[Senate Hearing 117-817]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-817
IMPLEMENTATION OF AVIATION SAFETY REFORM
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 3, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-587 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Ranking
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii ROY BLUNT, Missouri
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts TED CRUZ, Texas
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MIKE LEE, Utah
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
George Greenwell, Policy Coordinator and Security Manager
John Keast, Republican Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on November 3, 2021................................. 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Letter dated May 13, 2021 from Ian Won, Aviation Safety,
Acting Manager, BASOO Branch, Aircraft Certification
Service, Federal Aviation Administration................... 2
Letter dated August 19, 2021 from Ian Won, Aviation Safety,
Acting Manager, BASOO Branch, Aircraft Certification
Service, Federal Aviation Administration................... 6
Letter dated October 19, 2021 to Hon. Pete Buttigieg,
Secretary, Department of Transportation, Stephen M.
Dickson, Administrator, and Bradley Mims, Deputy
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration from the
families of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302.................. 54
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 10
Statement of Senator Tester...................................... 20
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 21
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 23
Memorandum dated September 16, 2021 from Earl Lawrence,
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service......... 24
Memorandum dated October 15, 2021 from Chris Rocheleau,
Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal
Aviation Administration.................................... 25
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 32
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 33
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 35
Statement of Senator Baldwin..................................... 36
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 38
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 39
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 41
Statement of Senator Warnock..................................... 43
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 45
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 47
Statement of Senator Sinema...................................... 49
Statement of Senator Scott....................................... 50
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 52
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 53
Witnesses
Hon. Steve Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Steve Dickson by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 81
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 92
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 93
Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 94
Hon. Ben Ray Lujan........................................... 95
Hon. Roger Wicker............................................ 96
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 97
Hon. Roy Blunt............................................... 98
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 100
Hon. Marsha Blackburn........................................ 101
IMPLEMENTATION OF AVIATION SAFETY REFORM
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria
Cantwell, Chair of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cantwell [presiding], Klobuchar,
Blumenthal, Markey, Peters, Tester, Sinema, Rosen,
Hickenlooper, Warnock, Wicker, Blunt, Cruz, Fischer, Moran,
Sullivan, Blackburn, and Scott.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
The Chair. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation will come to order. We are having a hearing
today on the implementation of our new aviation reform law, and
want to welcome the honorable Steve Dickson, Administrator for
the Federal Aviation Administration, for joining us today. I
also want to take a moment to recognize the families who have
lost loved ones who are with us today.
Thank you so much for being here and for your continued
oversight on this issue. I can't imagine the pain and suffering
of your loss and the pain that you are still feeling. But I
certainly want you to know we appreciate your vigilance on
aviation safety reform. You have shaped the safety work of this
committee, and with your support and critical input, the
Committee played a leading role in drafting the Aircraft
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act.
This important legislation enacted into law almost a year
ago, I believe, provided a big down payment on the direction
that we need to go to implement safety reforms in the United
States and to make us the gold standard around the world. That
is why we are here today to have this hearing, to determine
whether the Federal administration, the Federal Aviation
Administration, has faithfully and vigorously executed the
safety reform law in accordance with Congressional mandates for
deadlines and action. I will be upfront with you, Mr.
Administrator, about the purpose of this hearing. It is to find
out whether you are upholding the spirit and the letter of this
law.
While not the only thing we need to do, the law that we
implemented was a clear course correction. It said that we
needed to have a stronger FAA oversight, the people in place to
do that job, and to hold manufacturers accountable. Directing
the FAA and making sure that that job is done is critical.
While I know your communication to the Committee in your
written testimony talks about a lot of the actions and
requirements that were in the law, we also know that there is
more to be done. I want to say that I am very appreciative of
Ian Won at the Boeing Aviation Oversight Office, who on May 13
issued a letter basically slowing down the 777X so that more
information could be provided, needed to be provided for the
oversight of that plane.
[The letter referred to follows:]
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The Chair. I am a firm believer that engineers on the
ground know their job. What is not clear to me is whether
people are listening to them and whether the FAA has their
back. I also want to enter into the record an August 19 letter
from Mr. Won also, talking about the changes to the Boeing
BASOO Office and things that needed to be done to make sure
that they continue to have the oversights and objectives. He
has been clear, we need more resources. He has been clear, we
need the right people to do this job.
[The letter referred to follows:]
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The Chair. So we need the FAA, as I said, to be that gold
standard. When a Special Committee Review of Aviation
Certification Process, the SCRACP, came back with a whitewash
of what we needed to do, I was disappointed that you did not
take more critique with that. In fact, basically--you testified
before Congress, basically, the system is not broken. Well,
there were parts that were broken, and they need to be fixed.
So I look forward to your testimony, but reading it, I see more
of the same. Now is not a time to mince words.
Now is the time to provide the leadership that it takes to
get the staffing, the oversight, and the direction that is
required of an oversight agency to hold manufacturers
accountable. Make no mistake, the manufacturer has its own
responsibilities here, and we will also hold them accountable.
We believe there is more to be done on certification, more to
be done on the oversight and certification process so that we
are not just creating check marks on a list that now we can say
the list has its check marks.
That is where we were with the MCAS system. In the end, it
was the tragedy that we all know too well and are still living
with. So I am very challenged by your testimony. We don't
believe the FAA is prepared, on January 1 of 2022, to restore
direct supervision and control over those manufacturing
engineers and delegated authority because they--that process
should have started sooner because it is a big oversight
responsibility.
I will have questions for you in the Q&A about that and the
type of personnel that we need in all of these jobs. We don't
believe the FAA has conducted the necessary workforce review
for determining the staffing and experience of those levels.
And the FAA has not taken steps necessary to limit the
delegation of certification tax to industry until the FAA has
verified all human factor assumptions. Restating the law's
requirement in a two page memo is not what it takes to get that
implemented. It might be a basic start, but where is proof of
the implementation? And this level of reform is needed
immediately.
And the FAA has not fully implemented new requirements for
applicants to disclose safety critical information like
information related to flight control systems, so that the FAA
can be aware and fully assess the impact of those proposed
design changes and innovation technologies. Again, this went
into the U.S. Code and was effective immediately, but the FAA
expects to issue guidance in 2022. We don't have time to wait.
We need that kind of oversight today.
And the FAA has yet to complete the work of the Independent
Expert Panel, which is supposed to be convened 30 days from
enactment to provide timely advice on whether the FAA should
formally rein in Boeing's ODA authority. I also would like to
enter into the record a letter from the families who are
actually calling for a pulling of that authority. I understand
this--that there is a panel that is meeting now, but the
process and procedures in place to review their actions and
have it be transparent is critically important if we are going
to get this right. So all of these safety issues are critical
to all of us in America. It is critical to our families who fly
on planes.
It is critical to our economy. We need the leadership of
the FAA to--not just before our hearing today. The complexity
that got us to this situation is a lot of complexity of
language. In reality, it has to be leadership of FAA in
implementing the law. Now I will turn to my colleague, Senator
Wicker, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cantwell, for convening
this oversight hearing on aviation safety and the Federal
Aviation Administration's implementation of ACSA, the Aircraft
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act, which this
committee shepherded through Congress and was signed into law
at the end of last year.
As we all know, a little more than 3 years ago, a Boeing
737 MAX crashed in Indonesia. Approximately 5 months later, a
second MAX aircraft crashed in Ethiopia. And I too want to
recognize the families of the victims and tell them how much we
appreciate their input over time. It is really hard to put into
words our emotions in this regard. However, the Committee did
produce bipartisan legislation to improve aviation safety based
on recommendations from several experts and several expert
groups that carefully examined these accidents and the
development of the 737 MAX.
We then worked on merging our bill with one that our
colleagues in the House used. The result was that bicameral,
bipartisan bill representing the most significant aviation
safety legislation in recent history. I particularly want to
applaud the work of the families of the victims in pressing to
reform how the Federal Government oversees aviation safety,
particularly the process of certifying aircraft design and
production.
We will continue, Senator Cantwell and I and the members of
this committee, to press the FAA to implement the reforms in
this law. Enacting legislation was an important first step.
Now, the FAA and the industry must follow through with
implementing new programs and requirements. And so I am pleased
to welcome Administrator Dickson before us today. His agency
has already taken a number of actions in response to the
accidents as well as the new law, but there is still much more
work ahead, as the Chair has just mentioned.
Administrator Dickson should update us on the progress the
FAA has made so far, and he should outline how he will ensure
that the FAA follows through on the remaining work. I would
also ask the Administrator to let us know if Congress needs to
do more to ensure that the U.S. system remains the gold
standard for aviation safety. Safety is a constant mission
requiring the focus of the entire aviation community.
We are fortunate that our Nation continues to have a truly
remarkable aviation safety record. That high level of safety is
the result of decades of lessons learned, as well as the
dedication and hard work of safety professionals throughout the
system. We cannot ever be complacent. We should always be
working to improve aviation safety. So thank you, Madam Chair,
and I thank the Administrator for being with us today.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Wicker. I failed to mention
in my opening statement what great bipartisan work that
legislation was and certainly appreciate the hard work of your
staff and my staff and obviously our work with our House
colleagues on getting that over the goal line.
And so, so many members who are with us here this morning
also had legislation that was included in that, so it really
was a comprehensive list of issues that the Committee really,
and I can say from what I know about the Senate, engaged in in
a very deep way and I think that that will lead to a very deep
oversight of its implementation. Administrator Dickson,
welcome. We welcome you to make your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE DICKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Chair Cantwell. And good morning,
Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, and members of this
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the FAA's
approach to aviation safety oversight and our efforts to
strengthen the aircraft certification process.
Safety is a journey, not a destination. We are constantly
evolving as a regulator and an air navigation services provider
to deliver the safest and most efficient aerospace system in
the world. That is our mission, and our entire workforce of
nearly 45,000 Federal employees is singularly focused on
achieving that mission. As the Head of the FAA, safety is my
North Star. One of the first things I did as FAA Administrator
was to make it clear that we are the regulator, and that
included resetting our relationship with Boeing.
I said that we would continue to exert a high level of
scrutiny across the board, and we continue that scrutiny today.
I have made it clear internally that we always do the right
thing when it comes to safety and that I have the workforce's
back. We are also asking ourselves the hard questions, and we
are asking them of those that we regulate. When it comes to
safety, we do not accept the status quo.
This is why we embrace reform, and we are focused across
the agency on continuous improvement. I will discuss a number
of initiatives that we have underway and the work that we have
completed to address this goal and to implement the Aircraft
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act. But first, let me
say to the families of the victims of the Ethiopian Airlines
and Lion Air crashes that the FAA is committed to applying the
lessons learned from these tragedies so that the aviation
system here and around the world continues to improve.
I want this committee to know that the FAA appreciates and
respects the input and direction from Congress and that we
remain fully committed to executing this legislation to make
near and long term safety improvements that benefit the global
aviation system. Now, the Act has more than 100 specific
requirements that we are implementing to make aircraft
certification and safety oversight more holistic, systematic,
transparent, and effective.
I can say with confidence that we are doing more for
certification oversight, and we are doing it more
systematically than we were this time last year. For one, we
are delegating fewer responsibilities to manufacturers and
demanding more transparency from them. At the same time, we are
making use of their technical expertise as we prioritize our
safety oversight functions. The FAA is also revising guidance
and criteria that we use for determining significant
modifications to an aircraft, so the proposed changes are
evaluated from a whole aircraft system perspective and not just
a single part.
We are promoting the use of safety management systems, or
SMS, internally and externally. With SMS, an organization
actively searches for and identifies safety issues and then
addresses the root cause. From my own experience, I know that
SMS works, but only if there is buy-in from everyone at all
levels of the organization, from the C-suite down to the person
pushing the broom on the shop floor. At the FAA, that means
when anyone at any level flags an issue, I have got their back.
No questions asked.
Because SMS works, we have not let the rulemaking process
hinder manufacturers from using it now. Currently four design
and manufacturing organizations including Boeing have
voluntarily adopted SMS with six others in progress. As we
know, human factors continues to be an important part of our
work in evaluating aircraft and aircraft systems. We have
expanded our evaluation of manufacturers assumptions about
human factors that equipment manufacturers make when they
perform system safety assessments, including pilot response
times.
The FAA has initiated rulemaking to update regulations and
the guidance for conducting system safety assessments on
transport category aircraft. And we have increased our research
on automation, including potential overreliance on automated
systems and loss of basic piloting skills. To support this
increased emphasis on human factors, we have hired 14 human
factor specialists in our aircraft certification flight
standards organizations. We are actively expanding our
portfolio of data collection and analytics tools so that we can
more effectively share safety data within the FAA and among
industry stakeholders and international partners. Data is key
to the early identification of potential hazards and safety
problems.
Per the Act, we have a new contract with the Transportation
Research Board that will help us discover emerging safety
trends in aviation. Since aviation is a global system, the FAA
is also working closely with the International Civil Aviation
Organization and other international stakeholders to influence
and adjust the maintenance and pilot training requirements for
U.S. products operating under other civil aviation authorities.
Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, and members of this
committee, as you can see, the FAA is fully committed to a
thorough and complete implementation of the Aircraft
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act. We approach all
of this work with humility and never take safety for granted.
However, we are not just doing this work because you have
directed us to do it. We are doing it because it is the right
thing to do for aviation safety. It is our mission. That is
what the public expects, and it is the standard that we have
set for ourselves, and the agency will accept nothing less.
Thank you again for your support and your direction, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dickson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
Good morning Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, and Members of
the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approach to aviation safety
oversight and our activities to implement changes to strengthen the
aircraft certification process. Certifying aviation products is a
critical aspect of the FAA's safety mission. We are committed to
improving the certification process, including our oversight of
functions delegated to aircraft designers and manufacturers. We have
undertaken a number of initiatives to address this goal, as well as to
comprehensively implement the requirements of the bipartisan Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (``Act'').
Before we begin to discuss the specifics of certification reform
implementation, on behalf of the United States Department of
Transportation and everyone at the FAA, I would like to recognize, as
we have before, the families of the victims of the Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines accidents and extend our deepest sympathies and
condolences to them. It has been 3 years since the Lion Air accident,
and we have made significant progress on addressing the findings and
recommendations that resulted from the numerous investigations and
independent reviews of both accidents involving the Boeing 737 MAX. We
will continue to prioritize our work to improve aviation safety to make
sure this never happens again.
As mentioned, our efforts to implement certification reform are
well underway. I want to thank Congress for enacting this landmark
aviation safety legislation and for this committee's continued
leadership on aviation safety matters. The Act has more than one
hundred unique requirements that we are implementing in a holistic,
systematic, transparent, and efficient manner to improve aircraft
certification and safety oversight. The FAA is working diligently to
implement the requirements while also ensuring that we are approaching
our efforts as systemically and effectively as possible. Specific
agency actions taken to implement the requirements of the Act are
discussed more fully below; however, I also wish to note that, in
general, our approach to aircraft certification and safety oversight
has changed. The FAA's relationship with manufacturers is evolving. We
are prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and working to focus that
oversight on safety critical areas. We are delegating fewer
responsibilities and demanding more transparency from them, and
evaluating key assumptions prior to delegating functions in certain
areas. While we continue to value their technical expertise, we are
also committed to enforcing the highest safety standards for the
manufacturers that we regulate. Our work to fully implement the Act is
still in the early stages, and we are carrying it out with the urgency
that it requires. The discussion below provides an overview of some of
our accomplishments to date.
Safety Management Systems. To ensure a holistic and
proactive assessment and mitigation of hazards, and to support
further improvement in safety performance, we continue to work
with industry to increase transparency, strengthen risk
management practices, and improve feedback channels between
industry and the FAA. We believe that enhancing and promoting
the use of safety management systems (SMS)--where safety issues
are actively looked for and identified, and then the root cause
is addressed--is integral to achieving this objective, and we
have taken a number of steps toward increasing the use of SMS
in the design and manufacturing environment. As required by the
Act, we have initiated a rulemaking that contemplates requiring
aircraft manufacturers that hold both a type certificate and a
production certificate to adopt SMS, consistent with
international standards and practices.\1\ As part of this
rulemaking, we will also evaluate potential SMS requirements
for repair stations, certificate holders that conduct common
carriage operations under part 135, and certain air tour
operators under part 91.\2\ We also created guidance for the
development of voluntary SMS programs and are working closely
with industry to encourage participation in voluntary SMS
programs to further enhance safety across the entire aviation
system. Currently, four design and manufacturing organizations
have voluntarily adopted SMS with six others in progress.
Boeing also established an SMS under the FAA's Voluntary SMS
program as part of the settlement agreement. The voluntary
programs have enabled the FAA to gain valuable experience on
oversight of SMS for design and manufacturing organizations,
and the lessons learned will help inform FAA's SMS rulemaking
and policy development.
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\1\ RIN 2120-AL60, Safety Management System (SMS) for Parts 21, 91,
135 and 145 issued. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AL60
\2\ The FAA is developing a final rule to require the use of SMS at
airports certificated under Part 139. RIN 2120AJ38, Airport Safety
Management System. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AJ38
System Safety and Human Factors. We are working on several
initiatives to ensure system safety assessments and human
factors assumptions are incorporated into the FAA's aviation
safety policy and oversight. We have initiated a rulemaking to
standardize regulations and guidance for conducting system
safety assessments on transport category airplanes.\3\ In
addition, the expert safety review panel that we established
pursuant to the Act is meeting regularly to review the
assumptions relied upon in aircraft design and certification of
transport category aircraft--including assumptions regarding
pilot response times. We are also developing new guidance for
industry on the submission of safety critical information.
There are several interrelated provisions regarding human
factors and human systems integration. To address these, we
have taken a number of steps to strengthen the foundation of
aviation human factors safety research and to bolster the
technical expertise within the Aviation Safety (AVS)
organization. This includes developing a human factors
education and training program, doubling the number of human
factors staff within AVS, and realigning the hiring of
technical advisors with the necessary technical expertise
involved in critical safety decisions.
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\3\ RIN 2120-AJ99, System Safety Assessments for transport category
airplanes issued. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AJ99
Global Collaboration. To further international harmonization
and collaboration with respect to aircraft type certification
and continued operational safety, the FAA established the
Changed Product Rule International Authority Working Group and
held the first meeting in July 2021. This working group will
develop recommendations for international policy and guidance
to ensure proposed changes to an aircraft are evaluated from an
integrated whole aircraft system perspective. The FAA is
working closely with the International Civil Aviation
Organization and other international stakeholders to influence
and adjust the maintenance and pilot training requirements for
U.S. products operating under the oversight of another civil
aviation authority. In addition, FAA representatives have
presented at and attended several webinars, work group
meetings, and seminars, including a presentation at the 2021
Zhuhai International Flight Training and Safety seminar on
topics of competency based pilot training and automation
dependency. The FAA plans to continue this global engagement
into the future, including seeking new opportunities to
collaborate with civil aviation authorities and other
international stakeholders to foster improvements in
international safety standards and practices for aircraft
design and certification, pilot training, and operational
safety management. Additionally, to fulfill the requirement to
ensure that pilot operational evaluations for aircraft type
certifications utilize pilots from air carriers that are
expected to operate such aircraft, the FAA has already begun to
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incorporate air carrier pilots into such evaluations.
Data. We are actively expanding our oversight capabilities
by advancing data collection and analytics tools to share
safety data within the FAA and between industry stakeholders
and international partners. These efforts include technological
enhancements to the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing system to integrate new data sources and methods for
safety analysis, which will improve data quality and
accessibility to support risk-based decision-making. In
addition, the FAA's new contract with the Transportation
Research Board, established pursuant to the Act in June 2021,
will aid the agency's effort to conduct annual analysis and
reporting on current and emerging safety trends in aviation. As
the aviation landscape continues to evolve, it will be
increasingly necessary to bolster the FAA's use of safety data
and collaboration with industry to identify potential hazards
and safety problems and to solve these problems before they
give rise to an accident or incident.
Integration of Certification and Oversight. The Act requires
the FAA to convene an interdisciplinary integrated project team
upon the agency's receipt of every application for a new type
certificate for a transport category airplane. The FAA
previously commissioned the Integrated Program Management team
comprised of subject matter experts from Flight Standards and
the Aircraft Certification Service to assess current practices
and policies and make recommendations for improving FAA
oversight through the integration of design and operations. The
best practices identified from this process are being applied
to ongoing certification projects, and we intend to enhance the
current procedures to incorporate additional requirements
contained in the Act. The FAA is also revising our current
Technical Advisory Board (TAB) process to use the TAB in all
new and amended type certification projects. We anticipate
implementing this policy next spring. The Act also directs FAA
to establish an executive council to oversee the FAA Compliance
Program. This program provides a framework for how the agency
returns a regulated entity to compliance through comprehensive
safety data sharing between the FAA and regulated entities.
Pursuant to the Act's requirements, we established the FAA
Compliance Program Executive Council to monitor the operation
and effectiveness of the Compliance Program, and held the first
meeting in August 2021. We also updated the Compliance Program
order to reflect the implementation of the Executive Council
and the Compliance Program Steering Committee.\4\
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\4\ Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Aviation
Administration Compliance Program, Order 8000.373B, April 22, 2021, at
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_
Order_8000.373B.pdf.
Culture of Safety and Excellence. The FAA is committed to
fostering a just safety culture, while providing transparency
to improve safety, operational excellence, and efficiency.
These efforts include promoting voluntary safety reporting,
increasing workforce competencies, and attracting talented
staff. In April 2021, we implemented the Voluntary Safety
Reporting Program (VSRP) to provide a mechanism for employees
to voluntarily report potential hazards and safety concerns
without fear of reprisal or other repercussions.\5\ Preliminary
data on VSRP usage indicates that employees are comfortable
using the system and they are regularly using it to raise
safety concerns. An added bonus of VSRP is that it promotes
collaboration between employees and management for proactively
addressing safety concerns and developing corrective action
recommendations. To assess the effectiveness of these efforts
and to meet the requirements of the Act, we will conduct annual
internal safety culture assessments that include surveys of AVS
employees in order to evaluate the safety culture and the
implementation of VSRP programs.
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\5\ Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Safety Voluntary
Safety Reporting Program, Order 800.375, February 02, 2021, at http://
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/VS_8000
.375.pdf.
Accountability. A critical part of fostering a just safety
culture is ensuring that we hold our people to the highest
safety standards. In response to requirements in the Act, we
have taken a critical look at our own internal oversight
processes and taken steps to enhance accountability. This
includes re-designating the Office of Investigations to the new
Office of Investigations and Professional Responsibility and
establishing investigative processes that are based on best
practices identified from similar offices at other Federal
agencies and from the FAA's experience, expertise, and other
sources. Although our work is not yet done, we believe that
incorporating these best practices will improve the
effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the FAA's
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investigative process.
Delegation. The Act requires the FAA to institute extensive
and meaningful changes to the Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA) program and our oversight of that program.
To address these legislative requirements, we expect to
implement significant changes to our policies and procedures
for delegating certification authority to private entities.
These changes include policy requiring FAA approval of
individual ODA unit members for certain ODA types, and policy
aimed at preventing interference with ODA unit members in
performance of their duties. We are also standing up an expert
panel to conduct a review of ODAs for transport category
airplanes and make recommendations to the FAA based on that
review. Additionally, as required under the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018, we previously established the ODA Office to
provide oversight and to ensure consistency of the FAA's audit
functions under the ODA program. In April 2021, the FAA
realigned the ODA Office to report directly to the Associate
Administrator for Aviation Safety. This reporting structure
reflects the FAA's priority to oversee, standardize, and ensure
consistency in the ODA system, as well as to facilitate many of
the ODA reform requirements contained in the Act. To that end,
the ODA Office anticipates adding more employees in Fiscal Year
2022, and hiring has already begun. The additional staff will
allow the office to perform more outreach, identify best
practices, and implement measures to maintain consistent
oversight.
Certification and Continued Operational Safety Processes.
Ensuring the safety of aviation products through certification
is an important function of the FAA, and we are continuously
taking steps to enhance the type certification process. This
includes revising guidance and criteria used for determining
significant changes to best ensure that proposed changes to an
aircraft are evaluated from a whole aircraft-level perspective,
including human interface elements. We have also commissioned
external reviews to evaluate our Transport Airplane Risk
Assessment Model and type certification process. To address the
Act's requirements to establish an appeal and issue resolution
processes for certification decisions, we are developing an
implementing order.
Innovation. Aviation is incredibly dynamic, and it is
imperative for the FAA to take steps to accelerate and expand
the deployment of new technologies in order to reduce barriers
and actively promote innovation that enhances the safety and
efficiency of the National Airspace System. We recently
established and staffed the Center for Emerging Concepts and
Innovation to support certification of new aircraft and
technologies by providing preapplication engagement with
companies to identify a preliminary path to compliance. We are
also taking steps to foster enhanced coordination across the
FAA on emerging products and concepts.
Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, I want to assure you, and
each member of the committee, that the FAA is fully committed to
thorough and complete implementation of the Aircraft Certification,
Safety, and Accountability Act. As we continue this process, we remain
committed to our transparent and accountable approach, which includes
regular briefings on our progress with staff of the committees of
jurisdiction, labor partners, industry stakeholders, and more. We will
continue to assess our entire certification and oversight framework in
light of past experience, industry growth, technological advancements,
and innovation as we carry out our responsibilities for public safety.
We approach all of this work with humility and do not take safety for
granted. We are confident that we are making substantial and meaningful
progress, and will continue to keep Congress apprised throughout this
work.
The Chair. Thank you, Administrator Dickson. On the bill
itself, just I want to get to some basic yes and noes if I
could. The legislation in our mind, in crafting it, was a clear
stop of what we thought was a continuation toward more
delegation and a return closer to the elements of what DER was.
Do you agree, yes or no?
Mr. Dickson. I would agree with that. Yes, we have
restricted--we have limited the amount of delegation that we
are doing, particularly in the case of Boeing, but we are
looking at across the entire ODA system as well.
The Chair. So would you answer these questions, has the FAA
completed a workforce review recommended by the Department of
Transportation IG in 2015 as it relates to your workforce
needs?
Mr. Dickson. We are in the process of completing that
review in the context of the certification reform legislation.
As I said, we have increased our number of human factors.
Experts almost doubled our cadre there.
We have done a review of our chief scientists and technical
advisors and using them as well. But that review is ongoing,
and I look forward to working with the Committee as it is
completed because I think that we need to continue to make sure
that that is a dynamic process.
The Chair. Well we had a deadline for September 23, 2021,
and certainly you could have written to Congress and said, we
can't meet that deadline. But having a workforce that you know
is the technical oversight necessary to do the reviews we think
is step number one.
And when we look at the lack of technical oversight on
certain issues in a changing dynamic aviation market, this is
really problematic. And I think in Mr. Won's letter, he is
basically talking about the fact that 53 people in an oversight
office of 1,500 people on such the scale of aviation
manufacturing is not enough. Would you agree?
Mr. Dickson. We have increased our number of engineers in
the BASOO, and our engineers on the production line as well.
And we will continue to evaluate all of that going forward.
The Chair. This is the language I don't like, OK. We had a
deadline. We would have loved to see an assessment of the
workforce, something that would have said to Congress, here is
where we think we are coming up short, here is what we think we
need to do. So today, just like all the other IG reports,
everything else, the comments back from the FAA are, we are
working on this. We want to get on the same page about needs.
We are about to go into our appropriation process.
And even though we have authorized various things in the
past, we have appropriators who end up cutting these very
necessary functions for the FAA to do a good oversight role.
But if we just say for a deadline of September 23 of this year,
we are continuing to work on it in the future, it hasn't given
us the ability to hold you accountable, and that is what we are
going to do. We have to do that because we need this system to
work effectively for everybody, for safety and for economics.
So I want to get to, because my time is going to wind down
here, the critical safety functions. And this was something our
House colleagues worked on as well and put in civil penalties
for violation of disclosure of this information. And what--I
guess what I am saying is your process right now is following a
tab process.
You know, the same process of oversight and collection by
individuals that led us to the MCAS system. That group didn't
catch MCAS. And what we have written into law is that we want
an integrated system, if you will. Some people call it
graybeards.
And we want those people at the beginning of the process.
We want them reviewing the critical information and determining
whether more oversight needs to be done. So do you think that
your tab process is a fulfillment of the law?
Mr. Dickson. We are adapting the tab process to comport
with the legislation. So it is a good starting point, but this
integrated project team that you are referring to is definitely
a part of what we are doing going forward and how we are
organizing ourselves, both for future certification projects
and for projects that are ongoing now.
The Chair. But we have a certification going on right now.
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
The Chair. So why wouldn't you have made a big priority
setting up a critical information certification team now for
the ongoing certification project? The reason I am bringing
this up is, again, we have seen two instances here.
We are going to issue a report from whistleblowers before
the end of the year. And what we are hearing from
whistleblowers is the same that we have heard from the IG and
others, and that is that line engineers had early warnings,
whether it is the 787 battery issue or whether it was this
issue related to synthetic air speeds or the complexity of
automation and overload of pilots in the system.
But those line engineers weren't listened to, and that is
why we want this critical information system integrated, set up
immediately.
Mr. Dickson. Yes, ma'am. And the voluntary safety reporting
program that we have had in place is one mechanism. But the
integrated program reviews are ongoing now. And that will be a
big part of both existing projects and the new certification
projects again going forward.
The Chair. I will come back to this, but I want to go to my
colleagues. But I just want you to know I am not going to allow
the law to be skirted here. This issue is about whether you are
going to follow a process that allows us to see the work of the
FAA, see that it is completed, and not just hear it is ongoing.
Thank you. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Mr.
Administrator, let me start off with safety management systems.
You mentioned voluntary adoption of these. Can you give us the
manufacturers who are engaged in that and making progress in
voluntary as SMSs?
Mr. Dickson. We have currently among the transport
category, airframers, and engines, we have Boeing, Pratt and
Whitney, and General Electric. And I would have to look, I
believe Gulfstream is in there as well. And then there are a
number of others in work.
Senator Wicker. A number of others?
Mr. Dickson. Another--a number of other manufacturers. Six
in the pipeline that we have not fully accepted.
Senator Wicker. OK, well, then supply us with those names
on the record. There is supposed to be a notice of proposed
rulemaking with regard to the mandatory SMSs. When will that
notice of proposed rulemaking be issued?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, we are making good progress on the
SMS rulemaking. I anticipate that it will be, the NPRM will be
next fall, about less than a year from now. And then we will
have it out for public comment. And then we will proceed on
from there.
Senator Wicker. Why that long?
Mr. Dickson. Well, there is a lot of work that has to be
done to justify the rule. And we are learning from the
implementation of the voluntary programs that are out there now
and to make sure that we get it set up correctly and that we
are able to adjudicate all the public comments that we know
will come in.
We are using that time to make sure that we have got a
strong and sustainable SMS for manufacturers and for other
segments of the aviation community as well.
Senator Wicker. Let me ask one question that I just have to
ask. It doesn't deal with implementation of the statute, but it
does deal with safety. And that is the individuals we may lose
from the workforce, because they simply do not intend to comply
with President Biden's executive orders that require all
Federal employees and Federal contractors to receive the COVID-
19 vaccine. It seems to me that there are going to be a large
number of individuals who will just lose their job, leave the
workforce rather than comply with this.
Could you address what impact this vaccine mandate may have
on your safety workforce?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator Wicker, my focus is on safety
and on running the safest and most efficient aerospace system
in the world. And we have dealt with challenges throughout the
COVID 19 pandemic, and we will make sure that we continue to
operate safely, and that we manage our workforce appropriately
well. And I certainly wanted everyone to----
Senator Wicker. You are going to need numbers, Mr.
Administrator, to do that. Do you expect a significant drop in
the workforce from Americans who just are not going to be told
what they have to inject into their own bodies?
Mr. Dickson. We are focused on complying with the executive
order by November 22 within the agency. And I do not expect to
lose a significant portion of our workforce. We will make sure
that we are able to satisfy our safety mission.
Senator Wicker. Based on what information do you estimate
that you will not lose a significant portion of the workforce?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, we, you know, the requirement is
there. We are working with our employees as we have throughout
the pandemic to make sure they are supported, and they have all
the information that they need to make to make the best
possible decisions. We have a very well-established process
within the agency for handling our people.
Senator Wicker. Let's be mindful of that. With regard to
the international engagement, how are the bilateral agreements
working? And is there anything we need to do at the
Congressional level to help you?
Mr. Dickson. The bilateral agreements are working well but
they do require constant engagement.
With respect to Europe in particular, my counterpart over
at the Director General of Transport over in Europe and I held
a bilateral summit on aviation safety in June to reinforce the
importance and the alignment between the U.S. and the EU on
aviation safety issues. As a matter of fact, I saw him again
last week in Bogota and we will--we have continued that dialog
and we will make sure that there is consistency and alignment
across all the aspects of the bilateral agreement.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Administrator, this
is exactly your answer on SMS. Is exactly what I am talking
about in skirting the law. It has been long known that we need
to implement a mandatory SMS system.
So a voluntary system is not enough. The DOT IG found
recently on October 21, 2021, the FAA oversight over SMS was
not effective. So I think my colleague's questions here are not
about whether you can do a voluntary system.
Again, when there is an oversight of a true SMS system
required by an Administrative Procedures Act overseen by the
FAA, you will be seen as how you hold them accountable, and we
will be able to review that. Anything less is not meeting the
letter of the law. Senator Tester.
STATEMENT OF HON. JON TESTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Tester. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member
Wicker for holding this hearing. Thank you for being here too--
and for your testimony. I am going to start with a kind of
leading off where Senator Wicker was, except it deals with air
traffic control towers. We have had a hard time of Montana, we
have had a hard time getting those fully staffed under the best
of circumstances.
And so the question becomes, do you anticipate losing any
air traffic controllers once a mandate takes effect? And what
are you doing to make sure that we have enough traffic
controllers in our towers?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Senator
Tester. And as I said a moment ago, you know, we have dealt
with people issues throughout the pandemic. Safety and health
of my workforce is at the top of the list in terms of being
able to serve the public and our air traffic control
operations.
I do not anticipate--you know, there is certainly
potentially progressive discipline in the process, if we get to
that point. But at this point, I do not anticipate--I am not
hearing about any particular issues with respect to air traffic
controllers staffing, but it is something we are focused on on
a daily basis.
Senator Tester. So do you have what percentage of air
traffic controllers are vaccinated right now?
Mr. Dickson. The data is incomplete. The requirement for
the controllers to a test is a very manual process and the
reporting is uneven around the system. So I don't have an
accurate metric to share at this point.
Senator Tester. So that is a problem. And it is a problem--
I don't know, it is a bigger problem if you don't know it and
that you don't know what the exposure is here, if you don't
know how many people are not vaccinated. Does that makes sense
to you?
Mr. Dickson. That is correct, yes.
Senator Tester. So what--are you doing anything special
that has been effective in encouraging folks to get vaccinated?
Mr. Dickson. We are. We are conducting--we are working very
closely with our labor partners to encourage--we are
encouraging broadly. The Secretary and I are sending regular
updates and encouraging the workforce to do the right thing and
get their vaccines. And we will continue to do that on down to
the individual basis.
Senator Tester. Yes, it is a concern. I think it will be a
real train wreck if you are not on top of it. I want to talk
about an annual safety culture survey that is required hasn't
been done yet, and there was one put out in August 2020. At
least--yes, a safety culture assessment report.
That August 2020 report had some pretty alarming statistics
in it, 49 percent FAA employees indicated they believe that
safety concerns or instances will not be addressed. 43
percent--this was in August of last year. 43 percent believe
the FAA delegates too many certification activities to the
industry. 34 percent, the employees said the fear of
retribution is one of the reasons employees don't report safety
issues.
So we are a year later now, and we don't have that annual
safety culture survey. When can we expect it?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, the safety culture survey was done as
a baseline as we set up the Voluntary Safety Reporting Program,
and that started in April, and we wanted to let that run for a
period of time. So we will be doing the survey in a--within the
next few months and then renew it on an annual basis going
forward. But that--this really gave us a good baseline for
where we are starting from.
Senator Tester. Yes, so I think it is required by law
that--in fact, if you want to go attorney on you, Section 132
of the ACSAA requires it.
Mr. Dickson. And we will be conducting it on an annual
basis. That is correct.
Senator Tester. But shouldn't it have been done by now?
Mr. Dickson. Well, we--there is going to be some--it will
be more beneficial to do it with the voluntary safety reporting
program that we put in place, which is extremely important in
terms of driving this kind of transparency and openness that I
want and will give us a better baseline on how we are doing
with that program.
Senator Tester. This--not unlike the previous question,
this leads me to it--I mean, if you are not serving as
mandated, then how can the FAA inform us and the public that
the culture is improving?
Mr. Dickson. We are surveying, Senator. We are going to
conduct that survey and we will be doing it on an annual basis.
Senator Tester. Alright. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator, it
has been a little over 10 months since the Aviation
Certification, Standards and Accountability Act was signed into
law, and I was proud to support that legislation that also
included key reforms to the aircraft certification process.
When does the FAA hope to achieve full implementation of those
reforms?
Mr. Dickson. Well, we are working on those very
aggressively now. We have achieved currently 15 out of 19 of
the time limited items, but there are others--this work will go
on for some period of time with the SMS rulemaking and the
surveys that we just talked about.
So there will be a continuous improvement process as we go
forward.
Senator Fischer. So you really don't see an end date
because you plan on those other four areas to have a continuous
process--?
Mr. Dickson. Well, the other four areas--one of the four
areas was the expert panel for review of Transport Category
ODA, and that required some work with our labor partners. That
took a couple of months.
And then we had to determine, we had to put a solicitation
out for industry participants to comport with the requirements
in the law. And that kind of work is ongoing. It takes a while
to do that right. But we are fully committed to doing it and we
will see the results of that work here very soon.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. The Act also directs the FAA to
develop a better understanding of the human factors when
certifying aircraft, and the bill specifically requires the FAA
to account for pilots of all skill levels, both international
and domestic pilots. What countries are you working with to
better understand the pilot skills that we see across the
globe?
Mr. Dickson. Well, we are working through multiple
countries. We start with the states of design for transport
category aircraft, particularly Europe, Brazil, and Canada, and
the U.S. but we go beyond that. We work through ICAO. We
spearheaded----
Senator Fischer. Which is?
Mr. Dickson. The International Civil Aviation Organization.
And we spearheaded the set-up of a pilot training and licensing
panel. We also worked bilaterally and regionally with our
aviation safety counterparts around the world.
As I said a few minutes ago, I was in Bogota, Colombia,
working with the Latin American regulators, bilaterals with
several Latin American regulators last week and talking about
the work that we are doing on things like manual flying skills,
flight path management training, and also we will, in the
certification process, we will require going forward, as we did
with the 737 MAX, the use of international pilots of various
experience levels and training backgrounds to help with the
validation of the operational testing on the aircraft as well.
Senator Fischer. Has cooperation been good when you are
working with these other countries? And I guess, what have you
learned from them?
Mr. Dickson. Well, there are--I think the important thing
is that we are leading the efforts on flight path management
and use of automation property, use of automation, manual
flying skills. I think around the world, some of these issues
have not gotten the attention that they need.
Senator Fischer. What issues?
Mr. Dickson. The issues around manual flying skills, and
also information management in the cockpit. You know, when you
think about it, use of iPads, you know, on the flight deck or
electronic charting, the way that individuals process
information on the flight deck, all of that has changed in
recent years.
And so it is very important that pilots are able to
maintain situational awareness on their energy state and on the
flight path of the aircraft. And that is what we are working on
to make sure that we promulgate those issues with regulators
around the world.
Senator Fischer. OK. During your last appearance before the
Committee, I asked you if you had concerns about the pilot
reliance on automation, and you said, ``automation is a
benefit, but the individual still has to be engaged with the
machine.''
So when you are working with the international partners to
establish those training standards, are you comfortable with
where we are headed and especially with regards to the
automated system? Are the pilots feeling comfortable about
that?
Mr. Dickson. Flight path management is a--is at the core of
the concern that I have. And as a matter of fact, we are--we
have in draft and we have for public review shortly, a new
advisory circular that our chief scientist for human factors
has been working with the aviation community on for several
years.
And it will address guidance material and potential
application to air carrier training programs for flight path
management, which is knowing what your clearance is, putting
the airplane there, and then monitoring it to make sure that it
stays there. Also, manual flying skills and information
management that I was talking about before.
So all of these are extremely important to maintain the
situational awareness around the aircraft. And we will use this
at ICAO, but we will also help regulators around the world
implement these principles into their oversight and I think for
training programs as well. And that will be an effort that we
will undertake here in the coming years.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Yes, thank you. Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator
Dickson, when the Department of Transportation Office of
Inspector General investigated the 737 MAX, it found that the
FAA had increasingly delegated to Boeing the assessment of
flight controls and stabilizer plans. Part of what we did in
response was to seek to end that delegation and improve the
certification processes.
I am of a mind that we need to do more. The 737 was
certified in the 1960s, but Boeing was able to gain approval
for its MAX aircraft under an amendment to an over 50 year old
type certificate. And in response to the new law, the FAA
waited until September 16, 2021, to issue a one page policy
memo limiting delegation, which was one of the root causes of
issues found by the Inspector General.
Senator Blumenthal. Section 106 of the law was immediately
effective on December 27, 2020, so there was a clear lag
between that December passage of the law and the implementation
of this one page delegation. And what accounted for the delay?
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Mr. Dickson. Senator, we have used various mechanisms to
implement the provisions of the law as quickly and most
expeditiously as we possibly can while we go through the formal
process of developing orders.
And the direction to restrict delegation without validation
of the assumptions for critical system design features actually
was in place very early in 2021. So I will have check on the
timing that you are referring to.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, the timing of that many months, I
think, is symptomatic of broader problems in terms of prompt
response to new laws and issue rules and undertaking
rulemaking, and a number of my colleagues already highlighted
that problem in other areas. Which brings me to the October 20,
2021, Inspector General report finding that the FAA's oversight
of American Airlines was not as rigorous or robust as it should
have been.
The report states the FAA, ``lacks effective oversight
controls,'' to make sure that American is addressing the root
causes of problems that they fix. What is the FAA going to do
in response?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, thank you for the question. Our
oversight, our internal processes also identified these issues,
and we do need, and we have--we are putting in place
mechanisms, for example, for professional development of our
inspectors so that they can do more effective root cause
analysis, which is part of that oversight for safety management
system.
So we concurred with most of those recommendations, and we
already have plans underway to address them and close those
gaps.
Senator Blumenthal. What is the timeline for fulfilling
those plans?
Mr. Dickson. I would have to get back to you specifically.
But much of that work is already underway.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you about a similar issue.
The original 737, as I mentioned, was certified in the 1960s. I
continue to have concerns about the process of modifying the
aircraft without a full and robust certification that takes
into account the impact of the modifications on the functioning
of the entire system. Do you share those concerns?
Mr. Dickson. We--as required by the legislation and also
the various reviews and investigations, we are examining
changes to the criteria for what would require a new type
certificate.
We want to balance that with beneficial safety improvements
during a product service life. We don't want to--we want safety
improvements to come to the fore, but we need some criteria on
that. And so we are--we have commissioned a mitre to look at
the criteria for making those decisions, and we are also
working with our international partners. We began meeting with
them in July.
We chartered the International Authority Change Product
Rule Working Group that is meeting on a regular basis to make
sure that these rules are harmonized around the world,
regardless of manufacturer.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I look forward to hearing
more about what you are doing on all these issues. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
The Chair. Senator Blackburn.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Administrator
Dickson, thank you so much for coming back before us today. The
FAA issued a safety alert on 5G interference to aircraft, and I
want to talk with you about that because according to Bloomberg
Government, the agency stated that and I am quoting, ``action
might be required to address potential interference with
sensitive aircraft electronics.''
And it is my understanding that there are 39 countries that
are currently using the C-band spectrum for 5G services without
any interference to aviation. So are you taking this evidence
into consideration?
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Senator. It is--and I appreciate
the question. First of all, my focus is on aviation safety, and
I need to make sure that the safety of the public is protected.
But I will tell you in no uncertain terms that 5G in this
spectrum and aviation, particularly radio altimeters, are the
primary concern. They can coexist. And we are working very
closely with the FCC. We have had recent engagement with the
telecom companies. And we will figure this out so that 5G and
aviation safety can coexist.
Senator Blackburn. OK. Well, in Europe, you have got two
dozen countries that have been using 5G for 3 years, including
in the same spectrum band planned to be used here in the U.S.
They have had zero adverse occurrences and zero claims of
interference. So how are you working with them to ensure that
there are no issues and that you are learning from their
experience and maybe even adopting some of their best
practices?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, it is a great question. The use
of that spectrum in terms of power levels and specific
deployment locations is different in different parts of the
world. So it is a bit of an apples to oranges comparison. But
the standard setting bodies, RTCA in the U.S. and EUROCA in
Europe are both looking very closely at these issues.
And I do anticipate there will be some modifications
eventually over time that will need to occur to some of these
avionics. But in the short term, again, we are working very
closely with the telecom industry and the FCC to make sure that
again the 5G deployment can occur, but that it can be done
without an adverse impact to aviation safety.
Senator Blackburn. Well, and I would think that there are
plenty of lessons that you can learn from Europe since they are
using the same band. Is that correct?
Mr. Dickson. That is correct. Europe, Japan, others. And
again, all of these deployments are somewhat different than
what is planned in the U.S., but we are certainly learning from
each one.
Senator Blackburn. Very good. OK. In your testimony, you
noted that, and I am quoting now, ``it is imperative for the
FAA to take steps to accelerate and expand the deployment of
new technologies in order to reduce barriers and actively
promote innovation.'' So I want you to elaborate on this. What
specific steps are you taking to reduce barriers and promote
innovation within the FAA?
Mr. Dickson. Well, I think a good example is our AUS
Office. It works across--which does our drone integration. As
you know, we have the rulemaking them around remote
identification. We have engaged the industry on the next step
in that rulemaking, which is beyond visual line of sight.
But what we need to do is work across the various lines of
business. In other words, air traffic, aviation safety,
airports, maybe even commercial space. And that is an
enterprise approach that, across disciplines, that has not been
as necessary with traditional manned aviation.
And so we are really taking a data driven enterprise
approach and our AUS Office will help us do that in terms of
breaking down those barriers between disciplines at the FAA.
Senator Blackburn. Excellent. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and
thank you for holding this important hearing. Thank you for
being here. I also wanted to express my sympathies and
appreciation to Nadia and Michael Stumo, who are here with us
today. They lost their daughter, as we know, Sammy Rose, in the
crash in Ethiopia. We also lost a Minnesotan in that crash, and
I want to acknowledge him as well, Codd Hussein from St. Cloud,
Minnesota.
I am glad that we passed this bill. It was really, really
important to pass this bill, and I want to thank the chairwoman
for her leadership. But now we have to make sure it gets
implemented. That is always the trick. We can pass whatever
bills we want, but we want to make sure that it gets done.
Mr. Dickson, in your testimony, you highlighted a voluntary
safety management system for manufacturers, and I know that you
noted that several manufacturers, I think you said four, are
voluntarily adopting SMS. Does the FAA have plans to make SMS
mandatory for manufacturers?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. We have rulemaking underway, and
we expect the NPRM to be out for public comment next year.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And when do you think that will get
done?
Mr. Dickson. It will depend on the administrative process
associated with rulemaking. But we are learning a lot from the
programs that we have out there now. SMS has been very
successful in the air carrier community and applying it to
manufacturers is a somewhat different paradigm.
And so we are using that data and interaction and the
oversight that SMS enables to make sure that we get the best
possible initial proposed rule out there.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. I will ask another question on the
record, but I know that Senator Cantwell asked about workforce
and how important it is to have a qualified people to do that.
I will ask you that on the record.
What steps has the FAA taken to establish international
safety standards for foreign pilots? And how will you ensure
that pilots and airlines are complying with those standards?
Mr. Dickson. It is a great question. We have spearheaded
the implementation of a pilot training and licensing panel at
the International Civil Aviation Organization. We did that
about 2 years ago.
The FAA chief scientist for human factors is providing
leadership as well as one of our top training subject matter
experts, and that group continues to work to this day. But we
also take what we have done in the U.S. with upset prevention
and recovery training, which is required for U.S. carriers now,
and then we are promulgating that around the world.
And as I said, I had several bilaterals with my Latin
American counterparts last week. We will work with them to help
them implement the kinds of beneficial training improvements
that we undertake in the U.S.
Senator Klobuchar. Do you have a timetable for that?
Mr. Dickson. It will be ongoing work. The next--I think the
next significant step is at the ICAO assembly, which is coming
up next August, and that will--but there will be work that will
be ongoing between now and then.
Senator Klobuchar. In your testimony, you noted plans to
update FAA policies in order to prevent fraud in the self-
certification process. How can we trust that the updated self-
certification process will not lead to cost saving shortcuts
that endanger passengers?
Mr. Dickson. I have made--Senator, I have made it very
clear from day one that safety cannot be compromised. It has to
be our top priority. And we have to make sure both within the
agency and those that we oversee, that business pressures,
production pressures, operational pressures do not overcome
safety.
And so that is what we are all about, making sure that we
use the information that we get from our workforce and that
they do the same thing to drive beneficial transparency and
safety improvements.
Senator Klobuchar. Do you agree this is a bill--I believe
the Safe Skies Act, but do you believe the cargo pilot should
operate under the same fatigue rules as commercial airline
pilots? This is a bill I have with Senators Cantwell,
Blumenthal, Markey and Gillibrand.
Mr. Dickson. Well, there is no question that appropriately
managing fatigue among pilots is critical to safety, and we
have a requirement for fatigue risk management plans that have
to be submitted every 24 months. We are not seeing anything in
the data with the safety systems there.
As you know, that happened a number of years ago. So it is
something that we would certainly be interested in working with
you on.
Senator Klobuchar. And you need to be concerned on that.
And then finally on cybersecurity. As we see across industries,
there is more and more concern about what is going on, whether
it is the electricity grid, whether it is aviation.
Do you believe the FAA currently has sufficient resources
and workforce to protect data, defend the national airspace
system from the growing number of cybersecurity threats?
Mr. Dickson. I receive regular updates and I have been out
to our command center several times on our cyber capabilities.
And we are well-positioned currently, but it is something that
we need to be constantly vigilant about to make sure that we
reduce our attack surface, and we can continue to serve the
public.
So I think we are well-positioned now, but it is an area of
focus for us to make sure that we continue to bring on the
workforce that we need in that area.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
The Chair. Senator Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator
Dickson, good to see you. And I want to thank you and commend
you for the work you and the FAA did on commissioning the FAA
Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative. And as you know, sir, this
came out of the February 2020 NTSB report in the February--
which looked at a 10-year period and noted the very high
accident rates in Alaska, the high fatality rates in Alaska
relative to any other communities, any other parts of the
country.
So I want to ask, although it is not a budget document, the
Aviation Safety Initiative report, as it relates to Alaska,
certainly points out features in which we need improvement. And
I always like to say yes, it is expensive to help smaller
communities like mine, but I have over 200 committees that
aren't even connected by roads. If the Federal Government
helped us build roads as opposed to shutting down our ability
to build roads, we wouldn't need this kind of infrastructure.
But as you know, we need it dramatically and it is all
about safety. So how will you use that Alaska Aviation Safety
Initiative report to prioritize funding initiatives to be put
in the budget with the FAA?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator. And I--you know, as
you and I have discussed, I understand the importance of
aviation to Alaska, and Alaska to our economy and our aviation
system. The answer to your question is the FAASI will help
inform us on our resource decisions and what our resource needs
are. We have identified funding, just as one example, for the
equipment takeover that the state has requested, and look
forward to working with you and the state to address long-term
capital needs even beyond what is in the report itself.
Senator Sullivan. Good. I appreciate that. Again, I want to
thank you for your focus on this. It is very much needed for my
constituents, but anyone who comes up to Alaska, right. I mean,
unfortunately, we have too many crashes. And so, Madam Chair, I
am looking forward to working with this committee and the State
of Alaska and the FAA on these important budgetary
prioritizations. Let me mention another one.
You know, Alaska laid the groundwork for the nationwide
deployment of ADSB, known as NextGen. And yet the majority of
Alaska is without coverage in airspace that is not classed to
require coverage, even in congested areas where there has been
some concerns in terms of airspace like in the Bethel region.
Do you think it is time for the FAA or Congress to revisit
options in that area with regard to NextGen to provide aircraft
owners with the avionics equipment that is needed, particularly
in places that I mentioned that don't have the coverage?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I want to tell you, you know,
safety is certainly a shared priority. And again, I realize the
unique aspects of aviation in Alaska with the number of
aircraft and how communities rely on aviation to survive. And I
know the stakeholders, I am aware that they have asked for a
second capstone project, as you talked about. And I think the
first one was a great success. You can use as a template, and
we look forward to working with you and the stakeholders up
there to see what that might look like.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, it was. Let me ask one final
question in--I have been trying to determine an exact
comparison of how a safety related infrastructure funding makes
it to the Alaska region as compared to the rest of the U.S.
And my staff has reached out on an accounting of receipt
expenditures, budget, proposed expenditures for air traffic
organizations' facilities and equipment, and was surprised to
hear that the FAA doesn't track ATOF and e-spending by state or
even by service center. And, you know, our FAA in Alaska, as
you know, they do heroic work not just for Alaska, but for the
country as planes are flying over to Asia.
We have 586,000 square miles of land and almost 2--close to
2.5 million square miles of airspace. But there has been no
accounting--it has been difficult to get accounting for the
funding of just the Western service area. Do you have or can
you provide for a future a breakdown of where those costs and
dollars are being spent? I think it is important for us in the
Congress to be able to see comparisons with regard to different
regions, at least regions, if not states.
Mr. Dickson. Well, I am aware of the request, and we are
working on it. Look forward to working with you. Obviously, it
is a Federal system and expenditures are not tracked normally
by jurisdiction. But I think that there is a way to get you the
information.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think it is useful information?
We--I mean, I think it would be useful.
Mr. Dickson. I think if anyone on the Committee, yourself
included, think that it is useful information, we will endeavor
to provide an information that is useful to you.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you very much. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
The Chair. Yes, thank you. Senator Baldwin is next and then
followed by Senator Duckworth, who was on remotely, unless one
of our colleagues from the other side of the aisle appears. I
am going to run and vote, and I thank Senator Baldwin for
taking over the Chair while I am gone.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Baldwin. Yes. And I want to thank you, Chair
Cantwell, for holding this hearing today. And thank you, Mr.
Dickson, for your appearance here. This committee passed
necessary legislation last year in response to the Boeing 737
MAX crashes. And it is critically important that we follow
through with oversight as the FAA continues to implement the
new law.
Mr. Dickson, about a month ago, the Federal Aviation
Administration announced that airports are no longer required
to use firefighting foam that contains PFAS. However, that
announcement is limited in its effectiveness as the FAA has not
authorized the use of alternative foams. Airports in their
neighboring communities in my state see this as an empty
gesture.
I believe it misses the intent of Congress's direction in
FAA reauthorization. Residents in these communities deserve
more immediate action to protect their drinking water. So what
are the FAA's next steps to ensure that airports are able to
transition to PFAS-free firefighting foam? And on what timeline
can we expect that to happen?
Mr. Dickson. Thanks for the question, Senator Baldwin, and
this is a very important issue that we have been working very
diligently. And we fully respect the intent of Congress in the
legislation, and we are working to do this as rapidly as we
possibly can.
We have got to balance the effectiveness of the
firefighting foam, which is really important for public safety
in the event of a fuel fire, along with the removal of the PFAS
or free foams. To that end, we built a test facility, and we
were interrupted somewhat by COVID because of an inability to
be able to get onsite for some period of time. But we have
already conducted over 400 tests of 15 types of foam. We have
not found one yet that has adequate performance.
I have actually seen, witnessed some of these tests myself,
and it would be very concerning to use any one of these because
it is just not as effective at putting the fire out. So in the
meantime, we have taken steps that basically free airports from
the use of PFAS foam for any, you know, testing certification.
We have got recapture equipment out there where it doesn't
need to be discharged anymore. And we will continue to do that.
Really, the only occasion where PFAS would need to be--PFAS
foam would need to be used is for an actual aircraft fuel fire.
For hot brakes, anything else, they don't discharge anything.
We are also working very closely with the DOD because this is
based on a military specification.
And I am optimistic that we will have new standards set by
January 2023 and working very closely with DOD on the research.
We do the effectiveness part of the research, and they do the
chemical composition.
Senator Baldwin. Mr. Dickson, in previous hearings, we have
discussed my bipartisan American Aviator Act. That legislation
seeks to expand flight training programs for veterans who are
seeking jobs as commercial airline pilots.
Senator Hoeven and I secured $10 million in the Fiscal Year
2020 and 2021 appropriations bills for our Veteran Pilot
Training Program. I am concerned that the FAA has yet to make
these funds available. While I was pleased to see FAA recently
move forward with other aviation workforce development grants,
it is beyond time that we put this available funding for
Veterans Pilot Training Grant Program to use.
So could you provide me with an update of when you can--
when we can expect to see the notice of available funding for
Veterans Pilot Training Grant Program?
Mr. Dickson. Thank you for the question, Senator Baldwin.
This is something that is really important, and we have--this
is a novel grant program for us, and it took some time to set
up the specific parameters. We are making good progress.
With respect to the veterans pilot training grants, we are
driving to issue the first grant solicitation within this
calendar year. So I anticipate that you will see the first
snowfall within the next few weeks.
Senator Baldwin. Very good. Alright. Senator Moran, I will
now recognize you for questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Moran. Thank you, Chairwoman. Appreciate the
recognition. Administrator Dickson, welcome to the Committee.
Welcome back to the Committee. We have had a long history in
regard to the 737 MAX and its relationship to Kansas in
particular. This goes back to the decertification of the MAX in
2020.
As of now, the 737 MAX is in commercial operation in 31
airlines flying in 179 countries, and it has completed more
than 206,000 commercial flights since that December. However,
China and Russia remain the only civil aviation authority yet
to approve the Boeing 737 MAX's return to service.
Given the global regulatory community has broadly approved
the MAX for operation, what is the outstanding issues for China
and Russia, and what role is the FAA playing in resolving this?
Mr. Dickson. We are meeting with the Chinese and Russian
civil aviation authorities on a regular basis and have provided
them all the technical information that they need. So I am
confident that on a technical level, we are in good shape, and
they will make the decisions that they need to make within
their systems.
Senator Moran. What you suggest is that the technical
information is there. There may be other factors utilized by
China and Russia in making a determination?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir.
Senator Moran. Administrator Dickson, a handful of
universities, including one in Kansas, Wichita State
University, were selected to carry out 124 of the 127 ACSAA
related safety system human factor analysis.
Specifically, Wichita State is conducting a review of an
analysis of human error, methodologies framework, taxonomies
that could be used by industry during the design and
evaluation. You have a comment on the value of that kind of
work.
Mr. Dickson. That is extremely valuable. And again, it
helps add perspective and invaluable research to our efforts on
human factors and some of the issues that we have talked about
this morning.
Senator Moran. What is the FAA oversight in that regard,
and what is the time-frame for the results of that university
research work?
Mr. Dickson. I am not sure the precise timeframe. But, you
know, again, this is ongoing work and very important to our
existing human factors work.
Senator Moran. OK. Finally, I am hearing concerns,
Administrator, about significant delays in the FAA's ability to
issue regulations, guidance, and policy. I know there are lots
of new demands on the agency and there is new innovation and
automation and even the demands that are included in the
Aircraft's Certification, Safety and Accountability Act. But it
is really important for the FAA to be able to do its work in a
timely, although appropriate and adequate manner, with near
perfection. What are you doing, what can you do to reduce the
backlog in that work?
Mr. Dickson. Well, certainly, you know, there are multiple
factors here. If you are talking about rulemaking, obviously
there is the requirements for public comment and the
Administrative Procedures Act process, which requires us to
have safety data and a positive cost benefit business case
there as well.
We are--there has been some COVID impact that has led to
some backlog. We are in the process of--we have expanded work
hours and we are looking at some additional resources within
our chief counsel's office to be able to bring these things
forward more expeditiously and make sure that any chokepoints
that might be in the process are addressed.
Senator Moran. One of the things that you didn't mention is
staffing. Any comments in that regard?
Mr. Dickson. So it is something that we are always focused
on to make sure that we are adequately resourced. And again, I
don't know that that is the central issue, but it is something
that we need to look at, both with our inspectors and the rest
of our workforce as well.
Senator Moran. My understanding is that the vaccine
requirements have been visited in this hearing this morning. I
am sorry, I wasn't able to hear any of your answers, but I
would ask, do you perceive a challenge in the near future with
employees being discharged or no longer able to work because of
noncompliance with that mandate?
Mr. Dickson. Again, we--I am not hearing anything at this
point, but it is something that we are focused on a daily basis
to make sure that we can complete our mission, both the
operational and the safety aspects of our mission.
Senator Moran. Administrator, I look forward to further
conversations with you. Thank you. Chairwoman Baldwin, thank
you.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you. Next, joining us remotely is
Senator Duckworth.
STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Chairman Baldwin. And also
thank you for Chairwoman Cantwell for holding today's hearing.
I want to thank the Committee and Ranking Member Wicker for
leadership--their leadership on last year's aircraft
certification bill that included multiple provisions that I
worked on.
Mr. Dickson, as you know, the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General recently published a report
that revealed potentially unsafe airline maintenance practices
and raised some real serious questions over FAA's oversight of
major U.S. carriers. For example, 92 percent of cases sampled
by the IG found that FAA inspectors accepted the airline's
analysis rather than identifying the root causes themselves.
To me, this is really another example of FAA's often too
cozy relationship with industry partners, which fosters an
institutional mindset and I think a culture of complacency that
left at--if we leave it unchecked, can lead to deadly
consequences for flight crews and passengers alike.
Mr. Dickson, what specific mitigation strategies has FAA
implemented to address institutional oversight concerns and
improve the technical capabilities and regulatory knowledge of
the FAA workforce?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Senator
Duckworth. And you know, the issues that you are bringing up
are not acceptable, and we need to do better in terms of the
career development and the ability of our inspectors to
identify and address root cause analysis in particular. We
agreed with the bulk of the IG findings.
We are implementing improvements to those processes to
address the issues. Those are already in work and underway. We
had actually identified similar findings through our regular
internal review processes, and we are in the process of putting
those improvements in place. So some of this was not--were not
issues that we were aware of. We already had improvement plans
in place.
Also, we know that our oversight responsibilities--you
know, in this hearing, we are talking a lot about
manufacturers, but this goes into the continued operational
safety of a product, how crews are being trained, how airplanes
are being maintained because it is a continuous loop. So we
have embraced that input. We have--we are putting those
improvements in place.
And again, when I talk about resetting the relationship, it
is not just with Boeing, it is with all of the companies that
we oversee.
Senator Duckworth. Does the resetting of that relationship
include an update to your policy so that you prohibit closing a
compliance action before the carrier has implemented the
necessary corrective action? Because I feel like if you close
the compliance action and they haven't done the corrective
action, then there is no real incentive for them to complete
that corrective action. Has this been part of the updates to
your policies?
Mr. Dickson. It is a good point. We actually just stood up
this summer a compliance program, executive council, and
steering committee and they are--they are taking that into
consideration. And it is something that we will look very
closely at going forward as to how the entire spectrum of
compliance works all the way up to enforcement.
Senator Duckworth. OK. I would like to review that with you
at a later time, because I do think you need to update your
policy.
Mr. Dickson. We would be happy to do that.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. On Part 147 implementation,
the new law that our committee is examining today includes the
bipartisan Part 147 Act, which I was very proud to help develop
and pass in partnership with our fellow aviator, someone who
has far more hours than I do, Senator Inhofe.
For years, we have heard from students and schools and
employers that the FAA's regulations are decades out of date
and undermine significant investment students make in pursuit
of careers in aviation. Our bipartisan bill requires that FAA
make sure schools have the flexibility to teach core curriculum
that reflects modern technical advances and innovations across
the aviation industry.
And Mr. Dickson, nearly a year has passed since the Part
147 Act was enacted. What is the status of the FAA's efforts to
update aircraft maintenance technician curricula as Congress
directed, and with the interim final rule to be issued this
year?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I share your frustration and
how long this process takes, and I appreciate your interest and
your focus on this. We are--we continue to actively work
through this rulemaking. And I know that we missed the deadline
in the bill, but I want to emphasize to you and really everyone
on the Committee that we are fully committed to it. I think
that we are going to be in a position to issue the interim
final rule in the coming year, but I would love to stay in
contact with you and your office as we proceed.
Part of what happened here is we had some issues to
resolve, some professional debate within the agency on the best
methodology to approach this process, and that was something
that took some time to work out. But we are fully aligned now.
All those issues have been resolved and we are proceeding to
meet the intent of the law as soon as we can.
Senator Duckworth. Well, I hope that occurs in the first
quarter of next year and no later than the summer of next year.
But we will stay in touch with you as you move forward with it.
Thank you. I yield back.
The Chair. Thank you. Senator Cruz.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator
Dickson, welcome. Thank you for being here today. Thank you for
your words for the families of the victims of the Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines accidents. It is critical, even as we have
these discussions about things like certification, delegated
authority, and what reforms are needed in statute and
regulation, that we not lose sight of the victims--the 346
souls lost in the Lion Air and Ethiopian air crashes. And I
thank those that are here drawing attention to those victims.
As you know, last year we passed the Aircraft Certification,
Safety and Accountability Act. That law included a number of my
amendments, and I think it represented meaningful reforms which
will help keep the flying public safe. But I also recognize
that more work may need to be done in the next FAA
authorization, next Congress.
And I look forward to working with my colleagues and with
you and the FAA in those efforts. Administrator Dickson, in
your testimony, you discuss how the FAA is transforming its
relationship with manufacturers, and I am glad to hear that.
Agency capture, regulatory capture is something I have been and
remain deeply concerned about, and something on which I think
there is strong bipartisan concern.
In your judgment, how is the industry, and specifically how
has Boeing, reacted to this culture change and to the
implementation of the new requirements that were part of the
aviation safety bill?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator Cruz, again, culture change
requires daily focus. It requires regular focus. You can't just
change a process or boxes on the org chart and expect for the
kind of beneficial changes that this law provides for, and that
we are undertaking in terms of our own work, to stick. So it is
really important, you know, within the agency that we are
transparent. The--Boeing is not the same as it was 2 years ago,
but they have more work to do.
And the voluntary SMS program that they have in place is
giving us quicker information about issues that they face, but
we have--we have put more engineers on the shop floor in their
factories. We have put more inspectors. We have put more
rigorous oversight on them, and we will continue to do that. We
have also restricted what is delegated in terms of anything
that implicates human factors has to be validated by the agency
before the manufacturer can proceed.
And any critical safety system, we have retained a
delegation on that. And we are also, with the 737 MAX, we have
retained the issuance of the airworthiness certificates on each
individual airplane as it is produced. And so it will take some
time, but we are on the path that we need to be, but it
requires continuous vigilance and attention.
Senator Cruz. So staying on the topic of safety in our
airspace, I was glad to see the FAA yesterday finally issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking to require commercial balloon
pilots to hold a valid second class medical certificate. The
2016 hot air balloon crash in Lockhart, Texas, which took the
lives of 15 passengers and the pilot, and which remains the
deadliest hot air balloon crash in the history of the United
States, was a horrific tragedy made worse by the fact that it
was completely avoidable.
Although I am not pleased that it took the FAA almost 3
years to follow the law and implement the legislation that I
authored, Commercial Balloon Pilots Safety Act, which had a
statutory deadline of 180 days, I am glad that the medical
certificate loophole that allowed the pilot to fly that day in
2016, while he was high on a cocktail of prescription drugs
that included Ritalin, Valium and Oxycodone and was as impaired
as a drunk driver according to the NTSB, will finally be
closed.
Administrator Dickson, how quickly can this regulation be
finalized, and this loophole for commercial hot air balloon
pilots be dealt with once and for all?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, well, we will have to see it
through, the rulemaking process, as you are aware. It is
frustrating how long it takes, but we have the draft, the NPRM
out there and as soon as we get the public comments back, we
will adjudicate them as quickly as we can, push it up through
the department, and through OIRA, and get the final rule out
there.
Senator Cruz. So let me ask you another topic, which is,
what is the impact of Federal vaccine mandates been on airline
pilots and air traffic controllers?
Mr. Dickson. The--at this point, no impact. I mean, it is
something that we are focused on, certainly complying with----
Senator Cruz. Your sworn testimony is vaccine mandates have
had zero impact on pilots and air traffic controllers today?
Mr. Dickson. We have had--I have not seen anything in our
system that would indicate----
Senator Cruz. So, we have seen in recent weeks thousands
upon thousands of plane flights canceled. I was told by a
senior leader in the aviation industry that one of the causes
of it was a very significant number of air traffic controllers
in Jacksonville engaged in a sick out and refusing to go to
work because of the vaccine mandate. Is your testimony that
that is not correct and that didn't happen?
Mr. Dickson. We don't have any evidence of that, Senator.
That particular event that you were referring to was one
segment--I have looked at the numbers, one sector within
Jacksonville center that happened to be co-located with where
there was convective weather and extensive military activity.
So it did create a choke point, but it was not any kind of
organized activity or sick out. It was availability on one
particular shift.
Senator Cruz. And your testimony is you believe vaccine
mandates have zero impacts on pilot availability? I will tell
you, I have met with the pilot unions. That is not what the
pilot unions are telling me. And your testimony is that the
vaccine mandates have zero impact on air traffic controllers?
That is also not what I am hearing from the Air Traffic
Controllers Union. So, are they not telling the truth or what
are the facts here?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I am saying at this point in
time, I am not seeing any impact from that. We work very
closely with our union partners. I met with them within the
last week or so, and we are not seeing any indication that
there has been any impact on our staffing up to this point.
Senator Cruz. Well, passengers across the country are
having their flights canceled by the hundreds and by the
thousands, might have a different perspective on that. Thank
you.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Cruz. And I want to thank you
for your leadership in help in forming the legislation that we
passed last year. As the Subcommittee Chairman at the time,
very much appreciate your input on that.
And we are going to have another aviation hearing, forget
the date, but in the near future that is going to review
obviously our actions on the various COVID related bills, and I
think it will be an appropriate time to ask about the issues
you brought up today. So thank you. We have Senator Warnock and
then followed by Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAPHAEL WARNOCK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Warnock. Thank you so very much, Madam Chair. This
week I introduced the Arrow Act, to expedite the development
and adoption of sustainable aviation fuel and other emissions
reducing aviation technologies.
I could not be more proud that Georgia companies like
Lanza, Jet, Delta Airlines and Gulfstream down in my hometown
of Savannah, Georgia, have helped these aviation emissions
reduction efforts take off.
As we see a rise in exciting new technologies that increase
fuel efficiency and reduce harmful carbon emissions, it is
important that our safety oversight body has the resources and
the technical expertise to allow for the quick and safe
deployment of these new innovations.
Mr. Dickson, do you agree that having the right in-house
expertise will be crucial for FAA to successfully collaborate
and partner with industry on new sustainable products and
ensure that these technologies are deployed safely without
unnecessary delays?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Senator Warnock. It is good
to see you. And the answer to your question is yes. You know,
we recognize how critical sustainable aviation fuel is and very
much want to be a partner with Congress as people consider ways
to expedite its use and deployment at scale.
Within our Office of Energy and Environment, there is a
team of people who are dedicated to working on how best to make
staff a more routine source of aviation fuel, so we definitely
want to partner with you. To your specific question, which I
think is related to Section 104?
Senator Warnock. That is correct.
Mr. Dickson. We have initiated the review consistent with
the bill and are making--working very closely with our labor
partners to execute on that review. And it is more in depth
than we originally thought, but we are determined to make it a
comprehensive review.
At the same time, we have completed some concrete items,
including already a comprehensive review of our Senior
Technical Experts Program, which we call our STEP Program, and
that included benchmarking it against comparable programs
throughout industry, including NASA and the European Union
Aviation Safety Agency.
And we have engaged in some active recruiting on our chief
scientist and technical advisor positions. And I can tell you
from personal experience, we have got a very capable chief
scientist within our environmental group that look forward to
leading those efforts.
Senator Warnock. So as you move forward in this review, can
you say more about how you plan to address any identified
shortfalls in the short term and in the long term as we
prioritize trying to expedite these innovations in a way that
is safe for the public?
Mr. Dickson. Well, we have to critically--you know, we have
to critically evaluate the review and ensure that we take the
necessary steps, as you said.
And any existing shortfalls that we have, as well as those
gaps that can hinder our ability to understand and oversee new
our innovative technologies in terms of staff will be really
important because we need to engage not only the aviation
community, but the producers as well.
Senator Warnock. Well, I appreciate that and know that I am
going to continue to push the Arrow Act. I think it is
important that we do everything we can to move forward on
sustainable aviation technologies.
You know, this is an important part of creating a
sustainable, and safe future and having adequate levels of
experienced personnel and technical support at the FAA is
critical to the success of these efforts, so that we can have
skies that are safe in every sense of the word.
Thank you so much, and I look forward to working with you
on this issue.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Senator.
The Chair. Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Madam Chair. Administrator
Dickson, thank you. Welcome. And let me just start with an
issue that is important in my home state of South Dakota and
that deals with Ellsworth Air Force Base, which is prepared to
host the future B-21 bomber, which will train in the Powder
River training complex.
Ellsworth currently flies the B-1 bomber and host large
force exercises in the PRTC airspace, which requires occasional
altitude waivers, and I appreciate the FAA's efforts to
expedite coordination with the PBFA in this space. Looking
ahead more broadly, we have to ensure that our advanced
military aircraft have the expanded airspace volumes in the
time that they need the training.
Technology modernization will be critically important to
improving management of the national airspace system,
particularly as new entrants such as UAS technology
increasingly interact with general and commercial aviation
traffic. The implementation of Next Gen, which has been
hampered by the pandemic, will be crucial in the coming years.
These investments will allow the United States to better
utilize existing infrastructure, increasing the capacity and
efficiency of the NAS.
Could you speak to the status of Next Gen implementation,
particularly how the agency plans to make up for pandemic
related delays? And then second, how is the FAA incorporating
concepts like adaptive or dynamic airspace in its Next Gen
initiative to meet the growing demands on the national airspace
system while maintaining safety for current users and new
entrants?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, it is a great question about
Next Gen. We have about 70 percent of the technology fielded
for Next Gen, and the challenge that we have now is to
integrate those technologies between data communications, the
ADSB surveillance, which we successfully implemented across the
entire system in January 2020, and also the performance based
navigation aspects as well.
So what we really need and where the pandemic set us back a
bit is operationalizing these capabilities and integrating them
within our air traffic facilities, because we need to have the
controllers and the facility managers actually involved in
those implementations by facilities.
And because of COVID, we had to get everybody out of the
facility who wasn't involved in that daily operation, because
it is very, very difficult to socially distance and we didn't
want to expose any more of our employees than necessary to that
public health risk. Now that we have various public health
measures in place, we are back in the facilities doing more
training and then more of this operational implementation, so I
expect that the pace is going to pick up considerably here in
the coming months.
With respect to dynamic airspace management, I know that my
chief operating officer has met with you and your staff
recently, and I agree with you that this is extremely important
to us. We have demands being put on the airspace now with
commercial space, drones. We need to make sure traditional
civil aviation is protected, and of course, military and
National Security needs are at the core of all that.
So we will continue to work through those issues. I know
that we had some success here with the most recent exercise,
and we will continue to build on that.
Senator Thune. Thank you and we appreciate all your help
along the way and are going to need your continued assistance
in that space as the B-21, is hopefully before too long, enters
that airspace for training purposes, along with all the other
air assets that are involved in a large force exercise.
And so we thank you for your cooperation and hope that you
will continue to be able to assist us there. As you know, the
FAA issued a notice of policy September 2020 determining that
certain UAS may be type certificated as a ``special class of
aircraft,'' and I appreciate your commitment to advancing the
integration of UAS into the national airspace system.
However, I am concerned that the agency has since not made
more progress toward establishing generally applicable
standards for type certification of a UAS, which will provide
certainty to the industry while maintaining the highest level
of safety.
So could you talk about whether the FAA remains committed
to establishing generally applicable standards for UAS type
certification and what actions of the FAA taken related to
establishing generally applicable standards for certification
of special classes of UAS since the publication of this notice?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, the--you raise a very important
issue, and we are actively collaborating internally and with
the UAS industry on the approval process. As a matter of fact,
I have met with several stakeholder groups here over the last
couple of months. And we are developing an integrated schedule
template that will identify the critical paths, including the
environmental elements, which will better inform applicants for
certification throughout this process.
We will use a risk-based approach to certificating an
unmanned aircraft. We think that our existing rules will be
able to accommodate any near-term operations, but we are also
looking toward the future. I think, as you know, we have got
our MOSAIC, Modernization Special Airworthiness Certificates,
rulemaking process underway, and that will help us move to the
next step of specificity out there for all of our stakeholders,
so they know exactly with more granular detail what the
requirements are going to be for these systems as they come to
market.
Senator Thune. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Thune. Senator Hickenlooper.
[Technical problems.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. Your testimony and especially the
difficult times we have right now with the divisions in the
country that I think are causing such disruptions in many ways.
The FAA data that we saw demonstrated 5,033 unruly passenger
incidents this year, 227 of these resulted in enforcement cases
being initiated.
In August, you wrote to all U.S. airport officials saying
that many of these passengers, many unruly passengers, were
interviewed by local police and released without criminal
charges of any kind. And you wrote, ``when this occurs, we miss
a key opportunity to hold unruly passengers accountable.''
Can you describe how clearly incidents are reported by FAA
to DOJ and law enforcement? And how could that process maybe be
improved to spur more enforcement actions and make people aware
that this is a serious issue?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Senator. And
you know, this has been something that has been--I have been
laser focused on for really the entire year this year. Unruly
passenger incidents are nothing new, but we have seen a several
fold increase in them. As you know, we have we have been
successful at driving the rates down, but we still have ways to
go.
And it is very much a team effort. And what we are focused
on now is closing the seams between how airlines and airports
and law enforcement and the Federal Government to handle these
issues. And so that is--we have made a good bit of progress,
but we have got more to go.
And we have referred a number of cases that we give the
investigative packages to DOJ, but there are instances where at
some airports where there will be a Federal law enforcement
response--this actually happened with one event that was in the
news a couple of weeks ago.
So I think we are making good progress, but there is
certainly more to be done, and it really does require the
cooperation of all those private sector stakeholders, including
the airports, as well as the various aspects of the Federal
Government, FAA, TSA and DOJ. And we will continue to stay
focused on that.
Senator Hickenlooper. Right. Absolutely. And that there was
one where the unruly passenger last week broke flight
attendant's nose. They had to divert the flight into Denver.
Obviously, those issues that are so egregious, there has got to
be a better way that as we do hold that violent passenger
accountable, we get it into the media, so the people hear that
this isn't something that is not a, you know, just a passing
news item, but they understand that is how serious it is.
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I have been on social media, I
have been on news reports. My face is at every airport in the
country. I think not something that I wouldn't necessarily want
to be remembered for.
We are pulling out the stops. We have done memes. We have
done everything that we can. I have even been on TMZ, which I
never thought I would be, to make sure that the public is aware
of the importance of following crew instructions. The crews are
there for passenger safety. And this is about a behavior that
is not appropriate in an aviation environment, and we need to
get it under control.
Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely. And I think obviously
COVID has played a big role in this. I think that the fact that
it is so hard to find employees and the TSA is still operating
with significant less than a full force so that the waits are
very long. I fly out of Denver all the time, but I flew out of
Atlanta earlier this week and it was equally long, long lines.
And I think that is frustrating people so when they get in
the plane--and I realize that you don't control TSA. Let me
switch and just quickly, in February, a Boeing 777 made an
emergency landing in Denver because the Pratt Whitney engine
caught fire mid-flight. Debris from the engines scattered
across Northern Metro in Denver.
Preliminary NTSB report faulted an engine blade for causing
the engine fire. In May, FAA required strengthening of blades
in order to make sure we prevent this in the future. Do you
have an update on the investigation or what implementation of
safety measures you would--or are being suggested?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Senator. We are doing--taking several
actions here. We are increasing the inspection frequency of the
fan blades, and we have also recently approved a new inspection
technology, which is more effective in detecting internal
cracks in these titanium blades. So that ultrasonic fan blade
inspection process will now be the primary process. It is much
more effective.
We will still use it in combination with what had been used
before the thermal acoustic imaging, which had been used
before. Our chief scientist for propulsion and the U.S. Air
Force Research Lab collaborated on this and so we think that
will be very beneficial. In conjunction with that, we should
not have debris falling off of an airplane.
That is not acceptable. So we are--in our certification, we
have actually aligned our engine in airframe certification
within the same division to make sure that we are more tightly
coordinated, and we are requiring the airplane manufacturers to
strengthen the cowling and the design. And that work will have
to be done before those airplanes can take to the skies again.
Senator Hickenlooper. Right. Mr. Dickson, you have got one
of the toughest jobs in the country right now, and I appreciate
you taking some time out to share the facts of these issues and
what is being done with all of us. I yield back to the Chair.
The Chair. Thank you. We have Senator Sinema, then Senator
Scott, and then Senator Rosen, and I see Senator Peters. So we
are all filing in here.
STATEMENT OF HON. KYRSTEN SINEMA,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Sinema. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
Administrator Dickson, for your testimony today. Today, this
committee is examining the implementation of the Aircraft
Certification, Safety and Accountability Act and the current
state of aviation safety. I was proud to support this
bipartisan legislation to address significant concerns with our
aircraft certification system.
Arizonans rely on a safe aviation system for business and
leisure travel to bring tourists from all over the world to
Arizona, to ship Arizona products to customers, and even to
take scenic flights above our stunning landscape.
And as the Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee, a safe,
secure, and healthy aviation system is critical to my work.
Over the past years, our Subcommittee has held hearings on the
tragic Boeing accidents, the state of aviation during the COVID
19 pandemic, and the crucial need to improve our Nation's
airport infrastructure for the 21st century, while developing
bipartisan legislation to continue to improve safety. I
appreciate the work the FAA has done to help improve safety,
but more needs to be done, and I encourage you to keep working
quickly to fully implement the certification statute.
Now, Administrator Dickson, as you probably know, general
aviation is an important part of Arizona's aviation system.
Arizona is home to 4 of the 10 busiest general aviation
airports in the country, and thousands of Arizonans participate
in general aviation flights.
Tragically, on October 1, there was a midair collision
between a small airplane and a helicopter near the Chandler
Municipal Airport that resulted in two fatalities. The NTSB is
investigating the collision. As we consider the safety of our
entire aviation system, what steps is the FAA taking to
continue to improve general aviation safety in Arizona and
across the country?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for your question, Senator
Sinema. You know, general aviation is absolutely critical. It
is the--we have the largest general aviation segment of any
airspace in the world. And several years ago, the FAA had set
the goal of reducing the fatal accident rate for GA to less
than one fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours.
And this was actually a goal that was set to be met by
2018, and we were able to surpass that goal. And so in 2019, we
resnapped out of the line for an additional 10 percent
reduction by 2028. And up to this point, we are exceeding those
projections--so it is good.
We have done this by partnering with the General Aviation
Joint Steering Committee, which is the general aviation
counterpart to CAST, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team. The
GAJSC helps us analyze the accident trends and undertake
appropriate safety interventions when elevated risk is
identified.
And over the last 8 years, we have actually adopted 47
safety enhancements that are aimed at addressing the root
causes of loss of control and engine failure accidents, which
are the primary causes. And those have been adopted over the
past 3 years. We are also working on enhancements to the Airmen
certification system and working with aviation stakeholder
groups to improve testing and training standards as well.
And finally, on the subject of midair collisions, certainly
there are beneficial technologies such as TCAS that can be
implemented within GA as well.
Senator Sinema. Well, thank you, Administrator. In August,
the Senate passed the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act, and our legislation invests $25 billion over 5 years
for our Nation's aviation system, with $20 billion for airports
and $5 billion for improving air traffic control facilities.
So this airport funding will modernize runways, aprons,
taxiways, and safety areas at every airport in the United
States. And the legislation also creates a new airport terminal
improvement program for airports to improve their terminal
facilities, gates, and intermodal connection facilities.
Besides improving the efficiency and passenger experience
our airports, once this bill is passed, it will also improve
safety. Can you describe how the $20 billion for airport
improvements will increase airport safety?
Mr. Dickson. Sure. Well, the infrastructure improvements
with respect to airports would definitely improve the safety
and efficiency of our air transportation system. And, you know,
we already estimate a need of--in excess of $8 billion in
airport projects, and these requested projects exceed existing
FAA resources annually.
You know--as you know, our AIP budget is normally in the
range of about $3.3 billion. So in addition to terminals, we
will be able to do things like runway rehabilitation projects,
which, as you know, can cost in the tens of millions of dollars
each and are multi-year projects as well. So that is one
specific improvement that we would be looking at with that
infrastructure money.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Madam Chair, my time has
expired. I yield back. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICK SCOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Scott. Administrator Dickson, how are you doing?
You have seen all these videos of families being kicked off
airplanes because their young children can't keep their mask on
for a long time, and I have heard lots of stories of people
that have decided just not to fly because they have young
children they know that they are not going to be able keep
their mask on.
So can you talk about, you know, why the FAA supports a
policy that basically forces these airlines to kick these young
families off planes because a young child just can't do it? I
mean, I don't know if you have young children or grandchildren,
but you know they are not great at keeping their masks on.
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, the--you know, I can't speak to
public health in particular, but obviously we all want to get
through the effects of the COVID pandemic and that we support,
we certainly support what the public health authorities have
put in place in terms of a combination of mitigations.
But that is not an FAA requirement. Really, the important
thing to me is aviation safety and making sure that passengers
on commercial aircraft follow crewmembers instructions. And if
those requirements are in--and whether they are FAA
requirements or not, in this case, they are not, we really need
to whatever requirements, whether company policies or Federal
requirements, passengers need to comply with them.
Senator Scott. You have seen the reports, first Southwest
and then you hear about the air traffic controllers in
Jacksonville, and the latest is all the American Airline
flights have been canceled. And you know, it is your peers, it
is going to continue to get worse.
And then you watch, you know, people are just completely
concerned about this unconstitutional vaccine mandate by the
President that is going to impact jobs in this country. And you
have got the Federal Reserve reports that these vaccine
mandates are causing a low labor supply and issues with hiring
and retention.
So tell me what do you think is causing these pilot
shortages? What is causing these cancelations of all these
flights, which are impacting people's jobs all across the
country?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator, I have spoken with the air
carriers and with several of the pilot union leaders as well as
our own leaders within the agency, and at this point in time, I
am not seeing any staffing impact from the vaccine mandate
itself.
The event that we had a few weeks ago with Southwest down
in Florida was due to a combination of factors. The
difficulties that we are seeing with some airlines operations
right now, frankly, is, in my estimation, is due more to
changes in consumer behavior. You know, all of the algorithms
that they use to plan their schedules were disrupted in March
2020. And leisure demand, I think as you well know--Florida has
been--there has been a lot of demand for leisure travel into
Florida and those, that very close in demand signal is
different from what the airlines had seen before.
And so they are--they probably don't have as much buffer in
their schedules as they had had previously or as they would
like. I know that one of the airlines talked about they had a
number of a couple of thousand flight attendants who were in
the process of being recalled from furlough.
And so these kinds of things are just taking some time to
catch up on the system. And it is creating more operational
exposure when there are disruptive events such as convective
weather in the system.
Senator Scott. So do you think that the vaccine mandate by
the President is going to cause any staffing shortages at all
where you think it is going to have any impact on anybody,
which is going to impact the safety of travel in the United
States?
Mr. Dickson. Senator, my absolute focus, what I can
guarantee you is that we will have a safe aviation system in
the U.S. And we are focused on----
Senator Scott. Excuse me for a second. Does that mean you
will have to shut down flights because you won't have enough
air traffic controllers? You will still be safe, but you just
won't have the flights.
Mr. Dickson. We have robust contingency plans in place. We
have always, and we have ways that we can make adjustments as
we need to. But at this point in time, I am not seeing any
impact on safety, and we will work to make sure that the
airspace is open and available for the traveling public.
Senator Scott. How many jobs in the aerospace industry are
in, you know, any agencies you deal with--air traffic
controllers that are going to be lost because of the vaccine
mandate, do you have any idea?
Mr. Dickson. I couldn't speculate.
Senator Scott. Alright. Thank you very much. I turn it over
now to Senator Rosen.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Senator Scott, appreciate
that. And thank you, Administrator Dickson, for being here
today. I want to talk a little bit about international
information sharing and how we use that to enhance pilot
training because I would like to follow up on an issue I raised
2 years ago when this committee was investigating the problems
that led to the 737 MAX 8 accidents.
As you may know, in 2017, the Brazilian National Civil
Aviation Agency came to the U.S. to test the Boeing 737 MAX 8,
and they determined that the changes made to the aircraft from
the previous models were substantial enough to warrant request
to Boeing for more information about the plane's systems.
As a result of this, additional information from Boeing and
the Brazil--when the Brazilian National Civil Aviation Agency
published its updated pilot training requirements, they were
able to flag MCAS as one of the changes that the pilots needed
to account for when they were flying the MAX 8.
When he testified before this committee in October 2019, I
asked Boeing CEO why this information was not flagged for other
customers who had a 737 MAX in their fleet for more information
sharing, and he didn't respond. And so more information sharing
in this case could have been extremely beneficial.
So Administrator Dickson, FAA is the global leader in
aviation safety, and as such, we have a responsibility to share
critical information about aircraft systems with the
international community. In the case of Brazil, better
communication between national civil aviation agencies, well it
could have saved lives.
So I would like to ask, if FAA were in the exact same
position as Brazilian Civil Aviation Agency, as was with MAX 8,
what would we have done had we received information about a new
aircraft so important that it led to significant changes in
pilot training requirements, wouldn't we share that with
others? Is it policy and practice at FAA to make such
information available to the international community?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Senator Rosen, I can say unequivocally,
yes. And I think that one of the positive aspects of the
journey that we have been through over the last couple of years
is the collaboration and the work between states of design and
aviation authorities is stronger than it ever has been.
So we would absolutely share any relevant information that
we had regarding pilot training or information that needed to
be provided to flight crews with other authorities. And I will
emphasize also that the changes that we are putting in place
are designed to make sure that no single point of vulnerability
or no single individual can lead to a failure of the system.
We want to have those additional layers of redundancy
putting in here--put into the process. And what you are
pointing out is right in line with what I am talking about.
Senator Rosen. And I appreciate that. Have you set up--is
there any set up for collaborating and sharing this kind of
important information between countries? I mean, I know we
would do it, and that is great. But are other countries going
to respond the same? Is there a forum for that? And if there
isn't, should there be, and how do we make that happen?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, there is a forum. It is called the CMT,
the certification management team, and it consists of the four
countries that are involved--that certify transport category
aircraft. And that construct is--has actually been greatly
strengthened because of the collaboration that we have executed
here over the last couple of years as part of going through
this process.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I would like
to just quickly ask about FAA's certification workforce. Of
course, a 2015 audit found that the FAA at the time lacked
comprehensive process for determining aircraft certification
service staffing needs critical for effective ODA oversight and
other certification activities.
I would just kind of like to go quickly to the question. I
would like to build on that discussion. Administrator Dickson,
what can you tell us about today's FAA current certification
workforce needs, and how can Congress better work with you to
meet those needs? We need to have a robust certification
workforce to prevent any injury or loss of life.
Mr. Dickson. Well, as I mentioned earlier, we have nearly
doubled our number of human factors' experts. We will continue
to need data scientists and will need to continue to have those
engineers in new and emerging technologies and disciplines,
software engineers, so that the ability to be able to
adequately--there is much more of these systems are software
driven now. So that is certainly a need that we are currently
well-resourced for, but we will need to work very closely with
the Congress to make sure that we stay ahead of developments as
we move forward.
Senator Rosen. STEM education and training is key. I see my
time is up. I believe that, not sure if anyone's there, but I
think Senator Peters, you were after me, if I heard that
correctly.
The Chair. Not sure if Senator Peters is available.
Senator Rosen. Oh, sorry. Oh, it is Chair Cantwell. I
didn't know you were back. Sorry about that.
The Chair. You are doing a great virtual job of chairing.
Thank you so much. If Senator Peters is available, we would
certainly call on him, but maybe he stepped away to go to the
last vote. Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much. I
first--Madam Chair, I want to recognize the victims of these
crashes and their families, including Michael Stumo and Nadia
Milliron of Massachusetts, who are here today and whose
daughter Samya Stumo, was tragically killed in the Ethiopian
737 MAX crash. These families are here for justice, not just
for themselves, but for every other family that was involved in
protections for any other family that ever gets on a plane in
our country.
And we thank you for being here. We thank you for standing
vigil for all of those families. And, again we are so sorry for
the tragic loss, and we are going to work hard to make sure
that your message is heard at the FAA and here in Congress.
Thank you. After more than two years of investigations, it is
clear that Boeing abused the authority delegated to it by the
FAA to certify its own aircraft.
Boeing not only cut countless corners to maximize profit at
the expense of safety, it also intentionally misled the FAA in
order to avoid more rigorous scrutiny of new technologies
installed on the 737 MAX, including the flight control system
that caused both tragic nosedives in Indonesia and in Ethiopia.
This Committee's passage of the Aircraft Safety and
Certification Reform Act was a necessary first step toward
making sure that this can never happen again. But as today's
hearing makes clear, this new law is not fully implemented and
the danger of self-certifying aircraft remains even today,
which is unbelievable. It is also clear that Boeing has not
truly learned its lesson.
After giving its former CEO, who oversaw a production of
the MAX a $60 million golden parachute, Boeing offered its new
CEO a $7 million bonus for rushing the MAX back into service.
These decisions do not reveal a company that has learned to
prioritize safety and accountability over profit, and that is
why I stand with the families of the victims of these crashes,
who recently sent a letter calling for the FAA to suspend
Boeing's delegated authority to certify aircraft until trust is
fully restored.
We thank you for your letter and I know you have included
it in the record, and I think it is just so important that this
become part of our history----
The Chair. It will be part of the record.
(The information referred to follows:]
October 19, 2021
The Honorable Pete Buttigieg, Secretary
Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Ave SE
Washington DC 20590
Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator
Bradley Mims, Deputy Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue SW
Washington DC 20591
Re: ET302 victim's families request for ODA Termination
Dear Secretary Buttigieg, Administrator Dickson and Deputy
Administrator Mims:
The undersigned families of the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crash
request that the Federal Aviation Administration terminate Boeing's
Organization Designation Authority (ODA). It has become clear that
Boeing is not a company that can be trusted with the public safety
responsibilities conferred by the ODA. Just as the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) suspended GE Aviation's Design Organisational
Approval in Czech last March due to problems, FAA should do the same
for Boeing unless and until trust, competence and freedom from
interference is solidly demonstrated.
Section 7-2(c) of the Order 8100.15B, Organization Designation
Authorization Procedures, states that an ODA can be terminated due to
misconduct, lack of care or judgment or failure to implement needed
corrective action.
Boeing cannot be trusted to perform authorized safety functions
because it has engaged in the following misconduct which requires FAA
action to terminate its ODA:
1. deceiving the FAA about the nature and the power of the
maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) added to
the Boeing 737 MAX 8 (MAX) by way of misleading statements,
half-truths and omissions as admitted in its January 21, 2021
deferred prosecution agreement;
2. deceiving the FAA about whether simulator training was required
for pilots to fly the MAX;
3. creating an ODA culture that applies undue pressure to
engineering personnel so they are not able to exercise
independent judgment free from organizational conflicts of
interest;
4. wrongly approving the original 737 MAX design when it failed to
comply with several 14 CFR Part 25 regulations and required
Airworthiness Directives (ADs) for the resulting unsafe
conditions;
5. failing to notify FAA that not all MAX aircraft were equipped
with a functional AOA disagree alert;
6. failing to manage the ODA in a competent manner that would
detect and correct employee and/or management
misrepresentations and dishonesty that compromises safety while
benefitting Boeing's profit goals;
7. failing to conduct realistic system safety assessments on
critical systems;
8. failing to insulate the ODA from Boeing's profit motives;
9. crafting arbitrary and unscientific assumptions, such as pilot
response times, to avoid implementing safety measures;
10. failing to conduct proper system safety assessments after the
Lion Air crash to determine problems, check incorrect
assumptions, and fix the problems;
11. failing to recognize catastrophic failure due to novel design in
flight controls and implementing a failsafe mechanism per FAR
requirements;
12. falsely stating that the Boeing board safety committee was fully
briefed and engaged after the Lion Air crash when that body did
not meet and failed to discuss or take any action to correct
the flaws in the MAX;
13. failing to spend resources to quickly fix the MAX after the Lion
Air crash and instead raising dividend's by 20 percent and
authorizing a $20 billion stock repurchase program for
shareholders;
14. doubling down on the safety of the MAX, rather than fixing the
MAX, by issuing post-Lion Air crash press releases stating:
``We are confident in the safety of the 737 MAX''
(11/21/18);
``As our customers and their passengers continue to
fly the 737 MAX to hundreds of destinations around the
world every day, they have our assurance that the 737 MAX
is as safe as any airplane that has ever flown the skies.''
(11/27/18)
15. selling and delivering more defective MAX aircraft to more
airlines after the Lion Air crash without fixing the problems.
The FAA, the Department of Justice, the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and a Delaware judge have all
affirmatively found that Boeing lied and concealed problems relating to
the MAX. Other Boeing commercial problems have also raised concerns,
including the 787 (on board fires) and the 777 (quality and
certification issues).
In 2013, a report from NATCA recommended that the Boeing Safety
Office be structured along the lines of the more traditional Gulfstream
office in Atlanta. That recommendation was ignored. Part of the
justification was that there was not sufficient labor resources
available in the Seattle office, even though subsequently it was found
that the number of projects handled by the office was stable.
Another report in 2017 prophetically stated this problem clearly:
``The ODA organization makes certification decisions, not the
AR. This leads to a potential decision making process
influenced by a ``Group Think'' mentality. There is no personal
accountability or monetary motivation for ARs to contradict
Company management positions that do not support expenditures
to upgrade noncompliant designs or do testing needed to
demonstrate compliance. ARs are reluctant to take contradictory
positions or bring up issues within the ODA for fear of
retaliation. In several cases ARs have refused to answer
compliance related questions when in meetings with the FAA and
ODA management. This reflects their fear of retaliation if they
express a view that contradicts the company position.'' (Pre-
Decisional Involvement (PDI) report, addressing Aircraft
Certification Transformation, February 6, 2017)
The ODA system in general, and Boeing's use of ODA in particular,
invites undue influence and interference rather than resists it.
For these reasons, FAA should terminated Boeing's ODA so that FAA
performs the safety functions under standard certification procedures.
Sincerely,
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victim Signatory
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Vecere Megan Hoover, I am a friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo Liza Grandia, friend of the family
Danielle Moore Owen Campbell, I am the friend of Danielle Moore
Micah John Messent Amber Tansky, Sister of victim
Max Edkins Emily Harris, I am the friend of the victim
Matt Vercere Matthew Baiamonte, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix Dominique Lacroix, Sister
Stephanie Lacroix Michael Moscarello, I am a cousin of the victim.
Micah Messent Glenda Wray, Friend
Graziella de Luis Ponce Isabel de Luis, I am the niece of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo Ahmed Ali, I am a friend of the victim
Matt Vecere, Samya Stumo Michael Stumo, father
Melvin Riffel Carol Shrout, Family friend
Bennett Riffel
Angela Rehhorn Glenn Tibbett, Family friend
Melvin Riffle Nicholas Reissr, Family friend
Melvin Riffle Jim McCoy, Very close family friend of the victims
Bennett Riffle
Angela Rehhorn Melissa Tibbett, Neighbour of the victim
Jess Hyba Jeff Curry, I am a friend of the victim
Melvin Riffel Molly Abraham, Aunt
Bennett Riffel
Danielle Moore Idit Papular, I am a family friend of the victim
Danielle Moore Kimberly, Family friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo Kristine Wahlers, I am a friend of the victim's family.
Melvin Riffel Carly Bollinger, Cousins
Bennett Riffel
Melvin Riffel Marilyn Koutnik, I am a friend of the victims
Bennett Riffel
Danielle Moore Jodie Layne, Friend
Angela Rehhorn Julie Kramer, Friend of victim's mother
Danielle Moore William Hedges, Danielle knew me as Grandpa
Camille Geoffroy Pascale Perez, Mother's friend
Matthew Vecere Grace Traa, Friend of the victim
Micah Messant Nelsen Spickard, Cousin
Bennett Riffle Sydney Malain, Friend
Samya Stumo Chrys Hutchings, friend of Samya's parents
Jackson Musoni Huguette Debets, Father of my children
Micah Messent Amy Chow, Friend
Samya Stumo Lydia Littlefield, friend
Stephanie Lacroix Kim Bazinet, Family friend
Samya Rose Stumo Lou McNeil, Friend
Melvin Riffel Susan Riffel, I am the mother of these victims.
Bennett Riffel Ike Riffel, Father
Melvin Riffel
Danielle Moore Laura Reid, I am the Godmother of the amazing, talented, lovely Danielle
Moore
Melvin Riffel Anne Robertson, I am the cousin of these victims.
Bennett Riffel
Matt Vecere Sander Banta, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Sharon Krogman, I am the cousin of the victim.
Sam Pegram Natalie Eacersall, Friend of a relative.
Stephanie Lacroix Cassidy Howell, Friend
Angela Rehhorn Curt McCullough, Family friend
Samya Stumo Barbara Dean, Friend
Danielle Moore Chuk Odenigbo, Friend
Melvin Riffle Susan Janes, I am a family friend of the victims' family
Bennett Riffle
Samya Stumo Raffik Lopes, I am the cousin of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo Lois Fuller, Friend of the victim's family
Melvin and Bennett Riffel Tammy Fisher, Cousin
Angela Rehhorn Annette Vincent, I am the aunt of the victim.
Melvin Riffel Brittney Riffel, Spouse and Sister-in-Law
Bennett Riffel
Samya Rose Stumo Robert Holmlund, Great Uncle
Matt Vecere Jenna DiGenni, Friend
Oliver Vick Ben Coakley, Friend
Melvin Riffel Katherine Zahner, Friend
Paolo Dieci Elena Dieci, I am the niece of the victim.
Marie Philipp Julia Rubio Gamero, Best friend of the victim
Danielle Moore Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Max Thabiso Edkins Julian Kubel, I am the friend of the victim
Bennet Riffel Sandra Niemann, Family friend
Paolo Dieci Estella Dieci, Niece
Marie Christin Philipp Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Wolfgang Eigner Bettina Eigner, I am the mother of the victim
Danielle Moore Janet Hedges, Aunt
Marie Christin Philipp Heike Baumann, I am the aunt of the victim
Samya Stumo Grantt Lopes, Cousin
Melvin Riffel Pao Tane, Friend
Bennett Riffel Deborah Najera, Family Friend
Melvin Riffel Deborah Najera, Family Friend
Josefin Augusta Ekermann Madelen Maria Ekermann, Mother
Stephanie Lacroix Susan Lamarche, I am the maternal aunt of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo Melisse Bouziane, I am a cousin of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Paulina Polanco, I am the friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram Melanie Cremona, Friend
Mel Riffel May Saeteurn, Friend of victim
Bennett Riffel
Clemence Boutant Pernille Kjaer Porte, I am the friend of the victim.
Hussein Swaleh M'tetu Feisal Swaleh, Son of the victim
Anne Feigl Anna Caroline Feigl, Sister in Law
Sam Pegram William Pegram, Grandfather
Melvin Riffel Diana Officer, I am the friend of the victims
Bennett Riffel
Camille Geoffroy Aude Breton, Friend
Derick Kivia Lwugi Gladys Kivia, Wife
Camille Geoffroy Dominique caumes, Niece
Stephanie Lacroix Lizzie Muyawa Dube, Very very good friend. How I miss her daily
Sautner Christoph Johannes Pernkopf, Friend
Angela Rehhorn Phyllis Robertson, Friend
Samya Stumo Cheryl Engel, Very close friend
Xavier Fricaudet Vincent Edith, Friend
Jonathan Seex Noah Seex Svalin, I am Jonathan's nephew.
Anne-Katrin Feigl Lars-Peter Feigl, Sister
Camille Geoffroy Therese Rouget, Aunt of the victim
Camille Geoffroy Dominique Verdugo, I am a friend of the victim's family
Gatchi de Luis Jihane Sfeir, Friend
Jonathan Seex Par Schroeder, Brother in law
Marcelino Rassul Tayob Mario Rassul, Brother
Marcelino Rassul Tayob Elisangela Rassul, Uncle
Danielle Moore Kathy E. Martorino, Friend of the family
Virginia Chimenti Angela Maria Farioli, I am the friend of the victim
Danielle Moore Carol Moore, Aunt
Wolgang Eigner Kerstin Bashir, We grow up, studied and worked together
Christoph Sautner
Armin Schietz
Jonathan Seex Joanna Seex, I am the sister of Jonathan.
Micah John Messent Joy Camp, Aunt
Ollie Vick Keri Powell, Friend
Marcelino Rassul Tayob Emmanuel Rassul, Uncle
Micah John Messent David Camp, Uncle
Jonathan Bjorn Seex Britt-Marie Seex, I am the mother of the victim.
Clemence Boutant Mathieu Chaumeil, Friend
Samya Stumo Helen Fodnaess, I am a friend of the victim.
MARIA PILAR BUZZETTI AILA MOHRHOFF, FAMILY FRIEND
Sam Pegram Vslerie, Grandmother
Marcelino Rassul Tayob Hugo Leal, I am the friend
Xavier Fricaudet Nadine Raimondo, I am one of the parents' friends
Micheal Ryan Tiarnan, brother
Abiodun Bashua Mariam Bashua, Daughter
Abiodun Bashua Hyro Bashua, Grandson
Anne-Katrin Feigl Hans-Joachim Feigl, I am the father of the victim
Marie Philipp Julia Simonsberger, friend
Anne-Katrin Feigl Sieglinde Rink-Feigl, I am the mother of the victim
Camille Geoffroy Abel Orain, I am a cousin of the victim
Camille Geoffroy Eric Deschoenmaeker, Former employer
Clemence-Isaure Boutant Emma O'Leary, I am a colleague and friend of the victims
Willm
Sam Pegram
Clemence Boutant Lucie Viver, Friend
Graziella de Luis Martinez Gregorio, I'm a friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Kristina Louise Hetherington, I am a friend and colleague of the victim.
Clemence-Isaure Jean-Louis MICHEL, Friend
BOUTANT-WILLM
Gachi De Luis Patricia Rooke Crossley, I am a friend and colleague of victim
Marie Philipp Susanne Radtke, I am the friend of the victim.
Gachi de Luis Tom Afton, Friend
Alexandra Wachtmeister Anna Wachtmeister, Cousins
Anne Katrin Feigl Catherine Hubert, Friend
Camille Geoffroy Henri Virol, I am the friend of the victim
Anne Katrin Feigl Jack Davies, Friend
Graziella De Luis Anita Guerra, I am a friend of the victim
Gachi de Luis Francoise Point, I am a friend of the victim
Gachi de Luis Gilda Calleja, Close friend
Maria Pilar Buzzetti Dalma Reka BERES, Colleague
Mick Ryan Fergus Gleeson, Friend
Josefine Ekermann Susan Saado, Friend
Camille Geoffroy Marie-Claire Ribeiro, I am a friend of Veronique Geoffroy, Camille'
aunt.
Josefin Ekermann Alejandro Conde Geli, Exboyfriend
Matthew Vecere Jason McClain, I am the cousin of the victim.
Anne Katrine Fiegl Marcello GOLETTI, friend and colleague
Stef Lacroix Lauren Webber, Roommates
Karoline Aadland
Eric Prieur Sandra Prieur, He was my brother
Christoph Sautner Marlies Wohlmuth, Friend
Camille Geoffroy Juliette Rouesse, friend
Max Thabiso Edkins Anne Lyons, Friend
Clemence Boutant Isabelle Charre, Friend
Max Tabiso Edkins Dennis Bailey, Uncle
Maxc Thabiso Edkins Gillian Mary Bailey-Edkins, Auntie
Josefin Ekermann Lia Hen, My best friend
Graciela De Luis Ponce Rosita Castro Dominguez, Friend
Graciela Luis Alejandra Safa Barraza, Friend
Kadija Cathy Hamani Hamani, Colleague
Michael Ryan James Spinelli, Friend
Camille Geoffroy Jerome Bichot, Family friend
Camille Geoffroy Olivier Peyre, I am a friend of a cousin of the victim.
Clemence Boutant-Willm Pascale Vulliez, I am the friend of the victim
Michael Ryan Giulia Serrelli, Friend
Sara Gebre Michael Ababu Yetbarek, Husband
Samya Stumo Cassio Lopes, I am the cousin of the victim.
Samya Stumo Penny Owen, Friend of Family
Samya Stumo Bradley R Krogman, Cousin
Marie Philipp Angelika Begerow, I am the friend of the victim
Danielle Moore Stacey Troster, Family Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Christina Donnelly, Friend of the victim
Graziella De Luis Stefanie Santa, Friend of the victic
Sam Pegram James Killen, Friend of the victim
Xavier Fricaudet Yvette Le Gall, I am the mother in law of Xavier Fricaudet's brother
Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm Violaine Willm, Sister
Gachi de Luis Jorge Tagle, Friend
Samya Stumo Josh Webb, I am a friend of the victim
Samya Stumo Allyson Steele, Friends of a friend
Gachi de Luis Claire Farrimond, Friend
Samya Stumo Jilian O'Neill, Friend
Joanne Toole Michael Rodgers, I am a cousin of the victim
Amma Tesfamariam Solomon Tezera, Husband
Sintayhu Shafi Yewubnesh Asnake, cousin
Camille Geoffroy Guenievre Darbord, Friend
Graziella de Luis y Ponce Becky Padera, I am a friend of the victim
Sintayhu Shafi Yewubnesh Asnake, cousin
Samya Stumo Lara Mittaud, Friend
Paolo Dieci Elizabeth McCarthy, I am Paolo's sister in law
Max Edkins Teboho Edkins, I am the Brother of the victim.
Oliver Vick Tasha Slaise, Olly was a dear friend and our son's beloved godfather
Olly Vick Kirsty Norton, I am the friend of the victim
Danielle Moore Pierre Royer, Uncle
Mel Riffel Megan Golden, Cousin
Bennett Riffel
Danielle Moore David Lawless, Partner
Micah Messent Heather Wilson, I am Micah Messent's aunt.
Stephanie Lacroix Victoria Woodhouse, Friend and colleague
Angela Rehhorn
Danielle Moore
Micah Messant
Danielle Moore Gabrielle Mills, Friend
Samya Stumo Jill Frankel, Friend
Matthew Vecere Tracey Young, Friend
Angela Rehhorn Bryce and Linda Vincent, Aunt and Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix Micheline Geoffroy, Friend of the family
Danielle Moore Elizabeth Nagel, I am the friend of the victim
Daniel Moore Asma Azhar, Friend
Matt Vecere Jeff and Nancy Vecere, Matt was our nephew
Melvin Riffel Ryan Bennett, I am the cousin of the victims.
Bennett Riffel
Samya Rose Stumo Paige Kimble, friend in solidarity with the Stumo/Milleron family
Micah Messent Diane Gershman, I am Micah's aunt
Danielle Moore Siobhan Takala, I am a friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo Ludwika Dec, Family friend
Denielle Moore Marciana Alfaro, Niece
Virginia Chiementi Mateo Mancheno, Friend
Samya Stumo Judith Saathoff, Samya is the granddaughter of my cousin
Graciella de Luis Ponce Maria Regina Ponce Laviada, first cousin
Samya Stumo Sarina Ricketts, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Brian Hubbard, I am a friend of the victim's family.
Samya Stumo Ari Cardillo, Childhood friend of victim
Danielle Moore Tim Cruickshank, Roommate
Joanna Toole Joan Spruce, I am the aunt of the victim.
Angela Rehhorn G. Smith, Friend of the family
Samya Stumo Osamah Khalil, Friend of the Family
Danielle Moore Alexandra Bonham, Friend
Samya Stumo Christina Santala, Friend of the victim's mother
Micah Messent Lucy Wilkie, I am a friend of the 2 victims
Danielle Moore
Micheal Ryan Cristin Ryan, Sister
Mel Riffel Chante Hettinger, Friend
Camille Geoffroy Luigi Flora, Camille's mother's partner
Micah Messent Mike Gershman, First cousin
Camille Geoffroy Nicolas Merle, friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Deborah Conner, She was my husband's cousin
Ghislaine De Claremont Melissa Mairesse, Daughter of the victim
Danielle Moore Richard Sweetman, I am a family friend.
Melvin Riffel Katie Niccum, Cousin
Bennett Riffel
Sebastiano Tusa Alessandra Iovine, I am the friend of the victim's niece
Samya Rose Stumo Carolyn Souaid, I am a cousin of the victim.
Danielle Moore Karen Bourne, I am the friend of the mother of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Philippe Leroux, I am a friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Lucie Miron-Leroux, I am a friend of the victim.
Micah Messent Laurie Spickard, Cousin
Melvin Riffel Joe LoGiudice, Step son-in-laws
Bennett Riffel
Samya Stumo Amy Alpert, Friend of the family
Alexandra Wachtmeister Carl Nordlander, I am an uncle of the victim.
Derick Lwugi Angel Kivia, I am the daughter of Derick Lwugi.
Matthew Vecere Linda Ha, Partner
Samya Rose Stumo Tom Leatherman, I am a friend of the victim
Lexi Deighton Lexi Deighton, A friend
Xavier Fricaudet Solange Lamy, Friend
Olly Vick Simon Tilbury, Close friend
Josefin Ekermann V Leigh, Friend
Oliver Vick Rebecca Vick, I am sister to one victim, friend and `sister-in-law' to
Jessica Hyba the other
Micah Messent Caroline Rutledge, Friend
Angela Rehorn S Mark Vincent, Uncle
Melvin Riffel Alexandria Kealey, I am friend of victims mother.
Bennett Riffel
Angela Rehhorn Ryan Rehhorn, Brother of Angela
Xavier Fricaudet Marine Capron, I am the sister in law of the victim.
Samya Stumo Lloyd Baroody, friend of family
Danielle Moore Courtney Schreiter, Friend
Camille GEOFFROY Catherine BERTHET, I am the mother of the victim
Melvin Riffel Larissa felch, Melvin riffel was my brother in law
Jessica Hyba Gregory Kovacs, Brother
Jessica Hyba Allan Kovacs, step father
Melvin Riffel HEIDI PRICE, My sons best friends
Bennet Riffel
Jessica Hyba Karol Kovacs, Mother
Angela Rehhorn Petra MacKay, Cousin
Samya Stumo Nina Anderson, friend of parents
Max Thabiso Edkins Marianne Gysae-Edkins, I am the mother
Andrea Carol Anderson Andrea Anderson, I am the grandmother of the partner of Micah's brother.
Micah Messent Natalie Gates, friend
Hoda Bandeh-Ahmadi Hoda Bandeh-Ahmadi, Friend/colleague of Samya Stumo.
Danielle Courtney Moore Betty Moore, I am the paternal Grandmother of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Karen Carreras-Hubbard, Friend
Samya Stumo Ann Perry, family friend
Max Edkins Inga Coleman, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Joanne Belanger, Aunt
Alexandra Wachtmeister Wilhelm Wachtmeister, Father of Alexandra
Graziella De Luis Sofia Diaz, I am the niece of the victim.
Joanna Toole Natalie Fullick, Friend
Samya Stumo Lisa Markowitz, I am a friend of the victim.
Danielle Moore Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Danielle Moore Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Gachi de Luis Maya de Luis, She was my aunt
Clemence-Isaure BOUTANT Vincent WILLM, I am the brother of the victim
Stephanie Lacriox Connie Labreche, Cousin of the victims father
Baleker, Sintayehu Shafi Konjit Baleker, I'm the sister of the victim
Oliver Vick James Vick, Father
Matt Vecere Colleen Menz, Aunt
Olivert Vick Cheryl Vick, I am the mother of the victim
Graciela de Luis Alejandro suarez larrinaga, Nephew of victim
Oliver Vick Cheryl Vick. (Previously misspelt), I am the Mother of the victim
Oliver Vick Cheryl Vick, I am the Mother of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Noor Jdid, I am the friend of the victim
Graziela de Luiz Margaret de Vanssay, Close friend
De Luis Christian Klacko, Friend
Danielle Moore Lindsay Butt, I am a friend of the victim
N/A Arlene Tolopko, I am the triend of the victim
Samya Stumo Patricia Frank, Second cousin
Mick Ryan Rodolfo, Friend and work colleague.
Pilar Buzzetti
Zhen Zhen Huang
Oliver Vick Charles bennett, Friend
Marie Philipp Helmut Schmidt, I am the friend of the victim.
Marie Philipp Monika Schmidt, I am the friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole Nicky McNaughton, Best friend
Micah Messent Erica Greenup, best friend
Micah Messent Frank Messent, I'm his older brother
Graziela de Luis Javier, Brother of victim Graziella de Luis
Clemence boutant WILLM Eddy Willm, my cousin
Clemence boutant WILLM eddy willm, my cousin
Samya Stumo Leila Baroody, friend
Melvin Riffel Christina Felch, Mother in law to the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix Emma Belanger, Cousin
Micheal Ryan Christine Ryan, I am the mother of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Alain Lacroix, I am Stephanie's father.
Micheal Ryan Siobhan Brassil, Sister
Danielle Moore Chris Moore, Father
Melvin Riffel Clara LoGiudice, Son in law
Melvin Riffel Zach Niccum, I am a friend/family of the victims.
Bennett Riffel
Melvin Riffel Kaylynn Campbell, Family member of his widow
Samya Stumo Cheryl Williams, My daughter friend of victim
Angela Rehhorn Tara Reid, Friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Philip Palmquist, I am the cousin of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Sylvie Lamarche Lacroix, I am the mother of Stephanie Lacroix
Danielle Moore Lita Venezuela, Friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Alanna Clark, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Nathalie Robillard, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Carole Girard, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix Line Robillard, Aunt to victim
Stephanie Lacroix J Caron, Cousin
Micah Messent Suzanne Camp, I am Micah Messent's mother
Stephanie Lacroix Faith Neale, Friend of victim
Stephanie Lacroix Michael Moscarello, I am the maternal cousin of the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix Buczkowski, I am a friend of the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix Stephane Belanger, I am the uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Lucie Lambert, Friend of family
Stephanie Lacroix Christopher Lamarche, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Helene Lacroix, I am the grandmother of the victim
Micah Messent Deborah Fitzsimmons, Auntie
Stephanie Lacroix Brigitte Castonguay, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix Doris Blouin Harrison, Friend
Samya Stumo Torleif Stumo, I am the brother of Samya.
Stephanie Lacroix Cameron Caron, I am cousin of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Jennifer Finniss, Friend
Micah John Messent John Joseph Messent, Father of victim
Danielle Moore Clariss Moore, I am the mother of Danielle Moore
Danielle Moore Rodilla Abenir, I am the grandmother of Danielle Moore
Danielle Moore Fanny Abenir, I am the aunt of Danielle Moore
Samya Stumo Matthew Kreta, Childhood Friend
Stephanie Lacroix Anne Vien, Friend
Chunming Wang SiyueWang, I am the daughter of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Micheline Gervais, Friend of family
Steph Lacroix Shannon lafrance, Friend
Micah Messent Kidston Short, I am Micah's girlfriend
Micah Messent Nancy MacPherson, Sister-in-law
Graziella De Luis Attilia Fracchia, I was a close friend of the victim
Xavier Fricaudet Bernard Vinot, a dear friend
Stephanie Lacroix Linda Falardeau, Friend's daughter
Joanna Toole Mark Toole, Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix Caleb, Friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram Sarah Auffret Rhiannon Griffiths, I was a housemate of the victims at different times
Melvin Riffel Charlotte Wood, Friend of the victims
Bennett Riffel
Melvin Riffel Charlotte Wood, I am the friend of the victims
Bennett Riffel
Mel Riffel Ashley Jorgenson, I am a friend of Mel
Stephanie Lacroix Michel Robillard, I am the uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Mariane Piche, Friend of victim's parents (Alain and Sylvie Lacroix)
N/A Eric Pagoada, Friend of a friend
Stephanie Lacroix Joanne Quinn, I am a friend
Stephanie Lacroix Kris Picard, I am a friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Diane Caron, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Johanne Lamarche, cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Barb Hogan, Colleague and friend
Stephanie Lacroix Pierrette Lachance, I am a friend of the victim.
Danielle Moore Jesslene Jawanda, I am the friend of the victim
Danielle Moore Gualberto Abenir Jr, Neice
Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm Elisabeth Willm, I am the mother of Clemence-Isaure.
Stephanie Lacroix Jocelyne Dubien, My cousins daughter
Danielle Moore Julie McDonald, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix Gabrielle Gauthier, Former work friend
Samya Stumo Rami akhrass, Friend of family
Danielle Moore Kelly Ambrose, Friend
Danielle Moore Kathy Martorino, Moore Family friend
Danielle Moore Albert ajemian, Friend
Danielle Moore Lori Kinch, Friend of victim's family
Danielle Moore Laura Ward, I am a cousin of the victim Danielle Moore
Danielle Moore Joanne Cerdan, Family friend
Danielle Moore Cameron Ure, Friend
Danielle Moore Dagni Ziedins, Friend of the victims family
Stephanie Lacroix Line Fogal, Friend
Danielle Moore Colleen Duffey, Family friend
Danielle Moore Da Chen, I am the friend of the victim
Tamirat Mulu Fasika Mulu, Brother
Danielle Moore Richard Hedges, I am the uncle of the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix Jenny Sutton, Friend
Stephanie LaCroix Sarah Forrest, I am the friend of the victim.
Xavier FRICAUDET Roseline FRICAUDET, I an the mother of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Suzanne Labelle, I am an aunt to the victim
Danielle Moore Rob Del Mundo, Friend
Danielle Moore Chuchi Mangubat, niece
Samuel Pegram Seamus Harland, Friend
Anne Katrin Feigl Juan Carlos Llorens Rojas, I am the friend of the victim
Micah Messent Ross Camp, Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix Helene chartier, Friend
Camille Geoffroy Valerie Serres, friend
Danielle Moore Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Dawn Tanner Hunter Tanner French, I am the son of the victim.
Danielle Moore Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Danielle Moore Lyn Abenir, Niece
Matt Vecere Caroline McClain, I am the cousin of the victim
Danielle Moore Mark Uzer, Niece
Danielle Moore John Uzer, Niece
Jonathan Seex Nadege Dubois--Seex, I am the wife of the victim
Jonathan Seex Alexandre seex, I am the son of the victim
Mick Ryan Andy Jackson, Friend
Jonathan Seex Antoine Seex, I am the son of the victim
Danielle Moore Micah Messant Leah Luciuk, Friend of victims
Jonathan Seex Adeline seex, I am the daughter of the victim
Boutant wilm Clemence Christine Falcand, A Friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Jennifer Doucet, Cousin
Danielle Moore Victoria, I am the friend of the victim's parents
Paul N's wife, two children
and his mother-in-law
Mick Ryan Rohit Kumar Pokharel, Colleague
Joanna Toole Adrian Toole, I am Father
Mick Ryan Clodagh Finn, Friend of the victim
Danielle Moore Troy Sabaot, Goddaughter
Mick Ryan S.M. Tanbir Uddin, I am the colleague of the victim.
Danielle Moore Natasha Perera, Friend
Paolo Dieci Luca Dieci, Brother
Paolo Dieci Maria Luisa Mattioli, Wife
Paolo Dieci Nella Dieci, Sister
Marie Philipp Sophia Baumann, Cousin
Micah Messent Emma Spickard, I am the cousin of the victim.
Danielle C Moore Betty Moore, Grandmother of the victim
Mick Ryan Michael Brassil, Brother-in-law
Stephanie Lacroix Nicole Dumouchel, Friend
Danielle Moore Alexandra Dufort, I am a friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Geraldine leka, Friend
Samya Stumo Alexander Tripp, Godfather to Samya
Stephanie Lacroix Maya McDonald, I am a friend of the victim.
Danielle Moore Kim Lawrence, Friend of the victim's family
Melvin Riffel Marlina Riffel, I am the Aunt of the victims
Bennett Riffel
Mick Ryan Stephen Cahill, Friend and co-worker
Samya Stumo Sharrie Brooks, Cousin
Ekta Adhikari Samir Nepal, Colleague
Mick Ryan Finbarr Geaney, I am the friend of the victim.
Graziella de Luis Jean Kwo, Sister-in-law
Matt Vecere Joyce Courter, I am a friend of the victim.
Micah Messent John Camp, Uncle
Alexandra Wachtmeister Agneta Westman, Alexandra's aunt
Micah Messent Jade Ballard, I am the eldest sister of the victim.
Mick Ryan Roy Crabb, Friend and kindred Spirit
Micah Messent Darryl Gershman, I am the uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Rebecca Young, I am a friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Monique, I am her aunt
Micah Messent Cathy Camp, I am the Aunt of Micah Messent
Micah Camp Keshia Chutter, I am the cousin of the victim
Mick Ryan Jennifer McAuliffe, I am the cousin of the victims wife
Danielle Moore Clariss Moore, I am the mother of Danielle Moore
Micah Messent James Fitzsimmons, I am the uncle of the victim.
Mick Ryan Stuart Zimble, I am a close friend
Michael Ryan Declan O'Mahony, I am a friend of the victim.
Mick Ryan Eadin O'Mahony, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix Rosemary Quinn, Family friend
Samya Stumo Caitlin Hotaling, I am the friend of the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix Stephanie Kennedy, I used to go to school with the victim.
Mick Ryan Orla Clinton, Friend and colleague
Mick Ryan Helen O'Dowd, I am a Friend of the family of victim Mick Ryan
Samya Rose Stumo Paul and Patricia Nimchek, We are friends of the victim and her family.
Stephanie Lacroix Christina Callingham, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix Darla Bennison, Friend of Mother and Father and extended families of the
victim.
Stephanie Lacroix Darla Bennison, Friend of the Mother and Father and extended families of
the Victim
Stephanie Lacroix Marc Caron, Uncle
Samya Stumo Tom Connell, Family friend
Stephanie Lacroix Melanie Martin, Friend
Steph Lamarche Rachelle Helin, I am a friend of victim's mother.
Mick Ryan Ahmad bin Zakaria, He was my honorable chief
Danielle Moore David Moore, I am the brother of the victim
Ekta Adhikari Praneet Shrestha, Fiancee, Colleague
Mick Ryan
Marie Christin Philipp Ellen Philipp, I am the mother of the victim
Marie Christin Philipp Klaus Philipp, I am the father of the victim
Danielle Moore Annabelle Cerdan, Niece and good friend
Melvin Riffel Elena Riffel, I am the Aunt of the victims
Bennett Riffel
Anne-Katrin Feigl Katharina, Close friend
Graziella de Luis Mariana Cristellys, Friend
Michael Ryan Conor O'Sullivan, I am a friend of the victim
Oliver Vick Ilaria Gandossi, Father of my children
Danille Moore Aurie Narvaez, Friend
Danielle Moore Kathryn Brimson, Cousin
Danielle Moore Sydney Brimson, 2nd Cousin
Joanna Toole Dennis Spruce, Uncle
Marie Philipp Christiane Ulrich, Family friend
Samya Rose Stumo Diane Holmlund, I am a second cousin of Samya
Michael Ryan Mari Turashvili, Friend
Danielle Moore Alexander Cake, Cousin
Micah Messent Jacqueline Messent, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Julie Balasalle, Friend and coworker
Mick Ryan Catherine Clark, Friend and colleague of the victim
Anne-Katrin Feigel Nicole Blu, I am a friend of the victim.
Daniella Moore Wilson Lee, I am the friend of the victim
Mick Ryan lucie jouanneau, friend
Samya Stumo Theresa Williams, family friend
Peter deMarsh Michele Ashby, I am a friend of a victim's sister. And I fly!
Alexandra Wachtmeister Nane Annan, I am a friend of the victim
Mick (Micheal) Ryan Aodhnaid Connolly Lennon, Sister in Law
Amma Tesfamariam Woldesenbet Bruk Tesfamariam Woldesenbet, Brother
Danielle Moore Honor Hedges Royer, aunt
Danielle Moore Lora Meseman, Mother-in-law
Isabella Beryl Achieng Jaboma Allan Jaboma, She was my sister
Graziella De Luis Maya AlChidiac, Dear friend
Samya Rose Stumo Pilar Vera Palmes, I am the Chair of the Air Crash Families Federation
International (ACVFFI)
Mick Ryan Morgan Connolly, I am the father-in-law of Mick Ryan
Mick Ryan Maire Connolly, I am the mother-in-law of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Natalie, Dear family friend
Max Edkins Til Kreuels, I am a friend of the victim.
Mick Ryan Naoise Connolly Ryan, Wife of Victim
Danielle Moore Kathy Martorino, Friend of Moore family
Samya Stumo Nico Tripcevich, Family friend
Angela Rehhorn Catherine Vincent, I am the Aunt of the victim.
Angela Rehhorn John Vincent, I am the Uncle of the victim
Sintayehu Shafi Baleker Liul Baleker, I am the brother of the victim
Michael Ryan Robert Jackson, Friend
Mick Ryan Sile Geaney, Family friend
Matt Vecere Patricia Vecere McClain, Aunt of victim
Marie Christin Philipp Laura Vendt, Friend
Samya Stumo Jurgen Vsych, I am a friend of the victim.
Danielle Moore Glenn Gundermann, I am a friend of the victim's family.
Samya Rose Stumo Marjorie Aelion, I am the friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo Laila Mokhiber, Cousin
Danielle Moore Olivia Allen, friend and colleague of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Joy Wahba, Friend
Daniel Moore Matthew Miller, I am a friend of Daniel and Micah
Micah Messent
Abiodun Bashua Alem Tebeje, Brother-in-law
Melvin Riffel Korryll Lave, I am a friend of the victim.
Abiodun Bashua Yetunde Bashua, He was my father
Stephanie Lacroix Samantha Demers, I am a friend of the victim
Samya Stumo Luis Arnal Delgado, Friend
Samya Stumo Penny Owen, Family friend
Max Thabiso Edkins Jennifer Anderson-Ochoa, I am a friend of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo Harriett Northcutt, A friend
Samya Stumo Laudison Lopes, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Lucille Martin, Friend of the family
Samya Rose Stumo Gail Brinkmeier, friend of victim
Stephanie Lacroix Lucille Martin, Friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Emilie Brule, I am the friend of the victim.
Melvin Riffel Mackenzie Claver, I am the best friend to the victims
Bennett Riffel
Melvin Riffel John Fisher, I am married to a cousin of the victims.
Bennett Riffel
Samya Stumo Carrie Olson, Cousin
Matt Vercere Matthew Baiamonte, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Nadia Milleron, I am Samya's mother
Stephanie Lacroix Lauri-Ann Loreto Neal, I am a friend of the victim's mother.
Mel Riffel ED Duggan III, Friend
Carol Diehl Carol Diehl, I am a friend of the family
Samya Rose Stumo linda sawaya, friend of victim's family
Bennett Riffel Terri Sherman, Friend
Melvin Riffel
Samya Stumo Helen A Hellmers, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Pat Brooks, I am a friend of the victim's maternal Grandmother,
Professor Laura Nader
Samya Stumo Judy Metro, I am a friend of the family.
Samya Rose Stumo David Teisler, She was daughter of my daughter's GodMother and a great
friend
Samya Stumo Suzanne Murray, Family friend
Samya Stumo Mirna Mercado, I am a friend of Samya
Samya Stumo Laura Flores, my niece
Samya Rose Stumo Gabrielle Paese, I am the friend of the victim
Alexandra Wachtmeister Anne-Margrete Wachtmeister, I am her mother
Micah Messant Nelsen Spickard, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix Michel Monette, Friend of the victim
Riffel Tonia, Friend
Samya Stumo a d Bella Hayley Freedman, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo E Shaker, Cousin
Camille Geoffroy Diane de Schoutheete, I am an aunt of Camille Geoffroy
Danielle Moore Honor Hedges Royer, Aunt
Angela Rehhorn Jeremy Harbinson, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Renee Betar, Friend of the victim
Samya stumo Janet Domenitz, Friend
Micah Messent Caroline Willis, I am a family friend.
Samya Stumo James Holmlund, Samya is my grand niece
Samya Stumo Anne Marie Papandrea, Family friend
Danielle Moore Lita Venezuela, Friend if the victim
Angela Rehhorn Mary Eleanor Vincent, I am the Aunt and Godmother of Angela
Angela Rehhorn Kaitlin Thatcher, Friend
Angela Rehhorn August Pokotylo, I am the Uncle and Godfather of the victim
Angela Rehhorn Rowena Fonseka, Friend
N/A Shira Drossos, N/A
Samya Stumo Marilyn J Holmlund, Samya was the granddaughter of my cousin Mary
Holmlund Stumo
Danielle Moore Bryan Sison, I am the friend of the mother of the victim
Samya Stumo Emily Crawford, I am a friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo Karen Lundeen, Family friend
Mick Ryan Giacomo Re, Friend and colleague at WFP
Camille Geoffroy Veronique Geoffroy, Aunt
Samya Rose Stumo Cari borja, Close Friend of grandmother
Marie Christin Pfilipp Michael Baumann, I am the uncle of the victim
Samya Milleron Nola Frick, Relative
Samya Stumo Karen Hoyt, Friend of the victim
Marie Christin Philipp Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Samya Rose Stumo Mette Linnet, Friend
Wolfgang Eigner Carmen Sigl, Friend
Max Edkins Friederike Gysae-Schnurre, I am his aunt
Mariapilar Buzzetti Davide Picistrelli, friend
Immaculate Odero Victor Mwau, Close friend
Jonathan Seex Maria Petersen, Cousin
Wolfgang Eigner Jennifer Stefanits, Friend
Armin Schietz
Christoph Sautner
Stefanie LaCroix Lauren Webber, Malawi roommate
Sam Pegram William Pegram, Grandfather
Micheal Ryan MP O'Brien, brother-in-law
Camille Geoffroy Nicolas Tsioukis, I am the friend of the victim
Oliver Vick Jonathan Haines, Cousin
Xavier Fricaudet Francois Fricaudetxa, Father
Pilar Buzzetti Angelo, Friend
Samya Stumo Lucy MacGillis, Friend
Arnold Chria, Friend
Paolo Dieci Silvia Guglielmi, I am the niece of the victim.
Marie Christin Philipp Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Mercy NDIVO Beatrice Kimuyu, I am mother and Mother in-law of the two victims
Jared Babu
Ollie Vick Tim Bond, Friend
Jessica Hyba
Max Thabiso Edkins Andrea andersen, I am the cousin of the victim
Immaculate Achieng Odero Eliakim, Sister
Xavier FRICAUDET Olivier FRICAUDET, I'm the cousin of the victim
Sintayhu Shafi Yewubnesh, cousin
Harina HAFITZ Stephanie COSTERG, I am the friend of the victim.
Xavier Fricaudet Rene Hautier, ami
Josefin Ekermann Norah Elena Ekermann, Sister
Joanne Toole Tanya Hucklesby, Friends with her sister Karen
Graziela de Luis Alejandro, Nephew
Marie Philipp Hendrik Philipp, I am her brother
Michael Ryan Dene Cairns, I am a friend of the victim
Olly Vick Harriet Tarnoy, Friends
Jessica Hyba
Alexandra Wachtmeister Fredrik Wachtmeister, Brother
Jonathan Seex Par, Brother in law
Graziella de Luis Isabel de Luis, sister
Sam Pegram Val Pegram, Grandmother
Sebastiano Tusa Alberta Pongiglione, I am a friend of the victim
Marie Philipp Laura Petrak, Best friend
Oliver Vick Rifet Arapovic, I am the friend of the victim.
Anne-Katrin Feigl Gabriele Haldenwang, I am a friend of the family of the victim
Pilar Buzzetti Richard Culley, I am the friend of the victim
Immaculate Odero Sally, Sister-in-law
Oliver Vick James Vick, I am the father of the victim
Oliver Vick Cheryl Vick, I am the Mother of the victim
Immaculate Odero Christabel Were, Friend
Sam Pegram Scott Hetherington, I am the friend of the victim.
Michael Ryan Darragh Mcdonagh, Friend
Jessica Hyba George Ghikas, Friend
Oliver Vick George Ghikas, Friend
Anne Feigl Anna Caroline Feigl, Sister in law
Anne-Katrin Feigl Katharina Peters, Close friend
Immaculate Achieng Odero Denis Adhoch, Husband
Xavier Fricaudet Rossi Hadzhieva, I am a friend of the victim
Samya Stumo Diane Sykes, Family friend
Max Thabiso Edkins Donald Edkins, I am the father of Max Thabiso Edkins.
Danielle Moore Bhobbie alfaro, Cousin
Samya Rose Stumo Joan, I am a friend of the victim
Samya Stumo Carol Conner, Family Friend
Samya Stumo Matthew Caemmerer, Friend
Angela Rehhorn Lorna Nickerson, Family friend
Paolo Dieci Estella Dieci, Niece
Marie Philipp Julia Schmidt, Friend of family
Jonathan Seex Linda Poidnakk, Friend
Danielle Moore Mo Phung, Closed friends.
Micah Messent
Jonathan Seex Gunilla Larsson, Jonathan was the son of a very good friend and I had
known him since he was a baby. It still hurts that this beautiful
person is no longer because of greed and negligence!
Danielle Moore Jacqueline Miller, I am the friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole Paul Heydon, Friend of a Friend of the victim
Samya Stumo Linda Miller, Friend
Jonathan Seex Nadja Chekhov, I'm the friend of the victim's motter
Stephanie Lacroix Julie Lacourse, I am a friend of the victim.
Melvin and Bennett Riffel Cheryl hess, Cousin
Jonathan Seex Johan Hartzell, Wifes cousin
Immaculate Achieng' odero Princess Piro, I am a very close family & childhood friend & neighbor
Samya Stumo Arlene Tolopko, I am a friend of the victim.
Camille Geoffroy Valerie serres, friend
Sebastiano Tusa Sofia Ambrogio, I am the niece of the victim
Danielle Moore Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Clemence Boutant Ian HENSTOCK, Friend/former colleagues
Samya Rose Stumo Kristen Brookes, friend of the family
Michael Ryan Helen Maree, I am a family member of the victim
Angela Elizabeth Maria Rehhorn Roland Rehhorn, Father of victim
Sebastiano Tusa Carlo Tusa, He was my cousin.
Matthew Vecere Richard McMullin, I am a friend of the victim.
Jean-Michel Suzanne Barranger Laetitia Tavernier, I am the dauthger
Jean Michel Suzanne Barranger Marc Tavernier, I am son-in-law
Stephanie Lacroix Murray Howe, friend of Family
Eric Prieur Prieur claire, My brother
Danielle Moore Kathleen Randall, Cousin
Samya Stumo Deveney williams, Friend
Samya Stumo Amy Alpert, Family friend
Cedric Galia Asiavugwa Alex Kubasu, I am the friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Sheryl Lechner, family friend
Bennett Riffel Lorraine Micke-Hayden, I am the cousin of the victims.
Melvin Riffel
Oliver Vick Kirsten Young, Friend
Samya Stumo Jennifer Brown, I am a friend of the victim.
Johanna Toole Elisa Canalini, I am a colleague of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Steven Souaid, I am a cousin of the victim
Samya Stumo Robbyn Swan, Friend
Samya Stumo Sandra K Holmlund, Great Niece
Angela Rehhorn Jacob Oberfrank, Partner
Clemence Boutant-Willm Claire FABING, I am a colleague of the victims
Samuel Pendam
Stephanie Lacroix Michelle BeaudrySeguin, Close friend
Steph Lacroix Jamie Lafrance, Friend/former roommate
Xavier FRICAUDET NOUVION Marie, famille
Samya Rose Stumo Thomas Leatherman, Friend and Colleague
Melvin Riffel Melissa Duralia, I am the friend of a victim
Graziella de Luis y Ponce Maria Tauber, Friend
Marie Philipp Angelika Begerow, I am the friend of the victim
Jonathan Seex Anne-Marie Petersen, Aunt
Camille Geoffroy Sophie Le Bret, Family's friend
Michael Ryan John Maree, Concerned engineer family friend
Anne-Katrin Feigl Sam Eifling, I'm a friend of the victim
Samya Stumo Michelle Wolfensperger, Cousin
MELVIN Riffel Rebecca Richardson, I am a friend of Ike and Susan Riffel
BENNETT RIFFEL
Matt Vecere Stephen Dintino, Friend
Dawn Tanner Brian Kobiero, Spouse
Anne-Katrin Feigl Regina M. Buono, Friend
Immaculate Achieng Odero Emmy, Sister
Allan Chacha Allan Chacha, Friend
Samya Stumo Joseph Kreta, Childhood friends
Mick Ryan Jack Connolly, Uncle Inlaw
Melvin and Bennett Riffel Carl J. Koutnik MD, friend of family
Immaculate Achieng Odero Judith Otsieno, Friend
Mick Ryan Lee Wassem, Family member
Mick Ryan Deirdre Connolly, I am the wife of Jack Connolly--Micks uncle in law
Suzanne Barranger Barranger Sebastien, I am the son of the victim
Jean Michel Barranger
Paolo Dieci Harlan Downs-Tepper, I am the friend of the victim.
Juliah Mwashi Florah Mwashi, Sister
Juliah Mwashi Ivy Nduta, Mother
Juliah Mwashi Joy Ayuma, Mother
Xavier Fricaudet Virginie Fricaudet, I am the sister
Jonathan Seex Karen McDougall, I am a childhood friend of the victin.
Melvin Riffel Susan Mears, Family Friend
Bennett Riffel
Xavier Fricaudet Jean-Luc Moreau, I am friend of the victim
Clemence Willm Celine Grimault, I am a friend of the victim.
Mick Ryan Alan Connolly, Relative
Stephanie Lacroix David Finniss, I am the friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole Bridget Harris, Close family friend and best friend of my niece Katy
Harris
Samya Stumo Laura Zabriskie, I am a friend and parishioner of Samya.
Matt Vecere Tomra Vecere, Sister
Matt Vecere Charles Sinesi, Brother in law
Clemence-Isaure Willm Boutant Emma Boutant, I am the step-daughter of the victim.
Danielle Moore Colleen Duffey, Family friend
Samya Stumo Evelyn Kreta, I was her friend and church school teacher.
Matt Vecere Rachel Condon, Niece
Samya Stumo Sylvia Lewis, I am a family friend.
Oliver Vick Lucy Bowers-Wildblood, Friend, chosen family.
Oliver Vick Lucy Bowers-Wildblood, Friend, chosen family.
Danielle Moore Nick Cake, Cousin
Michael Ryan Hayley Dowsing-Connolly, Family friend
Samya Stumo Karen Hubbard, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Matilde Guillen, I am the host mother in Peru of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Gustavo Justo, I am the host father in Peru of the victim
Emmaculate odero Susan, Friend
Immaculate odero Ephie, Sister
Mick Ryan Mai, Colleague and Friend
Xavier Fricaudet Harm van Duin, Friend
Sam Pegram Mark Pegram, Father
Ekta Adhikari Noel Griffin, Colleague and friend
Maria Pilar Buzzetti
Virginia Chimenti
Harina Hafitz
Zhen-Zhen Huang
Michael Ryan
Djordje Vdovic
Alexandra Wachtmeister Anna Wachtmeister, Cousin
Immaculate Achieng Odero Hermaton Nalyanya, A friend to the victim
Agnes Mary Wangari Gathumbi Ian Kabaara, I am a friend of the children of the victim
Sam Pegram Melanie Cremona, Friend
KARIM SAAFI Mohamed Najeh Saafi, BROTHER
KARIM SAAFI DRISS SAAFI, Uncle
KARIM SAAFI ELYESS SAAFI, Uncle
Saafi Karim Ingrid de Viennay, Je suis son ancienne belle soeur.
KARIM SAAFI INESS SAAFI, Uncle
Max Edkins Kathleen McCarthy, Friend
Angela Shantel Rehhorn, Sister
Angela Rehhorn Joan Vincent, Mother
Samya Stumo Deirdre Hatch, I am a friend of the victim
Samya Stumo David Hatch, I am a friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Glen Levacque, Cousin
Immaculate odero Ephie odero, Sister
Riffle Brothers Ericka Allio, Family friend
CLEMENCE-ISAURE BOUTANT Denis Boutant, I am the husband of the victim
Joanna Toole Jerome Toole, I am the cousin of the victim.
Samya Stumo Jenelle Pierce, Cousins daughter passed away in the plane.
Emmaculate Achieng Odero Clifford Odero, I am the brother of the victim.
Samya Stumo Georgia Usry, Close friend of the family
Jonathan Seex Johanna, Friend
Samya Stumo Susan Lockwood, I am a friend of the victim
Oliver Vick David Haines, I am the victim's uncle.
Danielle Moore Mark Uzer, Cousin
Danielle Moore Mark Uzer, Cousin
Samya Stumo Joni Cushing, Friend
Jessica Hyba Susan Olszynko, Close friend
Michael Ryan Lynn Dowsing-Connolly, He was my cousin's husband
Samya Rose Stumo Fr. John Kreta, Spiritual father
Samya Rose Stumo Erika Wainwright, I am the friend of Samya Stumo
Graciela De Luis Ponce Noemi Laviada, Friend
Samya Stumo Hollis Starks, friend of the victim
Jonathan Seex Torben Rune, Friend of victim
ZHEN ZHEN HUANG WEI XIONG, I am the husband of the victim
Graziella De Luis Anita Guerra, I am a friend of the victim
Max Thabiso Edkins Gillian Mary Edkins Bailey, I am the auntie
Mick Ryan Thalia Maree, Cousin of Mick's wife Naoise
Maygenet Worku Eyasu Teshome, Husband
Anne-Katrin Feigl Michele Pasquale, I am the friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram Tom Pegram, Brother
Camille Geofrroy Amelie Jourdier, I am the aunt
Mick Ryan Seanna Connolly, Brother in law
Michael Ryan ciamha hurst, i am a friend
Mick Ryan Tina O'Flynn, I am a friend of the victim
Micheal Ryan Silvia Rodriguez Barbado, A friend of the victim
Graziella de Luis y Ponce Susan Draz, Friend
Michael Ryan Eoin Daffy, Friend
Marie Christin Philipp Wiebke Hormeyer, I am a friend
Ines Michaela Gans Bernd Gans, My daughter
Virginia Chimenti Vincenzo Maggiore, Colleagues
Pilar Buzzetti
Harina Hafiz
Karoline Aadland Knut Ingvar Aadland, I am the father of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo James Carter, Friend of Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Katherine Preston Cory, I am a friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo Tierney Simpson Jutzi, Friend of a Friend
Carlo Spini Andrea Spini, I am the son of the victims
Gabriella Viciani
Samya Stumo Joseph Homsi, Friend
Abiodun Bashua mena tebeje, I am a wife of the victim
Clemence Wilm Marine Rudant, friend
Samya Stumo Carol McFadden, Friend of friend
Xavier Fricaudet Yvette Le Gall, Xavier is the brother of my son in law
Stehanie Lacroix Chantale and Real Boissonneault, daughter of our friends
Josefin Ekerman La Torre Michael, Cousin
Samya Stumo Alyssa O'Connor, Close Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Andres Justo, I am the friendo ir the victim
Stephanie Lacroix Sara Lefebvre, Classmate
Samya Rose Stumo Lucia Justo, I am the friend of the victim
Samya Stumo Maria Sofia Justo Guillen, I am the friend of the victim
Samya Stumo April Cain, She was the close friend of a young friend of mine
Micah Messent Isabella Morgan, Friend
Samya Stumo Stuart Robinson, Friend
Sam Pegram Deborah Pegram, I am Sams Mum
Xavier FRICAUDET Isabelle REBILLARD, I am a friend of the victim's family
Oliver Vick LUcinda Pullinger, Long term friend
Melvin Riffel Mary Ann Tangney, Nephews
Bennett Riffel
Michael Ryan Padraig McCarron, I am the friend of the victim
Harina Hafitz Arnaud Sournia, Friend of the family of the victim
Virginia Chiementi Mateo Mancheno, Friend of the victim
Micheal Ryan Brian McDonagh, I am the friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo Ben Webb, Close friend
Jonathan Seex Bjorn Olund, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo Lucia Guillen, I am the friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo Sandra Sermini-curtiss, Friend of family
Matt Vecere Warren McClain, I am the uncle of the victim
Mel Riffel Thomas Tangney, Uncle
Bennet Riffel
Sergey Vyalikov Alex Fikhman, I am the uncle-in-law of victim.
Marie Philipp Derek Hagen, Friend
Camille Geoffroy Laura Couillet, Freind
Samya Rose Stumo Andrew Souaid, Cousin
GEORGE KABAU PAUL KABAU, BROTHER
Max Edkins Leonita Louw, Friend
Eric PRIEUR Fabrice CRABIE, brother in law
Mick Ryan Morgan F Connolly, Brother-in-law
Michael Ryan Theresa Stack, Friend of the fmily
Sergey Vialikov Dmitrii Vialikov, Brother
Sergey Vialikov Nadya Vialikova, SON
Anne Karanja, Dr. Karanja, Mother, sister, nephew and niece
Caroline Nduta Karanja,
Ryan, Kellie and Rubby
Mick Ryan Ian Connolly, Cousin in law
Mick Ryan Sam Woolhead, My partner is a family Friend
Karim SAAFI Abdel-Jawad Jellad, Nephew
Jonathan Seex Carola Schroder, I'm mother in law to his sister
Joanna Toole John Paul Rodgers, Cousin
Jonathan Seex Carola Schroder, I'm mother in law with his sister
Samya Stumo Clarice Faber, Friend
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Markey..--that Congress relies upon. Administrator
Dickson, will you suspend Boeing's delegated authority until
Congress aircraft certification bill is fully implemented and
Boeing has conclusively proven that it has changed its ways?
Mr. Dickson. Senator Markey, thanks for the question. We
have reset the relationship with Boeing in no uncertain terms.
And we have limited delegation of various items. As I said a
moment ago, the airworthiness certificates, we are retaining
full control over that. One of the improvements that has been
put in place is Boeing's safety management system. That is
revealing issues much earlier than they were previously. And we
are seeing results, and it is making our oversight more
effective and more systematic. We conduct regular performance
reviews with them, and we will continue to drive those
improvements.
Senator Markey. I would just say this, honestly limiting
delegation is just not enough. We cannot trust Boeing until the
systems that enabled and caused these tragedies are fully
fixed, and I urge you to take back the FAA's full certification
authority. Just take it all back. Should be in your hands, and
that is just the bottom line on this, Mr. Administrator.
I also want to strongly urge you to finish implementing two
overdue Congressional mandates from the FAA Reauthorization Act
of 2018. First, while I am glad the FAA has finally published
its proposed rule to increase the required amount of flight
attendant rest hours, you must finalize this proceeding without
further delay.
And second, the FAA needs to rapidly advance a requirement
to install secondary cockpit barriers on new airplanes, which
will protect our crews and passengers from anyone who may rush
the flight deck. It is simply time to get these essential rules
done. Administrator Dickson, will you complete them in the near
future?
Mr. Dickson. We are fully committed to completing them, and
I share your frustration, Senator, at how long these processes
take.
Senator Markey. Have you prioritized those two rules?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, we have.
Senator Markey. So what is your time-frame for finishing
those rules?
Mr. Dickson. We are--as you said, we are moving forward
with the--we have the NPRM out on the flight attendant rest
period. We are in the process of finalizing the proposal on
secondary barriers and that will--that NPRM should be out in
the coming months. It is a good bit more technically
complicated, but we want to make sure that we are able to
account for as much data as we can on the front end because it
will actually get us to the destination.
Senator Markey. Well do them right, but do them fast. There
is a lot depending upon it.
Mr. Dickson. I share your urgency and your emphasis.
Senator Markey. And we also have to address aviation
cybersecurity. Our airplanes are increasingly computerized and
new software is being rolled out every single day. These
technologies offer enormous potential to improve safety and
efficiency, but it will only take one hacker to cause a
disaster. And that is why I will soon reintroduce my
cybersecurity standards for aircraft to Improve Resilience Act
or the Cyber Air Act.
This bill will require the disclosure of information
relating to cyberattacks on our aviation system, as well as
build strong cybersecurity standards directly into our air
carrier and aircraft certification processes. Administrative
Dickson, do you agree that we need to require enhanced
cybersecurity in aviation before tragedy strikes, yes or no?
Mr. Dickson. Yes. Senator, I do.
Senator Markey. Well, I thank you for that. But ultimately,
I think we are going to need to pass legislation. Have you had
a chance to look at my legislation that would mandate this?
Mr. Dickson. I have not seen the specifics, but we
currently have protocols in place for avionics. But this is
again an evolving area. Airplanes are much more software
driven, as you state, these days, and so we need to make sure
that the adequate layers of protection are in there. So I look
forward to working on it.
Senator Markey. OK. Airplanes today are just flying
computers, and they are totally hackable. And to the extent to
which this is not a subject that has been addressed properly
yet, we are just in a very dangerous period of time. So again,
I urge you to move quickly, and I think as well, it should be
backed up with legislation that mandates that this occur. Thank
you, Madam Chair.
The Chair. Thank you, Senator Markey. I am not aware of
other members. I know Senator Peters joined us shortly on
video, but I am not sure if these returning were anyone else.
So while I will tell members that I am going to do a second
round here and we will see if anybody else appears for
questions. If not, we will close out the hearing.
Administrator, one of the issues that we have heard a lot
about in the certification process and it has come up a couple
of times is the fact that the law requires on the change
product rule to change the process. And yet I think you are
saying it is going to take years to do that by a rulemaking.
And yet we still have a process underway for certifying
planes. And so what are you putting in place now to make sure
that you have the workforce and the people to review that
process while a change product rule is in development?
Shouldn't the FAA produce like policies to close the loophole
in the meantime?
Mr. Dickson. Senator--Chair Cantwell, absolutely. And we
are working this on two tracks. We have MITRE doing a study for
us on the criteria for significant changes for the change
product rule to drive that--those decision criteria. And we
have also stood up the International Authorities Working Group.
They have already met several times and they will continue
on should provide recommendations to us by next summer on
harmonizing the change product rule across all States of
design, so it is consistent regardless of where equipped----
The Chair. I am a little more worried about the right now.
I mean, this was a pretty big change in the system that allowed
technology to outpace our focus on it, and we don't want to see
that happen again. So we don't need anything else to happen to
know that we need to put something in place, and it was already
asked to be put in place, so that we would have it today.
So this is the issue, if you are producing a plane that is
a derivative of a product. And this is the challenge that we
face. We were very clear in the law. We said everybody, every
plane has to go through a systems analysis on anything that is
different. So we----
Mr. Dickson. Chair Cantwell that is actually happening now.
So any critical design component requires validation, anything
that touches human factors, and the additional human factors
folks that we have got in the agency are focused, laser focused
on that issue. We are also involving them throughout the
process not just to design approval, but also for continued
operational safety once the airplane is actually out there
flying.
So that data is actually coming back and informing the
certification process where it wasn't to such a degree before.
The Chair. Well, back to Mr. Won, because I do--you know, I
think he is trying to get the information in his May 13th
letter, where he basically said that there was not enough
information on the 777-9 on their core, a common core system,
their communication system. When you look at this quote from
the letter, it is, ``an integrated modular avionics
architecture that provides a set of shared computing,
networking, input-output resources to support the computing and
system interface needs for multiple airplanes.''
So it sounds very similar to us saying we want to
understand what the software does, similar to the MCAS system.
So my question is, here is somebody who is doing what we
asked--and just, you know, for the context, there are more
than, I think, 1,600--I am sorry, thousands of SPIA members.
These are professional engineers. In the Northwest, they are
our friends, they are our neighbors.
These are people that are working and putting their name
behind their product, or let's say they would like to put their
name behind their product, but they need this backup of the
FAA. And here we have someone on the ground who is saying, yes,
I am going to make sure that we slow down and look at this.
But when we look at the fact that the Boeing Oversight
Office, the aviation FAA office overlooking the Boeing
manufacturing has basically been at a static engineering level
for decades, how do you expect that we are going to be able to
do this oversight and be able to really understand and keep
pace with this technology?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Chair Cantwell, it is again the--we have
increased engineering resources within the BASOO, but we are
also integrating the Certificate Management Office at Boeing,
which oversees the production side of the house. And all the
operators that operate Boeing aircraft, we are integrating them
so that we can leverage all their expertise in these processes
and make sure that the BASOO is able to be more effective in
its process. In this particular letter, part of what we are
dealing with is the issue of what our expectations are for
submissions.
And that is something that was a very early part of my
conversations with Boeing leadership. You have got to give us
the full picture. You can't give us a portion of it and then
say, well, you will get everything else next week.
So this is just really resnapping that line to make sure
that the applicant that we are overseeing is giving us a
complete system picture when they ask for us to move to the
next milestone in an approval process.
The Chair. To Senator Markey's point, I know that there was
an IASA repeal of an ODA authority. At what point would you
take that step?
Mr. Dickson. If--well, at this point we are--if we saw that
they weren't meeting our expectations on a consistent basis or
if we saw anything in their safety management systems or their
data where they weren't making the necessary cultural or
transparency improvements, then we would go down that path at
some point.
The Chair. Well, again, I--you know, we are going to have
our own report and our own reporting of what we have been told
by various whistleblowers, but it is clear that the process has
changed, that this process of collaboration and solving
problems has now changed into the--well, at least from what we
have heard the FAA not even asking the ODA unit members to
produce documentation about testing and information. That
literally this, does it comply, yes or no? So we have to build
this workforce.
We have to believe in them. They are our early warning
system when something is wrong, and you have to back them up.
So again, I am asking you because I don't see the workforce
improvement at the Seattle office that you are describing. I
think we are at a total of 52 people, 32 of which are
engineers.
So I don't think that that has changed much over the years.
So how have you, since these accidents, improved the Seattle
oversight office?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, we--I will get you the current
numbers, but we have increased our resources. And we are, I
know because I have sat down with them personally, our people
feel empowered and backed up as they never have been before.
And that is helping them to be more effective.
This, which I think was part of what you were really
focusing on in the legislation, the appointment of the unit
member advisors, is creating a direct communication path to
make sure that there is no interference with that line of
communication between----
The Chair. Not a direct communication path--that simply
makes it sound like it is about communication. It is an
authority oversight on whether this is going to move forward or
not.
Mr. Dickson. But the awareness in terms of what the issues
are and not allowing the employer to interfere with issues that
are brought forward directly to the agency, that is going to
help us be much more informed and our oversight much more
effective.
The Chair. Well, I look forward to seeing this list of
people that you say that you enhanced to the office with. What
do you think the skill level is to do certification oversight?
I mean, what is the skill level and background of the person
who heads this up for you at the FAA?
Mr. Dickson. Well, certainly, you know, aeronautical
engineers. We need system--we need software engineers. And I
think that there is a growing need in that area. That was
something that we--that I think with newer platforms where we
are seeing how the systems are interfacing with each other,
that is more and more a part of the architecture of newer model
aircraft.
And so that is an area that we will be focused on, but you
are always going to have engineers, mechanical engineers and
others in other aerospace disciplines. But it is transforming
to a more of a, how do all of these automated systems on newer
aircraft interface with each other.
I think as we go into the coming years, we will need to
build our workforce on things like auto--artificial
intelligence as well.
The Chair. Well, you and I might agree on that point about
software because I don't think there is enough attention that
has been paid to this, either at the skill level of
understanding this, particularly from an oversight and
certification perspective, but certainly also at the company.
And then when it comes to this issue of overload in the cockpit
on various alerts and understanding particularly--look, I think
we saw this.
I think you saw even in your own private background that
you had pilots complain about the automation system and the
fact that there was so much happening in these automated
systems. So the question is, what do you need to do to make
sure that we get this automation right? And I think to me,
there seems to be this task that we also outlined in the bill,
you know, when you are now doing an oversight of a new software
system, that is going to be so critical, I would think the FAA
would produce a document that says these are the things that we
expect to understand, and that you would get that integrated
team that we asked for right now on software stood up and
pounding on the kind of questions that you would want answered
from that system, so they are not simply relying on, you know,
the information presented.
Again, this is a huge transformation that is continuing in
aviation, and--but it is not only in aviation. It is happening
in vehicles. This committee is struggling with the same
oversight as it relates to unmanned cars and other issues.
So it is getting your team and getting people to do that
oversight now on the technical skill side and getting the right
level of workforce. I just don't see that urgency in the FAA's
action. So I would ask you to do that and to make that the
number one priority as you move forward.
Mr. Dickson. Chair Cantwell, it is a very--an extremely
high priority and I will get you that additional insight----
The Chair. Well, it is essential to fulfilling the law. OK,
so I have a larger, broader question, which is just about the
process, and this is again a perfect example of it--this 777
issue. So when you are submitting design data to the FAA for a
finding of compliance, shouldn't the applicant certify in
writing to the FAA that the submitted data complies with all
the available and applicable airworthiness standards?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, that is correct.
The Chair. OK. And if the design does not comply with the
applicable airworthy standards that a design should be brought
into compliance before the FAA certifies the aircraft?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, that is correct.
The Chair. OK. Well, I don't know that that happens. I am
not sure that that is what is happening. And so again, if we go
back down the system, there were a lot of checks on a list of
issues, but not on final compliance with that information. I
think that is what is missing in the system, and I think we are
going to continue to look at that.
And I would look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we
ensure that compliance really does meet that standard. So very
much appreciate your answer on that. Thought we had one more
question that we wanted to go over. My colleague--there are two
issues on the workforce side. Standing up of the air grant
program. This is very much similar to the sea grant program.
And getting here on the Hill, a professional workforce that is
very skilled and knowledgeable in aviation.
I am very proud of my colleagues here today. You can see
that many of them have been following this and know
specifically, but I would--I think it is easy to say that the
oversight of the FAA on this issue needs a more technical staff
here on the Hill in addition, and throughout, you know,
throughout the policymaking realm.
I am very pleased with what the sea grant fellows have been
able to achieve because they brought a lot of scientific
knowledge to our understanding as it relates to our NOAA
oversight or fisheries oversight. So what is it going to take
to get that stood up?
Mr. Dickson. We will look forward to working with you on
it. It is--I think it is a great idea and something that would,
I think, improve the collaboration and the communication with
the Committee and make sure that we are more effective in our
implementation. And frankly, lay a solid foundation for the
future, as you said.
The Chair. Yes. OK. And the same, I think one of my
colleagues may have asked about the same ICAO involvement of
going to ICAO and making sure that we are setting the same
international standards.
Mr. Dickson. Right. On pilot training, is that--?
The Chair. Yes, Yes. So that we are not going to allow a
slippage of the standards set by pilots on an international
basis. That we are going to very much understand the
manufacturing of planes with integrated software systems, but
we are also going to still have a skilled pilot at the helm,
two pilots who know how to fly the plane if those systems are
turned off.
Mr. Dickson. Right. And I think we--ICAO is important, but
we can't rely on ICAO. We have got to help authorities around
the world to implement the requirements that we are talking
about here, because that is going to really raise the bar in
terms of not only pilot training but also maintenance programs,
and anyone operating--in this case a U.S. product, but any
airplane and commercial operation anywhere in the world, we
want to work with those authorities.
So things like I have talked about before, upset prevention
recovery training, flight path management, as we implement
those beneficial changes in the United States, we want to work
through ICAO to get the standards set, but then we also have to
go to the individual aviation authorities to make sure that
they are implemented consistently around the world.
The Chair. We want the United States to be a leader on what
is required for both the manufacturers and for the skill set
that it takes for flying the planes.
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
The Chair. And so we want the FAA to set that standard
here, and we want you to be a loud advocate for it on an
international basis----
Mr. Dickson. Could not agree more.
The Chair. Thank you. According to my information, the DOT
OIG report of February of this year said there has only been
one engineer added to the Seattle office since the MAX
tragedies.
So I think there is some resolution here of what is really
the fact and information, so I will look forward to getting
that information from you so that we can--I just firmly believe
that having the right staffing and having your integrated team
set up to advise you right now, not waiting for their moment,
and clarifying this change product rule process will be
critical.
OK, but very much appreciate Mr. Won doing his job in
standing up. So I think that makes the hearing for us today.
The record will remain open until December 1st, 2021. Any
Senators that would like to submit questions for the record and
for the witnesses--for the witness--should do so by November 17
of this year.
And we ask for responses be returned no later than December
1. So that concludes our hearing again. Thank you,
Administrator, for being here today.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, ma'am.
The Chair. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Steve Dickson
Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office Staffing Levels. The
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) imposes
several new requirements on FAA to improve the aircraft certification
process, particularly for Boeing airplanes. Yet, we understand the
Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO), which reportedly had
inadequate resources to oversee Boeing before the adoption of ACSAA,
has had a net increase of only one engineer since October 2019. While
many engineers have been assigned to BASOO, an almost equal number have
left this office. According to information provided to the Committee,
this has been attributed to the fact that positions in the BASOO are
relatively low-paying compared to other AIR divisions that have a less
critical role in ensuring the safety of transport airplanes. The result
is that senior engineers in the BASOO are constantly training new
engineers, who then leave for promotions to other offices. You
testified that FAA is ``doubling the number of human factors staff
within AVS, and realigning the hiring of technical advisors with the
necessary technical expertise involved in critical safety decisions.''
Question 1. What factors do you attribute to the poor retention
rate at the BASOO? Are BASOO engineers receiving lower pay in
comparison to other AIR divisions? If not, why does the BASOO have such
turn-over of personnel? What is FAA doing to address staff turnover at
the office charged with overseeing the largest Organization Delegation
Authorization (``ODA'') unit in the country?
Answer. The FAA acknowledges the gaps identified in past employee
retention and is committed to addressing these issues. Since 2018, the
BASOO has experienced an increase in the number of employees who either
retired, were reassigned, or left Federal service. While some employee
movement is expected, a major factor in the BASOO's turnover rate is
recent scrutiny of the work of that office. This scrutiny has added
stress to already high-intensity jobs, which has caused employees to
look for opportunities elsewhere. Additionally, in the past two years,
the BASOO's ability to hire has also been hindered by geographical
requirements. Generally, the FAA has required engineers responsible for
oversight of Boeing to be located in Seattle or Los Angeles. When the
aviation industry is hiring, as it is in today's economy, the FAA is
typically unable to compete on salary or bonuses offered by aviation
companies. The FAA is currently evaluating all available options to
overcome this challenge.
Beyond the BASOO, there are several other offices and dozens of FAA
employees that are directly responsible for or support Boeing
certification, oversight, and continued operational safety duties. The
Boeing Certification Management Office (CMO) is responsible for the
oversight of Boeing's production certificate (PC) and its voluntary
safety management system (SMS). The CMO currently has approximately 30
engineers and safety inspectors.
Approximately 40 engineers and program managers from the Seattle
and Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Offices (ACO) and the Continued
Operational Safety Branch support Boeing continued operational safety
activities. These activities include assessing in-service events and
processing airworthiness directives. Additionally, flight test pilots,
human factors and system safety specialists located in various offices
within AIR, as well as operational specialists from the aircraft
evaluation division, are responsible for supporting human factors and
system safety assessment (SSA) reviews and compliance activities for
certification programs on an ad hoc basis.
The FAA is addressing staff turnover by offering a number of
different incentives. As an example, for the almost 20 job
announcements that are currently in process for the BASOO, full
permanent change in station (PCS) and a recruitment bonus up to $25,000
will be offered to attract qualified candidates to the geographical
area. To help retain employees, the FAA is considering retention
bonuses based on agreed upon terms of employment, as well as in-band
increases or higher grades for current employees.
Question 2. How many of the new human factors staff are assigned to
BASOO? If others of these new staff are made available to BASOO, please
explain how and under what conditions they assist BASOO. For other
referenced newly hired technical advisors, how many are experts in
systems safety assessments, and how many of these are assigned at
BASOO? For those newly-hired staff assigned to the BASOO, what will FAA
do to ensure they have adequate opportunities for advancement at the
BASOO?
Answer. There are currently no human factors staff directly
assigned to the BASOO. However, specialists and Chief Scientific
Technical Advisors (CSTA) across the Aircraft Certification Service
(AIR) support human factors and system safety assessments (SSA) as part
of the certification process. Flight test pilots, human factors and
system safety specialists located in various offices within AIR, as
well as operational specialists from the aircraft evaluation division,
are responsible for supporting human factors and SSA reviews and
compliance activities for certification programs led by the BASOO.
Additionally, the Boeing Certificate Management Office (CMO) supports
the integration of new design into the production system. The CMO is
also responsible for overseeing the production system and the issuance
of certificate of airworthiness. These FAA resources are supporting the
BASOO on current certification programs and oversight, including the
Boeing 737-7, 737-10, and the 777-9.
Sec. 104 Implementation: Certification Oversight Staff. This
section of ACSAA requires the FAA to examine and address any shortfall
in the agency's certification expertise including engineers, safety
inspectors, human factors specialists, software and cybersecurity
experts, and other qualified technical experts who perform duties
related to the certification of aircraft, engines, and other
components. FAA has reported that it has contracted in August 2021 with
Booz Allen Hamilton to perform this workforce assessment.
Question 1. When will the FAA's workforce assessment be complete?
Will this assessment take into account new safety responsibilities of
the FAA and certification staff under the ACSAA, such as
responsibilities for direct approval of ODA unit members and the
assignment of safety advisors to unit members?
Answer. In collaboration with our union partners, we are in the
process of conducting a review of our workforce. We are standing up a
workgroup consisting of representatives from AVS, the Office of Human
Resource Management, and applicable unions so that this workgroup can
collaboratively inform workforce assessments. We anticipate the
workgroup will convene in the coming weeks, and complete all workforce
assessments by the end of Fiscal Year 2022, which will take into
account new safety responsibilities and ACSAA requirements.
Question 2. Will the FAA's workforce assessment of certification
staff include a review of the FAA's Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight
Office (BASOO) to determine engineer resource and expertise needs,
particularly in the areas of systems engineering, human factors, and
software development, to both perform certification and oversight work?
If not, will FAA commit to performing such an assessment of the BASOO
and take action as necessary to provide adequate staffing levels?
Answer. Yes, the workforce assessment will include a review of the
BASOO, as well as other FAA offices that are responsible for or support
the BASOO in executing its certification, oversight, and continued
operational safety responsibilities. These offices include the Boeing
CMO, the Seattle and Los Angeles ACOs, the Continued Operational Safety
Branch, and other offices within AIR and AVS.
737 MAX Return to Service. FAA approved Boeing's proposed design
changes without addressing concerns expressed by foreign authorities
and some of its own technical experts regarding Boeing's design
retaining continuous distracting alerts, such as the stick-shaker for
stall warning, which contributed to both 737 MAX accidents according to
some experts. Foreign authorities reportedly only agreed to Boeing's
design changes based on a commitment that Boeing would address these
issues in future design changes. Furthermore, despite the findings from
the accidents that Boeing had not adequately considered human factors
issues in the 737 MAX design, FAA continued to allow Boeing not to
comply with its latest human factors requirements in 14 CFR 25.1322.
Question. During the 737 MAX's return to service process, did FAA
require that Boeing comply with the latest standards and address the
safety issues associated with continuous alerts? Prior to the 737 MAX's
return to service, did FAA make Boeing comply with the latest human
factors requirements in 14 CFR 25.1322? If not, please explain why this
was permissible.
Answer. Over the course of 20 months, the FAA engaged in a rigorous
and transparent review of the aircraft and ultimately found that
Boeing's proposed design changes met FAA safety standards and supported
a return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX. Throughout the return-to-
service process, we worked closely with other civil aviation
authorities (CAAs) at every step. And we took input from the
independent review of a Technical Advisory Board that included experts
from other U.S. government agencies.
Details on the FAA's review and recertification of the flight
control system can be found at https://www.faa.gov/foia/
electronic_reading_room/boeing_reading_
room/
Sec. 102 Implementation: Safety Management Systems. This section of
ACSAA requires FAA to issue a final rule within two years to require
U.S. aircraft manufacturers to implement safety management systems. In
its briefing to congressional staff on October 13, 2021, FAA said it
anticipated issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking in 2022. In
addition, the DOT Office of Inspector General recently found that FAA
had done an inadequate job of overseeing American Airlines'
implementation of its SMS, as required by 14 CFR part 5.
Question 1. In adopting and implementing the regulation required by
this section, how will FAA ensure that SMS is implemented in such a way
as to ensure compliance with both SMS requirements and other applicable
requirements, including airworthiness standards? Does the FAA agree
that SMS is not a substitute for a manufacturer's obligation to comply
with airworthiness standards? If so, what measures can FAA take to
ensure that SMS complements these compliance obligations?
Answer. The FAA agrees that SMS is not a substitute for compliance
with regulatory standards. A properly integrated SMS fosters a
fundamental and sustainable change in how certificate holders and
manufacturers/design organizations analyze data, make informed
decisions, and develop or revise operational methods. In addition,
FAA's promotion of SMS through guidance material and compliance
oversight will reinforce this obligation and assure regulatory
compliance.
Question 2. In your testimony, you state, ``The voluntary programs
have enabled the FAA to gain valuable experience on oversight of SMS
for design and manufacturing organizations, and the lessons learned
will help inform FAA's SMS rulemaking and policy development.'' What
are the lessons learned referenced in this testimony, and how are they
informing FAA's rulemaking and policy development?
Answer. Successful SMS implementation and maturation depends on
company leadership commitment, a strong safety culture, appropriate
industry and FAA resources, and transparency. The FAA Voluntary SMS
program has enabled the FAA rulemaking and policy development team to
capture a number of lessons learned in these areas to support
rulemaking and policy development. Some specific areas include:
Learning what is necessary for successful organizational and
cultural changes to influence future training and policy.
Understanding the resources necessary to develop a fully
operational SMS program. This includes internal process changes
for employee safety reporting, problem solving, analysis and
management of various safety risks, engagement of labor unions,
and revisions to internal and external company communication
practices.
Increasing transparency and open communication of safety
issues between the FAA and the company. This will inform the
access, availability, and appropriate FAA handling and decision
making regarding expanded industry safety data.
Enhancing coordination between different FAA offices and the
company to develop comprehensive SMS programs. Early experience
in this area is important as many companies will be
implementing a cross-functional SMS.
Increasing FAA employee competencies to ensure a sufficient
level of knowledge regarding SMS. Experience gained through
early implementation will be reflected in internal FAA training
materials to support the broader upcoming rule implementation.
Section 105: Disclosure of Safety Critical Information. Section
105(a) of ACSAA revises 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44704(e) to require that, as of
the date of ACSAA's enactment, FAA must require applicants for and
holders of type certificates for transport category airplanes to submit
safety critical information, as defined, including newly discovered
information and material design or analysis changes. In its October 13,
2021 briefing to Congressional staff, FAA said it would be issuing
three policy statements in 2022 to implement this section, but it is
not apparent that any of these statements address this requirement,
which applies to safety critical information both as originally
submitted and to later changes. Also under Section 105 of the reform
law, FAA is directed to revoke an airline transport pilot certificate
held by an individual who fails to disclose safety critical
information, including information related to flight control systems,
on behalf of a manufacturer. FAA has told the Committee that the agency
is developing policy documents to implement these disclosure
requirements and expects to issue them in 2022.
Question. Since the revision to revises 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44704(e) was
effective upon enactment of ACSAA, please describe what concrete steps
FAA has taken to implement these important disclosure requirements that
ensure greater accountability in the certification process? Please cite
examples.
Answer. The FAA currently requires applicants for transport
category airplane type certificates to disclose safety critical
information through 14 CFR Sec. 25.1309. The certification process set
forth in FAA Order 8110.4C also provides the FAA with information
specific to safety via familiarization meetings, project specific
certification plans, and type certification board meetings. In order to
enhance FAA awareness and understanding prior to issuance of additional
guidance, the FAA has instituted cross-organizational program reviews
of type certificate applications. The program reviews identify critical
design features, the latest project developments and design changes, as
well as FAA level of involvement.
To implement the requirements of section 105, the FAA plans to
implement policy that encourages applicants for a transport airplane
type certificate or supplemental type certificate to submit a single
document at the beginning of the certification process to disclose all
new systems and intended changes to existing systems, as well as ensure
that safety critical information will be kept current throughout the
certification process. The FAA also plans to clarify classification of
design changes to products in accordance with the requirements of 14
CFR Sec. 21.93(a).
Sec. 106 Implementation: Limitation on Delegation. This section of
ACSAA prohibits FAA from delegating transport aircraft certification
tasks related to safety critical design features, such as flight
control systems, until the FAA has reviewed and verified all underlying
human factors assumptions. Based on a status update from FAA's briefing
to Committee staff on October 13, 2021, the Aircraft Certification
Service (AIR) issued a memo to all employees highlighting the section's
requirements and reinforced the need to validate underlying assumptions
prior to delegating findings of safety critical systems compliance.
Question 1. Please provide a detailed description of how FAA
implemented this requirement across AIR, and how the change differs
from FAA practices prior to the requirement. Please include in your
description references to published regulatory policy/guidance to
understand cross agency application.
Answer. The FAA issued a policy memo on September 16, 2021, which
reinforced the requirements of section 106, while formal policy
surrounding underlying human factors assumptions is being developed.
The FAA developed a template for applicants to document underlying
assumptions for FAA review. This template is being used for the Boeing
737-7 certification and will be used for the Boeing 737-10
certification program. The FAA is finalizing guidance to further
institutionalize the requirements of section 106. This guidance will
define FAA responsibilities, provide a screening process for applicant
submittals (including the system safety documentation to be submitted
to the FAA for review), and provide instructions on the functions to be
retained by the FAA and what may be delegated to qualified designees or
organizations.
This change differs from prior FAA policy, which allowed FAA
offices to make risk based determinations regarding the delegation of
system safety documents, such as System Safety Assessments (SSA), for a
particular company.
Question 2. In your testimony, you state, ``We are delegating fewer
responsibilities and demanding more transparency from them, and
evaluating key assumptions prior to delegating functions in certain
areas.'' FAA's recently issued memo restates the requirements of
Section 106: prohibiting delegation until all human factors assumptions
are validated. The Committee also understands that FAA is retaining
issuance of airworthiness certificates for the 737 MAX and FAA has
limited delegated functions for critical design features on the 777-9
and the 737-10 certification projects. Besides those identified limits
on delegations, what other changes has FAA made to limit delegation,
and how specifically is FAA demanding more transparency?
Answer. On November 26, 2019, the FAA notified Boeing that we would
retain responsibility for airworthiness certification for the 737 MAX
airplanes until the FAA is confident that Boeing's quality system,
including inspection and delivery processes, is stable and producing
compliant, conforming, and safe airplanes. Since resuming airworthiness
certification of 737 MAX airplanes on November 30, 2020, the FAA issued
certificates of airworthiness for 232 aircraft and continues to retain
responsibility for airworthiness certification for the 737 MAX.
The FAA retained airworthiness certification of 787 Dreamliner
aircraft as a means to verify Boeing manufacturing and quality control
process changes and performance, and this practice will be used again
when delivery of 787 Dreamliner aircraft resumes.
The FAA is reviewing SSAs for the 737-7 program before making a
decision regarding delegation. The FAA is also implementing a process
to address major design changes for Boeing products, which will involve
a screening and review process consistent with the ACSAA section 106
requirements.
For the Boeing 777-9 program, the FAA increased technical
specialist involvement based on lessons learned from the 737 MAX. The
FAA will only consider increasing delegation once the agency has
identified an acceptable certification path with clear compliance
criteria and has found a demonstrated capability of the Boeing
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) to find compliance
consistent with FAA expectations. Examples of areas of increased FAA
involvement include:
New and novel design features such as the folding wing tip;
o Test participation and witnessing related to structural tests
and flight tests; o Areas of past technical challenge such as
fuel system lightning protection, engine failure analysis, and
system integration;
Software development and assurance methodologies; and
Verification of critical assumptions for system safety
analysis and verification that these assumptions have been
accounted for in subsequent design, operational procedure, and
training program development.
In order to foster transparency, the FAA is leveraging Boeing's
Voluntary SMS program to increase agency access to Boeing's performance
regarding root cause problem solving and safety risk management
assessments. These situations allow the FAA to gain direct insight
regarding Boeing's SMS implementation and to provide feedback on where
further changes are needed for the SMS to have greater impact.
The FAA pressed Boeing to consider implementation of an Aviation
Safety Action Program (ASAP), modeled after the U.S. airline industry
program, to support more effective employee identification of safety
issues. Boeing is incorporating FAA input and suggestions on how the
company's existing employee SpeakUp process can be adapted to better
emulate the ASAP program.
Sec. 107 Implementation: Interference with ODA Unit Members.
Section 107 of ACSAA requires that, as of the date of ACSAA's
enactment, FAA must seek to eliminate or minimize prohibited
interference by ODA holders that affects the performance of unit
members and must not prohibit communications between FAA personnel and
ODA unit members. FAA has said it anticipated publishing policy in
February 2022 to prevent interference with ODA unit members and
facilitate open communication between unit members and the FAA. For
many years, FAA has prohibited ODA holders from interfering with ODA
unit members. However, an August 19, 2021 letter from Acting BASOO
Manager Ian Won to Boeing shows that undue pressure and associated
actions to compromise the independence of ODA unit members persists at
Boeing, and requires swift action to ensure similar actions do not
occur moving forward.
Question 1. Regarding the two Aviation Safety (AVS) policy
documents relevant to Section 107 that were issued by FAA on October
15, 2021, how will these policies be more effective in preventing ODA
interference?
Answer. The two policies issued on October 15, 2021 require FAA
approval of Unit Members at Type Certification ODA holders and require
the FAA to assign advisors for engineering unit members at certain Type
Certification ODA Holders. While neither policy is targeted
specifically at preventing interference with ODA Unit Members, they
both address other requirements under the ACSAA. Assigning advisors
will provide another avenue for Unit Members to report possible
instances of interference to the FAA. The FAA is working to issue a
policy directive--anticipated in the first quarter of calendar year
2022--to carry out the mandate of section 107 and ensure that ODA
holders comply with regulatory requirements in 14 CFR part 183 to
ensure that Unit Members are not subject to interference.
Question 2. Why will it take over a year after the passage of ACSAA
for FAA to issue and implement a policy on ODA unit member non-
interference and communications that was required to be effective upon
enactment?
Answer. New policy to address the issues of ODA holder interference
with a Unit Member and Unit Member communication with the FAA require
ODA holders to meaningfully modify their procedures manual to include
procedures for monitoring for interference and investigating
allegations of interference. The FAA will post the draft policy for
public comment and public comments will need to be addressed prior to
issuance.
Question 3. In your testimony, you reference policy changes ``aimed
at preventing interference with ODA unit members in the performance of
their duties.'' FAA has had for many years a policy prohibiting such
interference, but such interference has continued. What policy changes
does this testimony reference and how will they be more effective in
preventing such interference?
Answer. 14 CFR 183.57 requires ODA holders to ensure that no
conflicting non-ODA Unit duties or other interference affects the
performance of authorized functions by ODA Unit Members. FAA Order
8100.15 references the regulatory requirement for ODA Unit Members to
be able to perform their duties without pressure or influence from
other parts of the company. The new policy directive under development
defines interference, including examples, and reinforces the FAA's
expectation that ODA holders comply with their regulatory
responsibilities by systemically and proactively monitoring for
interference, promptly investigating allegations of interference,
reporting allegations of interference to the FAA, and taking corrective
action if allegations of interference are substantiated.
Sec. 107 Implementation: Direct Oversight of ODA Unit Members.
Section 107 of ACSAA ensures that FAA will be responsible for approving
and removing manufacturers' engineers who act on behalf of the FAA--
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) unit members--beginning on
January 1, 2022. This section also requires assignment of FAA safety
advisors to a manufacturer's authorized representatives so that the FAA
has direct and ongoing oversight and communication with the ODA unit
members responsible for certification activities. On October 15, 2021
FAA issued two policy memos regarding FAA approval of unit members and
assignment of FAA advisers.
Question 1. Please provide a copy of the minimum qualifications for
ODA unit members to be approved by FAA.
Answer. The qualifications for ODA Unit Members at Type
Certification ODA holders are the same qualifications that the FAA uses
for individual designated engineering representatives and manufacturing
inspection designees. The FAA has reviewed these qualifications and
determined that they meet or exceed all specific requirements
identified in section 107.
Question 2. To satisfy the provisions of this section of the reform
law, FAA will be assigning safety advisors to each of the 1500 unit
members at the Boeing ODA, and FAA will be in charge of approving and
removing those designees. Does FAA currently have sufficient technical
workforce to carry out these obligations? What is the training schedule
for FAA safety advisors so that they can start to perform their
functions? Please provide a list of the FAA safety advisors assigned to
this role. Why did FAA wait until October 15, 2021 to issue a policy
memo to implement this key reform?
Answer. The FAA is focused on ensuring appropriate staffing levels
for all Organization Management Teams (OMT), including the OMT
responsible for overseeing Boeing. The new policy that establishes FAA
advisors for ODA Unit Members was effective on December 15, 2021, and
the advisors began performing that function on that date. The
responsibilities of an advisor overlap with the responsibility of being
an FAA Organization Management Team (OMT) member, so the additional
workload associated with being an advisor won't be known until the
requirements are implemented and we have a better understanding of how
often ODA Unit members reach out to their advisor at the FAA. We intend
to monitor that workload and adjust staffing levels as needed to
accommodate the outreach from ODA Unit Members.
Sec. 110 Implementation: Appeals of Certification Decisions.
Section 110 of ACSAA requires that, within 60 days after the date of
ACSAA's enactment, FAA must issue an order establishing an appeals
process for resolving disputes regarding type certification issues that
results in a written decision by the Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety that may be appealed to the Administrator for final
determination. At the October 13 briefing, FAA said it anticipates
issuing ``a high level order to define a dispute resolution process''
sometime in 2022.
Question. Why is FAA unable to meet the 60-day deadline set forth
in ACSAA? What are the steps necessary to issuing the order to
implement a dispute resolution process? What is the approximate date
for issuing the order?
Answer. Section 110 includes several requirements and mandates
issue resolution and appeals processes. The FAA has several existing
issue resolution processes, including those available to everyone and
those that are contractual and applicant-specific, such as Partnership
for Safety Plans. The FAA needed to review these processes to ensure
that the agency's existing commitments and the rights of applicants,
FAA employees, and the public would not be adversely impacted by the
implementation of this section. The FAA also had to define new
processes that would integrate with these existing processes and work
for all stakeholders. The Order establishing new issue resolution and
appeals processes is in the final stages of drafting and coordination.
It will be posted for a 30-day concurrent internal/external comment
period, followed by comment disposition and final coordination with
internal stakeholders. The anticipated issue date is the first half of
calendar year 2022.
Sec. 111 Implementation: Employment Restrictions. Section 111 of
ACSAA prohibits FAA supervisors from being involved in oversight of a
type certificate holder if the supervisor was employed by the holder in
the preceding one-year period. In its October 13, 2021 briefing, FAA
made general reference to its ``robust ethics program to ensure FAA
employees operate free of conflicts of interest,'' but said nothing
about implementing this prohibition.
Question. Based on the October 13, 2021 briefing to Congressional
staff, it is not clear how FAA is implementing the new employment
restrictions under ACSAA. Please describe and provide evidence that FAA
has taken new steps to implement this prohibition, such as a policy
document or order.
Answer. The FAA drafted guidance that will be incorporated into
existing FAA policy. The FAA anticipates having updated policy and
related training in place by spring 2022.
Sec. 113 Implementation: Voluntary Safety Reporting Program (VSRP).
In your written testimony, you state, ``Preliminary data on VSRP usage
indicates that employees are comfortable using the system and they are
regularly using it to raise safety concerns. . .. We will conduct
annual internal safety culture assessments that include surveys of AVS
employees in order to evaluate the safety culture and the
implementation of VSRP programs.''
Question 1. Since FAA implemented the new voluntary safety
reporting program in February 2021, how many reports have been
submitted through the program? What is the current status of these
reports? Has FAA reviewed submitted safety reports, identified the root
cause of any safety issue, and taken appropriate action to rectify any
errors? If so, please provide examples.
Answer. AVS employees filed 387 reports in the Voluntary Safety
Reporting Program (VSRP) through November 30, 2021. Of the 387 reports,
311 are currently under investigation, 16 have been closed and 9 were
not accepted.
The FAA has taken corrective actions on a number of VSRP reports.
Generally, when AVS receives a report, AVS de-identifies it to promote
confidentiality, determines whether to accept it, assigns risk, and
investigates. AVS then develops and implements a corrective action
plan. In some cases, there is no evidence to support the submitter's
claims or the submitter is unaware of policies or systems that address
the claims.
As an example, a report cited a situation where one company
developed a replacement carry-thru spar for an aircraft and the
Organizational Designation Authorization (ODA) improperly issued FAA
approval documentation before the FAA-approved engineering
certification was complete. An FAA Safety Inspector notified the FAA
office with oversight responsibility when he discovered the issue. A
VSRP report was filed and quickly corrected the discrepancy before the
aircraft were operated. The FAA office with responsibility for the ODA
has taken corrective action with the company to prevent a repeat of the
discrepancy.
Question 2. Given that the deadline for completion is December 31,
2021, when will FAA complete the annual safety culture assessment as
directed under section 132 of ACSAA? Additionally, in the past, FAA has
significantly delayed releasing the results of its assessments. How
soon after conducting the safety assessment can the Committee expect to
be provided with its results?
Answer. The FAA anticipates completing the safety culture
assessment no later than June 30, 2022. The FAA will brief
congressional staff on the results of the assessment during the
regularly scheduled ACSAA quarterly briefing that follows the
completion and compilation of results of the assessment.
Sec. 118 Implementation: Whistleblower Protections. This section of
the ACSAA expands whistleblower protection to include holders of
certificates under 49 U.S.C. 44704, i.e., type, production, and
airworthiness certificates, and their suppliers and contractors. In its
October 13 briefing, FAA said, ``The FAA Office of Audit and Evaluation
continues to work with whistleblower retaliation claims through the
AIR21 Whistleblower Protection Program.'' But the AIR21 program only
covered air carriers and their contractors.
Question. How does FAA currently facilitate the AIR21 Program? What
are the governing policy documents for the AIR21 Program? What has FAA
done to expand the coverage of its whistleblower program to include
manufacturers and their suppliers, as required by this section? If FAA
has issued a policy to address this expansion of the AIR21 Program,
please provide it to the Committee. If not, why not, and when will it?
Answer. AIR-21 assigns statutory responsibility for investigating
employment discrimination or other adverse action cases involving
aviation industry employees to the Department of Labor's Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) is responsible for investigating the safety-
related aspects of each case. The FAA provides OSHA with the results of
our safety investigations, but OSHA, as dictated by the statute,
independently conducts the wrongful termination/discrimination
investigation. It is also important to note that the FAA has no
statutory authority to provide whistleblower protection to industry
whistleblowers.
As part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the FAA and
OSHA, the FAA provides to OSHA any complaint information that contains
allegations of employment discrimination or other adverse action and
appears to meet the AIR-21 case criteria. In addition, the FAA notifies
any AIR-21 submitter who has not indicated they have filed their
retaliation complaint with OSHA how to do so and provides the submitter
a website link (www.whistleblowers.gov).
The FAA facilitates the AIR-21 Program through a dedicated web page
on faa.gov for potential submitters (https://www.faa.gov/about/
initiatives/whistleblower/complaint) which includes an e-mail address
designed for questions that a manufacturing worker might have
pertaining to AIR21 ([email protected]). Further, the FAA has a 2015
MOU with the Department of Labor/OSHA that requires OSHA to provide the
FAA's Office of Audit and Evaluation with any AIR-21 complaints
received, including manufacturing. Each of these case inputs are loaded
into the FAA Whistleblower Protection Program database program and
evaluated to determine if there is indeed a potential violation of a
regulation, order, or standard relating to the manufacture of parts or
aircraft for use by U.S. air carriers. FAA Order 1100.167B explains
FAA/AAE's responsibilities for execution of the AIR-21 Program. Other
guidance documents used in the program include: AIR-21 EWBPP Process,
AAE WB Confidentiality Policy, FAA-OSHA WB MOU, and FAA Order 8900.1
Volume 11, Chapter 3 (provides guidance to Flight Standards Inspectors
on the conduct of whistleblower investigations).
Following the lead of the Department of Labor Administrative Law
Judges, the FAA's AIR-21 Whistleblower Protection Program has always
treated employees of manufacturing entities, including their suppliers
and contractors, as covered employees under the AIR-21 Program if their
company provided parts/aircraft to U.S. air carriers. Because of this,
no expansion of the FAA's AIR-21 program was necessary nor undertaken.
For example, in FY21, AAE referred 8 AIR-21 complaints against
manufacturers for investigation, 21 in FY20, 15 in FY19, 8 in FY18, 12
in FY17, etc. These were noted in our annual report to Congress. The
FAA will continue to accept inputs from manufacturers and their
suppliers as directed under section 118.
Sec. 131 National Air Grant Fellowship Program. In the Committee's
efforts to ensure greater access to information about rapidly evolving
aviation technologies, the ACSAA targets areas to better integrate
human factors and system safety assessments of aircraft flight control
systems into FAA's overall certification process. Section 131 of the
reform law establishes the National Air Grant Fellowship Program to
connect students with the FAA and Congress to help advance safety in
the U.S. aerospace industry. ACSAA authorizes $15 million annually for
Fiscal Year 2021 through 2025 in new funding for the fellowship
program. The program is intended to enable graduate and post-graduate
students, with expertise in aerospace-related fields ranging from human
factors to software engineering, to help shape the future of aerospace
policy. According to FAA status updates, the Committee understands that
FAA is anticipating awarding the first fellowships beginning in 2022.
Question 1. What kind of impact does FAA expect the National Air
Grant Fellowship program to have on building additional capacity and
capability to certify advanced technologies at the FAA?
Answer. The FAA is optimistic the National Air Grant Fellowship
Program will attract exceptional candidates to the agency with
innovative knowledge of aerospace technologies. Consistent with the
enabling legislation, the FAA is hopeful this fellowship will mature
with participants from a wide variety of aerospace disciplines that
will yield benefit to our current operational and safety missions, as
well as help to shape the future of aviation.
Question 2. Based on information given to Committee staff, is the
program still scheduled to award the first fellowships in 2022? In
making such awards, what actions is FAA taking to ensure
underrepresented minorities and economically disadvantaged students
have equal access to being considered and selected for fellowships?
Answer. The FAA took special measures to make minorities and
economically disadvantaged students aware of the fellowship opportunity
and encourage interested members of those communities to apply. The
fellowship was announced using the agency's outreach plan for minority
serving institutions (MSI), as well as to employee associations that
represent these groups. The FAA is still evaluating applicants at this
time, but hopes to award the first fellowships in 2022.
Question 3. How much did FAA request in its latest budget request
for funding of the National Air Grant Program?
Answer. The FAA has requested $857K for the National Air Grant
Fellowship program for CY 2023. The amount includes stipend awards/
temporary hires to 5 Fellows ($280.1K), the appointment of a Director
of the National Air Grant Fellowship Program and a program assistant
($226.4K), and for program costs and fees ($350K).
Federal Preemption. The courts have repeatedly held that Federal
preemption of state law is primarily a function of congressional
intent. Congress has expressed its intent not to preempt state law in
providing remedies for damages in the context of aviation accidents in
49 U.S.C. Sec. 40120: ``A remedy under this part is in addition to any
other remedies provided by law.'' Yet FAA has argued in legal briefs in
civil litigation that, not only are FAA's airworthiness standards
preemptive of state standards of care, but the mere issuance of a
design approval prevents state courts from examining whether FAA's
standards were actually met.
Question. What is FAA current position on Federal preemption of
state standards of care and FAA certification of an aircraft design,
whether type certification, amended type certification, or supplemental
type certification? Does the FAA agree that the FAA type certification
does not itself establish or satisfy the relevant standard of care for
tort actions, nor does it evince congressional intent to preempt the
field of products liability? If not, please explain why and identify
the date of adoption of this policy.
Answer. The FAA does not agree with the second question. The FAA
position on preemption has existed for decades. For example, in 1993,
the FAA took the position that preemption applied in a lawsuit in New
Mexico, Cleveland v. Piper.
Most recently, the FAA's position concerning Federal preemption on
aircraft design is stated in Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae, filed in December of 2019, in the U.S. Supreme Court in the
matter of Avco Corp. v. Sikkelee, et al., In summary, the brief stated,
Design standards for aircraft engines are within a ``field''
that Congress has ``reserved for Federal regulation.'' And
where, as here, the FAA has determined that an engine design
satisfies the Federal safety standard, a plaintiff 's attempt
to invoke state law to impose different or higher obligations
on the manufacturer is impliedly preempted under principles of
both field and conflict preemption. Brief pages 12-13.
Citations omitted.
The United States stated in its brief, which would apply to
aircraft certification in general, where a state law conflicts with
Federal law because it would be an obstacle to accomplishing the
purpose of Congress or because it would be impossible for the private
party to comply with both state and Federal law, implied preemption
applies. A uniform, Federal system governing aviation is important to
develop aviation and improve safety. As stated in the government's
brief, ``The FAA has implemented Congress's objectives for the Federal
Aviation Act by requiring approval of the design of an aircraft or
aircraft engine through the multistage type-certification process, and
by requiring a manufacturer thereafter to conform to that design until
it is changed using the applicable procedures.'' Brief at page 15.
It is worth noting the limitations of our view on preemption.
Again, from the government's brief,
Importantly, Congress's preemption of state-law standards of
care for aircraft design does not foreclose all products
liability suits arising from allegedly defective aircraft. The
Federal Aviation Act's savings clause provides that ``[a]
remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies
provided by law.'' 49 U.S.C. 40120(c). That provision entitles
injured plaintiffs to bring state-law causes of action against
aircraft manufacturers for alleged violations of the Federal
safety standards, as found in the statute and FAA regulations.
For example, plaintiffs injured by alleged aircraft defects
might assert, among other potentially viable theories of tort
liability, that a manufacturer failed to make appropriate
disclosures during the type-certification process; failed to
obtain the required form of approval for a particular design
element on the type certificate; changed the type certificate
without the necessary approvals in contravention of the FAA
regulations; failed to build an aircraft in conformance with
the type certificate; failed to issue needed warnings to
consumers or was negligent in issuing a service bulletin; or
failed after issuance of a type certificate to adequately
monitor its design and to report known or suspected problems to
the FAA. Brief at page 17. Footnote omitted.
The FAA's position on preemption is long standing and rooted in
safety. Many older aircraft are operated safely in the National
Airspace System every day. As new technology is developed and
integrated into new type designs, those innovations improve safety for
the next generation of aircraft.
Data Collection and Analytics Tools. In your written testimony you
state, ``We are actively expanding our oversight capabilities by
advancing data collection and analytics tools to share safety data
within the FAA and between industry stakeholders and international
partners. These efforts include technological enhancements to the
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system to integrate
new data sources and methods for safety analysis, which will improve
data quality and accessibility to support risk-based decision-making.''
Question. How will these enhancements improve FAA's certification
and oversight of transport airplanes? How else will these enhancements
improve risk-based decision-making at FAA?
Answer. ASIAS is developing a repeatable process to prioritize
safety analyses across diverse aviation communities to support
programmatic decisions. In addition, ASIAS is working to enhance the
analysis of safety reports through topic modeling processes to discover
emerging safety issues. Enhancing the FAA's data collection and data
analytic capability will make data more accessible to support
certification and oversight decisions for transport airplanes. These
enhancements will provide the FAA workforce with the necessary tools to
identify more comprehensive root causes and analyze emerging safety
trends. For the long term, ASIAS is planning a new IT system that will
allow increased data volumes at faster processing speeds, and enable
more advanced analytical capabilities.
FAA Accountability. In your written testimony you state, ``we
believe incorporating these best practices [from similar offices at
other Federal agencies and from the FAA's experience, expertise, and
other sources] will improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and
transparency of the FAA's investigative processes.''
Question 1. While we understand this work is not yet done, what are
the lessons learned that FAA has identified to date? How will they
improve the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of FAA's
investigative processes?
Answer. The FAA has identified a need to develop a holistic
approach to the investigative process. This includes from the time the
initial allegation is submitted, to the determination of the final
action(s). There is a three-part solution that the FAA is developing to
improve effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accountability of
the investigation program.
1. Consolidate the intake process for all allegations into one
central location. Within the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) this will involve reviewing, classifying,
and tracking requests and allegations and ensuring each is
assigned to the appropriate investigative entity within the FAA
or partner agency. This will improve efficiency through greater
agency accountability and tracking of investigation trends.
2. OPR will review, enhance, and redeliver investigative training,
by qualified instructors, to all managers and personnel
responsible for conducting investigations and management
inquiries. This will help improve effectiveness and consistency
through common investigative standards that are utilized across
the different entities within the FAA.
3. Establish a Compliance and Oversight Review team led by OPR
comprised of personnel from the appropriate FAA offices to
ensure investigative standards, recommendations, and final
disciplinary decisions are within Federal guidelines. The
result will ensure improved effectiveness, accountability, and
transparency in the event that a manager fails to take proper
disciplinary action.
Question 2. In the past, FAA's processes have been criticized for
enabling managers whose decisions are challenged to make the final
decisions on the report. How is FAA addressing this problem?
Answer. The changes we are currently implementing with respect to
establishing an OPR program will address multiple aspects of this
concern. First, the FAA is proposing to change how we currently
document the overall findings in our investigative reports by advising
managers which violations are currently supported by known facts,
versus simply reporting the facts alone. Second, we plan to establish
an ``Oversight Review Board'', which will review all investigative
reports meeting the criteria of an OPR investigation, including
allegations of retaliation by managers, prior to dissemination to
management and the Office of Human Resource Management. The Board will
require a response back from the action authority with proposed and
final actions taken. It is important to note that the report is
distributed to the designated action authority in the subject's chain
of command and not to the subject themselves.
In accordance with current FAA personnel policies, final
disciplinary decisions lie with the manager. The proposed establishment
of the ``Review Board'' will ensure that managers are on notice that
there will be a review of their decisions and should result in an
increased awareness when managers fail to take proper action.
737 MAX Service Difficulty Reports. In the questions for the record
filed pursuant to a December 11, 2019 hearing before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, ``The Boeing 737 MAX:
Examining the Federal Aviation Administration's Oversight of the
Aircraft's Certification,'' Congressman Paul Mitchell asked you the
following:
Question. In the submitted written testimony from Mr. Edward
Pierson, he noted that during a 13-month time-frame from 5/12/18 to 3/
26/19, the Boeing 737 line had 15 emergencies, leading to 2 crashes and
13 incidents.
a. Is this statistic consistent with the FAA statistics on the 737
line?
b. If so, how does this record compare with other aircraft types?
c. If this statistic is an outlier, what accounts for this
inconsistency?
You responded, in part:
The FAA's understanding of Mr. Pierson's comments is that he is
referring to the two accidents that led to the grounding and
current redesign of the 737 MAX, and 13 Service Difficulty
Reports (SDR) received on the MAX aircraft. It is not unusual
for transport aircraft to have 13 SDRs in the stated reporting
time period. The FAA reviewed the SDRs raised by Mr. Pierson
and determined that none of them required an Airworthiness
Directive (AD) mandating corrective actions for the airplane.
Please provide this Committee with electronic copies of these 13
service difficulty reports and the analysis that concluded ADs were
unnecessary to address them.
Answer. See Attachment 1.
FY 22 Strategic Plan. During the Committee's hearing on November 3,
FAA released the ``AIR FY 22 Strategic Plan.'' The first paragraph of
the Plan states, ``AIR's FY22 strategic plan supports the efforts
outlined in the 2017 AIR Blueprint and 2018 Comprehensive Strategic
Plan.'' These documents, published before the Lion Air accident and the
enactment of ACSAA, envision a certification system that would rely
increasingly on industry's willingness to comply with airworthiness
standards to ``decrease transactional interactions in the certification
process.'' The FY22 plan makes no reference to AIR's responsibilities
to ensure compliance with standards and the new emphasis for direct
oversight of the certification process called for by Congress in the
ACSAA.
Question. Apart from your assurances that FAA takes implementation
of ACSAA seriously, how has FAA demonstrated its willingness to reverse
its policies of reliance on industry and its recognition that its
primary responsibility in the certification process is to issue a type
certificate only when ``the Administrator finds that the aircraft. .
.meets the regulations and minimum standards prescribed''?
Answer. The FAA is committed to improving the certification
process, including our oversight of functions delegated to aircraft
designers and manufacturers. The agency has undertaken a number of
initiatives to address this goal--some of which occurred prior to the
enactment of the ACSAA. As you noted, the FAA takes implementation of
the ACSAA very seriously. The Act includes over 100 unique
requirements, and we will ensure each is implemented. The agency has
made progress towards comprehensively implementing these requirements,
and, while the work to fully implement the Act is still in the early
stages, we are carrying it out with the urgency that it requires.
Furthermore, the FAA's approach to aircraft certification and
safety oversight has changed. The FAA's relationship with manufacturers
is evolving. The agency is prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and
working to focus that oversight on safety critical areas. The FAA is
delegating fewer responsibilities and demanding more transparency from
manufacturers, and evaluating key assumptions prior to delegating
functions in certain areas. While the FAA continues to value their
technical expertise, the agency is also committed to enforcing the
highest safety standards for regulated manufacturers.
2020 Safety Culture Survey. The Committee understands that on
November 3, 2021, FAA released the results of a 2020 safety culture
survey for its Policy and Innovation Division, which showed that high
percentages of personnel have little confidence in division leadership.
For example, 36.2 percent said the results of the survey would not be
used to make the agency a better place to work; 25.4 percent said their
talents were not used well in the workplace; and 17.9 percent said they
could not disclose suspected violations without fear of reprisal. In
addition, the top 3 ``Negative Results'' categories were #1 ``Senior
leaders generate high levels of motivation;'' #2 ``How satisfied are
you with information you receive from management on what's going on in
your organization;'' and #3 ``I have a high level of respect for my
organization's senior leaders.'' The results of the survey indicate
that personnel in this division, which are some of the most senior
engineers in AIR, are generally dissatisfied with their leadership.
Question. To what do you attribute these poor results? What will
FAA do to address these results? Do these corrective actions including
personnel changes, if necessary? Please provide the Committee with the
results of this survey.
Answer. The Aviation Safety (AVS) organization promotes just safety
culture. The Voluntary Safety Reporting Program (VSRP) Matrix Team--
comprised of management and union representatives--recommended a safety
culture survey to establish a baseline for the VSRP. While the results
of this survey showed a number of areas for improvement, the survey
found that the AVS workforce is passionate and committed to safety. The
workforce supported a voluntary safety reporting system as long as they
can raise concerns without fear of retribution. Launched in April 2021,
the AVS VSRP meets this standard and is consistent with successful,
well-established programs in industry and within the agency. AVS will
continue to strengthen the program and employee awareness of the VSRP.
The FAA is actively executing the search for the next Associate
Administrator for Aviation Safety. This individual will be responsible
for building upon efforts to improve our safety culture and break down
perceived barriers identified by the survey.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Hon. Steve Dickson
Funding for Air Traffic Control in the Infrastructure Investment
and Jobs Act (IIJA). In June, I chaired a hearing in my Aviation
Safety, Operations, and Innovation subcommittee where we heard from air
traffic controllers who shared stories about working long shifts in
aging air traffic control towers. For example, at Falcon Field's air
traffic control tower in Mesa, the roof lifts off the tower when the
wind blows above twenty miles per hour. Arizonans rely on air traffic
controllers to keep the skies safe, and air traffic controllers should
be able to focus on their jobs and not worry about the safety
conditions of their workplace.
Question. How will the five billion dollars for air traffic control
facilities in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act help air
traffic controllers do their jobs more effectively and improve the
safety of our Nation's airspace?
Answer. The FAA's National Air Space (NAS) Facilities physical
plant infrastructure is comprised of 21 air route traffic control
centers (ARTCCs), 4 combined control facilities (CCFs), and 10
Enterprise Facilities. There are also 348 FAA-maintained terminal air
traffic control towers and terminal radar approach control facilities
that include 104 federally owned contract towers. In addition, the FAA
has approximately 12,000 unstaffed facilities that house navigation,
communication, surveillance, and weather systems.
The five billion dollars for air traffic control facilities in the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act will help air traffic
controllers do their jobs more effectively and improve the safety of
our Nation's airspace by replacing aged Airport Traffic Control Towers
(ATCTs) and reducing the operational risk associated with the backlog
of physical plant infrastructure components that are beyond their
service life.
Approximately 50 percent of the funding will be allocated to
replacing FAA-owned ATCTs that are over 40 years old at regional and
municipal airports that the FAA typically cannot sustain with normal
appropriations. These new towers will have improved work areas that
address human factors needs such as space, line of sight for Air
Traffic Controllers, and provide a suite of new equipment to improve
the reliability and safety of operations.
The remaining balance of funding will be used to reduce the
operational risk associated with infrastructure backlog. This funding
will be used to replace and improve long past end of life building
components such as power and Heating Ventilating and Control (HVAC)
systems, roofs, etc. across the NAS that can affect airline operations
when they fail. In addition, the FAA is planning to replace a
significant number of remote facilities across the National Airspace
System (NAS). Building system failures at these facilities can also
affect operations and replacing them will improve the safety of the
NAS.
Oversight and Distribution of FAA Funding in IIJA. As I discussed
at the hearing, the bipartisan infrastructure bill includes significant
investments in our Nation's aviation sector. To see the maximum benefit
from our investments, we need to be sure that the FAA is ready to
distribute the funding and also provide the appropriate oversight to
ensure the funding is used appropriately.
Question. Can you describe FAA's preparations to ensure the IIJA
funding will be distributed appropriately and to ensure effective
oversight of the funding?
Answer. The FAA has established strict accounting protocols for the
receipt, accounting set up, and distribution and execution of the IIJA
funding. The FAA has established a defined budget structure with budget
line item detail that is unique to the IIJA funding as well as unique
capital investment plan numbers. These unique numbers have been entered
into the FAA accounting and work plan management systems and those
codes will allow the work to be tracked both nationally and at the
individual project site level.
The FAA has established a series of business rules that are unique
to the handling of IIJA funding and include practices that prohibit the
mixing of IIJA funding with core appropriation funding on any
procurement documents. The FAA also has an established process for
tracking the progress and completion of work at individual sites around
the U.S. through Job Control Numbers (JCNs). The JCN identifier allows
all of the financial data for an individual project to be easily
collected and reviewed at the national level. The JCNs also allow
tracking the scheduled work plan for individual projects and measures
progress toward completion of the project.
FAA has established weekly working group meetings that are used to
collaborate between the different offices that will be responsible for
the execution of the IIJA funding. These meetings cover the up-front
work that needs to be accomplished in preparation for a contract award
through the final deployment of a program. Risks and concerns are
presented and discussed among the working groups and they are also
beginning to collaborate on project work locations to allow for targets
of opportunity across the FAA and across appropriations. These targets
of opportunity will allow FAA to work in an efficient manner by
integrating work at a local level among the involved organizations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. Steve Dickson
FAA Technical Workforce. Following the two tragic airplane crashes
of a Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft in Indonesia and Ethiopia that took 346
lives--including Mucaad Hussein Abdalla from St. Cloud, Minnesota--we
worked to pass the bipartisan Aircraft Safety and Certification Reform
Act of 2020 (ACSAA). The bill incorporates critical aviation safety
reforms, including requiring manufacturers to adopt an internal set of
safety controls and employee reporting mechanisms known as safety
management systems (SMS).
Question. In your testimony, you note that the FAA is hiring
technical advisors with the expertise to make critical safety
decisions. How is the FAA recruiting and retaining talent with the
necessary technical expertise to conduct this oversight?
Answer. While the technical skills the FAA needs to respond to
evolving technology and innovation exist within a very competitive
market, the FAA continues to use all tools at its disposal to recruit
and retain workers with the right skills to support its safety mission.
The agency uses personnel authorities including direct hire authority,
competitive pay, relocation incentives, and recruitment incentives to
recruit and retain staff with the necessary technical skills,
especially for critical areas. This includes talent for the Chief
Scientist Technical Advisors, Senior Technical Specialists, and other
candidates with expertise in fields such as cybersecurity, systems
safety engineering, software engineering, manufacturing and industrial
engineering, data analytics and science, artificial intelligence,
human-machine interface, systems engineering, and international
aviation safety standards, to name a few. While the state of the
aviation workforce has changed as a result of the pandemic, and will
likely continue to evolve as the system progresses back to normalcy,
the FAA will continue to evaluate applicant pools for the various areas
of need and adjust tactics as needed to meet staffing and technical
skills targets.
FAA NextGen Program. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Reauthorization Act of 2018 included a provision that would provide the
FAA with the tools it needs to effectively implement the NextGen
program--the FAA-led modernization of the air traffic control system--
with improved technologies, including satellites, virtual maps, up-to-
date weather reports, and other real-time information to help pilots
navigate more safely and efficiently.
Question. In your testimony, you highlight innovation in aviation
and the use of new technologies to enhance safety and efficiency. Can
you speak to how new technologies will be tested by the FAA to ensure
safety?
Answer. As I mentioned in my written statement, the FAA recently
established and staffed the Center for Emerging Concepts and
Innovation. The Center will facilitate the safe introduction and
certification of new aircraft and technologies by providing pre-
application engagement with companies to identify a preliminary path to
compliance with regulatory standards. We are also taking steps to
foster enhanced coordination across the FAA on emerging products and
concepts.
Contract Tower Program. Investing in our Nation's infrastructure
and making sure we have the safest skies from airport to airport, both
large and small, includes continued investment in the FAA's contract
tower program, which provides critical air traffic control safety
benefits to 256 smaller airports across the country, including St.
Cloud and Anoka County airports in Minnesota.
Question. What can Congress do to ensure that contract tower
airports have the updated infrastructure and facilities they need to
accommodate rising air traffic levels?
Answer. The FAA Contract Tower program supports small airports
across the country and is an important part of maintaining safety in
the NAS. Congress recently recognized some of the infrastructure needs
of this program through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
(IIJA) by providing a minimum of $20 million annually for the next five
years for competitive grants to address contract tower construction,
rehabilitation, and modernization. This funding is in addition to
annual appropriations for the program. The FAA welcomes this added
funding and we look forward to working with Congress to address issues
that affect the program such as funding for existing facilities and new
entrants and identifying modernization strategies for infrastructure
and facility needs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
Hon. Steve Dickson
Preserving the ``1,500 Hour Rule.'' With the travel industry in a
post-pandemic upswing, some airlines are requesting that Congress and
the FAA reconsider pilot certification and qualification requirements
for air carrier operations. As required by Congress in the Airline
Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, the
1,500 Hour Rule requires pilots working to secure an Airline Transport
Pilot (ATP) certificate to obtain a total of 1,500 flight training
hours among other criteria. Some industry stakeholders are critical of
this important safety mechanism and suggest that pilots should receive
less training within a faster time-frame in order to meet corporate
objectives.
Question. As international travel bans are lifted and air travel
demand returns, is the FAA considering any plans to empower operators
to hire pilots with less training and experience by modifying
requirements of the 1,500 Hour Rule?
Answer. The FAA currently has no plans for creating any additional
pathways to an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate. The ``1,500
Hour Rule'' created pathways that allow for military pilots and pilots
with specific collegiate academic experience to receive an ATP
certificate with reduced aeronautical experience (i.e., less than 1,500
hours), but restricts their privileges to serving as a second in
command (i.e., first officer) for an airline only until the 1,500 hours
is achieved. See 14 CFR Sec. 61.160.
5G and Airline Safety. On November 2, 2021, FAA issued Special
Airworthiness Information Bulletin (AIR-21-18) alerting manufacturers,
operators and pilots that action might be required to address potential
interference with sensitive aircraft electronics caused by new 5G
telecommunications technology. I commend both FAA and FCC for recent
constructive conversations to address the aviation community's concerns
about potential harmful interference to radio altimeters. I also
commend the FCC's decision to delay deployment of ``C-band'' spectrum
for 5G purposes until January 2022, allowing for additional time for
interagency assessments of potential harmful impacts on aviation safety
technologies.
Question. Please describe in detail the FAA's to work with FCC to
address and mitigate potential harmful interference to aviation devices
related to C-band repurposing.
Answer. The FAA continues to have regular dialogue with the FCC on
the 5G radar altimeter issue. Over the last 6 months, FAA leadership
and engineers have worked with the FCC to determine process and
specific technical details in order to formulate mitigations to this
issue, which will then be communicated to wireless carriers. These
mitigations are meant to ensure aviation safety on and around airports
and heliports, as well as ensure viable 5G wireless network deployment.
The FAA and FCC meet (sometimes on a daily basis) to formulate
mitigations using known data sources, such as the RTCA report, to
determine 5G impacts to radar altimeters on the airport surface and for
approach and departure. These efforts have resulted in multiple
proposals, which continue to be negotiated, to ensure safe aircraft
operations.
Out of Practice Airline Pilot Errors. The Bureau of Transportation
Statistics reports airline travel is up 162 percent compared to last
year. As travel restrictions ease and air travel continues to return to
pre-pandemic levels, mid-air mistakes are mounting, according to the
FAA's confidential Aviation Safety Reporting System. These reports
highlight increased pilot errors that are attributable to a reduction
in flight hours during the COVID-19 pandemic. Aviation experts
recognize that pilot skills and proficiency can atrophy when they are
inactive for an extended period of time.
Question. How has data from the FAA's Aviation Safety Reporting
System informed pilot training requirements over the past 12 months?
Answer. The FAA uses the data from the Aviation Safety Reporting
System and other available databases to examine trends and identify
risks. The training requirements are contained in regulations, which
have not changed over the past 12 months. In the early stages of the
COVID pandemic, the FAA issued exemptions to some of the training
requirements and allowed pilots to extend the periods between training
and checking events. Those exemptions have expired and all air carriers
have resumed training and checking in accordance with the regulations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ben Ray Lujan to
Hon. Steve Dickson
The FCC began the process of rulemaking and collecting comments on
5G rollout back in 2017. In February, after years of rulemaking and
technical coordination, the FCC finalized the C-band Auction.
The special airworthiness information bulletin issued by the FAA on
November 2nd on radio altimeter interference raises a variety of
concerns on the coordination process across Federal agencies. I was
glad to hear during the hearing that you are ``working very closely
with the FCC'' and with telecommunications stakeholders on this issue.
Question 1. What communication did the FAA have with the FCC on
potential interference on the C-Band prior to the special information
bulletin on interference with radio altimeters? What role did the NTIA
play in coordinating these efforts?
Answer. The FAA attempted to communicate with the FCC multiple
times before the SAIB publication.
The FAA transmitted a letter to NTIA, the FCC's spectrum
regulator, on September 30, 2019, urging NTIA to put FAA's
comments on the FCC record. These comments urged the FCC to
consider preliminary radar altimeter test data from AVSI before
making a final rulemaking decision. It appears that this letter
was not included on the FCC docket.
The FAA and DOT sent a second letter to NTIA on December 1,
2020, urging the agency to engage with the FCC to defer the C-
band auction until the FAA could conduct a comprehensive safety
risk assessment as a result of the findings in the RTCA report.
It is unclear if this correspondence was communicated to the
FCC.
After the C-band spectrum auction, the FAA did not
communicate with the FCC until April 8, 2021, after a joint
meeting with committee staff (majority and minority), FAA,
NTIA, and FCC concerning these issues. FCC, NTIA, FAA, and the
RTCA report authors held two follow-up meetings (May 17 and
June 15) for a technical discussion of the RTCA report.
On August 12, 2021, the FAA informed the FCC that it would
send a letter to the Commission notifying them of operational
restrictions to protect radar altimeters from 5G C-band
interference in the absence of FCC mitigating actions and
information from the wireless community. By September 2021, the
three agencies (FAA, NTIA, FCC) started having regular (weekly,
sometimes daily) meetings to work out technical mitigations and
those meetings have continued to this day.
Question 2. Do you recommend Congress take steps to reform the
interagency coordination process with for spectrum management?
Answer. The FAA has longstanding relationships with its interagency
spectrum management partners. These relationships have helped to ensure
the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS). The FAA also
recognizes that the U.S. economy relies heavily on innovation and new
technology, which will enable advancements in the communications
sector.
Balancing the advancing technology needs of our Nation and the
safety of the NAS requires, now more than ever, constant
communications, interagency transparency, efficient use of spectrum
resources and a combined strategic approach to spectrum management by
the U.S. government. These, combined with thorough analysis and
engineering, will ensure the private and government sectors can reach
amenable solutions moving forward.
Question 3. What technical evidence formed the basis for the
November 2nd special information bulletin on radio altimeters?
Answer. SAIB AIR 21-18 was issued to address Risk of Potential
Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters.
As indicated in paragraph 395, Federal Communications Commission
Report and Order and Order of Proposed Modification in the matter of
Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz Band; GN Docket No. 18-122
\1\, the FCC indicated that the aviation industry is responsible for
ensuring protection of radio altimeters from interference associated
with 5G C-band emissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-22A1.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As identified in the public docket for the FCC report and the order
cited above, RTCA submitted a report identifying the potential for
significant safety risks associated with this matter. These concerns
were corroborated by communications from a wide-range of aviation
industry stakeholders in formal letters to the FAA, the FCC, and the
Department of Transportation. The FAA also engaged in individual
discussions with representatives from multiple radio altimeter and
aircraft manufacturers that corroborated an assessment of potential
risk of adverse effects.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
Hon. Steve Dickson
Question.. Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) can be used in numerous
new ways, including for leak inspection in oil and natural gas
operations. This new use of UAS helps can help reduce the emissions in
the oil and gas industry, but these operations can only be conducted
[beyond-line-of-site] pursuant to a waiver from the FAA. Given the
possibility the FAA may see an increase in waiver requests, is the
agency taking any steps to address potential bottlenecks and develop
ways to process waivers in a timely and efficient manner?
Answer. Several infrastructure companies in the railroad, electric,
oil and gas, and communications sectors currently use UAS to conduct
routine surveillance, inspection, and maintenance of their equipment.
While most of these operations are beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS),
applying current regulations to these operations is neither scalable,
nor economically viable in the mid-to long-term. However, limited
operations today will inform the regulatory updates needed to make them
routine in the coming years, which ultimately will result in better
performance-based, technology-agnostic rules. These types of operations
have been prevalent in the UAS community and the waiver requests have
been in place for years so the FAA is prepared to handle an increase in
requests.
Furthermore, the FAA announced a UAS BVLOS Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) on June 8, 2021. The UAS BVLOS ARC is co-chaired by the
FAA and industry partners and includes over 80 members of the aviation
community. The ARC is focused on taking a holistic approach and will
provide recommendations for a performance-based, technology-agnostic
regulatory framework to normalize safe, scalable, economically viable
BVLOS operations. The FAA intends to use the ARC's recommendations to
develop a proposed rule for BVLOS operations in the aviation regulatory
framework. The FAA will then move to translate the ARC's
recommendations into a rulemaking effort that transforms these ideas
into regulations, thus creating predictability and normalization for
the UAS industry to innovate toward.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Steve Dickson
Question 1. I believe that the centralization and expansion of the
Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) Office--created by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L.
115-254)--was crucial to improving the consistency of manufacturer
oversight nationwide, and I appreciate your continued efforts to
improve that office. Your testimony mentioned that FAA convened an
expert panel to review ODA designees and provide recommendations to the
agency for improvement.
Could you elaborate on the contents of this ODA review and the
timeline for its completion?
Answer. In response to section 213 of the 2018 FAA Reauthorization
Act (P.L. 115-254), the FAA convened a 20 member multidisciplinary
expert review panel knowledgeable in FAA certification processes and
procedures and the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA)
program. To address the requirements of section 213, the panel
conducted a survey of ODA Holders and program applicants to document
and assess FAA certification and oversight activities as they relate to
the ODA program. In addition to the survey task, the panel assessed the
ODA program and developed recommendations responsive to the
requirements of section 213. In December 2020, Congress passed the
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (P.L. 116-260).
Section 125 of this Act amended section 213 of the 2018 Reauthorization
Act to include additional tasks for the expert review panel. These new
tasks included an assessment of ODA Holders to identify and develop
best practices to address the prevention and deterrence of undue
pressure, to improve communications between the FAA and ODA staff, and
to ensure independence between the FAA and ODA Holder. The expert
review panel completed its assessment of these additional tasks and
drafted a report detailing its findings and recommendations as they
relate to the requirements of section 213 as amended by section 125.
The final report is expected by spring 2022.
Question 2. As you know, yesterday the FAA issued a Special
Airworthiness Information Bulletin regarding the planned deployment of
5G wireless networks in the 3.7-3.98 GHz bands, which recommended that
aircraft and altimeter manufacturers, operators, and pilots provide the
agency with information related to the potential effects of this
deployment on radio altimeters.
Can you describe the steps FAA is taking to work with both the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National
telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA) to assess and--if
needed--resolve this potential issue?
Answer. The FAA and the Department of Transportation continue to
advocate for open dialogue between the NEC, FCC, NTIA, and the aviation
and telecommunications industries. We continue to engage in regular
(sometimes daily) meetings with the FCC and we are committed to finding
a long-term solution that will enable aviation and 5G wireless to
operate to their fullest potential--safely. The FAA is in the process
of receiving and analyzing data from the wireless industry that we hope
will enable us to issue carefully tailored Notices to Air Missions
(NOTAMs). We are also engaging with operators to get their help in
identifying the capabilities of the radio altimeters in use in their
fleets so we can get an accurate picture of the likely impacts. The
more specific data we all have, the better we will be able to solve
this challenge. Longer term, we are committed to the process of
developing more robust avionics that can operate safely in close
proximity to the 5G spectrum and we will make it a priority to work
with the industry on a lasting solution.
Question 3. Earlier this year, the Director-General of the European
Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) made comments that appeared to
indicate that EASA intends to move away from the established practice
of relying on FAA for the certification of U.S. aircraft. While the
specific case of the 737 MAX was unique, this statement appeared to
apply to all U.S. aircraft, regardless of practices established under
the US-EU Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement.
If these comments became EASA policy moving forward, it would
violate the agreement and undermine the benefits of reciprocity in
certification between the two regulators. Has FAA or the Department of
Transportation sought clarification from EASA on this matter?
Answer. The United States and the European Union (EU) Safety
Agreement remains the framework for aviation safety cooperation between
the U.S. and the EU. The FAA-EASA Technical Implementation Procedures
(TIP) under the U.S.-EU Safety Agreement include provisions that allow
the validating authority to increase their level of involvements in
validation projects depending on factors such as the complexity of the
design. The FAA and EASA continue to follow the procedures established
under the TIP, and the FAA engages EASA regularly regarding validation
programs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to
Hon. Steve Dickson
Question 1. Administrator Dickson, the length of the process for
government agencies to issue rules is a topic that consistently
frustrates Congress. I have heard you discuss this in passing at
another hearing, but I think it would be helpful to hear you explain it
further. Why is it that FAA is consistently unable to issue rules that
meet that deadlines included in legislation? Are there staffing and
resources issues?
Answer. The FAA must comply with applicable provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act in promulgating all rules. Compliance with
the Act ensures the public is not subject to regulations without first
having the opportunity to review a proposed rule and comment on it.
In particular, the Act requires the FAA to develop proposed
requirements based on supporting safety data and analysis. Consistent
with Department of Transportation policy, which encourages its
operating administrations and components to conduct outreach and
provide robust opportunities for discussion with stakeholders during
the rulemaking process, the FAA seeks information from industry in a
variety of ways. Information gathering in compliance with the APA might
become time-consuming, but results in balanced rules that are poised to
withstand challenges.
Under Executive Order 12866 (Sept. 30, 1993), and successor
Executive Orders, the FAA must also determine whether the anticipated
benefits of a proposed rule would justify the costs. The FAA seeks cost
information from industry to assist the FAA in this determination.
Upon issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the public must have the opportunity to
submit comments to the FAA concerning the proposed rule. The FAA is
obligated to consider all comments and determine whether to make
changes to the proposed rule or revisit conclusions about the costs and
benefits of a proposed rule. The FAA must explain its conclusions,
based on the comments, in a final rule publication.
Question 2. I've heard you mention the process that is very often
dictated by Administrative Procedures Act. Can you discuss the
requirements under that law, and its impact on your ability to quickly
enact rules on issues like secondary barriers or flight attendant rest
requirements?
Answer. As indicated above, the Administrative Procedure Act
requires the FAA to publish a proposed rule and solicit comments on the
proposal prior to finalization and effectiveness. The Act provides only
limited exceptions to the requirement for publication: the FAA may
refrain from seeking comment only when doing so would be impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. In the absence of such
an exception, in order to issue a rule that imposes a requirement on
the public the FAA must solicit comments on a proposal that reflects
safety data or analysis and assesses the potential benefits and costs
of the rule.
Question 3. Administrator Dickson, the certification reform bill
came with many requirements and deadlines for your agency, along with
some additional resources. But do you have what you need to meet all
the requirements in the bill in a timely manner? For example, I know
you've increased your workforce around human factors issues, but is it
enough?
Answer. The FAA continues to use a variety of tools to recruit and
retain technical staff with the right skills to support human factors
issues, complete implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety,
and Accountability Act (ACSAA), and support its safety mission. The
agency continues to use personnel authorities/hiring flexibilities,
including direct hire authority, competitive pay, relocation
incentives, and recruitment incentives to recruit and retain technical
staff. We have focused on including Chief Scientist & Technical
Advisors, Senior Technical Specialists, and other candidates with
expertise in fields such as cybersecurity, systems safety engineering,
software engineering, manufacturing and industrial engineering, data
analytics and science, artificial intelligence, human-machine
interface, systems engineering, and international aviation safety
standards. While the state of the aviation workforce changed as a
result of the pandemic, and will continue to evolve as the system
returns to normal, the FAA continues to evaluate applicant pools for
the various areas of need and adjust tactics as needed to meet
staffing/technical specialty targets.
Question 4. It was important for Congress to make needed changes to
the aviation certification system, but while we're doing that I want to
ensure that as those changes are being made we're not going to
hamstring U.S. industry and their ability to compete with foreign
competitors by bringing safer and more efficient products into the
global marketplace. Is the FAA able to certify the safety and
compliance of new products without causing undue or needless delays in
the certification process?
Answer. The FAA continues to implement the ACSAA. While some of its
provisions include new requirements on the FAA and industry, we are
working to leverage current efforts to effectively and efficiently
implement the bill without undue disruption to certification and safety
oversight efforts. Further, we are working with our international
partners toward a harmonized approach to facilitate the global
acceptance of aviation products. Harmonization is key to ensure an even
playing field for the U.S. aviation industry.
Question 5. Administrator Dickson, the certification reform bill
contains language to enable the FAA to provide increased assistance to
foreign regulators, and to work through the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop requirements at the
international level on pilot training, operational standards, and human
factors.
Please describe the FAA's efforts to date in this area, as well as
your plans for future engagement and the benefits to the global air
travel system that we can expect to see as a result.
Answer. After years of work, the Air Navigation Commission (ANC)
voted to establish the Personnel Training and Licensing Panel (PTLP) in
June 2020, and the virtual kickoff meeting was in February 2021.
Over the course of several years, the PTLP will review and develop
personnel training and licensing requirements across technical
disciplines (e.g., pilot, mechanic, air traffic control). The panel
will also develop ICAO provisions related to aviation personnel
training and licensing, including studies to ensure that proposed
amendments to the applicable provisions reflect current and emerging
requirements, improvements in training tools and technologies, and new
training methodologies while reviewing automation dependency and
possible mitigations. The development of new or revised standards,
combined with new internationally recognized guidance material, will
improve pilot training and performance globally. An FAA team of 20
professionals supports this ICAO work and holds several lead roles in
advancing the work program of this panel.
The PTLP U.S.-led Working Group is tasked with determining the
scope of automation dependency globally and to provide recommendations
for addressing this challenge. This working group meets monthly and
anticipates completing its study report by December 2022.
While this work takes place on the international stage, the FAA
continues to work on publishing guidance for training program
development and operational policies and practices for U.S. operators.
In the coming months, the FAA will publish the draft of a new Advisory
Circular (AC) for Flight Path Management (FPM) for public comment,
which continues to build on recent information and guidance about stall
prevention, upset prevention, manual flight operations, and pilot
monitoring responsibilities. FPM is the planning, execution, and
assurance of the guidance and control of aircraft trajectory and
energy. While the guidelines in this new AC are not mandatory, they are
derived from extensive FAA and industry study of accidents and
incidents where ineffective FPM was either causal or contributory, and
are intended to help operators comply with applicable regulations to
prevent similar events in the future. This guidance will allow the FAA,
separate from the ICAO panel work, to engage with other regulators and
share the information more broadly.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Hon. Steve Dickson
Question 1. I am pleased to hear about the progress the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) has already made in implementing the
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA). Even
though the FAA's work is in the early stages, I am encouraged by the
diligence already being undertaken by the FAA. In your conversations
with industry, have they provided constructive feedback on the FAA's
rulemakings?
Answer. Generally, our external stakeholders have expressed support
for the goals of the ACSAA and the FAA's efforts to raise the level of
safety by implementing system safety management principles across all
segments of the aviation industry.
Question 2. Has the FAA heard of any issues or concerns from the
design and manufacturing organizations?
Answer. The most significant issues raised by design and
manufacturing organizations involve the scalability of SMS for
organizations of different sizes. Affected companies will have an
opportunity to comment on the rulemaking.
Question 3. In your testimony, you mentioned that four design and
manufacturing organizations have already voluntarily adopted safety
management systems (SMS) and six others are in the process of adopting
them. Does the FAA anticipate most design and manufacturing
organizations adopting SMS regulations?
Answer. The FAA continues to promote the voluntary SMS program and
while the agency anticipates participation in the voluntary program
will grow, the pending SMS rulemaking would require SMS for design and
manufacturing organizations.
Question 4. In your testimony, you mention that even before the
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act (ACSAA) the FAA had already started evolving your
relationship with manufacturers. Could you elaborate on the increased
transparency the FAA has requested from manufactures?
Answer. The agency is prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and
focusing on safety critical areas. The FAA delegates fewer
responsibilities and demands more transparency from manufacturers. In
the case of Boeing, the FAA leverages Boeing's Voluntary SMS program to
increase access to Boeing's performance regarding root cause problem
solving and safety risk management assessments. These situations allow
direct insight regarding Boeing's SMS implementation, and the FAA can
provide feedback on where further changes are necessary for the SMS to
have greater impact.
Question 5. As you noted in your testimony, the FAA has already
begun hiring additional staff, does the agency anticipate having the
staff necessary to implement the Act by FY22?
Answer. The FAA continues to use a variety of tools to recruit and
retain technical staff with the right skills to support human factors
issues, complete implementation of the ACSAA, and support its safety
mission. The agency continues to use personnel authorities/hiring
flexibilities, including direct hire authority, competitive pay,
relocation incentives, and recruitment incentives to recruit and retain
technical staff. We have focused on including Chief Scientist &
Technical Advisors, Senior Technical Specialists, and other candidates
with expertise in fields such as cybersecurity, systems safety
engineering, software engineering, manufacturing and industrial
engineering, data analytics and science, artificial intelligence,
human-machine interface, systems engineering, and international
aviation safety standards. While the state of the aviation workforce
changed as a result of the pandemic, and will continue to evolve as the
system returns to normal, the FAA continues to evaluate applicant pools
for the various areas of need and adjust tactics as needed to meet
staffing/technical specialty targets.
Question 6. How has the relationship between the FAA and
manufacturers changed?
Answer. The agency is prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and
focusing on safety critical areas. The FAA delegates fewer
responsibilities and demands more transparency from manufacturers, and
evaluates key assumptions prior to delegating functions in certain
areas.
While the FAA continues to value the manufacturers' technical
expertise, the agency is committed to enforcing the highest safety
standards for regulated manufacturers.
Question 7. I joined Chairwoman Cantwell along with Senators Moran
and Klobuchar on introducing the Foreign Civil Aviation Authority
Assistance Act which was included as a part of the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA). I am encouraged
by the progress the FAA has made and the FAA's close collaboration with
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to improve pilot
training. Could you describe the FAA's efforts to date in this effort
as well as your plans for future engagement and how this will benefit
global air travel?
Answer. After years of work, the Air Navigation Commission (ANC)
voted to establish the Personnel Training and Licensing Panel (PTLP) in
June 2020, and the virtual kickoff meeting was in February 2021.
Over the course of several years, the PTLP will review and develop
personnel training and licensing requirements across technical
disciplines (e.g., pilot, mechanic, air traffic control). The panel
will also develop ICAO provisions related to aviation personnel
training and licensing, including studies to ensure that proposed
amendments to the applicable provisions reflect current and emerging
requirements, improvements in training tools and technologies, and new
training methodologies while reviewing automation dependency and
possible mitigations. The development of new or revised standards,
combined with new internationally recognized guidance material, will
improve pilot training and performance globally. An FAA team of 20
professionals supports this ICAO work and holds several lead roles in
advancing the work program of this panel.
The PTLP U.S.-led Working Group is tasked with determining the
scope of automation dependency globally and to provide recommendations
for addressing this challenge. This working group meets monthly and
anticipates completing its study report by December 2022.
While this work takes place on the international stage, the FAA
continues to work on publishing guidance for training program
development and operational policies and practices for U.S. operators.
In the coming months, the FAA will publish the draft of a new Advisory
Circular (AC) for Flight Path Management (FPM) for public comment,
which continues to build on recent information and guidance about stall
prevention, upset prevention, manual flight operations, and pilot
monitoring responsibilities. FPM is the planning, execution, and
assurance of the guidance and control of aircraft trajectory and
energy. While the guidelines in this new AC are not mandatory, they are
derived from extensive FAA and industry study of accidents and
incidents where ineffective FPM was either causal or contributory, and
are intended to help operators comply with applicable regulations to
prevent similar events in the future. This guidance will allow the FAA,
separate from the ICAO panel work, to engage with other regulators and
share the information more broadly.
Question 8. I have raised the concern of the increased usage of
automation in the cockpit and pilot training previously. I certainly
believe that automation can and has improved aviation safety, but I
believe that it is imperative to ensure pilots are properly trained on
how to interact with these systems. I appreciate that you address this
in your testimony and that the FAA has several initiatives in order to
ensure human factors are incorporated into aviation safety policy and
oversight. What are the oversight changes being considered at the FAA
to ensure pilots become more proficient in managing safety systems?
Answer. The FAA continues to work on publishing guidance for
training program development and operational policies and practices for
U.S. operators. In the coming months, the FAA expects to publish the
draft of a new Advisory Circular (AC) for Flight Path Management (FPM)
for public comment, which continues to build on recent information and
guidance about stall prevention, upset prevention, manual flight
operations, and pilot monitoring responsibilities. FPM is the planning,
execution, and assurance of the guidance and control of aircraft
trajectory and energy. While the guidelines in this new AC are not
mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry study of
accidents and incidents where ineffective FPM was either causal or
contributory, and are intended to help operators comply with applicable
regulations to prevent similar events in the future.
The initial FPM AC will target operations and training for manual
flight operations, managing automated systems, pilot monitoring, and
energy management.
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Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Marsha Blackburn to
Hon. Steve Dickson
Question 1. If terrestrial broadband services in the C-Band
presents the potential for harmful interference to radar altimeters
such that the FAA would issue a safety bulletin, why aren't you
concerned about U.S. air carriers flying routes in countries where such
operations co-exist today?
How about U.S. passengers flying on European air carriers in those
specified areas?
Answer. The radio altimeter is an important aircraft instrument,
and its intended function is to provide direct height-above-terrain/
water information to a variety of aircraft systems.
Commercial aviation radio altimeters operate in the 4.2-4.4 GHz
band, which is separated by 220 megahertz from the C-Band
telecommunication systems in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. These transmitters
are expected to emit significantly stronger signals than those used in
other countries, which would heighten the likelihood of interference
with sensitive aircraft electronics.
Question 2. In the hearing, you mentioned the importance of the UAS
Integration Pilot Program. Can you please bring me up to date on the
latest initiatives FAA has spearheaded under this program?
Answer. The UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP) was established by
a presidential memorandum on Oct. 25, 2017. The program concluded on
Oct. 25, 2020. The IPP accomplished a significant amount of work to
support integration of UAS into the national airspace system (NAS).
Many integration challenges remained after the program concluded,
including a need for technological standards and a more robust
regulatory framework.
BEYOND began on Oct. 26, 2020, to continue the IPP mission. The
program focuses on operating under established rules rather than
waivers, collecting data to develop performance-based standards,
collecting and addressing community feedback, understanding the
societal and community benefits, and streamlining the approval
processes for UAS integration. BEYOND would enable beyond visual line-
of-sight (BVLOS) operations without visual observers that are
repeatable, scalable, and economically viable across rural, suburban,
and urban environments. Specific emphasis will be placed on
infrastructure inspection, public aircraft operations, and small
package delivery, along with analyzing and quantifying the societal and
economic benefits of UAS operations, and ensuring robust engagement
with communities. Since the beginning of the program in October 2020
through October 2021, the participants have logged more than 5,900
flights beyond the visual line-of-sight of the pilot-in-command to
complete package deliveries and infrastructure inspections.
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