[Senate Hearing 117-691]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 117-691

                        EXAMINING U.S. SECURITY 
                       COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                             MARCH 10, 2022

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
52-758 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                                 (ii)        
  
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Lewis, Hon. Jessica, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
  Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.....     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Karlin, Hon. Mara Elizabeth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    12
    Prepared Statement...........................................    13

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Jessica Lewis to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    38

Responses of Dr. Mara Elizabeth Karlin to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Robert Menendez was Given During a Classified Briefing.    48

Responses of Ms. Jessica Lewis to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    51

Responses of Dr. Mara Elizabeth Karlin to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch was Given During a Classified Briefing..    68

Responses of Dr. Mara Elizabeth Karlin to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Edward J. Markey was Given During a Classified Briefing    73

Responses of Ms. Jessica Lewis to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Chris Van Hollen...............................................    74

Responses of Dr. Mara Elizabeth Karlin to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Chris Van Hollen was Given During a Classified Briefing    80

                                 (iii)
 
                        EXAMINING U.S. SECURITY 
                       COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Murphy, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Romney, Young, Rounds, and 
Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come 
to order.
    Too often, when we hear the term security assistance we 
immediately think of military relationships and hard power 
projections of U.S. foreign policy.
    However, U.S. security assistance and cooperation are 
critical tools of broader foreign policy. Training, arms sales, 
planning, and civilian-military reform are critical elements of 
bolstering partners, allies, and recipient countries around the 
world critical to U.S. foreign and security interests and, 
indeed, to the interests of world stability and peace.
    Indeed, the State Department and this committee are charged 
with jurisdiction over security assistance. Many, if not most, 
of the current security assistance authorities and programs 
were created in the aftermath of September 11, placing an 
emphasis on short-term assistance to immediately confront and 
defeat al-Qaeda and its offshoot groups, but times have changed 
and our efforts must change as well.
    We see terrorist and extremist groups becoming more 
localized in many countries, portraying themselves as champions 
of aggrieved populations ignored or beset by weak and predatory 
governments.
    We see a return of great power competition where China and 
Russia compete with the United States for influence and 
position, offering their own versions of ``security 
assistance'' to countries around the world with what seems 
fewer conditions or requirements.
    We witnessed 20 years of efforts or, perhaps, as has been 
said, 21-year efforts to build effective military and security 
forces in Afghanistan, these largely led by the Department of 
Defense, only to watch them quickly crumble to the Taliban last 
August.
    We watched Iraqi Security Forces to which we had devoted 
billions in equipment and training flee before ISIS thugs in 
pickups in 2014, although now we have a new opportunity to 
reset our security relationship with Iraq.
    Today, we see countries in Africa, particularly in the 
Sahel, struggling to counter insurgents and terrorists amidst 
multiple coups, perverse unrest--pervasive, I should say, 
unrest and conflict.
    It is clear that our security assistance and cooperation 
programs are not achieving their intended outcomes despite the 
billions spent and dedicated efforts of the Departments of 
State and Defense.
    We, and Congress included, are not properly conceptualizing 
the problem. We need to understand that our security assistance 
should be rooted in concrete, measurable, and achievable 
outcomes rooted in sustainable security development, not just 
assistance.
    We must develop comprehensive multi-year plans that 
integrate U.S. assistance programs across the board that 
reflect the understanding that democracy, good governance, and 
economic reform programs are as important as guns and grenade 
launchers, that judicial accountability and robust civilian 
control of the military are as important as the integration of 
aircraft and ground force operations, that a population that 
has faith in the basic integrity and fairness of its government 
is one inoculated against the lies and appeals of terrorists 
and extremists.
    Which is why the Department of State must lead this 
comprehensive integration, since soon after 9/11 there has been 
a continued trend towards ceding State's authority as the 
purveyor of security assistance to the Department of Defense, 
which now provides nearly 50 percent of U.S.-security-related 
assistance.
    Most of the DoD's efforts are geared to short-term projects 
and activities and, perhaps, necessary ones, but not those that 
deal with the underlying problems of good governance and many 
of them without the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the 
sole official charged in statute with overseeing and 
coordinating all such assistance.
    It is time for a reckoning. To this end, I will be 
proposing legislation in the next few months to reform the U.S. 
security assistance process. I hope to work closely with the 
ranking member on this project.
    Finally, let me turn to the news of the day. Over the last 
2 weeks, we have seen Vladimir Putin's savage aggression 
against a free and democratic Ukraine. The destruction he has 
wrought is of the scale and criminality not seen in Europe 
since the Second World War, but the Ukrainian people have 
heroically resisted, clearly, frustrating and surprising the 
autocrat in the Kremlin.
    Much of this resistance have been made possible by the 
tremendous efforts of the United States, its allies, and 
partners in providing anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, 
rifles, ammunitions, training, and institutional organizational 
improvements to the defenders of Ukraine freedom.
    I hope and expect that our witnesses today will be able to 
inform the committee of this vital ongoing effort to help 
defend Ukraine.
    The dexterity with which the State and Defense Departments 
have been able to rally support for Ukraine come from 
longstanding political and security partnerships and programs, 
and that is something we certainly can applaud.
    I turn to the ranking member now for his opening remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do look 
forward to working with you on the legislation you referred to, 
and I hope will be there at the takeoff, rather than the 
landing, as has been suggested in the past.
    Look, never has the subject of U.S. security assistance 
been more important. It plays a vital role in the defense of 
the democratic world and our partners.
    In this hearing, we need to understand their efforts and 
what else we can do to ensure Ukraine defeats Russia. I also 
hope to hear about major new security assistance programs in 
the Indo-Pacific where the State Department has failed to 
invest sufficient resources.
    We owe the nation a discussion on lessons learned from 
security assistance, or lack thereof, in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and how those two efforts resulted in such remarkable failures.
    Regarding the Ukraine, my wants are the same as President 
Zelensky's. It is simple--more and faster. While we have 
provided significant resources to the Ukraine and certainly the 
Administration is to be applauded for what it has done, 
particularly over the past year, packages sat on the 
President's desk longer than they should have, and we lost 
valuable time.
    Now combat losses have depleted most of this aid, and 
Ukrainians desperately need more and faster.
    My goal here is simple--enable the Ukrainian people to 
expel the Russians and defeat the savage and murderous Putin. 
Ukraine needs more.
    It needs more Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger anti-
aircraft missiles, larger anti-aircraft systems, drones, and 
ammunition of all calibers, communications gear, protective 
equipment, and airplanes. Lots more also are needed. I have an 
ammunition manufacturer in Idaho ready to send more. They need 
State's sign off.
    We should support our allies providing aircraft to the 
Ukrainians. Stop over thinking this and toughen up. Keep these 
supplies flowing steadily. I guarantee you the Russians are not 
wimping around on these matters. They are acting.
    The Ukrainian people have made their stand. They are not 
asking us to fight on their behalf. They are merely asking for 
our support.
    Also, as the world watches Ukraine, our Asian allies are 
watching. Taiwan, threatened by a massive authoritarian 
neighbor, wonders how vulnerable it is to the growing might of 
the Chinese military.
    I hope the fierce resistance of the Ukrainians inspires 
Taiwan and casts doubt within the Chinese military on its 
prospects of successful aggression.
    To ensure the Chinese Communist Party knows it cannot 
succeed, we should be doing now for Taiwan what we should have 
done years ago for Ukraine.
    We should support investment in Taiwan's defense and help 
reform its planning and organization, which are needed. My 
Taiwan Deterrence Act proposes just that by starting a foreign 
military finance grant program for Taiwan, to highlight U.S. 
commitment to deterrence, incentivizing Taiwan to invest more 
in its own defense, and mandating more joint planning with 
Taiwan to determine the capabilities, its needs, and how best 
to defend itself. Time is running short. We must start this 
effort now.
    In the Middle East, today is almost 7 months after the 
disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and that disaster 
demands we ask hard questions about U.S. security assistance.
    Throughout a 20-year period, the U.S. spent over $125 
billion to build the Iraq and Afghan militaries. Some efforts 
succeeded, especially the Syrian Democratic Forces campaign 
against ISIS, but we saw the larger U.S.-supported Iraqi and 
Afghan armies melt away in the face of ISIS and the Taliban. 
The U.S. Government has not institutionalized the lessons from 
these failures. Instead, it seems eager to forget the whole 
debacle.
    We must ensure security assistance is truly focused on our 
most vital interests and supports our wider foreign policy and 
national security objectives, not just tactical and operational 
capabilities.
    As the Defense Department continues efforts to cut the 
State Department out of security cooperation, we have seen a 
greater focus on short-term tactical capabilities than on 
unsustainable forces aligned with strategic foreign policy.
    However, U.S. policy should focus on building enduring 
institutions, not just tactical units. We must address 
governance challenges, like corruption in all our activities, 
and we need to professionalize our security assistance 
workforce.
    Security cooperation must support strategic and diplomatic 
objectives. That is why the State Department must reassert its 
role in the process and the Senate should support that, but 
State must also be an active and helpful participant helping 
coordinate with the Defense Department.
    Security assistance is among the most essential tools of 
foreign policy, but this policy is being tested. We must 
succeed in helping Ukraine defend itself, we must pursue new 
efforts with Taiwan, and we must ensure that all of our efforts 
benefit from the hard, very hard lessons over the past 20 
years.
    We must also acknowledge the world is, indeed, a more 
dangerous place than it was 15 to 20 years ago. Our security 
cooperation must recognize this hard reality as we work with 
partners around the world to confront dangerous regimes.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. Let us turn to our 
witnesses.
    It is now my privilege to welcome back to the committee 
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs Jessica Lewis.
    There are few people better positioned to engage with 
Congress on United States security assistance programs than 
Assistant Secretary Lewis, following her nearly two decades 
working on foreign policy issues in Congress.
    Prior to assuming her role as Assistant Secretary, she 
served here at the committee as the Democratic staff director 
for 5 years, and from 2007 to 2014, Assistant Secretary Lewis 
was the national security adviser and foreign policy adviser, 
and then senior national security adviser to Senate Majority 
and Minority Leader Harry Reid. We welcome you back.
    We also welcome Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Dr. Mara Karlin. Assistant 
Secretary Karlin is now working for her sixth Secretary of 
Defense, where she has advised the Department on policy 
spanning strategic planning, defense policy, and budgeting 
future conflicts, and regional security affairs.
    Assistant Secretary Karlin previously performed the duties 
of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from August of 
2021 to February of 2022, and prior to that served as the 
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs.
    Welcome to you both. We will start the testimony. We would 
ask you to summarize in about 5 minutes or so, so the committee 
can engage in a conversation with you.
    We will recognize you, Secretary Lewis, to start off.

 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JESSICA LEWIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
  OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                     STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Lewis. Thank you.
    Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to 
appear before you and it is great to see all the familiar faces 
I worked with for so many years.
    I am pleased to be here to discuss United States security 
sector assistance with Dr. Mara Karlin, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, and I agree with both the chairman and the ranking 
member, never has it been more important to discuss security 
assistance, and we do need a new path forward.
    Security cooperation, including security sector assistance, 
is an instrument of foreign policy. It is an integral component 
of our national security strategy that enables foreign partners 
to join us in advancing global security, and our support to 
Ukraine demonstrates the wide array of tools that State and DoD 
can bring to a partner security sector.
    Since assuming office last January, this Administration has 
provided over $1 billion to Ukraine's defensive capabilities, 
including through foreign military financing, the DoD Ukraine 
Security Assistance Initiative, and other program lines.
    Through the Multinational Joint Commission, we work with 
Ukraine and our allies to identify military requirements and 
match funding streams to support needed defense capabilities 
ranging from radars to Javelins.
    Through the Excess Defense Articles program, we have 
delivered to Ukraine armed Coast Guard cutters to create an 
asymmetric maritime capability in the Black Sea.
    In addition, through programs such as our International 
Military Education and Training authority, we have supported 
the development of a cadre of professional and Western-looking 
mid- and senior-level Ukrainian officers, and through a series 
of exercises DoD has strengthened the interoperability of our 
forces and Ukraine's tactical and operational capabilities.
    As the Secretary of State said recently, last fall as the 
present threat against Ukraine from Russia developed, under the 
authority delegated by the President he authorized the 
Department of State to provide $60 million in immediate 
military assistance to Ukraine.
    In December, as that threat materialized, he authorized a 
further drawdown worth $200 million. Then, as Ukraine took up 
arms with courage to fend off Russia's brutal and unprovoked 
assault, he authorized an unprecedented third presidential 
drawdown of up to $300 million, the largest in history for 
immediate support to Ukraine's defense.
    At the same time, we continue to expeditiously process and 
approve requests for deliveries of U.S.-origin military 
equipment to Ukraine from allies and partners through our 
third-party transfer authority.
    Considering the strategic environment and the existing 
architecture of security cooperation and assistance together, I 
also see several opportunities for Congress to help address the 
security challenges we are currently facing and apply valuable 
lessons learned.
    First, I would encourage the committee to elevate security 
sector governance as a central consideration in U.S. security 
cooperation and assistance planning and treat long-term 
institutional capacity building as our primary mission.
    As a piece of this, human rights and the rule of law is 
really at the center of the discussion about security sector 
governance, and we look forward to working with all of you and 
the many members on this committee who have focused on this 
topic.
    Second, State's authorities require more flexibility. If we 
are to effectively address emerging crises and opportunities in 
today's geopolitical environment, greater flexibility is needed 
on several fronts.
    Greater flexibility for FMF and PKO funding would allow the 
Department to be more responsive and, in certain circumstances, 
result in cost saving. I would also encourage the appropriation 
of funds on a more regional or functional basis.
    Third, because there is no freestanding acquisition system 
for FMS, we encourage Congress to work with our DoD colleagues 
to seek efficiencies and make reforms to the federal 
acquisition process.
    Fourth, to ensure security cooperation and security 
assistance serve U.S. foreign policy goals and are properly 
synchronized and deconflicted to make maximum efficiency of 
taxpayer dollars, DoD's security cooperation's authorities, 
existing and future's, should include Secretary of State 
concurrence.
    Fifth, and in support of the reforms above, State 
Department staffing must keep pace with the increased workload 
and we must develop a better trained security cooperation 
workforce at the Department.
    Mr. Chairman, what our history tells us is one thing for 
certain. The nature of global security is ever changing, and as 
it shifts and evolves so too should our security assistance 
toolkit.
    That is why our alliances and partnerships are so vital. 
These alliances and partnerships, in turn, rely on security 
assistance and security cooperation to build capabilities, 
strengthen relationships, and provide interoperability, and as 
the Secretary has said many times, it is critical that we keep 
human rights at the center of that policy.
    Security assistance is not just a concept to be debated in 
the abstract. It is a real demand of today's world, 
encompassing a complex and broad scope of activities.
    It is therefore critical that we apply the authorities we 
have as effectively as we can and continue to think about how 
we can revise and renew them to face the next challenge.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Ms. Jessica Lewis

    Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the Committee. It's an honor to appear before 
you and it is great to see all the familiar faces I worked with for so 
many years. I am pleased to be here to discuss United States security 
sector assistance with Dr. Mara Karlin, Assistant Secretary of Defense.
    The subject of this Hearing is the future of U.S. Security 
Assistance, and I come before the committee with six recommendations 
for your consideration for (1) a greater focus on Security Sector 
Governance; (2) the need for greater flexibility; (3) the urgency of 
process reforms to make U.S. defense articles more available to 
partners and expedite their delivery; (4) the value of strengthening 
State-DoD coordination through concurrence mechanisms and (5) the 
foundational requirement to support the State Department's security 
assistance workforce.
    Before laying those proposals out in detail, I want to review how 
we got to the current authorities and programs we have; what those 
programs are; and, the strategic context in which we are currently 
exercising them.
    the development and current state of state department security 
                               assistance
    Security cooperation, including security sector assistance a, is an 
instrument of foreign policy. It is an integral component of our 
national security strategy that enables foreign partners to join us in 
advancing global security. Consequently, our national security 
interests can put us in a situation in which we need to evaluate hard 
choices between supporting the security needs of some partners or 
stepping back to allow those partners to buy from our adversaries. 
Security Assistance is also an opportunity to promote stronger and more 
effective security sector governance; it is a key to long-term 
relationship building. It is a mechanism for enhancing regional 
security, burden sharing, and interoperability with U.S. forces. It is 
a means of strengthening the professionalism of the armed forces 
agencies of allied and partner nations. It is also, and this is 
critical, just one element of our foreign policy toolkit. Security 
assistance is not a panacea, but rather, when applied alongside other 
tools of our diplomacy, an instrument by which we can support and 
advance security, stability, and peace.
    Congress--and specifically this committee, Mr. Chairman--has been a 
key partner in this endeavor from its outset. We look to build on this 
decades' long partnership, to open a discussion by sharing some general 
recommendations on the way forward with you today. Of course, it is 
impossible to talk about the future without some discussion of how we 
created the security sector assistance we have today. It took many 
years of policymaking, legislating, planning, and partnership for the 
United States to develop the security assistance tools we now have at 
our disposal.
    Security assistance took on its initial form in the early days of 
the Cold War, when the United States began providing surplus military 
equipment and military advisors to U.S. allies and partners.
    Then, in the wake of the Korean War and Berlin Airlift, and facing 
rising security challenges in the context of the Cold War, on November 
3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act to 
reorganize the structure of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs, 
with Congress writing into statute the role of the Secretary of State 
as responsible for the ``continuous supervision and general direction 
of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and 
training programs, including but not limited to determining where there 
shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military 
education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to 
the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and 
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served 
thereby.'' Thus, with the passage of the Act by Congress, U.S. foreign 
assistance underwent a major transformation that placed security 
assistance squarely under State's purview. The primary State Department 
security assistance tools we know today, including Foreign Military 
Financing, can be traced back to the Foreign Assistance Act.
    The next pillar of our current system came in the Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976. The ``AECA'' reformed the landscape for U.S. 
security cooperation, including security assistance, by setting the 
terms on which arms transfers could occur--including for internal 
security, for legitimate self-defense, and for preventing or hindering 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Like the Foreign 
Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act reflected the strategic 
thinking of the times, requiring consideration to be given as to 
whether the exports ``would contribute to an arms race, aid in the 
development of weapons of mass destruction, support international 
terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of 
conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral 
arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements.''
    The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act 
establish the foundational authorities for contemporary State 
Department U.S. security assistance programs. The United States relied 
mostly on these authorities through the remainder of the Cold War to 
shore up NATO partners, and to solidify diplomatic accomplishments such 
as the signing of the Camp David Accords.
    As the Cold War waned, the foreign policy landscape shifted, as did 
the United States' response to global threats.
    Beginning in the 1980s, Congress began providing DoD with 
additional authorities through annual National Defense Authorization 
Acts. Early examples focused on counter narcotics and humanitarian 
assistance, focused initially on emergency challenges in Central and 
South America.
    This trend accelerated considerably after 9/11 due to the 
perception that the United States needed to urgently build the capacity 
of local partners in the fight against violent extremists. Once of 
secondary importance, ``security cooperation'' with partner security 
forces was elevated to an integral part of DoD's mission.
    In FY 2006, Congress enacted the first major global DoD authority 
(Section 1206) to be used expressly for the purpose of training and 
equipping the national military forces of foreign countries worldwide. 
DoD's global train and equip authorities have since been consolidated 
and expanded under Title 10 Section 333 (as of FY 2017).
    Numerous country- and function-specific authorities, such as the 
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), The Indo-Pacific 
Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), the Counterterrorism Partnership 
Fund (CTPF), the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train 
and Equip Fund (CTEF), and, of course, the Iraq and Afghanistan 
Security Forces Funds (ISFF and ASFF), have also accrued directly to 
DoD over the past 15 years as well.
    Recognizing the potential for duplicative programming between State 
and DoD authorities, Congress has legislated Secretary of State 
concurrence, coordination, and joint planning requirements for many 
(but not all) DoD authorities.
    My bureau, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, links 
diplomacy and defense to bolster U.S. national security. My team works 
closely with the Department of Defense, Congress, and the U.S. defense 
industry to deliver tools and training that strengthen our allies' and 
partners' abilities to provide for their defense and contribute 
meaningfully to the stability of the rules-based international order. 
Day to day, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs oversees 
approximately $7 billion in security sector assistance programs 
annually--which accounts for roughly 20 percent of the Department of 
State's and USAID's total annual assistance. This assistance supports 
grants under Foreign Military Financing to help our partners invest in 
U.S. training and equipment; International Military Education and 
Training that enables foreign military personnel to study beside their 
U.S. counterparts; and Peacekeeping Operations funds to help train and 
equip foreign forces to rise to the challenge of helping countries 
emerge and recover from war.
    Notably, the $7B of security assistance appropriations is dwarfed 
by the foreign military sales funded by our allies and partners, which 
amounted to $28.67B in fiscal year 2021. Furthermore, for fiscal year 
2021, Direct Commercial Sales to our allies and partners accounted for 
$103.4B in fiscal year 2021. In other words, our global network of 
alliances and partnerships generated over $130B of funds to our defense 
industry that in turn will go back to support our national security. In 
addition, the Bureau coordinates State Department review of and 
Secretary of State concurrence with DoD activities conducted under 25 
different DoD authorities.
    This proliferation of DoD authorities has been matched with growing 
appropriations for DoD security cooperation activities. Since 2001-
2022, the total amount of security sector assistance has tripled to 
roughly $18 billion, and the proportion managed by DoD has grown from 
approximately 20 percent to slightly more than half.
    The State Department's resources, meanwhile, have also grown 
increasingly inflexible. Of the nearly $7 billion in annual assistance 
resources I oversee in PM, 93 percent has been subject to Congressional 
funding directives in recent fiscal years. Once assistance to partners 
such as Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq are accounted for, only limited 
resources remain (less than $1.8 billion) to strengthen other allies in 
need worldwide, creating countless lost opportunities to further 
America's foreign policy and national security.
    But within these constraints, Mr. Chairman, we make a difference.
    Security assistance still holds tremendous potential to advance our 
foreign policy by offering new avenues of access, influencing and 
assuring partners, strengthening their institutional capacity, and 
bolstering regional stability.
                           strategic context
    I sit before you to discuss these matters at a time where that 
proposition is being tested, and displayed, as at few points in 
history. As the bombs rain down on the hospitals and schools of Kyiv, 
as the Russian tanks roll through the Ukrainian countryside, as we see 
before our very eyes the sights of war in the European Theater that we 
had imagined had been retired to history, I can say that I am proud--
and that you can all be proud--of the support the United States has 
provided to Ukraine in, and in advance of, their time of need--and 
proud of the remarkable courage of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the 
Ukrainian people as they wield our assistance to push back on Russia's 
unforgivable assault.
    And our support to Ukraine demonstrates the wide array of tools 
that State and DoD can bring to a partner's security sector.
    Since assuming office last January, this Administration has 
provided over $1 billion to Ukraine's defensive capabilities, including 
through Foreign Military Financing, the DoD Ukraine Security Assistance 
Initiative, and other program lines. Through the Multinational Joint 
Commission (MJC) we work with Ukraine and our Allies to identify 
military requirements and match funding streams to support needed 
defense capabilities, ranging from radars to Javelins. Through the 
Excess Defense Articles program, we have delivered to Ukraine armed 
Coast Guard Cutters to create an asymmetric maritime capability in the 
Black Sea. In addition, through programs such as our International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) authority, we have supported the 
development of a cadre of professional and Western-looking mid- and 
senior-level Ukrainian officers, and through a series of exercises, DoD 
has strengthened the interoperability of our forces and Ukraine's 
tactical and operational capabilities. We have repeatedly condemned 
President Putin's efforts to intimidate and isolate Ukraine and have 
provided $1 billion in assistance in the last year alone. On at least 
two occasions we have turned around requests within just 24 hours; an 
incredible speed for issues of this complexity.
    As the Secretary said recently, last fall, as the present threat 
against Ukraine from Russia developed, under authority delegated by the 
President, he authorized the Department of Defense to provide $60 
million in immediate military assistance to Ukraine.
    In December, as that threat materialized, he authorized a further 
drawdown worth $200 million. Then, as Ukraine took up arms with courage 
to fend off Russia's brutal and unprovoked assault, he authorized, an 
unprecedented third Presidential Drawdown of up to $350 million for 
immediate support to Ukraine's defense.
    At the same time, we continue to expeditiously process and approve 
requests for deliveries of U.S.-origin materiel military equipment to 
Ukraine from allies and partners under our Third-Party Transfer 
Authority.
    Congruent to our efforts to assist Ukraine in its fight against 
Russia, the challenge posed by the PRC is unlike anything we have faced 
in recent history. The PRC is the only country with the economic, 
diplomatic, military, and technological power to seriously challenge 
the stable and open international system--all the rules, values, and 
relationships that make the world work. As we turn to the pacing threat 
the PRC and its model of autocracy poses to the rules-based order, we 
can look to security cooperation and security assistance as a key 
element of our response. This challenge forces us to return to our 
national security interests. We can either maintain our unprecedented 
network of security assistance relationships or we must acknowledge the 
risk of allowing these relationships to stagnate and open opportunities 
for China and Russia to step into the vacuum. For decades, for example, 
we have worked to strengthen our security cooperation with key allies 
such as Japan and South Korea while creating new partnerships with 
countries like Vietnam, all while working hand-in-glove with Taiwan to 
strengthen that brave island's defense and deterrence--and this 
Administration intends to deepen and expand that cooperation in the 
months and years ahead.
    As shown in our response to Ukraine, our global network of allies 
and partners are a unique American advantage and strategic asset in 
competition with the PRC and Russia. As a fundamentally political, 
relationship-building tool, security sector assistance can play a vital 
role in strengthening those partnerships. Both Beijing and Moscow have 
invested heavily in efforts meant to drive a wedge between us and our 
allies and partners.
    For the foreseeable future, it will be a priority for the United 
States to continue leveraging security cooperation to help our partners 
deter and defeat Russian and PRC aggression. It is especially critical 
that our fellow democracies on the frontlines have the means to defend 
themselves against their larger, autocratic neighbors. I should be 
clear, however, that just because a strategic competitor is willing to 
transfer arms to a country, it does not mean we should, or will. We 
will approve arms transfers only when they are actually in our foreign 
policy interest.
    Indeed, we must keep in mind that strategic competition is not 
simply a struggle of might between great powers. It is at base a 
contest of values and norms--of two fundamentally different models of 
global governance. As President Biden has said, ``We're living at an 
inflection point in history, both at home and abroad. We're engaged 
anew in a struggle between democracy and autocracy.'' And as Secretary 
Blinken said last year in a message to all our diplomatic posts 
worldwide, ``in a more contested, competitive world, America's values 
and our commitment to supporting the rights and freedoms of people 
around the world are a competitive structural advantage that our 
undemocratic adversaries and competitors cannot match, and that we 
should not cede.''
    Therefore, the President has stressed the need to defend free 
societies and promote democracy around the world, including by 
elevating our promotion of human rights. We must keep the importance of 
security sector governance and respect for universal human rights front 
and center as we consider where to provide security assistance, and as 
we engage partner nations' security institutions and empower them 
toward modernization, accountability, and reform.
    The same principles apply for security assistance intended to 
manage the persistent threats from violent extremists, Iranian proxies, 
and other destabilizing actors. These threats show no sign of 
decreasing even as we shift our policy focus to the long-term challenge 
posed by the PRC and, more immediately, by Russia. A significant share 
of security assistance is still allocated toward addressing these 
persistent threats globally.
                      challenges and opportunities
    Considering the strategic environment and the existing architecture 
of security cooperation and assistance together, I see several 
opportunities for Congress to help address the security challenges we 
are currently facing and apply valuable lessons learned: (1) a greater 
focus on Security Sector Governance; (2) the need for greater 
flexibility; (3) the urgency of process reforms to make U.S. defense 
articles more available to partners and expedite their delivery; (4) 
the value of strengthening State-DoD coordination through concurrence 
mechanisms and (5) the foundational requirement to support the State 
Department's security assistance workforce.
    First, I would encourage the Committee to elevate security sector 
governance as a central consideration in U.S. security cooperation and 
assistance planning and treat long-term institutional capacity building 
as our primary mission.
    It is not enough to build defense institutions in tandem with 
``train and equip'' missions; security sector governance must be the 
pacesetter. Security assistance delivered before baseline standards of 
governance and institutional capacity are in place will at best provide 
little return on investment, and more likely will harm U.S. interests 
in the long run.
    A governance-centered approach to security cooperation and 
assistance would better integrate our political-military tools with our 
foreign policy and with the diplomatic and economic instruments of 
statecraft, in keeping with the spirit of the Foreign Assistance Act.
    Operationalizing a governance-centered approach will also require 
the interagency to reduce duplication and to develop a common operating 
picture--especially with regards to the foreign policy risks posed by 
weak governance and the potential for elite capture of the security 
sector--and continuous, strategic-level monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks. The risk assessments and learning frameworks, moreover, 
should not merely inform program planning but meaningfully steer it.
    Second, State's authorities require more flexibility if we are to 
effectively address emerging crises and opportunities in today's 
geopolitical environment. Greater flexibility is needed on several 
fronts.
    The Department faces a perennial need to deliver basic military 
articles, training, and services to developing partners for the 
purposes of building institutional capacity, preventing conflict, and 
promoting stability. The Peacekeeping Operations account allows us to 
address such needs but is heavily directed by Congress. Greater 
flexibility for FMF and PKO funding would allow the Department to be 
more responsive and in certain circumstances result in cost-saving.
    I would also encourage the appropriation of funds on a more 
regional or functional basis. Most FMF is directed on a bilateral 
basis, which risks creating a latent expectancy among allies and 
partners and limits the Department's flexibility and responsiveness and 
the ability to utilize FMF in concert with diplomatic tools. After 
Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, for example, the Department of State 
was only able to urgently reallocate a few million dollars in FMF 
assistance.
    Expanded use of security sector assistance funding appropriated as 
regional funds provides not only greater flexibility to respond to 
emerging needs and align to strategic priorities, but also promotes 
fruitful competition among program proposals.
    To be clear, I am not suggesting that State is interested in 
greater flexibility to avoid the tough questions on security sector 
governance, democracy, and human rights, which are issues that this 
Administration is committed to prioritizing and in which Congress 
rightly maintains a steadfast interest. Rather, I have noted several 
areas where improvements are needed to State's flexibility after a 
decision is made to provide security assistance.
    Third, because there is no free-standing acquisition system for 
FMS, we also encourage Congress to work with our DoD colleagues to 
provide authorities and funding consistent with Administration requests 
that enable efficiencies and reforms to the Federal acquisition 
processes, which directly impact the speed of the FMS system. 
Concurrently, we are working diligently in the interagency to address 
challenges that have been identified through the Conventional Arms 
Transfer (CAT) Policy revision process, designed to ensure the United 
States remains competitive once the Administration has decided to 
provide security assistance. The four main areas we are working on are: 
expanding financing options for partners; improving the efficiency of 
the U.S. technology transfer approval process; building exportability 
into the development of new capabilities in order to get the capability 
to our partners more quickly; and encouraging innovative solutions by 
exploring options for partners that are not currently used by U.S. 
military, what we call non-program of record cases. These are requests 
from partners via the FMS system for capabilities that are not existing 
mainline DoD procurements, and which therefore require the addition of 
expertise and management processes within DoD to be able to facilitate 
the procurement of defense articles that are unfamiliar to the DoD 
system.
    In the context of strategic competition, I also see an acute need 
to offer more attractive financing options to partners who are 
considering acquiring major U.S. defense articles--for example, through 
expanded FMF loan authorities. Currently foreign competitors offer far 
more flexible financing than the United States. FMF loans would provide 
a tool for the United States to compete for more FMS in countries where 
FMF grant assistance is unavailable or insufficient to support major 
procurements and/or where foreign partners lack the national funds to 
pay the purchase price upfront.
    In addition, we look forward to working with Congress to identify 
opportunities and mechanisms to prioritize and expedite our assistance 
and our arms transfers to the partners who need them most urgently, in 
line with the requirements of those partners' defense. Taiwan is a 
useful case in point: we work constantly with our partners in Taiwan to 
develop a joint understanding of the asymmetric capabilities required 
for its defense; having identified those capabilities, we also need to 
ensure we can deliver them in a timely manner, and this is a challenge 
that stretches beyond government--though contracting process reform is 
certainly on the agenda--to industry, where production timelines have 
faced increased lag due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Fourth, to ensure security cooperation and security assistance 
serve U.S. foreign policy goals and are properly synchronized and 
deconflicted to make maximal efficiency of taxpayer dollars, DoD 
security cooperation authorities--when requested by the 
Administration--should include Secretary of State concurrence.
    Fifth, and in support of the reforms above, we encourage the 
Congress to provide requested State Department staffing resources to 
keep pace with the increased workload, and to develop a better trained 
security cooperation workforce at the Department. While DoD's Security 
Cooperation workforce is more than 20,000 strong, State maintains a 
roughly analogous political-military workforce that numbers in the low 
hundreds. This has remained the case despite the ever-increasing 
expansion of DoD authorities and funds that PM is required to jointly 
develop, in addition to our own funds. In short, we risk losing strong 
political-military talent when we must do more and more without 
additional personnel.
    While State actively supports many DoD security sector assistance 
activities, the Department currently lacks sufficient staff and 
bandwidth to fully participate in DoD planning processes and to 
thoroughly review proposed programs, including when some authorities 
include ``joint formulation'' requirements.
    It is also important to facilitate the development of a security 
cooperation expertise and capacity at the State Department. Today's 
security sector assistance programs are larger and more complex than 
those contemplated when the FAA was enacted, and they require personnel 
with both military and civilian areas of expertise.
                               conclusion
    What our history tells us is one thing for certain: the nature of 
global security is ever-changing. As it shifts and evolves so too 
should our security assistance toolkit. What security sector assistance 
looks like today is not what it looked like 10, 20, 30, or even 60-
plus-years-ago when many of the key statutes, policies and process that 
guide the current system were developed. Our world and the political 
landscape we live in has changed greatly in the post-Cold-War 
environment.
    Today, we are confronted on all sides by constantly emerging 
challenges and ever-present risks. Many of the security threats we face 
respect no borders or walls. Cyber and digital threats, international 
economic disruptions, climate insecurity, humanitarian crises, violent 
extremism and terrorism, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction all pose profound and dangers. None 
of these dangers can be effectively addressed by one nation acting 
alone--not even one as powerful as the United States. That is why our 
alliances and partnerships are so vital. These alliances and 
partnerships, in turn, rely on security assistance and security 
cooperation to build capabilities, strengthen relationships, and 
provide interoperability. Security assistance is not just a concept to 
be debated in the abstract: it is a real demand of today's world, 
encompassing a complex and broad scope of activities. It is therefore 
critical that we apply the authorities we have as effectively as we 
can--and continue to think about how we can revise and renew those 
authorities and processes to face the next challenge.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Karlin.

  STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARA ELIZABETH KARLIN, ASSISTANT 
  SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, 
           U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Karlin. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the 
invitation to testify before you today on security cooperation 
and I am honored to do so alongside my close colleague, 
Assistant Secretary Lewis.
    I respectfully submit my written statement for the record 
and will provide brief opening remarks.
    The United States is at a pivotal moment with our allies 
and partners to confront unprecedented challenges to our 
security, including the People's Republic of China's global 
ambitions and Russian aggression that threatens the territorial 
integrity of Europe. All the while, we battle historic 
transnational threats.
    One of the most important ways that we will rise to meet 
these challenges is by renewing a U.S. strategic advantage--our 
unmatched network of allies and partners.
    The forthcoming National Defense Strategy will emphasize 
how the Department will strengthen these alliances and 
partnerships through integrated deterrent, which, as Secretary 
Austin underscores, involves integrating our efforts across 
domains and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that the 
Department closely collaborates with the rest of the government 
and our allies and partners on the most critical security 
challenges. Security cooperation is an important part of this.
    The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale 
assistance programs that for lasting impact a comprehensive 
engagement plan must mean more than training and equipping. 
Resilient relationships thrive when values and deeds align. 
Security cooperation aims to uphold that approach.
    We aim to help partners with not only specific 
capabilities, but also with institutional integrity and an 
ability to promote our shared values, notably, the promotion 
and protection of human rights and good governance and 
legitimacy of the security sector.
    We view this as a strategic advantage that distinguishes us 
from our competitors. The degree of partnership should not be 
measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but 
rather by their quality. That includes transparency and 
effectiveness.
    We are building a culture of learning and adaptation, 
drawing on lessons from program successes and program 
challenges.
    To seize the opportunity for meaningful change, we are 
focusing on three priority areas: prioritizing who and what we 
invest in, focusing on sustainable impact, and adopting a 
holistic integrated approach to how we execute security 
cooperation programs.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, the U.S. network of alliances 
and partnerships is a strategic advantage, but this advantage 
is not a given.
    It requires active involvement by the entire U.S. 
Government and listening to partners' concerns and contexts, 
and taking a thoughtful and deliberate approach to how we 
employ our resources to meet our priorities.
    That is facilitated by good strategy, good policy, and 
close partnership among the Department of Defense, the 
Department of State, and Congress.
    I appreciate your leadership on this critical issue and 
thank you for the opportunity to share our vision for security 
cooperation.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Karlin follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Dr. Mara E. Karlin

                              introduction
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members 
of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today 
on examining U.S. security cooperation and assistance. The United 
States is at a pivotal moment with our allies and partners as we work 
to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. Together, we confront 
unprecedented challenges to our security, including the People's 
Republic of China's (PRC) global ambitions to rival the United States 
and Russian aggression that threatens the territorial integrity of 
Europe, while we also battle historic transnational threats.
    One of the most important ways that we will rise to meet these 
challenges is by renewing a U.S. strategic advantage--our unmatched 
network of allies and partners. The forthcoming National Defense 
Strategy will emphasize how the Department will strengthen these 
alliances and partnerships to advance national security through 
integrated deterrence. As Secretary Austin underscores, integrated 
deterrence is incorporating our efforts across domains and the spectrum 
of conflict to ensure that the Department closely cooperates with the 
rest of the government and our allies and partners on the most critical 
security challenges. Security cooperation is an important tool that 
helps key allies and partners strengthen their defense and enhances our 
ability to rely on one another in a time of need.
    Resilient partnerships thrive when values and deeds align; security 
cooperation aims to uphold that approach. Key planning assumptions, 
such as ensuring the technology and capability we provide can be 
absorbed, maintained, and sustained by the recipient are the basics; to 
fully realize our shared interests, assistance must align with our 
strategic objectives and include foundational aspects. On the last 
point, we aim to help allies and partners with not only specific 
capabilities, but also with institutional integrity and an ability to 
promote our shared values.
           the department's approach to security cooperation
    Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. They 
allow us to operate by, with, and through our allies and partners to 
meet shared security challenges. The degree of partnership should not 
be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but 
rather by their quality. The Department of Defense has learned from 
large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a 
comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and 
equipping. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and 
adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes, as well as, from 
programs that did not have the desired impact. We are building a 
learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measure 
program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting 
our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to 
learn lessons and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly 
prioritizing programs that are strategic, and setting appropriate 
expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. 
Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our 
allies and partners bring as we collectively work together to meet our 
shared objectives.
    A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise 
is the collaboration among and within the Department, most notably 
DoD's close collaboration with the State Department ensures that 
programs are designed and executed with broader national security 
interests in mind. Internal to the Department of Defense, we recently 
reorganized--bringing the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the 
umbrella of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office of the 
Secretary of the Defense for Policy to facilitate better collaboration 
and coordination. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that 
our entire team is focused on embracing it.
                       who and what we invest in
    I'll begin with who and what we invest in. First, we focus our 
global assets and resources to safeguard the most pressing concerns 
held by allies and partners who play critical roles in our shared 
security. The Department's invigorated focus on tailored allied and 
partner roles is one of the hallmarks of our evolving approach.
    The way we approach security cooperation with states on China and 
Russia's periphery fundamentally differs from how we employ security 
cooperation elsewhere. Here, our approach emphasizes building 
resilience and capability to counter coercive or revisionist activity.
    By contrast, when we look to the rest of the world, the Department 
wants to cultivate select security partners who can appropriately and 
effectively be regional security anchors, especially during crises.
    By leveraging these approaches, we are able to identify, export, 
and implement those capabilities that shape the strategic calculus and 
allow us increased operational flexibility. Whether the vehicle is 
Department of Defense security cooperation, foreign military sales, or 
co-development, we will work to provide critical capabilities with 
allies and partners in a way that makes a real difference. This 
requires employing the full security cooperation toolkit including 
engagement tools, capacity building, training, professional military 
education, and our regional centers in each area of responsibility.
    Security sector assistance with the United States is not simply 
about training and equipping. It is based on a holistic concept of 
security sector reform and governance that seeks to shape partners' 
defense institutions to enshrine shared values. Our system of security 
sector assistance is premised on the rule of law, human rights, and 
transparency. This is not simply a box we check; it is a strategic 
advantage. Predatory activities by rival powers seek to win power and 
influence. The United States believes that these activities are 
shortsighted and in the long-run, they disadvantage those nations that 
accept what is sold as assistance from such powers. And many of these 
nations are coming to realize the costs of the compacts they have 
joined. The United States offers an alternative. By incorporating 
security sector reform into the security sector assistance process, our 
capacity building shapes ally and partner defense institutions in a way 
that foments long-term growth, development, and enshrinement of 
critical values.
                           sustainable impact
    For each of these investments, we emphasize the tangible change 
that will happen as a result of our efforts, and keep our focus on a 
sustained impact that outlasts the particular investment. This requires 
robust assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. We are no longer 
satisfied with measuring inputs or outputs, but rather we are taking a 
longer view of the way our partners can sustain capabilities we 
provide. To this end, we are adopting rigorous learning, encouraging 
our workforce and partners to identify past pitfalls to draw out what 
success looks like in security cooperation and tailor it to the 
partner's context. This learning will be supported by objectives that 
ensure our efforts are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and 
anchored in a time frame, ensuring the sustainability of our programs.
    The Department of Defense, in close collaboration with the 
Department of State, has also instituted a robust strategic evaluation 
agenda focused on making public key findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. We are working every day to find ways to quantify, 
interpret, and evaluate return on investment with our security 
cooperation dollars. Currently, strategic evaluations span the 
effectiveness of maritime security, institutional capacity building, 
the State Partnership Program, the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund 
(CTEF), and International Professional Military Education.
               integrated approach to how we do business
    Third, we recognize that how we do business matters in achieving 
impact. We employ an integrated approach to partnership that includes 
longer-term thinking and a whole-of-government effort to achieve 
sustained and resilient partnership, consideration of the elements 
within our control and our partner's control that determine whether the 
investment is effective, and consideration of external threats and 
third parties that may compromise the investment.
    Security cooperation programs often fall short when they do not 
take into account higher order questions of mission, organizational 
structure, and personnel. The President's Strategy on Countering 
Corruption highlights the need to integrate corruption considerations 
in our work as well, which includes our security cooperation programs. 
We are building our tools to address these issues with partners by 
improving our institutional capacity and our dialogue with partners, 
and making tough choices when partners are not willing or not able to 
make critical changes. This is especially relevant for sustainability, 
ensuring that our partnerships are resilient to shocks and stresses, 
and can endure well past the day when we are consistently investing in 
them.
    We continue to invest in the professionalization of our security 
cooperation workforce by requiring increasingly rigorous training. We 
are investing in the concept of institutionalizing the defense 
diplomacy role the Department's representatives in embassies play, 
ensuring that the partnerships they promote are consistent with our 
national security interests and values.
    What ultimately sets apart the United States in an environment of 
strategic competition are the values we represent. Our ability to 
maintain and continue to set a high bar for human rights, humanitarian 
affairs, and rule of law--including our civilian oversight of the 
military--is a critical tool we can leverage to help our partners meet 
their goals and advance those shared values. Doing so is both a moral 
and strategic imperative.
    We also take our responsibility in the humanitarian sector very 
seriously, as we play an important supporting role in the interagency 
in supporting civil authorities in countries facing crises. Whether it 
is managing crisis response capacity building under the Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster, Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, 
employing Foreign Disaster Relief, or maintaining Humanitarian Mine 
Action (HMA), the Department is committed to supporting our partners' 
efforts to provide humanitarian services to their civilian populace. 
During our recent reorganization within the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Policy), we have merged the offices of Stability 
and Humanitarian Affairs and Security Cooperation to form a new Office 
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships. 
This shift deliberately integrated humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief, and human rights with the existing processes related to 
security cooperation to emphasize the centrality of these areas of 
defense cooperation that benefit allies and partners in need. Women, 
Peace and Security; civilian protection; and respect for the rule of 
law also fall into this issue set. This integration will help us look 
more holistically at the needs and challenges our partners and their 
diverse populations face, particularly when those needs can spiral into 
crises that spill outside the country's borders.
    Of course, none of this is possible without close collaboration 
with our interagency partners. We rely heavily on our colleagues at the 
Department of State and the United States Agency for International 
Development to achieve the effects we need to achieve, whether through 
joint development and planning, supplementing and coordinating security 
programs through structured diplomatic and military engagement, or 
ensuring that security cooperation fits into broader foreign policy 
goals.
                               conclusion
    Mr. Chairman, I began by sharing with you how the U.S. network of 
alliances and partnerships is a strategic advantage that competitors 
cannot match. I conclude by sharing that this advantage is not a given. 
It requires active involvement by the entire U.S. Government, listening 
to partners' concerns and contexts, and taking a thoughtful and 
deliberate approach to how we employ our resources to meet our 
priorities. That is facilitated by good strategy, good policy, and 
close partnership among the Department of Defense, the Department of 
State, and Congress. I appreciate the Committee's leadership on this 
critical issue and thank you for the opportunity to share our vision 
for engagement with allies and partners through security cooperation.

    The Chairman. Thank you both. Your full statements will be 
included in the record. We will start a round of 5 minutes.
    Let me first start off before I get to the broader policy 
questions here, there is bipartisan support for providing 
Ukraine with fighter jets of neighboring countries that they 
would know how to fly and engage in, and I understand that the 
Polish decision may have complicated how we achieve that, but 
what is our present status in terms of exploring potential 
paths to providing the fighter jets to Ukraine?
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you, Senator, and I know that this is 
something that is very much on the committee's minds.
    Secretary Blinken actually addressed this yesterday and I 
will comment, and then happy to turn it over to Dr. Karlin as 
well.
    Look, we understand, first of all, when it comes to the 
planes that it is up to any country. It is a sovereign decision 
about the transfer of the planes and, as you noted, that there 
were some complexities with the plan that was provided and we 
heard yesterday from the Department of Defense on that 
particular proposal.
    At this point, we are consulting very closely with Poland 
and our other NATO allies on the best way forward. We are 
working hard on this and as we--as that consultation develops, 
we will stay in close touch with you and the committee to make 
sure that you have the information you need.
    The Chairman. Time is of the essence. The Ukrainians are 
getting bombarded and they do not have--at least as their 
country's leaders suggest and assert, they do not have the 
wherewithal to compete in the sky.
    I understand why NATO and the United States are not engaged 
in the no-fly zone. That has potential direct conflict with 
Russia, but I do not understand why we are not working 
expeditiously to facilitate planes to Ukraine.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator, and 
looking holistically, of course, I would just cite the 
tremendous statement by Assistant Secretary Lewis in her 
opening remarks about the unprecedented level of support to 
Ukraine. It has been extraordinary.
    The Chairman. I am talking about planes. I have no doubt 
that we have been giving enormous assistance to Ukraine. We are 
going to vote, hopefully, today, and continuing to do that. I 
am talking specifically about planes.
    Dr. Karlin. Absolutely, Senator. Thank you for that.
    We are really focusing in particular on what we see as them 
needing most--anti-armor and air defense capabilities. 
Ukraine's air force does have several squadrons of mission 
capable aircraft in this contested airspace, but what we are 
seeing is that they really need greater air defense and, 
frankly, as we and our allies and partners are rushing this 
assistance to them, we are seeing the operational impact of it 
on the battlefield every single day.
    The Chairman. You are saying they do not need airplanes?
    Dr. Karlin. What I am saying, sir, is that we are trying to 
provide everything we can that really helps them with air 
defense and we do not see significant effectiveness tied to 
those airplanes specifically. I would----
    The Chairman. If we are giving them air defense other than 
airplanes, we better give it to them soon. Horrific pictures 
yesterday, or today's news, about the bombing of a maternity 
hospital. If we cannot be moved by that, I do not know what we 
can be moved by.
    I am not going to belabor the point except to say either we 
are going to get them some air defense systems so that they can 
protect themselves with or we need to engage with them in terms 
of the jet question.
    Let me turn to some broader questions.
    Secretary Lewis, recognizing you have been on the job for 
less than 6 months, but also recognizing that you were sitting 
on this side of the dais before that, do you believe that 
State's role in setting bilateral security assistance policies 
diminished over the last several years?
    Ms. Lewis. Senator, I certainly agree that there has been a 
shift over a number of years in terms of--particularly, on 
security assistance from the State Department to the Defense 
Department.
    The Chairman. Okay. That is a diplomatic way of saying yes. 
To what extent is this a problem for U.S. foreign policy? What 
reforms--you mentioned some reforms. What should be done to 
strengthen State's security assistance programs?
    Ms. Lewis. I think, first, and one of the things I did 
mention is making sure that the State Department has 
concurrence on the Defense Department programs that overlap 
with us, which we do in a number of areas, but not 100 percent, 
and we are working on that issue.
    I think the second piece is looking at creating more 
flexibility in the State Department funding so that we can be--
have State Department be ready to respond. There is more 
flexibility in the Defense Department funding and so that 
enables them sometimes to move more quickly.
    I think those would be the top of my list in terms of two 
changes to make immediately.
    The Chairman. Dr. Karlin, do you agree that DoD security 
assistance and cooperation programs unavoidably involve the 
foreign relations of the United States?
    Dr. Karlin. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that security 
assistance to be effective has to absolutely fall under the 
rubric of our foreign policy interests.
    The Chairman. Based upon that, should not the Secretary of 
State have concurrence authority over all DoD foreign security 
assistance and cooperation activities to fulfill his statutory 
responsibility to oversee and coordinate all U.S. foreign 
policy activities?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising this issue, Mr. Chairman.
    The State Department and Department of Defense staff work 
very closely to collaborate on all of these programs.
    The Chairman. Yes. Okay. That is a nonanswer.
    The reality is that there is one person statutorily who has 
the responsibility for this assistance in terms of foreign 
policy. That is the Secretary of State.
    The Defense Department, over years and administrations, has 
taken more and more of this responsibility without the 
statutory responsibility of the Secretary being engaged, and I 
expect the State Department to get what it is rightfully 
responsible for.
    I do not care what type of brotherhood or sisterhood exists 
between the two departments. You need to meet your statutory 
responsibility and that is what the committee is going to 
continue to pursue.
    Finally, I know that--as you may know, I have long been 
concerned about the circumstances under which we provide U.S. 
assistance to Azerbaijan.
    A report that I commissioned under the GAO was released 
last week that found that over several years the State 
Department and DoD failed to meet statutory reporting 
requirements to Congress on the impact of U.S. assistance on 
the military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
    This is deeply concerning as Azerbaijan's actions in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region have led to the deaths of more than 
6,000 people, extracted a steep toll on Armenians, uprooting 
them from--thousands from their homes.
    Are you familiar with the report's findings, Secretary 
Lewis, and do you commit to review State's compliance with the 
907 waiver requirements for providing assistance to Azerbaijan?
    Ms. Lewis. Yes, Senator, I am familiar, and yes, I commit 
to do that, and I am aware that the GAO report raised concerns 
about providing additional information related to those waivers 
and we will--it is a priority for me to look into that and 
ensure that we provide the information required.
    The Chairman. It is a priority for me to conduct the 
oversight to make sure this happens. I do not want to see this 
anymore. It is really--I should not have had to commission a 
report to get what we all know, that there has been a failure 
to justify this assistance.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Look, I am going to belabor the point on airplanes some. I 
do not usually feel comfortable in speaking for the Republican 
Caucus, but I am this time, and that is we are unanimous that 
this needs to be done.
    I watched Tony the other night, who I consider a friend, 
try to explain why we are not giving them airplanes. That does 
not wash. The people on the ground are saying they need 
airplanes. There are people here in DC saying, well, this is 
going to be a problem, or that is going to be a problem.
    Give them the airplanes. I mean, we really, really need to 
do that. If it turns out they cannot use them, then so be it, 
but I would hate to be in the position where we have things 
that they can defend themselves with and we will not give them 
to them.
    In addition to that, you really also need to focus on the 
intermediate missiles. You got a spectrum there, with the 
Stingers being at the low end and the Patriots being at the 
large end, but there is half a dozen systems in between that 
they could really, really use to defend the skies.
    My plea would be get at it. We need to help these people, 
and not tomorrow, but today, this stuff needs to start moving. 
I do not know what juice you have up there to push this thing 
along, but I am telling you this is--it is an embarrassment to 
be here and be in a position where we can give them something 
to defend themselves with and not being able to do it.
    Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I would like to yield 
the rest of my time to Senator Portman, who has another 
meeting, and he wants to get a couple of words in before he 
goes.
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Senator Portman.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Karlin, you have said that you cannot give planes 
to them because they really need ``better air defense.'' We do 
not particularly think they need planes. They think they need 
planes.
    Are you saying the only reason that the Department of 
Defense is against providing these MiG-29s to Ukraine is that 
you know better than them what they need to defend themselves? 
Is that your only reason?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator 
Portman.
    Senator Portman. I need to go quickly.
    Dr. Karlin. Of course. I would say that we are trying to 
get Ukraine everything that it can use immediately in the field 
today. That is the priority.
    Senator Portman. In your judgment. Your judgment is 
overriding their judgment as to what they need? Because they 
say they need airplanes.
    Dr. Karlin. We have spoken closely with them and, to be 
frank, it is, ultimately, a sovereign decision for Poland. We 
are----
    Senator Portman. No. No. No. We have spoken closely with 
them also, including the president of Ukraine. Are you saying 
that that is the reason?
    Dr. Karlin. Senator, I will convey all of your concerns 
back. I----
    Senator Portman. No. No. Just answer my question. Are you 
saying that is the reason that you--that your judgment 
supersedes that of the Ukrainian military?
    Dr. Karlin. I am not saying that.
    Senator Portman. Is that the reason?
    Dr. Karlin. I am saying that they have multiple squadrons 
that are mission capable.
    Senator Portman. Okay. You are saying that is--because the 
other reason I have heard is that somehow this would make 
Vladimir Putin upset if we were to send these weapons. In fact, 
we already are sending Stingers and Javelins, correct?
    In fact, you just said that the air defense weapons are 
more effective and that is what we should be sending. You are 
saying that what we would like to send is something that is 
more effective that, therefore, should offend Vladimir Putin 
more----
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising----
    Senator Portman. --than the airplanes, correct?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising that.
    Senator Portman. Yet, you cannot send airplanes. What is 
the logic behind that?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising that, Senator. We are, 
indeed, providing the assistance that you highlighted, as have 
many of our allies. Indeed, there are----
    Senator Portman. Are you saying that you are concerned 
about provoking Vladimir Putin? Is that not one of your 
reasons?
    Dr. Karlin. I think escalation considerations do need to 
factor into all of these----
    Senator Portman. You are saying you are escalating with a 
weapon that you think is less effective than other weapons you 
would like to send them. How does that makes sense, logically?
    Dr. Karlin. Our intelligence community has looked at this 
issue. I am more than willing to discuss it further in a 
classified session, but I do believe that we are------
    Senator Portman. We do not need a classified session. Here 
we are. You are saying the two reasons we are now learning is, 
one, that your judgment is superseding that of the Ukrainian 
military and, two, you think that it is somehow more 
provocative, even though you are saying that you should be 
sending them and want to send them something you think is more 
effective in the field that, by definition, would be something 
the Russians would be more concerned about, correct?
    Dr. Karlin. We are giving them capabilities that they are 
using immediately. We are looking very closely at escalation 
throughout this entire----
    Senator Portman. They would use this equipment immediately. 
Their pilots are ready to go. They are repairing airfields to 
be able to use it. They are willing to take off from highways.
    I mean, they want this right away, and, again, I go back to 
what the chairman and ranking member have said about the 
situation is dire. We do not have time here. I mean, the 
maternity hospital you raised is an example.
    This is a deliberate bombing of a maternity hospital. We 
know that because Lavrov responded by saying, yes, they--
sometimes they had militia there. The bigger context is here 
this is an ally of ours. This is a sovereign country. It is 
okay for us to have Russia go in and bomb people and take all 
kinds of weapons in, but it is somehow not appropriate for us 
to help facilitate what Poland wants to do and, hopefully, 
other countries as well?
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. To my colleague, 
Senator Risch, thank you for indulging me with giving me some 
of your time.
    The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate 
that this is not a decision that is being made at the level 
that either of you are operating, but I just want to weigh in 
with all of my colleagues.
    There is bipartisan support to provide these planes. It is 
disappointing to see the reluctance on the part of the 
Administration and it is coming across as indecision and 
bickering among members of the Administration, which is not 
helpful to the cause and not helpful to the Administration.
    I hope you will share that with those you report to and get 
us a better answer. I mean, if there is a good answer for why 
we are not doing this, we all can understand that, but we have 
not gotten a good answer to the question.
    I want to go on to another issue, and thank you, Secretary 
Lewis, for your testimony today and for working with our office 
to address an issue that we have--a private company has to try 
and get answers on a commercial sale. I know you are working 
hard to help us get that resolved and I really appreciate that.
    I want to talk a little bit about the women, peace, and 
security law that we have in New Hampshire, because--or in 
Congress and in the United States, because I think it is 
important as we think about how we address conflicts, whether 
it is in Ukraine, Afghanistan, around the world, and I know 
that there are different levels of implementation of the law.
    I wonder if each of you could address where you think your 
Department is with respect to that implementation and how you 
see it working.
    Ms. Lewis. Senator Shaheen, first of all, I really want to 
thank you for your leadership on this issue. It truly is 
inspirational to all of us, and I am always happy to work with 
your office to try to resolve any pending issues before the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and I know we talked about 
this a little bit in my nomination hearing.
    I want to highlight three pieces of work that we have 
worked on specifically under the Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs.
    First of all, let me start talking about the Global Peace 
Operations Initiative. We call it GPOI. It is the world's 
largest peace operations capacity building program, and we have 
partnered with more than 50 countries that work with the U.N. 
and the African Union peacekeepers to support women's 
participation and leadership in peace operations, to train 
women peacekeepers, and to integrate gender-related topics 
focused on gender and women's participation in peace 
operations.
    I am also going to mention something that sounds mundane, 
but is incredibly important. Although through GPOI, PM 
continues to work to remove barriers to women's participation 
in training through gender-inclusive facility upgrades, 
including accommodations, bathrooms, and showers at partners' 
peace operations training centers. These are the kinds of 
things that can keep women from being able to participate.
    Senator Shaheen. Can I just interrupt you for a minute?
    Ms. Lewis. Of course.
    Senator Shaheen. Because I think one of the things that is 
missed sometimes is why this is important both for security. Do 
you want to speak to that?
    Ms. Lewis. Absolutely. If we do not have women, who are 50 
percent of the population, participating on security-related 
issues then we miss a whole host of important issues. Women 
understand what is going on in their communities.
    They understand, particularly in peacekeeping operations, 
how to help keep people safe, including women and children, and 
they bring a unique lens and vision to security-related issues.
    If we do not have women at the table, often we miss key 
things that make differences like, again, as we are looking at 
peacekeeping operations making sure that women's rights are 
respected. This is not just important to women. This is 
important to the whole community.
    Senator Shaheen. I have only got a few seconds left.
    Dr. Karlin, I wonder if you could speak to what DoD is 
doing in this area.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator, 
especially serendipitously during the week of International 
Women's Day.
    I very much agree with everything Assistant Secretary Lewis 
said and, indeed, we have a number of efforts across our 
combatant commands to ensure that women, peace, and security 
issues are really looped into what they are doing.
    I think Assistant Secretary Lewis made the argument exactly 
right. We have got to involve the entire populations that they 
are bought in to the meaningful change that we all seek. Thank 
you.
    Senator Shaheen. I would just point out that we have very 
good data that shows when women are bought in and they are at 
the table that those negotiations last longer and are more 
stable, and that is really important. There are very good data-
driven reasons why this makes sense.
    Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I fully concur 
with the introductory comments made by the chairman and the 
ranking member and by Senator Portman and Senator Shaheen.
    I simply do not understand the logic for not getting the 
MiGs to the Ukrainians immediately. There is no logic which has 
been provided to this committee or to the nation for the lack 
of rapidity in making this decision and getting them the MiGs.
    It makes no sense. If there are people in the 
Administration that know the answer, I would suggest we get the 
occasion to meet with them, perhaps in a classified setting, 
but we need to know the reason why those MiGs have not been 
transferred already. I believe there is a sentiment that we are 
fearful about what Putin might do and what he might consider as 
an escalation. It is time for him to be fearful of what we 
might do.
    The only way to get Putin to act in a way that may be able 
to save lives of Ukrainians is if he fears us more than we fear 
him, and the truth of the matter is that his military is 
exposed in Ukraine--bogged down, unfed, without fuel. They are 
in a very precarious position. He has got to think about what 
happens if he provokes us because they could be obliterated by 
the forces of NATO.
    I would suggest that the continued--we have had this 
discussion now day after day after day of people from the State 
Department like yourself saying we are talking, we are 
considering.
    This is war. People are dying. We need to get this aircraft 
immediately to the people of Ukraine. That is what they are 
asking for.
    By the way, the idea that somehow we are calculating what 
is effective for them to run their war and that our Stingers 
and our Javelins are better than our aircraft, it makes no 
sense at all.
    They are better at running their own war. They know what 
the conditions of the ground are. They are there. We are not. 
Further, our A-10s would help. We need to get them A-10s. That 
is the aircraft that is really ideally designed for this kind 
of warfare. Why are we dithering on that as well?
    This makes no sense to me at all, and I would respectfully 
request that as you return to the State Department you indicate 
to them that we, this committee, deserve a response, because as 
Senator Shaheen has said, our caucuses--both sides of the 
aisle--are united on this. Get them the aircraft.
    I would also note that I would anticipate that there are 
going to be some adjustments in our military strategy with 
regards to Moldova, Georgia, the Balkans.
    What changes do you see with regards to arms and support 
going to other nations that Putin has his eyes on? Because it 
is now very clear, I think, to the entire world that this is a 
person who is trying to reestablish the old, if you will, 
boundaries of the Soviet Union and bring more and more nations 
under his control, and that is unacceptable.
    What has happened in Ukraine could spread to other places. 
What do we do militarily to prepare them for or to make them 
less vulnerable to his attack?
    Ms. Lewis. Senator Romney, thank you for that question and 
for your leadership on this issue.
    We have been thinking through exactly this question that 
you are raising, which is how to make sure the Eastern Flank is 
shored up.
    One of the things I know is that in the CR that, I think, 
is moving quickly there is about another $200 million in 
presidential drawdown authority and then, I think, when the 
final appropriations passes another significant--potentially, 
billions, and we want to----
    Senator Romney. I was going to say these are small numbers, 
very small numbers for helping these nations defend themselves.
    Ms. Lewis. I think the good news is there are bigger 
numbers in the appropriations bill--the Omni. I know there is 
over $3 billion there in presidential drawdown assistance and 
another $500 million in foreign military funds, and we can use 
those funds as well for the Eastern Flank countries.
    We have already started working on exactly what their needs 
are to make sure that they are shored up and I think lessons 
learned from this conflict will apply in terms of both training 
and the type of equipment they need.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I did read somewhere that--I do not know if it is Moldova 
now looking for arms, and we need to have a discussion with 
them as to what they think they need or not, but I agree with 
the senator.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank both of 
you for your testimony today.
    Assistant Secretary Karlin, you have written a book on the 
challenges of building militaries in fragile states.
    I chair the Africa Subcommittee, and perhaps there is no 
other area where those challenges are greater, especially with 
respect to the Sahel region, which has seen seven successful or 
attempted coups in just the last 18 months, and that is despite 
an influx of U.S. security assistance funds.
    In fact, the military officers alleged to have received 
U.S.-funded training have been implicated in several of these 
coups.
    Now, I am historically and still a supporter of the IMET 
program, but if you look at the sort of oversight on some of 
these countries and IMET programs over the years, you find big 
shortcomings.
    Back in 2011, a GAO report found that civil-military 
relations was identified as a priority for IMET training in 
only one-third of the most repressive African states.
    More recently, in 2019, a GAO report found, ``DoD does not 
systematically track human rights training, including civil-
military relations,'' and as a result, GAO could not fully 
report on this in 2019.
    My question is pretty simple. You would agree that it is 
not a good idea for the United States to be providing training 
to people who then turn around and use that training to engage 
in military coups, right?
    Dr. Karlin. Senator, I very much share your concern about 
the examples that you raised and, indeed, our training 
emphasizes the need for the appropriate role of the military in 
society.
    When these sorts of events do occur, as you know, we 
immediately consult with our colleagues at the State Department 
to pause and----
    Senator Van Hollen. Right. What have you done since 2019 
specifically to both provide greater reporting that indicates 
it is a priority and do you dispute the 2011 finding that it is 
not a priority in many of your programs?
    Dr. Karlin. Senator, thank you for raising this issue. We 
have, indeed, focused in particular on lessons learned so that 
when these events happen we can step back and try to figure out 
why did they occur, what do we need to do.
    What we have also seen with our IMET training, as you 
highlighted, is that it often leads to leaders of the military, 
say, chiefs of defense or service chiefs. Indeed, I think there 
is more than 1,100 international PME alumni who have served in 
those roles.
    Senator Van Hollen. Madam Assistant Secretary, I am not 
disputing the overall benefits of the IMET program. Back in the 
1980s, I used to write justifications for the IMET program at 
the Defense--what was then the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency.
    I am not disputing the overall value of the program, but 
clearly a program that at least is applied to countries in 
Africa ends up training people who then engage in military 
coups, that cannot be defined as a success.
    I am going to ask you beyond this hearing to get back to us 
with specifically what additional measures you are taking to 
address the shortcomings that were identified in both the 2011 
and 2009 GAO reports. Is that all right?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you, Senator. I would welcome doing so.
    I would just say, broadly, one of the things that has 
become clear to us is that we cannot take an Excel spreadsheet 
approach to how we do security cooperation and I think the 
examples you are highlighting really exemplify that.
    Senator Van Hollen. No, I appreciate that.
    Now, the IMET program is subject to the Leahy Law 
disclosure and reporting requirements and human rights 
requirements, but we also provide forms of security assistance 
in an operational setting under Section 127(e) of Title 10. 
Would you agree that with respect to those engagements we 
should also vet them to ensure that the participants have not 
engaged previously in gross violations of human rights?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator. 
Indeed, as you say, Leahy vetting is not required. However, 
there is a security vetting process that this does go through.
    Senator Van Hollen. Would you have any objection if we 
applied a Leahy Law vetting requirement subject to a waiver?
    Dr. Karlin. I would welcome working with my colleagues at 
the State Department to look at this issue.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay, because we are working with some 
of our colleagues in the House right now and submitted an 
amendment to the last NDAA. It was not adopted, but I look 
forward to working with you and your colleagues at the State 
Department as well on this issue because I think, given the 
track record, especially in the Sahel, we have more questions 
than answers at this point.
    Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
    I have seen reports in the press that Putin's invasion of 
Ukraine has prompted a further delay in internal assessment of 
the much-anticipated National Security Strategy and National 
Defense Strategy.
    Now, I recognize the realities of our current security 
environment and I understand that those realities sometimes 
intervene in the policy planning process, but we cannot permit 
Vladimir Putin's reckless actions to undermine our long-term 
strategic imperatives in the Indo-Pacific.
    Ms. Karlin, as the official responsible for developing the 
NDS and matching ends with means, can you commit that changes 
to our strategy in Europe will not undermine both our 
commitments to Taiwan and our efforts to increase their 
resistance to the Chinese Communist Party's pressure, including 
their defensive military capabilities?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for raising this issue, 
Senator.
    I cannot speak to the National Security Strategy, but on 
the National Defense Strategy, I can assure you that we have 
been working very hard at it and, indeed, thanks to the 
tremendous work of the U.S. intelligence community, we have 
been all quite cognizant of Russia's aggression in Europe for 
months now, in fact.
    I can also assure you that, as Secretary Austin has said, 
China is the pacing challenge for the U.S. Department of 
Defense. We are, of course, accounting for Russian aggression 
as well.
    Finally, regarding support for Taiwan, it is absolutely a 
priority to ensure that Taiwan is getting the asymmetric 
capabilities that it needs that is most appropriate for the 
challenge that it faces.
    Thank you.
    Senator Young. I could not agree more. Thank you for your 
response.
    I was encouraged to hear the President recently emphasize 
the need for bolstering Taiwan's defenses through the use of 
asymmetric weapons, including Harpoon weapons--the anti-ship 
weapons. That seems appropriate to me. We need to move more in 
that direction is my assessment.
    As a further means of follow up, we are a decade removed 
from the so-called pivot to Asia. It has been--to a great 
extent it has been a rhetorical pivot, but some very concrete 
initiatives have taken place.
    It is clear that resources did not fully pursue the 
strategy--did not follow the strategy, especially with respect 
to security assistance, though.
    Ms. Lewis, how are you prioritizing the flow of security 
assistance to the Indo-Pacific and fixing the imbalance that 
currently exists between how we support partners in East Asia 
versus partners in other regions?
    Ms. Lewis. First of all, Senator Young, thank you for that 
question, and I do think, as you point out, that we really need 
to focus on our security assistance to the Indo-Pacific--to the 
region.
    Let me answer your question specifically. One of the 
challenges that we have, which I pointed out in my initial 
testimony, is most--I think it is 93 percent--of our funding is 
actually earmarked in the FMF category, which gives us little 
flexibility to make those kinds of changes. Again, something we 
are happy to work with you on.
    What I would say is I look at this from, I want to 
highlight, three different ways to look at this. One is Taiwan 
specifically, and I think, as you know, our support remains 
rock solid.
    We have provided $18 billion to Taiwan since 2017 in 
security assistance and then an additional through commercial 
sales, which are--we regulate commercial sales in my bureau--
another $2.3 billion to Taiwan since 2017, and very focused on 
the asymmetric weapons you are talking about, which we can talk 
about in more detail.
    I think we both have to focus on the Indo-Pacific and the 
whole region, developing additional partnerships with Japan, 
who purchased the F-35--the Philippines, Vietnam, also AUKUS.
    Then the last piece, which I would be remiss in not 
mentioning, is I actually think as we look at China as the 
pacing challenge, we also need to look at countries in Africa 
and in Latin America to deepen and strengthen our security 
relationships there because China is focused on those regions 
as well.
    Senator Young. Indeed. You mentioned--it is a sobering 
figure--93 percent of FMS assistance is earmarked. Not a lot of 
flexibility there. Every Administration wants more flexibility. 
Every congressional body wants more of a say.
    Do we need to just increase the top line? Could that be a 
solution?
    Ms. Lewis. In addition, that could be a solution.
    Senator Young. Okay. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin  [presiding]. Chairman Menendez will be back 
in a moment so I have the gavel. I will recognize myself.
    Secretary Lewis, it is great to see you back in our 
committee.
    Dr. Karlin, welcome. Wonderful to have both of you before 
us.
    I listened to the exchanges in regards to the fighter jets. 
I raised that issue with Secretary Nuland during our hearing on 
Ukraine itself, and my request is please keep us informed as to 
how this process is unfolding.
    You see the concern on both sides of the aisle to make sure 
that we do everything we can to help the Ukrainians defend 
themselves.
    My request is that you provide us timely information--if it 
needs to be in a classified setting, in a classified setting--
as to how we can make sure that we provide everything we 
possibly can either directly or through our allies to help the 
Ukrainians in their moment of need, and timely action is 
critically important.
    I want to go to a subject that both of you talked about and 
that is that human rights is the bedrock centerpiece of our 
security assistance goals.
    Both of you mentioned that in your opening statements, but 
we did not talk too much in specifics. I would add to that we 
want to make sure that our security assistance is not used to 
further corruption in corrupt regimes, and then also, of 
course, we had the Leahy rules in regards to requirements in 
regards to assistance.
    Secretary Lewis, can you just tell us how the Biden 
administration is carrying out that commitment, that in our 
security assistance our values in promoting human rights and 
good governance, anti-corruption, are being advanced?
    Ms. Lewis. Senator, thank you for this question, and I know 
that you personally have worked on this issue for your entire 
time in Congress and really have played a leadership role here 
in the Senate.
    I want to walk through a few things and then take a minute 
specifically to talk more about security sector governance, 
which I really highlight in my written testimony in more 
detail.
    As you know, the Administration is putting together a new 
conventional arms transfer policy, which is the policy that 
governs the work of the whole interagency on security 
assistance and cooperation, and what we are including in that 
is a renewed focus on human rights.
    I think this is absolutely critical and reflective of the 
President's commitment, and so we look forward to working with 
you and briefing you on the details of that as that moves 
forward. One, we have got to get the policy governing it right.
    The second thing I really want to focus on is security 
sector governance and the reason why, which you highlight, is 
to me, security sector governance--it is the core of bringing 
together democracy, anti-corruption, human rights, and it is 
the reason I focused on it so much in my testimony.
    If we are working with security sectors, if we are working 
with the ministry of defense, and through our training, our 
cooperation, we include simple things like working on 
procurement, which reduces corruption, making sure that it has 
integrated--human rights and the rule of law are integrated 
into the training they receive from us and that it builds into 
their entire security sector, not just one or two people, that 
human rights are part of the discussion from the beginning, 
middle, and end.
    I think this is a real need for us to shift our focus in 
this way. I have only been here 4 or 5 months, but I have 
already tasked my team to looking at this and developing it 
further.
    The last piece I would say on this is for the State 
Department to do security sector governance right and for PM to 
do that right and for us to get human rights and anti-
corruption right we have to be working with USAID, the Justice 
Department, and other parts of the State Department because 
what we are talking about is all of those pieces working 
together trying to create rule of law, respect for human 
rights, and good governance in a country, and so that also 
requires coordination.
    Senator Cardin. Dr. Karlin, I want to just drill down a 
little bit on what Secretary Lewis is saying. I recognize the 
sincerity of our Commander-in-Chief on this issue. He talks 
about it frequently. Secretary Blinken has talked about this 
frequently.
    In the Department of Defense, I do not challenge the 
Secretary's commitment on the subject, but it is tough to get 
the players to recognize that good governance, human rights, 
are a priority when they are dealing with a more narrow focus 
objective that may have a military aspect to it and they do not 
focus on the human rights or governance factor.
    How can you show leadership to make sure that we do carry 
out our commitment to human rights and good governance as part 
of our security assistance program?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator, and 
for your leadership on it.
    Look, it is not just the right thing to do. It is critical 
to the efficacy of our efforts so it has to be central.
    I can assure you that we have emphasized that throughout 
the Defense Department, and when we are talking with partners 
with whom these are very real concerns, I can very much pledge 
to you this is always on the agenda and we are always raising 
it, again, because it is not just the right thing to do, it 
actually has a direct relationship to the efficacy of what we 
are all trying to achieve.
    Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both 
of you for being here with us today.
    I think I am going to begin my questioning with Dr. Karlin. 
It is good to see you again.
    I want to explore a little bit more the issue in Ukraine 
and what the options really are for us to provide additional 
assistance. My concern is I think there is a real desire on the 
part of a lot of the members here in Congress, me included, to 
provide as much additional assistance as possible to Ukraine.
    Clearly, the attacks on their country are--there is no 
reason for it. They are the innocent victim of an attack by 
Putin who is, clearly, in the wrong, and the human atrocities 
that are there are something which the American people simply 
are frustrated with, angered by, and, as usual, want to do 
something about.
    Yet, at the same time, we recognize that we have a nuclear-
armed aggressor and we have to be well aware of that as we make 
decisions about how to proceed.
    One of the items that has been discussed is the possibility 
of using Polish MiG-29s and they, as a member of NATO, have 
what are now--and I think this is fair to say--equipment which 
is designed to fight on behalf of NATO.
    I recognize that we are in an unclassified session and so 
the answers back and forth may be a little bit broader than 
what we would like to have, but I think it is important for the 
American public to hear and our colleagues to hear the 
challenges that we have in getting those, first of all, into 
the appropriate hands and, second of all, protecting them and 
making them effective.
    Dr. Karlin, can we walk through this a little bit in terms 
of just the logistics of what it takes to get a MiG-29 out of 
Poland, get it prepared, getting the pilots that would be 
Ukrainian to be able to get them somewhere and then to find 
locations within Ukraine in which they could safely land, be 
equipped to attack, find the appropriate equipment or weapon 
systems, and then the command and control to get it to where 
they could actually be effective?
    Can you talk us through that a little bit, please?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Senator. It is good to see 
you again, and I really appreciate all of your cooperation and 
leadership in all of us together being able to support Ukraine 
in, really, this unprecedented way.
    I would just underscore, as we all know, that there is only 
one man who is responsible for the despicable and horrific 
situation that we are seeing in Ukraine and that is Mr. Putin.
    I really appreciate your point on this issue of these MiGs 
and, of course, it is a sovereign decision by Poland. We have 
had many, many discussions with them and with other allies on 
it, but exactly as you highlighted, there is a whole lot of 
logistics that would have to happen should Poland wish to 
transfer them, again, should they wish to do so. It is up to 
them, rather, than of course them going through us.
    We are really focused on what Ukraine's military can use 
today immediately on the field and, frankly, we are seeing the 
extraordinary impact of that paired with the Ukrainian people's 
extraordinary willingness to fight against this horrific 
Russian aggression.
    Senator Rounds. Look, let me drill down to this a little 
bit because I think there is ways to work it through that if 
they wanted to deliver it to another base that we had, that is 
one thing that I do not have an objection to that.
    I am concerned about the actual logistics, the time frames 
that we are talking about to prepare the aircraft to actually 
be able to be used there and the equipment that would go with 
it--the systems, the weapon systems that would be identified, 
and then protecting those MiG-29s once we got there.
    Are you aware of airports that are currently in a position 
to receive them and do we have the ground assets to protect 
those? Does Ukraine have the ground assets to protect those 
aircraft once they are in Ukraine?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you. While I cannot speak to kind of 
specific bases, what I can tell you is that right now, today, 
Ukraine's air force does have several squadrons of mission 
capable aircraft, but we really have not seen that playing a 
massive role in the conflict.
    What we have seen is what they have been doing on air 
defense. That has really helped them have a pretty major impact 
on Russia's efforts to contest this airspace.
    Senator Rounds. I just think it is important that we do 
everything we can in an efficient manner and deliver whatever 
weapon systems we possibly can to help Ukrainians in their 
fight against this Russian aggression, and if it means that we 
can get these in in an expedited manner, that would be great. 
It would be a really good thing.
    At the same time, if there are other weapon systems that 
may need to be delivered that could have more effect I think we 
should do that as well as quickly as possible, but thank you 
very much for the discussion.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me, first, just associate myself with the comments and, 
I think, a question that you posed in the opening round, and I 
will not initially have a question on this because I am not 
sure that we can get a lot of helpful input from our panel on 
this question. The decision is much--is made at a slightly 
higher pay grade than those that are testifying here today.
    This transition of security assistance away from the 
Department of State to the Department of Defense is certainly 
something that this committee needs to be aware of and care 
deeply about.
    According to one study, the DoD manages 48 of the 50 new 
security assistance programs that were created after the 9/11 
attacks, and out of the 107 existing security assistance 
programs today, DoD manages 87--a whopping 81 percent of those 
programs. That is a fundamental transition from the way in 
which we used to manage security assistance.
    My worry is that it takes out of the equation the people 
who have the clearest and most important visibility on the 
ground as to the impact of that security assistance and those 
transfers, and so I join with the chairman in raising concerns.
    As for this question of the transfer of MiGs that has been 
raised by a number of colleagues here, I will put up my bona 
fides supporting Ukraine's sovereignty against anybody's. I 
have been there as many times as anybody on this committee.
    At the same time, I do think we need to recognize the 
extraordinary moment that we are in today. Never before has the 
United States and Russia been in this close military conduct, 
whether it was Afghanistan or Czechoslovakia or Hungary.
    When Russian forces during the Cold War moved into 
sovereign nations, the United States in those instances did not 
overtly support the forces fighting on the other side.
    Now, you can claim that was a mistake, but this is an 
unprecedented moment, and I think the Administration is wise to 
make sure that we are providing support to Ukraine based on 
whether or not it supports the outcomes we seek to achieve, 
which is an end to the war, rather than just in service of 
blind escalation or momentum.
    I appreciate the thought that the Administration is putting 
into this question of how and if we flow MiG fighter jets or 
other very expensive advanced systems.
    In the very small time I have left, I do want to ask one 
question and that is one that I do not know that has been 
covered here, which is we just spent $87 billion in military 
assistance over 20 years in Afghanistan and the army that we 
supported went up in smoke overnight.
    That is an extraordinary waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars and 
it mirrors a smaller, but similar investment we made from 2003 
to 2014 in the Iraqi military, who disintegrated when they 
faced the prospect of a fight against ISIS.
    Clearly, there is something very wrong with the way in 
which we are flowing military assistance to partner countries, 
especially in complicated war zones.
    I have got a minute and 10 seconds, so maybe you can just 
preview some lessons that we have learned or the process by 
which we are going to learn lessons from all of the money that 
we have wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Ms. Lewis. Senator, I will be brief so that Dr. Karlin can 
jump in as well.
    I think we do need to learn lessons. We need to make sure, 
as I was just saying to Senator Cardin, that when we provide 
security assistance we also look not just at train and equip, 
but we look at other things like how the ministries of defense 
operate, is there security sector governance, are we creating 
an infrastructure that is going to actually work.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising this issue, Senator, and 
I can assure you that the Department of Defense is in the 
process of commissioning a study on this exact issue.
    I will just say, in line with Assistant Secretary Lewis, it 
is really important that when we look at these efforts we spend 
time assessing political will and we do not take an Excel 
spreadsheet approach to building partner militaries.
    That misses the higher order issues that are deeply 
relevant to security sector governance that will fundamentally 
show us the extent to which we can, ultimately, be successful 
or not with a partner.
    Thank you.
    Senator Murphy. In Iraq, the last time I was there we were 
spending four times as much money on security assistance as we 
were on nonsecurity assistance, and what Afghanistan taught us, 
amongst many things, is that if you have a fundamentally 
corrupt government then all the money you are flowing into the 
military is likely wasted in the end because that government 
cannot stand unless the military cannot stand.
    It also speaks to rebalancing the way in which we put money 
into conflict zones to not think that military assistance alone 
does the job. You have got to be building sustainable 
governments that serve the public interests in order to make 
your security assistance matter and be effective.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy, I would like to follow up on the question 
you raised with Assistant Secretary Lewis, but before that I 
would just like to reach out to Assistant Secretary Karlin to 
follow up on Senator Rounds' questions.
    As I observed the situation with Poland's offer to transfer 
MiG-29s, initially, Secretary Blinken greenlighted that and 
then we saw the Department of Defense walk that back.
    My request of you would be that if there is new 
intelligence, if there is a new assessment, if you could 
arrange to work with this committee in the appropriate setting 
to share with us what is driving that decision.
    I understand there are a number of operational and 
logistical considerations that must be relevant, but I would 
appreciate your help in getting that information, again, in an 
appropriate setting to us so I can understand how we can have 
such a difference of opinion occur or a difference in 
direction, I should say, occur in such a short period.
    To Senator Murphy's point, Assistant Secretary Lewis, you 
and I have worked a great deal on this topic and that is 
foreign military sales. Certain of our allies are very 
important partners.
    When I served as ambassador to Japan, I put a great deal of 
time into this, working not only with the DoD, the State 
Department, the Department of Commerce, but also with the 
United States Senate, trying to find ways to accelerate the 
time line for foreign military sales.
    What I learned when I was serving in my previous role is 
that the time line is far too long to get our allies equipped 
with the latest technology that they would desire to have and 
that we would desire for them to have.
    Given the rate of technology development that is occurring 
right now, these time lines that are denominated in years are 
far too long and the bureaucratic paperwork consumes more than 
the production time, typically, to get this done.
    Again, Assistant Secretary Lewis, you and I have talked a 
great deal about this. I would be very interested to have you 
highlight for us the major areas where you think we could work 
together to compress this time line to make ourselves more 
interoperable with our allies to get more leverage out of our 
own investment in military defense technology because our 
allies are going to be more interoperable and more capable if 
we can get this done faster.
    Ms. Lewis. Senator, I really appreciate the question and, 
frankly, your leadership on this has been extraordinary and I 
appreciate the time we have gotten to spend together on this. I 
am going to tick through a few things, and happy to discuss in 
more detail.
    We really learned some lessons from the work you did in 
Japan, frankly, which was, number one, we have got to make sure 
that our two systems are working together and what we 
discovered in Japan and what we see in other places is 
sometimes we literally have things that sound mundane, but 
really make big differences. Different procurement time lines--
we have got to get those lined up.
    The second thing we have to do is make sure that we have 
the security agreements in place so that when we are ready to 
move things are ready to go.
    The third piece, which, I think, we are going to need to 
work on over time is, really, looking at the time lines both as 
things move through DoD. There is a long time line in sort of 
the upfront process. We have worked very hard to improve the 
time lines on our side and I know often we are able to move 
things much more quickly, depending on the system.
    Then, finally, as you talked about and we talked about 
previously, we are working with our companies who right now are 
facing some--there are some real production time line 
challenges. Some of that is due to COVID. Some of that we need 
to continue to work with them on.
    Senator Hagerty. I appreciate that. I think, given the fact 
that we are about to vote on a significant military budget, we 
need to be looking for every opportunity we possibly can to 
increase the efficiency of how our budget is deployed and, 
again, opportunities to leverage our military expenditures with 
our allies so that they are as interoperable as they possibly 
can be so that they have the latest technology that they are 
equipped to operate.
    I think that increases our broader footprint. The example 
in Ukraine and our need to work with our partners could not be 
more glaring, and I very much appreciate the effort that you 
and your team have put forward.
    Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Lewis.
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Is there any other--no? Okay. Let 
me close.
    Secretary Karlin, let me go back. You have now, in various 
answers to members' questions, alluded to the fact that Ukraine 
has several squadrons. I understand a squadron to be anywhere 
between 12 and 24 aircraft.
    If there are several squadrons, are you suggesting that the 
Ukrainians have aircraft that they are not presently using?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    What I am focusing on is that the materiel we have given 
Ukraine to help protect its population is, quite literally, 
being used every day and that is really what we are trying to 
prioritize. Those systems that we are seeing are having this 
effect and that they are immediately able to get out into the 
field.
    As you know, many of our allies have also given assistance 
and those are, of course, sovereign decisions.
    The Chairman. With all due respect, you have perfected the 
nonanswer so let me try again. The only thing is that I have 
endless time so we will get to an answer that is responsive.
    You said, in answer to several members' questions, Ukraine 
has several squadrons of aircraft. Now, that would imply that 
they have aircraft that they are not using.
    Is that a correct or incorrect statement?
    Dr. Karlin. I think it is probably better to get that 
answer from Ukraine. I would not want to speak, of course, for 
a sovereign government, but we have not seen them employing 
those aircraft to the extent that one might suggest.
    The Chairman. All right. Because even though we do not 
expect you to speak for a sovereign government, we have our own 
intelligence. You have your own assessments, and this is not--
Putin understands what they have and do not have and what they 
are using and not using so we are not giving away anything that 
is truly classified, at the end of the day. How many squadrons 
do they have, to our knowledge?
    Dr. Karlin. They have several squadrons. I do not know that 
I am best suited to give you the specifics beyond that.
    The Chairman. Is several two? Three? Four?
    Dr. Karlin. It is a handful. I do not know that I am best 
suited to give you more beyond that. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Here is the problem. Either there is a very 
good reason that the Administration needs to explain as to why 
we should not be facilitating fighter jets to Ukraine so they 
can defend themselves over the air space--if that happens to be 
that they have dozens of fighter jets that they are not using 
and then we get to the heart of why they are not using it, then 
that might be an explanation. If they need some type of 
logistical support to take the aircraft that they have to put 
into space that might be another answer.
    Both of your departments need to give us an insight. If 
that has to be in a classified setting, so be it, but it has to 
have an insight. There has to be an answer. Nonanswers to 
questions are not answers. Do we understand each other?
    Ms. Lewis. Yes. We will take that back, Senator. We 
certainly appreciate the questions that you are asking and the 
insight that you need to have into----
    The Chairman. Secretary Karlin, do we understand each 
other?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Senator. Yes, and as 
Assistant Secretary Lewis said, we will take back your 
concerns.

[Editor's note.--Dr. Karlin's response to the Chairman's 
request was given during a classified briefing.]

    The Chairman. Okay. When you take back my concerns, I would 
like to get an answer to my concerns.
    Senator Hagerty. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to 
associate myself with your comments, too, and say that I would 
very much----
    The Chairman. This committee has jurisdiction over arms 
sales. I do not like using that jurisdiction in a way that does 
not facilitate our foreign policy and national interest and 
security, but if I cannot get answers to the fundamental 
questions, then I will.
    There may be a perfectly valid and good reason I think all 
of us should know so we can pivot to something else, but if 
there is no perfectly valid and good reason, then we need to 
know that, too.
    Secretary Lewis, do you agree that U.S. security assistance 
needs a comprehensive strategy for each recipient country, 
integrating all relevant aspects of U.S. security and foreign 
assistance?
    Ms. Lewis. Yes.
    The Chairman. If so, then do you agree that the State 
Department is the right agency to lead and coordinate those 
efforts?
    Ms. Lewis. Yes, and, obviously, in coordination with other 
departments.
    The Chairman. Okay. Let us talk about that. Within State, 
for example, there are bureaus and offices that also do 
security assistance of various sorts. I am not convinced that 
they are all coordinated with your particular department.
    Should there not be an overall coordination to oversee and 
integrate State's various programs as well as those of other 
agencies like DoD and USAID?
    Ms. Lewis. Senator, I agree that we need to make sure that 
we are coordinated and, as you point out, there are other parts 
of the State Department that work on these issues.
    Right now, we are regularly interacting with them. They 
weigh in, give opinions as we work through sales, as we work on 
all of these issues, but happy to discuss further with you if 
you have additional ideas on improving coordination.
    The Chairman. We do. Do you feel that your position is 
empowered to do that or should it fall to (T)?
    Ms. Lewis. I am not going to comment here where I think 
that should fall. Obviously, (T) as you know, is the under 
secretary who oversees my bureau. I think our bureau does an 
excellent job at what we do.
    The Chairman. Okay. We are going to follow it up with you 
because we think that there is better coordination to be had.
    How is State and DoD's cooperation on DoD Section 333 
programs and other security assistance programs?
    Ms. Lewis. I would say we have excellent coordination. We 
work really hand-in-glove with them. I would say that as we 
look at the increases in funding that are going to be coming, 
we need to make sure that we have a workforce that is large 
enough and trained enough to deal with these increases coming 
our way.
    The Chairman. Does State have the ability to veto or 
significantly alter DoD's assistance programs in planning or in 
implementation if it feels that significant foreign policy 
priorities are not being appropriately reflected?
    Ms. Lewis. We do have that authority, yes. Let me clarify. 
Over some of the programs where we have concurrence, we have 
that authority.
    The Chairman. Yes. Okay. Have authority. Do you have the 
ability?
    Ms. Lewis. Yes.
    The Chairman. Yes? Okay. Let me ask one last round of 
questions on--that are focused on human rights.
    A 2019 Government Accountability Office--GAO--report found 
shortcomings in tracking and evaluating human rights-related 
training for foreign security forces that are required under 
DoD Section 333--required--State's international military 
education and training and other security assistance and 
security cooperation authorities.
    Some prior GAO reports have also found inconsistent 
implementation of required Leahy Law human rights vetting 
processes for security assistance recipients.
    How, if at all, have State and DoD improved implementation 
of these statutory requirements?
    Ms. Lewis. I am glad you raised this issue because this is 
one of the things that I have been focused on since arriving at 
the Department. We have worked to improve these processes.
    One of the ways as, I think, you know is we coordinate with 
the bureau that also oversees human rights to make sure that 
when we are supplying the security assistance that is provided 
that has to be vetted under the Leahy Law that we are tracking, 
making sure we know if there are units that have issues and 
making sure that the funding would not go to them.
    I think we have seen improvements. There is always more to 
do and I will continue to be focused on that.
    The Chairman. DoD?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you for raising this, Mr. Chairman.
    I would absolutely align myself with Assistant Secretary 
Lewis' comments. We are indeed making a lot of progress to 
ensure that we are tracking, and the moment that we see 
anything concerning either with a unit or with an individual we 
are immediately stepping back to try to understand what is 
happening and if we do need to, ultimately, pause or suspend 
such cooperation.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Have you both evaluated the effectiveness of 
human rights training?
    Ms. Lewis. That is something we are looking at right now. I 
think one of the things--to go back to my opening statement, I 
think human rights training is important in and of itself, but 
it also has to be broader than that, and that is why I am 
focused on this question of security sector governance.
    It is not just about the training that we provide for 
individuals or individual units. It has to be part of the 
entire way the ministry of defense operates.
    Dr. Karlin. Mr. Chairman, I would completely agree with 
Assistant Secretary Lewis' comments. It is not just that human 
rights operating appropriately for a military in that vein is 
nice to have. Frankly, it is directly related to that 
military's effectiveness.
    If a population cannot trust its military to treat it 
appropriately, it is probably not going to feel comfortable 
with how its military is exerting its sovereignty over its 
territory.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. All right. Then, finally, my understanding 
from the testimony I heard here today, partly in response to 
answers, is that the United States and--the United States 
believes that Taiwan should be focused on acquiring more 
asymmetric military capabilities to offset Chinese military 
superiority, should it invade, rather than acquiring more 
conventional military weapon systems. Is that a correct 
statement?
    Ms. Lewis. Senator, I am very much glad you raised that 
issue. I think the lessons learned and we are continuing to 
learn from Ukraine is exactly that. What we believe is that 
Taiwan needs to focus, and let me define asymmetric. It needs 
to be cost-effective, mobile, resilient, and decentralized 
defensive systems.
    I think we have seen those used to great effect in Ukraine. 
We are looking at things like ISR systems, short-range air 
defense systems, naval sea mines, and coastal defense and 
cruise missiles.
    The other piece I would add to that is what we call reserve 
reform, which, really, what we have seen in Ukraine is the 
population has to be ready to fight.
    Obviously, we do not want there to be a conflict in Taiwan, 
but what they are doing is taking steps to address this issue.
    They have just created the establishment of an all-out 
defense mobilization organization and they are working with our 
National Guard as they develop this program.
    The Chairman. Does the United States and Taiwan have a 
shared understanding in operational definition for asymmetric?
    Ms. Lewis. We are working on that with them today. I think 
we have a much deeper understanding of that right now.
    The Chairman. That is critical if we are going to have a 
combined understanding of what asymmetric means.
    Doctor, what was the last time the Department of Defense 
and the Taiwan MND undertook a joint assessment of its needs?
    Dr. Karlin. Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you the exact date, 
but I can assure you there are very regular consultations on 
this exact topic so that we can help them ensure that they are 
most appropriately building a military tailored to the threat 
that we all see.
    As Assistant Secretary Lewis said, I think the situation we 
are seeing in Ukraine right now is a very worthwhile case study 
for them about why Taiwan needs to do all it can to build 
asymmetric capabilities to get its population ready so that it 
can be as prickly as possible should China choose to violate 
its sovereignty.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ At the conclusion of the hearing, the Department of Defense 
requested that ``sovereignty'' be changed to ``territorial integrity.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Chairman. Do you know whether any such meetings have 
taken place this year?
    Dr. Karlin. Mr. Chairman, I cannot speak to that. That 
would----
    The Chairman. Would you respond to that for the record for 
me?
    Dr. Karlin. I would be glad to. It is another part of our 
Department, but I would be glad to get you that exact answer 
after this hearing.
    Thank you.

[Editor's note.--Dr. Karlin's response to the Chairman's 
request was given during a classified briefing.]

    The Chairman. Lastly, Secretary Lewis, the Safeguarding 
Human Rights in Arms Export, or SAFEGUARD Act, that I 
introduced last year with a half dozen of my colleagues would 
update the Arms Export Control Act to ensure that human rights 
are given proper consideration in arms exports and that such 
exports are monitored to ensure they are not used for human 
rights abuses.
    Do you know if the Department of State supports that 
objective?
    Ms. Lewis. I think we definitely support the objective and 
happy to work with you as you continue to develop that 
legislation and the other legislation you are working on.
    The Chairman. I would look forward to that opportunity.
    With that, and seeing no other members before the committee 
seeking recognition, this hearing's record will remain open 
until the close of business on Friday, March 11. Please ensure 
that questions for the record are submitted no later than 
tomorrow.
    With the thanks of the committee for your service--Senator 
Hagerty?
    Senator Hagerty. Mr. Chairman, just less than a minute if I 
might add to your point on Taiwan and Taiwan's military 
capabilities, particularly in the asymmetrical area.
    This is evolving rapidly. We are seeing with Ukraine the 
need and the desire to have our friends and allies equipped 
sooner than later, and as we see the threat continue to mount 
from China, I would encourage you to, again, put the notion of 
speed that we have talked about, Secretary Lewis, into your 
thought process--Dr. Karlin as well. We need to move quickly 
and not to be looking at this in hindsight, but to be prepared.
    Again, if we can include in our conversations, moving 
forward, Assistant Secretary Lewis, how we will incorporate 
that, particularly with the focus on Taiwan I would appreciate 
it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    With the thanks of the committee for your service and your 
testimony and looking forward to the responses to some of those 
things, both for the record and otherwise, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


              Responses of Ms. Jessica Lewis to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Afghanistan: The swift collapse of the Afghan National 
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which received nearly $90 billion 
in U.S. training and equipment over two decades, has prompted much 
speculation about the U.S. strategies and policies that preceded the 
collapse. Numerous sources contend that conflicting directives, the 
prioritization of short-term tactical gains, the lack of an integrated 
U.S. policy, and poor U.S. understanding of social, cultural, and 
political contexts in Afghanistan contributed to undermining U.S. 
security assistance from the onset. Other observers have found that 
U.S. security assistance overemphasized tactical skills and neglected 
strategic-level expertise, forced the ANDSF to be heavily reliant on 
airpower and technology that Afghans could not maintain independently, 
and excluded Afghan involvement or input in equipping decisions.
    How is the ANDSF collapse changing the way the United States 
conducts security assistance?

    Answer. The collapse of the Afghanistan National Defense and 
Security Forces illustrated that security sector assistance alone 
cannot overcome or `fix' underlying structural or political challenges. 
Rather, it must be part of a broader effort alongside lines of effort 
in the areas of justice, democratization, economic growth, countering 
corruption, and addressing stakeholder equities and concerns across the 
political spectrum. It is not enough to build defense institutions in 
tandem with ``train and equip'' missions; security sector governance 
must be the pacesetter. We are working to operationalize a more 
governance-centered approach to security assistance through strategic-
level advisory support, and better risk assessments--especially with 
regards to the foreign policy risks posed by weak governance and the 
potential for elite capture of the security sector--and continuous, 
strategic-level monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

    Question. What oversight requirements might ensure Congress is 
better informed of the capabilities and weaknesses of other major U.S. 
security assistance recipients?

    Answer. PM values its close relationship with the Committee and is 
happy to provide briefings on security assistance programs as questions 
or concerns arise. We recognize the value of strong monitoring and 
evaluation, but also acknowledge the challenges, given the complexities 
and interagency aspects of many programs. PM has strong program-level 
monitoring and evaluation, including through annual Foreign Military 
Financing and International Military Education Training Reports (with 
targeted bilateral/regional assessments) and ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) of individual programs such as the Global Peace 
Operations Initiative and Conventional Weapons Destruction programs.
    We are working to operationalize a strategic-level monitoring and 
evaluation framework by developing a diagnostic tool to holistically 
assess our partners' security sectors and evaluate the long-term 
contributions of the Bureau's activities to foreign policy outcomes--an 
important complement to our program-level monitoring and evaluation 
efforts.
    We also have ongoing discussions with DoD colleagues about 
improving data-sharing, a common operating picture on assistance 
resources and outputs, and shared approaches to M&E. It is a work in 
progress, but with commitment on both sides demonstrated through joint 
planning activities and collaborative forums such as the interagency 
M&E community of interest. Ensuring the Department has the resources 
and personnel to support such initiatives is important to sustain 
momentum.

    Question. To what extent are other U.S. partners as reliant as the 
ANDSF on U.S. intelligence, air power, and contracted logistics 
support?

    Answer. The United States provides a wide range and variety of 
intelligence, surveillance, logistics and other support, based on the 
capabilities and requirements of our partners. For more information, I 
would refer you to the Department of Defense.

    Question. Given this history, what are the main lessons you, 
personally, have learned from the failure of U.S. security assistance 
programs in Afghanistan? How will you seek to take those lessons and 
best practices and instill them in other security assistance efforts?

    Answer. Our experience in Afghanistan shows how important it is to 
focus on long-term sustainment to ensure partner forces can achieve 
greater self-sufficiency in a reasonable amount of time. This long-term 
success requires fully integrating programs that build capacity and 
resilience in parallel sectors beyond just the military, such as the 
economic, health, education, agricultural, justice, and governance 
sectors. Government legitimacy and the respect for human rights and 
inclusivity must grow alongside military development, so that 
communities from across the political spectrum feel they have a stake 
in the existing political process.
    Afghanistan also shows that we cannot defer anti-corruption efforts 
in the security sector until after we build security force capacity 
through train and equip programs. If we don't address both needs 
concurrently, we risk institutionalizing corruption in the security 
sector and undermining legitimacy and defeating our long-term security 
objectives.
    Consequently, I am working to elevate security sector governance as 
a central consideration in U.S. security cooperation and assistance 
planning and treat long-term institutional capacity building as our 
primary mission. Implementing the new U.S. Strategy on Countering 
Corruption and methodically assessing the risks to and effectiveness of 
U.S. Government security sector assistance activities are both 
important to this effort.

    Question. Strategic Competition with China and Russia: How have 
State and DoD aligned or realigned resources and activities toward 
strategic competition with China and Russia, outside of Ukraine?

    Answer. Security assistance and security cooperation are vital 
tools in the context of strategic competition, helping the United 
States realize broader foreign policy goals and enabling our 
unparalleled network of allies and partners to address shared threats. 
We align resources to help front line partners enhance their defensive 
capabilities and deter aggression from strategic competitors. State 
Department and DoD actively align resources through EUCOM and the 
Countering Russian Influence Fund in Europe, and INDOPACOM and the 
Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative in the Indo-Pacific. Through 
various regional assistance accounts, arms transfers, and global 
initiatives, such as the Countering Chinese Influence Fund, we are 
working to counter coercive and corrupt practices by building good 
governance, interoperability, institutional capacity, and strengthening 
security relationships with partners to help strengthen U.S. force 
posture and maintain the international rules-based order.

    Question. How is U.S. security assistance countering China in the 
Indo-Pacific?

    Answer. The State Department's security assistance in the Indo-
Pacific strengthens our partners' ability to maintain their territorial 
integrity, effectively govern the maritime domain, and respond to 
emerging threats. Funding for this region has increased significantly 
in previous years, and in FY 2020, Congress included a new 
appropriation for the global Countering Chinese Influence Fund that 
continued in FY 2021. Currently, the principal recipients of the 
Department's security assistance in the South China Sea (SCS) are the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. The SCS is of particular 
importance because of our defense treaty with the Philippines, close 
security partnerships with SCS claimant countries, as well as the vast 
volume of trade that transits its waters. The PRC's expansive and 
unlawful SCS maritime claims, continuing construction of, and 
improvements to, military facilities on reclaimed land in disputed 
areas, and other provocations and intimidation tactics severely 
undermine the rules-based maritime order.
    U.S. Security cooperation offers a clear advantage to our partners 
in their transparency, the quality of the capabilities we offer, and 
the depth of the relationship that comes with them. As Secretary 
Blinken said in his July 2021 message to our diplomatic posts 
worldwide, our values and commitment to rights and freedom are a 
competitive advantage our adversaries and competitors cannot match.
    As such, they are a key part of the toolkit in addressing strategic 
competition on a global basis. More broadly, building interoperability 
through existing defense trade relationships and export regulations is 
a key part of achieving our Indo-Pacific Strategy objectives, as well 
as deepening our overall defense and security relationships with 
regional allies and partners. Through our efforts to increase and 
strengthen security cooperation, we aim to optimize force posture, 
readiness, and interoperability with partners in furtherance of 
bolstering Indo-Pacific security. We will continue to maximize our 
security cooperation--to include security assistance--to demonstrate 
the reliability of the United States as a security partner and reassure 
allies and partners of our strong, sustained presence in the region.

    Question. What, if any, lessons can be learned from nearly two 
decades of counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities?

    Answer. The most valuable general lesson we have learned is that 
counterterrorism-focused security assistance works especially well when 
the beneficiaries demonstrate clear political will; when the assistance 
package is thoughtfully designed, focused on clear goals, and 
coordinated with interagency and international partners; and when the 
assistance activities are monitored closely, enabling adjustments as 
needed. Counterterrorism-focused security assistance has enabled 
security actors in beneficiary countries to protect U.S. interests, to 
save lives by preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks, to apprehend 
known and suspected terrorists, and to prevent terrorist travel.
    We have also learned that good governance impacts the effectiveness 
and sustainability of partners' security sectors, whether in support of 
counterterrorism or broader security assistance activities. We have 
seen that over the longer term, states will not be able to deliver 
acceptable levels of security to their populations and safeguard human 
rights unless their security forces can operate effectively and under 
democratic control--and even then, only within a broader context of 
political, economic, and even social reforms.
    The United States is proficient at training and equipping partners 
in the fight against violent non-state actors, and at times this has 
helped those partners achieve short-term gains on the battlefield. But 
without the institutional capacity to sustain and deploy those 
capabilities--and without the backing of a national government worth 
preserving--those gains can dissipate or even unravel over the long-
term--or, in the worst case, contribute to the militarization of 
political disagreements or even result in U.S. assistance being tainted 
by the behavior of bad actors.
    We have also learned that security assistance provides only limited 
leverage in cases where partners' interests are not fundamentally 
aligned with those of the United States. Years of U.S. efforts to 
condition Pakistan's security assistance, for example, failed to change 
Islamabad's fundamental perception of the threats in its immediate 
neighborhood.
    Security assistance still holds tremendous potential to advance our 
foreign policy by offering new avenues of access, influencing and 
assuring partners, strengthening their institutional capacity, and 
bolstering regional stability. However, we must continually assess how 
best to leverage this tool of statecraft effectively in the years 
ahead.

    Question. What, if any, are the potential implications for scaling 
down counterterrorism-focused activities in Africa and the Middle East, 
especially as Russia and China increase their influence in those 
regions?

    Answer. Our traditional security assistance programs provide 
flexibility in helping to address a range of security needs, including 
maintaining access and influence, countering terrorism, and competing 
against the increased engagement by Russia and China worldwide. 
However, countering terrorism remains a significant concern, and the 
Department continues to support counterterrorism capacity-building 
activities through our security assistance programs with many partners 
and is working with interagency partners to assess the implications of 
any reduction in counterterrorism-focused activities in Africa, the 
Middle East, and elsewhere.

    Question. As we look across the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere 
we are increasingly seeing a tangible competition in terms of military 
presence and particular arms sales, notably from China. How do we 
balance our policy priorities with protecting U.S. technology and 
security?

    Answer. The State Department considers multiple factors when 
determining whether a potential arms transfer is in the national 
interest and consistent with U.S. values. Transfers are assessed on a 
case-by-case basis, based on conditions at the time of the proposed 
transfer or sale. Considerations include the degree to which the 
transfer reduces the ally's or partner's dependence on U.S. 
competitors, the ability and willingness of the partner to protect U.S. 
technology, and the risk of diversion. Additionally, each review 
considers the recipient's history of compliance with end-use 
requirements, and whether the recipient maintains strong export 
controls and nonproliferation practices.
    In an increasingly competitive environment, the U.S. Government and 
industry will need to balance the need to protect sensitive 
technologies with the risk of losing the opportunity to deepen security 
cooperation. The United States has long been the security cooperation 
partner of choice, and we must continue to pursue policies, processes, 
and regulatory changes that drive efficiencies in the security 
cooperation field and provide conventional capabilities to vetted 
partners in a timely manner.
    We are doing in-depth thinking about the work we and industry need 
to do to innovate and improve our competitiveness. As an illustrative 
example, to better compete, we need to consider issues such as 
developing exportable versions of systems early in process. This could 
allow us to deepen security cooperation with partners in line with our 
national security interests and consistent with defense trade advocacy 
procedures.

    Question. What are the potential risks and rewards of reorienting 
U.S. security assistance programs in Africa to focus on global power 
competition? What kinds of activities or policies might such an 
approach involve? What would define success in this context?

    Answer. Along with traditional security assistance programs in 
Africa, PM currently has two programs focused specifically on 
addressing strategic competition: 1) programs under the Countering 
Chinese Influence Fund (CCIF) using Foreign Military Financing, and 2) 
the new Countering Strategic Competitors program funded with 
Peacekeeping Operations. There are risks to providing assistance solely 
focused on strategic competition, including with regard to the 
assumptions the United States must make regarding our ability to 
influence decision-making in the partner's government and our ability 
to accurately measure that impact. Another risk is a partner engaging 
with strategic competitors simply to try and get USG funds. However, 
programs like CCIF have made resources available to undertake 
activities in countries to whom PM might not have traditionally 
provided resources, but are now open to working more closely with the 
United States. PM is committed to working with AF to take advantage of 
those opportunities where the resources can have an impact. Success in 
this context could be defined as the United States becoming the primary 
security partner of choice, or continuing to maintain as much influence 
and access as possible to be in a position to exploit any future 
opportunities.

    Question. Africa: Over the last year and a half, coups have 
occurred in Mali, Chad, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. Successive 
administrations have funded robust security assistance programs in all 
of these countries. However, the Sahel is less stable now than ever; 
Extremist groups have multiplied and expanded, and recipient 
militaries, despite years of training, are still not capable of 
countering terrorist threats. Officers we trained in Mali, Burkina 
Faso, and Guinea have overthrown their own democratically elected 
civilian governments and installed themselves as Heads of State.
    Would you consider our security assistance programs in West Africa 
successful? Knowing that hindsight is always 20-20, are there things we 
could have done differently in the Sahel with regard to our security 
and counter-terrorism assistance?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has been successful in providing West 
African countries with critical capabilities that contribute to their 
ability to degrade violent extremist groups in the region and to 
provide security for their citizens. The Department recognizes that the 
fight against violent extremists is multi-faceted, and progress is 
required in areas beyond security and counter-terrorism assistance, 
including with respect to good governance and economic opportunities. 
The Administration recognizes the importance of ensuring all U.S. 
Government programming in the Sahel is coordinated and complementary, 
such that security assistance is fully synchronized with other U.S. 
Government programs that address the drivers of armed conflict and 
violent extremism. The Department is working diligently to ensure that 
individual programming efforts are not planned and implemented in 
isolation, and that coordination processes within the Department and 
with the interagency are revitalized. The development of a 5-year 
interagency Sahel Strategy is intended to take a more balanced approach 
with respect to focusing on good governance, respect for human rights, 
and rule of law.

    Question. Where has U.S. security assistance been most effective in 
Africa, and what situations have posted the greatest challenges? How 
can and should U.S. officials measure impact and effectiveness?

    Answer. U.S. security assistance has been most effective in 
countries that want our assistance, are committed to truly partnering 
with the United States, and share our values of democracy and civilian 
control of the military; examples include Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, and 
Senegal. Additionally, by continuing to build long-term military-to-
military relationships by bringing students through the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) programs to the United States, 
we are helping to foster access to future military leaders. IMET 
graduates in countries that have not traditionally received much U.S. 
security assistance have been able to influence their militaries to 
expand cooperation with the United States.
    U.S. security assistance is least effective in African countries 
where the U.S. the country is less interested in our assistance and 
where the U.S. is unwilling to provide the type of assistance that 
other countries might provide (such as operational support that Russia 
provides in the Central African Republic). However, even in those 
situations, it is important to continue to provide some IMET funding so 
that if there are future political opportunities, there are U.S.-
trained personnel with whom to engage.
    PM and AF have contracted monitoring and evaluation teams focusing 
on Foreign Military Financing, IMET and Peacekeeping Operations-funded 
assistance to measure the impact and effectiveness of PM-funded 
programs in Africa.

    Question. How satisfied are you with the investments we are making 
to improve defense institutions and civilian oversight of the military 
in Africa, and what must be done to ensure that our security assistance 
programs train militaries to be subordinate to civilians as opposed to 
deposing civilian governments?

    Answer. A core principle of providing security assistance in Africa 
is strengthening defense institutions and civilian oversight of the 
military. One PM program that supports this effort is Expanded-
International Military Education and Training, which focuses on 
enforcing the criticality of responsible defense resource management; 
fostering greater respect for and understanding of the principle of 
civilian control of the military; contributing to cooperation between 
military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counter-
narcotics law enforcement efforts; and improving military justice 
systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized 
human rights. Additionally, the Peacekeeping Operations account funds 
the Africa Military Education Program, which supports the capacity 
building of individual African military education and training 
institutions; and the Security Force Professionalization program, which 
is aimed at increasing the capacity of foreign militaries to operate in 
accordance with appropriate standards relating to human rights and the 
protection of civilians. We recognize that more needs to be done, and 
PM plans to work with AF and Posts in the region to take advantage of 
new programming opportunities and approaches that incorporate U.S. 
values, such as civilian control of the military, respect for human 
rights, and the creation of strong military justice systems.

    Question. Is the amount of support we provide to the Sahel in 
development and governance assistance commensurate, in your view, with 
the amount of money we have spent on security assistance? In other 
words, are we appropriately investing in the development arm of the 
three D's--Defense, Diplomacy, and Development?

    Answer. Four of the five Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
and Niger) are among the seven least developed countries in the world. 
Therefore, U.S. foreign assistance to the Sahel countries includes a 
focus on addressing the critical need for life-saving assistance, a 
need exacerbated by conflict and violent extremism. To overcome 
instability also requires a significant focus on building the capacity 
of Sahelian governments to improve governance. Addressing root drivers 
of conflict at the local level, including by supporting dispute 
resolution mechanisms, delivering public goods, and respecting human 
rights, can help reduce conflict. The recently approved interagency 
Sahel Strategy is our roadmap for addressing these drivers.

    Question. Are there currently security assistance programs being 
carried out in Chad, where there was a coup last year? Why did the 
Administration continue to propose security assistance programs in 
light of the military takeover?

    Answer. The Administration's current approach is to maintain 
sufficient security assistance to Chad to enable continued Chadian 
participation in key regional security initiatives, such as the Multi-
National Joint Task Force and MINUSMA, as well as conduct civilian-led 
investigations of terrorist activities. Chad continues to play a 
critical and irreplaceable role in these regional efforts, and the 
interagency assesses that U.S. assistance improves the effectiveness, 
professionalization, and respect for human rights of participating 
Chadian forces. The Department carefully reviewed events in Chad and 
concluded that the military coup restriction in section 7008 of the 
annual appropriations act had not been triggered with respect to Chad. 
We continue to urge the Transitional Military Council to hold an 
inclusive national dialogue that incorporates members of the diaspora, 
armed groups, and the opposition to ensure there is a viable democratic 
process at the end of the 18-month transition period.

    Question. U.S. security assistance for Africa decreased in recent 
years after peaking in FY 2015-FY 2016, but arguably remains high by 
historic standards as perceived threats to U.S. interests have grown. 
Looking ahead, do you expect security assistance for Africa to 
increase, decrease, or remain flat--and why?

    Answer. Consistent with the Administration's Interim National 
Security guidance and the State-USAID Joint Regional Strategy for 
Africa, the Administration will continue to prioritize funding for 
assistance efforts that advance mutual peace and security interests in 
Africa.
    These efforts will leverage regional cooperation to counter 
terrorism, including support for countries fighting the spread of ISIS 
and al-Qaida throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Security assistance 
programming in the Gulf of Guinea and East Africa will also reinforce 
partner nation efforts to capitalize on economic opportunities inherent 
in the blue economy, while countering Chinese efforts to secure 
commercial ports on SSA's vast coastlines. Assistance will also 
continue to support partner nation efforts to counter poaching, 
narcotics, trafficking, and other illicit transnational activities by 
strengthening African law enforcement.
    To support these efforts, Administration requests for Foreign 
Military Financing, International Military Education Training, 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, Peacekeeping 
Operations and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs funding for bilateral and regional operating units in SSA have 
remained consistent over the past 5 fiscal years. The President's 
Budget Request included $291.5 million for these accounts for SSA in FY 
2018, and $461.1 million in the FY 2022, though the FY 2022 request 
included $149 million for Somalia that was historically requested in 
the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account. We 
look forward to discussing security assistance for Africa in the 
President's FY 2023 President's Budget Request.

    Question. What lessons can U.S. policymakers learn from the Sahel, 
where security and humanitarian conditions have deteriorated 
significantly over the past decade despite an influx of U.S. security 
assistance funds? Beyond the elite U.S.-trained counterterrorism force 
known as Danab, how would you assess the impact of U.S. security 
assistance to Somali security forces?

    Answer. Our experience in the Sahel demonstrates the importance of 
a balanced approach in which gains within the security space are 
matched by an emphasis on improving good governance and livelihoods for 
the populations living in conflict-afflicted areas. The experience in 
the Sahel also illustrates the importance of ensuring that security 
forces respect human rights and do not victimize marginalized groups, 
as such actions can help fuel the spread of violent extremist groups 
and instability. Finally, our experience in the Sahel demonstrates the 
importance of strengthening defense institutions as well as tactical 
and operational capabilities, to ensure our partners are capably led, 
sustained, and held accountable for any abuses.
    There is currently minimal U.S. assistance to the Somalia National 
Army (SNA) beyond the Danab Brigade through the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET has helped the SNA 
professionalize in leadership positions. We have also seen modest gains 
in the professionalization and capacity building of some select 
civilian police forces through International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining funding and 
Related (NADR) funding. With NADR funding, Somalia Police Force 
counterterrorism units have responded to and investigated over 500 
terrorism incidents. NADR funding has also established a network of 
watchlisting and screening capabilities to inhibit terrorist travel and 
a framework to better disrupt terrorist financing.

    Question. What has been the impact of recent U.S. decisions to 
suspend (e.g., Cameroon in 2019) or publicly threaten to suspend (e.g., 
Burkina Faso in 2020) security assistance due to human rights concerns?

    Answer. Burkinabe authorities have been somewhat responsive to 
concerns over allegations of human rights violations and abuses by 
security forces. The government increased training on human rights to 
prevent future violations and abuses and deployed provost marshals 
during operations to encourage proper treatment of detainees. We have 
seen a notable reduction in allegations of abuses over the past year. 
We continue to work with Burkina Faso to build capacity to conduct 
investigations and prosecutions where there is an available authority 
to do so, given that Burkina Faso is subject to the restriction in 
section 7008 of the annual appropriations act. In Cameroon, the U.S. 
reprogrammed a significant amount of military assistance in 2018. We 
are constantly reviewing the different tools available to hold human 
rights violators accountable, including sanctions, and continue the 
practice of reviewing security assistance on a case-by-case basis. We 
continue to pursue engagement with the Swiss, France, key allies, and 
UN Security Council member states, to find ways to promote a peaceful 
resolution of the ongoing violence.

    Question. How has the application of coup-related aid restrictions 
to Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso affected U.S. regional security and 
foreign policy objectives?

    Answer. U.S. foreign assistance for the governments of Burkina 
Faso, Guinea and Mali (including their militaries) is restricted under 
section 7008 of the annual appropriations act. Some programs that are 
in the best interests of the U.S. have continued through the use of 
available authorities. The U.S. Government stopped funding Mali's and 
Guinea's participation in regional and country-specific security 
programs. These restrictions have hindered these transition 
governments' ability to effectively manage security threats, creating 
conditions that could enhance fragility and exacerbate instability. The 
Department is assessing the impact of section 7008 restrictions on 
Burkina Faso's security forces and their capacity to support regional 
security objectives.

    Question. Why were such restrictions not applied to Chad after a 
military takeover there in 2021?

    Answer. The Department carefully reviewed events in Chad and 
concluded that the military coup restriction in section 7008 of the 
annual appropriations act had not been triggered with respect to Chad.

    Question. To what extent do legal restrictions enhance U.S. 
leverage over the behavior of partner security forces?

    Answer. The Department can--and will--calibrate security assistance 
to leverage partner behavior. However, we recognize that there are 
limits on U.S. influence and the impact of our security assistance over 
the policies, priorities, or behaviors of recipient governments beyond 
their immediate security capacity objectives. We will continue to seek 
ways to build partner capacity and exert effective pressure on partner 
countries to uphold democratic norms, respect human rights, and promote 
accountability and the rule-of-law, in pursuit of a free and open 
international order.

    Question. State Department OIG inspections of U.S. embassies in 
Africa have repeatedly identified challenges in vetting foreign 
security force units pursuant to the ``Leahy laws,'' which prohibit the 
provision of U.S. security assistance to units implicated in gross 
human rights violations. In Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria, for instance, 
delays in Embassies' submission of vetting requests have reportedly led 
to program delays and/or expedited vetting.
    To what extent have such delays and other identified administrative 
challenges impeded rigorous investigations into evidence of past 
commission of human rights violations by recipient security force 
units?

    Answer. In all cases in which a foreign security force unit is 
submitted for Leahy vetting, the Department of State investigates any 
and all credible allegations of a gross violation of human rights 
against such unit that are discovered during its thorough vetting 
process. We are fully committed to rigorously implementing the Leahy 
Law, and we do not proceed with the provision of assistance unless and 
until vetting is complete and such assistance is deemed to meet the 
requirements of the Leahy Law.

    Question. What is the Administration's plan for addressing such 
issues?

    Answer. The Department of State continuously seeks to improve its 
Leahy Law implementation. In 2019, we fielded the enhanced 
International Vetting and Security Tracking-cloud global enterprise 
Leahy vetting system, which improved the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the vetting process by leveraging the latest available technology. 
Our officers at embassies around the world also regularly engage with 
our foreign security force security partners to stress the importance 
of our vetting requirements, seek the timely provision of information 
required to complete Leahy vetting, and overcome challenges in the 
vetting process. In Washington, our Leahy team is working to develop 
and publish updated Leahy vetting guidance to further aid in both 
enhancing the Department's Leahy Law compliance and further streamline 
the vetting process worldwide.

    Question. To what extent are U.S. Embassies capable of effectively 
monitoring the end-use of U.S.-provided defense materiel in Africa? 
What are the key barriers to end-use monitoring?

    Answer. DoD's Golden Sentry end-use monitoring (EUM) program for 
defense material procured through Foreign Military Sales has well-
established procedures that are time-tested and are implemented through 
U.S. Embassies' Security Cooperation Offices. There are inherent 
personnel limitations with respect to EUM depending on the volume of 
requests and breadth of security cooperation with our African partners 
that impact both the State and Defense Departments' ability to conduct 
inquiries beyond the norm.
    Regarding State's Blue Lantern EUM program for defense articles 
exported via direct commercial sales (DCS), over the last 2 fiscal 
years embassies in African countries have completed on average 8.8 
percent of our total Blue Lantern checks globally despite their host 
nations being listed as destination countries on only 1.4 percent of 
defense trade authorizations. Host nation governments receiving limited 
DCS defense articles are likely to have infrequent interactions with 
the Blue Lantern program, resulting in procedural delays when they are 
subject to end-use checks. To counter this trend, our posts have 
engaged with partners to educate them on the Blue Lantern program and 
sensitize them to the benefits of EUM cooperation. Such benefits 
include the potential for a stronger defense trade relationship when 
in-country end users are complying with U.S. export control 
requirements. Additionally, to ensure Blue Lantern officers in the 
field stay proficient in their EUM duties, the Directorate of Defense 
Trade Controls (DDTC) disseminates updated guidance every fiscal year 
to all U.S. diplomatic posts on the conduct of Blue Lantern end-use 
checks. This year DDTC also introduced a long-distance learning course 
to provide Department personnel with web-based training on all aspects 
of the Blue Lantern program.

    Question. Nigeria: Successive administrations have proposed that we 
sell arms--specifically planes and helicopters with lethal 
capabilities--to Nigeria, a country whose security forces have a very 
troubling human rights record, and notoriously weak accountability 
structures in the military.
    What thought has the Administration put into investing in programs 
and activities in Nigerian institutions that would have a 
transformative difference in terms of the capability and conduct of the 
Nigerian military?

    Answer. The primary goal of U.S.-Nigeria security cooperation is to 
build more capable, professional, and accountable Nigerian security 
forces that respect human rights and protect civilians. We support 
training programs and doctrinal changes in Nigerian institutions to do 
this. Our assistance includes training in civilian harm mitigation, 
adherence to the laws of armed conflict, air-to-ground integration 
between the services, improved sustainment processes, and other 
Professional Military Education. Our assistance includes DoD and State 
support for an Air-to-Ground Integration (AGI) program to build close 
air support capabilities while avoiding civilian casualties. As a 
result, Nigeria recently qualified its first Joint Terminal Attack 
Controllers, trained to NATO standards. DoD also provides support for 
the development of route clearance capabilities and tactical unmanned 
aerial systems. The Department of State funds military advisors to 
complement DoD programs, with current efforts to support advisors with 
a focus on AGI, military intelligence, and military justice 
institutions. Department of State assistance supports Nigerian infantry 
training capacity, as well as its maritime capacity. In addition, 
Nigeria is one of the largest recipients of International Military 
Education and Training (IMET). Our monitoring and evaluation efforts 
provide an opportunity to holistically assess the extent to which our 
interventions are having transformative impacts in Nigerian 
institutions and how we can improve U.S. interventions.

    Question. Should we be focused on arms sales in the absence of a 
comprehensive security development plan for Nigeria?

    Answer. The Nigeria strategic framework approved in October 2021, 
is a whole-of-government approach that includes a comprehensive 
security development plan. Our engagement goes beyond arms sales and 
supports Nigeria to address its many security challenges and its 
underlying governance issues. We support training programs and 
doctrinal changes in Nigerian security institutions to build more 
capable, professional, and accountable security forces that respect 
human rights and protect civilians. We supported the Government of 
Nigeria in establishing and implementing a defection and reintegration 
program for former Boko Haram fighters. We are working to strengthen 
linkages between civilian-led early warning and early response 
initiatives and local security force engagement. More broadly, we 
support peacebuilding programs and dialogue efforts with the 
government, civil society, faith leaders, youth, and others to prevent 
and mitigate intercommunal conflict and livelihoods programs to steer 
susceptible youth away from violence.

    Question. Interagency Coordination: What is the significance of 
legislation mandating ``concurrence,'' ``coordination,'' or ``joint 
formulation'' between DoS and DoD when designing, implementing, and 
overseeing security assistance programs? How do each of these terms 
affect DoS's influence in and oversight of DoD's Title 10 security 
cooperation programs?

    Answer. Secretary of State concurrence provides an important 
opportunity to ensure that foreign policy considerations are included 
in DoD security cooperation programs. The concurrence mechanism helps 
State identify proposed DoD activities that are problematic from a 
legal or policy perspective and align DoD security cooperation programs 
with foreign policy objectives. The effective veto that concurrence 
provides over DoD programs makes it far superior to coordination, which 
does not always provide State sufficient influence to stop or reshape 
programs deemed problematic. Legislation requiring both concurrence and 
joint formulation gives State the greatest degree of influence and 
oversight over DoD security cooperation activities. Joint formulation 
allows State to be involved in DoD programs from inception through 
program design to implementation and helps State and DoD to deconflict 
activities and often design them to be complementary. This level of 
State Department planning requires further investment in staffing at 
the State Department, since State's workforce is dwarfed by the DoD 
security cooperation enterprise.

    Question. Partner Nation Considerations: In your view, should the 
United States impose U.S. institutional standards on partner forces?

    Answer. While we strive to lead by the power of our example, 
promoting sustainable security sectors aligned with American values, 
security assistance cannot overcome or `fix' underlying structural, 
economic, or political challenges. Rather, it must be part of broader, 
holistic efforts to enhance civilian security through improved access 
to justice, democratic governance, and economic growth--addressing 
stakeholder equities and concerns across the political spectrum. We 
must also be realistic about the limited influence or leverage of U.S. 
security assistance over the policies, priorities, or behaviors of 
recipient governments beyond their immediate security capacity 
objectives. In addition, if we are to leverage security assistance, we 
must ensure that the Department has the resources and staffing to 
monitor those conditions and, more importantly, be able to respond 
effectively and decisively if our partners are not abiding by the 
conditions to which we agreed.

    Question. Are there benefits and drawbacks to imposing conditions 
on U.S. security assistance?

    Answer. To be most effective, security sector capacity-building 
programs should be part of broader efforts to improve civilian security 
through improved access to justice, democratic governance, and economic 
growth. While we lead with these values, our ability to influence the 
policies, priorities, or behaviors of partner governments is often 
limited. In contexts where U.S. interventions are unlikely to overcome 
obstacles or change a partner's behavior, reducing the scope of 
security assistance may be necessary. We should seek opportunities to 
incentivize partner progress on key foreign policy objectives but must 
be clear-eyed that the incentives of receiving U.S. security assistance 
are often not strong enough to overcome the local political obstacles 
or economic incentives. Furthermore, we want to avoid forcing our 
partners into a binary choice, particularly in the context of 
competition with the PRC.

    Question. Are there examples of security assistance activities that 
have helped partners professionalize their own forces in their own 
ways?

    Answer. Security assistance activities funded by the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program help partner nations 
professionalize their militaries by enhancing critical thinking and 
analytical skills, which prepares participants to design procedures, 
policies, and doctrine for their own militaries. In one example, a 
Lebanese Air Force officer changed procedures for protecting military 
personnel and equipment and instilled a culture of safety by 
implementing practices learned in a U.S. safety training course. In 
another example, a Hungarian senior military leader leveraged knowledge 
gained from a senior professional military educational experience to 
create doctrine guiding the development of the Hungarian Land Forces.
    Security assistance investments in enlisted and non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) also professionalize partner military forces in 
countries such as Botswana, Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan. In Angola--
historically partnered with Russia on military training and education--
an officer who attended staff college through IMET prioritized 
improvement of the NCO corps within his military and helped break down 
barriers to cooperation with the United States.
    The Peacekeeping Operations-funded Global Defense Reform Program 
(GDRP) professionalizes partner security forces as well. In North 
Macedonia, an embedded GDRP senior advisor supports defense 
modernization by helping the Ministry of Defense update strategic 
documents, improve planning and programming processes, and develop 
force generation and procurement plans--all of which contribute to more 
professional defense forces.

    Question. To what extent has DoS or DoD established dedicated corps 
of security assistance trainers, whether through direct U.S. Government 
hires or third-party implementers?

    Answer. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) implements 
security assistance training through a combination of active-duty 
military personnel and third-party contractors. For training 
implemented through DoD, drawing on resources such as the U.S. Army 
National Guard State Partnership Program, where applicable, provides a 
relatively consistent pool of trainers and facilitates the 
establishment of relationships with partner countries over time. 
Additionally, the U.S. Army's establishment of Security Force 
Assistance Brigades provide a pool of military trainers organized and 
oriented to support security assistance/security cooperation 
activities.
    For third-party contractor trainers, contracting mechanisms 
tailored for specific security assistance programs enable the 
Department to draw trainers from a single or limited group of vendors 
with whom the Department can work to develop subject matter expertise, 
for example, by holding vendor conferences and routinely sharing 
program information or even conducting training of trainers. 
Additionally, PM is expanding the use of longer-term, contracted 
mentors and advisors embedded in partner country institutions, both at 
the strategic level as well as in operational and tactical-level 
organizations. Advisors provide a dedicated, persistent presence, 
better enabling security assistance activities to influence partner 
country behavior.
    Other security assistance providers within the Department, 
including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (INL) and the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT), provide non-
military security assistance to civilian law enforcement and criminal 
justice sector stakeholders. INL bilateral programs are typically co-
developed with partner governments to tailor capacity building to the 
country context and legal frameworks. INL implementing partners--which 
include the U.S. interagency, U.S. state and local partners, 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and 
contractors--are then selected based on their ability to advance the 
agreed programmatic outcomes. Like INL, CT's implementing partners 
include subject matter experts from the U.S. interagency, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and contractors that are 
selected based on their ability to advance the agreed program 
objectives, which are tailored to the beneficiary country or regional 
context.
    The Department of State defers to DoD to more fully address the 
question of DoD's implementation approach.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of Dr. Mara Elizabeth Karlin to Questions Submitted by 
     Senator Robert Menendez was Given During a Classified Briefing

    Question. Afghanistan: The swift collapse of the Afghan National 
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which received nearly $90 billion 
in U.S. training and equipment over two decades, has prompted much 
speculation about the U.S. strategies and policies that preceded the 
collapse. Numerous sources contend that conflicting directives, the 
prioritization of short-term tactical gains, the lack of an integrated 
U.S. policy, and poor U.S. understanding of social, cultural, and 
political contexts in Afghanistan contributed to undermining U.S. 
security assistance from the onset. Other observers have found that 
U.S. security assistance overemphasized tactical skills and neglected 
strategic-level expertise, forced the ANDSF to be heavily reliant on 
airpower and technology that Afghans could not maintain independently, 
and excluded Afghan involvement or input in equipping decisions.
    How is the ANDSF collapse changing the way the United States 
conducts security assistance?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What oversight requirements might ensure Congress is 
better informed of the capabilities and weaknesses of other major U.S. 
security assistance recipients?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. To what extent are other U.S. partners as reliant as the 
ANDSF on U.S. intelligence, air power, and contracted logistics 
support?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Given this history, what are the main lessons you, 
personally, have learned from the failure of U.S. security assistance 
programs in Afghanistan? How will you seek to take those lessons and 
best practices and instill them in other security assistance efforts?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Strategic Competition with China and Russia: How have 
State and DoD aligned or realigned resources and activities toward 
strategic competition with China and Russia, outside of Ukraine?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How is U.S. security assistance countering China in the 
Indo-Pacific?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What, if any, lessons can be learned from nearly two 
decades of counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What, if any, are the potential implications for scaling 
down counterterrorism-focused activities in Africa and the Middle East, 
especially as Russia and China increase their influence in those 
regions?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. As we look across the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere 
we are increasingly seeing a tangible competition in terms of military 
presence and particular arms sales, notably from China. How do we 
balance our policy priorities with protecting U.S. technology and 
security?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What are the potential risks and rewards of reorienting 
U.S. security assistance programs in Africa to focus on global power 
competition? What kinds of activities or policies might such an 
approach involve? What would define success in this context?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Africa: Over the last year and a half, coups have 
occurred in Mali, Chad, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. Successive 
administrations have funded robust security assistance programs in all 
of these countries. However, the Sahel is less stable now than ever; 
Extremist groups have multiplied and expanded, and recipient 
militaries, despite years of training, are still not capable of 
countering terrorist threats. Officers we trained in Mali, Burkina 
Faso, and Guinea have overthrown their own democratically elected 
civilian governments and installed themselves as Heads of State.
    Would you consider our security assistance programs in West Africa 
successful? Knowing that hindsight is always 20-20, are there things we 
could have done differently in the Sahel with regard to our security 
and counter-terrorism assistance?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Where has U.S. security assistance been most effective in 
Africa, and what situations have posted the greatest challenges? How 
can and should U.S. officials measure impact and effectiveness?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How satisfied are you with the investments we are making 
to improve defense institutions and civilian oversight of the military 
in Africa, and what must be done to ensure that our security assistance 
programs train militaries to be subordinate to civilians as opposed to 
deposing civilian governments?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Is the amount of support we provide to the Sahel in 
development and governance assistance commensurate, in your view, with 
the amount of money we have spent on security assistance? In other 
words, are we appropriately investing in the development arm of the 
three D's--Defense, Diplomacy, and Development?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Are there currently security assistance programs being 
carried out in Chad, where there was a coup last year? Why did the 
Administration continue to propose security assistance programs in 
light of the military takeover?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. U.S. security assistance for Africa decreased in recent 
years after peaking in FY 2015-FY 2016, but arguably remains high by 
historic standards as perceived threats to U.S. interests have grown. 
Looking ahead, do you expect security assistance for Africa to 
increase, decrease, or remain flat--and why?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What lessons can U.S. policymakers learn from the Sahel, 
where security and humanitarian conditions have deteriorated 
significantly over the past decade despite an influx of U.S. security 
assistance funds? Beyond the elite U.S.-trained counterterrorism force 
known as Danab, how would you assess the impact of U.S. security 
assistance to Somali security forces?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What has been the impact of recent U.S. decisions to 
suspend (e.g., Cameroon in 2019) or publicly threaten to suspend (e.g., 
Burkina Faso in 2020) security assistance due to human rights concerns? 
How has the application of coup-related aid restrictions to Mali, 
Guinea, and Burkina Faso affected U.S. regional security and foreign 
policy objectives? Why were such restrictions not applied to Chad after 
a military takeover there in 2021? To what extent do legal restrictions 
enhance U.S. leverage over the behavior of partner security forces?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. State Department OIG inspections of U.S. embassies in 
Africa have repeatedly identified challenges in vetting foreign 
security force units pursuant to the ``Leahy laws,'' which prohibit the 
provision of U.S. security assistance to units implicated in gross 
human rights violations. In Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria, for instance, 
delays in Embassies' submission of vetting requests have reportedly led 
to program delays and/or expedited vetting. To what extent have such 
delays and other identified administrative challenges impeded rigorous 
investigations into evidence of past commission of human rights 
violations by recipient security force units? What is the 
Administration's plan for addressing such issues?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. To what extent are U.S. Embassies capable of effectively 
monitoring the end-use of U.S.-provided defense materiel in Africa? 
What are the key barriers to end-use monitoring?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Nigeria: Successive administrations have proposed that we 
sell arms--specifically planes and helicopters with lethal 
capabilities--to Nigeria, a country whose security forces have a very 
troubling human rights record, and notoriously weak accountability 
structures in the military.
    What thought has the Administration put into investing in programs 
and activities in Nigerian institutions that would have a 
transformative difference in terms of the capability and conduct of the 
Nigerian military?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Should we be focused on arms sales in the absence of a 
comprehensive security development plan for Nigeria?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Answer. Interagency coordination: What is the significance of 
legislation mandating ``concurrence,'' ``coordination,'' or ``joint 
formulation'' between DoS and DoD when designing, implementing, and 
overseeing security assistance programs? How do each of these terms 
affect DoS's influence in and oversight of DoD's Title 10 security 
cooperation programs?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Partner nation considerations: In your view, should the 
United States impose U.S. institutional standards on partner forces? 
Are there benefits and drawbacks to imposing conditions on U.S. 
security assistance? Are there examples of security assistance 
activities that have helped partners professionalize their own forces 
in their own ways? To what extent has DoS or DoD established dedicated 
corps of security assistance trainers, whether through direct U.S. 
Government hires or third party implementers?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Strategic competition: How have DoS and DoD aligned or 
realigned resources and activities towards strategic competition? How 
is U.S. security assistance countering China in the Indo-Pacific? What, 
if any, lessons can be learned from nearly two decades of 
counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities? What, if any, 
are the potential implications for scaling down counterterrorism-
focused activities in Africa and the Middle East, especially as Russia 
and China increase their influence in those regions?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. DoD reforms: What is the implementation status of FY 2017 
NDAA-mandated security cooperation reforms? In what ways have the 
reforms been successful? What reforms remain outstanding and how does 
DoD intend to implement them?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. AM&E: What is the implementation status of the FY 2017 
NDAA-mandated AM&E requirement? What is the current AM&E policy DoD and 
how does it differ from that of DoS? How many strategic evaluations 
have been completed? What quantitative and qualitative metrics and/or 
evaluation activities are used to assess U.S. security assistance 
success and effectiveness in the context of countering strategic 
competitors?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Data management: Has DoD's Global-Theater Security 
Cooperation Information Management System (GTSCMIS) been successfully 
transferred and integrated into Socium? What is the implementation 
status of Socium? What is the implementation status of DoS's Strategic 
Impact Assessment Framework (SIAF), and the replacement for its 
International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) database system? 
What types of records or information sources are consulted to 
accomplish vetting, and how does this vary by country, mission, or 
training program?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Jessica Lewis to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Has the Department of State's role in setting bilateral 
security assistance policies diminished over the last two decades? If 
yes to the previous question, to what extent is this a problem for U.S. 
foreign policy?

    Answer. The Department of State's role in setting bilateral 
security assistance policies has diminished over the last two decades. 
As DoD's share of U.S. security sector assistance funding has grown to 
approximately half of the current $18 billion investment, DoD has 
exerted greater influence in setting priorities for how assistance 
resources are spent. DoD's growing role makes greater State-DoD 
coordination important to ensuring a unified approach that supports 
U.S. foreign policy priorities. With an increase in the State 
Department's own capacity, along with legislation requiring State 
concurrence and joint formulation over those DoD security cooperation 
activities still lacking them, State would be better positioned to have 
foreign policy drive security sector assistance.

    Question. What actions has the Department of State taken to re-
establish leadership over security assistance?

    Answer. Given the bifurcation of security sector assistance 
programming between State and DoD, coordination at every level--from 
resource allocation decision-making to program design--is more 
important than ever. As a result, State has established coordination 
venues to ensure programs align with U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
State recently held a Strategic Sector Review on security sector 
assistance that brought together over 170 policymakers, programmatic 
officials, and regional and technical experts from the State 
Department, DoD, and other departments and agencies to further 
strengthen the effectiveness of security sector assistance and align it 
with the highest foreign policy priorities. This review will be 
followed in Spring 2022 with the Joint Security Sector Assistance 
Review, which will convene the State Department and DoD stakeholders to 
identify priorities, opportunities, and tradeoffs for program planning 
by both departments.

    Question. What additional capacity and capability to plan and 
execute security assistance has the Department of Defense acquired over 
security assistance?

    Answer. The DoD security cooperation enterprise has grown to more 
than 20,000 personnel across the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Joint Staff, military services, combatant commands, and Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency. To support its ability to plan and execute 
both DoD-funded security cooperation activities and State Department-
funded security assistance programs as well as Foreign Military Sales, 
DoD established the Defense Security Cooperation University and 
developed a continuous learning and certification program to properly 
train and professionalize its Security Cooperation Workforce.

    Question. What, if anything, can or should be done to strengthen 
the role of the Department of State?

    Answer. While the Department of State enjoys many opportunities to 
inform DoD-led security cooperation activities, it lacks the human and 
financial resources required to fully participate in myriad DoD 
planning processes, including when some authorities include ``joint 
formulation'' requirements. Consequently, the State Department tends to 
focus only on the largest or most problematic programs rather than the 
full range of activities proposed by DoD. We continue seeking ways to 
enable State to maximize its ability to conduct due diligence and move 
beyond coordination and concurrence to a more proactive joint 
formulation role, including joint evaluation and learning.

    Question. What DoD authorities currently do not require Secretary 
of State concurrence, but should?

    Answer. Several DoD security cooperation authorities should be 
amended to require Secretary of State concurrence. In particular, DoD's 
Combatting ISIS Train and Equip Fund lacks a concurrence requirement 
even though DoD's other train and equip programs such as 10 U.S.C. 
Section 333 Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity and FY 
2016 NDAA Section 1263 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative 
include a legal requirement for concurrence. Secretary of State 
concurrence helps ensure DoD train and equip authorities align with 
foreign policy priorities and are implemented consistently with 
analogous State authorities under Title 22 such as the Foreign Military 
Financing and Peacekeeping Operations accounts. For that reason, the 
concurrence of the Secretary of State should also be required for DoD's 
use of several authorities analogous to State's International Military 
Education and Training program, including, among others, 10 U.S.C. 
Section 342 Regional Centers for Security Studies and 10 U.S.C. Section 
345 Regional Defense Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare 
Fellowship Program. Finally, Section 1202 of the FY 2018 NDAA, Support 
of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare, should be amended to 
require Secretary of State rather than Chief of Mission concurrence, as 
currently written, in order to provide greater foreign policy oversight 
over DoD activities conducted under this authority.

    Question. What flexibility is needed for State Department security 
assistance?

    Answer. Of the nearly $7 billion in annual security assistance I 
oversee, 93 percent has been subject to Congressional earmarks or 
directives in recent fiscal years, unintentionally resulting in limited 
resources to strengthen other allies in need worldwide and creating 
lost opportunities to further U.S. foreign policy and national 
security. We would welcome more flexibility to adjust, on a real-time 
basis, our assistance to address emerging realities and requirements. 
This could include fewer earmarks and directives; the appropriation of 
funds on a regional or functional basis (rather than bilateral); and, 
particularly in the context of strategic competition, the ability to 
offer more attractive financing options through expanded Foreign 
Military Financing loan authorities.

    Question. How should security assistance address corruption?

    Answer. Security assistance can help partners create systems of 
transparency and accountability in the security sector, which reduce 
opportunities for corruption. U.S. security assistance includes 
programs to improve partners' security sector governance and 
institutional capacity-building, including by enhancing civilian 
oversight of security institutions; modernizing human resource and 
public financial management systems for the security sector; and 
reforming defense acquisition systems for greater transparency. 
Further, security assistance planning should include risk assessments 
and, where risks are identified, mitigation measures to reduce the 
chances that U.S. taxpayer dollars will be diverted or used illicitly 
or ineffectively. However, security assistance alone cannot `fix' the 
political or economic drivers of corruption and should be part of an 
integrated U.S. anti-corruption strategy that includes diplomatic 
engagement and civilian assistance.

    Question. Has corruption been sufficiently accounted for in USG 
security assistance programs?

    Answer. In the new U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption the 
Biden-Harris administration identifies several ways the U.S. Government 
can better address the risks that corruption poses to foreign 
assistance and to security assistance specifically. The interagency is 
now working to implement these lines of effort, which include 
developing protocols for assessing corruption risks and partners' 
political will, incorporating standards for security sector governance 
into assistance planning and arms transfer decision-making, and more 
frequent evaluations of security cooperation initiatives in countries 
with significant corruption risks. These efforts will strengthen 
existing mechanisms, such as end-use monitoring, that help counter 
corruption risks to U.S. security assistance.

    Question. How should security assistance address human rights 
issues?

    Answer. Security assistance can help build professional and 
accountable security institutions that respect human rights, 
international humanitarian law, and the rule of law. Through training, 
advising, and other institutional capacity-building programs, U.S. 
security assistance helps partners strengthen military codes of conduct 
in accordance with internationally recognized human rights standards, 
improve military justice systems to hold accountable security forces 
responsible for human rights abuses, and mitigate the risk of civilian 
harm during military operations. To be most effective, security sector 
capacity-building programs should be part of a broader effort to 
improve civilian security through improved access to justice, 
democratic governance, and economic growth. In contexts where U.S. 
interventions are unlikely to overcome the political obstacles to 
improving a partner's human rights record, withholding or reducing the 
scope of security assistance may be the best policy to address human 
rights concerns.

    Question. How should the USG best balance human rights among the 
interests involved in security assistance?

    Answer. As President Biden and Secretary Blinken have made clear, 
we cannot separate our values from our interests. It is squarely in the 
United States' national interests and strengthens our national security 
when human rights are protected and reinforced worldwide. Security 
assistance is no exception to this principle. As one of many tools in 
the bilateral relationship, security assistance must be calibrated on a 
case-by-case basis with each partner. In the context of countries whose 
policies or actions contradict human rights obligations, we must always 
continue to make clear our concerns, including that violations of human 
rights undermine security. We must seek ways to exert effective 
pressure on those countries to uphold democratic norms, respect human 
rights, and promote accountability.

    Question. What are the major obstacles to faster processing and 
delivery of FMS cases?

    Answer. The USG infrastructure to support Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) is built into the existing domestic structure of DoD 
acquisitions. Policies, databases, and organizational elements 
supporting FMS vary among DoD agencies that manage FMS cases, so 
improving the processing and delivery times for FMS cases is a complex, 
multifaceted challenge.
    The FMS process is complex and, for major weapons systems, may last 
for many years due to FMS concepts like the Total Package Approach that 
support a sale throughout its lifecycle. Encouraging and allowing DoD 
to find efficiencies in its own acquisition, logistics, financial, and 
training processes can and will improve FMS processing and delivery 
timelines, and the Department is working closely with DoD to explore 
ways to improve the system.

    Question. What are the major obstacles to faster processing and 
delivery of DCS cases?

    Answer. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has 
continued its in-office presence throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, 
keeping average export license processing time well below the standard 
of 60 days and ensuring that U.S. defense trade continues to run 
smoothly. From time to time our adjudication of more complex transfers 
may extend beyond this standard due to myriad factors; however, we are 
very cognizant of the need to balance a robust assessment of U.S. 
national security and foreign policy objectives with the impact of 
prolonged timelines on the defense industry. Notably, with respect to 
the Ukraine crisis, DDTC staff have worked closely with the defense 
industry and our foreign partners to expedite authorization for 
permanent transfers and re-exports from third countries, often 
providing approval within a matter of hours; since January 2022, DDTC 
has authorized more than $130 million in DCS exports to Ukraine.
    With respect to deliveries, the Department is not involved in the 
physical transportation of defense articles authorized under a DCS 
license, so I would respectfully refer you to individual defense 
companies regarding any supply chain or logistical issues they may 
encounter.

    Question. What reforms and efficiencies to the Defense Acquisition 
System would be most helpful to improve the Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) system?

    Answer. I will refer you to the Department of Defense, specifically 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition and 
Sustainment, who is responsible for the management of the Defense 
Acquisition System. The PM Bureau is working closely with the 
interagency to identify actions and reforms to the FMS system that can 
make the United States more competitive.

    Question. How, if at all, should State's security assistance 
programs be reformed? What might such reforms accomplish?

    Answer. First, we should elevate security sector governance as a 
central consideration in U.S. security cooperation and assistance 
planning and treat long-term institutional capacity-building as our 
primary mission. A governance-centered approach to security cooperation 
and assistance would better integrate our political-military tools with 
our foreign policy and with the diplomatic and economic instruments of 
statecraft, in keeping with the spirit of the Foreign Assistance Act. 
Second, the State Department's authorities--which were built to respond 
to the Cold War--require more flexibility if we are to effectively 
address emerging crises and opportunities in this new era of strategic 
competition. This could include making Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF), the State Department's primary military assistance authority, 
more responsive to evolving requirements, and appropriating funds on a 
more regional or functional (as opposed to bilateral) basis. Third, I 
see an acute need in the context of strategic competition to offer more 
attractive financing options to partners who are considering acquiring 
major U.S. defense articles--for example, through expanded FMF loan 
authorities. FMF loans would provide a tool for the United States to 
compete for more FMS in countries where FMF grant assistance is 
unavailable or insufficient to support major procurements and/or where 
foreign partners lack the national funds to pay the purchase price 
upfront. Fourth, DoD security cooperation authorities should require 
Secretary of State concurrence--and, ideally, joint formulation--to 
ensure security cooperation and security assistance serve U.S. foreign 
policy goals and are properly synchronized and deconflicted to make 
maximal efficiency of taxpayer dollars. Lastly, and in support of the 
reforms above, it is also important to facilitate the development of 
the State Department's political-military workforce to ensure staff 
have the expertise and capacity to fully carry out the Secretary's 
responsibility to provide foreign policy direction for security 
cooperation and assistance.

    Question. How does State plan for security assistance?

    Answer. The Department of State has a robust, multi-year budgetary 
planning process for security assistance. The security assistance 
planning process begins with the initial development of security 
assistance requirements by uniformed Security Cooperation Officers 
overseas and embassy country teams, based on U.S. and partner nation 
priorities, ongoing programs, and emerging needs. These requirements 
are then reviewed and coordinated with DoD colleagues, and through 
rounds of adjudication within the Department. This process informs the 
security assistance accounts in the President's Budget Request, 
allocations in the year of appropriation, implementation of prior year 
funds, and rapidly changing needs and priorities. Additionally, both 
the State Department and DoD engage in numerous joint planning 
conferences each year, including the annual Joint Security Sector 
Assistance Review, and often participate in bilateral security 
assistance planning conferences.

    Question. How does State set its priorities for security 
assistance?

    Answer. The Department takes many factors into consideration when 
contemplating security assistance for any country, including questions 
of allocation increases, decreases, changes in program activities, or 
suspension. The framework the Department uses for budget development, 
program planning, and execution of security assistance looks at many 
considerations to inform security assistance prioritization, but this 
is not an exhaustive list as there are numerous issues that arise 
during each stage in a program's lifecycle that can impact security 
assistance programming. Such considerations include:

   Does the requirement directly support U.S. national security 
        and foreign policy interests, to include U.S.-supported 
        operations and coalitions, or support specific requests?

   Will the provision or continuation of security assistance 
        enhance ongoing access and influence opportunities?

   Are there legislative earmarks or MOU commitments?

   Is the recipient country capable of utilizing assistance 
        effectively?

   If assistance requires sustainment, maintenance, or 
        modernization, is there a plan in for preserving the 
        investment, long-term?

   Does the partner have the required political will or 
        institutional capacity to implement and sustain assistance 
        provided?

   Are similar programs furnished through other accounts or 
        agencies? Are State Department security assistance programs 
        complementary or redundant activities?

   Have we determined whether the existing program is making 
        progress toward identified political and/or military capability 
        objectives?

    Question. What gaps exist in the current State workforce, both in 
numbers and in training or expertise?

    Answer. While DoD's Security Cooperation workforce is more than 
20,000 strong, the Department of State maintains a roughly analogous 
political-military workforce that numbers in the hundreds. This makes 
it difficult to fulsomely engage DoD in joint development and 
coordination of its growing Title 10 assistance programming. 
Additionally, the Department lacks bespoke career development and 
training structures tailored to a security cooperation career path. 
Today's complex security assistance activities require integrated 
foreign policy and technical expertise.

    Question. How can we best fill gaps in the current State workforce?

    Answer. Additional staffing would support the management, 
implementation, and monitoring of Title 22 authorities, support 
coordination and foreign policy oversight of Title 10 resources, and 
enable staff training. In addition, authorizing the Peacekeeping 
Operations Account (PKO) to support domestic personal service 
contractors, something State currently lacks, would significantly 
expand the Bureau's capacity in the long run to implement PKO 
activities through State contracting mechanisms, which can 
substantially reduce delivery times and provide notable cost savings. 
In contrast to third-party contractors, domestic personal service 
contractors can perform inherently governmental functions such as 
contracting and financial management. State would also benefit from 
legislation that would allow Directorate of Defense Trade Control 
(DDTC) registration fees to fund the hiring of Federal Government 
personnel who perform defense trade control licensing duties. If DDTC 
funds all positions with registration fees, the Directorate would be 
able to hire strategically, without constraints inherent in managing 
different funding types. It would also save the Department's 
operational budget approximately $10 million annually.

    Question. When should we expect delivery and briefing of the Javits 
report?

    Answer. We are working urgently to get this report to you. I 
anticipate sending the report to you in the next few weeks. Upon 
delivery, we will reach out to you to schedule a briefing of the 
report.

    Question. Do the current vetting requirements for foreign military 
training in CONUS present undue burdens to NATO allies and other 
trusted partners?

    Answer. The new vetting requirements are more stringent than what 
is required by Sec 1090 of the FY 2021 NDAA. The Department is 
continuing to engage with DoD on the new vetting requirements to ensure 
security without creating an undue burden on our partners.

    Question. What is the objective of U.S. security assistance for 
Ukraine?

    Answer. In response to Russia's aggression, the United States has 
provided over $3 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014, 
and over $2 billion in the past year. Our security assistance has 
focused on training and equipment to help Ukraine defend its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, better monitor and secure its 
borders, and deploy its forces more safely and effectively. We have 
provided Ukraine with lethal defense items as part of our assistance to 
ensure it has the capabilities it needs for self-defense against 
Putin's unprovoked war of choice.

    Question. If the objective of U.S. security assistance is not to 
enable the Ukrainians to defeat the Russian invaders, why not?

    Answer. The objective of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine is to 
support Ukraine's defense of its sovereignty and its ability to defeat 
Russia's unprovoked invasion. The Administration has been responsive to 
the most pressing Ukrainian needs. The United States remains committed 
to increasing the capabilities of the Ukrainian military to defeat 
Russia as it pursues this unprovoked war of choice.

    Question. Does the USG believe Ukraine can win?

    Answer. Yes. The Ukrainian people, including the Ukrainian 
military, have demonstrated remarkable courage fighting against a 
technically and numerically superior force. We will continue our 
unprecedented levels of security assistance to help Ukraine in its 
fight.

    Question. While backfilling Allies and partners who supplied 
assistance to Ukraine should be a major priority, as reflected in the 
recent Ukraine supplemental appropriation, can you confirm that the top 
priority for the Ukraine PDA included the supplemental will be the 
timely provision of critical military assistance to Ukraine?

    Answer. I can assure you the Administration's top priority is 
working to fill the immediate defense requirements of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces to assist them in repelling the ongoing Russian invasion. 
We are working closely with DoD to expedite provisions of key defense 
material to Ukraine. In fact, multiple deliveries of U.S. security 
assistance have already arrived and continue to arrive daily to Ukraine 
to support and sustain the Ukrainian Government's ability to defend its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity from Russia's ongoing aggression.

    Question. Why does the U.S. Government view the transfer of capable 
air defense, drone, and anti-tank systems as not escalatory towards 
Russia, but views the transfer of aircraft as escalatory?

    Answer. Russia may mistakenly allege security assistance to Ukraine 
is escalatory and would increase the prospects of a conflict with NATO. 
However, since the invasion of Ukraine began in 2014, Russia has been 
the only escalatory actor. In light of Russia's atrocities and alleged 
war crimes, we do not view security assistance to Ukraine as 
escalatory. Aid to Ukraine is lawful, justified, and a national 
decision any country can determine for themselves. We will continue to 
explore ways to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as the 
citizens of Ukraine, who are defending their country with great skill 
and bravery.

    Question. What specific evidence is there that the transfer of 
aircraft will be viewed by Russia as escalatory?

    Answer. Russia has stated the transfer of MiG-29s to Ukraine is 
escalatory and could increase the prospects of a conflict with NATO. 
However, since the invasion of Ukraine began in 2014, Russia has been 
the only escalatory actor. In light of Russia's atrocities, and 
credible allegations of Russian war crimes, we do not view security 
assistance to Ukraine, including the transfer of aircraft, as 
escalatory. Aid to Ukraine is lawful, justified, and a national 
decision any country can determine for themselves. We will continue to 
explore ways to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as the 
citizens of Ukraine, who are defending their country with great skill 
and bravery.

    Question. Was the transfer of fighter aircraft by the Soviet Union 
to the North Vietnamese escalatory?

    Answer. The significant differences between the current war in 
Ukraine and the Vietnam War make it difficult to draw any parallels 
regarding the implications of fighter aircraft transfers on the two 
respective conflicts.

    Question. Has the USG approached Turkey to donate its S-400 air 
defense systems to Ukraine? If so, what was the response? If not, why 
not?

    Answer. The United States continues to urge Turkey at every level 
not to retain the S-400 system. Separately, we are continuing to 
encourage Allies and partners to provide assistance to help Ukraine 
defend itself.

    Question. What is the USG doing to get more capable air defense 
systems to Ukraine?

    Answer. Over the past year, the United States has committed more 
than $2 billion worth of critical security assistance to Ukraine, 
including the largest use of Presidential Drawdown Authority in U.S. 
history. This aid includes air defense systems of both U.S. and non-
U.S. origin, to include man-portable air defense systems and air 
defense radar systems. The Administration is working with Ukraine to 
mitigate critical capability gaps and help resupply weapons Ukraine has 
indicated it needs to continue to defend itself against Russia's 
invasion. We are also continuing to press our Allies and partners to 
transfer systems that Ukraine will be able to swiftly deploy and use.

    Question. Who is in charge of coordinating the logistics and supply 
of military assistance to Ukraine?

    Answer. While the Department of State has a role in policy 
questions on military assistance to Ukraine, the Department of Defense 
oversees the logistics and supply of military assistance to Ukraine 
from the United States. Specifically, the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency leads the logistics and contracting piece, and EUCOM maintains a 
coordination cell in charge of implementation, coordination, and 
management of this complex effort. I would refer you to DoD for any 
further details.

    Question. What is the plan to ensure continuity of supplies and 
assistance into Ukraine?

    Answer. The Department of State is committed to providing Ukraine 
the aid it needs to help defend itself against Russia's ongoing 
aggression, in cooperation with our interagency and international 
partners. This includes utilizing the maximum authority currently 
available to continue to provide Ukraine with the types of weapons and 
protective equipment required to meet the armored, airborne, and other 
threats it is facing. It also includes working to expedite the 
transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment from our Allies to resupply 
the weapons that Ukraine has indicated it needs to defend itself. 
Multiple deliveries of U.S. security assistance continue to arrive 
daily in support of our multi-pronged strategy to assist Ukraine in its 
brave stand against Russia.

    Question. What are the next steps in building out Ukraine's air 
defense capabilities now that large numbers of MANPADS have been 
delivered?

    Answer. There are various challenges to increasing Ukraine's air 
defense capabilities, which include cost, technology release concerns, 
training, and time constraints. While the U.S. Government has already 
provided over $2 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 2014, 
we continue to explore various avenues to support Ukraine's air defense 
readiness needs in line with our capability assessment and have 
encouraged our Allies and partners to assist meeting Ukrainian defense 
priorities, including air defense. Additional details on these efforts 
are best conveyed in a classified setting.

    Question. What efforts are underway to source MANPADS and other air 
defense capabilities from allies and partners?

    Answer. The Department of State is committed to providing Ukraine 
with the aid it needs. Together with our Allies and partners, we are 
working to transfer hundreds of MANPADS to the Ukrainian Armed Forces 
to enable them to adequately meet the complex airborne threats they are 
facing. In addition to direct transfers from the Department of Defense 
and from partner countries that have donated non-U.S. origin equipment, 
the Department has authorized 14 Third Party Transfer requests for 
U.S.-origin air defense systems and anticipates additional transfers as 
more countries contribute to Ukraine's urgent defense requirements. In 
total, these armaments will help mitigate critical capability gaps and 
help resupply weapons Ukraine has indicated it needs to defend itself 
against Russia's renewed invasion.

    Question. What is the State Department's policy regarding American 
citizens traveling to volunteer to fight for the Ukrainians?

    Answer. The Secretary has repeatedly stated that Americans should 
not travel to Ukraine. Our Level 4 Ukraine Travel Advisory remains in 
effect: U.S. citizens in Ukraine should depart immediately if it is 
safe to do so using any commercial or other privately available ground 
transportation options. The Department will not be able to evacuate 
American citizens from Ukraine. For those who want to help Ukraine, 
there are many ways to do so, including by supporting and helping the 
many NGOs that are working to provide humanitarian assistance. 
Individuals that choose to disregard the Travel Advisory not to enter 
Ukraine should review the Department's website for additional 
considerations on travel to high-risk areas, including potential steps 
to consider prior to travel.

    Question. What efforts is State taking to make it easier for 
volunteer organizations, non-profits, and others to donate or send 
military equipment to Ukraine?

    Answer. The Department is working closely with organizations across 
civil society to advise on the process to receive authorization to 
export defense articles to Ukraine, and we have worked with our 
interagency partners to expedite the review of certain export requests 
where there is a clear need to do so. However, we continue to conduct 
all requisite due diligence when adjudicating requests in support of 
Ukraine to ensure that the transfers also comport with the national 
security and foreign policy of the United States.

    Question. Is State considering waiving any application fees or 
expediting processes for non-government organizations who wish to 
donate or send military equipment to Ukraine?

    Answer. Currently, we are not considering waiving application fees; 
however, we are applying all appropriate urgency to requests supporting 
Ukraine and thinking critically about existing flexibilities in our 
authorities while continuing to ensure that transfers are assessed in a 
manner consistent with the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and 
applicable regulations. My team has engaged closely with the Embassy of 
Ukraine and other international partners, the defense industry, NGOs, 
and our interagency colleagues to ensure that legitimate requests for 
the export or re-export of defense articles to Ukraine are expedited; 
we are conducting twice-daily audits of pending direct commercial sales 
export licenses, and in instances where an application has required 
additional due diligence to verify the bona fides of the transaction we 
have been able to confirm validity of official documentation and 
approve certain transactions within hours.

    Question. The 2022 budget supplemental includes $500M for Foreign 
Military Finance grant assistance for Eastern Europe and Ukraine. What 
are the USG's objectives for this assistance?

    Answer. The Department of State will work closely with key 
stakeholders, including U.S. European Command, to identify the most 
urgent requirements for the $650 million in Foreign Military Financing 
provided for Ukraine and ``countries impacted by the situation in 
Ukraine'' in the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2022. As 
Russia wages a premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against 
Ukraine, it is clear that partners in the region, including those on 
the frontline in NATO's Eastern Flank, will require U.S. support to 
bolster their defenses against Russia. Many of these countries answered 
the call to provide direct military assistance to Ukraine, and this 
funding will help support them and others impacted by Russia's 
continuing aggression.

    Question. What is the plan to use those funds?

    Answer. The Department is moving expeditiously to identify both 
immediate and medium- to longer-term requirements in coordination with 
the Department of Defense, including U.S. European Command. Assistance 
needs in Ukraine and the region involve different timelines. Given the 
multiple security assistance authorities available through the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, we will work closely with the 
interagency to identify funding authorities that best meet the 
timelines involved for each partner. Priorities may include assistance 
for NATO's Eastern Flank to support key defense capabilities to counter 
Russia's aggression and influence, and to resupply partners' military 
stockpiles depleted from their rapid deployment of assistance to 
Ukraine. As we continue to work on this issue, we are committed to 
keeping Congress informed of our efforts.

    Question. The 2022 budget supplemental includes $4B for Foreign 
Military Finance loan authority for Eastern Europe and Ukraine. What 
are the USG's objectives for this assistance?

    Answer. The Department of State will work closely with the 
Department of Defense to identify military requirements that can best 
be met through this loan authority. Objectives may include supporting 
key military capabilities in NATO Allies most at risk from Russia's 
aggression, including NATO Eastern Flank countries. We are in the 
processing of identifying these requirements and we are committed to 
keeping Congress informed of our efforts.

    Question. What is the plan to use those funds?

    Answer. The Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, includes 
$4 billion in FMF loans and an additional $4 billion in FMF loan 
guarantees for Ukraine and NATO Allies. The Department of State will 
work closely with the Department of Defense to identify military 
requirements that can best be met through such a loan program. Such 
requirements may include longer-term and higher value procurements, 
such as air defense systems and fixed wing aircraft, among others. As 
we further develop these plans, we are committed to keeping Congress 
informed of our efforts.

    Question. Eastern European allies have donated large quantities of 
defense articles to Ukraine. They still need to deter Russian 
aggression against themselves. What articles need to be backfilled to 
maintain deterrence?

    Answer. As you know, the United States is working to facilitate the 
transfers of U.S.-made military equipment from our Allies to Ukraine. 
As part of this process, we are exploring options to help backfill 
munitions and equipment that our Allies may provide Ukraine from their 
own reserves. This is an ongoing process, and we are currently 
assessing and identifying which Allies require backfills and whether 
the United States has an equivalent system that could fulfill the 
requirement.

    Question. What is the USG doing to expedite such backfills?

    Answer. The United States is currently exploring options to 
backfill munitions and equipment that our Allies and partners may be 
providing to Ukraine. This ongoing process includes assessments on 
backfill requirements, capability equivalents, and industry supply 
chain capacity. We are working with the Department of Defense to 
identify the most pressing partner needs and to identify ways we can 
expedite backfills from current and future production, as well as 
security assistance and loans that could help assist countries with 
long-term defense procurements. We are committed to keeping Congress 
informed of our efforts.

    Question. What is U.S. industry doing to expedite production and 
delivery?

    Answer. The United States is exploring options to increase our 
defense production capacity to help backfill munitions and equipment 
that the United States and our Allies are providing Ukraine. This 
interagency process is underway, and includes an assessment of our most 
pressing requirements, operational solutions, and industry capacity and 
production timelines. We are committed to keeping Congress informed of 
our efforts.

    Question. Does the 2014 Wales summit pledge of 2 percent GDP 
spending for defense still make sense in the face of Russia's invasion 
of Ukraine?

    Answer. The Wales Defense Investment Pledge is a critical 
commitment related to Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, which 
requires Allies to ``maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack.'' Allies have committed, as 
recently as the March 24 NATO Summit, to continue to share the 
responsibility of our collective security against new and existing 
threats, both conventional and non-conventional. Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine puts in sharp relief the need for Allies to meet their Wales 
Pledge commitments by investing in national defense, including 
readiness, force generation, and capabilities. We welcome the pledges 
made by some Allies since Russia's further invasion of Ukraine to meet 
their Wales Defense Investment Pledge targets sooner than previously 
planned and further welcome the pledges of several Allies to exceed it. 
We must ensure the Alliance has the sufficient, capable, and ready, 
integrated defense posture required to maintain a credible defense and 
deterrence in the 21st century threat environment.

    Question. What is the Biden administration doing to ensure NATO 
allies spend more?

    Answer. The Biden administration is continuing to ensure Allies 
equitably share the responsibility of NATO's collective security. 
Allies recommitted to the Wales Defense Investment Pledge at the March 
24 Brussels Summit. The Administration has reframed burden sharing as 
investing in the capabilities, readiness, and force generation needed 
to maintain a credible defense and deterrence posture and fulfill NATO 
missions and operations. We will continue to consult with Allies and 
with Congress to ensure NATO has the sufficient, capable, and ready 
forces required to fulfill this pledge.
    The Administration is ensuring that the revision of NATO's 
Strategic Concept proceeds from sound analysis of the evolving security 
environment to offer a clear approach to current and future threats and 
challenges. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, bordering NATO's eastern 
flank, has put the need for increased defense spending in sharp relief, 
and several Allies have announced renewed vows to increase national 
defense investment as a result.

    Question. Germany has announced a major shift in its defense 
policy. What actual tangible steps has it taken to put this policy into 
action?

    Answer. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz responded to Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine with a pledge to begin spending more than 2 percent 
of German GDP on defense each year starting in 2022 and announced a new 
$110 billion special fund to this end. Germany added 350 troops to its 
now 850-soldier NATO deployment in Lithuania, where it leads an 
enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup. Germany is also participating in 
a new NATO combat unit in Slovakia and has extended its air policing 
mission in Romania. Germany sent 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 
Stinger surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine and authorized Estonia and 
the Netherlands to supply Ukraine with German-produced weapons. Germany 
also supports EU efforts to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine. 
Additionally, Germany is modernizing its Air Force and has announced 
the procurement of 35 F-35 aircraft.

    Question. What other European Allies have announced defense policy 
changes in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

    Answer. Below is a list of notable defense policy changes made by 
European Allies, close NATO partner Sweden, and the EU in the wake of 
Russia's war of choice in Ukraine. Additionally, all European Allies 
have provided humanitarian and/or military assistance to Ukraine; for 
some Allies, the decision to provide lethal aid represents a 
significant shift in defense policy, with Germany and the Netherlands 
as key examples.

   Belgium:

        On February 25, the Government of Belgium announced it 
            will increase defense spending from its current level of 
            1.1 percent of GDP to 1.54 percent of GDP by 2030.

   Denmark:

        On March 6, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called 
            on Danish citizens to overturn Denmark's ability to opt-out 
            from EU defense policy and announced a referendum to do so 
            that will be held on June 1.

        PM Frederiksen also announced a 7 billion kroner ($1 
            billion USD) increase to defense, diplomacy, and 
            humanitarian spending over the next 2 years. Denmark plans 
            to meet NATO's Wales Pledge (2 percent of GDP towards 
            defense spending) by 2033.

   EU:

        Given that the majority of NATO Allies are also EU member 
            states, it is significant to note that in late February the 
            EU agreed to finance 1 billion euros (1.1 billion USD) in 
            assistance to the Ukrainian military, including lethal 
            assistance for the first time ever.

   Germany:

        In late February, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced 
            a plan to increase German military spending significantly 
            and imminently, pledging 100 billion euros ($112.7 billion 
            USD). Scholz also pledged to spend more than 2 percent of 
            GDP on defense, allowing Germany to meet NATO's Wales 
            Pledge, and Germany agreed to buy 35 F-35 fighter jets. 
            Germany currently spends only 1.53 percent of GDP on 
            defense, further highlighting the significance of this 
            policy shift.

        In late February, Germany agreed to send lethal aid to 
            Ukraine, shifting from a policy of not sending weapons to 
            active conflict zones.

   Netherlands:

        On February 18, the Dutch Government announced its 
            decision to supply Ukraine with military assistance, a 
            shift from previous policy that precluded the deployment of 
            lethal assistance to conflict zones.

   Poland:

        On March 3, Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jaroslaw 
            Kaczynski announced that Poland will increase defense 
            spending immediately, with a goal of increasing the defense 
            budget from 2.1 to 3 percent of GDP in 2023. He pledged 
            additional increases in the following years.

   Romania:

        On March 1, President Iohannis announced Romania would 
            increase its defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP, but 
            this still requires parliamentary approval. We believe the 
            increase in spending will go to military acquisitions (and 
            not personnel salaries) and allowing Romania to modernize 
            even further.

   Sweden (close NATO partner):

        On March 10, Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson 
            announced that Sweden will increase its defense spending 
            from 1.3 percent to 2 percent of GDP ``as soon as is 
            practical.''

    Question. What is the status of the German dual-capable aircraft 
replacement program?

    Answer. On March 14, 2022, Germany announced it would procure 35 F-
35 aircraft to replace its aging nuclear-capable Tornados. The F-35 
procurement may help Germany maintain critical continuity in its 
contributions under the NATO nuclear sharing program. We look forward 
to working with the German Ministry of Defense to maintain Germany's 
key contributions to NATO missions.

    Question. What is the status of the German heavy lift helicopter 
replacement program?

    Answer. Germany is still in the process of completing its aircraft 
selection for its $6 billion Heavy Lift Helicopter program. Both 
contenders are U.S. platforms, the Lockheed Martin's King Stallion CH-
53K Helicopter and the Boeing Chinook CH-47F, and the contract award is 
contingent upon U.S. Government provision of pilot and technical 
training through at least the first 5 years of the program. Germany 
contracted via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program for 22 pilots 
to be trained in the United States in 2021 and 30 in 2022.
    In order to receive a FMS offer for a heavy lift helicopter Germany 
must down select a platform and submit a Letter of Request (LOR) for 
Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). It is possible that Germany may 
request a LOR for LOA for both platforms to maintain flexibility and 
avoid the appearance of bias. Germany requested one final set of 
pricing and availability data from each competitor that will be 
provided in early April 2022. We anticipate Germany will make a 
selection by second quarter 2022.

    Question. What is the status of the German air defense replacement 
program?

    Answer. Lockheed Martin and Matra BAE Dynamics and Alenia 
Deutschland are in a joint venture to develop and produce Germany's 
next-generation air and missile defense system, the PATRIOT Advanced 
Capability (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) End-to-End Missile 
Model (ETMM). Germany calls this program the Taktische 
Luftverteidigungssystem (``Tactical Air Defense System;'' or TLVS). 
Germany submitted a Letter of Request in April 2019 for PAC-3 MSE-ETMM; 
however, Germany stopped the development of the Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance in March 2021 due to lack of a budget plan in 2021 or 2022 
for the TLVS program. Germany has not informed the USG if it intends to 
continue the program.

    Question. How does security assistance support U.S. interests 
regarding strategic competition with Russia?

    Answer. Security assistance revitalizes and bolsters alliances and 
partnerships to counteract Russia's destabilizing and subversive agenda 
in Eastern Europe. In Ukraine, the USG has provided over $3 billion in 
security assistance since 2014 to strengthen the capabilities and 
readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces--and the results are evident. 
We have provided security assistance to enhance conventional 
capabilities and address the asymmetrical threat of Russian hybridized 
warfare to other Eastern European countries, including the Baltic 
States, collectively the largest recipient of security assistance in 
Europe after Ukraine. Moreover, we are working to build capacity, good 
governance, and to strengthen relations, with security partners around 
the world, from Africa to Latin America, to better enable them to 
reject Russia's destabilizing activities.

    Question. How have or will Western sanctions and export controls 
affect Russia's ability to compete with the U.S. for defense exports?

    Answer. The sanctions imposed by the United States and many other 
countries as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine will make defense 
transactions with Russia even more difficult and risky. All countries 
must now consider the extreme risk of negative consequences from 
supporting a heavily sanctioned Russian defense sector. This support 
could also result in future inability to acquire military equipment, 
including spare parts and maintenance for their own forces.

    Question. What changes has the Biden administration made in our 
security relationship with Taiwan in the last year to help bolster 
Taiwan's ability to deter increasing Chinese military aggression?

    Answer. Our defense relationship with Taiwan continues to be 
commensurate with the threat we assess from the PRC, consistent with 
our one China policy and in the context of our Indo-Pacific Strategy.
    Taiwan's ability to deter China from using military force or 
coercion to invade, occupy, and unify the island is in the strategic 
interest of the United States. The U.S. Government's approach to Taiwan 
has shifted from one of insisting Taiwan deprioritize buying high 
profile, symbolic platforms to a more proactive approach on the 
provision of arms and the services that support Taiwan's self-defense 
in a manner commensurate with the threat from China. Further, the U.S. 
Government is consulting with the Taiwan Authorities to ensure there is 
alignment on the capabilities needed to deter the PRC and defend the 
island.

    Question. Please define the term ``asymmetric'' as regards Taiwan's 
defense requirements.

    Answer. The U.S. Government seeks to assist Taiwan in procuring 
asymmetric capabilities. These capabilities should be cost-efficient, 
mobile, lethal, resilient, and cable of operating and surviving in a 
contested environment. Further, these capabilities need to be able to 
deter the PRC, complicate PRC military planning, and should a conflict 
occur, they must be effective in the defense of the island. The 
Departments of State and Defense are discussing this terminology with 
Taiwan to ensure Taiwan's defense procurements align with this 
definition of asymmetric. Taiwan's definition of asymmetric is codified 
in greater detail in its national Defense Report 2021, section 2 
``Planning for Force Buildup.''

    Question. How would the Biden administration make best use of a new 
security assistance funding program for Taiwan?

    Answer. Provided the U.S. Government receives appropriations along 
with the authorization for security assistance funding for Taiwan, such 
funding would be used to support programs that align with our defense 
trade and defense priorities writ large. These priorities include anti-
ship missiles, integrated air and missile defense, C2, data links, ISR, 
redundant communications, and electronic warfare capabilities.

    Question. What changes have the Department of State and Department 
of Defense made in their processes to accelerate and expedite getting 
necessary defense capabilities to Taiwan (not just for Foreign Military 
Sales, but also Direct Commercial Sales or any other process relevant 
for Taiwan), other than reversing the bundling policy?

    Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are looking at the 
entire defense trade enterprise to see where efficiencies can be made 
and what delivery timelines of defense articles can be improved. We 
lowered the approval authority for the transfer of defense articles and 
services, and we are looking to review anticipatory policies, outline 
defense trade priorities to Taiwan and to industry to increase 
transparency and predictability, expedite Third Party Transfers, 
discuss arm sale exports from other countries, push for the conclusion 
of defense agreements related to defense trade, and look at 
opportunities to improve Taiwan's indigenous industrial defense 
capability.

    Question. What are the top 2-3 things the Department of State and 
the Department of Defense are working on to shorten delivery timelines 
for arms sales to Taiwan?

    Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are seeking to shorten 
delivery timelines for numerous Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct 
Commercial Sales cases under contract as well as those in the pipeline. 
Three notable cases that the U.S. Government is seeking to expedite 
include Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles, F-16 new buy deliveries and 
induction of F-16 retrofit airplanes, and Stinger missiles. Specific 
areas where the Department of Defense has focused in FMS are: 1) 
opportunities to prioritize Taiwan production and delivery as 
appropriate and 2) working with the defense industry to employ 
strategic contract strategies that enable early procurement of items 
that have long lead times.

    Question. What does the Department of State or Department of 
Defense need from Congress to shorten delivery timelines for arms sales 
to Taiwan?

    Answer. We encourage Congress to work with the Department of 
Defense to seek efficiencies and make reforms to the Federal 
acquisition processes that govern all U.S. Government acquisitions and 
directly impact the speed of Foreign Military Sales case execution for 
Taiwan. Title 22 and Title 10 security assistance programs are subject 
to the U.S. procurement regulations, such as the Balance of Payments 
Program, that in large part limit procurements to U.S. sources. In some 
cases, there may not be a U.S.-origin capability that can meet Taiwan's 
immediate requirements. Although the ability to acquire capabilities 
from foreign commercial or government sources would be particularly 
beneficial to the Department in executing security assistance programs 
for Taiwan, receipt of a blanket authority to procure foreign-made 
equipment, including license-produced items, under Title 22 and Title 
10 building partnership capacity authorities would vastly increase the 
Department's ability to provide capabilities globally in alignment with 
defense priorities.

    Question. How are the Department of State and Department of Defense 
thinking about Taiwan's civilian defense and resilience needs in 
planning out future engagements with Taiwan?

    Answer. While the U.S. Government has focused extensively on 
supporting Taiwan through the acquisition of asymmetric capabilities, 
the Departments of State and Defense are also coordinating closely with 
Taiwan on non-material solutions to improve Taiwan's defenses. This 
includes working with Taiwan on increasing its resiliency and jointness 
across the military and non-military domains by looking at its reserve 
and mobilization reforms and civil-military integration.

    Question. Are the Department of State or the Department of Defense 
considering any funding or programming that would address civilian 
defense and resilience needs?

    Answer. We would be willing to discuss security assistance funding 
with Congress. Historically, the Department of State has not provided 
any security assistance, including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and 
International Military Education Training, to Taiwan due to its high-
income status and ability to use national funds for foreign military 
sales and given that a substantial amount of FMF would be required to 
support the highly sophisticated capabilities that Taiwan needs. This 
is not feasible without significant support from appropriators. The 
annual global FMF account is about 93 percent earmarked by Congress, 
and State is therefore constrained by very limited discretionary funds. 
The Department of Defense has been supporting Taiwan via section 333 
(Train & Equip) and continues planning for 333 funding in out-years.

    Question. How have the Department of State and Department of 
Defense engaged with industry on supply chain delays for Taiwan's 
purchases?

    Answer. On March 14, the Department of State, in close coordination 
with the Departments of Defense and Commerce, will initiate a 
discussion with the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council (USTBC) and its 
members to discuss: 1) The U.S. Government's defense trade priorities 
for Taiwan; and 2) Solicit U.S. defense industry's recommendations for 
shortening the timeline from initial requests to delivery of a 
capability. The Department of State seeks to continue engaging through 
the USTBC to obtain industry wide recommendations. We will also engage 
in one-on-one discussions with defense contractors to discuss ways to 
mitigate supply chain issues for specific weapon systems to Taiwan.

    Question. The Biden administration says that China is the pacing 
threat for the U.S. and our allies. How much of the State Department's 
security assistance budget goes to the Indo-Pacific region, both in 
absolute numbers and as a percentage?

    Answer. The Administration's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
requests and Congressional appropriations are historically constrained 
by enduring commitments. For example, roughly 88 percent of the global 
FMF account is earmarked for the NEA region, which usually leaves the 
Department with limited flexibility in discretionary FMF funds, 
particularly when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. In recent years, the 
Department has allocated nearly a third (32 percent in FY 2021) of its 
discretionary FMF to the Indo-Pacific. I appreciate Congress' 
receptiveness to our concerns over the inflexibility of the FMF account 
and I was pleased to see fewer earmarks and restrictions in the FY 2022 
appropriations, which is a step in the right direction. I will keep you 
apprised as we determine resource alignment against the 
Administration's new Indo-Pacific Strategy.

    Question. What are the most pressing capability gaps among U.S. 
allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific? Please provide responses for 
each country to which the United States has provided security 
assistance in the prior 3 years.

    Answer. Over the past 3 years, we have focused our security 
assistance on addressing the following pressing capability gaps: 
maritime capacity, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, 
peacekeeping operations, institutional capacity building, military 
professionalization and training, border security, counterterrorism, 
and cyber. Particularly given the publication of the new Indo-Pacific 
Strategy, we will continue working closely with DoD to identify 
critical gaps, opportunities, and requirements to ensure FY 2022 
resources are aligned with priorities, and out-year budget planning and 
funding requests include emerging requirements. Given that many 
discussions on capabilities and gaps are classified--such as the South 
China Sea asymmetric working group--I would be happy to further engage 
on this topic in a classified setting.

    Question. What steps has the Biden administration taken to 
prioritize and expedite Foreign Military Sales to Japan?

    Answer. We are working with Japan, the Department of Defense, and 
industry to achieve efficiencies wherever possible within the Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) process. For example, we encourage Japan to make 
greater use of multi-year procurements. This supports DoD's ability to 
move cases faster and at lower cost, which will improve our forces' 
interoperability and ensure our alliance can adapt quickly to a 
changing security landscape with the necessary capabilities and 
military readiness. Following efforts to streamline case development, 
case processing time has reduced by 16 percent.
    Additionally, we welcome Japan's progress toward establishing the 
security infrastructure necessary to implement FMS cases in a timely 
fashion. For example, the May 2021 signing of the Advanced Weapons 
Systems Special Security Agreement (AWS SSA) will greatly reduce case 
execution time and increase the predictability of Japan's requirements.

    Question. What else can the Biden administration do to speed the 
process of Foreign Military Sales to Japan?

    Answer. We will continue exploring options for generating increased 
pricing data for Japan's internal purposes and to further reduce 
timelines for successful Foreign Military Sales (FMS) implementation. 
Over the coming months the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
and Japan's Acquisition Technology and Logistics Agency will pursue 
increased efficiency through pricing and availability estimates within 
Japan's budget process timelines. Staffing is underway to confirm what 
FMS policy exceptions are required and ensure buy-in from the services. 
DSCA is also looking at finance options to speed the implementation of 
FMS cases, saving months on the timeline from Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance signature and authority to enter contracting actions on 
Japan's behalf. We also look forward to working with the Government of 
Japan as it takes steps to increase pricing fidelity and programmatic 
efficiencies.

    Question. What, if anything, is new about AUKUS, when it comes to 
security assistance with Australia?

    Answer. The AUKUS trilateral partnership signals our commitment to 
a free and open Indo-Pacific region, providing impetus to ensure 
Australia has advanced capabilities to fulfill its part. This 
initiative extends beyond nuclear-powered submarines to include cyber, 
quantum, artificial intelligence, additional undersea, and other 
advanced conventional capabilities necessary to meet the region's 
dynamic security challenges. What is not new is that as we evaluate the 
transfer of any of these advanced conventional capabilities, we will 
continue to do so via the lens of our Conventional Arms Transfer 
policy, including ensuring that U.S. information and technology is 
appropriately protected. We will also continue to notify Congress in 
accordance with our obligations under the Arms Export Control Act.

    Question. Based on current circumstances, in which Indo-Pacific 
countries is the United States under-investing in terms of security 
assistance because of certain constraints?

    Answer. State and DoD work closely together to deconflict Title 22 
and Title 10 funding for countries and capabilities, considering 
critical factors such as political objectives, defense requirements, 
absorptive capacity, partner nation investments, access, influence, 
assurance and reciprocity, ability for embassies to manage increased 
resources, comparative advantages, end-use agreements, Congressional 
restrictions and legal considerations, and funding pipelines. 
Additionally, approximately 93 percent of State's FMF annual 
appropriation is earmarked, which reduces our ability to shift 
resources to priority regions and countries. All these issues can act 
as constraints; and we carefully review such variables prior to the 
allocation of funds, while also utilizing our assessment, monitoring, 
and evaluation resources to help inform out-year budget requests and 
allocations.

    Question. What constraints are there in the Indo-Pacific for 
investing in security assistance? Please provide a country-by-country 
breakdown.

    Answer. The Department of State and DoD work closely together to 
deconflict Title 22 and Title 10 funding for countries and 
capabilities, considering critical factors such as political 
objectives, absorptive capacity, partner nation investments, access, 
influence, assurance and reciprocity, ability for embassies to manage 
increased resources, comparative advantages, end-use agreements, 
funding pipelines, and Congressional restrictions and legal 
considerations. All these issues can act as constraints; and we 
carefully review such variables prior to the allocation of funds, while 
also utilizing our assessment, monitoring, and evaluation resources to 
help inform out-year budget requests and allocations. I would be happy 
to have further discussions on specific country issues.

    Question. Based on current circumstances, how much more Foreign 
Military Financing and International Military Education and Training 
could each of the countries absorb, if the United States had the 
security assistance funds to provide them with more FMF or IMET? Please 
provide a country-by-country breakdown.

    Answer. Absorptive capacity is a significant consideration when 
allocating both Title 22 (including Foreign Military Financing and 
International Military Education and Training, or IMET) and Title 10 
security assistance resources. We assess that the President's FY 2022 
Congressional Budget Justification is sufficient to meet current demand 
signal in the region, and as deconflicted with Title 10 resources and 
other variables. IMET, in particular, requires special consideration 
given the frequent misperceptions of the topline regional and bilateral 
allocation amounts. When determining bilateral IMET allocation levels, 
we consider several factors, the most important of which are absorptive 
capacity of the recipient country (e.g., the ability to identify 
candidates at the appropriate rank with the necessary language skills) 
and U.S. military schoolhouse capacity. Additionally, several countries 
`cost share' the attendance of their students to U.S. schools (i.e., 
IMET pays the tuition, the recipient country covers travel/per diem), 
which increases the number of students partners can send. We work very 
closely with the Security Cooperation Offices at our embassies and 
attend all Geographic Combatant Command strategy and resourcing 
conferences, as well as the regional Security Cooperation Education and 
Training Working Groups to validate individual country requirements on 
an annual basis. I look forward to continuing resourcing discussions to 
ensure we have sufficient funding to meet demand signals from our 
partners. I would be happy to have further discussions on specific 
country issues in a different setting.

    Question. Do you consider the Philippines to be a strategically 
important ally of the United States? Please explain your position.

    Answer. Yes, the long-standing alliance between the Philippines and 
the United States is anchored by our collective commitment to 
democracy, which has contributed to peace, stability, and prosperity in 
the Asia-Pacific region for more than 75 years. As documented in the 
joint statement of the 2021 U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Strategic 
Dialogue, the United States and the Philippines are coordinating on 
fundamental matters of peace and stability, including unimpeded lawful 
commerce, freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses 
of the sea, along with many other matters of vital importance to the 
national security of the United States.

    Question. The United States military currently cooperates with the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines on counterterrorism and maritime 
security. Multiple members of Congress have proposed limiting or 
cutting off U.S. security assistance to the Philippine military because 
of concerns over human rights abuses.
    Do you believe that taking such a step is in U.S. interests?

    Answer. The Philippines and United States maintain an ongoing 
dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including human rights. 
Such sustained constructive engagement is essential for promoting both 
respect for human rights and U.S. security interests. Our security 
assistance supports respect for, and understanding of, human rights in 
the Philippines, for example through the International Military 
Education & Training program. Furthermore, security assistance is 
subject to Leahy vetting to ensure that no proposed recipient is a 
member of a unit credibly implicated in a gross violation of human 
rights. I believe that we need to continue to monitor U.S. security 
assistance to the Philippines to ensure that it is striking the correct 
balance between promotion of respect for human rights and U.S. security 
interests.

    Question. The United States military currently cooperates with the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines on counterterrorism and maritime 
security. Multiple members of Congress have proposed limiting or 
cutting off U.S. security assistance to the Philippine military because 
of concerns over human rights abuses.
    Do you believe that taking such a step would improve human rights 
conditions in the Philippines?

    Answer. The U.S. Government utilizes the International Military 
Education & Training (IMET) program to foster respect for and 
understanding of human rights in the Philippine military. Consistent 
with the Leahy Law, the Department vets all assistance to security 
force units nominated for assistance and restricts any training or 
other assistance to units credibly implicated in a gross violation of 
human rights. This helps incentivize the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines to respect human rights and to investigate and address, as 
appropriate, allegations of human rights violations. I believe that we 
need to continue to monitor U.S. security assistance to the Philippines 
to ensure that it is striking the correct balance between promotion of 
respect for human rights and U.S. security interests.

    Question. The Philippines is a state party to the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Is that compatible with being a U.S. 
ally and security assistance recipient?

    Answer. While the Bureau of Political Military Affairs does not 
handle this issue directly, the United States has stated that the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) risks negatively 
affecting nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear deterrence, and our 
security relationships. We have repeatedly noted our concerns to those 
allies and partners who have expressed an interest in the TPNW, 
including its state parties. The Treaty may reinforce divisions that 
hinder the international community's ability to work together to 
address pressing proliferation and security challenges.

    Question. Have we made clear that the U.S. will not protect the 
Philippines against nuclear threats or coercion?

    Answer. While the Bureau of Political Military Affairs does not 
handle this issue directly, the United States has stated that the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) may reinforce 
divisions that hinder the international community's ability to work 
together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges. It 
also risks negatively affecting nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear 
deterrence, and our security relationships. It remains to be seen how 
TPNW states parties will interpret and implement many of the treaty's 
provisions and how this might impact their security relationships with 
nuclear weapons states.

    Question. How does security assistance support U.S. interests 
regarding strategic competition with China?

    Answer. Security assistance is vital to strengthening our alliances 
and partnerships, which serve as a source of strength and are a unique 
American advantage. These alliances and partnerships enable us to 
present a common front, defend access to the global commons, and hold 
countries like the People's Republic of China accountable for 
aggressive actions. Our security assistance helps to strengthen 
military-to-military cooperation and our overall bilateral and 
multilateral relationships, and to build the defensive capabilities, 
institutional capacity, and good governance of key partners, enabling 
them to defend their rights, make independent political choices free of 
coercion, reject unlawful maritime claims, and strengthen and maintain 
the international rules-based order.

    Question. How many missile or drone attacks did the Houthis launch 
against Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2021?

    Answer. The Department understands there were more than 400 cross-
border drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia during 2021, 
killing dozens and wounding many more.

    Question. What is the Biden administration doing to support them in 
countering these threats?

    Answer. The Administration has been clear with our partners that we 
will continue to support their territorial defense against cross-border 
attacks, including through relevant arms transfers. We appreciate 
Congressional support for these capabilities when they enter the 
Congressional review process.

    Question. What specific security assistance efforts are underway to 
counter these threats?

    Answer. The interagency continues to process air defense related 
arms transfer requests for systems such as Patriot and Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) that have been instrumental in defeating 
cross-border attacks. The Department continues to work closely with our 
Department of Defense colleagues to expedite the necessary processes 
ahead of any proposed defensive capability transfers.

    Question. What air and missile defense capabilities have the Saudis 
or Emiratis requested from the U.S. that have not yet been approved or 
provided?

    Answer. Aside from systems of record such as Patriot and Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense, the interagency is processing requests for 
additional counter-unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities, many of which 
are still in development. The Department continues to work closely with 
our Department of Defense colleagues to expedite the necessary 
processes ahead of any proposed defensive capability transfers.

    Question. China has exploited the USG's failure to export drones 
and other capabilities to establish growing military relationships in 
the Middle East. What is the Biden administration doing to counter 
these growing Chinese efforts?

    Answer. Following an interagency review, the Biden-Harris 
administration decided to maintain the unmanned aerial systems Export 
Policy, including to invoke national discretion for a subset of Missile 
Technology Control Regime-controlled systems. These transfers are 
considered on a case-by-case basis. In addition, as part of the 
Administration's review of the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, the 
Administration is exploring ways to make U.S. arms transfers more 
competitive, including flexible financing options and building 
exportability into platforms and technology early in the acquisition 
process.

    Question. Has the UAS export policy damaged U.S. interests in the 
Middle East?

    Answer. No, the policy reflects American values while still 
accounting for the security needs of our partners. As with all arms 
transfer requests, unmanned aerial system cases are reviewed on a case-
by-case basis to ensure the transfer aligns with U.S. national 
security, human rights, and other foreign policy objectives.

    Question. Has the UAS export policy damaged U.S. interests in the 
Middle East?

    Answer. The United States is committed to advancing the security of 
our partners across the Middle East. As with all arms transfer 
requests, unmanned aerial vehicle cases are reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis to ensure the transfer aligns with U.S. national security, human 
rights, and other foreign policy objectives.

    Question. What is the status of deliveries of KC-46 refueling 
aircraft to Israel? Are deliveries being expedited?

    Answer. I would defer to our Department of Defense colleagues for 
an update on the status of these contracts and delivery timeline.

    Question. The U.S. spent roughly $125B over 20 years in mostly 
failed efforts to build the Iraqi and Afghan militaries. Please 
describe any formal efforts that the USG has conducted to 
institutionalize lessons from these security assistance efforts.
    What lessons have been learned?

    Answer. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us that 
security assistance delivered before baseline standards of governance 
and institutional capacity are in place may provide little return on 
investment and may even harm U.S. interests in the long run. It is a 
matter of finding the correct balance in delivering security 
assistance, as a certain level of security is necessary for the 
implementation of baseline standards of governance and the growth of 
institutional capacity in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and the Special 
Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction have led the USG's formal 
efforts to assess and document lessons learned to inform future 
reconstruction efforts. For both Special Inspectors General, the USG's 
security sector assistance was a central focus. Among the key lessons 
that emerged: 1) the lag in developing host nation ministerial and 
security sector governing capacity hindered planning, oversight, and 
the long-term sustainability of their security forces; and 2) providing 
advanced weapons and management systems to host-nation security forces 
without also providing the appropriate training and institutional 
infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required increased U.S. 
financial support, and hampered efforts to make those security forces 
self-sustaining.

    Question. How have these lessons been institutionalized in the 
State Department and Defense Department?

    Answer. With our DoD colleagues, we are cognizant of past 
challenges in our support to Iraqi and Afghan security forces. In Iraq, 
we continue to update and refine our security cooperation and security 
assistance goals and objectives. While remaining focused on helping the 
Iraqis prevent the re-emergence of ISIS, we are working to institute a 
more ``normal'' security cooperation relationship, with emphasis on 
defense institutions, security sector reform, and security sector 
governance. Outside the context of Iraq, we recognize as a matter of 
principle that partners' institutional capacity to absorb and sustain 
U.S. training and equipment must be the pacesetter for U.S. security 
cooperation and assistance activities. Through improved planning, 
assessments, and interagency coordination, we are working to ensure 
security cooperation and assistance for each partner is integrated into 
a broader political strategy that advances our foreign policy interests 
and addresses the underlying drivers of insecurity. I would refer you 
to DoD colleagues for more details on how the Department of Defense is 
institutionalizing these lessons internally.

    Question. What are the objectives of U.S. security assistance to 
Africa?

    Answer. Our objectives include improving the capacity of African 
partners to advance regional stability and security by enabling more 
professional, apolitical, capable, and accountable government security 
actors that provide for their own security and stability, actively 
support shared security interests in the continent, and build 
sustainable security sector capabilities and institutions. The U.S. 
supports the development of institutions and processes required for 
accountable and responsive governance, thereby mitigating societal 
grievances and root causes of conflict that exacerbate global 
competitors' efforts to replace the United States as the partner of 
choice and undermine security, as exemplified by Wagner Group 
activities.

    Question. What are the priorities for U.S. security assistance to 
Africa?

    Answer. The U.S. is focused on building professional and capable 
security forces and institutions that enjoy popular legitimacy, support 
good governance and the rule of law, and respect human rights norms and 
the rules of armed conflict. We prioritize security assistance to 
countries leading efforts to reduce terrorist threats emanating from 
the continent to the U.S. Homeland region, U.S. interests and persons 
in Africa, and the region. U.S. security assistance also contributes to 
frustrating global competitors' efforts to replace us as the partner of 
choice and actively undermine security in some areas, as exemplified by 
Wagner Group activities. We support efforts to maintain open and legal 
access to major sea lines of communications and trade in the Atlantic 
Ocean, Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden as an important priority.

    Question. What is the status of the AH-1Z sale to Nigeria?

    Answer. An FMS case for the proposed sale of up to 12 AH-1Z attack 
helicopters was submitted for Congressional staff consultations on 
January 8, 2021. Because this case remained under review so long, the 
cost increased to $997M, in contrast to the $875 million figure 
originally transmitted. The original notification was removed from 
consultation on February 1, 2022; we resumed consultations on March 22, 
2022 with the updated case. This is a priority for the Administration's 
bilateral relationship, and Nigeria remains committed to the purchase.

    Question. Is additional U.S. security assistance required to 
support U.S. strategic goals regarding competition with China and 
Russia in Africa, especially potential basing issues?

    Answer. U.S. strategic goals regarding competition with the PRC and 
Russia in Africa require a whole-of-government approach. State works 
closely with DoD to align policy goals with military planning. State 
oversees approximately $300M annually in military assistance funding to 
sub-Saharan Africa to accomplish a number of objectives, including 
countering strategic competition. Several countries in Africa have 
benefited from the new Countering Chinese Influence Fund, and PM also 
created the new Countering Strategic Competitors program within the 
Peacekeeping Operations account to support activities in Africa. We 
will continue to work with interagency partners to make the right 
investments in capabilities to counter the PRC and Russia, in addition 
to violent extremist organizations.
    The Administration is committed to strengthening and expanding 
cooperation to enhance our ability to work by, with, and through our 
partners. Globally, but particularly in Africa, the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs has been expanding the number of enabling 
agreements to deepen defense cooperation and flexible access for U.S. 
forces to respond to contingencies or support disaster relief. Mindful 
of adversaries' activities, we prevail with the superior quality of 
U.S. engagement, exercises, and training and advantages of 
interoperability. We have recently concluded agreements with Cabo 
Verde, Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, and are in the process of concluding an 
agreement with Gabon.
    When it is apparent the PRC has clear plans to establish a military 
base in Africa, as is likely the case in Equatorial Guinea, both State 
and the NSC have engaged quickly at senior levels. We share the concern 
of our African and European partners over potential militarization of 
the Gulf of Guinea. This includes the possible construction of a PRC 
naval installation. The United States does not expect the Government of 
the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to end partnerships with other 
countries, but we have made clear that certain potential steps 
involving PRC-basing activity would raise U.S. national-security 
concerns both for the United States and Equatorial Guinea's neighbors.

    Question. What are the objectives of U.S. security assistance to 
the Western Hemisphere?

    Answer. U.S. security assistance for the Western Hemisphere focuses 
on building a safe and secure hemisphere with four primary objectives: 
1) combat irregular migration-related security risks by protecting U.S. 
citizens, ensuring secure borders; promoting safe, humane, and orderly 
immigration and asylum systems; enhancing protections for refugees and 
displaced persons; and promoting stability in areas impacted by 
migration; 2) build safe communities through violence prevention and 
intervention, including a focus on addressing gender-based violence; 3) 
strengthen host country resilience to malign foreign influence through 
partner nation capacity building, including bolstering law enforcement, 
judicial, criminal justice sector, and military institutions; and, 4) 
counter transnational criminal organizations and illicit networks.

    Question. What are the priorities for U.S. security assistance to 
the Western Hemisphere?

    Answer. U.S. security assistance for the Western Hemisphere 
prioritizes programs that combat transnational criminal organizations, 
terrorist groups, gangs, violence, (including gender-based violence) 
and corruption that drives irregular migration. These groups threaten 
borders by moving drugs and contraband (including illegal arms), 
trafficking in persons, and engaging in illicit finance and money 
laundering. Our assistance prioritizes regional efforts to bolster the 
rule of law and confront illicit activities by these groups through 
strong diplomatic engagement and support for local efforts to 
professionalize justice, police, and other security forces; to 
strengthen communities to resist violence and the lure of irregular 
migration; and to counter competitors and external actors of concern 
seeking to undermine regional democratic institutions and our 
collective security. Our assistance aims to build capacity among our 
partners and provide them with training, equipment and other assistance 
to address these issues.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of Dr. Mara Elizabeth Karlin to Questions Submitted by 
     Senator James E. Risch was Given During a Classified Briefing

    Question. Has the Department of State's role in setting bilateral 
security assistance policies diminished over the last two decades?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. If yes to the previous question, to what extent is this a 
problem for U.S. foreign policy from the perspective of the Department 
of Defense?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What actions has the Department of State taken to re-
establish leadership over security assistance?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What additional capacity and capability to plan and 
execute security assistance has the Department of Defense acquired over 
security assistance?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What, if anything, can or should be done to strengthen 
the role of the Department of State from the perspective of the 
Department of Defense?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What DoD authorities currently do not require Secretary 
of State concurrence, but should?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What flexibility is needed for State Department security 
assistance from the perspective of the Department of Defense?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How should security assistance address corruption from 
the perspective of the Department of Defense?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How does DoD plan for security assistance?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How does DoD set its priorities for security assistance?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What gaps exist in the current DoD workforce, both in 
numbers and in training or expertise?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How can we best fill gaps in the current DoD workforce?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. EUROPE AND EURASIA: Security Assistance for Ukraine: What 
is the objective of U.S. security assistance for Ukraine from the 
perspective of the Department of Defense?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. If the objective of U.S. security assistance is not to 
enable the Ukrainians to defeat the Russian invaders, why not?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Does the USG believe Ukraine can win from the perspective 
of the Department of Defense?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. While backfilling Allies and partners who supplied 
assistance to Ukraine should be a major priority, as reflected in the 
recent Ukraine supplemental appropriation, can you confirm that the top 
priority for the Ukraine PDA included the supplemental will be the 
timely provision of critical military assistance to Ukraine?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Why does the U.S. Government view the transfer of capable 
air defense, drone, and anti-tank systems as not escalatory towards 
Russia, but views the transfer of aircraft as escalatory?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What specific evidence is there that the transfer of 
aircraft will be viewed by Russia as escalatory?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Was the transfer of fighter aircraft by the Soviet Union 
to the North Vietnamese escalatory?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Has the USG approached Turkey to donate its S-400 air 
defense systems to Ukraine? If so, what was the response? If not, why 
not?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the USG doing to get more capable air defense 
systems to Ukraine?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Who is in charge of coordinating the logistics and supply 
of military assistance to Ukraine?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the plan to ensure continuity of supplies and 
assistance into Ukraine?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What are the next steps in building out Ukraine's air 
defense capabilities now that large numbers of MANPADS have been 
delivered?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What efforts are underway to source MANPADS and other air 
defense capabilities from allies and partners?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is DoD's policy regarding American service members 
traveling to volunteer to fight for the Ukrainians?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What efforts is State taking to make it easier for 
volunteer organizations, non-profits, and others to donate or send 
military equipment to Ukraine?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Security Assistance for Eastern Europe: The 2022 budget 
supplemental includes $500M for Foreign Military Finance grant 
assistance for Eastern Europe and Ukraine.
    What are the USG's objectives for this assistance?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the plan to use those funds?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. The 2022 budget supplemental includes $4B for Foreign 
Military Finance loan authority for Eastern Europe and Ukraine.
    What are the USG's objectives for this assistance?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the plan to use those funds?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Eastern European allies have donated large quantities of 
defense articles to Ukraine. They still need to deter Russian 
aggression against themselves.
    What articles need to be backfilled to maintain deterrence?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the USG doing to expedite such backfills?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is U.S. industry doing to expedite production and 
delivery?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Security Assistance for NATO and Europe as a Whole: Does 
the 2014 Wales summit pledge of 2 percent GDP spending for defense 
still make sense in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the Biden administration doing to ensure NATO 
allies spend more?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Germany has announced a major shift in its defense 
policy. What actual tangible steps has it taken to put this policy into 
action?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What other European allies have announced defense policy 
changes in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the status of the German dual-capable aircraft 
replacement program?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the status of the German heavy lift helicopter 
replacement program?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the status of the German air defense replacement 
program?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How does security assistance support U.S. interests 
regarding strategic competition with Russia?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How have or will Western sanctions and export controls 
affect Russia's ability to compete with the U.S. for defense exports?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. EAST ASIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC: Security Assistance for 
Taiwan: What changes has the Biden administration made in our security 
relationship with Taiwan in the last year to help bolster Taiwan's 
ability to deter increasing Chinese military aggression?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Please define the term ``asymmetric'' as regards Taiwan's 
defense requirements.

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How would the Biden administration make best use of a new 
security assistance funding program for Taiwan?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What changes have the Department of State and Department 
of Defense made in their processes to accelerate and expedite getting 
necessary defense capabilities to Taiwan (not just for Foreign Military 
Sales, but also Direct Commercial Sales or any other process relevant 
for Taiwan), other than reversing the bundling policy?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What are the top 2-3 things the Department of State and 
the Department of Defense are working on to shorten delivery timelines 
for arms sales to Taiwan?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What does the Department of State or Department of 
Defense need from Congress to shorten delivery timelines for arms sales 
to Taiwan?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How are the Department of State and Department of Defense 
thinking about Taiwan's civilian defense and resilience needs in 
planning out future engagements with Taiwan?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Are the Department of State or the Department of Defense 
considering any funding or programming that would address civilian 
defense and resilience needs?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How have the Department of State and Department of 
Defense engaged with industry on supply chain delays for Taiwan's 
purchases?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Security Assistance for the Indo-Pacific: The Biden 
administration says that China is the pacing threat for the U.S. and 
our allies.
    How much of the DoD's security assistance budget goes to the Indo-
Pacific region, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What are the most pressing capability gaps among U.S. 
allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific? Please provide responses for 
each country to which the United States has provided security 
assistance in the prior 3 years.

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What steps has the Biden administration taken to 
prioritize and expedite Foreign Military Sales to Japan?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What else can the Biden administration do to speed the 
process of Foreign Military Sales to Japan?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What, if anything, is new about AUKUS, when it comes to 
security assistance with Australia?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Based on current circumstances, in which Indo-Pacific 
countries is the United States under-investing in terms of security 
assistance because of certain constraints?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What constraints are there in the Indo-Pacific for 
investing in security assistance? Please provide a country-by-country 
breakdown.

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Based on current circumstances, how much more Foreign 
Military Financing and International Military Education and Training 
could each of the countries absorb, if the United States had the 
security assistance funds to provide them with more FMF or IMET? Please 
provide a country-by-country breakdown.

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Do you consider the Philippines to be a strategically 
important ally of the United States? Please explain your position.

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. The United States military currently cooperates with the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines on counterterrorism and maritime 
security. Multiple members of Congress have proposed limiting or 
cutting off U.S. security assistance to the Philippine military because 
of concerns over human rights abuses.
    Do you believe that taking such a step is in U.S. interests?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Do you believe that taking such a step would improve 
human rights conditions in the Philippines?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. The Philippines is a state party to the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
    Is that compatible with being a U.S. ally and security assistance 
recipient?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Have we made clear that the U.S. will not protect the 
Philippines against nuclear threats or coercion?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How does security assistance support U.S. interests 
regarding strategic competition with China?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND AF/PAK: Middle East 
partners are increasingly being targeted by Iranian-origin missiles and 
drones.
    How many missile or drone attacks did the Houthis launch against 
Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2021?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the Biden administration doing to support them in 
countering these threats?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What specific security assistance efforts are underway to 
counter these threats?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What air and missile defense capabilities have the Saudis 
or Emiratis requested from the U.S. that have not yet been approved or 
provided?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. China has exploited the USG's failure to export drones 
and other capabilities to establish growing military relationships in 
the Middle East.
    What is the Biden administration doing to counter these growing 
Chinese efforts?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Has the UAS export policy damaged U.S. interests in the 
Middle East?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the status of deliveries of KC-4 aircraft to 
Israel? Are deliveries being expedited?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Lessons Learned from Iraq and Afghanistan: The U.S. spent 
roughly $125B over 20 years in mostly failed efforts to build the Iraqi 
and Afghan militaries.
    Please describe any formal efforts that the USG has conducted to 
institutionalize lessons from these security assistance efforts.

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What lessons have been learned?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. How have these lessons been institutionalized in the 
State Department and Defense Department?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. SUB-SAHARA AFRICA: What are the objectives of U.S. 
security assistance to Africa?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What are the priorities for U.S. security assistance to 
Africa?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What is the status of the AH-1Z sale to Nigeria?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Is additional U.S. security assistance required to 
support U.S. strategic goals regarding competition with China and 
Russia in Africa, especially potential basing issues?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. WESTERN HEMISPHERE: What are the objectives of U.S. 
security assistance to the Western Hemisphere?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What are the priorities for U.S. security assistance to 
the Western Hemisphere?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of Dr. Mara Elizabeth Karlin to Questions Submitted by 
    Senator Edward J. Markey was Given During a Classified Briefing

    Question. What concrete actions has the Department of Defense taken 
or plans to take to configure U.S. nuclear policy with the January 3, 
2022 P5 Statement--from the leaders of China, France, the United 
Kingdom, Russia and the United States--declaring that ``a nuclear war 
cannot be won and must never be fought?''

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. The Department of Defense pledged in an email to my 
office on September 23, 2021 that the Department would contract out an 
independent analysis to ``objectively review the technical feasibility 
of extending the life of MMIII Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) past 2030 to inform future analysis.''
    Has the Department contracted out that independent study, and if 
so, to whom?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Did the Department reach out specifically to the JASONs 
to gauge its capacity to conduct an independent analysis, and if so, 
what was its response?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. In a subsequent email to my office, the Department 
appeared to have narrowed the scope of the promised independent 
analysis, saying that they would conduct an ``external study of diverse 
views on the intercontinental ballistic missile-leg of the nuclear 
triad.'' If the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) 
``external study'' does not ``objectively review technical feasibility 
questions,'' as pledged, what are the Department plans to conduct such 
a review before release of the Nuclear Posture Review this year?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. Will the Department make the CEIP study publicly 
available? Will it provide the Statement of Work for that study to my 
office as the Department's Office of Legislative Affairs pledged it 
would do in its September 23, 2021 email?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Jessica Lewis to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen

    Question. In August, I asked Deputy Assistant Secretary Resnick 
about the circumstances under which the Department investigates 
allegations of human rights violations under the Leahy Laws, and 
requested that the Department provide information on any Leahy Law 
investigations pursued over the preceding year, including those that 
did not result in a finding of a violation. I appreciated the 
Department's recent classified response to that question, which my 
staff and I reviewed.
    In your view, does the Department have adequate resources to 
investigate all credible allegations of human rights violations to the 
extent necessary to fully determine whether or not a violation of the 
Leahy Laws has occurred?

    Answer. The Department has adequate resources to implement its 
current Leahy vetting program. However, there is more work to be done, 
and the Department continuously seeks to improve this program. We 
welcome any additional resources to assist in these efforts.

    Question. In August, I asked Deputy Assistant Secretary Resnick 
about the circumstances under which the Department investigates 
allegations of human rights violations under the Leahy Laws, and 
requested that the Department provide information on any Leahy Law 
investigations pursued over the preceding year, including those that 
did not result in a finding of a violation. I appreciated the 
Department's recent classified response to that question, which my 
staff and I reviewed.
    Please provide, in classified format if necessary, a breakdown by 
country of all Leahy investigations pursued in calendar year 2021, 
including those which did not result in a finding that the law had been 
violated, listing each country for which at least one investigation was 
conducted and the number of investigations conducted for that country.

    Answer. Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act, also known as 
the Department of State Leahy law, requires that the Department of 
State vet each proposed recipient foreign security force unit of a 
covered transfer to ensure compliance with the statutory prohibitions 
on transfers. If the statute cannot be complied with, the transfer does 
not occur. We will work to provide the specific information you request 
about the Department's Leahy vetting program through the appropriate 
channels.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Total Completed
                        Post                            Cases, CY 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABIDJAN                                                              694
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABUJA                                                               1559
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACCRA                                                               1323
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADDIS ABABA                                                          383
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANTANANARIVO                                                         234
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAMAKO                                                               919
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BANGUI                                                              3250
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BANJUL                                                                86
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRAZZAVILLE                                                          233
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUJUMBURA                                                             28
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONAKRY                                                              131
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COTONOU                                                              692
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DAKAR                                                               1086
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DAR ES SALAAM                                                       2660
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DJIBOUTI                                                             405
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FREETOWN                                                             320
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GABORONE                                                             381
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HARARE                                                                24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUBA                                                                  48
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KAMPALA                                                             1639
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KHARTOUM                                                               1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KIGALI                                                               431
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KINSHASA                                                             802
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIBREVILLE                                                           163
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LILONGWE                                                             871
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOME                                                                 395
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LUANDA                                                               360
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LUSAKA                                                               855
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAPUTO                                                              1030
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MASERU                                                               143
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MBABANE                                                               75
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MONROVIA                                                            2265
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAIROBI                                                             2951
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NDJAMENA                                                             669
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NIAMEY                                                              1602
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOUAKCHOTT                                                           468
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OUAGADOUGOU                                                         1474
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PORT LOUIS                                                           263
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRAIA                                                                 27
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRETORIA                                                            1096
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WINDHOEK                                                             184
------------------------------------------------------------------------
YAOUNDE                                                              926
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MALABO                                                                18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOGADISHU (NAIROBI-S                                                2910
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BANDAR S.B.                                                           41
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BANGKOK                                                             2622
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BEIJING                                                                8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CANBERRA                                                              23
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DILI                                                                 141
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HANOI                                                                795
------------------------------------------------------------------------
JAKARTA                                                             2835
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KUALA LUMPUR                                                        1659
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAJURO                                                                 5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MANILA                                                             12046
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHNOM PENH                                                           501
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PORT MORESBY                                                          82
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RANGOON                                                                4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEOUL                                                                 31
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SINGAPORE                                                            177
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUVA                                                                  59
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAIPEI                                                                76
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOKYO                                                                 30
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ULAANBAATAR                                                          259
------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIENTIANE                                                            742
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WELLINGTON                                                             8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANKARA                                                               291
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATHENS                                                               871
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAKU                                                                 139
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BELGRADE                                                             484
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BERLIN                                                                 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BERN                                                                  10
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRATISLAVA                                                            88
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRUSSELS                                                              11
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUCHAREST                                                            688
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUDAPEST                                                             168
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHISINAU                                                             423
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COPENHAGEN                                                            45
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DUBLIN                                                                18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KYIV                                                                4929
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LISBON                                                                34
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LJUBLJANA                                                            110
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LONDON                                                                13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MADRID                                                                33
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NICOSIA                                                               70
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSLO                                                                   4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARIS                                                                  0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PODGORICA                                                            158
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRAGUE                                                               147
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRISTINA                                                            1079
------------------------------------------------------------------------
REYKJAVIK                                                              2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RIGA                                                                 846
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ROME                                                                  19
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SARAJEVO                                                            2221
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SKOPJE                                                               764
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOFIA                                                                454
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TALLINN                                                              246
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE HAGUE                                                              7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIRANA                                                               493
------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIENNA                                                                21
------------------------------------------------------------------------
VILNIUS                                                              377
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WARSAW                                                               518
------------------------------------------------------------------------
YEREVAN                                                              214
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ZAGREB                                                               448
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TBILISI                                                              821
------------------------------------------------------------------------
VALLETTA                                                              92
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABU DHABI                                                             28
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALGIERS                                                              190
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMMAN                                                               2544
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAGHDAD                                                             2528
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BEIRUT                                                               752
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAIRO                                                                473
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOHA                                                                   1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KUWAIT                                                                59
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MANAMA                                                               637
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MUSCAT                                                               391
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RABAT                                                               1748
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RIYADH                                                                11
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SANAA                                                                321
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEL AVIV                                                             113
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRIPOLI                                                              296
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TUNIS                                                               1178
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASHGABAT                                                             138
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BISHKEK                                                              382
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COLOMBO                                                              862
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHAKA                                                               1189
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DUSHANBE                                                            1088
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISLAMABAD                                                            954
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KABUL                                                               2193
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KATHMANDU                                                           1022
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEW DELHI                                                           2418
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TASHKENT                                                             395
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NUR-SULTAN                                                          1119
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THIMPHU                                                               14
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASUNCION                                                             831
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BELMOPAN                                                             949
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOGOTA                                                             19433
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRASILIA                                                            1746
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRIDGETOWN                                                          1054
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRIDGETOWN-ST LUCIA                                                   13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUENOS AIRES                                                         745
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CURACAO                                                                0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGETOWN                                                           508
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GUATEMALA CITY                                                      7433
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KINGSTON                                                            1067
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LA PAZ                                                                38
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIMA                                                                4838
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEXICO CITY                                                        16131
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MONTEVIDEO                                                           661
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASSAU                                                               214
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OTTAWA                                                                 9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PANAMA CITY                                                         3440
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARAMARIBO                                                           193
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PORT AU PRINCE                                                      1288
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PORT OF SPAIN                                                       1013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
QUITO                                                               3576
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAN JOSE                                                            2150
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAN SALVADOR                                                        3391
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SANTIAGO                                                             526
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SANTO DOMINGO                                                       2495
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEGUCIGALPA                                                         3714
========================================================================
                CY 2021 Total Cases                               176076
------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Responses of Dr. Mara Elizabeth Karlin to Questions Submitted by 
    Senator Chris Van Hollen was Given During a Classified Briefing

    Question. A 2011 GAO report (GAO-12-123) found that civil-military 
relations was identified as a priority objective for IMET training in 
only a third of the most repressive African states, those ranked ``not 
free'' by Freedom House, receiving IMET. And an August 2019 GAO report 
(GAO-19-554) found that ``DoD does not systematically track human 
rights training [including civil-military relations] and, as a result, 
only limited information is available on the provision of and funding 
for these activities.''
    What, if any, actions has the Department taken since the 2011 
report to ensure that civil-military norms are a priority objective of 
IMET-funded professional military education?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

    Question. What if any actions has the Department taken since the 
2019 report to improve its tracking of human rights training, including 
civil-military relations?

    [Response was given during a classified briefing.]

                                  [all]