[Senate Hearing 117-816]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                        S. Hrg. 117-816

                      INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION
    AND COMPETITION IN SPACE: OVERSIGHT OF NASA'S ROLES AND PROGRAMS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND SCIENCE

                                 of the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________


                            OCTOBER 21, 2021

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation





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                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov


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                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

54-586 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023












       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                   MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Ranking
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 ROY BLUNT, Missouri
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         TED CRUZ, Texas
GARY PETERS, Michigan                DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana                  MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  MIKE LEE, Utah
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado          SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West 
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia                 Virginia
                                     RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming

                 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
       George Greenwell, Policy Coordinator and Security Manager
                 John Keast, Republican Staff Director
            Crystal Tully, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel

                                 ------                                

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND SCIENCE

JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado, Chair   CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming, Ranking
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      TED CRUZ, Texas
GARY PETERS, Michigan                DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona,             TODD YOUNG, Indiana
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            MIKE LEE, Utah
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia             RICK SCOTT, Florida
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         JERRY MORAN, Kansas









                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on October 21, 2021.................................     1
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................     1
    Article dated June 2021 from Space News entitled, ``Mind the 
      Gap in Low Earth Orbit'' by Mike Gold......................    21
Statement of Senator Lummis......................................     2
Statement of Senator Wicker......................................     4
Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    38
Statement of Senator Lujan.......................................    48
Statement of Senator Blumenthal..................................    50
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................    57

                               Witnesses

Hon. Jim Bridenstine, Former NASA Administrator..................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     7
Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar, Executive Vice President for Government 
  Affairs, Axiom Space...........................................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    12
Mike Gold, Executive Vice President for Civil Space and External 
  Affairs, Redwire Space.........................................    25
    Prepared statement...........................................    27
Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, 
  National Aeronautics and Space Administration..................    33
    Prepared statement...........................................    34

                                Appendix

Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar 
  by:
    Hon. Kyrsten Sinema..........................................    63
    Hon. Raphael Warnock.........................................    66
Response to written questions submitted to Mike Gold by:
    Hon. Kyrsten Sinema..........................................    67
    Hon. Raphael Warnock.........................................    69
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Patricia Sanders 
  by:
    Hon. Kyrsten Sinema..........................................    69
    Hon. Raphael Warnock.........................................    71
    Hon. Shelley Moore Capito....................................    71









 
                      INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION
    AND COMPETITION IN SPACE: OVERSIGHT OF NASA'S ROLES AND PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2021

                               U.S. Senate,
                 Subcommittee on Space and Science,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06a.m., in 
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John 
Hickenlooper, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Hickenlooper [presiding], Cantwell, 
Blumenthal, Lujan, Lummis, Wicker, Cruz, and Moran.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

    Senator Hickenlooper. The Subcommittee on Space and Science 
will come to order. Today marks this subcommittee's second 
hearing examining this, today, U.S. leadership in space. Timely 
and critical discussion--really timely and critical discussion, 
following recent launch of advanced Chinese aircraft.
    We all recognize that NASA is a key agency for a number of 
programs, but especially important to civil and commercial 
space sector, enabling us to manage our international 
relationships in space. Congress last authorized a NASA 
authorization bill in 2017. We are absolutely thrilled that 
President Biden has confided in Senator Nelson and designated 
him to lead NASA, as the administrator. Together, hopefully in 
close cooperation, we can accomplish national goals within 
this, what we call, the last frontier.
    Dating back into the Cold War, space competition was 
primarily between Americans and Soviets. Today, 40 nations have 
a space agency of some sort. Competition also exists between 
commercial space companies from a number of different nations.
    The hearing today will examine several critical issues 
facing domain. One, how do we ensure the Artemis program 
remains competitive, on budget, on schedule, so that lunar 
landings can become a future reality that we can schedule with 
confidence? Are we going to be able to have spaceships--or 
space suits developed in time? The Artemis program is crucial 
to maintaining, what I think of as, the international 
confidence in America's ability to leader--to be a leader in 
space.
    The next question, is how do we ensure NASA's long-term 
continuity of purpose, make sure that it is supported with 
sufficient appropriations by Congress, and can transcend 
Presidential administrations, so that we can get to secure 
funding that, not just this country, but the world will 
recognize as continuity?
    Another question we will address is, is the U.S. future in 
low Earth orbit after the International Space Station, the ISS? 
The annual costs, now, is approaching almost $4 billion 
annually, just in operations. There are another commercial 
outposts under development, but there are still questions about 
how this will all shake out.
    We are also going to look at how Space Traffic Management, 
STM, impacts U.S. missions in LEO, low Earth orbit. How do we 
mitigate orbital debris to make sure that we have 
sustainability in our commercial space industry? This 
subcommittee is going to have to develop new legislation to--to 
actively remediate some of the debris that is already up there. 
Which brings the questions, again, of how does space 
exploration and research get accomplished? How do we bring 
nations together in common purpose? How do we strengthen 
science, accelerate innovation and discovery?
    Senate passed NASA reauthorization in the bipartisan U.S. 
Innovation and Competition Act, USICA--although I still prefer 
the Endless Frontier Act.
    Senator Wicker. Here, here.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Hickenlooper. The Space and Science Committee will 
continue developing upcoming legislation to support NASA 
missions and make sure that we find that continuity of funding. 
I am delighted to welcome the panel. The Honorable Jim 
Bridenstine, former NASA Administrator under the Trump 
administration, former U.S. Representative from Oklahoma.
    Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar, from the Coalition for Deep Space 
Exploration. Someday I want to be associated with a coalition 
for deep space exploration. She served as Senior Policy Advisor 
for the ISS National Laboratory.
    Mr. Mike Gold, of Redwire Space, former Associate 
Administrator for Space Policy and Partnerships at NASA.
    And Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair of the NASA Aerospace 
Safety Advisory Panel, former Executive Director of Missile 
Defense Agency.
    I want to thank each of you for taking the time out of your 
busy schedules to join us here. I want to make sure that the 
conversation we have takes advantage of all of your diverse 
experiences and perspectives. I'm looking forward to the 
conversation.
    Now, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Lummis for her 
opening comments.

               STATEMENT OF HON. CYNTHIA LUMMIS, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING

    Senator Lummis. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is so 
nice that we finally get to do this hearing. We were hoping to 
do it in Colorado Springs in August, and it would have been so 
nice to be in your beautiful state, then. But I am so delighted 
that we are getting to do this now. This is such a 
distinguished panel of witnesses and there is so much to learn 
for policymakers, and we rely so heavily on you to brief us, 
guide us, and support our efforts to support our space mission. 
So, thank you so much. I am so glad you got over your COVID and 
we are all back together again.
    This group of panelists is so exceptional. So, thank you 
for your flexibility in working with us through the change and 
your willingness to be here today to speak with us. Your 
expertise is something we just welcome. So, very, very nice to 
have you here today and finally get to do this.
    NASA has a long history of working with international 
partners and, of course, that is by design. The legislation 
that created NASA called for it to pursue cooperation with 
other nations and groups of nations. Our international 
partnerships have grown since NASA's creation and the success 
of the International Space Station speaks to the ways in which 
cooperation in space has strengthened our relationships on 
Earth. In fact, the first time I got to go to Russia--to 
Moscow, it was for the purpose of meeting with U.S. astronauts 
and Russian astronauts, who were there working together in 
Russia. Even in times of tension on Earth, American and Russian 
astronauts were able to work together at the International 
Space Station.
    Now, five space agencies are part of the ISS project. The 
ISS will soon reach the end of its life span, but it cannot 
mark the end of our partnership. New opportunities and 
challenges await us, as we step in the era of the Artemis 
program and the Lunar gateway and eventually, human exploration 
of Mars.
    While we embark on new adventures, we, along with every 
other spacefaring nation, must use them as opportunities to 
manage the challenge of space debris. We must work together to 
ensure we both remove orbital debris, and design equipment and 
policies to help cut back on the potential for orbital debris. 
I am encouraged by efforts in the private sector to step up and 
help with this problem, and I intend to work with my colleagues 
on solutions at the Congressional level to help tackle the 
issue.
    There are other challenges, as well. Space is not only an 
area for collaboration. Competition in space looms large and we 
must work to avoid a cold war-style Space Race. Unfortunately, 
it seems some countries are less committed to this than others. 
Some nations do not seem interested in differentiating between 
military and civilian space operations. This week, we heard 
reports that over the summer, China launched a hypersonic glide 
vehicle that circled the Earth in low orbit and reentered the 
atmosphere. China's labeling this test of a nuclear capable 
weapon a ``routine test of a space vehicle'' underlines their 
unwillingness to separate military and civilian activities in 
space.
    I suspect this trend will continue and it will become 
increasingly more difficult for the U.S. to view advancements 
made in space by China as anything other than a threat to our 
security. To that end, the United States must continue to 
pursue policies that make it the preferred partner for all 
other spacefaring nations and help to set norms that promote 
access, the sharing of scientific advancement, and neighborly 
attitudes toward other countries' assets in space.
    So, I am very much looking forward to this hearing and 
learning from our distinguished panelists about these issues. I 
am sure we are going to learn so much today that I cannot wait 
to hear what you have to say. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 
back.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Ranking Member Lummis. 
Appreciate having Wyoming and Colorado run this committee. You 
have been a great partner and continue to be a great partner.
    Now, I will recognize Ranking Member Wicker for his opening 
comments.

                STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Lummis, I 
came down with COVID the same time as Senator Hickenlooper.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Wicker. I hope you are just as delighted that I got 
over it.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Wicker. I guess it just goes without saying. As a 
matter of fact, Senator Hickenlooper, I found out how, finally, 
to get on the first few minutes of NBC Nightly News and that is 
to have an Independent and a Republican and a Democrat all come 
down with COVID on the same day.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Wicker. This morning's hearing will address topics 
related to international cooperation and competition in outer 
space. Decades of U.S. cooperation in space, with other 
nations, has enhanced America's leadership in science and 
technology, and strengthened ties with international partners. 
We want to continue that.
    NASA has been involved in thousands of cooperative 
activities with over 100 countries, including 20 years of 
sustained human presence aboard the International Space 
Station. Even during the height of the cold war, as Senator 
Lummis mentioned, space proved to be a rare area of cooperation 
between the U.S. and the USSR.
    Although space can bring nations together, the space domain 
has become increasingly competitive. Today, we are in a new 
space race with China. Beijing is seeking to secure both the 
lunar high ground, and low Earth orbit, LEO, to supersede the 
U.S. as the dominant space power. This year, China launched the 
first module of its space station and is eagerly soliciting 
international partners.
    Cooperative endeavors with other nations and the private 
sector will play a key role in helping America confront China's 
space challenge. NASA's Artemis deep space exploration program 
has already been critical in promoting U.S. leadership and 
cementing our alliances in space. Artemis will return 
astronauts to the surface of the moon and build----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Here, here.
    Senator Wicker. Cheers from the audience--and build a 
sustained presence there in preparation for future human 
exploration of Mars in this decade.
    Rather than going it alone, the Artemis program envisions 
major contributions from international partners such as Canada, 
European nations, and Japan. In addition to relying on other 
nations, Artemis will also employ unique capabilities offered 
by commercial space companies for key aspects of its mission.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on both 
the opportunities and the challenges NASA faces in competing 
against China, as well as carrying out the international 
commercial partnerships for Artemis, the International Space 
Station, and other programs.
    NASA needs clear Congressional reauthorization and 
direction to keep Artemis on track and support other 
cooperative efforts. And I am delighted to report to you all 
that this is a priority of the Chair of the Full Committee, and 
I appreciate her efforts in this regard. The Committee's NASA 
Authorization Act, which passed as part of the Endless Frontier 
Act, includes many provisions to accomplish those goals. I am 
proud to have worked with Senator Cantwell and others on the 
NASA bill. I hope my colleagues in the House will work with us. 
Let us find a space vehicle to attach that NASA bill to and get 
it signed into law, at this pivotal time.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you very much, Senator. We will 
have to find a space vehicle for the attachment.
    Now, we can hear from out witnesses with their opening 
statements. I think we can start with the Honorable Jim 
Bridenstine.

              STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BRIDENSTINE, 
                   FORMER NASA ADMINISTRATOR

    Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Chairman Hickenlooper, Ranking 
Member Lummis, Ranking Member Wicker, and Senator Moran. It is 
great to be back in Washington, DC, testifying before this 
committee.
    I want to thank this committee for the strong, apolitical, 
bipartisan support that this committee has shown to NASA and 
its agenda. I think that is critically important for a lot of 
reasons. When you are doing projects that take multiple decades 
in nature, we have to have continuity of purpose. Continuity of 
purpose requires Congress to engage, be involved, and support 
the efforts of NASA in an apolitical, bipartisan way. And when 
that happens--this is the most important thing. When that 
happens, we are able to achieve international cooperation in a 
way that is often very difficult.
    So, when you think about the history, you think about the 
vision for space exploration, the Constellation program, and 
the cancellation thereof. We think about the Space Exploration 
Initiative back in the 1990s and the cancellation thereof. When 
these things happen, it has--it has an effect on our 
international partners that is chilling. And they then choose, 
in many cases, not to partner with us and that is a problem.
    But what I will say is that, if you look back at 2017, we 
passed the NASA Transition Authorization Act in bipartisan way, 
House and Senate. It was signed by the President in 2017. And, 
of course, the current NASA Administrator, then senator, came 
to that event, in a bipartisan way to say, look, NASA needs to 
have continuity of purpose. So, passing an authorization bill, 
in my view, is critically important. We have to have that to 
demonstrate to the world that we have resolve, as a Nation, to 
accomplish these very impressive things and to stay ahead of 
our competitors. So, that is, I think, probably the highest 
order of priority, getting that authorization passed.
    Second thing I would like to say, and this is, I think, 
maybe even more important than the first, as when you think 
about the future, and that is the challenge of space debris. 
And Senator Hickenlooper, you nailed that right on the head. It 
is a big problem. And it is an even bigger problem when you 
think about the massive constellations that are being launched 
into low Earth orbit, even right now.
    So, we think about how the FCC licenses these 
constellations. They look at a constellation--let us pretend it 
is 15,000 satellites large. And they say, there is a certain 
percentage of those satellites that are going to not be able to 
maneuver and not be able to reenter. In other words, they 
become derelict. And they say--they apply a 1.5 percent chance 
for every satellite. So, if you launch 15,000 satellites that 
is 225 satellites that are derelict. And then, they say there 
is an aggregate collision risk for those 225 satellites, and 
they came up with a probability for a 15,000-satellite 
constellation that said there is a 1 in 44 chance of a 
collision in space. Here is the fundamental flaw with that. It 
only includes derelict satellites, which are 1.5 percent of the 
satellites. There is still a probability of collision for the 
other, you know, 98.5 percent of the thousands of 
constellations--satellites in that particular constellation. We 
do not know what that is. They have a maneuver capability--we 
do not know what that probability is.
    But let us say there is a collision that is going to happen 
that is a 1 in 10,000 chance of a collision and if you 
maneuver, that probability goes down to 1 in a million. That is 
fantastic. We love that. We do not know that that is the case 
and so, we are licensing satellites right now, not knowing--it 
is a known unknown, and yet, we are still licensing the 
constellations, which I think is not a good idea.
    But at the same time, here is what we do know. If it goes 
down to 1 in a million--which we do not know but let us 
pretend--and that eventuality happens 10 million times, that 
means there is going to be 10 collisions. So, if the 
probability goes down to 1 in a million and there are 10 
million maneuvers, then there are 10 collisions. This is a--
this is a mass--and by the way, I want to be clear. It goes 
beyond that. When we start talking about these constellations, 
we are only talking about satellites that we know that exist, 
and debris that we know that exists. For everything that we can 
track that is 10 centimeters or bigger, there are 10 to 100 
things that we cannot track, that are equally lethal.
    What I am saying is, that the challenge is much bigger than 
we know, but we know that we do not have any idea what that 
risk is. And yet, we are still launching these--and licensing 
these massive constellations without knowing what the risk 
really is. And I--I am telling you, it is much higher than what 
the FCC is currently predicting.
    I will also tell you, on the 1.5 percent derelict 
satellites, it is--that is a--that is not right. It is going to 
be higher than 1.5 percent that cannot reenter.
    Finally, I will say this. Just, I think it was, last night, 
somebody here can testify, Rwanda just filed for a 
constellation of 327,000 satellites into low Earth orbit. 
Recently, you had Spain file for a constellation that is 70,000 
satellites. And of course, right now, we have got Starlink, and 
Kuiper and we have got OneWeb. We have got the European Union; 
they want to have their constellation. China, Russia--they all 
have these massive constellations for low latency, high 
throughput communications which, by the way, I support. But we 
do not want to destroy space in order to achieve it, which is 
what I am concerned about. The challenge is that there are--
there are things that we absolutely know that we do not know, 
and we are still moving forward at a very rapid pace. And it is 
a very big concern, in my view. Orbital debris is number two.
    And I know that I am running out of time here quickly, but 
two other things that are important. I think it was mentioned 
by a number of senators, we have to have a replacement for the 
International Space Station. We love it. I know this committee 
passed an authorization bill out of the Senate that actually 
has it, no kidding, at, you know, going to 2030. That is a good 
thing. I would also tell you that there is no guarantee it is 
going to last that long and China just launched a brand-new 
space station. That is another big problem. We cannot cede--we 
do not know the value of microgravity at this point, but what 
we do know is that, if we do not--if we lose the ISS and do not 
have a replacement, we are going to be in trouble.
    Third thing, I think it is important to have two providers 
for the Human Landing System.
    And with that, I will yield back. Thank you, Senator.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Bridenstine follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Bridenstine, former NASA Administrator
    Chairman Hickenlooper, Ranking Member Lummis, and Distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee,

    It was my great pleasure to serve as the 13th Administrator of 
NASA. The men and women that serve our Nation at NASA are the best 
America has to offer. I would also like to commend the Biden 
Administration and specifically Administrator Bill Nelson for their 
commitment to NASA's continuity of purpose. NASA's projects are multi-
decadal and even multi-generational in nature. History has testified 
that whimsical shifts based on administration changes result in 
billions of dollars wasted and limited progress as our competitors and 
adversaries advance resolutely. Political leaders who care about 
exploration, science, discovery, and American leadership must 
constantly work to keep NASA outside of partisan political wrangling. I 
worked to that end every day and Administrator Bill Nelson has been 
working toward the same objective.
    There are three specific challenges facing NASA with which this 
committee can help:

  1.  Human exploration in low Earth orbit

  2.  Orbital debris mitigation

  3.  Redundancy in America's Moon lander
Low Earth Orbit
    It is absolutely critical that Congress fund America's replacement 
for the International Space Station (ISS), which has had humans onboard 
for over 20 years. The Chinese Space Station is on orbit, demonstrating 
great progress, and attracting international partners. Humanity is only 
at the beginning of understanding the immense economic, technological, 
and medicinal value of microgravity and America is at risk of ceding 
these capabilities to our greatest competitor. Congress must not let 
this happen.
    America's advantage is its capital markets that are funding 
commercial human habitation and the brilliant entrepreneurs that are 
putting that capital to work. While the future of human spaceflight in 
low Earth orbit (LEO) is commercial, the United States Government has 
an interest in ensuring the success and steering the direction of these 
capabilities. Congress needs to fund NASA's LEO commercialization 
efforts at $2 billion per year. This money should be used for 
development and demonstration of LEO habitation as well as establishing 
NASA and its partners as ongoing customers of commercial LEO 
habitation. If Congress does this, capital markets and entrepreneurs 
will respond in a way that establishes America as pre-eminent in LEO 
human spaceflight at a cost significantly less than the ISS.
    Once LEO commercialization is funded, Congress should require NASA 
to establish a date for the transition to new space stations with a 
plan to ensure there is no gap in American human spaceflight in low 
Earth orbit.
Space Debris Mitigation
    Satellite communications are advancing rapidly and will be 
transformative for humanity. New constellations in geostationary orbit 
(GEO) are breaking records for capacity and throughput, while 
drastically dropping the cost per megabit. Constellations being 
developed for low Earth orbit (LEO) could complement these systems by 
delivering low latency communications allowing for applications such as 
tele-robotics and video gaming. Global, hybrid networks (GEO and LEO) 
will soon deliver additional benefits to online education, 
telemedicine, mobile banking, and economic opportunity for people 
around the world waiting to connected.
    However, the U.S. government and governments around the world are 
failing to properly manage collision risk. If not remedied, the 
consequence will be losing access to space entirely, devastating not 
only satellite communications, but also human spaceflight, national 
security, weather prediction, disaster relief, climate science, and so 
much more.
    The challenge is that we are beginning an era of large, multi-
satellite constellations when FCC rules on debris mitigation apply on a 
satellite-by-satellite basis. Requiring a failure probability of less 
than 1/1000 over 5 years makes sense for a single satellite. However, 
if 40,000 satellites are launched into the same orbital shell, each 
with a probability of failure of 1/1000, there will be 40 failures on 
average. In short, the current requirement for low probability of 
failure becomes the inevitability of numerous failures.
    The problem becomes much worse when considering collisions. A study 
by the MITRE Corporation, commissioned by the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), suggests that it will not be feasible to operate some 
of the LEO systems being planned. That study predicts the effects of a 
LEO system that plans to include over 40,000 satellites at an altitude 
of about 600 kilometers.
    As shown in the following figure from that study, dramatic 
increases in space collisions, and new space debris, are expected 
within just a few years. In the longer term ``satellites are destroyed 
[by debris and collisions] faster than they are launched.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ G. Long, The Impacts of Large Constellations of Satellites, 
JASON--The MITRE Corporation, JSR-20-2H, November 2020, (Updated: 
January 21, 2021), at 97, available at https://www.nsf.gov/news/
special_reports/jasonreportconstellations/JSR-20-
2H_The_Impacts_of_Large
_Constellations_of_Satellites_508.pdf

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    The challenge increases drastically when considering that there are 
dozens of companies in the United States building constellations all 
desiring access to LEO. Additionally, China, Russia, Europe, and 
individual European countries have announced they will be deploying LEO 
constellations as well. The United States can and must take the lead on 
creating responsible rules that others in the international community 
can emulate to mitigate this growing concern.
    Space situational awareness and space traffic management (SSA/STM) 
are important long-term requirements. However, if we don't take action 
now to mitigate the debris problem, there will be no need for SSA/STM. 
Space will no longer be accessible. I fully support the Commerce 
Department being responsible for SSA/STM, but given the immediacy of 
the problem, we need to use our current framework for mitigation.
    Solution:

    First, Congress needs to quickly require the FCC to approve 
satellite constellations based on an aggregate collision risk metric, 
not one satellite at a time. The FCC proposed this rule in April 2020, 
but it was never implemented. It was the right policy then and it is 
even more the right policy today.
    Second, Congress must act quickly to require the FCC to define the 
limits on the nature and number of satellites that can exist in LEO. 
The FCC has said there are limits, but there has been no action.
    Third, once those limits are established, there must be an effort 
to work with our international partners to appropriately allocate 
access to the highest value orbital shells. If other nations are not 
included in this process, they will claim the same territory with 
disastrous consequences. America's allocation must then be fairly 
distributed to companies in a way that ensures competition in the 
marketplace.
    Finally, Congress should have the FCC analyze and report on the 
effects these constellations will have on launch, the International 
Space Station, the environment, astronomers, and future space 
exploration.
Artemis: America's Moon Program
    NASA determined that it had insufficient appropriations to select 
two human landing systems for the Artemis program. Congress should 
appropriate sufficient funds for two human landing systems.
    Dissimilar redundancy has worked exceptionally well in the 
Commercial Resupply Program and the Commercial Crew Program. When one 
contractor has a setback, the other moves forward, greatly increasing 
NASA's access to space and the International Space Station. This should 
be the approach for NASA's Human Landing System and Congress needs to 
fund it.
    Additionally, if the goal is to eventually buy access to the Moon 
as a commercial service, NASA needs two providers that will compete on 
cost, innovation and safety. Having two providers will also incentivize 
the companies to get customers that are not the U.S. Government, 
lowering the cost to the taxpayer. As a matter of principle, the only 
thing worse than a government monopoly is a private monopoly to which 
the government is beholden. I am not suggesting that any specific 
contractor would intentionally act nefariously. I am suggesting that 
the government has an obligation to provide the right incentives to 
benefit the taxpayer.
    Thank you for hearing my testimony. I am confident that with your 
leadership, NASA will continue to do amazing things for our Nation.

    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Jim, appreciate that. Dr. 
Dittmar.

 STATEMENT OF DR. MARY LYNNE DITTMAR, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 
           FOR GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, AXIOM SPACE, INC.

    Dr. Dittmar. Chair Hickenlooper, Ranking Member Lummis, and 
Senator Moran, Ranking Member Wicker, Members of the 
Subcommittee, thanks for the invitation to appear before you 
today. It is nice to be back in front of this committee with 
such a distinguished panel to discuss my thoughts on the topics 
of today's hearing.
    I am the former President and CEO of the Coalition for Deep 
Space Exploration, but I am now, the Executive Vice President 
of Axiom Space, which is building the world's first commercial 
space station. So, I wish to note that while I will be 
discussing some of Axiom's plans as to illustrate my 
discussion, the positions that are presented here are my own 
and do not reflect the official opinion of my employer.
    With that out of the way, my discussion will focus on 
competition--that aspect of today's hearing. It is often said 
that we are at an inflection point in space and while that is 
true, the phrase glosses over complexities, challenges, and 
opportunities, already pointed out, that confront us now and in 
the years to come.
    What is less frequently discussed is a more dangerous 
reality--namely, that if the U.S. does not act decisively and 
strategically, it risks squandering the competitive moat that 
it has built in commercial space to national actors who 
continue to maintain laser focus on asserting their own 
national interests.
    Axiom is the first, and so far, only company to develop a 
new space station destined for low Earth orbit without 
government funds for development, launch, or operations. 
Beginning by building modules that extend the functionality of 
the ISS, it will provide capabilities for a broad array of 
users--researchers, astronauts, government, international 
customers, and the business community. Critically, for the 
purposes of this hearing, it is also, in my opinion, best 
positioned to help challenge China's interests in LEO at the 
end of life of the International Space Station. And indeed, it 
was for that latter reason, more than any other, that I joined 
Axiom.
    It is tremendously important for the U.S. Government to 
recognize and respond, with urgency, to the situation our 
Nation and space industry is facing. Simply put, it is China's 
goal to establish a leading position in the economic and 
military use of outer space, as they have stated publicly, for 
many years.
    China recognizes the immense strategic value of space and 
intends to seize the opportunity to develop economic value, by 
dominating a space-based economy. Space has become part of 
China's Silk Road economic belt, part of its plan for 
geopolitical and economic dominance.
    In my written testimony, I refer to the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission's 2019 report to Congress, which 
offers the comprehensive analysis of what Beijing calls its 
``Space Dream'' and how it hopes to achieve it. China is 
playing the long game, make no mistake. Bolstering their space 
capabilities through military-civil fusion and through the 
exploitation of weaknesses in the U.S. space industrial base 
and our glacial pace of acquisition and procurement and of the 
stovepipe nature of our national agencies.
    With regard to LEO, NASA, and by extension its 
stakeholders, are facing uncertainty. Plans to transition off 
the ISS at the end of its life require clearly stated 
objectives, realistic timelines with milestones, and a firm 
commitment that has not yet been adequately communicated. At 
present, NASA is describing its objectives partly in terms of 
continued access to LEO, envisioning hardware development under 
its new commercial LEO Destinations Program, using the same 
acquisition strategy that works so well for Commercial Orbital 
Transportation System, COTS, and eventually for commercial 
crew.
    There are several differences between the circumstances 
that gave raise to COTS over a decade ago, however, and those 
in low Earth orbit now. COTS was able to leverage an existing 
market for launch services, that had developed and diversified 
over 50 years, to include an understanding of hardware 
development and a substantial customer portfolio in both 
government and commercial sectors. COTS was also set up to meet 
transportation needs that were communicated early in the 
program.
    Today, conditions are markedly different. While now, as 
then, hardware development is relatively well understood, there 
is no diversified market in LEO to leverage. Not yet. NASA has 
yet to clearly define its needs for services after the ISS 
ends, nor does it plan to do so for some time.
    And finally, we face a formidable competitor. At the very 
same time that NASA is embarking on this approach, American 
companies have admitted to losing customers to China as it 
employs strategies to undercut the U.S. commercial space sector 
through mechanisms such as state-backed financing that market 
driven companies in the U.S. cannot compete with. In my view, 
an important national objective for LEO should be to counter 
potential Chinese hegemony in low Earth orbit. Should Congress 
choose to authorize LEO programs with this goal in mind, then 
NASA's acquisition approach should reflect this. It is unclear 
that the same procurement approach that worked for COTS, in 
very different circumstances, will work now.
    I want to spend just a few minutes talking about demand. 
Both industry and NASA believe that the market sector is ready 
to develop next generation orbital platforms. In Axiom's case, 
this confidence is shared by capital markets. In a few years, 
Axiom will see its modules attached to station, increasing 
capacity and capabilities for meaningful science and research. 
And I have got a quick visualization, if that is available to 
us to see, so you can see how that will go. Maybe not. OK, 
moving on. However, Axiom and other companies providing 
services in LEO, now or in the future, are dependent upon 
sufficient demand to close their business cases. If there is 
not sufficient demand, then the very companies the U.S. is 
depending on to assure U.S. presence and soft power in low 
orbit may fail.
    In our system, governments do not create markets. They can 
only serve as customers. However, NASA can fund and conduct 
research that is too costly, risky, or difficult for industry 
to undertake and provide the results to industry for use in 
engaging with customers.
    If market development is to be a legitimate aim of space 
policy, much as it is for simple state and commerce, 
particularly if it is to underpin pursuit of a range of 
national, as well as business goals, we might also ask if NASA 
is the appropriate home for that policy. NASA is not an 
economic development agency, and we should not expect it to act 
as one. The space agency, that serves this country so well, has 
core confidence revolving around science, exploration, 
education, and technology.
    At the same time, as a Nation, we must think and act 
deliberately, with regard to the intersection between markets 
and space policy. In my written testimony, I offer several 
suggestions and recommendations that the committee may 
consider, regarding how government may help.
    It has been a pleasure and an honor to appear before you 
today and I look forward to answering any questions you may 
have.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Dittmar follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar, Executive Vice President, 
                           Axiom Space, Inc.
    Chair Hickenlooper, Ranking Member Lummis, Chair Cantwell, Ranking 
Member Wicker, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the 
invitation to appear before you today with such an extraordinary and 
distinguished panel to discuss my thoughts on the topic of today's 
hearing: ``International Collaboration and Competition in Space: 
Oversight of NASA's Role and Programs''. My name is Dr. Mary Lynne 
Dittmar, and I am the former President and CEO of the Coalition for 
Deep Space Exploration--an industry trade group supporting NASA's 
programs of record in human exploration, science, and space commerce--
and now, the Executive Vice President of Axiom Space, which is building 
the world's first commercial space station. The topic of this hearing 
is of intense interest to me, as it has guided most of my professional 
activities and service for more than 20 years. I wish to note that 
while I will be discussing some of Axiom's plans to illustrate my 
discussion, the positions presented here are my own and do not reflect 
the official opinion of my employer.
    Axiom is the first (and so far, the only) company to develop a new 
station destined for low Earth orbit (LEO) without government funds for 
development, launch, and operations. Beginning by building modules that 
extend the functionality of the ISS, it will provide capabilities to a 
broad array of users--researchers, astronauts, manufacturing firms, 
scientists, artists--and will offer those capabilities to meet existing 
and emerging needs across the U.S. government, international customers, 
and the business community. Critically, for the purposes of this 
hearing, it is also best positioned to help challenge China's interests 
in LEO at the end of life of the International Space Station. Indeed, 
it was for that latter reason, more than any other, that I joined 
Axiom.
    It's often said we're at an ``inflection point'' in space, and 
while that is true, the phrase glosses over the complexities, 
challenges and opportunities confronting us now and in the years to 
come. Regarding LEO, the term has been used to describe the transition 
from an exclusively government owned-and-operated domain to one 
utilizing publicprivate partnership. What is less frequently discussed 
is a more dangerous reality--namely, that if the U.S. does not act 
decisively and strategically, it risks squandering the competitive moat 
the U.S. has built in commercial space to national actors who continue 
to maintain laser focus on asserting their own national interests. In 
this testimony I will discuss this situation in both LEO and in deep 
space, with an emphasis on human spaceflight and exploration.
NASA's Efforts to Build Alliances
    The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958--the so-called 
``organic act'' that created NASA--has as one of its nine objectives 
``Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of 
nations in work done pursuant to this Act and to the peaceful 
application of the results thereof.'' \1\ In other words, cooperation 
with other nations is in the DNA of our Nation's space agency. This 
part of NASA's mission has been ratified by Congresses since 1958 in a 
series of Authorization Acts that build upon the first.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. Congress (1958). National Space and Aeronautics Act of 
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, as amended (29 July). Printed for NASA Use 
November 30, 2006. Accessed at: https://history.nasa.gov/spaceact-
legishistory.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NASA has demonstrated its commitment to that cooperation in the 
years since--in space science, in human spaceflight, in technology 
development, and in education and outreach. The most visible example--
but certainly not the only one--of multilateral cooperation in space is 
the International Space Station (ISS). For the past 20 years the ISS 
has been the focus of a strong international partnership that has 
attracted over 100 countries as participants. NASA's daily engagement 
with the partnership has weathered changing political climates both at 
home and abroad, demonstrating extraordinary stability, positive 
interdependence, and an ability to bridge the tensions and conflicts 
that inevitably surface in international relations.\2\ This has been 
particularly true with Russia, which served to ensure the continuation 
of the ISS after the loss of the shuttle Columbia and in the long 
interval between 2011 and the end of the shuttle program until 2020 
when the U.S. was again able to launch astronauts on American rockets 
from American soil. This partnership has been even more remarkable 
given the stresses that attended the Russian annexation of Crimea, and 
recent, sometimes contrary statements from Roscosmos regarding Russian 
intentions for future participation on the ISS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Dittmar, M. L. (2017). Statement before the Committee on Space, 
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 22 March. ``The 
ISS After 2024: Options and Impacts.'' https://docs.house.gov/meetings/
SY/SY16/20170322/105737/HHRG-115SY16-Wstate-DittmarM-2017
0322.pdf
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    Guiding this cooperation has been the Intergovernmental Agreement 
(IGA), a treaty-level multilateral agreement among the governments of 
Canada, governments of member states of the European Space Agency, the 
government of Japan, the government of the Russian Federation, and the 
government of the United States.\3\ The 15 member nations who signed 
the IGA after years of negotiations have remained committed to its 
goals and principles and have created a strong foundation of 
multilateralism in human spaceflight. However, the IGA is specific to 
the ISS and does not extend to exploration of deep space. In addition, 
China was not included in the ISS partnership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The U.S. State Department (1998). Space Station Agreement 
between the United States of America and Other Governments (signed 29 
January 1998). https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/12927-
Multilateral-Space-Space-Station-1.29.1998.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2010, Congress directed NASA to ask the National Academies to 
perform a study to review ``the goals, core capabilities, and direction 
of human spaceflight.'' In 2012 NASA asked the National Research 
Council at the Academies to perform a wide-ranging study in accord with 
Congressional direction. The NRC in turn convened a Committee on Human 
Spaceflight, on which I served, to carry out the work. The resulting 
report, entitled ``Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches 
for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration,'' was published in 
2014.\4\ Among many other recommendations, a central finding of the 
Committee was that NASA's deep space exploration program must be 
international in nature, and that continuing engagement is necessary to 
develop and maintain international partnerships. The report also 
recommended that China be engaged, arguing that exclusion of the 
Chinese space program could work against the interests of the United 
States, particularly given China's stated openness to working with 
other nations.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ National Research Council of the National Academies Human 
Spaceflight Committee (2014). Pathways to exploration: Rationales and 
approaches for a U.S. program of human space exploration. Washington, 
D.C., National Academies Press.
    \5\ Ibid, p. 26
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In October of 2020, NASA announced the signing of the Artemis 
Accords by eight founding member countries including the United States. 
Announced earlier in May of that year, the Accords ``reinforce and 
implement'' the principles of the Outer Space Treaty, and are aimed at 
avoiding conflict, strengthening international relationships, and 
encouraging ongoing cooperation in a growing coalition dedicated to the 
peaceful uses of outer space. The Accords do not constitute a treaty, 
but rather a framework to encourage bilateral agreements developed 
under the umbrella of several principles that, it is hoped, will 
develop into international law through custom and practice. The Accords 
thus offer a significant step toward implementing the recommendation of 
the Pathways report that U.S. deep space exploration be international 
in nature, providing a framework of principles underpinning future 
exploration: Transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, 
registration of space objects, release of scientific data, preservation 
of outer space heritage, extraction and utilization of space resources, 
deconfliction of space activities, and planning for the safe disposal 
of orbital debris.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2020). NASA, 
international partners advance cooperation with first signings of 
Artemis Accords. 13 October. https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-
international-partners-advance-cooperation-with-firstsignings-of-
artemis-accords
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Progress and Intentions of Other Nations in Space: Focus on China
    It is worth noting that neither the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) nor Russia have announced an intention to sign the Artemis 
Accords, offering mixed responses to the initiative at various 
times.\7\ \8\ However, the two countries have signed an 
intergovernmental agreement to proceed with plans for an International 
Lunar Research Station (ILRS). In June they announced opportunities for 
additional partnerships and said that they were already in negotiations 
with several nations.\9\ China, in particular, shares the U.S. 
determination to assert leadership in cislunar space, recognizing its 
immense strategic value and seeing in it an opportunity to develop 
economic value by dominating a space-based economy.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ TASS Russian News Agency (2020). Moon exploration projects 
could help Russia-US cooperation--Roscosmos. 16 May. https://tass.com/
science/1157255
    \8\ Ji, E., Cerny, M. B., Piliero, R. J. (2020). What does China 
think about the Artemis Accords? The Diplomat, 17 September. https://
thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-does-china-think-about-nasas-artemis-
accords/
    \9\ Pultarova, T. (2021). Russia, China reveal moon base roadmap 
but no plans for astronaut missions yet. 17 June. https://
www.space.com/china-russia-international-lunar-research-station
    \10\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Annual 
Report to Congress (2019). China's ambitions in space: Contesting the 
final frontier (Chapter 4). https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
2019-11/2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf
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    To fully assess China's intentions in space, it is important to 
understand how the PRC is advancing with extraordinary rapidity across 
a range of space technologies and capabilities. Notably, China is 
``playing the long game,'' focusing on the relationship between the 
defense sector and commercial space innovation and entrepreneurialism 
and leveraging the existing social commitment to hard work and national 
pride. Space has become part of China's ``Silk Road Economic Belt,'' 
part of its plan for geopolitical and economic dominance. In short, the 
PRC is pursuing a global strategy to win the competition in space, 
building upon several broad-based approaches.
    The first of these is via military-civil fusion (MCF). MCF is 
focused on building pathways between the traditional defense industrial 
base and the commercial sector, with the goal of increasing the flow of 
information, technology, and people between the two. This is not a new 
development in China--or for that matter, in the United States--but it 
has new impetus under the current government.\11\ According to 
testimony provided in 2019 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, in 2013 there was virtually no commercial space 
sector in China. In 2014, the government announced that it would allow 
the flow of private capital and companies to enter the previously 
sequestered space sector. In 2016, the Central Politburo elevated MCF 
to a national strategy. In 2017, President Xi Jinping established a 
commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development emphasizing 
technology development--particularly dual-use technology. Later in 
2017, the People's Liberation Army declassified almost 3000 patents, 
releasing them into the public sector, signaling a new development in 
the interaction between the PLA and the commercial sector. Also in 
2017, the ``13th Five Year Plan Sci & Tech MilitaryCivil Fusion 
Development Special Plan'' named human spaceflight as a MCF ``mega 
project.'' \12\ By 2018, the top seven state funds investing in MCF 
industries had over $56B in capital. Combined with capital from venture 
markets, the Chinese government is pouring billions into commercial 
space companies as compared with just a few years ago.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Kania, A.B. and Laskai, L. (2021). Myths and realities of 
China's military-civil fusion strategy. Center for a New American 
Security. https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/
Myths-and-Realities-of-China's-Military-Civil-FusionStrategy_FINAL-
min.pdf?mtime
=20210127133521&focal=none
    \12\ Laskai, L. (2019). Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, 25 April. ``China in Space: A Strategic 
Competition?'' https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Lorand%20Laskai%20USCC%2025%20April.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the total investment in both government and commercial space 
is thought to still lag that of the United States, the results are 
clear to see. For example, China's commercial launch industry has made 
rapid progress since 2015, with several companies testing advanced 
rocket capabilities, including fly-back boosters, suborbital flights, 
and advanced engine designs, including a liquid oxygen-methane 
engine.\13\ Notably, the PLA remains deeply engaged in guiding 
technical development, particularly those capabilities that it sees of 
benefit to it. Further, the personnel and relationships between the 
commercial space sector and the state defense sector are also deeply 
intertwined.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Curcio, B. and Lan, T. (2018). The rise of China's private 
space industry. Space News, 25 March. https://spacenews.com/analysis-
the-rise-of-chinas-private-space-industry
    \14\ Lee, T. A. and Singer, P. W. (2021). China's space program is 
more military than you might think. 16 July. Defense One. https://
www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/07/chinas-space-program-more-military-
you-might-think/183790/
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    A second means by which the PRC seeks to compete with the U.S. is 
taking shape through a long-term, multipronged strategy that exploits 
weaknesses in the U.S. space industrial base, in our glacial pace of 
acquisition and procurement, and of the stove piped nature of our 
national agencies. We have reached the point where a whole-ofgovernment 
approach to space, as intended to be implemented via the National Space 
Council among other mechanisms, is crucial to our continued 
competitiveness and leadership. This is particularly true regarding 
protecting the space industrial base and the emerging entrepreneurial 
sector, both of which are vulnerable to malfeasance and disruption--the 
latter clearly illustrated by impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. In Q&A 
during a hearing \15\ on competition with China in space before the 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Mike Gold pointed 
out the PRC thinks about markets strategically, while the U.S. does 
not. China has an industrial policy organized around state objectives. 
The U.S., with its focus on free markets, does not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2019). ``A 
hearing on China in space: A strategic competition? 25 April. https://
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-10/
April%2025%202019%20Hearing%20Transcript.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 2019 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission pointed out the need for a comprehensive, wholistic 
perspective regarding China's competitive interests in space.\16\ A 
recent report of a workshop in early 2019 co-sponsored by the Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL) and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) 
detailed a methodical, intentional approach that includes deliberate 
co-mingling of state-owned entities with commercial space companies. 
The key elements of the strategy were identified as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2019). 
Report to Congress. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/
2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf

   ``. . . theft of intellectual property combined with a 
        concerted and effective drive to create organic, national 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        expertise across key space science and technology areas;

   direct integration of state-owned corporations and their 
        technologies with commercial, space startupcompanies;

   penetration of American companies to obtain and further 
        exploit U.S. technology or to influence those companies in a 
        direction that serves China's domestic space priorities;

   investment in the U.S. space industrial base via front 
        companies and multi-level off-shore accounts to facilitate 
        early venture technology surveillance, infrastructure access 
        and control of developing space capabilities and intellectual 
        property;

   obtaining vertical control of the key space capabilities' 
        supply chains or control of sufficient elements of those supply 
        chains to influence space capabilities development in their 
        favor;

   predatory pricing of space capabilities or elements of key 
        space supply chains to control or dominate the market; and

   use of state-sponsored venture capital, finance, and market 
        control mechanisms to surveille U.S. technology, 
        interdependencies, business model innovations and other 
        advanced concepts.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Cooley, T., Felt, E., and Butow, S. J. (2019). State of the 
space industrial base: Threats, challenges, and actions. 30 May. Air 
Force Research Laboratory and Defense Innovation Unit. https://
cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4653168/
AFRL_DIU_Report_State_of_Space_Ind_Base_30May
2019_Final.pdf

    Congress has responded to these activities most recently through 
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020, which calls for the 
President, in consultation with the National Space Council, to develop 
``. . . a strategy to ensure the United States can effectively compete 
with other national space programs, maintain dominance in the emerging 
commercial space economy, and has market, regulatory, and other means 
available to address unfair competition from the PRC . . .'' and also 
``. . . a plan to strengthen and streamline cooperation with 
international allies and partners in space.'' \18\ However, additional 
action is needed to support the industrial base and by extension U.S. 
civil and commercial space activities it supports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ U.S. Congress (2019). National Defense Authorization Act of 
2020, Pub. Law 116-92 (20 December). https://www.congress.gov/116/
plaws/publ92/PLAW-116publ92.pdf
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The role of the commercial sector in advancing U.S. leadership and 
        global relationships
    As mentioned, several times, the primary strategic objective of 
NASA's activities in human exploration as seen from a national lens is 
geopolitical. However, that is not the only objective. In a previous 
appearance before the Aviation and Space Subcommittee of the Senate 
Commerce Committee in 2019, I opined that ``United States leadership in 
space depends upon establishing a foundation that provides other 
nations and a nascent space-based economy with security and assurance 
regarding our national intentions and long-term commitment to aspire, 
inspire, and achieve--in short, to lead.'' \19\ My viewpoint has not 
changed; however, my sense of urgency has.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Dittmar, M. L. (2019). Testimony before the Senate Commerce, 
Science and Transportation Committee Subcommittee on Aviation and 
Space, 9 July (p. 2). ``NASA's Exploration Plans--Where We've Been and 
Where We're Going.'' https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/
19109A37-22BF-4268-9E5C-553880A435BE
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    Regarding low Earth orbit (LEO), which will be the focus of the 
rest of this testimony, NASA plans to transition activities now onboard 
the ISS to one or more commercial platforms in LEO, as well as some 
intended for deep space to the lunar orbiting outpost known as Gateway. 
In LEO, effecting this transition successfully requires closing the gap 
that now exists between public investment (NASA and the ISS National 
Lab) and revenue generation sufficiently to lead private investors to 
fund new orbital facilities for both public and private use. In turn, 
this requires hardware developers to create a portfolio of services 
attractive to a robust group of customers. In the case of Axiom, this 
includes first offering qualified customers the opportunity to fly to 
the ISS--establishing the procedures and agreements necessary to 
develop joint operations with NASA as well as conducting science and 
research--and later to Axiom's own modules while attached to the ISS. 
This in turn will lead to astronaut missions with a full complement of 
activities onboard Axiom station, on a commercial basis, once it 
detaches from the ISS.
    To help visualize the latter, here is a quick video showing the 
assembly sequence: https://www.dropbox.com/s/z1s1paok8z8frax/
Assembly%20Sequence_stills.mp4
?dl=0
    Axiom's first private astronaut mission to the ISS is scheduled to 
fly in January of 2022, less than 6 months from now. Although he is not 
representing his country as a professional astronaut, one member of the 
first mission crew is an Israeli national and former Israeli Air Force 
fighter pilot who founded an investment firm that targets companies 
whose intention is to generate positive, measurable social and 
environmental impact alongside a competitive financial return. A close 
friend of Ilan Ramon, a member of the STS-107 crew who perished during 
the breakup of the shuttle Columbia in 2003, he will be conducting 
research onboard the ISS that is funded in part by the Ramon 
Foundation. A second member of the crew--which will be commanded by 
Michael Lopez-Alegria, a 4-time shuttle astronaut and former commander 
of the ISS--is a Canadian philanthropist and investor. Together with a 
third crew member and pilot who is American, all of the crew will be 
conducting research during their flight, bringing international 
payloads in through the ISS National Lab and opening the door to future 
missions with professional astronauts and researchers from other 
countries. Other commercial companies such as Nanoracks, Made In Space/
Redwire, and others have also developed their customer portfolios to 
include international customers.
    NASA, and by extension the U.S. space companies serve as a vehicle 
of U.S. ``soft power'', shaping favorable behavior and outcomes among 
foreign entities, customers, and over time, competitors who do not 
operate according to American laws and values. American companies 
understand, rely upon, and promote protection of intellectual property, 
fair exchange, mutual respect, and enhancement of customer experience. 
Commercial partnerships with nations, institutes and firms abroad can 
also provide a means for countries to ``bootstrap'' into a human 
spaceflight or space science program, working with American companies 
to develop science and engineering initiatives supporting space 
activities, establishing long-term relationships. In the case of the 
ISS, increasing the number and duration of these relationships 
strengthens the viability of commercial companies offering services in 
LEO, enabling NASA to eventually transition off the ISS and turn its 
full attention to deep space with the assurance that its needs and 
those of its partners will continue to be met.
    It should be noted that this is not a ``new'' phenomenon; American 
businesses have played a crucial role in establishing relationships 
with other countries in a variety of sectors--not just space--and have 
frequently engaged in diplomatic initiatives and helped to deepen 
international ties. In space, all this proceeds from existing 
partnerships with NASA and is expanding to incorporate other sectors 
and customer bases over time.
    The long-standing partnership between the government and commerce 
to promote American values and engage with other nations rests upon 
certain principles, however, including fair competition. At present, 
both Russia and China are competing with the United States by 
subsidizing launch costs and access to the Russian segment of the ISS 
and to Tiangong, the Chinese space station, respectively. Recently, a 
U.S. commercial company, Nanoracks, revealed that it had lost a 
commercial customer to the Chinese station for the first time.\20\. 
These developments threaten revenue sources for commercial space 
companies as national programs enter the commercial market with 
disruptive effect. Mechanisms to address unfair practices exist and 
have been used effectively in the past (for example, the 1993 agreement 
between the Russian Federation and the U.S. regarding commercial launch 
services, which enabled the Russians to enter the market without 
upsetting normal competition) \21\, however they must be prioritized by 
the U.S. government that recognizes the impact of such practices to the 
growing space economy and to America's leadership in space.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Foust, J. (2021). China's space station emerges as competitor 
to commercial ventures. Space News, 5 August. https://spacenews.com/
chinas-space-station-emerges-as-competitor-to-commercial-ventures/
    \21\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (published in the 
Federal Register, March, 1994). Text version of the Federal Register 
notice is available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1994-03-
10/html/94-5498.htm
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    The PRC certainly recognizes the power of utilizing space 
activities--especially human spaceflight--to enhance national prestige 
and deploy soft power. To this end the Chinese have recently announced 
plans to fly 1,000 payloads on the Tiangong as it continues 
construction of the station.\22\ In 2018, the PRC announced an 
agreement with the United Nations to ``develop the space capabilities 
of United Nations Member States via opportunities onboard the CSS'' 
(China Space Station)\23\. Since that time nine experiments have been 
selected, with more in the pipeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ David, L. Can the U.S. and China cooperate in space? 
Scientific American, 2 August. https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/can-the-u-s-and-china-cooperate-in-space/
    \23\ United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (2018). United 
Nations and China invite applications to conduct experiments on-board 
China's Space Station. http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/
media/2018-unis-os-496.html
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Constancy of Purpose: Clear Policy Objectives and Strategy Should Drive 
        Acquisition Approach
    In LEO, NASA, and by extension its commercial partners and emerging 
companies aspiring to operate in orbit, are facing uncertainty. Plans 
to transition off the ISS at the end of its life requires clearly 
stated objectives, realistic timelines with milestones, and a firm 
commitment that has not been adequately communicated to date. In 
Axiom's case, the competitively sourced award that provides the company 
with exclusive access to begin attaching modules to the ISS by 2024 
opens the door to a phased transition of U.S. government payloads, 
commercial or international payloads to Axiom once the modules are 
operational. However, Axiom's success--and that of other providers--
would be greatly enhanced by a publicly released transition plan and 
``date certain'' for ceasing operations on the ISS, developed in tandem 
with the international partners in the program. The date should be far 
enough in the future that it enables NASA to complete currently 
understood work but not so far that it exacerbates existing 
uncertainty.
    Any such plan should begin with clear objectives. At present, NASA 
is describing objectives in terms of hardware development in its new 
``Commercial LEO Destinations'' program, adopting the same acquisition 
strategy that worked for its Commercial Orbital Transportation System 
(COTS) program and eventually for the Commercial Crew Program. There 
are several differences between the circumstances that gave rise to 
COTS over a decade ago, however, and those in low Earth orbit now. 
First, COTS was able to leverage an existing market for launch services 
that had developed and diversified over 50 years to include a 
substantial customer portfolio in both government and commercial 
sectors. Secondly, COTS was set up to provide cargo and later crew 
conveyance (under ``Commercial Crew Program'') that was well 
understood, the need for which was communicated early in the program.
    In LEO, neither of these conditions obtain. While hardware 
development is well-understood, there is no diversified market to 
leverage, and NASA has yet to clearly define its needs after the ISS 
ends. The assumption that the same procurement approach that worked for 
COTS--in very different circumstances, where the market is just now 
emerging--is the best model for the CLD program, is questionable.
    Furthermore, other than to ensure one or more platforms are 
available after the ISS ends, it is unclear what objectives NASA is 
trying to meet on behalf of the Nation. Clear policy direction is 
needed. For example, in my view an important national objective is to 
counter potential Chinese hegemony in low Earth orbit. If Congress 
would authorize LEO programs with this goal in mind, then NASA's 
acquisition approach should reflect this, using mechanisms that balance 
NASA's evolving role and needs in low Earth orbit with the risks, 
benefits, and management practices best suited to meet U.S. 
geopolitical interests.
    At present, it is unclear that the current acquisition approach 
reflects a systematic strategy addressing higher order objectives--or 
indeed, what these objectives are. This is a critical point, because 
the consequences of these decisions have tremendous implications for 
the future of U.S. human spaceflight in low Earth orbit, and possibly 
beyond. Clear objectives and deliberate strategy must come first and 
should guide the acquisition approach--not the other way around.
    A similar, systematic approach should be reflected in the next 
iteration of the ISS Transition Plan called for in the NASA 
Authorization and Transition Act of 2017. It is well understood that 
any transition plan will be a work in progress, iterated upon as 
circumstances continue to evolve. However, objectives and a strategy 
for meeting them is every bit as critical as the tactical 
``transition'' plan (of which acquisition is a part.)
    The same can be said for resources. Whatever the objectives, 
strategy and tactical aspects of an ISS Transition Plan may be, 
adequate budgets available on a consistent basis are critical to meet 
objectives. The practice of relying on Continuing Resolutions (CRs) in 
lieu of regular order and budgets passed on time creates uncertainty 
and increased risk of failure. Unnecessary risk is beyond frustrating: 
It poses a threat to U.S. competitiveness and the ability to continue a 
permanent U.S. presence in LEO after the ISS program ends.
Whither Market Development in Space?
    NASA is not an economic development agency. We should not expect it 
to act as such, either. The space agency's core competencies revolve 
around science, exploration, education, and technology as well as 
hardware development. If the U.S. government is serious about 
statements made in past years across the Congress to achieve a vibrant, 
commercial space sector operating in low Earth orbit and beyond, a 
conversation should be had about ensuring that appropriate economic 
goals and the means to achieve them are enshrined in policy. The 
responsibility to organize and foster growth of the commercial space 
sector should be housed within a designated place in our government 
that is appropriately resourced and staffed with the requisite 
expertise. The roles and experience of the Department of Commerce make 
it the obvious choice. Bearing in mind the sense of urgency, informed 
must be made in the immediate future that would help guide NASA 
regarding implementation, lest we risk falling behind China as well as 
other nations.
    In LEO, hardware development is reasonably well understood. Both 
industry and NASA believe that the private sector is ready to develop 
next-generation orbital platforms. In Axiom's case this confidence is 
shared by capital markets. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
testimony, Axiom is developing its station entirely on investor funds 
and projected revenues from services, contracting with NASA to provide 
data and insight as the project proceeds. However, Axiom and any other 
company providing services in LEO, now or in the future, are dependent 
upon sufficient demand to close their business cases. If there is not 
sufficient, sustained, and growing demand, then the very companies the 
U.S. is depending on to assure U.S. presence--and soft power--in low 
Earth orbit, may fail. New entrants who bring innovation to the space 
ecosphere know that they must generate demand or fail. Suppliers who 
support the entire aerospace and defense sector rely upon sustained 
demand--indeed, this is one of the most important aspects of government 
programs. If suppliers fail, then the U.S. may have to look overseas 
for production. In the case where overseas production is critical to 
U.S. industry--as we are now seeing in the IT and telecom sectors--
threats to U.S. security emerge. The same is true in space.
    While governments cannot create markets, NASA can fund and conduct 
research that is too costly, risky or difficult for industry to 
undertake and provide the results to industry for use in engaging with 
customers. Businesses, in turn, are responsible for developing 
customers. In LEO, policy objectives that are beneficial to both the 
U.S. government and to industry--engagement with international 
countries and business, deployment of soft power by American industry, 
encouragement of new entrants into space technology and services, 
continued investment by capital markets, sustained U.S. presence in 
orbit around the Earth after the ISS ends--as well as other objectives 
I have not discussed such as using LEO platforms to create and enhance 
education and diversity programs to develop America's next generation 
of scientists and engineers--all depend on sufficient demand to sustain 
commercial platforms.
Actions the government can take: Recommendations
   Utilize the regular order for negotiating and passing 
        Appropriations Acts, avoiding the use of CR's and other stop-
        gap funding measures that increase uncertainty and negatively 
        impact NASA's ability to pursue policy and programmatic goals.

   Establish clear policy goals for LEO (and beyond). As part 
        of this, consider whether the time has come to make market 
        development a legitimate aim of space policy, and whether the 
        Department of Commerce might lend better focus and expertise to 
        that effort. This discussion should consider the changing 
        nature of NASA's role. When NASA can buy a service from the 
        market, it will act only as a customer. When NASA must engage 
        in development, it should do so with a very deliberate, 
        objective-based strategy that may include not only whether a 
        service is available, but whether purchasing from the market is 
        in accord with national goals. In neither case, however, should 
        NASA be expected to exercise oversight of the market.

   Formalize policy goals in another NASA Authorization Act. In 
        the recent past, NASA Authorization Acts such as those in 2005, 
        2008, 2010 and the NASA Transition and Authorization Act of 
        2017 called for international and commercial partnerships in 
        the exploration of space. ``Constancy of purpose'' as reflected 
        in the Acts has been of great benefit in assuring program 
        stability. Equally important, Authorization Acts send a signal 
        to the international community of the intent of Congress to 
        continue to assert U.S. leadership in space--a signal that is 
        important not only to our allies, but to those who do not wish 
        us well.

   Encourage NASA to deliver a transition plan for the ISS that 
        establishes clear objectives, working milestones, schedule, 
        clarity regarding its own needs beyond the life of the ISS, in 
        accord with Section 303 of the National Aeronautics and Space 
        Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2017 \24\. In 
        addition to the requirements specified by that Act for the 
        plan, NASA should also discuss its role and rationale 
        throughout the transition period in meeting national objectives 
        (including geopolitical ones) as well as its own. Ideally, this 
        rationale should drive, rather than be driven by any given 
        acquisition approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ U.S. Congress (2017). National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2017 (Pub. Law 11510, 
Section 303). 21 March. https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ10/PLAW-
115publ10.pdf

   Recognize that both Russia and China are determined to 
        achieve global leadership in space, and that the PRC has 
        embarked upon a long-term, multi-tiered national strategy aimed 
        at success. This strategy includes MCF and a long-term view of 
        markets with deliberate efforts to undermine the U.S. 
        industrial base and to ``buy-into'' U.S. entrepreneurial 
        efforts for the purposes of transferring technology and/or 
        expertise. Consider an interagency process, perhaps coordinated 
        by the National Space Council or the National Security Council, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        to detect and deny such efforts early.

   Support U.S. commercial entities by adopting a ``light 
        touch'' regulatory regime whenever possible.

   Shift U.S. Government investment in LEO to a more balanced 
        approach that is less on hardware development and more on 
        conducting research that may be useful in establishing demand 
        while ensuring that U.S. commercial companies and their 
        international and domestic customers have access to the ISS in 
        the interval between now and ISS end of life (EOF). 
        Specifically:

      (1)  Reduce uncertainty (see above recommendation about an ISS 
            transition plan) and avoid abrupt changes in policy that 
            disrupt business plans and customer relationships. Recent 
            examples of this include the NASA commercialization policy, 
            and more recently a review by NASA of the existing policy 
            that enables American companies to fly payloads of their 
            international customers via the ISS National Lab, which 
            stopped payload processing for weeks. Such abrupt changes 
            negatively impact the ability of companies to build demand 
            for their services and undermine the role of American 
            businesses in a competitive landscape (encouraging 
            migration of those customers to Tiangong), thereby creating 
            additional risks to the NASA plan to transition LEO to 
            commercial providers, which is in turn the lynchpin of the 
            U.S. government's policy objective to maintain U.S. 
            presence in LEO in perpetuity.

      (2)  Fully utilize the ISS as a platform for commercial 
            development during this interval, encouraging commercial 
            research, development, and use across diverse sectors to 
            facilitate the process of growing market demand. This 
            should include areas such as entertainment, marketing, 
            private and professional (national) astronaut missions. 
            Commercial use should be balanced with the needs of 
            researchers and government agencies, but with the 
            recognition that the clock is ticking regarding development 
            of demand needed to close the gap between government 
            investment in public-private partnerships, investor 
            funding, and revenue generation.

      (3)  Consider establishing an interagency process to look at the 
            economic development of low Earth orbit in a holistic way, 
            focusing on how government money is spent to encourage and 
            possibly incentivize innovation and entrepreneurship. 
            ``Hope is not a strategy''; rather, as a nation we must 
            think and act deliberately regarding the intersection of 
            markets and space policy.

    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Dr. Dittmar. Now, before I 
introduce Mr. Gold, I want to ask for unanimous consent to 
enter the following document into the record, an article from 
``Space News'' authored by Mr. Gold, titled, ``The Mind--'' It 
is titled, ``Mind the Gap in Low Earth Orbit''. So, if we ask 
for unanimous consent, all in favor say aye.
    [A chorus of ayes.]
    Senator Hickenlooper. So be it.
    [The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    

    Senator Hickenlooper. Now, Dr.--or Mr. Gold, the floor is 
yours.
    Mr. Gold. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. Perhaps we could also enter the visual that 
Dr. Dittmar----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely.
    Senator Wicker.--was trying to show us.
    Dr. Dittmar. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    [The visual referred to was a video shown at the hearing.]

  STATEMENT OF MIKE GOLD, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR CIVIL 
           SPACE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, REDWIRE SPACE

    Mr. Gold. Thank you, Senator. I will speak for both myself 
and Redwire. My CEO is right behind me, so he can kick me if I 
get out of line. So, I appreciate it. Again, gratitude to our 
Chair, Senator Hickenlooper. I would also like to express my 
appreciation to Ranking Member Lummis, to Committee Ranking 
Member, Senator Wicker, and Senator Moran, as well as my 
appreciation to the talented and intrepid staff that has helped 
support this hearing. And again, I want to say thank you for 
this extraordinarily important, timely topic of international 
collaboration and competition in space.
    We often think of space as a vacuum. The word space itself 
can be interpreted to mean nothing. But I prefer to think of 
space as everything. Space is what connects the moon to the 
Earth and all of us to each other. The exploration of space 
unites this country and the world, in a way no other endeavor 
can. And the desire to unite humanity is at the very heart of 
the Artemis mission.
    Through Artemis, NASA is assembling the largest, broadest, 
and most diverse international, beyond low Earth orbit, human 
space flight coalition in history. However, assembling this 
unprecedented international collaboration for Artemis was 
neither simple nor easy. Due to the failure of every single 
beyond LEO, American human space flight initiative to come to 
fruition since Apollo, there is great skepticism among both 
partner and rival nations, relative to NASA's ability to 
sustain a program to return astronauts to the surface of the 
moon.
    This is why, more than any other rocket engine or piece of 
technology, bipartisanship is the key to the success of 
Artemis. Without robust and ongoing bipartisan support, we will 
not be able to lead a global coalition to the moon, Mars, or 
any other destination. We cannot unite the world, if we cannot 
first unite here in Congress. Which is why a bipartisan NASA 
authorization bill is urgently needed to both reassure partner 
nations, and send a message of unity, of purpose to our rivals.
    I want to thank this committee for already passing NASA 
authorization language through the Senate, as part of the U.S. 
Innovation and Competition Act and urge your counterparts in 
the House to proceed with alacrity so that the entire Congress 
can adopt a NASA authorization bill that strongly and 
explicitly endorses Artemis.
    Beyond technology that we developed the Artemis, the policy 
surrounding the program is just as important. America must lead 
in developing norms of behavior in space, to ensure that the 
exploration and development of the moon and Mars is conducted 
in a safe, sustainable, and peaceful fashion. While at NASA, it 
was the privilege of my lifetime to craft and lead the 
development and successful adoption of the Artemis Accords, 
which have now been signed by 12 countries. The principles of 
the Accords, such as transparency, interoperability, due 
regard, avoiding harmful interference, the sustainable use of 
space resources, and mitigating debris are the foundation that 
humanity's future in space should be built upon.
    I hope that NASA continues to expand the family of nations 
that have adopted the Accords, and that the agency focuses, in 
particular, on bringing new partners from Africa and developing 
countries around the world, demonstrating that no matter how 
large or how modest their contributions are to Artemis, that 
all nations can join us in this unprecedented journey of 
discovery to the moon and Mars.
    Closer to Earth, the International Space Station continues 
to represent the pinnacle of global cooperation in human space 
flight. We must send a clear and unequivocal message to both 
partners and rivals, that America will remain a leader in low 
Earth orbit, by extending the ISS through 2030. At Redwire 
Space, which is the only company to successfully manufacture 
items on the ISS, we are focused on leveraging the unique 
nature of the microgravity environment to develop new 
technologies and innovations that will help to bolster global 
communications that will heal the sick and that will feed the 
hungry.
    Moreover, America must ensure that we do not suffer from a 
space station gap, which would cede the scientific, economic, 
and diplomatic benefits of crewed LEO operations to China. 
Therefore, in an upcoming authorization bill, we must provide 
robust support for the development and deployment, by the 
private sector, of a new commercial space station that will 
continue the legacy of the ISS, sustaining and expanding 
American international cooperation in low Earth orbit.
    While opportunities for collaboration are many and varied, 
we must also not lose sight of the ongoing technological 
competitions in space that American can ill-afford to ignore. 
Specifically, the countries and companies that master orbital 
servicing, assembly, and manufacturing, will be the economic 
and national security leaders of the future. I am proud that, 
at Redwire, through the development of systems such as 
Archinaut, a satellite that literally assembles itself in 
orbit, we are contributing to American competitiveness in this 
vital arena.
    However, much more needs to be done and the upcoming NASA 
authorization should include explicit support for Archinaut and 
public-private partnerships generally, that will result in even 
more ambitious technologies, leveraging deployable structures, 
robotics, and 3D printing. We can, and I believe, should engage 
with rival nations, including China, on norms of behavior in 
space, as well as benign, cooperative scientific activities, 
such as lunar sample swaps and sharing climate data. However, 
constant vigilance is the price we pay for liberty, which is 
why I hope the Senate will continue to urge NASA to redouble 
the agency support for public-private partnerships, which are 
the key to maintaining American competitiveness in space.
    The journey of Artemis and NASA is to the Moon, Mars, and 
beyond. But if we properly balance collaboration and 
competition, the destination will be peace and prosperity.
    Thank you for this opportunity to testify and I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Gold follows:]

  Prepared Statement of Mike Gold, Executive Vice President for Civil 
               Space and External Affairs, Redwire Space
I. Introduction
    Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, Subcommittee Chairman 
Hickenlooper, Subcommittee Ranking Member Lummis, and distinguished 
Members of the Committee, I'm grateful to all of you as well as your 
intrepid staff for the opportunity to testify regarding the vital topic 
of international collaboration and competition in space.
    All of us in the space industry are explorers. However, we're not 
just exploring the depths of space, we're also exploring new 
international relationships and innovative partnerships with the 
private sector. The benefits gained from such activities creates 
tremendous value and is a critical part of our Nation's journey into 
the final frontier.
    In today's geopolitical environment, maintaining and growing our 
international relationships in space has never been more important. The 
space environment challenges us in a singularly harsh manner. Space is 
a crucible that demands the formation of global coalitions to bear the 
extraordinary difficulties and risks of exploration and development. 
International partnerships are not just a luxury but a necessity, and 
the U.S. is at an inflection point where our Nation's ability to lead 
future global coalitions will either be bolstered and revitalized or 
undermined and substantively damaged.
II. Sustaining the Continuity of Artemis
    In regard to beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) human space exploration, 
our Nation has, unfortunately, struggled to maintain its focus. 
Numerous beyond LEO human spaceflight programs have been initiated by 
NASA only to face termination by a subsequent Presidential 
Administration or Congress. The Vision for Space Exploration, the 
Constellation Program, and the Asteroid Retrieval Mission, are just a 
few of the initiatives our country engaged in which did not come to 
fruition. This failure to sustain a beyond LEO human spaceflight 
strategy has not gone unnoticed by our international partners. Our 
colleagues in Europe, Japan, Canada, and across the world have in many 
ways born the brunt of our national inability to execute on a proposed 
vision. This pattern of inconsistency has substantively damaged U.S. 
credibility on the global stage and has forced partner nations to 
question their relationship with the U.S. in space exploration.
    As the Acting Associate Administrator for the Office of 
International and Interagency Relations (``OIIR''), I was often exposed 
to this growing skepticism of NASA's ability to sustain a beyond LEO 
human spaceflight program. My first overseas trip upon joining NASA in 
2019 was to Paris to conduct negotiations for the European Space 
Agency's (``ESA's'') contributions to the Gateway. My enthusiasm for 
international collaboration was met with justifiable skepticism from 
our European partners about whether the Gateway and Artemis would be 
sustained or, like previous NASA beyond LEO human spaceflight plans, 
would fade away and fail due to changing political priorities and/or a 
lack of funding.
    Despite this skepticism, the OIIR team and our State Department 
counterparts managed to convince not just ESA's leadership, but the 
Japanese and Canadian governments that Artemis would be different. My 
primary argument was the bipartisan support that Artemis enjoyed. At 
the time I pointed to support from several Democratic policymakers, 
including the Chair of this Committee, Senator Cantwell, for the 
general goals and structure of Artemis. I personally reassured foreign 
officials that then NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine was keenly aware 
of past history, and he was making every effort possible to build a 
bipartisan coalition which would sustain Artemis through any future 
changes in leadership in the White House or Congress. As a matter of 
fact, I was brought to NASA by former Administrator Bridenstine 
specifically to build a global coalition since he viewed such 
international partnerships as the key to sustaining the Artemis 
program.
    Again, despite justifiable skepticism, our international partners 
agreed to join us and executed binding agreements in support of the 
Gateway. This support was manifested by the commitment of billions of 
dollars of international contributions toward building hardware for the 
Gateway and the Artemis program. Our international partners have 
embraced Artemis, appropriated substantial funding, and built their own 
plans around our strategy. In return, the U.S. cannot equivocate, turn 
back, or show anything less than the steadfast commitment that our 
international partners have already demonstrated.
    Over the course of decades during which the U.S. struggled to 
sustain a beyond LEO human spaceflight program, the world has changed. 
China now represents a capable and attractive partner which is courting 
even our closest allies in Europe, Canada, and around the globe. In 
stark contrast to NASA, the Chinese space program has enjoyed 
unwavering political direction and consistency relative to their lunar 
plans. In the eyes of many, China represents a reliable alternative 
partner to the U.S. that does not suffer from the vicissitudes of the 
American political system and is rapidly growing its space-related 
capabilities and expertise.
    Therefore, clear and explicit support for the Artemis program has 
never been more vital. The U.S. can no longer afford to change 
direction and must continue to embrace the Artemis program in a 
bipartisan fashion to preserve American credibility and our Nation's 
ability to assemble and lead the global coalitions that are necessary 
to succeed in space exploration.
    For all of these reasons, I applaud the Biden administration for 
maintaining the continuity of the Artemis program with enthusiasm and 
alacrity. It was an honor to serve with then Acting Chief of Staff and 
Senior White House Appointee, Bhavya Lal, whose outstanding leadership 
allowed the Agency generally and Artemis specifically to emerge from 
the transition, which are always difficult periods, with clarity and 
constancy of purpose. Moreover, your former colleague and now NASA 
Administrator Bill Nelson has provided strong and consistent leadership 
and enjoys a close relationship with the President as well as the 
Congress which is vital to successfully implementing Artemis.
    I would also be remiss if I did not commend the bipartisan 
leadership of Jim Bridenstine, including reaching across the aisle to 
place our current Administrator on the NASA Advisory Council. 
Administrator Bridenstine's unflagging efforts to build a broad and 
deep political coalition helped to ensure the future of Artemis. I will 
never forget when, after participating in a Women's Equality Day event 
at NASA Ames, Speaker Pelosi stated her support for Artemis by 
instructing the Administrator to work on getting the first woman to the 
Moon as quickly as possible. Subsequently, Vice President Pence tweeted 
about the Speaker's message thanking her for the support. Such 
alignment between two political rivals is all too rare, and kudos to 
Jim Bridenstine for his efforts to bring disparate leaders together in 
support of the Artemis program.
    Of course, this Committee and its staff has consistently served as 
a shining example of bipartisanship. In my various private sector 
positions and while at NASA, I was always grateful for the vision and 
unparalleled bipartisan nature of the Commerce Committee's space 
policies. Under both Democratic and Republican control, including 
during Senator Nelson's tenure, this Committee has represented the best 
of Capitol Hill, always striving to find common ground and bridging 
divides.
    Now, more than ever, we need bipartisan leadership, which is why 
Congress passing a NASA Authorization Bill is of paramount importance. 
As I described previously, it's vital for the U.S. to present a unified 
vision to both allies and rivals. The best way to accomplish this is 
through a bipartisan NASA Authorization which includes strong and 
explicit support for the Artemis program. I want to thank and 
congratulate this Committee for crafting a NASA Authorization as part 
of the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) of 2021 which has 
been passed by the Senate. It's critical for the House of 
Representatives to also take action and for Congress to adopt a 
reconciled bill as expeditiously as possible. Both partner and rival 
nations have a sophisticated understanding of the Congressional 
process. The lack of a bipartisan NASA Authorization bill sends a 
negative message regarding America's ability to move forward with a 
unified vision for space exploration. Therefore, this issue must be 
rectified quickly before it leads to inevitable doubts and concerns 
that will damage America's ability to execute the critical global 
partnerships that are such an important part of the Artemis program.
III. Avoiding a Space Station Gap
    Another area where policy consistency is critical is in LEO. The 
venerable ISS, which has now supported a continuous crewed presence for 
over twenty years, stands out as a dramatic success for American global 
leadership and policy continuity. Thanks to the ISS, the U.S. has been 
a hub for an unprecedented partnership that defines the present and 
will influence the future of human space exploration. An entire 
generation has been born and grown to adulthood never knowing a world 
where there isn't an international team of scientists living and 
working on a space station. I believe that far too often we take this 
extraordinary accomplishment for granted. Having negotiated the binding 
Memorandums of Understanding for the Gateway which were based on the 
ISS's Intergovernmental Agreement, I have a great personal appreciation 
for the difficulty of assembling the ISS coalition as well as 
maintaining it. I have always felt that the ISS should receive a Nobel 
Peace Prize acknowledging the herculean work of those who transformed 
the station from dream into reality.
    Yet again, I would like to thank the Committee for including in the 
NASA Authorization Act, which passed the Senate, language extending the 
ISS to at least 2030. The ISS still remains the pinnacle for human 
spaceflight and we should leverage the station's singular capabilities 
for as long as possible. Again, Congress adopting an authorization bill 
extending the ISS will be extraordinarily important to provide our 
international partners with certainty relative to the future of the 
station.
    Moreover, per the commendable authorization language passed by the 
Senate, America's goal is to maintain a continuous human presence in 
LEO. Extending the ISS is an important part of achieving this 
objective, but of equal importance is ensuring that when the ISS is 
retired, there is a commercial space station that will carry on its 
legacy. The ISS itself took decades to construct and America now faces 
the troubling prospect of a space station gap. The U.S. can ill afford 
to lose its presence in LEO. Astronautics opportunities, which are the 
grist for the mill of international collaborations, will always be more 
plentiful in LEO than for beyond LEO operations. Additionally, we're 
only now beginning to realize the incredible potential of microgravity 
manufacturing, research, and development. The microgravity environment 
represents an entirely new arena for trailblazing scientific and 
commercial endeavors. What we will learn from and what we can do in 
microgravity has the potential to revolutionize fields as diverse as 
drug treatments and medicine to communications, agriculture, and 
construction.
    America cannot lose access to this unique environment at exactly 
the time when others are beginning to establish a foothold in LEO. 
Specifically, over the course of the past year, China has launched its 
own space station which has now received both resupply missions and 
astronauts. Only a few days ago, China launched their most recent crew 
to their station, beginning the longest duration mission Chinese 
astronauts have ever undertaken. Moreover, China is aggressively 
courting our existing ISS partners, particularly in Europe, to join 
their new crewed LEO operations. Again, for two decades the ISS has 
allowed the U.S. to serve as a hub for global astronautics activities. 
As the world's leading Democracy, we must not cede the substantial 
diplomatic and political soft power benefits of crewed space station 
operations to China or any other nation.
    Moreover, a space station gap would have a dramatic negative impact 
on American launch capabilities. Losing the demand for commercial cargo 
launches to the ISS as well as commercial crew (not long after 
investing billions of dollars to develop this capability), would impede 
gaining experience with these systems as well as continued innovation 
and growth. The damage done to American launch capabilities and 
international competitiveness would hurt our overall industrial base 
creating issues not just for civil space operations but for national 
security space activities as well.
    Avoiding a space station gap will not be simple or easy. Developing 
and deploying a new space station is a nontrivial effort that could 
take a decade or more. NASA is wisely turning to the private sector to 
leverage commercial innovation and efficiencies to build and operate 
this new station. I'm excited to see NASA's Commercial LEO Destinations 
(``CLD'') program progress taking us a step closer to ensuring that the 
U.S. and our partners maintain a continuous human presence in LEO. At 
Redwire Space, we are the only organization that has ever successfully 
printed objects on the ISS and we are a global leader in microgravity 
manufacturing and R&D. We will apply our company's singular 
capabilities and experiences with microgravity manufacturing, along 
with our innovative roll out solar arrays, robotics, digital 
engineering, sun sensors, star trackers, and other technologies to 
ensure the success of the CLD effort.
    Finally, I want to applaud this Committee for passing language that 
reinforces America's commitment to maintaining a continuous presence in 
LEO through the development of a commercial space station. I hope that 
the House moves forward quickly with a NASA Authorization Bill which 
includes identical language allowing Congress to send an unequivocal 
message to partners and allies alike that we have learned from history 
and that this Nation stands united in support of preventing a space 
station gap.
IV. Maintaining Technological Leadership Through Public-Private
  Partnerships
    There can be no question that we are in a great powers struggle 
with China. This rivalry extends to space where the implications of the 
U.S. falling behind China technologically would have devastating 
consequences. This is a race that the U.S. cannot afford to lose, 
however, in many critical areas we are already facing the prospect of 
falling behind. Specifically, the U.S. must redouble its efforts to 
support next-generation space-based robotics. We are entering a new era 
where satellites and robotic systems are merging, and America must 
embrace this change and excel at these advanced technologies.
    For example, at Redwire Space we are developing systems such as 
Archinaut (also referred to as `OSAM-2'), a satellite that, after 
deployment, will use robotics to build itself. In addition to robotic 
assembly, we are developing satellites that leverage 3D printing to 
create far larger objects in space than could have ever been placed 
into a rocket fairing. These space platforms that construct themselves 
after being deployed in space will offer substantially enhanced 
capabilities as well as resilience to attack that could never be 
achieved by traditional satellite systems. While Redwire Space has 
unparalleled heritage and expertise in this field, China is well aware 
of the importance of space-based robotics and has already deployed 
Shijian-17, a satellite with, among other features, a robotic arm that 
could be used to grapple satellites. Shijian-17 has already flown 
unusual orbital maneuvers bringing it closer to other satellites 
generating suspicion and concern. Again, the U.S. must bolster its 
efforts to equal and exceed Chinese space-based robotic capabilities to 
protect our industrial competitive edge as well as the Nation's overall 
economy and security.
    As noted previously, China's autocratic regime does have the 
benefit of policy consistency and the Nation has focused on developing 
world-class space technology for decades. China's efforts are coming to 
fruition and the U.S. faces an unprecedented challenge to maintain 
space supremacy or, in the long run, even parity.
    The best and possibly only way for the U.S. to meet this 
existential threat is for America to embrace its great strengths that 
China struggles to or cannot reproduce. Specifically, the U.S. must 
redouble its efforts to leverage American entrepreneurialism. A free 
society, grounded in the rule of law, with a diverse population, will 
always innovate at a greater rate than more homogeneous nations where 
freedoms are severely curtailed. America created the commercial space 
revolution, and our private space sector is the envy of the world. 
Programs such as NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services 
(``COTS'') and the Commercial Resupply Services (``CRS'') contracts, 
played a critical role in creating the commercial space industry as we 
know it today.
    In order to effectively compete with China, the Congress, NASA, the 
Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community, must all embrace 
public-private partnerships to an even greater degree than what is 
occurring today. The government must support commercial development, 
playing the role of both catalyst and customer for innovative 
technologies. Commercial space represents a force multiplier that has 
already transformed the nature of the industry. However, there is much 
more that can be done by the U.S. government to make efforts such as 
COTS and CRS the rule rather than the exception. Again, whenever 
possible, the government should serve as a customer for innovative 
capabilities that will maintain and accelerate U.S. leadership, 
particularly in critical areas such as orbital servicing, assembly, and 
manufacturing. Only by substantially expanding the use of public-
private partnerships can the U.S. effectively protect itself and the 
world from emerging threats that will only become more pernicious in 
the years to come.
    For all of these reasons, the NASA authorization bill should 
include explicit support to bolster Archinaut specifically and on-orbit 
servicing, assembly, and manufacturing technologies generally. This is 
a critical area of technological endeavor that the U.S. must excel in 
and explicit direction via an authorization bill is key to maintaining 
American competitiveness.
V. Establishing Norms of Behavior in Space
    It is vital for America to lead not only in technology but in 
policy as well. As in any new frontier, establishing rules and norms of 
behavior will play a critical role in preventing conflict and ensuring 
that space is developed in a safe, sustainable, and peaceful fashion. 
While at NASA, it was my privilege to craft and negotiate the Artemis 
Accords which, in less than one year since their inception, have now 
been signed by twelve nations.
    The Artemis Accords were successful due in no small part to the 
unprecedented partnership between NASA and the Department of State, and 
I want to take this opportunity to thank Jonathan Margolis, Acting 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Space, and Health at the Bureau 
of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs for 
his support, partnership, and friendship in developing the Accords. I 
also need to thank another friend and colleague, Gabriel Swiney, the 
Department of State's lead civil space attorney who was one of the 
first people I discussed the Accords with. Gabriel's vision and 
knowledge are reflected throughout the Accords and his skill made them 
a success. Finally, the Artemis Accords would of course not exist 
without the outstanding leadership of Jim Bridenstine, who provided 
strong and unflagging support for the Accords as well as the 
partnership with the Department of State, and the former Administrator 
simply wouldn't take no for an answer in his efforts to bring me to 
NASA.
    The Artemis Accords present the model for future policy initiatives 
wherein NASA and State work in unison. Moreover, the Accords would not 
have succeeded without the coordination and assistance provided by the 
National Space Council, and its former Executive Secretary, Dr. Scott 
Pace. I have greatly benefited from Dr. Pace's support over the years, 
and his leadership was vital for both the Artemis Accords and the 
signing of the binding Gateway agreements, particularly the agreement 
with the Government of Japan. Finally, I want to again thank the Biden 
administration's leadership including Secretary of State Antony 
Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, NASA Administrator 
Bill Nelson, NASA Deputy Administrator Pam Melroy, and Senior Advisor 
to the Administrator, Bhavya Lal, for their strong support of the 
Artemis Accords. Again, continuity is vital, and I am personally 
grateful for the Biden team's robust support for building international 
partnerships and establishing norms of behavior in space.
    Due to the Accords, the Artemis program has established the largest 
and most diverse human space exploration coalition in history, but much 
more remains to be done. Specifically, more countries should be added 
to the Accords and the Artemis program. For example, I hope that NASA 
and the Department of State continue and accelerate efforts that I 
worked on during my tenure at OIIR to bring African nations into the 
family of the Artemis Accords. I believe that the benefits of space 
exploration and space-based capabilities are particularly important for 
developing nations and that the unique views and voices of African 
youth in particular can greatly contribute to the Artemis program. 
Moreover, China has targeted Africa both economically and politically, 
and NASA should not cede African partnerships to rival nations. 
Additionally, it would be beneficial for a few more of our traditional 
space allies, specifically, France and Germany, to join the Accords 
demonstrating unified support in Europe for responsible norms of 
behavior in space. Finally, I hope that efforts at NASA and State are 
continuing for India to join the Accords. India's robust and growing 
space capabilities make their support for norms of behavior critical to 
achieve a peaceful and prosperous future in space for all of humanity 
to enjoy.
    The Accords establish a strong foundation for beyond LEO civil 
space activities, building a future based on transparency, 
interoperability, the full and public release of scientific data, 
avoiding harmful interference, and environmental sustainability. 
However, new rules and norms need to be established for national 
security operations. The Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space, 
described in a July 7th Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, 
represents a good start. However, establishing an international 
coalition to support these tenets is vital to their success and 
universal adoption. The Artemis Accords serve as a model for how such 
coalitions can be built, and I know that myself and others who were 
involved in developing and implementing the Accords stand ready to 
assist our colleagues at the Department of Defense and Space Force in 
their own efforts to establish vital norms of behavior in the national 
security realm.
    In addition to explicitly authorizing the Artemis program, I hope 
that the upcoming NASA authorization bill includes language 
complimenting NASA's work in support of the Artemis Accords, signaling 
to both partners and rivals that the Congress strongly endorses 
establishing global norms of behavior to ensure a peaceful and 
prosperous future in space.
VI. Collaborating and Competing with China
    For better or worse, the U.S.--Chinese relationship will determine 
the future of space exploration and development. As described 
previously, the U.S. cannot afford to fall behind China in critical 
capabilities such as space-based robotics, in-space manufacturing, and 
space-based solar power. However, there are nontrivial opportunities to 
collaborate with China that could benefit both countries and advance 
global prospects for peace and prosperity.
    Specifically, NASA and the Department of State should continue to 
advocate for China to sign the Artemis Accords. Although China is not a 
part of the Artemis program, and the Accords were written to ensure 
that nations participating in Artemis abide by international treaty 
obligations and norms of behavior such as the full, free, and timely 
release of scientific information, China signing the Accords would send 
a strong signal of unity and global consensus relative to the simple 
and intuitive principles of the Accords. The Accords were a product of 
lengthy negotiations between eight different space agencies and 
ministries of foreign affairs. The substance and text of the Accords 
represents the common ground among countries with a diverse set of 
policy positions (e.g., the U.S. opposes the Moon Agreement whereas 
Australia is a signatory). The Accords were written to be as inclusive 
as possible and, in particular, the United Arab Emirates officials who 
participated in the drafting process were a strong voice for ensuring 
that the Accords could be signed by any nation with a desire to support 
peaceful space operations and development. The Artemis Accords were 
explicitly and exquisitely crafted to unite nations with disparate 
views, bringing the world together to prevent conflict and ensure 
harmonious activities on the Moon and Mars. China committing to the 
Accords would be a welcome development that I believe would benefit 
both nations and global space policy discourse generally.
    During discussions at the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space, the State Department has invited China and all 
nations to sign the Artemis Accords. Beyond such interactions at the 
United Nations, I recommend that the State Department continue the 
practice of convening Civil Space Dialogues with China, to discuss the 
Accords and norms of behavior in space. If China were to join the 
Artemis Accords, like with other signatories, it would provide 
specific, actionable commitments that the country would be held to for 
civil space operations on the Moon, asteroids, comets, and Mars.
    I have high hopes that a productive conversation could be held with 
China on norms of behavior due to my experiences with several global 
efforts that included Chinese participation. For example, prior to 
joining NASA, I served as an industry member of the Hague International 
Space Resources Governance Working Group, which brought together 
experts from around the world to draft `building blocks' in support of 
establishing rules for space resource exploration and utilization. One 
of China's leading law professors participated in the Hague Working 
Group and his input was robust, constructive, and productive. As a 
matter of fact, some of the text and ideas generated by the Hague 
Working Group were adopted as part of the Artemis Accords.
    Moreover, I am currently supporting the efforts of the Global 
Expert Group on Sustainable Lunar Activities (``GEGSLA''), which is a 
NGO that, as the name indicates, is bringing together policy and legal 
experts from across the world to develop norms of behavior for the 
Moon. The GEGSLA involves many of the same academic, industry, and 
government experts as the Hague Group, including several Chinese 
nationals who have been working side-by-side with, among others, 
American commercial space leaders to establish rules of the road for 
lunar activities which are based upon not only the Outer Space Treaty 
of 1967, but the prior work done by the Hague Group and the Artemis 
Accords. While I know from personal experience that coming to agreement 
on even general principles for space exploration and development can be 
extremely difficult, I firmly believe that this is an area where the 
U.S. could and should engage with China in an attempt to identify 
common ground.
    At the next Civil Space Dialogue between the U.S. and China, in 
addition to norms of behavior, other forms of collaboration could be 
discussed. For example, a swap of lunar samples would be a low-risk 
means of initiating cooperation in space with China, which NASA could 
engage in while staying well within the bounds of the Wolf Amendment. 
Finally, the U.S. is already collaborating with China and other nations 
on the Space Geodesy Project, which produces a wide variety of 
information for Earth observation and climate science. Additional 
collaborations with China on climate research is another area which, if 
handled correctly, could benefit both nations without running afoul of 
the requirements of the Wolf Amendment.
VII. Conclusion
    Collaboration and cooperation must both be harnessed to ensure that 
humanity's journey into the undiscovered country of space is safe, 
peaceful, and prosperous. Again, we cannot afford to fall behind in 
critical new areas of space technology and must maintain the continuity 
of the Artemis program as well as maintain a continuous crewed presence 
in LEO. However, we must also reach out to both allies and rivals to 
collaborate whenever possible to support norms of behavior in space and 
mutual areas of scientific interest and concern such as climatology.
    As mentioned previously, Redwire is a global leader for in-space 
manufacturing. We have an expertise in building microgravity products 
that will enable ambitious space exploration missions and improve life 
on Earth. Redwire, and all of us in the private sector, must join with 
our colleagues in government to build not just technology, but the 
future. This is an in-space manufacturing endeavor that will demand 
unprecedented work, coordination, and support from across industry and 
government. Although we will face many challenges, I remain confident 
in America's ability to build a new era in space of peace, freedom, and 
prosperity, benefiting the world and many future generations to come.

    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you. And you did not even 
mention the companies that Redwire has in Colorado.
    Mr. Gold. I will say, since it is just between us, they are 
three of our best.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Hickenlooper. All right. Now, we are ready to hear 
from Dr. Sanders.

  STATEMENT OF DR. PATRICIA SANDERS, CHAIR, AEROSPACE SAFETY 
 ADVISORY PANEL, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

    Dr. Sanders. Thank you, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator 
Lummis, and Wicker, and Members of the Subcommittee. I thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 
NASA's international collaboration and competition in space.
    The panel that I chair has the serious charge to provide 
both NASA and the Congress with advice for the intelligent 
management of the risks that are inherent in human space 
flight. NASA has been at the forefront of human space flight 
for decades, formulating the missions, defining the 
requirements, executing the programs, performing management 
integration, and leading launch processing and mission 
operations.
    NASA still leads in human space exploration, but the 
Agency's role is evolving with critical implications for safety 
and risk management. The Agency is not the same as it was 10 
years ago and will not be the same in even another 5 years. The 
rapid growth of commercial space services, and increasing 
global interest in space, have changed the environment and the 
landscape will not return where NASA is the only, or even the 
major, actor. This has tremendous upside potential and equally 
tremendous challenges for managing the risk of human space 
exploration. At the same time, the exploration endeavors NASA 
leads are ever more complex and have ever more risk involved.
    NASA has been gradually and tactfully and successfully 
adjusting to a changing role and set of responsibilities, as it 
shifts from principally executing its programs and missions to 
commercially and internationally acquiring significant key 
elements and services. And our Panel firmly believes that NASA 
must now take a more strategic examination of the Agency's 
evolution in the emerging environment, while continuing to 
manage a safe and complex human exploration campaign.
    NASA's challenge is the melding of traditional and 
innovative approaches, including significant systems 
engineering and integration complexities, and the certification 
of commercial human space flight capabilities with high levels 
of risk. There are clear advantages to leveraging industry 
innovators and international partners, but NASA must still 
manage and be responsible for the overall risks, even when the 
Agency neither controls nor dictates the material solutions for 
all of the components. To do this, we believe that NASA, first, 
must determine how to exercise appropriate accountability, or 
how to hold its vendors accountable, for the safe and 
successful accomplishment of its mission.
    Second, we believe it is imperative to define the overall 
architecture for the highly complex Artemis mission. The Agency 
should identify how each individual element, regardless of 
provider, fits the architecture, and the top-level requirements 
for each element to fulfill its necessary function in the 
overall structure. This should allow NASA to focus on the right 
set of priorities at the right time and to communicate 
expectations to all the contributors: internal, commercial, and 
international, in a consistent manner.
    Third, all of this is complicated by the Nation's current 
lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework for human 
commercial spaceflight. NASA retains full accountability for 
its missions, but no external government regulations or 
standards exist to set a baseline level of expectation for the 
provider related to human safety. The few existing regulatory 
pieces leave a gap related to human on-orbit safety, and the 
space industry that impacts human safety. In particular, as has 
already been mentioned, there is an immediate and compelling 
need to designate a civil agency to oversee and coordinate 
space traffic management.
    Given the importance of space to international security, 
technological leadership, and international competitiveness, it 
is vital for the Nation to act now to preserve the safety of 
space operations and their environment.
    In closing, I note some consistent advice themes from the 
Panel. First, it is a need for a constancy of purpose, as 
mentioned, sustained commitment, and a clear understanding of 
the objectives. Second, is the importance of setting 
challenging but achievable schedules, and not allowing undue 
schedule pressure to lead to decisions adversely impacting 
safety and mission assurance. And third, is technical baselines 
and schedules that are mutually consistent, realistic, and 
achievable, and supported by adequate and stable resources.
    We encourage NASA, in partnership with the Congress, to 
hold fast to the foundations of risk management, while 
embracing and not fearing alternative methods to achieving 
those fundamentals.
    And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Sanders follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety and 
     Advisory Panel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    Senator Hickenlooper and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss NASA's 
international collaboration and competition in space.
    As you know, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is charged with 
advising both the NASA Administrator and the Congress with respect to 
the safety and risk of human space flight as well as other safety 
related matters at the Agency. In opening, I would like to emphasize 
that the Panel feels the responsibility to provide advice that promotes 
the driving down of risk to the lowest reasonable level consistent with 
accomplishing the mission. Space exploration is inherently dangerous; 
the environment is hostile, and the systems needed to survive in it are 
complex. Our charge is not to avoid any and all risks, but to provide 
advice and feedback for the intelligent management of those risks.
    NASA has been at the forefront of human space flight for decades, 
and for much of that time it executed the programs, formulated the 
missions, defined the requirements, and performed management 
integration of all the elements composing the system. NASA personnel 
performed the engineering analyses, and they led launch processing and 
mission operations.
    NASA leadership in human space exploration is still preeminent, but 
the Agency's role is evolving with critical implications for how risk 
and safety will be managed in the future. The Agency is not the same as 
it was ten years ago, and most assuredly, it will not be the same in 
another ten years--even five years--from now. With the rapid growth of 
available commercial space services, and increasing global interest in 
space, the environment in which NASA operates has changed; NASA will 
not return to a landscape in which it is the only, or even the major, 
actor. These developments have tremendous upside potential--and are 
accompanied by equally tremendous challenges for managing the risk of 
human space exploration. Concurrently, the human exploration endeavors 
NASA is leading are becoming ever more complex, and with more risk, 
from the lunar exploration to eventual excursions to Mars and beyond.
    Over the past several years, NASA has been adjusting to a changing 
role and set of responsibilities as it shifts from principally 
executing its programs and missions to commercially acquiring 
significant key elements and services. The Agency has gradually and 
tactically adapted and succeeded in meeting challenges as they arise. 
Regardless of their tactical achievements to date, the Panel firmly 
believes that it is critical at this time that NASA take more strategic 
scrutiny of the role the Agency should undertake going forward. How the 
Agency plans to evolve and transition to an organization that more 
frequently procures human space flight capabilities as services, while 
managing a safe and wholly new human exploration campaign, is a key 
strategic question that has the Panel's attention. We continue to 
emphasize the importance for NASA to strategically define its mission, 
its guiding principles, and its vision for the Agency's leadership role 
in the future in order to ensure that risk is managed appropriately.
    The emerging challenges for NASA involve the melding of traditional 
and innovative program approaches, including the significant systems 
engineering and integration complexities, and the certification of 
commercial human space flight capabilities that carry high levels of 
risk. The Panel has noted clear advantages to leveraging the industry 
innovators, but NASA must still manage and be responsible for the 
overall risks, even when the Agency does not control nor dictate the 
material solutions for some of the campaign components and services, 
such as the Human Landing System. It is critical for NASA to be able to 
manage the integrated risk and achieve the right balance with its 
providers.
    To do this, first, the Panel believes that NASA needs to figure out 
how to exercise appropriate accountability--or how to hold its vendors 
accountable--for the safe and successful accomplishment of its mission 
across the full spectrum of acquisition and development approaches. As 
the breadth and types of relationships develop, expand, and become more 
complex to achieve NASA's mission safely, and with good understanding 
of the risk involved, it is critical for the Agency to have and to use 
the appropriate tools including acquisition processes and contractual 
structures. There is not a one-size-fits-all approach anymore, and 
having an overarching view of what the Agency is trying to achieve 
should lead to a flexible and thoughtful deployment of the tools in the 
toolbox.
    Secondly, the Panel believes it is imperative to define the overall 
architecture for the highly complex Artemis mission sets. The Agency 
should identify how each individual element--regardless of provider--
fits the architecture, and define the top-level requirements that must 
be met in order to for the element to fulfill its necessary function in 
the overall mission structure. This work can then form the foundation 
for the system engineering and integration. The complexity of the 
Artemis ecosystem, along with the expected evolution of requirements--
which involves creating and maintaining an architecture that can be 
updated, adjusted, and can incorporate the latest innovation or new 
technology--can more effectively be managed by an integrated approach 
best achieved in a program construct. This should allow NASA as a whole 
to focus on the right set of priorities at the right time and to 
communicate expectations to all the contributors--internal, commercial, 
and international--in a consistent manner. In addition, all players 
understanding enterprise-level requirements, organized in a program 
construct, early in the process helps to identify opportunities and 
areas to pursue open architecture paradigms and reduce expensive, 
complicated, and bureaucratically burdensome design and contractual 
changes later.
    Thirdly, I note that NASA's approach is complicated by the Nation's 
current lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework for human 
commercial spaceflight. Presently, NASA retains full accountability, 
but no external government regulations or rules exist, which may help 
the Agency manage risk, or even set a baseline level of expectation for 
the provider, related to human occupant safety. There are some 
regulatory pieces in place. At the highest level is the Outer Space 
Treaty. The Federal Aviation Administration is responsible for 
licensing commercial launches and reentries, with a specific focus on 
the safety of the uninvolved public on the ground. The Federal 
Communications Commission is responsible for licensing radio broadcasts 
from space. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is 
responsible for licensing remote sensing operations. NASA and the 
Department of Defense are key players in space, but they are not 
regulatory agencies. That leaves a gap in authority specifically 
related to on-orbit safety, both for humans and the management of an 
increasingly more active satellite industry that will eventually impact 
human safety. Given the importance of space to national security, 
technological leadership and international competitiveness, our Panel 
believes it is vital for the United States to act now to preserve the 
safety of space operations and the safety of the environment. 
Consequently, I would be remiss if I did not repeat a standing Panel 
recommendation to the Congress. We feel very strongly that there is an 
immediate and compelling need to designate a civil agency to oversee 
and coordinate space traffic management. NASA, lacking any other 
framework, has established guidelines and standards for space traffic 
management, but there must be leadership and coordination at the 
national level
    Finally, I would like to reiterate some consistent advice themes 
from the Panel:

   First, we have consistently maintained that mission success 
        requires a constancy of purpose, a sustained commitment, and a 
        clear understanding of objectives.

   Second, a key issue, repeated year after year, is the 
        importance of setting challenging but achievable schedules, and 
        not allowing undue schedule pressure to lead to decisions that 
        adversely impact safety and mission assurance.

   Third, it is important to establish technical baselines and 
        schedules that are mutually consistent, realistic, and 
        achievable--supported by adequate and stable resources.

   And, we have continuously maintained that while NASA should 
        never lose sight of the fundamentals in risk management for 
        successful program execution, there is no one approach that 
        dictates success, and there should be an openness to learning 
        and accepting alternative means to understanding and 
        controlling margins.

    So, as NASA continues its deep space exploration, we encourage the 
Agency, in partnership with the Congress, to hold fast to the 
foundational standards of risk management while embracing new 
approaches and not fear alternative methodologies to achieving those 
fundamentals.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

    Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Well, thank you all for your--
your comments and appreciate the--the breadth of experience you 
bring to the table.
    We will now start a round of questions. Each of us will 
get--well, hopefully, will get 5 minutes. We try to stay on 
schedule. It is always hard. I always ask if, in responding to 
a question, if you can keep it to a minute, that allows us to 
get four questions in. If necessary, we can come back to a 
second round of questions or--there are so many questions to 
ask each of you. Anyway, I will start.
    I will start with Mr. Gold. Appreciate your work at NASA 
with the international partners and establishing these--the 
Artemis Accords and that cooperative spirit. In your testimony, 
I looked at it last night, you said ``space is a crucible that 
demands the formation of global coalitions''. So, how can 
Congress support NASA's goals to expand the coalition of 
international partners in space?
    Mr. Gold. Thank you, Senator. I can tell you, and I am sure 
the former Administrator would agree, NASA pays a lot of 
attention to Congress. And the rhetoric, you know, obviously, 
legislation that has passed, it determines whether NASA is 
aggressive in going out and forming international coalitions or 
holds back and really what the Agency does.
    So, I think it is extremely important, again, in an 
authorization bill, that there be explicit encouragement to the 
Agency, both to expand our international cooperation, 
generally, as well as specifically to expand, again, the family 
of the Artemis Accords. That there are so many countries that 
need to be involved that the Agency should be aggressively 
reaching out for, we need to lead by example and establish 
norms of behavior before there is conflict in space. And I know 
it is cliche, an ounce of prevention now, will prevent a pound 
of trouble down the road. So, including even a sense of 
Congress, about the Accords, international growth, and being 
aggressive to establish norms of behavior, I think, would be 
extremely helpful to assure a peaceful future.
    You know, other countries may or may not, you know, agree 
to the same norms that we do, but if we lead by example, we can 
take pressure there and create a coalition of willing.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely. That is--I think you are 
spot on. I could not agree more.
    Mr. Gold. Absolutely.
    Senator Hickenlooper. But I want to take--and Mr. Gold 
talked a little bit about this, the implications of a---of a 
gap. And I guess, Dr. Dittmar, let me ask you, where do you see 
the--what are the implications if we do end up with a space 
station gap, where the United States is not taking a leadership 
position?
    Dr. Dittmar. So, as--thank you for the question, Senator. 
As has already been pointed out, China has a space station that 
is flying in low-Earth orbit. This is actually their first 
module of a station that they are going to build out. And China 
is leveraging that space station. They have formed partnerships 
with UNOOSA. They have already--they recently announced that 
they had agreements to fly over 1,000 payloads. We have had 
American companies that have already said that they are 
beginning to lose customers to China and the Chinese station, 
because the Chinese are using state authority to subsidize 
access to station for commercial customers, as well.
    And so, if what we are saying is that we want to have a 
follow-on station that is privately--a public-private 
partnership, or is owned by a private entity, that entity 
absolutely depends upon access to customers that are not being, 
in effect, stolen away by a state agency, that is doing that, 
you know, intentionally to, sort of, undermine that capability.
    The other thing, frankly, is that, you know, robust 
presence in low Earth orbit, for Americans, has been a part of 
policy, whether stated or not, in the United States for more 
than 20 years--actually longer than that and--going back to the 
origin of NASA. And when you look toward an authorization bill, 
and I think it is really important to foot stomp, that U.S. 
presence in low Earth orbit is expected in perpetuity, that it 
is the policy of the United States that we will continue to do 
so, through whatever means. However, I think--and low Earth 
orbit is, frankly, our foothold going out into outer space. We 
need continuity of human space flight and human activity, 
beginning on the ground, through low Earth orbit, into deep 
space. And that chain is very, very important to American 
security, to American business, to American research and 
science, to American technology development and we cannot 
afford a gap.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. Well, we agree on that. Dr. 
Sanders, the GAO has expressed concern on the maturity of 
advanced lunar spacesuits. It is a classic case. But I think a 
lot of what all--everyone has talked about, and especially Mr. 
Bridenstine, the safety of these missions is--there are risks 
from 100 different directions. And can--I was going to ask you 
to describe how you believe that--that robust Congressional 
funding--that continuity of funding and authorizations could 
support--help NASA support the goals of safety and making sure 
that, you know, mission schedules can end up impacting safety 
and assurance.
    Dr. Sanders. Well, we have been a consistent proponent of 
adequately resourcing all of the complex requirements necessary 
for safely executing. When resources are not adequate, or not 
stable, the--NASA and their decision-making process on designs, 
end up making design choices that may be are premature, maybe 
they are--take risks that they would not necessarily take if 
they did not have to live within a resource that is not 
adequate, or they do not have the stability of the resources, 
it forces you to make choice sooner than you might want to 
take. It forces you to sometimes, down select earlier than you 
understand all the implications of competing designs. And so, 
it is very important to have the adequate resources and to have 
them in a stable fashion.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Right. Great, I appreciate that. I am 
already out of time. I cannot believe how fast this goes by. 
But I am not done with all of you. Mr. Bridenstine, you will 
get your moment.
    I am going to turn it over now to the Committee Chair, 
Senator Cantwell, who has been working on these issues for a 
long time, as long as--probably longer than most of you--most 
of us. Anyway, let me turn it over to the Chair.

               STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

    The Chair. Thank you, Chair Hickenlooper, and thanks for 
holding this subcommittee hearing, and to you and Senator 
Lummis for spending so much time to try to bring focus to the 
needs for authorizations. And thank you to the witnesses.
    I think I will start with you, Mr. Bridenstine. Obviously, 
one of the past times you came before this committee, you spoke 
very fervently about the need for authorization, and yet it has 
been since 2017 since we have actually had an authorizing bill. 
So, I sometimes feel like NASA wants to have the money without 
the authorization. That is, that it works, not to resolve the 
conflicts that we have with members that, basically, it just 
realizes, as long as you can just get the dollars it is OK. 
Well, that is not OK. And so, I just want to be clear with the 
panelists, if you could give me some feedback on some of these 
issues. Do you think that we need an authorization bill?
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, 100 percent.
    Dr. Dittmar. Yes.
    Mr. Gold. An authorization bill is vital to send messages 
to our partners and rival nations, with unity purpose of 
Congress, yes.
    The Chair. Dr. Sanders?
    Dr. Sanders. Yes.
    The Chair. OK. So, do we need to have more testing and 
analysis of rocket launching and the capabilities that we are 
looking for in the next system?
    Mr. Bridenstine. Do we need more testing and analysis?
    The Chair. Yes.
    Mr. Bridenstine. You can always have more testing. There is 
not doubt. And more analysis. At some point--and I like the way 
Patricia Sanders mentioned it earlier--we have to manage risk. 
So, it depends on what system we are talking about and--but 
certainly, there is value to more testing.
    The Chair. Dr. Dittmar?
    Dr. Dittmar. So, having been involved in the development of 
the space station, I would just echo what Jim said, which was--
--
    The Chair. I am just talking about--I will get to space 
stations in a minute.
    Dr. Dittmar. Specifically rockets?
    The Chair. Yes.
    Dr. Dittmar. No, what I was going to do was simply speak to 
engineering. OK, so--so it is always useful to have test data, 
but there is also an appropriate use of test data and then, a 
point at which just more and more testing simply adds cost and 
schedule.
    The Chair. And Mr. Gold?
    Mr. Gold. Senator, this country has not had a human space 
flight program beyond low Earth orbit in a very, very long 
time. We are going to have to relearn some critical lessons, as 
well as developing new technologies and new systems along the 
way. So, testing and making sure that we have a safe system 
that is robust and effectively competes with China and other 
nations is going to be critical, leveraging the wonderful 
private sector companies in your State, as well as those three 
that Senator Hickenlooper mentioned, of Redwire in Colorado.
    The Chair. OK. Dr. Sanders?
    Dr. Sanders. Strong proponent for adequate testing and 
analysis. As Mr. Bridenstine had said, it is not possible ever 
to completely and fully, totally eliminate risk and you want to 
manage it. But the way to manage it is through knowledge and 
we--as much knowledge as we think we have about systems, we 
continue to learn things about parachutes, about compatibility 
of the components, materials----
    The Chair. Do you think NASA Houston needs to have more 
oversight over the Artemis program and its schedules and 
launches?
    Mr. Bridenstine. I think their----
    The Chair. Than is currently provided.
    Mr. Bridenstine. I think their--well, oversight from the 
Congress or----
    The Chair. No, from NASA Houston.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Oh, from NASA Houston, for the Artemis 
program.
    The Chair. Yes.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Well, certainly there are a lot of 
different centers that are involved in the development of 
different components of the Artemis program. I think it is 
important that NASA has a robust capability to do the 
integration and I think, until recently, that has been lacking. 
But my understanding is--and I am not there anymore, but my 
understanding is they have really plussed up the systems 
integration piece that has been missing for a while.
    The Chair. Dr. Dittmar?
    Dr. Dittmar. With apologies, Senator, I am not as--I am not 
as current with what management has distributed across the 
center.
    The Chair. OK. Basically, I am bringing up topics that are 
part of the dispute between what the Senate and the House wants 
to do on a NASA authorization. So, I am just trying to get your 
viewpoints on that because part of the issue is, we have to 
debunk, you know, where we are. We cannot do an adequate 
oversight job if we do not have an authorization bill. We 
cannot come back on the measurements if we do not have some 
input here about what kind of structure we need.
    But we are sitting here with, obviously, a new--as Mr. Gold 
was saying, a pretty big, new adventure, at least from the 
number of stops we are talking about. And then, what we are 
talking about going beyond the moon. To say nothing of we 
really do not have any accurate dates or cost estimates or what 
we want out of each of these systems. What do we want out of 
the launch systems and the capabilities? What do we want out of 
the ISS and its capabilities? What do we want on the lander 
system? What do we want, you know, on the beyond lander--I am 
sorry, beyond the Moon?
    So, here we are having this discussion without reference 
and without oversight, really, because we do not have an 
authorization bill that is on a piece of paper, who is in 
charge, who is going to answer these questions, and how are we 
going to have this debate in Congress? So, what is coming 
across is the amount of money that people want to keep going, 
but then, it is always not enough. And then, the choices that 
people make do not necessarily adhere to redundancy and 
resiliency.
    So, I think it is just imperative that we get an 
authorization bill. And so, I am trying to figure out from you 
all, what you think some of these stumbling blocks really, 
truly are between our colleagues. So, Mr. Bridenstine?
    Mr. Bridenstine. Ma'am, I think--I think that is all--I 
agree with everything you just said. I think that is exactly 
right. And I would also say that one of the biggest values of 
having an authorization bill--yes, oversight is a big piece of 
it, but for NASA to have continuity of purpose over time 
requires an apolitical, bipartisan consensus on how we are 
moving forward. And if we can put that in an authorization 
bill, it sends a signal to everybody, globally, that we have 
resolve to accomplish these objectives. And then, as this 
hearing is titled, we have the opportunity to go get 
international partners.
    If we do not have that resolve--if the international 
partners do not trust that we are actually going to accomplish 
what we are saying we are going to accomplish, the first thing 
they are going to do is, they are going to go to China, which 
already has, you know, what they call the Chinese International 
Space Station and now they have entered into an agreement with 
Russia for going to the moon and establishing a lunar base. Our 
international partners have a history of partnering with other 
nations when we do not have that continuity. So, the 
authorization is important for that purpose, too.
    The Chair. OK. Mr. Gold?
    Mr. Gold. Senator Cantwell, when Administrator Bridenstine 
sent me overseas to negotiate the Gateway Commitments, it was 
because of statements that you made that we were able to 
complete that negotiation. I was told outright, by an 
international partner, ``Why should I believe anything that you 
are saying?'' Relative to Gateway, Artemis, and NASA's plans. 
And it was only by arguing the bipartisan support that Artemis 
had, that we were able to bring them and their collaboration to 
the table and prevent them from going over to China. Without an 
authorization bill, those doubts will continue to fester.
    The Chair. Well, one of the reasons why NASA's 
authorization is on the USICA, America's competitiveness bill, 
is because we have passed this twice now, out of the Senate, to 
have no results in the House. So, we are very adamant here, in 
a bipartisan fashion, what needs to be done and I am just 
trying to use today as a way to figure out what is this 
stalemate that we have with our House colleagues truly about.
    Now, I do not know if anybody wants to talk about the 
nature of a public lander--that issue. But obviously, that is 
one of the stumbling blocks, as well, is that people would like 
to have a process and go back and look at a public lander. 
Although, I think some people are saying, you know, the IP 
would belong to the government, all sorts of--so, how do we--
how do we get a resolution of this issue?
    Do we have other members waiting? Sorry.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think you are on such an important 
point that----
    The Chair. OK. OK, thank you. I do not know if we have 
colleagues here, so I do not want to hold up somebody if they 
are on----
    Senator Hickenlooper. No, you are--there is no one in the 
queue.
    The Chair. Thank you. That is----
    Senator Hickenlooper. They are all voting. They are voting.
    The Chair.--too bad for--too bad for the witnesses. Yes, go 
ahead, Mr. Bridenstine.
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, when we think about a human landing 
system for the moon, I think it is--we need to look back at the 
Commercial Resupply Program and the Commercial Crew Program. 
Both of those have proven to be very resilient. Even when one 
partner had a challenge, the other one would step forward and 
continue to move forward. We saw that--you go back to 2014 on 
commercial resupply of the International Space Station, we saw, 
you know, at the time it was orbital ATK. They had a problem 
resupplying the International Space Station in rocket failure. 
A lot of cargo blew up. And then, in 2015 SpaceX had a rocket 
blow up with the international docking adaptor and other cargo.
    But we had a resilient program where we could--we had 
dissimilar redundancy and we were able to use an Atlas rocket 
with a Cygnus cargo capability and basically, resupply the 
International Space Station. And we had international partners 
on that, Japan, that helped, you know, support the resupply and 
even Russia supported the resupply.
    So, the answer is we need this similar redundancy. Having a 
single provider for a human landing system, I think, imposes 
risk. That risk is budgetary. That risk is schedule. That risk 
is oversight. That risk is transparency. And I think, if we 
have competition, multiple providers that are competing on 
cost, on innovation, on safety, and those providers operating 
commercially are getting customers that are not necessarily the 
government, I think that is a good thing for the program. I 
think that was the original intent. I think that is why when, 
you know, Congress initially funded the Artemis program there 
was an anticipation there would be two, at least two, in the--
in the competition. I was fully supportive of that and that is 
what we were pushing for.
    The Chair. I am more trying to get--our colleague, the 
Chair of the House committee wants a public lander. And so, I 
was trying to get comments about that.
    Mr. Bridenstine. I think--I am going to say things I have 
said before and it is going to, maybe, get me in trouble with 
members of the House. I do not know. But I will tell you that I 
think any time you introduce a competition between the 
government and the private sector, the government wins, and the 
private sector loses. I think that is a challenge. I think--I 
think we have enough commercial capability now to have two 
commercial human landing systems. And I think, if we had 
adequate funding--you know, whether it is coming from the 
Executive Branch that is not providing it, or Congress, I think 
the adequate funding for two commercial human landing systems, 
at least, maybe even more, would be the right solution.
    Mr. Gold. Senator, I think the private sector has proven 
itself. It has delivered cargo to the International Space 
Station. It has now delivered crew to the International Space 
Station. The private sector can and will be able to meet that 
mission. What we are missing now, as you mentioned, dissimilar 
redundancy and direction and funds. And those are two things 
that we certainly hope Congress will be providing via an 
authorization bill. And certainly, we are advocating for the 
House to move and move quickly.
    The Chair. Well, we are trying to resolve these issues. So, 
the point you should take away--and NASA, really, if they are 
listening should take away is, we need an authorization bill. 
We are not going to continue to have this game where you just 
get appropriations. It is not going to serve the Artemis 
program or NASA well, but we have to resolve this issue. And 
frankly, you know, it is frustrating to me to see the spirit of 
NASA turned into, you know, the cheering of billionaires or 
competition with each other, because I am pretty sure that is 
not what our mission of Artemis is about.
    And so, somehow, we have gotten away from our focus, you 
know, on what we are trying to do from a technology 
perspective. And I believe in NASA's innovation in technology. 
I want them to apply the same spirit they had in fixing the 
problems on the Apollo project, to fixing and getting this 
authorization done. But if we have to address this public issue 
and get our House colleagues in a room and figure out what is 
the sticking point here, we should do better than just--just 
dismissing it and saying the private sector can do better. We 
just had this debate with the FAA and oversight of the aviation 
sector. We clearly saw where there were pitfalls.
    So, we have to figure this out and resolve our differences 
so we can get legislation, so Congress can do its oversight 
job, so that Senator Hickenlooper can continue to play a great 
role here in pushing this, and then, we can get to the 
international aspect of this. But right now, we are--you know, 
we are--it has been since 2017 since we have had a bill. And 
so, you ask yourselves why--why are we in this situation where 
the dates that are on a piece of paper right now, make no 
sense, as it relates to the Artemis program. Everybody knows 
that. So, how is that a good strategy? So, let us resolve these 
issues.
    Dr. Sanders, do you have any suggestions about how to 
resolve this issue about a public lander versus commercial 
landers? Do you have any input? Or Dr. Dittmar?
    Dr. Sanders. I think that, yes, the commercial industry is 
capable--increasingly capable. But NASA always still has to be 
accountable for what--for the success and safety of their 
mission. So, it is important for them to be able to have enough 
influence and interaction in order to have that--ensure that 
accountability.
    And also, NASA has a great deal of experience, a great deal 
of talent from--that they have acquired over decades. And so, 
there is a time for collaboration as this is going on and we 
saw that in commercial crew. There were times when SpaceX and 
there are times when Boeing have had--had problems to solve and 
NASA has been able to help them solve those because of the 
experience they have.
    So, I do not think it is a clear, straight, turn it over to 
commercial, nor is it a clear, straight, that NASA develop 
everything by itself.
    The Chair. Well, that is why I predicated my question 
earlier on that list and wanted to know what you thought about 
giving NASA Houston a larger role on that oversight. Look, we 
have seen where the same mistake was made by the FAA in 
deferring too much to aviation manufacturers, when it came to 
the oversight. So--and we have huge technological advances. And 
so, there is a lot to know and to be tested.
    So, we need to get--have this structure--I want a very 
strong NASA oversight of these companies--very strong. I am not 
supportive of NASA stepping away and turning it over to the 
commercial side. But we have to figure out what that looks 
like, from an authorizing perspective, and put that in a piece 
of paper.
    Mr. Gold or Dr. Dittmar?
    Dr. Dittmar. I would just add quickly, with regard to the 
lander, I do not know what the particular rationale is 
underlying the various positions, but one thing that might be 
pointed out is, if NASA is engendering--and I am in agreement 
with Jim, I think we need at least--two would be good. We 
definitely need redundant capability if we are going to take 
this approach. If--you need to do a path, basically. So, if you 
are going to do that--you know, one thing the government can 
always do is assert, what amounts to, imminent domain, right at 
first use, so that if--and I am speculating, if the issue 
having to do with the public lander has to do with whether or 
not the government could count on being able to use it, as it 
saw fit, in the same way that it can with regard to a 
government loaned asset.
    And there has been a great deal of discussion. I am one of 
the people having the discussion over the last several years, 
having to do with what is the appropriate role of government in 
signaling, particular to international allies, as Mike has 
already pointed out, and adversaries.
    What is the full faith and measure of the U.S. Congress 
mean and what is the difference between how it is that you see 
a government owned asset versus a public asset, OK, versus how 
you see a privately owned asset?
    Maybe one way to have the discussion is to talk about what 
rights the government has to assert in the case where it needs 
to use, OK, and to, in fact, basically say to private 
companies, ``Sorry, we understand you have other customers. We 
understand you have business and agendas. But we have to set 
those aside, under these circumstances.'' I do not know if that 
is a path forward, but it is just an idea.
    The Chair. Well, I think oversight is the question here. My 
sense is there is a feeling of loss of oversight with these 
commercializations. And, as I said, we have dealt very deeply 
with this, as it relates to the FAA and to the manufacturers. 
And you have a lot of people, even within the organization at 
the FAA, stepping away saying, ``Oh, they know better. Let them 
go ahead.''
    Dr. Dittmar. Yes.
    The Chair. And we need a very strong NASA and very strong 
NASA oversight.
    Dr. Dittmar. I believe to do that, what you also need to 
have, and when you think of authorization, is very clear 
statement of objectives. What are the objectives, OK, and so 
far as how the government sees them and how Congress sees them? 
Because without that, it is very difficult to even begin to be 
able to do oversight because you do not know what objectives 
you are trying to meet.
    The Chair. You could not have said it better, thank you.
    Mr. Gold. And Senator, perhaps you have the solution 
already, in terms of the compromise with the House, relative to 
oversight. I believe the question of government versus 
commercial is a false dichotomy, that we are stronger when we 
are working together. As Mary Lynne mentioned--Dr. Dittmar, 
that NASA has got so much incredible experience and the private 
sector has innovation, dollars, affordability. We need to 
combine that effectively and, hopefully, going to the House, 
bolstering oversight and insight of the programs and having two 
entities moving forward, I hope, could address the issues that 
you are raising.
    The Chair. You are raising an interesting point, but I 
think no one's against companies going out there and doing 
commercial space travel. OK, go for it. But we are talking 
about how we are now going to conduct our next Artemis mission.
    Mr. Chairman, you have been so lenient, and I see my 
colleague has returned. So, I am sure there are more questions 
by my other colleagues. Thank you so much to the witnesses and 
thank you for your diligence on trying to get this 
authorization over the goal line. Thank you.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I was 
copiously taking notes, as I trust you all were with her 
questions. I also have to vote, so I am going to turn this--the 
chairing of this meeting over to Senator Lummis, our Ranking 
Member, and then, she will proceed. But I will be back. So, you 
know, do not think you are going anywhere soon.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Lummis. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank 
you again, panelists, for tolerating our vote series that is 
interrupting the conversation. Former Congressman Bridenstine 
remembers those days very well.
    First question is for Mr. Gold, and it has to do with the 
importance of strong public-private partnerships and a good 
line of communication between NASA and the commercial space 
industry, particularly on regulatory and policy issues. So, Mr. 
Gold, I would like you to talk a little bit about the 
importance of the NASA Advisory Council's Regulatory Policy 
Committee.
    Mr. Gold. Thank you, Senator. Public-private partnerships 
in America are the envy of the world. It is incredible. This 
really, second Golden Age that we are having in space due to, 
not just the private sector, but the support that NASA has 
given--that combination of capabilities. Elon Musk has gone on 
the record that there would not be a SpaceX if it was not for 
NASA. So, being able to combine public and private sector 
benefits and advantages are so critical.
    And one of the other aspects that separates us out from 
foreign competition, other nations, are FACAS, the Federal 
Advisory Committees, that we have an explicit and official 
ability to combine private sector feedback and advice. And in 
this world, as Senator Cantwell just mentioned, where we are 
dealing with some pretty extraordinarily policy issues, the NAC 
Regulatory and Policy Committee is really the only place where 
NASA can go to get private sector feedback that represents, not 
just companies that, you know, are new--like, SpaceX and Blue 
Origin, Virgin Galactic--but also, Boeing and Lockheed, the 
traditional and terrific space companies that have brought us 
so far.
    So, having that common ground, where both the new and the 
traditional space companies can come together to advise NASA is 
just critical and will allow us to leverage the power of the 
private sector, in support of NASA's goals.
    Senator Lummis. Thank you. Would anyone else like to 
comment on that? Well, thanks. That is a pretty strong 
statement in favor of their work. So, thank you.
    Mr. Gold. The embarrassing thing to me, Senator, is that 
two of the members of that committee are now astronauts that we 
had. So, I am falling behind my colleagues who are on that 
committee----
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Gold. Audrey Powers, Sirisha Bandla.
    Senator Lummis. No worries. You bring your own qualities to 
that. This is for anyone who wishes to jump in on it. How would 
you say China and Russia manage their orbital debris? And are 
there things we can do to encourage them to do more?
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, everybody claims that they follow the, 
you know, the guidelines that NASA creates and is adopted 
broadly by the U.S. Government. And then, it goes and goes to 
international fora and people say, you know, we all agree on 
these guidelines.
    In practice, do all nations follow those guidelines? 
Absolutely not. And so, that is a challenge. It is one of the 
reasons, when I was a NASA administrator, I got Mike Gold 
engaged in the Artemis Accords. We needed to use the Artemis 
program--and I think this is an important thing. We--we look at 
the Artemis program, we get all these countries that want to be 
part of the Artemis program. How do we leverage that to create 
an international environment that is conducive for the future 
of human space flight? And so, we put in there that you had to 
adhere to the debris mitigation guidelines that are set forth 
by NASA. And interestingly, everybody has already agreed to 
that, so nobody could ultimately disagree. But here is the 
thing. If you want to participate in Artemis, now you are 
committed. You have got to follow these guidelines. And I 
think--so, the question is, how do you--how do you compel other 
nations to follow what the guidelines are?
    And, oh by the way, and this is another challenge that we 
have, as I mentioned in my opening statement, in this country 
we have, you know, these mega constellations now, that are also 
placing at risk, low Earth orbit. And I am not naming anyone. 
There are lot of them in this country. And as I mentioned 
earlier, there are a lot of other countries that have 
constellations, as well. Rwanda, as I mentioned, 327,000 
satellites being filed for at the ITU. So, we do not have the 
authority, as a Nation, to turn around and tell other 
countries, ``You are not allowed to have your own 
constellation'', when we ourselves are licensing exactly the 
same things.
    Senator Lummis. Yes.
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, the solution set, Ranking Member 
Lummis, is to recognize that there is a limitation to how much 
stuff can be put into any orbital shell. There is a limitation 
there. Once that--and, by the way, I do not know that that has 
been recognized by anybody at this point. But once it is 
recognized, we need to define what those limitations are. And 
those limitations can be determined by the cross-section or the 
size of the satellite, the mass of the satellite.
    So, we think about how much stuff can you put in any 
orbital regime and then, we say, OK, now that we know that 
there is a limitation, we have defined what that limitation is, 
there needs to be a process by which we allocate access. When I 
say we, there needs to be an international kind of effort to 
this, where access is allocated in an orderly way. And when the 
United States gets its allocation that we, in fact, do allocate 
in a market competitive way, where we allow access to a number 
of different companies that are trying to accomplish the same 
thing, so we do not end up with monopolistic behavior.
    I really think, if you look at the--kind of, the way the 
ITU works for geostationary orbit, I think that that might be a 
good model for low Earth orbit. It is going to have to be 
because the other result is this. We are all launching stuff 
into space, and it is going to--it is going to be not good. It 
is a race.
    Senator Lummis. Yes.
    Mr. Bridenstine. And when you have a race like this, and 
everybody is operating--it is the prisoner's dilemma. Everybody 
is operating to benefit themselves and, at the end, everybody 
loses.
    Senator Lummis. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Bridenstine. It is the tragedy of the commons and I 
think that is what we are facing right now in low Earth orbit. 
And there is no regulatory regime that manages it 
appropriately, and there is certainly not an international 
regime to manage it appropriately.
    Senator Lummis. OK, so the ITU----
    Mr. Bridenstine. International Telecommunications Union. It 
is a subset of the U.N.
    Senator Lummis. And would the U.N. be the proper 
organization to also be the umbrella organization for this?
    Mr. Bridenstine. Well, so wow.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Bridenstine. It is a challenge, for sure, because I 
would say that the ITU works, and I will tell you why. And Mike 
and I were just talking about this earlier. There are countries 
that are at war with each other, that want to have a satellite 
in geostationary orbit, and they go to the ITU to work it out. 
So, it works, and it has worked very well in geostationary 
orbit. Right now, there is nothing for low Earth orbit and I 
think that is a problem.
    Senator Lummis. Does anybody else want to weigh in on this 
before we move on?
    Mr. Gold. Senator, if I may. Space should be about joy and 
discovery, not danger and fear.
    Senator Lummis. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Gold. And per your question about China and Russia, 
that is what we are getting with their debris. You know, now I 
am going to steal from the former Administrator there, who 
would often talk--and we would be remiss if we did not mention 
ASAT testing in the context of this discussion. That due to a 
Chinese ASAT test, there is debris that is still up there. And 
I believe it was America that had to warn China that there was 
debris, created by their own ASAT test that was threatening 
their own space station. You know, the Foreign Minister would 
always point that out.
    So, they are not particularly responsible actors. There is 
Chinese debris, you know, debris that comes down from every 
launch. We do not know where it is going to land, often. And 
last couple launches, it could have even hit America. We do not 
know.
    So, as Jim was describing, what we need to do--and I do not 
think the U.N. is the entity to do it in, at least initially. 
We need to do what we have done with the Artemis Accords, and I 
am still grateful for the Administrator--former Administrator--
for that opportunity, is to build a coalition of the willing, 
in terms of what good looks like. Lead by example on the debris 
issue and then, use that to force United Nations, or form a new 
kind of ITU, to be able to develop it.
    Also, debris represents not just the problem, but as a 
private sector Redwire guy, it is an opportunity to innovate, 
to develop new technologies that can address this issue. We 
should have active debris removal missions, so that we can 
develop new systems that not only will help address the debris 
problems, but will create new satellite technologies and other 
systems that can benefit a wide variety of economic national 
security areas for the country.
    Senator Lummis. Mr. Bridenstine.
    Mr. Bridenstine. First of all, I want to double down on 
what he said. I think Mike is exactly right--Mr. Gold, as his 
nametag says, is exactly right.
    When we talk about--think about the FAA and we go back to 
the 1950s when the FAA was created. In those days, the United 
States did it alone and we were making great advances and it 
worked. We were able to have a lot more airplanes into a lot 
less space. Interestingly, because we took the lead, and we 
took that model around the world, an organization formed called 
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization. And they took 
the leadership of the FAA and they applied it globally. So now, 
when I fly my airplane, Navy pilot by trade, when I fly my 
airplane all over the world, I know exactly how to fly in 
whatever country I go to because we are all following the same 
rules. But it would not have happened if we would have, you 
know, gone to, you know, some international organization and 
said, ``Here is what we need to do'', and try to get agreement 
from our competitors. That would not have worked. But when the 
United States takes the lead, ultimately there becomes a 
standard that other countries can join. And I think that is 
exactly the idea that Mike was talking about just a few seconds 
ago.
    We have to lead on this and when we do, I think we are 
absolutely going to, you know, change the world so that all of 
those constellations, that we all believe in, for low latency, 
high throughput communications, can be successful.
    Senator Lummis. Well, this is a fascinating subject and I 
hope to pursue it further. But I want to recognize my 
colleague. This is Old Home Week. Not only is Mr. Bridenstine a 
former Congressman, but of course, so is the gentleman from New 
Mexico, Senator Lujan, who we recognize now.

               STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

    Senator Lujan. Thank you to our Ranking Member and to our 
Chair for this important hearing. Holding this hearing matters 
to us not just here in America, but in New Mexico.
    Now, in New Mexico, we have an incredible innovation 
ecosystem that supports the space industry. There is 
substantial research being done at the universities, the Air 
Force research labs, the Satellite Space Operations office, and 
two of our three NNSA Department of Energy National 
Laboratories. We have the home to the first commercial space 
port in the United States, where Virgin Galactic successfully 
launched its most recent space flight, as well.
    Now, to our former Administrator and colleague in the 
House, small launch companies are facing pressure as 
governments all over the world subsidize their launch 
industries. To ensure that NASA keeps a capability that many, 
including yourself, have said is critical, do you think NASA 
should expand the scope of the Rideshare office to be a small 
satellite launch office, charged with assessing mission needs 
relative to all available launch options, in order to determine 
the best solution on a mission-by-mission basis?
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, I will start by saying this. When I 
was in the House, I was a big champion of the Venture Class 
Launch Services Program, which was basically a bill that 
enabled NASA to--to support small launch companies in a, you 
know when you are trying to launch a small vehicle to a very 
specific orbit, we are talking 500 kilograms to 1500 kilograms, 
we did not have the capability, you know, five or 10 years ago 
to do that to a very specific orbit. So, the Venture Class 
Launch Services Program was used to let the private sector know 
that the U.S. Government has an interest in seeing the ability 
to launch small payloads into specific orbits. And it worked 
and now, we are seeing a lot of these companies develop that 
capability.
    I would also say, when I was the NASA Administrator--you 
mentioned Virgin Galactic. I mean, we had value from the fact 
that we could put our payloads at NASA on those vehicles. Of 
course, it benefited them, but it benefited NASA.
    The challenge that we had at NASA is, you know, you can get 
microgravity testing with drop tests, where you might get a 
couple of seconds of testing. You can do parabolic 
trajectories, where you might get, you know, minutes, like, 
eight or 10 minutes--or, I am sorry, 30 seconds, or whatever. 
But then, when you talk about, after that, you have got to go 
to, you know, low Earth orbit. So, a lot of these small 
launches, whether they are usually suborbital, there is 
opportunity there that, I think, you know, Virgin Galactic, 
Blue Origin, are making available to NASA.
    So, I do believe the United States of America has an 
interest in making sure that these companies are successful, 
because it is in the interest of our country that they are 
successful, for a whole host of different testing and science 
reasons. That being said, as far as that particular program, I 
would love to give you an answer--maybe do a little more 
looking into it and give you a more specific answer about that 
specific question.
    Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. And the next question I 
have is for both our former Administrator, Dr. Dittmar, and Mr. 
Gold. One of the bills that I am working on is building off an 
idea that has proven to be successful with other Federal 
agencies, and that is establishing a foundation. We are working 
on one with the Department of Energy. One exists with the 
National Institutes of Health. And it has been able to 
strengthen public-private partnerships to be able to attract 
that private capital and to make these investments.
    Now, as the former Administrator and leaders in the private 
industry for space, do you agree that if we fail to harness the 
full commercialization potential of NASA, we will fall behind 
countries willing to do so?
    Mr. Bridenstine. I absolutely think so. And I think, you 
know, my friend, Mike Gold, talks about it as, you know, our 
competitors in the world are never going to out entrepreneur 
the United States of America. And the best innovation that we 
see coming usually comes from small, innovative companies. And 
so, I think, in many cases, it is in our interest to make sure 
that we have those public-private partnerships for these unique 
opportunities.
    It is important to also remember that--that when we have 
those public-private partnerships, the goal is for those 
companies to go get customers that are not the U.S. Government. 
And if they do that, it drives down the cost to the American 
government. And we need to make sure, when we enter into 
public-private partnerships, that there is still competition in 
the marketplace, so that the competitor is competing in cost 
and innovation and safety.
    Senator Lujan. Dr. Dittmar?
    Dr. Dittmar. And so, I would just agree with everything 
that was just said here. And I think public-private 
partnerships--you know, public-private partnerships, they have 
become, you know, quite the thing to talk about in space over 
the last 20 years. But they have been extant in this country 
since we started the country. They have been used in a variety 
of different ways to create infrastructure.
    And we are looking for a whole ecosystem in space, right? 
One that supports everything from ground test equipment, all 
the way up to orbital space flight and then, beyond. There are 
opportunities we probably have not even thought of yet, in 
terms of how to utilize public-private partnerships to advance 
that.
    What the United States needs it to be able to have enough 
strategic flexibility that it can pull whatever levers it needs 
to to, sort of, be able to advance the private sector, as well 
as advance government--government intention and have those 
things work together. So, yes.
    Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. And Mr. Gold, I am going to 
ask for you and Dr. Sanders to maybe submit your answers to the 
record on that particular question. And then, the other 
question I have for the panel, that I would ask for you to 
submit to the record--we will submit it, is the importance of 
spaceports and especially the example that I shared with 
Spaceport New Mexico about the continued improvements to 
America's spaceports are needed to grow, not only our industry 
partnerships, but also for safe and sustainable government use.
    So, I will submit that to the record.
    I want to be respectful to Mr. Blumenthal's time, as well.
    And I want to thank the Ranking Member for her 
acknowledgment today.
    Senator Lummis [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Mr. 
Blumenthal.

             STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Madam Chair. Nobody is going 
to out entrepreneur the United States sounds like famous last 
words. And the idea of a public-private partnership, when it 
comes to space, the idea of an ecosystem brings back memories 
of my law school days when people were saying we should have a 
course at Yale Law School on the Law of Space. Only at Yale Law 
School would anyone make that suggestion. And it was dismissed 
as one of those bubblehead, imaginary topics.
    But there is no real law of space, is there? I mean, and 
should there be? Should we be thinking about, if we are going 
to have commercialization in space? You compared it, 
Administrator, to flying into other countries. But there is a 
means of enforcement there. You can ground pilots. You can take 
action that provides enforcement of rules of the road, so to 
speak--rules of the sky, rules of landing and taking off, and 
equipment, and so forth. But there is not any in space. And so, 
I mean, if there are three or four commercial flights going up 
on the same day, maybe from the same place, you have got a 
lot--you are going to have a lot of objects up there. You 
already have a lot of objects bumping into each other, except 
they just do not have human beings on them. And having human 
beings, and having commercialization for expanded purposes, 
either of surveillance or other missions, complicates it. 
Should we be thinking about laws and enforcement mechanisms in 
space?
    Mr. Gold. So, Senator, as the only recovering attorney on 
this panel, I may go ahead and take that one. And for the 
record, it is not just Yale. I am actually giving a lecture at 
Georgetown Law School tomorrow on Space Law. So, it has 
certainly taken--taken root.
    I do want to open with that there are laws in space. There 
is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. There is the Registration 
Convention, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts. So, 
there are a series of international agreements that set rules 
that nearly every country, or spacefaring country, certainly 
have agreed to abide by. However, there is a substantial gap 
that you are pointing out now, where, in the Outer Space 
Treaty, in Article 6, it requires authorization and continuing 
supervision of private sector activities.
    And we here in the U.S. have yet to define how that 
continuing supervision will occur for non-traditional 
activities--be it satellite service, which we have mentioned, 
private sector space station, orbital debris removal, rovers--
commercial rovers on the moon. We have not defined that yet. We 
have been using Band-aid solutions, via the FAAST and the FCC. 
But one of the most important things that Congress could do 
would address this issue, just to create a process that is 
predictable, and we know what to do here in the U.S. Because, 
frankly, it is a competitive issue. That predictability is key 
for investment and if we want to keep our country's here and 
keep innovation and keep entrepreneuring here in America, we 
need a predictable, reliable, and transparent regulatory system 
for commercial activities, which we do not have explicitly, 
yet.
    Senator Blumenthal. I think that is an excellent answer and 
obviously, I should have been more definitive or more specific 
in saying there is no law. There are, in fact, gaps in the law. 
Which means I probably should attend your lecture tomorrow at 
Georgetown. And I realize that law is the least glamorous or 
exciting aspect of space exploration. But I am very interested 
in your answer that, as in many other areas of life, certainty 
and predictability are very important for the risk takers and 
the scientists to make progress.
    Mr. Gold. Exactly. If you are going to invest, the last 
thing you want to see is an unpredictable regulatory 
environment. If you are going to ensure an activity, you need 
that certainty. So, I know it is not as sexy as fun, but it can 
be as important as any technological development to space not 
only occurring, but particularly occurring here in the United 
States.
    Senator Blumenthal. Spoken like a true recovering lawyer. 
Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony today and it has 
been very enlightening. I have been following it from afar, in 
between hearings, and we really thank you for being here.
    Senator Lummis. The gentleman yields back and the gavel is 
returned to the Chairman, the gentleman from Colorado.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Ranking Member Lummis. 
What did I miss? No.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Hickenlooper [presiding]. We have a couple of 
people that are trying to get in remotely, and luckily, I 
happen to have more questions and I think Senator Lummis might 
have some--a couple more questions, too.
    So, if I can re-enter the low Earth orbit of information, 
and let us go back to, Mr. Bridenstine. You spoke, I think, 
compellingly about the overcrowding in LEO and you did not even 
really get into that whole notion of, once you have collisions, 
how many more fragments are created and that you end up with a 
cavalcade of collisions. And that 1.5 percent really gets scary 
because that is too high, in and of itself, and I followed your 
math of how we get to 1 in a million. But there are a lot of 
probabilities between here and there and I think that is--it is 
unacceptable, when you begin to look at what--how rapidly you 
could escalate.
    So, anyway, I think--again, how would you look at what 
should Congress be doing? Who should be--have the regulatory 
responsibility there? And we are all--we are fully aware of the 
discussions there, but I would love to hear your opinion.
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, the--right now the regulatory 
authority for debris mitigation falls to the FCC, the Federal 
Communication Commission, and that is based on a law passed in 
the 1930s. Mr. Gold could probably tell me the specific date. 
But there was a law passed in the 1930s that gave the FCC the 
authority to regulate Spectra. And from that, you know, 
satellites, you know, emit, you know, all kinds of 
transmissions. And so, from that, they say we have the ability 
to regulate satellite, you know, debris, and orbits, and that 
kind of thing. Which, by the way, it is good that they are 
doing it because if they were not doing it, nobody would be 
doing it. So, they extrapolated the law to take that authority 
among themselves.
    I do not know--in fact I am confident that the FCC is not 
the agency that should be doing that. And the House and Senate 
have passed a bill that was signed that gives that authority to 
the Commerce Department. That has not been adequately funded at 
this point. They need, you know, resources to stand up a team 
of folks that can actually put into place the regulatory 
environment for this--for this capability.
    Senator Hickenlooper. So, are you agreeing that that notion 
of having a separate escalating one of the departments from 
Commerce up to----
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. I know exactly what you are saying. 
So, the Office of Space Commerce.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, so 100 percent.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Office that is the word I was looking 
for, office.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. The Office of Space Commerce is, 
right now, under NOAA. It is not--and look, we all love NOAA, 
but it is not their highest priority to do space situational 
awareness and space traffic management, let--and debris 
mitigation and remediation, as you mentioned earlier. So, since 
that is not--NOAA is not, probably, tremendously enthusiastic 
about that.
    I do believe it is a high enough priority. It needs to 
report to the Office of Space Commerce. It needs to report 
directly to the Secretary of Commerce and be responsible to the 
Secretary for achieving the outcomes that we are looking for.
    As far as what the FCC needs to do right now, given the 
risk that is in front of us, they need to consider that even 
satellites that can maneuver do have a collision risk. And that 
risk does not just come from other satellites, it comes from 
lethal, non-trackable debris. For every piece of debris, we can 
track that is 10 centimeters and bigger, there are, you know, 
10 to 100 pieces of debris that we cannot track. So, they need 
to take that into account when they start thinking about the 
collision risk for--for, you know, low Earth orbit.
    Once we recognize that there is a lot of risk here that, 
right now, is not being accounted for, I think it is important 
for us to say, OK, how many objects are we able to put into any 
orbital shell? And once we define that, then there needs--this 
is where the international pieces comes in. We recognize that 
there is a limitation. The question is, how do we allocate 
access to those orbital shells? And we need to have a process 
by which nations can get access to that and the United States 
of America needs to make sure that its allocation is, of 
course, adequately spread among, you know, competitive 
companies for a competitive marketplace.
    Right now, none of that is happening. It is a race, and the 
race is, ultimately, going to result in disastrous 
consequences, if we are not careful.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It reminds me a little bit of the 
old--do you remember the--as popularized in movies, via 
Hollywood, the Oklahoma Gold Rush--Land Rush, where they would 
all ride out and they had to stake off their little territory 
and they would be shooting each other and--I mean, it is, to a 
certain amount, out of control.
    Dr. Dittmar, just continuing on that, this importance of 
having international agreement on how we are going to regulate 
this debris that is up there already. And this is one of those 
things--I mean, the first thing, when I have nightmare, it is 
usually about cybersecurity. But this is now becoming--it is--
it is equally imposing onto my sleep patterns.
    So, how would you look at the--what should Congress' role 
be toward building, or moving toward an international agreement 
on the appropriate regulation of space debris?
    Dr. Dittmar. So, following on conversations that we have, 
sort of, already been having here on the table, one of the 
things that is really critical about authorization acts is that 
they are signaling devices. They signal not just to the United 
States, with the intent of Congresses and especially its 
investment in continuity of purpose, but they also signal to 
the international community. So, other countries look to see 
what Congress does. They look to see what is written into 
policy that is then expressed in an authorization act.
    And one thing I would like to see--I am in complete 
agreement with Jim, with regard to elevating the Office of 
Space Policy, completely making sure that it is consistently 
staffed across administrations, to the extent that you can. You 
can certainly express an intent, OK, and the intent of 
Congress, that it is adequately staffed and resourced with the 
appropriate expertise, OK? And then it is a direct report to 
the Department of Congress and the head of the Department of 
Congress. And so, doing so, while you are investing it, OK, 
with the authority to begin, then developing the sorts of 
regimen.
    You know this has been--Jim has talked about one--you know, 
one approach, which is sort of to look at, literally, what you 
can get into orbital shells and start thinking about regulation 
that way. But to invest them with the authority to be able to 
actually begin to be able to work in that way. Just doing that, 
OK, will convey to the United States how serious, I mean, how 
seriously the United States is taking this.
    It is going to also help. There is a big PR war going on. I 
mean, it is a competitive issue. But there is a huge PR going 
on--war going on. You just, basically, need to send a message 
to essentially all the stakeholders here. ``All right, look, 
no, we are serious about this. We are going to start pulling 
this together. We need to develop a regime. We are going to 
invest this office with the authority to be able to do that.'' 
And it also signals, to the rest of the world, now, the United 
States is serious. We are going to take a leadership position 
here. Here is how is going to be, who is going to be 
accountable for actually being able to do it? And I know that 
sometimes, from the outside, that does not seem like much, but 
it really is a big deal.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Oh, I buy that. And just as a frame 
of reference, the Office of Space Commerce, I believe, still 
does not have an executive director. So, we are in the market 
of hiring. So, if you have networks or connections, step 
forward and take one, you know, take one for the country, if 
you could.
    All right, one more question and I will turn it back to 
Ranking Member Lummis. And I guess I will ask Mr. Gold this, 
since we are looking at global leadership and technological 
leadership. You know, obviously leading-edge technologies are 
evolving and innovating at lightning speed in our commercial 
space industries. Which technologies do you think are most 
critical to make sure that the United States does not cede the 
leadership role to our competitors, such as China?
    Mr. Gold. Yes. Thank for such a terrific question, Senator. 
There are really two areas that I would highlight. One is, we 
are at a period where robotics and satellites are merging to 
create something entirely different. At Redwire, for example, I 
mentioned the Archinaut satellite, which is--uses robotic arms 
to build itself. We are also developing satellites that will 
literally print themselves, leveraging the 3D printing 
technology that we have done on the International Space 
Station. So, when it comes to this orbital servicing, assembly, 
manufacturing, we cannot fall behind China and others in this 
area. And the key to developing that is more public-private 
partnerships.
    The other area I would cite is microgravity. That the 
microgravity environment is a whole new arena for scientific 
and commercial research. I believe it is why China is investing 
in their LEO space station. And we are just beginning to 
understand the biotechnology, the fiber communications 
development, new supercomputer chips. Everything functions 
differently in low Earth orbit and the microgravity 
environment. And we must invest and develop those capabilities 
because it is going to change everything.
    So, those are the two areas I would recommend focusing on.
    Senator Hickenlooper. All right. They are good ones. I will 
turn it over to Ranking Member Lummis.
    Senator Lummis. Thank you.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I might come back with one more 
question, though.
    Senator Lummis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the 
strategies that China has been using to increase its footprint 
in space is helping developing countries gain access to space. 
For example, in 2019, China provided satellite development and 
launch services to Ethiopia to launch that country's first 
satellite.
    So, it seems to me the U.S. is generally more focused on 
relationships with nations that are already spacefaring. Do you 
see a value in the U.S. helping countries without programs 
access space? And how do you think we could or should do that? 
Mr. Bridenstine.
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, I will go first and then, I will turn 
it over to the others. So, the--when we think about the value 
of low Earth orbit, specifically, Mike mentioned a lot of 
items, as far as, you know, biotechnology and things like that. 
We think about pharmaceuticals, immunizations, the ability to 
create human tissue using your own DNA. Your own adult skin 
cells we can use to create your own tissue for regenerative 
medicine. The idea that we can use advanced materials, we can 
create--you know, potentially in future, we will be able to 
create an artificial retina for the human eyeball. So, people 
who have macular degeneration do not have to lose their 
eyesight.
    So, these are things that are begin tested, right now, on 
the International Space Station. And when we cede that--when we 
cede that to China, if we do not have a replacement for the 
International Space Station, they are going to be able to 
benefit economically from all of those values of microgravity 
that we are not going to have access to, in the way that we 
currently have access to.
    Now, as far as the international piece, you know, our--we 
have built capacity for countries in the past. We think about--
well, I do not want to name any specific countries, but we have 
worked very hard on all of our international partners on the 
International Space Station. Fifteen countries operate the ISS. 
We have got, you know, 19 different countries that have had 
astronauts on the ISS. Those capacities are largely built by 
us.
    And when we decide we are not going to have a next 
generation space station, which right now is the signal our 
country is sending by not funding the next generation human 
space station--I would say I saw, you know, defense--or, you 
know, the appropriations bill for CJS. I think it had $101 
million in there for LEO commercial destinations, which I think 
is fantastic. But--but that is still not enough, just to be 
honest. We need more. We do not want to cede that territory to 
our biggest competitor, primarily because all of that capacity 
we built for these other countries is going to go to them. And 
they are going to start benefiting from that.
    So, we have to maintain the leadership here. I think it is 
absolutely important. Countries that--when we think about 
Artemis and the Artemis Accords, we have been inviting 
countries that do not even have a space program, to participate 
in Artemis in whatever small way they can participate. Because, 
in my view, space is a tool of diplomacy for this country. It 
is something that every country wants, and we can help provide 
it.
    So, when we think about the big picture, kind of, how the 
Nation thinks about agreements around the world, I think space 
needs to be on the table, regularly. When we--even when we do 
trade agreements, when we do any kind of large negotiation with 
another nation or many nations, space needs to be on the table 
because it is a great tool of diplomacy that can improve our 
position.
    Mr. Gold. Senator, it is a great question and even better 
opportunity for me to vent. The Intergovernmental agreement, 
the IGA, which was the agreement that established the 
International Space Station--it is extraordinarily difficult, 
if not impossible for other nations to join the IGA, which has 
prevented NASA from reaching out to other countries that do not 
have space programs or have space programs they just started.
    The Artemis Accords were, in many ways, a reaction to that, 
that we wanted to create a vehicle that, no matter how modest 
your program was--even if it was just a couple of graduate 
students, that you could contribute to this unprecedented 
journey to the moon. And in the initiation of the Artemis 
Accords, you had countries like Luxembourg that has a 
relatively small but mighty space program and they are--by the 
way, shout out to the Embassy there at Luxembourg that has been 
so supportive. But also, United Arab Emirates which, again, has 
done amazing things in space but was not a traditional ally, 
certainly not on the International Space Station, yet.
    So, through the Accords now, it is so important that we 
reach out to developing countries. I was so proud when Brazil 
joined the Artemis Accords, because that was our first Latin 
American country. And I certainly hope that we can proceed in 
Africa where, by the way, China has been very aggressive, in 
terms of international, diplomatic development. We need African 
countries in the Accords, supporting not just the Artemis 
program, but sensible norms of behavior. And I think that is 
our best vehicle to proceed and get these countries involved.
    Senator Lummis. Dr. Dittmar, you were nodding.
    Dr. Dittmar. So, I would agree that it has been difficult 
for other countries to join the IGA, but I would also point out 
that the ISS has been used as a means to bring many countries, 
who are not spacefaring countries, into a larger community. It 
has, at this point, hosted--has, national projects of one type 
over another, for well over 105 countries, at this point, over 
its lifespan. And so, it has served as a tool of tremendous 
international diplomacy, not just among the original 15. If I 
was back in--I am back, old enough back in the days that Brazil 
was in discussion about that, right? So, this is very nice to, 
sort of, see that come around again with Artemis Accords. But 
so, it has actually done that.
    From the Axiom side, for example, as we are developing that 
space station, we are getting a lot of interest from 
internationals who see the commercial opportunity as a way to, 
sort of, bring themselves into the larger community of nations 
that are flying professional astronauts from those countries 
who are able to, sort of, use that. So, there is a lot of 
interest. I mean, we are finding that just even from a business 
point of view, let alone, sort of, national interest point of 
view.
    I think if we cede this to China. I am alarmed, frankly. 
And I mentioned earlier that the reason I joined Axiom was I 
saw them as best positioned at this particular point in time, 
and I still believe that. But I am alarmed by what I see as the 
potential for a gap, which we have already talked about 
earlier.
    And it goes back to what I said about objectives, right? I 
mean, in my written testimony, one of the things I said, and I 
think I said it orally, too, is that, you know, our objective 
needs to be assert and maintain U.S. leadership in low Earth 
orbit. Not just in low Earth orbit, but in all of space. But 
when we are talking about low Earth orbit that has always been 
done through exercise of soft power and use of soft power to 
bring other countries to our side.
    So, I think it is absolutely critical that we continue to 
do this.
    Senator Lummis. Dr. Sanders, is this something you wish to 
address?
    Dr. Sanders. Well, I will talk about the International 
Space Station and just quickly reiterate a point that was made 
earlier about the importance of having a persistent presence in 
low Earth orbit. We look at it from the Panel's perspective on 
the risk reduction that it provides for further exploration. 
And if you do not have that kind of persistent presence, in 
order to understand the effects of low Earth orbit of 
microgravity and the environment on the human physiology, for 
example, as well as other things, than you are not going to 
have the ability--you are going to have greater risk when you 
go further away. And so, there is--there needs to be that and 
there needs to be a good transition period, a good transition 
handoff to whatever follows the ISS. And there needs to be 
something to follow the ISS, however we do it.
    Senator Lummis. Thank you very much, Panel. I yield back.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Senator Lummis. Senator 
Cruz has joined us. Are you ready for your questions?

                  STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

    Senator Cruz. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the 
witnesses. Good to see all of you again. Thank you for your 
good work.
    As everyone on this panel knows, the International Space 
Station has been a big priority of mine for a long time. And 
not only is it a critical tool for projecting American 
leadership in space, something all the more important with the 
Chinese successfully putting the core module of their space 
station up, in April of this year, but we have also invested 
over $100 billion in it. And to be fiscally responsible and 
prudent, we need to get maximum use out of that investment.
    Multiple times, the Senate has taken up legislation I have 
introduced to extend the ISS through 2030. The extension 
through 2030 was part of the NASA Authorization Act, which the 
Senate passed unanimously at the end of last year. It was also 
part of that same NASA Authorization Act that was included this 
year in the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, which was 
passed by the Senate in May. And it is something that the 
current Administrator, Senator Nelson, strongly supports, as 
well. And so, both the current Administrator and the prior 
Administrator, we worked together on this extension. It is 
common sense. It is bipartisan. We are waiting on the House to 
act. And we will see if and when the House does act. But at 
least on the Senate side, it is 100 to nothing that this 
extension makes sense.
    And I will mention to the Chairman, so there were battles 
in the prior administration because there were a few misguided 
voices in the Trump Administration that wanted to retire the 
ISS early. And Senator Nelson and I, on this subcommittee, took 
turns taking a two by four to the administration on that 
question. And it only took about 300 to nothing votes for them 
to realize that, perhaps their position was not going to 
prevail in the Senate. But we need to see the House act.
    Let me ask the witnesses--look, I think we are going to get 
the extension done, in one vehicle or another. It is the right 
thing to do. It is long overdue. But given the experience of 
the panel, I am curious, technologically, from a safety 
perspective, what is keeping the station from lasting longer 
than 2030? From lasting through 2035 or 2040? There is a lot of 
expertise on this panel and so what is your collective 
judgment?
    Mr. Bridenstine. I will go ahead and start. First of all, 
Senator, the wounds from the two by four have recovered quite 
nicely and I think you are----
    Senator Cruz. To be clear, Jim, you were not the one 
advocating this.
    Mr. Bridenstine. No, I--I am aware of that but I was part 
of the administration. And look, here is the thing. I think 
what we are seeing now is that the foresight that you had at 
the time was right, because we are not ready for what comes 
after the International Space--we are not ready for it. 
Building a space station takes a long time, especially when you 
are doing it in a way that has never been done before which, in 
the future, will be commercial. I do not foresee Congress 
appropriating funds for a second International Space Station. I 
do not foresee that.
    Now, that being said, here is the thing that I think is 
important. Extending it to 2030, I know the Senate has already 
passed that, and I support that. I would also tell you that 
there is no guarantee we are going to make it to 2030. 
Certainly, we should, if we can. We have seen already a crack 
on the International Space Station. We have seen a hole on the 
International Space Station. If you look at the outside of the 
space station, it has been, you know, pelted by debris. And of 
course, there is always modifications, upgrades that have to 
happen in order to keep it, you know, moving forward.
    So, it is a--it is a marvel of engineering. Mike Gold used 
to tell me quite frequently we need to put it in for a Noble 
Peace Prize, which I think is right. It is a tool of diplomacy. 
It has been just a phenomenal capability for our country all 
around, not even considering how much science is coming from it 
right now.
    So, the key is, extending it. Yes, there is a challenge. We 
know it cannot last forever. How far can it last? I do not 
think we have that answer. Right now, I think it is--we are in 
great shape.
    Senator Cruz. Well, and let me ask a related question, 
which is what do you all think is the timing for a replacement 
of comparable capability? And when is that transition 
realistically possible? And how do we ensure that the ISS is 
operational--that we do not cede low Earth orbit, for a period 
of time, to the Chinese, that we maintain U.S. leadership 
continuously?
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, the future is going to depend on how 
much it gets funded. Right now, it has been funded at nothing 
compared to what it needs. I think it was, like, $15 million, 
or something like that, for the transition to a new commercial, 
you know, space station. But what we need--and the CGS 
Appropriations Bill had $101 million, which met the President's 
budget request. That coming from the Senate--the Senate had 
$101 million in there to meet the President's budget request, 
which is fantastic. But I am telling you, sir, it is still not 
enough.
    When we think about how long it takes to develop a space 
station, especially in a way that has not been done before, I 
do not know how long, I am not going to give you an answer on 
the date that that, but here is what--here is that I think the 
Senate should do. The Senate should absolutely declare that 
NASA needs to tell it when it is going to--what is the 
objective to have that new space station and then, the Senate 
needs to fund the requirements to achieve that.
    I do not think the right answer is to continue--first of 
all, extending the space station is the right thing to do. But 
continuing that, in perpetuity, believing that it is going to 
last forever, I think is not the right approach. And I am not 
suggesting that is what the Senate is doing, at all.
    But NASA needs to say, you know, ``Here is how we are going 
to replace it. Here is what it is going to cost.'' They need to 
put that in the President's budget request with many years--you 
know, 5-year outlook, and then, come to you and say, ``This is 
the money that we need''. And right now, I do not see that 
happening the way it should happen.
    Dr. Dittmar. And that begins with, I think, NASA needs to 
completely fulfill the spirit of what was written into the 2017 
NASA Transition Authorization Act, having to do with the 
transition plan. And a transition plan needs to have, you know, 
timing, milestones, clear objectives, how those objectives are 
going to be met. And then, once that is in place, then you can 
begin to have a conversation about follow-ons.
    So, as you know, Axiom--because we have--you know, we have 
spoken to you about this, Axiom's approach, you know, was 
funded on a competitively awarded agreement that was negotiated 
with NASA. And that $101 million that Jim was talking about, 
when you look at how NASA is planning to allocate it, does not 
meet the commitment to Axiom for 2022. The work that needs to 
go to work on the space station side of it, in other words, for 
the station to do the analysis that is needed, in order to 
ensure that Axiom can reach orbit and dock by 2024, is not 
funded completely in that amount. Let alone, looking at the 
creation of dual path, you know, for having maybe more of an 
alternative to it.
    So, I would agree, definitely more funding is needed. But 
also, NASA needs to be clear about objectives and the means 
that it sees at this point. Understanding that any transition 
plan is going to be a stake in the sand at the moment, it is 
going to have to be iterated upon, but it needs to be much 
clearer about what those objectives and milestones are.
    Mr. Gold. So, Senator, I do not know if I can enter this 
into the record, but I borrowed my son's ISS folder for today's 
testimony. I am such a fan. We talk about a lot of recycling on 
Earth, and I can tell you it is even more important on orbit. 
As you pointed out--and again, I appreciate your support and 
your two by four. That kept us going, you know, during some 
difficult times. We need to squeeze every minute and ounce of 
capability out of the ISS.
    And in terms of when we should be retiring it--I mean, 
again, I am a recovering attorney but, you know, the engineers 
tell me there are seals that will wear out, etc. But there is 
still going to be good hardware and we should look at, yes, 
maybe there is a point of retirement, but continuing to 
leverage the hardware that we can continue to use as part of 
another system or as part of a smaller system.
    And as we discussed before you arrived, you know, at 
Redwire Space we are the global leader of microgravity 
research, development, and manufacturing. The only company to 
actually build things on the ISS. And we are looking at a 
future with biotech and organs, etc., that you can build. We 
cannot see those technological capabilities or the diplomatic 
or political benefits of low Earth orbit to China. So, we need 
to have a two-pronged approach. One, extend the ISS to 2030, 
which I included in my written remarks. And then, ensure that 
we proceed with enough funding and capability to deploy a free-
flying commercial space station so that it is operational while 
the ISS is still there, and we do not create a gap in low Earth 
orbit that would be disastrous for us and the Nation. And as 
you point out, you have fans at NASA in doing that. You know, 
Senator Nelson--Administrator Nelson has been a great supporter 
and we have talked a lot about the need for an authorization 
bill. You have former staff that was working on that 
authorization bill that is now over at NASA. So, I think you 
have got great allies at the Agency.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Thank you, Senator. Appreciate 
you making the effort to get over here. I think we are at that 
point where I am forced by tradition and circumstance to let 
you go.
    The hearing record will remain open until November 18, 
2021. Any Senators who would like to submit questions for the 
record, for the witnesses, should do so by November 4, 2021. To 
all of you witnesses, in addition to my gratitude, we ask that 
your responses be returned to the Committee by November 18, 
2021.
    Again, I would like to thank each of you for your testimony 
today, but really, your service in terms of maintaining or 
helping to create America's role as a leader in space, but also 
to maintaining.
    That concludes our hearing for today. We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to 
                         Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar
    NASA Reauthorization. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act 
(USICA) includes legislative language to reauthorize the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that I developed on a 
bipartisan basis last year with Senators Cantwell, Wicker, and Cruz. 
NASA was last authorized in 2017.

    Question 1. Why is it important for Congress to reauthorize NASA 
after failing to do so for many years?
    Answer. It is important and necessary for Congress to pass 
authorization acts for several reasons. Authorization laws are intended 
to create, continue, and modify programs. These bills provide policy 
guidance and ensure that the goals of an agency are met. For NASA, it 
is critical that constancy of purpose is prioritized through 
authorization acts, so that the agency's multi-year investments and 
programs can maintain stability with regard to schedule and cost, and 
thus, support the agency as it strives to meet its goals. Authorization 
acts also send a signal to the international community of the intent of 
Congress to continue to assert U.S. leadership in space--a signal that 
is important not only to our allies, but also to those who do not wish 
us well. Finally, authorization acts provide a critical tool for 
Congressional oversight.

    Question 2. Do you support the reauthorization language in the 
USICA bill?
    Answer. There are many strong components of the Senate-passed bill. 
As I mentioned in my testimony before the committee, I applaud Congress 
for including language (once again) that it is the priority of the 
United States to maintain a continuous human presence in LEO (section 
2620 (1-3, 3(b)). In light of the findings and recommendations in the 
DoD Defense Innovation Unit's `State of the Space Industrial Base'' 
released on November 18, Congress may consider further strengthening 
the language to read ``continuous American presence in space, beginning 
with low Earth orbit.'' The report can be found by accessing the linked 
pdf below.

https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/43TeQTAmdYrym5DTDrhjd3/
a37eb4fac2
bf9add1ab9f71299392043/
Space_Industrial_Base_Workshop_2021_Summary_Report
_-_Final_15_Nov_2021c.pdf

    In addition, I support the reauthorization language that extends 
the ISS to ``at least 2030'' (Section 2521, and conforming amendments. 
Beyond 2030, the costs of maintenance, operations, and particularly the 
engineering lifecycle data should be evaluated carefully, as well as 
the ongoing role of the ISS. Certainty is required by commercial 
providers who are developing follow on stations to close their business 
cases which in turn is imperative to meet the higher order requirement 
to ensure continuing U.S. interests and human presence in low Earth 
orbit after the ISS end-of-life.
    However, regarding space suits (Section 2616, (1))), I would 
suggest that driving NASA to partner ``to the maximum extent 
practicable with industry-proven spacesuit design, development and 
manufacturing suppliers'' may limit innovation. Partnering with such 
entities is a good idea but so is partnering with entities that 
``credibly demonstrate the capability to meet requirements as 
determined by NASA''. To that end, I would also suggest that rather 
than providing NASA the option to partner with ``1 or more private 
entities'', this should be changed to ``2 or more'', based on precisely 
the same logic that the re-authorization employs in its position that 
the Human Landing System (HLS) should involve 2 or more providers.
    Regarding Section 2627, ``Payments Received for Commercial Space-
Enabled Production on the ISS'', I commend the committee for placing 
this into context by directing the NASA Administrator to take into 
account ``the relative maturity and profitability'' of the applicable 
product or service. However, ``profitability'' of a product or service 
may or may not be a simple metric, depending upon how the development 
of that product or service has been funded by a company. Most 
importantly, however, the low Earth orbit ``economy'' does not yet 
exist; it is a nascent entity that at its best creates goods and 
services that are executed in part in space but are based wholly on 
Earth. Congress should be doing everything in its power to enable 
companies to demonstrate profitability in production efforts--a goal 
that is still a long way off--to encourage investors to come to the 
table to support them and most importantly to support the commercial 
space stations that Congress intends should eventually take the place 
of the ISS. Those companies will be the customers of such stations and 
the entities trying to raise capital now on the private market must be 
able to assure their investors that business cases can close by `going 
concerns' that have time to fully demonstrate their viability on the 
ISS without government levying a ``lien'' of sorts that will then be 
deposited into a government-managed space exploration fund.
    Beyond the specific language of NASA reauthorization language, I 
also strongly support the language regarding Space Situational 
Awareness and encourage Congress to fund this effort and give it full 
attention and encouragement. Last week's Russian ASAT test illustrates 
(again) the need for U.S. leadership and orchestration of the complex 
issues related to SSA. It is critical that congress work with the 
Administration to confirm a Director for OSC who will provide clear 
leadership to OSC and provide a focal point for interagency and across-
industry collaboration. Further, OSC should be elevated into a separate 
bureau--the Bureau of Space Commerce--instead of being left within the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). OSC should be 
given authority over clear goals, namely: promoting commercial space 
and championing it within the government, aiding in the development of 
standards and norms of behavior in space, identifying and addressing 
regulatory gaps. Moving OSC out from NOAA will give it the independence 
to establish a new, clean cut, directive organizational culture.

    International Space Competition. As discussed in the hearing, the 
United States faces growing international competition in space. The 
Chinese government is building its own space station, recently launched 
a hypersonic missile, and is spending billions of dollars on 
establishing and promoting new space capabilities that cross-over from 
military to civil applications and back again (`military civil fusion, 
or MCF'). In addition, companies in the United States and several 
abroad have applied for tens, or in some cases, hundreds of thousands 
of satellites in low-Earth orbit.

    Question. What actions should Congress take to ensure that NASA and 
the United States remain global leaders in space?
    Answer. It is undeniable that China is moving fast in LEO, and 
forging partnerships with members of the international community for 
activities onboard their station and in cislunar space. In my 
testimony, I noted that China is playing the long game, and it is 
critical that in assessing China's intentions in space, Congress 
understand how the People's Republic of China (PRC) is advancing 
rapidly across a range of space technologies and capabilities. The 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) produced a 
report to Congress in 2019 that outlined the need for a comprehensive, 
wholistic perspective regarding China's competitive interests in space. 
In my testimony, I included the USCC's findings on China's strategy to 
catch up and overtake the U.S. in preeminence in space.
    In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020, Congress 
responded to the USCC report by codifying recommendations for action. 
Namely, the defense bill called for the President, in consultation with 
the National Space Council, to develop ``. . . a strategy to ensure the 
United States can effectively compete with other national space 
programs, maintain dominance in the emerging commercial space economy, 
and has market, regulatory, and other means available to address unfair 
competition by the PRC . . .'' and also ``. . . a plan to strengthen 
and streamline cooperation with international allies and partners in 
space.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. Congress (2019). National Defense Authorization Act of 
2020, Pub. Law 116-92 (20 December). https://www.congress.gov/116/
plaws/publ92/PLAW-116publ92.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NASA, and by extension U.S. space companies serve as a vehicle of 
U.S. ``soft power'', shaping favorable behavior and outcomes among 
foreign entities, customers, and over time, competitors who do not 
operate according to American laws and values. China's ability to plan 
and make investments 5-10 years out under a military-run program and an 
increasingly totalitarian government is intended to enable Chinese 
hegemony in space with a fairly high degree of certainty. This, 
unfortunately, is an area where the U.S. must look itself in the mirror 
and understand that it must dedicate itself to constancy of purpose and 
multi-year strategic planning and investment. We have maintained our 
leadership role in space for many years thanks to the great public 
servants of NASA and ingenuity of the American people, but China is 
making great strides in their goal to meet pace with America. If the 
U.S. Congress hopes to maintain its leadership role in low-Earth orbit, 
for example, a forward thinking and thoughtful plan for a post-ISS 
world must come sooner than later. Our international partners, U.S. 
commercial partners, and the scientific community must be engaged as 
Congress strategically positions the U.S. to continue thriving and 
exploring space.
    To go further, Congress must recognize that space as a domain 
extends far beyond NASA's remit. Congressional committee structure 
makes it difficult to meaningfully define strategy for the U.S. future 
in space, which is in many ways the same thing as the U.S. future and 
leadership on Earth. Space is simultaneously a contested and crowded 
corridor for transportation of goods, services, and assurance of 
security, an economic engine promoting job growth, an operational 
domain for civil, military, and commercial entities, a key component of 
U.S. infrastructure, a collaborative and competitive zone for foreign 
powers, a security-critical `location', a driver of technology 
advancement, plays a key role in monitoring and possibly mitigating 
climate change, and much more. As pointed out in the aforementioned DIU 
publication, the state of the U.S. space industrial base is 
``tactically strong but strategically fragile.'' In my opinion the U.S. 
is not prepared for the increasing competition in space. Becoming 
prepared will require a ``whole of government'' approach that Congress 
has not yet evidenced, beginning with addressing institutional barriers 
in committee scope, collaboration, and oversight. Full utilization of a 
bipartisan bicameral ``space caucus'' would be a start, as would work 
on joint hearings, for example on the establishment of an ``economic 
security corridor'' extending from the Earth to the Moon (and beyond). 
Another approach would be to extend support for NASA's Artemis Accords 
by authorizing both Artemis and the Accords and advancing their 
international goals, as the Committee just did in this most recent 
hearing.

    Role of University Partnerships. Much of the hearing discussion 
focused on the International Space Station and near-earth orbit 
satellites. Arizona universities support these missions, and 
additionally, the universities are leaders in other NASA projects. For 
example, Arizona State University's OSIRIS-REx Thermal Emission 
Spectrometer has collected samples from an asteroid and will return to 
Earth in 2023. Meanwhile, the University of Arizona's Near-Earth 
Objection (NEO) Surveyor Mission will help NASA complete its 
Congressional mandate to discover 90 percent of all near-Earth objects 
larger than 140 meters in length.

    Question 1. How can we ensure that crucial science and planetary 
defense missions, such as OSIRIS-REx and the NEO Surveyor, receive the 
support from NASA to be successful?
    Answer. NASA's Human Exploration programs and its Space Science 
missions are two sides of the same coin; the human aspiration and 
intention to inquire of the universe ``Where did we come from? Where 
are we going?'' Our understanding of the universe is advanced step-by-
step through robust support and decades-long development and funding of 
space science programs such as OSIRIS-Rex and the NEO Surveyor. 
However, these particular missions play a dual role; that of generating 
knowledge needed to develop the systems we need to protect our planet 
from NEO incursions. Critical programs such as OSIRIS-Rex and the NEO 
Surveyor need champions in Congress who will continue to support these 
and other missions through strong authorization and appropriations 
language. This can be difficult in the face of many other pressing--and 
apparently more immediate--national priorities; however, the question 
of planetary defense is only a question until it's not.

    Question 2. In your opinion, how can NASA best utilize university 
partnerships to perform research, advance science, and help NASA reach 
its goals?
    Answer. University partnerships are important for engaging the next 
generation of science and engineering leaders across the United States, 
and for expanding both the nature and quantity of collaborative 
partnerships related to NASA's mission and extending that mission. For 
example, NASA's L'SPACE Academy, a collaborative partnership between 
NASA and Arizona State University (ASU), provides the opportunity for 
undergraduate students to participate in free, online, and interactive 
programs that encourages students to learn about NASA missions and 
connects them with industry professionals. https://www.lspace.asu.edu/ 
In addition, ASU is the lead university for the Psyche Mission--an 
extraordinary mission to a `metal asteroid'. The Psyche team in turn 
has set up an online course about the mission which encourages 
participation and learning not only about Psyche but in related STEM 
fields. ASU was also the 2020 winner of NASA's Big Idea Challenge--
https://bigidea.nianet.org--which provides opportunity for partnerships 
with universities and other entities. Finally, competitions run by NASA 
that provide opportunities for universities to collaborate with the 
agency and with other companies has been a part of NASA's rich legacy 
of stimulating both basic and applied research since the earliest days 
of the space program. Finally, ASU is also a partner in the MILO Space 
Institute--an innovative partnership between ASU and Lockheed Martin to 
establish momentum toward public-private partnerships in science. Not 
to be overlooked, Arizona University is a key contributor to 
pathfinding NASA missions such as the Phoenix Mars Lander, the James 
Webb Space Telescope, which will enable humanity to peer back through 
time to the earliest moments after the beginning of the universe, and 
OSIRIS-Rex.

    Arizona's Apollo History. During the Apollo mission in the 1960s 
and 1970s, NASA astronauts trained at Sunset Crater National Monument 
near Flagstaff, Arizona, where the volcanic landscape approximated the 
lunar surface. Astronauts also trained at Meteor Crater in the high 
desert of northern Arizona.

    Question. Could these locations in Arizona be beneficial to Artemis 
astronauts as they train for their lunar missions?
    Answer. Training for spaceflight missions is informed by all that 
has been learned before, from previous missions and training programs. 
If the locations are still deemed to be close approximations of the 
lunar surface--in particular the environment around the south pole of 
the Moon, where the Artemis missions are intended to be carried out--
then they would certainly be reasonable candidates for training.
                                 ______
                                 
  Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to 
                         Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar
    Regulatory Framework for Commercial Spaceflight. In recent years, 
we have seen the tremendous growth in the commercial space sector. As 
multiple witnesses have noted, the responsibility of regulating this 
industry is spread across a variety of Federal agencies, with differing 
levels of technical expertise and industry outreach.

    Question 1. How can Congress improve interagency cooperation to 
better serve America's commercial space sector?
    Answer. The Office of Space Commerce (OSC) is the designated lead 
agency for representing commercial space sector interests in 
interagency discussions, yet the office's director position remains 
vacant. It is critical that Congress work with the Administration to 
confirm a Director for OSC who will provide clear leadership to the 
function of OSC.
    Further, OSC should be elevated into a separate bureau--the Bureau 
of Space Commerce--instead of being left within the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). OSC should be given authority 
over clear goals, namely: promoting commercial space and championing it 
within the government, aiding in the development of standards and norms 
of behavior in space, identifying and addressing regulatory gaps. 
Moving OSC out from NOAA will give it the independence to establish a 
new, clear cut, directive organizational culture.
    Once OSC is elevated and established in its roles and 
responsibilities, interagency cooperation will be made easier with the 
benefit of jurisdictional clarity.

    Question 2. Do you believe that Congress Federal regulatory 
oversight of commercial space endeavors should be more concentrated 
within one agency than exists under the current regulatory landscape? 
If so, what are the considerations that Congress should keep in mind as 
it designates or establishes such an office?
    Answer. There are benefits to different agencies regulating certain 
aspects of commercial space. FAA's Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation (AST), guided by Chapter 509 of Title 51, ensures the 
safety of the uninvolved public and their property, protects national 
policy goals, and enables industry growth by providing guidance, launch 
licenses, experimental permits, and promotional support including R&D. 
FAA AST has developed considerable expertise in commercial space 
transportation and has done a good job meeting the challenges that come 
with a rapidly growing industry. FAA AST requires continued oversight 
from Congress to balance the needs of industry to develop without 
premature regulatory burdens with the need to ensure, as far as 
possible, public safety.
    The Office of Space Commerce (OSC) has been tasked with shaping 
civil space situational awareness, modernizing oversight and regulation 
activities, and promoting the U.S. civil space industry 
internationally. This office's role is more important than ever--with a 
growing debris field around the earth, posing a serious threat to 
unfettered access to space, and our national assets that exist in the 
space domain--many of which contribute in a critical way to U.S. 
national security and our day-to-day activities. In addition, in the 
recent past OSC has played an important ``convening'' role for the 
commercial space industry, encouraging a free exchange of ideas, and 
building cross-agency bridges through sponsorship of events with the 
Department of State and the U.S. Trade Organization. These events and 
exchanges are an important part of the government function and a way 
that the government can encourage industry growth.

    Question 3. How should Federal agencies best engage with industry 
to ensure that Federal regulation of commercial space entities meets 
the need for public safety and oversight without unnecessarily curbing 
innovation?
    Answer. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 as amended (51 
USC 50901) is the primary law guiding Federal oversight, regulation, 
and promotion of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry. The 
law mandates that the Secretary of Transportation ensure that all 
launch and reentry activities shall protect public safety of property 
and support U.S. national security and policy interests, and that the 
Secretary shall issue licenses to U.S. applicants who show that they do 
and will continue to meet safety requirements. The CSLA has been 
amended several times since 1984. Critical to the regulatory regime's 
enabling nature is its exclusive focus on protecting the uninvolved 
public and their property. Space transportation continues to be seen as 
a dangerous and risky activity, i.e., not a common carrier mode of 
transportation with an expectation of safety and success for those who 
opt to participate. Thus, in the case of human spaceflight, the law 
expressly limits regulation for their safety and calls for informed 
consent of the flight participants. The intention of this ``learning 
period'' is to allow the industry time to grow and develop best 
practices ahead of the eventual arrival of regulatory action by the 
government.
    The commercial space industry in the United States is dynamic and 
evolving. A great example of this growth can be seen by the increase in 
launches licensed by the FAA per year. In 2011, the FAA licensed only 
one launch, in 2016, they licensed 11, and in 2021 so far, 47 licensed 
launches have occurred.\1\ While the industry has certainly experienced 
immense growth over the past decade, it would be unrealistic to 
determine it deserves the same type of regulatory landscape as that of 
commercial aviation, which transportations thousands of people globally 
each day. Given the technical and economic challenges in rocket 
science, this bounding of regulatory risk--while still protecting 
American citizens and interests from harm--gives entrepreneurs and 
investors' confidence that they will get permission to fly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``FAA Licensed Launches.'' Licensed Launches. Federal Aviation 
Administration, April 19, 2021. https://www.faa.gov/data_research/
commercial_space_data/launches/?type=license.
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    Continued encouragement by Congress on the development of safety 
standards and best practices between industry and the government will 
lead to an informed and mutually beneficial relationship for all 
parties involved, while not prematurely hamstringing the growth and 
progress of the commercial space sector in a time where America sees 
foreign powers rapidly developing this critical technology of their 
own.
    FAA/AST faces a growing workload, as launch cadences continue 
trending upward. As mentioned, AST requires the resources to meet this 
exciting challenge. Furthermore, Congress should invest directly in the 
consensus standards effort identified by FAA's Commercial Space 
Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) as the agreed-on consensus 
choice for human spaceflight standards-writing.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to 
                               Mike Gold
    NASA Reauthorization. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act 
(USICA) includes legislative language to reauthorize the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that I developed on a 
bipartisan basis last year with Senators Cantwell, Wicker, and Cruz. 
NASA was last authorized in 2017.

    Question 1. Why is it important for Congress to reauthorize NASA 
after failing to do so for many years?
    Answer. Since Apollo, no NASA beyond low Earth orbit (``LEO'') 
human spaceflight program has come to fruition, leaving our 
international partners justifiably skeptical of the Agency's ability to 
sustain such efforts and achieve success. This stands in stark contrast 
to China which has maintained both consistency and continuity for their 
own beyond LEO human spaceflight efforts and their space program 
generally. The best way to reassure our partners in Europe, Japan, 
Canada, and throughout the world is for Congress to pass a bipartisan 
reauthorization bill that demonstrates uniform support for the Artemis 
program and key aspects such as the Lunar Gateway which international 
partners are contributing billions of dollars to.

    Question 2. Do you support the reauthorization language in the 
USICA bill?
    Answer. Yes, the language in the USICA provides critical support 
for Artemis as well as for other important issues such as the extension 
of the International Space Station (ISS) to 2030 and ensuring the 
development of a commercial space station to ensure that the U.S. 
maintains a constant crewed presence in LEO.

    International Space Competition. As discussed in the hearing, the 
United States faces additional international competition in space. The 
Chinese government plans to develop its own space station and recently 
launched a hypersonic missile. Other nations have applied for tens, or 
in some cases, hundreds of thousands of satellites in low-Earth orbit.

    Question. What actions should Congress take to ensure that NASA and 
the United States remain global leaders in space?
    Answer. Again, Congress should pass a bipartisan authorization bill 
that explicitly supports the Artemis program. Moreover, Congress should 
extend the ISS until at least 2030 and direct NASA to support a future 
commercial space station by serving as a robust customer for such a 
platform including the purchase of seats not just for U.S. astronauts 
but for international partners as well allowing the Agency to maintain 
its traditional barter system and leadership role in space exploration.
    Congress should also take action to ensure that the U.S. does not 
fall behind China and other nations in orbital servicing, assembly, and 
manufacturing. Specifically, Congress should explicitly direct NASA to 
support critical programs such as OSAM-3 and the deployment of an Earth 
Science Platform which will bolster our knowledge of climate change 
while developing critical new capabilities to ensure that the U.S. 
doesn't fall behind China in this vital field of space-based robotics/
next-generation persistent platforms.

    Role of University Partnerships. Much of the hearing discussion 
focused on the International Space Station and near-earth orbit 
satellites. Arizona universities support these missions, and 
additionally, the universities are leaders in other NASA projects. For 
example, Arizona State University's OSIRIS-REx Thermal Emission 
Spectrometer has collected samples from an asteroid and will return to 
Earth in 2023. Meanwhile, the University of Arizona's Near-Earth 
Objection (NEO) Surveyor Mission will help NASA complete its 
Congressional mandate to discover 90 percent of all near-Earth objects 
larger than 140 meters in length.

    Question 1. How can we ensure that crucial science and planetary 
defense missions, such as OSIRIS-REx and the NEO Surveyor, receive the 
support from NASA to be successful?
    Answer. Congress should include explicit direction in authorization 
and appropriations bills directing NASA to leverage Archinaut-based 
technologies to enhance the capabilities of science and planetary 
defense missions while lowering their costs.
    Universities also have an important role to play in support of new 
commercial space stations. Specifically, Redwire Space is proud to be a 
partner with Arizona State University in support of the Orbital Reef, a 
next-generation commercial space station. Other Orbital Reef team 
members include Blue Origin, Sierra Space, and Boeing.

    Question 2. In your opinion, how can NASA best utilize university 
partnerships to perform research, advance science, and help NASA reach 
its goals?
    Answer. NASA should leverage universities to support key programs 
and missions, taking advantage of educational institutions' robust 
capabilities and to support vital workforce development to ensure that 
the U.S. does not fall behind China or other nations in space 
development and operations.

    Arizona's Apollo History. During the Apollo mission in the 1960s 
and 1970s, NASA astronauts trained at Sunset Crater National Monument 
near Flagstaff, Arizona, where the volcanic landscape approximated the 
lunar surface. Astronauts also trained at Meteor Crater in the high 
desert of northern Arizona.

    Question. Could these locations in Arizona be beneficial to Artemis 
astronauts as they train for their lunar missions?
    Answer. Absolutely. Continued ground training in Arizona and in 
other states will be a critical part of ensuring that Artemis 
astronauts are prepared to tackle the numerous challenges they will 
face exploring the Moon and Mars.
                                 ______
                                 
  Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to 
                               Mike Gold
    Regulatory Framework for Commercial Spaceflight. In recent years, 
we have seen the tremendous growth in the commercial space sector. As 
multiple witnesses have noted, the responsibility of regulating this 
industry are spread across a variety of Federal agencies, with 
differing levels of technical expertise and industry outreach.

    Question 1. How can Congress improve interagency cooperation to 
better serve America's commercial space sector?
    Answer. Thank you for asking such an important question. 
Establishing a proper regulatory framework which balances innovation 
and commercial development with preserving the space environment and 
meeting our international treaty obligations is vital. The most glaring 
issue that needs to be addressed is to establish an explicit system for 
providing ``continuing supervision'' as required by the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967 for commercial activities including private sector space 
stations; orbital servicing, assembly, and manufacturing; commercial 
lunar rovers; and mining activities on the Moon or asteroids.
    Congress should designate an entity within the Federal Government 
to exercise this continuing supervision activity by creating a `Mission 
Authorization' process that would require companies to describe their 
proposed activities prior to launch and subsequently update the 
government of any substantive changes. This would provide a benign 
means of meeting the `continuing supervision' requirement that wouldn't 
unduly burden entrepreneurs while still generating the information 
necessary that, per the requirements of the Artemis Accords, would be 
publicly shared with the United Nations to prevent confusion and 
conflict in space.

    Question 2. Do you believe that Congress Federal regulatory 
oversight of commercial space endeavors should be more concentrated 
within one agency than exists under the current regulatory landscape? 
If so, what are the considerations that Congress should keep in mind as 
it designates or establishes such an office?
    Answer. Further concentration of regulatory oversight for all 
commercial space endeavors into a single agency would be ideal. 
However, for such a paradigm to succeed, this single agency not only 
needs the proper authority, but must also be properly resourced in 
terms of funds and experienced personnel to avoid causing undue burdens 
that would harm American competitiveness, job growth, and scientific 
activities such as combating climate change.

    Question 3. How should Federal agencies best engage with industry 
to ensure that Federal regulation of commercial space entities meets 
the need for public safety and oversight without unnecessarily curbing 
innovation?
    Answer. All Federal agencies that engage in regulating commercial 
space activities should create or leverage existing Federal Advisory 
Committees to ensure that industry and government are acting in concert 
with each other to maximize both innovation and safety. Government and 
industry are stronger when they're working together. For example, 
during the hearing a question was asked about the NASA Advisory 
Council's Regulatory and Policy Committee (NAC RPC). This Committee is 
comprised exclusively of industry representatives and is vital to 
ensure that NASA and the private sector are communicating with each 
other on important regulatory and policy issues. In stark contrast, the 
NAC itself has only one industry representative which is completely at 
odds with the large and important role private sector entities play in 
executing NASA's mission. NASA should proceed with appointing more 
industry representatives to the NAC and its various committees, 
redouble its use of the NAC RPC, and other agencies/departments, such 
as the Departments of State and Commerce, should develop their own 
Federal Advisory Committees focused on commercial space activities.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to 
                          Dr. Patricia Sanders
    NASA Reauthorization. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act 
(USICA) includes legislative language to reauthorize the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that I developed on a 
bipartisan basis last year with Senators Cantwell, Wicker, and Cruz. 
NASA was last authorized in 2017.

    Question 1. Why is it important for Congress to reauthorize NASA 
after failing to do so for many years?
    Answer. The space environment is changing rapidly and is not the 
same as it was in 2017. Reauthorization of NASA at this time would be 
advantageous to set expectations for the Agency in the current and 
emerging environment.

    Question 2. Do you support the reauthorization language in the 
USICA bill?
    Answer. The USICA bill is very complex and wide-ranging. I would 
only comment on Part II which addresses space and only in general terms 
relevant to the charter of the ASAP. The Panel is pleased to see the 
emphasis placed on Space traffic Management and Space Situation 
Awareness which is consistent with the recommendation we made in 2020. 
We also support, as important safety and risk management approaches, 
the emphasis on continuing presence in Low Earth Orbit, the support for 
competing designs for the Human Landing Systems, the need for work on 
advanced space suits, and a step-wise approach to space exploration.
    One issue not addressed in the USICA bill is the much needed 
revision of the language in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 
concerning Human Space Flight Independent Investigations. The ASAP 
noted, as far back as 2015, that the language, while perhaps 
appropriate and logical for the ISS and Space Shuttle, was inadequate 
and obsolete for the emerging environment that included reusable and 
commercially provided space vehicles. In 2015, the ASAP made the 
following recommendation:
    The 2005 Authorization language should be reviewed with today's 
systems in mind. . .including details on the level of vehicle damage 
requiring investigation, the temporal issues of when mission phases 
begin and end, and NASA's oversight role in mishap investigations 
conducted by its providers, as well as when the need for oversight is 
required. The mishap response procedures should be thought through, 
documented, and in place well before any actual flights.
    The 2005 Authorization language is even more inadequate when 
considering the emerging space travel involving non-NASA participants. 
Yet this recommendation remains open and increasingly relevant.

    International Space Competition. As discussed in the hearing, the 
United States faces additional international competition in space. The 
Chinese government plans to develop its own space station and recently 
launched a hypersonic missile. Other nations have applied for tens, or 
in some cases, hundreds of thousands of satellites in low-Earth orbit.

    Question. What actions should Congress take to ensure that NASA and 
the United States remain global leaders in space?
    Answer. Congress can support NASA and United States global 
leadership by (1) providing adequate and stable resources to support a 
consistent program of work and a responsible and realistic schedule for 
that work, and (2) providing an appropriate regulatory framework to 
support the entire national space environment, including government and 
commercial entities.

    Role of University Partnerships. Much of the hearing discussion 
focused on the International Space Station and near-earth orbit 
satellites. Arizona universities support these missions, and 
additionally, the universities are leaders in other NASA projects. For 
example, Arizona State University's OSIRIS-REx Thermal Emission 
Spectrometer has collected samples from an asteroid and will return to 
Earth in 2023. Meanwhile, the University of Arizona's Near-Earth 
Objection (NEO) Surveyor Mission will help NASA complete its 
Congressional mandate to discover 90 percent of all near-Earth objects 
larger than 140 meters in length.

    Question 1. How can we ensure that crucial science and planetary 
defense missions, such as OSIRIS-REx and the NEO Surveyor, receive the 
support from NASA to be successful?
    Answer. The ASAP has not focused on science and planetary defense 
missions, but recognizes their importance. Support and resources from 
the Congress will be critical to NASA support.

    Question 2. In your opinion, how can NASA best utilize university 
partnerships to perform research, advance science, and help NASA reach 
its goals?
    Answer. NASA can best achieve its goals by taking advantage of the 
full range of capabilities available to it, including those from 
universities, commercial industry and international partners.

    Arizona's Apollo History. During the Apollo mission in the 1960s 
and 1970s, NASA astronauts trained at Sunset Crater National Monument 
near Flagstaff, Arizona, where the volcanic landscape approximated the 
lunar surface. Astronauts also trained at Meteor Crater in the high 
desert of northern Arizona.

    Question. Could these locations in Arizona be beneficial to Artemis 
astronauts as they train for their lunar missions?
    Answer. I am not sufficiently familiar with the specific locations 
mentioned to comment.
                                 ______
                                 
  Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to 
                          Dr. Patricia Sanders
    Regulatory Framework for Commercial Spaceflight. In recent years, 
we have seen the tremendous growth in the commercial space sector. As 
multiple witnesses have noted, the responsibility of regulating this 
industry are spread across a variety of Federal agencies, with 
differing levels of technical expertise and industry outreach.

    Question 1. How can Congress improve interagency cooperation to 
better serve America's commercial space sector?
    Answer. A number of Agencies today engage with or otherwise have an 
influence on the commercial space sector to include: NASA, DoD, DOT, 
FAA, DOC, FCC and the State Department. Interagency cooperation on 
space issues has generally been positive. Therefore, it may not be 
necessary for Congress to be concerned about improving interagency 
cooperation.
    Interagency cooperation has not been an area of focus for the ASAP, 
but some actions that we do believe Congress could take to better serve 
the United States commercial space sector--and NASA--would be to

   Avoid programmatic gaps and delays by providing adequate and 
        timely resources for government-funded space programs. A long-
        term perspective is needed for since these systems can take 
        years to develop. Following a normal appropriations process 
        rather than adopting Continuing Resolutions would be a key 
        step.

   Ensure that roles and responsibilities for space-related 
        departments and agencies are clear and do not have any 
        inappropriate overlaps or holes.

   Update the outdated, existing procedure for investigating 
        human space flight mishaps (as previously recommended by the 
        ASAP).

   Identify a lead Federal agency for Space Traffic Management 
        and provide the necessary authority, immunity from lawsuits, 
        and resources to do the job (as also previously recommended by 
        the ASAP).

    Question 2. Do you believe that Congress Federal regulatory 
oversight of commercial space endeavors should be more concentrated 
within one agency than exists under the current regulatory landscape? 
If so, what are the considerations that Congress should keep in mind as 
it designates or establishes such an office?
    Answer. The ASAP has not specifically considered whether oversight 
of commercial space endeavors should be concentrated under one agency. 
It is possible that consolidation and streamlining could be 
accomplished by transferring functions from other organizations to one, 
perhaps significantly simplifying the approval process for space 
operators. Alternatively, or as an interim step, it may be possible to 
streamline the regulatory process without making major changes to 
responsibilities, staffing and budgets, by designating a new or 
existing agency to serve as the regulatory ``front door'' for 
commercial space operators. This office might then work to consolidate 
and streamline the needed regulatory approvals and a consistent 
government response.

    Question 3. How should Federal agencies best engage with industry 
to ensure that Federal regulation of commercial space entities meets 
the need for public safety and oversight without unnecessarily curbing 
innovation?
    Answer. One possible approach would be for Congress or the White 
House to establish top-level guidance to do just that--to ensure public 
safety and to encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space 
transportation. As another step toward ensuring that a regulatory 
agency does not curb innovation, it is important to provide adequate 
resources for staffing with the appropriate expertise and experience to 
keep pace with advances in technology.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to 

                          Dr. Patricia Sanders
    Question 1. As you are probably familiar with, Fairmont, WV is home 
to the Katherine Johnson Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) 
facility. The Katherine Johnson IV&V Center provides NASA the highest 
achievable levels of safety and cost-effectiveness for mission critical 
software and has the capabilities for so much more. I have spoken a lot 
on this issue with Former Administrator Bridenstine and with current 
Administrator Nelson. I believe West Virginia has the facilities, like 
the Katherine Johnson IV&V Facility, and the people who can be the 
backbone for the Artemis program. As chair of the NASA's Aerospace 
Safety and Advisory Panel (ASAP), could you speak to the value of the 
IV&V to NASA's mission.
    Answer. Independent Verification and Validation is important to all 
software development. This is especially true for all of NASA's safety 
critical software.

    Question 2. I am proud of the capabilities housed at the Katherine 
Johnson IV&V center, however I hear too often that they feel 
underutilized. Is that the case?
    Answer. The Panel is aware that NASA employs the capabilities of 
that facility for all software developed by NASA and frequently for 
software developed by NASA contractors. We are not cognizant if that 
fully employs the full capacity of the Center.

                                [all]