[Senate Hearing 117-816]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-816
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION
AND COMPETITION IN SPACE: OVERSIGHT OF NASA'S ROLES AND PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND SCIENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 21, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-586 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Ranking
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii ROY BLUNT, Missouri
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts TED CRUZ, Texas
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada MIKE LEE, Utah
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
George Greenwell, Policy Coordinator and Security Manager
John Keast, Republican Staff Director
Crystal Tully, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Steven Wall, General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND SCIENCE
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado, Chair CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming, Ranking
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TED CRUZ, Texas
GARY PETERS, Michigan DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona, TODD YOUNG, Indiana
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts JERRY MORAN, Kansas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on October 21, 2021................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 1
Article dated June 2021 from Space News entitled, ``Mind the
Gap in Low Earth Orbit'' by Mike Gold...................... 21
Statement of Senator Lummis...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 4
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 38
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 48
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 50
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 57
Witnesses
Hon. Jim Bridenstine, Former NASA Administrator.................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar, Executive Vice President for Government
Affairs, Axiom Space........................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Mike Gold, Executive Vice President for Civil Space and External
Affairs, Redwire Space......................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.................. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar
by:
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 63
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 66
Response to written questions submitted to Mike Gold by:
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 67
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 69
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Patricia Sanders
by:
Hon. Kyrsten Sinema.......................................... 69
Hon. Raphael Warnock......................................... 71
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito.................................... 71
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION
AND COMPETITION IN SPACE: OVERSIGHT OF NASA'S ROLES AND PROGRAMS
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Space and Science,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John
Hickenlooper, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Hickenlooper [presiding], Cantwell,
Blumenthal, Lujan, Lummis, Wicker, Cruz, and Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Hickenlooper. The Subcommittee on Space and Science
will come to order. Today marks this subcommittee's second
hearing examining this, today, U.S. leadership in space. Timely
and critical discussion--really timely and critical discussion,
following recent launch of advanced Chinese aircraft.
We all recognize that NASA is a key agency for a number of
programs, but especially important to civil and commercial
space sector, enabling us to manage our international
relationships in space. Congress last authorized a NASA
authorization bill in 2017. We are absolutely thrilled that
President Biden has confided in Senator Nelson and designated
him to lead NASA, as the administrator. Together, hopefully in
close cooperation, we can accomplish national goals within
this, what we call, the last frontier.
Dating back into the Cold War, space competition was
primarily between Americans and Soviets. Today, 40 nations have
a space agency of some sort. Competition also exists between
commercial space companies from a number of different nations.
The hearing today will examine several critical issues
facing domain. One, how do we ensure the Artemis program
remains competitive, on budget, on schedule, so that lunar
landings can become a future reality that we can schedule with
confidence? Are we going to be able to have spaceships--or
space suits developed in time? The Artemis program is crucial
to maintaining, what I think of as, the international
confidence in America's ability to leader--to be a leader in
space.
The next question, is how do we ensure NASA's long-term
continuity of purpose, make sure that it is supported with
sufficient appropriations by Congress, and can transcend
Presidential administrations, so that we can get to secure
funding that, not just this country, but the world will
recognize as continuity?
Another question we will address is, is the U.S. future in
low Earth orbit after the International Space Station, the ISS?
The annual costs, now, is approaching almost $4 billion
annually, just in operations. There are another commercial
outposts under development, but there are still questions about
how this will all shake out.
We are also going to look at how Space Traffic Management,
STM, impacts U.S. missions in LEO, low Earth orbit. How do we
mitigate orbital debris to make sure that we have
sustainability in our commercial space industry? This
subcommittee is going to have to develop new legislation to--to
actively remediate some of the debris that is already up there.
Which brings the questions, again, of how does space
exploration and research get accomplished? How do we bring
nations together in common purpose? How do we strengthen
science, accelerate innovation and discovery?
Senate passed NASA reauthorization in the bipartisan U.S.
Innovation and Competition Act, USICA--although I still prefer
the Endless Frontier Act.
Senator Wicker. Here, here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hickenlooper. The Space and Science Committee will
continue developing upcoming legislation to support NASA
missions and make sure that we find that continuity of funding.
I am delighted to welcome the panel. The Honorable Jim
Bridenstine, former NASA Administrator under the Trump
administration, former U.S. Representative from Oklahoma.
Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar, from the Coalition for Deep Space
Exploration. Someday I want to be associated with a coalition
for deep space exploration. She served as Senior Policy Advisor
for the ISS National Laboratory.
Mr. Mike Gold, of Redwire Space, former Associate
Administrator for Space Policy and Partnerships at NASA.
And Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair of the NASA Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, former Executive Director of Missile
Defense Agency.
I want to thank each of you for taking the time out of your
busy schedules to join us here. I want to make sure that the
conversation we have takes advantage of all of your diverse
experiences and perspectives. I'm looking forward to the
conversation.
Now, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Lummis for her
opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. CYNTHIA LUMMIS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING
Senator Lummis. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is so
nice that we finally get to do this hearing. We were hoping to
do it in Colorado Springs in August, and it would have been so
nice to be in your beautiful state, then. But I am so delighted
that we are getting to do this now. This is such a
distinguished panel of witnesses and there is so much to learn
for policymakers, and we rely so heavily on you to brief us,
guide us, and support our efforts to support our space mission.
So, thank you so much. I am so glad you got over your COVID and
we are all back together again.
This group of panelists is so exceptional. So, thank you
for your flexibility in working with us through the change and
your willingness to be here today to speak with us. Your
expertise is something we just welcome. So, very, very nice to
have you here today and finally get to do this.
NASA has a long history of working with international
partners and, of course, that is by design. The legislation
that created NASA called for it to pursue cooperation with
other nations and groups of nations. Our international
partnerships have grown since NASA's creation and the success
of the International Space Station speaks to the ways in which
cooperation in space has strengthened our relationships on
Earth. In fact, the first time I got to go to Russia--to
Moscow, it was for the purpose of meeting with U.S. astronauts
and Russian astronauts, who were there working together in
Russia. Even in times of tension on Earth, American and Russian
astronauts were able to work together at the International
Space Station.
Now, five space agencies are part of the ISS project. The
ISS will soon reach the end of its life span, but it cannot
mark the end of our partnership. New opportunities and
challenges await us, as we step in the era of the Artemis
program and the Lunar gateway and eventually, human exploration
of Mars.
While we embark on new adventures, we, along with every
other spacefaring nation, must use them as opportunities to
manage the challenge of space debris. We must work together to
ensure we both remove orbital debris, and design equipment and
policies to help cut back on the potential for orbital debris.
I am encouraged by efforts in the private sector to step up and
help with this problem, and I intend to work with my colleagues
on solutions at the Congressional level to help tackle the
issue.
There are other challenges, as well. Space is not only an
area for collaboration. Competition in space looms large and we
must work to avoid a cold war-style Space Race. Unfortunately,
it seems some countries are less committed to this than others.
Some nations do not seem interested in differentiating between
military and civilian space operations. This week, we heard
reports that over the summer, China launched a hypersonic glide
vehicle that circled the Earth in low orbit and reentered the
atmosphere. China's labeling this test of a nuclear capable
weapon a ``routine test of a space vehicle'' underlines their
unwillingness to separate military and civilian activities in
space.
I suspect this trend will continue and it will become
increasingly more difficult for the U.S. to view advancements
made in space by China as anything other than a threat to our
security. To that end, the United States must continue to
pursue policies that make it the preferred partner for all
other spacefaring nations and help to set norms that promote
access, the sharing of scientific advancement, and neighborly
attitudes toward other countries' assets in space.
So, I am very much looking forward to this hearing and
learning from our distinguished panelists about these issues. I
am sure we are going to learn so much today that I cannot wait
to hear what you have to say. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Ranking Member Lummis.
Appreciate having Wyoming and Colorado run this committee. You
have been a great partner and continue to be a great partner.
Now, I will recognize Ranking Member Wicker for his opening
comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Lummis, I
came down with COVID the same time as Senator Hickenlooper.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. I hope you are just as delighted that I got
over it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. I guess it just goes without saying. As a
matter of fact, Senator Hickenlooper, I found out how, finally,
to get on the first few minutes of NBC Nightly News and that is
to have an Independent and a Republican and a Democrat all come
down with COVID on the same day.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. This morning's hearing will address topics
related to international cooperation and competition in outer
space. Decades of U.S. cooperation in space, with other
nations, has enhanced America's leadership in science and
technology, and strengthened ties with international partners.
We want to continue that.
NASA has been involved in thousands of cooperative
activities with over 100 countries, including 20 years of
sustained human presence aboard the International Space
Station. Even during the height of the cold war, as Senator
Lummis mentioned, space proved to be a rare area of cooperation
between the U.S. and the USSR.
Although space can bring nations together, the space domain
has become increasingly competitive. Today, we are in a new
space race with China. Beijing is seeking to secure both the
lunar high ground, and low Earth orbit, LEO, to supersede the
U.S. as the dominant space power. This year, China launched the
first module of its space station and is eagerly soliciting
international partners.
Cooperative endeavors with other nations and the private
sector will play a key role in helping America confront China's
space challenge. NASA's Artemis deep space exploration program
has already been critical in promoting U.S. leadership and
cementing our alliances in space. Artemis will return
astronauts to the surface of the moon and build----
Senator Hickenlooper. Here, here.
Senator Wicker. Cheers from the audience--and build a
sustained presence there in preparation for future human
exploration of Mars in this decade.
Rather than going it alone, the Artemis program envisions
major contributions from international partners such as Canada,
European nations, and Japan. In addition to relying on other
nations, Artemis will also employ unique capabilities offered
by commercial space companies for key aspects of its mission.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on both
the opportunities and the challenges NASA faces in competing
against China, as well as carrying out the international
commercial partnerships for Artemis, the International Space
Station, and other programs.
NASA needs clear Congressional reauthorization and
direction to keep Artemis on track and support other
cooperative efforts. And I am delighted to report to you all
that this is a priority of the Chair of the Full Committee, and
I appreciate her efforts in this regard. The Committee's NASA
Authorization Act, which passed as part of the Endless Frontier
Act, includes many provisions to accomplish those goals. I am
proud to have worked with Senator Cantwell and others on the
NASA bill. I hope my colleagues in the House will work with us.
Let us find a space vehicle to attach that NASA bill to and get
it signed into law, at this pivotal time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you very much, Senator. We will
have to find a space vehicle for the attachment.
Now, we can hear from out witnesses with their opening
statements. I think we can start with the Honorable Jim
Bridenstine.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BRIDENSTINE,
FORMER NASA ADMINISTRATOR
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Chairman Hickenlooper, Ranking
Member Lummis, Ranking Member Wicker, and Senator Moran. It is
great to be back in Washington, DC, testifying before this
committee.
I want to thank this committee for the strong, apolitical,
bipartisan support that this committee has shown to NASA and
its agenda. I think that is critically important for a lot of
reasons. When you are doing projects that take multiple decades
in nature, we have to have continuity of purpose. Continuity of
purpose requires Congress to engage, be involved, and support
the efforts of NASA in an apolitical, bipartisan way. And when
that happens--this is the most important thing. When that
happens, we are able to achieve international cooperation in a
way that is often very difficult.
So, when you think about the history, you think about the
vision for space exploration, the Constellation program, and
the cancellation thereof. We think about the Space Exploration
Initiative back in the 1990s and the cancellation thereof. When
these things happen, it has--it has an effect on our
international partners that is chilling. And they then choose,
in many cases, not to partner with us and that is a problem.
But what I will say is that, if you look back at 2017, we
passed the NASA Transition Authorization Act in bipartisan way,
House and Senate. It was signed by the President in 2017. And,
of course, the current NASA Administrator, then senator, came
to that event, in a bipartisan way to say, look, NASA needs to
have continuity of purpose. So, passing an authorization bill,
in my view, is critically important. We have to have that to
demonstrate to the world that we have resolve, as a Nation, to
accomplish these very impressive things and to stay ahead of
our competitors. So, that is, I think, probably the highest
order of priority, getting that authorization passed.
Second thing I would like to say, and this is, I think,
maybe even more important than the first, as when you think
about the future, and that is the challenge of space debris.
And Senator Hickenlooper, you nailed that right on the head. It
is a big problem. And it is an even bigger problem when you
think about the massive constellations that are being launched
into low Earth orbit, even right now.
So, we think about how the FCC licenses these
constellations. They look at a constellation--let us pretend it
is 15,000 satellites large. And they say, there is a certain
percentage of those satellites that are going to not be able to
maneuver and not be able to reenter. In other words, they
become derelict. And they say--they apply a 1.5 percent chance
for every satellite. So, if you launch 15,000 satellites that
is 225 satellites that are derelict. And then, they say there
is an aggregate collision risk for those 225 satellites, and
they came up with a probability for a 15,000-satellite
constellation that said there is a 1 in 44 chance of a
collision in space. Here is the fundamental flaw with that. It
only includes derelict satellites, which are 1.5 percent of the
satellites. There is still a probability of collision for the
other, you know, 98.5 percent of the thousands of
constellations--satellites in that particular constellation. We
do not know what that is. They have a maneuver capability--we
do not know what that probability is.
But let us say there is a collision that is going to happen
that is a 1 in 10,000 chance of a collision and if you
maneuver, that probability goes down to 1 in a million. That is
fantastic. We love that. We do not know that that is the case
and so, we are licensing satellites right now, not knowing--it
is a known unknown, and yet, we are still licensing the
constellations, which I think is not a good idea.
But at the same time, here is what we do know. If it goes
down to 1 in a million--which we do not know but let us
pretend--and that eventuality happens 10 million times, that
means there is going to be 10 collisions. So, if the
probability goes down to 1 in a million and there are 10
million maneuvers, then there are 10 collisions. This is a--
this is a mass--and by the way, I want to be clear. It goes
beyond that. When we start talking about these constellations,
we are only talking about satellites that we know that exist,
and debris that we know that exists. For everything that we can
track that is 10 centimeters or bigger, there are 10 to 100
things that we cannot track, that are equally lethal.
What I am saying is, that the challenge is much bigger than
we know, but we know that we do not have any idea what that
risk is. And yet, we are still launching these--and licensing
these massive constellations without knowing what the risk
really is. And I--I am telling you, it is much higher than what
the FCC is currently predicting.
I will also tell you, on the 1.5 percent derelict
satellites, it is--that is a--that is not right. It is going to
be higher than 1.5 percent that cannot reenter.
Finally, I will say this. Just, I think it was, last night,
somebody here can testify, Rwanda just filed for a
constellation of 327,000 satellites into low Earth orbit.
Recently, you had Spain file for a constellation that is 70,000
satellites. And of course, right now, we have got Starlink, and
Kuiper and we have got OneWeb. We have got the European Union;
they want to have their constellation. China, Russia--they all
have these massive constellations for low latency, high
throughput communications which, by the way, I support. But we
do not want to destroy space in order to achieve it, which is
what I am concerned about. The challenge is that there are--
there are things that we absolutely know that we do not know,
and we are still moving forward at a very rapid pace. And it is
a very big concern, in my view. Orbital debris is number two.
And I know that I am running out of time here quickly, but
two other things that are important. I think it was mentioned
by a number of senators, we have to have a replacement for the
International Space Station. We love it. I know this committee
passed an authorization bill out of the Senate that actually
has it, no kidding, at, you know, going to 2030. That is a good
thing. I would also tell you that there is no guarantee it is
going to last that long and China just launched a brand-new
space station. That is another big problem. We cannot cede--we
do not know the value of microgravity at this point, but what
we do know is that, if we do not--if we lose the ISS and do not
have a replacement, we are going to be in trouble.
Third thing, I think it is important to have two providers
for the Human Landing System.
And with that, I will yield back. Thank you, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bridenstine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Bridenstine, former NASA Administrator
Chairman Hickenlooper, Ranking Member Lummis, and Distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee,
It was my great pleasure to serve as the 13th Administrator of
NASA. The men and women that serve our Nation at NASA are the best
America has to offer. I would also like to commend the Biden
Administration and specifically Administrator Bill Nelson for their
commitment to NASA's continuity of purpose. NASA's projects are multi-
decadal and even multi-generational in nature. History has testified
that whimsical shifts based on administration changes result in
billions of dollars wasted and limited progress as our competitors and
adversaries advance resolutely. Political leaders who care about
exploration, science, discovery, and American leadership must
constantly work to keep NASA outside of partisan political wrangling. I
worked to that end every day and Administrator Bill Nelson has been
working toward the same objective.
There are three specific challenges facing NASA with which this
committee can help:
1. Human exploration in low Earth orbit
2. Orbital debris mitigation
3. Redundancy in America's Moon lander
Low Earth Orbit
It is absolutely critical that Congress fund America's replacement
for the International Space Station (ISS), which has had humans onboard
for over 20 years. The Chinese Space Station is on orbit, demonstrating
great progress, and attracting international partners. Humanity is only
at the beginning of understanding the immense economic, technological,
and medicinal value of microgravity and America is at risk of ceding
these capabilities to our greatest competitor. Congress must not let
this happen.
America's advantage is its capital markets that are funding
commercial human habitation and the brilliant entrepreneurs that are
putting that capital to work. While the future of human spaceflight in
low Earth orbit (LEO) is commercial, the United States Government has
an interest in ensuring the success and steering the direction of these
capabilities. Congress needs to fund NASA's LEO commercialization
efforts at $2 billion per year. This money should be used for
development and demonstration of LEO habitation as well as establishing
NASA and its partners as ongoing customers of commercial LEO
habitation. If Congress does this, capital markets and entrepreneurs
will respond in a way that establishes America as pre-eminent in LEO
human spaceflight at a cost significantly less than the ISS.
Once LEO commercialization is funded, Congress should require NASA
to establish a date for the transition to new space stations with a
plan to ensure there is no gap in American human spaceflight in low
Earth orbit.
Space Debris Mitigation
Satellite communications are advancing rapidly and will be
transformative for humanity. New constellations in geostationary orbit
(GEO) are breaking records for capacity and throughput, while
drastically dropping the cost per megabit. Constellations being
developed for low Earth orbit (LEO) could complement these systems by
delivering low latency communications allowing for applications such as
tele-robotics and video gaming. Global, hybrid networks (GEO and LEO)
will soon deliver additional benefits to online education,
telemedicine, mobile banking, and economic opportunity for people
around the world waiting to connected.
However, the U.S. government and governments around the world are
failing to properly manage collision risk. If not remedied, the
consequence will be losing access to space entirely, devastating not
only satellite communications, but also human spaceflight, national
security, weather prediction, disaster relief, climate science, and so
much more.
The challenge is that we are beginning an era of large, multi-
satellite constellations when FCC rules on debris mitigation apply on a
satellite-by-satellite basis. Requiring a failure probability of less
than 1/1000 over 5 years makes sense for a single satellite. However,
if 40,000 satellites are launched into the same orbital shell, each
with a probability of failure of 1/1000, there will be 40 failures on
average. In short, the current requirement for low probability of
failure becomes the inevitability of numerous failures.
The problem becomes much worse when considering collisions. A study
by the MITRE Corporation, commissioned by the National Science
Foundation (NSF), suggests that it will not be feasible to operate some
of the LEO systems being planned. That study predicts the effects of a
LEO system that plans to include over 40,000 satellites at an altitude
of about 600 kilometers.
As shown in the following figure from that study, dramatic
increases in space collisions, and new space debris, are expected
within just a few years. In the longer term ``satellites are destroyed
[by debris and collisions] faster than they are launched.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ G. Long, The Impacts of Large Constellations of Satellites,
JASON--The MITRE Corporation, JSR-20-2H, November 2020, (Updated:
January 21, 2021), at 97, available at https://www.nsf.gov/news/
special_reports/jasonreportconstellations/JSR-20-
2H_The_Impacts_of_Large
_Constellations_of_Satellites_508.pdf
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The challenge increases drastically when considering that there are
dozens of companies in the United States building constellations all
desiring access to LEO. Additionally, China, Russia, Europe, and
individual European countries have announced they will be deploying LEO
constellations as well. The United States can and must take the lead on
creating responsible rules that others in the international community
can emulate to mitigate this growing concern.
Space situational awareness and space traffic management (SSA/STM)
are important long-term requirements. However, if we don't take action
now to mitigate the debris problem, there will be no need for SSA/STM.
Space will no longer be accessible. I fully support the Commerce
Department being responsible for SSA/STM, but given the immediacy of
the problem, we need to use our current framework for mitigation.
Solution:
First, Congress needs to quickly require the FCC to approve
satellite constellations based on an aggregate collision risk metric,
not one satellite at a time. The FCC proposed this rule in April 2020,
but it was never implemented. It was the right policy then and it is
even more the right policy today.
Second, Congress must act quickly to require the FCC to define the
limits on the nature and number of satellites that can exist in LEO.
The FCC has said there are limits, but there has been no action.
Third, once those limits are established, there must be an effort
to work with our international partners to appropriately allocate
access to the highest value orbital shells. If other nations are not
included in this process, they will claim the same territory with
disastrous consequences. America's allocation must then be fairly
distributed to companies in a way that ensures competition in the
marketplace.
Finally, Congress should have the FCC analyze and report on the
effects these constellations will have on launch, the International
Space Station, the environment, astronomers, and future space
exploration.
Artemis: America's Moon Program
NASA determined that it had insufficient appropriations to select
two human landing systems for the Artemis program. Congress should
appropriate sufficient funds for two human landing systems.
Dissimilar redundancy has worked exceptionally well in the
Commercial Resupply Program and the Commercial Crew Program. When one
contractor has a setback, the other moves forward, greatly increasing
NASA's access to space and the International Space Station. This should
be the approach for NASA's Human Landing System and Congress needs to
fund it.
Additionally, if the goal is to eventually buy access to the Moon
as a commercial service, NASA needs two providers that will compete on
cost, innovation and safety. Having two providers will also incentivize
the companies to get customers that are not the U.S. Government,
lowering the cost to the taxpayer. As a matter of principle, the only
thing worse than a government monopoly is a private monopoly to which
the government is beholden. I am not suggesting that any specific
contractor would intentionally act nefariously. I am suggesting that
the government has an obligation to provide the right incentives to
benefit the taxpayer.
Thank you for hearing my testimony. I am confident that with your
leadership, NASA will continue to do amazing things for our Nation.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Jim, appreciate that. Dr.
Dittmar.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARY LYNNE DITTMAR, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
FOR GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, AXIOM SPACE, INC.
Dr. Dittmar. Chair Hickenlooper, Ranking Member Lummis, and
Senator Moran, Ranking Member Wicker, Members of the
Subcommittee, thanks for the invitation to appear before you
today. It is nice to be back in front of this committee with
such a distinguished panel to discuss my thoughts on the topics
of today's hearing.
I am the former President and CEO of the Coalition for Deep
Space Exploration, but I am now, the Executive Vice President
of Axiom Space, which is building the world's first commercial
space station. So, I wish to note that while I will be
discussing some of Axiom's plans as to illustrate my
discussion, the positions that are presented here are my own
and do not reflect the official opinion of my employer.
With that out of the way, my discussion will focus on
competition--that aspect of today's hearing. It is often said
that we are at an inflection point in space and while that is
true, the phrase glosses over complexities, challenges, and
opportunities, already pointed out, that confront us now and in
the years to come.
What is less frequently discussed is a more dangerous
reality--namely, that if the U.S. does not act decisively and
strategically, it risks squandering the competitive moat that
it has built in commercial space to national actors who
continue to maintain laser focus on asserting their own
national interests.
Axiom is the first, and so far, only company to develop a
new space station destined for low Earth orbit without
government funds for development, launch, or operations.
Beginning by building modules that extend the functionality of
the ISS, it will provide capabilities for a broad array of
users--researchers, astronauts, government, international
customers, and the business community. Critically, for the
purposes of this hearing, it is also, in my opinion, best
positioned to help challenge China's interests in LEO at the
end of life of the International Space Station. And indeed, it
was for that latter reason, more than any other, that I joined
Axiom.
It is tremendously important for the U.S. Government to
recognize and respond, with urgency, to the situation our
Nation and space industry is facing. Simply put, it is China's
goal to establish a leading position in the economic and
military use of outer space, as they have stated publicly, for
many years.
China recognizes the immense strategic value of space and
intends to seize the opportunity to develop economic value, by
dominating a space-based economy. Space has become part of
China's Silk Road economic belt, part of its plan for
geopolitical and economic dominance.
In my written testimony, I refer to the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission's 2019 report to Congress, which
offers the comprehensive analysis of what Beijing calls its
``Space Dream'' and how it hopes to achieve it. China is
playing the long game, make no mistake. Bolstering their space
capabilities through military-civil fusion and through the
exploitation of weaknesses in the U.S. space industrial base
and our glacial pace of acquisition and procurement and of the
stovepipe nature of our national agencies.
With regard to LEO, NASA, and by extension its
stakeholders, are facing uncertainty. Plans to transition off
the ISS at the end of its life require clearly stated
objectives, realistic timelines with milestones, and a firm
commitment that has not yet been adequately communicated. At
present, NASA is describing its objectives partly in terms of
continued access to LEO, envisioning hardware development under
its new commercial LEO Destinations Program, using the same
acquisition strategy that works so well for Commercial Orbital
Transportation System, COTS, and eventually for commercial
crew.
There are several differences between the circumstances
that gave raise to COTS over a decade ago, however, and those
in low Earth orbit now. COTS was able to leverage an existing
market for launch services, that had developed and diversified
over 50 years, to include an understanding of hardware
development and a substantial customer portfolio in both
government and commercial sectors. COTS was also set up to meet
transportation needs that were communicated early in the
program.
Today, conditions are markedly different. While now, as
then, hardware development is relatively well understood, there
is no diversified market in LEO to leverage. Not yet. NASA has
yet to clearly define its needs for services after the ISS
ends, nor does it plan to do so for some time.
And finally, we face a formidable competitor. At the very
same time that NASA is embarking on this approach, American
companies have admitted to losing customers to China as it
employs strategies to undercut the U.S. commercial space sector
through mechanisms such as state-backed financing that market
driven companies in the U.S. cannot compete with. In my view,
an important national objective for LEO should be to counter
potential Chinese hegemony in low Earth orbit. Should Congress
choose to authorize LEO programs with this goal in mind, then
NASA's acquisition approach should reflect this. It is unclear
that the same procurement approach that worked for COTS, in
very different circumstances, will work now.
I want to spend just a few minutes talking about demand.
Both industry and NASA believe that the market sector is ready
to develop next generation orbital platforms. In Axiom's case,
this confidence is shared by capital markets. In a few years,
Axiom will see its modules attached to station, increasing
capacity and capabilities for meaningful science and research.
And I have got a quick visualization, if that is available to
us to see, so you can see how that will go. Maybe not. OK,
moving on. However, Axiom and other companies providing
services in LEO, now or in the future, are dependent upon
sufficient demand to close their business cases. If there is
not sufficient demand, then the very companies the U.S. is
depending on to assure U.S. presence and soft power in low
orbit may fail.
In our system, governments do not create markets. They can
only serve as customers. However, NASA can fund and conduct
research that is too costly, risky, or difficult for industry
to undertake and provide the results to industry for use in
engaging with customers.
If market development is to be a legitimate aim of space
policy, much as it is for simple state and commerce,
particularly if it is to underpin pursuit of a range of
national, as well as business goals, we might also ask if NASA
is the appropriate home for that policy. NASA is not an
economic development agency, and we should not expect it to act
as one. The space agency, that serves this country so well, has
core confidence revolving around science, exploration,
education, and technology.
At the same time, as a Nation, we must think and act
deliberately, with regard to the intersection between markets
and space policy. In my written testimony, I offer several
suggestions and recommendations that the committee may
consider, regarding how government may help.
It has been a pleasure and an honor to appear before you
today and I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dittmar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar, Executive Vice President,
Axiom Space, Inc.
Chair Hickenlooper, Ranking Member Lummis, Chair Cantwell, Ranking
Member Wicker, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to appear before you today with such an extraordinary and
distinguished panel to discuss my thoughts on the topic of today's
hearing: ``International Collaboration and Competition in Space:
Oversight of NASA's Role and Programs''. My name is Dr. Mary Lynne
Dittmar, and I am the former President and CEO of the Coalition for
Deep Space Exploration--an industry trade group supporting NASA's
programs of record in human exploration, science, and space commerce--
and now, the Executive Vice President of Axiom Space, which is building
the world's first commercial space station. The topic of this hearing
is of intense interest to me, as it has guided most of my professional
activities and service for more than 20 years. I wish to note that
while I will be discussing some of Axiom's plans to illustrate my
discussion, the positions presented here are my own and do not reflect
the official opinion of my employer.
Axiom is the first (and so far, the only) company to develop a new
station destined for low Earth orbit (LEO) without government funds for
development, launch, and operations. Beginning by building modules that
extend the functionality of the ISS, it will provide capabilities to a
broad array of users--researchers, astronauts, manufacturing firms,
scientists, artists--and will offer those capabilities to meet existing
and emerging needs across the U.S. government, international customers,
and the business community. Critically, for the purposes of this
hearing, it is also best positioned to help challenge China's interests
in LEO at the end of life of the International Space Station. Indeed,
it was for that latter reason, more than any other, that I joined
Axiom.
It's often said we're at an ``inflection point'' in space, and
while that is true, the phrase glosses over the complexities,
challenges and opportunities confronting us now and in the years to
come. Regarding LEO, the term has been used to describe the transition
from an exclusively government owned-and-operated domain to one
utilizing publicprivate partnership. What is less frequently discussed
is a more dangerous reality--namely, that if the U.S. does not act
decisively and strategically, it risks squandering the competitive moat
the U.S. has built in commercial space to national actors who continue
to maintain laser focus on asserting their own national interests. In
this testimony I will discuss this situation in both LEO and in deep
space, with an emphasis on human spaceflight and exploration.
NASA's Efforts to Build Alliances
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958--the so-called
``organic act'' that created NASA--has as one of its nine objectives
``Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of
nations in work done pursuant to this Act and to the peaceful
application of the results thereof.'' \1\ In other words, cooperation
with other nations is in the DNA of our Nation's space agency. This
part of NASA's mission has been ratified by Congresses since 1958 in a
series of Authorization Acts that build upon the first.
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\1\ U.S. Congress (1958). National Space and Aeronautics Act of
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, as amended (29 July). Printed for NASA Use
November 30, 2006. Accessed at: https://history.nasa.gov/spaceact-
legishistory.pdf
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NASA has demonstrated its commitment to that cooperation in the
years since--in space science, in human spaceflight, in technology
development, and in education and outreach. The most visible example--
but certainly not the only one--of multilateral cooperation in space is
the International Space Station (ISS). For the past 20 years the ISS
has been the focus of a strong international partnership that has
attracted over 100 countries as participants. NASA's daily engagement
with the partnership has weathered changing political climates both at
home and abroad, demonstrating extraordinary stability, positive
interdependence, and an ability to bridge the tensions and conflicts
that inevitably surface in international relations.\2\ This has been
particularly true with Russia, which served to ensure the continuation
of the ISS after the loss of the shuttle Columbia and in the long
interval between 2011 and the end of the shuttle program until 2020
when the U.S. was again able to launch astronauts on American rockets
from American soil. This partnership has been even more remarkable
given the stresses that attended the Russian annexation of Crimea, and
recent, sometimes contrary statements from Roscosmos regarding Russian
intentions for future participation on the ISS.
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\2\ Dittmar, M. L. (2017). Statement before the Committee on Space,
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 22 March. ``The
ISS After 2024: Options and Impacts.'' https://docs.house.gov/meetings/
SY/SY16/20170322/105737/HHRG-115SY16-Wstate-DittmarM-2017
0322.pdf
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Guiding this cooperation has been the Intergovernmental Agreement
(IGA), a treaty-level multilateral agreement among the governments of
Canada, governments of member states of the European Space Agency, the
government of Japan, the government of the Russian Federation, and the
government of the United States.\3\ The 15 member nations who signed
the IGA after years of negotiations have remained committed to its
goals and principles and have created a strong foundation of
multilateralism in human spaceflight. However, the IGA is specific to
the ISS and does not extend to exploration of deep space. In addition,
China was not included in the ISS partnership.
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\3\ The U.S. State Department (1998). Space Station Agreement
between the United States of America and Other Governments (signed 29
January 1998). https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/12927-
Multilateral-Space-Space-Station-1.29.1998.pdf
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In 2010, Congress directed NASA to ask the National Academies to
perform a study to review ``the goals, core capabilities, and direction
of human spaceflight.'' In 2012 NASA asked the National Research
Council at the Academies to perform a wide-ranging study in accord with
Congressional direction. The NRC in turn convened a Committee on Human
Spaceflight, on which I served, to carry out the work. The resulting
report, entitled ``Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches
for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration,'' was published in
2014.\4\ Among many other recommendations, a central finding of the
Committee was that NASA's deep space exploration program must be
international in nature, and that continuing engagement is necessary to
develop and maintain international partnerships. The report also
recommended that China be engaged, arguing that exclusion of the
Chinese space program could work against the interests of the United
States, particularly given China's stated openness to working with
other nations.\5\
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\4\ National Research Council of the National Academies Human
Spaceflight Committee (2014). Pathways to exploration: Rationales and
approaches for a U.S. program of human space exploration. Washington,
D.C., National Academies Press.
\5\ Ibid, p. 26
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In October of 2020, NASA announced the signing of the Artemis
Accords by eight founding member countries including the United States.
Announced earlier in May of that year, the Accords ``reinforce and
implement'' the principles of the Outer Space Treaty, and are aimed at
avoiding conflict, strengthening international relationships, and
encouraging ongoing cooperation in a growing coalition dedicated to the
peaceful uses of outer space. The Accords do not constitute a treaty,
but rather a framework to encourage bilateral agreements developed
under the umbrella of several principles that, it is hoped, will
develop into international law through custom and practice. The Accords
thus offer a significant step toward implementing the recommendation of
the Pathways report that U.S. deep space exploration be international
in nature, providing a framework of principles underpinning future
exploration: Transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance,
registration of space objects, release of scientific data, preservation
of outer space heritage, extraction and utilization of space resources,
deconfliction of space activities, and planning for the safe disposal
of orbital debris.\6\
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\6\ National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2020). NASA,
international partners advance cooperation with first signings of
Artemis Accords. 13 October. https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-
international-partners-advance-cooperation-with-firstsignings-of-
artemis-accords
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Progress and Intentions of Other Nations in Space: Focus on China
It is worth noting that neither the People's Republic of China
(PRC) nor Russia have announced an intention to sign the Artemis
Accords, offering mixed responses to the initiative at various
times.\7\ \8\ However, the two countries have signed an
intergovernmental agreement to proceed with plans for an International
Lunar Research Station (ILRS). In June they announced opportunities for
additional partnerships and said that they were already in negotiations
with several nations.\9\ China, in particular, shares the U.S.
determination to assert leadership in cislunar space, recognizing its
immense strategic value and seeing in it an opportunity to develop
economic value by dominating a space-based economy.\10\
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\7\ TASS Russian News Agency (2020). Moon exploration projects
could help Russia-US cooperation--Roscosmos. 16 May. https://tass.com/
science/1157255
\8\ Ji, E., Cerny, M. B., Piliero, R. J. (2020). What does China
think about the Artemis Accords? The Diplomat, 17 September. https://
thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-does-china-think-about-nasas-artemis-
accords/
\9\ Pultarova, T. (2021). Russia, China reveal moon base roadmap
but no plans for astronaut missions yet. 17 June. https://
www.space.com/china-russia-international-lunar-research-station
\10\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Annual
Report to Congress (2019). China's ambitions in space: Contesting the
final frontier (Chapter 4). https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
2019-11/2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf
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To fully assess China's intentions in space, it is important to
understand how the PRC is advancing with extraordinary rapidity across
a range of space technologies and capabilities. Notably, China is
``playing the long game,'' focusing on the relationship between the
defense sector and commercial space innovation and entrepreneurialism
and leveraging the existing social commitment to hard work and national
pride. Space has become part of China's ``Silk Road Economic Belt,''
part of its plan for geopolitical and economic dominance. In short, the
PRC is pursuing a global strategy to win the competition in space,
building upon several broad-based approaches.
The first of these is via military-civil fusion (MCF). MCF is
focused on building pathways between the traditional defense industrial
base and the commercial sector, with the goal of increasing the flow of
information, technology, and people between the two. This is not a new
development in China--or for that matter, in the United States--but it
has new impetus under the current government.\11\ According to
testimony provided in 2019 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, in 2013 there was virtually no commercial space
sector in China. In 2014, the government announced that it would allow
the flow of private capital and companies to enter the previously
sequestered space sector. In 2016, the Central Politburo elevated MCF
to a national strategy. In 2017, President Xi Jinping established a
commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development emphasizing
technology development--particularly dual-use technology. Later in
2017, the People's Liberation Army declassified almost 3000 patents,
releasing them into the public sector, signaling a new development in
the interaction between the PLA and the commercial sector. Also in
2017, the ``13th Five Year Plan Sci & Tech MilitaryCivil Fusion
Development Special Plan'' named human spaceflight as a MCF ``mega
project.'' \12\ By 2018, the top seven state funds investing in MCF
industries had over $56B in capital. Combined with capital from venture
markets, the Chinese government is pouring billions into commercial
space companies as compared with just a few years ago.
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\11\ Kania, A.B. and Laskai, L. (2021). Myths and realities of
China's military-civil fusion strategy. Center for a New American
Security. https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/
Myths-and-Realities-of-China's-Military-Civil-FusionStrategy_FINAL-
min.pdf?mtime
=20210127133521&focal=none
\12\ Laskai, L. (2019). Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, 25 April. ``China in Space: A Strategic
Competition?'' https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Lorand%20Laskai%20USCC%2025%20April.pdf
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While the total investment in both government and commercial space
is thought to still lag that of the United States, the results are
clear to see. For example, China's commercial launch industry has made
rapid progress since 2015, with several companies testing advanced
rocket capabilities, including fly-back boosters, suborbital flights,
and advanced engine designs, including a liquid oxygen-methane
engine.\13\ Notably, the PLA remains deeply engaged in guiding
technical development, particularly those capabilities that it sees of
benefit to it. Further, the personnel and relationships between the
commercial space sector and the state defense sector are also deeply
intertwined.\14\
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\13\ Curcio, B. and Lan, T. (2018). The rise of China's private
space industry. Space News, 25 March. https://spacenews.com/analysis-
the-rise-of-chinas-private-space-industry
\14\ Lee, T. A. and Singer, P. W. (2021). China's space program is
more military than you might think. 16 July. Defense One. https://
www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/07/chinas-space-program-more-military-
you-might-think/183790/
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A second means by which the PRC seeks to compete with the U.S. is
taking shape through a long-term, multipronged strategy that exploits
weaknesses in the U.S. space industrial base, in our glacial pace of
acquisition and procurement, and of the stove piped nature of our
national agencies. We have reached the point where a whole-ofgovernment
approach to space, as intended to be implemented via the National Space
Council among other mechanisms, is crucial to our continued
competitiveness and leadership. This is particularly true regarding
protecting the space industrial base and the emerging entrepreneurial
sector, both of which are vulnerable to malfeasance and disruption--the
latter clearly illustrated by impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. In Q&A
during a hearing \15\ on competition with China in space before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Mike Gold pointed
out the PRC thinks about markets strategically, while the U.S. does
not. China has an industrial policy organized around state objectives.
The U.S., with its focus on free markets, does not.
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\15\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2019). ``A
hearing on China in space: A strategic competition? 25 April. https://
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-10/
April%2025%202019%20Hearing%20Transcript.pdf
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The 2019 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission pointed out the need for a comprehensive, wholistic
perspective regarding China's competitive interests in space.\16\ A
recent report of a workshop in early 2019 co-sponsored by the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
detailed a methodical, intentional approach that includes deliberate
co-mingling of state-owned entities with commercial space companies.
The key elements of the strategy were identified as follows:
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\16\ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2019).
Report to Congress. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/
2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf
``. . . theft of intellectual property combined with a
concerted and effective drive to create organic, national
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expertise across key space science and technology areas;
direct integration of state-owned corporations and their
technologies with commercial, space startupcompanies;
penetration of American companies to obtain and further
exploit U.S. technology or to influence those companies in a
direction that serves China's domestic space priorities;
investment in the U.S. space industrial base via front
companies and multi-level off-shore accounts to facilitate
early venture technology surveillance, infrastructure access
and control of developing space capabilities and intellectual
property;
obtaining vertical control of the key space capabilities'
supply chains or control of sufficient elements of those supply
chains to influence space capabilities development in their
favor;
predatory pricing of space capabilities or elements of key
space supply chains to control or dominate the market; and
use of state-sponsored venture capital, finance, and market
control mechanisms to surveille U.S. technology,
interdependencies, business model innovations and other
advanced concepts.'' \17\
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\17\ Cooley, T., Felt, E., and Butow, S. J. (2019). State of the
space industrial base: Threats, challenges, and actions. 30 May. Air
Force Research Laboratory and Defense Innovation Unit. https://
cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4653168/
AFRL_DIU_Report_State_of_Space_Ind_Base_30May
2019_Final.pdf
Congress has responded to these activities most recently through
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020, which calls for the
President, in consultation with the National Space Council, to develop
``. . . a strategy to ensure the United States can effectively compete
with other national space programs, maintain dominance in the emerging
commercial space economy, and has market, regulatory, and other means
available to address unfair competition from the PRC . . .'' and also
``. . . a plan to strengthen and streamline cooperation with
international allies and partners in space.'' \18\ However, additional
action is needed to support the industrial base and by extension U.S.
civil and commercial space activities it supports.
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\18\ U.S. Congress (2019). National Defense Authorization Act of
2020, Pub. Law 116-92 (20 December). https://www.congress.gov/116/
plaws/publ92/PLAW-116publ92.pdf
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The role of the commercial sector in advancing U.S. leadership and
global relationships
As mentioned, several times, the primary strategic objective of
NASA's activities in human exploration as seen from a national lens is
geopolitical. However, that is not the only objective. In a previous
appearance before the Aviation and Space Subcommittee of the Senate
Commerce Committee in 2019, I opined that ``United States leadership in
space depends upon establishing a foundation that provides other
nations and a nascent space-based economy with security and assurance
regarding our national intentions and long-term commitment to aspire,
inspire, and achieve--in short, to lead.'' \19\ My viewpoint has not
changed; however, my sense of urgency has.
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\19\ Dittmar, M. L. (2019). Testimony before the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee Subcommittee on Aviation and
Space, 9 July (p. 2). ``NASA's Exploration Plans--Where We've Been and
Where We're Going.'' https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/
19109A37-22BF-4268-9E5C-553880A435BE
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Regarding low Earth orbit (LEO), which will be the focus of the
rest of this testimony, NASA plans to transition activities now onboard
the ISS to one or more commercial platforms in LEO, as well as some
intended for deep space to the lunar orbiting outpost known as Gateway.
In LEO, effecting this transition successfully requires closing the gap
that now exists between public investment (NASA and the ISS National
Lab) and revenue generation sufficiently to lead private investors to
fund new orbital facilities for both public and private use. In turn,
this requires hardware developers to create a portfolio of services
attractive to a robust group of customers. In the case of Axiom, this
includes first offering qualified customers the opportunity to fly to
the ISS--establishing the procedures and agreements necessary to
develop joint operations with NASA as well as conducting science and
research--and later to Axiom's own modules while attached to the ISS.
This in turn will lead to astronaut missions with a full complement of
activities onboard Axiom station, on a commercial basis, once it
detaches from the ISS.
To help visualize the latter, here is a quick video showing the
assembly sequence: https://www.dropbox.com/s/z1s1paok8z8frax/
Assembly%20Sequence_stills.mp4
?dl=0
Axiom's first private astronaut mission to the ISS is scheduled to
fly in January of 2022, less than 6 months from now. Although he is not
representing his country as a professional astronaut, one member of the
first mission crew is an Israeli national and former Israeli Air Force
fighter pilot who founded an investment firm that targets companies
whose intention is to generate positive, measurable social and
environmental impact alongside a competitive financial return. A close
friend of Ilan Ramon, a member of the STS-107 crew who perished during
the breakup of the shuttle Columbia in 2003, he will be conducting
research onboard the ISS that is funded in part by the Ramon
Foundation. A second member of the crew--which will be commanded by
Michael Lopez-Alegria, a 4-time shuttle astronaut and former commander
of the ISS--is a Canadian philanthropist and investor. Together with a
third crew member and pilot who is American, all of the crew will be
conducting research during their flight, bringing international
payloads in through the ISS National Lab and opening the door to future
missions with professional astronauts and researchers from other
countries. Other commercial companies such as Nanoracks, Made In Space/
Redwire, and others have also developed their customer portfolios to
include international customers.
NASA, and by extension the U.S. space companies serve as a vehicle
of U.S. ``soft power'', shaping favorable behavior and outcomes among
foreign entities, customers, and over time, competitors who do not
operate according to American laws and values. American companies
understand, rely upon, and promote protection of intellectual property,
fair exchange, mutual respect, and enhancement of customer experience.
Commercial partnerships with nations, institutes and firms abroad can
also provide a means for countries to ``bootstrap'' into a human
spaceflight or space science program, working with American companies
to develop science and engineering initiatives supporting space
activities, establishing long-term relationships. In the case of the
ISS, increasing the number and duration of these relationships
strengthens the viability of commercial companies offering services in
LEO, enabling NASA to eventually transition off the ISS and turn its
full attention to deep space with the assurance that its needs and
those of its partners will continue to be met.
It should be noted that this is not a ``new'' phenomenon; American
businesses have played a crucial role in establishing relationships
with other countries in a variety of sectors--not just space--and have
frequently engaged in diplomatic initiatives and helped to deepen
international ties. In space, all this proceeds from existing
partnerships with NASA and is expanding to incorporate other sectors
and customer bases over time.
The long-standing partnership between the government and commerce
to promote American values and engage with other nations rests upon
certain principles, however, including fair competition. At present,
both Russia and China are competing with the United States by
subsidizing launch costs and access to the Russian segment of the ISS
and to Tiangong, the Chinese space station, respectively. Recently, a
U.S. commercial company, Nanoracks, revealed that it had lost a
commercial customer to the Chinese station for the first time.\20\.
These developments threaten revenue sources for commercial space
companies as national programs enter the commercial market with
disruptive effect. Mechanisms to address unfair practices exist and
have been used effectively in the past (for example, the 1993 agreement
between the Russian Federation and the U.S. regarding commercial launch
services, which enabled the Russians to enter the market without
upsetting normal competition) \21\, however they must be prioritized by
the U.S. government that recognizes the impact of such practices to the
growing space economy and to America's leadership in space.
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\20\ Foust, J. (2021). China's space station emerges as competitor
to commercial ventures. Space News, 5 August. https://spacenews.com/
chinas-space-station-emerges-as-competitor-to-commercial-ventures/
\21\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (published in the
Federal Register, March, 1994). Text version of the Federal Register
notice is available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1994-03-
10/html/94-5498.htm
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The PRC certainly recognizes the power of utilizing space
activities--especially human spaceflight--to enhance national prestige
and deploy soft power. To this end the Chinese have recently announced
plans to fly 1,000 payloads on the Tiangong as it continues
construction of the station.\22\ In 2018, the PRC announced an
agreement with the United Nations to ``develop the space capabilities
of United Nations Member States via opportunities onboard the CSS''
(China Space Station)\23\. Since that time nine experiments have been
selected, with more in the pipeline.
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\22\ David, L. Can the U.S. and China cooperate in space?
Scientific American, 2 August. https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/can-the-u-s-and-china-cooperate-in-space/
\23\ United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (2018). United
Nations and China invite applications to conduct experiments on-board
China's Space Station. http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/
media/2018-unis-os-496.html
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Constancy of Purpose: Clear Policy Objectives and Strategy Should Drive
Acquisition Approach
In LEO, NASA, and by extension its commercial partners and emerging
companies aspiring to operate in orbit, are facing uncertainty. Plans
to transition off the ISS at the end of its life requires clearly
stated objectives, realistic timelines with milestones, and a firm
commitment that has not been adequately communicated to date. In
Axiom's case, the competitively sourced award that provides the company
with exclusive access to begin attaching modules to the ISS by 2024
opens the door to a phased transition of U.S. government payloads,
commercial or international payloads to Axiom once the modules are
operational. However, Axiom's success--and that of other providers--
would be greatly enhanced by a publicly released transition plan and
``date certain'' for ceasing operations on the ISS, developed in tandem
with the international partners in the program. The date should be far
enough in the future that it enables NASA to complete currently
understood work but not so far that it exacerbates existing
uncertainty.
Any such plan should begin with clear objectives. At present, NASA
is describing objectives in terms of hardware development in its new
``Commercial LEO Destinations'' program, adopting the same acquisition
strategy that worked for its Commercial Orbital Transportation System
(COTS) program and eventually for the Commercial Crew Program. There
are several differences between the circumstances that gave rise to
COTS over a decade ago, however, and those in low Earth orbit now.
First, COTS was able to leverage an existing market for launch services
that had developed and diversified over 50 years to include a
substantial customer portfolio in both government and commercial
sectors. Secondly, COTS was set up to provide cargo and later crew
conveyance (under ``Commercial Crew Program'') that was well
understood, the need for which was communicated early in the program.
In LEO, neither of these conditions obtain. While hardware
development is well-understood, there is no diversified market to
leverage, and NASA has yet to clearly define its needs after the ISS
ends. The assumption that the same procurement approach that worked for
COTS--in very different circumstances, where the market is just now
emerging--is the best model for the CLD program, is questionable.
Furthermore, other than to ensure one or more platforms are
available after the ISS ends, it is unclear what objectives NASA is
trying to meet on behalf of the Nation. Clear policy direction is
needed. For example, in my view an important national objective is to
counter potential Chinese hegemony in low Earth orbit. If Congress
would authorize LEO programs with this goal in mind, then NASA's
acquisition approach should reflect this, using mechanisms that balance
NASA's evolving role and needs in low Earth orbit with the risks,
benefits, and management practices best suited to meet U.S.
geopolitical interests.
At present, it is unclear that the current acquisition approach
reflects a systematic strategy addressing higher order objectives--or
indeed, what these objectives are. This is a critical point, because
the consequences of these decisions have tremendous implications for
the future of U.S. human spaceflight in low Earth orbit, and possibly
beyond. Clear objectives and deliberate strategy must come first and
should guide the acquisition approach--not the other way around.
A similar, systematic approach should be reflected in the next
iteration of the ISS Transition Plan called for in the NASA
Authorization and Transition Act of 2017. It is well understood that
any transition plan will be a work in progress, iterated upon as
circumstances continue to evolve. However, objectives and a strategy
for meeting them is every bit as critical as the tactical
``transition'' plan (of which acquisition is a part.)
The same can be said for resources. Whatever the objectives,
strategy and tactical aspects of an ISS Transition Plan may be,
adequate budgets available on a consistent basis are critical to meet
objectives. The practice of relying on Continuing Resolutions (CRs) in
lieu of regular order and budgets passed on time creates uncertainty
and increased risk of failure. Unnecessary risk is beyond frustrating:
It poses a threat to U.S. competitiveness and the ability to continue a
permanent U.S. presence in LEO after the ISS program ends.
Whither Market Development in Space?
NASA is not an economic development agency. We should not expect it
to act as such, either. The space agency's core competencies revolve
around science, exploration, education, and technology as well as
hardware development. If the U.S. government is serious about
statements made in past years across the Congress to achieve a vibrant,
commercial space sector operating in low Earth orbit and beyond, a
conversation should be had about ensuring that appropriate economic
goals and the means to achieve them are enshrined in policy. The
responsibility to organize and foster growth of the commercial space
sector should be housed within a designated place in our government
that is appropriately resourced and staffed with the requisite
expertise. The roles and experience of the Department of Commerce make
it the obvious choice. Bearing in mind the sense of urgency, informed
must be made in the immediate future that would help guide NASA
regarding implementation, lest we risk falling behind China as well as
other nations.
In LEO, hardware development is reasonably well understood. Both
industry and NASA believe that the private sector is ready to develop
next-generation orbital platforms. In Axiom's case this confidence is
shared by capital markets. As mentioned at the beginning of this
testimony, Axiom is developing its station entirely on investor funds
and projected revenues from services, contracting with NASA to provide
data and insight as the project proceeds. However, Axiom and any other
company providing services in LEO, now or in the future, are dependent
upon sufficient demand to close their business cases. If there is not
sufficient, sustained, and growing demand, then the very companies the
U.S. is depending on to assure U.S. presence--and soft power--in low
Earth orbit, may fail. New entrants who bring innovation to the space
ecosphere know that they must generate demand or fail. Suppliers who
support the entire aerospace and defense sector rely upon sustained
demand--indeed, this is one of the most important aspects of government
programs. If suppliers fail, then the U.S. may have to look overseas
for production. In the case where overseas production is critical to
U.S. industry--as we are now seeing in the IT and telecom sectors--
threats to U.S. security emerge. The same is true in space.
While governments cannot create markets, NASA can fund and conduct
research that is too costly, risky or difficult for industry to
undertake and provide the results to industry for use in engaging with
customers. Businesses, in turn, are responsible for developing
customers. In LEO, policy objectives that are beneficial to both the
U.S. government and to industry--engagement with international
countries and business, deployment of soft power by American industry,
encouragement of new entrants into space technology and services,
continued investment by capital markets, sustained U.S. presence in
orbit around the Earth after the ISS ends--as well as other objectives
I have not discussed such as using LEO platforms to create and enhance
education and diversity programs to develop America's next generation
of scientists and engineers--all depend on sufficient demand to sustain
commercial platforms.
Actions the government can take: Recommendations
Utilize the regular order for negotiating and passing
Appropriations Acts, avoiding the use of CR's and other stop-
gap funding measures that increase uncertainty and negatively
impact NASA's ability to pursue policy and programmatic goals.
Establish clear policy goals for LEO (and beyond). As part
of this, consider whether the time has come to make market
development a legitimate aim of space policy, and whether the
Department of Commerce might lend better focus and expertise to
that effort. This discussion should consider the changing
nature of NASA's role. When NASA can buy a service from the
market, it will act only as a customer. When NASA must engage
in development, it should do so with a very deliberate,
objective-based strategy that may include not only whether a
service is available, but whether purchasing from the market is
in accord with national goals. In neither case, however, should
NASA be expected to exercise oversight of the market.
Formalize policy goals in another NASA Authorization Act. In
the recent past, NASA Authorization Acts such as those in 2005,
2008, 2010 and the NASA Transition and Authorization Act of
2017 called for international and commercial partnerships in
the exploration of space. ``Constancy of purpose'' as reflected
in the Acts has been of great benefit in assuring program
stability. Equally important, Authorization Acts send a signal
to the international community of the intent of Congress to
continue to assert U.S. leadership in space--a signal that is
important not only to our allies, but to those who do not wish
us well.
Encourage NASA to deliver a transition plan for the ISS that
establishes clear objectives, working milestones, schedule,
clarity regarding its own needs beyond the life of the ISS, in
accord with Section 303 of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2017 \24\. In
addition to the requirements specified by that Act for the
plan, NASA should also discuss its role and rationale
throughout the transition period in meeting national objectives
(including geopolitical ones) as well as its own. Ideally, this
rationale should drive, rather than be driven by any given
acquisition approach.
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\24\ U.S. Congress (2017). National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2017 (Pub. Law 11510,
Section 303). 21 March. https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ10/PLAW-
115publ10.pdf
Recognize that both Russia and China are determined to
achieve global leadership in space, and that the PRC has
embarked upon a long-term, multi-tiered national strategy aimed
at success. This strategy includes MCF and a long-term view of
markets with deliberate efforts to undermine the U.S.
industrial base and to ``buy-into'' U.S. entrepreneurial
efforts for the purposes of transferring technology and/or
expertise. Consider an interagency process, perhaps coordinated
by the National Space Council or the National Security Council,
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to detect and deny such efforts early.
Support U.S. commercial entities by adopting a ``light
touch'' regulatory regime whenever possible.
Shift U.S. Government investment in LEO to a more balanced
approach that is less on hardware development and more on
conducting research that may be useful in establishing demand
while ensuring that U.S. commercial companies and their
international and domestic customers have access to the ISS in
the interval between now and ISS end of life (EOF).
Specifically:
(1) Reduce uncertainty (see above recommendation about an ISS
transition plan) and avoid abrupt changes in policy that
disrupt business plans and customer relationships. Recent
examples of this include the NASA commercialization policy,
and more recently a review by NASA of the existing policy
that enables American companies to fly payloads of their
international customers via the ISS National Lab, which
stopped payload processing for weeks. Such abrupt changes
negatively impact the ability of companies to build demand
for their services and undermine the role of American
businesses in a competitive landscape (encouraging
migration of those customers to Tiangong), thereby creating
additional risks to the NASA plan to transition LEO to
commercial providers, which is in turn the lynchpin of the
U.S. government's policy objective to maintain U.S.
presence in LEO in perpetuity.
(2) Fully utilize the ISS as a platform for commercial
development during this interval, encouraging commercial
research, development, and use across diverse sectors to
facilitate the process of growing market demand. This
should include areas such as entertainment, marketing,
private and professional (national) astronaut missions.
Commercial use should be balanced with the needs of
researchers and government agencies, but with the
recognition that the clock is ticking regarding development
of demand needed to close the gap between government
investment in public-private partnerships, investor
funding, and revenue generation.
(3) Consider establishing an interagency process to look at the
economic development of low Earth orbit in a holistic way,
focusing on how government money is spent to encourage and
possibly incentivize innovation and entrepreneurship.
``Hope is not a strategy''; rather, as a nation we must
think and act deliberately regarding the intersection of
markets and space policy.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Dr. Dittmar. Now, before I
introduce Mr. Gold, I want to ask for unanimous consent to
enter the following document into the record, an article from
``Space News'' authored by Mr. Gold, titled, ``The Mind--'' It
is titled, ``Mind the Gap in Low Earth Orbit''. So, if we ask
for unanimous consent, all in favor say aye.
[A chorus of ayes.]
Senator Hickenlooper. So be it.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Hickenlooper. Now, Dr.--or Mr. Gold, the floor is
yours.
Mr. Gold. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Perhaps we could also enter the visual that
Dr. Dittmar----
Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely.
Senator Wicker.--was trying to show us.
Dr. Dittmar. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
[The visual referred to was a video shown at the hearing.]
STATEMENT OF MIKE GOLD, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR CIVIL
SPACE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, REDWIRE SPACE
Mr. Gold. Thank you, Senator. I will speak for both myself
and Redwire. My CEO is right behind me, so he can kick me if I
get out of line. So, I appreciate it. Again, gratitude to our
Chair, Senator Hickenlooper. I would also like to express my
appreciation to Ranking Member Lummis, to Committee Ranking
Member, Senator Wicker, and Senator Moran, as well as my
appreciation to the talented and intrepid staff that has helped
support this hearing. And again, I want to say thank you for
this extraordinarily important, timely topic of international
collaboration and competition in space.
We often think of space as a vacuum. The word space itself
can be interpreted to mean nothing. But I prefer to think of
space as everything. Space is what connects the moon to the
Earth and all of us to each other. The exploration of space
unites this country and the world, in a way no other endeavor
can. And the desire to unite humanity is at the very heart of
the Artemis mission.
Through Artemis, NASA is assembling the largest, broadest,
and most diverse international, beyond low Earth orbit, human
space flight coalition in history. However, assembling this
unprecedented international collaboration for Artemis was
neither simple nor easy. Due to the failure of every single
beyond LEO, American human space flight initiative to come to
fruition since Apollo, there is great skepticism among both
partner and rival nations, relative to NASA's ability to
sustain a program to return astronauts to the surface of the
moon.
This is why, more than any other rocket engine or piece of
technology, bipartisanship is the key to the success of
Artemis. Without robust and ongoing bipartisan support, we will
not be able to lead a global coalition to the moon, Mars, or
any other destination. We cannot unite the world, if we cannot
first unite here in Congress. Which is why a bipartisan NASA
authorization bill is urgently needed to both reassure partner
nations, and send a message of unity, of purpose to our rivals.
I want to thank this committee for already passing NASA
authorization language through the Senate, as part of the U.S.
Innovation and Competition Act and urge your counterparts in
the House to proceed with alacrity so that the entire Congress
can adopt a NASA authorization bill that strongly and
explicitly endorses Artemis.
Beyond technology that we developed the Artemis, the policy
surrounding the program is just as important. America must lead
in developing norms of behavior in space, to ensure that the
exploration and development of the moon and Mars is conducted
in a safe, sustainable, and peaceful fashion. While at NASA, it
was the privilege of my lifetime to craft and lead the
development and successful adoption of the Artemis Accords,
which have now been signed by 12 countries. The principles of
the Accords, such as transparency, interoperability, due
regard, avoiding harmful interference, the sustainable use of
space resources, and mitigating debris are the foundation that
humanity's future in space should be built upon.
I hope that NASA continues to expand the family of nations
that have adopted the Accords, and that the agency focuses, in
particular, on bringing new partners from Africa and developing
countries around the world, demonstrating that no matter how
large or how modest their contributions are to Artemis, that
all nations can join us in this unprecedented journey of
discovery to the moon and Mars.
Closer to Earth, the International Space Station continues
to represent the pinnacle of global cooperation in human space
flight. We must send a clear and unequivocal message to both
partners and rivals, that America will remain a leader in low
Earth orbit, by extending the ISS through 2030. At Redwire
Space, which is the only company to successfully manufacture
items on the ISS, we are focused on leveraging the unique
nature of the microgravity environment to develop new
technologies and innovations that will help to bolster global
communications that will heal the sick and that will feed the
hungry.
Moreover, America must ensure that we do not suffer from a
space station gap, which would cede the scientific, economic,
and diplomatic benefits of crewed LEO operations to China.
Therefore, in an upcoming authorization bill, we must provide
robust support for the development and deployment, by the
private sector, of a new commercial space station that will
continue the legacy of the ISS, sustaining and expanding
American international cooperation in low Earth orbit.
While opportunities for collaboration are many and varied,
we must also not lose sight of the ongoing technological
competitions in space that American can ill-afford to ignore.
Specifically, the countries and companies that master orbital
servicing, assembly, and manufacturing, will be the economic
and national security leaders of the future. I am proud that,
at Redwire, through the development of systems such as
Archinaut, a satellite that literally assembles itself in
orbit, we are contributing to American competitiveness in this
vital arena.
However, much more needs to be done and the upcoming NASA
authorization should include explicit support for Archinaut and
public-private partnerships generally, that will result in even
more ambitious technologies, leveraging deployable structures,
robotics, and 3D printing. We can, and I believe, should engage
with rival nations, including China, on norms of behavior in
space, as well as benign, cooperative scientific activities,
such as lunar sample swaps and sharing climate data. However,
constant vigilance is the price we pay for liberty, which is
why I hope the Senate will continue to urge NASA to redouble
the agency support for public-private partnerships, which are
the key to maintaining American competitiveness in space.
The journey of Artemis and NASA is to the Moon, Mars, and
beyond. But if we properly balance collaboration and
competition, the destination will be peace and prosperity.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Gold, Executive Vice President for Civil
Space and External Affairs, Redwire Space
I. Introduction
Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking Member Wicker, Subcommittee Chairman
Hickenlooper, Subcommittee Ranking Member Lummis, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, I'm grateful to all of you as well as your
intrepid staff for the opportunity to testify regarding the vital topic
of international collaboration and competition in space.
All of us in the space industry are explorers. However, we're not
just exploring the depths of space, we're also exploring new
international relationships and innovative partnerships with the
private sector. The benefits gained from such activities creates
tremendous value and is a critical part of our Nation's journey into
the final frontier.
In today's geopolitical environment, maintaining and growing our
international relationships in space has never been more important. The
space environment challenges us in a singularly harsh manner. Space is
a crucible that demands the formation of global coalitions to bear the
extraordinary difficulties and risks of exploration and development.
International partnerships are not just a luxury but a necessity, and
the U.S. is at an inflection point where our Nation's ability to lead
future global coalitions will either be bolstered and revitalized or
undermined and substantively damaged.
II. Sustaining the Continuity of Artemis
In regard to beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) human space exploration,
our Nation has, unfortunately, struggled to maintain its focus.
Numerous beyond LEO human spaceflight programs have been initiated by
NASA only to face termination by a subsequent Presidential
Administration or Congress. The Vision for Space Exploration, the
Constellation Program, and the Asteroid Retrieval Mission, are just a
few of the initiatives our country engaged in which did not come to
fruition. This failure to sustain a beyond LEO human spaceflight
strategy has not gone unnoticed by our international partners. Our
colleagues in Europe, Japan, Canada, and across the world have in many
ways born the brunt of our national inability to execute on a proposed
vision. This pattern of inconsistency has substantively damaged U.S.
credibility on the global stage and has forced partner nations to
question their relationship with the U.S. in space exploration.
As the Acting Associate Administrator for the Office of
International and Interagency Relations (``OIIR''), I was often exposed
to this growing skepticism of NASA's ability to sustain a beyond LEO
human spaceflight program. My first overseas trip upon joining NASA in
2019 was to Paris to conduct negotiations for the European Space
Agency's (``ESA's'') contributions to the Gateway. My enthusiasm for
international collaboration was met with justifiable skepticism from
our European partners about whether the Gateway and Artemis would be
sustained or, like previous NASA beyond LEO human spaceflight plans,
would fade away and fail due to changing political priorities and/or a
lack of funding.
Despite this skepticism, the OIIR team and our State Department
counterparts managed to convince not just ESA's leadership, but the
Japanese and Canadian governments that Artemis would be different. My
primary argument was the bipartisan support that Artemis enjoyed. At
the time I pointed to support from several Democratic policymakers,
including the Chair of this Committee, Senator Cantwell, for the
general goals and structure of Artemis. I personally reassured foreign
officials that then NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine was keenly aware
of past history, and he was making every effort possible to build a
bipartisan coalition which would sustain Artemis through any future
changes in leadership in the White House or Congress. As a matter of
fact, I was brought to NASA by former Administrator Bridenstine
specifically to build a global coalition since he viewed such
international partnerships as the key to sustaining the Artemis
program.
Again, despite justifiable skepticism, our international partners
agreed to join us and executed binding agreements in support of the
Gateway. This support was manifested by the commitment of billions of
dollars of international contributions toward building hardware for the
Gateway and the Artemis program. Our international partners have
embraced Artemis, appropriated substantial funding, and built their own
plans around our strategy. In return, the U.S. cannot equivocate, turn
back, or show anything less than the steadfast commitment that our
international partners have already demonstrated.
Over the course of decades during which the U.S. struggled to
sustain a beyond LEO human spaceflight program, the world has changed.
China now represents a capable and attractive partner which is courting
even our closest allies in Europe, Canada, and around the globe. In
stark contrast to NASA, the Chinese space program has enjoyed
unwavering political direction and consistency relative to their lunar
plans. In the eyes of many, China represents a reliable alternative
partner to the U.S. that does not suffer from the vicissitudes of the
American political system and is rapidly growing its space-related
capabilities and expertise.
Therefore, clear and explicit support for the Artemis program has
never been more vital. The U.S. can no longer afford to change
direction and must continue to embrace the Artemis program in a
bipartisan fashion to preserve American credibility and our Nation's
ability to assemble and lead the global coalitions that are necessary
to succeed in space exploration.
For all of these reasons, I applaud the Biden administration for
maintaining the continuity of the Artemis program with enthusiasm and
alacrity. It was an honor to serve with then Acting Chief of Staff and
Senior White House Appointee, Bhavya Lal, whose outstanding leadership
allowed the Agency generally and Artemis specifically to emerge from
the transition, which are always difficult periods, with clarity and
constancy of purpose. Moreover, your former colleague and now NASA
Administrator Bill Nelson has provided strong and consistent leadership
and enjoys a close relationship with the President as well as the
Congress which is vital to successfully implementing Artemis.
I would also be remiss if I did not commend the bipartisan
leadership of Jim Bridenstine, including reaching across the aisle to
place our current Administrator on the NASA Advisory Council.
Administrator Bridenstine's unflagging efforts to build a broad and
deep political coalition helped to ensure the future of Artemis. I will
never forget when, after participating in a Women's Equality Day event
at NASA Ames, Speaker Pelosi stated her support for Artemis by
instructing the Administrator to work on getting the first woman to the
Moon as quickly as possible. Subsequently, Vice President Pence tweeted
about the Speaker's message thanking her for the support. Such
alignment between two political rivals is all too rare, and kudos to
Jim Bridenstine for his efforts to bring disparate leaders together in
support of the Artemis program.
Of course, this Committee and its staff has consistently served as
a shining example of bipartisanship. In my various private sector
positions and while at NASA, I was always grateful for the vision and
unparalleled bipartisan nature of the Commerce Committee's space
policies. Under both Democratic and Republican control, including
during Senator Nelson's tenure, this Committee has represented the best
of Capitol Hill, always striving to find common ground and bridging
divides.
Now, more than ever, we need bipartisan leadership, which is why
Congress passing a NASA Authorization Bill is of paramount importance.
As I described previously, it's vital for the U.S. to present a unified
vision to both allies and rivals. The best way to accomplish this is
through a bipartisan NASA Authorization which includes strong and
explicit support for the Artemis program. I want to thank and
congratulate this Committee for crafting a NASA Authorization as part
of the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) of 2021 which has
been passed by the Senate. It's critical for the House of
Representatives to also take action and for Congress to adopt a
reconciled bill as expeditiously as possible. Both partner and rival
nations have a sophisticated understanding of the Congressional
process. The lack of a bipartisan NASA Authorization bill sends a
negative message regarding America's ability to move forward with a
unified vision for space exploration. Therefore, this issue must be
rectified quickly before it leads to inevitable doubts and concerns
that will damage America's ability to execute the critical global
partnerships that are such an important part of the Artemis program.
III. Avoiding a Space Station Gap
Another area where policy consistency is critical is in LEO. The
venerable ISS, which has now supported a continuous crewed presence for
over twenty years, stands out as a dramatic success for American global
leadership and policy continuity. Thanks to the ISS, the U.S. has been
a hub for an unprecedented partnership that defines the present and
will influence the future of human space exploration. An entire
generation has been born and grown to adulthood never knowing a world
where there isn't an international team of scientists living and
working on a space station. I believe that far too often we take this
extraordinary accomplishment for granted. Having negotiated the binding
Memorandums of Understanding for the Gateway which were based on the
ISS's Intergovernmental Agreement, I have a great personal appreciation
for the difficulty of assembling the ISS coalition as well as
maintaining it. I have always felt that the ISS should receive a Nobel
Peace Prize acknowledging the herculean work of those who transformed
the station from dream into reality.
Yet again, I would like to thank the Committee for including in the
NASA Authorization Act, which passed the Senate, language extending the
ISS to at least 2030. The ISS still remains the pinnacle for human
spaceflight and we should leverage the station's singular capabilities
for as long as possible. Again, Congress adopting an authorization bill
extending the ISS will be extraordinarily important to provide our
international partners with certainty relative to the future of the
station.
Moreover, per the commendable authorization language passed by the
Senate, America's goal is to maintain a continuous human presence in
LEO. Extending the ISS is an important part of achieving this
objective, but of equal importance is ensuring that when the ISS is
retired, there is a commercial space station that will carry on its
legacy. The ISS itself took decades to construct and America now faces
the troubling prospect of a space station gap. The U.S. can ill afford
to lose its presence in LEO. Astronautics opportunities, which are the
grist for the mill of international collaborations, will always be more
plentiful in LEO than for beyond LEO operations. Additionally, we're
only now beginning to realize the incredible potential of microgravity
manufacturing, research, and development. The microgravity environment
represents an entirely new arena for trailblazing scientific and
commercial endeavors. What we will learn from and what we can do in
microgravity has the potential to revolutionize fields as diverse as
drug treatments and medicine to communications, agriculture, and
construction.
America cannot lose access to this unique environment at exactly
the time when others are beginning to establish a foothold in LEO.
Specifically, over the course of the past year, China has launched its
own space station which has now received both resupply missions and
astronauts. Only a few days ago, China launched their most recent crew
to their station, beginning the longest duration mission Chinese
astronauts have ever undertaken. Moreover, China is aggressively
courting our existing ISS partners, particularly in Europe, to join
their new crewed LEO operations. Again, for two decades the ISS has
allowed the U.S. to serve as a hub for global astronautics activities.
As the world's leading Democracy, we must not cede the substantial
diplomatic and political soft power benefits of crewed space station
operations to China or any other nation.
Moreover, a space station gap would have a dramatic negative impact
on American launch capabilities. Losing the demand for commercial cargo
launches to the ISS as well as commercial crew (not long after
investing billions of dollars to develop this capability), would impede
gaining experience with these systems as well as continued innovation
and growth. The damage done to American launch capabilities and
international competitiveness would hurt our overall industrial base
creating issues not just for civil space operations but for national
security space activities as well.
Avoiding a space station gap will not be simple or easy. Developing
and deploying a new space station is a nontrivial effort that could
take a decade or more. NASA is wisely turning to the private sector to
leverage commercial innovation and efficiencies to build and operate
this new station. I'm excited to see NASA's Commercial LEO Destinations
(``CLD'') program progress taking us a step closer to ensuring that the
U.S. and our partners maintain a continuous human presence in LEO. At
Redwire Space, we are the only organization that has ever successfully
printed objects on the ISS and we are a global leader in microgravity
manufacturing and R&D. We will apply our company's singular
capabilities and experiences with microgravity manufacturing, along
with our innovative roll out solar arrays, robotics, digital
engineering, sun sensors, star trackers, and other technologies to
ensure the success of the CLD effort.
Finally, I want to applaud this Committee for passing language that
reinforces America's commitment to maintaining a continuous presence in
LEO through the development of a commercial space station. I hope that
the House moves forward quickly with a NASA Authorization Bill which
includes identical language allowing Congress to send an unequivocal
message to partners and allies alike that we have learned from history
and that this Nation stands united in support of preventing a space
station gap.
IV. Maintaining Technological Leadership Through Public-Private
Partnerships
There can be no question that we are in a great powers struggle
with China. This rivalry extends to space where the implications of the
U.S. falling behind China technologically would have devastating
consequences. This is a race that the U.S. cannot afford to lose,
however, in many critical areas we are already facing the prospect of
falling behind. Specifically, the U.S. must redouble its efforts to
support next-generation space-based robotics. We are entering a new era
where satellites and robotic systems are merging, and America must
embrace this change and excel at these advanced technologies.
For example, at Redwire Space we are developing systems such as
Archinaut (also referred to as `OSAM-2'), a satellite that, after
deployment, will use robotics to build itself. In addition to robotic
assembly, we are developing satellites that leverage 3D printing to
create far larger objects in space than could have ever been placed
into a rocket fairing. These space platforms that construct themselves
after being deployed in space will offer substantially enhanced
capabilities as well as resilience to attack that could never be
achieved by traditional satellite systems. While Redwire Space has
unparalleled heritage and expertise in this field, China is well aware
of the importance of space-based robotics and has already deployed
Shijian-17, a satellite with, among other features, a robotic arm that
could be used to grapple satellites. Shijian-17 has already flown
unusual orbital maneuvers bringing it closer to other satellites
generating suspicion and concern. Again, the U.S. must bolster its
efforts to equal and exceed Chinese space-based robotic capabilities to
protect our industrial competitive edge as well as the Nation's overall
economy and security.
As noted previously, China's autocratic regime does have the
benefit of policy consistency and the Nation has focused on developing
world-class space technology for decades. China's efforts are coming to
fruition and the U.S. faces an unprecedented challenge to maintain
space supremacy or, in the long run, even parity.
The best and possibly only way for the U.S. to meet this
existential threat is for America to embrace its great strengths that
China struggles to or cannot reproduce. Specifically, the U.S. must
redouble its efforts to leverage American entrepreneurialism. A free
society, grounded in the rule of law, with a diverse population, will
always innovate at a greater rate than more homogeneous nations where
freedoms are severely curtailed. America created the commercial space
revolution, and our private space sector is the envy of the world.
Programs such as NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(``COTS'') and the Commercial Resupply Services (``CRS'') contracts,
played a critical role in creating the commercial space industry as we
know it today.
In order to effectively compete with China, the Congress, NASA, the
Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community, must all embrace
public-private partnerships to an even greater degree than what is
occurring today. The government must support commercial development,
playing the role of both catalyst and customer for innovative
technologies. Commercial space represents a force multiplier that has
already transformed the nature of the industry. However, there is much
more that can be done by the U.S. government to make efforts such as
COTS and CRS the rule rather than the exception. Again, whenever
possible, the government should serve as a customer for innovative
capabilities that will maintain and accelerate U.S. leadership,
particularly in critical areas such as orbital servicing, assembly, and
manufacturing. Only by substantially expanding the use of public-
private partnerships can the U.S. effectively protect itself and the
world from emerging threats that will only become more pernicious in
the years to come.
For all of these reasons, the NASA authorization bill should
include explicit support to bolster Archinaut specifically and on-orbit
servicing, assembly, and manufacturing technologies generally. This is
a critical area of technological endeavor that the U.S. must excel in
and explicit direction via an authorization bill is key to maintaining
American competitiveness.
V. Establishing Norms of Behavior in Space
It is vital for America to lead not only in technology but in
policy as well. As in any new frontier, establishing rules and norms of
behavior will play a critical role in preventing conflict and ensuring
that space is developed in a safe, sustainable, and peaceful fashion.
While at NASA, it was my privilege to craft and negotiate the Artemis
Accords which, in less than one year since their inception, have now
been signed by twelve nations.
The Artemis Accords were successful due in no small part to the
unprecedented partnership between NASA and the Department of State, and
I want to take this opportunity to thank Jonathan Margolis, Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Space, and Health at the Bureau
of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs for
his support, partnership, and friendship in developing the Accords. I
also need to thank another friend and colleague, Gabriel Swiney, the
Department of State's lead civil space attorney who was one of the
first people I discussed the Accords with. Gabriel's vision and
knowledge are reflected throughout the Accords and his skill made them
a success. Finally, the Artemis Accords would of course not exist
without the outstanding leadership of Jim Bridenstine, who provided
strong and unflagging support for the Accords as well as the
partnership with the Department of State, and the former Administrator
simply wouldn't take no for an answer in his efforts to bring me to
NASA.
The Artemis Accords present the model for future policy initiatives
wherein NASA and State work in unison. Moreover, the Accords would not
have succeeded without the coordination and assistance provided by the
National Space Council, and its former Executive Secretary, Dr. Scott
Pace. I have greatly benefited from Dr. Pace's support over the years,
and his leadership was vital for both the Artemis Accords and the
signing of the binding Gateway agreements, particularly the agreement
with the Government of Japan. Finally, I want to again thank the Biden
administration's leadership including Secretary of State Antony
Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, NASA Administrator
Bill Nelson, NASA Deputy Administrator Pam Melroy, and Senior Advisor
to the Administrator, Bhavya Lal, for their strong support of the
Artemis Accords. Again, continuity is vital, and I am personally
grateful for the Biden team's robust support for building international
partnerships and establishing norms of behavior in space.
Due to the Accords, the Artemis program has established the largest
and most diverse human space exploration coalition in history, but much
more remains to be done. Specifically, more countries should be added
to the Accords and the Artemis program. For example, I hope that NASA
and the Department of State continue and accelerate efforts that I
worked on during my tenure at OIIR to bring African nations into the
family of the Artemis Accords. I believe that the benefits of space
exploration and space-based capabilities are particularly important for
developing nations and that the unique views and voices of African
youth in particular can greatly contribute to the Artemis program.
Moreover, China has targeted Africa both economically and politically,
and NASA should not cede African partnerships to rival nations.
Additionally, it would be beneficial for a few more of our traditional
space allies, specifically, France and Germany, to join the Accords
demonstrating unified support in Europe for responsible norms of
behavior in space. Finally, I hope that efforts at NASA and State are
continuing for India to join the Accords. India's robust and growing
space capabilities make their support for norms of behavior critical to
achieve a peaceful and prosperous future in space for all of humanity
to enjoy.
The Accords establish a strong foundation for beyond LEO civil
space activities, building a future based on transparency,
interoperability, the full and public release of scientific data,
avoiding harmful interference, and environmental sustainability.
However, new rules and norms need to be established for national
security operations. The Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space,
described in a July 7th Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense,
represents a good start. However, establishing an international
coalition to support these tenets is vital to their success and
universal adoption. The Artemis Accords serve as a model for how such
coalitions can be built, and I know that myself and others who were
involved in developing and implementing the Accords stand ready to
assist our colleagues at the Department of Defense and Space Force in
their own efforts to establish vital norms of behavior in the national
security realm.
In addition to explicitly authorizing the Artemis program, I hope
that the upcoming NASA authorization bill includes language
complimenting NASA's work in support of the Artemis Accords, signaling
to both partners and rivals that the Congress strongly endorses
establishing global norms of behavior to ensure a peaceful and
prosperous future in space.
VI. Collaborating and Competing with China
For better or worse, the U.S.--Chinese relationship will determine
the future of space exploration and development. As described
previously, the U.S. cannot afford to fall behind China in critical
capabilities such as space-based robotics, in-space manufacturing, and
space-based solar power. However, there are nontrivial opportunities to
collaborate with China that could benefit both countries and advance
global prospects for peace and prosperity.
Specifically, NASA and the Department of State should continue to
advocate for China to sign the Artemis Accords. Although China is not a
part of the Artemis program, and the Accords were written to ensure
that nations participating in Artemis abide by international treaty
obligations and norms of behavior such as the full, free, and timely
release of scientific information, China signing the Accords would send
a strong signal of unity and global consensus relative to the simple
and intuitive principles of the Accords. The Accords were a product of
lengthy negotiations between eight different space agencies and
ministries of foreign affairs. The substance and text of the Accords
represents the common ground among countries with a diverse set of
policy positions (e.g., the U.S. opposes the Moon Agreement whereas
Australia is a signatory). The Accords were written to be as inclusive
as possible and, in particular, the United Arab Emirates officials who
participated in the drafting process were a strong voice for ensuring
that the Accords could be signed by any nation with a desire to support
peaceful space operations and development. The Artemis Accords were
explicitly and exquisitely crafted to unite nations with disparate
views, bringing the world together to prevent conflict and ensure
harmonious activities on the Moon and Mars. China committing to the
Accords would be a welcome development that I believe would benefit
both nations and global space policy discourse generally.
During discussions at the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, the State Department has invited China and all
nations to sign the Artemis Accords. Beyond such interactions at the
United Nations, I recommend that the State Department continue the
practice of convening Civil Space Dialogues with China, to discuss the
Accords and norms of behavior in space. If China were to join the
Artemis Accords, like with other signatories, it would provide
specific, actionable commitments that the country would be held to for
civil space operations on the Moon, asteroids, comets, and Mars.
I have high hopes that a productive conversation could be held with
China on norms of behavior due to my experiences with several global
efforts that included Chinese participation. For example, prior to
joining NASA, I served as an industry member of the Hague International
Space Resources Governance Working Group, which brought together
experts from around the world to draft `building blocks' in support of
establishing rules for space resource exploration and utilization. One
of China's leading law professors participated in the Hague Working
Group and his input was robust, constructive, and productive. As a
matter of fact, some of the text and ideas generated by the Hague
Working Group were adopted as part of the Artemis Accords.
Moreover, I am currently supporting the efforts of the Global
Expert Group on Sustainable Lunar Activities (``GEGSLA''), which is a
NGO that, as the name indicates, is bringing together policy and legal
experts from across the world to develop norms of behavior for the
Moon. The GEGSLA involves many of the same academic, industry, and
government experts as the Hague Group, including several Chinese
nationals who have been working side-by-side with, among others,
American commercial space leaders to establish rules of the road for
lunar activities which are based upon not only the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967, but the prior work done by the Hague Group and the Artemis
Accords. While I know from personal experience that coming to agreement
on even general principles for space exploration and development can be
extremely difficult, I firmly believe that this is an area where the
U.S. could and should engage with China in an attempt to identify
common ground.
At the next Civil Space Dialogue between the U.S. and China, in
addition to norms of behavior, other forms of collaboration could be
discussed. For example, a swap of lunar samples would be a low-risk
means of initiating cooperation in space with China, which NASA could
engage in while staying well within the bounds of the Wolf Amendment.
Finally, the U.S. is already collaborating with China and other nations
on the Space Geodesy Project, which produces a wide variety of
information for Earth observation and climate science. Additional
collaborations with China on climate research is another area which, if
handled correctly, could benefit both nations without running afoul of
the requirements of the Wolf Amendment.
VII. Conclusion
Collaboration and cooperation must both be harnessed to ensure that
humanity's journey into the undiscovered country of space is safe,
peaceful, and prosperous. Again, we cannot afford to fall behind in
critical new areas of space technology and must maintain the continuity
of the Artemis program as well as maintain a continuous crewed presence
in LEO. However, we must also reach out to both allies and rivals to
collaborate whenever possible to support norms of behavior in space and
mutual areas of scientific interest and concern such as climatology.
As mentioned previously, Redwire is a global leader for in-space
manufacturing. We have an expertise in building microgravity products
that will enable ambitious space exploration missions and improve life
on Earth. Redwire, and all of us in the private sector, must join with
our colleagues in government to build not just technology, but the
future. This is an in-space manufacturing endeavor that will demand
unprecedented work, coordination, and support from across industry and
government. Although we will face many challenges, I remain confident
in America's ability to build a new era in space of peace, freedom, and
prosperity, benefiting the world and many future generations to come.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you. And you did not even
mention the companies that Redwire has in Colorado.
Mr. Gold. I will say, since it is just between us, they are
three of our best.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hickenlooper. All right. Now, we are ready to hear
from Dr. Sanders.
STATEMENT OF DR. PATRICIA SANDERS, CHAIR, AEROSPACE SAFETY
ADVISORY PANEL, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Sanders. Thank you, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator
Lummis, and Wicker, and Members of the Subcommittee. I thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
NASA's international collaboration and competition in space.
The panel that I chair has the serious charge to provide
both NASA and the Congress with advice for the intelligent
management of the risks that are inherent in human space
flight. NASA has been at the forefront of human space flight
for decades, formulating the missions, defining the
requirements, executing the programs, performing management
integration, and leading launch processing and mission
operations.
NASA still leads in human space exploration, but the
Agency's role is evolving with critical implications for safety
and risk management. The Agency is not the same as it was 10
years ago and will not be the same in even another 5 years. The
rapid growth of commercial space services, and increasing
global interest in space, have changed the environment and the
landscape will not return where NASA is the only, or even the
major, actor. This has tremendous upside potential and equally
tremendous challenges for managing the risk of human space
exploration. At the same time, the exploration endeavors NASA
leads are ever more complex and have ever more risk involved.
NASA has been gradually and tactfully and successfully
adjusting to a changing role and set of responsibilities, as it
shifts from principally executing its programs and missions to
commercially and internationally acquiring significant key
elements and services. And our Panel firmly believes that NASA
must now take a more strategic examination of the Agency's
evolution in the emerging environment, while continuing to
manage a safe and complex human exploration campaign.
NASA's challenge is the melding of traditional and
innovative approaches, including significant systems
engineering and integration complexities, and the certification
of commercial human space flight capabilities with high levels
of risk. There are clear advantages to leveraging industry
innovators and international partners, but NASA must still
manage and be responsible for the overall risks, even when the
Agency neither controls nor dictates the material solutions for
all of the components. To do this, we believe that NASA, first,
must determine how to exercise appropriate accountability, or
how to hold its vendors accountable, for the safe and
successful accomplishment of its mission.
Second, we believe it is imperative to define the overall
architecture for the highly complex Artemis mission. The Agency
should identify how each individual element, regardless of
provider, fits the architecture, and the top-level requirements
for each element to fulfill its necessary function in the
overall structure. This should allow NASA to focus on the right
set of priorities at the right time and to communicate
expectations to all the contributors: internal, commercial, and
international, in a consistent manner.
Third, all of this is complicated by the Nation's current
lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework for human
commercial spaceflight. NASA retains full accountability for
its missions, but no external government regulations or
standards exist to set a baseline level of expectation for the
provider related to human safety. The few existing regulatory
pieces leave a gap related to human on-orbit safety, and the
space industry that impacts human safety. In particular, as has
already been mentioned, there is an immediate and compelling
need to designate a civil agency to oversee and coordinate
space traffic management.
Given the importance of space to international security,
technological leadership, and international competitiveness, it
is vital for the Nation to act now to preserve the safety of
space operations and their environment.
In closing, I note some consistent advice themes from the
Panel. First, it is a need for a constancy of purpose, as
mentioned, sustained commitment, and a clear understanding of
the objectives. Second, is the importance of setting
challenging but achievable schedules, and not allowing undue
schedule pressure to lead to decisions adversely impacting
safety and mission assurance. And third, is technical baselines
and schedules that are mutually consistent, realistic, and
achievable, and supported by adequate and stable resources.
We encourage NASA, in partnership with the Congress, to
hold fast to the foundations of risk management, while
embracing and not fearing alternative methods to achieving
those fundamentals.
And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sanders follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety and
Advisory Panel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Senator Hickenlooper and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss NASA's
international collaboration and competition in space.
As you know, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is charged with
advising both the NASA Administrator and the Congress with respect to
the safety and risk of human space flight as well as other safety
related matters at the Agency. In opening, I would like to emphasize
that the Panel feels the responsibility to provide advice that promotes
the driving down of risk to the lowest reasonable level consistent with
accomplishing the mission. Space exploration is inherently dangerous;
the environment is hostile, and the systems needed to survive in it are
complex. Our charge is not to avoid any and all risks, but to provide
advice and feedback for the intelligent management of those risks.
NASA has been at the forefront of human space flight for decades,
and for much of that time it executed the programs, formulated the
missions, defined the requirements, and performed management
integration of all the elements composing the system. NASA personnel
performed the engineering analyses, and they led launch processing and
mission operations.
NASA leadership in human space exploration is still preeminent, but
the Agency's role is evolving with critical implications for how risk
and safety will be managed in the future. The Agency is not the same as
it was ten years ago, and most assuredly, it will not be the same in
another ten years--even five years--from now. With the rapid growth of
available commercial space services, and increasing global interest in
space, the environment in which NASA operates has changed; NASA will
not return to a landscape in which it is the only, or even the major,
actor. These developments have tremendous upside potential--and are
accompanied by equally tremendous challenges for managing the risk of
human space exploration. Concurrently, the human exploration endeavors
NASA is leading are becoming ever more complex, and with more risk,
from the lunar exploration to eventual excursions to Mars and beyond.
Over the past several years, NASA has been adjusting to a changing
role and set of responsibilities as it shifts from principally
executing its programs and missions to commercially acquiring
significant key elements and services. The Agency has gradually and
tactically adapted and succeeded in meeting challenges as they arise.
Regardless of their tactical achievements to date, the Panel firmly
believes that it is critical at this time that NASA take more strategic
scrutiny of the role the Agency should undertake going forward. How the
Agency plans to evolve and transition to an organization that more
frequently procures human space flight capabilities as services, while
managing a safe and wholly new human exploration campaign, is a key
strategic question that has the Panel's attention. We continue to
emphasize the importance for NASA to strategically define its mission,
its guiding principles, and its vision for the Agency's leadership role
in the future in order to ensure that risk is managed appropriately.
The emerging challenges for NASA involve the melding of traditional
and innovative program approaches, including the significant systems
engineering and integration complexities, and the certification of
commercial human space flight capabilities that carry high levels of
risk. The Panel has noted clear advantages to leveraging the industry
innovators, but NASA must still manage and be responsible for the
overall risks, even when the Agency does not control nor dictate the
material solutions for some of the campaign components and services,
such as the Human Landing System. It is critical for NASA to be able to
manage the integrated risk and achieve the right balance with its
providers.
To do this, first, the Panel believes that NASA needs to figure out
how to exercise appropriate accountability--or how to hold its vendors
accountable--for the safe and successful accomplishment of its mission
across the full spectrum of acquisition and development approaches. As
the breadth and types of relationships develop, expand, and become more
complex to achieve NASA's mission safely, and with good understanding
of the risk involved, it is critical for the Agency to have and to use
the appropriate tools including acquisition processes and contractual
structures. There is not a one-size-fits-all approach anymore, and
having an overarching view of what the Agency is trying to achieve
should lead to a flexible and thoughtful deployment of the tools in the
toolbox.
Secondly, the Panel believes it is imperative to define the overall
architecture for the highly complex Artemis mission sets. The Agency
should identify how each individual element--regardless of provider--
fits the architecture, and define the top-level requirements that must
be met in order to for the element to fulfill its necessary function in
the overall mission structure. This work can then form the foundation
for the system engineering and integration. The complexity of the
Artemis ecosystem, along with the expected evolution of requirements--
which involves creating and maintaining an architecture that can be
updated, adjusted, and can incorporate the latest innovation or new
technology--can more effectively be managed by an integrated approach
best achieved in a program construct. This should allow NASA as a whole
to focus on the right set of priorities at the right time and to
communicate expectations to all the contributors--internal, commercial,
and international--in a consistent manner. In addition, all players
understanding enterprise-level requirements, organized in a program
construct, early in the process helps to identify opportunities and
areas to pursue open architecture paradigms and reduce expensive,
complicated, and bureaucratically burdensome design and contractual
changes later.
Thirdly, I note that NASA's approach is complicated by the Nation's
current lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework for human
commercial spaceflight. Presently, NASA retains full accountability,
but no external government regulations or rules exist, which may help
the Agency manage risk, or even set a baseline level of expectation for
the provider, related to human occupant safety. There are some
regulatory pieces in place. At the highest level is the Outer Space
Treaty. The Federal Aviation Administration is responsible for
licensing commercial launches and reentries, with a specific focus on
the safety of the uninvolved public on the ground. The Federal
Communications Commission is responsible for licensing radio broadcasts
from space. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is
responsible for licensing remote sensing operations. NASA and the
Department of Defense are key players in space, but they are not
regulatory agencies. That leaves a gap in authority specifically
related to on-orbit safety, both for humans and the management of an
increasingly more active satellite industry that will eventually impact
human safety. Given the importance of space to national security,
technological leadership and international competitiveness, our Panel
believes it is vital for the United States to act now to preserve the
safety of space operations and the safety of the environment.
Consequently, I would be remiss if I did not repeat a standing Panel
recommendation to the Congress. We feel very strongly that there is an
immediate and compelling need to designate a civil agency to oversee
and coordinate space traffic management. NASA, lacking any other
framework, has established guidelines and standards for space traffic
management, but there must be leadership and coordination at the
national level
Finally, I would like to reiterate some consistent advice themes
from the Panel:
First, we have consistently maintained that mission success
requires a constancy of purpose, a sustained commitment, and a
clear understanding of objectives.
Second, a key issue, repeated year after year, is the
importance of setting challenging but achievable schedules, and
not allowing undue schedule pressure to lead to decisions that
adversely impact safety and mission assurance.
Third, it is important to establish technical baselines and
schedules that are mutually consistent, realistic, and
achievable--supported by adequate and stable resources.
And, we have continuously maintained that while NASA should
never lose sight of the fundamentals in risk management for
successful program execution, there is no one approach that
dictates success, and there should be an openness to learning
and accepting alternative means to understanding and
controlling margins.
So, as NASA continues its deep space exploration, we encourage the
Agency, in partnership with the Congress, to hold fast to the
foundational standards of risk management while embracing new
approaches and not fear alternative methodologies to achieving those
fundamentals.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Well, thank you all for your--
your comments and appreciate the--the breadth of experience you
bring to the table.
We will now start a round of questions. Each of us will
get--well, hopefully, will get 5 minutes. We try to stay on
schedule. It is always hard. I always ask if, in responding to
a question, if you can keep it to a minute, that allows us to
get four questions in. If necessary, we can come back to a
second round of questions or--there are so many questions to
ask each of you. Anyway, I will start.
I will start with Mr. Gold. Appreciate your work at NASA
with the international partners and establishing these--the
Artemis Accords and that cooperative spirit. In your testimony,
I looked at it last night, you said ``space is a crucible that
demands the formation of global coalitions''. So, how can
Congress support NASA's goals to expand the coalition of
international partners in space?
Mr. Gold. Thank you, Senator. I can tell you, and I am sure
the former Administrator would agree, NASA pays a lot of
attention to Congress. And the rhetoric, you know, obviously,
legislation that has passed, it determines whether NASA is
aggressive in going out and forming international coalitions or
holds back and really what the Agency does.
So, I think it is extremely important, again, in an
authorization bill, that there be explicit encouragement to the
Agency, both to expand our international cooperation,
generally, as well as specifically to expand, again, the family
of the Artemis Accords. That there are so many countries that
need to be involved that the Agency should be aggressively
reaching out for, we need to lead by example and establish
norms of behavior before there is conflict in space. And I know
it is cliche, an ounce of prevention now, will prevent a pound
of trouble down the road. So, including even a sense of
Congress, about the Accords, international growth, and being
aggressive to establish norms of behavior, I think, would be
extremely helpful to assure a peaceful future.
You know, other countries may or may not, you know, agree
to the same norms that we do, but if we lead by example, we can
take pressure there and create a coalition of willing.
Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely. That is--I think you are
spot on. I could not agree more.
Mr. Gold. Absolutely.
Senator Hickenlooper. But I want to take--and Mr. Gold
talked a little bit about this, the implications of a---of a
gap. And I guess, Dr. Dittmar, let me ask you, where do you see
the--what are the implications if we do end up with a space
station gap, where the United States is not taking a leadership
position?
Dr. Dittmar. So, as--thank you for the question, Senator.
As has already been pointed out, China has a space station that
is flying in low-Earth orbit. This is actually their first
module of a station that they are going to build out. And China
is leveraging that space station. They have formed partnerships
with UNOOSA. They have already--they recently announced that
they had agreements to fly over 1,000 payloads. We have had
American companies that have already said that they are
beginning to lose customers to China and the Chinese station,
because the Chinese are using state authority to subsidize
access to station for commercial customers, as well.
And so, if what we are saying is that we want to have a
follow-on station that is privately--a public-private
partnership, or is owned by a private entity, that entity
absolutely depends upon access to customers that are not being,
in effect, stolen away by a state agency, that is doing that,
you know, intentionally to, sort of, undermine that capability.
The other thing, frankly, is that, you know, robust
presence in low Earth orbit, for Americans, has been a part of
policy, whether stated or not, in the United States for more
than 20 years--actually longer than that and--going back to the
origin of NASA. And when you look toward an authorization bill,
and I think it is really important to foot stomp, that U.S.
presence in low Earth orbit is expected in perpetuity, that it
is the policy of the United States that we will continue to do
so, through whatever means. However, I think--and low Earth
orbit is, frankly, our foothold going out into outer space. We
need continuity of human space flight and human activity,
beginning on the ground, through low Earth orbit, into deep
space. And that chain is very, very important to American
security, to American business, to American research and
science, to American technology development and we cannot
afford a gap.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. Well, we agree on that. Dr.
Sanders, the GAO has expressed concern on the maturity of
advanced lunar spacesuits. It is a classic case. But I think a
lot of what all--everyone has talked about, and especially Mr.
Bridenstine, the safety of these missions is--there are risks
from 100 different directions. And can--I was going to ask you
to describe how you believe that--that robust Congressional
funding--that continuity of funding and authorizations could
support--help NASA support the goals of safety and making sure
that, you know, mission schedules can end up impacting safety
and assurance.
Dr. Sanders. Well, we have been a consistent proponent of
adequately resourcing all of the complex requirements necessary
for safely executing. When resources are not adequate, or not
stable, the--NASA and their decision-making process on designs,
end up making design choices that may be are premature, maybe
they are--take risks that they would not necessarily take if
they did not have to live within a resource that is not
adequate, or they do not have the stability of the resources,
it forces you to make choice sooner than you might want to
take. It forces you to sometimes, down select earlier than you
understand all the implications of competing designs. And so,
it is very important to have the adequate resources and to have
them in a stable fashion.
Senator Hickenlooper. Right. Great, I appreciate that. I am
already out of time. I cannot believe how fast this goes by.
But I am not done with all of you. Mr. Bridenstine, you will
get your moment.
I am going to turn it over now to the Committee Chair,
Senator Cantwell, who has been working on these issues for a
long time, as long as--probably longer than most of you--most
of us. Anyway, let me turn it over to the Chair.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
The Chair. Thank you, Chair Hickenlooper, and thanks for
holding this subcommittee hearing, and to you and Senator
Lummis for spending so much time to try to bring focus to the
needs for authorizations. And thank you to the witnesses.
I think I will start with you, Mr. Bridenstine. Obviously,
one of the past times you came before this committee, you spoke
very fervently about the need for authorization, and yet it has
been since 2017 since we have actually had an authorizing bill.
So, I sometimes feel like NASA wants to have the money without
the authorization. That is, that it works, not to resolve the
conflicts that we have with members that, basically, it just
realizes, as long as you can just get the dollars it is OK.
Well, that is not OK. And so, I just want to be clear with the
panelists, if you could give me some feedback on some of these
issues. Do you think that we need an authorization bill?
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, 100 percent.
Dr. Dittmar. Yes.
Mr. Gold. An authorization bill is vital to send messages
to our partners and rival nations, with unity purpose of
Congress, yes.
The Chair. Dr. Sanders?
Dr. Sanders. Yes.
The Chair. OK. So, do we need to have more testing and
analysis of rocket launching and the capabilities that we are
looking for in the next system?
Mr. Bridenstine. Do we need more testing and analysis?
The Chair. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. You can always have more testing. There is
not doubt. And more analysis. At some point--and I like the way
Patricia Sanders mentioned it earlier--we have to manage risk.
So, it depends on what system we are talking about and--but
certainly, there is value to more testing.
The Chair. Dr. Dittmar?
Dr. Dittmar. So, having been involved in the development of
the space station, I would just echo what Jim said, which was--
--
The Chair. I am just talking about--I will get to space
stations in a minute.
Dr. Dittmar. Specifically rockets?
The Chair. Yes.
Dr. Dittmar. No, what I was going to do was simply speak to
engineering. OK, so--so it is always useful to have test data,
but there is also an appropriate use of test data and then, a
point at which just more and more testing simply adds cost and
schedule.
The Chair. And Mr. Gold?
Mr. Gold. Senator, this country has not had a human space
flight program beyond low Earth orbit in a very, very long
time. We are going to have to relearn some critical lessons, as
well as developing new technologies and new systems along the
way. So, testing and making sure that we have a safe system
that is robust and effectively competes with China and other
nations is going to be critical, leveraging the wonderful
private sector companies in your State, as well as those three
that Senator Hickenlooper mentioned, of Redwire in Colorado.
The Chair. OK. Dr. Sanders?
Dr. Sanders. Strong proponent for adequate testing and
analysis. As Mr. Bridenstine had said, it is not possible ever
to completely and fully, totally eliminate risk and you want to
manage it. But the way to manage it is through knowledge and
we--as much knowledge as we think we have about systems, we
continue to learn things about parachutes, about compatibility
of the components, materials----
The Chair. Do you think NASA Houston needs to have more
oversight over the Artemis program and its schedules and
launches?
Mr. Bridenstine. I think their----
The Chair. Than is currently provided.
Mr. Bridenstine. I think their--well, oversight from the
Congress or----
The Chair. No, from NASA Houston.
Mr. Bridenstine. Oh, from NASA Houston, for the Artemis
program.
The Chair. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, certainly there are a lot of
different centers that are involved in the development of
different components of the Artemis program. I think it is
important that NASA has a robust capability to do the
integration and I think, until recently, that has been lacking.
But my understanding is--and I am not there anymore, but my
understanding is they have really plussed up the systems
integration piece that has been missing for a while.
The Chair. Dr. Dittmar?
Dr. Dittmar. With apologies, Senator, I am not as--I am not
as current with what management has distributed across the
center.
The Chair. OK. Basically, I am bringing up topics that are
part of the dispute between what the Senate and the House wants
to do on a NASA authorization. So, I am just trying to get your
viewpoints on that because part of the issue is, we have to
debunk, you know, where we are. We cannot do an adequate
oversight job if we do not have an authorization bill. We
cannot come back on the measurements if we do not have some
input here about what kind of structure we need.
But we are sitting here with, obviously, a new--as Mr. Gold
was saying, a pretty big, new adventure, at least from the
number of stops we are talking about. And then, what we are
talking about going beyond the moon. To say nothing of we
really do not have any accurate dates or cost estimates or what
we want out of each of these systems. What do we want out of
the launch systems and the capabilities? What do we want out of
the ISS and its capabilities? What do we want on the lander
system? What do we want, you know, on the beyond lander--I am
sorry, beyond the Moon?
So, here we are having this discussion without reference
and without oversight, really, because we do not have an
authorization bill that is on a piece of paper, who is in
charge, who is going to answer these questions, and how are we
going to have this debate in Congress? So, what is coming
across is the amount of money that people want to keep going,
but then, it is always not enough. And then, the choices that
people make do not necessarily adhere to redundancy and
resiliency.
So, I think it is just imperative that we get an
authorization bill. And so, I am trying to figure out from you
all, what you think some of these stumbling blocks really,
truly are between our colleagues. So, Mr. Bridenstine?
Mr. Bridenstine. Ma'am, I think--I think that is all--I
agree with everything you just said. I think that is exactly
right. And I would also say that one of the biggest values of
having an authorization bill--yes, oversight is a big piece of
it, but for NASA to have continuity of purpose over time
requires an apolitical, bipartisan consensus on how we are
moving forward. And if we can put that in an authorization
bill, it sends a signal to everybody, globally, that we have
resolve to accomplish these objectives. And then, as this
hearing is titled, we have the opportunity to go get
international partners.
If we do not have that resolve--if the international
partners do not trust that we are actually going to accomplish
what we are saying we are going to accomplish, the first thing
they are going to do is, they are going to go to China, which
already has, you know, what they call the Chinese International
Space Station and now they have entered into an agreement with
Russia for going to the moon and establishing a lunar base. Our
international partners have a history of partnering with other
nations when we do not have that continuity. So, the
authorization is important for that purpose, too.
The Chair. OK. Mr. Gold?
Mr. Gold. Senator Cantwell, when Administrator Bridenstine
sent me overseas to negotiate the Gateway Commitments, it was
because of statements that you made that we were able to
complete that negotiation. I was told outright, by an
international partner, ``Why should I believe anything that you
are saying?'' Relative to Gateway, Artemis, and NASA's plans.
And it was only by arguing the bipartisan support that Artemis
had, that we were able to bring them and their collaboration to
the table and prevent them from going over to China. Without an
authorization bill, those doubts will continue to fester.
The Chair. Well, one of the reasons why NASA's
authorization is on the USICA, America's competitiveness bill,
is because we have passed this twice now, out of the Senate, to
have no results in the House. So, we are very adamant here, in
a bipartisan fashion, what needs to be done and I am just
trying to use today as a way to figure out what is this
stalemate that we have with our House colleagues truly about.
Now, I do not know if anybody wants to talk about the
nature of a public lander--that issue. But obviously, that is
one of the stumbling blocks, as well, is that people would like
to have a process and go back and look at a public lander.
Although, I think some people are saying, you know, the IP
would belong to the government, all sorts of--so, how do we--
how do we get a resolution of this issue?
Do we have other members waiting? Sorry.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think you are on such an important
point that----
The Chair. OK. OK, thank you. I do not know if we have
colleagues here, so I do not want to hold up somebody if they
are on----
Senator Hickenlooper. No, you are--there is no one in the
queue.
The Chair. Thank you. That is----
Senator Hickenlooper. They are all voting. They are voting.
The Chair.--too bad for--too bad for the witnesses. Yes, go
ahead, Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. So, when we think about a human landing
system for the moon, I think it is--we need to look back at the
Commercial Resupply Program and the Commercial Crew Program.
Both of those have proven to be very resilient. Even when one
partner had a challenge, the other one would step forward and
continue to move forward. We saw that--you go back to 2014 on
commercial resupply of the International Space Station, we saw,
you know, at the time it was orbital ATK. They had a problem
resupplying the International Space Station in rocket failure.
A lot of cargo blew up. And then, in 2015 SpaceX had a rocket
blow up with the international docking adaptor and other cargo.
But we had a resilient program where we could--we had
dissimilar redundancy and we were able to use an Atlas rocket
with a Cygnus cargo capability and basically, resupply the
International Space Station. And we had international partners
on that, Japan, that helped, you know, support the resupply and
even Russia supported the resupply.
So, the answer is we need this similar redundancy. Having a
single provider for a human landing system, I think, imposes
risk. That risk is budgetary. That risk is schedule. That risk
is oversight. That risk is transparency. And I think, if we
have competition, multiple providers that are competing on
cost, on innovation, on safety, and those providers operating
commercially are getting customers that are not necessarily the
government, I think that is a good thing for the program. I
think that was the original intent. I think that is why when,
you know, Congress initially funded the Artemis program there
was an anticipation there would be two, at least two, in the--
in the competition. I was fully supportive of that and that is
what we were pushing for.
The Chair. I am more trying to get--our colleague, the
Chair of the House committee wants a public lander. And so, I
was trying to get comments about that.
Mr. Bridenstine. I think--I am going to say things I have
said before and it is going to, maybe, get me in trouble with
members of the House. I do not know. But I will tell you that I
think any time you introduce a competition between the
government and the private sector, the government wins, and the
private sector loses. I think that is a challenge. I think--I
think we have enough commercial capability now to have two
commercial human landing systems. And I think, if we had
adequate funding--you know, whether it is coming from the
Executive Branch that is not providing it, or Congress, I think
the adequate funding for two commercial human landing systems,
at least, maybe even more, would be the right solution.
Mr. Gold. Senator, I think the private sector has proven
itself. It has delivered cargo to the International Space
Station. It has now delivered crew to the International Space
Station. The private sector can and will be able to meet that
mission. What we are missing now, as you mentioned, dissimilar
redundancy and direction and funds. And those are two things
that we certainly hope Congress will be providing via an
authorization bill. And certainly, we are advocating for the
House to move and move quickly.
The Chair. Well, we are trying to resolve these issues. So,
the point you should take away--and NASA, really, if they are
listening should take away is, we need an authorization bill.
We are not going to continue to have this game where you just
get appropriations. It is not going to serve the Artemis
program or NASA well, but we have to resolve this issue. And
frankly, you know, it is frustrating to me to see the spirit of
NASA turned into, you know, the cheering of billionaires or
competition with each other, because I am pretty sure that is
not what our mission of Artemis is about.
And so, somehow, we have gotten away from our focus, you
know, on what we are trying to do from a technology
perspective. And I believe in NASA's innovation in technology.
I want them to apply the same spirit they had in fixing the
problems on the Apollo project, to fixing and getting this
authorization done. But if we have to address this public issue
and get our House colleagues in a room and figure out what is
the sticking point here, we should do better than just--just
dismissing it and saying the private sector can do better. We
just had this debate with the FAA and oversight of the aviation
sector. We clearly saw where there were pitfalls.
So, we have to figure this out and resolve our differences
so we can get legislation, so Congress can do its oversight
job, so that Senator Hickenlooper can continue to play a great
role here in pushing this, and then, we can get to the
international aspect of this. But right now, we are--you know,
we are--it has been since 2017 since we have had a bill. And
so, you ask yourselves why--why are we in this situation where
the dates that are on a piece of paper right now, make no
sense, as it relates to the Artemis program. Everybody knows
that. So, how is that a good strategy? So, let us resolve these
issues.
Dr. Sanders, do you have any suggestions about how to
resolve this issue about a public lander versus commercial
landers? Do you have any input? Or Dr. Dittmar?
Dr. Sanders. I think that, yes, the commercial industry is
capable--increasingly capable. But NASA always still has to be
accountable for what--for the success and safety of their
mission. So, it is important for them to be able to have enough
influence and interaction in order to have that--ensure that
accountability.
And also, NASA has a great deal of experience, a great deal
of talent from--that they have acquired over decades. And so,
there is a time for collaboration as this is going on and we
saw that in commercial crew. There were times when SpaceX and
there are times when Boeing have had--had problems to solve and
NASA has been able to help them solve those because of the
experience they have.
So, I do not think it is a clear, straight, turn it over to
commercial, nor is it a clear, straight, that NASA develop
everything by itself.
The Chair. Well, that is why I predicated my question
earlier on that list and wanted to know what you thought about
giving NASA Houston a larger role on that oversight. Look, we
have seen where the same mistake was made by the FAA in
deferring too much to aviation manufacturers, when it came to
the oversight. So--and we have huge technological advances. And
so, there is a lot to know and to be tested.
So, we need to get--have this structure--I want a very
strong NASA oversight of these companies--very strong. I am not
supportive of NASA stepping away and turning it over to the
commercial side. But we have to figure out what that looks
like, from an authorizing perspective, and put that in a piece
of paper.
Mr. Gold or Dr. Dittmar?
Dr. Dittmar. I would just add quickly, with regard to the
lander, I do not know what the particular rationale is
underlying the various positions, but one thing that might be
pointed out is, if NASA is engendering--and I am in agreement
with Jim, I think we need at least--two would be good. We
definitely need redundant capability if we are going to take
this approach. If--you need to do a path, basically. So, if you
are going to do that--you know, one thing the government can
always do is assert, what amounts to, imminent domain, right at
first use, so that if--and I am speculating, if the issue
having to do with the public lander has to do with whether or
not the government could count on being able to use it, as it
saw fit, in the same way that it can with regard to a
government loaned asset.
And there has been a great deal of discussion. I am one of
the people having the discussion over the last several years,
having to do with what is the appropriate role of government in
signaling, particular to international allies, as Mike has
already pointed out, and adversaries.
What is the full faith and measure of the U.S. Congress
mean and what is the difference between how it is that you see
a government owned asset versus a public asset, OK, versus how
you see a privately owned asset?
Maybe one way to have the discussion is to talk about what
rights the government has to assert in the case where it needs
to use, OK, and to, in fact, basically say to private
companies, ``Sorry, we understand you have other customers. We
understand you have business and agendas. But we have to set
those aside, under these circumstances.'' I do not know if that
is a path forward, but it is just an idea.
The Chair. Well, I think oversight is the question here. My
sense is there is a feeling of loss of oversight with these
commercializations. And, as I said, we have dealt very deeply
with this, as it relates to the FAA and to the manufacturers.
And you have a lot of people, even within the organization at
the FAA, stepping away saying, ``Oh, they know better. Let them
go ahead.''
Dr. Dittmar. Yes.
The Chair. And we need a very strong NASA and very strong
NASA oversight.
Dr. Dittmar. I believe to do that, what you also need to
have, and when you think of authorization, is very clear
statement of objectives. What are the objectives, OK, and so
far as how the government sees them and how Congress sees them?
Because without that, it is very difficult to even begin to be
able to do oversight because you do not know what objectives
you are trying to meet.
The Chair. You could not have said it better, thank you.
Mr. Gold. And Senator, perhaps you have the solution
already, in terms of the compromise with the House, relative to
oversight. I believe the question of government versus
commercial is a false dichotomy, that we are stronger when we
are working together. As Mary Lynne mentioned--Dr. Dittmar,
that NASA has got so much incredible experience and the private
sector has innovation, dollars, affordability. We need to
combine that effectively and, hopefully, going to the House,
bolstering oversight and insight of the programs and having two
entities moving forward, I hope, could address the issues that
you are raising.
The Chair. You are raising an interesting point, but I
think no one's against companies going out there and doing
commercial space travel. OK, go for it. But we are talking
about how we are now going to conduct our next Artemis mission.
Mr. Chairman, you have been so lenient, and I see my
colleague has returned. So, I am sure there are more questions
by my other colleagues. Thank you so much to the witnesses and
thank you for your diligence on trying to get this
authorization over the goal line. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I was
copiously taking notes, as I trust you all were with her
questions. I also have to vote, so I am going to turn this--the
chairing of this meeting over to Senator Lummis, our Ranking
Member, and then, she will proceed. But I will be back. So, you
know, do not think you are going anywhere soon.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lummis. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you again, panelists, for tolerating our vote series that is
interrupting the conversation. Former Congressman Bridenstine
remembers those days very well.
First question is for Mr. Gold, and it has to do with the
importance of strong public-private partnerships and a good
line of communication between NASA and the commercial space
industry, particularly on regulatory and policy issues. So, Mr.
Gold, I would like you to talk a little bit about the
importance of the NASA Advisory Council's Regulatory Policy
Committee.
Mr. Gold. Thank you, Senator. Public-private partnerships
in America are the envy of the world. It is incredible. This
really, second Golden Age that we are having in space due to,
not just the private sector, but the support that NASA has
given--that combination of capabilities. Elon Musk has gone on
the record that there would not be a SpaceX if it was not for
NASA. So, being able to combine public and private sector
benefits and advantages are so critical.
And one of the other aspects that separates us out from
foreign competition, other nations, are FACAS, the Federal
Advisory Committees, that we have an explicit and official
ability to combine private sector feedback and advice. And in
this world, as Senator Cantwell just mentioned, where we are
dealing with some pretty extraordinarily policy issues, the NAC
Regulatory and Policy Committee is really the only place where
NASA can go to get private sector feedback that represents, not
just companies that, you know, are new--like, SpaceX and Blue
Origin, Virgin Galactic--but also, Boeing and Lockheed, the
traditional and terrific space companies that have brought us
so far.
So, having that common ground, where both the new and the
traditional space companies can come together to advise NASA is
just critical and will allow us to leverage the power of the
private sector, in support of NASA's goals.
Senator Lummis. Thank you. Would anyone else like to
comment on that? Well, thanks. That is a pretty strong
statement in favor of their work. So, thank you.
Mr. Gold. The embarrassing thing to me, Senator, is that
two of the members of that committee are now astronauts that we
had. So, I am falling behind my colleagues who are on that
committee----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Gold. Audrey Powers, Sirisha Bandla.
Senator Lummis. No worries. You bring your own qualities to
that. This is for anyone who wishes to jump in on it. How would
you say China and Russia manage their orbital debris? And are
there things we can do to encourage them to do more?
Mr. Bridenstine. So, everybody claims that they follow the,
you know, the guidelines that NASA creates and is adopted
broadly by the U.S. Government. And then, it goes and goes to
international fora and people say, you know, we all agree on
these guidelines.
In practice, do all nations follow those guidelines?
Absolutely not. And so, that is a challenge. It is one of the
reasons, when I was a NASA administrator, I got Mike Gold
engaged in the Artemis Accords. We needed to use the Artemis
program--and I think this is an important thing. We--we look at
the Artemis program, we get all these countries that want to be
part of the Artemis program. How do we leverage that to create
an international environment that is conducive for the future
of human space flight? And so, we put in there that you had to
adhere to the debris mitigation guidelines that are set forth
by NASA. And interestingly, everybody has already agreed to
that, so nobody could ultimately disagree. But here is the
thing. If you want to participate in Artemis, now you are
committed. You have got to follow these guidelines. And I
think--so, the question is, how do you--how do you compel other
nations to follow what the guidelines are?
And, oh by the way, and this is another challenge that we
have, as I mentioned in my opening statement, in this country
we have, you know, these mega constellations now, that are also
placing at risk, low Earth orbit. And I am not naming anyone.
There are lot of them in this country. And as I mentioned
earlier, there are a lot of other countries that have
constellations, as well. Rwanda, as I mentioned, 327,000
satellites being filed for at the ITU. So, we do not have the
authority, as a Nation, to turn around and tell other
countries, ``You are not allowed to have your own
constellation'', when we ourselves are licensing exactly the
same things.
Senator Lummis. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. So, the solution set, Ranking Member
Lummis, is to recognize that there is a limitation to how much
stuff can be put into any orbital shell. There is a limitation
there. Once that--and, by the way, I do not know that that has
been recognized by anybody at this point. But once it is
recognized, we need to define what those limitations are. And
those limitations can be determined by the cross-section or the
size of the satellite, the mass of the satellite.
So, we think about how much stuff can you put in any
orbital regime and then, we say, OK, now that we know that
there is a limitation, we have defined what that limitation is,
there needs to be a process by which we allocate access. When I
say we, there needs to be an international kind of effort to
this, where access is allocated in an orderly way. And when the
United States gets its allocation that we, in fact, do allocate
in a market competitive way, where we allow access to a number
of different companies that are trying to accomplish the same
thing, so we do not end up with monopolistic behavior.
I really think, if you look at the--kind of, the way the
ITU works for geostationary orbit, I think that that might be a
good model for low Earth orbit. It is going to have to be
because the other result is this. We are all launching stuff
into space, and it is going to--it is going to be not good. It
is a race.
Senator Lummis. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. And when you have a race like this, and
everybody is operating--it is the prisoner's dilemma. Everybody
is operating to benefit themselves and, at the end, everybody
loses.
Senator Lummis. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bridenstine. It is the tragedy of the commons and I
think that is what we are facing right now in low Earth orbit.
And there is no regulatory regime that manages it
appropriately, and there is certainly not an international
regime to manage it appropriately.
Senator Lummis. OK, so the ITU----
Mr. Bridenstine. International Telecommunications Union. It
is a subset of the U.N.
Senator Lummis. And would the U.N. be the proper
organization to also be the umbrella organization for this?
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, so wow.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bridenstine. It is a challenge, for sure, because I
would say that the ITU works, and I will tell you why. And Mike
and I were just talking about this earlier. There are countries
that are at war with each other, that want to have a satellite
in geostationary orbit, and they go to the ITU to work it out.
So, it works, and it has worked very well in geostationary
orbit. Right now, there is nothing for low Earth orbit and I
think that is a problem.
Senator Lummis. Does anybody else want to weigh in on this
before we move on?
Mr. Gold. Senator, if I may. Space should be about joy and
discovery, not danger and fear.
Senator Lummis. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Gold. And per your question about China and Russia,
that is what we are getting with their debris. You know, now I
am going to steal from the former Administrator there, who
would often talk--and we would be remiss if we did not mention
ASAT testing in the context of this discussion. That due to a
Chinese ASAT test, there is debris that is still up there. And
I believe it was America that had to warn China that there was
debris, created by their own ASAT test that was threatening
their own space station. You know, the Foreign Minister would
always point that out.
So, they are not particularly responsible actors. There is
Chinese debris, you know, debris that comes down from every
launch. We do not know where it is going to land, often. And
last couple launches, it could have even hit America. We do not
know.
So, as Jim was describing, what we need to do--and I do not
think the U.N. is the entity to do it in, at least initially.
We need to do what we have done with the Artemis Accords, and I
am still grateful for the Administrator--former Administrator--
for that opportunity, is to build a coalition of the willing,
in terms of what good looks like. Lead by example on the debris
issue and then, use that to force United Nations, or form a new
kind of ITU, to be able to develop it.
Also, debris represents not just the problem, but as a
private sector Redwire guy, it is an opportunity to innovate,
to develop new technologies that can address this issue. We
should have active debris removal missions, so that we can
develop new systems that not only will help address the debris
problems, but will create new satellite technologies and other
systems that can benefit a wide variety of economic national
security areas for the country.
Senator Lummis. Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. First of all, I want to double down on
what he said. I think Mike is exactly right--Mr. Gold, as his
nametag says, is exactly right.
When we talk about--think about the FAA and we go back to
the 1950s when the FAA was created. In those days, the United
States did it alone and we were making great advances and it
worked. We were able to have a lot more airplanes into a lot
less space. Interestingly, because we took the lead, and we
took that model around the world, an organization formed called
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization. And they took
the leadership of the FAA and they applied it globally. So now,
when I fly my airplane, Navy pilot by trade, when I fly my
airplane all over the world, I know exactly how to fly in
whatever country I go to because we are all following the same
rules. But it would not have happened if we would have, you
know, gone to, you know, some international organization and
said, ``Here is what we need to do'', and try to get agreement
from our competitors. That would not have worked. But when the
United States takes the lead, ultimately there becomes a
standard that other countries can join. And I think that is
exactly the idea that Mike was talking about just a few seconds
ago.
We have to lead on this and when we do, I think we are
absolutely going to, you know, change the world so that all of
those constellations, that we all believe in, for low latency,
high throughput communications, can be successful.
Senator Lummis. Well, this is a fascinating subject and I
hope to pursue it further. But I want to recognize my
colleague. This is Old Home Week. Not only is Mr. Bridenstine a
former Congressman, but of course, so is the gentleman from New
Mexico, Senator Lujan, who we recognize now.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Thank you to our Ranking Member and to our
Chair for this important hearing. Holding this hearing matters
to us not just here in America, but in New Mexico.
Now, in New Mexico, we have an incredible innovation
ecosystem that supports the space industry. There is
substantial research being done at the universities, the Air
Force research labs, the Satellite Space Operations office, and
two of our three NNSA Department of Energy National
Laboratories. We have the home to the first commercial space
port in the United States, where Virgin Galactic successfully
launched its most recent space flight, as well.
Now, to our former Administrator and colleague in the
House, small launch companies are facing pressure as
governments all over the world subsidize their launch
industries. To ensure that NASA keeps a capability that many,
including yourself, have said is critical, do you think NASA
should expand the scope of the Rideshare office to be a small
satellite launch office, charged with assessing mission needs
relative to all available launch options, in order to determine
the best solution on a mission-by-mission basis?
Mr. Bridenstine. So, I will start by saying this. When I
was in the House, I was a big champion of the Venture Class
Launch Services Program, which was basically a bill that
enabled NASA to--to support small launch companies in a, you
know when you are trying to launch a small vehicle to a very
specific orbit, we are talking 500 kilograms to 1500 kilograms,
we did not have the capability, you know, five or 10 years ago
to do that to a very specific orbit. So, the Venture Class
Launch Services Program was used to let the private sector know
that the U.S. Government has an interest in seeing the ability
to launch small payloads into specific orbits. And it worked
and now, we are seeing a lot of these companies develop that
capability.
I would also say, when I was the NASA Administrator--you
mentioned Virgin Galactic. I mean, we had value from the fact
that we could put our payloads at NASA on those vehicles. Of
course, it benefited them, but it benefited NASA.
The challenge that we had at NASA is, you know, you can get
microgravity testing with drop tests, where you might get a
couple of seconds of testing. You can do parabolic
trajectories, where you might get, you know, minutes, like,
eight or 10 minutes--or, I am sorry, 30 seconds, or whatever.
But then, when you talk about, after that, you have got to go
to, you know, low Earth orbit. So, a lot of these small
launches, whether they are usually suborbital, there is
opportunity there that, I think, you know, Virgin Galactic,
Blue Origin, are making available to NASA.
So, I do believe the United States of America has an
interest in making sure that these companies are successful,
because it is in the interest of our country that they are
successful, for a whole host of different testing and science
reasons. That being said, as far as that particular program, I
would love to give you an answer--maybe do a little more
looking into it and give you a more specific answer about that
specific question.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. And the next question I
have is for both our former Administrator, Dr. Dittmar, and Mr.
Gold. One of the bills that I am working on is building off an
idea that has proven to be successful with other Federal
agencies, and that is establishing a foundation. We are working
on one with the Department of Energy. One exists with the
National Institutes of Health. And it has been able to
strengthen public-private partnerships to be able to attract
that private capital and to make these investments.
Now, as the former Administrator and leaders in the private
industry for space, do you agree that if we fail to harness the
full commercialization potential of NASA, we will fall behind
countries willing to do so?
Mr. Bridenstine. I absolutely think so. And I think, you
know, my friend, Mike Gold, talks about it as, you know, our
competitors in the world are never going to out entrepreneur
the United States of America. And the best innovation that we
see coming usually comes from small, innovative companies. And
so, I think, in many cases, it is in our interest to make sure
that we have those public-private partnerships for these unique
opportunities.
It is important to also remember that--that when we have
those public-private partnerships, the goal is for those
companies to go get customers that are not the U.S. Government.
And if they do that, it drives down the cost to the American
government. And we need to make sure, when we enter into
public-private partnerships, that there is still competition in
the marketplace, so that the competitor is competing in cost
and innovation and safety.
Senator Lujan. Dr. Dittmar?
Dr. Dittmar. And so, I would just agree with everything
that was just said here. And I think public-private
partnerships--you know, public-private partnerships, they have
become, you know, quite the thing to talk about in space over
the last 20 years. But they have been extant in this country
since we started the country. They have been used in a variety
of different ways to create infrastructure.
And we are looking for a whole ecosystem in space, right?
One that supports everything from ground test equipment, all
the way up to orbital space flight and then, beyond. There are
opportunities we probably have not even thought of yet, in
terms of how to utilize public-private partnerships to advance
that.
What the United States needs it to be able to have enough
strategic flexibility that it can pull whatever levers it needs
to to, sort of, be able to advance the private sector, as well
as advance government--government intention and have those
things work together. So, yes.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. And Mr. Gold, I am going to
ask for you and Dr. Sanders to maybe submit your answers to the
record on that particular question. And then, the other
question I have for the panel, that I would ask for you to
submit to the record--we will submit it, is the importance of
spaceports and especially the example that I shared with
Spaceport New Mexico about the continued improvements to
America's spaceports are needed to grow, not only our industry
partnerships, but also for safe and sustainable government use.
So, I will submit that to the record.
I want to be respectful to Mr. Blumenthal's time, as well.
And I want to thank the Ranking Member for her
acknowledgment today.
Senator Lummis [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Mr.
Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Madam Chair. Nobody is going
to out entrepreneur the United States sounds like famous last
words. And the idea of a public-private partnership, when it
comes to space, the idea of an ecosystem brings back memories
of my law school days when people were saying we should have a
course at Yale Law School on the Law of Space. Only at Yale Law
School would anyone make that suggestion. And it was dismissed
as one of those bubblehead, imaginary topics.
But there is no real law of space, is there? I mean, and
should there be? Should we be thinking about, if we are going
to have commercialization in space? You compared it,
Administrator, to flying into other countries. But there is a
means of enforcement there. You can ground pilots. You can take
action that provides enforcement of rules of the road, so to
speak--rules of the sky, rules of landing and taking off, and
equipment, and so forth. But there is not any in space. And so,
I mean, if there are three or four commercial flights going up
on the same day, maybe from the same place, you have got a
lot--you are going to have a lot of objects up there. You
already have a lot of objects bumping into each other, except
they just do not have human beings on them. And having human
beings, and having commercialization for expanded purposes,
either of surveillance or other missions, complicates it.
Should we be thinking about laws and enforcement mechanisms in
space?
Mr. Gold. So, Senator, as the only recovering attorney on
this panel, I may go ahead and take that one. And for the
record, it is not just Yale. I am actually giving a lecture at
Georgetown Law School tomorrow on Space Law. So, it has
certainly taken--taken root.
I do want to open with that there are laws in space. There
is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. There is the Registration
Convention, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts. So,
there are a series of international agreements that set rules
that nearly every country, or spacefaring country, certainly
have agreed to abide by. However, there is a substantial gap
that you are pointing out now, where, in the Outer Space
Treaty, in Article 6, it requires authorization and continuing
supervision of private sector activities.
And we here in the U.S. have yet to define how that
continuing supervision will occur for non-traditional
activities--be it satellite service, which we have mentioned,
private sector space station, orbital debris removal, rovers--
commercial rovers on the moon. We have not defined that yet. We
have been using Band-aid solutions, via the FAAST and the FCC.
But one of the most important things that Congress could do
would address this issue, just to create a process that is
predictable, and we know what to do here in the U.S. Because,
frankly, it is a competitive issue. That predictability is key
for investment and if we want to keep our country's here and
keep innovation and keep entrepreneuring here in America, we
need a predictable, reliable, and transparent regulatory system
for commercial activities, which we do not have explicitly,
yet.
Senator Blumenthal. I think that is an excellent answer and
obviously, I should have been more definitive or more specific
in saying there is no law. There are, in fact, gaps in the law.
Which means I probably should attend your lecture tomorrow at
Georgetown. And I realize that law is the least glamorous or
exciting aspect of space exploration. But I am very interested
in your answer that, as in many other areas of life, certainty
and predictability are very important for the risk takers and
the scientists to make progress.
Mr. Gold. Exactly. If you are going to invest, the last
thing you want to see is an unpredictable regulatory
environment. If you are going to ensure an activity, you need
that certainty. So, I know it is not as sexy as fun, but it can
be as important as any technological development to space not
only occurring, but particularly occurring here in the United
States.
Senator Blumenthal. Spoken like a true recovering lawyer.
Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony today and it has
been very enlightening. I have been following it from afar, in
between hearings, and we really thank you for being here.
Senator Lummis. The gentleman yields back and the gavel is
returned to the Chairman, the gentleman from Colorado.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Ranking Member Lummis.
What did I miss? No.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hickenlooper [presiding]. We have a couple of
people that are trying to get in remotely, and luckily, I
happen to have more questions and I think Senator Lummis might
have some--a couple more questions, too.
So, if I can re-enter the low Earth orbit of information,
and let us go back to, Mr. Bridenstine. You spoke, I think,
compellingly about the overcrowding in LEO and you did not even
really get into that whole notion of, once you have collisions,
how many more fragments are created and that you end up with a
cavalcade of collisions. And that 1.5 percent really gets scary
because that is too high, in and of itself, and I followed your
math of how we get to 1 in a million. But there are a lot of
probabilities between here and there and I think that is--it is
unacceptable, when you begin to look at what--how rapidly you
could escalate.
So, anyway, I think--again, how would you look at what
should Congress be doing? Who should be--have the regulatory
responsibility there? And we are all--we are fully aware of the
discussions there, but I would love to hear your opinion.
Mr. Bridenstine. So, the--right now the regulatory
authority for debris mitigation falls to the FCC, the Federal
Communication Commission, and that is based on a law passed in
the 1930s. Mr. Gold could probably tell me the specific date.
But there was a law passed in the 1930s that gave the FCC the
authority to regulate Spectra. And from that, you know,
satellites, you know, emit, you know, all kinds of
transmissions. And so, from that, they say we have the ability
to regulate satellite, you know, debris, and orbits, and that
kind of thing. Which, by the way, it is good that they are
doing it because if they were not doing it, nobody would be
doing it. So, they extrapolated the law to take that authority
among themselves.
I do not know--in fact I am confident that the FCC is not
the agency that should be doing that. And the House and Senate
have passed a bill that was signed that gives that authority to
the Commerce Department. That has not been adequately funded at
this point. They need, you know, resources to stand up a team
of folks that can actually put into place the regulatory
environment for this--for this capability.
Senator Hickenlooper. So, are you agreeing that that notion
of having a separate escalating one of the departments from
Commerce up to----
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. I know exactly what you are saying.
So, the Office of Space Commerce.
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, so 100 percent.
Senator Hickenlooper. Office that is the word I was looking
for, office.
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. The Office of Space Commerce is,
right now, under NOAA. It is not--and look, we all love NOAA,
but it is not their highest priority to do space situational
awareness and space traffic management, let--and debris
mitigation and remediation, as you mentioned earlier. So, since
that is not--NOAA is not, probably, tremendously enthusiastic
about that.
I do believe it is a high enough priority. It needs to
report to the Office of Space Commerce. It needs to report
directly to the Secretary of Commerce and be responsible to the
Secretary for achieving the outcomes that we are looking for.
As far as what the FCC needs to do right now, given the
risk that is in front of us, they need to consider that even
satellites that can maneuver do have a collision risk. And that
risk does not just come from other satellites, it comes from
lethal, non-trackable debris. For every piece of debris, we can
track that is 10 centimeters and bigger, there are, you know,
10 to 100 pieces of debris that we cannot track. So, they need
to take that into account when they start thinking about the
collision risk for--for, you know, low Earth orbit.
Once we recognize that there is a lot of risk here that,
right now, is not being accounted for, I think it is important
for us to say, OK, how many objects are we able to put into any
orbital shell? And once we define that, then there needs--this
is where the international pieces comes in. We recognize that
there is a limitation. The question is, how do we allocate
access to those orbital shells? And we need to have a process
by which nations can get access to that and the United States
of America needs to make sure that its allocation is, of
course, adequately spread among, you know, competitive
companies for a competitive marketplace.
Right now, none of that is happening. It is a race, and the
race is, ultimately, going to result in disastrous
consequences, if we are not careful.
Senator Hickenlooper. It reminds me a little bit of the
old--do you remember the--as popularized in movies, via
Hollywood, the Oklahoma Gold Rush--Land Rush, where they would
all ride out and they had to stake off their little territory
and they would be shooting each other and--I mean, it is, to a
certain amount, out of control.
Dr. Dittmar, just continuing on that, this importance of
having international agreement on how we are going to regulate
this debris that is up there already. And this is one of those
things--I mean, the first thing, when I have nightmare, it is
usually about cybersecurity. But this is now becoming--it is--
it is equally imposing onto my sleep patterns.
So, how would you look at the--what should Congress' role
be toward building, or moving toward an international agreement
on the appropriate regulation of space debris?
Dr. Dittmar. So, following on conversations that we have,
sort of, already been having here on the table, one of the
things that is really critical about authorization acts is that
they are signaling devices. They signal not just to the United
States, with the intent of Congresses and especially its
investment in continuity of purpose, but they also signal to
the international community. So, other countries look to see
what Congress does. They look to see what is written into
policy that is then expressed in an authorization act.
And one thing I would like to see--I am in complete
agreement with Jim, with regard to elevating the Office of
Space Policy, completely making sure that it is consistently
staffed across administrations, to the extent that you can. You
can certainly express an intent, OK, and the intent of
Congress, that it is adequately staffed and resourced with the
appropriate expertise, OK? And then it is a direct report to
the Department of Congress and the head of the Department of
Congress. And so, doing so, while you are investing it, OK,
with the authority to begin, then developing the sorts of
regimen.
You know this has been--Jim has talked about one--you know,
one approach, which is sort of to look at, literally, what you
can get into orbital shells and start thinking about regulation
that way. But to invest them with the authority to be able to
actually begin to be able to work in that way. Just doing that,
OK, will convey to the United States how serious, I mean, how
seriously the United States is taking this.
It is going to also help. There is a big PR war going on. I
mean, it is a competitive issue. But there is a huge PR going
on--war going on. You just, basically, need to send a message
to essentially all the stakeholders here. ``All right, look,
no, we are serious about this. We are going to start pulling
this together. We need to develop a regime. We are going to
invest this office with the authority to be able to do that.''
And it also signals, to the rest of the world, now, the United
States is serious. We are going to take a leadership position
here. Here is how is going to be, who is going to be
accountable for actually being able to do it? And I know that
sometimes, from the outside, that does not seem like much, but
it really is a big deal.
Senator Hickenlooper. Oh, I buy that. And just as a frame
of reference, the Office of Space Commerce, I believe, still
does not have an executive director. So, we are in the market
of hiring. So, if you have networks or connections, step
forward and take one, you know, take one for the country, if
you could.
All right, one more question and I will turn it back to
Ranking Member Lummis. And I guess I will ask Mr. Gold this,
since we are looking at global leadership and technological
leadership. You know, obviously leading-edge technologies are
evolving and innovating at lightning speed in our commercial
space industries. Which technologies do you think are most
critical to make sure that the United States does not cede the
leadership role to our competitors, such as China?
Mr. Gold. Yes. Thank for such a terrific question, Senator.
There are really two areas that I would highlight. One is, we
are at a period where robotics and satellites are merging to
create something entirely different. At Redwire, for example, I
mentioned the Archinaut satellite, which is--uses robotic arms
to build itself. We are also developing satellites that will
literally print themselves, leveraging the 3D printing
technology that we have done on the International Space
Station. So, when it comes to this orbital servicing, assembly,
manufacturing, we cannot fall behind China and others in this
area. And the key to developing that is more public-private
partnerships.
The other area I would cite is microgravity. That the
microgravity environment is a whole new arena for scientific
and commercial research. I believe it is why China is investing
in their LEO space station. And we are just beginning to
understand the biotechnology, the fiber communications
development, new supercomputer chips. Everything functions
differently in low Earth orbit and the microgravity
environment. And we must invest and develop those capabilities
because it is going to change everything.
So, those are the two areas I would recommend focusing on.
Senator Hickenlooper. All right. They are good ones. I will
turn it over to Ranking Member Lummis.
Senator Lummis. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper. I might come back with one more
question, though.
Senator Lummis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the
strategies that China has been using to increase its footprint
in space is helping developing countries gain access to space.
For example, in 2019, China provided satellite development and
launch services to Ethiopia to launch that country's first
satellite.
So, it seems to me the U.S. is generally more focused on
relationships with nations that are already spacefaring. Do you
see a value in the U.S. helping countries without programs
access space? And how do you think we could or should do that?
Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. So, I will go first and then, I will turn
it over to the others. So, the--when we think about the value
of low Earth orbit, specifically, Mike mentioned a lot of
items, as far as, you know, biotechnology and things like that.
We think about pharmaceuticals, immunizations, the ability to
create human tissue using your own DNA. Your own adult skin
cells we can use to create your own tissue for regenerative
medicine. The idea that we can use advanced materials, we can
create--you know, potentially in future, we will be able to
create an artificial retina for the human eyeball. So, people
who have macular degeneration do not have to lose their
eyesight.
So, these are things that are begin tested, right now, on
the International Space Station. And when we cede that--when we
cede that to China, if we do not have a replacement for the
International Space Station, they are going to be able to
benefit economically from all of those values of microgravity
that we are not going to have access to, in the way that we
currently have access to.
Now, as far as the international piece, you know, our--we
have built capacity for countries in the past. We think about--
well, I do not want to name any specific countries, but we have
worked very hard on all of our international partners on the
International Space Station. Fifteen countries operate the ISS.
We have got, you know, 19 different countries that have had
astronauts on the ISS. Those capacities are largely built by
us.
And when we decide we are not going to have a next
generation space station, which right now is the signal our
country is sending by not funding the next generation human
space station--I would say I saw, you know, defense--or, you
know, the appropriations bill for CJS. I think it had $101
million in there for LEO commercial destinations, which I think
is fantastic. But--but that is still not enough, just to be
honest. We need more. We do not want to cede that territory to
our biggest competitor, primarily because all of that capacity
we built for these other countries is going to go to them. And
they are going to start benefiting from that.
So, we have to maintain the leadership here. I think it is
absolutely important. Countries that--when we think about
Artemis and the Artemis Accords, we have been inviting
countries that do not even have a space program, to participate
in Artemis in whatever small way they can participate. Because,
in my view, space is a tool of diplomacy for this country. It
is something that every country wants, and we can help provide
it.
So, when we think about the big picture, kind of, how the
Nation thinks about agreements around the world, I think space
needs to be on the table, regularly. When we--even when we do
trade agreements, when we do any kind of large negotiation with
another nation or many nations, space needs to be on the table
because it is a great tool of diplomacy that can improve our
position.
Mr. Gold. Senator, it is a great question and even better
opportunity for me to vent. The Intergovernmental agreement,
the IGA, which was the agreement that established the
International Space Station--it is extraordinarily difficult,
if not impossible for other nations to join the IGA, which has
prevented NASA from reaching out to other countries that do not
have space programs or have space programs they just started.
The Artemis Accords were, in many ways, a reaction to that,
that we wanted to create a vehicle that, no matter how modest
your program was--even if it was just a couple of graduate
students, that you could contribute to this unprecedented
journey to the moon. And in the initiation of the Artemis
Accords, you had countries like Luxembourg that has a
relatively small but mighty space program and they are--by the
way, shout out to the Embassy there at Luxembourg that has been
so supportive. But also, United Arab Emirates which, again, has
done amazing things in space but was not a traditional ally,
certainly not on the International Space Station, yet.
So, through the Accords now, it is so important that we
reach out to developing countries. I was so proud when Brazil
joined the Artemis Accords, because that was our first Latin
American country. And I certainly hope that we can proceed in
Africa where, by the way, China has been very aggressive, in
terms of international, diplomatic development. We need African
countries in the Accords, supporting not just the Artemis
program, but sensible norms of behavior. And I think that is
our best vehicle to proceed and get these countries involved.
Senator Lummis. Dr. Dittmar, you were nodding.
Dr. Dittmar. So, I would agree that it has been difficult
for other countries to join the IGA, but I would also point out
that the ISS has been used as a means to bring many countries,
who are not spacefaring countries, into a larger community. It
has, at this point, hosted--has, national projects of one type
over another, for well over 105 countries, at this point, over
its lifespan. And so, it has served as a tool of tremendous
international diplomacy, not just among the original 15. If I
was back in--I am back, old enough back in the days that Brazil
was in discussion about that, right? So, this is very nice to,
sort of, see that come around again with Artemis Accords. But
so, it has actually done that.
From the Axiom side, for example, as we are developing that
space station, we are getting a lot of interest from
internationals who see the commercial opportunity as a way to,
sort of, bring themselves into the larger community of nations
that are flying professional astronauts from those countries
who are able to, sort of, use that. So, there is a lot of
interest. I mean, we are finding that just even from a business
point of view, let alone, sort of, national interest point of
view.
I think if we cede this to China. I am alarmed, frankly.
And I mentioned earlier that the reason I joined Axiom was I
saw them as best positioned at this particular point in time,
and I still believe that. But I am alarmed by what I see as the
potential for a gap, which we have already talked about
earlier.
And it goes back to what I said about objectives, right? I
mean, in my written testimony, one of the things I said, and I
think I said it orally, too, is that, you know, our objective
needs to be assert and maintain U.S. leadership in low Earth
orbit. Not just in low Earth orbit, but in all of space. But
when we are talking about low Earth orbit that has always been
done through exercise of soft power and use of soft power to
bring other countries to our side.
So, I think it is absolutely critical that we continue to
do this.
Senator Lummis. Dr. Sanders, is this something you wish to
address?
Dr. Sanders. Well, I will talk about the International
Space Station and just quickly reiterate a point that was made
earlier about the importance of having a persistent presence in
low Earth orbit. We look at it from the Panel's perspective on
the risk reduction that it provides for further exploration.
And if you do not have that kind of persistent presence, in
order to understand the effects of low Earth orbit of
microgravity and the environment on the human physiology, for
example, as well as other things, than you are not going to
have the ability--you are going to have greater risk when you
go further away. And so, there is--there needs to be that and
there needs to be a good transition period, a good transition
handoff to whatever follows the ISS. And there needs to be
something to follow the ISS, however we do it.
Senator Lummis. Thank you very much, Panel. I yield back.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Senator Lummis. Senator
Cruz has joined us. Are you ready for your questions?
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Cruz. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the
witnesses. Good to see all of you again. Thank you for your
good work.
As everyone on this panel knows, the International Space
Station has been a big priority of mine for a long time. And
not only is it a critical tool for projecting American
leadership in space, something all the more important with the
Chinese successfully putting the core module of their space
station up, in April of this year, but we have also invested
over $100 billion in it. And to be fiscally responsible and
prudent, we need to get maximum use out of that investment.
Multiple times, the Senate has taken up legislation I have
introduced to extend the ISS through 2030. The extension
through 2030 was part of the NASA Authorization Act, which the
Senate passed unanimously at the end of last year. It was also
part of that same NASA Authorization Act that was included this
year in the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, which was
passed by the Senate in May. And it is something that the
current Administrator, Senator Nelson, strongly supports, as
well. And so, both the current Administrator and the prior
Administrator, we worked together on this extension. It is
common sense. It is bipartisan. We are waiting on the House to
act. And we will see if and when the House does act. But at
least on the Senate side, it is 100 to nothing that this
extension makes sense.
And I will mention to the Chairman, so there were battles
in the prior administration because there were a few misguided
voices in the Trump Administration that wanted to retire the
ISS early. And Senator Nelson and I, on this subcommittee, took
turns taking a two by four to the administration on that
question. And it only took about 300 to nothing votes for them
to realize that, perhaps their position was not going to
prevail in the Senate. But we need to see the House act.
Let me ask the witnesses--look, I think we are going to get
the extension done, in one vehicle or another. It is the right
thing to do. It is long overdue. But given the experience of
the panel, I am curious, technologically, from a safety
perspective, what is keeping the station from lasting longer
than 2030? From lasting through 2035 or 2040? There is a lot of
expertise on this panel and so what is your collective
judgment?
Mr. Bridenstine. I will go ahead and start. First of all,
Senator, the wounds from the two by four have recovered quite
nicely and I think you are----
Senator Cruz. To be clear, Jim, you were not the one
advocating this.
Mr. Bridenstine. No, I--I am aware of that but I was part
of the administration. And look, here is the thing. I think
what we are seeing now is that the foresight that you had at
the time was right, because we are not ready for what comes
after the International Space--we are not ready for it.
Building a space station takes a long time, especially when you
are doing it in a way that has never been done before which, in
the future, will be commercial. I do not foresee Congress
appropriating funds for a second International Space Station. I
do not foresee that.
Now, that being said, here is the thing that I think is
important. Extending it to 2030, I know the Senate has already
passed that, and I support that. I would also tell you that
there is no guarantee we are going to make it to 2030.
Certainly, we should, if we can. We have seen already a crack
on the International Space Station. We have seen a hole on the
International Space Station. If you look at the outside of the
space station, it has been, you know, pelted by debris. And of
course, there is always modifications, upgrades that have to
happen in order to keep it, you know, moving forward.
So, it is a--it is a marvel of engineering. Mike Gold used
to tell me quite frequently we need to put it in for a Noble
Peace Prize, which I think is right. It is a tool of diplomacy.
It has been just a phenomenal capability for our country all
around, not even considering how much science is coming from it
right now.
So, the key is, extending it. Yes, there is a challenge. We
know it cannot last forever. How far can it last? I do not
think we have that answer. Right now, I think it is--we are in
great shape.
Senator Cruz. Well, and let me ask a related question,
which is what do you all think is the timing for a replacement
of comparable capability? And when is that transition
realistically possible? And how do we ensure that the ISS is
operational--that we do not cede low Earth orbit, for a period
of time, to the Chinese, that we maintain U.S. leadership
continuously?
Mr. Bridenstine. So, the future is going to depend on how
much it gets funded. Right now, it has been funded at nothing
compared to what it needs. I think it was, like, $15 million,
or something like that, for the transition to a new commercial,
you know, space station. But what we need--and the CGS
Appropriations Bill had $101 million, which met the President's
budget request. That coming from the Senate--the Senate had
$101 million in there to meet the President's budget request,
which is fantastic. But I am telling you, sir, it is still not
enough.
When we think about how long it takes to develop a space
station, especially in a way that has not been done before, I
do not know how long, I am not going to give you an answer on
the date that that, but here is what--here is that I think the
Senate should do. The Senate should absolutely declare that
NASA needs to tell it when it is going to--what is the
objective to have that new space station and then, the Senate
needs to fund the requirements to achieve that.
I do not think the right answer is to continue--first of
all, extending the space station is the right thing to do. But
continuing that, in perpetuity, believing that it is going to
last forever, I think is not the right approach. And I am not
suggesting that is what the Senate is doing, at all.
But NASA needs to say, you know, ``Here is how we are going
to replace it. Here is what it is going to cost.'' They need to
put that in the President's budget request with many years--you
know, 5-year outlook, and then, come to you and say, ``This is
the money that we need''. And right now, I do not see that
happening the way it should happen.
Dr. Dittmar. And that begins with, I think, NASA needs to
completely fulfill the spirit of what was written into the 2017
NASA Transition Authorization Act, having to do with the
transition plan. And a transition plan needs to have, you know,
timing, milestones, clear objectives, how those objectives are
going to be met. And then, once that is in place, then you can
begin to have a conversation about follow-ons.
So, as you know, Axiom--because we have--you know, we have
spoken to you about this, Axiom's approach, you know, was
funded on a competitively awarded agreement that was negotiated
with NASA. And that $101 million that Jim was talking about,
when you look at how NASA is planning to allocate it, does not
meet the commitment to Axiom for 2022. The work that needs to
go to work on the space station side of it, in other words, for
the station to do the analysis that is needed, in order to
ensure that Axiom can reach orbit and dock by 2024, is not
funded completely in that amount. Let alone, looking at the
creation of dual path, you know, for having maybe more of an
alternative to it.
So, I would agree, definitely more funding is needed. But
also, NASA needs to be clear about objectives and the means
that it sees at this point. Understanding that any transition
plan is going to be a stake in the sand at the moment, it is
going to have to be iterated upon, but it needs to be much
clearer about what those objectives and milestones are.
Mr. Gold. So, Senator, I do not know if I can enter this
into the record, but I borrowed my son's ISS folder for today's
testimony. I am such a fan. We talk about a lot of recycling on
Earth, and I can tell you it is even more important on orbit.
As you pointed out--and again, I appreciate your support and
your two by four. That kept us going, you know, during some
difficult times. We need to squeeze every minute and ounce of
capability out of the ISS.
And in terms of when we should be retiring it--I mean,
again, I am a recovering attorney but, you know, the engineers
tell me there are seals that will wear out, etc. But there is
still going to be good hardware and we should look at, yes,
maybe there is a point of retirement, but continuing to
leverage the hardware that we can continue to use as part of
another system or as part of a smaller system.
And as we discussed before you arrived, you know, at
Redwire Space we are the global leader of microgravity
research, development, and manufacturing. The only company to
actually build things on the ISS. And we are looking at a
future with biotech and organs, etc., that you can build. We
cannot see those technological capabilities or the diplomatic
or political benefits of low Earth orbit to China. So, we need
to have a two-pronged approach. One, extend the ISS to 2030,
which I included in my written remarks. And then, ensure that
we proceed with enough funding and capability to deploy a free-
flying commercial space station so that it is operational while
the ISS is still there, and we do not create a gap in low Earth
orbit that would be disastrous for us and the Nation. And as
you point out, you have fans at NASA in doing that. You know,
Senator Nelson--Administrator Nelson has been a great supporter
and we have talked a lot about the need for an authorization
bill. You have former staff that was working on that
authorization bill that is now over at NASA. So, I think you
have got great allies at the Agency.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Thank you, Senator. Appreciate
you making the effort to get over here. I think we are at that
point where I am forced by tradition and circumstance to let
you go.
The hearing record will remain open until November 18,
2021. Any Senators who would like to submit questions for the
record, for the witnesses, should do so by November 4, 2021. To
all of you witnesses, in addition to my gratitude, we ask that
your responses be returned to the Committee by November 18,
2021.
Again, I would like to thank each of you for your testimony
today, but really, your service in terms of maintaining or
helping to create America's role as a leader in space, but also
to maintaining.
That concludes our hearing for today. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar
NASA Reauthorization. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act
(USICA) includes legislative language to reauthorize the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that I developed on a
bipartisan basis last year with Senators Cantwell, Wicker, and Cruz.
NASA was last authorized in 2017.
Question 1. Why is it important for Congress to reauthorize NASA
after failing to do so for many years?
Answer. It is important and necessary for Congress to pass
authorization acts for several reasons. Authorization laws are intended
to create, continue, and modify programs. These bills provide policy
guidance and ensure that the goals of an agency are met. For NASA, it
is critical that constancy of purpose is prioritized through
authorization acts, so that the agency's multi-year investments and
programs can maintain stability with regard to schedule and cost, and
thus, support the agency as it strives to meet its goals. Authorization
acts also send a signal to the international community of the intent of
Congress to continue to assert U.S. leadership in space--a signal that
is important not only to our allies, but also to those who do not wish
us well. Finally, authorization acts provide a critical tool for
Congressional oversight.
Question 2. Do you support the reauthorization language in the
USICA bill?
Answer. There are many strong components of the Senate-passed bill.
As I mentioned in my testimony before the committee, I applaud Congress
for including language (once again) that it is the priority of the
United States to maintain a continuous human presence in LEO (section
2620 (1-3, 3(b)). In light of the findings and recommendations in the
DoD Defense Innovation Unit's `State of the Space Industrial Base''
released on November 18, Congress may consider further strengthening
the language to read ``continuous American presence in space, beginning
with low Earth orbit.'' The report can be found by accessing the linked
pdf below.
https://assets.ctfassets.net/3nanhbfkr0pc/43TeQTAmdYrym5DTDrhjd3/
a37eb4fac2
bf9add1ab9f71299392043/
Space_Industrial_Base_Workshop_2021_Summary_Report
_-_Final_15_Nov_2021c.pdf
In addition, I support the reauthorization language that extends
the ISS to ``at least 2030'' (Section 2521, and conforming amendments.
Beyond 2030, the costs of maintenance, operations, and particularly the
engineering lifecycle data should be evaluated carefully, as well as
the ongoing role of the ISS. Certainty is required by commercial
providers who are developing follow on stations to close their business
cases which in turn is imperative to meet the higher order requirement
to ensure continuing U.S. interests and human presence in low Earth
orbit after the ISS end-of-life.
However, regarding space suits (Section 2616, (1))), I would
suggest that driving NASA to partner ``to the maximum extent
practicable with industry-proven spacesuit design, development and
manufacturing suppliers'' may limit innovation. Partnering with such
entities is a good idea but so is partnering with entities that
``credibly demonstrate the capability to meet requirements as
determined by NASA''. To that end, I would also suggest that rather
than providing NASA the option to partner with ``1 or more private
entities'', this should be changed to ``2 or more'', based on precisely
the same logic that the re-authorization employs in its position that
the Human Landing System (HLS) should involve 2 or more providers.
Regarding Section 2627, ``Payments Received for Commercial Space-
Enabled Production on the ISS'', I commend the committee for placing
this into context by directing the NASA Administrator to take into
account ``the relative maturity and profitability'' of the applicable
product or service. However, ``profitability'' of a product or service
may or may not be a simple metric, depending upon how the development
of that product or service has been funded by a company. Most
importantly, however, the low Earth orbit ``economy'' does not yet
exist; it is a nascent entity that at its best creates goods and
services that are executed in part in space but are based wholly on
Earth. Congress should be doing everything in its power to enable
companies to demonstrate profitability in production efforts--a goal
that is still a long way off--to encourage investors to come to the
table to support them and most importantly to support the commercial
space stations that Congress intends should eventually take the place
of the ISS. Those companies will be the customers of such stations and
the entities trying to raise capital now on the private market must be
able to assure their investors that business cases can close by `going
concerns' that have time to fully demonstrate their viability on the
ISS without government levying a ``lien'' of sorts that will then be
deposited into a government-managed space exploration fund.
Beyond the specific language of NASA reauthorization language, I
also strongly support the language regarding Space Situational
Awareness and encourage Congress to fund this effort and give it full
attention and encouragement. Last week's Russian ASAT test illustrates
(again) the need for U.S. leadership and orchestration of the complex
issues related to SSA. It is critical that congress work with the
Administration to confirm a Director for OSC who will provide clear
leadership to OSC and provide a focal point for interagency and across-
industry collaboration. Further, OSC should be elevated into a separate
bureau--the Bureau of Space Commerce--instead of being left within the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). OSC should be
given authority over clear goals, namely: promoting commercial space
and championing it within the government, aiding in the development of
standards and norms of behavior in space, identifying and addressing
regulatory gaps. Moving OSC out from NOAA will give it the independence
to establish a new, clean cut, directive organizational culture.
International Space Competition. As discussed in the hearing, the
United States faces growing international competition in space. The
Chinese government is building its own space station, recently launched
a hypersonic missile, and is spending billions of dollars on
establishing and promoting new space capabilities that cross-over from
military to civil applications and back again (`military civil fusion,
or MCF'). In addition, companies in the United States and several
abroad have applied for tens, or in some cases, hundreds of thousands
of satellites in low-Earth orbit.
Question. What actions should Congress take to ensure that NASA and
the United States remain global leaders in space?
Answer. It is undeniable that China is moving fast in LEO, and
forging partnerships with members of the international community for
activities onboard their station and in cislunar space. In my
testimony, I noted that China is playing the long game, and it is
critical that in assessing China's intentions in space, Congress
understand how the People's Republic of China (PRC) is advancing
rapidly across a range of space technologies and capabilities. The
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) produced a
report to Congress in 2019 that outlined the need for a comprehensive,
wholistic perspective regarding China's competitive interests in space.
In my testimony, I included the USCC's findings on China's strategy to
catch up and overtake the U.S. in preeminence in space.
In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2020, Congress
responded to the USCC report by codifying recommendations for action.
Namely, the defense bill called for the President, in consultation with
the National Space Council, to develop ``. . . a strategy to ensure the
United States can effectively compete with other national space
programs, maintain dominance in the emerging commercial space economy,
and has market, regulatory, and other means available to address unfair
competition by the PRC . . .'' and also ``. . . a plan to strengthen
and streamline cooperation with international allies and partners in
space.'' \1\
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\1\ U.S. Congress (2019). National Defense Authorization Act of
2020, Pub. Law 116-92 (20 December). https://www.congress.gov/116/
plaws/publ92/PLAW-116publ92.pdf
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NASA, and by extension U.S. space companies serve as a vehicle of
U.S. ``soft power'', shaping favorable behavior and outcomes among
foreign entities, customers, and over time, competitors who do not
operate according to American laws and values. China's ability to plan
and make investments 5-10 years out under a military-run program and an
increasingly totalitarian government is intended to enable Chinese
hegemony in space with a fairly high degree of certainty. This,
unfortunately, is an area where the U.S. must look itself in the mirror
and understand that it must dedicate itself to constancy of purpose and
multi-year strategic planning and investment. We have maintained our
leadership role in space for many years thanks to the great public
servants of NASA and ingenuity of the American people, but China is
making great strides in their goal to meet pace with America. If the
U.S. Congress hopes to maintain its leadership role in low-Earth orbit,
for example, a forward thinking and thoughtful plan for a post-ISS
world must come sooner than later. Our international partners, U.S.
commercial partners, and the scientific community must be engaged as
Congress strategically positions the U.S. to continue thriving and
exploring space.
To go further, Congress must recognize that space as a domain
extends far beyond NASA's remit. Congressional committee structure
makes it difficult to meaningfully define strategy for the U.S. future
in space, which is in many ways the same thing as the U.S. future and
leadership on Earth. Space is simultaneously a contested and crowded
corridor for transportation of goods, services, and assurance of
security, an economic engine promoting job growth, an operational
domain for civil, military, and commercial entities, a key component of
U.S. infrastructure, a collaborative and competitive zone for foreign
powers, a security-critical `location', a driver of technology
advancement, plays a key role in monitoring and possibly mitigating
climate change, and much more. As pointed out in the aforementioned DIU
publication, the state of the U.S. space industrial base is
``tactically strong but strategically fragile.'' In my opinion the U.S.
is not prepared for the increasing competition in space. Becoming
prepared will require a ``whole of government'' approach that Congress
has not yet evidenced, beginning with addressing institutional barriers
in committee scope, collaboration, and oversight. Full utilization of a
bipartisan bicameral ``space caucus'' would be a start, as would work
on joint hearings, for example on the establishment of an ``economic
security corridor'' extending from the Earth to the Moon (and beyond).
Another approach would be to extend support for NASA's Artemis Accords
by authorizing both Artemis and the Accords and advancing their
international goals, as the Committee just did in this most recent
hearing.
Role of University Partnerships. Much of the hearing discussion
focused on the International Space Station and near-earth orbit
satellites. Arizona universities support these missions, and
additionally, the universities are leaders in other NASA projects. For
example, Arizona State University's OSIRIS-REx Thermal Emission
Spectrometer has collected samples from an asteroid and will return to
Earth in 2023. Meanwhile, the University of Arizona's Near-Earth
Objection (NEO) Surveyor Mission will help NASA complete its
Congressional mandate to discover 90 percent of all near-Earth objects
larger than 140 meters in length.
Question 1. How can we ensure that crucial science and planetary
defense missions, such as OSIRIS-REx and the NEO Surveyor, receive the
support from NASA to be successful?
Answer. NASA's Human Exploration programs and its Space Science
missions are two sides of the same coin; the human aspiration and
intention to inquire of the universe ``Where did we come from? Where
are we going?'' Our understanding of the universe is advanced step-by-
step through robust support and decades-long development and funding of
space science programs such as OSIRIS-Rex and the NEO Surveyor.
However, these particular missions play a dual role; that of generating
knowledge needed to develop the systems we need to protect our planet
from NEO incursions. Critical programs such as OSIRIS-Rex and the NEO
Surveyor need champions in Congress who will continue to support these
and other missions through strong authorization and appropriations
language. This can be difficult in the face of many other pressing--and
apparently more immediate--national priorities; however, the question
of planetary defense is only a question until it's not.
Question 2. In your opinion, how can NASA best utilize university
partnerships to perform research, advance science, and help NASA reach
its goals?
Answer. University partnerships are important for engaging the next
generation of science and engineering leaders across the United States,
and for expanding both the nature and quantity of collaborative
partnerships related to NASA's mission and extending that mission. For
example, NASA's L'SPACE Academy, a collaborative partnership between
NASA and Arizona State University (ASU), provides the opportunity for
undergraduate students to participate in free, online, and interactive
programs that encourages students to learn about NASA missions and
connects them with industry professionals. https://www.lspace.asu.edu/
In addition, ASU is the lead university for the Psyche Mission--an
extraordinary mission to a `metal asteroid'. The Psyche team in turn
has set up an online course about the mission which encourages
participation and learning not only about Psyche but in related STEM
fields. ASU was also the 2020 winner of NASA's Big Idea Challenge--
https://bigidea.nianet.org--which provides opportunity for partnerships
with universities and other entities. Finally, competitions run by NASA
that provide opportunities for universities to collaborate with the
agency and with other companies has been a part of NASA's rich legacy
of stimulating both basic and applied research since the earliest days
of the space program. Finally, ASU is also a partner in the MILO Space
Institute--an innovative partnership between ASU and Lockheed Martin to
establish momentum toward public-private partnerships in science. Not
to be overlooked, Arizona University is a key contributor to
pathfinding NASA missions such as the Phoenix Mars Lander, the James
Webb Space Telescope, which will enable humanity to peer back through
time to the earliest moments after the beginning of the universe, and
OSIRIS-Rex.
Arizona's Apollo History. During the Apollo mission in the 1960s
and 1970s, NASA astronauts trained at Sunset Crater National Monument
near Flagstaff, Arizona, where the volcanic landscape approximated the
lunar surface. Astronauts also trained at Meteor Crater in the high
desert of northern Arizona.
Question. Could these locations in Arizona be beneficial to Artemis
astronauts as they train for their lunar missions?
Answer. Training for spaceflight missions is informed by all that
has been learned before, from previous missions and training programs.
If the locations are still deemed to be close approximations of the
lunar surface--in particular the environment around the south pole of
the Moon, where the Artemis missions are intended to be carried out--
then they would certainly be reasonable candidates for training.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Dr. Mary Lynne Dittmar
Regulatory Framework for Commercial Spaceflight. In recent years,
we have seen the tremendous growth in the commercial space sector. As
multiple witnesses have noted, the responsibility of regulating this
industry is spread across a variety of Federal agencies, with differing
levels of technical expertise and industry outreach.
Question 1. How can Congress improve interagency cooperation to
better serve America's commercial space sector?
Answer. The Office of Space Commerce (OSC) is the designated lead
agency for representing commercial space sector interests in
interagency discussions, yet the office's director position remains
vacant. It is critical that Congress work with the Administration to
confirm a Director for OSC who will provide clear leadership to the
function of OSC.
Further, OSC should be elevated into a separate bureau--the Bureau
of Space Commerce--instead of being left within the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). OSC should be given authority
over clear goals, namely: promoting commercial space and championing it
within the government, aiding in the development of standards and norms
of behavior in space, identifying and addressing regulatory gaps.
Moving OSC out from NOAA will give it the independence to establish a
new, clear cut, directive organizational culture.
Once OSC is elevated and established in its roles and
responsibilities, interagency cooperation will be made easier with the
benefit of jurisdictional clarity.
Question 2. Do you believe that Congress Federal regulatory
oversight of commercial space endeavors should be more concentrated
within one agency than exists under the current regulatory landscape?
If so, what are the considerations that Congress should keep in mind as
it designates or establishes such an office?
Answer. There are benefits to different agencies regulating certain
aspects of commercial space. FAA's Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (AST), guided by Chapter 509 of Title 51, ensures the
safety of the uninvolved public and their property, protects national
policy goals, and enables industry growth by providing guidance, launch
licenses, experimental permits, and promotional support including R&D.
FAA AST has developed considerable expertise in commercial space
transportation and has done a good job meeting the challenges that come
with a rapidly growing industry. FAA AST requires continued oversight
from Congress to balance the needs of industry to develop without
premature regulatory burdens with the need to ensure, as far as
possible, public safety.
The Office of Space Commerce (OSC) has been tasked with shaping
civil space situational awareness, modernizing oversight and regulation
activities, and promoting the U.S. civil space industry
internationally. This office's role is more important than ever--with a
growing debris field around the earth, posing a serious threat to
unfettered access to space, and our national assets that exist in the
space domain--many of which contribute in a critical way to U.S.
national security and our day-to-day activities. In addition, in the
recent past OSC has played an important ``convening'' role for the
commercial space industry, encouraging a free exchange of ideas, and
building cross-agency bridges through sponsorship of events with the
Department of State and the U.S. Trade Organization. These events and
exchanges are an important part of the government function and a way
that the government can encourage industry growth.
Question 3. How should Federal agencies best engage with industry
to ensure that Federal regulation of commercial space entities meets
the need for public safety and oversight without unnecessarily curbing
innovation?
Answer. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 as amended (51
USC 50901) is the primary law guiding Federal oversight, regulation,
and promotion of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry. The
law mandates that the Secretary of Transportation ensure that all
launch and reentry activities shall protect public safety of property
and support U.S. national security and policy interests, and that the
Secretary shall issue licenses to U.S. applicants who show that they do
and will continue to meet safety requirements. The CSLA has been
amended several times since 1984. Critical to the regulatory regime's
enabling nature is its exclusive focus on protecting the uninvolved
public and their property. Space transportation continues to be seen as
a dangerous and risky activity, i.e., not a common carrier mode of
transportation with an expectation of safety and success for those who
opt to participate. Thus, in the case of human spaceflight, the law
expressly limits regulation for their safety and calls for informed
consent of the flight participants. The intention of this ``learning
period'' is to allow the industry time to grow and develop best
practices ahead of the eventual arrival of regulatory action by the
government.
The commercial space industry in the United States is dynamic and
evolving. A great example of this growth can be seen by the increase in
launches licensed by the FAA per year. In 2011, the FAA licensed only
one launch, in 2016, they licensed 11, and in 2021 so far, 47 licensed
launches have occurred.\1\ While the industry has certainly experienced
immense growth over the past decade, it would be unrealistic to
determine it deserves the same type of regulatory landscape as that of
commercial aviation, which transportations thousands of people globally
each day. Given the technical and economic challenges in rocket
science, this bounding of regulatory risk--while still protecting
American citizens and interests from harm--gives entrepreneurs and
investors' confidence that they will get permission to fly.
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\1\ ``FAA Licensed Launches.'' Licensed Launches. Federal Aviation
Administration, April 19, 2021. https://www.faa.gov/data_research/
commercial_space_data/launches/?type=license.
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Continued encouragement by Congress on the development of safety
standards and best practices between industry and the government will
lead to an informed and mutually beneficial relationship for all
parties involved, while not prematurely hamstringing the growth and
progress of the commercial space sector in a time where America sees
foreign powers rapidly developing this critical technology of their
own.
FAA/AST faces a growing workload, as launch cadences continue
trending upward. As mentioned, AST requires the resources to meet this
exciting challenge. Furthermore, Congress should invest directly in the
consensus standards effort identified by FAA's Commercial Space
Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) as the agreed-on consensus
choice for human spaceflight standards-writing.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Mike Gold
NASA Reauthorization. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act
(USICA) includes legislative language to reauthorize the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that I developed on a
bipartisan basis last year with Senators Cantwell, Wicker, and Cruz.
NASA was last authorized in 2017.
Question 1. Why is it important for Congress to reauthorize NASA
after failing to do so for many years?
Answer. Since Apollo, no NASA beyond low Earth orbit (``LEO'')
human spaceflight program has come to fruition, leaving our
international partners justifiably skeptical of the Agency's ability to
sustain such efforts and achieve success. This stands in stark contrast
to China which has maintained both consistency and continuity for their
own beyond LEO human spaceflight efforts and their space program
generally. The best way to reassure our partners in Europe, Japan,
Canada, and throughout the world is for Congress to pass a bipartisan
reauthorization bill that demonstrates uniform support for the Artemis
program and key aspects such as the Lunar Gateway which international
partners are contributing billions of dollars to.
Question 2. Do you support the reauthorization language in the
USICA bill?
Answer. Yes, the language in the USICA provides critical support
for Artemis as well as for other important issues such as the extension
of the International Space Station (ISS) to 2030 and ensuring the
development of a commercial space station to ensure that the U.S.
maintains a constant crewed presence in LEO.
International Space Competition. As discussed in the hearing, the
United States faces additional international competition in space. The
Chinese government plans to develop its own space station and recently
launched a hypersonic missile. Other nations have applied for tens, or
in some cases, hundreds of thousands of satellites in low-Earth orbit.
Question. What actions should Congress take to ensure that NASA and
the United States remain global leaders in space?
Answer. Again, Congress should pass a bipartisan authorization bill
that explicitly supports the Artemis program. Moreover, Congress should
extend the ISS until at least 2030 and direct NASA to support a future
commercial space station by serving as a robust customer for such a
platform including the purchase of seats not just for U.S. astronauts
but for international partners as well allowing the Agency to maintain
its traditional barter system and leadership role in space exploration.
Congress should also take action to ensure that the U.S. does not
fall behind China and other nations in orbital servicing, assembly, and
manufacturing. Specifically, Congress should explicitly direct NASA to
support critical programs such as OSAM-3 and the deployment of an Earth
Science Platform which will bolster our knowledge of climate change
while developing critical new capabilities to ensure that the U.S.
doesn't fall behind China in this vital field of space-based robotics/
next-generation persistent platforms.
Role of University Partnerships. Much of the hearing discussion
focused on the International Space Station and near-earth orbit
satellites. Arizona universities support these missions, and
additionally, the universities are leaders in other NASA projects. For
example, Arizona State University's OSIRIS-REx Thermal Emission
Spectrometer has collected samples from an asteroid and will return to
Earth in 2023. Meanwhile, the University of Arizona's Near-Earth
Objection (NEO) Surveyor Mission will help NASA complete its
Congressional mandate to discover 90 percent of all near-Earth objects
larger than 140 meters in length.
Question 1. How can we ensure that crucial science and planetary
defense missions, such as OSIRIS-REx and the NEO Surveyor, receive the
support from NASA to be successful?
Answer. Congress should include explicit direction in authorization
and appropriations bills directing NASA to leverage Archinaut-based
technologies to enhance the capabilities of science and planetary
defense missions while lowering their costs.
Universities also have an important role to play in support of new
commercial space stations. Specifically, Redwire Space is proud to be a
partner with Arizona State University in support of the Orbital Reef, a
next-generation commercial space station. Other Orbital Reef team
members include Blue Origin, Sierra Space, and Boeing.
Question 2. In your opinion, how can NASA best utilize university
partnerships to perform research, advance science, and help NASA reach
its goals?
Answer. NASA should leverage universities to support key programs
and missions, taking advantage of educational institutions' robust
capabilities and to support vital workforce development to ensure that
the U.S. does not fall behind China or other nations in space
development and operations.
Arizona's Apollo History. During the Apollo mission in the 1960s
and 1970s, NASA astronauts trained at Sunset Crater National Monument
near Flagstaff, Arizona, where the volcanic landscape approximated the
lunar surface. Astronauts also trained at Meteor Crater in the high
desert of northern Arizona.
Question. Could these locations in Arizona be beneficial to Artemis
astronauts as they train for their lunar missions?
Answer. Absolutely. Continued ground training in Arizona and in
other states will be a critical part of ensuring that Artemis
astronauts are prepared to tackle the numerous challenges they will
face exploring the Moon and Mars.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Mike Gold
Regulatory Framework for Commercial Spaceflight. In recent years,
we have seen the tremendous growth in the commercial space sector. As
multiple witnesses have noted, the responsibility of regulating this
industry are spread across a variety of Federal agencies, with
differing levels of technical expertise and industry outreach.
Question 1. How can Congress improve interagency cooperation to
better serve America's commercial space sector?
Answer. Thank you for asking such an important question.
Establishing a proper regulatory framework which balances innovation
and commercial development with preserving the space environment and
meeting our international treaty obligations is vital. The most glaring
issue that needs to be addressed is to establish an explicit system for
providing ``continuing supervision'' as required by the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967 for commercial activities including private sector space
stations; orbital servicing, assembly, and manufacturing; commercial
lunar rovers; and mining activities on the Moon or asteroids.
Congress should designate an entity within the Federal Government
to exercise this continuing supervision activity by creating a `Mission
Authorization' process that would require companies to describe their
proposed activities prior to launch and subsequently update the
government of any substantive changes. This would provide a benign
means of meeting the `continuing supervision' requirement that wouldn't
unduly burden entrepreneurs while still generating the information
necessary that, per the requirements of the Artemis Accords, would be
publicly shared with the United Nations to prevent confusion and
conflict in space.
Question 2. Do you believe that Congress Federal regulatory
oversight of commercial space endeavors should be more concentrated
within one agency than exists under the current regulatory landscape?
If so, what are the considerations that Congress should keep in mind as
it designates or establishes such an office?
Answer. Further concentration of regulatory oversight for all
commercial space endeavors into a single agency would be ideal.
However, for such a paradigm to succeed, this single agency not only
needs the proper authority, but must also be properly resourced in
terms of funds and experienced personnel to avoid causing undue burdens
that would harm American competitiveness, job growth, and scientific
activities such as combating climate change.
Question 3. How should Federal agencies best engage with industry
to ensure that Federal regulation of commercial space entities meets
the need for public safety and oversight without unnecessarily curbing
innovation?
Answer. All Federal agencies that engage in regulating commercial
space activities should create or leverage existing Federal Advisory
Committees to ensure that industry and government are acting in concert
with each other to maximize both innovation and safety. Government and
industry are stronger when they're working together. For example,
during the hearing a question was asked about the NASA Advisory
Council's Regulatory and Policy Committee (NAC RPC). This Committee is
comprised exclusively of industry representatives and is vital to
ensure that NASA and the private sector are communicating with each
other on important regulatory and policy issues. In stark contrast, the
NAC itself has only one industry representative which is completely at
odds with the large and important role private sector entities play in
executing NASA's mission. NASA should proceed with appointing more
industry representatives to the NAC and its various committees,
redouble its use of the NAC RPC, and other agencies/departments, such
as the Departments of State and Commerce, should develop their own
Federal Advisory Committees focused on commercial space activities.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kyrsten Sinema to
Dr. Patricia Sanders
NASA Reauthorization. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act
(USICA) includes legislative language to reauthorize the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that I developed on a
bipartisan basis last year with Senators Cantwell, Wicker, and Cruz.
NASA was last authorized in 2017.
Question 1. Why is it important for Congress to reauthorize NASA
after failing to do so for many years?
Answer. The space environment is changing rapidly and is not the
same as it was in 2017. Reauthorization of NASA at this time would be
advantageous to set expectations for the Agency in the current and
emerging environment.
Question 2. Do you support the reauthorization language in the
USICA bill?
Answer. The USICA bill is very complex and wide-ranging. I would
only comment on Part II which addresses space and only in general terms
relevant to the charter of the ASAP. The Panel is pleased to see the
emphasis placed on Space traffic Management and Space Situation
Awareness which is consistent with the recommendation we made in 2020.
We also support, as important safety and risk management approaches,
the emphasis on continuing presence in Low Earth Orbit, the support for
competing designs for the Human Landing Systems, the need for work on
advanced space suits, and a step-wise approach to space exploration.
One issue not addressed in the USICA bill is the much needed
revision of the language in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005
concerning Human Space Flight Independent Investigations. The ASAP
noted, as far back as 2015, that the language, while perhaps
appropriate and logical for the ISS and Space Shuttle, was inadequate
and obsolete for the emerging environment that included reusable and
commercially provided space vehicles. In 2015, the ASAP made the
following recommendation:
The 2005 Authorization language should be reviewed with today's
systems in mind. . .including details on the level of vehicle damage
requiring investigation, the temporal issues of when mission phases
begin and end, and NASA's oversight role in mishap investigations
conducted by its providers, as well as when the need for oversight is
required. The mishap response procedures should be thought through,
documented, and in place well before any actual flights.
The 2005 Authorization language is even more inadequate when
considering the emerging space travel involving non-NASA participants.
Yet this recommendation remains open and increasingly relevant.
International Space Competition. As discussed in the hearing, the
United States faces additional international competition in space. The
Chinese government plans to develop its own space station and recently
launched a hypersonic missile. Other nations have applied for tens, or
in some cases, hundreds of thousands of satellites in low-Earth orbit.
Question. What actions should Congress take to ensure that NASA and
the United States remain global leaders in space?
Answer. Congress can support NASA and United States global
leadership by (1) providing adequate and stable resources to support a
consistent program of work and a responsible and realistic schedule for
that work, and (2) providing an appropriate regulatory framework to
support the entire national space environment, including government and
commercial entities.
Role of University Partnerships. Much of the hearing discussion
focused on the International Space Station and near-earth orbit
satellites. Arizona universities support these missions, and
additionally, the universities are leaders in other NASA projects. For
example, Arizona State University's OSIRIS-REx Thermal Emission
Spectrometer has collected samples from an asteroid and will return to
Earth in 2023. Meanwhile, the University of Arizona's Near-Earth
Objection (NEO) Surveyor Mission will help NASA complete its
Congressional mandate to discover 90 percent of all near-Earth objects
larger than 140 meters in length.
Question 1. How can we ensure that crucial science and planetary
defense missions, such as OSIRIS-REx and the NEO Surveyor, receive the
support from NASA to be successful?
Answer. The ASAP has not focused on science and planetary defense
missions, but recognizes their importance. Support and resources from
the Congress will be critical to NASA support.
Question 2. In your opinion, how can NASA best utilize university
partnerships to perform research, advance science, and help NASA reach
its goals?
Answer. NASA can best achieve its goals by taking advantage of the
full range of capabilities available to it, including those from
universities, commercial industry and international partners.
Arizona's Apollo History. During the Apollo mission in the 1960s
and 1970s, NASA astronauts trained at Sunset Crater National Monument
near Flagstaff, Arizona, where the volcanic landscape approximated the
lunar surface. Astronauts also trained at Meteor Crater in the high
desert of northern Arizona.
Question. Could these locations in Arizona be beneficial to Artemis
astronauts as they train for their lunar missions?
Answer. I am not sufficiently familiar with the specific locations
mentioned to comment.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to
Dr. Patricia Sanders
Regulatory Framework for Commercial Spaceflight. In recent years,
we have seen the tremendous growth in the commercial space sector. As
multiple witnesses have noted, the responsibility of regulating this
industry are spread across a variety of Federal agencies, with
differing levels of technical expertise and industry outreach.
Question 1. How can Congress improve interagency cooperation to
better serve America's commercial space sector?
Answer. A number of Agencies today engage with or otherwise have an
influence on the commercial space sector to include: NASA, DoD, DOT,
FAA, DOC, FCC and the State Department. Interagency cooperation on
space issues has generally been positive. Therefore, it may not be
necessary for Congress to be concerned about improving interagency
cooperation.
Interagency cooperation has not been an area of focus for the ASAP,
but some actions that we do believe Congress could take to better serve
the United States commercial space sector--and NASA--would be to
Avoid programmatic gaps and delays by providing adequate and
timely resources for government-funded space programs. A long-
term perspective is needed for since these systems can take
years to develop. Following a normal appropriations process
rather than adopting Continuing Resolutions would be a key
step.
Ensure that roles and responsibilities for space-related
departments and agencies are clear and do not have any
inappropriate overlaps or holes.
Update the outdated, existing procedure for investigating
human space flight mishaps (as previously recommended by the
ASAP).
Identify a lead Federal agency for Space Traffic Management
and provide the necessary authority, immunity from lawsuits,
and resources to do the job (as also previously recommended by
the ASAP).
Question 2. Do you believe that Congress Federal regulatory
oversight of commercial space endeavors should be more concentrated
within one agency than exists under the current regulatory landscape?
If so, what are the considerations that Congress should keep in mind as
it designates or establishes such an office?
Answer. The ASAP has not specifically considered whether oversight
of commercial space endeavors should be concentrated under one agency.
It is possible that consolidation and streamlining could be
accomplished by transferring functions from other organizations to one,
perhaps significantly simplifying the approval process for space
operators. Alternatively, or as an interim step, it may be possible to
streamline the regulatory process without making major changes to
responsibilities, staffing and budgets, by designating a new or
existing agency to serve as the regulatory ``front door'' for
commercial space operators. This office might then work to consolidate
and streamline the needed regulatory approvals and a consistent
government response.
Question 3. How should Federal agencies best engage with industry
to ensure that Federal regulation of commercial space entities meets
the need for public safety and oversight without unnecessarily curbing
innovation?
Answer. One possible approach would be for Congress or the White
House to establish top-level guidance to do just that--to ensure public
safety and to encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space
transportation. As another step toward ensuring that a regulatory
agency does not curb innovation, it is important to provide adequate
resources for staffing with the appropriate expertise and experience to
keep pace with advances in technology.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Shelley Moore Capito to
Dr. Patricia Sanders
Question 1. As you are probably familiar with, Fairmont, WV is home
to the Katherine Johnson Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V)
facility. The Katherine Johnson IV&V Center provides NASA the highest
achievable levels of safety and cost-effectiveness for mission critical
software and has the capabilities for so much more. I have spoken a lot
on this issue with Former Administrator Bridenstine and with current
Administrator Nelson. I believe West Virginia has the facilities, like
the Katherine Johnson IV&V Facility, and the people who can be the
backbone for the Artemis program. As chair of the NASA's Aerospace
Safety and Advisory Panel (ASAP), could you speak to the value of the
IV&V to NASA's mission.
Answer. Independent Verification and Validation is important to all
software development. This is especially true for all of NASA's safety
critical software.
Question 2. I am proud of the capabilities housed at the Katherine
Johnson IV&V center, however I hear too often that they feel
underutilized. Is that the case?
Answer. The Panel is aware that NASA employs the capabilities of
that facility for all software developed by NASA and frequently for
software developed by NASA contractors. We are not cognizant if that
fully employs the full capacity of the Center.
[all]