[Senate Hearing 117-801]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]







                                                        S. Hrg. 117-801

                      BUILDING RESILIENT NETWORKS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA,
                             AND BROADBAND

                                 of the

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             JUNE 22, 2021

                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation








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       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                   MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             ROGER WICKER, Mississippi, Ranking
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 ROY BLUNT, Missouri
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         TED CRUZ, Texas
GARY PETERS, Michigan                DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             JERRY MORAN, Kansas
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana                  MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  MIKE LEE, Utah
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado          SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West 
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia                 Virginia
                                     RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
                    David Strickland, Staff Director
                 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
       George Greenwell, Policy Coordinator and Security Manager
                 John Keast, Republican Staff Director
            Crystal Tully, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                      Steven Wall, General Counsel
                                 ------                                

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA, AND BROADBAND

BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico, Chair     JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             ROY BLUNT, Missouri
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      TED CRUZ, Texas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         JERRY MORAN, Kansas
GARY PETERS, Michigan                DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            TODD YOUNG, Indiana
JON TESTER, Montana                  MIKE LEE, Utah
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West 
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado              Virginia
RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia             RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming   
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on June 22, 2021....................................     1
Statement of Senator Lujan.......................................     1
Statement of Senator Thune.......................................     3
Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    46
Statement of Senator Fischer.....................................    48
Statement of Senator Markey......................................    51
Statement of Senator Moran.......................................    53
Statement of Senator Peters......................................    55
Statement of Senator Blackburn...................................    57
Statement of Senator Rosen.......................................    59
Statement of Senator Capito......................................    61
Statement of Senator Young.......................................    64

                               Witnesses

Chief Jeffrey D. Johnson, Chief Executive, Western Fire Chiefs 
  Association....................................................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     6
Jonathan Adelstein, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
  Wireless Infrastructure Association............................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    12
Denny Law, Chief Executive Officer, Golden West 
  Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc............................    24
    Prepared statement...........................................    25
Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, Public Knowledge.............    32
    Prepared statement...........................................    33

                                Appendix

Letter dated June 17, 2021 to Hon. Ben Ray Lujan and Hon. John 
  Thune from Joseph Torres, Lep Fitzpatrick, and Carmen Scurato, 
  Free Press.....................................................    75
Letter dated June 21, 2021 to Senator Ben Ray Lujan and Senator 
  John Thune from Tony DeTora, VP, Government Affairs, Lynk 
  Global, Inc....................................................   119
Letter dated June 22, 2021 to Hon. Ben Ray Lujan and Hon. John 
  Thune from Steven K. Berry, President & CEO, Competitive 
  Carriers Association...........................................   120
Response to written question submitted to Jeffrey D. Johnson by:
    Hon. Raphael Warnock.........................................   121
Response to written questions submitted to Jonathan Adelstein by:
    Hon. Ben Ray Lujan...........................................   122
    Hon. Raphael Warnock.........................................   124
Response to written question submitted to Denny Law by:
    Hon. Raphael Warnock.........................................   125
Response to written questions submitted to Harold Feld by:
    Hon. Ben Ray Lujan...........................................   125
    Hon. Raphael Warnock.........................................   128

 
                      BUILDING RESILIENT NETWORKS

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 2021

                               U.S. Senate,
            Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,  
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in 
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ben Ray 
Lujan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Lujan [presiding], Klobuchar, Blumenthal, 
Markey, Peters, Rosen, Warnock, Thune, Fischer, Moran, 
Blackburn, Young, Capito, and Scott.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

    Senator Lujan. Appreciate everyone giving us a little bit 
of time this afternoon, as we are coming from a vote off the 
Senate floor. And our colleagues will be joining us here 
shortly, as well. So, thank you again for being with us today 
on this important hearing on Building Resilient Networks.
    In today's world, broadband is essential and 
telecommunications, including voice and Internet are basic and 
critical services that every American deserves. During the 
COVID-19 pandemic, broadband kept students in school and 
learning. The Internet kept us connected to our friends and 
loved ones that we could not be together with in person. For 
many of these networks connected us to our jobs and our 
livelihood. For so many, just access to basic healthcare.
    Just as important, these networks support how we 
communicate in times of emergency. When disaster strikes, these 
services connect us to someone who can help--firefighters, 
police officers, EMTs. In these vulnerable moments, we rely on 
these networks with our lives. Unfortunately, in times of 
emergency, too many Americans are not able to connect to 
someone who can get help. They get a busy signal. They get dead 
air. Connection does not work.
    Native, Hispanic and other communities of color are most at 
risk. In the fallout from Hurricane Maria, millions of 
Americans in Puerto Rico experienced telecommunication outages 
that lasted for months and left them stranded without vital 
services.
    Wildfires across the West caused cell phone services to go 
dark for more than 3 million people. They were left without 
access to 911 or emergency alerts, while wildfires raged.
    These are the stories that made the headlines, but similar 
stories are all too common across the country. In my home state 
of New Mexico, there was an incident in Sierra County where 
broadband outages caused a disruption on medical services. 
Hospitals were forced to transfer patients that they could no 
longer care for, because the hospital lost access to the 
network.
    Another outage impacted our Rail Runner, which is our 
public transportation train that runs through the center of the 
state--our main commuter line between Santa Fe and Albuquerque, 
where a network outage brought the train to a crawl. The outage 
shut down systems designed to prevent collisions.
    There are too many stories where 911 call centers lost 
access for up to a week, due to service outages.
    New Mexicans and all Americans deserve better than this. We 
need to remember that some of the worst outages are not even 
tied to natural disasters. In 2018, CenturyLink, now Lumen, 
experienced a 37-hour nationwide outage that disrupted 911 
service for millions of Americans. The cause? Faulty equipment 
and a configuration error. Thirty-seven-hour outage due to 
faulty equipment. It is unacceptable.
    And the U.S. Government has committed tens of billions of 
dollars to get Americans connected and telecommunication 
services are recording massive profits. It is time for these 
companies to step up. Reaching 100 percent connectivity, it is 
essential, but we must do more.
    It is time that these companies reinvest those profits 
toward ensuring that their users have access to resilient, 
redundant, and secure networks. Our connections must be 
resilient. They must be built to standards that correspond to 
the investment the Federal Government and states have made. 
When a natural disaster strikes, and we dial 911, the sound we 
hear should be someone ready to help.
    Our connections must be redundant. A single piece of faulty 
equipment or a burst gas main, should not disrupt 
telecommunication service, let alone national service across 
multiple carriers. Networks should have built in redundancies 
and consumers should have multiple options for providers in 
times of crisis.
    And finally, our connections must be secure. Malicious 
actors continue to target communication networks. Just this 
year, nationwide energy and health infrastructure have been 
held hostage. On Christmas Day last year, a bombing in 
Nashville caused a network outage that reached across three 
states. Planes were grounded and doctors were unable to reach 
electronic health records. Just imagine the consequences of 
future outages in a world where an interconnected, smart, 
electrical grid and autonomous vehicles, that rely on mobile 
broadband for communication.
    Our networks must be built to prevent and be resilient 
against these threats. The priorities I listed--resilient, 
redundant, and secure--are fundamental principles we must 
consider, as we look at existing infrastructure and as we build 
the next generation of networks.
    And I am grateful to Senator Thune and his work on this 
hearing. I know he recognizes the importance of reliable and 
resilient infrastructure. And I thank our witnesses for being 
here. They each represent critical perspectives in this issue--
public interest, emergency services, local carriers, and 
wireless infrastructure. I look forward to continuing our work 
together to make progress on this issue, for all Americans and 
all my fellow brothers and sisters, the people of New Mexico.
    And with that, I recognize the Ranking Member for his 
opening statement.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

    Senator Thune. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, and welcome to 
our panelists today. Expanding reliable and resilient broadband 
access in rural areas has long been a priority of mine, her in 
the Senate. So, I appreciate you holding this important hearing 
today.
    Reliable and resilient networks across all parts of the 
United States have never been more critical. The COVID-19 
pandemic changed the way we live, work, and is some places, 
educate our kids, which led to the most significant real-world 
test to date, of the resiliency of our broadband networks. 
Overnight, our networks faced new demands, as consumer and 
business usage of fixed and mobile broadband networks soared.
    As the Nation locked down, demand for reliable Internet 
connectivity shot up. Some reports have found that fixed 
broadband went up by 40 percent. Mobile data traffic shot up by 
over 20 percent. Voice traffic, on wireless networks, increased 
in some cases by nearly 40 percent.
    While networks in Europe and elsewhere reduced streaming 
quality in order to minimize the stress on their networks, U.S. 
broadband networks were able to accommodate this increased 
traffic and exceed expectations. This is largely because of the 
United States light touch regulatory approach to broadband 
policy, which has led to sustained investment by 
telecommunications companies, who have made network reliability 
and resiliency a priority.
    Even though our networks performed very well during the 
pandemic, I think we can all agree there is still more work to 
be done. Far too many times, however, Congress has attempted to 
spur broadband deployment by providing large sums of funding, 
with little to show. A 2009 stimulus package provided more than 
$7 billion to support broadband, but due to the lack of 
coordination and mapping, and a host of other factors, multiple 
agencies squandered away the funding, resulting in just a 
fraction of the access to connectivity that was promised.
    Today, as Congress considers a larger infrastructure 
package, this committee has an opportunity before it, to 
support the deployment of reliable and resilient networks and 
it is imperative that we get it right. Which is why I believe 
we should make smart investments, while maintaining a 
regulatory regime that allows companies to make the kind of 
choices in investments that have resulted in strong and 
resilient U.S. networks.
    We must remove the regulatory and permitting hurdles that 
delay the build out of networks, particularly to more rural 
areas. I will continue to advocate for updated regulatory 
measures, like the Streamline Small Cell Deployment Act, which 
would update current law to better reflect emerging technology 
and speed up permitting, while respecting the role of State and 
local governments, in making deployment decisions.
    Additional funding should also be targeted to unserved 
areas and not used to overbuild existing networks. In the last 
year alone, Congress, acting in a bipartisan manner, provided a 
significant amount of funding for broadband services, through 
the CARES Act and the year-end Coronavirus Relief Package.
    USDA's Connect--ReConnect Program received $735 million and 
NTIA was provided $1 billion to build networks in Tribal areas, 
and another $300 million to support broadband infrastructure in 
more rural areas. At the same time, Congress was appropriating 
additional broadband funding, the FCC, under the Rural Digital 
Opportunity Fund--or the RDOT Fund--has committed over $9 
billion to support broadband services over the next 10 years 
and another $11.2 billion, through that program's second phase. 
Additionally, the FCC is expected to distribute up to $9 
billion, over the next 10 years, to bring voice and mobile 
broadband services, under the 5G Fund for Rural America.
    The bipartisan Broadband DATA Act, signed into law last 
March, also requires the FCC to produce new maps. Having new, 
accurate maps is critically important to ensure that this 
funding, most of which is largely unspent, goes to truly 
unserved areas.
    At the same time, I believe it is equally important that 
this committee conduct oversight of the FCC's development of 
the new maps. And I hope that the Committee will hold an FCC 
oversight hearing so members can discuss this important issue.
    Recognizing the significant amount of funding already made 
available, finding common sense ways to efficiently deliver 
reliable broadband services in a technology neutral manner, 
like the framework under the bipartisan Rural Connectivity 
Advancement Program Act, should be part of any infrastructure 
conversation.
    We also need to be mindful that the deployment of reliable 
and resilient networks does not happen overnight. It takes time 
and it requires providers to have sustainable and predictable 
funding.
    States like my home state of South Dakota, have short build 
seasons, which leads me to my last point. Having a sufficient 
workforce and resilient supply chain in place, will be critical 
to keep networks up and running in times of emergencies, 
support the build out of broadband networks, meet the demands 
of 5G deployment, and perform maintenance and upgrades on the 
networks in the future. Which is why I hope the full Senate 
will soon pass the Telecommunications Skilled Workforce Act 
legislation that would increase the number of workers enrolled 
in telecommunications training programs.
    And before I close, I would like to reiterate a point I 
made earlier. The committee, which has jurisdiction over 
telecommunications policy, has a real opportunity to support 
efforts to close the digital divide. And if we work together in 
a bipartisan manner, we can ensure Americans have access to 
these important services.
    I appreciate all the witnesses for being here today. I look 
forward to hearing from them about how we can support resilient 
networks and ensure that any additional efforts focus on the 
areas that need it the most.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I am delighted that on our panel today, 
we have not one but two South Dakota witnesses. Jonathan 
Adelstein hails from South Dakota. And of course, Denny Law, 
who this committee has heard from before, who runs Golden West 
Telecommunications out of Wall, South Dakota, is someone who 
brings great knowledge and expertise to these issues, and I 
look forward, as always, to hearing from him. And he has with 
him today his son, Andrew, who is a State champion hurdler, 
both the 100s and the 300 hurdlers--hurdles, I should say. So, 
he has won the State Championship in the State of South Dakota, 
which is a pretty--a pretty big deal.
    So, anyway, delighted to have them here and look forward to 
hearing from all out panelists and to engage in a discussion 
about what we can do better, where we can make improvements, 
and continue to build out networks that serve people everywhere 
across this country.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Lujan. Appreciate that, Mr. Thune, and I join you 
in welcoming our panelists, and also, future generations of 
leaders who join them, as well. It is good to see them joining 
family today.
    In addition to both Mr. Law and Former Commissioner 
Adelstein, as well, we are also joined by Mr. Feld, who is the 
Senior Vice President of Public Knowledge, here from 
Washington, D.C.. And the first panelist that we will hear from 
today is Chief Jeffrey Johnson, who is the Chief Executive of 
the Western Fire Chiefs Association, out of Sisters, Oregon.
    Chief, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

            STATEMENT OF CHIEF JEFFREY D. JOHNSON, 
        CHIEF EXECUTIVE, WESTERN FIRE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION

    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member 
Thune, and distinguished Senators of this committee. Thank you 
for the opportunity to appear in front of this committee and 
discuss such an important topic.
    My name is Jeff Johnson, as mentioned, and I serve as a 
Chief Executive for the Western Fire Chiefs. We serve from Guam 
and Saipan to Colorado's border, and from Alaska to the border 
with Mexico. Two of our top priorities at the Western Fire 
Chiefs are wildfire, technology, and the intersection of 
wildfire and technology.
    The chiefs of the West serve some of the most wildfire 
prone, challenging terrain, and extreme fire conditions in the 
United States. In 2020 alone, 10.1 million acres burned, and 
9,248 structures were lost, which drew assistance from fire 
departments across the United States. We know factually that 
the fuels are dryer, the fires come earlier and last later in 
the year, and they are burning with previously unwitnessed 
intensity, which undermines our fire attack efforts.
    In my home state of Oregon, megafires last year 
simultaneously burned in the Clackamas, Santiam, Umpqua, and 
Rogue River drainages, destroying entire communities, homes, 
businesses, valuable timber assets, and critical communications 
infrastructure. Other Western States had similar experiences, 
in terms of the frequency and scale of the fires. For example, 
California saw its first ever gigafire, which burned over one 
million acres, and had its worst year on record since the Big 
Burn of 1910.
    As an Incident Commander, I know firsthand the value of 
communications to an effective operation. Unfortunately, fire 
of this magnitude often destroy back haul, burn over 
mountaintop antennas, and level buildings critical to network 
operations. To make matters worse, the communications 
infrastructure is critical, not only to responders, but to the 
civilians to whom we are trying to evacuate ahead of the flame 
front.
    Additionally, our challenges are often exacerbated by an 
unreliable power grid and public safety power shutoffs, which 
take down communicationsites that do not have adequate backup 
power to outlast the interruption. The Western Fire Chiefs have 
been working with our Member State Fire Chiefs Association to 
improve permitting and regulations processes for placement of 
backup power generation at communicationsites, and to inform 
communication providers and lawmakers of public safety's needs.
    As public safety and the public at large become 
increasingly reliant on our communications infrastructure, the 
need for reliable and expanded communications has never been 
more important to us. FirstNet, as the Nationwide Public Safety 
Broadband Network, has greatly enhanced communications 
availability, resilience, and reliability for first responders 
with dedicated spectrum for public safety and the ability for 
first responders to have access to portable cell towers that 
provide wireless connectivity during emergency events. As we 
approach the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, I 
would like to thank this committee for having played such a key 
role in advancing FirstNet, enacting law.
    Last, given the vast stretches of land in the West, that 
are publicly owned, passing law or regulation that ease and 
speed the placement of communication infrastructure on Federal 
lands, would be beneficial. By way of illustration, Oregon is 
60.4 percent public lands, California 52 percent, Washington 
41.9 percent, Alaska 95.8 percent, and Nevada at 87.8 percent, 
contrasted to Iowa at 2.8 percent public lands. As you can tell 
by this illustration, having expedited processes for placement 
of public--or communications infrastructure on public lands, 
would in fact be helpful.
    Because communications are so important to an effective 
fire attack, assistance by Congress to remove barriers and 
improve communications would be meaningful to incident 
commanders.
    Thank you and I look forward to your questions and 
comments.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Chief Jeffrey D. Johnson, Chief Executive, 
                    Western Fire Chiefs Association
    I am Jeffrey Johnson, Executive Chief for the Western Fire Chiefs 
Association (WFCA). I previously served as president of the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and a chief fire 
officer of the Tualatin Valley Fire and Rescue Department in Beaverton, 
Oregon where I served as chief of the department for 15 years before 
retiring in 2010 after a 32-year career. The WFCA serves fire chiefs in 
the 11 western states, including Oregon, Washington, California, Idaho, 
Nevada, Utah, Montana, Arizona, Alaska, Hawaii, as well as Guam/Saipan.
    I thank Chairman Ben Ray Lujan and Ranking Member John Thune, as 
well as the other esteemed members of the subcommittee, for convening 
this hearing to examine ways the Federal government can support 
``resilient, redundant, and secure broadband and telecommunications 
infrastructure'' and review lessons learned to improve our Nation's 
resiliency and reliability. It is an honor to join you, and I thank you 
for requesting guidance and input from the WFCA. The WFCA's membership 
includes the career and volunteer leaders of fire related emergency 
service organizations throughout the WFCA member states and the Western 
Pacific Islands.
    Prevention, Preparedness and Response to the Growing Threat of 
Wildfires. The WFCA's membership provides critical protection of 
people, critical infrastructure, and the environment from the 
occurrence and outcomes of fires and other natural, technological, and 
manmade emergencies. Over the past year, our membership and their 
departments have answered the call to support our country's response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, while simultaneously responding to yet another 
unprecedented fire season in 2020. The 2021 fire season is already upon 
us and we are preparing for another record year, with fires that have 
already ignited this year and dry conditions and unseasonably high 
temperatures across much of the Midwest and West. After consecutive 
years of devastating fire seasons, it has become clear that the major 
wildfires in the West are not one-off anomalies, but becoming a pattern 
and creating a new normal.
    History has taught us that planning and preparedness are key to 
mitigating risk and bolstering our readiness to achieve the best 
possible outcomes. Preparedness includes evacuation planning and 
drills, fuel management, hardening of structures against the threat of 
wildfire, and increasing the response resources that are available to 
respond to wildland fires through codified agreements. Once a fire has 
started, the goal is to contain the fire to the smallest area possible 
and minimize the amount of damage to our communities, critical 
infrastructure, and natural resources, which involves the notification 
and evacuation of all persons who are at risk, resource requests, and 
dispatching and coordinating with inter-and intra-state responders. 
Following a fire incident, the focus shifts to recovery and learning 
from the events that transpired during the emergency.
    Criticality of Broadband Communications for Public Safety and 
Emergency Response. Modern technology and broadband have provided new 
tools for citizens, emergency response personnel, and state and Federal 
forestry managers, including ``smart'' tools using drones and unmanned 
aerial systems/vehicles for land management and to detect small fires 
before they become large forest fires using broadband connectivity. 
Advanced technology solutions are equipping public safety with new 
capabilities to communicate and coordinate during emergencies. For 
example, an incident commander can enhance how resources are dispatched 
and deployed to emergencies. The ability to access information and 
situational awareness is also essential because the location, mapping, 
weather, terrain, and predictive fire behavior intelligence can help to 
inform the response and coordination during the fire event.
    In order for first responders to actually utilize these advanced 
solutions, they need to be able to count on the technology and 
underlying network performing in operationally critical situations. It 
is essential for emergency response personnel to have reliable access 
to broadband and the correspondingly essential resilient commercial 
power grid and backup power sources. Additionally, mobile wireless 
applications serving public safety should be built in accordance with 
commonly accepted standards, such as the 3GPP international wireless 
industry standards, to enhance their quality performance, 
interoperability, and reliable operation.
    While I expect there will be many compelling proposals discussed 
during today's hearing, I also want to recognize the tremendous 
progress that's been made -thanks to the U.S. Congress enacting 
legislation to establish the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband 
Network-to address the communications challenges that historically 
hindered emergency response. Before FirstNet, field-based first 
responders, such as wildland firefighters, were hesitant to adopt new 
technology solutions because they couldn't count on it working when 
they needed it most. Now that we have FirstNet, first responders have 
priority and preemption, dedicated 700 MHz public safety spectrum that 
has been built out across the country (with aggressive rural coverage 
build benchmarks--an important priority for the WFCA), and the ability 
to request portable cell towers (Colts and Cows) to make sure first 
responders have connectivity, such as in the event infrastructure has 
been damaged by a fire or when a command post is staged in a remote 
mountainous area. I had the opportunity to appear before the Senate 
Commerce Committee in 2010 during a hearing to discuss the 9/11 
Commission Report's recommendation to build a nationwide, public 
safety, wireless, interoperable, broadband network. As we approach the 
20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this committee and your 
colleagues in the House of Representatives and Senate can be proud of 
the successful fruit that's resulted from your legislative action. 
Thank you for working with the public safety community to make our 
vision become a reality.
    Enhancing Network Resiliency and Reliability: Cannot Be Achieved in 
a Silo. Our country won't be able to tackle the pressing issue of 
broadband and telecommunications network resiliency in a silo. I have 
seen firsthand the devastation caused by massive conflagrations, such 
as the deadly and destructive Camp Fire in Paradise, CA in 2018. While 
resiliency practices, like burying fiber underground can certainly 
improve resiliency, the reality is that above-ground communication and 
power infrastructure in the path of a catastrophic fire will have 
difficulty withstanding the heat, wind and conditions of these massive 
fire events--even if built to the highest possible level of physical 
resiliency. As a country, we must properly invest in fire mitigation 
activities, land management, community readiness, and ensure there are 
the necessary resources to support fire suppression. We are entering a 
new age of wildland firefighting, and state and local budgets and the 
workforce in the fire service are becoming strained as wildfire season 
becomes increasingly long, frequent, dangerous, and destructive.
    Commercial Power Grid. It is also important to recognize the need 
for improved power resiliency. Access to reliable commercial power 
isn't only important for the communications industry, but also for 
health care, first responders, citizens, and virtually every other 
facet of our economy. The recent and significant power failure events 
in California and Texas call into question the resiliency of the 
commercial power grid. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, society 
has transitioned to ``remote-everything,'' which further reinforces the 
critical need for a robust and resilient commercial power grid.
    Temporary and Fixed Backup Power. The placement of backup power 
generators at communications facilities can help enhance resiliency and 
power redundancy. The need for backup power has been evident during the 
public safety power shutdown (PSPS) in California. The WFCA has 
collaborated with local lawmakers and other stakeholders in California 
to streamline the process for siting backup power facilities. Local and 
state siting rules, environmental, and other regulations governing the 
placement of backup power generators can make it exceedingly difficult 
to get this equipment installed at communication towers. This is not 
unique to California and is an issue that hinders backup generator 
placement at sites in jurisdictions across the country. The Federal 
government could consider preemptive siting and environmental 
streamlining rules to make it easier for these backup power facilities 
to be installed.
    Streamlining the Process to Deploy Broadband Infrastructure. 
Especially in the case of wireless networks, greater reliability can be 
achieved from the number of cell towers in an area. This functions as a 
form of redundancy. As such, Congress should consider ways to expedite 
the process to deploy broadband infrastructure. Streamlining the 
deployment of both wireline and wireless broadband will also help to 
narrow the digital divide, boost the capacity and speeds available for 
broadband users, and expand available fiber backhaul-diversity. In 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress approved record levels of 
Federal stimulus that can be used to support the deployment of 
broadband and telecommunications infrastructure. While this is an 
important step forward, we should not stop there. Action should also be 
taken to streamline the process to make it easier, faster, and less 
costly to deploy wireless and wireline broadband across the federal, 
state, tribal, and local levels. With the passage of the American 
Rescue Plan Act of 2021 and current efforts underway to advance 
bipartisan infrastructure legislation, the time is now to move forward 
with broadband streamlining legislation or (at a minimum) approve a 
temporary window for expedited state, local, tribal, and Federal review 
and approvals while communities across America work to harness this 
opportunity to expand access to broadband.
    Difficulty and Delay Deploying Broadband Infrastructure on Federal 
Lands. The WFCA membership is regularly called upon to support fire 
suppression efforts on Federal lands to protect people, property, and 
some of America's most beloved landscapes. We also respond to other 
emergency situations on Federal lands to support and protect Federal 
government employees, local residents, and visitors, such as when first 
responders support a search and rescue for a missing person in a 
National Park or respond to a medical issue for an injured hiker at a 
U.S. National Forest. There is a critical public safety need for more 
robust and available broadband communications on Federal lands. 
Especially along major roadways, areas commonly used as incident 
command posts or other emergency staging grounds, and in recreation 
areas attracting large numbers of residents and visitors, the inability 
to have reliable and available wireless communications on Federal lands 
is no longer a mere inconvenience, it is a serious public safety issue. 
Congress should take action to overhaul, expedite, and streamline the 
Federal leasing, easement, appraisal, review, and approval processes 
for broadband projects on lands managed by the Federal government.
    The Federal government maintains a significant presence in rural 
areas and across the western United States. As Congress and the Biden-
Harris Administration endeavor to close the digital divide and bolster 
network resiliency, I am concerned this mission could be hampered 
unless there is a fundamental change in how many Federal agencies 
approach their responsibility to review and approve broadband 
infrastructure projects. Aesthetic, historical, and cultural 
considerations on Federal lands should not wholly outweigh or supersede 
concerns about the life and safety of first responders and the public 
visiting, working, and living on or near Federal lands. The ability to 
communicate should be recognized as critically important, and I'm 
hopeful the Federal government can find ways to make it easier for this 
critical infrastructure to be deployed.
    Cybersecurity and the Evolving Threat Landscape. Cybersecurity is 
another important pillar that must be included in our Nation's efforts 
to enhance our resiliency. Particularly given the recent high-profile 
ransomware attacks impacting the meat processing and energy sectors, 
the growing cyber threat landscape underscores the need for the Federal 
government to ensure the security of government infrastructure and 
systems. Additionally, Congress could consider proposals to help 
federal, state, tribal, local, and territorial governments modernize 
and update their security capabilities, including providing support for 
education and training to expand the available cybersecurity workforce. 
Voluntary cybersecurity grant funding could also be considered for 
other critical infrastructure sectors, including the communications 
industry.
    Next Generation 9-1-1: An Important National Priority. When 
discussing resiliency, reliability, and redundancy for the 
communications sector, we must not overlook the critical need to reform 
and invest in Next Generation (NG) 9-1-1. Federal funding for NG 9-1-1 
implementation will equip public safety answering points (PSAPs) and 
emergency communications centers (ECCs) with the ability to modernize 
their operations. This will bolster redundancy by allowing a 911 center 
to load-share with other PSAPs/ECCs. It will also allow PSAPs/ECCs to 
receive rich Internet protocol (IP)-based data and information in the 
form of video, photos, and multimedia from the public, and then send 
this critical and life-saving information directly to field-based first 
responders, including those using FirstNet. Transitioning our country's 
existing patchwork of 9-1-1 jurisdictions (many still using legacy 
systems) to NG 9-1-1 is critical for our Nation's communications 
resiliency. As bipartisan infrastructure legislation is considered by 
Congress, I urge this committee and your colleagues in the House and 
Senate to include the NG 9-1-1 reform and funding bill. We must ensure 
9-1-1 centers regardless of state or jurisdiction--can receive IP-based 
data and information, which will better inform emergency response, 
reduce response times, and improve outcomes.
    Public Safety Communications Priorities at the FCC. Finally, on 
behalf of the public safety community, I would like to take this 
opportunity to commend the Acting Chairwoman of the Federal 
Communications Commission and express my appreciation for her 
leadership and steadfast commitment to public safety communications. 
Acting Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel has been a longstanding champion 
for first responders. On behalf of the WFCA, we are hopeful the Biden-
Harris Administration will nominate her to serve as Chair. Should this 
happen, I urge this committee to advance her nomination.
    Throughout her career, Ms. Rosenworcel has meaningfully contributed 
to bipartisan legislative and regulatory efforts to modernize emergency 
communications for first responders in America. For example, as a 
senior congressional aid for this committee, Ms. Rosenworcel helped to 
author the bipartisan legislation that created the Federal First 
Responder Network Authority and set aside 20 MHz of Band 14 spectrum 
for public safety's use. In her role as Acting Chairwoman, she has 
continued to listen to the needs of public safety and recently helped 
lead bipartisan action to stay \1\ the reallocation of 4.9 GHz 
spectrum, which would have taken away this vital spectrum resource from 
public safety. The public safety community now has the opportunity to 
work with the FCC and other stakeholders to help shape the future use 
of the 4.9 GHz spectrum. With changes in broadband technology, public 
safety's communications resilience can be strengthened by preserving 
the spectrum for public safety's use, including facilitating the 
introduction of new 5G capabilities into the public safety 
communications ecosystem and meeting the urgent need for dedicated 
nationwide 5G spectrum for the public safety community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-49-ghz-stay-order
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    Thank you. Thank you for inviting me to testify. I appreciate your 
efforts to bolster our Nation's communications resiliency, reliability, 
security, and redundancy. On behalf of the WFCA, thank you for allowing 
us to share public safety's views on these topics. I am available to 
respond to any questions you may have.

    Senator Lujan. Chief Johnson, thank you so very much. Next 
we will hear from the Honorable Jonathan Adelstein, the 
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Wireless 
Infrastructure Association. The floor is yours, sir, for 5 
minutes.

                STATEMENT OF JONATHAN ADELSTEIN,

             PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,

              WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURE ASSOCIATION

    Mr. Adelstein. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, and Ranking 
Member Thune for holding this hearing and for getting the 
perspective of the wireless industry on providing resilient and 
reliable and redundant networks. Your priority on this is well-
founded because people's lives are at stake here.
    In the infrastructure package you are considering, I think 
is the biggest opportunity in decades to build more resilient 
networks that save Americans lives. Resiliency is a real 
priority, and you make it real priority by, not limiting 
funding to single, potentially less resilient, technology. That 
will be the way that you enable Congress to maximize the 
disaster prevention response and recovery we have been talking 
about. And it will help you to harness strengths in 
redundancies of multiple technologies. A flexible ``all of the 
above'' approach deploying fiber, mobile and fixed wireless, 
will be the best way to achieve all of Congress' both broadband 
and climate change goals.
    Now, when I ran RUS, during the Recovery Act, then Vice-
President Biden called me into his office, and I will never 
forget what he said. He said, ``Give yourselves freaking 
flexibility''. And that is a quote, not a PG version. I will 
never forget it because we made that our watch word at RUS. We 
were trying to get the money out the door and flexibility, I 
think, should be Congress' watch word, as well, when you try to 
get this money out the door. It would be unprecedented to 
direct all funding to a single technology, excluding others 
that may provide more resiliency.
    An investment of this magnitude is a dangerous time to 
experiment with putting all your eggs in the single wireline 
basket. Data speeds, both upload and download, are important to 
consumers. Congress can make them a priority. Yet cementing law 
of static level data speeds, as a gating eligibility factor--
you are not even eligible if you do not meet those--you could 
be hamstringing your ability to advance other goals that you 
care about. Seize this moment to promote all of your goals--
resiliency, speeding broadband service to your constituents, 
providing them mobility, serving public safety, like Chief 
Johnson here, promoting affordability and fighting climate 
change.
    This committee's long-standing approach has enabled the 
U.S. to build the world's strongest telecommunications 
networks. And as Senator Thune noted, we rose to the occasion 
during this pandemic. We saved the entire economy. You set 
goals, traditionally, and priorities for Federal agencies to 
execute. You do not cement, in law, narrow technological 
standards, like specific data speeds.
    Congress should, again, direct agencies to execute your 
priorities. Let all technologies that promote your goals 
compete for funding, including fixed and mobile 5G services. On 
resiliency, wireless networks have real advantages. They tend 
to go out less often in disasters and they tend to get restored 
more quickly--much more quickly, in some cases, than wireline 
networks.
    Rather than exclude wireless, Congress can make resiliency 
a priority funding factor. Reward applicants with the most 
resilient solutions. Let multiple technologies compete and let 
the best ones win. And get people who do not have access to the 
Internet connected as quickly as possible. Wireless networks 
get up and running much quicker than fiber. Your constituents 
need broadband now. Do not make consumers wait for a decade, or 
that long, by limiting the range of eligible providers. Future 
proof should not mean deployed far into the future. 
Connectivity delayed is connectivity denied.
    And excluding mobile solutions could inadvertently grow a 
rural mobility digital divide. Do not tether rural residents to 
the Internet through a wire to the home or to the farmhouse. 
Rural Americans need mobile networks for their daily lives, for 
precision ag, and for rural economic development. Prioritize 
public safety. First responders, like Jeff Johnson, do not have 
a fiber line trailing his fire truck. They go into harm's way 
to protect us all. Let us make sure the solutions meet their 
needs.
    And to combat climate change, which is causing so much 
trouble, right now, in your state, Chairman. 5G networks can 
help reduce carbon emissions by up to 15 percent--one-third of 
the 50 percent reduction required by 2030 by funding always a 
challenge for climate change solutions. Target your broadband 
dollars, which we think we can get, to prioritize projects that 
contribute the most to reducing carbon emissions. Do not 
eliminate options like 5G that are best documented to combat 
climate change and mitigate future disasters.
    Make affordability a priority. One in five Americans, many 
in our state of South Dakota, are smartphone only. Many are 
low-income, rural residents who will not give up their phone, 
their smartphone. But funding only wireline solutions means 
they have to purchase a costly new fiber service.
    So, inviting multiple technologies is the best way to 
attract qualified applicants in every service area, give 
agencies the flexibility to consider providers for each 
location. Otherwise, the hardest to reach areas by phone 
disrepair never get service. Congress has valued all these, 
many priorities. You do not have to choose one at the expense 
of the others.
    If rigid eligibility requirements are locked in statute, 
like symmetrical speeds that most consumers do not use, it 
precludes the technological flexibility to address other 
priorities, like resiliency and it can leave many people 
unserved.
    Thank you for holding this hearing and thank for the 
opportunity to testify.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Adelstein follows:]

    Executive Summary, Jonathan Adelstein, President and CEO of WIA
    By making resiliency a priority in the infrastructure plan, rather 
than limiting funding to a single, potentially less resilient, 
broadband technology, Congress can maximize disaster prevention, 
response, and recovery. A flexible all-of-the-above strategy, including 
fiber, fixed and mobile wireless improves redundancy and best employs 
this historic opportunity to achieve all Congressional broadband and 
climate change goals, not just one.
    Congress should set agencies' funding goals, not set technological 
gating factors that preclude other priorities. Otherwise, Congress may 
tie agencies down with limited flexibility, preventing consideration of 
innovative and geographically appropriate provider applications that 
address many essential consumer needs beyond data speeds. Rather than 
cement specific broadband speeds in statute, Congress should set a 
checklist of priority factors including:

        Resiliency: Congress can instruct agencies to consider 
        resiliency as a primary factor for funding. Applicants that 
        provide resilient solutions are rewarded with priority 
        consideration.

        Higher download and upload speeds: Download and upload speeds 
        are valued by consumers. Faster offerings deserve priority. In 
        terms of symmetrical speeds, data show consumers use over ten 
        times the downstream bandwidth compared to upstream. To make 
        the primary gating criteria for eligibility a service most 
        consumers do not require would foreclose providers from even 
        applying that could better address many Congressional 
        priorities and more urgent rural consumer needs.

        Mobility: If wireless broadband is excluded, Congress could 
        inadvertently grow a rural mobility digital divide. Many 
        unserved residents would be tethered to accessing the Internet 
        through a wired connection at the home or farmhouse. Fixed 
        wireless supports 5G mobile broadband that is indispensable for 
        rural Americans' daily needs, precision ag, and rural economic 
        development.

        Speed of deployment: Given the urgent need for broadband in 
        rural areas, prioritize connecting consumers as quickly as 
        possible provide flexibility to expert agencies to consider 
        applicants that get networks up and running. Don't make 
        consumers wait for many years by limiting the range of eligible 
        providers. Future proof should not mean deployed far in the 
        future.

        Public safety and first responders: First responders rely on 
        mobile networks as they go into harm's way to protect the 
        public. Service to those who serve us all should be a priority 
        goal.

        Battling climate change: Congress can set as a priority factor 
        for agencies the degree to which proposed projects will 
        contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions. If only one 
        technology is allowed, Congress would eliminate options like 5G 
        that can best achieve this clear priority. Let the best 
        technology win.

        Targeting unserved areas: Congress should target funds to truly 
        unserved areas. Define ``unserved'' areas as those lacking 
        service through either wired or wireless technology. Accurate 
        maps are needed to identify truly unserved areas with already 
        committed build plans to target support.

        Affordability: Limiting funding to wireline providers saddles 
        smartphone-only consumers with the need to purchase costly new 
        fiber service or require large ongoing Federal subsidies. Few 
        rural consumers are willing to give up mobility.

        Cost efficiency: Technological flexibility provides consumers 
        with the most megabits for the taxpayer dollar. No single 
        technology is likely to garner a qualified applicant in every 
        unserved area. Allow agencies flexibility to consider providers 
        with the most appropriate solution for the given deployment. 
        Ensure every awardee can cover its costs to remain viable so 
        service and quality is maintained. Otherwise, the hardest areas 
        to reach will fall into disrepair or remain unserved.

    Congress has long expressed the value of each of these factors--and 
should not choose one as a gating criterion at the expense of all 
others. If rigid requirements, such as symmetrical speeds, are locked 
in statute, it precludes the flexibility to consider providers that 
address other key priorities including resiliency, an evolving mix of 
speeds, mobility, quicker deployment, public safety, climate change, 
and affordability for rural consumers. Lack of flexibility may leave 
many areas unserved.
                                 ______
                                 
     Prepared Statement of Jonathan Adelstein, President and CEO, 
                  Wireless Infrastructure Association
    Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for holding this important hearing and for the 
opportunity to testify. I am the President and CEO of the Wireless 
Infrastructure Association (WIA), representing the companies that 
build, develop, own, and operate the Nation's wireless facilities. Our 
members include infrastructure providers, wireless carriers, equipment 
manufacturers, and professional services firms. WIA advocates for the 
widespread, responsible deployment of wireless infrastructure to enable 
mobile and fixed wireless broadband access for communities everywhere.
    The wireless infrastructure industry is committed to making next-
generation communications technology widely available to every corner 
of America. The importance of connectivity is dramatically underscored 
by the increased reliance on broadband during this unprecedented COVID-
19 pandemic. WIA and our members are grateful for the leadership of 
your Subcommittee in promoting our shared goal of closing the digital 
divide with ubiquitous, reliable, resilient, and redundant broadband 
networks.
The Importance of Resilient and Redundant Networks During Pandemic
    The focus of this hearing is on building resilient and redundant 
broadband networks. COVID-19 brought forth new challenges and new 
opportunities for broadband deployment. The pandemic created an even 
deeper recognition of how essential reliable broadband connectivity is 
to every household and to every business. The wireless industry's 
network investments enabled the entire economy to sustain itself during 
the pandemic. We helped businesses to stay afloat, children to continue 
learning, and first responders and health care providers to offer 
critical care.
    Dramatic consumer usage changes, including work-from-home, remote 
learning, and telehealth, generated an unprecedented demand for 
wireless connectivity anchored by the need for wireless infrastructure. 
Wireless networks rose to the challenge and performed magnificently. 
U.S. networks' performance during the pandemic continues to demonstrate 
why our networks are the envy of the world. COVID-19 drove mobile 
traffic up 20 percent, essentially overnight. Yet, mobile data speeds 
kept pace. This was not the case in other countries. According to an 
Ookla report, China's mobile download speeds saw speed decreases of up 
to 40 percent during their peak COVID-19 restrictions, while Italy saw 
decreases of up to 23 percent, and Spain saw decreases up to 15 
percent.\1\ Over two-thirds of European countries experienced mobile 
speed decreases of up to 30 percent in late March, according to 
OpenSignal.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Tracking COVID-19's Impact on Global Internet Performance, 
Ookla, https://www.speed
test.net/insights/blog/tracking-covid-19-impact-global-internet-
performance/#/United%20States (last updated July 20, 2020).
    \2\ Francesco Rizzato, Sam Fenwick, & Ian Fogg, Mobile Experience 
During the COVID-19 Pandemic: 4G Download Speed, Opensignal (Apr. 08, 
2020), https://www.opensignal.com/2020/04/08/mobile-experience-during-
the-covid-19-pandemic-4g-download-speed.
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    The wireless success story is not accidental. Thanks to the 
wireless industry's innovation, the nearly $30 billion invested every 
year by the wireless industry,\3\ a timely supply of spectrum due to 
the leadership of this Subcommittee and the FCC, and a regulatory 
framework that promotes investment in responsible wireless 
infrastructure, the U.S. was in a better position than the rest of the 
world during the pandemic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See 2020 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA at 3 (Aug. 25, 2020), 
https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2020-Annual-Survey-
final.pdf (noting industry investment was $29.1 billion in 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The pandemic was only the most dramatic and recent example of the 
need for reliable and resilient broadband networks. I was honored to be 
appointed by the Federal Communications Commission as the Vice-Chair of 
its Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee (BDAC) Disaster Response 
and Recovery Working Group (DRRWG). Our group delivered a unanimous, 
consensus report that outlined the challenges and solutions to ensure 
that reliable, resilient broadband was available before, during, and 
after natural disasters.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Report and Recommendations: COVID-19 Response, Fed. Commc'ns 
Comm'n Broadband Dep. Advis. Comm. Disaster Response & Recovery Working 
Grp., (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/bdac-
disaster-response-recovery-approved-rec-10292020.pdf [hereinafter BDAC 
DRRWG Report].
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    The single greatest legislative opportunity for Congress to enhance 
the reliability and redundancy of broadband networks is in the 
transformative infrastructure package now under consideration and 
proposed in President Biden's American Jobs Plan. That is why one of 
the most important recommendations of the BDAC's DRRWG was for Congress 
to make major investments to expand the availability of broadband 
access. The expert group concluded that resiliency and deployment go 
hand in hand. The report stated, ``the most obvious and immediate means 
of infusing the necessary capital to address these availability 
challenges is for Congress to appropriate the additional funds needed 
to deploy broadband in unserved areas in a timely manner.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Id. at 33.
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The Need for Multiple Technologies to Address Broadband Reliability and 
        Redundancy
    Wireless broadband serves as a key lifeline during storms, natural 
disasters, and other emergencies. Providing that lifeline is the 
industry's goal every day. Wireless providers and builders have 
invested significant resources to strengthen and harden networks and 
improve network resiliency and planning.\6\ In 2017, Hurricane Harvey's 
unprecedented floodwaters affected only 5 percent of the thousands of 
wireless facilities in the affected areas of Texas and Louisiana.\7\ In 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 1.75 million telecommunications lines 
were downed while only 1,000 cellular transmission towers were 
affected.\8\ Six months after the storm, 130,000 lines remained out 
while cellular service was fully operational.\9\ After the catastrophic 
events of 9/11, many point-to-point wireless links were established to 
supplement the loss of a main switching station housed in the World 
Trade Center. These links were installed in a matter of days, and many 
remain as a source of permanent backup.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA at 5 (June 20, 2019), 
https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06-/2019-Annual-Survey-
Highlights-FINAL.pdf (stating that the wireless industry invested over 
$253 billion between 2010 and 2019).
    \7\ Nick Ludlum, The Wireless Industry Responds to a Historic 
Hurricane Season, CTIA (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.ctia.org/news/the-
wireless-industry-responds-to-a-historic-hurricane-season.
    \8\ Paula Rhea, Hurricane Katrina: Telecom Infrastructure Impacts, 
Solutions, and Opportunities, Verizonbusiness (Feb. 12-16, 2006), 
https://archive.nanog.org/meetings/nanog36/presentations/rhea.pdf.
    \9\ Id.
    \10\ Zayan EL Khaled & Hamid Mcheick, Case Studies of 
Communications Systems During Harsh Environments: A Review of 
Approaches, Weaknesses, and Limitations to Improve Quality of Service, 
15 Int'l J. Distrib. Sens. Nets. (Feb. 24, 2019), https://doi.org/
10.1177%2
F1550147719829960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once disasters occur, the availability of multiple providers and 
networks can help consumers and businesses stay connected to critical 
services and information. Fiber is a state-of-the art network 
architecture that provides outstanding bandwidth and broadband service 
and is an essential element of any national broadband buildout effort 
but comes with its own tradeoffs. WIA members own and operate most of 
the fiber in the U.S. Regarding its resiliency, like other wireline 
infrastructure, we are aware that fiber can be vulnerable to damage 
from natural forces.\11\ In rural areas, fiber is usually deployed 
aerially on utility poles. Aerially deployed networks may be subject to 
interruptions from environmental events such as wind, ice loading, 
trees falling, snow and storms, fire, and hurricanes.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ See, e.g., The Real Cost of Fiber Cuts: How to solve using 
Gigabit Wireless, Gigabit Wireless (Mar. 15, 2016) (noting, among 
common reasons for outage such as tornadoes and hurricanes, squirrels 
accounted for 28 percent of damages to fiber lines in 2010).
    \12\ See The Complete Guide to Fiber to the Premises Deployment, 
PPC at 8 (2020), https://www.ppc-online.com/fiber-to-the-premises-
ebook.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiber buried underground is still subject to fiber cuts and other 
disruption often caused by excavations, and while it can be more 
resilient than aerial, it can also be far more costly, time consuming 
to deploy and repair, and sometimes impractical depending on the soil 
and topography.\13\ Wireless networks help to ensure that multiple 
providers and networks are available when disaster strikes. Through 
overlapping site coverage, diverse deployment of fiber backhaul, and 
extensive investments in deployable assets, wireless providers can 
mitigate the impact of disasters on their networks and often restore 
service more quickly than wireline fiber.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See Cost Efficiency infra pp.15-16 and related discussion.
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    As climate change continues to increase the severity of weather 
events, fiber and other wireline infrastructure will face increased 
exposure to risk. It is estimated that over 1,000 miles of long-haul 
fiber conduit and almost 2,500 miles of metro fiber conduit will be 
underwater by 2032.\14\ Unfortunately, these trends are not improving. 
Extreme heat waves and large storms are predicted to become more 
common.\15\ Wireline infrastructure will continue to face 
vulnerabilities that are different than wireless options.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Ramakrishnan Durairajan et al., Lights Out: Climate Change 
Risk to Internet Infrastructure, In Proceedings of the Applied 
Networking Research Workshop 2018 (July 16, 2018).
    \15\ See Climate Change Indicators: Weather and Climate, Environ. 
Prot. Agen., https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-climate 
(last visited June 16, 2021).
    \16\ Anthony Townsend & Mitchell Moss, Telecommunication 
Infrastructure in Disasters: Preparing for Crisis Communications, 
N.Y.U. Ctr. for Catastrophe Prep. and Resp. at 8 (April 2005) 
(``Wireless links, whose links are constructed out of intangible 
electromagnetic radiation, reduce some of the vulnerability of wired 
networks''); see also David Theodore, A Climate-Proof Internet is Here 
and Critical Infrastructure Needs it Yesterday, Climate Resilient 
Internet (Feb. 6, 2020) (suggesting a wireless alternative using point-
to-point millimeter wave links as a fail safe for when fiber lines are 
downed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Loss of electrical power can create outages of telecommunications 
service for wired and wireless networks. Telecommunications providers 
of both fiber and wireless broadband are equally and deeply committed 
to serving their customers' needs in emergencies. Yet, each is 
subject--in differing degrees--to the lack of a reliable electric grid. 
Fiber-to-the-premise (FTTP) networks face the more intractable problem 
of loss of power to the premise in addition to the network. Most in-
home fiber includes a battery backup that lasts twenty-four hours.\17\ 
After those twenty-four hours, services including telephone and 9-1-1 
services are lost. Power is often lost in rural areas for weeks even in 
regularly occurring ice storms and even longer in the wake of 
disasters. Restoring electrical service to all the homes in the wide 
areas often affected by these larger natural disasters is a lengthy 
process. Wireless connectivity requires the difficult, but far less 
onerous, challenge of providing power only to the transmission site 
such as a tower to serve all the households in the service area 
regardless of if they have power on their premises. And consumers can 
often find alternative locations to re-charge their devices, including 
in their cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ See Public Notice, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau 
Reminds Providers of Facilities-Based Residential Voice Services That 
are Not Line-Powered of Upcoming Requirement to Offer Subscribers 24 
Hours of Backup Power for Customer Premises Equipment, Fed. Commc'ns 
Comm'n DA 18-1205 (rel. Nov. 27, 2018), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DA-18-1205A1.pdf.
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    Wireless assets, such as cell on wheels (``COWs''), can be quickly 
rolled in to provide temporary network capacity--including backhaul 
when a fiber connection is lost--and restore connectivity. This speed 
of response is simply not always possible in primarily wireline 
networks that much reach many affected premises. Wireless networks also 
can be rerouted and optimized during and after a disaster. If one cell 
site is offline, the network can use capacity from another site to 
maintain connectivity.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ How Wireless Kept Americans Connected During COVID-19, CTIA at 
3 (June 23, 2020), https://api.ctia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/How-
Wireless-Kept-Americans-Connected-During-COVID-19-2.pdf.
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    Wireless networks also have unparalleled self-healing capabilities 
that are being enhanced with 5G technology. Fiber networks in rural 
areas, particularly aerial fiber that is damaged by storms, tend to 
take longer to restore. Restoring one tower can quickly provide service 
to an entire area, versus having to repair numerous fiber breaks or 
entire areas of poles washed, burned, or blown away. A resilient 
network is a redundant network. Resiliency is a key factor Congress 
should consider in prioritizing funding for broadband buildout.
Public Safety and First Responders Rely on Mobile Wireless Networks
    In terms of disaster response and resiliency, first responders also 
need universal coverage. First responders rely on wireless broadband as 
they rush to the front lines for fires, crime scenes, and disasters and 
need mobile connectivity on site to protect themselves and the public. 
In many rural areas, the closest hospital can be an hour or more away. 
Wireless broadband like 5G can turn an ambulance into a mobile 
emergency room during that ``golden hour,'' saving lives and preventing 
disabilities.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Sanjay Joshi, 5G and Me: And the Golden Hour, Dell 
Technologies (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.delltechnologies.com/en-us/
blog/5g-me-and-golden-hour/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many current and potential applications for public safety officials 
are powered by wireless broadband. A combination of wearables, sensors, 
cameras, and other Internet-connected technologies are being used by 
public safety departments to enhance their efforts in a variety of 
settings. For example, FirstNet, the dedicated network that Congress 
established to support first responders, has nearly eighty deployable 
assets available at no cost to subscriber agencies, utilizing Band 14 
for best public safety experience.\20\ In Chicago and Miami, for 
example, police departments are utilizing technology that uses an array 
of smart acoustic sensors to identify gunshots and isolate their 
location.\21\ In Sea Isle City, New Jersey, cameras and sensors are 
being used to monitor flood risk.\22\ Electronic flashing road signs 
are automatically activated to alert drivers when the flood risk is 
high.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Understanding the FirstNet Deployable Program: High-impact 
Solutions for Public Safety Operations, FirstNet Auth., https://
firstnet.gov/system/tdf/Deployables_factsheet_2021.pdf?
file=1&type=node&id=1342&force=0.
    \21\ Smaller Cities Increasingly Turn to Gunshot Detection 
Technology to Prevent and Reduce Gun Violence, Intrado Globe Newswire 
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2020/12/
22/2149702/0/en/Smaller-Cities-Increasingly-Turn-to-Gunshot-Detection
-Technology-to-Prevent-and-Reduce-Gun-Violence.html.
    \22\ Tech Help With Floods Begins with Sea Isle City Alert System, 
Press of Atlantic City (June 10, 2019), https://
pressofatlanticcity.com/opinion/editorials /tech-help-with-floods-
begins-with-sea-isle-city-alert-system/article_58d476e4-1feb-5644-a7c8-
a91a5bb19e71.html.
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    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, often referred to as ``drones'', can get 
information to first responders faster in an emergency. Drones equipped 
with cameras are increasingly being used in search and rescue 
situations to scour areas that may be difficult for people to access. 
In January 2019, a search and rescue team in Utah used a drone to 
locate a 60-year-old hiker stranded on a ledge.\23\ During the Camp 
Fire, sixteen Northern California emergency responder agencies worked 
together using a team of drones to map and track the fire, helping them 
develop and implement their containment strategies.\24\
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    \23\ Zacc Dukowitz, Drones in Search and Rescue: 5 Stories 
Showcasing Ways Search and Rescue Uses Drones to Save Lives, UAV Coach 
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://uavcoach.com/search-and-rescue-drones/.
    \24\ Joe Rosato Jr., How a Squadron of Drones Mapped the Entire 
Paradise Camp Fire Zone in Two Days¸ NBC Bay Area, https://
www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/how-a-squadron-of-drones-mapped-the-
entire-paradise-camp-fire-zone-in-two-days/201896/ (last updated Nov. 
29, 2018).
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    Advances in wireless technology have helped spur the development of 
tools utilized by public safety officials. As next-generation wireless 
devices and networks roll out across America, 5G will enable a whole 
new generation of public safety innovations. Public safety and disaster 
response is another key factor Congress should prioritize for funding 
broadband infrastructure.
Wireless Networks are Vital to Addressing Climate Change
    Reliable and redundant telecommunications networks have the unique 
ability to help prevent and to mitigate the destruction of disasters 
before they occur, as well as providing the means to respond to them. 
Scientific reports indicate that climate change is a major factor 
spurring the increasing number and severity of natural disasters--and 
one that humans can address.\25\ Studies have shown how dramatically 
the latest advances in broadband, wireless broadband, and particularly 
5G networks, can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Global e-
Sustainability Initiative documented that Internet-enabled solutions 
could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 16.5 percent.\26\
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    \25\ See, e.g., Climate Change Indicators: Weather and Climate, 
Envtl. Prot. Agen., https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-
climate (last visited June 16, 2021) (noting heat weaves and large 
storms are likely to become more frequent); The Effects of Climate 
Change, Nat'l Aero. and Space Admin., https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ 
(last visited June 17, 2021) (``Effects that scientists had predicted 
in the past would result from global climate change are now occurring: 
loss of sea ice, accelerated sea level rise and longer, more intense 
heat waves.'').
    \26\ GeSI Smarter 2020: The Role of ICT in Driving a Sustainable 
Future, Global e-Sustainability Initiative and Boston Cons. Grp. at 9 
(Dec. 2012), https://www.telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
SMARTer-2020-The-Role-of-ICT-in-Driving-a-Sustainable-Future-December-
2012._2.pdf.
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    The characteristics of wireless networks' wide area coverage, 
mobility, and speed of deployment offer unique benefits that address 
every policy goal of President Biden's American Jobs Plan. In fact, 
every element of the President's plan will rely on rapid deployment of 
wireless connectivity, including energy and smart grid, transportation 
and connected cars, agriculture, water and land use, building 
efficiency, and advanced manufacturing. The World Economic Forum 
documents that the digital technology sector, relying on 5G 
connectivity, ``is probably the world's most powerful influencer to 
accelerate action to stabilize global temperatures well below 2+C.'' 
\27\ Indeed, ``digital technologies could already help reduce global 
carbon emissions by up to 15 percent--or one-third of the 50 percent 
reduction required by 2030.'' \28\
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    \27\ Borje Ekholm & Johan Rockstrom, Digital technology can cut 
global emissions by 15 percent. Here's how, World Econ. Forum (Jan. 15, 
2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/why-digitalization-is-
the-key-to-exponential-climate-action/.
    \28\ Id. (emphasis added).
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    To ensure that Federal broadband infrastructure investments 
effectively target climate change, Congress should keep in mind the 
most important applications that accomplish the goal. Each of the most 
fundamental green technologies enabled by broadband requires wide-area 
and ideally universal and mobile coverage of rural America. These 
include smart grid, smart transportation and autonomous vehicles, 
precision agriculture, and water conservation.
    Wireless networks provide additional benefits to emerging 
technologies that will rely on resilient networks. Smart 
transportation, such as self-driving and electric vehicles, rely on 
advanced mobile networks to provide instantaneous connectivity for 
numerous operations, especially safety sensors. Vehicle traffic 
congestion is a major source of emissions. It is estimated that cars 
are responsible for about 30 percent of CO2 emissions.\29\ 
Deloitte estimates that self-driving cars, which rely on wireless 
connectivity, could reduce emissions by 40 percent to 90 percent, cut 
travel times by nearly 40 percent, and reduce delays by 20 percent.\30\ 
In addition, smart city and smart building technologies could result in 
$20 billion in savings if the energy efficiency of buildings is 
increased by just 10 percent.\31\
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    \29\ Digital Transformation of Industries: Automotive Industry, 
World Econ. Forum at 4 (Jan. 2016), https://reports.weforum.org/
digital-transformation/wp-content/blogs.dir/94/mp/files/pages/files/
wef-dti-automotivewhitepaper-final-january-2016.v1.pdf.
    \30\ Wireless Connectivity Fuels Industry Growth and Innovation in 
Energy, Health, Public Safety, and Transportation, CTIA (Jan. 19, 
2017), https://www.ctia.org/news/deloitte-wireless-connectivity-fuels-
industry-growth-and-innovation.
    \31\ Darrell M. West, Achieving Sustainability in a 5G World, 
Brookings at 4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads /2016/11/gs_20161201_smartcities_paper.pdf.
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    5G networks will increase manufacturing efficiency and 
sustainability goals. 5G can enable more efficient compressors that 
waste less energy, increase boiler efficiency to reduce air waste 
energy, and improve motor voltage imbalances to reduce energy 
consumption.\32\ Furthermore, 5G will reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
in numerous ways, such as making smarter electric grids that are more 
efficient and resilient.\33\
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    \32\ See generally id. (describing ways that 5G technology will 
enable resource management and sustainability).
    \33\ See, e.g., Sofana Reka et al., Future Generation 5G Wireless 
Networks for Smart Grid: A Comprehensive Review, 12 Energies 2140 at 
2145-49 (June 4, 2019) (detailing several benefits 5G will provide to 
electrical systems including real time demand response).
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    For example, WIA member Anterix is working with utilities to deploy 
utility-grade private networks, providing capabilities, features, 
functions, and equipment for reliable and resilient connections for 
essential services. These new networks enable a range of new use cases, 
such as the Falling Conductor Protection capability developed by San 
Diego Gas & Electric and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. It relies 
on the low latency of LTE--the same technology used in our phones--to 
enable broken power lines to be de-powered in the interval between 
breakage and hitting the ground, which reduces their likelihood to 
ignite wildfires that have recently plagued so much of the country and 
contributed to global warming.\34\
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    \34\ Wildfire Safety Innovation: Cutting off Power to a Broken 
Power Line Before it Hits the Ground!, San Diego gas and energy (Mar. 
20, 2019), https://sdgenews.com/article/wildfire-safety-innovation-
cutting-power-broken-power-line-it-hits-ground.
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    Internet of Things (``IoT'') technologies in appliances, buildings, 
factories, and homes employ sensors that rely on 5G as they monitor and 
analyze energy usage. These technologies alone could cut carbon 
emissions 15 percent by 2030.\35\ Smart energy grids also employ 5G. 
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory found that it could directly 
reduce energy usage and carbon impact by 12 percent and indirectly by 6 
percent.\36\ Having resilient electrical grids has become increasingly 
important during destructive wildfire seasons. As electrical grid 
operators aim to enhance their networks for greater reliability and 
resiliency, sensors and analytics enabled by 5G applications are 
increasingly critical, ``allowing for timely diagnosis, prediction, and 
prescription of all system variables and assets during normal and 
extreme-event conditions.'' \37\
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    \35\ Renee Cho, The Coming 5G Revolution: How Will it Affect the 
Environment?, Colum. Climate School (Aug. 13, 2020), https://
news.climate.columbia.edu/2020/08/13/coming-5g-revolution-will-affect-
environment/.
    \36\ R. Pratt, et al., The Smart Grid: An Estimation of the Energy 
and CO2 Benefits, Pacific Nw. Nat'l Lab. (Jan. 2010); see 
also Bruce Weindelt, Digital Transformation of Industries: Automotive 
Industry, World Econ. Forum at 4 (Jan. 2016).
    \37\ Louis Brasington, Digital Smart Grid Resilience: Wildfire 
Mitigation and Reliability, Cleantech Grp. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://
www.cleantech.com/digital-smart-grid-resilience-wildfire-mitigation-
and-reliability/.
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    Water conservation and efficient farming is another benefit of 
wireless broadband. Agriculture accounts for 80 percent of water use in 
the U.S.\38\ Agricultural IoT technologies, like precision agriculture, 
monitors, soil property and yield mapping, and satellite imagery, can 
help to reduce agricultural water consumption by as much as 15 percent 
per year.\39\
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    \38\ Darrell M. West, Achieving Sustainability in a 5G World, 
Brookings at 2 (Dec. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads /2016/11/gs_20161201_smartcities_paper.pdf.
    \39\ E.J. Sadler et al., Opportunities for Conservation with 
Precision Irrigation, 60 J. of Soil and Water Conserv. 374, 377 (Oct. 
27. 2015).
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    For the telecommunications industry itself, 5G networks are 
estimated to be 40 percent more energy efficient due to technological 
evolution, which has dramatically increased energy efficiency, 
particularly in chipsets.\40\ 5G processors and radios are tightly 
designed together, which promotes smart, integrated, energy saving 
features.
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    \40\ GeSI Smarter 2020: The Role of ICT in Driving a Sustainable 
Future, supra note 7 at 209.
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    There is much debate in Congress today about the level of resources 
the infrastructure plan should dedicate to combatting climate change. 
Yet, there seems to be wide agreement on the need for broadband 
deployment funding. Congress should target resources to deploy 
broadband infrastructure to maximize the beneficial impact on climate 
change. No broadband technology is better documented to achieve climate 
change goals than wireless broadband. If even a fraction of the 15 
percent reduction in carbon emissions estimated by WEF is achieved, it 
would be a monumental contribution toward saving the planet. Excluding 
wireless broadband would miss an urgently needed opportunity to combat 
global warming and to prevent untold disasters from occurring in our 
lifetimes and those of generations to come.
Lessons from the Recovery Act and then Vice-President Biden: The Need 
        for Flexibility
    My experience overseeing the Broadband Initiatives Program as 
Administrator of the Rural Utilities Service at the Department of 
Agriculture (``USDA'') for the Obama-Biden Administration can provide 
useful lessons as this Committee deliberates on how best to accomplish 
its broadband deployment objectives. It turns out that this can be much 
more complicated in practice than it might appear.
    I am very familiar with financing FTTP projects: the RUS under the 
Recovery Act ultimately approved 221 fiber wireline projects, 60 
wireless projects and 28 combined wireless/wireline.\41\ Given the 
severity of the economic downturn, we strove to move as quickly as 
possible seeking ``shovel ready projects.'' These were fewer and 
farther between than hoped. I was confirmed by the U.S. Senate in June 
2009 after the policy was already established for the first round 
Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA). Of the roughly $3.5 billion 
ultimately awarded, the first round awarded $1.067 billion for 68 
broadband projects.
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    \41\ Distribution of Broadband Stimulus Grants and Loans, Cong. 
Research Serv. at 6 (January 4, 2011).
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    However, funding was going out the door more slowly than the White 
House wanted to see. As we were devising the rules for the second and 
final NOFA, I was first called into the office of Chief of Staff Rahm 
Emmanuel, who admonished RUS to speed up the process. Shortly 
thereafter, I was called into the office of then-Vice President Biden, 
who had been charged by President Obama with overseeing the Recovery 
Act. Needless to say, this second meeting was more pleasant.
    The guidance Vice President Biden shared was as clear as it was 
sound: ``Give yourselves more freaking flexibility.'' I will never 
forget those words--which is a direct quote, not a PG-rated version--
because they became our motto as we made policy cuts in the second 
NOFA. When deliberating on decisions, I often called for more 
``freaking flexibility.''
    Vice President Biden's advice proved as wise as it was piquant. We 
made major changes in the second NOFA, including the mix of grants and 
loans, that were critical to the success of the program.\42\ It is a 
heretofore unreported fact that RUS had almost more funding than it had 
qualified projects. RUS received $28.965 billion in total applications 
for grants and loans that resulted in $3.529 billion RUS ultimately 
awarded. Yet, in the final process, almost every award that passed both 
our financial feasibility and our technical feasibility screens won 
funding--with only a handful that could have met those screens left at 
the end of the process. In other words, only about one in eight 
projects penciled out as technically and financially feasible.
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    \42\ Mark A. Abramson and Paul R. Lawrence, Paths to Making a 
Difference, Leading in Government ch. 4 (revised ed. 2012).
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    The lesson of the Recovery Act is that Congress cannot assume that 
if it provides funding with narrow strictures that its vision can be 
achieved--even if funding levels are very large as to appear 
sufficient. From the perspective of an Administrator, the agency does 
not choose who applies and which private or municipal actors are 
willing to step up. The agencies to which Congress allocates funding 
can only rely upon and consider what comes in through their doors. 
Agencies are limited to those operators that are prepared to offer the 
service specified. Even more fundamentally, implementing agencies can 
and should only fund those operators among them--whether for-profit, 
non-profit or municipal--that are not only willing, but able to 
demonstrate a plan that is both financially and technically feasible. 
The way telecommunications networks are structured geographically, 
typically only providers already serving an area or with existing 
infrastructure in the region are interested in or capable of expanding 
to the most hard-to-reach areas.
    Clearly, we learned that finding feasible projects is difficult. 
The more rural and less densely populated the area, the more difficult 
it becomes. The essential limiting factor is often whether--even if 
Congress pays for 100 percent of the capital expenses--the ongoing 
revenues from end users cover the operating expenses. Again, the less 
densely populated the service area (those Congress most seeks to reach) 
the more difficult this long-term business case becomes.
    I am concerned that if Congress does not provide implementing 
agencies with needed flexibility, it will find that for many areas, no 
qualified applications will come in the door and areas will remain 
unserved. Worse, if financially infeasible projects are nevertheless 
approved, the networks will be unsustainable, and consumers will lose 
the quality of service or end up having no service at all. For example, 
as noted above, fiber cuts in areas with long fiber runs (such as 
through rural, wooded areas) are expensive to repair, particularly 
considering that few customers are providing the revenue to cover those 
costs. If overly prescriptive technological parameters are sealed in 
statute, it may be too late to for Congress to change course, as we did 
at RUS in the second NOFA.
    The lesson is that applications are very provider specific and 
geographically specific. The unique history of network investment in a 
particular service area dictates feasibility along with the financial 
and technical strength of the operator proposing to provide service. 
Two areas similar in geography and density may not have similarly 
strong providers or existing networks from which to extend further into 
rural areas. For example, there may be an area in West Virginia that is 
similarly rugged and sparsely populated to one in Montana. However, one 
might have a local cooperative that has long invested in building out 
fiber connectivity, with a solid balance sheet girded by years of RUS 
and Universal Service funding, while the other has not benefited from 
similar investments in infrastructure or have a similarly strong local 
provider. One might offer a feasible project proposal while the other 
does not--or one area may not even get a qualified application to serve 
it. If Congress does not provide the funding agencies flexibility to 
take in the door a wider variety of proposals, one area may go 
unserved--or worse, become unserved when the provider is unable to 
cover its costs due to limited ongoing customer revenues after it is 
built at taxpayer expense.
Solution: Congress Establishes Priority Goals, not Limiting Technology 
        Decisions about How to Achieve Them
    Congress should set funding agencies' goals and not set 
technological gating factors. Otherwise, Congress may tie funding 
agencies down with limited flexibility to even consider innovative, 
cost-effective, and geographically appropriate provider applications 
that would have likely met Congressional priorities or have met them 
sooner.
    In the history of this distinguished Committee, the Communications 
Act is a model of setting goals and priorities rather than specific 
technological solutions that may or may not be sustainable or even meet 
all of Congress's objectives.
    Rather than cementing specific broadband speeds in statute, 
Congress can set a checklist of priority factors, including the 
following based on Congressional and Administration priorities:

   Resiliency of networks: both vulnerabilities and the speed 
        of restoration;

   Higher broadbands speeds;

   Mobility, highly valued by consumers in rural and other 
        areas, which is also an added benefit of fixed wireless 
        broadband investment;

   Speed of deployment and infrastructure siting;

   Public safety: the needs of first responders and emergency 
        response;

   Contribution to reducing carbon emissions and thus 
        preventing future natural disasters;

   Target unserved areas;

   Affordability to consumers;

   Cost efficiency;

   Workforce development.

    Congress has long expressed the value of each of these factors and 
should not choose one at the expense of all others, which would happen 
if certain priorities were locked in as gating factors that preclude 
the consideration of other factors. Consider each in turn:
    Resiliency: As indicated by this hearing, the resiliency of 
telecommunications networks is a priority for the Committee. American 
lives and property depend upon it, as we have seen in the pandemic. All 
telecommunications technologies, including wireless broadband, have 
their own vulnerabilities. As noted above, for obvious reasons, long 
stretches of aerially deployed fiber optic cable, or for that matter 
any wireline service deployed overhead, are exposed to many natural 
forces, and can take long periods to restore. Moreover, FTTH is 
dependent on electrical service at the home, which is often disrupted 
for long stretches. Whether one agrees with this analysis or not, 
Congress should not tie agencies' hands to one technology that may be 
more exposed to risk. It can charge funding agencies with considering 
resiliency as a factor in ``future-proofing'' funding choices. Agencies 
can ask applicants to identify the level of resiliency for its proposed 
broadband delivery mechanism--and make them prove their capability to 
meet their promises, both technically and financially. They can ask: 
how vulnerable is your technology to outages? What steps are you taking 
to ensure resiliency? How long will it take to restore service and what 
will it cost? Is your network financially sustainable considering those 
costs and the likelihood of disruptions in the proposed service 
territory?
    Resilient networks mean sustainable networks. Real ``future 
proofing'' requires that the companies that are provided funding to 
build networks will remain in business to provide service to customers 
into the future. Resiliency is key because ongoing operating costs must 
be covered by the revenue stream, or the networks will fall into 
disrepair and will not remain open consistently, provide adequate 
customer service or quick outage restoration, or could become 
inoperable.
    Higher speeds: Members of Congress have expressed an interest in 
prioritizing symmetrical speeds. Consumers clearly separately value 
both download and upload speeds, and it makes sense for agencies to 
prioritize them independently. The gap between downstream and upstream 
traffic has consistently grown over the last ten years. Recently, the 
ratio of downstream consumption to upstream is fourteen to one.\43\ 
Current consumer trends demonstrate significant increases in downstream 
consumption while upstream increases at a fraction of the rate.\44\ 
Today's consumers do not utilize upstream bandwidth at the same rate 
they use downstream and speak to it with their dollars and usage. Video 
streaming makes up over 80 percent of all Internet traffic, two thirds 
of which is traffic from downloads.\45\ Even popular applications that 
utilize relatively high upload bandwidth, such as two-way video 
conferencing, do not require anything near symmetrical speeds. Studies 
have shown video conferencing requires approximately one third of the 
upstream bandwidth compared to downstream.\46\
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    \43\ See John Ulm & Tom Cloonan, The Broadband Network Evolution 
Continues, CommScope 9 (2019), https://www.nctatechnicalpapers.com/
Paper/2019/2019-the-broadband-network-evolution-continues; see also The 
Asymmetric Nature of Internet Traffic, NCTA (Mar. 22, 2021), https://
www.ncta.com/whats-new/the-asymmetric-nature-of-internet-traffic 
(stating that the downstream to upstream traffic ration was sixteen to 
one at the end of 2020. But see, e.g., Peter Rysavy, The Folly of 
Attempting to Future-Proof Broadband, Light Reading (June 15, 2021), 
https://www.lightreading.com/opticalip/the-folly-of-attempting-to-
future-proof-broadband/a/d-id/770204 (noting a reverse in the trend 
that the gap between downstream and upstream grows every year due to 
increased use of video learning, telemedicine, and telelearning 
bringing the ratio down to ten to one).
    \44\ See id. at fig. 3, 4 (demonstrating a 37.8 percent average 
growth rate over five years for downstream while upstream has a 18.8 
percent growth rate for the same time).
    \45\ The Global Internet Phenomena Report, Sandvine at 6 (Sept. 
2019), https://www
.sandvine.com/hubfs/ Sandvine_Redesign_2019/Downloads/
Internet%20Phenomena/Internet%
20Phenomena%20Report%20Q32019%2020190910.pdf; see also Distribution of 
Global Downstream Internet Traffic as of October 2018, By Category, 
Statista (Feb 13, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/271735/
internet-traffic-share-by-category-worldwide/.
    \46\ Jay Zhu et al., Testing Bandwidth Usage of Popular Video 
Conferencing Applications, Cable Labs (Nov. 5, 2020), https://
www.cablelabs.com/testing-bandwidth-usage-of-popular-video-
conferencing-applications (studying various video conferencing 
applications utilization of upstream and downstream bandwidth).
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    Networks are optimized based on consumer use patterns. The 
telecommunications industry has responded by engineering networks to 
favor downloads to meet their customers' demand. It is possible that 
consumers will reverse long-term trends favoring download speeds; 
however, even if upload speeds demand doubles, it will remain far below 
download speed demand. The speculative prediction that upload speed 
demand will dramatically rise can justify making it a priority, but it 
is not a good basis to make symmetrical speeds the sole eligibility 
requirement for an entire planned investment of this magnitude--to the 
exclusion of other priorities.
    To make symmetrical upload the primary gating criterion for funding 
would shortchange addressing resiliency, climate change and disaster 
prevention, the speed of getting service to rural Americans, mobility, 
public safety, affordability and other key factors we know consumers 
value now and urgent crises Congress seeks to address.
    Mobility: We know for certain that Americans value mobility. Rural 
Americans traverse longer distances and rely on mobility even more 
heavily. If wireless technology to serve fixed or in-home or mobile 
broadband is excluded from an infrastructure plan, Congress could 
inadvertently grow a rural mobility digital divide in which many 
unserved residents would be limited to accessing the Internet through a 
wired connection in the home or farmhouse. All broadband technologies, 
including wireless broadband, are needed to provide communities with 
robust connectivity. And if Congress gives wireless broadband 
technology a fair chance to compete for the same funding, including for 
the in-home market, consumers will benefit from mobility that is 
provided by all wireless broadband investments including fixed wireless 
that supports 5G.
    This rural mobility divide would preclude rural Americans from 
access to similar interconnected solutions that are available to their 
urban counterparts. Rural residents should not be tethered to the 
relatively short leash of ethernet or a Wi-Fi signal when they need a 
high-speed connection. Further, many applications, such as precision 
agriculture, require wireless broadband to blanket vast acres of 
farmland to be useful. The larger properties and distance between 
houses that many Americans seek out by living in rural areas require 
larger areas of service. For children doing homework on hour-long bus 
rides in rural areas, for example, waiting until they get back home to 
go online is not a good option. In terms of a priority, you might ask 
your rural constituents what they value more: greater broadband 
mobility on the road and across their farm fields--or upload speeds at 
home. For those like me who have lived in rural America, I expect you 
can guess the answer.
    Speed of deployment, infrastructure siting and workforce needs: 
Fiber can take months to years to deploy even in easy geography, but 
more complex deployments can take many years. Wireless broadband links 
can be installed and ready for operation in a matter of days in a 
variety of scenarios.\47\ According to a study by the Fiber Broadband 
Association, it would take 10 years and an additional $70 billion to 
pass 90 percent of U.S. households--before even reaching the last 10 
percent which are of greatest concern for rural access.\48\ To connect 
that 90 percent would require an additional $15 billion.\49\
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    \47\ Dori Erann, Fiber VS Wireless-The Greatest Debate of the 
Decade, Ceragon (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.ceragon.com/blog/fiber-vs-
wireless-the-greatest-debate-of-the-decade.
    \48\ FTTH Study 2019, Cartesian at 2 (June 4, 2019), https://
optics.fiberbroadband.org/
Portals/0/
Cartesian%202019%20FTTH%20Study%20Summary%20Findings%2020190604%20
SENT.pdf at 2.
    \49\ Id. at 4.
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    Given rural consumers urgent need for broadband, especially in 
rural and unserved areas, the focus should be on utilizing all 
technologies to connect all communities as quickly as possible. And 
wireless broadband can be deployed quickly. WIA members report that, on 
average, it can take about six months for a wireless collocation and 
about eighteen months for a new tower to be built.
    Future proof should not mean deployed far in the future. Rural 
consumers should not have to wait in the back of a long line for many 
years to finally get the broadband Congress promised. Connectivity 
delayed is connectivity denied. Speed to market should be a priority 
Congress charges funding agencies to consider. In terms of keeping up 
with consumer needs--real future proofing--wireless networks are 
upgraded constantly. 5G is the most readily upgradeable generation of 
wireless broadband. Once deployed, it is easier to upgrade networks to 
handle varying demands and ultimately to upgrade to the next generation 
of wireless broadband. To achieve Congressional goals, placing a 
priority on getting networks up and running will meet rural Americans' 
urgent needs. Speeding deployment will require working to encourage 
providers to offer plans customized to different communities--not one-
size-fits all. Congress should provide priority and flexibility for 
expert funding agencies to evaluate how quickly providers can deliver.
    Public safety and first responders: As noted above, first 
responders rely on mobile networks as they go in harm's way to protect 
the public. Fiber to the premise will not help them as they race to put 
out fires, deliver health care in ambulances that can become a mobile 
emergency room with 5G, or protect the public from crimes in progress. 
Public safety has always and will always rely on mobile networks. 
Service to those who serve us should be a priority goal established by 
Congress for funding agencies.
    Battling climate change: As noted above, broadband and digital 
technologies can contribute to solving the crisis of climate change. 
Wireless broadband and 5G solutions play a particularly strong role 
given the need for wide-area coverage, mobility and distributed IoT 
applications. Congress can set as a priority factor that funding 
agencies consider the degree to which the proposed project will 
contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions. Again, if only 
wireline technology can be considered, Congress could tie agencies' 
hands in terms of considering the full range of options to achieve this 
clear priority. Let the best technology win. Target unserved areas: 
Congress should target funds to truly unserved areas as defined by the 
FCC as lacking broadband service. To close the broadband gap, define 
``unserved'' as those locations lacking service delivered through 
either wired or wireless technology. Accurate broadband maps are needed 
that take into consideration areas with already committed build plans 
so that support is targeted where it is needed.
    Congress can also reduce barriers to deployment by creating 
incentives for local jurisdictions who are able to demonstrate 5G and 
broadband readiness through siting-friendly rules such as the adoption 
of efficient, simplified processes, and cost-based access to the right 
of way. WIA supports a priority for funding to communities that 
demonstrate 5G and broadband readiness by implementing streamlined and 
cost-based access to the rights-of-way. Importantly, Congress can 
maximize the value of broadband investments, address concerns of city 
leaders about aesthetics and disruption to communities, reduce 
environmental impact, and speed deployment by prioritizing the use of 
existing infrastructure. Policies, like those Congress approved in Sec. 
6409 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 to 
prioritize the use of existing infrastructure, and dig once policies 
that are widely supported for fiber deployment, are prime examples. 
This ensures that networks can be deployed expeditiously while 
recipients are held accountable for outcomes.
    Affordability: As the technological capabilities of mobile devices 
continue to grow to rival traditional computers, many users have 
decided to prioritize their mobile connections over fixed.\50\ This 
choice is most clear among rural and low-income Americans, the majority 
of individuals who identify as ``smartphone only users.'' \51\ In rural 
America, nearly one in five residents has decided to rely solely on 
their wireless devices for broadband, while over one in four Americans 
who make less than thirty thousand dollars a year have made the switch 
to smartphone only; the same is true for those that have a high school 
degree or less.\52\ All of these groups, and all Americans, would 
benefit from an upgrade to 5G to support their choice. If FTTH is the 
only choice, millions of rural Americans would need to spend an 
additional $75 a month, or more, for a wireline connection that they 
already decided they do not want or cannot afford.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Monica Anderson, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2019, 
Pew Research Ctr. (June 13, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/2019/06/13/mobile-technology-and-home-broadband-2019/ (stating 
45 percent of non-broadband users said they do not have a connection at 
home because their smartphone meets all of their online needs).
    \51\ Andrew Perrin, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2021, Pew 
Research Ctr. (June 3, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2021/06/03/mobile-technology-and-home-broadband-2021/ (providing a 
demographic breakdown of smartphone only users).
    \52\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress should build on steps it has taken in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2021 that established an Emergency Broadband 
Connectivity Fund of $3.2 billion to help Americans afford Internet 
service during the pandemic. It should fund a permanent affordability 
support program with sufficient subsidies to ensure low-income families 
obtain quality broadband. Saddling consumers with the need to purchase 
a new wireline service on top of their smartphone connection could 
unnecessarily add to the burden of large ongoing Federal subsidies 
because few low-income consumers are willing to give up their 
smartphone and the mobility it provides.
    Cost efficiency: Technological flexibility can also provide 
consumers with the most megabits for the taxpayer dollar. The wireless 
industry is committed to closing the digital divide and has an 
indispensable role to play. Fiber is critical, yet it is one of many 
tools for closing the digital divide. The last mile--or last 10 miles 
in some cases in rural America--is most costly to provide with fiber, 
when simply connecting fiber to a tower for mobile or fixed wireless 
can cover many premises for a fraction of the cost and in a much 
shorter time. To provide connectivity to all communities, every 
broadband technology can contribute based on a community's specific 
needs and the capabilities of existing providers.
    Wireless broadband is an economically efficient solution that must 
be considered as part of the plan. When considering barriers to 
deployment, including the capital expenditure required to reach each 
new subscriber, time to market, and physical limitations of deploying 
infrastructure across diverse terrains, wireless service that covers 
long distances in some cases makes more sense than a home-by-home 
approach.
    Underground fiber deployments must consider a myriad of factors to 
ensure the longevity of the deployment, all of which add to cost and 
time for completion of a project. In coastal cities and areas prone to 
flooding, deployments must work around the water table often digging 
deeper to avoid water damage. In some of our hardiest states, including 
Alaska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Dakotas, frost lines can require 
deployments to bury conduit six feet underground or deeper.\53\ Soil 
and buried obstacles also play a role in determining speed and cost. 
For example, clay is harder to excavate than other soils and may 
contain rocky particles that can impinge on conduit, requiring 
additional hardening.\54\ Unexpected tree roots and boulders are also 
sources of significant delays.\55\ While insulated from some weather 
patterns and physical disruption, underground deployments are simply 
not technologically or economically feasible in all situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Frost Line by State 2021, World Population Review, https://
worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/frost-lines-by-state (last 
visited June 17, 2021).
    \54\ The Complete Guide to Fiber to the Premises Deployment, PPC at 
8 (2020), https://www.ppc-online.com/fiber-to-the-premises-ebook.
    \55\ See Joe Byrne, Key Factors When Choosing Between Buried and 
Aerial Fiber Deployments, PPC https://www.ppc-online.com/blog/key-
factors-when-choosing-between-buried-and-aerial-fiber-deployments (last 
visited June 17, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Workforce development: Another source of broadband deployment delay 
is the lack of a sufficient skilled workforce. To help ensure a diverse 
pipeline of job-ready workers ready for these jobs, Congress should 
take bold action to invest in registered apprenticeships and evidence-
based job training and support.
    Today, registered apprenticeship in the broadband industry is new 
and would quickly need resources to scale to the level needed to 
support the level of funding contemplated by Congress and the Biden 
Administration. To solve this ``good problem'' from creating high-wage, 
high-skilled jobs, and to increase the efficiency, equity, and success 
of a broadband infrastructure investment, a corresponding initiative is 
needed to develop and diversify the broadband workforce through 
additional support for registered apprenticeships and the educational 
and training system. An immediate expansion of education and skills 
training will create a pipeline for broadband infrastructure jobs in a 
growing industry of the future.
Conclusion
    Every community, regardless of size, location, or geography 
deserves broadband service. Congress has an extraordinary opportunity 
to expand digital inclusion and take dramatic steps to bridge the 
digital divide. Industry and the government must step up to meet this 
moment. This is no small task and will take every tool available. We 
must ensure the rapid deployment of networks that can meet consumer 
demands. We must ensure that these networks work in all scenarios from 
natural disasters to pandemics.
    While no technology alone will meet all these needs, wireless 
broadband is a key component of a resilient broadband network. With its 
distributed architecture, wireless broadband is inherently resistant to 
disruption; if one node goes down, traffic is rerouted to nearby 
antennas. Further, during times of disaster, we turn to wireless assets 
to help supplement telecommunications and broadband services, keeping 
people informed, allowing them to contact emergency services, and 
allowing first responders to coordinate efforts. Beyond today, wireless 
technology, particularly 5G, will allow for revolutionary, and life-
saving applications in disaster preparedness and response. These 
applications will directly contribute to U.S. commitments to mitigate 
climate change through increasing energy efficiency and will mitigate 
the frequency and severity of future disasters. Deploying this 
technology will also create millions of jobs across the country, many 
of which will not require a college degree. These jobs will elevate 
individuals as they build their own communities, providing 
opportunities and services that will benefit everyone. Congress can 
maximize this potential with support for registered apprenticeships and 
training for the telecommunications workforce.
    Realizing these benefits and bridging the digital divide will take 
continued, dedicated efforts by the entire telecommunications industry 
and the Federal government. WIA and its members stand ready to deliver.
    Wireless broadband helps to drive America's innovation economy and 
fuels the Nation's economic future. The U.S. has always been the global 
leader in wireless innovation. Broadband infrastructure legislation 
offers a unique opportunity to increase network resiliency if Congress 
designs the program with sufficient flexibility to address it and other 
Congressional priorities such as combatting climate change.
    That is why the leadership of this Subcommittee is so critical. WIA 
appreciates the opportunity to partner with the Subcommittee in 
addressing these important issues. We are deeply grateful for the 
bipartisan recognition of the importance of infrastructure by this 
Subcommittee, by Congress, by the FCC, and the Biden Administration. 
All have implemented policies to promote wireless broadband deployment, 
and all are working to build on recent successes.
    Thank you again, Chairman Lujan and Ranking Member Thune, for 
holding this hearing and inviting me to testify. I look forward to 
continuing to work with you and the rest of the Subcommittee to make 
real progress on these very important issues.

    Senator Lujan. Thank you so very much, Mr. Adelstein. Next, 
we are going to hear from Mr. Denny Law, the Chief Executive 
Officer and General Manager, from Golden West 
Telecommunications from Wall, South Dakota. The floor is yours 
for five minutes, sir.

 STATEMENT OF DENNY LAW, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GOLDEN WEST 
              TELECOMMUNICATIONS COOPERATIVE, INC.

    Mr. Law. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune, 
members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to 
participate in today's hearing on network resiliency.
    For over a century, Golden West has provided communications 
services to rural South Dakota. Today, we have more than 30,000 
accounts, located across a geographic area, the size of 
Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware combined. That 
is fewer than 2 customers per square mile. In addition to 
robust service for consumers and businesses within our 
territory, we serve several Tribal reservations, numerous 
anchor institutions, including schools and hospitals, VA 
facilities, and five Public Safety Answering Points.
    Golden 111--The Rural Broadband Association, which 
represents approximately 850 rural, community-based carriers 
like Golden West that offer advanced communications services 
throughout the most sparsely populated areas of the Nation. We 
operate in deeply rural markets where the cost of deploying and 
operating networks is high and a tailored approach to managing 
risk and resiliency, as necessary, to create sustainable 
networks.
    The first step to achieving resilient and reliable 
communications services begins with the network infrastructure. 
Golden West technology infrastructure is designed with 
resiliency in mind, including the construction of hardened 
buildings to withstand extreme weather conditions, large banks 
of redundant batteries in every network office, that are also 
backed up by standby generators.
    Golden West has also invested in physically diverse fiber 
routes, connecting to each of our network offices, coupled with 
redundant electronics with multiple connections to prevent 
large numbers of customers from being isolated from Golden 
West's local networks. We have also established connections to 
statewide fiber networks that provide middle mile transport and 
added redundant connections to separate Internet points of 
presence where possible.
    To mitigate the cost of purchasing this capacity from 
larger regional or national carriers, SDN Communications--an 
entity owned by Golden West--and a number of other small 
community-based providers in South Dakota enables connectivity 
between rural South Dakota and the rest of the world. SDN was 
created 30 years ago to connect rural markets to better long 
distance telephone service. And today, it is because of SDN's 
50,000-mile fiber network, that Golden West customers do not 
get isolated from the world in the event of a fiber cut, or a 
single network disruption.
    Deployment of cheaper technologies than fiber, often sounds 
attractive in rural markets. But it comes at a different kind 
of cost. Technology that causes connectivity to be spotty when 
it rains or snows, suffers from degradation or complete 
shutdown in extreme temperatures, and counters line of sight 
issues with seasonal foliage growth, or have network components 
exposed to the elements, may be less expensive to install 
initially.
    But those technologies often come with a higher operating 
cost over time, and lack the kind of reliability for essential 
functions, which could leave consumers without the ability to 
dial 911 during a hurricane, because the underlying network 
does not perform reliably in the rain.
    Another leading threat to network resiliency involves 
security. Each day, our networks can face the same security 
threats and denial of service attacks as the larger national 
broadband providers. To help mitigate those risks, Golden West, 
again, partnered with SDN to collectively deploy distributed 
denial of service protection across our networks.
    Knowing where to monitor, or take steps to manage risk on a 
network, can be the hardest part for many smaller providers. To 
support those efforts, NTCA created Cybershare which, among 
other things, is an information sharing center that provides 
access to daily threat indicators and a weekly technical 
analysis for small broadband providers, like Golden West.
    Finally, while high cost is the most imposing obstacle to 
deploying and maintaining reliable broadband in rural areas, 
other barriers can affect the ability to achieve resiliency, 
redundancy, and security objectives, including permitting 
delays or other access issues, like crossing railroads, supply 
chain shortages for critical communications equipment such as 
fiber or customer premise equipment, and shortages of skilled 
telecommunications workers, that help all providers deploy or 
repair networks.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, thank you for this 
opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your 
questions later.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Law follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Denny Law, Chief Executive Officer, Golden West 
                  Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc.
    Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's 
hearing focused on building resilient networks.
    I am Denny Law, Chief Executive Officer of Golden West 
Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc. in Wall, South Dakota. For over a 
century, Golden West and its subsidiaries have provided communications 
services to rural South Dakota, starting in 1916 with the stringing of 
a telephone line along fence posts. Today, Golden West has more than 
30,000 accounts, including 29,000 broadband subscribers and nearly 
9,000 cable television customers. Our customers are located across 
24,500 square miles--an area approximately the size of Maryland, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware combined--which equates to fewer than 
2 customers per square mile. In addition to robust service for 
consumers and businesses within our territory, we serve numerous anchor 
institutions, including 73 K-12 schools, 62 health clinics and 
hospitals, 20 libraries, five Veterans Administration facilities, and 
five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs).
    Golden West is a member of NTCA--The Rural Broadband Association 
(NTCA), which represents approximately 850 rural, community-based 
carriers like Golden West that offer advanced communications services 
throughout the most sparsely populated areas of the Nation. All NTCA 
members are fixed voice and broadband providers, and many members also 
provide mobile, video, and other communications-related services in 
their communities. Operators like those in NTCA's membership serve less 
than five percent of the population of the United States but cover 
about one third of its landmass. We operate in rural areas left behind 
decades ago when networks were first being built out by other service 
providers because the markets were too sparsely populated, too high 
cost, or just too difficult to serve in terms of terrain. In the vast 
majority of these rural areas, companies like Golden West are the only 
full-service fixed communications networks available.
    Despite the challenges of distance and density, Golden West and its 
fellow small broadband providers have led the charge in deploying 
advanced communications infrastructure that responds to consumer and 
business demands and connects rural America with the rest of the world. 
In rural America, broadband infrastructure enables economic development 
and job creation not only in agriculture, but for any other industry or 
enterprise that requires advanced connections to operate in today's 
economy. Yet those networks need to keep pace with consumer demand and 
provide reliable connections that deliver consistent performance for 
users when they depend on those services the most. Throughout the 
pandemic, as Americans worked and learned from home, consumers drove up 
network bandwidth usage and demand. Golden West and other small rural 
operators were able to meet those demands thanks to years of network 
investments and upgrades in robust and reliable networks.
    Yet, for all our progress to date, we still have more work to do in 
deploying and operating this critical infrastructure, as too many rural 
consumers still lack sufficient connectivity altogether. And, even 
where networks exist, operators face the challenges of: (1) sustaining 
and upgrading them to keep pace with consumer demand; (2) delivering 
affordable services that can be relied upon both for everyday functions 
that have become increasingly important during the pandemic; (3) 
ensuring users have access to them in the face of emergencies that may 
range from extreme heat or cold to wildfires, earthquakes, or other 
natural disasters; and (4) taking reasonable steps to manage risk and 
promote the security of networks from intrusions of all kinds.
    In short, network deployment is an essential goal and a condition 
precedent to achieving national connectivity objectives, which includes 
making sure that these networks are there for consumers in their times 
of greatest need. But the job is not done when the network is built, as 
community-based providers like Golden West and other smaller rural 
broadband providers know all too well. Living in the communities we 
serve, we can see firsthand how the decisions we make and the measures 
we implement affect our neighbors, friends, and family, and we 
therefore have substantial incentive to do what we can to make sure 
they have access to the best possible communications services. At the 
same time, however, the fact is that we operate in deeply rural markets 
where the costs of deploying and operating networks can be higher, and 
a tailored approach to managing risk, resiliency, and redundancy is 
necessary to create sustainable networks that provide services 
customers can afford. In this testimony I will provide examples of the 
kinds of measures we take--starting with network architecture and 
deployment and continuing through ongoing operations--to promote the 
availability of robust and reliable communications services for our 
users.
Network Resiliency Starts with Smart Network Investment
    As an initial matter, networks must address the rising demand of 
consumers' bandwidth needs and be easily scalable to meet that demand. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the essential nature of high-
speed download and upload connectivity for every American, whether at 
work or at home. For years, small rural community-based providers like 
Golden West have seen that high-speed broadband facilitates so much 
more than just downstream applications like streaming video 
entertainment, and the value of these other uses (and a network capable 
of supporting them) have been recognized and realized more widely now 
during the pandemic. Indeed, many Americans now realize the importance 
of robust broadband in connecting with a doctor without traveling to 
the medical office or hospital and for students to continue their 
education even when the classroom is hundreds of miles away or just 
right down the street but closed. A high-capacity network capable of 
handling significant upload speeds is also critical for people to 
continue receiving paychecks by working remotely using secure and 
bandwidth-intensive virtual private networks. Additionally higher 
upload speeds enable better two-way capability and network performance 
that not only allows us to video conference during the work day, but to 
maintain social interactions with friends, family, and other loved 
ones.
    A robust network is also important of course to accommodate the 
needs of public safety--and the public served by first responders and 
other professionals in the case of emergencies. Deployment of cheaper 
technologies often sounds attractive in rural markets, but it comes at 
a different kind of cost. Connectivity that is spotty when it rains, 
unreliable when it snows, suffers from degradation or complete shutdown 
in higher or lower temperatures, encounters line-of-sight issues when 
foliage grows back on trees, or has network components exposed to the 
elements may be less expensive to install initially, but these 
technologies often come with higher operating costs over time, are 
often unable to keep pace with ever-escalating consumer demand, and 
lack the kind of reliability that one wants for the conduct of everyday 
life such as telework, remote learning, or telemedicine, and especially 
in the case of an emergency. In short, no one wants to be in the 
position of being unable to access 911 in the event of a hurricane 
because the underlying network does not perform reliably in the rain.
    Golden West and other small rural broadband providers have used a 
variety of methods over the years to deploy service and, as a result, 
have gained first-hand experience with the differing capabilities and 
shortcomings of certain technologies. As we look to future needs of our 
customers and our communities, we have taken aggressive steps to focus 
on anticipated increases in usage and make network choices that will 
give our communities that they can rely upon for essential functions 
such as working or learning from home--and to reach public safety or 
others in the event of emergencies. Put plainly, we are investing in 
more and more fiber technology to meet that demand. Golden West has 
invested in physically-diverse fiber routes connecting to each Golden 
West network office, coupled with redundant electronics with multiple 
connections to the network to prevent large numbers of customers from 
being isolated from Golden West's local network.
    In addition to continuing to deploy ``last mile'' fiber as fast as 
we can where we can, we have taken measures to establish robust and 
reliable connections to statewide fiber networks that provide ``middle 
mile transport'' between our local communities and the rest of the 
world, and by adding redundant connections to separate Internet points-
of-presence where possible. SDN Communications, an entity owned by 
Golden West and a number of other small community-based providers in 
South Dakota, was created 30 years ago to help connect rural markets to 
better long distance telephone service and today it has a 50,000-mile 
fiber network that enables more robust broadband data connectivity 
between rural South Dakota and the rest of the world. In partnership 
with SDN, Golden West maintains multiple connections to the Internet 
backbone to ensure Golden West customers do not get isolated from the 
world in the event of a fiber cut or single network disruption.
    Efforts to deploy more robust and resilient networks, however, come 
at a cost. Whether we are talking about wired or wireless networks, 
building redundancy and greater resiliency into networks--especially in 
rural areas where distances are great and densities are low--can be a 
challenge. For example, redundancy in a wireless network translates to 
placement of more antennas or towers and more backhaul capacity such as 
fiber. Similarly, burying fiber provides relatively greater resiliency 
and security for both wired connections themselves and for the wireless 
services that depend upon that fiber foundation. Indeed, one must not 
overlook how critical a fiber foundation is to every kind of 
communications technology--wired or wireless. Fiber not only offers the 
most efficient and economical means of meeting consumer demand well 
into the future,\1\ but it also is essential to our Nation's 5G future. 
As the Wireless Infrastructure Association aptly captured in a report 
last year, ``The buzz around 5G focuses on the wireless aspect of the 
technology. However, the connectivity it advances is only made possible 
by extremely dense fiber networks.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See BROADBAND TODAY: Rural America's Critical Connection, 
Foundation for Rural Service (Mar. 8, 2021) (``BROADBAND TODAY''), 
available at: https://www.ntca.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021-
02/Rural%20America%27s%20Critical%20Connection%20--%20FRS%20
White%20Paper.pdf.
    \2\ Fiber, An Essential Facet of the Connected Community, WIA 
Innovation & Technology Council (Jul. 22, 2020), p. 4, available at: 
https://wia.org/wp-content/uploads/Fiber-v3-1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But burying wires to fulfill the needs of users for better and more 
reliable wired and wireless connections alike can often be more costly 
than if one were to string aerial fiber on poles--and in certain parts 
of the country, it is difficult to impossible at this point to bury 
fiber for a variety of logistical, environmental, and economic reasons. 
Similarly, procuring redundant connections to distant peering points 
hundreds if not thousands of miles away for Internet connectivity is 
expensive, and it is a cost that is not entirely under our control as 
many smaller providers must purchase such capacity from larger regional 
or national operators. In a number of rural states, smaller operators 
have taken steps to mitigate such costs by banding together to form 
statewide fiber networks; as noted above, and Golden West is proud to 
be a member of SDN Communications one of the earliest such statewide 
collaborative ventures that today provides robust connections to 
multiple Tier 1 Internet backbone providers. Nonetheless, even as we 
have taken these great strides to become more efficient while putting 
into place such redundancy and promoting the reliability of our 
connections to the rest of the world, we still are forced to rely 
upon--and pay--the Tier 1 operators.
    Local providers like Golden West are well-positioned to assess the 
balance needed in investment strategies and have sound incentives to do 
all they reasonably can to ensure the communities they serve have 
services they can depend upon. Our commitment can be seen in the 
efforts we have made to deploy the best possible networks. Indeed, as 
NTCA's annual broadband survey confirms year after year, small 
community-based providers like Golden West have consistently led the 
charge in rural broadband deployment, with the most recent report 
indicating that nearly two-thirds of NTCA members' rural customers have 
access to fiber-to-the-premises connectivity and speeds in excess of 
100 Mbps. Golden West is in the midst of a multi-year upgrade to 
replace our decades-old copper network with fiber optics. With more 
than 14,000 network route miles within South Dakota, at the end of 2021 
we will have successfully completed 70 percent of the copper network 
replacement with fiber optic service. This is the kind of connectivity 
that provides a reliable foundation for users when emergencies strike 
and a platform for community development and sustainability in rural 
areas that face many other challenges as well.
    Nonetheless, because of the higher costs of operating in rural 
areas, there is a need for governmental support to make the business 
case work and ultimately to support the kinds of networks that will 
provide greater resiliency, reliability, redundancy, and capability for 
rural users. Smaller rural telecom providers like Golden West have long 
leveraged support from the High-Cost Universal Service Fund (USF) 
overseen by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Rural 
Utilities Service (RUS) loans through the Department of Agriculture in 
concert to deploy advanced telecommunications services in the most 
rural areas of the United States. Many smaller providers have 
successfully leveraged a mix of funds from these programs and private 
investment to deploy robust broadband to millions of homes, businesses, 
farms, and anchor institutions including public safety entities. While 
RUS lending programs have helped to finance the substantial upfront 
costs of network deployment, the USF High-Cost Fund helps make the 
business case for construction and sustains ongoing operations at 
affordable rates. More specifically, USF by law aims to ensure 
``reasonably comparable'' services are available at ``reasonably 
comparable'' rates.
    Both the RUS loan programs and the FCC's USF programs are therefore 
critical to the deployment of the best possible networks in rural areas 
that meet the objectives of this Subcommittee and other policymakers 
when it comes to network performance and reliability. It is worth 
noting, however, that these programs are limited in their resources. 
Indeed, at times over the past decade, we have seen caps and even cuts 
in support enacted to the FCC programs in particular that have 
undermined, rather than furthered, the goal of deploying more robust 
and reliable networks more deeply into rural areas. In fact, we even 
saw for a time some policies that encouraged providers not to invest in 
network deployment as rapidly or that penalized perceived ``gold-
plating'' of networks that would be more robust and reliable--these 
caps and constraints certainly did not place value on the notion of 
redundant connections or help in spurring their deployment. In recent 
years, however, steps have been taken to enhance and address such 
concerns in these programs, but the fundamental point remains--rural 
broadband is not easy, it faces challenges of distance and density that 
make it higher cost than deploying and operating networks in an urban 
or suburban area, and without sufficient and predictable support, the 
goal of promoting resilient and redundant networks in rural American 
will be far more difficult to achieve.
Ongoing Efforts to Promote Resilient, Reliable, and More Secure 
        Networks
    Often, the primary focus in national broadband discussions is on 
the one-time act of building networks while insufficient attention is 
paid to what comes next. Once built, networks must be maintained, 
upgraded, and made useful over their entire lives, or those investment 
could be wasted or ultimately become incapable of meeting consumer 
demands whether in everyday life or in the context of an emergency. 
Services must be delivered over that infrastructure on an ongoing 
basis, at rates that are affordable enough for consumers to make good 
use of them and at consistent and reliable levels of performance. 
Maintenance must be performed, customer calls must be answered, 
``middle mile'' capacity to reach distant Internet points of presence 
must be procured, and upgrades must be made to facilities and 
electronics to enable services to keep pace with consumer demand and 
business needs. Constant concerns arise too in the form of bad weather, 
natural disasters, and third-party risks that make it important both to 
make sound choices in what kinds of networks to deploy in the first 
instance and then how those networks will be managed over time.
    All of this bears witness to the fact that as policymakers consider 
how best to promote broadband access going forward, we need to consider 
not only current demand, but also reliability and future projections 
for performance. When being built--or being funded--networks must 
account for potential surges or shifts in utilization and how demands 
on networks continue to increase at astounding rates. The pandemic has 
certainly highlighted the need for such advance planning and 
forethought, with a recent report indicating that broadband providers 
saw a 40 percent increase in broadband usage between the end of 2019 
and 2020 and estimating that around 30 percent of the modern workforce 
could be working from home multiple days a week by as soon as the end 
of 2021, creating a permanent demand for higher speeds and upload 
capacity.\3\ Similarly, OpenVault has found that upstream broadband 
that upstream broadband traffic increased by 63 percent from December 
2019 to December 2020,\4\ underscoring the shifts in network 
utilization and the need for reliable networks that will deliver 
consistent performance for those working, learning, or seeking medical 
assistance from home. Golden West's network usage during the pandemic 
experienced dramatic changes. In the span of just 90 days from January 
2020 to April 2020, Golden West's overall network usage increased by 25 
percent, and the bandwidth usage for upstream alone increased by 41 
percent in that time. Golden West's network was able to withstand the 
sudden and unpredicted increase in usage and our customers were able to 
seamlessly transition to their remote work and education activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ BROADBAND TODAY, pp. 2, 15.
    \4\ Dan O'Shea, Pandemic Drove Upstream Broadband Traffic Boom: 
OpenVault, Fierce Telecom (April 1, 2021, 12:46 PM), https://
www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/pandemic-drove-upstream-broadband-
traffic-boom-openvault.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fortunately, networks like those built by Golden West, SDN, and 
other providers based in rural America were architected to meet such 
demands brought on by shifting consumer and business usage. Indeed, as 
NTCA's annual broadband survey confirms year after year, NTCA members 
have led the charge in rural broadband deployment, with the most recent 
report indicating that nearly two-thirds of their rural customers have 
access to fiber-to-the-premises connectivity and speeds in excess of 
100 Mbps. Throughout the pandemic, NTCA members reported that their 
networks performed as designed, without congestion or disruption 
despite unprecedented increases in demand.
    Continued growth in demand is expected to increase significantly in 
coming years, such that peak demand for a family of four is projected 
to exceed 400 Mbps symmetric in just seven years, with bandwidth needs 
accelerating in the years after that.\5\ These imminent increases are 
anticipated due to an array of new technologies that hold substantial 
promise for consumers and businesses alike, such as greatly improved 
virtual education, telemedicine, agriculture, business, security, and 
entertainment. Golden West submits that federally funded broadband 
programs should therefore focus on the consumer experience and the 
long-term implications for rural communities by requiring the 
deployment of networks that in a decade or more will still deliver 
reliable and resilient services that consumers can depend upon. More 
specifically, we believe that fiber represents the best choice of 
network technologies to promote reliability in meeting these demands 
and ensuring that users have reliable access to public safety and other 
essential services as well. We also support an increase in the minimum 
broadband deployment performance benchmark to at least a symmetrical 
speed of 100 Mbps/100 Mbps to ensure that federally supported networks 
will meet the future needs of consumers. Any funding programs going 
forward should generally aim to ensure that new deployments perform at 
least at this speed threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See Comments of The Fiber Broadband Association, GN Docket No. 
20-269 (fil. Sep. 18, 2020), pp. 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The same reasoning with respect to ``planning ahead'' and not 
treating the job as done once the network is built in the first 
instance follows with respect to promoting network reliability, 
resiliency, and security. Achieving these objectives in more rural 
areas turns not just upon the kind of network built--although that is 
certainly an important factor for the reasons discussed above--but also 
on the efforts made to operate and upgrade that network over time. 
Golden West's technology infrastructure is designed with resiliency in 
mind, including the construction of hardened buildings to withstand 
extreme weather conditions and large banks of redundant batteries in 
every network office that are also backed up by standby generators. For 
all of our customers that are served directly by fiber optics, Golden 
West installs UPS batteries at customer's homes and businesses to 
ensure performance during limited power interruptions.
    Golden West and smaller broadband providers also take seriously 
network security. On a daily basis, our networks can face the same 
security threats of intrusion and denial of service attacks as the 
larger, nationally known broadband providers. As one example of the 
measures we take to help mitigate these risks, Golden West has 
partnered with SDN Communications and its other members to collectively 
deploy Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection across our 
respective networks. More broadly, smaller rural network owners again 
have sound incentives to take reasonable steps to secure their 
operations and manage risks given that any threats to their networks 
affect the communities in which they live and work--any incidents can 
affect their own homes and their friends, family, and neighbors. The 
hardest part for many smaller providers can simply be monitoring 
threats and taking reasonable steps to manage risk. To enable and 
empower such efforts, NTCA has worked with a number of members and 
collaborated with other stakeholders in a variety of ways to raise 
awareness of cybersecurity issues and to provide tools and actionable 
information to members regarding cyber risks. Such efforts include 
participation on the Executive Committee of the Communications Sector 
Coordinating Council and co-chairing of the Small and Medium-Size 
Business Working Group organized under the Information and 
Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force. NTCA 
also hosts an annual Cyber Summit for members and other small broadband 
providers that often includes presenters from key agencies such as the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Finally, NTCA created 
CyberShare: The Small Broadband Provider Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center, a member of the National Council of Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers, that among other things provides access 
to daily threat indicators curated for smaller operators' needs along 
with weekly technical analysis and bi-monthly calls in which providers 
can share experiences and resources.
    It is worth noting again, however, that these efforts do not come 
at a small cost in rural America. As noted earlier, Golden West's 
serving area is 24,500 square miles--roughly equal in scale to 
Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware combined. Dispatching 
technicians to address network resiliency or redundancy needs across 
such a wide swath of rural America is not easy, and recovering the 
costs of doing so from 30,000 customers stretched across this vast 
terrain would render services unaffordable. For this reason, I must 
emphasize again the significance of predictable and sufficient ongoing 
USF support for smaller operators--without such resources, efforts to 
promote greater resiliency, redundancy, and security in rural networks 
will run headfirst into the economic realities of operating in areas 
where there are at most a handful of customers per square mile.
Other Considerations
    While high costs are perhaps the most imposing obstacle to 
deploying and maintaining reliable broadband in rural areas, other 
barriers can affect the ability to achieve resiliency, redundancy, and 
security objectives. Several of these are discussed below.
Permitting Delays
    Infrastructure investment depends on prompt acquisition or receipt 
of permissions to build networks. Roadblocks, delays, and increased 
costs associated with permitting and approval processes are 
particularly problematic for Golden West and other NTCA members, each 
of which is a small business that operates only in rural areas where 
construction projects are undertaken over wide swaths of land. The time 
involved in obtaining construction permits can take substantial amounts 
of time, undermining the ability to plan for and deploy broadband 
infrastructure--especially in those areas of the country with shorter 
construction seasons due to winter temperatures that freeze the soil 
and prevent any excavation for burying fiber. Additionally, in some 
areas of the country, obtaining reasonable terms and conditions for 
attaching network facilities to poles that are owned and operated by 
other entities or for installing fiber near or under railroad crossings 
can result in long delays and costly fees charged to providers seeking 
to build out networks to rural communities lacking service. These can 
all affect both the timing for and economics of deploying resilient 
networks, and redundant facilities in particular.
    Navigating complicated application and review processes within 
individual Federal land-managing and property-managing agencies can be 
burdensome for any network provider, but particularly the smaller 
network operators that serve the most rural portions of the country. 
The lack of coordination and standardization in application and 
approval processes across Federal agencies further complicates the 
deployment of broadband infrastructure. Congress should look to 
implement the recommendations of the FCC's Broadband Deployment 
Advisory Committee's Streamlining Federal Siting Working Group final 
report issued in January 2018.\6\ NTCA participated in the development 
of these recommendations, which address streamlining of environmental 
and historical reviews and application review periods, among other 
pertinent recommendations in removing further regulatory barriers to 
broadband deployment. Such measures will be critical to the deployment 
and sustainability of wired and wireless networks alike, all of which 
rely in many rural areas upon robust fiber backbones that must often 
traverse Federal lands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee, Streamlining Federal 
Siting Working Group, Final Report, Federal Communications Commission, 
(Jan. 23-24, 2018), available at: https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/
files/bdac-federalsiting-01232018.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Addressing Supply Chain Concerns
    In recent years, Congress has provided significant funding through 
several agencies to deploy broadband infrastructure with the goal of 
bridging the digital divide. However, as broadband providers construct 
these networks, it is important to monitor the status of the 
communications supply chain. Many have been rightly focused on supply 
chain security in recent years--but there is a looming concern about 
supply chain resiliency as well, and this has the potential to 
undermine national objectives to deploy the best possible networks to 
as many Americans as possible in the coming years.
    Specifically, NTCA members are beginning to report significant 
backlogs for critical communications equipment like fiber, routers, 
antennas, network terminals, and customer premise equipment--ranging 
from several weeks to more than one year. As an example, Golden West is 
now finalizing our 2022 network and fiber optic buildout plans. As 
recently as last week, our fiber optic suppliers have indicated the 
delivery date for fiber-optics is 42 to 65 weeks out. Delays in 
production of necessary equipment appear to be related to both 
increased demand for broadband investment as well as ongoing effects of 
the pandemic. To ensure that existing and new infrastructure 
initiatives are as successful as possible in responding to consumer 
needs and demands, we believe it is important that the Federal 
government work closely and directly with manufacturers, distributors, 
and other suppliers to avoid disruptions in the communications supply 
chain. For these reasons, while there has been a great deal of focus on 
the security of our supply chains, we strongly encourage Congress to 
consider supply chain resiliency as a key component of delivering on 
national broadband objectives.
Workforce Development
    We also recommend Congress help in the development of a skilled 
telecommunications workforce that can help providers of all sizes 
deploy robust networks and help to keep them resilient and more secure. 
Earlier this year, NTCA and a number of other telecommunications 
associations sent a letter to the White House regarding how the United 
States currently faces a shortfall of skilled workers needed to ensure 
the deployment of robust fiber, mobile, and fixed wireless networks. A 
concerted effort by industry and government will likely be needed to 
develop a skilled workforce able to deploy next generation wired and 
wireless networks. To develop the telecommunications jobs needed, 
Congress could help by bolstering the capabilities of institutions of 
higher education and other institutions and providing support for 
employers to expand registered apprenticeships and associated technical 
instruction and certification costs. Several legislative proposals, 
including Senator Thune's Telecommunications Skilled Workforce Act, 
which would establish an interagency working group to develop 
telecommunications industry workforce solutions, or Senators Wicker and 
Sinema's Improving Minority Participation and Careers in 
Telecommunications Act to address this need by awarding grants to 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Tribal Colleges and 
Universities for workforce training, could go a long way in achieving 
this goal. We cannot build the networks of tomorrow without a skilled 
and diverse workforce today.
Conclusion
    Community-based providers like Golden West are deeply committed to 
the customers we serve and, given our experience and success in serving 
the most rural areas, we are critical components of any strategy 
seeking to achieve the Nation's broadband goals. We look forward to 
working with policymakers and other stakeholders to ensure that all 
Americans have access to sustainable and affordable networks that 
successfully manage risk, resiliency, and redundancy, so that those 
services are available when needed the most.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and for the 
Subcommittee's commitment to broadband infrastructure investment in 
rural America.

    Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Law, and it is very 
impressive what you all have built out there, as well. And 
again, thank you so much for being with us today.
    Next, we are going to hear from Mr. Harold Feld, who is the 
Senior Vice President with Public Knowledge, here in 
Washington, DC. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF HAROLD FELD, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC 
                           KNOWLEDGE

    Mr. Feld. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune. 
Thank you for inviting me to testify today on this important 
subject.
    As our economy and society have gone digital, our 
dependence on our communications networks has increased 
exponentially. Some of us may remember a time growing up, when 
the whole family shared a single telephone line. Today, nearly 
all of us have cell phones, sometimes more than one. And our 
digital communication does not stop there. At any given time, 
parents may be working remotely, while their children attend 
different virtual classrooms. Even our houses and devices may 
depend on constant connection with the Internet to function 
properly.
    But as our dependence on constant connectivity has grown, 
our networks have become more fragile. Those who grew up with 
the one telephone line to the home, will remember that it 
worked regularly and reliably, every time you called someone. 
Even in a blackout, as long as the copper lines remained 
connected, you could call family to make sure everyone was all 
right, call 911 if you had an emergency, and call the power 
company to ask how long until the power came back on.
    Today, we can wake up on a sunny day to discover that a cut 
fiber cable, or misconfigured router, has cutoff everything 
from our phone service to our video streams. An electric 
blackout, caused by a brutal heatwave, can now knock out 
communications when people desperately need to reach 911. A 
hurricane or wildfire can shut down phone and Internet in a 
geographic region for weeks, or even months. This is especially 
true for island communities and other geographically isolate 
communities, as we saw not only after Maria, but also after 
Sandy and Katrina.
    How did this happen? Briefly, our rules have not kept pace 
with changes in technology. The traditional copper network was 
reliable because we chose to make it reliable. We have not made 
this choice for our current IP based and mobile networks. To 
the contrary, our aggressive regulation has left us 
increasingly unable to address the threat of our fragile 
network ecosystem.
    The FCC has systemically divested itself of its authority 
to take the necessary leadership role by refusing to clarify 
the regulatory status of interconnected voiceover IP carriers, 
and by reclassifying broadband as a Title I information 
service. The FCC has rolled back its cybersecurity initiatives, 
at times claiming that it lacks authority to even consider 
cybersecurity.
    As a GAO report published last April 29 found, the FCC's 
role in restoring telecommunications networks remains unclear. 
This can create confusion in post-disaster situations over how 
to allocate resources, such as generators and fuel.
    Congress alone can resolve this confusion by creating clear 
priorities and clear lines of authority. None of this means 
returning to the days of monopoly network. To the contrary, 
competition among networks creates much needed redundancy. In 
small and rural markets that cannot support competition, we 
should be willing to invest public money to create the needed 
level of redundancy.
    Congress has a tremendous opportunity to resolve these 
issues and restore resilience and reliability to our critical 
communications infrastructure. Both our wireline and wireless 
networks are undergoing significant upgrades. Legacy carriers 
are retiring their copper networks. Wireless providers are 
shutting off their 3G networks and deploying 5G.
    States and Congress are currently debating how to close the 
digital divide and bring affordable high-speed broadband to all 
Americans. Legislation providing the necessary reliability 
framework and resources can ensure that these new networks will 
be resilient, reliable, redundant, and sustainable.
    My written testimony includes multiple recommendations for 
Congressional action. To highlight the most important here--
first, require the FCC to make outage data publicly available 
and to publish report after every major outage. Both markets 
and policymakers need information and, right now, there is a 
dearth of that in the market.
    Clearly empower and require the FCC, State governments, and 
Tribal governments to make rules and set standards for 
communications network reliability, including onsite power 
backup, and backup power in the home. Prioritize restoration of 
communications networks and establish agreed upon metrics to 
measure reliability.
    Fund network upgrades to improve reliability and permit 
governments to make communications assets, such as fiber 
inspection available to avert outages and to assist network 
recovery.
    To conclude, network resilience does not happen on its own. 
When something is everyone's general responsibility, it is no 
one's actual responsibility. We must upgrade our rules as we 
upgrade our networks to provide to all Americans, 
communications networks that will be there whenever we need 
them, whatever the emergency.
    Thank you and I am happy to take any questions, at this 
time.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Feld follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Harold Feld, Senior Vice President, 
                            Public Knowledge
    Chairman Lujan, Ranking Member Thune: Thank you for inviting me to 
testify on this important topic. My name is Harold Feld and I am the 
Senior Vice President of Public Knowledge, an organization that is 
celebrating its 20th anniversary this year, and is dedicated to 
promoting freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to 
affordable communications tools and creative works.
    Consumers and businesses expect a reliable communications network. 
In fact, our economy depends on it. But our very lives depend on 
reaching emergency responders every time we call 911. In disasters, the 
ability of first responders to communicate instantly with the public 
and with each other can mean the difference between life and death.\1\ 
In theory, upgrading our Nation's communications networks to Internet 
protocol (IP) should enhance resiliency because the protocol allows 
information to be broken up into packets, transmitted across multiple 
networks using different physical media (such as fiber and wireless), 
and reassembled at the endpoint. The protocol also establishes and 
confirms that packets are sent and received, and provides mechanisms 
for adjusting to congestion.
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    \1\ Lisa Krieger, 911 Failure During California Wildfire Prompt 
Changes, The Mercury News, June 2019 (``When lives are at risk, 
communication is critical, said Christina Taft, 25, a business student 
at CSU Chico who lost her mother, Victoria, in the fire. She and her 
mom received no emergency warnings. And she was unable to get help for 
her mother after repeatedly calling 911. She is researching new 
approaches to emergency communications--calling the proposed platform 
``Victoria'' after her mother--so others don't suffer the same 
fate.'').
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    Instead of proving more resilient, our networks have grown 
increasingly fragile. A 2018 report by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) noted that ``from 2009 to 2016, about one third of all 
wireless outages reported to [the] FCC (6,002 of 18,325) were 
attributed to physical incidents.'' \2\ These outages have also grown 
longer in duration, especially when they are the result of a natural 
disaster or involve a concurrent failure of the electric grid.\3\ In 
addition to outages caused by natural disasters such as wildfires and 
hurricanes, outages can occur when telephone infrastructure is targeted 
in physical attacks, or from cybersecurity attacks.\4\
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    \2\ GAO, Telecommunications: FCC Should Improve Monitoring of 
Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network Resiliency at 10 
(2018), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688927.pdf. 
Accidents accounted for 75 percent of outages; natural disasters 
accounted for 24 percent and manmade incidents accounted for 1 percent 
of outages during the period of 2009-2016. Id. at 12.
    \3\ Id. at 14-15 (From 2009 to 2016, the annual median duration of 
wireless outages attributed to accidents ranged from 8 hours to 16 
hours, compared to natural disasters, which ranged from 19 to 36 
hours.)
    \4\ Id. at 10. See also Mariah Timms, AT&T Outage: Internet, 911 
Disrupted, Planes Grounded, After Nashville Explosion, Nashville 
Tennessean (January 5, 2021).
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    Unfortunately, outages can occur as a consequence of technical 
issues and carrier neglect, as well as from external events. In 2014, a 
``preventable coding error'' in a single router in Washington State 
resulted in a 911 failure covering more than 11 million people.\5\ In 
2020, a server failure in Georgia resulted in a multi-state blackout of 
T-Mobile's network.\6\ In other places, carriers have allowed legacy 
infrastructure to rot.\7\ In too many rural areas and small towns in 
America, people cannot reliably reach 911 on a good day, let alone in 
the wake of a catastrophe. In the 20th century, our telecommunications 
infrastructure was the envy of the world. We reached 98 percent of the 
population with reliable, affordable voice service. Today, we have 
communities that lack basic phone service, and those who have access to 
modern networks can wake even on a sunny day to find themselves cut off 
from vital services for no apparent reason--and for an unknown time.
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    \5\ April 2014 Multi-State 911 Outage: Cause and Impact, Report and 
Recommendations, PS Docket No. 14-72 (Pub. Safety Bur. 2014), 29 FCC 
Rcd 9327 (2014). Bishr Tabbaa, Busy Signal: Behind CenturyLink's 911 
Service Outage of 2014, Medium, April 2019 (``On the early morning of 
April 9 2014, more than 6000 calls to 911 failed to reach call centers 
during a system outage that lasted more than six hours and affected a 
population of 11 million U.S. residents living in 60 counties across 
seven states including Washington, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Minnesota, California, Florida, and Pennsylvania. Networks owned by 
CenturyLink, Verizon, and others were involved with the outage, and the 
root cause of the failure was related to a software defect in the call 
routing service of Intrado, a 3rd party contractor used by the 
telecommunication providers.'')
    \6\ Jon Brodkin, T-Mobile Screwups Cause Nationwide Outage, but FCC 
isn't Punishing Carrier, ArsTechnica, Oct. 23, 2020.
    \7\ Kristina Panos, DSL is Hanging on the Line as Telcos Stop 
Selling New Service, Hackaday, Oct. 29, 2020. In re Technology 
Transitions, Policies and Rules Governing Retirement of Copper Loops by 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Special Access for Price Cap Local 
Exchange Carriers AT&T Corporation Petition for Rulemaking to Reform 
Regulation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier Rates for Interstate 
Special Access Services, WC Docket No. 05-25, GN Docket No. 13-5 RM-
11358 RM-10593, Report and Order, Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, and Order on Reconsideration, 30 FCC Rcd 9372 (2015) at  
90-92.
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    In addition to these nationwide problems, specific geographic areas 
and Tribal lands may face unique challenges. As we saw in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Maria, restoring service to islands presents a set of 
challenges not shared by mainland communities. This includes reliance 
on undersea cables, which may be damaged in a disaster, and the high 
cost of transporting equipment and supplies to the impacted area. 
Extreme temperatures in desert Tribal lands can range in excess of 59 
degrees in a day.\8\ The stress these temperature swings put on 
networks creates challenges for maintaining connectivity and requires 
additional hardening to withstand these ranges. Additionally, 
challenges exist in communities where terrain such as mountains or 
forests may hamper post-disaster restoration efforts, or in sparsely 
populated rural areas. In urban areas, it is imperative that providers 
and local governments invest equally in traditionally marginalized 
communities such as minority and low-income neighborhoods. Tribal 
authorities need to be empowered and resourced to restore 
communications on Tribal lands and to coordinate as equals with state 
and Federal authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Weather and Climate Inventory National Park Service Sonoran 
Desert Network, National Park Service Sonoran Desert Network at 10 
(2007).
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    Only Congress can remedy this situation. For reasons I will discuss 
in greater detail below, it is unrealistic to expect the market to 
solve this on its own. Public safety has always been regarded as a 
classic case of ``market failure,'' because market forces alone cannot 
ensure the optimal result. Widespread deregulation of IP-based services 
at the state level and by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has had the unintended consequence of muddying the overall authority of 
the agency and the states to ensure network reliability as they 
traditionally did for the analog phone network.
    Additionally, post-disaster restoration of modern communications 
networks requires coordination across multiple industries, Federal 
agencies, and local authorities, further diluting the ability of a 
single agency such as the FCC to address these resiliency problems 
without new Congressional authority. A GAO report released this month 
found that the failure of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
clarify the FCC's role in network restoration post-disaster 
significantly impeded the restoration of communications networks in 
Puerto Rico.\9\ Disaster relief has not traditionally prioritized 
restoration of communications. Federal and state agencies have not 
uniformly recognized the vital importance of restoring communications 
to the overall disaster recovery. Restoring communications to the 
public, not merely to first responders, is critically important to 
modern public safety and disaster response. The Wireless Emergency 
Alert System (WEAS) and the Integrated Public Alert Warning System 
(IPAWS) are the most obvious examples of the need to restore 
communications to the public as well as maintain communications for 
first responders. But the flow of communications in an emergency is 
two-way, especially as telemedicine becomes more integrated into our 
healthcare system and emergency response. Restoring communications to 
everyone needs to be fully integrated with disaster response efforts in 
the same way restoring power or clean water is prioritized. Only a 
clear mandate from Congress can make this happen across federal, state, 
and local authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ GAO, Telecommunications: FCC Assisted in Hurricane Maria 
Network Restoration, but a Clarified Disaster Response Role and 
Enhanced Communication Are Needed, available at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-21-297.pdf (Apr. 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Happily, the current transition of our national wireline networks 
to all-IP systems, and our deployment of 5G wireless networks, provides 
an ideal opportunity for Congress to act. As we upgrade to an all-IP 
framework, retire legacy copper networks, and build out 5G, we can 
upgrade our resiliency standards to take advantage of the new technical 
capacities of these networks. In the days of the AT&T monopoly, we 
could require the network be hardened to 99.999 percent (``five 9s'') 
reliability and incorporate the added cost into the regulated rate. 
That approach is simply not viable today. We enjoy the fruits of 
competition enabled by IP-based services. We welcome the ability to 
break up functions and aggregate functions in ways that were impossible 
using older technologies, because, when done correctly, doing so 
enables providers to offer better service more efficiently. IP-based 
services can allow local providers to offer their communities the same 
level of service as in larger markets at an affordable cost, taking 
advantage of the economies of scale from a world-wide market in IP-
based and mobile equipment.
    At the same time, we must recognize the inherent weaknesses of IP-
based and mobile technologies. First and foremost, these systems need 
power. Not merely power to cell phone towers and network operating 
centers, but power in the home. The traditional copper landline system 
was self-powered. It could operate even when the electric grid went 
down. Modern IP-based landlines and mobile networks are not self-
powered. Mandatory back-up power requirements must include mandatory 
back-up power in people's homes as well as to cellular towers.
    Moreover, the traditional landline network had clear lines of 
responsibility for maintaining reliable communications. Modern systems 
may be distributed among numerous vendors and network operators without 
a clear understanding of the architecture. As a result, it can take 
hours for a network operator to become aware of the scope and extent of 
an outage, and even more time to find the source of the outage. Cheap 
off-the-shelf equipment dramatically lowers cost, but may not be as 
reliable as custom-built equipment.
    Finally, for competition to work, markets need information. If we 
want carriers to prioritize resilience and reliability, we must make it 
possible for them to reap the rewards of these efforts. The current 
reporting requirements treat network outage information as confidential 
business information. Publicly available information, such as the 
Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS), suffers from being 
voluntary and from homogenizing the information to prevent comparison 
in performance between carriers. As a result, subscribers who wish to 
prioritize reliability over cost savings have no information on which 
to make that choice. Investment in reliability will produce no reward, 
and failure to invest in reliability will have no lasting consequence. 
Carriers are therefore disincentivized from investing in resilience and 
reliability.
    Public Knowledge has several specific recommendations that address 
these factors, which I provide at the end of my testimony.
I. Why Congress Must Act
    In the days of traditional landline networks, Congress typically 
left issues of reliability to the states, with broad support from the 
FCC under Section 1 and Section 214 of the Communications Act.\10\ This 
approach made sense at a time when the primary communications providers 
were closely regulated monopolies with self-powered networks. But 
today's universe is radically different. Some of these differences 
reflect changes in technology. Some differences reflect the increased 
centrality of communications in all aspects of our lives, including 
disaster recovery. Some differences are the result of deliberate policy 
choices that have allowed our communications infrastructure to grow 
increasingly fragile. Only Congress can provide the necessary guidance, 
authority, and resources to ensure that our national communications 
infrastructure can reliably meet our needs--whether in times of crisis 
or in our daily lives.
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    \10\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 151, 214.
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    It is worth noting that Congress has, in the past, stepped in where 
necessary to create national policy and provide funding for 
implementation. For example, as part of the 1996 Act, Congress 
established the 911 system as our national emergency number, creating 
needed uniformity.\11\ In 2008, Congress required all providers of 
public safety access points (PSAPs) to interconnect with providers of 
advanced communications services regardless of regulatory 
classification.\12\ Congress has provided funding for the national 
first responder network, FirstNet, as well as funding for E911.\13\ 
While the scope of the challenge here is significantly greater, it is 
not unprecedented.
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    \11\ Codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 251(e)(3).
    \12\ New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-283, 122 Stat. 2620 (2008) (NET 911 Act) (amending 
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
81, 113 Stat. 1286 (1999) (Wireless 911 Act)).
    \13\ Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-96, Title VI (Spectrum Act of 2012), Sec. 6409(a), 126 Stat. 
156, 232-33 (Feb. 22, 2012) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 1455(a)).
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A. Moving From a Single, Regulated Monopoly Network to Multiple, 
        Competing 
        Networks Has Fundamentally Altered the Communications Landscape
    To appreciate why our communications networks have gone from robust 
and resilient to fragile and unreliable, we must briefly review how our 
modern network ecosystem evolved. In the 1990s, two technologies began 
mass deployment: mobile networks and the internet. These technologies 
were in their infancy and therefore we expected only ``best efforts'' 
service. To be clear, ``best efforts'' does not mean that the providers 
are cavalier about the quality of their service. Best efforts means 
that customers are not entitled as a matter of right to a particular 
quality of service. Instead, all the provider promises is to make best 
efforts to deliver the message. For the vast majority of uses in life, 
``best efforts'' is good enough. This is particularly true because IP-
based technologies are designed to deal with the lack of reliability in 
best efforts networks. Packets are broken up and can move along 
multiple pathways and multiple networks. Wireless networks must move 
from tower to tower without dropping the call, and between networks for 
roaming when the carrier lacks sufficient capacity.
    This inherent flexibility not only produced cheaper service but 
also allowed new, competitive offerings. It enabled carriers to break 
up functions that traditionally had to be done in the ``core'' of the 
network and allowed these functions to take place at the edge. For 
example, in the traditional network, the local incumbent telephone 
network maintained the local PSAP networks. As networks evolved, new 
companies emerged capable of managing PSAPs on multiple networks. 
Packet switching allowed carriers to employ multiple routes for the 
same transmission instead of relying on and using a single circuit for 
each call. It also allowed them to outsource routing to specialized 
companies that could find the most efficient and least expensive 
routes. New services, such as video and geolocation, were easy and 
cheap to support when compared to the traditional regulated public 
switched telephone network (PSTN). Best efforts allowed these 
technologies to grow and proliferate.
    These advantages also gave rise to significant issues. First, 
packet-switched technologies and mobile technologies are not self-
powered. When the power goes out, communications stop. But as recently 
as 2019, the Senior Director of Emergency Preparedness for California's 
electric utility PG&E advised people to use landlines to communicate 
during power blackouts without any apparent awareness that modern 
landlines are not self-powered.\14\ Networks have grown so complex that 
even the companies themselves cannot predict how a failure in one part 
of the network impacts another part of the network. Nor is it clear 
whether a service is being provided by the carrier itself or by a 
contractor. This can make it difficult to trace the source of an 
outage, or take the needed steps to resolve the outage.\15\
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    \14\ Jonathan J. Cooper and Julliet Williams, Anger Grows as 
Utility Struggles to Get Its Blackouts Right, Associated Press (Oct. 
31, 2019) (quoting PG&E Senior Vice President for Disaster Recovery as 
urging people to get blackout information ``the old fashioned way, 
through calling on a landline'').
    \15\ See Tali Arbel, Over 12,000 Calls to 911 Failed in AT&T 
Outage, Baltimore Sun (March 23, 2017) (network configuration error); 
December 27, 2018 CenturyLink Network Outage Report (single server 
generating malformed packets disabled the entire network); April 2014 
Outage Report supra note 5 (``preventable coding error'' in 
contractor's router created multi-state 911 outage).
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    As long as self-powered traditional copper networks provided a 
reliable service alternative, the policy of treating competing networks 
as best efforts was manageable from a public safety perspective. Any 
traffic too important for best efforts went over the telephone 
networks. The failure of a dial-up Internet service provider might be 
an inconvenience, but hardly a matter of life and death. As long as 
people kept a traditional copper landline, they could guarantee 
themselves reliable access to 911 and to communications even during a 
power outage.
    Today, however, mobile networks and IP-based networks have long 
displaced traditional copper as the primary communications networks for 
the majority of the public.\16\ Indeed, it has become our national 
policy to sunset the traditional PSTN and transition to an all IP-based 
communications network. Additionally, the services that used to be 
considered secondary to voice, such as video communications and data 
transmission, have now become critically important. In 2002, when a 
peering dispute between Cogent and America Online caused a severe 
slowdown of Internet traffic in the D.C. region, it was an 
inconvenience.\17\ Today, a comparable slowdown of Internet traffic to 
the D.C. region would result in severe impacts on schools, businesses, 
and government operations.
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    \16\ Federal Communications Commission, Communications Marketplace 
Report, GN Docket No. 20-60, 35 FCC Rcd 13188 at para. 147, Dec. 2020 
(``as of December 2019, residential fixed voice connections were about 
30 percent switched access and 70 percent interconnected VoIP, with 
residential switched access connections comprising only 14.4 percent of 
all fixed retail voice connections.'').
    \17\ 'Peering' Dispute With AOL Slows Cogent Customer Access, The 
Washington Post, July 2012.
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B. Deregulation and Preemption Have Eliminated Needed Oversight By the 
        FCC and the States
    Clearly we can no longer afford to treat these networks as best 
efforts. But neither Federal nor state policy has kept pace with these 
changes. Despite debate over the growing use of voice-over-IP 
technologies and their potential to displace the traditional telephone 
network as early as 1998,\18\ and a study of the impact on resilience 
from the phase out of the PSTN by the FCC's Technical Advisory 
Committee in 2013,\19\ the FCC and the states have moved in the 
opposite direction. The FCC has imposed no reliability obligations on 
providers of broadband service--not even outage reporting requirements. 
Most states have divested themselves of authority over IP-based 
services.\20\ Even where states have retained (or reclaimed) authority 
over reliability requirements for voice service, the FCC has repeatedly 
acted to broadly preempt state authority to regulate either IP-based 
voice services or mobile voice services.\21\
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    \18\ Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 
96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd 11501(1998) (Stevens Report).
    \19\ Post-PSTN Public Network Resiliency: FCC Technological 
Advisory Council: Communications Resiliency Working Group, Dec. 2013.
    \20\ Telecommunications Oversight 2017: A State Perspective , 
National Regulatory Research Institute (2018) (``As of December 2017, 
35 states had passed legislation limiting direct oversight of the 
retail wireline telecommunications services provided by the large 
incumbent price cap service providers. In addition, Iowa, Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and Rhode Island had reduced oversight in either all or 
part of the state after a formal commission examination and review 
proceeding.'').
    \21\ See Charter Advanced Services, LLC v. Lange, 903 F.3d 715 (8th 
Cir. 2018); MN PUC v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2007).
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    The FCC has imposed certain limited obligations on interconnected 
VOIP providers and mobile voice providers (but not on their data or 
text messaging services). Mobile voice providers and interconnected 
VOIP providers must comply with the FCC's discontinuance notification 
rules under Section 214 of the Communications Act. In theory, this 
requires providers to demonstrate that discontinuing or impairing 
service to the community will not harm the public interest.\22\ 
Streamlined discontinuance processes, however, allow discontinuances to 
be granted with little review. Interconnected VOIP and mobile voice 
providers are obligated to participate in the FCC outage reporting 
system.\23\ As with all participants in the NORS and DIRS systems, 
these reports are kept confidential, preventing subscribers from making 
provider choices based on reliability.
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    \22\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214.
    \23\ See FCC Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) and Disaster 
Information Reporting System (DIRS).
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    Additional problems have emerged as providers of copper networks 
continue to discontinue these networks. In 2017 and 2018, the FCC 
relieved carriers of the bulk of their obligations to provide notice to 
customers when discontinuing networks. The FCC also eliminated the 
requirement to provide a comparable replacement network. Carriers may 
now discontinue all legacy copper service by asserting the presence of 
a broadband provider with sufficient capacity to support a VOIP product 
regardless of whether the broadband provider offers facilities-based 
VOIP.\24\ The FCC also eliminated customers' ability to file complaints 
when carriers simply allow facilities to rot or fail to replace 
facilities after a disaster. As a consequence, customers currently 
served by legacy copper have no enforceable right to continued service, 
let alone reliable and resilient continued service.
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    \24\ Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by Removing 
Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, Report and Order, Declaratory 
Ruling, and Further Notice of Rulemaking, WC Docket. No. 17-84, 32 FCC 
Rcd 11128 (2017); Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by 
Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, Second Report and 
Order, WC Docket No. 17-84, 33 FCC Rcd 5660 (2018).
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    Unfortunately, the FCC is not alone in deregulating even the legacy 
telephone network. The majority of the states have broadly deregulated 
their legacy telephone networks as well as IP-based networks. Those 
states that have investigated after deregulation have found that legacy 
networks have fallen into widespread disrepair--particularly in rural 
areas.\25\ Many of these rural areas lack cable systems or wireless 
networks; when the legacy copper stops working, communications in these 
regions simply stops. As a consequence of permitting legacy carriers to 
abandon, or constructively abandon, their networks, we now have 
communities in the United States that lack even basic 20th century 
communications infrastructure.
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    \25\ In re Commission Inquiry into the Service Quality, Customer 
Service, and Billing Practices of Frontier Communications, P407, 405/
CI-18-122 (2019); see generally Telecommunications Service Carriers' 
Service Quality Report.
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    Finally, the FCC has taken affirmative steps to limit its own 
authority over communications networks. The FCC reclassified broadband 
service (fixed and mobile) as a Title I service in 2017, abandoning the 
agency's traditional authority to require network resilience and 
reliability. Given the 2017 Order's elimination of Section 706 (47 
U.S.C. 1302) as an alternative source of authority over broadband, and 
general determination that it lacks significant ancillary authority 
over broadband, it is unclear whether the FCC could even require 
broadband networks to provide mandatory outage reports.
    It is also uncertain to what extent the FCC will retain authority 
over interconnected VOIP providers or mobile providers. The FCC has 
declined to classify interconnected VOIP. In the Orders imposing outage 
reporting requirements on interconnected VOIP providers, the FCC has 
relied on both its Title II authority (in the event interconnected VOIP 
is Title II) and its ``ancillary authority'' as ancillary to Title II. 
When the legacy copper network is retired, however, any existing 
ancillary authority will disappear. In other words, if the Commission's 
efforts to sunset the PSTN in the next few years are successful, the 
Commission will have effectively terminated its authority over the 
landline communications network.
    A similar fate awaits the FCC's authority over mobile networks. 
Section 332(d) defines Commercial Mobile Radio Networks (CMRS) as 
mobile networks that provide service to the public when interconnected 
with the ``public switched network.'' \26\ The 2017 ``Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order'' explicitly defined the ``public switched 
network'' as consisting of the traditional legacy phone network.\27\ 
Once the existing legacy phone network is retired, CMRS will cease to 
exist as a legal category. All mobile services will be ``Private Mobile 
Radio Service'' (PMRS).
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    \26\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 332(d).
    \27\ Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Order, Report 
and Order, WC Docket No. 17-108, 33 FCC Rcd 311, 355 para.75 (2017).
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    While the Commission will arguably retain its Title III authority 
over mobile providers, it is unclear how much that authority allows it 
to regulate in the name of reliability and resilience. When the FCC 
attempted to impose a backup power obligation on licensees following 
Hurricane Katrina, the rule was challenged in the D.C. Circuit.\28\ 
Because the case was rendered moot by the FCC withdrawing the relevant 
regulation,\29\ the question of the FCC's Title III authority to impose 
reliability and resiliency regulations remains unresolved.
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    \28\ RCR Wireless, Appeals Court Questions FCC Authority on Backup 
Power Rule, May 9, 2008.
    \29\ Matthew Lasar, FCC: Back to Square One on Cell Phone Tower 
Backup, Ars Technica (Dec. 8, 2008)
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    Finally, the Trump FCC consistently refused to acknowledge any 
authority to address issues of cybersecurity. The United States is thus 
the only developed nation whose telecommunications regulatory 
affirmatively avoids any consideration of cybersecurity as part of its 
deliberations. For the last four years, the FCC has assiduously avoided 
any hint of leadership or oversight in securing our critical 
communications infrastructure from cyber threats. This leaves, and will 
continue to leave until remedied, a giant and exploitable hole in our 
defenses. It is ironic indeed that the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission and Department of Energy have a mandate from Congress to 
consider cybersecurity threats to the electric grid and energy 
infrastructure, and meanwhile the Department of Transportation 
considers cybersecurity concerns to our transportation infrastructure, 
but the Federal Communications Commission is considered unsuited to 
protect the Internet from cybersecurity threats. The humor of this 
delightful irony will, alas, be of small comfort in the event our 
communications infrastructure is subverted by state-sponsored hackers 
or criminals seeking ransomware.
II. Unregulated Markets Are Not Capable of Adequately Protecting 
        Resiliency
    Carriers and proponents of deregulation have justified the risk to 
public safety by arguing that carrier's have sufficient financial 
incentive to invest in resilience and reliability.\30\ There are 
several problems with this. First, empirical evidence clearly 
contradicts this hypothesis. As noted above, the number of outages and 
the length of outages have both increased with deregulation--not 
decreased. Rural communities have seen legacy networks degrade and 
disappear without replacement by the promised advanced networks. Even 
setting this empirical evidence aside, classic economic theory 
demonstrates why public safety concerns such as network resiliency have 
traditionally been considered a case of market failure requiring 
regulatory intervention to achieve the desired result.
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    \30\ Technology Transitions; USTelecom Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling That Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Are Non-Dominant in the 
Provision of Switched Access Services, GN Docket No. 13-5, WC Docket 
No. 13-3, RM-11358, Declaratory Ruling, Second Report and Order and 
Order on Reconsideration, 31 FCC Rcd 8283 (2017).
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    First, as noted above, networks have become far too complicated for 
carriers to assess what is required to maintain resiliency. This is why 
``sunny day'' outages keep occurring. Fragility in the network from 
equipment failure or routing errors only becomes apparent after the 
fact. Nor can carriers force electric utilities to cooperate with them 
and agree to prioritize services. Carriers cannot prevent third parties 
from cutting fiber lines. While carriers can--and should--do more to 
improve their own networks, they cannot address the entire problem. 
Only the Federal government can do that.
    Second, while carriers have incentive to avoid outages, they also 
have substantial incentive to cut costs--especially where investment 
does not yield back immediate short-term profit. This makes carriers 
especially subject to what is called the ``optimism fallacy.'' Carriers 
believe that their preparations are sufficient because they take an 
optimistic view of likely outcomes (even when preparing for the worst). 
While economics likes to conceptualize corporations as rational actors 
immune to wishful thinking, corporations are managed by human beings. 
We should therefore expect that while those closest to the problem have 
valuable expertise, they may also have their own difficulty in 
remaining objective.
    Third, even putting that aside, carriers that invest in reliability 
cannot expect to be rewarded for their efforts in the market. Because 
the FCC keeps reliability data confidential, customers cannot make 
purchasing choices based on reliability. Certainly carriers can (and 
do) claim to have the ``most reliable network,'' but why should 
consumers believe these advertising claims? And even a network that is 
``most reliable'' on average nationwide may not be particularly 
reliable in a specific county or recover quickly after a natural 
disaster.
    By contrast, carriers will generally escape consumer backlash after 
a disaster-based outage because consumers blame the storm for the 
damage. Even when service is particularly bad by a specific carrier, 
outages are rare enough that consumer memory fades over time. 
Additionally, consumers face the uncertainty over whether the carrier 
they switch to will be a significant enough improvement in reliability 
to justify the cost and aggravation of switching. Finally, if mandatory 
network sharing agreements are in effect (which they should be), 
carriers that invest in more reliable networks face a free-rider 
problem. Other networks that chose to invest less in reliability will 
still remain operational by leveraging the responsible carrier's 
investments in resiliency. Because the public has no way of knowing 
that these networks are only operational as a consequence of the 
``prudent carrier's'' investment, the prudent carrier will receive no 
recognition or marketplace reward for prioritizing network resiliency. 
Instead, the investment will reward the rival who failed to adequately 
prepare.
    Finally, we must recognize that most of the costs we are concerned 
about do not fall directly on the carrier. Loss of business revenue, or 
even loss of life, from a communications outage is not charged to the 
carrier, whereas the cost of making reliability investments is. It is 
rational for carriers to discount the external costs. This is also why 
the Federal and state governments should not only require carriers to 
meet standards of reliability, but also invest public money. While it 
is appropriate to have communications carriers serve the public 
interest as well as their private interests, it is equally appropriate 
for public money to be spent for broad societal benefits.
III. Recommendations
    Public Knowledge notes that Senators Markey and Wyden have 
introduced a bill that would address many of the problems of network 
resilience, and provide incentives to do so in an environmentally 
sustainable manner. Public Knowledge is pleased to support the 
Generating Resilient and Energy Efficient Network (GREEN) 
Communications Act as an important step forward. In addition, Public 
Knowledge endorsed the RESILIENT Act introduced last Congress in the 
House by Chairman Palone and Representative McNerny. These two bills 
are examples of Congressional action that would help to restore 
reliability to our critical communications infrastructure.
    Public Knowledge makes the following recommendations for 
Congressional action. While some of these are reflected in the GREEN 
Communications Act, or were reflected in the RESILIENT Act, others were 
not. We hope you consider including these recommendations in any future 
legislation:

  1.  Provide the information necessary for proper planning and for the 
        market to reward investment. Direct the FCC to combine the 
        National Outage Reporting System (NORS) NORS and the Disaster 
        Information Reporting Service (DIRS) into a single, publicly 
        available database that permits the public to identify carrier 
        performance on a granular level. Direct the FCC to conduct a 
        full report after every significant outage.

  2.  Provide clear authority to the FCC and the States. Clearly 
        empower the FCC and states to create necessary rules for 
        network reliability, cybersecurity, and cooperation among 
        relevant stakeholders. Congress should direct DHS to fully 
        integrate the FCC into its disaster response in line with the 
        GAO recommendations. Additionally, Congress should require the 
        FCC and the Department of Energy to develop enforceable 
        guidelines for cooperation between power companies and 
        communications providers.

  3.  Create metrics necessary to set standards and promote 
        accountability. Require the FCC, National Telecommunications 
        Information Administration (NTIA), National Institute of 
        Standards (NIST), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
        to develop suitable metrics to measure reliability and 
        resiliency for wireline, fixed wireless, mobile terrestrial 
        wireless, and satellite networks.

  4.  Promote sustainability and avoid environmental degradation. 
        Require further study to create recommendations for 
        environmentally friendly and sustainable solutions, and to 
        reduce existing practices that risk degrading the environment.

  5.  Make Federal and state assets available in disaster recovery. 
        Permit and encourage the Federal government and state 
        governments to make available in an emergency communications 
        resources such as fiber, spectrum, operating government 
        networks, or other assets to communications providers to 
        restore communications to the general public.

  6.  Fund network upgrades that promote reliability. Provide Federal 
        money to pay for necessary upgrades to communications networks 
        to enhance reliability. In particular, provide funding to 
        replace aging copper networks with modern fiber networks built 
        to modern resiliency standards. Where legacy carriers wish to 
        retire their copper networks without replacement, create 
        incentives to sell these networks to alternative providers 
        (including state or local governments, community anchor 
        institutions, and cooperatives) willing to provide wireline 
        service. Additionally, Federal grant programs that fund 
        deployment should include mandatory reliability metrics.

  7.  FCC studies that address the specialized needs of specific 
        communities. Require the FCC to report to Congress on the 
        special needs of island communities, geographically isolated 
        communities, Tribal lands, low-income and traditionally 
        marginalized communities of color, and communities in 
        environmentally sensitive areas. The report should include 
        steps the FCC will take under its existing authority to address 
        identified special needs, and recommendations to Congress for 
        any other necessary action.

    Thank you. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.

    Senator Lujan. Thank you very much, Mr. Feld. I will now 
recognize members for questions, as well. I will recognize 
myself for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Feld, resilient, redundant, secure broadband is a core 
focus of today's hearing. However, before we can really address 
this problem, we need to understand the current state of 
broadband resiliency in the United States. In your testimony, 
you state that the FCC currently does not have broadband 
resiliency requirements. Does the FCC presently enforce 
broadband network resiliency standards, yes or no?
    Mr. Feld. No, it does not.
    Senator Lujan. Mr. Feld, in times of a disaster, when 
Americans lose access to broadband services, are there 
currently any nationwide requirements for reporting those 
outages as they are occurring, yes or no?
    Mr. Feld. No, there are not.
    Senator Lujan. Mr. Feld, are there any requirements for 
reporting broadband outages, after they have occurred, so 
consumers can make informed decisions between carriers, yes or 
no?
    Mr. Feld. No, there are not.
    Senator Lujan. This is unacceptable, and Americans deserve 
to know the reliability of the critical infrastructure. And I 
think this is an area that we can find some common ground and 
legislate on.
    Mr. Law, thank you for being here today. South Dakota and 
New Mexico are similar in many ways when it comes to broadband 
build out. Both are highly rural, and each has one unique 
challenge in laying fiber across the Federal, State, and Tribal 
land. Mr. Thune touched on it. It is getting all of that 
approved, and the topography that we face, and the challenges 
are significant. So, thank you so much for your testimony and 
your perspective.
    I want to highlight one part of your written statement. You 
``operate in deeply rural markets, where the cost of deploying 
and operating networks can be higher, and a tailored approach 
to managing risk, resiliency, and redundancy is necessary to 
create sustainable networks that provide services customers can 
afford''. Mr. Law, how has your decision to deploy fiber led to 
more sustainable, resilient, and affordable networks?
    Mr. Law. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think the first way is 
both the resiliency, in terms of its durability and performance 
characteristics. There is nothing superior to it on the market 
as it relates to, I will say, technology performance, whether 
it be broadband, voice, or whatever application you choose to 
put on it.
    The second item is its scalability. And so, we still use 
fiber that was--was deployed in the 1990s, in the early 2000s 
to 2010s. Throughout all of that, fiber has proven to be a very 
resilient medium to deploy, upgrade, and scale throughout those 
times and we have not needed to replace it, in some cases going 
on 30+ years. So, fiber has been a great benefit for rural 
customers, such as those served by Golden West.
    Senator Lujan. Can Congress support providers like yours in 
constructing future-proof networks that meet the highest 
standards of resiliency by passing an infrastructure package 
that would allow more investment in these areas?
    Mr. Law. I think, certainly, an infrastructure package 
would be a great start, in terms of continuing to expand and 
deploy broadband into rural and underserved areas. I think that 
is only one act, though, Mr. Chair, in terms of, that is a 
great first step, but you also have to consider, as part of 
that, both the sustainability of that network going forward--it 
is one thing to build it. Anybody with enough money can build a 
network. However, I have learned it is more challenging to 
actually operate a network, over a long period of time and you 
can spend a lot of money doing that, if it is not done 
properly.
    Senator Lujan. Appreciate that reminder, Mr. Law. Mr. 
Adelstein, in your testimony you state, ``Loss of electrical 
power can create outages of telecommunication service for wired 
and wireless networks''. And certainly, I agree with the 
statement that many energy grids are in desperate need of 
maintenance and repair. However, effective disaster response 
requires redundancy. It is important to anticipate failures and 
prepare accordingly. Do you believe the FCC states should 
regularly--I am sorry. Do you believe the FCC and states should 
regularly evaluate whether essential telecommunication networks 
are sufficiently resilient, to continue providing essential 
communication services during catastrophic events?
    Mr. Adelstein. Yes, I think it is very important that the 
regulators keep a close eye on the resiliency and redundancy 
networks. When it comes to redundancy, more network deployment 
leads to more resiliency, to your earlier question. That is 
what the BDAC actually concluded at the FCC.
    I think it is important that, when you think about, you 
know, resilient networks that, you know, in the case of 
wireless networks, if one node goes out, it can be rerouted 
traffic to another. And we try to build, now, overlapping 
densified networks that can--essentially, if there is a problem 
in one area, they can be rerouted to another. And so, when you 
have redundancy, in terms of coverage like that, it actually 
increases resiliency and ability to survive when there is an 
outage of any kind.
    Senator Lujan. If the FCC or a state finds essential 
networks are not adequately resilient, should they engage in 
rulemaking on the subject?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, I mean, you know, there have been 
rulemakings on this. The FCC has done rulemakings on this and 
they have concluded, and the industry has risen up to a 
voluntary agreement, basically, that is, I think, dramatically 
improved resiliency. We have seen really wonderful performance, 
not only during the pandemic, but during recent disasters, 
especially with regard to wireless networks. We have seen, 
while often cases the wireline network is gone for weeks and 
months at a time--often no fault of their own, as a result of 
the electric going down--we have seen wireless networks quickly 
restored, in the case of recent hurricanes and fires. And 
people then depend upon their wireless device.
    So, I think, when you are looking about spending an 
unprecedented sum of funding on a new infrastructure package, 
you have got to think about the resiliency of different types 
of technologies, as well as improving resiliency within those 
technologies. We can make wireless networks more resilient. We 
can make fiber more resilient. But both of them have different 
characteristics. And this kind of redundancy, and having 
multiplicity of technologies, makes it more likely that you 
will have the emergency services when people's lives actually 
depend upon them.
    Senator Lujan. So, just to clarify, when a state or the FCC 
finds that essential networks are not adequately resilient, you 
do support them engaging in rulemaking on the subject?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, I mean, rulemaking proceeding. I am 
not sure what rulemaking, in the end, they would need to do. I 
mean, right now, what we have found is, it is very hard to do a 
one size fits all approach on regulation. What works in New 
Mexico might now work in South Dakota, depending on the 
ability, for example, to get backup generators in place. You 
know we try to get them to as many sites as we can, but some 
sites do not have room. Sometimes it is a sacred national 
monument, where we cannot get, you know, certain types of 
devices in.
    I mean, it is important that the regulators really stay on 
top of this and make sure that they are--that the public is 
protected. But the industry, I think, is working very hard. And 
we will work hand in hand with regulators to make sure that all 
of the resiliency needs of our customers are met.
    Senator Lujan. I will explore that a little bit more later. 
Appreciate your time today.
    I will now recognize Mr. Thune for five minutes.
    Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Law, as you 
know, ensuring there are reliable and resilient broadband 
networks in rural America means not just having Federal 
resources to deploy these networks, but also having the Federal 
support available to maintain them over the lifetime of the 
network.
    Over the years, the FCC's Universal Service Fund High-Cost 
Program has provided the reliable support needed to sustain 
these networks. However, the USF contribution factor is now 
above 30 percent for the first time, which puts at risk the 
ability of the USF to ensure predictable and sufficient 
support, as required by law. It is for that reason that I 
introduced the Rural Connectivity Advancement Program Act, 
which would help strengthen connectivity in rural areas by 
providing funding for both the build out of networks, and to 
support the sustainability of those networks.
    Can you speak to the importance of the USF continuing to 
provide reliable support for companies, like Golden West, over 
the long run? And if that funding went away, what effect would 
that have on your customers?
    Mr. Law. Thank you, Ranking Member Thune. Absolutely. 
Universal Service Funding has been foundational to the 
broadband build out in much of rural America. I can 
specifically speak for the entirety of Golden West service 
territory, which I mentioned is about the size of Maryland, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and Delaware combined. Quite frankly, we 
could not have built out the broadband network that we have to 
date, and will continue to build, without the support of 
Universal Service funding, now and in the future. Both in terms 
of affordability, but as well as sustainability for networks.
    I applaud your efforts, as it relates to putting the 
Universal Service Funding on a sound financial footing, because 
that is in question. When you start seeing contribution to 
rates to fund something in the 30 percent territory, I think 
your draft legislation would do a lot, in terms of providing 
additional funding that would, perhaps, take the pressure off 
of the primary funding over periods of time, depending on the 
needs of the Universal Service Fund.
    But I absolutely think, regardless of infrastructure 
packages that are being discussed, or that have already been 
approved, you cannot have those discussions without having a 
similar discussion of, how do we keep Universal Service funding 
on firm support, both now and in the future.
    Senator Thune. And you, sort of, answered it, but just to 
reiterate the point, the bill I mentioned, RCAP or Rural 
Connectivity Advancement Program Act, would help the USF 
program over the long term.
    Mr. Law. Absolutely.
    Senator Thune. Yes, thank you. Mr. Adelstein, ensuring that 
our Nation's broadband networks are resilient to natural 
disasters and able to handle increases in network traffic 
requires technology to be deployed to all parts of the country. 
What can Congress do to ease the regulatory permitting burdens 
that slow down the deployment of redundant and resilient 
networks, particularly on federally owned lands?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, you know, Federal lands, there are 
enormous obstacles in getting wireless infrastructure placed. 
And those areas require these networks for emergency response. 
I mean, you have fires. You know, we see what is happening 
right now and what happened in Black Hills recently. We have 
got to have access to those lands and the FCC--I chaired a 
working group that came up with an entire report. For many 
years we have been trying to get these things implemented. 
Administration after administration, we have not been able to 
get it done.
    So, I think, you know, it is time for legislation to 
require Federal agencies to, basically, treat wireless on 
Federal lands like they would, you know, in the--like we would 
in the private sector, where we can get long term leases, where 
we can get access, where we can get these things expedited. 
Because it not only protects the public, but it protects 
Federal--Federal workers, as well.
    And when it comes to, you know, citing for resiliency, we 
need to be able to get things like generators placed. A lot of 
places do not even allow us to do that. We talked about backup 
power but, you know, if you are going to put funding into this 
bill, maybe you could require that there be streamlined types 
of approaches for things like that.
    And some of the progress that the FCC has made on allowing 
quick access for colocation to existing facilities, no allowing 
small cells to be cited in the rights of way, within certain 
limits. Making sure those do not get rolled back and making 
sure that, you know, funding goes to communities that have met 
model standards.
    Senator Thune. Very good. Mr. Law, any regulatory barriers 
that you face, in this respect?
    Mr. Law. We have certainly faced the challenges of 
accessing Federal lands, whether they be National Park, 
National Forest, BLM, lands administered by BIA, in certain 
cases. I would echo my colleague Mr. Adelstein's comments. I 
also would strongly urge there be a streamlining of the 
permitting process for access of Federal lands, both in terms 
of the processing, the forms, and also, I will tell you, in 
terms of the visibility into the process.
    I will tell you, Golden West has several projects ongoing, 
across various Federal lands this year. And when you make those 
applications for rights of way, each agency, A, handles them 
differently, B, there is no way for a provider to have any 
idea, short of repeated phone calls or e-mails that may or may 
not get answered, about what is the status of our application. 
In South Dakota, for example, with a 5-month construction 
window, if we do not have an answer in a April-May-June 
territory, receiving an answer that we can do it in November 
does us no good, nor will it do customers any good.
    So, I would--I would echo those comments that, absolutely, 
the recommendations from the FCC's BDAC committee a couple of 
years ago. Absolutely, whether it is by statute, order, or some 
other decree, I would wholly support.
    Senator Thune. So--and this I would direct, again, to 
either or both of you. And I will try to make this quick, Mr. 
Chairman. My time has run out.
    Multiple agencies are dispersing broadband funds, which 
could ultimately lead to duplication of broadband services. So, 
as Congress considers additional broadband funding, do you 
believe having funding go through one agency reduces the risk 
of overbuilding? And if so, which agency do you think is best 
suited to handle the disbursement of funds?
    Mr. Law. I would start by saying, I think--I think very 
clearly, the Federal Communications Commission is the preferred 
agency for the distribution of these types of funds, both in 
terms of their agency expertise and knowledge of networks, 
deployment, availability, affordability, sustainability--all of 
those items. But also, more importantly, beyond just the fact 
of getting these networks built, there has to be some level of 
monitoring and commitment capabilities that are done following 
up what are, to me, staggering amounts of money for broadband 
deployment. Great, but staggering amounts. There has to be 
follow up. The FCC is equipped to do that. I do not believe 
there are other Federal agencies that are adequately equipped, 
in the broadband field, to have that capability.
    Mr. Adelstein. And I would certainly agree that, if we are 
going to have multiple agencies having funding, you have got to 
make sure you avoid overbuilding. You have to have some kind 
of--if Congress is going to provide funding to multiple 
agencies, that there by some kind of a coordinating mechanism 
that is made within the legislation itself, to ensure that 
there is proper coordination and that there is not any 
overbuilding, particularly over other fellow programs, but 
certainly over existing networks. Limited resources need to go 
to truly unserved areas and there have to be good maps in place 
to get that done.
    Senator Thune. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Thune. Senator Klobuchar, you 
are recognized for five minutes.

               STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

    Senator Klobuchar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 
and thank you to you and Senator Thune for this important 
hearing.
    As we consider major investments, and this could not be 
more timely, this hearing, in infrastructure, we want to make 
sure that our networks are, what we call, future proof and that 
they also, as the focus here today, are better able to respond 
to emergencies. And the bill that Representative Clyburn and I 
are leading would make major investments in broadband 
infrastructure.
    Mr. Law, in your testimony, you highlighted the importance 
of capacity in broadband speeds, particularly for responding to 
emergencies. Can you elaborate on that about, particularly, for 
rural communities?
    Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Yes, I think one of 
the most important characteristics is not simply what is a 
network currently capable of delivering, but what is it able to 
capably deliver in the future, or in the event of a specific 
situation.
    I will use the pandemic as an example, from Golden West's 
perspective. In the span of 90 days, from January 2020 to April 
2020, Golden West's network usage, overall, increased 25 
percent. Our upstream usage increased 40 percent in 90 days. 
Our network was able and capable of handling that type of 
capacity change, I will say, somewhat at a moment's notice. 
Ninety days, in a network operator's world, is indeed a 
moment's notice, with no warning.
    So, I think it is absolutely critical that any future 
broadband funding that is discussed as part of an 
infrastructure bill or otherwise, begin the discussion about 
what type of network do we wish to have, what do we wish to 
accomplish with those networks--not just today, but tomorrow. 
Because if you only view the speed capabilities by the 
applications that you use today, it will be outdated by the 
time this money gets out the door.
    I have been in this industry a number of years and I have 
watched policy discussions in the last 10 years go from 4 by 1 
to 10 by 1 to 25 by 3, in the last 10 years. I will ask, you 
know, how many times do we wish to have this discussion, as we 
talk about these types of investments?
    Senator Klobuchar. Yes, I think that is a good rate and yes 
and I think it is time for action.
    Chief Johnson, Mr. Adelstein, good to see you again. The 
Next Generation 911 Bill that I have with Senator Cortez Masto, 
that would create a Federal grant program to help states and 
local communities upgrade their 911 infrastructure. And I 
actually got interested in this, in part, with interoperability 
issues and we had a--someone was killed, and the murderer was 
out, and they were trying to find them. And we had something 
like seven different systems that could not hook up, as police 
officers were frantically trying to find this perpetrator. And 
it was a memorable moment in our state. And this was in the 
metro area, much less what happens in the rural area.
    Chief Johnson, in your testimony you emphasize the need to 
invest in the next-generation 911. As the former Vice Chair of 
FirstNet, what lessons can we learn from FirstNet? And then, I 
would ask you, Mr. Adelstein, a recent study found that 240 
million 911 calls are made every year. Talk about upgrading 
911. I will start with you, Chief Johnson.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Yes, it is true. 
All emergencies start at a public safety answering point and it 
is next-generation 911 that will drive the capability of those 
centers into the future. Unfortunately, we are a bit behind in 
that area.
    So, public safety community would urge Congress to support 
the Next Generation 911 legislation and update these important 
centers. Again, that is where all emergencies start.
    Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
    Mr. Adelstein. And I would agree. I think it is very 
important that we do invest in that. I am particularly 
concerned about states that divert E911 funding to non-E911 
purposes, which is happening across the country. Those funds 
that are being raised for that purpose, should be used for that 
purpose.
    When it comes to future proofing--I just want to go back to 
the earlier question, I mean, we have to be careful about 
investing in networks that only have one type of capability. 
For example, aerial fiber is particularly exposed to the 
elements. And what can happen, in the case of a fire or wind or 
storm or hurricane, even ice storms, those networks can go 
down. That is not future proof. You put all your eggs in the 
basket of one type of technology that is very exposed, and not 
have multiple technologies be allowed to be considered, I do 
not think you are going to have networks up and running when 
you need it.
    When it comes to operational expenses that Mr. Law was 
talking about, if there is not enough customers, basically, to 
sustain that project going forward, and there is an ice storm, 
there is fiber cuts, in a fiber line that is going over long 
aerial distances, serving a very few number of customers, there 
is not the wherewithal to do that. And those networks will not 
be around for the long haul. They will not be there to provide 
decent service to customers. Or if they survive at all, they 
will not be there to provide service.
    So, when it comes to future proofing, we better make sure 
that we are only giving funding to well-run organizations like 
Mr. Law's in Golden West. And we better make sure that it is 
being distributed widely to a number of technologies that can 
be a sustainable network, with a multiplicity of options.
    Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Mr. Feld, just one last 
question. You note that natural disasters accounted for 24 
percent of outages. Our country has the second-highest number 
of natural disasters in the world. In your view, what key 
measures should we consider to ensure our networks are less 
vulnerable to the natural disaster outages? Mr. Feld?
    Mr. Feld. We need to prioritize backup power, not merely 
onsite, which a number of folks have pointed out, but also, in 
people's homes. Communications is, in public safety and 
emergency, two-way now, not simply one-way. And so, we need to 
make sure that we have reliable backup power everywhere in the 
network.
    We need to have more public information, so that consumers 
can choose the most reliable networks. Reward those companies 
that choose to invest in reliability. And ensure that 
policymakers have access to appropriate information, and 
develop standardized metrics, so that we can hold those 
carriers who are not investing sufficient resources in 
reliability accountable.
    Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Senator 
Fischer, you are recognized for five minutes.

                STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Lujan. I appreciate the 
witnesses here today, as we discuss network resiliency.
    Mr. Law, as you might know, the FCC updated its rules for 
recording for major network outages among the FCC states and 
Federal agencies in March. Information sharing is critical for 
managing threats to network infrastructure and restoring 
services. Do you feel that there is enough communication 
between the FCC and states to quickly respond to these network 
outages?
    Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Fischer. I think there could be 
more that could be done, in terms of the, I will say, both the 
channels of the communication, as well as the substance of 
information as it relates to the NORS, Network Outage 
Reporting, as well as, potentially, the DIRS, Disaster 
Information Reporting System. I think there could be 
improvement. Do I think they are necessarily bad? No, but I am 
confident they could be improved to provide better visibility 
to states, as well as consumers.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you. For farmers and ranchers, 
having a fast broadband connection to their homes is important. 
But that may fall short when they cannot get access to those 
connections when they are on a tractor or working cattle, a 
mile or more from their house. It is essential that America's 
producers have reliable connectivity to control and power 
precision agriculture technologies.
    Mr. Adelstein, is wireless or satellite broadband service 
more likely to provide our producers with high-speed Internet 
connections where they need it?
    Mr. Adelstein. Absolutely. I think, you know, when it comes 
to precision agriculture, it is required that the entire field 
be covered, not just the farmhouse. So, if you limit funding 
only to fiber that goes to one location, you do not cover the 
entire field.
    And you--not only do you lose the agricultural production 
advantages, but you lose the reduction in use of water. And 
right now, we are seeing vast droughts in the West. And they 
are really damaging, you know, the ecosystem for years to come. 
And the President's plan talks about trying to deal with this 
water crisis. Let us use the broadband funding to do that. The 
way you do that is by allowing coverage of the entire farm 
field, so that we can use precision agriculture to save water 
resources, especially at a time when we are seeing these 
droughts, and the disasters as a result, I think personally, of 
global warming. We need to address that.
    And you know, if you just go to the farmhouse, and the 
farmer has to run back to the farmhouse, it does not do him any 
good when he is trying to control his use of water, he is 
trying to increase crop yields. Make that, I think, a priority 
in funding so that there is a reward for that. There might be a 
little bit more----
    Senator Fischer. Yes, you know, we have so many new great 
technologies, especially when it comes to water conservation 
through irrigation practices, where that can be monitored, but 
you have to have that connectivity to do it.
    Mr. Adelstein. That is right. There are sensors throughout 
the field and there is also algorithms they put in, in terms of 
where they need to have the water.
    Senator Fischer. And on irrigation systems, as well.
    Mr. Adelstein. Yes, absolutely. Irrigation systems are now 
being used with extensive data sensors that rely on wireless 
connectivity throughout the field.
    Senator Fischer. Right, thank you. I am going to zoom out a 
little bit here. But a fundamental consideration for our 
conversation here today is knowing the actual scope and reach 
of our fixed and mobile broadband networks. I know it gets 
mentioned a lot in this committee's hearings, but broadband 
mapping and ensuring the FCC uses the most accurate data 
available affects many of these related issues.
    Mr. Law, could you touch on the importance of broadband 
mapping and the timing of updating those maps at the FCC, as it 
relates to building resilient networks, and beyond? Should we 
not have the most up to date, reliable information before we 
start putting money out there to deploy broadband?
    Mr. Law. I absolutely agree, Senator Fischer, that it is 
highly important that we know both where broadband services is 
available and what it is capable of? And more importantly, 
where is it not and where are the places that we need to fill 
in?
    Maps are always an interesting exercise. They are a 
snapshot in time. It is hard to make them dynamic, however, I 
am hopeful that the FCC continues to improve its process to 
develop, generate, and deploy those maps. And as a small rural 
provider, we certainly have tried to do our part to provide the 
FCC with timely information to reflect that.
    Senator Fischer. Right. Thank you. We have seen many 
different suggestions for what the current definition of 
broadband should be updated to. We hear about 25 megabytes per 
second download speeds is not enough for a family with high 
Internet usage and that demand is growing for upload speeds.
    Mr. Law and Mr. Adelstein, from your perspective, what 
makes more sense for future broadband build out? And how do we 
ensure that areas that currently do not have access to 
broadband, meeting the FCC definition of 25/3, that they do not 
slip through the cracks, as we--as we move forward on that well 
intended pursuit in building out?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, first, we certainly, you know, need to 
target unserved areas and under, you know, 25/3 would be a good 
place--would be a good place to start. Generally speaking, 
Congress does not set these standards and statutes. They leave 
it to the agencies. Because, as the Universal Service Law says, 
it is an evolving standard of technology. Today's gigabit speed 
is, you know, yesterday's telegraph.
    We need to let the agencies continue to upgrade it, but 
right now, consumers are using 10 times more download than 
upload. And that is the way the entire system is networked. So, 
to go to asymmetrical speeds is something that is not often 
used. There might be a handful of customers that use it, but 
generally speaking, the average user does not get anywhere--
anywhere near that.
    So, to engineer an entire system, and basically, in the 
case of wireless, they cannot always reach that. So, if you do 
say that you need a symmetrical speed, you basically cut out 
wireless from the entire bill, in today's marketplace. And you 
have cut out the ability to deal with precision agriculture. 
You cut out the ability to deal with the global warming, that 
actually causes some of the issues that we are talking about. 
You are dealing with resiliency of wireless networks. All that 
is cut out and you are putting everything into one technology 
because it meets this speed.
    Now, if people want to value those speeds, I think we could 
do that. You could make that a priority. Say we want higher 
upload; we want higher download. Just do not make it a gating 
factor, in law, that is set forever in this kind of cement that 
cannot be visited, that is inflexible, and suddenly find out, 
after you set that in law, that it cannot be revisited.
    That is why, traditionally, this committee and this 
Congress, in the Telecommunications Act that Senator Markey 
helped to pioneer, set standards, like an evolving definition 
of telecommunications service, that allows the continued 
evolution. And some day it will be more than 100/100, but 
today, that would, I think, artificially move the networks 
toward one single solution that does not meet your other goals 
including, what you mentioned, precision agriculture.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you. My time is up. Mr. Law, if you 
would like to answer that for the record, I would appreciate 
it. Thank you.
    Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Lujan. Senator Fischer and Mr. Markey--Senator 
Markey, you are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. So, as 
we assemble the broadband components of the next infrastructure 
bill, I believe that we must address issues at the intersection 
of climate change and telecommunications policy.
    Scientists have projected that sea level rise will submerge 
more than 4,000 miles of fiber optic cables within the next 15 
years. Increasing extreme weather events, like hurricanes and 
wildfires also raise the likelihood of severe outages in our 
communications networks. And at the same time, studies estimate 
that our digital technologies and the Internet account for 
nearly 4 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, a number 
that is only expected to rise as broadband adoption continues 
to grow.
    So, it is crystal clear that climate change is a threat to 
our networks, while our communications infrastructure is, 
itself, fueling this ever-growing crisis. So, that is why 
Senator Wyden and I have introduced legislation to tackle both 
ends of the problem, the Generating Resilient and Energy 
Efficient Network Communications Act, or the GREEN 
Communications Act. Our legislation will create a new $5 
billion program at the NTIA, which will fund projects to 
increase network resiliency, as well as initiatives to reduce 
the environmental footprint of communications technologies.
    Mr. Adelstein, do you agree that we need to invest in both 
network resiliency and carbon reducing technologies, as part of 
any broadband infrastructure package?
    Mr. Adelstein. Absolutely. I think, you know, our industry 
has certainly stepped up to deal with and reduce the carbon 
footprint of every one of our--my major members. You know, you 
look at our own footprint and what we have done to reduce it, 
and I can put in for the record those numbers, which are 
impressive. But I think the bigger picture is that Internet 
enabled solutions can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 16.5 
percent, according to independent experts. That is one-third of 
the way, by 2030, to the goal of 50 percent that we are 
shooting for. This is an enormous contribution. I do not know 
of any other technology that is more important.
    And 5G, of all the technologies, is the most important of 
those to get us to that goal. Because smart transportation--the 
biggest problem with emissions is transportation and smart cars 
and autonomous vehicles can contribute dramatically by 40-90 
percent reduced emissions. So, if we get 5G into this bill, you 
have got, suddenly, the ability to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions enormously. But if we limit it to one type of 
technology--and all telecom does help--but mobility is the most 
important because you have sensors in factories, you have the 
water we talked about.
    I mean, we are willing to do more than just reduce the 
footprint within our own industry, we are in a position, as an 
industry, to contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions in a dramatic fashion. But if you take the $65 
billion--we all read the same articles in the paper where we 
see there is pressure on the funding for climate change. Here 
you have got $65 billion, potentially, you want to target every 
one of those dollars to try to maximize the reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions.
    So, why not make it eligible to all technologies and let 
the agencies rate them? Say, which one of these--which one of 
these projects that you are proposing does the most to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions? And the wireless industry thinks we 
will be first in line, but we will see. Let the agencies 
decide. We think our technology can do more to save the planet 
than almost any other technology, besides renewable energy.
    Senator Markey. Love it. Mr. Feld, I would like to ask you 
two questions, if I could. One is just following up on Mr. 
Adelstein, it is explaining why, in addition to robust funding, 
we also need strong resiliency rules on the books, to require 
better preparedness before and after the inevitable disasters 
strike us.
    But also, if you would, just ruminate for a second, as 
well, on municipalities and this broadband industry march to 
state to state to prohibit municipalities from even deploying 
broadbands. What would you recommend that we do, in both of 
those areas?
    Mr. Feld. Well, we need this to be a fully integrated and 
fully coordinated at every level of government. I have 
recommended, in my testimony, that the Federal legislation 
preempt these State laws and not simply in the case of building 
out municipal networks, which are critical, but also that 
networks can--State and local government, as well as the 
Federal Government, can make assets available in time of 
emergency, as backup.
    There is often time, plenty of fiber in the ground to 
provide back haul, or plenty of spectrum that is going fallow, 
that is held by Federal agencies or by State and local 
governments, and they should be encouraged to put those to 
productive use, particularly in times of crisis.
    Senator Markey. Are we in a paradoxical situation where 
many of these municipalities might have acted themselves and 
there is a State law that the broadband companies have that 
prohibit them from acting on their own? And now, we are passing 
Federal legislation to provide funding that the broadband 
companies want to use in order to go in to solve a problem that 
the municipalities were saying they were willing to solve in 
the first place?
    Mr. Feld. Yes. This is a--it rates four out of five 
Morrisette's on the irony scale, as I like to say.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Feld. The local governments are closest to their 
citizens. They often have a much greater awareness of what the 
particular risks are, in the community. In addition, we have 
problems of communities that have traditionally been 
marginalized or underfunded, such as on Tribal lands, or in 
communities of color. These communities are uniquely situated 
to contribute and yet, in many states, they are prohibited from 
doing so. This is now trying to take on a problem where we need 
to focus everything in saying, well, instead, why do we not put 
a bucket of cement on your right foot and tie your hand behind 
your back, and now go out and fix the problem. But give the 
money to the people who put the cement on your foot and tied 
your hand behind your back.
    Senator Markey. Oh, you are definitely winning the metaphor 
contest today in the Commerce Committee. But I love each one of 
them because they are accurate, in terms of where we are. And I 
guess, all I would say is, if you can in 10 seconds say, do you 
believe we need strong rules on resiliency, to make sure that 
it gets done?
    Mr. Feld. We absolutely need rules on resiliency. It is not 
going to happen on its own, and we have 10 years of evidence--
20 years of evidence now to prove it.
    Senator Markey. Beautiful, thank you.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you so much, Senator Markey. Senator 
Moran, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

                STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

    Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you. Let me begin with, 
thank you all for being here. And then, let me begin with 
Commissioner Adelstein. I am part of this group working on 
infrastructure. One of the common denominators, even though we 
have had a debate as to what infrastructure--how it should be 
defined--one of the things that has been defined, from every 
iteration of this infrastructure plan, or plans that I have 
seen, is broadband. So, it has won the hearts, minds, and souls 
of Members of Congress and the public. We recognize its 
importance. And should we pass a bipartisan, or--infrastructure 
plan, I think that it, or whatever might come from 
infrastructure, will include broadband.
    So, what does that mean? The number, generally, has been 
$65 billion that is in nearly every plan. And what is your 
advice on how best that money should be spent? And let me give 
you this caveat. It seems to me that we elected officials, have 
the habit of creating a new program every time we decide we 
want to provide better services in broadband for our 
constituents. And then, I struggle to explain what the programs 
are that are available at the FCC, or the Department of 
Agricultural Rural Utility Services.
    What is it that we could do, perhaps even with an existing 
program, that would provide the depth and speed and the 
coverage that we are looking for, across the country, in regard 
to broadband?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, it is a great question. It is not 
really one size fits all solution. I mean, you need to give the 
broad guidance to the agencies as to what you want. You know, 
if speed is a factor, you make that a priority factor. If you 
want resiliency, you want these networks to be up, make sure 
that you put that in.
    We talk about regulations, etc. You have got the biggest 
carrot here, to feed resilience that you have ever had, if you 
are talking about $65 billion. Make sure those networks say 
that they can be up and running. But do not just pick one 
technology or come up with some standard that is a gating 
factor, that just says one technology, that may or may not be 
more resilient. If you want resilience, let the agencies 
decide, you know, which applications come in the door.
    You know, what I learned at RUS is, you cannot really 
decide who is going to apply or who is going to offer to 
provide service. You never know who is going to come in the 
door. And if you have, you know, hurricanes and--I am sorry, 
tornadoes in your part of the country that would wipe out 
aerial fiber and leave everybody with no service, I would kind 
of wonder, why did Congress only pay for, you know, aerial 
fiber in my district, when we could have had, you know, a 
wireless network that we would have had to replace one spot? We 
would replace the tower, get the power there, and we would have 
everybody covered, as opposed to having to go back and clean up 
all of the many fiber lines that got wiped out by a tornado.
    I mean, so, if that is a factor, make that a factor. But 
give some flexibility to the agencies to follow the goals of 
Congress. Today we are talking about resilience. We are talking 
about redundancy. But other goals that you have include 
precision agriculture, of course, we talked about before today. 
Mobility--rural customers want mobility more than anything 
else. And if you do not make that a factor that rewards it, you 
say, we are only going to do some gating factor that precludes 
wireless and fixed wireless, we will never get mobility.
    Senator Moran. Are there programs that exist today, at any 
Federal agency, that we could add the resources to, without 
creating a new program?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, the Rural Utility Service runs and 
outstanding program. You know, NTIA has done things, never on 
this scale before. The Federal Communications Commission ran 
the RDOF and has reverse auction mechanisms in place that could 
be used. Those are the three existing mechanisms. None of them 
have dealt with funding on this level. So, you have a bit of a 
challenge there.
    I think it is very important to give the agencies 
administrative funding, frankly, to be able to really kick the 
tires of these proposals. You know, you have got to make sure 
that they are there for the long haul. We talked about future 
proofing. Make sure you do not give money to programs that will 
not be around for years to come. Like, Denny will be there, but 
you give it to some new company that is a startup, it will not 
be around to provide service.
    Senator Moran. That is good point about the personnel and 
resources to manage the program. I am also an appropriator for 
both the Department of Agriculture and the FCC. The $65 billion 
may need to include some capabilities of those agencies to 
manage the program. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Law, anything that I ought to know, in regard to, like, 
the practical application? If we wanted to improve broadband, 
is there something that stands out to you that is most in need 
of attention? I know today's hearing is on resiliency, but I 
give you the license to talk beyond that.
    Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Moran. I will say a couple of 
things. One is, while I agree with my colleague that the--that 
the--that the technology that deploys has to have certain 
capabilities, I would caution Congress against setting the bar 
too low. It is easy to give talk about applications that are in 
use today, when you are talking about a generational 
investment, quite frankly. And I would not want to focus on the 
applications that any of us may use in our home today as those 
of the applications tomorrow. Because 3 years ago, there are 
applications we were not using then that we are using now. And 
that is just getting more rapid, not less.
    The second part it is, resiliency and redundancy, I think, 
is a great topic. I thoroughly enjoy talking about it. It is 
not cheap. And so, do you want the cheapest network? Do you 
want the best network? Or do you want something in between? And 
I think there is a possibility for both Congress, as well as 
the Agency, to define those items. But I will caution you, you 
cannot have both. You cannot ask for the cheapest network, but 
it has to be the most resilient, the most redundant, and 
perform in all capabilities because that will not be the 
cheapest network, and understandably so. Occasionally, that has 
been lost in earlier programs.
    And I would advocate, Senator, that from my perspective, 
the FCC is, indeed, the best agency to administer some type of 
significant broadband funding program.
    Senator Moran. I felt that way when there were two Kansans 
on the commission. Less so today.
    [Laughing.]
    Senator Moran. I do not what the clock says, but I will try 
one more question. I will ask you it, Mr. Law. You mentioned in 
your testimony, the ongoing support for Universal Service. It 
is important to resiliency and rural broadband, I think, was 
your testimony. Why is the stability of USF important for 
small, rural broadband providers and their consumers, 
particularly when it comes to the resiliency of the network?
    Mr. Law. So, when you look at what companies, such as 
Golden West, or those in Kansas--a Nex-Tech or a Pioneer or 
some of the other quality providers in Kansas, Universal 
Service Funding has been foundational for the platform and the 
network topologies that they have built. And they have built 
reliable networks and they have built quality networks that 
scale. We all have to operate those over long periods of time 
with low customer numbers and low density and the 
sustainability, which is key for Universal Service Funding.
    The sustainability of a company like a Golden West or a 
Pioneer being available to offer those services in 2021, 2031, 
or 2041--it is great to talk about $65 billion investment in 
broadband. But I will tell you, from my perspective, the 
Universal Service Fund will be the underpinning that will allow 
Golden West to be able to continue to provide whatever 
technologies are necessary in those years.
    Senator Moran. I assume you could have a caveat, if we make 
the Universal Service Fund more stable.
    Mr. Law. Thank you for that. I wish I had added that myself 
and concur entirely.
    Senator Moran. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Moran. Senator Peters, 
you are recognized for 5 minutes.

                STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to our 
witnesses, thank you for your testimony here today.
    I am--I serve as Chairman of the Homeland Security 
Committee, here in the Senate and I am certainly focused every 
day on ensuring that America's critical infrastructure is 
resilient to attacks, as well as national disasters.
    At DHS, the Office of Infrastructure Protection's 
Infrastructure, Development, and Recovery, IDR Program, works, 
with both Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
governmental officials, and infrastructure owners and 
operators, to plan, design, implement solutions that are going 
to enhance security and resilience of critical infrastructure 
against the whole gambit of threats that they face.
    Mr. Feld, my question is for you. What are the ways the 
Federal Government can better coordinate recovery of 
telecommunication networks, during outages caused by either a 
natural disaster and also, improve network resilience against 
other types of attacks against this critical infrastructure?
    Mr. Feld. It is critically important that we clarify and 
expand the role of the Federal Communications Commission, in 
terms of priority in restoring communications when it is down. 
Our--the GAO report that I mentioned in my testimony, shows 
that there is a tremendous amount of confusion about the right 
role of the FCC that needs to be clarified. There needs to be 
greater coordination, particularly between energy providers, 
the power companies, and the telecommunications providers, 
which can only be provided by leadership at the Federal level.
    With regard to cybersecurity, we have to get the FCC off 
the bench. We are talking about the agency that supervises the 
physical infrastructure of the Internet and it has, 
essentially, been benched for the last 4 years, on 
cybersecurity. The FCC is in the best position to monitor 
network providers, to ensure that they are taking appropriate 
precautions, to, as license conditions require that they show 
that they are taking cybersecurity responsible and seriously. 
And without the FCC involved, we have a giant and exploitable 
hole in our Federal response to cybersecurity threats.
    Senator Peters. Well, you mentioned several items. Are 
there some priorities that just jump right out at you, in terms 
of the FCC's oversight?
    Mr. Feld. Well, one of the key issues is the FCC's overall 
authority, which is in jeopardy at the moment, because of the 
failure to classify voiceover IP as a Title II service, and the 
classification of broadband as a Title II service. We are on 
track to see the FCC's oversight of wireline communications in 
this country completely disappear within the next five to 10 
years, as traditional copper networks are retired. That needs 
to be corrected.
    Senator Peters. Again, Mr. Feld, participation in the 
Disaster Information Reporting System, as you know, is 
voluntary for providers. It only collects data about outages at 
certain times and certain criteria that have to be met. The 
Network Outage Reporting System only requires reporting of 
longer outages, impacting a certain number of people, as well. 
And while participation in NORS is mandatory for voice 
providers, it is not mandatory for broadband providers. Plus, 
the information is not available to the public.
    My question to you is, how can regular collection of data, 
about a broader array of both sunny day and disaster outages 
prevent future outages? And what should we do, in Congress, to 
ensure the FCC is getting consistent, reliable data for all 
outages?
    Mr. Feld. Well, the FCC must be provided with appropriate 
data to make important decisions and policymakers need 
information about frequency of outages, where these outages are 
occurring, what factors are going into these. The single most 
important thing that Congress can do, is to provide clear 
authority for the FCC, to mandate the collection of this 
information, and funding to allow the FCC and carriers to 
provide this information.
    We can imbed, in every network, automatic outage reporting 
requirements. We can replicate what the FCC has done on speed 
testing, with regard to reliability testing, where we have 
carriers place the devices and software within their network, 
so that the FCC can track these things while respecting trade 
secrets and privacy. This does not have to be hard. And it does 
not have to impose significant long-term burdens, if we do this 
properly and fund it properly, so that we can deploy it now, 
when we need it.
    Senator Peters. And I say, sunny time outages, too. I have 
complaints I hear from constituents that their broadband is out 
consistently. Not for--it may not fit any of the criteria that 
I mentioned here, but it is a persistent problem and clearly, 
the resilience is not in the network. You think what you are 
discussing would help us address that? Or should we do even 
more?
    Mr. Feld. Well, I think what I am suggesting is a good 
first step. And it is important to recognize that repeated 
short outages can be as crippling as a long-term outage. The 
network must be reliable. It means that I have to be able--if I 
am saying we are going to do distance education, then that has 
to work for the school day. It cannot be something that works, 
kind of-sort of, during the school day and tomorrow it might 
not work, or it might work in the morning, but I might have 
to--there are just too many problems going on in our networks.
    We need--but the critical need, right now, is to establish 
the authority of the FCC to act, to mandate that the FCC act, 
and to provide the means to collect all this information. 
Because right now, we do not even have the metrics to say what 
is a reliable network. But I am also confident, as a consumer 
and as somebody who talks to consumers, that if we made 
information available, that consumers could trust, as to which 
networks were the most reliable, that network would be rewarded 
for its investment. But we must make that information 
available.
    Senator Peters. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator 
Blackburn, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

              STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

    Senator Blackburn. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And do 
our witnesses, we appreciate you all being with us.
    I represent Tennessee and in 2020, Tennesseans really came 
to appreciate the resiliency of their networks. In 2020, we had 
tornadoes, we had storms, we had floods, we had other natural 
disasters, and then, on Christmas Day, we had the bombing--a 
car bomb was detonated outside the AT&T downtown building in 
Nashville. And that is where the switching capabilities for 
much of the Southeast is located. And at that point, we had 
people in several states who where affected by that Christmas 
Day bombing.
    And during my work here in Congress, whether in the House 
or here in the Senate, working on broadband infrastructure 
resiliency is something that has taken a good bit of my 
efforts. And we have the Internet Exchange Act, which recently 
passed the Senate as part of a larger package and will help in 
building these resilient and redundant networks. And right now, 
in Tennessee, what we know is that we have 400,000 Tennesseans 
that are living in a census block that has no provider for 
service that hits that 25/3 mark. And the average cost of 
streaming that fiber is $30,000-40,000 per mile. And then, to 
trench that fiber, it is $50,000-70,000 per mile. So, the costs 
add up quickly.
    Tennesseans realize this and they are very concerned. We 
have heard from some of our--our Tennesseans about Congress 
considering this 100 by 100 standard for broadband, when they 
really have not been able to get the 25/3 FCC minimum.
    So, Mr. Law, I would like for you to talk about what this 
would do. If you had the 100/100 standard, what that would do 
to rural communities that are still trying to get the 25/3?
    Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Blackburn, for your question. I 
totally agree that, in terms of broadband availability and 
capability, the focus of any infrastructure program has to 
begin with focusing those dollars, targeted on those who do not 
have service today.
    And if the standard is, indeed, 100 megs symmetrical, that 
does not mean that somebody who has 75 meg or 100 by 10, or 
some other thing, has, you know, insufficient broadband. They 
may have adequate broadband. But I think any funding program 
would need to begin--let us begin with the hardest first. And 
the ones you just described, in Tennessee, I think would meet 
my definition of what is the hardest first.
    Then, the second part is, to make it available. The second 
part is, what are the capabilities that we want to have 
associated with that, along with both the affordability, and 
then, finally, the sustainability. So, it would really be, kind 
of, a four-part process--availability, capability, 
affordability, and sustainability. But I would propose you 
begin with how do you solve for the 25/3 customers first.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you for that. Mr. Adelstein, let 
me ask you this. And this is an area we have talked about in 
the past. Should we stay technologically neutral when we are 
distributing broadband funding and looking at broadband access?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, absolutely. I think, you know, your 
point, fiber costs 10 times more than wireless to deploy, 
according to the Carmel Group's study that I have seen. Capital 
outlays, per individual, are much, much higher. And you 
actually may not get the service that you ultimately want. I 
mean, you have got a lot of resiliency issues that could come 
with, particularly, aerial fiber and, as you mentioned, it is 
much more expensive if you bury it. And Denny was mentioning 
the--it gets more expensive the more resilient it is.
    The beauty of not doing 100/100 but being technologically 
neutral is that you can then pick more resilient technologies 
that might actually be less expensive in this case. Because 
instead of having to restore service at $30,000 a mile to 
$60,000 a mile, you only have to restore service to one site--
to a tower, to a water tower, wherever the facility might be. 
Get the back haul to that. Get the power to that, when the 
power goes down.
    If you have a fiber network that you spent all this money 
on, all of a sudden, there is no power. Nobody can get 
broadband in their home, because those require--fiber to the 
home requires power in the house. Getting power to the tower, 
getting power to the wireless transmission facility is a lot 
easier to do. So, not only is it more expensive to put in, but 
if you ever have a problem, you have got to restore it, it is 
more expensive to restore, and where is the money going to come 
to pay for that, once Congress has opened up its wallet for 
this enormous amount, on a non-resilient network, potentially?
    So, when you are spending these money--these moneys, make 
sure you target the most efficient technologies, ones that are 
the most resilient. You can reward these things. Now, getting 
higher upload speeds is wonderful. Make that a priority, too. 
But do not make that a gating factor, where you cut out all 
other technologies. You cut out fixed wireless, you cut out 
mobile wireless, you cut out other options that can do it 
cheaper, that can actually do it better, and that can be more 
resilient. That is why Congress, traditionally, has always been 
technologically flexible and has not set standards and statute 
that lock it down.
    Admirable though the standard might be, whatever--you know, 
100/100 is what we all want. Someday that is going to be very 
low, even for wireless networks. But today, you could end up 
using those fundings--those funds to architect a network that 
is not what you had in mind. And in fact, you will not reach 
many unserved customers because you spent so much on 
inefficient, expensive technology that, in the end, you do not 
get everywhere you need to go.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you so much, Senator Blackburn. 
Senator Rosen, you are recognized for five minutes.

                STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

    Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Lujan, really appreciate 
you holding this important hearing. Witnesses, I really 
appreciate you being here.
    I just want to say a little something, building on what 
Senator Peters said about--and everyone is talking about 
network resilience. But I just want to add my few cents about 
wildfires and network resilience to address wildfires. As the 
Chair knows all too well, wildfires, unfortunately, have become 
an ever-present threat to the Southwest. And 95 percent of the 
West Coast is under extreme drought, all across California, 
Oregon, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona. Lake Mead, in Nevada, has 
hit its lowest water level on record last week, since the 
inception, I believe, of the dam. Forty-six percent of my state 
are living in elevated risk of wildfires.
    So, it is imperative that communities, in my state, all 
across the West, but really, all across the country, have 
access to reliable and resilient communications network. I am 
not going to go on about that because other witnesses have, but 
I just wanted to put that out there. Resilience is really, 
really important.
    But I would like to talk a little bit about, what we are 
calling, the middle mile. In some of the most rural and 
underserved parts of Nevada and across the country, the lack of 
basic fiber infrastructure remains a barrier to bringing 
broadband service to many homes and businesses. Small Internet 
providers, in particular, often lack resources to invest in 
extensive networks. But by partnering with middle mile network 
providers, it can reduce their capital expenditures that often 
serve as a barrier to rural deployment.
    And so, Mr. Adelstein, how does the lack of middle mile 
infrastructure hinder the ability of ISPs, particularly in 
rural areas, to provide sufficient broadband service by either 
wireline, wireless, or both? And what do you think Congress can 
do to fill in the middle mile gap?
    Mr. Adelstein. It is a great question. Getting fiber deeper 
in the network is essential to meet the needs of people in 
Nevada and every other rural city in the country. The question 
is where do you terminate that? Do you take it all the way to 
the home? Or do you take it to an antenna? And sometimes, it is 
appropriate to take it to the home. Denny Law, in his 
territory, is somebody I would trust to do that. He has already 
built a very strong foundation and he just needs to finish out 
some exchanges that are not fiber to the home, yet.
    You might have areas of Nevada where, if you can get close 
to those end users, they are very widely dispersed once you get 
to the end of that line. So, you get the middle mile out there. 
And it may be that you want to take fiber to the end user, but 
you may want to use a wireless solution that will get out to 
those hard-to-reach Nevadans and get to them much cheaper and 
get to them much quicker.
    I mean, I know that people in Nevada need broadband now. It 
could take years to get fiber networks built out to the very 
farthest reaches, or you can put up a single tower, or co-
locate on an existing tower, and almost, you know, within 6 
months get service to an entire area. Whereas, one estimate is, 
it could take 10 years to even get to 90 percent fiber 
penetration in the United States.
    Senator Rosen. Wow, thank you. I want to talk a--ask Mr. 
Feld, too, a little bit more about the middle mile. Because, as 
we have discussed, smaller ISPs, they lack the capital 
expenditure to expand their footprint to high-cost areas, to 
meet the needs of rural communities--maybe even underserved 
communities. But in order to make it feasible for these smaller 
ISPs to deliver broadband service to underserved communities, 
should we consider, here in Congress, ensuring middle mile 
infrastructure as eligible for Federal resources, especially 
when partnered with an ISP that is committed to providing the 
middle mile and helping potentiate for those last mile 
connections?
    Mr. Feld. Middle mile is absolutely critical to rural 
America. It is absolutely critical to the deployment of 5G. I 
would highly recommend making these available for--eligible for 
grants, particularly if we are talking about open 
infrastructure, where we have public dollars go to pay to lay 
down fiber that will be open to multiple competitors, so that 
we can get the biggest bang for the buck.
    I have heard some people denigrate the BTOP program from 10 
years ago. But one of the most important things it did was to 
fund middle mile in a number of rural areas. In Maine, they, in 
particular, have something called the Three Ring Binder Fiber 
Backbone, which is, even now, paying dividends to rural 
communities in Maine. We can do this here, as part of build out 
and, indeed, we must, if we want to make sure that rural 
America has access to high-speed, reliable broadband.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you. I really appreciate everyone 
being here today and I look forward to having a little bit more 
robust discussion on middle mile access. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Capito, 
you are recognized for 5 minutes.

            STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

    Senator Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 
gentlemen, for being here today. I am from West Virginia. We 
have some of the lowest broadband deployment in the country, 
unfortunately. We also are subject to flooding, flash flooding 
in particular. And actually, I think about today on a day--
tomorrow will be the 5-year anniversary of a very devastating 
flood we had in Southern and, sort of, middle West Virginia.
    But I wanted to ask Chief Johnson this question about 
FirstNet. I was able to go to Kingwood, West Virginia, where we 
dedicated a FirstNet facility and tower sites, built in West 
Virginia. But in your testimony, you mentioned that, for 
resiliency, the importance of backup power generators. So, is 
that a--is that a frequent thing for first responders in the 
Western part of the United States, where people have backup 
generators for first response, to keep their systems up and 
running?
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you--excuse me. Thank you, Senator. It 
is a frequent issue in the West. It has been exacerbated by 
public safety power shutoffs, which are deenergizing the 
electrical grid, to avoid starting fires. So, when you take 
down the power grid, intentionally, to avoid starting a fire, 
it is only a matter of time until the towers, the facilities, 
etc., their backup power expires.
    So, that is why we are working with the California Fire 
Chiefs Association, etc., to work with the State legislature to 
speed the process by which we get permits and get backup power 
generation to these towers. That is what maintains our wireless 
connectivity.
    Senator Capito. Thank you. That reminds me, and you brought 
this up about the permitting. I know that some of these--well, 
I look at permitting major lines in West Virginia. You have to 
go under streams, or you try to get the right of way, or you 
want to work with the power company.
    I do not know, Mr. Law, if you have the same kind of issue 
in your home. What could we do to speed up the permitting? 
Because it is time and money. We are going to have the money. 
We just need to make sure we shorten the time to get to those 
last places.
    Mr. Law. Thank you, Senator Capito. I have two suggestions, 
I think, that could be implemented relatively simply. There 
were recommendations from the FCC's BDAC committee, Broadband 
Deployment Advisor Committee, which Mr. Adelstein was involved 
in, that had some excellent recommendations to streamline the 
application process for crossing Federal lands, particularly, 
which I know was also an issue in West Virginia.
    Senator Capito. Poor--poor service, yes.
    Mr. Law. Yep. Any--for us--for Golden West, my 
organization, for our service, BLM, just a whole--national 
parks, all sorts of things. Again, I do not think it is 
anything that the Federal agencies are doing intentionally, but 
obviously, their primary jobs are not to manage the rights of 
way on their--on their lands.
    Senator Capito. Right.
    Mr. Law. However, once you make an application for right of 
way, I will tell you it is a deep dark whole, it feels like, 
that goes in and you do not see it come to light until 2 years 
later. And you have no visibility into the part of the process 
and that has to be changed. That is one suggestion.
    The second suggestion is, you need to be cognizant of 
environmental and all of those items. So, I am not suggesting 
otherwise. However, when you are in particularly road right of 
way, that has been disturbed, they use that to build the road, 
yet still being required to do all, and then some, of the 
environmental reviews, when you are in the road right of way. 
It seems a little bit redundant to me.
    I understand if I am going cross country across, what I 
would term to be, virgin territory. There should be 
environmental reviews. There should be a higher standard set 
for that. But when I am in a disturbed road right of way, some 
of the permitting and application processes for that--which is 
our--I will say our main trunking and backbone lines--that has 
to be speeded up and I would think we could do that.
    Senator Capito. Yes, and we are trying to build that into 
the Surface Transportation Act. I know a lot of states have 
tried to do that, that dig once prospect, and I think that 
makes a whole lot of sense.
    Mr. Adelstein, let me ask you a question. You mentioned 
BTOP--or not BTOP. You mentioned RDOF and Rural USDA and 
Department of Commerce. We have ARC in West Virginia, 
Appalachian Regional Commission, which has a broadband 
component to it. What we are finding is, for instance, if we 
have auctioned off the census track in the rural auction, but 
it may be surrounded by something that the ARC is going to 
work, and you have to go through one to get to the other. These 
agencies just fight one another, rather than try to work with 
one another. Let us just say the ARC could build it quicker, 
could the FCC work with them to make that happen, why does that 
not happen? It makes too--does it make too much sense?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, you know, when I was running Rural 
Utility Service, we used to get called to the White House--I 
told a story earlier about Vice President Biden calling me in 
to try and coordinate and make sure the agencies were working 
together. What I really learned, from the perspective of 
somebody who is on the receiving end of applications, people 
saying, I want to serve your area. What is really important, I 
think, in West Virginia, in particular, is that we did not get 
to choose who came in and applied. We did not say, we want 
fiber here. We want wireless there. It depended on who came in 
the door.
    Senator Capito. Right.
    Mr. Adelstein. And when you are in a state like yours--and 
I worked with your predecessor, Senator Rockefeller and Senator 
Byrd on this--you know, we--you do not have really a great 
history. You have really pretty, you know, second-rate 
infrastructure in some ways, because of the history. Nothing to 
do with the senators, nothing to do with the providers. It is 
just that they did not have the rural co-ops that, for years, 
were getting RUS funding, USF funding. And so, when you are 
thinking, in West Virginia, about who is going to come in the 
door to serve us, it is--you cannot get some company just--that 
is newer, that does not have good infrastructure nearby, that 
is going to come in and do it. You have got to give 
flexibility, I think, to the agencies that you are giving it 
to.
    Make sure they are coordinated. Maybe, put in place in the 
statute, actually, if you are to go to more than one--and you 
can decide if they put it all through RDOF or something else--
but have a coordinating function, within the law itself so that 
they are required to coordinate. But then, watch out, because 
you have got to make sure that whoever comes in the door is in 
a position to actually serve West Virginia, and kick the tires 
of what comes through.
    Senator Capito. Well, I have got a real problem with one of 
the providers that is going to walk out with several hundred 
million dollars in the RDOF, in the State of West Virginia. And 
they have a terrible track record. They have not lived up to 
their obligations in the past. And yet--and yet, they were 
awarded--they are still in Process 2. Now, they did not get all 
of it, but they got a big bunch of it. And my understanding is, 
if they do not move forward, well, in 5 years, the only thing 
they have to do is pay a fine. And then, you have got 5 years 
of people who are not served, or underserved, and--well, you 
can tell. Very frustrating with me.
    Last question, Mr. Law. One of the things the 
Administration, I think, wants to do with the funding--and you 
mentioned that you thought the FCC was the best place for the 
increased funding--they are really high on municipal networks. 
We have had a couple municipalities in our state that have 
tried them. A couple that have failed. But could you talk about 
municipal networks and, you know, without disparaging a 
municipality?
    Mr. Law. Sure. And--and I would say, in general terms--and 
I would stress that my comments are in general terms--I do not 
necessarily think municipal networks are the preferred method 
for delivering broadband. And there are a couple of reasons for 
that. I do not think there is a great track record of success 
of governmental entities, whether they be communities or 
otherwise, competing with a private business. Even if that 
private business is lousy, for lack of a better word, 
communities competing, governmental entities competing is 
historically not beneficial. That is item one.
    The second item is, you are still going to have a large 
number of constituents that are haves and have nots. Because 
whatever governmental entity you pick--so, let us pick towns 
municipalities. That border of that municipality ends 
somewhere. Or, if you want to go counties, that county boundary 
ends somewhere. Or go beyond that to whatever district you 
wish, I guarantee you there will be a broadband subscriber 30 
feet the other side of that boundary that says, I do not have 
service.
    And so, for those reasons--again, in general terms--I do 
not--Do I think there should be laws banning it? Not 
necessarily. But at the same time, do I think that the funding 
should be specifically directed toward municipalities? No.
    Senator Capito. Yes, and I have a question, too, on the 
ability to maintain. They may be able to stand them up and they 
may be able to get them moving, but you are talking about over 
a long period of time, to have the expertise and the longevity 
to be able to maintain and adapt to the technology. Thank you.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Capito. We have Senator 
Young. Senator Young, you are recognized for your 5 minutes.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

    Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This--I am going to 
direct several questions to Mr. Adelstein. And I thank you for 
your appearance here today.
    Sir, I believe we need an all-of-the-above technology 
approach to close the digital divide. No single technology is, 
by my lights, going to be the right solution for every 
household's needs. There is a role to be played by multiple 
proven technologies, including fixed, mobile, satellite, wired, 
wireless, licensed, unlicensed, and others, to deliver 
connectivity throughout America's vast geography and diverse 
economy.
    Mr. Adelstein, in your testimony you talk about the 
importance of technological flexibility for resilient broadband 
networks. Can you tell us, why is technological flexibility so 
important? And what role does technological flexibility play in 
ensuring resilient networks?
    Mr. Adelstein. Great question. You know, technological 
flexibility is important because--you know, one-size-fits-all 
is an overused term, but what I was just saying to the Senator 
was that you do not know what is going to come in the door. It 
depends on the particular geography. It depends on the history 
of network investment in that particular geography.
    Sometimes, like in Denny's territory, fiber to his 
remaining exchanges makes perfect sense and it goes right to 
the end user. But another area that does not have that fiber 
that he has built, and he does not have a provider that comes 
in the door with a solid balance sheet, like he has, cannot be 
able to provide that and stay in business because it is not a 
very profitable area. There is a reason these areas are 
unserved.
    So, you want to find solid applicants and Congress does not 
get to pick them. Ultimately, it has got to be whatever comes 
in the door it is going to be--businesses decide they can serve 
that area. Let the best technology win that meets a number of 
concerns that Congress has.
    If you have a gating criteria, for example symmetrical 
speed service, then you are taking one priority, whether you 
think it is important or not, or the upload speed, and saying 
that is more important than mobility. You are saying upload 
speed is more important than getting consumers broadband 
quickly. Sometimes wireless can be deployed much more quickly.
    And you asked about resiliency. When it comes to 
resiliency, if you are talking about only fiber networks, they 
can be very exposed to damage and they require power in the 
home to work. Whereas, a fiber system, could more quickly be 
restored because you only have to get power to the transmission 
site and you only have to get back haul to that versus getting 
fiber back up to, literally, you know, thousands and thousands 
of homes that may be wiped out, and hundreds of fiber cuts. So, 
you know--but in some places, that actually might make more 
sense.
    Particularly, in terms of resiliency, it is not even one-
size-fits-all within a category. Denny was talking about buried 
fiber versus aerial. Buried is more resilient, but it is a lot 
more expensive. So, you know, that is a tradeoff. And if you 
sit here and----
    Senator Young. So, this----
    Mr. Adelstein. Go ahead.
    Senator Young. I am sorry, sir. So, in short, or in 
summary, this all-of-the-above approach that gives you 
technological flexibility, you might call it, there is a 
straight line from that approach to enticing your private 
carriers and your not for profits and others into service 
provision and in closing the digital divide. Is that accurate?
    Mr. Adelstein. Yes, if you--yes, it is exactly right. 
Because if you pick one technology, you are not going to close 
the digital divide, because you are not necessarily going to 
find a provider of that technology that is in a good position 
to serve that area. Depending on the nature of that area, 
whether it is mountainous, whether it is flat, whether they had 
invested in fiber, whether they have not yet, whether there is 
a nice tower there, whether there is not.
    Senator Young. Yes.
    Mr. Adelstein. I mean, you cannot, as a Congress, say we 
are going to pick one standard and nobody gets in unless you 
can do big, fat upload speeds. And that only allows one 
technology and, by the way, not many people actually use upload 
speeds. But guess what? They all use mobility. They want 
resiliency. They want those networks to be there.
    Senator Young. Yes.
    Mr. Adelstein. Why do you not let the agencies have the 
flexibility to consider other factors, besides just upload 
speed and cutting out everybody that cannot do certain upload 
speeds?
    Senator Young. I can tell this is an area of passion for 
you. And it is a really important area, as we contemplate how 
to best use taxpayer dollars, and in closing the digital 
divide. So, thank you for that answer.
    I am going to ask you another question. One of my areas of 
focus is ensuring that the United States is positioned to lead 
the world in innovation and the development of new 
technologies. As we think about advancing our international 
competitiveness and leading the world in wireless innovation, 
does it concern you that neither the Administration's budget 
blueprint, nor its broadband plan seem to speak at all to the 
need to win the race to deploy 5G?
    Mr. Adelstein. I would like to see it mentioned. You know, 
all the objectives of the President's American Jobs Plan 
requires 5G and relies on 5G. From water to advanced 
manufacturing to, of course, the broadband, but the jobs--we 
are talking about creating 4.5 million jobs with 5G, which is 
more than the entire American Jobs Plan. I think it might make 
sense that it should be included, since the green future that 
the President is committed to, really is going to rely on 
mobile connectivity. Smart transportation, which is the big 
focus, electric vehicles, reducing emissions all require 5G, 
all of them.
    So, I think, yes, it should be mentioned, and I think it 
should be a part of the plan. If we want to meet the 
President's objectives, it is going to have to be funded. And 
to say that we are only going to fund wireline networks, when 
everything else the President wants to see, from reducing 
climate change to smart transportation to electric cars, 
autonomous vehicles, is going to require wireless connectivity.
    Why would you take these funds that you have and use them 
to achieve all of these goals, instead of saying we only have 
one goal, and by the way, that goal is upload speed? That is 
it. You cannot make the upload speed; we are not going to worry 
about global warming. We are not going to worry about electric 
vehicles. We are not going to worry about autonomous vehicles. 
We are not going to worry about mobility. That is what would 
happen if you put a narrow technological standard in statute, 
and you do not allow the flexibility for the agencies to 
consider other Congressional priorities, other Administration 
priorities.
    Senator Young. Thanks so much for that answer. Let it be 
known to my constituents and colleagues that, ensuring the U.S. 
wins the race to deploy 5G is a priority of their senator.
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, we appreciate that very much.
    Senator Lujan. Thank you, Senator Young. Chief Johnson, the 
threat of wildfires has become a constant factor in states like 
New Mexico. Just last week, New Mexico communities, like those 
in much of the West, we experienced, for the most part, record-
breaking, triple degree heat earlier than we have experienced 
it in some time, even before Summer officially even really 
began.
    The increasing threat of wildfires to communication 
networks, has prompted states to act. The California Public 
Utilities Commission issued orders to require wireless and 
wireline providers, in the areas most prone to wildfire, to 
equip cell towers with 72 hours of backup power.
    Chief Johnson, can you discuss the role backup power 
sources play for emergency response during wildfire?
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. Well, I think the most 
important thing is that those networks work, and the wireless 
capacity is adequate, and that they sustain long enough so that 
the--so that the operational period is sustained, with that 
wireless infrastructure.
    That cost has currently been borne by the wireless carriers 
themselves, or by the people that own the towers and the 
infrastructure associated with it. That is currently who is 
funding that. So, anything that the Federal Government can do--
can do that would be a dollar in from the government or a 
dollar in from industry--anything that speeds deployment of 
backup power, we think is a wise choice.
    Senator Lujan. And Chief Johnson, should cell towers in 
areas susceptible to wildfires be equipped with backup power 
sources, when technically feasible?
    Mr. Johnson. We believe that wireless towers should be 
equipped with backup power. Now, that does not mean, 
necessarily, that every tower for every purpose needs backup 
power. A lot of that depends on the architecture of the 
network. What we would encourage, and you have heard it here by 
some of the witnesses today, is to provide the agencies the 
flexibility to take a look at the network architecture and 
achieve the goal and measure the goal. But we believe they do 
require backup power when it is a key site and that will only 
be determined by the architecture itself.
    Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. And Chief Johnson, the next 
question I am asking is, because I have heard this from critics 
and folks that have been pushing back against getting redundant 
power and backup power. How do you ensure that the backup power 
itself does not become a risk? No one wants anyone to be 
hauling diesel fuel through what is, effectively, dry timber. 
What are your thoughts there?
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. Well, you know, as a 
firefighter, I do not see hauling diesel, or diesel's presence 
in a wildfire environment as a risk. These wildfires are moving 
commonly at a mile a minute. The are moving ahead of the fire 
front, five and six miles at a time. If the ember cast 
component to wildfires is the risk, the intensity of these 
wildfires is consuming everything on the top of a mountaintop 
or the infrastructure. Adding a few hundred gallons of diesel 
will not materially affect the size, scope, and scale of that 
fire.
    So, to us, the most important thing is that those towers 
and facilities are operating for as long as possible. And you 
can deal with the combustibility and the survivability of those 
sites, through the size of the compounds, by making sure that 
the setbacks of the vegetation are such that we can do 
retardant drops ahead of the fire and that we can actually 
deploy resources in there to protect those sites. It is a 
priority operationally to protect those sites. That said, you 
can protect three or four sites and lose an aerial back haul 
fiber line and lose the whole thing.
    So, you do have to look at this systemically, Senator.
    Senator Lujan. I appreciate your clarification. Now, it is 
no secret that this hearing is taking place in the middle of 
ongoing negotiations of what could be historic Federal funding 
for broadband infrastructure. Now is the time to get Federal 
investment in broadband right and that means investing in 
resilient, redundant, secure broadband networks.
    Just a couple questions that I have left. When a single 
community has access to multiple broadband providers, does that 
benefit the community's resilience to communications outages? 
Chief Johnson, yes or no?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes, in general.
    Senator Lujan. I will come back to you.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
    Senator Lujan. Mr. Law, yes or no?
    Mr. Law. Not necessarily, no.
    Senator Lujan. Mr. Adelstein?
    Mr. Adelstein. Yes.
    Senator Lujan. Mr. Feld?
    Mr. Feld. Absolutely.
    Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. Chief Johnson, you want to 
expand on that?
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. When market conditions 
exist that would allow for the presence of multiple providers, 
then I think adding redundancy to any network adds 
survivability of the network. And I operate from that 
assumption.
    Senator Lujan. Mr. Law, do you have a quick response, sir?
    Mr. Law. To clarify a little further, Mr. Chair, two items. 
As it relates to who are the second network providers, or the 
additional network providers connected to? So, you may have 
situations where there may be a second provider in town. They 
came in, quite frankly, they provided service to the five 
largest customers in Wall, South Dakota, where I grew up, and 
they go out the other side of town, and away they go. I do not 
find a large material amount of value to that, from a 
resiliency and a redundancy perspective, as it relates to those 
small, you know, situations of competitors picking and choosing 
who they may serve, but say, you know, providing these large 
community benefits.
    So, that is a reason for my not necessarily answer. It 
depends if there is another provider that is committing to 
serve all those institutions, residential, not redlining 
neighborhoods and other items, then, yes, that would be the 
case.
    Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. Mr. Feld, we have seen a 
lot of different responses, including from Federal agencies 
like the FCC, when it comes to natural disasters and full 
recovery, delaying families, schools, and businesses trying to 
rebuild. How did the responses to Hurricane Maria differ from 
FCC responses to other disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, 
Superstorm Sandy, and Hurricane Michael? Commissioner and 
Acting Chair Rosenworcel has said, for example, ``It's time for 
the FCC to develop a consistent and reliable approach to 
ensuring the resiliency of networks in disaster''.
    Mr. Feld. Yes, the response to Maria was highly unusual. In 
the case of Katrina and Sandy both, the FCC, number one, 
engaged in significant on the ground activity. I participated 
in a conference call that was hosted by then FCC Chair Kevin 
Martin, in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, where all 
stakeholders were brought together to solve the problem of, 
what can we do in this catastrophe.
    During Katrina, the FCC, the Chair of the Relevant Bureau, 
David Turetsky, and Chairman Genachowski were constantly 
keeping the public informed, bringing together stakeholders to 
ensure that there was activity. And in both of those cases, 
they convened taskforce to conduct an investigation. Hundreds 
of pages of testimony that culminated in Commission reports 
with significant recommendations and many rule changes that 
have put in place and have benefited resilient networks to this 
day.
    None of this was done in response to Hurricane Maria. The 
public inquiry that the FCC conducted afterwards was grudging 
and handled at an extremely low level of the bureau. I find it 
unfortunate that, whereas after both Katrina and Sandy there 
were full Commission hearings in the devastation zone. After 
Maria, there were a few press junkets by the Chair to Puerto 
Rico. But it was--frankly, the FCC's response was inadequate 
and disgraceful.
    And yes, we need to have standardized responses to 
disaster. And Congress should include a mandatory reporting 
requirement, investigation requirement to ensure that the FCC 
takes appropriate steps following a disaster, particularly one 
of that magnitude.
    Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. What happened with Maria 
is just simply unacceptable. People were left without access to 
anything, including lack of a timely response with getting 
connected.
    Mr. Adelstein, after hearing from Chief Johnson and Mr. 
Feld and the question that I asked around Hurricane Maria, do 
you support FCC regulation that requires a certain level of 
resiliency in communication infrastructure and mandates the 
restoration of services in a timely fashion?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, you know, Maria is a good example. I 
mean, there was--it was devastating in Puerto Rico what 
happened. I mean, it was unbelievable devastation. And you look 
at the response from my industry--and I can only speak for my 
industry--80 percent of the citizens of Puerto Rico were 
restored service by wireless.
    Now, this is something, when we go to resiliency, it is 
different for different technologies in different areas. Within 
2 weeks we had cells on light trucks, providing 2,800 calls an 
hour. The wireless industry can respond very quickly and did 
respond very quickly. And it is not the fault, or lack of 
commitment by wireline providers that they could not respond 
more quickly. When you have devastation to every--to every pole 
in the state of--in the territory of Puerto Rico, what can they 
do? You know, you cannot restore it.
    But when you think about resiliency, one size really does 
not fit all. And the industry did look at that and said, what 
can we do. As a matter of fact, we buried back haul after 
Maria--one of our providers, one of my members said, we cannot 
have our back haul up there on aerial anymore. And we talked 
about being more expensive, well, now we are learning lessons 
from that. And I think one of the great lessons that we learned 
is that wireless service was restored much more quickly than 
wireline service.
    And this is not just in that situation. In Florida, I mean, 
I could give example after example. I would like to put in 
record examples of how quickly we have restored wireless 
service. And it is not because we care more than fiber 
providers. They care equally. We are all committed. We 
understand we are in an industry that people rely on for life 
and death. But the question is, we have a technology that if we 
can just get one transmissionsite up, we can cover vast areas. 
And when you have a technology that is, for example, fiber to 
the home, where you have--you have wires out to every single 
home, you have got to restore, potentially hundreds or 
thousands--in the case of, you know, Puerto Rico, hundreds of 
thousands of connections that you have to restore.
    And that is why, when you think about resiliency, I think 
it is important to think about having multiple technologies. 
The advantages of each one--and it is very hard--as a former 
regulator myself, I think regulators do need to be vigilant. I 
think Harold is right that, the fact that they really rode hard 
after Sandy, we have made major improvements. The fact that 
they really ride on the industry and say, you know, tell us 
what you did. Tell us how you can improve. Let us work 
together. The industry has come together in consortia. They 
have come together working with electrical companies, because 
so much of it relies on the electric grid. We have done much 
better, and I think we can continue to do better. And I do not 
think that regulators ought to let up.
    But I am not sure--and, you know, we are willing to engage 
in these rulemakings--that there is one rule that we could put 
in place that fits for all these different circumstances. And 
certainly, it is a very different circumstance for wireline and 
wireless.
    So, when you have got, as you mentioned, this enormous pot 
of money--you have the biggest carrot you have ever had to feed 
resiliency, instead of regulations--saying do it this way, do 
it that way--say, we are going to reward those applications 
that are more resilient. Make us prove that we are going to be 
able to get service restored quickly. Say, you are not getting 
the funding unless you can reliably--and we will kick the tires 
to make sure you can really do it--get service restored quickly 
to all the customers, or to a certain percentage of them.
    And you know, I think that if you do that, you will find 
out that mobile networks actually can--and wireless, fixed 
wireless, as well--can respond really quite quickly, and more 
quickly, in some cases, than wireline. In other cases, wireline 
can be very reliable. You know, within each technology--buried 
fiber can be more some resilient, in some cases, than aerial 
fiber. And buried fiber might not be resilient in an area where 
there is--it is flood prone, like in--in the south of the 
country, along the coast.
    So, you know, it is hard to come up with a regulation that 
fits for everybody. But it is very, I think, easy for Congress 
to say, we have all this money. What are we going to do with 
it? What are we going to prioritize? Do not tie agencies' hands 
and say you can only consider one type of application. You can 
only consider wireline, without thinking about, does that limit 
the flexibility to have more resilient networks that can 
respond like they did in Puerto Rico.
    Senator Lujan. So, would you say that is a yes or no to 
supporting the FCC regulation that--or supporting the FCC 
regulation that requires a certain level of resiliency and 
communication infrastructure and mandates the restoration of 
services in a timely fashion?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, it depends what it says. I would say--
I would say maybe. And we will certainly work with the FCC and 
I think we might be able to come behind it. There is a 
resilient act that you have----
    Senator Lujan. Maybe is OK. So, you would be--you feel 
comfortable representing the organization that you are doing, 
that is substantial, to participate with the FCC and with your 
expertise as a former FCC Commissioner and rulemaking, around 
this.
    Mr. Adelstein. We would certainly work with them in a 
rulemaking and see if we could come up with something that 
deals with all of the many different categories. But, you know, 
narrow requirements and mandates, I think, ultimately------
    Senator Lujan. I will take yes or no here.
    Mr. Adelstein. OK.
    Senator Lujan. Because you went on a little longer and I 
did not gavel you down. But that--that is--I appreciate that. 
And anything else, please submit it to the record on that one, 
Mr. Adelstein.
    There has been a lot of chatter about rural areas, and I 
very much appreciate the attention to modernization, when it 
comes to precision agriculture. Mr. Law, as discussed, 
precision agriculture, its critical application. In 2019, the 
USDA published a report that stated, ``As technology advances, 
and the volumes of data to manage agriculture production grow, 
higher speeds will likely be necessary, requiring more 
symmetric data flows''. Should there be a minimum standard 
required for both up and down connections, to prepare the 
network for precision agriculture?
    Mr. Law. I think there should be, Senator--or Chairman, for 
a couple of reasons. One is, in terms of, again, the 
applications and the usage of the network, both today and for 
tomorrow, I will say connected ag is a great example, in terms 
of the gigabytes of data that is generated from the connected 
ag environment. Whether it is in live time, or in a stored 
basis that is later uploaded to the--I will say, to the cloud, 
for lack of a better phrase, I do think that there should be 
minimum standards.
    And I think that is also a cautionary tale, in terms of 
understanding the need between deploying the technology and 
things that technology--current technologies are capable of 
doing versus deploying technology that will meet the needs of 
broadband subscribers, not just today, not just tomorrow, but 
generations in the future. That is the question I think 
Congress will have to answer with that. But yes.
    Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. Mr. Adelstein, I am going 
to ask you the same question I asked Mr. O'Rielly, former FCC 
Commissioner. What broadband speed do you have at home?
    Mr. Adelstein. It is about 80--I happen to have Fios. I do 
have fiber to the home spot--80 down and similar up, a little 
less than 100.
    Senator Lujan. That is pretty good, really good. I will 
share with you what I shared with Mr. O'Rielly is, that is all 
that I am asking for people to be able to get. Whether they 
live in a city or they live out in the country. You know, we 
can have a conversation, a debate about this, but what I am 
looking at is, what is it going to take for us to live up to 
the commitment, to make sure that we have equitable speeds in 
rural, as well as urban? And it is my understanding that most 
people that live in urban settings and in cities, they have a 
choice between a cable company or a fiber line that they can 
get up to gigabit connection. That is just not something that 
is available in rural areas.
    Our national commitments in this area has always been to 
make sure that rural and underserved communities be on that 
equal playing field. And what I am looking at is for an 
investment with public funds to ensure that kind of equal 
opportunity.
    And the reason I am raising this with you is because of the 
back and forth with looking at wireless versus wireline. It 
should not be seen that way. Wireless depends on fiber, too, as 
we all know. We need to be making investments that will help us 
achieve those same opportunities in rural America and in the 
frontier communities, as we have in cities.
    And so, as a matter of engineering and technology and 
economics, would you say that wireless performs and scales the 
same as fiber?
    Mr. Adelstein. Not in terms of upload speeds. As a matter 
of fact, the way the networks are engineered, that is why 
upload speed is, kind of, being used as something that can 
block mobile service.
    Senator Lujan. Appreciate--I appreciate--that is--I agree 
with that. Now, the last question that I have is, it surprised 
me when I read this, which I think goes to a big part of the 
conversation we are having today. I believe that we need to 
have the inclusion of a comprehensive network solution in 
America. While I joined many of my colleagues in asking for 
Chairman Pai to delay the RDOF auctions, because of the 
concerns that were shared today by Senator Capito, we are now 
finding that areas that have the highest Internet connection 
speeds in the country qualify as areas that will benefit from 
the RDOF auction. I do not think that was the intent. And it is 
why we all should be looking at this.
    Now, with that being said, recently, AT&T, the Senior EVP 
and CFO, Mr. Desroches said that he thinks, I quote, ``Fiber is 
the only product out there that delivers the performance 
necessary for telehealth, online education, remote work--''. He 
even goes on to talk about the importance of demand for 
symmetrical speeds over time.
    If AT&T, who is one of the most significant wireless 
providers today is now saying--and this was from January--
sorry, June 18, 2021--that that is where they are going, what 
do I read into that?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, AT&T is a member of mine and my 
understanding is that they seek flexibility, as well. I mean, 
we all think fiber is wonderful if it makes sense for a 
particular area, like it would in Mr. Law's territory. I think 
that Congress has to think about getting good wireless and 
wireline service. It is not fiber versus wireless--fiber and 
wireless.
    We have talked before about how many people are frustrated 
that there is not wireless service in certain areas. And even 
in my, you know, neighborhood sometimes this thing, it does not 
work as well as I might want but, you know, we want to make 
that comparable, too. And so, the question is, what gets the 
consumer what they need? And consumers really----
    Senator Lujan. Can I ask you a follow up in that space?
    Mr. Adelstein. Yes.
    Senator Lujan. Does wireless substitute for wireline 
connectivity?
    Mr. Adelstein. It absolutely does. It is doing it today.
    Senator Lujan. It does?
    Mr. Adelstein. It does. You have got 20 percent of the 
population today----
    Senator Lujan. So, what I--and I am going to push back a 
little bit here. When I asked the question about the 
engineering, your response to me was no, that in fact, what I 
stated, which is that the engineering and technology and 
economies that wireless performs and scales the same as fiber, 
the answer to that question is no, it is not.
    So, it is hard for me to not push back in saying that it 
does replace wireline. There is a reason why you and I both 
have a wireline connection where we live, not a wireless 
connection that is providing us the up and down speeds that we 
need to communicate with our constituents, with consumers, and 
with members.
    So, I agree that they should--we should be working to look 
at a comprehensive approach here. But you would still argue 
that, in fact, wireless can replace wireline and get the same 
architecture that I just laid out, with the foundation of that 
question, is that from an engineering and technological and 
economic perspective, wireless performs and scales the same as 
fiber?
    Mr. Adelstein. Not only can it, it is. One in five 
Americans are using their smartphone as their only broadband 
connection. You can put this into a laptop and get 100--in 5G 
you can get--and even 4G, get 100 megabit download speed. 
Consumers, our customers, are not using upload, 1 to 10, using 
one-tenth the amount of upload they are download. So, your 
question was can they do equal to upload? And I said, you know, 
really they cannot, because these things--the power coming out 
of this is not the same as the power coming out of the tower.
    So, an advantage of fiber is it has better upload. That 
should not be used as something to not allow rural consumers 
the choice to use this, and 1 in 5 consumers have, as their 
connection to the internet. It is absolutely substitutable. If 
you get fixed wireless into the home, you can get even better 
levels of service, and you can do it more quickly. Instead of 
waiting, potentially, 10 years, as the Fiber Broadband 
Association studies showed, you can get it done within months, 
or a year or two.
    I mean, there is a lot of tradeoffs. But if upload speed is 
the only thing you want, I would say, yes, fiber is going to 
give you bigger upload speeds, due to the nature of the 
architecture. But if you are saying what do consumers need, 
they are using 1 to 10. Even if it doubles, 1 in 5, you are not 
going to need fiber to meet the vast bulk of consumers' 
applications. And for precision ag, it does not need that level 
of upload.
    Senator Lujan. So, would you support eliminating data caps 
from wireless companies?
    Mr. Adelstein. Well, when you go to a fixed wireless, there 
are no data caps, generally speaking. You can get a service 
that has no data caps. Now, if you are doing mobile----
    Senator Lujan. Would you support eliminating data caps from 
wireless plans in America?
    Mr. Adelstein. No, I mean, it is up to the--to the company 
to decide if they--what they want to do. And it is up to the 
customers to decide what they want to buy. If the customer 
wants to buy an unlimited plan, they can. And fixed wireless, 
which is the best substitute----
    Senator Lujan. Let me push back on you there, Mr. 
Adelstein. And I know I have to close this hearing. If 
someone--you said, if someone wants to get an unlimited plan, 
they can. No, they cannot. Not if they cannot afford it. When 
there is a 16-year--16-year-old little girl from New Mexico, 
her name is Helene Archuleta, that lives on the Navajo Nation. 
She was my special guest for President Biden's Joint Address to 
the Congress earlier this year. Because we did it remotely, she 
could not watch it because her and her mom cannot afford an 
unlimited plan. She can barely do her homework.
    And using the example that, if 5G in wireless is the answer 
here, there cannot be data caps on these families. It is a 
thing of the past. That is an old technology. It is like long 
distance calling. People should not be charged for long 
distance calling anymore, I believe. Because, if you have a 
wireless phone in your house--I do this with my mom all the 
time. When she is going to call a family member that lives out 
of state and she picks up her landline, I say, ``Wait a minute, 
Mom, you are going to pay for that one''. She goes, ``Oh, yes, 
yes'', and she pulls out her wireless phone and then, she makes 
the call, and it does not charge her that extra fee.
    And then, you know, we talk about funding USF and--that is 
not a responsible way for us to be looking at funding Lifeline 
or USF. We have got to modernize there. And so, I just want to 
make sure that when we are making these investments, and I 
completely agree with the goals here to find ways to make 
investments that we are going to reduce emissions in America. 
In the biggest cities, yes. Precision farming, those tractors 
are going to work. They communicate both ways.
    How do we make sure we get those speeds? Wireless is going 
to be a solution, but it is going to take long. It is going to 
take intense back haul when it comes to the fiber, as well.
    But I want rural customers to be able to have those speeds, 
as well. I want my firefighters to be equipped. When they have 
technology on them, that becomes their eyes and ears, so that a 
camera can be on their back and on their front and you have 
someone at the command center saying, be careful. There is 
something coming right at you or something behind you. Or if 
someone goes down because of an accident or inhalation, you can 
get them out of there. That is what 5G is going to help 
deliver.
    I want us all to work together but not diminish another 
while we are trying to promote another here. And so, this has 
been an important hearing for me. I think it has been an 
important hearing for our colleagues. And I very much 
appreciate the perspective of each and every one of the 
witnesses today.
    Now, with that, if I do not close this hearing correctly, I 
am going to get into some trouble. So, I want to thank all of 
the witnesses for their productive discussion today. And the 
hearing record will remain open for two weeks, until July 6, 
2021. Any senators that would like to submit questions for the 
record for the witnesses, should do so by that date. And we ask 
that your responses be returned to the Committee by July 20 of 
2021.
    That concludes today's hearing and again, I thank everyone 
for their time today. Thanks so much.
    [Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

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Table of Contents
Introduction

The Perfect Storm: Colonialism and Government Apathy Meet Hurricanes 
Irma and Maria

Just Reconstruction Efforts Must Include Just Access to Communications

The Voices of Puerto Ricans Must Be Heard

What Congress and the FCC Must Do to Help Puerto Rico Build a Resilient 
Communications System

Timeline of Events and Related Oversight Questions

Next Steps

Appendix: Puerto Ricans Share Their Stories on How Puerto Rico's 
Communications Crisis Impacted Their Lives After Hurricane Maria 

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Acknowledgements
REPORT AUTHORS
Leo Fitzpatrick, Carmen Scurato and Joseph Torres

The Free Press Puerto Rico working group made this report possible. 
Members include Teresa Basilio Gaztambide, Lucia Martinez, Nilda Muhr, 
Yesenia Perez-Algarin and Misty Perez Truedson.

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Introduction
    The ability to communicate during and after a disaster is a life-
and-death matter. And few disasters better exemplify this need than 
Hurricanes Irma and Maria, which devastated Puerto Rico in September 
2017.
    Hurricane Irma struck on Sept. 6 and left more than a million 
people without power while weakening Puerto Rico's already fragile 
infrastructure. Then on Sept. 20, Hurricane Maria--a Category 4 storm--
destroyed the islands' infrastructure. It left nearly the entire 
population without power and knocked out Puerto Rico's communications 
networks.
    Between 3,000-5,000 people died, making Maria one of the deadliest 
disasters in U.S. history.\1\ And the inability of Puerto Ricans to 
make calls or access life-saving information contributed to the death 
toll.
    Nazario Lugo, president of Puerto Rico's Association of Emergency 
Managers, captured the crisis in an interview with the Associated Press 
in March 2019: ``The biggest crisis after Maria was communication . . . 
that unleashed an endless number of problems.'' \2\
    The tragedy that continues to unfold in Puerto Rico isn't just the 
result of the storm. The word ``natural''--often used to describe a 
disaster like Hurricane Maria--should be removed from any descriptions 
of what happened on the islands.
    The disaster can't be separated from the history of more than 100 
years of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico, a history of wealth 
extraction, systemic racism and economic exploitation that left the 
islands' critical infrastructure--including the communications 
networks--fragile and vulnerable.
    Colonialism has also led to the willful neglect of Puerto Ricans' 
basic needs. This has been the case in the wake of Hurricanes Irma and 
Maria, where the focus has been on debt repayment and austerity 
measures to ``reduce costs'' rather than on rebuilding and ensuring 
access to critical services. Meanwhile, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and other government entities--including the Federal 
Communications Commission--have failed to respond adequately to the 
disasters that unfolded.
    The FCC, the government agency responsible for ensuring that the 
media and telecom companies it regulates serve the public interest, has 
yet to conduct a vigorous investigation into the failure of the 
islands' communications infrastructure, which was a major factor in the 
death toll.
    This report's goal is to call attention to the critical need to 
examine and investigate all of the causes for the collapse of the 
communications networks. There are dozens of key questions posed 
throughout this document that Congress must demand answers to if we are 
to ensure a crisis like this isn't repeated.
    It's deeply troubling how little interest the FCC has shown in 
analyzing what went wrong and using this information to shape its 
policies on communication rights and public safety.
    So far, the FCC has failed to:

   Convene an independent commission--as it did after Hurricane 
        Katrina--tasked with thoroughly investigating the 
        communications blackout.

   Directly engage with the affected communities in Puerto Rico 
        through field hearings to inform the agency's policies.

   Be forthcoming and transparent with information regarding 
        its work to restore communications after the 2017 hurricanes.

   Adequately respond to the gravity of the communications 
        crisis in Puerto Rico as it has to crises in other parts of the 
        United States.

   Abandon its efforts to dismantle the Lifeline program, which 
        would directly undermine Puerto Ricans' ability to afford 
        telephone and broadband services.

   Hold telecom companies accountable for the amount of time 
        they took to restore services.

   Implement sufficient measures to identify potential misuse 
        of the Federal funds the FCC set aside for recovery work.

   Take necessary steps to ensure that telecom companies 
        deliver on promises to accelerate reconstruction.

   Provide access to Spanish-language translations for all 
        Puerto Rico-related material.

    This is why we're calling on Congress to ensure the FCC adopts 
policies that address the underlying causes of the prolonged outage in 
Puerto Rico. Affected communities should be part of the design and 
governance of their local communications infrastructure and funds 
should be allocated to support self-sustaining and resilient 
communities.

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The Perfect Storm: Colonialism and Government Apathy Meet Hurricanes 
        Irma and Maria
    Understanding the history of colonialism in Puerto Rico is 
essential to creating policies that will address the economic, 
political, social and racial inequities shaping the islands' 
reconstruction efforts. These inequities played a central role in the 
tragedy of Hurricanes Irma and Maria. And they're why the fight for a 
just reconstruction of Puerto Rico is a critical racial-justice issue.
    Puerto Rico has been a colonial possession of the United States for 
more than a century. During this time, the Federal government has 
imposed predatory economic policies that have allowed U.S. companies to 
extract enormous profits from the islands at the expense of Puerto 
Ricans and Puerto Rico itself.
    That legacy of colonialism continues to this day. In 2016, Congress 
passed legislation that created an unelected fiscal-oversight board 
tasked with restructuring Puerto Rico's debt, which had ballooned to 
$120 billion after Federal tax breaks \3\ for U.S. companies operating 
in Puerto Rico ended in 2006.
    Unlike other cities in the United States, Puerto Rico doesn't have 
the legal recourse to declare bankruptcy. The islands lost that right 
in 1984 due to an amendment inserted into a bankruptcy bill.\4\ Now, 
the fiscal-oversight board is implementing punitive austerity measures 
that will further punish Puerto Ricans trying to recover from a 
historic tragedy.
    The U.S. government has failed to provide the kind of economic 
support needed for the recovery and reconstruction of the islands. 
Puerto Rico has received less Federal relief in the wake of Hurricanes 
Irma and Maria than other parts of the United States that suffered 
significant hurricane-related damages in 2017.
    In addition, President Donald Trump reportedly told congressional 
leaders that Puerto Rico should not receive further Federal assistance 
for programs like food stamps.\5\
    Trump has also repeatedly lied about how much Federal assistance 
Puerto Rico has received and has made racist statements about Puerto 
Ricans.\6\ His message is clear: Puerto Ricans don't deserve help, an 
attitude that's reflected in his administration's failure to respond 
adequately to the disaster on the islands.\7\
    This refusal to respond appropriately extends to the FCC.
Just Reconstruction Efforts Must Include Just Access to Communications
    The FCC has failed to conduct a comprehensive investigation that 
examines all of the factors that led to the collapse of the islands' 
communications networks--or to hold telecom providers accountable for 
the slow pace of service restoration.
    While the FCC has allocated more than $100 million in new Federal 
funding to restore communications services and build more resilient 
networks on the islands, the Commission has failed to put in place an 
adequate oversight process to ensure that the telecom companies 
receiving this funding spend the money for its intended purposes.
    The FCC has a history of investigating communication failures and 
holding public hearings following disasters. It's historically done so 
to inform its policymaking and prevent such failures from happening 
again. For example, this is what the FCC did after Hurricane Katrina 
devastated communications in Louisiana and other Gulf states.
    Chairman Ajit Pai's indifference to the communications crisis in 
Puerto Rico speaks volumes about the islands' colonial status. When Pai 
visited Puerto Rico, he met with telecom-company officials but failed 
to hold a single public hearing.
    By contrast, consider Pai's urgent response in October 2018 after 
Hurricane Michael struck the Florida Panhandle. Pai immediately ordered 
his agency to investigate the failure of telecommunications providers 
to quickly restore service. The chairman's decisive action came just 
weeks before Election Day, which saw Republican candidates in that 
region running in close gubernatorial and senatorial races.
    Chairman Pai has failed to show the same urgency with Puerto Rico. 
This is unacceptable.
    Over the past year, Free Press has called on the FCC to appoint an 
independent commission to investigate the causes of the islands' 
communications failure. And last November, we submitted Freedom of 
Information Act requests to both the FCC and FEMA to learn more about 
how our government agencies responded to the islands' communications 
crises. FEMA is as critical as the FCC to rebuilding the communications 
networks due to the agency's central role in coordinating disaster-
recovery efforts.
    To date, only the FCC has provided documents, with an initial 
production of 52 consumer complaints received on April 30, 2019. The 
agency has claimed it will take years to provide all of the complaints 
it has received, and this delay is further evidence of how it's failing 
to prioritize Puerto Ricans' essential communication needs.

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The Voices of Puerto Ricans Must Be Heard
    It's crucial that we hold the FCC accountable so we understand why 
communications networks in Puerto Rico collapsed and how that breakdown 
has impacted the lives of the people on the islands. Congress has an 
essential role to play in ensuring the FCC fulfills its 
responsibilities in this regard.
    Since Hurricane Maria hit, Free Press has worked to ensure the 
voices of Puerto Ricans are heard and prioritized when it comes to 
policies adopted to restore and rebuild Puerto Rico's 
telecommunications infrastructure. This is a personal issue for many 
Free Press staffers who are Puerto Rican and have family living on the 
islands.
    Last year, we submitted comments to the FCC that included 
heartbreaking stories that Puerto Ricans shared with us on how the 
islands' communications crisis prevented them from learning whether 
their loved ones were alive or able to access the help they desperately 
needed (see appendix).
    Free Press and Resilient Just Technologies also traveled to Puerto 
Rico and held story circles--intimate community gatherings--to allow 
participants to share their stories on how the loss of communications 
affected their lives. Residents of Comerio and Vieques discussed how 
the communications blackout limited their mobility, their ability to 
find food, water and medical care, and their capacity to seek out their 
loved ones.\8\

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What Congress and the FCC Must Do to Help Puerto Rico Build a Resilient 
        Communications System
    As U.S. government actions--and inactions--have worsened a massive 
humanitarian crisis, it's the FCC's duty to investigate what went wrong 
and to adopt policies that prevent the islands' communications networks 
from collapsing in the future.
    In this report, Free Press shares essential actions Congress should 
compel the FCC to take in Puerto Rico and offers key policy suggestions 
that can be applied to future disasters anywhere in the country:

   The FCC, in coordination with other Federal agencies or 
        Congress, must form an independent commission to conduct a 
        comprehensive and expedited investigation of every major or 
        prolonged communications outage, regardless of where it occurs 
        in the country. The Commission must produce a detailed report 
        for each discrete outage that includes a critical assessment of 
        agency actions, or inactions, and provides clear, actionable 
        recommendations or proposed regulations to prevent the 
        recurrence of such outages.

   he FCC must immediately and directly engage with affected 
        communities, hold public field hearings in such communities, 
        and provide access to potentially life-saving information in 
        languages appropriate for these communities.

   The FCC must apply its expertise and promulgate regulations, 
        including recommending actions or regulations for other 
        federal, state or territorial agencies, to a) address the known 
        underlying causes of prolonged outages and b) engage in a 
        longer-term examination and rulemaking to strengthen resilient-
        network infrastructure.

   The FCC must be more transparent, provide clear and 
        measurable requirements for funds allocated to network-recovery 
        work, and hold telecom providers accountable for unreasonable 
        delays to ensure recovery efforts accelerate the restoration of 
        services and increase network resiliency.

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Timeline of Events and Related Oversight Questions
    As Congress works to address Puerto Rico's urgent and unmet needs, 
Free Press offers the following timeline of events along with key 
questions for lawmakers to ask the FCC about rebuilding resilient 
communications networks for the islands.
2017
    SEPTEMBER. Hurricane Irma unleashes tropical storm-force winds in 
Puerto Rico, knocking out electricity for 1.1 million people. Two weeks 
later, Hurricane Maria makes landfall as a Category 4 storm. As a 
result, Puerto Rico experiences one of the most extensive and lengthy 
communication blackouts in modern U.S. history.\9\ Right away 95 
percent of cell sites are knocked out of service; two days after 
landfall, 97 percent of radio stations remain off the air, and not a 
single TV station is broadcasting.\10\ Subsequent reports indicate that 
the lack of power and accessible communications contributed to the 
3,000-5,000 lives lost and hindered recovery work.\11\ The FCC 
activates the Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS), a web-based 
system launched in 2007 in response to Hurricane Katrina that telecom 
carriers use to report communications-infrastructure status and 
situational-awareness information during a disaster to coordinating 
agencies and first responders. DIRS functions on an entirely voluntary 
basis.
    OCTOBER. Free Press joins a letter commending the FCC for advancing 
$76.9 million to restore communications services and urges the 
implementation of additional measures to swiftly restore 
communications.\12\ The agency forms an internal Hurricane Recovery 
Task Force to: coordinate across bureaus and offices throughout the 
FCC; support the restoration of communications services following the 
2017 hurricane season; and focus on the ``challenges facing Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.'' \13\
    Then-Ranking Member Frank Pallone Jr. of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee calls for a ``Commission level review'' to 
strengthen the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework based on his 
own constituents' experiences following Superstorm Sandy (2017 Pallone 
Wireless Framework Letter).\14\ The framework is an industry-led, self-
policing and voluntary guidance that defines the actions wireless 
providers agree to take following a disaster.
    NOVEMBER. FCC Chairman Pai visits the islands to survey the damage 
and meets with government officials coordinating recovery efforts. He 
also meets with various representatives from communications entities, 
including AT&T, Claro, Liberty, Open Mobile, T-Mobile and Verizon--but 
fails to hold a single public hearing.\15\
    DECEMBER. The pace of recovery is excruciatingly slow: Less than 5 
percent of TV stations are back on the air; 66 percent of radio 
stations are still out; and cable and landline phone services are, in 
the FCC's own words, ``generally nonexistent.'' \16\
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   How effective and accurate was the information the FCC 
        collected through DIRS and does that information hold insights 
        on how each telecom provider restored services?

   Did inaccuracies or lack of access to information slow down 
        or impede subsequent recovery efforts? How can the FCC remedy 
        the way it addresses such obstacles?

   Should DIRS, and another arrangement with industry discussed 
        below, continue to be entirely voluntary?

   How did Puerto Ricans rely on these aggregated DIRS reports 
        to make decisions for their families? Considering that publicly 
        available DIRS information provides only the percentage of cell 
        sites operating in a given area, how would the public and on-
        the-ground first responders benefit from having access to more 
        accurate coverage maps and outage information?

    DECEMBER. The FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau 
opens an inquiry into the ``resiliency of the communications 
infrastructure, the effectiveness of emergency communications, and 
government and industry responses to the 2017 hurricane season.'' \17\
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why has the FCC refused to assemble an independent panel 
        like the one it convened after Hurricane Katrina?

   Why has the agency failed to examine whether stakeholders 
        actually applied the lessons learned from past investigations?

   What is the composition of the agency's Hurricane Recovery 
        Task Force? How often does it meet and what activities is it 
        undertaking? What is the task force's role in responding to the 
        2017 Atlantic hurricane season?
2018
    JANUARY. The Government Accountability Office releases a report on 
the industry-led Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework.
    In response to extensive network outages following Superstorm 
Sandy, the FCC opened a rulemaking proceeding in 2013 to ``promote 
transparency to consumers as to how mobile wireless networks compare in 
maintaining operations during major emergencies'' to spur providers 
into improving network resiliency.\18\ After a fierce backlash from 
providers, the agency closed the 2013 proceeding and adopted the 
industry-proposed framework in place of regulations protecting the 
public.
    The GAO report on the framework finds the FCC doesn't have a means 
to evaluate the progress of the initial implementation of the 
framework; the FCC and industry's broad goals for the framework don't 
have any specific metrics to assess progress toward these goals; and 
the FCC didn't have plans to communicate information about the 
framework to public-safety officials and other stakeholders.\19\ The 
report recommends ``[m]ore robust measures and a better plan to monitor 
the framework [to] help [the] FCC collect information on the framework 
and evaluate its effectiveness.'' \20\
    The FCC agrees with the GAO's recommendations.

    MARCH. Chairman Pai again visits the islands with unidentified 
members of his internal Hurricane Recovery Task Force. The related 
press release and subsequent mentions of the visit include no 
information on the makeup or activities of the group.\21\ FCC 
Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel also visits Puerto Rico and speaks 
with members of communities most impacted by the hurricane.\22\
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why has the FCC publicized the chairman's visits to Puerto 
        Rico but withheld important details about the task force's 
        policy priorities, or even its membership?

   Who serves on the task force, what has it done, and who has 
        it interacted with in government and industry?

    The FCC proposes a $954-million plan for rebuilding telecom 
networks in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
    Hurricane Maria's severity forces the agency to track and publish 
DIRS outage reports for 182 days--the longest, by a wide margin, for 
any U.S. disaster-recovery effort since DIRS' creation.
    APRIL. Free Press and the National Hispanic Media Coalition (NHMC) 
file joint comments in the FCC's inquiry, highlighting stories from 
Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rican diaspora and demanding that the agency 
fully engage with Puerto Ricans by holding field hearings on the 
islands, publishing key documents in Spanish, and giving the public 
information on the task force.
    Free Press and NHMC also call on the FCC to consider how its plan 
to gut the Lifeline program would disconnect many Puerto Ricans--who 
participate in the subsidy program at twice the national average.\23\
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why did the FCC largely ignore the reasonable requests 
        issued by Free Press and NHMC?

   Why didn't the FCC and FEMA have the Spanish-language 
        expertise to communicate critical public-safety information?

   Why is the FCC still considering its 2017 proposed changes 
        to Lifeline--a program expanded under President George W. Bush 
        in response to the displacement Hurricane Katrina caused--given 
        that this plan would directly undermine families in Puerto Rico 
        who are still living under precarious conditions?

    The FCC's Public Safety Bureau holds a single public workshop on 
its inquiry--in Washington, D.C.--to ``identify communications 
information needs of government and consumers to improve preparation 
and response efforts during crises.'' The FCC invites federal, state, 
local and territorial government representatives to attend and includes 
a panel of consumer groups--but excludes industry stakeholders, the 
very carriers the agency is supposed to regulate.\24\
    This exclusion insulates the providers from exposure to public 
scrutiny. As a result, there's no opportunity to learn about the 
conversations these carriers had with the FCC on restoring and 
rebuilding the islands' communications networks. Excluding these 
providers also allows the FCC to avoid public discussion of potential 
regulation that could hold the carriers accountable.
    For example, during the event, the FCC presses the consumer panel 
to discuss one tangible ``improvement'' for a crowdsourced disaster-
information application. Such thinking reveals how the FCC may consider 
shifting responsibility for disaster readiness and situational 
awareness from the FCC and industry to members of the public, despite 
the enormous quantity of actionable information already in the hands of 
these actors during disasters.
    At the workshop, Jarrett Devine, the regional emergency 
communications coordinator for FEMA Region I, provides an important 
observation:

        We've heard a lot of things today. Folks saying ``voluntary.'' 
        Folks saying ``trend analysis'' . . . This is life-safety 
        equipment. We have to do better. Post-disaster, we have an 
        extremely fragile environment with a vulnerable population. 
        This ``voluntary'' word needs to go away. We have commercial 
        entities selling themselves as public-safety grade. If you are 
        going to make a profit saying you are serving the community 
        with public-safety grade communications, then you need to be 
        able to prepare an answer and response as to where your 
        communications are available. Specifically post-disaster 
        response events.\25\
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why did the FCC shield these regulated entities from public 
        questioning and take the industry's assertions at face value?

   How has Chairman Pai's myopic deregulatory agenda allowed 
        industry to ceaselessly avoid regulatory scrutiny, even on 
        public-safety matters?

   Why has the FCC resisted shifting from the voluntary 
        approach of DIRS and the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative 
        Framework (see June below) to one that mandates first-responder 
        access to communications services during and after a disaster, 
        consumer information on outages and service-restoration 
        estimates, and improving telecom-network resiliency?

    JUNE. Rep. Nydia Velazquez of New York introduces the National 
Commission of the Federal Response to Natural Disasters in Puerto Rico 
Act of 2018, which would convene a commission to consider a broad array 
of factors that impacted the disaster response, including the adequacy 
of the islands' telecom networks. The bill remains in committee through 
the conclusion of the legislative session.
    The FCC opens a proceeding for comments on the creation of the 
$954-million Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund and the Connect USVI Fund, 
which plans to divvy out hundreds of millions of dollars over 10 years 
to accelerate telecom recovery in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.\26\ The FCC forgives the earlier $76.9-million advance in 
funds to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands announced in October 
and allocates approximately another $100 million for Puerto Rico.
    Notably, the bulk of the total simply renames existing commitments 
from long-standing Universal Service Fund programs that predate the 
hurricanes. These programs support buildout of telecom infrastructure 
to areas that are otherwise too expensive to serve. Barring any pending 
changes from the FCC, the programs will continue to use a methodology 
that's independent of Hurricane Maria specifically or disaster relief 
generally.
    In addition, the FCC doesn't include any coordinated oversight 
measures, metrics or requirements to ensure funds are used to 
accelerate recovery of telecommunications.
    The Public Safety Bureau opens a proceeding seeking comments on the 
effectiveness of the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework. Even 
though the unique devastation of the 2017 hurricane season revealed the 
vulnerability of Puerto Rico's communications infrastructure--and first 
responders and consumers alike advocated for more resilient networks--
the FCC is only now considering whether the voluntary framework is 
appropriate or effective.
    However, the inquiry stops short of asking whether the voluntary 
framework should be replaced with a mandatory one.
    JULY. FEMA releases a report noting that the loss of communications 
in Puerto Rico impeded the agency's response and recovery efforts: 
``FEMA and supporting Federal agencies struggled to gain situational 
awareness and assess the status of critical infrastructure, in part due 
to communications outages across Puerto Rico.'' \27\
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why did the FCC--the expert agency on telecom matters--fail 
        to recognize and address the clear threat to first responders' 
        ability to communicate during and after a disaster?

   Why did FEMA's assessment fail to further explore the causes 
        of the communications outage and its effect on recovery work?

   Why did the FCC fail to conduct a similar self-critique?

    Free Press submits a letter on the proceeding on the Uniendo a 
Puerto Rico Fund that expresses concern that without more robust 
accountability measures, money will be used to offset already planned 
deployments or simply end up in shareholders' pockets.\28\ Free Press 
also flags an investor call in which a telecom CEO expresses skepticism 
about the company's ability to fully restore its network in Puerto 
Rico.
    The FCC suggests no meaningful changes to the Wireless Resiliency 
Cooperative Framework (aside from suggesting that other entities, such 
as backhaul providers, be enveloped into this voluntary framework).
    AUGUST. The FCC releases an initial round of $64.2 million from the 
Uniendo Fund to telecom providers that serve Puerto Rico. To date, the 
agency has not disclosed what accountability processes, resiliency 
requirements or measures will be used to determine how the funds will 
accelerate recovery and promote network resiliency.
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Is the FCC keeping track of how the additional funds are 
        spent? If so, how has the money contributed to network 
        resiliency?

   What measures are in place to ensure that these funds are 
        being used to expedite recovery?

    The FCC's Public Safety Bureau concludes the 2017 hurricane-
response inquiry by releasing a paltry 36-page report (the ``2017 
Hurricane Season Report'').\29\ The report fails to reflect the gravity 
of one of the most catastrophic communications crises and deadliest 
hurricanes in U.S. history. The report also fails to determine whether 
any FCC-regulated entity should be held accountable for the slow 
restoration of service and includes only information that was already 
publicly available.
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why did the FCC fail to conduct a self-critical review as it 
        did after prior disasters?

   Did the FCC's Public Safety Bureau have sufficient staff and 
        resources to conduct a comprehensive examination on par with 
        the staff and resources involved in the Hurricane Katrina 
        investigation?

   Did FCC staff in the Public Safety Bureau provide an honest 
        critique of FEMA or their own agency's response to the 
        hurricanes, or are such insights best captured through an 
        independent commission?

   Why didn't the existing internal Hurricane Recovery Task 
        Force prepare the 2017 Hurricane Season Report, as it was well-
        situated to discuss its own activities and to note how the 
        various agency bureaus and offices coordinated their hurricane 
        response? If task-force members contributed in unacknowledged 
        ways, how did they do so?

   Why didn't the 2017 Hurricane Season Report provide any 
        useful details about the task force's activities?

    SEPTEMBER. The Government Accountability Office releases a report 
revealing how woefully unprepared FEMA was in responding to the 
disaster in Puerto Rico.\30\
    On the first anniversary of Hurricane Maria, Free Press joins a 
coalition of Puerto Rican advocates, racial- and social-justice 
organizations, and media and telecom experts to urge Chairman Pai to 
convene an independent commission to conduct a comprehensive 
investigation of the communications crisis in Puerto Rico.\31\ 
Alongside allies, Free Press hosts a Facebook Live discussion on 
Maria's impact and the future of communications.\32\
    Free Press files comments calling on the FCC to gather more 
complete and accurate data to better coordinate the work needed to 
build resilient networks and disburse recovery funds effectively. We 
urge the FCC to conduct a deep and thorough analysis of its current 
policies to address the resiliency of communications networks.\33\
    OCTOBER. Free Press teams up with Resilient Just Technologies, the 
Center for Embodied Pedagogy & Action and other organizations in Puerto 
Rico to host small-group discussions in Comerio and Vieques to hear 
Puerto Ricans talk about how the loss of communications has impacted 
them. Residents discuss how the loss of communications limited their 
mobility as well as their ability to find food or water or medical care 
or seek out their loved ones.\34\
    In the wake of Hurricane Michael, Chairman Pai admonishes telecom 
providers for their slow response to the week-and-a-half-long telecom 
outage in the Florida Panhandle and demands that the Public Safety 
Bureau investigate the matter. Free Press criticizes Pai for failing to 
show the same urgency in response to Hurricane Maria. Pai is more 
critical of telecom providers in Florida than he is about the 
communications crisis that continues to affect Puerto Rico more than a 
year after the storm made landfall.\35\ Wireline and wireless service 
remains spotty and in some parts of the islands not all services are 
restored to the level available prior to Hurricane Maria.
    A year after then-Ranking Member Pallone of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee first wrote to the FCC on the matter (see 2017 
Pallone Wireless Framework Letter above), he requests a rulemaking to 
expand and make enforceable the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative 
Framework (2018 Pallone Wireless Framework Letter).\36\
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why was the FCC's response to Hurricane Michael so different 
        from its response to Hurricane Maria?

   Why did it take several letters from Congress starting in 
        2017--and several massive disasters--to prompt Chairman Pai to 
        move toward engaging in his agency's public-safety charge 
        against carriers and the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative 
        Framework? \37\

    NOVEMBER. The FCC relaunches an examination of the Wireless 
Resiliency Cooperative Framework after Hurricane Michael and long after 
allowing its related June inquiry to sit dormant. This time, the agency 
demands information from telecom providers on how they responded to 
both the 2017 and 2018 hurricane seasons. While such an inquiry is 
welcome, it comes more than 400 days after Hurricane Maria's landfall, 
and 74 days after the FCC closed its inquiry into the 2017 season.
    Various providers' responses are cursory or heavily redacted. The 
information the providers offer is general in nature and doesn't allow 
the public, or advocates acting on its behalf, to assess the resiliency 
and restoration of carriers' networks or to compare variations in 
disaster response from one state or territory to the next or over time 
from one hurricane to the next.
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why didn't the FCC conduct this review earlier, and why 
        didn't the agency demand the carriers provide more 
        comprehensive information on its response to the 2017 and 2018 
        hurricane seasons?

   What prompted the FCC to conduct this review after Hurricane 
        Michael but not after Maria? \38\

   Why was it necessary for the FCC to re-launch an inquiry 
        that was already open and allowed to sit dormant following one 
        of the most destructive disasters?

    Free Press files Freedom of Information Act requests with the FCC 
and FEMA, seeking a clearer understanding of each agency's role in 
response to Hurricane Maria and ensuing recovery efforts. The FCC 
should have completed this type of inquiry on its own initiative by 
convening an independent commission when the 115th Congress was in 
session, ideally in coordination with congressional investigations.\39\ 
Free Press requests consumer complaints in the aftermath of the 2017 
and 2018 seasons and records of the FCC's actions--with a particular 
focus on the task force's work.
    The FCC later tells Free Press that the requested information will 
take years to produce.
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why didn't the FCC request this kind of information after 
        receiving either Rep. Pallone's 2017 or 2018 Wireless Framework 
        letters, and why wasn't the information Free Press requested 
        included as part of the FCC's 2017 hurricane report in the 
        first place?

   » Why hasn't the FCC proactively analyzed the consumer 
        complaints that came from hurricane-stricken Puerto Rico? Why 
        did the FCC fail to cite the Hurricane Maria-related consumer 
        complaints in its 2017 hurricane report or relevant dockets?

    DECEMBER. The FCC expands its inquiry on the Wireless Resiliency 
Cooperative Framework to include the role of backhaul and power 
companies in promoting resilient telecom systems. The FCC fails to 
assess how telecom providers performed during the 2017 and 2018 
hurricane seasons or implement new requirements to improve network-
infrastructure resilience.
    While we welcome the FCC's newfound desire to more comprehensively 
analyze the problem of network resiliency, the fact that the agency 
expanded the inquiry to entities it doesn't regulate while asking 
nothing more from the entities it does regulate is telling.
    Essentially, this act shifts attention elsewhere and sidesteps any 
accountability from telecom providers for failing to mitigate the long 
delay in restoring communications in Puerto Rico. Instead, this inquiry 
represents a continuation of the agency's belated examination of 
telecom issues directly impacting public health and safety in Puerto 
Rico.
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why has the FCC gone to great lengths to excuse the telecom 
        providers for any responsibility in the months-long 
        telecommunications blackout in Puerto Rico?

   Given the Trump administration's widespread efforts to 
        obscure its role in the excruciatingly slow recovery efforts in 
        Puerto Rico, how can rigorous congressional oversight produce 
        more information on the telecom aspect of the recovery efforts?
2019
    FEBRUARY. House Energy and Commerce Chairman Pallone submits a 
letter demanding a status update from the FCC on its current workload 
and backlog, including FOIA requests. On the same day, the agency 
contacts Free Press regarding our pending FOIA request.\40\
    APRIL. Almost six months after filing its FOIA request, Free Press 
receives the initial production, which is comprised of 52 consumer 
complaints from Puerto Rico for a period after Hurricane Maria. The FCC 
doesn't provide carriers' responses to these complaints.
    The comments from consumers offer a small window into a much larger 
problem: Providers promised automatic refunds and relief for the 
extensive loss of services but failed to deliver.
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Why has the FCC failed to cite or acknowledge these consumer 
        issues publicly, including in its 2017 Hurricane Season Report?

   Why did the FCC fail to launch a more skeptical 
        investigation of the carriers when it began receiving these 
        complaints?

    MAY. The FCC releases a report on its investigation into 
communications providers' preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Michael.\41\ The investigation criticizes the lack of coordination 
among wireless and landline service providers, power crews and 
municipalities in restoring communications in the wake of the storm.
    Furthermore, the Public Safety Bureau identifies a credibility 
issue: ``the effusive praise given by [Wireless Resiliency Cooperative] 
Framework signatories that commented in this docket simply does not 
ring true, in light of the lengthy wireless outages in Bay and Gulf 
Counties. . . . At least tens of thousands [of] wireless customers had 
to wait days, unnecessarily, for their mobile phone service to be 
restored while their provider held off entering into roaming 
arrangements'' (emphasis added).\42\
    While the report doesn't go far enough, it nonetheless reveals the 
FCC's ability to provide a critical analysis of telecom companies' 
conduct. Such analysis was woefully absent from the agency's report on 
the 2017 hurricane season. The agency's condemnation of days-long 
outages in Florida contrasts its lack of outrage over the months-long 
outages millions of Puerto Ricans experienced.
    These are the questions that remain unanswered:

   Given how the FCC raised concerns in the Hurricane Michael 
        report over the carriers' failures in Florida, will the agency 
        revisit the conduct of carriers operating in Puerto Rico--and 
        approach it with greater skepticism?

   Why was the tone of the FCC's 2019 Hurricane Michael report 
        so different from the tone of its 2017 Hurricane Season report? 
        And why did the FCC provide a critical analysis of the effects 
        of Hurricane Michael and no critical analysis of the impact of 
        Hurricane Maria?
Next Steps
    Puerto Rico needs a comprehensive and community-governed plan to 
build a resilient communications system. To create such a plan, the FCC 
needs to first conduct a full independent investigation of the 
communications crisis in Puerto Rico.
    Free Press recommends the following actions:

   The FCC should promulgate regulations--and recommend related 
        actions or rules for other federal, state and territorial 
        agencies--to address the underlying causes of the prolonged 
        outage in Puerto Rico.

   The FCC must engage in a long-term examination and 
        rulemaking to strengthen the resiliency-network infrastructure 
        not just in Puerto Rico but throughout the United States.

   Congress and the FCC should provide more funding for 
        restoration efforts and offer coordination and oversight to 
        ensure those funds accelerate restoration and incorporate 
        network resiliency. Lawmakers and agency officials should 
        mandate that affected communities are part of the design and 
        governance of their local infrastructure and that funds are 
        allocated to support self-sustaining and resilient communities.

   Congress should hold hearings to provide robust and regular 
        oversight of the FCC's response to Hurricane Maria and recovery 
        efforts in Puerto Rico.

   Congress should launch an investigation focused on what 
        happened in Puerto Rico and should mandate the creation of an 
        independent FCC commission to examine the roots of the 
        communications crisis.

   Congress should use its subpoena power to ensure the prompt 
        delivery of all requested documents from the FCC and FEMA in 
        response to FOIA requests from Free Press and existing 
        congressional-information requests.

   Lawmakers should request reports from both the Government 
        Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service on 
        the history of telecom in Puerto Rico. These reports should 
        analyze how the islands' colonial status contributed to the 
        2017 disaster.

   The FCC should abandon its Lifeline proposals, which would 
        directly harm Puerto Ricans and other disaster survivors.

   Lawmakers should hold industry accountable by requiring 
        regular reports to Congress, clear and public guidance and 
        monitoring from the FCC, and publicly available data for 
        advocates to a) identify potential misuse of the funds set 
        aside for recovery work and b) ensure that telecom companies 
        deliver on their promises to accelerate reconstruction.

   The FCC and other relevant agencies must provide Spanish-
        language translations of all Puerto Rico-related material, and 
        the FCC should create a Spanish-language consumer-complaint 
        portal.
Puerto Ricans Share Their Stories on How Puerto Rico's Communications 
        Crisis Impacted Their Lives After Hurricane Maria
    In the absence of adequate FCC outreach, Free Press and the 
National Hispanic Media Coalition invited their members and the public 
to share their experiences of losing communications during and after 
Hurricane Maria through a public comment-collection tool on the Free 
Press website.
    Beginning on Jan. 29, 2018, Free Press reached out to its members 
and asked: ``What's your story about the impact Hurricane Maria has had 
on Puerto Ricans' ability to access communications services?'' \43\ 
Despite the extreme hardships that many Puerto Ricans faced--and 
despite the lack of access to basic necessities, including 
communications services--many people sent feedback via this tool with 
the hope that the FCC would hear them and heed their concerns.
    For instance, Sandralis Rivera of Woodland Park, New Jersey, said 
on Jan. 31, 2018:

        My grandfather died 4 days after the hurricane hit [Puerto 
        Rico]. . . . We weren't able to find out about his death until 
        3 days later in a brief 3 min. phone call. The lack of service 
        had us extremely concern[ed] over the welfare of my grandmother 
        who was in an elderly home without any power nor access to cell 
        service. It took at least 3 weeks before I was able to speak to 
        my in-laws and my cousins. Up until last week, when I visited 
        [Puerto Rico], I experienced several dropped calls and no 
        internet[.]

    This tragic story is all too common and is an important piece of 
the larger story of the communications crisis--a story the FCC failed 
to hear due to its indifference and subpar outreach. Many commenters 
noted in January 2018 that providers had only recently restored 
reliable communications services--more than four months after Hurricane 
Maria struck.
    Many stories of uncertainty and heart-wrenching silence from loved 
ones came to the fore as power and service were slowly restored and 
some survivors were finally able to speak for themselves by submitting 
their stories through Free Press' comment tool. One commenter noted the 
difficulty caused by the timing and conduct of the FCC's proceeding:

        How can the FCC possibly ask for comments regarding the impact 
        of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico when many of [the] citizens 
        of the island still remain without power or internet[?] Is the 
        FCC actually going [to] the . . . island and knocking on doors? 
        Is the FCC going to drop fliers on the island that citizens can 
        mail back to them? \44\

    Such outreach does not relieve the Commission of the obligation to 
do more and learn from the people it serves. But the comments we 
collected tell a powerful narrative about the hardships suffered by 
people disconnected from their communication services and from each 
other in the wake of the storms.
   Patricia in Bayamon, Puerto Rico (Jan. 31, 2018):

        Communication was down for weeks, making it hard for everyone 
        to stay sane, calm, and collected. Thus . . . our mental health 
        decreased, worse than what it already was. . . . My boyfriend's 
        family still does not have home Internet access thanks to the 
        hurricane. Many areas that provide Internet (theirs being 
        Claro, the telephone company) were severely damaged thanks to 
        water coming in the central buildings.

   Michael Slayder in Luquillo, Puerto Rico (Jan. 29, 2018):

        Ever since the Hurricane hit us I wasn't able to contact my 
        friends for about two weeks before my parents took a very long 
        trip to the center of the island which was crowded with cars 
        and people where a few stores had signal for everyone to 
        communicate with, I got in contact with my friends from the 
        U.S. but I haven't heard anything from the ones here in Puerto 
        Rico due to school being closed and me not knowing where they 
        live.

   Luis Lugo in Adjuntas, Puerto Rico (Feb. 12, 2018):

        As of today, the AT&T tower has not been replaced or rebuilt, 
        leaving us with a mediocre service. However, last weekend there 
        was a service outage with one of Claro's fiber-optic cable, 
        leaving all Claro customers in Adjuntas without phone or 
        Internet service until today. I feel that the telecommunication 
        companies have left the people in the mountain area behind. My 
        parents had AT&T postpaid accounts. One of the numbers was 
        transferred to Claro and the other was not paid because of the 
        lack of service from AT&T, who refused to give us a fourth 
        month of credit (emphases added).

   Hector Santana in Carolina, Puerto Rico (Jan. 31, 2018):

        In the beginning of the hurricane the hospital my mom worked at 
        was filled with people who were on the floor crying over the 
        fact that their homes were more than likely destroyed and that 
        their families were still in their homes and [they had] no way 
        of being able to contact them.

   Maria Colon in San Juan, Puerto Rico (Feb. 2, 2018):

        I live in the San Juan metropolitan area. My mother lives on 
        the west side of the island. I was not able to communicate with 
        her for 5 days. I couldn't access any reception and her land 
        line was completely out of service. Due to lack of gas and road 
        obstructions I couldn't get to her. I [must] say those were the 
        most difficult days since she is elderly and depends on the 
        phone to let her needs known. Finally, I was able to go see her 
        in person (emphasis added).

        When I go visit her, as of today, the communications are 
        difficult and at times I need to go out of my community to get 
        reception. It is extremely urgent and important that the FCC 
        investigates and reassure[s] the Puerto Ricans, USA citizens, 
        that this will never happen again (emphasis added).

   Otoniel Cajigas in Aguada, Puerto Rico (Jan. 29, 2018):

        On September 19, 2017 my family [and] I were about to go sleep 
        knowing that early in the mornings we will begin to feel the 
        impact of the hurricane Maria at our home in Bo Espinal, 
        Aguada, PR. To our surprise before any wind or rain began there 
        was a power outage (which later we lived [through] for 75 
        straight days), which caused that around 2 or 3 am we end up 
        without any broadband Internet access at our home (ISP Liberty 
        Cable), but at least we still had the cellphone. . . . 
        [H]owever around 4:30 [or] 5:00 am we also [lost] any cellular 
        signal from our provider (AT&T and Tmobile). At this point we 
        decided to try capturing local channels, however none [were] 
        available, therefore we tried the radio . . . [no] FM radio was 
        available in the spectrum, so we switched to AM. [F]inally we 
        were able to locate one local radio station: 1340AM. 
        Unfortunately, even while they were trying to provide 
        information to the audience, they were blind as well. [N]o 
        information was received from any government agency, neither 
        status of the Hurricane and how much additional time we should 
        expect to receive [the] impact (emphasis added).

        [A]t around 7:00AM [on] September 21st we wake up to our new 
        reality, no running water, no electricity, but worse than that 
        No communications at all . . . basically it passed 1 week 
        before we heard that the communications provider Claro had part 
        of their cell towers working, therefore we looked for people 
        with their service to load a cell phone in order to communicate 
        with our family members out in U.S. mainland. AT&T cellular 
        signal took almost a month to begin working for calls and SMS, 
        however . . . data service wasn't available until 6 weeks, but 
        very unstable and extremely slow (emphasis added).

        3 months later the service [stabilized] and was near to normal, 
        however broadband service for home wasn't available. Finally, 
        on day 75 our neighborhood was re-energized, therefore I began 
        contacting Liberty to get estimates on when should I get the 
        service back, but there weren't any estimates given. Finally, 
        last week, January 23, 2018 the [fiber] cable was installed at 
        the neighborhood, however my coax cable from the fiber to my 
        home was cut, so I contacted Liberty to get it replaced. I have 
        contacted them more than 5 times and thru all possible channels 
        however I'm still without the service and they aren't even 
        providing any installation date. So this is a summary of our 
        story so far . . . (emphases added).

   Sheila Ward in San Juan, Puerto Rico (Jan. 31, 2018):

        We did not have electricity at our house in San Juan until 
        January 11. Therefore, our access to our landline telephone 
        service was limited. Concerning the cell phone, it was about 10 
        days before I could talk well with my husband. I was off island 
        and he was in PR for Hurricane Maria.

   Maritza Stanchich in San Juan, Puerto Rico (Jan. 31, 2018):

        For me, not having any cell phone connection or access to 
        Internet in the immediate aftermath of the storm was worse than 
        not having electricity or water service. We had little idea 
        what had happened in the rest of the country, as only one radio 
        station was left operating (WAPA).

        Once I managed to get hold of a newspaper (by driving about 
        half an hour to the newspaper with a friend), I learned that 
        the mayors and authorities of five municipalities of the 
        country's southwest had achieved no contact with the governor 
        or emergency officials, this [was] five-six days after the 
        storm.

        In addition, I knew personally of someone living nearby who 
        contracted potentially life-threatening leptospirosis but could 
        not seek medical attention from the hospital military ship in 
        port because doing so required a referral, yet there was no way 
        to call or reach his doctors for one.

   Gerardo Talavera in Brookline, Massachusetts (Jan. 29, 
        2018):

        It was me and my uncle putting our phones outside, against 
        anything we thought could work as an antenna. No service for 
        days, no reliable service for weeks. It was an absolute 
        nightmare to let everyone know we were OK. Communication was at 
        such a premium that when PREPA offered an Internet `oasis' it 
        was flooded with people trying to get on WiFi. Such things 
        should never happen again (emphasis added).

    The communications blackout also harmed people on the U.S. mainland 
who had friends and family in Puerto Rico. Here are some of their 
comments:
   Sonia Acevedo in Alexandria, Virginia (Feb. 12, 2018):

        Most of my family lives in the . . . southeast of the Island, 
        to be exact in the town next to where the hurricane Maria 
        landfall. It wasn't until 12 days after Maria . . . that I was 
        able to talk with my mom. She had to drive at least 30-40 min 
        far from my town, park in the shoulder of a highway to be able 
        to talk with me and my sister. The 10 min or so that . . . the 
        call [lasted] it was very difficult to understand what she was 
        saying because the signal was bad. It wasn't until a week later 
        that I was able to talk with her again. I went to the Island 
        [in the beginning] of November and I had no signal all the 
        time. Almost 5 months after the hurricane communications still 
        bad. I used to talk with my parents almost every day. Now if we 
        are lucky, we talk twice a week. People in Puerto Rico pay a 
        lot for cellphone and internet. They are U.S. Citizens, they 
        deserve to be treated the same way [as] the people that live in 
        the U.S. mainland (emphasis added).

   Ahmad Moradi in Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Jan. 30, 2018):

        As an Expat who lives in PR, communication is vital to our 
        business operation. We cannot conduct business when struggle 
        continues with lack of power, Internet, and other related 
        services.

   N. L. in Long Grove, Illinois (Jan. 30, 2018):

        Six months following Hurricane Maria and we still are not able 
        to directly communicate with our friends in parts of the 
        mainland and Vieques[.]

   Magdaliz Figueroa in Silver Spring, Maryland (Feb. 11, 
        2018):

        My immediate family, my parents, my mom and sister had phone 
        signal on and off during the whole ordeal they live in 
        Bayam[o]n . . . and I am more than thankful for that because I 
        will have gone crazy if I wouldn't have listen from them for 14 
        or 20 days like it happened to so many of my friends here.. . .

        My friend decided to go stay with her parents in her hometown 
        of Cidra[.] They didn't have any radio or cellphone signal 
        [and] didn't know what was happening. . . . [W]ith no 
        communications they couldn't know if the hurricane passed or if 
        it was still there (emphasis added).

        [T]he death toll of the aftermath of the hurricane is more 
        [than] 1,000 people[.] [T]he mayor of Orocovis walked for a day 
        or more with a corpse just to be able to get signal on a 
        cellphone [for the corpse to] be pick[ed] up. There are 
        thousands of stories like the ones I just wrote here. Still to 
        this day there're people without power, water and phone 
        signal[.] [I]t's been 5 months, and all I can think is that the 
        2018 hurricane season will start in a few months.

   Sandra Wilkes in Perth Amboy, New Jersey (Jan. 29, 2018):

        It took two whole weeks to try to communicate with my parents. 
        Those two weeks were heart wrenching not knowing if my parents 
        were safe as [images] of devastation were spreading. They 
        couldn't use their cellphone because the cell towers were down 
        and landlines were destroyed.

   Clarinda Low in New York City (Feb. 2, 2018):

        For several people I know, even in San Juan, Internet services 
        have been very spotty at best. Because phone service is even 
        worse, this has interrupted every aspect of life. Professors 
        are unable to communicate with students, parents [are] unable 
        to communicate with their children['s] schools, information 
        flow in general has come to a standstill (emphasis added).

   Marta Landrieu in New York City (Jan. 30, 2018):

        My family, sister, cousins [and] other close relatives live in 
        Patillas and Guayama areas [most devastated] by Maria. Today, 
        months after Maria most are still without electricity and no 
        access [to] the internet. . . . One cousin, [struggling with] 
        multiple cancers, was unable to reach anyone nor use the 
        Internet to receive updated information/news as to her town's 
        condition and for information on the distribution of needed 
        water, food that would reach her remote area. FEMA 
        irresponsibly was/is asking folks to file their claims on the 
        Internet and was closing its doors to those who were unable to 
        do so.
Endnotes
    \1\ See New England Journal of Medicine, ``Mortality in Puerto Rico 
after Hurricane Maria,'' July 12, 2018: https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMsa1803972; GW Today, ``GW Researchers: 29,75 Excess Deaths 
Linked to Hurricane Maria,'' August 29, 2018: https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/
gw-researchers-2975-excess-deaths-linked-hurricane-maria.
    \2\ Danica Coto, ``Puerto Rico Lures Tech Developers as Hurricane 
Season Looms,'' Associated Press, March 20, 2019: https://
www.apnews.com/36ad55904ab6459db6a0521d92490b90.
    \3\ Puerto Rico and possession-tax credit, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 936 
(fully repealed 2006).
    \4\ See Juan Gonzalez, ``Puerto Rico's $123 Billion Bankruptcy Is 
The Cost Of U.S. Colonialism,'' The Intercept, May 9, 2017: https://
theintercept.com/2017/05/09/puerto-ricos-123-billion-bankruptcy-is-the-
cost-of-u-s-colonialism/.
    \5\ See Gabriela Martinez, ``Why This Disaster Relief Bill Is Stuck 
on a Debate over Puerto Rico Food Stamps,'' PBS NewsHour, March 28, 
2019: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/why-this-disaster-relief-
bill-is-stuck-on-a-debate-over-puerto-rico-food-stamps.
    \6\ See, e.g., Annie Karni & Patricia Mazzei, ``Trump Lashes Out 
Again at Puerto Rico, Bewildering the Island,'' The New York Times, 
April 2, 2019: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/02/us/trump-puerto-
rico.html; Aaron Rupar, ``Trump's Latest Outburst Against Puerto Rico, 
Explained,'' Vox, April 2, 2019: https://www.vox.com/2019/4/2/18291975/
trump-puerto-rico-disaster-relief-funding-bill-explained.
    \7\ See Amy Sherman, ``Donald Trump Falsely Tweets That Puerto Rico 
Got $91 Billion in Hurricane Aid,'' Politifact Florida, April 3, 2019: 
https://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2019/apr/03/donald-trump/
trumps-false-tweet-puerto-rico-got-91-billion-hurr/
    \8\ See Joseph Torres, ``Puerto Ricans Speak Out About Islands' 
Communications Crisis,'' Free Press, Oct. 18, 2018: https://
www.freepress.net/our-response/advocacy-organizing/stories-field/
puerto-ricans-speak-out-about-islands-communications
    \9\ See Trevor Houser & Peter Marsters, ``The World's Second 
Largest Blackout,'' Rhodium Group, April 12, 2018: https://rhg.com/
research/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-worlds-second-largest-blackout/ 
(``What was already the largest blackout in American history has now 
likely become . . . the second largest blackout in the world''); see 
also Alexia Fernandez Campbell, ``It Took 11 Months to Restore Power to 
Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria. A Similar Crisis Could Happen 
Again,'' Vox, Aug. 15, 2018: https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/15/
17692414/puerto-rico-power-electricity-restored-hurricane-maria 
(reporting the restoration of ``power to the last neighborhood that 
lost electricity after Hurricane Maria--328 days after the Category 4 
storm hit the island'').
    \10\ See FCC, ``Communications Status Report for Areas Impacted by 
Hurricane Maria,'' released Sept. 23, 2017: https://docs.fcc.gov/
public/attachments/DOC-346860A1.pdf.
    \11\ See Milken Institute School of Public Health, George 
Washington University, Ascertainment of the Estimated Excess Mortality 
from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico (2018); Nishant Kishore et al., 
``Mortality in Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria,'' 379 New England 
Journal of Medicine 162, 162-170 (2018); see also Nidhi Prakash, ``A 
New Study Says Nearly 6,000 Died In Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria. 
The Government Still Says 64 People Died,'' BuzzFeed News, May 29, 2018 
(noting that the collapse of the cell networks ``prevented many people 
from seeking help if they were unwell,'' and those ``who relied on home 
oxygen and dialysis machines or refrigeration for diabetes medication 
were left vulnerable, cut off from medical professionals and unable to 
call for help''); Danica Coto, ``Puerto Rico Unveils New Emergency 
Preparations After Maria,'' Associated Press, Sept. 11, 2018 (noting 
the recent installation of direct emergency lines to nursing homes to 
address the fact that many of the people who died as a result of Maria 
were elderly), https://www.apnews.com/b6651a23cc51481497f7f64eafc4bf78.
    \12\ See Letter from the Center for Media Justice, Color Of Change, 
Free Press, the National Hispanic Media Coalition and Public Knowledge 
to FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, Oct. 6, 2017: http://www.nhmc.org/fcc-must-
aid-puerto-rico.
    \13\ FCC, ``FCC Chair Announces Hurricane Recovery Task Force,'' 
released Oct. 6, 2017: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-chairman-
announces-hurricane-recovery-task-force
    \14\ See Letter from Rep. Frank Pallone Jr. to FCC Chairman Ajit 
Pai, OL 17-18, Oct. 6, 2017: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/
DOC-347575A2.pdf.
    \15\ See FCC, ``Chairman Pai Meets with Officials in Puerto Rico,'' 
Nov. 7, 2017: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-chairman-pai-meets-
officials-puerto-rico
    \16\ See FCC, ``Communications Status Report for Areas Impacted by 
Hurricane Maria,'' released Dec. 6, 2017.
    \17\ See ``Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Seeks Comment 
on Response Efforts Undertaken During 2017 Hurricane Season,'' PS 
Docket No. 17-344, Public Notice, 32 FCC Rcd 10245 (Dec. 7, 2017).
    \18\ ``Improving the Resiliency of Mobile Wireless Communications 
Networks; Reliability and Continuity of Communications Networks, 
Including Broadband Technologies,'' PS Docket Nos. 13-239 & 11-60, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd 14373, 14373-74  1, 3 
(2013).
    \19\ See GAO, ``FCC Should Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts 
to Strengthen Wireless Network Resiliency,'' December 2017 https://
www.gao.gov/assets/690/688927.pdf.
    \20\ Id.
    \21\ See FCC press release, ``FCC Chairman Announces Visit to 
Puerto Rico & U.S. Virgin Islands in March,'' Feb. 21, 2018: https://
docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-349352A1.pdf.
    \22\ See Sharon Minelli Perez, ``La FCC Fiscalizara el Uso de los 
Fondos para las Telecomunicaciones,'' El Nuevo Dia, March 8, 
2018:https://www.elnuevodia.com/negocios/econo
mia/nota/lafccfiscalizaraelusodelosfondosparalastelecomunicaciones-
2404761.
    \23\ See Joint Comments of Free Press and the National Hispanic 
Media Coalition, PS Docket No. 17-344 & WC Docket No. 17-287, filed 
April 17, 2018: https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/ 2018-04/
joint_comments_nhmc_freepress_2017_hurricane_season.pdf.
    \24\ See Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces 
Workshop to Identify Critical Information Needs to Improve 
Communications During Disasters, Public Notice, DA 18-292, released 
March 23, 2018: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-
292A1.pdf; see also FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau 
announces the agenda for the April 13, 2018 public workshop to identify 
critical information needs to improve communications during disasters, 
Public Notice, DA 18-357, released April 10, 2018: https://
docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-292A1.pdf.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ See Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund and the Connect USVI Fund, 
Order and NPRM, WC Docket Nos. 18-143, 10-90, 14-58, FCC 18-57, May 29, 
2018: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-670A1.pdf.
    \27\ See Federal Emergency Management Agency, ``2017 Hurricane 
Season FEMA After-Action Report'' (2018): https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/
10720156823712/FP%20Rosenworcel%20Ex%20Parte
%20re%20Puerto%20Rico%20-%20July%2020%202018.pdf.
    \28\ See Letter from Joseph Torres, Free Press, to FCC Secretary 
Marlene H. Dortch, WC Docket No. 18-143, filed July 20, 2018.
    \29\ See ``2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications 
Report and Recommendations,'' Public Safety Docket No. 17-344, Aug. 24, 
2018: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-353805A1.pdf.
    \30\ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-18-472, ``2017 
Hurricanes and Wildfires: Initial Observations on the Federal Response 
and Key Recovery Challenges,'' 32 (2018): https://www.gao.gov/assets/
700/694231.pdf.
    \31\ See Letter from Free Press et al. to FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, PS 
Docket No. 17-344 & WC Docket No. 18-143, filed Sept. 20, 2018: https:/
/www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/ 2018-09/
Call_for_Independent_Commission_on_Puerto_Rico.pdf.
    \32\ See Free Press, ``Reflections on Hurricane Maria: 
Communications in Puerto Rico,'' https://www.facebook.com/freepress/
videos/992587910924018/ (last visited March 5, 2019).
    \33\ See Comments of Free Press, PS Docket No. 17-344 et al., filed 
Sept. 17, 2018: https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/ 2018-09/
free_press_puerto_rico_recovery_comments.pdf.
    \34\ See Free Press, ``Puerto Ricans Speak Out About Islands' 
Communications Crisis,'' Oct. 18, 2018: https://www.freepress.net/our-
response/advocacy-organizing/stories-field/puerto-ricans-speak-out-
about-islands-communications.
    \35\ Free Press press release, ``Chairman Pai's Call for an 
Investigation of Communication Failures in Florida Contrasts His 
Inaction in Puerto Rico,'' Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.freepress
.net/news/press-releases/free-press-chairman-pais-call-investigation-
communication-failures-florida
    \36\ See Letter from Rep. Frank Pallone Jr. to FCC Chairman Ajit 
Pai, OL 17-18, Oct. 26, 2018: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/
DOC-355997A2.pdf.
    \37\ Congress created the FCC to ``promot[e] safety of life and 
property through the use of wire and radio communications.'' 47 U.S.C. 
Sec. 151 and it ``is required to consider public safety . . . its 
enabling act.'' Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 
2006).
    \38\ See Letter from Joseph Torres, Free Press, to FCC Secretary 
Marlene H. Dortch, PS Docket No. 18-339 & WC Docket Nos. 09-197, 11-42 
& 17-287, filed Dec. 17, 2018.
    \39\ See Letter from Carmen Scurato, Free Press, to the FCC, filed 
Nov. 9, 2018 https://www.freepress.net/ sites/default/files/2019-05/
free_press_foia_request_11_09_18.pdf.
    \40\ See Letter from Reps. Frank Pallone Jr. and Mike Doyle to FCC 
Chairman Ajit Pai, OL 18-17, Feb. 4, 2019.
    \41\ See ``October 2018 Hurricane Michael's Impact on 
Communications: Preparation, Effect, and Recovery,'' Public Safety 
Docket No. 18-339, May 9, 2019: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DOC-357387A1.pdf.
    \42\ Id.
    \43\ See Free Press, ``Cuente su historia: La FCC necesita saber 
sobre el impacto del huracan Maria en los servicios de comunicacion en 
Puerto Rico,'' (last visited April 16, 2018): https://
act.freepress.net/act/ internet_fcc_pr_spanish/; ``Free Press, Tell 
Your Story: The FCC Needs to Know About the Impact of Hurricane Maria 
on Communications Services in Puerto Rico'' (last visited March 6, 
2018): http://act.freepress.net/letter/internet_fcc_pr/.
    \44\ Comment of Michael Brossi, Framingham, Massachusetts (Feb. 1, 
2018).
                                 ______
                                 

               Telecommunications Policy 45 (2021) 102094

 Emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico: Interaction between 
    regulatory institutions and telecommunications companies during 
                            Hurricane Maria

      Luis Rosario-Alberta, Bruno Takahashib

    a Department of Liberal Arts, Program of Communication, 
Universidad Ana G. Mendez, Carolina Campus, USA

    b School of Journalism and AgBioResearch, College of 
Communication Arts and Sciences, Michigan State University, USA

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      ARTICLE INFO                           ABSTRACT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keywords:                Extreme infrastructure collapse poses unique
Emergency                 challenges to emergency communications. This
 communications           was the case in Puerto Rico in 2017 after
Communication             hurricanes Irma and Maria. In this study, we
 administration           first examined telecommunications carriers
Puerto Rico               representatives' views of the adequateness of
Hurricane Maria           emergency communications policies. Their views
Telecommunications        were contrasted with the perspectives of a
 policy                   selection of telecommunications experts and
                          regulators. Secondly, we conducted a policy
                          analysis to assess the FCC, the
                          Telecommunications Bureau of Puerto Rico, and
                          telecommunications companies' emergency
                          communications processes and outcomes. An
                          electronic questionnaire and in-depth
                          interviews with telecommunications companies'
                          representatives, and secondary data analysis
                          were used. The analysis revealed that most
                          participants considered favorably the 2017
                          Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework but
                          did not look favorably upon various state-
                          level emergency communications policies. The
                          policy analysis points to ineffective state
                          emergency communications policies due to the
                          impact of external factors and the lack of
                          coordination of the state government
                          electrical power provider and private
                          telecommunications companies. The results also
                          revealed that between 2017 and 2019, policy
                          makers and the application of policy tools in
                          regard to emergency communications were
                          largely reactive and relied on vigorous state
                          level intervention through a prescriptive
                          regulatory approach. The analysis includes
                          policy recommendations for emergency
                          communications.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Introduction
    Natural and human-made disasters validate the social importance of 
traditional news media, new media, and emergency warning systems. 
Extreme infrastructure collapse poses unique challenges to emergency 
communications. This was the case in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 
2017 after hurricanes Irma and Maria battered the island and left its 
citizens without access to communication channels and emergency 
communication services. This study examines emergency communications 
policies carried out by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
the Telecommunications Bureau of Puerto Rico (TBPR), and Privately-
Owned Telecommunications Companies (PTCs) during Hurricane Maria 
response and recovery phases.
    Federal and state laws and rules adopted or enforced by the FCC and 
the TBPR \1\--the regulatory agencies for telecommunications services 
in Puerto Rico--serve to define roles and emergency communications 
policy objectives. These objectives are adopted by a range of policy 
actors such as public safety organizations, regulatory institutions, 
citizenry, and PTCs. During emergency situations, PTCs (e.g., wireline 
carriers, wireless carriers, broadband services companies, 
telecommunications infrastructure companies) rely on a combination of 
legal mandates, policy tools (e.g., technical standards, licensing, 
subsidies, tax credits) and industry self-regulatory standards (e.g., 
best practices, codes), and agreements (e.g., cooperative frameworks). 
Also, PTCs' activities are integrated to federal, state, and municipal 
governments, private organizations (non-governmental organizations), 
and volunteer emergency response activities. In particular, PTCs' 
conduct is aimed at providing continuity of emergency communications 
services for public safety services (e.g., 911 emergency services) and 
commercial services to citizens (e.g., wireline and wireless 
telephony).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ On August 12, 2018 the Act to Execute the Reorganization Plan 
of the Puerto Rico Public Service Regulatory Board (Law Num. 211) was 
signed into law. The law created the Puerto Rico Public Service 
Regulatory Board (PRPSRB). The law renamed the Puerto Rico 
Telecommunications Regulatory Board (PRTRB) to the Telecommunications 
Bureau of Puerto Rico. With the exception of the resolutions and 
orders, the study will refer to the state telecommunications regulator 
as the Telecommunications Bureau of Puerto Rico (TBPR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This study of emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico is 
articulated at two levels of analysis. First, adopting a stakeholder 
approach, we analyze PTCs' (i.e., carriers, broadband & network 
services, communications infrastructure) views of the adequacy of 
emergency communications regulatory policies and the need to strengthen 
them. Their views were contrasted with a selection of five interviews 
with state level telecommunications experts and regulatory officials. 
This second group of interviews contributed to the analysis by 
providing a better understanding of the regulatory framework for 
emergency communications in Puerto Rico, but their responses are not 
included in the results. Therefore, the study only analyzes carriers' 
perspectives. Secondly, we carried out a policy examination of FCC, 
TBPR, and PTCs' interaction and outcomes through a detailed analysis of 
the emergency management activities and adoption of policy tools during 
the emergency situation in 2017.
    The analysis is conceptually grounded in policy studies and media 
and telecommunications policy analysis. Since the study focused on 
PTCs' opinions, it followed an inductive and exploratory approach but 
was grounded in an analytical framework proposed by Picard and Pickard 
(2017) for media and telecommunications policy making and policy 
analysis. This framework served as the starting point for the analysis 
of PTCs' opinions about emergency communications policies and the 
analysis of the organizations' conduct during the response and recovery 
phases. The policy problem explored is the extent to which emergency 
communications policies carried out in Puerto Rico provided citizens 
and public safety authorities effective use of emergency communications 
services during the response and recovery phases. The policy problem is 
framed in three types of relationships and influences: 1) FCC and 
telecommunications industry interaction, 2) TBPR and telecommunications 
industry interaction, and 3) Wireless industry self-regulatory 
practices during emergency situations, specifically the roaming service 
agreement in 2017.
    This study also presents a detailed narrative of the diverse, 
overlapping, and complementary Federal and state emergency 
communications policies at play after Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. 
The analysis of governmental literature and other documentation, 
embedded within the accounts of companies' representatives, provide a 
unique in-depth view of emergency communications policy processes. Our 
purpose is to contribute to the academic literature examining contexts 
of extreme infrastructure collapse in relation to emergency 
communications policy objectives, policy mechanisms, and policy tools. 
In addition, we draw from the participants' in-depth interviews to 
present practical recommendations (as suggested by Enserink et al., 
2013) for telecommunications at the federal and state levels that could 
be implemented to strengthen emergency communications in Puerto Rico 
and other contexts.
2. Conceptual considerations of emergency communications policies
2.1. Policy analysis and telecommunications policy
    The literature on policy analysis for public policymaking shows 
that changes in the legal sphere and technological innovation have been 
two significant factors in the evolution of emergency communications 
regulatory policies. First, telephone companies have to provide access 
to local public safety emergency systems such as 911 and E911 
(Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2007; Ten, 2001). Also, Ryan and Peha (2008) 
recommended the deployment of a single nationwide network that serves 
all public safety personnel, and Peha (2009) analyzed long-term 
spectrum policy reform in relation to public safety spectrum. Moreover, 
given the wide adoption of wireless communication services, Seeman et 
al., (2018) analyzed the policies for implementing and funding the 
transition from Enhanced 911 to Next Generation 911 (NG911) and its 
integration into the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network.
    Several scholars have addressed some of the challenges for media 
and communications policy analysis. For instance, Napoli (1999) 
elaborated on the unique characteristics of media regulation in 
relation to other industries' regulatory regimes and proposed a 
symmetrical approach to communications policymaking. For Napoli, policy 
makers should base their decisions on analytical assessments that take 
into account economic and social values for policy objectives in an 
equitable way.
    Another perspective within a framework based on legal principles 
has been proposed to address how economic viability and political 
feasibility limit the adoption of sustainable policy options for 
telecommunications regulation (Cherry, 2006). Cherry pointed out a 
trend in academic research on the relationship between? deregulatory 
policies and the design of regulatory incentives to affect the behavior 
of private parties in order to achieve expected policy goals. More 
recently, Picard (2020) has addressed the historical evolution and the 
normative topics for media, information, and telecommunications 
policies (e.g., policy mechanisms, policy tools and policy outcomes).
    Picard and Pickard (2017) proposed a framework for media and 
telecommunications policy making and policy analysis based on seven 
principles. The framework serves to ``inform the development of policy 
objectives and policy mechanisms and to provide consistency across 
varying issues, technologies, and actions by defining fundamental 
criteria that can be used to inform discussion and guide policy 
decisions'' (5). Their emphasis was on defining fundamental principles 
from which specific policy objectives, policy tools, and desired 
outcomes can be originated. For Picard and Pickard (2017, 5), policy 
analysis for policymakers, policy advocates, and scholars should start 
from ``a more principled level and then link policy objectives and 
tools to these normative foundations rather than merely seeking 
immediate problem solutions.'' These principles for media and 
communications policymaking and policy analysis are:

  1)  Meeting fundamental communication and content needs;

  2)  Providing effective ability for public use of media and 
        communications;

  3)  Promoting diversity/plurality in ownership of media and content 
        available;

  4)  Affording protection for users and society;

  5)  Providing transparency and accountability;

  6)  Pursuing developmental and economic benefits; and

  7)  Pursuing equitable and effective policy outcomes.

    Picard and Pickard (2017) argue that the main stakeholders in 
emergency communications are the citizenry and authorities (e.g., first 
responders), and that during emergency situations the primary 
objectives of communications are: 1) To allow the public to communicate 
with authorities and among themselves, and 2) To allow authorities to 
communicate directly with the public and to enhance communication among 
authorities themselves. In this study we used these two principles as 
conceptual lenses for a policy examination of emergency communications 
processes and outcomes during the response and recovery phases in 
Puerto Rico. The lack of existing theoretical models or frameworks for 
emergency communication policy analysis requires an exploratory and 
inductive approach that allows for the development of emergency 
communications performance analysis instruments.
2.2. Law, regulation, and self-regulation
    The legal and regulatory literature distinguishes Federal and state 
provisions for public safety communication services from those 
emergency communications requirements specific for PTCs. In this 
section we will refer to Federal and state laws and rules for emergency 
communications that make up a dynamic framework that sets different 
types of requirements, either mandatory or voluntary, for Public Safety 
Organizations and PTCs.
    The FCC's definition of emergency communications details roles and 
services related to the 911/E911 Service, the Emergency Alert System, 
Commercial Mobile Alert System, Emergency Management Information 
Systems (e.g., Disaster Information Reporting System, Network Outage 
Reporting System), and spectrum interoperability for public safety 
systems.\2\ The Communications Act of 1934 sets the principle of 
universal service; that is, telephone access for all citizens (Jayakar, 
2009) and eligible telecommunications carriers receiving 
UniversalService low-income support are required to meet emergency 
communications provisions. According to the Federal requirement on 47 
CFR54, Subpart-C-Carriers Eligible for UniversalService Support, 54.202 
(a) (2), a company must:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ FCC. 2015. Emergency Communications. Retrieved from: https://
www.fcc.gov/general/emergency-communications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Demonstrate its ability to remain functional in emergency 
situations, including a demonstration that it has a reasonable amount 
of back-up power to ensure functionality without an external power 
source, that it is able to reroute traffic around damaged facilities, 
and that it is capable of managing traffic spikes resulting from 
emergency situations.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 47 CFR 12. PS Docket No. 14-174. FCC 15-98. See also FCC. 
(2015). Ensuring Continuity of 911 Communications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the state level, Telecommunications Law 213-1996, created the 
Puerto Rico Telecommunications Regulatory Board (PRTRB) and reaffirmed 
the Universal Service principle of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
As in the Federal statute, state law provided that eligible 
telecommunications carriers could receive subsidies through the Puerto 
Rico Universal Service Fund (a complementary fund) to provide 
vulnerable groups and low income households access to 
telecommunications services (e.g., Lifeline Program and Link-Up America 
Program).\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Telecommunications Act of 1996, Section 254(b) and the Puerto 
Rico Telecommunications Law 213-1996, Statement of Reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The TBPR requires telecommunications companies to demonstrate the 
ability to deal with emergency situations. The Reglamento para la 
Expedicion de Certificaciones y Franquicias (Regulations for the 
Issuance of Certifications and Franchises) and the Reglamento de 
Servicio Universal (Regulations for Universal Service) also set the 
legal and procedural basis for the state regulator to certify ETCs 
every two years, and to formulate new requirements related to the 
ability of companies to continue providing services during emergency 
situations. Also, Article 2 of Chapter III of Law 213-1996 provides 
that companies must demonstrate ``moral and economic solvency, their 
experience or history in the area in which they request 
certification.'' Therefore, the regulatory regime at the Federal and 
state level impose on telecommunications carriers and PTCs the 
responsibility, and require of them the ability, to restore 
telecommunications services to consumers during emergency situations 
(e.g., require the capacity to provide continuity of services, reroute 
traffic, network interconnection, and interoperability).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See Article 9.3 in Puerto Rico Telecommunications Board 
(PRTRB). (1997). Reglamento para la Expedicion de Certificaciones y 
Franquicias (Regulations for the Issuance of Certifications and 
Franchises). PRTRB, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As noted by Picard and Pickard (2017), self-regulation is a topic 
of growing importance for international and industry professional 
organizations, telecommunications companies, and media and 
communications policymaking organizations.\6\ Emergency communications 
intra-industry standards (e.g., best practices, codes) and agreements 
(e.g., cooperative frameworks) for emergency situations are important 
self-regulatory provisions.\7\ In 2016 the Wireless Resiliency 
Cooperative Framework adopted by U.S. wireless carriers and industry 
associations and endorsed by the FCC was the basis for an important, if 
not historic agreement and collaboration between wireless carriers in 
Puerto Rico, later endorsed by the TBPR. This agreement's main outcome 
was that it provided roaming service to wireless subscribers during the 
recovery phase. This cooperative initiative fits under what Freeman 
refers to as business and top-down approaches to crisis informatics, in 
which ``an overarching policy effort (e.g., national) is used to assist 
and make decisions on how the technology can be used by citizens'' 
(Freeman, 2011, p. 74).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See International Telecommunications Union. (2020a). ITU 
Guidelines for national emergency telecommunication plans; The World 
Bank/GFDDR. ``Communication during Disaster Recovery. Disaster Recovery 
Guidance Series''.
    \7\ Cited in Picard and Pickard, Haufler, V. (2001). A Public Role 
for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy. 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.3. Emergency communications framework
    In natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made 
disasters, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 USC 101 et seq.) 
identifies communications networks as critical infrastructure. During 
emergency situations, communications networks' response and recovery 
activities are led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS 
has designated a group of agencies that provide communications support 
to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, agencies, 
and first responders ``when their systems have been impacted and 
provides communications and information technology (IT) support to the 
Joint Field Office (JFO) and JFO field teams.'' \8\ The FCC and the 
TBPR are Emergency Support Function #2 (ESF#2) organizations with 
specific emergency plans \9\ and calls to action.\10\ Under these 
considerations, first responders' organizations and citizenry are the 
main subjects of a dynamic emergency communication model that entails 
various emergency warning systems (e.g., Emergency Alert System, 
Wireless Emergency Alerts/Commercial Mobile Service Alerts, and the 
Integrated Public Alert & Warning System), emergency management 
information systems (e.g., Disaster Information Reporting System, 
Network Outage Reporting System), use of multiple technologies (e.g., 
wireless services, broadcasting services), and a dedicated segment of 
the electromagnetic spectrum to provide access to emergency 
communications services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ DHS. (2016). National Response Framework (3rd ed); NRF. (2008), 
Emergency Support Function Annexes: Introduction.
    \9\ As an ESF#2 organization the TBPR during an emergency situation 
supports the restoration of communications infrastructure and services 
and in the coordination between PTC's and federal, state, and local 
public safety organizations. See Torres Lopez (2017, November 7). 
Letter to Hon. Miguel A. Laureano Correa. President, Innovation, 
Telecommunications, Urban and Infrastructure Commission, Senate of 
Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 457).
    \10\ DHS (2008). National Emergency Communications Plan. P.11; DHS 
(2013). NIPP 2013. Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience. P. 21-25; Torres Lopez (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry 
Neumann Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto 
Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the state level, since 1999 the TBPR has had a dual role in 
emergency communications. First, it is the coordinator of the 
communications component in the Puerto Rico Agency for Emergency and 
Disaster Management (PRAEDM). Over the years following 1999, the TBPR's 
mission was to provide assistance for the continuity of public 
communications services in PRAEDM and more than a dozen other state 
agencies. This role includes providing support in the coordination of 
federal, state, and local communications during emergency situations. 
Secondly, in 1999 the TBPR created the Emergency Management Program. 
This program is based on a cooperation agreement between the state 
regulator and ETCs. The agreement was the foundation for the creation 
of the Committee of the Telecommunications Industry for Emergency 
Management (CTIEM). The committee's main objective is to restore and 
protect the telecommunications and cable television infrastructure, as 
well as to be responsive to the communications needs that arise out of 
emergency or disaster situations (Rosario-Albert, 2016).
3. Background to emergency communications in Puerto Rico
    In this study we examine emergency communications policies in 
Puerto Rico around the time of Hurricane Maria because of the 
uniqueness of the case, one in which the telecommunications 
infrastructure collapsed entirely. In this section we provide an 
overview of the telecommunications sector, including access to and 
adoption metrics of main electronic media and telephone services, and 
economic and historical trends.
    In 2017, Puerto Rico's telecommunications industry profile showed 
that in the wireline sector, Claro/Puerto Rico Telephone Company 
(Claro/PRTC) was the Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier, and that AT&T, 
Liberty of Puerto Rico, T-Mobile, Sprint, and Open Mobile were the 
other Competitive Local Exchange Carriers. By then, Liberty of Puerto 
Rico was the only cable television service, which also provided 
telephony (VoIP) and Internet services. Up until 2017, 
telecommunications industry revenues reported consecutive gains from 
2011 ($2,329,985,690) to 2016 ($2,269,116,256), while in 2017, the year 
of hurricanes Irma and Maria, telecommunications industry revenues 
($1,912,882,859) decreased 16 percent.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Puerto Rico Telecommunications Bureau. (2020). Statistics for 
Telecommunications and Cable Television Industries in Puerto Rico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2017, mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants reached 107.04 
percent, while only 70.60 percent of the population used the 
Internet.\12\ Mobile telephony accounted for 81 percent (3,389,402) of 
all telephone lines, while wireline telephony accounted for 19 percent 
(783,739 lines). In 2017 the consolidated total (4,173,141) of wireline 
and wireless lines, as well as for total broadband subscribers 
(3,372,768), reached its peak. Another indicator is the number of low-
income customers (556,455) subscribed to the Lifeline Program in 
relation to the consolidated total of lines for 2017.\13\ By the time 
of Hurricane Maria, 13 percent of the consolidated total (wireline and 
wireless) lines represented low-income subscribers (a vulnerable 
group). Since 2017 was a year of record growth in broadband subscribers 
and in wireless services, which are provided by PTCs, the analysis of 
emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico becomes more relevant, 
and may provide data for other emergency communications policies 
reviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ ITU (2020b). Mobile-Cellular Subscriptions; Puerto Rico 
Telecommunications Bureau. (2020). Statistics for Telecommunications 
and Cable Television Industries in Puerto Rico.
    \13\ The Lifeline Program was established in 1985. The FSU has two 
items: one item is to company infrastructure and the other item is for 
the Lifeline grant program, which is a telephone subsidy for low income 
families.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The analysis of emergency communications polices in Puerto Rico 
also considers historical trends in infrastructure and the economy. 
First, in 2015 the state government's credit classification had been 
progressively degraded and in 2016, for the first time in its history, 
a Federal District Court decided that the island's government was 
insolvent and unable to pay its obligations. This finding deepened the 
political, social, and economic crisis that the island was already 
undergoing. In 2017 the island's poverty rate was 44.4 percent and its 
unemployment rate had reached 10.8 percent.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ U.S. Census Bureau (2019) More Puerto Ricans Move to Mainland 
United States, Poverty Declines. (September 26, 2019); Center for 
Economic and Policy Research. (2017). Life After Debt in Puerto Rico: 
How Many More Lost Decades?.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second consideration was the devastation of the already 
degraded electric power infrastructure. As the Government 
Accountability Office (2017)pointed out, wireline and wireless networks 
are dependent on external and commercial electrical power companies in 
order to provide uninterrupted telecommunications services. Also, to 
provide wireless services to consumers, wireless carriers' networks 
interconnect to wireline networks (e.g., local telephone company or 
cable company). Hence, power failures in wireline services can create 
outages in the backhaul network, affecting wireless networks. In 
relation to backup power at cell sites, a GAO report stated that in 
2007 the FCC had set a requirement of 8 h of backup power for wireless 
carriers. However, the Office of Management and Budget disapproved 
FCC's requirement because of the rule's information collection 
requirements, with the effect of withdrawing the rule.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ The report affirmed that nine of the stakeholders interviewed 
for their study were open ``about the feasibility of guidance.'' See 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2017). FCC Should Improve 
Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network 
Resiliency. DC: GAO. P. p.6-7, 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Miller et al., (2018) analyzed the destruction and inability of the 
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) to restore electricity 
production and distribution after Hurricane Maria, leading to the 
largest power outage in U.S. history. The collapse of the electrical 
network had a cascade effect on public safety services (e.g., 911 
emergency service and first responders' activities, access to 
healthcare, nutrition, and housing services) and in wireless telephony, 
resulting in more than three million wireless lines out of service for 
weeks during the emergency situation. Access to and adoption of 
wireless telephony services is paramount in the effectiveness of plans 
to restore telecommunications services to citizens and its use by news 
organizations (Nieves-Pizarro et al., 2019; Takahashi et al., 2019).
    The considerations above serve to contextualize the process of 
restoring emergency communications services, particularly through 
wireless telephony. As stated by the FCC, in Puerto Rico ``service was 
restored gradually over a six-month period, considerably longer than 
for any other storm.'' \16\ The combination of the historical trends in 
the economy and in the electrical power infrastructure, together with 
the devastation caused by hurricanes Irma and Maria, meant from the 
outset unique challenges to public safety organizations and PTCs' 
readiness and capacity to restore emergency communications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ FCC (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on 
Communications Report and Recommendations. Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. p.15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based on the discussion above, we pose the following research 
questions:

        RQ1 In what ways and to what extent did Federal regulations 
        facilitate the continuity of emergency communication services?

        RQ2 In what ways and to what extent did state regulations 
        facilitate the continuity of emergency communication services?

        RQ3 What external and structural factors were the most 
        influential in the reestablishment of emergency communications?
4. Methods
    The study integrates two approaches. First, we conducted an 
analysis of Private Telecommunications Companies' opinions about 
telecommunications policies and emergency communications using the 
following methods: 1) an electronic questionnaire; 2) semi-structured 
in-depth interviews; and 3) institutional documentation from Federal 
and state agencies, the local and national press, and academic studies.
    Second, a policy examination was conducted focusing on the FCC, 
TBPR, and PTCs' emergency communications processes and outcomes during 
Hurricane Maria response and recovery phases. The research used a 
qualitative approach supported by the analysis of data compiled mainly 
by regulatory agencies. This provided a granular look at the 
implementation of regulatory policies for emergency communications.
4.1. Interview and questionnaire data collection and analysis
    A purposive sampling approach was used to select a group of 
eligible telecommunications companies certified by the TBPR. After 
Hurricane Maria, and for the next 60 days, the TBPR organized daily 
meetings with representatives of both telecommunications and 
telecommunications infrastructure companies. During the process to 
reestablish telecommunications services, 17 telecommunications service 
companies participated in the meetings at the Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) of the Government of Puerto Rico (GPR). In 2019, to 
facilitate the participation of these companies in the study, we used a 
list with the companies' contact details that the TBPR provided. E-mail 
invitations were sent to 16 companies and follow-up calls were made to 
explain the purpose of the research project. The qualitative analysis 
is based on the answers to the electronic questionnaire and in-depth 
interviews. Eight of the 16 companies responded to the electronic 
questionnaire (Table 1). The response rate to the electronic 
questionnaire was 50 percent. The questionnaire used closed and 
multiple-choice questions that reflected the research questions to 
gather the opinions and different emphasis of PTCs.
    The PTCs that participated in the in-depth interviews include all 
companies listed in Table 1 plus Neptuno Networks (Broadband & Network 
Services) and T-Mobile Puerto Rico (Wireless Carrier). Ten interviews 
were conducted, and two interviews included more than one participant 
for a total of 13 participants. The response rate for the in-depth 
interviews was 62 percent. Of the interviews, eight were conducted in 
Spanish and two in English. The audio files of the interviews were 
transcribed verbatim by professional transcribers. Transcripts in 
Spanish were analyzed directly, with only those quotes used in the 
results section translated into English by the authors. The list of the 
de-identified interview subjects' information appears in Appendix 1. 
The participants' PTCs represent different industry sectors (e.g., 
broadband providers, cable TV providers, network infrastructure, 
network services and wireless telephony) providing an outlook on the 
opinions for emergency communications in Puerto Rico. Most of them are 
members of the Puerto Rican Alliance for Telecommunications (PRTA), an 
industry organization that represents eligible telecommunications 
companies in Puerto Rico.
    In-depth interviews followed a semi-structured approach using open-
ended questions based on the research questions and organized 
thematically and chronologically (before and after September 17, 2017, 
three days before the hurricane made landfall in Puerto Rico). The 
qualitative data analysis application Deedose was used to analyze 
interview transcripts. The answers and content obtained were coded 
according to the research questions, the three subjects (i.e., FCC, 
TBPR and PTCs) and relationships analyzed, and factors that influenced 
restoring emergency communications services (e.g., infrastructure, 
regulatory, logistical). The analysis of the interviews focused on 
identifying themes related to emergency communications and other 
emerging and complementary themes directly related to the research 
questions. Due to respondents' availability, data collection was 
conducted during two time periods: May to December 2019 (nine 
companies) and February 2020 (one company). The data collected from the 
answers to the electronic questionnaire and the in-depth research 
interviews from carriers (T-Mobile Puerto Rico, Liberty of Puerto Rico) 
is a limited representation of the total eligible telecommunications 
carriers at the time of Hurricane Maria. The data from the remaining 
PTCs (8) and those that actively participated during the rehabilitation 
of telecommunications services provide a more representative account of 
their point of views on the research questions. In addition to 
interviews with PTCs, five interviews were conducted with state 
telecommunications experts (1) and regulatory officials (4) between 
January 2018 and September 2019. This second group of interviews 
contributed to a better understanding of the regulatory framework for 
emergency communications in Puerto Rico, but their responses are not 
included in the electronic survey results.
4.2. Policy examination: data collection and analysis
    In regard to emergency communications during the response and 
recovery phases after Hurricane Maria, the FCC and the TBPR were the 
two government agencies with the responsibility to assist in the 
restoration of communication and telecommunications services. These 
organizations interacted primarily with PTCs and public safety 
organizations. Therefore, our analysis takes into account the 
activities of the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau 
(PSHSB) and the TBPR's Committee of the Telecommunications Industry for 
Emergency Management (CTIME). To provide a comprehensive assessment of 
the FCC, TBPR, and PTC's activities, secondary data analysis results 
are organized under two rubrics: emergency management activities (e.g., 
daily emergency incident reports, fact-finding visits, interagency 
committees), and adoption of policy tools (e.g., resolutions and 
orders, thematic reports).
    The study used secondary research sources (e.g., government 
documents) for two objectives: 1) To summarize and assess FCC, TBPR and 
PTC's emergency communications processes and outcomes during the 
response and recovery phases, and 2) To triangulate the answers to the 
research questions providing a deeper and multifactorial understanding 
of the respondents' opinions about the feasibility of strengthening 
emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico.

                                 Table 1
          Companies that answered the electronic questionnaire.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Companies                             Services
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AeroNet                          --Broadband & Network Services
Crown Castle                     --Communications Infrastructure
DatAccess                        --Broadband & Network Services
Liberty Cablevision of Puerto    --Carrier, Cable TV, Telephony,
 Rico LLC.                        Broadband Services
PREPA Networks                   --Network Infrastructure
Verizon                          --Network Infrastructure
VPnet                            --Broadband & Network Services
WorldNet Telecommunications,     --Broadband & Network Services
 Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The research examined Federal and state institutional documentation 
published by the Department of Homeland Security, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), and the Government of Puerto Rico.\17\ In 
particular, the review included documents and statistical and economic 
data published by the FCC and TBPR.\18\ Also, we considered reports and 
journalistic accounts on the social and economic effects after the 
passage of hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico, carried out by 
international organizations (e.g., World Meteorological Organization), 
non-governmental organizations (e.g., Resilient Puerto Rico Advisory 
Commission), research centers (Free Press), and journalistic 
organizations (e.g., Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, El Nuevo Dia, 
NotiCel).
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    \17\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2018). 2017 Hurricanes 
and Wildfires. Initial Observations on The Federal Response and Key 
Recovery Challenges. DC: GAO; Puerto Rico Emergency Management Bureau, 
Puerto Rico Department of Public Safety. (2019). Joint Operational 
Catastrophic Incident Plan of Puerto Rico (Version 1.10); Resilient 
Puerto Rico Advisory Commission. (2018). Reimagina Puerto Rico Informe 
Sectorial de Infraestructura Fisica. San Juan PR.
    \18\ In regard to Hurricane Maria and Puerto Rico, the FCC 
published Public Notices (16); news releases, statements and 
presentations (12); reports (1); and communications status reports 
(107). On the other hand, between September 18 and December 28, 2017, 
the TBPR issued 74 resolutions and orders, as well as participating in 
legislative hearings (6) of the State Legislature on issues related to 
the vulnerabilities of the telecommunications industry and public 
safety communication systems after the passage of hurricanes Irma and 
Maria.
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    The second analysis focuses on three types of relationships between 
regulatory organizations and PTCs during the aftermath of Hurricane 
Maria: 1) FCC and telecommunications industry interaction, 2) TBPR and 
telecommunications industry interaction, and 3) industry self-
regulatory practices during emergency situations, specifically the 
roaming service agreement in 2017.
5. Results and discussion
    The results section first presents a short summary of responses 
from PTC representatives to the preliminary closed-ended questionnaire 
and follow-up interviews that sought to establish the position of the 
companies on the topic of Federal and state emergency communications 
policies. The second part of this section presents a more detailed 
account of the emerging themes related to those questions that were 
extracted from the interviews and supported by the analysis of 
secondary data.
    The results show that half of the companies considered the Federal 
regulation for emergency communications inadequate. A participant 
considered it necessary to improve control and access to 
telecommunications infrastructure. The participant commented: ``Federal 
entities seemed to take over jurisdiction over private tower owners and 
block access to certain facilities as they pleased and take control of 
private property as they pleased without providing proper 
documentation.'' \19\ Another participant expressed that regulation 
must consider employees of telecommunications companies as a priority 
group that support access ``to infrastructure services that allow for a 
faster and more effective recovery.'' \20\
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    \19\ Interview #2 with Senior Executive.
    \20\ Interview #9 with Senior Executives (2 participants).
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    Second, representatives of four companies disagreed or strongly 
disagreed about the need to strengthen Federal regulation. Several 
telecommunications companies stated that it was not necessary to 
strengthen regulation but rather to improve the application of 
administrative procedures and the distribution of detailed information 
on contacts with the Federal government. In this sense, a participant 
said, ``I don't think it is a matter of the regulations but a matter of 
well documented and agreed upon procedures.'' \21\
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    \21\ Interview #10 with Executive.
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    Third, most of the responses (n = 5) expressed disagreement with 
state regulation for emergency communications. One participant said: 
``What I believe was missing was the communication from all government 
agencies with the telecom providers. We had to extract information from 
them.'' Another participant stated: ``I mean if there was regulation 
and cooperation and a good plan, I think, communications could have 
been up weeks before it was.'' \22\
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    \22\ Interview #7 with Senior Executives (3 participants).
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    Fourth, representatives of four companies favored strengthening 
state regulation. Several respondents indicated the importance of 
communication and coordination for the state government to facilitate 
and accelerate the processing of permits during the response and 
recovery phase. Regarding cooperation and emergency communications, one 
participant stated that ``regulation needs to be strengthened in the 
area of company cooperation . . . These types of situation are exactly 
where government needs to regulate, when market forces work against the 
safety of society.'' \23\ Another participant provided a singular view 
on the need to strengthen state emergency communications regulatory 
policies. For instance, the viability of a non-governmental 
organization responsible for the emergency communications services. On 
this matter the participant said:
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    \23\ Interview #7 with Senior Executives (3 participants).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I think the hardest part of that was who manages the network. You 
don't want the government managing it. It's going to be inefficient . . 
. But then who is? And maybe the answer is, you know, you got to get 
the board to hire an external, independent party, to manage it because 
it's got to be fair and equal for everybody to get access.\24\
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    \24\ Interview with Senior Executive #10.
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    The remaining remarks from the results and discussion section are 
organized in six sub-sections. The first two sections derived mostly 
inductively from the interview data. The first sub-section addresses 
telecommunications infrastructure damages, while the second sub-section 
discusses the factors that influenced the effective use of emergency 
communications. References to press articles and government 
documentation are used to develop and support various themes. The next 
three sub-sections entail the policy examination on the interaction of 
the FCC and TBPR with PTCs, and the roaming service agreement, as an 
industry self-regulatory practice adopted in Puerto Rico during the 
emergency situation. The last sub-section provides an analysis of 
recent Emergency Communications State Regulatory Reform.
5.1. Telecommunications infrastructure and services after Hurricane 
        Maria
    The analysis of damages to emergency communications associated with 
Hurricane Maria shows the complex process to restore emergency 
communications services. For instance, the National Oceanic Graphic 
Administration's weather radar was destroyed.\25\ The FCC reported that 
the two call centers in Puerto Rico managed by the Government of Puerto 
Rico were out of service for a period of time or ``could not receive 
the types of information (location, call back number, etc.), as 
happened in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), that 
both they and the American public have come to expect.'' \26\
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    \25\ World Meteorological Organization. (2018). Center for Economic 
and Policy Research, 2017 Hurricane Season an Evidence-Based Assessment 
of the Early Warning System. Geneva, Switzerland. P.19.
    \26\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on 
Communications Report and Recommendations. Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P.3.
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    In regard to Public Safety Systems, restoring the 911 service 
required technical assistance from the Department of Defense's Joint 
Force Land Component Command. For instance, the Air Force 85th 
Engineering and Installation Squadron was deployed to restore radio 
communications for local emergency personnel and first responders 
across the island. This account provides information related to the 
resiliency of public safety networks, as the following remark shows: 
``What most would consider a redundant communication system in the 
[mainland] United States, they don't have here . . . As soon as we get 
that back up, I think it will definitely help that level of 
communication.'' \27\ During the in-depth interviews, the resiliency of 
public safety communication systems was also addressed. In regard to 
compliance with Federal government standards, a state regulatory 
official stated that:
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    \27\ State News Service. Airmen work to restore Radio 
Communications in Puerto Rico. Oct. 23, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    And what happens is that each agency chooses . . . the one that 
it's going to provide service and most of the time those systems do not 
talk to each other . . . that explains a lot of what happened in the 
hurricane . . . At the time of the event, some government agencies did 
not meet the P25 standard of government emergency management 
organizations.\28\
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    \28\ Interview #12 with Telecommunications Regulatory Official. 
Project 25 (P25) is a process to establish wireless communication 
standards for the public safety community. Associated Public-Safety 
Communications Officers, 2018. Project 25 Steering Committee BY-LAWS. 
(April 16, 2018).
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    Damage to public safety networks were numerous. Even though PTCs' 
networks, which interconnect with emergency communications services, 
were active for a period of time, they were unable to activate their 
services due to power outages and damages to other networks with which 
they interconnect.\29\ Based on interview data, the portfolio of 
government clients of some PTCs included security and emergency 
organizations such as firefighters, health services, and hospitals. 
When discussing the effects of the telecommunications collapse on 
health services, a participant mentioned the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Some of them also contracted services from private 
telecommunications companies for data transmission services, support 
tasks, maintenance and security.
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    A lot of communication couldn't be done and that could possibly 
have had an impact on the accounting of the missing and the deaths. 
Ultimately, the effect it had on communications for first responders 
was disastrous.\30\
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    \30\ Interview #11 with Telecommunications Regulation Specialist. 
See Kishore et al., (2018) for an assessment on the total number of 
official reported deaths and the lack of telephone services during the 
response and recovery phases.
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    Wireless telecommunication services between the 78 municipalities 
of Puerto Rico, including the islands of Vieques and Culebra, were very 
scarce, if not null, during the following weeks. On this matter, the 
FCC affirmed that ``All municipios in Puerto Rico had greater than 75 
percent of their cell sites out of service. Forty-eight out of the 78 
municipios in Puerto Rico had 100 percent of their cell sites out of 
service.'' \31\ With respect to wireless telecommunications services, 
the dominant telephone service, one respondent noted that ``at the 
worst point, 95.6 percent of cell sites were out of service in Puerto 
Rico.'' \32\
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    \31\ FFC. (2018). Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on 
Communications Report and Recommendations. Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. DC: FCC. P.5. The word municipios refers to counties.
    \32\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on 
Communications Report and Recommendations. Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P.15.
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    Six months after Hurricane Maria, as part of a fact-finding visit 
to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai's remarks 
provide a description of Puerto Rico's communications infrastructure 
damages that still included ``poles down, cell towers toppled, 
electrical power depleted, and otherwise unavailable, wireless 
infrastructure completely destroyed, many radio and television 
broadcast facilities impacted.'' \33\ The TBPR estimated damages to the 
communications network at $1.5 billion.\34\
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    \33\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on 
Communications Report and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P. 27.
    \34\ Torres Lopez, S. E. (2017). Letter to Ajit Pai, Chairman. FCC 
WC Docket No. 10-90, at 1 (filed Dec. 13, 2017).
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5.2. Factors affecting the restoration of telecommunications services
    In regard to the third research question, participants identified 
the following factors as the most influential in the process of 
restoring emergency communications services during the response and 
recovery phases: 1) Lack of electricity and dependence on PREPA's 
electricity service, 2) Difficulties in access and security of fuels 
for backup power systems and transportation, 3) Hurricane Irma's 
degrading effects on the electrical power and telecommunications 
networks, 4) Human-caused damage (i.e., questionable practices during 
debris cleaning and restoration of the electrical system), and 5) 
Aerial deployment of fiber optics.
    On the issue of lack of electricity and dependence on the Puerto 
Rico Electric Power Authority service, all participants considered this 
to be the main factor in the restoration process. With respect to the 
extended power outages and wireless telephone service availability, one 
participant stated that:
    If the electrical power connection was lost, they used the backup 
power, which are generally small because they serve small areas and 
their specifications at the tolerance level that will be given for a 
certain time. It is possible that the plants could supply energy for 8 
h and after that the tanks had to be refilled and without the 
transportation mechanisms or the closed or blocked roads, the cell 
tower lost its service and left all the clients of that area without 
service. That was what caused more than 95 percent of cell phone 
customers to lose their service after the hurricane. That experience 
was very similar for almost all cell phone companies.\35\
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    \35\ Interview #11 with Telecommunications Regulation Specialist.
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    Participants also discussed the difficulties in fuel access and 
security for backup power systems and transportation. Regarding the 
distribution of fuels, a participant commented:
    When the event occurred, Federal agencies arrived, specifically 
FEMA, and took control of all fuel supplies with the intention of them 
establishing their recovery process . . . But that in turn meant that 
local operators did not have access to fuel when they needed it. And 
that's one of the critical points because everything runs on power and 
we need the generators running.\36\
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    \36\ Interview #6 with Senior Executive.
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    A particular feature of the restoration process was the ongoing 
recovery mode in place after Hurricane Irma's impact just two weeks 
before Hurricane Maria. According to some participants, that was a main 
factor in the difficulty of restoring telecommunications services after 
Hurricane Maria.\37\ On this matter, a participant commented: ``I 
think, back-to-back events posed a unique challenge because you were 
already in emergency mode and you had to beat another emergency mode.'' 
\38\
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    \37\ This opinion was also subscribed by the FCC. FCC. (2018). 2017 
Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications Report and Recom-
mendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-344. P.5.
    \38\ Interview #4 with Senior Executive.
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    Participants also mentioned human-caused damage related to 
difficulties in coordination during debris cleaning and restoration of 
the electrical system, particularly between the Puerto Rico Electric 
Power Authority, the TBPR, and telecommunications companies. For 
example, transmission paths and fiber optic and coaxial cables were 
accidentally cut as branches and trees were removed in order to allow 
vehicular access and restoration work. With respect to this practice, a 
telecommunications regulatory specialist stated:
    The Electric Power Authority in its process of reestablishing 
service cut fiber optic cables for telephone distribution. We did not 
lose the service as a consequence of the hurricane, but we did lose it 
in the recovery process because contractors or employees of the 
Authority motu propio decided to cut them in order to advance the 
restoration of the electrical power service.\39\
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    \39\ Interview #12 with Telecommunications Regulatory Official.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another factor identified by some of the participants was the 
aerial deployment of fiber optics. Historically, fiber optics were 
deployed mainly overhead, with underground fiber optics lagging behind, 
mostly due to high installation costs for underground fiber optics. On 
this matter, a participant stated:
    When we left the metropolitan area, and this is what happens to 
most carriers, almost all infrastructure is overhead. In the wake of 
the storm, initiatives have been made to bury sections to help mitigate 
the impact on future events. But most of the infrastructure outside the 
metropolitan area is aerial.\40\
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    \40\ Interview #6 with Senior Executive. In relation to fiber 
optics costs another participant stated: ``I mean we looked into this. 
I mean the cost was prohibitive. It was like 10 times the cost of 
aerial which is why people don't do it. . . . So that may be another 
example of where you need government assistance.'' Interview #10 with 
Senior Executive.
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5.3. Policy examination of the interaction and outcomes between the 
        FCC, TBPR, and PTCs
    This section addresses the interaction between the FCC and the 
telecommunications industry during the response and recovery phases, 
outlined under two rubrics: emergency management activities and 
adoption of policy tools.
5.3.1. Emergency management activities
    The FCC activated its Incident Management Team (IMT), a technical 
and policy experts group from other FCC's Bureaus and Offices. The 
IMT's activities included addressing information and action requests 
from Federal and state government agencies such as the Emergency 
Operations Center of the GPR, the TBPR, and PTCs. During the response 
and recovery phases the FCC activated the Disaster Information 
Reporting System (DIRS) and over the next two months issued daily 
Communications Status Reports about Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.\41\
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    \41\ The Communications Status Reports were generally organized 
under the following categories: 911 Services, Wireless Services, and 
Cable Systems and Wireline and Broadcasting (combined).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to Puerto Rico, the FCC deployed three employees to 
its Joint Field Office in San Juan. Also, on October 6, 2017, the FCC 
created a Hurricane Recovery Task Force to transition from a short-term 
to a longer-term recovery phase. Both groups provided support in areas 
such as waivers of FCC rules, the extension of the period for 
regulatory filings, the granting of Special Temporary Authority (STA), 
personnel support to Roll Call, support in shipping of equipment and 
materials, and other regulatory filings and requests to Federal 
agencies (e.g., United States Environmental Protection Agency).
    For the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season and related to Hurricane 
Maria, the FCC's Bureaus and Offices granted 824 STAs (Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau--717, Public Safety & Homeland Security 
Bureau--8, Media Bureau--85, International Bureau--5, Office of 
Engineering & Technology--9).\42\ The FCC data are useful in recounting 
the complexities and scale of FCC's activities during Hurricane Maria. 
However, a specific breakdown of STAs for Puerto Rico was not found. In 
regard to the specific number of STAs for Puerto Rico, one participant 
stated that because of having the Emergency Operations Center, the FCC 
granted over 300 STAs to just one company during the recovery 
phase.\43\ Participants stated that FCC staff approved ``the needed 
Special Temporary Authority to operate in Puerto Rico as part of our 
efforts to support a roaming partner on the island.'' \44\
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    \42\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on 
Communications Report and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P.21.
    \43\ Interview #7 with Senior Executives (3 participants).
    \44\ Interview #10 with Senior Executive.
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    The FCC STAs facilitated access to frequencies and use of 
technologies, such as microwaves, granted a request from the American 
Radio Relay League (ARRL) for amateur data transmissions to facilitate 
hurricane relief communications between the continental United States 
and Puerto Rico, waived location accuracy obligations for 911 calls for 
certain service providers, and waived rules that allowed public safety 
use of interoperable channels in Puerto Rico. Other examples of FCC and 
industry interaction in the restoration of telecommunications services 
was the FCC's permission for deployment of the 600 band and the 
temporary use of some of our frequencies in the radio spectrum to 
support Google Looms technology. Also, after the event and for two 
years approximately, on a one week per month basis, the FCC had an 
expert in public safety spectrum issues available in Puerto Rico.
    For over a year, the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security 
Bureau issued additional public reports on the status of communications 
services, published public notices seeking comment on communications 
infrastructure resiliency, and hosted a workshop of government and 
consumer stakeholders to identify critical information needs and 
facilitate access to information in support of preparedness and 
response activities. Also, Ajit Pai, FCC Chairman, made two fact-
finding visits (November 2017 and March 2018) to Puerto Rico during the 
response and recovery phases. These visits included meeting with 
stakeholders (state government and public safety officials, industry 
representatives, and community members in Utuado, Puerto Rico).\45\
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    \45\ Gonzalez, J. (2017, December 19). La FCC abre proceso sobre 
efectividad de telecomunicaciones tras Maria (The FCC opens a process 
on telecommunications effectiveness after Maria). El Nuevo Dia; FCC. 
(2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications Report 
and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-344. P. 27. Also on 
March 2018 FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel visited Puerto Rico to 
assess damages to the communications sector and recovery efforts. More 
recently, in February 2020 FCC Commissioner Geofrey Starks visited 
Puerto Rico. See Minelli Perez, S. (March 8, 2018). La FCC fizcalizara 
el uso de los fondos para las telecomunicaciones (The FCC will monitor 
the use of funds for telecommunications). El Nuevo Dia.
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5.3.2. Adoption of policy tools
    As part of the administrative provisions, the FCC activated the 
DIRS system and provided public information regarding the state of 
communications services in Puerto Rico.\46\ By December 2017, along 
with the funding allocations to telecommunications carriers in Puerto 
Rico, the FCC announced a public consultation process seeking comments 
from stakeholders on the resiliency of the communications 
infrastructure during hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and Nate. The 
purpose was to obtain ``information to better understand how well such 
access was provided during these hurricanes in order to assess what 
lessons may be learned for the future.'' \47\ El Nuevo Dia, the 
newspaper of record in Puerto Rico, reported the FCC public notice and 
based on their journalistic investigation found that approximately 80 
percent of mobile antennas were operating 90 days after the event. This 
means between six and seven out of 10 antennas were still working with 
backup power generators due to the extended power outage across the 
island.\48\
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    \46\ Torres Lopez, S. E. (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry 
Neumann Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto 
Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708).
    \47\ FCC. (December 7, 2017). Public Safety and Homeland Security 
Bureau seeks comment on response efforts undertaken during 2017 
Hurricane Season. Public Notice.
    \48\ Gonzalez, J. (2017, December 19). La FCC abre proceso sobre 
efectividad de telecomunicaciones tras Maria. (The FCC opens a process 
on telecommunications effectiveness after Maria). El Nuevo Dia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the FCC's first economic measures during the restoration of 
telecommunications services was a first allocation of funds for 
telecommunications companies in Puerto Rico (Supplemental Emergency 
Support). Telecommunications companies had already expressed the need 
for financial assistance to restore telecommunications services. In 
regard to supplemental Federal emergency assistance to PTCs, on October 
4, 2017, the FCC authorized a first allocation of $77 million for 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands from the Universal Service Fund High 
Cost Program to PTCs. Later, on August 7, 2018, the FCC issued a Public 
Notice announcing the allocation of $64 million for Stage 1 for 
telecommunications service providers in Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands. By May of 2018, in response to the damage to 
telecommunications infrastructure in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, the FCC created the Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund (Bringing 
Puerto Rico Together Fund) and the Connect USVI Fund.\49\
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    \49\ FCC. (October 4, 2017). FCC Approves Advance of $77 M to 
Restore Connectivity in PR and USVI. FCC. WC Docket No. 10-90. Retrived 
from https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-approves-advance-77m-restore-
connectivity-pr-and-usvi; FCC. (2019, May 8). FCC Gives Additional 
Funding to Restore Networks in PR and USVI. FCC. Docket 18-143,10-90, 
14-58. Retrieved from https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-18-
57A1.pdf; FCC. (2020, February 5). Uniendo A Puerto Rico Fund and 
Connect USVI Fund Procedures PN.; FCC. Docket 18-143, 10-90, 15-58. 
Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/document/uniendo-puerto-rico-fund-
and-connect-usvi-fund-procedures-pn.
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    More recently, in 2019 the FCC approved $750 million in funding 
over ten years to strengthen communications networks in Puerto Rico, 
500 million for fixed broadband and $250 million over three years for 
mobile broadband.\50\ Since telecommunications companies are 
responsible for restoring service, maintaining and hardening 
infrastructure, the FCC's financial assistance goes to companies and 
that economic assistance indirectly benefits customer service. In this 
sense, according to one of the participants, ``as there is more money 
for companies to have infrastructure, I think that this is beneficial 
for all of us.'' \51\ The policy objectives of this Federal funding 
allocation are to improve, expand, and harden communications networks.
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    \50\ FCC. (September 26, 2019). FCC Invests $950 Million to Improve 
Broadband in Puerto Rico, USVI (Press Release); FCC. (February 5, 
2020). The Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund and Connect USVI Fund Notice and 
Filing Requirements and Other Procedures for Stage 2 Fixed Competitive 
Proposal Process. WC Docket Nos. 18-143, 10-90, 14-58; FCC WC Docket 
Nos. 18-143, 10-90, 14-58. Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/document/
uniendo-puerto-rico-fund-and-connect-usvi-fund-procedures-pn.
    \51\ Interview #12 with Telecommunications Regulatory Official. The 
TBPR supported the allocation of financial aid to companies through the 
Universal Service Fund.
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5.4. TBPR and the telecommunications industry interaction
    This section addresses the TBPR's emergency management Activities 
and adoption of policy tools.
5.4.1. Emergency management activities
    Prior to hurricanes Irma and Maria, on August 22, 2017, the major 
telecommunications providers in Puerto Rico signed a cooperation 
agreement with the TBPR.\52\ The purpose of the cooperation agreement 
was to ``to unite efforts between public and private entities in order 
to restore and protect the telecommunications and cable television 
infrastructure, and meet priorities arising from disasters or 
emergencies.'' \53\
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    \52\ The signatory companies were AT&T, Puerto Rico Telephone Co./
Claro, Open Mobile, Sprint, Telefonica Larga Distancia, T-Mobile Puerto 
Rico, WorldNet Telecommunications, Liberty Cablevision & PREPA 
Networks. Torres Lopez (February 4, 2019). Letter to Hon. Victor L. 
Pares Otero. President, Economic Development, Planning, 
Telecommunications, Public & Private Alliances and Energy Commission, 
Representatives of Representatives of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report 
for House of Representatives Resolution 64).
    \53\ The agreement was renewed in June 2019. See Serrano-Roman, 
(2019, June 19). Acuerdo permitira mejorar el restablecimiento de las 
telecomunicaciones despues de una emergencia (Agreement will improve 
the restoration of telecommunications after an emergency). El Nuevo 
Dia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After Hurricane Maria and for the following 60 days approximately, 
the TBPR organized daily meetings with representatives of 
telecommunications companies and established its own Telecommunications 
Operations Center (COT) in the facilities of the Government Command 
Center, with the purpose of dealing with incidents from the 
telecommunications industry and government agencies. There, in 
collaboration with DHS, FEMA, the FCC and other Federal entities, TBPR 
staff, and the Puerto Rico Innovation and Technology Service (PRITS), 
the telecommunications companies carried out support activities for the 
restoration of telecommunications services (e.g., PTCs Daily Status 
Reports).\54\ Other activities of the TBPR, in conjunction with CTIME, 
included the management of a telephone bank for first responders and 
people in transit at airport and ports.\55\
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    \54\ The Telecommunications Operations Center was opened on PRTRB 
(September 20, 2017). See PRTRB Administrative Order JRT 2017-004, 
PRTRB (October 10, 2017); PRTRB. Order JRT-2017-OA-0003, September 18, 
2017; Torres Lopez, S. E. (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry Neumann 
Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto Rico 
(Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708).
    \55\ For instance, AT&T supplied 103 telephones for First 
Responders. Also, the TBPR and CTIEM's agreement provided for an 
inventory of ``at least thirty (30) cell phones activated by company 
(subject to availability) to be used by representatives of the state 
and Federal government, according to priorities during an emergency, 
and after these have exhausted their resources.'' See Torres Lopez, S. 
E. (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry Neumann Zayas, President, 
Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for 
Senate Resolution 708).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to providing satellite telephones (22) to the 
Governor's Office and heads of designated agencies for use during 
emergency situations, during this period the activities of the TBPR 
included the use of an interactive map of the critical 
telecommunications infrastructure in Puerto Rico, identification and 
security for the distribution of fuels, support for several orders for 
telecommunications companies' exemptions from state and municipal 
permits making arrangements for and constructing their infrastructure, 
relief of taxes for equipment and materials destined for the recovery 
phase, and access to back yards and easements without civil or Criminal 
liability.\56\
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    \56\ See Torres Lopez, S. E. (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Henry 
Neumann Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto 
Rico(Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708); Interview #12 with 
Telecommunications Regulatory Official.
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    Several participants favorably described TBPR's emergency 
management activities during the response and recovery phases.\57\ In 
response to the need for information to restore emergency 
communications and wireless telecommunications services, one project 
developed by the TBPR was the adoption of Map Plus, an electronic 
platform that traced telecommunications service connectivity and 
outages according to geographical coverage areas. This initiative was 
mentioned by several participants as an important instrument in support 
of the restoration of emergency communications.\58\
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    \57\ Interview #5 with Senior Executive.
    \58\ The context for this resource is traced back to Hurricane 
Irma. After Hurricane Irma the TBPR asked the FCC's Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau for information about critical 
telecommunications infrastructure in Puerto Rico. Because the 
information reported by the companies to the DIRS system was 
confidential, the information request didn't materialize. It is 
noteworthy that in the order of October 10, 2017, that reported the 
problems in getting information from the PTC's, the state regulator 
also stated that it had not received information related to critical 
telecommunications infrastructure from the FCC.
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5.4.2. Adoption of policy tools
    With regard to TBPR's resolutions and orders during the first three 
weeks after Hurricane Maria, on October 10, 2017, the state regulator 
requested that PTCs provide detailed information on the recovery of 
essential telecommunications infrastructure. According to the TBPR, 
aside from the voluntary information provided by the PTCs during the 
response phase, the state regulator ``still continues to face problems 
with getting data from companies, despite the fact that they have a 
duty to report to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) once the 
Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) has been activated. This 
information is not shared with the states.'' \59\ The order's mandate, 
a prescriptive policy measure, required daily information reports from 
PTCs with fines for noncompliance, and a Restoration Plan from each 
company.\60\
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    \59\ PRTRB. Administrative Order JRT 2017-004, October 10, 2017. 
Translation by the authors.
    \60\ On the matter of compliance with the voluntary reporting to 
the DIRS system, later, in 2018, the FCC provided information on PTCs 
participation in DIRS in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria. It stated: 
``During Hurricane Maria, the major incumbent local exchange carrier 
and cable providers in Puerto Rico and the USVI did not provide 
detailed information in DIRS. In some cases, the lack of participation 
was due to service providers' loss of communications, which precluded 
access to the DIRS platform. In other cases, service providers may not 
have been aware of DIRS prior to the hurricanes.'' FCC. (2018). 2017 
Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on Communications Report and 
Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-344. P.28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to consumers, the TBPR issued a statement and order 
requiring PTCs to provide information related to the granting of 
credits to consumers, specifically to include a description of the type 
of credit and the time without service, the number of billing cycles 
with credits to consumers, how the credits were communicated to their 
clients, and how many clients had requested credit for service outages. 
It is worth mentioning that before the order, telephone service 
providers offered credits to consumers for 60 or 90 days of service. 
PTCs also voluntarily agreed to give credits to other 
telecommunications companies due to the inability to interconnect 
between them.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ See PRTRB. Resolution and Order JRT-2017-CCG-0002, PRTRB 
(November 11, 2017); Torres Lopez, S. E. (November 7, 2017). Letter to 
Hon. Miguel A. Laureano Correa. President, Innovation, 
Telecommunications, Urban and Infrastructure Commission, Senate of 
Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 457).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the response and recovery phases, other policy tools to 
further emergency communications objectives were TBPR's agreements with 
the Patriot Amateur Radio Emergency Club and the Federation of Radio 
Amateurs of Puerto Rico (Federacion de Radioaficionados de Puerto 
Rico).\62\ Also, in regard to public safety organizations, the TBPR 
collaborated with other emergency communications partners in the 
Central Recovery and Reconstruction Office's Report on Puerto Rico 
Critical Communications Preparedness for the 2018 Hurricane Season,\63\ 
and in 2019, with the Puerto Rico Emergency Management and Disaster 
Bureau's Joint Operational Catastrophic Incident Plan of Puerto Rico, 
the renewal of cooperation agreements between the TBPR and the Puerto 
Rican Alliance for Telecommunications, and policy briefs to several 
state hearings on the telecommunications industry's emergency 
plans.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Torres Lopez (2018, May 25). Letter to Hon. Victor L. Pares 
Otero. President, Economic Development, Planning, Telecommunications, 
Public & Private Alliances and Energy Commission, Representatives of 
Representatives of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for House of 
Representatives Resolution 64).
    \63\ The agencies that collaborated in the report were the TBPR, 
Puerto Rico Department of Public Safety, DHS, FEMA, FCC National 
Coordinating Center for Communications, Mobile Emergency Response 
Support Team, and the National Telecommunications and Information 
Systems. See (2018, May 25). Torres Lopez (2018, May 25). Letter to 
Hon. Henry Neumann Zayas, President, Public Safety Commission, Senate 
of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report for Senate Resolution 708).
    \64\ The Joint Operational Catastrophic Incident Plan of Puerto 
Rico was approved on August 18, 2019. However, in 2018, a year after 
Hurricane Maria, the Puerto Rican Alliance for Telecommunications, a 
professional organization representing telecommunications companies in 
Puerto Rico, expressed its disappointment because the GPR had not 
submitted its new emergency communications plan to the 
telecommunications industry. On the contrary, by then PTCs had complied 
with the legal and regulatory mandates to provide new emergency 
communications plans to the regulator while undertaking voluntary 
network hardening and emergency communications-related investments. See 
Suarez, D. (2018, September 12). Desconectadas empresas de 
comunicaciones de nuevo plan emergencia. Noticel; Minelli Perez, S. 
(2018, December 30). La reparacion en telecomunicaciones dio paso a 
sentar las bases para 5G (Telecommunications repair gave way to laying 
the groundwork for 5G). El Nuevo Dia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.5. Wireless industry self-regulatory practices during emergency 
        situations: the roaming service agreement
    Before and during the first days after Hurricane Maria's landfall, 
several PTCs reached confidential cooperation agreements for the 
transportation of generators, materials, and personnel, access to 
submarine cables, and preliminary agreements for roaming services 
between companies. Also, during the process of reestablishing 
telecommunications networks, other companies adopted written and verbal 
agreements of cooperation for interconnection services, exchange of 
materials and equipment, and acquisition and repair of equipment.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Interview with Senior Executives #7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other initiatives adopted by the telecommunications providers to 
mitigate the loss of telecommunications services were the deployment of 
Satellite Cells on Light Trucks (COLTs) and Cell on Wheels (COWs). Of 
these PTC cooperation initiatives, with regard to citizenry's and first 
responders' emergency communications access, several respondents 
considered the cooperation agreement between the wireless carriers as 
the most important. This agreement is based on the 2016 Wireless 
Resiliency Cooperative Framework, supported by the FCC on December 14, 
2016.\66\ The framework is a voluntary mechanism enacted by wireless 
carriers during emergency situations that provides continuity of 
wireless services (roaming) to subscribers of wireless services 
(citizens), first responders, and public safety systems. As noted by 
the GAO, the agreement was in response to ``FCC's 2013 notice of 
proposed rule-making on wireless network resiliency.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ The Competitive Carriers Association also endorsed the 
cooperative framework. FCC (2016a, 2016b). Wireless Resiliency 
Cooperative Framework.
    \67\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2017). FCC Should 
Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network 
Resiliency. DC: GAO. P. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2016 the signatory companies of the framework included AT&T 
Mobility, the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), 
General Communication Inc., Southern Linc, Sprint, T-Mobile, U.S. 
Cellular, and Verizon Wireless. The agreement sets five objectives, of 
which four are directly related to restoring mobile telephony services 
during emergency situations.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ The objectives related to our analysis are: 1) Provide 
reasonable roaming under disaster arrangements when technically 
feasible, 2) Foster mutual aid among wireless providers during 
emergencies, 3) Support municipal preparedness and restoration with 
local government public safety representatives and develop best 
practices and establishing a provider/PSAP contact database, 4) Improve 
public awareness and stakeholder communications on service and 
restoration status, through Commission posting of data on cell site 
outages on an aggregated, county-by-county basis in the relevant area 
through its Disaster Information Reporting System.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based on the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework of 2016 and 
the fact that no single company could restore mobile phone services, 
the agreement was adopted to establish a roaming phone service. The 
Puerto Rican Alliance for Telecommunications supported the agreement 
and the TBPR endorsed it. For instance, there were companies that could 
extend the roaming service to other competing companies, allowing the 
coverage area to be expanded. In this regard, a participant mentioned:
    There were pieces of Sprint and Open that could roam on Claro. But 
Claro, AT&T, and T-Mobile could roam based on their LTE and based on 
their GSM infrastructure under lane. And then we quickly found out that 
some of the handsets that Sprint had actually sold came from Europe 
which meant they had a GSM chip set. So, we quickly then started 
turning on those numbers as well to allow those guys to roam on our 
network . . . It actually cost a lot of problems because there was no 
continuous coverage all the way to any one place . . . So it wasn't the 
most perfect of networks but at least it allowed somebody to call 
somebody to say, ``I need help''.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Interview #7 with Senior Executives (3 participants).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A favorable outcome of the framework was that alongside the 
wireless carriers' efforts to provide a roaming service, other 
telecommunications companies endorsed and provided support for this 
initiative. Another group that benefited from this cooperative 
agreement was first responders, as they obtained another communication 
system to carry out safety, health, and other support activities.
    Approximately three weeks after Hurricane Maria, on October 10, 
2017, the FCC reported that the four major wireless companies had 
opened a roaming service that could benefit 54 percent of the 
population subscribed to wireless services.\70\ The roaming agreement 
concluded once wireless carriers reached between 50 and 60 percent of 
their service in order to avoid affecting the service of other 
companies.\71\ Later, on November 5, 2017, almost seven weeks after 
Hurricane Maria, the TBPR reported that service had reached 50 
percent.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ FCC. (October 10, 2017). Communications Status Report for 
Areas Impacted by Hurricane Maria October 10, 2017. Primera Hora, a 
local newspaper provided an earlier date, circa October 2, 2017, 
approximately two weeks after Hurricane Maria. The source indicates the 
agreement to provide a roaming service benefits nearly 2.5 million 
mobile subscribers. By then, only 12 percent-15 percent of the 
telecommunications infrastructure had been repaired. See Rivera Cruz, 
Y. (2017, October 2). Acuerdo entre Claro, T-Mobile y AT&T beneficia a 
2.5 millones de usuarios (Agreement between Claro, T-Mobile and AT&T 
benefits 2.5 million users). Primera Hora.
    \71\ Interview #12 with Telecommunications Regulatory Official.
    \72\ The report doesn't specify if the 50 percent refers to a 
specific service (e.g., wireline, wireless) or is an aggregated number. 
Torres Lopez, S. E. (May 25, 2018) Letter to Hon. Henry Neumann Zayas, 
President, Public Safety Commission, Senate of Puerto Rico (Explanatory 
Report for Senate Resolution 708). P.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The roaming service agreement adopted in 2017 by the principal 
wireless carriers (AT&T, Claro, Open Mobile, Sprint, and T-Mobile) was 
a positive factor in the restoration of emergency communications and 
telecommunications services during the response and recovery 
phases.\73\ The roaming agreement was considered by various 
participants a historic initiative and it had a direct impact on 
citizens and on first responders' ability to perform their work. 
Nonetheless, data show that initially half of the total wireless 
subscribers benefited from the roaming service, and that due to the 
prolonged restoration of wireless services and other telecommunications 
services in order to provide access to emergency communications 
services--a policy objective--was significantly limited to citizens. 
Hence, outages in emergency communications (i.e., 911 emergency 
service, wireless services) compromised the citizenry's use of safety 
and health services and social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp) for communication activities during the 
emergency.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ Other telecommunications companies endorsed the roaming 
service agreement, such as Verizon and Neptuno Networks.
    \74\ See Fitzpatrick et al., (2019). Connecting the dots. The 
telecommunications crisis in Puerto Rico. Free Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.5.1. GAO and FCC assessments of the wireless resiliency framework
    In December of 2017 the GAO published a report entitled FCC Should 
Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network 
Resiliency. The report covered the years 2009-2016 and its focuses were 
trends in mobile wireless outages attributed to physical incidents, 
Federal agencies' and industry's steps to improve wireless network 
resiliency, and a classification of stakeholders' proposed measures 
that could be adopted by Federal agencies. With respect to the Wireless 
Resiliency Cooperative Framework as it relates to our analysis of 
emergency communications in Puerto Rico, the main consideration to be 
taken from the GAO's report is the concern expressed by various 
stakeholders as to whether the framework represented a sufficient path 
forward, due to the following factors: 1) Lack of Federal agency 
enforcement or monitoring, 2) Adequate testing to enable roaming during 
and after disasters, and 3) High threshold to trigger the response 
elements to the detriment of local events.\75\ In light of the previous 
issues and to improve wireless network resiliency, the GAO submitted 
recommendations in three areas of action: preparedness, response, and 
awareness. Three executive actions were submitted to the FCC: 1) 
Develop specific and measurable objectives, 2) Plan to monitor the 
outputs and outcomes that serve to document and evaluate results, 3) 
Promote awareness in state and local public safety officials and 
industry stakeholders through outreach mechanisms.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2017). FCC Should 
Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network 
Resiliency. DC: GAO. P. 3-4, 27.
    \76\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2017). FCC Should 
Improve Monitoring of Industry Efforts to Strengthen Wireless Network 
Resiliency. DC: GAO. P. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Later, in 2018, the FCC published the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane 
Season Impact on Communications Report and Recommendations, which 
completed the documentation and assessment of the 2017 hurricane 
season. With respect to the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework, 
the FCC reported various stakeholders' favorable opinion of the 
Framework's outcomes. The report also adopted T-Mobile's broader view 
of the Framework, recommending to the FCC that it consider ``a similar 
approach to cover the entire communications ecosystem, including 
backhaul providers to provide faster and more complete service 
restoration.'' \77\ With respect to the Framework, the report made a 
series of voluntary recommendations that we have classified under two 
categories: emergency management initiatives and communication and 
outreach Activities. The emergency management initiatives aim to: 1) 
Widen the number of signatory companies and encourage backhaul 
providers to work cooperatively with wireless service providers, 2) 
Promote other voluntary industry commitments from Framework signatory 
companies to provide detailed information when the Framework is active 
and making it public on an aggregated and anonymous basis, and 3) PSHSB 
active engagement with emergency management partners (e.g., Critical 
Infrastructure and SLTT governments) during disaster situations to 
better address and position communications needs.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on 
Communications Report and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P. 29.
    \78\ FCC. (2018). 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Impact on 
Communications Report and Recommendations Public Safety Docket No. 17-
344. P. 28-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.6. Review of the Emergency Communications State Regulatory Reform
    During the response and restoration phases, the Senate of Puerto 
Rico approved three resolutions to carry out investigations of the 
telecommunications industry's response to Hurricane Maria and industry 
readiness in 2018.\79\ Moreover, Table 2 shows three state laws 
approved between January 2018 and mid-2019 that reformed the state 
emergency communications regulatory regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ Puerto Rico's Senate Resolution Num. 457, October 23, 2017; 
Puerto Rico Senate Resolution Num. 467, October 24, 2017; Puerto Rico 
Senate Resolution Num. 708, April 16, 2018; Puerto Rico Senate 
Resolution Num. 708, April 16, 2018. In response to Puerto Rico's House 
of Representatives Resolution Num. 64, from January 18, 2017, the TBPR 
also submitted a detailed report on the state of the telecommunications 
industry after Hurricane Maria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2018, Law No. 5-2018 declared it public policy to recognize 
``telecommunications as an essential service,'' placing it on equal 
footing with other essential services such as the production and 
distribution of electrical power and potable water. With regard to Law 
No. 5-2018, a telecommunications regulatory specialist stated: that 
came because the telecommunications service was not seen as a priority. 
. . . Now the Bureau can require other government agencies to 
contribute to maintaining the service because it helps the Government, 
first responders, and recovery efforts. It allows the Bureau to ask for 
certain things within its design plan to make the system more 
resilient. As the ministerial function of the Bureau is to ensure 
compliance with public policy at the telecommunications level, it can 
request it and at the same time Federal agencies are involved in the 
process.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ Interview with Telecommunications Regulatory Official #12. See 
Torres Lopez (December 7, 2017). Letter to Hon. Miguel A. Laureano 
Correa. President, Innovation, Telecommunications, Urban and 
Infrastructure Commission, Senate of Puerto Rico (Explanatory Report 
for Senate Project 711). The TBPR endorsed the state senate project 
that resulted in the approval of Law No. 5-2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second measure was Law No. 211, of August 12, 2018, known as 
the Execution Law of the Reorganization Plan of the Puerto Rico Public 
Service Regulatory Board (PRPSRB), which created a new regulatory 
agency. According to the statement of intentions, the ``Law is not 
intended to change the public policy of the Government of Puerto Rico 
on this subject. Its main intention is to bring the new organizational 
and administrative structure into conformity with the current legal 
order''.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ As an umbrella organization, the PRPSRB brings together the 
Telecommunications Bureau of Puerto Rico, the Energy Bureau of Puerto 
Rico, and the Transportation and Other Public Services Bureau of Puerto 
Rico.

                                 Table 2
   Laws approved for the Telecommunications State Regulator, 2018-2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Law                                Purpose
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law No. 5, January 20, 2018  To amend subsection (a) of Article 2 of
                              Chapter I of Act 213-1996, known as the
                              Puerto Rico Telecommunications Act.
Law No. 211, August 12,      Law of Execution of the Reorganization Plan
 2018                         of the Public Service Regulatory Board of
                              Puerto Rico
Law No. 22, May 15, 2019     To add new Article 8 A to Chapter III of
                              Act 213-1996, as amended, known as the
                              ``Puerto Rico Telecommunications Act
                              1996'', in order to require providers of
                              telecommunications services to have a
                              contingency and continuity plan for
                              services in the face of a duly declared
                              emergency or disaster, and for other
                              related purposes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Law No. 22, of May 15, 2019, directed its attention to emergency 
communications. The legislators' objective was to strengthen state 
regulation in the field of emergency communications through a series of 
policy measures aimed at two subjects: the TBPR and PTCs. Law No. 22-
2019 mandates to the state regulator new policy objectives such as:

  1)  Establishing TBPR's functions during an emergency situation aimed 
        at to restoring communications infrastructure and networks.

  2)  Leading efforts to coordinate, establish, and maintain federal, 
        state, and local communications during emergency situations.

  3)  Creating and managing a pool of amateur radio operators to 
        support public safety activities during emergency situations.

  4)  Supporting the 911 Emergency System Bureau under the Department 
        of Public Safety.

  5)  Giving the TBPR the authority to carry out inspections, 
        investigations, and audits, if necessary, to achieve the 
        purposes of this Law.

    Law No. 22-2019, while reaffirming the jurisdiction of the state 
regulator, conditioned PTC's licensing to the state regulator 
examination and approval of their contingency and continuity plans for 
a duly declared emergency or disaster. Article III--8 A of the new law 
provided that ``through this plan, the Company will, to the extent 
possible, establish the necessary mechanisms for maintaining the 
continuity of the services and operations that they offer to the 
public.''
    Law No. 22-2019 charged the state regulator with the responsibility 
for the approval of the contingency plans and ordered that they be in 
accordance with the Government of Puerto Rico's State Emergency 
Management Plan. However, Law No. 22-2019 establishes an administrative 
procedure consistent with Law No. 5-2018, that sets a shared 
responsibility between the Department of Public Safety and the TBPR. In 
this sense, and in order to comply with Law 5-2018, the Department of 
Public Safety was ordered to coordinate the integration of the TBPR and 
certified telecommunications providers in the development, management, 
and implementation of the State Plan for Emergency Management. 
Furthermore, Law No. 22-2019 established in situ inspection of 
infrastructure sites by the state regulator as part of the 
certifications process and gave the regulator the ability to take 
administrative measures, ``including notifications of non-compliance 
and, if necessary, the imposition of fines up to a maximum of five 
thousand dollars, to ensure faithful compliance with what is 
established herein.'' \82\ Prior to 2019, mandatory state regulatory 
field inspections related to emergency communications were not 
required. In sum, Law No. 22-2019 reflects the state government's 
intervention in the telecommunications industry through a prescriptive 
regulatory approach, that establishes new legal mandates through the 
PTCs' licensing process--a structural intervention tool--and specific 
emergency communications policy objectives to the state 
telecommunications regulator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Puerto Rico. Law No. 22, of May 15, 2019. P.2. Translation by 
the authors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The laws discussed above were approved for the telecommunications 
state regulator and aimed at strengthening the TBPR's powers, setting 
new policy objectives, and defining intergovernmental procedures for 
the TBPR. These laws amended the Puerto Rico Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (Law No. 213-1996), and during the legislative process received 
TBPR support. In particular, Law No. 22-2019 showed that at a state 
level the policymaking process had resulted in a political and legal 
reform aimed at strengthening emergency communications policies. Based 
on these developments, we can conclude that state legislators and the 
state regulator took a vigorous stand, as opposed to simply adopting 
other regulatory tools (e.g., incentives) in the emergency 
communications field.
6. Conclusions
    This study examined emergency communications policies in Puerto 
Rico during the response and recovery phases after Hurricane Maria in 
September of 2017 using a qualitative analysis of PTCs' responses and a 
policy analysis of the emergency communications regulatory framework, 
the conduct of Federal and state regulatory institutions, PTCs' 
adoption of the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework, and the 
intervention measures taken by the state legislature between 2017 and 
2019.
    Due to the limited number of participants in the survey, the 
research questions presented in the paper can only partially be 
answered and cannot be generalized to all other PCTs. A general 
conclusion drawn for the results is that the majority of participants 
had no particular opinion on strengthening emergency communications 
polices at the Federal level (RQ1). Similarly, the results show that 
the majority of opinions considered emergency communications policies 
at the state level not adequate, yet that only half the participants 
favored strengthening state regulation (RQ2).
    In regard to the role of external and structural factors (RQ3), the 
results suggest that such factors such as lack of fuel and backup power 
systems, inadequate debris cleaning practices, and reliance on the 
deployment of aerial fiber optics were highly consequential and 
affected the execution of existing emergency communications policies.
    At a more nuanced level of analysis, the policy analysis of 
emergency communications policies in Puerto Rico examined the 
interaction of the FCC, the TBPR, and PTCs based on the emergency 
management activities carried out and the policy tools adopted. Their 
activities were contextualized according to emergency communications 
policy objectives, the historical trends mentioned above, and the 
specific factors related to Hurricane Maria's catastrophic impact noted 
by the research's participants, regulatory institutions, and 
governmental and academic literature.
    This study was grounded in two principles of telecommunications 
policymaking proposed by Picard and Pickard (2017). The first principle 
suggests that policies should allow the public to communicate with 
authorities and among themselves. The 911 emergency service was an 
active designated emergency service number before the hurricane, but 
for several months after Hurricane Maria, access and adoption of the 
911 emergency service was largely limited to citizens and first 
responders due to the technical damage and an extended power outage. 
Aside from the adoption of the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative 
Framework, the results demonstrate that in Puerto Rico, in the 
immediate aftermath of Hurricane Maria, both Federal and state 
emergency communications policies already in place were initially 
ineffective, largely due to the external factors discussed above and to 
limited short-term policy requirements regarding power outages.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ See FCC Commisioner Geoffrey Starks' comments on PTCs outcomes 
during Hurricaine Maria recovery phase. Pacheco Santa, G. (2020, 
February 22). La FCC admite que su respuesta tras el paso de Maria 
debio ser mas eficiente (The FCC admits that its response after Maria's 
passage should have been more efficient). El Nuevo Dia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In comparison, state legislation was more vigorous than the Federal 
efforts by mostly intervening in the telecommunications sector, through 
a prescriptive regulatory policy approach. Additionally, restoring the 
power grid had an impact on the restoration of telecommunications 
systems, revealing the lack of coordination between the Puerto Rico 
Electrical Power Authority, the TBPR, and PTCs during the recovery 
phase. During 2017 and 2019, several policy agreements between PTCs and 
government agencies were put in place to address the structural and 
implementation failures. Hence, policymaking and policy tools 
application in regard to emergency communications were largely 
reactive.
    The second principle suggests that policies should allow 
authorities to communicate directly to the public and should be aimed 
at enhancing communication among authorities themselves. The results 
show that communication from authorities to the public was hampered by 
the same factors described above under the first principle. In regard 
to communication between authorities, the results show that at the time 
of the event, access to early warning systems such as EAS, WEA/CMAS, 
and IPAWS were available.\84\ After the event these services were 
limited due to technical damage and an extended power outage. The 
information examined suggests that access and adoption of enhanced 
technology to support first responders' activities was limited. Data 
from the in-depth interviews indicated funding difficulties to meet 
Federal technological standards. After the event, broadcasting services 
(e.g., terrestrial and satellite), wireless services (e.g., Wireless 
Resiliency Cooperative Framework), FCC's DIRS system, and TBPR's Map 
Plus System provided a multiple-technologies approach to avoid single 
technology disruption during emergency situation. Further research is 
needed in order to address public safety organizations communications 
networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Interview with Telecommunications Regulatory Official #12, 
Interview with Telecommunications Regulatory Official #15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Drawing from Cherry (2006), after Hurricane Maria the reform of the 
emergency communications regime shows two distinctive policymaking 
processes at the Federal and state levels. The FCC has addressed the 
financial viability for carriers' network reconstruction and hardening, 
through supplemental and long-term funding allocations. Meanwhile the 
political feasibility of emergency communications polices was the state 
legislator's task, as its intervention resulted in new rules and 
workflows for PTCs and the TBPR. This study also aimed at improving 
emergency communications policymaking processes and their outcomes by 
providing practical recommendations based on the findings reported in 
the results section. One of the study's findings is that after 
Hurricane Maria, telecommunications companies made investments in 
technology and have reevaluated their emergency plans.\86\ Based on the 
participants' responses, nine applicable recommendations were 
identified:

  1.  Establish government-approved procedures for the distribution of 
        fuel to telecommunications companies during emergency 
        situations.

  2.  Strengthen public safety communication systems.

  3.  Create a tax incentive program for the broadband market in order 
        to encourage competition and to acquire resilient technologies.

  4.  Establish a subsidy program to improve infrastructure such as 
        underground fiber optics and to acquire resilient technologies.

  5.  Strengthen the exchange of information between Federal and state 
        agencies during emergency communications.

  6.  Evaluate underwater infrastructure vulnerabilities due to the 
        island's geographical position and increase and decentralize 
        the number of cable mooring points.

  7.  Revisit the proposal to use the underground infrastructure of the 
        Department of Transportation and Public Works in the 
        metropolitan area (San Juan).

  8.  Designate Hot Zones across the island so that telecommunications 
        service providers are required to offer free access to Wi-Fi.

  9.  Re-evaluate the use of satellite technology in regard to 
        satellite bandwidth to support emergency communications.

    These recommendations include a mix of policy tools that are aimed 
at strengthening Federal or state emergency communications policies, 
and some of them are already at a development stage.
    The implications and recommendations of this study, although 
particular to Puerto Rico, may further research in emergency 
communications in contexts of extreme infrastructure collapse. 
Furthermore, other media and telecommunications policy research topics 
are derived when emergency communications policies are considered as a 
legal framework that asserts citizens' right to communicate with their 
community and public safety organizations during emergency situations.
Declaration of competing interest
    No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. This 
research was funded by the National Science Foundation (Grant number 
#1824976); Division of Civil, Mechanical and Manufacturing Innovation.

                               APPENDIX 1
                            Interviewee List
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Telecommunications Company                 Position             Code
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Telecommunications Company #1       Senior Executive                   1
Telecommunications Company #2       Senior Executive                   2
Telecommunications Company #3       Senior Executive                   3
Telecommunications Company #4       Senior Executive                   4
Telecommunications Company #5       Senior Executive                   5
Telecommunications Company #6       Senior Executive                   6
Telecommunications Company #7       Senior Executives (3               7
                                     participants)
Telecommunications Company #8       Senior Executive                   8
Telecommunications Company #9       Senior Executives (2               9
                                     participants)
Telecommunications Company #10      Senior Executive                  10
Telecommunications Expert                                             11
Telecommunications Regulatory                                         12
 Official
Telecommunications Regulatory                                         13
 Official
Telecommunications Expert                                             14
Telecommunications Regulatory                                         15
 Official
------------------------------------------------------------------------

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                                 ______
                                 

   EXPLAINER Internet Access (/articles/8), Communications Justice (/
                              articles/33)

      GAO Confirms Inadequate FCC Disaster Response in Puerto Rico

             June 8, 2021--Carmen Scurato, Leo Fitzpatrick

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    The Government Accountability Office (GAO), the government's in-
house watchdog, recently released a report ( https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-21-297.pdf) that examines the Trump FCC's protracted 
attempts to restore communications in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria 
struck in September of 2017. This report was years in the making and is 
part of a long struggle to learn the whole truth of the government's 
response to this disaster.
    The report found that the FCC's role was not clearly defined and 
that the agency wasn't transparent about its efforts. On this last 
point, the GAO noted that the FCC did not sufficiently engage with the 
Puerto Ricans on the islands who were most impacted by the devastation. 
Unfortunately, the report does not offer any specifics about how the 
FCC's murky role and lack of engagement harmed affected communities.
    There are still many questions left to be answered. The Trump FCC 
ignored our constant (https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/
2018-09/Call_for_Indepen
dent_Commission_on_Puerto_Rico.pdf) and repeated (https://
www.freepress.net/news/press-releases/free-press-report-and-foia-
documents-expose-trump-fccs-neglect-toward-puerto) requests (https://
www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2020-05/
free_press_comments_puerto_rico_fcc.pdf) to thoroughly investigate the 
near-collapse of Puerto Rico's communications infrastructure and the 
delayed recovery efforts that left people on the islands without the 
ability to communicate for months. With hurricane season underway, we 
urge the Biden FCC to undertake this long-overdue task.
What led to the GAO report
    Hurricane Maria obliterated the communications infrastructure on 
the islands of Puerto Rico in 2017: 95 percent of cell sites were out 
of service, TV and radio stations went dark, and, for those fortunate 
few who had phone service, calls to 911 went unanswered.
    Free Press, along with our allies, immediately urged (https://
www.nhmc.org/release-fcc-must-aid-puerto-rico-virgin-islands-proactive-
steps-restore-communications-says-national-hispanic-media-coalition-
four-public-interest-groups/) the FCC to use its expert knowledge to 
closely monitor and help accelerate recovery and restoration efforts. 
Over a year after the hurricane devastated the islands, it was clear 
that an investigation into the agency's role was necessary (https://
www.freepress.net/our-response/expert-analysis/explainers/building-
future-communications-puerto-rico) to truly understand why Puerto 
Ricans were still struggling to get reliable access to communications.
And yet we met resistance to our questions when we called on the Trump 
        FCC to be more transparent and engage with the affected 
        populations.
    In an attempt to get some answers on our own, Free Press filed a 
Freedom of Information Act request (https://www.freepress.net/sites/
default/files/2019-05/free_press_foia_request_11_09_18.pdf) asking the 
FCC for several types of documents--including documents related to its 
secretive Hurricane Recovery Task Force. We received wired and wireless 
consumer complaints (https://www.freepress.net/policy-library/fcc-foia-
response-puerto-rico) in response to the FOIA, which offered a small 
window into a much larger problem where carriers promoted refunds and 
relief for the extensive loss in services, but failed to deliver on 
those promises.
    One complainant in Bayamon, Puerto Rico, wrote that communications 
remained unreliable nearly two months after Maria made landfall:

    ``I live in Puerto Rico and system was down for 2 months (September 
and October) due to hurricane Maria. Cellphone service is still not 
working at 100 percent capacity. No signal available in some areas. 
[The carriers] said they were going to credit two months of service 
towards the bill and when I called today they said no credit due to 
data usage which makes no sense since we were using the Internet from 
the landline and had to go to the freeway to get a little service. 
Communication right now in PR is essential to keep us safe. I want what 
they promised: no payment for September and October since we did not 
have service.''

    Our report Connecting the Dots: The Telecommunications Crisis in 
Puerto Rico (https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2019-05/
connecting_the_dots
_the_telecom_crisis_in_puerto_rico_free_press.pdf) showed how much was 
unknown about the destruction of communications networks following 
Hurricanes Irma and Maria. Our report documented how the communications 
blackout contributed to the unfolding tragedy and loss of life and 
illustrated how the Trump FCC acted in secrecy and treated Puerto Rico 
differently than parts of the mainland that had experienced disasters. 
Our report also raised questions to try to bring light to why this 
failure in communications occurred and understand the FCC's role in 
restoring communications services.
    In response to our report, House Energy and Commerce Committee 
Chairman Frank Pallone Jr. wrote a letter (https://
energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/
files/documents/GAO.2019.10.3.%20
Letter%20re%20Puerto%20Rico%20and%20US%20VI.CAT_.pdf) on Oct. 3, 2019 
to the GAO and requested an investigation into the FCC's role after 
Hurricane Maria. The letter listed a series of questions for the GAO to 
investigate, including:

   Has the FCC adequately responded to the communications 
        problems in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands following 
        Hurricane Maria?

   To the extent the FCC took action, were the actions timely 
        or could the FCC have acted more quickly?

   Did the FCC's response differ from the agency's response to 
        hurricanes that hit the U.S. mainland?

    Now in May 2021--nearly four years after the storm--we've made 
progress with the release of the GAO report. But we still don't have 
all the answers.
What the GAO found
    The GAO report affirmed much of what we already knew: The ability 
to communicate is a life-and-death issue. The report rightly notes that 
``[t]he loss of telecommunications in an emergency has cascading 
detrimental effects on other critical infrastructures due to 
interdependencies among sectors, including the transportation, medical, 
and financial sectors.''
    And resilient communications networks are key to recovery and 
rebuilding efforts.
    People need to ensure loved ones are safe and can call emergency 
services, receive emergency alerts and find out where to access 
emergency food and water supplies. Puerto Ricans felt abandoned after 
the storm, with little-to-no clarity of when life would return to 
normal. That's why we urged the FCC to conduct field hearings (https://
www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2018-04/joint_comments_nhmc
_freepress_2017_hurricane_season.pdf) and directly reach out and engage 
with Puerto Ricans on the islands to better inform agency regulations 
and policies to accelerate recovery efforts at the time.
The first recommendation: The FCC's emergency role must be clearly 
        defined
    The GAO report notes that the ``lack of clarity could have 
contributed to confusion and delays in the hurricane's aftermath.'' 
However, we already knew that this delay was no mere possibility. 
FEMA's report of its own response to Hurricane Maria, released in July 
2018, describes how ``FEMA and supporting Federal agencies struggled to 
gain situational awareness and assess the status of critical 
infrastructure, in part due to communications outages[.]''
    At a critical time, the government struggled to gather and 
disseminate important information about what infrastructure and 
services were available and where to deploy its limited resources--and 
this struggle surely contributed to delays. The GAO report recommends 
that the Department of Homeland Security (which includes FEMA) define 
specific actions for the FCC in its emergency guidance on how to 
restore communications infrastructure.
The second recommendation: The FCC must be more transparent in its 
        efforts to help restore communications
    While the FCC established an internal cross-bureau Hurricane 
Recovery Task Force soon after Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico, 
it was not clear what the task force was doing. Even after we submitted 
our FOIA request over a year after Hurricane Maria, the FCC was 
unwilling to share any information regarding the task force's actions 
or recommendations.
    It should come as no surprise that the GAO report ``found that FCC 
obtained limited public input and that the Hurricane Recovery Task 
Force's efforts lacked transparency because FCC had not publicly 
communicated the task force's actions or findings.''
    While the report confirmed much of what we already knew, what's 
important now is what comes next.
Where do we go from here? An FCC investigation & a new playbook
    The GAO report lays the groundwork for the Biden FCC to step into 
its role as the expert agency in communications and take the lead in 
restoring communications after a disaster. The FCC should create 
regulations to ensure our communications infrastructure is more 
resilient--which is an urgent need in light of the climate crisis.
    The agency should also commit to greater transparency with the 
public to help people know what it's doing after a disaster strikes. 
That means incorporating feedback that addresses the needs of the 
public--not corporations. Here, the FCC must start with the largely 
unexamined disaster in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria.
    We urge the Biden FCC and Acting Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel to 
preserve documents related to its response to Hurricane Maria and 
expeditiously release relevant documents publicly, as the GAO 
recommends. These two acts can set in motion an investigation and a 
full accounting of what happened in Puerto Rico after the storm.
    We also agree with Acting Chairwoman Rosenworcel that the FCC needs 
a ``new playbook (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-
359891A5.pdf)'' when it comes to disaster preparedness and recovery--
and a playbook that accounts for the impact of the climate crisis. The 
Biden FCC should propose new rules to ensure the resiliency of our 
networks--and to prevent a total collapse of communications from ever 
happening again.
                                 ______
                                 
                                          Lynk Global, Inc.
                                    Falls Church, VA, June 21, 2021

Senator Ben Ray Lujan,
Chair, Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
Washington, DC.

Senator John Thune,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chair Lujan and Ranking Member Thune:

    Thank you for joint efforts to examine potential Federal government 
actions to support the deployment of resilient, redundant, and secure 
broadband and telecommunications infrastructure. Reviewing lessons from 
past outage incidents as well as current proposals to improve network 
resiliency and reliability is an important step in enhancing 
connectivity for consumers and first responders throughout the United 
States and the world.
    Lynk Global, Inc. (Lynk) fully supports your work and appreciates 
the Subcommittee's focus on this critical issue.
    Lynk was founded on the belief that by keeping consumers connected 
wherever they are, at all times, the phones in their pockets can save 
their lives. To accomplish this goal, Lynk is building a constellation 
of small satellites which will essentially function as cell towers in 
space. When fully built, Lynk's constellation will automatically fill 
in unconnected areas on Earth for mobile phone users everywhere. The 
Lynk constellation fills in unserved areas where there is simply no--or 
very limited--infrastructure, such as at our national and state parks. 
Notably, the Lynk system can also be utilized in areas where 
infrastructure exists but is unavailable due to natural disasters, 
power failures, or intentional shutdowns to prevent fires. In those 
situations, Lynk will provide an automatic, instantaneous backup system 
from space--resilient against threats and damage to infrastructure on 
the ground.
    As Acting FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel stated during her 
testimony to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications & Technology 
during a hearing in the last Congress: ``When utilities in California 
turned off power to mitigate wildfires last year it exposed a glaring 
weakness in our preparation for disaster. In some areas more than half 
the cell sites were rendered inoperable.'' Such circumstances surely 
call for new, different, and better approaches to keeping consumers and 
first responders connected to critical communications services, like 
911 and Wireless Emergency Alerts.
    Lynk is currently demonstrating its capabilities through its 
ongoing test program. To date we have launched four demonstration 
missions, with our fifth planned for June 25, 2021. Last year, Lynk 
achieved an historic ``first''--sending the world's first ever text 
message from an orbiting satellite to a standard mobile phone on Earth. 
For that demonstration, we sent a Wireless Emergency Alert from one of 
our American-built satellites in space directly to phones on the 
ground. That capability alone could save lives, notifying affected 
residents of evacuations or other emergencies, even when terrestrial 
towers are down or not working.
    As you evaluate potential Federal actions or requirements, Lynk 
respectfully submits that it is critical that solutions do not create 
unintended consequences. Specifically, some proposals to ensure 
resiliency may create additional threats or challenges. Requiring 
mobile phone towers to have on-site backup power, for example, may 
require large tanks of fuel or numerous batteries in a fire zone. 
Obviously, this creates a host of additional risks, not to mention 
inconsistencies with state or Federal environmental laws.
    In contrast, satellite systems like that proposed by Lynk can 
provide a resilient communications option without requiring additional, 
potentially hazardous ground equipment. Moreover, Lynk's approach 
eliminates the need for specialized handsets or equipment--the 
satellites connect directly to the phones already in the pocket of 
hundreds of millions of Americans.
    We therefore urge consideration of satellite systems like that 
proposed by Lynk as part of America's resiliency and reliability 
solutions.
    Again, thank you for your leadership on this critical matter.
                                               Tony DeTora,
                                            VP, Government Affairs.
                                 ______
                                 
                           Competitive Carriers Association
                                      Washington, DC, June 22, 2021

Hon. Ben Ray Lujan,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.

Hon. John Thune,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Communications, Media, and Broadband,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Lujan and Ranking Member Thune:

    Competitive Carriers Association \1\ (``CCA'') commends the 
Subcommittee for holding today's hearing on ``Building Resilient 
Networks'' and respectfully requests that this letter be included in 
the hearing record. CCA and our members are deeply committed to 
ensuring the resiliency and security of the Nation's communications 
infrastructure, and CCA members work to harden networks to increase 
resiliency and take decisive steps before, during, and after 
emergencies and disasters to maintain and restore connectivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ CCA is the Nation's leading trade association for competitive 
wireless providers and stakeholders across the United States, and our 
members range from small, rural carriers serving fewer than 5,000 
customers to regional and nationwide providers serving millions of 
customers, as well as vendors and suppliers that provide products and 
services throughout the wireless communications ecosystem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CCA has endorsed the voluntary Wireless Network Resiliency 
Cooperative Framework, and CCA members have individually committed to 
many of its principles, with proven results including sharing 
information and resources among carriers and with authorities in 
response to natural disasters, expanding roaming access for consumers 
on compatible networks to maintain connectivity, and positioning mobile 
assets, including generators and fuel, in advance of anticipated 
events. This approach has allowed each carrier to prioritize the needs 
of their consumers based on unique network and resource needs to serve 
distinctive topography and challenges related to a particular disaster. 
Just as all disasters are different, there is no one-size-fits-all 
framework for responding to recovery efforts, and policymakers should 
support continued flexibility to allow each carrier to appropriately 
take steps to maintain connectivity or restore services as 
expeditiously as possible. Further, CCA participates in the Cross-
Sector Resiliency Forum with telecommunications and power companies to 
improve communications before, during, and after emergencies.
    Any consideration of generational investment in our Nation's 
infrastructure, including broadband and digital infrastructure, 
provides a rare opportunity to significantly increase the resiliency of 
our communications networks and ensure that consumers and wireless 
networks are adequately prepared to respond to emergencies and 
disasters. But to take advantage of this opportunity, investing in our 
digital infrastructure must include a focus on wireless services in 
addition to fiber connections.
    Wireless network resiliency is a critical priority because 
consumers turn to mobile devices and wireless networks for information 
and to communicate during natural disasters and catastrophic events, 
especially if they are not in a fixed location during the event or are 
forced to evacuate. These technologies deliver wireless emergency 
alerts and other notifications and connect consumers with emergency 
services, recovery assistance, and their loved ones during challenging 
times. Wireless assets, such as Cells on Wheels, Cells on Light Trucks, 
and other deployables, can be swiftly positioned to enhance coverage or 
capacity or provide connectivity while impacted base stations or 
wireline networks are restored. Even in instances where an individual 
remains in a fixed location, wireless networks provide an important 
layer of redundancy for voice and data communications should wired 
networks go down.
    Because of the critical role wireless services take on during 
emergency situations, it is crucial that support for the latest 
wireless networks, including 5G services, is included in any broadband 
infrastructure legislation. Not only will policies that advance 
wireless deployment increase mobile services and drive economic growth, 
but they are also vital to ensuring that resilient communications 
services are available when and where Americans depend on them most.
    CCA strongly agrees with the bipartisan goal to close the digital 
divide and connecting all Americans with broadband that meets future 
demands for communications services. With the focus today on 
resiliency, we are again reminded that to truly provide ubiquitous 
connectivity, policy efforts must support both wired and wireless 
networks. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or if 
CCA can be helpful to your efforts in any way.
            Sincerely,
                                           Steven K. Berry,
                                                   President & CEO,
                                      Competitive Carriers Association.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to 
                           Jeffrey D. Johnson
    Technical Assistance. I am glad we are having this timely 
conversation on how to increase network availability and resiliency. As 
you've noted, different communities in Georgia, and across America, 
face different challenges when it comes to deploying, operating, and 
securing broadband networks.

    Question. In light of these diverse requirements, what steps can 
Congress take to ensure that Federal agencies involved in our 
communications networks, including the FCC, USDA, and NTIA, meet the 
needs of all our communities?

   Do you feel they are providing adequate technical assistance 
        in order to comply with regulations and/or access available 
        programs and funding?

   If not, what are your recommendations for improvement?

    Answer. Federal Agencies could best help by streamlining Broadband 
Construction and related permitting on Federal lands especially for 
FirstNet, our National Public Safety Broadband Network built with and 
for public safety. The FirstNet Authority is a Federal agency which 
governs the public-private partnership so other Federal agencies could 
easily assist in this mission. This could best be accomplished by 
setting a ``shot clock'' on Federal permitting processes, avoiding 
needless delays. Furthermore, establishment of a FirstNet liaison 
within the Departments of Agriculture and Interior would aid in 
streamlining processes.
    Regarding NTIA, this administration will need the full support of 
the Department of Commerce and other agencies to quickly, and with 
accountability, distribute the current Broadband Stimulus Funding. The 
allocation of stimulus funding for wireless Public Safety Broadband 
needs, cannot just be for fiber/wireline but also tower infrastructure, 
and should incentivize public private partnerships on infrastructure to 
further leverage the Federal funding.
    Technical Assistance is often difficult for practitioners to access 
due to confusion over what assistance exists and for whom. There are 
concerns in the public safety community that DHS and S&T often cause 
confusion and/or redundancy for public safety and their programs often 
serve technical needs from the last technical generation rather than 
the current generation. An example is the recent emphasis by DHS on the 
wireless priority program, which in its prime was horribly 
underutilized and clumsy, as opposed to FirstNet which has priority for 
public safety embedded in the technology and requires no further action 
by responders.
    With respect to Next Generation 911 (NG911) funding, this funding 
needs a nationwide refresh to become current with technology. In the 
same action, diversion of 911 funds should be stopped and the future 
funding tied to 3 key factors:

  1.  Require non-proprietary technology to avoid excessive costs for 
        the local 911 center.

  2.  Future NG911 funds should incentivize but not require PSAP 
        consolidation.

  3.  Our ability to afford security and technology upgrades will be 
        enhanced if there are

    Ideally, both the Senate and the House of Representatives would 
embrace FCC Chairwoman Rosenworcel's approach for NG911 refresh as part 
of the FCC's spectrum auction authority.
    Chairwoman Rosenworcel has steadfastly engaged and supported the 
public safety community and has a great sense of what will address our 
communication issues. We applaud her efforts.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ben Ray Lujan to 
                           Jonathan Adelstein
Cellular Wireless and Fiber Wireline
    During questioning, in response to my question whether or not 
wireless can perform and scale at the same level as fiber, you stated 
that it is already doing so. Furthermore, in response to my question on 
whether wireless can replace wireline broadband infrastructure, you 
stated:

        ``Not only can, it is. One in five Americans are using their 
        smartphone as their only broadband connection.''

    Many Americans in rural communities that experience dead-zones and 
service interruptions on their smartphones may express skepticism that 
a smartphone can effectively serve as their primary broadband 
connection. Especially in states like New Mexico, it's critical that we 
support solutions that suit challenging geography. We need solutions 
that keep Americans connected to their work, healthcare, and emergency 
services without interruption. To restate my question,

    Question 1. Is cellular wireless comparative to fiber connectivity 
for a connection to a household? In the scope of the question, is 
cellular wireless a complete and competitive substitute to fiber in 
terms of upload and download speeds, resiliency against outages from 
weather and disasters, line of site, and other topographic challenges?
    Answer. For many consumers, wireless is the only viable primary 
broadband connection. For some, it is the only connection they have. 
Fifteen percent of all U.S. adults nationwide now rely solely on their 
smartphone for Internet connectivity. In rural communities, nearly 20 
percent of users rely on smartphones only and more than 25 percent of 
low-income users are smartphone only.\1\ In addition, all three 
nationwide wireless carriers currently offer mobile home Internet at 
broadband speeds, with many smaller carriers offering home broadband, 
as well. The quality and speed of these programs will only increase as 
5G is rolled out.
    Wireless broadband's high download speeds and mobility are why 
consumers increasingly view it as a substitute for wireline 
connections. Wireless networks are responsive and optimized based on 
consumer use patterns. Wireless networks are engineered to favor 
downloads to meet their customers' demand. While upload speeds are not 
as high as for fiber, data shows that consumers use over ten times the 
downstream bandwidth compared to upstream. The gap between downstream 
and upstream traffic has consistently grown over the last ten years. 
Recently, the ratio of downstream consumption to upstream is fourteen 
to one. Current consumer trends demonstrate significant increases in 
downstream consumption while upstream increases at a fraction of the 
rate. Even if upload speed demand doubles, it will remain far below 
download speed demand.
    Network resiliency is also a key focus for wireless providers. This 
is also a high priority issue for WIA and we appreciate you bringing 
attention to it. In 2017, during Hurricane Harvey, only 5 percent of 
wireless facilities in the affected areas of Texas and Louisiana were 
taken offline by flooding. After Hurricane Katrina, cellular service 
was fully operational within six months, while over 100,000 
telecommunications lines were still offline. After a disaster, wireless 
providers can minimize network disruptions through traffic management 
and reestablish service quickly, as restoring one tower can provide 
service to an entire area. Additionally, wireless providers have made 
significant investments in deployable assets, allowing for supplemental 
service while repairs are being made.
    Wireless can be easier to maintain, meaning greater connection 
reliability.\1\ Wireless technology is less subject to external 
disruption than other technologies. If one wireless facility goes 
offline, traffic can quickly be rerouted throughout the network to 
minimize disruptions. Furthermore, wireless Internet uses point-to-
point connections, which makes identifying technical issues much 
quicker and simpler.\2\ As noted in your question, there are some 
physical limitations that must be accounted for when planning a 
wireless network, such as line of sight. However, fiber must also 
consider geographic limitations in planning to avoid areas that are 
difficult to deploy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Riviera Networks, Line of Sight Internet: What is it, and What 
are the Benefits, https://www.riviera-networks.co.uk/blog/internet/
what-is-line-of-sight-internet/.
    \2\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ultimately, it is not an apples-to-apples comparison. Certain 
technologies will be better suited for certain deployments. I do not 
claim that one technology is better than another, rather we should let 
all technologies compete and communities can pick the best technology 
for their unique requirements.

    Question 2. And to follow up, under what conditions should Congress 
consider wireless broadband as a viable primary broadband connection 
for a fixed connection to a household?
    Answer. Wireless is part of any solution to close the digital 
divide and end the homework gap. Current consumer usage already 
suggests that wireless is viable as a primary form of broadband 
connection for many households. Many customers across the country have 
decided to prioritize their mobile connections over fixed.\3\ According 
to a recent survey by Pew Research Center, among individuals who do not 
have a home broadband connection, 45 percent say they do not subscribe 
because their smartphone lets them do everything they need to do 
online.\4\ In rural America, nearly one in five residents has decided 
to rely solely on wireless devices for broadband, while over one in 
four Americans, who make less than thirty thousand dollars a year, have 
made the switch to smartphone only; the same is true for those that 
have a high school degree or less.\5\ Thus, millions of Americans 
already rely on wireless broadband as their primary broadband 
connection given the reliability and mobility it provides.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Andrew Perrin, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2021, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (June 3, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2021/06/03/mobile-technology-and-home
-broadband-2021/.
    \4\ Id.
    \5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research and Next Generation Resilience
    Mr. Adelstein. It's important to highlight the vital role that 
technological research, especially done in collaboration with our 
national labs has on improving the resilience and reliability of 
critical communications infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Energy's 
Argonne National Laboratory recently partnered with AT&T on a series of 
projects to enhance the resilience of AT&T's infrastructure to climate 
change. Similarly, in New Mexico, Sandia National Labs has been a 
leader in research to modernize the electrical grid through safety, 
security, and resiliency research.

    Question 3. Can you elaborate on the importance of investing in new 
technologies that support network resilience?
    Answer. The innovation that occurs at places like Sandia National 
Laboratories is essential to resolving our most challenging security 
and resiliency issues. For instance, having resilient electrical grids 
has become increasingly important during destructive wildfire seasons. 
As electrical grid operators aim to enhance their networks for greater 
reliability and resiliency, sensors and analytics enabled by 5G 
applications are increasingly critical, ``allowing for timely 
diagnosis, prediction, and prescription of all system variables and 
assets during normal and extreme-event conditions.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Louis Brasington, Digital Smart Grid Resilience: Wildfire 
Mitigation and Reliability, CLEANTECH GRP. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://
www.cleantech.com/digital-smart-grid-resilience-wildfire-mitigation-
and-reliability/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beyond responding to emerging threats, wireless networks enable 
efficiencies that can help reduce contributors to climate change. The 
World Economic Forum documents that the digital technology sector, 
relying on 5G connectivity, ``is probably the world's most powerful 
influencer to accelerate action to stabilize global temperatures well 
below 2+C.'' \7\ Indeed, ``digital technologies could already help 
reduce global carbon emissions by up to 15 percent--or one-third of the 
50 percent reduction required by 2030.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Borje Ekholm & Johan Rockstrom, Digital technology can cut 
global emissions by 15 percent. Here's how, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Jan. 15, 
2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/why-digitalization-is-
the-key-to-exponential-climate-action.
    \8\ Andrew Perrin, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2021, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (June 3, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
2021/06/03/mobile-technology-and-home
-broadband-2021/ (providing a demographic breakdown of smartphone only 
users).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All telecommunications technologies, including wireless broadband, 
have their own vulnerabilities. Resilient networks are sustainable 
networks. Real ``future proofing'' requires that the companies that are 
provided funding to build networks will remain in business to provide 
service to customers into the future. Resiliency is key because ongoing 
operating costs must be covered by the revenue stream, or the networks 
will fall into disrepair and will not remain open consistently, provide 
adequate customer service or quick outage restoration, or could become 
inoperable.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to 
                           Jonathan Adelstein
    Technical Assistance. I am glad we are having this timely 
conversation on how to increase network availability and resiliency. As 
you've noted, different communities in Georgia, and across America, 
face different challenges when it comes to deploying, operating, and 
securing broadband networks.

    Question. In light of these diverse requirements, what steps can 
Congress take to ensure that Federal agencies involved in our 
communications networks, including the FCC, USDA, and NTIA, meet the 
needs of all our communities?

   Do you feel they are providing adequate technical assistance 
        in order to comply with regulations and/or access available 
        programs and funding?

   If not, what are your recommendations for improvement?

    Answer. Thank you, Senator Warnock, for highlighting the importance 
of digital equity. In particular, the bipartisan infrastructure bill 
that recently passed the Senate makes great strides toward closing the 
digital divide. The bill wisely creates digital equity programs whose 
purpose is ``to promote the achievement of digital equity, support 
digital inclusion activities, and build capacity for efforts by States 
relating to the adoption of broadband by residents of those States.'' 
By allocating $2.75 billion for Digital Equity Act programs, as well as 
another $14.2 billion for broadband assistance to households that are 
not able to afford a connection, Congress will ensure that NTIA is 
involved in our communications networks as it considers whether an 
applicant will increase Internet access and the adoption of broadband 
among covered populations to be served and the comparative geographic 
diversity of the application in relation to other eligible 
applications.
    Title III of the infrastructure bill states that for both the State 
Digital Equity Plans and the Digital Equity Competitive Grant program, 
NTIA ``shall, to the extent practicable, carry out this title in a 
technologically neutral manner.'' This guidance is crucial to promoting 
network resiliency and ensuring that the programs meet the needs of all 
our communities. In rural America, nearly one in five residents has 
decided to rely solely on their wireless devices for broadband, while 
over one in four Americans who make less than thirty thousand dollars a 
year have made the switch to smartphone only; the same is true for 
those that have a high school degree or less.\7\
    Federal agencies, including the ones mentioned, have an excellent 
track record of supporting broadband initiatives. As a former FCC 
Commissioner and Administrator of the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) 
under the USDA, I know that these agencies are staffed with highly 
skilled and professional public servants who want to see broadband 
brought to every American. One thing these agencies need from Congress 
is flexibility. I quickly learned as Administrator of RUS that you do 
not get to pick which applications come in the door. We received 
requests for nearly three times the amount of total funding. However, 
only one in eight of those applications were deemed financially and 
technically feasible. However, almost all the projects that made it 
through the screening ultimately won funding. By allowing expert 
agencies to use their best judgment, rather than unnecessarily 
proscriptive gating requirements, they can find the best solutions to 
address the various challenges we face in deploying broadband across 
the country, especially to communities that have not had the same 
opportunities as others.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to 
                               Denny Law
    Technical Assistance. I am glad we are having this timely 
conversation on how to increase network availability and resiliency. As 
you've noted, different communities in Georgia, and across America, 
face different challenges when it comes to deploying, operating, and 
securing broadband networks.

    Question. In light of these diverse requirements, what steps can 
Congress take to ensure that Federal agencies involved in our 
communications networks, including the FCC, USDA, and NTIA, meet the 
needs of all our communities?

   Do you feel they are providing adequate technical assistance 
        in order to comply with regulations and/or access available 
        programs and funding?

   If not, what are your recommendations for improvement?

    Answer. As Congress has appropriated funding related to broadband 
service, including funds for the deployment of new broadband networks, 
sustainability of existing networks, or affordability programs for 
customers to access broadband services, I recommend Congress do more 
than merely require the respective Federal agencies to ``consult'' with 
each other to prevent duplicative or conflicting spending efforts. With 
increasing amounts of Federal funds being spent to address broadband 
availability and affordability, it is important these dollars are not 
wasted with one federally funded program being used to potentially 
compete or duplicate a different federally funded program. It is also 
important for federally funded programs to adhere to similar 
(preferably identical) broadband qualification standards, such as 
desired speed and capability requirements for new broadband networks 
constructed using Federal funds, or qualification standards for 
recipients to receive funds designed for affordability programs.
    When allocating funds to the various Federal agencies to 
administer, Congress should require a report be provided to Congress 
indicating the specific actions taken by the agencies to ensure that 
allocated funds did not overlap or conflict with funds or programs from 
other programs.
    Regarding the technical assistance provided by these Federal 
agencies in order to comply with regulations and/or access to available 
funding, I believe it will be critical for Federal agencies to closely 
evaluate state and local governments, who will be tasked with 
implementing several new Federal programs--including the distribution 
of funds to sub-grantees--to ensure state and local officials possess 
the resources to properly implement these new broadband programs and to 
provide these eligible entities with sufficient guidance and technical 
assistance.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ben Ray Lujan to 
                              Harold Feld
Cellular Wireless and Fiber Wireline
    Mr. Feld. Many households in rural America are currently either 
unserved by broadband, or underserved with legacy DSL systems that are 
not being maintained. As we consider options to connect these 
communities, some have advocated for wireless as a viable alternative 
to fiber.

    Question 1. Under what conditions should Congress consider wireless 
broadband as a viable primary broadband connection?
    Answer. Modern households need broadband that will suit their needs 
in terms of speed and reliability both now and into the future. 
Investing money in networks that don't meet these needs is a waste of 
taxpayer money, and ensures that Congress will have to continuously 
invest in order to close the digital divide, instead of investing once 
and being done for decades. Currently, households need high-speed 
broadband connections with symmetrical upload and download speeds. 
Speeds of 100/100 should meet needs household needs for the next few 
years, but the further out we look to ensure connectivity, the faster 
speeds will need to be.
    At the same time, mobile wireless networks aren't suitable for 
modern household needs--including working and learning from home. As an 
initial matter, the quality of mobile service can vary wildly 
throughout a service area depending on factors such as terrain, 
foliage, weather conditions, and the distance between the home and the 
receiving tower. Consumers know from their daily lives that even within 
the same neighborhood--or even within the same house--signal quality 
can vary wildly. Mobile network providers do not monitor the quality of 
the network signal for each individual location, and doing so would be 
a difficult and expensive process.\1\ Additionally, many wireless 
connections have data caps that force households to ration 
connectivity. The difficulty in connecting multiple devices through 
tethering to a mobile phone makes it even more difficult for a 
household to have multiple users engaged in bandwidth-intensive work 
(such as distance learning or telework) simultaneously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Standard testing for a region is to do ``drive throughs'' with 
vans and sensing equipment. But this cannot tell even the most diligent 
network operator how the home environment (e.g., thickness of walls) or 
weather conditions might alter the strength and reliability of the 
signal for a specific address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fixed wireless networks, by contrast, can attain stronger and more 
reliable connections. Because these networks use different technologies 
than mobile networks, fixed wireless networks can test signal quality 
to each premises in the same way a wireline connection can. Because 
they do not need to accommodate mobility, they can route around terrain 
obstacles. Because they employ a receiving antenna on a fixed point in 
the premises, the home environment is no more relevant to fixed 
wireless than to wireline. In geographic areas where terrain makes 
pulling fiber difficult, fixed wireless networks may well offer a more 
cost-effective alternative without sacrificing quality. ``Technology 
neutral'' should mean that any technology that can meet the standard 
for a future-proof network that meets our many and growing needs for 
connectivity can receive funding. It should not mean lowering the 
standards so that inferior technologies that do not meet our needs are 
eligible.
    With this in mind, Congress should only consider wireless broadband 
as a viable primary broadband connection if that wireless connection 
offers speeds of at least 100/100, is fixed, and does not have data 
caps.

    Question 2. Even if wireless is not a substitute for wireline 
connectivity, should Federal funds be used to support expanding access 
to mobile wireless technologies?
    Answer. Yes. Although wireless is not a substitute for wireline 
connectivity, it is nevertheless a needed connection. Most households 
expect to have both fixed and mobile connectivity. Mobile enables 
participation in the Wireless Emergency Alert System (WEAS) and 
connection with 911. Mobile telephony is so ubiquitous that it is 
assumed by most employers, school systems and others that individuals 
have a cell phone. In the event of an emergency evacuation--such as in 
the case of a wildfire or a hurricane--a cell phone is the only means 
by which people can remain in contact with emergency responders and 
loved ones.
    Additionally, two factor identification, which cybersecurity 
experts recommend as one of the best ways for individuals to protect 
themselves online, often requires texting a confirmation code to a cell 
phone. Furthermore, although many online tasks such as completing forms 
cannot be easily done (or done at all) with a cell phone, many 
applications are now designed for mobile devices rather than for 
laptops or desktops.
    Every American deserves access to the communications networks 
necessary to participate fully in our digital society. That means both 
an affordable broadband connection in the home and an affordable mobile 
phone service.
Next Generation Networks
    Mr. Feld. Right now, legacy carriers are in the process of retiring 
their copper lines, and wireless providers are shutting down their 3G 
networks. As you highlight in your testimony, critical decisions are 
being made right now that will determine how the next generation of 
American communications infrastructure will take shape.

    Question 3. What opportunities does this period of transition 
present to Congress? How can it best use this moment to restore 
resilience and reliability requirements for critical communications 
infrastructure in rural America?
    Answer. When networks are shut down, we can build new, reliable, 
future proof networks in their place. Network transitions must be an 
upgrade for all, not an upgrade for some and a downgrade for others. 
Because carriers are replacing their older equipment and replacing it 
with newer equipment, the Federal government can impose new standards 
of reliability and quality without the added difficulty of trying to 
retrofit existing networks. The widespread upgrade in the industry 
introduces economies of scale for equipment that will meet any new 
reliability or quality of service standards. The total replacement 
brought about by the phase out of old wireless and legacy wireline 
technologies essentially creates a new ``greenfield'' opportunity to 
deploy more resilient, superior networks. Once these assets are 
deployed, they will be subject to the usual depreciation cycle. Network 
operators will seek to minimize capital expenditures and maintain the 
legacy technology for as long as possible--as we have seen with the 
legacy copper network.
    But this will require Federal regulation of appropriate standards. 
As we have seen, for-profit companies are poor judges of what is 
required to maintain reliable networks. Reliability and preparation for 
emergencies that occur infrequently, does not immediately offer 
tangible return on investment--whereas reducing capital expenditures is 
rewarded with higher stock valuations and fatter bottom lines. This 
creates strong incentives to skimp on reliability and to take unduly 
optimistic views about the network's resiliency. This is a classic 
example of ``market failure,'' i.e., the unregulated market creates 
incentives for the wrong behavior. Regulatory action is necessary to 
remedy the failure of the market incentive in this case. Such action 
should include direct grants/subsidies to cover the added cost of 
higher reliability standards. If reliability is a public benefit that 
is unrewarded in the marketplace, it is only reasonable to subsidize it 
with public funds. This was traditionally done in telecom through rate 
regulation, which included reliability costs in the rate base. Today, 
it should include targeted grants.
    Unfortunately, the FCC doesn't currently guide the shutdown of 
these networks, leaving ISPs free to replace the network with anything 
they want, and consumers without a promise of a suitable replacement. 
One reason for this is the absence of clear authority following the 
FCC's reclassification of broadband as a Title I ``Information 
Service'' and failure to determine the regulatory status of voice-over-
IP (VOIP). Congress designed Title II so that the FCC could impose 
adequate oversight through standard setting and rulemakings to ensure 
adequate reliability and quality of service. If Congress were to 
reclassify broadband as a Title II service--the FCC could regulate 
these transitions and ensure that any new networks are future proof, 
reliable, and resilient.
Next Generation Networks
    Mr. Feld. As you discuss in your testimony, cybersecurity must be a 
central point in network resilience. As we have seen from recent 
national cybersecurity incidents, this is critical. Unless we take this 
threat seriously, we risk massive vulnerabilities to our critical 
communications networks.

    Question 4. How should the FCC and Congress work to set standards 
for cybersecurity in our national telecommunications infrastructure?
    Answer. The United States is the only developed nation whose 
telecommunications regulatory does not play a significant role in 
cybersecurity. This has created a significant FCC-shaped hole in 
protecting our national communications infrastructure. It is time to 
take the FCC off the bench when we need a ``whole of government'' 
approach.
    Communications networks are the circulatory system for data, and 
therefore the primary vector by which infection can spread from system 
to system. The FCC and Congress can work together to set and enforce 
standards for communications networks that achieve the following:

  1.  Ensure that the communications providers networks are themselves 
        secure. Penetrating the security of a communications network 
        can give bad actors unlimited access the devices connected to 
        the network and the traffic that rides on the network.

  2.  Detection of cyberattacks and countermeasures, in ways that 
        respect privacy and national security. Communications carriers 
        are ideally positioned to detect when devices across the 
        network are being hijacked for nefarious purposes by detecting 
        significant deviations in traffic output. If devices are 
        infected and injecting harmful traffic into the network, the 
        network operator can take steps to alert the relevant device 
        owners and authorities and, if necessary, temporarily block the 
        sources of harmful traffic. Because of the enormous sensitivity 
        of using carriers as ``traffic cops'' (e.g., the potential for 
        carriers to abuse this gatekeeper position to accumulate 
        private data for commercial purposes or discriminate against 
        purportedly ``suspicious'' traffic to advantage their own 
        services and products), carrier activity in this area must 
        subject to strict oversight by the FCC. Although the FCC 
        already possess adequate authority pursuant to Title II of the 
        Act, Congress may wish to remove any uncertainty with targeted 
        legislation (and, of course, classification of broadband 
        service as Title II).

  3.  Wireless vulnerabilities. The FCC can, and should, require 
        wireless licensees to take adequate precautions to guard 
        against unauthorized interception of wireless traffic or 
        hijacking of consumer devices. For example, the FCC recently 
        opened a proceeding to require carriers to take appropriate 
        precautions to prevent ``SIM-swapping,'' a form of identity-
        theft/cyberattack where the bad actor persuades the wireless 
        carrier to transfer the customer's account to a device 
        controlled by the bad actor, is an example of how the FCC can 
        use its authority to improve cybersecurity for consumers.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See ``In the matter of Protecting Consumers from SIM SWAP and 
Port-Out Fraud, WC Docket No. 21-341, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(Sept 30, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Raphael Warnock to 
                              Harold Feld
    Technical Assistance. I am glad we are having this timely 
conversation on how to increase network availability and resiliency. As 
you've noted, different communities in Georgia, and across America, 
face different challenges when it comes to deploying, operating, and 
securing broadband networks.

    Question. In light of these diverse requirements, what steps can 
Congress take to ensure that Federal agencies involved in our 
communications networks, including the FCC, USDA, and NTIA, meet the 
needs of all our communities?

   Do you feel they are providing adequate technical assistance 
        in order to comply with regulations and/or access available 
        programs and funding?

   If not, what are your recommendations for improvement?

    Answer. Congress should ensure that all of the agencies working on 
network deployment communicate with each other, set similar standards, 
and make it easy for entities to coordinate applying for money.
    We should recall that Congress created the different grant and 
subsidy programs to address different aspects of the digital divide 
challenge, and to take advantage of the different expertise of each 
agency. These are not competing pots of money where a community must 
choose between one or the other. Just as we do not require those in 
need of Federal assistance to choose between subsidized school lunches 
for their children or subsidized heating oil for their homes, we should 
not require communities to choose between funding designed to expand 
rural networks, expand educational access, or address affordability. 
Certainly, agencies should coordinate to prevent ``double dipping'' by 
having the same set of costs covered multiple times. But where a grant 
program only covers a portion of the cost, or only covers costs 
associated with a specific portion or function of the network, 
applicants should be helped and encouraged to apply for multiple grants 
that will provide the necessary funding for their communities. At the 
least, Congress should explicitly prohibit these agencies from 
penalizing applicants who have successfully applied for a different 
grant, or force applicants to forgo application to programs for which 
they are qualified.
    Moreover, many eligible entities report difficulties with 
navigating the landscape of grants. It would be helpful if there was a 
one stop shop for those entities to seek technical assistance, so they 
don't have to go to multiple agencies.

                                  [all]