thank both of you.
        Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
        Via Webex, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
        Thanks to both of you for your service to our country and
    the commitment by your families for their service. I think they
    need to be commended, also.
        The first question I want will go to both of you, but
    Admiral Richard, with the current and planned advancements in
    missile technology, such as hypersonics from our adversaries,
    defense of the homeland can no longer be taken for granted. So,
    my question would be, Admiral Richard, would you tell me about
    the adequacy of our current missile-defense batteries, like the
    Ground-Based Interceptors, the PAC-3 missile, and [inaudible]
    platforms.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I would, in the end, defer to the
    operational commanders of those systems. For example, for
    Ground-Based Interceptor, that is Northern Command; however,
    from my vantage point, in terms of my mission sense and my
    overall responsibility in missile defense for advocating and
    operation support, we have an adequate missile defense today.
    We do need to make sure that we pace it into the future against
    the threats that we are seeing.
        The number-one thing that I would prioritize is both, the
    ability to warn and the ability to track birth-to-death,
    because it is not only the defensive pieces to it, that is
    missile defense. On the missile-warning side, I need to be able
    to posture forces and posture people in advance of the threat
    or I have to take other operational decisions over.
        Senator Manchin. General Dickinson, if you could tell me
    how STRATCOM and SPACECOM are working to integrate future
    missile-defense technologies, like a Space Sensor Layer with
    our current systems to maintain global awareness, and the
    quickest reaction possible to these threats.
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
        So, we work very closely hand-in-hand with U.S. Strategic
    Command and all the other combatant commands in terms of the
    integrating, as I mentioned earlier in terms of taking existing
    terrestrial-type radars that have not necessarily been used
    before, particularly in the space domain, but in this
    particular vignette with hypersonics. We continue to look at
    the integration of those assets.
        We are also working very closely with the Missile Defense
    Agency in growing capabilities on orbit that will help us
    address that problem, our dilemna with hypersonic weapons.
        Senator Manchin. Admiral Richard, your testimony states the
    next generation of deterrent forces must encompass responsive
    weapons systems, world-class personnel, resilient
    infrastructure, and intelligence-informed decisions.
        Can you describe the steps that you have taken or
    relationships that you have established, to ensure the timely
    and initiate flow of intelligence in order to provide decision-
    makers with accurate, timely information that is going to be
    needed to make these decisions.
        Admiral Richard. So, a number of steps. Again, I am
    fortunate in terms of the priority that is given to strategic
    deterrence intelligence needs by the intelligence community. I
    have a number of relationships and a number of liaisons. I
    mean, as one example, I have 300 Defense Intelligence Agency
    personnel assigned to STRATCOM headquarters as part of our
    ability to go do that.
        Additionally, we have a specific stack of strategic
    intelligence requirements that have been given to the
    intelligence community and I receive great support in terms of
    that.
        Senator, if I could real quick, I just want to add, going
    back to the missile-defense piece, because it has been asked a
    couple of times. We are very satisfied with the way that Space
    Command has taken over the sensor commander function, right, by
    utilizing sensors across missile-warning, missile-defense, and
    space situational awareness. I am actually getting better
    missile-warning data and the Nation is getting better
    utilization of the assets that it purchased.
        Senator Manchin. Well, that will go right into General
    Dickinson. As we all know, the availability of speed and
    communicating data are and always will remain a vulnerability
    for our forces, and with the ease of optical or tightbeam
    communications, utilizing lasers in a space environment, that
    speed is increased substantially.
        So, the question would be, that is very impressive, but how
    is SPACECOM working to bring that speed of communications back
    down to Earth as we may speak?
        General Dickinson. So, Senator, that is, what we are
    currently working with, I think some of the work that General
    VanHerck has done in all-domain awareness, I fully support the
    efforts that he is undertaking, as well as the Department in
    terms of increasing our able to communicate at speed so that we
    can make the proper decisions at the proper time.
        What we are doing at U.S. Space Command is kind of looking
    at the current command and control systems that handle these
    volumes of information and we are looking at ways that we can
    integrate those capabilities to provide an all-domain
    capability where we can see and do and act with speed of
    relevance to the situation at hand.
        So, we are looking at existing command and control
    architectures that we can leverage. We already have a very
    robust one in the space domain, but we continue to look and how
    we can leverage all of them together in an all-domain fashion.
        Senator Manchin. Okay. I just want to thank both of you,
    Admiral Richard and General Dickinson. Thank you, both, for
    your service, again, and thank you for being here today.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Now let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here and your years of
    service.
        Admiral Richard, I want to start with you. I was in the
    Committee room when you gave your opening statement and towards
    the end you were talking about how we are losing our advantage
    and you want on to say that we could reach a point to where no
    amount of money would allow us to catch back up.
        Would you go back and give a little bit broader context to
    the specific areas that you think that that threat is real and
    maybe over what sort of timeline if we don't have adequate
    resources or authorities, that we could reach that tipping
    point.
        Admiral Richard. So, Senator, what drives me to say that in
    the opening statement is the observation that we have delayed
    this recapitalization so long that we are getting to points,
    key pieces of infrastructure or key talent areas, human talent
    areas where we have not had to do something in 30 years. The
    best examples are on the weapons complex side of the house
    right now. There will be more in the delivery system and the
    command and control that shortly follow.
        It is a situation that we don't normally face as a nation.
    Normally, when we make a decision, and if we find out we were
    wrong, we can come back 2 or 3 years later and buy it back. We
    can change our minds. We have to write a bigger check. We try
    to avoid doing it, but at least we can.
        We are now at the point that if we lose some critical
    pieces of infrastructure or we lose some key talent bases, a
    specific example would be how you make a nuclear reentry
    vehicle heat shield, right, we haven't done it in 30 years.
        You would think we had never done it before. If we lose
    those talent bases, you can't buy it back. It will take 5 to 10
    years to either retrain and redevelop the people or rebuild the
    infrastructure. We don't normally face decisions like that.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        General Dickinson, you mentioned 32,000 space objects out
    there. I think you said somewhere on the order of about 7,000
    are operational.
        I have been reading a lot of articles on space junk and the
    dangers that they could pose to the International Space
    Station, commercial assets. How much of solving that problem,
    our emphasis on it, and how many resources are actually
    dedicated to that?
        I think Senator Shaheen touched on it, but is this the
    threat that I perceive it to be, based on publications of the
    last month or so?
        General Dickinson. So, Senator, that is a mission area
    within the command that we do every day. It is about 32,000. It
    grows, as we see, with the commercialization, if you will, of
    space with multiple [inaudible] companies now moving into the
    space domain. It is something that we do and we do a very good
    job at that, in terms of making sure that we are able to
    predict where we may have a problem with either a conjunction
    or a collision on orbit.
        We have a very close relationship with NASA. To your
    mention of the International Space Station, a very close
    working relationship, where we provide them with that
    information and they use that information to do, take whatever
    actions they may feel is appropriate to maintain a safe
    environment for the astronauts and cosmonauts onboard the
    International Space Station.
        But it is one that we spend a lot of time doing each and
    every day.
        Senator Tillis. Going forward, I followed Starlink since
    they first set up the first dishwasher-sized satellites to
    provide broadband, ubiquitous broadband. I read a report
    earlier this week that while they are topping a thousand on
    orbit now, their goal is to have over 40,000 on orbit.
        How are we working in the commercial space to make sure
    that we are sequencing more object in space with the goal of
    not making it more difficult for you to do your job? To what
    extent would you play a role, if any, in the commercial
    decisions and permitting to allow more to go on orbit that
    create a more complex challenge for you?
        General Dickinson. So, Senator, my responsibilities lie in
    predicting and understanding where those objects are or the
    satellites are. The actual interaction with the commercial
    company on how they should conduct a space launch or on-orbit
    activities with their satellites really kind of goes back to a
    licensing capability or a licensing process that I believe the
    FAA actual conducts with each of those companies before they
    launch.
        Senator Tillis. Then, my remaining time, I am kind of
    curious about how SPACECOM and STRATCOM are going to work
    together to create a credible U.S. deterrent, particularly,
    when we seem to be challenged in every domain. So, how are your
    two commands working together to face up against those threats?
        General Dickinson. So, Senator, I will answer that first
    and then I will turn it over to my shipmate here, Admiral
    Richard, but we work every day with that. One of the notable
    things within the U.S. Space Command is the stand up of our
    joint fires element within the command that actually does that
    deterrent-type of work in terms of the space domain.
        But we are very integrated with the rest of the combatant
    commands to include U.S. Strategic Command and that daily
    activity in terms of deterrence, not only in the space domain,
    but in all the other domains. Because as the Secretary of
    Defense has asked us and told us to do is that deterrence is
    not just one domain; it is all domains, all the time, and so,
    our synchronization and coordination of those activities, in
    particular, on orbit, and then for the other pieces, the other
    domains is very fundamental. But our relationship and
    synchronization with U.S. Strategic Command is very close.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you.
        Admiral Richard. Yes, Senator, if I could just add, not
    only to endorse everything that General Dickinson just said,
    but Chairman Milley and Vice Chairman Hyten have made it really
    clear, it is not just our two co-coms; it is all co-coms,
    right. We are driving hard towards global integration both, in
    planning and operations. We see that as a necessary way forward
    into the future.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Let me now recognize Senator Rosen, via Webex.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed and Ranking Member
    Inhofe, for holding this important hearing.
        I would also like to thank Admiral Richard and General
    Dickinson for testifying today and, of course, I am grateful
    for their service to our country.
        But I would like to speak a little bit about explosive
    nuclear weapons testing, because last May, the prior
    administration was reportedly considering resuming explosive
    nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site, the only
    facility in the Nation equipped to accommodate underground
    nuclear testing. This is for the first time since 1992.
        Nevadans do not want to return to a time when explosive
    nuclear testing was allowed in our state. It puts the health
    and safety of Nevadans in jeopardy.
        So, to prevent this outcome, Senator Cortez Masto and I
    introduced legislation requiring congressional approval before
    any future explosive nuclear weapons testing were to take
    place.
        So, Admiral Richard, you told the Senate Armed Services
    Committee last year that there is no condition under which you
    would recommend the need for renewed nuclear testing.
        Can you confirm for me, please, today, that there is no
    current need for a resumption of explosive testing in Nevada or
    elsewhere, to ensure the reliability of our nuclear arsenal.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, as you know, I am obligated by
    Congress to report on my assessment of the combat-readiness of
    the stockpile. That includes an assessment on the need for
    nuclear weapons testing.
        So, you are correct. I have certified the stockpile. I do
    it annually in writing, and I have stated that there are no
    identified conditions at this point that would require nuclear
    weapons testing to restore that confidence.
        But I further stated in it that I am concerned about the
    Nation's test-readiness and that I endorsed the lab director's
    calls, the NNSA, nuclear weapons labs, for a national review of
    our test-readiness to understand where we sit.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to build on that and
    ask if you agree that a resumption in explosive nuclear
    testing, which would violate longstanding, international norms,
    might provide other nations with an incentive to resume their
    own explosive nuclear testing activities and, more broadly,
    would impact global peace and security.
        So, what are you thinking in that realm?
        Admiral Richard. Ma'am, I would defer the political
    implications of a nuclear weapons test to OSD policy or the
    State Department. I think from a technical standpoint, a bigger
    driver in terms of any nation's decision to conduct a test has
    to do with what level of confidence do they have that their
    nuclear weapons will work to their standards and what other
    mechanisms they may have; in other words, how much confidence
    do they want and by what means do they want to get it.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I will move on, but I will just
    reiterate, we want no nuclear explosive testing in Nevada or
    anywhere across this country.
        But I would like to build now on what Senator Gillibrand
    spoke about earlier, a cyber mission in space. It is no secret,
    of course as anyone knows, our adversaries see the value of the
    space domain, developing counterspace capabilities to undermine
    our interests. So, this week, I plan to introduce with Senator
    Blackburn, legislation to build a civilian cybersecurity
    reserve to ensure additional cyber capacity at our times of
    greatest need.
        So, General Dickinson, does the newest branch of the
    military, do you currently possess the necessary workforce to
    fulfill your cyber mission effectively, and how can we help
    support your needs in growing the workforce?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
        In terms of the cyber piece that you mentioned earlier, I
    would say that is probably General Jay Raymond's avenue or area
    in terms of what the service, the Space Force provides.
        But as a combatant commander, I can tell you that I have
    the resources that I need right now and I am confident in our
    ability to protect my space missionaries, my critical space
    missionaries that I do each and every day.
        My relationship with Cyber Command in terms of working with
    Paul Nakasone and his team, is very close. As the newest
    combatant command, I have gotten resource that I have
    determined that I need in order to have a resilient cyber
    capability or protection within the missionaries, I will have
    today.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you.
        I was able to, last year, help get the PROMOTES Act passed,
    which has a junior ROTC STEM track now and we hope that that
    will help grow our young men and women as they join JROTC early
    to help build all of our capabilities and technology in the
    military. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen.
        Let me recognize Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
        Admiral Richard, I read your op-ed from February and I
    appreciate your candid assessment of the challenges we face
    regarding Communist China.
        Have you seen anything with regard to behavior, military
    spending, posturing, and public statements that lead you to
    believe that Communist China has any interest in cooperating
    with other countries on nuclear weapons?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I have not. They have a very
    opaque policy. It makes it difficult to determine anything
    about what their intentions are, but I certainly have not seen
    anything that looks like cooperation.
        Senator Scott. If we don't spend sufficiently to modernize
    our nuclear forces and Communist China achieves its goal of
    having an effective nuclear triad by the middle of this decade,
    what are we facing in terms of defending United States
    interests in the Indo-Pacific Region and beyond?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, it would be two things, one of
    which is they could use those capabilities coercively in a way
    that would limit our decision space in crisis; additionally, it
    will rip out the underpinnings, by which all the rest of our
    forces are employed, right. We would not be able to deter China
    from simply escalating right past us if the stakes were high
    enough in a crisis or conflict.
        Senator Scott. So, the value of having forces in South
    Korea and Japan would be just wasteful. There would be no
    ability to help them.
        Admiral Richard. We would be the first to tell you that
    those forces are important, but you have to backstop them with
    a strategic deterrent to dissuade the opponent from attempting
    to do something like that.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        General Dickinson, are we on pace, given what we expect
    from the President's budget to be able to defeat Chinese and
    Russian goals in space?
        There is no question they each want to dominate in this
    area, and do you believe that we will be able to stop them,
    given our current spending plans and policy?
        General Dickinson. Senator, I think at this point, we are
    on a glide path to that capability. Our ability to protect and
    defend on orbit is that those capabilities and capacities are
    growing, and I think that is very important as we look to the
    future. But to answer your question, I think we are on a glide
    path.
        Senator Scott. So, do you believe that going forward, that
    we are going to be expected, like the President's budget
    doesn't have much of an increase in Defense spending, do you
    think we are going to, that is going to be enough to pursue the
    goals that you have?
        General Dickinson. Well, so, for the command over the last
    year, we have done our first analysis of the requirements, if
    you will, for the combatant command, and I have delivered those
    requirements to the Department of Defense, as well as the
    services, and in those requirements, I have identified my
    priority in terms of developing better space domain awareness
    in terms of being able to understand what is happening in the
    space domain, to characterize that, and to understand what our
    adversaries and competitors are doing there.
        So, in terms of the budget for this year, I think it is
    satisfactory for what we are doing right now.
        Senator Scott. Admiral Richard, do you think we are clear
    enough about our relationship with Taiwan and our interest in
    making sure they remain, you know, independent of Communist
    China?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, ultimately, I would defer to the
    Department of State and OSD policy in terms of what is the best
    course of action there.
        What I am committed to doing is making sure that the United
    States military has the ability to set the appropriate
    operating conditions and deter Chinese strategic capabilities
    to allow us those options for the rest of the force and the
    Nation.
        Senator Scott. So, if we are in the position that we
    believe that we can deter them from doing something, why are
    they doing all the flyovers now? Why is Communist China doing,
    taking the aggressive action they are taking against Taiwan
    right now?
        Admiral Richard. Sir, fundamentally, I would defer. You
    would have to ask China that question, right, but that is a
    point that gets back to deterrences linked, right. We have to
    pay attention all the way down into thresholds below
    conventional armed conflict to make sure that we are putting
    these things on the right trajectory in the long term.
        Senator Scott. I want to thank both of you and thank all
    the men and women that serve with you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
        Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Richard, thank you for your testimony, General
    Dickinson.
        I would like to discuss for a couple of minutes, the
    ground-based strategic deterrent effort. The program to replace
    the Minuteman-III and its command and control system is
    significant. Often, large programs like this are threatened
    when there is budgetary pressure.
        Now, my understanding is that there is not a cost-effective
    way to modernize the Minuteman-III and that the 60-year-old
    missile needs to be replaced.
        Can you explain in detail, Admiral Richard, why that is,
    and what new capability are we going to get with GBSD.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, first, I would offer the
    Department has sent several pretty detailed reports to Congress
    that go into that, and so I would refer to those.
        But biggest picture, I need a weapon that can fly and make
    it to the target. Minuteman-III is increasingly challenged in
    its ability to do that. There is almost no possibility of an
    upgrade on that, relative to the threat.
        In particular, I would draw attention to the cyber
    capabilities, right. Minuteman-III is a very old system that we
    have to be able to cyber defend, and the GBSD will come with a
    great improvement inside its cyber defenses, as well as the
    overall operational availability, redundancy and reliability of
    its command and control.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you.
        The Russians have been modernizing their systems. Can you
    highlight some of the upgrades that they have been making in
    delivery system, command and control, and their warning
    systems, just top-level.
        Admiral Richard. I mean, Senator, they, across the board,
    are operating new equipment. They are on their second
    generation of a new ballistic-missile submarine. They have a
    new ballistic missile for that; it is quite capable. They have
    a very impressive, sold-fueled intercontinental ballistic
    missile, brand new. They have new road-mobile missiles. They
    have up-gunned their bombers. They have new weapons off their
    bombers. This is in addition to the novel capabilities that I
    described in my opening statement. They have new command and
    control. They have new warning. They are exercising at a level
    we haven't seen since the Cold War. President Putin plays in
    those exercises, and we are seeing readiness levels like we
    have not seen before. So, is an across-the-board, comprehensive
    improvement in their strategic capabilities; again, about 80
    percent complete right now.
        Senator Kelly. On the B61 Mod 12 program underway, going to
    give us more accuracy of smaller CEP for that weapon and that
    weapon system. Do you see this mod of the B61 being able to
    last here for the next 20 years or so or do you see a point
    where we are going to have to find a new air-launched,
    ballistic bomb?
        Admiral Richard. So, for the B61, right, I do think that
    modernization program will serve our well going into the
    future. That is a gravity weapon, as you well know, and that
    is, in particular, of importance to NATO, in terms of our
    extended deterrence and assurance commitments. So, I am
    satisfied that that weapons system is going to serve us well.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Dickinson, when we spoke last week, we discussed
    the importance of cooperation and communication with other
    space-faring nations to deal with the common challenges that we
    face with orbital debris, a challenge I had to deal with
    myself, personally, on a number of occasions. You know, these
    communications are critical for advanced warning, as well, test
    launches with competitors like Russia and China.
        I want to, just in the remaining time in your view, you
    know, how good are the current structures for communications
    with Russia and China concerning orbital debris, but also, when
    they launch unexpectedly, it could be to put payloads in orbit,
    and if the communications systems are not adequate, what could
    we do right now to improve those?
        General Dickinson. So, Senator, we, as I mentioned----
        Chairman Reed. Microphone, please.
        General Dickinson. So, we communicate with our competitors
    in terms of what is going on in the space domain.
        Could it be better?
        Yes, it could be better. But we communicate to them
    electronically through a website called space.org that has a
    catalog or has information on there that we can alert them to a
    potential collision in space. So, we do communicate in that
    way, but I do believe that we could improve upon that as we go
    forward.
        Senator Kelly. That would be true for a test launch, as
    well?
        General Dickinson. Yes, it would be for test launches, as
    well, so that we can make sure that we understand intention, as
    well as what activity they may be doing in the space domain so
    that we can ensure that we provide a safe environment for space
    operations.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General.
        General Dickinson. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to both of
    you, thank you for your testimony here today and your service
    to our country.
        General Dickinson, in your opening remarks, you addressed
    space-situational awareness in the context of your work with
    the Department of Commerce and its open-architecture data
    repository. So, my question to you is, could you ever foresee
    space-situational awareness being a wholly Commerce function
    with Space Command playing a supporting role, and if not, why?
        General Dickinson. I think as we look to the future and,
    really, the current situation that we have now, as I mentioned,
    32,000 pieces of debris, objects on orbit. As we move forward,
    I do believe that we will see that as a, or we should see that
    as a purely administrative type of function in terms of
    tracking objects in the space domain.
        My job at the U.S. Space Command is to not only understand
    that, but also be able to characterize what we are seeing in
    the space domain so we can understand what our adversaries'
    intention may be and their capabilities. But I see in the
    future that as we move towards that, that that could be a
    wholly administrative-type function, similarly to what the FAA
    does right now, in terms of making sure the air domain is safe.
        Senator Peters. So, if that would be a Commerce function,
    you would be supportive of that, as long as you are playing the
    role that you mentioned?
        General Dickinson. Yes.
        Senator Peters. On the same topic, in 2020 alone, I any
    Senator Kelly mentioned his involvement with it in space, as
    well, but the International Space Station had to perform three
    maneuvers to being hit by space debris.
        Has the command, your command undertaken any initiatives to
    contend with space debris by participating in commercial
    efforts, such as the LSAD launch that occurred last month?
        General Dickinson. We are looking at those types of
    opportunities right now, because that could contribute to our
    ability to understand the domain better.
        Senator Peters. Very good, and, as well, General, I have
    another question for you. Much like the economy at large, our
    operations in space are going to be facilitated not by just the
    purchase and the operation of hardware, but also the
    utilization of services that will allow us to maintain a robust
    presence in space.
        For example, in Michigan, we have a company called ATLAS
    Space Operations in Traverse City that is involved in the
    assistance of launch operations, communications, other types of
    services, and they are doing very innovative work in that area.
    Under your command, how is SPACECOM utilizing private sector
    partners, who can provide a variety of these kinds of
    capabilities?
        General Dickinson. So, Senator, out at Vandenberg Air Force
    Base, which is part of the U.S. Space Command, we have a
    Commercial Integration Cell where we are working every day with
    the commercial industry in terms of understanding capabilities
    that they are bringing online, as well as on-orbit type of
    activities. I think we have close to 90 different companies
    that we work with out there.
        Senator Peters. Great.
        Admiral Richard, in your opening remarks, you described the
    submarine-launched nuclear missile as necessary to address
    regional deterrence challenges from both, China and Russia, but
    increasing the flexibility, in your words, quote, providing a
    more credible deterrent to a limited attack against the United
    States, end of quote.
        Could you explain what you mean by, quote, more credible,
    and does a submarine-launched cruise missile fill that
    capability gap to our extended deterrence posture?
        Admiral Richard. So, sir, when I say more credible, that
    was in relationship to the low-yield, submarine-launched
    ballistic missile aspect of that. You can't deter if you can't
    get to the target, and that weapons system has a better ability
    to do that it. It makes it more credible in the eyes of the
    other party.
        The second part, on the sea-launched cruise missile, it
    goes after more the large disparity that we have in non-treaty
    accountable weapons between us and the Russians. I use that
    term very specifically. Sometimes, they are used as strategic
    versus non-strategic. I think that distinction is increasingly
    irrelevant and a large number of so-called strategic weapons
    are a direct threat to the homeland, in addition to our forces
    regionally, and to our allies.
        The sea-launched cruise missile would give us an ability to
    not rely on host nation's support and give us an ability to,
    again, provide an effective counter to the disparity that we
    see in non-treaty accountable weapons.
        Senator Peters. Well, as you know very well, deterrence
    depends on capability, on credibility, and communication, and
    when a Virginia-class submarine launches a Tomahawk cruise
    missile into Syria, for example, China, Russia, and other
    nuclear powers can now credibly recognize that such launches
    are carrying conventional munitions.
        My question is, if attack submarines reacquire the
    capability to launch nuclear weapons, then, does that mean that
    Beijing and Moscow will need to worry about every missile
    launch within the range of their territories, and are you
    concerned, therefore, that this added ambiguity might lead to
    some sort of miscalculation?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, what I would offer is I think
    that it is a fundamental error to try to determine what the
    payload is on any weapons system by assigning it to a
    particular trajectory. You can make any trajectory carry any
    payload.
        The Nation has long had a cruise missile, nuclear cruise
    missile capability. Russia and China, or Russia has it today.
        So, the idea that we will somehow sort out what a threat
    is, based on its profile, I think, is a flawed idea to begin
    with and we certainly don't characterize anything based on the
    flight profile coming at us.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, Admiral.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        I recognize Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen,
    thank you for your service and your testimony today.
        You know, I was in a hearing last week, an oversight
    hearing, and one of my colleagues on the other side of the
    aisle was kind of putting out this number of 10 percent, his
    estimate of the military was extremist, racist. I think in my
    experience, and I am still serving in the Marine Corps
    Reserves, that number is absurdly high. It wasn't based on any
    data. That would make about two hundred or 250,000 members of
    the Active force supposedly fitting within that category, which
    I think is a disparagement of our men and women in the
    military. I got a little heated in that hearing last week,
    because I am really tired of hearing about, you know, what,
    supposedly is all the bad things about the members of the
    military, when I think it is some of the finest young men and
    women in America serving, volunteering to serve.
        Is that your experience, 10 percent, 1 in 10, 250,000
    active-duty forces are somehow extremist, racist?
        It is an absurd number, but it gets thrown around in the
    newspaper, and I am trying to get the men and women, like you,
    who is served for decades to kind of give me your view.
        Admiral, General, I know that is not the purpose of the
    hearing, but I think it is really important, particularly for
    the men and women that you are leading, and that we have
    oversight of, to let them know that we don't think a huge
    majority of the force is extremist; obviously, some of my
    Senate colleagues do, which I think is absurd.
        Can I get your view on that.
        Admiral Richard. Let me go first on that one. I am very
    confident that the number of extremists in my forces is zero
    and let me explain why I say that.
        The Department has made it clear for decades that we don't
    tolerate that. My forces are a little bit different.
        We have certainly done everything Secretary Austin has told
    us to do. He has made it very clear what the standards are, but
    it is reiterating a standard.
        Every person in my organization has to have a security
    clearance, for starters, right. When you fill that form out,
    and I have been filling it out for 40 years, there is an
    extensive battery of questions designed to get after that very
    point. Then somebody goes and investigates you, and then they
    go talk to all of your references, and then they go talk some
    more, hunting for that very thing.
        We don't care what the source of extremism was. Those date
    back to Communism is actually what they were looking for when I
    first came in, and today they will even go look at your social
    media. If you can't pass that part, I don't even see you. Then
    on top of that, in my forces, we have a personnel reliability
    program for these. So, you now have peer-monitoring brought in
    and a number of other standards.
        So, if there are any extremists in my organization, one,
    they hide it very well, and, two, it is just a matter of time
    until I get to them.
        Senator Sullivan. So, you are saying that you agree with
    me, these are some of the best men and women in America and to
    be besmirched by the media or a senator, 10 percent is
    ridiculous.
        Admiral Richard. Sir, I will just explain what the standard
    is that we uphold. It is contrary to the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice. It is essential for good order and
    discipline, and my forces meet the highest standard of that,
    that DOD requires.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. General, your view on this?
        I know you have a lot of experience, given your decades in
    the U.S. Army.
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Senator.
        So, in my organization, a very similar organization to the
    U.S. Strategic Command. So, space, as we all understand, and I
    know we have talked about it many times in terms of the
    classification or the security clearances that are required
    within my organization to be able to do the things that we do
    in the space domain and terrestrially. We have the same rigor
    in terms of some of the questions that are asked during their
    security clearances in terms of getting them to the proper
    clearance level so they can perform their duties within my
    command.
        I would tell you right now that we have done everything
    that Secretary Austin has asked us to do in terms of training
    and awareness, but in my organization, I would say that number
    is zero. We are very keen and aware of these types of
    activities or what would lead to those, and we understand that
    very well.
        So, in terms of years of experience, yes, I would tell you
    that in the formations that I have had throughout my career, I
    have not seen that. So, I believe that it is close to zero in
    my organization, if not zero.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        But nothing nearing 10 percent. Ridiculous, in my view,
    but, obviously, you guys, you gentlemen would agree.
        Let me just ask one final question. Admiral, it is for you.
    As the North Koreans continue advancement of their weapons
    systems, what can we do, are you concerned it is going to
    outpace our ability to defend the United States Homeland, I am
    talking about the GBI system, and what can we do to accelerate
    development of the next generation of interceptor, and does it
    make sense to have 20 empty silos right now at Fort Greely?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, one, I think the Nation has the
    right standard and policy when it comes to missile defense
    relative to rogue threats, with North Korea right now being the
    defining example of that. Obviously, that is something we may
    go review, but right now, I would start off with, I think that
    is the right pace.
        We will have to pace that threat. I certainly support
    Northern Command's requirements to be able to do so and would
    look for the Department, understanding resource limitations and
    other mission sets that are in competition for us to maintain
    that standard in terms of our missile defenses.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Blumenthal, are you prepared? Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for being here. Thank you for your
    extraordinary service.
        Admiral Richard, we have interacted before on a number of
    submarine-related events and I thank you for your service,
    particularly in that area.
        General Dickinson, thank you for embarking on this very
    promising, important new area.
        At a recent hearing, I expressed my concern about white
    supremacist actions and extremism in our military and I want to
    just be clear that I said at a prior hearing, it was a very
    small percentage of our troops that potentially were involved
    in these activities.
        I am sure it is well under 10 percent, as I believe I
    indicated then, but I think any percentage of white supremacist
    or violent extremism in our military is intolerable and
    unacceptable. I hope you both agree.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I certainly agree with that,
    right, that extremism, you are either on team Constitution or
    you are not, and if you are not, you have no place in our
    military.
        General Dickinson. Senator, I agree, as well. There is no
    place for it in our military today.
        Senator Blumenthal. As you know better than all of us,
    General, much of the operational information utilized within
    SPACECOM remains very highly classified and is often
    restrictive in terms of access. I have been an advocate in many
    other areas of sharing more information with the American
    public so that they understand the threats and the risks in
    this area. Right now, I think there is almost no awareness
    among the American public.
        What can be done to make the American public better
    informed and aware of the challenges, to use a euphemism, that
    exists in your domain?
        General Dickinson. Senator, thanks for that we.
        I would say that is probably, in my words, one of the most
    visible things that U.S. Space Command has done over the last
    20 months, in that we have been able to articulate and call-out
    some of the activities that we have seen in orbit that we would
    determine, at a minimum, dangerous; at a maximum, or the other
    end of the scale, as threatening.
        What I am describing is what we have seen over the last
    year, 2019 and 2020, with the on-orbit activities of the
    Russians, in terms of conducting an on-orbit anti-satellite
    test, as well as a ground-based missile, anti-satellite test
    that was threatening or demonstrating a capability that they
    have.
        In other words, Senator, our ability to be able to discuss
    that, like we do in many other domains, air, land, and sea, is
    very important to what we do, and really working very closely
    with the intel community, we have been able to do that.
        So, in terms of classification and being able to declassify
    that so that we are able to communicate and talk not only to
    the American public about it, but also our allies and partners
    around the world to make sure that we understand what they are
    building and what their future intent could be.
        Senator Blumenthal. That was my next question.
        Do you think that there are procedures for declassifying
    information that make our ability to share information with our
    allies and partners operational?
        General Dickinson. So, Senator, we are working that every
    day. Just the fact, last year, that we were able to come out
    publicly and describe what I just mentioned about their on-
    orbit activities is a big step in the right direction.
        We continue to work within the Department, as well as
    within the intel community, so that we can continue to do that
    and do it more frequently.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, both of you for being here. Thank you
    for your many years of service to our country.
        Admiral, can I start with you, and I want to talk about
    little bit about the B-2 Whiteman Air Force Base in my home
    state of Missouri, of course is proudly home to the B-2 bomber.
    In your testimony, you wrote that the B-2, and I am quoting you
    now, is the only heavy-payload, penetrating stealth bomber in
    the world, able to hold at risk, heavily defended, hard, and
    deeply buried targets.
        I just want to give you an opportunity to talk about why
    this is so important for our strategic deterrence and what it
    is we need to do to ensure that the B-2 continues to be
    effective until the B-21 comes fully online.
        Admiral Richard. Well, sir, that summarized it, in terms
    of, that is the only capability that we have to hold certain
    targets at risk that are very important in our ability to deter
    that, right. It is known that that weapons system can do that.
    That changes decision calculus of people that we are trying to
    deter.
        I applaud Air Force efforts, right, to maintain the B-2 all
    the way through, with its full range of capabilities, while
    simultaneously taking all the steps necessary to bring the B-21
    in on time, such that the Nation maintains this capability
    going into the future.
        Remember, in addition to its penetration capabilities, one
    key aspect that the bomber leg adds is its flexibility; the
    fact that we can move it all over the place. That provides a
    deterrent benefit.
        It certainly provides assurance to allies. You see us doing
    that with these forces today, and it is signaling. It is
    visible, right. We can directly show our, it is the best way we
    have to directly show our resolve as a nation by what we do
    with this piece of the triad.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
        Let's talk about China a little bit. You said earlier today
    that what it is going to take to deter China is going to start
    to be additive to what we have to do with Russia. Can you just
    elaborate a little bit on what you mean by additive.
        Admiral Richard. So, fundamentally, I am required to deter
    all nations that I am assigned, all the time, right. I don't
    get to do it one at a time. I have an obligation, such that we
    are able to meet all the objectives simultaneously with
    everybody that is involved.
        Until recently, it was pretty reasonable to assume that
    with the margins, right, for uncertainty that are built into
    our strategic forces, it would be reasonable to assume you had
    sufficient residual capability to deter any other lesser-
    included case. That is about to no longer be true, and that is
    what I am talking about. I can give you some specific numbers
    in closed session, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
        Tell me this, what do you think that China's progress from
    a nuclear dyad to triad says about their view of a no-first-use
    policy?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, that, along with everything else
    in my mind, is fundamentally inconsistent with a no-first-use
    policy and the implied minimum-deterrent strategy.
        But maybe more importantly than independent of what their
    intent is, it certainly gives them the capability, if they
    choose to, to any number of possible employment strategies. So,
    even if that was the basis of the decision, it still allows a
    very large range of possible employment strategies, independent
    of why they got it to begin with.
        Senator Hawley. Very good.
        Admiral, tell me, many of those who advocate for shrinking
    or eliminating our ICBM force are also strong proponents of
    international arms control, and I am just wondering from a
    Defense point of view, is it your view that cutting our ICBM
    force would help or hurt our negotiating position in future
    arms-control negotiations with Russia or China.
        Admiral Richard. Senator, the way I approach that,
    fundamentally, that negotiation is the responsibility of the
    Department of State, with input from OSD policy, and I would
    defer to them on what the best negotiating strategy is.
        I just have to look at what the actual capabilities are now
    and what I have to have to deter that. So, my strong advice is
    arms control would be excellent. Additional arms control would
    reduce the threat. Get the arms control in place first before
    we then decide to take reductions in our capability.
        Senator Hawley. Let me ask you one final question and here
    in my remaining seconds about the danger of a simultaneous
    conflict. In your testimony, you wrote that prudence dictates
    military planners consider and account for the complex threat
    environment enabled by the strategic cooperation of Russia and
    China.
        Tell me how you are thinking about the threat of
    simultaneous conflicts in both, Europe and Asia, and how that
    informs your thinking of what we are going to need to maintain
    strategic deterrence in the coming years.
        Admiral Richard. Deterring opportunistic aggression going
    into the future will be a challenge that we haven't faced on
    this scale in a long time. So, if we are engaged in one
    theater, other folks sensing opportunity, and it is not only
    for their own individual aims. We also have to think through
    what they might do in cooperation with each other, because
    while they both have different national aims, both of them are
    inconsistent with us and it is to both of their advantage for
    us to potentially give constrain in a particular area.
        So, it is not only opportunistic; it is in combination.
    This three-party world that we are in is something we have
    never faced before, and we have a lot of work to continue to do
    to think our way through that.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much for that and your
    testimony.
        I will have some questions for you, General, for the
    record, and thank you for being here and thank you for your
    service.
        Thank you, Admiral.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Blackburn, via Webex.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for the time today to talk a little bit.
        General Dickinson, I want to come to you. SPACECOM, the
    Southeast is home to three of our Nation's top-12 university
    programs for aerospace engineering. So, we are very excited and
    think it is appropriately placed, having SPACECOM there in
    Huntsville. We look forward to hosting this in the future and
    hearing more about SPACECOM. I appreciate some of the vastness
    of your area of operations, and it really is, quite literally,
    limitless. I see a range of reach in space and look forward to
    that.
        So, let me ask you this, is there a role for SPACECOM in
    traditional Departments of Commerce and Transportation-like
    functions, such as the shaping of the domestic ecosystem of
    space activity, space traffic management, launch licensing, and
    other space activities, because we know that, certainly, the
    Chinese are already working on this.
        General Dickinson. Senator, I think what you just described
    is appropriate. I think as we look at the rapid
    commercialization of space, just from the United States'
    perspective, in terms of numbers of capabilities and satellites
    going into orbit, that the actual administrative piece to that,
    which is the licensing and those types of functions, absolutely
    are part of the whole-of-government type of activity.
        For me at U.S. Space Command, my job is to make sure that I
    provide that secure environment through my ability to
    understand what is going on in the space domain in terms of
    what our competitors, potential adversaries are doing there, in
    terms of characterization of that, and understanding what their
    intentions might be.
        Senator Blackburn. Where are you in working with the
    Department of State and our partners and our allies to create
    norms of behavior in space, to include beyond near-Earth orbit?
        General Dickinson. Senator, I work very closely with OSD
    policy and the Department of Defense on helping to characterize
    maybe what we would think would be norms of behavior, but the
    work there is actually with the Department of State and how
    they are characterizing that.
        My job in U.S. Space Command is to make sure that I provide
    them that type of information that would show them or
    illustrate to them what those activities or behaves would be on
    orbit, in terms of our adversaries and competitors.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Now, if there were to be a
    conflict that began in or either transitioned to space, how do
    you interpret your current responsibilities to defend U.S.
    commercial assets?
        General Dickinson. So, my ``protect and defend''
    responsibilities in the space domain are one of my fundamental
    mission sets for this command and I do that in a number of
    ways. One is understanding the environment. Two, is
    communicating that to, in this case, a commercial entity so
    that they are aware of that, and we do that. We are integrated
    very well with some of our commercial partners out at
    Vandenberg Air Force Base in one of my subordinate commands,
    and so we work every day to do that. But we would do that in a
    timely manner so that we are able to make them aware of
    activities.
        Senator Blackburn. So, you believe these responsibilities
    are appropriate in scope and scale?
        General Dickinson. So, Senator, I would take that in terms
    of my responsibilities and direction from the National Command
    Authority, on which assets, in particular, to protect, in that
    case, and in terms of the resources, I have resources today
    that are growing in capacity and capability over the next few
    years to help me.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay, and then, when it comes to
    development and enhancement of our space-based sensor layer,
    what would you say is the top threat that we should be hedging
    against and what should be our priority investment to counter
    that threat?
        General Dickinson. So, the pacing threat, the pacing
    challenge for, in the space domain is like it is in the other
    domains, which is China. They are growing capability and
    capacity as we have seen over the last several years. If you
    look at just the gross number of satellites that the Chinese
    have today, based on what they had just, you know, 10 years
    ago, they have gone from, back in 2010, they had about 70
    satellites on orbit; today, they have well over 400.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        General Dickinson. We know that is growing in capability
    and capacity to probably be over a thousand by year 2030. So,
    they are the pacing threat for us in the space domain, just as
    they are in other domains.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. I have a couple questions for
    Admiral Richard. I will submit those as a QFR.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blackburn, and
    now let me recognize and salute the patience of Senator
    Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        I know they are getting tired. Look, they look hungry and
    they probably need to go to the restroom, probably, so I won't
    be that long.
        First of all, thank you for your service. I can't imagine
    starting a new team from scratch. I can't imagine that. I never
    had to do it in football, and I just had 120 players, and,
    General, you have got your hands full, and thank you for your
    service, and an important service.
        Admiral, I like your forcefulness in terms of, hey, we need
    to modernize at the end of the day. You have had a team for a
    long time, or we have had a team that is getting old and we
    need new players and we need new equipment.
        I like what our secretary says. We can afford survival, and
    he is exactly right. All the money we are spending, we can
    afford it.
        You know, growing up, we were all in a space race, General,
    and we are in a new one now. It is a competition that we have
    to win. The Chinese have weaponized space, sadly.
        Many in our country don't understand that American life
    depends on our secure and reliable access to space, whether it
    is the GPS on our phones or watching a football game.
        Admiral Richard, you are a native of the great state and,
    General Dickinson, I know you worked at Huntsville as Army
    Missile Command, and you both understand firsthand that
    Alabamians stand firmly behind our men and women in uniform.
    Alabama's industry stands behind our military.
        Alabama and Redstone Arsenal are ready for Space Command,
    but many people in this room probably don't understand
    Redstone. Redstone has been involved with space operations for
    70 years. NASA's only facility on a military base is the
    Marshall Space Flight Center. The largest consumer of space
    products is the U.S. Army and the Army Missile Command and has
    been at Redstone Arsenal since it was established in 1962.
        Space technology won't just be developed by the Government
    to outpace China and Russia, which is going to be a challenge.
    We need private industry. The area around Redstone boasts 800
    suppliers and contractors building the very latest in space
    technology.
        I was at Redstone 3 weeks ago and Redstone has the land for
    Space Command to grow as your mission expands. It has dedicated
    64 acres behind the fence as Space Command and the base has
    temporary spaces for you right now if needed.
        So, General, I am looking forward to you calling the Great
    State of Alabama your home, and, Admiral, you are welcome to
    come any time.
        General Dickinson, thank you for your productive call last
    week. My colleague asked how much of a civilian workforce we
    might move to Huntsville. I would like to follow-up on that
    question. First, how much do your civilian workforce have you
    hired and how many people do you intend to hire in the future?
        General Dickinson. Senator, my approved manning document is
    about 60 percent civilian. To date, we have hired probably
    about, not quite a third of that into the command. The command,
    right now, is about a third of what our in strength will be.
    So, we are a little over 600. Some of that is contractor. Some
    of that is civilian, and some of that is military.
        So, as we look to the future, you know, we are absolutely
    looking at incentives that we can provide to our civilian
    workforce. They are absolutely the bedrock of the command today
    and into the future, and so, we will look at how we can try to
    incentivize our civilian workforce in terms of making the move
    to Alabama.
        But I can't give you, like I said earlier, I can't give you
    a prediction on what that percentage will be. There are a lot
    of factors that go into it. What we can do, though, is try to
    incentivize them through motivation, in terms of wanting to
    work with the command, and some other things that we will
    consider, as well.
        Senator Tuberville. Well, we are proud that the Secretary
    of Air Force selected Alabama as the home for Space Command.
        How do you see the National Guard implementing into that,
    at all? Do you, at all, in the future in Space Command and
    Space Force?
        General Dickinson. Senator, as we speak now, the Reserve
    component is a very important part of the U.S. Space Command.
    As a matter of fact, when we stood up or we established about
    20 months ago, one of our biggest elements or components within
    the command was the Reserve component.
        It was the Reserves and the National Guard. That is a very
    important part of the command. They bring a great deal of
    expertise and knowledge to the command.
        I see that in the future, too. We will always, as part of
    Space Command, have the Reserve component as an element within
    the command.
        Senator Tuberville. Admiral Richard, Russia and China are
    prioritizing investments to compete and win across the range of
    strategic capabilities, especially with regard to nuclear and
    space capabilities.
        Do you believe that we are behind the curve?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, I have what I need to do to
    deter, to do what the President has asked me to do, but I need
    it modernized, right. There is no remaining margin.
        We cannot extend or delay any of the modernization programs
    for me to continue to say that in the future.
        Senator Tuberville. Do we have the technology we need?
        Admiral Richard. Senator, yes, right now.
        The one area that we are working the hardest on to make
    sure we are fully taking advantage of new technologies is in
    the nuclear command and control system. We have got the next 5
    years locked in pretty tight.
        Trying to make sure that we take full advantage of
    technological development both, from the Commercial Sector and
    the Government Sector, will be keys to improving that in future
    iterations.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.
        We will now close the open session, adjourn, as quickly as
    possible to SVC-217 for the classified section.
        I have a conflict with the Appropriations Committee. If the
    ranking member arrives first, he will begin the initiation of
    the questions.
        With nothing [inaudible] or no other business before the
    Committee in the open session, I adjourn the hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

              Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
                         nuclear-tipped cruise missiles
        1. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, prior to the previous
    President reversing course, two Democratic and two Republican
    administrations had agreed that we no longer needed to deploy nuclear
    armed cruise missiles on conventional Navy ships. Why is a new nuclear
    sea launched cruise missile needed now, particular in times of fiscal
    austerity?
        Admiral Richard. The military requirement is driven by the
    increasing threat; i.e., the dramatic deterioration of the strategic
    environment.
        Specifically:
          Russia has recapitalized roughly 80 per cent of its
    strategic nuclear forces, has as many as 2000 nuclear weapons not under
    arms control agreements, and is capable of producing hundreds of
    warheads per year. Further, Russian strategy, doctrine, and
    capabilities call for the limited use of nuclear weapons to coerce
    NATO, and to defeat NATO conventional forces through wider use of
    nuclear weapons if coercion fails.
          China continues heavy investment in nuclear capabilities;
    has an intercontinental ballistic missile / submarine launched
    ballistic missile (ICBM / SLBM) dyad which will soon become a triad and
    is ahead of pace to more than double its nuclear stockpile by end of
    the decade. China's actions in the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
    and ballistic / hypersonic missile development significantly add to the
    threat--and they are likewise unconstrained by treaties or agreements.
        Deploying the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) is
    intended to deny potential adversaries any mistaken confidence limited
    nuclear employment would provide an advantage over the U.S. and its
    Allies.
        SLCM-N will bring a needed non-strategic regional presence and an
    assured response capability. It does not require host nation support
    and provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and
    survivability. It will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence and
    assurance while expanding the range of credible U.S. options.
        Reintroduction of the SLCM-N (and other supplements) is intended to
    strengthen deterrence by convincing adversaries the U.S. has credible
    and effective options at any level of conflict, and they cannot coerce
    the U.S., our Allies and partners through the use of nuclear weapons.

        2. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, how will deploying these
    weapons on conventional navy vessels like attack submarines change
    their mission?
        Admiral Richard. Deploying such weapons on conventional Navy
    vessels would not fundamentally change their mission but they would
    augment their capabilities and provide additional options for the
    President.
        The nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) is intended
    to deny potential adversaries any mistaken confidence limited nuclear
    employment would provide an advantage over the U.S., its Allies and
    partners.
        SLCM-N will bring a needed non-strategic regional presence and an
    assured response capability. It does not require host nation support
    and provides additional diversity in platforms, range, and
    survivability. The SLCM-N complements the low-yield submarine launched
    ballistic missile (SLBM) to provide assurance to our Allies through
    tailored response options in vast operating areas where forward basing
    may not be possible. It will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence
    and assurance while expanding the range of credible U.S. options.
        Reintroduction of the SLCM-N (and other supplements) is intended to
    strengthen deterrence by convincing adversaries the U.S. has credible
    and effective options at any level of conflict, and they cannot coerce
    the U.S., our Allies and partners through the use of nuclear weapons.
                               the nuclear triad
        3. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, Air Force Chief of Staff
    General C.Q. Brown, USAF, recently stated ``the number [of nuclear
    weapons] might adjust and that may be a part of a dialogue . . .
    there'll be a fork in the road at some point.'' Do you agree with his
    comments?
        Admiral Richard. General Brown was referring to a hypothetical
    dialogue that may occur in the future regarding the appropriate triad
    force structure, so I would agree and expect many such conversations as
    we move forward with modernization. General Brown also stated, ``We
    can't stop our work on GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent].'' In a
    recent visit to Minot Air Force Base, General Brown said ``By updating
    the missile portion of the nuclear triad, we ensure a credible, capable
    and safe nuclear deterrent that provides our Nation and our Allies an
    umbrella of deterrence while discouraging others from use of nuclear
    weapons . . . Modernization of the ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile] program is both strategic and cost-effective.'' I fully agree
    with these statements.

        4. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, if you agree with General
    Brown's recent statements, what kinds of options are you considering in
    terms of adjusting our nuclear arsenal?
        Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM will fully support ongoing strategic
    and nuclear policy reviews, with a goal of assessing the role of
    nuclear weapons in our defense strategy while adjusting to the
    operational implications of policy choices, as well as significant
    changes to the threat environment.
        As such, it is premature to speculate on any potential adjustments
    to our nuclear arsenal. Any adjustments to our force structure or
    stockpile size should be informed by a comprehensive strategic review,
    to evaluate the global threats, followed by a policy and strategy
    determination.
                        ground-based strategic deterrent
        5. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, the Air Force recently
    awarded a $13.3 billion contract to develop the Ground Based Strategic
    Deterrent to replace the existing Minuteman III intercontinental
    ballistic missiles (ICBM). Some critics have questioned whether ICBMs
    are necessary for nuclear deterrence or whether the Minuteman III could
    be extended for decades. Investing in other programs besides the
    ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD) could save $260 billion dollars
    and create jobs. In a time of fiscal constraint, why should we
    modernize a weapon system that critics call redundant?
        Admiral Richard. The three legs of the strategic triad--ICBMs,
    ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and heavy bombers--are
    complementary, not redundant. Each leg has unique attributes intended
    to complicate adversary planning while enhancing achievement of U.S.
    strategic deterrence and extended assurance objectives. The flexibility
    and responsiveness attributes provided by the ICBM leg are unmatched by
    the SSBN or bomber legs, and eliminating ICBMs would allow an adversary
    to concentrate resources on defeating the remaining two legs. For
    example, without ICBMs China becomes a strategic nuclear peer.
        The Air Force's decision point to either continue GBSD or pivot to
    a Minuteman III life extension program passed a number of years ago,
    when the DOD approved the Milestone-A (approves program entry into the
    Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction [TMRR] phase, approval of the
    program acquisition strategy, and release of the final Request for
    Proposal [RFP]) and initiated the GBSD development phase. GBSD is
    timely, cost effective, and ensures credibility of the ground leg of
    the U.S. strategic deterrent for decades into the future.

        6. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Richard, in your opinion, if we had
    to continue to rely on the Minuteman III, how much longer could we rely
    on that system?
        Admiral Richard. We cannot rely on Minuteman III (MM III) past its
    currently planned retirement date. Our MM III force is 40 years beyond
    its designed life expectancy; relies on 20-50 year old technology;
    requires reverse engineering for costly, inflexible, sustainment
    solutions; and faces diminishing manufacturing sources, materiel
    shortages, and skilled labor force losses. A MM III life extension
    program would be prohibitively difficult, expensive, is already late to
    need, and will not address future threats.
        Previous decisions to delay needed modernization have resulted in
    aging components, asset attrition, and declining infrastructure. The
    Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is a comprehensive weapon
    system replacement for MM III and must begin deploying no later than
    2028 to prevent negative impacts to strategic deterrence. There is no
    margin to delay the GBSD deployment.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                     coordination with indo-pacific command
        7. Senator Hirono. General Dickinson, in your opening statement,
    you noted that Beijing actively seeks space superiority and is
    developing capabilities that could hold U.S. space assets at risk. How
    are you working with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to deter
    China from attacking our space systems?
        General Dickinson. USSPACECOM is actively working with USINDOPACOM,
    other Combatant Commands, and the Intelligence Community to improve our
    posture, strengthen our alliances, and enhance emerging partnerships
    across the Indo-Pacific to deter China.
        Posture/Plans: Since USSPACECOM stood-up, we've been aggressive in
    our efforts to integrate with the other Combatant Commands, especially
    USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM. We have Integrated Planning Elements
    supporting each of the 10 other Combatant Commands. These are members
    of my staff that are onsite at the other Combatant Commands to
    integrate space into planning and operations, including Camp Smith in
    Hawaii. Thanks to the collaborative efforts of our Integrated Planning
    Elements, USSPACECOM equities are embedded in the other Combatant
    Commands' planning processes, just as theirs have been incorporated
    into ours. The understanding that space capabilities are both necessary
    to enable the Joint fight and are also vulnerable greatly increases
    emphasis on space planning among the Combatant Commands for competition
    and conflict. These planning efforts include Posture Plans, which
    address the necessary forces, footprints, and agreements for the
    Combatant Commands to meet their Unified Command Plan (UCP)
    responsibilities and our Contingency Plans to which we will transition
    if conflict arises.
        Strengthening Alliances: USSPACECOM is leveraging our security
    cooperation plans to focus collaboration with key allies on space
    domain awareness, force support, contingency operations, and strategic
    messaging. We are capitalizing on opportunities to increase the
    frequency of combined operations, exercises, and training with
    Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand, including
    leveraging Global Sentinel, Global Thunder, and Global Lightning to
    increase resilience and interoperability. We are contributing to
    collective security in the Pacific by supporting Exercise Pacific Fury,
    Pacific Sentry, Talisman Saber, Northern Edge, and Keen Edge with space
    integration experts.
        Enhancing Emerging Partnerships: USSPACECOM is working with
    USINDOPACOM to identify opportunities for enhancing our space
    relationships with non-traditional space partners in the region who are
    beginning to show interest in space.
             columbia-class ballistic missile submarine procurement
        8. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, construction of the new line of
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines started last fall, with the
    first boat scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in 2027 and then go on
    its first deterrence patrol in 2031 to begin replacing the Ohio-class
    submarines. In your discussions with the Navy, has the COVID pandemic
    negatively affected the procurement timeline for the Columbia-class
    subs?
        Admiral Richard. Defer to the Navy regarding the ballistic missile
    submarine (SSBN) acquisition schedule.
        The Columbia-class delivery timeline remains on time despite the
    challenges posed by COVID-19. I applaud continued and focused support
    essential to build the workforce required to execute construction of
    the Columbia program.

        9. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, how confident are you in the
    procurement timelines I mentioned?
        Admiral Richard. Defer to the Navy regarding the ballistic missile
    submarine (SSBN) acquisition schedule.
        There is no margin in the Columbia-class delivery schedule and any
    delay will result in an operational capability gap. The Navy continues
    to make every effort to ensure on time delivery and the program must
    remain fully funded to replace our aging Ohio-class SSBNs.

        10. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, why is it important to have a
    minimum of 12 Columbia-class submarines in the Fleet?
        Admiral Richard. Section 242 of the Fiscal Year 2012 National
    Defense Authorization Act directed DOD to submit a report on the
    Columbia-class program that included, among other things, an assessment
    of various combinations of submarines and number of missile launch
    tubes per submarine.
        The assessment concluded at least 12 Columbia-class submarines with
    16 missile tubes each provided the best balance of performance,
    flexibility and cost while supporting the Nation's strategic deterrence
    mission and objectives. This is the absolute minimum capability needed
    to allow USSTRATCOM to meet our at-sea requirement during the most
    limiting maintenance intensive times throughout its service life.
        It is important to note the assessment was completed during a
    period of reduced tension. Given today's challenges and anticipated
    future threats, an assessment completed today would likely recommend
    additional hulls, missiles tubes, or a combination of both.
                    hawaii air national guard space squadron
        11. Senator Hirono. General Dickinson, last year, it was announced
    that the Hawaii Air National Guard had been selected to have one of
    four national offensive space control squadrons. I understand that the
    Hawaii Air National Guard is in the process of establishing the 293rd
    Space Control Squad based at the Pacific Missile Range Facility on
    Kauai. What role would members of the National Guard play in U.S. Space
    Command's (SPACECOM) operations?
        General Dickinson. (Dir, Reserve Forces and Manpower, Col Lisa
    Johnson)
        Air National Guard (ANG) Space Control Squadrons have been
    providing Space Electronic Warfare in support of Combatant Command
    requirements since 2018. There are currently three Offensive Space
    Control units in the California, Colorado, and Florida ANGs
    respectively. Once all basing actions are completed and the Secretary
    of the Air Force (SecAF) provides the record of decision, the ANG will
    stand up a fourth Offensive Space Control Squadron along with the first
    Defensive Space Control Squadron in the ANG. Specific to the proposed
    Space Control unit in Hawaii, the Environmental Assessment (EA) will be
    completed on 5 Aug 2021 with a SecAF Record of Decision anticipated
    before the end of CY21, Initial Operation Capability (IOC) is projected
    for fiscal year 2023. United States Space Command commands and controls
    these forces based on theater and global operational requirements.
                    iran joint comprehensive plan of action
        12. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, before the Trump
    Administration decided to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
    (JCPOA) agreement, head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
    the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) testified that the JCPOA
    extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile
    material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about 1 year. This
    is why it's crucial to be a part of an agreement with Iran on the issue
    of nuclear weapons. The Biden Administration is seeking to rejoin the
    JCPOA with the condition that Iran returns to compliance under the
    agreement. What are your thoughts on negotiating a return to the JCPOA?
        Admiral Richard. Defer to the State Department regarding
    negotiations of international agreements.

        13. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, would rejoining the JCPOA be a
    good step toward containing Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities?
        Admiral Richard. I support any agreement that enhances the security
    of this nation. Defer to the State Department and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense regarding whether rejoining JCPOA would enhance
    the security of the U.S., its Allies and partners.
                                  north korea
        14. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, in your opening statement you
    say that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is committed to supporting
    the efforts of Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department to
    work with Indo-Pacific partners to reduce military tensions and support
    the achievement of the fully verified denuclearization of North Korea.
    What do you think the next steps are to achieve full denuclearization
    of North Korea?
        Admiral Richard. As diplomacy is the Nation's tool of first resort,
    defer to the State Department in this matter.

        15. Senator Hirono. Admiral Richard, what role will STRATCOM play
    in achieving the goal of full denuclearization of North Korea?
        Admiral Richard. USSTRATCOM supports DOD and State Department
    efforts to coordinate with regional partners, reduce military tensions,
    and engage diplomatic efforts towards achieving the complete
    denuclearization of North Korea.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                            cyber mission and space
        16. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, how are you utilizing
    technologies like machine learning and artificial intelligence to
    maintain our digital superiority and stay ahead of our adversaries?
        General Dickinson. Digital superiority is one of my key tasks, and
    we are introducing new technologies and linking current ones to
    increase our Space Domain Awareness and Command and Control as my top
    two priorities. As an example, under my Global Sensor Manager (GSM)
    mission, directed in the Unified Campaign Plan (UCP), I must ingest the
    sensor data, make the data available and transparent through transport,
    and curate the data before applying algorithmic machine learning models
    and artificially intelligent applications to aid the decision making
    process. The data value chain is foundational to our ability to make
    decisions concerning objects in space. As noted in the National
    Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) final report,
    there are high-data volumes associated with the space domain that make
    it particularly well-suited for prioritized integration of AI-enabled
    applications. In support of the DOD C3I Modernization Strategy,
    USSPACECOM works closely with the DOD CIO, U.S. Space Force (USSF), and
    the Space Development Agency and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to
    deliver SATCOM governance in support of tightly integrated, hybrid
    military and commercial, Enterprise SATCOM Architecture.
          science, technology, engineering, and math outreach programs
        17. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, the Junior Reserve Officer
    Training Corps (JROTC) STEM [science, technology, engineering, and
    math] program is funded through the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
    Navy. Is this a program that could help SPACECOM carry out its mission?
        General Dickinson. Any program that encourages youth participation
    in STEM education and follow-on career opportunities has the potential
    to benefit USSPACECOM. The conversion of some Air Force JROTC
    detachments to Space Force may be particularly helpful. The JROTC
    program promotes patriotism, citizenship, and appreciation for the work
    of the U.S. Armed Forces, yet there is no direct guarantee of a career
    in the DOD. However, programs which encourage STEM activities have the
    potential to enhance the talent base from which the Services recruit,
    which ultimately benefits all selective-crewed organizations such as
    the Combatant Commands. Moreover, these efforts enrich the talent base
    from which USSPACECOM can recruit for federal civilian employment
    opportunities following college education.

        18. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, what are SPACECOM's other
    STEM outreach programs, and how do you plan to grow them to keep up
    with the workforce of the future?
        General Dickinson. USSPACECOM has initiated collaboration with
    academic institutions in order to encourage STEM careers. In the very
    first year of our standup I directed the staff to assess the optimum
    ways to do this. Some of these avenues include leveraging students and
    graduates in the intern programs we are beginning this summer to
    increase our diversity and bring cutting edge thinking into the
    command. We intend to grow the opportunities for USSPACECOM internships
    in STEM areas where we perceive interest.
                             stimulating innovation
        19. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, what is your assessment of
    the report on the ``State of the Space Industrial Base 2020'' which
    concluded (among other things) that ``The very long schedules of many
    DOD space programs limit the opportunities for short design-build-test
    projects that stimulate interest and innovation within the U.S.
    workforce.''?
        General Dickinson. In the past, the capability to build, test, and
    iterate quickly in space eluded the DOD as the threat did not demand a
    better approach for providing space capabilities. Our adversaries
    exploited this shortcoming and rapidly developed space and counter-
    space capabilities that threaten our space superiority.
        Given this new reality, we must regain our advantage through
    building capability more rapidly at lower cost. In addition, we must
    leverage the opportunity to partner with commercial space companies and
    with our Allies and partners in these efforts.
        I support any effort that enables the Department and the Nation to
    develop and field space capabilities more rapidly.

        20. Senator Rosen. General Dickinson, how is the acquisition arm of
    Space Command working to decrease the timelines for DOD space programs
    and increase the rate of space experiments and prototypes for small
    launch?
        General Dickinson. In general, CCMDs do not do acquisitions, but
    rely on the services, especially the USSF as the primary provider of
    space capabilities for our mission needs. As such, while we have
    fostered close working relationships with all of the Services, we are
    especially linked with the USSF as well as Interagency space capability
    development partners. We interact with these stakeholders at many
    levels across multiple requirements, integration, and acquisition
    oversight and coordination councils.
        USSPACECOM, USSF and the larger Space Community, are working to
    decrease the timelines for DOD space programs through multiple facets.
    For USSPACECOM, our primary acquisition support responsibility is
    producing accurate and clear combatant command operational requirements
    and focus areas based on component operations, lessons learned from
    exercises and gaming, and a sound analytical foundation. This enables
    the space enterprise to build and deliver exactly what we need, when we
    need it.
        Additionally, USSPACECOM is aggressively engaging with industry as
    the innovation, speed, and competitive edge resident in the US
    commercial market must be woven into the fabric of our operational
    warfighting architectures and postures. We are engaging our Science,
    Technology, and Advanced Concepts with the space community and
    acquisition authorities to accelerate technology maturation in proofs
    of concept, developmental and operational prototyping, and
    experimentation.
        Finally, in coordination with the Space Development Agency,
    USSPACECOM is levying space warfighter requirements in support of their
    payload technology capabilities for future tranche generations. These
    opportunities, starting in 2024, will enable capability insertion
    opportunities required by the warfighter, as well as support quick
    reaction technology upgrades, resulting in decreased timelines for DOD
    space programs, space experiments, and assessing prototypes.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                intercontinental ballistic missile modernization
        21. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, one of the criticisms
    surrounding ballistic missiles is that, unlike bombers, they're not
    recallable should the president reconsider his or her order after
    launch. However, several press reports over the years have documented
    occasions where range safety personnel remotely destroyed a Minuteman
    III ICBM when anomalies were discovered during test flights. Could you
    explain any technical, operational, or security reasons why such a
    self-destruct mechanism couldn't or shouldn't be installed on deployed
    missiles?
        Admiral Richard. There is no military value to installing a self-
    destruct mechanism on operationally deployed ICBMs. The only reason
    such equipment is installed on test vehicles is to ensure safety of
    personnel and the general public. A self-destruct mechanism introduces
    a potential vulnerability that could impact ICBM force effectiveness
    and reliability.
        Our ICBM force is controlled through secure, reliable, positive
    control measures, which ensures only the President, in deliberate
    consultation with senior advisors, can authorize the use of nuclear
    weapons. We have a strategic triad so the President is never in a
    position where he / she must make a hasty decision to launch ICBMs or
    risk losing the capability to respond. The ICBM force will not launch
    until the President deliberately issues orders.

        22. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, during a recent House Armed
    Services Committee hearing, it came to light that certain offices
    within the Department of Defense may be advocating for a plan that
    would cut the number of operational Minuteman III intercontinental
    ballistic missiles from 400 to 200, develop some means of further
    extending the life of this system, and cancelling the planned
    replacement program, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent. Could you
    outline the operational challenges your successors would face in
    deterring two nuclear peer adversaries with a 60+ year old ICBM force
    that will be half the size it is today?
        Admiral Richard. Our Cold War-era systems were developed and built
    to counter a single, peer adversary (Soviet Union). The most compelling
    argument against reducing our ICBM force structure is we must now deter
    two peer adversaries (Russia and China) and several regional
    adversaries (North Korea and Iran). All pose unique threats and
    challenges; and must be deterred differently. If we reduce ICBM force
    structure in the face of growing adversary threats, USSTRATCOM cannot
    meet strategic guidance nor guarantee a credible nuclear deterrent.
        Our legacy delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure are all
    well past their intended operational life and are not designed for, nor
    capable of keeping pace with evolving threats. I do not support any
    Minuteman III (MM III) force structure reductions (e.g. cannibalizing
    assets to keep MM III on alert) or pivoting from the Ground-Based
    Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program to a life extension effort. While
    ``cannibalizing'' the MM III force may defer the asset attrition
    problem, it does not halt component aging or address identified
    capability gaps. In 2014, the DOD and USAF considered a MM III life
    extension program and determined GBSD modernization is the most cost-
    effective way to maintain the ICBM force. Switching to a MM III life
    extension now is late-to-need, will result in a capability gap, and
    adds operational risk to USSTRATCOM's deterrent mission.
                              strategic deterrence
        23. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, those who favor reducing the
    size of our nuclear forces often argue that non-nuclear capabilities
    can be substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our ability
    to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries, and assure allies.
    For example, some groups argue that conventional or cyber weapons can
    be substituted for nuclear weapons. Do you think other capabilities can
    be as effective as nuclear weapons in deterring the highest levels of
    aggression to the extent that one can be directly substituted for the
    other?
        Admiral Richard. While new non-nuclear capabilities offer the
    opportunity for risk reduction and de-escalation during a crisis, there
    is little evidence to suggest a nuclear state would be deterred by
    anything other than nuclear weapons. However, new capability
    development is one of the few ways to reduce reliance on nuclear
    weapons, and hypersonic weapons are the best near-term capability to
    achieve this. The range, promptness, and survivability of hypersonic
    weapons could provide some effects that today require nuclear weapons.

        24. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, in response to a question from
    Senator Tom Cotton, you stated that reducing the number of
    intercontinental ballistic missiles or removing that leg of the triad
    would ``solve a critical problem for China''. Can you elaborate how
    that would be the case?
        Admiral Richard. The triad must be considered as a whole because it
    functions as a whole, with each leg essential to overall effectiveness.
    The triad's overlapping attributes ensure the enduring survivability of
    our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold a
    diverse range of adversary targets at risk throughout the spectrum of
    crisis or conflict.
        The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force is the most
    responsive leg of the triad and ICBM geographic dispersion presents an
    intractable targeting problem, complicating China's (and Russia's)
    strategies. These missiles are capable of holding a wide range of
    targets, to include emergent and time sensitive targets, at risk. They
    are survivable to all but a massive nuclear exchange and possess the
    highest day-to-day readiness.
        Reducing the ICBM force by half would be a unilateral reduction in
    the face of a deteriorating security environment along with the
    detrimental messaging to our Allies and adversaries, and would
    facilitate China's rise as a strategic peer. China's currently
    intractable targeting problem would be significantly eased and they
    would be closer to possessing a credible counter-force strategy (i.e.,
    the ability to directly attack our nuclear forces) for the first time
    in their history.
        For the case without any ICBMs, in addition to the above, the
    potential for a strategic attack on our homeland further increases. A
    conventional attack on our few (5) submarine and bomber bases would
    significantly degrade the Nation's remaining deterrent.

        25. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, how would going below 400 to
    200, or to even zero, be solving a ``big problem'' that China currently
    has?
        Admiral Richard. The triad must be considered as a whole because it
    functions as a whole, with each leg essential to overall effectiveness.
    The Triad's overlapping attributes ensure the enduring survivability of
    our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold a
    diverse range of adversary targets at risk throughout the spectrum of
    crisis or conflict.
        The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force is the most
    responsive leg of the triad and ICBM geographic dispersion presents an
    intractable targeting problem, complicating China's (and Russia's)
    strategies. These missiles are capable of holding a wide range of
    targets, to include emergent and time sensitive targets, at risk. They
    are survivable to all but a massive nuclear exchange and possess the
    highest day-to-day readiness.
        Reducing the ICBM force by half would be a unilateral reduction in
    the face of a deteriorating security environment along with the
    detrimental messaging to our Allies and adversaries, and would
    facilitate China's rise as a strategic peer. China's currently
    intractable targeting problem would be significantly eased and they
    would be closer to possessing a credible counter-force strategy (i.e.,
    the ability to directly attack our nuclear forces) for the first time
    in their history.
        For the case without any ICBMs, in addition to the above, the
    potential for a strategic attack on our homeland further increases. A
    conventional attack on our few (5) submarine and bomber bases would
    significantly degrade the Nation's remaining deterrent.

        26. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, during your testimony, you
    noted that due to Russia's and China's aggressive nuclear modernization
    activities, the United States, ``for the first time in our history . .
    . is facing two nuclear-capable strategic peer adversaries at the same
    time, both of whom have to be deterred differently.'' You also stated
    that, ``China . . . cannot be considered a lesser included case in this
    context.'' Could you elaborate on what you mean by these statements?
        Admiral Richard. Russia and China are pursuing extensive military
    modernization goals and present different deterrence challenges:
          Russia is constrained by the New Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty (New START, or NST), but maintains a significant stockpile of
    non-accountable weapons. China is not party to NST and is expected to
    at least double its nuclear stockpile in the next decade.
          Russia has attacked neighboring states, annexed conquered
    territory, interfered in foreign elections, and worked to undermine
    European institutions.
          China cannot be considered a lesser included case as it
    is on a trajectory to be a strategic peer with the United States and
    Russia. Specifically, China is expanding and diversifying its nuclear
    arsenal by rapidly increasing the numbers of land-, sea- and air-based
    delivery systems, adding capabilities to include multiple warheads,
    pursuing a launch-on-warning posture, and developing methods to defeat
    missile defense systems. China continues to invest significant
    resources in hypersonic systems and is expanding its space and counter-
    space capabilities.
        Deterrence is influencing an adversary's decision-making such that
    a given adversary is induced to choose restraint over action, i.e., a
    strategic attack. China and Russia have unique goals, aspirations,
    interests, and objectives as well as distinct histories, cultures,
    perceptions and values. Our deterrence strategies must be tailored to
    each. Neither country can be deterred individually in a vacuum, given
    the multi-polar nature of today's world. Actions taken to deter Russia
    will have a measurable impact on China, and vice versa--and this must
    be taken into account. The threat posed by China is now additive to the
    threat posed by Russia. Previously, we were able to address both with a
    force sized for Russia.

        27. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, in your best military advice,
    could you outline what the implications of this multipolar nuclear
    balance could have for the capabilities you and your successors will
    need to meet deterrence requirements?
        Admiral Richard. A multipolar nuclear environment requires the
    application of tailored and flexible strategies to effectively deter
    adversaries under various threats and scenarios in all domains during
    peacetime, crisis, and across the spectrum of conflict. This requires a
    fully modernized nuclear force and supporting infrastructure that is
    credible, flexible, adaptable, and resilient.
        Our strategic nuclear deterrent underwrites U.S. military
    operations around the world, is the foundation and backstop of our
    national defense, and assures Allies and partners. As such, the Nation
    must remain committed to modernizing and recapitalizing our strategic
    forces and supporting infrastructure--and fully resource every program
    each year. Nothing else works as planned or envisioned without a safe,
    secure, effective, and credible nuclear deterrent.
                         china's nuclear modernization
        28. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, as part of during a recent
    House Armed Services Committee hearing, a DOD official submitted
    written testimony that stated that Chinese nuclear modernization is
    accelerating `` . . . in response to perceived threats, including
    potentially first-strike capability from the United States.'' Are you
    aware of any intelligence that would support such a conclusion?
        Admiral Richard. No. U.S. nuclear capabilities are essentially
    unchanged since the end of the Cold War, except for getting smaller in
    size and older. We assess the PRC strategy includes advancing a
    comprehensive military modernization program to ``basically'' complete
    military modernization by 2035 and transform the PLA into a ``world
    class'' military by 2049. However, it is difficult to truly know when
    China will be complete because, due to their opacity, we do not know
    where they are heading. I believe they are at an inflection point with
    regard to their accelerated pace of modernization and I know they can
    no longer be viewed as a lesser-included strategic adversary.
                                      w93
        29. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, with respect to development of
    the W93/Mk7 warhead, an analysis of alternatives is underway, with
    contributions from DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA). In the past, both the Pentagon and representatives from the
    United Kingdom communicated the urgency of supporting this program, and
    the importance of continuing the longstanding cooperation between our
    countries on nuclear issues. Has anything changed with respect to the
    urgent need to continue progress this program?
        Admiral Richard. No. It is neither operationally viable nor cost-
    effective to indefinitely sustain currently fielded 1980's submarine-
    launched ballistic missile (SLBM) weapons and expect them to remain
    militarily relevant against evolving 21st century threats. In addition
    to U.S. modernization requirements, the W93/Mk 7 program enables us to
    continue our longstanding support to the U.K. and their warhead
    replacement program. As an Allied, independent nuclear power
    contributing to NATO's nuclear deterrence posture, the U.K.'s
    continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent is critical to strategic security.

        30. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, when can the Committee expect
    the analysis of alternatives to be complete?
        Admiral Richard. The scope of the W93 design will be more defined
    as we complete Phase 1 (a concept study to explore alternatives to meet
    the need), and enter Phase 2 (a feasibility study to evaluate Phase
    1concepts deemed viable in Phase 1). Phase 1 is expected to be complete
    by the end of fiscal year 2023.
        national nuclear security administration modernization programs
        31. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, do you believe DOD and NNSA
    programs are adequately aligned to meet STRATCOM military requirements
    for modernizing the Nation's nuclear forces?
        Admiral Richard. DOD's current delivery systems modernization
    programs and NNSA's stockpile and enterprise stewardship programs are
    tightly integrated and aligned to sustain our current capabilities.
    Across the board, NNSA's stockpile and infrastructure modernization
    programs required to ensure on-time delivery of weapon capabilities for
    an effective and credible nuclear deterrent are projected to be either
    just-in-time or late-to-need. This is evidenced by the recent Critical
    Decision--One (CD-1) on pit production which projects fielding the 80
    pits per year requirement between 5 to 10 years later than the military
    and statutory requirement of NLT 2030. On-time fielding of replacement
    capabilities depends on meeting established schedules, and as with the
    NNSA, DOD's replacement system capabilities are now projected to
    deliver just-in-time. There is no schedule margin remaining for either
    DOD or NNSA.

        32. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, if NNSA programs are not
    adequately funded, could you outline the potential operational impacts
    that could result if the two Departments' programs become misaligned?
        Admiral Richard. The continued, chronic underfunding of the
    maintenance and modernization of the Nation's nuclear weapons
    infrastructure is the single greatest risk to strategic deterrence.
    This significantly degrades the U.S.'s ability to achieve strategic
    deterrence, extended deterrence, and non-proliferation objectives.
        Not providing the needed resources to recapitalize invites the very
    real risk of losing the capacity to field a credible and effective
    nuclear deterrent, at a time when our adversaries are modernizing and
    expanding their own nuclear capabilities. Once these capabilities are
    lost it will take 15-20 years to recapitalize them. In an ever-evolving
    world of adversaries and Allies, we must be cognizant of the
    operational implications and national risks of any decision to not fund
    or divest any capability--and we must have a comprehensive threat-based
    strategy review to ensure this capability will not be needed for at
    least a generation.
        We are already at a point where nuclear modernization programmatic
    risks are transferring to me, as the USSTRATCOM Commander, in the form
    of operational risk. This impacts my ability to meet national-level
    strategic guidance. If NNSA lacks fundamental infrastructure
    recapitalization funding, then we will reach the point in less than a
    decade when a future USSTRATCOM commander testifies he / she can no
    longer certify the effectiveness of the strategic deterrent force to
    meet assigned strategic deterrence and assurance mission requirements.

        33. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Richard, could you outline the impact
    to the operational force in the 2030s if plutonium pit production does
    not reach the Congressionally-mandated target of 80 pits per year by
    2030?
        Admiral Richard. Pit production is a foundational capability, a
    leading indicator and symptomatic of larger issues in today's nuclear
    security enterprise. No option below 80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030
    fully supports achieving assigned Presidential objectives.
        Failing to achieve a pit production capability to meet 80 ppy in
    2030 will result in the current stockpile of weapons with components
    far exceeding intended design life. We will be forced to reuse aged
    pits for a longer period of time, ultimately leading to deployed
    weapons with 100 year old pits--a situation where we have no scientific
    basis to ensure confidence the weapons will function as designed. This
    scenario may result in the inability to certify the safety, security,
    reliability and effectiveness of the weapons.
        Because pit aging impacts are uncertain, this nation cannot afford
    to be without the capability to address these concerns--we cannot wait
    for an issue in the stockpile to occur before addressing it, and
    pausing work on the current program to reassess requirements is no
    longer viable. It is in the best interests for the U.S. and Allies to
    proactively make the required investments versus waiting until a
    potentially catastrophic safety or reliability concern in aged pits
    manifests itself.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                          u.s. nuclear force structure
        34. Senator Fischer. Admiral Richard, the New Strategic Armed
    Reduction Treaty (START) limits U.S. strategic nuclear forces to 1,550
    deployed warheads. Currently the U.S. deploys about 70 percent of its
    treaty-accountable warheads submarine-based SLBMs, no more than 400
    warheads on ground-based ICBMs, with the bomber-leg of the nuclear
    triad making up the remainder. Do you support the current force
    structure's distribution of treaty-accountable warheads across the
    three legs of the triad?
        Admiral Richard. Yes. The force structure's distribution of
    accountable weapons provides the appropriate diversity, flexibility and
    resilience to deter potential adversaries from conducting nuclear and
    non-nuclear strategic attacks, assure Allies and partners, achieve U.S.
    objectives if deterrence fails, and hedge against an uncertain future.

        35. Senator Fischer. Admiral Richard, would it be your best
    military advice to preserve the current force structure's allocation of
    warheads between the legs of the triad for a force limited to 1,550
    deployed warheads?
        Admiral Richard. Yes. Under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
    (New START) limit of 1,550 accountable warheads, U.S. nuclear forces
    are sized and postured to deter potential adversaries from conducting
    nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks, assure Allies and partners,
    achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and hedge against an
    uncertain future.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
                 space launch options--increased demand signal
        36. Senator Rounds. General Dickinson, in 2020 you stated, ``A
    mixed architecture increases warfighting resilience by assuring that
    the loss of any single platform does not result in serious mission
    degradation or failure. This opens up the opportunity for more frequent
    refresh of technology and creates an additional demand signal for
    appropriately sized launch options.'' Can you elaborate on what you
    mean by ``appropriately sized launch options,'' and what type of demand
    signal you envision?
        General Dickinson. ``Appropriately sized launch options'' means
    exploring a wide range of cost, schedule, scale, and supply options as
    well as leveraging partnering opportunities to support warfighter space
    capability needs. The DOD must take advantage of rapid commercial
    development, streamlined operational testing processes, and innovative
    technology advancements to deliver immediate and revolutionary space
    capabilities on-time.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                missile defense
        37. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, the Unified Command Plan
    directs the Commander, STRATCOM, to be the advocate for missile
    defense. With that in mind, can you outline what homeland missile
    defense requirements are needed to meet current and predicted future
    threats? Please explain why these capabilities are needed and along
    what timeline.
        Admiral Richard. Today's missile defense is designed to defend the
    homeland against a limited threat. The upward trajectory of future
    threats requires the delivery of enhanced missile defense capabilities
    as soon as technically and feasibly possible.
        Specific improvements include an architecture of persistent sensors
    to detect, track and discriminate advanced missile threats, including
    hypersonics; improvements to interceptor reliability, capacity, and
    lethality; and development of next-generation capabilities such as
    directed energy, boost phase intercept, and non-kinetic effects.

        38. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, the missile capabilities
    possessed by rogue nations continue to rapidly evolve. For instance, as
    reported by the New York Times earlier this year, North Korea recently
    showcased the country's ``largest-ever'' intercontinental ballistic
    missile (ICBM) and revealed a new submarine-launched ballistic missile.
    Also, in a 2020 House Armed Services Committee hearing, former Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood agreed with the U.S. Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM) assessment that North Korea's ICBM threat could
    challenge the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
    system as soon as 2025. Provided the continuing advancement of these
    weapon systems, do you think it makes good strategic ``sense'' to have
    20 empty silos--ready to accept missiles--at Fort Greely, Alaska?
        Admiral Richard. Defer to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) for
    specifics on their ability to maintain / accelerate Next-Generation
    Interceptor (NGI) capabilities and deliveries.
        USSTRATCOM's role is to advocate for missile defense capabilities
    on behalf of combatant commands. The importance of pursuing additional
    missile defense capability on behalf of the warfighter must be
    coordinated and adjudicated with MDA and associated stakeholders. MDA
    is taking steps to bridge the gap for these additional 20 silos--a
    direct result of NDAA language for additional interim Ground-Based
    Interceptors--until NGI is fielded.
                          extended nuclear deterrence
        39. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Richard, as you know, we provide
    extended nuclear deterrence to a number of allies in Europe, Asia, and
    elsewhere. In turn, this assists in preventing the proliferation of
    nuclear materials and weapon systems. Great power competitors and rogue
    nations are pursuing nuclear modernization while we continue to delay
    and defer our own. How will continued delay and deferral impact allies
    who rely on us for extended nuclear deterrence?
        Admiral Richard. Allies and partners place enormous value on U.S.
    extended nuclear deterrence, which is key to nuclear non-proliferation.
    Effectively assuring Allies and partners depends on their confidence in
    the credibility of our nuclear deterrent.
        Since there is no additional margin for postponing our strategic
    deterrent modernization programs, our Allies and partners are likely to
    interpret any further delay or deferral as an erosion of the U.S.
    extended deterrence guarantee and likewise, incur doubt regarding the
    credibility of our commitments.
        As such, the Nation must remain committed to modernizing and
    recapitalizing our strategic forces and supporting infrastructure--we
    must maintain the current schedule with full and consistent resourcing.
    Nothing else works as planned or envisioned without a safe, secure,
    effective, and credible nuclear deterrent.
                     chinese and russian space development
        40. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, in your statement for the
    record you described various space capabilities China and Russia have
    developed that could threaten United States intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance (ISR), communication, and navigation capabilities in
    the event of a conflict. Can you explain how China and Russia are
    attempting to use international treaties and dual-use capabilities to
    militarize space and create an advantage over the United States?
        General Dickinson. International Treaties:
        To counter United States space capabilities, Russia and China
    jointly sought international support for binding treaties or UN
    resolutions which they likely believe would asymmetrically constrain
    United States national security space activities. Generally, these
    proposals have no verification or enforcement mechanisms, but would
    tend to aid Russia and China in identifying (and acting against)
    national security space activities of western democracies, while they
    continue to develop counterspace weapons.
          The major Russia/Chinese initiative is the proposed
    agreement for the ``Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
    Space'' (PPWT for short). The proposed PPWT bans any ``weapon'' [not
    fully defined] in orbit or that transits a fraction of an orbit--
    something that in practice could, for example limit U.S. ballistic
    missile defense activities. The PPWT has no effective enforcement
    mechanism, and verification and ``transparency'' are voluntary. Notably
    lacking from the treaty's language are prohibitions on Chinese and
    Russian direct-ascent (ground to space) anti-satellite weapons and
    ground based directed-energy anti-satellite weapons.
          In addition, Russia and China have repeatedly submitted a
    UN resolution regarding voluntary ``no first placement'' (NFP) of
    weapons in space, again without verification mechanisms. As with the
    PPWT, the NFP does not define the term ``space weapon''. The irony is
    that while Russia claims to seek a ban on ``first placement'' of
    weapons in space, it already deployed space weapons, as it demonstrated
    with its July 15, 2020 on-orbit test of a space-based anti-satellite
    weapon, among other tests of counterspace capabilities.
          Ironically, considering Russia and China's public
    propaganda against ``weaponization of space'', both rejected last
    year's UK-sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution (75/36) ``Reducing
    Space Threats Through Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible
    Behavior''. This resolution encouraged member states to ``study
    existing and potential threats to space systems'', a proposal which
    could shine a light on both countries' wide-ranging counterspace
    efforts.
        Dual Use:
        China and Russia are likely integrating civilian satellites used
    for remote sensing, satellite communications, and navigation with
    counterspace capabilities to support their deterrence efforts against
    the United States. According to the National Air and Space Intelligence
    Center (NASIC), both countries are capable of employing their civil and
    commercial remote sensing satellites to supplement military-dedicated
    capabilities. China employs a ``whole of nation'' strategy for
    military-civil fusion, through which commercial or civilian assets may
    be required to support or assist intelligence organizations or the
    military, according to open source reporting. China's National
    Intelligence Law of 2017 requires Chinese corporations to assist in
    ``intelligence work'', likely facilitating technology transfer to
    military space and weapons development. China is expanding satellite
    communications and navigation capabilities, which likely support PLA
    operations. China is probably testing dual-use technologies in space
    that could be applied to counter-space missions.
        Russia also maintains a satellite communications and robust
    navigation fleet that provides resilient services Russian to civil,
    government, and military users locally and worldwide. According to the
    Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia continues to develop sophisticated
    on-orbit capabilities that could serve dual-use purposes. For example,
    ``inspection'' or servicing satellites are capable of closely
    approaching satellites to inspect or fix issues; this same technology
    could also be used to approach another country's satellite and conduct
    an attack that results in temporary or permanent damage. Russia appears
    to have carried out a test of an on-orbit anti-satellite weapon in July
    2020.
        Dual-use capabilities will challenge United States ability to
    provide advanced warning of nefarious intentions or discern between
    peaceful and potential hostile activity. Both China and Russia's
    militaries stand to benefit from fielding viable threats to United
    States satellites.

        41. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, from your perspective as
    SPACECOM Commander, how do the Chinese and Russian threats differ
    operationally within your combatant command?
        General Dickinson. China and Russia each have weaponized space as a
    way to deter and counter a possible United States intervention during a
    regional conflict and as a means to reduce United States and allied
    military effectiveness in a conflict. Beijing aims to build a more
    joint, versatile, professional, and lethal force capable of power
    projection; space is critical to this goal. Russia's focus is on
    integrating space services--such as communications; precision
    navigation and timing (PNT); geolocation; and intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)--into its weapons and command
    and control (C2) systems as a means of enabling strategic defense.
    Russia recognizes the importance of military space capabilities;
    however, its budget is more limited than China's due to competing
    priorities with broader militarization efforts. China and Russia's
    counterspace focus is very likely tied to perceived fears of United
    States military capabilities. Both countries will likely continue
    endeavors in the space domain to deliver electronic warfare, directed
    energy, and kinetic capabilities to disrupt U.S. C2 systems and use
    space or space denial operations as an integral component to achieve
    information superiority in conflict.

        42. Senator Sullivan. General Dickinson, a recent study
    commissioned by the U.S. Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, and
    the Air Force Research Laboratory stated, ``China's institution
    building and use of space are the key providers of global economic
    development reinforcing their . . . Belt and Road Initiative, whereby
    infrastructure for economic development wins over and binds new allies
    and partners.'' Fittingly during your testimony you stated, ``one of
    our biggest deterrence opportunities is with our allies and partners .
    . . .we've seen a bow wave of allies and partners who want come and be
    part of SPACECOM and part of the space enterprise.'' Understanding that
    both the United States and China are actively competing and seeking to
    work with allies and partners in the space domain, in your personal
    opinion, how could the United States use our existing comparative
    advantage in space launch to further collaborate with our allies and
    partners on their space-based capabilities?
        General Dickinson. Space launch is a key comparative strength for
    the U.S., and it is a vital component of our whole-of-government
    approach to cooperation with our allies and partners. Beyond our space
    launch capabilities, we cooperate with our allies and partners in areas
    like Space Situational Awareness data sharing as a part of our holistic
    work to deepen and strengthen long-term partnerships.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                             hypersonic development
        43. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, are you confident that the
    United States' hypersonic testing facilities are sufficiently well-
    maintained and modern to meet the demands of hypersonic development? If
    not, please identify the most concerning areas of insufficiency.
        Admiral Richard. Today, the DOD can adequately test current
    hypersonic prototypes. However, additional investment is needed to meet
    future hypersonic acquisition program and operational test requirements
    along with the accelerated prototyping program schedules.
        The Test Resource Management Center (TRMC), responsible for
    assessing the readiness of the DOD's test infrastructure, anticipated
    the increased demand for testing hypersonic systems and programmed
    funding to address the most critical hypersonic test infrastructure
    capability and capacity needs.

        44. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, what additional
    investments--including in personnel--are needed to support the testing
    needs across the hypersonic spectrum to better compete with Beijing and
    Moscow? Please explain.
        Admiral Richard. To support developmental and operational testing
    across the hypersonic spectrum, DOD is considering enhancements to
    hypersonic ground test facilities (to include the Arnold Engineering
    Development Complex (AEDC) in Tullahoma, TN), and establishment of
    additional long-range flight corridors to support increased hypersonic
    flight test demand.
        The Joint Hypersonic Transition Office (JHTO) is executing the
    workforce development strategy to advance current training, and
    leveraging university expertise to accelerate development of the next
    generation hypersonic workforce.
                     nuclear modernization and sustainment
        45. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, please provide specific
    examples of potential consequences to STRATCOM if we do not modernize
    our nuclear enterprise's aging infrastructure. Would STRATCOM be able
    to field an effective deterrent?
        Admiral Richard. The continued, chronic underfunding of the
    maintenance and modernization of the Nation's nuclear weapons
    infrastructure is the single greatest risk to strategic deterrence. Not
    providing the needed resources to recapitalize invites the very real
    risk of losing the capacity to field a credible and effective nuclear
    deterrent, at a time when our adversaries are modernizing and expanding
    their own nuclear capabilities. This significantly degrades the U.S.'s
    long-term ability to achieve strategic deterrence, extended deterrence,
    and non-proliferation objectives. Once these capabilities are lost it
    will take 15-20+ years to recapitalize them. We must be cognizant of
    the operational implications and national risks of any decision to not
    fund or divest any capability--and we must have a comprehensive threat-
    based strategy review to ensure this capability will not be needed for
    at least a generation.
                        ground-based strategic deterrent
        46. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, how--specifically--could
    the Air Force best capitalize on the Ground-based Strategic Deterrent's
    (GBSD) modularity and open-system architecture when implementing future
    program upgrades?
        Admiral Richard. Defer to the Air Force regarding the GBSD
    program's technical details.

        47. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Richard, in what ways could GBSD's
    modularity and open-system architecture inform other current and future
    DOD systems' approaches to cost savings and mid-life flexibility?
    Please explain.
        Admiral Richard. Defer to the Air Force regarding the GBSD
    program's technical details
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                     china
        48. Senator Hawley. General Dickinson, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
    Austin has written that we need to maintain combat-credible forward
    forces in order to deter or, if necessary, deny a Chinese fait accompli
    against Taiwan. How do you see our forces in space contributing to
    deterrence by denial against China?
        General Dickinson. At Secretary Austin's direction, USSPACECOM has
    begun establishing the necessary posture to both deter China and
    prepare to support the Joint fight, regardless of where our
    capabilities are required. Our current and future on-orbit space
    capabilities will enable the Joint Force to operate in a contested
    environment, increase resilience in our space architecture, and enhance
    our on-orbit counter-space capabilities. In addition, we are working
    with USINDOPACOM, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM to address gaps in our
    forward-deployed space control posture in their AORs. Concurrently,
    we're continuing our efforts to maintain and grow our regional
    architecture of key allies and partners, assuring access, space
    operations, and capability sharing when we'll need it the most. Apart
    from those efforts, we must remember USSPACECOM's AOR is global in
    nature, and our warfighters will not only reside in the USINDOPACOM AOR
    but positioned in operations centers around the world. Our personnel
    provide critical space capabilities from on-orbit and terrestrial
    assets ready to support the Joint fight, globally, from the first
    moment, unencumbered by the need to deploy or relocate.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
                                 u.s. spacecom
        49. Senator Tuberville. General Dickinson, once the Inspector
    General (IG) investigation and environmental study are completed, can
    SPACECOM recruit and hire civilians directly in Huntsville, Alabama and
    not have to relocate them from Colorado?
        General Dickinson. The Secretary of the Air Force's final basing
    decision, which is pending the environmental study, is the determining
    factor for recruiting and hiring civilians in Huntsville, Alabama. My
    intent is to reach full operational capability at our permanent
    location as expediently as practicable, without essential mission
    degradation, all within the guidance, direction, and authority of the
    Department of Defense leaders involved in the ongoing establishment of
    United States Space Command. Mission readiness depends on the
    availability of both people and equipment; therefore, I directed my
    staff to posture the command for transition to the permanent location
    as soon as practicable, without degradation to our missions, after the
    SECAF completes the basing decision process. We will not know what
    percentage of civilian employees may choose to transfer locations until
    after the SECAF confirms the outcome of the basing decision process,
    and without that information, we cannot calculate an accurate cost of
    relocation.

        50. Senator Tuberville. General Dickinson, if we, as a country,
    want to accelerate your readiness, save taxpayer money, and prevent
    having to relocate employees, would further delay to the final SPACECOM
    basing decision be detrimental to those goals?
        General Dickinson. The Secretary of the Air Force's (SecAF) final
    basing decision will enable initial design of the consolidated
    headquarters facility, relocation of personnel, and the hiring of human
    capital to the permanent headquarters location. I appreciate that the
    Air Force is adhering to the basing process, including compliance with
    NEPA, which takes time. Ensuring that we reach full operational
    capability is my priority. Therefore, I have directed my staff to
    posture the command for transition to the permanent location as soon as
    practicable, without degradation to our missions, after the SecAF makes
    the final basing decision.

        51. Senator Tuberville. General Dickinson, is it true that the
    taxpayer savings moving SPACECOM to Redstone Arsenal, AL results in a
    35 percent one-time savings for the move and 25 percent annual cost
    savings over 20 years?
        General Dickinson. I will defer basing process questions to the
    SecAF, who has the authority for selecting the permanent location for
    USSPACECOM Headquarters. Analysis to understand the impact of a
    transition to Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL is underway. My staff
    is looking hard at timelines, anticipated impacts to human capital,
    facilities, and mission with a goal of minimizing risk to mission while
    being good stewards of the taxpayers' money. Once we have a final
    basing decision, we will be able to provide and discuss the full
    analysis.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

         UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
    Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
    Sullivan, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing to order.
        This morning the Committee will receive testimony from
    General McKenzie, Commander, United States Central Command,
    CENTCOM, and General Townsend, Commander, United States Africa
    Command, or AFRICOM. Thank you both for your many decades of
    military service, and please extend our appreciation to the men
    and women serving under you, and we appreciate very much their
    sacrifice and the sacrifice of their families on behalf of the
    United States.
        Last week, in one of the most challenging decisions facing
    President Biden, he announced the withdrawal of all forces from
    Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. It appears the President
    concluded that more troops might buy more time and casualties,
    but more time would not create a government that could defeat
    the Taliban and effectively govern Afghanistan. The President's
    decision, however, should be seen as a transition, not closure,
    and should not mean an end to our counterterrorism efforts.
    Most importantly, we must ensure that Afghanistan will not be a
    source of planning, plotting, or projection of terrorist
    attacks around the globe, including against the Homeland, and,
    General McKenzie, I would be interested in hearing your
    thoughts on how best to transition to a new counterterrorism
    architecture in the region to continue to degrade al Qaeda,
    ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] of Khorasan Province,
    and other terrorist groups, and prevent their ability to attack
    the Homeland.
        Additionally, support to the Afghan forces will remain
    vital. The intelligence community's Annual Threat Assessment
    for 2021 noted, ``The Afghan Government will struggle to hold
    the Taliban at bay if the coalition withdraws support.'' I
    would like to understand plans to continue training and
    assistance to the Afghan forces in light of the transition, and
    how we will balance that against the need to conduct robust
    oversight of funding that we provide to the Afghan Government
    and forces.
        General McKenzie, you are also facing a complex challenge
    of deterring the threat from Iran and its proxies while the
    Administration seeks a diplomatic solution to contain the
    Iranian nuclear threat. I would be interested to hear an update
    on your progress in meeting these challenges, particularly
    against the backdrop of indirect talks in Vienna, and the
    recent attack on the Natanz nuclear facility, and Iran's
    announcement that they have begun enriching uranium up to 60
    percent, which would move it closer than ever before to the 90
    percent purity threshold required for weapons-grade uranium.
        Turning to AFRICOM, General Townsend, you have said that
    Al-Shabab is the largest and most violent of al Qaeda's
    branches worldwide, yet the previous Administration chose, with
    little notice, to remove the vast majority of United States
    troops from Somalia. The Biden Administration is now reviewing
    that decision as part of a larger assessment of our strategy in
    Somalia. I hope you will share your views on the current
    security situation as well as the status of our engagement with
    our Somali partners, particularly in light of news this week
    that the Somali federal government has extended the mandates of
    the president and parliament by 2 years. This move directly
    undermines the progress made on democratic processes and
    institutional reforms, and may threaten international support.
        As you noted in your testimony, Africa is a vast continent
    of opportunity and promise, but one that includes many
    strategic challenges, many of which are overlapping also.
    Population growth, food insecurity, and impacts from climate
    change increase instability, drive conflict, and further
    threaten vulnerable populations. These challenges do not lend
    themselves to geographic or bureaucratic boundaries. They
    require well-resourced and well-integrated whole-of-government
    solutions. I look forward to your views on the importance of
    investing in diplomacy and development to force long-term
    stability, as well as an update on AFRICOM's support to the
    Interagency in these efforts.
        Our competitors recognize that investing in Africa and the
    Middle East is in their long-term interests, as evidenced by
    Chinese and Russian military and economic activity that
    continues to grow in these critical regions. General Townsend
    and General McKenzie, I look forward to hearing your views and
    how we best leverage U.S. views--U.S. engagement, rather, and
    investments to create attractive alternatives and ensure we
    maintain key partnerships and access. I want to thank you again
    for being here this morning, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        Before I turn it over to the ranking member, Senator
    Inhofe, I would like to remind my colleagues that there will be
    an informal classified briefing immediately following this
    session in SVC-217, the Office of Senate Security Center.
    Senator Inhofe?

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past few
    years, this Committee's top priority has been ensuring that we
    implement the--there it is--this document. It has been kind of
    a surprise that something that was put together back in 2018 by
    an equal number of Democrats and Republicans has been so
    accurate, and we have been using that as a blueprint. If we are
    serious about the security of our Nation, we need resources to
    make the--this National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    happen, make it a reality. The President's Budget request does
    not meet this standard. Instead, it represents a decline in
    defense spending, which will have serious implications for our
    national security. It also means our combatant commanders will
    have to do more with less, so the standard that was put forth
    was not met by the President. Our top military commanders have
    testified in unison in recent weeks that the threats to the
    United States are growing at an alarming rate. Cutting the
    defense budget sends exactly the wrong signals to our allies
    and our adversaries alike.
        General Townsend, you highlighted China's growth in--
    growing use in Africa as a power projection platform for the
    military. They have secured their first overseas base in
    Djibouti. We have been there. We have witnessed that. They are
    aggressively pursuing a base on Africa's west coast, which
    would be the first time, giving China an enduring naval
    presence in the southern Atlantic. With less than 6,000 troops
    on the continent and the continued lack of Intelligence,
    Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), I hope Department of
    Defense's (DOD) Global Posture Review will ensure your resource
    shortfalls are being addressed. In CENTCOM, we have the
    opposite problem. It gets significant resources to counter al
    Qaeda, ISIS, and the Iranian-backed terrorists.
        General McKenzie, in the last year, I understand you have
    been able to reduce U.S. troop levels in the region, but I
    worry this Administration's policies in your region are driven
    more by politics than the national security. First, in
    Afghanistan, the Administration is, by its own admission,
    executing a calendar-based drawdown rather than a condition-
    based one. We know this is true, and we have talked about this
    for quite a period of time. General McKenzie, you recently
    stated that the Taliban still has to take action to meet the
    conditions for United States troop withdrawal of the February
    2020 agreement. The arbitrary September the 11th deadline for
    troop drawdown risks a power vacuum that terrorists will
    dominate and use to threaten our Homeland again. I want to add
    here that I am extremely disappointed that General Miller has
    not yet been scheduled to testify publicly before this
    Committee, and I hope that you will work to fix that, General
    McKenzie.
        Secondly, regarding Iran. The Administration is moving
    quickly to negotiate a quick return to the failed 2015 Iran
    deal granting Tehran large sanctions relief, even though the
    nuclear limitations will begin to expire within the next 5
    years. As we saw during the Obama Administration, Iran will use
    sanctions relief to fund terrorist groups, including the ones
    currently targeting the men and women in uniform that you
    command. Third, in Yemen, the Administration is pulling back
    from our Saudi partners, while, at the same time, the Iran-
    backed Houthis are escalating their attacks. We should not
    expect the Saudis to tolerate a perpetual Houthi ballistic
    missile that--an armed drone threat on our border. We would not
    tolerate one on our border. So the United States arms sales
    restrictions could very well lead the Saudis to seek support
    from our peer competitors. General McKenzie, I hope you will
    address these issues and offer your views on how to heighten
    risk of that and manage that in the year ahead.
        So I thank both of you for your testimony and your presence
    here today, and also in the closed session that we will have,
    as the chairman mentioned. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, and let me concur
    with the ranking member. We have been pressing the Department
    for General Miller to testify in an open hearing on Afghanistan
    well before the decision was made by President Biden with
    respect to forces in Afghanistan. Now with that decision, it is
    even more important that we receive direct, in-person
    communication from General Miller. The last time we had such an
    open hearing was, I believe, with General Nicholson in 2017, so
    we need to carry out our duties, the direct contact, and I will
    once again, General McKenzie, ask for your assistance and relay
    that message, and hopefully General Miller will be here very
    shortly.
        With that, let me now recognize the witnesses, beginning
    with General McKenzie. Thank you, sir.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL KENNETH F. McKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER,
                     UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

        General McKenzie. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    distinguished Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
    appear before you proudly representing the 70,000 men and women
    of the United States Central Command. It is a great pleasure to
    be with you here today. It is my duty to testify, of course,
    but I have to say it is also a privilege to address this body,
    and all the greater honor to do so beside the commander of
    United States Africa Command, General Steve Townsend. I would
    also like to recognize my senior enlisted leader, Fleet Master
    Chief Jamie Herdel of the Navy, who is here with me today, as
    well as chief legislative assistant, Air Force Colonel Jen
    Hlavaty.
        Since my last testimony, the region has continued to
    evolve, and it remains as dynamic as ever. With the President's
    announcement last week, we are focused on working closely with
    the Afghan Government and our National Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) allies to responsibly conclude our Resolute
    Support Mission in Afghanistan. This is my main effort at
    present, but it is not my only responsibility. My prepared
    statement addresses our other missions in some detail.
        The United States and our NATO allies sent forces to
    Afghanistan nearly 20 years ago, and the President has judged
    the time is now appropriate to redeploy and reposition these
    forces so that they are better arrayed to deter adversaries and
    respond to threats globally, including those in the CENTCOM
    Command region. Our singular purpose in Afghanistan has been to
    ensure that al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations
    would never again plot, prepare, and perpetrate attacks against
    the United States and our allies from the refuge of that
    country. The campaign has evolved considerably over the years,
    from Active combat operations with United States and NATO
    forces in the lead, to advisory efforts designed to enhance the
    Afghan national defense and security forces' ability to conduct
    their own campaigns against violent extremist organizations.
    That there has not been another 9/11 is not an accident. It is
    the cumulative product of these efforts.
        We will now conclude our Afghanistan-based advise and
    support mission. We are further planning now for continued
    counterterrorism operations from within the region, ensuring
    that the violent extremist organizations fighting for their
    existence in the hinterlands of Afghanistan remain under
    persistent surveillance and pressure. Ever since 12 September
    2001 when our allies invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic
    Treaty, we have done everything in Afghanistan within a
    partnership framework, and that will not change in the months
    ahead. We are planning collaboratively with our interagency and
    international partners and will take measures to ensure the
    safe and orderly withdrawal of all of our forces and those of
    our partners. This includes positioning significant combat
    power to guard against the possibility that the Taliban decides
    to interfere in any way with our orderly redeployment.
        I would now like to briefly summarize some other challenges
    in the region.
        While Iran has itself avoided state-on-state attacks on
    United States Forces since last January's strikes on the Al
    Asad and Erbil air bases, it continues to menace regional
    partners and the free flow of commerce through the use of
    proxies and the proliferation of armed, unmanned aerial systems
    and other munitions. Its pursuit of regional hegemony remains
    the greatest source of instability across the Middle East. In
    Iraq and Syria, the campaign to eliminate the threat posed by
    ISIS has entered a new phase. In Iraq, we are engaged in a
    strategic dialogue with the Iraqi Government to determine the
    nature of our security relationship. ISIS' physical caliphate
    is no more, but its toxic ideology lives on. The problem is
    especially acute in communities ravaged by conflict and its
    sprawling camps for displaced persons where ISIS preys upon
    vulnerable populations.
        What has accelerated in the last year is the influence of
    China and Russia, who, each in their own way, are attempting to
    subvert the rules-based international order and to gain
    strategic influence in the Middle East. China's activity in the
    region takes the form of economic investment, arm sales, and
    other overtures. Russia has made an 18th century power play in
    Syria, propping up the murderous Assad regime. The Middle East
    remains key terrain, and I believe China and Russia will
    continue to expand their efforts to improve their position in
    the region and diminish United States standing wherever
    possible.
        The CENTCOM area of responsibility is the most cyber-
    contested theater in the world. It is also the proving ground
    for the proliferation and employment of unmanned weaponized
    systems, many emanating from Iran. This difficult and complex
    operational environment provides units inside CENTCOM
    opportunities to operate and to conduct realistic training
    within an environment that exists nowhere else in the world. I
    can state as a matter of fact that the units and ships assigned
    to CENTCOM are as ready as any in the Joint Force.
        The weeks and months ahead will see us execute a very
    complicated and demanding military operation to withdraw United
    States and NATO forces from Afghanistan. This is presently the
    main effort of my command, and we have the tools necessary to
    accomplish this task. With that, I look forward to answering
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General McKenzie follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.
                                  introduction
        United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) mission--to direct and
    enable military operations and activities with allies and partners to
    increase regional security and stability in support of U.S. enduring
    interests--remains as valid and vital to our Nation today as ever
    before. While acknowledging military force is not the principal answer
    to the region's challenges, our presence in the region provides
    advantage, opportunity and leverage for U.S. diplomats to operate from
    a position of strength, prevents losing ground to our global
    competitors, and protects the security of the American people by
    meeting challenges abroad from state and non-state adversaries who
    threaten the U.S. and our allies, attempt to destabilize the USCENTCOM
    area of responsibility (AOR), and inhibit access to the global commons.
        USCENTCOM aligns with the President's Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance (INSSG) to work with like-minded allies and partners
    to advance our shared interests to address the four global challenges
    that manifest across the USCENTCOM AOR: China, Russia, Iran, and
    Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). Maintaining an effective
    posture to meet these challenges requires making hard choices. While
    China will remain our Nation's pacing competitor for the foreseeable
    future, the main challenges USCENTCOM faces in its AOR occur in the
    present. Iran's destabilizing actions reverberate through the region
    daily. Iran has not indulged in idle saber rattling against the United
    States and our partners. Iran has launched state-on-state ballistic
    missile, cruise missile, and unmanned aerial system (UAS) attacks, as
    well as attacks through its proxies and aligned groups that have killed
    and injured Coalition forces and innocent civilians; those attacks are
    increasingly directed at key United States partners. Every day across
    the AOR, VEOs like al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
    (ISIS) operate without respect for borders or consequence, creating
    instability and human suffering in an attempt to destroy sovereign
    nations to remake them in their own twisted vision. Where gaps open,
    China and Russia pursue steady economic and military measures that
    encroach on United States presence and influence in the region.
        None of these current threats to our United States national
    interests are approaching sunset, and they all continue to unfold with
    speed and unpredictability. Since the beginning of the year, Iranian-
    aligned militia groups (IAMGs) in Iraq and Syria likely conducted more
    than 50 improvised explosive device attacks against Iraqi-operated,
    Coalition-contracted logistical convoys, and nine indirect fire attacks
    against United States diplomatic facilities or Iraqi military bases
    hosting United States and Coalition personnel. Protracted conflicts
    across the AOR and the destruction of government services and
    infrastructure have caused large-scale humanitarian crises. More than
    20 million displaced people are spread across the USCENTCOM AOR,
    representing one fourth of the nearly 80 million people displaced
    globally. Millions sought refuge in neighboring countries, many of
    which struggle with their own economic and social challenges, while
    millions more internally displaced persons (IDPs) struggle to find
    daily sustenance. Meanwhile, the underlying socio-economic factors that
    sparked the ``Arab Spring'' movements in 2011 persist and contribute to
    recurring unrest.
        The way forward requires a whole-of-government approach applying
    all of the elements of U.S. national power to address the underlying
    conditions threatening stability. Alongside our U.S. interagency
    partners, USCENTCOM will continue to work with allies and partners to
    set the conditions for diplomacy and development. By advancing our
    shared interests and coming together to face shared threats, USCENTCOM
    develops capable regional partners to act as guarantors of their own
    security and sovereignty, able to secure their own borders and ensure
    their internal stability.
                               strategic approach
        USCENTCOM's actions and activities across the AOR run the spectrum
    from cooperation and collaboration, to competition and conflict. To
    ensure synchronization throughout our ongoing missions, we align our
    operations, activities, and investments along three lines of effort.
    These lines of effort support Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S.
    Government priorities and are aligned with DOD guidance and the INSSG.
        Recognizing the importance of enhancing stability throughout the
    region, USCENTCOM's first line of effort is to deter Iranian aggression
    against United States Forces and interests, and strengthen our
    partners' capabilities to defend themselves against Iranian and proxy
    and aligned group aggression. USCENTCOM's second line of effort is
    aligned against the persistent challenge of disrupting and degrading
    VEOs that destabilize the region and threaten the U.S Homeland, our
    vital interests, and our partners and allies. USCENTCOM considers this
    an enduring effort covering a wide range of operations and activities
    from active campaigns against al Qaeda, ISIS, and other VEOs in the
    region, to supporting whole-of-government solutions to ensure good
    governance and to thwart efforts by ISIS and VEOs to radicalize and
    make appeals to vulnerable populations, including refugees and IDPs.
    Success in this campaign is not defined as the absence of violence. It
    is militarily impossible to defeat an ideology, but when force is
    required, we will employ it alongside international and local partners
    wherever possible to bolster effectiveness and legitimacy, share
    burdens, and invest others in success.
        Our third line of effort is long-term strategic competition with
    China, combined with countering Russia. Both nations leverage their
    proximity to the region, historical relations, and a perceived decline
    in United States engagement to establish and strengthen opportunistic
    relationships. China and Russia each seek ends in their own self-
    interest using different approaches. Russia plays the part of spoiler
    to the United States, using military means, influence operations and
    grey-zone activities to undermine and disrupt U.S. influence and
    reassert its own global influence. China uses predominantly economic
    means to establish regional in-roads, with a long-term goal of
    expanding its military presence to secure vital routes of energy and
    trade.
                        line of effort 1--deterring iran
        Iran views the United States presence in the region as the greatest
    threat toward achieving its ambition of regional hegemony. The regime
    uses a combination of coercion and IAMG violence to bring about the
    removal of United States Forces from Iraq, despite United States and
    Coalition forces being in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq
    (GoI). Iran's political maneuverings toward this end have failed to
    date, while the United States and GOI continue strategic dialogue to
    maintain momentum in the Global Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS) campaign.
        Iran currently possesses one of the most capable militaries in the
    Middle East, and its offensive capabilities include nearly 3,000 short-
    and long-range ballistic missiles as well as an array of land-attack
    cruise missiles (LACMs) and UASs. The Iranian regime demonstrated both
    the capability and willingness to employ all of these offensive weapons
    in complex attacks against Saudi Arabia's oil facilities in 2019, and
    again against United States Forces in Iraq in 2020.
        Iran provides weapons, parts, and expertise to Houthi forces in
    Yemen for the purpose of attacking Saudi Arabia. Since January 2021,
    Iranian-aided Houthi forces have launched more than 150 ballistic
    missile, LACM, and one-way UAS attacks against military,
    infrastructure, and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. These attacks
    have varied in scope and complexity, with UAS detection and
    interdiction particularly challenging not just for Saudi forces, but
    also for United States and Coalition forces supporting Saudi Arabia's
    defense. These small- and medium-sized UAS proliferating across the AOR
    present a new and complex threat to our forces and those of our
    partners and allies. For the first time since the Korean War, we are
    operating without complete air superiority. As a result, USCENTCOM has
    made the counter-UAS effort one of its top priorities, and employs a
    variety of systems and tactics to defeat these threats. Until we are
    able to develop and field a networked capability to detect and defeat
    UAS, the advantage will remain with the attacker.
        USCENTCOM remains committed to helping defend Saudi Arabia. United
    States assistance to the Kingdom focuses on providing information to
    Saudi Arabia's armed forces to assist them in thwarting Houthi UAV,
    ballistic missile, and explosive boat attacks that contravene
    international law and undermine diplomatic efforts. USCENTCOM does not
    provide offensive military support to the Saudi-led Coalition. Saudi
    Arabia understands that the only way to end the Houthi UAV and missile
    attacks is to end the war in Yemen. Deputy Minister of Defense Khalid
    bin Salman and other senior Saudi officials have engaged consistently
    and constructively with United States. Special Envoy Tim Lenderking and
    UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths in an effort to find a negotiated end
    to the conflict. Under a proposed UN agreement, which Saudi Arabia has
    publicly endorsed, parties would agree to a nationwide ceasefire in
    exchange for the opening of Hudaydah Port and Sanaa Airport, then
    transition to political talks. USCENTCOM supports these diplomatic
    efforts and remains postured to support a UN-backed ceasefire if
    directed.
        However, international efforts to end the war have been met with
    political intransigence and more Houthi attacks, including a sustained
    ground Houthi offensive to seize Marib, an attack targeting the
    Republic of Yemen Government Parliament while it was deplaning in Aden,
    and unprecedented missile and UAS strikes against civilian targets in
    Saudi Arabia. The Iranian regime's provisioning of lethal aid to the
    Houthis to enable such attacks prolongs the conflict in Yemen,
    exacerbates regional tensions, threatens the security of Saudi Arabia,
    and extends the suffering of the Yemeni people who are subject to
    widespread food and water shortages, malnutrition, and insufficient
    healthcare services.
        In addition to USCENTCOM's regular force posture, the theater
    benefits from Dynamic Force Employment missions (DFE); Agile Combat
    Employment (ACE); and a balanced, visible maritime presence. Strategic
    bomber task force missions flown no-notice from bases in the United
    States to the Gulf from the fall of 2020 to the present and two
    fighter-squadron deployments demonstrate DFE over-the-horizon power
    projection, exercise seamless and rapid operational coordination
    between multiple combatant commands. They also enhance integration with
    numerous partners and allies across the region. Developing the
    capability to arm and fuel Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft
    from austere, expeditionary air bases in the Arabian Peninsula provides
    an example of how USCENTCOM generates and exercises ACE capabilities in
    an active combat theater. Meanwhile, U.S. carrier strike groups and
    other strategic maritime capabilities operating wherever international
    law allows provide USCENTCOM the flexibility of U.S.-sovereign
    deterrent options free from access, basing, or overflight restrictions.
        As Iran's ballistic missile force is the most formidable in the
    region, USCENTCOM's missile defense assets incorporate Patriots,
    Sentinel and Avenger systems, and Navy cruisers/destroyers to form a
    layered defense, augmented by Theater High-Altitude Air Defense when
    ordered. Since Gulf nations field nearly 80 percent of all regional
    air-defense systems, USCENTCOM is working to develop a long-term,
    regionally-aligned effort focused on a centralized integrated air and
    missile defense (IAMD).
        Other active and passive defense efforts to safeguard United States
    Forces, deter Iranian destabilizing actions, and provide regional
    safety and security include:
          Critical mine countermeasure capabilities provided with
    Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon heavy-
    lift helicopters help maintain freedom of navigation for U.S. and
    merchant shipping.
          ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)
    platforms, such as our MQ-9s, are highly useful in monitoring and
    identifying potential threats or malign activities, providing early
    warning and attribution.
          Pursuing opportunities to enhance expeditionary basing in
    less vulnerable portions of the USCENTCOM AOR.
          Conducting analysis on bunker hardening proposals and
    implementing blast mitigation measures to improve protective shelters
    within missile range and mitigate the risk of traumatic brain injury in
    the event of missile and rocket attacks.
          Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar and Patriot missile
    systems that provide proven, effective ground-based air-defense
    platforms critical for U.S. and partner self-defense.
        In addition, as the U.S. footprint in the AOR evolves, legacy KC-
    135 and replacement KC-46 refueling capabilities will continue to play
    a critical role, enhancing USCENTCOM's ability to execute essential
    missions across a vast region with limited suitable airfields.
          line of effort 2--countering violent extremist organizations
    Countering Violent Extremist Organizations--Afghanistan
        The United States strategic objective in Afghanistan, as it has
    been since 2001, is to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe
    haven for terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies
    and partners. Success toward this objective and the path to lasting
    peace remains an Afghan-owned, Afghan-led process to achieve a
    political settlement and comprehensive ceasefire between the Taliban
    and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).
    USCENTCOM remains steadfast in support of ongoing interagency and
    diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated political settlement, and is
    committed to working with our regional partners to ensure our ability
    to counter a potential reemergence of terrorist threats against the
    Homeland.
        Pursuant to President Biden's April 14 policy announcement,
    USCENTCOM will execute a deliberate and orderly withdrawal of remaining
    United States troops in Afghanistan before the 20th anniversary of
    September 11. We will execute this withdrawal in lockstep with our NATO
    allies and partners in a manner that ensures the safety of our people
    and security of our assets. We went in together, adjusted together, and
    will prepare to leave together. USCENTCOM's key focus during the
    withdrawal will be management of the transition and the safety of U.S.,
    as well as NATO ally and partner personnel as they depart the country.
    We have told the Taliban in no uncertain terms that any attacks on
    United States troops as we undergo a safe and orderly withdrawal will
    be met with a forceful response.
        The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) is the primary source
    of funds for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
    and remains a critical resource to Security Force Assistance, enabling
    an effective, affordable, and sustainable ANDSF. As the President has
    said, while we will not stay involved in Afghanistan militarily, we
    will continue to support the government of Afghanistan and keep
    providing assistance to the ANDSF. Overseeing the responsible execution
    of ASFF has been, and will continue to be, a team effort. USCENTCOM is
    committed to working with interagency partners to develop mechanisms
    that ensure continued oversight of and accountability for ASFF.
        As we finalize this mission, I must express my deepest gratitude to
    those Americans who served and sacrificed on behalf of our Nation. I
    realize that not all of our troops returned from their deployments
    while others returned home wounded and forever changed. My deepest
    admiration and respect goes out to our heroes and their families.
    Countering Violent Extremist Organizations--Iraq and Syria
        United States and Coalition Forces remain in Iraq at the request of
    the GOI for one purpose--to ensure the defeat of ISIS. In July 2020,
    Coalition forces under command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation
    Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) began Phase IV of the Global D-ISIS
    campaign in Iraq and Syria, transitioning from a focus on tactical-
    level Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA), to a focus on advising and
    enabling partner forces at the operational and strategic levels. This
    partnering model in Iraq uses a centralized advising approach toward
    the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) at higher echelons of command. The
    Coalition established the Military Advisory Group co-located with the
    Iraqi Joint Operations Command to provide on-site intelligence,
    operations, logistics, fires, and air support from a central location.
        Iraqi Security Forces continue to make great progress, due in large
    part to the D-ISIS Coalition's investment in training and equipping
    thousands of Iraqi troops. Many ISF units are now capable of
    independently planning large-scale operations and executing with
    Coalition enablers. Operation READY LION was a 14-day Counter Terrorism
    (CT) mission conducted in March 2021 to clear ISIS remnants from
    mountain strongholds in northeast Iraq. This ISF planned and led
    operation, aided by Coalition enablers, eliminated nearly 200 ISIS hide
    locations. As our recent Strategic Dialogue with Iraq made clear, the
    transition of the United States and other international forces to
    training, equipping, and assisting the ISF reflects the success of
    their strategic partnership and supports the ISF's continued efforts to
    ensure ISIS can never again threaten Iraq's stability.
        USCENTCOM also established the Special Operations Advisory Group to
    provide similar advisory support to the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism
    Service, one of our most effective partners in targeting ISIS
    leadership. Other necessary enabling functions include ISR and air
    strike capabilities still in nascent development in the ISF.
        USCENTCOM recognizes that efforts to stabilize Iraq must go beyond
    CJTF-OIR's D-ISIS campaign and address the root causes of instability.
    NATO's contribution, through NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) is a separate, but
    complementary mission of Security Sector Reform targeting the
    institutional capacity of Iraq's Ministry of Defense. This mission is
    vital to taking advantage of the Coalition's hard-won gains in Iraq.
    Bolstering CJTF-OIR's efforts of advising and enabling partner forces,
    NMI is a non-combat mission that seeks to build the institutional
    governance of, and professionalize, the ISF at the senior levels. As
    CJTF-OIR's mission matures through Phase IV, NMI's role within Iraq
    will grow. The North Atlantic Council projects NMI's eventual end
    strength to expand considerably, contingent on the GoI's continued
    approval. USCENTCOM and NATO staffs collaborate frequently to ensure
    close coordination, and CJTF-OIR maintains two planners within the NMI
    staff to coordinate future efforts.
        In Syria, efforts by Global Coalition partners and the Syrian
    Democratic Forces (SDF) were critical in the territorial defeat of
    ISIS, and these partners remain essential to the ongoing D-ISIS
    campaign. Throughout 2020, the ongoing Syrian civil war, long-term
    displacement of civilians, destabilizing influence of Iran, disruptive
    role of Russia, and COVID pandemic complicated efforts to bring about
    the enduring defeat of ISIS in Syria. Despite these obstacles, our SDF
    partners continue to make progress against ISIS as the Coalition
    continues to provide enabling support while developing capabilities for
    the SDF to operate independently. Partnered operations focus on
    enhancing planning, command and control capabilities, and the provision
    of key enablers for success to include ISR and medical support.
        Notwithstanding significant attrition to its senior leadership and
    difficulties generating sufficient revenue, ISIS remains a learning,
    adaptive, and committed VEO with a dedicated core. It promotes a global
    cyber presence while retaining a cellular structure that allows it to
    carry out local attacks--with the ultimate aspiration to reestablish a
    physical ``caliphate.''
        Constant surveillance and consistent pressure by the ISF in Iraq
    and SDF in Syria, enabled by United States and Coalition forces, have
    prevented ISIS from conducting or enabling external attacks against the
    United States and its allies. As USCENTCOM's D-ISIS campaign continues
    we assess attacks inspired, enabled, or conducted by ISIS will continue
    in the form of an insurgency. Our objective is to develop and enable
    the ability of the ISF in Iraq and SDF in Syria to address and contain
    these threats without external assistance. Throughout 2021, our partner
    forces will continue to benefit from a range of financial and materiel
    support provided through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)
    program that provided $701 million of critical assistance in 2020.
        As noted in the 2020 congressionally-mandated RAND study,
    ``Strategic Evaluation of the Counter Islamic State Train and Equip
    Fund,'' the CTEF program has proven a very effective tool in the Global
    D-ISIS campaign, predominantly because of the flexibility and speed
    with which it can be applied to dynamic conditions in Iraq and Syria.
    Key activities funded by CTEF include the acquisition of niche CT
    capacity for the ISF, support to the SDF, stipends for our Syrian and
    Peshmerga partners, detention facility support, and the repatriation of
    ISIS detainees. CTEF support for Syrian partner forces also facilitates
    ongoing operations to find, fix and finish SIS sleeper cells, and
    maintain control of key terrain and lines of communication in eastern
    Syria.
    ISIS Detainees, their Family Members, and Refugees/Internally Displaced
            Persons
        Two by-products of the Global D-ISIS campaign that cannot be solved
    by the use of military force are the repatriation of foreigners from
    detention centers and displaced persons camps in Northeast Syria and
    the pace of stabilization programs and reintegration of displaced
    people across both Syria and Iraq.
        Presently, the SDF holds nearly 10,000 ISIS fighters, including
    nearly 2,000 hard-core foreign fighters, in more than two dozen
    makeshift detention centers across northeast Syria. Although U.S.
    Forces do not directly supervise these detention activities, we
    mitigate risk using CTEF that helps enable the security of those
    facilities. While the SDF remains capable of responding to external
    attacks and quelling internal riots, threats persist. The SDF cannot,
    and should not be expected to hold these detainees indefinitely.
    Outside of detention centers, thousands of foreign women and children,
    many affiliated with ISIS detainees, are living in displaced persons
    camps. They too need to be repatriated. While several countries have
    taken responsibility to repatriate their own citizens, the overwhelming
    majority of countries have yet to do so.
        Over the last year, increased violence in the Al-Hol displaced
    persons camp in northeast Syria has impeded the SDF's access to, and
    overall safety in, the camp, having a detrimental effect on
    humanitarian conditions. The adverse and insecure conditions create
    increased risk for camp populations and camp administration, as well as
    humanitarian relief organizations and non-governmental organizations
    operating in the camp. Al-Hol, one of the largest displaced persons
    camps in Syria holds nearly 61,000 people. Ninety-four percent of Al-
    Hol's occupants are women and children, with two-thirds under the age
    of 18. Besides the near-term risk of an outbreak of disease or other
    conditions that could cause a humanitarian catastrophe, efforts by ISIS
    to radicalize elements of this population pose longer-term concerns.
        Stabilization programs in northeast Syria implemented by USAID and
    DOS have responded to the need for basic services in communities of
    origin to incentivize voluntary, safe, and dignified returns of
    displaced populations and help maintain stability. Current resources
    from all international donors are insufficient to meet demand,
    resulting in a sense of community grievance which extremist elements
    attempt to exploit. This presents opportunities for ISIS to re-emerge
    and increases the risk to the SDF.
    Countering Violent Extremist Organizations--Yemen
        The critical United States interest in Yemen resides in maintaining
    our ability to conduct counterterrorism activities against al-Qaida in
    the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen. Without a lasting
    political solution and accompanying economic recovery, the conflict in
    Yemen will continue to threaten regional security and stability, and
    Yemen will remain a safe haven for VEOs aspiring to threaten United
    States interests and regional stability. USCENTCOM, in partnership with
    Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Republic of Yemen Government, has been
    effective in degrading VEO external operations capabilities in Yemen
    over the past several years.
      strategic competition with china and the destabilizing influence of
                                     russia
        The USCENTCOM AOR is, and always has been, a crossroads of global
    interests and a historically prime arena for foreign powers to compete
    for influence, resources and access. In 2020, China and Russia
    exploited ongoing regional crises, financial and infrastructure needs,
    perceptions of declining United States engagement, and the COVID-19
    pandemic to advance their objectives across the Middle East and Central
    and South Asia (CASA) nations to gain or enhance influence in the
    region.
        China's strategic engagement in the USCENTCOM AOR takes the long
    view with short and long-term objectives in mind. China's current
    interests and approach in the region are predominantly diplomatic and
    economic. China engaged with nearly every country in the AOR in 2020,
    using debt traps, the Belt and Road Initiative, and medical diplomacy
    to create dependence and expand its influence within the AOR. China's
    recent 25-year agreement with Iran could vastly expand Chinese
    influence in Iranian banking, telecommunications, ports, railways and
    dozens of economic projects in exchange for discounted oil. The
    agreement also proposes expanding military cooperation, potentially
    providing China an additional foothold in the Arabian Gulf while also
    undercutting United States efforts to negotiate with Iran. China has
    also emerged as an arms supplier to the region. Attempting to rival the
    United States as a ``partner of choice,'' China sells military
    equipment at discount prices, unencumbered by United States deliberate
    processes, maintenance support packages, and end-use restrictions.
        In 2021, China will continue to strengthen defense cooperation
    throughout the region through arms sales, exercises, and multilateral
    organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, seeking to
    establish and strengthen trade relationships across the Middle East,
    prioritizing access to energy resources. China's long-term goals are
    not just to cultivate trade relationships, economic investment, and
    comprehensive partnerships among regional states, but to exert coercive
    influence and eventually establish a permanent military presence in an
    area from which it imports nearly 50 percent of its crude oil and
    roughly 40 percent of its natural gas.
        Russia, in contrast, does not play a long game, yet it is equally
    disruptive to the region. Russia seeks to undermine and disrupt United
    States influence to enhance its own, and improve its position on the
    global stage. Russia's engagement in the USCENTCOM AOR is largely
    opportunistic and transactional. Fueled in part by a desire to play
    ``spoiler'' to United States interests but also by a set of economic
    factors, Russia maintains oil production agreements and works to expand
    nuclear energy markets, trade, and arms sales. Russia increased its
    activities in Syria by establishing an enduring military presence where
    it regularly interferes with the Global Coalition's D-ISIS campaign,
    and obtaining a warm-water base for its navy in Tartus. Russian
    military expansion in Syria provides it with a proving ground to test
    emerging capabilities, technologies, and fifth-generation equipment
    used for electronic warfare, air defense, UAS, and information
    operations--all in proximity to United States Forces. In September
    2020, USCENTCOM deployed Sentinel radar and Bradley Fighting Vehicles
    to the Eastern Syria Security Area, and increased fighter patrols over
    United States Forces in response to a dangerous increase in
    unauthorized, unsafe Russian interactions threatening Coalition forces.
    Russia will seek ways to challenge United States presence as
    opportunities present themselves, in an effort to position itself as an
    alternative to the West by offering to mediate regional conflicts,
    selling arms without end-use restrictions, offering military expertise,
    and participating in regional and multilateral organizations and
    military exercises. In Central Asia, where proximity to China and
    Russia is great and United States presence is comparatively small,
    every interaction holds significance. Opportunities to compete with
    China and Russia in this region manifest themselves through border
    security, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and defense institution
    building.
        As China and Russia compete militarily with the United States below
    the level of combat, USCENTCOM develops capabilities to address and
    mitigate gray-zone actions, safeguarding our technology from rivals
    operating in the region. USCENTCOM represents the world's most active
    electromagnetic battlespace and requires a robust interoperability and
    information sharing capability in order to protect U.S., allied, and
    partner critical capabilities as we move forward with collective
    defense initiatives. Adversary jamming of our commercial satellite
    communications allows state and non-state actors to asymmetrically
    contest and complicate U.S. Force projection. The increasing
    computational power and improvements in rival powers' cryptographic
    analysis capabilities makes it imperative that USCENTCOM and our
    partners plan, execute, and implement a cryptographic modernization
    plan to ensure maximum interoperability, mitigate potential cyber-
    attacks, and maintain a secure information exchange environment.
                     regional cooperation and partnerships
        As encapsulated in its overall mission, USCENTCOM will continue to
    focus on regional partnerships and cooperation. Two examples of
    maritime partnerships that promote regional collective security and
    demonstrate U.S. commitment to broad relationships and partners in the
    region are the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and the International
    Maritime Security Construct (IMSC). The 33 nation CMF conducts maritime
    security operations to ensure the free flow of commerce, actively deny
    the use of the high seas to terrorist and illicit networks, and curtail
    illegal shipments of narcotics and lethal aid. The IMSC is a
    cooperation-based framework ensuring safety of maritime shipping and
    the free flow of seaborne commerce through presence, surveillance, and
    attribution of malign activities in international waters in and around
    the Arabian Gulf and the Bab al Mandeb.
        The normalization of relations between Israel and a number of
    Muslim-majority Arab states in 2020 and the realignment of the Unified
    Command Plan (UCP) moving Israel from United States European Command to
    USCENTCOM provide new opportunities for enhancing regional stability
    and security cooperation. The UCP change better aligns the combatant
    command areas of responsibility with the organizational boundaries of
    other federal agencies, creating coordination efficiencies for whole-
    of-government efforts in the AOR. USCENTCOM plans to achieve initial
    operating capability and the shift of combatant command authority and
    responsibility by September of 2021. The normalization of relations
    between Israel and other key USCENTCOM partners, manifested initially
    in diplomatic and economic cooperation, reduces tensions and holds
    potential for eventual expansion of military cooperation and alignment
    toward shared threats.
        USCENTCOM's senior defense officials and defense attaches (SDO/
    DATT) live, work, and develop close relationships with host nation
    officials in every country in the USCENTCOM AOR except Iran and Syria.
    Our partners place great weight on these relationships, and the
    military rank of our SDO/DATTs conveys respect and importance as to how
    the U.S. views the partnership we have with each nation.
                                covid-19 impacts
        Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, several governments in the
    USCENTCOM AOR faced growing economic challenges. Most governments
    incurred significant expenditures and revenue losses during the
    pandemic that exacerbated pre-existing socioeconomic conditions
    contributing to deepening popular unrest. Government officials largely
    prioritized efforts to mitigate the spread of the virus over
    implementing needed economic policy reforms. Impacts to regional
    economies will further fuel issues fomenting unrest to include
    provision and equitable distribution of services, medical care, and
    employment.
        Across the AOR, USCENTCOM rapidly responded to the COVID-19 threat,
    implementing non-pharmaceutical interventions, obtaining and
    disseminating personal protective equipment, and adapting newly-
    developed treatment guidelines to an austere deployed environment.
    Despite the pandemic, military operations and medical support for
    combat and non-combat casualties remain fully mission capable.
    Extensive public health measures and medical support across the AOR
    resulted in zero COVID-19-related service member deaths.
        In fall 2020, USCENTCOM worked closely with the Joint Staff,
    Defense Health Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency to identify
    requirements for emerging COVID-19 vaccines released under Food and
    Drug Administration Emergency Use Authorization in December 2020.
    USCENTCOM prioritized forward-deployed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
    Syria for early vaccine delivery and voluntary inoculation efforts.
        As of 14 April 2021, over 7,114 cases of COVID-19 were identified
    resulting in 276 personnel medically evacuated from theater. Since
    March 2020, constraints associated with COVID-19 resulted in
    cancellation of 20 Joint or Combined exercises within the USCENTCOM
    AOR, impacting mission readiness and partner-nation collaboration.
    While many events were cancelled due to COVID-19, partners remain
    committed to continuing larger, multinational exercises like Bright
    Star and Eager Lion.
        Refinement of theater deployment physical standards for all
    personnel helped reduce the impact to U.S., Coalition, and partner-
    nation civilians. Vaccinations for forward-deployed personnel in
    Afghanistan and the Gulf region began in late January 2021. Continued
    entry of COVID-19 infected personnel, finite quantities of on-hand
    testing consumables, limited quarantine and hospital capacity in
    theater, and irregular resupply remain significant obstacles to
    outbreak prevention and containment. In March, USCENTCOM significantly
    expanded vaccine distribution throughout the AOR with the intent to
    provide COVID-19 vaccines for all DOD personnel, dependents, and
    contractors willing to receive it to provide maximal force health
    protection. We have received a substantial portion of the required
    vaccines to meet that objective. Furthermore, USCENTCOM advocates
    providing COVID-19 vaccines for Coalition and partner forces working
    alongside U.S. Forces. Continuing an aggressive vaccination program for
    forward-deployed units, combined with further emphasis on effective
    pre-deployment restriction of movement and testing, clean transit
    routes into theater, and prioritization of deploying personnel for a
    CONUS-based, Service-led COVID-19 vaccination program will ensure
    continued mission effectiveness forward.
        At USCENTCOM headquarters, restrictions on travel and movement in
    both the AOR and the U.S. impacted face-to-face key leader engagements
    and regular personnel rotations throughout much of 2020. USCENTCOM
    instituted robust teleworking procedures, with on-site staffing reduced
    to 25 percent in March 2020. This percentage increased to 50 percent in
    September 2020. USCENTCOM remains a warfighting headquarters, postured
    to support multiple active campaigns across the AOR. Partial staffing,
    teleworking, and effective uses of technology since March 2020 provided
    short-term solutions to enable safe operations in the headquarters and
    continuous support to forward-deployed formations.
                           taking care of our people
        The USCENTCOM workforce operates at a warfighting tempo, whether
    deployed or working in the Tampa headquarters. The mental and physical
    stressors associated with the demands of our operational environment,
    exacerbated by COVID-19, present significant challenges to our
    workforce. Meeting the mental health and spiritual needs of our people
    regardless of religious affiliation remains a high priority at
    USCENTCOM. Our chaplains provide professional, confidential counseling
    across the USCENTCOM workforce addressing essential matters of the
    heart and soul to include sexual harassment, extremism, personal
    relationships, stress, and suicide prevention.
        Sexual assault and sexual harassment, extremism, and discrimination
    break down the trust and cohesion necessary for the USCENTCOM workforce
    to execute its missions effectively and efficiently. To combat these
    challenges, USCENTCOM places command emphasis on programs that build
    resilience, readiness, and cohesion. It is a leadership responsibility
    to provide a safe work environment, and to hold accountable those who
    seek to disrupt it. USCENTCOM leaders understand it is not just what
    our people hear their leaders say, but what they see their leaders do
    that makes an impact.
        Improving diversity and inclusion across the force is an
    operational imperative to meet the demands of strategic competition.
    USCENTCOM takes deliberate actions to build a diverse workforce
    promoting equality and innovation. USCENTCOM established a Diversity
    and Inclusion position, singularly focused on advising the command on
    all matters relating to discrimination and institutional biases, as
    well as barriers to diversity and inclusion across the organization.
        USCENTCOM remains fully committed to the prevention of sexual
    assault and sexual harassment, improving our command climate and
    prevention efforts in both of these areas. We constantly work to ensure
    both our military and civilian workforce feel comfortable coming
    forward and reporting any concerns, and ensure that leaders at all
    levels take appropriate action to build positive workplace climates.
        USCENTCOM recently completed a command-wide stand down to address
    extremism. These stand downs were led by general/flag rank officers or
    senior civilians, and included virtual training modules featuring
    subject matter experts and facilitated small-group discussions to build
    awareness and help prevent actions associated with extremist behaviors.
    USCENTCOM's leaders are charged with the responsibility to continue
    this dialogue beyond the DOD mandate to make clear that operating in a
    command free of discrimination, hate, and harassment while
    accomplishing our mission is paramount to our success.
        Taking care of our people is a very high priority for me personally
    as the USCENTCOM commander. I speak frequently to my subordinate
    commanders on these matters because this is commander's business. It
    requires the full attention of the chain of command, and in USCENTCOM,
    these critical matters have that full attention.
                                   conclusion
        The USCENTCOM AOR remains challenging and dynamic. One constant in
    USCENTCOM remains the strength of our people. As nearly two decades and
    two of the longest conflicts in U.S. history begin to wind down, our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, guardians,
    civilians, and their families remain steadfast in their commitment to
    our mission and the vital roles they serve in U.S. national security.
    Their service and sacrifice over many long years of conflict is
    humbling and inspirational, benefiting the lives of millions across the
    U.S. and the AOR. We honor those who have sacrificed by ensuring the
    mission continues, and their sacrifices were not in vain.
        USCENTCOM fulfills its missions, appreciative of the efforts and
    support of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense on our
    behalf. We acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency and thank the
    members of Congress, the Defense Committees, and their staffs, without
    whose consistent and timely support we would be unable to accomplish
    our missions in support of U.S. national security interests and the
    will of the American people.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General McKenzie.
    General Townsend, please.

       STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER,
                      UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

        General Townsend. Can you hear me?
        Chairman Reed. Yes, sir.
        General Townsend. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    Members of the Committee, good morning, and thank you for the
    opportunity to appear today. It is a privilege to represent
    America's exceptional men and women at United States Africa
    Command, who are dedicated to securing United States interests
    and preserving our strategic options on the African continent.
    This morning I am accompanied by AFRICOM's senior enlisted
    leader, Marine Corps Sergeant Major Richard Thresher, and one
    of my key staff advisors, Air Force Colonel Jacqueline Breeden.
    I am also here this morning with my colleague and friend,
    General Frank McKenzie, the CENTCOM commander, to discuss
    shared challenges and opportunities in our areas of
    responsibility and the high return the American people give of
    their defense investments around the globe.
        Historically, America has not been penalized for
    underestimating the importance of Africa. Today, we can no
    longer afford to underestimate the economic opportunity and the
    strategic consequence that Africa embodies, and which
    competitors, like China and Russia, fully recognize. Africa is
    a crossroads of the globe. The recent blockage of the Suez
    Canal not only demonstrated the importance of critical sea
    lines of communication flowing through the Mediterranean and
    Red Seas, but also around the Cape of Good Hope. Violent
    extremist organizations, competitor activities, and fragile
    states are among some of the threats to U.S. interests.
        Beyond geography, global population growth is largely
    African. By 2050, 1 in 4 people on the planet will live in
    Africa. Rapidly-growing markets, 60 percent of the world's
    arable land, and vast untapped resources, including strategic
    rare earth minerals, provide tremendous economic potential.
    Thirteen of the world's 25 fastest-growing economies are in
    Africa. Africa's tremendous opportunities are offset by
    significant challenges, including climate change, food
    shortages, poverty, ungoverned spaces, historic grievances, and
    other factors, that make the continent also home to 14 of the
    world's 20 most fragile countries.
        Our strategic competitors are very active in Africa. China
    has invested heavily in their second continent, where some
    think tanks call it China's fifth island chain. Russia seeks to
    exploit instability and fragility for their own gain and at
    United States expense. Iran is increasingly active on the
    continent. At the same time, African-based violent extremists,
    like al Qaeda affiliates, Al-Shabab and ISIS, thrive in the
    government's--in the continent's ungoverned spaces. They
    provide the greatest threat to many of our African partners and
    aspire to kill Americans in Africa, as well as here at home.
        Across the diverse continent, United States AFRICOM
    operates with .3 percent of DOD's budget and .3 percent of
    DOD's manpower. This tiny investment pays enormous dividends as
    just under 6,000 servicemembers, civilians, and contractors
    work with our partners, both interagency and foreign, to
    counter malign actors and transnational threats, respond to
    crises, and strengthen security forces to advance U.S.
    interests and promote regional security, stability, and
    prosperity. AFRICOM works every day to protect America's
    security and advance our access and influence. We do this arm
    in arm with the U.S. Interagency and through coordinated action
    with our allies and partners. What AFRICOM accomplishes with a
    few people and a few dollars on a continent three-and-a-half
    the size of the continental United States is a bargain for the
    American taxpayer and a low-cost insurance policy for America's
    security.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thanks for your
    continued support to our armed forces, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Townsend follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Stephen J. Townsend
     introduction: strong return on our modest investment in this dynamic
                                    theater.
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
    the Committee, it is an honor to come before you again to represent the
    dedicated and professional service members and civilians of United
    States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Since the last time I briefed you,
    USAFRICOM participated in a Command review and has developed a new
    campaign plan to ensure our alignment with the National Defense
    Strategy (NDS). USAFRICOM's Campaign Plan (ACP) aligns with our
    Nation's strategic objectives to protect our people and our Homeland,
    assure our allies and partners, and counter malign actors. Our national
    interests guide our campaign plan and our mission: United States Africa
    Command, with partners, counters malign actors and transnational
    threats, responds to crises, and strengthens security forces in order
    to advance United States interests and promote regional security,
    stability, and prosperity. I am confident the American people are
    getting a good value for our very modest investment of defense
    resources in Africa.
        The African Continent is important to the United States
    politically, economically, and militarily. It is home to the fastest
    growing economies and populations in the world, sits at crossroads of
    international commerce, trade and global force flow, and watches over
    important sea lines of communication. Our future security, prosperity,
    and ability to project power globally rest on free, open, and secure
    access in and around Africa. Activities of competitor states, violent
    extremist organizations, instability and fragility all challenge our
    access. Despite these challenges, this dynamic continent presents a
    number of opportunities for the United States to advance our interests.
        The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the coupling of challenges and
    opportunities in Africa. Our forces remained in place and continued to
    operate within the limits of our force health protection measures. Our
    nation's values and long-term whole-of-government commitment to support
    and build partner capacity has been our strongest assets over the last
    year. To combat and contain the pandemic, African partners have
    mobilized medical capabilities built over decades of United States-led
    efforts to combat infectious diseases. USAFRICOM supported United
    States efforts to provide COVID-19 assistance in 43 countries,
    including the delivery of nearly $500 million in medical supplies.
    While force health protective measures required us to re-scope many of
    our activities, we have stayed connected with our African partners
    during their time of need.
       strategic environment: incredible potential checked by incredible
                                   obstacles
    A Vast Continent of Opportunity and Challenge
        The land mass of Africa is larger than the United States, China,
    India, Japan, and most of Europe combined. Over half of the world's
    arable land is on the continent, along with much of the planet's
    untapped mineral resources, \1\ including strategic minerals. Africa is
    home to 11 of the world's 25 fastest growing economies, as measured by
    gross domestic product data for 2020. \2\ Africa's population is young,
    growing fast, and expected to top two billion in 2050, when more than a
    quarter of the world's inhabitants will live on the continent. By 2100,
    Africa's population could nearly double again. Not only is the
    continent's growth rate the highest in the world, but the population is
    the youngest, with 41 percent under the age of 15. \3\ The growing size
    of the population, illustrates the rising global importance of the
    African continent and the momentum of Africa's expanding markets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Grow Africa: ``60 percent of Arable Land is in Africa and it
    has Billions in Investment Potential,'' 2020.
        \2\ International Monetary Fund, 2020 GDP growth (annual percent)
    https://www.imf.org/ (South Sudan, Egypt, Rwanda, Benin, Tanzania,
    Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, and Niger), 2021
        \3\ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/
    Population Division World Population Prospects, 2019
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Africa's rapid population growth also amplifies several challenges.
    Over two-thirds of Africans live in poverty. \4\ Natural resource
    exploitation, impacts of climate change, and infectious disease
    outbreaks all fuel instability and conflict. Desertification,
    particularly in the Lake Chad Basin where the Sahara Desert is
    expanding into the Sahel, has dramatically reduced arable land,
    threatened food security, and created conditions for instability and
    insecurity. Lack of economic opportunities and a search for a better
    life lead to migration, which creates compounding challenges. An
    increase in migration across Africa, as well as into Europe and North
    America, feeds a lucrative market for extremist organizations and
    criminal networks. The Fund for Peace ``Fragile State Index'' captures
    the aggregation of these challenges. Fourteen of the world's top twenty
    most fragile states are in the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).
    \5\ Despite these challenges, Africa's potential and strategic location
    continue to attract investment and engagement by geo-strategic
    competitors.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ 85 percent of Africans live off less than 5.50 USD per day,
    World Bank, 2019
        \5\ The Fund for Peace, ``Fragile State Index'' https://
    fragilestateindex.org/data/ (Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria,
    Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan,
    Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Burundi, Haiti, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali,
    Iraq, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Libya). Three of the top 20 (Afghanistan,
    Syria, and Iraq) represent $1.5 trillion in ``war-related'' expenses
    from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2019 according to the DOD
    Comptroller., 2021
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Strategic Geography
        Africa has global strategic importance relative to NATO's Southern
    Flank, the flow of commerce through the Red Sea, and protecting access
    to the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and South-East Asia. Located at the
    crossroads of the world, Africa watches over strategic choke points
    including the Strait of Gibraltar, the Strait of Sicily, the Red Sea,
    the Bab al Mandeb, and the Mozambique Channel. The sea line of
    communication (SLOC) running through the Mediterranean and Red Seas,
    and a second, dipping around the Cape of Good Hope, connect the East
    Coast of the United States to East Africa, the Middle East, India, and
    South East Asia. These pathways are essential to global trade, ongoing
    operations and contingency plans of seven other Combatant Commands.
    These corridors facilitate one-third of the shipping between North
    America and Asia, and one-third of global oil shipping. United States
    and global security depend on unhindered access to these waters.
    Strategic Competition
        The NDS prioritizes geo-political competition due to the
    ``magnitude of the threats [China and Russia] pose to United States
    security and prosperity, and the potential for those threats to
    increase in the future.'' \6\ Both Beijing and Moscow have long
    recognized the political, military, and economic importance of Africa
    and each continues to seize opportunities to expand their influence
    across the continent. Unencumbered by international norms and standards
    of transparency, our competitors are able to combine both government
    and private resources to gain influence. Exploitative practices for
    trade, resource extraction, weapons sales, and debt manipulation
    ultimately weakens governance, slows economic growth, and fosters
    instability.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American
    Military Competitive Edge, 2018, p 7.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The People's Republic of China leads the international community in
    head of state and senior leadership visits to Africa over the last
    decade--investing heavily, pledging $60 billion in infrastructure and
    development, and increasing arms sales to African countries. Beijing's
    activities in Africa are outpacing those of the United States and our
    allies as they seek resources and markets to feed economic growth in
    China and leverage economic tools to increase their global reach and
    influence. The People's Republic of China has 52 embassies in Africa,
    three more than the United States, and they continue to expand their
    base in Djibouti into a platform to project power across the continent
    and its waters--completing a large naval pier this year. The base is
    only 12 kilometers from our 3,400 DOD personnel at Camp Lemonnier, the
    Department's primary forward operating location in the USAFRICOM AOR.
    Beijing seeks to open additional bases, tying their commercial seaport
    investments in East, West and Southern Africa closely with involvement
    by Chinese military forces in order to further their geo-strategic
    interests.
        Russian strategy in Africa has long centered on building influence
    to facilitate economic opportunity, obtain political support for
    Russian initiatives, and increase military presence on NATO's southern
    flank. Russian private military companies (PMCs) are a destabilizing
    influence in Africa, frequently securing Russian investments at the
    expense of African interests. Russian PMCs almost certainly downed an
    unarmed, unmanned United States aircraft in Libya in November 2019
    using a sophisticated Russian air defense system. This past year,
    USAFRICOM exposed the extent of the Kremlin's malign involvement,
    despite its continued denial, by identifying and publicizing their
    deployment of high performance fighter aircraft to Libya.
        Iranian military capabilities threaten sea-lanes through the Red
    Sea and our posture locations in the Horn of Africa. Iranian support to
    Yemen's Houthis further jeopardizes freedom of navigation in the Red
    Sea and increases tensions and instability in East Africa. Camp
    Lemonnier's geostrategic location makes it a critical posture location
    to support USCENTCOM plans and operations. To mitigate this risk to our
    people, this year USAFRICOM requested funding for improving force
    protection. I am thankful that Congress has authorized and appropriated
    these funds. With the inclusion of the Iranian threat, East Africa is a
    nexus of four of the five major threats identified in the National
    Defense Strategy: The People's Republic of China, Russia, Iran, and
    violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
    VEOs are a Primary Threat to Many African Partners
        When I meet with African leaders, their primary concern is often
    VEOs killing their soldiers, kidnapping their civilians, and
    challenging their authority to rule. Transnational VEOs, like al Qaeda
    and ISIS, are expanding in Africa at a rapid pace, taking advantage of
    weak governance and disenfranchised populations. They threaten our
    partners' capacity to govern effectively, protect their populations,
    and improve their economies. Their terror attacks on the continent
    exacerbate the challenges of vulnerable populations, and some of them
    remain committed to strike at U.S. interests in both the region and the
    U.S. Homeland.
        East Africa is home to Al-Shabaab, the largest, wealthiest, and
    most violent Al Qaeda-associated group in the world. In 2019, Al-
    Shabaab's leadership publicly identified Americans and United States
    interests worldwide as priority targets, mirroring Usama bin Laden's
    declaration of war on the United States in 1996. In January 2020, Al-
    Shabaab followed through on this threat, attacking our forces at the
    Kenyan Naval Base at Manda Bay. This complex and well-resourced attack
    killed three Americans and clearly demonstrated Al-Shabaab's
    willingness and capability to attack the United States outside of
    Somalia. In February 2021, Al-Shabaab emir Ahmed Diriye repeated his
    call for violent attacks against Americans. Today, Al-Shabaab is the
    primary African VEO threat to American interests.
        The Islamic State is rapidly franchising across Africa, becoming
    increasingly more capable, violent, and difficult for our African
    partners to defeat without international support. In West Africa, the
    primary VEO threats are ISIS networks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin,
    Boko Haram, and al Qaeda's Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
    Kidnapping for ransom, targeting Westerners, remains a common tactic
    for VEOs and criminal organizations. USAFRICOM's continued engagement
    in the Counter-VEO (C-VEO) fight in West Africa has developed the
    situational awareness and regional partnerships that sustain United
    States access and influence. These relationships enabled USAFRICOM to
    rescue Mr. Philipe Walton within days of his abduction in Niger last
    October. To conduct this rescue mission, USAFRICOM requested, and
    within hours received approval for, armed access, basing, and
    overflight from seven countries and permission to conduct a raid in
    Nigeria. Continued collaboration with, and support to, our French
    African partners as well as our European allies, is imperative to
    counter growing extremism with limited United States resources in the
    West. Bottom line: Our relationships and our counter-VEO efforts build
    U.S. influence over strategic competitors.
      strategic approach: an ounce of prevention and cheap insurance for
                                    america
        A secure, stable, and prosperous Africa--aligned with the United
    States--is an enduring American interest. The U.S. must continue to
    work with our allies and partners to advance our mutual interests
    within the rules-based international system. Our campaign plan is
    focused on achieving four campaign objectives, developed and refined
    over the last year: 1) Gain and Maintain Strategic Access and
    Influence, 2) Disrupt VEO Threats to U.S. Interests, 3) Respond to
    Crises to Protect U.S. Interests, 4) Coordinate Action with Allies and
    Partners to Achieve Shared Security Objectives.
        USAFRICOM resources offer cheap insurance and an ounce of
    prevention for America. Funds to support contracted ISR capabilities as
    well as personnel and recovery and casualty evacuation dramatically
    improve our ability to help our troops accomplish their missions and
    protect them with less impact on high demand military capabilities.
    Similarly, modest but sustained funding levels for exercises,
    professional education and Section 333and 332 activities are critical
    to our ability to build partner capacity to do more for themselves and
    to compete effectively with competitors.
    Gain and Maintain Strategic Access and Influence
        Strategic access to exert influence and project power enables a
    broad range of U.S. Government activities. USAFRICOM competes and acts
    to maintain or expand U.S. influence and access. Our influence in
    Africa provides an advantage over competitors, deters conflict, assures
    partners of our commitment, and postures the United States to
    transition effectively to crisis or conflict if necessary. In
    cooperation with our allies, USAFRICOM builds trust and strengthens
    military relationships to allow for the rapid flow of forces and enable
    warplans when needed. As competition is increasingly global, Africa is
    rich with opportunities to counter, disrupt, tax, and win against
    strategic competitors.
        USAFRICOM prioritizes access in key geostrategic locations to
    disrupt competitor efforts that threaten United States freedom of
    action and to check malign activities which exploit our African
    partners. While we focus our military activities in key locations, we
    stay engaged across the continent to maintain situational awareness,
    support partners and allies, and respond to emerging crises.
    Disrupt VEO Threats to U.S. Interests
        Persistent state fragility in Africa drives instability and violent
    extremism, but also invites competitor exploitation. VEOs remain a
    significant threat to the shared interests of the United States, our
    allies, and our African partners. Many of these VEOs explicitly aspire
    to kill Americans. USAFRICOM, working with African and European
    partners, monitors these VEOs for indicators and warnings of attacks
    against the Homeland, our embassies, and our citizens. Monitoring VEO
    capabilities and intentions can be resource intensive but is a vital
    first step in preventing successful terrorist attacks.
        Regional VEOs are the number one security concern for many of our
    partners. Access and influence stem from helping our partners with the
    problems they face. Shared efforts against VEOs provide the best
    opportunity to strengthen partnerships and to ensure the U.S. is the
    security partner of choice in priority countries. In Africa, counter
    VEO efforts are strategic competition.
        USAFRICOM contributes to multi-national efforts to disrupt VEOs
    while also conducting direct actions to degrade VEOs who threaten the
    Homeland. In the East, USAFRICOM capabilities support and enable the
    African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the multi-national effort
    to defeat Al Shabaab, an arm of al Qaeda, and build sustainable
    security in Somalia as outlined in the 2017 London Security Pact. In
    the West, USAFRICOM supports the French-led multi-national coalition,
    United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
    Mali (MINUSMA), and the African-led G5 Sahel forces against Al Qaeda
    and ISIS affiliates. This sustainable, partner-centric approach
    protects the Homeland, builds relationships, creates access, and
    thwarts competitor advances.
    Respond to Crises to Protect U.S. Interests
        The DOD often helps set the conditions necessary for subsequent
    whole-of-government efforts across Africa. The tremendous work of the
    Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Development
    (USAID), and other organizations has dramatically reduced the impact of
    diseases like HIV/AIDS, Ebola, and COVID-19, strengthened educational
    systems, supported democratic elections, and encouraged economic
    growth. Whole-of-American Government efforts are contingent upon the
    ability of USAFRICOM and the DOD to protect our embassies, our
    investments, and our people working in Africa to advance United States
    interests.
        The DOS has designated 30 diplomatic facilities worldwide as High
    Threat, High Risk posts, 15 of them are in Africa. USAFRICOM shares
    many of our crisis response forces with USEUCOM to maximize savings and
    readiness to the department. In the last year, the attack on Manda Bay
    in Kenya, diplomatic engagements in Libya, the coup in Mali, recovery
    of an American Citizen, the order to reposition from Somalia and
    ongoing violence in Ethiopia have all tested our response capabilities
    across the spectrum of operations and across tens of thousands of
    miles.
        As our service members operate in small groups in remote locations
    throughout the continent, USAFRICOM is continuously adjusting our
    limited collection, medical, transportation, and response assets to
    protect our troops. I would like to thank Congress for authorizing and
    appropriating funds to dramatically improve force protection, personnel
    recovery, and casualty evacuation efforts to provide our troops the
    medical care where and when they need it.
    Coordinate Action with Allies and Partners to Achieve Shared Security
            Objectives
        USAFRICOM maintains a well-developed constellation of allies,
    multi-national organizations (European Union, African Union, NATO, and
    the United Nations), and African partners. \7\ These relationships
    enable USAFRICOM to coordinate action, enhance interoperability, and
    share costs and risks to achieve mutual security goals.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ USAFRICOM maintains Foreign Liaison Officers representing 19
    countries and multinational organizations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        USAFRICOM's active participation in multi-national efforts
    reinforces cooperation for mutual benefit, assures partners of U.S.
    commitment, and denies competitors opportunities to erode U.S.
    influence. Enhanced relationships and military activities enable
    USAFRICOM to help create time and space for our African partners to
    build the governance and economic growth necessary to gain the capacity
    to repel malign actors and VEO influences. Building partner capability
    is also an important tool in strategic competition, reinforcing the
    United States role as Africa's security partner of choice while
    furthering American values and influence. A great example of building
    relationships and trust is Exercise African Lion. Since 2002, African
    Lion has brought together partners and allies to enhance
    interoperability, build readiness and strengthen relationships. Trust
    is built over time--the relationships made while we develop partner
    capabilities provide America with long-term strategic alliances needed
    to address future challenges and ensure regional security and
    prosperity.
          regional assessments: a large, complex, and dynamic theater
    East Africa
        The strategic geography of East Africa remains vital to United
    States National Security. Despite a determined Chinese effort to assert
    influence in Djibouti and the region, our relationship with the
    Djiboutian Government remains strong. The strength of the relationship
    built between the United States and Djibouti was evident in the opening
    months of the COVID-19 pandemic. As global travel became more
    difficult, senior Djiboutian leaders approved every one of our flight
    requests into and out of our three facilities that comprise the
    Djibouti Base Cluster. This vitally important base houses approximately
    half of the U.S. military personnel in the USAFRICOM AOR and enables
    the U.S. to protect the SLOC through the Red Sea and project power
    across East, Central, and Southern Africa as well as into the USCENTCOM
    and USINDOPACOM AORs. The base cluster supports global force flow,
    sustains forward staged response forces, supports strategic
    competition, and enables C-VEO activities in both USAFRICOM and
    USCENTCOM's AORs.
        The recent Operation Octave Quartz demonstrated the agility and
    flexibility of the Joint Force. In just over 60 days, USAFRICOM
    received the order to reposition from Somalia, planned the operation,
    assembled a Joint Task Force of 13,400 service members from around the
    globe, and executed this high-risk mission ahead of schedule and
    without major incident. Once again, our strong partnerships with
    Djibouti and Kenya played a vital role in our successful repositioning.
    Our mission in Somalia has not changed, but our posture has.
    Ultimately, achieving our shared objectives in Somalia is tied to
    reconciliation between the Federal Government in Mogadishu and the
    Federal Member States, building institutional capacity across various
    sectors, and enhancing support to the troop contributing countries of
    AMISOM.
        The collective efforts of the United States Government,
    international community, and regional partners, has created tangible
    progress in Somalia, albeit far slower, far smaller, and far more
    fragile than we would like. AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA)
    have made slow gains in Al-Shabaab strongholds in the south, holding
    territory and establishing outposts. However, pre-election political
    friction between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Federal
    Member States has distracted Mogadishu from our common fight against
    Al-Shabaab. United States-trained and supported ``Danab'' SNA units, a
    result of the USG's commitment at the 2017 London Security Pact, most
    often spearhead security operations but it is critical that AMISOM
    remain in the fight until the SNA is able to counter Al-Shabaab
    themselves. As this is written, USAFRICOM is working with the Joint
    Staff and OSD to review our mission, resources and authorities in East
    Africa as part of the Global Posture Review.
    West Africa
        USAFRICOM employs a small footprint in West Africa as part of our
    African-led, allied-assisted, and United States-enabled framework to
    counter the expansion of VEOs in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin and
    to monitor increased strategic competitor activities. We coordinate our
    efforts with the larger multi-national security activities in West
    Africa (G5-Sahel and Multi-National Joint Task Force) and provide
    bilateral support to partner nations. However, progress is slow because
    in much of West Africa governance remains weak and populations
    disenfranchised. VEOs remain a significant threat and their violence
    continues to grow and spread.
        Extreme poverty, more frequent and intense weather events,
    vulnerable and marginalized populations, separatist movements, and
    illicit transnational networks overlap in the Sahel, creating
    opportunities for VEOs to establish safe haven, increasingly control
    the local populace and grow in strength. JNIM and ISIS associates have
    expanded in the region and now threaten the littoral states from the
    north--a development of increasing concern. ISIS-Core promotes ISIS-
    West Africa as a flagship network, while Al Qaeda supports their global
    network using revenue generated in the Sahel, mostly through kidnapping
    for ransom. Faced with these growing VEO threats, African countries
    seek United States support, making C-VEO efforts one of our most
    effective tools to counter competitor influence.
        The People's Republic of China's ``Belt and Road Initiative'' is
    one competitor initiative that seeks to increase Chinese access and
    influence along the Atlantic Coast of Africa. Today, the People's
    Republic of China has invested heavily in large-scale industrial
    fishing infrastructure in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), making the People's
    Republic of China the primary contributor to a growing food crisis that
    will further drive instability in West Africa. This exploitation--much
    of it illegal, unregulated, or under-reported illegal, unreported, and
    unregulated (IUU)--is not only counter-productive to our shared
    security objectives with West African countries, but also provides the
    economic pretense the People's Republic of China has previously used to
    justify increased military access. The way forward requires continued
    efforts with African partners and allies to build capacity to enforce
    their own maritime sovereignty. For example, Exercise Obangame Express
    is one way we seek to improve regional maritime domain awareness,
    capacity and cooperation. But, this annual event is insufficient by
    itself. A multinational maritime task force is a good option to address
    the plague of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Additionally, piratical
    attacks in Gulf of Guinea have become more frequent and violent,
    causing risk to international commerce and threatening maritime
    security.
        USAFRICOM will continue to work with Gulf of Guinea nations and
    other international partners to help strengthen regional cooperation
    and responses to piracy. Our European allies play critical roles in C-
    VEO operations in West Africa. France, who leads C-VEO multilateral
    efforts in the Sahel, is committed to security in the region with
    approximately 5,500 troops conducting security force assistance and
    direct action with support from a number of European allies. We mourn
    the loss, in recent months, of five French Soldiers killed fighting to
    secure our mutual security interests in West Africa. Our mutual support
    and cooperation with the French has had the effect of multiplying the
    resources available to advance our shared interests. The European Union
    and United Nations maintain multi-national missions in West Africa and
    the continued effort of the United States Government help keep these
    international partners engaged in this fight and sustain France's
    leadership of this effort.
    North Africa
        The Kingdom of Morocco, first to recognize our Nation in 1777,
    remains our strongest partner through exercises, training programs,
    foreign military sales, and counterterrorism cooperation. The Tunisians
    are also strong partners in the fight against ISIS-Libya and reinforce
    our security assistance with national funds. Our military relationship
    with Algeria significantly improved in the last year. Once looking
    almost exclusively to Russia, senior officials in the Algerian
    Government have recently expressed their desire to continue improving
    relations with the United States.
        In Libya, the election of a new Prime Minister and an Interim Unity
    Government mark continued progress. In the last 12 months, USAFRICOM
    supported our State Department in formally establishing a diplomatic
    link and we appreciate our excellent cooperation with AMB Norland and
    his team. Libya has provided Russia access and influence along NATO's
    southern flank. The Kremlin has publically denied direct involvement in
    the Libyan conflict, while thinly masking their governmental activities
    under the banner of the Wagner Group PMC. Continued progress on the
    political front is the best chance for long-term stability in Libya.
    Central and Southern Africa
        The potential exists for stronger partnerships and opportunities in
    central and southern Africa. Botswana is a bright spot with its
    enduring democracy, continued stability, professional military, and
    good relations with the United States. South Africa, the second-largest
    economy and our largest trading partner on the continent, has been the
    hardest hit by the global pandemic. USAFRICOM provided COVID-19 aid
    with the help of the OSD, DOS, and USAID. In northern Mozambique, where
    United States and European energy partners have planned an
    approximately $50 billion investment in liquid natural gas, we have
    seen a rapid increase in sophistication and violence from local groups
    that have evolved into the newest African affiliate of corporate ISIS.
    \8\
        Despite emerging opportunities, the People's Republic of China and
    Russia currently have the inside track in much of central and southern
    Africa. Russia is testing its playbook for malign activity in the
    Central African Republic, where they are employing PMCs, extracting
    minerals, and buying influence. Likewise, the People's Republic of
    China provided welcome COVID-19 aid diplomacy in South Africa. Without
    significant forces in Central and Southern Africa outside of our
    embassies, USAFRICOM maintains a limited supporting role to our United
    States diplomatic and development efforts in this region.
        conclusion: a secure and stable africa is an enduring american
                                   interest.
    Economy of Force
        A small investment in Africa goes a long, long way. What USAFRICOM
    accomplishes with a few troops and a few dollars, on a continent 3.5
    times the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the
    American taxpayer. Honest assessments and prudent investments ensure
    the U.S. maximizes the impact of every taxpayer dollar spent to secure
    American interests and support allies and partners. The locations where
    USAFRICOM resources and activities are concentrated represent the
    overlapping points where small teams of dedicated Americans can have
    outsized impacts on geo-strategic competition, protecting our personnel
    and Homeland, and reassuring our partners and allies. Providing our
    service members with the support we expect and they deserve, while
    operating across a vast continent with limited infrastructure, requires
    that power projection platforms, force protection, ISR, response
    forces, communications equipment, and medical care be forward deployed
    and ready to respond. Our partners and allies already bear much of this
    burden through reciprocal support and the relationships developed in
    exercises, intelligence sharing, coordination, and engagements. We
    could not complete our mission and advance our national interests in
    Africa without operating by, with, and through our allies and partners.
    An Ounce of Prevention
        USAFRICOM remains ready to protect United States citizens, advance
    our interests and strategic access, and to respond to crises in Africa.
    The men and women of USAFRICOM, our partners on the continent, and our
    broad collection of stakeholders understand how important Africa is to
    the global economy and security environment. Strategic access to Africa
    and its surrounding waters will be even more vital to United States
    national security in the future than it has been in the past.
        Africa is key terrain for strategic competition with the People's
    Republic of China and Russia and our support to C-VEO operations is
    necessary to protect the Homeland as well as America's citizens and
    interests abroad. Today, we are reviewing our very modest resources to
    maximize our ability to protect and advance our national security
    interests. Persistent engagement by the United States military, in
    areas where our objectives are shared with our African and European
    partners, allows the United States to remain the security partner of
    choice across much of the continent. Furthermore, the United States has
    the opportunity to apply our asymmetric advantages in C-VEO experience,
    intelligence collection, and military professionalism in furthering
    international norms, good governance, economic development, and
    security cooperation against the challenges facing our African
    partners. Our investments to improve the security environment in Africa
    will pay ever-larger dividends in the future as African states are
    increasingly able to harness opportunities of the African continent.
        It remains my honor to lead the service members, civilians, and
    families of United States Africa Command. Our efforts have made the
    U.S. safer, secured United States interests, and preserved America's
    strategic options in the region, while helping Africans do more for
    themselves. I hope you are as convinced as I am that USAFRICOM is a
    good investment in the future--for America, for Africa, and for the
    world. Thank you.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Townsend, and
    let me remind my colleagues, because this is a hybrid hearing,
    of our procedures. Rather than using the early bird rule, we
    will recognize individuals by seniority. We will do the
    standard 5-minute rounds of questioning, and I ask my
    colleagues to keep track of the clock. Finally, for everyone to
    be heard effectively, I would ask all colleagues to please mute
    your microphones when not speaking. Thank you very much.
        General McKenzie, the intelligence community in the 2021
    Estimate indicated that al Qaeda and ISIS remain among the
    greatest threats to the United States overseas, and also
    continue to have the intent to project power into the United
    States. In addition, the Afghan Study Group, led by General
    Dunford and Senator Ayotte, concluded that United States
    withdrawal--a complete withdrawal, which is--I do not think you
    are contemplating--a complete withdrawal would allow al-Qaeda
    and other elements to restore themselves within 18 to 36
    months. Do you agree with these assessments, one, that al-Qaeda
    and ISIS are probably among the greatest threats, and, two, if
    unchecked they will revitalize themselves?
        General McKenzie. Chairman, I do agree that al Qaeda and
    ISIS remain--have aspirational goals of continuing to attack
    us, so I completely agree with the intelligence community's
    estimate.
        Chairman Reed. Director Burns of the Central Intelligence
    Agency (CIA) indicated in testimony that the very nature of the
    withdrawal will diminish, to a degree, our ability to collect
    intelligence. Do you concur with that assessment, too?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I do concur with that assessment. We
    will lose the abilities to see completely into Afghanistan.
        Chairman Reed. So the issue before us, very practically, is
    how do we compensate for those facts on the ground and here.
    Perhaps you might reserve some more comments to the classified
    section. How do you intend to compensate so that we can
    effectively disrupt al Qaeda and ISIS?
        General McKenzie. Chairman, I will have more pointed
    comments in our closed session, but briefly, I would tell you
    it will be difficult. It is not impossible to accomplish this
    task. A couple of things have changed since 2001 when were last
    attacked from Afghanistan. First of all, the United States
    itself is a far harder target than we were in September of
    2001. It is more difficult to operate in the United States. It
    is more difficult to gain access to the United States. So a
    variety of things have changed inside the United States, and we
    should always keep that in mind. Additionally, although we are
    going, in fact, to pull out of Afghanistan, and I am operating
    under the concept that for United States military presence,
    zero is going to be zero, and we can talk a little bit more
    about that in the closed session. We will have an architecture
    in the theater that will allow us to look into Afghanistan. It
    will not give us the same picture that we have got now. It will
    allow us to see in. The ranges will be greater, the resources
    will be greater, the risks will all be greater, but it will be
    possible to do those things. It is certainly not impossible,
    but we will not have the vision that we have now.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General McKenzie.
    General Townsend, again, thank you gentlemen for your
    leadership and your advice to the Committee. We have withdrawn,
    effectively, our forces from Somalia. Can you assess what is
    the operational effect? One of the factors that I think you
    both recognize is that the terrorist threat once was--seemed to
    be solely located in the mountains of Afghanistan, but now it
    is dispersed throughout the entire CENTCOM region. Syria has
    the capability of generating forces, and Somalia also, with Al-
    Shabab, has that capability. So can you give us a sense of the
    effect of the withdrawal on your operations?
        General Townsend. Thank you, Chairman. So in the last 60 to
    90 days of the previous Administration, we were directed, as
    you stated, to reposition our forces out of Somalia. We left a
    small footprint behind in Mogadishu tied into the embassy there
    of less than 100. Since that time, we have been commuting to
    work. We work virtually with our partners from bases in the
    region, and then we fly in to conduct training and to advise
    and assist our partners. We have done four such operations in
    the last roughly 90 days. One of them is ongoing right now, and
    we are continually revising and improving the way that we do
    that to make it as effective as we can.
        There is no denying that repositioning forces out of
    Somalia has introduced new layers of complexity and risk, and,
    as General McKenzie said, our understanding of what is
    happening in Somalia is less now than it was when we were there
    on the ground physically located with our partners, so we are
    working to make this new mode of operation work. At the same
    time, we are participating in the Global Posture Review with
    the Department of Defense, and we will be presenting options to
    the Secretary of Defense on the way ahead. And, of course, I do
    not want to get ahead of my civilian leadership to address
    that, but we are working to make it work.
        I would say that probably, though, the biggest impact to
    security in Somalia right now is less Al-Shabab and more so the
    political dysfunction that exists between the federal
    government of Somalia and the federal member states, and, as
    you mentioned in your opening remarks, the extra-constitutional
    extension of the president's term in office. That is our
    biggest challenge, I think, right now.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Ironically or coincidentally,
    what you are anticipating and actually experience at this
    moment is very much the same situation that General McKenzie
    might face, having withdrawn forces from the target country,
    for want of a better word. You have to operate on the
    periphery. You are doing that, and you face political/cultural
    issues, and General McKenzie will face political/cultural
    issues. So, again, we look forward to the classified session to
    get more into detail of these questions. Thank you. Senator
    Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You hit it
    right on there. The term that is being used, ``over the
    horizon,'' which merely means that you are taking troops out of
    the area and conducting your activity from another country, and
    that is something that I disagreed with in the previous
    Administration. The last Administration pulled nearly all of
    the 200 troops that we had in Somalia out, and that was the
    previous Administration. I disagreed with that at that time,
    and I really think that we were right in disagreeing with that.
    History has shown that it does not work as well from an
    adjoining country as it does from the country where the
    activity is. So I would say--I would ask them the--General
    Townsend, I know you are going to be able to do this and will
    continue to do it, but does an over-the-horizon
    counterterrorism strategy in Somalia not make your job harder?
    General Townsend.
        General Townsend. Ranking Member, I would agree with the
    General McKenzie's characterization. It makes it more
    difficult. It does not make it impossible.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah, well, I understand that, and I would
    say the same thing. I know that General McKenzie has already
    expressed, yeah, it makes it more difficult, but it does not
    make it impossible. You guys are soldiers and you have a duty
    to do it, and you will do it. Now, General McKenzie, are you
    concerned that we will not be able to secure and maintain the
    U.S. embassy? Tell me what--if all this happens as it is
    designed to happen in Afghanistan, what will be our situation
    with the embassy?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I believe it is our desire to retain
    an embassy presence in Afghanistan.
        Senator Inhofe. You got to protect it, right?
        General McKenzie. So we do, and of course.
        Senator Inhofe. You got to secure it.
        General McKenzie. Sir, we do. Of course, protection of an
    embassy is the responsibility of the host nation. Most of our
    embassies around the world have very little military presence
    there because the host nation lives up to their obligations. It
    is a matter of very much great concern to me, and I think
    everyone, whether or not the future Government of Afghanistan
    is going to be able to do that after we leave. That will be
    determined here over the next few weeks as we begin our
    drawdown and we evaluate the security platform that is there.
        Senator Inhofe. Will you be able to make that determination
    as the drawdown is occurring? My concern is, if we get to the
    point where we do not have that help, we would be depending on
    another country to do what we always do on our own, and that is
    defend and secure the embassies. That concerns you?
        General McKenzie. Ranking Member, it does concern me, but I
    would say if we have concerns about the physical security of
    the embassy, the United States will take whatever measures are
    necessary to ensure the safety of our diplomats. So we will do
    that based on the security situation as it exists on the ground
    in Kabul.
        Senator Inhofe. I would hope that you would anticipate that
    if there are going to be problems or signs of problems as the
    drawdown continues, that you would be on top of that, and I am
    sure you will be. In AFRICOM, General Townsend, the
    Administration is conducting a global force posture review.
    Now, that actually started in the previous Administration, and
    I can remember at that time cautioning the then Secretary of
    Defense that we do not have a lot of assets there, and we do
    not have a lot of protection there, and that is something that
    has concerned me before, and the same concern is out there
    right now. We have less than, what, 6,000, I guess, personnel?
    We face the shortfalls and ISR capability. These things are
    there. What would you say, General Townsend, is your biggest
    resource gap that would impact your ability to do your job?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Ranking Member. As you pointed
    out, we underwent the blank slate review, or a COCOM review, in
    the previous Administration, and by the time we got to the end
    of that, AFRICOM was still largely intact. I think we removed
    about 365 troops from the continent. As you pointed out, there
    is just no fat to cut there, and we did lose some funding in
    the various programs. Again, I do not want to get ahead of my
    civilian leaders on the Global Posture Review, so I will defer
    discussing options about forces and posture.
        But I would say that wherever we have forces in Africa,
    there are three things that we will need there. First would be
    the proper amount of personnel recovery and casualty evacuation
    of medical treatment to make sure our troops are properly
    protected. Second, as you mentioned, is ISR, and with the loss
    of the Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) and the ISR
    Transfer Fund, that puts at risk one of our primary sources of
    ISR, which is contracted ISR in Africa. Then the third thing I
    would say would be funding for building partner capacity and
    exercises with our partners. We do everything in Africa through
    partners. There is no activity that America conducts
    unilaterally in the lead for, so building partner capacity is
    how we help the Africans and our international partners the
    most. So I would say those are the three things we will need
    regardless of what our future posture might be.
        Senator Inhofe. I agree wholeheartedly with that, and I am
    glad that you are coming out forcefully in making those
    statements. When you point out that we are in a continent, they
    are 3-and-a-half times the size of our country. I had not heard
    that before, and we have got to be aware of that. This is a
    problem. We need to have resources in there to do the job.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen,
    please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you, General McKenzie
    and General Townsend, for your service and for being here this
    morning. I especially appreciate whoever at DOD heard us when
    we said please give us a map that shows not just Russia and
    Chinese activity, but also shows United States activity, and it
    is pretty dramatic. It does not take much to take a look at
    those pictures and see China's influence all in red in Africa
    and our influence, and that picture says it all. So I very much
    appreciate that and have used the map that we got from United
    States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to make the argument that we
    need more investment in Latin America in the Foreign Relations
    Committee. Can I just ask for whoever is listening, if there
    are acronyms on the maps, that you give us a key to tell us
    what those acronyms mean for those of us who are not dealing
    with them on a daily basis? I would appreciate it.
        General McKenzie, I want to begin with you because in your
    testimony before this Committee last year, you indicated that
    there had been an increase in Iranian activity in Afghanistan,
    and that posed a potential risk to United States Forces.
    Obviously, the decision to withdraw American troops, which I
    have expressed concern about, has an impact not just on what
    happens with Afghan forces and the Afghan people, but it also
    creates a vacuum that allows regional actors, like Iran, and
    Pakistan, Russia, and China, to fill that vacuum. Can you talk
    about what you see happening after the U.S. withdraws and what
    the potential is for those regional actors to come in and
    influence what happens?
        General McKenzie. Certainly. After we complete our
    withdrawal, I think the country that is probably going to be
    most affected is Pakistan because of their long contiguous
    border with Afghanistan, the fact that the Taliban, largely
    centered in eastern Afghanistan, nonetheless maintains some
    presents in Pakistan as well. So I think Pakistan is interested
    in stability in Afghanistan, and I think it is going to be very
    difficult for that stability to remain after we leave, so I
    think Pakistan will be very concerned by that. I would say,
    frankly, that it is a situation they have not been terribly
    helpful on over the last 20 years, so that is unfortunate for
    them that some of this is now going to come back home in a way
    that they perhaps did not anticipate.
        As for Iran, you know, Iran does not wish us well, has
    always wanted to have the ability in Afghanistan to attack us
    or to have others attack us should they choose to do so. That
    capability remains, is as extant now as it was last year. Their
    interest in Afghanistan is the same as Pakistan's. They want
    stability in that region. I think everyone is concerned that,
    should we leave, should a civil war ensue, there is the
    possibility of a mass refugee movement that could affect all of
    the nations around Afghanistan. So I think they are very
    concerned by that because they do not see a clear way forward
    after we reduce our presence.
        Senator Shaheen. You mentioned ISIS camps in your opening
    remarks. One of the concerns, having visited Syria, that I
    have, given our withdrawal--precipitous withdrawal from Syria,
    has been the failure to address those camps from family and
    former ISIS members that continue to have thousands of people
    in them. Is there any international effort to address those
    camps and to try and resolve how the international community is
    going to deal with them before they become another threat?
        General McKenzie. I wish I could tell you a better news
    story there, Senator, but I cannot. It is one of my very
    highest concerns. Al-Hol camp, which you are very familiar
    with, is probably the poster child for 62,000 people,
    principally women, principally young children--and they are at
    an immediate risk from disease, cholera or coronavirus. But the
    long-term threat is ISIS radicalization which goes on in that
    camp, and unless we find a way to pull these children out of
    that camp, get them back to the nations that they came from,
    find a way to reintegrate them into civil society, and de-
    radicalize them, we are giving ourselves a very significant
    military problem 10 years down the road.
        I know that our diplomats and our people in United States
    Agency for International Development (USAID) are working on
    this very hard. Nations need to step up, claim their people,
    repatriate those that they can bring home. Unfortunately, there
    is not a lot of progress on this front. It is one of my very
    highest concerns in the region.
        Senator Shaheen. We actually created a coordinator through
    the defense authorization bill--not last year, I think the year
    before--to try and address that. I am not aware that anybody
    has been appointed to that position yet, so hopefully the
    Administration will move on that. Before I am out of time,
    General Townsend, I wanted to ask you about what is happening
    in Ethiopia in the Tigray region, and to what extent the
    instability there has the potential to create instability in
    the surrounding countries, and how concerned you are about
    that.
        General Townsend. Ma'am, that probably takes longer than
    the 10 or 15 seconds I have to give the answer. Ethiopia is in
    the midst of several challenges, three or four significant
    challenges on multiple fronts. It definitely will affect
    security and stability in the region, and I can answer that
    more in another venue.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, and now let me
    recognize via Webex, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here today. General McKenzie, what is your
    understanding of the assistance that we will be providing to
    the Afghan security forces after we withdraw? Secretary Austin,
    he discussed some of this last week at the joint press
    conference at NATO. He spoke about training, securing their
    borders, and saying we will continue to support them in those
    efforts, also about funding capabilities, to continue paying
    salaries for the Afghan security forces. So what types of
    assistance are you seeing that we are still going to be
    providing and be responsible for?
        General McKenzie. Ma'am, let me just begin by saying we are
    going to go to zero solution in Afghanistan, so whatever we do,
    it will largely not be done by people on the ground in
    Afghanistan. We can still do some things from remote locations.
    We can work the administration of the Afghan security force
    funding, which is sort of the bedrock programmatic weapon or
    tool that we use to support the Afghan military and other
    things. We will not be able to do it as efficiently as we do
    now where we have people in the country that can really follow
    the money all the way to its destination, but we can still
    follow it into the country at least, and we will work tools to
    mentor from remote locations that will allow us to work with--
    work with the Afghans themselves.
        Some of this will be contingent on how big the embassy is
    that remains, and that is still something that is going to be
    worked out over the next few weeks. So we could have a--we
    could have a security cooperation office in the embassy. We may
    not have a security cooperation office in the embassy. That
    will be ultimately a Department of State decision informed by
    our assessment of the security situation that is there. It will
    be far more difficult than the way we do business now. Again,
    it is certainly not impossible. We will not have the oversight
    that we have now just because we will not have the people on
    the ground to actually perform those functions.
        Senator Fischer. Now, as look at these force posture
    options over the horizon, I hope you will certainly keep this
    Committee informed about that as plans are finalized. So I
    would appreciate that from you.
        General McKenzie. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. For both of you, we talk a lot about ISR
    shortfalls, and I understand that demand always exceeds supply,
    but can you share with us what percentage of your ISR needs are
    being met? Also talk a little bit about the operational impact
    that this has.
        General McKenzie. Sure. I will begin. The majority of my
    operational ISR requirements are being met, not all of them.
    They are being--and I will give you a little bit more in the
    closed session. You know, we use a variety of manned and
    unmanned resources to look at our problems, and we are most
    particularly concerned with ISR in areas where we have U.S. and
    coalition forces in combat. Of course, that is in Afghanistan
    and in Iraq and Syria, and occasionally in Yemen. So there, we
    very--we work very hard to make sure we have got the ISR needed
    to do those things. We take risks sometimes in the ISR that we
    apply to the Iran problem, simply because I place a higher
    priority on ensuring that Americans--where we have Americans on
    the ground, we want to make sure we have got the resources
    there that we need to take a look at in order to protect them.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Townsend?
        General Townsend. Senator, the joint staff has a formula by
    which they validate our ISR requests. By that formula, we are
    resourced to about 30 percent, a little less than one-third of
    our requirement. If I take a hard look at that formula, I could
    probably get by with less than that. If I take that into
    account, our resourcing levels approach 40 or 80 percent. Every
    day in Africa, we have to make decisions about what we will do
    and what we will not do based on how much ISR we can apply to
    the day. We do not need a tremendous amount of gray tail or
    military ISR platforms. We need some of that to protect our
    troops, but we can do a lot of our work with contracted
    solutions, which are a good bargain for the taxpayer.
        Senator Fischer. But do you--I guess, do you both believe
    that having that presence of ISR used against hostile nations
    or their proxy forces, that that does act as a deterrent?
    General McKenzie, would you say that has happened with Iran?
        General McKenzie. I can say unequivocally that the maneuver
    of ISR assets in the summer of 2019 deflected imminent Iranian
    attack planning.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Townsend, do you have
    any instances of that?
        General Townsend. Yes, Senator. So we know that Al-Shabab
    looks over their shoulder every day at our--looking for our
    ISR, and so we know that they limit their activity because of
    the presence of our ISR.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator. Now let me
    recognize via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General
    McKenzie, I have several questions for you related to Israel.
    What is the status of Israel being moved to CENTCOM, and what
    do you see as the benefits for Israeli inclusion in CENTCOM?
    Also, Israel and United States European Command (EUCOM)
    coordinated very closely on ballistic missile defense,
    including Aegis support from the Mediterranean. How will you
    ensure continuity of ballistic missile defense with Israel, and
    will this continue through EUCOM or move to a different
    direction with CENTCOM?
        General McKenzie. Senator, we are in a planning phase right
    now to move Israel into United States Central Command. We are
    on about a 6-month planning timeline for that. There are--as
    you have noted, a number of things have to happen in order to
    make sure that that move goes seamlessly, and I will address
    those here in just a moment. But we work closely with European
    Command and the joint staff based on guidance we have gotten
    from the Secretary to make sure that that move is--that move is
    proceed--that move proceeds very smoothly and nothing falls
    through the cracks, particularly those things related to the
    defense of Israel.
        The principal benefit of Israel coming into the Central
    Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the fact that most of
    Israel's threats--all of Israel's threats really--emanate from
    the East, which is in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
    Today, I talk a lot to the Israeli chief of defense. I talk a
    lot all throughout my command at all levels of the Israeli
    military about the threats that emanate against them because
    the threats to Israel have morphed from being, at one time, a
    purely ballistic missile threat, now to a Unmanned Aircraft
    System (UAS) and a land attack cruise missile threat. So now
    the threat is far more diffuse and actually dangerous, so we
    need to make sure that we are coordinating fully on all those
    matters.
        We work with European Command to make sure that we
    transition the defense of Israel to CENTCOM when we are ready
    to do it. That does involve questions of water space management
    in the eastern Mediterranean, questions of what ships are going
    to be available and when. I am in close contact with General
    Walters actually as we work through those problems, and we will
    present a plan to the Secretary a little bit later this year
    for an initial date when combatant command authority will shift
    for Israel.
        The last point I would just like to make is, the other
    benefit of bringing Israel into the Central Command AOR is it
    allows further normalization of relations between Israel and
    various Arab states in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and
    this just recognizes that by placing them all under one
    combatant command. We were not able to do that in the past,
    particularly because of strains between Egypt and Israel. We
    are now well past that. Egypt and Israel function very well
    together at a variety of levels, including joint operations
    against threats in the Sinai.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. General Townsend, in the
    last decade, China has made significant investments in Africa,
    and it has been in the form of infrastructure and military
    installations, as well as significant investment from private
    firms. I am concerned with perceptions of the United States
    presence when we are conducting major air operations with
    significant collateral damage while China builds roads and
    bridges. What is AFRICOM's strategy for breaking this dynamic?
    Is this a problem that has a military solution?
        General Townsend. Senator, you are right. China has been
    aggressively investing in the continent with infrastructure,
    bases, arm sales, training, et cetera. We do not have to
    compete with China head-to-head, dollar-for-dollar. We can
    target where our investments are best made. I would not
    characterize it the way you did about our strikes with
    significant collateral damage. We do not do very many strikes
    in Africa. They are limited to Al-Shabab areas in Somalia, and
    we have very low collateral damage when we do those strikes. I
    agree with your point, though. There is not a military solution
    to any of these challenges on the African continent.
        Senator Gillibrand. Right.
        General Townsend. It is a whole-of-government approach that
    will be necessary to solve these challenges.
        Senator Gillibrand. I was encouraged by your commitment to
    working with African Union security forces and other nations'
    militaries, and I do appreciate the fact that we can fight
    terrorism, but we have to actually stop the social problems at
    the source. In your opinion, how can we increase cooperation
    with the African standby force and the African Union Peace and
    Security Council? Just to note, in your written statement, you
    listed extreme poverty, more frequent and intense weather
    events, and vulnerable and marginalized populations as issues
    that are contributing to instability in the region and, as a
    result, terrorism. These obviously sound like political
    problems and potentially a vacuum that China will be happy to
    fill with their own investments. So what are your thoughts on
    this issue, and how do we confront China and make the territory
    less fertile for Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)?
        General Townsend. Regarding the--confronting China here, I
    think we can do that in a targeted way in certain selected
    countries, and that way we can make our investments count for
    more. You mentioned several partners--African partners. We work
    with all of those partners to advance what we are doing. The
    United States does not lead any activity. We work through
    African partners first and international partners second, and
    then you mentioned several political problems. I think our
    administration strategy is the right one: lead with diplomacy,
    follow with development, secure with defense.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Let me know
    recognize via Webex, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you both for your service to our country. Let me begin with a
    question for General Townsend.
        General, the last time that I had an opportunity to visit
    Djibouti, I noted that at that time, we had a chance to observe
    the operations that the Chinese were doing with regard to the
    creation of a naval base, or at least a port there at Djibouti.
    Can you share with us the current status of the Chinese
    operations in Djibouti right now with regard to their port and
    what they are capable of doing with it?
        General Townsend. Thank you, Senator. The Chinese base in
    Djibouti is named Doraleh Port, or Doraleh Base. What they have
    done in the last 2 years is completed a very large and capable
    naval pier that has joined their base. This pier has the
    capability to dock their largest ships to include the Chinese
    aircraft carrier as well as nuclear submarines. Now, they are
    finishing that pier now. They are applying the final coats of
    paint to this thing. I expect that we will see increased
    Chinese naval presence there. Their presence at Doraleh Base in
    the past has been largely to secure and sustain their small
    naval task force that operates in the Red Sea and the Gulf of
    Aden. I anticipate now with this pier being recently completed,
    they will increase their naval activity into Djibouti soon.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General. General McKenzie, I
    would like to visit with you with regard to the difference
    between a conditions-based withdrawal and a withdrawal with a
    date certain, and I recognize that your role here is to follow
    the directions of the Commander-in-Chief. I respect that, and I
    know that the President has made the decision to move from a
    conditions-based withdrawal to a date-certain withdrawal. There
    is a reason why I think many of us had talked about, and I
    believe a number of the military officials in the past have
    discussed the validity of a conditions-based withdrawal, while
    at the same time recognizing that there is no real good answer
    to the Afghanistan questions.
        Respecting the President's ability to make and having to
    make this decision, can you share with us a little bit about
    some of the concerns that you have expressed with regard to the
    ability of the existing Afghan national forces to be able to
    respond to aggression by the Taliban, and what the impacts
    could be in those areas that are not currently under Taliban
    control with regard to the stability in those villages, those
    communities, and the impact that could occur for women and
    children in those regions?
        General McKenzie. Senator, thank you. First of all, the
    decision-making process was very inclusive. I had multiple
    opportunities to make my views known, and I appreciate the
    opportunity to have had those views known. I cannot share those
    views with you in this forum, but I would just tell you that
    the inclusion and the deliberate and methodical way that this
    decision was approached was heartening for me, at least. I
    would tell you that my concern about leaving with a date
    certain is that after we withdraw, and we have talked about we
    are going to go to zero means zero, that there will be no real
    United States enablers in Afghanistan. My concern is the
    ability of the Afghan military to hold the ground that they are
    on now without the support that they have been used to for many
    years, which we have weaned them off direct support--U.S. and
    coalition soldiers being present with them on the ground to a
    point where now it is intelligence, it is fire support. It is
    the enabling things that actually give them an edge over the
    Taliban. Now all that will be gone, so I am concerned about the
    ability of the Afghan military to hold on after we leave, the
    ability of the Afghan air force to fly, in particular, after we
    remove the support for those aircraft. All of those things are
    factors that will be worked out here in the next few months,
    and we will get an opportunity to see how the Afghans do.
        Your last point on conditions for women and children, and
    women, in particular, and the strides--the great strides that
    have been made in education and human rights in Afghanistan,
    the levers that we have now will be reduced, but I believe
    there will still be levers that we can apply, and those levers
    will be principally diplomatic and economic because if the
    Taliban or whatever future hybrid government exists in
    Afghanistan wants to gain global recognition and receive some
    form of international support, they are going to have to take
    some actions that would tend to protect those groups. Again,
    those are things we just cannot know right now.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General. I most certainly
    appreciate your responsible comments, and I understand that you
    did have the ability to give input. I just simply think that it
    is important for the American people to understand that the
    repercussions of this are not going to be pretty, and that we
    will see reports of atrocities in those areas as committed by
    the Taliban if these Afghan national forces are not able to
    hold their own without those United States supports that they
    have become very dependent on. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator. Now, let me
    recognize Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
    for your service and to the men and women under your command. I
    do not need to tell either of you that the definition of
    success in Afghanistan has changed over the 20 years that we
    have been fighting wars in that part of the world. In October
    2001, President Bush set the terms for victory in Afghanistan
    as bringing al Qaeda to justice and ensuring that they could no
    longer use Afghanistan as a base to launch terrorist attacks on
    the United States. Coming right to the point, General Townsend,
    public press reporting states that after a withdrawal from
    Afghanistan, it would be a 4-hour flight for an MQ-9 to be on
    station in Afghanistan to do a counterterrorism mission. My
    question is, how does that compare to the flight to be on
    station in Somalia, or Libya, or other places under your
    command where countering terrorism is a similar mission?
        General Townsend. Senator, we also have some pretty long
    legs to get our ISR on station, although I do not believe 4
    hours. Our transit times are more in the realm of 1 to 2 hours
    one way. We spend 4 hours probably, on average, back and forth,
    but not as long as you just described.
        Senator Blumenthal. General McKenzie, would that length of
    time enable effective counterterrorism in Afghanistan using the
    kind of air resources that we have in General Townsend's
    command?
        General McKenzie. Senator, right now in Afghanistan, we
    principally use MQ-9s and MQ-1s, and the newspaper story may
    have said 4 hours. If we get out of Afghanistan, most likely
    the transit time will be considerably longer than 4 hours to
    get in, and I can talk about this in a closed session in a
    little bit more detail. So I can, in fact, give the persistent
    overhead coverage that is required. It will simply require far
    more platforms operating at greater range in order to
    accomplish that same mission that you can do with fewer
    platforms because, as you know, the airplane has so long to
    fly. You are either going to use that flight time either
    getting to the objective or what you do on the objective. We
    want to maximize what you can do on the objective. It will be
    difficult.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would like to hear, and probably it
    should be in a closed setting with the chairman's and senator's
    support, what specifically by way of counterterrorism can be
    done, what the plans are to do it, because I think that is an
    essential feature of our withdrawal. You said ``if,'' but it is
    right now planned for September 11th, and I would like to know
    what our preparations are.
        General McKenzie. Sure, I will be happy to discuss that in
    closed session.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I think Senator Inhofe
    alluded to this topic, but, as you know, there have been
    various reports about attacks on American personnel, diplomats,
    members of the intelligence community, perhaps even military,
    some of it referred to as the Havana Syndrome, referring only
    to those public reports. If there is any truth to those reports
    about attacks on American personnel, don't you think the
    American people deserve to know about it?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I do, and I track that very--and I
    can only speak, of course, to the U.S. Central Command area of
    responsibility, and I can give you a little bit more
    information in a closed session, but I have found no evidence
    of those attacks in U.S. Central Command. But I can talk a
    little bit more about it, and I would like to do so in a closed
    session.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would like to hear about it in closed
    session, but I would also like for the American people to know
    about it because I think they need and deserve to know about
    it. General Townsend, do you have any comment?
        General Townsend. Senator, we have not seen that phenomenon
    in AFRICOM in any significant number; in fact, any number that
    I am aware of.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. General McKenzie, what have
    you seen by way of the Iranian support for proxies and their
    attacks on United States personnel under your command, the
    malign influence of Iran and their support for those kinds of
    attacks on our personnel or our allies and partners?
        General McKenzie. So I think, first of all, Iran is not
    seeking state-on-state conflict with the United States right
    now. I think they would like to see how the Biden
    Administration's approach on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
    (JCPOA) works out for them. At the same time, and this just
    reflects the contradiction inherent in the way the Iranians
    think about many of these problems, they want us out of places
    like Iraq, and they are prepared to take kinetic activity,
    which they believe they can disavow by their actors, their
    proxies, acting on the ground to conduct low-level attacks
    against us. Over last year, in 2020, the Iranians believed they
    had a political solution to eject us from Iraq. That no longer
    appears to be a viable way ahead for them, so we are seeing a
    return to a more kinetic approach, and that has been manifested
    here over the last few weeks as low-level attacks have begun to
    crop up in Iraq, attacks that the Iranians would disavow
    themselves from. We carefully look for attribution in these
    attacks, and national leadership will eventually make a
    decision on how to respond.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you both. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Now let me
    recognize Senator Ernst, please.
        Senate Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and, gentlemen, thank
    you very much for your testimony today. I do want to take time
    to thank you, your senior enlisted members, and all of the men
    and women within your commands for their continued service to
    our Nation. I will move into my questions, but what we are
    doing today, we are obviously discussing the significant
    challenges that both of you have within your commands. Our
    national defense strategy is still targeted towards five very
    real threats--China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and then, of
    course, violent extremist groups--and four of those five
    challenges operate in both of your AORs, and, of course, the
    way that we operate and resource your AORs is very different.
    But, General Townsend, I would like to start with you.
        Within AFRICOM, we do have various pockets of activity, and
    we do engage our special operations forces in those areas. The
    Lake Chad Basin is a very volatile region, and there are a
    number of those violent extremist organizations there, such as
    ISIS, Boko Haram. They are operating within the region, and
    they are exploiting, of course, the economy, the terrain, and
    the vulnerable population there. What is the assessment of the
    risk these various organizations pose to the U.S., and have we
    allocated the proper resources necessary to defeat their
    threats?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Senator. You specifically
    addressed the Lake Chad Basin, and there we see operations by
    Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa. A couple of years ago, those
    two organizations had joined in league with one another. They
    have split in the last year or two, again, apart. My assessment
    is that neither--although they caused tremendous problems there
    for the countries that all adjoin in the Lake Chad Basin, which
    is Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon--all come together right
    there--they caused tremendous problems for them. It is my
    assessment that neither Boko Haram nor ISIS-West Africa today
    pose a significant threat to United States interests. That is
    not true of other violent extremist organizations in Africa.
        Senate Ernst. Mm-hmm. Thank you very much, General. How can
    we help those countries in that area, be it military or other
    resources available, through our Federal Government? There are
    a few of those countries that do have significant resources
    that could be exploited by China or Russia. What ways can we
    further support that region, not just military, but other types
    of supports?
        General Townsend. Well, just exactly what you said along
    the lines of not just military. So there--a whole-of-government
    approach in that region would help. We have that now to some
    degree. I think we can make that more robust. There is a
    partnership between our Department of State and Department of
    Defense to provide security assistance to those countries
    there. We do that on a bilateral basis directly with those
    countries. There is a Multinational Joint Task Force that
    operates in the Lake Chad Basin region. It would not be hard to
    increase some of our efforts there. I think what we see,
    particularly with Nigeria, is they are struggling with that
    particular threat in the Lake Chad Basin and northeast part of
    their country.
        Senate Ernst. All right. Thank you, General. General
    McKenzie, it was my great honor just several days ago to spend
    some time in the company of some truly extraordinary women, and
    these women are Gold Star Wives, and many of them came from our
    Special Operations Forces. We had an Air Guard member as well
    as an Army Guard member, and part of the conversation obviously
    flowed towards the close down of Afghanistan, the withdrawal of
    troops, and, of course, what we would hope to see as the end to
    the Global War on Terror. I have concerns about it. I have
    concerns that we are conceding territory at a great loss of
    lives, and so if you could indulge me, sir, and address these
    extraordinary women and their families all across the United
    States, and just let them know your thoughts and how we can
    recognize the ultimate sacrifice that their husbands made, and
    to please let them know that those sacrifices were not in vain.
        General McKenzie. Senator, thank you, and certainly the
    sacrifices have not been in vain, and particularly the family
    members of those people who have gone forward to defend this
    Nation and have died in so doing, are going to carry those
    memories with them for the rest of their lives, and there is
    nothing I can do to really make that better. But what I can
    tell them is I believe we went to Afghanistan in a good cause,
    and I believe we have, in fact, prevented attacks on the United
    States from being generated from Afghanistan for over the last
    20 years, and that was ultimately our base mission for being
    there.
        The long-term view for the War on Terror is this: it is not
    going to be bloodless. The War on Terror is probably not going
    to end. What we actually seek is the creation of local security
    where the threats, as they arise, can be dealt with
    indigenously by those countries themselves without a
    significant U.S. presence there. We will see a test of that
    hypothesis in Afghanistan and in the months ahead. We also
    tested it in Iraq where it is moving towards success. We also
    tested in Syria and in other places. Nothing will ever
    compensate for the loss of a loved one, and I would not attempt
    with any words I can say here to try to do that.
        Senate Ernst. God bless you. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
    Inhofe, and thank you, Senator Ernst, for asking that question
    to the witnesses who are before us today. We appreciate your
    service. Just a comment. I think we have had a good discussion
    about the big issue that is, you know, dominating our attention
    right now--Afghanistan--and every concern that anyone I know
    that has expressed about it is a very legitimate one. There are
    a lot of concerns. I do support the President's decision, but
    believe it was a decision made with no particularly wonderful
    options out there on the table. I honor the 20 years of
    service, 10 years to find and kill Bin Laden, and then 10 years
    to train hundreds of thousands of Afghan security forces.
    General McKenzie, as you mentioned, there will be a test of
    that security apparatus to determine its efficiency to counter
    the threat that the Taliban poses, and we will all be paying
    attention in a significant way.
        One thing I would like to just caution against is
    sometimes, particularly in a military hearing, we will talk
    about the state beginning on September 11th as a zero solution,
    and it is true that the President's announced intention is a
    zero solution with respect to military presence in Afghanistan,
    except for that necessary to protect our embassy and, if
    needed, for counterterrorism operations as they arise. But I
    think it is important for the American public to know that it
    is not a zero solution if you look at it from the whole-of-
    government standpoint, because I think it is very likely that
    the United States is going to continue to provide significant
    security assistance to Afghanistan. It is highly likely that we
    are going to provide significant assistance in the
    humanitarian, economic, trade, development, and diplomacy
    space.
        So it is not a zero solution in terms of America's
    partnership with Afghanistan. I would imagine that when we get
    to a new status quo in terms of the relationship, the support
    that we provide for our partner, Afghanistan, will be
    significant and may be significantly greater than sort of the
    support we provide to other nations. That remains to be seen,
    and obviously the effect of that support is being tested, as
    General McKenzie mentioned.
        General McKenzie, you mentioned something about Afghans'
    neighbors, and I wanted to just dig into that a little bit. You
    indicated that while they have not all been helpful to the
    United States, not by a long shot, and they have not
    necessarily even done what we would hope they might do to
    assist in Afghanistan, they do help with stability in
    Afghanistan. They do not see instability there as furthering
    their interests, and just quickly, I was looking at who
    Afghanistan--the Afghan neighbors are. Afghanistan is bordered
    by six countries: Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
    Tajikistan, China, and Iran. Very different nations, those six,
    but can I just dig in a little bit with you, General McKenzie,
    on that? As different as these nations are from each other, and
    as different as they are in their relationships with the United
    States, would you say that they all, for their own reasons,
    would desire stability in Afghanistan and would feel threatened
    by instability in Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I would agree with you
    completely. I think all, for their own reasons, and, as you
    noted, those reasons are very different, they all want
    stability in Afghanistan. The other thing some of them want,
    too, is they recognize the vast natural resources that are
    inherent in Afghanistan, and they seek access to that.
        Senator Kaine. In terms of wanting stability, I would
    imagine that they want stability, again, for their own reasons,
    but some of the common reasons would be instability could lead
    to unacceptable refugee flows into neighboring nations if that
    is not managed, and instability could also lead to the
    possibility of terrorist or other attacks in their own nations
    if that is not managed correctly. Are those two of the reasons
    that they want stability, and are there others why they would
    want stability?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I think those are the two
    principal reasons, the movement of refugees across national
    borders, and also the threat of exportation of ISIS or al
    Qaeda's ideology, you know, from inside Afghanistan. I think
    those are the two principal reasons.
        Senator Kaine. In terms of those threats, the threat of
    refugee flows and the threat of terrorist attacks, in many
    ways, they have more of an existential connection to stability
    in Afghanistan than the United States does, just because of
    their proximity to Afghanistan. Is that not correct?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I would agree.
        Senator Kaine. All right. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I do not
    have other questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Let me now
    recognize via Webex, Senator Tillis.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding the hearing, and, gentlemen, thank you for being here
    and for your years of service. General Townsend, I want to talk
    a little bit about China. In your opening comments, you talked
    about China's move, I think, in Djibouti as a power projection
    platform. We know that there is even talk about an Atlantic
    Coast naval base. How does this play out over the next several
    years if they continue at their current pace, and what are the
    real threats to our own national security as a result?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Senator Tillis. So we know that
    the Chinese desire a network of bases around the globe. How
    that plays out in Africa is, first, with their base at Doraleh
    in Djibouti. They have been working on a number of options to
    get a base elsewhere in Africa, Tanzania--primarily on the east
    coast--the Indian Ocean, and then they have placed a number of
    bets down along the Atlantic coast. My concern is the greatest
    along the Atlantic coast of Africa. This is probably--this is
    the most significant threat, I think, from China would be to
    gain a militarily useful naval facility on the Atlantic coast
    of Africa, and by ``militarily useful,'' I mean something more
    than a place that they can make port calls and get gas and
    groceries. I am talking about a port where they can rearm with
    munitions and repair naval vessels. They are working
    aggressively to get that, but we have not seen any of that come
    to fruition yet, and it is my number one global power
    competition concern.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, General Townsend. General
    McKenzie, with the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan, we have
    received, you know, various estimates of how that is going to
    play out over the next year or so. I, for one, think that we
    are going to run into--that Afghanistan is going to run into
    serious problems after we completely withdraw our troops, but I
    am primarily concerned with force protection as we withdraw
    from the forward-operating bases and, ultimately, Kabul. What
    are we doing? Are we just going exploit the resources we have
    on the ground for force protection? Are we going to surge a bit
    as we withdraw? Can you give me some sense and some confidence
    that we are going to be able to do this with the full
    expectation that the Taliban may take some shots at us on our
    way out the door?
        General McKenzie. Senator, first of all, we are prepared if
    the Taliban want to take shots at us, today, or after 1 May, or
    at any point during the withdrawal. The plan that we have
    designed and that General Miller will begin execution of is
    designed to come out with or without pressure from the Taliban,
    and, yes, we will bring additional resources in in order to
    protect the force as it comes out. That is normal in any kind
    of disengagement operation. I do not want to go into the
    details of those operations right now, but we will bring--we
    will have additional capabilities, and I am confident that we
    will be able and our coalition partners will be able, to
    extract ourselves. We look every day, every hour at force
    protection in Afghanistan. It has the complete, undivided
    attention of General Miller and myself.
        Senator Tillis. Well, I hope that any malign activities on
    the part of the Taliban are met, and that you have the
    authority to exact a cost for any of those. Hopefully there
    will not be any, but I am afraid that we will probably see
    some. General McKenzie, I also wanted to talk about the Abraham
    Accords. Do you think the other countries that have come to the
    Accords already, that it has been a positive thing, and what
    other additional cooperation or participants in the Accords do
    you think would be helpful as a check against Iran?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I think the normalization of
    relationships between Israel and her Arab neighbors is a
    profound step forward. It represents really a new era in the
    Middle East, and I think that is one of the things that Israel
    coming into United States Central Command as part of a unified
    command plan shift will also help. So I think, you know, we
    have got to be patient. It will take time for this to happen,
    but I would look over time for further nations to join in
    normalization of relations with Israel, and I think that is a
    net positive thing for the region.
        Senator Tillis. The last question is, with the missile
    attack or rocket attack out of Syria against Israel just this
    week, is that potentially a part of a trend, or do you think
    that maybe it was just a one-off activity?
        General McKenzie. I think it reflects actually incompetence
    in Syrian air defense where they were responding to Israeli
    strikes on targets in Syria. They fired their missiles. The
    missiles went ballistic, literally, and followed the parabolic
    trajectory into Israel where they were intercepted. I do not
    believe it was an intentional attack, but just rather lack of
    capability on the part of the Syrian air defenders.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. Thank you both. Thank you both,
    gentlemen. Thank you for your service and your leadership.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Now let me
    recognize Senator King via Webex.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There has been a lot
    of discussion today about the September 11th date and the
    calendar-based withdrawal. I think it is important to recall
    that the prior Administration initiated a calendar-based
    leaving--withdrawal from Afghanistan, and, in fact, that
    calendar date is 1 week from tomorrow. So the current
    Administration was, in a sense, boxed in by those negotiations
    with the Taliban that took place last year, and which, by the
    way, excluded the Afghan Government. General McKenzie, you used
    a term earlier in your testimony, ``if a civil war ensues.'' Is
    there not a civil war going on right at this very moment? There
    is no doubt that a civil war is going on now and will continue.
    Is there?
        General McKenzie. Sorry. I am probably not the best person
    to give you an answer to this. I would defer to the diplomats.
    But we have a constituted-elected government in place in
    Afghanistan, and so that we have a legal authority in place. So
    I am not sure that I would refer to what is going on right now
    as a civil war. Others might take a different view of that, but
    I am not certain that I would refer to it in that way.
        Senator King. It would not--you do not think the Taliban is
    a viable insurgency that is fighting against the government and
    the government's reach into the provinces?
        General McKenzie. I think the Taliban certainly are
    militarily very capable. I do not know how much of the actual
    Afghan population they represent. Polling data would tell you
    it is a very low percent if you subjected it to an honest
    election, which I know would be very difficult to accomplish in
    Afghanistan. But I would not confuse an insurgency, however
    capable and lethal, with a civil war.
        Senator King. Well, I will turn the question around. We
    have been there 20 years. We have spent over $1 trillion, lost
    lives, tens of thousands of injuries, incredible support to the
    Afghan Government. Why has the Afghan Government not been able
    to take hold? My understanding is, General, that the Taliban
    controls more land today than they did last year, and more last
    year than they did the year before. They are, in fact, winning.
    Why can the Afghan Government not defend itself successfully?
        General McKenzie. Sir, our principal objective in
    Afghanistan has been, and will remain, to prevent al Qaeda and
    ISIS from developing attacks against our Homeland and those are
    of our allies.
        Senator King. No, I understand that, General. That is not
    my question. My question is, in your military judgment, why has
    the Afghan Government not, with all the support that it has had
    from us, been more successful in beating back the Taliban,
    when, in fact, over the last dozen years or so, the Taliban has
    been making steady gains?
        General McKenzie. I believe that right now, a rough stasis
    exists between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan
    forces. The Taliban has access to offshore havens where they
    are able to reconstitute where the Government of Afghanistan
    cannot reach, and it is always very difficult in a
    counterinsurgency to fight when your opponent has the ability
    to do those things.
        Senator King. Well, I understand that, but it just seems
    like with all the advantages of the Afghan Government, I am
    just puzzled as to why they have not--and you testified that
    you thought they had the support of the majority of the
    people--why they have not been able to be more successful.
    General Townsend, we have talked a lot about the Chinese
    activity in Africa. You talked about the purpose appears to be
    both economic and military. My question is, do you discern any
    backlash in these African countries where the Chinese have made
    these big loans and big investments and now the bills are
    coming due? Are the Africans having any second thoughts about
    their engagement with the Chinese?
        General Townsend. Thank you, Senator. Actually, we do see
    some backlash. You know, you have heard of the famous debt trap
    diplomacy that the Chinese have used. That has actually worked
    against their efforts in a lot of African countries. Our
    embassies have a very successful program where we now will
    review any contracts. We have a standing offer to review any
    contracts that these countries are going to undertake with
    China to point out the inconsistencies, the potential pitfalls,
    and the differences often we find between the host nation
    language translation and the Chinese translation. I think this
    is a great effort by our Department of State to help these
    countries make informed decisions on their own.
        We see backlash, and we see it in the military sphere.
    Their equipment frequently breaks within a year or two. It is
    sitting rusting at the--on the side of the airfield or the
    port, and their training has been described to me by one
    African leader as not much more useful than a Hollywood
    demonstration. So we are starting to see some pushback by
    African leaders on the Chinese.
        Senator King. Well, I think one way to look at it, and I
    have talked to leaders throughout Asia, is that we have allies;
    China has customers. I think to the extent we can maintain
    those relationships with those African countries in the long
    run, I think they are going to prefer our model and our air
    support. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your service.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
    please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Thank both of you for
    your service and all the men and women under your command. Just
    to follow up with General Townsend with what Senator King was
    saying. What are you hearing from these leaders in these
    African countries about how they are going to deal with the
    debt that the Chinese have done or their relationship? Is there
    much opposition to what China is doing right now?
        General Townsend. I had an African leader tell me a
    drowning man will reach for any hand, and so I think they are
    faced with very difficult choices, many of these countries.
    They have got extreme poverty. They have climate challenges,
    food shortages. They want to advance their country for their
    people. Many of them have challenges with violent extremist
    organizations, and they need to secure their country, so they
    will reach out to any offer. Frequently those offers are
    fastest from China and Russia. We are slower to deliver, in
    their estimation, and it is true, and we are more deliberate in
    that way, and we have more strings attached than the Chinese
    and the Russians. You know, our strings are related to good
    behavior and things like that, democratic values, and the
    Chinese and the Russians attach no such strings other than
    loans--loan shark type of lending.
        So they reach for whatever assistance they can get. They
    constantly tell us we would prefer you to be our partner, and
    many of them do that when they have the ability to do that. But
    they also will take help from any source, and they will take
    help from us and help from the Chinese and the Russians all at
    the same time, and they will reassure us they can manage those
    relationships, and we try to help them with that.
        Senator Scott. So take the Chinese. Are they going to be
    able to enforce the deals they have entered into in these
    countries?
        General Townsend. That is a great question, Senator, and I
    do not know the answer to that. Probably best for the
    Department of State.
        Senator Scott. Okay. General Townsend, you know, Israel--it
    seems like Israel's reputation and presence in Africa is
    growing, and with the Abraham Accord, you would think it would
    be a positive. So are you seeing Israel's involvement in Africa
    growing at all?
        General Townsend. We do see Israel. Israel has always been
    involved in parts of Africa, mostly the northeast and along the
    Red Sea. We are seeing Israel reach out across Africa in a
    fairly positive way in most cases, and they are doing some arms
    sales there. Quite frankly, I would rather see our African
    partners buy Israeli drones than Chinese drones.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. General McKenzie, how concerned
    are you about the relationship that Iran is building with
    China?
        General McKenzie. I am very concerned about it. It is too
    soon to tell, though, if this latest agreement is going to
    mount into something or nothing at all. I think Iran is always
    seeking opportunities to buy weapons, you know, and so I think
    it is interesting, but I am not yet prepared to pass a judgment
    on it.
        Senator Scott. Are you seeing China's involvement grow--
    continuing to grow militarily all across the area you are
    responsible for?
        General McKenzie. In Central Command, China's involvement
    engagement is principally economic with the debt trap diplomacy
    that General Townsend discussed in Africa. We see the same
    thing across our region. You know, we should not forget that
    China actually imports a significant fraction of their
    hydrocarbons from the region, and through the Strait of Hormuz,
    and from the Arabian Gulf, so they are going to be very
    interested in the region. So I think right now what we are
    seeing is the leading edge of a long-term Chinese plan to
    firmly establish themselves in the region.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Now let me
    recognize via Webex, Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    General McKenzie and General Townsend, for being here. So,
    General McKenzie, President Biden recently announced his plans
    to withdraw all United States Forces from Afghanistan no later
    than September 11th, 2021. That is going to mark our longest
    war ever, so I just want to review what has happened just over
    the past decade and where we stand right now. General McKenzie,
    is it true that the Taliban has more members today than it did
    10 years ago?
        General McKenzie. The Taliban has 50,000 or so members
    today. I would have to come back to you on where that stands
    compared to 10 years ago, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Currently, the estimated strength of the Taliban is 60,000
    to 80,000 full-time fighters. In 2011, the number of Taliban
    fighters was estimated at 20,000 to 25,000. Taliban strength
    has continued to increase from as low as 20,000 in 2011 to
    60,000 in 2018, to as high as 85,000 as of March 2021.

        Senator Warren. Well, actually, I think the number could be
    as high as 85,000, according to the special inspector general
    for Afghanistan reconstruction, and that is almost triple what
    it was in 2011. You might want to go back and look at those
    numbers. Does the Taliban control more of Afghanistan than it
    did 10 years ago?
        General McKenzie. Yes, it does, Senator.
        Senator Warren. Yes, and does Pakistan or elements of the
    Pakistani Government still provide support and sanctuary to the
    Taliban?
        General McKenzie. We believe that elements of the Taliban
    are in Pakistan. Yes, Senator, we do.
        Senator Warren. Is corruption in the Afghan Government
    still endemic?
        General McKenzie. The Afghan Government has corruption,
    significant corruption.
        Senator Warren. Yes, and after all this time and all this
    work to prop up and support the Afghan Government, is it fair
    to say that Afghans still have little trust in their government
    and elections just as they did 10 years ago?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I would defer to the Department
    of State for a better commentary on that.
        Senator Warren. All right. I think if you check their
    commentary, they will say yes. The situation in Afghanistan has
    not improved in the last 10 years, even with our troops
    present, and it is clear there is little for us to be gained by
    a continued United States presence there. I strongly support
    President Biden's decision to withdraw U.S. troops. We should
    have learned by now that a conditions-based withdrawal is just
    a recipe for staying in Afghanistan forever. Defense officials
    have come before this committee year after year to proclaim
    that the United States has turned the corner in Afghanistan,
    but all I see is a vicious cycle that damages our Nation's
    reputation abroad and keeps our troops in harm's way, while
    producing little tangible benefit for our security.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of
    my time.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warren. Now let
    me recognize Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your service. General McKenzie, I appreciate our
    discussion yesterday. Let me start with a big kind of picture
    issue. You are in the Middle East, a lot of energy there. Does
    it help or hurt the United States of America from a national
    security and foreign policy perspective that we are now the
    world's energy superpower, producing more natural gas than
    Russia, more oil than Saudi Arabia? Does that help our national
    security posture in the Middle East and other places in the
    world?
        General McKenzie. I would say--I would think that it helps
    globally. It certainly helps in the CENTCOM region.
        Senator Sullivan. So do you think it makes sense from a
    perspective to just unilaterally start reducing the production
    of American energy? It kills jobs, but I am talking about from
    the national security perspective, to enable Saudi Arabia and
    Russia to be bigger energy producers than us. Does that makes
    sense, from your perspective, national security, your personal
    opinion?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I would--first, I would defer to
    Commerce for a more informed opinion.
        Senator Sullivan. I am asking as a----
        General McKenzie.----I would say that it is not helpful to
    the United States.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. You know, General, this is a
    very difficult decision, controversial decision. Certainly I
    wish the President would not have picked September 11th as some
    kind of date to celebrate. It is not a good date in American
    history. I think the Taliban is going to have a great
    propaganda victory by saying 20 years ago there was a victory,
    now there is a victory. I do not believe that it is a victory,
    but I hope in the future that the President, Secretary of
    Defense, even you do not use September 11th as some kind of
    date we are celebrating here for 2021 on the withdrawal of
    troops. You do not need to comment on that. I just think it is
    baffling that somehow somebody in the White House thought that
    was a good day to choose.
        One thing that we are hearing, many of our bravest men and
    women fought. Many died, sacrificed. You know, you start to
    hear this mantra that, well, they--if we are pulling out, the
    Taliban takeover, which is a distinct possibility, that these
    sacrifices, particularly those who died, died in vain. You
    know, I had the honor of serving as a staff officer to General
    Abizaid for 1-and-a-half years when he was CENTCOM commander
    many years ago. He said something once that really struck me.
    He said, no American who has ever fought for freedom or the
    defense of the national security of the United States has ever
    died in vain. What would you say to the men and women who
    fought in Afghanistan, wounded families who lost loved ones,
    about their sacrifice, even though we are leaving?
        General McKenzie. Senator, first of all, there is really
    nothing I can say to replace the empty chair at the table, the
    loss of a loved one, and I am very much humbled by recognizing
    that. I cannot improve on what General Abizaid said. In many
    ways, you know, to fight for freedom is not to give something
    up in vain. I think it is--but I think it is a very--it is
    still very hard on those people. As you know, I have been to
    Afghanistan multiple times, as has General Townsend seated
    beside me. My son has been to Afghanistan twice, so I am well
    aware of the burden that has been placed on families of this
    Nation to support our fight there.
        Senator Sullivan. I just want to make sure our message to
    these families, to the men and women who served, sacrificed,
    some gave their lives, that it is not going to be your
    sacrifice did not mean anything. I would agree with General
    Abizaid. I hope that can be the statement from our military
    leaders. No American who has ever fought for freedom in the
    security of this Nation has died in vain, regardless of what
    happens in Afghanistan in the next 2 to 3 years. Would you
    agree with that?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I would, certainly.
        Senator Sullivan. Would you agree with that, General?
        General Townsend. Senator, I would. Absolutely.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. General,
    you are a Marine. You know honor, courage, and commitment is a
    cornerstone of our ethos. Semper Fidelis. Do you believe
    nations have honor?
        General McKenzie. I do believe nations have honor.
        Senator Sullivan. So one thing that I worry about, given
    this decision, is that a lot of people who worked with our
    military, their lives are going to be at risk. The women who
    are now parliamentarian, their lives are going to be at risk if
    the Taliban takes over, which I think is a distinct
    possibility. I think we should be doing much more and planning
    much more to try to protect those lives, maybe get them out of
    Afghanistan if needed. Would you agree with that and if there
    is a plan to do that? Well, what is the plan to do that right
    now, and if there is not a plan, would you be able to execute a
    plan if we were able to keep our word to people who sacrificed
    and worked with us, who, now their lives are clearly going to
    be at risk, to help them? Would that not help the honor of
    America despite leaving?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I know the Department of State
    is looking at a variety of venues, the Special Immigrant Visa
    Program, among others, you know, to potentially get people out.
    We have the capability to do that if so directed.
        Senator Sullivan. I certainly hope we look at doing that in
    a big way. I think the idea of a year from now or a year-and-a-
    half from now if the Taliban takes over, which I think is a
    distinct possibility, and you have people who worked with our
    troops who are lined up and shot or killed because they worked
    with Americans, I think that would be a stain on our honor as a
    Nation, and I hope that we are making plans to avoid that.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Now let me recognize
    Senator Rosen via Webex.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe for holding this hearing, of course, and I would like to
    thank Generals Townsend and McKenzie for testifying today, and,
    of course, for their service to our country. I would like to
    speak a little bit about maintaining Israel's Qualitative
    Military Edge (QME) because for decades, maintaining Israel's
    qualitative military edge has been a bipartisan American
    foreign policy priority. It has been codified in law since
    2008.
        In recent years, the combination of Iran acquiring advanced
    Russian and Chinese systems, transfers of arms to terrorist
    groups, and an escalating weapons race in the region undermine
    Israel's QME, and they pose a significant conventional threat
    to the United States personnel. Just last night, a Syrian
    surface-to-air missile exploded in Israel, demonstrating the
    danger of advanced missiles proliferating through the region.
    So, General McKenzie, what is your assessment of Israel's
    current QME, and what must be done to maintain it? Do you view
    the escalating arms race in the region as having a negative
    impact on Israel's QME?
        General McKenzie. Senator, you know, I am newly energized
    to study the Israeli question because of the movement of Israel
    into the Central Command under the recent Unified Command (UCP)
    decision, although I have looked at it for several years at
    United States Central Command. I am confident that we will be
    able to preserve Israel's QME going forward, even considering
    arms sales to various countries across the region. We should
    also reflect that the arm sales to those countries across the
    region at least partially reflects the increasing normalization
    of ties between Israel and those nations. Nonetheless, I am
    absolutely confident that we will be able to retain Israel's
    military advantage.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I look forward to revisiting that
    with you as you move forward. I would like to move next to the
    MQ-9 production because the MQ-9 is remotely piloted aircraft.
    It plays a critical role in supporting our current intelligence
    surveillance and reconnaissance requirements. A key part of the
    MQ-9's architecture is the mission at Nevada's Creech Air Force
    Base. As force drawdowns in CENTCOM's area of responsibility
    have reduced human intelligence availability, signals
    intelligence capabilities become even more important. Despite
    this, the prior Administration tried to cut MQ-9 production.
    So, again, General McKenzie, last year you included additional
    MQ-9 funding at the top of CENTCOM's unfunded priorities. So
    how would additional MQ-9 aircraft support your ISR mission,
    and what would be the impacts or the gaps in your ISR
    capabilities if that production were to be suspended without a
    follow-up plan?
        General McKenzie. Senator, the MQ-9, MQ-1, and various
    other platforms are critical platforms for us in Central
    Command, particularly for use in the VEO fight. They give us
    the persistent overhead coverage that we need to go through the
    find, fix, and finish part of the equation. So we continue to
    use them, particularly in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq and
    Syria, and we have also found the MQ-9 to be valuable in use
    against Iran. In the summer of 2019, the manipulation of ISR
    assets in and around the Strait of Hormuz directly deflected
    Iranian attack planning, so it is useful in a variety of venues
    for us.
        Senator, I also recognize there is a global demand for
    these resources. Other combatant commands need them. My partner
    here, General Townsend, needs them in Africa as well. It
    remains an invaluable platform for us. I also recognize the
    platform is not viable in a high-end fight, and there are parts
    of CENTCOM that could become a high-end fight. There are parts
    of CENTCOM that are not a high-end fight. The platform is going
    to remain vital to us as we go forward, particularly as we pull
    out of Afghanistan, and our ability to maintain persistent
    overhead coverage will maybe possibly require additional MQ-9s
    in order--because of the range of--range from the base to the
    place where we will actually be looking. We may even need more
    of them in Central Command dedicated to that particular task.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that, and glad
    to do our part in signals and reconnaissance intelligence, and
    the MQ-9s certainly helps us meet those goals. Thank you. I
    notice my time has just about expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Rosen,
    and there are several members that are endeavoring to get here,
    and in order to allow them a fair opportunity, let me ask an
    additional question or two, and Senator Inhofe joins us. In
    fact, this is perfect timing because I can now introduce and
    recognize Senator Kelly. Are you prepared, Senator?
        Senator Kelly. I am always ready.
        Chairman Reed. Always ready.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, General
    McKenzie, General Townsend, thank you for your testimony today.
    So we have seen a range of Gray Zone engagement activities by
    near peer competitors throughout Africa and the Middle East,
    from China's pursuit of strategic partnerships with the
    Iranians and attempts to use infrastructure loans of medical
    supplies to gain favor on the African continent, to Russia's
    efforts to establish a foothold in critical mineral extraction
    and a presence on NATO's southern edge. The national defense
    strategy speaks of the need to expand the competitive space.
    With that in mind, I would like to get both of your thoughts on
    how the U.S. should be engaging in this environment to build
    relationships in each of these areas of responsibility with an
    eye towards countering the opportunistic influence-seeking
    behaviors by our competitors and discouraging any further
    escalation. General Townsend?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Senator. So you have correctly
    pointed out that Russia and China are competing deliberately
    and hard in Africa with the United States. I believe that they
    are determined to win. China is determined to win that
    competition. I am a little less concerned about Russia's
    competition, although it is not helpful. I think they are
    exploitative. They are self-interested. I think in many ways
    the Russians can be their own worst enemies. I think they are
    less of a longer-term concern to me than China is. China is a
    concern today and longer term. They are a learning
    organization. They are spending a lot of money in Africa. We do
    not have to outspend them. What we have to do is figure out
    where we need to out-compete them and how to do that, and how
    to do that is a whole-of-government solution.
        In my view, the first thing I am concerned about with
    China, number one, is an Atlantic Coast naval base. Number two,
    it is their activities in North Africa, and I can discuss that
    more in a closed session. My third concern would be the
    influence of Russia in Libya. As the Libyan national
    government--there is a sort of forming up now. Maybe there is a
    path forward there that is better. My fourth concern would be a
    Libyan naval--or a Russian naval base in Sudan on the Red Sea.
    So those are my top four global power competition concerns with
    those competitors, and it is a whole-of-government approach I
    think that will get us there. Most African partners want to
    partner with us.
        Senator Kelly. When you are thinking about China's desire
    to have an Atlantic Coast naval base, where do you think the
    most likely place is that they are exploring right now?
        General Townsend. Senator, let me say this. They have
    placed bets from Mauritania in the north to Namibia in the
    south, and many countries in between. I would really rather dig
    into those details in closed session.
        Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you. General McKenzie?
        General McKenzie. Senator, when we talk about competition
    against Russia and China in the gray space, clearly we need to
    think globally, not just in the western Pacific and not just in
    Europe. The principal tools that we use in Central Command
    range from exercises with our partners. Everybody wants to
    exercise with the United States, so we work those very hard
    with all these partners. The other is International Military
    Education and Training (IMET), bringing their officers and Non-
    Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to the United States for
    educational opportunities, extremely low-cost, extremely high
    payoff. Everybody wants to go to a U.S. school if they can
    have--a military school if they have--if they can have the
    opportunity to do that.
        Additionally, security cooperation. As Steve noted,
    everybody wants our weapons. They would prefer to buy from us.
    They accept the restrictions that we will place on those
    weapons, but we have a variety of tools that we can employ, and
    that is just in the military domain. On the whole-of-government
    side, I would just call out, too, the economic aid that we can
    offer and the work of USAID. All of those working in concert
    with us give us significant advantages that we can apply
    against Russia and China, particularly in the Central Command
    AOR.
        Senator Kelly. If we were able to expand those educational
    opportunities for foreign, often, officers, but just military
    personnel, is the demand--I mean, how significant is the demand
    right now?
        General McKenzie. The demand is--the demand far outpaces
    supply. Far outpaces supply.
        Senator Kelly. So we could double the----
        General McKenzie. You could double, triple. You could
    quadruple. You could do a lot of things. The problem really is
    on our end. I mean, our institutions are good because they are
    scoped in size, and we recognize that, but nonetheless, there
    is enormous demand for these.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator
    Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Well, thank you very much. Very
    quickly, thanks for being here today. General McKenzie, what is
    the most important thing we can do to prevent a resurgence of
    ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and are we doing enough?
        General McKenzie. I think we are on track to do that. I
    think the Iraqis are a lot better at fighting ISIS. We have
    pulled back from accompanying them in the fight to high-level
    advising. They can generally master the battlefield and protect
    their own country, so I think we are in a good place. I think
    we are in a good place in Iraq. In Syria, we work with our
    Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) partners to continue the fight
    against ISIS remnants. They do not hold any ground. You know,
    there are small, isolated groups of them that operate up and
    down the Euphrates River, and we go after them pretty hard.
    Because of that, they are unable to generate effective attack
    plans against the United States or our allies.
        Senator Tuberville. General Townsend, how will China's
    growing influence in the region disrupt the United States'
    abilities to impact long-term strategic goals?
        General Townsend. Senator, I think our number one strategic
    goal for Africa is to ensure that the United States has the
    access and the strategic influence that we need in the future.
    That is, I think, the number one concern I have for China's
    activity in Africa is that they will try to maneuver us or box
    us out of access and influence. I would say that we have an
    edge still. As much money as they have invested and as many
    activities that they are doing, we still have an edge in access
    and influence.
        An example I use is our rescue of an American citizen that
    was held hostage in Nigeria just last October. In an hour's
    notice, we asked seven countries for access to their country
    for our armed forces to enter their country and do some
    military activity. In many of these countries, this was done
    over the phone with literally hours to give us an answer. All
    seven said yes, and that is an example of the access and
    influence the United States has today, and we need to work to
    ensure we have that access and influence in the future, and not
    all seven of those countries are what we would consider strong
    and close partners, but they all said yes to that request.
        Senator Tuberville. Excellent. Thank you. General McKenzie,
    are there effective measures being taken today by CENTCOM to
    address the individual displaced persons crisis along the
    Syrian and Iraqi border? If so, how?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I remain very concerned about
    displaced persons in northeast Syria. It is not a military
    problem. It is really a whole-of-government, and more than
    that, it is actually an international problem. We have trained
    the people that were in those camps--that is our
    responsibility--and we prevent external actors from getting in
    there and causing harm. Nonetheless, those camps are incubators
    for radical ideology. We need to find a way to return,
    particularly the children, but also the other members, back to
    the countries that they came from, and that requires an
    international effort, and I know the Department of State is
    working very hard to make that--to make that happen. It is a
    tough--it is an uphill sled, though, trying to make--trying to
    achieve that. This is one of my most significant concerns, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Townsend, as we
    build relationships with African nations, such as Morocco and
    Algeria, how does this strengthen our national security?
        General Townsend. Both of those countries sit in a
    geostrategically important part of Africa. They both have--
    Morocco directly watches over the Strait of Gibraltar, and
    Algeria is close enough to influence the Strait of Gibraltar in
    the western Med. So from a geostrategic standpoint, we
    absolutely need good working relations with those two
    countries. Morocco is a very strong partner of the United
    States, probably our number one African partner as far as
    relationships go. They take great pride in their military being
    equipped primarily with United States equipment and operating
    at a standard that is equivalent to a NATO standard, so they
    are very strong partner. Algeria has been--has had close ties
    with Russia for decades. However, they have recently been
    expressing a desire to increase their ties with the United
    States, and we do have a good working relationship with Algeria
    on issues of mutual concern.
        Senator Tuberville. Do we sell Morocco a lot of arms and
    equipment?
        General Townsend. I am sorry?
        Senator Tuberville. Do we sell Morocco a lot of arms and
    equipment?
        General Townsend. We do, and unlike a lot of African
    partners, they purchase it all with their own money.
        Senator Tuberville. Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville, and now I
    would like to recognize via Webex, Senator Hawley, please.
        [No response.]
        Chairman Reed. I know Senator Hawley is trying very quickly
    to get either to Webex----
        Senator Hawley. There we go. Can you hear me now, Mr.
    Chairman?
        Chairman Reed. I can, Senator. Please proceed.
        Senator Hawley. Okay. Thank you. Thank you so much. Sorry.
    I could not hear you there. Thank you, gentlemen, for being
    here, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being patient with me.
        General McKenzie, let me start with you, if I could.
    Secretary Austin said recently that the United States will be
    able to maintain counterterrorism capabilities in the region
    sufficient to ensure Afghanistan cannot become a safe haven for
    terrorists who threaten our security. Again, that was Secretary
    Austin. Can you just give me a sense, do you agree with the
    Secretary's assessment that we can achieve our counterterrorism
    objectives in Afghanistan even once we complete the drawdown
    that President Biden has directed?
        General McKenzie. Senator, I do agree with that assessment.
    You know, we will rely on our defense in depth. The changes
    that have been made to security here in the United States make
    our Homeland a much harder target than it was in 2001.
    Additionally, the re-basing that we will do across the theater
    as we pull out of Afghanistan will give us the capability to go
    back in as necessary to strike targets when they need to be
    struck. I do not want to make it sound too easy. It is going to
    be extremely difficult to do that. It is certainly possible to
    do that, and we will have the forces that will allow us to
    accomplish those tasks.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you for that answer. I am glad to
    hear that. What are some of the options, can you give us a
    sense, that CENTCOM is evaluating for finding and neutralizing
    targets in Afghanistan once we withdraw our forces?
        General McKenzie. Sure. I would prefer to cover it in
    detail perhaps in the closed session.
        Senator Hawley. Sure.
        General McKenzie. But just very broadly, I would tell you
    that you always need a combination of--you want--the formula is
    you have got to--you got to find them, you got to fix the
    target, then you have to finish the target. So we tend to think
    in those terms when we talk about the resources that we will
    need. What you will need is the ability to bring persistent
    overhead coverage in, probably from extended ranges, to still
    loiter and take a look at areas that you want to further
    examine. The reason you are going to need persistent coverage
    is, if you plan to strike something, we are going to strike it
    in full compliance with the law of armed conflict: low
    collateral damage and the American way of war. So we are going
    to make sure if we go after something, it is really what we
    want to hit, and we are not going to kill innocent people
    should that be necessary.
        So we will do all that from extremely long range and it
    will be a challenge, but we do have the capability to do it. We
    have a number of ways to get to a fixed solution, ranging from
    a precision strike at very long range to on-the-ground options
    should those prove necessary. I would really prefer to talk a
    little bit more about those in a closed session, sir.
        Senator Hawley. Absolutely. Give me a sense, General, if
    CENTCOM has done a similar analysis to identify ways that we
    can achieve our counterterrorism objectives in Iraq, should we
    withdraw our forces there.
        General McKenzie. The logic is the same. We would certainly
    be able to do that, and the logic would be the same.
        Senator Hawley. Would you be willing in the appropriate
    setting to share your findings with the Committee in terms of
    the analysis you have done about how we might achieve that in
    Iraq?
        General McKenzie. Certainly. Of course, right now we do not
    anticipate withdrawing from Iraq. In fact, we believe, as a
    result of the strategic dialogue that was just completed in the
    last 2 weeks, we will maintain a footprint in Iraq going
    forward. But certainly, pending approval of the Secretary and
    further--you know, and further approval by the Department, we
    would be willing to do that.
        Senator Hawley. Yeah, let me perhaps rephrase my question.
    Has CENTCOM done a similar--you are doing this analysis now for
    Afghanistan because of the President's order in terms of how we
    can reposition there to achieve our counterterrorism
    objectives. Has CENTCOM done a similar analysis for Iraq in the
    event that our force posture there might change significantly?
        General McKenzie. Senator, not vis-a-vis Iraq particularly,
    although the logic of the argument, the logic of the capability
    would be the same where there is a target against Afghanistan
    or Iraq. So the work that we are doing right now would be
    useful should that prove necessary at some contingent time in
    the future as yet unplanned.
        Senator Hawley. Do you anticipate doing an analysis for the
    Iraq situation? The reason I am asking, General, it seems that
    if we are going to have a meaningful discussion about our
    continued military presence there, we are going to need to know
    the options, what we can realistically hope to achieve should
    we draw down or leave entirely.
        General McKenzie. Sure. So right now we are not planning
    for that in Iraq, is probably the best way to answer your
    question. We could plan for it very rapidly if so directed,
    but, again, I note that right now we do plan on maintaining a
    presence in Iraq into the future, subject to agreements and
    further discussions with the Government of Iraq.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you in the few seconds I
    have remaining, General, DOD budgeted about $4 billion last
    year for the Afghan Security Forces Fund. That is just short of
    the amount that United States Indo-Pacific Command (PACOM)
    needs for this year's installment of the Pacific Deterrence
    Initiative. At the same time, there is strong reason to believe
    that the Afghan security forces will be significantly reduced,
    harmed, or just collapse when United States troops depart. Here
    is my question. From a military standpoint, under what
    conditions would you say that it is no longer advisable for DOD
    to be investing this amount--these billions of dollars each
    year in the Afghan security forces?
        General McKenzie. Senator, that is a sort of a future
    hypothetical question which I try to avoid answering, but I can
    tell you this. If we do not provide them some support, they
    certainly will collapse, and I think that is not in our best
    interests.
        Senator Hawley. Yeah. The reason--as you can probably
    anticipate, the reason I am asking is I am concerned that we
    will continue to pour resources into the security forces
    without much return on investment when we need them. We need
    those resources very badly in other theaters, particularly in
    our pacing theater. I have had just about used up my time here,
    I think. In fact, I am over my time. Thank you, General, for
    being here. Thank you, General Townsend, as well. I will have
    some additional questions for you in a written setting. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. This concludes
    the open session. Let me yield to Senator Inhofe for any
    comments he might have.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah, I do. I want to make sure the staff,
    anyone who is here, understands that we have a lot of questions
    we want to ask in a closed session. That is going to take place
    in 217. We have four votes coming up, so it is going to be very
    convenient to be down there, run up and get our votes and come
    back, so I would invite all of our members to come to that
    closed session immediately.
        Chairman Reed. Let me echo what Senator Inhofe said. In
    fact, I was going to say that, but he----
        Senator Inhofe.----Oh.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman Reed. This is sort of ESP, I think. I do not know
    what is going on. But, yes, we are going to adjourn immediately
    to SVC-217. We will have a closed session. It will be people
    coming in and out to vote, but there are many issues we want to
    cover there. Gentleman, thank you for your testimony, thank you
    for your service, and for those who serve in your commands.
        The open hearing is adjourned.

        [Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
           iran and reentering the joint comprehensive plan of action
        1. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, would rejoining the Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) be a positive step in containing
    Iran's nuclear ambitions?
        General McKenzie. Our diplomats at the Department of State have the
    lead for the nuclear talks currently underway in Vienna, working with
    our Allies to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The JCPOA
    effectively constrained Iran's nuclear program by blocking all of
    Tehran's potential pathways to a nuclear weapon and enabled robust
    international monitoring of all aspects of Iran's nuclear program. An
    agreement that verifiably restrains Iranian return to full nuclear
    activities and strict compliance with its commitments under the deal
    extends breakout timelines preventing an Iranian weapons in the U.S
    national security interest.

        2. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, how does extending the nuclear
    weapon production timeline support the United States' strategic
    interests in the region?
        General McKenzie. Iran's behavior remains the greatest, single
    threat to security and stability in the region. Our diplomats are hard
    at work with Allies to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. If
    they are able to make progress in curtailing Iran's nuclear program,
    particularly by extending Iran's breakout timeline, this would
    depressurize the region by reducing the likelihood of the development
    of a weapon of mass destruction and the chances for increased regional
    conflict as a result of that acquisition.

        3. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, how does extending the nuclear
    weapon production timeline support your ability to plan for
    contingencies if Iran does attempt to build nuclear weapons?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
                     withdrawal of forces from afghanistan
        4. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, are you preparing contingency
    plans to react if United States Forces are attacked by the Taliban
    during the withdrawal?
        General McKenzie. USCENTCOM has a plan in place, to include
    carrier-based airpower, bombers, and other crisis response forces to
    protect United States and coalition troops as we withdraw from
    Afghanistan. We are confident we have the right capabilities in place
    to defend our troops and respond to any attacks. We will maintain a
    regional counterterrorism capacity, with a military and intelligence
    assets in the region, that can counter the re-emergence of a terrorist
    threat and deal with it if it does emerge. We will also hold the
    Taliban accountable if they are not doing what they have committed to
    do. Conducting counter-terrorism surveillance and suppression without a
    ``platform'' in Afghanistan is a lot harder, but it is not impossible.

        5. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, what role will United States
    Central Command (CENTCOM) play in preventing violent extremist
    organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
    from regaining a foothold in Afghanistan after the withdrawal?
        General McKenzie. The United States will conserve and sustain
    regional counterterrorism capabilities with our international and
    Afghan partners to prevent the emergence of terrorist networks that
    could threaten the United States homeland. Furthermore, through
    diplomatic efforts with Government of the Islamic Republic of
    Afghanistan, the United States Government will hold the Taliban to its
    commitments to ensure that al Qaeda or any other group never again can
    use Afghanistan as a base of operations against the United States.
                            iran's presence in syria
        6. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, over the last several years
    Iran has become increasingly involved in the conflict in Syria. What is
    the current status of United States Forces in Syria?
        General McKenzie. In Syria, approximately 900 United States
    military personnel support the Counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
    (ISIS) mission from bases in northeastern Syria and At-Tanf Garrison, a
    desert garrison located in southeastern Syria near the border with Iraq
    and Jordan. We provide training and enabling support to vetted Syrian
    groups and individuals, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in
    the Eastern Syria Security Area. We have provided training to the SDF
    on operational and tactical skills such as marksmanship, heavy weapon
    employment, and mounted maneuver (vehicle operations). We also provide
    intelligence and other enabling support to the SDF. We continue to
    provide training and equipment to help increase SDF's capacity to
    manage their detention facilities, holding approximately 10,000 ISIS
    detainees.

        7. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, how are United States Forces
    managing Iranian involvement in this conflict?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

        8. Senator Hirono. General McKenzie, what conditions do you believe
    need to be satisfied before the United States withdraws our remaining
    forces from Syria?
        General McKenzie. First, I would like to say that the United States
    leaving Syria is a policy decision. For USCENTCOM, our mission is to
    defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Although ISIS no longer
    holds territory, remnants of ISIS remain a threat and given the
    opportunity, ISIS will reconstitute its capability to plan and attack
    the homeland, our interest, and our Allies and partners. Our forces in
    Syria provide vetted Syrian groups and individuals with the equipment,
    training, and intelligence that they need to continue to counter the
    ISIS threat. When our vetted partner forces, including the Syrian
    Democratic Forces, are capable of dealing with this threat without our
    support, then I would be satisfied that the military conditions have
    been met for a withdrawal of our remaining forces.
                          population growth in africa
        9. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, as noted in your posture
    statement, the population of the African continent is growing rapidly
    and has the potential to exacerbate the extreme poverty already present
    on the continent, especially among younger generations who both make up
    the majority of the population and are most vulnerable to recruitment
    by violent extremist organizations. What steps is United States Africa
    Command (AFRICOM) taking, in coordination with our interagency partners
    and allies, to address recruitment efforts by violent extremist
    organizations on the continent?
        General Townsend. Africa's increasing youth population can be a
    positive force for prosperity, innovation, and growth. Future
    generations of young men and women should be viewed as our shared
    responsibility to protect from the cruelties of al Shabaab, Boko Haram,
    and ISIS. If left defenseless in unstable environments, African youth
    are vulnerable to a wide range of malign actors, including criminal
    networks, militias, and in some cases, violent extremist organizations
    (VEOs). In many cases, VEOs specifically target young people and
    forcibly kidnap or coerce them into their ranks.
        To help African partners protect their youth, USAFRICOM works
    closely with the interagency to improve security, stop the spread of
    extremist ideologies, and stabilize regions affected by VEOs.
    USAFRICOM, in conjunction with Allies and partners, degrades VEO
    networks to create the environment for the Department of State and
    USAID's stabilization and development activities to take root.
    USAFRICOM, in close collaboration with USAID, conducts humanitarian
    assistance to address underlying drivers of instability, working with
    host governments to provide essential services and relieve acute
    conditions. We share the premise with our interagency partners that
    young people are more likely to work with security forces to stand up
    to VEOs when they trust those security forces to protect them and have
    hope for a brighter future. This is one of the key reasons why the
    United States is often the security partner of choice in Africa, in
    recognition of our core values versus malign alternatives.

        10. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, are there any additional
    authorities or initiatives that require Congress' help in this area?
        General Townsend. USAFRICOM has supported officers from eleven
    African partners to attend courses on countering VEO recruitment taught
    by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). Increased funding
    for such courses and other IMET funds would help address underlying
    drivers of radicalization, USAFRICOM works to strengthen citizen
    security by professionalizing partner forces through the Institutional
    Capacity Building (ICB) Sec. 332 Authority in support of the Building
    Partner Capacity Sec. 333 Authority. The Ministerial and Service level
    ICB Lines of Effort strengthen the institutions shaping African
    security sectors, and by extension, African security broadly.
    Congress's continued support for these efforts would go far to ensure
    African youth are free from the spectre of VEO recruitment. I would
    also submit that addressing the risks of climate change in Africa can
    further insulate fledging institutions from the strain of climate-
    induced crises and VEO alternatives. The resumption and expansion of
    the Defense Environmental International Cooperation Program, which lost
    funding in 2020, would provide USAFRICOM with critical tools to reduce
    the risk for Africa youth and citizens. When African youth are safe
    from irregular threats attempting to recruit or coerce them into
    service, they are free to pursue productive futures.

        islamic state of iraq and syria in united states africa command
        11. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, ISIS continues to develop a
    foothold in North and East Africa and based on the recent attack in
    Palma, Mozambique last month, it seems that ISIS is gaining ground in
    southern Africa and across the continent. Can you provide an overview
    of your assessment of ISIS in the AFRICOM area of operations?
        General Townsend. ISIS branches and aspirants in Africa are mostly
    on an upward trajectory. The two exceptions are in North Africa where
    most of ISIS's affiliates have been largely degraded and are focused on
    survival and in Horn of Africa where their presence is small and
    competes with Al Shabaab. However, in West, East, and Central Africa,
    ISIS branches are growing and expanding in under-governed areas,
    exploiting poor economic conditions, ethnic competition, and weak
    security forces. Mozambique is a prime example of this, where ISIS-
    Mozambique, since its inception in 2017, has exponentially grown the
    frequency and complexity of its attacks, and expanded its geographic
    areas of operations into neighboring Tanzania and to the western LNG
    sites in northern Mozambique. In West Africa, ISIS-West Africa is
    ISIS's largest and most active province outside of Iraq and Syria, and
    has consolidated control over its Lake Chad Basin safehaven. The group
    has expelled Nigerian military and security forces and attacked Boko
    Haram in these safehavens and has provided rudimentary governance and
    social service to the local populace since at least early 2018. ISIS in
    the Greater Sahara maintains a presence in Sahelien West Africa and
    continues low-level attacks, but is still recovering from losses
    sustained from French CT operations and conflict with al-Qaida
    affiliates in the area. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a
    previously anti-Uganda insurgent group rebranded itself and pledged
    allegiance to ISIS in 2017, and attacks local security forces, UN
    peacekeepers, NGOs, and local towns and villages. Along with the ISIS
    Branch in Somalia, these groups are increasingly interconnected and are
    fueling the growth and expansion of ISIS supporters in many sub-Saharan
    Africa countries. Although all of these groups are focused locally in
    their areas of operation, their attacks and ability to control
    territory offer ISIS core fodder for their media releases and
    propaganda, which allows ISIS to portray a successful and expanding
    caliphate to its global support base despite setbacks in other areas of
    the world.

        12. Senator Hirono. General Townsend, how are you partnering with
    nations across the continent to counter ISIS attacks and recruitment?
        General Townsend. Senator, the bottom line up front is USAFRICOM is
    not resourced to do very much to help partners to counter growing ISIS
    attacks, and recruitment. Where we do try to help, USAFRICOM follows a
    partner-centric approach to countering ISIS attacks and recruitment
    across the continent. This is done primarily through a myriad of Title
    10 and Title 22 capacity-building activities conducted in coordination
    with the inter-agency. Specifically, force modernization and training
    efforts with key African partners provide them with the tools and
    knowledge necessary to confront ISIS on the battlefield. Military
    intelligence capacity building also plays an important role helping
    partners to understand how to obtain, verify, and analyze intelligence
    and then appropriately use it in operational decision cycles. In doing
    so, USAFRICOM and its components create sustainable entities, which do
    not only anticipate and respond to security threats but aid in more
    professional operations, grounded in doctrine.
        USAFRICOM capacity building activities are important, but the long-
    term fight with ISIS will not be won on the battlefield alone. Good
    governance, economic opportunity, and human development in African
    societies are antidotes to ISIS recruitment. To that end, USAFRICOM
    plays a supporting role to USAID and Department of State ``3D''
    Diplomacy, Development, and Defense activities. USAFRICOM also supports
    many Department of State programs, such as the Global Peace Operations
    Initiative (GPOI), the Partnership for Regional East Africa
    Counterterrorism (PREACT), Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
    (TSCTP), Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), and coordinates with
    the Department of State to advance Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) on
    the continent. These programs, among others, strengthen the ability of
    our African partners to counter ISIS recruitment activities by
    providing training on human rights and the rule of law.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                                mq-9 production
        13. Senator Rosen. General Townsend, how would additional MQ-9
    aircraft support AFRICOM's intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) mission?
        General Townsend. Additional ISR, manned or unmanned and preferably
    SIGINT enabled and armed, is AFRICOM's number one unresourced unfunded
    priority. Additional aircraft would meaningfully bolster USAFRICOM's
    counter-violent extremist organization and strategic competition
    missions by providing additional coverage in both space and time -
    increasing our situational awareness of adversarial activities on the
    continent. With vast distances between basing locations and operating
    areas, MQ1/9s provide the essential range and long-endurance ISR
    capability we require. Additional MQ1/9s would also fill a force
    protection role, enabling increased DOD and DOS engagement
    opportunities on the continent.

        14. Senator Rosen. General Townsend, what would be the impacts of a
    gap in ISR capabilities if MQ-9 production were to be suspended without
    a follow-on plan?
        General Townsend. Additional ISR, manned or unmanned and preferably
    SIGINT enabled and armed, is AFRICOM's number one unresourced unfunded
    priority. I don't know how suspending MQ-9 production would affect
    USAFRICOM's allocation of ISR assets. The United States Air Force would
    be better equipped to answer how a change in production would impact
    their force offering to the Joint Force. If suspended production
    resulted in reduced capacity, Joint Staff could potentially make
    adjustments to the global allocation to USAFRICOM and other combatant
    commands. A reduction in allocation to USAFRICOM would impact our
    ability to address security concerns and provide force protection to
    United States and partner forces during operations, engagements and
    crisis response.
              transfer of israel to united states central command
        15. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, how have Arab states under
    CENTCOM's area of responsibilities that don't have diplomatic relations
    with Israel responded to the transfer?
        General McKenzie. USCENTCOM has noted no reactions from AOR states
    to the Unified Command Plan change.
                               iranian aggression
        16. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, what are the impacts on
    regional stability of this new agreement between China and Iran? Is
    this merely a piece of paper or is it the beginning of significant
    strategic relations between Beijing and Tehran?
        General McKenzie. The China-Iran 25-year agreement provides a non-
    binding framework for Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure in
    return for guaranteed Iranian oil sales at a discount and increased
    military cooperation. High-level Chinese diplomatic visits to key Gulf
    partners, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and
    Bahrain suggest Beijing will seek to continue balancing its regional
    relationships while avoiding potentially destabilizing actions such as
    certain arms sales to Iran. While the agreement signals China's intent
    to continue strengthening ties with Iran, China has publicly downplayed
    its significance. This agreement signifies a significant change for
    Iran, in light of the potential for increased oil sales and closer
    Iranian-Chinese relations across a broad spectrum. Tehran likely
    believes the deal will ensure reliable revenue and set the stage for
    future additional trade agreements.

        17. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, how is CENTCOM proactively
    protecting our Forces and diplomats from the threat to United States
    and coalition forces posed by Iranian-aligned militia groups?
        General McKenzie. We continually conduct cross-discipline terrorism
    threat assessments, strategic threat analysis, and planning and
    integration to mitigate threats. This detailed assessment and planning
    process enables commanders to deploy and employ various methods of
    active defense such as counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM)
    systems and counter unmanned aircraft systems (CUAS) systems. We also
    employ passive defense methods such as structured hardening and
    camouflaging. These active and passive defense measures protect United
    States & coalition forces and diplomats from potential attacks by
    Iranian-aligned militia groups.

        18. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, how is CENTCOM working with
    our regional partners to deter Iranian aggression, including by
    stopping transfers of conventional arms to terrorist groups like Hamas
    and Hezbollah and ensuring freedom of navigation in the region's
    waterways?
        General McKenzie. Starting in 2019, after several incidents in
    which freedom of navigation was threatened by Iran and Iran backed
    militia groups, USCENTCOM partnered with regional and extra-regional
    Allies and partners to establish the International Maritime Security
    Construct. This construct allows nations to provide maritime forces to
    patrol and stand watch to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of
    Hormuz, the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and in the vicinity of the
    Bab al-Mandeb Strait. To counter transfers of conventional arms to
    terrorist groups and militias, we are working with the interagency,
    Allies, and partners, to conduct operations to stop the transfer of
    lethal aid to Iranian proxies and partners. Specific actions include
    intelligence gathering and subsequent interdiction of weapons
    shipments. The recent seizure of a large weapons cache by the USS
    Monterey is a recent example of these types of operations.
                         political stability of jordan
        19. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, what military risk do we
    assume with Jordan if political instability in the country escalates?
        General McKenzie. Escalation of political instability in Jordan
    could impede the Department's efforts to strengthen the Jordan Armed
    Forces (JAF) while imposing risk to operations to defeat Islamic State
    of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and counter violent extremist organizations
    (VEO). USCENTCOM requires a balanced, tailored force presence and
    basing network across the Middle East. Jordan is a key partner,
    providing access to several bases, ports, and airspace while
    facilitating the Department's operational reach. The JAF remains
    committed to the defeat ISIS Coalition, providing air, ground, and
    special operations force capabilities. Any degradation to the
    Department's access to Jordan or to the JAF's capacity and will would
    therefore have a lasting effect on regional stability.

        20. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, what are the implications for
    our national security interests?
        General McKenzie. President Biden, in his April 7 call with King
    Abdullah II, emphasized the importance of the King's leadership to the
    United States and the region. If Jordan were to become politically
    unstable it could effectively threaten a key partner of our defeat
    Islamic State of Iraq and Syria campaign. Political instability in
    Jordan could therefore result in the Jordan Armed Forces directing
    their attention away from their efforts to defeat ISIS.

        21. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, can you explain how the recent
    defense agreement with Jordan, which was made public last month,
    benefits our military posture?
        General McKenzie. The Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
    supplements the 1996 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and codifies
    additional rights, privileges and immunities for United States Forces,
    such as access to and use of facilities, tax exemptions, and freedom of
    movement, that greatly benefit our military posture in Jordan. The DCA
    also enables the United States to make investments in military
    construction projects to support joint military efforts to defeat ISIS
    and to pursue mutual goals of regional stability and counterterrorism.
                                   iron union
        22. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, can you provide an update on
    the Iron Union exercise between the United States and the United Arab
    Emirates?
        General McKenzie. Field Training Exercise (FTX) IRON UNION 14 was
    held in the United Arab Emirates 28 Jan-5 Feb 2021 with one United
    States mechanized infantry company and one United Arab Emirates Land
    Forces Company. All exercise objectives were met, strengthening the
    relationship between the two nations, enhancing interoperability,
    improving partner capacities and promoting regional security. Despite
    the great results from this event, it is the last FTX to be planned,
    with future iterations shifting instead to a computer-based Command
    Post Exercise due to reduction in forces and funding provided to
    USCENTCOM.

        23. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, the Emirati ambassador has
    suggested that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) might invite the Israel
    Defense Forces (IDF) to a future iteration of the Iron Union exercise.
    Do you believe it would be a good thing to begin to build a more
    unified and capable American, Arab, and Israeli coalition to push back
    on aggression from Tehran?
        General McKenzie. The participation of Israel Defense Forces in
    future exercises with other regional partners in the USCENTCOM Area of
    Responsibility would certainly be a positive step towards regional
    stability. While there are benefits to keeping some exercises as
    bilateral events only, efforts to further normalize relationships among
    all USCENTCOM partners would benefit everyone involved, enhance
    regional stability, and send a strong signal to potential adversaries.
    Increasing the number, scope or scale of any exercise events will not
    be achievable without a corresponding increase in funding and resources
    available.

        24. Senator Rosen. General McKenzie, would you welcome an Emirati
    invitation to the IDF to join the next Iron Union Exercise?
        General McKenzie. USCENTCOM welcomes any effort to enhance regional
    relationships and expand U.S. interoperability with our partners in the
    area of responsibility, and to increase bilateral cooperation between
    each of those partners. While including Israel in Exercise IRON UNION
    is one option, there are also benefits to maintaining some exercises as
    bilateral events. I am looking at all options to try to include Israel
    in events like this and will discuss with our regional partners their
    objectives and desires as well.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                            great power competition
        25. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, and General McKenzie, are
    you aware of the Chinese and/or Russian disinformation operations being
    propagated within your area of responsibility, and if so is this a
    pervasive issue?
        General Townsend. Chinese disinformation is all over Africa, and
    Beijing is spreading it via both official and unofficial channels.
    We've seen Chinese ambassadors try to obscure the origins of COVID-19,
    for instance, saying in interviews it didn't actually originate in
    China. China also operates more than 60 Confucius Centers across the
    continent. You might go to one to learn Mandarin, but it comes with a
    helping of propaganda. Finally, Chinese media companies, like Star
    Times, which broadcasts in more than 30 countries, will make pro-China
    content, dub it into a local African language, distribute it for free,
    present it as factual journalism, and frequently, fund its publication.
        As for Russia, its influence operations are also pervasive across
    the USAFRICOM AOR, most prominently through the organization of Russian
    oligarch Yevginy Prigozhin. Prigozhin's network has interfered with
    African elections in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and South Africa. A
    Prigozhin-linked influence operation based in Ghana and Nigeria
    targeted the 2020 United States election. In Libya, Prigozhin's network
    took over television studios and a newspaper to push Russian-approved
    narratives. Influence efforts in Mali, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and
    Mozambique have criticized French foreign policy, made claims of a
    fictitious coup attempt, and promoted Russian COVID-19 vaccines. These
    influence campaigns also targeted African diaspora populations in
    Europe.
        General McKenzie. Yes. Russian and Chinese disinformation is
    pervasive throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Both
    Russian and Chinese operatives seek to shape the information
    environment to undermine United States relations in all 21 AOR states,
    using diplomatic engagements and social/traditional media to question
    United States reliability. Moscow and Beijing tend to prioritize
    efforts in countries in which they have military and economic strategic
    interests and deem to be in their respective spheres of influence (such
    as Central and South Asia). While the efficacy of these efforts varies,
    disinformation is a key component of Russian and Chinese strategic
    competition strategy.

        26. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, compared to what we spend
    in Iraq, for example, how do the modest expenditures we make for
    AFRICOM counter the influences of China and Russia in ways that impact
    the average American?
        General Townsend. There are approximately 232,000 Americans living
    and working in Africa every single day. These Americans represent a
    significant counterbalance to the 1.1 million Chinese in Africa
    advancing China's ambitious agenda for the continent. Given the vast
    natural resources and incredible growth potential in the population of
    Africa, 1.7 billion by 2030, the United States can ill-afford to ignore
    the economic opportunity in Africa.
        USAFRICOM's modest expenditures are focused on exposing China and
    Russia's malign efforts to undermine sovereignty, forcing African
    countries into disadvantageous agreements, and extracting resources
    from Africa with little benefit for Africans.
        Countries free of Russian and Chinese malign influence create
    opportunities for United States businesses to compete in a rules-based
    system, as part of a free international order. By extension, businesses
    bound by legal regulations, including the many United States companies
    doing business in Africa, have a chance to offer their services in a
    fair and open process. The current efforts underway in Africa are the
    barest minimum that the United States can do to preserve the option to
    play in the economic future of Africa.

        27. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, what would be the impact
    if Moscow does establish a port in northern Africa?
        General Townsend. Establishing a military port facility in North
    Africa is one of Russia's long-term strategic goals. A dual-use
    civilian/military port or exclusive naval facility would represent a
    significant leap in Russia's level of access and influence in the
    region. It would also be a major advancement in Russia's strategic
    effort to be seen as a global power with NATO as their primary
    opponent. A Russian port increases the Russian Navy's logistical
    support in the Mediterranean, improves intelligence collection of
    United States and NATO forces in Europe and Africa, and reduces their
    reliance on port calls. This is vital to Russia as a means to avoid
    sanctions on access to European ports following their annexation of
    Crimea. Guaranteed access to naval facilities simplifies the logistics
    of Russia's routine naval deployments through the Mediterranean.
        A Russian port facility and consequent increase in Russian Naval
    Assets poses a direct threat to United States and NATO forces by
    improving Russia's ability to monitor and threaten the Mediterranean,
    especially maritime approaches to Syria, the Black Sea and the Suez
    Canal, as well as the Straits of Gibraltar and Straits of Sicily. A
    Russian port in Libya complicates both United States military support
    to diplomatic relations in that country and personnel recovery and
    crisis response across the continent. Direct Russian access to Libyan
    oil complicates United States economic diplomacy and disrupts critical
    access and influence in North Africa. While a base in North Africa
    would be exposed and isolated in a conflict with Russia, it widens the
    problems of potential contested logistics in any war plan dependent on
    the Suez Canal as a strategic line of communication. Finally, USAFRICOM
    is as concerned, or more concerned, about a Chinese naval facility in
    North or West Africa as we are a Russian facility.
                                      iran
        28. Senator Blackburn. General McKenzie, with respect to Iran and
    competition within this proxy force grey zone environment, where could
    we be more effective and what enabling capabilities or authorities do
    you require?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]

        29. Senator Blackburn. General McKenzie, Israel has accused Iran of
    providing the Hezbollah militia with precision-guided missile
    production facilities. Is this true, and if so what can the Lebanese
    Armed Forces (LAF) do to prevent Iran from providing Hezbollah with
    this capability?
        General McKenzie. [Deleted.]
                                    somalia
        30. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, how important to the
    counter-ISIS and counter-al-Shabaab fight is maintaining our political
    influence in Somalia?
        General Townsend. Maintaining political influence in Somalia is
    decisive to the CVEO fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
    Political influence enables United States interagency efforts that
    ensure the Somalia Security Forces remain an apolitical, professional
    force. If the Somali National Army becomes politicized or devolves into
    militias, the fight against VEO adversaries fails. Regional instability
    provides the fertile ground for terrorist activity with U.S. Homeland
    aspirations. If security forces are distracted with internal political
    conflicts, VEOs will fill the void. Additionally, CVEO strategies that
    rely solely on kinetic targeting are unable to address underlying
    drivers of violent extremism in Somalia. USAFRICOM builds United States
    political influence in Somalia through its contribution to a whole-of-
    government approach to CVEO. Maintaining this influence is necessary to
    ensure the Federal Government of Somalia can move forward. As stated in
    President Biden's inaugural address and within the Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance, ``we will only succeed in advancing
    American interests and upholding our universal values by working in
    common cause with our closest allies and partners.''

        31. Senator Blackburn. General Townsend, how have your
    counterterror operations been impacted by the reduction in United
    States troops on the ground in Mogadishu and has al-Shabaab's activity
    changed as a result?
        General Townsend. Al-Shabaab operations were already on an upward
    trajectory as the United States began its repositioning in December
    2020 and continues on that trend according to academic database data
    and high profile incidents in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab assassinations of
    government and security force officials in 2021 are at the highest
    levels ever, and as of May, the group has conducted 6 VBIED attacks in
    Mogadishu equaling last year's total number of VBIEDs. Al-Shabaab
    publically celebrated the departure of United States troops from
    Somalia and is using the opportunity to enhance their global
    reputation, increase recruitment, and extend control into new regions
    in central Somalia, all of which may have long-term impacts.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                    THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
    Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. I would like to call this hearing to order.
    The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    President's Defense Budget Request for fiscal year 2022.
        Witnesses this morning are Secretary Lloyd Austin,
    Secretary of Defense; Mr. Michael McCord, Under Secretary of
    Defense (Comptroller); and General Mark Milley, Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff. I welcome each of you and thank you for
    your service and willingness to appear before us today.
        Two weeks ago, President Biden released his Defense Budget
    Request for fiscal year 2022, with a top line of $715 billion.
    The request focuses on several key areas: defeating COVID-19,
    prioritizing China as the pacing challenge, addressing advanced
    and persistent threats, innovating and modernizing the
    Department of Defense (DOD), and tackling the climate crisis.
        The President's Defense Budget Request is a starting point
    for Congress, and must always be viewed in the broader context
    of the national security and fiscal challenges we face. It is
    important that we ensure we have the right strategies and
    resources to keep the American people safe now and in the
    future, with a keen eye toward evolving threats around the
    globe.
        I am pleased to see that this budget request places a
    priority on taking care of the men and women who serve in
    uniform and the civilians who serve alongside them in the
    Department, by including an across-the-board pay raise for
    military and civilian personnel of 2.7 percent. While this pay
    raise is required by law for military personnel, too often DOD
    civilians have been overlooked. This increase in civilian pay
    sends an important message to the workforce and begins to
    reverse years of pay freezes and benefit cuts.
        Notably, the budget request includes $112 billion in
    research, development, test, and evaluation funds, the largest
    ever requested in this area. This includes significant funding
    for modernization areas such as microelectronics, artificial
    intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and 5G. Building our
    strength in these areas will be critical to the modernization
    of our national security.
        But as the recent SolarWinds, Microsoft Exchange, and
    Colonial Pipeline server breaches painfully illustrated, our
    traditional ``perimeter-based'' cyber defenses are simply
    inadequate to deal with sophisticated adversaries that are
    clearly advantaged in the cyber domain. I hope our witnesses
    will expand on what activities DOD is taking to accelerate and
    expand our cybersecurity and what resources are needed to
    accomplish them.
        With regard to the President's transition strategy in
    Afghanistan, the budget request includes $3.3 billion for the
    Afghan Security Forces Fund. This will ensure our continued
    support for the sustainment, infrastructure, equipment, and
    training requirements for Afghan security personnel. I ask that
    our witnesses update the Committee on this transition.
        Last year, this Committee led the way in establishing the
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or PDI, to serve as a means for
    improving the capabilities, design, and posture of our joint
    forces in the Indo-Pacific region. The PDI was intended to
    strengthen the presence and resiliency of our armed forces;
    improve logistics and maintenance capabilities; support
    exercises, training, experimentation, and innovation for the
    joint force; and build the defense and security capabilities
    and cooperation of allies and partners. I am concerned that the
    Department's budget request takes a heavily platform-centric
    approach to PDI, and I look forward to working collaboratively
    with the Department of Defense leadership to more appropriately
    align resources in the DOD budget with our intent for PDI.
        Similarly, the budget request proposes an $800 million
    reduction to the European Deterrence Initiative, the EDI. The
    Initiative, which was also established by this Committee, has
    seen budget decreases for the past 3 years. The Department has
    suggested that this is part of ``transitioning to a steady
    state'' in the European Command AOR [area of responsibility]. I
    would ask that our witnesses further explain the reasoning
    behind the reduced EDI budget, and specifically, whether you
    believe this level of investment in infrastructure, force
    posture, and capabilities is sufficient to deter Russian
    aggression.
        With regard to our nuclear strategy, I understand that the
    budget request before us supports important steps toward
    nuclear modernization. Our allies and partners depend on the
    United States nuclear umbrella, and modernization of our
    strategic forces is needed to reassure them of our
    dependability. One thing I think everyone would agree on, and
    often gets lost in the discussion, is the fact that arms
    control and the modernization of our nuclear forces are
    inherently linked together. Even as we modernize, we should
    seek ways to promote strategic stability, like the extension of
    the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] agreement and
    follow-on talks to cover new strategic weapons and further
    nuclear stockpiles.
        Lastly, I would note that fiscal year 2022 is the first
    year in 10 years that we will not be constrained by the Budget
    Control Act. Eliminating arbitrary spending caps means that
    every department's budget can, and should, be argued on its
    merits. Taxpayers should not have to pay for programs or
    systems that are wasteful or ineffective, and Congress must not
    shirk its responsibilities to get rid of outdated systems in
    favor of more advanced, effective, new technologies and
    capabilities. Belt-tightening in any department, particularly
    defense, is always a challenge, but it is also an opportunity
    to evaluate what is necessary and what drives innovation. The
    Department has taken the first difficult step in proposing $2.8
    billion worth of divestments and retirements of platforms, and
    I will work with my colleagues to evaluate these proposals and
    make hard but necessary choices.
        Finally, as we progress through this legislative year, the
    Committee will tackle many important policy issues, none bigger
    than how we prevent and prosecute sexual assault and harassment
    in the ranks. Change is coming to the Department and the
    military services. More than anything, cultural change within
    the force is critical to reducing the number of sexual assaults
    and related offenses. The President directed a review earlier
    this year, and I know the Deptartment has been hard at work. I
    look forward to receiving the administration's recommendations
    to incorporate into the Committee's important work on this
    issue.
        Again, I thank the witnesses for their participation today,
    and I look forward to their testimonies.
        Now let me now recognize the ranking member, Senator
    Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
    like to thank all three of our witnesses for dedicating their
    lives to securing our Nation. Secretary Austin told us, along
    with nearly every witness who has come before this Committee,
    China is our pacing threat. It is a global, long-term
    competition, and it is across every arena of the national
    power, but the military balance of power concerns me most.
        In 2018, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) gave us a
    blueprint for pushing back on China. The bipartisan NDS
    Commission said that 3 to 5 percent real growth was needed to
    implement that strategy. It does not look like we are going to
    get that. Since then, the threats have gotten worse. The
    administration gave us a budget that cuts spending when we need
    real growth. They want the military to do more on climate
    change and pandemic response, more mission, but with fewer
    resources.
        We have been asking our military to do too much with too
    little for too long. President Biden's budget cuts would make
    it even harder. It barely treads water while we face all these
    threats. These budget cuts shift aircraft, munitions, and more.
    We have nearly $25 billion of unfunded priorities. These are
    not wish lists. These are risk lists. The budget cuts aircraft
    procurement by 20 percent, backslides on Army readiness, and
    starves Navy shipbuilding. This budget forces our military
    leaders to choose between being ready for today's fight or the
    fight of the future.
        The Chinese military leaders, they are not making that
    choice. On Tuesday, I read in the press about the memo by
    Acting Secretary of the Navy on next year's budget. He says the
    Navy must choose between modernizing ships, subs, and aircraft.
    Does anyone think the Chinese have to make that decision?
        The Chinese defense budget has grown by 450 percent since
    2001. They added $200 billion in the last decade, while we cut
    $400 billion. So we are behind in some of the areas and we are
    falling behind in some of the other areas, and as a result I am
    worried deterrence will fail. Maybe today or 5 years or 10
    years. When it does, the cost will be much higher than any
    investment we could be making today to prevent that. We are not
    making hard choices. We are making bad choices and short-
    sighted choices.
        The administration tells us that the Pentagon budget is cut
    because of fiscal realities, but they are spending trillions of
    taxpayer dollars on everything else under the sun. We all
    agree, and even the administration agrees, that a strong
    military improves all other tools of national power. I just
    cannot understand this short-sighted underfunding of our
    troops. We make a sacred compact with our servicemembers. We
    tell them we will take care of them and their families, and we
    do that very well. We also tell them that we will give them the
    tools that are necessary to defend the Nation and come home
    safely, but we are not holding up our end of the bargain with
    this proposed budget. We are failing to give them the resources
    they need to implement that strategy, and, Mr. Chairman, we
    need to do better.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
    Secretary Austin, please.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF
                                DEFENSE

        Secretary Austin. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to testify today about the President's
    budget request for fiscal year 2022.
        I am pleased to appear before you alongside General Milley,
    whose advice and counsel has been crucial to us as we developed
    our budget, and as we continue to defend this nation, which is
    our chief responsibility and my top priority. I am also glad to
    be joined by our Comptroller and our Chief Financial Officer
    (CFO), Mr. Mike McCord.
        Let me say at the outset that I believe that our budget
    requests will help us match resources to strategy, strategy to
    policy, and policy to the will of the American people. Informed
    by the President's Interim National Security Guidance and my
    own message to the force, it funds the right mix of
    capabilities that we need most to defend this nation, now and
    in the future. It invests in hypersonic weapons, artificial
    intelligence, microelectronics, 5G technology, space-based
    systems, shipbuilding, and nuclear modernization, to name a
    few. In fact, this budget asks you to approve nearly $28
    billion to modernize our nuclear triad, and $112 billion for
    research, development, test, and evaluation, the largest
    research and development (R&D) request ever put forth by this
    Department.
        Our request also gives us the flexibility to divest
    ourselves of systems and platform that no longer adequately
    meet our needs, including older ships, aircraft, and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms
    that demand more maintenance, upkeep, and risk than we can
    afford.
        As you know, we have commissioned a Global Posture Review
    and a new National Defense Strategy which will further inform
    and guide our resource decisions.
        The Department must be ready to meet and keep pace with our
    competitors, and if necessary, to fight and win the next war,
    and not the last one. That is why this budget stays true to our
    focus on matching the pacing challenge that we clearly see from
    the People's Republic of China, to include more than $5 billion
    for the Pacific Defense Initiative. I would just add that our
    China task force has also completed its work, and yesterday I
    issued an internal directive kicking off several Department-
    wide efforts that will, among other things, help bolster our
    deterrence against the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
    revitalize our network of regional allies and partners and
    accelerate the development of cutting-edge capabilities and new
    operational concepts.
        However, we recognize that China is not our only challenge.
    Our budget also includes $617 million to counter the damaging
    effects of climate change and additional funds to prepare for
    future challenges like another pandemic. It also helps us
    counter the belligerence that we face from Russia, especially
    in the cyber realm. You will see more than $10 billion here
    devoted to cybersecurity, cyberspace operations, and cyber
    research and development.
        With this emphasis on space, missile defense, and more
    sophisticated sensors, our budget will also help us counter the
    increasing ballistic missile capabilities of nations like North
    Korea and Iran. It funds a troop presence and counterterrorism
    capabilities in the Middle East and South Asia to meet the
    threats posed not only by Iran but also by terrorist networks
    like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda,
    and in Africa like those posed by Al-Shabaab.
        I am also confident that this budget will help us maintain
    the integrated deterrent capability and global posture
    necessary to back up the hard work of our diplomats and
    demonstrate our resolve in leadership all over the world,
    alongside our allies and partners.
        I know that Afghanistan remains at the top of all of our
    minds, and today I can report that the retrograde remains on
    pace. We have accomplished the mission for which our troops
    were sent to Afghanistan 20 years ago, and I am very proud of
    the men and women who made it possible and of those who gave
    their lives for this mission. I am also deeply grateful to the
    families of our servicemembers who have endured as much, as
    they sent their sons and daughters and husbands and wives into
    battle.
        We will now transition to a new bilateral relationship with
    our Afghan partners, one that continues to help them meet their
    responsibilities to their citizens, but one that will not
    require a United States footprint larger than what is necessary
    to protect our diplomats. That is one reason why we are asking
    to move overseas contingency operations funding inside the
    budget. This will give us and you greater transparency,
    accountability, and predictability in the budgeting process.
    This is the right thing to do, and frankly, it is overdue.
        Now taking care of our people is also the right thing to
    do. Our budget request increases funding to support in- home
    care and support, which has become increasingly important
    during the pandemic. We will also be seeking funds to improve
    military base pay, retention bonuses, and other incentives that
    will help us attract and retain the best talent, and we will be
    working hard to combat challenges that make service in the
    ranks more difficult for the men and women of the Department,
    from getting a better handle on the extent to which we
    experience extremist behavior to combating sexual assault and
    harassment.
        As you know, my first directive as Secretary of Defense,
    issued on my first full day in the office, was to Service
    leadership about sexual assault. I made it clear then, and I
    still believe that we must not be afraid to try new approaches
    and to change our minds so that we can truly and fully address
    the scourge of sexual assault in our force. Clearly what we
    have been doing has not been working, and one assault is too
    many. The numbers of sexual assaults are still too high, and
    the confidence in our system is still too low.
        The Independent Review Commission that we established has
    provided me with an initial set of recommendations, starting
    around the issue of accountability, and this line of effort is
    focused on how these crimes are investigated and prosecuted. I
    shared these recommendations with General Milley and the
    civilian military leaders of the Service branches, and I am
    carefully reviewing the feedback that they provided me.
        There will be additional recommendations coming to us from
    the IRC on prevention, culture, and victim support, and I look
    forward to receiving them as well, and making my full
    recommendation to the President later this month. As I have
    said before, what we are doing is not working, and we need to
    fix it. I want to be sure that whatever changes to the Uniform
    Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that I recommend to the
    President, and ultimately to this Committee, that they are
    scoped to the problem that we are trying to solve and have a
    clear way forward on implementation and ultimately restore the
    confidence of the force and the system. You have my commitment
    to that and my commitment to working expeditiously as you
    consider legislative proposals. So whatever changes we make, I
    believe we need to focus on effective implementation and
    resourcing, and I know I will need your help.
        Chairman Reed, Members of this Committee, we field the
    greatest military in human history, made up of the finest men
    and women who have ever donned the cloth of their nation. We
    also enjoy a civilian workforce deeply committed to every
    mission that they take on, and for all the things that we know
    we need to do better, no adversary can match the quality of our
    people. I am immensely proud of them and humbled to be of
    service to them, and privileged to be able to serve again with
    them and their families. I know the values they espouse and the
    oath that they took, I know what they are capable of, and I
    believe I have a very good sense of what they need to do their
    jobs, and I can assure you that President's Budget request for
    fiscal year 2022 fulfills that obligation.
        I look forward to answering your questions, and thank you
    for the steadfast support that you continue to provide to the
    Department of Defense, and for all the efforts that you make
    very day to ensure that we remain ready to defend this nation.
    Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Austin follows:]

         Prepared Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III
                                  introduction
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of the
    Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of the
    President's Budget request for fiscal year 2022.
        On behalf of myself, Deputy Secretary Hicks, the leadership of the
    Department of Defense, and the men and women of our Department and
    their families, let me also thank you for your continued support and
    partnership as we work to address the threats facing the United States
    of America today, and build the force that can address the challenges
    of tomorrow. I also want to thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, General Mark Milley, who is testifying alongside me and is a
    critical partner in realizing the Department's priorities. I am also
    pleased to be joined by our Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer,
    Mr. Mike McCord.
        The President's $715 billion defense budget request for fiscal year
    2022 provides us with the capabilities we need most and drives
    investment in efforts that will help us advance our three key
    priorities: defending the Nation, taking care of our people, and
    succeeding through teamwork.
        Today, the Department of Defense stands ready to deter conflict in
    any domain and, if necessary, to fight and win against any challenger.
    Since becoming Secretary of Defense, I have met with many of our
    service members and commanders in the field and have seen first-hand
    the dedication of the men and women of our Department. I can assure you
    that we continue to have the best joint fighting force on Earth and a
    civilian workforce fully dedicated to the many critical missions we
    face.
        We must maintain and improve this advantage on land, at sea, in the
    air, and in emerging domains, including space and cyberspace. I am
    confident that the President's budget request helps us do that. The
    request is driven by our recognition that our competitors--especially
    China--continue to advance their capabilities. We must outpace those
    advances to remain a credible deterrent to conflict around the world.
        The President's Budget Request represents my commitment to matching
    resources to strategy, strategy to policies, and policies to the will
    of the American people. This budget also reflects difficult funding
    decisions necessary to ensure that we have the right mix of
    capabilities that we need most. We have proposed cuts to systems and
    capabilities that no longer meet the challenges and requirements of the
    Department, making room for more advanced programs that do. In making
    these decisions, we were guided by the President's Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance and informed by a set of program reviews
    conducted by the Department early in this Administration.
        We are also undertaking a series of strategic reviews in the
    Department to ensure that our global force posture, and our nuclear and
    missile defense capabilities, are matched with the challenges that we
    face and aligned with the priorities of the President. The Global
    Posture Review will help inform my advice to the Commander-in-Chief
    about how best to allocate our forces around the world to advance our
    national interests, and our nuclear and missile defense reviews will
    consider how we maintain our deterrent and defensive capabilities,
    within and across domains.
        I take very seriously the importance of being good stewards of
    taxpayer dollars and ensuring that we are transparent and honest with
    the American people about how their money is spent. This year, the
    President's budget consolidates the Overseas Contingency Operations
    funding and the base budget, raising transparency of direct war costs
    to a level not seen in several years.
        We are also working to address our audit responsibilities as
    quickly and effectively as possible and move forward on reform to our
    business operations. This is not just about finding and reapplying
    savings to higher priorities, it is about improving organizational
    performance and efficiency. The best advocates for reform are those
    closest to the issues, so we will hold leaders appropriately
    accountable for a management improvement agenda within their respective
    components. Reform also requires a holistic approach--including
    concepts of operation, organizations, personnel, training, and modern
    systems--and must have a seat at the table in our deliberations over
    Department programs and priorities.
        The fiscal year 2022 budget also reflects the President's decision
    to retrograde in Afghanistan, following 20 years of war in that
    theater. We are profoundly grateful to our uniformed service members
    and their families, and to our civilian workforce, who have served and
    sacrificed so much through combat deployments in the defense of our
    Nation since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. We
    are now engaged in a deliberate, safe, and orderly withdrawal from
    Afghanistan following the President's decision.
        Moving forward, we must continue to engage in a concerted effort to
    recruit, retain, and develop the finest talent available for the
    uniformed and civilian workforce, providing quality opportunities for
    personal and professional growth, advancement, and leadership to those
    in our charge.
        We owe it to them to build an environment that is safe, welcoming,
    and free of fear, harassment, or violence. That is why I have focused
    some of my earliest efforts on addressing sexual assault and harassment
    in the Department, identifying and addressing extremist behavior in the
    ranks, and ensuring that everyone is given a fair and equitable
    opportunity to serve this country.
        But we cannot do this work alone. Whether it is defending the
    Nation, building a force of the future, growing our talent, or building
    an environment welcoming to all, we rely on teamwork that starts at the
    senior-most levels of the Department, filters down into our workforce,
    and extends across departments to our relationships with interagency
    colleagues, Congress, and our allies and partners.
        When called upon to protect and defend our Nation, the Department
    of Defense will always answer, but diplomacy must be our first national
    security tool of choice. That is why the President's Fiscal Year 2022
    Budget helps fund a Department of Defense able to credibly back up the
    hard work of our diplomats through our deterrent capabilities and our
    force posture.
        As we look outward to our global security interests, we are focused
    on strengthening our relationships with our allies and partners. The
    investments in this budget demonstrate that the United States will
    continue to be a key guarantor of the peace, security, and the rules-
    based world order that we have helped foster for the past seven
    decades.
        The fiscal year 2022 budget request ensures that we will remain the
    best-trained and best-equipped military in the world and will have the
    resources to defend the Nation, with the confidence to advance our
    priorities and build and sustain the force we need now and in the years
    ahead.
                              defending the nation
        As the President has noted, the country finds itself at an
    inflection point. The rapid pace of development of capabilities by our
    competitors, and the changing character of conflict that comes with it,
    mean that we can no longer do things the way we always have and sustain
    our military edge.
        China has invested heavily in new technologies, with a stated
    intent to complete the modernization of its forces by 2035 and to field
    a ``world-class military'' by 2049. Russia has shown that it is not
    afraid to target the United States in contested domains like cyberspace
    and still shows a continued interest in regional hegemony. Iran
    continues to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to
    support destabilizing proxy groups in the Middle East in an effort to
    threaten its regional neighbors. We also face challenges from North
    Korea, a country with the ambition to be capable of striking the United
    States Homeland.
        We will continue to address violent extremist and transnational
    criminal organizations active in several theaters and to face
    unexpected but challenging tests of our resolve like the deadly spread
    of COVID-19. Climate change is a growing challenge, the effects of
    which are driving regional conflicts and instability, even as extreme
    weather caused by a changing planet threatens installations and
    readiness.
        As the character of conflict and competition changes and
    accelerates, our strategic competitors have watched our efforts in
    warzones over the last two decades, seeking to understand not only our
    capabilities but also our will to defend our interests abroad. They are
    watching us and learning from us.
        I have asked the Department to think through our capabilities and
    operational concepts and how we use cyber, space, and nuclear
    capabilities to create a more credible and resilient deterrent against
    our competitors, including China. What I have in mind are ways we can
    better use the capabilities we already have, including by integrating
    across domains, and determining the capabilities we need to address
    potential future conflict.
        This means investing in cutting edge technologies like artificial
    intelligence and quantum computing. It also means ensuring that if an
    adversary attacks one system or domain--in cyberspace or Global
    Positioning System (GPS) satellites, for example--we are able and ready
    to respond through appropriate and separate means in other domains, as
    necessary.
        This is going to take a culture shift in the Department because it
    requires working across Military Services, domains, and regions in a
    way that we have not done before. It also requires deeper integration
    with our allies and partners, ensuring that their capabilities add
    value in deterrence and in conflict.
        The fiscal year 2022 budget request will help us achieve this new
    vision of 21st-century deterrence, and we look forward to your support
    and partnership to help get it right.
    Regional Challenges
        In the Indo-Pacific region, we are facing an increasingly assertive
    People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's regional ambitions have
    grown, as has its footprint around the world, drawing on significant
    economic influence to encourage and, in some cases, coerce countries
    into a deepening relationship with the PRC.
        But China's ambitions are not only economic. It seeks to use its
    influence to shift rules and norms in the region, erode democratic
    values and human rights, and challenge a free and open Indo-Pacific
    region. The President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
    identifies China as the only global competitor capable of combining its
    economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a
    sustained challenge to the international order.
        As the Department of Defense, our responsibility is to protect and
    defend our interests in the Indo-Pacific region and to assure our
    allies and partners of our commitment to our shared goals. That
    requires keeping pace with the rapid military modernization of the
    People's Liberation Army (PLA) and remaining sighted on the PLA's
    advancements in the South and East China Seas, the Second Island Chain,
    and beyond.
        That is why I established the China Task Force early in my tenure.
    The Task Force's mandate was to conduct a baseline assessment of
    Department policies, programs, and processes on China-related matters
    so that we might better meet the challenge posed by the PRC. The Task
    Force has now completed its work. Based on its recommendations,
    yesterday I issued internal guidance initiating major Department-wide
    efforts to address China as the United States' number one pacing
    challenge.
        Even as we address China's growing military capability, we will
    remain focused on North Korea. Pyongyang continues to develop its
    nuclear and ballistic missile programs, posing an increasing threat to
    regional allies and partners and with ambitions to be able to strike
    the United States homeland. Leading with diplomacy, the United States
    will continue to work to mitigate North Korea's destabilizing and
    provocative behavior and maintain peace and stability on the Korean
    Peninsula.
        In Europe, I am focused on strengthening our relationships with our
    allies and partners, bilaterally and in NATO. The Department will
    ensure that we are postured to deter aggression from Russia or any
    other power that seeks to challenge us in the region. Our alliance with
    NATO remains ironclad, and our allies remain a force multiplier for
    U.S. security around the world. We are encouraged that NATO defense
    spending has increased for the seventh straight year, demonstrating
    their commitment to the strength of the alliance. The fiscal year 2022
    budget supports efforts to grow the capability and capacity of our
    allies.
        Over the past 20 years, much of our effort as a Department has been
    focused on the threat posed by violent extremist organizations
    operating out of parts of the Middle East and South Asia. We remain
    committed to ensuring that no one launches an attack on the U.S.
    homeland, and we will maintain the capability to protect the United
    States and our interests in the region. That includes countering the
    Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al Qaeda, and associated terrorist
    networks that pose ongoing threats to the United States.
        Meanwhile, Iran remains a destabilizing force as it seeks to
    advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, threaten freedom of
    navigation, and support proxy terrorist and militia groups. We will
    continue to maintain the capability to deter Iran in the Middle East.
    We will also continue to support our partners in the region, including
    by helping to ensure that Israel has the capability to defend itself
    effectively and maintain its qualitative military edge.
        In Afghanistan, the Department is working to conduct a deliberate,
    orderly, and safe withdrawal, as directed by the President. This is an
    important step in responsibly ending this two-decade-long conflict, and
    it offers us an opportunity to redirect our resources toward strategic
    competition.
        In Africa, the Department is focused on sustaining and improving
    the capabilities of our partners, particularly as we deter and disrupt
    terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab. The group remains an active threat to
    Somalis, their neighbors, our interests in Africa, and those of our
    allies and partners. Our partner-centric strategy has always been at
    the core of our counterterrorism mission, and we will continue to help
    regional partners strengthen their capabilities to counter shared
    threats. This is critical to stability and the opportunity for
    political and economic development in East Africa.
        To the north, the Department remains committed to preserving a free
    and open Arctic region, which is why we undertake annual Arctic
    exercises and operations, including with allies and partners, such as
    ARCTIC EDGE, ICEX, and NORTHERN EDGE. These exercises provide valuable
    experience and offer important lessons learned for conducting multi-
    domain operations in the High North.
        In the western hemisphere, our competitors seek to gain a foothold
    through economic and security investment and cooperation. We remain
    focused on building partner capacity and capability to ensure that the
    United States remains the partner of choice and to address
    transnational criminal and terrorist networks active in the region.
        Additionally, the Department supports interagency efforts to
    address the migration crisis. Although other departments and agencies
    appropriately lead efforts to respond to this challenge, DOD supports
    partner nations in addressing the security-related aspects of the root
    causes of migration. This includes providing limited humanitarian and
    medical assistance and participating in engagements to strengthen the
    professionalism of Central American militaries and defense
    institutions.
        Here in the United States, our men and women in uniform have
    supported our critical domestic missions. National Guard personnel
    provide support to our fellow Americans, including at Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) mass vaccination sites. National Guard
    personnel have also helped secure our national Capitol at various times
    over the past year, and thousands more have helped secure State
    capitals across the United States at the direction of State officials.
    We also continue to support law enforcement operations on our southern
    border by providing limited enabling capabilities. At the request of
    the Department of Health and Human Services, we are supporting its
    mission to shelter unaccompanied migrant children arriving at the
    border.
    COVID-19
        Tackling COVID-19 has been one of my highest and most urgent
    priorities. Since I became Secretary of Defense, the Department has
    received almost 500 FEMA mission assignments and more than 65 requests
    for assistance from other Federal departments and agencies. As of June
    10, more than 4,700 Active Duty service members have deployed to 34
    community vaccination centers in 28 States and territories.
    Additionally, more than 32,000 National Guard personnel have deployed,
    carrying out FEMA mission assignments issued to DOD to assist their
    local communities.
        In total, the Department has administered more than 17 million
    vaccine doses to the American people, with some 4.9 million delivered
    by Active Duty personnel and 12.2 million supported by the National
    Guard. Within the Department, we have executed one of the most complex
    vaccination programs in the world, vaccinating millions of service
    members, beneficiaries, and Department personnel in 42 countries,
    including multiple combat zones. Internally, the Department has
    protected its force and families by administering over 3.6 million
    vaccinations.
        We are also making investments in the Defense Health Agency to
    ensure that we have the resources needed for public-health surveillance
    and force protection. We continue to review and update our force health
    protection policies, and even as vaccinations increase, we remain
    committed to testing, which will expand our genomic sequencing efforts
    so that we can track variants and declining immunity.
        I am tremendously proud of our men and women in uniform who stepped
    up to join our whole-of-nation response. But this will not be the last
    time our Nation and our world will face such a challenge. That is why
    our budget request also funds programs that support biological threat
    reduction, in cooperation with our global partners, emerging
    infectious-disease surveillance, biosafety and biosecurity, and medical
    countermeasure research and development.
    Climate Change
        We face a grave and growing climate crisis that is threatening our
    missions, plans, and capabilities. From increasing competition in the
    Arctic to mass migration in Africa and Central America, climate change
    is contributing to instability and driving us to new missions.
        At the same time, increasingly frequent extreme weather events
    degrade force readiness and drain resources. Recent DOD budgets have
    been forced to absorb recovery costs at battered bases such as Naval
    Air Station Pensacola, among others. Our military installations, and
    the mission-critical capabilities they support, must be made resilient
    to climate-induced extreme weather.
        Our mission objectives are aligned with our climate goals. The
    Department is investing in projects and capabilities that mitigate the
    impacts of climate change while improving the resilience of our
    facilities and operations to a range of threats. Our budget request
    also invests in initiatives to reduce operational energy demand to
    enhance capability, improve freedom of action in contested logistical
    environments, and reduce costs. Those investments are good for the
    climate, and they are critical for the mission.
        Additionally, this budget invests in power and energy research and
    development to improve installation and platform energy performance and
    optimize military capability. The Department can help lead by
    leveraging its buying power to deploy technologies such as energy
    storage and microgrids that support the mission while protecting the
    climate.
        The Climate Working Group is coordinating the Department's work
    implementing the President's Executive Order on this crisis and
    building up climate expertise within DOD. It will also track the
    implementation of climate- and energy-related actions and progress
    toward future goals.
    Modernization and Innovation
        One of our chief priorities is to drive innovation across the
    Department and modernize our culture, people, systems, and processes to
    meet our future needs. It is critical to nearly everything we do. Even
    as we develop new capabilities, we will always adhere to our
    international humanitarian law obligations in the use of new weapons of
    war, as well as ensure the protection of civilians in all missions.
        This budget supports our efforts to:
          Modernize the nuclear Triad to maintain a strong and
    effective strategic deterrent;
          Make critical investments in advanced technologies such
    as microelectronics, fifth-generation network (5G), and artificial
    intelligence (AI);
          Ensure access to precursors and key inputs by shoring up
    our critical supply chains;
          Accelerate investments in cutting-edge capabilities that
    will define the future fight, such as hypersonics and long-range fires;
    and
          Advance our joint warfighting concepts and commit to
    rapid experimentation and the fielding of emergent capabilities across
    warfighting domains.
        The nuclear Triad remains the bedrock of our national defense and
    strategic deterrence, ensuring that no adversary believes it can employ
    nuclear weapons against the United States or our allies without risking
    devastating consequences.
        But we must modernize our aging capabilities to ensure a credible
    deterrent for the future. As we do, we will review ongoing programs to
    assess their performance, schedule, risks, and projected costs. The
    fiscal year 2022 budget invests in nuclear modernization efforts, and
    the Department will always seek to balance the best capability with the
    most cost-effective solution. We are also launching a nuclear posture
    review to ensure that we have the right capabilities matched with the
    national nuclear strategy.
        Microelectronics enable many of today's capabilities, such as GPS,
    radar, command and control, and communications. Advanced
    microelectronics are key to nearly all of the Department's
    modernization efforts, from AI and hypersonic weapons systems to 5G
    wireless networks. The Department will continue to invest in programs
    to secure U.S. microelectronics interests; reverse the erosion of
    domestic innovation and supply; and establish a strong foundation for
    the next generation of microelectronics technology for DOD
    applications, while also sustaining current systems.
        The U.S. military must also utilize the connectivity provided by 5G
    to operate with the speed, precision, and efficiency required in the
    future. Countries that master advanced communications technologies and
    connectivity will have long-term military advantages; for example,
    tomorrow's warfighters will be able to use local and expeditionary 5G
    networks to move considerable amounts of data to connect distant
    sensors and weapons into a dense, resilient battlefield network.
        Similarly, the power of AI will help us modernize not only our
    warfighting decisions but also our business processes. We must be able
    to ingest, make sense of, and act on the vast amounts of information
    available to our warfighters on the battlefield and our decision-makers
    leading our Department. As I have said, we must understand faster,
    decide faster, and act faster. We must do it all responsibly and at
    scale.
        To support many of these efforts, we recently launched the
    Innovation Steering Group. This entity, chaired by the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Research and Engineering, will advise me on science,
    technology, and technological transition. It will also empower efforts
    to make the changes to incentives, processes, and structures needed to
    truly innovate.
        However, our efforts are not just focused on buying the
    capabilities of the future. We must fundamentally shift the way we
    think and the way we do business. We have not yet made full use of our
    most agile acquisition authorities, and we remain too risk-averse as a
    Department to move decisively beyond the capabilities of today and
    prepare for the future.
        We also remain too reliant on critical minerals produced in or by
    China. To shore up our critical supply chains, we must focus on
    building our domestic production capabilities and growing our defense
    industrial base. That is why I am establishing the Supply Chain Risk
    Management Group, which will complement the work of the Industrial Base
    Council, both of which are chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Acquisition and Sustainment.
        Tomorrow's conflicts will be contests of speed within and across
    domains of conflict. The President's budget request invests in the
    development and testing of hypersonic strike capabilities, while
    enhancing existing long-range strike weapons to bolster deterrence and
    improve survivability and response timelines. Long-range fires provide
    key offensive capabilities that are cost-effective and improve
    deterrence. By enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk
    to critical U.S. assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed on
    the enemy increases.
        The Department is also focused on developing enhanced joint
    warfighting concepts; expanding experimentation and fielding; shifting
    our budget and investment priorities to incentivize innovation; and
    improving acquisition systems while making use of more flexible ones to
    identify and deliver new capabilities at scale. These efforts will help
    build a force that is more resilient and integrated and that ensures
    decision advantage across all domains.
    Domain Challenges
        On land, the Army continues to invest in its six modernization
    priorities: long-range precision fires, future vertical lift, next-
    generation combat vehicle, air and missile defense, the network, and
    soldier lethality. To sustain the required funding levels for the
    development and procurement of next-generation capabilities, the Army
    reduced resources for several platforms as well as missiles, munitions,
    and conventional ammunition.
        At sea, delivering all-domain naval power that can defend the
    homeland, deter adversaries, control the seas, and project power ashore
    in a conflict requires the Navy to balance current operational demands
    with the need for modernization. Maintaining naval power is critical to
    reassuring allies and signaling
        U.S. resolve to potential adversaries. The budget request proposes
    responsible investments in the Navy fleet. It also continues the
    recapitalization of our strategic ballistic-missile submarine fleet and
    invests in remotely-operated and autonomous systems and the next-
    generation attack submarine program.
        We also seek to divest of some platforms that do not contribute
    effectively to power-projection needs. The fiscal year 2022 request
    reflects a strong commitment to continued U.S. naval dominance,
    including a properly sized and well-positioned defense industrial base.
    The health of the defense industrial base continues to be fundamental
    to achieving and sustaining our future fleet. Our shipbuilding and
    supporting vendor base constitute a national security imperative that
    must be steadily supported and grown to maintain a skilled workforce.
        In the air domain, the Air Force will shift away from certain
    platforms in favor of key weapons systems such as the F-35 Joint Strike
    Fighter, the F-15EX Eagle II, and the Next Generation Air Dominance
    aircraft to bolster the Air Force's ability to provide air superiority.
    Meanwhile, we will drive down sustainment costs, the fleet's average
    age, and inherent risk. At all times, we will work to ensure rigorous
    oversight of maintenance costs of the F-35.
        Additionally, Air Force investments in hypersonics, the Long-Range
    Standoff Weapon, the B-21 Raider, and the Ground-Based Strategic
    Deterrent will allow the Department to conduct global strike operations
    with precise conventional and unconventional capabilities, delivered
    from both standoff capabilities and penetrating platforms. Meanwhile,
    the Navy is developing the ``Air Wing of the Future'' to deliver game-
    changing lethality and survivability. These efforts include
    transforming Carrier Air Wings with the addition of the F-35C, E-2D,
    and CMV-22B aircraft and rapidly developing the MQ-25 Stingray.
        Unfettered access to space and the freedom to maneuver there
    enhances every aspect of American power and underwrites the design of
    the joint force. Competitors including China and Russia are seeking to
    challenge the United States' advantage in space by developing weapons
    to deny or destroy U.S. space capabilities in conflict. The fiscal year
    2022 budget request strengthens our ability to deliver flexible
    capabilities and strategic options swiftly to outpace emerging threats
    in space.
        Priority areas in this budget include investment in a resilient
    architecture of capabilities for missile warning and missile tracking;
    modernization of all segments of GPS to ensure precision and
    availability; development of cyber-resilient space command-and-control
    capabilities that can integrate with Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control; and investment in a broader base of domestic launch providers
    to further ensure our access to space.
        In cyberspace, the United States is facing increasingly aggressive
    activity, including strategic campaigns by competitors, other nation-
    states, and proxies seeking to undermine our national security and
    democracy. The fiscal year 2022 budget invests in cybersecurity and
    cyberspace activities that build on the goals in DOD's Cyber Strategy.
    The Cyber Operations portion of the budget supports U.S. Cyber
    Command's operational element, the Cyber Mission Force, which performs
    cyberspace operations to defend the Nation, support the joint force,
    and secure DOD infrastructure and networks.
        The budget also enhances our cybersecurity by mitigating key cyber
    deficiencies and strengthening our defensive capabilities to counter
    malicious attempts to exploit U.S. technology. Ultimately, we seek to
    improve joint force offensive capabilities to stay ahead of foreign
    threats.
                           taking care of our people
        The dedicated men and women who make up the Department of Defense
    are the greatest strength and asset we have. That is why I have
    prioritized growing our talent, building resilience and readiness in
    the force, and ensuring appropriately accountable leadership as we
    address tough workforce issues.
        The fiscal year 2022 budget request prioritizes improvements to
    recruiting, retention, training, and education, and support for
    military spouses, caregivers, survivors, and dependents. We are also
    intensely focused on ending sexual assault and harassment and
    identifying and addressing extremist behavior in the Department, two of
    my top priorities.
        We have established the Deputy's Workforce Council, a senior-level
    governance forum co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is dedicated to
    addressing the most pressing people management, personnel policy, and
    total force requirements. This includes issues such as diversity,
    equity, and inclusion; military healthcare and childcare; sexual
    assault prevention and response; and more. This forum will ensure that
    workforce issues remain a critical priority for Department leadership,
    including the Secretaries of the Military Departments and our
    commanders, and will help bring the same vision and disciplined
    execution to workforce issues that the Department devotes to weapons
    systems and budgeting.
    Growing Our Talent
        We accomplish our mission far better when we look to the full range
    of talent that the United States has to offer. That means drawing on a
    diversity of experiences and backgrounds, which will help drive
    creative thinking and adaptation, innovation, and cultural
    understanding. These will be vital to meet the complex challenges of
    today and the future.
        Longstanding, systemic barriers for historically marginalized and
    underrepresented communities persist today. We must do all we can to
    ensure that we recruit and retain talent from the broadest pool of
    qualified, eligible candidates.
        This spring, we updated the Department's policy on the open service
    of transgender people in the military. We welcome the recruitment,
    retention, and care of all qualified transgender individuals, and we
    look forward to their continued service with honor and dignity. The new
    policy reinforces that principle and also allows for a short
    implementation period for the Military Departments and Services to
    update their policies.
        We also must continually grow and develop our workforce and create
    new avenues for advancement to drive the promotion and retention of our
    outstanding next-generation leaders. That requires thinking about our
    critical skill sets with an eye to the future, in particular by
    recruiting and training individuals in Science, Technology,
    Engineering, Math, and advanced technologies.
    Building Resilience and Readiness
        In building a resilient and ready force, we must recognize the key
    role that our military families play in supporting our personnel. The
    health and well-being of our service members and their families are
    inextricably linked to the readiness of our force, and we must do all
    we can to take care of them.
        The effects of COVID-19 have been especially tough for our military
    families, putting a particular strain on those who have lost childcare
    or civilian employment. The fiscal year 2022 budget expands our efforts
    to provide high-quality childcare to our military families, and we
    continue to provide virtual career support through Military OneSource.
        The budget also addresses efforts related to our military
    electronic health records, through which the Department is working to
    implement needed modernization most effectively. We must get military
    healthcare right for our service members and their families.
        We will also remain focused on addressing suicide and mental health
    issues in our joint force by enhancing services and support while
    seeking to reduce the stigma around seeking help.
    Ensuring Appropriately Accountable Leadership
        We must provide our workforce with a safe, secure, and welcoming
    environment that empowers them to do their best work and grow
    personally and professionally. At the most basic level, that means
    creating a workplace free of discrimination, hate, and harassment. It
    also means guaranteeing swift and clear accountability to anyone who
    does not live up to the highest standards of the Department.
        Sexual assault and harassment have no place in our country and no
    place in the Department of Defense. For too long, the Department's
    leadership has tried to get a handle on this challenge, but we have not
    made significant progress. One case of sexual assault or harassment is
    too many, and we are losing the confidence of our junior enlisted
    personnel and officers because we have yet to make significant progress
    against this challenge.
        That is why, at the direction of the President, I established a 90-
    day Independent Review Commission (IRC) on sexual assault in the
    military. The IRC is responsible for reviewing DOD policies and
    processes related to sexual assault and harassment to determine where
    we can improve as a Department.
        The IRC will soon complete its work on all four lines of effort--
    accountability, prevention, climate and culture, and victim care and
    support. I recently received an initial set of recommendations from the
    IRC Chair and provided the Department the opportunity to review those
    recommendations. It is critically important that we get this right, and
    I am grateful for congressional partnership as we seek to do that.
        The vast majority of those who serve in uniform and their civilian
    colleagues do so with great honor and integrity. But extremism in our
    ranks can have an outsized impact on the Department, which will not be
    tolerated. The Department is focused on rooting out extremist behavior,
    and this fight is about our values, the Constitution, and the
    obligations in the Oath of Office we swear to uphold.
        Behavior that defies or degrades our core values erodes unit
    cohesion as well as good order and discipline. It can also damage the
    health, morale, and readiness of the workforce.
        I have moved immediately to meet this problem head-on. On February
    5, I directed that within 60 days, commanding officers and supervisors
    at all levels conduct a one-day extremism stand-down to emphasize the
    importance of the Oath of Office we take, and to give military members
    and civilian employees the opportunity to participate in and continue
    to have this important conversation.
        On April 9, I further directed several immediate actions to combat
    extremism, including reviews of what constitutes extremist activity,
    training for transitioning service members who may be targeted by
    extremist groups, and establishing the Countering Extremism Working
    Group to develop long-term recommendations to ensure all those who
    serve do so with honor and fealty to our values and our democracy. This
    must be a sustained effort, embraced by Department leadership.
                          succeeding through teamwork
        To accomplish anything we set out to do, the Department must
    operate as a unified team. That requires that we build unity among our
    leadership and ensure the right balance of civilian and military inputs
    to our decision-making and Department processes. In the last four
    months, we have made significant progress in rebuilding normal order in
    the Department to safeguard civilian oversight of the military.
        In particular, we have established several bodies aimed at
    supporting the efforts of our Deputy's Management Action Group, the
    Department's principal governance body for management actions,
    including resource management and planning, programming, budgeting, and
    execution.
        We have also established the Deputy's Workforce Council to address
    the Department's people management, personnel policy, and total force
    requirements, and task forces and working groups on COVID-19, China,
    climate change, and extremism.
        Protecting the United States requires teamwork at every level:
    state, local, tribal, territorial, and federal. It requires cooperation
    with all who have a stake in our national security, including Congress,
    private industry, civil society, and the American people.
        Our work to combat COVID-19 is a prime example of our commitment to
    working with our fellow Americans. Across the Executive Branch, DOD has
    worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security, including
    FEMA, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the State
    Department in efforts to end the pandemic. We are also investing in the
    defense industrial base to produce more personal protective equipment
    and test kits. Across the Nation, we continue to work closely with the
    Department of Health and Human Services and State, local, tribal and
    territorial authorities to bring life-saving vaccines to the American
    people. At all times, our support to the Nation is reliant on our
    partnership with Congress, which plays an integral role in providing
    the authorities, appropriations, and leadership necessary to have the
    most effective Department of Defense.
        As part of our efforts to build teamwork into all we do, and in
    line with the President's intent, we are also leading with diplomacy,
    our first national security tool of choice. I am committed to ensuring
    that the Department of Defense continues to field a credible force able
    to back up the hard work of our diplomats around the world. We are
    working in lock-step with the State Department and other departments
    and agencies, and I took my first trip as Secretary of Defense with
    Secretary Blinken to reassure our allies and partners in the Indo-
    Pacific region that this Administration is committed to our
    relationships there. Secretary Blinken and I also traveled to Europe to
    assure our allies and partners of our commitment to the region.
        When I traveled to NATO Headquarters earlier this spring, I shared
    a key message: we must consult together, decide together, and act
    together. Global crises, such as the pandemic, climate change, and
    economic downturns, present significant dangers that span our borders.
    In many countries, internal strife, brought on by corruption,
    inequality and polarization, and transnational threats, such as violent
    extremism and criminal organizations, threaten stability around the
    alliance's rim. In Afghanistan, we went in together and we will leave
    together, after a substantial consultative effort. Meanwhile,
    aggressive and coercive behaviors from emboldened strategic competitors
    such as China and Russia reinforce the importance of collective
    security.
                                   conclusion
        The challenges we face are many, but the Department stands ready to
    defend the United States against any enemy, foreign or domestic, just
    as we always have. We remain resolute in our commitment to protect the
    Nation and will not shy away from any challenge.
        The fiscal year 2022 budget will help us fulfill that
    responsibility, and we are grateful for your support in working with us
    as we build the Department of the future. We need your help.
        We also remain grateful for the tremendous trust that the United
    States places in our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and
    DOD civilian employees, all of whom will continue to defend our
    democracy, our people, and our way of life. Thanks to them, we will
    always operate from a position of strength. Thank you.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Before I
    recognize General Milley, since a quorum is present I would ask
    the Committee to consider seven nominations, the nominations of
    the Honorable Frank Kendall III to be Secretary of the Air
    Force; the Honorable Heidi Shyu to be Under Secretary of
    Defense for Research and Engineering; Ms. Susanna V. Blume to
    be the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,
    Department of Defense; Ms. Jill M. Hruby to be Under Secretary
    of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National
    Nuclear Security Administration; Mr. Frank A. Rose to be
    Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security
    Administration; Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum to be Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
    Defense Programs; and Mr. Christopher P. Maier to be Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
    Conflict.
        Is there a motion to favorably report these seven
    nominations to the Senate?
        Senator Inhofe. So moved.
        Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
        Senator Kaine. Second.
        Chairman Reed. All in favor?
        [Chorus of ayes.]
        Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Thank you very much.
        General Milley, your comments, please.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Milley. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify before you today, and it remains my
    distinct honor and privilege to represent the soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians of the United States
    Joint Force, the most capable military in the world. Our troops
    are the best led, best equipped, and best trained force
    anywhere. I want to personally thank Secretary Austin for his
    steady leadership and wise guidance.
        Your Joint Force is standing watch, protecting American
    interests in all domains around the globe. Alongside our allies
    and partners, American troops are currently training or
    conducting combat operations or other operations in 165
    countries to keep America safe. We are conducting major
    exercises as we speak in Europe; we are monitoring the
    demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Korea; we are conducting freedom of
    navigation operations in the strategic waterways of the global
    commons; we are sustaining operations in space, in cyberspace;
    we are supporting our allies and partners in Africa, Asia, and
    Europe; and we are patrolling the skies of the Middle East, and
    as we speak our Joint Force is conducting a safe, responsible,
    and deliberate strategic retrograde from Afghanistan in good
    order, while ensuring continued support to the Afghan National
    Security Forces.
        The purpose of the United States military is simple. It is
    to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States of
    America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and with
    that comes two key tasks. Task one is to fight and win
    America's wars, if necessary, and key task two is to prepare to
    fight and win America's wars.
        The United States military is a critical component of
    national power, which in concert with our diplomatic efforts,
    economic engine, and overriding hope of the American message
    that will deter adversaries and preserve the peace. We are
    prepared to fight, however, and fight and win, if those who
    seek to attack the United States and our allies and partners
    are undeterred. But force must always be a last resort when
    other means of achieving our ends have been exhausted.
        We are in an era of increased strategic competition. The
    current strategic landscape is witnessing rapid change, and the
    potential for increased threat to the peace and stability of
    various regions, and indeed, for the world. States and non-
    state actors are rapidly transforming technologically, and we
    are bearing witness to a fundamental change in the character of
    war. In particular, China is increasing its military capability
    at a very serious and sustained rate, and we must ensure that
    we retain our competitive and technological edge against this
    pacing threat, as Secretary Austin has directed.
        Readiness, modernization, and combat power are key to deter
    war and maintain the peace, and equally important are the
    combat multipliers of teamwork, cohesion, and well-led units.
    We must resolve the issue of sexual assault and confront the
    issue of extremism. Both are corrosive to the very essence of
    what it means to be in the military, and they destroy cohesion,
    they destroy teamwork, and they reduce combat power.
        Additionally, we must continue to invest in leader
    development and talent management required for the future
    operating environment. Finally, we must continue to nurture and
    sustain a key strategic source of our strength, which is our
    network of many close allies and partners around the world.
        The Joint Force appreciates the work that our elected
    representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed
    to train, equip, and man the force in order to be ready. The
    days of the Budget Control Act, as noted, are over, and
    repeated, continuing resolutions which eroded readiness are
    hopefully behind us for good.
        The Joint Force will deliver modernization with this budget
    of our armed forces and security to the people of the United
    States at the fiscal year 2022 budget request of $715 billion.
    While it is a modest increase from the enacted fiscal year 2021
    budget, it is a significant commitment of treasure that the
    American people have entrusted to us, and we will work
    diligently to ensure it is spent prudently and in the best
    interest of the Nation.
        The Fiscal Year 2022 Presidential Budget is a result of
    very hard choices, in a year in which the Nation has suffered
    economic hardship due to COVID-19 pandemic. In alignment with
    the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, this budget
    delivers a ready, agile, and capable Joint Force that will
    compete, deter, and win, across all domains, and which is
    postured for continue dominance in the future.
        This budget prioritizes nuclear modernization, long-range
    fires, hypersonic technology, artificial intelligence,
    shipbuilding, microelectronics, space, cyber, and 5G. These
    investments, in concert with our recently developed joint
    warfighting concept will pave the way for a Joint Force of the
    future. The President's Budget 2022 budget request increases
    the readiness of the force by developing the Joint Force of the
    future, ensuring our people are our number one priority, and
    positioning us to achieve through teamwork.
        Many enemies, historically, have grossly underestimated the
    United States and our people. They have underestimated our
    national resolve. They have underestimated our capability, our
    skill, and our combat power, and each, in the past, has made a
    fatal choice, which ended in their enrollment in the dustbin of
    history. The same will be true of any enemy that makes that
    mistake today or tomorrow. We are ready now and will remain so
    in the future, and we are also facing tough strategic choices,
    and we are being increasingly challenged with very capable,
    potential adversaries clearly acting in opposition to our
    interests.
        Consistent, predictable budgets, informed by the will of
    the people, are critical to our Nation's defense, and the
    passage of this budget in a timely way is important. The Fiscal
    Year 2022 Presidential Budget strikes an appropriate balance
    between preserving present readiness and future modernization.
    It is a down payment on investments for the future, with a bias
    toward the future operating environment.
        It is now that we must set ourselves on a path to modernize
    the Joint Force, and this budget contributes to doing that. Our
    job, as your Joint Force, our contract with the American
    people, is that we, the United States military, will be able to
    fight and win when called upon. We will support and defend this
    Constitution always and forever, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Milley follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Mark A. Milley, USA
                                  introduction
        It remains my distinct honor and privilege to represent the
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and guardians of the United States
    Joint Forces-The most capable military in the world. Our troops are the
    best led, best equipped, and best trained force anywhere. Alongside our
    allies and partners, American soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and
    guardians are currently standing watch in 165 countries and conducting
    operations that keep Americans safe.
        The United States Military is a critical component of national
    power which in concert with our diplomatic efforts, economic engine and
    overriding hope of the American message deters our adversaries and
    preserves peace. We are prepared to fight and win if those who seek to
    attack the United States and our allies and partners are undeterred.
        The Joint Force appreciates the work that our elected
    representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed to
    train, equip, and man the force in order to be ready. The days of the
    Budget Control Act of 2011 and repeated continuing resolutions which
    eroded readiness are hopefully behind us for good.
        The Joint Force will deliver modernization of our armed forces and
    security to the people of the United States at the fiscal year 2022
    budget request of $715 billion. While it is a modest increase from the
    enacted fiscal year 2021 budget, it is a significant commitment of
    treasure that the people of the United States have entrusted to us and
    we will work diligently to ensure it is spent prudently in the best
    interest of the Nation. This fiscal year 2022 budget is the result of
    hard choices in a year in which the Nation has suffered economic
    hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In alignment with the Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) this budget delivers a
    ready, agile, and capable Joint Force that will compete, deter and win
    across all domains and which is postured for continued dominance in the
    future.
        Consistent predictable budgets informed by the will of the American
    people are critical to our Nation's defense. The passage of timely
    budgets enables planning and prioritization.
                             strategic environment
        The current strategic landscape is witnessing rapid change and
    potential for increased threat to the peace and stability of various
    regions and for the world.
        China: is our #1 geostrategic security challenge. History is not
    deterministic, war with China is not inevitable. China is clearly an
    increasingly capable strategic competitor and we need to keep our
    relationship at competition, not conflict. This is best done through
    integrated deterrence where the United States remains militarily strong
    relative to China and we retain military overmatch in all the various
    domains of war. If we remain militarily superior to our adversary, then
    conflict is less likely.
        China is challenging the peaceful status quo in the Pacific, and is
    intent on revising the global international order by midcentury. China
    is conducting large-scale exercises in the region with an emphasis on
    amphibious landing, joint fires, and maritime strike scenarios. These
    actions threaten our allies and partners' autonomy, jeopardize freedom
    of navigation, overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and
    compromise regional peace and stability. In short, China has and
    continues to develop significant nuclear, space, cyber, land, air, and
    maritime military capabilities.
        Russia: retains a large nuclear capability to deter and threaten
    the United States and our allies and partners. Russia has also
    demonstrated the capability and will to conduct complex malicious cyber
    activities targeting American protected digital infrastructure, both
    military and commercial. Increasingly Russia uses irregular warfare and
    mercenary contract support, along with regular troops, to conduct
    aggressive operations, the most notable being illegal seizure of
    Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula and the ongoing conflict in eastern
    Ukraine. Its actions in Libya as well as Syria and elsewhere
    demonstrate Moscow's relative flexibility, resourcefulness, and
    opportunism.
        North Korea: continues to enhance its ballistic missile capability
    and possesses the technical capacity to present a real danger to the US
    homeland as well as our allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific.
    They show no signs of moderation in their focus on military capability
    at the expense of their most vulnerable citizens and peace of the
    Korean Peninsula.
        Iran: The current irregular warfare conflict between Iran and its
    neighbors threatens to push the Middle East into broader regional
    instability. Through its funding of terrorist activities, and a proxy
    army inside the borders of its neighbors, and through its ballistic
    missile programs, Iran seeks to revise the regional order and balance
    of power in Iran's favor.
        Violent extremist organizations such as al Qaeda, ISIS, Al Shabaab,
    and others continue to export their terror, destruction, and
    destabilization. Until and unless the root causes of instability that
    give rise to these types of groups are resolved, we will continue to
    deal with their attacks to undermine legitimate governments worldwide.
    The root causes can only be effectively addressed by including
    governments of the region and we can best influence outcomes with
    diplomatic, economic, information and stability efforts along with
    train, advise, assist and intelligence sharing. Through coalition
    efforts and in concert with the local governments affected by these
    groups, we will continue to ensure they do not possess the capacity and
    capability to exert their will.
        As we move into the middle of the twenty first century, it is
    imperative that we maintain our technological advantage over our
    competitors. As the diffusion of military technology permeates the
    globe, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain the advantage
    that we've enjoyed for last seven decades.
        This year's budget will adequately fund our department priorities,
    with bias on the future while ensuring we continue to deter the
    adversaries of today. The character of warfare is changing in a
    fundamental way. How we fight, the weapons, doctrine, organizations and
    leader development are all undergoing a transformation not seen in
    scale and scope since the decades between World War I and World War II.
    The current rapid and radical change in technology along with its
    diffusive nature will provide decisive advantage to those nation states
    that best master the convergence and capability in precisions
    munitions, all domain sensors, all domain command and control,
    robotics, hypersonics and artificial intelligence. Our collective
    success or failure to adapt the United States military to this future
    as a Nation is an increasingly challenging security environment.
        Climate change presents a growing threat to U.S. national security
    interests and defense objectives. The adverse impacts of climate change
    are already being felt across the Joint Force in terms of increased
    operational demands, adverse impacts on our installations and new
    requirements for equipment and formations able to operate in a world
    defined by climate change and as a contributing factor to regional
    instability.
        As we enter the third quarter of this fiscal year, it is imperative
    that we finish the fight against COVID-19. The Joint Force has
    contributed planning and logistics expertise during all phases of the
    pandemic response and continues to assist with vaccination efforts. We
    will continue to be able to provide equipment, personnel, and vaccine
    deployment and development assistance when called upon to assist. We
    all should be very proud of the conduct of our Joint Force and our
    ability to continue to deploy and defend the interests of the United
    States during this unprecedented global event as the pandemic has only
    modestly impacted the Joint Force's readiness.
        Our alliances and partnerships are key to maintaining the
    international rules-based order that offer the best opportunities for
    peace and prosperity for America and the globe. This budget allows us
    to build our partners and allies capabilities, foster interoperability,
    and strengthen relationships. Doing so allows us, our allies, and
    partners to counter the coercion of our strategic competitors, the
    malign activity of regional threats, and meet the varied security
    challenges state and non-state actors, terrorism, climate change, and
    pandemics or any other threat that may emerge. We are stronger when we
    operate closely with our allies and partners.
                          readiness and modernization
        The Joint Force is in a position where modernization is an
    imperative. We must avoid the tyranny of the now at the expense of our
    future. The United States as a nation has always had the advantage and
    time to conduct a long build up prior to the beginning of hostilities.
    The operating environment of the future will likely not afford us the
    luxury of time to project force so having modernized forces in
    sufficient size and readiness will be the key to sustaining deterrence
    and maintaining the peace and if deterrence fails then fight and win.
        The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, National Defense
    Strategy, and National Military Strategy discuss the re-emergence of
    strategic competition and directs the Joint Force to develop the
    capabilities and capacity to counter near-peer threats. Strategic
    adversaries are accelerating military modernization; to maintain
    military advantage, the Joint Force must adapt to the future operating
    environment. It is imperative that we maintain US technological
    advantage over our adversaries and improve the concepts and doctrine
    which organize our conduct of warfare. In the fall of 2019, the
    Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint Staff to develop a threat-
    informed Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) to address strategic conflict.
    The Joint Warfighting Concept will guide and revitalize how we
    organize, train, and equip the Joint Force. It will constantly evolve
    to help us shape our strategic environment and future operations. The
    JWC is a multi-year effort to develop a comprehensive approach for
    joint operations against future threats and provide a guide for future
    force design and development. Supporting concepts to the JWC describe
    key warfighting functions. They are fires, logistics, C2, and
    information advantage. The Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
    framework enables the holistic development and realization of the JWC
    and Supporting Concepts. JADC2 today is beginning to deliver the
    capability to sense, and act at speeds greater than our adversaries.
    JADC2 uses data, artificial intelligence, machine learning and
    predictive analytics to create decisive information advantage at all
    echelons in the Joint Force.
        Utilizing cloud-based networks and agile software development, our
    modular open sourced systems will deliver the necessary strategic
    operational advantage required within both competition and conflict.
    Our JADC2 architecture is increasingly providing the attributes and
    interfaces to transition to a data-centric force able to operate at
    scale within multiple security levels and across all-domains and the
    electro-magnetic spectrum.
        We will also revise our leader development Joint Professional
    Military Education to support the JWC. Specifically, we are increasing
    the amount of JPME devoted to the study of the changing character of
    war and both China and Russia as potential adversaries.
        In addition to adapting our concepts, doctrine, training, and
    military education, we must continue to invest in capabilities that
    close gaps or sustain our advantage. Key investments in this budget are
    nuclear modernization, long range fires, hypersonic technology,
    shipbuilding, space and cyber.
        Nuclear modernization: The nuclear triad has been the bedrock of
    our strategic deterrent for decades. Together, the three legs of the
    Triad allow us to hedge against geopolitical, technological,
    operational and programmatic risks. Our Cold War era systems have been
    extended beyond their original service lives and we must recapitalize
    our nuclear enterprise. Modernization of our nuclear forces, weapons
    complex, and requisite nuclear command, control, and communications
    (NC3) capabilities are a high priority. The Department projects the
    cost of modernization will peak at 7 percent of the DOD budget in 2029
    before decreasing again. If these projections bear out, compared to
    past modernization efforts, the cost would be significantly less as a
    proportion of the overall DOD budget--the nuclear recapitalization in
    the 1980s cost 10.6 percent at its peak and 17 percent in the early-
    1960s.
        Long range fires: provide key offensive capabilities that are both
    cost-effective and cost-imposing means of improving deterrence. By
    enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk to critical
    U.S. assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed upon the enemy
    increases. China has thousands of ground-launched theater-range
    missiles in its arsenal that would be difficult for the United States
    to counter given its current inventories. Investments in long range
    missiles are a cost-effective strategy that improves our ability to
    compete with China. Recent budget requests have enhanced the lethality
    and resilience of the Joint Force by developing and expanding the long-
    range fires portfolio. President's Budget 2022 funding is essential to
    mitigate offensive fires capacity shortcomings, enhance operational
    flexibility in multiple domains, and accelerate the transition of
    hypersonic weapons from development to procurement and fielding.
    President's Budget 2022 balances long-range fires investments between
    both proven solutions and higher risk/high-payoff systems, such as
    hypersonic fires.
        Hypersonic technology: Hypersonics are a suite of capabilities that
    provide transformational warfighting capability to our Joint Force. Our
    competitors are investing in this capability and in order to provide
    our Joint Force with the best possible technology we will need to
    invest to defend the Nation, our allies and partners.
        Legacy platform divestment: Continuing to purchase and maintain
    legacy equipment takes needed defense dollars away from the acquisition
    of systems that are needed for modernization. We need to divest select
    legacy platform to ensure that every defense dollar spent on programs
    and equipment that will be relevant in the next fight.
        Shipbuilding: The industrial base continues to be the fundamental
    enabler for achieving and sustaining the Navy's future fleet. Our
    shipbuilding and supporting vendor base are a national security
    capability that needs support to grow and maintain a skilled workforce.
    The Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget reflects the Administration's
    strong commitment to continued American naval dominance, including a
    properly sized and well-positioned industrial base to meet the demands
    of our current and future defense needs. Commitment to the steady
    acquisition profiles underlying our budget is key to ensure the
    industrial base achieves the capability and capacity required to build
    and maintain the Navy's future fleet. The conclusions from past force
    structure analyses have been fully considered and simple ship count is
    an incomplete metric, as it fails to fully capture the capability,
    payload capacity, and employment of ship classes in the fleet. This
    budget specifically procures warships and submarines with credible
    combat power to deter China while continuing remotely operated ship
    development and investing in the industrial base to support fleet
    modernization and on time delivery of the Columbia class submarine.
        Space: Space is essential to our way of life; space capabilities
    are essential to our economy, quality of life, our exploration
    initiatives, and our ability to wage war. Competitors are testing and
    fielding space weapons that threaten not just our National interests
    and advancements in space, but those of all nations that rely upon
    space. Russia has recently tested both a ground-based anti-satellite
    missile and an on-orbit anti-satellite weapon prototype which threatens
    our space capabilities. In 2007, China destroyed a satellite to
    demonstrate their anti-satellite capabilities and the resulting debris
    will remain in orbit, threatening commercial, civil, and national
    security satellites for more than a century. Left unsecured, our
    capabilities in space may become strategic vulnerabilities.
        Cyber: Adversaries continue to use operations in the cyber domain
    as a means to compete with the U.S. and pursue a position of advantage
    in crisis and conflict. Malign cyberspace actors increasingly exploit
    supply chain vulnerabilities, such as commercial software, to gain
    network access and conduct cyber operations against U.S. citizens,
    organizations, and institutions. The low cost/barrier to entry and
    anonymity that cyberspace provides make this domain a priority focus
    for adversaries to asymmetrically compete without escalation.
    Therefore, we must increase our ability to compete in cyberspace and
    ensure all elements of informational power are integrated into
    operations, activities, and efforts to deter our adversaries and
    protect the U.S. Homeland. This requires DOD to invest in partners and
    technology, building and maturing cyber operations and readiness,
    reducing risk to weapon systems and critical infrastructure,
    strengthening cybersecurity, and improving network resiliency.
                             advanced capabilities
        The changing character of war necessitates that we continue to
    modernize and innovate. We must be able to have clear linkage from
    sensors to shooters in an advanced information environment with the
    technology present to protect our warfighters, critical assets, and
    homeland. Investment in ensuring reliable supplies of microelectronics,
    advanced network technology such as 5G, and artificial intelligence
    will ensure that we maintain our technological edge over our
    adversaries. The current globally distributed supply chains present
    vulnerabilities to the Joint Forces' ability to acquire necessary parts
    and technology in the event of a crisis that either prevents the
    manufacture, or shipping of material to our units in the field.
        Advanced microelectronics are the key element in all of the
    Department's modernization efforts, from Artificial Intelligence and
    Hypersonic Weapon Systems to Fifth Generation Wireless Networks. High-
    speed connectivity will transform the way militaries operate.
    Tomorrow's warfighters will use local and expeditionary 5G networks to
    move massive amounts of data to connect distant sensors and weapons
    into a dense, resilient battlefield network. Communication networks are
    fundamental to how the United States trains, plans, and engages
    adversaries. The U.S. military must utilize the connectivity provided
    by 5G to operate with the speed, precision, and efficiency necessary to
    remain effective and survivable in the future.
        U.S. Army: The Army faces an inflection point that requires
    innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship in the application of
    combat power. The battlefield is increasingly faster, more lethal, and
    more distributed. Overmatch will belong to the side that can make
    better decisions faster. To meet emerging challenges, the Army is
    transforming to provide the Joint Force with the speed, range, and
    convergence of cutting edge technologies that will generate the
    decision dominance and overmatch required to win the next fight. The
    Army's materiel modernization transformation is based on the six
    modernization priorities announced in 2018: Long Range Precision Fires,
    Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army Network,
    Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier Lethality. By 2035, the Army will
    realize its vision of a multi-domain force. Decisive outcomes in war
    are ultimately achieved on land where people live and maintaining a
    capable land force in the United States Army is key to our overall
    deterrence capability and national security.
        U.S. Navy: America is a maritime nation. Our security and
    prosperity are inextricably linked to the seas. To sustain America's
    advantage at sea, we must deliver combat-ready forces to deter
    aggression and keep the seas free and open. Deploying battle-ready
    ships, submarines, and squadrons around the world--from the South China
    Sea to the Arctic--deters aggression, reaffirms our commitment to
    allies and partners, and keeps the seas open and free. Readiness
    underpins our forward-engaged posture and touches all elements of the
    Navy, from our shipyards and aviation depots to the steaming and flying
    hours our Sailors use to hone their skills. This budget prioritizes a
    fleet that is ready for combat over a larger fleet that is not ready to
    fight.
        U.S. Marine Corps: The Marine Corps is optimizing the force for
    competition in the vast littoral regions of the globe by modernizing
    the force for Strategic Competition. As codified in law, Marines serve
    in cooperation with the Navy in the conduct of naval campaigns. As
    international relations are defined more by periods of cooperation and
    competition, the Marine Corps will focus on the competition phase
    before conflict by generating a persistent reconnaissance force for the
    Joint Force that has organic long-range, precision fires with mobility.
    Thus far, they have fully invested in their modernization by divesting
    of capabilities and capacities that no longer offer the best value for
    a maritime force in the contact and blunt layer.
        U.S. Air Force: Moving forward, the Air Force will prioritize its
    resources to transform our equipment, support our airmen, and bolster
    our core missions. To deter and defeat today's competitors and
    tomorrow's adversaries, this budget continues to re-capitalize our Air
    Force. The Air Force is retiring legacy platforms with a bias toward
    the future, so that we can focus on aircraft that can penetrate high
    end defenses. A cutting edge Air Force that is without peer is
    fundamental to successful land or sea operations and is the key element
    to maintaining deterrence and sustaining the force.
        U.S. Space Force: The Space Force investments accelerate
    modernization of the entire Joint Force. Space Force capabilities
    underwrite, enhance, and enable Joint Force operations. The Space Force
    protects U.S capabilities and freedom of operation outpacing actions of
    our competitors.
        Ongoing actions to fully resource the United States Space Force
    (USSF) including transfer of the Space Development Agency (SDA) and
    unit transfers from the Army and Navy, will enhance the USSF's ability
    to organize, train, equip and present forces who can compete, deter and
    if necessary prevail should war initiate in, or extend to space.
                       people first / people and families
        People are our most important resource in the Joint Force. We must
    ensure that we are doing all that we can do to take care of and guard
    our most critical resource. Taking care of people is a critical
    readiness issue, it decisively impacts unit cohesion, recruitment,
    retention, and confidence in leadership. The Joint Force has been
    working to rid our military from the scourge of sexual assault and
    sexual harassment for years. We must do more to finally implement real
    and lasting change. Sexual assault undermines our military values and
    undercuts our ability to field a cohesive fighting force. Sexual
    assault and harassment prevention, response and accountability are
    leadership issues. We will hold DOD leaders at every level responsible
    for building a safe environment for our people, guaranteeing anyone who
    does not act within the highest standards of the Joint Force is held
    accountable.
        We will not tolerate actions that go against the fundamental
    principles of the oath we share, including actions associated with
    extremist ideologies. Extremism also destroys readiness because it
    destroys cohesion. Extremism presents a complex and unique challenge to
    DOD. We must meet this head-on, and place the highest importance on
    treating all personnel with dignity and respect, in an environment free
    from discrimination, harassment, and maltreatment. We must be ever
    vigilant in our efforts to identify and counter extremist behavior
    within our ranks.
        We continuously earn the trust of our service members and their
    families by ensuring that they continue to receive excellent quality of
    life benefits. Our premier all-volunteer force will continue to be the
    greatest in history only if we continuously affirm how much we value
    the service that our military and civilian members provide their
    country.
        The Joint Force is committed to growing our talent and ensuring
    that all who meet the requirements to serve are able to serve. The
    Joint Force competes for the talent of America's youth along with every
    other business, and organization who seeks our Nation's best and
    brightest. Service to Nation is a worthwhile cause and we welcome all
    who are eligible to serve. Despite our inclusive approach only 29
    percent of today's youth are eligible for military Service without a
    waiver. The Joint Force's objective is to field the most lethal and
    combat effective fighting force in the world. We will continue to
    support the accessions of all qualified people to all jobs and
    positions within the Joint Force.
        The Nation's largest employer-sponsored child care program supports
    our Joint Force, with more than 27,000 staff members providing daily
    care for more than 160,000 children aged birth to 12 years in
    approximately 700 nationally-accredited child care centers. Taking care
    of families is a holistic approach that ensures that our troops are
    ready to fight because they know their families are well cared for.
        Housing our forces is critical to ensure that our junior and most
    vulnerable families are able to live in a healthy environment wherever
    the Nation calls them to serve. Families don't raise their hand and
    join the service. We as a nation owe it to our troops to ensure they
    have what they need. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative
    (MHPI) reform efforts are actions that will improve the tenant
    experience, rebuilt tenant trust, and maintain MHPI housing project
    financial viability. The MHPI Tenant Bill of Rights (BOR), issued in
    February 2020, is a visible and important commitment in DOD's larger
    effort to regain resident trust.
                           achieving through teamwork
        We in the Joint Force are a team of teams. Sworn to support and
    defend the constitution, teamwork is our watchword. There is no
    daylight between the services when it comes to ensuring the security of
    the American people. The Joint Force is a collective effort, and no
    services ever fights alone.
        Joint exercises with all services, allies and partners
    participating are a key component to our warfighting readiness.
    Ensuring that exercises such as Defender Pacific and Defender Europe
    continue and that we fastidiously increase the number of participants
    and complexity in these exercises will guarantee the best preparation
    for war and a mechanism to demonstrate our commitment and resolve to
    those who wish to question our friends and our capabilities.
                                   conclusion
        The United States Joint Force is a flexible and adaptable force
    ready to deter, fight, and win our Nation's wars. The President's
    Budget 2022 budget request increases the readiness of the force by
    developing the Joint Force of the future, ensuring people are our
    number one priority, and positioning us to achieve through teamwork.
    America's network of allies and partners is a strategic source of
    strength. Many enemies have grossly underestimated the United States
    and the American people in the past. They've underestimated our
    national resolve. They've underestimated our capability, our skill and
    our combat power, and each made a fatal choice which ended with their
    enrollment in the dustbin of history. The same will be true of any
    enemy that makes that mistake today or tomorrow. We are ready now, and
    will remain so in the future, we are also facing tough strategic
    choices, and we are being increasingly challenged with very capable
    potential adversaries, clearly acting in opposition of our interests.
    Our job as your Joint Force, our contract with the American people is
    that we, the United States military will always be ready to deter our
    enemies and if deterrence fails then to fight and win.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Milley. I
    understand Mr. McCord does not have a statement. Is that
    correct? Thank you, Mr. McCord.
        Secretary Austin, we are in the process of withdrawing our
    combat forces, save for embassy protection personnel. It is
    going rapidly. The projections, I think I have read, are
    perhaps July we could have all forces out. I think also, too,
    the Taliban are aware that if they would encroach upon our
    forces that would not only delay our departure but re-engage us
    in Active operations.
        So the questions, I think, now are after the departure of
    our forces, do you believe you have the appropriate authorities
    and funding to continue to support the Afghan National Security
    Forces and to conduct counterterrorism operations after the
    transition?
        Secretary Austin. Thank you, Chairman. As you know, what we
    have said is that we intend to maintain a good and productive
    relationship with the Afghans post our retrograde, and that
    entails making sure that, with your support, we can continue to
    provide funding for their military and support for the
    government as well. I think that support is critical in
    ensuring that the government retains the ability to function
    and that their military remains intact. So, again, we will need
    your support to be able to do that.
        In terms of authorities, I do think that we have the
    authorities that we need to be able to focus on a discrete set
    of threats, and that threat is those threats that could conduct
    operations against the United States of America that would
    emanate from that space in Afghanistan. So our counter
    terrorism (CT) threat is focused on al Qaeda, and we are
    confident that we will have the authorities to continue
    operations.
        Chairman Reed. Are you also confident that given the
    significant drawdown of personnel that you will be able to
    effectively distribute the resources to the Afghan National
    Army and other security institutions?
        Secretary Austin. As you know, Senator, our plan is to keep
    our embassy there, and hopefully as we continue to work with
    the Afghan Government we will establish those capabilities and
    procedures necessary to be able to effectively distribute funds
    and track the movement of those funds and capabilities.
        Chairman Reed. Well, at any point in your review, as the
    situation develops and you feel you need additional
    authorities, please do not hesitate to contact the Committee. I
    think both myself and the ranking member would be very eager to
    provide those authorities.
        You mentioned in your opening statements the scourge of
    sexual assault in the military and the ongoing efforts to
    reform the UCMJ. The last time we did a major military reform,
    in 2017, the Defense Bill required a 2-year implementation time
    frame, and every bit of which was used. Critical to this
    process is the fact that the President must republish the
    Manual for Courts Martial and ensure that ongoing
    investigations and prosecutions are not jeopardized by rushed
    implementation.
        When you forward the administration's recommendation, will
    you include your assessments of the time, resources, and the
    qualified personnel necessary to effectively implement those
    changes?
        Secretary Austin. We will, Chairman, and to your point, any
    proposed change to the UCMJ is a very serious issue. We will
    need adequate time to implement the change in a very
    responsible way, and we will also need resources to make sure
    that we can effectively implement it. We will need flexibility
    to ensure that if there is something that needs to be adjusted
    we can adjust.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank
    you, General Milley and Mr. McCord. Senator Inhofe?
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of the
    interest we have here I just have two brief questions. One,
    General Milley, in 2018, you testified that it is hard to
    compare the United States and Chinese defense budgets because
    China's budget is very different, and for a better comparison
    we need to make some adjustments, and we have done that, little
    things like the cost of labor and all of that. But making those
    adjustments is not easy, and that is why we required, in last
    year's Defense Authorization Bill, that the Pentagon do a study
    to try to make this comparison.
        China and Russia combined probably spend more than we do. I
    made that point in an op-ed piece last May. But I would ask
    you, General Milley, the Chinese and Russian economies in
    defense spending are unique, and given this, do you think that
    their relative combined effort is similar to ours, and do you
    think that they understate the spending that they are doing?
        General Milley. Senator, both of our analyses, DOD's
    analysis and the intelligence community's analysis of budgets
    for both Russia and China are classified. At an unclassified
    level I would tell you that, combined, the Russian and Chinese
    budgets exceed our budgets, if all the cards are put on the
    table. Both governments do not put all their cards on the table
    when it comes to their budget. It is a very difficult thing to
    discern, that which is being spent on their defense versus
    other priorities.
        With respect to China, they have put significant levels of
    effort, of their economy, and, of course, their economy is
    second only to ours, significant levels of resources into
    building the Chinese military. The Chinese military, as we have
    noted many times before, is on a significant increasing rise in
    capability over the last 20 or 30 years, and they continue to
    invest heavily in that.
        Senator Inhofe. That is right. Secretary Austin, during
    your confirmation hearing in January you said, and this is a
    quote, you said, ``I see China, in particular, as a pacing
    challenge for our Department,'' and that you need our help to
    deter China. I am worried that if we underfund the military,
    our military, we will undermine our alliances and weaken
    deterrence.
        In your opinion--well, me just state this. We have felt for
    some time, and have said that when we countries, and it
    happened that Senator Rounds and I went to six different
    countries last week, and one of those was Romania. They
    reminded us that we talked to them about 2 percent, they should
    get 2 percent for defense spending, and they did that, and they
    told us that they did that. Yet they are looking at us actually
    reducing our funding, and I would just like to have you comment
    on what kind of effect that might have to other countries too.
        Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, Senator. I would say
    that when you look at our overall contributions to the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), we contribute a
    substantial amount to the NATO effort, and we will continue to
    do so going forward. I think the budget gives us the right mix
    of capabilities and the flexibility to be very effective in our
    efforts to deter China going forward, and Russia, or anyone
    else who would want to take us on.
        So I am confident that this budget will allow us to match
    our resources to our strategy and our strategy to our policy.
        Senator Inhofe. My concern has been that our insistence in
    the previous administration, which I agreed with, that we reach
    the 2 percent in these other countries, and they see that it
    appears that our expectations are much less in this
    administration.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Before
    I recognize Senator Shaheen, we have a room reserved for a
    closed session after this open session. So any questions that
    the panel feels would be best addressed in a closed session, we
    will retire there. If there are no such questions then we will
    conclude with the open session.
        Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    all three of you for your service to the country and for being
    here this morning.
        Secretary Austin, there is an interesting article in The
    New York Times today that suggests that our plan in Afghanistan
    is to not just provide for some sort of over-the-horizon troops
    to address counterterrorism but that we might also be looking
    at ways that we can provide air support to the Afghan forces if
    they are in danger, or if we are in danger of losing Kabul or
    another major city in the country. It also quotes Afghan
    officials as saying that they have been told by their American
    counterparts that the United States would stop any takeover of
    a major city. Obviously, who knows what the source of that is.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        But can you tell me if we are, in fact--first of all, where
    we are in our plans to develop an over-the-horizon CT force,
    and if we are, in fact, contemplating any other actions in
    support of the Afghan troops should the Taliban be in danger of
    taking over Kabul?
        Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator. As you know, we
    continue to provide support to the Afghan Security Forces as we
    retrograde. Once we have completed our retrograde that will be
    very difficult to do, because our capabilities will have
    diminished in country.
        I really will not speculate about any potential outcomes or
    any potential future actions. I will just say that the
    President has been clear that our mission in Afghanistan has
    been accomplished and we are focused on retrograding our people
    and equipment out. Again, going forward, in terms of our CT
    efforts, those CT efforts will be focused on those elements
    that can possibly conduct attacks against our homeland.
        In terms of our efforts to establish over-the-horizon
    capability, I would just point to the fact that as we have
    retrograded a lot of our capability out of country we are doing
    a lot of things over the horizon now. ISR is being flown from
    the Gulf, a lot of our combat aircraft missions are being
    conducted from platforms in the Gulf, and so we have the
    capability now to do that. What we are looking for is the
    ability to shorten the legs going forward by stationing some
    capability in neighboring countries. That is still a work in
    progress.
        Senator Shaheen. So do you have a timetable for when that
    plan might be completed?
        Secretary Austin. I do not have a timetable. I will tell
    you that we will move as quickly as we can, in conjunction with
    State Department efforts.
        Senator Shaheen. In talking with some of the women leaders
    of Afghanistan in the last weeks, one of the things that they
    have asked and said they thought was very important would be
    for high-level American officials--the President, certainly you
    as Secretary of Defense--to speak out against the Taliban's
    attacks against women and girls in the country and to make it
    clear that that is a violation of international norms of
    behavior and human rights.
        I would urge you to do that, along with other members of
    the administration. I think that is the least we can do at this
    point is to make a point of the violation of norms and human
    rights that the Taliban are conducting in Afghanistan,
    especially when it comes to women and girls.
        I want to go on to another issue in my time that is left,
    because one of the things you talked about in your opening
    statement was the importance of taking care of our people. As
    we know, one of the challenges that we are facing, not just
    among DOD employees but intel agencies, at State, has been
    attacks what has come to be known as the Havana Syndrome. The
    National Academy of Science report that was released in
    December calls these directed energy attacks.
        It is my understanding that DOD is the department that is
    taking the lead on treating individuals suffering from these
    attacks. Can you tell us if that is the case, and if you have
    the resources that you need to continue to do that, and then
    what steps you are taking to protect DOD personnel from future
    attacks.
        Secretary Austin. Well, the health and welfare of our
    people is of utmost importance to me, and we are working as one
    element, a larger whole-of-government effort to really try to
    determine the cause of these injuries, and also we are working
    as hard and as fast as we can to expand our medical
    capabilities. We have done that, expanded our capabilities to
    treat traumatic brain injuries (TBI) and acquired brain injury
    (ABI). We will have the ability to treat more people going
    forward, but again, we will remain sighted on this and we are
    working as a part of a whole-of-government effort.
        Senator Shaheen. You factored that into your budget
    request?
        Secretary Austin. We did not ask for additional funds for
    this specific, but we have sufficient funds to do what is
    necessary.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Let me recognize
    Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
    thank you for being with us today. We had a Seapower
    Subcommittee hearing just this week, and the Navy's vice
    admiral witness before that subcommittee said this, and I
    quote: ``We have done many studies over the last 5 years that
    say we need a larger Navy. The Navy we can afford now is
    roughly 300 to 305 ships. So if we are going to pace the
    adversary we need to have a bigger Navy.''
        Mr. Secretary, did the vice admiral misspeak in saying
    that?
        Secretary Austin. What I would say, Senator, and, you know,
    I think certainly we have the most capable and dominant navy in
    the world, and it will continue to be so going forward. When
    you talk about naval power, certainly size matters, but what
    also matters is having the right mix of capabilities in the
    force, and so our goal is to make sure that we maintain a
    ready, capable, and sustainable force in the future.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Did the Navy vice admiral misspeak in
    saying that we need a larger Navy? He said that two days ago in
    testimony before the Seapower Subcommittee. Can you just answer
    that?
        Secretary Austin. What I will say, Senator, is that for
    some time we have had a goal of a 355-ship Navy, and I think
    that goal is a good goal to shoot at. So I think that is
    probably what he is referencing.
        Senator Wicker. This budget does not get us anywhere near
    back on the path to do that. I also have concerns about the
    Navy's plans for amphibious war ships. Last year, Congress
    authorized, in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a
    multi-ship procurement bundle for three amphibious transport
    dock (LPDs) and one landing helicopter assault (LHA). This
    would result in a $700 million cost savings, and at that
    hearing on Tuesday, Acting Secretary of the Navy for Research,
    Development, and Acquisition testified that although the Navy
    had reached a handshake agreement to execute the block buy, the
    Department of Defense was unlikely to approve it.
        Why does it make sense that knowing that we are going to
    have to buy these amphibious ships, why does it make sense that
    the Department of Defense might oppose saving the taxpayers
    over $700 million by procuring the ships in a block buy?
        Secretary Austin. As we said at the top, Senator, and you
    well know, we are always faced with making tough choices, and
    so as we looked at what we could do in this budget, and what
    was best to do in this budget, we are making those choices.
        Senator Wicker. All right. Well, let me just say this. This
    is an inadequate defense budget, and I sit here, and while I
    very much admire our Constitution and the fact that we have one
    commander-in-chief, so the military members, no matter how many
    stars they have on their shoulders, under our Constitution they
    salute that commander-in-chief, and he appoints a Secretary of
    Defense and he appoints Cabinet officials, and based on the
    best advice that you and others give him, the commander-in-
    chief makes the decision. The Office of Management and Budget
    (OMB) that he appoints apparently has decided that we could do
    just fine in a world where China is expanding in the Pacific,
    where Hamas is still raining rockets down on Jerusalem, where
    Russia is not quitting at all, and where we have just heard
    that the combined budgets of Russia and China are greater than
    ours, we have decided, based on what some budget crunchers in
    OMB, and bean counters in OMB have decided that we ought to be
    able to do, and that we can have massive increases in domestic
    spending, but a cut in purchasing power for the national
    defense budget.
        Let me just say to my colleagues, the Constitution of the
    United States also gives us the power of the purse, and while
    we appreciate the suggestion by OMB budget crunchers, it is our
    obligation to defend this nation, and this proposed budget does
    not do so, in the two respects that I have mentioned, and in
    the respect that the ranking member mentioned earlier on, and
    it is incumbent on us to reverse this and to get our troops and
    our Nation the national security budget that they need.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Let me recognize
    Senator Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
    our witnesses for your service, your dedication, and your
    integrity.
        As you both know, I have been fighting against sexual
    assault in the military for the last 8 years. I, along with now
    66 co-sponsors on the legislation from the U.S. Senate, are
    proposing that we draw a bright line at all serious crimes,
    take them out of the chain of command. That one change, we
    believe, will create more transparency, more accountability, a
    higher professionalization, and will create less bias within
    the system.
        General Milley, I would like to ask you about your thoughts
    on this proposal. It is my understanding that you are now open
    to removing sexual assault and related crimes from the chain of
    command. Can you please confirm that to the Committee today?
        General Milley. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
    leadership on this issue. I have said publicly before, and I
    will say it here, I think that this issue has been out there
    for quite a long time, and we, in uniform, generals and members
    of the chain of command, et cetera, we have not successfully
    moved the needle in resolving sexual assault. In addition to
    that, I have some evidence, some studies, some anecdotal
    evidence, that junior members of the chain of command, or
    junior members in the military, primarily women, have lost
    faith and confidence in our chain of command to resolve sexual
    assault through the chain of command.
        So I am very open-minded to some significant and
    fundamental change in the area of sexual assault and sexual
    harassment. What you mentioned was the bright line of all the
    other--all felonies, for example. I think that requires some
    detailed study before we completely overhaul the entire UCMJ.
    But the focused area of sexual assault and sexual harassment,
    completely open-minded to some very significant change, and I
    think that is also true of most of the senior leaders in
    uniform.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much, General. As you
    and I discussed, in recent years we have seen some very
    chilling statistics about bias in the military justice system
    against people of color. Black servicemembers were at least
    1.29 times, and as much as 2.16 times more likely to have
    disciplinary action taken against them in the average year
    across all branches, from 2006 to 2015.
        These disparities largely do not improve, and in some cases
    got worse, in the most recent years. As an example, the
    December 2020 Air Force Inspector General's review found that
    black servicemembers, quote, ``voiced a consistent lack of
    confidence,'' end of quote, in Air Force discipline processes.
    Three in five black servicemembers said they would not receive
    the same benefit of the doubt as their white peers if they got
    into trouble, and 1 in 3 said they believed the military
    justice system is biased against them.
        The problem, however, is even more chilling when you look
    at military capital cases. One 2012 death penalty study found
    that 41 percent of defendants were people of color, but 67
    percent of those that actually received the death penalty were
    people of color.
        So the reason why we wrote our bill 8 years ago to draw
    bright lines against all serious felonies, all serious crimes,
    anything that carried more than a year of penalty, was not just
    to professionalize the systems and remove bias against
    survivors of sexual assault but also to remove biases across
    the board and to professionalize the entire military justice
    system. That is what all military experts in criminal justice
    recommended, and it is what our allies actually did over the
    last 40 years--the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, Canada,
    Netherlands, Australia.
        As a result, we mirrored that in our legislation, and we
    carve out all uniquely military crimes. So I would like to
    know, General Milley, will you remain to have an open mind as
    you review these statistics and this additional data before you
    make your recommendation to the Committee?
        General Milley. Totally, and I am very sincere. I have a
    complete open mind on this. As I said up front in my opening
    statement, the United States military has a singular purpose,
    to support and defend the Constitution, and we have two tasks,
    to fight and win our Nation's wars and to prepare to fight and
    win our Nation's wars, and unit cohesion is a significant
    contributor--in fact, it is probably the most important
    contributor--to combat power. Sexual assault, sexual
    harassment, any kind of deviance from any sort of good order
    and discipline rips apart at that. Central to the concept is
    also the commander's personal responsibility and accountability
    for the good order and discipline of the unit, and they are
    personally responsible for the cohesion.
        So I am absolutely open-minded to suggestions to improve
    the system, because what we want to do is fix the problem and
    improve the combat power of the U.S. military.
        Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Austin, we have also had the
    benefit of having a conversation about these details, and I
    would like to ask you the same question. Will you remain an
    open mind as you look at new data about racial disparities as
    well as the data you will receive from the panel that you
    requested, advice on specifically sexual assaults and related
    crimes? I ask that you remain an open mind as you look at the
    full version of the details and facts that the DOD has compiled
    over many years and the work of this Committee over the last 8
    years.
        Secretary Austin. Before I answer that, Senator Gillibrand,
    just let me thank you for your incredible work that you have
    done over the years on this issue, on the issue of sexual
    assault and sexual harassment. Whatever changes occur going
    forward will be largely due to your incredible dedication to
    this issue. So on behalf of the Department of Defense, thank
    you for what you have done.
        As you know, Senator, first of all, yes, I always have an
    open mind to solving any tough problem. But as you know, the
    commission that the President tasked me to stand up, and has
    stood up and provided me some initial recommendations, and
    still owes me more recommendations, has been focused on the
    issue of sexual assault and sexual harassment. Those are the
    problems that we are trying to resolve and improve.
        But yes, I always maintain an open mind with any tough
    problem, but we are focused on the issue of sexual assault and
    sexual harassment, and again, thank you for all the work that
    you have done on this issue.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now let me
    recognize Senator Fischer, please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
    gentlemen. I too want to thank you for your patriotism, your
    years of service, and your years and years of caring for those
    who serve with you in protecting this nation.
        Secretary Austin, I appreciate the way the budget has
    prioritized nuclear modernization and kept important programs
    like the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the Long
    Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO), and the Columbia-class submarine
    on track. I am also happy to see it invest in the nuclear
    command, control, and communications (NC3) and finally begin
    moving forward on replacing the E-4B with survivable, airborne
    operations center.
        During your confirmation you talked about the need for a
    review of our nuclear posture and modernization programs. Has
    the Department begun a formal nuclear posture review, and when
    do you expect it to be complete?
        Secretary Austin. We have not begun that review yet,
    Senator, but it will begin very shortly, and it will take us
    several months to conduct the review.
        Senator Fischer. Well, I think that review process is so
    very important. These systems are the most important military
    capabilities that we possess, and decisions about our nuclear
    policies and programs must be considered in a thorough,
    deliberative process that allows stakeholders from across the
    Department of Defense, as well as other Federal agencies, like
    the Department of Energy, and our allies to provide their input
    so that decisions can be made with a full understanding of the
    consequences. We cannot be careless about this.
        Which is why I was very concerned to see a news story that
    put forth a copy of the memo from the Acting Secretary of the
    Navy, Thomas Harker, in which he directed the Navy to defund
    the sea-launched cruise missile program. This memo was signed
    June 4th. That is just one week after the Department of Defense
    submitted a budget request that asked for $5 billion to
    continue to study that concept, and the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) requested $10 million to conduct
    its own assessment.
        Based on what you just said, it seems like this decision
    was made outside of any kind of posture review process. Is that
    correct?
        Secretary Austin. Senator, I have not seen the memo, but I
    would say that, you know, all of us, all the Services and the
    Department are, again, making tough choices in terms of what to
    prioritize and where to accept risk. That memo has to be pre-
    decisional because of where we are in the process, and so I do
    not feel comfortable in commenting on his memo. I would just
    say that again, I am committed to a posture review, to make
    sure that we adequately analyze what our capabilities are, what
    is needed in the future, that we maintain the right balance in
    our nuclear forces, going forward.
        Senator Fischer. So you were not consulted on that at all?
        Secretary Austin. That is an internal department memo, I
    believe, based upon what has been said.
        Senator Fischer. General Milley, were the Joint Chiefs
    consulted at all, to your knowledge?
        General Milley. I am not familiar with the memo, nor was I
    consulted, but as soon as we are done here I will go find that
    memo and get consulted.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. I find it very concerning
    that an Acting Service Secretary, who has not been confirmed by
    the Senate, is making a decision like this, outside of any
    review process, without analysis or input from the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy, from nuclear matters,
    the Joint Chiefs, or U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and
    without taking to other agencies, or having, it seems, any
    discussions with our allies.
        I would also point out that the analysis of alternatives
    for the missile is still ongoing, and so it would seem very,
    very premature to reach any conclusions about it being
    feasible, or infeasible.
        I do think this is the right way to make decisions about
    nuclear policy. Do you agree with that, Secretary Austin?
        Secretary Austin. I do, Senator.
        Senator Fischer. Should a decision like this be made
    through that review process?
        Secretary Austin. I have every confidence that it will be,
    Senator.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. I hope you will follow up with
    the Acting Secretary to make sure that it is a posture review
    that makes a decision on this.
        Does the Department still support the President's fiscal
    year 2022 budget request for this program?
        Secretary Austin. It does.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Happy to hear that. Thank you
    again.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Now let me
    recognize Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
    Secretary McCord and Secretary Austin and General Milley for
    being here today.
        General Milley, this question is for you, and it is
    specific to the A-10. I think you would agree that properly
    balancing the need to sustain America's military with the need
    to modernize is paramount to ensuring our adversaries are
    unable to outpace the United States. Having the right equipment
    available to our troops on the battlefield is critical, which
    is why I am very concerned, very concerned by the proposed
    divestment of 42 A-10 aircraft in the fiscal year 2022 budget.
        As you know, the A-10 is a combat-proven asset that is
    unmatched in its ability to provide close air support to troops
    on the ground. The Air Force has not been able to establish a
    convincing replacement to carry out this mission, and it has
    not demonstrated a replacement that can match the A-10's cost
    effectiveness.
        Budget analysts have estimated a modest cost savings if the
    A-10s are divested, but those savings are quite small when you
    consider the scope of the Department's $715 billion budget. It
    is critical that we consider the real costs of what we would be
    trading away if we were to take this action before an
    effective, close air support replacement is in place. American
    troops rely on close air support in the most dire of
    circumstances. The A-10 has saved the lives of many men and
    women because of its unique capabilities. Everyone I speak to,
    everyone, who has had experience with the A-10 in combat wants
    that to be the plane that shows up when they are in trouble.
        So when I think about the tradeoffs we would be making by
    divesting, I just do not see that the risk has been properly
    accounted for. I expect that you have had some of these same
    conversations and experiences as you talk to our troops.
        So, General, do you feel that we have adequately assessed
    the risk that these retirements could pose for our troops on
    the ground?
        General Milley. Thanks, Senator, and as a ground soldier
    who has been in a lot of firefights, I know exactly what you
    are talking about with the A-10 or attack helicopters or any
    other munitions delivered by air. It is a very, very important
    capability, and personally I am a big fan of the A-10.
        However, we are talking about 42 aircraft. We are still
    going to have 239. We have got enough for five squadrons. What
    we have to do--we, collectively, Congress, the Department of
    Defense, we in uniform--we have got to recognize and begin to
    shift toward the future operating environment and the changing
    character of war, and we must shift the capabilities that are
    going to be relevant, survivable, and effective against a Tier
    1 adversary sometime in the future. This is a modest decrease
    in the number of A-10s. I think it is an acceptable risk, and I
    support the Air Force's recommendation.
        Senator Kelly. So, General, we often think about these
    things as, you know, what does day one of the war look like.
        General Milley. Sure.
        Senator Kelly. I am also concerned about future conflict on
    day 30, 60, day 180, and in a former life I used to be a test
    pilot. I have flown close air support missions myself in an
    airplane that does not do the job well. I do not see another
    airplane in our inventory--not the F-16, not the F-35--that can
    do the mission like the A-10 can. When you combine the fact
    that it is far superior in that role, and protects troops on
    the ground when they need it the most, and at the same time is
    cheap compared to the flight-hour cost of an F-35 or even an F-
    16, and we do not have an airplane that can do this mission
    like the A-10 can, and I am seriously concerned that if we go
    down this road and we remove 42 airplanes from the inventory,
    that if we wind up in a conflict, and we wind up at day 30, 60,
    90, we are going to be regretful that we do not have that
    platform.
        So thank you, General, and I yield back the remainder of my
    time.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Now let me
    recognize Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, I received, along with
    Congressman Crenshaw, several hundred whistleblower complaints
    about Pentagon extremist and diversity training. I want to
    share just a small selection of what your own troops are
    saying. Mr. Chairman, I have a longer list I would like to
    submit for the record.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cotton. Again, this is just a few examples. One
    Marine told us that a military history training session was
    replaced with mandatory training on police brutality, white
    privilege, and systemic racism. He reported that several
    officers are now leaving his unit, citing that training.
        Another servicemember told that their unit was required to
    read White Fragility by Robin DiAngelo, which claims--and this
    is a quote--"white people raised in western society are
    conditioned into a white supremacist world view.''
        A member of the Special Operations community has told us
    that they are being instructed that, quote, ``The U.S. Special
    Operations community is racist.''
        One Army officer related to us the words of his general
    officer, who told him that the entire U.S. Army is racist.
        A midshipman at the Naval Academy said classmates are
    calling America a fundamentally racist place, and that this
    sentiment is not contested by school administrator.
        An airman told us their unit was forced into a racist
    exercise called a ``privilege walk,'' where members of the wing
    were ordered to separate themselves by race and gender in order
    to stratify people based on their perceived privilege.
        One African American officer disparagingly said, and I
    quote, ``The Navy thinks my only value is as a black woman,''
    and not the fact that she is a highly trained military
    specialist.
        Soldiers have come forward to tell us they are being forced
    to watch videos about systemic racism, and documentaries that
    rewrite America's history as a fundamentally racist and evil
    nation.
        One Space Force officer told me that two guardians left his
    ranks in a short period of time. One was a young African
    American who said that after the training she would never have
    joined the military had she known that it was such a hotbed of
    racism. The other was a white airman who said he did not sign
    up to be indoctrinated, and filed separation paperwork.
        Mr. Secretary, we are hearing reports of plummeting morale,
    growing mistrust between the races and sexes, where none
    existed just six months ago, and unexpected retirements and
    separations based on these trainings alone. Again, these are
    not my words. These are the words of your own troops.
        So I want to ask a few simple but vital questions. Mr.
    Secretary, do you believe that our military is a fundamentally
    racist organization? Yes or no, please.
        Secretary Austin. Well, I will not give you a yes or no
    answer or that, sir, because it deserves more than a yes or no.
    The military, like any organization, will have its challenges,
    but I do not believe it is a fundamentally racist organization.
    We----
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I am sorry to cut you off but
    our time is limited. I think it is a pretty simple question. I
    am glad that you agree it is not fundamentally racist.
        Do you believe that any member of the military should be
    treated differently based on their skin color and sex? Again,
    yes or no will do.
        Secretary Austin. Again, this question deserves more than a
    yes or no answer. It is----
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry to cut you off.
    Our time is limited. It is a very simple question. Should a
    member of the organization you lead be treated differently, in
    violation of the Constitution, I would add, based on their sex
    or the color of their skin?
        Secretary Austin. No, I do not believe that, and that why
    we have diversity, equity, and inclusion focus in the military.
        Senator Cotton. The military, for decades, has been one of
    the institutions in this society where you are most likely to
    get ahead based on your own performance, on your own merit,
    irrespective of the color of your skin or where you came from
    or who your parents were.
        Secretary Austin. Sir, I absolutely agree with that, and I
    am an example of that.
        Senator Cotton. Your distinguished career----
        Secretary Austin. But I would say that----
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Secretary, your career
    is an excellent example of that, but I have more questions,
    based on the reports we have seen.
        The military has included the works of critical race
    theories on its reading list by authors like Ibram Henry
    Rogers, who now calls himself Ibram Kendi, and Robin DiAngelo.
    Mr. Kendi has written, quote, ``The only remedy to past
    discrimination is present discrimination. The only remedy to
    present discrimination is future discrimination,'' end quote.
    Do you agree with that proposition?
        Secretary Austin. I have not read that and I do not--you
    know, I certainly do not agree with what you just said, but----
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary----
        Secretary Austin.--it is always important to have the full
    context of anything that you are being asked to evaluate.
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that race and
    sex should be the key factor when selecting combat leaders,
    rather than, say, operational excellence, technical
    proficiency, leadership, agility, and integrity?
        Secretary Austin. I do not, Senator. I think what you just
    said should be key components in making any selection.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I am glad we agree on all this.
    So let me just wrap up by saying this. If troops are subjected
    to the kinds of training drawing on critical race concepts like
    America and our military is inherently racist, or certain races
    are inherently privileged, other races are inherently
    victimized, given what you have said, should they report it up
    their chain of command or to the inspector general or to other
    appropriate channels?
        Secretary Austin. Yes, they should. They have always had
    that ability to do that, and I would recommend that in the
    future. I would also say that diversity, equity, and inclusion
    is important to this military now, and it will be important in
    the future, and so we are going to make sure that our military
    looks like America and that our leadership looks like what is
    in the ranks of the military, and I appreciate your support on
    that.
        Senator Cotton. I agree with that, and like I said, the
    military has always been one of the most diverse institutions
    in our society, where you can get ahead irrespective of the
    color of your skin or who your parents are or where you came
    from. I am glad that we agree on that. This is not about
    diversity, in general, though. This is about a very specific
    kind of anti-American indoctrination that is seeping into some
    parts of our military, based upon the whistleblower complaints
    we have received.
        Thank you. My time has expired.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Let me recognize Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Secretary, I want to give you a chance
    to explain the context. Senator Cotton asked you a question
    about your own career, and you indicated that your career is an
    indication that the military can be welcoming to all kinds of
    people. But you were then going to explain the context of what
    your own personal experience has shown you during your time in
    the military, about why we need to take seriously these issues
    of diversity and inclusion. The Senator had other questions,
    but I would like to hear how you were going to answer that
    question, giving the full context.
        Secretary Austin. I think the leadership has a
    responsibility to create a climate where--first of all, we
    should be welcoming to everyone who can qualify and who is fit
    to serve and who can maintain the standards. Secondly, you
    know, we ought to look like the America that we support and
    defend, and our senior leadership should look like what is in
    the ranks. Where we have done a great job in recruiting very
    highly qualified and capable people, I think we need to do a
    bit better in terms of making sure that we are absolutely
    inclusive and making sure that we create pathways, or pathways
    are available for everybody that in the ranks to realize their
    full potential.
        That is what that diversity, equity, and inclusion is all
    about. It is about cohesion. It is about making sure that we
    remain the most effective and lethal fighting force in the
    world, and we have been in the past and we will be in the
    future.
        Senator Kaine. When we move toward diversity in the
    military it has always made us stronger. When President Truman
    integrated the military it was not uniformly popular. In fact,
    I believe his Secretary of the Army ended up resigning after
    refusing to desegregate units about a year after the order.
        But moves like that, where the military has often led
    society in building cohesion, the military does it well. They
    are not always immediately popular but they end up paying
    dividends not just for the military but for American society.
    It has to be done sensibly, carefully, by people who understand
    it, but I applaud you and other leaders who are trying to do
    that.
        Let me now move to questions that have been asked about the
    top line of the budget, and I have gotten some handouts from
    folks who have not yet asked questions, and so I can see some
    more questions on this are coming.
        So, General Milley, if I recall you became head of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 2018. Is that correct?
        General Milley. 2019.
        Senator Kaine. 2019.
        General Milley. 1 October.
        Senator Kaine. Were you involved in the discussions around
    the submission of President Trump's fiscal year 2021 budget,
    which came to this Committee in February of 2020?
        General Milley. Sure. Absolutely.
        Senator Kaine. So I guess I want to just compare the Biden
    proposal, President Biden's proposal for defense to President
    Trump's proposal. My argument is, to some of my colleagues who
    are trying to attack the Biden budget, it is exactly what
    President Trump proposed. President Trump gave us a future year
    defense plan in February of 2020, and it called for a top line
    of $721 billion for this year. Now President Biden has
    submitted a top line of $715 billion.
        So it would suggest that maybe the Trump budget projection
    for this year was $6 billion higher than the Biden budget, but
    that is actually not the case, because under the Trump
    administration, there was a practice of taking money out of the
    Pentagon budget for non-military emergencies. Over an 11-month
    period, between March of 2019 and February of 2020, the Trump
    administration took $10 billion out of the top line. That
    straddled two fiscal years, so divided that in half--about $5
    to $6 billion a year was taken out of the Pentagon's budget by
    President Trump. So the difference between the $715 billion and
    $721 billion is essentially erased, so long as President Biden
    doesn't take money for non-military purposes.
        I have asked the OMB director, I have asked everybody that
    I know in the Biden White House, is it the intention of this
    White House to take Pentagon dollars for non-military purposes,
    and the answer to that is no. President Biden says if Congress
    appropriates, I am going to respect the appropriation, and I am
    not going to spirit monies out of the Pentagon and use them for
    non-military emergencies.
        So my belief is this is a budget that was essentially
    identical to the budget that we would have seen under President
    Trump, based upon the Trump numbers that were submitted to us
    over a year ago. When those numbers were submitted to us, I did
    not hear anyone on this Committee complain about President
    Trump did not have a high enough top line. We ultimately
    control what the number will be, but in terms of the difference
    between the two administrations and their budget submissions to
    this body, I would argue that they are identical. President
    Biden has submitted a top line that is essentially identical to
    what President Trump would have submitted, based upon the
    documents they gave us a year ago.
        With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine, and now
    let me recognize Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for your service to our country. I would like to follow up
    a little bit and continue the discussion that Senator Kaine has
    begun, and that is with regard to the top line of the budget. I
    do believe that this defense budget request, on the whole, is
    moving in a very similar direction that we had before, with
    regard to trying to follow through with the National Defense
    Strategy, the NDS. I think, and I would like confirmation, and
    I will begin with General Milley, that this particular budget
    is focused on achieving the major goals that are found in the
    NDS from 2017.
        General Milley, could you share a little bit about, in
    terms of what those major goals are and the priorities are in
    the NDS that this particular budget is trying to achieve?
        General Milley. Sure, Senator. The NDS, as it was written,
    and that was under Secretary Mattis and I was, at that point,
    Chief of Staff of the Army, and all the Joint Chiefs
    participated in that, that is a rigorous document, it is well
    thought out, and it stood the test of time. We all still use it
    as a guiding light, and we are under a review with Secretary
    Austin and we will see how that comes out, but there will be
    modifications. The document is 4 or 5 years old now, so there
    will be some modifications to that.
        But it is still good, and the fundamentals of it emphasize
    readiness, modernization, lethality, allies, partners,
    irregular warfare. It calls out China, Russia, Iran, North
    Korea, counterterrorism. So the main structures are more or
    less still valid, and perhaps China is a little bit more
    advanced now that they were, say, 5 years ago. So it is still a
    fundamentally solid document.
        But I would tell you, as I said in my opening statement,
    the $715 billion budget requires hard choices in terms of
    prioritization, but I think it adequately meets the needs in
    terms of the priorities of the current, existing NDS and the
    one that we are working on modify under Secretary Austin's
    signature. So I am very comfortable that we can provide an
    adequate defense of the United States of America with a $715
    billion budget.
        Senator Rounds. I understand the direction and the fact
    that you have been involved in establishing and that your input
    has been involved in the development of this budget. But I also
    note that I think nuclear command and control upgrades are
    critical, and would be recognized under this as well, would it
    not?
        General Milley. Yes, absolutely.
        Senator Rounds. The continued development and modernization
    of the nuclear triad would also be involved, would it not?
        General Milley. Absolutely. In fact, we have said that the
    recapitalization of the nuclear triad is the number one
    priority in terms of the actual programs, programmatic
    spending. It is critical that we have the air, sea, and land
    components of that triad in order to maintain the security of
    the United States going forward.
        Senator Rounds. See, General, I think that the basic goals
    of the NDS are represented within this. I do not disagree with
    that. My concern that I will express is that it is based on
    being able to handle those goals but also being able to
    maintain and not expect the Members of the armed services to
    continue to do the day-to-day operations if we have increases
    in inflation, whether it be for fuel or for other supplies, for
    health care, and so forth.
        General, I think there were some very hard choices made,
    and I guess my question to you, sir--and I do not intend this
    to be a gotcha question--the hard choices that had to be made
    in order to achieve the top-line goals of the NDS, where are
    the reductions or the limitations that have to recognized when
    we do have a very similar--in terms of the total number of
    dollars--when we do expect that inflation will run perhaps
    between 3 and 5 percent, and at the same time the NDS expected
    to have, and in order to meet its goals, an ongoing increase of
    between 3 and 5 percent over inflation, which clearly is not
    reflected in the budget, and I know is not news to you, sir.
        General Milley. Sure. I mean, you could do the numbers a
    lot of different ways, and we have Mike McCord here, and he
    knows it better than anyone else. But this budget is about $11
    billion more than the fiscal year 2021 enacted budget. If you
    factor in inflation, you normalize the dollars, it is more or
    less flat, or I think it is 0.5 less, or something like that.
    So it depends on which way you look at the numbers.
        But in terms of the key capabilities, Senator Kelly
    mentioned 42 A-10s getting divested. We had to make a choice
    between buying two subs, one destroyer and a frigate versus two
    destroyers, and things like that. So there are hard choices in
    all of the domains, and this is my sixth budget. In every
    single budget I have seen we are always making hard choices. We
    always have unfunded asks (UFA) lists. We always have ways to
    spend more money effectively for the defense of the country.
    But in my professional opinion, a $715 billion budget, as long
    as we are disciplined in its application and we adhere to the
    priorities that we have established, will provide for the
    defense of the United States.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, my time has
    expired. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Now let me
    recognize Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
    want to discuss just for a moment one of those hard choices.
    The top Navy unfunded priority is a destroyer that was
    eliminated from the budget, that was already committed to under
    the multiyear procurement. That has several problems, one
    national security. These destroyer, guided missile (DDG)
    destroyers are the workhorse of the Navy, eyes and ears around
    the world, very important part of our assets. But it also sent
    a shudder through the industrial base. It is unprecedented, in
    my experience, that a multiyear has been breached, which would
    actually cost the government money in penalties. I hope, Mr.
    Secretary, that you and Admiral Michael Gilday can work with us
    to restore that ship, because I think it has importance beyond
    just the one ship. But the symbolism of breaking a multiyear
    and also pulling back on our commitment to increasing the
    capacity of the Navy is, I think, a very important priority.
        That is not really a question. It is an entreaty to you to
    work with us to try to find the funds to restore that ship and
    restore the Navy's number one unfunded priority. Will you
    commit to working with us on that?
        Secretary Austin. Absolutely, Senator. We will do
    everything we can to make sure that we maintain a good working
    relationship with Congress, and I appreciate your tremendous
    support throughout, and especially now. We want to make sure
    that we maintain a ready, capable, and sustainable force. We
    also want to make sure that the industrial base has the ability
    to produce what we have asked them to produce. Current plans
    are to buy that DDG in 2023.
        Senator King. Thank you. The importance of the industrial
    base--I live within 8 miles of the industrial base in Maine,
    and the industrial base is not something you can just turn off
    and on. It has got to be something that is sustained and
    maintained over time.
        Let me turn to a different topic. I believe one of the most
    serious risks this country faces today is accidental conflict
    with China, some kind of conflict in the South China Sea, the
    Strait of Taiwan, and the danger of escalation from that
    accidental conflict of some kind. It is concerning to me that
    we do not seem to have an effective hotline, direct line,
    whatever you want to call it, with China, officials at your
    level and also at the Presidential level. I understand the
    Chinese are reluctant about this, but I believe this should be
    a national security priority. I looked up yesterday and I find
    that Amazon has 11 copies of The Guns of August in Chinese, and
    I think what I might do is buy those and send them to the
    Politburo in Beijing, because this is a very clear and distinct
    danger.
        Do you agree with me that a better deconfliction link
    between military-to-military and also government-to-government
    with China would be an important mitigation of this risk?
        Secretary Austin. I absolutely agree with you. As we look
    at some of the aggressive behavior that we have witnessed from
    China in the Indo-Pacific, you know, I am concerned about
    something that could happen that could spark a crisis. I think
    we need the ability to be able to talk with both our allies and
    partners but also our adversaries, or potential adversaries. I
    think there needs to be a direct line of communication, between
    the military and also between government officials as well. So
    I share your concern and I absolutely agree with you that this
    is critical.
        Senator King. Thank you. One other area that has come to my
    attention. In fact, we had a hearing yesterday on missile
    defense, and General Glen VanHerck said he had to pry the data
    out of another agency. We had Goldwater-Nichols, which has
    enabled joint operations. We do not necessarily have a joint
    capability acquisition, particularly in the area of software. I
    hope that we might work with you and General Milley and others
    on how to rationalize, if you will, the joint acquisition of
    things like software so that we do not have silos within the
    military, that are analogous to the silos that we had pre-
    Goldwater-Nichols. Is that something that you will be willing
    to work with us on?
        Secretary Austin. Absolutely. I think it is critical, and
    you have my commitment to do so.
        Senator King. General Milley, I am sorry I did not get my
    questions to you but perhaps we will have a second round. Thank
    you very much.
        General Milley. I am okay with that Senator. Thank you very
    much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Ernst,
    please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Chairman, and gentlemen, thank
    you very much for being here today and for your continuing
    service to our great United States of America.
        Superior weapons personnel and technology ensure that we
    won the 20th century, but of course, now our adversaries have
    adapted their technologies, they have improved their operating
    concepts, and they have expanded their challenges into the new
    domains of cyber and space, and, in fact, President Biden has
    stated, ``The world is at an inflection point with shifting
    global dynamics and emerging crises that demand attention.''
        We, of course, know that we face emboldened adversaries
    such as Vladimir Putin in Russia and President Xi Jinping in
    China. Both are actively seeking to disrupt a stable and
    prosperous global order, and then, of course, we have other
    actors like Iran and North Korea presenting their own
    significant threats. As we are withdrawing from Afghanistan we
    do not see the removal of terrorist threat. Instead, we see, as
    the President has stated, the threat has become more dispersed,
    metastasizing around the globe.
        So of course we want to make sure that we are funding and
    resourcing our troops appropriately, but going along with
    taking care of our own troops is working with other allied
    nations. Secretary Austin, in a March editorial the Washington
    Post, you wrote about the importance of joint partnerships with
    other nations, and called them force multipliers. I do agree
    with you, Secretary. You wrote, ``It would be a huge strategic
    error to neglect these relationships, and it is a wise use of
    our time and resources to adapt and renew them, to ensure there
    are as strong and effective as they can be.'' Yet, the
    President's defense budget guts our partner nation joint
    exercise budget compared to the pre-COVID levels by over 50
    percent.
        So how do you square your advocacy for improving our
    interoperability with our NATO allies and theater partners
    around the world with those proposed cuts?
        Secretary Austin. Well, certainly with respect to NATO we
    are encouraging the members of NATO to do more, to invest in
    air defense and also to do more to contribute to NATO overall.
        What we have been focused on is making sure that--you know,
    you have heard me say that China is our pacing challenge, and
    so we really weighted our main effort there to the Indo-Pacific
    region, and you will note that my first trip overseas was out
    to the region, along with Secretary Blinken, and we visited
    South Korea, we visited Japan, and also made a visit to India
    as well.
        Again, we truly value the importance of strong
    relationships with our allies and partners. I think there is a
    great capacity that can be leveraged there, and so in some
    areas those partnerships, while still strong, are not as strong
    as they could possibly be, so we will remain focused on that.
        Senator Ernst. I do hope so, Secretary. I think this is a
    really important area to focus on, making sure that we are able
    to leverage them and continue to use our allies as this force
    multiplier.
        Mr. Secretary, I also wanted to just make a brief
    statement. I do appreciate that you have stated your commitment
    to making changes to how the military handles and prevents
    sexual assault, and I am concerned about the continued delay
    that we continue to face, though. Certainly if any of our
    adversaries were attacking members of our military, as we have
    seen within our own ranks, members attacking other members
    within our own ranks, if it had been an adversary we would have
    responded immediately. We must respond immediately as well. So
    I am encouraging both you and the chairman to continue to push
    on this issue, to make sure we bring resolution and justice for
    our members of the military, those very important survivors.
        Just a brief statement, and I am sorry, General Milley, I
    did not get to my questions for you either. Secretary McCord, I
    will follow up with you later on the audit. But I do want to
    echo concerns that were raised by Senator Fischer about the
    Navy's intent, whether it was an interoffice memo, whatever it
    was. I do also want to stress my concern that the Navy intends
    to cancel development of the sea-launched nuclear cruise
    missile. I think this is very, very concerning, especially
    coming from an Acting Secretary that has yet to be confirmed,
    and I hope that that is truly not reflective of the overall
    attitude of the Department of Defense.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Secretary Austin. It is not, Senator, and as we said, we
    will be true to our posture review and make sure that that
    drives the process.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Now let me
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here today.
        Secretary Austin, during your confirmation process you
    disclosed that you were on the board of Raytheon Technologies,
    one of the Nation's largest defense contractors, and that
    caused me to ask you for some commitments about ethics issues
    that you would face. Existing ethics laws already require some
    commitments but they do not go nearly far enough. This matter a
    lot because the Pentagon spends $360 billion every year on
    goods and services provided by contractors, and those
    contractors have a revolving door with the DOD.
        So that is why I have introduced legislation to strengthen
    ethics rules for all public officials. But it is also why I
    asked you during your hearing to extend your recusal from
    matters involving Raytheon for the duration of your government
    service. I asked you to pledge not to seek a waiver of that
    recusal, and to refrain from seeking compensation from a giant
    defense contractor within 4 years of leaving government
    service, and you agreed to make those commitments, and I want
    you to know, I appreciate that. I think the American people
    appreciate that too.
        Secretary Austin, as I recall, you explained that you
    voluntarily made these commitments because you think it is
    important that the American people have concrete assurance so
    that they never doubt that you are working for them and not for
    giant defense contractors. Right?
        Secretary Austin. Yes. That is true.
        Senator Warren. Good, and I just want to say, I also asked
    several Trump nominees to make the same commitments, and they
    refused. You, by contrast, demonstrated considerable leadership
    in making those commitments.
        Now, since your confirmation, the Senate has confirmed five
    additional nominees to go to work at the Pentagon. Not a single
    one of them was on the board of a major defense contractor,
    none of them reported that the bulk of their income came from
    our most powerful contractors, and I appreciate that and I
    supported all of their nominations.
        But this Committee is now being asked to consider nominees
    who do not meet that test, and in these cases, when nominees
    report the vast majority of their income from major defense
    contractors, either through direct employment or consulting, or
    when they are on those companies' boards, I plan to ask
    nominees to make the same voluntary ethics commitments that you
    did during your confirmation.
        So let me ask you, Secretary Austin. Do you agree that the
    people working for you, who have similar or even more extensive
    ties to industry, should be living up to the same ethics
    commitments that you made? Do you think it is important that
    the American people have confidence, as you put it, that these
    Pentagon officials are working for the American people and not
    for their former employers in the defense industry?
        Secretary Austin. Well, Senator, you have heard me say, on
    a number of occasions, that sound, ethical behavior is
    important to us, important to me, and important to the
    Department. I have every reason to believe that those who have
    been nominated to serve will conduct themselves properly and
    exercise sound, ethical behavior, and I am truly appreciative
    of your support in getting our nominees confirmed as quickly as
    possible. We absolutely need them on the team.
        Senator Warren. Well, let me say, though, I recognize the
    importance of filling these important Defense Department
    positions, but I am asking for commitments that they are going
    to avoid conflicts of interests, and I have laid out what they
    are, and you have agreed to them. So the question I am asking
    is whether you think that the people who are going to be
    working for you who have these ties should make the same kind
    of commitments that you make.
        Secretary Austin. Senator, again, I believe that they will
    conduct themselves appropriately. I have no concerns about
    their ethical behavior. I think that they are committed to
    doing the right things.
        Senator Warren. Well, look. I appreciate that you do not
    want to step into this, but this is what leadership is about. I
    am still in conversation with the current nominees, where I
    think these commitments are warranted, and I hope that we can
    come to an understanding as their nominations progress. If we
    can, I will support their nominations. But in these cases and
    going forward, if nominees with significant ties to the defense
    industry refuse to make the commitments you made, then I will
    vote no in this Committee, on their nominations, and I will ask
    for a roll call vote on the floor where I will vote no again.
        So let me be clear. I am asking for these commitments, not
    because I am challenging anyone's integrity but because I think
    it is critical that the American people have total confidence
    that our public officials are truly working for them and not
    for the defense industry that has paid them so well.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Let me recognize
    Senator Tillis, please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here. I want to go back to the discussion
    of the UCMJ and what is described as military sexual assault.
    It is an area I am frustrated with. I have spent a lot of time
    with Senator Gillibrand. But, Secretary Austin, I am concerned
    that even when we have the discussion here people think we are
    just talking about military sexual assault. But we are talking
    about alleged crime that would have a sentence of over 1 year.
    So that is a sweeping change to the UCMJ.
        I am also concerned with some of the technical aspects that
    have not been spelled out in the bill. It is more of a
    framework. We have not seen the details. But one of the things
    that I am most troubled by is the 6-month implementation time
    frame. In your judgment, to the extent that you know the
    details of Senator Gillibrand's proposal, is that even possible
    to be implemented?
        Secretary Austin. I don't know all of the specific details
    of her proposed timeline. What I would tell you is--and I would
    echo what I said to the chairman a couple of minutes ago, is
    that any change that we make, Senator, I would hope that we
    would be provided ample time to make sure that we properly and
    appropriately implement these changes, because a change to the
    UCMJ is a very significant issue in the military. We want to
    make sure we get this right, and we will get it right if a
    change is required.
        Senator Tillis. General Milley, do you think maybe taking
    crimes that could be barracks larceny out of the chain of
    command is a good idea, and would put us in a position where
    good order and discipline on the part of the command would be
    undermined?
        General Milley. As I mentioned to Senator Gillibrand before
    and some others earlier, I think the commander is essential to
    maintaining good order and discipline in the military. We are a
    military that is built to fight. The UCMJ is there to support
    combat power. At the same time, cohesion is critical, and I am
    very, very open to significant change in the area of sexual
    assault and sexual harassment. When we get beyond that, at this
    point my position is I need to study it more. I am open-minded,
    but I think we would be really--it needs a lot of due diligence
    before we bundle all the 1-year felonies and take them away
    from the commander. So I think it is right to study it further.
        Senator Tillis. General Austin, I think you have heard from
    some of us about the need for a timely report back on the
    commission findings and the DOD recommendations. With the mark-
    up coming up next month, I think it is very important that we
    get that feedback if it is to have any impact on what may
    likely be in the National Defense Authorization (NDA) mark.
        Secretary Austin. You are right, Senator, and I understand
    your sense of urgency. I share that sense of urgency. As you
    know, the Independent Review Commission is still evaluating the
    other three lines of effort, that include prevention, victim
    care, and also climate. I will get those shortly, and when I do
    I will make my recommendations to the President, and those
    recommendations will be based upon what I get from the IRC,
    plus my consultations with the leadership of the Services.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. Jumping to budget matters, the
    immediate response force--I know you know; you have spent some
    quality time, you and General Milley, down at Fort Bragg--it
    was deployed back in 2019, after the Iranian-backed Hezbollah
    attacked our embassy in Iraq. The reports that I have got on
    the ground there is the folks from the 82nd Airborne that would
    be a part of the response spent pretty much the day going over
    what you all know is a big complex, getting ready to do it, at
    the expense of briefings and preparation.
        The strategic deployment complex is not yet even on the
    unfunded priorities list. Why is that?
        Secretary Austin. I will look into that, Senator. I do not
    know why the Army has not put that on their unfunded
    requirements list, but I am sure that the Army's choice is
    based upon the input they have gotten from the 18th Airborne
    corps commander and others. But I will engage the Army on that.
        Senator Tillis. I will submit a question for the record,
    because I am concerned that in an instance where we may have to
    once again send out an immediate response deployment request
    that they are not the best prepared that they could be for it.
    I would like to get that reported back, and I will submit other
    questions for the record.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Senator Hirono,
    please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have had a
    number of opportunities, Secretary Austin, to raise my concerns
    about the fact that Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H), the
    missile defense radar for Hawaii, has been zeroed out over the
    last two fiscal year requests, and so in response to some of my
    concerns raised about the fact that there is no funding
    requested for this radar, which was told to us that it was
    going to be very important as part of our system to protect
    Hawaii, I am told that under the current situation, currently
    protected against today's threats, that is the response I have
    gotten, Secretary Austin.
        But what we are looking at is we need to protect against
    future threats, i.e., 2025 threats. So I am going to want to
    have further discussions with you and your team as to what the
    projected dangers are, going to 2025. I recognize that Hawaii
    is protected under today's threat but not necessarily 2025, and
    that was the time frame in which this radar was determined to
    be necessary for our national security. So I do not want to get
    into further discussion with you on the explanation as to why
    it was zeroed out.
        Let me move on to support for the Pacific Deterrence
    Initiative. The PDI was enacted last year to ensure that DOD
    prioritizes and invests in an often overlooked but critical
    components of joint readiness. In fact, with regard to the PDI,
    the previous commander of INDOPACOM, Admiral Philip Davidson,
    identified five areas of focus in the PDI. One, the Joint Force
    technology; two, force design and posture; three, strengthen
    allies and partners; four, exercises, experimentation, and
    implementation; and five, logistics and security enablers.
        Looking at your budget request, though, I do not see
    requested items in the five areas that Admiral Davidson had
    identified as being supportive of the PDI, and, in fact, your
    request identifies platforms like a Navy destroyer, fleet
    oiler, and items related to the F-35 aircraft as PDI
    investments.
        So I would like to know, why is the vast majority of
    funding identified to support PDI unrelated to the lines of
    effort outlined in the United States Indo-Pacific Command
    (INDOPACOM) Section 1251 report?
        Secretary Austin. Senator, let me say, off the top, that
    our intent was to align our PDI investment with congressional
    intent, and so my staff is currently working with the Committee
    to clarify and adjust any perceived misalignments, and, in
    fact, make sure that we answer any and all questions, and so we
    will continue to work that.
        As you know, we have dedicated some $5.1 billion to PDI,
    and again, our intent was to align our investments with
    congressional intent.
        I will go further to say that a great deal of the
    Department's budget is invested in capabilities and activities
    that concentrate on deterring China, and I would further say
    that I am committed to working with the Committee to making
    sure that we get it right and answer the needs of the commander
    out in PACOM.
        Senator Hirono. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that commitment
    toward aligning to congressional intent with what the combatant
    commanders are requesting, and I think that alignment needs to
    be much better. For example, the DOD is only partially funding
    INDOPACOM's top three priorities that are important to
    deterring China, since you mentioned that just now.
        Moving on to the importance of military construction, and
    funding, of course, is very critical to what we need to be
    doing. I have had conversations with your team regarding the
    need for a shipyard modernization and infrastructure support
    for that, including a new dry dock for Hawaii. Now I know that
    there is a request for dry docks in Portsmouth, and there is
    money also for saltwater purification system in Norfolk. This
    is in front of requested funding to move the dry dock for
    Hawaii along.
        I would request that you take a look at that. It is very
    clear that the dry dock in Hawaii is very necessary for the
    Hawaii Pearl Harbor shipyard to be able to take care of the
    Virginia-class submarines that are there. We have no capacity
    to do that right now, and so that dry dock needs to be moved
    along. So I request that you look at the funding request to see
    whether you can move the appropriation request for the dry dock
    in Hawaii along.
        My time is up, but I hope that you will continue to discuss
    that particular concern with us and address my concern.
        Secretary Austin. I understand, Senator, and we are
    committed to making sure that we maintain the ability to
    maintain and sustain our force, and so I will take a look at
    that.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me now
    recognize Senator Cramer, and also alert all of my colleagues
    there will be two votes beginning at 11:30, and also I believe
    the panel sought a break around that time. So in talking with
    the ranking member we will figure out a strategy to accomplish
    all those objectives.
        Senator Cramer, please.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of
    you for your service and for being here. Good to see you.
        I want to start, Secretary Austin, by following up from an
    answer that you gave to Senator Shaheen earlier about further
    support for the Afghan forces, and you specifically mentioned
    ISR support from the GCC, and I am wondering if you could tell
    me specifically what kind of ISR support that is, what system.
        Secretary Austin. Certainly we are flying our MQ-9s from
    there, and essentially the vast majority of ISR is being
    provided from other places outside of Afghanistan. You know, as
    we have retrograded we have had to make sure we protect our key
    platforms and systems there.
        Senator Cramer. Are Global Hawk Block 30s part of that?
        Secretary Austin. That is correct, yes.
        Senator Cramer. You realize the Block 30s are slated for
    retirement in this budget? You and I have had this discussion
    before. I am concerned about the lack of a bridge between where
    we are today and where we are going to get to eventually with
    new systems. You have tough choices, and we have heard all
    about the difficult priorities you have to set. But I remain
    concerned about the retirement of Block 30s prematurely, to
    benefit our combatant commanders everywhere, but I think the
    Afghan stand presents a rather unique example of the threat.
        With that, General Milley, could I ask you, are the
    combatant commanders getting all of the ISR support that they
    need, in every theater?
        General Milley. I would tell you that as Chief of Staff for
    the Army for 4 years and Chairman for almost 2, no combatant
    commander has ever gotten all the ISR they wanted. It is one of
    those commodities that is a high demand all the time, and no
    one is completely ever satisfied. Every commander wants perfect
    knowledge, and that is what ISR does is feed you with
    knowledge. But we are never going to get enough ISR to fill all
    the demand.
        Having said that, it is all a function of risk. It is all a
    function of where you take risk, what your priority is, are you
    going to support the main effort, and what do you for the
    supporting effort, and so on and so forth. In this budget, I
    think that we are adequately funding ISR as we go forward, for
    the main effort relative to China, and with respect to the
    Block 30s and the MQ-9s, again, it has to do with relevance and
    pivoting to the future. This budget biases future operating
    environment, change in the character of war, and against the
    pacing threat of China. That is not to say we are going to stop
    everything with respect to A-10s or MQ-9s or some of these
    systems. We have got to make that turn.
        Senator Cramer. So since we are on the topic, if you could
    list the top three threats to America's national security, in
    order, what would they be?
        General Milley. From a military standpoint, strictly
    military standpoint, I think China is the number one military
    threat as we go forward, but I also knowledge that Russia is a
    considerable great power competitor, and those two, in the NDS,
    and in the current strategic environment, from a military
    perspective. There are many, many threats, but from a military
    perspective I put those two up there.
        Senator Cramer. I understand. One of the things I want to
    get at, because I think it was just yesterday President Biden
    announced, when he announced America is back, in Europe, to
    military men and women Air Force in the United Kingdom, that
    according to the military leaders that the number one threat
    facing America's national security is climate change. Six weeks
    ago today, the European Union Parliament, speaking of NATO and
    allies which are a prominent part of your testimony in this
    budget, EU Parliament passed a resolution, 569-67, urging the
    EU institutions and member states to do everything they can to
    stop the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Three weeks
    ago today, President Biden lifted the sanctions on completing
    the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
        I am just kind of wondering--that flies in the face both of
    America's back and it flies in the face of building NATO
    alliances, rebuilding, as the budget document states--I am not
    sure which ones we lost--but I know that there are at least
    eight European union allies, including Ukraine, who strongly
    oppose Nord Stream 2 for national security reasons, and certain
    from climate change standpoint. If climate change is the number
    one threat facing America's national security, allowing Nord
    Stream 2 to be built is not good for the climate.
        So I have some great concerns, and I think we ought to get
    them straightened out. I do not know, for the life of me, how
    completing Nord Stream 2 helps our alliance with the European
    Union, other than maybe with the current Chancellor of Germany.
        General Milley. Senator, if I could just----
        Senator Cramer. Please.
        General Milley.--make a comment on your piece about
    threats. Climate change is a threat. Climate change has
    significant impact on military operations, and we have to take
    it into consideration. Climate change is going to impact
    natural resources, for example. It is going to impact increased
    instability in various parts of the world. It is going to
    impact migrations and so on. In addition to that, we have
    infrastructure challenges here at home--witness some of our
    hurricanes. So climate change does impact.
        But the President is looking at it at a much broader angle
    than I am. I am looking at it from a strictly military
    standpoint, and from a strictly military standpoint I am
    putting China-Russia up there. That is not, however, in
    conflict with the acknowledgement that climate change or
    infrastructure or education systems--national security has a
    broad angle to it. I am looking at from a strictly military
    standpoint.
        Senator Cramer. I just think it is peculiar that the
    President would go to another continent and tell our
    servicemembers there that the number one threat is climate
    change, albeit a threat.
        My time has expired. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cramer.
        In collaboration with the ranking member, and at the
    request of the panel to take a short break at this time, I
    would move to recess for 10 minutes. It also would allow people
    to go to the vote, which has just been called, and so with that
    I would ask for a 10-minute recess.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman Reed. Let me call the hearing back to order after
    the short recess, and recognize Senator Blumenthal for his
    questions.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
    Secretary, Chairman Milley, for your extraordinary service, and
    thank you for being here today.
        I have been very concerned about the ship that apparently
    has been sent from Iran to Venezuela. Apparently two Iranian
    vessels are believed to be carrying arms intended to transfer
    to Venezuela. As you know, these ships are thought to be
    carrying weapons that would fulfill a deal that Iran and
    Venezuela made a year ago. We do not know the types of weapons,
    at least as far as I know. There were reports that Venezuela
    was considering purchasing missiles from Iran, including long-
    range ones. Commercial satellite imagery of one of the ships
    shows fast-attack boats loaded on the deck, but it is still
    unclear whether those boats were aboard when the ships began
    their journey.
        I was pleased to see that a senior administration official
    stated that delivery of these weapons would be a, quote,
    ``provocative act and understood as a threat to our partners in
    the western hemisphere,'' end quote, and that the United States
    would reserve the right to take appropriate measures, quote,
    ``in coordination with our partners to deter the transit or
    delivery of such weapons.''
        Secretary Austin, allowing this ship to dock seems
    significant to me on many different levels. It would be the
    first time that Iranian vessels have made such a transit, and
    the precedent of allowing Iran to provide weapons to the region
    causes me grave concern. Do you share that concern, and how
    would such delivery effect the region, in your view?
        Secretary Austin. Well, Senator, thanks for the question. I
    am absolutely concerned about the proliferation of weapons, any
    type of weapons, in our neighborhood, and so I share your
    concern.
        Senator Blumenthal. Can you tell me whether the
    administration knows exactly what is on those Iranian vessels?
        Secretary Austin. I would like to take that conversation,
    either that question for the record or we could take that
    conversation is another forum.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would be glad to do it in another
    setting. Have you had any communication with your colleagues in
    other nations in this hemisphere?
        Secretary Austin. I have not had any discussions with any
    other nations in our hemisphere on this issue.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, on the topic of white
    supremacy and violent extremism, which you and I have discussed
    both in your confirmation hearings and privately, I understand
    that there will be a task force report. Can you tell us when
    that report will be released?
        Secretary Austin. I am sorry, Senator. I did not quite hear
    the question.
        Senator Blumenthal. Can you provide an update as to the
    status of the extremism task force that you announced recently
    and when this Committee can expect to be briefed on the
    results?
        Secretary Austin. As you recall, Senator, early on in my
    tenure I asked the force to conduct a brief standdown to
    discuss the issue of extremism in our ranks, and let me preface
    what I am going to say by saying that, you know, I am totally
    convinced that 99 percent of our troops are focused on the
    right things and doing the right things and embracing the right
    values each and every day. But as I may have mentioned to you
    earlier, I believe that small numbers can have an outsized
    effect regarding this issue.
        So we did gain some insights from the standdown, and it was
    a great opportunity for leaders to have discussions with other
    leaders, and leaders to have discussions with subordinates, and
    talk about those behaviors, and we are focused on behaviors,
    those behaviors that are not supported by the values that we
    embrace.
        In addition to that, we stood up a counter-extremism
    working group which routinely monitors our efforts across the
    Department in terms of what we are doing to make sure that we
    counter extremism or extremist behaviors. They are refining our
    policies and also gaining a better understanding of the
    complete challenge. Certainly, you know, I can have the
    leadership of that working group come to brief you, upon
    request, or any time you want.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would very much appreciate that, Mr.
    Secretary, and I applaud the efforts that you are making
    against that probably less than 1 percent, as you said, 99
    percent. But I think it is an even more overwhelming majority
    who adhere to the basic values and are dedicated patriots, and
    the focus on that less than 1 percent is well warranted,
    because they may have an outsized effect. So I would welcome an
    opportunity to learn more from the task force whenever it is
    appropriate to do so. I will be in touch with your office, if
    that is okay.
        Secretary Austin. I would absolutely agree with you,
    Senator, that it is less than 1 percent. We will gain better
    insights, and also equip our force with better policies and
    definitions.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
    appreciate that you all are here today.
        Secretary Austin, I want to come to you on the issue of
    nuclear deterrence. When you went through your confirmation
    hearing we had a discussion about that, and in your advance
    policy questions you had made a statement, and I am quoting
    you, ``The tipping point where we must simultaneously overhaul
    these forces is now here.'' That was your comment in reference
    to nuclear deterrence. While we are looking at this budget that
    is before us, we see that modernization is fully funded. But
    then when you look at deferred maintenance, you see that it
    cuts hundreds of millions of dollars from the enacted level,
    the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's)
    deferred maintenance budget.
        So we know that more than half of the NNSA facilities are
    over 40 years old. Thirty percent date back to the 1940s. So to
    me, this sounds like we are at a tipping point when we discuss
    these facilities. So was that deferred maintenance cut
    coordinated with DOD, and realistically, what effect will it
    have on the ability of the NSNA to meet the DOD requirements?
        Secretary Austin. To my knowledge it was not coordinated
    with DOD, and what I would say to you though, Senator, is that
    it is very important to me and to our Department to make sure
    that we work with the Department of Energy to ensure that we
    achieve our common goal of maintaining a robust nuclear
    deterrent. You have my commitment to make sure that I remain
    engaged with the Department of Energy (DOE) to make sure that
    the right things are happening in this regard.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Then let me ask it like this. What
    are the consequences that happen if we do not modernize and
    bring this infrastructure, maintain this infrastructure?
        Secretary Austin. You have head me say before, Senator,
    that, you know, I am absolutely committed to the modernization
    of the triad, and you know that we have dedicated $28 billion
    in this 2022 budget to that effort. Maintenance is also
    important, and again, with respect to NNSA, we will remain
    engaged with DOE to make sure that the right things are
    happening and gain a better understanding of what DOE's
    objectives are.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, you all frequently will say that
    infrastructure is a part of what you need to retain talent, and
    I would expect that the enterprise's invaluable workforce, as
    they are, as we look at 21st century warfare, that it is
    difficult for them to continue to work in dilapidated and
    sometimes unsafe conditions. And I would assume that that is a
    concern to you also.
        Secretary Austin. It absolutely is a concern, both for what
    the issues that DOD controls and also, you know, I am sure it
    is a concern for all the things that DOE is responsible for as
    well.
        Senator Blackburn. Senator Fischer brought up to you the
    action of the Acting Secretary of the Navy cancelling the
    nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. So why was this decision
    made before completion of the nuclear posture review?
        Secretary Austin. Again, Senator, I have not seen the memo,
    but like the Chairman, I will see it very shortly after this
    hearing. As I understand the purpose of that memo was to issue
    some guidance for planning and evaluation to the Navy. But
    again, I am committed to conducting a nuclear posture review
    that we talked about earlier, and that will be conducted, and
    that will drive our activities going forward.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, I think that memo sent a message
    we did not want to send to Russia and China, when it comes to
    great power competition.
        I did appreciate the Department being on pace to fully fund
    the PDI, and the concern is the number one PDI ask was the Guam
    defense system to be fully funded at $350 million. But when you
    look through this, the funding totals for the defense of Guam
    procurement and the Guam defense development line items in the
    budget was $118.3 million, and that is less than half of the
    money that is required for this, which is the number one
    unfunded priority, if you will.
        So I would like to hear you speak to that. You know, we
    know that these fusion centers are vitally important. I have
    done a good bit of work on these multilateral fusion centers,
    and they serve a critical function of really enhancing our
    intelligence, our information, our logistical coordination.
    Future fusion centers are the commanders' number 11 unfunded
    priorities. These fusion centers also support investments in
    mission partner environments, the number 2 unfunded priority.
    So it seems like we have got a pattern that is going there, and
    I would love for you to address it. I know I am over and there
    are other waiting for questions, and I would be happy to take
    that response in writing.
        Secretary Austin. We will most certainly get it to you,
    Senator. Thank you very much.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Let me
    recognize Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and each of our
    witnesses here today, thank you for your service, and thank you
    for being here today.
        But I want to start first by saying how disappointed--and I
    will just say, actually, quite angry--at a recent decision made
    by the Air Force to not award Selfridge Air National Guard Base
    the F-35 international training mission, and my feelings are
    based on the data and the criteria that was presented by each
    of the installations that competed as well as what the Air
    Force put forward. It is clear, from my review of that, and
    others, that Selfridge was clearly the superior choice in the
    matter, and this is clearly a problem that, as we have seen
    before with the Air Force, as all of you know, the GAO is now
    investigating strategic basing decisions being made by the Air
    Force over the last few years. Without question this Committee,
    this body, needs to retain confidence that the choices made by
    the U.S. Air Force are based on data and based on criteria and
    not at a whim, or whatever may be behind it.
        So my question for you, Secretary Austin, is, do I have
    your commitment that you will review the Air Force's F-35
    international training mission decision and we will have an
    opportunity to talk about that?
        Secretary Austin. You do have my commitment that I will
    review it, as I do all of those types of decisions over time,
    and I would also offer to have the Air Force come in and brief
    you on their decision. Air Force typically uses a very detailed
    process to make those kinds of decisions, and I would offer
    that politics has no place in this decision-making process,
    this type of decision-making process. and so, if you desire for
    the Air Force to come and do a lay-down for you, I am sure that
    they will be willing to do that.
        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that. I have had some of
    those discussions already, but to make sure that the process is
    indeed an objective process, it is critically important there
    is full transparency so that we can see not only how Selfridge
    ranked, based on that data and the criteria, but also how the
    one that was selected also ranked, so there could be a true
    objective comparison of that criteria. We tend to just get one
    side and not hear the other side. I want to make sure that all
    of our questions are asked. That is something I assume you
    would certainly support.
        Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. My guidance and
    requirement is that we always try to be as transparent as
    possible.
        Senator Peters. I appreciate that. While I understand the
    fiscal year 2022 budget continues to fund per- and
    polyfluoralkyl substances PFAS remediation, the reality is that
    the funding requested is not anywhere close to being sufficient
    to address the contamination that we continue to find in
    Michigan, and unfortunately hundreds of other sites all across
    the country. The price tag to address (PFAS) contamination
    comes on top of what is already a staggering backlog of
    environmental remediation needs facing the Department.
        This is why I have joined my fellow Armed Services
    Committee members in introducing legislation to expedite
    cleanup of some of the most contaminated sites and why I will
    continue to work to implement clear and enforceable standards
    to guide those.
        So Secretary Austin, how does the Department's budget
    address the management challenge presented by these literally
    forever chemicals? I know this is not a problem that we are
    going to be able to solve in a year or, quite frankly, even in
    the next decade. But the longer we wait to address these toxic
    contaminations, the higher the eventual cost is to our
    servicemembers, to our communities, and, quite frankly, to the
    U.S. taxpayers.
        Secretary Austin. Yeah. As you know there are provisions in
    this budget to address remediation for contaminated sites, and,
    this will extend obviously well beyond this budget. You have my
    commitment to continue to work this going forward.
        I just recently met with Environmental Protection Agency
    (EPA) Administrator a couple of weeks ago to focus on this and
    a couple of other issues. It was a very good meeting. We
    committed to working together and making sure that we met the
    standards of remediation and we had good procedures for
    remediation.
        This is a significant challenge to our country, as you
    pointed out. You know, DOD is an element of a larger challenge.
    Obviously, we are not the only source of this contaminant. But
    I would tell you that DOD is committed to doing its part to
    remediating whatever damage has been done in every part of this
    country where we have contributed to this.
        Senator Peters. Well, thank you, Secretary Austin. I
    appreciate your attention to both of the matters that I raised,
    and I look forward to working with you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Sullivan,
    please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    thank you for your service. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General
    Milley, you know how much respect I have for both of you. You
    have a hard job, especially coming here to defend a budget you
    probably do not like or did not support internally, but you
    have got to do it, and that is tough job.
        But let me just mention, budgets are a reflection of an
    administration's priorities. Take a look at this chart. I
    handed this chart out to you as well, this chart here. The
    Biden administration, in its $6 trillion budget blowout,
    clearly prioritizes defense and homeland security dead last.
    Dead last. If you look at in terms of inflation adjusted it is
    actually a cut.
        [The information referred to follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Now I think a lot of us here, Democrats and Republicans,
    think national security should be prioritized first, not last.
    I think you gentlemen probably believe that. But importantly,
    how can we tell the troops that you are leading that we are
    prioritizing their mission, which is defending America, when it
    is clear that the Biden administration's prioritization of
    their mission is last, a declining defense budget when almost
    every other agency in the Federal Government is getting a
    massive, double-digit increase?
        Mr. Secretary, do you want to try to take that one on
    first?
        Secretary Austin. Thanks, Senator. What I will tell our
    troops, and what I have told them and will continue to tell
    them, is that I truly believe that the President's budget gives
    us the flexibility to go after the right mix of capabilities to
    defend the Nation and to deter aggression.
        Senator Sullivan. No, I mean, I understand that. I have
    been watching the hearing. I get it. I am just talking about
    the--and again, it is tough question for you because you are
    not in charge of these other agencies like OMB and the White
    House is. But they are clearly not prioritizing the military
    and national defense relative to any other agency at all. I
    mean, look at this chart. They are putting the national
    security mission dead last in terms of the prioritization of
    budgets. How do we tell our troops that, hey, we are putting
    you first?
        Secretary Austin. Our troops are always first. They are
    first now and they will always be first going forward. Again, I
    do believe that we have what we need to go after the right
    capabilities.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. There has been a lot of focus,
    Senator Cramer talked about this issue of climate change.
    Clearly our country needs to address this issue. This is a big
    issue in Alaska. I am always puzzled, though, how our military
    is task-organized to do this. You know, I had the honor of
    serving with you at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). General
    Milley, we overlapped briefly in Afghanistan. I do not think in
    any of my military service I heard climate change as a phrase
    mentioned once. I heard the Taliban, Iraq, Iran, improvised
    explosive devices.
        Nevertheless, Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you
    mentioned climate change 15 times and lethality twice, which I
    think is a bit of a mismatch.
        I was just in South Korea and Taiwan. You guys also
    mentioned China is our pacing threat. Let me ask a simple
    question that relates to these two priorities. What is a more
    immediate threat to our national security interests that DOD
    has the capability of responding to, particularly in the Asia-
    Pacific, a Chinese communist invasion of Taiwan or the
    challenge of climate change? I think it is a pretty simple
    question. I think it is actually a really simple answer.
        Mr. Secretary, do you have a comment on that?
        Secretary Austin. Well, first, I do not recall mentioning
    climate change 15 times. I will go back and do my word count.
        Senator Sullivan. I think it was in your written statement.
        Secretary Austin. Okay, and let me also be clear, Senator,
    that lethality is important. This is the most lethal force that
    has ever occupied the planet, and it will remain so going
    forward. That is what we remain focused on in the Department of
    Defense, defending this nation, and we will go after the
    capabilities required to do that.
        Senator Sullivan. So Taiwan invasion by the Chinese
    Communist Party or climate change? I think it is very simple.
    What is the most immediate threat DOD can respond to?
        Secretary Austin. The most significant military threat that
    we are focused on, and you have heard me say this probably 100
    times, Senator, is China. It is our pacing challenge, and that
    is what we have asked you, a number of times, to help us
    resource our efforts on that challenge, and I appreciate what
    you have done thus far, and I know that you will continue to
    help us going forward.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. Sorry, Mr.
    Chairman. It is related to that. I have another chart here. It
    shows that our budget increases or decreases relative to the
    Chinese. The Chinese have dramatically and consistently
    increased their defense budget annually by at least 6 percent,
    sometimes as much as 13 percent. We have increased ours, during
    the Trump administration, when the Republicans controlled the
    Senate. You see during the Biden administration, Obama-Biden,
    it was dramatically cut. Now we are looking at cuts again.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        What message does this chart send to China and our allies
    in the region, and can we sustain our declining comparative
    advantage over China, militarily, if these trends continue?
    This both for the Secretary and General Milley.
        Secretary Austin. Well, a message that I am concerned about
    is the message that we send to the world, and that is that we
    are going to continue to go after the capabilities and develop
    the operational concepts to be able to deter anyone who would
    venture to take on the United States of America. So we will
    have the capabilities necessary to defend this nation.
        Senator Sullivan. General?
        General Milley. So, Senator, a couple of things. I want to
    go back and make two points on the budget piece, explaining it
    to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians out there.
    We are getting $715 billion if this is passed. That is a lot of
    money. That is 50 percent of the entire President's budget.
    That is 1 out of every 2 dollars in the discretionary spending
    of the Federal Government. That is not a small amount of
    change. The increases that you show on your chart, those are
    factually correct, but relative to the whole and in context, we
    are getting a lot of money. So that is the first thing.
        The second thing is relative to climate change. Paragraph
    one of every operations order I have ever seen for 41
    consecutive years says enemy situation to include weather and
    terrain. We always consider weather, and climate change is
    weather at the strategic level. It has military impact. We are
    not going to change climate change. The Department of Defense
    is not going to change climate change. But we must consider it
    in on our strategic calculations, all the time, because it is
    going to increase instability overseas and it has impact on our
    infrastructure here. So climate change is real.
        The military threat is China, as the Secretary just said,
    is the pacing threat. We are calculating all of our
    calculations relative to that as the pacing threat, and others
    are second in nature.
        The third piece, relative to the China versus U.S.
    spending. This is a disturbing trend--there is no question
    about it--with respect to China. They have made a major
    economic investment in developing their military. It has been
    going on for 20 or 30 years. The gaps that used to exist, say
    20, 30 years ago, were like this. Today they are like that, and
    the Chinese have a deliberate plan to be a global challenger to
    the United States of America, militarily, by mid-century. Now
    we have got to continue strong investments in our military, and
    I think this budget, for this year, is an adequate investment
    right now. We have to set the conditions, though, to pivot to
    the future character of war with the pacing threat of China.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Let me now
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
    gentlemen. Thank you so much for being here today. Thank you
    for your service to our country.
        While responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, natural
    disasters and civil unrest, or seamlessly integrating with the
    Joint Forces and overseas operations, the National Guard and
    Reserve component continues to answer the call. Over the past
    20 years, the high demand for Reserve component forces has
    necessitated a shift from a strategic Reserve to an operational
    force. In fact, last June, over 120,000 National Guard troops
    were mobilized, more than at any time since World War II.
        In short, our Nation relies on our Reserve component
    forces, the Reserves and the National Guard, to defend the
    United States and fulfill the DOD's national security
    responsibilities. However, even though the National Guard and
    Reserves are serving in critical capacities and in dangerous
    duty assignments, they are not receiving the same pay and
    benefits as their Active Duty counterparts. The complexity of
    the current slate of duty statuses adds unnecessary confusion
    to activating Reserve component forces. The disparity in pay
    and benefits between different duty statuses can also
    incentivize manipulating orders to minimize the servicemembers'
    access to benefits.
        I believe duty status reform is necessary to ensure the
    National Guard and Reserve forces receive equal pay and access
    to the health care and educational benefits they deserve for
    the work that they do. Bottom line: servicemembers doing the
    same job in the same place should not earn different pay and
    benefits based on their duty statuses.
        General Milley, could you please update me on the DOD's
    plans to address Reserve component duty status reform, and when
    do you anticipate releasing your findings?
        General Milley. Thanks, Senator. As part of the Joint
    Force, Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard, it is a total
    force, and we have a commitment to ensure that we have
    appropriate and fair pay and benefits given to our National
    Guard troops and our reservists. That reform effort is
    underway. We are reviewing that. I cannot give you the exact
    date of when we will have that to you, but we are working it,
    and we are working it very hard, and we are working it with
    both the National Guard Bureau and each of the Services. But we
    do recognize the need to ensure that it is evenly applied in
    terms of pay and benefits to the soldiers in the Reserve
    component, or the troops in the Reserve component.
        Senator Duckworth. Well, will you also commit to making
    sure that whatever the reform proposal is that is appropriated
    shaped to eliminate orders manipulation and current pay and
    benefit disparities?
        General Milley. Sure. Absolutely. You know, our commitment
    is to ensure that everyone who wears the cloth of our Nation,
    whether they are Active, Guard, or Reserve, no matter where
    they are, are treated equally in all respects, to include pay
    and benefits. I commit that to you and I will get you the
    answer on the exact date of when the reform proposals are due
    in.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Secretary Austin, Reserve
    component servicemembers are required to maintain the same
    proficiency in certain critical skill sets as their Active
    component counterparts, even though they do not necessarily put
    on the uniform every day. This is especially true for pilots,
    for example. They only received incentive pay at a fraction of
    the amount of Active servicemembers.
        I believe every servicemember, whether Active or Reserve,
    deserve to be fairly compensated for maintaining mission-
    essential skills. The RAND Corporation has shown that incentive
    pay can help improve retention and is far more cost effective
    than training new servicemembers to replace those who separate.
        As we continue to strengthen our National Guard and Reserve
    forces, we must retain our talented servicemembers. That is why
    I introduced the bipartisan National Guard and Reserve
    Incentive Pay Parity Act, to help ensure that Reserve component
    servicemembers in high-skill roles are compensated at the same
    rates as they Active Duty counterparts.
        Secretary Austin, will you commit to exploring options such
    as the Incentive Pay Parity Act, to help improve retention,
    especially of those servicemembers with critical skills?
        Secretary Austin. I will, Senator, and for all the reasons
    that General Milley mentioned, our Guard and Reserve have done
    amazing work. The skill sets that you are talking about in many
    cases are warfighting or combat-related skills, and so it is
    absolutely important that they are proficient, and they should
    receive the same proficiency pay.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I have one final question I
    will submit for the record, but it has to do with modernization
    efforts to continue across the Joint Force, and wanting to know
    whether DOD and the military services are factoring in program
    performance into decisions about how to prioritize budget
    requests to adequately resource successful programs such as
    future vertical lift. But I will submit that for the record.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Let me
    recognize Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. First off, I want to
    thank each of you for your willingness to serve. You have very
    significant roles for our country. Probably the most important
    thing we can be doing is making sure we defend our freedoms.
        Would any of you disagree that when you are thinking about
    Communist China you are thinking about a party that either
    wants world domination or, in the worst case, wants to
    absolutely control the Indo-Pacific?
        Secretary Austin. I do believe that their goal is to
    control the Indo-Pacific, and I also believe that they desire
    to be the dominant to preeminent country in the world, and so I
    think they are working towards that end.
        Senator Scott. So would you all disagree that their goal is
    to eventually take back Taiwan, a great American ally? You
    wouldn't disagree with that, right?
        Secretary Austin. I would not disagree with the point that
    they have a goal of eventually uniting Taiwan with China.
        Senator Scott. That would be whether they do it voluntarily
    or involuntarily, through the military.
        Do you all believe that we are going to just continue to
    see more surveillance by the Communist Party of China of
    American citizens and our allies around the world? We are
    seeing more surveillance all the time. You agree with that,
    right?
        Secretary Austin. I mean, it stands to reason that whatever
    level of surveillance that is ongoing now will continue, and
    quite possibly increase going forward.
        Senator Scott. So if you look at this, you saw what Senator
    Sullivan brought up. You saw the fact that year after year they
    are investing more in their military. Their goal is to have an
    economy bigger than ours, and you seem to agree that if they
    have an economy bigger than ours they are going to increase
    their defense spending. As General Milley says, it is getting
    closer and closer.
        If China is able to pull this off, then our opportunities
    all over the world, opportunities of American citizens and our
    way of life, is going to change, right? If they can do fulfill
    their goals, then our opportunities will be diminished. Would
    you all agree with that?
        Secretary Austin. You know, I would describe our
    relationship with China currently as one of competition. Again,
    you have mentioned that they desire to be the preeminent
    country on the planet, and that is, in fact, the case. Their
    mid- to long-term goal is to do that. They look to compete with
    us, not only militarily but across a spectrum of activity. What
    you see us doing, the military and in other sectors in our
    government, is making sure that we remain competitive,
    economically, making sure that we are developing the best--we
    continue to develop the best scientists in the world, and we do
    the most comprehensive research. So it is a competition across
    a broad spectrum of activity.
        Senator Scott. So if you follow through the reasoning, if
    China wants to be either Indo-Pacific or world dominant, if
    they build an economy bigger than ours, if they continue to
    out-invest us in the military, which they are, at least growing
    faster than we are, then what are you all doing to, one, inform
    American citizens of the risk, because, you know, we all do a
    budget based on what the American citizens believe the priority
    is--that is how we elect our elected leaders. So what are you
    all doing to, one, inform the public of the risk of Communist
    China, and ensure them that we have the budget we need to make
    sure that in 5 or 10 or 15 years we are not sitting here,
    saying we wish we would have done more, we all saw this threat
    but we didn't do enough about it?
        Secretary Austin. Yeah, just about every time you hear me
    speak, Senator, I know you probably grow tired of me taking
    about the competition with China. But that is my focus. My
    number one focus is to defend this nation and protect our
    interests. Our pacing challenge is, and will continue to be,
    China. Again, we are going after the capabilities that can
    match the operational concepts that we are putting into play
    and allow us to be not only competitive but actually dominant
    in this competition.
        So that is what the Department of Defense is doing, and I
    think you see activity across the entire government that is
    focused on making sure that we not only can compete with China
    but maintain our edge with respect to China.
        Senator Scott. Do you think it is important that in your
    role that you inform the American public of the risk of
    Communist China so everybody will be more focused on making
    sure we have the military budget we need?
        Secretary Austin. We do so, routinely, and we will continue
    to do that, Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott. Let me
    recognize Senator Rosen, please.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, for holding this hearing. I would like to thank the
    witnesses for your service to our great nation. Thank you for
    being here today.
        Right before the break, Senator Cramer was talking to you
    about our ISR requirements and his concerns, and I am concerned
    as well about the MQ-9. So, Secretary Austin, the MQ-9 Reaper,
    I do not have to tell you, it is critical to supporting our
    current intelligence, surveillance, and recognizance
    requirements. A key part of the MQ-9 architecture is the
    mission at Nevada's Creech Air Force Base. Last year, CENTCOM
    Commander, General Kenneth McKenzie, included additional MQ-9
    funding at the top of his unfunded priorities, and in April he
    told this Committee of the MQ-9's importance and his need for
    more of them, not fewer.
        The Air Force today still lacks the ISR capacity to meet
    combatant commanders' requirements contained in the 2018
    National Defense Strategy. Despite this, the Department has
    previously proposed cutting this platform, their most cost
    effective, without a program of record to replace it, which
    would further risk widening the ISR capability gap that General
    Milley talked about.
        So Secretary Austin, what is the Department's plan for the
    MQ-9, and given its importance, cost effectiveness, and the
    requirement for combatant commanders for more ISR assets, why
    has the Air Force cut funding for this program without a
    program of record to replace it?
        Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, Senator. I think you
    heard General Milley talk earlier about the way combatant
    commanders view ISR, having been a combatant commander in a
    former life. I can tell you I agree with him. There is never
    enough ISR--I will always want more.
        The Air Force has committed to taking off a number of lines
    of ISR, but they are not reducing the tails, the aircraft, that
    go with those lines. What they are doing is making sure that
    they upgrade and modernize their aircraft, where possible, and
    so that they can network the aircraft better. So the number of
    tails is not being reduced. The number of lines is being
    reduced slightly.
        Senator Rosen. So can you get to us some information about
    that so we know what the program of record will be going
    forward and how it can impact us?
        Secretary Austin. Absolutely.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        I would like to move on to talking a little bit about
    Iranian aggression, how we combat that, because Iranian-backed
    militias, of course, are increasingly targeting United States
    installations, our servicemembers in Iraq, via rocket and drone
    attacks. Iran continues to be the world's leading state sponsor
    of terrorism, a threat to the United States allied interests
    all across the world, be its ballistic missile program, its
    support for terrorist proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas,
    kata'ibltezbollah (KH), Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and many
    others.
        According to a recently released annual threat assessment
    of the United States Intelligence Committee, and I quote,
    ``Iran-supported Iraqi Shia militias will continue to pose the
    primary threat to U.S. personnel in Iraq.''
        So to Secretary Austin and General Milley, with the
    constant threat to the United States and coalition forces in
    the Middle East posed by Iran and Iran-backed militia groups,
    what are we doing to counter them, and how are we proactively
    protecting our forces and personnel? Do we have what we need to
    do that and prevent them, prevent these militias and terrorists
    from targeting our U.S. troops in the region?
        Secretary Austin. Yeah. We certainly continue to demand
    that Iran cease its malicious behavior in the region, in terms
    of its support of the Iranian-backed Shia militia groups, and
    we demand that they cease providing them modernized equipment
    so that they can conduct these kinds of attacks. We are doing
    everything within our power and our capability to make sure
    that our troops that are forward deployed have adequate
    protection. We are engaging the Iraqi leadership to make sure
    that the Iraqi leadership does what is necessary to help
    protect our citizens, who are there to help the Iraqi
    Government.
        General Milley. So I would say, in addition to everything
    the Secretary said, is think offense/defense. So in terms of
    defense, the force protection of the force, the disposition of
    exactly where they are at, how many they are at, what the
    hardening of those sites, we are doing all of those measures.
    In addition to that, we have air defense capabilities--SeaRAMs,
    counter-rocket and mortar, and counter-unmanned aircraft
    systems that were put in place. Those have been proven quite
    effective, actually, against some of the Shia militia groups'
    capabilities. We are going to continue to reinforce all of
    that.
        On the offense side, I will not discuss it here but I can
    discuss it in some detail in a classified session as to what we
    can do, what we are prepared to do, and what we have already
    done. All of that in combination we think is mitigating the
    risk. It certainly does not reduce it to zero. It is a
    dangerous environment. We all recognize that. But we have got
    to continue to work by, with, and through the Iraqi Government,
    because they are the first line of defense for the protection
    of our forces in their country.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I just want to be sure that we
    have assets on the ground to defend American installations in
    Iraq and Syria----
        General Milley. We do.
        Senator Rosen.--and other places in the Middle East.
        General Milley. We absolutely do.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Hawley,
    please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
    witnesses for being here. Thank you for your service, as
    always.
        Mr. Secretary, if I could just start with you. I asked you
    earlier this year if you agreed with the National Defense
    Strategy assessment that the U.S. military needs to be
    postured, and here is the quote, ``to deter and prevent a fait
    accompli by an agile, opportunistic adversary.'' You responded
    to me in writing, which I appreciated, and I appreciated the
    response you gave, which was, you said, and I am quoting you
    now, ``Yes, I agree with the Commission's finding. A combat-
    credible, forward deterrent posture is instrumental to our
    ability to deter, and if necessary, deny a fait accompli
    scenario.'' I assume you still agree with that.
        Secretary Austin. I do, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. Very good, and would you also agree then, I
    assume that this would apply to our ability to maintain the
    ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan. Is
    that accurate?
        Secretary Austin. That is accurate, Senator. I think nobody
    wants to see a unilateral change of the status quo with respect
    to Taiwan. You have heard us say that we are committed to
    helping Taiwan defend itself, in accordance with the Taiwan
    Relations Act, the three communiques, and the six assurances.
    Our position has not changed in that regard, and we will
    continue to help them develop the capability.
        Senator Hawley. General Milley, if I could just get you on
    this as well. Would you agree that the United States should
    maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against
    Taiwan, if necessary?
        General Milley. I absolutely would, but, Senator, frankly,
    I am not sure what a Chinese fait accompli in Taiwan is. If you
    are talking about a military invasion of Taiwan, crossing the
    straits, the Taiwan Straits, with a sizeable military force to
    seize an island the size of Taiwan against the military that
    they have and with the population that they have, that is an
    extraordinarily complex and difficult operation. Even against
    an unopposed force that is a very hard thing to do. But I can
    assure you that we have the capabilities if there were
    political decisions made in accordance with the Taiwan
    Relations Act and so on. But we do have military capabilities.
        Senator Hawley. To defeat such an attempted invasion is
    what you are saying, General Milley.
        General Milley. Yes.
        Senator Hawley. Got it. Good. Would you agree, Mr.
    Secretary, if I can just come back to you, would you agree that
    we need to be, when we think about deterring China, that we
    need to be as focused on deterring China in the next 3, 5, 7
    years as we are 10 to 15 years from now? I am asking this--the
    context for this is we have heard now from the outgoing United
    States Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander, from the incoming
    PACOM Commander, we just heard earlier this week from the
    former Deputy National Security Advisor that China is
    increasingly aggressive and that the window to deter that
    aggression may be shorter than we had thought.
        So thus my question. Would you agree that we need to be
    focused on deterring them in the short to medium term, 3, 5, 7
    years, including the longer term?
        Secretary Austin. We do, and I would say that those two
    issues are not mutually exclusive, Senator. As you know, they
    complement each other. While we are developing a future
    capability, we certainly have to bridge to that capability, and
    that is absolutely our focus.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Great.
        General Milley. Senator----
        Senator Hawley. Yeah, General.
        General Milley.--I would say the key here is deterrence. We
    are in a condition of strategic great power competition. It
    needs to stay at competition, and deterrence is key to prevent
    it from going from competition to incident or competition to
    war.
        Senator Hawley. Yeah, very good. I am glad you mentioned
    that, and if I could just follow up on that, General. The
    adversary, the competitor in this case, China, knowing that we
    have the ability to deter them, we have the ability to do what
    you said a minute ago, which is if they should choose military
    aggression, we have the ability, should we choose, to deny that
    aggression, that is important for deterrence, is it not, them
    knowing we have the capability?
        General Milley. Yeah. I mean, in simple terms, I mean,
    deterrence is actually a very complex thing, but in simple
    terms you have to have the capability, your opponent has to
    know you have the capability, you have got to communicate that
    capability to your opponent and he has to know it, you have to
    communicate your will to use it, if necessary, and both actors
    have to be rational. If all of those components are there, in
    simple terms, you will be able to achieve a state of
    deterrence. Thus far, it is achieved.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
        Mr. Secretary, let me just ask you in this context then
    about the Department's request for the Pacific Deterrence
    Initiative. In your request you include, if I understand it
    correctly, $23 million for force design and posture
    improvements, out of the $2.2 billion that is required. I am
    trying to understand how providing our forces in the Pacific
    with just 1 percent of the funding they need for posture
    improvements to support those combat-credible, forward
    deterrent posture that we are talking about, how can we do that
    and say that we are going to maintain the ability to deter or
    deny a fait accompli?
        Secretary Austin. Yeah. So Senator, I would flag for you
    just a couple of issues. The first issue is that, as I said
    earlier, that our intent is to make sure that with respect to
    the PDI investment that we meet the congressional intent, and
    we believe we have invested in a number of things that meets
    that intent, and we will meet with your staff and explain where
    the investments are, to make sure that the language is not
    confusing.
        The second thing is we have invested $5.1 billion in the
    PDI.
        The third thing I would flag for you is that, you know,
    much of what we are investing in, in terms of capability is
    really focused on our efforts to counter the challenge
    presented by China. I would also say that when we speak of
    deterrence, we are not talking about just air, land, and sea.
    We are talking about using every capability across all domains,
    to include cyber and space. We are talking about integrating
    the capabilities of our allies, which I believe is very, very
    important. We are talking about using every lever that the
    United States Government has available to it to, in fact,
    effect that deterrence.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much. I have got some more
    questions for you on this, Mr. Secretary. I will follow up with
    you in writing. But I appreciate the opportunity to engage with
    you on it. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator
    Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    being here today.
        Chairman Reed. Put your microphone on, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Hello. Hello. Does that work? Good.
    Thank you. I thought mine was worn out after this long day, Mr.
    Secretary.
        I want to take a little different angle here. I have been a
    team-builder all my life, and I am on the Veterans' Affairs
    Committee, and I have been talking my first 6 months here with
    recruiters out in the field for the military. I am huge
    military person, military brat, and I grew up in a military
    family. We talk about missiles and bombs and ships, and you
    have got to have all of those. But if we do not have the
    people, the best people we can possibly get, we are going to be
    in trouble. It is like winning a football game--the best
    players win games. There is no doubt the same thing within the
    military, and we have always had a strong military.
        I hear a lot of comments about, ``Why should I get in the
    military? They did not look out for the people in Iraq and
    Afghanistan on the burn pits.'' Gentlemen, we have got a huge
    problem. We are getting ready to spend hundreds and hundreds
    and hundreds of billions of dollars for veterans that have gone
    over and breathed that smoke and chemicals and all those
    things. We have got to make better decisions than that. You
    know, all that money we are going to get ready to spend, you
    know, it could have gone to you guys, to defense. But to me it
    is going to be hard to recruit good people, the best people.
        I hear all this extremism stuff, and again, I have dealt
    with people all my life. You know, you don't have to like each
    other to be on the team. A lot of my players could not stand
    other guys on the team. You know, they just had personality
    conflicts. But at the end of the day, you have got to learn
    respect. You have got to earn the trust and dedication and all
    that from your teammates. I mean, you have got to learn that,
    and so I just hate for us to get off on this tangent of the
    people that we have in the military.
        Now in football, for instance, it is your coaches, when you
    bring players in you have got to build a team. You have got to
    bring them together. Same thing in the military. You have got
    lieutenants, captains, drill sergeants, corporals, all those.
    Everybody's responsibility is to bring that team together. The
    things that I am hearing and seeing in the military bases I
    have been going to the last six months, and talking to
    recruiters, we are going to have a tough time. Then we have got
    to face the people in big tech of taking the best and
    brightest, because cyber is one of the things that we have
    really got to get into in the military and continue to grow and
    to build in all of our technology.
        You know, that being said, I just want to make sure that we
    understand, you know, that when we talk about all this
    equipment and budget and all that--and I understand, we have
    got to have that. But if we do not have the people it does not
    make any difference.
        We had the Selective Service here a few months ago. They
    sat right here and they told us that if we had a draft today we
    would have 35 million people that we could draft from, 35
    million. Only 450,000 of those 35 million are eligible to be in
    the military, for one form or another. That is not enough. That
    is not enough. We cannot build a killing machine, which is what
    our military is--you can say anything else. We have got to be
    able to kill the enemy when they come at us, and so that is
    just something I have watched and listened, I have been on the
    road talking, and I want us to have the best military in the
    world, and we probably do. I want us to fund the best military,
    but we have got to fund our young men and women that are going
    to get in the military, and they have got to want to come in.
    They have got to want to be there. They have got to want to be
    there for the simple fact that they want to fight for the best
    country on the face of the earth.
        Just one question I have got for you, Secretary Austin. I
    wrote you a letter, me and Senators Wicker and Cramer, and our
    concern was disturbing, about training materials coming from
    our military. Let me be clear. Like you, we want to see good
    order and discipline in the ranks, for our military to remain
    the nonpartisan institution that Americans trust more than any
    other. But what emerged from some of the Services revealed is a
    disappointing partisan slant and a poorly defined First
    Amendment rights for military members.
        This year we have seen multiple senior military leaders, in
    uniform, from official DOD channels, criticize individual
    members of the press. That ain't got nothing to do with the
    military. To me, you have just got to go about your business.
        We have seen the National Guard march on elected officials
    here, just down from this building. We ask you to provide a
    report on what steps your office will take to reprimand
    officers who inappropriately engage in partisan behavior to
    ensure that the standdown training materials comply with the
    guidance issued by your office. We asked for that report no
    later than May 7th, and we still have not gotten it. I know you
    have been busy, but we would just like to know, you know, the
    steps that we are going to take to clamp down on people that do
    not deserve to be in our military.
        I did not want to get up here and rant, but I have been a
    recruiter all my life, and we have got to be able to recruit
    people, to spend this money that we are going to appropriate
    you in the right way, because we are in dire straits. Secretary
    Austin, could I get that commitment?
        Secretary Austin. You certainly have that commitment, and I
    would also like to offer a thought on what you just said,
    Senator, and thanks for your continued support of our great
    military. Again, you have heard me say this a couple of times
    today. I do not want our force, or anybody else in this
    country, to be confused. It is the most lethal organization on
    the face of the planet, and it will remain so, and it will
    remain the most cohesive organization on the face of the
    planet.
        You know, when I came in as the Secretary of Defense, I
    issued guidance to the force, and that guidance included three
    things. My focus is on defending this nation and protecting our
    interests, the second thing is taking care of our people, and
    the third thing is teamwork. Like you I have put a couple of
    teams together too, and I have employed those teams into
    combat, and I have watched these youngsters do amazing things,
    in support of their country and in support of each other. It is
    unbelievable.
        I have a pretty good feel in terms of what it takes to
    create that kind of cohesion, and cohesion is what is most
    important to me, just like it is to you, Senator. I know you
    absolutely understand that, and you have demonstrated that you
    understand that with some tremendous success over the years.
        Regarding the burn pits, you know, the welfare of our
    veterans is foremost in my mind. I mean, that is something that
    me and the Chairman both really care about. I would tell you
    that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary Denis
    McDonough, shares that concern. He and I worked together
    closely on a number of issues, and we have vowed to make sure
    that we do not lose our veterans as a transition from Active
    Duty to retirement or get out of the military and go do
    something else.
        I have inhaled those fumes from burn pits. The Chairman has
    inhaled those fumes from burn pits. We know it is important to
    take care of our troops, and you have our commitment to remain
    focused on that.
        But I would also say that this is not just the Army's
    problem. It is not just the military's problem. This is the
    issue for the United States of America. These are our troops,
    and we are going to do everything we can to take care of them,
    and I know that all the great resourcers and authorizers that
    are in this room share that same commitment, and we have felt
    that commitment going forward. I know that it is the reason
    that you asked that question.
        But the question you have is, are we committed to it?
    Senator, I am absolutely committed to making sure that we do
    what we can to ensure that this issue is addressed, and I know
    that Secretary McDonough is working this issue very hard, as
    well.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you for your service.
    Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville.
        This is the second round. I will recognize Senator King,
    who will ask one question, and he will also preside and
    conclude the hearing, and then he will recognize Senator
    Sullivan for one question. I would ask both the questions and
    the responses be as concise and eloquent as they have been all
    morning. Thank you very much.
        Senator King. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First,
    just a very brief observation. There has been a lot of talk
    about budgets and comparisons of budgets and budgets with
    China. I yield to no one in terms of my determination to
    successfully compete with China on all fronts. I would point
    out, though, even though they have had significant increases
    lately, their budget this year is still less than one-third of
    ours. I think that is important just to have that context,
    because we have been talking about growth, but they were
    showing significant growth from a much lower base.
        General Milley, I am gravely concerned about the men and
    women in Afghanistan who support and aided our troops, and that
    we are not moving fast enough to be sure that they are brought
    to safety. I think this is an essential moral commitment of
    this country, and also a practical one. If we leave these
    people to the tender mercies of the Taliban, I do not know who
    is ever going to cooperate and help us again in another
    setting.
        So I hope that both the Pentagon, the White House, and all
    the agencies of the U.S. Government are committed to this as an
    urgent priority, an urgent priority, and that if we cannot
    repatriate all of these people to this country that we at least
    make arrangements to get them safely out of Afghanistan. Can
    you give me your thoughts on that, please?
        General Milley. Well, Senator, first I think the President,
    Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, myself, others,
    have all commented on the importance of making sure that we
    keep faith with those that have supported us over the last two
    decades in Afghanistan, and that clearly is our intent, and we
    will do that.
        In terms of specific actions, Department of State has the
    lead on the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program and some other
    programs with respect to those Afghans that have supported us.
    That planning is working through the system right now. But I
    can commit to you that it is my belief that the United States
    Government will do what is necessary in order to ensure the
    safety and protection of those that have been working with us
    for two decades.
        Senator King. Thank you. The term ``working through the
    system'' is what gives me some concern.
        General Milley. Sure. I understand.
        Senator King. This is an absolutely urgent priority over
    the next 6 to 8 weeks, I would say, as our troops draw down. So
    I appreciate your commitment on that.
        Mr. Secretary, I assume you will make absolutely the same
    commitment?
        Secretary Austin. You are correct, Senator. This is very
    important to us, and we are pushing as hard as we can on our
    end to move as fast as we can. I know Secretary Anthony Blinken
    has asked for an increase in authorizations in terms of numbers
    to move into the SIV process, and I would ask your support in
    providing that authorization. Again, anything that you can do
    to expand our current capabilities in terms of authorizations
    would be very, very much appreciated.
        Senator King. I am sure the Members of this Committee will
    work to that end, and look forward to working with you.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I share your
    views, and I know most of the Members of the Committee do, on
    keeping faith with those who supported us in Afghanistan.
    Gentlemen, I appreciate you running the gauntlet today. It is
    an important element of our constitutional oversight
    responsibilities.
        I have one final question. A growing and critical area of
    great power competition with Russia, certainly, but also with
    China is our strategy interests in the Arctic. Mr. Secretary,
    as you know, and General, each of the military services, in
    some ways prompted by this Committee, have now published an
    Arctic strategy. I think all of us view this as a positive
    development. Both of you, during your confirmation hearings,
    had committed to focus on this area of our national security,
    to fully resources each of the Service Arctic strategies.
    Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks, through her confirmation
    process, did the same.
        In a Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing yesterday I had
    the chance to ask General VanHerck, who is the United States
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Commander, in his role as the
    designated advocate for Artic capabilities, how he saw each of
    the Services implementing their respective strategies in the
    President's new budget submission. He told me that DOD
    resourcing for the various Service Arctic strategies was,
    quote, ``inching along'' but that DOD, quote, ``did not move
    the ball very far down the field with the fiscal year 2022
    budget.''
        So I want to ask both of you, do you share this view, and
    how can we work to fully resource the Service strategies that
    have been out, the DOD strategies that have been put out in
    this important area of great power competition?
        Secretary Austin. Thank you, Senator. You know, when we
    talked before, I indicated to you that the Arctic and Arctic
    strategy was important to me, and that has not changed. It
    remains so.
        As you know, we are working on developing our National
    Defense Strategy overall, and also working through to refine
    our force posture globally. As we develop that National Defense
    Strategy, certainly the Arctic will be an area that we will
    take into consideration and make sure that we have the right
    emphasis, the right focus, and that strategy will drive our
    resourcing.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. General Milley, do you have a
    view?
        General Milley. Yeah, absolutely. We are committed to the
    Arctic strategy, and, you know, this whole issue with the
    Arctic is a classic example of the strategic military impact of
    climate change. As the snowcaps melt, the ice packs melt, it is
    exposing further resources. The Russians and Chinese are
    realizing that, so they are clearly trying to exploit some of
    that. We are going to see increased, not decreased, great power
    competition in the Arctic over time, and we do need to
    resource, full resource the Arctic strategy.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator King. Thank you. I would like to associate myself
    with Senator Sullivan's questions on the Arctic. It is an
    incredibly important strategic area. I appreciate your
    commitments.
        With no further questions, and I understand the decision
    has been made not to go to an additional closed session, so I
    want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today, for your
    forthrightness, for the information that you have shared, and
    most of all, for your service to our country.
        With that this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                    defense community infrastructure program
        1. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, as co-chair of the Defense
    Communities Caucus, I was pleased to see Defense Community
    Infrastructure Program (DCIP) included in the budget request. As you
    know too well, our installations are no longer islands unto themselves
    and recent events like the pipeline disruption and severe winter storms
    make obvious the need for resilient and secure infrastructure,
    especially for our military bases. The DCIP program was specifically
    designed to provide you with tools to address these issues, while
    leveraging state and local dollars. Do you believe that the Department
    of Defense (DOD) is adequately using this program?
        Secretary Austin. Yes, the Department is using the Defense
    Community Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to competitively select
    projects that address deficiencies in community infrastructure,
    supportive of a military installation, in order to enhance military
    value, installation resiliency, and family quality of life. In fiscal
    year 2020, the DOD awarded sixteen grants totaling $49.8 million, and
    each of these projects is on schedule to start physical construction
    activities by the end of September 2021. DCIP is also on schedule to
    execute its fiscal year 2021 budget of $60 million. The proposal
    submission deadline for the fiscal year 2021 DCIP Federal Funding
    Opportunity closed on July 12, 2021, and submitted proposals are in the
    process of being screened, evaluated, scored, and ranked. Selected
    proposers will be contacted and offered the opportunity to submit a
    grant application.

        2. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin and General Milley, are you
    putting enough emphasis on working with defense communities to address
    critical issues facing our military today?
        Secretary Austin. The Department continues to build partnerships
    with our defense communities that are crucial to the viability,
    resiliency, and sustainability of our local installations, missions,
    and defense industrial base. Often, the same issues confronting our
    military (including but not limited to energy resiliency, public
    services, cybersecurity, and encroachment) are also challenging to our
    civilian neighbors and require a ``whole of community'' approach to
    solve. We welcome opportunities to broaden these partnerships that
    underpin the quality of life and well-being of our servicemembers and
    their families.
        General Milley. I recognize the value in equipping municipalities
    and cooperatives, the smallest elements of local government, with the
    tools necessary to enable successful defense of the homeland. I fully
    support the Secretary's Defense Community Infrastructure Program
    (DCIP), which is designed to address deficiencies in community
    infrastructure, supportive of a military installation, in order to
    enhance military value, installation resilience, and military family
    quality of life.

        3. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin and General Milley, while
    studying how cyber-originating disruptions can impact force projection,
    the Army Cyber Institute's Jack Voltaic Project developed a software-
    based framework for local governments to rehearse their cyber incident
    response capabilities. Do you see value in equipping municipalities
    with solutions like this through a DCIP-like process?
        Secretary Austin. This software, while still in development, has
    potential for use by non-DOD entities. We will engage our Federal
    partners, who have the lead in coordinating with these entities, to
    consider whether it would be complementary to their ongoing efforts to
    improve energy and cyber resilience.
        General Milley. Providing communities programs like JACK VOLTAIC
    through a Defense Critical Infrastructure Program-like process is
    important not only to the communities involved but also to maintaining
    our national security. Events like the ransomware attack on Colonial
    Pipeline continue to demonstrate how interconnected our society is and
    how an attack on critical systems can impact our day-to-day lives. The
    ability to wargame these scenarios, identify weaknesses in our policies
    and procedures, and create solutions is vital to everyone. We believe
    that JACK VOLTAIC is a step in helping to improve our communities', and
    by extension, our Nation's resilience.
        The Joint Staff recognizes the value in equipping municipalities
    and cooperatives, the smallest elements of local government, with the
    tools necessary to enable successful defense of the homeland. Building
    capacity to protect the homeland and enable a quick response from the
    Nation's defensive forces requires a multi-layered approach that
    considers authorities and the importance of other Government
    Departments in reaching solutions. The Defense Critical Infrastructure
    Program (DCIP) represents a successful process to support local
    initiatives and can provide a blueprint.
               dod support to the department of homeland security
        4. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin and Secretary McCord, in
    February 2021, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a
    report titled ``Southwest Border Security'' (GAO-21-356) which found
    that DOD developed unreliable cost estimates for its support to the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the southwest border. Since
    DOD is currently considering a request from DHS to extend the
    military's border mission, I am concerned DOD could inadvertently adopt
    the previous flawed estimate process. How are you factoring the border
    mission into the defense budget?
        Secretary Austin. Other than specified exceptions such as support
    for counterdrug activities and activities to counter transnational
    organized crime pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 284, the Department of
    Defense (DOD) does not program and budget for support of other Federal
    departments and agencies, including DOD support of the DHS border
    security mission.
        DOD support of the DHS border security mission is provided in
    accordance with Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. Code, and Section 1059 of
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
    114-92), as amended. DOD support provided pursuant to Chapter 15 is
    required to be on a reimbursable basis. However, Chapter 15 authorizes
    the Secretary of Defense to waive reimbursement if certain criteria are
    met, including if providing the support would result in a benefit to
    the DOD element or National Guard personnel providing the support that
    is substantially equivalent to that which otherwise would be obtained
    from military training. In such circumstances, training funds may be
    made available to fund such DOD support.
        Reimbursement is not required for DOD support provided pursuant to
    Section 1059.
        DOD appreciates--and shares--the GAO's interest in ensuring well-
    documented cost estimates are used when assessing DHS requests for
    assistance. Rather than use best practices designed for the acquisition
    process, as recommended by the GAO, DOD cost estimates for operational
    support are developed using the Contingency Operations Support Tool
    (COST) model. Informed by prior year actual cost data, DOD cost
    estimates have steadily improved. Armed with cost estimate data from
    fiscal years 2018 to 2021, the cost estimate for DOD support in fiscal
    year 2022 and, if necessary, future years, will be much more accurate.
        Secretary McCord. Other than specified exceptions such as support
    for counterdrug activities and activities to counter transnational
    organized crime pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 284, the Department of
    Defense does not program and budget for support of other Federal
    departments and agencies, including DOD support of the DHS border
    security mission.
        DOD support of the DHS border security mission is provided in
    accordance with Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. Code, and Section 1059 of
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law
    114-92), as amended. DOD support provided pursuant to Chapter 15 is
    required to be on a reimbursable basis. However, Chapter 15 authorizes
    the Secretary of Defense to waive reimbursement if certain criteria are
    met, including if providing the support would result in a benefit to
    the DOD element or National Guard personnel providing the support that
    is substantially equivalent to that which otherwise would be obtained
    from military training. In such circumstances, training funds may be
    made available to fund such DOD support.
        Reimbursement is not required for DOD support provided pursuant to
    Section 1059.
        DOD appreciates--and shares--the GAO's interest in ensuring well-
    documented cost estimates are used when assessing DHS requests for
    assistance. Rather than use best practices designed for the acquisition
    process, as recommended by the GAO, DOD cost estimates for operational
    support are developed using the Contingency Operations Support Tool
    (COST) model. Informed by prior year actual cost data, DOD cost
    estimates have steadily improved. Armed with cost estimate data from
    fiscal years 2018-2021, the cost estimate for DOD support in fiscal
    year 2022 and, if necessary, future years, will be much more accurate.

        5. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin and General Milley, how does
    the southwest border mission affect the readiness of the participating
    units?
        Secretary Austin. There is a manageable impact on readiness.
    Participating units continue to maintain high levels of readiness, as
    continually assessed by the Military Services. Nonetheless, DOD
    continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) to address DHS capability and capacity gaps and, thereby, to
    reduce DHS reliance on DOD support to secure the southern border of the
    United States.
        General Milley. There has been negligible impact on the unit
    readiness of forces participating in the southwest border mission. Over
    fiscal year 2020 to 2021, the majority of units have seen no change or
    increase to their pre-deployed readiness levels. Reserve Component (RC)
    personnel have benefited from valuable military training by gaining
    valuable experience from deploying to austere environments and being
    afforded the opportunity to exercise ground, aviation, and intelligence
    support of the interagency in a relatively-benign real-world
    environment under the command and control of U.S. Northern Command.
        The Joint Staff and the Services work diligently to mitigate
    training and warfighting readiness concerns in the Global Force
    Management process. During this process, the Joint Staff coordinates
    with Force Providers to source the southwest border with qualified
    units and personnel whose support has the least impact on the Services,
    and ultimately, Joint Force operational readiness.
                               irregular warfare
        6. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, will the forthcoming National
    Defense Strategy still aim to institutionalize irregular warfare?
        Secretary Austin. Yes. The Department of Defense will continue to
    institutionalize irregular warfare across the entire Joint Force, an
    effort that is in alignment with emerging strategic guidance including
    the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. The Department has
    also published a comprehensive implementation plan. Our adversaries use
    indirect and asymmetric strategies in an attempt to erode our strengths
    and pursue their strategic interests. Irregular warfare provides
    valuable ways for us to shape conditions prior to conflict and maintain
    an integrated approach to deterrence alongside our high-end
    capabilities and the efforts of our allies and partners.

        7. Senator Peters. General Milley, a March 2021 article in Joint
    Force Quarterly by Heather M. Bothwell titled ``Gray is the New Black:
    A Framework to Counter Gray Zone Conflicts'' contends that current
    doctrine inadequately addresses gray zone conflicts. How does the joint
    force plan a campaign against revisionist states that employ gray zone
    strategies?
        General Milley. The Joint Force operates across the continuum of
    conflict and requires a whole-of-government approach to synchronize all
    our instruments of national power.
        Currently under development, the Joint Concept for Competing will
    deliver a structured approach and expand the intellectual aperture for
    how the Joint Force will synchronize with other USG departments and
    agencies across the ``gray zone'' in pursuit of national interests.
    Secondly, the Department continues to institutionalize our
    understanding of irregular warfare across the Joint Force. By relooking
    how irregular warfare is defined, taught, planned, and capabilities
    thereof are developed, our military is better positioned to contend in
    the ``gray zone.''
        These two efforts are fundamental to allowing the Joint Force to
    campaign plan against adversaries who have adopted irregular
    methodologies to challenge our interests.

                            avoiding miscalculation
        8. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, as we strive to maintain an
    edge in conventional deterrence for ourselves and our partners in the
    Indo-Pacific, the possibility of miscalculation increases. Secretary
    Mark Esper convened a Crisis Communications Working Group with the
    Chinese People's Liberation Army. Is that something you plan to
    continue?
        Secretary Austin. Yes. Our aim is to hold the Crisis Communication
    Working Group as an annual event.
            united states-israel operations technology working group
        9. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, section 1299m of the William
    M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2021 (Public Law 116-283) authorized the Secretary of Defense to
    establish, under the United States vice chairman of the United States-
    Israel Defense Acquisition Advisory Group, a working group to address
    operations and technology matters. This effort will help to ensure that
    the United States and its allies remain at the cutting edge of
    technological development. Have you taken steps to create this working
    group?
        Secretary Austin. Our allies and partners are a force multiplier
    and one of the greatest strategic assets we have in protecting our
    Nation. To this end, the Department works closely with Israel's
    Ministry of Defense (IMOD) to advance collaborative defense research,
    development, test, and evaluation of operationally-required weapons
    systems to increase the lethality of Warfighters in the United States
    and Israel. I support the intent of this provision. As such, the IMOD
    and the Department are developing the terms of reference for such a
    group for discussion at the Undersecretary (Acquisition and
    Sustainment)-led United States-Israel Defense Acquisition Advisory
    Group meeting.
                             armenia and azerbaijan
        10. Senator Peters. General Milley, during the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict, Azerbaijan's drone fleet highlighted the vulnerabilities of
    sophisticated weapons systems. Has this affected how you prioritize
    counter-unmanned aerial systems' capabilities in U.S. European Command?
        General Milley. Small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) technology
    trends are dramatically transforming making them less expensive,
    easier, and increasingly capable weapons in the hands of state actors,
    non-state actors, and criminals not only in USEUCOM but across the
    globe.
        I am encouraged by how our new Directed Energy C-sUAS systems are
    performing in CENTCOM and AFRICOM and we will make appropriate
    allocation of assets based on our worldwide assessment of the threat.
        The Department currently has capabilities to mitigate and/or defeat
    the current generation of sUAS but recognize that advances in
    artificial intelligence/machine learning will increase the challenges
    posed by sUAS with regards to swarming and other advanced techniques.
        18 November 2019, the Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary
    of the Army as the DOD Executive Agent for Counter-sUAS (C-sUAS),
    Groups 1, 2, and 3. US technology to counter the sUAS threat continues
    to improve. DOD establishing the Joint small-Counter UAS Office to
    consolidate, coordinate, and expedite new capabilities in our C-sUAS
    portfolio is a critical step in tackling this threat.

        11. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, is DOD able to confirm
    reports of abuse against Armenian prisoners of war currently being
    detained by Azerbaijan?
        Secretary Austin. DOD is aware of, but has not confirmed, reports
    of abuse against Armenian detainees currently held by Azerbaijan. The
    United States has called on Azerbaijan to respect its obligation under
    international law to ensure the humane treatment of all detainees in
    its custody, and has called for the release of all remaining Armenian
    detainees as soon as possible.
                                    tricare
        12. Senator Peters. Secretary Austin, the Department has taken
    significant steps to keep costs down, but for several years we have
    known that one subset of Tricare beneficiaries - those who rely on
    brand name maintenance medications - face department imposed barriers
    when it comes to convenience and choice of where to access these needed
    prescriptions. Due to current Defense Health Agency (DHA) policy, and
    how they ask for certain rebates, Tricare beneficiaries who rely on
    these drugs are forbidden from picking up their prescriptions at a
    local, in-network pharmacy following their first (up to second) fill.
    At such point, they're forced to use a military treatment facility
    (MTF) or mail order. This also applies to Tricare retirees. In my home
    State of Michigan, access to MTFs with a pharmacy is extremely limited
    - as a matter of geography that leaves many of my constituents in a
    tough spot with no other option than to receive drugs by mail order.
    The current system offers them little flexibility and limited access to
    pharmacist care. We've been working in a bipartisan manner for several
    years to try and fix this problem. In fact, the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes optional pilot language
    on this issue. We want to make it easier for military families and
    retirees to access the medications they need. Do we have your support
    in this endeavor?
        Secretary Austin. The pharmacy pilot language in the NDAA for
    fiscal year 2021 directed that the pilot should be executed if the
    total costs of the pilot for beneficiaries to receive all medications
    at retail pharmacies would not exceed the overall total costs to the
    Department for beneficiaries receiving those same medications through
    the TRICARE mail order program. We have explored the costs of this
    pilot, and an independent analysis comparing the costs for this retail
    pharmacy pilot to the costs for the same medications through mail order
    showed that total costs to the Department for this pilot exceed the
    costs for the same medications at mail order by 13.4 percent, or $132M,
    with only a 25 percent beneficiary participation rate. Based on the
    results of the cost analysis, the Department has decided not to proceed
    with this pilot. However, we recognize how critical optimization of the
    TRICARE pharmacy benefit is and we are exploring how to leverage
    commercial best practices that promote patient safety, maximize access
    to covered medications, and deliver high levels of beneficiary
    satisfaction. This work continues.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
            factoring program performance for budget prioritization
        13. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Austin, it's absolutely critical
    that DOD leverage best practices to achieve its modernization efforts
    efficiently and deliver high-quality systems to our warfighters on-
    time, on-budget and in alignment with the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy and the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I
    remain encouraged by the Army's Future Vertical Lift Family of Systems,
    an example of the Department of Defense's ability to leverage the
    streamlined middle tier of acquisitions pathway to quickly generate
    highly competitive options at relatively little risk to the government
    and the American taxpayer. As modernization efforts continue across the
    joint force, are DOD and the military services factoring program
    performance into decisions about how to prioritize budget requests to
    adequately resource successful programs, such as Future Vertical Lift,
    and sustain their momentum?
        Secretary Austin. The Department's annual Program Budget Review
    process evaluates programs on many factors, including current
    performance metrics such as cost, schedule, and technical maturity. In
    addition, every program is evaluated for support to the National
    Defense Strategy to ensure programs prioritized for funding are both
    cost effective and aligned to our strategic requirements.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                                      mq-9
        14. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, during the hearing, you
    mentioned that the Air Force is reducing the number of MQ-9 lines but
    not the number of tails. I'm curious why there is any reduction at all
    when the Air Force today still lacks the intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance capacity to meet Combatant Commanders' requirements
    contained in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Can you elaborate and
    provide specific information detailing the impact of reducing the
    number of lines on the number of MQ-9 aircraft the Air Force will
    operate?
        Secretary Austin. In fiscal year 2022, the Air Force requested a
    reduction in combat lines. This reduction is less than 10 percent of
    the current force presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to
    reduction in aircraft inventory. No tails will be divested and no
    squadrons will be reduced. We will continue to work with Combatant
    Commands to ensure daily intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
    and strike capability requirements are fulfilled. Concurrently, we
    intend to continue development of future ISR platforms that can
    penetrate inside contested environments, persist in these locations,
    and be able to connect and share data in the advanced battle management
    system.

        15. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, can you also please expand on
    what this reduction strategy is and whether there is soon to be a
    program of record to replace the MQ-9?
        Secretary Austin. Starting with the 2018 NDS, and continuing with
    the March 2021 interim NSS, Services are directed to prioritize
    investments in capabilities needed in a peer conflict. The MQ-9 has
    very limited capabilities in contested environments.
        In fiscal year 2022, the Air Force requested a reduction in combat
    lines. This reduction is less than 10 percent of the current force
    presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to reduction in aircraft
    inventory. No tails will be divested and no squadrons will be reduced.
        While the MQ-9 provides significant utility today, it was not
    designed for operation in a future highly-contested environment.
    Modifying the MQ-9 force presentation is about balancing near and long-
    term risk. Continued ISR modernization efforts seek to provide future
    warfighters the ability to access data and information at a moment's
    notice. Future systems must be able to penetrate inside contested
    environments, persist in these locations, and be able to connect and
    share data in the advanced battle management system.
        The Department can offer more details on replacement ISR programs
    in a classified setting.
                                 cybersecurity
        16. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, you have noted DOD's continued
    challenges to address competitive requirements for certain key skill
    areas, such as those in the cyber and science, technology, engineering,
    and mathematics fields. Could a civilian cyber reserve corps of
    cybersecurity professionals with prior government or military service
    be of value to the national security enterprise as a means of
    supplementing existing agency personnel with additional cyber capacity
    expertise?
        Secretary Austin. The Department's demand signal for more
    technically skilled personnel will continue to increase, and DOD will
    continue to compete for technical talent with the private sector. DOD
    excels at developing technically trained personnel and is able to
    retain those personnel in the Services' reserve components, which help
    the Department fulfill its cyber missions. To the extent that retired
    or separated personnel wish to serve in other civilian capacities,
    their cyber skills can certainly be applied to the Nation's broader
    cybersecurity challenges. A civilian cyber reserve corps would,
    however, support such missions under civil authorities.
        If called to support civil authorities in a major incident, a
    civilian cyber reserve corps could potentially relieve pressure on the
    Department from being asked to provide that civil support potentially
    at the expense of performing Title 10 mission. In such a scenario where
    a civilian reserve corps were available, the Department could remain
    focused on its core missions.
        Congress directed a study in Section 1730 of the fiscal year 2021
    NDAA to evaluate non-traditional cyber support to DOD, which is
    currently underway. The findings of that study will inform our
    understanding of alternative cyber support models.
                       continued support for the afghans
        17. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, what is the plan for an
    enduring counterterrorism strategy that will be able to address and
    counter the influence of violent extremist organizations, which
    directly supports the stability of the Afghan Government?
        Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
    Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows:
        Over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations are difficult but
    absolutely possible, and the intelligence that supports them comes from
    a variety of sources, not just U.S. boots on the ground. We recognize
    that transnational terrorists will migrate towards ungoverned spaces.
    We are also committed to not allowing Al-Qaeda to regenerate and be
    able to export terror from Afghanistan to the United States of America.
    We will do everything within our power to make sure that does not
    happen.

        18. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, will we establish or build up
    an existing presence elsewhere in the region to continue
    counterterrorism operations?
        Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
    Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: In
    terms of military tools, we have the ability to offer a range of
    options depending on the President's objectives.
        Additional details regarding discussions to enhance our regional
    presence were addressed during the closed session.

        19. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, what will U.S. assistance to
    Afghanistan look like after withdrawal?
        Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
    Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows:
        Our servicemembers and civilians face a new mission: helping Afghan
    evacuees move on to new lives in new places. I know that you share my
    profound gratitude and respect for their service, courage, and
    professionalism.

        20. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, looking ahead, have we
    established any agreements to fly United States air assets from
    neighboring countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan
    in order to provide the Afghans with air support?
        Secretary Austin. Additional information regarding regional basing
    agreements was addressed by Secretary Austin during the closed session
    of the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

        21. Senator Rosen. General Milley, how much military equipment will
    be turned over to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces?
        General Milley. The Department of Defense has identified over $300
    million in equipment and structures to be transferred to the Afghan
    Government via the Foreign Excess Property and Foreign Excess Real
    Property Programs. In addition, DOD has transferred a small amount of
    military equipment to the Afghan Government either as excess defense
    articles (EDA) or as sales from stock using the Afghanistan Security
    Forces Fund. This included 35 EDA MRAPs, 15 other EDA military
    vehicles, about $4 million of ammunition, several hundred small arms
    and small quantities of other items.

        22. Senator Rosen. General Milley, is there logistical support in
    place or plans to maintain that equipment, which is currently the
    responsibility of either Coalition Forces or contractors?
        General Milley. The new Defense Security Cooperation Management
    Office for Afghanistan (DSCMO-A), which replaced the Combined Security
    Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A), has been established to
    continue the management of security assistance to Afghanistan. This
    includes advice and direct assistance to ensure proper maintenance for
    all donated military equipment to Afghanistan's National Defense and
    Security Forces. (ANDSF).

                   north atlantic treaty organization forces
        23. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, is there a plan for North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to continue supporting
    Afghan Security Forces after the United States withdrawal? If so, what
    will that support look like in the fight to counter violent extremist
    organizations once we leave?
        Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
    Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: As I
    engage my counterparts, they are very willing to work with us. They
    have been very thankful that we helped them evacuate their people.

        24. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, given the upcoming withdrawal
    and pending any future deterioration in Afghanistan's security
    situation, what is the threshold for re-establishing a NATO presence or
    involvement with the Afghan Security Forces in Afghanistan, should it
    be necessary?
        Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
    Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: I do
    not think it is preordained that we are going to have to return to
    Afghanistan. We are committed to not allowing Al Qaeda to regenerate
    and be able to export terror from Afghanistan to the United States of
    America.

                             countering adversaries
        25. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, what have we seen regarding
    the status of women in territories where the Taliban has retained
    control or has already overthrown the Afghan Government?
        Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
    Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: I
    share the concerns of Members of this Committee regarding the status of
    women and girls in Afghanistan. We will have to work to use economic
    levers and also international pressure to hold the Taliban accountable.

        26. Senator Rosen. Secretary Austin, what can we expect of the
    progress that has been made over these past 20 years once we withdraw,
    and how can we mitigate this?
        Secretary Austin. During the 28 September 2021 Senate Armed
    Services Committee hearing, Secretary Austin testified as follows: We
    provided the Afghan military with equipment and aircraft and the skills
    to use them. Over the years, they often fought bravely. Tens of
    thousands of Afghan soldiers and police officers died. But in the end,
    we couldn't provide them with the will to win. As a veteran of that
    war, I am personally reckoning with all of that. But I hope that we do
    not allow a debate about how this war ended to cloud our pride in the
    way that our people fought it. They prevented another 9/11, they showed
    extraordinary courage and compassion in the war's last days, and they
    made lasting progress in Afghanistan that the Taliban will find
    difficult to reverse and that the international community should work
    hard to preserve.
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                              afghanistan savings
        27. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Austin, in your testimony you wrote:
    ``In Afghanistan, the Department is working to conduct a deliberate,
    orderly, and safe withdrawal, as directed by the President. This is an
    important step in responsibly ending this two-decade-long conflict, and
    it offers us an opportunity to redirect our resources toward strategic
    competition.'' General Kenneth McKenzie testified to the Committee that
    to accomplish the mission from over the horizon that: ``The ranges will
    be greater. The resources will be greater. The risks will all be
    greater . . . '' This week, Acting Air Force Secretary John Roth said
    the Air Force budgeted for $10 billion in unspecified U.S. Central
    Command needs to deal with post-withdrawal missions. Your testimony
    about redirecting resources, an implied savings, seems to directly
    contradict what the combatant commander believes and what the Air Force
    is being required to execute. Approximately how much do your budget
    experts believe will be saved due to the withdrawal from Afghanistan
    and over what timeframe?
        Secretary Austin. Please reference the table below from DOD
    Comptroller. When compared to the fiscal year 2021 enacted funding
    levels, the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2022 savings related to
    the Afghanistan withdrawal is approximately 8$9.4 billion comprised of
    $-4.0 billion in reduced Operation FREEDOM's SENTINEL direct war costs
    (mostly Afghanistan in-country costs) and from $-5.4 billion in reduced
    enduring requirements (mostly in-theater support costs) related to the
    withdrawal. The timeframe for the estimated savings is for fiscal year
    2022 only.
        The Department reinvested not only the Afghanistan withdrawal
    related savings of $9.4 billion, but the entire savings of $11.8
    billion, as noted below, in decreased direct war and enduring theater
    requirements towards weapon system modernization and readiness in the
    fiscal year 2022 President's Budget request.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year                Related to
                         Operation/Activity                           2021         2022        Delta     Afghanistan
                                                                    Enacted      Request                  Withdrawal
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS) Direct War Costs                 12.9          8.9         -4.0         -4.0
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) Direct War Costs                    7.0          5.4         -1.6
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Enduring Theater Requirements and Related Missions*                 29.5         24.1         -5.4         -5.4
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and Ukraine Security            4.5          3.7         -0.8
     Assistance Initiative
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      GRAND TOTAL                                                       53.9         42.1        -11.8         -9.4
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Related missions include OSS, CT Ops, OEF-HOA, etc.

        The Air Forces' fiscal year 2022 budget submission amount of $10.1
    billion includes Operation Inherent Resolve, $1.6 billion; European
    Deterrence Initiative, $0.7 billion; and Operation Freedom's Sentinel,
    $7.8 billion of which $0.7 billion is direct war requirements and $7.1
    billion is enduring requirements.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                        fort bragg military construction
        28. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin and General Milley, as you are
    aware, the Immediate Response Forces (IFR) is the Nation's rapid
    response force, which is comprised of paratroopers from one of the 82nd
    Airborne Division's brigade combat teams and should be able to rapidly
    deploy within 18 hours. For the first time since 1989, the response
    force received rapid deployment orders on New Year's Eve 2019,
    following the Iran-supported Hezbollah militia attacks on the American
    embassy in Iraq. However, as paratroopers prepared for the deployment,
    they spent most of the day traveling across Fort Bragg from location to
    location gathering equipment instead of spending their limited time on
    briefings or preparing for the mission. Compounding this issue is that
    conventional forces at Fort Bragg have only been supported with a
    single military construction (MILCON) project since 2010, compared to
    the numerous MILCON projects that have supported special operations
    units at the same base. It is irresponsible of Congress, and I would
    argue of the Department of Defense and Army, to require the IFR to
    perform its duties if we are not going to provide the necessary support
    facilities to ensure mission success and soldier safety. While it is
    currently not on the unfunded priority list, do I have your commitment
    that you will support our IFR warfighters by placing their request for
    a strategic deployment complex and a tactical equipment maintenance
    facility on this year's list of unfunded priorities?
        Secretary Austin. According to departmental analysis, the Strategic
    Deployment Complex and the Tactical Equipment Maintenance Facility
    projects supporting the Immediate Response Force lack sufficient design
    status to be placed on the fiscal year 2022 Unfunded Priority List
    (UPL). While they do not met the 35 percent-design threshold required
    to be considered for the fiscal year 2022 UPL list. These projects may
    meet the design threshold to compete in a later budget cycle, and will
    be considered for inclusion in a future funding request.
        General Milley. For President's Budget 2022, the Department will
    continue to evaluate the feasibility of the strategic deployment
    complex and tactical equipment maintenance facility moving forward,
    while the Army prioritized Soldier Barracks and Child Development
    Centers in their unfunded priority list.

        29. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin and General Milley, taking it
    a step further, if the IFR is essential to the Department's ability to
    rapidly support America's national security in emergent crises, why is
    it not part of the DOD's requested budget? If it is not essential, as
    it would appear based on the budget and unfunded priority list, why
    have it?
        Secretary Austin. The Immediate Response Force is an essential
    asset to the Department's ability to rapidly support America's national
    security in emergent crises. Army needs regularly exceed available
    resources. Based on departmental analysis, this project has not cleared
    the planning and design phase, it is not executable in fiscal year
    2022.
        General Milley. Forces within the Immediate Response Force (IRF)
    are manned, trained, and equipped to respond with short notice when
    called upon. Funding for the IRF is part of each Services' base budget
    request.
        The IRF is a key capability of the Department of Defense's Global
    Force Management (GFM) framework. The IRF, consisting of wide ranging
    abilities from every Service, provides ready forces for proactive and
    scalable Joint Force employment whenever called upon.

                               readiness and risk
        30. Senator Tillis. General Milley, in Defense News at the end of
    last month you stated that the fiscal year 2022 DOD Budget ``strikes an
    appropriate balance between preserving present readiness and future
    modernization.'' I would argue that today our DOD is unable to meet
    present readiness requirements whether it be with personnel, ground
    vehicles, aircraft, ships, and infrastructure. For example, the V-22
    Osprey, which has been in operational service since 2006 and is flown
    by three services, still fails to meet fleet-wide mission capable
    readiness rate set by the Defense Department. With that said, how do
    you envision we preserve current readiness, which we are not doing
    right now, with a budget that does not keep up with inflation and
    reduces spending on present readiness capabilities?
        General Milley. President's Budget 2022 invests $122.1 billion in
    Readiness, a $1.2 billion increase over fiscal year 2021. We are also
    looking at readiness differently than in past years. For example, the
    budget improves maintenance data analytics and parts availability,
    which will enable military and civilian maintainers to repair ships,
    aircraft, and brigades in shipyards, hangars, & depots with greater
    agility.
        Further, the SECDEF-directed 1-to-3 deploy-to-dwell ratio coupled
    with the Afghanistan retrograde allows for a flexible reallocation of
    the Joint Force and increases in our readiness posture.
        While specific challenges remain, tools such as the Directed
    Readiness process aid the Department in balancing near term readiness
    with the need to modernize the force.

        31. Senator Tillis. General Milley, in your testimony to the House
    Appropriations Committee, you noted that this budget is geared toward
    2030 or 2035. I'm concerned about the many years until we build the
    perfect military. What sort of risks are we taking in the near- to mid-
    term?
        General Milley. The fiscal year 2022 presidential budget strikes an
    appropriate balance between preserving present readiness and future
    modernization. It's a down payment on investments of the future, with a
    bias toward the future operating environment.
        Advanced technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence, 5G,
    Hypersonics, etc, will change the character of war. As such, the
    Department is investing $112 billion (more than any previous budget
    request) in Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation.
        President's Budget 2022 directs a $25.7 billion investment in 11
    key enabling technologies critical to building a more lethal force,
    that is capable of competing in a peer conflict. This is a $1.6 billion
    increase over fiscal year 2021 enacted levels.
        President's Budget 2022 increases funding in:

          Space (+$2.6 billion from fiscal year 2021)

          Long Range Fires (+$1.4 billion from fiscal year 2021)

          RDT&E (+$5.6 billion from fiscal year 2021)

          Nuclear Enterprises / NC3 (+$2.6 billion from fiscal year
    2021)

          Cyber (+$0.4 billion from fiscal year 2021)

          Readiness (+$1.2 billion from fiscal year 2021)

        32. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin and General Milley, this
    budget takes risk in the near term with the promise of a better future
    force. The history of military conflict tells us that states will often
    undertake military aggression when they view their relative advantage
    as maximized. Do you worry that this investment strategy plays into
    that dynamic?
        Secretary Austin. The Department is continually preparing the Joint
    Force for an immediate contingency, a potential near- to mid-term
    conflict, largely using today's extant force, and for a future
    conflict, where today's emerging technology will be critical. The
    President's Fiscal Year 2022 Budget strikes an appropriate balance of
    readiness, force structure, and modernization investments across these
    timeframes, in order to dissuade any potential adversaries from
    opportunism in the near, medium, and long-term.
        With respect to a future conflict, the President's Fiscal Year 2022
    Budget emphasizes longer-term modernization, including by investing in
    the Defense Industrial Base. The Department is also focused on making
    it easier for industry to work with the Department, increasing DOD's
    access to commercial innovation and creating opportunities for job
    growth in fields such as advanced manufacturing. This approach will
    help ensure the U.S. Joint Force maintains a competitive edge in key
    domains and warfighting functions, such as in space, 6th generation air
    power, cyber, undersea warfare, and long-range fires.
        General Milley. As the key tasks of the Joint Force are 1) to fight
    and win, and 2) to be prepared to fight and win, we are focusing our
    efforts to adapt to the changing character of warfare. Modernization
    and readiness prioritization, as reflected in this budget submission,
    support the Joint Force's ability to adapt to this evolving
    environment.

                      biological threat reduction program
        33. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin, the Biological Threat
    Reduction Program finds and fights emerging global diseases that can
    threaten U.S. troops and, ultimately, the world's population. In fact,
    the Pentagon program funded a lab in Thailand that detected in January
    2020 the first case of novel coronavirus outside China. Your budget
    wants the program's fiscal 2022 budget to be set at $124 million--or 45
    percent lower than the current level, according to the your budget
    justification documents. I am baffled and extremely concerned with this
    as the world begins to emerge from the COVID-19 Pandemic. If anything,
    you as a Department, and we as a country should be fully invested in
    this program to facilitate the detection, minimize the spread, and
    quickly respond to future pathogens. Based on the 600,000 American
    COVID-19 deaths, how can the DOD justify cutting the funding for this
    program in half?
        Secretary Austin. Countering biological threats, whether from
    biological weapons or a naturally-occurring pathogen of security
    concern, is an important mission. The DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction
    (CTR) program continues to deliver impressive results through
    investment in foreign partner capabilities to prevent, detect, and
    report biological threat events. It is one, but not the only, program
    that the Department uses to address to biological threats. Moreover,
    DOD is not the U.S. Government's only Department or Agency with this
    mission.
        The DOD countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) enterprise
    requires balanced investment across the WMD threat spectrum. For fiscal
    year 2022, the Department requested $239.8 million for the DOD CTR
    program, which includes $124 million for biological threat reduction
    activities. This funding level is similar to program's fiscal year 2021
    request, and aligns with validated, prioritized requirements. DOD
    decisions on DOD CTR program investments are based on several factors
    including, but not limited to, presence of a WMD threat as well as
    partner nation will and ability to sustain DOD-provided capabilities.
    To maximize threat reduction outcomes, DOD also partners with
    multilateral bodies and allied nations conducting similar work.

        34. Senator Tillis. Secretary Austin, is this a good example of
    where we're making bad choices simply because DOD's topline is
    artificially low?
        Secretary Austin. No. The DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
    Program has been and continues to be aligned to achieve the program's
    mission: reduce WMD threats to U.S. interests. The DOD CTR Program is
    one part of a broader, coordinated, whole-of-government and
    international effort to reduce these threats and improve global health
    security, with a specific DOD-focus on protecting the Joint Force and
    reducing risks to the homeland and our partner nations. The fiscal year
    2022 budget request represents the amount the DOD CTR Program can
    effectively spend to fulfill its targeted mission with partner
    countries willing and able to sustain these investments and
    capabilities and deliver high-priority threat reduction return on
    investments.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                 ted stevens center for arctic security studies
        35. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, you approved the
    establishment of the sixth DOD Regional Center, the Ted Stevens Center
    for Arctic Security Studies, on June 3, 2021 to bring increased focus
    and cooperation on topics pertinent to the unique challenges and
    security concerns related to the Arctic region. As of June 10, 2021,
    DOD is able to begin actions to stand up the center. You delegated
    final site selection authority to Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy, Dr. Colin Kahl. It is my understanding that Dr. Kahl is
    considering sites in Alaska, Colorado, and the National Capital Region.
    The DOD Plan to Establish a Regional Center for Security Studies for
    the Artic--Report to Congress for fiscal year 2021, lists three
    criteria for site selection: proximity of a location to other academic
    institutions that study security implications with respect to the
    Arctic region; the proximity of a location to the designated lead for
    Arctic affairs of the U.S. Northern Command; and the proximity of a
    location to a central hub of assigned Arctic-focused Armed Forces so as
    to suitable advance relevant professional development skills unique to
    the Arctic region. Alaska is the only location that satisfies these
    criteria. Will you commit to having Dr. Kahl update my office on site
    selection progress, including how each of these criteria are weighted?
        Secretary Austin. Yes, I will commit the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy to provide updates to your office as the Department works
    through defining the site selection process it will use, including the
    criteria identified in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    for fiscal year 2021 and the operational, logistical, and
    participation-related factors identified by the DOD.

        36. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Austin, once a final decision is
    made on the location of the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security
    Studies, will you commit to having Dr. Kahl provide my office a brief
    on what locations were considered, how they scored on their respective
    evaluations, and what the execution timeline is?
        Secretary Austin. On 17 November 2021, the Department announced
    that it had identified Anchorage, Alaska as the sole candidate city to
    host the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, the Department
    of Defense Regional Center for the Arctic. The Department will continue
    to work through the Department of the Air Force Strategic Basing
    process to evaluate facilities within Anchorage to finalize the site
    selection. Once a final decision is made, I will commit to having the
    Department brief your office on the locations that were considered and
    the anticipated execution timeline.

                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
                    presentation of defense budget materials
        37. Senator Cramer. Secretary Austin, the Fiscal Year 2021 National
    Defense Authorization Act Senate Report (S. Rpt. 116-236) included
    language that said ``The Committee additionally directs that the
    amounts and shares for each military service or department reported
    pursuant to this direction shall not include amounts that are not
    directly related to the budgets of each service or department, such as
    funding that is subsequently redirected to general defense-wide needs
    or for other national security purposes.'' But this year's Office of
    the Secretary of Defense's Roll Out Brief did not differentiate the
    amount of topline budget a service received versus what they could
    control. Why wasn't this Senate report language executed?
        Secretary Austin. There are classified reasons why the budget
    presentation exists in its current form. The Comptroller takes care to
    avoid inadvertently exposing classified information to the public and
    continues to provide the annual classified budget extract report along
    with the President's Budget submission to the Committees in order to
    present a complete, classified picture to Congress. The Department was
    unable to provide the display requested by the Congress for the fiscal
    year 2022 Budget Request without adversely affecting
    counterintelligence, but is considering several options to do so in the
    future.

        38. Senator Cramer. Secretary McCord, broken out by service, how
    much ``pass-through'' money was put under each service's topline
    budget?
        Secretary McCord. The amounts of ``pass-though'' money for each
    Service are classified and were provided in the annual classified
    budget extract report that accompanied the Fiscal Year 2022 President's
    Budget submission to the committees. A similar classified budget
    extract report will be provided for the Fiscal Year 2023 President's
    Budget submission. I understand that the classification issues involved
    here can hinder a full understanding of the defense budget structure by
    the public.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                         the threat of a fait accompli
        39. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the Defense Science Board
    assessed the following in June 2018: ``Russia and China have each
    developed theories of victory that differ in important respects, but
    that have in common this idea of exploiting asymmetries in space and
    time and asymmetries in stakes. In particular, once it is clear that
    armed conflict is inevitable, they will attempt to achieve a decisive
    outcome very quickly, presenting the U.S. and its allies with a fait
    accompli. They will then seek to demonstrate that the U.S. and its
    allies will incur significant costs in seeking to reverse that
    outcome.'' Do you agree with the Defense Science Board's assessment?
        General Milley. Yes. Asymmetry in space and time just means that
    adversaries are very close to the fight and can get there fast. During
    a crisis and as conflict begins, adversaries will work tirelessly in
    the information environment, communicating to the international
    community, to their own people, and to our citizens in an attempt to
    convince the world that their military coercion is just and reasonable,
    and that the outcome matters more to them than it does to us. This
    narrative will be coupled with operational concepts explicitly designed
    to make it difficult and costly for our military to move into the
    region. Adversaries' theories of victory explicitly attempt to win
    without fighting. This combat without (direct) conflict aims to cripple
    the Joint Force before it ever leaves the homeland. If they are
    unsuccessful in that effort, they plan to contest our global logistical
    enterprise so that our units are degraded by the time they reach the
    battlefield. Finally, they will demonstrate that the stakes in such a
    conflict are considerably higher with nuclear posturing and potentially
    threatening nuclear escalation if the conflict does not go their way.

        40. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the National Defense Strategy
    Commission found in November 2018 that ``successfully competing in
    Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, while also managing escalation
    dynamics, requires positioning substantial capability forward . . . to
    deter and prevent a fait accompli by an agile, opportunistic
    adversary.'' Do you agree with this finding by the National Defense
    Strategy Commission?
        General Milley. Yes. Fait accompli attacks typically occur
    relatively close to an adversaries' homeland. This may require the
    Joint Force to rapidly project power far from the U.S. Homeland to
    counter them. However, we have to offset adversary positional advantage
    with a variety of forward forces that are credible, lethal, and can
    maneuver decisively to prevent a fait accompli in the manner of our
    choosing.
        The Joint Force, along with its Allies and Partners, can deter and
    prevail against an attempted fait accompli with forward postured
    forces, as well as through rotational and periodic deployments of units
    with unique capabilities across all domains. The Joint Force's Dynamic
    Force Employment attempts to anticipate adversary actions and support
    U.S. interests with agility akin to or greater than that of our
    adversaries. The Joint Force supports Allied and Partner resistance to
    adversary coercion/aggression and prevents fait accomplish by
    supplementing them with complementary U.S. capabilities and working
    together toward high levels of interoperability--in planning and
    operations. The Department supports these actions through security
    cooperation initiatives including foreign military sales, bilateral and
    multilateral exercises, and joint/combined training.
        I would add that our definition of what is `forward' should expand
    as well, occurring not just in the land sea, and air domains, but also
    engaging in space and cyberspace, and through the electromagnetic
    spectrum. Our effective forward presence, exercises, and operations,
    backed by additional combat credible forces at home and superior power
    projection capacity enables the Joint Force to militarily compete and
    prevent successful fait accompli attacks in support of national
    interests.

        41. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the National Defense Strategy
    Commission also found that ``the United States must develop new
    operational concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by
    addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to achieve a fait accompli
    against states on their periphery.'' Do you agree with this finding by
    the National Defense Strategy Commission?
        General Milley. Yes. Adversaries are working hard to modernize
    their forces in ways that they believe can to deter the United States
    from intervening and if necessary, defeat the U.S. military so they can
    achieve their regional goals. New joint operational concepts are
    designed to work across competition and war--a distinction our
    adversaries do not recognize. New operational concepts will improve our
    ability to convince adversaries that military coercion short of war
    will not have the desired effect, while also ensuring that we have the
    military advantages needed to defeat adversary aggression when it
    occurs. Just as important, new operational concepts will support
    broader national efforts to convince adversaries that they cannot
    succeed. But the Joint Force cannot do this alone. We need to better
    synchronize the Joint Force with other USG departments and agencies to
    leverage all the instruments of national power against our adversaries'
    fait accompli strategies.

        42. Senator Hawley. General Milley, you wrote the foreword for the
    December 2018 Army publication titled, ``The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
    Operations 2028.'' This publication states that ``Army forces must
    demonstrate four capabilities in competition to deter the adversary,''
    the first of which is the ``[a]bility to immediately deny a fait
    accompli attack.'' Do you agree with the assessment in this document
    that Army forces must be able to ``immediately deny a fait accompli''
    in order to demonstrate a credible deterrent?
        General Milley. Yes. Denying the adversary operational success on
    short timelines can be a critical component in a campaign to defeat a
    fait accompli attack. Joint warfare is team warfare and each of the
    Services--to include the Army--have important roles to play in the
    mission to deter and defeat a fait accompli attack. Credible deterrence
    happens when we have a military that, every day, convinces the
    adversary that it can disrupt the success of any initial attack, while
    preventing the adversary from consolidating its advances and
    establishing an effective defense.

        43. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the Department of Defense's
    2019 ``Indo-Pacific Strategy Report'' stated, ``If our competitors
    decide to advance their interests through force, they are likely to
    enjoy a local military advantage at the onset of conflict. In a fait
    accompli scenario, competitors would seek to employ their capabilities
    quickly to achieve limited objectives and forestall a response from the
    United States, and its allies and partners. DOD initiatives on force
    employment, crisis response, force and concept development, and
    collaboration with allies and partners are aimed to help address this
    critical challenge.'' Do you agree with the Department's assessment in
    the ``Indo-Pacific Strategy Report'' that a ``fait accompli scenario''
    is a ``critical challenge''?
        General Milley. Yes. The U.S. military underwrites the global
    commitments our Nation has made to both defending allies and partners
    under threat from adversary coercion, but also the rules-based
    international order that that reflects our interests and values
    globally. As the PRC adapts its forces in a bid to more effectively
    coerce its neighbors and deter the U.S. from engaging in the region,
    the Joint Force also needs to adapt its combat capabilities. This
    includes improvements in how we operate closely and in concert with
    Allies and partners to ensure that the PRC cannot quickly, cheaply, or
    easily advance their aims through military force.

        44. Senator Hawley. General Milley, the Tri-Service Maritime
    Strategy released by the United States Navy, United States Marine
    Corps, and United States Coast Guard in December 2020 stated, ``In the
    event of conflict, China and Russia will likely attempt to seize
    territory before the United States and its allies can mount an
    effective response--leading to a fait accompli. Each supports this
    approach through investments in counter-intervention networks. Each
    seeks to shift the burden of escalation by reinforcing annexed
    territory with long-range precision-strike weapons and make a military
    response to an invasion seem disproportionately costly.'' Do you agree
    with this assessment by Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard leadership?
        General Milley. Yes. Adversaries have invested heavily in counter-
    intervention networks--sometimes referred to as ``anti-access, area
    denial'' capabilities. Basically, this means that adversaries are
    applying new long range precision weapons and other advanced
    capabilities to widen their defensive perimeter such that it holds the
    Joint Force at bay and allows their own operations to proceed without
    effective interference. They intend that their counter-intervention
    networks are so dense and comprehensive that the U.S. will be forced
    with a difficult choice about whether to commit the U.S. military in a
    presumably costly campaign to roll the adversary back.

        45. Senator Hawley. General Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army
    General James McConville released Chief of Staff Paper #1, ``Army
    Multi-Domain Transformation,'' in March 2021. In this document, he
    states, ``Our adversaries will attempt to achieve their strategic goals
    without fighting, or to seize their objectives quickly as a fait
    accompli.'' Do you agree with General McConville's assessment?
        General Milley. Yes. Adversaries would prefer that they achieve
    their objectives--and that the United States loses--without having to
    fight at all. For this reason, adversaries work tirelessly to develop
    advantages early. They take coercive actions against neighbors that
    they believe are effective but still remain below thresholds that might
    trigger a U.S. military response. Failing that, adversaries aim to move
    quickly and decisively to avoid a longer and potentially riskier
    conflict and convince the U.S. that attempting to reverse their
    military seizure would be costlier than our Nation is willing to bear.

                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
                                 nuclear policy
        46. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, there are reports that
    the Acting Secretary of the Navy would cancel a new Nuclear Sea
    Launched Cruise Missile after submission of the fiscal year 2022
    budget, and before a Nuclear Posture Review. Will you commit to
    postponing that decision until after the findings of the Nuclear
    Posture Review have been delivered to this body?
        Secretary Austin. The sea-launched cruise missile--nuclear (SLCM-N)
    program will be examined during the upcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR). As you know, the fiscal year 2022 budget request included
    a small amount of funding to evaluate the next steps for a potential
    nuclear sea-launched cruise missile program as proposed by the 2018
    Nuclear Posture Review. The upcoming review of U.S. nuclear posture and
    policy will re-examine if a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile is
    necessary for our national defense strategy.

                                  afghanistan
        47. Senator Tuberville. General Milley, after 20 years we are
    leaving Afghanistan and with it, one of the world's largest airbases,
    Bagram Airfield. Is there any United States military aircraft that
    Bagram Airfield cannot accommodate?
        General Milley. At the height of our military operations in
    Afghanistan, Bagram Airfield could accommodate the largest aircraft in
    the United States inventory. As we prepare the airfield for the
    departure of U.S. Forces and the handover to the ANDSF, we have ceased
    the manning and contracts for the radar approach system and air traffic
    control. In addition, we can no longer ensure the upkeep of instrument
    approach systems. Collectively, these changes will limit the airfield
    to Visual Flight Rules (VFR), causing our aircraft to operate in `fair
    weather' conditions only.

        48. Senator Tuberville. General Milley, would you agree that an air
    base within 500 miles of both the Iranian and Chinese borders could be
    strategically invaluable?
        General Milley. An airbase located within 500 miles of both the
    Iranian and Chinese borders could provide strategic advantage. However,
    that advantage is only relevant within the overall framework of US
    policy and strategy. Our ability to militarily support US national
    security policy priorities will not be significantly curtailed by the
    absence of such an air base.

        49. Senator Tuberville. General Milley, what is the feasibility of
    retaining Bagram Airfield as a United States base?
        General Milley. President Biden has directed the withdrawal of
    United States Forces from Afghanistan by September 11. The withdrawal
    will include the transfer of Bagram Airfield to Afghan National Defense
    and Security Forces.

                                   extremism
        50. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, during the hearing, one
    of my colleagues claimed that 1 percent of those in the military are
    likely white supremacists. That would suggest that 35,000 members of
    the military might be white supremacists. Do you think this is
    accurate? Explain your answer.
        Secretary Austin. I believe that the vast majority of
    servicemembers, civilians, and contractors in DOD honor their oath to
    support and defend the U.S. Constitution, and these individuals perform
    their duties with integrity. However, as we have seen, the actions of a
    few can have an outsized impact--which is why the Department of Defense
    prohibits extremist activity such as the use of unlawful force or
    violence to achieve goals that are discriminating in nature.

        51. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Austin, do you believe that
    accusations like the one above hinders the enlistment of minorities or
    white members? Explain your answer.
        Secretary Austin. As stated previously, I believe the vast majority
    of servicemembers, civilians, and contractors in DOD honor their oath
    to support and defend the U.S. Constitution, and perform their duties
    with integrity.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL EAR 2022 AND THE
                          FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  ARMY POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Rosen, Kelly,
    Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan,
    Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. The Committee meets today to receive
    testimony on the President's Defense Budget Request for the
    Army for fiscal year 2022. Our witnesses this morning are
    Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, and General James
    McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army. Thank you both for your
    service and willingness to appear before us today. I would
    also, on behalf of myself and my colleague, the Ranking Member,
    wish the Army a happy birthday. It turned 246 years old
    yesterday, and we were in it long before its 246th anniversary,
    so happy birthday.
        President Biden's Defense Budget Request for fiscal year
    2022 includes approximately $172.7 billion in funding for the
    Army, a reduction of $3.6 billion from the fiscal year 2021
    enacted budget. The Army's request focuses on taking care of
    its people, maintaining and enhancing military readiness, and
    innovating and modernizing, but it does so in the face of these
    significant reductions. Budget briefings indicate that the Army
    budget decreased while the budgets of the Air Force and Navy
    increased, primarily because of the focus on China as our
    pacing threat, and the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.
    The Army has thus prepared a tightly crafted budget that
    prioritizes modernization efforts over procurement and military
    construction. With that in mind, I am interested in hearing
    about the Army's view of the mission globally, especially in
    the INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] theater, now
    and in the future. Further, we would like to understand the
    risk the Army is assuming with current funding projections.
        The Army's most valuable asset has always been its people.
    This budget request would increase funding for military
    personnel by $1.2 billion and support a total force of just
    over one million soldiers. It also includes adjustments for
    retirement compensation reform, recruiting and retention
    incentives, and an across-the-board pay raise for military and
    civilian personnel of 2.7 percent, an important message to the
    workforce that begins to reverse years of pay freezes and
    benefit cuts on our civilian personnel.
        The Army must continue to improve its readiness in the
    context of long-term strategic competition. The Army's ongoing
    focus on large training exercises, including the Defender
    series in Europe and the Pacific, and its leadership in the
    Project Convergence series, demonstrate progress in the right
    direction. These large-scale events not only test system
    capabilities and exercise critical skill sets to include
    mobilization and deployment of the force, they also facilitate
    joint and coalition training, reflecting how we would fight in
    future operations. The Army has also introduced the Regionally
    Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model, or ReARMM, to
    synchronize all Army components across regions and provide
    predictability to the formations within the service: regular
    Army, National Guard, and Army Reserves. This effort has great
    promise, and I would ask our witnesses to elaborate on how the
    budget request supports ReARMM and the Army's other important
    readiness exercises and efforts.
        The Army's budget request includes an overall decrease in
    research, development, testing, and evaluation, RDT&E, but
    makes important increases in several cutting-edge technology
    areas. To remain competitive with China and Russia, it is
    critical that we continue to invest in these emerging
    technologies which will define future battlefields across all
    domains. The Army specifically has been pursuing modernization
    in the areas of long-range precision fires, air and missile
    defense, soldier lethality, next-generation combat vehicles,
    future vertical lift, and the communications network. These are
    ambitious and far-sighted objectives, but we must acknowledge
    that the Army has historically struggled to effectively
    modernize.
        The establishment of Army Futures Command, and the
    associated reorganization of related commands, injected
    tremendous energy into modernization efforts, and Congress has
    provided the Army with wide latitude to make programmatic and
    structural changes. Secretary Wormuth, General McConville, I
    would ask that you update the Committee on the Army's
    modernization and RDT&E efforts and what resources are needed
    to effectively continue them.
        Finally, as I said at the opening, the Army is
    fundamentally about people. In previous hearings before this
    Committee, you have both committed to the Army being a ``People
    First'' organization, not just for soldiers, but their
    families, Army civilians, and veterans. For too long, issues
    such as racism, extremism, sexual harassment, and sexual
    assault have, in too many instances, gone unchecked. As we
    progress through this legislative year, the Committee will
    tackle many important policy issues, including how we prevent
    and prosecute sexual assault and harassment in the ranks. More
    than anything, cultural change within the force is critical to
    reducing the number of sexual assaults and related offenses.
    The President directed a review earlier this year, and I know
    the Department and the Army have been hard at work. I plan to
    incorporate the administration's recommendations into the mark
    and look forward to debate and votes on the issue.
        Again, I thank the witnesses for their participation today,
    and I look forward to their testimonies.
        Now let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator
    Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Ms.
    Wormuth and General McConville, thank you for being here today
    and for all the great contributions you have made for our
    safety in this country. I also want to recognize the 246th
    birthday. I will not tell you what the first birthday in the
    United States Army was that I celebrated. Well, yes, I will. It
    was the 172nd. I imagine it would have been a happier birthday
    had the Army fared better in the President's Fiscal Year 2022
    Budget Request.
        As I have often said, the world is the most dangerous place
    that I have experienced certainly in my lifetime, and we face a
    wide range of adversaries, the most dangerous of which are an
    increasingly aggressive China and belligerent Russia. At the
    same time, we must contend with rogue nations like Iran and
    North Korea, as well as violent extremist organizations.
        Our strategic competitors have gone to school on the
    American way of war, and they are rapidly modernizing their
    militaries to exploit our vulnerabilities. China and Russia
    combined are spending more to modernize their militaries than
    we are. This is something that we have not been able to say
    before.
        This request is a cut to defense, and the Army is bearing
    the brunt of it. This seems to always be the case every time an
    administration tries to cut defense, and yet, every time we cut
    the Army, we end up reversing those cuts soon after. It is a
    shortsighted approach that fails to recognize the strategic
    value the Army provides.
        With this budget, the Army's top line decreases by $4
    billion from the previous year, putting at risk the gains in
    readiness made after we hit rock bottom in 2017.
        Procurement funding decreases $4.2 billion, a debilitating
    11 percent cut, and military construction is cut by 15 percent.
    As we watch our strategic competitors make unprecedented
    investments in modernization, cuts like this just do not make
    sense.
        So I look forward to understanding from our witnesses the
    impact of these cuts on the readiness and modernization of the
    Army, and how it could risk the Army's ability to accomplish
    assigned tasks from the National Defense Strategy. Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Senator Inhofe,
    and let me now recognize the Secretary of the Army, Secretary
    Wormuth. Madam?

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, SECRETARY OF
                                THE ARMY

        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
    for your continued support for our Army and our people. It is a
    distinct privilege to appear before you today. I would like to
    take a moment to thank General McConville for his lifetime of
    service to the Army and to our Nation. He is a great partner
    and we are off to a running start.
        I am honored to be serving as Secretary of the Army and to
    be working with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks
    once again. I thank them for their continued leadership.
        As I have stepped into the role, all of 3 weeks, I am
    impressed but not surprised to see the state of the Army and
    the professionalism, hard work, and continued sacrifice of our
    soldiers and leaders that make up the world's greatest land
    fighting force. I would like to highlight a few key
    observations on the state of our Army as I see them today.
        First, the Army must continue to heavily invest in the
    development of its people. People are the strength of our Army.
    We are steadily working to enhance our force structure, build
    inclusive leadership, and invest in quality-of-life
    initiatives. Like my predecessors, I can assure you that the
    character, culture, and climate within our formations, at every
    installation, will reflect a continued focus on placing people
    first. The harmful behaviors of sexual assault and harassment,
    racism, and extremism cannot and will not be tolerated.
        We will purposefully work to stem the tide of suicides. Our
    responsibility is to ensure every soldier and civilian has the
    right leadership policies and resources to be safe and
    successful among their teams so that they can continue to be
    successful in our Nation's defense.
        Second, the Army is now a leader in new technology. From
    our Army Futures Command to the cross-functional teams to the
    Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office on down to
    fielding the next-generation soldier equipment for individual
    unit members, the Army is prototyping and experimenting with
    new capabilities and concepts. The Army is at the forefront of
    developing and fielding new technology in counter-UAS, directed
    energy, hypersonic weapons, next-generation assured positioning
    navigation and timing devices, pushing software coding to the
    edge, and in many other areas.
        Third, the Army is opening doors in the Indo-Pacific,
    Europe, and beyond. The Army can be relied upon to engage with
    our allies, foster partnerships, maintain deterrence, and set
    conditions for success prior to, or while engaging in conflict.
    Deterrence requires boots on the ground, and the DOD
    [Department of Defense] must be present to succeed in crises.
    The Army is recognized around the world as an enduring,
    reliable partner that can directly contribute by bringing
    resources, training, and expertise. Our partnerships can lay
    the groundwork for access and cooperation in contingencies.
        Fourth, the next fight will be an all-domain conflict.
    Future conflict will be in and across all domains with ground
    forces to secure terrain, penetrate defenses, and achieve
    objectives. The Army's transformation is directly aimed at
    supporting joint warfighting that will depend on joint all-
    domain command control, expeditionary joint logistics, and
    joint maneuver across domains. As the Army continues to
    modernize, we will maintain our overmatch against near-peer
    adversaries, helping make future conflict less likely by
    ensuring the costs to our adversaries outweigh the benefits.
        Finally, the Army's readiness gains in modernization
    procurement requirements must be prioritized to continue. The
    Army recognized years ago the need to modernize concepts and
    capabilities to sharpen our global competitive edge. Working in
    close coordination with you and Congress, we established a
    deliberate, achievable path to deliver a ready, modernized
    Army. Significant progress has been made, but success can only
    be assured through future and continued transformation. The
    Army has already made, and will continue to make tough
    decisions to ensure the best use of the resources we have to
    adapt to and to stay ahead of the capabilities of our
    adversaries, whether they are near-peer nations or newly
    emerging threats. The Army will also compete successfully below
    the threshold of conflict.
        The President's Budget will help us to care for our people,
    maintain and enhance military readiness, and innovate and
    modernize. With your continued support we will pivot to next-
    generation capabilities to assure we can win now and in the
    future.
        From what I have seen our Army is in great shape, but we
    have important work ahead. I want to use this window of
    opportunity to make certain that the Army will continue to
    provide modernized and ready forces capable of responding
    globally. I join General McConville in striving to ensure we
    provide the Army with the resources it needs to succeed. I know
    General McConville is eager to share his thoughts with you as
    well, and I look forward to your questions and our continued
    partnership. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary. General
    McConville, please.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES P. McCONVILLE, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF
                              OF THE ARMY

        General McConville. Well, I would like to thank the
    Secretary for leading our Army during this critical time.
    Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of
    the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today
    and for your continued support to the Army and our people, our
    soldiers, our families, our civilians, and our Soldiers for
    Life, our retirees, and veterans.
        The Army currently has 485,000 Active Duty soldiers and a
    little more than 1 million in the total force. That is roughly
    the same size Army that we had on 9/11. Army soldiers are
    presently supporting combatant commanders around the world in
    more than 140 countries. They form the most lethal and decisive
    land force in the world, and they stand ready to fight and win
    the Nation's wars as part of the Joint Force. I could not be
    more proud of each and every one of them.
        Since last October, the Army's priorities have been people,
    readiness, and modernization, making us well aligned with the
    emerging national security guidance. Putting people first means
    recruiting and retaining the best talent our Nation has to
    offer, maximizing their potential, and taking care of them. We
    are building a culture of cohesive teams that are highly
    trained, disciplined, and fit, where everyone is treated with
    dignity and respect. That is who we prevent the harmful
    behaviors that hurt our soldiers and break trust with the
    American people, these being sexual assault and harassment,
    acts of racism and extremism, and death by suicide.
        All three of my children, two sons and a daughter, plus my
    son-in-law, are currently serving in the Army.
        Providing a safe and secure environment for our soldiers is
    not only my responsibility as the Chief of Staff of the Army,
    it is also a deeply held personal commitment. We win through
    our people, the best fighting forces in the world, to ensure
    that soldiers and their units are masters of their craft. This
    is why we are shifting to a foundational readiness model that
    prioritizes training at the company level and below first. The
    Army has rebuilt a high level of readiness with the support of
    Congress, but that readiness level is fragile. We must sustain
    that high level of readiness while continuing our most
    comprehensive transformation and modernization efforts in over
    40 years. That is the only way we will maintain our overmatch
    against near-peer competitors and would-be adversaries.
        This year we are turning our multi-domain operations
    concepts into real doctrine. We are not only developing but we
    are delivering our six modernization priorities, including our
    31+4 signature systems. With new doctrine, organizations, and
    equipment, the Army is offering multiple options to our
    combatant commanders and multiple dilemmas to our competitors
    and adversaries. We are doing so alongside our sister services
    and alongside our allies and partners. The U.S. Army never
    fights alone. We are the strongest land force in the world, and
    a great source of that strength comes from our allies and
    partners. As a people-based organization, we are uniquely
    qualified to foster these relationships.
        Thank you for your continued support to America's sons and
    daughters in uniform. I look forward to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth and
    General McConville follows:]

      Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Christine E. Wormuth and
                          General James P. McConville
                               evolved priorities
        America's Army remains prepared to compete globally and fight and
    win the Nation's wars as a member of the Joint Force. As demonstrated
    repeatedly over the past year, we also remain the Nation's principal
    response force to protect our country and communities in the face of
    unexpected crises. We thank Congress for the consistent, predictable,
    and sustained funding you have provided. This funding enabled us to
    deliver a ready Army that responded promptly and superbly to a dynamic
    and unpredictable security environment, like the COVID-19 pandemic,
    Middle East tensions, civil unrest, cyberattacks, and south-west border
    mission. Our priorities are well aligned with the Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance: investing in people, sustaining readiness,
    divesting of legacy systems to reinvest in cutting edge technologies
    and capabilities, mitigating the impact of climate change, and
    strengthening our alliances and partnerships.
        Last October, the Army evolved its priorities to people, readiness,
    and modernization. This evolution reflects the achievements of a multi-
    year effort to rebuild readiness and accelerate modernization. Six
    years ago, we recognized that readiness had declined precipitously
    after years of reduced funding, uncertain budgets, and deferred
    modernization. We also recognized the need for new concepts,
    capabilities, and posture to compete aggressively in the Indo-Pacific
    and Europe. With your support, we rebuilt tactical readiness in our
    units and built strategic readiness in our power projection
    infrastructure. We deliberately executed internal reforms over the last
    four years by realigning over $35 billion within the Army budget to
    self-fund modernization priorities in support of joint all-domain
    operations.
        Thanks to your continued support for Army modernization, we are
    successfully pivoting from the incremental improvements of the past to
    fulfilling the robust Army Modernization Strategy that Congress
    prescribed in the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act. Because of
    this strategy, and new Congressional authorities to streamline the
    acquisitions process, we are already beginning to field new systems in
    long-range precision fires, air and missile defense, and soldier
    lethality, with more on the way in next generation combat vehicles,
    future vertical lift, and the Army network. With these modernization
    capabilities, we are able to deliver multi-domain concepts,
        capabilities, and formations that will give the Joint Force
    asymmetric, all-domain advantages against near-peer potential
    adversaries. Our gains are real, but fragile. With Congressional
    support, we established a deliberate achievable path to deliver a ready
    and modernized Army by 2028 and a transformed multi-domain Army by
    2035. However, sustaining today's readiness and modernizing for
    tomorrow's readiness is only possible through your timely, adequate,
    predictable, and sustained funding.
                             strategic environment
        A dynamic global security landscape continues to challenge our
    Nation. These challenges include: (1) borderless threats, like COVID,
    cyber, violent extremism, and climate change; (2) the global siege on
    democracy to include an increasingly contested information environment;
    and (3) the changing distribution of global power that draws new lines
    and value propositions for many of our allies and partners. These
    challenges require an agile, ready, modern, and multi-domain Army that
    works alongside strong allies and partners. Strategic competitors and
    regional actors are testing American norms, institutions, and
    alliances. China, our pacing threat, increases its global
    assertiveness, while Russia increases its disruptive behavior. Threats
    from Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism and terrorism remain.
    While America's Army maintains a tenuous overmatch, it is fleeting.
    Future conflicts will manifest at longer range, across all domains, and
    at much greater speed, both physically and cognitively.
        Climate change is altering the Army's operational environment and
    adding new mission demands; mitigating these effects has been an
    ongoing priority for the Army for several years. Climate change impacts
    Army installations globally and opens the Arctic as a new geographic
    theater for competition. The Army must consider alternative energy
    sources, improved energy storage, fuel-efficient design, more robust
    power distribution, and new technologies, such as weather pattern and
    terrain stability modeling to better inform operations.
        The Army must also contend with threats from within. The harmful
    behaviors of sexual assault, sexual harassment, racism, and extremism
    hurt Soldiers and break trust with the American people. The Army is
    working diligently to solidify a culture of cohesion and intervention
    to protect our Soldiers, not only from the deliberate fratricide of
    these behaviors, but from the invisible danger of mental and behavioral
    health issues, and other stressors that can increase the risk of
    suicide.
                                  people first
        Listening to Soldiers led to our very deliberate decision to re-
    align our priorities. The Army's number one priority is now people. Our
    people are our Soldiers from the Active, Guard, and Reserve components,
    Army families, Army civilians, and retiree and veteran Soldiers for
    Life. At every echelon, the Army must promote and build cohesive teams
    (1) that are highly trained, disciplined, and fit, (2) that are ready
    to fight and win, and (3) in which each person is treated with dignity
    and respect. Cohesive teams are the foundation of all our people
    initiatives and how the Army can best sustain readiness and transform
    for the future. Three critical enablers from the 2019 Army People
    Strategy continue to set conditions for putting people first: Army
    Culture, Quality of Life initiatives, and a 21st Century Talent
    Management System.
    Army Culture
        Last December, the Army stood up the People First Task Force to
    address and implement the 70 Fort Hood Independent Review Committee
    recommendations, with the understanding that the issues identified are
    not unique to a single installation. Army leaders are stewards of a
    special bond of trust and confidence with the American people. We held
    accountable those leaders deemed to have broken that trust. We have
    fundamentally transformed our command selection process in order to
    improve the way we choose future leaders to assume positions with the
    most influence over Soldiers. We are piloting independent climate
    assessment teams of subject matter experts to identify unit climate
    trends early and respond before systemic problems emerge. We are
    listening to our people to learn and lead better. We conducted 96
    listening sessions across 14 locations in addition to a special
    ``Solarium'' conference that asked junior- and mid-career leaders to
    develop solutions. The Army is now working to change policies and
    aspects of Army culture that impede prevention and response to harmful
    behaviors. The first policy change introduced ``absent--unknown'', an
    additional duty status code which affords missing Soldiers oversight
    not present in ``Absent Without Leave (AWOL).''
        ``This is My Squad'' is the foundational principle for Army
    culture. This initiative, led by the Sergeant Major of the Army,
    promotes cohesion by encouraging Soldiers to better know those around
    them, develop greater compassion, and intervene early to protect
    others. Implementation actions include increased non-commissioned
    officer professional military education, redistribution of experienced
    leaders, and better reception processes for integrating new Soldiers at
    each installation and unit.
        Project Inclusion is a holistic effort to improve diversity,
    equity, and inclusion across the force. As of March of this year, the
    Army had conducted 83 Project Inclusion listening sessions with over
    4,700 attendees. Separately, the Army reviewed its policy on official
    photos and removed official photos from all promotion boards. The Army
    later redacted race, ethnicity, and gender data from Soldier Record
    Briefs in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's direction. The
    Army is building relationships with influencers in diverse cities and
    communities to better acquire, develop, employ, and retain the best
    talent across the entire Nation.
    Quality of Life (QoL) Initiatives
        Putting people first also means creating a duty and installation
    environment that allows Soldiers to thrive. The Army continues to
    prioritize the QoL focus areas identified in 2019. The COVID era only
    reinforced how essential each of those initiatives is to the well-being
    and readiness of our Soldiers and their families.
        Housing and Barracks. We continue executing the Army Housing
    Campaign Plan to shape policies, procedures, and processes at every
    echelon. The Army implemented 14 of the 18 tenets of the Tenant Bill of
    Rights in its Residential Communities Initiatives (RCI) projects. We
    expect the remaining four (common tenant lease, 7-year maintenance
    history, dispute resolution and rent segregation) to be available at
    the majority of installations with privatized housing by June 1, 2021.
    We implemented mechanisms that hold privatized companies accountable to
    residents for proper maintenance and customer service, hired additional
    personnel to provide quality assurance oversight, and implemented 100
    percent change of occupancy inspections and quality assurance checks.
    To address environmental hazards (mold and lead), we developed
    educational materials, a response registry, and policies for
    habitability and displaced residents. Through the RCI, we are
    committing over $1.8 billion and reinvesting another $1 billion to
    improve residential housing. Additionally, the Army is projected to
    invest over $10 billion in the next 10 years, in both Restoration &
    Modernization and Military Construction funds, which will renovate or
    replace more than 1,200 barracks for all components and eliminate sub-
    standard barracks.
        Healthcare. Army Medicine is partnering with the Defense Health
    Agency to deliver the best care for our beneficiaries across our
    installations. We are focusing on readiness as the Military Health
    System reforms. We will emphasize operationally oriented training,
    modernized capabilities, and innovative operational concepts. We are
    grateful to Congress for increases in Health Professional Officer
    special pay caps. This necessary investment ensures Army Medicine can
    recruit and retain the best quality healthcare professionals for the
    sustainability of the force.
        Childcare. Childcare professionals serve on the front line of the
    Army's response to the COVID-19 pandemic as they allow mission
    essential personnel to maintain Army readiness. The Army has a multi-
    pronged strategy to maintain, and in some cases, increase access to
    care. With continued Congressional support, we plan to build 21
    additional Child Development Centers by fiscal year 2030, adding
    approximately 4,000 spaces. We appreciate Congressional support for the
    three centers funded in fiscal year 2021, two in Hawaii and one in
    Alaska. We continue to invest in these professionals, adjusting
    compensation to recruit and retain quality staff. We are incentivizing
    the family child care program, like a $1,000 bonus for new providers
    and for families that stay in the program after a move. We implemented
    revised DOD priorities for childcare to grant more access to military
    families. Finally, we continue to invest in fee assistance to buy down
    the cost of off-post care when on-post care is unavailable.
        Spouse Employment. With the support of Congress, the Army continues
    to make improvements in spouse employment. The Army reimburses up to
    $1,000 for professional licensing and certification in a new state,
    with Army Emergency Relief offering an additional $2,500. We thank
    Congress for its efforts to bolster the support of individual states in
    granting reciprocity. We streamlined the Home-Based Business
    application and approval system, improved policies for military spouse
    hiring preference, strengthened the Employment Readiness Program, and
    made the transfer of non-appropriated fund employees between
    installations easier. We continue to work with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) to promote workforce development
    scholarships, improve state license reciprocity and professional
    license compacts, and reduce overseas employment barriers.
        Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Moves. Soldiers are now receiving
    PCS orders an average of 120 days before their report date, an
    improvement of 30 to 90 days. Families can now claim 100 percent of
    their costs for reimbursement when conducting a personally procured
    move. Our development and launch of the ``Army PCS Move'' app and
    automation of several business processes, including the Smart Voucher
    program, are helping families research, book movers, track progress,
    and file claims, expediting reimbursement. Though COVID-19 heavily
    impacted last summer's peak PCS season, we still executed over 70,000
    moves with a 95 percent satisfaction rate.
        21st Century Talent Management System
        The Army continues to refine and implement its 21st Century Talent
    Management System in order to effectively acquire, develop, employ, and
    retain talent. We are maximizing the potential of each Soldier. We are
    evolving our marketing and recruiting with initiatives like Army Hiring
    Days and the ``What's Your Warrior?'' campaign to bring in the best
    talent from across the country, including cities and communities with
    populations who may be unfamiliar with the opportunities military
    service affords. This year the Army launched cutting-edge digital
    talent initiatives. Our Army Artificial Intelligence Center partners
    with Carnegie Mellon University to grow data engineers and data
    technicians, while our Software Factory leverages the extraordinary
    existing talent in our Army to grow coders to solve Army problems.
        At the heart of the Army's 21st Century Talent Management System
    are new approaches, systems, and processes that leverage deep data
    about unit needs and Soldier knowledge, skills, behaviors, and
    preferences. The Integrated Personnel and Pay System--Army (IPPS-A) is
    on track to go live across all three components by the end of this
    calendar year. Release 2 is complete, having brought IPPS-A to the Army
    National Guard across 54 states and territories. Release 3, currently
    in testing, will integrate the Active and Reserve forces and complete
    the Army's transition to a single system across all components capable
    of identifying needed talent and managing Soldier careers from
    accession to transition.
        Talent management starts with having the right Army leaders at the
    battalion and brigade-level. These are the Army's most consequential
    leadership positions in terms of affecting retention and attrition. In
    the biggest change to the Army's command selection process in fifty
    years, the Army now uses a Commander Assessment Program to select
    future battalion and brigade commanders, as well as command sergeants
    major. This intensive five-day program evaluates individuals for their
    temperament, cognitive fitness, physical health, and leadership skills.
    We are also expanding to build a system to assess and select our Army
    Acquisition Corps civilians at the same echelons. We are putting the
    right people in the right place at the right time to remain ready
    today.
                                  ready today
        The Army stands ready today to compete globally and fight and win
    the Nation's wars in support of the Joint Force. This is only because
    we recognized six years ago that readiness had declined precipitously
    after three years of reduced funding and uncertain budgets. Since then,
    and funding from Congress, we rebuilt tactical readiness and built
    strategic readiness. However, readiness is fragile. We require
    continued support to maintain it, in order to reliably meet the needs
    of combatant commands without overstressing our people.
        People are the Army's most important weapon system. The Army
    represents 25 percent of the Defense Budget, 35 percent of the Active
    Force, and 45 percent of the Active and Reserve forces, but meets over
    half of global demands. Today, the Total Army supports the Joint Force
    by supplying Soldiers to combatant commanders in more than 140
    countries. Over 69,000 Soldiers are in the Indo-Pacific, including over
    25,000 forward deployed on the Korean peninsula. Over 30,000 soldiers
    are in Europe supporting NATO and the European Deterrence Initiative,
    including the forward command post of our newly reactivated V Corps. We
    remain dedicated to our counterterrorism and train, advise, assist
    missions, providing over 21,000 soldiers in support of the U.S. Central
    Command theater. In our Nation's Capital this year, over 26,000
    National Guard soldiers mobilized from 28 states to assist with medical
    evacuation, communications, security, logistics and safety support.
    Last year, we executed 64 brigade-equivalent deployments and moved 45
    thousand pieces of equipment through 55 ports of embarkation/
    debarkation in support of worldwide missions.
        This past year highlighted the need for the Army to defend the
    Nation at home as well as abroad. In response, the Army continually
    demonstrated its capability and capacity to provide timely and
    effective support in crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic expanded the Army's
    existing mission set as DOD's leader in protecting the warfighter from
    biological threats and investigating infectious diseases that threaten
    public health. Since last March, Army scientists, medical
    professionals, engineers, and logisticians from all components have
    deployed nationwide to aid COVID prevention and response efforts. For
    its vaccine development and distribution initiative, America turned to
    an Army logistician to lead operations. Our National Guard and Reserve
    units across America supported both neighbor and nation in an
    unprecedented level of mobilization, not only for COVID support, but in
    response to civil unrest, hurricanes, and wildfires, all while
    continuing to train for wartime missions.
        In 2020, the Army demonstrated strategic readiness through its
    series of DEFENDER exercises, despite the constraints of a pandemic
    environment. Strategic readiness involves installation capabilities to
    mobilize, train, and deploy formations and then sustain them from the
    Homeland. DEFENDER-Pacific 2020 witnessed the deployment of combat
    credible forces across the breadth of the Indo-Pacific theater from
    Guam and Palau to the Aleutian Island chain and mainland Alaska. Under
    the command and control of U.S. Army Pacific, combined joint forces
    executed strategic readiness operations that included cargo delivery,
    forcible entry operations, rapid infiltration of High Mobility
    Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), operational maneuver of Army
    watercraft, and fighter combat patrols. DEFENDER-Europe 2021 is
    currently underway with over 30,000 multinational forces from 27
    nations conducting nearly simultaneous operations across 30 training
    areas. This year's exercise will incorporate Security Force Assistance
    Brigades, the Army's new V Corps, and U.S. Air Force and
        Navy assets. DEFENDER-Europe 21 is led by the Army's newly
    consolidated United States Army Europe and Africa Command.
        The foundation of Army readiness is our people. The Army is moving
    to a foundational readiness model that prioritizes the training of
    individuals and small units at the company level and below. The best
    combat units in the world ensure their individuals and small units are
    masters of their craft. To foster individual readiness, the Army is
    also investing in holistic health and fitness. We continue to study the
    impact of the Army Combat Fitness Test in accordance with Congressional
    guidance in order to better connect individual fitness with combat
    readiness. A solid foundation of readiness enables unit agility and
    provides the greatest return on an investment of limited time and
    resources. We will continue to use the combat training centers to bring
    these highly trained, disciplined, and fit teams together for large-
    scale collective training that validates the combat effectiveness of
    our battalions and brigades.
        The Army must balance the continuous demand for current readiness
    from combatant command requirements with the imperative to secure
    future readiness, all without overly stressing our people or our
    equipment. To this end, the Army developed, tested, and rehearsed a new
    unit lifecycle model that will go into effect October 2021: the
    Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM). ReARMM
    will harmonize historically conflicting Army priorities. It will take
    care of people by reducing operational tempo and maximizing
    predictability and stability to commanders, Soldiers, and families.
    ReARMM will sustain readiness by carving out dedicated windows for
    building readiness at echelon while aligning units with primary regions
    and functions. Regional alignment provides units deep wells of
    knowledge on the terrain, culture, and people where their units are
    most likely to operate. Joint force commanders also gain by leveraging
    habitual, trusted relationships between Army formations and Allies and
    partners. Finally, ReARMM will facilitate modernization by giving units
    dedicated windows to integrate new equipment, reorganize formations,
    and train on new doctrine. Adopting this model transitions the Army
    from small, incremental, evolutionary modernization of platforms to
    large-step modernization of our formations.
                 army modernization--transforming for tomorrow
        The Army faces an inflection point that requires innovation,
    creativity, and entrepreneurship in the application of combat power.
    The battlefield is increasingly faster, more lethal, and more
    distributed. Overmatch will belong to the side that can make better
    decisions faster. To meet emerging challenges, the Army is transforming
    to provide the Joint Force with the speed, range, and convergence of
    cutting edge technologies that will generate the decision dominance and
    overmatch required to win the next fight. We are leading the way in
    developing and fielding advanced technology in support of the Joint
    Force.
        The Army's materiel modernization transformation--what we fight
    with--is based on the six modernization priorities announced in 2018:
    Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Future
    Vertical Lift, the Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier
    Lethality. The Army's conceptual transformation--how we fight--begins
    with our Multi-Domain Operations concept, which we are currently
    turning into doctrine. The Army is using Project Convergence, our
    campaign of learning and annual capstone event, to shape future
    concepts and capabilities. By 2035, the Army will realize its vision of
    a multi-domain force.
        The Army is committed to seeing our signature materiel
    modernization efforts through to completion. Many are coming on line
    according to, or ahead of, our accelerated development schedule and
    being delivered to our Soldiers. Through continuous reform efforts, we
    have been able to redirect scarce resources to these key modernization
    efforts; however, we could not achieve this without Congressional
    support and authorities. Army Futures Command is providing
    unprecedented unity of effort across the modernization enterprise,
    having changed our business model and culture through public-private
    partnerships and a focus on Soldier-centered design. This allows us to
    gain immediate operator feedback, accelerating the development process
    and ensuring new systems are effective in operational environments.
    These reforms, combined with early experimentation through Project
    Convergence, are paying significant dividends. Judicious use of Middle
    Tier Acquisition and Other Transaction Authorities enable progress from
    characteristics to fielded capabilities in as short as three years,
    versus the five to seven years it took just to prescribe requirements
    in the past.
    Long Range Precision Fires
        Long range precision fires provide the capability to penetrate
    Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environments, suppress air defenses and
    strike maritime targets at range from land, and establish our own A2/AD
    capability to open windows of opportunity for the Joint Force to
    exploit. In 2019, OSD directed the Army to develop a ground based long-
    range hypersonic weapon. In fiscal year 2023, the Army will field the
    first Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) firing battery. The Army is
    also developing a ground-launched, Mid-Range Capability that will
    complement the LRHW and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM)
    capabilities. The PrSM is on schedule to conduct its maximum range test
    in 3QFY21 and deliver 30 missiles in fiscal year 2023. It will provide
    greater range, lethality, and survivability at a lower cost per shot
    than ATACMS. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery remains on schedule
    for delivery in fiscal year 2023. It will establish overmatch against
    peer adversaries in the close and deep operational maneuver areas with
    an extended range out to 70km.
    Next Generation Combat Vehicle
        Next generation combat vehicles will increase the firepower, speed,
    and survivability of land forces, allowing them to maneuver into
    positions of advantage in the future operational environment. After
    rebaselining the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) program last
    year, the Army issued the final request for proposal for the concept
    design phase on December 18, 2020. OMFV is an example of how our new
    acquisitions process enabled the Army to learn early and recover before
    programs become too big to fail. The Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV)
    effort envisions an unmanned platform that provides decisive mobility,
    lethality, survivability, and increased situational awareness to
    formations. RCV will undergo increasingly rigorous experiments and
    capability demonstrations with a decision to procure by fiscal year
    2024. The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is an adaptable and more
    survivable multi-variant vehicle that replaces the 1960s era M113
    Family of Vehicles. Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) is an armored
    combat vehicle that will provide, large caliber, long-range direct
    fires in support of Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. The first unit
    equipped with MPF will be in fiscal year 2025.
    Future Vertical Lift
        Future Vertical Lift platforms and technologies increase the
    maneuverability, range, endurance, lethality, and survivability of Army
    aircraft, providing joint commanders with increased operational reach
    and effectiveness against near-peer competitors. Our new acquisitions
    process has put the onus on industry to innovate and invest early,
    allowing the Army to ``fly before we buy.'' The Future Armed
    Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) closes the gap left by retirement of the
    Vietnam-era Kiowa. Two prototypes will fly in fiscal year 2023 followed
    by a year-long flight demonstration. The Future Long Range Assault
    Aircraft (FLRAA) will replace the UH60 Blackhawk with increased speed,
    range, payload, and endurance. We expect initial FLRAA prototypes in
    fiscal year 2025. Future vertical lift will leverage advances in
    Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) technology to develop Air Launched
    Effects (ALE) with a wide array of payloads and extended communication
    mesh networks with a fielding plan in fiscal year 2024.
    Army Network
        The Army network modernization underpins Project Convergence as the
    Army's contribution to Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control.
    It provides necessary information technology (IT) infrastructure to
    link the right sensors to the right shooters through the appropriate
    command and control node. In fiscal year 2021, we will field more than
    150 units with new technologies while simultaneously developing the
    next capability set of equipment. The Army is also modernizing current
    Global Position System (GPS) receivers to meet current and emerging
    threats by providing the Joint Force with advanced assured precision,
    navigation and timing (APNT) systems. Included are modernized receivers
    that meet congressional mandates to transition to M-code GPS and
    integrate alternative APNT technologies for our ground combat
    platforms, dismounted Soldiers, precision weapons and munitions, and
    aviation systems. We are fielding the first generation mounted APNT
    systems to our forward deployed formations with a second generation
    ready not later than fiscal year 2023. Additionally, the Army continues
    to invest in space-based technologies that close operational gaps in
    deep sensing and targeting activities. We are coordinating with
    partners in the Intelligence Community and private industry to enhance
    Army access to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space-based sensing and link with
    national-level capabilities to provide tactical-level sensor to shooter
    capability to combat formations.
    Air and Missile Defense
        Air and missile defense capabilities defend the Joint Force,
    allies, and partners against manned and unmanned air and missile
    threats. The Army's integrated air and missile defense capabilities
    will protect joint forces from adversary aircraft, missiles, and drones
    to protect the force and enable operations. This includes both theater
    systems and tactical / short-range air defense like the Maneuver-Short
    Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) which defeats aerial threats to the
    maneuver force with a mix of kinetic capabilities. The Rapid
    Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) is developing a
    Directed Energy (DE) M-SHORAD variant that utilizes a 50kW class laser.
    We will field four DE prototypes for experimentation and further
    development. Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) will defend
    fixed and semi-fixed assets primarily against cruise missiles and
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems as well as fixed and rotary wing aircraft.
    Based on the authorization in the 2021 NDAA, the Army is currently
    preparing two Iron Dome batteries for operational deployment at the end
    of fiscal year 2022. This spring the Army will conduct a shoot-off to
    inform our decision on the enduring IFPC solution. RCCTO is also
    working on two IFPC variants, a High Energy Laser (HEL) and a High-
    Powered Microwave (HPM). The IFPC-HEL uses a 300kW-class HEL to defeat
    Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (RAM) threats and is on track for
    demonstration. The IFPC-High-Powered Microwave is being developed with
    the Air Force to produce the Tactical High Power Microwave Operational
    Responder (THOR) in fiscal year 2021 with a prototype expected in
    fiscal year 2024. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command
    System (IBCS) initial operational capability is 3QFY22 with fielding.
    IBCS is a revolutionary command-and-control system that streamlines
    sensor to shooter linkages for air and missile defense engagements--and
    once fielded with enable optimized employment of the Patriot force.
    This enhanced tracking system delivers an unambiguous view of the
    operating environment, allowing commanders and air defenders to make
    critical decisions within seconds. The Lower-Tier Air and Missile
    Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) will deliver the next generation sensor that
    leverages the capabilities of the Patriot Missile Segment Enhanced
    (MSE) interceptor and is fully integrated into IBCS.
    Soldier Lethality
        Soldier Lethality improvements to weapons, sensors, body armor, and
    training will deliver decision dominance and overmatch at the level
    where it matters most-, allowing individual Soldiers to quickly
    understand and react to emerging situations. With ReARMM, we are
    incorporating Guard and Reserve units into the fielding schedule much
    earlier and more broadly than in past modernization efforts. The Army
    seeks continued Congressional support for the rapid prototyping,
    development, and procurement of the Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW)
    Rifle and Automatic Rifle, Enhanced Night Vision Goggles (ENVG),
    Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS)--Heads-Up Display (HUD)
    3.0, and the Synthetic Training Environment (STE). By 1QFY22, we'll
    equip the first unit with IVAS. In 4QFY22, we will equip the first unit
    with the Next Gen Squad Weapon Rifle and Automatic Rifle, as well as
    General Purpose Ammo. STE efforts that complement IVAS include the
    Squad Immersive Virtual Trainer (as part of IVAS) and the STE
    Information System that includes: One World Terrain, Training
    Simulation Software, and Training Management Tools.
        In addition to our six priorities, the Army understands the need
    for considerable investment in long-term research to deliver science
    and technology solutions. The Army is aligning its laboratories towards
    modernization and partnering with over 250 research institutions. The
    Army's priority research areas are: disruptive energetics, Radio
    Frequency (RF) electronic materials, quantum research, hypersonic
    flight, artificial intelligence, autonomy, synthetic biology, material
    by design, and advanced manufacturing.
        The Army is also investing in deep sensing and analysis to provide
    intelligence support to long range precision fires and commanders'
    situational awareness during Joint All-Domain Operations. We will
    continue to drive intelligence modernization by acquiring capabilities
    and capacities across the Space, Aerial, Terrestrial, and Foundation
    Layers nested with and in support of the Army's six modernization
    priorities.
        We will continue to leverage the Intelligence Community (IC), other
    Services', and commercial partner enterprise-level Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance collection programs to provide timely,
    accurate, and relevant intelligence to support Army targeting efforts
    and enhance commanders' decision making.
        The Army is not just modernizing concepts and materiel. We require
    continued budget support to modernize infrastructure and execute
    workload in our Organic Industrial Base (OIB) of depots, arsenals, and
    ammunition plants, along with our power projection and Mobilization
    Force Generation Installations to better project power from and into
    contested environments. We must be able to address the risk of new and
    emerging cyber, information, and physical threats that can thwart our
    ability to project power by disrupting installation operational
    capabilities and the supply chains supporting our forces, whether from
    malign actors or nature. Our installations must be resilient to
    disruption and modernized in support of the modernized Army force. The
    Army is investing significant time and resources to mitigate the
    effects of climate change on our installations. We are establishing
    energy and water resilience, efficiency, and affordability across our
    installation enterprise. In the past five years, energy programs,
    partnerships and initiatives recognized a cost avoidance or savings of
    more than 14 percent, every installation has added a full-time energy
    manager position, and 16 of 26 Army OIB depots, arsenals and ammunition
    plants have transitioned from fossil fuels to clean energy
    alternatives. We are also partnering with private industry to implement
    energy and utility savings contracts that maximize the latest
    technology to drive efficiency and reduced costs, with 99 agreements
    currently in execution.
        The Army is also not modernizing in a vacuum, but in partnership
    with our sister Services. We have completed two Army-Air Force
    Warfighter Talks and one Army-Air Force-Navy joint session to ensure
    the Army's Project Convergence initiatives remains synchronized with
    the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System and the Navy's
    Project Overmatch to meet the unique needs of each Service. As we work
    to stand-up a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) in Europe later this year,
    our Indo-Pacific aligned MDTF continues to synchronize effects with the
    Joint Force during multiple exercises. The MDTF's All-Domain Operations
    Center enables Joint training, to include hosting
        Carrier Strike Group-3 for the Navy's Fleet Synthetic Training--
    Joint exercise and connecting to the Navy's Continuous Training
    Environment network. During INDOPACOM's Pacific Fury 21, the MDTF
    validated its ability to virtually synchronize long range fires and
    effects with the Joint Force. The MDTF will participate in
    USINDOPACOM's upcoming Northern Edge and Joint All Domain Command and
    Control (JADC2) Simulation Experiment (SIMEX) in May before rotating
    into the Indo-Pacific later this summer to participate in joint
    exercises with PACAF, PACFLT, and MARFORPAC.
                    strengthening alliances and partnerships
        America does not fight alone. Alliances and partnerships are among
    the greatest sources of our military strength. This global landpower
    network is DOD's foundation for competition, creating inroads and
    maneuver space for Joint and whole-of-government strategic engagement.
    As a people organization, the Army is uniquely qualified to maintain
    and expand this vital network, especially given that partner militaries
    and their senior leaders are predominately land force-centric. Our
    roadmap for building and strengthening relationships spans a range of
    activities that include military and key leader engagements, education
    and training programs such as the Department of State's International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) and International Professional
    Military Education (IPME), security assistance through Title 22 Foreign
    Military Sales, and advise and assist capabilities. Boots on the ground
    deter would-be adversaries, and small, scalable engagements with our
    Allies and partners open doors to the access and presence we need to
    compete effectively. The Army's new Security Force Assistance Brigades
    (SFAB) demonstrate our commitment to alliances and partnerships and our
    capability to compete.
        Last year we completed the activation of all six SFABs, five in the
    Regular Army and one in the Army National Guard. Since then, 5th SFAB
    has already completed missions with multiple partners across the Indo-
    Pacific theater, including elements of the Thai, Indonesian, and Indian
    armies. Later this year, many of those partners will join their
    American counterparts in combined exercises at the National Training
    Center. Engagements such as these are vital, not only for
    interoperability, but in recognition that Cold War-era exclusive
    allegiance to a single great power no longer exists. Many if not all of
    our allies and partners maintain concurrent relationships with both the
    United States and our competitors and potential adversaries. We cannot
    take for granted these relationships and the vital access and presence
    they provide us.
                                    closing
        The men and women of the United States Army are the greatest
    Soldiers in the world. The Army is cultivating cohesive teams,
    maximizing talent, sustaining tactical and strategic readiness,
    progressing through our greatest transformation in over 40 years, and
    strengthening our alliances and partnerships. We are leading the way in
    developing and fielding high technology for the Joint Force. We are
    opening operational and strategic doors in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
    We are succeeding through calibrating our force posture around the
    globe to assure our partners and deter would-be adversaries, and we
    need your continued support. With timely, adequate, predictable, and
    sustained funding, we will remain ready to fight and win our Nation's
    wars--now and into the future.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you, General McConville. As I
    mentioned in my opening statement, and as is obvious to all,
    the focus on Chinese as the pacing threat is taking a lot of
    your attention and time. Also with the decision to withdraw
    from Afghanistan that is adding additional, I think, emphasis
    to the Indo-Pacific region.
        Secretary Wormuth, with your policy and strategy expertise,
    what do you see is the appropriate role of the Army in Indo-
    Pacific?
        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman. I think there are a
    number of roles for the Army in the INDOPACOM AOR [area of
    responsiblity] across the full spectrum of competition, if you
    will. First, I think the Army is uniquely well positioned to
    serve our Nation in the competition phase. You know, many of
    the chiefs of defense in the countries in Asia are actually
    Army generals, and so they are particularly interested in
    partnerships with our Army, and I know General McConville has
    seen that in his many visits with his counterparts.
        We can use those relationships to increase our alliances
    and partnerships to deepen our relationships with those
    countries so that, as I said in my opening statement, in a time
    potentially where tensions are rising, we may be able to
    leverage those positive relationships for access that can be
    very helpful, and we are doing that with things like our
    Security Force Assistance Brigades, with elements of our multi-
    domain task force that right now is working out of JBLM [Joint
    Base Lewis-McCord] in Washington, and that we are going to
    build on in the future.
        Then moving up the spectrum of competition into conflict,
    the Army, particularly with the modernization programs we are
    pursuing, can do a number of things: provide long-range
    precision fires, again through the numerous programs we have
    there to go after maritime and air targets. We can provide a
    layered air defense, which will help us in terms of the anti-
    access and area denial capabilities we face there. We are
    pursuing making sure we have a survivable, resilient network,
    which we know we are going to need given the counter-space
    capabilities that we face.
        So I think, again, as part of the Joint Force, the Army can
    be very, very useful in terms of bringing options to the
    combatant commander in INDOPACOM.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
    General McConville, how do the Army modernization efforts
    complement and support the strategy that the Secretary just
    talked about?
        General McConville. Yes, Chairman. As we take a look at our
    modernization priorities, what they provide us is speed, they
    provide us range, and they provide us this concept of
    convergence, when we bring together all the Army's systems and
    the joint systems and the future, even our allies' and
    partners' systems, and that gives us the decision dominance
    that we need, and quite frankly, the overmatch we need to deter
    competitors and potential adversaries. I would argue that we
    get deterrence through strength. That strength comes from a
    strong Joint Force working together, and it comes from strong
    allies and partners, and we have strong allies and partners, as
    the Secretary said, in the region.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Madam Secretary, you
    just returned from Fort Hood. Senator Inhofe and I went there
    in the wake of the serious situations that developed there.
    There are many factors involved, but obviously command climate,
    leadership engagement--one of the more disconcerting comments
    that I heard was from a sergeant major, saying that the troops
    do not trust the commanders and the commanders do not know the
    troops. That might be a function of constant deployments and
    constant activity, but still it cannot be tolerated.
        Can you give us your comments and observations about the
    positive changes that you have made and will make?
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly. We are very focused on
    building cohesive teams down to the lowest level. So we have
    launched the This is My Squad initiative, and the Sergeant
    Major of the Army is our point man on that effort. We are, as
    you know, completely redesigning the SHARP [Sexual Harassment
    Assault Response and Prevention] program. We are also
    restructuring our Criminal Investigative Division so that,
    among other things, we will have more experienced investigators
    to handle these kinds of special victim crimes.
        I want to share--well, one other thing I will touch on
    before I share just an observation. A very important piece we
    have also undertaken is the Command Assessment Program that
    really is revolutionizing how we are selecting future leaders,
    and takes into account their past performance on command
    climate. But I did a sensing session with soldiers, myself
    alone in the room, and one of the things I heard strongly was
    they feel that their commanders do care. I think they think
    their commanders have a lot of things on their plate that makes
    it hard for them to have time to care, but there was a sense of
    caring that was very clear.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
    let's get another shot at the Army budget cuts. As I stated in
    my opening remarks, the Army bears the brunt of the
    disappointing President's Budget Request that prioritizes a
    domestic agenda over national defense. I am reminded also of
    the amendment that I had on there for parity between defense
    and non-defense. I will have to go back and check, but I think
    this is the first time in 10 years or so that we have actually
    come out and said parity is not something that is going to be
    pursued, and that is the first time the statement has been made
    in a recorded vote.
        General McConville, please describe the impact--I will give
    you another shot at the same thing that you were just now
    talking about--and the risk of these cuts on the Army's ability
    to modernize the force for competition, and if necessary, if it
    should become necessary, conflict with China and Russia, and to
    fulfill its obligation to the other combatant commanders, which
    they would have to do at the same time. Talk about capacity.
    Where do we stand with that now?
        General McConville. Well, Senator, as I said in my opening
    statement, the end strength of the United States Army is
    485,000 on the Active and a little over 1 million when it comes
    to the total force. That is the same size Army that we had
    right before 9/11. As we all know, we go to war with the Army
    we have, and we had to grow that Army during the conflicts in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, and so we have frozen that end strength
    at 485,000. Would we like to have a bigger Army, depending on
    the strategy? Absolutely. But with the budget we have we are
    trying to bring forward the best Army that can fight tonight
    and win.
        But also what I would argue, more importantly in the
    future, as we watch our strategic competitors continue to
    improve their capabilities, the budget gives us the most
    efficient capability when it comes to readiness. If we are
    going to send forces into harm's way they have got to be ready.
    As the Secretary talked about, we are focusing on the squad,
    platoon, and company level, to make sure that all those
    soldiers are ready to go.
        Then we have to modernize the Army. I would argue every 40
    years the Army has to transform. It did in 1940, right before
    World War II, it did in 1980, when I came in the Army. Most of
    the weapons we are using are 1980 vintage, and quite frankly, I
    think in 2020 we must do the same. So we have done all we can
    with the Secretary and myself to protect the modernization of
    the Army, and we believe we must do that. I have outlined in my
    unfunded requirement letter to you those unfunded requirements
    that were not met within the budget.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, in general, I am the first to
    admit, with the budget that we have, you guys are just doing
    great. We do not have an adequate budget. That is the problem
    that we have. Let's look into the future of the cuts. It always
    seems like when the administration wants to cut defense it goes
    after the Army first, and when President Obama reduced defense
    he cut the Army's base budget by $70 billion and cut end
    strength by nearly 90,000. So that was a problem that we were
    dealing with at that time. These cuts left the Army with only
    one brigade combat team at the highest level of readiness. It
    took nearly half a decade, and $100 billion of additional
    funding to fix it.
        Now, Secretary Wormuth, while we the Army has worked hard
    in this request to preserve end strength and limit reductions
    to its highest modernization priorities, would this be possible
    with additional budget cuts the next year and the year after
    that? We all tend to look at where we are today, and I am
    concerned right now, with the trends that are out there, where
    we are going to be with budget cuts in the near future. What do
    you think?
        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. As you know,
    Secretary Austin has undertaken both a new national defense
    strategy review as well as a global posture review, and we, of
    course, in the Army, are participating in both of those
    efforts. I think it will be very important in terms of looking
    to the future to look at how that new strategy is developed and
    what it requires the Army to do. I would agree with you
    certainly that we are in a very, very tough international
    security environment. There is no shortage of threats.
        So I think as General McConville and I go forward into
    future POM [program objective memorandum] builds we are going
    to have to be looking carefully at what does the strategy call
    upon us to do, what do we think are the current demands from
    combatant commanders, and can we meet those current demands
    while also protecting our modernization efforts, which is going
    to be critical? Particularly having seen everything we are
    doing at Fort Hood, and again, the challenge of taking care of
    our people while also meeting current mission requirements, I
    think we are having set end strength at 485,000, we are still
    under stress, particularly in certain areas like air defense,
    as you know. So we are going to be strong advocates going into
    the future budget discussions.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, I do not have any doubt of
    that, and I know that you are fully aware of the problems that
    exist if we have reductions, which a lot of people, including
    myself, are concerned with. So I appreciate the fact that we
    have the two of you at the helm at this given time, but it is
    going to take more resources.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen,
    please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Secretary Wormuth and General
    McConville, for being here this morning and for your service.
        The National Guard plays a critical role both in adding to
    the total force of the Army but also in the welfare of each of
    our states. I do not know how New Hampshire could have gotten
    through the last year and a half with the pandemic without the
    National Guard. We had the highest percentage of our force
    structure per capita activated in response to the Guard, and it
    has come to my attention that there was a recent letter sent by
    members of the Florida, California, and Texas congressional
    delegations to the Secretary of Defense that requested larger
    Guard end strength levels in line with the per capita size of
    their states. For a small state like New Hampshire, that is
    especially troubling to think about what that means for the
    future.
        So can you talk about how we strike the balance between the
    needs of those large states and small states that have our
    Guard both working on state missions but are also being
    activated for the national missions as well?
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator Shaheen, and I would
    ask General McConville to expand on this. When it comes to
    looking at the National Guard, first I want to agree that they
    have done a fantastic job all around the country this year. It
    has really been incredible, whether it has been helping us
    respond to COVID, natural disasters, or securing the Capitol
    here more recently.
        We need to look at both what the overseas requirements are
    for the National Guard and how they fit into our contingency
    plans around the world, whether it is Europe or in Asia. That
    is part of what we think about when it comes to looking at the
    size. But we also, of course, look at their support to civil
    authorities here at home, and try to look at that very
    holistically. That is something we look at each year as we go
    through our total Army analysis, and I think, you know, we
    would want to look carefully at making adjustments,
    particularly significant adjustments.
        But, General McConville, you may want to add to that.
        General McConville. I think the Secretary--you know, one
    thing that I do want to say about the National Guard, this has
    been the year of the Army National Guard. I could not be more
    proud of what they have done in their communities. They have
    been there. They have been all over the place. I just could not
    be more proud of them, and I think, Senator, it comes to
    balance. We have big states and we have little states. What we
    want to do is work with each of the states, make sure we know
    what their requirements are. As we transform the Army, we are
    working very closely with their leadership. You know, we have
    certain states that would like to have certain type units that
    are more beneficial for how they operate within their state,
    but also the type of people that want to serve in the Army,
    there are some states that have better opportunities than
    others.
        So as the Secretary said, we need to work very, very
    closely with them, with you all, and come forward with what the
    Army looks like, what the National Guard, what the total force
    looks like in the future.
        Senator Shaheen. So we should not expect to see an
    announcement any time soon that will dramatically cut the size
    of small states' Guard forces to the benefit of large states?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I would not expect--you should
    not expect to see that. Again, if we are going to make
    adjustments to the distribution of Guard force around the
    country, that is something that the Chief and I are going to
    want to look at carefully.
        Senator Shaheen. Consult with Congress, I assume.
        Secretary Wormuth. Absolutely.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Secretary Wormuth, in your
    opening statement you talked about future conflicts being all-
    domain conflicts. Do you see hybrid warfare as an all-domain
    conflict?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think certainly hybrid
    conflict or gray zone conflict, as some people refer to it, can
    take place in multiple domains. So, for example, you may have
    the little green men that we saw that Russia put into Ukraine--
    --
        Senator Shaheen. That we are still seeing in Ukraine.
        Secretary Wormuth. Correct, while at the same time you see
    cyber warfare and information operations, for example. So I do
    think that hybrid or gray zone conflict can be multi-domain.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, where I am going with this is
    concern about how we are preparing to respond to that kind of
    hybrid or gray zone warfare, because so far we have not been as
    successful as I would like to see us. So how do we address
    that, going forward, as we are looking at preparing our Army?
        Secretary Wormuth. I think we do need to do more in that
    area, and I would anticipate that that is something, again,
    that in the strategy review it is going to be looked at,
    because I think we need to build out our thinking about how to
    operate effectively in that zone. In particular, in the Army,
    we first of all had been investing for some time now in
    additional cyber capabilities, for example. We have been paying
    attention to cybersecurity but also building out or cyber
    protection teams and doing a lot of work with Army Cyber
    Command.
        We also see, in the Multi-Domain Task Force formation an
    information operations capability, an electronic warfare
    capability, and those are the kinds of capabilities I think
    that we can bring to bear in gray zone situations. We, of
    course, also have Special Forces, who can go back to the more
    traditional unconventional warfare that was sort of some of
    their roots in the Cold War.
        So those are, I think, all things that the Army can do, but
    again, the Chief may want to add.
        General McConville. So I think you make a very important
    point, and I think we find ourselves at an inflection point
    right now. Over the last 20 years we were really focused on
    irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism. We have
    to be ready for gray zone, hybrid, but really being contested
    in what we call every single domain. So, we are going to be
    contested in cyber, and then the question becomes is that
    conflict or how does that work? We are going to be contested
    with a lot of type of systems that we use, all the way back to
    the United States, and so we are preparing for that.
        The second thing is the information influence operations
    are going to change the way we operate in the future. I would
    argue, in some cases, information advantage may be more
    important than even the type of operations that are going on on
    the ground. We go back to some of the, ``Sun Tzu'', winning
    without fighting. You can do that, in some cases, with
    information operations. Our competitors are not constrained the
    way they operate in that sphere, and we have to take that very
    seriously when it comes to cyber information operations and
    some of the other domains, and we are preparing our forces and
    our troops to be able to operate in that environment.
        Senator Shaheen. I could not agree more, having just come
    back from Europe where they are very concerned about those
    operations in Russia.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ernst,
    please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you both very much for coming to the
    Committee this morning and for testifying in front of us, and
    most certainly and most importantly, for your service to our
    great United States.
        I appreciate the efforts that you are truly making to put
    our people first. I think that is extremely important. But you
    also must meet mission requirements, modernize the force, and
    adapt to the new challenges and threats that we see presented
    before us. As we withdraw from Afghanistan, which will be a
    significant emotional event for those that have been involved
    in actions there, as well as their families, I want to commend
    the force very much and thank them for their service, and your
    leadership, for the tremendous efforts and accomplishments that
    we have seen in that theater of operations. For 20 years, the
    Army, along with our Joint Force, our allies and partners, have
    kept those threats at bay and away from our Homeland.
        So now, of course, the Army does face new challenges, and I
    am very concerned about this administration's budget as it
    comes to meeting the needs of the Army. So, Madam Secretary,
    the Army is executing its modernization strategy, per the 2018
    NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], You state that the
    gains you have made are real, but fragile, and I agree.
        As the only service that is facing real budget cuts this
    year, how do you intend to keep the gains that you have made?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Ernst, I think to preserve the
    gains that we have made we are going to have to balance
    multiple dimensions of the Army, inside of its budget. First we
    are going to have to continue to seek, wherever we can,
    efficiencies and reforms. As you know, my predecessors and
    General McConville have done a few cycles of what was called
    ``night court'' to be able to identify funding that we could
    move internally. We have, the big fish have been fished out of
    that pond. At this point there are more small fish and minnows
    left there. But we need to keep seeking those efficiencies
    where we can.
        I think we need to work with the Secretary and the
    combatant commanders to really scrub our current operational
    requirements, to see if we can find places where we may be able
    to take pressure off of the Army. Then I think we will have to
    look carefully at how we make sure, with the resources that we
    have, that we continue to put people first but really protect
    those modernization programs. We are playing the long game now,
    and we have some time to be able to pursue our modernization
    program. But we really need to keep that, I think, front and
    center, because our soldiers are our most important asset and
    they need those new capabilities, those new next-generation
    weapons systems to be able to execute their missions in the
    future.
        So we are going to have to look very carefully across the
    whole budget, going forward.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, and I think this will be a very
    delicate balance as we move forward.
        So both for you, Secretary, and for you, General
    McConville, as well, the budget significantly reduces the R&D
    [research & development] funding, meaning that development,
    experimentation, and advancement as we are modernizing our
    force will be hamstrung, even as we are facing continuing
    evolving threats. So as we are making that balance, you have
    mentioned the unfunded requests that have gone forward, how
    would you prioritize, if you could today, if we had unlimited
    dollars to send your direction, what would those priorities be,
    and why?
        General McConville. Senator, one of the things on the
    research and development--and I will come back to priorities--
    is we have aligned about 74 percent of our science and
    technology against the 31+4 systems. We have really moved
    everything we can do.
        So as far as priorities, we have some installation
    priorities. We often talk about what would be the top
    priorities. We have some people priorities right now that we
    would like to finish. We have barracks, we have housing, we
    have some child development centers that are all in there. It
    is about people first, and we would like to get those
    completed. They are in the unfunded requirements.
        We also have what we call ``enduring systems.'' We have
    focused on the 31+4, the modernization systems, but we also
    have Abrams tanks, we have Paladin howitzers, we have Apache
    helicopters, we have Black Hawks, we have other weapons systems
    that are going to be here enduring, that we need to modernize
    our forces, we need to modernize the National Guard with, so
    they have the forces when they go off to conflict. Those
    systems are going to be around for the next 20, 30, 40 years,
    and so we are improving them, and as the new systems come on,
    some of those systems will be divest and some will not. Those
    are where the priorities are, at least for the Army.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you very much. I think that is an
    important point is that while we are seeking to modernize the
    force, we do have legacy systems as well that will need to be
    maintained until we see the realization of modernization.
        So again, thank you both very much for your service. Trying
    times for all of us. We certainly are here to support. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Hirono,
    please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Wormuth,
    first of all congratulations on your well-deserved
    confirmation.
        Let me start with, we have all acknowledged the importance
    of sensing our allies, and so what unique tools is the Army
    investing in to enable joint interoperability with our allies,
    and what can the Army do to further strengthen U.S. military
    relations with our allies and partners in the region? I am
    talking about, in particular, within the Indo-Pacific region.
        Secretary Wormuth. I understand, Senator Hirono. It is very
    nice to see you in person, and thank you for your well wishes.
        A few things in terms of interoperability with our
    partners. First of all, again, many of the countries in the
    INDOPACOM AOR are led by chiefs of defense who come from their
    armies. So one thing that we have that I think helps us build
    our alliances and partnerships is those army-to-army
    relationships. They very much want to train with us, to
    exercise with us, to learn from us, and in many cases, purchase
    our various weapons systems. So those are all things that we
    can build on. Those exercises are part of what helps us with
    building interoperability.
        We are moving, with our Project Convergence campaign of
    learning, that started last year and was largely Army centric,
    this year it will be a joint undertaking, but we are building
    towards bringing together some of our allies and partners from
    the INDOPACOM AOR to be able to work with us and experiment
    with us and look at using prototypes. So we also are working to
    try to bring our allies and partners in on the ground floor of
    developing these new, joint warfighting concepts.
        Senator Hirono. I think the mil-to-mil relationships have
    always been the area where we have strong alliances, and would
    you acknowledge also that diplomacy plays a major part in all
    of this?
        Secretary Wormuth. Absolutely, and frankly, my own view is
    that to make the kind of progress that we would like to see,
    particularly in terms of access and being able to have more
    presence in the region that has to be led by our diplomats. The
    Department of Defense, the Department of State, the White
    House, we all need to work together, and frankly, we need to
    work with our agencies that have economic and trade
    responsibilities as well. But I think we need to have a whole-
    of-government approach to really help us get to where we want
    to be in that region.
        Senator Hirono. I agree. So moving on, on the issue of
    sexual assault and harassment, Secretary Wormuth and General
    McConville, for a number of years now senior DOD leaders have
    briefed us, basically from my seat countless times, on the need
    to eliminate the scourge of sexual violence in the military. To
    the credit of the DOD and the military, yes, a number of
    attempts have been made, but we still are confronted with the
    scourge, and, in fact, the Fort Hood report that came out at
    the end of last year described the installation as having, ``a
    permissive environment for sexual assault,'' where junior
    enlisted personnel did not trust the chain of command. I think
    you mentioned that there is a need to increase trust in the
    military, and it is not just in the sexual assault situation,
    of course, but in other instances.
        So for both of you, do you think moving sexual harassment
    investigations, for example, outside the immediate chain of
    command would help to restore trust in the system?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Hirono, I had the opportunity to
    go and visit Fort Hood last week and see first-hand, frankly, a
    lot of the steps that the Army is taking, at that installation
    in particular, to try to really get after the command climate
    issues. I think where we are really going to see results in
    terms of driving down the prevalence of sexual harassment and
    sexual assault is through prevention. So I am very interested
    in seeing things like the redesign of our SHARP program, doing
    This is My Squad initiative that really tries to bring leaders
    taking care of our soldiers down to the lowest level.
        That said, accountability is an important piece of the
    issue as well and I think can play a role. I am open-minded to
    looking at how best to do that. I think increasing the
    specialization of our folks responsible for prosecuting these
    kinds of crimes would be beneficial, and I am open to looking
    at this, and have been asked to be a part of the conversation
    with Secretary Austin on this matter.
        Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, if I could just do one short
    follow-up.
        Chairman Reed. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. So I mentioned sexual harassment because
    right now that is not a separate charge under UCMJ [Uniform
    code of Military Justice], and I do have a bill to move in that
    direction. I certainly welcome your support of that, and yes,
    we want to move toward prevention. But there will be an effort
    to remove the prosecutorial discretion on investigations and
    prosecutions out of the chain of command. There will be an
    effort to do that relating to sexual-related offenses. I
    mentioned that because that is the direction that I think we
    need to go.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton,
    please.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
    for your appearance.
        Secretary Wormuth, when you were here for your confirmation
    hearing you agreed with me that the Army University Press
    should not remove the term ``Union Army'' from its
    publications. Have you had a chance to address that issue yet?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Cotton, I apologize. I have not
    had the chance to address that yet, given that I have been here
    3 weeks, but as I said to you in my hearing, I will look into
    that and talk to the folks at Army University Press.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I understand it has been a short
    time and you have got a lot of other pressing issues, but as I
    said then and I will say again, if it was good enough for U.S.
    Grant, I think it is good enough for our troopers today.
        For both Secretary and General McConville I want to speak
    to you about the nearly decade-long effort to replace the Army
    Physical Fitness Test with the Army Combat Fitness Test, to
    test our soldiers on physical fitness that is a bit more
    applicable to the tasks on the battlefield, and also to make it
    gender neutral. There are reports of further Combat Fitness
    Test redesigns and changing standards associated with the test
    have made for a somewhat confusing story and heated debate. Can
    you clarify for us the obstacles that are currently facing the
    Combat Fitness Test, whether it will remain gender neutral and
    how the Army is seeking to implement the test now?
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator, and again, I would
    ask General McConville to build on my answer. But first of all
    it is very important that we have our soldiers be physically
    fit for a demanding environment on the future battlefield, and
    one of the reasons that the Army has pursued the ACFT [Army
    Combat Fitness Test] is to try to raise our overall fitness
    level while reducing injuries. So that was the impetus.
        We are continuing to look at how to finalize the design for
    the ACFT. We are continuing to have gender-neutral standards.
    We have made some changes, as you know, moving from the leg
    tuck to making the plank an option. But we are waiting for the
    results of a study from RAND that has been required by
    Congress, and we are not going to make any final decisions
    about the test until we have the results of that and we can
    understand how the test is going to both improve our fitness
    but also potentially what it might do in terms of our ability
    to recruit specialized skills like cyber and doctors and things
    of that nature. But why don't I let the Chief build.
        Senator Cotton. General?
        General McConville. I think the science behind the Army
    Combat Fitness Test is really about reducing injuries. As we
    have taken a look at the Army Physical Fitness Test over the--
    in fact, I was there when it was implemented, I hate to say, it
    was 40 years ago, and it is time to transform that test, to
    take advantage of the capabilities we have today. As we take a
    look at it, as the Secretary said, we are examining the impact
    on the force. I took it last week, for the record. I think it
    is a good test. What we want to do is move forward in
    implementation, based on the study. I think it is going to have
    a more fit force, which is something that we need as we move in
    the future.
        Senator Cotton. Do you want to share you score, for the
    record?
        General McConville. Four hundred seventy-eight, for the
    record.
        Senator Cotton. That is good. I am sure all your joes
    around are going to try to beat that now.
        General, are you committed, as well, to maintaining gender
    neutrality on the test?
        General McConville. I am.
        Senator Cotton. Is there any consideration to pegging
    scores towards branch or MOS [military occupational specialty]?
        General McConville. Well, I think the future, at least if I
    could make a recommendation in the future, is as we move to
    more of a talent management model in the Army, if you are an
    airborne ranger, which is a fitness type organization, if you
    are in the 101st Airborne Division or the 82nd, I would say
    from talent management you want people with a certain level of
    physical fitness. If you are doing something else, you are a
    neurosurgeon, you might be more concerned with that person that
    can operate at a Level VI level than, you know, lead the
    battalion in PT.
        So I think what we want to get to--at least I do--is move
    away from an Industrial Age personnel management system to a
    21st century talent management system where we recruit people,
    we select people, and we, quite frankly, promote people based
    on the knowledge, skills, behaviors that they have within their
    specialized area. But we still want a certain level of fitness
    in the Army.
        Senator Cotton. Yeah. I think the Army needs to consider
    that. You know, loading a round into a tank gun or a Howitzer
    has to be done, whether you are a man or a woman.
        General McConville. That is right.
        Senator Cotton. It requires a certain level of physical
    fitness. But that is a different level of physical fitness than
    it takes to be a flight surgeon or to be a cybersecurity
    specialist.
        One last question for you, General. In the last decade, I
    think maybe when you were Vice Chief, the Army stood up the
    Security Force Assistance Brigades.
        General McConville. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. They were primarily active in Afghanistan.
    Now that we will be out of Afghanistan in a few weeks and our
    national security strategy has postured towards competition
    against near-peer rivals like China and Russia, what do you see
    as the future of those SFABs [Security Force Assistance
    Brigades], and what role are they going to play for the Army in
    the future?
        General McConville. They are in tremendous demand. You
    know, the question was what are you doing in Indo-Pacific. The
    5th Security Force Assistance Brigade is active. They are
    employed. They are building partner and allies capacity and
    capability, and quite frankly, they are one of the hottest
    items that are out in each combatant commanders, providing
    great options to professionalizing the force within these
    countries. As we talked about, we are getting our strength, not
    only from having a strong military but through our allies and
    partners, and they are instrumental in doing that, and they are
    building tremendous relationships for us right now, as we
    speak.
        So each of the Security Force Assistance Brigades is
    oriented to a combatant commander and they are using them very
    well.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. Thank you, Secretary.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly, if
    you are ready, you could be recognized.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
    you having this hearing today. Thank you to Secretary Wormuth
    and General McConville.
        Secretary Wormuth, Arizona is home to some of the Army's
    most capable test ranges, like Fort Huachuca's Electronic
    Proving Ground and the Yuma Proving Ground. Both installations
    play an important role in the mission of our Army Futures
    Command and also an important role for DEVCOM [Development
    Command].
        At Yuma alone, 30 percent of the workload is dedicated to
    DEVCOM developmental testing. Yuma is also the host of Project
    Convergence, a critical modernization project designed to
    further integrate the Army into the Joint Force and test the
    effectiveness of concepts and equipment that will prepare us
    for future conflicts.
        The defense contractor workforce at these ranges works
    side-by-side with uniformed and civilian personnel to execute
    the mission. Now I am concerned by reductions in funding for
    these range support functions. Electronic Proving Grounds at
    Fort Huachuca and Yuma Proving Ground is seeing some of these
    funding reductions.
        These are premier testing sites for the advanced systems
    that will modernize America's Army. It is critical that we
    invest not only in programs but in range infrastructure--it is
    often the thing that is left out--but also investing in the
    workforce that allows us to make leaps in technology, providing
    our soldiers with the best equipment to meet the challenges of
    tomorrow.
        Secretary Wormuth, what would be the risks involved in
    decreasing funding for test range support, including for the
    government and contractor workforce, at a time when
    modernization is a top priority of the Army?
        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Kelly. As you
    mentioned, Arizona, and Yuma, is going to be the host for
    Project Convergence. Has been. I am excited to go out there
    this fall and see the next Project Convergence, which we are
    scaling up.
        To your question, given the budget that the Army has, we
    have made some difficult choices. But we have done everything
    we can to protect our modernization programs and the testing
    facilities and ranges that we believe are needed to support
    those programs, as well as the contractors to support that kind
    of testing. That said, I have not yet been able to come out to
    Yuma and Fort Huachuca, and would welcome doing that in the
    future and talking with you about your concerns, because again,
    it is very important that we preserve adequate ranges to do the
    kind of testing that we need for the future. So this is
    something I would be happy to work with you on and have a
    dialogue about.
        Senator Kelly. I appreciate that. I would love to visit
    with you at Fort Huachuca, at Yuma Proving Ground. If we are
    going to stay ahead of our adversaries, we are going to do it
    by out-innovating them, and to innovating our near-peer
    adversaries we need to test the equipment. So we need ranges
    and test centers that can support those functions.
        General, for the past 20 years the Army has focused efforts
    and resources on conflicts in the Middle East. At the same
    time, our adversaries were focused on outpacing us through
    military modernization efforts. Modernization is critical to
    staying ahead of our adversaries, and when done effectively can
    function as a deterrent. We know that future wars will look
    different than current conflicts, and the Army will need to use
    resources and equipment efficiently across a range of domains
    to meet tomorrow's challenges.
        Knowing the important role that basic research plays, are
    you concerned about the decreases to Army science and
    technology funding, and is there a plan to reinvest in this
    area for future years?
        General McConville. As we take a look at the budget we are
    always concerned about making cuts, and what the Secretary and
    myself have to do is we have to look across the portfolio and
    determine what are the must-must-dos. For science and
    technology, we have reoriented our resources so they are
    focused on our top priorities. I think it is like 71 or 72
    percent of our research and development, our science and
    technology dollars are focused on delivering the 31+4 top
    systems. Could we use more money in those other areas?
    Absolutely. But the Secretary and myself have got to make tough
    decisions, and those tough decisions are based on the
    priorities we need to be effective in the future.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General, and thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly. Let me
    now recognize Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam
    Secretary, just a quick question for you. Kingsport, Tennessee,
    has the Holston Ammunition facility, and it is a main supplier
    of explosive materials to the Department of Defense, and
    Holston is on the Army's unfunded priorities list, along with
    similar facilities there in Virginia, Missouri, Pennsylvania,
    and Iowa. Total request for modernization is $40 million. And
    these are basically World War II-era facilities, and we need
    that money for modernization of these facilities. So I would
    call this to your attention, and I would ask that you commit to
    me that you will work on this, to modernize these facilities.
        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. It is nice
    to see you in person, first of all.
        As General McConville developed the unfunded requirements
    list, those are obviously things that we would like to have if
    we had additional funding, and we have tried to give you a
    sense of how we would prioritize them. As the Chief just said,
    with the resources we have had we have had to make difficult
    choices, but certainly going forward I would commit to you to
    look into the ammunition facilities there and try for myself,
    develop a better idea of how it fits in with other places in
    the country that provide similar capabilities to us.
        Senator Blackburn. I think it is appropriate that we review
    that but that we make certain we have modernized these
    facilities, because they are a part of our supply chain, if you
    will.
        General, good to see you. There are a lot of people from
    Fort Campbell that fondly remember your and Ms. McConville's
    time on post, and so we thank you for that.
        O&M [Operations and Maintenance] cuts and our concerns that
    are around these, given the aviation mishaps that have
    occurred, not only with the Guard but also with the 160th SOAR
    [Special Operations Aviation Regiment], and I know that you are
    very familiar with these incidences. So talk to me a little bit
    about how we are going to get in behind this equipment. I know
    that you have heard, I have heard it from some of our men and
    women, where they get the order to make it work when they are
    doing maintenance and repair or find a way to get to yes. We
    want to be smart. Sometimes shortcuts do not serve us well, and
    our men and women in uniform deserve to know that when they get
    into that equipment that that equipment is going to allow them
    to fulfill their mission.
        General McConville. First of all, Senator, thank you, and I
    have got a special place in heart for Fort Campbell, and I have
    two kids serving there, and it is very special. You make a
    great point on Army aviation. Pilots have to have the flying
    hours to train. They have to have that, and our maintainers
    have to have the time to maintain those aircraft, and they have
    to have the resources. As we pressurize the budget, as we push
    on these type things, we start--especially with trends, as the
    Secretary talked about. I worry about trends, because trends
    start moving you in a certain direction, and you slowly start
    taking away things, just a few less hours, a few more this, a
    few more those type things, and then you find out you have some
    very serious concerns.
        So I am concerned about that. I am committed to making sure
    that our units have the flying hours that they need to be
    proficient, and really more than proficient, that they can do
    their job in combat, and I am committed to making sure that
    they are getting the parts and they have the expertise to
    maintain those aircraft.
        Senator Blackburn. Well, and as you know, I went to bat
    more than once to get dollars for those flying hours and to
    make certain that those were there.
        I have got additional questions for each of you, but my
    time is going to be running out. I will submit these to
    writing. General, I am going to come to you with a question on
    end strength as it relates to this budget. I am very concerned
    about the impact that that is having on our military personnel
    and their families, the uncertainty that that has inserted into
    their lives.
        So I thank each of you for your time and your service, and
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Let me now
    recognize Senator Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
    for being here this morning. Thank you for your service.
        I do not know whether you have seen the report by the
    Associated Press on weapons belonging to all of the military
    services that have been lost or stolen, and apparently have
    been unaccounted for. I hope you have. I commend it to you.
    This report is absolutely blood-curdling. The idea that
    pistols, assault weapons, grenade launchers are missing from
    armories of the United States military because they have been
    lost or stolen, without any apparent account, without any
    reporting to Congress or to the FBI [Federal Bureau of
    Investigation] or to the agency, Alcohol, Tobacco, and
    Firearms, that may have jurisdiction as well, is just
    incredibly alarming and astonishing. I would like to get from
    both of you what you know about it and your commitment that you
    will, in fact, investigate these reports.
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I did see that report in the
    press, and certainly we take this situation very, very
    seriously. You know, we train our soldiers to maintain
    accountability of their weapons. That is a basic skill and
    responsibility that we expect from our soldiers. My
    understanding is that the cases of weapons from any branch of
    the services being unaccounted for and getting into the hands
    of civilians is likely to be a small number, but particularly
    given these reports I commit to you that this is something that
    we will look into and certainly make sure we have situational
    awareness of that situation in the Army.
        Senator Blumenthal. Well, this is a public report, and
    1,900 firearms is not exactly a small number. Apparently, a
    substantial number are used in crimes, have been recovered at
    crime scenes, which is really mind-boggling and blood-curdling.
    I would like to know whether you will commit, as the Pentagon
    used to do, sharing annual updates about lost or stolen
    firearms with Congress, whether you will resume that regular
    reporting?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, again, we do take these reports
    very seriously, and I absolutely commit to you to look into
    this and share what we know, and get back to you on that.
        Senator Blumenthal. I do not mean to interrupt, and I
    apologize, but will you commit to reporting to Congress, as was
    the practice?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I think what I can commit to is
    we can share with you everything we in the Army understand
    about our weapons.
        Senator Blumenthal. Will you support a reporting
    requirements, generally, to the Department of Defense?
        Secretary Wormuth. I think we would be open to a reporting
    requirement.
        Senator Blumenthal. This report says that the Army and the
    Air Force could not answer basic questions about missing
    weapons. It says also, ``The Army sought to suppress
    information on missing weapons and gave misleading numbers that
    contradict internal memos.'' Will you report back to us about
    that claim?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I would be happy to look into
    how we have handled this issue.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you know whether it is true?
        Secretary Wormuth. I do not, Senator. I do now know what
    our past practice, going back years, has been on this matter.
        Senator Blumenthal. The report says, further, the AP
    [Associated Press] began asking the Army for details on missing
    weapons in 2011, and filed a formal request a year later for
    records of guns listed as missing, lost, stolen, or recovered.
    Apparently the reports quote an official as saying, ``You are
    dealing with millions of weapons, but we are supposed to have
    100 percent recon, right? We are not allowed a discrepancy on
    that, but there is so much room for discrepancy,'' which
    indicates to me that there is systemic failure at every level,
    a failure to keep track of the weapons, a failure to report up
    the chain, a failure to report to Congress, a failure to report
    to law enforcement. Do you disagree?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I am not, again, familiar with
    the details of the story so I do not want to speculate. You
    know, I do not want to characterize how the Army has handled it
    to date without having the facts. But I would certainly commit
    to collecting the facts and continuing to talk with you about
    this important issue.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Well, I really appreciate
    it, and I know that you are new to the job. Welcome to your
    first Committee hearing. Sorry to hit you with this topic, but
    I think you will agree with me that it is profoundly important
    that the military keep track of stolen or missing weapons. I
    hope we can agree on that.
        Secretary Wormuth. Of course.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam
    Secretary, General McConville, thank you for being here. Thank
    you for your service.
        Let me just start with one of our priorities in Missouri,
    which is to ensure that all of our servicemembers have the best
    possible quality of life. One of the challenges that we are
    facing in Missouri, at Fort Leonard Wood, is to make sure that
    the homes that were built there in the 1960s that are overdue
    for replacement get replaced in a timely fashion, and that we
    are able to provide quality housing. So could you just give us
    an update on what the Army is doing to facilitate replacements
    for these homes? Madam Secretary, we will start with you.
    General, you can add as you see fit.
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, Senator. Thank you. General
    McConville probably can speak to the details at Fort Leonard
    Wood better than I. But as you know, we have reorganized how we
    are dealing with privatized housing, to basically make a four-
    star general responsible, and we meet now weekly to go over the
    family housing at each of our major installations. We now have
    37 out of 44 installations that have privatized housing have
    fully implemented the Tenant Bill of Rights. We expect to have
    the other 7 compliant with the Tenant Bill of Rights by the end
    of July. So this is something that we are working on very, very
    hard.
        I would ask General McConville to speak directly to the
    Fort Leonard Wood installation.
        General McConville. Yeah, just from a priority standpoint,
    the reason we came out with people is our number one priority
    was that kind of drives for the resources, and then within the
    people portfolio, housing in the number one priority. A couple
    of things that we have been working, as the Secretary talked
    about, is we have privatized housing. We are putting billions
    of dollars back into that. Probably about 25 percent of our
    housing right now needs to be fixed. Some of that is
    privatized, and we are working with the privatized housing, and
    they have raised money to put additional money to improve that
    housing.
        The Army housing that the Army owns, which is about 10 to
    15 percent--we had historical housing. It was not historical
    housing. It was old housing, and to me ``old'' is not
    ``historical.'' You know, you have a 100-year-old house that
    needs to be fixed, and for a while there we were trying to fix
    it at historical rates, put old windows back that looked like
    old windows, those type of things. So we have got an exception
    to that so we are putting more money into that. We are also
    putting additional funds into housing to get after that,
    because we want quality housing.
        I will need to come back to you on precisely what we are
    doing there, and we will come back to you on that.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much. Thanks to both
    of you. Thank you, General. We will follow up with you on that.
        Let's shift to our pacing theater, if we could. General,
    you released the Chief of Staff of the Army Paper Number 1 this
    past March. One of the things the paper said that caught my
    attention, and I am quoting you here, ``Our adversaries will
    attempt to achieve their strategic goals without fighting or to
    seize their objectives quickly as a fait accompli.'' I want to
    commend you for highlighting that scenario in the paper.
        Along those lines, give us a sense of how you see the
    Army's long-range precision fires and their enablers being able
    to help deter or, if we have to, defeat a Chinese fait accompli
    in Taiwan.
        General McConville. Yeah, I think when we talk about long-
    range precision fires, and when you think about the threats
    that we could face, as far as deterrence, many of our strategic
    competitors have set up what we call an anti-access air denial
    capability within integrated air and missile defense
    capabilities. So you need something that can penetrate that and
    suppress that. By having land-based, long-range fires you start
    to provide options to the COCOM [combatant command] commander
    to do that. Part of our portfolio and the long-range precision
    fires is also having a land-based, anti-ship capability, so
    then again, you have the ability to hold competitive ships at
    risk. They all come together to give that combatant commander
    multiple options, and really to present multiple dilemmas to
    those who may be wishing us harm, and then by doing that and
    having those capabilities 24/7, you can deter certain types of
    behavior from a strength standpoint.
        Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you, as a follow-up to
    that, TRADOC's [Training and Doctrine Command] December 2018
    publication, which was called ``The Army Multi-Domain
    Operations in 2028,'' stated that the Army must demonstrate the
    ability to immediately deny a fait accompli in order to deter
    an adversary like China. You still agree with that, I assume?
        General McConville. I do.
        Senator Hawley. Along those same lines, Madam Secretary,
    when you and I visited last month you highlighted--and I
    thought this was really good--one of the things you said was
    that China would like to pull off a fait accompli because it
    would be much harder for us to dislodge them from Taiwan than
    to stop them from getting to Taiwan in the first place. Can you
    just elaborate on that? I thought that was such a crystal-clear
    explanation of the dangers of the fait accompli scenario. So
    can you just elaborate on that a little bit?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator. Happy to do that. You
    know, essentially given the anti-access area denial
    capabilities that China now possesses, if they are able to
    achieve a lodgment on Taiwan, we will not have the kind of air
    superiority, for example, that we have had in things like the
    Gulf War in the last 20 years. It will be much harder to
    essentially eject Chinese forces from Taiwan once they land
    there than it would be to stop them coming across the straits
    to begin with.
        Now I am not saying it is impossible to dislodge them, but
    it will be a tougher fight. So my own view is we want to
    develop the kinds of capabilities that we are pursuing in the
    Army, along with the rest of the Joint Force, to basically
    present a sufficiently strong deterrent force to make the
    Chinese continue to think twice, year after year, about whether
    they want to actually undertake that amphibious landing.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. My time has expired. General, I
    wanted to ask you about the PACOM's [Pacific Command] 1251
    report and what that means for the Army's posture in that
    region, so I will give that to you as a question for the
    record, and I will follow up with you about the Fort Leonard
    Wood.
        Thank you both very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Now let me now
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
    Wormuth, you and I have talked about the scourge of sexual
    violence in the military at length, and you understand that for
    the last 8 years this Committee has been trying to have a vote
    on a bright line to take out all serious crimes from the chain
    of command, to create a more professional system, to create an
    unbiased system, to create a system where our trained military
    prosecutors can make the first judgment about whether a case
    should go to trial.
        As you know, about 3 percent of commanders have the right
    to make this decision about whether a case should go to court
    martial. So if the prosecutor decides a case should not go
    forward it will go back to that 3 percent of commanders, who
    then will have the opportunity to do a summary, a court
    martial, or a special court martial, or charge a related or a
    lesser crime, and get NJP [non-judicial punishment].
        So given this, I would like your assessment of whether this
    is a recommendation that you will support, number one. I know
    in your written testimony you intend to take all 70
    recommendations from the Fort Hood Independent Review
    Commission, which, as you know, suggests taking sexual assault
    out of the chain of command and creating an independent SHARP
    program. So you have already said you support that.
        What is your assessment of a bright line on all serious
    crimes, and as part of your analysis I would like you to
    consider the data that has been developed by the military and
    the report by Protect Our Defenders that showed that black and
    brown servicemembers are up to 2.5 times more likely to be
    punished for serious crimes than their white counterparts? So I
    would like you to talk a little bit about how you see reforming
    the military justice system so that it is fair, unbiased, and
    guarantees civil rights and civil liberties for all
    servicemembers.
        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand, and thank
    you, first of all, for your leadership on this issue. You have
    been working on this issue for years. It is a problem that we
    all want to solve, that I know all senior leaders and all
    leaders in the Army want to solve, so I appreciate everything
    you have done.
        A few thoughts. As I said earlier with Senator Hirono, I do
    think that focusing on prevention, and doing more on the
    prevention side, is, I think, where we will really see more
    success in reducing the prevalence of sexual harassment and
    sexual assault in our military. But accountability is
    important. I think----
        Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Wormuth, can you speak to why
    you think prevention is the panacea here? Because we have
    passed over a dozen laws to implement prevention measure, and
    the GAO [Government Accountability Office] reviewed all the
    laws we have passed on prevention and what they found was that
    more than 30 recommendations and prior works, specifically
    related to DOD's effort to prevent sexual assault and address
    the needs of certain populations in the sexual assault
    prevention and response efforts. What they found that a lot of
    the recommendations and laws that we passed just have not been
    implemented.
        So what change do you imagine would have to happen for the
    command and the DOD to take the prevention measures seriously,
    given that we have given you 8 years of prevention measures and
    they are not being implemented?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, first, I do not think
    prevention is a panacea. I think we have to pursue this problem
    across a spectrum, from prevention to accountability. So I want
    to be clear on that.
        I think really what we have to focus on is pushing
    responsibility for a positive command climate, caring for our
    soldiers down to the lowest level possible, and that is what we
    are trying to do through the This Is My Squad initiative,
    through the redesign of our SHARP program, and also through,
    frankly, selecting our leaders, looking more closely at their
    previous command climate performance. So making sure the people
    we put in charge are people who have been able to create
    positive command climates. I think all of that will be helpful,
    and that is something we are going to have to work hard on, and
    work hard on year after year after year, not just sort of when
    there is a crisis and then we become complacent.
        Senator Gillibrand. But do you not think that actually
    prosecuting sexual assailants who are predators, who are often
    recidivists, and putting them in jail would also prevent
    crimes, since we have many examples of sexual assaulters who
    were not prosecuted in the first instance and went on to not
    only assault others, including children as one of the most
    recent examples. Don't you think it would be far better to
    actually treat these cases appropriately and put sexual
    predators in jail?
        Secretary Wormuth. We do absolutely have to hold
    perpetrators and predators accountable, and it is for that
    reason that one of the things I think makes a lot of sense is
    increasing the specialization of the individuals in the Army
    and in the military writ large, who prosecute these cases. You
    know, I think one of the recommendations that we have seen is
    to basically help both our investigators and our prosecutors
    build more specialization in special victims crimes, and given
    the complexity and sensitive nature of those kinds of crimes,
    that is something that I am open-minded to and think would be
    beneficial for us.
        Senator Gillibrand. Will you review, for this Committee,
    the issues of racial disparity and the recommendations that by
    giving the decision-making to trained prosecutors you can also
    eliminate bias with regard to racism?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, what I have been focused on in
    my time in the job so far has been specifically the sexual
    harassment and sexual assault set of crimes. So that is where I
    have been focused. It is clear that there are disparities in
    our justice system for people of color. I have not been able to
    look into that in depth, but my initial assessment of this
    issue, or I should say my initial sense of this issue is that
    some of those disparities may be happening more on the
    investigation side of the ledger rather than on the prosecution
    side. But this is something I would want to study further.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Now let me
    now recognize Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
    for being here today. General, in your family service, you have
    got all of your kids in the military. That's awesome.
        I am a people person. You had your budget cut, and we need
    things to fight with. But the number one thing we need is
    people. With the cuts, how do we address pay and pay raises for
    our troops? With this inflation rising every day 5 percent, it
    looks like there is no stop to it. Number one, how do we
    recruit, and how do we pay our troops with the cuts that we are
    having? Both of you.
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Tuberville, good to see you. Why
    don't I start. I would say on the recruiting side, it is a
    tough environment. As you said, we are competing against all
    sorts of companies that are starting to increase their wages
    and so on. We are trying to bring in 61,000 soldiers this year.
    We think we are on track for that. But we are sending out a
    large number of recruiters to really showcase all of the things
    that the Army can offer to people all around the country who
    want to join. As part of that, in the President's Budget 2022
    we have a 2.7 percent pay increase for our soldiers, and that
    is a pretty good pay increase. I think we looked carefully at
    that issue. We also have, as you know, our Tuition Assistance
    Program, which is very popular with soldiers.
        So we really try to use a range of the things that we do to
    be able to bring in the quality best and brightest that we need
    in the Army every year, to keep us healthy and at the size that
    we need.
        General, do you want to build on that?
        General McConville. Yeah, thank you, and, I am very
    thankful that our soldiers and our civilians got a pay raise
    this year, and we are very appreciative of that, and we think
    that is extremely important. But as the Secretary said, we are
    in a war for talent, with young men and women. The advantage we
    have in the Army, and we have to continue to work this, is they
    want purpose in their life and they want to belong to a team,
    and we can do both for them. Once we get them in we have to
    compete for their talents and make sure that we are putting
    them in a place where we are taking full advantage of their
    talents. We are actually being fairly successful at that.
        We wake up every day making sure we can maintain the all-
    volunteer force. We want a force where there is no harmful
    behaviors, so parents are looking at us, and hey, this is a
    good place that I want to send my kids, and this is a great
    place to get ahead, for working class people. They can go to
    school and get an education, they get discipline, and all those
    wonderful things. So that is what we are doing, Senator.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you very much.
    Speaking of recruiting, Secretary, you probably did not have
    anything to do with this, but last month the Army released an
    animated marketing campaign titled ``The Calling"--I am sure
    you are familiar with +that--which was aimed at reaching the
    Generation Z audience with its storylines. This campaign cost
    approximately $4 million to produce. The campaign received so
    many negative comments, the Army took the comments section
    down.
        The Army should seek to recruit the best and brightest to
    protect our country, regardless of their background, because it
    is the generals' the captains' and the lieutenants' jobs, once
    they get there, to build them into a fighting force. My staff
    has asked for performance metrics on the campaign. Can I get
    your commitment that we will be given a thorough briefing on
    quantitative measures?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, we would be happy to brief you
    on the campaign, and what we know about how well it has
    performed. I would also just like to emphasize that as the
    general said, we are in a war for talent. We are trying to
    reach young people around America, all across the country, from
    all sorts of different backgrounds. We are trying to recruit
    Generation Z and those younger than them, and the days of Super
    Bowl ads maybe have been replaced by YouTube and other things.
        So part of what we are doing is trying to also figure out
    which innovative recruiting techniques is most successful and
    resonates with all sorts of folks around the country. But I
    would be happy to come back and brief you on the campaign, at
    your convenience.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. It is important that we get
    the best, because they do not make a lot, and as the general
    said here, we are fighting big tech, you are fighting people
    that are going to be paying a lot more money. I have got
    buddies in the Army, been in there for a long time, and they
    struggle, them and their families, as a lot of people across
    this country struggle, especially with the times that we are in
    right now. We have just got to take care of our people first,
    because that is our life blood. We were talking to the
    Selective Service not too long ago. We discussed this. Thirty-
    five million people are eligible for the draft and only 450,000
    eligible to serve in our military. That is scary. That is
    really scary. So we have got to do everything possible to sell
    the point that the military is somewhere that they can come,
    get a great education, get a great life, raise their families,
    and be great Americans.
        Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Let me now
    recognize Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Madam Secretary, my first piece of advice is
    don't talk about Super Bowl ads not working to a former
    football coach.
        Secretary Wormuth. Good point.
        Senator King. I want to welcome you to the Committee and
    congratulate you on your nomination and confirmation.
        Page 4 of the charts that you gave us, I am a little
    confused, and I want to get to the terminology to really get a
    fix on how this budget really works. OCO [Overseas Contingency
    Operations] seems to have disappeared. OCO was a significant
    part of the budget over the last 4 or 5 years. It is not in
    your chart. There is a little dotted line, but you talk about
    direct war costs and enduring costs of about $18 billion. Is
    that what we used to call OCO? General, you are nodding.
        Secretary Wormuth. Essentially, yes, Senator King. I think
    there has been a debate, as you undoubtedly know, for years,
    about trying to ensure we were providing sufficient
    transparency into the budget.
        Senator King. Listen, I agree. I have always been skeptical
    of OCO as a kind of slush up and down. So what you are really
    proposing is a higher base budget with less OCO, and I presume
    part of it, OCO last year was about $24 billion, under your
    formulation it is about--what we are thinking of as OCO, direct
    war and enduring costs, $18 billion. Does that reflect, in some
    measure, the reduction of costs in Afghanistan, for example?
        Secretary Wormuth. There is a small reduction in costs
    associated with our retrograde out of Afghanistan, Senator, but
    I do not believe it is a large one.
        Senator King. Okay. Hopefully we are going to have a little
    more transparent budget in the future, where OCO, the
    expenditures on war costs are part of the budget. Is that
    correct?
        Secretary Wormuth. That is the goal, yes.
        Senator King. Okay. Thank you. General McConville, you used
    the word ``convergence'' in one of the answers to your
    question, in terms of joint operability. One of your colleagues
    the other day said he had to pry data out of one of the other
    service branches. We have got joint operations. That was
    Goldwater-Nichols. My sense is, however, we need more in the
    way of joint compatibility of software and capability
    acquisition. Is that a sensible thing to be talking about?
        General McConville. Absolutely, Senator, and one of the
    things that we have done, and I have done it in conjunction
    with the other service chiefs, is we have stood up what we call
    the Joint Systems Integration Lab at Aberdeen. Because the
    future of convergence is really the ability to pass data from
    system to system, and to do it in a contested environment. If
    you want to pass an F-35 to some type of weapons system on the
    ground or some type of sensor, what that allows us to do is go
    up there, figure out how to move that data, test it, and then
    we go out into Yuma and do Project Convergence in the dirt. You
    have already got a way to do that.
        Senator King. But this is sort of the 21st century version
    of the phones not talking to each other in Grenada, where we
    could not communicate.
        General McConville. Well, I think what we are doing,
    Senator, is making sure that we can pass data between all the
    different types of systems we have in the joint system. That is
    what the intent is, and then next year we go to make sure we
    can do it with our allies and partners.
        Senator King. I look forward to working with you on that,
    because I think that is a very important point going forward.
        Missile defense and deterrence. Iron Dome appears to be a
    very effective system as it has been operating in Israel. It
    has saved a lot of lives. We were involved in the development
    of Iron Dome. Are we taking advantage of that capability, and
    is that something----
        General McConville. Yes, Senator. As I think you know, we
    have two batteries right now. We are going through the process
    of training our soldiers on that. That is the interim program,
    and what we are working with them and some others is how does
    that fit into our integrated air and missile defense system. We
    want to be able to pass data from all the different systems.
    The future is you have multiple sensors, and you have multiple
    shooters, and you use an integrated battle command system for
    integrated air and missile defense. It will take the
    information from the different sensors, it will pick the right
    shooter, and then you get the most efficient capability when it
    comes to protecting forces against air threats.
        Senator King. So we are back to convergence of data and
    software.
        General McConville. Yes, we are, Senator.
        Senator King. My final question is, my concern is defense
    against hypersonics. That strikes me as a significant strategic
    challenge for this country. Is this something that is in your
    area, with the Army, or is this again a joint enterprise,
    because certainly the Navy has to worry about hypersonics?
        General McConville. Well, we are all concerned about that,
    and I think we could take that in a different form with the
    Missile Defense Agency and talk through, probably in another
    forum, where we are on that, Senator.
        Senator King. Fine. Thank you. Thank you both. Thank you
    for your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King, and now let me now
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, of course
    Ranking Member Inhofe. I really appreciate you holding this
    hearing, and I would love to thank the witnesses for testifying
    today and for their service.
        I would like to speak a little bit about Hawthorne Army
    Depot which is located in Nevada. So Secretary Wormuth,
    Nevada's Hawthorne Army Depot, it is the world's largest--the
    world's largest--ammunition depot and demilitarization
    facility. The depot stores and demilitarizes munitions, it
    ensures munitions readiness for DOD, amongst other things. It
    also supports the Services by hosting military training. It has
    very unique terrain. All throughout Nevada we have, with the
    Air Force Nevada Test and Training Range and, of course, up in
    northern Nevada Fallon Naval Air Station. So we have unique
    Afghanistan-like terrain throughout Nevada.
        In 2005, there were attempts to close Hawthorne, but it is
    mission critical, and again, it is the world's largest
    ammunition depot. I am grateful that its closure did not come
    to fruition. So given Hawthorne's contributions to our national
    security, will you commit to working with me to ensure that the
    depot continues its important work serving our warfighters?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator, I would be happy to work with
    you on making sure that we continue to keep the capabilities at
    Hawthorne that we need. It sounds like they offer a variety of
    capabilities to our Army, and I would look forward to gaining a
    more in-depth understanding of Hawthorne, and again, making
    sure that it fits into future Army requirements.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move on to a
    little bit of tactical cybersecurity, because, of course,
    Senator King brought that up. We are going to have convergence
    of data, of software, hardware, software, firmware, all of it.
    Multiple points of vulnerability. Every time we add something
    on we can create a new stress point or a new access point.
        So, General McConville, in recent years Army Cyber Command,
    you have been fielding units to enhance our ground commanders'
    tactical cyber capabilities, such as intelligence, information,
    cyber, electronic warfare, and space detachment and the 915th
    Cyber Warfare Battalion. So, General McConville, what are the
    Army's plans for the growth of this mission, and in which
    theaters do you see the Army employing these cyber units? Is it
    something that you envision for the Indo-Pacific with our NATO
    [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, or possibly in
    Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan? I am just curious how you see it
    expanding.
        General McConville. Well, Senator, right now, when you talk
    about--we have to use an acronym, but it is I2CEWS which is
    intelligence, information, cyber, electronic warfare, and
    space. We are standing up the new multi-domain task force that
    has that capability at Joint Base Lewis-McChord with the focus
    on the Indo-Pacific. The second multi-domain task force is
    being stood up inside of Europe, and we are looking at third
    for the Pacific, and we are in the process of developing that
    also.
        We see this capability as extremely important for the
    future. We see, in the competition space, in the crisis space,
    the notion that we are going to have to have these type of
    capabilities, and we are in the processing of standing those
    organizations up and bringing them to fruition.
        Senator Rosen. Well, I would like to build on that, because
    how do you envision retaining these high-skilled cyber soldiers
    when NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officer], warrants, and even
    officers can find more lucrative and more balance work-life
    opportunities in cybersecurity jobs in the private sector? So
    you not only have to grow up your staff, train them, retrain
    them, and upskill them--there is always new technology,
    obviously--but how are you going to keep the people you have?
        General McConville. Well, I think that is a great question.
    With some of the people that are willing to stay in the Army,
    sometimes they surprise me. I was just down at the software
    factory at Austin, Texas, and we just stood this up because we
    are going to need people with these types of capabilities.
    There is a specialist, an E-4 down there, that, quite frankly,
    was a medic in our Army, and when we put out a call for coders
    he answered the call and he is probably one of the best in the
    Army, and the other people in that organization that have
    master's and Ph.D.'s recognize him as one of the very, very
    best we have.
        So we have got to have a talent management path for him and
    for others like him that they may become warrant officers or
    they may become incentivized, based on their level of
    experience. What we find is, if we can give them a good wage,
    and have them doing what they want to do, they will stay in the
    Army and they really like the mission that they have. Even
    though they could go outside and probably make a little more
    money, they really appreciate the mission. That is the feedback
    I get from the cyber operators that we have within Cyber
    Command.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I hope that we can help
    you. Senator Blackburn and I introduced a Civilian
    Cybersecurity Reserve Act to help you with a Civilian Cyber
    Reserve Corps, and so I look forward to working with you on
    that soon. Thank you.
        General McConville. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Sullivan,
    please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
    the witnesses being here. Thanks for your service.
        Last week I shared this chart with Secretary Austin and
    General Milley on the prioritization of the Biden
    administration with regard to our military, and asked them the
    question, how do you tell our troops that you are prioritized
    when you clearly are not? If you can see this--and I will make
    sure you have a copy for the record--almost every Federal
    agency in the U.S. Government is getting double-digit increases
    with inflation, which is now, unfortunately, creeping up to 5
    percent. The U.S. military budget, homeland security budget is
    actually getting decreased. I find it completely unacceptable.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        I asked the two leaders of the Pentagon, how do you tell
    the troops that you are prioritizing our military? They tried
    to answer. It was a tough question, because I am sure that they
    probably did not like the budget that they had to come to the
    Hill and defend.
        Madam Secretary and General, digging deeper, the Army--I
    mean, you guys are getting gutted. Let's call it like it is.
    Madam Secretary, in your confirmation hearing you told this
    Committee you do not want the Army to be the bill-payer for
    everybody else. You are the bill-payer right now, 4 percent
    cuts without inflation, with inflation you are almost double-
    digit numbers. This is like 2015, when the Obama-Biden
    administration was trying to cut 40,000 troops from the U.S.
    Army, Active Duty. They did it.
        How do you explain this to your forces? This is tough on
    you. I know you did not like this. I know you did not like
    being the bill-payer, but you are. How are you telling your
    troops right now that the U.S. Army is prioritized, and why do
    you think you are taking it on the chin, in terms of your
    budget? Madam Secretary, I will start with you.
        Secretary Wormuth. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. I think
    what I tell our soldiers when I talk with them is that I am
    confident that at the budget we have we are able to----
        Senator Sullivan. Is this the budget you wanted?
        Secretary Wormuth. Certainly, I think----
        Senator Sullivan. Almost 10 percent cut in the Army, with
    inflation.
        Secretary Wormuth.--I would certainly welcome additional
    funds. Having seen, for example, you know, barracks at Fort
    Hood, I would absolutely welcome additional funds.
        Senator Sullivan. General, is this the Army you advocated
    for? Sorry to interrupt.
        General McConville. Well, Senator, I did----
        Senator Sullivan. This is a huge issue. It is not getting
    nearly enough attention.
        General McConville. Yeah.
        Senator Sullivan. The Biden administration is blowing out
    the Federal Government, $6 trillion in spending. Okay? But with
    regard to the U.S. Army they are saying, ``Sorry, guys, ladies.
    You are getting nothing.'' So this is a real problem. General?
        General McConville. No, I just--I said I laid out our
    requirements. We have our budget and we have our unfunded
    requirements that I sent a letter to this Committee and all the
    other committees that lay out, if we can get additional money
    that is where we want to put it, and we would like to get that
    additional money.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I am going to advocate strongly for
    additional money for the U.S. Army. I think this is dangerous,
    and I think it is clear that the Biden administration does not
    prioritize the military, but it really does not prioritize the
    Army.
        Let me ask, you know, a lot of your testimony--I have been
    watching it all morning--talks about tough choices. I agree
    with you, you have tough choices. General, you have done a
    phenomenal job, your leadership, on addressing what is a huge
    challenge with the U.S. Army in Alaska. In the last 5 years we
    have had 32 suicides. You know, we have only had 41--and every
    death is horrible--combat deaths in Afghanistan in the same
    time frame. I just want to get your commitment that when you
    make tough choices, the work you are doing on addressing
    suicide, in one of the most important places in the country, my
    state, is not going to be one of these tough choices that you
    leave on the cutting room floor, because the Biden
    administration will not fund the damn Army. Can I get your
    commitment on that? Lives are at stake.
        General McConville. Absolutely. It is about people first,
    Senator. You have my full commitment on that.
        Senator Sullivan. Madam Secretary?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes. Yes, you have my commitment as
    well.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me finally ask, can I just get a
    quick update? I know, Madam Secretary, you committed to meet,
    you and General McConville, to brief me on the Arctic plan from
    the Army. We are getting mixed messages. Secretary of Defense,
    in his confirmation hearing, said he was going to fully
    resource Arctic strategies of all the Services. General Milley
    said the same last week at the hearing. But General VanHerck,
    in his hearing last week, he mentioned that the DOD budget,
    this budget, is inching along, did not move the ball very far
    down the field in terms of military Arctic strategy, and as you
    know, as NORTHCOM [Northern Command] Commander he is the
    advocate.
        Can I just get an update from the two of you on that
    strategy, which I think you have done a great job on, and I
    look forward to the briefing I am going to be getting from both
    of you here in the next couple of weeks.
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Sullivan, we have resourced, in
    this year's budget, the strategy, the Arctic strategy that the
    Army put forward to you, and I have not lost track of my
    commitment to come and brief you, so I am looking forward to
    doing that as well. I do not know if General McConville has
    anything else to add.
        General McConville. I think, Senator, you and I talked
    about the strategy is focused on being able to operate in the
    Arctic, which is a little different than operating from Alaska.
    We are putting that together. We will have more of an
    operational command up there. You tend to have an
    administrative command right now, but as you take a look at the
    fact that you are going to want to compete up there, we are
    taking a look. We have talked about the type of organizations
    we will put in there. We have got some more coordination to do,
    but we have a vision of where we want to go, and that is funded
    in the resources we have right now. There is some other
    collaboration that needs to be done on the type of units. We
    have a Stryker brigade up there, and as we take a look at what
    the future of that brigade looks like, that may change, and
    that is where we are having discussions right now.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Kaine,
    please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to continue
    along the lines of my colleague, Senator Sullivan, on budget
    issues, and I think the key is this Committee has to make a
    decision. The President has given us a budget and we have to
    make a decision about what we think is right. But I want to dig
    into this question of the Biden administration proposal and is
    it a ``cut.'' I am looking at a document, and it is the FYDP
    [Future Years Defense Program] that the Trump administration
    sent to us last year in April, April 2020. Page 195, table 616,
    this was the Trump administration's proposal for Army funding.
    Fiscal year 2021 it was $177 billion. But in this table, the
    Trump administration predicted, their projection was that in
    fiscal year 2022 they were going to make the Army undergo a 10
    percent cut. I am looking at this table and it shows fiscal
    year 2021 $177 billion, but they project that the Army was
    going to drop to $164 billion in fiscal year 2022. That was the
    Trump administration's plan that they submitted to Congress
    last April.
        The Biden administration did not follow the Trump plan for
    $164 billion. My understanding, and I think I am correct, is
    that the top line that is now before us is $173 billion. Am I
    right about the top line in the President's Budget, that it is
    $173 billion, not $164 billion?
        Secretary Wormuth. Yes, Senator. That is right.
        Senator Kaine. At what point in your budget deliberations
    did you switch from the Trump-era projection of $164 billion to
    the dollar amount that was submitted in the President's Budget
    of $173 billion?
        Secretary Wormuth. Senator Kaine, I think I am going to
    have to let General McConville speak to that because I was not
    yet the Secretary during the budget deliberations.
        General McConville. Yes, Senator. As far as the budget
    discussions, I was not aware, as far as we were planning
    through the process, on how that was going to play out, what
    was enduring OCO, what was OCO, and all those type things. So I
    cannot give you a good answer to that but I will take a look
    and come back to you.
        Senator Kaine. Yeah, I would like to ask that for the
    record, and, Mr. Chair, if I could, I would like to submit the
    FYDP that was submitted to us last April 2020, for the record.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.]
        Senator Kaine. Because I think what it shows is that
    contrary--again, the question of what is the right dollar level
    for the Army is a very legitimate one, and we may well decide,
    as a committee, that the President's request is not sufficient.
    I have done that before and I may do it again. But if I am
    thinking about who is proposing to cut, I am sure glad that
    President Biden recommended a $173 billion top line instead of
    $164 billion top line, which was suggested by the FYDP that the
    Trump administration gave us over a year ago.
        That is the only questions that I have, Mr. Chair, and I
    will yield time back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine, and I
    believe that we have concluded all of our colleagues who wished
    to speak. At this point let me thank the Secretary for her
    comments and General McConville for your comments, both of you
    for your extraordinary service. With that I will call the
    hearing adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                 integrated visual augmentation solution radios
        1. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, in
    the fiscal year 2022 budget request, the Army appears to request that
    funds intended for IVAS radios be transferred from the IVAS funding
    line to the Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) line. This is a
    new program and new start in fiscal year 2022. Can you ensure that the
    funding requested will support a full and open competition and
    procurement process for the IVAS radios?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Procurement of the single
    channel IVAS radios is not a new program start. The Fiscal Year 2022
    President's Budget Request outlined the intent to manage the IVAS
    radios within the HMS program. The single channel radio (IVAS)
    requirement will be executed through a January 2021 approved Middle
    Tier of Acquisition (MTA) Rapid Fielding pathway. An Other Transaction
    Agreement (OTA) Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
    contract was awarded on 25 March 2021. The program office will continue
    to utilize competitively awarded contracts using best value source
    selection procedures.

                enhanced night vision goggle-binocular (envg-b)
        2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    fiscal year 2022 request for ENVG-B is approximately $218 million,
    however, according to last year's budget justification documents, the
    projected budget request for ENVG-B procurement in fiscal year 2023
    would be about $6 million. That is a significant cut to a program that
    is being fielded and receiving positive feedback. Does the Army still
    plan to request $6 million in procurement for ENVG-B in fiscal year
    2023 or will that number be revised?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army will consider an
    appropriate revision to the Army's fiscal year 2023 budget request for
    the ENVG-B in order to prioritize resources in accordance with the
    National Defense Strategy and our Modernization Priorities. Following
    the Night Vision Modernization Strategy, the Army is initially focusing
    on the IVAS, which is expected to be the night vision device of choice
    for our Close Combat Force Soldiers, while the ENVG-B systems will be
    used by the Close Area Combat Force units. While the ENVG-B has
    received very positive feedback and is a leap forward from older night
    vision devices (such as the PVS-14), it does not necessarily provide
    overmatch against current and future adversaries.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
             army multi-domain transformation and the indo-pacific
        3. Senator Hirono. General McConville, the Army's #1 modernization
    priority is long-range precision fires--including missiles you're
    planning to base in the Western Pacific--can you provide a general
    status update on the progress of getting allies and partners in the
    Region to agree to host these weapon systems?
        General McConville. Rather than seeking permanent basing, the Army
    (with United States Army Pacific in the lead) is prioritizing the
    necessary agreements and infrastructure to ensure rotational access for
    Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) and other Army capabilities inside
    the first island chain during competition. At this time, the Army is
    not seeking permanent basing of LRPF in the Western Pacific, but it is
    seeking the necessary access to posture LRPF in competition and for
    contingency.
            army's hawaii infrastructure readiness initiative (hiri)
        4. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, I'm
    concerned about the Army's long-term effort to modernize installations
    in Hawaii through MILCON, known generally as the Hawaii Infrastructure
    Readiness Initiative--the only two projects funded in this year's
    budget are for the West Loch ammunition storage annex and a veterinary
    treatment facility at Pearl Harbor. Three other projects--an Aviation
    Operations Building and a Rotary Wing Parking Apron at Wheeler Army
    Airfield and a Command and Control Facility at Fort Shafter--are on
    your unfunded requirements list. Given the Army's focus on supporting
    the joint force to deter China in the Pacific, why aren't these three
    high risk MILCON projects that you identified on your unfunded
    requirements list in the base budget request?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is concerned
    about the condition of its infrastructure in Hawaii and the impacts
    that substandard facilities have on readiness and Soldier quality of
    life. The Army must balance these requirements against all
    requirements, across all installations, in support of quality of life,
    readiness, and modernization. The Army intends to address the Rotary
    Wing Parking Apron, the Aviation Operations Building, and the final
    increment for the Command and Control Facility in future budget cycles
    if they are not authorized and appropriated in this budget.
                        renewal of training land leases
        5. Senator Hirono. General McConville, the Army is negotiating
    renewals for several training area land leases in Hawaii that are set
    to expire in 2029, including the Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), which
    is critical for joint and partner nation readiness. It's important for
    the Army to conduct respectful engagement with local community leaders,
    especially the Native Hawaiian population. Is the Army Corps of
    Engineers' plan to stand up a Training Lands Retention Office by August
    of this year to work with the local community still on track?
        General McConville. Yes, the plan to stand up a Training Lands
    Retention office is on track and a program manager is expected to be
    hired by the end of August. This employee will work directly for the
    U.S. Army Pacific, Director of Training, as well as working in close
    partnership with both U.S. Army Hawaii and the U.S. Army Garrison
    Hawaii to accomplish program objectives. The position will enable a
    close working relationship with the local community.
                          army multi-domain task force
        6. Senator Hirono. General McConville, the Army's Multi-Domain Task
    Force (MDTF) is focused on defeating an enemy's anti-access/area denial
    capabilities. Is the Army still planning to stand up additional MDTFs
    beyond the one at Joint Base Lewis McCord in Washington State, and if
    so, where will they be located?
        General McConville. The Secretary of Defense announced in April
    that the Army will activate the second MDTF in Germany in September
    2021. We are reviewing options for additional MDTFs, including added
    support for USINDOPACOM. However, given competing demands and available
    force structure, the Army has not yet made final decisions on where and
    when to grow additional MDTFs.

        7. Senator Hirono. General McConville, what steps is the Army
    taking to ensure the MDTFs can work closely with our allies and
    partners?
        General McConville. The Army has incrementally introduced MDTF
    concepts and capabilities with select countries interested in multi-
    domain operations. We are also initiating a Capability Gap Analysis to
    identify which Joint and Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) capabilities and
    linkages are required to integrate MDO with our allies and partners.
        In the Indo-Pacific, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) shapes
    force design and employment concepts. USARPAC and the Headquarters,
    Department of the Army will incorporate MDTF concepts with select
    allies and partner countries through Indo-Pacific Pathways exercises,
    joint exercises, concept development, and wargaming.
        In Europe, the Army will activate a MDTF in mid-September 2021.
    This capability has received significant interest from allies and
    partners. As MDTF-Europe comes on-line, U.S. Army Europe-Africa
    (USAREUR-AF) will engage with specific allies and partners to refine
    region-specific requirements.

        8. Senator Hirono. General McConville, what additional MILCON
    projects do you anticipate being necessary to support the establishment
    of future MDTFs?
        General McConville. In the immediate term, no additional MILCON
    projects are necessary. The Army is using Operations and Maintenance
    (O&M) Restoration and Modernization (R&M) funds to adapt existing
    facilities to meet experimental or interim stationing of MDTFs. The
    Army will evaluate several stationing alternatives before making
    permanent stationing decisions in accordance with applicable laws and
    regulations. The Army is also conducting a facility Requirements
    Analysis to scope future MILCON submissions. Once the evaluation of
    permanent stationing alternatives (pursuant to NEPA and Army
    Regulations) is complete, the Army will be in a better position to
    identify and request future MILCON projects.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
    department of army budget change from fiscal year 2021 fydp projection
                              to fiscal year 2022
        9. Senator Kaine. Secretary Wormuth, when did the Army begin to
    plan to a top line budget of $173 billion for fiscal year 2022?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army conducted concurrent planning for
    different top lines throughout the POM 22 build in fiscal year 2020;
    however, it was not until the second quarter of fiscal year 2021 that
    the Army received specific guidance of a $173 billion top line. At this
    time the Army began deliberate planning based on that number.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Gary C. Peters
                                    stryker
        10. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    Stryker combat vehicle has proven itself to be one of the Army's most
    versatile platforms and continues to expand its missions beyond its
    core function as an infantry carrier. For example, Stryker was selected
    as the platform for critical fielding of urgently needed short-range
    air defense systems using both traditional missiles and cannon, as well
    as cutting-edge technology lasers. Stryker is also the platform for the
    Army's next generation of Electronic Warfare and Signals Intelligence
    systems and mobile command posts outside the Stryker Brigade
    formations. The key to being able to perform these expanded missions is
    the Army's decision in 2018 to upgrade to the newest Stryker A1
    configuration that provides more engine and electrical power, a digital
    network, and a much heavier suspension. Does the pace of modernization
    outlined in your budget request reflect the Stryker's expanding
    missions?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Yes, it does. The
    modernization efforts for the Stryker portfolio represent the Army's
    commitment to preparing Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) to fight
    and win in a dynamic and complex operational environment. All aspects
    of the Army's budget request are nested and synchronized to develop a
    modern force capable of meeting worldwide contingencies. The lethality
    upgrades for the Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station- Javelin, the
    Medium Caliber Weapon System, and the Anti-Tank Guided Missiles Vehicle
    prepare the SBCT to meet its expanding mission set on the future
    battlefield. These upgrades will yield six DVHA1-equipped, very
    capable, and lethal, SBCTs by the end of fiscal year 2030.
        The Army budget request also accelerates funding for the SBCT's
    Stryker platform to incorporate the Terrestrial Layered System (TLS),
    which integrates Electronic Warfare, Signals Intelligence, and Cyber
    Warfare at the tactical edge of battle. We are funding four and one
    half SBCT sets of TLS between fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022.
    Additionally, the Army is funding 96 Mobile Short Range Air Defense (M-
    SHORAD) integrated Stryker vehicles in fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year
    2022 to defend Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) against manned and
    unmanned aircraft systems.

        11. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, I am
    concerned that a planned effort to test two Active Protection Systems
    (APS) on the Stryker continues to be delayed and is listed in the
    Army's unfunded requirements list. How would not funding this testing
    impact the procurement of an APS for Strykers?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The $21 million unfunded
    requirements list request would support multiple efforts. Specifically,
    $16 million is required to complete Phase 2 Iron Fist Light Decoupled
    (IF-LD) Urgent Materiel Release (UMR) documentation on the Bradley
    Fighting Vehicle (BFV) and $5 million is required to execute Limited
    Characterization (LC) of two Hard-Kill (HK) Active Protection System
    (APS) solutions informing the APS requirement on the Stryker vehicle.
    If the $16 million for BFV is not resourced, then logistic product
    development and verification, engineering change proposal release,
    vehicle software updates, and the UMR will not be completed. This will
    result in a day-for-day slip in procurement and fielding of a hard kill
    capability in support of the Directed Requirement. If the $5 million
    for LC is not resourced, the Army will be unable to determine if either
    HK APS solutions meet the specifications, or if integration of either
    system onto a Stryker platform is feasible without the performance data
    captured during the characterization effort. Therefore, the Army will
    be unable to proceed with the planned procurement of a HK APS solution
    for Stryker if the unfunded requirement is not resourced.
                                   m-1 abrams
        12. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    Abrams Main Battle Tank as currently upgraded to the M1A2 SEPV3
    configuration remains the world's best tank and is the backbone of the
    Army's most powerful formation, the Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT).
    I am concerned to see a 30 percent reduction in ``version 3'' upgrades
    when Russia is another year closer to fielding and exporting the T-14
    Armata. What is affected by the 30 percent reduction reflected in the
    budget request?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The 30 percent reduction
    will reduce Abrams production from one ABCT per year to three fourths
    of an ABCT per year and will reduce the number of brigade field
    modifications from two BCTs to one BCT in fiscal year 2022. The
    reduction in funding is due to the significant amount of funding placed
    in Abrams production over the past four years, the necessity to fund
    other critical Army modernization priorities, and the reduction in the
    Army's fiscal year 2022 budget.

        13. Senator Peters. General McConville, is this an acceptable level
    of risk?
        General McConville. The production at three fourths of an ABCT per
    year places Abrams at a moderate programmatic risk (which can be
    mitigated through Foreign Military Sales) and a low operational risk
    due to the significant amount of Abrams M1A2SEPv3 production in past
    years. As the Army is modernizing tanks at a faster rate than the rest
    of the combat vehicles in the ABCT, this allows the ability to focus on
    other critical Army modernization priorities.
                            critical infrastructure
        14. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, as
    co-Chair of the Defense Communities Caucus, I believe the Defense
    Community Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to be invaluable. But at the
    same time, I believe it could do more to strengthen communities'
    critical infrastructure to prevent cyber-driven disruptions that impact
    force projection and readiness. While studying how cyber-originating
    disruptions can impact force projection, the Army Cyber Institute's
    Jack Voltaic Project developed a software-based framework for local
    governments to rehearse their cyber incident response capabilities. Do
    you see merit in equipping municipalities with solutions like this
    through a DCIP-like process?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Yes, providing
    communities programs like Jack Voltaic through a Defense Critical
    Infrastructure Program-like process is important. This is true not only
    to the communities involved, but also to maintain our national
    security. To help local governments prepare for potential crises, Jack
    Voltaic was created to bring the whole-of-community together. This
    program ensures industry and the national security enterprise, as well
    as federal, state, and local governments are brought together in an
    unclassified exercise environment to understand the challenges for
    communities, to develop incident response plans, and to them capture
    lessons learned. The ultimate goal of this program is to develop an
    exportable framework that communities throughout the United States can
    use to run an exercise for themselves and to ensure DOD preparedness
    for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) requests.
        Past efforts illuminated cyber response challenges for financial
    institutions in New York City; addressing attacks against multiple
    infrastructure sectors after a hurricane in Houston; city-wide cyber
    responses in eight locations, as well as disruption of Army force
    projection via highways, railroads, and the ports of Savannah and
    Charleston. The Jack Voltaic planning tools show great potential
    through a DCIP-like process, both to exercise the cyber resilience of
    communities near military bases, but also for the Army to exercise
    force projection with critical infrastructure owners and operators.
    This software framework is at an initial operating capability, but
    needs additional development and testing before wider distribution.

        15. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, will
    you explore ways to translate the institute's work into something
    useable for communities?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army Cyber Institute
    (ACI) has already begun the work needed for communities to conduct
    independent Jack Voltaic-like events. Currently, ACI has issued grants
    to universities for development of exercise planning tools that will
    allow communities to create their own scenarios, conduct their own
    exercises, and share data and lessons learned among various
    communities. The work is expected to be fully operational and ready to
    transfer to communities in fiscal year 2023, depending on future
    funding.
                            professional development
        16. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, the budget request shows a
    significant reduction in Army Tuition assistance, citing an
    ``anticipated reduction of intake rates'' into the program. Will this
    translate to less funds available to soldiers pursuing off-duty
    civilian education (e.g., lowering $4,000 limit per fiscal year)?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army Cyber Institute (ACI) has already begun
    the work needed for communities to conduct independent Jack Voltaic-
    like events. Currently, ACI has issued grants to universities for
    development of exercise planning tools that will allow communities to
    create their own scenarios, conduct their own exercises, and share data
    and lessons learned among various communities. The work is expected to
    be fully operational and ready to transfer to communities in fiscal
    year 2023, depending on future funding.

        17. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, is the reduction in any way
    related to the current problems stemming from the transition to
    ArmyIgnitED from GoArmyEd?
        Secretary Wormuth. No, the current challenge with bringing
    ArmyIgnitED fully online is unrelated to the President's Budget
    Request. ArmyIgnitED replaces the outdated legacy system and supports
    participation by allowing Soldiers to request tuition assistance
    through an automated process.

        18. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, when will the ArmyIgnitED-
    related problems be resolved?
        Secretary Wormuth. ArmyIgnitED opened, Army-wide, for tuition
    assistance enrollments on July 19, 2021. The transition to ArmyIgnitED
    continues to progress as technical issues are resolved. Soldiers are
    able to use ArmyIgnitED for those educational institutions that have
    uploaded their institutional degree files into the system. Currently,
    there are 92 schools with successful integration into the ArmyIgnitED
    platform. Soldiers will continue to gain greater access to the
    ArmyIgnitED platform as more educational institutions successfully
    enter into the system. As an interim measure, while schools continue to
    enter into the system, the direct enrollment option with educational
    institutions through an exception to policy is still available should
    any Soldier be unable to enroll through ArmyIgnitED. The Army will
    continue working with those participating schools who have not yet
    uploaded their institutional degree files as well as with our Soldiers
    who need to use the exception to policy process to enroll.
                            multi-domain task force
        19. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    Multi-Domain Task Force is the organizational centerpiece for Army
    modernization, yet its Intelligence, Information, Cyber, Electronic
    Warfare, and Space (I2CEWS) Detachment and the All-Domain Operations
    Center are on the list of unfunded requirements. As these are relevant
    in competition, crisis, and conflict, why are they not in the base
    budget?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army's fiscal year
    2022 budget request reflected the Army's highest priorities.
    Recognizing the importance of the Multi-Domain Task Force, the Army
    would welcome an opportunity to accelerate the Intelligence,
    Information, Cyber, Electronic Warfare, and Space (I2CEWS) Detachment
    and the All-Domain Operations Center requirements in fiscal year 2022,
    if additional funding is available.
                                      ampv
        20. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is listed by the Army as one of
    its 31+4 key modernization programs but received a cut in funding of
    over $500 million from last year's budget position and there is no
    Unfunded Requirement listed for AMPV in the Army's request.
    Additionally, the budget exhibits highlight that this funding will be
    used for non-production activities and not actually procure any
    vehicles in fiscal year 2022. The Public Affairs Officer for the PEO
    who owns AMPV published a statement that identified the reason for the
    cut and that the program was re-baselined to support moving the Full
    Rate Production (FRP) decision to fiscal year 2023; however, by not
    including the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) in the Army's budget
    exhibits, this Committee is unable to validate that the PAOs statement
    is true and whether AMPV actually remains a priority for the Army. When
    will this Committee see the FYDP for AMPV?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. I understand that the
    Department of Defense intends to submit a fiscal year 2023 FYDP during
    the Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget submission next year. That
    decision will be informed by the National Defense Strategy review
    process.
        The single year budget was submitted because the transitioning
    administration was developing its policies and strategic guidance
    necessary to inform the out-year budget plans. For the last two
    Presidential transition year budgets, for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal
    year 2018, DOD only submitted the next year Fiscal Year President's
    Budget.

        21. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, AMPV
    is the only Next Generation Combat Vehicle in production. Is it still a
    priority?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Yes, the Armored Multi-
    Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is managed by the Next Generation Combat Vehicle
    (NGCV) Cross-Functional Team (CFT) and is included in the Army's 31+4
    modernization priorities. Additionally, the Optionally Manned Fighting
    Vehicle is in development and is fully funded in fiscal year 2022. It
    is scheduled to begin replacing the Bradley Fighting Vehicle no earlier
    than fiscal year 2029.

        22. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    Army and contractor have highlighted significant investments made for
    this program to include the first ever use of robotic welding on combat
    vehicles. Given our soldiers are currently using a Vietnam era vehicle,
    will Full Rate Production still occur at a rate to support the
    investments made for this program, which the Committee understands is
    at least 1 brigade set per year?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army remains fully
    committed to divesting the Vietnam-era M113 family of vehicles from our
    ABCTs as quickly as fiscally possible. For the Armored Multi-Purpose
    Vehicle (AMPV), the Army awarded four Low Rate Initial Production
    (LRIP) contracts for three and half Armored Brigade Combat Teams'
    (ABCTs) worth of AMPVs (or 457 vehicles), and those are being produced
    and will begin fielding in fiscal year 2023. The Army elected to re-
    baseline the AMPV program last winter to provide the vendor more time
    to establish the production line and not because of any change in
    priority. AMPV remains an extremely important Army modernization
    effort. The next contract and the first Full-Rate Production (FRP)
    contract under this re-baseline is scheduled for fiscal year 2023.
                            tactical electrification
        23. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, during your confirmation
    hearing you testified that electrification of combat and tactical
    vehicles, as well as associated battery technology development would be
    focus areas for you if confirmed in order to better understand how
    deeply the Army could pursue tactical electrification noting
    operational benefits in fuel efficiencies and overall power management.
    The Administration has also placed emphasis in supporting the
    transition of the commercial automotive fleet to all-electric fleets
    through recent Executive Orders. As such, please provide more details
    on:
          The Army's near and long term strategy for tactical
    electrification.
        Secretary Wormuth. In the near term, we are partnering with U.S.
    industry through multiple initiatives to share knowledge and to learn
    from our collective investments. We are also investing in the
    technologies required to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels,
    including power storage, rapid recharging, and integration of new
    capabilities into existing systems. Progress to date has
        demonstrated the potential for smarter use of power to improve
    mileage of our tactical wheeled vehicle fleets and the potential for
    hybrid power options to fulfill some of our vehicle power requirements.
    Fully electric options for our heaviest combat platforms are not
    currently feasible with existing and emerging technologies.
        The Futures and Concepts Center of U.S. Army Futures Command is
    developing a long-term electrification strategy for the Army. It is
    informed by national policy and strategies, industry plans and
    progress, and military requirements to implement the defense strategy.
    The strategy will describe the future Modernized Army Energy Ecosystem
    and identify ways and means to achieve it.
          How you are working with commercial industry to leverage
    the significant levels of internal research and development investment
    being made by automotive companies?
        Secretary Wormuth. Our Ground Vehicle Systems Center (GVSC) within
    U.S. Army Futures Command's Development Command (DEVCOM) is co-located
    with the commercial automotive industry in southeastern Michigan. The
    GVSC leverages its proximity to automotive technical centers through
    Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with many of
    these automotive partners to leverage commercial efforts and
    investments in areas such as electrification. To date, we have
    established 11 CRADAs and Test Service Agreements with automotive
    Original Equipment Manufacturers and suppliers of electrification
    components. Additionally, the GVSC has hosted five electrification
    forums attended by dozens of companies working in electrification to
    share information on the Army's unique operational environment and to
    gain their input on our electrification plans and architecture. These
    forums allow the GVSC to share the Army's electrification needs and
    challenges with commercial industry partners. The GVSC has an
    established track record of working with America's research
    universities and leveraging groups such as the Automotive Research
    Center (ARC), partnering with 15 industry organizations and 9
    universities from around the country. These collaborative efforts
    between the Army and the commercial automotive sector are informing
    future vehicle requirements.
        Finally, the Army Applications Laboratory (AAL) in Austin, Texas,
    is working with the automotive sector nationwide to find industry
    solutions in relevant areas, such as the mobile charging infrastructure
    needed to support future military electric systems. As part of this
    effort, the Army has received technical input and solutions from over
    70 different non-traditional partners, ensuring that commercial best
    practices are being leveraged to address the unique military challenges
    with vehicle electrification.
                  electric light reconnaissance vehicle (elrv)
        24. Senator Peters. Secretary Wormuth, regarding the electric light
    reconnaissance vehicle (eLRV) program, I understand the Army has an
    identified unfunded requirement in fiscal year 2022 of $5.6 million and
    that if left unfulfilled could significantly impact the Army's ability
    to award up to 4 other transaction agreements to initiate this critical
    program. What steps are you taking internally to ensure this program
    remains on schedule?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request reflects the
    Army's best effort to balance allocated funding against our
    requirements while assuming the least anticipated risk. The electric
    Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (eLRV) program was not funded in our
    budget request. If additional resources become available, we will
    consider funding the eLRV to avoid a one-year slip in its program.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
            factoring program performance for budget prioritization
        25. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
    DOD, particularly the Army, must leverage best practices to make sure
    our Nation delivers high-quality systems to our warfighters on-time . .
    on-budget . . . in alignment with the National Defense Strategy and
    Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I'm encouraged by our
    progress to date in key programs, like Future Vertical Lift, or FVL.
    The Army's embrace of a streamlined--so-called, ``middle tier of
    acquisition'' pathway--is proving effective in efficiently generating
    highly competitive options, while minimizing program failure risk to
    the government and the American taxpayer. Secretary Wormuth, can you
    address how the Army is factoring program performance to prioritize
    budget requests, especially in regard to doubling down on proven
    programs that work, such as FVL?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Program performance is
    just one factor that is considered for budget priority. Programs are
    prioritized based on the importance of the capability gap they are
    filling and the timeframe in which that gap must be closed.
        For instance, Long Range Precision Fires is the Army's number one
    acquisition priority because we are currently outranged by our near
    peer competitors, and we need to close that gap as soon as possible.
    Other gaps may not need to be closed as quickly, so they fall lower in
    priority and can be developed and procured at a slower rate. This frees
    up budget for higher priority programs. Programs that have a poor
    performance record, on the other hand, typically result in lower budget
    priority and offer an opportunity to shift funding within the budget,
    across the Future Year's Defense Program, because underperforming
    programs typically cannot execute their full budget due to program
    delays.
        We are, however, very proud of the combined Army teams' approach to
    the FVL programs, including their responsible use of new procurement
    and acquisition authorities granted by Congress, the focus at all
    echelons on affordability, and the continued emphasis on stable and
    achievable requirements.

        26. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
    another aspect of FVL that warrants a compliment is the Army's
    discipline in making sure the service implements a ``modular open
    systems architecture'' approach to maximize the Army's flexibility in
    managing operation and support costs over the program's lifecycle.
    Actively avoiding vendor lock-in is absolutely vital to enable DOD to
    provide warfighters with cutting-edge technology, while lowering
    overall costs through competition. Secretary Wormuth, as the Army
    continues to embrace modular open systems architecture in the FVL
    family of systems, will you commit to working with me to make sure this
    acquisition best practice is adopted and replicated across all
    Services?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is committed to
    Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) as a warfighting imperative
    and has developed policy and implementation guidance to apply and
    certify the appropriate level of MOSA implementation in all Army
    programs. Accordingly, each of the Army Program Executive Officers
    (PEOs) have written MOSA guidance specific to their portfolio of
    programs. PEO Aviation has established a MOSA Transformation Office to
    ensure a disciplined approach to MOSA. It is currently identifying
    lessons learned in applying MOSA to Future Vertical Lift (FVL) and
    across the entire aviation portfolio of programs.
        The Army is actively engaging with industry to identify means to
    enhance competition, avoid vendor lock-in, accelerate and streamline
    technology insertion, and reduce support costs over a program's
    lifecycle. The Army is also an active participant in the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) Modular Open Systems Working Group and the
    associated Tiger Teams, where best practices are identified,
    established, and shared across the Services. We will continue to work
    with OSD to assist in the adoption and implementation of MOSA across
    the Department of Defense.
    balancing modernization efforts with readiness investments in the indo-
                                 pacific region
        27. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
    I've been encouraged to see expanding roles for organizations such as
    the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade and the National Guard's
    State Partnership Program. Forging long-standing relationships with
    SFABs and Guard units gives international partners a more local view of
    the U.S. in a way that presents a unique diplomatic opportunity, in
    addition to building partner military capabilities and
    interoperability. Bottom-line: enhancing relationships increases
    deterrence and opens doors to the access and presence we need to
    compete in the region. General McConville, how does the Army properly
    balance the need to invest in modernization with resourcing critical
    readiness and mil-to-mil initiatives with our partners and allies,
    particularly in the Indo-Pacific Region?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army seeks to balance
    investment in modernization with resourcing critical readiness and mil-
    to-mil initiatives with our partners and allies, particularly in the
    Indo-Pacific Region, through a series of detailed analytic processes
    that consider requirements, funding, and risk across all programs. Army
    leadership uses these processes to ensure investments are balanced
    across all portfolios based on the National Defense Strategy and other
    service requirements, including the Indo-Pacific region. The Army
    continues to evaluate, contribute and invest in readiness and
    capabilities that support the Army's efforts in the Indo-Pacific region
    to build partnerships and allies.
        For example, the Army instituted a new unit lifecycle model--ReARMM
    (Regionally Aligned Readiness & Modernization Model)--to generate ready
    forces for SECDEF validated requirements, which include exercises and
    engagements with our allies and partners, while allocating force
    elements to undergo deliberate modernization. ReARMM maximizes
    readiness while allowing the Army to continue its modernization. This
    model provides predictability to units and commanders and better aligns
    the many moving parts required to modernize a combat formation while
    simultaneously allowing the Army to program the right units to support
    exercises and mil-to-mil engagements.

        28. Senator Duckworth. General McConville, will you commit to
    exploring opportunities to expand the National Guard State Partnership
    Program in the Indo-Pacific to sustain presence and build partner
    nation capacity?
        General McConville. Yes. I fully support the National Guard's State
    Partnership Program. The State Partnership Program is one of our
    strongest tools for building partnership capacity and we continue to
    grow the program by two to three partners per year throughout the
    world. As the Pacific Defense Initiative is established, the
    USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility will receive significant attention.
    We look forward to adding to the current 13 partnerships within the
    Indo-Pacific, which are critical to maintaining relationships in the
    region and avoiding conflict with China.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                   reserve components & new army fitness test
        29. Senator Rosen. General McConville, the Reserve Components face
    their own set of challenges as citizen soldiers, with two careers to
    manage and without access to the day-to-day services available to
    active duty troops on military installations. One such challenge will
    be the transition to the Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT). While active
    duty soldiers will have ACFT equipment at their everyday place of work,
    Reserve Component soldiers will not, no matter how much equipment is
    fielded to Reserve/Guard units. These soldiers are not at their units
    every day to train on the equipment. This will require Reserve
    Component soldiers to have to pay for, and have access to, specialized
    gym equipment in order to train for the ACFT, whereas every soldier can
    train for the current Army Physical Fitness Test from their own home.
    How does the Army plan to address this disparity as they implement the
    ACFT?
        General McConville. The Army Reserve Components will continue to
    lead by example in ACFT implementation. The efforts by the Reserve
    Components ensure that no Soldier has to pay out of pocket in order to
    prepare for and then pass the ACFT. The ARNG has fielded 15,854
    complete sets of ACFT testing equipment to over 1,400 cities and towns
    across all 54 States and Territories. This equipment is distributed to
    maximize Soldier access and is dispersed in a manner to provide at
    least one full lane of equipment for every 21 Soldiers assigned, which
    aggregates to nearly six lanes of equipment per ARNG facility. The Army
    Reserve has placed 8,020 sets of equipment in the field for Soldiers to
    use. Army Reserve analysis indicates 84 percent of USAR Soldiers have
    homes of record within 25 miles of an equipment facility. An additional
    13 percent are within 50 miles.
        Furthermore, Master Fitness Trainers are expertly advising and
    coaching Reserve Component Soldiers to train for the ACFT utilizing
    dozens of exercises that can be accomplished with only body weight,
    with simple equipment, or with the equipment Soldiers typically have on
    hand. All of these exercises are illustrated in the Army Training
    Publication 7.22.02, ``Holistic Health and Fitness Drills and
    Exercises.'' The identified exercises in this reference allow Reserve
    Component Soldiers to train for the ACFT despite geographic dispersion
    or limited access to DOD fitness facilities, though all Reserve
    Component Soldiers have access to Department of Defense gyms and
    equipment. Finally, an additional 5,000 lanes of equipment are being
    distributed by TRADOC across the country to recruiting stations, ROTC
    schools/universities, and other TRADOC posts.
        Lastly, the ARNG reports that 21 States are currently piloting
    Holistic Health and Fitness initiatives and partnership programs with
    access rights to equipment and facilities, such as YMCAs, schools, and
    community centers that will specifically enable ACFT training.
                                   iron dome
        30. Senator Rosen. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, I
    applaud the Army's decision to acquire two Iron Dome batteries and its
    successful integration of Iron Dome components as part of the Indirect
    Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) program. Despite the ongoing rocket
    attacks against U.S. Forces and facilities in Iraq showing gaps in the
    U.S.'s ability to defend against rocket attacks, the Army has
    eliminated having the current ability to defend against rocket attacks
    as a criteria in the IFPC selection, only requiring the future ability
    to have such a capability. This raises concerns about leaving our
    forces unprotected against these threats that adversaries are already
    using against the United States and allies like Israel. Why has the
    Army eliminated counter-rocket capabilities from being a requirement in
    the IFPC program?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army has not
    eliminated counter-rocket capabilities as a requirement in the IFPC
    Increment 2 program. The enduring IFPC Increment 2 system will be fully
    integrated into the Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    architecture to defeat not only cruise missiles, as directed in the
    Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, but also rockets,
    artillery, mortars, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
          army decision to eliminate malaria drug and vaccine research
        31. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wormuth, Senator Durbin and I
    recently sent a group letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the
    elimination of the malaria vaccine and drug research program at Walter
    Reed Army Institute of Research. We remain concerned with the
    Department's decisions over recent years to precipitously decrease and
    even eliminate funding for malaria research, particularly in light of
    increased drug-resistant malaria in Asia and insecticide resistance in
    Africa. Malaria remains the number one infectious disease threat to
    United States servicemembers abroad in those AORs.
        As a Nation, we have learned during this pandemic that a lack of
    health readiness can come at an enormous cost to American life and
    treasure. Understanding the ability for an infectious disease such as
    malaria to disrupt mission readiness and the likelihood of continued
    future deployments to the AFRICOM and PACOM AORS, how will you ensure
    previous investments in malaria at the Walter Reed Army Institute of
    Research, the world's premier research center for malaria, continued to
    be leveraged?
        Secretary Wormuth. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development
    Command (MRDC), a subordinate command of U.S. Army Futures Command, is
    committed to preserving internal expertise and capabilities that are
    essential to research and development of medical countermeasures to
    protect military personnel. MRDC and the Walter Reed Army Institute of
    Research (WRAIR) focus on scientific core competencies that are broadly
    applicable across a range of pathogens threatening the health and
    readiness of military personnel. As infectious disease threats emerge
    and evolve within the operational environment, MRDC and WRAIR will
    pivot those competencies towards the highest priority threats, focusing
    investments on threats that do not receive attention or funding from
    inter-agency partners, non-governmental organizations, or industry.
        Malaria research and development will continue to have a high level
    of interest and support from inter-agency partners, academia, non-
    governmental organizations, and international bodies. The MRDC recently
    delivered two Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drugs for
    malaria prevention and treatment, respectively: Tafenoquine and
    Artesunate. Tafenoquine can prevent malaria infection from all species
    of malaria and is a new option for malaria prevention that will
    increase in importance as resistance to standard of care therapies
    grows. Artesunate is the only FDA-approved treatment for severe malaria
    in the United States and is a critical capability to save lives.
                          unfunded requirements lists
        32. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wormuth, the MATES' repair is a
    National Guard priority that gets absorbed into the larger Army
    Unfunded Requirements List. Secretary Wormuth, would providing separate
    Unfunded Lists better communicate priorities specific to the Army and
    the Army National Guard?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army National Guard (ARNG) currently
    integrates UFR requests within a Total Army concept. This ensures the
    ARNG UFRs nest with the Army's priorities of improving the quality of
    life of our Soldiers and Families, modernizing our facilities and
    equipment, and increasing readiness of the force.
                afghanistan special immigrant visa (siv) program
        33. Senator Wicker. Secretary Wormuth, as United States troops
    continue to execute the withdrawal from Afghanistan, I am concerned
    about the safety of our Afghan partners who assisted United States and
    coalition forces in the country. The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    program provides a path for these individuals and their families, but
    delays and quota limits may jeopardize the lives of these persons.
    Secretary Wormuth, please describe what the Army is doing to ensure the
    safety of our Afghan partners as we depart the country, both in support
    of the SIV program and through other means.
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army is fully integrated into Department of
    Defense planning efforts that support the State Department and the
    whole-of-government approach to ensuring the safety of our Afghan
    partners as military operations come to a close in Afghanistan. To that
    end, the Army has established a specific team to assist with prudent
    planning efforts.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                        fort bragg military construction
        34. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, as
    you are aware, the Immediate Response Forces (IFR) is the Nation's
    rapid response force, which is comprised of paratroopers from one of
    the 82nd Airborne Division's brigade combat teams and should be able to
    rapidly deploy within 18 hours. For the first time since 1989, the
    response force received rapid deployment orders on New Year's Eve 2019,
    following the Iran-supported Hezbollah militia attacks on the American
    embassy in Iraq. However, as paratroopers prepared for the deployment,
    they spent most of the day traveling across Fort Bragg from location to
    location gathering equipment instead of spending their limited time on
    briefings or preparing for the mission. Compounding this issue is that
    conventional forces at Fort Bragg have only been supported with a
    single MILCON project since 2010, compared to the numerous MILCON
    projects that have supported special operations units at the same base.
    It is irresponsible of Congress, and I would argue of the Army, to
    require the IFR to perform its duties if we are not going to provide
    the necessary support facilities to ensure mission success and soldier
    safety. While it is currently not on the unfunded priority list, do I
    have your commitment that you will support our IFR warfighters by
    placing their request for a strategic deployment complex and a tactical
    equipment maintenance facility on this year's list of unfunded
    priorities?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. At this time, the
    Strategic Deployment Complex and the Tactical Equipment Maintenance
    Facility projects lack sufficient design status. As a result, they do
    not meet the 35 percent-design threshold required for inclusion in the
    fiscal year 2022 CSA MILCON unfinanced requirement (UFR) list. These
    projects are expected to meet the design threshold to compete in a
    later budget cycle.

        35. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
    taking it a step further, if the IFR is essential to the Department's
    ability to rapidly support America's national security in emergent
    crises, why is it not part of the Army's requested budget? If it is not
    essential, as it would appear based on the budget and unfunded priority
    list, why have it?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Immediate Response
    Force (IRF) is essential to the Department's ability to rapidly ensure
    America's national security in emergent crises. The Army continues to
    develop Military Construction, Restoration, and Modernization projects
    to improve the efficiency of deployment operations in support of the
    IRF, while taking into account the Army's facility requirements
    worldwide to support unit readiness and Soldier quality of life.
                              future vertical lift
        36. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) modernization program consists of two
    distinct aircraft, each designed to accomplish different missions in
    the Army's future force. They are the Future Long Range Assault
    Aircraft (FLRAA) program, designed to replace the Blackhawk and the
    Future Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) designed to fill the void
    left by the retirement of the Army's armed scout aircraft. The Army has
    budgeted $181m between fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2021, and
    Congress has added $185m during the same period. The Army suggests that
    this program is its number 3 modernization initiative (out of 6) and
    the total funding is between number 5 and 6 in total dollars over the
    FYDP. Additionally, the Army has awarded two competitive prototypes for
    each variant, both to Bell Helicopter and LM/Sikorsky. The Future
    Vertical Lift program is considered the furthest along of all the
    projects under the CFTs, and Futures Command. The FLRAA program, in
    particular, is the one major program that is actually flying. This is
    not a ``paper'' program, and thus represents the ``Poster Child'' for a
    successful acquisition program coming out of Futures Command. The
    existing vertical lift fleet, according to CSIS, lacks the necessary
    speed, range, endurance, survivability, and lethality to compete in the
    Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. The U.S. Army FVL program
    seeks to modernize the vertical lift fleet by delivering the most
    modern, versatile, and lethal power projection platform to insure
    success on the modern battlefield. There have been recent articles in
    the press (believed to be pushed by those opposing FVL) which have been
    critical for the Army's requirement for speed. The Army has pushed back
    aggressively citing the need for speed and range to increase lethality
    and allow the Army to achieve a more lethal force in the Great Power
    Competition, and Indo-Pacific Theater. General McConville, the Army has
    consistently discussed the need for speed and range, as well as
    survivability when it comes to the future vertical lift aircraft. Could
    you explain to this Committee why speed and range are so critical to
    the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft and how this new technology will
    allow the Army to leverage FLRAA as a power projection platform?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. FLRAA is the next
    generation of affordable vertical lift, including both assault and
    intra-theater aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC) aircraft. It will be
    both effective and decisive in the lower tier of the air domain.
        The fundamental capability of FLRAA is its reach and the power
    projection it provides in the increasingly dangerous and complex multi-
    domain operations environment. FLRAA will compel enemy forces to
    respond to multiple dilemmas with its ability to move and converge
    ground forces through decentralized operations over extended distances.
    FLRAA will expand the reach of ground forces to conduct air assault
    missions across the battlespace, reducing enemy reaction time and
    freedom of action.
        Importantly. FRLAA will remain survivable with the use of Air
    Launched Effects (ALE) and integration with other maneuver forces and
    long-range fires, all enabled by the network. Additionally, the cost
    per effect for FLRAA to insert two infantry battalions in one period of
    darkness is comparable to the cost of twice as many UH-60s to achieve
    the same effect.

        37. Senator Tillis. General McConville, how will this capability
    assist the Army with its strategy in the Indo-Pacific Theater and in
    the Great Power Competition?
        General McConville. The Future Vertical Lift (FVL) ecosystem is
    poised to provide Multi-Doman capabilities for Joint Force threat
    penetration at the outset of large-scale conflict using
    transformational speed, range, and the ability to converge Army and
    Joint sensors and shooters to enable decision dominance. In addition,
    FVL will provide overmatch capability and capacity to out-tempo the
    enemy at all Army echelons to win the close fight.
        China's investment in creating a dense network of anti-access/area-
    denial (A2/AD) capabilities throughout the Pacific island chains
    presents a complex problem. It inhibits U.S. power projection, erodes
    joint freedom of maneuver, and ultimately diminishes credible
    deterrence.
        Dominating in the lower tier of the air domain, the FVL ecosystem
    provides a unique advantage against A2/AD systems, such as Integrated
    Air Defense Systems (IADS), enemy long-range fires, and threat command
    and control systems. Hidden by surface clutter while operating at lower
    altitudes, FVL outmatches radar and observation with the standoff and
    swarming capability of its Air Launched Effects (ALE) with Electronic
    Warfare (EW) and lethal strike capabilities. Joint force aircraft and
    follow-on maneuver forces can exploit this penetration to destroy other
    critical targets once FVL destroys or neutralizes the IADS barrier.

        38. Senator Tillis. General McConville, is the Future Vertical Lift
    program fully resourced, across the FYDP for both the FLRAA and FARA
    programs, both Research and Development funding and Procurement
    funding? What are the amounts of funding, through the FYDP? And in
    which year will Congress see funding requested for procurement dollars?
        General McConville. We do not yet know how much funding will be
    allocated to the Army each year beyond fiscal year 2022, so we are not
    able to state that both FLRAA and FARA are fully resourced across the
    FYDP. Fiscal year 2030 remains our target for equipping the first unit.
        Both the FARA and FLRAA programs are actively utilizing in-process
    feedback from our industry partners to inform data driven discussion,
    government cost models, and decisions on future resourcing
    requirements.
        The FARA and FLRAA analyses, demonstrations and risk reduction, and
    prototyping efforts will help us ensure informed future budgets; we are
    committed to keeping Congress informed on these efforts at each
    juncture. Procurement requirements will align to support the Army's
    First Unit Equipped target of fiscal year 2030 and will be informed by
    the vendors' performance through developmental test activities.
                       short-range reconnaissance program
        39. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, it is
    my understanding that the Army's Short-Range Reconnaissance program was
    the driver behind the development of the ``Blue Small Unmanned Aircraft
    Systems.'' Am I correct in the assumption that the five Blue drones
    that have undergone a down-select for consideration are 100 percent
    made in the USA?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army's RQ-28A Short
    Range Reconnaissance (SRR) program is separate and distinct from Blue
    Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Blue sUAS) managed by the Defense
    Innovation Unit (DIU). The Army's SRR program provided access to Army
    contracts that were utilized by DIU to evaluate the first batch of the
    Blue sUAS aircraft. Specifically for SRR, the RQ-28A is not
    manufactured completely in the United States. However, it is compliant
    with Section 848 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization
    Act, which restricts all Department of Defense UAS critical components
    from being manufactured in specific countries.
                              army ground vehicles
        40. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth, during the hearing General
    McConville clearly identified the need to modernize and transform the
    Army for any future fight against a strategic peer competitor like
    China and stated that ``most of the weapon systems we're using are 1980
    vintage''. Regarding the Army's acquisition strategy for the Joint
    Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, which the Army plans to
    recomplete as a ``build to print'' competition and is the only tactical
    wheeled vehicle competition planned through 2028, I'm concerned about
    whether this current ``build to print'' strategy is setting the right
    conditions for modernization of the Army's TWV fleets, specifically the
    JLTV program, which is currently planned to be in the fleet through
    2040. What other alternative acquisition strategies have you considered
    as part of the JLTV competitive acquisition strategy to ensure the JLTV
    remains relevant and not effectively buying more of the same capability
    that is technically better designed for the previous conflicts in Iraq
    and Afghanistan?
        Secretary Wormuth. The Army conducted research and considered
    multiple strategies, which focused on how much industry would be asked
    to invest and the capabilities, risk, and the life cycle cost
    implications of these decisions. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
    (JLTV) acquisition strategy was selected to leverage an already capable
    platform, and through focused design upgrades and competition, it
    brings new capabilities to Soldiers and Marines. The JLTV Follow-On
    Contract is based upon a new variant of the family of vehicles, which
    includes several technology insertions in the areas of powertrain,
    electrical architecture, noise reduction, and stowage. The pending
    competition also includes significant incentives for competitors to
    propose additional technology enhancements in the areas of fuel
    efficiency, corrosion, upgrade of vehicle architecture, and driver
    assist capabilities, while keeping the cost of the JLTV affordable.
    These technology advances on a proven system, which currently has
    growth and modularity capability in weight, power, and available kits,
    make the JLTV the optimal platform for the light tactical vehicle
    mission in a Multi-Domain Operational environment.

        41. Senator Tillis. Secretary Wormuth, the Army's infantry squad
    vehicle (ISV) is planned to enter full rate production in September and
    despite this being a new capability to address an operational need for
    infantry brigade combat teams for enhanced tactical mobility the
    program had its funding reduced by 10 percent in the fiscal year 2022
    budget request, effectively keeping production rates well below minimum
    sustaining rates of production. Recognizing the budget request was
    submitted without a future year's defense program, could you provide us
    with more insight into the long term acquisition strategy for the ISV
    program to include whether the Army plans to procure the authorized
    objective of 2,065? It's my understanding the Army is currently
    reviewing the light tactical vehicle fleet mix for infantry brigade
    combat teams to include JLTV, HMMWVs, and ISVs. What is the status of
    this review and when can we expect to see details?
        Secretary Wormuth. The plan for the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV)
    was to procure 11 Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) sets, or 649
    vehicles, with funding ending in fiscal year 2024. The Tactical Wheeled
    Vehicle Study is ongoing, and it will inform the right mix of light
    tactical vehicles in the IBCT. That study will inform Army decisions on
    future procurement of light tactical vehicles for the IBCT and the Army
    expects to have the results later this year.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                        cold-weather all-terrain vehicle
        42. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    Cold-Weather, All-Terrain Vehicle (CATV) is not on the Army's ``31 plus
    4'' modernization list. As I understand it, two firms were recently
    selected to build CATV prototypes that would replace the obsolete Small
    Unit Support Vehicles, which enable mobility for Arctic operations. Can
    you provide an update on this program, including when it will achieve
    initial operational capability?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Cold Weather All-
    Terrain Vehicle (CATV) program awarded Other Transaction Authority
    agreements to two vendors in April 2021 for the prototype phase. Each
    vendor delivered two vehicles in June 2021. The Army will perform
    testing of the vehicles at Cold Regions Testing Center, FT Greely, AK.
    Successful completion of the testing of these prototypes will determine
    eligibility to compete for a production contract.
        A production award is targeted for the fourth quarter of fiscal
    year 2022, with the first unit equipped with five vehicles in the
    fourth quarter of fiscal year 2023 to United States Army Northern
    Warfare Training Center, FT Wainwright, AK. At this point, the Army
    intends to protect programmed funding for this important modernization
    effort, as it is necessary to divest the Small Unit Support Vehicles
    (SUSV), which are reaching obsolescence.
                          arctic brigade combat teams
        43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    Army Arctic strategy calls for the transformation of the Alaskan-based
    BCTs into Arctic BCTs to ``recapture our cold-weather dominance.'' Part
    of my understanding of this transformation is that it requires a shift
    away from Infantry Carrier Vehicles, or Strykers, to a vehicle that
    provides better mobility in Arctic terrain. What is the status of the
    Army's transformation effort?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is finalizing
    options and timelines to transform the Alaska-based Stryker Brigade
    Combat Team (SBCT) into a more arctic-capable formation. We expect to
    announce the options being assessed in early fiscal year 2022. Ground
    mobility requirements in arctic terrain could be provided by the Cold
    Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CATV). The CATV will replace the aging
    Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV). The CATV program is in the prototype
    phase, with vehicles from two vendors conducting testing at the Cold
    Regions Testing Center at Fort Greely, Alaska. Our current timelines
    project a production award by the end of fiscal year 2022, and first
    unit equipped by the end of fiscal year 2023.

        44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
    what is the timeline for 1-25 and 4-25 BCTs to convert to Arctic BCTs?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is reviewing
    options for the conversion of force structure to Arctic-capable
    formations. Once approved, those conversions will follow the Total Army
    Analysis (TAA) timeline with announcements typically in the first
    quarter of the fiscal year. The decision will be followed with a
    synchronization of resources (personnel, training, and equipment)
    required for the conversions.
                         arctic multi-domain task force
        45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, it
    is my understanding that the Army will create an Arctic Multi-Domain
    Task Force (MDTF) in Alaska. It will consist of several units currently
    assigned to 1-25 and 4-25 in addition to newly assigned units. Which
    long-range precision fires systems will this unit field and will they
    undergo Arctic testing before fielding?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is currently
    exploring options for different capabilities to place within the
    planned MDTFs depending on location and mission. The options are being
    validated through testing and experimentation, which will inform the
    types of long-range fire precision systems the Army will station in
    MDTFs both within the continental United States and outside the
    continental United States.

        46. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, it
    is my understanding that the Arctic MDTF will include long-range
    precision fires that the Army wants to operate along Alaska's vast
    coastline for extended periods of time to create anti-access/area
    denial networks. Is the Army considering how civilian and military
    infrastructure will impact Arctic Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF)
    operations along Alaska's coastline?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army is exploring
    multiple force structure options to support the newly published Arctic
    Strategy. As those options are developed, we will consider the impacts
    from civilian and military infrastructure.
                        army multi-domain transformation
        47. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    ``Army Multi-Domain Transformation'' document calls for long-range,
    land-based missiles on West Pacific islands to threaten targets deep
    within China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) defenses. That document
    also emphasizes the Army's role as an inside force, operating within
    adversary A2/AD networks. The fiscal year 2022 budget indicates the
    Army either failed to establish a compelling narrative about its
    usefulness in the Pacific or the Department of Defense did not find the
    Army's INDOPACOM plans credible. If defense budget cuts continue, how
    will the Army modernize to deter and defeat potential peer or near-peer
    adversaries while simultaneously maintaining readiness levels for
    inside forces?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Faced with potential
    downward budgetary pressure, the Army must strike a difficult balance
    between meeting the demands of current operations while preparing for
    the future. To accomplish this, the Army can and will achieve the
    balance between People, Readiness, and Modernization needed to field
    the future force. We will use the Regionally Aligned Readiness and
    Modernization Model (ReARMM) to align units regionally to meet current
    Joint Force demand while preparing the force for the future. We must
    satisfy operational demand while modernizing for pacing and emergent
    threats. Detailed modeling and simulation has shown us that we must
    modernize or risk defeat in the future against near peer adversaries.
    We have cut our legacy and enduring programs significantly in order to
    fund our Modernization Priorities, accepting as much risk as possible
    in those programs. Future budget reductions will likely cause the Army
    to reduce funding to our top six Army modernization priorities to
    protect our People First initiatives and to protect Readiness. The Army
    will pursue a resourcing strategy, which is fully aligned with the
    national security strategic guidance, and we will provide the very best
    Army we can within our budget.
        To do this, we must sustain the readiness that we have worked so
    hard to rebuild over the past several years, while reprioritizing
    funding to invest in critical capabilities. Long Range Precision Fires
    (LRPF) remains the Army's number one modernization priority. LRPF is
    absolutely critical to defeating China's Anti-Access/Areal Denial
    capability. To deter and win, we must also be capable and prepared for
    the close fight with capabilities such as Future Vertical Lift and the
    best equipped Soldiers in the world. The Joint Force and INDOPACOM have
    asked for, and will depend on, Army LRPF in support of their
    operational plans, along with other capabilities such as logistics,
    intelligence and prepositions stocks.
                               anti-ship missiles
        48. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, the
    ``Army Multi-Domain Transformation'' document calls for long-range,
    land-based missiles on West Pacific islands to threaten targets deep
    within China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) defenses. If these
    capabilities include anti-ship missiles, how is the Army coordinating
    with the Navy and Marine Corps to execute sea denial missions?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army's on-going
    coordination with the USN and USMC includes training, capability
    development, and mission planning. The Army coordinates for Soldier
    training on
        USN weapon systems in support of the Long Range Fires Battalions.
    This training includes firing procedures, command and control, and
    missile handling.
        Army coordination with the USMC includes USN weapons training,
    sharing weapon capability development, and refining digital C2 and
    communications common to both services. Additionally, the Army and USMC
    hold a semi-annual programmatic Army/Marine Corps Board that focuses on
    capability development within the long range fires portfolio to ensure
    we were maximizing resources and reducing redundancies.
                                  air defense
        49. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, how
    is the Army coordinating with the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to
    deploy integrated air defense capabilities to protect the Joint Force
    from China and Russia's prodigious land-attack and anti-ship missile
    arsenals?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense (IAMD) is an inherently joint mission, which requires a
    number of offensive and defensive capabilities from all services to
    effectively protect the Joint Force and enable our freedom of action.
    At the theater level, the Army directly supports Regional Combatant
    Commanders in carrying out their responsibility to synchronize and
    coordinate the planning, resourcing, and execution of IAMD operations
    with other sister-service elements. The Army does this through its
    regionally aligned Army Air and Missile Defense Commands (AAMDC).
    Specific to China and Russia, the 94th AAMDC is located in, and
    supports, the INDOPACOM theater and the 10th AAMDC is located in, and
    supports, the European theater. Additionally, the 32nd AAMDC is
    stationed in Texas, but it maintains a forward deployed element in
    support of CENTCOM's IAMD operations. The 263rd AAMDC is located in
    South Carolina and directly supports NORTHCOM and the homeland IAMD
    mission.
        In addition to this operationally focused support to the Combatant
    Commanders, the Army provides strategic IAMD planning and coordination
    support in collaboration with our sister-services. Specifically, the
    Army is directly involved in IAMD planning, which includes past and
    current missile defense reviews, multi-service strategies for air base
    defense against missile threats, the defense of Guam, and the
    development of joint service IAMD doctrine, as well as multi-service
    IAMD tactics, techniques, and procedures.
        The Army's highest AMD modernization priority is the Integrated Air
    and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). IBCS will provide the
    Army with the necessary mission command network to integrate not only
    the Army's IAMD system, but also the other Service's IAMD capabilities
    to enable more efficient and effective target detection and
    prosecution. IBCS IAMD interoperability with the Joint Services is a
    key component of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
    experiments Project Convergence 21, the Orange Flag demonstration
    series, and other JADC2 events.
                                   logistics
        50. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville, if
    competition with China turns into conflict, how is the Army planning to
    move its inside forces within Chinese A2/AD networks?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army and the Joint
    Force must successfully maneuver across all domains inside the first
    island chain to win critical first battles in a conflict with the
    People's Republic of China (PRC). In competition, Army forces postured
    inside the first island chain are well within the PRC's Anti-Access/
    Area Denial (A2/AD) and long-range fires zones. Army Forces are key to
    enabling distributed networks and protecting the Joint Force during
    crisis and conflict through Integrated Air and Missile Defense and
    other means. Army forces, distributed and dispersed across the region,
    pose multiple dilemmas to the PRC. Distributed Army forces also provide
    options to the Joint Force Commander to increase the speed of decision
    making and the physical range of when and where to apply military force
    across the theater.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                             ammunition facilities
        51. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, what specific resources
    or authorities will it require to fully modernize Holston Army
    Ammunition Plant so that its outdated infrastructure no longer
    represents a single point of failure in the defense enterprise?
        General McConville. The Army is currently developing its resourcing
    strategy beyond fiscal year 2022 as part of a holistic 15-year Organic
    Industrial Base (OIB) Modernization Strategy that will encompass its 23
    government-owned and government-operated (GOGO) and government-owned
    and contractor-operated (GOCO) depots, arsenals, and ammunition
    facilities. We anticipate the initial results of our analysis to be
    available next year.
        This strategy is critical to preparing the OIB to support multi-
    domain operations in large scale combat operations, and it will inform
    the fiscal year 2023 budget request to include the necessary
    infrastructure investments required to modernize Holston Army
    Ammunition Plant over the Future Years Defense Plan FYDP. In fiscal
    year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, the Army received approximately $600
    million to continue safety improvements, RDX expansion, infrastructure
    upgrades, environmental improvements, and cybersecurity solutions.
    Continuing to modernize Holston will reduce the likelihood of
    production interruptions or catastrophic failures, and improve worker
    safety.
                               army end strength
        52. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, the Army's fiscal year
    2022 end strength proposal reduces the collective force by
    approximately 1,700 Soldiers. What are your primary concerns looking at
    the operational commitments you are simultaneously being asked to
    source?
        General McConville. My primary concerns are operational tempo
    (dwell and deployment) on our Soldiers and units as well as having the
    necessary structure to stand up new organizations like the Multi-Domain
    Task Forces (MDTF).

        53. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, what sort of unforeseen
    impacts and risk associated with end strength reduction are you trying
    to anticipate? (i.e. safety, retention, family stress, and force
    preservation issues)
        General McConville. End strength reductions will limit the Army's
    ability to meet unforecasted requirements, while maintaining
    modernization timelines, planned rotational deployments, and
    reorganizing for multi-domain and large scale combat after two decades
    of war against Violent Extremist
        Organizations (VEO's). In fiscal year 2021, the Army responded to
    multiple unforecasted requirements to include hurricane recovery,
    wildfires, the treatment of COVID patients and administration of COVID
    vaccines, the security of the Southwest border, efforts to counter
    Iranian aggression, the support of civilian law enforcement in the
    National Capital Region, and the support of the Afghanistan retrograde.
    We reasonably expect fiscal year 2022 unforecasted emergent
    requirements to remain commensurate with fiscal year 2021. Reduced Army
    end strength limits our capacity to respond to emergencies while
    transforming without trading critical aspects of modernization or other
    planned activities in support of the Combatant Commands.
                              future capabilities
        54. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, in October 2019 you
    affirmed your support for Admiral Davidson's request for two Multi-
    Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) in INDOPACOM. Is that still a priority, and
    if so, how long do you anticipate it will take to source Admiral
    Aquilino with the additional MDTF he needs?
        General McConville. The Army continues reviewing options for
    additional MDTFs beyond the second deployment recently announced for
    Europe; these options include added support for USINDOPACOM. The third
    MDTF, if we can resource it, is earmarked for the Pacific region. We
    are working with INDOPACOM and U.S. Army Pacific to determine location
    and timing; however, given competing demands and available force
    structure, the Army has not yet made those decisions. If we do, we
    anticipate having the ability to activate an additional MDTF as early
    as fiscal year 2023.

        55. Senator Blackburn. General McConville, would a higher topline
    increase the speed at which you could resource and deploy the
    additional MDTF to INDOPACOM?
        General McConville. A topline increase in fiscal year 2022 could
    enable the Army to increase the speed at which we resource and deploy
    the MDTF to an extent. Resourcing the MDTF is the number one priority
    on the Army's Unfunded Requirements List for fiscal year 2022. Funding
    the $2.5 million unfunded requirement would allow the MDTF to take full
    advantage of advances in digital warfare, autonomous robotics, and
    artificial intelligence to maintain digital overmatch against near-peer
    adversaries and non-state actors by shortening kill chains, providing a
    persistent capability, and enabling freedom of maneuver. It would
    provide the MDTF the ability to securely deploy computing resources on-
    demand to networked users around the globe.
        Additional topline resourcing would not likely increase the speed
    at which we are developing other capabilities critical to the MDTF,
    such as Long Range Hypersonic Weapons, the Mid-Range Capability or the
    Precision Strike Missile, nor would it increase the speed at which we
    can build and train on them.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                       army housing at fort leonard wood
        56. Senator Hawley. General McConville, one of our priorities in
    Missouri is ensuring that all of our servicemembers enjoy the best
    quality of life possible. One of the challenges we're facing is that
    many of the homes at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri were built in the
    1960s and are long overdue for replacement. What is the Army doing to
    facilitate replacements for these homes, so we can ensure all
    servicemembers in Missouri can continue to enjoy the highest standards
    of living?
        General McConville. The Army's number one priority is our people,
    and we are committed to providing a quality of life that allows
    Soldiers and their Families to thrive. Privatization of the family
    housing at Fort Leonard Wood occurred in March 2005; Balfour Beatty
    Communities (BBC) is the Managing Member of the Fort Leonard Wood
    privatized housing company. Sharing your concern about the age of the
    housing inventory, the Army has conceptually approved BBC's five-year
    development plan for Fort Leonard Wood that includes the demolition and
    replacement with new construction of 59 legacy (built in 1957-1962)
    family housing units using existing project funds. In addition, the
    Army is supporting BBC's endeavor to obtain additional private sector
    financing to fund additional new development at top priority locations,
    including Fort Leonard Wood. The additional financing is anticipated in
    Fall 2021. These additional funds are expected to fund the demolition
    of more legacy housing units and their replacement with new
    construction housing in numbers that are still being determined at Fort
    Leonard Wood and other top priority locations.
                    army's role in the indo-pacific theater
        57. Senator Hawley. General McConville, combat-credible forward
    postured forces in the Indo-Pacific are critical to deterring Chinese
    aggression. How do you see the posture investments requested in
    INDOPACOM's 1251 report supporting the Army's efforts to bolster its
    own forward deterrent posture in the Pacific?
        General McConville. The Army is focused on improving and expanding
    our rotational force posture inside the first island chain to deter
    People's Republic of China (PRC) military aggression by denying their
    ability to conduct military operations at will. Improved posture will
    result in a stronger deterrent capability, which will also support a
    rapid transition to crisis or conflict. Our posture investments are in
    support of the Joint Force and aligned with United States Indo-Pacific
    Command's (USINDOPACOM's) 1251 Report.
        As an example, USINDOPACOM's request of land-based anti-ship
    capabilities will increase conventional deterrence of the PRC. The
    Army's additional posture priorities within the first and second island
    chains support this requirement and seek to establish a forward Joint
    and Combined defense in depth. The Army's dispersed and innovative
    posture efforts provide support in accordance with the USINDOPACOM 1251
    Report, and we will continue to pursue a forward deterrent posture as
    opportunities arise through continuous engagement.

        58. Senator Hawley. General McConville, how does the Army plan to
    use partnership-building exercises such as Pacific Defender and Pacific
    Pathways to strengthen our relationships and access across the Indo-
    Pacific region, and how are you thinking about building on these
    initiatives in the future?
        General McConville. Partnership-building exercises strengthen
    relationships, increase interoperability, and contribute to a Land
    Power Network for collective defense and security. Through exercises,
    operations, and activities, the Army expands access, presence, and
    influence that contribute to the development of lasting cooperation and
    codified agreements.
        These agreements serve several functions. First, they demonstrate
    the steadfast commitment of the U.S. to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
    Second, they allow the United States to actively compete in the region
    during peacetime, countering People's Republic of China (PRC) malign
    activities and coercion. Third, they enable incremental progress toward
    long-term agreements that guarantee U.S. access to key terrain during
    crisis and contingency. For additional context, in fiscal year 2022 and
    beyond, ``Indo-Pacific Pathways'' is the new name that replaces
    ``Pacific Defender'' and ``Pacific Pathways.''

        59. Senator Hawley. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville,
    President Biden said all United States Forces will be withdrawn from
    Afghanistan by September 1st. How will our departure from Afghanistan
    help the Army refocus attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific and
    China, in particular?
        Secretary Wormuth and General McConville. The Army will remain
    committed to supporting the security of the United States Embassy in
    Kabul. Reduced operational demands will allow the Army to focus on a
    number of ongoing efforts to include Army force modernization
    initiatives and improvements to force readiness to better compete with
    China. This reduction will also increase the forces available for
    employment in the Indo-Pacific to compete against China or to shape an
    emergent crisis.

        60. Senator Hawley. General McConville, the Army deploys an armor
    brigade to Europe every year to help deter Russian aggression. Outside
    of units already assigned to conduct partner exercises, should the Army
    consider deploying a Brigade Combat Team to the Indo-Pacific theater in
    the same fashion as EUCOM?
        General McConville. With the existing Army Immediate Response Force
    (IRF) construct as part of the Joint Contingency Response Force (CRF),
    there is potential for the Dynamic Force Employment of Army
    capabilities through Indo-Pacific Pathways. Like in Europe, a short
    episodic presence would reassure allies and demonstrate the ability to
    project power at a time and place of our choosing. It would also
    provide the Army opportunities to learn from deploying a large Army
    element into a contested archipelagic environment, which would be very
    different from the past 20 years of deploying large Army forces into a
    continental, largely uncontested environment. For context, since 2015,
    the Army has deployed a Brigade Combat Team to South Korea annually.

        61. Senator Hawley. General McConville, what message do you believe
    this would send the Chinese and our allies and partners in the region?
        General McConville. Deployment of a large ground combat force into
    the region would send a clear signal of U.S. resolve to ensure a free
    and open Indo-Pacific, as well as a willingness to defend our own
    interests and those of our allies and partners.
                      sexual assault response coordinators
        62. Senator Hawley. General McConville, Sexual Assault Response
    Coordinators are the first-line responders that victims of military
    sexual assault rely on for medical, legal, and other support. But the
    Fort Hood Independent Review Committee found that these professionals
    often lack the staffing, resources, and training they need not only to
    be effective for victims, but also to support one another and take care
    of themselves. Do you think improving recruitment, retention,
    education, and support for SARCs would help them to be as effective as
    possible?
        General McConville. The Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response
    and Prevention (SHARP) program includes 630 full-time Brigade-level/
    equivalent and installation SHARP professionals, 50 SHARP Program
    Managers, and four Assistant Program Managers across the Army
    enterprise. These professionals are some of the most highly-trained
    advocates in the Department of Defense. The Army has continued to make
    improvements to their recruitment, training, education, and support.
        In terms of training and education, all full-time Army Sexual
    Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and Victim Advocates (VAs) must
    attend a 6-week resident SARC/VA Career Course at the U.S. Army SHARP
    Academy at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The Army SHARP Academy curriculum
    exceeds the minimum training requirement for victim advocacy set by the
    National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA) and fully prepares
    the SARCs and VAs for their roles and responsibilities. The curriculum
    includes competency-based assessments and training on self-care, a
    topic that is reinforced through continuous education and outreach
    activities.
        In order to enhance recruitment and retention of the most qualified
    individuals to serve in these sensitive positions, the Army published
    guidance in February of 2021 that included specific incentives for
    military personnel serving in SARC or VA positions. In addition, the
    Army is transitioning to a more centralized screening, selection, and
    assignment process for military personnel in full-time SHARP positions.
    This transition will enable improved benefits and career management
    similar to military Equal Opportunity Advisors.
        Lastly, understanding these positions are potentially high strain
    and can result in vicarious trauma, the Army Resilience Directorate
    offers website training for self-care to personnel in this field. This
    training teaches personnel how to overcome some of these stresses they
    are exposed to while advocating for a victim of sexual harassment or
    sexual assault. In addition, during the annual Program Improvement
    Forum, SHARP professionals are provided training with techniques to
    better care for themselves, underscoring the importance of this
    necessary practice in providing advocacy to others.

                                APPENDIX

                     ARMY FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET OVERVIEW
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                               AIR FORCE POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Manchin,
    Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
    Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn,
    Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. The Committee meets today to receive
    testimony on the plans and programs of the Department of the
    Air Force in review of the fiscal year 2022 President's Defense
    Budget Request.
        I would like to welcome our witnesses, Mr. John Roth,
    Acting Secretary of the Air Force; General Charles Brown, Chief
    of Staff of the Air Force; and General John Raymond, Chief of
    Space Operations. We are grateful to you for your service, and
    the service of all the men and women of the Air Force and Space
    Force, and to their families for their continued support.
        I want to note that is the first appearance of both General
    Brown and General Raymond at an Air Force posture hearing. We
    all look forward to working with you as leaders of the Air
    Force and the Space Force.
        President Biden's defense budget request for fiscal year
    2022 includes approximately $173.3 billion in funding for the
    Department of the Air Force, a 3.26 percent increase from the
    fiscal year 2021 enacted budget. In preparing this budget
    request, the Air Force faced difficult decisions in balancing
    the need to modernize and keep technological advantage over
    near-peer competitors against the need to support ongoing
    operations around the world. The budget request before us tries
    to maintain that balance by increasing funding to address
    readiness concerns while also funding technologies for the
    future fight and modernizing our strategic deterrent
    capability.
        This year, the Air Force is again proposing to retire and
    realign a number of aircraft systems to free up resources for
    implementing General Brown's strategic vision of ``Accelerate
    Change or Lose.'' General Brown, I am interested in hearing
    more this morning on the programs that have received increased
    emphasis under your vision.
        The budget request would also reduce or alter the force
    structure for A-10's, F-16's, F-15's, C-130's, KC-135's, KC-
    10's, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
    (JSTARS) aircraft, and Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft.
    Any Air Force proposal of this sort deserves our careful
    consideration. I hope the witnesses will provide the Committee
    with the reasoning for the proposed retirements and
    realignments within this budget request and assure us that any
    decisions are well thought-out. I also recognize that Congress
    has made divestment decisions difficult at times.
        I am also interested in hearing about your continued
    efforts to improve shortfalls within the remotely piloted
    aircraft operator community, and how the Air Force has
    addressed shortfalls within the larger pilot community and
    maintenance personnel.
        One of the primary reasons Congress established the Space
    Force was to consolidate the numerous space activities in the
    Department of Defense (DOD). General Raymond, this is your
    first posture hearing, but you are a familiar face to this
    Committee. I would like to know how you are growing the Space
    Force and normalizing operations within the larger Department
    of Defense, including progress on the merging of the Space
    Development Agency into the Space Force by October 1, 2022.
    With regard to space warfighting capabilities, I will also want
    to know how you are progressing in your role as the lead force
    design architect for the Defense Department's satellite
    constellations.
        Finally, now that the Space Force is standing up, it is
    important to present a trained force with material capabilities
    to the combatant commands. One of the capabilities for the
    combatant commands now under discussion is tactical space
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). This is a
    new operating domain for DOD, and I would ask the witnesses to
    discuss what resources they believe are needed to ensure its
    success.
        Acting Secretary Roth, General Brown, and General Raymond,
    thank you again for appearing before our Committee and I look
    forward to your testimony.
        Now let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Ross,
    General Brown, and General Raymond, thank you for being here
    today and for all of your work.
        The current National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's
    military to be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat our
    peer adversaries, including Russia and China. For the Air Force
    and the Space Force to meet that requirement they have got to
    properly man and train and equip to win both air and space.
    Given this budget, I fear this is going to be a very difficult,
    if not an impossible thing to do. I think we are going to have
    to improve upon this budget.
        At the end of the Obama administration, the Air Force was
    at a historic low in readiness and size. Less than 10 percent
    of combat squadrons were ready to deploy, and even fewer were
    prepared for a peer fight.
        We began to improve readiness over the past 4 years and
    started to really get after the modernization concern that we
    all have, and I am concerned that with this year's budget it
    does not look like we are going to have the resources to get
    these things done.
        In previous administrations--and I am talking about
    Barrett, Wilson, Goldfein--the Air Force leadership, they had
    told us that the Department of the Air Force was too small, too
    old to do what the Nation asked to have done. Almost half of
    our aircraft fleet is beyond its service life. Our satellite
    programs were built for peacetime. Now that was all from the
    previous administration.
        China and Russia--just this last week we had General
    Milley, who said that China and Russia combined are already
    spending more to modernize their force than we do, and it
    shows. China will have more stealth fighters than we will in
    the Western Pacific by 2025. So we are getting reports now that
    do not look good at all.
        All the independent studies show that the Air Force needs
    to grow and modernize. This budget does not do either one.
    Procurement actually decreases by almost 15 percent. We keep
    divesting but we do not turn around and follow with
    investments. Nearly all of these bad choices were caused by a
    budget that cuts the defense instead of the achieved 3 to 5
    percent we have been talking about now since 2018. It just does
    not do that.
        So our airmen, our space guardians deserve better than
    that, and we look forward to getting our questions responded to
    and to getting some ideas from the experts who are here today
    as to how we are going to handle these shortfalls that we
    believe we have.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe, and
    again, gentlemen, welcome to the Committee. First let me thank
    Secretary Roth for stepping into the breach and continuing to
    move forward with the Department of the Air Force. Thank you
    sir very much.
        General Raymond, Congress created the Space Force in the
    Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) with
    the intent to consolidate space activities within the
    Department of Defense. What role should the combatant commands
    play in designing the elements of Space Force capability? What
    contact or communication or coordination do you envision?
        General Raymond. Yes, sir. We have a very close, as you
    would expect, a very close partnership with the combatant
    command. The combatant command is the joint requirements--they
    come up with the joint requirements. Our job then is to
    organize, train, and equip and provide capabilities to meet
    those joint requirements. But the relationship that we enjoy
    today is seamless.
        Chairman Reed. Do you believe that the warfighter should
    have the ability to set the force design or architecture of DOD
    satellite constellations?
        General Raymond. I think how we go about meeting those
    requirements is a service function, and, in fact, that is one
    of the reasons why I think we established the Space Force. This
    Committee and other committees have long said that there were
    65 different organizations that had a role in space
    acquisition, and I think there are 30-something different
    organizations that had a role in force design.
        My view is that is one of the main reasons why we
    established the Space Force, to drive unity of effort across
    the Department. We work very closely to meet those joint
    requirements, but the force design work is service business,
    and we are already making great strides towards that end.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, and not only is
    my time expired but my timing has been off considerably.
        Senator Inhofe. I did not say anything.
        Chairman Reed. You gentlemen should have the privilege of
    making your opening statements. So let me recognize the
    Secretary for his opening statement, and then General Brown and
    General Raymond. Apologies to all my colleagues.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN P. ROTH, ACTING SECRETARY OF
                             THE AIR FORCE

        Mr. Roth. Thank you very much, Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Inhofe, and the Members of the Committee. It is, in
    fact, a pleasure to be here today.
        I am also honored to have General Brown and General Raymond
    join me in representing the nearly 700,000 airmen and guardians
    that defend our Nation. We are thankful for your consistent and
    persistent support over the years, which has enabled us build
    the world's greatest air and space force.
        As an integrated force, our airmen and guardians stand
    ready, willing, and able to meet responsibilities to our Nation
    and continue defending the high ground. From 300 feet to 300
    miles off the ground, we protect the Homeland, we project
    power, and we defend democracy.
        The long-term strategic competition with China and Russia
    demands we focus on the capabilities we need to invest in today
    in order to win tomorrow. Our Nation's competitive strategic
    advantage relies on air and space superiority, which is
    underpinned by rapid technological advancement and the
    extension of space as a warfighting domain.
        In line with Secretary Austin's priorities to defend the
    Nation, take care of our people, and succeed through teamwork,
    our fiscal year 2022 budget is the beginning of a journey to
    the air and space forces of 2030. It builds the capabilities
    that allow the Department to modernize while continuing to meet
    national security objectives and defend the high ground.
        Specifically, we are committed to investing in: (1)
    empowering airmen and guardians, (2) capability-focused
    modernization, (3) connecting us to the Joint Force, and (4)
    expanding partnerships.
        First, our airmen and guardians remain the heart of our
    ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat our competitors. We
    are transforming our talent management systems to ensure we
    develop and train leaders with the competence, character, and
    skills required to win high-end fights, and we remain devoted
    to recruiting and retaining a diverse corps of multi-capable,
    innovative talent to outmaneuver our adversaries, today and in
    the future.
        We owe it to our force to provide them with the environment
    where all can thrive. That is why we are directing critical
    resources to rid our ranks of any corrosive elements and
    injustices that degrade our ability to provide a lethal, ready
    force.
        Second, to remain the world's greatest Air and Space Force,
    we must look to the future through a lens of capability-focused
    modernization. Evidenced by nuclear modernization and the next-
    generation air dominance platforms, our digital acquisition
    approach revolutionizes how we design and field capabilities to
    the warfighters. Moving forward, we will expand on these
    digital revolutions while also investing in Next Generation
    Space Systems that are resilient and defensive. Space is no
    longer a benign domain. Our U.S. Space Force is purpose-built
    to deter and protect free access to space.
        Third, combatant commanders require an agile military that
    operates seamlessly across all domains at both speed and scale.
    That is why we continue to invest in capabilities like the
    Advanced Battle Management System, our contribution to Joint,
    All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), which will connect
    every sensor to every shooter across all domains.
        Likewise, access to, and freedom of action in space is
    central to connecting us to the Joint Force. In its second
    year, the U.S. Space Force is laser-focused on integration.
    Investments in space capabilities increase the effectiveness of
    all operations across all domains. The result is a U.S.
    military that is better connected, better informed, faster, and
    more precise.
        Finally, the U.S. Air and Space Forces do not fight alone.
    We benefit from the expertise and capabilities of our sister
    services and coalition forces as well as from a whole-of-
    government, commercial industry, and academia. We will continue
    to invest in enduring relationships while expanding new
    partnerships to transform how we fight future wars.
        Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting us to
    testify. I look forward to your support and am confident that
    with your help the Air and Space Forces will be armed with the
    capabilities necessary to protect our Nation and defend the
    high ground.
        We welcome your questions, and I ask that this opening
    statement be entered into the record.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection, the opening statement
    will be in the record.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Roth, General Brown,
    and General Raymond follows:]

     Prepared Statement by The Honorable John P. Roth, General Charles Q.
                    Brown, Jr., and General John W. Raymond
                        The Department of the Air Force
        The Air and Space Forces unite under the Department of the Air
    Force and are inextricably linked in defense of the crucial high
    ground, integral to the stability of the global security landscape.
    Under civilian leadership, the Department's nearly 700,000 airmen and
    guardians provide independent and integrated options to national
    leaders while defending democracy, an ideal that President Biden said,
    ``holds the key to freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity.'' The
    Department of the Air Force enhances the peaceful instruments of
    diplomacy, sustains instruments of deterrence that check the spread of
    conflict, and ensures credible consequences for aggression.
        Today more than ever, we and our national security partners must be
    bold. The challenges are many: the People's Republic of China, the
    Russian Federation, contested domains old and new, the vulnerabilities
    of proliferated technology and weapons, climate change, a global
    pandemic and its aftermath, the accumulated results of past budget
    priorities and decisions, and corrosive, difficult human issues like
    extremism, sexual assault/harassment, suicide, and disparate treatment
    of others. We must think and act differently. We no longer have the
    luxury of time to evolve into what we need to be . . . we must harness
    this unique moment together taking action to change. We simply cannot
    maintain status quo.
        Given China's exponential pace of weapons development and extensive
    marshalling of government and industry, we do not have the leeway to
    simply maintain our current approach. China is on track to exceed our
    capacity, so it is our obligation to act with a sense of urgency. China
    poses challenges unlike any other in our Nation's history. We must be
    clear-eyed about these threats and our response to them. We recognize
    the need for change AND must create the capacity for that change. We
    must substantially improve our understanding of China and the Indo-
    Pacific region and prioritize the threats accordingly. We cannot afford
    to keep prioritizing near-term operational posture and today's force
    structure at the expense of modernization and investment.
        This Department is particularly suited for these challenges. We own
    the high ground with air and space today, but it becomes more contested
    every day. We cannot allow the erosion of our advantages in this
    crucial high ground in competition now or in a future conflict. The
    speed, reach, and responsiveness of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space
    Force reinforce all instruments of national power and norms of
    responsible behavior. We can see, sense, and strike targets near and
    far, and provide global warning, networks, and independent options in
    space. We provide global strike and effects that can hold any target at
    risk within 24 hours--this is not conceptual or theoretical, it is
    reality. Global strike requires a unique fusion of intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, access, and speed that only
    the Air and Space Forces provide at a moment's notice. Our ability to
    rapidly eliminate threats anywhere in the world is a consequence of our
    inherent global persistence and reach, not necessarily dependent upon
    pre-positioning or forward basing. We have been exceptional at this,
    and until now we have also been unmatched.
        The Department of the Air Force requires a modernized force that is
    relevant today and long into the future. We are hard at work designing
    our future force. We must invest in the cutting-edge technologies and
    capabilities that are critical to securing our military advantage in
    the future--this includes updating our two legs of the Nation's nuclear
    triad, and our nuclear command, control, and communications systems.
    Enabling our military advantage in the long term means we need to shift
    away from legacy platforms and weapons systems that are decreasing in
    relevance today and will be irrelevant in the future--our aircraft
    fleet is 30 years old on average, and 44 percent are beyond their
    designed service life. Maintaining our aging weapon systems is costly
    now and, without change, will mortgage our future. We must also create
    decision superiority by delivering information and capabilities to
    decision makers at all echelons through a ``military internet of
    things.'' A critical step includes accelerating command and control
    infrastructure by investing in the Advanced Battle Management System
    (ABMS)--a vital contribution by the Department of the Air Force to
    Joint All-Domain Command and Control. We must methodically and
    immediately move out on tough decisions in order to compete.
        Similarly, we must revise the Space Force's force design to be
    resilient against a significantly increasing threat. We must continue
    to innovate, adapt and diversify capabilities to meet the threats that
    challenge America's access and maneuverability in space and that of our
    allies and partners. As we advance space defense, we must
    simultaneously work with stakeholders across the Department of Defense,
    the whole-of-government, our allies and partners, and commercial
    industry to integrate and streamline spacepower efforts. Only then will
    America be able to fully leverage what we have built over the last
    year.
        The Air Force and Space Force have been on the leading edge of
    technology since their inception. By embracing novel authorities such
    as middle-tier of acquisition authorities, and innovative approaches
    such as agile software development, modular open systems approach, and
    digital engineering, we will stay on the cutting edge. We intend to
    capitalize on future investments in modeling and synthetic simulation
    environments to ensure both joint warfighters and operational platforms
    are ready.
        As outlined in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, we
    are ``committed to realizing and defending the democratic values at the
    heart of the American way of life.'' Outpacing threats in tomorrow's
    complex global security landscape requires innovative thinking and
    modern investments. We recognize the need for change in order to
    protect the American way of life. This budget lays out a plan to
    modernize our military capabilities, and will allow U.S. diplomats to
    negotiate from a position of strength.
                         empowered airmen and guardians
        America's airmen and guardians conduct combat operations, channel
    innovation, and conquer adversity around the globe all day, every day.
    We know that airmen and guardians are our greatest and most precious
    resource. While weapons systems and tactics inevitably change, our
    airmen and guardians remain the core of our ability to deter and, if
    necessary, defeat our competitors. We need multi-capable professionals
    who bring diverse ideas, leverage digital tools, and outmaneuver and
    out think our adversaries. Our airmen and guardians have committed to
    service and taken oaths pledging their lives to the protection of our
    Constitution. And while we are working to provide the best environment
    possible as we recruit, train, retain, and leverage our strategic
    advantage--our people.
        As a Department, we are working to increase diversity and
    inclusion, build and fortify resiliency, support our families, and
    develop empowered airmen and guardians. We must ensure a culture of
    dignity and respect. We must ensure our people have both high quality
    of service and high quality of life. This starts with ensuring Air
    Force and Space Force leaders represent the Nation and our Core Values.
    Our Nation's defenders must be empowered, resilient, agile, innovative,
    well-led and clear on how much they are valued.
    Diversity
        A diverse and inclusive force is a warfighting imperative. The
    Department of the Air Force must attract, recruit, and retain talented
    Americans from all backgrounds to leverage diverse ideas and
    experiences. By harnessing airmen's and guardians' diverse experiences,
    geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds, cultural knowledge, and
    language abilities, we possess an asymmetric advantage over our
    competitors.
        To sustain our lethality and credibility, our force must be truly
    inclusive and reflect the best of the diverse society we serve. This
    includes removing barriers to service--from reviewing our accession and
    assessment tools and career development, to expanding outreach to
    underrepresented minorities through diversity recruiting and increasing
    scholarships at minority-serving institutions. It will also include
    modernizing how we develop airmen and guardians, transforming our
    personnel and talent management systems, and championing a culture of
    support and inclusion for all airmen, guardians, and their families.
    Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
        Sexual assault is a crime that undermines force lethality,
    readiness, and mission success. The Department of the Air Force is
    committed to eradicating sexual assault using effective, research-based
    prevention. These efforts utilize assessment tools to identify those at
    high risk for unethical behavior, equip all leaders with information
    and goals to reduce assault risk factors, educate the force on
    intervention skills, and promote positive unit culture to eradicate
    sexual assault. When sexual assault does occur, the Department is
    dedicated to supporting victims and prosecuting those who would harm
    others through the chain of command and Uniform Code of Military
    Justice.
    Suicide and Personal Violence Prevention
        The prevention of suicide and interpersonal violence remains a
    difficult challenge. To reduce the incidence of suicide, the Department
    of the Air Force is undertaking a leadership-driven public-health
    approach informed by data and analysis while partnering with academia,
    industry, and our sister Services to include diverse ideas and
    perspectives.
        The Department of the Air Force is also committed to eliminating
    interpersonal violence in any form. Domestic violence, child
    maltreatment, workplace violence, and sexual assault negatively impact
    victims, families, units, mission effectiveness, and the Department as
    a whole. We are dedicated to a strategy that leverages the latest
    science, implements best practices, and incorporates feedback from our
    members. Should these acts of violence occur despite our prevention
    efforts, we are committed to providing victims the necessary care and
    holding perpetrators accountable.
    Quality of Life
        We owe our airmen and guardians the best quality of life possible.
    We must continue work to improve all the professional and personal
    aspects of life for each of our airmen and guardians, and their
    families. It includes professional development, housing, child care
    programs, healthcare, education, and spousal employment, among many
    others. We are integrating the availability of quality housing, health
    care, occupational licensing reciprocity, and school caliber into our
    strategic basing criteria--ensuring our families have the best support
    possible. The Department is committed to continuing these worthy
    efforts. Our airmen and guardians deserve nothing less.
                     a department of the air force for 2030
        As the Department of Air Force prepares to celebrate 75 years of
    service to our great Nation, the Air Force is transforming itself to
    address the challenges of near-peer adversaries while the newest branch
    of the U.S. Armed Forces--the Space Force--is creating and integrating
    a Service purposely built to compete, deter, and win in the space
    domain. Both Services, and the entire Department of the Air Force, are
    dedicated to protecting the Homeland and democracy around the globe. We
    must modernize and integrate to meet the challenges posed by great
    power competition, climate change, cybersecurity, fiscal constraints,
    and worldwide pandemics. With Congress's support, we will maintain our
    dominance of the high ground, and we will ensure the American way of
    life for generations to come.
                            United States Air Force
                vision for change--america's air force for 2030
        America fights as a joint team, and the U.S. Air Force is the only
    Service that can meet our Nation's adversaries with mass, speed,
    agility and survivability on near-immediate timelines. The Air Force
    sees, senses, and communicates globally. The Air Force monitors our
    adversaries' movements, deploys forces en masse, deters competitors,
    and strikes enemies without warning. No one else can do it. Without the
    Air Force, the joint force loses. Only with a modernized and ready Air
    Force is the joint team--and our Nation--secure.
        The American Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. Our citizens face
    threats from a variety of actors in both the physical and digital
    arenas. Competitors, especially the China and Russia, continue
    aggressive efforts to negate our long-standing warfighting advantages
    while challenging America's interests and geopolitical position. While
    the Nation was focused on countering violent extremist organizations,
    great power competitors focused on the American way of war. They
    studied, resourced, and introduced systems specifically designed to
    defeat Air Force capabilities that have strengthened the joint force
    for a generation. That is why the Air Force must accelerate change now,
    so we can protect the American way of life in 2030 and for decades to
    come. Simply put, if we do not change, we risk losing. We risk losing
    in great power competition, we risk losing in a high-end fight, and we
    risk losing quality airmen and families.
        The President clearly stated that diplomacy is our primary means of
    engaging with the world: it must be our first tool of choice. The
    President likewise recognizes that our decisions and actions must come
    from a position of strength. The Air Force offers safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrence, which strengthens national policies. It
    is also important to recognize that air dominance is not an American
    birthright. The Air Force is pivotal to deterring these aggressors and
    bolstering our allies and partners. America remains committed to
    freedom of the commons to support maintaining the rules-based
    international order around the globe. Control of the air and enabling
    domains ensures that the joint force has full freedom of maneuver.
        The diversity of our airmen is both a tactical and strategic
    advantage. We are committed to recruiting and retaining the best of
    America. While the COVID-19 pandemic provided new challenges to our
    force, we remain devoted to caring for airmen. Suicide and sexual
    assault persist as challenges that we are tackling head-on. Likewise
    family support programs are vital to our resiliency as a Service. A
    diverse and inclusive Air Force helps us out-innovate adversaries today
    and overcome challenges tomorrow. And, we know that each airman--Active
    Duty, guard, reserve, and civilian, no matter their background--took an
    oath to defend the Nation for all Americans.
        Airmen in the near future are more likely to fight in highly-
    contested environments. These complex, all-domain conflicts will result
    in combat attrition rates and risks to the Homeland that are more akin
    to World War II than the uncontested environments to which we have
    become accustomed. Given our ability to project power from afar,
    independent of forward access or lengthy prepositioning timelines,
    Airmen will be the first to respond to many emerging crises. In any
    scenario, the Air Force plays a unique and integral role to our
    collective deterrence and joint warfighting credibility. We must
    accelerate change to meet the challenges our Nation faces. This
    requires a relevant, modern force based on cutting-edge capabilities
    that will survive in future conflicts and shifting away from legacy
    platforms that are increasingly irrelevant.
        The Air Force is expected to provide enduring airpower capabilities
    irrespective of the threat encountered, the technology utilized, or the
    budget provided. The core missions of airpower--air superiority; global
    strike; rapid global mobility; command and control; and intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance--provide unequivocal advantage to the
    joint force. Only the Air Force provides air superiority, global
    strike, and rapid global mobility for the Nation. Without these
    missions, the Homeland is unprotected and America cannot project power
    around the globe. We are innovating and advancing our competencies with
    innovative capabilities such as the Advanced Battle Management System,
    which will increase commanders' decision advantage. Moreover, new
    approaches to our core missions enhance the joint force and answer the
    challenges posed by great power competitors.
        The Air Force's future force design recognizes the need for change
    and the range of threats to the Nation, our allies, and partners. In
    2021, we identified three key capability development areas for
    investment: connect the joint force, generate combat power, and conduct
    logistics under attack. Moving forward we will prioritize the resources
    that will allow us to continue to make investments in these areas, with
    more to come. Additionally, the Air Force will prioritize within its
    resources, affordable, analytically defensible, force structure and
    system capability proposals. Through partnership with Congress, the Air
    Force will prioritize resources to guard the foundations of national
    freedom and independence for America and our allies.
                                air superiority
        Combat power, regardless of Service, often depends on the Air
    Force's ability to deliver air superiority. Our competitors have
    fielded air forces, radar systems, and missiles that can attack our
    territory, bases, forces, and allies and partners, or defend against
    our military actions. Our job is to stop them through control of the
    air. To do this, we build understanding of the air situation and then
    use the right mix of capability and capacity to control the air while
    creating windows of air superiority--no matter the threat. As we stay
    ahead of our competitors, the Air Force needs flexible systems and
    agile design processes to field new capabilities at speed.
        Current platforms will not fully support tomorrow's demands. Airmen
    are deliberately balancing today's readiness risk with capability
    modernization. Remaining ahead of adversaries who are committed to
    negating our technological edge requires investment in advanced
    capabilities. Likewise, access to domestic airspace allows us to train
    in realistic environments, which is essential to developing and
    maintaining these advanced capabilities. Near-peer competitors are
    challenging our capability to command the air. We must take action now
    to ensure the joint force's success tomorrow.
    Future Air Superiority Capability
        The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the cornerstone of our future
    fighter force and air superiority. Achieving air superiority in a
    future fight is strongly dependent on full-spectrum dominance. The F-35
    and its 5th-generation capabilities are part of our fighter force
    design that outpaces key competitors. The Air Force is fully committed
    to the F-35 and needs it to be capable, available, and affordable. As
    we continue to receive the F-35 into the Air Force and increase our
    capability, it is important to manage our F-35 fleet in an intelligent
    and deliberate way to ensure we remain ready to deter adversaries,
    support our international allies and partners, and meet our Nation's
    security commitments worldwide.
        The Air Force cannot successfully fight tomorrow's conflicts with
    yesterday's weapons. Our adversaries recognize that full-spectrum
    dominance is a national strength. As a direct result, competitors are
    investing to overtake our current warfighting advantage in the air.
    Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) ensures we maintain air
    superiority in the future by introducing game-changing technology that
    includes digital engineering, open mission systems architecture, and
    agile software. NGAD is not a single platform--it is a capability
    focused on fielding capabilities to mitigate identified capability
    gaps, not on creating a ``next-generation'' aircraft. The capabilities
    NGAD provides will ensure survivability, lethality, and persistence
    while seamlessly integrating with the Advanced Battle Management System
    via a mix of manned, unmanned, and even optionally-manned aircraft
    along with advanced stand-off weapons.
        We will complement NGAD and currently fielded 5th-generation
    fighters such as the F-22 and F-35 with the F-15EX. Acquiring this re-
    designed aircraft allows us to shore up our fighter force while driving
    down sustainment costs, our fleet's average age, and inherent risk. By
    leveraging our partners' investments in the F-15 platform, the Air
    Force is efficiently fielding a familiar aircraft with proven tactics.
    It also boasts an open mission software system, which allows us to
    easily update the computer and avionics software.
                                 global strike
        Global strike is critical to our national power and an enduring
    airpower capability. Regardless of the aircraft, weapon, or system
    employed, we must maintain the capability to attack at a time and place
    of our choosing. As China and Russia develop new weapons and defenses,
    we must modernize and develop capabilities to maintain a competitive
    advantage. Both nuclear and conventional strike must be integrated to
    compete against these near-peer adversaries. Air Force strike
    operations are precise, and these effects are delivered through
    standoff capabilities as well as penetrating platforms.
        Nuclear deterrence allows the Nation to negotiate from a position
    of power. A credible, capable, and safe nuclear deterrent provides the
    United States and our allies with an umbrella of protection while
    discouraging the use of nuclear weapons by all nations. Likewise, a
    strong nuclear strike capability deters conflict.
        For precise, conventional attack capabilities to succeed, they must
    be capable of penetrating highly-contested environments. To maintain
    our advantage, the Air Force requires capabilities that incorporate
    domain awareness, full-spectrum survivability, extended range, and
    sufficient payload. It is vital that our capabilities keep pace as
    threats evolve. By leveraging human-machine learning, the right mix of
    manned and unmanned systems, and agile design processes, our global
    strike capabilities will provide responsiveness, precision,
    flexibility, connectedness, and integration across the joint force.
        The United States Air Force has the unique ability to sense, see,
    and strike any target, anywhere, at any time, nearly instantaneously,
    from anywhere in the world. On a daily basis, one aspect of these
    capabilities is on full display as our bomber task forces execute
    training scenarios with our allies and partners. It is no secret that
    potential adversaries closely monitor global activity--these maneuvers
    make adversaries think twice about conducting malign activities while
    reassuring our allies and partners.
        The Air Force's global strike capabilities have the range, speed,
    and flexibility required in a conflict and are far less as dependent on
    pre-positioning or forward-basing. A continued investment in
    modernization efforts to our bomber and tanker fleets will ensure our
    long-range capability for the future. Additionally, a renewed emphasis
    into air base defense, along with Agile Combat Employment and Joint
    All-Domain Command and Control concepts will ensure the United States
    maintains the worlds' greatest military asymmetric advantage well into
    the future.
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
        The Nation requires a fully modernized nuclear triad and supporting
    infrastructure to maintain our nuclear deterrence capability.
    Deterrence operates in peacetime, through the gray zone, worldwide,
    across all domains, and into conflict. And, deterrence requires all
    three legs for a responsive nuclear triad. By not maintaining a
    reliable U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force, we risk
    deterrence erosion against not one, but two strategic nuclear
    adversaries. This is too high of a risk to our Nation's security. Our
    ICBMs have provided a highly reliable and secure deterrent capability
    since 1959. Delaying their modernization for the last two decades
    necessitates a comprehensive weapon replacement.
        The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the ICBM replacement,
    capitalizes on the strengths of a land-based triad component that is
    survivable, efficient, and geographically dispersed, while replacing
    aging components and addressing asset attrition along with the ICBM
    force's declining infrastructure.
    B-21 Raider
        Our bomber force constitutes the second critical leg of our
    Nation's nuclear triad and the B-21 Raider aircraft will be the
    backbone of our future bomber force. The B-21 will possess the range,
    access, and payload to penetrate the most highly-contested threat
    environments and hold any target around the globe at risk. This new
    bomber will provide the capabilities to deter and, if needed, win in
    high-end, near-peer conflicts. And with bombers as the most flexible
    leg of the nuclear triad, the B-21 underscore our national security.
    This aircraft will support combatant commanders across the range of
    military operations as both a nuclear and conventional bomber.
        Over the past 3 years, the B-21 program accelerated from design to
    physical manufacturing of aircraft. While building test aircraft, the
    program is scaling manufacturing infrastructure and capacity across the
    industrial supply base. In parallel, B-21 beddown preparations continue
    on-track to support the Nation's newest bomber aircraft projected
    arrival in the mid-2020s.
    Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO)
        The Air Launched Cruise Missile is nearly 30 years beyond its
    intended design life and faces evolving threats and availability
    challenges. Recapitalization of these missiles via the Long-Range
    Standoff Weapon (LRSO) is vital to our nuclear deterrence capability.
        As our competitors improve their air defense systems, our stand-off
    delivery capability diminishes. In order to maximize our capabilities,
    the Nation requires a modernized bomber fleet and the LRSO. This
    weapon's ability to penetrate contested airspace and survive
    adversaries' defenses holds targets at risk and is a cost-effective way
    to modernize the nuclear triad. Additionally, bombers armed with LRSO
    provide a recallable and re-targetable capability which can hold any
    target at risk--it is both a visible and tailorable deterrent.
    Hypersonics
        The Air Force is also investing heavily in hypersonic weapons. This
    cutting-edge technology increases the Nation's rapid strike
    capabilities. By leveraging hypersonic weapons' improved
    maneuverability, America will have additional response options to deter
    adversaries and reassure allies. An operational hypersonic air-launched
    weapon enables the United States to hold fixed, high-value, and time-
    sensitive targets at risk in contested environments from stand-off
    distances. To that end, the Air Force is developing the Air Launched
    Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) using the middle tier of acquisition rapid
    prototyping authority. ARRW is on track to be the Nation's first
    operational hypersonic weapon. Hypersonics--and global strike as a
    whole--enable diplomacy by strengthening the negotiating position of
    the United States.
                             rapid global mobility
        The Air Force capability that most directly, and physically,
    supports both the Air Force and our joint teammates is rapid global
    mobility. Airmen conduct Rapid Global Mobility operations to project
    and sustain combat power by moving personnel, material, fuel, and
    supplies across the globe, in and through permissive and contested
    threat environments on short timelines. The combination of speed,
    range, flexibility, and responsiveness is what differentiates air
    mobility operations from other forms of transport and is critical to
    multi-modal operations contributing to a higher pace for Joint All-
    Domain Operations. As threats evolve and the United States can no
    longer operate from well-established fixed bases, rapid global mobility
    is the lynchpin to persistent logistics, and we are examining unique
    ways to utilize mobility aircraft.
    Air Refueling
        Air refueling, one segment of rapid global mobility, is
    foundational to worldwide power projection. The ability to extend the
    range and persistence of air platforms provides a decisive advantage
    and deterrent against adversaries. To maintain our air refueling edge,
    the Air Force must continue investment in the KC-46 while moving beyond
    legacy KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft. The inability to phase the divesture
    of the legacy tanker fleet shackles funding and manpower resources and
    hampers the fielding of the more capable KC-46 at the rate required to
    support combatant commanders. This negatively impacts air refueling
    capacity and tanker advancement. Offsets from legacy tanker divestment
    in both funding and manpower are critical to the success of the KC-46
    and air refueling as a whole.
    Emerging Logistics
        Every 4.2 minutes a mobility aircraft takes off from an airfield
    somewhere in the world. This is a unique opportunity as mobility
    aircraft are envisioned as critical nodes in the Advanced Battle
    Management System framework. Mobility platforms of all types can act as
    sensor nodes, inputting information into the sensing grid and
    increasing a commander's decision advantage. At the same time, we are
    exploring novel approaches to logistics through Agility Prime, which is
    developing electric vertical takeoff-and-landing vehicles (eVTOL). This
    innovative program will help us rapidly move small numbers of personnel
    and equipment around a battlefield and quickly rise to respond to
    emerging challenges such as isolated servicemembers. We are also
    training airmen and developing concepts and practices that allow for
    dispersed, defendable, and mobile logistics networks. We are
    establishing agreements with allies and partners that provide access,
    and the ability to expand access, to key aerial ports, seaports,
    storage nodes, and associated connections.
                            command and control (c2)
        Inherent to outthinking adversaries is the ability to command and
    control (C2) the joint force. Combatant commanders require an agile
    military that operates seamlessly across domain boundaries at both
    speed and scale. The Air Force's current C2 structure is based on a
    Cold War-era design that is vulnerable and slow--a roadblock to the
    goal of rapid and agile decision making. The enemy can easily target
    our C2 structure's centralized nodes with both kinetic and non-kinetic
    means. C2 must be resilient to attack, responsive to rapid changes,
    integrated across all domains, and secure from exploitation. This core
    mission allows the joint force to create an advantage by converging
    units and capabilities at a time and place of our choosing.
        Achieving decision advantage for combatant commanders requires both
    sensors to gather data and a C2 network to translate and share data
    across the joint force. Real-time dissemination of actionable
    information, aided by artificial intelligence and machine learning,
    allows joint warfighting across all domains at a pace faster than our
    competitors. This speed matters to the decision maker and the
    warfighter. And, with the proliferation of technology, future
    warfighters will have the ability to observe, orient, decide and act
    within minutes--as opposed to hours and days.
    Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)
        A critical step towards accelerating command and control
    architecture is the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)--the
    Department of the Air Force's contribution to Joint All-Domain Command
    and Control. As a new approach towards information sharing and decision
    management, ABMS enables compressed decision making and converging
    effects without domain or geographic boundaries. As a family of
    capabilities--versus a single system--ABMS creates a digital
    environment capable of increasing awareness, creating greater
    understanding, and enabling superior decision making--all of which is
    critical to prevailing in future conflicts.
        As a simple analogy, ABMS strengthens decisions by channeling
    necessary information and capabilities through a ``military internet of
    things.'' This internet, designed with digital standards, is being
    purpose-built to deliver critical capabilities to the joint force
    including secure processing, connectivity, data management,
    applications, sensor integration, and effects integration. ABMS helps
    overcome the Cold War-roadblock of vulnerable command and control
    nodes. For instance, by transforming from a small number of air
    operations centers to a ``military internet of things,'' ABMS allows
    for agile, distributed, and mobile capabilities able to execute mission
    command even when fractured by an enemy attack.
        ABMS's infrastructure is critical to ensuring the joint force
    connects sensors to shooters with machine-to-machine precision and
    speed while increasing commanders' awareness. And just like the
    development of the internet, ABMS is being built across multiple fiscal
    years. Fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021 have focused on exploring
    how we can best connect sensors and shooters while building
    partnerships with our industry partners. Moving forward, the Air Force
    will prioritize resources to allow the continued building of ABMS's
    digital network environment and infrastructure. By prioritizing the
    resources to support ABMS investment, the Air Force will be able to
    initiate replacement of human-in-the-loop data transfer processes with
    machine-to-machine data exchanges allowing for delivery of multi-domain
    secure processing and data management, connectivity, and applications
    that synchronize sensors and networks. In turn, the joint force is
    enabled to make decisions faster than the adversary is able to respond.
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
        Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) systems act as
    the central nervous system of our nuclear deterrent. They link the
    President and national leaders to the nuclear force--all day, every
    day, under all conditions, without fail. Without NC3, we cannot
    effectively command and control nuclear forces. And without effective
    command and control of nuclear forces, we cannot deter adversaries.
        Previously, electromagnetic pulses posed the greatest challenge to
    our NC3 networks. Now, electronic warfare, cyber-attack, and threats
    from space all provide challenges to key nodes and systems. Russia,
    while embracing a doctrine of nuclear escalation in conventional
    conflict, is nearly complete with its recent full range of nuclear
    modernization efforts. Equally concerning is China's pursuit of new
    nuclear capabilities tailored to achieve its national security
    objectives while also modernizing its conventional military.
        As we modernize our portion of the nuclear triad, we must also
    modernize our NC3. The Air Force is pursuing communication capability
    enhancements with respect to our bomber force and Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent so they will be fully integrated into our current
    NC3 systems and has flexibility to adapt as NC3 systems are modernized.
    Moreover, we understand that the strategic environment evolves and is
    increasingly dynamic. Our NC3 architectures and modernization plans
    will be adaptable, look beyond the near-term, and integrate with the
    Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). While ABMS will enable
    conventional forces, it will also enable nuclear forces with rapid,
    multi-path transmissions that will transform NC3 from a Cold War-era
    relic into a C2 network operating at speeds our adversaries cannot
    match.
        Successfully executing command and control across the joint force
    requires information. A major avenue for that information is the Air
    Force's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
              intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr)
        The Air Force conducts intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) missions to analyze, inform, and provide joint
    force commanders with the knowledge needed to achieve decision
    advantage. This ISR sensing grid consists of a robust multi-layered
    network of sensors, platforms, people, devices, and services with the
    goal of delivering a holistic, accurate, predictive, and timely
    characterization of the operating environment. This network is
    interoperable with the joint force, the intelligence community, allies,
    and partners. Domain awareness is underpinned by automation,
    connectivity and analysis; is rooted in intelligence; and is critical
    to the future of warfare. In that future, ISR underpins the Advanced
    Battle Management System (ABMS) architecture and allows joint force
    commanders to achieve an accurate, real-time understanding of the
    environment. This understanding accelerates decision making,
    effectively conducts command and control, and achieves decision
    advantage ahead of competitors.
        Future ISR capabilities must be survivable against high-end threats
    while leveraging forward-looking investments in command and control
    capabilities--including emerging technology like artificial
    intelligence--to present decision-ready information faster than our
    adversaries' capabilities. The Air Force's current ISR systems are
    viable in a counter-insurgency war, but may not effectively contribute
    in tomorrow's competitive environment. Without investment in additional
    capabilities necessary for the high-end fight, we will be reliant on
    ISR platforms that will be ineffective in highly-contested and denied
    environments. As a result, we risk fighting blind.
    Survivable, Relevant Platforms
        ISR platforms play a critical and continuous role in supporting a
    range of military operations. The most important role of intelligence
    in military operations is to provide analysis of key aspects of the
    operating environment to facilitate timely military decisions. Current
    ISR platforms have been able to accomplish this task with relative ease
    because they operated in uncontested and low-threat environments where
    the United States enjoys superiority across all domains of warfare.
    Such freedom of action will not be the case in the future. Future
    threats will challenge the ability of legacy ISR platforms to
    successfully execute their missions.
        In the near future, ISR platforms will feed critical data through
    the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), which in turn will
    present near real-time information to joint force decision makers.
    Future airborne ISR platforms will need to survive and operate in a
    more challenging environment. Ongoing modernization efforts will focus
    on a family of platforms that are effective, resilient, and survivable
    against technologically-advanced threats, and able to pass data to
    necessary networks at machine speed. In our discussions going forward,
    we will steer away from platform-centric conversations and focus
    instead on the capabilities needed to inform joint force operations.
        Our adversaries are already fielding technologies that will hold
    our legacy platforms at risk to support the range of military
    operations in a future high-end fight, and the technological evolution
    will continue to accelerate. In order to keep pace ahead of emerging
    threats, we must work with the combatant commands to assess the demand
    signal on current fleets and where acceptable risk can be taken so the
    Air Force can accelerate modernization. Legacy ISR platforms, once
    considered irreplaceable to operations, are often unable to survive or
    deliver needed capabilities on competition-relevant timelines. These
    legacy platforms must be phased out, with resources used to invest in
    modern and relevant systems. Working together, we must take calculated
    risk now in order to reduce the greater future risk.
        For instance, the RQ-4 Block 30 Global Hawk was crucial to the ISR
    requirements of yesterday and today. However, this platform cannot
    compete in a contested environment. And tomorrow's conflicts will be
    contested. Moving beyond this platform allows us to bring the ISR
    enterprise into the digital-age by using sensing grids and fielding
    advanced technology that includes penetrating ISR platforms. The Air
    Force will continue to pursue the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA RQ-4 Block 30
    divestment waiver in order to repurpose the RQ-4 Block 30 funds for
    penetrating ISR capability. Overall, intelligence collection will
    transition to a family of systems that includes non-traditional assets,
    sensors in all domains, commercial platforms, and a hybrid force of
    5th- and 6th-generation capabilities.
        A comprehensive investment strategy that the Air Force is bringing
    forward synchronizes divestment of legacy platforms, takes calculated
    risk in upgrading existing platforms, and introduces the next-
    generation ISR family of systems that will feed into ABMS.
                                 new approaches
        The Air Force's core missions encompass both enduring capabilities
    unique to our Service and some capabilities shared with the joint
    force. Airmen are rapidly iterating and innovating improvements to all
    core missions. These new approaches to airpower overcome today's
    roadblocks and focus on tomorrow's great power challenges. Both
    technology and operational concepts benefit from our airmen's
    perspectives. Every day, airmen increase the agility, speed,
    resilience, and lethality of our contributions to the joint force.
    Force Generation Model
        The Air Force is also re-examining how we present forces to
    combatant commanders. The core missions of the Air Force continue to be
    in constant demand around the world. And because many of the
    capabilities we provide are exclusive to our Service, our forces have
    been under strain for two decades. This strain negatively impacts
    readiness and our ability to modernize.
        Preparing for near-peer adversaries, the Air Force is implementing
    a new force generation model focused on building and sustaining long-
    term, high-end readiness. Our goal is to more effectively articulate
    readiness impacts and capacity limits, and instill discipline into the
    system. Our new, simplified model, realigns the Air Force with the
    Joint Staff's three phase model, is easily understood by combatant
    commanders, builds towards sustainable readiness, and balances current
    operations with the training necessary for future full-spectrum combat
    operations.
    Agile Combat Employment (ACE)
        The Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) not only connects
    sensors and shooters but also enhances persistent logistics by sensing
    the threat landscape and material environment. Persistent logistics,
    with the inherent ability to posture, sense, and respond, is the
    warfighting answer to the key operational problem of logistics under
    attack and enables Agile Combat Employment (ACE). ACE is the ability to
    quickly disperse & cluster forces to a cooperative security location
    and conduct operations across all domains with minimal disruption,
    while maintaining operational flexibility. This new method of operating
    will allow the United States to confuse the enemy and strike at a time
    and place of our choosing with minimal risk. The ability of ACE to
    sustain combat operations through persistent logistics has already been
    validated through multiple exercises across both the Pacific and
    European theaters.
        ACE requires technological advances like ABMS, novel equipment, and
    innovative airmen. Our airmen are tackling ACE, and the larger
    challenge of persistent logistics, by adapting techniques previously
    associated with special operators. Our commanders support these efforts
    by encouraging critical thinking skills and driving decision making to
    the lowest levels--in many cases our youngest frontline supervisors.
    These empowered airmen are innovating new approaches to projecting
    combat power across the globe.
    Base and Critical Infrastructure Defense
        The Department's infrastructure defense efforts are currently
    focused on directed energy research, development, test and evaluation;
    counter-small UAS; and investments in cruise missile defense. In the
    coming years, we will steadily increase investment of critical
    infrastructure defense measures to meet the challenges of the future
    fight, ACE, and logistics under attack.
        As China and Russia develop weapons that challenge our superiority
    in the air, they are also making strides that hold our bases at risk.
    While the Air Force will mitigate some risk through persistent
    logistics, the security of our air bases is essential to conducting
    combat operations. Like other aspects of combat operations, base
    defense is inherently joint. And just as the joint force is dependent
    on the Air Force to execute our core missions, the Air Force must
    leverage our sister Services for base defense.
        If future expeditionary and permanent air bases are not protected
    from attack, the Air Force will be challenged to conduct combat
    operations. Without the Air Force's air superiority, the joint force is
    at risk of attack from the air for the first time since the Korean War.
    The Air Force acknowledges that this is a joint problem that requires a
    joint solution, which is why we have allocated experimental funding to
    explore and develop directed energy and kinetic and non-kinetic base
    defense options. Looking forward, the Air Force will prioritize
    resources that will allow it to continue prototyping the ability to
    detect, track, identify, and mitigate small unmanned aircraft system
    threats. Proper base defense encompasses significant decisions with
    far-reaching impacts--we must get this right.
    Infrastructure
        We project power, generate readiness, test new platforms, train to
    support joint operations, and provide safe and healthy communities for
    our families at our bases. As the joint force becomes increasingly
    dependent on an integrated battle network, installations also serve as
    key nodes in enabling mission success around the world. The readiness
    and resiliency of installations is a matter of strategic importance to
    ensure the Air Force can always provide combat capability. Changing
    climate and severe weather events are a continual threat to our
    installations, and we have seen first-hand the impacts climate and
    severe weather have on our installations.
        The Air Force views installation resilience as the capability of a
    base to project combat power by protecting against, responding to, and
    recovering from deliberate, accidental, or naturally occurring events
    that impede operations. We are taking a deliberate, holistic approach
    to installation resilience through Department of the Air Force's
    Installation Energy Strategic Plan. This includes improving the
    resiliency of our energy, cyber, infrastructure, and response options.
                          america's air force for 2030
        This year we celebrate America's 245th birthday and next year the
    Air Force celebrates its 75th anniversary. Throughout our history, the
    Nation prospered because of our willingness to adapt and evolve, to
    adjust course when the situation dictates. Democracy is not a
    birthright, and neither is air dominance. And although airpower is our
    great comparative advantage, tomorrow's competitive environment
    requires that we accelerate change or lose.
        Tomorrow's battlespace will be shaped by human talent, climate
    change, constricting budgetary resources, and challenges posed by great
    powers. The Air Force and its core missions stand ready to exploit the
    air domain, provide nuclear deterrence, and underwrite the national
    security America expects and requires. By working with Congress, we
    will protect the Homeland and defend democratic ideals. Moving forward,
    the Air Force will prioritize its resources so it is able to adapt our
    equipment, support our airmen, and bolster our core missions. We must
    continue to adjust course and overcome situational challenges so
    America maintains its airpower advantage.
        America cannot wait to modernize the Air Force any longer, not 1
    year, 1 month, or 1 week. To deter and defeat today's competitors and
    tomorrow's adversaries, we must re-capitalize our Air Force and we must
    do it now . . . the call to accelerate change or lose is not
    hyperbole--it is a requirement.
                           UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE
                         securing an enduring advantage
        The United States is a space-faring nation. We have long understood
    that our Nation is strongest economically, militarily, and
    diplomatically when we have access to, and freedom to operate in,
    space. Unfortunately, potential adversaries have taken note of the
    United States' reliance on space, and this vital national interest can
    no longer be taken for granted; it must be secured. The rapid
    advancements of potential adversaries to threaten U.S. freedom of
    operation in space must be countered with immediate improvements to our
    space defense architecture and capabilities.
        Competitors like China and Russia are challenging America's
    advantage in space by aggressively developing weapons to deny or
    destroy U.S. space capabilities in conflict. Both China and Russia have
    mobile ground-based laser and electronic warfare systems capable of
    jamming and blinding our satellite systems. China has invested in
    satellite grappling technologies, like the Shijian-17 satellite's
    robotic arm, which could be used in future conflicts. Russia has tested
    an on-orbit system that has released a projectile designed to destroy
    U.S. satellites in low-Earth orbit.
        The United States would prefer that conflict not begin in or extend
    to space. Our goal is to deter conflict in space from happening and
    from spilling over into other domains, and the best way to do so is
    from a position of strength. We are prepared to protect U.S. interests
    today and we are moving fast to ensure we can deter in the future, but
    our ability to deter conflict hinges on demonstrating both capability
    and resolve. Over-classification of existing systems threatens this
    ability, and we are developing a reveal and conceal strategy to ensure
    we can compete, deter, and win in this contested domain.
        The Space Force was established to protect U.S. investments and
    freedom of operation in space, provide space capabilities to the
    Nation, the joint force, sister Services, the intelligence community,
    and our allies and partners. The Space Force is designed to be lean,
    agile, and innovative in order to move at speed and compete in the vast
    domain of space. Our small size also makes us the ideal pathfinder to
    validate new structures and approaches that can provide benefit across
    the joint force. While our budget is roughly two percent of the
    Department of Defense's request, the capabilities we deliver underwrite
    the force design of the entire joint force. Space capabilities have
    become a cornerstone of deterrence, not just in space, but in every
    domain. Without space, our forces abroad, security at home, and allies
    everywhere are at much greater risk. If we lose in space, America
    loses.
        We spent the first year inventing the Space Force, with an
    organizational design that reflects the character of our operating
    environment and the nature of conflict that is likely to manifest. A
    headquarters and Field Command structure aligns complementary functions
    and streamlines command authority in the deliberate pursuit of speed
    and agility. Our first field command, Space Operations Command, stood
    up in October 2020 as the primary space forces provider to the
    combatant commands. We will establish the remaining two field commands
    before the end of 2021: Space Systems Command will develop, acquire,
    and field operationally relevant and resilient space capabilities in
    resilient and defendable architectures, and Space Training and
    Readiness Command will develop tactics, a testing enterprise, doctrine,
    advanced warfare training, and a dedicated cadre of warfighting
    professionals. We have already transferred space missions, billets, and
    monetary resources from 23 Air Force units to the Space Force, and we
    are preparing to merge operations, acquisition, and sustainment for
    some space systems currently distributed across the Army, Navy, and the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the Space Development
    Agency beginning next year.
        In our second year, we are aggressively integrating the Service
    into the fabric of national and international security by collaborating
    across the Department of Defense, interagency, commercial industry, and
    our allies and partners. As the Space Force creates independent
    military options for decision makers, we are preparing a force
    presentation model to optimize integration and delivery of space
    capability to the joint force. We are working to streamline acquisition
    processes to increase decision speed and expedite capability
    development, creating an integrated test enterprise, and doing the
    analytical and developmental work to create the most effective and
    efficient force design for the domain to bring unity of effort across
    the department. Lastly, we have initiated planning for a National Space
    Intelligence Center to provide scientific and technical intelligence as
    well as foundational space intelligence to the Service and the
    intelligence community. These initiatives make us more resilient and
    competitive, and they will put us in a better position to sustain
    continuing advantage.
                      developing and caring for guardians
        The character of operations and aspects of potential conflict in
    space are fundamentally different from the military art of terrestrial
    domains. Vast distances and speeds, potential for first-mover
    advantage, and unique operating environment demand experts that are
    familiar with these physical characteristics. As in all other domains,
    guardians must stay ahead of adversaries to give joint commanders and
    national civilian leadership new space-based security options. This
    requires a dramatic change in how we attract, recruit, develop, train,
    and retain talent.
        We are committed to ensuring that the guardians reflect the diverse
    character of the United States--it is a national security imperative.
    Diversity gives us the perspective and skills to meet the challenges of
    our security environment and ensures we can bring our Nation's best
    talent to bear on the hardest problems. In order to meet these goals,
    we must work hard to address tough issues like sexual assault,
    extremism, and discrimination within the force; solving these problems
    is essential to building a Service that ensures talented people of all
    genders, orientations, races, ethnicities, and beliefs are included and
    empowered to reach their full potential.
    Guardian Strategy
        To win the battle for talent, we have created a Human Capital
    Office to develop a new strategy for unified talent management for all
    guardians, in pursuit of an inclusive and team-centric culture. Our
    small size creates the opportunity and the mandate for a tailored
    approach to caring for and developing our guardians from accessions to
    retirement and beyond.
        This ``Guardian Strategy'' will lead digital enablement by creating
    a digital cadre, an optimized data infrastructure, increased process
    automation, and new digital platforms. Using interviews and other
    assessment tools as well as focusing our Reserve Officer Training Corps
    presence at select universities will support both diversity efforts and
    needs for space related research and technical grounding. We look to
    develop and employ talent by taking a competency-based development
    approach, mandating more robust feedback systems, and creating
    potential-based promotion assessments with sequenced talent management
    boards. In our first year, professional development opportunities and
    promotion rates have increased significantly; we must reinforce
    systemic change to make this an enduring effect.
        The Space Force is developing its own officer and enlisted
    professional military education (PME) programs to fit within the
    broader concepts of the Guardian Strategy to ensure that all members
    are career-long learners, and that learning directly relates to the
    success of their current and future duties. Space Force PME will focus
    on the development of space-minded warfighters who are credible and
    effective in multi-domain warfare and the joint environment. We have
    already expanded space curricula at Airman Leadership School; stood up
    a Space Force Non-Commissioned Officer Leadership Academy; expanded the
    Schriever Space Scholars Program at Air University; and created the
    West Fellowship for Senior Developmental Education. Finally, we are
    taking a proactive approach featuring teams at the unit level to
    strengthen social, physical, and mental attributes to energize personal
    and organizational resiliency. As the Space Force takes care of
    guardians and their families, it must prepare them to defend our
    Nation. Space Force talent must be deliberately managed by well-
    positioned human resources mission partners in the field commands and
    headquarters office to support both military and civilian guardians.
    Training and Doctrine
        We have completely redesigned our space training and doctrine
    across all space operations competencies, beginning with publication
    last year of a foundational doctrine document. Our training has
    elevated from basic operation of space systems to threat- and target-
    based advanced space warfare training. Guardian training and doctrine
    focuses on seven core competency areas, through advanced training and
    education: orbital warfare, space electromagnetic warfare, space battle
    management, space access and sustainment, military intelligence, cyber
    operations, and engineering and acquisition. Our shift in training and
    doctrine must be complementary to our capabilities and reflect the
    reality of our current and future missions. Additionally, Space
    Training and Readiness Command is bringing together training and
    doctrine to support our tactics, strategies, and theories of victory.
                             value of partnerships
        An independent Service focused on space has already provided
    greatly expanded opportunities for partnerships with civil and
    commercial space organizations within the United States and with allies
    and partners around the world. Working through the Department of
    Defense, close cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration and the Department of State has ensured a unified U.S.
    voice in discussions about responsible behavior in space with foreign
    governments. Similarly, through the Department of Defense, we continue
    to work hand in hand with the Department of Commerce on shared
    interests including space traffic management, positioning, navigation,
    and timing programs, applications, and efforts to maintain the space
    industrial base. We are working to expand cooperation with commercial
    partners using both traditional and innovative development pathways;
    seeking means for tighter fusion to take advantage of the enthusiasm
    and energy in the commercial space sector.
        Internationally, our partnerships have historically been built
    around one-way data sharing agreements with a small number of
    countries. As the proliferation and importance of space capabilities
    increases around the world, we are fostering greater cooperation with
    international partners across the board. For example, a hosted payload
    agreement with the government of Norway will save us more than $900
    million and helped us get capability on orbit 2 years faster. We are
    also working with NATO to further integrate space capabilities and
    knowledge in that alliance, including the stand-up of the first NATO
    Space Operations Center within NATO Air Command. Cooperation with
    allies and partners, on both capability development and operations,
    continues to provide opportunities to decrease cost and increase speed
    and innovation.
                           creating a digital service
        Founded in the Information Age, the Space Force was ``born
    digital.'' We are harnessing modern era advancements and tools to
    accelerate innovation and ensure our military advantages in, to, and
    from space. Under the leadership of the newly established Technology
    and Innovation Office, the Space Force focuses on partnering with U.S.
    Government, science and technology industries, and academia to build a
    digital Service to support Space Force missions and business
    operations.
    Digital Headquarters
        Leaders at every echelon of the force require access to data and
    analytics in order to make informed decisions with speed and precision.
    A new data analytic environment and automation tools will streamline
    headquarter processes, enable seamless data sharing, increase decision
    space, and accelerate warfighting outcomes. Digital transformation is
    occurring in operational readiness, talent management (recruiting and
    onboarding), programming and budgeting, and capability development. In
    capability development, digital models will enhance analyses of
    alternatives, iterate requirements decomposition, improve cost
    estimation fidelity, and ultimately accelerate the planning,
    coordination, and development of optimum solutions to meet critical
    warfighter needs.
    Digital Operations
        Commanders and unit-level guardians are empowered to innovate
    inside their mission operations, explore novel concepts for space
    domain awareness, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, collaborate
    with small business innovators, and align innovation efforts for
    transition into operations. This effort includes partnerships with the
    Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, industry, and academia to advance
    use of artificial intelligence applications and research.
    Digital Workforce
        Continuous transformation requires digitally-fluent military and
    civilian guardians. Therefore, we are funding software-coding training
    for military and civilian personnel and leveraging Department-wide
    digital training efforts to improve digital literacy using industry-
    leading commercial courseware. To achieve the goal of a digital
    workforce we must cultivate our collective digital acumen, develop an
    expert cadre of ``Supra Coders,'' and equip and empower them to apply
    agile software practices, use artificial intelligence, and data
    science. Finally, we must place them strategically across the force to
    unleash their talent and energy toward inventive, innovative solutions
    in operations and acquisition.
              accelerating capability design, decision, & delivery
        The Space Force must modernize its architecture to survive and
    execute spacepower missions in a contested domain and do so at speed.
    To this end, the Space Force is engaged in an end-to-end transformation
    of organizations and processes to accelerate delivery of operationally-
    relevant capabilities. Consistent with our effort to become a ``Digital
    Service,'' we will exploit our digital engineering systems as a
    backbone to connect multiple processes and accelerate capability
    development activities from analysis to integration, decision, and
    acquisition.
    Integrated Analysis for Optimal Design
        The Space Warfighting Analysis Center (SWAC), currently aligned
    under the Space Operations Command, is leading analysis, modeling,
    wargaming, and experimentation to generate new operational concepts and
    force design options for the Department of Defense. The SWAC integrates
    domain expertise with unique analytic tools, datasets, and intelligence
    to develop operational architecture options to fulfill space missions.
    By driving unity of effort, we reduce cost, duplication of effort, and
    increase our speed of decision and action
    Digital Engineering to Better Inform Requirements
        Rather than static reports, the SWAC's design options are digital
    models, which enable testing of proposed capabilities through
    simulation in an environment that accurately reflects fast evolving
    threats and the space domain. The Space Force Strategy and Resources
    Office (SRO) integrates SWAC's design options with the appropriate
    processes to develop Service capability and programmatic options for
    presentation to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy's
    Management Action Group. The SRO also ensures digital models generate
    required data artifacts to inform oversight; Planning, Programming,
    Budgeting, and Execution; and acquisition actions.
    Streamlined Governance for Timely Decisions
        In order to support the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
    Space Acquisition and Integration, who will eventually have Service
    Acquisition Executive (SAE) authority and chair the Space Force
    Acquisition Council (SAC), the Space Force has established a supporting
    Program Integration Council (PIC). As a collaborative interagency
    leadership council, the PIC facilitates cooperation and deconfliction
    between National Security Space Enterprise stakeholders and ensures
    planning, alignment, execution, delivery, and optimization of
    capabilities across all space mission areas. Streamlined coordination
    across the enterprise via the PIC and SAC improves collaboration and
    better enables timely decisions by the SAE. The Assistant Secretary of
    the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration is an essential
    element of this approach and we look forward to implementing this
    congressionally-directed change as quickly as permitted by law.
    Consolidated Space Acquisition Enterprise for Agility
        Finally, in the summer of 2021 the Space Force will stand up the
    Space Systems Command (SSC) to provide for cooperation across space
    acquisition within the Department of the Air Force. Initially comprised
    of the former Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the Service's
    launch enterprise, SSC will also have a limited administrative support
    relationship with the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO) and--as
    of the beginning of fiscal year 2023, per statute--the Space
    Development Agency (SDA). By aligning three organizations with a
    pedigree in traditional acquisition, disruptive acquisition, and
    commercial acquisition, the Department of the Air Force can access
    best-of-breed solutions. Because SSC acquirers will receive digital
    models with traceable requirements, Program Managers and Program
    Executive Officers will be equipped to make faster, more agile
    decisions and trades. In addition, the space acquisition enterprise
    will continue to improve both commercial and allied integration.
                      missile warning and missile tracking
        Strategic and theater missile warning and missile tracking
    capabilities provide indications and warning to protect the Homeland,
    joint forces and allies abroad. The evolution of threats to on-orbit
    systems force us to re-think both how we protect and defend our
    strategic assets, and how future strategic capabilities should be
    designed to mitigate threats. The Space Force is partnering with
    combatant commands, the Missile Defense Agency, National Reconnaissance
    Office, and the Space Development Agency to design and build a
    resilient missile warning architecture for the collective defense of
    our Nation, joint force, and allies.
    Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
        We are designing and developing the future architecture for missile
    warning and missile tracking. Next-Generation Overhead Persistent
    Infrared (OPIR) will succeed the current Space Based Infrared System
    (SBIRS) and will provide increased missile warning, missile defense,
    battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence capabilities with
    resiliency and defensive features to counter emerging threats.
        The ground system for Next-Gen OPIR, also known as Future
    Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE), migrates satellite
    command and control to the Space Force's Enterprise Ground Services,
    modernizes Mission Data Processing to implement an open framework, and
    upgrades Relay Ground Stations to meet United States Space Command's
    operational requirements. We are using Middle Tier Acquisition
    authorities to rapidly prototype solutions. This pathfinder approach
    delivers the first resilient geosynchronous satellite and associated
    ground system in fiscal year 2025 and the first polar satellite in
    fiscal year 2028.
                      positioning, navigation, and timing
        The Global Positioning System (GPS) remains the ``gold standard''
    for positioning, navigation, and timing for the United States and the
    world. GPS underpins the global economy and our way of war. Adversaries
    have long recognized our dependence on GPS and have proliferated
    technologies to degrade, deny, and spoof GPS signals for civil and
    military users. We are pursuing modernization efforts across the entire
    GPS architecture to include upgrades in space, ground, and user
    segments. The Space Force's future GPS architecture provides more
    robust positioning, navigation, and timing to the joint force, ensuring
    at least one technical generation advantage over any adversary.
    GPS Space Segment
        The Space Force is pursuing significant satellite enhancements to
    our GPS constellation, including higher-power military signals, new
    civilian signals, upgraded nuclear detection system payloads, and
    hosted search-and-rescue payloads. GPS Block III features improved
    signal strength and accuracy, increased anti-jam power, and a longer
    expected design life. The next block of GPS, GPS Block IIIF-- available
    for launch in fiscal year 2026--will deliver regional military-code
    protection, a higher power signal in a given geographic area of
    operation to boost anti-jam capabilities for contested environments.
    GPS Operational Control Segment Next (OCX)
        Operational Control Segment Next (OCX) will develop and field a
    modernized ground system required for the command and control of GPS
    satellites. The OCX program is on track to meet current Acquisition
    Program Baseline cost and schedule milestones. OCX provides expandable,
    robust information assurance architecture to significantly improve
    cyber resiliency, enabling the latest military and civilian GPS
    signals, improving cyber protection, and allowing the system to evolve
    to combat emerging threats. We have completed product test, are
    currently progressing through segment integration, and will transition
    to operations in fiscal year 2022.
    Military Global Positioning System User Equipment (MGUE)
        Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) will modernize user equipment to
    enable precision fires, safe navigation, and time coordination across
    multiple platforms in GPS-degraded environments. Military-code receiver
    cards embedded in weapon systems enable cyber-secure, anti-jam, and
    anti-spoof precision, navigation, and timing for the joint force and
    our partners. MGUE Increment one (1) completed developmental testing of
    the Army and Marine Corps lead platforms in fiscal year 2020. MGUE
    efforts support finalization of card design, testing, and integration
    with Navy and Air Force lead platforms. MGUE Increment two (2)
    leverages the MGUE Increment one (1) technology to the maximum extent
    while addressing the production of M-Code integrated circuits far into
    the future.
                            command and control (c2)
        Our top priority is to develop a Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control System to ensure United States Space Command and their joint
    and coalition warfighting partners have the capability they require to
    command and control in a contested domain. We have made considerable
    gains this year, fully integrated in, and helping lead, the Advanced
    Battle Management System (ABMS) effort. In recognition that legacy
    space command and control capabilities are insufficient for us to
    prevail in future conflict, we have prioritized the delivery of space
    command and control capabilities using a development, security, and
    operations (DevSecOps) approach to acquisitions. Leveraging the agile
    approaches of commercial software developers, we are rapidly developing
    cyber-resilient capabilities that enhance U.S., allied, and partner
    nation operational-level space warfighting capabilities against the
    adversary.
        The initiatives below build and sustain the infrastructure required
    to connect sensors to shooters using machine-to-machine planning and
    tasking of warfighting capabilities.
    Unified Data Library (UDL)
        The Space Force built and delivered the Unified Data Library (UDL),
    a cloud-based, cyber-accredited, multi-classification data store that
    facilitates universal data access and serves as the foundational
    element of the ABMS data architecture in partnership with the Air
    Force. UDL provides all-domain secure Space Domain Awareness (SDA) data
    sharing from all Services and sensors to support space-focused Battle
    Management and Command and Control; it is also extensible to fit the
    needs of Joint All-Domain Command and Control. This effort adds long-
    term access to a wide variety of space domain awareness data sources
    including commercial, allies, and academia. The UDL creates unified,
    agile procurement of commercial products to bolster Combined Space
    Operations Center and National Space Defense Center operations.
    Additionally, it protects satellite tracking data by seamlessly
    integrating defensive cyber operations.
    Space C2 Open Architecture Operational Prototype (SCOOP)
        The Space Force has also delivered the Space C2 Open Architecture
    Operational Prototype (SCOOP) program, a modern cloud architecture that
    is connected to 40 sites nationwide. Leveraging the Department of the
    Air Force's prior work on open architecture standards, SCOOP delivers a
    command and control capability for our most pressing needs, with the
    ability to connect into other domains, and serves as the foundation of
    our next generation C2 capability.
    Space Domain Awareness (SDA)
        Space Domain Awareness (SDA) is the cornerstone of our ability to
    command and control warfighting capabilities. The Space Force budget
    invests in new terrestrial radars, optical sensors, and space-based
    capabilities and commercial partnerships to increase the quantity and
    quality of space observations. A robust SDA architecture improves our
    indications and warnings, ensures freedom of action in space, and
    enables joint and coalition options to defend critical space
    capabilities. Additionally, investments in secure connectivity and data
    sharing tools improve our collective understanding of our adversaries'
    capabilities and intent.
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
        As part of Department of Defense's efforts to modernize the nuclear
    triad, the Space Force will provide and modernize the space and mission
    control segments for worldwide, secure, jam-resistant, and survivable
    communications. We are pursuing digital development efforts for the
    future disaggregated strategic and tactical satellite communications
    systems to meet emerging threats in the 2030-timeframe. Evolved
    Strategic SATCOM will continue the strategic mission of the Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program with improved on-
    board resilience features, upgraded satellite capabilities, and
    cybersecurity features. We are leveraging rapid prototyping
    demonstrations to speed the delivery of the space segment to meet the
    warfighter need date in 2032.
    Space System Prototype Transition (SSPT)
        Space System Prototype Transition (SSPT) is a portfolio of programs
    that rapidly advance next-generation space capabilities to the
    warfighter at the speed of relevance. The portfolio leverages the
    commercial industrial base and demonstrates common defense through
    partnerships to enhance resiliency. One example is the development and
    integration of space domain awareness payloads on two Japanese Quasi-
    Zenith Satellite System spacecraft. The hosted payloads will increase
    sensor diversity and enable space surveillance and event detection over
    USINDOPACOM in the geosynchronous orbit regime.
    Transition to Enterprise Ground System (EGS)
        Enterprise Ground System (EGS) will enable the transition from a
    family of legacy stovepiped satellite C2 systems to an improved, open,
    resilient, and common platform. The effort funds modernized system
    interfaces, virtualization, and the translation of mission applications
    to ensure rapid response to emerging threats and integration of new
    capabilities. We continue to develop a Minimum Viable Product for
    foundational services and infrastructure to provide an initial
    Enterprise Capability. EGS will integrate multiple new mission partners
    within the Space Warfighting Construct & Missile Warning mission
    threads, scale multiple services for existing mission partners, and
    integrate them at one or more of three EGS locations. Continued
    investment provides foundational services and infrastructure to deliver
    enterprise-wide command and control services to all Space Force
    satellite programs. We are on track to deliver a fully integrated
    system by 2028.
                            assured access to space
        National Security Space Launch (NSSL) provides assured access to
    space for the Nation's most critical warfighting and intelligence
    capabilities. To meet the full set of National Security Space
    requirements, we must continue to competitively invest in domestic
    launch providers' development of new launch systems. The Space Force,
    National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration have a coordinated strategy to certify new
    entrants to launch payloads, and continue to work with different launch
    providers to reliably meet our national requirements. The Space Force
    recently completed a 5-year strategy to bolster a commercially
    competitive market and transition to domestic launch systems by
    awarding the NSSL Phase Two procurement contract.
        Leveraging this strategy, we are pursuing five National Security
    Space Launches to deliver warfighting capabilities on time. Following
    the outcomes of our Phase Two launch procurement strategy, we will
    continue to engage with industry partners regarding emerging launch
    requirements and technologies to invest in continued assured access to
    space.
    National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Enabling Investments
        We are investing in multiple public-private partnerships to develop
    enabling technologies for future space access, mobility, and logistics.
    Targeted investments in orbital transfer, on-orbit servicing, digital
    engineering, and novel on-orbit propulsion technologies will increase
    U.S. access and freedom to operate in space. We will continue to invest
    in providers of domestic launch services enabling our transition from
    non-allied space launch engines to domestic rocket propulsion systems.
    We will also continue technical maturation, risk reduction, and public-
    private partnership investment to expand domestic and cost-effective
    solutions for assured access to space. Additionally, the Space Force's
    research and development standards must reflect both the mission areas
    and the threat environment. The Space Force is building a more
    defensible and resilient space defense architecture by disaggregating
    on-orbit capabilities. We are building agile and threat responsive
    systems to complicate targeting. Additionally, we are building
    redundancy and resiliency countermeasures into the spacecraft and
    payload designs of our systems.
                                  way forward
        Congress established the Space Force to ensure freedom of action
    for the United States in, from, and to space. This Department of the
    Air Force Posture Statement builds on fiscal year 2021 efforts in
    strengthening our ability to deliver flexible capabilities and
    strategic options at operationally relevant speeds to outpace emerging
    and dynamic threats. The Service's streamlined and integrated
    organizational design also creates new military options with the joint
    force, inter-agencies, industry, and our partners and allies. We are
    eager to work with Congress to build a common understanding of both the
    strategy and the investments needed to secure our Nation's vital
    interests.

        Chairman Reed. General Brown, do you have a statement,
    please?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES Q. BROWN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
                             THE AIR FORCE

        General Brown. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Inhofe, and distinguished Members of this Committee. I am
    humbled to serve as the Nation's 22nd Air Force Chief of Staff
    and to represent 689,000 total force airmen serving today. Your
    support for them and their families is greatly appreciated. It
    is an honor to be up here before you to day with Acting
    Secretary Roth and my fellow service chief and long-time
    friend, General Jay Raymond.
        As a general officer, I have spent the last decade-plus in
    positions overseas and/or supporting operations in the Middle
    East, Europe, Africa, and most recently the Indo-Pacific. With
    this context, I have been able to look at the Air Force from
    varied perspectives, and I personally have seen the reemergence
    of the strategic competition and how the character of war has
    changed. The strategic environment has rapidly evolved. We have
    not changed fast enough to keep pace.
        The People's Republic of China has recognized modern
    warfare as a contest among systems, not individual units or
    platforms. Accordingly, Secretary Austin has prioritized China
    as our pacing threat. Meanwhile, Russia continues to modernize
    its armed forces, increasing the capability of its missiles,
    strike aircraft, warships, artillery systems, and nuclear
    weapons.
        Competition and future warfare will be conducted across all
    domains simultaneously. It will be a transregional and global
    undertaking with complex actions and actors intertwined. To
    account for these changes, our Nation, our Air Force must
    change faster than we have been. If we continue on a path of
    incremental change, our advantage erodes, and losing becomes a
    distinct possibility.
        The Air Force recently updated our mission statement, to
    fly, fight, and win--airpower anytime, anywhere. To execute
    this mission, now and into the future, we must transition our
    Air Force and our operational concepts from today to tomorrow,
    and we must do so much faster. That is why I wrote ``Accelerate
    Change or Lose,'' to call attention to the changes in the
    strategic environment, because the mix of capabilities that our
    Air Force has now, that were good enough yesterday, that are
    good enough today, will likely fail tomorrow. Our future Air
    Force must be agile, resilient, and connected, with the ability
    to generate near-instantaneous effects anytime, anywhere. Not
    just sometime, in some places, but anytime, anywhere.
        Our Air Force is the only service that provides our joint
    teammates, allies, and partners the assurance of air
    superiority, the advantage of global strike, and the agility
    and rapid mobility through a range of capabilities most
    requested by today's combatant commanders. Additionally, the
    Air Force ISR and command and control capabilities provide the
    ability to sense, make sense, and act.
        But while our past and current capabilities have sufficed
    for the last three decades, they will not effectively perform
    in tomorrow's highly contested environment. To address these
    challenges that will endanger our national security of
    tomorrow, the transition to the future Air Force design must
    start today.
        Finally, we have a foundational responsibility to our
    airmen and their families. I remain focused on ensuring we are
    ready and that we have the tools, infrastructure, and talent
    management systems to provide the environment where all can
    reach their full potential. The future Air Force design
    advances our core missions and new approaches to warfighting
    that will holistically support every combatant commander and
    benefit every service chief. Investing in your Air Force is an
    investment in the Joint Forces.
        Ladies and gentlemen, the bottom line is simple. We must
    modernize for the future and focus on capabilities that
    maintain our advantage, both today and tomorrow. For decades,
    we have collaborated with the Congress and our industry
    partners to modernize for the future. Now to fulfill our
    responsibility to ensure our national security, we must be
    willing to change, to make the tough choices required to
    deliberately transform our Air Force to the future force we
    need to compete, deter, and win. We have done it before, and I
    am confident together we can do it again.
        Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Brown. General
    Raymond, please.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN W. RAYMOND, USSF, CHIEF OF SPACE
                               OPERATIONS

        General Raymond. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of this Committee. It
    is an absolute honor to appear before you today with Secretary
    Roth, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and General C.Q.
    Brown, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and a long-time
    friend and teammate. On behalf of the guardians stationed
    worldwide, let me begin by thanking you for the continued
    leadership and strong support that you have provided to the
    United States Space Force (USSF) .
        The United States is a spacefaring nation. We have long
    understood that our Nation is strongest, economically,
    diplomatically, and militarily, when we have access to and
    freedom to maneuver in space. For the past three decades, we
    have been able to take that access and freedom to maneuver for
    granted.
        Unfortunately, as the National Defense Strategy and the
    newer Interim National Security Strategy identified, this is no
    longer the case. Both China, our pacing threat, and Russia are
    doing two things to eliminate the lead that the United States
    currently enjoys. First, they are rapidly developing their own
    space capabilities to provide them the advantages that we
    currently enjoy. Second, they are building weapons systems
    specifically designed to deny our access to space and the
    advantages that that provides. These threats include robust
    jamming of the global positioning system (GPS) and
    communications satellites; directed energy systems that can
    blind, disrupt, or damage our satellites; anti-satellite
    weapons, both in space and launched from the ground, that are
    designed to destroy U.S. satellites; and cyber capabilities
    that can deny our access to the domain.
        Thankfully, with the strong support of Congress, especially
    this Committee, the United States seized on the opportunity to
    make needed changes to stay ahead of that growing threat by
    establishing the United States Space Force. This leadership is
    resonating globally and is already delivering results for our
    Nation.
        We have slashed bureaucracy at every level in order to
    empower our guardians to move at speed and to increase the
    accountability necessary to operate in this domain. We have put
    together a forward-leaning human capital strategy, allowing us
    to build a more highly-trained, educated, and developed
    warfighting force, while taking care of our guardians and their
    families throughout their careers. We wrote our first doctrine
    to clearly articulate the independent value of space power to
    joint and coalition forces, and this importance is fully
    captured in the Department's new joint warfighting construct
    that is being developed.
        Our international partnerships are stronger, with many of
    our partner nations following our lead and elevating space in
    their own militaries. We have created a new end-to-end
    capability development process from force design and
    requirements to acquisition and testing, enabled by a digital
    thread to move at speed while driving unity of effort across
    the Department. We have rejected stovepipes by actively working
    with the Joint Force, other government agencies, and industry
    to compete, deter, and win at an affordable cost.
        The Space Force cannot and will not tolerate business as
    usual. Our demanding mission and lean force demand nothing less
    than a new standard. This budget reflects the shift of many
    Department of Defense space activities into the Space Force,
    yet we remain only 2.5 percent of the overall Department of
    Defense budget. We are committed to stretching every dollar to
    its limit to buy as much capability as possible for our Nation.
    Our Joint Force does not close on its warfighting requirements
    without space. Space is the force multiplier we must continue
    to invest in so that we can compete, deter, and win, and
    without it we risk losing.
        This fiscal year 2022 budget balances the need to protect
    capabilities we have on orbit now while shifting and
    modernizing to a more defendable architecture in the future. It
    is an investment that provides assured space capabilities to
    our sister services, our Nation, and our joint coalition
    partners. These demanding tasks could not have been possible
    without sustained support from Congress, and for that I thank
    you. We cannot afford to lose space.
        I am absolutely honored and humbled to serve as the first
    Chief of Space Operations and to have the opportunity to serve
    side-by-side with the incredible guardians that I am privileged
    to lead. It is because of them that our Nation enjoys the
    benefits of space today, and it is because of them, America's
    sons and daughters, that we will compete, deter, and win in the
    future.
        I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Raymond, and
    thank you all, gentlemen, for your testimony and service.
        Since I had a chance to unleash a few questions out of
    order, let me ask one question to General Brown and then yield
    and recognize Senator Inhofe.
        General Brown, Section 139 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for fiscal year 2021 requires the Secretary
    of Defense to certify that the retirement of the U-2 or Global
    Hawks will not denigrate the capability of combatant commanders
    to carry out their missions. Has the Secretary of Defense made
    such a determination that would allow you to retire 20 Global
    Hawk aircraft in this fiscal year 2022 budget?
        General Brown. Chairman, we are actually in the process of
    working through that waiver. I personally have sat down with
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense to discuss the waiver package.
    I do not know exactly what the status is with the Secretary of
    Defense, but we are on the path to get that waiver approved.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Since I have had my
    question time, let me recognize Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. No, feel free to go ahead and take more.
        All right. General Brown, first of all thank you for the
    discussion that we had in my office. I appreciate that very
    much, and I really learned a lot as to what we are really
    trying to get to. As I mentioned, China will have more stealth
    fighters in the Western Pacific than us in 2025. That is just
    one of the consequences of our very low number of aircraft
    procurements since 1990, and we can get into the discussion. I
    hate to keep comparing. My fear for what might be happening to
    that F-35, with what has happened and did happen back in about
    2004 with the F-22. The only reason I keep bringing that up, I
    am about the only one around here old enough to remember that.
    So we want to make sure that we profit from the mistakes we
    made back at that time.
        We need the total capability that we have, for the stress
    on the airmen, and to that point Mr. Kendall testified at his
    confirmation hearing to be Secretary of the Air Force, that the
    way to bring down sustainment costs is to procure more F-35's.
        So, General Brown, I was surprised that no F-35's were on
    your unfunded priority list, and quite often I think we had 48,
    I believe it was, in the budget, and at time we used that same
    number before, 48 new F-35's. But we have also been having F-
    35's on our commitment for our unfunded priority list, and they
    were not.
        So I would kind of like to know, first of all, I am sure
    there is some reason that we did not have more on our unfunded
    list this time as we have in the past, and then some kind of a
    statement as to your commitment as to the F-35 being the
    cornerstone of the Air Force. Now that is not just for us on
    this Committee. That is for our allies that are out there,
    because they are depending on that, because there is not
    another game in town.
        Do you have any response as to why we did not have unfunded
    F-35's in this last budget?
        General Brown. Chairman Inhofe, I appreciate the
    conversation as well and I appreciate the opportunity to share
    with you, and with the Committee as well, as I have said
    publicly.
        The F-35 is the cornerstone of our fighter fleet. Right now
    it is the second-largest of our fighter fleets inside the
    United States Air Force. At the same time, it is a very capable
    platform, and in watching the mission capable rates, the
    mission capable rates for the F-35 are on par with the rest of
    our fighter fleet. So not only for the United States Air Force
    but also for our allies and partners, and I personally engage
    with many of our allies and partners that are flying the F-35,
    and I know they feel the same way about the F-35.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, but I am just saying that you can not
    say it enough, because they have a big investment, a lot to
    rely on, on that vehicle. And so I think it serves a good
    purpose to remind them that yes, that is our cornerstone, it
    will remain that way, and we are going to increase that fleet.
        General Raymond, we discussed this also in our meeting. One
    of the main reasons we created the Space Force was to focus the
    Department efforts in space. It seems to me, and I suspect I am
    not the only member up here on this dais that is a little
    confused in terms of what are we trying to--what is our goal
    right now? I know there are some things that we have done that
    we are going to be leaving with the services, some will be
    transferred over to Space Force. I am not exactly sure.
        First of all, what is going to be transferred over, and
    then, secondly, what would be our timing on this, and what
    would it look like at the end? In the remainder of my time,
    just another 40 seconds, any comments about that? What is this
    supposed to look like, and when would we anticipate the signs
    are, therefore, to end that transformation that is taking place
    now?
        General Raymond. Yes, thanks for the question, sir and I
    appreciated the opportunity to meet with you yesterday.
        We are driving unity of effort across the Department. As
    you said in your question, I think that is one of the reasons
    why we stood up the Space Force. We have come to agreement with
    the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force on what missions should
    transfer over, and I appreciate the close partnerships that we
    have enjoyed with all three of those services.
        We are going to begin bringing those capabilities over this
    year, and it is largely capabilities that the other services
    operated in space, and we will bring those over. What we wanted
    to be careful, though, is that we did not break the other
    services as we stood up at Space Force. We did that work
    initially with the Air Force over the last year. We have
    brought all the mission sets from the Air Force now into the
    Space Force, and beginning in this fiscal year we will begin
    the transfer of Army and Navy capabilities into the force as
    well, to unite those efforts under one service.
        Senator Inhofe. When would you anticipate that those
    expectations would be met?
        General Raymond. Sir, that begins this year, and will bleed
    over into next year to finalize it. But over the next two
    fiscal years we will complete that shifting of capabilities
    from those other services.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, General. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen,
    please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and Acting Secretary Roth,
    General Brown, and General Raymond, thank you all for being
    here this morning.
        General Brown, I would like to begin with you, and I am
    sure you will not be surprised to know that I want to talk
    about the KC-46, because we had the opportunity, back in
    February, to fly with airmen from the Pease Air National Guard
    Base. It was really impressive to see how proficient they were
    getting with the new aircraft, and I understand that is
    happening across the country.
        What I understand the Air Mobility Command has said is that
    units like the 157th Air Refueling Wing will begin taking on
    operational taskings from United States Transportation Command
    (TRANSCOM) this summer. When do you expect that to begin? Do
    you have a date?
        General Brown. Thank you for the question, and I also
    appreciate the opportunity to go with you on the KC-46 and meet
    with our guardsmen from New Hampshire.
        It will be this summer. I do not have a specific date but I
    can get back to you on that. But actually, the KC-46 capability
    release, to be able to refuel, to be able to use those that
    have KC-46's that are already mission capable, the New
    Hampshire Air National Guard will be at the top of the list of
    one of the units that will be asked to help support.
        Senator Shaheen. I am really pleased to hear that. Thank
    you. Can you talk about how investments in this 2022 budget are
    going to help to meet the goal of full operational status for
    the KC-46's, and how will it, or will it, address the remote
    vision system, and what is the update on making that
    operational, what the status is of that.
        General Brown. So in this particular budget as we continue
    to pursue and procure KC-46's, the 46 has been delivered here
    just this past week and we will continue on that path.
        On the remote vision system, we are making great progress
    there with the Air Force engineers and with the Boeing
    engineers, to bring that capability, and it is staying on track
    to deliver fiscal year 2023 time frame. The other aspect of
    this is, as we discussed, is the ability to retire some of our
    KC-10's and KC-135's frees up the airmen that we are going to
    train to fly the KC-46's that are coming off the line, and so
    working all those in concert will be important to ensure we
    have the capability from the KC-46.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, great. I am really pleased to hear
    that, and we are looking forward to having those folks who have
    been transferred out of New Hampshire back, to be able to fly
    all those missions.
        General Raymond, this week National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration (NASA) Administrator Bill Nelson testified
    before the Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations
    Subcommittee, which I chair, and he talked about the need for
    the United States to continue to lead the world in outer space,
    and as we saw, China sending two astronauts into space this
    week, it really resonates that we have competition. He also
    talked about the importance of landing the next humans on the
    moon, and that being done by the United States, not by China or
    Russia.
        So can you talk about how leadership in the civilian
    space--no pun intended--factors into your decision-making as
    you are looking at the decisions you are making for the Space
    Force, and how do you coordinate, or do you coordinate your
    investments with NASA, since many of those overlap as we are
    looking at what we are doing in space?
        General Raymond. Yes, ma'am. It is a great question. I have
    had the opportunity now, on two occasions over the last week,
    to talk to new Administrator Nelson, former Senator Nelson, a
    great man, and we are lucky to have him as the Administrator.
        We work very closely with NASA. We send people to NASA to
    be astronauts. We partner with them on launch. We partner with
    them on developing norms of behavior. We partner with them on
    developing training capabilities. In fact, NASA had some
    capabilities that they developed back in the Apollo days, and
    we said rather than having us build our own thing, why don't we
    just take that and modify it? So we have done it.
        So I am very pleased with the partnership that we enjoy. We
    both rely on the same defense industrial base. We also have
    strong partnerships with commercial. We also partner with
    partners, and NASA has a very broad set of partners. We are in
    the partnership-building business, and that relationship really
    allows us to help develop our partners as well.
        So I am very grateful for the partnership in NASA and look
    forward to working very closely with Senator Nelson, now
    Administrator Nelson, in the future.
        Senator Shaheen. Do you agree with his analysis that it is
    going to be really important for the United States to lead in
    the next lunar landing?
        General Raymond. I absolutely agree that it is important
    that the United States lead in all aspects of space. It is
    critical. It underpins every instrument of national power.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Let me call upon
    Senator Fischer, via Webex.
        Senator Fischer. Welcome to all the members of the panel
    today.
        Secretary Roth and General Brown, I appreciate the strong
    support this budget shows toward nuclear modernization,
    including critical programs like the Ground Based Strategic
    Deterrent (GBSD) and the Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO). I
    am also happy to see the Air Force moving forward with the
    Survivable Airborne Operations Center as a replacement to the
    E-4B. This was something that the Air Force studied for a long
    time, and it is gratifying to see action begin to happen here.
        General Brown, let me say again how much I appreciate you
    traveling with me and a number of other Senators to Minot,
    North Dakota, and also to United States Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM) earlier this year. Very briefly, sir, do you
    continue to believe that the GBSD program is essential?
        General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question, and most
    definitely. The program has been on track. It is essential to
    our strategic deterrence. It supports every one of our
    Operating Plans (OPLANs). [Inaudible] the foundation of our
    OPLANs to provide our nuclear deterrent. So it is very
    important to our security, and I appreciated the opportunity to
    engage with you on that topic when we had a chance to visit
    both STRATCOM and Minot.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Another vital component to our
    modernization effort involves extending the life of the B-52
    through 2050, and equipping the plane's new engines is central
    to this effort. This budget requests significant additional
    resources in fiscal year 2023 for re-engining, and I am
    concerned that some people have portrayed this as an increase,
    as reflecting a 50 percent cost growth in this program.
        Secretary Roth, that is not an accurate statement by those
    people, is it?
        Mr. Roth. No, it is not. We just recently approved the
    program, total program costs about $11 billion. That was a 9
    percent increase over the previous estimate, and all that was
    an update to the estimate. Based on some of the virtual
    prototyping that had taken place in the program, a reassessment
    of the requirement, a look at the complexity of the integration
    of a commercial engine into the aging platform that the B-52
    is, and a look at the current price of the industrial base and
    the realities of buying from the current industrial base.
        So again, back to your question, it was a 9 percent
    increase in the total acquisition cost.
        Chairman Reed. Senator Fischer, there seems to be an
    interruption in your signal.
        We will restore communication with Senator Fischer, but at
    this time I would like to ask Senator King if he would prepare
    his questions.
        Senator King. Thank you. It is always daunting to
    substitute for Senator Fischer.
        General Brown, I am concerned about readiness and aircraft
    availability. There was a Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) report in the winter of 2020 that indicated various
    numbers for various airplanes, ranging from 70 percent down to
    52 percent, sometimes even the 40 percent range. How do we
    improve that? That just strikes me as unacceptable. I do not
    know the comparable figures for the private sector, but my
    sense is if Delta Airlines had a 70 percent availability for
    their aircraft they would be out of business. Is it parts? Is
    it maintenance personnel? Is it intellectual property so that
    we can make our own parts? What are the bottlenecks on
    availability?
        General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question, and like
    you I am concerned to make sure that we have the readiness that
    is required to support the combatant commanders, but also to
    ensure that our airmen are fully trained and capable to support
    our national security requirements.
        One of the key factors that impacts our readiness is our
    weapons system sustainment, but I also look at the age, the
    average age of our fleet, which is about 28 years, in addition
    to about 40 percent or more of our fleet is past designed
    service life. So our focus on not only sustaining the current
    capability with our weapons systems sustainment investment, but
    at the same time being able to modernize. What we are finding
    is that our aircraft now, over the past 2 decades, are breaking
    about a third more, taking about 10 percent longer to fix. We
    have the right manpower from a maintenance perspective, but
    they are young. What I mean by that is we plussed up manpower
    there just several years ago. A lot of them are what we call at
    our entry level, and we are building that experience at the
    same time we are operating some older platforms.
        Senator King. But my understanding is part of the problem
    is parts availability, it can take ages to get parts from the
    manufacturer. Are we developing programs where we can build our
    own parts? I foresee a day where every depot has a 3D printer
    and we have the intellectual property as part of the purchase
    of the airframe in order to be able to make our own parts, so
    that we do not have to be at the mercy of the original
    equipment manufacturer (OEM).
        General Brown. Senator, we are doing that, and the intent
    is to do as much as we can with some of the 3D printing,
    particularly as we look at some of our older platforms, where
    we have diminishing supply from our vendors, because some of
    those vendors do not exist anymore. So taking opportunities to
    advance in our technology with the 3D printing is exactly one
    of the things we are working on.
        Senator King. Well, I hope that in future acquisitions part
    of the deal is always to purchase the intellectual property, so
    that we can make our own parts and not be dependent upon the
    supply chain.
        General Brown. That is exactly our approach, is we do our
    digital acquisition approach and be able to have not only
    access to the intellectual property but also using open-mission
    systems and agile software to be able to redesign very quickly,
    or adjust quickly, and print like you described.
        Senator King. Let me ask a question that Senator Fischer
    might have wanted to ask. Have you done a cost analysis of the
    new GBSD versus life-extension for Minuteman-III over a long
    period of time? What is the difference in cost?
        General Brown. Well, to date the difference in cost is $38
    billion. It is $38 billion cheaper to do GBSD than to life-
    extend the Minuteman-III.
        Senator King. In addition to a cost savings, you are
    gaining a new generation of technology. Is that correct?
        General Brown. Exactly. For our nuclear portfolio, it needs
    to be safe, secure, reliable, and deter the threat, and with
    the GBSD it will be more safe, more secure, more reliable, and
    better deterrence against a threat, with a very capable system.
        Senator King. General Raymond, you mentioned unity of
    effort in your testimony. You are trying to coordinate the work
    within the development of the Space Force. Can you expand on
    that for a few minutes--actually, for 39 seconds?
        General Raymond. For 39 seconds? Yes, sir. I will be happy
    to. It is good to see you, and thanks for traveling with me to
    Colorado. As we showed you out there----
        Senator King. Did you get your driver's license, John?
        General Raymond. I did. Thank you. As I showed you out
    there, sir, we have made great progress in developing a
    strategy and then architecting and designing the force to meet
    that strategy. That is driving unity of effort across Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),
    Space Development Agency, the Space and Missile Systems Center.
    For the first time in my career we have got all five working
    towards a common vision now and a common architecture. That is
    the value of standing up this service, and that is going well.
        On the requirements side, the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC) just signed a memo that says the Space Force is
    going to be the lead integrator for requirements for this space
    across the Department, and so that is another big steps that is
    in close partnership with that force design work.
        Then, finally, and I know I have got the red light [points
    to timer], on the acquisition side, we are driving unity of
    effort as we have designed our space systems command to bring
    disruptive innovators and align them with our more traditional
    partners, to have competition and go fast.
        Senator King. Well, I appreciate that, and I am out of time
    but I do--and perhaps I will submit a question for the record
    on the issue of joint capability acquisition, software, for
    example. We have Goldwater-Nichols for joint operation. I am
    concerned that we have got software being purchased all over
    the Defense Department that may be duplicative and may even be
    incompatible. So I will be submitting that question to you and
    the Secretary.
        Thank you all very much for your service.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me now
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, thank you very much, and I
    would have been happy to defer to Senator Fischer to finish her
    questions, but here we go.
        I understand Senator Shaheen has already asked about the
    KC-46. But let me just say I appreciate the progress that is
    being made. But KC-135's continue to perform a majority of
    refueling missions. Last year's NDAA prohibited the Air Force
    from retiring the KC-135's until after fiscal year 2023. The
    budget submission includes plans to retire 18 KC-135's, and, of
    course, the Legislative branch will eventually make the
    decision there.
        But I am concerned that the Air Force wants to move KC-
    135's to a backup inventory. I remain concerned about this, and
    it seems to me that your decision is budget driven rather than
    needs driven. If you had a higher top line, General, would you
    be forced to make this decision to retire 18 KC-135's, in a
    reversal of the clear language of the NDAA?
        General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question. I really
    do believe that I would actually probably continue on the same
    path we are today, to transition from our aging KC-135 to the
    newer KC-46. That is to balance where we are headed as an Air
    Force, to transition to the future. In addition to that, the
    manpower in our airmen that operate and maintain those KC-135's
    are the same airmen that operate and maintain our KC-46's, and
    so I have got to have the ability to, as we bring KC-46's
    online, to send them to training. Because it is not a flip of a
    switch, and have them transition to this newer platform.
        It will be a balance, and so right now we are on the path
    to have 179 KC-46's and still have 300 KC-135's in our
    inventory to meet the requirements laid out by the United
    States Transportation Command.
        Senator Wicker. If you had more money, you still would make
    the very same decision?
        General Brown. Well, if I had more money I would actually
    reconsider. What I would also do is, actually, I am not so sure
    I would put it into tankers, because of all the other
    requirements we have as an Air Force. That is where the
    analysis that I have been working very hard with our staff on,
    to ensure that any decision we make is thought through very
    carefully, we have the analysis to back it up, because with a
    degree in engineering I am all about the facts and the numbers.
    That is what I actually do. I would not commit to you whether I
    would put it into tankers but I would take a hard look at
    tankers but also other capabilities that the United States Air
    Force requires.
        Senator Wicker. Well, we are prepared to take a hard look,
    in this Committee, too. Just with regard to training aircraft,
    I understand that a plan is being finalized to retire the T-1
    training aircraft, currently used to support specialized
    Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), and the Air Force intends
    to move to an increased reliance on simulator training. General
    Brown, what is the Air Force's plan for the future of the T-1
    training fleet? In a recent forum, retired Air Force General
    James Holmes commented that there is no substitute for live
    training. That make sense to me. Are you concerned about the
    possible impacts that overreliance on simulator training could
    have on the quality of the new Air Force UPT graduates?
        General Brown. When I look at our UPT and our training
    there is a combination of things I am actually looking at. One
    is the T-1 and how we are looking at the T-1 here in this
    budget but also to the future of how long we keep it into the
    Air Force. It is also a balance of being able to use some of
    the technology of some of our simulators as well as using live
    flying, because you have got to be able to do some of both.
        What I have seen, really, throughout my career, is the
    increasing capability of our simulators to make it more
    realistic. But there is nothing like hearing that engine noise,
    smelling that JP-8, and actually being airborne, and so we have
    to do a combination of both and ensure we get the best training
    for our pilots.
        Senator Wicker. Well, does the current plan contain enough
    of that actual in-the-cockpit training?
        General Brown. Senator, I believe it does, and this is
    something that I do pay very close attention to, as I work with
    Air Education and Training Command, to talk to them about some
    of the initiatives we have, to ensure not only the production
    numbers but also the quality of our students when they graduate
    from pilot training.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, my time is about to expire. I
    will submit a question to you, General Brown, about an article
    written under the pseudonym of Ned Stark, concerning a call for
    senior officer reform in the Air Force, an insider's
    perspective on the promotion process in the Air Force. I will
    submit that to you for the record, sir, and thank you all for
    your service.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. We are trying to
    re-establish connection with Senator Fischer. Once we do we
    will recognize her in order, to finish her questioning. But at
    this time let me recognize, via Webex, Senator Gillibrand,
    please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I can
    attest the internet is down in the Senate right now, so I am
    using my phone.
        I am very excited, for Secretary Roth and General Brown, to
    hear that the Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station (NFARS), one of
    my state's best defense equities, is a candidate for hosting
    the KC-46A Pegasus reserve component. In addition to the Air
    Station's strategic location, and that it possesses much of the
    needed equipment, the community around NFARS is one of the best
    in the country, that supports servicemembers, their families,
    and has an economy, amenities, and services, including health
    care and affordable housing, that allows for this to be a very
    strategic location.
        Will you be looking at these types of issues as you make
    your decision about where to locate, and to what extent do
    considerations made by the Air Force include economic,
    educational, and health care options for spouses and
    dependents?
        Mr. Roth. As you may be familiar, we have what we call a
    strategic basing process, that is very analytically based, and
    uses a series of criteria, that include an assessment of the
    individual communities in terms of kinds of the educational
    opportunities, the opportunities for spouse employment, and
    those kinds of things. So it is part of our strategic basing
    process and criteria, and will be used across the board for all
    our basing decisions.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. On the issues of sexual
    assault in the military, it is something obviously this
    Committee has been looking at for the last 8 years, and I
    personally have been focused on trying to create reforms that I
    believe can begin to get at this scourge. One of the main
    reforms that we have settled on over the last 8 years is
    drawing a bright line at all serious crimes and taking those
    crimes out of the chain of command.
        The reason why there is a bright line at serious crimes is
    because this is what our allies did--the U.K., Israel, Canada,
    Australia, Netherlands, Germany--for defendants' rights. They
    thought if you could have a less biased system, a more
    professionalized system, a more highly trained system, and
    certainly have the decision-maker not know the perpetrator or
    the plaintiff, that it would be able to be a fairer, more just
    system. So they did it for defendants' rights.
        This reform is something that 66 Senators now believe is
    the right way to improve our military justice system so that
    justice is possible, through professionalization and through
    making sure that there is no bias.
        This will help our military in two ways. One, I believe it
    will mean more cases will go to trial, sexual assault cases,
    and I believe that the right cases will be chosen, and so they
    might end in conviction, since we have a very low conviction
    rate right now.
        Second, there has been a lot of talk the last few years
    about racial bias in the criminal justice system, in the
    military system, and that black----
        Chairman Reed. We are having, obviously, technical
    difficulties. I am told that the internet in Russell Building
    is down, and that, again, when we restore communication with
    Senator Gillibrand we will allow her to finish her questioning,
    along with others.
        But at this point let me call on Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, gentlemen,
    let me begin by just saying thank you for your literally
    decades of service to our country.
        General Brown, an issue this Committee consistently hears
    about, from the combatant commanders, is the lack of ISR
    capability. I understand this budget proposal asks to retire a
    number of JSTARS, along with some RQ-4's. I would like to hear
    your thoughts on how the Air Force will continue to meet the
    ISR requirements while you retire a portion of your existing
    ISR fleet, recognizing that right now we are not able to meet
    the demands of the combatant commanders today. Then I guess I
    would ask, also, as a follow-up on that, I understand the Air
    Force is no longer requesting to procure additional MQ-9
    aircraft. Does the Air Force plan to divest these valuable
    assets in the near future as well?
        General Brown. Senator, I appreciate your question, and one
    of the things from the United States Air Force is the demand
    signal from combatant commanders for ISR from the Air Force far
    exceeds the capacity that we do have. So there is a great
    appetite for what the Air Force provides.
        Part of that is how we balance risks between the United
    States Air Force and the combatant commanders. That is the
    dialogue I have with the combatant commanders. The aspect I
    look at, as we move to the future, is we have got to ensure
    that ISR is persistent, connected, and survivable. We have
    persistence today, not as connected as I want to be, and not as
    survivable as I think we need to be as we look to the future.
        As I work with the combatant commanders it is how we make
    that transition. At the same time, how do we look at moving
    information, because it is really about the information to make
    decisions, versus a platform. Now I am thinking about terabytes
    of data that we move through other means, like Advanced Battle
    Management System. So it is a combination of those that we work
    together.
        On the MQ-9, we are not procuring MQ-9's but we are going
    to still have MQ-9's in our inventory until the middle of the
    next decade. We still have deliveries that will occur into
    fiscal years 2024 and 2025. The MQ-9's that we do have, we are
    going to modernize to make them more resilient and connected,
    like I just described, and those upgrades will occur on the MQ-
    9's that we do have, and they will be in the inventory until
    about 2035 or so.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Just continuing on, General
    Brown, reviewing the Air Force's budget requests I am concerned
    with the decreasing flying hours that are indicated, by about
    7.5 percent. I am curious about your opinion about how this is
    going to impact how we can safely train pilots, and ultimately
    enabling the service to meet the National Defense Strategy
    objectives. I know there have been several reports in the press
    already where there has been a question as to whether or not
    these airmen are able to have access to aircraft and the
    numbers needed to maintain the proficiency right now. How do we
    add into that an anticipated 7.5 percent reduction in the
    budget for that?
        General Brown. Part of that 7.5 percent reduction was
    actually us going back and doing the analysis on under-
    execution of our flying hour program, going back to fiscal year
    2019. We made some adjustments in fiscal year 2020, realizing
    that COVID--in 2021--COVID has impacted what we really
    executed, and so what we are really trying to do is normalize
    and get closer to our actual execution.
        The balance of that is also to ensure that we have the
    right amount of training and flying hours to be able to execute
    and train our airmen, by using that funding that we take out of
    the flying hour, to ensure we actually have the availability of
    aircraft to match up with the flying hour program.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General.
        Secretary Roth, bomber inventory continues to be stressed,
    and the retirement of 17 B-1B's, while understandably
    necessary, depletes an already undersized and critical force.
    Are there any further planned cuts to the bomber force before
    adding significant numbers of the operational B-21's to the
    inventory?
        Mr. Roth. The answer is what we are going to do is manage
    the transition from the current force of bombers that we have
    to the ultimate bomber inventory that we will have, that will
    be dependent on the B-21 and B-52. So we will manage that in a
    conditions-based, events-based kind of manner, that as B-21's
    come online we will then start retiring B-1's and B-2's. We
    will not get ahead of our headlights on that. We will ensure
    that the B-21 is delivering on time and on schedule as we go
    forward.
        The 17 B-1's that were identified this year were the oldest
    and most expensive to repair B-1's, that, to a large extent,
    were not flying anyway. That is where we are now, and we will
    stay there for a while, and then what we are going to look
    forward to is as the B-21 delivers we will start retiring B-
    1's, and B-2's.
        Senator Rounds. Just a confirmation that it is your
    understanding that the B-21 is on time and on budget.
        Mr. Roth. To date it is an exemplary acquisition program.
    It has met every significant milestone to date. The first
    flight we anticipate is in fiscal year 2022, so the first
    airplane will actually get off the ground next year.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. There appears to
    be a disruption of telecommunication services around the
    Capitol, so would urge all of our colleagues to come in person
    to ask their questions. That would expedite the hearing
    immensely.
        With that let me recognize Senator Hirono, please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Roth,
    last year it was announced that the Hawaii Air National Guard
    had been selected to have one of four national offensive space
    control squadrons. I understand that the Hawaii Air National
    Guard is in the process of establishing the 293rd Space Control
    Squad based on the Pacific Missile Range facility on Kauai.
        Mr. Secretary, I know that you are working with the
    National Guard Bureau on a plan to add a reserve component to
    the Space Force. What is the status of this plan?
        Mr. Roth. Yes. We have been working on that plan over the
    last year or so, and that plan has been sent to the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense, for his
    approval. So as soon as we can schedule a session with the
    Secretary of Defense we plan to go through that with them, and
    then we will work with both the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, ultimately probably the Office of Management and
    Budget, and will be forwarding a proposal, based on the
    Secretary of Defense's decision.
        Senator Hirono. So in terms of the status of a plan, then,
    would you envision it within this fiscal year, or next, that
    this plan would be in place?
        Mr. Roth. We actually hope it is imminent. I can have the
    Space Chief jump in here too and give you more details. We are
    hoping it is imminent. You know, we have done what we have to
    do, and so we are working with the Secretary's staff to get
    something we would anticipate this summer.
        Senator Hirono. ``Imminent'' is good right now. For General
    Raymond. Could you envision a missile tracking system in space
    replacing ground-based radars like Homeland Defense Radar-
    Hawaii (HDR-H)? If so, what is the timeline for these
    satellites coming online?
        General Raymond. Yes, ma'am, first of all, we are doing
    work right now to design that, and we have united the entire
    Department towards that end, including the Missile Defense
    Agency, the Space Development Agency, Space and Missile Systems
    Center, and others. We are doing that force design work as we
    speak, and then we will begin to program for that this next
    budget, this shift. But to do that mission effectively, you
    have to do that from space. It provides the coverage and the
    ability to do that critical mission.
        Senator Hirono. So are you saying that this kind of
    tracking system in space will replace the planned HDR-H, which,
    by the way, I and other members have concerns that that is not
    even in the President's budget this year.
        General Raymond. We are not looking to replace--it is kind
    of a dual path. Like today in missile warning, we have
    satellites that are on orbit and we also have missile warning
    radars, and so it requires both.
        Senator Hirono. Just so I can be clear then, you are saying
    it is not necessary to replace the ground-based defense radars
    but it could be in addition to. Is that what you just said?
        General Raymond. Yes, ma'am. The space capabilities that we
    have today, for example, the missile warning detect launches
    immediately upon launch, and then as the missiles fly they go
    through radar paths. It requires really both of those assets to
    be able to do that well.
        Senator Hirono. Okay. Based on your response I continue to
    have concerns that HDR-H is not in the budget.
        For Secretary Roth, I note in your testimony a commitment
    to diversity, which, of course, I applaud. Do you have a matrix
    for determining whether your efforts to removing barriers to
    service, as you note in your testimony, are, in fact, resulting
    in a more diverse Air Force?
        Mr. Roth. Yeah. We actually have a data-driven process. We
    have established an Office of Diversity and Inclusion. The head
    of that office is a direct report to the Secretary. So there
    has been a plan outlined. We have something, for example,
    called the Barrier Working Group, and other kinds of groups
    that are looking at doing climate kinds of surveys and doing
    analysis on some of the trends in both the hiring trends and
    the promotion trends and those kinds of things.
        We have an overall process that includes education, that
    includes training, it includes additional guidance to hiring
    panels and the like, as well. So again, our attempt is to do
    focused, data-driven kinds of initiatives to try to get at
    improving our posture overall.
        Senator Hirono. Does this mean that you can already provide
    us with information as to how you are doing on the diversity
    front?
        Mr. Roth. Let me get back to you. Let me check and see, in
    terms of--because, to some extent, the office--in defense of
    the office, it was just stood up this year. But we have some
    climate survey results from previous surveys that we have done.
    So we will work with your folks, if that is okay, and we will
    get with you and show you what we have.
        Senator Hirono. I am glad that this is happening, because
    having an intention to diversify does not mean anything unless
    you actually do those kinds of things that will result in
    diversity.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have some other questions for
    the record.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton,
    please.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for your appearance today.
        General Brown, as Congress considers this year's budget
    requests, and the Department of Defense's top line budget, it
    has become increasingly clear that the Services cannot rely on
    budget increases to acquire the capabilities the Nation will
    require in the future unless Congress takes action to change
    the President's Budget. If not, though, the Services will need
    to find money inside their existing budgets.
        I understand that retiring certain older aircraft is
    critical to finding these funds to invest in what the Air Force
    seeks for the future, like F-35's, KC-46's, the Advanced Battle
    Management System, B-21's, and a new ground-based
    intercontinental missile. Can you please describe some of the
    risks that the Air Force will have to accept if it is not able
    to pursue those planned retirements of older aircraft?
        General Brown. Sure, Senator. I appreciate the question. I
    would categorize the risk in really four categories:
    modernization, manpower, maintenance, and operational.
        On modernization, what it would do is really force us to
    continue to operate today's equipment and not be able to meet
    the requirements I expect from future combatant commanders.
        On manpower, from a manpower standpoint, the airmen that we
    have today, that are tied up in some of these older platforms
    or legacy platforms, are the same airmen I am going to require
    to operate the newer platforms. So I have to be able to balance
    and train them to be ready to execute.
        On the maintenance, what I see is our sustainment costs
    continue to go up, and as those sustainment costs go up it
    actually then decreases our buying power, to be able to use
    that money to purchase new equipment, and as you have that new
    equipment, it is a bit easier to maintain and sustain as we go
    forward.
        Then last is on operational. There are impacts for
    readiness, based on aircraft availability, for example. I also
    think about our airmen and our joint teammates that we put at
    risk with capabilities that may not meet up against the threat.
    The last is really the risk to our national security
    objectives, when you pull it all together, what the Air Force
    provides with our joint teammates to make sure that we do the
    things that the Nation has asked us to do.
        Senator Cotton. Those are all worrisome risks, I would
    agree. I think we should be mindful as a committee, too, about
    those risks, before we try to maintain some of these aircraft
    in the fleet, if it is time for them to go or we pursue future
    aircraft, occasionally for parochial reasons.
        Is it also fair, General Brown, to say that some of the
    money you hope to save by these retirements is going to be
    spent on systems or weapons that we cannot discuss in this open
    forum?
        General Brown. That is correct, and I would be more than
    happy to come back in a classified forum to share some of those
    details.
        Senator Cotton. I know what they are. You do not have to
    come back to me.
        I want to make a point, though, here, that I think every
    system the Air Force hopes to retire is a system that flies
    openly, that we know about, that is in their local communities,
    and that can cause some political friction with Congress. Some
    of things we have talked about, we all know about and talk
    about openly, like the F-35 or the B-21, but some of them we
    can not, and that is hard for Senators and Congressmen to
    explain to our voters back home sometimes, especially if
    certain states or districts are going to lose an aircraft. I
    just think that we need to be mindful that there is a lot the
    Air Force needs to do in its classified setting, and that we
    may not always be able to explain that publicly, but the
    American people should keep that in mind, that you are doing a
    lot of work behind the scenes to keep this country safe as
    well.
        General Brown, the Air Force is heavily invested in both
    the B-21 and the Long-Range Standoff weapon. Do you agree that
    both of these programs are required in their own right but also
    as a supportive and complementary system to each other?
        General Brown. I do, very much so.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. General Raymond, my time
    is almost up. I would like to discuss with you, at some point,
    the circumstances with Lieutenant Colonel Matt Lohmeier's
    relief out in the 11th Space Warning Squadron, if you will
    follow up with my office so we could have a conversation.
        Secretary Roth, I think you probably will not be appearing
    before the Committee anymore any time soon, at least as one of
    the longest-serving officials in the Department of Defense. I
    want to thank you for many decades of service to our country,
    and should you come back as an expert in the private sector at
    some point in the future, I do not want to hear what we always
    hear from Bob Gates when we bring him back, which is--he is
    telling the biggest lie in Washington--"It is a pleasure to be
    back in front of the Committee.''
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton. But thank you very much for many, many
    years of dedicated service at the Department of Defense.
        Mr. Roth. Thank you, Senator, for your kind words.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Now we have
    restored communication with Senator Gillibrand. Let me
    recognize her for the remaining minutes of her questioning.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, Secretary
    Roth, I just wanted to conclude the point I was making, that
    this idea of a bright line begins to restore two concerns we
    have with the military justice system: bias against survivors
    of sexual assault and bias against black and brown
    servicemembers, for both plaintiffs' rights and defendants'
    rights, and to mirror the reforms of our allies, that they have
    done over the last 40 years.
        So I wanted to know what your take on this was, whether you
    have looked at this data in detail, what you think the current
    status of affairs is with regard to the Air Force, and what you
    hope to accomplish.
        Mr. Roth. Yes. Obviously we have looked at it and we have
    discussed it, and we are aware of the legislation that is
    working its way through the Senate. We are also aware of
    legislation in the House, and I think, as you are aware, we
    have an Independent Review Commission inside the Pentagon who
    is also coming up with a series of recommendations. Our
    commitment to all of you is we will work with you. We have some
    concerns, in terms of some of the breadth of what is being
    addressed, and we also have some process concerns.
        But we agree there is a problem there. We need to fix it.
    What we are doing today is not working, and so we will work
    with everybody to find a way forward here, and arrive at what
    is best for the airmen and the guardians in the force.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Secretary Roth and General
    Raymond, you did address this issue of the Space National
    Guard, and you discussed it already today, but I wanted to know
    what your perspective is on that and what you hope to create
    with a reserve component, and whether you think that might be
    able to address some of our recruiting challenges and our
    retention challenges for that best talent in the country.
        Mr. Roth. Yes. Perhaps I should defer to the Space Chief.
    But from my perspective, there are two elements to that. There
    are the reserves and then there is the National Guard, and
    there is some nuanced differences in how we approach that. But
    I think with the Space Force we have a unique opportunity here
    for a new Space Force, a relatively small Space Force, to do
    things that are innovative and creative, that will move us
    forward, and might provide us kind of a pilot for what we could
    do with a larger force as well.
        General Raymond. Ma'am, it is a centerpiece to our human
    capital strategy. I think it will help enable exactly the
    things that you highlighted. I would welcome the opportunity,
    since the red light is on, to come discuss this with you in
    great detail. I am excited about where we have landed on this,
    and I think it is going to be very beneficial to our service
    and to the Guard and reserves as well.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Let me
    recognize Senator Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and gentlemen, thank
    you for appearing in front of the Committee today. We certainly
    appreciate your great service to our Nation.
        I would like to start, obviously we have addressed the
    issue of operating in a budgetary environment that is very
    constrained, and with that comes certain challenges. But
    through those challenges I think it is up to us to find some
    opportunity.
        Secretary Roth, Congress had granted DOD middle-tier
    acquisition authority, the 804 authorities, to save some time
    and money on acquisition programs. As I understand it, this
    particular authority is being used at least in the B-52 engine
    program.
        So could we hear from you a little bit about some of the
    lessons learned, if that is effective, how that program is
    working with the use of the 804 authorities?
        Mr. Roth. Well, for us, I mean, the criticism of DOD
    acquisition, Air Force acquisition, specifically is that it is
    too bureaucratic, it is too slow, it is not agile enough, all
    those kinds of things. We look at the mid-tier acquisition
    initiative, Section 804, as an opportunity to be more agile, to
    be quicker, to be more responsive, more dependence on
    prototyping, more dependence on tailoring acquisition to
    individual programs, more emphasis on delegating management of
    programs down to the lowest level possible, rather than trying
    to run everything from the Pentagon.
        We are actually very interested and excited about what that
    could bring to the table across the board, and so we have, I
    guess, for lack of a better word, bought in across the board in
    terms of doing that.
        So the B-52 re-engining program is an example. We plan to
    use it, for example, for the A-10 re-winging program. For two
    major programs, two or three major programs that are in our
    modernization program. The Next Generation Air Dominance
    program, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program, and the
    B-21 are all examples where we are using that kind of an
    approach married up with digital engineering, the digital
    trinity, in terms of open systems architecture and agile
    software, and the like.
        Going along with that is some rigorous metrics that have to
    be put in place. Just because we are going fast does not mean
    we should not have any discipline and we should not be watching
    these. But it also offers us opportunities to shift gears and
    go in a different direction if what we are doing is not
    working.
        Senator Ernst. No, that is fantastic, and I appreciate
    that. My next question was going to be, can you give other
    examples where this is working, and so thank you for laying
    that out for us. Again, I think it is important that we
    understand, operating in this type of environment, that we need
    to find other ways of doing business, not to drop the standard
    but simply to find ways where we can save time and hopefully
    some dollars.
        General Brown, I want to thank you again for traveling to
    Minot and Offutt, as Senator Fischer had stated. It was a
    phenomenal trip for many of us to witness our two branches of
    the nuclear triad. But I would like to address the National
    Guard for just a moment.
        The President and the Secretary of Defense have both raised
    some alarm about the rising challenges that we see from some of
    our near-peer adversaries, primarily China and Russia, and, of
    course, a lot of dispersed terrorist threats around the globe.
    We have really been stretching our force to meet those
    challenges, and the Air Guard has seen its busiest year since
    World War II. The demand signal continues to increase, and the
    Air Guard is mobilizing with increasing frequency, both at
    home, domestically in the United States, as well as abroad.
        The President's Budget does slash the Air National Guard
    training and component budgets, along with cuts to paid drill
    and individual training days, with the expectation that
    contingency mobilizations are on the path to pre-9/11 levels.
    What evidence do you have that would indicate the Air National
    Guard's usage reductions will go to pre-9/11 levels?
        General Brown. One of the things that we are going doing
    inside the United States Air Force is our force generation
    model, new force generation model that actually can better
    predict how we are going to actually deploy our forces, and at
    the same time put some discipline about how we execute. The Air
    Force and the Air Guard gets called on a lot. We have a lot of
    flexibility, as I said in my opening statement, to do air
    power, any time they work, and because of that we get called on
    quite often.
        One of the things we are working with, both on the Active
    but also with the Reserve components, is to ensure we lay out a
    more disciplined process of how we actually execute and
    contribute that air power to support our combatant commanders.
    That will give us a more predictable tempo that gets to pre-9/
    11 levels, as well as the ability to train and maintain a level
    of readiness.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. I appreciate that, and should we not
    return to this pre-9/11 op-tempo level then we certainly need
    to know that. We want to make sure that are supporting those
    reserve and National Guard forces.
        So again, gentlemen, thank you so much for your time and
    your commitment to our great United States. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Tillis, if
    you are ready, you are recognized.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Chairman Reed. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here, and Secretary Roth, I want to
    associate myself with my colleague, Senator Cotton, on your
    service and wish you the best.
        I know you all are working in an environment where if we
    could wave a wand and give you all the money to fund the
    unfunded priority list and move some others up that you would
    welcome it, but you are not working in that environment right
    now. I know a couple of my colleagues talked about the KC-46A
    and the problems that we are continuing to have with the boom
    system. So I want to talk a little bit about the operational
    impact.
        I know you are trying to balance some of the cost savings
    and deployment of future systems against meeting your mission,
    but just going down this list, if you have this information,
    how many KC-46A air-to-air refueling missions are being sourced
    outside the contiguous United States (OCONUS)?
        General Brown. I do not have an exact number for you,
    Senator, but we can get that for you. But we are using the KC-
    46 on a day-to-day basis to support particularly our training
    missions, to refuel, to get our pilots their currency and our
    brand-new pilots up to speed on their refueling.
        Senator Tillis. I have got a series of questions that you
    can maybe report back for the record, a similar question for
    the KC-10 air-to-air refueling mission.
        One of the concerns that I have, I think it was the Air
    Force and TRANSCOM had previously stated that more than 25,000
    hours of air refueling missions are not being supported
    annually, with the KC-46 not being fully operational. So we
    will submit a series of questions on that, because we just want
    to get it right. I am not here to preserve an old platform if
    you have full confidence in the future one, but the gap is what
    I am concerned about and the mission requirements, and
    potentially the training impacts, by not being able to train
    the way that they would fight, based on current capabilities.
        General Raymond, I think at one point, I know we have
    talked about, in the space domain, the need for identification
    and attribution activities of our adversaries. I think at one
    point you also mentioned the concept of the need to punch back
    or retribution. You have got 2.4 percent of the total DOD
    budget. Number one, is retribution a part of your planning
    process, and number two, how do you manage that with a
    relatively small percentage of the overall budget?
        General Raymond. Thank you for the question. First of all,
    in this budget we invest in our ability to characterize, as you
    mentioned in your question. We invest in what we call space
    domain awareness, to have an understanding of what is going on
    in that domain and to be able to characterize it. Just like any
    other warfighting commander, the U.S. Space Command Commander
    must have an opportunity to have the ability to understand what
    is going on in that domain.
        The second big area is, he has to have the ability to
    command and control, so we are focusing on commanding and
    controlling as well.
        Where we are really focusing on in this budget is four big
    priorities. One is you have to be able to defend what you have.
    Two, we have to shift. We have to modernize to a more
    defendable architecture. Three, you have to develop the ability
    to impose costs, warfighting capability. Fourth, you have to
    look at what other new missions should go to space. We are
    really working to balance all four of those priorities. I think
    space is central to our ability to deter, and that space can
    help amplify the deterrence messaging and change the deterrence
    calculus of an adversary, in both denying benefits and imposing
    costs, and that is what we are balancing.
        Senator Tillis. I do not know whose lane this is in. I
    could assume maybe several different agencies. But we have had
    reports about the amount of space debris or space junk that we
    had out there. We had a report about a month ago of the
    International Space Station (ISS) being hit. Is that a part of
    your planning process, and is there budget allocated for that
    purpose?
        General Raymond. Yes, sir. We act as the space traffic
    control for the world, the United States does. We catalog or
    track about 30,000 objects. We provide all the conjunction
    assessment, if you will, warning if two things are going to
    collide, and then U.S. Space Command does all that notification
    to keep things from hitting the ISS and other satellites. That
    is becoming a full-time job, because of the increased
    congestion that is going on and the increased number of objects
    that are launching into space.
        Space domain awareness is critical to the warfighter. Space
    traffic control or space traffic management is something that
    needs to be shifted to another organization to free up U.S.
    Space Command and our operators that operate all those systems
    and doing the critical space domain awareness work that they
    need to do for our national security.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. Secretary Roth, I am kind of
    curious of your perspective. Senator Gillibrand asked some
    questions about the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
    proposals that are coming through. There are some on military
    sexual assault but there is a larger proposal that would
    dramatically change the shift out of the command. Have you
    reviewed the commission report? I am saying this to everybody
    who is coming here that is part of the DOD, we need your
    feedback soon. We are about a month away from doing an NDAA
    markup that could have a sweeping change that may have some
    operational challenges and others.
        I am over time but I would like to just send a message to
    Secretary Austin and all of the leadership, who I understand is
    in the process of vetting it. We need your feedback pretty
    quickly or it will not weigh into the decisions we are going to
    be making about a month from now. So I will just leave that as
    a statement rather than expect you to respond.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Let me recognize
    Senator Cramer, please.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
    of you for being here. Since Senator Tillis just ended with
    that, let me just add my voice to the same admonition.
        As you might imagine, General Brown, thank you for being
    here and thank you for going to Minot, I listened very
    attentively to your answers to Senator Reed about the
    retirement of Global Hawk 30's and the waiver. But I also
    noticed that in the modernization plan presented to the House
    Armed Services Committee, the Block 40 now is being slated for
    retirement beginning in 2025. Do we now consider the Block 40 a
    sunset system?
        General Brown. Not at the moment, Senator, and part of our
    process as well is we want to make sure we have a good
    transition. As we build the plan and as we have had a chance to
    talk about it, we look at the classified system we are bringing
    on. What I do not want to do is actually leave a gap. So it is
    balance between our planning factors for the Block 40 and the
    classified system we are going to bring on, to make sure that
    we have a smooth transition going forward.
        Senator Cramer. I have appreciated your great attention to
    the details of that with me.
        Secretary Roth, the Office of t he Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) reported that the Air Force's budget is $212.8 billion.
    How much of that $212.8 billion does the Secretary of the Air
    Force actually control?
        Mr. Roth. $174 billion. $39 billion is what has been
    referred to frequently as the pass-through.
        Senator Cramer. Can we do something about a more
    transparent budgeting system that does not give this view that
    the Air Force is getting a whole bunch of money that they
    really do not control?
        Mr. Roth. Yeah. We are actually working with the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense to see if there are some things that
    could be done. There are classified reasons why that exists,
    and so we need to make sure that we do not uncover things that
    ought not be uncovered. But we are working with our colleagues
    on the Secretary of Defense's staff to see if there are some
    ways to do that.
        I will say, when we come out with the budget and we do our
    budget briefings, come brief you and others here on the
    oversight committees, we immediately identify what we call the
    ``blue budget,'' which is the $174 billion, and all our
    conversations from that day on is about the $174 billion.
        But I take your point, and we are, in fact, discussing what
    is in the art of the doable with the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense.
        Senator Cramer. Well, and I think your answering that
    question that way, in this forum, is part of the process, so I
    thank you for that.
        General Raymond, I really appreciate all the efforts that
    you have put in, in this last year and a half, really from day
    one, in how to involve universities in providing not only
    technological assistance but obviously a well-educated and
    hopefully prepared workforce, in many cases, for you to
    succeed. I was really happen to see that University of North
    Dakota faculty made a recent visit to Cavalier, to the radar
    station, and if Molly does not get you ND Today, she can have
    my copy to read all about it. It was very cool, and I really
    appreciate it.
        But now that you have had these 18 months, do you think
    that Space Force's outreach and involvement with universities
    is where it needs to be, and what can we do to strengthen you
    in that regard?
        General Raymond. Yes, sir, and I think it is where it needs
    to be. We have developed a University Partnership Program. It
    is focused on doing research together, developing people
    together, recruiting talent together. This first year we are
    going to have universities that are part of that University
    Partnership Program, and we look to expand that in the future.
    I think it is going to provide us great advantage, and we
    appreciate very much the University of North Dakota's
    partnership with us.
        Senator Cramer. Well, and as always, let us know how we can
    be helpful.
        General Brown, I do have some concerns about the cuts in
    the fiscal year 2022 funding for the MH-139, and it is slated
    to replace, of course, our very aging UH-1 helicopters in
    Minot. I am told the delay is because of a delay in FAA
    certification. But unless you think the aircraft is not going
    to achieve its certification, why would we stop paying for it
    and building it, because we have seen other aircraft that have
    had those same FAA delays but did not have a pause in
    production. So I am kind of concerned about that. Is it really
    necessary? I do not know if you have ever flown in a UH-1 in
    Minot in the winter, but it is very unpleasant, and we would
    like to be able to keep that on track.
        So do you have an explanation, other than the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA) certification?
        General Brown. Well, it is FAA certification, and the
    aircraft is a commercially-derived platform that we are putting
    military equipment on, which drives the additional
    certification. So we ran into an issue in part of the testing.
    So we are continuing testing on other parts of the aircraft
    besides the defensive system, that was causing some issues.
        What we want to do is ensure we aligned our money with the
    delivery. The delivery delay is, I believe, just several
    months, is what we expect going forward. So we want to keep our
    focus on it, and we want to make sure that, as you said, flying
    a UH-1 in Minot in the winter is probably not what we want to
    continue to do, which is why we want to get the MH-139 on
    track.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you. Thank you all again for your
    service.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Now let me
    recognize Senator Warren, via Webex, please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
    for being here today.
        General Brown, I had the opportunity to discuss the
    strategic basing process at Mr. Kendall's nomination hearing,
    and I would like to be able to do the same with you this
    morning. This is the formal process the Air Force uses to
    decide where to station new aircraft, like the F-35 or the KC-
    46.
        The Air Force has gone to admirable lengths to ensure that
    when it is choosing installations for these aircraft issues
    like the quality of education available near a base, and
    licensure reciprocity are a big part of the consideration. This
    is, of course, important because the quality of schools
    available for their children and the ability of spouses to
    obtain jobs and sustain careers are critical issues that
    impacted servicemembers' quality of life.
        So, General, can you commit to ensuring that the quality of
    education and licensing reciprocity are indeed factors in the
    strategic basing process?
        General Brown. Yes, Senator, they are.
        Senator Warren. Good. I just want to hear that. You know,
    these issues are part of base selection criteria for a reason,
    and they matter a lot to the servicemembers who do so much for
    our country.
        One thing that is not formally considered during part of
    the process is the effects of climate change and extreme
    weather. A 2019 Pentagon analysis found that of all the
    services, the Air Force's base infrastructure is most at risk
    for climate change threats, such as recurrent flooding,
    drought, desertification, wildfires, and thawing permafrost.
        Do you think it is worth making that another factor in the
    strategic basing decision-making process?
        General Brown. One of the areas we do look at is
    installation resiliency and how we take a look at not only the
    location but its capability and what kind of things we would
    have to do to make sure that that base or that location will be
    operationally relevant, as well as to ensure it can support the
    mission. As we look at that, we want to make sure that we do
    not put ourselves in a situation selecting a location that is
    going to be impacted by extreme weather or other things and the
    base locations are not well prepared.
        Senator Warren. So just to make sure I am understanding,
    you are saying yes, that we should take into account the
    climate change threat and the impact it could have on military
    operations.
        General Brown. That is one of the factors we do look at,
    the location, but we also look at the operational mission, and
    as you mentioned earlier also the education, the community,
    spousal licensure as well.
        Senator Warren. As one of the conditions. That is what I
    care about, and while we are on the subject of climate change,
    there is no way to address the climate crisis without
    confronting DOD's role as the largest consumer of fossil fuel
    on the planet, and the Air Force is obviously a big contributor
    to this, given the number of aircraft it flies.
        General Brown, what is the Air Force's progress,
    researching and developing new engine technologies that will
    decrease your dependency on fossil fuel and reduce emissions
    without sacrificing capability?
        General Brown. Well, one of the things we talked about a
    little earlier today is the re-engining of the B-52, and that
    is one area that is going to save us about 30 percent of its
    fuel consumption from what it does today. The other aspect that
    we also take a look at is advancing technology with our
    simulators, the ability to do some of our training in
    simulators, particularly from some of our more complicated and
    high-end things that we do not want our adversaries to see and
    be able to take those into a simulation environment, which then
    saves us on fuel. So it is a balance of those as well as the
    technology, engine technology, we look at as well.
        Senator Warren. Okay, and what I am hearing you say is
    about reducing consumption, which I very much appreciate. But I
    hope that you are prioritizing research and development as well
    in the engine technology and how to reduce reliance on carbon-
    based fuels. That will help make sure that the Air Force
    remains flexible and agile for the future and reduce dependency
    on potentially vulnerable fossil fuel supply chains.
        So I look forward to working with you and the incoming
    Secretary to help make this technology a reality.
        General Brown. Well, thank you, Senator. One thing I would
    highlight is our Agility Prime that we have been using to--it
    has been called a flying car, but that uses mostly electrical
    power, and it is an aspect we are also taking a look at of how
    we do that for logistics and other opportunities versus using
    the fossil fuels.
        Senator Warren. Well, that is the whole point. Let's invest
    in that research and development (R&D) and get this up and
    running. Our entire world is depending on it.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Let me now
    recognize Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. I thank each of you for
    your service. I want to thank each of you for the benefit of
    the men and women who defend the freedom of this country.
        First, can you all agree that it looks like we are facing
    increased threats around the world? You all would say that,
    wouldn't you?
        General Brown. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Scott. We would all agree that Communist China is
    investing in building up their military, with one goal, is to
    actually compete with us.
        General Brown. Yes.
        Senator Scott. As they build their economy, do you see any
    reason that they are going to slow down their investments?
        General Brown. I don't.
        Senator Scott. So given knowing what Communist China is
    doing, do you all believe that the Air Force today is prepared
    to defend this country but also to help our allies, like
    Taiwan?
        General Brown. I believe we are prepared but I still think,
    as you just described, as the Chinese advance their capability,
    the United States Air Force needs to do the same, which is why
    I particularly am pushing on being able to modernize our
    capability to make sure that we are a credible deterrent, so
    you do not have a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
        Senator Scott. So I think, both for General Brown and Mr.
    Roth, as we have had these hearings, a lot of people on our
    Committee have expressed a lot of concern about the President's
    defense budget, his proposed defense budget, especially when
    you look at it as compared to other agencies, how he wants to
    spend the money.
        So we have had a pretty good defense budget for the last
    few years, but do you really believe that this budget is going
    to give you the resources you need to be able to deter the
    actions of China, Russia, and other threats around the world?
        Mr. Roth. The short answer is yes, we are challenged. We
    need to get on with it, and in particular that is why we are
    emphasizing investing in future technologies. We need to take
    some reasonable risks today in order to make sure that we keep
    pace with the Chinese. Our concern is the pace in which they
    are modernizing. They seem to be quicker than we are. They have
    amped up their spending, and so as a number of us have said, we
    need to move out smartly. We need to accelerate. We need to buy
    things smarter, quicker, and more agile. So the answer is I
    think this budget provides a reasonable risk going forward, but
    we need to keep on that pace.
        Senator Scott. General Brown?
        General Brown. I mean, I feel the same way the Secretary
    just described. That is exactly why I wrote ``Accelerate Change
    or Lose,'' is if we do not pick up our pace, there is the
    distinct possibility of losing, and losing our advantage, at
    the least. It is important that we take a hard look at the
    budget. You know, ideally it puts pressure on us, but we have
    got to be smarter within the budget we do have, regardless of
    what the number might be.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. General Raymond, does the
    President's budget allow you to develop and deploy the force
    you need, because clearly the threats in space are not
    decreasing. They are clearly increasing.
        General Raymond. Yes, sir. The President's budget does, and
    this budget reflects a $2 billion increase in national security
    space, about $1 billion of that is shifting existing
    capabilities and resources from services into the Space Force,
    and then about $1 billion in new growth, focused on protecting
    and defending. I am very comfortable that I can protect and
    defend today, but that superiority gap is shrinking fast. One
    of the reasons why we established the Space Force was to move
    out at speed, drive unity of effort, reduce costs, and be able
    to stay ahead of that threat, and that is our main focus.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Do you all believe that we are
    ahead of the Russians and the Chinese in developing hypersonic
    weapons?
        General Brown. Thank you. I have asked the same question of
    our intel, and the aspect, I believe, is that we are--there are
    areas that we are ahead, but their testing is probably a little
    more advanced in numbers than we are. So this is again, this is
    an area that I am focused on. As a matter of fact, in this
    budget we have money to buy 12 hypersonic munitions by the end
    of fiscal year 2022. So we have got to continue to put pressure
    on ourselves to provide that capability as well.
        Senator Scott. Do you believe that is enough?
        General Brown. Well, I want to balance it against the
    threat, and so at the rate that I see that our adversary is
    going, we need to make sure that we continue to build out our
    capability. But it doesn't necessarily have to be symmetric. I
    think there are aspects of using asymmetric capability as well.
    But having some hypersonic capability to go against our
    adversaries will be important.
        Senator Scott. Do you think the American public realizes
    the threat of Communist China and what their goals are?
        General Brown. I do not. I would say, just based on my time
    as the Pacific Air Force Commander, and how much I learned in
    the 2 years I was out there, and where I sit today, the
    advancing capability of the Chinese is something that we all
    should be thinking about.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Let me now
    recognize, via Webex, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed, Ranking
    Member Inhofe, for holding this hearing. I would also like to
    thank the witnesses for their service, and, of course, for
    being here.
        Today I would like to talk a little bit about, of course,
    Nevada, and Nevada's Air National Guard's 152nd Airlift Wing in
    Reno. It flies legacy C-130's in some of the hottest
    temperatures. You can just look at the weather report today. I
    do not have to tell you what is happening all out on the West
    Coast. They fly in the highest elevations, the most challenging
    mountainous environments of any C-130 unit. Integral to their
    mission is flying the Modular Airborne Firefighting System, the
    MAFS. They supply those in support of the U.S. Forest Service.
    We know wildfire season is just upon us.
        Upgrading the Nevada Air National Guard C-130 H fleet with
    C-130J's would have a substantial impact on their readiness and
    firefighting capabilities, in Nevada and the western United
    States, where every year we are plagued by devastating fires.
        I was therefore discouraged that the Air Force was not
    considering MAFS when evaluating base candidates for the C-
    130J, and even more disappointed when Reno was not selected.
    Ensuring that the Air National Guard is ready to assist and
    respond to these emergencies, it should be a priority for the
    Air Force as you consider where to base more capable aircraft.
        So Acting Secretary Roth, can you explain to me this
    decision not to consider MAFS when conducting your base
    evaluation, particularly in the West Coast where more fires,
    our open terrain, our longer distances to travel, we have in
    any other region in the Lower 48?
        Mr. Roth. Senator, we will take a look at that. I mean,
    your point is well taken. It is not part of our core criteria
    that we use in selecting the base. My commitment to you is we
    will work with you and see if there are ways that we can give
    that some consideration going forward.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. General Brown,
    can I get a commitment that MAFS will be part of the basing
    criteria in the future rounds of C-130J recapitalization?
    Again, all I have to do is point to weather reports today
    around the West Coast and around the country to see what is
    happening, and then understanding what Nevada does and what we
    are responsible for, we really need your commitment that Reno
    will be considered, given its need, its mission, its
    capabilities, and existing infrastructure to host the aircraft.
        General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment to have that
    considered as one of the criteria as we look at forward basing
    decisions.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like again, General
    Brown, to talk to you a little bit about the Air Force and its
    Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), the land withdrawal that
    you have requested for Nevada Test and Training Range. You
    requested a 300,000-acre expansion of the Nevada Test and
    Training Range within the Desert National Wildlife Refuge in
    order to modernize the range. You also asked for primary
    jurisdiction over the 800,000 acres of land currently shared
    with the refuge. The fiscal year 2021 NDAA renewed your
    existing withdrawal of almost 3 million acres of public land,
    and Senator Cortez Masto and I offered mandates on
    intergovernmental executive committees between the Air Force,
    U.S. Fish and Wildlife, and other allies and partners, to be
    sure that we are taking everything into consideration.
        So, General Brown, as the Air Force pursues modernization
    of the range, can you commit to setting up our
    intergovernmental committees and can you commit to exchanging
    information with all the collaborating state, local, and Tribal
    governments, along with our relevant environmental stakeholders
    on any proposals to withdraw Nevada's public lands?
        General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment, and I will
    tell you, since our last conversation about a month ago we have
    already had some of the interagency committee meetings to work
    towards the intergovernmental executive committee. That first
    needs to occur here in the next couple of months. But I am
    committed to work with you and other entities to work on the
    Nevada Test and Training Range, to ensure we are paying
    attention to all the equities of all the interested parties.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I will just
    make a note that up in northern Nevada, in Fallon, the Navy has
    already scheduled those meetings, and so I hope it would be
    sooner than the next few months, as soon as possible.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me now
    recognize Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
    the great work that all the panelists are doing.
        You know, I listen to some of my colleagues, and some of my
    Democratic colleagues continue to make this narrative that
    climate change is somehow an issue that is a bigger threat than
    China or Russia, that the military has something to do with.
        Let me just ask, you mentioned basing locations in your
    exchange with Senator Warren. General Brown, you mentioned some
    climate change. Do you actually take into account strategic
    location for basing locations as well?
        General Brown. Senator, we do.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. Is that a pretty high priority?
        General Brown. Strategic location and operational mission
    requirements are high on the list, and it carries most of the
    weight in our decision-making for strategic basing.
        Senator Sullivan. That is what I would assume.
        Do you remember the father of the Air Force, Billy
    Mitchell? Do you remember what he called the most strategic
    place in the world?
        General Brown. I do, and you remind me often. It is Alaska.
        Senator Sullivan. Oh, okay. I am just checking. So that is
    pretty strategic. Just checking.
        If DOD stopped using any fossil fuels, like today, forever,
    how much do you think that would reduce global greenhouse gas
    emissions?
        I will just give you the answer. It would not.
        So your mission is to fight and win wars, kill people, yes?
    Sometimes we have to say that. So I think it is really
    important to just stay focused on lethality. A lot of times you
    are getting pushed to do climate change, trying to fix climate
    change. The Department of Defense is not going to fix climate
    change. So that is what most people believe. I just want you to
    hear it from Senators who care about the real mission of the
    Department of Defense, which is to fight and win our Nation's
    wars, not somehow be the lead agency fighting climate change.
    It is not your role. You are not capable of doing it. I know
    you get pressured from the other side to do it all the time,
    including the President, and I think it is nuts. So stay
    focused.
        Can I get your commitment to stay focused on your number
    one mission? What is your number one mission?
        General Brown. The number one mission for the Air Force is
    to fly, fight, and win, provide air power, anytime, anywhere.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, General. That is a
    great mission.
        Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), and Senator
    Rosen was just talking about the Nevada Testing Range. I, too,
    am very concerned about the reduction in the Department of
    Defense's budget. But as you know, prioritizing that kind of
    high-end training and fighting, particularly fifth-gen, remains
    important. Can I get your commitment to prioritize and
    accelerate the investments in JPARC and the Nevada Testing
    Range--I think JPARC is about ten times bigger--to achieve the
    Threat Matrix Level 4 capability that I know you are very
    interested in, even though you are starting to see declining
    budgets?
        General Brown. Senator, you do have my commitment, and as
    you described, JPARC and the Nevada Testing and Training Range
    are the two ranges we have for the United States Air Force that
    we are looking to get to Threat Level 4, and another six that
    would be Threat Level 3. We have a strategy to be able to do
    that for both the Nevada Testing and Training Range and the
    JPARC.
        Senator Sullivan. So I have a commitment--thank you on
    that--I have a commitment from the incoming Secretary, and I
    know we are going to do it together--you, me, and him--on the
    KC-46, the global basing decisions on our new tankers. You and
    I talked about this for over years.
        So can I get your commitment when he gets confirmed to work
    with me and this Committee just on the new strategy that the
    Air Force has put forward on that? It has been a moving target,
    as you know, but it is an important issue for me and the
    country?
        General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment.
        Senator Sullivan. What about the issue of the E-3? How are
    we looking at the replacement? You may have seen this big, big
    Russian exercise last fall where they actually had, I think it
    was either five or six Bear bomber runs in the Air Defense
    Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Alaska, where we had to go
    scramble six different sections of F-22's to go intercept these
    simultaneous incursions into our airspace by the Russians. It
    was unbelievable, the biggest one ever. As you know, there were
    no Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) up there. That
    was a really tough mission. Our great pilots in Alaska did it
    well, but they did it with no AWACS capability, which is tough.
        What are we looking at in terms of the AWACS replacement,
    and how quickly do you think we can get that going?
        General Brown. There are a couple of things we are looking
    at, reference the AWACS. One is some modernization aspects of
    the AWACS, at the same time looking at advanced technologies to
    do airborne moving target indication from other capabilities.
    That technology is not quite there, so we are going to have to
    take a look at some type of gap, and we are looking at a
    handful of platforms that may have that capability to bridge to
    the newer technology. That is not necessarily in this budget
    cycle but it is something that I am looking at, internal to the
    Air Force.
        Senator Sullivan. Is the E-7 one of those that you are
    looking at?
        General Brown. E-7 is one of those candidates. It is
    actually flown by the Royal Australian Air Force. The Royal Air
    Force from the U.K. is also purchasing. It is a capable
    platform. I have actually personally flown on it. So it is one
    of those that I am considering.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, gentlemen, and, Mr.
    Chairman, I will have additional questions for the record.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan. Let
    me now recognize Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Sullivan
    was just speaking of lethality and fighting and winning, which
    I too find incredibly important. So, General Brown, I want to
    discuss, just for a minute here, one of the most lethal
    aircraft in your inventory, the A-10 Warthog. We have spoken
    before about my serious concerns with the Air Force's proposed
    retirement of more than 40 A-10 aircraft in this year's budget,
    and as you know, I feel it would be a mistake to retire these
    combat-tested, combat-proven aircraft when we do not have a
    viable replacement to effectively conduct close-air support for
    our troops.
        In addition to my disagreement with the Air Force's
    attempts to divest A-10's, I see some concerns with the plans
    to sustain the fleet the Air Force proposes to keep, and this
    is a real concern, because we all agree that A-10's are going
    to continue to support our warfighters into the 2030s.
        Last year, the Air Force budget request indicated a
    requirement for $100 million in fiscal year 2022, and $100
    million again in fiscal year 2023 to support the A-10 wing
    replacement program. Critical element, as we know, of
    sustaining the fleet. So I have to say I am concerned about the
    incredibly low amount of funding, just $44,000 budgeted for the
    A-10 wing replacement program in this year's request.
        So, General, why has the Air Force not followed through on
    using the money it requested in fiscal year 2021, that Congress
    appropriated for wing replacements last year, and is the Air
    Force seeking to reprogram fiscal year 2021 funds?
        General Brown. Senator, we are not going to reprogram
    fiscal year 2021 funds. We are fully committed to the rewing of
    the A-10's as it was laid out in the budget. We are able to
    execute that over multiple years. By the end of this fiscal
    year we should be about 50 percent done, and we are going to
    continue on the path to upgrade those wings, as laid out in the
    budget and as we committed to.
        Senator Kelly. Can you clarify the $44,000 request for A-10
    rewinging in this year's request?
        General Brown. I do not have those details with me here
    today, but I will get back to you with more information on it.
        Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, General. I
    appreciate it.
        General Raymond, in the remaining time here, great to see
    you again, General. I would like to touch on the security of
    U.S. assets in space. You know, many Americans think of space
    distant place, but the ability for us to operate unhindered in
    space, it is a matter of national security. As Russia and China
    aggressively advance their space programs and develop
    capabilities that aim to disrupt or destroy United States space
    assets, it is critical that we are able to adapt to secure our
    systems and deter aggression. The Department's statement for
    this hearing affirms that both China and Russia have mobile
    ground-based laser systems and electronic warfare systems
    capable of jamming and blinding our satellite systems.
        General Raymond, in your estimation, how good is our
    current understanding of threats to our satellite systems and
    our space architecture?
        General Raymond. I think we have a really good
    understanding of the threats. They have been pretty visible.
    Both China and Russia have developed a full spectrum, the ones
    that you mentioned and also on-orbit, anti-satellite weapons,
    missiles that can launch from the ground and destroy
    satellites. There is a full spectrum out there. We have a good
    understanding of the threats. The work that we are now doing is
    to shift our architecture to a more defendable architecture,
    because the architecture that we have today was built for a
    different domain.
        Senator Kelly. Do you feel that our defense and
    intelligence communities are working well enough together on
    this issue?
        General Raymond. I do. In fact, one of the benefits of
    standing up the Space Force is that we are now going to stand
    up a National Space Intelligence Center that is going to be co-
    located with the National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
    and that is going to sharpen the focus on foundational intel.
    We still have a lot of work to do on that, both foundational
    and operational, but I am very comfortable that the
    intelligence community is focused on this.
        The other thing that we have done, after establishing the
    Space Force, we became the 18th member of the Intelligence
    Community (IC), which also gives us a stronger seat at the
    table to get the intelligence requirements that we need.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, General. I am convinced
    that the only way we are going to stay ahead of our near-peer
    adversaries is by innovation, and one of the domains that we
    are really good at is space, and we just have to continue to
    move forward, out-innovate our adversaries, but also make sure
    we can protect the assets that we have.
        General Raymond. I could not agree more. Thanks.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Kelly. Let me
    now recognize Senator Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to each of you for being here today.
        Being a Tennessean, I think you would each expect me to
    talk about Arnold Engineering and Development Complex, the
    AEDC, there in Tennessee. It really is the crown jewel of the
    Air Force testing infrastructure. You have got 68 wind tunnels
    there, you have got engine test cells that are there, arc
    heaters, space testing chambers. It is vital to the test work
    that has been mentioned here today. It is vital to hypersonics.
    The way we get ahead in hypersonics is we have testing.
        So, General Brown, when we are looking at these facilities
    we are very concerned about upkeep and about maintenance. The
    state of that infrastructure is posing a critical risk to
    continuing this testing mission for high-priority items like
    hypersonic development. So talk a little bit about the
    importance--what is the priority with you, where does it stand
    when it comes to risk of not modernizing this structure, how
    does this affect retention and recruiting, what are you looking
    at this year for preventive maintenance? Because whether it is
    some of our AV's or hypersonics, Arnold is an important
    component.
        General Brown. As you described, very important work that
    occurs there to advance our capability in hypersonics, and so
    the United States Air Force works with the OSD Test and
    Resource Management Center that helps drive the investment on
    places like Arnold, in particular. As the Air Force Chief of
    Staff, with our staff, is working very closely with them to
    outline the requirements to upkeep the capabilities there, not
    only for hypersonics but the future capabilities that might
    come our way as well.
        I think a key aspect of this is in order to retain that
    great capability, of the minds that work there, is we have got
    to have the right infrastructure and tools there. So it is the
    combination of that investment that helps us to be able to do
    that. I do not have details but I will be able to get you
    details.
        Senator Blackburn. Let me ask you about, because I think
    one element important to this is the ground test asset board.
    So speak to that a minute, and I would like to have you commit
    to work to stand up that asset board, because we need to make
    certain that all resources are available to maintain facilities
    like Arnold.
        General Brown. That ground asset test board is internal to
    the Air Force Test Center, and it is something that I will
    commit to look at how we might broaden that beyond just the
    Test Center but broader within the Air Force.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay, and also, the 2 percent Plant
    Replacement Value (PRV), reaching that and having budgets
    sufficient to reach that 2 percent, there is concern over that
    because your unfunded priority list is to the tune of $320
    million. So where are you on having sufficient budget to reach
    that?
        General Brown. The combination of the budget we have, plus
    the $320 million that we have in the unfunded priority list
    will get us to that 2 percent.
        Senator Blackburn. That does get you to the 2 percent.
        General Brown. Yes, ma'am, it does.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Even though you are not
    reprogramming funds.
        General Brown. That is correct.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. All right.
        General Raymond, we were pleased to see you make a trip to
    Vanderbilt University. We thank you for that. We do believe
    that the projects that are being done there in the partnership
    programs are vitally important. Involving the warfighter, the
    front-line warfighter is important. Having this collaboration
    with academia on cyber and electronics R&D we think is vital.
    My hope is that you are going to continue to keep these
    programs robust and work to recruit talent for these
    technologies.
        General Raymond. Absolutely. I agree. Not only did I visit
    Vanderbilt, I also visited Tennessee State. I also had the
    opportunity to talk to the Tennessee Science, Technology,
    Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Initiatives group. I think
    there are about 500 elementary school and high school teachers.
    It was a great visit. We are eager to partner on the University
    Partnership Program and research consortiums that we have had.
    In Vanderbilt, I was very impressed with what I saw.
        Senator Blackburn. As you are aware, if you visited with
    the STEM Consortium, we have not only our elementary schools
    and middle schools but also groups like Boy Scouts are now
    starting STEM Scouts and programs of that nature to encourage
    our young people to consider STEM, and certainly our military
    is a great opportunity for them to consider.
        General Raymond. Ma'am, after that visit I had a gentleman
    that worked in the studio where I did the session with the STEM
    Innovation Network. He just joined the Space Force. So we are
    excited to recruit, and we are excited to have him on the team.
        Senator Blackburn. There you go, and we are so pleased to
    have Space Force with the Huntsville present, which is in our
    region. I know that Senator Tuberville is going to talk with
    you about that. So thank you all so much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Senator
    Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks too to the
    witnesses. Thank you for being here. Thank you for your
    service.
        Mr. Secretary, if I could just start with you. Rosecrans
    Air National Guard Base in my home state is home to the
    Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Center, which offers training
    courses, not just to U.S. airlift units but also to our allies
    and partners, something I think not a lot of people know.
        Give me a sense of how you see the Center's work
    contributing to the Air Force's broader efforts to strengthen
    those relationships with allies and partners.
        Mr. Roth. As you noted, it does, in fact, make a
    significant contribution, and at this point we do not have any
    intent to change the current mission.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that. General
    Brown and General Raymond, let me shift now to our pacing
    theater and our pacing threat, which you have been getting a
    lot of questions on today, which I am glad to hear about.
        Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks have both
    testified before this Committee that the United States has got
    to maintain its ability to deny a Chinese fait accompli against
    Taiwan. I am a broken record on this subject, and I am not
    going to disappoint here today. So do you agree with that
    testimony that we must maintain that ability to defeat the
    Chinese fait accompli? Go ahead, General Brown.
        General Brown. I do.
        Senator Hawley. Great. General Raymond?
        General Raymond. I do.
        Senator Hawley. General Brown, there are a few ways we can
    think about denying a fait accompli in a Taiwan scenario. Most
    of them involve sinking or disabling key elements of the
    Chinese fleet in a relatively short period of time. How would
    you envision the Air Force executing or supporting this kind of
    a sea denial mission?
        General Brown. Well, the first thing you have got to have
    in order to be able to execute the sea denial mission is a
    level of air superiority. So I think that is important that is
    the aspect of our Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter, so we
    can actually get our bombers in, because you have a defensive
    threat from China to get too close to where that maritime
    capability might be that you are trying to sink. To get our
    bombers in, and then also the ability to actually have the
    awareness of where things are, and that goes into joint, all-
    domain command and control, and the Air Force's contribution to
    that is the Advanced Battle Management System. It is how we
    move the data around between not just internal to the Air Force
    but within our joint partners, to be able to do that. Then the
    last is actually having the weaponry to go with that, and so
    Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is one of those. It is
    very focused on this particular mission set, but it is also
    working with the rest of the joint team as we bring that.
        Then the last piece of this is logistics. In order to
    maintain that campaign we have got to be able to do the
    logistics, and be able to do it under attack. So, it is
    connecting the Joint Force, generating the combat power, and
    being able to execute the logistics under attack in support of
    the complete joint team from the Air Force, supporting both our
    Navy friends and our allies and partners as well.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that. You
    mentioned LRASM. Let me ask you about it. The Air Force
    requested funding for just five LRASMs last year, if I am not
    mistaken. This year, I think zeroed out, so no LRASM request.
    Give me a sense of why this is. Why are we cutting funding for
    anti-ship missiles, given how important it is, as you just
    stated, for our sea denial capability?
        General Brown. Well, part of this is actually how we
    balance out not just sea denial but other capabilities that we
    have for missions, and hypersonics, the conversation we just
    had, is high on that list for us, to be able to do that. But we
    will continue to look at LRASM as we bring that on with other
    capabilities as well, for advanced weapons.
        Senator Hawley. Got it. Yes, I am concerned by the cuts
    there in what I think is a pretty key capability. You mentioned
    JADC2. Let me just ask you about that, General, while I have
    you. Can you describe the progress that has been made on the
    JADC2 over the last year and what your goals are for it, this
    coming year?
        General Brown. Sir, the JADC2 is more of the Joint Staff
    piece to drive between the services, the Air Force's Advanced
    Battle Management System. Over the course of the past couple of
    budget cycles we have been really focused on demonstrations and
    evaluations. We have gone through that part and now it is about
    delivering capability. The first step in that is a capability,
    one, to put that capability on the KC-46, to be able to connect
    with our fifth-gen capability and expand our node. Underlying
    that, though, is the digital infrastructure to move all that
    information I talked about just a minute or two ago. So that is
    important on how we do that.
        The last--and I will not say last, but one of the other
    areas is our collaboration with the other services, with the
    Army in their Project Convergence, the Navy on their Project
    Overmatch, and the dialogue we have had together. Because if we
    cannot move information between the services we will not be
    able to do the maritime scenario that you just described. So it
    is important that we work very closely together to be able to
    have that capability.
        Then I would also offer, with the Space Force, because a
    lot of that information moves through space. So I am very
    connected to General Raymond as well, to ensure we are able to
    make sure we are able to communicate and move information for
    decision-makers.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you. Let me ask you about,
    briefly here, in my remaining time, the modernization agenda
    that the Air Force has embarked upon, General. The
    modernization agenda is focused on the early to mid 2030s, but
    this Committee has heard testimony, repeatedly and recently,
    that a Chinese potential assault on Taiwan or other contingency
    could happen much sooner than that. It could happen as early as
    the late 2020s, 2027, for instance.
        Give us a sense of what the Air Force is doing to ensure
    that it is able to help on defeating that fait accompli
    scenario that we were talking about in the next 5 to 7 years,
    even as you pursue this necessary modernization that is going
    to take you out to 10 or 15 years from now.
        General Brown. Well, Senator, as I said in my opening
    statement, that transition needs to start today. If we do not
    start today, we will not be ready 5 to 6 years from now, or 10
    to 15 years from now. I lay out 10 to 15 years from now so we
    can actually have something to put a goal on, but we have got
    to make that transition, to provide that capability, and we
    have got to do it much faster. This is why the Middle Tier
    Acquisition authorities are so important to allow us to move
    much faster, in collaboration with Congress, this particular
    Congress, and with our industry partners, we have got to move
    faster. If things were to happen, to accelerate, we have got to
    be able to accelerate as well.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you very much. Thank you,
    gentlemen, all of you, for your service. I will have a few
    additional questions for you, for the record.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Let me recognize
    Senator Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The great
    thing about being last is everybody has already asked you
    questions, so I just want to ask a couple of things.
        General Raymond, two things that I think that are most
    important in anything that we do is people and education. We
    talked today about you going around to universities and all
    that. I would like all three of you to maybe just chime in on
    this.
        Our biggest threat is going to be in space in the very,
    very near future, if it is not today. Do we need a Space
    Academy, where we can have specialized skills and training? I
    have spoken at every academy in our country, leadership and
    organization. I am very proud of them. I just hope that we
    are--you know, we have got great institutions in this country,
    but I think we need something maybe to just specialize with
    space.
        General Raymond. I think one of the things, as an
    independent service you have to develop your own people. On the
    officer side, we only bring in about 300 or so folks a year. I
    am very comfortable that the Air Force Academy is developing
    those people for us. In fact 2 years ago, before the Space
    Force stood up, we only got 30 cadets out of the Academy. The
    first year, last year, out of the Academy we received 86. This
    year, 118. So we are coming up on almost a half, a little less
    than half of our total population is coming from the Academy,
    and the talent that we are getting is really top-tier talent,
    including a Rhodes scholar.
        The Academy has a strong astro program, they have got a
    strong space program. I am very comfortable to that they are
    producing the officers that we need to come in the Space Force,
    and they are doing really good work.
        Senator Tuberville. Do you think we need something for
    contractors, future, not in military, for space?
        General Raymond. Yeah, I think, Senator, there is great
    excitement going around the country about space, and it is in
    all three sectors. You have NASA going back to the moon and
    then on to Mars. You have got commercial space sector that is
    really alive and well and flourishing, and then you have the
    national security space sector.
        What we are seeing, and what I am seeing as you go around
    to the schools is that there is an increased amount of folks
    that are applying for space-related STEM degrees, which is
    important. I think it is going to pay great dividends for our
    Nation. What we are trying to do with our University
    Partnership Program is partner with those folks and then
    attract them to come into the space program. I have talked to
    Administrator Nelson. I would really like to partner with them
    as well. I think there is great opportunity here for the youth
    of America.
        Senator Tuberville. You know, I am excited about going
    around to high schools, as I have all my life, and even the
    last few years in campaigning for this job I have got today,
    and we are seeing a lot of robotics courses being taught in
    high schools now. We are really advancing, and I think that is
    going to be the key to our survival, to be honest with you, is
    the education of our kids. Of course, they are all into
    computers and technology, and I just hope we are doing enough
    and planning on that for the future, because I do not want us
    to get to a point where we hit a wall and we do not have enough
    people trained for the future in space. But thank you for that.
        General Brown, I know one of your first acts as Chief was
    to honor General Charles McGee, and Alabama is proud to host
    the Red Tails and the 187th Fighter Wing down at Dannelly
    Field. In the very near future, within 2 years, we are getting
    the opportunity to have transitioned in 20 F-35's, and we are
    excited about that. I just want your commitment to stay with us
    on that, and we want to see red tails on all those planes. I
    was there the other day, and I think it is going to be huge for
    recruiting in the future of having 20 F-35's there. A lot of
    young kids are kind of recognized with the red tails, and we
    have done a good job of that. We just need to keep it going. So
    can I get your commitment to continue with the Red Tails and
    the things that we do at Dannelly Field?
        General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment, and great
    legacy from the Tuskegee Airmen there at Dannelly and there in
    Alabama with the Tuskegee Institute as well.
        Senator Tuberville. Well, thank you very much. Thank you
    for your service, guys. Thanks for being here today.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Now we are
    trying to connect with Senator Duckworth via Webex. There may
    be some technical difficulties, but Senator Duckworth, you are
    recognized.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I logged out
    and logged back in so it seems to be working now.
        Chairman Reed. Very good.
        Senator Duckworth. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for
    being here today, and thank you for your service to our
    country.
        As the Air Force modernizes its platforms to meet the
    demand of future conflict, particularly the possibility of a
    contested logistics environment in the Indo-Pacific region, we
    must consider the evolution of our air mobility and other
    combat support functions, in addition to our combat
    capabilities. Bottom line, without combat-credible air mobility
    we do not have a combat-credible deterrent.
        General Brown, will you ensure that the Air Force addresses
    the gap in advanced air mobility capabilities suitable for
    distributed warfare in the Indo-Pacific, and when do you think
    the Air Force can deliver a plan for the future of air
    mobility, beyond the C-130, to Congress?
        General Brown. Senator, you do have my commitment, and this
    is an area we are looking at, particularly through the aspect
    of Agility Prime and other techniques to be able to logistics
    under attack. That planning process is in its very early stages
    and so I probably cannot commit to you today on when we would
    actually be able to present a plan to Congress. But what I
    would like to be able to do is continue to work with you and
    this Committee to work through a process to answer that
    particular question, not only in the capability but also the
    timeline of when we would be able to provide some more
    information on a study and some other techniques, and the
    technology to be able to look at how we do mobility,
    particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am going to take you up on
    that. Thank you very much. You know, modernization is critical,
    but it must be balanced against present-day readiness
    requirements that are necessary to respond to emerging crises.
        I am actually pretty alarmed that the Air Force plans to
    continue C-130 divestment from the Guard and reserve. It has
    not created a plan to replace the C-130 itself. Eliminating
    enduring platforms without even beginning to design their
    replacement I think is a huge gamble. Is it wise to wager our
    National Guard and reserves' operational capability and
    capacity and risk creating a huge gap that undermines our
    ability to respond to new emergencies? I mean, after all, over
    half the Air Force tactical and mobility airlift resides in the
    reserve components.
        I truly believe that C-130 divestiture will limit the Joint
    Force's ability to meet the challenges outlined in the 2018
    National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Interim National
    Security Strategic Guidance, as well as the reserve components'
    ability to complete their domestic missions, which have only
    increased in recent years.
        That is why I fear that we must not divest the C-130
    aircraft in our reserve components without first ensuring that
    we retain the critical airlift capability and capacity that
    gives our commanders the operational flexibility to respond
    when called, both overseas and here at home. While I understand
    that the Air Force has difficult decisions to make in how it
    manages its budget, and I understand about the increasing costs
    of maintaining old aircraft, I flew the oldest Black Hawk in
    the entire Army inventory, the fourth off the production line,
    so I understand the challenges of that. I have, however, heard
    from my TAG [The Adjutant General] about how concerned he is
    that the Illinois National Guard will not be able to fulfill
    its duties to Illinois and to the country if there are further
    C-130 divestments without replacement platforms.
        During his confirmation hearing, Mr. Kendall, the
    President's nominee to lead the Air Force, committed to working
    with governors and adjutants general of states with reserve
    component C-130 wings to ensure that they can fulfill their
    domestic missions and the Air Force's divestment plans do not
    eliminate C-130 capacity that is needed to deliver the air
    mobility our Nation has come to rely upon.
        General Brown, will you make the same commitment as Mr.
    Kendall?
        General Brown. Senator, I will, and as a matter of fact,
    one of the areas that I am focused on is every time I travel to
    any one of the states, one of my goals is to either meet with
    or communicate, ahead or during the trip, with the TAGs for
    each of the states, to talk about where the Air Force is
    headed. So you do have my commitment.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Another asset that is really
    important to our combat credibility are the KC-135's, and the
    Air Force plans to divest 18 KC-135's and 14 KC-10 tankers in
    fiscal year 2022 to support the KC-46 program. This budget
    significantly reduces aerial refueling capacity. Could you
    please outline the risks we are accepting in the short term,
    and is the KC-46 program appropriately funded to accelerate its
    fielding to close this gap?
        General Brown. Well, one thing I will tell you about the
    KC-46 is that it does have the capability to do a good majority
    of missions, to include air refueling, aeromedical, as well as
    cargo movement. What we are working very closely with the
    United States TRANSCOM on is an interim capability release to
    provide the KC-46 for day-to-day mission taskings that will
    allow for it to be able to support the retirement of our KC-
    10's and KC-135's. I have had great conversations with General
    Lyons most recently as about 6 weeks ago on this very topic,
    and we are both on agreement that the path we have right now on
    the KC-46 versus the KC-135 and KC-10 retirements are suitable
    to support his requirements.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am out of time but I would
    love to be updated on the Air Force's progress in fielding the
    KC-46 and to be provided early notification to myself, and to
    the Committee, actually, if any issues arise that may further
    delay the program or otherwise increase gaps in our overall
    aerial refueling capability, and we take this after the
    hearing. Thank you.
        General Brown. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Thank you very
    much. Gentlemen, again thank you for your testimony. Thank you
    for your dedicated service over many years. I also want to
    thank you for opening up your schedule for a possible closed
    session after this session, but I do not think there were any
    issues that have come up within the context of this hearing
    that cannot be resolved by an individual contact with the
    relevant Senator. Because of that we will not have a closed
    session.
        I thank you very much for your, again, service, and
    Secretary Roth, thank you. You have done a superb job, not only
    in this tenure as Acting Secretary but for years as a stalwart
    in the Department of Defense. Thank you very, very much, sir.
        General Raymond. Thank you very much, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Gentlemen, with that I will adjourn the
    hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                    pease air national guard base ramp space
        1. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Roth and General Brown, in early May,
    the 157th Air Refueling Wing out of Pease Air National Guard Base in
    New Hampshire, responded to a short notice request to support the
    transfer of 12 Marine F/A-18s traveling to U.S. Central Command. The
    157th provided 6 KC-46s to refuel the F/A-18s en route and Pease
    provided ramp space for 6 F/A-18s that were forced to make an unplanned
    maintenance stop during the refueling. Not only is that an example of
    the outstanding work of the 157th and the importance of the KC-46 for
    real-world missions, but it also emphasizes the importance of Pease as
    a strategic location. Will you commit to working with me on a plan to
    invest in Pease's infrastructure to ensure it can continue to perform
    the missions needed to meet commanders' requirements?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. We recognize the importance of
    the 157th Air Refueling Wing and Pease Air National Guard Base in New
    Hampshire as a strategic location. Since 2010, the ANG has invested in
    excess of $138 million in the infrastructure of Pease, including $55
    million to ensure the installation is capable of supporting KC-46
    mission requirements. This includes facility construction, hangar
    upgrades, maintenance and storage space, aircraft hydrant refueling
    capabilities and significant ramp improvements. This effort continues
    as emerging mission requirements are identified and validated for
    future MILCON/SRM consideration. The DAF will continue to work with the
    ANG and the unit to support mission requirements, and will be happy to
    discuss our plans with you as appropriate.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                                small businesses
        2. Senator Hirono. Secretary Roth, by partnering with AFWERX, the
    Air Force has recently awarded Small Business Innovation Research
    (SBIR) contracts that include technology research and development
    projects ranging from artificial intelligence to supply chain security.
    These types of initiatives coupled with the Air Force's annual Tech
    Warrior Exercise help small businesses bring much needed technological
    advancements into the Department. How is the Air Force removing
    barriers to entry for small businesses to access both SBIR contracts
    and other small business initiatives?
        Secretary Roth. The Department of the Air Force established a new
    ``Open Topic'' solicitation where any domestic small business may
    submit a concept it believes can benefit Air Force and/or Space Force
    missions.
        AFWERX has since contracted with 1,433 companies, greater than 75
    percent of which are new to the DAF SBIR/STTR program.
        AFWERX Spark sponsors collider events designed to educate industry
    and academia on DAF requirements and capabilities. Collider events
    remove barriers for small businesses through better understanding of
    DAF user requirements, informing refinement of technology proposals and
    accelerating solutions.

        3. Senator Hirono. Secretary Roth, what is the Air Force doing to
    overcome the dreaded ``valley of death,'' the gap between product's
    development and the product being funded as a program of record?
        Secretary Roth. The Department of the Air Force delivers technology
    to the warfighter through the AFRL Technology Transfer and Transition
    Office, innovation organizations such as AFWERX, and Vanguard programs,
    which are designed for rapid transition of remarkable new capabilities
    that hold promise for providing significant battlefield advantage.
        The Department of the Air Force employs prototyping and
    experimentation in rapid acquisition pathways to achieve smarter and
    faster programs, shorten the requirement process, and move capabilities
    to warfighters more quickly.
        The greatest limitation for programs exiting the valley of death is
    the lack of funds to continue programs. Early stage technology and
    prototyping is much cheaper than development and production.

        4. Senator Hirono. Secretary Roth, how can we get these advanced
    technologies brought into the Department of Defense (DOD) faster?
        Secretary Roth. The Department of the Air Force rebalanced the
    science and technology portfolio to emphasize a reduction in the time
    required to develop and deliver new transformational capabilities,
    while maintaining a strong enduring and enabling technology portfolio.
        DAF Vanguard programs partner technologists, operators, and
    acquisition professionals at project inception, and gain corporate
    commitment to mature and rapidly transition technology.
        AFWERX employs a partnership strategy with private sector companies
    to accelerate the technology development timeline and ensure commercial
    commitment.
        AFWERX launched the Prime program with the specific purpose of
    overcoming the ``Valley of Death'' in collaboration with commercial
    investors to accelerate emerging technologies. Agility Prime, the first
    of these programs, is accelerating electric vertical takeoff and
    landing aircraft development.
        The Department of the Air Force employs prototyping and
    experimentation to speed up the requirements and fielding process by
    enabling the understanding of how specific technologies can provide a
    competitive advantage, as well as to address the associated acquisition
    risks and costs.
        Despite these efforts, funding limitations are the greatest
    obstacle to transitioning technologies of interest. Early stage
    development is inexpensive--allowing the science and technology
    community to fund many more technologies than the DAF can afford to
    take into production and fielding.
                             delivery of the kc-46
        5. Senator Hirono. General Brown, in last year's National Defense
    Authorization Act, Congress set limits on the number of KC-135 and KC-
    10 refueling aircraft the Air Force could retire over the next three
    years as a result of acquisition delays and capability limitations the
    new KC-46 replacement aircraft is still experiencing. Has the Air Force
    made any progress on speeding up the delivery of additional KC-46
    aircraft?
        General Brown. The KC-46A fixed price contract provides the
    Government with very limited visibility into Boeing's manufacturing
    processes. The recent impacts to Boeing's aircraft delivery schedule
    appear to come from the COVID pandemic and manufacturing quality
    assurance/control issues. The Air Force and the Defense Contract
    Management Agency are exploring available corrective options with our
    Federal Aviation Administration partners to help Boeing improve its
    rate of production and meet their delivery schedule. The Government
    retains the right to employ withholds or progress payment reductions if
    they deem that is the best mechanism to drive improvement in overall
    aircraft quality.

        6. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what is the timeline for
    correcting the KC-46's problem with refueling planes in different
    lighting conditions?
        General Brown. The Air Force is working with Boeing to resolve the
    problems with refueling planes in different lighting conditions as part
    of the Remote Vision System 2.0 effort. The Air Force expects the
    Remote Vision System 2.0 will be ready to begin fleet retrofit in
    fiscal year 2024.

        7. Senator Hirono. General Brown, your opening statement mentions
    the importance of divesting from the legacy KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft
    quickly because it ``hampers the fielding of the more capable KC-46''--
    but how does that position square with the ongoing capability issues
    the newer KC-46 is still experiencing?
        General Brown. We continue to work closely with Boeing on the
    Remote Visual System 2.0 fix and feel confident they will have a
    retrofit solution in the fiscal year 2023/fiscal year 2024 timeframe.
        We have worked carefully with USTRANSCOM to ensure we can deliver
    the needed air refueling capacity while we develop the KC-46 enterprise
    and work through deficiencies in the platform.
        The KC-46 is currently providing operational and training missions
    throughout the world. It can already refuel several platforms, move
    cargo and conduct aeromedical evacuation missions with some
    restrictions. DAF is implementing a conditions-based approach to
    operationalize the KC-46 for USTRANSCOM use prior to full operational
    capability declaration.
                                 pilot shortage
        8. Senator Hirono. General Brown, the Air Force has been
    experiencing significant shortfalls in both pilots and aircraft
    maintainers in recent years. What steps are you taking to address the
    pilot and aircraft maintainer shortage?
        General Brown. While the USAF is experiencing unprecedented high
    retention rates in both the Enlisted and Officer Corps, the aggregate
    success may mask areas where we have retention challenges like pilots
    and aircraft maintainers. In response to these continued challenges, we
    continue to offer targeted monetary incentives such as Selective
    Retention and Aviation Bonuses as well as non-monetary strategies
    focused on Quality of Life and Quality of Service.
        Focusing on pilots specifically, the Air Force strategy is twofold:
    1) sustainably produce at least 1,500 pilots per year; 2) improve long-
    term retention of pilots through a combination of policies, incentives
    and actions. This strategy centers on increasing pilot production
    capacity to meet our annual production requirement of 1,500 pilots year
    after year allowing all three Air Components the necessary number of
    pilots to meet their line pilot demand. Sustaining this production
    level over ten years will restore Company Grade Officer health as well
    as line pilot inventory health. The Air Force could expand production
    faster but it would create unnecessary and possibly, unmanageable
    challenges with training, absorbing and maintaining the force.
    Production of at least 1,500 pilots per year balances our need to
    reduce the shortfall at a manageable pace.
        We expect we will produce between 1,500 and 1,600 pilots per year
    by fiscal year 23 through several key initiatives. These include: UPT
    2.5, Accelerated Path to Wings (a T-1 only path to wings), Helicopter
    Training Next (a Rotary Wing Only Path to Wings), Improving Contact
    Simulator Instructor manning and compensation, Remote Simulator
    Instruction and the use of Aviation Schools (Alternate Path to Wings)
    as well as credit for civilian flight experience (Civil Path to Wings).
        The USAF also instituted an aircraft maintenance retention strategy
    that has successfully contributed to the current 100 percent fill rate
    for our funded maintenance billets. This four-step retention strategy
    focuses on building and maintaining the right skill levels and
    specialties within its enlisted maintenance workforce. It focuses on
    cyclical evaluation of historical retention trends; on-going review and
    adjustments to retention goals by skill level and maintenance
    specialty; clear understanding of retention rates necessary to attain
    those goals; and establishment of metrics needed to track performance
    against those goals. Keeping maintenance manning and retention high
    relies on being able to coordinate timing for aircraft divestment with
    arrivals of new weapons system (F-35, KC-46, B-21, NGAD). Without the
    ability to repurpose our maintenance manning and retention levels will
    be put at risk again.

        9. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what efforts are you taking to
    recruit, retain, and remove barriers for a more diverse force, and in
    particular, what steps you are taking to diversify the pool of pilots
    serving in the Air Force?
        General Brown. Air Education and Training Command is responsible
    for recruiting the Air Force we need with an emphasis on Rated
    Diversity. Pilot retention, to include potential culture or bias
    problems impacting under-represented groups, is a focus area for the
    Air Force. The Service has leveraged a body of work that includes
    studies, advanced data analytics, and surveys to better understand all
    the factors impacting the quality of life and service for our pilots.
    The most recent studies (e.g., RAND 2018) have explored historic
    challenges in recruiting a diverse pilot force by focusing on
    understanding demographic differences in pilot training attrition. This
    study, coupled with additional advanced analysis, resulted in a re-
    assessment of the Pilot Candidate Selection Model (PCSM). Specific
    actions targeted at improving pilot retention include decreasing
    administrative burdens for pilots within operational squadrons,
    broadening height range to allow for a larger pool of candidates
    (specifically women), developing gender-specific flight duty uniforms,
    and modernizing other dress and appearance rules.
                          missile warning and tracking
        10. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, the threat from North Korean
    ballistic missiles and the cutting edge hypersonic weapons that China
    and Russia are fielding is an ongoing concern, especially in Hawaii.
    The Space Force is collaborating with other DOD partners, including the
    Missile Defense Agency, on the Next Generation Overhead Persistent
    Infrared missile warning and tracking system--what can you tell me
    about your progress on this system?
        General Raymond. In the face of existing and emerging threats,
    notably China, the USSF must continue to adapt space systems to a more
    mission-capable and defendable architecture. The USSF continues to
    successfully work with the Missile Defense Agency and the Space
    Development Agency to plan for and deliver Overhead Persistent Infrared
    (OPIR) capabilities focused on advanced threats. In the interim, the
    USSF is designing and developing the next generation of strategically
    survivable space-based Missile Warning OPIR platforms. The Next-Gen
    OPIR Block 0 architecture will provide more sensitive and more
    resilient Missile Warning capabilities to maintain an advantage over
    our adversaries.
        The Next-Gen OPIR Block 0 program continues to make progress
    against an aggressive development schedule. Since initiation, the
    program has met all design milestones on time to support the
    warfighter's Initial Launch Capability requirement in fiscal year 2025.
    The ground system continues to develop the framework and applications
    required to operate the satellites, process the infrared data, and
    disseminate Missile Warning messages to National Command Authorities,
    the Joint Warfighter, and Allied nations.
        Finally, to better detect and track advanced maneuvering missile
    targets, such as hypersonic weapons that China and Russia are fielding,
    the USSF, in collaboration with other stakeholders across the
    Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, has completed a
    force design study for the Missile Warning and Missile Tracking mission
    areas. When the design work is complete, the acquisition community will
    develop a strategy and timeline to rapidly deliver the required
    capability to orbit.

        11. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, the Space Force has awarded an
    ``other transaction authority'' (OTA) contract to determine whether
    sensors for the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared satellites
    can effectively detect and track ballistic missiles. When are the
    results of this OTA expected?
        General Raymond. In May 2021, the U.S. Space Force awarded Other
    Transaction Authority (OTA) contracts to Millennium Space Systems and
    Raytheon Technologies through Space and Missile Systems Center's Space
    Enterprise Consortium. The U.S. Space Force's Missile Track Custody
    prototype effort will examine Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
    sensor capability from Medium Earth Orbit through ground simulation.
    This effort complements Space Development Agency's and Missile Defense
    Agency's planned on-orbit demonstrations in Low Earth Orbit and informs
    USSF architecture feasibility studies.
        The Missile Track Custody effort includes an 18-month base period
    of performance. During this time, the contractors will advance their
    concepts to Critical Design Review-maturity and deliver functioning
    Engineering Development Units to validate sensor designs. Additionally,
    the contractors will deliver Digital Engineering models which will
    reduce integration risk and support Missile Track Custody requirements
    development.

        12. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, does the Space Force have a
    projected timeline for when satellites will be a viable addition to the
    constellation of radars to track ballistic missiles?
        General Raymond. It is important to note the Space Force currently
    operates a Missile Warning architecture that detects and tracks
    ballistic missiles. These systems provide an ``unblinking eye'' capable
    of warning the Joint warfighter and our Allies of an impending missile
    attack. However, to better detect and track advanced maneuvering
    missile targets which emit reduced infrared signatures, the U.S. Space
    Force, in collaboration with other stakeholders across the Department
    of Defense and the Intelligence Community, has completed a force design
    study for the Missile Warning and Missile Tracking mission areas. When
    the design work is complete, the acquisition community will develop a
    strategy and timeline to rapidly deliver the required capability to
    orbit.

        13. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, can persistent overhead
    satellites eliminate the need for ground based radar systems for
    detecting and tracking ballistic missiles?
        General Raymond. Current and future planned space-based overhead
    persistent infrared (OPIR) systems do not eliminate a need for ground
    based radar (GBR) systems to detect and track ballistic missiles today.
    OPIR and GBR systems are both required to provide accurate, timely and
    unambiguous warning and attack assessment of air, missile and space
    threats. Space-based OPIR systems will detect a missile launch first
    and cue the GBRs to improve our missile warning capability.
    Additionally, current OPIR satellites do not track cold objects in
    space.
        Given the speed and nature of advancing threats, as well as the
    technologies and operational concepts used to detect and warn against
    those threats, it is premature to assess how missile warning and
    tracking will be provided in the future, and when, if ever, transition
    to a different approach would occur.

        14. Senator Hirono. General Raymond, how is the Space Force
    planning to protect critical intelligence, missile warning and
    tracking, and communications satellites in space from emerging Chinese
    and Russian threats?
        General Raymond. The Space Force strategy for protecting critical
    satellites has three components: resilient architectures, ready
    guardians, and robust partnerships.
        First, the Space Force continues to field systems with
    architectural resiliency. This includes fielding satellites with
    enhanced hardening and resiliency, fortifying ground and communication
    infrastructure, deploying proliferated constellations, and increasing
    our ability to rapidly reconstitute our capabilities. Resilient
    architectures reduce the likelihood and severity of a successful
    attack. The Space Force can also use non-technical means, such as
    maneuvering satellites to help protect from certain types of attacks.
        The Space Force is developing guardians prepared to defeat Russian
    and Chinese threats. This requires warfighting focused intelligence,
    tactics, exercises, and training programs. Space Training and Readiness
    Command will consolidate all of these functions under a single
    commander who is solely focused on developing combat-ready guardians.
        Finally, the Space Force continues to reinforce a safe and secure
    space environment by sharing data, forming partnerships with
    interagency, commercial, and international partners. This creates an
    environment where adversaries who would threaten U.S. satellites will
    find themselves entrenched against a diverse collection of partners
    committed to a safe and secure orbital environment.
        We can address this more fully at higher classification levels.
                               future fighter mix
        15. Senator Hirono. General Brown, in February you launched a study
    into the service's future fighter jet force mix. After reviewing your
    budget request, it appears the Air Force is planning to focus research
    funds on a Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft while complementing
    the existing F-22 and F-35 fleets with more F-35s and the F-15EX. What
    steps is the Air Force taking to ensure the F-35's operational testing
    is not further delayed beyond 2022?
        General Brown. The Air Force continues to fully fund F-35 test and
    the fiscal year 2022 President's Budget request commits $1.05 billion
    to research, development, test & evaluation.
        The Air Force will continue to work with the Joint Program Office
    to finalize the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE) schedule to complete
    initial operational test & evaluation and inform the new Acquisition
    Program Baseline. This updated schedule will be presented to the
    Defense Acquisition Executive in August 2021.
        The Air Force will also continue to work with the JPO to explore
    opportunities to streamline and accelerate test activities wherever
    possible.

        16. Senator Hirono. General Brown, what is the timeline for
    procurement of the Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft and how will
    it fit in the Air Force's future fighter mix over the next two decades?
        General Brown. The Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) capability
    is currently in the Research and Development phase. NGAD will take time
    to fully develop and field.
        NGAD will provide Survivability, Lethality, and Persistence across
    the entire range of military operations--seamless integration with
    ABMS--a mix of manned, unmanned, and even optionally manned aircraft
    and advanced stand-off weapons.
        NGAD fits into the future fleet as a complementary capability to F-
    15EX, F-35, and F-16.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
                       all domain capability development
        17. Senator King. General Brown and General Raymond, please
    describe your priority obstacles within the Department of Defense and
    the interagency that your services encounter when trying to develop
    Joint All Domain capabilities. Please specifically address obstacles
    regarding software development, data sharing and integration, network
    integration, risk management frameworks, Joint All Domain Command and
    Control, artificial intelligence, joint development environments, and
    cloud-based systems.
        General Brown. Many years of stove piped and rapid development of
    niche capabilities has challenged the DOD's ability to enable globally
    integrated operations. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) is focused on the
    Department of the Air Force's role in Joint All-Domain Operations. The
    Air Force has published Air Force Doctrine AFDP 3-99 titled Department
    of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), which also
    addresses Joint All-Domain Command and Control a key piece to Joint All
    Domain Operations.
        As the USAF shifts from a network-centric to a data-centric
    enterprise, seeking to build information advantage as a key enabler to
    JADC2, data sharing is vital. It will require changes in how the USAF
    characterizes, secures, transports, stores, and exchanges data. Though
    theater-specific conditions will dictate tailored solutions, a common
    framework between the USAF and its partners is needed. Disparate, patch
    worked, ``bolted on'' data sharing policies, standards, and technology
    are a hindrance; in order to excel in competition and conflict moving
    forward, unity and cohesion of effort is a requirement.
        As we develop Joint All Domain capabilities, we also have to
    remember that allies and partners will be integral to our success. It's
    not good enough to somehow bolt them onto our networks when a conflict
    begins--we need to include them from the beginning. This means that as
    we develop architectures and standards, we need to overcome some of our
    own instincts to over-classify our work so that we can include allies
    and partners from the start.
        As we move into the Joint All Domain future, we also need to
    develop the Joint doctrine, policy, structures, training, and our
    people to fully realize these capabilities. Using new technology in old
    ways will not deliver decision superiority on its own.
        General Raymond. The USSF is fundamentally focused on creating a
    modern, data-driven enterprise to achieve mission success in the space-
    domain and as a key contributor to joint multi-domain, interagency and
    joint warfighting success. In pursuit of Joint All-Domain capabilities,
    the USSF has encountered general challenges and obstacles within the
    DOD and across the interagency that include system complexity, limited
    personnel resources, and competing priorities. Coordination,
    communication, and cooperation are essential to address these in
    committed pursuit of true Joint All-Domain operations. Data sharing is
    vital to this effort within the USSF and across our joint, interagency,
    industry, academia, and international partners. As the first Service to
    be born-digital, we are providing several space and cyber domain
    capabilities, including the Unified Data Library, as a key contribution
    for all domain Command and Control (C2) capabilities. Additionally, we
    are focused on developing and refining space and Joint doctrine,
    policy, process, governance, tools, structures, training, and culture
    to fully realize the full potential of a Joint All-Domain future.
        The USSF has encountered several specific challenges or obstacles
    in developing Joint All Domain capabilities. Software development is
    still constrained by competing demand for government and industry
    personnel and the time it takes to increase capacity. Data sharing and
    integration remain an immense system of systems challenge exacerbated
    by legacy DOD systems, the breadth of domain-specific demands, and
    service-specific Command and Control approaches. Network integration is
    a challenge given the diverse array of mission objectives, operational
    requirements, and interfaces. Although risk management frameworks
    differ, significant progress has been made to incorporate operational
    risk perspective in this area. Joint development environments are being
    fielded, but as of yet lack the overarching force design to drive
    enterprise changes. Cloud-based systems remain essential, but are
    challenged by security concerns, disparate Zero Trust implementations,
    and integration issues in a federated approach.
        The USSF is addressing some of these challenges via people,
    policies, tools and partnerships to reduce obstacles in developing
    Joint capabilities. Within our authorities, the Space Force is raising
    the digital literacy of our workforce through Digital University to
    better understand and manage the latest technologies like cloud-based
    systems, artificial intelligence and software development and shift
    from a risk-averse to a more risk-informed culture.
        We also continue to partner within the Department of the Air Force
    on common challenges.
        The Department is working to shift from a network-centric to data-
    centric enterprise in order to build information advantages and advance
    data sharing.
        At the end of the day, the Space Force must create a lean digital
    workforce that is supported by culture and processes we often see in
    cyber-secure focused industry. We will continue to work with Joint,
    interagency, coalition, industry and academia partners to resolve
    issues and develop solutions.

        18. Senator King. General Brown and General Raymond, would the Air
    Force and the Space Force be willing to work with Congress in reducing
    some of these obstacles, possibly by developing Goldwater-Nichols like
    reforms for Joint All Domain capability development, data sharing and
    integration, and network integration across the DOD and interagency?
        General Brown. We are always seeking ways to work with Congress in
    delivering better capabilities to the warfighter and streamlining our
    capability development process to accelerate change.
        Within DOD, the services are closely coordinating through the Joint
    All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Cross Functional Team, led by
    the Joint Staff, to pursue JADC2 capability development, data sharing
    and integration, and network integration. This effort includes joint
    capability development across the entire range of capabilities through
    a Joint All Domain Command and Control Implementation Plan.
        In recognition that data sharing underpins our Joint All Domain
    capabilities going forward, we've also been working across the DOD and
    interagency on a series of high-level Data Summits to focus the efforts
    of our team.
        On 20 July 2020, this group met at U.S. Special Operations Command
    to develop our DOD Reference Architecture 3.0 which will set common
    standards to ensure integration. In early August 2020, our cross-DOD
    and interagency data sharing and network integration teams will meet to
    further develop the DOD Reference Architecture 3.0. Our Department of
    the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Chief Architect Office, Chief
    Data Officer's team, and other experts will participate to ensure a
    high level of integration.
        General Raymond. Yes. The USSF is willing to work with Congress to
    efficiently, affordably, and responsively deliver better capabilities
    to the Space and Joint warfighters while streamlining our capability
    development, data sharing, and systems integration processes to
    accelerate change and ensure national security success.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
                                      mq-9
        19. Senator Rosen. General Brown, last week, Secretary Austin told
    me during the DOD Posture hearing that the Air Force is reducing the
    number of MQ-9 lines, but not the number of tails. I'm curious why
    there is any reduction at all when the Air Force today still lacks the
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity to meet
    Combatant Commanders' requirements contained in the 2018 National
    Defense Strategy. Can you please expand on what this reduction strategy
    is and whether there is soon to be a next generation program of record
    to replace the MQ-9?
        General Brown. In fiscal year 2022 the Air Force is only requesting
    a reduction in combat lines. This reduction is less than 10 percent of
    the current force presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to
    reduction in aircraft inventory; no tails will be divested, no
    reduction in personnel, and no reduced squadrons. By keeping 60 combat
    lines, and not modifying the way the MQ-9 fleet is utilized, the
    platform will become more vulnerable and irrelevant, even in low-end
    conflicts.
        The Air Force remains committed to providing MQ-9 intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capability to Combatant
    Commands and will continue to offer MQ-9 capability to CENTCOM for the
    foreseeable future.
        While the MQ-9 provides utility today, it was not designed for
    operation in a future highly-contested environment. Modifying the MQ-9
    force presentation is about balancing near and long-term risk.
        The Air Force is looking at multiple systems that can replace the
    capacity and capability currently filled by the MQ-9. Continued
    modernization efforts seek to provide future warfighters the ability to
    access data and information at a moment's notice. Our systems must be
    able to penetrate contested areas and survive and the MQ-9, as we know
    it today, simply cannot.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
                                 amraam program
        The fiscal year 2022 request for AMRAAM production includes a
    significant reduction to the planned quantity for the Air Force and
    zero fiscal year 2022 funding for Navy production. The basis for these
    reductions was the previous schedule delay on the Form, Fit, and
    Function Refresh (F3R) cut-in for the next version of AMRAAM. It is my
    understanding that following the re-plan with the Air Force, the
    development program is meeting its schedule milestones. More than 850
    employees in Arizona work on this program today, and I want to ensure
    we don't inadvertently cause a production break of this critical air
    dominance capability.

        20. Senator Kelly. Secretary Roth and General Brown, the Air Force
    awarded Lot 34 (fiscal year 2020 funding) this spring, and plans to
    award Lot 35 (fiscal year 2021 funding) in July 2021, and Lot 36
    (fiscal year 2022 funding) in July 2022. What is the confidence level
    of the Air Force on the F3R recovery--is it moving in the right
    direction?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. Yes, the program is progressing
    in the right direction. Due to hardware integration issues, the AMRAAM
    Form, Fit, Function, Refresh (F3R) program experienced a 13 month
    schedule slip. Since then, Raytheon Missiles & Defense (RMD) achieved a
    number of significant milestones and implemented a detailed plan to
    maintain schedule to the completion of the program. Additionally, RMD
    has demonstrated improvement in forecasting remaining work while
    burning down a backlog of tasks that were behind. This gives the
    government high-confidence in RMD's ability to meet its Functional
    Configuration Audit, a major milestone for the program, by January
    2023. The program's critical path is holding steady and the program is
    confident in RMD's ability to execute the fiscal year 2022 budget.

        21. Senator Kelly. Secretary Roth and General Brown, how will the
    Air Force and Navy ensure stable AMRAAM production across production
    lots planned for fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022 without fiscal
    year 2022 Navy production funding? Please provide details on how prior
    year funding will be utilized to stabilize production rates.
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. While the Air Force and the Navy
    pursued different funding approaches to address the F3R impacts to
    future production lots, both are intended to stabilize AMRAAM
    production quantities across Lot 34, Lot 35, and Lot 36. The Air Force
    chose to decrease AMRAAM procurement funding across fiscal year 2020,
    fiscal year 2021, and fiscal year 2022, while the Navy's approach was
    to zero-out fiscal year 2022 and carry over fiscal year 2021 funds to
    support both Lot 35 and Lot 36 procurement. It is imperative that the
    fiscal year 2021 Navy funding remains intact to execute this strategy
    and keep the production line above minimum sustainment rates. The
    services will continue to coordinate with each other and communicate
    with Congress to ensure these funding profiles are protected.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
                          air force officer promotions
        22. Senator Wicker. General Brown and General Raymond, several
    years ago an anonymous Air Force Colonel writing under the pseudonym of
    Ned Stark published an article, ``A Call for Senior Officer Reform in
    the Air Force: An Insider's Perspective,'' which criticized the
    service's officer promotion process. I think the grade of O-3 is too
    early to identify individuals as future general officers. This system
    could result in promoting below standard O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s to the
    general officer ranks. Do you believe the Air Force's current
    evaluation and promotion system best meets the needs of both the
    service and the individuals?
        General Brown. While the current Air Force talent management system
    has served us well, like all processes we utilize it is constantly
    evolving to improve and meet future developmental requirements. As a
    result, the Air Force has been overhauling its talent management system
    with a focus on ensuring we produce airmen capable of executing future
    Air Force missions as envisioned in the National Defense Strategy. This
    includes building leaders with the key Airmen Leadership Qualities
    (ALQs) we believe will be essential for success in the future fight
    like smart risk taking, innovation, leading inclusively and others. To
    set this course, the AF published 10 ALQs which form the foundation of
    new officer and enlisted evaluation systems currently under
    development. We also transformed the single Line of the Air Force
    promotion category into six developmentally focused categories adding
    agility for officer development and career progression. In 2020, we
    transitioned away from below the promotion zone consideration where we
    selected some officers ahead of their peers based on demonstrated and
    future promotion potential. This transition now allows officers'
    greater space for in-grade development and building deeper leadership
    skills and experience through less rigid career tracks. While not
    directly related, the Air Force certainly talked with and partnered
    with Colonel Jason Lamb, ``Ned Stark,'' on many of the reforms we are
    undertaking to ensure our future leaders are just as capable as those
    we've been developing.
        General Raymond. The Air Force has an excellent system it is
    building upon and evolving to meet its needs; however, the Space Force
    is much smaller and requires a more individualized talent management
    system. Until the Space Force is able to field the new system described
    in the Guardian Ideal, we will continue to use the Air Force system
    with some policy differences based in our unique Service requirements.
    We anticipate fielding our new developmental feedback process,
    appraisal system, and approach toward promotions before the end of
    fiscal year 2023. Mr. Jason Lamb, who wrote the referenced essay under
    the pseudonym Cole Ned Stark, was a principal author of the Guardian
    Ideal and is fully involved in its implementation as our Talent
    Strategist.

        23. Senator Wicker. General Brown and General Raymond, what, if
    anything, are the Air Force and Space Force doing to address the issues
    raised in the article?
        General Brown. While the current Air Force Talent management system
    has served us well, like all processes we utilize it is constantly
    evolving to improve and meet future developmental requirements. As a
    result, the Air Force has been overhauling its talent management system
    with a focus on ensuring we produce airmen capable of executing future
    Air Force missions as envisioned in the National Defense Strategy. This
    includes building leaders with the key Airmen Leadership Qualities
    (ALQs) we believe will be essential for success in the future fight
    like smart risk taking, innovation, leading inclusively and others. To
    set this course, the AF published 10 ALQs which form the foundation of
    new officer and enlisted evaluation systems currently under
    development. We also transformed the single Line of the Air Force
    promotion category into six developmentally focused categories adding
    agility for officer development and career progression. In 2020, we
    transitioned away from below the promotion zone consideration where we
    selected some officers ahead of their peers based on demonstrated and
    future promotion potential. This transition now allows officers'
    greater space for in-grade development and building deeper leadership
    skills and experience through less rigid career tracks. While not
    directly related, the Air Force certainly talked with and partnered
    with Cole Jason Lamb, ``Ned Stark,'' on many of the reforms we are
    undertaking to ensure our future leaders are just as capable as those
    we've been developing.
        General Raymond. The Space Force is building upon the excellent
    work by the Air Force to expand the type and quantity of information
    available to the promotion board to help inform promotion
    recommendations. The approach that we outline in the Guardian Ideal has
    three primary components: performance appraisal, behavioral and
    competency assessments, and situational judgment testing. Performance
    management science and cutting edge approaches in the private sector
    have demonstrated that this will provide us better informed and data-
    driven assessments of who is best prepared for promotion. All of these
    tools are based on where a person is in the here and now, including the
    propensity for success, and not based on a record of performance
    largely based on past performance. The Department of the Air Force is
    one team who remain committed to developing our members and promoting
    the best candidates.
                            training aircraft (t-1)
        24. Senator Wicker. General Brown, I understand that a plan is
    being finalized to retire the T-1 training aircraft currently used to
    support Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT), and the Air
    Force intends to move to an increased reliance on simulator training.
    What is the Air Force's plan for the future of the T-1 training fleet?
        General Brown. Over the last few years the Air Force has been
    analyzing better ways to train aircrews, to better prepare our pilots
    for the modern platforms now entering service (F-35, KC-46, MH-139, B-
    21, etc.).
        The Air Force plans to transition away from some of the T-1
    capacity in the coming years and will increase use of simulators and
    other Virtual Reality training devices. This new training program and
    syllabi are still in development.
                               space force firing
        25. Senator Wicker. General Raymond, last month the firing of Space
    Force commander Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lohmeier was widely
    publicized. According to a spokesman from the Space Force, he was fired
    due to comments he made in a podcast criticizing aspects of diversity
    training as being based in Marxism and discriminatory critical race
    theory. Regarding the firing, does it concern you that we may be
    stifling independent thinking and healthy self-critique within the
    ranks?
        General Raymond. The specifics of Lieutenant Colonial Lohmeier's
    relief from Command are currently under review, and it would be
    improper for me to comment on the specifics of his case. However,
    independent thinking, self-assessment, and debate are encouraged in
    both the Air Force and Space Force.
                              critical race theory
        26. Senator Wicker. Secretary Roth, last month I sent a letter to
    Secretary of Defense Austin expressing my concerns about possible
    political motivations behind this action. servicemembers are prohibited
    from participating in public broadcasts like a podcast if they do so as
    an advocate for partisan causes. If, in criticizing critical race
    theory, Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier's comments were found to be
    partisan, it follows that the Department recognizes critical race
    theory as reflecting one side of a partisan debate, and if that is the
    case, it would be inappropriate for the Department to actively promote
    critical race theory through training initiatives at any level. Is it
    the Department of the Air Force's position that publicly opposing
    critical race theory represents prohibited partisan activity for
    servicemembers?
        Secretary Roth. The Department of the Air Force has not taken the
    position that publicly opposing critical race theory represents
    prohibited partisan activity for servicemembers. Lieutenant Colonial
    Lohmeier was relieved because a superior competent authority lost trust
    and confidence in his ability to command. Command is a privilege, not a
    right. Our Department of the Air Force Inspector General is conducting
    a comprehensive investigation which we will share with Congress when
    complete.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                            kc-10 & aerial refueling
        27. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, the KC-46A
    Pegasus aircraft has yet to achieve full rate production and lacks a
    remote visual system that is fully functional during all light levels.
    Moreover, a KC-46 carries only 2,000lbs more transferable fuel than a
    KC-135 and carries 140,000lbs less than a KC-10. In an effort to reduce
    cost at the risk of mission failure, the Air Force seeks to retire
    legacy aircraft with fully functional and approved fuel transfer
    systems; specifically, KC-10s. In your opinion, are cost savings more
    important than strategic mission success? Put differently, should a
    legacy platform with proven, capable systems be maintained and utilized
    over a future system that has yet to meet primary mission requirements?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. Cost savings are not the reason
    the Air Force is transferring to the KC-46. The KC-46 will be a more
    reliable capability that ensures refueling capacity well into the
    future.
        Also, the KC-46 provides capabilities the KC-10 cannot. These
    include capabilities for aeromedical evacuation, cargo missions, and
    its advanced communication system will extend ABMS to the edge of the
    battlespace. The KC-10 cannot be retrofitted to provide these
    capabilities in a platform with increased survivability, self-
    protection, and situational awareness required to compete, deter, and
    win in complex security environments.

        28. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, how many KC-
    46A air-to-air refueling missions are being sourced outside the
    continental United States in support of operational sorties (i.e. not
    training sorties)?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. The following numbers reflect the
    number of OCONUS sorties flown for each of the last few years. It
    includes regular component AMC tails only (not Air National Guard
    (ANG), Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), Air Education & Training
    Command (AETC), United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Pacific Air
    Forces (PACAF), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), or Air Force Special
    Operations Command (AFSOC)) that either took off or landed outside of
    the United States:
        Calendar Year 2018: 0 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
        Calendar Year 2019: 25 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
        Calendar Year 2020: 123 OCONUS KC-46 sorties
        Calendar Year 2021: 83 OCONUS KC-46 sorties (thru 31 May)

        29. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, how Many KC-
    10 air-to-air refueling missions are being sourced outside the
    continental United States in support of operational sorties (i.e. not
    training sorties)?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. The following numbers reflect the
    number of OCONUS sorties flown for each of the last few years. It
    includes regular component AMC tails only (not ANG, AFRC, AETC, USAFE,
    PACAF, AFMC, or AFSOC) that either took off or landed (or both) outside
    of the United States:
        Calendar Year 2018: 4,319 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
        Calendar Year 2019: 4,546 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
        Calendar Year 2020: 2,927 OCONUS KC-10 sorties
        Calendar Year 2021: 983 OCONUS KC-10 sorties (thru 31 May)

        30. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, how important
    is it that ``warfighters train like they fight'' and prepare for future
    deployments by tanking from platforms that they will encounter overseas
    and in combat?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. As Moody Suiter stated in the
    1960's in response to combat losses in Vietnam, if we give our aircrew
    their first 10 combat sorties in a training environment, their
    survivability in combat will improve exponentially.
        This concept applies across all elements of Air Force Operations
    and training. Our Aircrews must have training on all expected tankers
    before deploying. The capability to train like we fight is critically
    important. I think the Air Force has the right sight picture and is
    incorporating this concept into training appropriately.

        31. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, the Air Force
    and U.S. Transportation Command have previously stated that more than
    25,000 hours of aerial refueling missions are not being supported
    annually. Given that the KC-46 is still not fully operational, and the
    Air Force has already begun retiring some of the KC-10 fleet, I assume
    that there is still a significant shortfall in Air Force's aerial
    refueling capacity. What is the current shortfall? How does this impact
    training for aircrews and tanker availability for combatant commands?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. In April 2020, The Secretary of
    the Air Force provided the Congress with a report titled, ``Fiscal Year
    2020 NDAA Contractor-Operated Aerial Refueling Aircraft.'' That
    reported extrapolated ``as many as 30,000 hours of aerial refueling
    missions are not being supported annually.'' That assessment resonates
    with the Joint Force's appetite for aerial refueling. However, requests
    for air refueling capability vary in criticality and are often
    unconstrained by resources. That said, the air refueling fleet remains
    stressed. USTRANSCOM manages the tension between available resources
    and requests for capability in order to prevent mission failure.
        The transition to the KC-46 created an air refueling capacity
    bathtub, meaning the air refueling enterprise is at a low point in
    available capacity. However, acceptance of the KC-46 will ameliorate
    this capacity low point. Additionally, as forces withdraw from
    Southwest Asia, air refueling demands also decrease. As recently as
    2017, USTRANSCOM supported 70 air refueling aircraft deployed to
    CENTCOM. By 2022, this will drop to about 35 aircraft. Additionally,
    the KC-46 crew ratio is higher across the Total Force when compared to
    both the KC-135 and about the same as the KC-10. When fully delivered
    and manned in 2029, roughly 160 more air refueling crews across the
    Total Force will exist, providing 10 percent more taskable aircraft on
    a daily basis than we had in 2019, before any aircraft were retired.
    While we have a shortfall today, the trajectory is improving over time
    and will accelerate as the KC-46 reaches full operational capability.
        USTRANSCOM's top priority is warfighting readiness and ensuring our
    component commands are capable of supporting their wartime missions. As
    such, training for a high-end fight is an absolute necessity. As
    operational activity decreased in Southwest Asia, a greater focus
    across the entire Mobility Air Force, including air refueling forces,
    shifted to full-spectrum readiness.
        Since 2015, the average daily number of global air refueling
    missions was 139, and by the end of 2020, the average dropped to 100.
    This created opportunity for aircrews to conduct necessary high-end
    training. Tanker crew training is certainly necessary, but receiver
    pilot training presents a priority in order to maintain their combat
    edge.
        While the number of tasked air refueling missions was about 100 a
    day in 2020, USTRANSCOM committed an additional 68 aircraft to receiver
    training. Looking to the future, air refueling workload is balanced
    with expected capacity, especially with the relief gained through use
    of the KC-46 interim capability release that can support many non-
    deployed and lower priority missions, freeing up fully capable KC-10
    and KC-135 units to provide necessary support and refocus on training.

        32. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, last year
    General Lyons testified before this Committee that the KC-10 and KC-135
    legacy tanker retirements proposed in fiscal year 2021 would ``create a
    capacity bathtub with significant impacts to combatant command daily
    competition and wartime missions, and negatively impact senior leader
    decision space for mobilization when confronted with a crisis.''
    Congress prevented some, but not all, of these retirements in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Given that the
    KC-46 is still not fully operational, and aerial refueling requirements
    have presumably either increased or remained the same, would you
    support efforts to increase tanker capacity in order to meet aircrew
    training and daily combatant commander operational requirements?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. Reduced refueling requirements as
    a result of withdrawal from Afghanistan provides us a window for
    modernization of the force while also incurring minimal operational
    risk.
        USTRANSCOM has confirmed that, with planned divestments, the Air
    Force will continue to have sufficient air refueling capacity to meet
    global Joint Force demands during the transition to a fully operational
    KC-46. No additional air refueling capacity is needed beyond the PB22
    position to meet aircrew training and daily Combatant Command
    requirements.

        33. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, I have
    serious concerns regarding the Air Force's desire to retire a
    significant number of legacy tankers prior to the KC-46 becoming fully
    operational. I am particularly concerned by the potential loss of the
    KC-10, which provides significantly more fuel offload than both the KC-
    135 and the KC-46. I understand that the KC-10 fleet has many more
    years left in terms of potential service life, and am concerned that
    prematurely retiring such a strategic asset would result in a loss of
    warfighter capability that cannot be regained for many years to come.
    Please describe the importance of the KC-10 to the Air Force's aerial
    refueling capability, and the potential impact to missions for Air
    Force, Navy, and Marine Corps pilots and aircrews if we cut additional
    KC-10s.
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. The KC-10 has been a great
    aircraft, providing strategic air-refueling and airlift capabilities
    over the last 34 years; however, they are expensive to maintain. In
    order to ensure global reach for the Joint Force and air refueling
    capabilities that can generate combat power in austere and contested
    environments of the future, the Department of the Air Force is retiring
    the KC-10, certifying and fielding the KC-46, and maintaining upgraded
    KC-135s.
        We do not have the manpower and resources for future Tanker
    capability unless we divest KC-10s in the near-term. Our operators and
    maintainers are a fixed resource and cannot fully operate and maintain
    two sets of tanker aircraft at fully operational capable levels.

        34. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, I understand
    that, although the KC-46 has been cleared to conduct some aerial
    refueling missions, the aircraft will not be considered to be fully
    operational until major deficiencies such as the Remote Visual System
    are resolved, which likely won't be until 2023 at the earliest. I was
    surprised to learn that, despite this non- or semi-operational status,
    the KC-46s being delivered are being coded into the Primary Mission
    Aircraft Inventory (PMAI). Please explain why these aircraft are given
    the same inventory status as fully operational KC-10s or KC-135s.
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. Primary Mission Aircraft
    Inventory (PMAI) is the correct designation for KC-46s that are being
    assigned to a unit, since the other categories (training, development,
    and special missions) are not applicable.
        The Department of the Air Force and Boeing are on a path to correct
    remaining performance Category-I deficiencies as soon as 2023/2024, but
    the KC-46, consistent with operational restrictions, is currently
    demonstrating limited operational capability to conduct air refueling.
    The Air Force plans a conditions-based approach to leverage existing
    and planned KC-46 capability to provide predictable and sustainable
    tanker capacity through daily operational missions prior to Initial
    Operational Capability (IOC) declaration, lessening the tasks on the
    KC-135 and KC-10.

        35. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, I understand
    that there have been conversations regarding possible uses for KC-10
    aircraft prior to being fully retired and sent to the boneyard. I
    understand that one option is to provide the aircraft to industry,
    either through sale or as Government Furnished Equipment, for use in a
    commercial air refueling program. I understand that the Navy and Marine
    Corps have been successfully utilizing a commercial air refueling
    program for the last 20+ years. What is the status of those
    discussions? Shouldn't KC-10 retirements be halted until a decision is
    made on commercial air refueling? More generally, do you believe the
    Air Force should be pursuing a commercial air refueling program to
    address current and future aerial refueling shortfalls?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. The Air Force is currently
    completing an internal Commercial Aerial Refueling Study focusing on
    how daily tanker requirements are met within the force structure
    dictated by the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2020
    (MCRS-20). If it is determined that additional tankers, crews, or
    flying hours are needed, then the Commercial Aerial Refueling Study
    will describe and evaluate sources to supply the additional need.
    However, the Air Force plans to continue KC-10 retirements since
    manpower and resources are needed to transition to the KC-46.
        KC-10 retirements should not be halted until a decision is made on
    commercial air refueling. In coordination with USTRANSCOM, we have
    developed a sustainable way forward that maintains sufficient air
    refueling requirements as we bridge to the KC-46; for example, the Air
    Force's Interim Capability Release (ICR) process makes KC-46 capacity
    available for limited USTRANSCOM tasking.

        36. Senator Tillis. Secretary Roth and General Brown, the Air Force
    just issued a press release stating, ``the Air Force is seeking
    companies that have the capability to deliver approximately 140-160
    Commercial Derivative Tanker Aircraft--at a rate of 12 to 15 per year--
    to supplement the Air Force Tanker Aircraft fleet at the end of KC-46A
    production, and bridge the gap to the next Tanker recapitalization
    phase. The Commercial Derivative Aircraft must be operational by
    2029.'' This while at the same time the Air Force is seeking to retire
    30+ tankers, all of which would otherwise be operational in 2029. The
    KC-10, in particular, is well short of its end of service life. There
    are no recent, public service life estimates, but a Federation of
    American Scientists report from 1999, which has been cited regularly,
    projected 2043. A 2019 War on the Rocks article says the KC-10s are at
    only about 40 percent of their expected lifespan, which would put the
    service life well past 2050. It would appear that the Air Force does
    not expect the KC-46 to have a sufficient lifecycle to last until the
    next generation tanker (KC-Z) is fielded. If this is the case, and you
    have assets like the KC-10 that have more than 20 years left of usable
    service, why divest of fully operational tankers, like the KC-10, that
    can ``bridge the gap'' until the KC-Z is operational? From a monetary
    lens, is this a fiscally responsible use of tax payer dollars?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. The KC-10 has been a great
    aircraft, providing strategic air-refueling and airlift capabilities
    over the last 34 years; however, they are expensive to maintain.
    Maintaining the KC-10 fleet beyond the current divestiture plan
    increases demand for spare parts. Not right-sizing the fleet could
    jeopardize the planned resources for parts repair efforts to maintain a
    safe and air worthy FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) certified
    fleet.
        In order to ensure global reach for the Joint Force and air
    refueling capabilities that can generate combat power in austere and
    contested environments of the future, the Department of the Air Force
    is retiring the KC-10, certifying and fielding the KC-46, and
    maintaining upgraded KC-135s.
        USTRANSCOM concurs with the Department of the Air Force's decision
    to divest the KC-10 in order to facilitate the fielding of a fully
    operational KC-46 weapon system.
                           f-35 joint strike fighter
        During his nomination hearing to be Secretary of the Air Force,
    Frank Kendall stated the F-35 is ``the best tactical aircraft of its
    type in the world, and will be for quite some time.'' In response to
    Senators' questions regarding F-35 costs, Mr. Kendall said, ``the key
    to keeping the cost down in an air fleet is getting the numbers up.
    There's a very strong correlation between the size of the fleet and the
    cost to sustain that fleet. So if there were one thing that I think
    would drive cost down overall, it's continue to buy.''

        37. Senator Tillis. General Brown, the Air Force's fiscal year 2022
    budget request included 12 less F-35 aircraft than were appropriated by
    Congress for fiscal year 2021, and the Air Force's Fiscal Year 2022
    Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) did not include any additional F-35s.
    Further, the Air Force's fiscal year 2022 budget request for Advanced
    Procurement (AP) suggests the Air Force plans to procure no more than
    43 F-35s per year beginning in fiscal year 2023. Do you disagree with
    Mr. Kendall's view that continuing to grow and mature the F-35 fleet at
    a rate consistent with Full Rate Production (FRP) can help manage costs
    and increase aircraft availability?
        General Brown. The Air Force must have the right mix of
    capabilities in the right capacity to ensure combat readiness for today
    and tomorrow. We need Block 4 F-35 modernization, enabled by Technical
    Refresh-3 (TR-3) hardware, on competition-relevant timelines to ensure
    continued F-35 relevance against China or Russia.
        Generally, a larger fleet drives reduced sustainment costs per
    aircraft but the Air Force must weigh overall sustainment costs against
    the potential for increased retrofit costs and development costs for a
    fleet with multiple configurations.
        Procuring additional aircraft before Block 4/TR-3 ``cuts into''
    production, drives a retrofit bill, and is therefore not desired. As a
    cornerstone capability, the Air Force must retain the F-35's mission
    contribution, even if this requires offsets from within the program.

        38. Senator Tillis. General Brown, how does the Air Force plan to
    mitigate cost and aircraft availability challenges if it continues down
    the path of procuring less F-35As per year than originally planned for
    Full Rate Production?
        General Brown. The Air Force must have the right mix of
    capabilities in the right capacity to ensure combat readiness for today
    and tomorrow. We need Block 4 F-35 modernization, enabled by Technical
    Refresh-3 (TR-3) hardware, on competition-relevant timelines to ensure
    continued F-35 relevance against China or Russia.
        Generally, a larger fleet drives reduced sustainment costs per
    aircraft but the Air Force must weigh overall sustainment costs against
    the potential for increased retrofit costs and development costs for a
    fleet with multiple configurations.
        Procuring additional aircraft before Block 4/TR-3 ``cuts into''
    production, drives a retrofit bill, and is therefore not desired. As a
    cornerstone capability, the Air Force must retain the F-35's mission
    contribution, even if this requires offsets from within the program.

        39. Senator Tillis. General Brown, the Air Force has been procuring
    F-35s at a rate nearing Full Rate Production for the past several
    years. Air Force leaders have testified that F-35s coming off the
    production line today have the best ``break rate'' in the Air Force.
    Recently publicized data showed F-35 as having the best ``Mission
    Capable'' rate out of all Air Force fighter fleets in 2020. Despite
    these significant achievements, the Air Force's fiscal year 2022 budget
    proposes reducing F-35 annual procurement below last year's
    appropriated level, while purchasing additional 4th generation fighters
    that have not been produced at rates for the Air Force in roughly 20+
    years. As the Air Force tries to mitigate a fighter shortfall, how does
    this revised acquisition plan not add additional risk? How does the Air
    Force plan to mitigate this risk?
        General Brown. The Air Force is investing in a future fighter force
    needed to ensure air superiority for the Joint Force against any
    adversary. This includes a focus on investments to create a
    complementary combination of higher end and lower end fighters that
    provide the affordable capabilities and capacity needed to achieve NDS
    objectives.
        The current fighter force path is unaffordable in both the near and
    long term due to increasing operating costs of 5th gen aircraft and
    rising modernization costs of an aging legacy fleet.
        By reducing the number of types of fighter aircraft in the
    inventory from seven to four over the next 15-20 years will allow the
    Air Force to focus investments on capabilities needed to win (NGAD, F-
    15EX, F-35, F-16).

        40. Senator Tillis. General Brown, recent Air Force messaging on
    the F-35 program has been inconsistent and at times conflicted with
    feedback Congress has received from Combatant Commanders, other
    services, and international customers. Does the Air Force understand
    that by slowing F-35 procurement, it will inevitably increase
    procurement costs, decrease aircraft availability, and discourage
    further international involvement? If unchanged, I am deeply concerned
    the Air Force could put F-35 on a path similar to F-22 and be left
    without any advanced fighter fleet going forward.
        General Brown. The AF is continuing to modernize the F-22 to remain
    capable against improving adversaries, and there are no plans to retire
    it in the near-term. Results from the TACAIR study will be a force
    structure recommendation for a capable and affordable force structure
    with sufficient capacity to provide air superiority and global strike
    to the Joint Force.
        The Air Force is absolutely not backing away from the F-35. In
    fact, the majority of the fighters we are procuring in our budget are
    F-35. Also, there is currently a delivery delay for full Block 4
    capability (6-18 months; 2026 delivery). A slight slowing of F-35
    procurement ensures we do not increase the number of aircraft requiring
    retrofit to achieve full Block 4 capability.
        Air Force fighters average 29 years of age, and that is reflected
    in our readiness and fiscal challenges. We need to buy as many fighters
    as possible to recapitalize the force, we just need to approach
    procurement smartly.

        41. Senator Tillis. General Brown, you have previously stated that
    the U.S. Air Force is committed to the F-35 program and that it is the
    ``cornerstone'' of the Air Force's tactical fighter fleet. Can you
    confirm for the Committee that the U.S. Air Force remains committed to
    the F-35 program? How is F-35 the ``cornerstone'' of the fighter fleet
    and what important capabilities does it provide the Air Force?
        General Brown. The F-35 is a cornerstone capability for several
    reasons, first of which being it is the majority of the fighters we are
    procuring in our budget are F-35.
        Additionally, the F-35 is the only western fifth-generation
    aircraft currently in mass production; it provides the U.S. and our
    closest allies and partners with potent combat power.
        If called upon to fight a peer adversary today in a highly
    contested environment, the F-22 and F-35 would provide a potent one-two
    punch as part of a joint or coalition team. In the future, our Next
    Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform will be an even-more
    formidable teammate for the F-35 in that environment.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
            joint pacific alaska range complex (jparc) modernization
        42. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Roth and General Brown, in response
    to a question for the record concerning the interdependence of range
    modernization and readiness, the USINDOPACOM commander, Admiral
    Aquilino, stated, ``Modernizing our ranges . . . will allow the joint
    force to train against an evolving threat and technologically advanced
    opponent with our allies and partners.'' I could not agree more. In
    March of 2020, the Department of the Air Force submitted a report to
    the congressional defense committees concerning range modernization for
    the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and the Nevada Test and
    Training Range (NTTR). The report identified JPARC and NTTR as the only
    two major training ranges the Air Force would modernize to Threat
    Matrix Level 4--or near peer--capability. The report also stated it
    would complete such modernization efforts by fiscal year 2026. Does the
    President's budget submission keep the Air Force on track to complete
    this modernization effort by fiscal year 2026?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. Most of the infrastructure
    required for Level 4, including versions 1 and 2 of the Advanced Radar
    Threat Systems (ARTS), will be in place at these two ranges by fiscal
    year 2026. The final step to achieving Level 4 is fielding the ARTS v3.
    This is a reprioritization from the original plan that was based on the
    ARTS v4. The ARTS v3 will provide significantly greater capability and
    is projected to field in the fiscal year 2030 FYDP (as late as fiscal
    year 2032).
        AF funds are being allocated to Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex
    (JPARC) modernization as part of the Combat Training Ranges (CTR)
    funding. These capabilities will be deployed first to the Nellis Test
    and Training Range (NTTR) and JPARC--the only two AF ranges planned for
    Level 4 (near-peer) capability.
        JPARC is currently scheduled to receive four medium-range ARTS V2s
    ($64.8 million) (2 each projected to be delivered in fiscal year 2023
    and fiscal year 2024), two long-range ARTS V1s ($81.1 million) (1 each
    projected to be delivered in fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025),
    along with Radar Signal Emulators (RSEs) ($41.8 million).
        The plan includes funding for development of high-fidelity
    surrogate targets matching simulated threat systems to stress 5th
    Generation sensor fusion capabilities.
        Live Mission Operations Capability (LMOC) will be installed at
    JPARC ($4 million). Effort will deliver a common hardware and software
    platform called ``War Room'' to each training location, links each site
    via a Live Mission Operations Network (LMON), and fields a Multi-Level
    Security (MLS) architecture that enables LMOC to connect all live
    training systems.
                               e-3 modernization
        43. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Roth and General Brown, as you know
    the E-3 Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft is a
    vital piece of air combat command and control and essentially serves as
    the long-range eyes and ears for our air forces. In fact, the E-3
    helped the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) intercept
    over 60 aircraft off the coast of Alaska last year--the most since the
    Cold War. This aircraft uses early 1970s technology and an airframe
    designed in the late 1950s. In February 2021, the Pacific Air Forces
    Commander, General Wilsbach, spoke at the Aerospace Warfare Symposium
    and advocated for the Air Force to procure the E-7 Wedgetail to replace
    the E-3, which is getting ``harder and harder to get airborne.'' How
    does the Air Force plan to modernize the E-3 platform to keep it
    effective against near-peer competitors into the 2030s?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. Current E-3 upgrade programs such
    as the navigation and 40/45 computer processing modifications do not
    provide the capabilities that enable the aircraft to keep up with next
    generation airborne moving target indication ("AMTI") and battle
    management requirements. The future AMTI platform must be able to sense
    and share data both on and off board systems across multiple frequency
    spectrums. Although there is promising future AMTI technologies that
    could someday potentially operate without a hosted airborne platform,
    these future concepts will not be ready before the end of service of
    the E-3 platform. A very near-term decision is needed for a bridging
    capability for an AMTI platform moving forward.

        44. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Roth and General Brown, is
    procuring the E-7 platform that the Royal Australian Air Force operates
    a viable option? What capabilities does that aircraft provide that the
    E-3 does not?
        Secretary Roth General Brown. The Air Force is exploring the
    viability of acquiring the E-7 which is used by both the Royal
    Australian Air Force and the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force. At the
    forefront of the Service's evaluation is the E-7's enhanced
    capability(s) and assessing the aircraft's suitability to meet existing
    and future Air Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) and Battle Management
    requirements. In comparison to the E-3, the E-7 offers a superior radar
    capability with a modern Multirole Electronically Scanned Array (MESA)
    radar capable of staring at sectors of interest and closing the kill
    chain on small and fast targets. Based upon early assessments, the E-7
    could provide capability closing both near and mid-range AMTI gaps
    while also providing wide-area surveillance and integrated fire control
    at the tactical edge. Additionally, the E-7 also presents a potential
    opportunity for cost savings in operations, maintenance, and fuel
    costs.
                           arctic strategy resourcing
        45. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Roth and General Brown, in July 21,
    2021, the Department of the Air Force published its Arctic strategy,
    which Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks committed to fully
    resource. In last week's Department of Defense posture hearing,
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley reaffirmed the
    need to ``fully resource the Arctic strategy.'' In a Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee hearing last week, General VanHerck, the U.S. Northern
    Command Commander and designated advocate for Arctic capabilities,
    testified that DOD resourcing for the various service Arctic
    strategies, to include the Department of the Air Force, was ``inching
    along'' but that the Department ``didn't move the ball very far down
    the field'' with the fiscal year 2022 budget. General VanHerck's
    observation is very discouraging and somewhat alarming given the
    increased competition in the region. Do you share General VanHerck's
    view that the implementation of the Air Force's Arctic strategy is too
    slow? If so, how do you plan on accelerating implementation of Air
    Force Arctic strategy?
        Secretary Roth and General Brown. The Air and Space Forces have
    made significant strides on implementation across the strategy's four
    lines of effort: Domain Vigilance, Power Projection, Cooperation, and
    Preparation. Over the past year, we have been researching new
    technology like over the horizon radar and space assets to detect
    incoming threats and working hand in hand with Canada to co-develop a
    data sharing system. Additionally, the Space Force is developing
    public-private partnerships to bring much needed satellite
    communications to the Arctic which can be used by both civilians and
    joint force alike by the end of this year. In recognition of the role
    Alaska plays in global power projection, the Air Force is also on track
    to deliver the majority of F-35s to Alaska by the end of year.
    Meanwhile, we are investing hundreds of millions to modernize the Joint
    Pacific Alaska Range Complex to provide realistic training for these
    advanced aircraft. Understanding the environment is also a priority;
    while we work to mitigate the impact of climate change induced coastal
    erosion and permafrost thaw on our infrastructure, we are enhancing our
    weather forecasting to better predict storms and space weather that are
    unique to the region. While much progress has been made, we will
    continue our implementation efforts to achieve the objectives of the
    DAF Arctic Strategy.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                     arnold engineering development complex
        46. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, Arnold Engineering
    Development Complex operates with WWII-era infrastructure. Do you
    assess these aging facilities and the backlog of projects awaiting
    testing to be national security risks?
        General Brown. We do recognize the test infrastructure's age as a
    causal factor regarding the backlog of projects to be tested and that
    these projects are vital to national security. Our challenge is that we
    must modernize and restore this equipment at the same time we are using
    it to execute test programs. Using planned down time and robust
    scheduling procedures we continue to prioritize use of the facilities
    for the highest priority projects in order to minimize delays to those
    weapon systems with the most impact to National security.

        47. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, are we at a point where
    expanding our throughput capacity and modernizing our testing equipment
    and infrastructure would provide long run RTD&E cost savings and
    opportunity costs in terms of time?
        General Brown. Expanding our throughput capacity and modernizing
    test equipment and infrastructure would no doubt assist us in meeting
    our mission requirements on shorter timelines and would provide RDT&E
    cost savings. The Air Force in conjunction with the Department's OSD
    Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) is aggressively working to
    address aging test infrastructure. Currently, OSD TRMC, the
    Department's hypersonic investment lead, is funding in fiscal year 2022
    a new high temperature aeroshell test materials facility at Arnold
    Engineering Development Complex.

        48. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, do you believe modern, safe
    facilities to be a key element of retention? Are investment in our
    people's workspace a signal of how much we value their efforts?
        General Brown. We value all airmen and invest in them in a variety
    of ways to include salary, health benefits, continuing education,
    proper equipment, and safe workspaces. While we cannot specifically tie
    facilities to retention, overall the Air Force continues to experience
    historic retention rates, reaching a 20-year high in 2020 likely due to
    COVID and the economy. While motivation for retention is difficult to
    quantify, retention and exit surveys indicate job security, assignment
    choices, unit climate & leadership, and spouse employment are key
    retention elements. Finally, we continually look for ways to offer
    increased quality of life, quality of service, and career flexibility
    in order to attract, assess, develop and retain the airmen we need.

        49. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, what obstructions exist that
    would preclude an expeditious standing up of the Ground Test Asset
    Board in consultation with Congress? What additional authorities or
    resources will this effort require?
        General Brown. The Ground Test Asset Board (GTAB) is an Air Force
    Flight Test Center (AFTC) only concept not yet fully approved for use.
    GTAB will be an AFTC communication tool to quickly educate Air Force
    leadership on the unique nature and critical path that these AFTC
    facilities occupy for transitioning programs to the battlefield. Given
    the concept status of GTAB it will be developed to operational status
    by AFTC in a prudent expeditious manner. No additional authorities or
    resources are required.

        50. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, do you believe that the
    current budget is sufficient to reach a 2 percent Plant Replacement
    Value given the Facility, Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization
    account is underfunded, appearing on the Air Force's Unfunded Priority
    List at $320 million?
        General Brown. The fiscal year 2022 President's Budget request for
    the Facility, Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization account would
    bring the DAF to 1.91 percent of the Plant Replacement Value. The $320
    million on the DAF UPL will bring the Department to 2 percent of the
    Plant Replacement Value.
                                  mq-9 reapers
        51. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, what is your view on the role
    of the large, existing fleet of flexible and highly reliable MQ-9
    Reapers in Great Power Competition?
        General Brown. While the MQ-9 provides utility today, it was not
    designed for operation in a future highly-contested environment.
    Modifying the MQ-9 force presentation is about balancing near and long-
    term risk.
        In fiscal year 2022 the Air Force is only requesting a reduction in
    combat lines. This reduction is less than 10 percent of the current
    force presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to reduction in
    aircraft inventory; no tails will be divested and no squadrons will be
    reduced. Additionally, the Air Force is requesting funding in our
    fiscal year 2022 budget towards the completion of studies, analysis,
    and concept exploration to determine a capability that better aligns
    with National Defense Strategy objectives for near peer competition in
    the future.
        The Air Force remains committed to providing MQ-9 intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capability to Combatant
    Commands and will continue to ensure daily requirements are fulfilled.
    Concurrently, we intend to continue development of future ISR platforms
    that can penetrate inside contested environments, persist in these
    locations, and be able to connect and share data in the advanced battle
    management system. The MQ-9, as we know it today, simply cannot
    accomplish these tasks.
        The Department can offer more details pertaining to replacement ISR
    programs in a classified setting.

        52. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, what would be the value of
    layering redundancy into our MQ-9 Command and Control architecture--
    specifically, moving MQ-9 command/return links to a commercial low
    Earth orbit constellation?
        General Brown. The Department of the Air Force is looking at
    multiple options to provide layered redundancy for the MQ-9 Command and
    Control (C2) architecture.
        A low-earth-orbit (LEO) construct could provide resilience in
    global C2 structure by leveraging a commercial, cost-effective network
    that would be shared across the entirety of DOD, thereby providing an
    opportunity for communication and cost efficiencies beyond just the MQ-
    9.
        The reduced latency, increased data rates, and numbers of
    satellites proliferated across a LEO constellation also allows for a
    more flexible employment framework that might provide benefits the Air
    Force is exploring for the MQ-9.

        53. Senator Blackburn. General Brown, How do you intend to leverage
    Air Force ISR, to include the rapidly developing Air National Guard
    Cyber ISR Enterprise in the increasingly critical cyber domain?
        General Brown. The Department of the Air Force is fully committed
    to utilizing current and evolving Air Force ISR and the total force
    capabilities in the cyber domain. Through organically owned Air Force
    capabilities and those ISR and Cyber Airmen presented to USCYBERCOM's
    Cyber Mission Force, the Air Force continues to leverage the critical
    skills found in our total force ISR and Cyber Enterprises to achieve
    Joint All Domain Operations.
                               guard and reserve
        54. Senator Blackburn. General Raymond, can we expect to see
    movement toward a Space National Guard?
        General Brown. The DAF has completed a report required by the 2021
    National Defense Authorization Act detailing how to best organize the
    Reserve component within the Space Force. We anticipate delivery to
    Congress after OSD and OMB coordination is complete.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                  afghanistan
        55. Senator Hawley. General Brown, do you have a sense of the
    resources that our withdrawal from Afghanistan will free up for the Air
    Force?
        General Brown. Not at this time. Afghanistan is a very fluid and
    dynamic situation in which the Secretary of Defense will make final
    determination on force posture with in the CENTCOM Area of
    Responsibility.
        Once Air Force resources are redeployed, post Afghanistan
    withdrawal, we intend to recover, reconstitute, re-posture, and
    modernize those resources to build readiness and capacity in alignment
    with National Security/National Defense Strategies.

        56. Senator Hawley. General Brown, how is the Air Force planning to
    reallocate those resources freed up by our withdrawal from Afghanistan
    toward the Indo-Pacific and China?
        General Brown. The global reallocation of forces is a part of the
    Joint Staff led Global Force Management process for Secretary of
    Defense decision.
        Within the global reallocation process, the Air Force intends to
    recover, reconstitute, re-posture, and modernize post Afghanistan
    withdrawal resources towards building readiness and capacity in
    alignment with National Strategy.
        Forces will be reallocated as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
                                     f-15ex
        57. Senator Hawley. General Brown, the Air Force has requested 12
    additional F-15EXs on its Unfunded Priorities List this year. How does
    the F-15EX--and the 12 additional aircraft you've requested, in
    particular--help the Air Force reorient toward strategic competition
    with China?
        General Brown. The F-15EX serves as a replacement for the aging
    single role F-15C and reduces near and mid-term risk by increasing the
    Air Force's 4th Generation Air to Air capacity as well as Air to
    Surface capability. There are several ways in which the aircraft
    improves the Air Force and Joint Force's ability to compete with and
    deter China. The aircraft provides the greatest payload capacity of any
    air superiority fighter and provides the most effective enhancement and
    enabler of the Air Force's 5th Generation Fleet. The F-15EX will also
    provide superior sensing, range, and payload in support of Critical
    Infrastructure Defense. The aircraft also improves the Air Force's
    ability to utilize long range weapons in a potential conflict with a
    near peer adversary. The F-15EX serves as a replacement for the aging
    single role F-15C and reduces near and mid-term risk by increasing the
    Air Force's 4th Generation Air to Air capacity as well as Air to
    Surface capability. There are several ways in which the aircraft
    improves the Air Force and Joint Force's ability to compete with and
    deter China. The aircraft provides the greatest payload capacity of any
    air superiority fighter and provides the most effective enhancement and
    enabler of the Air Force's 5th Generation Fleet. The F-15EX will also
    provide superior sensing, range, and payload in support of Critical
    Infrastructure Defense. The aircraft also improves the Air Force's
    ability to utilize long range weapons in a potential conflict with a
    near peer adversary.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                  NAVY POSTURE

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
    Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
    Blackburn, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. I would like to call the hearing to order.
        The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the plans
    and programs of the Department of the Navy in review of the
    President's Fiscal Year 2022 Defense Budget Request. I would
    like to welcome our witnesses, Acting Secretary of the Navy,
    Thomas Harker; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael
    Gilday; and Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David
    Berger. We are grateful for your service, for the service of
    the men and women under your command, and for the support of
    all Navy and Marine families.
        The administration's defense budget request for fiscal year
    2022 includes approximately $211.7 billion in funding for the
    Department of the Navy, an increase of $3.7 billion from the
    fiscal year 2021 enacted budget. As the leaders of the Navy and
    Marine Corps, you face significant challenges as you strive to
    balance the need to support ongoing operations and sustain
    readiness alongside the need to modernize and sharpen the
    technological edge that is so critical to our military success.
    I would welcome an update from all of our witnesses on how they
    are balancing new concept implementation with the procurement
    of new systems and the upgrade of existing platforms, all while
    meeting current operational needs.
        Our naval forces are maintaining extremely high operations
    tempo across all areas. Demand is overwhelming for attack
    submarines, air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and
    strike fighter inventories. The Navy is now in its 8th year of
    operating with fewer than the legally required 11 aircraft
    carriers. The USS Gerald Ford is listed in the Navy inventory,
    but that carrier is more than 6 years behind schedule and not
    yet ready to deploy. While the Ford has been playing an
    important role in training aviators by conducting carrier
    qualification operations, she will not be ready to deploy for
    several more months. However, I am glad to see that the Ford
    has begun conducting full ship shock trials, an important step
    in the process for ensuring she is ready to engage in
    unrestricted operations.
        Looming on the horizon during the next decade, the Navy
    will also need to buy new Columbia-class ballistic missile
    submarines to replace the Ohio-class fleet. This is an
    expensive undertaking on a very tight schedule, and I trust the
    Navy is making every effort to keep this program on track, and
    I would ask for our witnesses to give an update.
        The Navy is using tools such as multiyear procurement
    authority to conduct its modernization programs more
    efficiently. Congress has approved multiyear procurement
    authority for both attack submarines and Aegis destroyers.
    These vessels represent the largest inventory shortfall against
    the goals of the 2016 Force Structure Assessment, with the
    actual Navy fleet 15 boats below the attack submarine goal and
    14 below the goal for destroyers.
        With that in mind, I am concerned that the Navy is breaking
    faith with Congress by submitting a budget that would break the
    multiyear contract for the DDG-51 destroyers. I understand that
    the number one item on the CNO's Unfunded Priority List is a
    second Aegis destroyer in fiscal year 2022. The Navy took a
    similar approach in fiscal year 2021 by asking for only one
    Virginia-class submarine, and then making the submarine the
    number one item on its Unfunded Priority List. That year, the
    second submarine was merely an option on the underlying
    multiyear contract, but in this case the absence of the second
    destroyer in the fiscal year 2022 budget would violate the
    terms of the current destroyer multiyear procurement contract.
    I would appreciate an explanation of this decision, and
    assurances that such actions of cutting a ship only to put it
    on the Unfunded Priority List is not a trend.
        The Marine Corps is restructuring around two concepts:
    Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment and
    Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. The key element of
    these concepts is a more flexible amphibious force that can
    support a broader naval fight once ashore. Rather than simply
    acting as a landing force, the Marine Corps hopes to help
    control the sea and air around them in support of the Navy. To
    accomplish this, the Marine Corps is prioritizing modernization
    of its ground vehicles, including partnership with the Army on
    the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or JLTV, to replace the
    Humvee, and targeted investments in the High Mobility Artillery
    Rocket System, or HIMARS, to provide Marines with ground-based
    indirect fire support. In addition, programs like the
    Amphibious Combat Vehicle, Ground-Based Anti-Ship Missiles, and
    Long Range Precision Fires will provide critical modernization,
    increased force protection, and enhanced lethality to marines.
    General Berger, while this restructuring has been ongoing for
    many months, due to COVID you have not really had an
    opportunity to explain it to a wide audience, and I invite you
    to do so at this hearing.
        Finally, 2016, Admiral Richardson released a force
    structure assessment that identified a new force structure
    goal, a fleet of 355 ships. Last year, we received, from
    Secretary Esper, what was portrayed as an updated assessment,
    which called for expanding the goal for the Navy fleet to
    include between 400 and 500 ships, with roughly 100 of these
    vessels unmanned.
        I would like to know how the Navy intends to maintain a
    fleet of 355 ships, or even 400 to 500 ships, when it is
    frankly unable to maintain the current fleet of 294 ships on a
    consistent schedule. Deferred ship maintenance, reduced
    steaming and flying hours, and cancelled training and
    deployments have created serious readiness problems within the
    Navy. We remember too well the collisions of the McCain and
    Fitzgerald and the loss of life that resulted. So I am
    interested in hearing about the progress the Navy is making in
    continuing to implement changes that will ensure such incidents
    will not happen in the future.
        Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today,
    and I look forward to their testimonies.
        Now let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of the
    witnesses for being here and for the great job they are doing.
    As we have said before, this is a lousy budget, but it is not
    the fault of these three people who are here today. They do not
    have a choice. They are doing what they are ordered to do, and
    I do not like it, and not many Members of this Committee like
    it, because this budget does not keep up with inflation, much
    less the 3 to 5 percent--if you read the book [National Defense
    Strategy (NDS) Commission Report--Providing for the Common
    Defense], this is what we go by, and we have since 2018, it is
    very clear where we should be today. Our increases in the
    military should be between 3 and 5 percent. It has been here,
    and we have talked about this for a long period of time. We are
    there and we are not doing it.
        So the budget like this sends China and our other potential
    adversaries the wrong messages, they are not willing to do what
    it takes to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.
    That is the message that they are getting from us.
        We should be worried about China for a multitude of
    reasons, but looking just at their navy, they passed our fleet
    size target of 355 ships last year, and will reach the 460
    ships by 2030. They are on schedule to do that. That is an
    increase of 105 ships in 10 years. Meanwhile, this budget
    supports, at best, the status quo U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.
    Our Navy is under 300 ships today, and there is no growth. In
    fact, while China is growing its fleet, our Navy is struggling
    to avoid shrinking, because right now that is what it is, along
    with the rest of the military.
        It is an unacceptable situation because our military is not
    being given the resources it needs. As I have said, this budget
    makes bad choices, not hard choices. For example, Admiral
    Gilday was forced to cut the destroyer, not because he does not
    need it and does not want it. He wants it, but he is forced to
    cut it. He did not have a choice.
        The budget also proposes to inactivate 15 ships, 10 of
    which have more years of service left. It buys 6 fewer F-35C
    Joint Strike Fighters than required, divests all 12 patrol
    craft, cuts Navy and Marine Corps munitions by roughly 10
    percent. As bad as this budget is, I am concerned about next
    year, that it will be worse.
        Secretary Harker, on June 4, you directed the Navy to
    defund nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and prioritize the
    modernization of aircraft and ships. You had to make a choice
    between aircraft, ships, and submarines. China does not have to
    make a choice between aircraft, ships, and submarines.
        So we have got a lot of work to do. We have got a problem,
    and I think we all understand this.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Mr.
    Secretary, your testimony, please.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS W. HARKER, ACTING SECRETARY
                              OF THE NAVY

        Mr. Harker. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for your
    bipartisan efforts on behalf of the sailors, marines, and
    civilians in the Department of the Navy. I am honored to be
    here with General Berger and Admiral Gilday. I support their
    efforts to build a more integrated, all-domain naval force
    through the NAV (navigation) Plan and Force Design 2030.
        In order to move those plans forward within existing
    resources, we have had to make some very hard choices in this
    budget. But that is exactly what the American people expect us
    to do. Every dollar is a strategic asset that must be maximized
    to stay ahead of the pacing threat of China, and many other
    challenges facing our fleet and our union. Every investment
    must be done in a balanced and sustainable manner to ensure we
    maintain the readiness of our current fleet while building the
    capacity and capability we will need in the future.
        The cost of readiness is increasing. Maintenance costs have
    grown at a rate that is 2.5 percent above inflation. Personnel
    costs are also growing at a rate greater than inflation. This
    growth squeezes the rest of the budget. In order to maintain
    our readiness, we have had to delay some of our planned ship
    purchases to future years. In order to invest in a superior
    future for us, we had to divest of less capable assets. These
    were not easy choices.
        In order to ensure future availability and readiness of our
    fleet, we are prioritizing investments in our physical
    infrastructure, including full commitment to the Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Program. I have visited all four of
    our public shipyards, as well as most of the private shipyards
    and other commercial facilities. It has been an inspiration to
    shake the hands of the men and women who are building and
    maintaining our fleet and to speak with every level of labor
    and management about the issues they face and the need for
    consistency in funding and demand. That is why we are
    increasing the capability and resiliency of these century-old
    installations, increasing the size and capability of our dry
    docks, and equipping our 40,000-person workforce with the tools
    they need to maintain our new, more lethal assets.
        To ensure our resources reach the warfighters who need
    them, we are demanding rigorous self-assessment and responsive
    accountability, in every part of our enterprise, through the
    Performance To Plan initiative. This effort has improved
    readiness of our strike fighters and is being rolled out
    successfully across the fleets.
        As good stewards, we are on the right path towards
    obtaining an audit opinion for the Navy and Marine Corps
    general funds and the Department's working capital fund. We are
    the only Military Department that has eliminated audit material
    weaknesses--three in the Navy, one in the Marine Corps--and are
    leading the way on this critical effort inside the Department.
    This has enabled us to improve cybersecurity in our business
    systems. Since 2017, the Marine Corps has closed 41 out of 110
    IT [information technology] findings, 17 of which were
    cybersecurity related. We are also increasing investment in the
    Department's oversight functions while maximizing the return on
    our investment in the performance audit process.
        Effective use and management of data is key to our digital
    transformation and will change how we fight and win at every
    level. This requires the modernization of our information
    technology infrastructure, which is a critical warfighting
    priority for the Department.
        We are prioritizing the mental health of our force,
    speaking out at a senior level about the benefits of counseling
    and the availability of counselors, chaplains, and other
    professionals. We appreciate the Committee's attention to this
    vital issue and your support in providing additional mental
    health support to our sailors and marines in our forward
    operational units.
        We are fighting the scourge of sexual harassment and sexual
    assault through efforts like the The Watch List, a tool that
    uses Navy and Marine Corps data to alert commanders to
    conditions in their units that may lead to these toxic
    behaviors. We are increasing investment in this area, focusing
    on the prevention of, and response to, sexual harassment and
    assault. In this fiscal year 2022 budget we have added over 200
    personnel across the Navy and Marine Corps focused on
    prevention. The majority of these personnel will be placed at
    Navy and Marine Corps installations, working with sailors and
    marines. We are also adding an additional 80 sexual assault
    response coordinators for the Marine Corps, as well as 18 Navy
    criminal investigative service personnel dedicated to sexual
    assault prevention and response.
        We look forward to the findings of Secretary Austin's 90-
    day Independent Review Commission and are committed to making
    meaningful and lasting progress on this issue.
        Around the world and around the clock, the sailors,
    marines, and civilians of our integrated force stand the watch
    and execute the mission. On behalf of each of them and their
    families, thank you for your time and dedicated oversight. I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Harker follows:]

               Prepared Statement by The Honorable Thomas Harker
                                  introduction
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of the
    Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the posture of the
    Department of the Navy (DON). I appreciate the hard work of the Members
    and Staff of this Committee to ensure funding stability and principled
    oversight for every sailor and marine now standing watch around the
    world.
        The reemergence of long-term strategic competition from China and
    Russia is spurring a period of rapid transformation in the global
    security environment. The disruptions related to the COVID-19 pandemic
    underscore the need for agility and distributed readiness. Climate
    change is accelerating, and its impact on both our planet and force
    will continue to grow as significant weather events threaten our
    infrastructure, and the arctic opens to unprecedented activity.
        In a world more interconnected and interdependent than ever before,
    a fully integrated and forward maneuverable Navy-Marine Corps Team has
    never been more important to the security of our Nation and the
    preservation of the rules-based international order. We must protect
    our Nation, our allies and partners, and our global interests, while
    also leading on the urgent issues facing our personnel and planet, from
    the mental and physical health care needs of our people, to the scourge
    of sexual assault and harassment, to the need for diversity and
    inclusion at every echelon, to the ongoing threat of climate change.
        General Berger, Admiral Gilday, and I stand united in our resolve
    to ensure your DON will be ready for the global challenges before us
    with the personnel, platforms, and technology to secure vital sea
    lanes, stand together with our allies, and protect the United States of
    America.
                               defend the nation
        The President's Budget submission for fiscal year 2022 (PB22)
    reflects hard choices to divest of less capable platforms and systems
    to invest in a powerful and superior future force. Throughout the
    budget process and in all aspects of capability acquisition, design,
    construction, and deployment, we must balance the urgent readiness
    needs of our force today with investments in the future force and
    effective business process reforms in order to ensure our sailors and
    marines are always ready to fight and win in any clime or place.
    Force Posture
        The presence and availability of naval forces must always reflect
    the strategic needs of the Nation, providing effective options for the
    President and Secretary of Defense to counter every challenge. To
    ensure preparedness, the DON provides maximum operational flexibility
    through warfighting concepts including Distributed Maritime Operations,
    Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Expeditionary
    Advanced Base Operations, ensuring continual overmatch and flexibility
    in the battle space.
        Secretary Austin has identified China as the pacing threat for our
    military forces, and we will continue to position our integrated global
    maritime force to lead in the Indo-Pacific. But ours is a global force
    with global responsibilities, including increased Russian presence in
    the Atlantic, terrorism and instability in the Arabian Gulf, an
    increasingly blue arctic, a global need for agile and ready Marine
    forces to respond to the unexpected in every domain, and the constant
    threat of cyberattacks to our force, support infrastructure, industrial
    base, and supply chain.
        The DON fiscal year 2022 budget request delivers ready maritime
    forces through sustained investment and performance improvement,
    developing more lethal, networked capabilities and concepts, closely
    integrated between the services and with our joint force and government
    partners. Within limited resources, we will field the right platforms
    and capability to maintain freedom of the seas, support international
    law, and stand by our allies as we continue to fly, sail and operate
    wherever international law allows.
        That spirit is reflected in the guidance put forth by our services.
    I support Admiral Gilday's Navigation Plan, which refocuses our
    integrated all-domain naval power on the core functions of sea control
    and power projection we need to compete and win. It places a high
    priority on a more lethal and better connected fleet to project power
    from blue water, to the littorals, to the shoreline and beyond.
        The guidance centers on four lines of effort:
          Deliver a More Ready Fleet. Deliver a Navy that is
    organized, trained, and equipped to deploy forward and win in day-to-
    day competition, in crisis, and in conflict.
          Deliver a More Lethal, Better-Connected Fleet. Deliver a
    Navy capable of projecting synchronized lethal and non-lethal effects
    across all domains.
          Deliver a Larger, Hybrid Fleet. Grow a larger, hybrid
    fleet of manned and unmanned platforms--under, on, and above the sea--
    that meets the strategic and operational demands of our force.
          Develop a Seasoned Team of Naval Warriors. Develop a
    dominant naval force that can outthink and outfight any adversary.
        To meet the forward maneuverable force requirements of the Joint
    Force long into the future, the Marine Corps has put into motion an
    aggressive modernization of the Service. I support General Berger's
    Force Design 2030, which is not simply an improvement on its existing
    form and function. It is a transformational effort rooted in the
    anticipated challenges of the future operating environment. Building on
    the cooperative efforts of all of our sea services, the Marine Corps is
    reinvigorating the Fleet Marine Forces within existing resource
    constraints as an indispensable element to global maritime operations.
        The goal of Force Design 2030 is to provide a Marine expeditionary
    assets that will:
          Successfully compete with peer adversaries in the
    maritime gray zone
          Deter, and if required, fight and win in support of naval
    campaigns
          Facilitate sea denial and sea control
          Win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
    competition
          Persist inside actively contested spaces
          Be capable of ``rapidly sensing, making sense of, and
    acting upon information'' inside an adversary's weapon engagement zone.
        Across both services and throughout the DON, we are executing force
    designs centered on Naval Expeditionary force deployment, giving us a
    sustainable edge and a resilient capability to deliver the integrated
    all-domain naval power required by the Joint Force. We are investing in
    the readiness of the integration-ready platforms to ensure continued
    freedom of action throughout the maritime domain, from amphibious and
    ground element equipment, to agile warships and submarines, to dominant
    aircraft carriers and air wings. Successful implementation of the
    concepts within the Navigation Plan and Force Design 2030 will be
    pursued through a unified, integrated effort at every echelon.
    Maintain the Edge
        We greatly appreciate the Committee's efforts to ensure funding
    stability and predictability over the past several years. This has
    given our force the agility and flexibility needed to address emerging
    threats, to invest in critical future capabilities for our integrated
    naval force, while shifting away from less beneficial spending.
        The DON is building on this foundation by aggressively pursuing
    better readiness, lethality, and capabilities in those areas of
    warfighting technology showing the greatest promise of delivering non-
    linear warfighting advantages. From artificial intelligence and cyber
    weapons to unmanned platforms and directed energy, we are on the cusp
    of technological breakthroughs that will define future conflict. Our
    future force will be defined by our decisions today.
        We will continue to invest in key naval capabilities to control the
    seas and project power in every domain. We will field a resilient,
    networked, and dispersed fleet, connected through the Naval Operational
    Architecture to provide decision advantage in contested environments.
    We will continue to invest in advanced technologies such as long range
    hypersonic and directed energy capabilities to ensure maximum reach,
    survivability and decision space for our forces.
        Our number one shipbuilding priority remains resourcing Columbia
    SSBN for on-track delivery in order to ensure the future strength of
    the most survivable leg of our Nation's nuclear triad. We are also
    advancing our asymmetric undersea attack advantage through the Tactical
    Submarine Evolution Plan, including follow-on Blocks VI and VII of the
    Virginia-class, and the SSN(X) program. We are advancing battle force
    shipbuilding programs such as the Constellation-class frigate and the
    Gerald R. Ford-class carriers, as well as enhancing our fleet
    capabilities through additional battle force ships.
        We are also extending the reach of our warriors from the sea with
    the addition of sea-based platforms such as USS Miguel Keith, our third
    Expeditionary Sea Base, which was commissioned on May 8th. To ensure
    our Marines maintain their edge, we will continue to invest in key
    Marine Corps development programs that support the Marine Corps Force
    Design concept, such as the Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile, Ground
    Based Air Defense, Medium Altitude-Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial
    System, Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel, and the Light Amphibious
    Warship. These enhance the ability of Marines to maneuver and deter
    competitors within range of enemy weapon systems.
        Targeted investments in key emerging technologies and capabilities
    will enhance and sustain amphibious battlefield maneuverability ashore
    and superiority at sea, with the support of properly resourced
    facilities, infrastructure, and systems to sustain our frontline
    forces.
    Continual Readiness
        Hard experience has shown long term readiness cannot be sustainably
    achieved through ``can do'' and ``make do'' improvisation. Our front
    line personnel may be determined, adaptive, and skillful enough to get
    the job done in the face of equipment shortfalls and intense battle
    rhythms, but relying on their adaptability is no substitute for genuine
    fleet readiness. We owe it to the sailors and marines out in the fleet
    to make sure they always have the tools they need to do the dangerous
    jobs we ask of them.
        The changes generated from the Readiness Reform and Oversight
    Council (RROC) and other introspective efforts have enabled us to
    improve readiness, training, and maintenance processes at every level.
    For example, we've implemented a uniform readiness assessment and
    certification process that must be followed before a ship can be
    certified to return to the fleet. We have also increased opportunities
    for shipboard certification and skills enhancement, while adjusting
    manning schedules to maximize safety and improve quality of life and
    professional effectiveness for our personnel while underway. These and
    many other changes will result in a better prepared and equipped force.
        We continue to build on our efforts to increase availability,
    improve maintenance, and maximize throughput, by making targeted shore
    investments designed to increase fleet readiness. The Navy's four
    public shipyards--Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
    Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, and
    Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility--are
    critical infrastructure elements of America's national defense. In
    order to improve naval maintenance production capacity at these
    facilities, the DON is fully committed to the Shipyard Infrastructure
    Optimization Program (SIOP), comprising three primary focus areas: dry
    dock recapitalization, facility layout and optimization, and capital
    equipment and modernization. The DON is dedicating the resources and
    oversight necessary to ensure the required maintenance is completed
    across all shipyards as quickly as possible, and has established a
    Program Office (PMS-555) to ensure integration of all elements of the
    plan.
        Building on the successful Naval Aviation Enterprise efforts to
    meet Strike Fighter aircraft availability goals for both the Navy and
    Marine Corps, we are targeting greater aviation readiness across the
    force, incorporating commercial best practices to improve performance.
    Through the Performance to Plan initiative we're using data driven
    decision making to enable to remove the root causes of maintenance
    delays as well as operational mishaps. This data-driven approach is
    based on a ``Get Real, Get Better'' approach, demanding rigorous self-
    assessment, strong characterization of current performance, and
    detailed analysis backed by accountability and the opportunity to
    implement needed improvements.
        We appreciate the Committee's interest in ensuring our Naval forces
    have the right facilities to train, fight, and win, even as various
    demands on the land, sea, and air reduce the available area for
    military training. Specifically, we are grateful for the Committee's
    continued attention to the urgent need to expand the Fallon Training
    Range Complex, which is necessary to the readiness of every Naval
    Aviator and Navy SEAL. We are listening to the interests of Tribal
    governments, environmental organizations, and the local community, as
    well as our counterparts across the Federal Government, and are
    committed to finding a favorable solution for everyone involved.
    Combat Climate Change
        The United States Navy and Marine Corps recognize the reality of
    global climate change, our responsibility to mitigate our contribution
    to it, and our need to prepare for its short and long-term effects. As
    we grapple with the effects of climate change on maritime operations
    around the globe, the DON must continue to lead and find ways to go
    farther, both in substantially reducing our impact on climate change
    and building a force that is resilient to its potential effects.
        We must adapt our infrastructure for the coming changes with
    initiative and problem solving throughout the DON. In the past few
    months I have visited and recognized several Marine Corps and Navy
    installations that have demonstrated leadership in climate resiliency,
    environmental stewardship, and sustainable development. These
    facilities include Parris Island, Naval Base San Diego, Marine Corps
    Air Base Camp Pendleton, and Naval Base Point Loma. We will continue to
    invest in vehicles, infrastructure, and technology that increase our
    resiliency and efficiency, as we pursue the use and availability of
    alternative fuels. The DON is determined to lead from the front against
    the threat of climate change.
                            take care of our people
        The greatest source of readiness and strength for our force will
    always be the people who wear the uniform and comprise our civilian
    workforce, as well as the families that serve alongside them. We are
    committed to ensuring our sailors, marines, and civilians are trained
    and equipped to execute the mission and return home safely, and that
    their families are provided with the housing, medical attention, and
    education they deserve.
    Building the Future Force
        To maintain a Fleet prepared to fight and win in long term
    strategic competition, we continue to evaluate and improve our
    capability to attract, retain, and develop a talented and diverse
    workforce. In the context of an intense competition for talent in our
    country, and in light of the rapidly evolving tactical and technical
    landscape, we are modernizing and enhancing our entire talent
    management approach to succeed.
        We are continuously identifying opportunities for personnel to
    develop their leadership skills throughout the ranks, promoting equal
    opportunity in every aspect of our force. The DON is investing in the
    training, education, and professional development of our officers,
    enlisted personnel, and civilian teammates with special emphasis on
    partnerships with civilian institutions to enhance educational
    opportunities for our junior sailors and marines.
    Eliminate Toxic Behaviors
        It is a personal priority for all three of us to build a climate of
    trust, respect and inclusion throughout our force. A major focus of
    that effort must be on recognizing and stopping destructive behaviors
    early and consistently, so leaders at every level can take appropriate
    and effective actions.
        We remain determined to eliminate sexual assault, sexual
    harassment, and gender discrimination from every part of our force.
    These behaviors are a betrayal of those who have stepped forward to
    serve in uniform. We will continue to work with this Committee to share
    best practices and ideas, relentlessly pursuing a future where no
    sailor, marine, or civilian teammate ever has to fear for their own
    safety while protecting us all.
        To assist leaders in this effort, we have developed The Watch List:
    Top Five Signals of Risk for Sexual Assault, a research-driven tool
    that used Navy and Marine Corps data to identify five of the key
    destructive behaviors that increase risk for sexual assault. These
    include sexual harassment, gender discrimination, lack of
    responsibility and intervention, lack of respect and cohesion, and
    workplace hostility behaviors. We have promulgated The Watch List
    throughout the Navy and Marine Corps and are actively working to
    develop tools that will provide operational commanders data on their
    units so they can take action to prevent incidents.
        We are actively engaged in rooting out extremism throughout our
    force. In coordination with efforts across the joint force, the DON has
    conducted ``Extremism Stand Downs'' at every echelon. This process
    sparked important conversations and made the position of our leadership
    and force clear to every sailor, marine, and civilian in the DON, and
    we will continue to build on these efforts.
        Trust is at the heart of all our warriors do. Extremist ideologies
    are a strategic threat to that trust and have no place within the Navy
    and Marine Corps. We will persistently focus on this problem, and
    appreciate this Committee's partnership and involvement in this
    critical effort.
        As leaders we must do all in our power to ensure that our people
    feel respected and valued. We cannot and will not tolerate
    discrimination or racism of any kind. Our core values and oath demand
    that we critically examine all of our policies and practices to remove
    inequity and unconscious bias.
    Promote Mental Health
        Mental health is a critical aspect of our readiness as a force--and
    our responsibility to our warriors and their families. We have made it
    a priority to ensure the ready availability of mental health
    professionals, chaplains, family counselors and other support
    professionals when our people are in need--or when they see the need in
    others.
        I know from personal experience how helpful counseling can be
    during both personal and professional struggles. That's why as part of
    our recognition of May as Mental Health Awareness Month, I launched a
    series of videos encouraging leaders throughout the DON to share their
    personal stories of seeking and receiving counseling and help. I also
    emphasized this point to our newest officers at the US Naval Academy
    Commissioning Ceremony, and will continue promoting mental health care
    throughout the force. We have to remove the stigma and start the
    conversation, particularly as our warriors and their families contend
    with the added stressors related to COVID-19.
        The DON is committed to ensuring the health, safety, and well-being
    for all members within our military community. The loss of any sailor,
    marine or civilian to suicide is one too many. The DON offers a variety
    of suicide prevention efforts, encouraging positive help-seeking
    behaviors, eliminating stigma, and increasing visibility and access to
    critical resources. We are constantly revisiting and revising the
    portfolio to meet the needs of our people, and have increased our
    investment in this area.
    Take Care of Our People
        We are reforming operating procedures and promotion practices to
    reward initiative, applied problem solving, and innovative thinking at
    every level. A top priority as we evaluate personnel practices are the
    needs and challenges of military families, particularly dual service
    families. Senior leaders are also taking a personal and hands-on
    approach to ensure enduring excellence in housing, dependent education,
    and other quality of life concerns for our military families.
        Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and
    customer service programs, we are increasing our responsiveness to the
    needs of the individual warfighters and their families, making
    continued service a viable and attractive option. We are expanding
    opportunities for civilians with prior service through the Targeted
    Reentry Program. We are also expanding avenues for personnel to learn,
    operate, and innovate with partners from the private sector, across the
    joint force, and alongside our allies.
    Defeat COVID-19
        With consistent personal and fleet discipline and continued
    refinement of best practices, we have ensured a robust, proactive, and
    coordinated COVID-19 response across the DON. We are preventing and
    containing outbreaks with minimal impact on fleet readiness, and are
    doing everything in our power to get the vaccine out to our sailors,
    marines and civilians as quickly and effectively as possible.
        The DON is also working with the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency to assist local, state, and Tribal governments in the overall
    vaccination effort of the Nation, building on the proactive
    contributions to the urgent medical and security needs of the American
    civilian population, including the deployment of COMFORT and MERCY to
    our Nation's two most populous cities, and the deployment of medical
    personnel to facilities in communities across the country.
        Like all Americans, the Navy and Marine Corps have adjusted to this
    global pandemic, from addressing outbreaks aboard ships, to changes in
    recruitment and training, to supporting our military families through
    extended deployments and virtual leaning. We have invested significant
    resources to upgrade the Navy and Marine Corps intranet to improve
    functionality and to enable telework for our military and civilian
    workforce.
        The Navy and Marine Corps continue to operate under Force Health
    Protection measures to protect marines, sailors, civilians,
    contractors, and our military families. Across the DON, we've
    implemented flexibilities to help minimize risk to military personnel
    and their families, respond to evolving situations, and ensure the
    readiness of our force. We continue to use active testing protocols to
    detect asymptomatic COVID-19 positive personnel, contain outbreaks
    aboard vessels, and conduct surveillance to detect and treat the
    disease as early as possible.
        We will not relent in these critical measures. We are well
    positioned to emerge stronger than ever, as the pandemic has forced us
    to rethink and refine our recruitment, training, and personnel
    movements across the DON, as well as our shipyard operations,
    deployments, and maintenance schedules, with efficiencies and
    applications of technology that can continue to benefit our operations
    and throughput long after COVID-19 is in our wake.
                            succeed through teamwork
        A dominant naval force is central to the effective execution of our
    strategic goals. We must be ready at all times to execute as one
    integrated naval force--Navy and Marine Corps seamlessly linked at
    every level--with common logistics, infrastructure, practices and
    support networks--executing a fleet-wide emphasis on resilient and
    combat ready forces. These integrated connections must extend beyond
    the DON as well, encompassing our vital partners across the joint force
    and the whole-of-government, as well as our industry partners,
    shipyards, and allies and partners around the world.
    Trust and Collaboration
        Leaders throughout the DON are actively engaged with the joint
    force and the whole-of-government to meet the maritime challenges that
    face our Nation. One key initiative of this collaboration is the Tri-
    Service Maritime Strategy, Advantage at Sea. This is was truly
    collaborative maritime strategic planning effort led jointly by all
    three of our Nation's sea services--Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
    Guard. In order to execute these goals, Admiral Gilday, General Berger,
    Admiral Schultz and I are working together in order to promote
    integration, communication, and collaboration as a warfighting
    priority. There can be no daylight between us as we strengthen the
    integrated all-domain Naval power of the United States.
    Operationalizing the Audit
        In my previous roles as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
    Financial Management and Comptroller, and while Performing the Duties
    of Comptroller for the Department of Defense, I saw first-hand the
    importance of effective, transparent examination and oversight, and I
    witnessed the direct relationship of accountable financial controls to
    our frontline strength. In my current role as Acting Secretary of the
    Navy, I am determined to strengthen this process in order to provide
    our Congressional oversight partners with complete visibility and
    accountability for every dime.
        Central to this effort is building on the findings of our financial
    statement audit process, and improving that process moving forward. As
    I've emphasized to senior leaders across the Navy and Marine Corps, the
    audit is Commander's business. Accurate inventory, proper resource
    allocation, redundancy elimination are all directly connected to our
    end strength.
        We are on the right path towards obtaining an audit opinion for the
    Navy and Marine Corps general funds, and the DON working capital fund.
    We have a detailed roadmap that will guide our effort, placing a strong
    emphasis on budgetary reform, including receipt, distribution,
    execution, and monitoring.
        The President's Budget 2022 increases investment in DON oversight
    functions. In addition to our work on the financial statement audit, we
    are looking at ways to increase effective oversight going forward,
    removing redundancy and duplication of effort in every part of our
    enterprise through the performance audit process. I have met with
    leaders across the government and the DOD to discuss audit planning and
    understand areas of high risk, and am incorporating that feedback into
    the fiscal year 2022 audit priorities direction provided to the Naval
    Audit Service and our internal control program under the Federal
    Managers Financial Integrity Act and OMB Circular A-123. Our top
    priority is to ensure that our oversight capabilities and capacity is
    as efficient and effective as possible in order to keep our promise to
    the American taxpayer and the warriors on the frontline.
    Sustaining Maritime Information Superiority
        Leaders in every functional unit and discipline have been directed
    to set business systems modernization on an integrated path that is
    sufficiently resourced and supported across the DON. We are using data
    driven decision-making to achieve tangible savings while consistently
    working to become more effective and more efficient.
        Modernization of our information technology infrastructure is a
    critical warfighting priority for the DON. Effective use and management
    of data is key to our digital transformation, and will change how we
    will fight and win at every level. We are consolidating legacy systems
    and will have moved from ten financial systems to three by the end of
    this fiscal year. I have established top-down performance management
    efforts, driven by data, to ensure the cyber resilience and strength of
    our defense business and warfighting networks.
        As an information age naval force, every DON warfighting function
    and mission area is dependent on data and information to rapidly inform
    decision-making throughout the entire competition to conflict
    continuum. The dependency on secure and reliable IT has grown
    exponentially over the last decade and is critical to maintaining a
    competitive warfighting advantage. Simply put, information is combat
    power.
        In order to generate and sustain that power, the DON is building on
    the findings of our Cybersecurity Readiness Review with an Information
    Superiority Vision, detailing how the Navy and Marine Corps will:
          Modernize our infrastructure to bring the DON to parity
    with industry, move data and information from anywhere to anywhere
    securely.
          Innovate and leverage emerging technology including 5G
    and Artificial Intelligence to drive capability outcomes for
    competitive advantage at speed.
          Defend forward with robust information protection
    regardless of where data resides.
        Through Operation Flank Speed, the DON is shifting enterprise
    collaboration and productivity services to an enduring cloud-based
    Microsoft Office 365 solution which will provide world-class security
    and collaboration tools to improve productivity across our distributed
    workforce.
        This initiative will modernize our infrastructure to a more cloud-
    enabled, performant, and defendable network allowing data and
    information to move from anywhere to anywhere securely. It will also
    improve our overall cyber readiness posture by implementing key Zero-
    Trust-Architecture principles; securing devices and endpoints,
    establishing identity and user privileges, and introducing content and
    data rights management.
        The Marine Corps has now completed the transition of all users to
    Microsoft Office 365, and I have directed the transition of over
    470,000 users in the Navy no later than December 31, 2021. Flank Speed
    will create the capabilities needed to increase Naval lethality and our
    ability to fight and win.
        Failure to invest now will result in this effort now would further
    delay much needed improvements to our core technology infrastructure
    and leave the workforce without a sustained follow-on capability once
    the DOD-provided Commercial Virtual Remote capability is sunset in June
    2021, extending our reliance on outdated, duplicative and less secure
    legacy IT systems that cost more and deliver less, further eroding
    DON's competitive warfighting advantage.
    Strengthen Relationships with Stakeholders
        Working alongside our vital industry partners, we are aligning our
    efforts to produce the right platforms and capabilities for the
    warfighter, and ensure maximum availability and throughput from design
    to production to maintenance.
        We're working closely with our partners and suppliers in the
    defense industrial base to ensure the continued viability of the
    crucial businesses and infrastructure needed to ensure our ships,
    aircraft, and ground equipment are available when needed for the
    defense of our Nation, both during the current COVID-19 challenge and
    long into the future. A robust, resilient, and nimble industrial base
    and supply chain is critical to the long term strength of our Navy and
    Marine Corps. Funding predictability and long term planning are key
    elements in ensuring the efficiency of our acquisitions and maintenance
    processes in partnership with a supply chain calibrated to deliver
    maximum value to the taxpayer and warfighter.
        At our public shipyards, the DON took aggressive steps at the start
    of the COVID-19 pandemic to implement and require safety measures to
    protect the personnel, civilians, contractors, and families. These
    steps have included maximum telework opportunities for shipyard
    employees, administrative leave for high-risk individuals unable to
    telework, altered shifts to maximize social distancing, sanitization
    and hand-washing stations throughout the shipyard, cloth face coverings
    and face shields for the workforce, and screening checks at all
    workplace entry points.
    Global Engagement
        We cannot meet the global challenges our Nation faces alone.
    Readiness requires presence and rapid capabilities in every part of the
    world, as well as specialized and localized knowledge to handle
    evolving and challenging situations. The strategic maritime defense
    partnerships we maintain today with our partners and allies extend the
    reach and power of our force. They underscore the importance of
    cooperation and coordination in maintaining the rules-based
    international order that enables so much of our global prosperity and
    security.
        Our personnel regularly train and operate alongside their foreign
    counterparts, test the interoperability of our systems, and build our
    collective readiness on the front lines of great power competition.
    Operational exercises, international port calls, joint Marine force
    training, and other interactions generate the personal contact that
    builds understanding, respect, and trust across national and functional
    lines. Our sailors, marines and civilian personnel know that through
    their service they are front-line diplomats for our Nation. Their
    professionalism and dedication promotes the connections that strengthen
    our collective security and cultivate shared ideals that send the
    message that the United States is a friend worth having.
                                   conclusion
        Our sailors, marines, and civilian teammates will always be our
    greatest source of strength in a challenging and changing world. On
    behalf of each of these brave patriots and the families that serve at
    their side, I once again thank the leadership and membership of this
    Committee for your attention, interest, and ongoing commitment to the
    defense of the United States of America. It is an honor to work with
    each of you, and I look forward to your questions.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Admiral
    Gilday, please.

      STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Gilday. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe,
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today alongside Secretary Harker and
    General Berger. I am thankful for the enduring support that
    this Committee provides the greatest navy in the world.
        I do believe this hearing comes at a critical time for our
    country. The competition at sea is intensifying. China and
    Russia are rapidly mobilizing their militaries, attempting to
    undermine our alliances and degrading the free and the open
    order. The Chinese battle force is the largest in the world,
    and it is growing. Backed by a robust industrial base and the
    biggest shipbuilding infrastructure in the world, they command
    a modern fleet of surface combatants, submarines, aircraft
    carriers, amphibious assault ships, and next-generation
    fighters.
        Furthermore, they are strengthening their space
    capabilities and stockpiling an arsenal of long-range missiles
    to hold us and our allies and partners at risk. China is
    deliberately modernizing for the 21st century, and is building
    all-domain capabilities to rival our own.
        Make no mistake. Our fleet can control the seas in conflict
    and project power ashore today, but we will be increasingly
    challenged to do so in the future unless hard choices are made.
    The results of analysis over the past 5 years, inside and
    outside the Pentagon, have been consistent and they have been
    clear--America needs a larger, more capable fleet. Importantly,
    our latest study gave us the headlights not only for the size
    but also for the composition of that force. We need to
    transition away from older, less capable platforms and deliver
    the platforms and systems that provide overmatch. At the same
    time, we need to grow.
        However, our Navy faces the task right now of
    recapitalizing our strategic nuclear deterrent, something we
    have not done in 40 years, and we are making a once-in-a-
    century investment in our public shipyards--long overdue--while
    preserving our current readiness so the fleet can confidently
    operate forward and be relevant.
        Nearly 70 percent of the ships that we have today we will
    have a decade from now. We have to take care of the ships that
    we own, but the price tag on that readiness is rising. Over the
    past two decades, manpower, operations, and maintenance costs,
    which make up almost 60 percent of our budget, have grown at a
    rate, as the Secretary mentioned, 2.5 percent above the rate of
    inflation. Meanwhile, the Navy's buying power is less than it
    was in 2010. Back then we had 288 ships. Today we have 296.
    Given these factors, if the Navy's top line remains flat or if
    it goes down, the size of our fleet will definitely shrink.
        Nevertheless, we are determined to deliver the most ready,
    the most capable, and the most lethal Navy we can with the
    budget that we are given. To do this, we are improving
    maintenance in our shipyards and aviation depots, we are
    ensuring our ships are properly manned, that our magazines are
    filled with ammunition, spare parts are in our storerooms, and
    our sailors are getting the steaming days and the flying hours
    that they need to hone their skills.
        We are working hard on a more robust, resilient network
    infrastructure as part of JADC2 [Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control]. We are investing in long-range precision fires like
    hypersonics and Tactical Tomahawk, and we are developing
    directed energy systems to improve fleet survivability.
        Our eye is on the larger hybrid fleet. The investments in
    our shipbuilding account reflect the rigorous analysis we
    conducted last year as well as the needs of our combatant
    commanders, who are determined to build affordable capacity,
    which includes a deliberate approach to uncrewed vessels. We
    are making sure that every sailor can outthink and outfight any
    adversary by scaling our 21st century training framework, and
    also our live virtual constructive training.
        Senators, the average age of the Chinese fleet is 11 years.
    Ours is 21. It is time to move decisively and field the future
    Navy. We must modernize now, in this decade, or we will risk
    falling behind. We need to keep a forward posture that
    maintains America's safety and prosperity.
        I am extremely proud of our sailors, our Navy civilians,
    and our families who sustained a historic, high OPTEMPO
    [Operational Tempo] in the midst of this pandemic. They are the
    source of our strength, as are the patriots in our shipyards
    and our aircraft depots, and our partners in industry,
    companies large and small, who keep the production lines
    moving.
        Again, I am grateful for this Committee's support to the
    Navy and the Marine Corps team. I look forward to answering
    your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral Michael M. Gilday
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of the
    Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
    posture of the United States Navy. Moreover, on behalf of all our
    sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, thank you for your
    continued leadership and support. With the funding provided by Congress
    these last several years, we are building back our readiness,
    strengthening our advantages at sea, and keeping our fleet deployed
    forward where it matters.
        This hearing comes at a critical time for our country. Multiple
    nations are working to undermine the free and open rules-based
    international system that has benefited so many for so long. Our rivals
    are rapidly modernizing their militaries to erode our advantages. The
    COVID-19 pandemic threatens the health and livelihood of our people.
    Climate change puts our coast lines at risk with rising seas levels and
    more severe weather. And the maritime environment--a vital source of
    our Nation's prosperity and protection--has become increasingly
    contested. America's Navy is ready to meet these challenges. As we have
    done since our founding, we will set sail to defend our Nation, take
    care of our people, and succeed through teamwork.
        The President has made it clear--America stands at an inflection
    point. The choices we make today will have a dramatic impact on the
    future of our Nation. The very nature of the free and open
    international system is threatened. To defend our Nation, safeguard
    economic opportunity, and secure the blessings of liberty for years to
    come, we must renew our enduring advantages and work in concert with
    our allies and partners to secure the rules-based order at sea.
     america is a maritime nation--our people depend on the freedom of the
                                      seas
        The United States Navy--alongside the Marine Corps and Coast
    Guard--provides a unique, enduring advantage to the American people.
    Since our Nation was founded, Americans have relied on the seas for
    prosperity and protection. For 245 years, our Navy has deployed forward
    to ensure safe passage for our commerce and to keep fights far from our
    shores. Since the end of World War II, we have sailed with like-minded
    navies to build and sustain the open, rules-based international system
    at sea. Together, we have provided stability, deterred great power war,
    and ushered in prosperity for billions across the world.
        Over time, our reliance on the seas has only grown. Today, 90
    percent of global trade by volume travels by sea, facilitating $3.7
    trillion in U.S. commerce annually and supporting 31 million American
    jobs. Ninety-five percent of global internet traffic travels along
    undersea cables, fueling our digital economy and accounting for $10
    trillion of financial transactions every day. The free flow of
    commerce--both physical and digital--cannot be taken for granted. It
    relies on the rules-based international system at sea and unimpeded
    access to markets through open waterways. Even minor disruptions can
    have extraordinary impacts. The recent grounding of the container ship
    Ever Given in the Suez Canal, which delayed hundreds of ships and cost
    the global economy an estimated $9.6 billion per day, highlights the
    importance of predictable passage through the world's strategic
    waterways. If a rival nation attempted to control passage through the
    South China Sea--a strategic location where $208 billion of U.S.
    commerce flows annually--the impact to the global economy would be
    extremely costly.

       [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Meanwhile, the competition for offshore resources such as
    aquaculture, energy, and rare-earth minerals is increasing across the
    globe. Currently, 93 percent of the world's fishing stocks are
    overexploited, threatening a major protein source for 3.3 billion
    people. Several nations have deployed distant water fishing fleets and
    expanded the use of maritime militias in their quest to maintain their
    lucrative fishing industries. Additionally, many nations are
    increasingly looking to maritime sources of energy and mineral wealth.
    The global oil and gas industry, which generates an estimated $3.3
    trillion in annual revenue, is turning toward energy exploration along
    the seafloor to extract untapped reserves. With trillions of dollars in
    raw resources awaiting discovery on the unmapped ocean floor, states
    and multinational companies are racing to develop capabilities for
    deep-sea mining.
        The world's oceans have always been a wellspring of wealth and
    prosperity. Today, and in the years ahead, they pose an increased risk
    of competition turning into conflict.
     the growing challenge to the united states and the open international
                                     system
        Despite benefiting from free and open seas for decades, the
    People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are currently working to
    undermine the rules-based international system at sea. Both are
    attempting to control access to key waters and the resources that lie
    within these waters, inhibiting freedom of the seas and overflight.
    Both are intimidating their neighbors and attempting to enforce
    unlawful claims with the threat of force. Both are expanding
    sophisticated networks of sensors and long-range weapons to hold
    important waterways at risk. Both are leveraging offensive cyber
    tactics to advance their competitive advantage, illegitimately
    obtaining U.S. intellectual property to close research and development
    gaps and disrupt our industrial base And both are attempting to replace
    the free and open international system with a more unilateral and self-
    serving one by turning incremental gains from their malign actions into
    long-term advantages--such as militarizing contested features in the
    South China Sea or illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula.
        The PRC's and Russia's revisionist approaches at sea threaten
    United States interests, undermine alliances and partnerships, and
    degrade the free and open international order. Moreover, the PRC's and
    Russia's aggressive naval growth and modernization are eroding United
    States military advantages. Unchecked, these trends will leave the Navy
    unprepared to ensure our advantage at sea and protect national
    interests within the next decade.

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        The PRC--our pacing challenge--is carrying out a strategy aimed at
    the heart of America's maritime power. They are deliberately working to
    erode maritime governance, inhibit freedom of the seas and overflight,
    deter our engagement in regional disputes, and displace the United
    States as the partner of choice across the world. To achieve its
    strategic goals, the PRC has rapidly grown its Navy from 262 to 350
    ships. Today, their fleet includes modern surface combatants,
    submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and polar
    icebreakers. Expanding their robust naval force with a hundreds of
    Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels, they routinely harass
    neighbors to exert pressure at a level below traditional armed
    conflict. They have built the world's largest missile force to target
    regional waters in an attempt to intimidate others. They have
    strengthened all dimensions of military power to contest the United
    States from the seafloor to space and in the information domain. Under
    the One Belt, One Road Initiative, they are extending their maritime
    infrastructure across the globe through aggressive investments,
    particularly in ports, to control access to critical waterways.

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        As our United States Indo-Pacific Commander recently stated, the
    greatest danger for America and our allies is the erosion of our
    conventional deterrence with respect to the PRC. Absent a convincing
    conventional deterrent, the PRC will continue to take action to
    undermine the free and open conditions at sea upon which our citizens
    rely. While the PRC is expanding its influence across the globe, this
    challenge is most acutely present in the Indo-Pacific, including the
    East and South China Seas and increasingly in the Indian Ocean. History
    shows that a strong U.S. Navy provides a stabilizing influence across
    the world, assists in peaceful maritime dispute resolution, and expands
    economic opportunities for the American people. The future will prove
    no different.
       u.s. navy--deployed forward to defend america and our allies and
                        protect the freedom of the seas
        The U.S. Navy is responding to the challenges to our free and open
    international system by demonstrating our global reach, enforcing
    common principles, sustaining the conditions that enable shared
    prosperity, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and
    modernizing our fleet to control the seas in conflict and project power
    in contested environments. Today, over 42,000 sailors are deployed on
    111 ships and submarines to preserve freedom of the seas, deter
    conflict, and keep America and our allies safe. Together with the
    Marine Corps and Coast Guard, our Navy is delivering integrated all-
    domain naval power across the globe. And we are doing this in the midst
    of a global pandemic.

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Even with many parts of the world shut down in response to COVID-
    19, the worldwide demand for naval forces required us to maintain a
    high operational tempo, which included eight major Carrier Strike Group
    and Expeditionary Strike Group deployments in fiscal year 2020. Since I
    appeared before you last year, the Navy has continued to steam and fly
    from the Arctic Circle to the Cape of Good Hope and from the Caribbean
    to the South China Sea. Our hospital ships provided relief to American
    communities; we executed underway training events for deployment
    certification; and we conducted exercises as part of the Joint Force
    and alongside our allies and partners. Our ability to sustain a forward
    posture rests on the individual commitments of over 600,000 sailors and
    Navy civilians and their families. Their adaptive spirit and commitment
    to COVID-19 protocols kept the force healthy and our ships at sea.
        The pandemic taught us a great deal about operating in a
    challenging environment. Our entire force learned how to adapt as we
    iterated and honed our COVID-19 Standardized Operational Guidance. Our
    logistics teams learned what it means to sustain our fleet with limited
    means. Our information technology workforce quickly scaled virtual
    private network licenses and supported the roll-out of virtual and
    remote environments to keep us connected. Our dedicated, patriotic
    shipyard and aviation depot workforce adapted to our COVID-19
    protocols, came to work, and got our ships and aircraft back to sea.
    And we learned how brittle portions of our defense industrial base
    could be if not postured appropriately. We took every opportunity to
    learn throughout this dynamic year--and shared those lessons with our
    allies and partners--to improve the resiliency of our Navy in the years
    ahead.
        We certainly did not address the challenges of continued maritime
    operations during this pandemic alone. Our broader Navy team--which
    includes Congress, industry, research institutions and laboratories,
    and our international allies and partners--overcame so much to design,
    build, and sustain our fleet through this pandemic. We cannot thank all
    of you enough. As our Nation--and the world--emerges from this
    pandemic, we will continue to face the daunting challenge posed by
    long-term competition with the PRC and Russia. And we will need your
    support, now more than ever, as we modernize and recapitalize the Navy
    to sustain our enduring advantage at sea.
               timeless roles of sea control and power projection
        American security and prosperity is underpinned by the U.S. Navy's
    ability to control the seas and project power ashore in conflict. The
    world would be a less prosperous, more dangerous place if the seas were
    not open and free for the benefit of all. Every day, combat-credible
    naval forces operate forward to reassure our allies and partners,
    confront malign behavior, and deter potential adversaries from
    escalating into conflict. We preserve a stable and secure global
    maritime environment and advance prosperity through transit, trade, and
    the lawful pursuit of natural resources. Our ability to carry out these
    essential functions comes from our ability to credibly control the seas
    and project power ashore in conflict. These missions are timeless.
        Controlling the seas protects friendly shipping, provides the Joint
    Force and our allies freedom to maneuver, and denies the use of the
    seas to our adversaries. In the past, sea control required us to fight
    our adversaries on, under, and above the sea. Now, in our digital age,
    it requires us to also fight in space, cyberspace, and across the
    electromagnetic spectrum. In short, modern sea control demands the all-
    domain power of our Navy and Joint Force.
        America also needs a Navy that can influence events ashore. This
    starts with deterring nuclear attack against our Nation with our
    ballistic missile submarines--the most survivable leg of the nuclear
    triad. Projecting power and influence from the seas is vital to
    deterring aggression and resolving crises on acceptable terms to the
    United States. Our Navy must field capabilities in all domains--
    employing information warfare, cyber capabilities, special operations,
    and a host of conventional weapons launched from on, under, and above
    the sea--to convince our rivals they have no viable means of achieving
    their objectives through force. Our sea control and power projection
    capabilities, alongside our strategic deterrent, provide America and
    our allies their surest guarantee of peace. If the Navy fails to
    deliver a fleet that can control the seas and project power, our Nation
    will lack the conventional deterrent needed to protect America and our
    allies and expand economic opportunities for the American people.
        While America's need for sea control and power projection
    capabilities has not changed over time, how we operate and what we
    operate with is changing. Emerging technologies have expanded modern
    fights at sea into all domains. Ubiquitous and persistent sensors,
    advanced battle networks, and long range weapons have made contested
    spaces more lethal. Advances in artificial intelligence have increased
    the importance of achieving decision superiority in combat.
    Additionally, autonomous systems have shown promise for an effective
    and affordable way for us to fight and win in contested spaces. These
    technologies offer clear advantages to the militaries that integrate
    them first. America cannot afford to fall behind.
        Meanwhile, our fleet is adapting to operate in new ways. To
    preserve and promote the rules-based order, we are taking a more
    assertive posture in daily operations. We are challenging excessive
    maritime claims by sailing and flying wherever international law allows
    and expanding our decision advantage by persistently monitoring
    activities at sea to expose malign behavior that undermines the rules-
    based order. Our cyber teams are actively defending our networks and
    projecting power in the cyber domain to maintain a tactical advantage
    against our rivals. Furthermore, we are dynamically deploying our
    forces forward to deter our rivals from making incremental gains and to
    work alongside our allies and partners to keep the seas free and open.
        Should deterrence fail, our Navy stands ready to confront
    aggression and decisively win a fight. Using concepts such as the Joint
    Warfighting Concept and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), we will
    mass sea- and shore-based fires from distributed forces. By maneuvering
    distributed forces across all domains, we will complicate adversary
    targeting, exploit uncertainty, and achieve surprise. Controlling the
    seas by constraining or destroying adversary fleets will enable freedom
    of movement at sea and power projection ashore. Working with the Joint
    Force and our allies and partners, Navy submarines, aircraft, and
    surface ships will launch massed volleys of networked weapons to
    overwhelm adversary defenses and compel a termination of conflict on
    favorable terms. Delivering an all-domain fleet that is capable of
    effectively executing these concepts is vital to maintaining a credible
    conventional deterrent with respect to the PRC and Russia.
                       delivering all-domain naval power
        To deliver the all-domain naval power America needs, our Navy must
    evolve our capabilities and grow our capacity. The Navy--working in
    close collaboration with the Joint Force--has studied, identified, and
    prioritized the future capabilities we need to execute our evolving
    warfighting concepts and maintain a credible deterrent with respect to
    the PRC. The PRC has invested heavily in anti-access capabilities. In
    conflict, they will seek to contest all domains and hold our forces at
    risk with sophisticated networks of sensors and a large number of long-
    range, precision weapons. To effectively deter the PRC as part of the
    Joint Force, our fleet must be imbued with distributed weapons of
    increasing range and speed, more magazine depth, more mobility, more
    stealth and deception, and more sustainability. This requires a
    deliberate adjustment to our naval force structure.
        Based upon multiple rigorous, threat informed assessments conducted
    over the past five years--both inside and outside the Navy--it is my
    best military advice that America needs a larger Navy to counter the
    People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) that is growing in both capability
    and capacity. To fill critical Joint Force demands, the Navy requires
    greater numbers of submarines, smaller and more numerous surface
    combatants, more lethal offensive capabilities, a host of integrated
    unmanned platforms--under, on, and above the seas--and a modern
    strategic deterrent. We also need a robust network infrastructure to
    link our distributed forces together and resilient logistics to sustain
    them. In short, a balanced, hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned
    platforms is the most effective and affordable way to meet the security
    demands of our Nation.
        Analysis has also confirmed that numbers are not the only factor--
    the composition and combat effectiveness of our fleet matters more.
    Naval power is not a function of ship numbers alone, nor is it simply a
    result of the lethal systems employed from those ships. It comes from
    the concepts that shape how we fight and the means to maintain, train,
    and equip our forces to win in combat. And it fundamentally comes from
    developing sailors--the true source of our naval power--who can
    outthink and outfight and adversary.
        Within the scope of the President's Fiscal Year 22 Budget request,
    we are maximizing our Navy's contribution to the Joint Force. We are
    prioritizing a fleet that is ready for combat over a larger fleet that
    is not ready to fight. We are divesting of legacy assets that do not
    bring sufficient lethality to the fight and investing in next-
    generation platforms and systems that close critical Joint capability
    gaps. Meanwhile, we are prioritizing the training and education needed
    to prepare our sailors to outthink and outfight any adversary. And we
    are using every dollar we can to sustainably grow the fleet. As we
    prepare our fleet for long-term competition with the PRC, we are
    focused on key objectives in the following areas--readiness,
    capabilities, capacity, and our sailors.
                                   readiness
        To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must deliver combat-ready
    forces to deter aggression and keep the seas free and open. Deploying
    battle-ready ships, submarines, and squadrons around the world--from
    the South China Sea to the Arctic--deters aggression, reaffirms our
    commitment to allies and partners, and keeps the seas open and free.
    Readiness underpins our forward-engaged posture and touches all
    elements of the Navy, from our shipyards and aviation depots to the
    steaming and flying hours our sailors use to hone their skills. With
    nearly 70 percent of the fleet we will have in 2030 already in service
    today, affordably sustaining our ships and aircraft is vital to meeting
    future demands. This is why President's Budget 2022 places such an
    emphasis on critical components of our Navy's readiness.
        Our force is in a higher state of readiness today than prior to
    2017 with a healthier surge force, improved shipboard manning, better
    training for our crews, and improved parts availability. Increased
    funding, combined with cultural reforms throughout the fleet, have
    arrested the decline in our readiness and put us on a path to recovery.
    Still, we have much work to do.
        Deploying combat-ready forces starts with taking expert care of our
    platforms. To this end, we are using data-driven reforms to improve
    maintenance processes, increase operational availability, and save
    taxpayer dollars. We have seen tremendous success with these methods in
    our aviation community. For years our F/A-18 aircraft were stuck at a
    55 percent mission capable rate. At the time, we assumed only an
    increase in inputs--aircraft, manpower, or parts--could raise the
    number of ready jets available to our pilots. However, in fiscal year
    2019 we shifted our focus to cultural reform and used the power of
    data-analytics to raise our F/A-18E/F mission capable rate to 80
    percent--a rate we have continued to maintain throughout all of fiscal
    year 2020 and into fiscal year 2021. With higher numbers of aircraft
    available, our aircrew are more ready to fly and fight than at any
    point over the last decade.
        We are now applying a similar approach to improving ship
    maintenance. On-time private shipyard surface ship availability
    completion rates rose from 37 percent in fiscal year 2019 to 67 percent
    in fiscal year 2020. Meanwhile, public shipyards reduced maintenance
    delay days by over 75 percent from fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year
    2020. To generate these gains, we modified contracting strategies,
    increased dry dock capacity, and optimized facility and pier layouts.
    We improved planning and adjusted maintenance durations to better align
    workload with shipyard capacity. We also leveraged authorities provided
    by Congress, such as the three year ``Other Procurement, Navy'' pilot
    program, to increase flexibility and stabilize demand for our shipyard
    workforces.
        Unfortunately, COVID-19 impacted our recent ship depot maintenance
    gains--as the need to protect our people caused delays in on-time
    completion of ship maintenance. Half of our maintenance availabilities
    in both public and private shipyards are trending late due to workforce
    capacity reductions. To mitigate further impacts in our private
    shipyards, we accelerated awards of contract options and improved the
    cash positions of the industrial base. For our public shipyards, we
    mobilized over 1,300 skilled Navy Reserve sailors, increased overtime
    usage, and rebalanced future workloads to address these delays. These
    efforts have stemmed the disruption COVID-19 caused to our shipyard
    maintenance and will mitigate work spilling over into fiscal year 2022.
    We are methodically and safely returning to normal operating
    conditions. Though some delays will continue to persist until the
    shipyards return to full strength, the production workforce in both
    public and private shipyards is returning to pre-pandemic levels.
        Sustaining our advantage at sea requires us to make targeted
    investments in critical infrastructure. This includes ensuring our
    worldwide constellation of bases are postured to sustain and support
    our fleet at sea. Of particular importance are critical elements of our
    national defense industrial base such as our public shipyards and
    aviation depots. Our Shipyard Infrastructure and Optimization Program
    (SIOP) provides a strategic roadmap for necessary investments in dry-
    docks, capital equipment, and optimizing the layout of these vital
    national assets. We have already broken ground on a perimeter floodwall
    at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and are building a new lock system at
    Portsmouth Naval Shipyard with many more projects on the horizon. We
    are also recapitalizing our aviation depot infrastructure. Through our
    Naval Aviation Fleet Infrastructure Optimization Plan (FIOP), we are
    developing a 10-year Master Plan that provides our aviation depots the
    capacity to sustain and modernize our aircraft, engines, components,
    and support equipment. Meanwhile, we are also transforming our Navy
    enterprise shore network infrastructure into a secure, resilient
    digital platform.
        Sustaining our advantage also requires us to master all-domain
    fleet operations. To credibly deter aggression, we must integrate the
    all-domain power of the Navy with the Joint Force and our allies and
    partners. This starts with providing our sailors adequate ranges to
    train for the high-end fight. The speed and scale of a potential fight
    for control of the seas has changed. The size of our premier Carrier
    Air Wing and SEAL training center--the Fallon Range Training Complex
    (FRTC)--is no longer sufficient. Within existing capacity, our sailors
    cannot sufficiently train with longer-range weapons or practice the
    tactics and techniques they will need to employ against a near-peer
    threat. We will continue to work with Congress, tribal leadership,
    local communities, and key stakeholders in the year ahead to modernize
    the FRTC and ensure our sailors have the infrastructure they need to
    train to win in combat.
        Mastering all-domain fleet operations also requires a rigorous
    learning campaign. We are conducting a series of fleet battle problems,
    wargames, and exercises to refine our concepts and capabilities. For
    example, we recently conducted our most complex exercise to date
    involving unmanned systems, which brought unmanned surface vessels and
    aircraft under the control of a Zumwalt-class destroyer--the USS
    Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001). This summer we will conduct Large Scale
    Exercise 2021--bringing together our fleets from across the globe to
    test out key components of our DMO concept. Overall, our campaign of
    experimentation and learning prepares our sailors for high-end
    warfighting and drives updated joint concepts, fleet requirements, and
    future naval capabilities.
        Sustaining our advantage at sea depends on developing, training,
    and fielding battle ready surface force crews. As of the end of 2020,
    we have fully implemented all 111 Comprehensive Review/ Strategic
    Readiness Review recommendations. Over 1,700 junior officers have now
    graduated from our new Junior Officer of the Deck course with training
    aligned to International Maritime Organization's standards. We are
    broadening the use of instructor-led virtual reality training through
    the construction of two Mariner Skills Training Centers and the
    modernization of our Integrated Navigation Seamanship and Ship handling
    Trainers. With the support of Congress, we are investing in and
    employing meaningful reforms in how we man our surface fleet, train our
    crews, schedule and execute workups and deployments, and how we equip
    and maintain the surface force.
        We will continue to invest in these key priorities and drive
    maximum efficiency from every dollar to deliver the naval power America
    needs. We are currently meeting operational demands while adapting to
    protect our sailors and their families. But readiness recovery remains
    a long game and will require sustained funding over time to fully
    recover.
                                  capabilities
        To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must deliver a more
    lethal and better connected fleet. The fight at sea is evolving
    rapidly. Emerging technologies have expanded into all domains and made
    contested spaces more lethal. Artificial intelligence and machine
    learning, autonomy, quantum computing, additive manufacturing, and new
    communications technologies are transforming the maritime environment.
    These changes emphasize the need for the Navy to develop sea control
    and power projection capabilities at speed and scale. That means more
    lethality, more survivability, better combat logistics, and a resilient
    network that connects command and control nodes, platforms, weapons,
    and sensors all together.
        President's Budget 2022 prioritizes capabilities that amplify the
    fleet's ability to disperse and project synchronized lethal and non-
    lethal effects from multiple axes and in all domains. To achieve this
    vision, we are developing a Naval Operational Architecture (NOA) that
    integrates with Joint All-Domain Command and Control. The NOA is a
    collection of networks, infrastructure, data, and analytic tools that
    connects our distributed forces and provides decision advantage. Beyond
    recapitalization of our undersea nuclear deterrent, there is no higher
    development priority. We launched Task Force Overmatch this past
    October to align resources and expertise from across our force to field
    the NOA by the middle of this decade.
        Developing longer-range, higher-speed weapons--such as hypersonic
    missiles--will give our warfighters the competitive advantage they
    need. Hypersonic missiles change the risk calculus for our rivals by
    providing a non-nuclear sea-based prompt, global strike capability. We
    are working in close partnership with the Army to deliver a truly-
    joint, conventional hypersonic weapon across land and sea-based
    platforms. We conducted a successful test of our common hypersonic
    glide body in March 2020, which keeps our Conventional Prompt Strike
    program on-track to field this game changing capability by the mid-to-
    late 2020s. President's Budget 2022 signals our strong support for
    developing this vital joint capability.
        Our adversaries are attempting to deter us with massive numbers of
    sea- and shore-based missiles. To complicate their ability to
    understand the potential battlespace, we are investing in Counter-
    Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence,
    Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting systems. Our response also
    includes fielding an inexhaustible directed-energy system that
    accurately and reliably defeats anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The
    High Energy Laser Counter ASCM Project is expediting the development of
    critical technologies to protect our ships from the cruise missile
    threat. At the same time, we are pursuing other directed energy
    initiatives in parallel--such as the 150 kilowatt class laser weapon
    system--to accelerate learning and fielding of this critical
    capability. The recent demonstration onboard USS Portland showed how we
    can disable an unmanned aerial vehicle using directed energy. We will
    continue to invest in laser technology and non-kinetic defensive
    systems to increase fleet survivability while maintaining free magazine
    space for our offensive weapons.
        Our logistics enterprise and strategic sealift capacity are also
    vital to sustaining our advantage at sea and keeping the Joint Force
    operating forward. Accordingly, we are modernizing networks and
    communication and navigation systems of our Combat Logistics Force to
    best posture this aging fleet to operate in a contested environment. We
    are also investing in increased fuel distribution capacity as well as
    improvements in our expeditionary rearm capabilities and resuscitative
    care surgery systems. Specific to the Sealift Fleet, which provides
    inter-theater lift capability to the Joint Force, we have accelerated
    recapitalization, leveraging a ``buy used'' strategy to replace our
    least ready vessels, and invested in service life extension for the net
    effect of increased readiness. We are grateful for Congress's
    authorization to affordably revitalize our Sealift Fleet with used
    vessels. We are moving ahead with purchasing two used ships in 2021 and
    five used vessels in President's Budget 2022, signaling our continued
    support for this approach. We will continue to work with Congress to
    efficiently recapitalize this critical capability in the years ahead
    and request that Congress remove remaining obstacles to used ship
    procurement. Our longer-term plan is to construct new vessels to
    replace prepositioned vessels in the Maritime Prepositioning Force as
    those ships begin to reach expected service life at the end of this
    decade.
        Pivoting toward the future and resourcing needed capabilities--
    especially in the Indo-Pacific region--requires tough choices. To
    invest in the next-generation capabilities we need to meet the
    challenge of near-peer competitors, we need to divest of our legacy
    capabilities that no longer bring sufficient lethality to the fight. We
    will work transparently with Congress to make these critical divestment
    decisions and free up resources to modernize the fleet.
                                    capacity
        To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must field a larger,
    hybrid fleet that is designed for sea control and power projection. To
    provide a credible conventional deterrent in peace and win in war, we
    need to sustainably generate cost-effective platforms and mature
    unmanned systems. This transition will increase the capacity of the
    fleet, expand our ability to distribute our forces, and rebalance the
    fleet away from exquisite, manpower-intensive platforms and toward
    smaller, less-expensive ones. By growing a hybrid fleet--on, above, and
    below the seas--we will ensure our success across the continuum of day-
    to-day competition, crisis, and conflict.
        As we design and build a larger, hybrid-fleet, our number one
    acquisition priority remains delivering the Columbia-class ballistic
    missile submarine on time. No mission is more important to our Nation
    than providing a secure and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent. Our
    ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable portion of our
    nuclear triad and provide an assured response to any strategic nuclear
    attack on the United States. With our Ohio-class submarines nearing the
    end of their service life, we cannot afford to get behind in delivering
    on the Columbia program. The first submarine is starting construction
    this year with the second boat on-track for procurement in fiscal year
    2024. We will continue to drive affordability, technology development,
    and integration efforts to ensure the program remains on schedule and
    our ballistic missile submarines remain on patrol in the decades ahead.
        Meanwhile, our future fleet places a premium on expanding our
    undersea advantage. During conflict, sea control and sea denial from
    beneath the waves are among our Navy's core advantages--we cannot
    afford to yield any ground to our competitors. We are now planning to
    construct the tenth Block V Virginia-class submarine with a Virginia
    Payload Module (VPM). President's Budget 2022 underscores our sustained
    support for procuring two Virginia-class submarines per year.
    Sustainable production of the Virginia-class submarine, in addition to
    the development of a follow-on attack submarine program, is key to
    sustaining our undersea advantage in the years ahead.
        As we shift our focus toward smaller platforms that can operate in
    a more dispersed manner, there is a clear need to rapidly incorporate
    unmanned systems into our fleet architecture. They expand our
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantage, add depth to
    our missile magazines, enhance fleet survivability, and provide more
    risk-worthy vessels to operate inside the weapons engagement zone of
    any adversary. In other words, they give our operational commanders
    flexible and effective options to maneuver within a contested
    environment. The Navy is taking a deliberate approach to developing
    unmanned systems through our Unmanned Campaign Framework. Our framework
    lays out an overarching vision on how we intend to produce tested and
    proven systems at scale, as well as develop the core technologies
    required to successfully integrate unmanned systems on, below, and
    above the sea. By the end of this decade, our sailors must have a high
    degree of confidence and skill operating alongside proven unmanned
    platforms. The combined capability of manned and unmanned systems will
    provide our operational forces the advantage we need in a future fight.
        Nuclear powered aircraft carriers are the most survivable and
    versatile airfields in the world. For decades to come, they will remain
    a cornerstone of the Navy's forward presence, sea control, and power
    projection capabilities. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) represents a
    generational leap in the aircraft carrier's capacity to project power.
    Over the past year, Ford has been underway, executing over 7,100 total
    launches and recoveries with the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System
    and Advanced Arresting Gear. Additionally, over 30,000 pounds of
    ordnance has been moved, loaded and expended by embarked F/A-18
    aircraft using Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWEs). Seven of Ford's AWEs
    have completed certification and the remaining four are on track to
    certify by this summer. We expect Ford to be cleared for blue water
    operations later this year and ready for employment in 2022.
        The striking power of our Carrier Air Wing is vital to controlling
    the seas and projecting power in a high-end fight, and the adaptability
    of the air wing keeps our carriers relevant for 50-plus years of life.
    The air wing of today is currently transforming with the addition of
    the F-35C, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and the CMV-22B Osprey.
    President's Budget 2022 increases our F-35 inventory to get the fleet
    closer to a fourth generation and fifth generation fighter mix. Carrier
    Air Wing TWO--which includes the first operational F-35C squadron--is
    currently undergoing pre-deployment training and will deploy later this
    year. Meanwhile, we are rapidly developing the MQ-25 Stingray--the Air
    Wing's first unmanned platform--to extend the striking range of our
    fleet. And we are laying the groundwork for the highly networked air
    wing of the future--a 6th generation family of systems that leverages
    manned-unmanned teaming--which will deliver overwhelming firepower in
    contested spaces in the years ahead. Delivering a 6th generation family
    of systems is vital to keeping pace with PRC fighter development and
    sustaining our advantage over the seas. America cannot afford to fall
    behind.
        We are also going through a surface combatant reset on ship design
    and construction to provide the next enduring hull forms for small and
    large surface combatants. Our surface combatant inventory is aging with
    limited options for future upgrades. At the same time, our future fleet
    design places an emphasis on greater numbers of small surface
    combatants. The Constellation-class frigate is a versatile, multi-
    mission platform capable of supporting day-to-day operations and the
    high-end fight. We began cutting steel on Constellation this year, and
    we are excited to incorporate this ship into the fleet in 2026.
    Meanwhile, the future large surface combatant (DDG(X)) will bring the
    space, weight, and power needed to incorporate future capabilities for
    the high-end fight such as high power lasers, long-range strike, and
    sensor growth. Together, both ship classes will bring more lethality,
    more survivability, more endurance, and more self-sufficiency to the
    fleet.
        We are not just building better ships--we are building ships
    better. The Navy is mindful of past shipbuilding efforts that did not
    perform to plan, which is why we are moving ahead in ways that
    deliberately reduce risk. Early and sustained industry involvement,
    robust land based testing, and focused design maturity are foundational
    to our shipbuilding approach. We appreciate the strong support from
    Congress in fiscal year 2021. Delivering ships on time, on budget, and
    within performance targets is our priority.
                                    sailors
        To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must recruit, develop,
    and retain a seasoned team of naval warriors. The strength of our naval
    power depends on the strength of our sailors--active and reserve,
    uniformed and civilian. In the long-term strategic competition we face
    today, every sailor must be able to outthink and outfight any
    adversary. Our Navy must remain the best trained, finest educated, and
    most ready maritime force in the world. We recognize the strength we
    gain from a diverse force and our actively pursuing combat-minded
    sailors with varied backgrounds, experiences, and thought to build up
    our readiness and resilience. As we take care of our sailors, we will
    accelerate their development and harness their talents to keep America
    safe and prosperous.
        As we modernize our fleet, we are modernizing our talent management
    systems to better recruit, train, retain, and support our sailors. We
    achieved our accession goal of 39,600 new Active Duty sailors in fiscal
    year 2020 to further improve afloat manning and filled operational
    billets to their highest point in six years. President's Budget 2022
    makes a slight reduction in our end-strength with the divestment of
    legacy ships. However, the demand for a highly trained, diverse force
    has not abated. We are grateful to Congress for the generous pay raises
    and personnel reforms. The Navy is leveraging both--alongside our
    talent management initiatives--to better recruit and retain our
    incredibly talented force. Meanwhile, we continue to transform our
    MyNavyHR infrastructure to rapidly deliver services to our sailors and
    families at a reduced cost. This includes the DOD-leading mobile
    applications that help with the challenge of military moves and finding
    childcare or housing and the MyNavy Career Centers which proved vital
    during the COVID-19 pandemic.
        We are continuing to cultivate a culture of excellence across the
    fleet, which builds resilience and strengthens our Navy's enduring
    standards of professional competence and personal character. Over the
    past year, our culture of excellence campaign has strengthened the
    signature behaviors that define our service to prevent the occurrence
    of destructive behaviors--such as sexual harassment or discrimination.
    At the same time, we have maintained a resolute focus on preventing the
    scourge of sexual assault within our ranks. President's Budget 2022
    increases our civilian Sexual Assault Prevention and Response workforce
    to provide greater support for our sailors and drive down investigation
    timelines. Overall, we are providing more training, more tools, and
    more resources so every sailor receives the support they need.
        We are also actively building a workforce that represents the full
    diversity of America and the strength it brings. Task Force One Navy
    (TF1N) was launched last year to analyze and evaluate issues in our
    military that detract from Navy cohesiveness and readiness. The task
    force released their report in January 2021 and highlighted 56
    recommendations that will elevate a culture of diversity, equity, and
    inclusion throughout the fleet. Respect and the promise of opportunity
    are core to our Navy, and we are committed to implementing TF1N reforms
    and ridding discrimination, sexism, and other forms of structural
    biases from our ranks.
        Without a doubt, the vast majority of sailors in the U.S. Navy
    serve every day with honor, character, and integrity. However, we
    cannot be under any illusions that extremist behaviors do not exist in
    our Navy. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, each command across
    the fleet conducted a stand down to address extremism within our ranks.
    Racism, injustice, indignity, and disrespect keeps us from reaching our
    potential--an inclusive, respectful, professional fighting force that
    answers the Nation's call with unparalleled readiness and lethality.
    The stand down was only a starting point; this will be an ongoing
    fight. We are committed to eliminating extremist behavior and all of
    its corrosive effects on our fighting force.
        The intellectual investments we make in each sailor provide a key
    advantage over our rivals. To strengthen our advantage in this area, we
    are aligning the curriculum and research of the Navy's education
    enterprise to deliver warfighting advantage in our operations at sea
    and in how we design, deliver, and generate our forces. Additionally,
    the Naval Community College is on track to provide our sailors
    opportunities for education in fields that strengthen the service.
    Maintaining educational relationships with our international partners
    through exchanges and scholarships remains a priority for us to deepen
    enduring relationships and broaden understanding between likeminded
    navies.
        To ensure our sailors are ready for any challenge on the horizon,
    we are scaling Ready Relevant Learning (RRL) and Live, Virtual,
    Constructive (LVC) training. RRL provides the right training, at the
    right time, in the right way for our sailors. It replaces ``one-and-
    done'' classroom training events with career-long learning continuums
    through a mix of in-classroom instruction and modern training methods.
    LVC technology blends the intensity of underway operation with high-
    fidelity synthetic training, allowing our sailors to master high-end
    tactics in secure and controllable conditions. Our force will always
    fall back to their baseline under the stress of combat--RRL and LVC
    will raise their baseline.
                                   conclusion
        Let there be no doubt--America is a maritime nation. Our security
    and prosperity are inextricably linked to the seas. For 245 years--in
    both calm and rough waters--your Navy has stood the watch to protect
    our homeland, preserve the freedom of the seas, and defend our way of
    life. For generations, we have provided a bulwark against aggression
    and have underwritten the international order that led to an
    unprecedented era of peace and prosperity. Now that order is under
    threat.
        As the President stated, we are at an inflection point. The PRC's
    rapid military growth and aggressive behavior at sea has put it on a
    trajectory that will challenge our maritime advantage in the years
    ahead. Our naval forces--and the American people--must maintain a
    clear-eyed resolve to compete, deter, and--if necessary--defeat our
    rivals, while accelerating the development of a larger and more lethal
    future fleet. We must do so while integrating more closely with the
    Marine Corps and Coast Guard to generate integrated all-domain naval
    Power. Only by working as a team and taking care of our people will we
    be able to defend the Nation in the years ahead. We must move
    deliberately, but also with speed. Our actions this decade will shape
    the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century.
        On behalf of more than 600,000 active and reserve sailors and Navy
    civilians, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I
    am grateful to this Committee, and to all of your colleagues in
    Congress, for your steadfast commitment to the Navy. We look forward to
    sailing alongside you to sustain our advantage at sea.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral Gilday. General
    Berger, please.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Berger. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, over the past couple of
    years, since becoming Commandant, I have come to better
    understand and appreciate the bipartisan support of this
    Committee, which is critical to creating and sustaining the
    force that we have today but also to build the force that we
    are going to need for the future.
        Now I realize, as we all do, that there are competing
    national priorities that you have to wrestle with, and that
    certainly puts pressure on defense budgets. But I am also
    confident that you have a clear view of the severity of the
    security environment around us.
        As the Secretary mentioned, the competition with China and
    Russia is increasing and it is accelerating, and your military
    is going to need more advanced capabilities in order to
    effectively compete, to reassure our allies and partners, and
    to effectively deter war.
        Force Design 2030 is the Marine Corp's answer to creating
    the cutting-edge capabilities that will better enable the fleet
    and the Joint Force to deter, to compete, and to respond with
    ready forces to any crisis, anywhere on the globe. To be clear,
    force design is the centerpiece of a broader, systemic
    modernization effort, as the Chairman pointed out, across the
    Marine Corps, one that improves more than just our equipment
    and our warfighting formations, but also our personnel systems,
    our training systems, and our family programs as well.
        We are roughly 2 years into this modernization effort, and
    I feel I owe this Committee an update. While we do not have
    sufficient time this morning to address every detail, I do want
    to touch on three areas that are key.
        First, we have improved the operational reach and the
    efficacy of our naval expeditionary forces, and this includes
    the Marine Expeditionary Units, the MEUs, which remain the
    crown jewel of the force. Beginning last year, we started our
    transition to a mixed capability of long-range ship and ground-
    based unmanned aerial systems, including the MQ-9 Reaper. This
    will significantly expand the organic ISR [Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities, and it will
    enable us to support both naval and joint operations, including
    anti-submarine warfare.
        We have also initiated a partnership with industry to
    develop a future autonomous, long-range, unmanned surface
    vessel. That is going to extend the reach of our MEUs. That
    vessel will give us a new tool for maritime gray zone
    competition, and it will help in thickening the C5ISR [Command,
    Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems,
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] network, as we
    call it, and it will help us in conventional deterrence, naval
    deterrence, using loitering munitions.
        Lastly, we are aggressively pursuing organic precision
    fires for our infantry, also with loitering munitions, and we
    will make a final decision on vendors this year.
        Second, we have made significant advancements across our
    training and education enterprise. In the past 16 months, we
    released the first new doctrine we published in 20 years,
    actually two publications, one on learning and one on
    competing. We have also significantly advanced the intellectual
    framework for some of our future operating concepts. Earlier
    this year, we published a tentative manual for Expeditionary
    Advanced Base Operations, and we will use that to inform our
    exercises, our experimentation, and our training.
        We have significantly expanded the resources we tie to
    wargaming and to experimentation. Last month, down in Quantico,
    Virginia, we broke ground on a new, state-of-the-art war-gaming
    center that we will use in the future.
        Finally, we have dramatically enhanced both the quality and
    the duration of training for our infantry marines. Infantry
    training is now 50 percent longer, and we added new modules to
    increase lethality.
        Third, we have taken some important initial steps to
    improve our personnel system and our policies. To continue
    attracting the highest quality men and women into our Marine
    Corps, we raised both the AFQT [Armed Forces Qualification
    Test] standards for enlistment and the ASVAB [Armed Services
    Vocational Aptitude Battery] requirements for the infantry. Our
    enlisted performance evaluation system was antiquated. It was
    subjective. It was completely manual. We have now replaced that
    system with a cloud-based system, where marines are evaluated
    now based on clearly defined, objective standards that are
    under their control, and they can see across the force.
        We revised our retention policies. Now qualified marines
    can re-enlist a full year early, and I have delegated two
    commanders in the field the authority to re-enlist qualified
    marines on the spot.
        Recognizing the strong connection between the health of our
    force and the support of our families, we revised out parental
    leave policies. Now they include adoptive and same-sex parents,
    and I will continue to push for expanded maternity leave for
    all marines. While it may seem like a modest accomplishment to
    some this year, we updated our maternity uniforms to improve
    both their utility and their professional appearance.
        So while I am encouraged by the progress of Force Design,
    as well as our other modernization initiatives, I am not
    satisfied with the pace of change. We must move faster. To
    accelerate our programs, we, as a service, need to do a better
    job of explaining the details of Force Design 2030 to members
    and to your staffs, and that is my responsibility as your
    Commandant.
        Last week, I offered to the House Armed Service Committee
    that I would be willing to testify on Force Design before the
    full committee, as well as the Appropriations Committee, if
    committee chairs would find that valuable, and I make the same
    offer here, Chairman.
        It is critical that we build a shared understanding about
    where your Marine Corps is headed and why, and how your support
    is absolutely essential to our success. Equally important I
    believe is explaining how we are going to pay for it all.
        During a recent speech at the Ronald Reagan Institute,
    Chairman Reed noted that belt-tightening, in any department, is
    always a challenge, but it also provides an opportunity to
    evaluate what is necessary, and I agree. In today's challenging
    budget environment, the Marine Corps has pursued a cost-neutral
    approach for the last 2 years to Force Design. We have self-
    funded our modernization. To ensure the success of this
    approach, I will ask your support for reducing the total
    procurement of some platforms, commensurate with the current
    reduction in our end strength. The fact is, today's Marine
    Corps is significantly smaller than it was 10 to 12 years ago,
    almost 24,000 marines smaller, and we simply will not need as
    many ground vehicles, will not need as many aircraft as we did
    when the initial procurement decisions were made a decade ago.
    It is simple math.
        So with the reductions outlined in our Force Design report
    I believe we will have sufficient resources to create the
    modern capabilities required for competition, for deterrence,
    and for crisis response, without a further reduction in our end
    strength.
        I welcome the opportunity to work with this Committee, and
    I look forward to your questions, both in this hearing and in
    the weeks that follow. Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Berger follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General David H. Berger
                                  introduction
        Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of
    this Committee, thank you for this opportunity to present the annual
    report on the Marine Corps. More importantly, thank you for your
    continued support and leadership over this challenging year. I believe
    strongly that major change in existing force structure and ways of
    doing business are needed in this era of renewed great power
    competition. The strategic environment the Marine Corps and joint force
    operate in has changed, as has the domestic context as a result of the
    ongoing COVID-19 and related relief measures. We must therefore make
    appropriate adjustments to our investment plans to ensure a proper
    return on the taxpayers' investment. The promotion and sustainment of
    the Marine Corps that our Nation and fleets will need in 2030 and
    beyond requires your continued active support.
        Since testifying last year, our Nation has engaged in a long
    overdue conversation on race and social justice sparked by several
    visible incidents of institutional racism, and perhaps more
    importantly--how to remedy the inequities of the present. As with all
    other Americans, I--and every other marine--have acknowledged these
    challenges, and will continue to do our part to overcome them once and
    for all. While confronting issues of inequality, we have simultaneously
    endured the adverse consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Like
    millions of others, marines and their families across the country and
    globe suffered the consequences of isolation, closure of our public
    schools, and increased childcare demands; and like those millions of
    other Americans, marines made the necessary sacrifices to stop the
    spread. I am proud of every one of those marines with their collective
    leadership and of their ability to rapidly adapt and lead by example.
        Our Nation witnessed a small but violent minority attempt to
    subvert the rule of law through an overt act of violent coercion on
    January 6, 2021. Like most every other American, I was shocked by this
    attack on our democracy. I was even more dismayed to learn that some of
    those engaged in that attack had previously served in the military--to
    include the United States Marine Corps. Thankfully, we as a nation and
    military have done as we always do--learned, endured, and grown
    stronger. We have and will continue to actively work to identify
    recruits and marines who hold extremist views and we look forward to
    participating in the Secretary of Defense's new Countering Extremism
    Working Group to develop additional methods of keeping extremists from
    within our ranks.
        Over the past year, I have continued to communicate my
    understanding of the future demands of naval expeditionary warfare and
    maritime gray zone competition. Related to the future of naval
    campaigns, I have articulated a case for change to reinforce and expand
    existing naval warfighting advantages and create future strategic
    advantages. It is abundantly clear that a future operating environment
    characterized by a maturing and proliferating precision strike regime
    will place heavy demands on our Nation's Naval Services. We are not yet
    organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet those demands and
    support fleet operations. This is no longer a controversial assertion
    as it was when my predecessor first uttered it. The vast majority of
    defense professionals--including the Members of the bipartisan Future
    of Defense Task Force--perceive the same challenges I do in the
    emerging operating environment, as well as the urgent need for real
    innovation and rapid change in response. Although there is an ongoing,
    healthy debate about how and what we should change across the Armed
    Services, there are very few lining up to defend the status quo. We
    must continue to discuss these changes, but defense professionals have
    almost unanimously acknowledged that real change is required--and soon.
        Though some things require substantial change, we should be clear
    to acknowledge those foundational tenets which remain as relevant and
    operationally suitable today as they have been over the previous 70
    years. In 1952, Members of Congress noted the Marine Corps ``can
    prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and
    vigorous action during their incipient stages. The nation's shock
    troops must be the most ready when the Nation is least ready . . . to
    provide a balanced force-in-readiness for a naval campaign and, at the
    same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain
    international disturbances short of large-scale war . . .'' This role
    as the Nation's force-in-readiness, prepared to create strategic
    advantage via its ability to be quickest to respond to either crisis or
    conflict, and prepared to both prevent and contain conflict below the
    threshold of traditional armed conflict remains as valid today as it
    was when first articulated.
                        personnel and talent management
        None of our Force Design 2030 aspirations are possible without
    addressing the people within our ranks. As Secretary Austin
    highlighted, ``our most critical asset . . . is our people.'' I believe
    this is even more relevant within the Marine Corps. Marines are the
    heart and soul of the Corps. Almost all of your 225,000 marines serve
    honorably every day, representing the very best of our country and your
    constituencies. No institution, however, is without flaws. As I noted
    last year, malignant individuals and small malignant subcultures
    continue to exist within your Marine Corps. In this era of profound
    ideological division within our Nation, some individual marines
    regrettably bring with them, or fall victim to while in service,
    misogynistic, racist, and homophobic/transphobic ideologies driven by
    hate, fear, and ignorance. While I have instituted even more rigorous
    policies than previously existed to ensure we identify such individuals
    during enlistment and accession screening, I remain committed to
    identifying and holding accountable any marine unable to uphold our
    core values and to adhere to our unapologetically high standards. This
    is what you should expect from me, and you will get it.
        Within the context of the larger national conversation on race,
    social justice, and equality, it became clear to me early in my
    Commandancy that there were symbols and behaviors within our Corps that
    challenged the cohesion and unity essential to military effectiveness.
    The Confederate Battle flag stood out as one such symbol. I am not a
    historian and do not take a position as to the true meaning of this
    ancient banner, but some in today's world have rallied around the
    colors of that defeated rebellion to foster division and hate. As a
    result, I prohibited its display aboard all Marine Corps installations
    beginning last spring. My primary responsibility is to prepare marines
    to fight and win in combat, and we cannot tolerate artificial division
    driving wedges among your marines--especially ones so easy to identify
    and remove. I will do everything within my authority to remove any
    obstacle preventing equality and cohesion. Signs or symbols that
    support or endorse hatred, ignorance, or injustice have no place in our
    Corps.
        While these acknowledgements of past prejudice are good first
    steps, we must do more than simply look over our shoulders at the past.
    We must acknowledge the real bias and obstacles in the system today. We
    must promote and retain the very best marines; however, it is clear to
    me that a degree of structural racism and sexism exists within our
    current system. We must create a system of structural equality that
    ensures all marines--of all backgrounds--are able to use their best
    talents to solve the problems we soon will face. The diversity of
    thought and actions each marine brings will help us find more creative
    and innovative solutions to these future challenges. We must actively
    work to retain and grow this diversity of thought through a more
    diverse group of talented individuals, while at the same time
    protecting against extremism.
        Over the past decade and in close coordination with Congress, we've
    prioritized the prevention of sexual harassment and sexual assault as
    well as dedicated tremendous effort into providing the appropriate
    response to these criminal acts. I am convinced of the linkage between
    sexual harassment and sexual assault, thus we will continue to make
    every effort to eliminate both from our ranks with your continued
    assistance. We have increased the number of Victim Legal Counselors
    dedicated to supporting sexual assault victims over the past 12 months.
    However, all of these efforts are dedicated to the response after a
    tragic event has occurred. We must do better at the prevention in order
    to stop sexual assault and sexual harassment before they occur.
    Although we conduct regular training aimed at preventing this from
    happening, we are still working to overcome unhealthy attitudes and
    behaviors recruits arrive with to Recruit Training. We must develop
    practices that identify those negative behaviors before they turn into
    heinous acts and prevent such behaviors from occurring in the first
    place.
        Improving the capabilities and proficiencies of the individual
    marine necessitates we must also have the very best senior leaders for
    those marines. I am humbled to serve alongside the General Officers and
    Flag Officers within the Department of the Navy. But even one instance
    of misconduct or misbehavior within our General Officer ranks is too
    many. Over the past decade, the Marine Corps has selected several
    officers for promotion to brigadier general who subsequently failed to
    be confirmed by the Senate. This is unacceptable. Over the coming
    months, I will announce several major policy changes related to talent
    management to include how we screen and select our commanders and most
    senior leaders. We are currently reviewing the efficacy of implementing
    a 360-degree review for all lieutenant colonels and colonels eligible
    for command selection and all colonels eligible for selection to
    brigadier general, to help ensure we identify the absolute best who
    have earned the trust and respect of juniors, peers, and seniors alike.
    In addition to these issues related to screening, I remain concerned at
    the absence of Black officers within the senior ranks of our aviation
    enterprise and specifically within the ranks of our fixed-wing pilots,
    as well as the paucity of female general officers. We are currently
    studying both issues, and will share the results of those studies once
    completed.
        As you are aware, we cannot create new senior leaders in a day. If
    we are to correct our gap in diversity at the senior ranks, we must
    also address diversity at accessions. The largest single source of
    commissioning within the Marine Corps is the U. S. Naval Academy,
    accounting for nearly 20 percent of officer commissions each year. A
    recently released study identified that almost 75 percent of the
    nominations to our service academies were given to white students. The
    diversity of this population has a direct impact on what leaders are
    available for selection to our senior ranks.
        It is not enough that we recruit and train the very best. Once
    marines have joined our ranks, we must nurture and incentivize them
    along their individual journeys through a modern talent management
    system flexible enough to account for changing career interests and
    common life choices over time. Without such a system, we will
    increasingly struggle to retain the very best people in an ever more
    competitive marketplace. Our one-size-fits-all, industrial-era approach
    that treats individuals as interchangeable cogs within a larger machine
    does not appropriately incentivize the most talented individuals to
    remain in service. We are currently reviewing policy options that will
    offer marines greater flexibility when it comes to tour lengths based
    on an individual's circumstances--most notably when a marine has a
    child entering or completing high school. Our marines must not be
    forced to choose between being good parents or being good marines.
    Those sterling goals must be compatible. I remain committed to
    improving the lives of our marines as they become parents and we are
    looking into ways that would prevent them from having to choose between
    the newborn and continued service as a marine. I truly desire a Marine
    Corps known for being the best within the joint force for our treatment
    of new parents and families--and not just our warfighting prowess.
        It is a well-known issue that the Marine Corps is struggling to
    recruit and retain Americans possessing the crucial science,
    technology, engineering, and mathematical skills and competencies
    required for the future. Technology companies present exciting and
    challenging opportunities for software developers, cyber professionals,
    and engineers. We must offer opportunities that allow someone to choose
    both service and professional reward. In addition, we must do a better
    job targeting the application of our NROTC scholarships to these
    individuals, as well as explore new possibilities with Historically
    Black Colleges and Universities to satisfy these shortfalls.
        The military services--including your Marine Corps--continue to
    lose the competition with the civilian airline industry for pilots and
    maintainers, even with the adverse impacts of COVID-19 on the airline
    industry. We are not maintaining sufficient numbers of naval aviators
    and F-35 maintainers to sustain either our existing inventory of
    aircraft or aircraft programmed for the years to come. Within our F-35
    community, we have a shortfall of both pilots and maintainers. I am
    concerned that if we do not remedy these shortfalls in the very near
    future, we may be in a situation in which we are directed by Congress
    to procure aircraft for which we have insufficient pilots and
    maintainers.
                             training and education
        A key element of our larger force design transformation is our need
    to adopt an information age approach to training and education that
    produces better leaders and warfighters more effectively and
    efficiently. The essence of this approach is to focus on identifying,
    developing, and sustaining the unique talents of individual marines,
    not turning out MOS-shaped cogs to fit MOS-shaped slots in a machine.
    Better warfighters in an era of exponential change means adaptive,
    critical thinkers who are also tactical and operational masters of
    their profession. Among many implications of this shift will be higher
    expectations and intellectual standards for marines, especially
    commissioned officers, at every stage of their selection for and
    attendance at formal schools. We still need standardized training and
    education to set a baseline and inculcate our core Service values and
    ethos, but there are significant aspects of entry-level training that
    must be adapted. Much of our current understanding of future
    warfighting requirements, associated concepts, and force design point
    to a more highly trained force from the entry-level onward. We need to
    change how we train and educate as well. We have known for a long time
    that rote repetition and even ``perfect practice'' against static,
    unresisting targets is only the barest beginning of mastery. Consistent
    opportunities to make tactical and operational decisions against a
    thinking enemy must be a critical part of our curricula at all levels.
    This kind of force-on-force wargaming and training must stand on a
    solid foundation of military history and theory--games, simulations,
    and exercises are necessary, but not sufficient. We will develop that
    foundation in school, but sustain it by rigorous, accountable, self-
    directed effort. We must address the question of ``standards''
    transparently and head-on to create the force we desire, and to create
    the force we advertise. In an initial step to creating a philosophy and
    culture of a learning organization, last year I signed the first all-
    new service doctrine since 1998; MCDP 7 Learning was released in
    February and MCDP 1-4 Competing in December. In addition to releasing
    new doctrine, we have elevated command of our Training and Education
    Command to a three-star general, equal to all other Deputy Commandants,
    and are in the process of re-establishing a robust Futures Directorate.
        Achieving diversity of thought requires fixing our entry-level
    instruction to allow every new recruit and officer candidate the same
    opportunity to master these skills without it impeding their future
    career opportunities. Not every young man or woman who joins our ranks
    grew up participating in activities relevant to individual battlefield
    skills such as marksmanship, orienteering, water survival, or technical
    skills. As a matter of longstanding practice, however, we continue to
    assess potential at the very earliest stages of our recruit and officer
    training programs based on performance in precisely those skills. There
    is no doubt of the continuing importance of these military basics, but
    we cannot expect every new marine to master those individual skills
    with the same amount of in-service instruction, regardless of previous
    experience. A new recruit who has never touched a rifle cannot be
    expected to master marksmanship in the same amount of time as a recruit
    who grew up handling rifles regularly, and a marine who never learned
    to swim should not compete unaided for job placement with a marine who
    grew up as a competitive swimmer. In effect, we penalize marines who
    fail to master these basic skills because they did not start with the
    same knowledge or skill base. While holding the line on the standard of
    basic competencies that define a marine, our entry-level training must
    provide the instruction necessary for every recruit and officer
    candidate to achieve mastery in basic skills, regardless of how much
    time it takes.
        The COVID-19 pandemic brought new challenges and opportunities to
    your Marine Corps. During the entire time, your force-in-readiness
    continued recruiting, training, operating, and deploying around the
    globe. Although we did not stop any of our activities, we did learn
    many lessons from the pandemic that we can continue to use going
    forward to make a more resilient and capable force. We devised new
    methods of virtually connecting with potential recruits and with our
    force, internally. For entry-level training, we spread out recruits
    while they slept and installed more handwashing stations, which has
    virtually eliminated the inevitable illness that the new recruits will
    pass around as they come in from all over the country. A key factor in
    this success has been the level of discipline instilled by small unit
    leaders which prevented any significant outbreaks and kept marines
    healthy. Your marines continue to serve their communities by
    establishing Federal COVID-19 vaccine sites in local communities in
    support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. As President Biden
    highlighted, we don't have enough people to provide vaccination shots--
    put the shots in people's arms--so marines are filling in this
    immediate shortfall.
                           gender integrated training
        The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA directed the Marine Corps to integrate
    training at both Marine Corps Recruit Depots Parris Island and San
    Diego. Since the signing of the law, we have trained multiple
    integrated companies at MCRD Parris Island. In February, the recruits
    of Lima Company were the first gender-integrated company at MCRD San
    Diego in the installation's 100-year existence. To train the first
    females at MCRD San Diego, we graduated the first gender-integrated
    class at Drill Instructor School in San Diego in December and relocated
    female drill instructors from MCRD Parris Island. We will take the
    lessons learned from this company as well as a concurrent study to
    identify the requirements needed to fulfill the 2020 NDAA within the
    prescribed timelines. However, as I have publicly stated several times,
    we will prioritize options that provide the best training and most
    efficient use of resources to ensure marines graduating from boot camp
    are ready for the rigors of service in an elite organization during
    challenging times.
                                  force design
        Shortly after I testified before this Committee in the spring of
    2020, I published the Force Design 2030 report. Force Design 2030 is
    how your Marine Corps is changing its trajectory to create advantage
    for the fleets and joint force in both maritime gray zone competition
    and more traditional conflict. Although we need new capabilities to
    deter adversaries, we must fundamentally change how we think about
    armed conflict. We can no longer view warfare through the binary lens
    of war and peace, but should recognize the existence of a cyclical
    continuum of competition that occurs every day and involves all
    elements of national power. Historically, the military viewed
    maintaining the peace as deterring war through denial or by punishment.
    Force Design 2030 offers a third option in addition to those two that
    will counter strategies below the threshold of armed-conflict by
    winning the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance competition and
    facilitating deterrence by detection.
        At its core, Force Design 2030 is a campaign of learning. Through
    wargames, analysis, and limited experimentation, it has become clear
    the joint force needs a capability that operates persistently and with
    maximum organic mobility and dispersion to compete and deter in the
    contact and blunt layers. The vulnerability of large fixed bases and
    shore-based infrastructure to long-range precision strike, combined
    with the impracticality of defending such infrastructure from the
    pacing threat's emerging capabilities at any politically-feasible level
    of resourcing and regional posture, necessitates that the stand-in
    force be able to perform these functions from a strictly expeditionary
    and highly mobile and resilient naval posture. This refined analysis
    and understanding is what is driving our Force Design 2030 to support
    concepts like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), as well as
    informing the recently released Tentative Manual on Expeditionary
    Advanced Based Operations. We will continue to refine and update the
    Tentative Manual with the lessons learned from our FMF experimentation.
    In the near future, we will release our latest concept--Stand-In
    Forces.
        Much as our 29th Commandant codified maneuver warfare in our
    principal doctrine MCDP-1 Warfighting to instill a maneuver warfare
    mindset into every marine, I felt it necessary to codify how we compete
    every day around the globe. We recently released a doctrinal
    publication entitled Competing to instill a competitive mindset into
    every marine, whether above or below the threshold of armed conflict.
    Marines--and the military as a whole--must be aware that every action
    or inaction has an effect on reassuring our partners and allies and
    deterring our competitors. All that we do, from our force laydown, to
    the activity at each location, to the equipment we buy, signals our
    commitment to reassure and deter. In a globally connected operating
    environment, we no longer have the luxury of maintaining a binary
    combat or garrison mindset; our posture and mindset must be one of
    continuous competition.
                      naval expeditionary stand-in forces
        Expeditionary advanced bases are a platform for small, mission-
    tailored groups of marines to distribute and hide in plain sight with
    the assistance of advanced camouflage, cover, concealment, detection,
    and deception (C3D2) capabilities against a competitor who is seeking
    to locate our forces. Expeditionary advanced bases will enable the
    convergence of capabilities from multiple domains and create the
    virtues of mass without concentration. The Marine Littoral Regiment
    (MLR)--the base unit for our future force--will provide fleet and joint
    force commanders with persistent, survivable forces that will enable
    the generation of effects within areas that our adversaries hope to
    deny to us through their integrated systems of anti-access and area-
    denial capabilities. In terms of hardware, marine capabilities will
    include anti-ship Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) loaded on the unmanned
    Remotely Operated Ground Unit Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires; self-
    sustainment and mobility with the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW); and,
    long-loiter aerial reconnaissance in an expeditionary environment with
    the Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) Group 5 unmanned aerial
    systems (UAS). Future infantry units operating within the MLR construct
    will be equipped with organic precision fires to include loitering
    munitions. The MLRs will be networked with our F-35 capabilities,
    providing a further layer of combat credibility and sensing. In the
    future, these forces could employ more advanced munitions such as
    Tomahawk Land Attack Munitions (TLAM), Maritime Strike Tomahawks (MST),
    SM-6 containerized anti-ship missiles; and a wide array of unmanned or
    optionally manned systems to enhance deterrence. Without these long-
    range precision fires, the MLRs will not be suitable to support the
    fleets and will lack the ability to influence the vast maritime area
    your Marine Corps must do.
        In the even more critical human domain, these capabilities will
    encompass the necessary training and education to produce leaders who
    understand how to deter competitors and provide civilian leadership
    strategic options across a wider spectrum. The MLRs will offer
    deterrence by detection through constant surveillance of the
    competitor, complicating their decision-making calculus if they attempt
    fait accompli gambits, and doing so while networked into the larger
    architecture of naval and joint command, control, computers,
    communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
    tracking (C5ISR-T) articulated in the Joint All-Domain Command and
    Control (JADC2) concept and previous discussions on Mosaic Warfare.
        With global sensors becoming ubiquitous, the value of
    reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance or scouting and counter-
    scouting will increase. Force Design 2030 offers civilian leaders
    strategic options to identify, deter, and hold accountable competitors
    challenging U.S. interests or infringing on international norms at any
    point on the globe. It creates advantage by providing uniformed and
    civilian leadership with a force capable of denying key maritime
    terrain to an adversary or to force a change in decision calculus and
    facilitate de-escalation. Those naval expeditionary forces will also be
    capable of rapidly sensing, making sense, and acting upon information
    from inside the enemy's weapon engagement zone (WEZ) in support of the
    fleet and larger joint force, further complicating adversary decision
    calculus. These stand-in forces will be able to support anti-submarine
    warfare (ASW) efforts and help sanitize key maritime straits, thus
    expanding our strategic undersea warfare advantage. Your Marine Corps
    is transforming into a force capable of competing and winning the
    hider/finder competition by proliferating sensors to detect adversary
    presence, employing advanced C3D2 for resilience, and maintaining a
    lethal array of long-range precision fires to prosecute targets at a
    time and place of our choosing--whether ashore or afloat or in the air.
    Stand-in forces will simultaneously satisfy traditional requirements
    from the fleet and combatant commanders for a modern, resilient crisis
    response force capable of responding across the range of military
    operations. And, as noted in the most recent testimony by the
    Commander, USINDOPACOM, these stand-in expeditionary forces are further
    required as the forward leading-edge to any strategic defense in the
    Indo-Pacific and any maritime defense-in-depth.
        From our continued wargaming and experimentation, we have learned
    much about the utility of multi-domain reconnaissance. As a result,
    over the coming months a new marine reconnaissance enterprise will
    consolidate disparate elements of existing organizations within a
    structure capable of generating a coherent, persistent, forward-
    presence focused on key maritime terrain that is vital to U.S. national
    security interests. The next step will be the development of our Mobile
    Reconnaissance framework which will deliver expanded all-domain
    capabilities to our naval expeditionary forces and fleets via a
    combination of Marine Commandos, manned and unmanned surface platforms
    to include the Long-Range, Unmanned Surface Vessels (LRUSV) and small
    boats, manned and unmanned ground Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles (ULTV),
    unmanned aerial systems, and unmanned subsurface vehicles. As with
    other force design efforts, these forces will be fully capable of
    networking with our 5th generation F-35 capabilities as well as
    connecting with the larger joint architecture. In addition to offering
    continuous surveillance in the contact layer, the MLR increases
    lethality, disbursement, mobility, and survivability in a way that our
    current stable of large, expensive, high-signature platforms cannot
    match to deter and counter aggression in critical regions. The MLRs
    will provide a unique expeditionary advanced base capability, but they
    will not be the sole definition of the FMF as our Marine Expeditionary
    Units will remain our ``crown jewel.'' Your Marine Corps can compete,
    deter, and win as part of a naval expeditionary force operating in
    international waters and with light footprints ashore on the territory
    of local allies and partners. It does not require the sustained
    presence of heavy ground forces or the regular deployment of large,
    land-based aviation elements. These unique capabilities make the Marine
    Corps the ideal choice for a force-in-readiness that serves as the
    backbone of the contact layer because our forces can cooperate with
    allied and partnered nations without burdening their local
    infrastructure, whether for steady-state operations or disaster
    response operations. Additionally, the sensing elements of the FMF
    coupled with lethality are key attributes in preventing conflict.
                                    posture
        Twenty-first century strategic competition requires a new posture
    to deter modern threats. Our current force posture is strikingly
    similar to the one designed coming out of the Korean War. That posture
    was designed to deter and confront a Soviet threat that consisted of
    strategic bombers and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Over the
    last two decades, our strategic competitors took note of our strengths
    and designed forces specifically to counter them. We must now adjust
    our posture against the pacing threat of China due to its ability to
    hold our fleet at stand-off ranges and prevent significant force
    projections. This does not mean abandoning our forward position of
    advantage, but rather adopting a more robust and resilient forward-
    deployed posture as described in testimony by Admiral Davidson as part
    of a larger defense-in-depth.
        Marine forces working with Navy ships must occupy space within the
    contested first and second island chains in the Indo-Pacific with the
    ability to effectively operate in all domains. Guam remains one of our
    most important strategic locations as it is US territory located
    closest to contested maritime regions. In order to effectively deter by
    detection, our forces must be within sensor and striking range to
    impose cost on the adversary through their allocation of limited C5ISR-
    T assets or determining that the cost is too high to attempt anything
    that would cross the line of established international laws and norms.
    However, while Guam remains a strategically important location within
    our larger defense-in-depth, we must not ignore the potential impacts
    to it due to the adverse effects of climate change. We must take the
    necessary steps to protect Guam and the strategic advantage it
    provides.
        Our posture includes more than the laydown of our forces around the
    world, it also must include what our forces are doing in those
    locations. As Secretary Austin has told us, ``our success will depend
    on how closely we work with our friends around the world to secure our
    common interests and promote our shared values.'' Marines regularly
    conduct training with allies and partners globally. This training is
    beneficial to building trusting relationships and interoperability.
    These relationships are not--and should not be--one way, in that US
    Forces tell partners and allies how to operate. We can learn from other
    nations as much as we can teach. For example, the Japanese Amphibious
    Rapid Deployment Brigade may have used the U. S. Marine Corps as an
    example in its development, but we have much to learn from them based
    on how quickly they designed, assembled, tested, and operationalized
    the brigade. Our commitment to working with allies and partners creates
    a mutually beneficial relationship for our military organizations while
    simultaneously signaling our resolve to competitors. Initiatives like
    the Pacific Deterrence and the European Deterrence are so important in
    supporting our posture.
                              competition and risk
        Some critics of our Force Design 2030 suggest that non-stealthy
    platforms such as the LAW, LPD-17 class amphibious ship, and the
    current Group 5 UAS are operationally unsuitable for high-end
    warfighting. This critique's foundational assumption is that our
    decades-old stealth technology or military-standard naval architecture
    will be overcome with technological countermeasures and that stealth
    technologies will become affordable enough to proliferate the operating
    environment in large quantities. Survivability under such conditions is
    likely to prove far more a matter of quantity, dispersion, signature
    management, and distributed lethality than of being able to avoid
    technical detection or defend against all threats. We must view
    survivability in terms of the entire system--the entire system must be
    able to survive long enough to accomplish the mission vice an
    individual platform. The expeditionary system of platforms our marines
    employ--and the networks they operate on--must be capable of competing
    and deterring below the level of armed conflict as well as fight at the
    high-end to reassure our partners and allies as well as demonstrate a
    credible capability to a would-be adversary. For example, while not a
    part of the currently envisioned program, LAWs operating in plain sight
    with containerized missiles could effectively compete and deter. Such a
    reimagining of the program could involve greater costs, so we will have
    to study the benefits and make resource informed decisions about
    tradeoffs in capabilities and capacity. Traditional amphibious ships,
    such as the LPD-17s, possessing tactical advantages derived from well-
    decks will confound adversaries and force them to consume resources
    attempting to positively identify those capabilities loaded inside--
    whether unmanned surface vessels, unmanned underwater vessels, or more
    traditional capabilities. Long-endurance Group 5 UAS, like the MQ-9,
    also provides the persistent presence necessary to win the hider /
    finder competition for the fleet. Additionally, a proven platform like
    the MQ-9 supports quickly learning the platform through the experience
    of the US Air Force while continuing adaptation and innovation over
    time as we procure the future system.
        If competition expands from opening volleys or punishment strikes
    to large-scale conflict, the Fleet Marine Force offers the Joint Force
    Commander a persistent stand-in force capable of conducting
    reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and targeting in the blunt
    layer. A stand-in force with the ability to support allies and partners
    while striking the adversary with long range precision fires, 5th
    generation short take-off and vertical landing aircraft, and a host of
    electronic warfare options combined with the mobility of the Amphibious
    Combat Vehicle (ACV), LAW, and unmanned surface and undersea vehicles
    provides a survivable option to buy time for the remainder of the joint
    force to bring war-winning capabilities.
                            logistics and resilience
        Sustaining the force we are developing now becomes even more
    critical in the years ahead. The relative ease with which we have been
    able to project power into the Middle East over the last few decades
    has lulled us into a false sense of security. As a result, we have
    optimized service logistics efforts to support requirements without
    regard to the threat actions that could disrupt them. My predecessor
    said ``we are going to have to fight to get to the fight.'' I will take
    that a step further by saying we will have to fight to sustain our
    warfighting efforts over time. The Joint Logistics Enterprise must
    connect our emerging operational concepts at the tactical edge all the
    way back to the defense industrial base. We have been an end user of
    the system, but that needs to change. We must develop new methods for
    the Naval Force to enable broader joint force sustainment efforts. On a
    day-to-day basis, today's distributed force strains our systems to the
    limits. This will only get more challenging considering the dynamic,
    evolving threats that competitors can apply against our supply chains,
    manufacturing bases, and global sustainment network.
        Based on anticipated funding levels and the additional budget
    uncertainty that has been introduced by the COVID-19 response, we must
    clearly consider risk as we move forward. Our force design efforts for
    the future will provide the context necessary to make the difficult
    choices for our installations and logistics enterprise. We can no
    longer accept the inefficiencies inherent in legacy bureaucratic
    processes nor accept incremental improvements. In order for our
    installations and logistics organizations to change effectively, we
    must better understand the implications that Force Design 2030 will
    have on the FMF across multiple time horizons so we can resource our
    installations and logistics enterprise appropriately. In coordination
    with partners both inside and outside the service, we will evolve our
    organization to meet the future FMF's operational requirements in the
    air, on land, and at sea while continuing to provide world-class
    support to the force today. This may require a change in the existing
    command relationships between the bases and stations and the forces
    they support. I will keep the Committee fully informed of any such
    changes as our understanding evolves.
        Finally, in an effort to modernize our bases and stations in a
    manner commensurate with our overall force design, we are experimenting
    with advanced force protection systems enabled by artificial
    intelligence at several of our installations. This capability is
    promising and may provide the service an opportunity to greatly enhance
    the protection of our installations while drastically cutting personnel
    costs.
                       major defense acquisition programs
        I have always operated under the assumption that evidence, wargame
    findings, modeling and simulations, and my own best military advice as
    Commandant would persuade people across the defense enterprise and
    within Congress that we need change now. While I remain convinced that
    this assumption remains valid and look forward to a continued dialogue
    with the Committee, we have more work to do to persuade key audiences
    of the merits of our desired changes. Congressional support for Ground
    Based Anti-Ship Missiles (GBASM); LRUSV; Medium Altitude, Long
    Endurance UAS; and I believe that Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) will
    be essential to our modernization efforts. We will continue to work
    with the Congress to demonstrate the importance of a rapid acquisition
    of these critical capabilities. I have repeatedly asked for
    Congressional support to change legacy programs that are no longer
    operationally relevant or have become cost prohibitive, as well as
    support for new initiatives that create a relative warfighting
    advantage. This is the kind of agility we will need going forward in
    order to sustain that warfighting advantage.
        Based on my understanding of the strategic challenges before us and
    my desire to remain the best steward of taxpayer dollars, I am
    convinced that we must be willing to critically assess the scope of
    current Programs of Record for our Major Defense Acquisition Programs
    (MDAP). As we reduce the end strength of the Marine Corps in order to
    internally fund our modernization, each MDAP must be reevaluated for
    capacity and sustainability. We will need the continued support of
    Congress to re-scope any program that exceeds our requirement or is
    unaffordable to procure, man, and sustain.
        In addition, we should acknowledge that up to three quarters of a
    weapon system's cost occurs in sustainment-- the operational and
    maintenance upkeep after the initial acquisition. With the new
    procurement of large weapon systems like the F-35B/C, CH-53K, MV-22,
    JLTV, and ACV--to name but a few--we should be prepared to modify
    programs of records to ensure affordability and viability throughout
    the entire lifecycle of each program. Prioritizing high-end platforms
    without resourcing the supplies and infrastructure needed to sustain
    its operational capability is fundamentally irresponsible; the result
    would be a hollow force.
        With every dollar we expend to upgrade a legacy platform that is no
    longer survivable against a peer competitor, we are slowing our rate of
    transformation. Our competitors no longer wait to see what America does
    and follow suit; they have embarked on their own trajectory, which
    currently outpaces ours. Our Force Design 2030 addresses this problem
    by forcing the competitor to adapt to us through the tactical,
    operational, and strategic challenges a truly modern force presents.
    This does create domestic dilemmas as we are forced to transition from
    legacy platforms built in certain districts to modern and relevant
    equipment that may be built elsewhere. However, if we are to succeed in
    this great power competition, we must make those difficult choices. I
    remain confident that this can occur in a responsible and balanced way,
    without creating winners and losers, and look forward to discussions
    with each of you on a way ahead that satisfies shared interests.
        The Marine Corps remains constrained by an acquisition process that
    tries to eliminate risk--risk poorly defined as uncertainty. We must
    recognize that incrementally better versions of the current Marine
    Corps is not going to be enough for real great power competition. As
    noted in the House Armed Services Committee's Future of Defense Task
    Force Report 2020, our acquisition process is too sluggish to work
    effectively at scale with many technology companies, as they need to
    innovate and compete daily to survive in their dynamic industry. With
    the rapid transition we need to make over the next decade, we must be
    willing to incur some short-term risk to better prepare and compete in
    the future. The ability to prototype new technologies, then
    aggressively experiment and exercise with prototype equipment to
    understand its full capability on the battlefield is paramount. Lastly,
    I agree with the Report's recommendation that we need a process that
    better bridges the ``valley of death'' to transition critical prototype
    equipment into full-scale fielding without taking years through the
    traditional planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process.
                       readiness and strategic advantage
        As we build a more capable and lethal force, we must also take into
    consideration the readiness of that force. Since 2017, the Marine Corps
    has significantly increased the availability of forces to Combatant
    Commanders based on the generous funding of Congress. As marines deploy
    forward in support of operational requirements, they buy down today's
    risk by deterring competitors from violating international norms while
    assuring allies and partners of the strength of our commitments.
    However, the mere availability of those marines does not equal
    readiness to compete in the maritime gray zone, nor does it create
    strategic advantage to deter or defeat rapidly evolving threats. It is
    time for us to embrace a more sophisticated and balanced understanding
    of military readiness and cease using availability as the primary
    metric in our readiness evaluations. This antiquated model is hugely
    consumptive and forces us to spend limited resources ensuring the
    availability of platforms designated for retirement and replacement.
    This also applies to equipment that we are attempting to transition to
    more modern capabilities. For example, every dollar spent to make a 4th
    generation aircraft that has exceeded its intended service life is a
    dollar that cannot be spent to accelerate the fielding of 5th
    generation very low-observable aircraft and advanced UAS. We must
    invest in future capabilities that create, maintain, and expand
    warfighting advantage to ensure a ready force tomorrow that maintains
    its ability to compete and deter.
        During the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
    Armenian ground forces that we would have labeled ready based on
    availability, were easily targeted and destroyed by Azerbaijani forces
    employing elements of a precision strike regime to include swarms of
    loitering munitions and lethal unmanned systems. While Armenia's tanks
    and infantry fighting vehicles were available, they were not
    operationally suitable, thus not ready for the conflict. As our
    competitors continue to expand their capabilities, we will soon find
    ourselves outmatched unless we change our readiness framework. To do
    so, we should embrace a new readiness paradigm in which availability
    ranks behind generating a relative warfighting advantage. A ready
    capability in the future must be one that is both available when we
    need it and creates a strategic warfighting advantage against a
    specific threat in great power competition and conflict.
        A ready force that creates a strategic advantage over the pacing
    threat must be organized to generate faster decision cycles against the
    enemy. A large part of our Force Design 2030 efforts is aimed at
    developing the right capabilities for the future force, but just as
    important is devising the correct organizational model to employ those
    capabilities. I do not support creating more or larger headquarters
    organizations to accommodate the larger quantities of data coming in as
    I feel this will only slow the decision-making process. I'm also not
    committed to organizations that we have employed in the past if they
    don't work to fulfill our future requirements. In addition to right-
    sizing our FMF, I've also directed an ongoing assessment to reduce 15
    percent of our personnel across Headquarters Marine Corps to generate
    savings that we can reinvest into our warfighting capabilities without
    losing the institutional processes necessary to support an adaptable
    force.
        Your Marine Corps, and the Naval Service as a whole, have a proven
    record when it comes to driving change. Both the People's Republic of
    China and Russia modernized their militaries over the past decade based
    on what they assessed as our strengths and our competitive warfighting
    advantages. They adapted their operational and strategic approaches to
    counter us and now we must modernize in order to remedy shortfalls and
    drive the next cycle of change. Simply making our legacy platforms
    better or more of them available will not force our competitors to
    change course, nor will it create the strategic advantage required. I
    concur with the Air Force Chief of Staff General CQ Brown: we must
    accelerate change or lose.
        One way we can accelerate change is by seeking a more nuanced
    understanding of readiness as it applies to each service or even common
    force elements within each service, and to ask--how many forces-in-
    readiness can we collectively afford? A critical factor of
    understanding readiness is identifying when a joint force will need a
    capability in accordance with a detailed mobilization plan. The Marine
    Corps--as well as other critical elements of the joint force--will
    always be at the front of the timelines because we are the force who is
    present before conflict and deters an adversary's early escalation.
    Serving as the foundational element of our persistent contact layer
    allows time for the joint force to mobilize and surge the war winning
    capabilities of the other services. However, without your marines
    forward deployed to tamp back the aggressor and create decision space,
    the joint force will not have the time and opportunity to deploy.
                       fleet design and naval integration
        Thus far, my comments have focused on issues germane to my role as
    Commandant of the Marine Corps--to organize, train, and equip Marine
    Corps forces in support of the Fleets and Combatant Commanders. Please
    now allow me to share a few thoughts with you as one of the three
    senior naval officials testifying before you and also as a member of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My experience and role as a senior Naval
    officer requires that I share my best military advice in the ongoing
    fleet design conversation. One thing is clear: serious naval
    professionals both in and out of service agree that the status quo
    fleet will not provide the strategic advantages required in an era of
    great power competition, and must change.
        I would like to state for the record my thanks to the CNO and his
    OPNAV staff for their continued support redesigning the fleet and the
    amphibious / naval expeditionary portion of it without reservation or
    hesitation in support of our shared understanding of the operational
    dilemmas created by peer adversaries. The CNO is leading a major change
    in future fleet design and I wish to acknowledge that for the record,
    and formally communicate my support. I agree with the CNO that the Navy
    does not need to be ``reimagined'' or ``reinvented,'' and neither does
    the Marine Corps for that matter. However, as the CNO has noted, how we
    perform our core roles and functions of deterrence, maritime security,
    power projection, and sea control must change--just as it has many
    times in the past.
        Being physically present within the area of responsibility is no
    longer evidence of success, and we should no longer think presence
    somehow produces deterrence in and of itself. For naval presence to
    deter competitors, physical positioning must create real strategic
    advantage. The specific capabilities present must provide a competitive
    warfighting advantage against specific peer threats and do so in a
    resource neutral manner. Dispersing large numbers of militarized
    fishing vessels with a nuclear aircraft carrier may result in the
    temporary absence of those adversary vessels in key maritime terrain,
    but it comes at a fiscally prohibitive cost, not to mention the
    operational cost of not having that warfighting capability postured to
    project power via its carrier air wing. However, having a robust
    inventory of submarines, frigates, light amphibious warships, and
    networked unmanned or optionally manned surface vessels--or even T-AGOS
    and military sealift vessels--operating in the same region would
    provide a competitive warfighting advantage without resource
    prohibitive operating costs. Such a fleet would further reinforce our
    strategic advantages in undersea warfare through their modern ASW
    capabilities and our advantages in naval expeditionary warfare. The
    process of redesigning the fleet will not be an easy or inexpensive,
    nor will it be accomplished quickly, but it can be done with your
    continued oversight and support. I wish to thank the Secretary, the
    CNO, and the Members of this Committee for their continued commitment
    to the construction and sustainment of our ships necessary to support
    amphibious operations.
        Not that long ago, the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that comprised
    the Navy ships for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) consisted of
    five ships with a combined gross tonnage of approximately 73,000
    tonnes. Today, our standard three ship ARG/MEUs operate in a
    distributed manner from platforms with a combined gross tonnage of
    approximately 86,000 tonnes. As with many other systems and
    capabilities across the joint force, our ARG/MEU has become smaller yet
    heavier, while simultaneously being asked to be more agile. Distributed
    Maritime Operations is not only the future of naval operations, but in
    reality--the present. As we modernize our marine forces as part of our
    force design efforts, we must also modernize the ARG/MEU. We have seen
    the great value of disaggregating the ARG/MEU with each individual ship
    conducting its own mission within the same Area of Operational
    Responsibility for a Combatant Commander. Greater numbers of smaller
    ships would allow us to disaggregate for a greater number of mission
    sets while maintaining the ability to reassemble into a large force
    with expansive mission sets. Defining our future operational concept
    will also help drive us to better understand what we need from LXX--or
    the next class of amphibious ships. We know they will need to be
    smaller, faster, more lethal, and better networked, but we don't yet
    know to what degree we need these characteristics. As we continue our
    analysis with the Navy, we know that they must be affordable so that we
    can purchase and maintain the number of ships we need to operate
    globally. Therefore, our requirements will be matched to a program that
    is affordable and sustainable over the long-term.
        Finally, I wish to state my support for the observations,
    positions, and conclusions articulated by Admiral Davidson in his most
    recent testimony. The vision he articulated for a strategic defense to
    include a defense-in-depth with naval expeditionary forces postured
    forward and west of the international dateline is one I share, and have
    attempted to communicate as often as possible over the previous 22
    months. I share his conclusion that highly lethal and distributable
    expeditionary forces than can generate the effects of mass without the
    liabilities of concentration are of the highest utility, and am doing
    everything possible to create such forces via my force design efforts
    with the Marine Littoral Regiment.
                                   conclusion
        The American people expect us to be our own toughest critics, and
    we are. We have significant strides to make in the near future, but I
    know the leadership and support of this Congress will help us to
    revolutionize our approach to competition and conflict. I pledge to
    keep you informed and involved in the transformation of your Marine
    Corps. The American people are counting on their Marines, Navy, and
    joint force to maintain our ideals and way of life now and into the
    future. The dustbin of history is crammed with once successful
    militaries, businesses, and organizations that recognized the world was
    changing and attempted to meet that change through merely incremental
    improvements in existing ways of doing business. Despite their previous
    successes, these institutions failed in the new environment because
    they could not make the fundamental changes necessary to remain on top.
    We are now in the midst of just such a period of change, and we will
    need all the help and support of this Congress to ensure we continue
    our long history of successful innovation and adaptation.
        While our aspirations and expectations are great, I am certain that
    you expect nothing less from your Marine Corps. With your continued
    support, we shall succeed. We will achieve our goals of transformation,
    both in our culture and warfighting capability, to best support the
    naval campaign and the joint force.

        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Berger.
        Secretary Harker, would you give us some insight as to why
    the Navy chose to cancel the DDG-51 multiyear procurement, the
    second ship, and then add it as your first unfunded priority?
        Mr. Harker. Thank you, Senator. That was the most difficult
    choice that we faced this year. As we looked at trying to
    balance readiness, capability, and capacity, taking that DDG
    out of the budget was the most difficult choice that we faced,
    and it was something that we wish we could have afforded. After
    visiting both shipyards where we build DDG-51's, I have the
    utmost confidence in those shipyards' ability to deliver
    another DDG-51 if we had been able to afford it in the budget,
    but it was unfortunately a challenge for us.
        Chairmgian Reed. Thank you. Admiral Gilday, we frequently
    sort of focus on the number of ships as the most important
    metric, but it seems to me there are other factors, for
    example, communications, concealment of vessels, operational
    readiness of vessels, where you can have a 500-ship fleet with
    only 100 able to sail. Then now, with the ability to match
    autonomous vehicles to manned vessels, unmanned autonomous
    vehicles, is this notion of a fixed number of ships consistent
    with actual operational needs?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would like to answer your question
    in three parts. First of all, with respect to numbers, it is
    one metric, and if we are going to fight as a distributed for
    against a military as robust as China, as an example, we are
    going to need a bigger Navy. I believe the analysis has been
    consistent in that regard since 2016. However, I do think this
    is really all about capabilities, and joint capabilities in
    terms of what the Navy brings to the fight for the Joint Force.
        So one of the things that I think that the analysis that we
    did last year was particularly helpful is not only talking
    about the size of the fleet, as you mentioned, but most
    importantly, the composition of the fleet, submarines being
    right at the top of the list in terms of--you hinted at this--
    in terms of concealment, right, in terms of our most survivable
    strike platform, where we have overmatch right now against any
    adversary, and we want to maintain that.
        Aircraft carriers, the most survivable airfields in the
    world, quite a platform. The USS Enterprise, which was our
    first nuclear-powered carrier and was around for 50 years, had
    59 different type series aircraft that flew off the deck of
    that aircraft carrier. There is incredible flexibility here,
    particularly, sir, as you hinted at uncrewed or unmanned in the
    future. Our shipbuilding plan begins to touch at that, and we
    are on a very deliberate path, some of it based on the feedback
    from this Committee that we solve two key problems with respect
    to unmanned before we make a decision to come to you for money
    to scale. The first is the reliability of those platforms at
    sea, that they can sustain themselves, be self-sustaining at
    sea for long periods of time, and the second is the ability to
    be able to command and control them with a high degree of
    confidence, and so, sir, I hope I have touched on your point
    adequately.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Berger, the Littoral Operation and Contested
    Environment Doctrine, the Expeditionary Advanced Base
    Operations, essentially what you are talking about, as I sense
    it, is a widely distributed environment for marines, that they
    would be separated in relatively small detachments across a
    broad area. Is that a fair estimate?
        General Berger. I would say so, sir.
        Chairman Reed. So that raises the issue of how do you
    supply logistic support to widely dispersed elements in
    contested environments.
        General Berger. I would agree with that. We have not had
    our supply chains challenged since World War II. We have had
    assured supply lines for 70 years, said another way. We have to
    focus now on tactical, operational, strategic logistics. If we
    don't, then we will have the very best capabilities that we
    can't sustain forward, and we are not going to allow that to
    happen. Logistics is a key. Within the Marine Corps we view it
    as our pacing function right now.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. I have been informed
    that a quorum is present, and since a quorum is now present--
    excuse me, before I recognize Senator Inhofe--I ask the
    Committee to consider a list of 2,932 pending military
    nominations. Of these nominations, one nominations is one day
    short of the Committee's requirement that nominations be in
    committee for 7 days before we report them out. No objection
    has been raised to this nomination, and I recommend the
    Committee waive the 7-day rule in order to permit the
    confirmation of the nomination of this officer before the
    Senate recesses for the Fourth of July recess.
        In addition, since a quorum is now present, I ask the
    Committee to consider five civilian nominations plus the list
    of 2,932 pending military nominations. First I ask the
    Committee to consider the nominations of Honorable Caroline D.
    Krass, to be General Counsel of the Department of Defense; Ms.
    Gina Ortiz Jones, to be Under Secretary of the Air Force; Dr.
    Ely S. Ratner, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
    Pacific Security Affairs, Ms. Shawn G. Skelly, to be Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Readiness; and Ms. Meredith A. Berger,
    to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
    Installations, and Environment.
        Is there a motion to report the military nominations and
    the five civilian nominations?
        Senator Inhofe. So moved.
        Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
        Senator Shaheen. Second.
        Chairman Reed. All in favor, please say aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]

        [The list of nominations considered and approved by the
    Committee follows:]

     Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
     Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on June 22, 2021.

        1.  In the Army there are 22 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Ramie K. Barfuss) (Reference No. 293)

        2.  In the Army there are 63 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Eric P. Ahnfeldt) (Reference No. 294)

        3.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of lieutenant colonel (Anthony N. Sama) (Reference No. 320)

        4.  In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the
    grade of rear admiral (list begins with Robert T. Clark)
    (Reference No. 343)

        5.  RADM(lh) Eileen H. Laubacher, USNR to be rear admiral
    (Reference No. 344)

        6.  Capt. David R. Storr, USN to be rear admiral (lower
    half) (Reference No. 462)

        7.  Capt. Michael J. Schwerin, USN to be rear admiral
    (lower half) (Reference No. 463)

        8.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of
    rear admiral (lower half) (list begins with Bradly D. Dunham)
    (Reference No. 464)

        9.  Capt. Dennis E. Collins, USN to be rear admiral (lower
    half) (Reference No. 465)

        10.  In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Patricia H. Ajoy) (Reference No. 516)

        11.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Robin C. Cherrett) (Reference No.
    517)

        12.  In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Joseph B. Harrison II) (Reference No.
    518)

        13.  In the Navy there are 8 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Taylor R. Forester) (Reference No.
    519)

        14.  In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with David B. Damato) (Reference No. 520)

        15.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Roy L. Henkle) (Reference No. 521)

        16.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Steven J. Dwyer) (Reference No. 522)

        17.  In the Navy there are 195 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Thomas P. Abbott) (Reference No. 523)

        18.  In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Daniele Braham) (Reference No. 524)

        19.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Shawn G. Gallaher) (Reference No.
    525)

        20.  In the Navy there are 19 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Michael P. Aiena) (Reference No. 526)

        21.  In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Josh A. Cassada) (Reference No. 527)

        22.  In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Kevin D. Bittle) (Reference No. 528)

        23.  In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Jodie K. Cornell) (Reference No. 529)

        24.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Jeffrey N. Dugard) (Reference No.
    530)

        25.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Kenneth O. Allison, Jr.) (Reference
    No. 531)

        26.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of lieutenant colonel (Whit A. Collins) (Reference No. 583)

        27.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of major (Timothy E. Holland) (Reference No. 584)

        28.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of lieutenant colonel (Karl J. Vogel) (Reference No. 585)

        29.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of lieutenant colonel (Nicholas R. Reynolds) (Reference No.
    586)

        30.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Christopher A. Blanco) (Reference No. 587)

        31.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Curt C. Lane) (Reference No. 588)

        32.  In the Army there are 15 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with David P. Curlin) (Reference No. 589)

        33.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Michael R. Bean) (Reference No. 590)

        34.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Daniel J. Meyers) (Reference No. 591)

        35.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (James M. McKnight III) (Reference No. 592)

        36.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Craig P. Lanigan) (Reference No. 593)

        37.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Lisa M. Kopczynski) (Reference No. 594)

        38.  In the Army Reserve there are 6 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Toby J. Alkire) (Reference
    No. 595)

        39.  In the Army Reserve there are 55 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Jeremy C. Abrams) (Reference
    No. 596)

        40.  In the Army Reserve there are 211 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with Donna M. Alexander)
    (Reference No. 597)

        41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Anthony C. Bonfiglio) (Reference No. 598)

        42.  In the Army Reserve there are 185 appointments to the
    grade of colonel (list begins with David A. Acosta) (Reference
    No. 599)

        43.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of lieutenant colonel (Joseph L. Gill II) (Reference No.
    600)

        44.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (Anne C. Mooser) (Reference No. 601)

        45.  In the Space Force there are 765 appointments to the
    grade of colonel and below (list begins with Heather J.
    Anderson) (Reference No. 602)

        46.  In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    brigadier general (list begins with Alison C. Martin)
    (Reference No. 611)

        47.  In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    brigadier general (list begins with Eugene D. Cox) (Reference
    No. 612)

        48.  MG Jonathan P. Braga, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Commanding General, US Army Special Operations Command
    (Reference No. 623)

        49.  MG Antonio A. Aguto, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general
    and Commanding General, First United States Army (Reference No.
    624)

        50.  MG Stuart W. Risch, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Judge Advocate General, US Army (Reference No. 626)

        51.  MG David J. Furness, USMC to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations,
    Headquarters, US Marine Corps (Reference No. 627)

        52.  MG Matthew G. Glavy, USMC to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commandant for Information, Headquarters, US Marine
    Corps (Reference No. 628)

        53.  MG Paul A. Chamberlain, USA to be lieutenant general
    and Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)
    (Reference No. 646)

        54.  COL Haldane B. Lamberton, ARNG to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 648)

        55.  COL Joseph A. Dinonno, ARNG to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 649)

        56.  In the Army Reserve there are 23 appointments to the
    grade of major general (list begins with Michael N. Adame)
    (Reference No. 650)

        57.  In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
    grade of major general (list begins with Robert A. Boyette)
    (Reference No. 651)

        58.  BG Michael J. Garshak, ARNG to be major general
    (Reference No. 652)

        59.  BG Damian K. Waddell, ARNG to be major general
    (Reference No. 653)

        60.  COL Mark G. Alessia, to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 654)

        61.  COL Rose P. Keravuori, USAR to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 655)

        62.  BG Mark T. Simerly, USA to be major general (Reference
    No. 656)

        63.  In the Army Reserve there are 6 appointments to the
    grade of brigadier general (list begins with Christopher A.
    Holland) (Reference No. 657)

        64.  In the Army Reserve there are 86 appointments to the
    grade of brigadier general (list begins with Derek L. Adams)
    (Reference No. 658)

        65.  Vice Admiral William R. Merz, USN to be vice admiral
    and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and
    Strategy, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
    (Reference No. 660)

        66.  Rear Admiral Francis D. Morley, USN to be vice admiral
    and Deputy Principal Military Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
    Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) (Reference No.
    662)

        67.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of colonel (Jeannette M. Watterson) (Reference No. 663)

        68.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Jason O. Allen) (Reference No. 664)

        69.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 113 appointments to
    the grade of colonel (list begins with Connie Irene Armstrong)
    (Reference No. 665)

        70.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (David R. Evans) (Reference No. 666)

        71.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Nicollette D. Dennis) (Reference No. 667)

        72.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Waldo D. Galan) (Reference No. 668)

        73.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Roger W. Dodson) (Reference No. 669)

        74.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Chase D. Crabtree)
    (Reference No. 670)

        75.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Donald A. Vacha) (Reference No. 671)

        76.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Michael E. Lane) (Reference No. 672)

        77.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Timothy J. Redhair) (Reference No. 673)

        78.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Bryce E. Livingston)
    (Reference No. 674)

        79.  In the Army there are 22 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Maria I. Bruton) (Reference No. 675)

        80.  In the Army there are 33 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Ryan S. Bible) (Reference No. 676)

        81.  In the Army there are 6 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Avery J. Carney) (Reference No. 677)

        82.  In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Robin L. Burke) (Reference No. 678)

        83.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Brenton A. Arihood) (Reference No. 679)

        84.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Tracy R. Norman) (Reference No. 680)

        85.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of lieutenant colonel (Jaclyn N. Urso) (Reference No.
    681)

        86.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of colonel (Paul J. Goguen) (Reference No. 682)

        87.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of major (Benjamin E. Barr) (Reference No. 683)

        88.  In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Kelly L. Bryne) (Reference No. 684)

        89.  In the Navy there are 25 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with John A. Allen) (Reference No. 685)

        90.  In the Navy there are 29 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Jordan M. Adler) (Reference No.
    686)

        91.  In the Navy there are 29 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Kyle C. Backman) (Reference No.
    687)

        92.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    commander (Ashley S. M. McAbee) (Reference No. 688)

        93.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Antonio Barcelos, Jr.) (Reference
    No. 689)

        94.  In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Christopher M. Anctil) (Reference
    No. 690)

        95.  In the Navy there are 19 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Jemar R. Ballesteros) (Reference
    No. 691)

        96.  In the Navy there are 514 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Marco A. Acosta) (Reference No.
    692)

        97.  In the Navy there are 36 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Sung H. Ahn) (Reference No. 693)

        98.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Drew R. Barker) (Reference No. 694)

        99.  In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Miguel A. Bernal, Jr.) (Reference
    No. 695)

        100.  In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Richard S. Chernitzer) (Reference
    No. 696)

        101.  In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Jason K. Bruce) (Reference No. 697)

        102.  In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Sylvester C. Adamah) (Reference No.
    698)

        103.  In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
    grade of captain (Patrick L. German) (Reference No. 699)

        104.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (Andrew S. Foor) (Reference No. 700)

        105.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    commander (Kevin M. Bacon) (Reference No. 701)

        106.  In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Abdeslam Bousalham) (Reference No.
    702)

        107.  In the Navy there are 17 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Chabonnie R. Alexander) (Reference
    No. 703)

        108.  In the Navy there are 50 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Michael J. Arnold) (Reference No.
    704)

        109.  In the Navy there are 20 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Casey J. Burns) (Reference No. 705)

        110.  In the Navy there are 19 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Timothy D. Barnes) (Reference No.
    706)

        111.  In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Derek Butler) (Reference No. 707)

        112.  In the Navy there are 21 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Accursia A. Baldassano) (Reference
    No. 708)

        113.  In the Navy there are 27 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Anthony P. Bannister) (Reference No.
    709)

        114.  In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Jennifer D. Bowden) (Reference No.
    710)

        115.  In the Space Force there are 20 appointments to the
    grade of colonel and below (list begins with Edward G.
    Ferguson) (Reference No. 711)

        116.  In the Space Force there are 3 appointments to the
    grade of colonel and below (list begins with James J. Watson)
    (Reference No. 712)

        117.  LTG Edwin J. Deedrick, Jr., USA to be lieutenant
    general and United States Military Representative to the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee (Reference
    No.721)

        TOTAL: 2,932

        Chairman Reed. The ayes have it. Thank you very much.
        Senator Inhofe, you are recognized.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
    before asking a question I am going to ask Admiral Gilday to
    share with the Committee what happened last Friday and the
    significance of that.
        Admiral Gilday. Last Friday we conducted our first shock
    trial on the USS Gerald R. Ford. The 2016 NDAA requires that
    those shock tests be conducted--it is a series of three tests
    over the next couple of months--before we operationally deploy
    that vessel. Our intent, Senator, is to deploy that vessel in
    2022, and right now we remain on track to do so.
        Senator Inhofe. Are the catapults--how many elevators are
    working?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, right now we have accepted 7 of 11
    elevators. I expect that we will accept two by early fall and
    the remaining two by the end of the year. After the shock
    trials the ship will go into a maintenance availability, we
    will finish up those last two elevators, and then we will get
    her out to deploy in 2022.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. We have heard a lot of things. As I
    recall, the deployment date would have been 2017, initially,
    and a lot of people have reasons to believe that there is
    justification for a lot of the stalls. I don't agree with that,
    but I certainly agree with you, that you believe that is going
    to happen. I hope you are right, and we have had a lot of
    problems with that particular piece of equipment and it has
    been very, very expensive.
        So, anyway, Admiral Gilday, as I said in my opening
    statement we have a 355-or-more ship goal. Yet this budget is
    only enough for a status quo 300-ship Navy. I hope we can get
    the money needed to build the Navy. I know none of the three of
    you agree--you won't say it but I will say it--you are not
    getting an adequate budget. I can say it and you can't. But
    anyway, we are going to do everything that we can to try to
    make this happen. Cutting a new destroyer, retiring ten ships
    early, fewer F-35C's, these do not seem to be strategic choices
    but rather last-minute, haphazard cuts.
        So anyway, that is what we are faced with right now. We
    have often said the world is the most dangerous right now of
    any period in my lifetime, and since release of 2018 National
    Defense Strategy, the threats have only gotten worse. In fact,
    the NDS Commission said that we need 3 to 5 percent real
    growth--this is overall, not just the Navy--this particular
    year, and obviously that is not going to happen. It is going to
    be something less than a break even, of 1.6 percent, I believe.
        So Admiral Gilday and General Berger, if I were to ask you
    who in the Department of Defense is best positioned to set
    forth structure requirements for the Navy and the Marine Corps,
    I think it is the CNO and the Commandant, and I think you would
    agree with me. The difference is I can say it and you can't.
    But nonetheless, we do have serious problems that we are facing
    right now. Your list of unfunded requirements amounts to $9.3
    billion. This amount shows the difference of between 3 to 5
    percent increase instead of 1.6 percent decrease makes in
    developing a defense budget. Some call this, the things that we
    are asking for right now, a wish list. I do not call them a
    wish list. I call them a risk list. We have to remind
    ourselves--and you folks, the three of you, know this better
    than anyone--that it is the risk that takes lives, and we are,
    I believe, in an unacceptable are.
        So we are going to do the best that we can to increase and
    to develop a budget that we can be proud of, and you will be an
    important part of that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Senator
    Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and thank you to each of you
    for your testimony this morning and for your service to the
    country.
        Admiral Gilday, I would like to begin with you, and I
    appreciated our call last week. You said in your opening
    statement that we are making a once-in-a-century investment in
    our public shipyards, and there is no doubt that the
    investments through the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
    Plan (SIOP) are really important.
        At the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, where we are the first to
    get those investments, we have seen significant cost overrun in
    the multi-mission dry dock project, which has to be done if we
    are going to ensure that our submarines are able to be
    maintained and ready when they are needed. So when we talked,
    you discussed two major causes for that overrun, as I recall.
    One was the increased cost of supplies, because of the
    pandemic, but the other one was sort of inaccurate estimates by
    those who were making projections for what the costs of the
    project would be.
        So can you talk about whether that is accurate. Are those
    the two major costs? What else might be contributing to those
    overruns, what we are going to do about it, and where are we
    going to get the money to make sure that that project stays on
    time?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am, I do think that is accurate. In
    terms of raw material we saw significant growth in cost for
    lumber, for cement, and for steel, and that has been pretty
    steady through the pandemic, although it is beginning to level
    off now. I think construction companies have had the same
    challenges.
        The initial estimate was done 2 years ago, and so that was
    a factor. The second, I think more importantly, was the
    complexity of that work. What we have learned from that--and I
    had a discussion with Senator Hirono recently, as we look to a
    multi-mission dry dock in Hawaii--is that we are now bringing
    in industry before we make the estimates, so that we have
    better-informed idea of the complexity of the job.
        As an example, at Portsmouth it makes more sense for the
    contractor to do the foundational work, the fabrication, and
    then to ship it down to the site, rather than to do it in the
    shipyard.
        It is my number one unfunded priority on the list. It came
    in about the same--that estimate, or the estimate in the
    bidding process, and we are still in that sensitive bidding
    acquisition time frame right now. I put it on my unfunded list
    because it is vitally important that we keep the progress of
    that project on pace for the first Virginia-class availability
    in 2026.
        So, ma'am, I ask the Committee's support on that unfunded
    item, but nevertheless, I am committed to keeping that project
    on track, for the very reason I just mentioned.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. If it is not on track we
    are not going to have the dry dock capacity that we need. Is
    that correct?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am, that is a correct statement.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. There is an article--and I
    don't know, maybe this is for you, Secretary Harker--there is
    an article in Bloomberg this morning. The headline is the
    ``U.S. Navy's deadliest new sub are hobbled by spare parts
    woes,'' and it goes on to talk about how the Navy has swapped
    more than 1,600 parts among its new Virginia-class submarines
    since 2013, to ease maintenance bottlenecks.
        Can you talk to why that is occurring? I would just put it
    in the context of, in fiscal year 2020 NDAA this Committee put
    in language raising concern about the supply chain and the
    potential for this kind of shortfalls, and we encouraged--and I
    am quoting from the language--"we encouraged the Navy to better
    communicate the capability of their submarine forecasting
    model. The Committee also encourages the Navy to communicate
    needs in a timely fashion, and encourages the Secretary of
    Defense to support shipbuilding industrial base initiatives to
    maintain readiness and a strong submarine industrial base.''
        It appears that that encouragement has not made much
    difference. We still have this problem. So can you talk to what
    the Navy is doing about it?
        Mr. Harker. Yes, ma'am. The Navy is aware that there are
    some challenges with some of the Virginia-class supply chain.
    There are parts on the Virginia-class that we thought were
    going to be a life-of-the-submarine parts, and they are failing
    more quickly than we had originally envisioned, and so we have
    to go back in and find alternate sources for those parts, and
    they are not something that----
        Senator Shaheen. I am sorry to interrupt, but can you talk
    about why that is happening? Why are they failing faster than
    we anticipated? Were our estimates bad? Are there problems with
    how they are being fabricated? What is going on?
        Mr. Harker. I will have to get back with you on that,
    ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that they
    report back to the Committee on exactly what is causing that
    shortfall. That would be very helpful, I think.
        Chairman Reed. I would ask that the Secretary and the CNO
    report back promptly.
        Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
    before I begin my questions I would like to put two letters in
    the record, a letter from me, dated June 16, 2021, to General
    Berger, and his response to me, dated June 21, 2021. I would
    like that they be entered into the record.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The letters follow:]

        Senator Wicker. General Berger, thank you for your service.
    You have been in the military now for over 40 years. Is that
    correct?
        General Berger. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Well, I appreciate your service and I
    appreciate you giving us straight advice.
        Now during House Seapower Subcommittee hearing last week,
    Lieutenant General Eric Smith testified that a joint Navy and
    Marine Corps study determined that the requirement for
    traditional amphibious ships is 31, including 10 big-decks and
    21 LSD/LPDs. Is that your assessment also?
        General Berger. It is, sir.
        Senator Wicker. As a matter of fact, you stated that in the
    letter that you sent to me only yesterday. Is that correct?
        General Berger. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Wicker. I am disappointed, shocked, in fact, that
    the so-called 30-year Shipbuilding Plan released last Friday
    calls for a range of 16 to 19 LPDs. It seems to me that the
    Office of Secretary of Defense has some bureaucrats in there
    that are taking over the Pentagon requirements and putting
    armchair opinions on warfighting above those of the men and
    women, like you, with decades of experience in uniform.
        Now let's do the math. Based on the current amphibious
    ships under construction, and the most recent decommissioning
    planning guide as provided by the Navy, by the end of fiscal
    year 2023, the Navy will have a total of 21 LSD/LPDs instead of
    the 21 LSD/LPDs that you say we need.
        Move ahead then to 2025. Based on this same guidance, the
    Navy will have only 17 LSD/LPDs. This falls short, of course,
    of the 21 that you and General Smith have said we need.
        Then based on the current ships under contract, once all of
    the legacy LSDs have been decommissioned, the Navy will have
    only 15 LPDs. Of course, this falls short of the 21 that we are
    being told by the greatest experts that we rely on is a
    requirement.
        Now this Committee, last year, and the Congress of the
    United States, passed, and it was signed into law by the
    President of the United States, the NDAA, and section 124
    provided the Navy with a mechanism to procure two more LPDs to
    fill this gap. If OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
    executes this authority it would save the taxpayers over $700
    million.
        General Berger, you have a need for more LPDs. Does the
    amphibious ship authority provided you in section 124 help you
    meet your warfighting requirement?
        General Berger. It would do both parts which you mentioned,
    Senator. It would meet a warfighting requirement and it would
    save an estimate of $722 million. Correct.
        Senator Wicker. You know, I appreciate you being honest and
    speaking truth to this Committee and to the Congress, and I
    would just say, in response--I do not have time to engage
    Acting Secretary Harker in this--but basically the regretful
    answer that was given today of, ``it sure was hard not to make
    that decision to do this multiple ship procurement but we just
    could not afford it,'' the fact is we could not afford it
    because somebody in the Office of Management and Budget sent
    word to the Pentagon that they were not going to give you
    enough money. I totally agree with Senator Inhofe that we need
    to reverse this.
        I would point out to my colleagues what the Chief of Naval
    Operations has told us today. Numbers are an important metric,
    and clearly in response to what the Chairman asked, they are
    not the only metric, but they are an important metric. We also
    were told, by our leading sailor in the country, if we are
    going to meet the challenge, we are going to need a bigger
    Navy.
        I just say to the people here on the dais, and our
    witnesses today, who are doing the best they can, we have an
    obligation, under the constitution, to defend the United States
    of America and to provide the numbers and financing to do that.
    I totally agree with those on both sides of the dais that this
    is a crying need that we have to meet.
        I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Senator
    Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all
    for being here and for your sacrifice and service.
        As you know, I have been working on this issue of trying to
    reduce sexual assault in the military and to try to create a
    military justice system that is worthy of the sacrifice our men
    and women make. Through the work with a number of people on
    this Committee we have put together legislation that now has 66
    co-sponsors, and that legislation essentially says that for all
    serious crimes, except for uniquely military crimes, that the
    decision about whether to prosecute will be taken out of the
    chain of command and given to trained military prosecutors.
        We believe that that one change will professionalize
    military justice. We also think that one change will change the
    view of both survivors and defendants, that the system is less
    biased, because it will be a review by the most highly trained
    individuals, who do not necessarily know the plaintiff or the
    defendant. We think it cures two defects in the military
    justice system today. The first is how it handles sexual
    assault cases--very few are going to trial and even less are
    ending in conviction; it was about 20,000 cases estimated by
    the DOD [Department of Defense] in the last couple of years,
    and in the last 3 years approximately 200 have ended in
    conviction. So each year--we are just not getting better.
        We also have data, over the last 4 years, developed by the
    DOD, that shows there is racial bias, that, in fact, if you are
    a black servicemember you are more likely to be punished. In
    the Navy, for example, the average of the last several years,
    the last 15 years, is you are 1.4 times more likely to be
    punished in the Navy, and in the Marines you are up to 2.61
    times more likely to have a general court martial. So this is
    data that the DOD has collected.
        So we believe this one change could change how the justice
    system is perceived. Many survivors of sexual assault do not
    believe that justice is possible in the current system, and
    among black servicemembers I think 60 percent do not believe
    that they will have a fighting chance, or the same chance as a
    white servicemember to get justice.
        So I would like to know, for each of you, what is your
    perspective on this issue. Do you remain open-minded on what
    solutions would be the best to handle this? As you know, this
    Committee has studied this issue for a decade. We have passed
    nearly 250 reforms to improve the military justice system, as a
    Committee, all of which have been supported by the Department
    of Defense. Unfortunately, none of them have moved the ball and
    none of them have instilled confidence in the system.
        So I would like to know if you have an open mind in
    reviewing this data and information as we begin to try to end
    the scourge of sexual assault and try to remove bias within the
    military justice system, and each of you can answer.
        Mr. Harker. So, ma'am, I will start. For me, I definitely
    have an open mind. We have invested a significant amount of
    money in this current year budget to increase the size of both
    the prevention and the response side for this important issue,
    and it something that we believe is important for us to change.
        Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I am definite open to an evidence-
    based approach to the best way to get after this. I have seen
    much of the data, not all of it, with respect to the racial
    inequities that you pointed out.
        I think the key problem to solve with respect to sexual
    assault is one of trust, and I think that if servicemembers do
    not trust the system that we have in place then I think that it
    is a readiness problem for us, because we have victims that are
    not going to report, they are not going to receive treatment,
    and then we have perpetrators that essentially are not going to
    receive due process. So I am, ma'am, open to new ways of
    looking at getting after it.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Admiral?
        General Berger. I would also remain open-minded, as you
    point out. I think we have the same goals that you highlight.
    We have to reduce the number of sexual assaults. We have to
    restore the trust between victims and their chain of command.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        General Berger. Third, we have to retain the authority of
    commanders to do what they need to do in combat. So I think the
    objectives are the same.
        Senator Gillibrand. I agree.
        Secretary Harker, the Navy has created a military justice
    track. My understanding is that it has been in practice for the
    last 10 to 15 years. My understanding is that there are
    currently 95 military justice litigation career track
    practitioners, 80 percent of whom are in designated litigation
    billets at any given time, and half of those are prosecutors.
        Have you had a problem of being able to fill those roles,
    and in your opinion, has this program created a more
    professional military justice system? Would you recommend it to
    other branches?
        Mr. Harker. Ma'am, based on my limited experience I do not
    think we have had any problem in filing those roles, and it has
    been effective. I think it is something that would be useful
    for others to consider, and it is part of what is being
    considered, as the Secretary looks at all the various options
    during his independent review.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Let me now
    recognize Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. Admiral Gilday, I want to talk
    about your choice to include books like ``How to be an Anti-
    Racist'' and ``The New Jim Crow'' in your professional reading
    list. We discussed this last week in our phone call. Normally I
    would not disclose that conversation, but you said the exact
    same thing in front of the Armed Services Committee in the
    House last week, which I found deeply disappointing. When you
    are asked questions about this, you characterized it as a
    criticism of sailors for being weak. That is a straw man. It is
    not a criticism of sailors being weak. It is a criticism of
    your decision to include these books on your professional
    reading list, which ensigns and sailors across your service
    take very seriously.
        So I just want to give you a sampling of some of the things
    that are included in books like that, the notion that
    capitalism is essentially racist, and racism is essentially
    capitalist. That the only remedy for past discrimination is
    present discrimination. The only remedy for present
    discrimination is future discrimination. That some individuals,
    by virtue of his or her race, are inherently oppressive, or
    privileged, while others are victimized or oppressed. That
    individuals can bear some kind of collective responsibility or
    collective guilt for the actions committed by members of his or
    her race.
        Admiral Gilday, how did these books get on your reading
    list?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I chose a variety of books. There are
    over 50 books in my reading list, to give our sailors a wide
    range of information from which I hope they can make facts-
    based decisions on both their ability to look outwardly at
    potential aggressors like China and Russia, as well as looking
    inwardly and being honest with ourselves in area that we need
    to improve.
        In talking to sailors over the past year, it is clearly
    obvious, to me and others, that the murder of George Floyd and
    the events surrounding that, the discussions in this country
    about racism, which go back for years and years and years, are
    still a painful part of our culture, and that talking about
    them, understanding them, is the best approach, and that
    offering books like Kendi's for people to read--and they do not
    have to agree with every assertion that Kendi makes.
        I do not accept every assertion that Kendi makes, and I
    would not think that all sailors would as well. But they need
    to be exposed to it, so that they are making facts-based--we
    need critical thinkers in the Navy and throughout the military,
    in our enlisted force, again, who not only think outwardly but
    inwardly, so that they make objective, hopefully objective
    facts-based decisions, or draw conclusions in a world that it
    is increasingly more difficult to get an unbiased view at a
    really tough problem. Even if they are looking at things on
    social media, artificial intelligence associated with those
    platforms feeds them more of whatever they tend to look at. I
    am offering them one book among 53 as a different perspective.
        Senator Cotton. Yes, I agree there is a lot of information
    like that on social media and in our culture, and you are
    saying, as the senior leader of the Navy, that you want 18-
    year-old sailors and 22-year-old ensigns to read a book that
    asserts that capitalism is essentially racist. Do you agree
    that capitalism is essentially racist?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, with all due respect, I am not going
    to engage without understanding the context of statements like
    that. But these are the same sailors----
        Senator Cotton. Admiral, I am sorry, our time is very
    limited here. I know you said this in the House Armed Service
    Committee last week. In what context could the claim that
    capitalism is essentially racist possibly be something with
    which you would agree?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would have to go back to the book to
    take a look at that, but again, this comes down to trusting
    sailors who are running nuclear power plants on submarines at
    hundreds of feet under the water, under the polar ice cap, that
    are maintaining the highest, the most complicated and complex
    jets in the world. We put them in harm's way every day. Sir, I
    believe that we can trust them to read books like that and to
    draw reasonable conclusions.
        Senator Cotton. Well, it not just a matter of trusting. It
    is a matter of how they spend their time, and you, as the Chief
    of Naval Operations, are suggesting, in your professional
    reading list, that it is a worthwhile endeavor for our sailors
    and ensigns to spend their time reading books like these, as
    opposed to, say, books on maritime strategy or basic seafaring
    skills, which also are included on your list. But there are
    plenty that are not included on your list that I think could
    also benefit them. I mean, the Navy has had genuine cultural
    problems now for many years, whether it is the McCain and the
    Fitzgerald having collisions in the Western Pacific, the
    Bonhomme Richard catching fire in port, the Fat Leonard
    scandal, a Navy SEAL team being recalled from Iraq because of a
    breakdown in basic military order, a patrol boat in the Persian
    Gulf surrendering to what is a little more than Iranian fishing
    boat. The Navy has had some genuine cultural problems and drift
    and lack of focus that it needs to address. Assigning books
    like these and encouraging your sailors to take the time to do
    so is not a way for the Navy to regain its focus, Admiral.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
    Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    your service and for being here today. I want to begin, Admiral
    Gilday, I know from your visit to Connecticut, Electric Boat
    Dynamics, the boat yard there, that you are a strong believer
    in our submarine program. I was pleased to see that the Navy
    has requested two Virginia-class submarines in the fiscal year
    2022 budget proposal and has exercised the option to build a
    tenth Virginia-class submarine, recognizing how important this
    amazing technology is to our national defense. I am hopeful
    that you continue to strongly support this program.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Consistently the analysis that we
    have done, the wargaming, the exercises, the deep analysis that
    the Pentagon, and analysis inside and outside the Pentagon has
    placed a high value on attack submarines with respect to
    survivability and lethality as our Nation's best strike
    platform.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. On June 15, just days ago,
    the Associated Press reported that the United States military
    has had losses of 1,900 lost or stolen weapons over the past
    decade. This staggering number is probably only a fraction of
    the total. It included assault rifles, fully automatic machine
    guns, armor-piercing grenade launchers. Some of these weapons
    have been found in connection with crimes committed with them.
    I hope you agree that this kind of lost or stolen weapon has to
    be stopped.
        Can you tell me how many weapons, similar to the ones I
    have mentioned, have been lost or stolen from the Navy or
    Marine Corps armories in the last 10 years?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, based on the initial results of the
    investigation that is ongoing it is about 240 weapons for the
    Navy. I am interested in learning deeper, as our investigation
    continues along with the other services to find out what laps
    in accounting led to those losses. Some of them might have been
    training losses, but specifically the root cause so that we can
    get after it and correct it.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you have a number for the Marine
    Corps, General Berger?
        General Berger. Sir, I do not want to give you an
    inaccurate number, but I will get you that number. If 10 years
    is the horizon you are looking at, we will get you that
    accurate number.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Berger. After an extensive review of 10 years of
    data (as of 3 Aug 2021), the Marine Corps has 31 weapons for
    which we cannot account. The numbers that had been reported by
    the media around the time of this hearing included combat
    losses and weapons destroyed or lost as the result of mishaps.

        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Can you tell me, perhaps
    both you, Admiral, and General, what is the system for the Navy
    and the Marine Corps tracking and accounting for conventional
    arms, ammunition, and explosives that may be lost or stolen?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I can say with a high degree of
    certainty it is done at the individual unit level. So in the
    case of the Navy specifically, at each ship. I cannot speak
    with a high degree of specificity of the tracking beyond. When
    a weapon is lost, there are reports that are made, there are
    investigations that are done, but how that is tracked in the
    aggregate I do not have a good answer for you at the moment,
    sir.
        Mr. Harker. So sir, if I could add in, this is something
    that is actually looked at during our financial statement audit
    every year. Our independent public accountants that work for
    the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
    go out and do inventory testing on the accuracy of our
    inventory around our small arms or ammunition, that type of
    thing. So it is something that is tested annual. Both the Navy
    and the Marine Corps have done better than our peers in the
    Army and Air Force, and it is something that we do take very
    seriously.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I would like to follow up on
    that area, but in the remaining time that I have I wanted to
    ask about a study that was released yesterday. Brown
    University's Cost of War Project reported that the number of
    veterans and servicemembers who have died by suicide since
    September 11, 2001, is more than quadruple the number who died
    in the wars during this same period. The study estimates that
    7,057 servicemembers have been killed in post-9/11 war
    operations while 30,177 Active Duty servicemembers and veterans
    have died by suicide. Quadruple. That is really an astonishing
    number.
        It goes on to say the average suicide rate for post-9/11
    veterans between 18 to 34 was 32.3 per 100,000, between 2005
    and 2017, but it rose to 45.9 per 100,000 in 2018. That is
    about 2.5 times the rate in the general population.
        There is no way that we can adequately address this topic
    this morning, but I would like an explanation from everyone on
    this panel as to what you think the causes are for this
    phenomenon, which is so deeply concerning, and what we can do
    about it. I know this topic has been a longstanding issue for
    all the services, and I think that it has to be raised to a
    much higher priority than it has been given so far.
        Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. This is something that we are
    investing significantly in, in this year's budget. We are
    putting $22 million towards mental health. Our fiscal year 2021
    amount was $21 million. We are more than doubling that going
    into this current budget cycle, because we believe that
    embedding mental health practitioners at the front, with
    sailors and marines, is probably the best way to get at this.
    We are also increasing the number of chaplains and the number
    of clergy members that are there to provide support as well.
        So this is something that we take very seriously, and we
    have been working to both destigmatize getting treatment as
    well as providing additional services for our sailors and
    marines.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I would just suggest that
    more of the same is not going to work. It has to be a
    reinventing, a re-energizing, a re-imagining of how mental
    health is addressed in the military. But again, I am no expert,
    and I really welcome a thorough study and action. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, let me
    begin by just saying thank you for your service to our country,
    at a time like this, in which we are looking at a budget which,
    to me, appears to be a little bit on the disingenuous side. I
    would like to just point out one item with regard to previous
    contracts, and then Acting Secretary Harker, I would like to
    have your response.
        The Navy's overall shipbuilding budget--and, by the way, I
    come from South Dakota where we do not build ships, but I care
    deeply about making sure that we have a consistency in our
    national defense--the Navy's overall shipbuilding budget
    decreased in this budget by $700 million, from $23.4 billion to
    $22.6 billion, but the budget includes purchase of one Arleigh
    Burke-class destroyer. Previously, it had been planned to
    purchase two. In fact, the Government has already agreed to
    purchase just the one. In this particular case it would breach
    a contract that the Government had previously agreed to with
    Ingalls Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Bath Ironworks back
    in 2018. At that time, the Government had agreed to buy one
    destroyer from each shipyard per year, including fiscal year
    2022. Now a second Arleigh Burke destroyer at $1.6 billion is
    at the top now of the Navy's Unfunded Requirement List,
    recognizing that there was already a contract in place and that
    we are trying to rebuild a supply chain and trying to at least
    get some consistency so that these shipyards are maintained.
        What is the logic in a budget which has an unfunded request
    attached to it when you already have a contract that says that
    you have agreed to purchase two instead of one?
        Mr. Harker. Sir, that was our biggest regret going through
    this budget process.
        Senator Rounds. I am sorry. Could you say that again?
        Mr. Harker. That was our biggest regret going through this
    budget process was that we could not fit that destroyer into
    our budget. As we looked at the balance between readiness and
    the cost of operations, maintenance, and personnel going up,
    and the challenge with new capacity, and then also maintaining
    the current capacity, we just could not afford to put that
    destroyer into the budget.
        Senator Rounds. Admiral Gilday, naval fighter aircraft are
    among our most important front-line weapons systems in
    confronting China, and this budget proposal cuts their
    procurement by 15.6 percent. Now as the Navy cuts its number of
    operational F/A-18's from 150 to a proposed 50--and I recognize
    that the year in which we achieved 50 has not yet been
    released--how do we fill the gap which is created in readiness,
    especially considering that the Navy has only requested, this
    year, 20 F-35C's instead of what had been anticipated, at least
    as last year, 26. So we are going down in the number of fifth-
    gen aircraft that we are purchasing. At the same time, we are
    anticipating that our fourth-gen aircraft, Hornets, we are
    talking about decreasing them from 150 to 50 operational units.
    How does that jive?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, the Navy's goal is to have a mix of
    fourth- and fifth-gen, and we will be at five squadrons that
    have that mix by 2025. Right now we have over 500--543, I
    think--Super Hornets, and that number goes above 600 when we
    complete the latest procurement and delivery that was in the
    2021 budget.
        So what we are doing with the Block 4's, our older Block
    4's, is we are actually increasing the life on those jets by 5
    or 6 years. We are upgrading the computer systems on them and
    upgrading their range, with respect to fuel. With the fifth-
    gen, one of the regrets is the number that we are purchasing
    this year. However, on my Unfunded List I have five more. I am
    a believer in the fifth-gen aircraft. I am believer in the mix.
    Consistently the studies and the wargaming that we have done
    has shown that that fourth- and fifth-gen mix is a winner in
    the battle space.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have got some
    other questions but I will leave them for the record at this
    time. My time is expiring.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds. Senator
    Hirono, please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin I
    would like to state, for the record, Secretary Harker and
    Admiral Gilday, I remain concerned about the safety of the fuel
    tanks at Red Hill facility, especially after the recent release
    of 1,000 gallons of fuel. It is imperative that the Navy is
    transparent on this issue and provides open and frequent
    information to Congress and the public, because, of course,
    people on Oahu are very concerned about contamination of their
    drinking water due to these situations that occur at Red Hill.
    So I expect that you share my concern.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. That is fine. Thank you. I also would like
    to note that I support efforts to more effectively prevent
    sexual assault and harassment in the military and the changes
    to the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] that will get us
    to that point, and, of course, I very much thank Senator
    Gillibrand for her leadership.
        I would like to get to the shipyard modernization issues
    that Senator Shaheen mentioned. I share her concerns. So for
    Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, I would like to get you
    both on the record that construction of a new dry dock at Pearl
    Harbor will begin in fiscal year 2023. Why is that important?
    Because you have--well, I have been told that it will take 5
    years for this dry dock to be built, and that is about the time
    frame--that is the time frame when the new Virginia-class
    submarine is delivered.
        So can I get your commitment, because the concern is that
    with the kind of cost overruns that are already happening at
    Portsmouth, you know, I want to make sure that Pearl Harbor
    will be timely addressed?
        Mr. Harker. Yes, ma'am. We are committed to the Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Plan, especially all the
    improvements at Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor Navy Shipyard was
    the first one that I ever visited in my tenure, and I am very
    committed to improving.
        Senator Hirono. The timing of it, of course, is really
    important, so Admiral Gilday?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. It honestly is at the top of
    our priority list as we go into the fiscal year 2023 budget
    bill for MilCon [Military Construction]. I think, as I
    mentioned earlier, we are about to have a conference with
    industry out in Hawaii early next month, to get a better
    understanding of the scope, the estimate. We think right now
    that that project is probably in the 6- to 7-year time frame,
    based on the phasing. But we would like to get rolling as soon
    as possible on that effort.
        Senator Hirono. Yes, because the timing of that dry dock
    has to be pretty much in conjunction with the delivery of the
    Virginia-class submarine.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. I am glad that you are meeting
    with industry, because one of the explanations of what is
    happening at Portsmouth is that you did not really deal with
    the complexity of the work. So I am glad that is definitely a
    lesson learned. We do not want to see the kind of cost overruns
    at Pearl Harbor that we are seeing at Portsmouth.
        It is my understanding, Secretary Harker, that Secretary
    Hicks has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from
    research and development for deployment on Navy ships in the
    Pacific after a test to simulate an attack at Hawaii by North
    Korea in November indicated that they could stop an ICBM
    [markupistic Missile]. Although current sensors were adequate
    to intercept this one shot, we know from MDA [Missile Defense
    Agency] and CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation] that
    current sensors will not be adequate for the future
    capabilities of our adversaries.
        Won't these ship-based interceptors need a more advanced
    radar to combat future capabilities such as HOR-H [Homeland
    Defense Radar-Hawaii]?
        Mr. Harker. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker?
        Mr. Harker. While I am not an expert in all of the MDA
    pieces, I do understand the need for that.
        Senator Hirono. For HDR-Hawaii?
        Mr. Harker. Yes. I understand the requirement.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. You probably know that I am very
    concerned about the fact that there is no funding for HDR-
    Hawaii in this year's budget, and we need to keep this project
    going if we are going to be prepared for a scenario where our
    adversaries, particularly North Korea, will be developing their
    capabilities.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Let me recognize
    Senator Tillis, please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
    you for being here, and General Berger, thank you for the time
    that we spent at breakfast a few weeks ago.
        Secretary Harker, I would like to start maybe with just a
    general statement, I do not expect you to respond to it, but on
    the subject of military sexual assault, and really more of a
    broad-based change to the UCMJ. I think it is very important
    for the service Secretaries and those are vetting the
    commission report to get us information as quickly as possible.
    Now we are less than 3 weeks away from beginning the NDAA
    markup. The only thing we have now is something that I have
    heard from the DOD, that they have expressed concerns with the
    scope and the technical challenges of a 6-month implementation,
    but we really have to get the leaders over in the DOD to get us
    information quickly, or it is simply not going to be considered
    before you may have entirely new framework foisted upon you.
        But I do want to ask you all, Admiral Gilday and Secretary
    Harker, about Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) East. I know General
    Berger went down there and visited recently. A lot of the
    underlying facilities were established about the same time
    Buddy Holly was top in the charts, and they are antiquated
    facilities. It is like a Rubik's Cube when you are moving
    equipment around to actually do servicing, and so much so that
    I think Lockheed Martin is talking about, or considering their
    own depot maintenance facility. There are over 4,000 people
    that are employed down there. They are doing great work. We
    have done work like getting the money for the security fencing
    down there, securing in fiscal year 2018 the lift fan facility
    funding. But these projects are not online yet, and I do not
    even think the lift fan facility is under contract.
        So am I reading it right, that FRC East is still considered
    to be an important part of airframe maintenance? They do
    airframe maintenance for several lines of service, and
    certainly they are a key for the B variant for the Joint Strike
    Fighter. What should I read in some of these projects shifting
    to the right or not moving ahead?
        Mr. Harker. It definitely an important base for us and an
    important place where we do depot maintenance. I think the----
        Chairman Reed. Microphone, Mr. Secretary.
        Mr. Harker.--something that is tied to the funding
    constraints when you need to fit things into the budget.
        Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, anything to add?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Similar to the SIOP for
    shipyards, we have the FIOP [Fleet Infrastructure Organization
    Plan] for fleet repair facilities, and we just started that
    effort and we are prioritizing those projects. I owe you a
    better answer, sir, and will come back with what the potential
    timelines look like, and, of course, how they might play out as
    we get into the 2023 budget bill.
        Senator Tillis. Yes, I understand you all have got
    competing priorities and limited funds, so I understand. But we
    will be submitting for the record some of the specific projects
    that are required now in a matter of less than 2 years that
    have not even started. So we know that things are going to
    shift to the right, so I would like to get an update on those.
    I will not run through the details here but will submit them
    for the record.
        I also want to ask you a question about personnel
    shortfalls, for Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on
    crew fatigue in the surface force that found crew shortfalls
    were worse than previously reported. GAO reported that until
    recently the Navy measured shortfalls based on the number of
    funded positions rather than the number actually required for
    the safe operation of a vessel. The study also found
    inconsistent implementation of fatigue management measures.
        So how are you working to ensure a safe and adequately
    crewed surface for our sailors? What are we going to do
    differently? I know you are new into the role, so looking back,
    what do we need to do differently, or looking forward, what are
    we going to do differently?
        Mr. Harker. So the report, we are still working on our
    response to the report, but I think some of the things we have
    done is we have shifted how we track things from, as you said,
    the number of funded billets to the actual number of required
    billets. So that is something that we have shifted as we track
    and measure things going forward. We have also increased the
    number of billets on our seagoing for ships and invested in
    filling those billets and improve the fill ratio.
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, for the past 3\1/2\ years we have
    increased our sailors at sea by 23,000. We have more sailors at
    sea today than we had in 2014.
        The gaps that we see right now in the data that I look at
    is less than 5 percent of our billets at sea are gaps. That is
    not satisfactory. It needs to be zero. What led to this effort
    to fund all those billets, and why it is so important goes
    right back to what we learned from those collisions in 2017. So
    it is a priority for us.
        The Secretary said, in the beginning, in terms of
    prioritizing current readiness as our top priority, that gets
    right to manning, equipping, and training the force at adequate
    levels.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. General Berger, I am out of time
    but I will be submitting a few questions that have more to do
    with some of your strategy and the future of the Marine Corps,
    right-sizing. But thank you all for your service, and I look
    forward to speaking with you individually.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Now let me now
    recognize Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
    Inhofe. Admiral Gilday, I was going to ask other questions but
    I am sort of inspired to follow up a little bit, from Senator
    Cotton, on your reading list, because when I saw that there was
    controversy about it I pulled up the reading list. Mr. Chair, I
    would like to introduce the CNO's 2021 reading list into the
    record.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Kaine. So as I look at it there are 53 books on the
    reading list, which would probably be, you know, tens of
    thousands of pages, and I read your intro statement about the
    Navy history, beginning with every ship would have 37 books on
    it that would be recommended to sailors. This is a voluntary
    reading list to basically train leaders, and I think the motto
    that you used to kind of summarize this is ``Read well to lead
    well.'' Isn't that right?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes sir, it is.
        Senator Kaine. As I look at the list, it is a pretty
    remarkably broad category of books. There are books about naval
    history. There are books about particular naval operations,
    SEAL Team Six. There are books about particular weapons
    systems, like autonomous aerial or marine vehicles or robotics
    or the use of artificial intelligence. There is a lot about
    kind of, you know, naval history and weapons systems, a lot
    about strategy. A lot of the books are about sort of individual
    leadership traits, maybe specifically to the military, officers
    eat last. But also a lot of book that are not military at all
    that are really about leadership traits, as I look at the list.
        There are book that tackle contemporary issues in society,
    like racism or the second-class status that many women have
    perceived throughout history, and those seem to be designed to
    make people maybe put themselves in somebody else's shoes, to
    think about somebody else. Those do not seem that controversial
    to me. There is nothing in the intro to the reading list where
    you are saying, you know, ``I agree with every assertion made
    in each of these 53 books,'' and the list is not offered as any
    kind of mandate or, you know, thought direction. You are just
    wanting people to make sure that they consider broadly both
    strategy and history and the perspectives as others as they
    tackle the important and patriotic task of being military
    leaders. Isn't that right?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, and if I could say, on the
    booking question by a gentleman named Kendi, the reason why
    that is on the list is because we stood up a task force called
    Task Force One Navy, after George Floyd's murder, and that
    essentially came down to conversations in small groups, at
    every command in the Navy, so that people could tell their
    story, courageously come forward and tell their stories.
        So Kendi tells his story as a black American growing up and
    the challenges that he faced, but he is also very self-
    critical. I do not agree with every assertion that Kendi makes
    and every conclusion he draws, but I did find it to be a very
    helpful read, particularly in light of those conversations that
    we were having, and that is why I put it on the recommended
    list. I know that some question that choice, but it really does
    get to critical thinking, as I spoke to earlier, in a day and
    age where it is really difficult sometimes to get right to the
    facts and for people to make value judgments.
        Senator Kaine. You even have a book on the list that I
    thought was an interesting one. I can't remember the title but
    it was about how to talk about difficult subjects in a really
    easy way. So it is kind of like you can't talk about that at
    work, how to talk about race, politics, and religion. Because
    in many workplaces those can be divisive, and they are divisive
    if you do not talk about them or they are divisive if you talk
    about them in the wrong way----
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kaine.--in a military composed of the entire cross-
    spectrum of American society. It is good to be able to talk
    about tough issues and talk about them in a way where people
    are respectful and listen to one another. Isn't that true?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, and so back to the conversations
    we were having, specifically on ships, some people needed to
    understand how to get the ball rolling, how to introduce these
    conversations in a way that were not controversial or
    provocative but in a useful kind of way, to learn from each
    other. We think it has been helpful. We are trying to continue
    it, and, sir, thanks for deepening the discussion on this.
        Senator Kaine. Yes, deepening the discussion. One of your
    books is called Deep Thinking. It is by Gary Kasparov, and it
    is about how human creativity is even more powerful than the
    most advanced automation or computers.
        So, you know, look, the military has got to defend this
    country, and even though depends, to some degree, on platforms,
    it still depends most on people, and not people working in
    their own little sphere and not connected to others, but people
    working in groups. If people are going to work in groups in a
    diverse society there are going to be a lot of people in the
    group who are not exactly like them, and books that help you
    understand others' perspective, hey, even books that make you
    feel uncomfortable. My favorite book is the Bible, but I don't
    like ``the last shall come first and the first shall come
    last.'' That makes me a little bit uncomfortable, I am not sure
    there is good book, a really good book, in the history of the
    written word that has not made some people uncomfortable, and a
    book that just made everybody feel completely comfortable, I am
    not sure it lands on any great books list at all.
        So I do not discourage you from what you are trying to do,
    to enable people to read broadly and then see the world through
    each other's perspectives, so that they can work better
    together as unit to defend the Nation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Let me recognize
    Senator Cramer, please.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and leave it to
    Senator Kaine to change the topic completely, but I can't
    resist.
        In these times that we are going through, where it is
    difficult to start a discussion, to your point and your
    reference to scripture, I am reminded that scripture tells us--
    it doesn't tell us to be careful. Well, it tells us to be
    careful how we treat people, but it also tells us to stop being
    offended so easily. I think part of the problem--and, Admiral,
    I admire you for wanting to enhance critical thinking, but to
    have critical thinking you have to have critical conversations,
    and so, anyway, good work. I applaud you for it, and I will
    leave it at that. But you never know what is going to on in
    SASC, right guys?
        But back to the other topics--and thank you all for being
    here and for your service, of course. When we talk about the
    goal of 460 ships, the Chinese goal of 460 ships by 2030, we
    are not even really considering their militia or the Coast
    Guard, which it is my understanding basically doubles that
    number of assets available to them.
        If we had to forcibly maintain freedom of navigation to
    locations like South Korea or Taiwan or any number of others,
    how much of an additional problem are the militia assets and
    the Coast Guard assets? I will start with you, Admiral.
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think they are problem just in terms
    of numbers, but what we have in our favor, besides a pretty
    robust, forward-deployed force we have, are really strong
    networks of allies and partners, and that network is growing.
    The Brits, their first carrier in a generation, is now headed
    over to the Western Pacific. We work very closely with the
    French, with the South Koreans, with Japanese, with the
    Australians, with the Canadians, and the list goes on and on.
    We are sailing with them, operating with them every day, and I
    think that is something that China does not have, and they wish
    they did.
        We really do value it. I just had the Dutch CNO over for
    dinner the other night. I will meet with another head of Navy
    next week. I was just in Denmark, and I was in Toulon, France,
    with both the First Sea Lord from the Royal Navy and also the
    Chief of Navy from the French Navy, and those partnerships are
    just key.
        Senator Cramer. Great reminders. Secretary, did you want to
    add anything to that, or just agree?
        Mr. Harker. I am sorry. I missed the question.
        Senator Cramer. Did you want to add anything to what the
    Admiral was saying, or just agree?
        Mr. Harker. No, sir. I believe that we have the power and
    credibility to deter our enemies over there.
        Senator Cramer. So where I want to go next, and this may be
    a little less conventional, and this is real important back
    home. So here I come from this agricultural state in the middle
    of the North American continent, right, and we are talking to
    Navy guys.
        But in 2020, United States agricultural exports to the
    Pacific included $11.7 billion to Japan, $7.7 billion to South
    Korea, $3.4 billion to Vietnam, $3.3 billion to Taiwan, $3.2
    billion to the Philippines, and $2.8 billion to Indonesia, and
    on and on it goes, obviously. A lot of hungry people. A lot of
    hungry people out in the Pacific that like what we grow in
    places like North Dakota and throughout our country.
        In this 2030 scenario, could we guarantee we would have
    shipping access to all or any of these important trading
    partners?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think that is the crux of the issue
    with respect to how our investment----
        Senator King. Admiral, can you get a little closer to the
    mic, please?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, that is the crux of our investment
    strategy, to make sure that we can keep the Navy forward and be
    relevant. So at any given day we have got about a third of the
    Navy at sea. We think that is what we need, and not only
    training but also deployed, to have that presence forward, to
    maintain those open sea lanes and keep that trade flowing.
        We saw what happened in the Suez recently. That should be a
    lesson for all of us, that at a cost of $9 billion a day, it
    does not take much to upset global trade through those key
    chokepoints.
        Senator Cramer. Well, and to your point you made to the
    previous question regarding the important partnerships,
    obviously we have to always be reminded of that, because when
    you look at just the volume, as you said, the assets that they
    have, the shipyards that they have, both commercial and naval,
    obviously it can be a little bit overwhelming.
        Anyway, getting off on the reading list tangent cost me a
    little bit of time, but it was all worth it. Thank you, all.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator King,
    please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the most
    telling chart in the presentation that you gave us this morning
    is on page six. It is the Department of Navy total obligation
    authority, and the telling line is the yellow line, which is
    ``constant dollars.'' What it shows is that we are actually
    either flat or slightly below--you saw me trying to figure it
    out here--we are slightly below the level of expenditure for
    the Navy as in 2010.
        Admiral, the strategic challenge to this country has
    changed dramatically since 2010, has it not?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. It certainly has. I would agree
    with that.
        Senator King. It has changed from the global war on terror
    to near-peer competition, particularly with China and Russia,
    which is a more conventional kind of adversarial challenge. Is
    that correct?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, but the only thing I would add is
    that the character of conflict is changing as well, with our
    focus on space and cyber as well as the conventional domains.
        Senator King. But still, the point is it is difficult to
    argue that a flat budget, since 2010 to today, given the rise
    of the Chinese Navy, for example, it seems to me that is tough
    to justify, and I know that these were not your decisions.
        I want to go back to something Senator Rounds asked, about
    the DDG. Just let's get it on the record. If that multiyear
    contract is breached, the Government will have to pay a $33
    million penalty. Is that not correct, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Harker. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator King. You have told me, both in the hearing today
    and previously, that this was the toughest decision that you
    had to face. The point I want to make about this is not only
    the lack of the destroyer but the impact that this decision has
    on the industrial base, not only in the immediate future, in
    terms of how many people do you need to build the ships, but
    also the principle of breaking a multiyear I would argue sends
    a shudder through the industrial base, in terms of their
    investment. If they are going to make major, $100 million
    investments in shipbuilding capacity, and also in training of
    new shipbuilders, they have to have some confidence that there
    is a stream of demand coming.
        Mr. Secretary, you understand that, I am sure.
        Mr. Harker. I do. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Admiral, you saw it at Bath Iron Works, the
    number of people that they are hiring and the problem of the
    cliff, in terms of future production. Now I understand you
    cannot guarantee ships into the indefinite future, but you
    understand the impact of the sort of chilling effect that the
    breaching of the multiyear might have on investment and on
    workforce.
        Admiral Gilday. Absolutely, sir, and if I take a look at,
    as an example, the Columbia-class, we know we are going to
    build X amount of submarines. So that gives those companies a
    clear set of headlights in terms of where are we going, so that
    they can make infrastructure investments with a high degree of
    confidence. We saw what happened in Bath, with the Zumwalts,
    when we only built 3 and we thought we were going to build 30,
    and they made significant investments that never panned out,
    and so it is not lost on me, the significant negative impact on
    the industrial base with decisions like this, sir.
        Senator King. Well, and the problem is, as you know I live
    near Bath, you cannot turn the industrial base off and on. If
    it goes down, you are talking about welders going somewhere
    else, and in this economy they are going to go somewhere else,
    and so I think that is the national security challenge involved
    here.
        The other piece that is the challenge of this budget is--
    this has occurred to me for a long time. We are having a total
    rebuild of our nuclear deterrent capacity at the same time as a
    100-year rebuild of our depot maintenance capacity, and the
    problem, those are two sort of one-time expenditures that are
    sort of varying or altering what would otherwise be a normal
    budget. I call them the pig in the python of the Navy budget.
    There is bulge that we are having to deal with, and that is
    constraining everything else. Mr. Secretary, is that true?
        Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. It has given us unprecedented
    challenges to try to recapitalize the Columbia as well as the
    shipyards and grow the Navy.
        Senator King. But I think we should look on these as sort
    of one-time events rather than business as usual, because we
    are not going to recapitalize the strategic deterrent every 5
    years, and we are not going to recapitalize the shipyards.
        Final point is on the DDG(X) planning. We talked about the
    Ford today. We had a full hearing on the Ford a couple of years
    ago, and one of the principal things that we learned from that
    hearing was don't do R&D while you are building the ship,
    because the catapult and the elevator were both new, and here
    we are still dealing with the elevators.
        So I hope, to both of you, that you will work with the
    shipyards to minimize what I call the first ship premium. The
    more fully developed the plans and requirements are before the
    contracts are bid, the better you are going to do in terms of
    price and performance on those ships. That is just based on
    what we have seen in the past.
        Admiral, I hope that you are going to follow a course of
    working with the shipyards and having the engineering as
    complete as possible before we force these shipyards to bid
    with considerable risk built in.
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, that is the plan. In fact, we are
    talking to both Bath and Ingalls right now, all stakeholders in
    the same room as we talk about the design of that ship. So
    similar to what we did when we went from, let's say, the
    Ticonderoga-class cruiser to the Arleigh Burke destroyer, we
    are changing the hull, right, but the combat system is going to
    remain the same. So to the point you made about Ford, we are
    not looking for a build where we are going to have to pull off
    successive miracles to get a ship to sea on time.
        Senator King. Thank you very much for your service, all of
    you. Thank you, General Berger.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Let me now
    recognize Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen,
    thank you for your testimony today and your service to our
    Nation.
        Look, I want to agree with Senator Inhofe here. There is a
    lot of discussion about difficult choices, and you are up here
    and you cannot admit it but you do not like this budget. We
    know that. I do not like this budget. This is not difficult
    choices. This is bad choices.
        If you look at where the Biden administration is
    prioritizing our military, it is dead last, that and homeland
    Security. After inflation it is actually cut. Every other
    agency gets a double-digit increase, but for the military and
    defense of our Nation it is dead last.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Now this is a very bipartisan Committee, and I want to
    thank the Chairman, because I think he is doing a great job. I
    want to thank my friend, Angus King, because I also think he is
    doing it. But I am going to ask my colleagues, particularly my
    Democratic colleagues, for help, for help--let's see the one on
    China--because at the national Democratic level, whether it
    Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders, with their Defend the
    Pentagon amendment last year to the NDAA, that was 14 percent
    across-the-board cuts, for that budget, or what we are doing
    with competing with China. That shows China increasing its
    defense budget about, on average, 10 percent a year over the
    last decade. We have decreased it, Obama-Biden, 25 percent
    cuts--25 percent cuts, second term. That is just crazy.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We tried to rebuild it when the Republicans were in power.
    Now we are cutting again. We cannot do this. We cannot do this.
    So my colleagues, I am asking, help us. That is the trend.
        So let me just ask, Admiral, General Berger, if these
    trends continue--I am not going to ask you to comment on the
    budget, but Admiral, I was very appreciative of your statement,
    if the Navy's top line remains flat, the fleet will decrease,
    but we need a larger, more capable fleet. If these trends
    continue, flat, or actually this is a declining military
    budget--again, if you are Department of Education you get a 40
    percent increase to your budget. You guys get a 4 percent cut.
        If these trends continue, what will this do, specifically
    Admiral and General, to our ability to compete against China,
    in the long term? I am not asking for you to comment on this
    budget. I am asking you, declining budgets, what will that do.
    Sir?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, it is going to cause us to make some
    difficult choices in terms of priorities, and it will be that
    tension between current day, current readiness, and
    modernization, and making tough choices in terms of where the--
    --
        Senator Sullivan. But more directly, if we are--sorry to
    interrupt--if we have declining budgets, which the Biden
    administration clearly wants, okay. That is what they do. No
    offense to my national Democratic--not the ones here. Not the
    ones here on this Committee, but overall, go look at the
    chairman of the Budget Committee right now. He wants a 25
    percent cut to the U.S. military, Bernie Sanders. Our ability
    to compete with China will be dramatically diminished, won't
    it?
        Admiral Gilday. So I think that chiefs have been consistent
    about our best advice is a 3 to 5 percent growth profile would
    put us in a place where we think we need to be to both compete,
    deter, and win, if it comes to a conflict.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. General, do you have a view on
    this? Again, if the trends continue. I am not asking you to
    comment on today's budget. I know it is difficult for you as
    the witness because you do not like this budget. I know you do
    not like this budget. I cannot stand this budget. But what do
    you think, General?
        General Berger. What has to remain consistent is the notion
    of a pacing threat, as you highlight, Senator. That means they
    are moving, we are moving. The trends continue, as you point
    out. If they continue to invest at the rate that they are
    going, and we do not maintain pace with that, then we will
    widen a gap, in other words, increase the risk strategically to
    our country.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one more specific thing, and
    it is really a joint thing between the Navy and the Marine
    Corps. General Berger, again, I really appreciate all you are
    doing on the force design and your very strategic and
    innovative thinking with regard to the Marines. What sea denial
    capability does the Marine Corps currently have, and what
    capabilities will Naval Strike Missile and Tactical Tomahawk
    give the Marine Corps? Admiral, to you, how important is it to
    you that the Marine Corps be able to conduct these sea denial
    missions to support the Navy? This is a really integrated
    element of your strategy. It is Marine Corps and Navy. I think
    a lot of people--I know the Congress cut this last year, and I
    think it was a mistake. Do the two of you have a view on that?
        General Berger. Today we have a very limited capability. I
    mean, you could probably, on one hand, less than four or five
    of the capabilities that contribute directly to sea denial. We
    need a ground-based, anti-ship capability so that we can lock
    down certain, especially key choke points that the fleet
    commander, the Joint Force commander need to control. The anti-
    ship missile, the NMESIS [Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
    Interdiction System], the Naval Strike Missile, and the larger,
    longer-range, the Maritime Strike Tomahawk, those give us the
    ability to control straits, to lock down an area that the fleet
    commander needs to control.
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, I agree with the Commandant, and I
    think that the analysis that we have done and we have
    presented, it requires a different mix of both traditional
    battle force ships but also new amphibious ships and combat
    logistics ships in order to yield more combat power in a
    distributed way. We understand how we think we need to fight in
    the future, and the plan that we have presented, the analysis
    that we have done, I think puts us on a path to yield the kind
    of power that you introduced and the Commandant followed up on.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Warren
    is recognized via Webex.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
    for being here today.
        Admiral Gilday, I would like to address the Navy's efforts
    on predicting more fuel-efficient engines for the surface
    fleet. One of these technologies is the Hybrid Electric Drive,
    the HED, system, which uses an electric motor to improve the
    ship's overall fuel efficiency, consuming less fuel and
    lowering its total costs.
        A GAO report in November 2020 detailed how the Navy had
    decided to suspend the HED program and pursue a different
    research effort, the Propulsion Derived Ship Service, PDSS. The
    report also stated that the Navy did not fully assess the costs
    and benefits or complete the testing of the HED system before
    making its decision, and could not provide any information on
    why it is necessary to suspend the HED program in order to
    pursue the PDSS research effort.
        So Admiral Gilday, after spending over $100 million of
    taxpayer money on the development, purchase, and upgrade of six
    HED systems, would you say that the Navy made the right
    decision in suspending the HED program?
        Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I am familiar with the report, but I
    really need to go back and take a look at the conclusions and
    then the recommendations, and I would like to come back to you
    with the details.
        Senator Warren. Well, can you say something about what
    factors went into the decision for suspending the HED system?
        Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I cannot with a degree of
    specificity that I think this topic deserves.
        Senator Warren. Well, Admiral, the GAO report mentioned
    that the system requires little maintenance, per the commanding
    officer and crew of the USS Truxtun and senior Navy engineers.
    Also, according to the Navy's January 2020 report to Congress,
    the system was designed for low-speed operations which comprise
    more than a third of a typical DDG's operating profile.
        So the report I am reading, it does not match up with the
    conclusion here. So it is my understanding that the PDSS is
    still in its infancy stages, with quite a lot of time before it
    reaches full operational capability. Is that correct, Admiral?
        Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I do not mean to be evasive. I just
    really need to dig into that report more deeply and get briefed
    on it. I am committed to come back here with a thorough answer
    to your questions.
        Senator Warren. All right, and one of the questions I am
    going to ask you about is whether or not the money dedicated to
    the HED system is going to the PDSS system, or if it is
    something else here.
        You know, I am glad that the Navy is prioritizing research
    and development on fuel-efficient ship engines, and that it
    thinks that there are even better technologies that can
    outperform the HED. But I am really concerned that abandoning a
    good system now in favor of a better but not yet close to an
    operationally ready system is a good idea. It is critical that
    investments in improving fuel-efficient ship engines be made
    reliably and with transparency. You know, these technologies
    ensure that the Navy remains flexible and agile for the future
    and reduces its dependency on a potentially vulnerable fossil
    fuel supply chain, and that it builds public trust in how money
    is being spent.
        So I am going to look forward to hearing more from you on
    these questions. I really want to understand where the Navy is
    on this.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. If Senator Scott
    is ready he could be recognized.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair Reed.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. I want to thank you for your service and
    what you do every day.
        I guess the first question is, do we all agree that we are
    facing increasing threats from our adversaries all across the
    world?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
        Senator Scott. Do we have any feeling that Communist China
    is going to slow down in building up their military and doing
    everything they can to cause us problems in the Indo-Pacific?
        Admiral Gilday. No, sir. There is no indication they are
    slowing down.
        Senator Scott. Do you believe that as they build their
    economy they are going to continue to invest--Communist China
    will continue to invest more and more into their military?
        Admiral Gilday. I think that is one of the projected ways
    forward, sir, that their funding lines would continue to trend
    upward.
        Senator Scott. So if we believe all that, if you look at
    these budget numbers we are seeing, as Senator Sullivan has
    pointed out, and when you look at inflation, we are seeing less
    money invested in military. We are not even staying up with
    inflation. How does that make any sense? How can we believe
    that we can do our job if we are not even going to stay up with
    even inflation in defense?
        Admiral Gilday. I will just say that I am grateful for the
    top line that the Navy has, and I am committed to making every
    dollar count so that we are fielding the best force that we
    possibly can. So I think that that is my responsibility, is to
    take the top line that we have and to field the best force that
    we can, the most ready and the most capable and the most
    lethal. That is how I am proceeding with respect to how we are
    investing our money.
        Senator Scott. You are not defending whether it is the
    right number or not. You are just saying, ``I got stuck with
    this number and so I am going to--whatever I get stuck with, I
    will do my best.''
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, that is what I have to do. My way
    forward has to be budget informed, and I have a responsibility
    to make sure that the force that is out there today, that I am
    serving not only the Nation well but I am serving the sailors
    that are on those ships, that they have what they need to be a
    credible fighting force. I think we can do that.
        Senator Scott. So everything I read, Admiral, is that when
    the United States plays war game scenarios in the Indo-Pacific,
    especially over Taiwan, we lose. Is that the war games you have
    played, or do you have a different view that what we----
        Admiral Gilday. No. Sir, I have a different view. It
    depends on the game. It depends on the approach. Those war
    games, even the ones where we get beat, we learn a whole lot in
    terms of honing our skills, our concepts, and giving a better
    understanding of what we need to win, with respect to kit.
        Senator Scott. Do you believe that we have the Navy that is
    going to deter Communist China from invading Taiwan today?
        Admiral Gilday. I do. I do not think we are doing it alone.
    I think we are doing it with allies and partners. But I think
    we have a credible force forward right now.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. General Berger, can you give us a
    little bit more information on your re-envisioning of the
    Marine Corps and what you are doing and how that is going to
    help us deal with Communist China?
        General Berger. Sir, the Marine Corps, for the past 20
    years, largely has been in the Middle East, doing what the
    Nation needed it to do, but going forward it needs to do
    something different. To deter the PRC [People's Republic of
    China], the PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy], and to be
    ready to respond to any crisis, we have to go back to our naval
    roots. We have to become expeditionary once again. We have to
    fit into a Joint Force, as CNO answered to your first question,
    as a Joint Force that can work with our partners and allies, to
    first prevent a crisis, but if there is one, be ready to
    respond quickly.
        Senator Scott. Do you believe today that your understanding
    of--if you were involved in trying to deter or defend Taiwan, I
    mean, defend, could you do it?
        Admiral Gilday. That is a simple question to ask. As you
    pointed out, sir, it is a very complicated one to answer,
    because on different classification levels and different
    scenarios the outcome is different.
        Senator Scott. What do you personally believe? Do you
    believe that we can defend Taiwan today?
        Admiral Gilday. I believe we need a margin of error so that
    it is not even close.
        Senator Scott. Do you think that we have it?
        Admiral Gilday. It depends. Conventionally, deterrence is
    partly in the mind of the adversary. Do they believe we have
    the capabilities and believe we have the will to use it? I can
    answer the first one, not the second one.
        Senator Scott. Do you think having a defense budget that
    does not stay up with inflation that it gives them the belief
    that we are committed?
        Admiral Gilday. I think, back to the pacing part of a
    pacing threat, there is a degree of strategic and operational
    risk that we need to understand. The budget is part of that.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, each of you. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Peters,
    please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    each of our witnesses for your service to our country.
        Admiral, my question for you is, I would like to return to
    the GAO report that Senator Tillis addressed earlier, and
    specifically its finding on fatigue. Shifting away from optimal
    manning process to better account for ship workload will
    certainly help in the long run, but my question for you, sir,
    is what are you doing now to combat fatigue in the fleet?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, making great gains to make sure that
    everybody on ships gets 7, 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep a
    night. That is a challenge. We have been learning a lot. We
    have medical experts who are helping us design a program. We
    are assessing that program. We just came out with a revised
    instruction based on our assessment a few months ago. We
    continue to learn, but I am confident they are on the right
    track and we are committed to this, sir, again, tied to those
    collisions in 2017.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Berger, the Marine Corps just awarded a contract
    for the Organic Precision Fires-Mounted system. This type of
    investment in loitering munitions will certainly be a key to
    ensure that the Marine Corps is properly equipped for those
    fights in the future.
        My question for you is, could you discuss how the fiscal
    year 2022 budget actually reflects these modernization
    priorities in unmanned system?
        General Berger. Both in the air and on the surface, as you
    highlight, we will triple the number of unmanned aerial
    systems, aerial squadrons that we have, and they will be a mix
    of those that collect, those that are lethal, those that
    provide logistics, those that fuse information and move
    information.
        On the surface, to an earlier discussion, the Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle, for example, we are using it in a
    configuration now with the Naval Strike Missile, where it is a
    combination of manned and unmanned teaming, some vehicles
    crewed, some uncrewed. That allows the tactical commander to
    spread his forces out and pose the adversary a threat from
    multiple vectors, which is what we need to be able to do.
        Senator Peters. Right. General Berger, again, in April, the
    Marine Corps Gazette, there was a story talking about the
    Second Marine Information Group, and the commander offered
    several recommendations for operating in the information
    environment, focusing entirely on both individual and unit
    mindsets. This certainly makes me wonder about the intangible
    components of Force Design 2030. So could you talk to the
    Committee a little bit about what you believe every marine
    should know about information and how to operationalize it, as
    well as what every commander should know?
        General Berger. My assumption is that you are going to want
    your Marine Corps and your Navy far forward. That is the best
    chance you have to deter. That is the best chance you have to
    respond to a crisis. If you are far forward, then you are
    closest to the adversary, and what information goes back and
    forth, what messages you are sending, what you are collecting
    and moving within your force matters.
        I think the Joint Force Commander, the combatant commander
    that the CNO talked about earlier, is going to rely very
    heavily on the Marine Corps and the Navy forward to paint a
    picture of what is in front of them and to move that
    information, and to call out an adversary's actions to make it
    public.
        Every marine then who is forward has to understand that as
    lethal as we are, and we are very lethal, the information part
    of that is extraordinarily important. We have to understand
    that, that every individual becomes a cog in a bigger system of
    what do they see in us, what do we see in them, how are we
    trying to defeat their reconnaissance of us. What do they
    understand about us?
        So it is higher level of understanding for marines and
    sailors, I think, forward, that has not been necessary in the
    past, but will be critical moving forward.
        Senator Peters. Right. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator
    Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
    service.
        Admiral, I want to revisit your statement that numbers
    matter. China's navy is bigger, not only bigger but
    geographically concentrated. Almost all PLA [People's
    Liberation Army] Navy ships are in the South China Sea. Do you
    believe the United States maintains naval superiority within
    1,000 miles of China?
        Admiral Gilday. Sir, right now we do. If we needed to
    respond, we could, and we could respond with overwhelming
    force, and then surge additional forces forward.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. General Berger, Iwo Jima, Midway,
    Pearl Harbor--a fight in the Pacific falls on the Navy and the
    Marine Corps. If we have conflict with China, our Nation will
    look to you. But if this budget passes, the Marine Corps in
    strength of fiscal year 2022 down by 2,700. You have worn the
    cloth of this Nation for 40 years, and I know have the courage
    to answer this question like a marine. Is it responsible to
    shrink the Marine Corps as the Nation pivots into the Indo-
    Pacific?
        General Berger. When you say, just to clarify, sir,
    ``shrink the Marine Corps,'' are you talking about end
    strength, just to make sure, the structure of the Marine Corps?
        Senator Tuberville. Yes.
        General Berger. I would trade size for quality if we have
    to. I think all the service chiefs would like to never cut
    their end strength, given an unrestricted, unlimited set of
    resources. But that is not the world that we live in. So we
    will reduce the end strength. We have reduced the end strength
    in order to fund our own modernization for the future.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. You know, our military is
    built on, obviously, recruitment, because we are a volunteer
    military. I just do not want us to get into this extremism in
    which we know we have problems in a lot of different areas. You
    know, being a football coach for years I brought people in, and
    they went my way or they went the other way, because you have
    got to build a team.
        But, you see things like, Admiral, in your department I
    saw, on social media, we had a Pride flag on your social media
    on an aircraft carrier. I have no problem with that because, I
    had young men that were gay that played football for me. I
    mean, you know, you take everybody, and this takes everybody in
    the military. But we cannot separate. We cannot separate. To me
    it is the bigger cause that all these young men and women fight
    for our military. It is not individual sport. It is not golf.
    It is football. I mean, we have got to build a team.
        I have asked this same thing of Secretary Austin and the
    others. We just need a commitment from everybody to kind of
    calm down on all this so we can build a military that believes
    in one thing--our country--and we believe in it together. If we
    keep dividing our country we are going to continue to have
    problems, and I think it is something we just need to all be
    real careful of in the future. Because we have got the greatest
    country on the face of this earth, and we do not want to
    destroy it by individualizing and making individual sports out
    of everything we do, especially the military--especially the
    military.
        So I just needed to make that statement. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
    Duckworth is recognized via Webex.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and as someone
    who has served 23 years in our military I can tell you it is
    one team, one fight, regardless of who is in the aircraft with
    you. I would tell you that when I was bleeding to death in my
    helicopter I did not ask what somebody's background was. I only
    cared that they had an American flag on their shoulder and were
    there to rescue me. So our military truly is united, and that
    oath of office is what unites all of us.
        Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here and thank
    you for your service to our Nation. I am very courage to see
    the development of unmanned naval platforms such as the MQ-25
    aerial refueler, which will provide essential logistics support
    to our maritime forces. The MQ-25 conducted the first-ever
    aerial refueling between a manned aircraft and an unmanned
    tanker on June 4, from MidAmerica Airport in my home state of
    Illinois. It will be the world's first operational carrier-
    based, unmanned aircraft providing aerial refueling and ISR
    [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities
    for carrier strike groups. MQ-25 integration will extend the
    range of our aircraft carriers and lay the foundation for all
    future carrier-based unmanned systems.
        Admiral Gilday, could you speak to the impact unmanned
    programs such as the MQ-25 have on our ability to provide
    essential logistics in contested environments and the
    importance of continued investments in unmanned systems for the
    Navy's future force design. In particular, how do you plan to
    employ this capability to support our operational plans in the
    Indo-Pacific region, where the tyranny of distance is something
    we have already discussed? Thank you.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question. I
    think that the impact of the MQ-25 and our experiences that we
    have seen out at sea, and again, with the aerial refueling that
    you mentioned 2 weeks ago, I think the effects are profound,
    for not only the Navy but our military. It will change the
    dynamic of the carrier air wing. You mentioned increased ISR
    capability, increased range, increased lethality.
        I also think it is going to change the way that we employ
    the air wing, where you will have manned and unmanned operating
    together. The MQ-25 is our first look at how we are going to do
    that going into the 2030s. That particular platform we have a
    high degree of confidence in right now, and that is only
    growing day by day as we operate it.
        So as we move forward, ma'am, what we are learning from the
    MQ-25, we are not only applying that to other aerial vehicles
    but we are also applying it to the work that we are doing in
    unmanned surface platforms and unmanned undersea platforms as
    well.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Admiral. I was pleased that
    you released the Department of the Navy's Unmanned Campaign
    Framework, which outlines a holistic approach to developing and
    deploying unmanned systems and ensuring that individual
    technologies can operate within a broader architecture of
    networked warfighting systems. I believe unmanned systems will
    play a key role in future distributed marine operations,
    littoral operations in a contested environment and
    expeditionary advanced-based operations.
        However, these platforms will not provide maximum
    capability for our forces if they are not fully integrated with
    other important systems, and I am so glad to hear, in your
    earlier answer, that you are integrating these systems in.
        I do understand that you need to develop a manned/unmanned
    teaming solution in order to effectively employ the MQ-25 in
    some situations. Can you please just walk me through your plans
    for this solution and what resources you might need to develop
    this enabler, so we can get the most use out of an important
    capability like the MQ-25?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. So first of all, on a campaign
    plan I would also like to mention that the Commandant, General
    Berger, also signed that framework with me, so the Marine Corps
    and the Navy are working, because we have to, hand in hand as
    we proceed forward with unmanned.
        So conceptually, ma'am, what we believed for some period of
    time is that this would be a phased approach with respect to
    unmanned, where, for a certain period of time, there needs to
    be a man in the loop. So eventually we will have artificial
    intelligence technology, machine learning that allows us to
    continue to increase the amount of autonomy that we employ with
    these vessels. But I think that we have to be smart about this
    and understand that this is going to be a phased approach. But
    there is still a lot of power there, even in a phased approach,
    in a responsible way to keep a man in the loop as we leverage
    the unmanned and uncrewed vessels.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I would like to chat a little
    bit about the Indo-Pacific region. You know, I think we are
    clear that our alliances and partnerships provide the United
    States with a clear asymmetrical advantage against potential
    adversaries. I know I am out of time. General Berger, I would
    like to submit a question for the record to ask you really how
    would the Marine Corps balance the need to invest in
    modernization with resourcing critical readiness and mil-to-mil
    initiatives with our partners and allies, particularly in the
    Indo-Pacific region. I am talking specifically about building
    trust and interoperability by actually have a presence in the
    Indo-Pacific on the ground, in the region, to basically, bottom
    line, enhance relationships and increase deterrence and open
    doors, finding new friends, maybe not necessarily allies but
    people who are just happy to have us there to enforce the rule
    of law and international norms and behaviors. So I will submit
    that for the record, and I hope that you will send me an
    answer. Thank you, General Berger.
        I am over time, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Senator
    Blackburn, please.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Gilday,
    I want to come to you, if I may. Naval Support Activity Mid-
    South in Millington there in Tennessee, and, of course, we have
    some of the best personnel there for Navy Recruiting Command
    and Navy Personnel Command, and we are just so honored to have
    them there and appreciative of the work that they do.
        I want to talk with you a little bit about the newly
    transformed model of recruiting, which you have really pushed
    back and away from the legacy model, and where you had one
    recruiter for every job. I like what you are doing with the
    1,000 talent acquisition stations supported by 64 Talent
    Acquisition and Onboard Centers, and 26 Navy talent acquisition
    teams. I understand that this is fully operational now, in
    2021, when your start date and your target date had been 2023.
        So it is wonderful to see transformative change being
    implemented and ahead of schedule, and the men and women that
    have worked on that really deserve a lot of talent. So talk a
    little bit about how this transformational model with basically
    the three-person team, with the recruiter or the scout, the
    assessor, and the onboarder, how that is working and how you
    have implemented that.
        Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, thanks for recognizing our teammates
    out at Millington. Really a terrific group of innovators out
    there.
        I would say two things up front that allow us to take a
    look at how we reimagine recruiting. One was the pandemic. We
    were challenged with respect to face-to-face contact, and so we
    began to rely on the digital that much more. We already had an
    idea of how we were going to do this in terms of, as you
    described, transforming the organization. Based on funding from
    Congress, we were able to accelerate that by 3 years. We could
    not have done that without the help of this Committee and
    others. That is, I think, a real model for when Congress
    believes that we are on the right track here and they allow us
    to fund it, that we can make fundamental changes.
        Under this new system, we have recruited 54,000 new sailors
    into the Navy. We have met and exceeded our goals, even during
    the pandemic. So it is relying on small teams that work
    together very closely and also are leveraging social media and
    the digital, as well as teams that compete out there where the
    potential recruitable population hangs out, which is on the
    gaming sites.
        Senator Blackburn. All right. I want you to drill down a
    little bit on two things. Number one is how this is helping you
    get the skilled talent you need for 21st century warfare, and
    second, how you have used bots and data to help target and to
    be effective.
        Admiral Gilday. So the data has allowed us to understand
    where the recruitable population resides, not physically but
    virtually, in cyberspace. When you think about the gaming
    community, which is pretty big--I have sons that are in
    college, and it is millions of young people that play these
    games online. We have created Navy teams that are out there
    playing and can answer people's questions when they have one.
        We found, in particular, with respect to those that are
    interested in the cyber field of study that I have to rely less
    on them being a college graduate than the fact that they are a
    good gamer or a good hacker, and just are interested in how
    they can apply their skills in a place like the Navy, where
    they can do some pretty exciting things, if they have the right
    authorities to do so, and that is classified, but that gets
    into a higher classification.
        But we have been able to attract, as you mentioned, ma'am,
    some really sophisticated and dedicated patriots into the Navy.
        Senator Blackburn. I would assume utilizing that type,
    artificial intelligence, you will be able to apply that to
    things such as promotion boards, to eliminate bias and to----
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. That is good goal. I would just
    say that I think it will take us some time to get there before
    machines can make those kinds of, in some cases, subjective
    judgment calls, whether it is on the battlefield or whether it
    in a promotion board. But I certainly think that is in our
    future, and that is the path that we are on.
        Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that, and I commend you and
    the team at Millington for the way forward on this.
        General Berger, I am going to submit questions for you
    dealing with China. Secretary Harker, I also have some
    questions pertaining to China, and I will submit those for the
    record.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. Senator Rosen,
    please.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed and Ranking Member
    Inhofe, for holding this hearing, and thank you so much for
    your service and for being here today.
        Of course, in Nevada we have our wonderful Fallon Naval Air
    Station, and we are proud to host it. It is home to Top Gun,
    our Nation's premier carrier air wing. It is home to the Navy
    SEAL Training Center.
        So last year the Navy requested an expansion of over
    600,000 acres of Federal land and over 65,000 acres of non-
    Federal land, which would expand Fallon Training Complex to
    about 900,000 acres. Federal land managers currently allow
    access to the public for much of the proposed expansion area
    for grazing, for hunting, for mineral exploration, and
    geothermal development, and the Navy's proposal would curtail
    many of these activities, in addition to restricting Tribal
    access to some of their most important cultural sites.
        The fiscal year 2021 NDAA included a provision that Senator
    Cortez Masto and I offered that mandates the creation of an
    Intergovernmental Executive Committee, or IEC, to allow local,
    state, and Tribal governments a public forum to collaborate
    with the Navy to provide advice and exchange information. In
    doing so, we hope we can support the Navy's modernization
    requirements and keep up with all, of course, our current
    emerging threats, technologies, while maintaining Nevada's
    natural resources and cultural resources.
        But the Navy sent over a legislative proposal to this
    Committee almost identical to last year, unfortunately, and it
    did not incorporate any of the suggested changes or feedback
    from our local stakeholders. So, Admiral, I am really pleased
    that you did your IEC right away, but why hasn't the Navy's
    proposal been modified to incorporate some of these?
        Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I think for the very reasons that
    you mentioned with respect to there are a number of
    stakeholders involved here. As you know, we have had over 300
    engagements with the Native American Tribes to try and work
    through some of those difficulties. There are other
    difficulties that may or may not coincide with the Tribes that
    involve the county. There is also the state. There is also the
    Department of the Interior.
        So the IEC, we have had two meetings so far. The Walker
    Paiute Tribe is a vice chair, as well as the County Commission
    is also the vice chair. I think the way forward here that I am
    optimistic about is we are now getting all the stakeholders in
    the same room together, so that we can work through all of
    these issues in a way that allows us, we hope, in the end, to
    modernize the range. We have not done so since the mid 1980s.
    We are two generations behind with respect to aircraft. We are
    facing a problem now where if we do not modernize this range,
    the first time F-35's will be able to employ their full
    capability will be in combat.
        We are building wind farms off the California coast that,
    again, cut into our training range. We are running out of space
    to train, but we are using, you know, for some years now,
    precision weapons, GPS-guided weapons, with longer ranges, with
    sophisticated aircraft, and we cannot train our pilots and our
    air crews to their full capability.
        So I, again, am very enthused, ma'am, by the IEC. A meeting
    here next Monday, is the next one, tracking it very closely,
    and, of course, I very much appreciate your support as we work
    through this.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I look forward to working
    on that with you and all the allies and partners. I want to
    just quickly talk about the Fallon's B-19 range, because in
    1959 the Navy did drop live, inert ordnance right outside of
    there, speaking of the Walker River Paiute Tribe, and that is
    nearly 6,000 of their acres where you dropped this ordnance,
    and so it contaminated all of that.
        Will you commit to working with me and the Nevada
    delegation on ensuring that the Tribe is very fairly
    compensated for this contamination?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. You have my commitment.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I will submit this for the
    record, but Senator Blackburn and I, she talked about the
    skilled workforce. We actually have a bill called the Cyber
    Security Reserve Act, to establish a civilian cyber reserve
    corps, modeled after a recommendation from the National
    Commission on Military, National, and Public Service report,
    that will help in surge capacity and training, giving people
    onramps to serve their government, like the other Reserve corps
    do, and I look forward to talking with you about that in
    another time. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Kelly,
    please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.
    Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you for joining us this
    morning.
        This past weekend I visited the U.S. Merchant Marine
    Academy, a school that gave me the foundation to succeed in the
    Navy and then later at NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration] as an astronaut. While the Merchant Marine is
    overseen by other committees, I want to acknowledge the
    important contribution it makes to our total sealift
    capability. This is critical, and in order to sustain our
    forces we need to ensure robust and reliable sealift capacity.
    Competition with China is increasing, and projecting power to
    the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) places a demand on our sealift
    capability that simply was not a factor in the Middle East.
        Our witnesses mentioned earlier, and all of you indicated
    in written testimony for this hearing, your concern about
    threats to our supply chains and global sustainment networks.
    General Berger, can you expand on any concerns you may have
    about our sealift capability today and what more does the U.S.
    need to do to ensure that we have a ready force of sufficient
    capability?
        General Berger. Like a lot of other people wearing a
    uniform, the first time I got familiar with sealift capability
    was 1991 in Saudi Arabia. Sailed them into Al Jubail port,
    offloaded ships for probably 2, 2 1/2 weeks. That is where we
    got our equipment from, and we flew from Contiguous United
    States (CONUS) and linked up with our equipment there. That was
    my first exposure to sealift. But that was assured. Sailing
    those ships in and out of there, they were protected, they were
    secured. Nobody was threatening those lines at all.
        A very different picture, as you point out, from the Indo-
    Pacific, where the Chinese Navy is stretching out, it is
    gaining a marine and a naval force projection capability that
    they have not had. They want to control the same straits that
    we need to keep open. Sealift now becomes a major concern. In
    other words, a handful of large ships with a lot of gear on
    them now becomes vulnerable. We need to disperse that.
        So I think military sealift, going forward, is not the same
    variant as 1991, where there are three or four ships, or five
    in a squadron, and they are loaded to the gills with equipment,
    and you can sail into a secure port and offload it on your
    timeline. That is not going to be the case.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you. Admiral or Secretary
    Harker, any additional comments on our sealift capability?
        Mr. Harker. We definitely need to recapitalize our sealift
    capability. We are working to do so, and it is something that
    we believe strongly in investing in new ships, because that
    gives us the biggest bang for our buck.
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. If I could just mention
    something, or expound on something that General Berger
    mentioned. I think that as the Department looks at this new
    Joint Warfighting Concept and as we think about how we are
    going to fight differently in the future, I think this is
    exactly what the Commandant was getting to with respect to one
    area would be sealift, in terms of the capacity that we need,
    based on the way we are going to fight.
        What the Navy is doing right now, we know that we are
    behind on recapitalizing sealift, but Congress has given us
    authorities to buy used sealift. So we have done the market
    analysis and we are currently purchasing five additional ships,
    nine total, about a tenth of the cost to build a new ship. So
    we do some minor modifications in a U.S. shipyard that gives us
    a Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) capability as an example.
        Secondly, what we are doing in this budget, particularly,
    we have got 16 additional life-extension plans for existing
    sealift. We are not satisfied with where we are right now, sir,
    but I think we are headed in the right direction with regard to
    recapitalization and repair.
        Senator Kelly. As you get those new ships, do you feel like
    you can find the officers and crew to man them?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. One of the national treasures we
    have is our Merchant Marine force, and they have been great.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, and I am willing to work
    with you going forward on any further ideas on how we
    strengthen that capability. It is critical to maintain these
    supply lines. General, as you pointed out, it is much different
    than what we dealt with in 1991, in the first Gulf War.
        Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you for your
    testimony today and thank you for your service to the Nation
    over many years, and please relay our thanks to the men and
    women of the Navy and Marine Corps and their families.
        With that I will adjourn the hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                      shipbuilding defense industrial base
        1. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, what policy initiatives or
    funding investments are being implemented within the shipbuilding
    defense industry to help stabilize the future of the industrial base
    and to counter increased costs and other risks due to defense industry
    gaps?
        Secretary Harker. In an effort to create, maintain, protect and
    restore the defense industrial base, the Navy is focused on investments
    and efforts that safeguard, synchronize, and expand domestic
    shipbuilding and ship sustainment supply chains. The shipbuilding
    supply base faces an unprecedented set of challenges: resiliency
    throughout a global pandemic; the decline of critical markets and
    suppliers; aggressive industrial postures of peer and near-peer
    competitor nations; and the loss of vital skills in the domestic
    workforce. The overlap of external, macro-level pressures, and the net
    effect of these factors, create the need and urgency to leverage
    policy, authorities, and investments in the interest of national
    defense.
        Congressionally added supplier development funding, Defense
    Production Act projects, and CARES Act investments have been critical
    levers and authorities to expand product lines and capacity to de-risk
    single sources in vulnerable and volatile shipbuilding market spaces.
    Beginning in fiscal year 2011, these funding streams have injected
    hundreds of millions of dollars into strategic supplier efforts to: (1)
    maximize productive capacity of single/sole sources, and (2) develop
    additional sources of supply to mitigate risk to the Navy enterprise.
    Separately, over the last 18 months and throughout the pandemic, CARES
    Act investments were targeted towards two focus areas: (1) ensuring the
    continued viability of key, cross-platform vendors with the greatest
    impact to the greatest number of Navy programs, and (2) sustaining
    critical capability and capacity (both at the shipbuilder and heavy
    machining and fabrication levels) to support the 30-Year Shipbuilding
    Plan and Future Naval Force Structure goals.
        In addition to infrastructure improvements, the Navy is focused on
    building resilient, sustainable workforce pipelines that match the
    investments being made into capability and capacity. In partnership
    with OUSD/Acquisition and Sustainment, Industrial Base Analysis and
    Sustainment office, there are several ongoing initiatives targeted at
    long-term stability and predictability between Navy demand signal and
    workforce/trades, particularly for critical skillsets in welding,
    pipefitting, and specialized machining.
        The Navy is taking a more forward-looking approach to maintenance
    and modernization to provide stability to the industrial base,
    including contracting strategies that align workload with industrial
    base capacity. The Navy has been grouping ship maintenance and
    modernization contracts to provide long-term predictability,
    incentivize industry growth, and facilitate learning.
        The Navy is also into its third year of the Shipyard Infrastructure
    Optimization Program (SIOP). Fully executed, SIOP will provide much
    needed recapitalization of CVN and SSN dry docks, new waterfront
    production facilities, improved facility layout, modernized machinery
    and support infrastructure that increase productivity and safety at the
    four public shipyards. These improvements will help ensure the
    efficient, timely and cost effective execution of scheduled maintenance
    availabilities.
                    virginia-class submarine industrial base
        2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, your testimony asserted that
    the Virginia-class fast-attack submarines have parts that are failing
    much sooner than expected. How is the Navy proactively identifying the
    quantity of ``life-of-the-submarine'' parts that require replacement
    and developing a sourcing strategy for the industrial base to prepare
    for this new demand signal?
        Secretary Harker. The Virginia-class submarine is still
    comparatively a quite young class. The lead ship of the Virginia-class
    submarines is still in its second major maintenance availability. As
    the major availabilities have been completed some components identified
    to last the life of the ship based on engineering analysis and testing
    were subject to degradation modes (e.g. complex galvanic interactions)
    that had not been predicted. The information collected on actual
    material condition during major maintenance availabilities is being fed
    back to the material modeling process and commercial suppliers to
    improve the modeling/reliability and those lessons are being
    incorporated into the next block procurement. This enables us to move
    from reactive to proactive replacement and improve material
    availability and sparing. Each availability provides an opportunity to
    refine, adjust and improve our ability to accurately forecast the
    required materials for maintenance availabilities.

        3. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, what is being done to
    efficiently identify the source of this unexpected degradation to parts
    that are not lasting for the lifetime of the submarine as expected?
        Secretary Harker. The Navy is still learning about the long-term
    reliability Virginia-class components. In fact, USS Virginia (SSN 774)
    is just now completing its second major maintenance availability which
    allows for additional information on component reliability.
        Maintenance availabilities have identified that some components
    intended to last the life of the ship, based on engineering analysis
    and testing, were subject to degradation modes (e.g. complex galvanic
    interactions) that were not predicted. This was due to more severe
    temperature and moisture conditions than expected and operationally
    evolving environments which did not extend similarly from commercial
    applications for certain commercial off-the-shelf systems. The
    information collected on actual material condition during major
    maintenance availabilities is being incorporated into the material
    modeling process and provided to commercial suppliers to improve future
    reliability, and those lessons are being incorporated into the next
    block procurement and parts planning processes.

        4. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, what impact will the
    manufacturing limitations to replace and stock these parts, have on
    upcoming Virginia-class maintenance schedules and the submarine fleet's
    ability to execute operations and respond to national tasking?
        Secretary Harker. [Deleted.]

        5. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, what steps are being taken to
    make reliability improvements on the identified degraded parts for
    later blocks of the Virginia-class submarine?
        Secretary Harker. An organizational structure and team has been
    established to focus on in-service submarine reliability issues and
    solutions. The Navy's Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM)
    -Integrated Product Team (IPT) is analyzing the reliability of over 70
    systems and individual parts using data-driven models and tools. The
    RAM IPT has investigated root causes and began implementing solutions
    such as; improved fleet training, more robust component designs, better
    troubleshooting procedures, maintenance plan improvements, and improved
    onboard component stocking and design. These improvements are planned
    to be incorporated into Columbia-class and future Virginia-class Block
    V/VI contracts. Additionally, the Navy's Reliability Control Board
    facilitates prioritization of reliability issues based upon feedback
    from the Fleet. The RAM IPT and RCB initiatives have resulted in
    redesigns to improve reliability with solutions already fielded in the
    fleet:
          Impressed Current Cathodic Protection Non-pressure Hull
    Penetrators--Installation process difficult/susceptible to damage.
    Redesigned to simplify installation/improved reliability.
          CO2 Scrubber Compressor--Reliability lower than predicted
    due to unexpected operating environment. Redesigned compressor to
    improve reliability.
          Turbine Generator Magnetic Bearing--Earlier than
    anticipated failures. Several redesigned components to mitigate root
    cause of bearing failure.
          Vertical Launch System Outboard Cables--Early failures
    observed on Block I/II. Cable connector redesigned to address observed
    failure modes.
          Capstan Outboard Cables--Corroded connectors resulted in
    failures earlier than expected. Redesigned cable and minimized
    connectors to improve reliability.
          Outboard Cable Failures--Cables and connectors failed due
    to corrosion. Redesigned connectors to include coatings resulting in
    better reliability and resistance to flooding.
             small business and innovation research program (sbir)
        6. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Harker, the SBIR program is a
    competitive acquisition process that provides the Department with vast
    authority to transition innovative technologies. Can you share how the
    Department of the Navy is using the SBIR program to advance
    modernization priorities across all warfare domains?
        Secretary Harker. The Department of the Navy (DON) recognizes the
    cutting edge work that is conducted by our small business partners and
    continues to view small businesses as vital to meeting the needs of
    Sailors and Marines, both today and in the future. Modernization is a
    long-standing priority of the DON Small Business Innovation Research
    (SBIR)/Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. Advancing
    modernization priorities through these programs starts with a topic
    that represents the needs of the Fleet and Force, for which innovative
    solutions are sought from domestic start-ups and small businesses. The
    DON SBIR/STTR topic development process ensures alignment of all topics
    with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), including modernization
    priorities, and captures input from seven DON Systems Commands
    representing needs across all warfare domains.
        Since fiscal year 2020 the DON SBIR/STTR programs have tracked
    modernization as a category entitled ``Modernize Key Capabilities'' to
    identify NDS alignment. Currently, 134 topics are categorized as
    modernization priorities (40 percent of all topics since fiscal year
    2020), from which the Program has awarded 406 Phase I contracts valued
    at over $60 million to small businesses to prove the feasibility of
    their innovative modernization solutions. To date, 52 of these Phase I
    awardees successfully have competed for and received Phase II contract
    awards to continue the development and testing of prototype technology.
    The value of these Phase II contracts is $21 million and growing.
        Prior to fiscal year 2020, at least 78 topics had a direct impact
    on advancing modernization priorities, with the oldest topic dating
    back to fiscal year 2083. Collectively, these topics resulted in 182
    Phase I awards valued at $19 million and 101 Phase II awards valued at
    $117 million. At the completion of Phase II, DON Program Executive
    Offices, labs, and Warfare Centers used Phase III authority to
    successfully commercialize 16 of these projects to advance
    modernization priorities. Phase III non-SBIR/STTR funding for these
    projects exceeds $222 million.
        DON SBIR/STTR topic N05-149 is an example of how these programs
    have succeeded in advancing DON's modernization efforts. The objective
    of the topic was to use artificial intelligence (AI) to provide an
    operator with solutions to reduce manning. Specifically, the topic
    requested innovative solutions applicable to the evaluation of data
    sets used to process decision-making in the Ocean Battlespace
    Environment (e.g., littoral waters). This topic desired: exploration of
    using AI within the decision-making process; development of algorithms
    based on structural and human behavioral models, and heuristic
    inference rule sets, as well as numerical algorithms; evaluation of
    data sets used to process a decision; and incorporation of AI within
    the surface and subsurface tactical and operational decision process.
    Three small businesses received Phase I awards valued at a total of
    $299,000 and, at the end of Phase I, all three small businesses
    received Phase II awards valued at a total of $9.2 million. These same
    three small firms have received multiple Phase III contract awards
    totaling more than $49.2 million.
        The DON SBIR/STTR programs have five objectives to deliver
    capability to our acquisition programs and the Fleet and Force. These
    objectives are: (1) stimulate technological innovation; (2) meet
    federal research & development (R&D) needs; (3) foster and encourage
    participation in innovation and entrepreneurship by women and socially
    or economically disadvantaged persons; (4) increase private sector
    commercialization of innovations derived from federal R&D funding; (5)
    and foster technology transfer through cooperative R&D between small
    businesses and research institutions. The DON SBIR/STTR programs are
    critical to meeting these objectives and advancing modernization
    priorities across all warfare domains.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                             shipyard modernization
        7. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, while I've
    been supportive of the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan
    (SIOP), I'm concerned about the timeline, cost overruns, and the
    capability, even with these upgrades, of maintaining a future larger
    fleet. I'd like to get you both on the record that construction of the
    new drydock at Pearl Harbor will begin in fiscal year 2023.
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Navy has prioritized the
    construction requirement for Dry Dock 3 at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
    and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (P-209). In support of a contract
    award, the Navy must complete environmental impact studies and planning
    and design efforts. Construction is planned to be completed to support
    the submarine class maintenance plan.

        8. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, I'm concerned that even after
    the upgrades to the four public shipyards, we're going to barely meet
    maintenance demands for the current fleet of 296 ships, let alone a
    future larger fleet of potentially 355 ships or more. How is the Navy
    planning to meet the demands of a larger fleet in the future?
        Admiral Gilday. The shipyard maintenance enterprise is transforming
    how the shipyards do business to create more production capacity and
    improve productivity to deliver submarines and aircraft carriers out of
    maintenance availabilities on-time. Naval Sustainment Systems--
    Shipyards (NSS-SY) is an all-shipyards, all-hands effort that deploys
    industry and government best practices across the four public shipyards
    to eliminate variability, increase throughput and improve production
    efficiencies. NSS-SY seeks to identify methods for rapid development in
    these areas, test these methods and, if successful, share these methods
    across all four shipyards.
        NSS-SY is challenging Navy leadership at the highest levels to
    identify and collaborate on solutions to Navy-wide problems that have
    the greatest impacts on the shipyards. Naval Sea Systems Command
    (NAVSEA) created the NAVSEA Transformation Office (NTO), led by the
    Commander, NAVSEA, to oversee the NSS-SY effort using nine pillars for
    success--planning, engineering, material, waterfront operations,
    shipyard resourcing, shipyard infrastructure, inside shop, fleet
    operations, and information technology. Each pillar has a flag officer
    or SES leading the efforts. Pillar leads are focused on executing those
    changes that, ultimately, allow our mechanics at the waterfront and on
    the shop floor to do their job with maximum efficiency and minimal
    interruption..
        The Navy is also into its third year of the Shipyard Infrastructure
    Optimization Program (SIOP). Fully executed, SIOP will deliver required
    dry dock repairs and upgrades to support both current and future
    classes of ships, optimize workflow within the shipyards through
    significant changes to their physical layout, and recapitalize obsolete
    capital equipment with modern machines that will increase productivity
    and safety. The program is currently working a comprehensive plan on
    the feasibility and ability to accelerate SIOP implementation.
        Combined, SIOP and NSS-SY will fundamentally shift how the Navy
    plans and executes major submarine and aircraft carrier maintenance
    availabilities to dramatically improve their on-time delivery to the
    Fleet today and into the future.
                amphibious warship acquisition and availability
        9. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker, last year the Navy received
    Congressional authority to make a block buy of four amphibious ships
    that would save the taxpayers $750 million dollars, but this year's
    budget doesn't execute that authority. These ships provide a
    competitive advantage, particularly in the Pacific, and I am concerned
    about amphibious ship availability, especially given the loss to fire
    last summer of the USS Bonhomme Richard. Why is the Navy not taking
    advantage of the cost savings efforts Congress provided it in last
    year's National Defense Authorization Act?
        Secretary Harker. The Department of Defense supports smart
    acquisition strategies and is committed to achieving best value
    possible. Traditional amphibious ship requirements are undergoing
    analysis to ensure a balance between operational requirements and
    fiscal constraints. The Department is reviewing the plan for the
    procurement of LPDs and LHAs closely and will pursue a responsible plan
    for the timely procurement of these platforms.

        10. Senator Hirono. General Berger, how does the burning of the USS
    Bonhomme Richard and the decision to not execute the block buy impact
    the Marine Corps' ability to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        General Berger. USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) was decommissioned in
    April 2021, after 22 years of service, due to a fire which occurred on
    12 July 2020. The unplanned decommissioning of LHD 6 resulted in the
    loss of a Joint Strike Fighter capable Amphibious Assault Ship as the
    cornerstone of the Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit
    (ARG/MEU). The loss pressured other LHD/ LHA ships to meet Global Force
    Management deployments and affected maintenance and modernization
    schedules.
        Short-term impacts to ARG/MEU generation are mitigated by
    accelerating the USS Tripoli (LHA 7) Post Delivery Test and Trials
    period to prepare, and certify, the ship for deployment in fiscal year
    2022.
        Long-term impacts to the LHD/LHA inventory cannot be mitigated
    without future procurement of additional ships. LHA 9 is estimated to
    start construction in fiscal year 2023. When the Department is certain
    it will procure specific vessels on a particular timeframe, block-buy
    contracts can be a valuable tool to reduce costs and delivery delays
    and support the industrial base with a clear demand signal. However,
    the Department is still reviewing amphibious ship requirements, and
    committing to a block-buy is premature at this time until inventory
    objectives are established. The Marine Corps appreciates your support
    for these ships in future budget requests.

        11. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, has the
    investigation into the burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard completed
    and if so, what are the results?
        Secretary Harker. and Admiral Gilday. The investigation remains
    open. All substantive investigative activity is complete. The
    investigation is pending an Article 32 hearing. The convening authority
    is Commander 3rd Fleet.

        12. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, how does
    the Navy intend to replace the gap in amphibious ship availability that
    was created by the burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard?
        Secretary Harker. and Admiral Gilday. The decommissioning of USS
    Bonhomme Richard resulted in the loss of her fiscal year 2022
    deployment and fiscal year 2023 sustainment/surge availability period.
    Prior to the fire, the Navy was tasked to maintain the prescribed
    Amphibious Readiness Group Immediate Response Force as outlined by the
    Secretary of Defense (SecDef). To maintain that posture, the following
    actions have been taken:
          USS Tripoli (LHA 7) schedule was accelerated to take the
    place of USS Bonhomme Richard.
          USS Makin Island (LHD 8) schedule accelerated to mitigate
    the USS Tripoli schedule change, resulting in a de-scoped maintenance
    period to meet the new timeline.
          USS Essex (LHD 2) fiscal year 2021 deployment was delayed
    in order to better align with rotational requirements.
        The Navy's planned mitigations meet all requirements as outlined by
    the SecDef. Additionally, we continue to support the LHA program. In
    addition to USS Tripoli's delivery to the fleet in fiscal year 2020,
    USS Bougainville (LHA 8) is under construction and scheduled to deliver
    in fiscal year 2025.
               virginia-class attack submarine procurement issues
        13. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, the
    private shipyards are currently running 12-18 months behind delivery
    dates for the Block IV Virginia-class attack submarines. It appears
    this has led to increasing the cost estimates for Block IV boats yet to
    be delivered, cost and schedule increases for all of the future larger
    Block V boats, and potentially cost increases for the boats in the
    Columbia strategic missile program. What is wrong with the attack
    submarine production programs?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Submarine industrial base
    performance remains challenged in achieving steady state delivery of
    two boats per year. Improving this performance is essential for
    Virginia-class (VCS) Block IV schedule recovery, VCS Block V
    foundational success, and concurrent Columbia-class construction. The
    Navy continues to closely monitor labor hours and schedule performance
    and is working to address the negative impact of COVID-19 on supply
    base performance, production schedules, and planned staffing growth.

        14. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, what are
    the private shipyards proposing to solve the problems?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Navy has completed a
    detailed assessment of the integrated VCS and Columbia-class schedules
    to ensure an achievable plan supporting Columbia as the #1 Navy
    acquisition priority. We are working with the private shipyards to make
    improvements in on-time and quality material delivery, and are taking
    steps to address production cadence and cost performance, such as
    shifting work between shipyards to better manage labor and footprint
    constraints, and increasing the quantity of strategically outsourced
    components and hours to the supplier base, allowing the shipbuilders to
    focus more on their core work. The Department is also updating and
    enhancing detailed VCS production schedules with an Enterprise
    perspective to ensure integration yard-wide with construction and
    maintenance activities, facility usage, and strategic outsourcing to
    avoid resource conflicts.

        15. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, what steps
    is the Navy planning to take to get the cost overruns and schedule
    delays back under control?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Navy has completed a
    detailed assessment of the integrated VCS and Columbia-class schedules
    and is working to ensure an achievable plan to deliver to a schedule
    and cadence of two VCS per year in accordance with Congressional
    authorizations and appropriations. By taking steps to improve the
    governance structure and align the Enterprise Business Strategy on key
    issues and assumptions, the Department will ensure that starting
    construction on the next VCS will not adversely impact Columbia. The
    Navy has implemented Construction Readiness Reviews , quarterly cost
    and schedule reviews, and monthly executive leadership reviews to
    ensure alignment between programs and quickly address challenges.
      issues with spare parts availability for the virginia-class attack
                                   submarine
        16. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, according to recent news
    reports, the Navy has swapped out over 1,600 parts among its Virginia-
    class attack subs since 2013 to avoid maintenance bottlenecks as
    components that were supposed to last for decades wear out sooner than
    anticipated--adding extra workload to an already stressed system and
    additional risk that the parts could be damaged during the extra steps.
    I'm concerned the Navy is not investing enough in maintenance, supply
    chains, and shipyard infrastructure--what can you tell me about the
    efforts to mitigate the shortage in spare parts for the Virginia-class
    subs?
        Admiral Gilday. Beginning in 2017, to mitigate the shortage in
    spare parts for the Virginia-class, the Navy implemented a new process
    that leverages all adjacent business processes in order to produce a
    robust and highly credible material forecast for Virginia-class
    submarine depot level maintenance. The improved material analytics and
    forecasting will improve overall material requirements identification,
    ordering, and parts availability.
        Additionally, the Navy's various stakeholders including Naval Sea
    Systems Command (NAVSEA), Naval Supply Systems Command Weapons Systems
    Support (NAVSUP WSS), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), In Service
    Engineering Agents (ISEAs), and Technical Authorities are working
    together through root cause analysis to identify potential short and
    long term issues and corrective actions for cannibalizations (swapping
    parts between hulls) to improve submarine fleet support and operational
    availability. One long term solution set is for cannibalizations to be
    included in the material forecasting process for submarine
    availabilities. Additionally, NAVSEA and stakeholders are submitting
    candidates for potential provisioning adjustments, based on the current
    demand and stakeholder determined essentiality/criticality of each
    item.

        17. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, has the Navy conducted a root
    cause analysis to determine why many of these components are wearing
    out sooner than anticipated?
        Admiral Gilday. Yes. As a result of the Navy's root cause analysis,
    an organizational structure and team has been put in place to focus on
    in-service submarine reliability issues and solutions. The Navy's
    Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM) Integrated Product
    Team (IPT) is analyzing the reliability of over 70 systems and
    individual parts using data-driven models and tools. The RAM IPT has
    investigated root causes and identified solutions such as: improved
    fleet training, more robust component designs, better troubleshooting
    procedures, maintenance plan improvements, and improved onboard
    component stocking and design improvements, which are planned for
    incorporation into Columbia-class and the next block of Virginia-class
    submarines. Additionally, the Navy's Reliability Control Board
    facilitates prioritization of reliability issues based upon feedback
    from the Fleet.
             issues with submarine maintenance at private shipyards
        18. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, the Navy has turned to private
    shipyards in recent years to assist with ongoing maintenance delays for
    our attack submarines which are usually serviced at our four public
    shipyards. Can you give me a progress update on the expected completion
    of the maintenance availabilities for several of the Los Angeles-class
    boats currently at Newport News Shipbuilding (USS Helena, USS Columbus,
    and USS Boise)?
        Admiral Gilday. The following is the status of current private yard
    submarine maintenance schedules:
          USS Helena's (SSN 725) Dry-Docking Selected Restricted
    Availability is underway and projected to complete in October 2021 with
    a total duration of approximately 48 months.
          USS Columbus (SSN 762) is undergoing an Engineered
    Overhaul (EOH) and after rebaselining the availability we expect
    deliver in September 2021; which has exceed its previously planned
    duration of 60 months.
          USS Boise (SSN 764) began a ``smart start'' for its EOH
    in May 2020, ahead of its planned fiscal year 2022 official start. The
    availability duration and end date is subject to negotiation as part of
    the contract award.

        19. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, why is the maintenance backlog
    occurring at Newport News Shipbuilding?
        Admiral Gilday. Both nuclear-qualified private shipyards have
    experienced challenges in re-building their repair capabilities.
        HII-NNS is currently coming through its efforts to re-instate the
    requisite processes, policies, procedures, and skills required to
    properly execute complex submarines maintenance availabilities.
    Shortfalls in SUBSAFE maintenance processes, policies, procedures, and
    skills at HII-NNS contributed to the Helena and Columbus delays and
    have directly impacted all availabilities in planning and execution.

        20. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, what steps is the Navy taking
    to ensure in the future these delays at private shipyard submarine
    availabilities are eliminated?
        Admiral Gilday. Background: Between fiscal years 2015-2018, NAVSEA
    awarded four submarine maintenance availability contracts to the two
    nuclear qualified Private Shipyards, including one Interim Dry Docking
    (USS Montpelier (SSN 765)), one Docking Selected Restricted
    Availability (USS Helena (SSN 725)), and two Engineered Overhauls (USS
    Columbus (SSN 762) and USS Boise (SSN 764)). These contracts were
    structured primarily as Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) Level of Effort
    (LOE) with a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract line item number (CLIN)
    for execution services in support of the CPFF CLINs. The Navy based its
    use of FFP CLINs for execution services on the reasonable definite
    nature of the execution service requirements, under which the
    contracting officer could establish a fair and reasonable price at the
    outset. Issues arose during performance under this contract structure
    largely related to uncertainty as to the vessels' conditions at the
    time of contract award. This led to increased costs and duration, and
    revealed separate understandings of the FFP scope and its relation to
    the CPFF LOE scope. To better align the contracts to the Navy's
    schedule and quality objectives, the Navy and contractor agreed to
    restructure the FFP CLINs to CPFF LOE CLINs and link the contractor's
    fee/profit objectives to incentives that require engineering, material,
    and production value stream improvements and schedule adherence on the
    USS Helena and USS Columbus availabilities. To achieve these same
    objectives, the Navy and contractor agreed to utilize a Cost Plus
    Incentive Fee (CPIF) completion contract with incentives on USS Boise
    execution work.
        Way Ahead: The Navy is taking a new approach to submarine
    maintenance availability contracts based on lessons learned from recent
    submarine availabilities and incorporating best practices from the
    Aircraft Carrier Refueling Complex Overhauls (RCOHs) accomplished by
    the Private Shipyards, including the following.
          Eliminating FFP CLINs from submarine maintenance
    availability contracts;
          Splitting planning phase (CPFF LOE) from execution phase
    (CPIF Completion);
          Managing LOE tasking strictly with Technical
    Instructions;
          Awarding longer planning durations (20 months);
          Invoking proven Public Shipyard processes into Private
    Shipyard planning contracts to improve contractor performance (e.g.
    Resource Loaded Integrated Master Schedule, Task Group Instruction
    (TGI) development, Integrated Project Team Development (IPTD)
    curricula, and performance metrics)
          Invoking and incentivizing Cost Data Sheet (CDS) mutual
    agreement process to align contractor schedules and proposals with
    government/contractor mutually agreed to scope of work;
          Conducting planning product reviews by the Navy;
          Positioning retired Public Shipyard Subject Matter
    Experts on-site; and
          Instituting EVMS within the execution contract.
        The USS Hartford (SSN 768) EOH is the first availability to start
    on this new path. The Navy awarded the planning contract in August
    2020. The Navy will not realize the benefits of this new approach fully
    until the availabilities incorporating this new approach are completed.

        21. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, my understanding is Newport
    News Shipbuilding has told the Navy that attempting to prepare for or
    to be servicing three submarines at once is too many to handle at any
    given time. Is that accurate?
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy, while unaware of any specific statements
    Newport News Shipbuilding may have made regarding their submarine fleet
    in-service repair capacity, agrees with that assessment.

        22. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday, a March 2021 Congressional
    Budget Office Report stated required maintenance for submarines is
    projected to exceed the capacity of the Navy's shipyards in 25 of the
    next 30 years. Beyond the SIOP, which is focused on the Navy's public
    shipyards, what steps is the Navy taking to increase submarine repair
    capacity/efficiency at private shipyards?
        Admiral Gilday. Navy continues to help our private industry
    partners improve their processes, policies, procedures and skills for
    the on-going and upcoming availabilities--USS Helena (SSN 725) Docking
    Selected Restricted Availability, USS Columbus (SSN 762) Engineered
    Overhaul (EOH), USS Boise (SSN 764) EOH, and USS Hartford (SSN 768)
    EOH.
        In addition to placing submarine maintenance subject matter experts
    on site at both HII-NNS and GDEB, Navy has converted the Columbus EOH
    to a CPFF/LOE with special incentives, awarded the Hartford smart start
    contract, and continues to develop both the Boise and Hartford EOH CPIF
    contracts, both expected to be awarded in fiscal year 2022.
        These efforts align private industry and Navy's desired outcomes
    while incentivizing high quality and on time completion of our valuable
    Fleet assets.
                acquisition of light amphibious warships (laws)
        23. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, I know the
    Navy and Marine Corps are planning to procure approximately 30 vessels
    of a new class, the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), to support
    Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations to deter Chinese aggression in
    the Indo-Pacific. What will be your acquisition strategy for acquiring
    the Light Amphibious Warship?
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy has aggressively developed requirements
    and has an approved Acquisition Strategy / Acquisition Plan in support
    of a 2023 procurement and a 2026 delivery of the first Light Amphibious
    Warship (LAW). The LAW Acquisition Plan is to award two contracts, one
    for Concept Studies/ Preliminary Design (CS/PD) followed by a Detailed
    Design and Construction (DD&C) contract for the lead ship. The Navy
    awarded the CS/PD contract in June 2021. The DD&C contract will be a
    full and open competition with the Request for Proposal scheduled for
    release in 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2022 and an expected award in
    early fiscal year 2023. The first contract will include the lead ship
    with options for up to eight follow ships. The strategy procurement of
    the remaining ships of the class is still being evaluated by the Navy.
        General Berger. The Navy is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives
    and will commence with Concept Studies and Preliminary Design to
    evaluate a new medium intra-theater amphibious ship. Studies will
    primarily focus on commercial designs tailored for military application
    to enable maneuver and mobility for our integrated naval forces
    conducting Distributed Maritime Operations. The Department is driving
    towards a lead ship contract award in fiscal year 2023 that will
    support the Marine Corps' future Marine Littoral Regiments in the Indo-
    Pacific region. The Light Amphibious Warship is complementary to
    traditional large amphibious ships; both types of ships are required to
    deliver Marine Corps forces to expeditionary locations.
        The current requirement, after a deliberate analysis process, is 35
    LAWs and would support three future Marine Littoral Regiments. Within
    the constraints of the current fiscal reality, we will work together
    with the Navy to prioritize the acquisition strategy to provide the
    Naval Expeditionary Force with the best value in platform capability
    and capacity.

        24. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, will you be
    following a methodical approach, paying adequate attention to good
    systems engineering principles to ensure the propulsion plant and
    electrical generators are reliable before construction to avoid some of
    the pitfalls of previous classes of ships like the LCS?
        Admiral Gilday. The LAW design will adhere to best practices and
    systems engineering principles and will follow all of the rigorous
    Naval Sea Systems Command Design Review processes. The vessel design,
    based on existing parent designs, will leverage mature commercial
    technologies with proven reliability. To validate equipment reliability
    prior to construction, the program plans to leverage efforts regarding
    propulsion plant and electrical generation system component reliability
    from other programs such as the Medium/Large Unmanned Surface Vessel
    (USV) programs. To that end, the Navy has already initiated a study to
    identify opportunities for LAW to exploit on-going efforts for a Land
    Base Test Site (LBTS) for the Medium/Large USV programs. Additionally,
    LAW system specifications will be written to drive the vessel design
    towards simple but effective systems that minimize required maintenance
    and are designed for ease of maintainability.
        General Berger. Yes, sound systems engineering principles and a
    methodical approach will be used for the acquisition of Light
    Amphibious Warships (LAWs). The Marine Corps works in concert with the
    Navy on amphibious ship requirements.
                   budget request only includes one destroyer
        25. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 set as policy a
    355-ship Navy--right now, we have 296 ships. Looking at this year's
    budget, the Navy's topline only increased by 2 percent, with most of
    that going to the Marine Corps. Only 8 new ships are budgeted out of
    the 12 ships that were expected. Most impactful was one less destroyer
    than originally planned as part of a multi-year contract meant to save
    taxpayer money--in fact, by breaking the contract, we'll have to pay a
    $33 million dollar penalty. Given our strategic shift to the Pacific
    and the importance of the Navy in deterring the rising threat of China,
    how did the Department come to the decision to cut the second
    destroyer?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Destroyers play an important
    role in the Navy's capability and capacity to deter China. As we
    developed the fiscal year 2022 budget, we had to balance our
    investments across readiness, capability, and capacity and it was a
    very difficult funding decision to not include the second destroyer in
    fiscal year 2022 due to affordability. Our goal remains to field the
    best, most capable, and most lethal fleet we can within the limits of
    available resources.

        26. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker, I am very disappointed that
    the Department has submitted a budget that would call for breaking the
    terms of the multiyear procurement of the Aegis destroyers. From your
    perspective, what kind of message does breaking multi-year contracts
    send to our industrial base and do you think actions like this
    incentivize Congress to provide the Department the authority to enter
    into multi-year contracts moving forward?
        Secretary Harker. The Navy has been using multi-year procurement
    (MYP) authority with the support of Congress to efficiently procure DDG
    51 destroyers in quantities that support stable production and a
    healthy industrial base. Over the course of the fiscal year 2018-2022
    MYP, the Navy will procure a total of 11 Flight III DDGs, more than the
    original ten ship procurement. The Navy continues to support the use of
    MYP contracts for procuring DDG 51 class ships.
                         sexual assault and harassment
        27. Senator Hirono. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, eliminating
    the scourge of sexual misconduct within the ranks is a top priority--
    I've been a vocal supporter of removing the chain of command from the
    court-martial decision-making process in cases of sexual assault and
    sexual harassment because I think it will increase victim trust and
    remove perceived conflicts of interest. How do you view these
    proposals?
        Admiral Gilday. The Secretary of Defense directed the Department of
    Defense to work with Congress to amend the UCMJ to remove prosecution
    of sexual assaults, domestic violence, and related crimes from the
    chain of command and create dedicated offices within each military
    department to handle the prosecution of these special crimes. The Navy
    and the Marine Corps are fully committed to working towards the
    successful implementation of these efforts and the additional reforms
    from the Secretary's initiatives following the 90-day Independent
    Review Commission's recommendations on sexual assault and sexual
    harassment. As the Secretary has stated, creating enduring change will
    require a comprehensive approach across multiple lines of effort, and
    these changes must be well-designed for successful implementation. It
    is imperative that we have a military justice system that is effective,
    trustworthy and fair, and one that functions in an operational and
    forward deployed environment.
        General Berger. The Secretary of Defense directed the Department of
    Defense to work with Congress to amend the UCMJ to remove prosecution
    of sexual assaults, domestic violence, and related crimes from the
    chain of command and create dedicated offices within each military
    department to handle the prosecution of these special crimes. The Navy
    and the Marine Corps are fully committed to working towards the
    successful implementation of these efforts and the additional reforms
    from the Secretary's initiatives following the 90-day Independent
    Review Commission's recommendations on sexual assault and sexual
    harassment. As the Secretary has stated, creating enduring change will
    require a comprehensive approach across multiple lines of effort, and
    these changes must be well-designed for successful implementation. It
    is imperative that we have a military justice system that is effective,
    trustworthy and fair, and one that functions in an operational and
    forward deployed environment.

        28. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker, I was happy to see the
    Department of the Navy request more money in the President's Budget for
    sexual assault prevention this year--what steps is the Navy taking on
    the prevention front and how are you communicating to your sailors and
    marines on this important issue?
        Secretary Harker. The Department of the Navy (DON) is further
    growing our capacity to address prevention through the establishment of
    a dedicated prevention workforce and increasing civilian staff at the
    Headquarters level to improve oversight of the efforts of the Navy and
    Marine Corps.
        Integrated Prevention Specialists will lead and support strategic
    prevention efforts at both the Headquarters and Service levels,
    including embedded within deployed and afloat units. This workforce
    will address cross-cutting prevention and will enhance primary
    prevention strategy and capability across thefleet.
        The prevention workforce's role is reducing negative behaviors and
    supporting higher-risk populations through assessing for needed
    training enhancements, and promoting skill-building in healthy
    professional and personal relationships. Establishing a dedicated
    integrated prevention workforce was a key recommendation of the
    Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
    in the Military, and the DON's efforts were already underway.
        The DON engages sailors and marines in prevention efforts through
    training and leadership development initiatives, and will work to
    incorporate prevention strategies, skill-building, and prevention
    throughout the military career cycle. In addition, the DON has
    developed and disseminated tools to command to increase leader
    ownership for recognizing and addressing emerging negative behaviors.
        For example, in April 2021 the DON launched The Watch List: Top 5
    Signals of Risk for Sexual Assault. This evidence-driven tool promotes
    unit-level engagement, increasing awareness of behaviors and attitudes
    that indicate when marines and sailors are at higher risk for sexual
    assault. This fall, we will roll out realistic training scenarios and
    resources to support first-line leaders and their teams in practicing
    how to best respond when faced with emerging negative behaviors.
                            diversity and inclusion
        29. Senator Hirono. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, I was
    happy to see the establishment of Task Force One Navy following the
    murder of George Floyd last year--in the military, it's especially
    important to enhance diversity and foster a culture of inclusion in the
    ranks. Following the results of Task Force One Navy, what steps is the
    Navy taking to bolster diversity within the senior ranks?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy
    (DON) is committed to attracting, recruiting, retaining, and developing
    a pipeline of diverse military talent. We continue to review and revise
    our policies to better support our workforce and advance our diversity
    initiatives.
        While the U.S. Navy is implementing the strategy to operationalize
    the Task Force One Navy (TF1N) final report recommendations, the DON
    has established a team, led by a Diversity, Equity and Inclusions
    (DE&I) Highly Qualified Expert, to build on the TF1N framework, and
    develop our strategic vision, Implementation Strategy, Governance and
    organizational structure for an enterprise DE&I program. The focus is
    to create an enduring and measurable program that champions signature
    leadership behaviors with linkage to culture and in alignment with OSD.
        The DON DE&I framework will leverage a number of indicators within
    our talent management systems to establish demographic trend analysis
    to more effectively address diversity issues throughout the entire
    human capital pipeline.
                  gender integration at marine corps boot camp
        30. Senator Hirono. General Berger, the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 required the Marine Corps to
    integrate boot camps on the East and West coast by 2025 and 2028,
    respectively--this is an important step in my opinion to ensure women
    are viewed equally from the outset in their Marine Corps careers. What
    can you tell me about the progress of this effort and specifically,
    whether the Marine Corps is integrating these units down to the platoon
    level?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is on track to meet the timelines
    associated with Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA). The Marine Corps is using a proven model that adheres to 10 USC
    8431 and maximizes unit cohesion, accountability, equity, diversity,
    and sustainability for both the recruits and drill instructors.
        The service has a 5 year Integration Build Plan. In fiscal year
    2022, MCRD SD will execute three sequential iterations of integrated
    recruit training followed by 12 iterations in fiscal year 2023. By the
    end of fiscal year 2024, MCRD SD will achieve initial operational
    capable (IOC), defined as training companies manned, training
    approximately 50 percent of all female accessions, but will still
    require externally sourced experienced female DIs. By the end of fiscal
    year 2026, MCRD SD will achieve Fully Operational Capable, defined as
    self-sustaining and not requiring external experienced female DIs. MCRD
    Parris Island will achieve the NDAA 2020 requirements in fiscal year
    2024.
        The Marine Corps is integrating genders at the company level,
    however, it is not integrating genders within platoons and below.
    Mandating platoon-level gender integration at recruit training will be
    to the detriment of female Marines during the critical entry-level
    transformation process. In the career force, it will significantly
    reduce billet opportunities as compared to their male counterparts. A
    detailed explanation has previously been provided to Congress.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
                                   education
        31. Senator Peters. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, in 2019,
    Acting Secretary Modly began implementing parts of the Education for
    Seapower (E4S) initiative by breaking ground on the Naval Community
    College (USNCC) and hiring John Kroeger to serve as the Department's
    first Chief Learning Officer (CLO). USNCC has since begun its first
    pilot program and projects growth for fiscal year 2022--this is good
    news--but other aspects of E4S appear to have languished. The budget
    request notes that ``[a]s Naval Leadership seeks to address the balance
    between future force structure, current readiness requirements, and
    warfighter development, a reexamination of the Navy Education for
    Seapower strategy has been undertaken.'' Please detail this
    reexamination, to include its timeline and projected completion, as
    well as the process by which it is assessing E4S.
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. The Office of the Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (OASN (M&RA))
    began a reexamination of the Department of the Navy (DON) Education for
    Seapower (E4S) Strategy 2020 in May 2021. The initial review indicated
    that we needed to update our education strategy to provide clear
    guidance for naval education. On June 30, 2021, OASN (M&RA) convened a
    working group of stakeholders from throughout the DON to review and
    provide recommendations to update the E4S Strategy. The working group
    is examining the overall strategy, including its education objectives,
    implementation plan, and clarity. The working group will provide ASN
    (M&RA) with a draft naval education strategy by October 2021.

        32. Senator Peters. Secretary Harker, the CLO position was created
    to lead and unify all Navy and Marine Corps formal education programs.
    Given that it has been vacant for a year, is its purpose no longer a
    priority for the Department?
        Secretary Harker. Education remains a priority for the Department.
    The Department of the Navy has made great progress in enhancing
    education opportunities and programs since the Education for Seapower
    initiative began in 2019. I assigned the responsibility for all naval
    education to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve
    Affairs) (ASN (M&RA)) in November 2020, which includes responsibilities
    previously delegated to the Chief Learning Officer. I work closely with
    ASN (M&RA) to continue the Department's efforts to improve and
    modernize Navy and Marine Corps education programs.

        33. Senator Peters. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, the
    Department's budget request decreases funding for tuition assistance,
    citing its ``reexamination of the Navy Education for Seapower
    strategy.'' Please expand on this rationale.
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. To improve Sailor and Marine
    education opportunities, the Navy is implementing a consistent 18
    credit hour limit per Sailor and Marine, per year, for the tuition
    assistance (TA) program beginning in fiscal year 2022, consistent with
    Department of Defense policy and guidance. TA usage and required
    funding continues to be monitored, as we implement this policy.
    Accordingly, the Services have specific eligibility criteria to manage
    available TA funds.
                               talent management
        34. Senator Peters. Admiral Gilday, in an article titled ``Use
    Sailors' Hidden Skills'' from the June 2021 issue of Proceedings, Petty
    Officer 1st Class Michael Amenti argues that the Navy can do better to
    leverage Sailors' skills and abilities unrelated to their ratings. Do
    you share this view, and if so, how are you setting the conditions for
    this approach in policy and in practice amongst commands?
        Admiral Gilday. Navy agrees with the author's assessment that we
    have ``the best sailors in the world, and its leaders should recognize
    and use every ounce of their potential.'' As alluded to by the author,
    since 2015, we have been on a journey to bring our talent management
    processes, policies, and programs into the 21st century by enabling
    better ``talent to task'' matching at scale, greater career
    flexibility, modernized and portable training delivery, and incentives
    (monetary and non-monetary), which keep pace with market forces.
        One of these initiatives is Ready Relevant Learning (RRL) which
    fundamentally changes the way our Sailors train, transforming
    industrial-era, conveyer-belt training into a modern, proactive system
    by providing Sailors with the right training, at the right time, to
    maximize their ability to operate across the spectrum of strategic
    competition and ultimately prevail in a high-end fight. Through a
    career-long learning continuum, RRL delivers training at the most
    appropriate time in a Sailor's career, while providing a detailed
    learning roadmap for every Navy career, covering technical,
    professional, and leadership training that is tightly linked to needs
    of the Fleet.
        Additionally, we are improving Fleet readiness and manning through
    better distribution of talent. We continue to expand our Talent
    Marketplace, creating a modern, flexible, and transparent assignment
    process that better balances a Sailor's assignment, location, talents,
    and advancement opportunities with Navy's mission and operational
    needs.
        Accordingly, MyNavy Assignment (MNA) has replaced the Career
    Management System-Interactive Detailing and delivers a modern interface
    and user-friendly experience for our Sailors with expanded visibility
    into jobs. This includes ready access to features such as Sailor
    Resume, Job Bookmarking, the Sailor Application Lifecycle Tracker,
    enhanced Projected Rotation Date modification request routing, and
    associated incentives for a particular job.
        Finally, in 2018, we introduced Advancement-to-Position (A2P) as a
    pilot program to incentivize service in priority or hard-to-fill
    billets across the Fleet by linking service in the position to
    advancement to the next paygrade. We permanently established the
    journeyman-level A2P (E-6 positions), which allows qualified E-5s to
    fill priority E-6 positions identified within MNA and receive a
    permanent advancement incentive.
        We understand that there is intense competition for talent in our
    country, and in light of rapidly evolving tactical and technical
    landscapes, we are modernizing and enhancing our entire talent
    management approach to increase Fleet readiness and lethality to win at
    long term strategic competition.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                building partnerships in the indo-pacific region
        35. Senator Duckworth. General Berger, our alliances and
    partnerships provide the United States with a clear asymmetric
    advantage against potential adversaries. However, we cannot build trust
    and interoperability with our maritime allies and partners from a
    distance. Nor can we contest malign activities without having a
    presence on the ground in the region. Bottom-line: enhancing
    relationships increases deterrence and opens doors to the access we
    need to compete in the region. But as we prioritize resources for
    modernization, we risk underinvesting in opportunities to build
    military to military relationships in the region.
        General Berger, how will the Marine Corps balance the need to
    invest in modernization with resourcing critical readiness and mil-to-
    mil initiatives with our partners and allies, particularly in the Indo-
    Pacific Region?
        General Berger. The Fiscal Year 2022 President's Budget continues
    to prioritize Force Design innovations as the way forward in
    modernizing and training the Marine Corps for the future fight while at
    the same time maintaining a high level of readiness as the Nation's
    crisis response force. A key component of our ability to persist and
    operate forward is maintaining close military to military relationships
    with our partners and allies--particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
    In our PB22 submission we have balanced the requirements of readiness
    and mil to mil engagement with investments in the future.
        A critical element of this budgetary balancing continues to be the
    divestment of legacy capabilities that do not meet future requirements
    and reallocating resources into capabilities needed to build
    expeditionary naval power in support of the joint force. fiscal year
    2022 reform initiatives generated $1.4B from policy reforms, direct
    divestment, and business process/system improvements to reallocate into
    Force Design initiatives that modernize and increase the lethality of
    the Marine Corps, supporting readiness both now and in the future.
    Investments include long range precision fires, advanced command,
    control and sensing capabilities as well as unmanned systems.
        We have also ensured continued investment in our Fleet Marine
    Forces in the Indo-Pacific Region. This investment includes the
    development of permanent capabilities on Guam and continued presence in
    Australia, Korea and Japan. We continue to deepen relationships with
    the armed forces of the Philippines, France, Thailand, Singapore,
    Malaysia, Indonesia and New Zealand. Additionally, we are developing
    new opportunities with Vietnam. Indo-Pacific theater training exercises
    such as IRON FIST, VALIANT MARK, RIMPAC, KAMANDAG, SSANG YONG and
    TALISMAN SABRE continue our current efforts to strengthen our network
    of allies and partners. We have also successfully deployed a full
    squadron of F-35Bs aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth II on her maiden voyage
    to the Indo-Pacific theater, an important demonstration of power
    projection and interoperability with a key ally.
        A critical enabler to our forward presence, exercise participation,
    and partnership development is organic lift aboard amphibious shipping.
    This is a joint capability that enables Littoral Operations in a
    Contested Environment, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO),
    and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). The EABO and DMO are keys to
    effective integrated deterrence and to creating a competitive advantage
    over our pacing threat.
        Our persistent forward presence in the Indo-Pacific region, along
    with Force Design modernization investment, increases interoperability
    and further builds partner capabilities.
        Together, these efforts are critical to maintaining our role as the
    Nation's naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and the leading edge of
    the joint force.
                           indo-pacific force posture
        36. Senator Duckworth. General Berger, what additional resources
    are needed to ensure the Marine Corps has the right balance of
    dispersed and distributed forces in the Indo-Pacific to work with our
    allies and partners and deter potential adversaries?
        General Berger. In addition to Marine programs, the Marine Corps'
    success of ground modernization is also predicated on Navy shipbuilding
    programs. The vast Indo-Pacific region is ideally suited for naval
    expeditionary forces persistently operating forward to assure allies
    and partners and deter malign behavior from China. Amphibious warfare
    ships allow the United States to position forces forward in
    international waters with Marines poised and ready to conduct a wide
    range of missions supporting the fleet commander's campaign and
    national interests. Authorizing and appropriating amphibious ships in
    future budget requests will ensure we have the right ships available
    for operational tasking in a distributed maritime environment.
        Littoral maneuver, the ability to move at will throughout the
    littoral archipelago, is a key capability for our employment
    objectives. Through analytic rigor, the Navy and Marine Corps
    determined that building the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) is the best
    solution to this maneuver gap. The LAW, which is a new class of
    warship, will complement existing traditional amphibious warships and
    provide added surface mobility and survivability for Marine Corps
    forces. These functions will be critical to the Marine Corps' ability
    to operate and sustain itself in austere intra-theater locations across
    remote beaches. Funding for this program is in the Navy's research,
    development, test, and evaluation appropriation before transitioning to
    the first ship award.
        Additionally, the fiscal year 2022 budget includes three of the
    Marine Corps' top investments. These investments are in support of the
    initial operations capability of the new 3d Marine Littoral Regiment
    (MLR) in fiscal year 2023. For example, the Marine Corps' highest
    priority is the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System
    (NMESIS) and its anti-ship missile capability. Eight of the systems in
    the fiscal year 2022 budget request will form the first anti-ship
    missile capability for the Marine Corps. This capability provides the
    Marine Expeditionary Force's kinetic fires to hold adversaries at risk
    and supports the stand-in forces ability to persist within an
    adversary's weapon engagement zone (WEZ).
        The aircraft requested in the fiscal year 2022 budget are critical
    enablers of Marine Corps' units. The six MQ-9A Extended Range in the
    budget request will provide communication data relay and improve
    overall command and control. The six KC-130J in the budget request
    provide the needed air mobility for the Indo-Pacific region. These
    NMESIS anti-ship missile capabilities and aircraft will deliver initial
    capabilities to the Fleet in fiscal year 2023 or shortly thereafter. We
        appreciate your support of these programs in the fiscal year 2022
    budget request and future requests, as we build out the capacities of
    these units.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
                            virtual training methods
        37. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Gilday, from the recent U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command Pacific Deterrence Initiative report to this Committee
    as well as public statements by Navy flag officers, we understand there
    is a need for a realistic training environment to prepare our
    warfighters to win decisively in a peer or near-peer fight. Fielding a
    Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) training solution that enables our
    aviation, land and maritime teams to conduct training that is secure
    and interoperable across the Department of Defense and with Coalition
    partners seems to be a priority, but I am concerned about how long it
    will take the Navy to field LVC.
        With continued successful development, what is the Navy's plan to
    accelerate the fielding of this game changing LVC air combat training
    capability?
        Admiral Gilday. DoN and USAF remain committed to TCTS II/P6 and
    plan to incorporate additional LVC air combat training and LVC testing
    capabilities, such as those being demonstrated this summer and fall,
    into the Program of Record as the most adaptable and executable path
    forward. The complex LVC environment must not only ultimately provide
    high end training across multiple platforms, domains, and services, but
    must also have ties to the flight test environment to enable affordable
    development of future capabilities needed to outpace our adversaries.
    The DoN and USAF will collaborate on the necessary requirements,
    infrastructures, and investments.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
                               aircraft carriers
        38. Senator Wicker. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, the Navy's
    Shipbuilding Plan, published last week, identifies a target range for
    aircraft carriers as between 9 and 11. The current legal requirement
    for carriers remains 11. The carrier fleet is struggling to meet
    today's operational requirements even with 11 carriers. In February,
    the USS Nimitz returned home from a 321 day deployment--the longest
    ship deployment since the Vietnam era. The USS Ronald Reagan has had to
    abandon her station in the Western Pacific, a strategic priority area,
    to transit to the Middle East in order to support the troop withdrawal
    from Afghanistan. When it arrives, the Reagan will relieve the USS
    Dwight D. Eisenhower, which deployed in February after just returning
    from a seven month deployment last August. What analysis supports
    reduction in requirements for aircraft carriers when the Navy is
    struggling to meet current demands?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Navy's Long Range Plan for the
    Construction of Naval Vessels provides the objective inventory for
    naval vessels out to the distant future. It is not intended to
    communicate a reduction in requirements, but to highlight a potential
    range, given the long time horizon covered by the plan and the number
    of factors that can ultimately impact ship counts.
        The Navy continues to meet requirements for 11 nuclear powered
    aircraft carriers (CVNs) in support of title 10 requirements. Nuclear
    powered carriers (CVNs) and carrier air wings (CVWs) are the Joint
    Force's most survivable and adaptable aviation basing option. They
    provide sea control and power projection in contested battlespace,
    offering a uniquely valuable combination of maneuver, operational
    reach, volume of fires, sustainability and organic sensors.
        The recent Future Naval Force Study effort--led by the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense and supported by tri-chair leadership from the
    Department of the Navy, Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE)--
    found that in order to maintain dominance, the United States needs a
    naval force that is balanced and can strike targets from the undersea,
    surface, air and land domains.
        As stated in the shipbuilding plan, the Navy--working closely with
    the OSD CAPE--continues to assess naval force structure options
    consistent with Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and
    designed to maximize the maritime contribution to the Joint Force. The
    outcomes of this analytic work will provide key insights in describing
    the future objective battle force.

        39. Senator Wicker. Admiral Gilday, why did the Navy choose to send
    the USS Ronald Reagan, the forward deployed 7th Fleet aircraft carrier,
    to the Middle East?
        Admiral Gilday. A Carrier Strike Group (CSG) was requested by
    United States Central Command in support of the Afghanistan Retrograde
    mission. After providing the Secretary of Defense with the options and
    associated risks, he determined that USS Ronald Reagan was the right
    asset to execute this important mission.

        40. Senator Wicker. Admiral Gilday, as USS Ronald Reagan covers the
    troop withdrawal in Afghanistan, is there an aircraft carrier available
    in the Western Pacific?
        Admiral Gilday. While there is not a CVN currently operating in the
    Western Pacific, RRN could be rapidly redeployed if the circumstances
    or situation in the Western Pacific were to change. Additionally, the
    CARL VINSON CSG is scheduled to arrive in the Western Pacific in mid-
    August and could be accelerated if required.
                                   shipyards
        41. Senator Wicker. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, Senators
    Kaine, Shaheen, King, Collins, and I introduced the SHIPYARD Act, which
    would provide $25 billion in funding to the Nation's Navy shipyard
    infrastructure in order to repair and modernize these facilities. With
    strong bipartisan support, we hope to help the Navy address what the
    GAO described as the Navy's ``primary readiness challenge.'' If this
    legislation passed, how would the Navy invest these funds to improve
    shipyard infrastructure, both public and private?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Public Shipyards: The
    Department of the Navy Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program
    (SIOP) defines investments necessary to improve America's public
    shipyards by modernizing and upgrading their outdated facilities. If
    additional funds were made available via the SHIPYARD Act, the Navy
    would be able to accelerate Phase II and Phase III of the SIOP
    implementation strategy for public dry dock recapitalization, including
    optimized placement of new maintenance facilities and major equipment
    replacement at each public shipyard to support nuclear powered
    submarine and carrier requirements.
        Private Shipyards New Construction and Ship Repair: The Navy is
    supportive of increasing maintenance and construction capacity at the
    Nation's private shipyards. If the SHIPYARD Act were to provide funds
    for use at private shipyards, the Navy would work collaboratively with
    private industry to determine the most effective way to implement those
    funds to improve facilities and infrastructure at our industry
    partner's shipyards.

        42. Senator Wicker. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, how would
    these shipyard investments impact Navy readiness?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Investments in America's
    shipyards that modernize and upgrade outdated facilities will provide
    the Navy the opportunity to improve maintenance efficiency, reduce
    availability durations, and return ships to the fleet on time.
                     transferring aegis ashore to the army
        43. Senator Wicker. Admiral Gilday, the Army serves as the
    Department of Defense's executive agent for theater integrated air and
    missile defense. Based on public statements, I understand that Navy
    leadership has been exploring options to transfer responsibility for
    the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense program, which currently has
    sites located in Romania and Poland. Are the Army and Navy developing a
    plan to transfer responsibilities for Aegis Ashore, and if so, what is
    the status of these discussions?
        Admiral Gilday. Per the CNO's 2021 NAVPLAN, the Navy's strategic
    direction includes divesting of non-core Navy missions like Aegis
    Ashore in order to remain ahead of competitors. Transferring shore-
    based Ballistic Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors
    to focus on their core missions at sea and frees up resources to
    increase lethality. The transfer of Aegis Ashore to a ground-based
    service is being addressed within the Department.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                            naval aircraft readiness
        44. Senator Rounds. Admiral Gilday, according to the fiscal year
    2022 budget request, the Navy plans to retire 55 F/A-18 A-D Hornets in
    fiscal year 2022 and to retire all F/A-18 A-D Hornets by fiscal year
    2024. Meanwhile, the Navy has also requested just 20 F-35Cs this year,
    after acquiring 26 in fiscal year 2021. Admiral, can you articulate the
    operational risk the Navy may be assuming by executing this
    divestiture, while simultaneously requesting cuts to F-35C procurement
    in fiscal year 2022? Is procurement of 5 additional F-35Cs, which
    appears in your unfunded request list, the best way to mitigate this
    operational risk?
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy began divesting of 55 F/A-18 A-D Hornets
    in fiscal year 2021. The remaining 33 F/A-18 A-D Hornets, which are
    flown by the Navy Reserves and NAWDC, will be divested in fiscal year
    2022. All 55 F/A-18A-D Hornets are non-combat coded aircraft and
    therefore do not incur any operational risk.
        The DON procurement of F-35Cs in fiscal year 2021 was 26 total (10
    F-35Cs for USMC and 11 F-35Cs for USN with a Congressional add of 5 F-
    35C to procure 26 F-35Cs). The USMC procurement plan remained
    consistent in support of the squadron transition roadmap with a
    procurement reduction from 10 F-35Cs in fiscal year 2021 to 5 F-35Cs in
    fiscal year 2022. The USN procurement plan also remained consistent
    from the fiscal year 2021 to the fiscal year 2022 budget request, with
    an increase in procurement from 11 F-35Cs in fiscal year 2021 to 15 F-
    35Cs in fiscal year 2022. The request for an additional 5 F-35Cs for
    the USN is needed to mitigate operational risk.
                                     cyber
        45. Senator Rounds. General Berger, I had a phenomenal opportunity
    to visit with the Marines from Marine Forces Cyber last week at U.S.
    Cyber Command. I was impressed with the offensive and defensive
    capabilities they are bringing to the fight. Can you briefly discuss
    the capabilities the Marines bring to the cyber fight and how the
    fiscal year 2022 budget request will shape the Marine Forces Cyber
    operations of the future?
        General Berger. The Commander MARFORCYBER (CDRMARFORCYBER) commands
    both MARFORCYBER and Marine Forces Space (MARFORSPACE). MARFORCYBER and
    MARFORSPACE are delegated authorities by U.S. Cyberspace Command
    (USCYBERCOM) and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) that support service
    level requirements. MARFORCYBER/SPACE exercises both Title 10 and 50
    authorities while organizationally aligned to plan, direct, and provide
    intelligence operations, full-spectrum cyberspace, and space
    operational support to the respective Combatant Commands (CCMD). Major
    subordinate commands (MSC) include Marine Corps Cyberspace Operations
    Group (MCCOG), Marine Corps Cyberspace Warfare Group (MCCWYG), and
    Joint Forces Headquarters Marines Cyber (JFHQ-C(M)).
        Collectively, MARFORCYBER/SPACE conduct operations in the
    information environment (OIE), secure the homeland from cyberspace
    aggression; secure, operate, and defend the Department of Defense
    Information Network (DODIN); advance national interests; and deliver
    capabilities and effects for the Joint Force. MARFORCYBER/SPACE
    capabilities directly align to the National Defense Strategy (NDS):
          Invest in space and cyberspace warfighting domains
          Provide more lethal, resilient and rapidly innovating
    forces
          Increase speed and reach
          Incorporate new technologies
          Support the Global Operating Model
          Invest in command, control, communications, computers,
    cyber-defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C5ISR)
    from the tactical to strategic levels
          Organize for innovation
        The relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that
    many space operations depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of
    cyberspace can only be provided via space operations. MARFORCYBER
    provides on-demand capabilities to support CCMDs with the ability to
    impact objectives through the application of cyberspace capabilities
    and effects across the globe in all warfighting domains. MARFORCYBER
    utilizes a range of tools to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance,
    collect and analyze data, improve situational awareness, execute the
    targeting cycle, and assure command and control across the spectrum of
    competition. Simultaneously, MARFORCYBER enables the warfighter through
    protecting and hardening our own networks. The current capabilities of
    MARFORSPACE are growing rapidly along with our joint partners and will
    ensure that the Marine Corps contributes effective forces that enable
    space dominance.
        How will the fiscal year 2022 budget request shape the Marine
    Forces Cyber operations of the future?
        Fiscal year 2022 is a pivotal year for MARFORCYBER/SPACE. The funds
    provided in this and future years' budgets are critical to maintaining
    the tactical and strategic edge over our competitors.
        CDRMARFORCYBER has released a fiscal year 2022 Campaign Plan that
    will train and set the conditions for MARFORCYBER/SPACE personnel to
    respond to major contingencies and achieve the information advantage in
    conflict. Initiatives include naval integration, contingency planning,
    development of domestic and international partnerships, and
    participation in global exercises. This is in support of USMC Force
    Design 2030 Initiatives that modernize the force for the INDOPACOM AOR.
    The fiscal year 2022 Budget is critical to achieving MARFORCYBER's
    fiscal year 2022 Campaign Plan (CP) objectives and maintaining momentum
    in each of the associated lines of effort (LOEs): Information Maneuver,
    Defense-in-Depth, Assured C2, and Space Operationalization.
        MARFORCYBER/SPACE enable the service to secure, operate, and defend
    the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) while fielding new
    capabilities to make critical networks resilient and responsive to
    operational needs. During fiscal year 2022, resources are dedicated to
    the deployed MCEN (D-MCEN) project that will consolidate networks and
    security to ensure greater capability at the tactical edge. Resources
    will be applied through a variety of initiatives that include, but are
    not limited to:
          Mission focused cyber hardening and mission assurance
    programs
          Improvement of operational architectures through various
    optimization and secure cloud migration programs
          Artificial intelligence, machine learning, and automation
          Defensive cyber tool and capability development
          Data sharing and analytics that support offensive and
    defensiveness cyberspace operations, OIE, and Joint Forces
        In order to maintain relevance in a highly technical and rapidly
    evolving domain, any future funding and resources will be applied to
    operations, activities, and investments (OAI) such as:
          Pacing adversarial threats and enhancing integrated
    deterrence capabilities
          Invest in capability development and force modernization
          Preempt, disrupt, and counter adversaries in and through
    the OIE
          Set conditions to rapidly respond to armed conflict
          Refine C2 and enhance readiness
          Enhance the service's ability to deliver long-range
    precision kinetic and non-kinetic fires
          Secure, operate, defend, optimize, and modernize the
    Marine Corps portion of DODIN
          Protect critical infrastructure
          Invest in people (Active Duty, Reserve, and Civilian)
          Enhance training to transform human capital
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                          distributed stovl operations
        46. Senator Tillis. General Berger, the Marine Corps continues to
    build upon past experience with distributed operations with Short Take-
    Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft. Military exercises like the
    2017 operations in Yap and Palau with MV-22B Ospreys and AV-8B Harriers
    from the USS America showcase this. As the Marine Corps transitions its
    primary STOVL fighter to the F-35B, exercises must continue that put
    this new aircraft in similar conditions. In this effort, what role do
    distributed STOVL operations play in the broader transformation efforts
    of the Marine Corps?
        General Berger. Conducting operations in the contested environment
    that is the Indo-Pacific region requires us to continue the
    expeditionary nature on which the Marine Corps has built its legacy.
    Investment in the F-35B underpins our efforts as we pursue a more
    agile, lethal aviation force. The F-35B's STOVL capability affords the
    combatant commander an additional flexibility of 5th generation combat
    power, not feasible with conventional fixed-wing platforms. This STOVL
    capability further develops our globally deployable Naval Expeditionary
    Force. As we continue to tailor our combat power offering to the Joint
    Force, we are exploring options for the proper complement of MV-22s and
    F-35s employed from the ARG/MEU. We have recently completed the
    academic rigor validating the inclusion of 10 F-35s in the Aviation
    Combat Element aboard the LHA and are continuing experimentation
    efforts, most notably as a 20-plane complement of F-35Bs aboard an
    America Class LHA in spring of 2022. As we prepare ourselves to serve
    as the stand-in force, we are constrained by the realities of limited
    conventional airfields throughout the first and second island chains.
    Our STOVL capability further challenges the adversary's ability to
    counter the force due to the inherent ability to rapidly employ from
    austere and expeditionary, shore and ship based environments. In order
    to sustain this force throughout the contact and blunt phases, it is
    imperative that we maximize the utility of the STOVL assets in our
    inventory.

        47. Senator Tillis. General Berger, how does the budget support or
    not support distributed STOVL operations with different or additional
    hardware, training, and logistics? What can we do to assist the Marine
    Corps in this transformative effort?
        General Berger. The PB22 budget request continues support of the
    USMC TACAIR transition and inherent distributed STOVL operations
    capabilities. The procurement of 17 F-35B aircraft will support the
    transition and stand-up of three F-35B squadrons in the fiscal year
    2023 to fiscal year 2025 timeframe, including our 1st of 5 squadrons
    based in Cherry Point, NC. Below-the-line requirements are fully
    supported and critical to preventing exacerbation of the existing
    Peculiar Ground Support Equipment (PGSE) gap. We have asked for
    specific support on the USMC Unfunded Priority List (UPL) for
    additional PGSE to address this gap, and are currently mitigating its
    effects through cross-decking or ``sharing'' of PGSE among units. This
    has strained the readiness and availability of F-35 support equipment,
    which in turn threatens the Marine Corps' ability to effectively train
    to and perform distributed operations.
        Additionally, modernization modifications supported in the budget
    request will enable the upgrade of lower Low Rate Initial Production
    (LRIP) aircraft to the TR-3 configuration, which enables the broad
    future F-35 capabilities required for all F-35 mission sets including
    facilitation of distributed operations. Continued Congressional support
    of the USMC budget request is crucial to maintaining the TACAIR
    transition timeline and delivering USMC F-35 capabilities critical to
    Force Design 2030.
                            assault support capacity
        48. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in the face of contested
    logistics in the Pacific theater, how is the Marine Corps revamping or
    evolving its concept of operations and will that have any impact on the
    CH-53K requirements or program?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps' new document, ``A Concept for
    Stand-in Forces'' guides how the Marine Corps will operate in the Indo-
    Pacific region and other parts of globe defined by the littorals. EABO
    is a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the employment of
    mobile, low-signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and
    sustain naval expeditionary forces. These forces will operate from
    austere, temporary locations, ashore or inshore, within a contested or
    potentially contested maritime area to conduct sea denial, support sea
    control, or enable fleet sustainment.
        The CH-53K will enable the mobility needed to operate in these
    environments. More specifically, it will greatly reduce the reliance of
    Marines within the littorals on external mobility support. The Marine
    Corps is committed to the CH-53K program and is evaluating its quantity
    requirements. The CH-53K provides a greater payload than any current or
    emerging rotorcraft, both at sea level and high altitude conditions, at
    greater ranges to support the rapid transition of Joint and Coalition
    forces from contact to blunt layer activities in a contested
    environment. Its purpose based capabilities provide for the resupply of
    the stand-in force from within and outside of the enemy's weapons
    engagement zone (WEZ). The CH-53K is the most capable and survivable
    assault support aircraft that enables the rapid deployment, movement
    and resupply of stand-in forces within a contested Indo-Pacific region.

        49. Senator Tillis. General Berger, do you foresee the MV-22B and
    CH-53K as being survivable within the envisioned Marine Corps concept
    of employment?
        General Berger. Yes, provided the required investments in
    modernization and survivability are supported and continue to advance.
    The MV-22B and CH-53K are currently being configured with a common
    Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) suite that provides a reprogrammable
    radar and missile warning system, attacking missile declaration, sector
    direction finding, laser detection, and self-protection capability. The
    digitization of communications, along with spectrum diversity, sensor
    modernization and netting, and the coupling with appropriate counter
    measures significantly increases the ability to operate in contested
    environments, through a multi-layered approach to the challenges.
    Combined with modernization investments of survivability equipment,
    proven assault support tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in
    preparation for, and response to an enemy threat, will continue to
    advance through the integration of kinetic and non-kinetic fires to
    assist with freedom of maneuver both in and outside the enemy's weapons
    engagement zone. Those TTPs use a multipronged approach to identify,
    avoid, and communicate a threat throughout the battlespace; using
    aircraft designed and equipped with maximum vulnerability reduction
    features, robust and redundant systems, designed to provide
    survivability protection to provide the ability to fly home should they
    sustain combat damage.

        50. Senator Tillis. General Berger, in a distributed environment,
    it would appear that organic lift capabilities would be a necessary
    requirement. Moreover, given the austere nature of this environment and
    potentially limited space, it would also seem that vertical take-off
    and landing capabilities would be needed. How does the Marine Corps
    seek to fill these requirements with adequate resources given a
    reduction in overall medium- and heavy-lift assets?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is committed to continuing to
    invest in its fixed-wing and rotary-wing programs, while balancing the
    needs of the overall force. While enhancing the lethality of the Force,
    Force Design modernization efforts are also reducing the overall end
    strength of the Marine Corps. The reduction in medium- and heavy-lift
    aircraft will take into account the smaller structure of the Marine
    Corps to right size the Assault Support requirements needed. Though the
    force is reducing total numbers, medium- and heavy-lift assault support
    is prioritized to MARFORPAC reflected in the force laydown of four West
    Coast CH-53 squadrons, five West Coast MV-22 squadrons, two Hawaii MV-
    22 squadrons, and two Okinawa, Japan based MV-22 squadrons. Marine
    Corps assault support is regionally aligned to support Force Design
    2030.
        In the Marine Corps assault support portfolio, the development and
    fielding of the CH-53K maximizes work effectiveness and efficiency,
    ultimately improving overall reliability and decreasing operating and
    support costs in comparison to the CH-53E, which is facing parts
    obsolescence issues as a legacy platform. In addition to an increase in
    heavy lift performance, the CH-53K reduces operational risk as a modern
    fly by wire helicopter with greater safety, survivability, and
    reliability capable of integrating into the current battlefield and
    taking advantage of future technologies, such as manned/unmanned
    teaming and MAGTF digital interoperability.
                              air wing composition
        51. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, given the
    recent force design decisions as well as the focus on manned/unmanned
    pairing, how is the Marine Corps thinking about meeting their
    conventional carrier fighter squadron requirements with the F-35C? Do
    you foresee making any changes?
        Admiral Gilday. The Marine Corps is committed to meeting our
    conventional carrier fighter squadron requirements. The Marine Corps
    has continued to procure F-35Cs with the intent of equipping our four
    F-35C squadrons, meeting the conventional carrier requirement. In early
    July of this year, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314, out of Miramar,
    California was the first Marine squadron to be declared fully
    operational capable.
        We do not foresee any changes to our carrier fighter squadron
    requirement.
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is committed to meeting our
    conventional carrier fighter squadron requirements. The Marine Corps
    has continued to procure F-35Cs with the intent of equipping our four
    F-35C squadrons, meeting the conventional carrier requirement. In early
    July of this year, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314, out of Miramar,
    California was the first Marine squadron to be declared fully
    operational capable. We do not foresee any changes to our carrier
    fighter squadron requirement.

        52. Senator Tillis. Admiral Gilday, how are the Navy and Marine
    Corps looking to integrate unmanned aircraft into the fleet and what is
    the goal for the ratio of manned and unmanned aircraft?
        Admiral Gilday. Given our adversaries' abilities to strike with
    increasing range, precision, and lethality, we must reduce exposure of
    our Marines wherever possible and correspondingly increase our reliance
    on unmanned systems. These platforms and payloads will be pivotal on
    the future battlefield. The ability to flood an adversary's decision-
    making and targeting processes with an array of low signature,
    affordable, and risk-worthy platforms in the air, as well as on the
    ground and on the surface, will greatly expand the survivability and
    capabilities of Marines operating within the adversary's weapon
    engagement zones. For two decades, the Marine Corps has relied on
    unmanned aerial systems to provide reconnaissance for our ground
    forces, and the Marine Corps will continue this investment in the
    future.
        The Marine Corps is investing in a new group 5 capability UAS, and
    the identified materiel solution is the MQ-9A Extended Range. This UAS
    platform will fulfill a primary mission of communication and data relay
    with an additional airborne early warning capability. This will provide
    deployed Marine Corps and Joint Force units with persistent tactical
    maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and command and
    control gateways. The MQ-9A Extended Range is also a critical enabler
    to the Naval force in building an alternate Precision, Navigation, and
    Timing network.
        The Marine Corps seeks to procure six MQ-9A Extended Range systems
    in fiscal year 2022, and a total of 18 systems over the next several
    years, to form three UAS squadrons. The Marine Corps will leverage an
    existing Air Force system and two current Marine Corps assets in
    USCENTCOM to reduce risk, while providing advanced capabilities to the
    Marine Corps and overall joint warfighting enterprise.
        In addition to the MQ-9A Extended Range, the Marine Corps continues
    to develop and experiment with a family of UAS with a variety of plug-
    and-play payloads. These systems will give ground combat units organic
    Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) assets
    capable of supporting long-range precision kinetic and non-kinetic
    fires, both afloat and ashore. This includes conducting extended user
    evaluations with industry leading systems to include the UAV V-BAT and
    the Stalker UAS to inform requirements for the Ground Combat Element.
                                long-range fires
        53. Senator Tillis. General Berger, the Marine Corps has requested
    funds for a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk cruise missile. In
    addition to being a physically large weapon, the Tomahawk has a pretty
    extensive range that would allow Marine forces to engage targets across
    a theater. How does the Marine Corps envision integrating those assets
    with existing Marine command and control and with some of the higher-
    level joint command and control structures within the theater?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps Long Range Fires (LRF) program,
    which is developing the capability to launch Tomahawk missiles from
    ground-based launchers, will also field the fire control hardware and
    software to enable the Marine weapons to be integrated into existing
    Joint/Naval command, control and communications systems. The LRF
    program will support joint targeting, mission planning, and the
    execution of precision strikes. These systems form architectures and
    support the processes that enable the situational awareness, planning,
    coordination, and control that is necessary to employ this weapon
    system over extensive ranges.

        54. Senator Tillis. General Berger, would these weapons directly
    support Marines forward? The broader joint force? How would those
    decisions be made?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps will operationally assign Tomahawk
    missile-capable Long Range Fires units to a Marine Expeditionary Force
    as a general support, long-range, lethal capability available for
    National Command Authority and Geographic Combatant Commander tasking.
    These assets would be employed in the same manner as other naval
    Tomahawk missiles, providing an alternate method of employing highly
    effective missile systems against a variety of targets in the land and
    maritime domains.

        55. Senator Tillis. General Berger, what can this Committee do to
    assist in your acquisition of this capability?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps respectfully requests that
    Congress supports the President's Budget request for fiscal year 2022.
    Additionally, the Marine Corps submitted an unfunded priority list
    (UPL), and the third item was Tomahawk missiles for this Long Range
    Fires capability. The Marine Corps appreciates your continued support
    and is on track to begin delivering the capability in fiscal year 2024.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                  icebreakers
        56. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, in
    Secretary Harker's prepared testimony, he described the Tri-Service
    Maritime Strategy, Advantage at Sea, as a ``truly collaborative
    maritime strategic planning effort led jointly by all three of our
    Nation's sea services--Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.'' He also
    stated that, ``[i]n order to execute these goals, Admiral Gilday,
    General Berger, Admiral Schultz and I are working together in order to
    promote integration, communication, and collaboration as a warfighting
    priority,'' and that ``[t]here can be no daylight between us as we
    strengthen the integrated all-domain Naval power of the United
    States.'' In the past few years, one issue has demonstrated a lot of
    daylight between the Navy and the Coast Guard--icebreakers. The Navy's
    Arctic Strategy says the ``United States Naval forces must operate more
    assertively across the Arctic Region to prevail in day-to-day
    competition.'' The Russians have over 40 icebreakers, the Chinese have
    three, and the United States has 1.5. How can the U.S. Navy operate
    more assertively in the Arctic without icebreakers?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. While the Navy strongly
    supports the national need for icebreaking capability and capacity, and
    supports the Coast Guard's recapitalization of their polar icebreaking
    fleet, the Navy already operates extensively in the Arctic. Our
    submarines have routinely operated in the Arctic since 1958, and we had
    near continuous surface ship operations in the High North from April-
    November 2020. Additionally, we regularly participate in Arctic and
    High North exercises such as Northern Edge in May 2021.

        57. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday, do you
    see collaboration with the Coast Guard on icebreaker acquisition as
    aligned with the precepts outlined in the Tri-Service Maritime
    Strategy?
        Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday. Yes, the Navy's collaboration
    with the Coast Guard on icebreaker acquisition are in alignment with
    the Tri-Service Strategy, specifically the precepts of day-to-day
    competition in the polar region and integrated All-Domain Naval Power.
    This partnership allows the Navy to leverage the Coast Guard's mission
    focus and unique expertise operating in the polar region, while the
    Coast Guard utilizes the Navy's proficiency in ship acquisition and
    program management.
                                   sea denial
        58. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday, you have described the
    purpose of Marine Corps expeditionary advanced bases as supporting sea
    denial and sea control. An essential component of the Marine Corps'
    ability to conduct the sea denial mission is anti-ship missiles,
    including the Naval Strike Missile and Maritime Strike Tomahawk. These
    missiles are #1 and #3 on the Marine Corps' unfunded priorities list.
    The Marine Corps, in General Berger's estimation, has almost no sea
    denial capability or capacity currently. How does inadequate Marine
    Corps sea denial capability and capacity impact fleet operations
    against the pacing threat?
        Admiral Gilday. The Marine Corps recognizes that their sea denial
    capability gap negatively impacts distributed naval operations and is
    taking action to rapidly close the gap. The Marine Corps is developing
    a ground-based, anti-ship missile (GBASM) capability. The first
    iteration of this GBASM capability is the Navy/Marine Expeditionary
    Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which fires the Naval Strike
    Missile. It will be introduced to the Fleet in fiscal year 2024.
        Today, the Navy is shouldering the burden of sea denial from our
    air, surface and subsurface platforms. As the Marine Corps' sea denial
    capacity grows, directly supporting the Navy's sea denial and sea
    control missions, it will reduce some of that burden on Navy platforms
    and potentially free those assets to conduct other missions.
                          marine corps systems at sea
        59. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, you have testified to
    Congress and written about the need for Marines to be more than
    passengers on Navy ships as they transit to the fight. In the last few
    years, Marine Corps systems such as the Light Amphibious Vehicle and
    Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System have augmented organic
    defensive capabilities on amphibious ships transiting through maritime
    chokepoints. Has the Marine Corps conducted any tests or experiments
    operating any of its land-based systems--including Ground-Based Anti-
    Ship Missile, air defense, or counter-UAS--from aboard ships?
        General Berger. Yes, the Marine Corps has tested and employed
    offensive and defensive capabilities onboard Navy ships. The Marine
    Corps has employed L-MADIS aboard Navy ships with both East- and West-
    Coast Marine Expeditionary Units for the past four years. These
    capabilities were highlighted in July 2019 when Marines from the 11th
    Marine Expeditionary Unit onboard the USS Boxer successfully jammed an
    Iranian UAS during transit through the Straits of Hormuz.
        Additionally, Marines successfully tested the High Mobility
    Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) from the flight deck of the San
    Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Anchorage (LPD 23)
    during Dawn Blitz 2017. During this test while at sea, the HIMARS
    engaged a land-based target at a range of 70 kilometers. The Ground-
    Based, Anti-Ship Missile (GBASM) capability is in the early stages of
    testing and has yet to be tested on a Navy ship.
                  navy-marine corps integration in ship design
        60. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, both of
    you have spoken at length about increased integration, coordination,
    and cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps. As part of the
    requirements and ship design process, is the Department of the Navy
    considering how existing or planned Marine Corps systems can be
    integrated into and operated from Navy ships to augment organic
    offensive and defensive capabilities?
        Admiral Gilday. The Navy is committed to improving the overall
    lethality and survivability of our amphibious force. We continue to
    explore concepts to improve our defensive and offensive capability, as
    well as improved C2 through continued development of systems such as
    the Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S). We are also
    supporting Fleet and USMC studies, war games, and experiments to
    develop new capabilities through science and technology efforts.
    Finally, we are initiating a Capabilities Based Assessment to start
    development of the LPD Flight II replacement.
        General Berger. The Marine Corps works in concert with the Navy to
    ensure that Marine Corps systems are integrated into Navy ships. While
    on board, the Marine Expeditionary Unit's Air Combat Element
    contributes to the defense of the amphibious task force. For example,
    the Marine Corps' F-35B aircraft provide long-range maritime domain
    awareness and strike capabilities. Rotary wing H-1 aircraft track
    surface, subsurface, and airborne threats using Digital Interoperable
    networks to cue and engage as necessary, and MV-22B tiltrotor aircraft
    integrate with the ship's defensive networks to provide classified and
    unclassified data.
        The Marine Corps is an integral and active participant in the Naval
    Tactical Grid efforts to ensure that Marine Corps forces afloat and
    ashore can connect and share data with Navy platforms. One initiative
    to gain greater interoperability is the Navy's implementation of Common
    Aviation Command and Control System Afloat on Navy amphibious ships.
    This system, which will share a common software baseline with the
    Marine Corps variant, is integrated with the Navy's Consolidated Afloat
    Network and Enterprise System to leverage Joint Strike Fighter, Link
    16, fires, and situational awareness data while Marines are embarked.
    The first installation of Common Aviation Command and Control System
    Afloat took place in August 2019 on USS America (LHA-6) and was
    subsequently installed on three other LHD/LHA ships. Additional
    installations on LHD/LHA and LPD amphibious ships are scheduled for
    fiscal year 2022.
        As another example of Marines supporting the ship's defensive
    capabilities, the Marine Corps has employed Light-Marine Air Defense
    Integrated System (L-MADIS) onboard Navy ships with both east- and
    west-coast Marine Expeditionary Units for the past four years. This was
    highlighted in July 2019 when Marines from the 11th Marine
    Expeditionary Unit onboard the USS Boxer successfully jammed an Iranian
    UAS during transit through the Straits of Hormuz.
                               force design 2030
        61. Senator Sullivan. General Berger, what is your vision of the
    Reserve component's role in Force Design 2030?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps Reserve, as part of the single
    integrated Total Force, remains a vital contributor to the warfighting
    capability and capacity of the Naval Service. The Marine Corps is
    committed to sustaining a relevant and capable Reserve Force.
        The Marine Corps Reserve is focused not only on integrating with
    the Active component across the competition continuum, including
    conflict, but also on providing specialized and general-purpose
    conventional forces to II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in response
    to global contingencies. Further, the Marine Corps Reserve is uniquely
    postured to partner with the Navy's 4th Fleet in USSOUTHCOM. This
    partnership will generate opportunities to first develop and then
    employ unique talent and skillsets that will contribute to a campaign
    of maritime competition, as we enhance global maritime interoperability
    with our partners and allies.
        While Force Design focuses on meeting maritime and joint service
    requirements against the pacing threat, II MEF and Marine Forces
    Reserve (MARFORRES) remain ``service-retained forces'' tasked as the
    Service's offering for global crisis and contingency response. Given
    the challenging resourcing environment, service-retained forces may not
    require the same capabilities that the Service's primary mission
    compels for III and I MEF forces. Accordingly, II MEF will be the
    pacing MEF for MARFORRES resourcing, capabilities, and requirements.
    MARFORRES will also continue to provide capabilities within INDOPACOM
    through the Service's unit deployment program, as required in support
    of III MEF.
        Finally, experimentation and innovation efforts are vital to the
    Service's Force Design initiatives. Within the Reserve component, there
    are marines who have unique skillsets developed in academia or the
    commercial sector that will be essential for strategic competition.
    This diverse talent can be leveraged to advance innovation for the
    Naval Services. We will identify and invest in proven Marines who have
    an aptitude and desire to gain new, complex warfighting skills. These
    Marines will represent some of our most vital warfighting capabilities
    and capacity as they develop enhanced skillsets through continued
    service in the Marine Corps Reserve.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                              competing with china
        62. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, you have said ``We must
    continue to seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the
    exquisite.'' How does the concept of ``the affordable and plentiful at
    the expense of the exquisite and few'' translate into your envisioned
    force laydown within U.S. Indo-Pacific Command?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is building a ready, globally-
    employed, naval force that relies on organic lift--not strategic lift.
    It is dynamic and postured forward in competition and ready to
    transition rapidly to conflict, and back again. Our new Marine Littoral
    Regiments (MLRs) will be organized, trained, and equipped to support
    sea denial and sea control operations within actively contested
    maritime spaces as part of a modernized III Marine Expeditionary Force
    (III MEF). The MLR is a smaller, more agile, and low-signature force,
    yet is more lethal with longer range precision fires, as compared to
    those of legacy Marine infantry regiments. III MEF and the Navy's 7th
    Fleet will support the future MLRs with significant additional
    capabilities and equipment, including an integrated communication and
    sensor architecture, aviation assets (MQ-9A, F-35, KC-130J, MV-22, and
    CH-53K), maritime mobility and maneuver (Light Amphibious Warships and
    traditional amphibious warships).
        In addition to the MLR, the Marine Corps will still operate its
    Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) in concert with the Navy's Amphibious
    Ready Groups (ARGs). The MEU/ARG will continue to provide the Nation
    with a global crisis response capability. The MEUs crisis response
    capability was recently demonstrated when Marines from the 24th MEU
    were dynamically re-tasked from operations in the North Arabian Gulf to
    support the evacuation mission in Afghanistan.
        III MEF, in conjunction with 7th Fleet, will exercise and operate
    with our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. This forward posture
    will provide operational and strategic depth to the Joint and multi-
    national force. III MEF as a stand-in force, will operate in a
    distributed manner complicating an adversary's decision-making
    calculus. III MEF will leverage the MLR and organic assets to establish
    a network of expeditionary advanced bases designed to project credible
    anti-access/area denial capabilities against a peer adversary in a
    littoral fight.
        The approach of ``the affordable and plentiful'' supports our
    concepts for Stand-in Forces and Expeditionary Advanced Base
    Operations. Stand-in Forces are forward-postured, steady state forces
    operating in contested areas within an adversary's weapon engagement
    zone (WEZ). By being able to transition rapidly from competition to
    conflict creates a strategic advantage for the joint force. We envision
    these forces being able to establish and conduct expeditionary advanced
    base operations (EABO). EABO is a form of expeditionary warfare that
    calls for naval expeditionary forces operating from a series of
    austere, temporary locations ashore or inshore with a contested
    maritime area. To be successful, these stand-in forces need to be
    small, lethal, low signature and mobile. A force with these attributes
    will be allowed to remain positioned to achieve desired operational
    effects while complicating adversary efforts to find and target them.
        For stand-in forces to conduct EABO they require a variety of
    options, such as future amphibious ships, unmanned platforms, and other
    smaller more lethal and more agile platforms.

        63. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, how can our force laydown in
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command reduce dependence on concentrated,
    vulnerable, and expensive forward infrastructure and platforms?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps is in close coordination with the
    Navy as we continue to develop concepts of operations and capabilities
    for distributed lethality. In steady-state, forward-deployed forces
    demonstrate our commitment to our allies and partners, providing
    combat-ready forces in theater, and building ally and partner
    capability through bilateral and multilateral exercises. The Marine
    Corps, as the Stand-In Force, will be forward-postured, steady-state
    forces operating in contested areas--capable of transitioning rapidly
    from competition to crisis to conflict and back again to create a
    strategic advantage. These operations must be carried out in close
    partnership with host nations and partners.
        The Stand-In Forces are expeditionary in nature, with small
    footprints and fewer infrastructure requirements, which makes them less
    burdensome on host nations than are larger U.S. formations.
        These expeditionary capabilities are reliant on ready lift
    collocated with operating forces. Forward stationed and rotational
    forces support partner and ally readiness, bolstering their ability to
    resist coercion and malign activities, while contributing to a free and
    open Indo-Pacific. Our forward forces' engagements with regional
    partners during competition improves Joint Force access, basing, and
    overflight prior to a potential crisis. While we may conduct limited
    operations from legacy bases in crisis and conflict, our expeditionary
    nature and organic lift will ensure we can rapidly distribute lethal
    forces to continue to operate wherever required.

        64. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, as we look at the Marine
    Corps' role in Great Power Competition, what unique capabilities can
    you currently provide or are on pace to provide, that will enable us to
    compete and win within the ``Grey Zone''?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps possesses, or over the next
    several years, will field advanced capabilities in long range precision
    fires, resilient communications, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance platforms, and in influencing organizations--all to
    deter conflict and win within the competition continuum. In the fiscal
    year 2022 budget request, the Marine Corps requested funding for the
    MQ-9A Extended Range unmanned aerial system (UAS), which will assist in
    communications data relay and overall maritime domain awareness.
    Additionally, the Marine Corps requested funding for the Navy/Marine
    Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which will be able to
    strike ships, holding adversary assets at risk and contributing to the
    Navy's sea denial mission. Advanced capabilities such as these along
    with the capabilities provided by organizations like the Marine
    Information Group, (MIG), will provide exploitable advantages in
    competition, while enhancing lethality should competition turn to
    conflict. These capabilities are on schedule for fielding by fiscal
    year 2024 and will be critical enablers to Naval and Joint Forces in
    contested maritime environments.
        The Marine Corps modernization efforts are ultimately enabling the
    establishment and implementation of what the Marine Corps refers to as
    the Stand-in Force concept, or SIF concept. The SIF concept dictates
    that Marines perform three essential functions; find and track
    adversary threats inside a given area, remain difficult to find to a
    potential adversary, and if armed conflict begins, use knowledge of the
    adversary to help the fleet or other elements of the joint force attack
    quickly and effectively. These enduring functions of the SIF, combined
    with Marines' forward posture and modernized capabilities, yield two
    primary benefits. First, it supports deterrence through approaches such
    as ``deterrence by detection.'' Second, in the event deterrence fails
    and armed conflict occurs, winning the reconnaissance fight allows the
    fleet to attack effectively first and seize the initiative. The concept
    is being refined and is expected to be implemented across the Indo-
    Pacific region in the near future.

        65. Senator Blackburn. General Berger, as the future operating
    concept of the force would necessitate, what coordination has been
    done--with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Department of State--to
    identify where our expeditionary basing locations would be, where our
    stand-in forces would bed down, and what sort of weapons systems are
    tolerable for our regional partners to be hosting on their home turf?
        General Berger. The Marine Corps continues to coordinate its global
    posture through the Global Posture Executive Council (GPEC), which
    includes OSD, State Department, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and
    Service participants. This past summer, we supported the Global Posture
    Review, and we continue to provide details that will shape OSD's final
    report and support OSD and State Department policy recommendations. We
    continue to discuss with OSD to support coordinated efforts across the
    DOD and enable effective State Department and Inter-Agency engagement.
        The Department of State, in particular, is a pivotal partner, based
    on the essential coordination with friendly nations on which the Marine
    Corps Concept for Stand-In Forces is based. All parts of the U.S.
    presence need to speak with one voice in engagements with those
    nations. As the Stand-In Force, Marines will often be operating from
    host nations' sovereign littorals, which will necessitate true
    partnerships and a common cause for deterrence outcomes. Today, the
    U.S. forward defensive posture in the western Pacific is enabled by
    strong alliances and partnerships built on shared values and interests.
    For Stand-In Forces to be effective, this must continue.
                      nuclear sea-launched cruise missile
        66. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Harker, why was the decision to
    cancel the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile made prior to the
    Nuclear Posture Review?
        Secretary Harker. As part of the Department of Defense (DOD)
    programming and budgeting process, Services make many early assumptions
    to help shape the Service's input into the broader DOD budget request.
    These assumptions are further refined throughout the budgeting process
    in a collaborative process with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and DOD stakeholders. Internal planning guidance deferred programmatic
    decisions until later in the budget process so as to be informed by the
    on-going 2021 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which is reviewing all
    strategic weapons systems. The Department of the Navy is committed to
    fully funding the validated requirements as outlined by the NPR and as
    directed by the Administration.

        67. Senator Blackburn. Secretary Harker, regardless of what you may
    have previously published with respect to defunding the Nuclear Sea-
    Launched Cruise Missile, do you believe that is a strategically
    relevant weapon system?
        Secretary Harker. The requirement to pursue a Sea Launched Cruise
    Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N) originated with the 2018 Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR). The Navy completed its Analysis of Alternatives earlier
    this year, and included funding in the fiscal year 2022 President's
    Budget to support the start of the program. The Department of Defense
    is now conducting a new 2021 NPR and I understand that the SLCM-N
    capability is being discussed as part of that review. The Navy will
    support the results of the 2021 NPR.
                 artificial intelligence in personnel decisions
        68. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Gilday, on a surface level, do you
    see Artificial Intelligence providing an advantage to the career
    monitor population in terms of slating Sailors and Naval Officers for
    future assignments?
        Admiral Gilday. Advanced computing technology, such as machine
    learning or Artificial Intelligence (AI), could increase efficiencies
    and automate processes when developing assignment slates. While AI may
    not always account for the nuances or other special cases for each
    service member, Navy is exploring new initiatives to better support the
    slating of enlisted and officer assignments.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                        the threat of the fait accompli
        69. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, the Tri-
    Service Maritime Strategy says, ``In the event of conflict, China . . .
    will likely attempt to seize territory before the United States and its
    allies can mount an effective response--leading to a fait accompli.''
    Can you explain why the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy highlights the
    threat of a Chinese fait accompli?
        Admiral Gilday. In a fait accompli scenario the People's Republic
    of China (PRC) will likely attempt to rapidly seize territory before
    the United States and its allies can mount an effective response and
    then quickly reinforce its lodgment with long-range fires to deter any
    future response. We highlight this in the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy
    because it is likely that China would do this in initiating military
    action in the Western Pacific, which poses a serious challenge to the
    Naval Service.
        A fait accompli scenario reinforces the need for the Naval Service
    to maintain a combat credible presence in the Western Pacific to
    respond with little warning in the event the PRC takes overt military
    action in violation of international law. A core tenet of the Tri-
    Service Maritime Strategy is the need for the Naval Service to continue
    operating forward to deter coercive behavior and conventional
    aggression as well as to reassure allies and partners.
        General Berger. Senator, as America's expeditionary force in
    readiness, and with clear guidance that China is our pacing threat, we
    have an obligation to think through what China's likely courses of
    action are during competition or conflict. We have clear evidence that
    China's preferred option is to make their desired objectives an
    accomplished fact (a fait accompli) by moving rapidly before we, our
    allies, and partners can react, thus forcing us to either accept new
    conditions on the ground or escalate. Military history is replete with
    examples where aggressors employed this gambit with both successful and
    unsuccessful outcomes. In many of the most likely crisis scenarios,
    China and Russia enjoy the advantage of proximity, while the United
    States must address numerous challenges (time, space, mass, critical
    infrastructure) to project military power within the contested region.
    This positional advantage, therefore, must elevate the possibility of
    adversary fait accompli strategies within our contingency planning
    scenarios. As a result, the fait accompli threat needs to be at the
    forefront of our minds as we build the Force Design 2030 force.

        70. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday and General Berger, I've asked
    Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and nearly every other
    defense leader who has come before this Committee if the United States
    should maintain its ability to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against
    Taiwan. They have all responded in the affirmative. Do you agree that
    we need to maintain this capability?
        Admiral Gilday. The United States has a serious commitment to
    preserving peace and security in the Western Pacific, including
    encouraging the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and ensuring
    that Taiwan can defend itself from China. We stand behind this
    commitment and believe it would be a serious mistake for China to
    threaten the status quo of peace and stability across the Taiwan
    Strait. If China threatens that status quo, the United States Navy can
    provide a credible force to defeat the PRC invasion against Taiwan. To
    sustain America's advantage at sea, the Navy will deliver combat-ready
    forces to deter aggression and keep the seas free and open. Maintaining
    our ability to deploy battle-ready ships, submarines, and squadrons
    around the Western Pacific ensures the credibility of our commitments
    to our allies and partners in the region.
        General Berger. Senator, I stand with my fellow Service Chiefs, the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary in affirming our
    commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act which includes maintaining
    our capacity to resist all forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
    security of the people of Taiwan.
        As outlined in the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, our capacity to
    deter military aggression by China against Taiwan, alongside the
    capabilities of our allies and partners, includes:

          Operating forward deters coercive behavior and
    conventional aggression. We cannot contest malign activities without
    being present. Our force generation models must ensure we have
    sufficient combat-credible naval forces available to deter aggression,
    preempt a fait accompli, and win in conflict, all backed up by rapid
    surge capability and capacity.

          Contested seas require a renewed emphasis on sea control.
    Denying our adversaries' use of the seas thwarts their direct wartime
    objectives and disrupts their efforts to threaten our allies and the
    American homeland from the maritime domain. We must increase our
    emphasis on controlling the seas in conflict to provide joint and
    allied forces with the freedom of maneuver to attack adversary forces
    and impose costs globally.

          Maintaining advantage at sea requires modernization. In
    persistently surveilled, contested environments, agile naval forces
    offer dynamic and flexible options from which to project combat power.
    We must maintain our advantage at sea with new platforms, new thinking,
    and new technologies that enhance distributed naval operations while
    developing our people and culture to meet the challenges of a complex
    security environment.

        Given the geography of the Indo-Pacific and China's rapidly
    advancing long-range precision fires capabilities, the Navy and the
    joint force will need a stand-in force that can operate persistently
    within these weapons engagement zones and provide `deterrence by
    detection'. The Marine Corps will be that force.
        Our Corps' Force Design 2030 transformation focuses on how the
    Marine Corps maintains its status as the Nation's premier expeditionary
    force in readiness while purposely building stand-in forces capable of
    assurance and deterrence in the Pacific and other areas. We will be a
    stand-in force within the adversary's weapons engagement zone that is
    light, mobile, widely distributed, and that operates from diverse
    maritime platforms. By delivering mission-critical capabilities from
    expeditionary advanced bases, Marines will provide more vectors of
    attack to deter and ultimately defeat enemy aggression. Not only will
    the Marines possess formidable organic fires capable of denying key
    maritime terrain because of our forward presence, but we will also be a
    linchpin in the kill chain for naval and joint fires by performing
    reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance.
        For more than a decade, the Marine Corps has been planning and
    executing actions for a military build-out across the Pacific Region
    via the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to sustain warfighting
    capabilities and to achieve force posture realignments, including
    necessary training range development, the identification of unit and
    installation facility requirements, programming and budgeting, and
    supporting establishment requirements necessary to set the theater for
    an increasingly competitive environment. Continued congressional
    funding of Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and DPRI initiatives is vital
    to creating the military capabilities, geographic positioning, and
    critical infrastructure necessary to prevent a fait accompli in the
    Indo-Pacific.
                           long-range precision fires
        71. Senator Hawley. General Berger, the Marine Corps has included
    Naval Strike Missiles and Tactical Tomahawks at the top of its Unfunded
    Priorities List. How will these systems and their enablers help us deny
    a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, and why is it so important that
    we field them as quickly as possible?
        General Berger. When forward deployed inside the adversary's
    weapons engagement zone, these weapon systems will provide the Marine
    Corps, Integrated Naval Force, and Joint Force with a Stand-In Force
    capable of conducting sea denial, thus affecting an adversary's plan.
    Denying a specific area can present a forward edge behind which the
    U.S. fleet can maneuver, or prevent an adversary from using key straits
    or chokepoints, such as the Taiwan Strait. Area denial can also channel
    an adversary into areas in which U.S. Forces enjoy a relative
    advantage.
        Ground-based launchers add a new type of threat against a peer
    adversary, stress different surveillance and offensive systems, are
    hard to detect and track in a cluttered ground environment, and add a
    significant level of persistence and depth to existing anti-ship
    capabilities. The range, persistence, survivability and lethality of
    these weapon systems will deny the adversary key maritime maneuver
    space, and limit their deployment options and avenues of approach for
    amphibious forces. The Naval Strike Missile-equipped medium-range
    missile battery is a critical element of the Marine Littoral Regiment
    (MLR). As such, the first battery will be fielded to support the 3d MLR
    beginning in fiscal year 2023. The first Tomahawk Missile-capable long-
    range missile battery is on schedule to begin fielding in 2024.
                               fleet architecture
        72. Senator Hawley. The Navy is required by law to maintain not
    less than 11 aircraft carriers. It's not clear, though, that money
    spent on 11 carriers is money best spent. It seems just as likely, for
    instance, that we should use that money to grow our undersea forces or
    invest in other capabilities that are optimized for blunting a Chinese
    offensive in the initial period of war.
        Admiral Gilday, how do you assess the opportunity costs associated
    with maintaining an 11-carrier fleet as opposed to a 10- or 8-carrier
    fleet, if reducing the number of carriers would allow you to invest
    more in these other capabilities?
        Admiral Gilday. The U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) with
    their associated Surface Combatants, Large-deck, Nuclear-powered
    Aircraft Carriers (CVN) and Carrier Air Wings (CVW) represent the
    eleven most survivable and lethal airfields in the world. The CSG
    continues to be the preeminent power projection force with its ability
    to produce long range kinetic and non-kinetic effects from the sea
    without the need for foreign basing rights. The current and future CSG
    constitutes a robust mix of sustainability, survivability and lethality
    with massed firepower and influence in a time of great power
    competition. The CSG is a key component to Distributed Maritime
    Operations (DMO) and offers Combatant Commanders rapid and decisive
    response options across the entire spectrum of military operations in
    an increasingly complex global landscape.
        The CVN enables the CSG to operate without replenishment for weeks
    at a time, due to its Nuclear power plant, aviation fuel capacity,
    weapons storage, and organic repair capabilities. Coupled with the
    CVN's maneuverability, the CSG can operate undetected while creating
    significant uncertainty, greatly complicating adversary targeting. The
    CSG's layered defenses starting with the offensive fire power from the
    mix of fifth and fourth generation aircraft from the CVW integrated
    with the Destroyer and Cruiser escorts allows the CSG to survive and
    operate inside threat ASCM ranges.
        With 11 CVNs we are able to employ CSGs, the Department of
    Defense's most visible asset for power projection and deterrence, to
    meet Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) directed presence.
    CSG presence has a direct effect on the decisions of malign actors in
    any theater and is our most viable military option in the great power
    competition. Any reduction in the number of CVNs, and associated CSGs,
    will have a commensurate decrement in our ability to project power
    around the globe, with the loss of associated deterrent value. The
    airpower resident within a CSG facilitates numerous naval missions;
    reducing the number of CVNs would have a corresponding negative impact
    on those alternate missions as well.
                            global force management
        73. Senator Hawley. Admiral Gilday, there has been a substantial
    increase in Requests for Forces from the Combatant Commanders in recent
    years. How has this increase impacted the Navy's ability to improve
    readiness and invest in the modernization that we so badly need to keep
    pace with China?
        Admiral Gilday. Combatant Commander Requests for Forces continue to
    outpace Navy's ability to meet Secretary of Defense-approved presence
    requirements given our current force structure. For example, four
    recent Carrier Strike Group deployments were extended to support U.S.
    Central Command, resulting in additional incremental costs of over $200
    million. While the inherent flexibility built into the Optimized Fleet
    Response Plan readiness production construct has enabled us to meet
    this increased demand, continued deployment extensions will have
    significant, longer-term costs and readiness impacts. Unplanned costs
    require reprioritization of readiness resources (i.e. personnel, spare
    parts, and ordnance) and modernization funds, typically resulting in
    reductions to non-deployed flying hours and deferred parts and
    maintenance. This degrades the readiness of our next-to-deploy forces.
    Unplanned schedule changes often require ship maintenance
    availabilities to be deferred or cancelled, degrading material
    condition and impacting future availability planning and on time
    performance. Ensuring that platforms complete required maintenance and
    modernization availabilities on time is essential for the long term
    health of the force and generating future readiness. Additionally,
    unplanned schedule changes, including deployment extensions, negatively
    impact the quality of life for our Sailors and their families, which
    may result in reduced retention.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND
                        THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2021

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
                      ON ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m., in
    Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
    Kaine, King, Warren, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker,
    Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and
    Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. I would like to call the hearing to order.
        The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
    Department of Energy's atomic energy defense programs in review
    of the fiscal year 2022 President's defense budget request. I
    would like to welcome our witnesses, Secretary of Energy
    Jennifer Granholm and Acting Administrator of the National
    Nuclear Security Administration, Dr. Charles Verdon. Thank you
    for joining us. I also want to thank the workforce for their
    service to the Nation.
        The fiscal year 2022 budget request for the defense
    functions of the Department of Energy is $27.9 billion. This
    figure accounts for about 60 percent of the Department of
    Energy's overall $46.2 billion request. Having the Secretary of
    Energy appear before us underscores the importance that this
    Committee places on oversight of the Department of Defense
    activities, which span from maintaining our nuclear stockpile
    to cleaning up former Cold War defense production sites in
    order to meet binding commitments between the Federal
    Government and the communities and states they reside in.
        Within this $27.9 billion defense proposal, the National
    Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, is requesting $19.74
    billion, or a 0.5 percent increase over last year's level of
    $19.73 billion. While the fiscal year 2022 budget is flat, I
    would note that the amount for environmental cleanup increased
    by 6.4 percent to a total of $6.8 billion.
        Madam Secretary, given this flat NNSA budget there will be
    tradeoffs within the remaining budget to meet ongoing DOD
    requirements. I would like to know what these offsets are and
    what impacts they will have. Our analysis shows that
    maintenance of long-term engineering and science programs
    decreased 4.4 percent. Funds for infrastructure and operations,
    particularly safety, decreased by 12.3 percent. There is a view
    that there are carryover monies in infrastructure that can be
    spent in these areas, but this Committee has too often found
    that using carryover funding simply pushes today's important
    infrastructure problems to subsequent years, where they
    inevitably grow in magnitude.
        With respect to DOD requirements, I would appreciate an
    update on how the NNSA is working with the Nuclear Weapons
    Council. The Committee spent considerable time last year
    ensuring the relationship between the Department of Energy, the
    NNSA, and the Nuclear Weapons Council was on the right footing.
    I will want to know your views on this matter, as it is an
    important issue.
        The NNSA has also experienced its highest workload since
    the 1980s, as it manages five major warhead programs while
    rebuilding nuclear infrastructure that is original to the
    Manhattan Project of 70 years ago, and I am interested in how
    NNSA is managing this workload and the status of modernization
    of the facilities.
        I would also ask that our witnesses share how the NNSA is
    meeting the requirement for plutonium pit production. This
    administration has endorsed a two-site solution for producing
    pits at Los Alamos and rebuilding the abandoned mixed oxide
    facility at the Savannah River site. I would like to know what
    issues you see in the coming year for both sites with respect
    to cost and meeting production requirements.
        Finally, Madam Secretary, I hope you will update us on your
    efforts to continue cleaning up former Defense production
    sites, particularly at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. As you
    are aware, the Hanford site has 55 million gallons of
    radioactive waste stored in 177 underground tanks, some of
    which are leaking. Although your Department is starting
    operations to remove the first 40 percent of low-activity
    radioactive waste from these tanks, which accounts for 90
    percent of the waste, at present there is no plan to remove the
    high-activity radioactive waste in the tanks. I would ask you
    share how you are working with the State of Washington on a
    plan to remove this highly radioactive waste.
        Again, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today
    and for their distinguished service to the Nation in so many
    different ways.
        Now let me recognize the ranking member, Senator Inhofe,
    please.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past few
    years one of the Committee's top priorities has been ensuring
    that we rebuild our U.S. nuclear deterrent, the cornerstone of
    our national security. We have talked together, and I think we
    are all in agreement on that.
        I think Secretary Austin said it well when he told us,
    quote, ``The U.S. nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond
    their original services lives, and the tipping point where we
    must simultaneously overhaul these facilities is now here. It
    is actually beyond here.
        If we are serious about meeting that growing and
    underappreciated threat posed by China and Russia, we need to
    be honest about the resources needed to do so, and repair these
    resources, which we will talk about in a minute.
        Unfortunately, the administration's fiscal year 2022 DOD
    budget cuts spending when we need real growth. We simply cannot
    compete if our budgets do not support our strategy. Strategy by
    starvation is a recipe for disaster.
        We have that same problem with this year's NNSA budget. For
    the first time since 2013--this is significant--for the first
    time since 2013, the NNSA request has shrunk from the previous
    year, mostly because of a $500 million cut to NNSA deferred
    maintenance efforts. Deferred maintenance is kind of a less-
    than-courageous way of doing something without being caught. I
    think we all understand that.
        If this were the result of real progress in modernizing our
    nuclear weapons stockpile, that would be one thing. But that is
    not the case here. We are still trying to recover from decades
    of underinvestment. We must rebuild our aging nuclear forces.
        I cannot understand why the administration is cutting NNSA
    funding while pushing for trillions of dollars in spending in
    so many other areas, less critical areas, such as so-called
    ``green energy'' subsidies. Almost a third of NNSA's facilities
    date back to World War II, and we have buildings where chunks
    of the concrete fall from the ceiling on workers below. We need
    to do better for the people who care for our nuclear
    enterprise.
        By contrast, our adversaries clearly prioritize their
    nuclear programs. They understand their value. Our lack of
    focus on nuclear weapons puts us in danger of falling even
    farther behind, and puts our Nation at risk, and we cannot
    allow this to happen.
        So I look forward to your testimony of these two great
    witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. Madam
    Secretary, you are recognized, please.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM, SECRETARY OF
                                 ENERGY

        Secretary Granholm. Thank you so much, Chairman Reed and
    Ranking Member Inhofe and Members of the Committee. It is a
    privilege to be before you on behalf of the Department of
    Energy as the Nation's 16th Energy Secretary. I am unspeakably
    honored to be entrusted with the responsibility of enhancing
    America's security through nuclear defense, nonproliferation,
    and environmental efforts, in addition to leading the
    Department's efforts to support the breakthrough scientific
    discoveries at our 17 National Labs and to deploy those
    breakthroughs at scale to create jobs for the American people.
        As we endeavor to build America's clean energy future we
    know the Department's nuclear security mission is essential to
    ensuring that future is safe and secure. It is a core focus of
    our daily work, and I recognize that the Senate Armed Services
    Committee has always demonstrated bipartisan commitment to this
    mission. I applaud your ability to consistently work together
    on such serious matters and your continued support for the
    Department's efforts around deterrence and on proliferation and
    environmental management, which, of course, together make up
    nearly three-quarters of the Department of Energy's budget.
        We know full well that as long as nuclear weapons exist the
    United States must maintain the safety, security, and
    effectiveness of our Nation's nuclear stockpile. We have to
    make sure that the U.S. Navy has the nuclear propulsion that
    they need to carry out their important operations, and we must
    also advance nuclear nonproliferation intentionally, and we
    have to do it internationally. We have to address the threat of
    nuclear terrorism, we have to mitigate the environmental harm
    from our nuclear program, and to those ends, I am pleased to
    report that since I have taken office the Department and the
    NNSA have reinforced a strong working relationship,
    prioritizing collaboration and communication, while respecting
    NNSA's semi-autonomous status.
        Here I do want to thank our colleagues at the NNSA, and in
    particular Acting Under Secretary Dr. Charlie Verdon, who is
    here and whose incredible vast experience and expertise has
    been invaluable to our nuclear security mission. I want to
    thank this Committee for having advanced Dr. Jill Hruby and
    Frank Rose to the next level, and hopefully the Senate can
    follow your lead, given the importance of this mission.
        Working together with NNSA and DOE, we have reached several
    notable milestones over the last 5 months, and that includes
    our support for diplomatic efforts to successfully extend the
    New START nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, and our
    progress around the Los Alamos plutonium pit production
    project, which is now underway, and which will produce 30 war-
    reserved plutonium pits per year to meet our national security
    needs. We have also moved forward on a series of upgrades that
    are essential to the Nation's nuclear deterrent, and our work
    is further facilitated by our exceptional partnership with the
    Department of Defense. You will be glad to know, I hope, that
    DOE and NNSA and DOD are engaging in high-level coordination,
    and we are in lockstep around our mutual goal of ensuring that
    the U.S. nuclear deterrent is fully funded and properly
    managed.
        I will note also that we are fully aligned with the
    Department of Defense regarding the budget for this next fiscal
    year, which meets DOD requirements. I am fully committed to
    working in close cooperation and coordination with the Defense
    Department on the future budget requirements.
        The budget proposal before you would allow us to make
    substantial progress in five areas. One, it would sustain
    funding for NNSA in support of the agency's longstanding
    nuclear modernization efforts. Second, it would support our
    weapons account activities, and that means allowing us to keep
    the Nation's stockpile and infrastructure in line with DOD
    requirements. Third, it will enhance our Office of Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation, so that we can ramp up our work to
    prevent state and nonstate actors from achieving their
    ambitions around nuclear weapons. Fourth, it provides the
    resources needed to support the U.S. Navy with militarily
    effective nuclear propulsion plants, and ensure they are safe
    and reliable and long-lived operation. Fifth, importantly, it
    would allow our Office of Environmental Management to advance
    our commitments to the communities that have supported national
    defense programs and nuclear research and facilitating
    continued progress along all 16 of our cleanup sites.
        Before I close I do want to acknowledge that we know,
    following the attacks on the grid and on the pipeline, with
    SolarWinds and the Colonial Pipeline, that we face this
    national security imperative to harden our critical
    infrastructure against these evolving cyber threats as well.
        So I am humbled by the opportunity to lead the Department
    of Energy in this moment, and I am happy to discuss our
    priorities and our goals with this Committee, and answer any
    questions that you may have.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Granholm and Dr.
    Verdon follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm and
           Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security Charles Verdon
        It is a privilege to serve as the 16th Secretary of Energy and have
    the responsibility of leading the Department in enhancing America's
    nuclear security through defense, nonproliferation, and environmental
    efforts. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must
    maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons
    stockpile through the application of unparalleled science, technology,
    engineering, and manufacturing. The Department also works to prevent
    nuclear weapon proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear and
    radiological terrorism by leveraging the unique expertise of our
    federal and nuclear security enterprise workforce. In addition, the
    Department provides the U.S. Navy with militarily effective nuclear
    propulsion plants and ensures their safe, reliable, and long-lived
    operation. Finally, we must complete the safe cleanup of the
    environmental legacy brought about from decades of nuclear weapons
    development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. The
    Department stands ready to support the President in meeting all these
    missions. To meet these challenges, DOE must uphold our values,
    revitalize our nuclear security enterprise, and ensure the
    environmentally sound and safe cleanup of legacy nuclear sites,
    particularly in disadvantaged communities. I am committed to investing
    in the kinds of science and technology that will help us today,
    tomorrow, and well into the future so the United States will always
    have a qualitative edge over its adversaries. I am proud to lead the
    more than 100,000 dedicated federal and DOE contractor employees
    working every day to find solutions to our most pressing national
    security, scientific, energy, cybersecurity, and climate change
    challenges.
        As I noted in my confirmation hearing, I am focused on three
    missions as the Secretary of Energy--first, the security of the United
    States through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    nuclear stockpile, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval nuclear
    propulsion missions, and the Environmental Management (EM) program's
    clean-up of our Cold War legacy sites. Second, supporting the amazing
    scientific work being done at the DOE's 17 National Labs and other
    facilities across the country, including on climate change and
    emissions reductions. Third, taking that research to scale and
    deploying it to create jobs for Americans. As Secretary, I am
    responsible for what happens at NNSA, and that includes making sure
    NNSA is properly resourced to execute its mission. Since I have been in
    the position, the Department and NNSA have reinforced a strong and
    collaborative working relationship that protects NNSA's semi-autonomous
    status while also ensuring that we are able to best leverage the
    different skills sets and expertise across the Department.
                     nnsa fiscal year 2022 budget overview
        DOE's NNSA is committed to supporting the President's Interim
    National Security Strategic Guidance. The President's Fiscal Year 2022
    Budget Request reflects the U.S. commitment to maintain a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reduce global nuclear threats,
    and provide the U.S. Navy's submarines and aircraft carriers with
    militarily effective nuclear propulsion. NNSA is on track to modernize
    the nuclear stockpile with our life extension and alteration programs;
    make substantial progress on maintaining, repairing, and recapitalizing
    NNSA's deteriorating infrastructure; provide policy and technical
    leadership to address all aspects of the nuclear threat reduction
    mission; and deliver nuclear propulsion that meets the U.S. Navy's
    operational requirements.
        The President's Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request of $19.7 billion
    for NNSA, an increase of $10.8 million, or 0.1 percent over the fiscal
    year 2021 enacted level. \1\ This request would enable NNSA to execute
    its long-standing nuclear modernization efforts, begun under the Obama-
    Biden Administration, while this Administration undertakes its formal
    review of efforts to modernize our nuclear deterrent, to include
    Department of Defense delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons required
    for those platforms, and the NNSA infrastructure needed to produce and
    maintain those weapons. This will preserve space for future policy
    decisions related to nuclear modernization, and nuclear
    nonproliferation and counterterrorism, as the Administration adjusts to
    the changing international threats facing America. Russia, China, and
    our adversaries should make no mistake--America will do whatever is
    necessary to deter our enemies and provide security in our strategic
    relationships with allies and partners.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The fiscal year 2021 Enacted level does not include the
    mandated transfer of $91 million from Naval Reactors to Nuclear Energy
    for the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is currently safe, secure, and
    militarily effective. However, the legacy stockpile systems are aging,
    and NNSA's production infrastructure has atrophied considerably.
    America must invest in the weapons and infrastructure modernization
    programs to provide the capabilities needed to ensure the deterrent's
    viability into the future. Future American political leaders will not
    have the weapons and infrastructure in place to support the nuclear
    arsenal unless we reestablish that capability now.
        As we advance the important work of modernizing our Nation's
    nuclear deterrent and the infrastructure that supports that mission, it
    is also important that the Department continues to collaborate with the
    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) as it has successfully
    done for decades. I am happy to report that DOE and DNFSB are
    developing a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU) to serve as a
    foundation for mutual communication, transparency, and information
    sharing. The completion of this MOU, which we expect to occur this
    year, will be an important tool for our continued collaboration.
                               weapons activities
        The fiscal year 2022 budget request for the Department's Weapons
    Activities account is $15.5 billion, an increase of $139.3 million, or
    0.9 percent, over fiscal year 2021 enacted levels. This budget request
    supports the Administration's goals to modernize the Nation's nuclear
    weapons stockpile and infrastructure to meet DOD deterrent
    requirements. Included in this request is funding for activities of
    NNSA's Office of Defense Programs which, in coordination with the
    Department of Defense (DOD), has maintained the effectiveness of the
    nuclear deterrent for almost 30 years without the need for additional
    nuclear explosive testing. In fiscal year 2021, the science-based
    Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and
    Defense to certify to the President for the 25th consecutive year the
    nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and militarily
    effective. This remarkable scientific achievement is made possible
    through the expertise of NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and
    technicians, and prior investments made in the necessary infrastructure
    and tools.
                              stockpile management
        For Stockpile Management, the fiscal year 2022 budget request is
    $4.6 billion, an increase of $342.4 million, or 8.0 percent, over the
    fiscal year 2021 enacted level.
        NNSA is requesting $771.7 million in fiscal year 2022 for the B61-
    12 Life Extension Program (LEP), which consolidates four variants of
    the B61 gravity bomb and improves the safety and security of a weapon
    that entered service in 1966. The B61-12 LEP is currently in Phase 6.5
    and has achieved first production on most of its components and will
    achieve the system's first production unit (FPU) in the first quarter
    of fiscal year 2022.
        NNSA is requesting $207.2 million in fiscal year 2022 for the W88
    Alteration (Alt) 370, which supports the sea-based leg of the nuclear
    triad. The W88 Alt 370 is currently in Phase 6.5 and currently on track
    with a system FPU date in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021.
    Nearly all major components have completed their respective FPUs.
        NNSA is requesting $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2022 for the W80-4
    LEP, which is currently in Phase 6.3, Development Engineering. The W80-
    4 LEP supports the U.S. Air Force Long Range Standoff (LRSO) program.
    Fiscal year 2022 will see a planned ramp-up of production development
    and design activities as the program transitions to Phase 6.4,
    Production Engineering.
        NNSA is requesting $691.0 million in fiscal year 2022 for the W87-1
    Modification Program, which will replace the aging W78-0 warhead. NNSA
    has planned first production in fiscal year 2030 to support fielding on
    the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent ballistic missile system in the
    Mk21A reentry vehicle. The program will deploy new technologies that
    improve safety, security, and manufacturability. Efforts in fiscal year
    2022 will focus on completion of the Weapon Design and Cost Report, an
    independent cost estimate, and entry into Phase 6.3.
        The W93/Mk7 is a new program of record authorized by Congress in
    fiscal year 2021 to meet DOD requirements. Starting the W93 program in
    fiscal year 2021 ensured the development of the warhead coordinated
    with the Navy's Mk7 aeroshell program. The W93 will incorporate modern
    technologies to improve safety, security, and flexibility to address
    future threats, and will be designed for ease of manufacturing,
    maintenance, and certification. All the key nuclear components will be
    based on previously tested nuclear designs and will not require
    underground nuclear explosive testing to certify. NNSA is requesting
    $72.0 million in fiscal year 2022 for the program, an increase of $19.0
    million, or 35.8 percent above the fiscal year 2021 enacted level.
    Fiscal year 2022 will focus on completion of Phase 1 activities and
    entry into Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design Options.
                            production modernization
        The Production Modernization program focuses on the production
    capabilities of nuclear weapons components critical to weapon
    performance, including primaries, secondaries, radiation cases, and
    non-nuclear components. For Production Modernization, the fiscal year
    2022 budget request is $2.9 billion, an increase of $363.1 million, or
    14.3 percent over the fiscal year 2021 enacted level. Included in this
    request is funding for activities that support the Primary Capability
    Modernization, Secondary Capability Modernization, and Non-Nuclear
    Component Modernization programs.
        Primary Capability Modernization includes the plutonium program and
    the high explosives and energetics programs. NNSA urgently needs to
    recapitalize our plutonium pit production fabrication capabilities to
    support our weapons modernization programs. High explosive and
    energetic materials are required for every weapon system in the
    stockpile and are also under increasing demand.
        NNSA's priority infrastructure need is re-establishing a modestly
    sized production capacity for plutonium pits. The fiscal year 2022
    budget request of $1.7 billion includes funding for plutonium
    operations and the plutonium pit production projects at Los Alamos
    National Laboratory (LANL) and Savannah River Site (SRS). At LANL, the
    Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project advanced in the Critical
    Decision (CD) process from Critical Decision (CD)-0 to CD-1
    (Alternative Selection and Cost Range), in April 2021. At Savannah
    River, the Department is working toward CD-1 by this summer. This two-
    site approach is necessary to re-establish the Nation's ability to
    produce plutonium pits in support of defense requirements, and to
    provide needed resilience against unplanned outages.
        Secondary Capability Modernization includes our Uranium, Depleted
    Uranium, Lithium, Tritium, and Domestic Uranium Enrichment programs.
    The fiscal year 2022 budget request of $488.1 million for Secondary
    Capability Modernization is a $31.1 million, or 6.8 percent, increase
    over the fiscal year 2021 enacted budget. All these programs support
    the nuclear stockpile and face infrastructure and lapsed capability
    concerns. Major construction investments to address these
    infrastructure concerns are funded within the Infrastructure and
    Operations program. For example, NNSA is continuing its progress on the
    Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which, when completed, will be one
    of the largest investments in Tennessee and one of the largest
    construction projects across the nuclear security enterprise since the
    Manhattan Project. UPF construction will support 2,500 good-paying jobs
    in 2022 and 1,100 jobs in 2023. NNSA is also working with its partners
    to increase production of tritium and is in the early phases of
    designing the Tritium Finishing Facility (TFF), to replace a 1950s-era
    facility. The United States no longer maintains a lithium purification
    capability and relies on material recycling as its main source, which
    will be exhausted soon. These operations currently take place in a
    World War II-era building well beyond its design life, putting both
    operators and processing at risk. NNSA plans to modernize lithium
    purification and processing operations in a new Lithium Processing
    Facility (LPF) built to modern standards.
        Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization includes programs to modernize
    production of non-nuclear components for multiple weapon systems. Non-
    nuclear components are a significant portion of the costs for the
    warhead modernization programs due to the number of parts, their
    complexity, and the testing required to ensure they will continue to
    function over their required 20-to-30-year lifetimes.
        This ongoing modernization of NNSA's production infrastructure is
    advancing at a critical time. As the Commander of U.S. Strategic
    Command, Admiral Charles Richard, has testified, ``We simply cannot
    continue to indefinitely life extend Cold War leftover systems...and
    successfully carryout our national strategy. A particular concern is
    the aging nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure and
    we can reach a point where no amount of money will adequately mitigate
    the operational risks the Nation will face due to infrastructure and
    human talent capability losses.'' Put another way: time is money.
    Continued recapitalization is imperative, otherwise there will be a
    point at which no amount of money will be able to mitigate the
    operational risks and losses to infrastructure capabilities that
    accrued over time.
                stockpile research, technology, and engineering
        The fiscal year 2022 budget request for Stockpile Research,
    Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E) is $2.7 billion, a decrease of
    $123.1 million, or 4.4 percent below the fiscal year 2021 enacted
    levels. The decrease reflects a rebalancing of efforts within NNSA to
    focus on near-term priorities to support the stockpile. SRT&E will
    continue to focus on the implementation of the Enhanced Capabilities
    for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) and various activities in
    preparation to accept and operate NNSA's first Exascale high
    performance computing system in 2023. Both capabilities provide data in
    support of the W80-4 LEP requirements and the W87-1 modification. SRT&E
    provides the data and tools that underpin science-based stockpile
    decisions, including the knowledge and expertise needed to maintain
    confidence in the nuclear stockpile without the need for additional
    underground nuclear explosive testing.
        ECSE will produce experimental data to enable the assessment of the
    current stockpile and the certification of the future stockpile without
    the need to return to explosive nuclear testing. This capability is
    needed to help underpin confidence in the W80-4 LEP, W87-1
    Modification, and future warhead acquisition programs. NNSA is
    requesting $215.6 million in fiscal year 2022 for the program, the same
    as the fiscal year 2021 enacted level.
        The Exascale Computing Initiative (ECI) will provide NNSA with
    next-generation simulation capabilities to support weapons design,
    warhead assessment and certification, and continued development of the
    science needed to support the nuclear stockpile over the long-term.
    NNSA remains on track to accept and operate NNSA's first Exascale high
    performance computing system for program use in 2023.
        The Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) program provides high energy
    density (HED) science capabilities and expertise to provide the data
    needed to advance warhead performance and production science, and to
    inform design choices for warhead acquisition programs. In addition,
    activities like the pursuit of ignition provide not only important
    scientific understanding, but a unique training environment for the
    workforce. NNSA is requesting $529.0 million in fiscal year 2022 for
    the program, a decrease of $46.0 million or 8.0 percent, from the
    fiscal year 2021 enacted level. The decrease reflects a decision to
    rebalance priorities within the SRT&E portfolio. These programs, along
    with our advanced computing and simulation, technology maturation,
    academic programs, and other SRT&E missions are essential to
    maintaining our confidence in the stockpile.
        Every year, NNSA provides grants and cooperative agreements with
    top universities across the country. Programs such as the Stewardship
    Science Academic Alliances Program and the Minority Serving Institution
    Partnership Program (MSIPP) facilitate in recruiting the next
    generation of scientists and engineers for our nuclear security
    enterprise, and conducting cutting-edge science in national security
    and nonproliferation. In support of the President's effort to eliminate
    inequities in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM),
    MSIPP's mission is to create and foster a sustainable STEM-pipeline
    that prepares a diverse workforce of world class talent through
    strategic partnerships between Historically Black Colleges and
    Universities, Tribal Colleges and Universities, and other Minority
    Serving Institutions and the nuclear security enterprise.
                         infrastructure and operations
        Infrastructure is the foundation that supports all NNSA missions.
    Modern, efficient, sustainable, and resilient infrastructure is needed
    for the nuclear deterrent, nonproliferation, counterterrorism,
    emergency response, leading-edge research, and solving the climate
    crisis. The deterioration of facilities built during the Manhattan
    Project and Cold War eras threatens NNSA's ability to execute its
    mission. Today, the average age of NNSA's facilities is 47 years old
    and of the agency's $116 billion worth of real property infrastructure,
    nearly 60 percent is beyond its design life and half of all facilities
    are in poor condition. NNSA's infrastructure includes, among other
    things, office buildings, light laboratories, emergency operations
    centers, fire houses, roads, utilities, and the specialized equipment
    used to support our missions.
        The fiscal year 2022 budget request for Infrastructure and
    Operations is $3.6 billion, a decrease of $497 million, or 12.2 percent
    below the fiscal year 2021 enacted level. The decrease largely results
    from the completion of construction projects in fiscal year 2021, the
    prioritization of funding for programmatic plutonium construction
    funded within Production Modernization, the beginning of the ramp down
    of funding for the Uranium Processing Facility project, and the use of
    carryover balances to fund work within the Chemistry and Metallurgy
    Research Replacement project.
        NNSA infrastructure must be resilient and provide the capabilities
    and capacities for executing its vital national security missions. This
    requires an array of complementary strategies, including minor and
    major construction projects, short-term leasing, purchases, and timely
    disposition of excess facilities. In partnership with the EM program,
    DOE is strategically demolishing high-risk excess facilities such as
    the former Biology Complex at Y-12. Its removal enhances safety and
    clears land for NNSA missions at the site. We must modernize and
    upgrade antiquated infrastructure and address safety and programmatic
    risks through strategic, risk-informed investments that directly
    support our nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs.
        NNSA is continuing its progress on the Uranium Processing Facility
    (UPF), which, when completed, will be one of the largest investments in
    Tennessee and one of the largest construction projects across the
    nuclear security enterprise since the Manhattan Project. UPF
    construction will support 2,500 good-paying jobs in 2022 and 1,100 jobs
    in 2023. NNSA is also in the early phases of designing the Tritium
    Finishing Facility (TFF). The United States no longer maintains a
    lithium purification capability and relies on material recycling as its
    main source. The current Program of Record provides sufficient lithium
    supply through 2035. These operations currently take place in a World
    War II-era building well beyond its design life, putting both operators
    and processing at risk. NNSA plans to modernize lithium purification
    and processing operations in a new Lithium Processing Facility (LPF)
    built to modern standards.
        Also, key are the personnel needed to safely and securely operate
    and maintain NNSA facilities. As NNSA mission scope increases, so does
    the demand for personnel to support new facilities and capabilities
    being brought on-line. Many of these sites across the complex will
    require additional staff to support moving to 24/7 operations. These
    individuals are essential to minimizing unplanned outages and to
    supporting safe and secure operations, particularly in high hazard
    operations.
                        defense nuclear security efforts
        The Office of Defense Nuclear Security's (DNS) primary mission is
    protecting the facilities, people, and assets that are critical to
    achieving NNSA's important national security missions. DNS's fiscal
    year 2022 budget request is $847.6 million, an increase of $58.6
    million, or 7.4 percent, over the fiscal year 2021 enacted amount. NNSA
    is making key investments to recapitalize aging physical security
    infrastructure through the Security Infrastructure Revitalization
    Program. Growth across the nuclear security enterprise, including
    plutonium pit production efforts, has led to increased security
    requirements. To mitigate the threat from unmanned aircraft systems
    (UAS), DNS is installing counter UAS systems at Y-12, the Pantex Plant,
    and the Nevada National Security Site.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) is critical
    to implementing the President's call to ``lock down fissile and
    radiological materials around the world.'' The fiscal year 2022 budget
    request for the DNN account is $2.3 billion, an increase of $4.0
    million, or 0.2 percent, over the fiscal year 2021 enacted level. \2\
    DNN works worldwide with our international partners to prevent state
    and non-state actors from developing nuclear weapons or acquiring
    weapons-usable
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The fiscal year 2022 amount does not include the proposed
    cancellation of $330 million of prior year balances from the Mixed
    Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility project.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        nuclear or radiological materials, equipment, technology, and
    expertise. Around the globe, DNN has eliminated the need for weapons-
    usable material at over 100 civilian sites and removed over 7,200
    kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from almost 50
    countries, achieving a permanent reduction in these threats from these
    materials. DNN's unique capabilities are critical to America's national
    security and welfare: from promoting and supporting International
    Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements internationally; to
    supporting diplomatic arms control efforts such as the successfully
    extended New START treaty with Russia; to partnering with United States
    industry to support non-HEU based production of the vital medical
    isotope molybdenum-99, which is used in 40,000 procedures every day in
    the United States.
                    nuclear terrorism and incident response
        The fiscal year 2022 request for the Nuclear Counterterrorism and
    Incident Response (NCTIR) Program is $370.8 million, a decrease of $6.7
    million, or 1.8 percent below, the fiscal year 2021 enacted level. The
    fiscal year 2022 request is lower due to the transfer of management
    responsibility and authority for IT and Cyber services and solutions
    for the Emergency Communications Network from NCTIR to NNSA's Office
    for Information Management.
        NCTIR includes two subprograms: Emergency Operations (EO) and
    Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP).
        EO provides the structure and processes the Department uses to
    prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all-
    hazards emergencies that threaten life and property. In addition, EO
    provides the framework for building, assessing, and improving
    organizational resilience to ensure uninterrupted performance and
    delivery of the Department's Essential Functions under the Presidential
    Policy Directive 40, Executive Order 13961, the National Nuclear
    Security Act, and the National Response and Planning Frameworks.
        CTCP provides capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear
    incidents and accidents worldwide. The foundation of NNSA's diverse
    missions is an unparalleled command of nuclear science, which is
    harnessed to understand and contend with global nuclear threats. CTCP's
    expertise influences a wide range of policies to keep nuclear material
    beyond the reach of non-state actors, including security standards for
    the storage and transport of such material. The office shares knowledge
    of nuclear and radiological threats with federal, state, local, tribal
    governments, and international partners by conducting training,
    exercises, and information exchanges to strengthen emergency
    preparedness and response. CTCP also develops tools to impede the
    efforts of proliferant states to obtain nuclear capabilities.
        CTCP manages the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), a cadre of
    on-call technical specialists who are trained and equipped to respond
    to all manner of nuclear events. Notable NEST capabilities include
    mobile teams that can search for nuclear devices and technical
    personnel whose knowledge of nuclear weapons is used to characterize
    and defeat such threats. NEST features nuclear forensics capabilities
    to identify the origin of nuclear material outside of regulatory
    control or used in a threat device. These capabilities constitute an
    important element of the U.S. deterrence strategy, by allowing the
    United States to credibly threaten retaliation against any state that
    facilitates an act of nuclear terrorism.
                                 naval reactors
        The Office of Naval Reactors remains at the forefront of
    technological developments in naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new
    technologies and improvements in naval reactor performance. This
    preeminence provides the U.S. Navy with a commanding edge in naval
    warfighting capabilities. Naval Reactors has given the United States
    unmatched reach with an unparalleled record of over 169 million miles
    safely steamed on nuclear power and over 7,300 reactor-years of
    operation.
        The fiscal year 2022 budget for Naval Reactors is $1.9 billion, an
    increase of $182.7 million, or 10.8 percent, over the fiscal year 2021
    enacted level. \3\ The budget request supports Naval Reactors' three
    major projects--the Columbia-class reactor plant development, the
    refueling overhaul of a research and training reactor in New York, and
    the construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho.
    Naval Reactors is committed to supporting the operational nuclear
    fleet, continuing research and development efforts for future
    generations of nuclear-powered warships, and making progress on both
    the recapitalization of laboratory facilities and the environmental
    remediation of legacy responsibilities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The fiscal year 2021 Enacted level does not include the
    mandated transfer of $91 million from Naval Reactors to Nuclear Energy
    for the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor. The fiscal year 2022
    amount does not include the proposed cancellation of $6 million of
    prior year balances.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            new era of progress for environmental management mission
        As important as the missions of today and tomorrow are, the Cold
    War left an indelible mark on America. It is the mission of the Office
    of Environmental Management (EM) is to address the legacy of nuclear
    weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research
    that has played a significant role in domestic security and prosperity.
        As the largest environmental cleanup program in the world, EM plays
    a key role in the Department's overarching mission to protect the
    planet. The Department's fiscal year 2022 budget request of $7.6
    billion will help EM continue to make progress in fulfilling the
    government's responsibility to clean up the environment in communities
    that supported nuclear weapons programs and government-sponsored
    nuclear energy research.
        Building on past success, the EM program is entering a new era of
    cleanup accomplishments. The fiscal year 2022 request supports a ramp
    up in EM's ability to tackle tank waste--one of the Department's
    largest environmental challenges and financial liabilities. The request
    will also enable continued progress in infrastructure improvements at
    the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and support an increased rate of waste
    shipments from across the EM program. In addition, EM will continue to
    advance facility demolition and risk reduction projects across the
    program.
        The fiscal year 2022 request includes $6.8 billion for defense
    environmental cleanup activities, which covers most major EM sites. The
    request of $1.5 billion for the Office of River Protection will enable
    EM to remain on track to initiate tank waste treatment at the Hanford
    site by the end of 2023 through the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
    (DFLAW) approach. In fiscal year 2022, EM expects to achieve a
    significant milestone in the start of tank waste treatment through the
    initiation of operations at the Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) unit,
    which is necessary to prepare waste for DFLAW treatment. Also at
    Hanford, the request of $1.0 billion for the Richland Operations Office
    will support continued risk reduction activities at Hanford's Central
    Plateau and along the Columbia River corridor, including remediation
    activities at Building 324 and the transfer of cesium and strontium
    capsules to dry storage.
        At the Savannah River Site, the request of $1.7 billion will help
    EM accelerate tank waste treatment through operation of the Salt Waste
    Processing Facility and the Defense Waste Processing Facility. The
    request will also continue operations and maintain a high state of
    readiness for H Canyon, the only chemical separations facility
    remaining in operation in the United States. At the Idaho Cleanup
    Project, the request of $381 million will continue advancing the
    Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU) toward hot operations. This
    facility is necessary to address the last remaining tank waste at the
    Idaho National Laboratory. In addition, exhumation of buried waste and
    treatment of transuranic waste sludge will complete, allowing the site
    to proceed with closure of the Radioactive Waste Management Complex.
        The request also supports key modernization and infrastructure
    recapitalization priorities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).
    Specifically, the request of $437 million will help ensure WIPP is
    equipped to meet the needs of the national transuranic waste disposal
    mission by enabling transportation activities from multiple locations
    required for sustained operations of up to 14 shipments per week.
        EM's fiscal year 2022 budget also facilitates the Department's
    broader national security and scientific research missions. The request
    includes $436 million in defense environmental cleanup funding for Oak
    Ridge, which will enable EM to continue cleanup operations at the Oak
    Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Y-12 National Security Complex
    excess facilities. The request enables EM to advance progress on
    several near-term priorities at Oak Ridge including the disposition of
    the remaining uranium-233 inventory at ORNL, addressing transuranic
    debris and sludges, and continuing design of the On Site Waste Disposal
    Facility.
        At the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the request of $333.5
    million will support EM initiating deactivation and decommissioning
    (D&D) work at the Ion Beam Facility, along with remediation activities
    at the DP-Road site, groundwater treatment and transuranic waste
    shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The request also includes
    $35 million to support continued D&D efforts for excess facilities at
    the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
        As the Department enters this new era of cleanup progress, EM is
    working to build a workforce for the future that promotes diversity and
    inclusion. That includes high-quality jobs in environmental cleanup
    where workers from all backgrounds can make a living and make a
    difference. The budget request includes a significant boost in funding
    to expand the Minority Serving Institutions partnership program to a
    new EM STEM Manufacturing and Cybersecurity Consortium. This program
    will be primarily focused on Historically Black Colleges and
    Universities and other Minority Serving Institutions with research
    specialties needed to advance the EM mission.
        EM's fiscal year 2022 request reflects a planning approach that
    will boost the Department's ability to complete its clean up mission.
    EM is prepared to put these resources to work to enhance environmental
    protections and remediate sites so they can be transitioned to future
    uses in local communities that helped the Nation win the Cold War and
    maintain peace for decades. As we do, the Department will work hand-in-
    hand with workers, unions, Tribal Nations, local communities, and
    Congress to plan for this next era of cleanup.
                            enhancing cybersecurity
        As you all are aware, a ransomware attack happened on May 7th that
    led to the shutdown of the Colonial Pipeline Company's largest fuel
    pipeline on the East Coast. The White House asked the Department of
    Energy to coordinate a whole-of-government effort to ensure that the
    company had the resources necessary to resume operations as quickly and
    safely as possible, while moving fuel supplies to impacted areas by
    other means. This incident was a stark reminder of the imperative to
    harden the Nation's critical infrastructure against these serious and
    growing cyber threats.
        As the Sector Risk Management Agency for cybersecurity in the
    Energy Sector, the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and
    Emergency Response, or CESER, leads the Department's efforts to
    safeguard the Nation's critical energy infrastructure against growing
    and evolving cyber threats and attacks. CESER works closely with the
    Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and public and
    private sector partners to strengthen the energy sector's risk
    management capabilities and enhance sector-wide situational awareness
    and threat analysis. The Office is advancing policies, technologies,
    and risk management tools that will increase the visibility of physical
    and cyber threats in the operational technology environment, mature the
    cybersecurity supply chain, and support exercises and partnerships with
    states and other organizations. Earlier this year, DOE and CISA
    announced a partnership with the electricity sector to develop the 100-
    day Industrial Control Systems Cyber Initiative. The initiative will
    strengthen the security of electricity critical systems and increase
    the visibility of the systems that control the Nation's utility
    operations. Ultimately, the initiative will help pave the way for
    efforts to secure critical infrastructure in other sectors.
        In the current threat environment, the Department cannot afford to
    neglect its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as frontline assets
    that protect the information, systems, and networks necessary to
    execute its mission. Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable
    every element of DOE/NNSA's missions. To meet future requirements, the
    Department must modernize its outdated and legacy technology.
        The Office of the Chief Information Officer leads the Department's
    efforts to modernize and improve cybersecurity defenses to protect
    federal systems and information at our national laboratories, power
    marketing administrations, plants, sites and headquarters.
    Additionally, we remain focused on strengthening our ability to respond
    and recover from cybersecurity incidents when they occur.
        The Department is targeting cybersecurity investments on lessons
    learned from recent cybersecurity attacks and implementing the
    Executive Order to Improve the Nation's Cybersecurity, including:
          Accelerating the movement to a zero-trust security model
    and secure cloud services;
          Securing the software supply chain; and
          Improving cybersecurity threat hunting and response in
    both information technology and operational technology.
        I can assure you that cybersecurity will remain a top priority for
    the Department, and these investments will posture DOE to defend
    against an ever-evolving landscape of cyber threats.
                                   conclusion
        DOE is charged with the truly unique and awesome responsibilities
    of advancing national security through the application of science.
    NNSA's weapons activities, nonproliferation, and naval reactors
    programs are essential to promoting America's national security and
    keeping our people safe. By applying the highest environmental
    standards and the best that new technology has to offer, DOE can ensure
    that science is harnessed to bolster America's national security, keep
    our edge in research and technology, and build an economy that reflects
    what we value most--our people. We are mindful of the resources
    entrusted for these vital missions and greatly appreciate the ongoing
    support of this Committee and Congress.

        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary. Dr.
    Verdon, do you have a statement?
        Dr. Verdon. No, sir. Not at this time.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much. Let me begin with
    the Secretary. Once again, thank you for your service in so
    many ways to the Nation. I deeply appreciate it.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, last year the
    Committee spent a great deal of time trying to iron out the
    relationship with the Department of Defense and the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, and from your perspective, is that process
    working now? Are we getting a full, integrated conclusion from
    both Defense and Energy?
        Secretary Granholm. I am happy to say that it is, sir. It
    is very intentional. We are absolutely working hand-in- glove
    and are coordinated in our goals, our approach, and in the
    budget.
        Chairman Reed. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary.
        Dr. Verdon, plutonium facility construction costs are about
    $20,000 to $25,000 per square foot, on average, based on what
    you have been doing out at Los Alamos. In 2018, you performed
    an engineering study in which Los Alamos originally proposed a
    modular 25 [sic]-square-foot building to be built next to their
    plutonium facility, at roughly $5 billion, and early the
    Nuclear Weapons Council approved this approach.
        That was one approach, but the administration is firmly
    committed now to two facilities, one in Savannah and one in Los
    Alamos. But the facility in Savannah's cost growth has gone
    from $4.6 billion to $11 billion. I wonder, looking at the
    metric of square feet and what you have done in Los Alamos, are
    you considering applying the same type of production to
    Savannah to lower costs, or alternatives to try to lower costs?
        Dr. Verdon. Sir, we are looking at--the original cost of
    $4.2 was really a top-down estimate. The present cost we have
    now are the first time the subject matter experts have actually
    built a bottoms-up cost. So, you know, the costs are actually
    comparable now to the Los Alamos project also. So there is
    quite a bit of consistency between the two.
        But we still find that the two-site solution is the most
    schedule- and cost-efficient way for us to reach the 80 pits a
    year, because as you mentioned, to do 80 pits at one site would
    require a whole new facility to be built, which would add years
    and quite a bit of money to build that facility. We are finding
    that the approach that we are using for MOX and Los Alamos are
    very consistent, and all of the latest information we have,
    which is basically the best we have had since we started this,
    still indicates that this is the best path to reach the 80 pits
    per year that the DOD has identified.
        Chairman Reed. So roughly the square foot cost at Savannah
    will be equivalent to the cost at Los Alamos?
        Dr. Verdon. It look a little different from the point that
    the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility-4 actually has a lot of the
    infrastructure already in the building, where the MOX facility,
    we will have to install a lot of the environmental equipment
    that is already present at Los Alamos, we will be installing
    it. So when you take that into account it would look more, but
    it is going to be, effectively, if you try to neutralize all
    that they are very consistent. In fact, we utilized the
    information that we obtained from installing the equipment for
    1 to 10 pits already at Los Alamos to inform the costs of both
    sites.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. Let me ask another question, Dr.
    Verdon. NNSA has been directed by the Nuclear Weapons Council
    to begin exploratory studies of submarine warhead to be sealed
    in the mid-2030s, and my understanding is that this effort is
    being undertaken with the United Kingdom. Can you, in this open
    session, describe what activity we will be participating with
    in the United Kingdom, and the necessity for this weapon
    system?
        Dr. Verdon. Well, the necessity, I would say you would have
    to speak to the STRATCOM Commander for that, because he sets
    those requirements. But our work with the United Kingdom, which
    is an independent development of their warhead, we tried to
    synergistically leverage each other's abilities to make sure
    that we have the highest confidence that both systems will
    work. Where they integrate is more back into, again, the Navy,
    so Admiral Wolfe, when it comes to integrating on the missile.
    So that is why it is necessary for us to work closely together
    to make sure that both what we build for the United States and
    what they build for their country will function correctly on
    the missiles, which are common.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Again, Madam Secretary,
    Dr. Verdon, thank you very much.
        With that I would recognize the ranking member for his
    questions. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, that is good. Thank you. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman. We are putting this exhibit up. I know you have
    both seen it, and you are very familiar with it. But we want to
    make sure it is in view of the camera and make sure that
    everyone understands what we are trying to say here.
        Last summer, the previous NNSA administrator testified that
    more than a third of the NNSA's facilities are over 60 years
    old. We know that, and we have heard that, and that is a
    problem.
        Secretary Granholm, I would first ask you, have you
    personally seen and witnessed and toured these facilities?
        Secretary Granholm. No, I have not yet because of the COVID
    restrictions, but I look forward to doing so.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. I knew that was your answer, and I
    know that is right, and you and I talked about this so I wanted
    to ask you on the record. Will you personally do that?
        Secretary Granholm. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. That is good. That is good. When our
    adversaries are rapidly building up their nuclear arsenals, why
    would be cutting the funding of our basic facility maintenance?
        Now everybody knows that during the last administration
    there was a problem, a relational problem, between your
    predecessor and me and some of the others up here. I want to
    make sure that we all want to do the same thing, and from our
    conversations I believe that we do, and I am looking forward to
    a great relationship, unlike the previous administration's
    relationship with me.
        Dr. Verdon, you are an expert. In the past year's NNSA,
    official stated that they need real sustained growth every year
    to keep the nuclear modernization on track. How will flat or
    reduced budget affect the NNSA ability to meet the DOD
    requirements over time, should that be the case? Would you
    expand on that a little bit, on what would be the effect if we
    failed to come up with the right approach to this?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes, sir. So when we put the 2022 request
    together we took a hard look at all of the requirements as we
    understood them, and, you know, given to them by the Department
    of Defense and what we had to do to meet those requirements. We
    did the best risk balancing that we could across the complex.
    We ensured that the warheads got the funding that they
    absolutely needed, that the major facility modernizations got
    the funding that they absolutely needed.
        In the area of infrastructure and operations, what we
    looked at there that was one of the areas during the COVID
    pandemic that we actually had to do some slowdowns. We
    recognize that we will have higher than usual carryovers in
    those areas. So that is why we reduced some of the requests
    that we originally were thinking about. We reduced them in
    recognition of the fact that we just could not put the number
    of people necessary within the square footage to get the work
    accomplished in a safe and effective manner.
        So that was one of the reasons we lowered the request from
    some initials, was just the realization that COVID had a larger
    impact in that area. But again, we think we can accomplish--you
    know, we are working with the sites, that we can accomplish all
    of the work required to keep the infrastructure moving forward.
    As I say, all the major facility modernizations are supported,
    and so that was a lot of the thinking.
        Then the other important area in the infrastructure
    modernization that looks like an artificial downturn is that
    the uranium processing facility is at its highest funding in
    fiscal year 2021, and it is beginning its natural roll-off in
    fiscal year 2022. So that almost accounts for $100 million or
    more of the reduction in fiscal year 2022, is just that natural
    roll-off that is beginning at the uranium processing facility.
        I think the important message is we believe we can
    accomplish, with the budget request as presented, all of the
    key things that we have to do in fiscal year 2022.
        Senator Inhofe. Dr. Verdon, it is understandable some of
    the things that we had to go through during the pandemic, and
    we do understand that, and we understand the results of that.
    But now we are out of that and we are on our way, and would you
    agree with the statements that I made about our adversaries,
    what they have been doing, and the necessity for us to get back
    in the game?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes, I agree. I mean, your pictures are worth
    1,000 words. We have a lot of infrastructure work to do, and as
    I say, we kept a major focus on the modernization because that,
    in some sense, is deferred maintenance as well. Some of the
    buildings, the faster we can replace them, the better off we
    are, instead of putting money to try to keep old buildings
    functioning.
        Senator Inhofe. In your background, have you ever seen more
    deplorable conditions than we are witnessing here?
        Dr. Verdon. Some of those buildings, they are eye- opening
    to go through them, and that is some of the challenges we face
    is still trying to keep them functioning. The sites are
    commended for still accomplishing the work in some of those
    facilities.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, I thank both of you, and thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Let me recognize
    Senator Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you to the chair and ranking member,
    and thank you to the witnesses for your service, and especially
    Governor Granholm and I served together as governors, and it is
    a real treat to see you here before the Committee.
        A concern that I had in the previous administration was a
    policy that is known as Part 810 authorizations, when the
    United States--Part 810 describes a process by which the United
    States vets and then approves the transfers of sensitive
    nuclear technology to other nations. It had long been the
    practice of administrations of both parties that when Part 810
    agreements were reached, and limited transfers of sensitive
    nuclear technology to other nations was allowed, that the
    administrations would notify Congress of that fact.
        The Part 810 process involves DOE and other agencies,
    looking at the request for the transfer of nuclear technology,
    and it involves signoff by a number of agencies, including the
    DOE.
        During the past administration, there began to be a
    practice which I believe was unprecedented, of the U.S.
    Government doing transfers of sensitive nuclear information to
    other nations, and in particular, to Saudi Arabia, without
    Congress being notified. At a hearing, I believe it was 2 years
    ago, when we had Secretary Kerry before us, I asked him about
    such transfers, and in particular were transfers being made to
    Saudi Arabia, and in extreme particularity, were we
    transferring nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia after the
    assassination by the Saudi Arabian Government of Virginia
    resident and Washington Post journalist, Jamal Khashoggi.
        I was not given an answer about that at the hearing. I was
    promised information about it, and it took a very, very long
    time for me to finally get the information from the
    administration, and I give credit, actually Senator Jim Risch,
    then chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
    eventually helped me get this information.
        But what I was hoping, Madam Secretary, is that you would
    commit to us that the Biden administration would return to past
    practice, and when there is a decision made by the
    administration to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to
    other nations that Congress be informed of that. It does not
    seem to be too much to ask for the SAS Committee, the Intel
    Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and others to know
    if we are transferring sensitive nuclear technology to other
    nations.
        So just a bottom-line question, could you tell us that you
    will return to past practice and keep Congress informed when
    Part 810 authorizations are being utilized to transfer nuclear
    technology to other nations?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, Senator. You have my word.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine, and now let me
    recognize Senator Rounds, please. Excuse me, Senator Rounds,
    but Senator Fischer is on Webex. Senator Fischer via Webex,
    please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Verdon, what
    lessons do you think we can learn from our recent experience
    with pit production? I know this has been an objective since
    Rocky Flats closed in 1989. It was part of President Obama's
    modernization commitment that he made with the New START
    Treaty. But CMRR was cancelled in 2012, and NSA did not begin
    its analysis of alternatives for follow-up options until 2016.
    That analysis failed to select a preferred alternative. It was
    followed by a subsequent engineering analysis, and finally,
    after 2 years of study, NNSA selected its current approach,
    which we are now discovering is not going to make the deadline
    for production.
        Clearly the challenge we faced was underestimated.
    [Inaudible] about having time to spare they were wrong. What do
    we do differently to make sure that this does not happen again?
        Dr. Verdon. Thank you for the question. It is a very good
    question that we are actually working very hard on. We are
    trying to follow a very rigorous process for when we identify
    requirements to when we actually commit to doing the actual
    construction. What we are finding is we have to find a way to
    improve the fidelity of the information we have earlier in the
    project, because, you know, we are pushing through on the pit
    production, and when we achieved Critical Decision 1 that is
    only 30 percent design complete. Critical Decision 2 is when we
    get to 90 percent design complete.
        What we are trying to figure out is how to get more of that
    information up front without committing the country yet to a
    final decision and making sure that we bring to the country all
    of the right options still. So we are trying to walk that fine
    line of how to improve the fidelity of the information, and the
    costing information, scheduling information earlier, but
    literally what we are finding is takes doing the detailed
    design work, because all of these facilities are unique, one-
    of-a-kind. That is both good news and bad news. It is good news
    that there are not too many of these around the world, and it
    is rougher news from the point of view that they are not
    commodity, they are not off the shelf. Each one is unique.
        But we are working and we recognize it is an area where we
    have to improve on how to bring higher fidelity information
    earlier into the process rather than later, which is how we are
    doing it right now, as we improve the fidelity as we go along.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Madam Secretary, I
    know this predates your tenure, but you are in a position to
    apply the lessons learned and ensure that we do not repeat
    these mistakes. So I would also like to hear your views on
    this.
        Secretary Granholm. Well, I obviously defer to the
    expertise of the gentleman to my left, because his knowledge
    and his management of the production and the time frame and the
    estimates are well grounded in his experience. I just have to
    say that, you know, as the Energy Secretary, the relationship
    between NNSA and DoE and the sharing of information like this
    has been incredibly important for me, just as a starting
    matter, but also the pledge to continue to work closely with
    NNSA, in my learning of the production challenges, the estimate
    challenges, the managerial challenges, the personnel
    recruitment issues that NNSA is experiencing, which is
    reflected across society, frankly.
        Senator Fischer. Very good. Good to hear. Thank you.
        Also, Secretary Granholm, Section 179 of Title 10 requires
    that the Nuclear Weapons Council, to make certification
    regarding the adequacy of NNSA's budget, the certification is
    required to be submitted with the budget, and that was released
    on May 28th, but this Committee has still not received it. I
    understand the budget process this year is irregular, but let
    me ask you this. We have DOE and NNSA, have they begun
    discussions with members of the Nuclear Weapons Council about
    next year's budget, so that the Council is in a position to
    provide a certification when it is submitted to Congress, as
    required?
        Secretary Granholm. Oh yes. We have been in lots of
    discussions with the Council about the budget that you are
    considering. I believe they are going to be certifying that
    budget, and clearly we will continue those conversations going
    into the next year after this.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Rosen
    must preside, so I want to thank Senator King for yielding.
    Senator Rosen, you are recognized.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, Senator King, and thank you,
    Chairman Reed and Ranking Member Inhofe, and I appreciate both
    your service and being here today.
        I want to quickly talk about the Nevada National Security
    Site and our infrastructure needs, because when I last visited
    there I saw the ongoing construction project at the U1a
    facility for enhanced capabilities for the subcritical
    experiments that we do there, the ECSE. I am excited that
    Nevada National Security Site was going to house the most
    capability weapons radiographic system in the world.
        So Dr. Verdon, could you provide us with an update on the
    upgrade to the ECSE facility at the U1a complex and tell us how
    the new facility will improve our Stockpile Stewardship
    Program's scientific capabilities, including a very important
    understanding of plutonium?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes. We are moving forward, as you say, with
    the ECSE, which is really two parts. One is actually the
    construction of the underground facility, which is moving
    forward and is meeting all of their objectives, and the
    development of the radiographic equipment, which is also making
    progress on schedule. So the project is one of our highest-
    focused areas and the labs and sites are working very hard to
    make sure that that is met.
        Yes, it will be a world-class facility when completed, and
    it will give us information that we just have not had access to
    since we did nuclear tests. So this is a key technological
    advancement in that regard, and will actually decrease the
    technical need to ever return to testing once we complete this
    facility.
        Senator Rosen. Now that you have said that I am awfully
    concerned that the President's budget request proposes an 11
    percent cut to the Nevada National Security Site. So how is
    that going to impact the critical mission that we are going to
    have, that we have there, ongoing and into the future, and
    maintain our superiority?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes, so the funding to all the critical, you
    know, the high-priority areas has been maintained. There are a
    few areas that we completed projects and we rolled them off.
    But there are others that are going to be starting soon. But
    all of the major projects, like utility upgrades and the ECSE
    and other activities have all been funded at the requisite and
    required levels.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move on to you,
    Secretary Granholm, and talk a little bit about the plutonium
    removal. In fall of 2018, the Department of Energy secretly--
    secretly--shipped one half a metric ton of weapons-grade
    plutonium from South Carolina to the Nevada National Security
    Site. As part of an effort to restore trust with the people of
    Nevada, NNSA committed to begin that removal of the material no
    later than 2021, completing the removal by 2026.
        Can you provide us with an update on the plan to remove the
    plutonium, and I do understand that one-half metric ton of this
    plutonium will be used for pit production activities at Los
    Alamos, and so I know it is critical that it gets there,
    Secretary.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. The commitment that we made with
    the state stands. We will remove, and continue to remove that
    plutonium, consistent with that agreement.
        Senator Rosen. Dr. Verdon, can you--if you cannot do it
    now, can you provide to the Committee in writing an update on
    the status of Los Alamos achieving their 30 pits per year, and
    how this does rely on the materials being transported from the
    Nevada National Security Site?
        Dr. Verdon. We will be happy to do so.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Granholm. The Department of Energy's National
    Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) remains committed to
    remove the weapon-grade plutonium shipped from South Carolina
    in 2018 and currently staged at the Nevada National Security
    Site (NNSS). This effort is crucial to support Los Alamos
    National Laboratory's (LANL) mission to produce 30 plutonium
    pits per year (ppy) beginning in the year 2026. Pursuant to a
    U.S. District Court order, DOE/NNSA was required to remove one
    metric ton of plutonium from South Carolina by 2019. The one-
    half metric ton of weapon-grade plutonium that was shipped from
    South Carolina to Nevada before November 2018 is material that
    will be utilized to meet NNSA's pit manufacturing objectives at
    LANL. DOE/NNSA committed to commence removal of this material
    from Nevada beginning in calendar year 2021 and to complete
    removal by the end of calendar year 2026. DOE/NNSA remains on
    track and committed to meeting the agreement regarding removal
    of this plutonium from Nevada.

        Dr. Verdon. Department of Defense (DOD) objectives and
    federal law require reestablishing the capability to produce no
    fewer than 80 war reserve plutonium ppy. In 2018, the Nuclear
    Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed the NNSA two-site strategy for
    pit production. This includes expanding existing capabilities
    at LANL's Plutonium Facility (PF-4) to produce no fewer than 30
    ppy at LANL during 2026. Work to implement 30 ppy production
    capacity at LANL is progressing. The Los Alamos Plutonium Pit
    Production Project (LAP4) to install the equipment and
    infrastructure necessary to meet LANL's pit production mission
    objectives achieved Critical Decision-1, Approve Alternate
    Selection and Cost Range, in April 2021 and work continues to
    finalize the project design in support of CD-2, Approve
    Performance Baseline. Concurrently, under the auspices of the
    joint Pit Product Realization Team, LANL continues to produce a
    series of pits to prove-in and qualify manufacturing processes
    and enable production of the first war reserve plutonium pit in
    2023. The weapon-grade plutonium currently staged at the Nevada
    National Security Site (NNSS) is in the process of being moved
    to LANL to support this element of NNSA's pit production
    mission. Plutonium removal from NNSS began in 2021 and will be
    completed by the end of 2026.

        Senator Rosen. Thank you, and the last question I have is
    about radioactive waste shipments, because in 2019, Nevada
    learned that the Department of Energy had been shipping
    incorrectly labeled low-level radioactive waste from the Y-12
    facility in Oakridge to the Nevada National Security Site. This
    waste was, in fact, mixed, low-level radioactive waste, which
    violated the waste acceptance criteria for NNSS.
        Currently, NNSS lacks waste verification equipment to
    verify that waste received for disposal meets the acceptance
    criteria. This technology and additional personnel are critical
    if we are able to do our job. Over 1 million cubic feet of low-
    level radioactive mixed waste may come to us for disposal each
    year.
        Secretary Granholm, would you support funding for waste
    verification technology at the NNSS to ensure that the site is
    receiving and disposing the proper waste and avoiding further
    mislabeled shipments?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. I am assuming that Dr. Verdon
    would agree that that is important.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I yield back. I have 10
    seconds. I am going to preside. Thank you again for allowing me
    to----
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Let me now
    recognize Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say
    Governor Granholm, but Secretary Granholm, it is good to see
    you again. It is. I think the governor title is probably a
    better title, but nonetheless, welcome.
        Secretary Granholm. Thank you.
        Senator Rounds. Dr. Verdon, thank you for your service, and
    we appreciate you being here in front of us today. I have got a
    series of questions, but I want to focus back on, and come back
    to where Senator Fischer was leading to begin with, with regard
    to the budget. But I want to lead into it by visiting with Dr.
    Verdon for just a few minutes, concerning the infrastructure
    issues.
        I would like to begin by just simply asking how confident
    are you that the infrastructure in place to support the nuclear
    modernization efforts and the programs planned over the next
    few decades, whether or not the infrastructure will be able to
    handle those necessary programs, as planned. The reason why I
    am asking it in this way is because it is pretty clear that the
    infrastructure that we have got right now, and I think what
    Senator Inhofe has shared, is that we have got some pretty
    serious infrastructure problems.
        In fact, the NNSA's own fiscal year 2021 Stockpile
    Stewardship and Management Plan states that a number of key
    facilities do not meet modern safety standards and require
    significantly increased investments to maintain. The plan
    further states that the infrastructure issues may very well
    impact stockpile maintenance and warhead deliveries.
        This is simply not acceptable, and with that I would like
    your opinion on whether or not we actually have it in place and
    whether or not we are doing enough to bring it up to speed.
        Dr. Verdon. We have used the DOD requirements to actually
    drive the priority of which we are attacking the
    infrastructure. So all of the large facility, or facility
    infrastructure requests have been prioritized, all with meeting
    the DOD requirements and worker safety in mind.
        We recognize that there is--you know, as I think I have
    said many times, the complex has truly atrophied. The pictures
    showed that. We recognize we cannot do it all at once, so we
    have prioritized it based on personnel safety and the weapons
    that we need to deliver to the DOD. We are keeping those
    priorities and moving to address them all, and working
    diligently on those facilities that we will not be able to
    wholesale replace, to make sure that their maintenance is kept
    up to speed.
        Senator Rounds. Here is the second part of this, though.
    Naturally, we are also concerned about the recent announcement
    concerning NNSA's ability to produce plutonium pits. Both
    statute, specifically 50 U.S.C. 2538a and STRATCOM, require
    that NNSA produce no less than 30 plutonium pits per year by
    2026, and 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030. Can you explain
    why you are unable to meet this statutory requirement, and
    also, what do we need to do, as Congress, to be able to help
    you meet that goal, that directive, that mandate?
        Dr. Verdon. So again, the two-site solution is the approach
    that we still think is a viable one for the 80 pits per year.
    What we identified--we still have confidence of being to meet
    the 30 pits per year by 2026 at Los Alamos. What the detailed
    analysis showed is when we started the work on the Savannah
    River site, what the detailed analysis showed is as we actually
    started to do the design work that the amount of equipment we
    needed in there, the amount of people we needed in there, we
    just could not get them in, all done at the same time, to meet
    the 2030 objective.
        What we do believe is if we can meet it between 2032 and
    2035, that is what the next phase of the Savannah River project
    will look at, is defining better what that time frame is. But
    it was just basically more detailed information, more detailed
    analysis to identify that vendors could not potentially provide
    the equipment we needed on the right time frame, we could not
    get enough people in the building to do the work, you know,
    faster.
        Senator Rounds. Dr. Verdon, I am going to run out of time,
    but I just want to make this point. The Nuclear Weapons Council
    has not certified the NNSA budget, as I think Senator Fischer
    was getting at, which was supposed to be done by the end of
    June. They pushed the deadline to the end of July. Now there is
    a reason why they have not done that yet.
        Now this particular council, just for the benefit of folks
    watching this, this Nuclear Weapons Council consists of the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the
    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy, the STRATCOM Commander, the NNSA
    Administrator. Clearly there is an issue, and I am suggesting--
    and this is the reason, Secretary Granholm, that I think you
    need to be able to participate in this directly--apparently the
    budget--and I think there is a reason why they are not
    certifying the budget at this point and have delayed it at
    least 30 days--I am questioning whether or not the budget
    adequately responds to the immediate needs that are being
    pointed out by the deficiencies in infrastructure and the
    inability to produce plutonium pits based on what is directed
    by STRATCOM and by statute.
        I know I am out of time, but just a quick, brief response,
    if the Chairman would allow it.
        Chairman Reed. Yes, please. A quick response.
        Secretary Granholm. You want that to me? It is my
    understanding that--and, of course, you have not seen the
    documentation yet--but that we are all in sync, and that it
    will be certified. But again, you have got to get your
    documents in front of you. I also understand that there will
    be, as you know, a nuclear posture review in August, and in the
    first year of any administration, or at least the past couple
    of administrations, there is the out-funding, the policy
    associated with that nuclear posture review is not reflected in
    the budget, and there we wanted to have some conversations
    about that. Understandably, we all want to make sure that we
    have the requirements met in the out years as well.
        So I think--and again, you will have to get the document
    from them, but I think we are in sync, and I think there will
    be a certification.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator King,
    please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Granholm,
    the bedrock of this nation's national defense strategy is
    deterrence, and we are going through a once-in- a-generation,
    perhaps once in two or three generations modernization of our
    deterrent capability--Columbia submarine, B-21, ground-based
    strategic deterrent, returning to pit production, upgrading of
    warheads, and nuclear command and control.
        In your view, if we failed to do that, if we back off of
    that mission of upgrading those elements of our nuclear
    deterrent, does that diminish the deterrence that affects the
    calculus of our adversaries?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes.
        Senator King. That is exactly the answer that I believe is
    also the case. Deterrence is in the mind of the adversary, and
    if they perceive that we have allowed our nuclear deterrent
    capability to degrade, that in itself, will it not diminish the
    effectiveness of deterrence?
        Secretary Granholm. Absolutely. As Secretary Austin has
    said, nuclear deterrence should be the number one priority.
        Senator King. The best conflict is the one that does not
    occur.
        Secretary Granholm. Exactly.
        Senator King. The best way to have that occasion is for our
    adversaries to understand that we are serious, and that part of
    that is committing the resources necessary to establish the
    capability of the deterrence.
        Turning a moment--and this is not strictly NNSA related but
    it is certainly in this area--is the role of cyber and the
    danger of cyber in our nuclear enterprise, as well as across
    the government. CESER is one of the subagencies of the
    Department of Energy. I would like your commitment that this is
    an agency that will be emphasized, supported, and there is some
    discussion about whether it should be an assistant secretary or
    a professional. But the important thing is that this, I
    believe, is one of the most important initiatives within the
    Department of Energy, and will you commit to your full and
    enthusiastic support of their mission?
        Secretary Granholm. Not only will I commit to the full and
    enthusiastic support, I agree with you 100 percent that it must
    be elevated, and elevated, in my mind, means that we have to
    make sure that we have professional staff. I want to make it a
    directorate that will have the ability to ensure that
    professionals are running it. It is an emergency response
    organization, and you need professionals who are running it
    regardless of administration.
        Unfortunately, and you and I have discussed this, and I
    know this is question and I am happy to have further
    conversations, if there is an appointee, often there are long
    gaps in the leadership, and because these issues, cyberattacks,
    are relentless, gaps in leadership make it very difficult to
    run an effective organization. Since CESER was created, the
    leader of CESER has been unseated, no leader for exactly half
    of the time.
        So we want to make sure that there is consistent, strong,
    professional leadership, and I want to elevate it to be a
    directorate, and make sure that it has the resources that it
    needs.
        Senator King. We will continue to discuss that issue, but
    the important thing is the emphasis on the significant role.
        Let me ask another couple of cyber questions. One is, part
    of nuclear modernization has to be what they call C3--
    communications, command, and control. That has got to be cyber
    protected, to the nth degree. Do you agree that that is part of
    the nuclear modernization challenge?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes.
        Senator King. I am sorry?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes.
        Senator King. Thank you. The other piece is the cyber
    protection within your agency. I hope you will be brutal in
    testing, pen testing, and really working the cyber protection
    within the agency. The Federal Government is notorious for
    being cyber vulnerable, and one of the only ways to protect
    against that is individual desktop cyber hygiene. So I hope
    that you will test your employees to be sure that they are not
    responding to phishing emails, that they are not clicking on
    attachments that they shouldn't. It seems mundane, but 85 or 90
    percent of cyberattacks could be prevented by just
    straightforward, simple cyber hygiene at the desktop. I want
    you to appoint somebody whose job it is to expose
    vulnerabilities within the Department.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes. We have actually appointed a new
    CIO, and this is exactly what we are focused on.
        Senator King. The final question. Deterrence does not work
    with nonstate actors. That is where nonproliferation comes in,
    and we have to be concerned into the future about nonstate
    actors getting a hold of nuclear materials, and so it is
    critical that your Department works closely with the
    intelligence community, with the entire nonproliferation
    governmental structure, because, as I say, our whole strategy
    rests upon deterrence, but deterrence does not work for a half-
    dozen people who are perfectly willing to die to bring a
    nuclear weapon into New York Harbor.
        So please commit to me that you are going to remain
    committed and keep your eye on nonproliferation, because that
    has got to be part of our strategy.
        Secretary Granholm. Absolutely.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Tuberville,
    please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman. Thanks for being here today.
        Secretary Granholm, in January the DOD issued an order
    prohibiting utilities at military facilities from acquiring,
    importing, transferring, or installing specified bulk power
    system equipment from China. What was the rationale behind that
    order?
        Secretary Granholm. The rationale behind the order
    initially, that the Trump administration provided, was, of
    course, to make sure that our system is protected from
    equipment that might be containing cyber malware from our
    adversaries. A very solid rationale. When it was issued, we
    received a lot of feedback from the utilities saying it was
    overly broad and it needed to be addressed more with a scalpel
    rather than an axe.
        We will be following up on this. We have issued a Request
    for Information from the utilities and others, to make sure
    that it is crafted in a way that achieves the goal. But the
    goal is the right goal.
        Senator Tuberville. Does this cover critical civilian
    facilities too?
        Secretary Granholm. Yes.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. In 2015, it was reported
    that the DOE planned to sign a 10-year agreement to build a
    molten salt reactor with China. What is the status of that
    agreement?
        Secretary Granholm. I am going to get back to you on that.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you. You know, they give
    all these explanations over the years, that China is no longer
    a developing nation. I think they have proven that they are a
    little bit past that. They are rapidly growing their military
    and nuclear capabilities. So I would love to hear from you on
    that. Thank you.
        You know, a recent Hill article says the DOE is destroying
    an important piece of our Cold War nuclear programs, Uranium
    233. Have you read the 2008 IG report that cites that U233 is
    vital to our national interest? Have you read that?
        Secretary Granholm. I have not read the report.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed, I would like permission to submit this
    report to the record, please.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.]

        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Just one other question.
    U233 costs the U.S. billions to create and store, billions, and
    as we speak we are destroying U233. We are going to eventually
    need it, and we are spending more money than is imaginable.
    There is not a lot of it. It is stored. In your answer, why
    would we destroy something that eventually is going to be that
    valuable to this country?
        Secretary Granholm. I would ask whether Dr. Verdon has a
    response to this, but I would say----
        Senator Tuberville. Doctor, do you want to weigh in on
    this?
        Dr. Verdon. Actually, no. I would have to look into that as
    well.
        Senator Tuberville. Okay. Well, thank you.
        Secretary Granholm. But I will say this, if I might. It is
    important that the United States provide the means for its own
    use, and there has been talk of a uranium stockpile, which this
    Congress funded last year, which has carried over. We are, this
    month, sending out a Request for Information about the creation
    of a U.S.-based uranium stockpile.
        Senator Tuberville. You know, I just hope we are not
    allowing--and helping China in any way. We should not be doing
    that, especially when it comes to nuclear. I have got another
    article, too, from The Hill on U233, Mr. Chairman, I would like
    to submit too.
        Chairman Reed. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you
    both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville. Now
    let me now recognize, via Webex, Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our witnesses for being here today.
        I would like to talk about the NNSA's out-of-control
    spending on the nuclear weapons systems. NNSA has a habit of
    overpromising on development timelines and underestimating on
    costs. This has resulted in projects costing taxpayers billions
    of dollars more than originally anticipated, and finishing up
    the job years behind schedule.
        Just recently, NNSA's budget request estimated that the
    high end of the cost range for pit production at Savannah River
    could be as much $11.1 billion. That is 2.5 times the original
    projection of $4.6 billion. On top of that, NNSA has now pushed
    back its goal of producing 80 plutonium pits per year from 2030
    to 2035. This is just the latest NNSA project that has gone
    over budget and behind schedule.
        So Administrator Verdon, let me ask you, do you think these
    ballooning costs and delays are acceptable?
        Dr. Verdon. Again, to me it is basically, what we are
    trying to do is actually more in line with what you are asking
    for. We are actually trying to be more rigorous in our costing
    and schedule estimates, and that is what we have brought
    forward. You may not have been on earlier on. The original
    estimate for Savannah River was a top-down estimate. It was the
    first that anybody even thought of. So it was not ever viewed
    as a really detailed budget estimate. The one we just announced
    is the first detailed budget and schedule estimate for that
    facility, and that----
        Senator Warren. You know. Okay, let me stop you there. The
    problem I am talking about, I use the example of Savannah River
    because it is 2.5 times past what was originally budgeted, and
    it is now 5 years longer to get it done. But it is not the only
    one.
        NNSA is anticipating a $505 billion in nuclear weapons
    spending over the next 25 years, over $100 billion more than
    what it planned to spend previously. So the question I have is
    this is not just one off. How can Congress or taxpayers feel
    confident that NNSA's cost estimates are anyplace close to
    accurate?
        Dr. Verdon. So again, we are trying to learn lessons from
    the past as quickly as we can. In fact, of all of the major
    construction projects we have done in the recent years, 75
    percent of them have actually come in at or under costs that
    was projected for them. So I do think as an organization we are
    learning. But what we are also identifying, and as we are
    getting new requirements, new requirements also drive up the
    costs, you know, the apparent costs, because we are getting
    additional new requirements into the program. So we have to
    look at that in total. But we are trying to learn hard from the
    past and improve as we go forward, and I think we are making
    progress in that area.
        Senator Warren. Well, I would sure like to see the
    progress, because, you know, if this had only happened once or
    twice, that programs ran into issues, I would feel differently
    about this. These issues are chronic. They have a long and
    well-documented history. A 2010 GAO report concluded, and I am
    going to quote it, that ``DOE did not have a cost-estimating
    policy and that cost-estimating guidance it had developed in
    the 1990s remained in effect but was out of date.'' That is
    over 11 years ago.
        I just want to hear you talk about how things have really
    changed, and maybe the best way to do that is just tell me some
    of the steps that NNSA can take right now, or is taking right
    now to improve its cost estimates and to ensure that these
    projects stay on schedule.
        Dr. Verdon. Again, I think the Department and NNSA together
    have put in a very rigorous capital acquisition project, you
    know, management scheme, that we are following very rigorously.
    We are using OMB and GAO best practices and guidance. If you
    take something like uranium processing facility, which is
    almost a decade-long project, $6.5 billion, it is on budget.
        So as I say, we are seeing successes. We are not perfect
    yet. We recognize that. But we are striving to work to improve
    as we go forward, and I say, I am learning from the past, and
    we are moving forward to improve, and I see metrics that show
    that we are improving. I think with working with the Department
    we have come up with a very rigorous process to manage these
    large capital acquisition projects, in an effort to improve.
        Senator Warren. I hope that is the case. You know, these
    wildly inaccurate cost estimates are unacceptable, and we
    cannot just accept them as the norm, especially as we are
    trying to plot out trillions of dollars in unnecessarily
    modernizing our nuclear arsenals. These cost overruns erode
    public faith in government spending and jeopardize other
    important NNSA projects like nonproliferation and
    counterterrorism efforts.
        Look, I do not think it is outrageous to expect that
    taxpayer dollars we invest be spent intelligently and
    responsibly, and I think it is long past time for NNSA to get
    its house in order on this. I hear you when you say that those
    procedures are underway, but I want to see the results on this.
    These are taxpayer dollars and taxpayer time that is at risk
    here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Let me now
    recognize Senator Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
    Secretary Granholm and Dr. Verdon, for being here today.
        Of course, effective transition to the ground-based
    strategic deterrent will require a plan to safely and
    efficiently dismantle, dispose, and demilitarize the current
    ICBM fleet. If you could--and I apologize for missing the first
    part of this--but if you could please walk us through what
    progress is actually being made and what challenges you are
    facing with the disposition planning for the Minuteman III.
        Dr. Verdon. So we are not responsible for the missile--that
    would be the Air Force--but for the warheads that are on the
    missile, roughly half of them will transition off of the
    Minuteman III onto the GBSD. The ones that will not transition,
    the material associated with those warheads, when authorized,
    will be disassembled and stored safely and securely, as we have
    done in the past, with the material that composes those
    warheads.
        Senator Ernst. So you do not foresee any issues then with
    that disposition.
        Dr. Verdon. No.
        Senator Ernst. That is good, and then also, of course, DOD,
    DOE, and NNSA, they all have a stake in the development of the
    nuclear cores that are supporting our weapons systems and our
    nuclear Navy. What is the assessment of the capability and
    ability of our domestic supply and production chains to produce
    these nuclear cores?
        Dr. Verdon. By cores--I am sorry, for clarification--by
    cores you are referring to the pits, that we call the pits? Is
    that what you mean by the core, or the whole weapon?
        Senator Ernst. The whole weapon.
        Dr. Verdon. So we are working very diligently to make sure
    we have a supply chain. I think we are working very closely
    with the Department and the Department of Defense in
    reestablishing more domestic supplies of some of the materials
    that we need, so we are recognizing that that is a key area
    that we have to work on.
        But we are reestablishing, or we have established and we
    continue to work to make sure that we have the correct
    infrastructure to support what we need to do.
        Senator Ernst. Dr. Verdon, is there a role that you would
    see at the Federal Government level or with Congress in making
    sure that we can procure what is necessary domestically?
        Dr. Verdon. You know, we do not have a definitive answer
    yet, but I believe there will be some materials for which the
    economic--you know, trying to get industry to restart some of
    the, you know, domestically, will be a challenge that we may
    need help in the future. There are certain materials we use
    that we have to rely on external sources for, that bringing
    them back onshore may present a challenge for the future that
    we certainly would potentially need help in doing so.
        Senator Ernst. What would some of those concerns that we
    have with external sources, where would those sources be
    located?
        Dr. Verdon. I will say sensitive countries.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate your time.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst. Let me
    now recognize Senator Kelly, please.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary
    Granholm, great to see you again, and Dr. Verdon, great to have
    a University of Arizona Wildcat testifying.
        Secretary Granholm, cyberattacks, malware, ransomware
    attacks have been increasing. Yesterday we had a closed
    Cybersecurity Subcommittee hearing on some of the details of
    these recent attacks. It is an issue that impacts us all, from
    small businesses, large business, government agencies, secure
    networks in our national security agencies. It is a big concern
    of mine.
        The recent Colonial Pipeline cyberattack underscored the
    vulnerability of America's physical infrastructure and the
    impact that even a single attack can have on the Nation. So I
    am pleased to see the increased focus on cybersecurity in the
    fiscal year 2022 budget request, a 42 percent increase from
    last year's funding.
        Secretary Granholm, if Congress funds this increase, what
    efforts will the Department of Energy undertake to ensure that
    America's energy networks are secured against malware,
    ransomware, and other types of cyberattacks?
        Secretary Granholm. Thank you for asking the question. As
    we have seen, the Colonial Pipeline incident made it clear that
    the fact that we do not have standards on pipelines, cyber
    standards on pipelines, like we do on the electricity sector,
    suggests a major whole. So working internally--now the
    Department of Energy and CESER is the sector risk manager for
    the energy sector--working in partnership with CISA, who is
    over in the Department of Homeland Security, and the TSA that
    has responsibility over pipelines, we want to make sure that
    our efforts, and this increase in funding, ensures a
    collaborative, cohesive whole response inside of government, on
    the energy side, which is obviously where our focus is.
        We want to make sure that the Executive order that the
    President issued regarding cyber, and including the notion of
    Energy Star ratings for software, so that we all, inside the
    Federal Government, are purchasing supplies, software, that we
    know are the best, that have the highest standards, that make
    us secure. Those efforts inside of DOE are going to require
    additional resources, hence some of that increase, so both on
    personnel, as well as coordination, as well as helping develop
    standards, as well as implementing those standards inside of
    the Department are all what CESER is working on.
        Senator Kelly. Then also part of this, you know, is the
    sharing of information, and the President had Executive Order
    14028, that talked about this, and really discussed removing
    barriers to cyber threat, information- sharing with the private
    sector. So information that would go from government agencies
    to private sector to benefit all Americans, and this could
    enhance our national security, but being able to gather real-
    time information about active threats and effectively
    communicate to others at risk in private industry, we see that
    this can help deter and prevent cyberattacks on our country's
    energy network.
        So can you address any barriers that currently exist to
    communication between the Department of Energy and private
    sector regarding cyberattacks?
        Secretary Granholm. Yeah. I mean, CESER's communications
    with the electricity sector are excellent. We are embedded in
    the Council, we work with them closely. It is a great example
    of what the steps are that have to happen. In that Executive
    order, the President, for example, required that pipelines
    notify the government if they have been the victim of
    cyberattack or ransomware attack. That was not required before.
        So what CESER wants to do is to elevate the visibility, the
    transparency between what is happening in the private sector
    and the information flow to the government. So one example of
    that is technology that has been developed at one of our
    national labs, PNNL. It is called CRISP. It was one example of
    technology that was attached to the electricity sector that
    would give us visibility into the systems, so that if there
    were a bad actor we would know about it, our intelligence
    community would know about it, and we would be able to engage
    in defensive strategies. We do not have that on the pipeline
    sector, and so that is the kind of visibility that is needed on
    the full panoply of the infrastructure associated with energy.
        Senator Kelly. And beyond even infrastructure, I just want
    to point out that it would benefit all of us if we could do a
    much better job sharing this information from the private
    sector to the public sector, so our law enforcement agencies,
    Department of Justice, FBI knows what is going on in the
    private sector. We were discussing this yesterday. How can we
    improve that flow of information? Often, you know, companies--
    and I understand their rationale for this--don't always want
    this information to get out there, so we need to explore
    options to maybe keep this somewhat private at some level. What
    we are discussing today is the information that goes from
    government to private industry. So we have got to do a better
    job. This is just going to continue, and in my view, accelerate
    and get worse.
        Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I want to submit just a couple
    of questions for the record to Dr. Verdon. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Quite all right. Without objection. Let me
    now recognize, via Webex, Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    to our witnesses. I want to talk a little bit about our NNSA
    facilities. We have mentioned this in several of our hearings.
    Most of these are over 40 years old. Some are more than 75
    years old that go back to the Manhattan Project. These
    facilities present numerous single points of failure.
        So to understand the gravity of the situation, I would like
    for each witness to provide a specific example of a potential
    consequence to the stability of the U.S. nuclear enterprise, if
    it must continue to rely on this aging infrastructure, and talk
    a little bit about how this is a budgetary issue, how this is a
    personnel issue, and how this a national security issue,
    because if any facilities experience operational shutdowns,
    warhead deliveries may be affected.
        So let's start with that and look at this deferred
    maintenance around these facilities, and talk about how you are
    going to deal with this in this budget. Secretary Granholm, we
    will start with you.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, thank you for the question,
    Senator, and I know Dr. Verdon can speak with great
    specificity, but I think your point about if we do not
    modernize, if we do not have the deterrent capability, then we
    put our Nation at risk. Bottom line. So we have to be able to
    modernize the warheads, and in order to do that we have to have
    facilities that will allow for that modernization to occur. So
    it is a national security issue, obviously.
        It is also, I would say, an opportunity for the U.S. to
    continue to build up its manufacturing backbone inside of the
    United States. So the issue that Senator Ernst began to raise,
    and I think Senator Tuberville, you were suggesting as well, is
    to bring and make sure that we have the capabilities for our
    own defense here in the United States without having to rely
    upon others.
        So from an economic point of view, from a national security
    point of view, we have to do this. It will require budgetary
    commitment--I know that was a third part of your question--and
    we want to make sure that we do this in a thoughtful and
    responsible way, to make sure that we meet the defense
    requirements, and do so in a way that manages, and are stewards
    of the taxpayer dollars as well.
        Dr. Verdon. I would just add that I agree with your
    statements. I think, you know, uranium processing facility at
    the Y-12 is one of the key examples of that, that we are trying
    to get, eventually be able to get programmatic work out of a
    70-year-old building that was built during the Manhattan
    Project, that we are critically dependent on now. That is the
    approach we have taken to our whole approach of replacing a lot
    of these old facilities is identifying what those are key, that
    if we were to lose them would really cause the strategic
    commander a great deal of difficulty operationally, and those
    are our priorities to focus. The uranium processing facility is
    one. The lithium processing facility proposed in starting to be
    designed at Y-12. There are a number of them that we have
    worked very hard to identify which one of those would really be
    instrumental to get done as quickly as possible, and that has
    been the focus of the program. Those that we can risk mitigate
    out longer--we have delayed them, just, you know, to make sure
    that we can, workload level as well as cash flow level.
        But your point is well taken. I agree with the Secretary
    that we are reaching--we have reached a tipping point. We have
    to do this. Otherwise there will be consequences to the
    operations.
        Senator Blackburn. Dr. Verdon, when you talk about
    scheduling modernization for the key secondaries group, and the
    capabilities that are there with enriched uranium, depleted
    uranium, lithium, how does this lack of attention to meeting
    the deferred maintenance backlog, what does that do and what
    kind of challenge does that present to the secondaries, not
    only in an economic manner but also with a personnel manner?
        Dr. Verdon. Again, what we tried very hard to do is we have
    prioritized the deferred maintenance we do. It is clearly
    applied to those facilities that are most important for
    workforce safety and programmatic deliverables. That is where
    we applied the money first.
        Then for a number of facilities, like at Y-12, which you
    mentioned for the secondaries, they have reached the point to
    where, again, we are working on replacing most of them because
    we recognize that, you know, affectionately we say something
    the paint is holding the building together.
        Senator Blackburn. Yeah.
        Dr. Verdon. Those are the ones that we prioritized to be
    replaced, effectively as a different approach to deferred
    maintenance, but we think it is the best approach, and for
    those other areas we have prioritized the work to the highest-
    priority buildings that we have on the sites.
        So again, that is the approach we have taken, driven by DOD
    deliverables and workforce and environmental safety.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Senator Blackburn, I assume you have
    concluded your comments?
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        Chairman Reed. With respect to that I will now recognize,
    via Webex, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
    Granholm and Administrator Verdon, I was really pleased to see
    in your written testimony you mentioned enhancing our
    cybersecurity across the nuclear enterprise, especially in the
    wake of the Colonial Pipeline hack, and the targeting of
    another contractor that works for the government's nuclear
    programs.
        I listened with great interest to your responses to Senator
    Kelly. But acknowledging that we are in an unclassified
    setting, do you feel confident about DOE and NNSA's capacity to
    handle the ever-growing cybersecurity threat from malicious
    actors and adversaries, and where are the areas where Congress
    can be helpful? I did hear you say you needed funding. I did
    not know if you need authorities. How is your ability to
    recruit and retain key personnel?
        Secretary Granholm. Thank you for the question, Senator. I
    think there is, right now, an administration effort on cyber,
    where we are reviewing all of this. But I will say that it is
    clear that there are gaps, not so much in our ability
    internally to respond, but in our ability to seek what is
    happening in the private sector.
        So this will be a question, and I am sure Congress will
    have to look at this, is there a way that the private sector
    can, for example, on the pipeline side, step up to allow
    themselves to allow the government to have some visibility into
    the system, since the public relies upon their system? Is there
    a requirement that would have Congress step in to say
    something, or is this something that could be incentivized on a
    voluntary basis? I think those are all worthy questions of
    exploring. But what is not acceptable, I think is the status
    quo. So penetrating the information flow from the private
    sector and encouraging that to us and to the intelligence
    community is a high priority.
        Senator Gillibrand. I agree that the status quo is
    unacceptable, and we are working on legislation within the
    Intelligence Committee to address visibility into the private
    sector, and least have mandatory reporting when private sector
    has some intrusion. So we are working on authorities, and this
    Committee will also be working on that to meet the needs, and I
    welcome your advice and guidance on that.
        Do you have the personnel that you need? We have talked a
    lot about getting the best and brightest cyber personnel for
    the entire services and intelligence services. We have debated
    issues of whether we need, for example, a cyber academy,
    similar to the service academies, where we can create civilian
    workforce through something like a service academy, and for 4
    years of your education you give back 4 years in the public
    sector, such as working at Department of Energy or working at
    NSA or CIA, or any other civilian branches that need the best
    and brightest in cyber. Is that something that you think would
    be useful for your ability to attract and retain some of the
    best talent, as opposed to having them go to the private sector
    immediately?
        Secretary Granholm. Yeah, I think we would welcome a pool
    of talented people. We are always trying to increase our
    science, technology, engineering, and math pipeline, and if
    there were a dedicated place where we could be able to ensure
    that we would have some of that talent, and perhaps even once
    they are in, recruit them for the long haul, that would be a
    terrific gift to the Nation.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. One further question. I see
    that there is some potential for artificial intelligence to
    help bolster the security of our nuclear weapons systems, but I
    also have significant concerns given our vulnerability. Again,
    acknowledging that this is an unclassified setting, what
    elements of our nuclear command, control, and communication,
    would you feel more comfortable potentially having AI play a
    role, and what elements do you believe should firmly remain
    within the control of human beings?
        Secretary Granholm. I am going to let Dr. Verdon respond to
    that.
        Dr. Verdon. Well, I think the bigger control, I think,
    would be the bigger NC3. That is really a DOD requirement, and
    they would be the ones that would have to answer that question
    in detail.
        With regards to ours and that kind of role, our
    requirements, we are taking a hard look at that, and it is a
    good question. We are taking a hard look at that, of how do we
    make sure that parts which have to stay in human control do so,
    and that which we can turn over to things like AI, we do, you
    know, do carefully. But I think the bigger question of the
    whole command and control that is really a DOD question for you
    to address.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you so much, both of
    you, for your service, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
    Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
    witnesses for being here. Dr. Verdon, if I could just start
    with you, I want to talk about the Kansas City National
    Security Campus, something we are very proud of, my home state
    of Missouri. Can you give us an update on the NNSA's efforts to
    ensure that the Kansas City campus has the capacity, the
    additional capacity it needs to meet production requirements in
    the coming years?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes, sir. So we are expanding the capacity, or
    the footprint, if you like, for manufacturing and developing.
    We are doing that right now through leasing, but in parallel we
    are starting to work on what a long-term vision would be, what
    would be the long-term commitment. So we are doing both. We are
    trying to address the near-term needs, and that will give us
    information about what size the long term may need to be, and
    then we are looking at options for a consolidated campus as we
    go forward into the future.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Secretary Granholm, let me ask
    you to weigh in here. I did want to ask specifically about the
    space that the campus needs, as well as more general support.
    So can you comment on that as well, making sure that the campus
    has the space that it is going to need?
        Secretary Granholm. Yeah. As Dr. Verdon said, they are
    looking at these short-term leases for the moment, but
    expanding to create one consolidated place makes sense, and
    supportive, obviously, of what the NNSA's needs are.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Dr. Verdon, the STRATCOM
    Commander testified earlier this year, this is the quote, ``The
    plutonium pit production is the biggest stockpile modernization
    issue.'' Can you confirm that the NSA is still on track to
    restore our ability to produce 80 plutonium pits per year by
    2030?
        Dr. Verdon. So we are, as we recently notified, we believe,
    based on all of the input we have now, and having the ability
    to work with the vendors and the construction, that we will not
    be able to achieve the 50 pits a year by 2030. We believe that
    the time frame for that will be somewhere in the range of 2032
    to 2035. That is the next step find out as to what that range
    would be.
        We started to have the detailed discussions with actually
    laying out the construction that was required, laying out the
    work with the vendors that supply the equipment, and we found
    that it did not look like it was possible to do it by 2030. So
    right now we have identified 2032 to 2035, and the next step is
    to fine-tune those dates.
        Senator Hawley. So we are looking at, I think you said 50,
    50 pits per year by 2032 to 2035?
        Dr. Verdon. So, sorry. But we are still very optimistic
    that we will achieve the 30 pits a year at Los Alamos by 2026.
    So that still is on target.
        Senator Hawley. But 50 pits a year, now you are hoping, in
    the 2032 to 2035 time range, is what you are saying.
        Let me ask you, in that context, about China. Madam
    Secretary, Admiral Richard has testified recently that China is
    well ahead of the pace to double their stockpile by the end of
    this decade. I can only say I think that those efforts are
    deeply, deeply concerning, and speaks to the need to modernize
    our own nuclear deterrent.
        Do you agree that plutonium pit production is absolutely
    foundational to our nuclear deterrent, and will you prioritize
    ensuring that we are able to stay on schedule? It sounds like
    the schedule is already slipping. Will you prioritize getting
    back on schedule to ensure our efforts to restore this key
    capability?
        Secretary Granholm. I do and I will.
        Senator Hawley. Very good. Dr. Verdon, the NNSA's budget
    request this year includes several increases in the Production
    Modernization Account, I noticed. Some of those increases
    relate to plutonium pit certification activities. Can you say
    something more about that, what those certification activities
    entail, and why you requested the increase?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes. So to build a pit is not just putting the
    equipment in. It is actually then having the laboratory that
    designs that pit, saying that what was built meets
    requirements. What is what we call certification. So it is
    those activities which involve, you know, small-scale testing,
    large-scale testing, to make sure that what the equipment and
    the people have built meets requirements and could be put into
    the stockpile. That is the certification effort.
        Senator Hawley. Got it. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. I understand that
    Senator Inhofe has no additional questions. I want to thank the
    witnesses, Secretary Granholm and Dr. Verdon, for your
    thoughtful and important testimony today, and with that I would
    call the hearing adjourned. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 10:27 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mark E. Kelly
                             nnsa future workforce
        1. Senator Kelly. Dr. Verdon, we're blessed to have world-class
    higher education programs in Arizona that are training the next
    generation of technology and security leaders. This pipeline is
    critical for our national security workforce, especially for agencies
    like NNSA, which are faced with the reality of an expert, yet aging,
    workforce. The fiscal year 2022 budget request includes $96 million for
    Academic Alliances, like the Minority Serving Institution Partnership
    Program, which the University of Arizona participates in today.
        How will investment in these and other programs help to recruit and
    retain the highly-technical talent we need to provide for America's
    nuclear security? How is NNSA actively seeking talent and partnering
    with universities across the Nation to develop the necessary talent for
    the future?
        Dr. Verdon. NNSA has implemented multiple university programs to
    develop, recruit, and retain high-quality individuals. Currently NNSA
    sponsors dozens of university programs designed to help meet current
    and future challenges in the nuclear security enterprise (NSE). The
    programs are strategically linked to succession-planning efforts to
    develop, recruit, and retain highly qualified and diverse talent across
    the NSE. Investment in these programs will help provide the next
    generation with opportunities to acquire the experience and expert
    judgment needed to sustain the NSE and provide valuable basic and
    applied research to NNSA's missions.
        NNSA actively seeks talent through partnering with academic
    institutions across the Nation including Minority Serving Institutions
    (MSIs). NNSA's Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program
    (MSIPP) and the related Tribal Education Partnership Program (TEPP)
    work directly with MSIs and National Laboratories and plants to build
    diverse and sustainable science, technology, engineering, and
    mathematics (STEM) career pipelines to prepare NNSA's next-generation
    technical workforce. MSIPP aligns investments in university capacity
    and workforce development with DOE/NNSA mission areas to develop the
    needed skills and talent for DOE/NNSA's enduring technical workforce
    and to enhance research and education capacity at MSIs. MSIPP builds a
    network of NSE-ready students through enrichment activities from K-12
    to the post-doctoral level. Through MSI-NSE lab/plant consortia
    partnerships, students are provided with internship opportunities
    across the NSE in direct alignment with their academic disciplines and
    exposed to cutting-edge research and activities in their relevant
    fields. The internships afford students the opportunity to make
    significant and immediate contributions to the enterprise.
        Capacity building through curriculum and infrastructure has led to
    the creation of new and advanced nuclear security enterprise related
    curricula. As a result of MSIPP, in fiscal year 2020 there were 485
    undergraduate and graduate college and university students supported
    through the program; 146 faculty professional development and 92 K-12
    outreach activities completed; 277 new MSIPP-type courses and labs;
    eight new degree programs and nine new program certificates; 600
    professional development activities; 162 student internships; and 20
    students were hired into the NSE. NNSA and NNSA's Management and
    Operation (M&Os) contractors are also sponsoring an MSIPP virtual
    career day fair on September 15th with 73 confirmed MSIPP institutions.
        A key MSIPP consortium is the Partnership for Proactive
    Cybersecurity Training (PACT), led by the University of Arizona. PACT
    addresses current and future cybersecurity research challenges, while
    educating and training a next generation of cybersecurity workforce.
    Cybersecurity is a critical area of interest for the enterprise and
    PACT provides an essential pipeline to help the NSE maintain that core
    cybersecurity capability. This is just one of 17 consortia that NNSA
    partners with to develop the necessary talent for the future.
        Another program, the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP),
    recruits, hires, and retains the next generation of talented, high-
    potential graduate-level professionals who will continue to contribute
    to the NNSA mission. NGFP has become a robust talent succession
    pipeline for the NSE, and Arizona State is one of our university
    partners helping to bring top talent into the enterprise. For over 25-
    years, the program has produced over 600 Federally sponsored graduates,
    and over 85 percent of alumni have accepted positions with ties to the
    national security sector. Since fiscal year 2015, 45 percent of the
    graduates (306 individuals) have accepted Federal employment with NNSA.
        The Stewardship Science Academic Alliances Program (SSAA)
    emphasizes academic research in technical areas of fundamental research
    and development that are relevant to NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship
    Program mission. The Centers of Excellence activities supported by SSAA
    maintain the pillars of technical peer expertise while individual
    investigator grants develop breadth in each field of research relevant
    to NNSA. Both provide students with training and development that align
    with the needs of the NSE. SSAA funding supports research at
    approximately 80 universities, including training of more than 350
    undergraduate, graduate students, and post-doctoral researchers each
    year. The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation University Consortia for
    Nuclear Nonproliferation program funds are awarded to three university
    consortia, with a fourth consortium focused on nuclear forensics
    planned for fiscal year 2022. The consortia are structured to encourage
    direct engagement of university students at NNSA laboratories for
    graduate research. Nearly 500 degrees, including 177 Ph.Ds., have been
    awarded through the consortia, resulting in more than 140 new career
    placements in the DOE/NNSA's national laboratories. These are just a
    few examples of how NNSA is actively seeking talent for the NSE.
                             nnsa future workforce
        2. Senator Kelly. Dr. Verdon, what challenges and obstacles does
    the organization face in recruiting the needed talent for NNSA to
    sustain and maintain America's nuclear arsenal and other critical
    activities?
        Dr. Verdon. Meeting NNSA's growing mission requirements mandates an
    aggressive, external hiring strategy. With a renewed focus on
    recruitment in multiple cities to support all program areas, NNSA has
    worked to close its staffing shortfall to meet mission growth and
    commitments. NNSA's expanding and challenging national security
    missions require it to recruit, train, and retain a highly skilled
    Federal employee workforce. Challenges the organization faces in
    recruiting the talent needed for NNSA to sustain and maintain America's
    nuclear arsenal and other critical activities include: 1) laboratory
    locations in areas that have high costs of living, are remote, or both;
    2) the need to compete with private industry and other government
    agencies for a limited pool of high-caliber talent; and 3) many NNSA
    positions require security clearances which can be lengthy and/or
    difficult to obtain for some elements of our civilian labor workforce.
          Based on OPM guidance, NNSA is allowed to provide
    recruitment and retention bonuses that would otherwise not be
    authorized, for two hard-to-fill NNSA locations: Livermore Field Office
    (LFO) in Northern California and Los Alamos Field Office (LAFO) just
    north of Albuquerque, New Mexico.
        Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is uniquely situated
    in the midst of the Nation's information technology hub, and the lure
    of working for a major technology entity for our workforce is very
    real. LFO leadership is constantly recruiting as Federal employees and
    contract partners are pulled away to the private sector with increased
    pay and exorbitant sign-on bonuses. Moreover, the high cost of living
    associated with residing in the local area of LLNL makes government
    employment less attractive.
        LAFO's recruitment and sustainment efforts are hampered by both the
    remoteness of the Lab's location and the high cost of living associated
    with the local area. The attractiveness of employment elsewhere -
    including at the Sandia National Laboratories and a competitive job
    market in the Albuquerque, NM metro area, just an hour and a half south
    of LANL, complicates recruitment and retention for LANL leadership.
          OPM has also identified three critical occupational
    series that are more challenging to recruit for: certified contracting
    professionals, information technology professionals, and cyber security
    professionals.
        NNSA's Office of Acquisition and Project Management requires a
    cadre of seasoned contract specialists with cradle-to-grave acquisition
    experience to assist with providing agile procurement solutions. The
    consistent need for contracting professionals across the whole-of-
    government and within the private sector has created a lack of
    available resources across the spectrum of employment opportunities.
        NNSA faces recruitment and retention challenges across the spectrum
    of the information technology and cyber security professions. These two
    occupational specialties are in demand across the Federal Government
    and within the private sector. NNSA competes with the whole-of-
    government for a limited pool of available IT and cyber security
    professionals, which impacts recruitment and retention in this critical
    occupational series.
                          nnsa technology investments
        3. Senator Kelly. Dr. Verdon, you have said that the fiscal year
    2022 budget request will enable the National Nuclear Security
    Administration's Office of Naval Reactors to advance new technologies
    and improve reactor performance. This innovation is part of what
    provides the U.S. Navy with an edge over our adversaries.
        What are some of NNSA's target areas for technology innovation in
    the upcoming fiscal year and can you expand on how this funding would
    support them?
        Dr. Verdon. Naval Reactors Development (NRD) funds the development
    of advances in the unique nuclear propulsion technical capability that
    the Navy relies on to operate, build, and maintain nuclear-powered
    ships. Included in this line is funding that enables the Naval Nuclear
    Propulsion Program to manage operations of the current fleet, perform
    analysis of current reactor performance, and support construction of
    nuclear-powered warships. The fiscal year 2022 budget request also
    increases investment in the research and development of new
    technologies, including those intended to support the Navy timeline for
    SSN(X). Investment in mid- to long-term advanced research and
    development has been deferred over the past decade to support major
    recapitalization efforts across the Program.
        The increase in NRD in fiscal year 2022 will support the following
    efforts:
          Performing cutting-edge research to develop new
    technologies and manufacturing methods that significantly improve the
    capability, effectiveness, performance, and cost of future naval
    nuclear propulsion plants to maintain our strategic maritime
    superiority. Examples include added focus on:
           Advanced instrumentation and control technology and
    equipment: Current digital control and power management equipment is
    becoming obsolete and will need to be replaced. Naval Reactors is
    working with commercial industry on replacements that take up less
    space, run cooler and with less power, enable more effective use of
    electrical power in the ship, are more secure against cyber-attack,
    costs less and can efficiently acquire and process a broad range of
    plant data.
           Plant Data and Automation: Advanced sensors, artificial
    intelligence, and data analytics are being pursued to automate current
    manual data collection, and process that data into information that
    gives the operator a clearer picture of plant status, with goals to
    simplify operation, enable confident condition-based maintenance,
    increase ship operational availability and ease the burden on our
    sailors.
           Core manufacturing development: Naval Reactors has
    started an effort to change how we manufacture reactor cores, with
    technology that promises to provide a more capable reactor for the next
    ship, while also allowing that reactor to be smaller and cost less. The
    new approach employs advanced, high precision robotics and machine
    learning methods for automated in-process inspection that can quickly
    find and correct potential production process issues much earlier than
    is possible today, reducing our fabrication costs and risks.
           Component manufacturing technologies: Naval Reactors
    sees practical potential for using certain advanced manufacturing
    approaches in building major plant components. These advanced
    capabilities include hot-isostatic pressing and metal additive
    manufacturing, and based on industry experience, promise to deliver
    propulsion plant components at reduced cost and schedule, in addition
    to enabling performance-enhancing designs with unique or complex
    geometries. These advanced manufacturing approaches can supplement, or
    in some cases replace, traditional forging and casting methods, some of
    which have changed little since WWII.
          Developing technology for reactor plant components that
    will provide substantial improvements in quieting capability and
    performance for future submarines. There is real potential to make a
    meaningful improvement to submarine stealth. Achieving an improvement
    involves work in reactor technology areas using existing specialized
    laboratory test facilities and state of the art flow and heat transfer
    computer methods, as well as targeted improvements to key reactor plant
    components.
          Recapitalizing facilities and equipment for inspecting
    and characterizing naval spent nuclear fuel; efforts that have the
    potential to provide increased operating capability of nuclear
    submarines and aircraft carriers.
                                   __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy H. Tuberville
                                 nuclear energy
        4. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, would you agree nuclear
    energy is essential to the long-term goal of plentiful power and carbon
    reduction? Please explain your answer in detail.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, I agree that nuclear energy is essential
    to the long-term goal of plentiful power and carbon reduction. To reach
    our ambitious goals of a 50 to 52 percent reduction in our carbon
    emissions in 2030, 100 percent clean electricity by 2035, and a net-
    zero economy by 2050, we will need to use every single clean energy
    tool available. Our existing nuclear power plants, as well as new
    advanced nuclear designs will play crucial roles in helping us meet
    these goals.
                                nuclear reactors
        5. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, please provide an
    overview of recent developments in advanced reactors, many of which are
    reincarnated from the heyday of nuclear design in the 1960s and 1970s.
    How many are being developed in the private sector?
        Secretary Granholm. Current innovative advanced reactor designs
    that are under development have the potential to offer significant
    benefits versus existing and past technologies, including possible
    lower costs, enhanced safety and security, greater resource
    utilization, and simpler operating regimes. The Office of Nuclear
    Energy's (NE) Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) program supports
    innovative reactor concepts including fast reactors, molten salt
    reactors (MSR), high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR), and
    microreactors.
        Fast Reactors can utilize many coolants including liquid sodium,
    liquid lead, gas, and molten salts. Recent advancements in fast reactor
    technology have focused on reducing capital costs, enhancing safety,
    and improving operational flexibility.
        Modular HTGRs under development today use low-enriched uranium and
    a relatively low-powered core to enable passive heat removal. This
    combination of fuel and core design prevents the core from melting even
    under the most severe accident conditions. It also allows the coolant
    to be safely heated to much higher temperatures suitable for supporting
    energy-intensive processes that currently rely on fossil fuels, such as
    hydrogen production, desalination, district heating, petroleum
    refining, and ammonia production. Over the past decade, the advanced
    gas reactor (AGR) program has refined fuel fabrication expertise and
    improved the fuel performance of tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) fuel
    for use in commercial HTGRs. TRISO fuel exhibits very low particle
    failure rates during irradiation, and remarkable durability under
    severe accident conditions. Additionally, advances in materials
    development and qualification, such as the recent qualification of
    Alloy 617, enables HTGRs to potentially support higher efficiency base-
    load electricity generation and broader cogeneration and high-
    temperature process heat markets. Alloy 617 can be deployed in reactor
    environments up to 954 degrees Celsius (C), which is an increase of 180
    degrees C over previously accepted alloys.
        Some recent MSR concepts are being designed to use chloride salts,
    which are more economical and readily available than salts used in
    early MSR designs. Early MSRs also were liquid fueled but a new MSR
    variant known as the Fluoride salt-cooled High Temperature Reactor
    (FHR) can utilize the robust solid TRISO fuel form being developed for
    high temperature reactors. Further, FHRs can operate at high
    temperatures and can potentially support higher efficiency electricity
    generation and process heat applications.
        Microreactors are a cross-cutting category of very small reactors
    that may utilize any of the coolants currently under development by
    advanced reactor designers and supported by NE. Microreactors offer
    unique features such as high energy reliability, simplicity of reactor
    control and safety design, factory fabrication, and transportability by
    truck, rail, or aircraft. These features may provide a reliable and
    economic power production alternative for remote, off-grid communities
    and may provide reliable, secure, and transportable power and process
    heat options for defense applications.
        Recognizing the promise of advanced reactor designs, dozens of
    United States companies are working on advanced nuclear reactor designs
    for a wide array of capabilities to meet the energy needs of the
    future.

        6.Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, is it possible for
    civilian reactors to potentially create more fuel than they consume?
    e.g., all fast-neutron reactors can technically be designed to operate
    as ``breeder'' reactors, and when using U-233, both fast and slow-
    neutron reactors can run as breeders.
        Secretary Granholm. Yes, fast reactors can be designed to breed
    fissile material in the reactor core and produce fissionable material
    when operated in conjunction with a reprocessing/recycling facility in
    a closed fuel cycle, as is done in some foreign fast reactor programs.
    As noted, when using uranium-233, both fast and slow-neutron reactors
    can breed fissile material. In all uranium and thorium fuels, new
    fissile isotopes are created in the reactor environment. Both existing
    and advanced reactors take advantage of this conversion and subsequent
    fissions that have the performance benefit of extending fuel burnup.
    The favorable neutron balance in fast reactors at high uranium loading
    can create fissile isotopes more quickly than they are consumed by
    fission. The rate of fissile isotope production is highly dependent on
    the reactor fuel loading, with flexibility to ``breed'' or burn the
    fissile inventory.
        Most U.S. advanced fast reactor concepts are being designed to be
    net consumers (burners) of fissile material. Fast burner reactors can
    be used to support waste management missions by consuming nuclear
    waste. However, the commercial infrastructure to support reprocessing/
    recycling does not exist in the United States today; hence, U.S. fast
    reactor developers are planning on a once-through fuel cycle supporting
    their reactors and are targeting high efficiency base-load electricity
    generation and process heat markets.

        7. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, one of the reactors that
    DOE has chosen for demonstration--the Natrium reactor design by GE-
    Hitachi and Terrapower--is a fast-neutron reactor. Do you believe it
    could produce more fuel than it consumes?
        Secretary Granholm. The Natrium reactor is a sodium fast-spectrum
    reactor (SFR) design. SFRs could be designed to breed fissile material
    in the reactor core and produce fissionable material when operated in
    conjunction with a reprocessing facility in a closed fuel cycle, as is
    done in some foreign SFR programs. However, due to a lack of commercial
    reprocessing infrastructure in the United States, the designers of the
    Natrium reactor decided to design Natrium to produce less fuel than it
    consumes and operate with an open fuel cycle.

        8. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, depending on the
    residence time of the fuel in the reactor and the nature of the
    chemical processing, any excess fuel produced by a reactor can
    potentially be weapons-grade material. What steps does the DOE foresee
    are necessary to ensure that we can adequately safeguard the
    production, storage, and movement of such nuclear fuel in a future
    where advanced reactors are more prevalent?
        Secretary Granholm. The Department is confident that the management
    of spent nuclear fuel from existing reactors and that expected from the
    proposed advanced reactors is and will be done in a responsible manner
    that protects the environment, the workers, and the public. Consistent
    with this, the Department understands that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission (NRC) ensures safeguards and security (S&S) of these
    reactors and their spent nuclear fuel by regulating licensees'
    accounting systems for nuclear materials and security programs. The
    Department further understands that NRC regulations require the
    licensee to maintain a nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A)
    program that tracks and verifies special nuclear material (SNM) that is
    on site. The MC&A regulations ensure that the information collected by
    the licensee about SNM is accurate, authentic, and sufficiently
    detailed to enable a licensee to maintain current knowledge of its SNM
    and manage its program for securing and protecting SNM. The MC&A
    program, together with physical protection of facilities and
    information security requirements, make up the primary elements of the
    NRC's SNM safeguards program. The NRC regulates light water reactors
    and has the responsibility to ensure advanced reactors are equally
    secure and protected as they are developed and deployed. The Department
    funds S&S research and development to ensure that improved technologies
    and approaches that strengthen safeguards and security are available to
    licensees, and to help implement them all to meet NRC requirements in
    the most efficient and cost-effective manner.
        The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as an
    intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in
    the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear power worldwide. The
    programs of the IAEA encourage the development of the peaceful
    applications of nuclear energy, science and technology, provide
    international safeguards against misuse of nuclear technology and
    nuclear materials, and promote nuclear safety and nuclear security
    standards and their implementation. The National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) announced the rollout of U.S. Nuclear Nexus
    (http://www.anl.gov/nuclear-nexus), a tool designed to foster timely
    connections between NNSA and the U.S. nuclear industry on the global
    deployment of advanced nuclear technology on August 17, 2021. Nexus
    will act as a single point of access for NNSA and DOE National
    Laboratory recommendations, training, tools, and other relevant
    technical expertise and guidance on nonproliferation.
                                 nuclear waste
        9. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Granholm, since the government
    already owns civilian nuclear waste, does it make sense for the Federal
    Government, or in other words, the American people, to own all nuclear
    fuel and by extension any fuel created inside reactors and create a
    leasing program whereby civilian reactors can acquire such fuel?
        Secretary Granholm. The Federal Government does not currently own
    the vast majority of the Nation's civilian spent nuclear fuel but
    instead is obligated to accept and dispose of such material pursuant to
    the Standard Contract that section 302(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy
    Act authorizes DOE to enter into with the owners of civilian reactors.
    Specifically, due to the lack of any viable existing disposal or
    storage options, DOE has been unable to take title to any spent nuclear
    fuel pursuant to the Standard Contract. However, assuming DOE were able
    to take title to civilian spent nuclear fuel, there are no existing or
    planned commercial reprocessing facilities in the U.S., which could
    extract enriched uranium and plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel for
    fabrication into usable nuclear fuel. Moreover, section 53 of the
    Atomic Energy Act of 1954 generally prohibits DOE from leasing special
    nuclear material, including nuclear fuel, to anyone who possesses or
    operates an NRC-licensed utilization facility, including a civilian
    reactor. In addition, as a general matter, section 3112 of the USEC
    Privatization Act imposes limits on the authority of DOE to provide
    source and special nuclear material, including nuclear fuel, to
    civilian reactors in competition with the commercial sector.
        DOE believes the commercial sector has the capacity and expertise
    to supply nuclear fuel to both the domestic and international markets
    and can better respond to market conditions than DOE. DOE is playing,
    and should continue to play, an important role in maintaining the
    viability and competitiveness of the American nuclear industry by
    supporting efforts to develop advanced nuclear fuel forms and improved
    technology for production, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication.

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