[Senate Hearing 117-817]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-817

                IMPLEMENTATION OF AVIATION SAFETY REFORM

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________


                            NOVEMBER 3, 2021

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation






                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]






                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

54-587 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2024











       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                   MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Ranking
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 ROY BLUNT, Missouri
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         TED CRUZ, Texas
GARY PETERS, Michigan                DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana                  MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  MIKE LEE, Utah
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado          SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West 
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia                 Virginia
                                     RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming

                 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
       George Greenwell, Policy Coordinator and Security Manager
                 John Keast, Republican Staff Director
            Crystal Tully, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel








                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on November 3, 2021.................................     1
Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................     1
    Letter dated May 13, 2021 from Ian Won, Aviation Safety, 
      Acting Manager, BASOO Branch, Aircraft Certification 
      Service, Federal Aviation Administration...................     2
    Letter dated August 19, 2021 from Ian Won, Aviation Safety, 
      Acting Manager, BASOO Branch, Aircraft Certification 
      Service, Federal Aviation Administration...................     6
    Letter dated October 19, 2021 to Hon. Pete Buttigieg, 
      Secretary, Department of Transportation, Stephen M. 
      Dickson, Administrator, and Bradley Mims, Deputy 
      Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration from the 
      families of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302..................    54
Statement of Senator Wicker......................................    10
Statement of Senator Tester......................................    20
Statement of Senator Fischer.....................................    21
Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................    23
    Memorandum dated September 16, 2021 from Earl Lawrence, 
      Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service.........    24
    Memorandum dated October 15, 2021 from Chris Rocheleau, 
      Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal 
      Aviation Administration....................................    25
Statement of Senator Blackburn...................................    32
Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    33
Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................    35
Statement of Senator Baldwin.....................................    36
Statement of Senator Moran.......................................    38
Statement of Senator Duckworth...................................    39
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................    41
Statement of Senator Warnock.....................................    43
Statement of Senator Thune.......................................    45
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................    47
Statement of Senator Sinema......................................    49
Statement of Senator Scott.......................................    50
Statement of Senator Rosen.......................................    52
Statement of Senator Markey......................................    53

                               Witnesses

Hon. Steve Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation 
  Administration.................................................    11
    Prepared statement...........................................    13

                                Appendix

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Steve Dickson by:
    Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    81
    Hon. Kyrsten Sinema..........................................    92
    Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................    93
    Hon. Tammy Duckworth.........................................    94
    Hon. Ben Ray Lujan...........................................    95
    Hon. Roger Wicker............................................    96
    Hon. John Thune..............................................    97
    Hon. Roy Blunt...............................................    98
    Hon. Shelley Moore Capito....................................   100
    Hon. Marsha Blackburn........................................   101









 
                IMPLEMENTATION OF AVIATION SAFETY REFORM

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria 
Cantwell, Chair of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cantwell [presiding], Klobuchar, 
Blumenthal, Markey, Peters, Tester, Sinema, Rosen, 
Hickenlooper, Warnock, Wicker, Blunt, Cruz, Fischer, Moran, 
Sullivan, Blackburn, and Scott.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

    The Chair. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation will come to order. We are having a hearing 
today on the implementation of our new aviation reform law, and 
want to welcome the honorable Steve Dickson, Administrator for 
the Federal Aviation Administration, for joining us today. I 
also want to take a moment to recognize the families who have 
lost loved ones who are with us today.
    Thank you so much for being here and for your continued 
oversight on this issue. I can't imagine the pain and suffering 
of your loss and the pain that you are still feeling. But I 
certainly want you to know we appreciate your vigilance on 
aviation safety reform. You have shaped the safety work of this 
committee, and with your support and critical input, the 
Committee played a leading role in drafting the Aircraft 
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act.
    This important legislation enacted into law almost a year 
ago, I believe, provided a big down payment on the direction 
that we need to go to implement safety reforms in the United 
States and to make us the gold standard around the world. That 
is why we are here today to have this hearing, to determine 
whether the Federal administration, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, has faithfully and vigorously executed the 
safety reform law in accordance with Congressional mandates for 
deadlines and action. I will be upfront with you, Mr. 
Administrator, about the purpose of this hearing. It is to find 
out whether you are upholding the spirit and the letter of this 
law.
    While not the only thing we need to do, the law that we 
implemented was a clear course correction. It said that we 
needed to have a stronger FAA oversight, the people in place to 
do that job, and to hold manufacturers accountable. Directing 
the FAA and making sure that that job is done is critical. 
While I know your communication to the Committee in your 
written testimony talks about a lot of the actions and 
requirements that were in the law, we also know that there is 
more to be done. I want to say that I am very appreciative of 
Ian Won at the Boeing Aviation Oversight Office, who on May 13 
issued a letter basically slowing down the 777X so that more 
information could be provided, needed to be provided for the 
oversight of that plane.
    [The letter referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    The Chair. I am a firm believer that engineers on the 
ground know their job. What is not clear to me is whether 
people are listening to them and whether the FAA has their 
back. I also want to enter into the record an August 19 letter 
from Mr. Won also, talking about the changes to the Boeing 
BASOO Office and things that needed to be done to make sure 
that they continue to have the oversights and objectives. He 
has been clear, we need more resources. He has been clear, we 
need the right people to do this job.
    [The letter referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    

    The Chair. So we need the FAA, as I said, to be that gold 
standard. When a Special Committee Review of Aviation 
Certification Process, the SCRACP, came back with a whitewash 
of what we needed to do, I was disappointed that you did not 
take more critique with that. In fact, basically--you testified 
before Congress, basically, the system is not broken. Well, 
there were parts that were broken, and they need to be fixed. 
So I look forward to your testimony, but reading it, I see more 
of the same. Now is not a time to mince words.
    Now is the time to provide the leadership that it takes to 
get the staffing, the oversight, and the direction that is 
required of an oversight agency to hold manufacturers 
accountable. Make no mistake, the manufacturer has its own 
responsibilities here, and we will also hold them accountable. 
We believe there is more to be done on certification, more to 
be done on the oversight and certification process so that we 
are not just creating check marks on a list that now we can say 
the list has its check marks.
    That is where we were with the MCAS system. In the end, it 
was the tragedy that we all know too well and are still living 
with. So I am very challenged by your testimony. We don't 
believe the FAA is prepared, on January 1 of 2022, to restore 
direct supervision and control over those manufacturing 
engineers and delegated authority because they--that process 
should have started sooner because it is a big oversight 
responsibility.
    I will have questions for you in the Q&A about that and the 
type of personnel that we need in all of these jobs. We don't 
believe the FAA has conducted the necessary workforce review 
for determining the staffing and experience of those levels. 
And the FAA has not taken steps necessary to limit the 
delegation of certification tax to industry until the FAA has 
verified all human factor assumptions. Restating the law's 
requirement in a two page memo is not what it takes to get that 
implemented. It might be a basic start, but where is proof of 
the implementation? And this level of reform is needed 
immediately.
    And the FAA has not fully implemented new requirements for 
applicants to disclose safety critical information like 
information related to flight control systems, so that the FAA 
can be aware and fully assess the impact of those proposed 
design changes and innovation technologies. Again, this went 
into the U.S. Code and was effective immediately, but the FAA 
expects to issue guidance in 2022. We don't have time to wait. 
We need that kind of oversight today.
    And the FAA has yet to complete the work of the Independent 
Expert Panel, which is supposed to be convened 30 days from 
enactment to provide timely advice on whether the FAA should 
formally rein in Boeing's ODA authority. I also would like to 
enter into the record a letter from the families who are 
actually calling for a pulling of that authority. I understand 
this--that there is a panel that is meeting now, but the 
process and procedures in place to review their actions and 
have it be transparent is critically important if we are going 
to get this right. So all of these safety issues are critical 
to all of us in America. It is critical to our families who fly 
on planes.
    It is critical to our economy. We need the leadership of 
the FAA to--not just before our hearing today. The complexity 
that got us to this situation is a lot of complexity of 
language. In reality, it has to be leadership of FAA in 
implementing the law. Now I will turn to my colleague, Senator 
Wicker, for his opening statement.

                STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cantwell, for convening 
this oversight hearing on aviation safety and the Federal 
Aviation Administration's implementation of ACSA, the Aircraft 
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act, which this 
committee shepherded through Congress and was signed into law 
at the end of last year.
    As we all know, a little more than 3 years ago, a Boeing 
737 MAX crashed in Indonesia. Approximately 5 months later, a 
second MAX aircraft crashed in Ethiopia. And I too want to 
recognize the families of the victims and tell them how much we 
appreciate their input over time. It is really hard to put into 
words our emotions in this regard. However, the Committee did 
produce bipartisan legislation to improve aviation safety based 
on recommendations from several experts and several expert 
groups that carefully examined these accidents and the 
development of the 737 MAX.
    We then worked on merging our bill with one that our 
colleagues in the House used. The result was that bicameral, 
bipartisan bill representing the most significant aviation 
safety legislation in recent history. I particularly want to 
applaud the work of the families of the victims in pressing to 
reform how the Federal Government oversees aviation safety, 
particularly the process of certifying aircraft design and 
production.
    We will continue, Senator Cantwell and I and the members of 
this committee, to press the FAA to implement the reforms in 
this law. Enacting legislation was an important first step. 
Now, the FAA and the industry must follow through with 
implementing new programs and requirements. And so I am pleased 
to welcome Administrator Dickson before us today. His agency 
has already taken a number of actions in response to the 
accidents as well as the new law, but there is still much more 
work ahead, as the Chair has just mentioned.
    Administrator Dickson should update us on the progress the 
FAA has made so far, and he should outline how he will ensure 
that the FAA follows through on the remaining work. I would 
also ask the Administrator to let us know if Congress needs to 
do more to ensure that the U.S. system remains the gold 
standard for aviation safety. Safety is a constant mission 
requiring the focus of the entire aviation community.
    We are fortunate that our Nation continues to have a truly 
remarkable aviation safety record. That high level of safety is 
the result of decades of lessons learned, as well as the 
dedication and hard work of safety professionals throughout the 
system. We cannot ever be complacent. We should always be 
working to improve aviation safety. So thank you, Madam Chair, 
and I thank the Administrator for being with us today.
    The Chair. Thank you, Senator Wicker. I failed to mention 
in my opening statement what great bipartisan work that 
legislation was and certainly appreciate the hard work of your 
staff and my staff and obviously our work with our House 
colleagues on getting that over the goal line.
    And so, so many members who are with us here this morning 
also had legislation that was included in that, so it really 
was a comprehensive list of issues that the Committee really, 
and I can say from what I know about the Senate, engaged in in 
a very deep way and I think that that will lead to a very deep 
oversight of its implementation. Administrator Dickson, 
welcome. We welcome you to make your opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE DICKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 
                    AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Chair Cantwell. And good morning, 
Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, and members of this 
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the FAA's 
approach to aviation safety oversight and our efforts to 
strengthen the aircraft certification process.
    Safety is a journey, not a destination. We are constantly 
evolving as a regulator and an air navigation services provider 
to deliver the safest and most efficient aerospace system in 
the world. That is our mission, and our entire workforce of 
nearly 45,000 Federal employees is singularly focused on 
achieving that mission. As the Head of the FAA, safety is my 
North Star. One of the first things I did as FAA Administrator 
was to make it clear that we are the regulator, and that 
included resetting our relationship with Boeing.
    I said that we would continue to exert a high level of 
scrutiny across the board, and we continue that scrutiny today. 
I have made it clear internally that we always do the right 
thing when it comes to safety and that I have the workforce's 
back. We are also asking ourselves the hard questions, and we 
are asking them of those that we regulate. When it comes to 
safety, we do not accept the status quo.
    This is why we embrace reform, and we are focused across 
the agency on continuous improvement. I will discuss a number 
of initiatives that we have underway and the work that we have 
completed to address this goal and to implement the Aircraft 
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act. But first, let me 
say to the families of the victims of the Ethiopian Airlines 
and Lion Air crashes that the FAA is committed to applying the 
lessons learned from these tragedies so that the aviation 
system here and around the world continues to improve.
    I want this committee to know that the FAA appreciates and 
respects the input and direction from Congress and that we 
remain fully committed to executing this legislation to make 
near and long term safety improvements that benefit the global 
aviation system. Now, the Act has more than 100 specific 
requirements that we are implementing to make aircraft 
certification and safety oversight more holistic, systematic, 
transparent, and effective.
    I can say with confidence that we are doing more for 
certification oversight, and we are doing it more 
systematically than we were this time last year. For one, we 
are delegating fewer responsibilities to manufacturers and 
demanding more transparency from them. At the same time, we are 
making use of their technical expertise as we prioritize our 
safety oversight functions. The FAA is also revising guidance 
and criteria that we use for determining significant 
modifications to an aircraft, so the proposed changes are 
evaluated from a whole aircraft system perspective and not just 
a single part.
    We are promoting the use of safety management systems, or 
SMS, internally and externally. With SMS, an organization 
actively searches for and identifies safety issues and then 
addresses the root cause. From my own experience, I know that 
SMS works, but only if there is buy-in from everyone at all 
levels of the organization, from the C-suite down to the person 
pushing the broom on the shop floor. At the FAA, that means 
when anyone at any level flags an issue, I have got their back. 
No questions asked.
    Because SMS works, we have not let the rulemaking process 
hinder manufacturers from using it now. Currently four design 
and manufacturing organizations including Boeing have 
voluntarily adopted SMS with six others in progress. As we 
know, human factors continues to be an important part of our 
work in evaluating aircraft and aircraft systems. We have 
expanded our evaluation of manufacturers assumptions about 
human factors that equipment manufacturers make when they 
perform system safety assessments, including pilot response 
times.
    The FAA has initiated rulemaking to update regulations and 
the guidance for conducting system safety assessments on 
transport category aircraft. And we have increased our research 
on automation, including potential overreliance on automated 
systems and loss of basic piloting skills. To support this 
increased emphasis on human factors, we have hired 14 human 
factor specialists in our aircraft certification flight 
standards organizations. We are actively expanding our 
portfolio of data collection and analytics tools so that we can 
more effectively share safety data within the FAA and among 
industry stakeholders and international partners. Data is key 
to the early identification of potential hazards and safety 
problems.
    Per the Act, we have a new contract with the Transportation 
Research Board that will help us discover emerging safety 
trends in aviation. Since aviation is a global system, the FAA 
is also working closely with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization and other international stakeholders to influence 
and adjust the maintenance and pilot training requirements for 
U.S. products operating under other civil aviation authorities.
    Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, and members of this 
committee, as you can see, the FAA is fully committed to a 
thorough and complete implementation of the Aircraft 
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act. We approach all 
of this work with humility and never take safety for granted.
    However, we are not just doing this work because you have 
directed us to do it. We are doing it because it is the right 
thing to do for aviation safety. It is our mission. That is 
what the public expects, and it is the standard that we have 
set for ourselves, and the agency will accept nothing less. 
Thank you again for your support and your direction, and I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Dickson follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, 
                    Federal Aviation Administration
    Good morning Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, and Members of 
the committee:

    Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss 
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approach to aviation safety 
oversight and our activities to implement changes to strengthen the 
aircraft certification process. Certifying aviation products is a 
critical aspect of the FAA's safety mission. We are committed to 
improving the certification process, including our oversight of 
functions delegated to aircraft designers and manufacturers. We have 
undertaken a number of initiatives to address this goal, as well as to 
comprehensively implement the requirements of the bipartisan Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (``Act'').
    Before we begin to discuss the specifics of certification reform 
implementation, on behalf of the United States Department of 
Transportation and everyone at the FAA, I would like to recognize, as 
we have before, the families of the victims of the Lion Air and 
Ethiopian Airlines accidents and extend our deepest sympathies and 
condolences to them. It has been 3 years since the Lion Air accident, 
and we have made significant progress on addressing the findings and 
recommendations that resulted from the numerous investigations and 
independent reviews of both accidents involving the Boeing 737 MAX. We 
will continue to prioritize our work to improve aviation safety to make 
sure this never happens again.
    As mentioned, our efforts to implement certification reform are 
well underway. I want to thank Congress for enacting this landmark 
aviation safety legislation and for this committee's continued 
leadership on aviation safety matters. The Act has more than one 
hundred unique requirements that we are implementing in a holistic, 
systematic, transparent, and efficient manner to improve aircraft 
certification and safety oversight. The FAA is working diligently to 
implement the requirements while also ensuring that we are approaching 
our efforts as systemically and effectively as possible. Specific 
agency actions taken to implement the requirements of the Act are 
discussed more fully below; however, I also wish to note that, in 
general, our approach to aircraft certification and safety oversight 
has changed. The FAA's relationship with manufacturers is evolving. We 
are prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and working to focus that 
oversight on safety critical areas. We are delegating fewer 
responsibilities and demanding more transparency from them, and 
evaluating key assumptions prior to delegating functions in certain 
areas. While we continue to value their technical expertise, we are 
also committed to enforcing the highest safety standards for the 
manufacturers that we regulate. Our work to fully implement the Act is 
still in the early stages, and we are carrying it out with the urgency 
that it requires. The discussion below provides an overview of some of 
our accomplishments to date.

   Safety Management Systems. To ensure a holistic and 
        proactive assessment and mitigation of hazards, and to support 
        further improvement in safety performance, we continue to work 
        with industry to increase transparency, strengthen risk 
        management practices, and improve feedback channels between 
        industry and the FAA. We believe that enhancing and promoting 
        the use of safety management systems (SMS)--where safety issues 
        are actively looked for and identified, and then the root cause 
        is addressed--is integral to achieving this objective, and we 
        have taken a number of steps toward increasing the use of SMS 
        in the design and manufacturing environment. As required by the 
        Act, we have initiated a rulemaking that contemplates requiring 
        aircraft manufacturers that hold both a type certificate and a 
        production certificate to adopt SMS, consistent with 
        international standards and practices.\1\ As part of this 
        rulemaking, we will also evaluate potential SMS requirements 
        for repair stations, certificate holders that conduct common 
        carriage operations under part 135, and certain air tour 
        operators under part 91.\2\ We also created guidance for the 
        development of voluntary SMS programs and are working closely 
        with industry to encourage participation in voluntary SMS 
        programs to further enhance safety across the entire aviation 
        system. Currently, four design and manufacturing organizations 
        have voluntarily adopted SMS with six others in progress. 
        Boeing also established an SMS under the FAA's Voluntary SMS 
        program as part of the settlement agreement. The voluntary 
        programs have enabled the FAA to gain valuable experience on 
        oversight of SMS for design and manufacturing organizations, 
        and the lessons learned will help inform FAA's SMS rulemaking 
        and policy development.
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    \1\ RIN 2120-AL60, Safety Management System (SMS) for Parts 21, 91, 
135 and 145 issued. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AL60
    \2\ The FAA is developing a final rule to require the use of SMS at 
airports certificated under Part 139. RIN 2120AJ38, Airport Safety 
Management System. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AJ38

   System Safety and Human Factors. We are working on several 
        initiatives to ensure system safety assessments and human 
        factors assumptions are incorporated into the FAA's aviation 
        safety policy and oversight. We have initiated a rulemaking to 
        standardize regulations and guidance for conducting system 
        safety assessments on transport category airplanes.\3\ In 
        addition, the expert safety review panel that we established 
        pursuant to the Act is meeting regularly to review the 
        assumptions relied upon in aircraft design and certification of 
        transport category aircraft--including assumptions regarding 
        pilot response times. We are also developing new guidance for 
        industry on the submission of safety critical information. 
        There are several interrelated provisions regarding human 
        factors and human systems integration. To address these, we 
        have taken a number of steps to strengthen the foundation of 
        aviation human factors safety research and to bolster the 
        technical expertise within the Aviation Safety (AVS) 
        organization. This includes developing a human factors 
        education and training program, doubling the number of human 
        factors staff within AVS, and realigning the hiring of 
        technical advisors with the necessary technical expertise 
        involved in critical safety decisions.
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    \3\ RIN 2120-AJ99, System Safety Assessments for transport category 
airplanes issued. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AJ99

   Global Collaboration. To further international harmonization 
        and collaboration with respect to aircraft type certification 
        and continued operational safety, the FAA established the 
        Changed Product Rule International Authority Working Group and 
        held the first meeting in July 2021. This working group will 
        develop recommendations for international policy and guidance 
        to ensure proposed changes to an aircraft are evaluated from an 
        integrated whole aircraft system perspective. The FAA is 
        working closely with the International Civil Aviation 
        Organization and other international stakeholders to influence 
        and adjust the maintenance and pilot training requirements for 
        U.S. products operating under the oversight of another civil 
        aviation authority. In addition, FAA representatives have 
        presented at and attended several webinars, work group 
        meetings, and seminars, including a presentation at the 2021 
        Zhuhai International Flight Training and Safety seminar on 
        topics of competency based pilot training and automation 
        dependency. The FAA plans to continue this global engagement 
        into the future, including seeking new opportunities to 
        collaborate with civil aviation authorities and other 
        international stakeholders to foster improvements in 
        international safety standards and practices for aircraft 
        design and certification, pilot training, and operational 
        safety management. Additionally, to fulfill the requirement to 
        ensure that pilot operational evaluations for aircraft type 
        certifications utilize pilots from air carriers that are 
        expected to operate such aircraft, the FAA has already begun to 
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        incorporate air carrier pilots into such evaluations.

   Data. We are actively expanding our oversight capabilities 
        by advancing data collection and analytics tools to share 
        safety data within the FAA and between industry stakeholders 
        and international partners. These efforts include technological 
        enhancements to the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and 
        Sharing system to integrate new data sources and methods for 
        safety analysis, which will improve data quality and 
        accessibility to support risk-based decision-making. In 
        addition, the FAA's new contract with the Transportation 
        Research Board, established pursuant to the Act in June 2021, 
        will aid the agency's effort to conduct annual analysis and 
        reporting on current and emerging safety trends in aviation. As 
        the aviation landscape continues to evolve, it will be 
        increasingly necessary to bolster the FAA's use of safety data 
        and collaboration with industry to identify potential hazards 
        and safety problems and to solve these problems before they 
        give rise to an accident or incident.

   Integration of Certification and Oversight. The Act requires 
        the FAA to convene an interdisciplinary integrated project team 
        upon the agency's receipt of every application for a new type 
        certificate for a transport category airplane. The FAA 
        previously commissioned the Integrated Program Management team 
        comprised of subject matter experts from Flight Standards and 
        the Aircraft Certification Service to assess current practices 
        and policies and make recommendations for improving FAA 
        oversight through the integration of design and operations. The 
        best practices identified from this process are being applied 
        to ongoing certification projects, and we intend to enhance the 
        current procedures to incorporate additional requirements 
        contained in the Act. The FAA is also revising our current 
        Technical Advisory Board (TAB) process to use the TAB in all 
        new and amended type certification projects. We anticipate 
        implementing this policy next spring. The Act also directs FAA 
        to establish an executive council to oversee the FAA Compliance 
        Program. This program provides a framework for how the agency 
        returns a regulated entity to compliance through comprehensive 
        safety data sharing between the FAA and regulated entities. 
        Pursuant to the Act's requirements, we established the FAA 
        Compliance Program Executive Council to monitor the operation 
        and effectiveness of the Compliance Program, and held the first 
        meeting in August 2021. We also updated the Compliance Program 
        order to reflect the implementation of the Executive Council 
        and the Compliance Program Steering Committee.\4\
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    \4\ Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Aviation 
Administration Compliance Program, Order 8000.373B, April 22, 2021, at 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_
Order_8000.373B.pdf.

   Culture of Safety and Excellence. The FAA is committed to 
        fostering a just safety culture, while providing transparency 
        to improve safety, operational excellence, and efficiency. 
        These efforts include promoting voluntary safety reporting, 
        increasing workforce competencies, and attracting talented 
        staff. In April 2021, we implemented the Voluntary Safety 
        Reporting Program (VSRP) to provide a mechanism for employees 
        to voluntarily report potential hazards and safety concerns 
        without fear of reprisal or other repercussions.\5\ Preliminary 
        data on VSRP usage indicates that employees are comfortable 
        using the system and they are regularly using it to raise 
        safety concerns. An added bonus of VSRP is that it promotes 
        collaboration between employees and management for proactively 
        addressing safety concerns and developing corrective action 
        recommendations. To assess the effectiveness of these efforts 
        and to meet the requirements of the Act, we will conduct annual 
        internal safety culture assessments that include surveys of AVS 
        employees in order to evaluate the safety culture and the 
        implementation of VSRP programs.
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    \5\ Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Safety Voluntary 
Safety Reporting Program, Order 800.375, February 02, 2021, at http://
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/VS_8000
.375.pdf.

   Accountability. A critical part of fostering a just safety 
        culture is ensuring that we hold our people to the highest 
        safety standards. In response to requirements in the Act, we 
        have taken a critical look at our own internal oversight 
        processes and taken steps to enhance accountability. This 
        includes re-designating the Office of Investigations to the new 
        Office of Investigations and Professional Responsibility and 
        establishing investigative processes that are based on best 
        practices identified from similar offices at other Federal 
        agencies and from the FAA's experience, expertise, and other 
        sources. Although our work is not yet done, we believe that 
        incorporating these best practices will improve the 
        effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the FAA's 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        investigative process.

   Delegation. The Act requires the FAA to institute extensive 
        and meaningful changes to the Organization Designation 
        Authorization (ODA) program and our oversight of that program. 
        To address these legislative requirements, we expect to 
        implement significant changes to our policies and procedures 
        for delegating certification authority to private entities. 
        These changes include policy requiring FAA approval of 
        individual ODA unit members for certain ODA types, and policy 
        aimed at preventing interference with ODA unit members in 
        performance of their duties. We are also standing up an expert 
        panel to conduct a review of ODAs for transport category 
        airplanes and make recommendations to the FAA based on that 
        review. Additionally, as required under the FAA Reauthorization 
        Act of 2018, we previously established the ODA Office to 
        provide oversight and to ensure consistency of the FAA's audit 
        functions under the ODA program. In April 2021, the FAA 
        realigned the ODA Office to report directly to the Associate 
        Administrator for Aviation Safety. This reporting structure 
        reflects the FAA's priority to oversee, standardize, and ensure 
        consistency in the ODA system, as well as to facilitate many of 
        the ODA reform requirements contained in the Act. To that end, 
        the ODA Office anticipates adding more employees in Fiscal Year 
        2022, and hiring has already begun. The additional staff will 
        allow the office to perform more outreach, identify best 
        practices, and implement measures to maintain consistent 
        oversight.

   Certification and Continued Operational Safety Processes. 
        Ensuring the safety of aviation products through certification 
        is an important function of the FAA, and we are continuously 
        taking steps to enhance the type certification process. This 
        includes revising guidance and criteria used for determining 
        significant changes to best ensure that proposed changes to an 
        aircraft are evaluated from a whole aircraft-level perspective, 
        including human interface elements. We have also commissioned 
        external reviews to evaluate our Transport Airplane Risk 
        Assessment Model and type certification process. To address the 
        Act's requirements to establish an appeal and issue resolution 
        processes for certification decisions, we are developing an 
        implementing order.

   Innovation. Aviation is incredibly dynamic, and it is 
        imperative for the FAA to take steps to accelerate and expand 
        the deployment of new technologies in order to reduce barriers 
        and actively promote innovation that enhances the safety and 
        efficiency of the National Airspace System. We recently 
        established and staffed the Center for Emerging Concepts and 
        Innovation to support certification of new aircraft and 
        technologies by providing preapplication engagement with 
        companies to identify a preliminary path to compliance. We are 
        also taking steps to foster enhanced coordination across the 
        FAA on emerging products and concepts.

    Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, I want to assure you, and 
each member of the committee, that the FAA is fully committed to 
thorough and complete implementation of the Aircraft Certification, 
Safety, and Accountability Act. As we continue this process, we remain 
committed to our transparent and accountable approach, which includes 
regular briefings on our progress with staff of the committees of 
jurisdiction, labor partners, industry stakeholders, and more. We will 
continue to assess our entire certification and oversight framework in 
light of past experience, industry growth, technological advancements, 
and innovation as we carry out our responsibilities for public safety. 
We approach all of this work with humility and do not take safety for 
granted. We are confident that we are making substantial and meaningful 
progress, and will continue to keep Congress apprised throughout this 
work.

    The Chair. Thank you, Administrator Dickson. On the bill 
itself, just I want to get to some basic yes and noes if I 
could. The legislation in our mind, in crafting it, was a clear 
stop of what we thought was a continuation toward more 
delegation and a return closer to the elements of what DER was. 
Do you agree, yes or no?
    Mr. Dickson. I would agree with that. Yes, we have 
restricted--we have limited the amount of delegation that we 
are doing, particularly in the case of Boeing, but we are 
looking at across the entire ODA system as well.
    The Chair. So would you answer these questions, has the FAA 
completed a workforce review recommended by the Department of 
Transportation IG in 2015 as it relates to your workforce 
needs?
    Mr. Dickson. We are in the process of completing that 
review in the context of the certification reform legislation. 
As I said, we have increased our number of human factors. 
Experts almost doubled our cadre there.
    We have done a review of our chief scientists and technical 
advisors and using them as well. But that review is ongoing, 
and I look forward to working with the Committee as it is 
completed because I think that we need to continue to make sure 
that that is a dynamic process.
    The Chair. Well we had a deadline for September 23, 2021, 
and certainly you could have written to Congress and said, we 
can't meet that deadline. But having a workforce that you know 
is the technical oversight necessary to do the reviews we think 
is step number one.
    And when we look at the lack of technical oversight on 
certain issues in a changing dynamic aviation market, this is 
really problematic. And I think in Mr. Won's letter, he is 
basically talking about the fact that 53 people in an oversight 
office of 1,500 people on such the scale of aviation 
manufacturing is not enough. Would you agree?
    Mr. Dickson. We have increased our number of engineers in 
the BASOO, and our engineers on the production line as well. 
And we will continue to evaluate all of that going forward.
    The Chair. This is the language I don't like, OK. We had a 
deadline. We would have loved to see an assessment of the 
workforce, something that would have said to Congress, here is 
where we think we are coming up short, here is what we think we 
need to do. So today, just like all the other IG reports, 
everything else, the comments back from the FAA are, we are 
working on this. We want to get on the same page about needs. 
We are about to go into our appropriation process.
    And even though we have authorized various things in the 
past, we have appropriators who end up cutting these very 
necessary functions for the FAA to do a good oversight role. 
But if we just say for a deadline of September 23 of this year, 
we are continuing to work on it in the future, it hasn't given 
us the ability to hold you accountable, and that is what we are 
going to do. We have to do that because we need this system to 
work effectively for everybody, for safety and for economics.
    So I want to get to, because my time is going to wind down 
here, the critical safety functions. And this was something our 
House colleagues worked on as well and put in civil penalties 
for violation of disclosure of this information. And what--I 
guess what I am saying is your process right now is following a 
tab process.
    You know, the same process of oversight and collection by 
individuals that led us to the MCAS system. That group didn't 
catch MCAS. And what we have written into law is that we want 
an integrated system, if you will. Some people call it 
graybeards.
    And we want those people at the beginning of the process. 
We want them reviewing the critical information and determining 
whether more oversight needs to be done. So do you think that 
your tab process is a fulfillment of the law?
    Mr. Dickson. We are adapting the tab process to comport 
with the legislation. So it is a good starting point, but this 
integrated project team that you are referring to is definitely 
a part of what we are doing going forward and how we are 
organizing ourselves, both for future certification projects 
and for projects that are ongoing now.
    The Chair. But we have a certification going on right now.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    The Chair. So why wouldn't you have made a big priority 
setting up a critical information certification team now for 
the ongoing certification project? The reason I am bringing 
this up is, again, we have seen two instances here.
    We are going to issue a report from whistleblowers before 
the end of the year. And what we are hearing from 
whistleblowers is the same that we have heard from the IG and 
others, and that is that line engineers had early warnings, 
whether it is the 787 battery issue or whether it was this 
issue related to synthetic air speeds or the complexity of 
automation and overload of pilots in the system.
    But those line engineers weren't listened to, and that is 
why we want this critical information system integrated, set up 
immediately.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, ma'am. And the voluntary safety reporting 
program that we have had in place is one mechanism. But the 
integrated program reviews are ongoing now. And that will be a 
big part of both existing projects and the new certification 
projects again going forward.
    The Chair. I will come back to this, but I want to go to my 
colleagues. But I just want you to know I am not going to allow 
the law to be skirted here. This issue is about whether you are 
going to follow a process that allows us to see the work of the 
FAA, see that it is completed, and not just hear it is ongoing. 
Thank you. Senator Wicker.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Mr. 
Administrator, let me start off with safety management systems. 
You mentioned voluntary adoption of these. Can you give us the 
manufacturers who are engaged in that and making progress in 
voluntary as SMSs?
    Mr. Dickson. We have currently among the transport 
category, airframers, and engines, we have Boeing, Pratt and 
Whitney, and General Electric. And I would have to look, I 
believe Gulfstream is in there as well. And then there are a 
number of others in work.
    Senator Wicker. A number of others?
    Mr. Dickson. Another--a number of other manufacturers. Six 
in the pipeline that we have not fully accepted.
    Senator Wicker. OK, well, then supply us with those names 
on the record. There is supposed to be a notice of proposed 
rulemaking with regard to the mandatory SMSs. When will that 
notice of proposed rulemaking be issued?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, we are making good progress on the 
SMS rulemaking. I anticipate that it will be, the NPRM will be 
next fall, about less than a year from now. And then we will 
have it out for public comment. And then we will proceed on 
from there.
    Senator Wicker. Why that long?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, there is a lot of work that has to be 
done to justify the rule. And we are learning from the 
implementation of the voluntary programs that are out there now 
and to make sure that we get it set up correctly and that we 
are able to adjudicate all the public comments that we know 
will come in.
    We are using that time to make sure that we have got a 
strong and sustainable SMS for manufacturers and for other 
segments of the aviation community as well.
    Senator Wicker. Let me ask one question that I just have to 
ask. It doesn't deal with implementation of the statute, but it 
does deal with safety. And that is the individuals we may lose 
from the workforce, because they simply do not intend to comply 
with President Biden's executive orders that require all 
Federal employees and Federal contractors to receive the COVID-
19 vaccine. It seems to me that there are going to be a large 
number of individuals who will just lose their job, leave the 
workforce rather than comply with this.
    Could you address what impact this vaccine mandate may have 
on your safety workforce?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator Wicker, my focus is on safety 
and on running the safest and most efficient aerospace system 
in the world. And we have dealt with challenges throughout the 
COVID 19 pandemic, and we will make sure that we continue to 
operate safely, and that we manage our workforce appropriately 
well. And I certainly wanted everyone to----
    Senator Wicker. You are going to need numbers, Mr. 
Administrator, to do that. Do you expect a significant drop in 
the workforce from Americans who just are not going to be told 
what they have to inject into their own bodies?
    Mr. Dickson. We are focused on complying with the executive 
order by November 22 within the agency. And I do not expect to 
lose a significant portion of our workforce. We will make sure 
that we are able to satisfy our safety mission.
    Senator Wicker. Based on what information do you estimate 
that you will not lose a significant portion of the workforce?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, we, you know, the requirement is 
there. We are working with our employees as we have throughout 
the pandemic to make sure they are supported, and they have all 
the information that they need to make to make the best 
possible decisions. We have a very well-established process 
within the agency for handling our people.
    Senator Wicker. Let's be mindful of that. With regard to 
the international engagement, how are the bilateral agreements 
working? And is there anything we need to do at the 
Congressional level to help you?
    Mr. Dickson. The bilateral agreements are working well but 
they do require constant engagement.
    With respect to Europe in particular, my counterpart over 
at the Director General of Transport over in Europe and I held 
a bilateral summit on aviation safety in June to reinforce the 
importance and the alignment between the U.S. and the EU on 
aviation safety issues. As a matter of fact, I saw him again 
last week in Bogota and we will--we have continued that dialog 
and we will make sure that there is consistency and alignment 
across all the aspects of the bilateral agreement.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    The Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Administrator, this 
is exactly your answer on SMS. Is exactly what I am talking 
about in skirting the law. It has been long known that we need 
to implement a mandatory SMS system.
    So a voluntary system is not enough. The DOT IG found 
recently on October 21, 2021, the FAA oversight over SMS was 
not effective. So I think my colleague's questions here are not 
about whether you can do a voluntary system.
    Again, when there is an oversight of a true SMS system 
required by an Administrative Procedures Act overseen by the 
FAA, you will be seen as how you hold them accountable, and we 
will be able to review that. Anything less is not meeting the 
letter of the law. Senator Tester.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JON TESTER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA

    Senator Tester. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member 
Wicker for holding this hearing. Thank you for being here too--
and for your testimony. I am going to start with a kind of 
leading off where Senator Wicker was, except it deals with air 
traffic control towers. We have had a hard time of Montana, we 
have had a hard time getting those fully staffed under the best 
of circumstances.
    And so the question becomes, do you anticipate losing any 
air traffic controllers once a mandate takes effect? And what 
are you doing to make sure that we have enough traffic 
controllers in our towers?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Senator 
Tester. And as I said a moment ago, you know, we have dealt 
with people issues throughout the pandemic. Safety and health 
of my workforce is at the top of the list in terms of being 
able to serve the public and our air traffic control 
operations.
    I do not anticipate--you know, there is certainly 
potentially progressive discipline in the process, if we get to 
that point. But at this point, I do not anticipate--I am not 
hearing about any particular issues with respect to air traffic 
controllers staffing, but it is something we are focused on on 
a daily basis.
    Senator Tester. So do you have what percentage of air 
traffic controllers are vaccinated right now?
    Mr. Dickson. The data is incomplete. The requirement for 
the controllers to a test is a very manual process and the 
reporting is uneven around the system. So I don't have an 
accurate metric to share at this point.
    Senator Tester. So that is a problem. And it is a problem--
I don't know, it is a bigger problem if you don't know it and 
that you don't know what the exposure is here, if you don't 
know how many people are not vaccinated. Does that makes sense 
to you?
    Mr. Dickson. That is correct, yes.
    Senator Tester. So what--are you doing anything special 
that has been effective in encouraging folks to get vaccinated?
    Mr. Dickson. We are. We are conducting--we are working very 
closely with our labor partners to encourage--we are 
encouraging broadly. The Secretary and I are sending regular 
updates and encouraging the workforce to do the right thing and 
get their vaccines. And we will continue to do that on down to 
the individual basis.
    Senator Tester. Yes, it is a concern. I think it will be a 
real train wreck if you are not on top of it. I want to talk 
about an annual safety culture survey that is required hasn't 
been done yet, and there was one put out in August 2020. At 
least--yes, a safety culture assessment report.
    That August 2020 report had some pretty alarming statistics 
in it, 49 percent FAA employees indicated they believe that 
safety concerns or instances will not be addressed. 43 
percent--this was in August of last year. 43 percent believe 
the FAA delegates too many certification activities to the 
industry. 34 percent, the employees said the fear of 
retribution is one of the reasons employees don't report safety 
issues.
    So we are a year later now, and we don't have that annual 
safety culture survey. When can we expect it?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, the safety culture survey was done as 
a baseline as we set up the Voluntary Safety Reporting Program, 
and that started in April, and we wanted to let that run for a 
period of time. So we will be doing the survey in a--within the 
next few months and then renew it on an annual basis going 
forward. But that--this really gave us a good baseline for 
where we are starting from.
    Senator Tester. Yes, so I think it is required by law 
that--in fact, if you want to go attorney on you, Section 132 
of the ACSAA requires it.
    Mr. Dickson. And we will be conducting it on an annual 
basis. That is correct.
    Senator Tester. But shouldn't it have been done by now?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we--there is going to be some--it will 
be more beneficial to do it with the voluntary safety reporting 
program that we put in place, which is extremely important in 
terms of driving this kind of transparency and openness that I 
want and will give us a better baseline on how we are doing 
with that program.
    Senator Tester. This--not unlike the previous question, 
this leads me to it--I mean, if you are not serving as 
mandated, then how can the FAA inform us and the public that 
the culture is improving?
    Mr. Dickson. We are surveying, Senator. We are going to 
conduct that survey and we will be doing it on an annual basis.
    Senator Tester. Alright. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    The Chair. Senator Fischer.

                STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator, it 
has been a little over 10 months since the Aviation 
Certification, Standards and Accountability Act was signed into 
law, and I was proud to support that legislation that also 
included key reforms to the aircraft certification process. 
When does the FAA hope to achieve full implementation of those 
reforms?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we are working on those very 
aggressively now. We have achieved currently 15 out of 19 of 
the time limited items, but there are others--this work will go 
on for some period of time with the SMS rulemaking and the 
surveys that we just talked about.
    So there will be a continuous improvement process as we go 
forward.
    Senator Fischer. So you really don't see an end date 
because you plan on those other four areas to have a continuous 
process--?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, the other four areas--one of the four 
areas was the expert panel for review of Transport Category 
ODA, and that required some work with our labor partners. That 
took a couple of months.
    And then we had to determine, we had to put a solicitation 
out for industry participants to comport with the requirements 
in the law. And that kind of work is ongoing. It takes a while 
to do that right. But we are fully committed to doing it and we 
will see the results of that work here very soon.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you. The Act also directs the FAA to 
develop a better understanding of the human factors when 
certifying aircraft, and the bill specifically requires the FAA 
to account for pilots of all skill levels, both international 
and domestic pilots. What countries are you working with to 
better understand the pilot skills that we see across the 
globe?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we are working through multiple 
countries. We start with the states of design for transport 
category aircraft, particularly Europe, Brazil, and Canada, and 
the U.S. but we go beyond that. We work through ICAO. We 
spearheaded----
    Senator Fischer. Which is?
    Mr. Dickson. The International Civil Aviation Organization. 
And we spearheaded the set-up of a pilot training and licensing 
panel. We also worked bilaterally and regionally with our 
aviation safety counterparts around the world.
    As I said a few minutes ago, I was in Bogota, Colombia, 
working with the Latin American regulators, bilaterals with 
several Latin American regulators last week and talking about 
the work that we are doing on things like manual flying skills, 
flight path management training, and also we will, in the 
certification process, we will require going forward, as we did 
with the 737 MAX, the use of international pilots of various 
experience levels and training backgrounds to help with the 
validation of the operational testing on the aircraft as well.
    Senator Fischer. Has cooperation been good when you are 
working with these other countries? And I guess, what have you 
learned from them?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, there are--I think the important thing 
is that we are leading the efforts on flight path management 
and use of automation property, use of automation, manual 
flying skills. I think around the world, some of these issues 
have not gotten the attention that they need.
    Senator Fischer. What issues?
    Mr. Dickson. The issues around manual flying skills, and 
also information management in the cockpit. You know, when you 
think about it, use of iPads, you know, on the flight deck or 
electronic charting, the way that individuals process 
information on the flight deck, all of that has changed in 
recent years.
    And so it is very important that pilots are able to 
maintain situational awareness on their energy state and on the 
flight path of the aircraft. And that is what we are working on 
to make sure that we promulgate those issues with regulators 
around the world.
    Senator Fischer. OK. During your last appearance before the 
Committee, I asked you if you had concerns about the pilot 
reliance on automation, and you said, ``automation is a 
benefit, but the individual still has to be engaged with the 
machine.''
    So when you are working with the international partners to 
establish those training standards, are you comfortable with 
where we are headed and especially with regards to the 
automated system? Are the pilots feeling comfortable about 
that?
    Mr. Dickson. Flight path management is a--is at the core of 
the concern that I have. And as a matter of fact, we are--we 
have in draft and we have for public review shortly, a new 
advisory circular that our chief scientist for human factors 
has been working with the aviation community on for several 
years.
    And it will address guidance material and potential 
application to air carrier training programs for flight path 
management, which is knowing what your clearance is, putting 
the airplane there, and then monitoring it to make sure that it 
stays there. Also, manual flying skills and information 
management that I was talking about before.
    So all of these are extremely important to maintain the 
situational awareness around the aircraft. And we will use this 
at ICAO, but we will also help regulators around the world 
implement these principles into their oversight and I think for 
training programs as well. And that will be an effort that we 
will undertake here in the coming years.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    The Chair. Yes, thank you. Senator Blumenthal.

             STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator 
Dickson, when the Department of Transportation Office of 
Inspector General investigated the 737 MAX, it found that the 
FAA had increasingly delegated to Boeing the assessment of 
flight controls and stabilizer plans. Part of what we did in 
response was to seek to end that delegation and improve the 
certification processes.
    I am of a mind that we need to do more. The 737 was 
certified in the 1960s, but Boeing was able to gain approval 
for its MAX aircraft under an amendment to an over 50 year old 
type certificate. And in response to the new law, the FAA 
waited until September 16, 2021, to issue a one page policy 
memo limiting delegation, which was one of the root causes of 
issues found by the Inspector General.
    Senator Blumenthal. Section 106 of the law was immediately 
effective on December 27, 2020, so there was a clear lag 
between that December passage of the law and the implementation 
of this one page delegation. And what accounted for the delay?
    [The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    Mr. Dickson. Senator, we have used various mechanisms to 
implement the provisions of the law as quickly and most 
expeditiously as we possibly can while we go through the formal 
process of developing orders.
    And the direction to restrict delegation without validation 
of the assumptions for critical system design features actually 
was in place very early in 2021. So I will have check on the 
timing that you are referring to.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, the timing of that many months, I 
think, is symptomatic of broader problems in terms of prompt 
response to new laws and issue rules and undertaking 
rulemaking, and a number of my colleagues already highlighted 
that problem in other areas. Which brings me to the October 20, 
2021, Inspector General report finding that the FAA's oversight 
of American Airlines was not as rigorous or robust as it should 
have been.
    The report states the FAA, ``lacks effective oversight 
controls,'' to make sure that American is addressing the root 
causes of problems that they fix. What is the FAA going to do 
in response?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, thank you for the question. Our 
oversight, our internal processes also identified these issues, 
and we do need, and we have--we are putting in place 
mechanisms, for example, for professional development of our 
inspectors so that they can do more effective root cause 
analysis, which is part of that oversight for safety management 
system.
    So we concurred with most of those recommendations, and we 
already have plans underway to address them and close those 
gaps.
    Senator Blumenthal. What is the timeline for fulfilling 
those plans?
    Mr. Dickson. I would have to get back to you specifically. 
But much of that work is already underway.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you about a similar issue. 
The original 737, as I mentioned, was certified in the 1960s. I 
continue to have concerns about the process of modifying the 
aircraft without a full and robust certification that takes 
into account the impact of the modifications on the functioning 
of the entire system. Do you share those concerns?
    Mr. Dickson. We--as required by the legislation and also 
the various reviews and investigations, we are examining 
changes to the criteria for what would require a new type 
certificate.
    We want to balance that with beneficial safety improvements 
during a product service life. We don't want to--we want safety 
improvements to come to the fore, but we need some criteria on 
that. And so we are--we have commissioned a mitre to look at 
the criteria for making those decisions, and we are also 
working with our international partners. We began meeting with 
them in July.
    We chartered the International Authority Change Product 
Rule Working Group that is meeting on a regular basis to make 
sure that these rules are harmonized around the world, 
regardless of manufacturer.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I look forward to hearing 
more about what you are doing on all these issues. Thank you, 
Madam Chair.
    The Chair. Senator Blackburn.

              STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Administrator 
Dickson, thank you so much for coming back before us today. The 
FAA issued a safety alert on 5G interference to aircraft, and I 
want to talk with you about that because according to Bloomberg 
Government, the agency stated that and I am quoting, ``action 
might be required to address potential interference with 
sensitive aircraft electronics.''
    And it is my understanding that there are 39 countries that 
are currently using the C-band spectrum for 5G services without 
any interference to aviation. So are you taking this evidence 
into consideration?
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Senator. It is--and I appreciate 
the question. First of all, my focus is on aviation safety, and 
I need to make sure that the safety of the public is protected. 
But I will tell you in no uncertain terms that 5G in this 
spectrum and aviation, particularly radio altimeters, are the 
primary concern. They can coexist. And we are working very 
closely with the FCC. We have had recent engagement with the 
telecom companies. And we will figure this out so that 5G and 
aviation safety can coexist.
    Senator Blackburn. OK. Well, in Europe, you have got two 
dozen countries that have been using 5G for 3 years, including 
in the same spectrum band planned to be used here in the U.S. 
They have had zero adverse occurrences and zero claims of 
interference. So how are you working with them to ensure that 
there are no issues and that you are learning from their 
experience and maybe even adopting some of their best 
practices?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, it is a great question. The use 
of that spectrum in terms of power levels and specific 
deployment locations is different in different parts of the 
world. So it is a bit of an apples to oranges comparison. But 
the standard setting bodies, RTCA in the U.S. and EUROCA in 
Europe are both looking very closely at these issues.
    And I do anticipate there will be some modifications 
eventually over time that will need to occur to some of these 
avionics. But in the short term, again, we are working very 
closely with the telecom industry and the FCC to make sure that 
again the 5G deployment can occur, but that it can be done 
without an adverse impact to aviation safety.
    Senator Blackburn. Well, and I would think that there are 
plenty of lessons that you can learn from Europe since they are 
using the same band. Is that correct?
    Mr. Dickson. That is correct. Europe, Japan, others. And 
again, all of these deployments are somewhat different than 
what is planned in the U.S., but we are certainly learning from 
each one.
    Senator Blackburn. Very good. OK. In your testimony, you 
noted that, and I am quoting now, ``it is imperative for the 
FAA to take steps to accelerate and expand the deployment of 
new technologies in order to reduce barriers and actively 
promote innovation.'' So I want you to elaborate on this. What 
specific steps are you taking to reduce barriers and promote 
innovation within the FAA?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I think a good example is our AUS 
Office. It works across--which does our drone integration. As 
you know, we have the rulemaking them around remote 
identification. We have engaged the industry on the next step 
in that rulemaking, which is beyond visual line of sight.
    But what we need to do is work across the various lines of 
business. In other words, air traffic, aviation safety, 
airports, maybe even commercial space. And that is an 
enterprise approach that, across disciplines, that has not been 
as necessary with traditional manned aviation.
    And so we are really taking a data driven enterprise 
approach and our AUS Office will help us do that in terms of 
breaking down those barriers between disciplines at the FAA.
    Senator Blackburn. Excellent. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chair. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.

               STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

    Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and 
thank you for holding this important hearing. Thank you for 
being here. I also wanted to express my sympathies and 
appreciation to Nadia and Michael Stumo, who are here with us 
today. They lost their daughter, as we know, Sammy Rose, in the 
crash in Ethiopia. We also lost a Minnesotan in that crash, and 
I want to acknowledge him as well, Codd Hussein from St. Cloud, 
Minnesota.
    I am glad that we passed this bill. It was really, really 
important to pass this bill, and I want to thank the chairwoman 
for her leadership. But now we have to make sure it gets 
implemented. That is always the trick. We can pass whatever 
bills we want, but we want to make sure that it gets done.
    Mr. Dickson, in your testimony, you highlighted a voluntary 
safety management system for manufacturers, and I know that you 
noted that several manufacturers, I think you said four, are 
voluntarily adopting SMS. Does the FAA have plans to make SMS 
mandatory for manufacturers?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. We have rulemaking underway, and 
we expect the NPRM to be out for public comment next year.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. And when do you think that will get 
done?
    Mr. Dickson. It will depend on the administrative process 
associated with rulemaking. But we are learning a lot from the 
programs that we have out there now. SMS has been very 
successful in the air carrier community and applying it to 
manufacturers is a somewhat different paradigm.
    And so we are using that data and interaction and the 
oversight that SMS enables to make sure that we get the best 
possible initial proposed rule out there.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. I will ask another question on the 
record, but I know that Senator Cantwell asked about workforce 
and how important it is to have a qualified people to do that. 
I will ask you that on the record.
    What steps has the FAA taken to establish international 
safety standards for foreign pilots? And how will you ensure 
that pilots and airlines are complying with those standards?
    Mr. Dickson. It is a great question. We have spearheaded 
the implementation of a pilot training and licensing panel at 
the International Civil Aviation Organization. We did that 
about 2 years ago.
    The FAA chief scientist for human factors is providing 
leadership as well as one of our top training subject matter 
experts, and that group continues to work to this day. But we 
also take what we have done in the U.S. with upset prevention 
and recovery training, which is required for U.S. carriers now, 
and then we are promulgating that around the world.
    And as I said, I had several bilaterals with my Latin 
American counterparts last week. We will work with them to help 
them implement the kinds of beneficial training improvements 
that we undertake in the U.S.
    Senator Klobuchar. Do you have a timetable for that?
    Mr. Dickson. It will be ongoing work. The next--I think the 
next significant step is at the ICAO assembly, which is coming 
up next August, and that will--but there will be work that will 
be ongoing between now and then.
    Senator Klobuchar. In your testimony, you noted plans to 
update FAA policies in order to prevent fraud in the self-
certification process. How can we trust that the updated self-
certification process will not lead to cost saving shortcuts 
that endanger passengers?
    Mr. Dickson. I have made--Senator, I have made it very 
clear from day one that safety cannot be compromised. It has to 
be our top priority. And we have to make sure both within the 
agency and those that we oversee, that business pressures, 
production pressures, operational pressures do not overcome 
safety.
    And so that is what we are all about, making sure that we 
use the information that we get from our workforce and that 
they do the same thing to drive beneficial transparency and 
safety improvements.
    Senator Klobuchar. Do you agree this is a bill--I believe 
the Safe Skies Act, but do you believe the cargo pilot should 
operate under the same fatigue rules as commercial airline 
pilots? This is a bill I have with Senators Cantwell, 
Blumenthal, Markey and Gillibrand.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, there is no question that appropriately 
managing fatigue among pilots is critical to safety, and we 
have a requirement for fatigue risk management plans that have 
to be submitted every 24 months. We are not seeing anything in 
the data with the safety systems there.
    As you know, that happened a number of years ago. So it is 
something that we would certainly be interested in working with 
you on.
    Senator Klobuchar. And you need to be concerned on that. 
And then finally on cybersecurity. As we see across industries, 
there is more and more concern about what is going on, whether 
it is the electricity grid, whether it is aviation.
    Do you believe the FAA currently has sufficient resources 
and workforce to protect data, defend the national airspace 
system from the growing number of cybersecurity threats?
    Mr. Dickson. I receive regular updates and I have been out 
to our command center several times on our cyber capabilities. 
And we are well-positioned currently, but it is something that 
we need to be constantly vigilant about to make sure that we 
reduce our attack surface, and we can continue to serve the 
public.
    So I think we are well-positioned now, but it is an area of 
focus for us to make sure that we continue to bring on the 
workforce that we need in that area.
    Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
    The Chair. Senator Sullivan.

                STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator 
Dickson, good to see you. And I want to thank you and commend 
you for the work you and the FAA did on commissioning the FAA 
Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative. And as you know, sir, this 
came out of the February 2020 NTSB report in the February--
which looked at a 10-year period and noted the very high 
accident rates in Alaska, the high fatality rates in Alaska 
relative to any other communities, any other parts of the 
country.
    So I want to ask, although it is not a budget document, the 
Aviation Safety Initiative report, as it relates to Alaska, 
certainly points out features in which we need improvement. And 
I always like to say yes, it is expensive to help smaller 
communities like mine, but I have over 200 committees that 
aren't even connected by roads. If the Federal Government 
helped us build roads as opposed to shutting down our ability 
to build roads, we wouldn't need this kind of infrastructure.
    But as you know, we need it dramatically and it is all 
about safety. So how will you use that Alaska Aviation Safety 
Initiative report to prioritize funding initiatives to be put 
in the budget with the FAA?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator. And I--you know, as 
you and I have discussed, I understand the importance of 
aviation to Alaska, and Alaska to our economy and our aviation 
system. The answer to your question is the FAASI will help 
inform us on our resource decisions and what our resource needs 
are. We have identified funding, just as one example, for the 
equipment takeover that the state has requested, and look 
forward to working with you and the state to address long-term 
capital needs even beyond what is in the report itself.
    Senator Sullivan. Good. I appreciate that. Again, I want to 
thank you for your focus on this. It is very much needed for my 
constituents, but anyone who comes up to Alaska, right. I mean, 
unfortunately, we have too many crashes. And so, Madam Chair, I 
am looking forward to working with this committee and the State 
of Alaska and the FAA on these important budgetary 
prioritizations. Let me mention another one.
    You know, Alaska laid the groundwork for the nationwide 
deployment of ADSB, known as NextGen. And yet the majority of 
Alaska is without coverage in airspace that is not classed to 
require coverage, even in congested areas where there has been 
some concerns in terms of airspace like in the Bethel region.
    Do you think it is time for the FAA or Congress to revisit 
options in that area with regard to NextGen to provide aircraft 
owners with the avionics equipment that is needed, particularly 
in places that I mentioned that don't have the coverage?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I want to tell you, you know, 
safety is certainly a shared priority. And again, I realize the 
unique aspects of aviation in Alaska with the number of 
aircraft and how communities rely on aviation to survive. And I 
know the stakeholders, I am aware that they have asked for a 
second capstone project, as you talked about. And I think the 
first one was a great success. You can use as a template, and 
we look forward to working with you and the stakeholders up 
there to see what that might look like.
    Senator Sullivan. Yes, it was. Let me ask one final 
question in--I have been trying to determine an exact 
comparison of how a safety related infrastructure funding makes 
it to the Alaska region as compared to the rest of the U.S.
    And my staff has reached out on an accounting of receipt 
expenditures, budget, proposed expenditures for air traffic 
organizations' facilities and equipment, and was surprised to 
hear that the FAA doesn't track ATOF and e-spending by state or 
even by service center. And, you know, our FAA in Alaska, as 
you know, they do heroic work not just for Alaska, but for the 
country as planes are flying over to Asia.
    We have 586,000 square miles of land and almost 2--close to 
2.5 million square miles of airspace. But there has been no 
accounting--it has been difficult to get accounting for the 
funding of just the Western service area. Do you have or can 
you provide for a future a breakdown of where those costs and 
dollars are being spent? I think it is important for us in the 
Congress to be able to see comparisons with regard to different 
regions, at least regions, if not states.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I am aware of the request, and we are 
working on it. Look forward to working with you. Obviously, it 
is a Federal system and expenditures are not tracked normally 
by jurisdiction. But I think that there is a way to get you the 
information.
    Senator Sullivan. Do you think it is useful information? 
We--I mean, I think it would be useful.
    Mr. Dickson. I think if anyone on the Committee, yourself 
included, think that it is useful information, we will endeavor 
to provide an information that is useful to you.
    Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you, 
Madam Chair.
    The Chair. Yes, thank you. Senator Baldwin is next and then 
followed by Senator Duckworth, who was on remotely, unless one 
of our colleagues from the other side of the aisle appears. I 
am going to run and vote, and I thank Senator Baldwin for 
taking over the Chair while I am gone.

               STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

    Senator Baldwin. Yes. And I want to thank you, Chair 
Cantwell, for holding this hearing today. And thank you, Mr. 
Dickson, for your appearance here. This committee passed 
necessary legislation last year in response to the Boeing 737 
MAX crashes. And it is critically important that we follow 
through with oversight as the FAA continues to implement the 
new law.
    Mr. Dickson, about a month ago, the Federal Aviation 
Administration announced that airports are no longer required 
to use firefighting foam that contains PFAS. However, that 
announcement is limited in its effectiveness as the FAA has not 
authorized the use of alternative foams. Airports in their 
neighboring communities in my state see this as an empty 
gesture.
    I believe it misses the intent of Congress's direction in 
FAA reauthorization. Residents in these communities deserve 
more immediate action to protect their drinking water. So what 
are the FAA's next steps to ensure that airports are able to 
transition to PFAS-free firefighting foam? And on what timeline 
can we expect that to happen?
    Mr. Dickson. Thanks for the question, Senator Baldwin, and 
this is a very important issue that we have been working very 
diligently. And we fully respect the intent of Congress in the 
legislation, and we are working to do this as rapidly as we 
possibly can.
    We have got to balance the effectiveness of the 
firefighting foam, which is really important for public safety 
in the event of a fuel fire, along with the removal of the PFAS 
or free foams. To that end, we built a test facility, and we 
were interrupted somewhat by COVID because of an inability to 
be able to get onsite for some period of time. But we have 
already conducted over 400 tests of 15 types of foam. We have 
not found one yet that has adequate performance.
    I have actually seen, witnessed some of these tests myself, 
and it would be very concerning to use any one of these because 
it is just not as effective at putting the fire out. So in the 
meantime, we have taken steps that basically free airports from 
the use of PFAS foam for any, you know, testing certification.
    We have got recapture equipment out there where it doesn't 
need to be discharged anymore. And we will continue to do that. 
Really, the only occasion where PFAS would need to be--PFAS 
foam would need to be used is for an actual aircraft fuel fire. 
For hot brakes, anything else, they don't discharge anything. 
We are also working very closely with the DOD because this is 
based on a military specification.
    And I am optimistic that we will have new standards set by 
January 2023 and working very closely with DOD on the research. 
We do the effectiveness part of the research, and they do the 
chemical composition.
    Senator Baldwin. Mr. Dickson, in previous hearings, we have 
discussed my bipartisan American Aviator Act. That legislation 
seeks to expand flight training programs for veterans who are 
seeking jobs as commercial airline pilots.
    Senator Hoeven and I secured $10 million in the Fiscal Year 
2020 and 2021 appropriations bills for our Veteran Pilot 
Training Program. I am concerned that the FAA has yet to make 
these funds available. While I was pleased to see FAA recently 
move forward with other aviation workforce development grants, 
it is beyond time that we put this available funding for 
Veterans Pilot Training Grant Program to use.
    So could you provide me with an update of when you can--
when we can expect to see the notice of available funding for 
Veterans Pilot Training Grant Program?
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you for the question, Senator Baldwin. 
This is something that is really important, and we have--this 
is a novel grant program for us, and it took some time to set 
up the specific parameters. We are making good progress.
    With respect to the veterans pilot training grants, we are 
driving to issue the first grant solicitation within this 
calendar year. So I anticipate that you will see the first 
snowfall within the next few weeks.
    Senator Baldwin. Very good. Alright. Senator Moran, I will 
now recognize you for questions.

                STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

    Senator Moran. Thank you, Chairwoman. Appreciate the 
recognition. Administrator Dickson, welcome to the Committee. 
Welcome back to the Committee. We have had a long history in 
regard to the 737 MAX and its relationship to Kansas in 
particular. This goes back to the decertification of the MAX in 
2020.
    As of now, the 737 MAX is in commercial operation in 31 
airlines flying in 179 countries, and it has completed more 
than 206,000 commercial flights since that December. However, 
China and Russia remain the only civil aviation authority yet 
to approve the Boeing 737 MAX's return to service.
    Given the global regulatory community has broadly approved 
the MAX for operation, what is the outstanding issues for China 
and Russia, and what role is the FAA playing in resolving this?
    Mr. Dickson. We are meeting with the Chinese and Russian 
civil aviation authorities on a regular basis and have provided 
them all the technical information that they need. So I am 
confident that on a technical level, we are in good shape, and 
they will make the decisions that they need to make within 
their systems.
    Senator Moran. What you suggest is that the technical 
information is there. There may be other factors utilized by 
China and Russia in making a determination?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir.
    Senator Moran. Administrator Dickson, a handful of 
universities, including one in Kansas, Wichita State 
University, were selected to carry out 124 of the 127 ACSAA 
related safety system human factor analysis.
    Specifically, Wichita State is conducting a review of an 
analysis of human error, methodologies framework, taxonomies 
that could be used by industry during the design and 
evaluation. You have a comment on the value of that kind of 
work.
    Mr. Dickson. That is extremely valuable. And again, it 
helps add perspective and invaluable research to our efforts on 
human factors and some of the issues that we have talked about 
this morning.
    Senator Moran. What is the FAA oversight in that regard, 
and what is the time-frame for the results of that university 
research work?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not sure the precise timeframe. But, you 
know, again, this is ongoing work and very important to our 
existing human factors work.
    Senator Moran. OK. Finally, I am hearing concerns, 
Administrator, about significant delays in the FAA's ability to 
issue regulations, guidance, and policy. I know there are lots 
of new demands on the agency and there is new innovation and 
automation and even the demands that are included in the 
Aircraft's Certification, Safety and Accountability Act. But it 
is really important for the FAA to be able to do its work in a 
timely, although appropriate and adequate manner, with near 
perfection. What are you doing, what can you do to reduce the 
backlog in that work?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, certainly, you know, there are multiple 
factors here. If you are talking about rulemaking, obviously 
there is the requirements for public comment and the 
Administrative Procedures Act process, which requires us to 
have safety data and a positive cost benefit business case 
there as well.
    We are--there has been some COVID impact that has led to 
some backlog. We are in the process of--we have expanded work 
hours and we are looking at some additional resources within 
our chief counsel's office to be able to bring these things 
forward more expeditiously and make sure that any chokepoints 
that might be in the process are addressed.
    Senator Moran. One of the things that you didn't mention is 
staffing. Any comments in that regard?
    Mr. Dickson. So it is something that we are always focused 
on to make sure that we are adequately resourced. And again, I 
don't know that that is the central issue, but it is something 
that we need to look at, both with our inspectors and the rest 
of our workforce as well.
    Senator Moran. My understanding is that the vaccine 
requirements have been visited in this hearing this morning. I 
am sorry, I wasn't able to hear any of your answers, but I 
would ask, do you perceive a challenge in the near future with 
employees being discharged or no longer able to work because of 
noncompliance with that mandate?
    Mr. Dickson. Again, we--I am not hearing anything at this 
point, but it is something that we are focused on a daily basis 
to make sure that we can complete our mission, both the 
operational and the safety aspects of our mission.
    Senator Moran. Administrator, I look forward to further 
conversations with you. Thank you. Chairwoman Baldwin, thank 
you.
    Senator Baldwin. Thank you. Next, joining us remotely is 
Senator Duckworth.

              STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chairman Baldwin. And also 
thank you for Chairwoman Cantwell for holding today's hearing. 
I want to thank the Committee and Ranking Member Wicker for 
leadership--their leadership on last year's aircraft 
certification bill that included multiple provisions that I 
worked on.
    Mr. Dickson, as you know, the Department of 
Transportation's Inspector General recently published a report 
that revealed potentially unsafe airline maintenance practices 
and raised some real serious questions over FAA's oversight of 
major U.S. carriers. For example, 92 percent of cases sampled 
by the IG found that FAA inspectors accepted the airline's 
analysis rather than identifying the root causes themselves.
    To me, this is really another example of FAA's often too 
cozy relationship with industry partners, which fosters an 
institutional mindset and I think a culture of complacency that 
left at--if we leave it unchecked, can lead to deadly 
consequences for flight crews and passengers alike.
    Mr. Dickson, what specific mitigation strategies has FAA 
implemented to address institutional oversight concerns and 
improve the technical capabilities and regulatory knowledge of 
the FAA workforce?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Senator 
Duckworth. And you know, the issues that you are bringing up 
are not acceptable, and we need to do better in terms of the 
career development and the ability of our inspectors to 
identify and address root cause analysis in particular. We 
agreed with the bulk of the IG findings.
    We are implementing improvements to those processes to 
address the issues. Those are already in work and underway. We 
had actually identified similar findings through our regular 
internal review processes, and we are in the process of putting 
those improvements in place. So some of this was not--were not 
issues that we were aware of. We already had improvement plans 
in place.
    Also, we know that our oversight responsibilities--you 
know, in this hearing, we are talking a lot about 
manufacturers, but this goes into the continued operational 
safety of a product, how crews are being trained, how airplanes 
are being maintained because it is a continuous loop. So we 
have embraced that input. We have--we are putting those 
improvements in place.
    And again, when I talk about resetting the relationship, it 
is not just with Boeing, it is with all of the companies that 
we oversee.
    Senator Duckworth. Does the resetting of that relationship 
include an update to your policy so that you prohibit closing a 
compliance action before the carrier has implemented the 
necessary corrective action? Because I feel like if you close 
the compliance action and they haven't done the corrective 
action, then there is no real incentive for them to complete 
that corrective action. Has this been part of the updates to 
your policies?
    Mr. Dickson. It is a good point. We actually just stood up 
this summer a compliance program, executive council, and 
steering committee and they are--they are taking that into 
consideration. And it is something that we will look very 
closely at going forward as to how the entire spectrum of 
compliance works all the way up to enforcement.
    Senator Duckworth. OK. I would like to review that with you 
at a later time, because I do think you need to update your 
policy.
    Mr. Dickson. We would be happy to do that.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. On Part 147 implementation, 
the new law that our committee is examining today includes the 
bipartisan Part 147 Act, which I was very proud to help develop 
and pass in partnership with our fellow aviator, someone who 
has far more hours than I do, Senator Inhofe.
    For years, we have heard from students and schools and 
employers that the FAA's regulations are decades out of date 
and undermine significant investment students make in pursuit 
of careers in aviation. Our bipartisan bill requires that FAA 
make sure schools have the flexibility to teach core curriculum 
that reflects modern technical advances and innovations across 
the aviation industry.
    And Mr. Dickson, nearly a year has passed since the Part 
147 Act was enacted. What is the status of the FAA's efforts to 
update aircraft maintenance technician curricula as Congress 
directed, and with the interim final rule to be issued this 
year?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I share your frustration and 
how long this process takes, and I appreciate your interest and 
your focus on this. We are--we continue to actively work 
through this rulemaking. And I know that we missed the deadline 
in the bill, but I want to emphasize to you and really everyone 
on the Committee that we are fully committed to it. I think 
that we are going to be in a position to issue the interim 
final rule in the coming year, but I would love to stay in 
contact with you and your office as we proceed.
    Part of what happened here is we had some issues to 
resolve, some professional debate within the agency on the best 
methodology to approach this process, and that was something 
that took some time to work out. But we are fully aligned now. 
All those issues have been resolved and we are proceeding to 
meet the intent of the law as soon as we can.
    Senator Duckworth. Well, I hope that occurs in the first 
quarter of next year and no later than the summer of next year. 
But we will stay in touch with you as you move forward with it. 
Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chair. Thank you. Senator Cruz.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator 
Dickson, welcome. Thank you for being here today. Thank you for 
your words for the families of the victims of the Lion Air and 
Ethiopian Airlines accidents. It is critical, even as we have 
these discussions about things like certification, delegated 
authority, and what reforms are needed in statute and 
regulation, that we not lose sight of the victims--the 346 
souls lost in the Lion Air and Ethiopian air crashes. And I 
thank those that are here drawing attention to those victims. 
As you know, last year we passed the Aircraft Certification, 
Safety and Accountability Act. That law included a number of my 
amendments, and I think it represented meaningful reforms which 
will help keep the flying public safe. But I also recognize 
that more work may need to be done in the next FAA 
authorization, next Congress.
    And I look forward to working with my colleagues and with 
you and the FAA in those efforts. Administrator Dickson, in 
your testimony, you discuss how the FAA is transforming its 
relationship with manufacturers, and I am glad to hear that. 
Agency capture, regulatory capture is something I have been and 
remain deeply concerned about, and something on which I think 
there is strong bipartisan concern.
    In your judgment, how is the industry, and specifically how 
has Boeing, reacted to this culture change and to the 
implementation of the new requirements that were part of the 
aviation safety bill?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator Cruz, again, culture change 
requires daily focus. It requires regular focus. You can't just 
change a process or boxes on the org chart and expect for the 
kind of beneficial changes that this law provides for, and that 
we are undertaking in terms of our own work, to stick. So it is 
really important, you know, within the agency that we are 
transparent. The--Boeing is not the same as it was 2 years ago, 
but they have more work to do.
    And the voluntary SMS program that they have in place is 
giving us quicker information about issues that they face, but 
we have--we have put more engineers on the shop floor in their 
factories. We have put more inspectors. We have put more 
rigorous oversight on them, and we will continue to do that. We 
have also restricted what is delegated in terms of anything 
that implicates human factors has to be validated by the agency 
before the manufacturer can proceed.
    And any critical safety system, we have retained a 
delegation on that. And we are also, with the 737 MAX, we have 
retained the issuance of the airworthiness certificates on each 
individual airplane as it is produced. And so it will take some 
time, but we are on the path that we need to be, but it 
requires continuous vigilance and attention.
    Senator Cruz. So staying on the topic of safety in our 
airspace, I was glad to see the FAA yesterday finally issued a 
notice of proposed rulemaking to require commercial balloon 
pilots to hold a valid second class medical certificate. The 
2016 hot air balloon crash in Lockhart, Texas, which took the 
lives of 15 passengers and the pilot, and which remains the 
deadliest hot air balloon crash in the history of the United 
States, was a horrific tragedy made worse by the fact that it 
was completely avoidable.
    Although I am not pleased that it took the FAA almost 3 
years to follow the law and implement the legislation that I 
authored, Commercial Balloon Pilots Safety Act, which had a 
statutory deadline of 180 days, I am glad that the medical 
certificate loophole that allowed the pilot to fly that day in 
2016, while he was high on a cocktail of prescription drugs 
that included Ritalin, Valium and Oxycodone and was as impaired 
as a drunk driver according to the NTSB, will finally be 
closed.
    Administrator Dickson, how quickly can this regulation be 
finalized, and this loophole for commercial hot air balloon 
pilots be dealt with once and for all?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, well, we will have to see it 
through, the rulemaking process, as you are aware. It is 
frustrating how long it takes, but we have the draft, the NPRM 
out there and as soon as we get the public comments back, we 
will adjudicate them as quickly as we can, push it up through 
the department, and through OIRA, and get the final rule out 
there.
    Senator Cruz. So let me ask you another topic, which is, 
what is the impact of Federal vaccine mandates been on airline 
pilots and air traffic controllers?
    Mr. Dickson. The--at this point, no impact. I mean, it is 
something that we are focused on, certainly complying with----
    Senator Cruz. Your sworn testimony is vaccine mandates have 
had zero impact on pilots and air traffic controllers today?
    Mr. Dickson. We have had--I have not seen anything in our 
system that would indicate----
    Senator Cruz. So, we have seen in recent weeks thousands 
upon thousands of plane flights canceled. I was told by a 
senior leader in the aviation industry that one of the causes 
of it was a very significant number of air traffic controllers 
in Jacksonville engaged in a sick out and refusing to go to 
work because of the vaccine mandate. Is your testimony that 
that is not correct and that didn't happen?
    Mr. Dickson. We don't have any evidence of that, Senator. 
That particular event that you were referring to was one 
segment--I have looked at the numbers, one sector within 
Jacksonville center that happened to be co-located with where 
there was convective weather and extensive military activity. 
So it did create a choke point, but it was not any kind of 
organized activity or sick out. It was availability on one 
particular shift.
    Senator Cruz. And your testimony is you believe vaccine 
mandates have zero impacts on pilot availability? I will tell 
you, I have met with the pilot unions. That is not what the 
pilot unions are telling me. And your testimony is that the 
vaccine mandates have zero impact on air traffic controllers? 
That is also not what I am hearing from the Air Traffic 
Controllers Union. So, are they not telling the truth or what 
are the facts here?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I am saying at this point in 
time, I am not seeing any impact from that. We work very 
closely with our union partners. I met with them within the 
last week or so, and we are not seeing any indication that 
there has been any impact on our staffing up to this point.
    Senator Cruz. Well, passengers across the country are 
having their flights canceled by the hundreds and by the 
thousands, might have a different perspective on that. Thank 
you.
    The Chair. Thank you, Senator Cruz. And I want to thank you 
for your leadership in help in forming the legislation that we 
passed last year. As the Subcommittee Chairman at the time, 
very much appreciate your input on that.
    And we are going to have another aviation hearing, forget 
the date, but in the near future that is going to review 
obviously our actions on the various COVID related bills, and I 
think it will be an appropriate time to ask about the issues 
you brought up today. So thank you. We have Senator Warnock and 
then followed by Senator Thune.

              STATEMENT OF HON. RAPHAEL WARNOCK, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

    Senator Warnock. Thank you so very much, Madam Chair. This 
week I introduced the Arrow Act, to expedite the development 
and adoption of sustainable aviation fuel and other emissions 
reducing aviation technologies.
    I could not be more proud that Georgia companies like 
Lanza, Jet, Delta Airlines and Gulfstream down in my hometown 
of Savannah, Georgia, have helped these aviation emissions 
reduction efforts take off.
    As we see a rise in exciting new technologies that increase 
fuel efficiency and reduce harmful carbon emissions, it is 
important that our safety oversight body has the resources and 
the technical expertise to allow for the quick and safe 
deployment of these new innovations.
    Mr. Dickson, do you agree that having the right in-house 
expertise will be crucial for FAA to successfully collaborate 
and partner with industry on new sustainable products and 
ensure that these technologies are deployed safely without 
unnecessary delays?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator Warnock. It is good 
to see you. And the answer to your question is yes. You know, 
we recognize how critical sustainable aviation fuel is and very 
much want to be a partner with Congress as people consider ways 
to expedite its use and deployment at scale.
    Within our Office of Energy and Environment, there is a 
team of people who are dedicated to working on how best to make 
staff a more routine source of aviation fuel, so we definitely 
want to partner with you. To your specific question, which I 
think is related to Section 104?
    Senator Warnock. That is correct.
    Mr. Dickson. We have initiated the review consistent with 
the bill and are making--working very closely with our labor 
partners to execute on that review. And it is more in depth 
than we originally thought, but we are determined to make it a 
comprehensive review.
    At the same time, we have completed some concrete items, 
including already a comprehensive review of our Senior 
Technical Experts Program, which we call our STEP Program, and 
that included benchmarking it against comparable programs 
throughout industry, including NASA and the European Union 
Aviation Safety Agency.
    And we have engaged in some active recruiting on our chief 
scientist and technical advisor positions. And I can tell you 
from personal experience, we have got a very capable chief 
scientist within our environmental group that look forward to 
leading those efforts.
    Senator Warnock. So as you move forward in this review, can 
you say more about how you plan to address any identified 
shortfalls in the short term and in the long term as we 
prioritize trying to expedite these innovations in a way that 
is safe for the public?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we have to critically--you know, we have 
to critically evaluate the review and ensure that we take the 
necessary steps, as you said.
    And any existing shortfalls that we have, as well as those 
gaps that can hinder our ability to understand and oversee new 
our innovative technologies in terms of staff will be really 
important because we need to engage not only the aviation 
community, but the producers as well.
    Senator Warnock. Well, I appreciate that and know that I am 
going to continue to push the Arrow Act. I think it is 
important that we do everything we can to move forward on 
sustainable aviation technologies.
    You know, this is an important part of creating a 
sustainable, and safe future and having adequate levels of 
experienced personnel and technical support at the FAA is 
critical to the success of these efforts, so that we can have 
skies that are safe in every sense of the word.
    Thank you so much, and I look forward to working with you 
on this issue.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chair. Senator Thune.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

    Senator Thune. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator 
Dickson, thank you. Welcome. And let me just start with an 
issue that is important in my home state of South Dakota and 
that deals with Ellsworth Air Force Base, which is prepared to 
host the future B-21 bomber, which will train in the Powder 
River training complex.
    Ellsworth currently flies the B-1 bomber and host large 
force exercises in the PRTC airspace, which requires occasional 
altitude waivers, and I appreciate the FAA's efforts to 
expedite coordination with the PBFA in this space. Looking 
ahead more broadly, we have to ensure that our advanced 
military aircraft have the expanded airspace volumes in the 
time that they need the training.
    Technology modernization will be critically important to 
improving management of the national airspace system, 
particularly as new entrants such as UAS technology 
increasingly interact with general and commercial aviation 
traffic. The implementation of Next Gen, which has been 
hampered by the pandemic, will be crucial in the coming years. 
These investments will allow the United States to better 
utilize existing infrastructure, increasing the capacity and 
efficiency of the NAS.
    Could you speak to the status of Next Gen implementation, 
particularly how the agency plans to make up for pandemic 
related delays? And then second, how is the FAA incorporating 
concepts like adaptive or dynamic airspace in its Next Gen 
initiative to meet the growing demands on the national airspace 
system while maintaining safety for current users and new 
entrants?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, it is a great question about 
Next Gen. We have about 70 percent of the technology fielded 
for Next Gen, and the challenge that we have now is to 
integrate those technologies between data communications, the 
ADSB surveillance, which we successfully implemented across the 
entire system in January 2020, and also the performance based 
navigation aspects as well.
    So what we really need and where the pandemic set us back a 
bit is operationalizing these capabilities and integrating them 
within our air traffic facilities, because we need to have the 
controllers and the facility managers actually involved in 
those implementations by facilities.
    And because of COVID, we had to get everybody out of the 
facility who wasn't involved in that daily operation, because 
it is very, very difficult to socially distance and we didn't 
want to expose any more of our employees than necessary to that 
public health risk. Now that we have various public health 
measures in place, we are back in the facilities doing more 
training and then more of this operational implementation, so I 
expect that the pace is going to pick up considerably here in 
the coming months.
    With respect to dynamic airspace management, I know that my 
chief operating officer has met with you and your staff 
recently, and I agree with you that this is extremely important 
to us. We have demands being put on the airspace now with 
commercial space, drones. We need to make sure traditional 
civil aviation is protected, and of course, military and 
National Security needs are at the core of all that.
    So we will continue to work through those issues. I know 
that we had some success here with the most recent exercise, 
and we will continue to build on that.
    Senator Thune. Thank you and we appreciate all your help 
along the way and are going to need your continued assistance 
in that space as the B-21, is hopefully before too long, enters 
that airspace for training purposes, along with all the other 
air assets that are involved in a large force exercise.
    And so we thank you for your cooperation and hope that you 
will continue to be able to assist us there. As you know, the 
FAA issued a notice of policy September 2020 determining that 
certain UAS may be type certificated as a ``special class of 
aircraft,'' and I appreciate your commitment to advancing the 
integration of UAS into the national airspace system.
    However, I am concerned that the agency has since not made 
more progress toward establishing generally applicable 
standards for type certification of a UAS, which will provide 
certainty to the industry while maintaining the highest level 
of safety.
    So could you talk about whether the FAA remains committed 
to establishing generally applicable standards for UAS type 
certification and what actions of the FAA taken related to 
establishing generally applicable standards for certification 
of special classes of UAS since the publication of this notice?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, the--you raise a very important 
issue, and we are actively collaborating internally and with 
the UAS industry on the approval process. As a matter of fact, 
I have met with several stakeholder groups here over the last 
couple of months. And we are developing an integrated schedule 
template that will identify the critical paths, including the 
environmental elements, which will better inform applicants for 
certification throughout this process.
    We will use a risk-based approach to certificating an 
unmanned aircraft. We think that our existing rules will be 
able to accommodate any near-term operations, but we are also 
looking toward the future. I think, as you know, we have got 
our MOSAIC, Modernization Special Airworthiness Certificates, 
rulemaking process underway, and that will help us move to the 
next step of specificity out there for all of our stakeholders, 
so they know exactly with more granular detail what the 
requirements are going to be for these systems as they come to 
market.
    Senator Thune. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    The Chair. Thank you, Senator Thune. Senator Hickenlooper.
    [Technical problems.]

             STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

    Senator Hickenlooper. Your testimony and especially the 
difficult times we have right now with the divisions in the 
country that I think are causing such disruptions in many ways. 
The FAA data that we saw demonstrated 5,033 unruly passenger 
incidents this year, 227 of these resulted in enforcement cases 
being initiated.
    In August, you wrote to all U.S. airport officials saying 
that many of these passengers, many unruly passengers, were 
interviewed by local police and released without criminal 
charges of any kind. And you wrote, ``when this occurs, we miss 
a key opportunity to hold unruly passengers accountable.''
    Can you describe how clearly incidents are reported by FAA 
to DOJ and law enforcement? And how could that process maybe be 
improved to spur more enforcement actions and make people aware 
that this is a serious issue?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Senator. And 
you know, this has been something that has been--I have been 
laser focused on for really the entire year this year. Unruly 
passenger incidents are nothing new, but we have seen a several 
fold increase in them. As you know, we have we have been 
successful at driving the rates down, but we still have ways to 
go.
    And it is very much a team effort. And what we are focused 
on now is closing the seams between how airlines and airports 
and law enforcement and the Federal Government to handle these 
issues. And so that is--we have made a good bit of progress, 
but we have got more to go.
    And we have referred a number of cases that we give the 
investigative packages to DOJ, but there are instances where at 
some airports where there will be a Federal law enforcement 
response--this actually happened with one event that was in the 
news a couple of weeks ago.
    So I think we are making good progress, but there is 
certainly more to be done, and it really does require the 
cooperation of all those private sector stakeholders, including 
the airports, as well as the various aspects of the Federal 
Government, FAA, TSA and DOJ. And we will continue to stay 
focused on that.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Right. Absolutely. And that there was 
one where the unruly passenger last week broke flight 
attendant's nose. They had to divert the flight into Denver. 
Obviously, those issues that are so egregious, there has got to 
be a better way that as we do hold that violent passenger 
accountable, we get it into the media, so the people hear that 
this isn't something that is not a, you know, just a passing 
news item, but they understand that is how serious it is.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I have been on social media, I 
have been on news reports. My face is at every airport in the 
country. I think not something that I wouldn't necessarily want 
to be remembered for.
    We are pulling out the stops. We have done memes. We have 
done everything that we can. I have even been on TMZ, which I 
never thought I would be, to make sure that the public is aware 
of the importance of following crew instructions. The crews are 
there for passenger safety. And this is about a behavior that 
is not appropriate in an aviation environment, and we need to 
get it under control.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely. And I think obviously 
COVID has played a big role in this. I think that the fact that 
it is so hard to find employees and the TSA is still operating 
with significant less than a full force so that the waits are 
very long. I fly out of Denver all the time, but I flew out of 
Atlanta earlier this week and it was equally long, long lines.
    And I think that is frustrating people so when they get in 
the plane--and I realize that you don't control TSA. Let me 
switch and just quickly, in February, a Boeing 777 made an 
emergency landing in Denver because the Pratt Whitney engine 
caught fire mid-flight. Debris from the engines scattered 
across Northern Metro in Denver.
    Preliminary NTSB report faulted an engine blade for causing 
the engine fire. In May, FAA required strengthening of blades 
in order to make sure we prevent this in the future. Do you 
have an update on the investigation or what implementation of 
safety measures you would--or are being suggested?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. We are doing--taking several 
actions here. We are increasing the inspection frequency of the 
fan blades, and we have also recently approved a new inspection 
technology, which is more effective in detecting internal 
cracks in these titanium blades. So that ultrasonic fan blade 
inspection process will now be the primary process. It is much 
more effective.
    We will still use it in combination with what had been used 
before the thermal acoustic imaging, which had been used 
before. Our chief scientist for propulsion and the U.S. Air 
Force Research Lab collaborated on this and so we think that 
will be very beneficial. In conjunction with that, we should 
not have debris falling off of an airplane.
    That is not acceptable. So we are--in our certification, we 
have actually aligned our engine in airframe certification 
within the same division to make sure that we are more tightly 
coordinated, and we are requiring the airplane manufacturers to 
strengthen the cowling and the design. And that work will have 
to be done before those airplanes can take to the skies again.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Right. Mr. Dickson, you have got one 
of the toughest jobs in the country right now, and I appreciate 
you taking some time out to share the facts of these issues and 
what is being done with all of us. I yield back to the Chair.
    The Chair. Thank you. We have Senator Sinema, then Senator 
Scott, and then Senator Rosen, and I see Senator Peters. So we 
are all filing in here.

               STATEMENT OF HON. KYRSTEN SINEMA, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, 
Administrator Dickson, for your testimony today. Today, this 
committee is examining the implementation of the Aircraft 
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act and the current 
state of aviation safety. I was proud to support this 
bipartisan legislation to address significant concerns with our 
aircraft certification system.
    Arizonans rely on a safe aviation system for business and 
leisure travel to bring tourists from all over the world to 
Arizona, to ship Arizona products to customers, and even to 
take scenic flights above our stunning landscape.
    And as the Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee, a safe, 
secure, and healthy aviation system is critical to my work. 
Over the past years, our Subcommittee has held hearings on the 
tragic Boeing accidents, the state of aviation during the COVID 
19 pandemic, and the crucial need to improve our Nation's 
airport infrastructure for the 21st century, while developing 
bipartisan legislation to continue to improve safety. I 
appreciate the work the FAA has done to help improve safety, 
but more needs to be done, and I encourage you to keep working 
quickly to fully implement the certification statute.
    Now, Administrator Dickson, as you probably know, general 
aviation is an important part of Arizona's aviation system. 
Arizona is home to 4 of the 10 busiest general aviation 
airports in the country, and thousands of Arizonans participate 
in general aviation flights.
    Tragically, on October 1, there was a midair collision 
between a small airplane and a helicopter near the Chandler 
Municipal Airport that resulted in two fatalities. The NTSB is 
investigating the collision. As we consider the safety of our 
entire aviation system, what steps is the FAA taking to 
continue to improve general aviation safety in Arizona and 
across the country?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for your question, Senator 
Sinema. You know, general aviation is absolutely critical. It 
is the--we have the largest general aviation segment of any 
airspace in the world. And several years ago, the FAA had set 
the goal of reducing the fatal accident rate for GA to less 
than one fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours.
    And this was actually a goal that was set to be met by 
2018, and we were able to surpass that goal. And so in 2019, we 
resnapped out of the line for an additional 10 percent 
reduction by 2028. And up to this point, we are exceeding those 
projections--so it is good.
    We have done this by partnering with the General Aviation 
Joint Steering Committee, which is the general aviation 
counterpart to CAST, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team. The 
GAJSC helps us analyze the accident trends and undertake 
appropriate safety interventions when elevated risk is 
identified.
    And over the last 8 years, we have actually adopted 47 
safety enhancements that are aimed at addressing the root 
causes of loss of control and engine failure accidents, which 
are the primary causes. And those have been adopted over the 
past 3 years. We are also working on enhancements to the Airmen 
certification system and working with aviation stakeholder 
groups to improve testing and training standards as well.
    And finally, on the subject of midair collisions, certainly 
there are beneficial technologies such as TCAS that can be 
implemented within GA as well.
    Senator Sinema. Well, thank you, Administrator. In August, 
the Senate passed the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and 
Jobs Act, and our legislation invests $25 billion over 5 years 
for our Nation's aviation system, with $20 billion for airports 
and $5 billion for improving air traffic control facilities.
    So this airport funding will modernize runways, aprons, 
taxiways, and safety areas at every airport in the United 
States. And the legislation also creates a new airport terminal 
improvement program for airports to improve their terminal 
facilities, gates, and intermodal connection facilities.
    Besides improving the efficiency and passenger experience 
our airports, once this bill is passed, it will also improve 
safety. Can you describe how the $20 billion for airport 
improvements will increase airport safety?
    Mr. Dickson. Sure. Well, the infrastructure improvements 
with respect to airports would definitely improve the safety 
and efficiency of our air transportation system. And, you know, 
we already estimate a need of--in excess of $8 billion in 
airport projects, and these requested projects exceed existing 
FAA resources annually.
    You know--as you know, our AIP budget is normally in the 
range of about $3.3 billion. So in addition to terminals, we 
will be able to do things like runway rehabilitation projects, 
which, as you know, can cost in the tens of millions of dollars 
each and are multi-year projects as well. So that is one 
specific improvement that we would be looking at with that 
infrastructure money.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Madam Chair, my time has 
expired. I yield back. Thank you.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SCOTT, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Scott. Administrator Dickson, how are you doing? 
You have seen all these videos of families being kicked off 
airplanes because their young children can't keep their mask on 
for a long time, and I have heard lots of stories of people 
that have decided just not to fly because they have young 
children they know that they are not going to be able keep 
their mask on.
    So can you talk about, you know, why the FAA supports a 
policy that basically forces these airlines to kick these young 
families off planes because a young child just can't do it? I 
mean, I don't know if you have young children or grandchildren, 
but you know they are not great at keeping their masks on.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, the--you know, I can't speak to 
public health in particular, but obviously we all want to get 
through the effects of the COVID pandemic and that we support, 
we certainly support what the public health authorities have 
put in place in terms of a combination of mitigations.
    But that is not an FAA requirement. Really, the important 
thing to me is aviation safety and making sure that passengers 
on commercial aircraft follow crewmembers instructions. And if 
those requirements are in--and whether they are FAA 
requirements or not, in this case, they are not, we really need 
to whatever requirements, whether company policies or Federal 
requirements, passengers need to comply with them.
    Senator Scott. You have seen the reports, first Southwest 
and then you hear about the air traffic controllers in 
Jacksonville, and the latest is all the American Airline 
flights have been canceled. And you know, it is your peers, it 
is going to continue to get worse.
    And then you watch, you know, people are just completely 
concerned about this unconstitutional vaccine mandate by the 
President that is going to impact jobs in this country. And you 
have got the Federal Reserve reports that these vaccine 
mandates are causing a low labor supply and issues with hiring 
and retention.
    So tell me what do you think is causing these pilot 
shortages? What is causing these cancelations of all these 
flights, which are impacting people's jobs all across the 
country?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I have spoken with the air 
carriers and with several of the pilot union leaders as well as 
our own leaders within the agency, and at this point in time, I 
am not seeing any staffing impact from the vaccine mandate 
itself.
    The event that we had a few weeks ago with Southwest down 
in Florida was due to a combination of factors. The 
difficulties that we are seeing with some airlines operations 
right now, frankly, is, in my estimation, is due more to 
changes in consumer behavior. You know, all of the algorithms 
that they use to plan their schedules were disrupted in March 
2020. And leisure demand, I think as you well know--Florida has 
been--there has been a lot of demand for leisure travel into 
Florida and those, that very close in demand signal is 
different from what the airlines had seen before.
    And so they are--they probably don't have as much buffer in 
their schedules as they had had previously or as they would 
like. I know that one of the airlines talked about they had a 
number of a couple of thousand flight attendants who were in 
the process of being recalled from furlough.
    And so these kinds of things are just taking some time to 
catch up on the system. And it is creating more operational 
exposure when there are disruptive events such as convective 
weather in the system.
    Senator Scott. So do you think that the vaccine mandate by 
the President is going to cause any staffing shortages at all 
where you think it is going to have any impact on anybody, 
which is going to impact the safety of travel in the United 
States?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator, my absolute focus, what I can 
guarantee you is that we will have a safe aviation system in 
the U.S. And we are focused on----
    Senator Scott. Excuse me for a second. Does that mean you 
will have to shut down flights because you won't have enough 
air traffic controllers? You will still be safe, but you just 
won't have the flights.
    Mr. Dickson. We have robust contingency plans in place. We 
have always, and we have ways that we can make adjustments as 
we need to. But at this point in time, I am not seeing any 
impact on safety, and we will work to make sure that the 
airspace is open and available for the traveling public.
    Senator Scott. How many jobs in the aerospace industry are 
in, you know, any agencies you deal with--air traffic 
controllers that are going to be lost because of the vaccine 
mandate, do you have any idea?
    Mr. Dickson. I couldn't speculate.
    Senator Scott. Alright. Thank you very much. I turn it over 
now to Senator Rosen.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you.

                STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

    Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Senator Scott, appreciate 
that. And thank you, Administrator Dickson, for being here 
today. I want to talk a little bit about international 
information sharing and how we use that to enhance pilot 
training because I would like to follow up on an issue I raised 
2 years ago when this committee was investigating the problems 
that led to the 737 MAX 8 accidents.
    As you may know, in 2017, the Brazilian National Civil 
Aviation Agency came to the U.S. to test the Boeing 737 MAX 8, 
and they determined that the changes made to the aircraft from 
the previous models were substantial enough to warrant request 
to Boeing for more information about the plane's systems.
    As a result of this, additional information from Boeing and 
the Brazil--when the Brazilian National Civil Aviation Agency 
published its updated pilot training requirements, they were 
able to flag MCAS as one of the changes that the pilots needed 
to account for when they were flying the MAX 8.
    When he testified before this committee in October 2019, I 
asked Boeing CEO why this information was not flagged for other 
customers who had a 737 MAX in their fleet for more information 
sharing, and he didn't respond. And so more information sharing 
in this case could have been extremely beneficial.
    So Administrator Dickson, FAA is the global leader in 
aviation safety, and as such, we have a responsibility to share 
critical information about aircraft systems with the 
international community. In the case of Brazil, better 
communication between national civil aviation agencies, well it 
could have saved lives.
    So I would like to ask, if FAA were in the exact same 
position as Brazilian Civil Aviation Agency, as was with MAX 8, 
what would we have done had we received information about a new 
aircraft so important that it led to significant changes in 
pilot training requirements, wouldn't we share that with 
others? Is it policy and practice at FAA to make such 
information available to the international community?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator Rosen, I can say unequivocally, 
yes. And I think that one of the positive aspects of the 
journey that we have been through over the last couple of years 
is the collaboration and the work between states of design and 
aviation authorities is stronger than it ever has been.
    So we would absolutely share any relevant information that 
we had regarding pilot training or information that needed to 
be provided to flight crews with other authorities. And I will 
emphasize also that the changes that we are putting in place 
are designed to make sure that no single point of vulnerability 
or no single individual can lead to a failure of the system.
    We want to have those additional layers of redundancy 
putting in here--put into the process. And what you are 
pointing out is right in line with what I am talking about.
    Senator Rosen. And I appreciate that. Have you set up--is 
there any set up for collaborating and sharing this kind of 
important information between countries? I mean, I know we 
would do it, and that is great. But are other countries going 
to respond the same? Is there a forum for that? And if there 
isn't, should there be, and how do we make that happen?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, there is a forum. It is called the CMT, 
the certification management team, and it consists of the four 
countries that are involved--that certify transport category 
aircraft. And that construct is--has actually been greatly 
strengthened because of the collaboration that we have executed 
here over the last couple of years as part of going through 
this process.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I would like 
to just quickly ask about FAA's certification workforce. Of 
course, a 2015 audit found that the FAA at the time lacked 
comprehensive process for determining aircraft certification 
service staffing needs critical for effective ODA oversight and 
other certification activities.
    I would just kind of like to go quickly to the question. I 
would like to build on that discussion. Administrator Dickson, 
what can you tell us about today's FAA current certification 
workforce needs, and how can Congress better work with you to 
meet those needs? We need to have a robust certification 
workforce to prevent any injury or loss of life.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, as I mentioned earlier, we have nearly 
doubled our number of human factors' experts. We will continue 
to need data scientists and will need to continue to have those 
engineers in new and emerging technologies and disciplines, 
software engineers, so that the ability to be able to 
adequately--there is much more of these systems are software 
driven now. So that is certainly a need that we are currently 
well-resourced for, but we will need to work very closely with 
the Congress to make sure that we stay ahead of developments as 
we move forward.
    Senator Rosen. STEM education and training is key. I see my 
time is up. I believe that, not sure if anyone's there, but I 
think Senator Peters, you were after me, if I heard that 
correctly.
    The Chair. Not sure if Senator Peters is available.
    Senator Rosen. Oh, sorry. Oh, it is Chair Cantwell. I 
didn't know you were back. Sorry about that.
    The Chair. You are doing a great virtual job of chairing. 
Thank you so much. If Senator Peters is available, we would 
certainly call on him, but maybe he stepped away to go to the 
last vote. Senator Markey.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much. I 
first--Madam Chair, I want to recognize the victims of these 
crashes and their families, including Michael Stumo and Nadia 
Milliron of Massachusetts, who are here today and whose 
daughter Samya Stumo, was tragically killed in the Ethiopian 
737 MAX crash. These families are here for justice, not just 
for themselves, but for every other family that was involved in 
protections for any other family that ever gets on a plane in 
our country.
    And we thank you for being here. We thank you for standing 
vigil for all of those families. And, again we are so sorry for 
the tragic loss, and we are going to work hard to make sure 
that your message is heard at the FAA and here in Congress. 
Thank you. After more than two years of investigations, it is 
clear that Boeing abused the authority delegated to it by the 
FAA to certify its own aircraft.
    Boeing not only cut countless corners to maximize profit at 
the expense of safety, it also intentionally misled the FAA in 
order to avoid more rigorous scrutiny of new technologies 
installed on the 737 MAX, including the flight control system 
that caused both tragic nosedives in Indonesia and in Ethiopia. 
This Committee's passage of the Aircraft Safety and 
Certification Reform Act was a necessary first step toward 
making sure that this can never happen again. But as today's 
hearing makes clear, this new law is not fully implemented and 
the danger of self-certifying aircraft remains even today, 
which is unbelievable. It is also clear that Boeing has not 
truly learned its lesson.
    After giving its former CEO, who oversaw a production of 
the MAX a $60 million golden parachute, Boeing offered its new 
CEO a $7 million bonus for rushing the MAX back into service. 
These decisions do not reveal a company that has learned to 
prioritize safety and accountability over profit, and that is 
why I stand with the families of the victims of these crashes, 
who recently sent a letter calling for the FAA to suspend 
Boeing's delegated authority to certify aircraft until trust is 
fully restored.
    We thank you for your letter and I know you have included 
it in the record, and I think it is just so important that this 
become part of our history----
    The Chair. It will be part of the record.
    (The information referred to follows:]

                                                   October 19, 2021

The Honorable Pete Buttigieg, Secretary
Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Ave SE
Washington DC 20590
  

Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator
Bradley Mims, Deputy Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue SW
Washington DC 20591

Re: ET302 victim's families request for ODA Termination

Dear Secretary Buttigieg, Administrator Dickson and Deputy 
Administrator Mims:

    The undersigned families of the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crash 
request that the Federal Aviation Administration terminate Boeing's 
Organization Designation Authority (ODA). It has become clear that 
Boeing is not a company that can be trusted with the public safety 
responsibilities conferred by the ODA. Just as the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) suspended GE Aviation's Design Organisational 
Approval in Czech last March due to problems, FAA should do the same 
for Boeing unless and until trust, competence and freedom from 
interference is solidly demonstrated.
    Section 7-2(c) of the Order 8100.15B, Organization Designation 
Authorization Procedures, states that an ODA can be terminated due to 
misconduct, lack of care or judgment or failure to implement needed 
corrective action.
    Boeing cannot be trusted to perform authorized safety functions 
because it has engaged in the following misconduct which requires FAA 
action to terminate its ODA:

   1.  deceiving the FAA about the nature and the power of the 
        maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) added to 
        the Boeing 737 MAX 8 (MAX) by way of misleading statements, 
        half-truths and omissions as admitted in its January 21, 2021 
        deferred prosecution agreement;

   2.  deceiving the FAA about whether simulator training was required 
        for pilots to fly the MAX;

   3.  creating an ODA culture that applies undue pressure to 
        engineering personnel so they are not able to exercise 
        independent judgment free from organizational conflicts of 
        interest;

   4.  wrongly approving the original 737 MAX design when it failed to 
        comply with several 14 CFR Part 25 regulations and required 
        Airworthiness Directives (ADs) for the resulting unsafe 
        conditions;

   5.  failing to notify FAA that not all MAX aircraft were equipped 
        with a functional AOA disagree alert;

   6.  failing to manage the ODA in a competent manner that would 
        detect and correct employee and/or management 
        misrepresentations and dishonesty that compromises safety while 
        benefitting Boeing's profit goals;

   7.  failing to conduct realistic system safety assessments on 
        critical systems;

   8.  failing to insulate the ODA from Boeing's profit motives;

   9.  crafting arbitrary and unscientific assumptions, such as pilot 
        response times, to avoid implementing safety measures;

  10.  failing to conduct proper system safety assessments after the 
        Lion Air crash to determine problems, check incorrect 
        assumptions, and fix the problems;

  11.  failing to recognize catastrophic failure due to novel design in 
        flight controls and implementing a failsafe mechanism per FAR 
        requirements;

  12.  falsely stating that the Boeing board safety committee was fully 
        briefed and engaged after the Lion Air crash when that body did 
        not meet and failed to discuss or take any action to correct 
        the flaws in the MAX;

  13.  failing to spend resources to quickly fix the MAX after the Lion 
        Air crash and instead raising dividend's by 20 percent and 
        authorizing a $20 billion stock repurchase program for 
        shareholders;

  14.  doubling down on the safety of the MAX, rather than fixing the 
        MAX, by issuing post-Lion Air crash press releases stating:

       ``We are confident in the safety of the 737 MAX'' 
            (11/21/18);

       ``As our customers and their passengers continue to 
            fly the 737 MAX to hundreds of destinations around the 
            world every day, they have our assurance that the 737 MAX 
            is as safe as any airplane that has ever flown the skies.'' 
            (11/27/18)

  15.  selling and delivering more defective MAX aircraft to more 
        airlines after the Lion Air crash without fixing the problems.

    The FAA, the Department of Justice, the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure and a Delaware judge have all 
affirmatively found that Boeing lied and concealed problems relating to 
the MAX. Other Boeing commercial problems have also raised concerns, 
including the 787 (on board fires) and the 777 (quality and 
certification issues).
    In 2013, a report from NATCA recommended that the Boeing Safety 
Office be structured along the lines of the more traditional Gulfstream 
office in Atlanta. That recommendation was ignored. Part of the 
justification was that there was not sufficient labor resources 
available in the Seattle office, even though subsequently it was found 
that the number of projects handled by the office was stable.
    Another report in 2017 prophetically stated this problem clearly:

        ``The ODA organization makes certification decisions, not the 
        AR. This leads to a potential decision making process 
        influenced by a ``Group Think'' mentality. There is no personal 
        accountability or monetary motivation for ARs to contradict 
        Company management positions that do not support expenditures 
        to upgrade noncompliant designs or do testing needed to 
        demonstrate compliance. ARs are reluctant to take contradictory 
        positions or bring up issues within the ODA for fear of 
        retaliation. In several cases ARs have refused to answer 
        compliance related questions when in meetings with the FAA and 
        ODA management. This reflects their fear of retaliation if they 
        express a view that contradicts the company position.'' (Pre-
        Decisional Involvement (PDI) report, addressing Aircraft 
        Certification Transformation, February 6, 2017)

    The ODA system in general, and Boeing's use of ODA in particular, 
invites undue influence and interference rather than resists it.
    For these reasons, FAA should terminated Boeing's ODA so that FAA 
performs the safety functions under standard certification procedures.
            Sincerely,

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Victim                                                  Signatory
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Vecere                             Megan Hoover, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Liza Grandia, friend of the family
 
Danielle Moore                          Owen Campbell, I am the friend of Danielle Moore
 
Micah John Messent                      Amber Tansky, Sister of victim
 
Max Edkins                              Emily Harris, I am the friend of the victim
 
Matt Vercere                            Matthew Baiamonte, Friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Dominique Lacroix, Sister
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Michael Moscarello, I am a cousin of the victim.
 
Micah Messent                           Glenda Wray, Friend
 
Graziella de Luis Ponce                 Isabel de Luis, I am the niece of the victim.
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Ahmed Ali, I am a friend of the victim
 
Matt Vecere, Samya Stumo                Michael Stumo, father
 
Melvin Riffel                           Carol Shrout, Family friend
Bennett Riffel
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Glenn Tibbett, Family friend
 
Melvin Riffle                           Nicholas Reissr, Family friend
 
Melvin Riffle                           Jim McCoy, Very close family friend of the victims
Bennett Riffle
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Melissa Tibbett, Neighbour of the victim
 
Jess Hyba                               Jeff Curry, I am a friend of the victim
 
Melvin Riffel                           Molly Abraham, Aunt
Bennett Riffel
 
Danielle Moore                          Idit Papular, I am a family friend of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Kimberly, Family friend of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Kristine Wahlers, I am a friend of the victim's family.
 
Melvin Riffel                           Carly Bollinger, Cousins
Bennett Riffel
 
Melvin Riffel                           Marilyn Koutnik, I am a friend of the victims
Bennett Riffel
 
Danielle Moore                          Jodie Layne, Friend
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Julie Kramer, Friend of victim's mother
 
Danielle Moore                          William Hedges, Danielle knew me as Grandpa
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Pascale Perez, Mother's friend
 
Matthew Vecere                          Grace Traa, Friend of the victim
 
Micah Messant                           Nelsen Spickard, Cousin
 
Bennett Riffle                          Sydney Malain, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Chrys Hutchings, friend of Samya's parents
 
Jackson Musoni                          Huguette Debets, Father of my children
 
Micah Messent                           Amy Chow, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Lydia Littlefield, friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Kim Bazinet, Family friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Lou McNeil, Friend
 
Melvin Riffel                           Susan Riffel, I am the mother of these victims.
 
Bennett Riffel                          Ike Riffel, Father
Melvin Riffel
 
Danielle Moore                          Laura Reid, I am the Godmother of the amazing, talented, lovely Danielle
                                         Moore
 
Melvin Riffel                           Anne Robertson, I am the cousin of these victims.
Bennett Riffel
 
Matt Vecere                             Sander Banta, Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Sharon Krogman, I am the cousin of the victim.
 
Sam Pegram                              Natalie Eacersall, Friend of a relative.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Cassidy Howell, Friend
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Curt McCullough, Family friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Barbara Dean, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Chuk Odenigbo, Friend
 
Melvin Riffle                           Susan Janes, I am a family friend of the victims' family
Bennett Riffle
 
Samya Stumo                             Raffik Lopes, I am the cousin of the victim.
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Lois Fuller, Friend of the victim's family
 
Melvin and Bennett Riffel               Tammy Fisher, Cousin
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Annette Vincent, I am the aunt of the victim.
 
Melvin Riffel                           Brittney Riffel, Spouse and Sister-in-Law
Bennett Riffel
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Robert Holmlund, Great Uncle
 
Matt Vecere                             Jenna DiGenni, Friend
 
Oliver Vick                             Ben Coakley, Friend
 
Melvin Riffel                           Katherine Zahner, Friend
 
Paolo Dieci                             Elena Dieci, I am the niece of the victim.
 
Marie Philipp                           Julia Rubio Gamero, Best friend of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Cynthia Abenir, Niece
 
Max Thabiso Edkins                      Julian Kubel, I am the friend of the victim
 
Bennet Riffel                           Sandra Niemann, Family friend
 
Paolo Dieci                             Estella Dieci, Niece
 
Marie Christin Philipp                  Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
 
Wolfgang Eigner                         Bettina Eigner, I am the mother of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Janet Hedges, Aunt
 
Marie Christin Philipp                  Heike Baumann, I am the aunt of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Grantt Lopes, Cousin
 
Melvin Riffel                           Pao Tane, Friend
 
Bennett Riffel                          Deborah Najera, Family Friend
 
Melvin Riffel                           Deborah Najera, Family Friend
 
Josefin Augusta Ekermann                Madelen Maria Ekermann, Mother
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Susan Lamarche, I am the maternal aunt of the victim.
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Melisse Bouziane, I am a cousin of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Paulina Polanco, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Sam Pegram                              Melanie Cremona, Friend
 
Mel Riffel                              May Saeteurn, Friend of victim
Bennett Riffel
 
Clemence Boutant                        Pernille Kjaer Porte, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Hussein Swaleh M'tetu                   Feisal Swaleh, Son of the victim
 
Anne Feigl                              Anna Caroline Feigl, Sister in Law
 
Sam Pegram                              William Pegram, Grandfather
 
Melvin Riffel                           Diana Officer, I am the friend of the victims
Bennett Riffel
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Aude Breton, Friend
 
Derick Kivia Lwugi                      Gladys Kivia, Wife
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Dominique caumes, Niece
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Lizzie Muyawa Dube, Very very good friend. How I miss her daily
 
Sautner Christoph                       Johannes Pernkopf, Friend
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Phyllis Robertson, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Cheryl Engel, Very close friend
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Vincent Edith, Friend
 
Jonathan Seex                           Noah Seex Svalin, I am Jonathan's nephew.
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Lars-Peter Feigl, Sister
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Therese Rouget, Aunt of the victim
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Dominique Verdugo, I am a friend of the victim's family
 
Gatchi de Luis                          Jihane Sfeir, Friend
 
Jonathan Seex                           Par Schroeder, Brother in law
 
Marcelino Rassul Tayob                  Mario Rassul, Brother
 
Marcelino Rassul Tayob                  Elisangela Rassul, Uncle
 
Danielle Moore                          Kathy E. Martorino, Friend of the family
 
Virginia Chimenti                       Angela Maria Farioli, I am the friend of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Carol Moore, Aunt
 
Wolgang Eigner                          Kerstin Bashir, We grow up, studied and worked together
Christoph Sautner
Armin Schietz
 
Jonathan Seex                           Joanna Seex, I am the sister of Jonathan.
 
Micah John Messent                      Joy Camp, Aunt
 
Ollie Vick                              Keri Powell, Friend
 
Marcelino Rassul Tayob                  Emmanuel Rassul, Uncle
 
Micah John Messent                      David Camp, Uncle
 
Jonathan Bjorn Seex                     Britt-Marie Seex, I am the mother of the victim.
 
Clemence Boutant                        Mathieu Chaumeil, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Helen Fodnaess, I am a friend of the victim.
 
MARIA PILAR BUZZETTI                    AILA MOHRHOFF, FAMILY FRIEND
 
Sam Pegram                              Vslerie, Grandmother
 
Marcelino Rassul Tayob                  Hugo Leal, I am the friend
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Nadine Raimondo, I am one of the parents' friends
 
Micheal Ryan                            Tiarnan, brother
 
Abiodun Bashua                          Mariam Bashua, Daughter
 
Abiodun Bashua                          Hyro Bashua, Grandson
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Hans-Joachim Feigl, I am the father of the victim
 
Marie Philipp                           Julia Simonsberger, friend
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Sieglinde Rink-Feigl, I am the mother of the victim
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Abel Orain, I am a cousin of the victim
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Eric Deschoenmaeker, Former employer
 
Clemence-Isaure Boutant                 Emma O'Leary, I am a colleague and friend of the victims
Willm
Sam Pegram
 
Clemence Boutant                        Lucie Viver, Friend
 
Graziella de Luis                       Martinez Gregorio, I'm a friend of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Kristina Louise Hetherington, I am a friend and colleague of the victim.
 
Clemence-Isaure                         Jean-Louis MICHEL, Friend
BOUTANT-WILLM
 
Gachi De Luis                           Patricia Rooke Crossley, I am a friend and colleague of victim
 
Marie Philipp                           Susanne Radtke, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Gachi de Luis                           Tom Afton, Friend
 
Alexandra Wachtmeister                  Anna Wachtmeister, Cousins
 
Anne Katrin Feigl                       Catherine Hubert, Friend
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Henri Virol, I am the friend of the victim
 
Anne Katrin Feigl                       Jack Davies, Friend
 
Graziella De Luis                       Anita Guerra, I am a friend of the victim
 
Gachi de Luis                           Francoise Point, I am a friend of the victim
 
Gachi de Luis                           Gilda Calleja, Close friend
 
Maria Pilar Buzzetti                    Dalma Reka BERES, Colleague
 
Mick Ryan                               Fergus Gleeson, Friend
 
Josefine Ekermann                       Susan Saado, Friend
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Marie-Claire Ribeiro, I am a friend of Veronique Geoffroy, Camille'
                                         aunt.
 
Josefin Ekermann                        Alejandro Conde Geli, Exboyfriend
 
Matthew Vecere                          Jason McClain, I am the cousin of the victim.
 
Anne Katrine Fiegl                      Marcello GOLETTI, friend and colleague
 
Stef Lacroix                            Lauren Webber, Roommates
Karoline Aadland
 
Eric Prieur                             Sandra Prieur, He was my brother
 
Christoph Sautner                       Marlies Wohlmuth, Friend
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Juliette Rouesse, friend
 
Max Thabiso Edkins                      Anne Lyons, Friend
 
Clemence Boutant                        Isabelle Charre, Friend
 
Max Tabiso Edkins                       Dennis Bailey, Uncle
 
Maxc Thabiso Edkins                     Gillian Mary Bailey-Edkins, Auntie
 
Josefin Ekermann                        Lia Hen, My best friend
 
Graciela De Luis Ponce                  Rosita Castro Dominguez, Friend
 
Graciela Luis                           Alejandra Safa Barraza, Friend
 
Kadija Cathy Hamani                     Hamani, Colleague
 
Michael Ryan                            James Spinelli, Friend
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Jerome Bichot, Family friend
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Olivier Peyre, I am a friend of a cousin of the victim.
 
Clemence Boutant-Willm                  Pascale Vulliez, I am the friend of the victim
 
Michael Ryan                            Giulia Serrelli, Friend
 
Sara Gebre Michael                      Ababu Yetbarek, Husband
 
Samya Stumo                             Cassio Lopes, I am the cousin of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Penny Owen, Friend of Family
 
Samya Stumo                             Bradley R Krogman, Cousin
 
Marie Philipp                           Angelika Begerow, I am the friend of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Stacey Troster, Family Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Christina Donnelly, Friend of the victim
 
Graziella De Luis                       Stefanie Santa, Friend of the victic
 
Sam Pegram                              James Killen, Friend of the victim
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Yvette Le Gall, I am the mother in law of Xavier Fricaudet's brother
 
Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm           Violaine Willm, Sister
 
Gachi de Luis                           Jorge Tagle, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Josh Webb, I am a friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Allyson Steele, Friends of a friend
 
Gachi de Luis                           Claire Farrimond, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Jilian O'Neill, Friend
 
Joanne Toole                            Michael Rodgers, I am a cousin of the victim
 
Amma Tesfamariam                        Solomon Tezera, Husband
 
Sintayhu Shafi                          Yewubnesh Asnake, cousin
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Guenievre Darbord, Friend
 
Graziella de Luis y Ponce               Becky Padera, I am a friend of the victim
 
Sintayhu Shafi                          Yewubnesh Asnake, cousin
 
Samya Stumo                             Lara Mittaud, Friend
 
Paolo Dieci                             Elizabeth McCarthy, I am Paolo's sister in law
 
Max Edkins                              Teboho Edkins, I am the Brother of the victim.
 
Oliver Vick                             Tasha Slaise, Olly was a dear friend and our son's beloved godfather
 
Olly Vick                               Kirsty Norton, I am the friend of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Pierre Royer, Uncle
 
Mel Riffel                              Megan Golden, Cousin
Bennett Riffel
 
Danielle Moore                          David Lawless, Partner
 
Micah Messent                           Heather Wilson, I am Micah Messent's aunt.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Victoria Woodhouse, Friend and colleague
Angela Rehhorn
Danielle Moore
Micah Messant
 
Danielle Moore                          Gabrielle Mills, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Jill Frankel, Friend
 
Matthew Vecere                          Tracey Young, Friend
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Bryce and Linda Vincent, Aunt and Uncle
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Micheline Geoffroy, Friend of the family
 
Danielle Moore                          Elizabeth Nagel, I am the friend of the victim
 
Daniel Moore                            Asma Azhar, Friend
 
Matt Vecere                             Jeff and Nancy Vecere, Matt was our nephew
 
Melvin Riffel                           Ryan Bennett, I am the cousin of the victims.
Bennett Riffel
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Paige Kimble, friend in solidarity with the Stumo/Milleron family
 
Micah Messent                           Diane Gershman, I am Micah's aunt
 
Danielle Moore                          Siobhan Takala, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Ludwika Dec, Family friend
 
Denielle Moore                          Marciana Alfaro, Niece
 
Virginia Chiementi                      Mateo Mancheno, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Judith Saathoff, Samya is the granddaughter of my cousin
 
Graciella de Luis Ponce                 Maria Regina Ponce Laviada, first cousin
 
Samya Stumo                             Sarina Ricketts, Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Brian Hubbard, I am a friend of the victim's family.
 
Samya Stumo                             Ari Cardillo, Childhood friend of victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Tim Cruickshank, Roommate
 
Joanna Toole                            Joan Spruce, I am the aunt of the victim.
 
Angela Rehhorn                          G. Smith, Friend of the family
 
Samya Stumo                             Osamah Khalil, Friend of the Family
 
Danielle Moore                          Alexandra Bonham, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Christina Santala, Friend of the victim's mother
 
Micah Messent                           Lucy Wilkie, I am a friend of the 2 victims
Danielle Moore
 
Micheal Ryan                            Cristin Ryan, Sister
 
Mel Riffel                              Chante Hettinger, Friend
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Luigi Flora, Camille's mother's partner
 
Micah Messent                           Mike Gershman, First cousin
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Nicolas Merle, friend of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Deborah Conner, She was my husband's cousin
 
Ghislaine De Claremont                  Melissa Mairesse, Daughter of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Richard Sweetman, I am a family friend.
 
Melvin Riffel                           Katie Niccum, Cousin
Bennett Riffel
 
Sebastiano Tusa                         Alessandra Iovine, I am the friend of the victim's niece
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Carolyn Souaid, I am a cousin of the victim.
 
Danielle Moore                          Karen Bourne, I am the friend of the mother of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Philippe Leroux, I am a friend of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Lucie Miron-Leroux, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Micah Messent                           Laurie Spickard, Cousin
 
Melvin Riffel                           Joe LoGiudice, Step son-in-laws
Bennett Riffel
 
Samya Stumo                             Amy Alpert, Friend of the family
 
Alexandra Wachtmeister                  Carl Nordlander, I am an uncle of the victim.
 
Derick Lwugi                            Angel Kivia, I am the daughter of Derick Lwugi.
 
Matthew Vecere                          Linda Ha, Partner
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Tom Leatherman, I am a friend of the victim
 
Lexi Deighton                           Lexi Deighton, A friend
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Solange Lamy, Friend
 
Olly Vick                               Simon Tilbury, Close friend
 
Josefin Ekermann                        V Leigh, Friend
 
Oliver Vick                             Rebecca Vick, I am sister to one victim, friend and `sister-in-law' to
Jessica Hyba                             the other
 
Micah Messent                           Caroline Rutledge, Friend
 
Angela Rehorn                           S Mark Vincent, Uncle
 
Melvin Riffel                           Alexandria Kealey, I am friend of victims mother.
Bennett Riffel
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Ryan Rehhorn, Brother of Angela
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Marine Capron, I am the sister in law of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Lloyd Baroody, friend of family
 
Danielle Moore                          Courtney Schreiter, Friend
 
Camille GEOFFROY                        Catherine BERTHET, I am the mother of the victim
 
Melvin Riffel                           Larissa felch, Melvin riffel was my brother in law
 
Jessica Hyba                            Gregory Kovacs, Brother
 
Jessica Hyba                            Allan Kovacs, step father
 
Melvin Riffel                           HEIDI PRICE, My sons best friends
Bennet Riffel
 
Jessica Hyba                            Karol Kovacs, Mother
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Petra MacKay, Cousin
 
Samya Stumo                             Nina Anderson, friend of parents
 
Max Thabiso Edkins                      Marianne Gysae-Edkins, I am the mother
 
Andrea Carol Anderson                   Andrea Anderson, I am the grandmother of the partner of Micah's brother.
 
Micah Messent                           Natalie Gates, friend
 
Hoda Bandeh-Ahmadi                      Hoda Bandeh-Ahmadi, Friend/colleague of Samya Stumo.
 
Danielle Courtney Moore                 Betty Moore, I am the paternal Grandmother of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Karen Carreras-Hubbard, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Ann Perry, family friend
 
Max Edkins                              Inga Coleman, Cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Joanne Belanger, Aunt
 
Alexandra Wachtmeister                  Wilhelm Wachtmeister, Father of Alexandra
 
Graziella De Luis                       Sofia Diaz, I am the niece of the victim.
 
Joanna Toole                            Natalie Fullick, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Lisa Markowitz, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Danielle Moore                          Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
 
Danielle Moore                          Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
 
Gachi de Luis                           Maya de Luis, She was my aunt
 
Clemence-Isaure BOUTANT                 Vincent WILLM, I am the brother of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacriox                       Connie Labreche, Cousin of the victims father
 
Baleker, Sintayehu Shafi                Konjit Baleker, I'm the sister of the victim
 
Oliver Vick                             James Vick, Father
 
Matt Vecere                             Colleen Menz, Aunt
 
Olivert Vick                            Cheryl Vick, I am the mother of the victim
 
Graciela de Luis                        Alejandro suarez larrinaga, Nephew of victim
 
Oliver Vick                             Cheryl Vick. (Previously misspelt), I am the Mother of the victim
 
Oliver Vick                             Cheryl Vick, I am the Mother of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Noor Jdid, I am the friend of the victim
 
Graziela de Luiz                        Margaret de Vanssay, Close friend
 
De Luis                                 Christian Klacko, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Lindsay Butt, I am a friend of the victim
 
N/A                                     Arlene Tolopko, I am the triend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Patricia Frank, Second cousin
 
Mick Ryan                               Rodolfo, Friend and work colleague.
Pilar Buzzetti
Zhen Zhen Huang
 
Oliver Vick                             Charles bennett, Friend
 
Marie Philipp                           Helmut Schmidt, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Marie Philipp                           Monika Schmidt, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Joanna Toole                            Nicky McNaughton, Best friend
 
Micah Messent                           Erica Greenup, best friend
 
Micah Messent                           Frank Messent, I'm his older brother
 
Graziela de Luis                        Javier, Brother of victim Graziella de Luis
 
Clemence boutant WILLM                  Eddy Willm, my cousin
 
Clemence boutant WILLM                  eddy willm, my cousin
 
Samya Stumo                             Leila Baroody, friend
 
Melvin Riffel                           Christina Felch, Mother in law to the victim.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Emma Belanger, Cousin
 
Micheal Ryan                            Christine Ryan, I am the mother of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Alain Lacroix, I am Stephanie's father.
 
Micheal Ryan                            Siobhan Brassil, Sister
 
Danielle Moore                          Chris Moore, Father
 
Melvin Riffel                           Clara LoGiudice, Son in law
 
Melvin Riffel                           Zach Niccum, I am a friend/family of the victims.
Bennett Riffel
 
Melvin Riffel                           Kaylynn Campbell, Family member of his widow
 
Samya Stumo                             Cheryl Williams, My daughter friend of victim
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Tara Reid, Friend of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Philip Palmquist, I am the cousin of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Sylvie Lamarche Lacroix, I am the mother of Stephanie Lacroix
 
Danielle Moore                          Lita Venezuela, Friend of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Alanna Clark, Cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Nathalie Robillard, Cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Carole Girard, Friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Line Robillard, Aunt to victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       J Caron, Cousin
 
Micah Messent                           Suzanne Camp, I am Micah Messent's mother
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Faith Neale, Friend of victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Michael Moscarello, I am the maternal cousin of the victim.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Buczkowski, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Stephane Belanger, I am the uncle of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Lucie Lambert, Friend of family
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Christopher Lamarche, Cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Helene Lacroix, I am the grandmother of the victim
 
Micah Messent                           Deborah Fitzsimmons, Auntie
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Brigitte Castonguay, Friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Doris Blouin Harrison, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Torleif Stumo, I am the brother of Samya.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Cameron Caron, I am cousin of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Jennifer Finniss, Friend
 
Micah John Messent                      John Joseph Messent, Father of victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Clariss Moore, I am the mother of Danielle Moore
 
Danielle Moore                          Rodilla Abenir, I am the grandmother of Danielle Moore
 
Danielle Moore                          Fanny Abenir, I am the aunt of Danielle Moore
 
Samya Stumo                             Matthew Kreta, Childhood Friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Anne Vien, Friend
 
Chunming Wang                           SiyueWang, I am the daughter of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Micheline Gervais, Friend of family
 
Steph Lacroix                           Shannon lafrance, Friend
 
Micah Messent                           Kidston Short, I am Micah's girlfriend
 
Micah Messent                           Nancy MacPherson, Sister-in-law
 
Graziella De Luis                       Attilia Fracchia, I was a close friend of the victim
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Bernard Vinot, a dear friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Linda Falardeau, Friend's daughter
 
Joanna Toole                            Mark Toole, Uncle
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Caleb, Friend of the victim.
 
Sam Pegram Sarah Auffret                Rhiannon Griffiths, I was a housemate of the victims at different times
 
Melvin Riffel                           Charlotte Wood, Friend of the victims
Bennett Riffel
 
Melvin Riffel                           Charlotte Wood, I am the friend of the victims
Bennett Riffel
 
Mel Riffel                              Ashley Jorgenson, I am a friend of Mel
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Michel Robillard, I am the uncle of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Mariane Piche, Friend of victim's parents (Alain and Sylvie Lacroix)
 
N/A                                     Eric Pagoada, Friend of a friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Joanne Quinn, I am a friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Kris Picard, I am a friend of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Diane Caron, Cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Johanne Lamarche, cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Barb Hogan, Colleague and friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Pierrette Lachance, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Danielle Moore                          Jesslene Jawanda, I am the friend of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Gualberto Abenir Jr, Neice
 
Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm           Elisabeth Willm, I am the mother of Clemence-Isaure.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Jocelyne Dubien, My cousins daughter
 
Danielle Moore                          Julie McDonald, Friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Gabrielle Gauthier, Former work friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Rami akhrass, Friend of family
 
Danielle Moore                          Kelly Ambrose, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Kathy Martorino, Moore Family friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Albert ajemian, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Lori Kinch, Friend of victim's family
 
Danielle Moore                          Laura Ward, I am a cousin of the victimDanielle Moore
 
Danielle Moore                          Joanne Cerdan, Family friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Cameron Ure, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Dagni Ziedins, Friend of the victims family
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Line Fogal, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Colleen Duffey, Family friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Da Chen, I am the friend of the victim
 
Tamirat Mulu                            Fasika Mulu, Brother
 
Danielle Moore                          Richard Hedges, I am the uncle of the victim.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Jenny Sutton, Friend
 
Stephanie LaCroix                       Sarah Forrest, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Xavier FRICAUDET                        Roseline FRICAUDET, I an the mother of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Suzanne Labelle, I am an aunt to the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Rob Del Mundo, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Chuchi Mangubat, niece
 
Samuel Pegram                           Seamus Harland, Friend
 
Anne Katrin Feigl                       Juan Carlos Llorens Rojas, I am the friend of the victim
 
Micah Messent                           Ross Camp, Uncle
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Helene chartier, Friend
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Valerie Serres, friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Cynthia Abenir, Niece
 
Dawn Tanner                             Hunter Tanner French, I am the son of the victim.
 
Danielle Moore                          Cynthia Abenir, Niece
 
Danielle Moore                          Lyn Abenir, Niece
 
Matt Vecere                             Caroline McClain, I am the cousin of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Mark Uzer, Niece
 
Danielle Moore                          John Uzer, Niece
 
Jonathan Seex                           Nadege Dubois--Seex, I am the wife of the victim
 
Jonathan Seex                           Alexandre seex, I am the son of the victim
 
Mick Ryan                               Andy Jackson, Friend
 
Jonathan Seex                           Antoine Seex, I am the son of the victim
 
Danielle Moore Micah Messant            Leah Luciuk, Friend of victims
 
Jonathan Seex                           Adeline seex, I am the daughter of the victim
 
Boutant wilm Clemence                   Christine Falcand, A Friend of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Jennifer Doucet, Cousin
 
Danielle Moore                          Victoria, I am the friend of the victim's parents
Paul N's wife, two children
and his mother-in-law
 
Mick Ryan                               Rohit Kumar Pokharel, Colleague
 
Joanna Toole                            Adrian Toole, I am Father
 
Mick Ryan                               Clodagh Finn, Friend of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Troy Sabaot, Goddaughter
 
Mick Ryan                               S.M. Tanbir Uddin, I am the colleague of the victim.
 
Danielle Moore                          Natasha Perera, Friend
 
Paolo Dieci                             Luca Dieci, Brother
 
Paolo Dieci                             Maria Luisa Mattioli, Wife
 
Paolo Dieci                             Nella Dieci, Sister
 
Marie Philipp                           Sophia Baumann, Cousin
 
Micah Messent                           Emma Spickard, I am the cousin of the victim.
 
Danielle C Moore                        Betty Moore, Grandmother of the victim
 
Mick Ryan                               Michael Brassil, Brother-in-law
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Nicole Dumouchel, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Alexandra Dufort, I am a friend of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Geraldine leka, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Alexander Tripp, Godfather to Samya
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Maya McDonald, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Danielle Moore                          Kim Lawrence, Friend of the victim's family
 
Melvin Riffel                           Marlina Riffel, I am the Aunt of the victims
Bennett Riffel
 
Mick Ryan                               Stephen Cahill, Friend and co-worker
 
Samya Stumo                             Sharrie Brooks, Cousin
 
Ekta Adhikari                           Samir Nepal, Colleague
 
Mick Ryan                               Finbarr Geaney, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Graziella de Luis                       Jean Kwo, Sister-in-law
 
Matt Vecere                             Joyce Courter, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Micah Messent                           John Camp, Uncle
 
Alexandra Wachtmeister                  Agneta Westman, Alexandra's aunt
 
Micah Messent                           Jade Ballard, I am the eldest sister of the victim.
 
Mick Ryan                               Roy Crabb, Friend and kindred Spirit
 
Micah Messent                           Darryl Gershman, I am the uncle of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Rebecca Young, I am a friend of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Monique, I am her aunt
 
Micah Messent                           Cathy Camp, I am the Aunt of Micah Messent
 
Micah Camp                              Keshia Chutter, I am the cousin of the victim
 
Mick Ryan                               Jennifer McAuliffe, I am the cousin of the victims wife
 
Danielle Moore                          Clariss Moore, I am the mother of Danielle Moore
 
Micah Messent                           James Fitzsimmons, I am the uncle of the victim.
 
Mick Ryan                               Stuart Zimble, I am a close friend
 
Michael Ryan                            Declan O'Mahony, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Mick Ryan                               Eadin O'Mahony, Friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Rosemary Quinn, Family friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Caitlin Hotaling, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Stephanie Kennedy, I used to go to school with the victim.
 
Mick Ryan                               Orla Clinton, Friend and colleague
 
Mick Ryan                               Helen O'Dowd, I am a Friend of the family of victim Mick Ryan
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Paul and Patricia Nimchek, We are friends of the victim and her family.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Christina Callingham, Friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Darla Bennison, Friend of Mother and Father and extended families of the
                                         victim.
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Darla Bennison, Friend of the Mother and Father and extended families of
                                         the Victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Marc Caron, Uncle
 
Samya Stumo                             Tom Connell, Family friend
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Melanie Martin, Friend
 
Steph Lamarche                          Rachelle Helin, I am a friend of victim's mother.
 
Mick Ryan                               Ahmad bin Zakaria, He was my honorable chief
 
Danielle Moore                          David Moore, I am the brother of the victim
 
Ekta Adhikari                           Praneet Shrestha, Fiancee, Colleague
Mick Ryan
 
Marie Christin Philipp                  Ellen Philipp, I am the mother of the victim
 
Marie Christin Philipp                  Klaus Philipp, I am the father of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Annabelle Cerdan, Niece and good friend
 
Melvin Riffel                           Elena Riffel, I am the Aunt of the victims
Bennett Riffel
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Katharina, Close friend
 
Graziella de Luis                       Mariana Cristellys, Friend
 
Michael Ryan                            Conor O'Sullivan, I am a friend of the victim
 
Oliver Vick                             Ilaria Gandossi, Father of my children
 
Danille Moore                           Aurie Narvaez, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Kathryn Brimson, Cousin
 
Danielle Moore                          Sydney Brimson, 2nd Cousin
 
Joanna Toole                            Dennis Spruce, Uncle
 
Marie Philipp                           Christiane Ulrich, Family friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Diane Holmlund, I am a second cousin of Samya
 
Michael Ryan                            Mari Turashvili, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Alexander Cake, Cousin
 
Micah Messent                           Jacqueline Messent, Cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Julie Balasalle, Friend and coworker
 
Mick Ryan                               Catherine Clark, Friend and colleague of the victim
 
Anne-Katrin Feigel                      Nicole Blu, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Daniella Moore                          Wilson Lee, I am the friend of the victim
 
Mick Ryan                               lucie jouanneau, friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Theresa Williams, family friend
 
Peter deMarsh                           Michele Ashby, I am a friend of a victim's sister. And I fly!
 
Alexandra Wachtmeister                  Nane Annan, I am a friend of the victim
 
Mick (Micheal) Ryan                     Aodhnaid Connolly Lennon, Sister in Law
 
Amma Tesfamariam Woldesenbet            Bruk Tesfamariam Woldesenbet, Brother
 
Danielle Moore                          Honor Hedges Royer, aunt
 
Danielle Moore                          Lora Meseman, Mother-in-law
 
Isabella Beryl Achieng Jaboma           Allan Jaboma, She was my sister
 
Graziella De Luis                       Maya AlChidiac, Dear friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Pilar Vera Palmes, I am the Chair of the Air Crash Families Federation
                                         International (ACVFFI)
 
Mick Ryan                               Morgan Connolly, I am the father-in-law of Mick Ryan
 
Mick Ryan                               Maire Connolly, I am the mother-in-law of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Natalie, Dear family friend
 
Max Edkins                              Til Kreuels, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Mick Ryan                               Naoise Connolly Ryan, Wife of Victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Kathy Martorino, Friend of Moore family
 
Samya Stumo                             Nico Tripcevich, Family friend
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Catherine Vincent, I am the Aunt of the victim.
 
Angela Rehhorn                          John Vincent, I am the Uncle of the victim
 
Sintayehu Shafi Baleker                 Liul Baleker, I am the brother of the victim
 
Michael Ryan                            Robert Jackson, Friend
 
Mick Ryan                               Sile Geaney, Family friend
 
Matt Vecere                             Patricia Vecere McClain, Aunt of victim
 
Marie Christin Philipp                  Laura Vendt, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Jurgen Vsych, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Danielle Moore                          Glenn Gundermann, I am a friend of the victim's family.
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Marjorie Aelion, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Laila Mokhiber, Cousin
 
Danielle Moore                          Olivia Allen, friend and colleague of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Joy Wahba, Friend
 
Daniel Moore                            Matthew Miller, I am a friend of Daniel and Micah
Micah Messent
 
Abiodun Bashua                          Alem Tebeje, Brother-in-law
 
Melvin Riffel                           Korryll Lave, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Abiodun Bashua                          Yetunde Bashua, He was my father
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Samantha Demers, I am a friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Luis Arnal Delgado, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Penny Owen, Family friend
 
Max Thabiso Edkins                      Jennifer Anderson-Ochoa, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Harriett Northcutt, A friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Laudison Lopes, Cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Lucille Martin, Friend of the family
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Gail Brinkmeier, friend of victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Lucille Martin, Friend of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Emilie Brule, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Melvin Riffel                           Mackenzie Claver, I am the best friend to the victims
Bennett Riffel
 
Melvin Riffel                           John Fisher, I am married to a cousin of the victims.
Bennett Riffel
 
Samya Stumo                             Carrie Olson, Cousin
 
Matt Vercere                            Matthew Baiamonte, Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Nadia Milleron, I am Samya's mother
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Lauri-Ann Loreto Neal, I am a friend of the victim's mother.
 
Mel Riffel                              ED Duggan III, Friend
 
Carol Diehl                             Carol Diehl, I am a friend of the family
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        linda sawaya, friend of victim's family
 
Bennett Riffel                          Terri Sherman, Friend
Melvin Riffel
 
Samya Stumo                             Helen A Hellmers, Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Pat Brooks, I am a friend of the victim's maternal Grandmother,
                                         Professor Laura Nader
 
Samya Stumo                             Judy Metro, I am a friend of the family.
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        David Teisler, She was daughter of my daughter's GodMother and a great
                                         friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Suzanne Murray, Family friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Mirna Mercado, I am a friend of Samya
 
Samya Stumo                             Laura Flores, my niece
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Gabrielle Paese, I am the friend of the victim
 
Alexandra Wachtmeister                  Anne-Margrete Wachtmeister, I am her mother
 
Micah Messant                           Nelsen Spickard, Cousin
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Michel Monette, Friend of the victim
 
Riffel                                  Tonia, Friend
 
Samya Stumo a d Bella                   Hayley Freedman, Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        E Shaker, Cousin
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Diane de Schoutheete, I am an aunt of Camille Geoffroy
 
Danielle Moore                          Honor Hedges Royer, Aunt
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Jeremy Harbinson, Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Renee Betar, Friend of the victim
 
Samya stumo                             Janet Domenitz, Friend
 
Micah Messent                           Caroline Willis, I am a family friend.
 
Samya Stumo                             James Holmlund, Samya is my grand niece
 
Samya Stumo                             Anne Marie Papandrea, Family friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Lita Venezuela, Friend if the victim
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Mary Eleanor Vincent, I am the Aunt and Godmother of Angela
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Kaitlin Thatcher, Friend
 
Angela Rehhorn                          August Pokotylo, I am the Uncle and Godfather of the victim
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Rowena Fonseka, Friend
 
N/A                                     Shira Drossos, N/A
 
Samya Stumo                             Marilyn J Holmlund, Samya was the granddaughter of my cousin Mary
                                         Holmlund Stumo
 
Danielle Moore                          Bryan Sison, I am the friend of the mother of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Emily Crawford, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Karen Lundeen, Family friend
 
Mick Ryan                               Giacomo Re, Friend and colleague at WFP
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Veronique Geoffroy, Aunt
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Cari borja, Close Friend of grandmother
 
Marie Christin Pfilipp                  Michael Baumann, I am the uncle of the victim
 
Samya Milleron                          Nola Frick, Relative
 
Samya Stumo                             Karen Hoyt, Friend of the victim
 
Marie Christin Philipp                  Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Mette Linnet, Friend
 
Wolfgang Eigner                         Carmen Sigl, Friend
 
Max Edkins                              Friederike Gysae-Schnurre, I am his aunt
 
Mariapilar Buzzetti                     Davide Picistrelli, friend
 
Immaculate Odero                        Victor Mwau, Close friend
 
Jonathan Seex                           Maria Petersen, Cousin
 
Wolfgang Eigner                         Jennifer Stefanits, Friend
Armin Schietz
Christoph Sautner
 
Stefanie LaCroix                        Lauren Webber, Malawi roommate
 
Sam Pegram                              William Pegram, Grandfather
 
Micheal Ryan                            MP O'Brien, brother-in-law
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Nicolas Tsioukis, I am the friend of the victim
 
Oliver Vick                             Jonathan Haines, Cousin
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Francois Fricaudetxa, Father
 
Pilar Buzzetti                          Angelo, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Lucy MacGillis, Friend
 
Arnold                                  Chria, Friend
 
Paolo Dieci                             Silvia Guglielmi, I am the niece of the victim.
 
Marie Christin Philipp                  Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
 
Mercy NDIVO                             Beatrice Kimuyu, I am mother and Mother in-law of the two victims
Jared Babu
 
Ollie Vick                              Tim Bond, Friend
Jessica Hyba
 
Max Thabiso Edkins                      Andrea andersen, I am the cousin of the victim
 
Immaculate Achieng Odero                Eliakim, Sister
 
Xavier FRICAUDET                        Olivier FRICAUDET, I'm the cousin of the victim
 
Sintayhu Shafi                          Yewubnesh, cousin
 
Harina HAFITZ                           Stephanie COSTERG, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Rene Hautier, ami
 
Josefin Ekermann                        Norah Elena Ekermann, Sister
 
Joanne Toole                            Tanya Hucklesby, Friends with her sister Karen
 
Graziela de Luis                        Alejandro, Nephew
 
Marie Philipp                           Hendrik Philipp, I am her brother
 
Michael Ryan                            Dene Cairns, I am a friend of the victim
 
Olly Vick                               Harriet Tarnoy, Friends
Jessica Hyba
 
Alexandra Wachtmeister                  Fredrik Wachtmeister, Brother
 
Jonathan Seex                           Par, Brother in law
 
Graziella de Luis                       Isabel de Luis, sister
 
Sam Pegram                              Val Pegram, Grandmother
 
Sebastiano Tusa                         Alberta Pongiglione, I am a friend of the victim
 
Marie Philipp                           Laura Petrak, Best friend
 
Oliver Vick                             Rifet Arapovic, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Gabriele Haldenwang, I am a friend of the family of the victim
 
Pilar Buzzetti                          Richard Culley, I am the friend of the victim
 
Immaculate Odero                        Sally, Sister-in-law
 
Oliver Vick                             James Vick, I am the father of the victim
 
Oliver Vick                             Cheryl Vick, I am the Mother of the victim
 
Immaculate Odero                        Christabel Were, Friend
 
Sam Pegram                              Scott Hetherington, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Michael Ryan                            Darragh Mcdonagh, Friend
 
Jessica Hyba                            George Ghikas, Friend
 
Oliver Vick                             George Ghikas, Friend
 
Anne Feigl                              Anna Caroline Feigl, Sister in law
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Katharina Peters, Close friend
 
Immaculate Achieng Odero                Denis Adhoch, Husband
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Rossi Hadzhieva, I am a friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Diane Sykes, Family friend
 
Max Thabiso Edkins                      Donald Edkins, I am the father of Max Thabiso Edkins.
 
Danielle Moore                          Bhobbie alfaro, Cousin
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Joan, I am a friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Carol Conner, Family Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Matthew Caemmerer, Friend
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Lorna Nickerson, Family friend
 
Paolo Dieci                             Estella Dieci, Niece
 
Marie Philipp                           Julia Schmidt, Friend of family
 
Jonathan Seex                           Linda Poidnakk, Friend
 
Danielle Moore                          Mo Phung, Closed friends.
Micah Messent
 
Jonathan Seex                           Gunilla Larsson, Jonathan was the son of a very good friend and I had
                                         known him since he was a baby. It still hurts that this beautiful
                                         person is no longer because of greed and negligence!
 
Danielle Moore                          Jacqueline Miller, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Joanna Toole                            Paul Heydon, Friend of a Friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Linda Miller, Friend
 
Jonathan Seex                           Nadja Chekhov, I'm the friend of the victim's motter
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Julie Lacourse, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Melvin and Bennett Riffel               Cheryl hess, Cousin
 
Jonathan Seex                           Johan Hartzell, Wifes cousin
 
Immaculate Achieng' odero               Princess Piro, I am a very close family & childhood friend & neighbor
 
Samya Stumo                             Arlene Tolopko, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Valerie serres, friend
 
Sebastiano Tusa                         Sofia Ambrogio, I am the niece of the victim
 
Danielle Moore                          Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
 
Clemence Boutant                        Ian HENSTOCK, Friend/former colleagues
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Kristen Brookes, friend of the family
 
Michael Ryan                            Helen Maree, I am a family member of the victim
 
Angela Elizabeth Maria Rehhorn          Roland Rehhorn, Father of victim
 
Sebastiano Tusa                         Carlo Tusa, He was my cousin.
 
Matthew Vecere                          Richard McMullin, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Jean-Michel Suzanne Barranger           Laetitia Tavernier, I am the dauthger
 
Jean Michel Suzanne Barranger           Marc Tavernier, I am son-in-law
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Murray Howe, friend of Family
 
Eric Prieur                             Prieur claire, My brother
 
Danielle Moore                          Kathleen Randall, Cousin
 
Samya Stumo                             Deveney williams, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Amy Alpert, Family friend
 
Cedric Galia Asiavugwa                  Alex Kubasu, I am the friend of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Sheryl Lechner, family friend
 
Bennett Riffel                          Lorraine Micke-Hayden, I am the cousin of the victims.
 
Melvin Riffel
 
Oliver Vick                             Kirsten Young, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Jennifer Brown, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Johanna Toole                           Elisa Canalini, I am a colleague of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Steven Souaid, I am a cousin of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Robbyn Swan, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Sandra K Holmlund, Great Niece
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Jacob Oberfrank, Partner
 
Clemence Boutant-Willm                  Claire FABING, I am a colleague of the victims
Samuel Pendam
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Michelle BeaudrySeguin, Close friend
 
Steph Lacroix                           Jamie Lafrance, Friend/former roommate
 
Xavier FRICAUDET                        NOUVION Marie, famille
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Thomas Leatherman, Friend and Colleague
 
Melvin Riffel                           Melissa Duralia, I am the friend of a victim
 
Graziella de Luis y Ponce               Maria Tauber, Friend
 
Marie Philipp                           Angelika Begerow, I am the friend of the victim
 
Jonathan Seex                           Anne-Marie Petersen, Aunt
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Sophie Le Bret, Family's friend
 
Michael Ryan                            John Maree, Concerned engineer family friend
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Sam Eifling, I'm a friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Michelle Wolfensperger, Cousin
 
MELVIN Riffel                           Rebecca Richardson, I am a friend of Ike and Susan Riffel
BENNETT RIFFEL
 
Matt Vecere                             Stephen Dintino, Friend
 
Dawn Tanner                             Brian Kobiero, Spouse
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Regina M. Buono, Friend
 
Immaculate Achieng Odero                Emmy, Sister
 
Allan Chacha                            Allan Chacha, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Joseph Kreta, Childhood friends
 
Mick Ryan                               Jack Connolly, Uncle Inlaw
 
Melvin and Bennett Riffel               Carl J. Koutnik MD, friend of family
 
Immaculate Achieng Odero                Judith Otsieno, Friend
 
Mick Ryan                               Lee Wassem, Family member
 
Mick Ryan                               Deirdre Connolly, I am the wife of Jack Connolly--Micks uncle in law
 
Suzanne Barranger                       Barranger Sebastien, I am the son of the victim
Jean Michel Barranger
 
Paolo Dieci                             Harlan Downs-Tepper, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Juliah Mwashi                           Florah Mwashi, Sister
 
Juliah Mwashi                           Ivy Nduta, Mother
 
Juliah Mwashi                           Joy Ayuma, Mother
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Virginie Fricaudet, I am the sister
 
Jonathan Seex                           Karen McDougall, I am a childhood friend of the victin.
 
Melvin Riffel                           Susan Mears, Family Friend
Bennett Riffel
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Jean-Luc Moreau, I am friend of the victim
 
Clemence Willm                          Celine Grimault, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Mick Ryan                               Alan Connolly, Relative
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       David Finniss, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Joanna Toole                            Bridget Harris, Close family friend and best friend of my niece Katy
                                         Harris
 
Samya Stumo                             Laura Zabriskie, I am a friend and parishioner of Samya.
 
Matt Vecere                             Tomra Vecere, Sister
 
Matt Vecere                             Charles Sinesi, Brother in law
 
Clemence-Isaure Willm Boutant           Emma Boutant, I am the step-daughter of the victim.
 
Danielle Moore                          Colleen Duffey, Family friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Evelyn Kreta, I was her friend and church school teacher.
 
Matt Vecere                             Rachel Condon, Niece
 
Samya Stumo                             Sylvia Lewis, I am a family friend.
 
Oliver Vick                             Lucy Bowers-Wildblood, Friend, chosen family.
 
Oliver Vick                             Lucy Bowers-Wildblood, Friend, chosen family.
 
Danielle Moore                          Nick Cake, Cousin
 
Michael Ryan                            Hayley Dowsing-Connolly, Family friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Karen Hubbard, Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Matilde Guillen, I am the host mother in Peru of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Gustavo Justo, I am the host father in Peru of the victim
 
Emmaculate odero                        Susan, Friend
 
Immaculate odero                        Ephie, Sister
 
Mick Ryan                               Mai, Colleague and Friend
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Harm van Duin, Friend
 
Sam Pegram                              Mark Pegram, Father
 
Ekta Adhikari                           Noel Griffin, Colleague and friend
Maria Pilar Buzzetti
Virginia Chimenti
Harina Hafitz
 
Zhen-Zhen Huang
Michael Ryan
Djordje Vdovic
 
Alexandra Wachtmeister                  Anna Wachtmeister, Cousin
 
Immaculate Achieng Odero                Hermaton Nalyanya, A friend to the victim
 
Agnes Mary Wangari Gathumbi             Ian Kabaara, I am a friend of the children of the victim
 
Sam Pegram                              Melanie Cremona, Friend
 
KARIM SAAFI                             Mohamed Najeh Saafi, BROTHER
 
KARIM SAAFI                             DRISS SAAFI, Uncle
 
KARIM SAAFI                             ELYESS SAAFI, Uncle
 
Saafi Karim                             Ingrid de Viennay, Je suis son ancienne belle soeur.
 
KARIM SAAFI                             INESS SAAFI, Uncle
 
Max Edkins                              Kathleen McCarthy, Friend
 
Angela                                  Shantel Rehhorn, Sister
 
Angela Rehhorn                          Joan Vincent, Mother
 
Samya Stumo                             Deirdre Hatch, I am a friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             David Hatch, I am a friend of the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Glen Levacque, Cousin
 
Immaculate odero                        Ephie odero, Sister
 
Riffle Brothers                         Ericka Allio, Family friend
 
CLEMENCE-ISAURE BOUTANT                 Denis Boutant, I am the husband of the victim
 
Joanna Toole                            Jerome Toole, I am the cousin of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Jenelle Pierce, Cousins daughter passed away in the plane.
 
Emmaculate Achieng Odero                Clifford Odero, I am the brother of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Georgia Usry, Close friend of the family
 
Jonathan Seex                           Johanna, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Susan Lockwood, I am a friend of the victim
 
Oliver Vick                             David Haines, I am the victim's uncle.
 
Danielle Moore                          Mark Uzer, Cousin
 
Danielle Moore                          Mark Uzer, Cousin
 
Samya Stumo                             Joni Cushing, Friend
 
Jessica Hyba                            Susan Olszynko, Close friend
 
Michael Ryan                            Lynn Dowsing-Connolly, He was my cousin's husband
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Fr. John Kreta, Spiritual father
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Erika Wainwright, I am the friend of Samya Stumo
 
Graciela De Luis Ponce                  Noemi Laviada, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Hollis Starks, friend of the victim
 
Jonathan Seex                           Torben Rune, Friend of victim
 
ZHEN ZHEN HUANG                         WEI XIONG, I am the husband of the victim
 
Graziella De Luis                       Anita Guerra, I am a friend of the victim
 
Max Thabiso Edkins                      Gillian Mary Edkins Bailey, I am the auntie
 
Mick Ryan                               Thalia Maree, Cousin of Mick's wife Naoise
 
Maygenet Worku                          Eyasu Teshome, Husband
 
Anne-Katrin Feigl                       Michele Pasquale, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Sam Pegram                              Tom Pegram, Brother
 
Camille Geofrroy                        Amelie Jourdier, I am the aunt
 
Mick Ryan                               Seanna Connolly, Brother in law
 
Michael Ryan                            ciamha hurst, i am a friend
 
Mick Ryan                               Tina O'Flynn, I am a friend of the victim
 
Micheal Ryan                            Silvia Rodriguez Barbado, A friend of the victim
 
Graziella de Luis y Ponce               Susan Draz, Friend
 
Michael Ryan                            Eoin Daffy, Friend
 
Marie Christin Philipp                  Wiebke Hormeyer, I am a friend
 
Ines Michaela Gans                      Bernd Gans, My daughter
 
Virginia Chimenti                       Vincenzo Maggiore, Colleagues
Pilar Buzzetti
Harina Hafiz
 
Karoline Aadland                        Knut Ingvar Aadland, I am the father of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        James Carter, Friend of Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Katherine Preston Cory, I am a friend of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Tierney Simpson Jutzi, Friend of a Friend
 
Carlo Spini                             Andrea Spini, I am the son of the victims
Gabriella Viciani
 
Samya Stumo                             Joseph Homsi, Friend
 
Abiodun Bashua                          mena tebeje, I am a wife of the victim
 
Clemence Wilm                           Marine Rudant, friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Carol McFadden, Friend of friend
 
Xavier Fricaudet                        Yvette Le Gall, Xavier is the brother of my son in law
 
Stehanie Lacroix                        Chantale and Real Boissonneault, daughter of our friends
 
Josefin Ekerman La Torre                Michael, Cousin
 
Samya Stumo                             Alyssa O'Connor, Close Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Andres Justo, I am the friendo ir the victim
 
Stephanie Lacroix                       Sara Lefebvre, Classmate
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Lucia Justo, I am the friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             Maria Sofia Justo Guillen, I am the friend of the victim
 
Samya Stumo                             April Cain, She was the close friend of a young friend of mine
 
Micah Messent                           Isabella Morgan, Friend
 
Samya Stumo                             Stuart Robinson, Friend
 
Sam Pegram                              Deborah Pegram, I am Sams Mum
 
Xavier FRICAUDET                        Isabelle REBILLARD, I am a friend of the victim's family
 
Oliver Vick                             LUcinda Pullinger, Long term friend
 
Melvin Riffel                           Mary Ann Tangney, Nephews
Bennett Riffel
 
Michael Ryan                            Padraig McCarron, I am the friend of the victim
 
Harina Hafitz                           Arnaud Sournia, Friend of the family of the victim
 
Virginia Chiementi                      Mateo Mancheno, Friend of the victim
 
Micheal Ryan                            Brian McDonagh, I am the friend of the victim.
 
Samya Stumo                             Ben Webb, Close friend
 
Jonathan Seex                           Bjorn Olund, Friend
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Lucia Guillen, I am the friend of the victim
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Sandra Sermini-curtiss, Friend of family
 
Matt Vecere                             Warren McClain, I am the uncle of the victim
 
Mel Riffel                              Thomas Tangney, Uncle
Bennet Riffel
 
Sergey Vyalikov                         Alex Fikhman, I am the uncle-in-law of victim.
 
Marie Philipp                           Derek Hagen, Friend
 
Camille Geoffroy                        Laura Couillet, Freind
 
Samya Rose Stumo                        Andrew Souaid, Cousin
 
GEORGE KABAU                            PAUL KABAU, BROTHER
 
Max Edkins                              Leonita Louw, Friend
 
Eric PRIEUR                             Fabrice CRABIE, brother in law
 
Mick Ryan                               Morgan F Connolly, Brother-in-law
 
Michael Ryan                            Theresa Stack, Friend of the fmily
 
Sergey Vialikov                         Dmitrii Vialikov, Brother
 
Sergey Vialikov                         Nadya Vialikova, SON
 
Anne Karanja,                           Dr. Karanja, Mother, sister, nephew and niece
Caroline Nduta Karanja,
Ryan, Kellie and Rubby
 
Mick Ryan                               Ian Connolly, Cousin in law
 
Mick Ryan                               Sam Woolhead, My partner is a family Friend
 
Karim SAAFI                             Abdel-Jawad Jellad, Nephew
 
Jonathan Seex                           Carola Schroder, I'm mother in law to his sister
 
Joanna Toole                            John Paul Rodgers, Cousin
 
Jonathan Seex                           Carola Schroder, I'm mother in law with his sister
 
Samya Stumo                             Clarice Faber, Friend
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Senator Markey..--that Congress relies upon. Administrator 
Dickson, will you suspend Boeing's delegated authority until 
Congress aircraft certification bill is fully implemented and 
Boeing has conclusively proven that it has changed its ways?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator Markey, thanks for the question. We 
have reset the relationship with Boeing in no uncertain terms. 
And we have limited delegation of various items. As I said a 
moment ago, the airworthiness certificates, we are retaining 
full control over that. One of the improvements that has been 
put in place is Boeing's safety management system. That is 
revealing issues much earlier than they were previously. And we 
are seeing results, and it is making our oversight more 
effective and more systematic. We conduct regular performance 
reviews with them, and we will continue to drive those 
improvements.
    Senator Markey. I would just say this, honestly limiting 
delegation is just not enough. We cannot trust Boeing until the 
systems that enabled and caused these tragedies are fully 
fixed, and I urge you to take back the FAA's full certification 
authority. Just take it all back. Should be in your hands, and 
that is just the bottom line on this, Mr. Administrator.
    I also want to strongly urge you to finish implementing two 
overdue Congressional mandates from the FAA Reauthorization Act 
of 2018. First, while I am glad the FAA has finally published 
its proposed rule to increase the required amount of flight 
attendant rest hours, you must finalize this proceeding without 
further delay.
    And second, the FAA needs to rapidly advance a requirement 
to install secondary cockpit barriers on new airplanes, which 
will protect our crews and passengers from anyone who may rush 
the flight deck. It is simply time to get these essential rules 
done. Administrator Dickson, will you complete them in the near 
future?
    Mr. Dickson. We are fully committed to completing them, and 
I share your frustration, Senator, at how long these processes 
take.
    Senator Markey. Have you prioritized those two rules?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, we have.
    Senator Markey. So what is your time-frame for finishing 
those rules?
    Mr. Dickson. We are--as you said, we are moving forward 
with the--we have the NPRM out on the flight attendant rest 
period. We are in the process of finalizing the proposal on 
secondary barriers and that will--that NPRM should be out in 
the coming months. It is a good bit more technically 
complicated, but we want to make sure that we are able to 
account for as much data as we can on the front end because it 
will actually get us to the destination.
    Senator Markey. Well do them right, but do them fast. There 
is a lot depending upon it.
    Mr. Dickson. I share your urgency and your emphasis.
    Senator Markey. And we also have to address aviation 
cybersecurity. Our airplanes are increasingly computerized and 
new software is being rolled out every single day. These 
technologies offer enormous potential to improve safety and 
efficiency, but it will only take one hacker to cause a 
disaster. And that is why I will soon reintroduce my 
cybersecurity standards for aircraft to Improve Resilience Act 
or the Cyber Air Act.
    This bill will require the disclosure of information 
relating to cyberattacks on our aviation system, as well as 
build strong cybersecurity standards directly into our air 
carrier and aircraft certification processes. Administrative 
Dickson, do you agree that we need to require enhanced 
cybersecurity in aviation before tragedy strikes, yes or no?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes. Senator, I do.
    Senator Markey. Well, I thank you for that. But ultimately, 
I think we are going to need to pass legislation. Have you had 
a chance to look at my legislation that would mandate this?
    Mr. Dickson. I have not seen the specifics, but we 
currently have protocols in place for avionics. But this is 
again an evolving area. Airplanes are much more software 
driven, as you state, these days, and so we need to make sure 
that the adequate layers of protection are in there. So I look 
forward to working on it.
    Senator Markey. OK. Airplanes today are just flying 
computers, and they are totally hackable. And to the extent to 
which this is not a subject that has been addressed properly 
yet, we are just in a very dangerous period of time. So again, 
I urge you to move quickly, and I think as well, it should be 
backed up with legislation that mandates that this occur. Thank 
you, Madam Chair.
    The Chair. Thank you, Senator Markey. I am not aware of 
other members. I know Senator Peters joined us shortly on 
video, but I am not sure if these returning were anyone else. 
So while I will tell members that I am going to do a second 
round here and we will see if anybody else appears for 
questions. If not, we will close out the hearing.
    Administrator, one of the issues that we have heard a lot 
about in the certification process and it has come up a couple 
of times is the fact that the law requires on the change 
product rule to change the process. And yet I think you are 
saying it is going to take years to do that by a rulemaking.
    And yet we still have a process underway for certifying 
planes. And so what are you putting in place now to make sure 
that you have the workforce and the people to review that 
process while a change product rule is in development? 
Shouldn't the FAA produce like policies to close the loophole 
in the meantime?
    Mr. Dickson. Senator--Chair Cantwell, absolutely. And we 
are working this on two tracks. We have MITRE doing a study for 
us on the criteria for significant changes for the change 
product rule to drive that--those decision criteria. And we 
have also stood up the International Authorities Working Group.
    They have already met several times and they will continue 
on should provide recommendations to us by next summer on 
harmonizing the change product rule across all States of 
design, so it is consistent regardless of where equipped----
    The Chair. I am a little more worried about the right now. 
I mean, this was a pretty big change in the system that allowed 
technology to outpace our focus on it, and we don't want to see 
that happen again. So we don't need anything else to happen to 
know that we need to put something in place, and it was already 
asked to be put in place, so that we would have it today.
    So this is the issue, if you are producing a plane that is 
a derivative of a product. And this is the challenge that we 
face. We were very clear in the law. We said everybody, every 
plane has to go through a systems analysis on anything that is 
different. So we----
    Mr. Dickson. Chair Cantwell that is actually happening now. 
So any critical design component requires validation, anything 
that touches human factors, and the additional human factors 
folks that we have got in the agency are focused, laser focused 
on that issue. We are also involving them throughout the 
process not just to design approval, but also for continued 
operational safety once the airplane is actually out there 
flying.
    So that data is actually coming back and informing the 
certification process where it wasn't to such a degree before.
    The Chair. Well, back to Mr. Won, because I do--you know, I 
think he is trying to get the information in his May 13th 
letter, where he basically said that there was not enough 
information on the 777-9 on their core, a common core system, 
their communication system. When you look at this quote from 
the letter, it is, ``an integrated modular avionics 
architecture that provides a set of shared computing, 
networking, input-output resources to support the computing and 
system interface needs for multiple airplanes.''
    So it sounds very similar to us saying we want to 
understand what the software does, similar to the MCAS system. 
So my question is, here is somebody who is doing what we 
asked--and just, you know, for the context, there are more 
than, I think, 1,600--I am sorry, thousands of SPIA members. 
These are professional engineers. In the Northwest, they are 
our friends, they are our neighbors.
    These are people that are working and putting their name 
behind their product, or let's say they would like to put their 
name behind their product, but they need this backup of the 
FAA. And here we have someone on the ground who is saying, yes, 
I am going to make sure that we slow down and look at this.
    But when we look at the fact that the Boeing Oversight 
Office, the aviation FAA office overlooking the Boeing 
manufacturing has basically been at a static engineering level 
for decades, how do you expect that we are going to be able to 
do this oversight and be able to really understand and keep 
pace with this technology?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Chair Cantwell, it is again the--we have 
increased engineering resources within the BASOO, but we are 
also integrating the Certificate Management Office at Boeing, 
which oversees the production side of the house. And all the 
operators that operate Boeing aircraft, we are integrating them 
so that we can leverage all their expertise in these processes 
and make sure that the BASOO is able to be more effective in 
its process. In this particular letter, part of what we are 
dealing with is the issue of what our expectations are for 
submissions.
    And that is something that was a very early part of my 
conversations with Boeing leadership. You have got to give us 
the full picture. You can't give us a portion of it and then 
say, well, you will get everything else next week.
    So this is just really resnapping that line to make sure 
that the applicant that we are overseeing is giving us a 
complete system picture when they ask for us to move to the 
next milestone in an approval process.
    The Chair. To Senator Markey's point, I know that there was 
an IASA repeal of an ODA authority. At what point would you 
take that step?
    Mr. Dickson. If--well, at this point we are--if we saw that 
they weren't meeting our expectations on a consistent basis or 
if we saw anything in their safety management systems or their 
data where they weren't making the necessary cultural or 
transparency improvements, then we would go down that path at 
some point.
    The Chair. Well, again, I--you know, we are going to have 
our own report and our own reporting of what we have been told 
by various whistleblowers, but it is clear that the process has 
changed, that this process of collaboration and solving 
problems has now changed into the--well, at least from what we 
have heard the FAA not even asking the ODA unit members to 
produce documentation about testing and information. That 
literally this, does it comply, yes or no? So we have to build 
this workforce.
    We have to believe in them. They are our early warning 
system when something is wrong, and you have to back them up. 
So again, I am asking you because I don't see the workforce 
improvement at the Seattle office that you are describing. I 
think we are at a total of 52 people, 32 of which are 
engineers.
    So I don't think that that has changed much over the years. 
So how have you, since these accidents, improved the Seattle 
oversight office?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, we--I will get you the current 
numbers, but we have increased our resources. And we are, I 
know because I have sat down with them personally, our people 
feel empowered and backed up as they never have been before. 
And that is helping them to be more effective.
    This, which I think was part of what you were really 
focusing on in the legislation, the appointment of the unit 
member advisors, is creating a direct communication path to 
make sure that there is no interference with that line of 
communication between----
    The Chair. Not a direct communication path--that simply 
makes it sound like it is about communication. It is an 
authority oversight on whether this is going to move forward or 
not.
    Mr. Dickson. But the awareness in terms of what the issues 
are and not allowing the employer to interfere with issues that 
are brought forward directly to the agency, that is going to 
help us be much more informed and our oversight much more 
effective.
    The Chair. Well, I look forward to seeing this list of 
people that you say that you enhanced to the office with. What 
do you think the skill level is to do certification oversight? 
I mean, what is the skill level and background of the person 
who heads this up for you at the FAA?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, certainly, you know, aeronautical 
engineers. We need system--we need software engineers. And I 
think that there is a growing need in that area. That was 
something that we--that I think with newer platforms where we 
are seeing how the systems are interfacing with each other, 
that is more and more a part of the architecture of newer model 
aircraft.
    And so that is an area that we will be focused on, but you 
are always going to have engineers, mechanical engineers and 
others in other aerospace disciplines. But it is transforming 
to a more of a, how do all of these automated systems on newer 
aircraft interface with each other.
    I think as we go into the coming years, we will need to 
build our workforce on things like auto--artificial 
intelligence as well.
    The Chair. Well, you and I might agree on that point about 
software because I don't think there is enough attention that 
has been paid to this, either at the skill level of 
understanding this, particularly from an oversight and 
certification perspective, but certainly also at the company. 
And then when it comes to this issue of overload in the cockpit 
on various alerts and understanding particularly--look, I think 
we saw this.
    I think you saw even in your own private background that 
you had pilots complain about the automation system and the 
fact that there was so much happening in these automated 
systems. So the question is, what do you need to do to make 
sure that we get this automation right? And I think to me, 
there seems to be this task that we also outlined in the bill, 
you know, when you are now doing an oversight of a new software 
system, that is going to be so critical, I would think the FAA 
would produce a document that says these are the things that we 
expect to understand, and that you would get that integrated 
team that we asked for right now on software stood up and 
pounding on the kind of questions that you would want answered 
from that system, so they are not simply relying on, you know, 
the information presented.
    Again, this is a huge transformation that is continuing in 
aviation, and--but it is not only in aviation. It is happening 
in vehicles. This committee is struggling with the same 
oversight as it relates to unmanned cars and other issues.
    So it is getting your team and getting people to do that 
oversight now on the technical skill side and getting the right 
level of workforce. I just don't see that urgency in the FAA's 
action. So I would ask you to do that and to make that the 
number one priority as you move forward.
    Mr. Dickson. Chair Cantwell, it is a very--an extremely 
high priority and I will get you that additional insight----
    The Chair. Well, it is essential to fulfilling the law. OK, 
so I have a larger, broader question, which is just about the 
process, and this is again a perfect example of it--this 777 
issue. So when you are submitting design data to the FAA for a 
finding of compliance, shouldn't the applicant certify in 
writing to the FAA that the submitted data complies with all 
the available and applicable airworthiness standards?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, that is correct.
    The Chair. OK. And if the design does not comply with the 
applicable airworthy standards that a design should be brought 
into compliance before the FAA certifies the aircraft?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, that is correct.
    The Chair. OK. Well, I don't know that that happens. I am 
not sure that that is what is happening. And so again, if we go 
back down the system, there were a lot of checks on a list of 
issues, but not on final compliance with that information. I 
think that is what is missing in the system, and I think we are 
going to continue to look at that.
    And I would look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we 
ensure that compliance really does meet that standard. So very 
much appreciate your answer on that. Thought we had one more 
question that we wanted to go over. My colleague--there are two 
issues on the workforce side. Standing up of the air grant 
program. This is very much similar to the sea grant program. 
And getting here on the Hill, a professional workforce that is 
very skilled and knowledgeable in aviation.
    I am very proud of my colleagues here today. You can see 
that many of them have been following this and know 
specifically, but I would--I think it is easy to say that the 
oversight of the FAA on this issue needs a more technical staff 
here on the Hill in addition, and throughout, you know, 
throughout the policymaking realm.
    I am very pleased with what the sea grant fellows have been 
able to achieve because they brought a lot of scientific 
knowledge to our understanding as it relates to our NOAA 
oversight or fisheries oversight. So what is it going to take 
to get that stood up?
    Mr. Dickson. We will look forward to working with you on 
it. It is--I think it is a great idea and something that would, 
I think, improve the collaboration and the communication with 
the Committee and make sure that we are more effective in our 
implementation. And frankly, lay a solid foundation for the 
future, as you said.
    The Chair. Yes. OK. And the same, I think one of my 
colleagues may have asked about the same ICAO involvement of 
going to ICAO and making sure that we are setting the same 
international standards.
    Mr. Dickson. Right. On pilot training, is that--?
    The Chair. Yes, Yes. So that we are not going to allow a 
slippage of the standards set by pilots on an international 
basis. That we are going to very much understand the 
manufacturing of planes with integrated software systems, but 
we are also going to still have a skilled pilot at the helm, 
two pilots who know how to fly the plane if those systems are 
turned off.
    Mr. Dickson. Right. And I think we--ICAO is important, but 
we can't rely on ICAO. We have got to help authorities around 
the world to implement the requirements that we are talking 
about here, because that is going to really raise the bar in 
terms of not only pilot training but also maintenance programs, 
and anyone operating--in this case a U.S. product, but any 
airplane and commercial operation anywhere in the world, we 
want to work with those authorities.
    So things like I have talked about before, upset prevention 
recovery training, flight path management, as we implement 
those beneficial changes in the United States, we want to work 
through ICAO to get the standards set, but then we also have to 
go to the individual aviation authorities to make sure that 
they are implemented consistently around the world.
    The Chair. We want the United States to be a leader on what 
is required for both the manufacturers and for the skill set 
that it takes for flying the planes.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    The Chair. And so we want the FAA to set that standard 
here, and we want you to be a loud advocate for it on an 
international basis----
    Mr. Dickson. Could not agree more.
    The Chair. Thank you. According to my information, the DOT 
OIG report of February of this year said there has only been 
one engineer added to the Seattle office since the MAX 
tragedies.
    So I think there is some resolution here of what is really 
the fact and information, so I will look forward to getting 
that information from you so that we can--I just firmly believe 
that having the right staffing and having your integrated team 
set up to advise you right now, not waiting for their moment, 
and clarifying this change product rule process will be 
critical.
    OK, but very much appreciate Mr. Won doing his job in 
standing up. So I think that makes the hearing for us today. 
The record will remain open until December 1st, 2021. Any 
Senators that would like to submit questions for the record and 
for the witnesses--for the witness--should do so by November 17 
of this year.
    And we ask for responses be returned no later than December 
1. So that concludes our hearing again. Thank you, 
Administrator, for being here today.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, ma'am.
    The Chair. We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office Staffing Levels. The 
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) imposes 
several new requirements on FAA to improve the aircraft certification 
process, particularly for Boeing airplanes. Yet, we understand the 
Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO), which reportedly had 
inadequate resources to oversee Boeing before the adoption of ACSAA, 
has had a net increase of only one engineer since October 2019. While 
many engineers have been assigned to BASOO, an almost equal number have 
left this office. According to information provided to the Committee, 
this has been attributed to the fact that positions in the BASOO are 
relatively low-paying compared to other AIR divisions that have a less 
critical role in ensuring the safety of transport airplanes. The result 
is that senior engineers in the BASOO are constantly training new 
engineers, who then leave for promotions to other offices. You 
testified that FAA is ``doubling the number of human factors staff 
within AVS, and realigning the hiring of technical advisors with the 
necessary technical expertise involved in critical safety decisions.''

    Question 1. What factors do you attribute to the poor retention 
rate at the BASOO? Are BASOO engineers receiving lower pay in 
comparison to other AIR divisions? If not, why does the BASOO have such 
turn-over of personnel? What is FAA doing to address staff turnover at 
the office charged with overseeing the largest Organization Delegation 
Authorization (``ODA'') unit in the country?
    Answer. The FAA acknowledges the gaps identified in past employee 
retention and is committed to addressing these issues. Since 2018, the 
BASOO has experienced an increase in the number of employees who either 
retired, were reassigned, or left Federal service. While some employee 
movement is expected, a major factor in the BASOO's turnover rate is 
recent scrutiny of the work of that office. This scrutiny has added 
stress to already high-intensity jobs, which has caused employees to 
look for opportunities elsewhere. Additionally, in the past two years, 
the BASOO's ability to hire has also been hindered by geographical 
requirements. Generally, the FAA has required engineers responsible for 
oversight of Boeing to be located in Seattle or Los Angeles. When the 
aviation industry is hiring, as it is in today's economy, the FAA is 
typically unable to compete on salary or bonuses offered by aviation 
companies. The FAA is currently evaluating all available options to 
overcome this challenge.
    Beyond the BASOO, there are several other offices and dozens of FAA 
employees that are directly responsible for or support Boeing 
certification, oversight, and continued operational safety duties. The 
Boeing Certification Management Office (CMO) is responsible for the 
oversight of Boeing's production certificate (PC) and its voluntary 
safety management system (SMS). The CMO currently has approximately 30 
engineers and safety inspectors.
    Approximately 40 engineers and program managers from the Seattle 
and Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Offices (ACO) and the Continued 
Operational Safety Branch support Boeing continued operational safety 
activities. These activities include assessing in-service events and 
processing airworthiness directives. Additionally, flight test pilots, 
human factors and system safety specialists located in various offices 
within AIR, as well as operational specialists from the aircraft 
evaluation division, are responsible for supporting human factors and 
system safety assessment (SSA) reviews and compliance activities for 
certification programs on an ad hoc basis.
    The FAA is addressing staff turnover by offering a number of 
different incentives. As an example, for the almost 20 job 
announcements that are currently in process for the BASOO, full 
permanent change in station (PCS) and a recruitment bonus up to $25,000 
will be offered to attract qualified candidates to the geographical 
area. To help retain employees, the FAA is considering retention 
bonuses based on agreed upon terms of employment, as well as in-band 
increases or higher grades for current employees.

    Question 2. How many of the new human factors staff are assigned to 
BASOO? If others of these new staff are made available to BASOO, please 
explain how and under what conditions they assist BASOO. For other 
referenced newly hired technical advisors, how many are experts in 
systems safety assessments, and how many of these are assigned at 
BASOO? For those newly-hired staff assigned to the BASOO, what will FAA 
do to ensure they have adequate opportunities for advancement at the 
BASOO?
    Answer. There are currently no human factors staff directly 
assigned to the BASOO. However, specialists and Chief Scientific 
Technical Advisors (CSTA) across the Aircraft Certification Service 
(AIR) support human factors and system safety assessments (SSA) as part 
of the certification process. Flight test pilots, human factors and 
system safety specialists located in various offices within AIR, as 
well as operational specialists from the aircraft evaluation division, 
are responsible for supporting human factors and SSA reviews and 
compliance activities for certification programs led by the BASOO. 
Additionally, the Boeing Certificate Management Office (CMO) supports 
the integration of new design into the production system. The CMO is 
also responsible for overseeing the production system and the issuance 
of certificate of airworthiness. These FAA resources are supporting the 
BASOO on current certification programs and oversight, including the 
Boeing 737-7, 737-10, and the 777-9.

    Sec. 104 Implementation: Certification Oversight Staff. This 
section of ACSAA requires the FAA to examine and address any shortfall 
in the agency's certification expertise including engineers, safety 
inspectors, human factors specialists, software and cybersecurity 
experts, and other qualified technical experts who perform duties 
related to the certification of aircraft, engines, and other 
components. FAA has reported that it has contracted in August 2021 with 
Booz Allen Hamilton to perform this workforce assessment.

    Question 1. When will the FAA's workforce assessment be complete? 
Will this assessment take into account new safety responsibilities of 
the FAA and certification staff under the ACSAA, such as 
responsibilities for direct approval of ODA unit members and the 
assignment of safety advisors to unit members?
    Answer. In collaboration with our union partners, we are in the 
process of conducting a review of our workforce. We are standing up a 
workgroup consisting of representatives from AVS, the Office of Human 
Resource Management, and applicable unions so that this workgroup can 
collaboratively inform workforce assessments. We anticipate the 
workgroup will convene in the coming weeks, and complete all workforce 
assessments by the end of Fiscal Year 2022, which will take into 
account new safety responsibilities and ACSAA requirements.

    Question 2. Will the FAA's workforce assessment of certification 
staff include a review of the FAA's Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight 
Office (BASOO) to determine engineer resource and expertise needs, 
particularly in the areas of systems engineering, human factors, and 
software development, to both perform certification and oversight work? 
If not, will FAA commit to performing such an assessment of the BASOO 
and take action as necessary to provide adequate staffing levels?
    Answer. Yes, the workforce assessment will include a review of the 
BASOO, as well as other FAA offices that are responsible for or support 
the BASOO in executing its certification, oversight, and continued 
operational safety responsibilities. These offices include the Boeing 
CMO, the Seattle and Los Angeles ACOs, the Continued Operational Safety 
Branch, and other offices within AIR and AVS.

    737 MAX Return to Service. FAA approved Boeing's proposed design 
changes without addressing concerns expressed by foreign authorities 
and some of its own technical experts regarding Boeing's design 
retaining continuous distracting alerts, such as the stick-shaker for 
stall warning, which contributed to both 737 MAX accidents according to 
some experts. Foreign authorities reportedly only agreed to Boeing's 
design changes based on a commitment that Boeing would address these 
issues in future design changes. Furthermore, despite the findings from 
the accidents that Boeing had not adequately considered human factors 
issues in the 737 MAX design, FAA continued to allow Boeing not to 
comply with its latest human factors requirements in 14 CFR 25.1322.

    Question. During the 737 MAX's return to service process, did FAA 
require that Boeing comply with the latest standards and address the 
safety issues associated with continuous alerts? Prior to the 737 MAX's 
return to service, did FAA make Boeing comply with the latest human 
factors requirements in 14 CFR 25.1322? If not, please explain why this 
was permissible.
    Answer. Over the course of 20 months, the FAA engaged in a rigorous 
and transparent review of the aircraft and ultimately found that 
Boeing's proposed design changes met FAA safety standards and supported 
a return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX. Throughout the return-to-
service process, we worked closely with other civil aviation 
authorities (CAAs) at every step. And we took input from the 
independent review of a Technical Advisory Board that included experts 
from other U.S. government agencies.
    Details on the FAA's review and recertification of the flight 
control system can be found at https://www.faa.gov/foia/
electronic_reading_room/boeing_reading_
room/

    Sec. 102 Implementation: Safety Management Systems. This section of 
ACSAA requires FAA to issue a final rule within two years to require 
U.S. aircraft manufacturers to implement safety management systems. In 
its briefing to congressional staff on October 13, 2021, FAA said it 
anticipated issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking in 2022. In 
addition, the DOT Office of Inspector General recently found that FAA 
had done an inadequate job of overseeing American Airlines' 
implementation of its SMS, as required by 14 CFR part 5.

    Question 1. In adopting and implementing the regulation required by 
this section, how will FAA ensure that SMS is implemented in such a way 
as to ensure compliance with both SMS requirements and other applicable 
requirements, including airworthiness standards? Does the FAA agree 
that SMS is not a substitute for a manufacturer's obligation to comply 
with airworthiness standards? If so, what measures can FAA take to 
ensure that SMS complements these compliance obligations?
    Answer. The FAA agrees that SMS is not a substitute for compliance 
with regulatory standards. A properly integrated SMS fosters a 
fundamental and sustainable change in how certificate holders and 
manufacturers/design organizations analyze data, make informed 
decisions, and develop or revise operational methods. In addition, 
FAA's promotion of SMS through guidance material and compliance 
oversight will reinforce this obligation and assure regulatory 
compliance.

    Question 2. In your testimony, you state, ``The voluntary programs 
have enabled the FAA to gain valuable experience on oversight of SMS 
for design and manufacturing organizations, and the lessons learned 
will help inform FAA's SMS rulemaking and policy development.'' What 
are the lessons learned referenced in this testimony, and how are they 
informing FAA's rulemaking and policy development?
    Answer. Successful SMS implementation and maturation depends on 
company leadership commitment, a strong safety culture, appropriate 
industry and FAA resources, and transparency. The FAA Voluntary SMS 
program has enabled the FAA rulemaking and policy development team to 
capture a number of lessons learned in these areas to support 
rulemaking and policy development. Some specific areas include:

   Learning what is necessary for successful organizational and 
        cultural changes to influence future training and policy.

   Understanding the resources necessary to develop a fully 
        operational SMS program. This includes internal process changes 
        for employee safety reporting, problem solving, analysis and 
        management of various safety risks, engagement of labor unions, 
        and revisions to internal and external company communication 
        practices.

   Increasing transparency and open communication of safety 
        issues between the FAA and the company. This will inform the 
        access, availability, and appropriate FAA handling and decision 
        making regarding expanded industry safety data.

   Enhancing coordination between different FAA offices and the 
        company to develop comprehensive SMS programs. Early experience 
        in this area is important as many companies will be 
        implementing a cross-functional SMS.

   Increasing FAA employee competencies to ensure a sufficient 
        level of knowledge regarding SMS. Experience gained through 
        early implementation will be reflected in internal FAA training 
        materials to support the broader upcoming rule implementation.

    Section 105: Disclosure of Safety Critical Information. Section 
105(a) of ACSAA revises 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44704(e) to require that, as of 
the date of ACSAA's enactment, FAA must require applicants for and 
holders of type certificates for transport category airplanes to submit 
safety critical information, as defined, including newly discovered 
information and material design or analysis changes. In its October 13, 
2021 briefing to Congressional staff, FAA said it would be issuing 
three policy statements in 2022 to implement this section, but it is 
not apparent that any of these statements address this requirement, 
which applies to safety critical information both as originally 
submitted and to later changes. Also under Section 105 of the reform 
law, FAA is directed to revoke an airline transport pilot certificate 
held by an individual who fails to disclose safety critical 
information, including information related to flight control systems, 
on behalf of a manufacturer. FAA has told the Committee that the agency 
is developing policy documents to implement these disclosure 
requirements and expects to issue them in 2022.

    Question. Since the revision to revises 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44704(e) was 
effective upon enactment of ACSAA, please describe what concrete steps 
FAA has taken to implement these important disclosure requirements that 
ensure greater accountability in the certification process? Please cite 
examples.
    Answer. The FAA currently requires applicants for transport 
category airplane type certificates to disclose safety critical 
information through 14 CFR Sec. 25.1309. The certification process set 
forth in FAA Order 8110.4C also provides the FAA with information 
specific to safety via familiarization meetings, project specific 
certification plans, and type certification board meetings. In order to 
enhance FAA awareness and understanding prior to issuance of additional 
guidance, the FAA has instituted cross-organizational program reviews 
of type certificate applications. The program reviews identify critical 
design features, the latest project developments and design changes, as 
well as FAA level of involvement.
    To implement the requirements of section 105, the FAA plans to 
implement policy that encourages applicants for a transport airplane 
type certificate or supplemental type certificate to submit a single 
document at the beginning of the certification process to disclose all 
new systems and intended changes to existing systems, as well as ensure 
that safety critical information will be kept current throughout the 
certification process. The FAA also plans to clarify classification of 
design changes to products in accordance with the requirements of 14 
CFR Sec. 21.93(a).

    Sec. 106 Implementation: Limitation on Delegation. This section of 
ACSAA prohibits FAA from delegating transport aircraft certification 
tasks related to safety critical design features, such as flight 
control systems, until the FAA has reviewed and verified all underlying 
human factors assumptions. Based on a status update from FAA's briefing 
to Committee staff on October 13, 2021, the Aircraft Certification 
Service (AIR) issued a memo to all employees highlighting the section's 
requirements and reinforced the need to validate underlying assumptions 
prior to delegating findings of safety critical systems compliance.

    Question 1. Please provide a detailed description of how FAA 
implemented this requirement across AIR, and how the change differs 
from FAA practices prior to the requirement. Please include in your 
description references to published regulatory policy/guidance to 
understand cross agency application.
    Answer. The FAA issued a policy memo on September 16, 2021, which 
reinforced the requirements of section 106, while formal policy 
surrounding underlying human factors assumptions is being developed.
    The FAA developed a template for applicants to document underlying 
assumptions for FAA review. This template is being used for the Boeing 
737-7 certification and will be used for the Boeing 737-10 
certification program. The FAA is finalizing guidance to further 
institutionalize the requirements of section 106. This guidance will 
define FAA responsibilities, provide a screening process for applicant 
submittals (including the system safety documentation to be submitted 
to the FAA for review), and provide instructions on the functions to be 
retained by the FAA and what may be delegated to qualified designees or 
organizations.
    This change differs from prior FAA policy, which allowed FAA 
offices to make risk based determinations regarding the delegation of 
system safety documents, such as System Safety Assessments (SSA), for a 
particular company.

    Question 2. In your testimony, you state, ``We are delegating fewer 
responsibilities and demanding more transparency from them, and 
evaluating key assumptions prior to delegating functions in certain 
areas.'' FAA's recently issued memo restates the requirements of 
Section 106: prohibiting delegation until all human factors assumptions 
are validated. The Committee also understands that FAA is retaining 
issuance of airworthiness certificates for the 737 MAX and FAA has 
limited delegated functions for critical design features on the 777-9 
and the 737-10 certification projects. Besides those identified limits 
on delegations, what other changes has FAA made to limit delegation, 
and how specifically is FAA demanding more transparency?
    Answer. On November 26, 2019, the FAA notified Boeing that we would 
retain responsibility for airworthiness certification for the 737 MAX 
airplanes until the FAA is confident that Boeing's quality system, 
including inspection and delivery processes, is stable and producing 
compliant, conforming, and safe airplanes. Since resuming airworthiness 
certification of 737 MAX airplanes on November 30, 2020, the FAA issued 
certificates of airworthiness for 232 aircraft and continues to retain 
responsibility for airworthiness certification for the 737 MAX.
    The FAA retained airworthiness certification of 787 Dreamliner 
aircraft as a means to verify Boeing manufacturing and quality control 
process changes and performance, and this practice will be used again 
when delivery of 787 Dreamliner aircraft resumes.
    The FAA is reviewing SSAs for the 737-7 program before making a 
decision regarding delegation. The FAA is also implementing a process 
to address major design changes for Boeing products, which will involve 
a screening and review process consistent with the ACSAA section 106 
requirements.
    For the Boeing 777-9 program, the FAA increased technical 
specialist involvement based on lessons learned from the 737 MAX. The 
FAA will only consider increasing delegation once the agency has 
identified an acceptable certification path with clear compliance 
criteria and has found a demonstrated capability of the Boeing 
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) to find compliance 
consistent with FAA expectations. Examples of areas of increased FAA 
involvement include:

   New and novel design features such as the folding wing tip; 
        o Test participation and witnessing related to structural tests 
        and flight tests; o Areas of past technical challenge such as 
        fuel system lightning protection, engine failure analysis, and 
        system integration;

   Software development and assurance methodologies; and

   Verification of critical assumptions for system safety 
        analysis and verification that these assumptions have been 
        accounted for in subsequent design, operational procedure, and 
        training program development.

    In order to foster transparency, the FAA is leveraging Boeing's 
Voluntary SMS program to increase agency access to Boeing's performance 
regarding root cause problem solving and safety risk management 
assessments. These situations allow the FAA to gain direct insight 
regarding Boeing's SMS implementation and to provide feedback on where 
further changes are needed for the SMS to have greater impact.
    The FAA pressed Boeing to consider implementation of an Aviation 
Safety Action Program (ASAP), modeled after the U.S. airline industry 
program, to support more effective employee identification of safety 
issues. Boeing is incorporating FAA input and suggestions on how the 
company's existing employee SpeakUp process can be adapted to better 
emulate the ASAP program.

    Sec. 107 Implementation: Interference with ODA Unit Members. 
Section 107 of ACSAA requires that, as of the date of ACSAA's 
enactment, FAA must seek to eliminate or minimize prohibited 
interference by ODA holders that affects the performance of unit 
members and must not prohibit communications between FAA personnel and 
ODA unit members. FAA has said it anticipated publishing policy in 
February 2022 to prevent interference with ODA unit members and 
facilitate open communication between unit members and the FAA. For 
many years, FAA has prohibited ODA holders from interfering with ODA 
unit members. However, an August 19, 2021 letter from Acting BASOO 
Manager Ian Won to Boeing shows that undue pressure and associated 
actions to compromise the independence of ODA unit members persists at 
Boeing, and requires swift action to ensure similar actions do not 
occur moving forward.

    Question 1. Regarding the two Aviation Safety (AVS) policy 
documents relevant to Section 107 that were issued by FAA on October 
15, 2021, how will these policies be more effective in preventing ODA 
interference?
    Answer. The two policies issued on October 15, 2021 require FAA 
approval of Unit Members at Type Certification ODA holders and require 
the FAA to assign advisors for engineering unit members at certain Type 
Certification ODA Holders. While neither policy is targeted 
specifically at preventing interference with ODA Unit Members, they 
both address other requirements under the ACSAA. Assigning advisors 
will provide another avenue for Unit Members to report possible 
instances of interference to the FAA. The FAA is working to issue a 
policy directive--anticipated in the first quarter of calendar year 
2022--to carry out the mandate of section 107 and ensure that ODA 
holders comply with regulatory requirements in 14 CFR part 183 to 
ensure that Unit Members are not subject to interference.

    Question 2. Why will it take over a year after the passage of ACSAA 
for FAA to issue and implement a policy on ODA unit member non-
interference and communications that was required to be effective upon 
enactment?
    Answer. New policy to address the issues of ODA holder interference 
with a Unit Member and Unit Member communication with the FAA require 
ODA holders to meaningfully modify their procedures manual to include 
procedures for monitoring for interference and investigating 
allegations of interference. The FAA will post the draft policy for 
public comment and public comments will need to be addressed prior to 
issuance.

    Question 3. In your testimony, you reference policy changes ``aimed 
at preventing interference with ODA unit members in the performance of 
their duties.'' FAA has had for many years a policy prohibiting such 
interference, but such interference has continued. What policy changes 
does this testimony reference and how will they be more effective in 
preventing such interference?
    Answer. 14 CFR 183.57 requires ODA holders to ensure that no 
conflicting non-ODA Unit duties or other interference affects the 
performance of authorized functions by ODA Unit Members. FAA Order 
8100.15 references the regulatory requirement for ODA Unit Members to 
be able to perform their duties without pressure or influence from 
other parts of the company. The new policy directive under development 
defines interference, including examples, and reinforces the FAA's 
expectation that ODA holders comply with their regulatory 
responsibilities by systemically and proactively monitoring for 
interference, promptly investigating allegations of interference, 
reporting allegations of interference to the FAA, and taking corrective 
action if allegations of interference are substantiated.

    Sec. 107 Implementation: Direct Oversight of ODA Unit Members. 
Section 107 of ACSAA ensures that FAA will be responsible for approving 
and removing manufacturers' engineers who act on behalf of the FAA--
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) unit members--beginning on 
January 1, 2022. This section also requires assignment of FAA safety 
advisors to a manufacturer's authorized representatives so that the FAA 
has direct and ongoing oversight and communication with the ODA unit 
members responsible for certification activities. On October 15, 2021 
FAA issued two policy memos regarding FAA approval of unit members and 
assignment of FAA advisers.

    Question 1. Please provide a copy of the minimum qualifications for 
ODA unit members to be approved by FAA.
    Answer. The qualifications for ODA Unit Members at Type 
Certification ODA holders are the same qualifications that the FAA uses 
for individual designated engineering representatives and manufacturing 
inspection designees. The FAA has reviewed these qualifications and 
determined that they meet or exceed all specific requirements 
identified in section 107.

    Question 2. To satisfy the provisions of this section of the reform 
law, FAA will be assigning safety advisors to each of the 1500 unit 
members at the Boeing ODA, and FAA will be in charge of approving and 
removing those designees. Does FAA currently have sufficient technical 
workforce to carry out these obligations? What is the training schedule 
for FAA safety advisors so that they can start to perform their 
functions? Please provide a list of the FAA safety advisors assigned to 
this role. Why did FAA wait until October 15, 2021 to issue a policy 
memo to implement this key reform?
    Answer. The FAA is focused on ensuring appropriate staffing levels 
for all Organization Management Teams (OMT), including the OMT 
responsible for overseeing Boeing. The new policy that establishes FAA 
advisors for ODA Unit Members was effective on December 15, 2021, and 
the advisors began performing that function on that date. The 
responsibilities of an advisor overlap with the responsibility of being 
an FAA Organization Management Team (OMT) member, so the additional 
workload associated with being an advisor won't be known until the 
requirements are implemented and we have a better understanding of how 
often ODA Unit members reach out to their advisor at the FAA. We intend 
to monitor that workload and adjust staffing levels as needed to 
accommodate the outreach from ODA Unit Members.

    Sec. 110 Implementation: Appeals of Certification Decisions. 
Section 110 of ACSAA requires that, within 60 days after the date of 
ACSAA's enactment, FAA must issue an order establishing an appeals 
process for resolving disputes regarding type certification issues that 
results in a written decision by the Associate Administrator for 
Aviation Safety that may be appealed to the Administrator for final 
determination. At the October 13 briefing, FAA said it anticipates 
issuing ``a high level order to define a dispute resolution process'' 
sometime in 2022.

    Question. Why is FAA unable to meet the 60-day deadline set forth 
in ACSAA? What are the steps necessary to issuing the order to 
implement a dispute resolution process? What is the approximate date 
for issuing the order?
    Answer. Section 110 includes several requirements and mandates 
issue resolution and appeals processes. The FAA has several existing 
issue resolution processes, including those available to everyone and 
those that are contractual and applicant-specific, such as Partnership 
for Safety Plans. The FAA needed to review these processes to ensure 
that the agency's existing commitments and the rights of applicants, 
FAA employees, and the public would not be adversely impacted by the 
implementation of this section. The FAA also had to define new 
processes that would integrate with these existing processes and work 
for all stakeholders. The Order establishing new issue resolution and 
appeals processes is in the final stages of drafting and coordination. 
It will be posted for a 30-day concurrent internal/external comment 
period, followed by comment disposition and final coordination with 
internal stakeholders. The anticipated issue date is the first half of 
calendar year 2022.

    Sec. 111 Implementation: Employment Restrictions. Section 111 of 
ACSAA prohibits FAA supervisors from being involved in oversight of a 
type certificate holder if the supervisor was employed by the holder in 
the preceding one-year period. In its October 13, 2021 briefing, FAA 
made general reference to its ``robust ethics program to ensure FAA 
employees operate free of conflicts of interest,'' but said nothing 
about implementing this prohibition.

    Question. Based on the October 13, 2021 briefing to Congressional 
staff, it is not clear how FAA is implementing the new employment 
restrictions under ACSAA. Please describe and provide evidence that FAA 
has taken new steps to implement this prohibition, such as a policy 
document or order.
    Answer. The FAA drafted guidance that will be incorporated into 
existing FAA policy. The FAA anticipates having updated policy and 
related training in place by spring 2022.

    Sec. 113 Implementation: Voluntary Safety Reporting Program (VSRP). 
In your written testimony, you state, ``Preliminary data on VSRP usage 
indicates that employees are comfortable using the system and they are 
regularly using it to raise safety concerns. . .. We will conduct 
annual internal safety culture assessments that include surveys of AVS 
employees in order to evaluate the safety culture and the 
implementation of VSRP programs.''

    Question 1. Since FAA implemented the new voluntary safety 
reporting program in February 2021, how many reports have been 
submitted through the program? What is the current status of these 
reports? Has FAA reviewed submitted safety reports, identified the root 
cause of any safety issue, and taken appropriate action to rectify any 
errors? If so, please provide examples.
    Answer. AVS employees filed 387 reports in the Voluntary Safety 
Reporting Program (VSRP) through November 30, 2021. Of the 387 reports, 
311 are currently under investigation, 16 have been closed and 9 were 
not accepted.
    The FAA has taken corrective actions on a number of VSRP reports. 
Generally, when AVS receives a report, AVS de-identifies it to promote 
confidentiality, determines whether to accept it, assigns risk, and 
investigates. AVS then develops and implements a corrective action 
plan. In some cases, there is no evidence to support the submitter's 
claims or the submitter is unaware of policies or systems that address 
the claims.
    As an example, a report cited a situation where one company 
developed a replacement carry-thru spar for an aircraft and the 
Organizational Designation Authorization (ODA) improperly issued FAA 
approval documentation before the FAA-approved engineering 
certification was complete. An FAA Safety Inspector notified the FAA 
office with oversight responsibility when he discovered the issue. A 
VSRP report was filed and quickly corrected the discrepancy before the 
aircraft were operated. The FAA office with responsibility for the ODA 
has taken corrective action with the company to prevent a repeat of the 
discrepancy.

    Question 2. Given that the deadline for completion is December 31, 
2021, when will FAA complete the annual safety culture assessment as 
directed under section 132 of ACSAA? Additionally, in the past, FAA has 
significantly delayed releasing the results of its assessments. How 
soon after conducting the safety assessment can the Committee expect to 
be provided with its results?
    Answer. The FAA anticipates completing the safety culture 
assessment no later than June 30, 2022. The FAA will brief 
congressional staff on the results of the assessment during the 
regularly scheduled ACSAA quarterly briefing that follows the 
completion and compilation of results of the assessment.

    Sec. 118 Implementation: Whistleblower Protections. This section of 
the ACSAA expands whistleblower protection to include holders of 
certificates under 49 U.S.C. 44704, i.e., type, production, and 
airworthiness certificates, and their suppliers and contractors. In its 
October 13 briefing, FAA said, ``The FAA Office of Audit and Evaluation 
continues to work with whistleblower retaliation claims through the 
AIR21 Whistleblower Protection Program.'' But the AIR21 program only 
covered air carriers and their contractors.

    Question. How does FAA currently facilitate the AIR21 Program? What 
are the governing policy documents for the AIR21 Program? What has FAA 
done to expand the coverage of its whistleblower program to include 
manufacturers and their suppliers, as required by this section? If FAA 
has issued a policy to address this expansion of the AIR21 Program, 
please provide it to the Committee. If not, why not, and when will it?
    Answer. AIR-21 assigns statutory responsibility for investigating 
employment discrimination or other adverse action cases involving 
aviation industry employees to the Department of Labor's Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) is responsible for investigating the safety-
related aspects of each case. The FAA provides OSHA with the results of 
our safety investigations, but OSHA, as dictated by the statute, 
independently conducts the wrongful termination/discrimination 
investigation. It is also important to note that the FAA has no 
statutory authority to provide whistleblower protection to industry 
whistleblowers.
    As part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the FAA and 
OSHA, the FAA provides to OSHA any complaint information that contains 
allegations of employment discrimination or other adverse action and 
appears to meet the AIR-21 case criteria. In addition, the FAA notifies 
any AIR-21 submitter who has not indicated they have filed their 
retaliation complaint with OSHA how to do so and provides the submitter 
a website link (www.whistleblowers.gov).
    The FAA facilitates the AIR-21 Program through a dedicated web page 
on faa.gov for potential submitters (https://www.faa.gov/about/
initiatives/whistleblower/complaint) which includes an e-mail address 
designed for questions that a manufacturing worker might have 
pertaining to AIR21 ([email protected]). Further, the FAA has a 2015 
MOU with the Department of Labor/OSHA that requires OSHA to provide the 
FAA's Office of Audit and Evaluation with any AIR-21 complaints 
received, including manufacturing. Each of these case inputs are loaded 
into the FAA Whistleblower Protection Program database program and 
evaluated to determine if there is indeed a potential violation of a 
regulation, order, or standard relating to the manufacture of parts or 
aircraft for use by U.S. air carriers. FAA Order 1100.167B explains 
FAA/AAE's responsibilities for execution of the AIR-21 Program. Other 
guidance documents used in the program include: AIR-21 EWBPP Process, 
AAE WB Confidentiality Policy, FAA-OSHA WB MOU, and FAA Order 8900.1 
Volume 11, Chapter 3 (provides guidance to Flight Standards Inspectors 
on the conduct of whistleblower investigations).
    Following the lead of the Department of Labor Administrative Law 
Judges, the FAA's AIR-21 Whistleblower Protection Program has always 
treated employees of manufacturing entities, including their suppliers 
and contractors, as covered employees under the AIR-21 Program if their 
company provided parts/aircraft to U.S. air carriers. Because of this, 
no expansion of the FAA's AIR-21 program was necessary nor undertaken. 
For example, in FY21, AAE referred 8 AIR-21 complaints against 
manufacturers for investigation, 21 in FY20, 15 in FY19, 8 in FY18, 12 
in FY17, etc. These were noted in our annual report to Congress. The 
FAA will continue to accept inputs from manufacturers and their 
suppliers as directed under section 118.

    Sec. 131 National Air Grant Fellowship Program. In the Committee's 
efforts to ensure greater access to information about rapidly evolving 
aviation technologies, the ACSAA targets areas to better integrate 
human factors and system safety assessments of aircraft flight control 
systems into FAA's overall certification process. Section 131 of the 
reform law establishes the National Air Grant Fellowship Program to 
connect students with the FAA and Congress to help advance safety in 
the U.S. aerospace industry. ACSAA authorizes $15 million annually for 
Fiscal Year 2021 through 2025 in new funding for the fellowship 
program. The program is intended to enable graduate and post-graduate 
students, with expertise in aerospace-related fields ranging from human 
factors to software engineering, to help shape the future of aerospace 
policy. According to FAA status updates, the Committee understands that 
FAA is anticipating awarding the first fellowships beginning in 2022.

    Question 1. What kind of impact does FAA expect the National Air 
Grant Fellowship program to have on building additional capacity and 
capability to certify advanced technologies at the FAA?
    Answer. The FAA is optimistic the National Air Grant Fellowship 
Program will attract exceptional candidates to the agency with 
innovative knowledge of aerospace technologies. Consistent with the 
enabling legislation, the FAA is hopeful this fellowship will mature 
with participants from a wide variety of aerospace disciplines that 
will yield benefit to our current operational and safety missions, as 
well as help to shape the future of aviation.

    Question 2. Based on information given to Committee staff, is the 
program still scheduled to award the first fellowships in 2022? In 
making such awards, what actions is FAA taking to ensure 
underrepresented minorities and economically disadvantaged students 
have equal access to being considered and selected for fellowships?
    Answer. The FAA took special measures to make minorities and 
economically disadvantaged students aware of the fellowship opportunity 
and encourage interested members of those communities to apply. The 
fellowship was announced using the agency's outreach plan for minority 
serving institutions (MSI), as well as to employee associations that 
represent these groups. The FAA is still evaluating applicants at this 
time, but hopes to award the first fellowships in 2022.

    Question 3. How much did FAA request in its latest budget request 
for funding of the National Air Grant Program?
    Answer. The FAA has requested $857K for the National Air Grant 
Fellowship program for CY 2023. The amount includes stipend awards/
temporary hires to 5 Fellows ($280.1K), the appointment of a Director 
of the National Air Grant Fellowship Program and a program assistant 
($226.4K), and for program costs and fees ($350K).

    Federal Preemption. The courts have repeatedly held that Federal 
preemption of state law is primarily a function of congressional 
intent. Congress has expressed its intent not to preempt state law in 
providing remedies for damages in the context of aviation accidents in 
49 U.S.C. Sec. 40120: ``A remedy under this part is in addition to any 
other remedies provided by law.'' Yet FAA has argued in legal briefs in 
civil litigation that, not only are FAA's airworthiness standards 
preemptive of state standards of care, but the mere issuance of a 
design approval prevents state courts from examining whether FAA's 
standards were actually met.

    Question. What is FAA current position on Federal preemption of 
state standards of care and FAA certification of an aircraft design, 
whether type certification, amended type certification, or supplemental 
type certification? Does the FAA agree that the FAA type certification 
does not itself establish or satisfy the relevant standard of care for 
tort actions, nor does it evince congressional intent to preempt the 
field of products liability? If not, please explain why and identify 
the date of adoption of this policy.
    Answer. The FAA does not agree with the second question. The FAA 
position on preemption has existed for decades. For example, in 1993, 
the FAA took the position that preemption applied in a lawsuit in New 
Mexico, Cleveland v. Piper.
    Most recently, the FAA's position concerning Federal preemption on 
aircraft design is stated in Brief of the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, filed in December of 2019, in the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
matter of Avco Corp. v. Sikkelee, et al., In summary, the brief stated,

        Design standards for aircraft engines are within a ``field'' 
        that Congress has ``reserved for Federal regulation.'' And 
        where, as here, the FAA has determined that an engine design 
        satisfies the Federal safety standard, a plaintiff 's attempt 
        to invoke state law to impose different or higher obligations 
        on the manufacturer is impliedly preempted under principles of 
        both field and conflict preemption. Brief pages 12-13. 
        Citations omitted.

    The United States stated in its brief, which would apply to 
aircraft certification in general, where a state law conflicts with 
Federal law because it would be an obstacle to accomplishing the 
purpose of Congress or because it would be impossible for the private 
party to comply with both state and Federal law, implied preemption 
applies. A uniform, Federal system governing aviation is important to 
develop aviation and improve safety. As stated in the government's 
brief, ``The FAA has implemented Congress's objectives for the Federal 
Aviation Act by requiring approval of the design of an aircraft or 
aircraft engine through the multistage type-certification process, and 
by requiring a manufacturer thereafter to conform to that design until 
it is changed using the applicable procedures.'' Brief at page 15.
    It is worth noting the limitations of our view on preemption. 
Again, from the government's brief,

        Importantly, Congress's preemption of state-law standards of 
        care for aircraft design does not foreclose all products 
        liability suits arising from allegedly defective aircraft. The 
        Federal Aviation Act's savings clause provides that ``[a] 
        remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies 
        provided by law.'' 49 U.S.C. 40120(c). That provision entitles 
        injured plaintiffs to bring state-law causes of action against 
        aircraft manufacturers for alleged violations of the Federal 
        safety standards, as found in the statute and FAA regulations. 
        For example, plaintiffs injured by alleged aircraft defects 
        might assert, among other potentially viable theories of tort 
        liability, that a manufacturer failed to make appropriate 
        disclosures during the type-certification process; failed to 
        obtain the required form of approval for a particular design 
        element on the type certificate; changed the type certificate 
        without the necessary approvals in contravention of the FAA 
        regulations; failed to build an aircraft in conformance with 
        the type certificate; failed to issue needed warnings to 
        consumers or was negligent in issuing a service bulletin; or 
        failed after issuance of a type certificate to adequately 
        monitor its design and to report known or suspected problems to 
        the FAA. Brief at page 17. Footnote omitted.

    The FAA's position on preemption is long standing and rooted in 
safety. Many older aircraft are operated safely in the National 
Airspace System every day. As new technology is developed and 
integrated into new type designs, those innovations improve safety for 
the next generation of aircraft.

    Data Collection and Analytics Tools. In your written testimony you 
state, ``We are actively expanding our oversight capabilities by 
advancing data collection and analytics tools to share safety data 
within the FAA and between industry stakeholders and international 
partners. These efforts include technological enhancements to the 
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system to integrate 
new data sources and methods for safety analysis, which will improve 
data quality and accessibility to support risk-based decision-making.''

    Question. How will these enhancements improve FAA's certification 
and oversight of transport airplanes? How else will these enhancements 
improve risk-based decision-making at FAA?
    Answer. ASIAS is developing a repeatable process to prioritize 
safety analyses across diverse aviation communities to support 
programmatic decisions. In addition, ASIAS is working to enhance the 
analysis of safety reports through topic modeling processes to discover 
emerging safety issues. Enhancing the FAA's data collection and data 
analytic capability will make data more accessible to support 
certification and oversight decisions for transport airplanes. These 
enhancements will provide the FAA workforce with the necessary tools to 
identify more comprehensive root causes and analyze emerging safety 
trends. For the long term, ASIAS is planning a new IT system that will 
allow increased data volumes at faster processing speeds, and enable 
more advanced analytical capabilities.

    FAA Accountability. In your written testimony you state, ``we 
believe incorporating these best practices [from similar offices at 
other Federal agencies and from the FAA's experience, expertise, and 
other sources] will improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and 
transparency of the FAA's investigative processes.''

    Question 1. While we understand this work is not yet done, what are 
the lessons learned that FAA has identified to date? How will they 
improve the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of FAA's 
investigative processes?
    Answer. The FAA has identified a need to develop a holistic 
approach to the investigative process. This includes from the time the 
initial allegation is submitted, to the determination of the final 
action(s). There is a three-part solution that the FAA is developing to 
improve effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accountability of 
the investigation program.

  1.  Consolidate the intake process for all allegations into one 
        central location. Within the Office of Professional 
        Responsibility (OPR) this will involve reviewing, classifying, 
        and tracking requests and allegations and ensuring each is 
        assigned to the appropriate investigative entity within the FAA 
        or partner agency. This will improve efficiency through greater 
        agency accountability and tracking of investigation trends.

  2.  OPR will review, enhance, and redeliver investigative training, 
        by qualified instructors, to all managers and personnel 
        responsible for conducting investigations and management 
        inquiries. This will help improve effectiveness and consistency 
        through common investigative standards that are utilized across 
        the different entities within the FAA.

  3.  Establish a Compliance and Oversight Review team led by OPR 
        comprised of personnel from the appropriate FAA offices to 
        ensure investigative standards, recommendations, and final 
        disciplinary decisions are within Federal guidelines. The 
        result will ensure improved effectiveness, accountability, and 
        transparency in the event that a manager fails to take proper 
        disciplinary action.

    Question 2. In the past, FAA's processes have been criticized for 
enabling managers whose decisions are challenged to make the final 
decisions on the report. How is FAA addressing this problem?
    Answer. The changes we are currently implementing with respect to 
establishing an OPR program will address multiple aspects of this 
concern. First, the FAA is proposing to change how we currently 
document the overall findings in our investigative reports by advising 
managers which violations are currently supported by known facts, 
versus simply reporting the facts alone. Second, we plan to establish 
an ``Oversight Review Board'', which will review all investigative 
reports meeting the criteria of an OPR investigation, including 
allegations of retaliation by managers, prior to dissemination to 
management and the Office of Human Resource Management. The Board will 
require a response back from the action authority with proposed and 
final actions taken. It is important to note that the report is 
distributed to the designated action authority in the subject's chain 
of command and not to the subject themselves.
    In accordance with current FAA personnel policies, final 
disciplinary decisions lie with the manager. The proposed establishment 
of the ``Review Board'' will ensure that managers are on notice that 
there will be a review of their decisions and should result in an 
increased awareness when managers fail to take proper action.

    737 MAX Service Difficulty Reports. In the questions for the record 
filed pursuant to a December 11, 2019 hearing before the House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, ``The Boeing 737 MAX: 
Examining the Federal Aviation Administration's Oversight of the 
Aircraft's Certification,'' Congressman Paul Mitchell asked you the 
following:

    Question. In the submitted written testimony from Mr. Edward 
Pierson, he noted that during a 13-month time-frame from 5/12/18 to 3/
26/19, the Boeing 737 line had 15 emergencies, leading to 2 crashes and 
13 incidents.

  a.  Is this statistic consistent with the FAA statistics on the 737 
        line?

  b.  If so, how does this record compare with other aircraft types?

  c.  If this statistic is an outlier, what accounts for this 
        inconsistency?

    You responded, in part:

        The FAA's understanding of Mr. Pierson's comments is that he is 
        referring to the two accidents that led to the grounding and 
        current redesign of the 737 MAX, and 13 Service Difficulty 
        Reports (SDR) received on the MAX aircraft. It is not unusual 
        for transport aircraft to have 13 SDRs in the stated reporting 
        time period. The FAA reviewed the SDRs raised by Mr. Pierson 
        and determined that none of them required an Airworthiness 
        Directive (AD) mandating corrective actions for the airplane.

    Please provide this Committee with electronic copies of these 13 
service difficulty reports and the analysis that concluded ADs were 
unnecessary to address them.
    Answer. See Attachment 1.

    FY 22 Strategic Plan. During the Committee's hearing on November 3, 
FAA released the ``AIR FY 22 Strategic Plan.'' The first paragraph of 
the Plan states, ``AIR's FY22 strategic plan supports the efforts 
outlined in the 2017 AIR Blueprint and 2018 Comprehensive Strategic 
Plan.'' These documents, published before the Lion Air accident and the 
enactment of ACSAA, envision a certification system that would rely 
increasingly on industry's willingness to comply with airworthiness 
standards to ``decrease transactional interactions in the certification 
process.'' The FY22 plan makes no reference to AIR's responsibilities 
to ensure compliance with standards and the new emphasis for direct 
oversight of the certification process called for by Congress in the 
ACSAA.

    Question. Apart from your assurances that FAA takes implementation 
of ACSAA seriously, how has FAA demonstrated its willingness to reverse 
its policies of reliance on industry and its recognition that its 
primary responsibility in the certification process is to issue a type 
certificate only when ``the Administrator finds that the aircraft. . 
.meets the regulations and minimum standards prescribed''?
    Answer. The FAA is committed to improving the certification 
process, including our oversight of functions delegated to aircraft 
designers and manufacturers. The agency has undertaken a number of 
initiatives to address this goal--some of which occurred prior to the 
enactment of the ACSAA. As you noted, the FAA takes implementation of 
the ACSAA very seriously. The Act includes over 100 unique 
requirements, and we will ensure each is implemented. The agency has 
made progress towards comprehensively implementing these requirements, 
and, while the work to fully implement the Act is still in the early 
stages, we are carrying it out with the urgency that it requires.
    Furthermore, the FAA's approach to aircraft certification and 
safety oversight has changed. The FAA's relationship with manufacturers 
is evolving. The agency is prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and 
working to focus that oversight on safety critical areas. The FAA is 
delegating fewer responsibilities and demanding more transparency from 
manufacturers, and evaluating key assumptions prior to delegating 
functions in certain areas. While the FAA continues to value their 
technical expertise, the agency is also committed to enforcing the 
highest safety standards for regulated manufacturers.

    2020 Safety Culture Survey. The Committee understands that on 
November 3, 2021, FAA released the results of a 2020 safety culture 
survey for its Policy and Innovation Division, which showed that high 
percentages of personnel have little confidence in division leadership. 
For example, 36.2 percent said the results of the survey would not be 
used to make the agency a better place to work; 25.4 percent said their 
talents were not used well in the workplace; and 17.9 percent said they 
could not disclose suspected violations without fear of reprisal. In 
addition, the top 3 ``Negative Results'' categories were #1 ``Senior 
leaders generate high levels of motivation;'' #2 ``How satisfied are 
you with information you receive from management on what's going on in 
your organization;'' and #3 ``I have a high level of respect for my 
organization's senior leaders.'' The results of the survey indicate 
that personnel in this division, which are some of the most senior 
engineers in AIR, are generally dissatisfied with their leadership.

    Question. To what do you attribute these poor results? What will 
FAA do to address these results? Do these corrective actions including 
personnel changes, if necessary? Please provide the Committee with the 
results of this survey.
    Answer. The Aviation Safety (AVS) organization promotes just safety 
culture. The Voluntary Safety Reporting Program (VSRP) Matrix Team--
comprised of management and union representatives--recommended a safety 
culture survey to establish a baseline for the VSRP. While the results 
of this survey showed a number of areas for improvement, the survey 
found that the AVS workforce is passionate and committed to safety. The 
workforce supported a voluntary safety reporting system as long as they 
can raise concerns without fear of retribution. Launched in April 2021, 
the AVS VSRP meets this standard and is consistent with successful, 
well-established programs in industry and within the agency. AVS will 
continue to strengthen the program and employee awareness of the VSRP.
    The FAA is actively executing the search for the next Associate 
Administrator for Aviation Safety. This individual will be responsible 
for building upon efforts to improve our safety culture and break down 
perceived barriers identified by the survey.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    Funding for Air Traffic Control in the Infrastructure Investment 
and Jobs Act (IIJA). In June, I chaired a hearing in my Aviation 
Safety, Operations, and Innovation subcommittee where we heard from air 
traffic controllers who shared stories about working long shifts in 
aging air traffic control towers. For example, at Falcon Field's air 
traffic control tower in Mesa, the roof lifts off the tower when the 
wind blows above twenty miles per hour. Arizonans rely on air traffic 
controllers to keep the skies safe, and air traffic controllers should 
be able to focus on their jobs and not worry about the safety 
conditions of their workplace.

    Question. How will the five billion dollars for air traffic control 
facilities in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act help air 
traffic controllers do their jobs more effectively and improve the 
safety of our Nation's airspace?
    Answer. The FAA's National Air Space (NAS) Facilities physical 
plant infrastructure is comprised of 21 air route traffic control 
centers (ARTCCs), 4 combined control facilities (CCFs), and 10 
Enterprise Facilities. There are also 348 FAA-maintained terminal air 
traffic control towers and terminal radar approach control facilities 
that include 104 federally owned contract towers. In addition, the FAA 
has approximately 12,000 unstaffed facilities that house navigation, 
communication, surveillance, and weather systems.
    The five billion dollars for air traffic control facilities in the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act will help air traffic 
controllers do their jobs more effectively and improve the safety of 
our Nation's airspace by replacing aged Airport Traffic Control Towers 
(ATCTs) and reducing the operational risk associated with the backlog 
of physical plant infrastructure components that are beyond their 
service life.
    Approximately 50 percent of the funding will be allocated to 
replacing FAA-owned ATCTs that are over 40 years old at regional and 
municipal airports that the FAA typically cannot sustain with normal 
appropriations. These new towers will have improved work areas that 
address human factors needs such as space, line of sight for Air 
Traffic Controllers, and provide a suite of new equipment to improve 
the reliability and safety of operations.
    The remaining balance of funding will be used to reduce the 
operational risk associated with infrastructure backlog. This funding 
will be used to replace and improve long past end of life building 
components such as power and Heating Ventilating and Control (HVAC) 
systems, roofs, etc. across the NAS that can affect airline operations 
when they fail. In addition, the FAA is planning to replace a 
significant number of remote facilities across the National Airspace 
System (NAS). Building system failures at these facilities can also 
affect operations and replacing them will improve the safety of the 
NAS.

    Oversight and Distribution of FAA Funding in IIJA. As I discussed 
at the hearing, the bipartisan infrastructure bill includes significant 
investments in our Nation's aviation sector. To see the maximum benefit 
from our investments, we need to be sure that the FAA is ready to 
distribute the funding and also provide the appropriate oversight to 
ensure the funding is used appropriately.

    Question. Can you describe FAA's preparations to ensure the IIJA 
funding will be distributed appropriately and to ensure effective 
oversight of the funding?
    Answer. The FAA has established strict accounting protocols for the 
receipt, accounting set up, and distribution and execution of the IIJA 
funding. The FAA has established a defined budget structure with budget 
line item detail that is unique to the IIJA funding as well as unique 
capital investment plan numbers. These unique numbers have been entered 
into the FAA accounting and work plan management systems and those 
codes will allow the work to be tracked both nationally and at the 
individual project site level.
    The FAA has established a series of business rules that are unique 
to the handling of IIJA funding and include practices that prohibit the 
mixing of IIJA funding with core appropriation funding on any 
procurement documents. The FAA also has an established process for 
tracking the progress and completion of work at individual sites around 
the U.S. through Job Control Numbers (JCNs). The JCN identifier allows 
all of the financial data for an individual project to be easily 
collected and reviewed at the national level. The JCNs also allow 
tracking the scheduled work plan for individual projects and measures 
progress toward completion of the project.
    FAA has established weekly working group meetings that are used to 
collaborate between the different offices that will be responsible for 
the execution of the IIJA funding. These meetings cover the up-front 
work that needs to be accomplished in preparation for a contract award 
through the final deployment of a program. Risks and concerns are 
presented and discussed among the working groups and they are also 
beginning to collaborate on project work locations to allow for targets 
of opportunity across the FAA and across appropriations. These targets 
of opportunity will allow FAA to work in an efficient manner by 
integrating work at a local level among the involved organizations.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    FAA Technical Workforce. Following the two tragic airplane crashes 
of a Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft in Indonesia and Ethiopia that took 346 
lives--including Mucaad Hussein Abdalla from St. Cloud, Minnesota--we 
worked to pass the bipartisan Aircraft Safety and Certification Reform 
Act of 2020 (ACSAA). The bill incorporates critical aviation safety 
reforms, including requiring manufacturers to adopt an internal set of 
safety controls and employee reporting mechanisms known as safety 
management systems (SMS).

    Question. In your testimony, you note that the FAA is hiring 
technical advisors with the expertise to make critical safety 
decisions. How is the FAA recruiting and retaining talent with the 
necessary technical expertise to conduct this oversight?
    Answer. While the technical skills the FAA needs to respond to 
evolving technology and innovation exist within a very competitive 
market, the FAA continues to use all tools at its disposal to recruit 
and retain workers with the right skills to support its safety mission. 
The agency uses personnel authorities including direct hire authority, 
competitive pay, relocation incentives, and recruitment incentives to 
recruit and retain staff with the necessary technical skills, 
especially for critical areas. This includes talent for the Chief 
Scientist Technical Advisors, Senior Technical Specialists, and other 
candidates with expertise in fields such as cybersecurity, systems 
safety engineering, software engineering, manufacturing and industrial 
engineering, data analytics and science, artificial intelligence, 
human-machine interface, systems engineering, and international 
aviation safety standards, to name a few. While the state of the 
aviation workforce has changed as a result of the pandemic, and will 
likely continue to evolve as the system progresses back to normalcy, 
the FAA will continue to evaluate applicant pools for the various areas 
of need and adjust tactics as needed to meet staffing and technical 
skills targets.

    FAA NextGen Program. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
Reauthorization Act of 2018 included a provision that would provide the 
FAA with the tools it needs to effectively implement the NextGen 
program--the FAA-led modernization of the air traffic control system--
with improved technologies, including satellites, virtual maps, up-to-
date weather reports, and other real-time information to help pilots 
navigate more safely and efficiently.

    Question. In your testimony, you highlight innovation in aviation 
and the use of new technologies to enhance safety and efficiency. Can 
you speak to how new technologies will be tested by the FAA to ensure 
safety?
    Answer. As I mentioned in my written statement, the FAA recently 
established and staffed the Center for Emerging Concepts and 
Innovation. The Center will facilitate the safe introduction and 
certification of new aircraft and technologies by providing pre-
application engagement with companies to identify a preliminary path to 
compliance with regulatory standards. We are also taking steps to 
foster enhanced coordination across the FAA on emerging products and 
concepts.

    Contract Tower Program. Investing in our Nation's infrastructure 
and making sure we have the safest skies from airport to airport, both 
large and small, includes continued investment in the FAA's contract 
tower program, which provides critical air traffic control safety 
benefits to 256 smaller airports across the country, including St. 
Cloud and Anoka County airports in Minnesota.

    Question. What can Congress do to ensure that contract tower 
airports have the updated infrastructure and facilities they need to 
accommodate rising air traffic levels?
    Answer. The FAA Contract Tower program supports small airports 
across the country and is an important part of maintaining safety in 
the NAS. Congress recently recognized some of the infrastructure needs 
of this program through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 
(IIJA) by providing a minimum of $20 million annually for the next five 
years for competitive grants to address contract tower construction, 
rehabilitation, and modernization. This funding is in addition to 
annual appropriations for the program. The FAA welcomes this added 
funding and we look forward to working with Congress to address issues 
that affect the program such as funding for existing facilities and new 
entrants and identifying modernization strategies for infrastructure 
and facility needs.
                                 ______
                                 
  Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    Preserving the ``1,500 Hour Rule.'' With the travel industry in a 
post-pandemic upswing, some airlines are requesting that Congress and 
the FAA reconsider pilot certification and qualification requirements 
for air carrier operations. As required by Congress in the Airline 
Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, the 
1,500 Hour Rule requires pilots working to secure an Airline Transport 
Pilot (ATP) certificate to obtain a total of 1,500 flight training 
hours among other criteria. Some industry stakeholders are critical of 
this important safety mechanism and suggest that pilots should receive 
less training within a faster time-frame in order to meet corporate 
objectives.

    Question. As international travel bans are lifted and air travel 
demand returns, is the FAA considering any plans to empower operators 
to hire pilots with less training and experience by modifying 
requirements of the 1,500 Hour Rule?
    Answer. The FAA currently has no plans for creating any additional 
pathways to an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate. The ``1,500 
Hour Rule'' created pathways that allow for military pilots and pilots 
with specific collegiate academic experience to receive an ATP 
certificate with reduced aeronautical experience (i.e., less than 1,500 
hours), but restricts their privileges to serving as a second in 
command (i.e., first officer) for an airline only until the 1,500 hours 
is achieved. See 14 CFR Sec. 61.160.

    5G and Airline Safety. On November 2, 2021, FAA issued Special 
Airworthiness Information Bulletin (AIR-21-18) alerting manufacturers, 
operators and pilots that action might be required to address potential 
interference with sensitive aircraft electronics caused by new 5G 
telecommunications technology. I commend both FAA and FCC for recent 
constructive conversations to address the aviation community's concerns 
about potential harmful interference to radio altimeters. I also 
commend the FCC's decision to delay deployment of ``C-band'' spectrum 
for 5G purposes until January 2022, allowing for additional time for 
interagency assessments of potential harmful impacts on aviation safety 
technologies.

    Question. Please describe in detail the FAA's to work with FCC to 
address and mitigate potential harmful interference to aviation devices 
related to C-band repurposing.
    Answer. The FAA continues to have regular dialogue with the FCC on 
the 5G radar altimeter issue. Over the last 6 months, FAA leadership 
and engineers have worked with the FCC to determine process and 
specific technical details in order to formulate mitigations to this 
issue, which will then be communicated to wireless carriers. These 
mitigations are meant to ensure aviation safety on and around airports 
and heliports, as well as ensure viable 5G wireless network deployment.
    The FAA and FCC meet (sometimes on a daily basis) to formulate 
mitigations using known data sources, such as the RTCA report, to 
determine 5G impacts to radar altimeters on the airport surface and for 
approach and departure. These efforts have resulted in multiple 
proposals, which continue to be negotiated, to ensure safe aircraft 
operations.

    Out of Practice Airline Pilot Errors. The Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics reports airline travel is up 162 percent compared to last 
year. As travel restrictions ease and air travel continues to return to 
pre-pandemic levels, mid-air mistakes are mounting, according to the 
FAA's confidential Aviation Safety Reporting System. These reports 
highlight increased pilot errors that are attributable to a reduction 
in flight hours during the COVID-19 pandemic. Aviation experts 
recognize that pilot skills and proficiency can atrophy when they are 
inactive for an extended period of time.

    Question. How has data from the FAA's Aviation Safety Reporting 
System informed pilot training requirements over the past 12 months?
    Answer. The FAA uses the data from the Aviation Safety Reporting 
System and other available databases to examine trends and identify 
risks. The training requirements are contained in regulations, which 
have not changed over the past 12 months. In the early stages of the 
COVID pandemic, the FAA issued exemptions to some of the training 
requirements and allowed pilots to extend the periods between training 
and checking events. Those exemptions have expired and all air carriers 
have resumed training and checking in accordance with the regulations.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ben Ray Lujan to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    The FCC began the process of rulemaking and collecting comments on 
5G rollout back in 2017. In February, after years of rulemaking and 
technical coordination, the FCC finalized the C-band Auction.
    The special airworthiness information bulletin issued by the FAA on 
November 2nd on radio altimeter interference raises a variety of 
concerns on the coordination process across Federal agencies. I was 
glad to hear during the hearing that you are ``working very closely 
with the FCC'' and with telecommunications stakeholders on this issue.

    Question 1. What communication did the FAA have with the FCC on 
potential interference on the C-Band prior to the special information 
bulletin on interference with radio altimeters? What role did the NTIA 
play in coordinating these efforts?
    Answer. The FAA attempted to communicate with the FCC multiple 
times before the SAIB publication.

   The FAA transmitted a letter to NTIA, the FCC's spectrum 
        regulator, on September 30, 2019, urging NTIA to put FAA's 
        comments on the FCC record. These comments urged the FCC to 
        consider preliminary radar altimeter test data from AVSI before 
        making a final rulemaking decision. It appears that this letter 
        was not included on the FCC docket.

   The FAA and DOT sent a second letter to NTIA on December 1, 
        2020, urging the agency to engage with the FCC to defer the C-
        band auction until the FAA could conduct a comprehensive safety 
        risk assessment as a result of the findings in the RTCA report. 
        It is unclear if this correspondence was communicated to the 
        FCC.

   After the C-band spectrum auction, the FAA did not 
        communicate with the FCC until April 8, 2021, after a joint 
        meeting with committee staff (majority and minority), FAA, 
        NTIA, and FCC concerning these issues. FCC, NTIA, FAA, and the 
        RTCA report authors held two follow-up meetings (May 17 and 
        June 15) for a technical discussion of the RTCA report.

   On August 12, 2021, the FAA informed the FCC that it would 
        send a letter to the Commission notifying them of operational 
        restrictions to protect radar altimeters from 5G C-band 
        interference in the absence of FCC mitigating actions and 
        information from the wireless community. By September 2021, the 
        three agencies (FAA, NTIA, FCC) started having regular (weekly, 
        sometimes daily) meetings to work out technical mitigations and 
        those meetings have continued to this day.

    Question 2. Do you recommend Congress take steps to reform the 
interagency coordination process with for spectrum management?
    Answer. The FAA has longstanding relationships with its interagency 
spectrum management partners. These relationships have helped to ensure 
the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS). The FAA also 
recognizes that the U.S. economy relies heavily on innovation and new 
technology, which will enable advancements in the communications 
sector.
    Balancing the advancing technology needs of our Nation and the 
safety of the NAS requires, now more than ever, constant 
communications, interagency transparency, efficient use of spectrum 
resources and a combined strategic approach to spectrum management by 
the U.S. government. These, combined with thorough analysis and 
engineering, will ensure the private and government sectors can reach 
amenable solutions moving forward.

    Question 3. What technical evidence formed the basis for the 
November 2nd special information bulletin on radio altimeters?
    Answer. SAIB AIR 21-18 was issued to address Risk of Potential 
Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters.
    As indicated in paragraph 395, Federal Communications Commission 
Report and Order and Order of Proposed Modification in the matter of 
Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz Band; GN Docket No. 18-122 
\1\, the FCC indicated that the aviation industry is responsible for 
ensuring protection of radio altimeters from interference associated 
with 5G C-band emissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-22A1.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As identified in the public docket for the FCC report and the order 
cited above, RTCA submitted a report identifying the potential for 
significant safety risks associated with this matter. These concerns 
were corroborated by communications from a wide-range of aviation 
industry stakeholders in formal letters to the FAA, the FCC, and the 
Department of Transportation. The FAA also engaged in individual 
discussions with representatives from multiple radio altimeter and 
aircraft manufacturers that corroborated an assessment of potential 
risk of adverse effects.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    Question.. Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) can be used in numerous 
new ways, including for leak inspection in oil and natural gas 
operations. This new use of UAS helps can help reduce the emissions in 
the oil and gas industry, but these operations can only be conducted 
[beyond-line-of-site] pursuant to a waiver from the FAA. Given the 
possibility the FAA may see an increase in waiver requests, is the 
agency taking any steps to address potential bottlenecks and develop 
ways to process waivers in a timely and efficient manner?
    Answer. Several infrastructure companies in the railroad, electric, 
oil and gas, and communications sectors currently use UAS to conduct 
routine surveillance, inspection, and maintenance of their equipment. 
While most of these operations are beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS), 
applying current regulations to these operations is neither scalable, 
nor economically viable in the mid-to long-term. However, limited 
operations today will inform the regulatory updates needed to make them 
routine in the coming years, which ultimately will result in better 
performance-based, technology-agnostic rules. These types of operations 
have been prevalent in the UAS community and the waiver requests have 
been in place for years so the FAA is prepared to handle an increase in 
requests.
    Furthermore, the FAA announced a UAS BVLOS Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee (ARC) on June 8, 2021. The UAS BVLOS ARC is co-chaired by the 
FAA and industry partners and includes over 80 members of the aviation 
community. The ARC is focused on taking a holistic approach and will 
provide recommendations for a performance-based, technology-agnostic 
regulatory framework to normalize safe, scalable, economically viable 
BVLOS operations. The FAA intends to use the ARC's recommendations to 
develop a proposed rule for BVLOS operations in the aviation regulatory 
framework. The FAA will then move to translate the ARC's 
recommendations into a rulemaking effort that transforms these ideas 
into regulations, thus creating predictability and normalization for 
the UAS industry to innovate toward.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    Question 1. I believe that the centralization and expansion of the 
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) Office--created by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 
115-254)--was crucial to improving the consistency of manufacturer 
oversight nationwide, and I appreciate your continued efforts to 
improve that office. Your testimony mentioned that FAA convened an 
expert panel to review ODA designees and provide recommendations to the 
agency for improvement.
    Could you elaborate on the contents of this ODA review and the 
timeline for its completion?
    Answer. In response to section 213 of the 2018 FAA Reauthorization 
Act (P.L. 115-254), the FAA convened a 20 member multidisciplinary 
expert review panel knowledgeable in FAA certification processes and 
procedures and the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) 
program. To address the requirements of section 213, the panel 
conducted a survey of ODA Holders and program applicants to document 
and assess FAA certification and oversight activities as they relate to 
the ODA program. In addition to the survey task, the panel assessed the 
ODA program and developed recommendations responsive to the 
requirements of section 213. In December 2020, Congress passed the 
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (P.L. 116-260). 
Section 125 of this Act amended section 213 of the 2018 Reauthorization 
Act to include additional tasks for the expert review panel. These new 
tasks included an assessment of ODA Holders to identify and develop 
best practices to address the prevention and deterrence of undue 
pressure, to improve communications between the FAA and ODA staff, and 
to ensure independence between the FAA and ODA Holder. The expert 
review panel completed its assessment of these additional tasks and 
drafted a report detailing its findings and recommendations as they 
relate to the requirements of section 213 as amended by section 125. 
The final report is expected by spring 2022.

    Question 2. As you know, yesterday the FAA issued a Special 
Airworthiness Information Bulletin regarding the planned deployment of 
5G wireless networks in the 3.7-3.98 GHz bands, which recommended that 
aircraft and altimeter manufacturers, operators, and pilots provide the 
agency with information related to the potential effects of this 
deployment on radio altimeters.
    Can you describe the steps FAA is taking to work with both the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National 
telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA) to assess and--if 
needed--resolve this potential issue?
    Answer. The FAA and the Department of Transportation continue to 
advocate for open dialogue between the NEC, FCC, NTIA, and the aviation 
and telecommunications industries. We continue to engage in regular 
(sometimes daily) meetings with the FCC and we are committed to finding 
a long-term solution that will enable aviation and 5G wireless to 
operate to their fullest potential--safely. The FAA is in the process 
of receiving and analyzing data from the wireless industry that we hope 
will enable us to issue carefully tailored Notices to Air Missions 
(NOTAMs). We are also engaging with operators to get their help in 
identifying the capabilities of the radio altimeters in use in their 
fleets so we can get an accurate picture of the likely impacts. The 
more specific data we all have, the better we will be able to solve 
this challenge. Longer term, we are committed to the process of 
developing more robust avionics that can operate safely in close 
proximity to the 5G spectrum and we will make it a priority to work 
with the industry on a lasting solution.

    Question 3. Earlier this year, the Director-General of the European 
Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) made comments that appeared to 
indicate that EASA intends to move away from the established practice 
of relying on FAA for the certification of U.S. aircraft. While the 
specific case of the 737 MAX was unique, this statement appeared to 
apply to all U.S. aircraft, regardless of practices established under 
the US-EU Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement.
    If these comments became EASA policy moving forward, it would 
violate the agreement and undermine the benefits of reciprocity in 
certification between the two regulators. Has FAA or the Department of 
Transportation sought clarification from EASA on this matter?
    Answer. The United States and the European Union (EU) Safety 
Agreement remains the framework for aviation safety cooperation between 
the U.S. and the EU. The FAA-EASA Technical Implementation Procedures 
(TIP) under the U.S.-EU Safety Agreement include provisions that allow 
the validating authority to increase their level of involvements in 
validation projects depending on factors such as the complexity of the 
design. The FAA and EASA continue to follow the procedures established 
under the TIP, and the FAA engages EASA regularly regarding validation 
programs.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    Question 1. Administrator Dickson, the length of the process for 
government agencies to issue rules is a topic that consistently 
frustrates Congress. I have heard you discuss this in passing at 
another hearing, but I think it would be helpful to hear you explain it 
further. Why is it that FAA is consistently unable to issue rules that 
meet that deadlines included in legislation? Are there staffing and 
resources issues?
    Answer. The FAA must comply with applicable provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act in promulgating all rules. Compliance with 
the Act ensures the public is not subject to regulations without first 
having the opportunity to review a proposed rule and comment on it.
    In particular, the Act requires the FAA to develop proposed 
requirements based on supporting safety data and analysis. Consistent 
with Department of Transportation policy, which encourages its 
operating administrations and components to conduct outreach and 
provide robust opportunities for discussion with stakeholders during 
the rulemaking process, the FAA seeks information from industry in a 
variety of ways. Information gathering in compliance with the APA might 
become time-consuming, but results in balanced rules that are poised to 
withstand challenges.
    Under Executive Order 12866 (Sept. 30, 1993), and successor 
Executive Orders, the FAA must also determine whether the anticipated 
benefits of a proposed rule would justify the costs. The FAA seeks cost 
information from industry to assist the FAA in this determination.
    Upon issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the public must have the opportunity to 
submit comments to the FAA concerning the proposed rule. The FAA is 
obligated to consider all comments and determine whether to make 
changes to the proposed rule or revisit conclusions about the costs and 
benefits of a proposed rule. The FAA must explain its conclusions, 
based on the comments, in a final rule publication.

    Question 2. I've heard you mention the process that is very often 
dictated by Administrative Procedures Act. Can you discuss the 
requirements under that law, and its impact on your ability to quickly 
enact rules on issues like secondary barriers or flight attendant rest 
requirements?
    Answer. As indicated above, the Administrative Procedure Act 
requires the FAA to publish a proposed rule and solicit comments on the 
proposal prior to finalization and effectiveness. The Act provides only 
limited exceptions to the requirement for publication: the FAA may 
refrain from seeking comment only when doing so would be impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. In the absence of such 
an exception, in order to issue a rule that imposes a requirement on 
the public the FAA must solicit comments on a proposal that reflects 
safety data or analysis and assesses the potential benefits and costs 
of the rule.

    Question 3. Administrator Dickson, the certification reform bill 
came with many requirements and deadlines for your agency, along with 
some additional resources. But do you have what you need to meet all 
the requirements in the bill in a timely manner? For example, I know 
you've increased your workforce around human factors issues, but is it 
enough?
    Answer. The FAA continues to use a variety of tools to recruit and 
retain technical staff with the right skills to support human factors 
issues, complete implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, 
and Accountability Act (ACSAA), and support its safety mission. The 
agency continues to use personnel authorities/hiring flexibilities, 
including direct hire authority, competitive pay, relocation 
incentives, and recruitment incentives to recruit and retain technical 
staff. We have focused on including Chief Scientist & Technical 
Advisors, Senior Technical Specialists, and other candidates with 
expertise in fields such as cybersecurity, systems safety engineering, 
software engineering, manufacturing and industrial engineering, data 
analytics and science, artificial intelligence, human-machine 
interface, systems engineering, and international aviation safety 
standards. While the state of the aviation workforce changed as a 
result of the pandemic, and will continue to evolve as the system 
returns to normal, the FAA continues to evaluate applicant pools for 
the various areas of need and adjust tactics as needed to meet 
staffing/technical specialty targets.

    Question 4. It was important for Congress to make needed changes to 
the aviation certification system, but while we're doing that I want to 
ensure that as those changes are being made we're not going to 
hamstring U.S. industry and their ability to compete with foreign 
competitors by bringing safer and more efficient products into the 
global marketplace. Is the FAA able to certify the safety and 
compliance of new products without causing undue or needless delays in 
the certification process?
    Answer. The FAA continues to implement the ACSAA. While some of its 
provisions include new requirements on the FAA and industry, we are 
working to leverage current efforts to effectively and efficiently 
implement the bill without undue disruption to certification and safety 
oversight efforts. Further, we are working with our international 
partners toward a harmonized approach to facilitate the global 
acceptance of aviation products. Harmonization is key to ensure an even 
playing field for the U.S. aviation industry.

    Question 5. Administrator Dickson, the certification reform bill 
contains language to enable the FAA to provide increased assistance to 
foreign regulators, and to work through the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop requirements at the 
international level on pilot training, operational standards, and human 
factors.
    Please describe the FAA's efforts to date in this area, as well as 
your plans for future engagement and the benefits to the global air 
travel system that we can expect to see as a result.
    Answer. After years of work, the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) 
voted to establish the Personnel Training and Licensing Panel (PTLP) in 
June 2020, and the virtual kickoff meeting was in February 2021.
    Over the course of several years, the PTLP will review and develop 
personnel training and licensing requirements across technical 
disciplines (e.g., pilot, mechanic, air traffic control). The panel 
will also develop ICAO provisions related to aviation personnel 
training and licensing, including studies to ensure that proposed 
amendments to the applicable provisions reflect current and emerging 
requirements, improvements in training tools and technologies, and new 
training methodologies while reviewing automation dependency and 
possible mitigations. The development of new or revised standards, 
combined with new internationally recognized guidance material, will 
improve pilot training and performance globally. An FAA team of 20 
professionals supports this ICAO work and holds several lead roles in 
advancing the work program of this panel.
    The PTLP U.S.-led Working Group is tasked with determining the 
scope of automation dependency globally and to provide recommendations 
for addressing this challenge. This working group meets monthly and 
anticipates completing its study report by December 2022.
    While this work takes place on the international stage, the FAA 
continues to work on publishing guidance for training program 
development and operational policies and practices for U.S. operators. 
In the coming months, the FAA will publish the draft of a new Advisory 
Circular (AC) for Flight Path Management (FPM) for public comment, 
which continues to build on recent information and guidance about stall 
prevention, upset prevention, manual flight operations, and pilot 
monitoring responsibilities. FPM is the planning, execution, and 
assurance of the guidance and control of aircraft trajectory and 
energy. While the guidelines in this new AC are not mandatory, they are 
derived from extensive FAA and industry study of accidents and 
incidents where ineffective FPM was either causal or contributory, and 
are intended to help operators comply with applicable regulations to 
prevent similar events in the future. This guidance will allow the FAA, 
separate from the ICAO panel work, to engage with other regulators and 
share the information more broadly.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to 

                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    Question 1. I am pleased to hear about the progress the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) has already made in implementing the 
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA). Even 
though the FAA's work is in the early stages, I am encouraged by the 
diligence already being undertaken by the FAA. In your conversations 
with industry, have they provided constructive feedback on the FAA's 
rulemakings?
    Answer. Generally, our external stakeholders have expressed support 
for the goals of the ACSAA and the FAA's efforts to raise the level of 
safety by implementing system safety management principles across all 
segments of the aviation industry.

    Question 2. Has the FAA heard of any issues or concerns from the 
design and manufacturing organizations?
    Answer. The most significant issues raised by design and 
manufacturing organizations involve the scalability of SMS for 
organizations of different sizes. Affected companies will have an 
opportunity to comment on the rulemaking.

    Question 3. In your testimony, you mentioned that four design and 
manufacturing organizations have already voluntarily adopted safety 
management systems (SMS) and six others are in the process of adopting 
them. Does the FAA anticipate most design and manufacturing 
organizations adopting SMS regulations?
    Answer. The FAA continues to promote the voluntary SMS program and 
while the agency anticipates participation in the voluntary program 
will grow, the pending SMS rulemaking would require SMS for design and 
manufacturing organizations.

    Question 4. In your testimony, you mention that even before the 
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act (ACSAA) the FAA had already started evolving your 
relationship with manufacturers. Could you elaborate on the increased 
transparency the FAA has requested from manufactures?
    Answer. The agency is prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and 
focusing on safety critical areas. The FAA delegates fewer 
responsibilities and demands more transparency from manufacturers. In 
the case of Boeing, the FAA leverages Boeing's Voluntary SMS program to 
increase access to Boeing's performance regarding root cause problem 
solving and safety risk management assessments. These situations allow 
direct insight regarding Boeing's SMS implementation, and the FAA can 
provide feedback on where further changes are necessary for the SMS to 
have greater impact.

    Question 5. As you noted in your testimony, the FAA has already 
begun hiring additional staff, does the agency anticipate having the 
staff necessary to implement the Act by FY22?
    Answer. The FAA continues to use a variety of tools to recruit and 
retain technical staff with the right skills to support human factors 
issues, complete implementation of the ACSAA, and support its safety 
mission. The agency continues to use personnel authorities/hiring 
flexibilities, including direct hire authority, competitive pay, 
relocation incentives, and recruitment incentives to recruit and retain 
technical staff. We have focused on including Chief Scientist & 
Technical Advisors, Senior Technical Specialists, and other candidates 
with expertise in fields such as cybersecurity, systems safety 
engineering, software engineering, manufacturing and industrial 
engineering, data analytics and science, artificial intelligence, 
human-machine interface, systems engineering, and international 
aviation safety standards. While the state of the aviation workforce 
changed as a result of the pandemic, and will continue to evolve as the 
system returns to normal, the FAA continues to evaluate applicant pools 
for the various areas of need and adjust tactics as needed to meet 
staffing/technical specialty targets.

    Question 6. How has the relationship between the FAA and 
manufacturers changed?
    Answer. The agency is prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and 
focusing on safety critical areas. The FAA delegates fewer 
responsibilities and demands more transparency from manufacturers, and 
evaluates key assumptions prior to delegating functions in certain 
areas.
    While the FAA continues to value the manufacturers' technical 
expertise, the agency is committed to enforcing the highest safety 
standards for regulated manufacturers.

    Question 7. I joined Chairwoman Cantwell along with Senators Moran 
and Klobuchar on introducing the Foreign Civil Aviation Authority 
Assistance Act which was included as a part of the Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA). I am encouraged 
by the progress the FAA has made and the FAA's close collaboration with 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to improve pilot 
training. Could you describe the FAA's efforts to date in this effort 
as well as your plans for future engagement and how this will benefit 
global air travel?
    Answer. After years of work, the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) 
voted to establish the Personnel Training and Licensing Panel (PTLP) in 
June 2020, and the virtual kickoff meeting was in February 2021.
    Over the course of several years, the PTLP will review and develop 
personnel training and licensing requirements across technical 
disciplines (e.g., pilot, mechanic, air traffic control). The panel 
will also develop ICAO provisions related to aviation personnel 
training and licensing, including studies to ensure that proposed 
amendments to the applicable provisions reflect current and emerging 
requirements, improvements in training tools and technologies, and new 
training methodologies while reviewing automation dependency and 
possible mitigations. The development of new or revised standards, 
combined with new internationally recognized guidance material, will 
improve pilot training and performance globally. An FAA team of 20 
professionals supports this ICAO work and holds several lead roles in 
advancing the work program of this panel.
    The PTLP U.S.-led Working Group is tasked with determining the 
scope of automation dependency globally and to provide recommendations 
for addressing this challenge. This working group meets monthly and 
anticipates completing its study report by December 2022.
    While this work takes place on the international stage, the FAA 
continues to work on publishing guidance for training program 
development and operational policies and practices for U.S. operators. 
In the coming months, the FAA will publish the draft of a new Advisory 
Circular (AC) for Flight Path Management (FPM) for public comment, 
which continues to build on recent information and guidance about stall 
prevention, upset prevention, manual flight operations, and pilot 
monitoring responsibilities. FPM is the planning, execution, and 
assurance of the guidance and control of aircraft trajectory and 
energy. While the guidelines in this new AC are not mandatory, they are 
derived from extensive FAA and industry study of accidents and 
incidents where ineffective FPM was either causal or contributory, and 
are intended to help operators comply with applicable regulations to 
prevent similar events in the future. This guidance will allow the FAA, 
separate from the ICAO panel work, to engage with other regulators and 
share the information more broadly.

    Question 8. I have raised the concern of the increased usage of 
automation in the cockpit and pilot training previously. I certainly 
believe that automation can and has improved aviation safety, but I 
believe that it is imperative to ensure pilots are properly trained on 
how to interact with these systems. I appreciate that you address this 
in your testimony and that the FAA has several initiatives in order to 
ensure human factors are incorporated into aviation safety policy and 
oversight. What are the oversight changes being considered at the FAA 
to ensure pilots become more proficient in managing safety systems?
    Answer. The FAA continues to work on publishing guidance for 
training program development and operational policies and practices for 
U.S. operators. In the coming months, the FAA expects to publish the 
draft of a new Advisory Circular (AC) for Flight Path Management (FPM) 
for public comment, which continues to build on recent information and 
guidance about stall prevention, upset prevention, manual flight 
operations, and pilot monitoring responsibilities. FPM is the planning, 
execution, and assurance of the guidance and control of aircraft 
trajectory and energy. While the guidelines in this new AC are not 
mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry study of 
accidents and incidents where ineffective FPM was either causal or 
contributory, and are intended to help operators comply with applicable 
regulations to prevent similar events in the future.
    The initial FPM AC will target operations and training for manual 
flight operations, managing automated systems, pilot monitoring, and 
energy management.
                                 ______
                                 
  Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Marsha Blackburn to 
                           Hon. Steve Dickson
    Question 1. If terrestrial broadband services in the C-Band 
presents the potential for harmful interference to radar altimeters 
such that the FAA would issue a safety bulletin, why aren't you 
concerned about U.S. air carriers flying routes in countries where such 
operations co-exist today?
    How about U.S. passengers flying on European air carriers in those 
specified areas?
    Answer. The radio altimeter is an important aircraft instrument, 
and its intended function is to provide direct height-above-terrain/
water information to a variety of aircraft systems.
    Commercial aviation radio altimeters operate in the 4.2-4.4 GHz 
band, which is separated by 220 megahertz from the C-Band 
telecommunication systems in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. These transmitters 
are expected to emit significantly stronger signals than those used in 
other countries, which would heighten the likelihood of interference 
with sensitive aircraft electronics.

    Question 2. In the hearing, you mentioned the importance of the UAS 
Integration Pilot Program. Can you please bring me up to date on the 
latest initiatives FAA has spearheaded under this program?
    Answer. The UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP) was established by 
a presidential memorandum on Oct. 25, 2017. The program concluded on 
Oct. 25, 2020. The IPP accomplished a significant amount of work to 
support integration of UAS into the national airspace system (NAS). 
Many integration challenges remained after the program concluded, 
including a need for technological standards and a more robust 
regulatory framework.
    BEYOND began on Oct. 26, 2020, to continue the IPP mission. The 
program focuses on operating under established rules rather than 
waivers, collecting data to develop performance-based standards, 
collecting and addressing community feedback, understanding the 
societal and community benefits, and streamlining the approval 
processes for UAS integration. BEYOND would enable beyond visual line-
of-sight (BVLOS) operations without visual observers that are 
repeatable, scalable, and economically viable across rural, suburban, 
and urban environments. Specific emphasis will be placed on 
infrastructure inspection, public aircraft operations, and small 
package delivery, along with analyzing and quantifying the societal and 
economic benefits of UAS operations, and ensuring robust engagement 
with communities. Since the beginning of the program in October 2020 
through October 2021, the participants have logged more than 5,900 
flights beyond the visual line-of-sight of the pilot-in-command to 
complete package deliveries and infrastructure inspections.

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