[Senate Hearing 117-673]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-673
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL LEADER-
SHIP: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2023
STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 26, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-322 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Blinken, Antony J., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 8
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez........................... 62
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch............................ 76
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin........................ 124
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen............................ 126
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio............................... 129
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Rob Portman............................... 134
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey.......................... 139
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Merkley.............................. 140
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso............................. 145
(iii)
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR
2023 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 26, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen,
Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Young, Barrasso,
Cruz, Rounds, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order. Mr. Secretary, welcome back to
the committee. We appreciate you being here with us today.
As we look across the world from Cuba, to Mali, to Iran, to
China, and, of course, Russia, authoritarians are crushing free
speech, arresting dissidents, utilizing technology to control
their citizens, relying on mercenaries and illicit weapons to
target innocent civilians and topple governments. This is a
confrontation between violent autocrats and those of us
fighting for a rules-based international order for democracy,
human rights, and the cause of freedom around the world. Our
diplomats, and development professionals, and our budget for
these efforts, which we are examining today, are our front
lines in this fight. With that in mind, I would like to take a
moment to highlight some of our most pressing areas of
concerns. I am sure members on both sides will want to talk
about these and others.
In Europe, we must maintain absolute unity, as President
Biden has said, and I believe your recent trip to Kyiv with
Secretary Austin to show support for President Zelensky and the
Ukrainian people, and to continue shining a light on Russia's
military brazen abuse of civilians that certainly amount to war
crimes, was a critical display of that unity, and we salute you
for that visit. More broadly, this means countering Russian
aggression with security assistance that aligns with our
foreign policy, combatting disinformation and election
interference, delivering humanitarian relief, and helping
neighboring countries with a huge influx of Ukrainian refugees
fleeing violence. We have a responsibility to the American
people and to the Ukrainians themselves to ensure that we are
effectively spending the $13.6 billion package Congress
approved back in March.
With only a minor increase in foreign military financing
funds, I would like to hear the Administration's plans for
countries in NATO's Eastern flank and for Taiwan for that fact,
which is facing a similar threat from China. Whether it is
Japan, South Korea, or Australia, when it comes to countering
China, a strong alliance with our partners is vital. Xi
Jinping's hypernationalism is more assertive around the globe
than ever before. The State Department must work on a pragmatic
appraisal of how to best combat China's predatory economic and
trade practices so we have the ability to outcompete China in
the generation ahead, bilaterally and through robust presence
and action in regional and international institutions.
Authoritarianism also threatens Latin America and the
Caribbean in a part of the world hit hard by the COVID
pandemic. From Cuba, to Venezuela, and even Nicaragua, we are
seeing arbitrary detentions, the dismantling of civil society,
the weaponization of hunger and migration, all as Maduro
carries out systematic extrajudicial executions. On top of
this, an epidemic of criminal violence, stretching from Mexico,
to Haiti, to El Salvador is fueling a serious refugee and
migration crisis. The Americas now host more than 18.4 million
displaced people. This budget is a good down-payment, but more
will be needed to address these challenges across the
hemisphere.
Countering authoritarianism also requires serious
investment across Africa where Moscow has reasserted itself
over the past several years and democracy seems on the retreat.
Civilians from the Central African Republic to Mali have paid a
heavy price with Russian Wagner mercenaries reportedly
committing human rights abuses. Despite concerted diplomatic
efforts by the Administration, the democratic aspirations of
the Ethiopian and Sudanese people have yet to be realized.
Looking further north from there, I am also expecting an update
on what is happening with the JCPOA and negotiations with Iran.
We were told that the end of February was the date in which we
needed to conclude an agreement. It is going to be end of
April, so we look forward to hearing about that as well as
Iran's malign actions across the region.
I am pleased that the security of our important ally,
Israel, is fully funded in this request, and I am supportive of
the funding request for Jordan, but I am concerned by cuts to
security assistance in Iraq as we transition away from combat
operations to bilateral diplomacy. In Tunisia, we would love to
hear a strategy confronting democratic backsliding, and in
South and Central Asia, we need clarity on whether the
Administration will waive CAATSA sanctions for India's purchase
of the Russian S-400 missile defense system and what role, if
so, are they going to continue to play in the Quad. Also, in
the wake of the Taliban's broken promise to allow girls to
attend secondary school, their media crackdown, and the
unfolding humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, we need a better
sense of the Administration's diplomatic strategy.
Across the globe today, we are facing multiple humanitarian
challenges, refugee crises on several continents, and one of
the worst food insecurity crises we have seen in a generation.
Considering all of this, I do not think the Administration's
budget requests to address humanitarian and resettlement needs
reflects current global realities. The United States must
elevate the needs of women, girls, and other at-risk
populations. We must document war crimes. Added to this,
climate change is a force multiplier, which will exacerbate
humanitarian crises and conflicts around the world. It requires
us to rethink how we prepare for the future, from the energy
security crisis in Europe and Ukraine, to increasing sea-level
severe weather and drought, including working multilaterally to
help partner countries advance clean, sustainable energy
solutions. We must also think about how to better prevent,
detect, and respond to future pandemics.
I want to applaud the State Department's push to modernize
and increase diversity by adding internships, a chief diversity
and inclusion officer across foreign affairs agencies, and
equity strategies in our overseas policies and programs,
including the Department's high-level representative on racial
equity. The Senate Foreign Relations has also taken steps to
join in that effort. Finally, I would like to congratulate the
Department on launching the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital
Policy, which will be essential in our diplomacy on cyber and
technology issues.
There is a lot to discuss, Mr. Secretary. We look forward
to hearing your thoughts on how you see the Department tackling
some of these issues and challenges we face as a Nation. I
certainly want to say that we appreciate your service to our
country, and with that, let me turn to the distinguished
Ranking Member, Senator Risch, for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. Secretary,
thank you for visiting with us today. On a personal note, thank
you for visiting with Senator Menendez and I earlier and giving
us your thoughts on your visit there and the systems that are
operating in the Ukraine.
At the present time, as the world becomes more dangerously
complicated, we need the State Department to prioritize
national security diplomacy and effectively spend taxpayer
money to defend U.S. national interests. Now is the time for
the Department to rebalance its risk calculus and get our
diplomats back in the field, particularly in the Ukraine,
advance U.S. values and interests, and compete against
adversaries across the globe.
However, in certain places like China, the Administration
appears to be recalcitrant, giving up the privileges and
immunities that keep them and their families safe in order to
appease Beijing's extreme response to COVID. I have heard
reports of U.S. diplomats forced into government-run fever
hospitals for lengthy periods, living in squalid conditions,
and being forced to take medical tests for no legitimate
reason. In response, the Administration has not moved on this,
and it should.
Against this backdrop, we have been asked to consider
whether the funding priorities set out in the President's FY
2023 budget request align with our most pressing national
security interests. Just as last year, there are bright spots.
For example, while I have major concerns about the ambiguous
request for $6.5 billion in mandatory spending, I do appreciate
the emphasis on global health security within the discretionary
budget. Chairman Menendez and I continue to advance legislation
to improve international pandemic preparedness and response,
and I urge the Administration to help us align those efforts.
I am disappointed by the failure to present a concrete
proposal to reform U.S. international food aid, particularly in
light of the global food crisis exacerbated by Russia's brutal
war in Ukraine. I am, however, pleased to hear the President
and Administration is open to ideas. Let us get to work on
that. However, overall, the request continues a destructive
pattern of asking for more resources to advance policies that
run counter to U.S. interests, including for energy projects
utilizing slave labor from Xinjiang, providing billions of
dollars to an unaccountable green climate fund, and proposing
to increase U.S. contributions for U.N. peacekeeping in
contravention of the historic Helms-Biden Agreement. Meanwhile,
this budget request undercuts security and humanitarian
assistance.
Mr. Secretary, I am very glad that you and Secretary Austin
went to Kyiv just a few days ago to show U.S. support for
Ukraine. Our embassy needs to open up again. All our European
partners are already back there. We need people on the ground
to help Ukraine meet its needs immediately, and I was impressed
by your description of what you found there that would
certainly open the door for us to reopen our embassy there.
Despite the unprecedented military assistance the U.S. and our
allies have sent to Ukraine, there is still more we can do. The
tenor of this war has changed, and Ukraine needs different
items than they did just 1 month ago. I urge the Administration
to transfer more advanced capabilities, including U.S.-origin
multiple launch rocket systems, medium-range air defense
systems, and anti-ship cruise missiles, among other things, and
I was impressed with what you reported to us in confidence this
morning. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Russia provided
our enemies with aircraft and trained our enemy's pilots. It is
high time we return that favor.
Further, we must see expedited production of our new
systems to backfill our allies to deter Russia, new sanctions,
and tighter export controls to starve the Russian war machine
and expand humanitarian assistance. It is time to act
aggressively, not perform another deep dive that will take
months to complete. After its victory, Ukraine will need
extensive support to rebuild the country. The State Department
should plan now for this huge undertaking, which will require
participation from the entire civilized world.
This all relates in a very real way with U.S. response to
China's ambitions, the most important challenge facing the
United States today. We started too late in providing security
assistance to Ukraine. We cannot make the same mistake with
Taiwan. Supporting an island during a war is much more
difficult. Our assistance must be there beforehand. We must
accelerate existing foreign military sales to Taiwan so they
get there quicker, and we should use security assistance to
help Taiwan acquire additional capabilities. I have introduced
language to do this, and we need it now. In March, Chairman
Menendez and I spearheaded an effort to get funding into the
appropriate package for security assistance to Taiwan, and I
fully agree with Senator Shelby's recent comments that we
should absolutely spend more to help with Taiwan's defense.
Secretary Blinken, I hope you can commit to that during today's
hearing.
Turning to the Middle East, it is clear that America's
relationship with our Middle East partners is in desperate need
of some work. These are longtime partnerships that we really
need to maintain. Instead of America as a steadfast partner,
our Middle Eastern friends have seen increasingly restrictive
security assistance policies, the botched Afghanistan
withdrawal, and an Iran policy that fails to deter regional
terrorism and a previously lukewarm embrace of the Abraham
Accords. The Biden administration's Middle East policies have
reinforced a claim of American disengagement and pushed our
longstanding partners towards China and Russia. This cannot
happen.
In Syria, we have seen a lack of seizure sanctions
enforcement. While our Administration is not explicitly
encouraging normalization with Assad, it is clear there are no
repercussions for others doing so. We cannot ignore this or
teach the world that a despot and a murderer can be
rehabilitated just by hanging on for a long period of time. On
Iran, we have been on the cusp of a nuclear deal for several
weeks apparently. Given the sunsets and short-term gains of
rejoining the JCPOA, Israel, the Gulf, and other members of
Congress have voiced loud opposition to rejoining the 2015
accord.
Our Iran policy must be one that can survive successive
Administrations and one both parties can support. To accomplish
this, you need to get it right. From what we are seeing and
what we are being told right now, you are in the process of
getting it wrong again. No other issue divides this
Administration from Congress and U.S. allies than this issue.
If you cannot get it right, and it looks like you are not, walk
away from this. That will be a victory, and you will be
applauded for that. No agreement is far better than a bad one.
Israel will see that Iran never completes a nuclear weapon.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. With that, Mr.
Secretary, the floor is yours. Your full statement will be
included in the record, without objection.
STATEMENT OF ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Risch, thank you. It is very good to be with
you, to be with every member of this committee today. Thank you
for the opportunity to speak with you about the
Administration's proposed budget for the State Department. As
both of you noted, I just returned from Kyiv with Defense
Secretary Lloyd Austin, where, together, we demonstrated the
United States' commitment to the Government and to the people
of Ukraine.
I have to tell you, the trip left an indelible impression.
We had a chance to talk about it a little bit before the
hearing. As we took the train across the border and rode
westward into Ukraine, we saw mile after mile of Ukrainian
countryside, territory that, just a couple months ago, the
Russian Government thought that it could seize in a matter of
weeks. Today, it is firmly Ukraine's. In Kyiv, we saw the signs
of a vibrant city coming back to life, people eating outside,
sitting on benches, strolling. It was right in front of us. The
Ukrainians have won the battle for Kyiv.
For all the suffering that they have endured, for all the
carnage that Russia's brutal invasion continues to inflict,
Ukraine was and will continue to be a free and independent
country. It is impossible not to be moved by what the
Ukrainians have achieved. It is also impossible not to believe
that they will keep succeeding because they know why they
fight. Seeing this, I have to tell you I felt some pride in
what the United States has done to support the Ukrainian
Government and its people, and an even firmer conviction that
we must not let up.
Moscow's war of aggression against Ukraine has underscored
the power and purpose of American diplomacy. Our diplomacy is
rallying allies and partners around the world to join us in
supporting Ukraine with security, economic, humanitarian
assistance, imposing massive costs on the Kremlin,
strengthening our collective security and defense, addressing
the war's mounting global consequences, including the refugee
and food crises that you both alluded to. We have to continue
to drive that diplomacy forward to seize what I believe are
strategic opportunities, as well as address risks presented by
Russia's overreach as countries are reconsidering their
policies, their priorities, their relationships. The budget
request before you predated this crisis, but fully funding it
is critical, in my judgment, to ensuring that Russia's war in
Ukraine is a strategic failure for the Kremlin and serves as a
powerful lesson to those who might consider following its path.
As we are focused intensely on this urgent crisis, the
State Department continues to carry out the missions
traditionally associated with diplomacy, like responsibly
managing a great power competition with China, facilitating a
halt to fighting in Yemen and Ethiopia, pushing back against
the rising tide of authoritarianism and the threat that it
poses to human rights. We also face evolving challenges that
require us to develop new capabilities, such as the emergence
and reemergence of infectious disease, an accelerating climate
crisis, and, of course, a digital revolution that holds both
enormous promise, but also some peril.
Last fall, I had an opportunity to set out a modernization
agenda for the Department and for U.S. diplomacy to respond to
these complex demands. In no small part thanks to the FY22
budget approved by Congress, we have been able to make real
progress on this agenda, though much remains to be done. To
give just a few examples, we have strengthened our capacity to
shape the ongoing technical revolution so that it actually
protects our interests, it boosts our competitiveness, it
upholds our values. With bipartisan congressional support and
encouragement, we recently launched a new Bureau for Cyber
Station Digital Policy with 60 team members to start, and I am
grateful to Congress, to this committee, for long supporting
this effort, for the ideas that you shared in how best to do
it.
We are also making headway in ensuring that our diplomats
reflect America's remarkable diversity, which is one of our
greatest strengths, including in our diplomacy. We have, as the
chairman notes, our first-ever chief diversity inclusion
officer, who is spearheading an effort to analyze and address
the obstacles that prevent underrepresented groups from joining
and advancing at State. We have expanded the Pickering and
Rangel fellowships and created, for the first time, thanks to
the support of Congress and this committee, paid internships at
State, along with strong congressional input and support for
all of these efforts, and we are showing results. We recently
welcomed a new cohort of 179 exceptional Foreign Service
professionals. That is putting our Department on track for its
largest annual intake in a decade.
My first 15 months in this job have only strengthened my
own conviction that these and other reforms are not just
worthwhile, they are essential to our national security and to
delivering for the people we represent. Today's meeting marks,
by our count, the 100th time that I have had an opportunity to
brief Congress, which is one of the ways I have worked to meet
the commitment that I made in my confirmation before this
committee: to restore Congress' role as a partner, both in our
foreign policymaking and in revitalizing the State Department.
Ensuring that we can deliver on the agenda will require
sustained funding, some new authorities, and maybe, most
important of all, partnership from Congress. That is why I am
grateful for the chairman and ranking member's request to
establish a formal dialogue on the State Department
authorization, a request that we have delivered on, and we are
going to look forward to working in detail with you as the
authorization process moves forward.
If we want to deepen our capability in key areas like
climate, like pandemic preparedness, like multilateral
diplomacy, if we want to expand on Secretary Powell's vision of
a Foreign Service training float and equip our workforce with
the training, with the tools, with the technology that we need
for today's challenges, we need some additional resources, and
those are set out in the budget. If we want to be able to
swiftly stand up new missions, deploy diplomats when and where
they are needed, and I very much agree with the ranking member
on this, and make those decisions based on risk management
rather than on risk aversion, we need to reform the State
Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act and the
Accountability Review Board statute. That is laid out as well.
If we want to rapidly scale up our response to crises, like
refugee surges and epidemics, while also avoiding costly
overhead, we need more flexible domestic hiring authorities.
This is not about advancing the goals of any one
Administration, any one party. It is about refocusing our
mission and purpose on the forces that really affect the lives
of our fellow citizens, their livelihoods, their security for
decades to come.
I very much appreciate this opportunity to speak today
about why this matters and look very much forward to continuing
to make this committee and Congress a full partner in these
efforts. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Blinken follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary Antony J. Blinken
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, I'm grateful for the
opportunity to speak with you about the Administration's proposed
budget for the State Department.
I just returned from Kyiv, where Secretary of Defense Austin and I
demonstrated the United States' stalwart commitment to the Government
and people of Ukraine.
Moscow's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has brought into
sharp focus the power and purpose of American diplomacy, and why it's
more crucial than ever to our national security and the interests of
the American people. Our diplomacy is rallying allies and partners
around the world to join us in supporting Ukraine with security,
economic, and humanitarian assistance, imposing greater costs on the
Kremlin, strengthening our collective security and defense, and
addressing the war's mounting global consequences, including the
refugee and food crises.
President Putin's war of choice has achieved the exact opposite of
his objectives. Uniting, rather than dividing, Ukrainians.
Strengthening, rather than weakening, NATO and the U.S.-EU partnership.
Undercutting, rather than asserting, the Kremlin's claims of military
might. And that's not only because of Ukraine's bravery and resilience.
It's also because of effective U.S. diplomacy.
We must continue to drive that diplomacy forward to seize to the
strategic opportunities and address risks presented by Russia's
overreach, as countries reconsider their policies, priorities, and
relationships. The budget request before you predated this crisis, but
fully funding it is critical to ensuring Russia's war in Ukraine is a
strategic failure for the Kremlin and serves as a powerful lesson to
those who might consider following its path.
As we focus on this urgent crisis, the State Department continues
to carry out the missions traditionally associated with diplomacy, like
responsibly managing great power competition with China, facilitating a
halt to fighting in Yemen and Ethiopia, and pushing back against the
rising tide of authoritarianism and the threat it poses to human
rights.
We also face evolving challenges that require us to develop new
capabilities, such as the emergence and reemergence of infectious
diseases, an accelerating climate crisis, and a digital revolution that
holds both enormous promise and peril.
Last fall, I set out a modernization agenda for the State
Department and U.S. diplomacy to respond to these complex demands,
built on five pillars. Deepening our expertise in areas that are
critical to the future of America's national security. Continuing to
attract, retain, and develop the world's best diplomats. Fostering
greater innovation and feedback. Modernizing our technology,
communications, and analytical capabilities. And reinvigorating in-
person diplomacy and public engagement--to get our diplomats beyond
embassy walls and engage the people we need to reach most.
In no small part thanks to the significant FY22 budget approved by
Congress, we've been able to make real progress on this agenda, though
much remains to be done.
To give just a few examples, we've strengthened our capacity to
shape the ongoing technological revolution, so it protects our
interests, boosts our competitiveness, and upholds our values. With
bipartisan Congressional support and encouragement, we recently
launched a new bureau for cyberspace and digital policy, with 60 team
members to start.
We're also making headway on ensuring our diplomats reflect
America's remarkable diversity, which is one of our nation's greatest
strengths. Our Department's first ever Chief Diversity and Inclusion
Officer, Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, has spearheaded an
effort to analyze the obstacles that prevent underrepresented groups
from joining and advancing at State, and will soon release a 4-year
strategic plan to tackle these problems. We've expanded the Pickering
and Rangel fellowship programs, and created, for the first time, paid
internships at State, also with strong Congressional input and support.
These efforts are showing results. We recently welcomed a new
cohort of 179 exceptional Foreign Service professionals, putting the
Department on track for its largest annual intake in a decade.
My first 15 months in this job have only strengthened my conviction
that these and other reforms are not just worthwhile, but essential to
delivering for the American people.
Today's meeting marks the 100th time I've briefed Congress in
meetings or calls, which is one of the ways I've worked to meet the
commitment I made in my confirmation hearing to restore Congress's role
as a partner both in our foreign policymaking and in revitalizing the
State Department. These engagements have also helped further refine and
strengthen our modernization agenda.
Ensuring we can deliver on that agenda will require sustained
funding, new authorities, and most importantly, partnership from
Congress. That's why I was grateful for the Chairman and Ranking
Member's request to reestablish a formal dialogue on the State
Department Authorization, a request we've delivered on. Last month, we
sent your staff the first package of legislative authorities required
to meet the complex challenges we face, and we expect to send another
in the coming weeks.
If we want to deepen our capability in key areas like climate,
pandemic preparedness, and multilateral diplomacy; expand on Secretary
Powell's vision of a foreign service training float; and equip our
workforce with the training, tools, and technology that today's
challenges demand--we need additional resources.
If we want to be able to swiftly stand up new missions . . . deploy
diplomats when and where they're needed . . . and make those decisions
based on risk management rather than risk aversion--we need to reform
the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act and
Accountability Review Board statute to enable greater flexibility,
while meeting important security standards.
If we want to rapidly scale up in response to crises like refugee
surges and epidemics, while also avoiding costly overhead, we need more
flexible domestic hiring authorities.
This is not about advancing the goals of any one administration or
party. It's about refocusing our mission and purpose on the forces that
will affect Americans' lives, livelihoods, and security for decades to
come.
So I appreciate the opportunity to speak today about why this
matters, and look forward to continuing to make this committee, and
Congress as a whole, a partner in these efforts.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
opening statement. I will start a round of questions. I will
start, myself.
Your visit to Ukraine, I am sure members of the committee
will want to hear, in terms of President Zelensky's request for
assistance, both militarily and otherwise, are we aligned with
his requests? Are we going to move forward and seek to fulfill
his request? In that regard, what can you tell us about your
several-hour meeting with him?
Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, in short, yes, and let me
speak very briefly to this. First, we started making sure that
the Ukrainians have the equipment that they needed to repel
potential Russian aggression way back before the aggression
started. The first presidential drawdown was back Labor Day of
last year, a very significant drawdown, a second one of about
$200 million around Christmas time, again, well before the
aggression, and then, of course, we are now on our eighth
drawdown. We have tried to focus these drawdowns on the
equipment that we believe the Ukrainians need and can most
effectively use right away to repel the Russians. Indeed, their
success is primarily because of their incredible courage and
determination, but it is also because we were able to equip
them with what they needed.
For every tank that the Russians have had in Ukraine, we
have managed, with 30 allies and partners in one way or
another, to provide about 10 anti-armor systems. For every
plane that the Russians have flown in the skies, there have
been about 10 anti-aircraft munitions of one kind or another,
but as you point out, the nature of this battle is changing to
Eastern and Southern Ukraine. They are adapting to that. We are
adapting to that. We spent a great deal of time with President
Zelensky, the chief of his military, their defense secretary
going through what it is they believe they need to effectively
prosecute the battle going forward.
Secretary Austin is in Germany today with representatives
from, I think, close to 40 countries, focused on making sure
that we are either delivering ourselves or finding the
countries to deliver what it is the Ukrainians need. I can just
say broadly, and we can go in more detail in a different
setting, I think we are largely aligned in what they say they
need and what we think we are able to provide.
The last thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, we are doing this
very quickly. In the past, it has taken, from the time a
President made a drawdown decision to getting equipment into
the hands of the people who needed it, weeks. Now, often it is
72 hours, from the time of the drawdown decision to the time
that equipment is actually in the hands of the Ukrainians.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Based upon that, I will
assume that we will be looking at a supplemental request
because this budget, as you said, was drawn together before,
and I think there is bipartisan support for such a supplemental
request. Is that something we should be expecting shortly?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. Yes, it is.
The Chairman. Okay. As we move forward, my final question
is, keeping our allies engaged with us, and putting the
sanctions pressure on Russia, and continuing an all-out effort
to try to tighten the noose around Putin's neck, is it your
sense at this point in time that we will be able to keep the
allies on board in the longer term?
Secretary Blinken. I believe so, yes. We have had
remarkable solidarity to date. A lot of work went into this.
One of the advantages, in the sense of having a long lead into
this, because we, as you know and we told the world, we saw
this coming for some months, is we were able to prepare
effectively, not only in terms of the military assistance, but
also in terms of getting countries together to be prepared to
impose massive consequences on Russia. Back in October of last
year, President Biden got together with the leaders of France,
the United Kingdom, and Germany, including the incoming
chancellor as well as the outgoing chancellor, and showed them
in detail the information that we had about the looming Russian
aggression. This really concentrated minds on the need to be
prepared. We spent several months working intensely with allies
and partners, including on sanctions. That is why, in December,
we were able to say that there would be massive consequences
and mean it, know that we could back it up, and there have
been. The challenge now is making sure that we not only sustain
that, but that we build on that, and I believe we will.
The Chairman. Thank you. Now, let me turn to a different
topic: Iran. Your negotiator on the Iran nuclear deal said back
in February if there was no deal by the end of February, the
benefits we would receive would be dramatically diminished. It
is now the end nearly of April, 2 months later. Can you give us
where we are at on that, and, importantly, can I get a
commitment from you on holding an open Iran hearing before the
Memorial Day recess?
Secretary Blinken. On the latter question, in short, yes.
We will make sure that we get that done. Second, in terms of
where we are, without belaboring it, we inherited a very
challenging situation--an Iranian nuclear program that was
galloping forward, Iranian provocations and malicious
activities that had ramped up throughout the region, the
decision to pull out of the agreement--and the effort to exert
maximum pressure on Iran, whatever the intent, did not produce
results. On the contrary, it produced a more dangerous nuclear
program, a breakout time that went from a year to a matter of
weeks. Iran was acting with an even more destabilizing effect
throughout the region, including endangering and attacking our
own forces in ways that it had not before. That is what we have
to deal with.
We continue to believe that getting back into compliance
with the agreement would be the best way to address the nuclear
challenge posed by Iran and to make sure that an Iran that is
already acting with incredible aggression does not have a
nuclear weapon or the ability to produce one on short notice.
The Chairman. Here is the challenge we have, Mr. Secretary,
because my time is running out.
Secretary Blinken. Please.
The Chairman. I have been generous and want to make sure
your answers are full.
Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you.
The Chairman. Six months, which is what I hear is the
ability to get into an agreement of breakout time, is far less
than it was a year ago, and I understand why.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
The Chairman. It will do nothing in terms of Iran's missile
program, which the CENTCOM commander already says it has
overmatched in the region their abilities between themselves
and their proxies. It will do nothing about the destabilization
of the region. At the end of the day, while I understand the
breakout time now is maybe a matter of publicly reported, a
week or two, that, at the end of the day, it is not going to
meet the essential challenge that we have with Iran. It has its
missile capacities, which is one of the third parts of the bomb
delivery. It has the fissile material capability whether we
push it back 6 months or not, and recreating the sanctions
regimes if it were to violate, but with the knowledge it has,
that 6 months will be nothing. Then finally, the weaponization
element of that, which is the one point that we still believe
they are not at.
When you look at the totality of it, 2022 is not 2014 or
2015, and the sunsets are on the horizon even if a deal was to
be made, and that is part of the challenge that I see. I
appreciate your commitment to come before the committee, either
because we have an agreement, in which case you will testify
about that agreement, or if there is no agreement, to
understand what is our strategy moving forward on Iran.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did not
intend to start with Iran, but I will since that is where you
finished. Mr. Secretary, you can see there is little, if any,
daylight between myself and the chairman on this issue. I think
he has stated for you as clearly and concisely as he can the
lack of benefits of entering into an agreement at this point in
time, particularly as it relates to the bad activities of Iran
aside from its nuclear ambitions. As I have said, I believe
that the Israelis when they say publicly that Iran will never
complete a nuclear weapon, and they will see to it. The
question for you is here, do you think the Iranians believe
that today?
Secretary Blinken. Ranking Member Risch, I think that what
we have seen and have assessed over many years is that the
Iranians have sought to move forward with their fissile
material program, which is exactly what the JCPOA stopped, and,
if we were to resume compliance, would continue to stop and
would buy us a decade on the critical sunsets in terms of the
stockpile of fissile material in terms of the enrichment level.
At the same time, their efforts to actually weaponize, based on
public information, paused, stopped some years ago, but, of
course, we look very carefully to see if they resume. We would
be focused on this like a hawk either way.
To your point and to the chairman's point, which I agree
with, the agreement does not address their other malicious
activities. We have two premises. One is that when it comes to
those activities, things would be even worse if they had a
nuclear weapon or the ability to get one on short notice. It
would encourage them to act with even greater impunity. Second,
an agreement, were we to reach one, does not take away--in any
way from our ability and determination to go at them in all
these other areas in concert with allies and partners. We have
spent a lot of time working with them on exactly that,
everything from sanctions, to interdictions, to stopping the
money flow that they need to produce these weapons and to move
these weapons about. All of that would continue.
Senator Risch. Well, thanks. That did not really answer my
question directly. I am going to gather from what you said that
you at least have some agreement with me that the Iranians do
believe the Israelis when they say what is going to happen if
they move towards weaponization, and if that is the case, look,
they are going to do that. The Israelis are going to act, and
they have said so, regardless of what the agreement says. We
can make any agreement we want. They are going to act in their
national interest. If that is the case, then we really need to
focus on the other bad activities that Iran engages in as were
laid out by the chairman, and this agreement, I think you would
have to agree, does not cover that, and it seems to me that
that is really where we ought to be focused. In any event, I
come back to no agreement is better than a bad agreement, and I
would urge you to move on. They have given us every indication
that that would be appropriate for us to do, and I would
encourage you to do that.
Let us talk about Ukraine for a moment. We have an
ambassador in place in Russia still on the ground. Without
obviously disclosing any classified material, what can you tell
us about the cables that are coming back from Russia about the
conditions on the ground in Russia and what is happening there,
what people are thinking there? Can you enlighten us on that
publicly at all?
Secretary Blinken. It is very challenging because what
Putin has done over many, many years is set up, among other
things, a state propaganda system that is such that whatever he
says, whatever he communicates, a lot of people believe. Never
mind the facts, never mind what is actually going on, so
penetrating that information system is incredibly challenging.
Having said that, I think what we are seeing is that people
increasingly in Russia are feeling the effects of the
disastrous decision by Putin to attack Ukraine. For example,
upward of 600 companies have left Russia, including many of the
major consumer brands that we all know and are familiar with.
Increasingly, Russians are finding the things they thought they
could take for granted, they cannot. They cannot buy the things
they have been used to buying for the last almost 30 years.
Their economy is contracting in a dramatic way. We see
about a 15-percent contraction. The gains of the last 15, 20
years of opening are being erased. That is being increasingly
felt in people's lives. The Russians' ability to modernize key
sectors of their economy as a result of the export controls,
that increasingly is biting. They are not going to be able to
do it. All of this is going to be felt more and more. There is
a tension between the information and propaganda system that
Putin has set up that is very effective and the actual facts. I
think the facts increasingly will encroach and make themselves
felt, but for now, I think what we are seeing is Russian
people, to the extent that they are informed, continue to
support, for the most part, President Putin.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you for that. I would encourage
you to continue to tighten that screw. That is going to make a
lot of difference as far as what actually happens on the ground
in Russia. You are right. At least people publicly proclaim
that they support Putin and want to go along with the war
effort. I am not so sure that actually exists privately, but--
--
Secretary Blinken. Well, that is a very good point because,
to your point, there are severe penalties for doing or saying
anything in opposition to Putin's war, including 15 years in
prison. To the extent we are able to read public opinions, some
portion of that is definitely colored by the fact that people
are afraid to speak their minds. The final thing is, this gets
to the heart of the Achilles heel of any autocracy, which is
the inability of anyone to speak truth to power, and this has
severely misinformed Putin himself about what is actually going
on.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. Briefly, since my
time is almost up, obviously we need to focus on China. Over
this century, China is going to continue to be the major
challenge that we have. With what we have just gone through
with Ukraine, I think it is important that we walk and chew gum
at the same time and understand that the Taiwan issue is there
and that we ought to be thinking about that as we go forward,
and obviously, the chairman and I have worked on bolstering
Taiwan's defense. We are going to continue to do that. We look
for you as a partner in that. It is certainly important as we
go forward. It is going to be another challenge.
With that, my time is up. Thank you.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Let me follow up first on one of Senator Risch's points,
and that is what is going on in Russia. We saw that Vladimir
Kara-Murza was just recently arrested----
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Cardin. --following in the path of what happened
with Alexei Navalny and Sergei Magnitsky, and the list goes on
and on and on. Mr. Secretary, I hope that you will be following
that case very closely, recognizing that those responsible for
his illegal detention, we do have tools available as a result
of the Magnitsky statute, and I hope that that will be
considered in regards to what is happening and that we will
speak out strongly in support of Mr. Kara-Murza.
Secretary Blinken. In short, yes. First of all, let me just
say how much we appreciate your leadership for many years on
this, including on Global Magnitsky, including as part of the
Helsinki Commission. We are very focused on this, very focused
on making sure that Russia continues to be held to account for
its human rights abuses, not only in Ukraine, but in Russia
itself.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I appreciate that. Let me focus
on Ukraine for one moment. Senator Hagerty and I have sent you
a letter in regards to the subcommittee on the management of
the State Department in regards to returning our mission to
Kyiv. You have indicated that we are trying to comply with all
the requests that are being made by President Zelensky. One is
certainly to have our mission locate again in Kyiv. It is
critically important. We have a new ambassador that has been
named. We would like her to be stationed in Kyiv.
We recognize that you are doing some work in Lviv, but Kyiv
is the capital. Can you just tell us your plans on returning
our mission to Kyiv and whether you will comply with the
request we made, that we have a briefing as to the steps
necessary to make sure that our mission is safe in Kyiv?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. First of all, when it comes to a
briefing, yes, we will certainly do that. I appreciated your
letter, the letter from you and Senator Hagerty. There are two
things. We are sending diplomats back to Ukraine this week, and
they will begin to assess how we can most effectively and
securely reopen the embassy in Kyiv. Without going into too
much detail in this setting, I anticipate that we will be in
Lviv and then head to Kyiv, subject to the President's final
decision on that, but we are moving forward on that. We want to
have our embassy reopened, and we are working to do that.
Senator Cardin. Let me switch to the war crimes issues.
There was a report today in The Washington Post as to the
cooperation the United States is giving--I am glad to hear
this--in regards to the--how to collect the necessary evidence,
and how to interview, and what is necessary in order to proceed
with war crimes against those who have perpetrated those in
Ukraine under Mr. Putin's guidance. Could you just briefly tell
us what additional steps we need to take? We recognize we have
a challenge in regards to the ICC, but what steps is America
taking to make sure there will be accountability for these
atrocities that are taking place in Ukraine?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, we are working on this on
multiple fronts. First and foremost, we are supporting the work
of the Ukrainian prosecutor general to build the cases
necessary, and we are doing that with bringing tremendous
expertise in support of that effort. Technical advice, we have
people on the ground in surrounding countries working on this,
working with the Ukrainian investigators and prosecutors. We
are compiling, collecting information that we will share with
the Ukrainians. That is one major line of effort. Second, we
have a commission of inquiry that we helped establish through
the Human Rights Council at the U.N. We are supporting its
efforts as well and, again, providing information, advice as
that work moves forward.
Finally, we welcome the fact that the ICC is seized with
this, and we have in the past supported work by the ICC. Just
recently, in fact, the prosecution of a Janjaweed human rights
violator went forward successfully, in part, as a result of
information that we supplied to the ICC. We will look to do
that as well.
Senator Cardin. If there is anything that Congress needs to
do in order to support these efforts--we recognize the
challenges that you may have, so if there is a role for us to
play, please let us know. I think there is just about unanimous
support here in Congress to make sure that, at the end of the
day, there is accountability for these atrocities and war
crimes that have been committed.
Let me go to the budget for one moment. You mentioned that
you just recently had close to 200 new Foreign Service
officers. That is certainly good news. The budget, if I am
correct, provides for 570 additional personnel. We have been
concerned in the Subcommittee on the State Department in
regards to the ability for training for our Foreign Service
officials. In order to do that, you have to have a training
float. We have put in a 15-percent goal on the training float
in order that you can have individuals assigned for training
without a loss of their capacity within the mission. Can you
tell us how well we are doing in regards to meeting that
objective and what additional resources are necessary in order
to achieve that level?
Secretary Blinken. First of all, I really want to thank
Congress, this committee, as well as the appropriators last
year as well as hopefully this year, in to giving us the
resources we needed to bring in a record number of new people
to the Department, and this budget would fund an additional
500-plus new positions. This would allow us to have a float of
about 250 people, which would get us to pretty much where we
need to be in making sure that we have that. This is--to your
point, it is something that you have worked on for some time
for the Department. This would be an extremely meaningful way
of making sure that we have the flexibility to continuously
train and modernize the Department, allow people to have
opportunities for--not only for training, but for different
ways to expand their capacities with mid-career abilities to
come here, for example, as well as to universities, et cetera,
to do that while maintaining the full operations of the
Department. In short, the budget that we are proposing would
allow us to get the float that we think that we need to really
move forward and have the flexibilities for ensuring that we
are continuously professionalizing the Department.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate it. This committee has passed
two bills in regards to improving the training capacity of the
State Department, so you need to have the personnel in order to
take advantage of that. I am glad to see that we are going to
track in order to accomplish that.
Next will be--Senator Romney is recognized.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it
is good to see you and appreciate your willingness to be here
today, and appreciate, in particular, your visit to Kyiv,
making clear to the people of the world our commitment to the
people of Ukraine and to its leadership. This follows on the
heels of what I and many others across the country had to feel
was the disastrous departure from Afghanistan and obviously the
diplomatic, and military, and human crisis continues, stories
of hundreds of people who worked with us in Afghanistan being
murdered by the Taliban, girls not being able to go to school.
These things are obviously very troubling, and I think I and
others were apprehensive about how we would deal with Ukraine
given how badly we had dealt with the situation in Afghanistan.
Credit where credit is due. I think you and the
Administration deserve a great deal of credit for how well we
have acted, providing intelligence to our allies early on,
collaborating with our allies to have a united front on
sanctions, and our military support. I am sure that, looking
back, there are things that we will say we did not get it
exactly right, but, overall, it has been a success so far and
want to compliment you on that. I think it was unfortunate that
one of the headlines that came back from your trip was that our
purpose was to diminish the Russian military capacity. That may
be a byproduct, but our mission there is to help the people of
Ukraine have freedom and sovereignty, which they richly
deserve.
One of the great challenges that has already been mentioned
is with regards to China. You know that they have a
comprehensive strategy, that China's economic power is
continuing to rise. Their military power likewise. Their
investments both in ICBMs over the coming years and their navy
and so forth is really daunting. They have attempted to pacify
the world. They, of course, monitor and pacify their own
citizenry and propagandize their own citizenry. One of the
things that Chairman Menendez and I made part of the NDAA this
last year was a provision requiring the Administration to
develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with the emergence of
China as a great power. Your Department, along with other
departments, will be tasked with that as soon as the National
Security Strategy is released. I just want to underscore how
important that is, and I do believe that we are still not
making the kind of progress strategically we would like to on
that front.
I was concerned with the report about the Solomon Islands
entering into a military agreement with China. That is
alarming. I wonder if you have a perspective on that, whether
you know whether there is a military component. It is a
military agreement, but will there be potentially a military
presence in the Solomon Islands by the Chinese? What is your
sense of that, and is there a way of recovering?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much, Senator Romney.
First, with regard to the strategy, we very much agree with
you, and I will have an opportunity, I think, very soon in the
coming weeks to speak publicly and in some detail about the
strategy. We appreciate the work that, in many ways, Congress
has done to give us some of the tools that we need to make that
strategy effective. I look forward to having an opportunity to
lay that out in some detail and then continuing to refine it
with you and others.
With regard to the Solomon Islands, yes, we share the
concern about this agreement. We sent a very high-level
delegation to the Solomons just a few days ago. Our lead China
expert at the White House, Kurt Campbell, along with the
assistant secretary for the region, Dan Kritenbrink, led a
delegation to the Solomon Islands. I had previously announced
some months ago that we intend to open an embassy there that we
are moving forward on. We want to have day-in, day-out presence
there. We are moving forward on that. The delegation met with
the Prime Minister. He vowed publicly, as well as privately,
that there would be no Chinese military base, no long-term
presence, no power projection capability. We will be watching
that very, very closely in the weeks and months ahead.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to
conclude in the brief time I have with indicating my support
with the comments of Ranking Member Risch and Chairman Menendez
with regards to Iran. I happen to believe that Iran will be
hellbent on having a nuclear weapon at some point, that they
will negotiate and delay as long as they can the negotiations
with us, but that they ultimately intend to have a nuclear
capacity. I do hope that that is not going to be the case, but
I believe that in that circumstance, that giving into them is
not the right course, but instead that there needs to be a very
heavy price paid for them pursuing that path, and not only to
hope in some way to delay them or dissuade them, but, more
importantly perhaps, to dissuade anyone else in the world from
taking a path to become a nuclear power because the cost of
doing so would be demonstrated by what we do with Iran.
I would encourage the Administration to once again bring
this matter to Congress for an up or down vote for a level of
support on the part of the national interest. This is, I think,
critical for--not just for what is happening in Iran and the
Middle East, but around the world. As more and more nations are
looking at becoming nuclear powers, I think they have to see
that the cost is enormous for doing so and would hope that we
do not in any way lessen the cost in negotiations. I would be
more than happy to hear that we have walked away. Iran asks for
more and more and more, the answer is no, and that we need to
show extraordinary backbone and make a solid commitment that
America will not stand still as they or other nations seek to
become nuclear powers.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator. I can simply say
that we share the same objective, which is to make sure that
Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. The question is what is
the most effective way to do that. We have now tested two
propositions. One was the nuclear agreement that was originally
reached and that significantly set back Iranian capabilities to
pursue a nuclear weapon, particularly the fissile material for
such a weapon, and that agreement was working by all objective
accounts. In fact, now we have many Israeli colleagues from the
security establishment who have come and said publicly that it
was a huge mistake to pull out of the agreement because, on its
own terms, preventing Iran from acquiring the fissile material
necessary for a weapon, it was succeeding. That does not
address the other concerns that you rightly and we rightly have
with Iran, but on its terms, it was working.
We have tested the other proposition, which was pulling out
of the agreement, trying to exert more pressure, and we have
also seen the result. The result has been that that nuclear
program, which had pushed back the breakout time to a year in
terms of being to produce fissile material for a weapon, that
is now down to a matter of weeks. Their program has galloped
forward--more sophisticated centrifuges are spinning, a greater
stockpile of fissile material--and Ranking Member Risch was
talking about this earlier. I think it is important to
underscore the reason the agreement originally reached--focused
on fissile material is because this is something we can see.
With the most intrusive inspections regime ever in an arms
control agreement, we could see it, and if there was breakout,
do something about it.
The problem with focusing on weaponization is, which we
believe that they halted in the early 2000s, but could resume
if there is a decision. The problem with that is, that work
happens in a room a tenth of the size of this one at a computer
in ways that we or the Israelis may not be able to see
immediately in real time, may not be able to track. Hanging
your hat on the peg of weaponization is a very risky one. That
is why this agreement was designed around fissile material, and
we continue to believe that whatever the imperfections, if, on
its own terms, we can back into the agreement, it would be, of
all of the answers that we have, the best one for the nuclear
issue. However, we are not there, and I could not agree with
you more, first of all, on the overriding objective that we
have and also with both the chairman, the ranking member, and
you, the need to confront Iran on its other malicious
activities.
Senator Cardin. It is our understanding we will have a
separate opportunity in regards to the Iran agreement, and we
appreciate the Secretary's willingness to work with our
committee in that regard.
It is my understanding Senator Murphy is available through
Webex.
Senator Murphy. Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Blinken. Senator.
Senator Murphy. Thank you for taking the time with us. I am
sorry that I cannot be there with you in person. I do not share
my colleagues' skepticism of a renewed nuclear agreement with
Iran, in part, because the whole world has watched how
difficult it is to craft a Western response to Russia's
invasion of Ukraine given Russia's status as a nuclear power. I
simply cannot imagine why we would wish for a policy that will
allow Iran to be weeks, maybe months away from a nuclear weapon
given all of their malevolent activity in the Middle East. What
about the last 2 months has been an advertisement that we would
be better off if more of our adversaries had nuclear weapons?
I appreciate the clarification you made to Senator Romney's
question because it is true: we have tried the alternative. We
have indeed attempted to apply significant costs on the Iranian
economy and through President Trump's maximum pressure
campaign, and, in fact, the result was not that Iran came to
the table on all of their other behaviors in the region. It was
not that they held firm on the commitments that they had made
in the JCPOA. It was, in fact, that they moved faster towards a
potential nuclear weapon. They accelerated their research
program.
I want to maybe ask you one more sort of question to level
set where we are today. You have stated, I think very
effectively, that the maximum pressure campaign did not, in
fact, have the effect of constraining Iran's nuclear weapon
program, but for my colleagues that have significant concerns,
rightly so, about Iran's support for terrorist organizations,
for regional proxies, the money they put into their ballistic
missile program, is there any evidence that during the period
of time in which we have been out of the nuclear agreement,
during the period of time in which we have applied these
significant sanctions, including sanctions on the IRGC, that
Iran has lessened their support for terrorist organizations or
proxy organizations or lessened the amount of money that they
put into their ballistic missile program?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, to the contrary, no. What we
have seen is two things. First, during the period of time when
the original agreement was being negotiated--go back to 2012--
through its entry into Force and the time when the Trump
administration pulled out--2018--2012 to 2018, there were
virtually no attacks on American presence in the Middle East.
When we pulled out of the agreement, when we imposed the
foreign terrorist organization designation on the IRGC, and
when Soleimani was killed, and no one is shedding any tears for
his demise, but I am just stating the facts, when those things
happened, the attacks on our forces, on our personnel, on our
people went up dramatically. In fact, from 2019 to 2020, they
went up 400 percent, so we have seen that effect.
Similarly, and it is an unfortunate fact of life that Iran
is willing to dedicate what resources it has to supporting its
military, to supporting its various tools of destabilization
and terror, including the IRGC Quds Force, irrespective of what
its revenues are from other sources. We have seen sustained
support for those forces even during maximum pressure. Again,
we share the same objectives. The question is how do we most
effectively reach those objectives? That is what we are
concerned with.
Senator Murphy. Well, thank you for that response, and I
think you will find many of us on this committee very
supportive of your efforts to re-enter that agreement. Let me
turn to one other topic, and that is the topic of human rights.
The assault on Ukrainian democracy, I think, has elevated the
need for us to be incredibly consistent between our words and
our actions on supporting human rights and democracy. You and I
have had a number of conversations about the pace of reform in
Egypt, a country that enjoys more direct U.S. military support
than almost any other in the world prior to the war in Ukraine
Buried inside your budget request is a curious proposal;
that is, a proposal to de-link human rights conditions from
military aid to Egypt. I worry about the message that this
would send to Sisi, but also the world. They have made tepid
progress even when presented with fairly minimalist requests
for reforms, and I wonder why this would be a moment that the
Administration would be asking to separate the money we send to
Egypt for military support from our human rights requests and
our human rights work in Egypt.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, first, I really appreciate your
focus on human rights. Indeed, it is central to President
Biden's foreign policy, and that applies across the world,
including when it comes to Egypt. Let me just say quickly a
couple of things. First, Egypt is a vital partner for us. It is
a vital partner in trying to sustain and advance stability in
the Middle East to combat terrorism. It played a critical role
last year when tensions rose dramatically in Gaza, and it has
played an important role now in trying to keep things in check
as well. In many ways, it is a vital partner. It is also an
important economic partner for us. At the same time, that does
not divorce from our policy and our approach the need to focus
on human rights and the concerns that we have about the
Egyptian approach when it comes to civil society, when it comes
to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, political
detentions, abuses, et cetera.
I have engaged President el-Sisi directly on this at some
length, including the first meeting that we had. We continue to
meet and engage with human rights defenders, with civil
society. Last year, we signed the Human Rights Council
statement at the U.N. expressing our grave concerns for the
first time since 2014, and reprogrammed some of the foreign
military financing this past year because Egypt did not meet
some of the objectives that we set out in terms of making
progress on human rights, and that will continue to be the case
going forward. It is, however, important to us to have maximum
flexibility in being able to deal with this and deal with this
effectively.
I would also say that, going back to the conversation on
Russian and Ukraine, this is a critical time, too, in the
relationship with a number of countries, particularly countries
that may be reconsidering their own relationships and potential
dependencies on Russia. They are seeing how Russian military
equipment is performing or not performing in Ukraine. They are
seeing growing challenges to Russia being able to sustain and
ultimately export its military equipment. They are making
different decisions about the future. That presents a strategic
opportunity for us, one we want to make sure that we also have
flexibility to take advantage of.
I completely share your focus on and concern about human
rights, including in Egypt. It is and it will remain a central
part of our policy even as we work to strengthen what is a
vital partnership for us.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Murphy. Well, very briefly, just count me amongst
those who think it would be unwise at this moment to de-link
our human rights conditions from military aid. This is a
country that still has more political arrests than Russia does.
Sixty thousand people have been arrested for political crimes
in Egypt. That is a stunning number. As to your point, finally,
about countries that are rethinking their traditional
association with Russia; Senator Shaheen, Tillis, and I are
just back from a trip to the Balkans. I think Assistant
Secretary Donfried was there this week. Tremendous
opportunities in the Balkans to try to shift alliances and
allegiances there. Bosnia is a place where there is a rapid
deterioration of the security situation. We have to pay close
attention there, but many opportunities around Russia's
periphery to convince folks that it is time for them to stop
sitting on two chairs--
The Chairman. Thank you. The senator's time has expired.
Thank you.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you. I look forward to working
with you on that.
The Chairman. I would ask the clerk to make sure he starts
the clock because we have a lot of members who want to ask
questions.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Secretary Blinken, for appearing before us again. It is very
important you went to Kyiv both to meet with President Zelensky
and, importantly, to demonstrate our support for the people of
Ukraine. It has now been 2 months since the war in Ukraine
began, and with our help, they are fighting with heart, with
conviction, with some success, and with our help, we can win
this thing, but it needs a lot more help. I am glad we are
returning the U.S. embassy to Kyiv. I am pleased the
Administration just appointed a Ukraine security assistant
coordinator. As you know, some of us had called for that. We
continue to be concerned about some of the red tape that is
involved in some of the military transfers, so this should help
quite a bit.
We must continue to address Russia's barbaric actions with
speed, with urgency, and with confidence that the right weapons
can contribute to a victory. The Kremlin must know that the
free world stands united against them. I am also pleased the
Administration has finally nominated a U.S. ambassador to
Ukraine. As you know, I believe this is long overdue, and I
look forward to Bridget Brink's testimony before this committee
as soon as possible. I want to talk to the chairman about that.
Energy revenues continue to be the main source of income
fueling Russia's war machine. As you know, energy is their top
export. In fact, receipts from energy alone accounts for about
40 to 50 percent of the Russian budget. We have got to cut off
this funding if we want to stop the increasing war effort from
Russia. I was pleased that the Administration banned the import
of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal in the United States in
early February, but that was only about 8 percent of our total
petroleum imports. Other countries import a lot more. The
larger issue at hand, of course, is the EU and their reliance
on Russian energy. Approximately 40 percent of EU gas comes
from Russia as well as more than a quarter of its oil. This
means, Mr. Secretary, Europe is continuing to send Russia--
roughly $870 million a day--$870 million a day in energy
revenues compared to about $50 million a day the U.S. was
purchasing on a daily basis. Again, money used to fuel the
Putin war machine.
Last month, I was pleased with the announcement of the
joint task force with the EU on energy security for better
coordination. It has now been exactly a month since this task
force was established. Can you please provide us today with an
update on the efforts and progress as it relates to reducing
European reliance on Russian energy, and when can we expect a
plan detailing the objectives of the task force and a strategy
to achieve them?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, thank you very much. Can I
first just start by applauding your leadership on Ukraine, both
as head of the caucus here, but also just your continuous
engagement going back from the Munich Security Conference and
well before that. It is greatly appreciated. It has made a real
difference.
With regard to energy, you are right. This is one of the
critical areas where we have to continue to move forward, and
we are and we will. The big challenge is, of course, European
dependence on Russian energy that has built up over decades,
particularly natural gas, but also oil, and let me say a couple
of things very quickly. First, the Europeans have, I think,
genuinely ambitious plans to move away from this reliance on
Russian energy. The challenge is to put them into effect, and
the other challenge is that, in some cases, this is not--no pun
intended--like flipping a light switch. It is a process, and
that is what we are working with them on implementing.
A few things to that end. First, I think you are likely to
see in the coming weeks further progress on the oil side of the
equation in terms of Russian imports. Gas is a bigger
challenge. It is particularly acute for certain countries,
including, notably, Germany, but also others. We have
redirected significant amounts of LNG to Europe in the short
term to help them compensate for any losses that they might
have in moving away from Russian gas. That process is
continuing, and we want to make sure that as they do that,
there is backfill and there is a significant amount that is
going to that.
Senator Portman. Mr. Secretary, just two quick questions,
one, with regard to the task force. When can we expect a report
from the task force detailing what the objectives are and what
the strategy is? Then second, with regard to LNG shipments, you
just mentioned that actually this is a central component of the
initiative. The U.S. is now saying that we are going to give
them 15 billion cubic meters this year----
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Portman. --an additional 50 over the next decade.
How has the Administration and the task force engaged with
energy producers in the United States to follow through on
those commitments? Your budget increases taxes on natural gas
production. As you know, the Administration continues to take
steps to discourage new leasing for oil and gas development on
public lands and waters. These and other policies have stifled
domestic natural gas production are going to make it difficult,
it seems to me, to meet our objectives. How can we keep our EU
commitment and reduce this massive flow of funds into Russia?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am not an expert on the
domestic policy component of this. I will say a couple of
things. First, we have doubled the LNG exports to Europe since
last year--actually since early this year. They have already
doubled. The President has urged domestic producers to speed up
production. There are, as you know, thousands of licenses that
have gone unused, and hopefully they will be used to increase
production. The task force--let me come back to you on when we
can anticipate providing a report, but it is focused on
diversification. It is focused on curbing demand and making
sure that the backfill is there. It is also necessary to focus
on an energy transition because, ultimately, that is going to
be the most effective way, over time, in making sure that there
is genuine energy security. One thing that you cannot do----
Senator Portman. Secretary Blinken, I want to ask you, let
me just say the obvious, which is that you have a strong
interest in these domestic policy issues now because to stop
the Russian war machine getting all this funding, which is your
strong interest I know, you are going to have to be a voice for
some reason in terms of an all-of-the-above energy strategy,
including not stifling fossil fuels at this point because we
need them in terms of natural gas to Europe.
On the coordinator, Lieutenant General Terry Wolff has now
been appointed. I was glad to see that.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Portman. As you know, I am delighted we have
somebody to be there as a coordinator. How is the State
Department going to coordinate with him on improving the arms
transfer process, which is your bailiwick, and does he report
to you, the President, or the national security advisor?
Secretary Blinken. Terry is someone that I have worked with
for a long time. He, as you may remember, was one of the lead
coordinators for the counter-ISIL coalition that was
established back in 2015, 2016. We worked very closely
together. We will continue to work very closely together in
this effort, and he will be working both with us at the State
Department as well as reporting to the White House, but we have
a long history of working closely together.
Let me say--just repeat very quickly something I said
earlier, which is that this process of transferring equipment
to the Ukrainians is moving, in my judgment, very effectively
and very efficiently. The drawdown authorities that we have
used now eight times, whereas it used to take sometimes weeks
to get equipment to the Ukrainians, we are now getting things
from the point the decision is made to draw down to getting it
into Ukrainian hands in as little as 72 hours, so this is
moving quickly. We have cut through a lot of red tape. At the
same time, we have been going around the world looking for
other countries that may have equipment that Ukraine can find
useful. When it has come to authorizing the transfer of that
equipment if it has U.S. origin technology in it, I have done
those authorizations in 24 hours or less to make sure, to your
point, that we are moving things quickly.
Having said all of that, we want to make sure that we
continue to drive this as effectively and efficiently as
possible. Terry will focus on that. I will work directly with
him. So will the White House and the Pentagon.
Senator Portman. Who will General Wolff report to? Who will
he report to is the question?
Secretary Blinken. Let me come back to you on exactly what
the reporting line is. I do not know what the exact reporting
line is, but I can tell you that he will work directly with me
as well as with the White House, and, of course, the Pentagon.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr.
Secretary, welcome. Thank you for taking that trip to Kyiv with
Secretary Austin. I was just listening to Secretary Austin
address some of our NATO partners about the need to continue to
push and coordinate more weapons into Ukraine, and I do want to
commend you for accelerating that process as the war has gone
on.
I want to start with a question about the Foreign Service
Families Act. This was legislation that I teamed up with
Senator Sullivan on. We co-chair the Foreign Service Caucus
here. I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for
working with us to include that in the passage of the last
national defense authorization bill. It extends to Foreign
Service officers some of the same benefits we extend to our
military folks deployed overseas and also includes more
opportunities for family members in order to continue to
attract and retain a world-class Foreign Service. Thank you for
your input as we worked on that passage. We are trying to
implement the provisions now, and I am not going to go through
the entire list, Mr. Secretary, but just to give you one
example. The legislation allows Foreign Service officers who
are getting orders to deploy----
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. --and who go to their missions overseas
to be able to terminate contracts, leases, that kind of thing,
but in order to make that work in the real world, we need a
system to make sure that landlords, for example, can verify
that a Foreign Service officer does have, in fact, those orders
to go overseas. The military has created a successful system to
do that. We have been working with your team to try and do it.
I want your commitment that we can accelerate this process.
Secretary Blinken. You have got it.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay.
Secretary Blinken. First of all, you have been an
incredible champion for the Foreign Service for a long time,
and that is appreciated very much by the men and women of the
State Department. Second, we want to make sure that we are
putting in place these necessary tools and efficiencies to do
right by the men and women who work for us. Yes, in short, we
will try to move forward on that as expeditiously as possible.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Yes, there
are series of things. It is just question of implementation,
but the sooner we can get them in effect, the sooner the
benefits will flow to the men and women of the Foreign Service.
I want to follow up a little bit on Senator Portman's line
of questioning with respect to sanctions and the issue of
Russian exports of oil, and gas, and other commodities, and,
again, salute the Administration for working with our allies to
put in place punishing sanctions right away, and we have
expanded those sanctions over time. To my knowledge, and
correct me if I am wrong, we have not used any of the existing
authorities to date to apply secondary sanctions to
institutions overseas that may be aiding and abetting Russian
oligarchs and others who may be aiding and abetting Putin. Is
that right?
Secretary Blinken. I do not believe that we have, but that
does not mean that we will not. Thanks to this committee, we
now have at the State Department a senior sanctions
coordinator, Jim O'Brien, a deeply experienced diplomat. One of
the things that he is looking intensely at is sanctions evasion
by other countries or entities. This is something that we are
going to focus on relentlessly as we move forward.
Senator Van Hollen. I am glad to hear that, Mr. Secretary,
because I think leakage in the sanctions only hurts our
alliances and helps Putin. I recognize that a lot of our
European partners are working to reduce their reliance on
Russian oil and gas, and that we are working with them to do
that, and obviously we want to accelerate that process as much
as possible. What I am worried about is reports of certain
countries that are increasing their imports of Russian oil, and
gas, and commodities. Are you aware of countries that are doing
that?
Secretary Blinken. We have been watching this carefully,
and we have engaged with some countries where we have had
concerns that they might be increasing their purchases, taking
advantage of discounted prices that Russia has been forced to
offer in order to get anyone to take this. In short, yes, there
are few countries that we have engaged with to dissuade them
from doing that.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, Mr. Secretary, we have not been
successful doing that, right? According to the information I
have got, in the month of March, China increased its trade with
Russia by 12 percent in terms of actually additional goods
being imported to China from Russia, and there are a number of
countries. The question is, we made the right decision by
saying that the United States is not going to continue to
import Russian gas and oil, but if that oil is just on the
international market and Putin is able to sell it to somebody
else, it obviously does not do us any good at all. I guess my
question is very blunt: why are we not applying secondary
sanctions against countries that are increasing their imports
from Russian commodities?
Secretary Blinken. I would say two things. First, where we
can, it is far preferable to get countries to voluntarily not
engage in these practices, and that is where our diplomacy is
focused. Second, as we are dealing with the energy piece of
this, and, again, I agree with the general tenor of Senator
Portman's remarks, we have to do it not only effectively, we
have to be as smart as possible about how we do it and when we
do it. For example, we want to be sure that we are not taking
actions in the near term that may have the result of spiking
energy prices and, thus, lining Putin's pockets instead of
taking resources away.
The more that we can do things voluntarily, deliberately,
make sure that we have the necessary backfill, including from
our own sources, make sure that energy is on the market. The
President, as you know, did a historic release from the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve on that front. We have got a
million barrels a day over 6 months. We have got many countries
to join in doing the same thing. We have to do it in a
deliberate way so that we do not have an effect contrary to the
one that we are trying to achieve.
Senator Van Hollen. I agree with that, Mr. Secretary, but
as you point out, there are countries that are taking advantage
of discounted Russian oil prices. They are able to unload it at
lower prices, and they are taking advantage of it, which only
helps Putin. Just a statement in closing which is, one of the
consequences of Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been our
European partners have watched China's response, and I think
that they have been extremely concerned with the fact that
China first said that we are all in together. I do think this
is an opportunity to work even more closely in practical ways
with our European and other allies with respect to a
coordinated approach with respect to China.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Blinken. I very much agree with you. Deputy
Secretary of State Wendy Sherman was just in Europe for a
dialogue that we established with the European Union on China.
She had a very, I think, productive session with the EU. You
saw the results of the summit between the EU leaders and
President Xi Jinping, which, I think, did not go to China's
benefit because of the increasingly deep skepticism about China
in Europe. China is paying a reputational cost for, to be
charitable about it, sitting on the fence when it comes to
Russia's aggression against Ukraine, never mind falling on the
Russian side of the fence, something that it has to factor in.
I think it is seeing that play out in its relationships with
other countries, notably in Europe.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. While there is no justification for Putin's
war on Ukraine, it does not follow that there is no explanation
for the invasion. John Mearsheimer writes that the trouble over
Ukraine actually started in NATO's Bucharest Summit in 2008
when the George W. Bush administration pushed the alliance to
announce that Ukraine and Georgia will become members. Even
with this 2008 announcement, though, most analysts acknowledge
that it was unlikely that either country would ever be admitted
to NATO because of opposition from France and Germany.
Nevertheless, the U.S., including the Biden administration,
insisted on beating the drums to admit Ukraine to NATO.
Just last fall, you signed the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on
Strategic Partnership, which renewed a commitment to the 2008
Bucharest Declaration supporting Ukrainian admission to NATO.
Knowing full well that Ukraine was unlikely to ever join NATO
since it had already been 14 years since they said they were
going to become members, why was it so important last fall
before this invasion to continue agitating for Ukraine's
admission to NATO?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator. Not a question of
agitating for Ukraine's admission. It is a question of standing
up for the basic principal that we strongly adhere to that
there should be and will be an open-door policy when it comes
to their membership. These are sovereign decisions for European
countries to make, and, of course, a decision for the NATO
alliance to make in terms of making sure that a country that
wishes to join actually adds value to NATO. This goes to the
heart of the international system and the international order,
and part of that is a basic principal that one country cannot
dictate to another the choices it makes about with whom it
allies. It is foreign policies. It is a decision or not to try
to engage with the European Union, with NATO.
The other thing----
Senator Paul. Yet, as we speak and we see the destruction
of Ukraine, we also hear pronouncements from President Zelensky
saying, well, you know what? Maybe we might consider a
neutrality as a possibility. There could have been voices
before this invasion instead of agitating for something that we
knew our adversary absolutely hated and said was a red line. As
recently as last September, before you signed the agreement,
once again, agitating for NATO, Russia said that it was a red
line. Now, there is no justification to the invasion. I am not
saying that, but there are reasons for the invasion, and I
think it has added nothing. In fact, had Ukraine been in NATO,
as you have advocated for and many others have advocated for,
we would now have troops in Ukraine. We may still have the
destruction, but we would also have troops in Ukraine.
If you were to put them in now, if it is still your policy
that you want them in now, that means American troops go. The
one good thing about them not being in is the most bellicose of
our members here are not advocating for U.S. troops right now.
That is a good thing. We have not had advocacy for U.S. troops
because they are not part of NATO. Had they been or are they to
become part of NATO, that means U.S. soldiers will be fighting
in Ukraine, and that is something I very much oppose.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, could I just say to that,
because, look, these are important conversations and arguments.
My judgment is different. If you look at the countries that
Russia has attacked over the last years--Georgia, leaving
forces in Transnistria and Moldova, and then repeatedly
Ukraine--these were countries that were not part of NATO. It
has not attacked NATO countries for probably----
Senator Paul. You could also argue the countries they have
attacked were part of Russia.
Secretary Blinken. Well----
Senator Paul. Were part of the Soviet Union or whatever.
Secretary Blinken. Yes, and I firmly disagree with that
proposition. It is the fundamental right of these countries to
decide their own future and their own destiny.
Senator Paul. I am not saying it is not, but I am saying
that the countries that have been attacked--Georgia and
Ukraine--were part of the Soviet Union, were----
Secretary Blinken. That does not give Russia the right to
attack them.
Senator Paul. They were a part of the Soviet Union since
the 1920s.
Secretary Blinken. That does not give Russia the right to
attack them. On the contrary----
Senator Paul. No one is saying it does, but it really has
nothing to do----
Secretary Blinken. They were liberated from being part of
this empire by force. Let me just say this because I do think
it is important. If you look at why President Putin went into
Ukraine this time, we took very seriously the arguments that
some Russians were putting forward back last fall that they had
concerns about Ukraine's eventual membership in NATO in terms
of Russia's security posture. What would this mean in terms of
the placement of forces near Russia, weapons systems, et
cetera? We sought to engage them on those issues in real
seriousness as well as engage them on deep concerns we have
about many of the things that undermine our security.
When everything came to a head, it is abundantly clear, in
President Putin's own words, that this was never about Ukraine
being potentially part of NATO, and it was always about his
belief that Ukraine does not deserve to be a sovereign,
independent country, that it must be reassumed into Russia in
one form or another, and that is not something we can let----
Senator Paul. Yet the discussions between Zelensky and the
Russians have included discussions of them assuming an
unaligned or neutral posture. That has been part of the
discussion.
Secretary Blinken. This is a sovereign decision for Ukraine
to make.
Senator Paul. Yes, but at the same time, we are all over
the place thinking we are coming to the rescue, and then maybe
sometimes we are not. Maybe sometimes we are agitating for
something, like admission to NATO, that makes it worse. Maybe
Ukraine has more of an ability to make this decision if they
are not being pushed and goaded by half the members of the
Senate who want them in NATO. Perhaps it is not useful to be
pushing them into NATO, and perhaps they will come to an
agreement. The other thing to remember about war is war very
rarely ends in complete victory by either side.
I am proud of how well the Ukrainians have fought. I am
supportive of their cause, but I would say it is very unlikely
they are going to now invade--take over Russia and depose
Putin. I think the most likely and the best outcome would be
some sort of stalemate, perhaps pushing them completely out of
Ukraine, but even pushing them out of Ukraine is still a great
step from where we are now. There may well be a negotiated
peace. Would the U.S.--would President Biden be open to
accepting Ukraine as an unaligned, neutral nation?
Secretary Blinken. We, Senator, are not going to be more
Ukraine than the Ukrainians. These are decisions for them to
make. Our purpose is to make sure that they have within their
hands the ability to repel the Russian aggression and, indeed,
to strengthen their hand at an eventual negotiating table. We
have seen no sign to date that President Putin is serious about
meaningful negotiations. If he is and if the Ukrainians engage,
we will support that.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Secretary Blinken. With a 7-minute round, I am going to start
with three compliments and then get to my tougher questions
about a region in the world that nobody has yet talked about,
which is Central America. Three compliments. First, in my time
on this committee and in the Senate, I have not seen an
instance where the gap between U.S. prediction of activity and
our European allies' prediction of activity was wider than with
respect to Ukraine, what was Russia's intent amassing troops on
the border, and we could see this going back into about
October. Everyone had the same facts, but the prediction of
what Russia's behavior would be from the U.S. and many of our
allies was very, very different.
The compliment that I want to give you and the
Administration is you basically took the position with European
nations that said there is not going to be an invasion, we hope
you are right, but if we are right, what can we set up in
advance so that if there is an invasion, Nord Stream 2 can be
closed down, sanctions can be immediately put in place, we can
pursue humanitarian and military aid. I think that was very,
very adept diplomacy. Recognizing that there was a difference
of opinion about what was going to happen, you nevertheless put
the plans in place before February 24 that enabled you to
assemble a quite significant coalition not only of NATO
nations, but others to really put pressure on in multiple
domains. That is compliment one.
Compliment two. The U.S. vaccine diplomacy in the world has
been extremely successful, and this bears on a matter we are
talking about now, whether in a COVID bill we should do more
vaccine diplomacy in the world, and I want to focus just
particularly on the Americas. I took six of us--bipartisan
delegation to South and Central America in July, right at the
time that U.S. vaccines were being delivered. These are nations
that have felt like the U.S. has kind of ignored them. China
and Russia are paying a lot of attention to them. They do not
really feel like we are, but for the first time, I could really
see they love the U.S. vaccines, high quality. We were not
charging him. They thought the Russian and Chinese vaccines
were substandard quality, and they were being charged for them.
The shipments were being delayed, and if they happen to say
something nice about Taiwan, suddenly the contract would
expire.
We really did good work in vaccine diplomacy in the
Americas. I would argue we still probably did not allocate
enough there. With 30 percent of the world's deaths, they only
got 8 percent of our vaccine distribution, but we built up a
lot of good will. I would argue that thinking forward, it would
be a really smart investment in the Americas and elsewhere if
we could continue to be great partners in nations that are
still trying to find more vaccines.
Then the third compliment is, I think it was my first
hearing when I was on Foreign Relations was about the ARB, the
Accountability Review Board, report on the Benghazi attack, and
it was in 2013, and what should we be doing to provide more
security for State Department personnel. One of the
recommendations was dramatically increasing the security
training of our FSOs. I just had the chance last Friday to go
see this state-of-the-art FASTC Center at Fort Pickett and
watch a final exercise. Forty-one weeks a year we put cohorts
of FSOs through a 1-week-long security training facility that
they have to repeat during their career, and it culminates with
a fairly adrenaline-producing and shocking exercise where
people get to put in place what they have learned during the
week, so that if it ever happens on a post overseas, it is not
the first time they are seeing it. I was in the facilities as
this was happening, and even though I knew what was going to
happen, I will say it made a huge impression on me, but the
fact that you are investing in that kind of training for our
folks is really important.
Okay. Now, on to the Americas. I still do not think we are
paying the attention to the region that we should. Now, this is
a budget hearing, and I applaud the fact that you have sought
significantly more funds for Central America to help them deal
with their own issues, but also deal with this push that has
led so many to leave the Northern Triangle to come to the
United States. We will not deal with this migration question
effectively unless we deal with root causes, but let us be
honest. We have got some real weak partners there, so you have
proposed a bulk-up investment, but in both El Salvador and, to
a lesser degree, Guatemala, we see real backsliding toward
authoritarianism. The Honduran elections were fair, and there
was a clear outcome, which is positive. President Castro is
fairly new in. How do you propose to increase investments in
the Northern Triangle to make a difference for people there and
on this migration challenge when at least two of the three
governments are probably getting to be less reliable partners
rather than more reliable partners?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, and let me just start by
thanking you for the visit that you made on Friday. It was
greatly appreciated, and, indeed, we have really bulked that
up, bolstered that up. We have also, thanks to Congress, been
able to invest greater resources in diplomatic security, which
plays a vital role in enabling us to do our job. I thank you
for that.
When it comes to our own region, and I personally have been
intensely engaged on a number of fronts. I just came back, even
in the midst of Ukraine, from a conference that brought
together most of the foreign ministers in the region in Panama,
focused on migration, which is obviously an immediate challenge
for everyone, as well as a long-term challenge, and we can
speak more about that. The bottom line there is, as a result of
a lot of work that we have done over the last year, including
getting together in Panama, and Colombia before that, at the
United Nations, we are building a generally-shared sense of
responsibility when it comes to dealing with what is a historic
migration challenge that is affecting, in one way or another,
every country in our region, whether they are countries of
origin, countries of transit, countries of destination. We have
now bilateral agreements with Costa Rica and Panama with more
to come. We have the Summit of the Americas that the President
will be hosting over the course of a week in Los Angeles in
June where on migration, I anticipate there will be a
declaration of shared principles on how we work this together,
but also, on virtually every other aspect of the relationship
with our closest neighbors.
Second, when it comes to these--I could not agree with you
more that even as we take near-term steps to deal with what is
a historic migratory flow in our own region and around the
world, the ultimate answer has to be addressing the so-called
root causes, because it takes a lot for someone to decide that
they want to pick up, give up everything they know, leave their
families, leave their friends, their communities, their
culture, their language, and make a hazardous journey to the
United States or anywhere else in the region. One of the things
that we have seen in our own region is the primary driver, not
the only one, but the primary driver is the lack of economic
opportunity. We know that, and so what we have to do is help
these countries create greater opportunities.
The Vice President, who has been leading these efforts, did
a call to action some months ago with the private sector that
resulted in $1.2 billion in new investments in the Northern
Triangle countries that will create job opportunities over time
and give people a means to stay. We have a series of programs
reflected in this budget to work in that way to create
opportunities for people, also to address, of course, many of
the other challenges that are drivers of migration, including
corruption, including poor governance, including insecurity. In
many cases, we have to work around some of the governments or
individual leaders. We are doing that effectively with the
private sector, with NGOs, with civil society, with components
of governments that we can work effectively with. I think it
varies from country to country, but we are deeply engaged on
that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
The Chairman. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
first of all, thank you for your service to our country.
Let me just begin by bringing back in a discussion that
Senator Portman began and that you have shared. I think it has
been a pretty frank discussion regarding the need to have
additional energy production and the impact that that would
have on your ability to work with our allies in Europe. It
seems to me that not only does it impact the foreign policy,
but with regard to our domestic policy and with regard to our
economy, it would seem that the production of those products--
energy products here--fossil fuels, natural gas, and so forth--
from North America would make your job a lot easier with regard
to not only would it be good in terms of--it is such a large
part of the inflationary trends that we are seeing right now,
in terms of cost of supply chains and just basically the cost
of basic services and transportation here. The fact that, as
you stated, Mr. Putin receives significant dollars from energy,
and when you inflate the value of those commodities, that goes
to his bottom line and makes it easier for him to wage war.
Are you sensing that the Administration or the people that
you work with within the White House are recognizing the need
to increase that, not just for domestic purposes, but also
because of what is going on in Europe right now?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. In short, yes. As I mentioned,
Senator, just when it comes to making sure that we could try to
create some flexibility for Europeans to really start this move
away from dependence on Russian energy in the short term, as I
noted, we have doubled our LNG exports to Europe just in the
past 3 months from where they were a year ago. That is
significant. We are committed to adding to that to make sure
that there is some cushion as they engage in this process. It
has to be a process, though, because, as you know, this has
built up over many decades. Overall, European dependence on
Russian gas is about 40 percent, but in individual countries,
it is a lot higher than that. That is part of the challenge.
Second, we want to make sure that as we do this, we are
doing it in a way that does not create the effect that you just
cited, which is to actually inflate energy prices and line
Putin's pockets. That is one of the reasons the President did
this historic release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve that
will extend over 6 months. We got other countries to join in
doing that. At the same time, he has called, as you know, for
increased production in the United States. We are doing that.
The last thing, if I could quickly, is this: we also have
to do this in a way that does advance, in my judgment at least,
the transition over time to renewables because one of the
things that is true about renewables is you cannot weaponize
the sun, you cannot weaponize the wind. Both as a matter of
climate, but also as a matter of strategy, I think we have a
good reason to reinforce that effort, even as we are making
sure that there is sufficient energy on the market now and in
the near term for Europeans to really start this transition.
Senator Rounds. I think the all-of-the-above approach is a
very good approach.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Rounds. I do not think it should exclude those
consistent, conventional energy sources that we have got, and I
appreciate your comments on that. I also think the one thing
that is missing in this discussion is the fact that we have to
have a stable, long-term plan of not having those go up, or our
European allies will not trust us. If they think that our
policy is going to change in 6 months, they are probably not
going to be interested in having a short-term LNG proposal and
then find out that, well, we are going to change it again. I
think it has got to be consistent, and I think you are in
agreement with that.
Secretary Blinken. That is a very fair point, and part of
the reason we have this task force with the EU is precisely to
address that, to make sure that there is a long-term plan in
place, not just one that meets the immediate needs.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. I would like to change
subjects here for just a minute on something that has been very
important, and we have been trying to work with the State
Department on. There was a huge, very challenging time period
in which the Department was working on processing special
immigrant visas, specifically coming from Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, this process is excruciatingly slow, and Afghans
who risked their lives for our service members do remain in
grave danger. For one example, we have an applicant that I had
brought to your attention that received a chief of mission
approval the day before your September hearing, yet he was
stuck in Afghanistan until early March and just received his
visa last week. This outcome would not have been even possible
had it not been for his risky move to flee to a third country.
Yet he and his family still remain in a fourth country waiting
for travel orders, and the final resolution of an application
submitted in 2018. A second individual received a denial the
day of your hearing, but his appeal, which was submitted in
December, still has not been viewed by the State Department
office which adjudicates these requests.
Mr. Secretary, I and my staff have asked your people on
multiple occasions if the Department has the resources to
execute this mission, and the answer I have always received has
been ``yes.'' I just want to be specific. I am looking to be of
assistance in terms of making sure that the appropriate
resources are made available, and it seems to me that right
now, when we cannot get these completed in a timely fashion,
there has got to be a reason for it. If it is resources, we
need someone to say it is resources. If it is something else,
we need to know. I do not think we are talking about the issue
of just we need background checks. I think there is more to it.
Could you help us understand what the resources are that
would be needed to expedite appeals within, say, 30 days,
because right now, it does not seem to be working.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, let me first start just by
thanking you for your personal and sustained engagement on this
issue, on the SIVs, in general, and on specific cases, in
particular. It is greatly appreciated. I know it is especially
appreciated by the people on behalf of whom you have been
advocating. We want to continue to work closely with you, with
your staff, on this. Let me just say a couple of things about
this.
This committee knows very well the very laborious and
multi-step proposal that goes into the SIV Program that was
legislated and then regulated over many years. It involves six
different agencies, not just the State Department, that has
more than a dozen steps involved in it. Of course, it has been
made more complicated by the fact that we are not on the ground
in Afghanistan.
There are two things I want to focus on. First, the process
of getting chief of mission approval, that authority, that is
the most critical step because what we have found historically,
well back before leaving Afghanistan, was that of those who
applied for an SIV, about 40 percent did not ultimately get the
approval from the chief of mission because they did not qualify
in one way or another, sometimes, tragically, because the
documentation necessary and required, they could not produce.
We have worked very hard to expedite that process. We have cut
the processing time for chief of mission approval in half in
recent months. We are doing it much faster than we did when we
were actually in Afghanistan, but we are looking to see if we
can make it even faster, and we would like to work with you on
that.
Second, a big part of the challenge that we have is for
those who are in Afghanistan and actually have SIVs or are well
along in the process and have chief of mission approval, part
of the challenge is being able to make sure that they can leave
the country. We are working on that day-in, day-out to try to
encourage the Afghans to regularize transportation out so that
people can leave. We have a processing facility now, as you
know, in Doha where we have the capacity, once someone has
chief of mission approval, to process about 1,000 a month, and
that is there. It is active. We are working on it, but we need
the in-flow, if you will, to make that real.
We have dedicated increasing resources to this. I will go
back and triple check that I am confident that we actually have
the resources we need given the constraints of the program to
do this as efficiently as possible. I commit to you if, in my
judgment, we do not, we will come to you and ask for more
resources.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Thank
you, Mr. Secretary, for the work which you are doing and to
Secretary Austin, the President. I think it is first-class
work. Thank you.
Senator Booker, and Senator Kelly, and Senator Gillibrand,
and I visited the Polish-Ukrainian border at Rzeszow, and we
saw all the work the 82nd Airborne is doing to facilitate the
transfer of our assistance to the Ukrainians into that country,
and it is absolutely a first-class operation. We were in Krakow
as well, and we could see the humanitarian effort in place,
and, again, very impressive. I just think that, in general, we
should just roll out the red carpet and just say however many
Ukrainians want to come to our country, they should come here.
As a Congress, we should finance that resolve so that we help
the Ukrainians to ultimately defeat the Russians. I just wanted
to congratulate you on that.
I appreciate the commitment which the Biden administration
is making for our country to be a leader in vaccinating the
world, but we are falling far behind. The world has a goal of
70 percent vaccination by the fall of this year. That is not
happening, and, as we know, we are just going to be setting
ourselves up for a boomerang effect in terms of it coming back
to us. As the co-chair of the COVID-19 Global Vaccination
Caucus, I have been repeatedly calling for a significant
Federal investment in those efforts. We have called for
inclusion of a substantial global COVID-19 response funding and
any COVID-19 supplemental. That funding remains stalled.
Mr. Secretary, a recent Harvard study indicated that the
economic toll of COVID-19 so far is $16 trillion. We just
cannot afford to keep repeating history. Could you talk about
how important it is for the Congress to pass a global COVID
relief package so that the funding is there to put shots in the
arms of people around the world so that, once again, a variant
does not come back to haunt us in the United States?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I could not agree with you
more, and I appreciate your comments on this and leadership on
this as well as Senator Kaine's. Let me say a few things
quickly. First, substantively I am absolutely convinced this is
the necessary and right thing to do for the very reasons that
you say, which is that we know that as long as COVID is
somewhere, it could produce a variant that ultimately
undermines everything that we have done and even defeats the
vaccines that we have developed or the therapeutics that we put
in place. We have, I think, a very strong national interest and
incentive to make sure that we are doing everything we can to
put an end to this, not only in our own country, but around the
world. Second, what we seen is this. As Senator Kaine said,
this has been also a tremendous benefit to our foreign policy
and to our standing in the world. The fact that the President
has committed to donate 1.2 billion vaccines around the world,
and we are now over 500 million that have actually been
delivered, to do it primarily through COVAX to make sure that
it is done equitably, to do it with no strings attached in
stark contrast to other countries like China. That has inured
to our benefit and to our standing in palpable ways. I get this
virtually every place I go. It is good for our foreign policy
and our standing.
Here is the challenge that we have, and it goes to your
question. Right now, we have a relative abundance of actual
vaccines. The challenge that we have is, as you said, getting
shots into arms. There are in many places around the world,
nowhere more so than in Africa, real challenges in making sure
that there is cold storage, that there are distribution
networks, that there are healthcare workers, and other experts
who can administer the vaccines to deal basically with the last
mile. We also have real information or misinformation problems,
and that contributes to vaccine hesitancy, so we need to be
doing work on that.
Senator Markey. Is it critical that we pass funding?
Secretary Blinken. It is, in my judgment, absolutely
critical that we do this because if we do not, we will not have
the resources we need to see this through.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Yes, this disease, because of
global travel and trade, is just a flight away from our
country.
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Markey. The more that we build barriers further
away from us, the way we are trying to do with confronting the
Russians so that it does not go any further in terms of its
incursion into other countries, we have to do the same thing
with COVID. We are not doing it. We just cannot allow this
Congress to not fund a global explanation program.
Earlier, we heard my colleagues on the committee suggest
that we should walk away from the negotiating table with Iran.
Let us be clear. Plan B is really plain bad. That is what it
stands for. It means that Saudi Arabia's nuclear program will
accelerate. It means that Iran's nuclear facilities that are
above ground will go underground. It means our troops in the
region will face increased threats which could require sending
our brave men and women in the armed forces into another
conflagration in the Middle East. Secretary Blinken, you just
covered this before, but before Trump and Bolton blew up the
deal, how far was Iran towards acquiring enough material for a
nuclear weapon?
Secretary Blinken. A year or more.
Senator Markey. How far away is Iran today?
Secretary Blinken. By public records, it is a matter of
weeks.
Senator Markey. Based on experience, would kinetic or non-
kinetic attacks on Iran prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon?
Secretary Blinken. The judgment of our military over many
years is that the military could certainly set back the
program, but Iran would rebuild it, rebuild it probably even
more underground and rebuild it a lot faster than a nuclear
agreement would allow the Iranians to resume.
Senator Markey. Has not Mohammed bin Salman pledged that
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would acquire a nuclear weapon if
Iran did so?
Secretary Blinken. I think the Saudis and other countries
have made clear in one way or another that they would be likely
to pursue nuclear weapons in the event that Iran actually gets
one, yes.
Senator Markey. Did the Trump administration's campaign of
maximum pressure lead to an increase or decrease of Iran's
attacks on its neighbors in the region?
Secretary Blinken. We have seen what the causality is.
People can make their judgments, but as I mentioned earlier,
what we have seen is this: from 2012 to 2018 when we were
negotiating the agreement, then when we had the agreement and
it was in effect, there were very few attacks on our forces in
the region. After we pulled out of the agreement, designated
the IRGC, and killed Soleimani, we saw the attacks go up
dramatically. From 2019 to 2020, they went up 400 percent on
our personnel and our forces in the region.
Senator Markey. Thank you. It is clear, I think, to any
objective analysis that we just cannot listen to the same
voices who rejected a good deal in search of the impossible and
who preached brinksmanship over diplomacy. The Iran deal is not
perfect, but it is our best path to prevent Iran from acquiring
the ultimate weapon to back its coercion in the region, a
nuclear bomb. We are seeing right now the saber rattling in
Russia because they have a nuclear program. We have to avoid
that in Iran. The ripple effect would be catastrophic. We are
either going to live together, or we are going to die together.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Markey. We are either going to know each other. Are
we going to exterminate each other? We have to put a new regime
in place to make sure Iran does not get this bomb. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you,
Ranking Member Risch, and thank you, Secretary Blinken, for
taking the time with our committee today.
First, I would just like to note that Chairman Cardin is
the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on the State Department. I am sorry. He is the chairman. I am
the ranking member. We both sent you a letter last week
encouraging you to reopen diplomatic relations in Ukraine. I
want to thank you for taking the steps in that direction to do
that, and I appreciate your willingness to brief us as that
moves forward. I wanted to say thanks again for that
acknowledgement.
I would like to turn to the Indo-Pacific, if I might.
Recently, I led the first congressional delegation to Japan
since the pandemic began in early 2020, and I was honored to be
joined by Senator Benjamin Cardin and by Senator John Cornyn. I
want to first thank you, Ambassador Emanuel, and the entire
staff at the State Department for helping make that trip a
success. I also want to thank you personally for your efforts
to bring home my constituent, Greg Kelly, who was wrongly
detained there in Japan, and you were very helpful in making
that happen and it made a very big difference. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for that.
During our week in Japan, our Senate delegation met with
Prime Minister Kishida with his senior officials there. We met
with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. We met with a number of
Japanese parliamentarians and also with leaders of some of the
most formidable and innovative companies in the Japanese
private sector. In each of our meetings, we saw a great deal of
promise in terms of the United States' ability to further
strengthen our alliance with Japan, and they want an
increasingly special relationship with us, and we see that
possibility. Secretary Blinken, I think you would agree with me
that the U.S.-Japan alliance is one of our most important
strategic and special relationships.
Secretary Blinken. I would. Absolutely.
Senator Hagerty. Amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Japan
has shown leadership and proactively supported the
international pressure campaign against Vladimir Putin's war
machine. I also want to note that that Yoshimasa Hayashi, your
counterpart there as the foreign minister, became the first
Japanese foreign minister to attend a NATO ministerial when he
traveled to Brussels on April 7. As other international
conflicts and crises emerge, I believe the United States will
need to be even more aligned and move in lockstep with our
ally, Japan. There is a real appetite that I could sense there
to do that with us, and I would like to encourage you along
those lines to see that the United States can proactively
ensure that Japan, as the world's third-largest economy after
the U.S. and China, can be a pillar of peace and security. They
always would like a seat at the table in discussions on how we
can increase multilateral pressure. If we can include them in
as many critical issues as we can, I think it will go a long
way to deepen that relationship.
After Foreign Minister Hayashi broke new ground by
attending the NATO ministerial in April, would you support the
United States exploring opportunities for Japan and NATO to
have further high-level interactions and more formal
information sharing?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, absolutely, and I want to address
that just a little bit more, but first to say thank you. You
have been an extraordinary leader in building this
relationship, first as ambassador to Japan and now as a member
of this committee. I could not agree more on the strategic
imperative of this for us.
Senator Hagerty. Yes.
Secretary Blinken. This partnership is vital, and, as you
said, Japan has stood up in remarkable ways on the Ukraine
crisis. When it comes to NATO and Japan, we are doing a few
things. First, one of the things we have been advancing is
increasing NATO focus on working with partners that are not
part of NATO, including what we call the Asia-Pacific Four, and
that, of course, includes Japan. We just had a foreign
ministers meeting of NATO where we had the AP Four, including
my good friend and colleague, the foreign minister. At the NATO
summit that the President will attend the AP Four and Japan
will be there.
Senator Hagerty. Yes.
Secretary Blinken. The President is going to have an
opportunity, I think, in the coming weeks to visit. I think his
first actual visitor was the former Prime Minister Suga, and
this is something we are very focused on and really are eager
to continue to work with you on.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate it.
Secretary Blinken. By the way, I am very glad that Rahm
received you in the appropriate fashion when you were in----
Senator Hagerty. Oh, he absolutely did, and he and I agreed
that he would work hard to deliver Greg Kelly at the airport,
and I would be on the other side to receive him, and with your
help and the help of many others, that is exactly what
happened. I very, very much appreciate that. If I could turn
just a little bit more to the role that we are playing to
advance the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, I support
the Biden administration's efforts to build on that legacy,
including the AUKUS Agreement that really enhances trilateral
security between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. I was very glad to see that NSC coordinator for the
Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, and your assistant secretary for
East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Ambassador Dan Kritenbrink,
recently led an interagency delegation to the Solomon Islands
and met with both ruling party and opposition party members. I
appreciate those actions, and I sincerely hope that our efforts
can help the Solomon Islands reach the right conclusions, that
granting China a military base in the middle of the Pacific
Ocean would really undermine the security and stability of the
entire region.
During our congressional delegation visit to Japan, many of
our Japanese interlocutors, both the Japanese Government side
and the business side, expressed concerns about the broader
trends in the Indo-Pacific. Our bipartisan delegation sought to
instill confidence and optimism that the United States remains
committed to advancing the vision of a free and open Indo-
Pacific. Amid recent international shocks, I believe the United
States should really work to strengthen energy security in the
Indo-Pacific region, particularly among the Quad countries.
Like the rest of the world, the Quad countries seek
reliable access to cost-effective sources of energy. Energy
security is in inextricably linked with economic security and
national security. I worked on this a great deal in my previous
position when I served at Embassy Tokyo. I worked on the Japan-
U.S. strategic energy partnership. They call that JUSEP. The
idea there, the goal, to promote universal access to affordable
and reliable energy in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad should have a
similar mechanism, in my view, to strengthen energy security in
the Indo-Pacific, especially since the Quad includes Japan,
which is the world's third-largest economy, India, the world's
most populous democracy, and Australia, which is a significant
industry exporter. I would just like to ask you to consider
supporting the idea of the Quad standing up a working group on
energy security that would help ensure reliable access to cost-
effective energy sources, especially from like-minded partners.
Secretary Blinken. That is a really interesting idea,
Senator. I will take that back and then come back to you on it.
Senator Hagerty. I would be happy to work with your team
and share the experience that I had earlier, but I do think
that there is a real opportunity, but also a concern, right
now.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Hagerty. The Japanese reflected the concerns in a
very blunt term to me because I worked hard to get them
positioned, particularly with billions of dollars of
infrastructure investment, to bring in more LNG to that area.
They see a worldwide market. They see the challenges that
Europe is facing being dependent on Russia in LNG from there.
They are very concerned that there could be, in some respect, a
diversion of exports that would be harmful from them.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Hagerty. I think a focus and an intent focus there,
again, assets in the region that we could help with, but I
think it would be extremely helpful. Thank you.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary, thank
you for being here. Let us stay in the Pacific. I want to
follow up on the COFA negotiations. The U.S. agreements with
the freely-associated states expire soon. The current
agreements with the RMI and FSM expire in 2023, and the
agreement with Palau expires in 2024. GAO estimates that the
assistance that the United States provides constitutes about
one-third of FAS' annual budgets, making them heavily reliant
on U.S. support promised through the current compacts. As you
know, FAS countries and island nations are aligned with us, but
that is not a permanent situation. Senator Rubio and I wrote a
letter expressing some concern about the pace of negotiations,
especially since you are dealing with small nations, but they
are nations so, and you are dealing with your own Department of
Defense. Can you reassure me that we are either on track or
about to be on track for a compact renegotiation and
ratification, 2023 and 2024?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, in short, yes. This is
something that I have been focused on. I have met with the
leadership in a variety of ways, the Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Palau. I was in the region just a couple of months
ago. We have appointed a very experienced diplomat, Ambassador
Joseph Yun, as the negotiator for this. I know you know that.
We are very focused on the pieces that expire in FY23 and FY24.
I want to make sure that these get done. We need support from
Congress for this. There may be some appropriations, as you
know, that need to go along with this, but I am committed to
getting this done.
We have, I think, a longstanding obligation/responsibility.
It is also in our strategic interest to do this. I look forward
to working with you to make sure that we have what we need to
try to bring this to closure as rapidly as possible.
Senator Schatz. Thank you. Back to NATO. Article 6 of the
NATO treaty states in part that, ``For the purpose of Article
5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to
include an armed attack on the territory of the parties in
Europe or North America, on the Algerian Department of France,
on the Territory of Turkey or on the islands under the
jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area
north of the Tropic of Cancer.'' The 1949 treaty excludes
Hawaii. Now, if Hawaii were ever attacked, it is an attack on
the free world. I do not have any doubt that the entire free
world would rally to our defense, but this is no small problem.
Alaska is covered. All other 49 States are covered. Hawaii is
not covered because statehood came afterwards. What are we
going to do about that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Blinken. You are right about Article 6 of the
treaty. It does define the alliance area exactly as you
suggested. I think a few things. First, to emphasize the most
important part, any attack on the United States or its
territories, even if outside the geographic scope of Article 5,
would almost certainly, of course, garner our reaction, but
would almost certainly, in my judgement, draw allied reaction
to include via the consultation procedures that exist under
Article 4 of the treaty. I am very confident about that.
I think an effort to, for example, amend the treaty to
cover Hawaii and/or other U.S. territory would be unlikely to
gain consensus because we are not the only ally, as you know,
that has territory that is outside the geographic scope of
Article 6. This would open something of a Pandora's box that, I
think, would be very difficult to get a safe landing on because
so many other allies have territories that would then
potentially claim to want to be covered, so I am not sure that
we could get there. I would also refer you to our colleagues at
DoD to talk about military considerations raised by this
question.
The main thing I want to emphasize is I am very confident,
of course, not only about our own response, but also confident
about the response of allies and partners were something of
that nature to happen.
Senator Schatz. So am I, but I am not satisfied with your--
I understand the Pandora's box argument, and you are probably
right, but there has got be something in between leaving this
alone and endeavoring to change it in a failed way. Look, we
are the 50th State. We ought to be covered, and if we cannot
amend Article 6, then we got to do something here. Let us
explore----
Secretary Blinken. I am happy to continue the conversation
and see if there are ideas that make sense.
Senator Schatz. Thank you. During a March 2021 SFRC
hearing, I asked the Deputy Secretary of State about
integrating an emphasis on climate action throughout the
Department, and he replied that it is not just going to be
Secretary Kerry's team. Can you update me on how the Department
is fully integrating climate action throughout the
organization? I am specifically interested in the extent to
which we can depoliticize climate action. Climate adaptation
seems to be a space where we can all work together. I just do
not think American foreign policy and the State Department as
its instrument ought to be swinging wildly back and forth on
the question of whether or not the sea levels are rising, or
whether or not storms are becoming more frequent and severe,
and whether or not the United States should continue to lead in
this space. I am wondering what you are doing to
institutionalize climate action throughout the Department.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you. First, we thought that it was
vital not only to institutionalize, but to elevate, climate in
everything that we are doing. The reason that the President
asked former Secretary Kerry to take it on was to do exactly
that, to make sure that as we headed into an incredibly
challenging period, that we were doing everything possible to
reengage the United States in leading these efforts, and we did
through reengaging Paris, through the summit the President
held, through COP26 and the successful parts of that endeavor,
through sustained diplomacy that John Kerry has been leading.
To your point, we also wanted to make sure that this is
truly institutionalized throughout the Department, and we are
doing that in a number of ways. First, every regional bureau
has within it someone who is focused and expert on these issues
and is fully coordinated with the climate office that John
Kerry is leading to make sure that in all of our engagements
with allies, partners, and those who are not, the climate
issues are very much a part of the agenda, and that has been
institutionalized. Second, we have a bureau, OES, that, as a
general matter, is the locus of focus, if I can, on climate. We
have very strong leadership of that bureau in Monica Medina,
who has been partnered closely with John Kerry on a lot of
these efforts. That bureau and its work will continue well into
the future.
We are also making sure as well, as part of our training
and the efforts that we are putting into that, that climate
factors in and features in so that as officers, no matter where
they are serving, take on their responsibilities, this is part
of their thinking.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
welcome.
Secretary Blinken. Nice to see you, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Let us talk Iran. As you know, Iran is the
world's top state sponsor of terrorism, and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps is their premier terrorist
organization. As the State Department noted in 2019, ``Iran is
an outlaw regime that uses terrorism as a key tool of
statecraft, and the IRGC has engaged in terrorist activity or
terrorism since its inception 40 years ago.'' The IRGC's
support for terrorism ``is foundational and institutional.''
The IRGC has killed over 600 Americans in Iraq. They control
vast parts of the Iranian economy, and they use them for
financing terrorism.
Right now, the IRGC is actively trying to murder additional
Americans, including former Trump administration officials. We
know from public reports that the State Department spends $2
million every month protecting former officials, including
former Secretary of State Pompeo, and the Secret Service is
providing similar protection to protect former National
Security Advisor Bolton. Because of such activities, the Trump
administration rightly designated the IRGC as a foreign
terrorist organization, an FTO.
As you know, the FTO designation is the most powerful we
have. It includes a criminal prohibition on knowingly
supporting the IRGC up to life in prison. It imposes vast
immigration restrictions. It allows victims, including the Gold
Star families of those killed in Iran, to sue for civil damages
from such support. Just as importantly, it is a signal to our
allies in the Middle East and across the world that we will use
our most powerful tools to counter the threats that Iran poses
to them, including existential threats.
The Iranian regime knows all of this, of course, which is
why they have refused to reenter a nuclear deal unless the
Biden administration agrees to lift the FTO designation.
According to public reports, the negotiations have stalled over
this issue. To advance the talks, American negotiators and the
Biden administration officials have tried to find ways to
rationalize meeting Iran's demands. You, yourself, have
downplayed concerns over such a move by saying the IRGC would
remain designated under other weaker sanctions. Back in Vienna,
American negotiators have also reportedly asked Iranians to
make commitments to stop conducting terrorism in exchange for
removing the FTO, and, specifically, to stop trying to murder
former American officials. According to these reports, the
Iranians told you ``no.''
I have to admit it is flabbergasting that the Biden
administration would take such Iranian commitments at face
value, let alone consider dismantling terrorism sanctions. I
want to ask you is it true that American negotiators made
specific requests for a commitment that the IRGC will stop
trying to murder former American officials, and is it true that
they said no?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am not going to get into the
details of any discussions or negotiations in a public forum. I
am happy to come back and talk privately about that. Let me
address a few things that you have raised because I do think
that they are important.
First of all, I share your views on the IRGC and,
especially, a number of its component parts, notably the Quds
Force, which is primarily responsible for the egregious actions
that it has taken in terms of targeting Americans, and, as you
rightly say, continuing to do so. We very much share with that
view. I agree with you. We have over the course of this
Administration, of the sanctions we have issued, 86 of the 107
designations by this Administration have been against the IRGC
or its component parts, again, for the reasons you cite. None
of this is inconsistent with the nuclear agreement, whether it
was enforced or not enforced. There are myriad sanctions as you
know, as you have cited, against the IRGC in one way or
another, both the entity as a whole, its component parts,
individual members that will remain on the books, irrespective,
but there are a few other factors that are worth at least
considering, and I will come to the bottom line in a moment if
I can.
First, when the question of designating the IRGC as a whole
first came up the Bush administration many years ago----
Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, as you know, we have limited
time.
Secretary Blinken. Well, no, but it is important----
Senator Cruz. I am going to try to focus on the specific
question I asked. Let me start off with this. Is it true that
the IRGC is actively trying to murder former senior officials
of the United States?
Secretary Blinken. I am not sure what I can say in an open
setting, but let me say generically that there is an ongoing
threat against American officials, both present and past, and--
--
Senator Cruz. Is it true that the State Department is
spending roughly $2 million a month to protect those officials?
Secretary Blinken. --we are making sure and we will make
sure for as long as it takes that we are protecting our people,
present and former, if they are under threat.
Senator Cruz. I am assuming you would agree that attempting
to murder a Secretary of State or a former Secretary of State
is a pretty damn big deal.
Secretary Blinken. I would certainly agree with that, yes.
Senator Cruz. There have been multiple public reports that
we asked them to make the simple promise to not murder a former
Secretary of State, and they refused. There is nothing
classified about that. If they are actively refusing, saying,
no, we are going to keep trying to murder your former Secretary
of State, the idea that our negotiators are sitting in Vienna
saying, okay, that is great, so how many more billions can we
give you, that does not make any sense. I just want to know the
factual question. Did you ask them to stop trying to murder the
former Secretary of State, and did they sit there and tell you,
no, we are going to keep trying to murder him?
Secretary Blinken. Of course within the context of any
engagements that we have, directly or indirectly, with
Iranians, one of the strong messages we send to them is they
need to stop targeting our people, period, and here are the
facts, as I mentioned a few minutes ago.
Senator Cruz. Did they tell you no?
Secretary Blinken. Again, I am not going to characterize
what they said. They know what they would need to do to address
this problem, and that is pretty straightforward. We have seen
these attacks go up 400 percent from 2019 to 2020 after we got
out of the nuclear agreement, after we designated the IRGC,
after we killed Soleimani for whom no one is shedding any
tears. Those are the facts. We have to deal with the facts in
terms of what represents a threat to our people and how we can
most effectively----
Senator Cruz. Let me ask a final question just because my
time has expired on a topic you and I have talked a great deal
about, Nord Stream 2. We have finally gotten to sanctioning
Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream 1 continues to deliver an enormous
amount of natural gas. Stopping Nord Stream 1 would benefit our
Ukraine allies significantly. What are we doing to urge Europe
to stop taking deliveries on Nord Stream 1, which, in turn,
would benefit Ukraine substantially?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, we are working across the board
to help Europeans move away from dependency on Russian oil and,
especially, on Russian gas, including gas that is coming
through Nord Stream 1. I am glad we got to where we got on Nord
Stream 2. I think we went about it the right way. We did it in
a way that kept the Germans fully allied with us. They made
that decision, as you know, like that after the Russian
invasion. That has been very, very meaningful, and we are
looking across the board at steps that we can take to support
them as they continue to move away from a reliance on Russian
gas wherever it is coming from, including the Nord Stream 1
population.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here
today. I am going to touch on a number of issues very quickly.
I will submit follow-up questions, and then I want to turn to
in terms of your thoughts, address transnational repression.
First on Burma, thank you for the genocide determination. I
know that that was a long, lengthy, complicated process, but
the State Department did reach a conclusion. I think it is
incredibly important for our position in the world that when
genocide occurs, that we call it out clearly and effectively.
Otherwise, the other times that we criticize human rights, it
is ineffective. I will follow-up in questions regarding some of
the budgeted funds for Burma. I want to make sure they are
going to support civilian groups and in no way assists the
government of that country.
Second, turning to Honduras. Thank you for the strategic
dialogue that was begun yesterday and will continue in regards
how to support their anti-corruption agenda and, in general,
how to support the resetting of that relationship. Congress
sent a strong message by zeroing out the foreign military
financial assistance to the Northern Triangle countries and
making 60 percent of the rest contingent upon completion,
implementation of an anti-corruption agenda. If we do not
tackle the corruption successfully there, we will not
successfully address any of the issues we are trying to help
with.
Third, Uyghur Force Labor Protection Act, I was very
pleased to partner with my colleague from Florida, Senator
Marco Rubio, to do that. I know the Administration is asking
for more funds to implement it, support that. Thank you very
much. Ethiopia, we pressed hard to get the truckloads of food
into Tigray Province. Thank you for doing that. Finally, there
were three successful convoys in April, but they amount to 200
truckloads. We are told there needs to be 2,000 per month, that
there are some 700,000 families in famine-like condition.
Please keep pressing hard. They need to get those convoys
through basically every couple days in order to alleviate that
famine.
Philippines. New election is coming up. I am pleased that
we have not supported the Philippine National Police, and there
have been some estimated 20,000 extrajudicial killings, really
violating human rights in a massive way. We have a chance to
reset that relationship with the upcoming election. I know you
are aware of that. I know your team is working to prepare for
that. Thank you. I echo my colleagues' statements of support
for your actions on Ukraine. I will follow up in terms of our
help for very poor countries affected by the increased cost of
wheat and fertilizer. There will be profound reverberations.
Then I will follow up a lot on climate issues.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Merkley. Complicated world. Many things to touch
on, but I wanted to take your time today on a topic that I did
not hear addressed, and that is transnational repression. We
are seeing more and more countries engaged in retaliation for
both what companies do outside of their borders, what countries
do, what individuals do, basically compromising freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly. Those nations include China,
and Turkey, and Russia, and Saudi Arabia, and Rwanda, and a
couple dozen more at a lower scale. It is a growing strategy of
authoritarian-leading countries to not just new technologies,
surveillance technology for repression at home, but to do
repression abroad.
The worst country in this regard is China, and think about
kind of this long list of things that they have done. They took
up economic measures against Mongolia for hosting the Dalai
Lama; South Korea for deploying U.S. missile defense; Canada
for Huawei's arrest--the arrest of the Huawei CFO; to Sweden
for giving a human rights prize to a Swedish dissident under
detention in China; Taiwan for refusing to acknowledge that it
is part of China; United Kingdom for supporting pro-democracy
protestors; Australia for calling for an independent inquiry
into the origins of COVID; Lithuania for establishing a
Taiwanese representative office in its capital. That list goes
on.
Then in terms of individuals, the China Commission held a
hearing, and we heard from folks from Hong Kong, from Tibet,
from Shenyang Province talk about the impact on their families,
being impacted. Just to give you one example, there is a Uyghur
activist who had encouraged the development of mother tongue
schools. His name is Abduweli Ayup, and initially there was
some significant support for this concept, and then China
evolved its policy and said we don't want these native language
schools. We want to force everyone into, if you will, the major
Chinese dialect, and he had to flee to Norway. His in-laws were
threatened. They were pressured to bring their daughter home,
his niece home, back to China where she was detained, and she
died in detention. The parents were threatened with
imprisonment if they said anything to the world about her
death. I just was amazed at his courage to continue to speak
out against repression with his family being threatened. It is
an incredibly effective tool.
We see China undertaking these massive strategies both with
trade policy and with deliberate strategies targeting
dissidents abroad and family members at home. Huge threat to
the vision of democracy and freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly. Big issue for the State Department to undertake.
Could you expand on your efforts?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator. First of all, let me
say I appreciate the comments you made briefly about Burma,
about Honduras, about Ethiopia, about the Uyghurs, and also
about food security, all things that we look forward to coming
back to you with and on because all are very important, very
much a focus of what we are doing. I very much share your
concern about the growing practice of using tools of
transnational repression to attack those, in one way or
another, who are speaking up, speaking out on behalf of human
rights, on behalf of democracy, on behalf of basic freedoms.
We have put in place a number of measures to try to address
this problem. You will recall that with regard to Saudi Arabia,
for example, the so-called Khashoggi ban specifically goes not
just with regard to Saudi Arabia, but around the world. It goes
at countries that engage in this practice, to include visa
bans, to include sanctions, so that if they are trying to use
tools of transnational repression, we have means to go at them.
More broadly, we are seeing this, as you rightly cited, being
used in different ways in different places. This is very much a
part of the conversation that we are having with other
likeminded countries who share the concern, and we are looking
at tools that we can put into place to push back effectively
against this.
You cited the example of Lithuania and China using coercion
with Lithuania. I think we have supported them along with other
countries in the European Union effectively to help them
resist. We had a Summit for Democracy, as you know, a few
months ago. Part of that was doing exactly what you suggest,
which is developing tools for pushing back against this kind of
coercion and providing support to those who may be on the
receiving end of it. I am happy to share with you some of the
specific initiatives that we are working on with other
countries to try to, in effect, arm ourselves and others
against this practice.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
welcome back from the Ukraine. You have obviously dealt with
issues relating to energy. You have heard a lot from the
members of the Republican side today, energy--the way Russia
uses energy as a weapon and the impact it has brought to
Ukraine. Senator Rounds asked a question on energy, and you
stated that we need to accelerate transition to renewables, and
you said you cannot weaponize the sun, you cannot weaponize the
wind, but you also cannot run a modern economy on sunshine and
whether it is a windy day or not. I would say from the first
days in this Administration, the Biden administration has
failed to prioritize energy security, which I have always said
is part of our national security.
Now, under your leadership, the State Department is looking
to cut deals with dictators in order to access more energy
resources. The State Department is in negotiations to remove
sanctions on Iran's energy sector as part of the Iran nuclear
deal. The State Department officials have traveled Venezuela to
meet with Maduro to discuss removing sanctions to access
additional crude oil. You personally called on OPEC Plus to
increase production to ``stabilize global energy markets'' to
make sure that there remains an abundant supply of energy
around the world. Your State Department then went to Qatar and
other foreign countries to ask them to export more liquefied
natural gas to Europe. Now, all this happening at the same time
that the Administration that you serve on has made it harder to
produce American energy, and I heard about it again this week
back home in Wyoming.
To me, energy security is critically important. Our
adversaries would love to see us even more dependent upon them
to meet our own energy needs at home in America. I think we
should not be removing energy sanctions on brutal dictators. It
is unacceptable to bankroll the terrorist activities of Iran.
It is a mistake to go to Venezuela and ask for more energy, and
I think it is dangerous to rely on Russia for energy
resources--oil, gas, coal, and uranium. I think we need to
increase production of American energy resources. Our Nation
has plenty of energy to power our Nation and to provide our
allies and friends with a stable energy supply.
Could you just explain why the Administration is more
focused on buying energy from our enemies than finding ways to
increase American energy exports and production here?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator. A few things. First,
we are focused primarily in the near term in making sure that
there are abundant supplies of energy on world markets to our
benefit, to the benefit of American consumers so that prices
are held in check, also to help Europeans to make this
transition, especially in the midst of the Russian aggression
against Ukraine. We want to make sure that we are doing that in
a way, as I said, that does not spike prices and line President
Putin's pockets. That makes, I think, good sense.
We have taken a number of steps, as I mentioned, to support
this effort, including doubling our LNG exports to Europe just
in the last few months. The President has called as well for
increased domestic production. As you know well, there are
thousands of licenses that have not been used that exist, and
we will see if production increases as a result. As it comes to
renewables, we have been very clear all along that this is a
process and a transition. It is not flipping a light switch,
and so we have to have abundant sources of energy of various
kinds going forward even as we make the transition. There are
tremendous opportunities over time in this transition,
particularly when it comes to American technology, in leading
this effort and having vast new markets, but it is a process.
It is a transition, and we need to make sure that we have
abundant supplies of energy on the market.
When it comes to other countries, first of all, with regard
to Venezuela, the visit to Venezuela was made with the
objective of getting released Americans who are being unjustly
detained, and, in fact, we were able to bring home two of those
Americans as well as to press the Venezuelans to reengage in
talks with the united opposition on moving back to free
elections and democracy. That was the focus of the visit. With
regard to Iran, the purpose of the negotiations with Iran is to
see if we can get the Iranians back into compliance with the
Iranian Nuclear Agreement, which has clear benefits to the
United States and making it much more difficult for Iran to get
fissile material for a nuclear weapon. That is the purpose of
that engagement. The purpose is not to get more Iranian oil on
the markets.
Senator Barrasso. Let me move to the crisis at the Southern
border. Last month, 220,000 illegal immigrants apprehended at
the U.S.-Mexico border, 2021, after President Biden was sworn
into office, 1.9 million apprehensions. Currently on pace for 2
million this year. President Biden tasked the Vice President
with addressing the crisis at the Southern border. The
President is talking about removing Article 42 because
apparently COVID is behind us, although since you started
testifying this morning, there has been news reports that
Senator Wyden, Senator Murphy from this committee, and the Vice
President are all right now with COVID.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Barrasso. During the Vice President's visit to
Guatemala last year, Vice President Kamala Harris sent a
message to illegal immigrants attempting to enter the United
States. She said, ``I want to be clear to folks in this region
who are thinking about making this dangerous trek to the United
States-Mexico border. Do not come. Do not come.'' She went on
to say, I believe, if you come to the border, you will be
turned back. Well, do you agree with those statements by the
Vice President that if you come, you will be turned back?
Secretary Blinken. I would agree. If people come to the
border and cannot show a legal basis for coming into the United
States under asylum or other rules, they will be removed. That
is the policy. Let me just say when it comes to Title 42, as
you know, Senator, this is a CDC authority. It is not
immigration policy. The CDC will make its judgment. They made a
judgment to terminate the Title 42 next month, but if that
happens, as I said, what will happen as a practical matter, if
people come to the border and try to get in without the
necessary legal basis to do so, they will be sent away.
Senator Barrasso. That is not happening, and it is not
going to happen, and that is how you go from more illegal
immigrants coming into the country in the first 14 months of
President Biden in office than over the previous 4 years with
President Trump in the White House. Now we are at a point where
we are facing a crisis that the Administration appears to be
sending a different message with this revoking Title 42. I
think it is an important border control tool. It is a critical
border control tool. As you mentioned, it is a public health--
to protect the public. It is going to result--what we are going
to see, I think, is a massive surge. The head of Homeland
Security from this Administration said they are not prepared.
The head of the Homeland Security from President Obama's term
said we are not prepared to handle what is coming this way.
Elizabeth Warren explained on CNN this weekend, and, Mr.
Chairman, this will be my final question. She said, ``The Biden
administration is putting plans in place to deal with people
who are asking for amnesty and relief at the border.'' Would
you please describe the plans that the Biden administration is
putting in place, that Senator Warren alluded to, to deal with
this surge of migrants attempting to enter our country
illegally?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I would refer you to DHS, which
is responsible for the border and for those plans. The focus
that I am bringing to this is making sure that, to the best of
our ability, we are getting countries throughout our
hemisphere, where we have an unprecedented situation. We have
not only migrants from the Northern Triangle. We have, as you
know, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, and then other
countries that have had populations from some of these
countries who are also seeing them move north. What is vital
from the perspective of the State Department is to build a
sense of shared responsibility for dealing with this. That is
exactly what we have been doing.
I just got back from Panama where we had the foreign
ministers from virtually of the all concerned countries in
place to take practical steps to deal with this. For example,
we have bilateral arrangements now with Costa Rica and Panama,
and we are working on more, where countries will take steps,
for example, to put in place transit visas so that people
cannot go through their countries to try to come to the United
States, to do repatriations themselves, to treat people
humanely, to apply protections, to grant asylum themselves as
opposed to having people come to the United States to seek it.
All of these things are practical steps that we are working on
and putting into effect as the State Department to help deal
with what is an unprecedented situation. In addition, there is
going to be a Summit of the Americas, as I mentioned earlier,
led by President Biden in a couple of months, where this will
be a major topic of issue.
Look, I would, again, refer you to DHS. We obviously have
over many years challenges in effectively, humanely, and
efficiently processing those who come to our country and make
claims of asylum. We need more resources to do that
effectively, efficiently so that their cases can be adjudicated
very quickly, and if they do not have a legal basis for being
here, they are returned.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much. It is good to see you,
Mr. Secretary. Thank you for taking so much time to endure all
of our questioning and being so responsive.
I just want to jump right in. I am just back from a long 8
days overseas going from Poland all the way to Nepal and India.
One thing, when I was in Germany, which was our last stop, we
just really pressed both German officials we met with as well
our State Department folks about, as we all are focused
obviously on Ukraine, not losing focus on China's influence in
the region. Germany is obviously now after Brexit the center of
economic power in the EU. Our relationship with them is
critical. I was stunned as I probed our officials there about
how China's influence is just growing in their country, and we
are not, I do not believe, just allocating the necessary
resources to really counter Chinese influence in Europe.
I know you are doing a lot of things already. Your budget
proposal includes funding for new initiatives to counter
Chinese influence globally, such as increasing the number of
China watchers, but I want to make sure that this includes
adequate funding for countering China in Europe. I was alarmed
when I started asking questions to find out, for example, that
China's COSCO Shipping has struck a deal to take a 35 percent
stake in Hamburg's Tollerort Terminal, one of Germany's largest
ports. When I started asking our ambassador there, she was
telling me we have actually plans to sell American property
there, and none of them could tell me anything when I started
probing them with questions, other than the fact that they all
think it would be a terrible mistake to sell that property
there because it sends the exact wrong message in Hamburg, that
the Chinese are buying everything up they can, and we are
selling property that might just be bought by the Chinese. When
I pressed even further, and they could not escape my
questioning, they had to admit to me that they are threadbare
there in our consulates in the second- and third-largest
cities, and agreed with me that when it comes to countering
China, one of the most important economic powers, we are not
keeping up. In fact, we are losing ground.
The first thing I just want to offer you an opportunity is,
why does your budget not reflect the importance of adding
investment in Germany? Why are we selling critical property
there? That makes no sense whatsoever.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, and I will look into the
specifics that you mentioned just to make sure that I fully
understand.
Senator Booker. Could you get back to me in writing or call
me, one of the two?
Secretary Blinken. I am happy to. Sure. No, happy to do
that.
We are focused on this relentlessly, including in Europe,
both at the level of the European Union and with individual
countries. We have done a number of things to make sure that we
not only are focused on it, but we are doing something about
it. We established a dialogue with the European Union on China
and all of the aspects of its engagement in Europe that the
Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, just came back from.
One of the things that it is focused on is Chinese investment
that poses potentially a strategic challenge or threat to us.
We have been going across the continent and urging
countries to adopt investment screening tools. I have done that
personally. It is in virtually all of my engagements with
countries that do not have them, for the purposes of making
sure that they can identify and, as necessary, do something
about potential investments by China that could pose a security
threat. The purpose is not to cut off trade or investment from
or with China. That is not the issue. The issue is focusing in
on specific areas of strategic importance, including ports as
well as telecommunications and other things, that we have eyes
on it, and that we or they have the tools to do something about
it.
Senator Booker. So please----
Secretary Blinken. Third, we also reorganized the
Department to have a whole-of-enterprise focus on China, again
led by the deputy secretary. Part of our instruction to all of
our embassies around the world, including in Europe, is to
focus on and report on the kinds of potential investment----
Senator Booker. I am grateful for that. I will probably
have a conversation with the deputy secretary as well.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Booker. It is just tough when I talk to the staff
over there face-to-face that they do not seem to have the
resources they need to do the work that you are talking about.
As I said to them, as Secretary Mattis once said, if you cut my
State Department, buy me more bullets. Well clearly, it is a
pivotal country that we just watched a decade or two of
terrible policy with the Russians, with increased engagement, I
do not want to see the same story repeated with China. Talking
to my peers in that country, they really needed to hear from us
and see from us that this was a priority for us, that we were
going to be holding them to account, and that we were not
retracting from Germany, but actually upping our investments
across the board. I understand that you value this. I have only
got a minute and 55 seconds.
Secretary Blinken. I would love to pursue this with you
because we have expanded the regional China Officer Program so
that in each of our regional bureaus, we have people who are
expert in this, who expanding our capacity to engage on
economic issues. This is part of my modernization agenda, in
part, to be able to do----
Senator Booker. I appreciate that. Real quick. I see this
every time I travel abroad, the lack of diversity in our State
Department. It does not reflect America.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Booker. It is stunning to me at times where I sit
in rooms with no diversity whatsoever in a large group of a
State team with me. You have increased the funding for the paid
internship programs. I think that is important.
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Booker. There are $10 million in addition to the $8
million in fiscal year 2022. Just it is something that is a
priority to me and other members of this committee. I just
really hope that is enough, and I hope we do more because it is
disappointing to me whenever I come back from traveling abroad.
Then when I talk to people of color that do serve in our
embassies, they sort of feel like I do, and Warnock, and
perhaps Tim Scott probably does here in the Senate, like, wow,
we need more diversity. I am hoping that--I know that is a
priority for you from private conversations. I am just hoping
we can do something about it.
My last point. I am so concerned about food security
globally. This, to me, is stunning that we are--we do not
understand the connection, besides a moral urgency, everywhere
from Yemen, to Afghanistan, to the Horn of Africa, the moral
urgency to do something about this, how critical it is for
global security to meet this food crisis because, if not, as we
have learned and I talked with obviously Mr. Beasley from the
World Food Programme, just to calculate for me that dollars
invested in food security now save us hundreds of dollars in
terms of the instability that is created when we do not meet
these crises.
I am hoping that the Biden administration in their next
Ukraine package, because these are related issues, is asking
for the resources necessary to meet this crisis. We know that
there is probably about a $10 billion urgent need for resources
to meet the food crisis alone, and I would like you just to
conclude by maybe giving me, which I know does reflect my sense
of urgency, of the gravity of this crisis and the need for us
to put in $5-7 billion of American resources, especially to
trigger other of our allies to join us in trying to meet this
crisis, further exacerbated by the crisis in Ukraine.
Secretary Blinken. Let me--very quickly, I fully share that
concern. This is an area of intense focus for us. We are going
to use our presidency of the U.N. Security Council next month
to focus on food security. We will be looking to work with
Congress to provide $11 billion over 5 years for programs like
Feed the Future. We are working right now with countries around
the world to get them to increase the donations they are making
and resources they are giving to the World Food Programme, to
the Food and Agriculture Organization.
We are pressing on countries that have large stockpiles of
food to make those available, not to put in place export
restrictions. We are--the President has made--created
incentives for fertilizer production in the United States to
make sure that more of that is getting on the market because as
you know, that goes to making sure that next year's crops and
the years after are abundant and prices do not further go up.
We have given an additional--more than $100 million just
recently to--from the Humanitarian Assistance Fund to Ethiopia,
to Kenya, to Somalia to deal with their acute problems.
I could not agree with you more, and we are intensely
focused on it.
Senator Booker. Mr. Secretary, I am sure this was said, but
I want to thank you for your courageous trip you just took,
coming from a meeting with Ukrainians when I was in Poland.
Your extraordinary leadership, in my opinion, has been a light
during this crisis, and I want to thank you for that and the
entire State Department staff and what they are doing under
difficult circumstances.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr.
Secretary.
Can you describe to me what your and what the
Administration's definition of, is a ``win'' in Ukraine?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, on the terms that President
Putin himself set, Ukraine has already succeeded and Russia has
failed. The terms that Putin set was to eliminate the
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to subsume it back
into Russia. I can state with confidence that that has failed
and that will fail. I do not see a scenario by which that
happens. As we are speaking, the Ukrainians are doing an
extraordinary job, thanks to their courage, but also because of
the support that we have led in providing in pushing back the
Russians. They have done that from Kyiv, and Western Ukraine,
and Northern Ukraine.
They are now engaged, as you know, in a ferocious battle in
the East and South. We are doing everything we can to make sure
that they have the means to continue to do that. Ultimately, it
will be up to them, the Ukrainians, as a sovereign, independent
country, how they want to resolve this, and we will see if
President Putin ever gets to the point of being willing to
engage in any meaningful negotiation about that. That will be
up to the Ukrainians. They will have our full support as they
do now.
Senator Johnson. You are not really willing to lay out what
the Administration's view of what the end state ought to be to
consider it a win?
Secretary Blinken. The end state should be determined by
the Ukrainians as a sovereign, independent country. We will
back that. We will continue to back that, however they choose
to do it.
Senator Johnson. When you were with President Zelensky, did
he talk to you about what he considered his objectives are, and
I would say his objectives would be probably the definition of
what he would consider a win.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I do not want to put words in
his mouth. I think what it would be fair and safe to say is
that his objective would be to push the Russians out of the
territory that they are trying to occupy in Eastern Ukraine.
Also, let me add to this because I think it is important, to
try to make sure that when that is accomplished, Russia is not
in a position to repeat this exercise next month, next year, or
in 5 years. That goes to making sure that Ukraine has the
effective capacity to deter and defend itself, and it also goes
to something that Secretary Austin said yesterday, was also
making sure in various ways that Russia does not have the
effective means to do this again.
Senator Johnson. Putting your two answers together,
President Zelensky would view his objective is to push Russia
out, certainly out of Eastern Ukraine, and you said the
Administration will support President Zelensky in his
objectives. Are you willing to state that that is the U.S.
objective, as well? That that aligns with President Zelensky
that we will provide the support? Our goal is for them to win,
according to the definition of the Ukrainians and President
Zelensky. We will support them in their efforts to win in
Ukraine, which means pushing Russia out of at least Eastern
Ukraine?
Secretary Blinken. If that is how the Ukrainians continue--
let me just say again, I do not want to put words in his mouth,
but if that is how they define their objectives as a sovereign,
democratic, independent country, that is what we will support.
I come back to my initial proposition, which was that on
Putin's own terms, which was trying to subjugate Ukraine fully
to Russia and eliminate its sovereignty and independence, that
has already failed.
Senator Johnson. I understand. Now it appears that Putin's
goal is establishing a land bridge at least between Eastern
Ukraine to Crimea.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Johnson. Is that a very--are you willing to state
that is definitely the U.S. objective, our NATO partners'
objective, to deny him that land bridge?
Secretary Blinken. Our objective is to make sure that the
Ukrainians have the means to repel and deal with this Russian
aggression wherever it is taking place in Ukraine, including in
Southern Ukraine, and that is exactly what we are doing.
Senator Johnson. Again, I was at a subcommittee
investigation hearing on the way, we still have not addressed
military housing, so I missed some of the testimony, so maybe
you already covered this, but are we going to provide them the
types of weaponry they need, recognizing that what worked when
Kyiv was surrounded, and now it is flatter terrain, in some
cases almost trench warfare, are we committed to providing the
type of weaponry that President Zelensky was asking for?
Secretary Blinken. In short, yes, and the point you make is
an important one. The nature of the battle has changed from
what was necessary for Western Ukraine and Kyiv to where things
are now. We spent 3 hours with President Zelensky, with the
Secretary of Defense. A big focus of that conversation was what
it is that Ukraine needs to deal with the current state of the
Russian aggression. The Secretary of Defense, as we speak, is
actually in Germany with the ministers of defense from about 40
countries focused on making sure that we are all providing to
Ukraine what it needs to deal with this aggression.
Senator Johnson. To what extent are we aware that China is
helping Russia in their aggression against Ukraine? Is the
Russian--do we know if they are using Chinese drones?
Secretary Blinken. We are very focused on this in a number
of ways. President Biden made directly clear to President Xi
Jinping that it would not be in China's interest to materially
support Russia in this aggression or, for that matter, to
undermine sanctions. This is something we are looking at very,
very carefully. I think you are seeing that China is having to
deal with the significant reputational risk that it is already
incurring by being seen as, in the most charitable
interpretation, on the fence and, more practically, supportive
of Russia. We can in a different session get into more detail,
but for now, we are not seeing significant support by China for
Russia's military actions.
Senator Johnson. Finally, in the remaining seconds I have,
I have been attempting to get from the State Department a
report that the State Department conducted on an inspection
from the Wuhan Lab. I think we understand that the overall
thrust of that report is it was not a lab that had the type of
safety standards that we would have expected. I am somewhat
baffled that is a report that I am simply not able to get my
hands on. This report came from--it is April 19, 2018. The
cable describing it was January 19 of 2018. Is that something
you will commit to me today to turn over to my committee?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I will look back into that. My
recollection is this. There was a program that ended in 2019.
There was no funding of that program since, and I think any--
there was a report that may have been done by an outside
contractor that, I think, was seen as problematic in its
methodology. In any event, I will follow up. I do not know the
status of that, but we will come back to you with it.
Senator Johnson. Okay. I would appreciate that, and I will
expect that response. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Mr. Secretary, for your testimony this morning and for your
trip to Ukraine. I think it was something that the entire world
watched with great appreciation.
I really want to start this afternoon with the Western
Balkans because I think Senator Murphy mentioned that he, and
I, and Senator Tillis traveled through Serbia, Kosovo, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina last week. I think it is fair to say that if
Putin has stalled in Ukraine, he may look elsewhere to sow
chaos and that his fingerprints of malign influence could be
found throughout the Western Balkans. I am particularly
concerned about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has
been plagued by corruption, a lack of leadership, and a
tripartite presidency that is at war with itself, but there is
also a very troubling security outlook there. We had a chance
to meet with representatives from the EUFOR and NATO mission
there, the European Union Force and BIH, and everyone we talked
to indicated a growing concern about the potential for Russia
to play games with reauthorization of the EUFOR Force when it
comes up this fall. It does not appear that there is any Plan B
for what to do about that. We raised this concern with our
ambassador. Obviously, we heard from a number of people, and we
raised it when we were at NATO headquarters in Brussels as
well.
Can you tell me whether we have a plan in place to maintain
a peacekeeping presence?
Secretary Blinken. First, let me just say thank you for
your engagement and for your leadership on these issues, not
only your recent trip, but just across the board. I remember
well from my days working for this committee----
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Secretary Blinken. --Senator Voinovich was the sort of flag
bearer and really appreciate the fact that you have sort of
taken the flag on the Western Balkans, and it remains very
important.
Let me say two things very quickly. First, I think,
generally speaking, the situation with the Russian aggression
against Ukraine only underscores the broader urgency of
integration for all of these countries into European
structures, something that, in a variety of ways, we are
continuing to encourage, work on, support. We have a number of
programs that try to help them advance their candidacies and
qualifications and meeting criteria for these things that I
know that you know very well. That is just as a general
proposition. Diplomatically, we have been engaged in every
aspect of this, whether it is the relationship between Kosovo
and Serbia, whether it is helping get North Macedonia and as
well as Albania across the line in the direction of the EU.
Finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where I very much share all of the
concerns that you have cited.
When it comes to the Force, I would say two things. First,
I very much agree with you that some kind of international
force with an adequate mandate is essential to trying to
maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. What I can tell you about where we are is this is
a work in progress we are--because of the concerns that you
have raised about the mandate and whether it will be blocked,
in effect, and not continued. We are engaged with a variety of
stakeholders in this on contingency planning in the event that
the Security Council is not in a place where it renews the
mandate or it expires, which is, I think, in November. We are
trying to make sure that we have something to back this up if
that happens. Very happy to work with you on that and share
ideas on how we can do that.
Senator Shaheen. I would very much appreciate that, and we
were able to speak with Deputy Secretary Donfried, who is in
the Balkans this week I know and share with her what we had
heard and our concerns about what is happening there. I look
forward to that because I--you mentioned Senator Voinovich. I
first traveled with him to the Western Balkans in 2010. I think
it is fair to say that in each of the countries we visited, I
was more concerned about the political situation today than I
was in 2010.
We need to pay attention, and I know that there are people
within the Department who are trying to do that. I want to go
now to the Office of Global Women's Issues because I was
pleased to see that the budget increased funding for that
office, which is long overdue. I wonder if you could talk a
little bit about why you think this is important and really the
gender lens with which we should be looking at foreign policy
in many ways.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, and, again, thank you as well
for your ongoing leadership on this. I think the budget request
is substantial and by design. We are looking overall for about
$2.6 billion to try to do a number of things to advance gender
equality, to prevent and respond, as necessary, to gender-based
violence, and to promote women peace and security. Simply put,
all of these things are not only, in my judgment, the right
thing to do, they are also the necessary thing to do if we are
going to have societies that are making the most of their
potential with the full inclusion of women across the board--
economically, politically, et cetera.
It is necessary as well in terms of, I think, effectively
dealing with conflict and making sure that women's voices and
women's leadership is engaged to both prevent and deal with
that. We know the track record when that happens is much better
than when it does not, and because there are significant and
severe threats, some of which have been accentuated by COVID-19
where we know that vulnerabilities, for a variety of reasons,
have increased, not decreased, in recent years. We have a
number of things that we are trying to do that are reflected in
the budget and in our programs.
With regard to gender-based violence, there are a series of
programs that would be funded by this request to offer support,
to offer services, to use our foreign assistance as well as our
diplomatic action, again, to prevent and to deal with, as
necessary. One of the critical aspects of this that I know you
know very well and that you have spoken about is, for example,
making sure that we have, in refugee situations, a gender-based
approach to making sure that there is safe access to food,
water, medicine, sanitation, hygiene, and that these are
factored in not only into our programs, but into the work that
we are doing with the organizations that provide these
services, and the budget and our programs reflect that. We also
are very focused, again, on women peace and security and
working to support the participation, the leadership, the
empowerment of women in decisionmaking on peace and security
issues. This is very much a part of our diplomacy, again,
because we know that it produces better outcomes.
We are pushing with diplomacy, with public diplomacy,
amplifying voices of local women, women-led organizations. All
of these things have programs and the programs, of course, have
a price tag attached to them.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I am out of
time, but I hope we are keeping the women and girls of
Afghanistan----
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. --included in that equation as well. Thank
you very much.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Young.
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. Good to see you,
Secretary.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
Senator Young. As a former staff member to this committee,
I know you agree that robust oversight of the workings of the
Department is incredibly important. With that understanding, I
have been disappointed in the Department and the
Administration's communication with and transparency to
Congress as it relates to the negotiations with Iran. Any sort
of deal, so to speak, that might be cut with the Government of
Iran that inadequately curbs Iran's appetite to develop nuclear
weapons, to continue to carry out malign activities within the
region and beyond, will not be in American interests, that of
our allies, or, I believe, of the Iranian people themselves. I
was encouraged earlier that you gave a commitment to the
chairman to work with the committee on an open hearing at some
point in this work period to discuss negotiations. I would just
build on that and ask you, sir, if you commit to making Special
Envoy Malley, our chief negotiator, available to appear before
this committee before an agreement is announced and agreed to.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, thank you, and, look, I want to
make sure that we are doing exactly as you say, which is to be
communicating effectively and in as real a time as possible on
this issue and, for that matter, on virtually every other
issue. I know that Special Envoy Malley has been engaged in,
one way or another, with members of this committee and Congress
throughout the course of these negotiations as well as, of
course, with allies and partners. I want to make sure that that
continues to happen, so we will look for an opportunity to make
sure that people are brought as up-to-date as we possibly can,
including by him or other members of his team. We are happy to
work with you on that.
Senator Young. I understand the sensitivities of
negotiations and the practical realities that would prevent an
hour-by-hour, perhaps even a day-by-day update, but in light of
the gravity of this situation and the news reports that a deal
may be forthcoming soon, could we have Special Envoy Malley
appear before this committee--can I have an agreement from you
to that end, if not before this work period has ended,
certainly before an agreement is announced and agreed to?
Secretary Blinken. I will go back and see what we can do to
make something happen. Now, I will say that I would assume that
for that purpose, we would probably need to do something in a
closed session because this is in the midst of a negotiation,
but let me come back to you on that. I want to find a way to
make that happen.
Senator Young. Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate
that. Staying on Iran just briefly, do you commit that the
IRGC's foreign terrorist organization designation will not be
lifted as part of any agreement the Administration reaches with
Iran?
Secretary Blinken. The only way I could see it being lifted
is if Iran takes steps necessary to justify the lifting of that
designation. It knows what it would have to do in order to see
that happen.
Senator Young. Do you agree that IRGC's FTO designation
will not be lifted merely at the negotiating table, meaning not
just concessions made at the negotiating table. A pattern of
constructive behavior would have to occur over a period of
time. I can speak vaguely only to this matter in order for the
FTO designation to be removed.
Secretary Blinken. Yes, this would--irrespective of the
nuclear negotiation, just with regard to the FTO, it would
require Iran to take certain actions and to sustain them. Of
course, if it purported to do something and then did not, and a
designation--any kind of designation were lifted, it can always
be reimposed. As you know, there is a long history to this when
it comes to the IRGC designation. The Bush administration
looked at it, did not do it. The advice was not to do it
because it did not gain anything, but might create actually
more dangers for our people and forces in the region. The Obama
administration came to the same conclusion. When President
Trump decided to do it, it was against the advice of his
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his military, and the
intelligence community, because in the judgment of those--the
two administrations and senior leadership in President Trump's
administration, the gain was minimal and the pain was
potentially great.
Again, as a practical matter, the designation does not
really gain you much because there are myriad other sanctions
on the IRGC. The primary sanction when it comes to the FTO
designation actually is a travel ban, and the people affected
by that ban when it comes to the IRGC, as you know, the IRGC is
a large----
Senator Young. Yes.
Secretary Blinken. --force that has a lot of conscripts in
it. They would not be able to travel. The people who are the
real bad guys have no intention of traveling here anyway.
Senator Young. I am going to move on to Burma because I
have a very large Burmese-American diaspora community, and I
care a lot about this issue. I applaud the Administration's
decision to formally declare the persecutions and killings of
Rohingya people by the Burmese military a genocide. It is
something Senator Merkley, Cardin, and many of my colleagues on
this committee have pushed for, and I commend the
Administration for that. The situation in Burma following last
year's coup continues to inflict deep suffering on the people
in the country and many diaspora families, like those in
Indiana.
As you know, the FY22 NDAA required a briefing to Congress
within 60 days of passage examining a variety of policy options
as it relates to the United States' response to the ongoing
crisis in Burma. Among those issues are a determination on the
legitimacy and recognition of the national unity government,
holding those in the military accountable for their crimes,
including sanctions, and looking into strategic interests and
actions of the People's Republic of China. We are long overdue
for said briefing, and legislative response is, of course,
suffering on account of this. I fully acknowledge how many
challenges the Administration is tending to, but we do need
action here, and so I just ask you, Mr. Secretary, would you
commit to working with others in the Administration to follow
the law and brief Congress on these matters as soon as
possible?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Young. Thank you. I will be following up.
The Chairman. Thank you. Well, Mr. Secretary, just some
final questions to wrap up. I just came back from a trip with a
series of colleagues, both on this committee and off, on
Australia, Japan, and Taiwan, and what became clear to me, not
only on this trip, but with all of the ambassadors that we
hosted of the ASEAN nations here in Washington, is that unless
we have an economic and trade agenda, we will not meet the
strategic competition challenge that we have with China, and we
will not necessarily meet the reach for some of these countries
to engage in a way that we want them on the security question,
because they just feel that we are not engaged.
In the interagency process--I know you do not drive this
agenda on your own, but in the interagency process, I hope that
you are advocating for some robust economic, which is not
necessarily a trade agenda, but economic and/or plus a trade
agenda, because in the absence of that, even though we consider
China our single-biggest geostrategic threat, we cannot win it
without this dimension.
Secretary Blinken. I strongly agree with you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that is exactly right. We are pursuing that. We are
launching what we call the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework that
addresses, I think, part of this challenge. It includes a
number of things. It includes trade facilitation. It includes
standards for the digital economy and technology. It includes
building supply chain resilience, infrastructure investments,
including in clean energy, worker standards. There are a number
of----
The Chairman. It does not include market access, which is
probably the single-most significant thing they are looking
for. Look, this is a good initiative. I said it in the Finance
Committee to our trade representative.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
The Chairman. All of these nations, when we have talked to
them, have suggested their aspiration for a much more robust
engagement by the United States is necessary. That is why I add
the economic equation, which is not necessarily a trade agenda,
because whether it is the DFC, or whether it is Millennium
Challenge, or whether it is USAID, or whatever else, we cannot
meet something with nothing.
Secretary Blinken. Again, I very much agree with your
premise.
The Chairman. I hope you will just be a strong voice within
the interagency process. I intend to make that point to the
President and others as well. In that context, in our visit to
Taiwan, it is very clear to me that if China could ultimately
overcome Taiwan, which produces 90 percent of all the high-end
semiconductors in the world, which means, for the average
American who may be watching, in everything that we use--the
phone that we have, the car that we drive, the refrigerator we
keep our food in, and I could go on and on--there are
semiconductors. If, in fact, China could overwhelm and take
Taiwan and now have control of 90 percent of the world's
semiconductors, the world would be in a world of hurt, and that
is just one dimension.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
The Chairman. Not to mention the message that we heard it
would send within the region if, in fact, we do not come to
Taiwan's assistance here because other countries will say,
well, if they did not do it for Taiwan, they are not going to
do it for us. Do we have that sense of urgency?
Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, we do, and we are focused
on this in a number of ways. First of all, with regard to
semiconductors themselves, we have a significant advantage
right now over China in the ability to produce the highest-end
semiconductors and the chips. As you know very well, a small
number of countries, to include Taiwan, are at the forefront of
that, and we are taking very significant steps with Taiwan,
with Japan, with the Netherlands which is critical to this, and
a few other countries, to make sure that when it comes to the
highest-end semiconductors, they are not transferred to China
or China does not get the technology to manufacture them.
Taiwan is integral to that.
At the same time, when it comes to Taiwan itself, we are
determined to make sure that it has all necessary means to
defend itself against any potential aggression, including
unilateral action by China to disrupt the status quo that has
been in place now for many decades. I think there have been, in
foreign military sales, close to $20 billion in such sales
since 2017. That is ongoing as we speak. There has been another
almost $2\1/2\ billion in direct commercial sales that we have
authorized or facilitated. We have been expediting third party-
transfers to Taiwan. We have been supporting an indigenous
industrial defense capability, and we are focused on helping
them think about how to strengthen asymmetric capabilities,
again, as a deterrent----
The Chairman. I think we are now aligned between our views
of what their asymmetric capabilities need to be and their
views, which is an important thing. I look forward to our
robust engagement to help them have the capacity capabilities
of that asymmetric capability.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
The Chairman. Finally, I requested a GAO report on the
State Department's annual waiver of Section 907 of the Freedom
Support Act, which was released in March. The report found that
the State Department's reporting to Congress on fulfillment of
waiver conditions did not address required elements, including
the impact on proposed assistance on the military balance
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over a 7-year period. It also
found that State did not provide detailed instruction to
agencies about reporting requirements, and that state and DoD
did not document their consideration of waiver requirements
over a 6-year period.
I look at this budget now, and I see a $1.4 million
discrepancy between the support for Armenia and Azerbaijan. I
see what the Azerbaijanis are doing in Nagorno-Karabakh,
including trying to eradicate the presence of Armenians who
have lived there. How is it that we are going to provide more
money, which, in my mind, is in violation--forgetting about the
waiver--is in direct violation of Section 907? That is not
something I am going to support, just to have you know.
Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to go back and
take a look at that--the specifics of the concerns you have
raised about the adequacy of the reporting. I will take that
on. Section 907 is, as you know, an annual decision. We have
interagency review going on, and that review is underway, but I
take what you say seriously, and I will take a look at that.
More broadly, I have been very actively and directly engaged
with leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, including, just
as recently as a week ago, phone calls with Prime Minister
Pashinyan and with President Aliyev, as well as their foreign
ministers, trying to help advance prospects for a long-term
political settlement. With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, we have
been developing and promoting various confidence-building
measures. We have been trying to push back on any unilateral
actions, particularly by Azerbaijan, that would only inflame
the situation, and we have a number of programs in place that
are part of the budget to try to help advance more peaceful
prospects.
That is very much on my agenda. Happy to work closely with
you and your team on that.
The Chairman. Well, we look forward to working with you on
it. Finally, let me just say, and, listen, you have a difficult
job. I think the breadth and scope of--and the depth that you
have exhibited today is one of the reasons you make a great
Secretary of State, and we appreciate you have spent here
nearly 3 hours, but I have to tell you something. We see--we
cannot seem to get--to call things as they are sometimes.
The State Department put out a statement with reference to
the decision to convict Osman Kavala in Turkey that we are
troubled and disappointed. This is why authoritarian figures
like Erdogan, they get away with continuing to do what they are
doing. We should have condemned the conviction. The Department
goes on to say that he should be released in keeping with the
European Court of Human Rights rulings as well as to free all
other arbitrary incarceration. It goes on to talk about the
harassment of civil society, media, political and business
leaders in Turkey to prolonged detention. It goes on to talk
about--there are more lawyers and journalists in prison in
Turkey than any other place in the world. That says something
considering some of the terrible places in the world.
We express trouble and disappointment. Our ally, India,
that is in the Quad, they go buy oil from Russia. They buy the
S-400. They abstain at the United Nations, but they are a
member of the Quad. At some point, messages that we send
globally here are inconsistent. I have heard President Biden
say that he stands up for human rights and democracy in the
world. I believe him. That is his history from the time he sat
where I am sitting today, but, man, when we say we are troubled
and disappointed, that does not cut it.
When we allow someone who we have invited to be part of the
Quad to go ahead and purchase the S-400, go ahead and purchase
Russian oil in violation of the global sanctions we are
creating, go ahead and vote against our position and most of
the world's position at the United Nations, if you think you
can do all those things and still get whatever it is that we
give, which is a lot, then you will. I just hope that, Mr.
Secretary, you will look at some of the positions that we take,
and equivocate less, and be more forcefully directed as to what
people should or should not be able to do.
Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, first, I take your point
about that specific statement, and I will go back and have a
look at that myself. More broadly, and I said this at the
outset, I think we are at a very important strategic moment as
various countries, to include the countries you have cited, are
thinking about and possibly reconsidering some of their other
relationships, including with Russia. As a strategic
proposition, I think it is very much in our interest to
encourage that, and work with that, and see what we can do to
make sure that, along with success for Ukraine in Ukraine, we
also take advantage of other strategic opportunities that may
present themselves as a result of Russia's aggression, as well
as dealing with some of the new challenges we face.
I think that also has to factor into our thinking about how
we approach things. Some countries have had decades-long
relationships, as you know very well, with Russia that take
time to change and to adjust. I hope that as we do this, we
want to be as effective as we can in getting the right
strategic result, even as, to your point, we keep faith with
our basic principles, especially when it comes to human rights.
The Chairman. Listen, I agree with you. Look, on India, I
want India to be aligned not with us, is the final point I
make. As I traveled all over this region and to receive foreign
dignitaries here, I say the choice is not between the United
States and China. The choice is what type of world do you want
to live in?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
The Chairman. One that is ultimately governed by the rule
of law where you get to choose who governs you, where you get
to worship as you please, where you get to ultimately achieve
economic success by the use of your intellect or the sweat of
your brow, or is it a world where you are minded, where you do
not get to choose who governs you, where you do not get to
worship as you please, where you are put in a concentration
camp because of who you are, and the list goes on. That is the
choice. At the end of the day, in the pursuit of making that
choice clear, I hope that we will hold higher expectations of
some of those who we describe as allies because, historically,
some of these countries who view themselves as non-aligned,
ultimately, if they can have it both ways, they will. At some
point, there has to be a definition of which type of world do
you want to live in.
With the thanks of the committee for your very extensive
responses to everybody's questions here and your service to our
country, this record will remain open until the close of
business tomorrow. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. China: Russia is an urgent threat, but China clearly
remains a serious long-term competitor for the United States, with
global ambitions to overturn the rules-based order that has benefited
the entire international community--perhaps, ironically, no one as much
as China--for the past 75 years. Given the imperative of responding to
Putin in Ukraine, how can the United States best position itself to
work with partners and allies to assure that Xi does not exploit our
attention in Europe?
Answer. The February 4 joint statement between the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and Russia signals alignment between Beijing
and Moscow in challenging the rules-based international order. The
statement endorsed spheres of influence and rejected democracy and
broadly recognized human rights. Investing in our network of allies and
partners is a critical part of our approach to the PRC, and we are
coordinating our response with allies and partners to ensure the PRC
learns the right lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine as it
considers its own foreign policy actions. Working with allies and
partners to respond to Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine has
not distracted us from strategic competition with the PRC, but is
instead a part of these important efforts.
Question. Are there particular issues--with Taiwan, in the Pacific,
China's export of its model of digital authoritarianism, or elsewhere--
where you believe China is stepping up pressure and where a more
concerted U.S. response is needed?
Answer. Beijing uses cutting-edge technology for control and
oppression domestically and indiscriminately exports these tools to
those that would like to replicate the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) model of digital authoritarianism. The Administration is
coordinating with allies and partners to ensure technology advances
reflect democratic values and to support an Internet that remains
interoperable, secure, and reliable, including through the recent
Declaration for the Future of the Internet (DFI). Taiwan, Micronesia,
Palau, and other key Indo-Pacific partners are among the more than 50
DFI signatories.
Question. Climate Preparedness: The time that we have to address
the climate crisis contracts with each passing year. The
Administration's Climate Adaptation and Resilience Plan represents a
pragmatic approach to the reality that climate change, as a threat
multiplier, must be accounted for across U.S. diplomatic missions. This
is something that my U.S. CLIMATE Act calls for and I'm glad to see
that the Administration is making efforts to regularize the practical
application of climate change forecasting data into our national
security planning. The Administration has said that the Budget's
request for international investment in climate change programming,
assistance, and contributions go to help those at risk, but can you
please expand on how this broad cross-cutting initiative informs these
investments and if executed properly, could help reduce costs in the
future?
Answer. In our 2021 Climate Adaptation and Resilience Plan, the
Department committed to assessing its exposure to climate hazards and
developing a priority list of locations for action. From droughts in
South Africa to wildfires in Australia, our diplomats and their
families are all too aware that we need to prepare for worsening
disasters caused by climate change. If resourced, this analysis and
preparedness work will help reduce risk to our staff and their
families, and avoid costs and financial risks from disrupted
operations, poor siting, and equipment failures. Further, as a cross-
cutting emerging issue, this analysis will also enable us to prioritize
work with host governments on climate adaptation and resilience
projects that both benefit the local population and our operations.
Question. What additional resources does the Climate Adaptation and
Resilience Plan initiative require?
Answer. The FY 2023 Presidential Budget Request includes more than
$11 billion government-wide in international climate finance, including
$2.28 billion in foreign assistance for State Department and USAID
climate programs, underscoring the President's commitment to tackling
the climate crisis. A key initiative supported by these investments
includes the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience
(PREPARE), for which the request more than quadruples adaptation
finance government-wide from the U.S. FY 2013-2016 average. If enacted,
the FY 2023 request will ensure that PREPARE remains on track to meet
the U.S. pledge of $3 billion in annual adaptation finance by FY 2024.
Question. What can the United States do to better lead on the
global stage and fund U.S. foreign assistance for energy and resilience
programs?
Answer. Our foreign assistance programs tangibly demonstrate the
benefits of establishing open, transparent, and market-based energy and
mineral sectors and building low-carbon, resilient economies. We are
carrying out assistance programs to help governments develop their
regulatory environment, technical capacity, and governance structures
to become reliable contributors to the global clean energy technology
market and improve supply chain resilience. Our targeted assistance
promotes competitive procurement of energy assets and creates
opportunities for U.S. companies to compete on a level playing field.
Question. Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion: I have long championed
a diverse workforce at the Department and equity in the implementation
of U.S. foreign policy, which is why I commended last year's
appointment of the Department's first Chief Diversity and Inclusion
Officer--Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley. Given longstanding
racism around the globe affecting numerous communities and our American
troops, diplomats, students, and business professionals living and
working overseas, I also welcomed the Department's announcement of a
Special Representative for Racial Equity and Equity Action Plan last
week. Both efforts demonstrate our commitment to democratic values and
are critical to the long-term success of our foreign policy interests
overseas, which is why I would like to work closely with you to ensure
their success. Given the Department cited equity as a ``strategic
National Security imperative'' and included equity in the Joint
Strategic Plan with USAID, will the Special Representative for Racial
Equity sit in the Secretary's front office and hold the status of
Ambassador similar to others appointed to lead critical efforts of the
Department?
Answer. The Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice
(SRRE), a Senior Executive Service-level position, will be located in
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Front Office, given
DRL's responsibility for a range of equity, social justice, and human
rights. The SRRE will work with the Secretary and State Department
leadership multilateral institutions, civil society, and host
governments worldwide to combat systemic racism and advance the human
rights of members of marginalized racial and ethnic communities. The
SRRE is responsible for successfully integrating E.O. 13985 into all
aspects of the Department's foreign affairs mission.
Question. While the work of the Chief Diversity and Inclusion
Officer was included in this year's budget request, I did not see a
funding request for the Department's large-scale equity efforts, from
increasing procurement opportunities for minority-owned businesses to
establishing a new Special Representative for Racial Equity's office
and work. Will you be submitting a budget request for this important
equity work to this Committee?
Answer. The Department Congressional Budget Justification includes
a table on page 10 outlining DEIA priorities included in the FY 2023
Request. The Department intends to create the Special Representative
for Racial Equity and Justice based in DRL to embed racial equity in
State's policies and programs and support E.O. 13985. Similar equity-
based efforts include work of the Office of Global Women's Issues,
Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, Special Envoy for the
Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons, Special Advisor for International
Disability Rights, Agency Equity Team, and CDIO Officer.
Question. We understand you completed your new Diversity and
Inclusion Strategic Plan as required by Executive Order 14035 in March.
We have not yet received this Plan. When do you anticipate providing us
with this Plan?
Answer. Pursuant to the executive order, the Department submitted
its 5-year diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility strategic
plan. We look forward to sharing the plan once it is released by the
White House.
Question. Do you intend to release it to the public?
Answer. Yes, I intend to share the Department's diversity, equity,
inclusion, and accessibility strategic plan with the public once it is
released by the White House.
Question. What steps are you taking to ensure that everyone in the
Department is held accountable for the goals in this Plan?
Answer. The Office of Diversity and Inclusion will lead the
Department's diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA)
implementation team composed of senior officials from the various
action offices and bureaus. The implementation team will meet
quarterly, starting in the summer of 2022, to identify new DEIA
initiatives for action that will help the Department achieve the goals
established in the plan, measure Department-wide progress on the plan's
DEIA goals, and update the Department's Diversity and Inclusion
Leadership Council (DILC).
Question. You've talked about the need to track progress in
advancing DEIA--how does State plan to track and measure progress in
advancing its DEIA goals?
Answer. The Department recently established the first-ever
demographic baseline of its direct-hire Foreign Service and Civil
Service workforce. It is the most detailed picture the Department has
ever had of the demographic composition of the organization--broken
down by race, gender, and disability status across bureau, employment
category, and rank. We just launched the first-of-its-kind Department-
wide DEIA climate survey, which, among other analyses, assesses how
employees' experiences differ by demographic group, for all direct-hire
Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel. We will update this
baseline annually and conduct the DEIA climate survey biennially to
track the Department's progress on advancing its DEIA goals.
Question. Authoritarianism in the Americas: As President Biden has
rallied our democratic allies and partners against the threats posed by
authoritarian regimes globally, we must be candid about the challenges
we face from dictatorships in our hemisphere. The Diaz-Canel regime is
sentencing Cuba's citizens, including children, to lengthy prison terms
for protesting peacefully. In Venezuela, Maduro is perpetrating crimes
against humanity and deepening a humanitarian crisis that has forced
over 6 million people to flee the country. The Ortega regime has jailed
presidential candidates and political opponents in Nicaragua, and even
expelled the Pope's chief diplomat from the country. These campaigns of
repression have enabled the worst forms of lawlessness and the rise of
illicit activities, directly threatening regional stability and U.S.
national security interests. What additional resources are needed to
support civil society, democratic activists, and human rights defenders
in these three countries as a counter to the authoritarian resurgence
we've seen in our hemisphere?
Answer. The FY 2023 Request includes robust funding to continue
supporting civil society, independent media and journalists, democratic
actors, and human rights defenders in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
The United States will continue to stand with the people of all three
countries, where authoritarian governments continue to suffocate
democratic aspirations and access to information and have failed to
protect human rights. We work to counter these threats to the region in
all three countries and will seek to intensify our efforts.
Question. Ukraine: What is the Administration's perspective on what
circumstance might trigger Putin to use nuclear weapons?
Answer. Russia's provocative rhetoric about nuclear weapons is the
height of irresponsibility. It is dangerous and it adds to the risk of
miscalculation. That said, there are no indications Russia has changed
its nuclear posture in any way.
Question. How will the Administration respond to a Russian
demonstration of its nuclear capabilities or in the worst
circumstances, a nuclear strike in Ukraine?
Answer. There are no indications Russia has changed its nuclear
posture in any way. That said, we have been very clear to Russia that
there would be a very serious and severe response not just from us, but
from the international community, if Russia uses a nuclear weapon. This
Administration takes this risk very seriously and is actively engaged
in planning for all contingencies.
Question. President Biden warned of a ``response in kind'' to a
Russian chemical or biological weapons attack in Ukraine; what sort of
response is the Administration considering?
Answer. As President Biden has said repeatedly, any use of chemical
or biological weapons is unacceptable. If Putin does launch a chemical
weapons attack, Russia would pay a severe price as such use would both
be inhumane and contrary to Russia's international legal obligations.
We will continue to make clear that there is no benefit for Russia to
use such weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere and will coordinate closely
with our allies and partners on any response. Additionally, we would
impose sanctions on Russia for any confirmed use of chemical or
biological weapons as required by U.S. law.
Question. Do you anticipate Russian cyber tactics changing in the
next phase of the invasion?
Answer. Russia's cyber activities targeting Ukraine may be less
visible than its missile and artillery bombardments, but they are key
pieces of the Kremlin's unjustified war. I believe Russia will continue
to use cyber operations in support of its strategic objectives in
Ukraine and to influence public opinion regarding the conflict. Russia
views cyber disruptions as a foreign policy lever to shape other
countries' decisions, as well as a deterrence and military tool.
Question. And what measures is the State Department taking to
prepare other Eastern European countries for potential Russian
cyberattacks?
Answer. We are actively working with Allies and partners to ensure
that crisis response mechanisms are in place in the event of major
cyber incidents affecting critical infrastructure. Additionally, since
FY 2016, the United States has provided more than $63 million in
foreign assistance to support cybersecurity capacity development across
Europe and Eurasia, prioritizing front-line states facing the greatest
threat from Russia, including Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Our work
has already improved cyber resilience and public-private partnership
across the region. Cybersecurity capacity development and cooperation
with Eastern Europe will remain a critical priority for the foreseeable
future, and we will continue to prioritize this support.
Question. How are you prioritizing the protection of women and
girls in Ukraine as a central component of our assistance efforts?
Answer. The U.S. Department of State's programs emphasize the
protection of women, girls, and other vulnerable populations in
Ukraine, in countries in Europe receiving refugees from Ukraine, and
around the world. Whether through direct assistance or by funding
international organizations and third parties, our programs have built
in mechanisms to prevent and deter violence against women and girls,
discrimination, and human trafficking in Ukraine. We also provide
support to Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General to investigate
and prosecute war crimes involving sexual violence. We plan to increase
support for projects that prevent and respond to gender based violence
(GBV) and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in the context of the
Ukraine war, including provision of emergency assistance to individuals
at threat of and survivors of GBV and CRSV. Programming will support
survivor-centered, trauma-informed approaches that foster survivor and
community resilience during and after the conflict.
Question. Western Hemisphere Migration: The international
community's collective inability, across successive U.S.
administrations, to preserve democracy, curb criminal violence,
alleviate poverty, and reverse climate change in the Americas, has led
untold numbers of people to flee their homes. At our Southwest border,
Venezuelans, Cubans, Mexicans, Central Americans, and Haitians, are
hopeful that the imminent end of Title 42 means that they will again
have a fair chance at having their asylum cases heard. But, the
combined effects of the pandemic, deepening poverty, and protracted
violence mean that many more will likely attempt the dangerous journey
to the United States. While the Department's budget is a notable down
payment to address the root causes of migration from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, we need much larger, hemisphere-wide
programming, to address the factors driving migration from other
countries. So my question is two-fold: First, beyond the funding for
Central America, can you please describe how this budget will expand
our approach to address the ``root causes'' of migration across the
Americas?
Answer. The request includes nearly $100 million in bilateral and
regional funding for hemispheric migration management to support the
Administration's Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, the new
Regional Migration Framework, and bilateral migration arrangements to
reduce the number of encounters with irregular migrants at the U.S.
southern border and to expand Colombia's model of supporting the social
and economic integration of long-term migrants into host communities.
Funding would expand bilateral and regional support to stabilize
communities and reduce push factors and repeat irregular migration,
including through community-based interventions and lawful pathway
referral mechanisms.
Question. And second, given the hemisphere-wide nature of the
challenge, will you commit to ensuring that the Department of State--
not DHS--remains firmly in the lead of any discussions and/or
negotiations with international partners on addressing regional refugee
and migration challenges?
Answer. The Department of State continues to lead hemispheric
cooperation on humanely managing migration. I co-hosted the Migration
Ministerial in Bogota in October 2021, and the Ministerial Conference
on Migration in Panama in April 2022. The Under Secretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights traveled to the region to make
progress on humanely managing migration, increasing access to
protection, and discussing legal pathways with our regional partners.
The Department of State remains the leader on all aspects of our
bilateral relationships with foreign partners.
Question. India-Russia: Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we
have seen India fail to join with the rest of the international
community in imposing punitive costs on the Kremlin. While I understand
the shared history between Moscow and New Delhi, India has long
championed the principles of territorial integrity and non-aggression
in its foreign policy. As the world's most populous democracy, India
must now stand up for those principles when it comes to Ukraine. What
concrete steps has the Administration taken to make clear that further
Indian purchases of discounted Russian oil or setting up a rupee-ruble
exchange mechanism would be unacceptable?
Answer. I am encouraging steps to reduce long-term dependence on
energy supplies from Russia and coordinating with India to mitigate the
impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on global energy markets. I have
also engaged with India at senior levels to discourage any steps to set
up alternative payment mechanisms or other measures that could
undermine the impact of global sanctions on Russia. In those
conversations, I relayed the United States' readiness to serve as a
reliable supplier of energy and to support India in diversifying its
imports.
Question. When will the Administration provide Congress an update
on whether it will provide a CAATSA sanctions waiver for New Delhi's
acquisition of the S-400?
Answer. We have not yet made a determination pursuant to CAATSA
Section 231 regarding India's S-400 acquisition. The Administration
will continue to provide updates to Congress as there are further
developments. The Department continues to urge Indian counterparts to
refrain from new purchases of Russian military equipment, given the
potential impact of CAATSA and other sanctions authorities.
Question. North Korea: Since the start of 2022, North Korea has
conducted at least nine ballistic missile test, including two that the
United States Government has determined to be part of a ``new''
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems. Experts contend that
the most recent ICBM launch was the heaviest ICBM North Korea has ever
tested, capable of carrying one nuclear warhead to anywhere on Earth or
two warheads to the United States. How is the Biden administration
responding to these developments?
Answer. The Biden administration has made clear that the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) unlawful and destabilizing
ballistic missile launches have consequences, that the international
community will not accept these actions as normal, and the only viable
path forward for the DPRK is through diplomacy.
We have no hostile intent toward the DPRK and remain open to
meeting without preconditions. However, we also have a responsibility
to address the DPRK's continued efforts to advance its unlawful WMD and
ballistic missile programs, including by implementing existing UN
Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).
Question. While U.S. officials have offered to meet with North
Korea without preconditions, suggesting that ``the ball is in their
court,'' what active steps are we currently taking to achieve the
complete denuclearization of the Korea peninsula?
Answer. We have condemned the DPRK's 20 ballistic missiles launches
as of May 18, all of which violated multiple UN Security Council
resolutions (UNSCR) and demonstrated that the DPRK continues to seek to
advance the capabilities of its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile
programs.
UN sanctions on the DPRK remain in place, and we will continue to
press all member states to fully implement them, including through
diplomacy at the UN and with the DPRK's neighbors. We are also in the
process of negotiating a new UNSCR to restrict the DPRK's ability to
advance its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs, streamline
sanctions implementation, and further facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian aid.
Question. Afghanistan: The reports coming out of Afghanistan now--
of Taliban executions of former government officials, street thugs
beating female protestors, young girls prevented from attending
school--prove what I told you last fall, Mr. Secretary. There is no
such thing as a reformed Taliban. What we are seeing in terms of the
regression of the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan is truly
horrific. What is the Administration's diplomatic strategy toward
Afghanistan in the wake of the Taliban's broken promise to allow girls
to attend secondary school?
Answer. Within hours of the Taliban's March 23 decision to ban
girls' access to secondary school, we were undertaking energetic and
focused diplomacy with our allies, regional partners, and Muslim
majority countries and organizations to ensure that the world would
stand united and vocal in its abject opposition to this indefensible
decision. G7 Foreign Ministers, joined by counterparts from the United
States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the United
Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union condemned
this move against Afghan women and girls' fundamental rights. Qatar,
Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation also condemned the decision. Within days, ulemma leaders
from across Afghanistan, as well as leaders in Pakistan, likewise
called on the Taliban to reverse their decision. The United States
cancelled a high-level session on economic stabilization with Taliban
leaders that was to take place on the margins of the Doha Forum March
26-27. We also issued instructions to our missions abroad to discourage
any further steps by any country toward normalized relations with the
Taliban in the wake of the March 23 decision. We will continue to work
with allies, regional partners, and the Muslim world to ensure we are
all undertaking concerted public and private action that leads to a
reversal of the Taliban's ban. I cannot commit that this engagement
will produce the reversal we all wish to see, but it is essential that
the world speak and act with one voice on this basic human right for
half of Afghanistan's population.
Question. What is the status of the Administration's review of its
Pakistan policy that it promised to conduct after the fall of Kabul
last summer?
Answer. The Department continuously reviews its policies and
adjusts priorities for engagement with Pakistan, including during the
period following the August 2021 Taliban takeover of Kabul and through
the April 2022 political transition in Islamabad. We view our
partnership with Pakistan as critical to our broader regional and
global interests, including counterterrorism, stability and inclusive
governance within Afghanistan, relocations of U.S.-affiliated Afghans,
health security, and climate action. We will continue to brief you and
your staff on our evolving policy towards Pakistan.
Question. Cyber Bureau: I was glad to see the official launch of
the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy a few weeks ago--and to see
that building capacity in cyberspace and emerging technologies is a
priority for this year's budget; these steps will be essential in
addressing some of the most critical challenges in the coming decades.
What will be the key priorities for this new bureau in the next year?
The next 5 years?
Answer. I see building an integrated team, while also advancing our
diplomatic objectives, as crucial to our success over the next year.
That means hiring the right leadership and staff throughout the bureau,
as well as coordinating and advancing the security, economic, and
values-based elements of cyberspace policy and diplomacy. Within the
next 5 years, the Cyberspace and Digital Policy Bureau will be leading
and coordinating, at State and throughout the interagency, on work with
foreign and domestic counterparts to prove that the United States can
build the open digital future essential to preventing cyberattacks that
target our businesses, regulating technology that threatens our
privacy, and defending our democratic values.
Question. Will you commit to keeping this Committee appraised of
the new bureau's work and to consult with this Committee on significant
developments and decisions?
Answer. Yes, we are committed to maintaining open and regular
communications with the Hill on issues related to the Cyberspace and
Digital Policy Bureau's mission, objectives, and progress. In
introductory conversations with authorizing committees, the Bureau
leadership will discuss its plans for proactive, regular Hill
engagement in coordination with the Legislative Affairs Bureau. We are
grateful for the bipartisan support as the Department re-organized to
elevate and institutionalize these critical foreign policy issues.
Question. Will you commit to the same [to keeping this Committee
appraised of the new bureau's work and to consult with this Committee
on significant developments and decisions] with respect to the planned
Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technologies?
Answer. Yes, my team will continue to keep the Committee informed
about significant developments in the process for establishing the
Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology.
Question. Foreign Military Financing: The vast amount of Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) funds are committed every year to just three
countries, leaving little available for the entire rest of the world.
While this funding for those countries is important and should not be
reduced--except, maybe, for Egypt--earmarking over 80 percent of those
funds leaves the State Department little to allocate to other friendly
states and partners, and little flexibility. Would you support moving
the funding for those three countries to a new appropriated fund--to be
used for the same purposes as FMF--and plus-up the general FMF fund
accordingly?
Answer. Our recent experiences with security cooperation are
driving the Department to take a new look at possible changes to our
authorities and our current security sector assistance framework. FMF
remains a vital tool for the Department within this framework. But as
you rightly point out, there is a tension between the need to signal
U.S. commitment to certain partners through the provision of
predictable resources that allow for long-range planning, and the
availability of more flexible resources to respond to emerging crises
and the changing needs for building military capabilities. This tension
results in budgetary tradeoffs within the FMF account that may decrease
the effectiveness of both priorities. I fully support our ongoing
discussions with the oversight committees to explore wholesale
modernization of our security assistance authorities.
Question. Russia/New Start: Earlier this month, the State
Department published the unclassified bits of the data exchange about
the status of the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces as required under New
START. The publication confirms that Russia and the United States
continue to abide by the treaty. Further, the United States has paused
its Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia following its invasion of
Ukraine. While I am pleased that the data exchange confirms that the
United States and Russia continue to abide by the New START treaty,
does the Department expect New START inspections to resume when the
COVID-related suspension expires in June?
Answer. Although inspections have been paused by mutual
understanding because of pandemic conditions, we are actively working
to resume inspections as soon as possible.
Question. Under what conditions would the United States consider
returning to the Strategic Stability Dialogues?
Answer. Due to Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war on Ukraine,
we suspended the Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia and are not
planning another session. Our objectives for next steps in nuclear arms
control have not changed, nor has the expiration date for New START. We
will continue working internally to be prepared to engage Russia on
follow-on measures to New START when we assess such measures as serving
the U.S. interest.
Question. East Africa: East Africa is in the midst of an
unprecedented wave of instability, including in Somalia and South
Sudan, but particularly in Sudan and Ethiopia. The United States has
been active in responding to the major crises of the moment by naming a
Special Envoy early in the Administration, among other actions.
However, fairly or not, actors on the ground point to the departure of
Ambassador Satterfield--the second Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa
to resign in 3 months--and the lack of a confirmed Ambassador in Addis
as signs of policy disarray. What are the next steps in terms of U.S.
efforts to help resolve the conflicts in Tigray, Oromia and elsewhere
in Ethiopia?
Answer. U.S. policy toward Ethiopia has been consistent across the
interagency and not dependent on any one actor. Normal personnel
changes should not indicate a policy in disarray. Our policy will
maintain course to secure a durable ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian
access, transparent investigations into human rights abuses, and a
negotiated resolution to the conflict.
Question. Iraq: The Administration's move to end combat operations
and transition the U.S.-Iraq relationship to a strategic one centered
on bilateral diplomacy are positive steps, which I fully support.
However, I am concerned that the Administration's proposed cut to Iraqi
FMF comes at a time when ISIS is trying to reconstitute itself while
attacks on U.S. facilities by Iranian-backed proxy forces continue.
What Iraqi priorities would no longer be funded if FMF to Iraq is
funded at the level of the Administrations' request?
Answer. FMF is part of the U.S. Government's strategic effort to
build effective, civilian-controlled, self-sustaining Iraqi forces, to
include the Peshmerga, that operate in accordance with the rule of law.
FMF provides equipment and tactical counterterrorism training for the
continued development and professionalization of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and to improve their interoperability with U.S. and
regional forces. It also allows for the sustainment of U.S. systems
purchased to date and assists the ISF in maintaining critical
capabilities and previous U.S. Government investments, while providing
training, assistance, and time for the ISF to generate self-sufficient
sustainment capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that Iraqi Security Forces have reached a
level of professionalism and capability that the previous level of FMF
is no longer warranted? If so, what led you to that assessment?
Answer. The Iraqi Security Forces have historically received a
range of assistance from several authorities. FMF plays an important--
but not sole--part in the U.S. Government's strategic effort to build
effective, civilian-controlled, self-sustaining Iraqi forces that
operate in accordance with the rule of law. I support continuing
military assistance to Iraq in support of building capabilities and
professionalism, and we are working to ensure that the resources are
commensurate with validated requirements.
Question. Embassy Baghdad Staffing: I remain concerned that the
drawdowns of the previous Administration left Embassy Baghdad
understaffed, relative to the size and scope of its mission. While the
safety and security of U.S. personnel is always paramount, I believe
that a robust diplomatic presence, including in southern Iraq, will be
key to this new phase of the U.S.-Iraq relationship that is centered on
bilateral diplomacy. What is your assessment of current staffing levels
at Embassy Baghdad and what do you need to see on the ground before
considering an increase to those levels?
Answer. I and the team at Embassy Baghdad are committed to ensuring
the Embassy is not only secure, but appropriately staffed to meet
Department goals. While current in-country staffing levels in Iraq are
temporary and reversible, they are consistent with the existing Ordered
Departure status. As with all our posts, we continue to assess both the
security and health environment in Iraq and hope to revert to higher
in-country staffing levels as soon as circumstances permit.
Question. Similarly, what would you need to see on the ground
before reopening the U.S. Consulate in Basrah?
Answer. The Department suspended operations at U.S. Consulate
General Basrah in 2018 as a result of heightened security threats. We
continue to evaluate the security situation in Basrah and will, of
course, keep Congress appraised of any decisions.
Question. Jordan: The Administration's request for assistance to
Jordan is the highest such request by any administration to date and
reflects a strong and continuing commitment to an incredibly valuable
U.S. partner in the Middle East. I appreciate this Administration's
commitment to helping the Jordanian Government reach a sound fiscal
footing and would appreciate further details on how U.S. economic
assistance will be used to incentivize important reforms by the
Jordanian Government.
Answer. Negotiations are ongoing with the Jordanians on the new
assistance MOU, which we expect will include consistent annual request
levels for Foreign Military Financing and Economic Support Fund (ESF)
assistance, including for direct budget support. The MOU is also
intended to include ESF-funded assistance to be provided if Jordan
implements meaningful and achievable reforms in key sectors, which will
be developed in consultation with the Jordanians and are intended to
bolster Jordan's long-term fiscal health.
Question. Syria: Eleven years on, the conflict in Syria still has
no clear end in sight. While fighting is down, the Assad regime
continues to escape true accountability for its heinous crimes against
the Syrian people. Additionally, it is enabled by its support from Iran
and Russia, which continues to threaten to veto the cross-border
provision of desperately needed assistance, while also being emboldened
by renewed outreach from countries like the UAE. Given the ongoing
deadlock on a political solution under the auspices of UN Security
Resolution 2254, what are the Administration's priorities for its $125
million request for Economic Support Funds for Syria?
Answer. U.S. stabilization activities are vital to preventing the
resurgence of terrorist groups, keeping violence levels low, promoting
accountability for the Assad regime's atrocities, and supporting an
inclusive political solution to the conflict consistent with UN
Security Council Resolution 2254. President Biden's budget requests for
Syria stabilization assistance in both FY 2022 and FY 2023 reflect the
urgent need to address the impacts of drought and food insecurity,
deteriorating economic conditions, and the lingering impacts of COVID-
19. Stabilization assistance also provides critical support for the
reintegration of displaced Syrians returning home to areas liberated
from ISIS, and for the communities receiving them, promoting social
cohesion and preventing cleavages that could drive conflict.
Question. What steps is the Administration taking to renew or
expand the UN cross-border assistance mandate this summer?
Answer. We are working with our allies and partners, as well as the
United Nations and fellow members of the Security Council, in support
of the renewal and expansion of the cross-border mechanism. As part of
this effort, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield attended the Brussels VI
Conference on Syria on May 10, during the United States' presidency of
the UNSC, to emphasize that continuing and expanding UN-facilitated
cross-border aid is a top U.S. priority. She also conveyed this message
at a separate, Syria-focused ministerial meeting convened by the United
States, which was attended by several UNSC members. Ambassador Thomas-
Greenfield plans to travel to Bab al-Hawa, the last remaining UN border
crossing, in the next few weeks to highlight the importance of renewing
the mandate. We will continue to coordinate with like-minded members of
the UNSC to seek the support of all others for the renewal, including
by explaining the humanitarian repercussions of a non-renewal.
Question. What will the Administration do if Russia vetoes that
mandate?
Answer. We will use all means available to advocate for continued
humanitarian access and to deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the
Syrian people, including in the northwest, in coordination with the UN,
NGOs, other donors, and partners. Preparations to date have confirmed
our assessment that any contingency operations in the event of a non-
renewal will only cover a fraction of the UN's current caseload of
assisting 2.4 million people per month through cross-border aid. The
Department is available to provide further details in response to this
question in an appropriate setting.
Question. Tunisia: President Saied's continued consolidation of
executive powers has raised many concerns that Tunisia is rapidly
sliding back into a state of authoritarian rule. President Saied must
recommit to the democratic principles that underpin longstanding U.S.-
Tunisia relations and work constructively with all Tunisians to further
an inclusive and transparent reform process. Economic support funds
(ESF) are dedicated to programs that strengthen independent
judiciaries, protect human rights and freedom of the press, combat
corruption, and increase public accountability and access to justice.
The $45 million ESF request for Tunisia is nearly a 50 percent decrease
from the requested FY22 amount. Given that Tunisia may be holding
elections in December and is currently facing increasing economic
problems, can you elaborate on the reasoning for the proposed cuts to
Tunisia's economic support funding, which could be used to support rule
of law and improved governance?
Answer. I share your concerns about Tunisian democracy and have
relayed them to President Saied. Reductions in the FY 2023 Request for
economic assistance, in comparison to the FY 2022 Request, reflect
these concerns and the priority the Administration places on democracy
and human rights. Through our FY 2023 request, the United States will
continue to support programming that strengthens civil society,
government accountability, inclusive economic growth, and access to
higher education--programming designed to help Tunisians preserve their
democratic institutions and promote inclusive economic reform.
Question. Lebanon: The economic crisis gripping Lebanon continues
to push Lebanese deeper into poverty while eroding the ability of the
government to provide services, including for upcoming elections, and
straining the readiness of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The
Administration's reduction of FMF for Lebanon from last year's request
is significant, especially in light of the amount ultimately obligated
and reprogrammed to assist the LAF last year. What is the
Administration's assessment of the LAF's readiness and capacity used to
justify the FMF reduction in this year's budget request?
Answer. Despite facing the greatest challenges to operational
readiness and internal cohesion since the Lebanese civil war, the LAF
continues to play a critical role in mitigating further instability in
Lebanon, without which conditions in Lebanon would certainly worsen.
U.S. assistance bolsters the LAF's ability to maintain operational
readiness while continuing to develop its capabilities. The Department
works with the LAF to maintain a 5-Year Security Assistance Roadmap
that aligns State and DoD funding with the LAF's prioritized needs. The
FY 2023 FMF request for Lebanon rebalances FMF support to other vital
needs globally, but maintains steadfast support for the LAF, which
remains one of our most important partners in the region.
Question. What steps, including funding, is the Administration
taking to support upcoming elections in Lebanon and implement reforms
for subsequent elections in Lebanon?
Answer. Senior U.S. officials frequently emphasize to Lebanese
leaders the importance of free, fair, and transparent elections,
including the parliamentary elections which took place on May 15. The
Administration also provides robust assistance to Lebanon. For example,
USAID provided $2 million through the UN Development Programme's
Lebanese Elections Assistance Project to strengthen elections
management and promote inclusive public participation. The
Administration also continues its support to the Lebanese Armed Forces
and Internal Security Forces, key partners tasked with securing polling
stations and ballot boxes. The Administration will review official
election observation reports to guide any efforts related to reforms
for future elections in Lebanon.
Question. Food Security: As many countries in the MENA region
heavily depend on Black Sea grain and other food commodity imports,
Russia's continued illegal invasion of Ukraine threatens to have
serious short- and long-term ripple effects in the region. In countries
such as Syria and Yemen, who rely on food aid from the U.N. and USAID
programs, the surging prices and shortage of essential food supplies
risks further exacerbating food insecurity, while in other countries
such as Lebanon, Tunisia and Egypt, increasing prices have led to
widespread public anger and social unrest. What is the U.S. doing to
address the worsening food security crisis in the MENA region?
Answer. President Putin's brutal war against Ukraine has had a
devastating effect on food security in the MENA region. Since February,
the United States has provided more than $2 billion in emergency food
assistance globally, including more than $450 million for Yemen and $64
million for Lebanon. We announced an additional $337 million in
emergency food assistance for Syria on May 10 at the EU Donor's
Conference in Brussels. We hosted a UN Global Food Security Ministerial
on May 18, with high level MENA representatives attending. I will
discuss with the UN Secretary General our shared concerns about the
growing humanitarian crisis exacerbated by Putin's war and encourage
multilateral organizations to swiftly address the situation.
Question. How are you considering emergency or other authorities to
address the emerging food crisis in MENA countries that as of now are
not considered recipients of humanitarian assistance?
Answer. We are working with multilateral organizations including
the World Bank and UN World Food Program to identify near term food
security solutions. To that end, the President has also submitted a
supplemental appropriations funding request that contains $1.6 billion
in additional humanitarian and food security assistance to people
around the world, including the MENA region, facing increased food
insecurity due to Putin's war in Ukraine and other drivers. The
supplemental request also includes additional requested funds for the
Departments of Agriculture and Treasury to address global food
insecurity.
Question. Are there mechanisms that can be used to address this
gap?
Answer. The Department believes that multilateral institutions such
as the UN World Food Program oversee the most effective mechanisms to
deliver immediate and coordinated food assistance.
Question. How does the U.S. plan to use the presidency of the U.N.
Security Council to address the global food security crisis?
Answer. We have used our presidency of the U.N. Security Council
actively to address the global food security crisis exacerbated by
Russia's brutal further invasion of Ukraine. For example, on May 18, I
hosted a Ministerial at the U.N. attended by the Secretary General and
a diverse group of 46 Member State Ministers, Permanent
Representatives, and heads of multilateral agencies. Dozens of Member
States endorsed the resulting global food security call to action,
which reaffirms our commitment to respond to the urgent food security
and nutrition needs of millions of people around the world. In
addition, on May 19, I chaired an open debate in the UN Security
Council to discuss the relationship between conflict and global food
insecurity.
Question. Russian Influence in Africa: Russia has expanded its
influence in Africa through particularly insidious activities--
including the deployment of mercenaries and trainers to conflict zones,
the use of disinformation campaigns, unscrupulous arms sales, and
corrupt business practices. Most shocking has been the alleged
participation of Wagner Group mercenaries in human rights abuses,
including massacres in Mali and the Central African Republic. However,
there seems to be surprisingly little in the budget request to deal
specifically with the threat of malign Russian influence in Africa. How
serious of a threat do Russian activities pose to Africa and to our
interests on the continent?
Answer. Russia has increasingly exploited insecurity in order to
expand its presence in Africa, threatening African and U.S. interests
of promoting stability, good governance, and human rights in the
process. For example, Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other elements of
Yevgeniy Prigozhin's enterprise have stoked conflict; obstructed UN
missions; engaged in human rights abuses; and eroded African leaders'
control of their national security forces in several countries. We are
addressing Russia's malign activities by maximizing Department
resources and diplomatic tools, including through sanctions,
multilateral fora, countering disinformation, and bilateral
engagements.
Question. What are we doing to counter Russian malign influence?
Answer. We are countering Russian malign influence in Africa in
several ways, including support for UN and other investigations into
allegations of wrongdoing, messaging around sanctions, and a large-
scale diplomacy campaign to warn those considering engaging with the
Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other elements of Yevgeniy Prigozhin's
enterprise on the threats to regional stability. For example, we are
coordinating with partners to maximize the impact of our sanctions
against the Wagner Group and related entities to disrupt its operations
in Central African Republic, Mali, and elsewhere. Meanwhile, we are
working with African partners to strengthen governance and security
institutions, along with exposing, countering, and building resiliency
to Kremlin-sponsored disinformation aimed at undermining the stability
and the integrity of African democratic systems.
Question. Suspension and Reprogramming of Assistance to Central
America: According to a recent GAO report, the 2019 suspension and
reprogramming of assistance to the Northern Triangle adversely affected
implementation of many State projects. Specifically, 65 of State's 168
projects were adversely affected. State reported that commonly
experienced adverse effects on project implementation were delays from
planned timeframes and decreased frequency, quality, or types of
services provided to beneficiaries. (GAO-21-104366). What is State
doing to overcome the effects of the suspension and reprogramming of
assistance on the implementation of projects?
Answer. The Department used existing prior year funding and FY 2019
and FY 2020 funds to continue implementing programs consistent with
U.S. Government priorities in Central America and to expand programs
delayed and reduced due to the reprogramming.
Question. Will you provide an update on the level of assistance
State is currently providing compared to prior to the suspension?
Answer. The Department and USAID allocated nearly $804 million in
FY 2021 bilateral, regional, and humanitarian assistance for Central
America, and the President's FY 2022 Request included nearly $861
million to support the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of
Migration in Central America. Prior to the reprogramming of assistance,
the Department and USAID allocated approximately $807.5 million in FY
2016 and $769.3 million in FY 2017 bilateral, regional, and
humanitarian assistance to Central America.
Question. Democracy Assistance: Multiple State bureaus are involved
in providing democracy assistance around the world. In 2020, GAO
reported that State officials in its case study countries said they
generally lacked information about the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor's (DRL) democracy assistance projects, including
project descriptions and funding amounts. State's existing information-
sharing mechanisms, including data systems and strategies, do not
consistently address these gaps (GAO-20-173). What actions has State
taken to improve information sharing on democracy assistance projects
between the HQ-based DRL bureau and embassies abroad?
Answer. DRL coordinates closely at all stages of the procurement
cycle with relevant stakeholders, including regional offices,
embassies, and USAID. As part of the Office of Foreign Assistance-led
planning process, all Department offices and bureaus, including
regional offices and embassies, can review and request changes to DRL's
intended programming. Per DRL policy, all program solicitations require
regional office and embassy clearance and, in consultation with the
relevant embassy, regional desk officers serve as voting members on all
application review panels. DRL strives to improve information flows
with embassies by sharing information biannually regarding on-going
programming to address knowledge gaps due to turnover at posts.
Question. U.S. Assistance to the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen:
Since 2015, the United States has provided intelligence, military
advice, and logistical support to the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition in
Yemen. In February 2021, the President announced an end to all American
support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including
relevant arms sales. How, if at all, has State sought to determine
whether requested equipment is offensive or defensive in nature?
Answer. The Department adheres to the President's February 2021
guidance that suspended arms sales relevant to offensive operations in
Yemen while maintaining support for Saudi Arabia's capabilities to
defend its territory, where more than 70,000 U.S. citizens reside.
Based on this guidance, the Administration evaluates proposed arms
transfers on a case-by-case basis and consistent with previous use.
Question. We understand that the Administration plans to release a
new version of the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy in the near
future. How, if at all, does State plan to use this policy to guide its
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transfer decisions in a way that aligns
with the Administration's policy not to support offensive operations in
the war in Yemen?
Answer. The Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy provides a
global framework under which U.S. Government agencies review and
evaluate proposed transfers of military articles, defense services, and
certain commercial items, to foreign countries or organizations. Under
the CAT Policy, proposed arms transfer decisions continue to be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis to ensure transfers align with U.S.
foreign policy and national security interests. The Administration will
continue the policy of denying arms transfers where we believe there is
significant risk of diversion, civilian harm, or misuse, including
human rights abuses. While the CAT Policy does not specifically address
the conflict in Yemen, we apply the same standards to those partners
who are operating in Yemen.
In reviewing and updating the CAT Policy, the Biden-Harris
administration is working to emphasize our foreign policy priorities,
including leading with diplomacy, elevating human rights, and renewing
and revitalizing America's alliances.
Question. Promoting Equity Abroad: Protests around the world
against racism and injustice have highlighted opportunities for U.S.
leaders to advance racial and ethnic equity and to support historically
marginalized groups around the world. To this end, in 2021, the
President issued several executive directives that outlined policy
commitments for his Administration. These include advancing racial
equity and support for underserved communities, preventing and
combating discrimination based on gender identity and sexual
orientation, and promoting and protecting the human rights of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transsexual, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) persons. The
2023 Budget request provides $2.6 billion to advance gender equity and
equality and to support underserved communities across a broad range of
sectors. This includes $200 million for the Gender Equity and Equality
Action Fund to advance the economic security of women and girls. How
does State plan to spend the remaining $2.4 billion?
Answer. The FY 2023 President's Budget Request includes an historic
request of $2.6 billion for gender equity and equality across the
Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, more
than doubling such funding over the FY 2022 Request. In addition to the
Gender Equity and Equality Action Fund (GEEA Fund), the request
includes funding with a primary purpose of advancing gender equality
and women's empowerment, preventing and responding to gender-based
violence, and promoting Women, Peace, and Security. The request also
includes funding for other assistance programming across development
sectors and security assistance that will integrate gender equality and
women's empowerment.
Question. Given the Administration's focus on racial equity and
equity for all, how does State plan to promote equity amongst other
underserved populations?
Answer. The Department of State employs a range of diplomatic and
programmatic tools to address the intersectional barriers that limit
members of all marginalized communities from fully participating in
civic and economic life, including by integrating racial equity and
support for underserved communities into the Department's strategic
plans at the mission, bureau, and agency levels. For example, DRL
champions the access, inclusion, and equality of all people by leading
and supporting Department efforts to identify and address barriers for
marginalized and underserved groups within a society, including those
experiencing discrimination, violence, or other forms of injustice,
through both diplomacy and programming.
Question. Definitions for marginalized groups are somewhat
expansive due to the need to include all those who may experience
marginalization. Do you anticipate any challenges with directing
sufficient resources to any particular group due to the number of
populations covered by expansive definitions?
Answer. As the lead for democracy and human rights in the
Department, DRL supports programs that contribute to the promotion,
protection, and advancement of nondiscriminatory practices and laws
around the globe through strategic resource allocation to ensure that
we are meeting the needs of all marginalized populations. DRL
prioritizes inclusive and integrated programming to address the
barriers to access for individuals and groups based on their unique
needs, including communities that experience intersectional
discrimination. Our resources are targeted based on connections between
discrimination and the weakening of democratic institutions, and where
specific types of marginalization are a global issue.
Question. Your budget request expands programs to foster diversity
and inclusion. In support of the President's DEIA-related Executive
Orders, the Department's request is $65.6 million, which includes
funding for 30 new positions for DEIA efforts. What efforts and how
many positions, if any, will be directed to promoting DEIA in State's
foreign assistance provided abroad?
Answer. As outlined in the Department's recently released Equity
Action Plan, the United States is addressing systemic racism and
strengthening democracy and human dignity worldwide as a core tenet of
President Biden's foreign assistance. In addition to orienting our
external work around the values of diversity, equity, inclusion, and
access, we are placing just as much emphasis on bolstering Department
leadership to amplify and accelerate assistance that is comprehensive
in its approach to advancing equity for all. Accordingly, we expect to
see new and enhanced leadership across sectors and regions, the details
of which will correspond to Department personnel announcements and
staffing timelines.
Question. State has taken numerous actions in response to E.O.
13985, such as creating the Agency Equity Team and increasing the focus
on equity in new strategy documents. How does State plan to
institutionalize these changes, such as through multi-year funding or
permanent dedicated staffing?
Answer. The Department created an equity action plan outlining
actions, commitments, and accountability mechanisms to integrate equity
across our foreign affairs work. We will institutionalize this plan by
prioritizing engagements with diplomatic partners from underrepresented
and underserved communities, establishing reporting requirements and
equity analysis tools for international aid, embedding the executive
order principles into public diplomacy programming and communications
strategies, updating the interpretation and application of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and requiring reviews under current
federal contracting processes to provide more equitable access to
underserved and small business partners.
Question. Child Trafficking Programs: In 2013, Congress authorized
Child Protection Compacts (CPCs), multi-year bilateral agreements
between the U.S. Government and selected partner countries that are
managed by the Department of State's Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP). These compacts focus on bilateral
efforts to prevent child trafficking, protect victims, and prosecute
cases of child trafficking. Since 2015, J/TIP has selected five CPC
partner countries to work collaboratively with the government through a
joint commitment (with a sixth CPC to be negotiated soon). How, if at
all, are these bilateral government partnerships more effective than
individual State awards/projects in combatting trafficking?
Answer. Child Protection Compact (CPC) Partnerships are negotiated
with the partner government and are multidisciplinary in nature,
engaging a wide variety of governmental institutions and systems across
the three ``Ps'' of prevention, protection, and prosecution to reduce
child trafficking and protect victims. Unlike our typical foreign
assistance, foreign governments make formal commitments to address
child trafficking and often their own investments to advance the goals
of the partnership. This level of coordination with the CPC partner
government is deeper than typical bilateral programs, which tend to
focus on one or two issues or institutions within a country and are not
intended to take the multidisciplinary approach that the CPC program
does.
Question. Does State believe it would be useful to adopt this type
of compact partnership model for delivering foreign assistance in other
areas?
Answer. The Department is constantly examining new and innovative
ways to be more effective with our foreign assistance funding. We
examine each proposal on a case-by-case basis to determine what is most
appropriate for a given program and account. However, per our response
to your earlier question about Child Protection Compact Partnerships,
the TIP Office has found that programs can have particularly strong and
sustainable impacts when there is a multidisciplinary approach that
includes increased engagement with government stakeholders at all
levels.
Question. Global Health Programs Funds: The Global Health Programs
(GHP) account funds health-related foreign assistance to control the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, prevent child and maternal deaths, and combat
infectious disease threats. Between fiscal years 2018 through 2020,
State typically carried over an average of about $9 billion in
unobligated balances. In fiscal year 2021, Congress appropriated $4
billion in emergency funds to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Please
provide an update on State's GHP obligations and describe how, if at
all, the global pandemic is affecting your ability to obligate and
distribute funding before available GHP funds expire.
Answer. Please see the chart below for an update on unobligated GHP
balances.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thus far, the pandemic has not significantly impacted PEPFAR's
ability to obligate funds before they expire. While there have been
some costs that decreased (e.g. travel, certain program interventions
like Voluntary Male Medical Circumcisions), there have been other costs
that increased (e.g. virtual platforms, increased internet bandwidth,
increased need for personal protective equipment, and increased supply
chain costs). One significant program disruption has been to our Peace
Corps programming given that volunteers departed most programs during
the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this has not yet specifically resulted
in the expiration of funding.
USAID fully obligated the $4 billion in FY 2021 COVID-19 emergency
funds during FY 2021. While there continue to be challenges in the
programming, obligation, and implementation of GHP funds as a result of
the global pandemic, USAID remains committed to the timely obligation
of GHP funds to achieve our three strategic global health goals. USAID
doesn't foresee any insurmountable challenges to fully obligating FY
2021 funds this fiscal year.
Question. Migration and Refugee Assistance Funds: The Migration and
Refugee Assistance (MRA) account funds assistance programs to protect
vulnerable people around the world, including refugees, conflict
victims, internally displaced people, stateless persons, and vulnerable
migrants. The fiscal year 2022 request included $550 million for
refugee admissions and resettlement efforts that would be used to
rebuild the refugee resettlement infrastructure within the United
States and admit up to 125,000 refugees in fiscal year 2022. Is State
on track to admit the planned 125,000 refugees into the United States?
Answer. In the FY 2022 Presidential Determination on Refugee
Admissions, President Biden established a refugee admission target of
125,000 individuals. After several years of decreasing arrivals and a
significant reduction in the global resettlement infrastructure, we
expect to see increased refugee arrivals this year, but do not expect
to reach 125,000 arrivals. This ambitious goal requires significant
effort to rebuild and expand the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, which
the Administration remains fully committed to undertaking this work
across the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and
Human Services. As we rebuild, we are prioritizing efforts to restore
the program's infrastructure and staffing, address historic backlogs of
pending applicants, invest in new innovations to make the program more
efficient, and increase public outreach.
Question. Does State have allocations on the number of refugees it
plans to admit from different geographic areas?
Answer. In the Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions,
President Biden approved a refugee admissions ceiling of 125,000
individuals, with regional allocations as follows:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
At this time, we cannot project how many refugees in total will
arrive under each regional allocation in FY 2022.
Question. Specifically, how many refugees from Europe, Africa, and
Latin America does State plan to admit to the United States?
Answer. At this time, we cannot project how many refugees in total
will arrive under each regional allocation in FY 2022.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. On October 29, 2021, I and Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Robert Menendez wrote a letter expressing concern
over the political and economic crisis facing Lebanon and urging the
Administration to complement the European Union's announced sanctions
framework. When will I receive a response to this letter? Please be
specific.
Answer. The Administration shares your concern over the compounding
crises facing Lebanon and coordinates closely with our like-minded
partners, including the European Union, to urge implementation of
political and economic reforms and promote accountability for
corruption in Lebanon. On October 28, 2021, the Department worked
closely with the Department of Treasury to sanction two Lebanese
businessmen and a member of Parliament whose actions contributed to the
breakdown of good governance and the rule of law in Lebanon under
Executive Order 13441. The Department takes seriously the
responsibility to respond to Member inquiries. The Department has not
received the letter referenced and will respond upon receipt. Please
send the letter to [email protected].
If you have records to indicate that the letter was sent to the
Department, please notify us on where it was sent so we can remedy this
issue ASAP.
Question. Why has a response to my October 29, 2021 letter taken
over 180 days?
Answer. The Department has not received the letter and will respond
upon receipt. Please send the letter to
[email protected].
Question. On February 1, 2022, I and House Foreign Affairs
Committee Ranking Member McCaul wrote a letter to express serious
concerns regarding the energy deals the Biden administration is
facilitating between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt that would
enrich the Assad regime and trigger U.S. sanctions under the Caesar
Syria Civilian Protection Act. When will I receive a response to this
letter? Please be specific.
Answer. I understand that the Department received your letter and
is working to finalize the response to it. We apologize for the delay,
but given newly-confirmed leadership in the NEA bureau, we expect to
send this letter to you very soon.
Question. Why has a response to my February 1, 2022 letter taken
over 85 days?
Answer. The Department endeavors to respond to all correspondence
from the Congress in a timely manner. We also want to make sure that
our response appropriately addresses the concerns you have raised. We
apologize for the delay, but given newly-confirmed leadership in the
NEA bureau, we expect to send this letter to you very soon.
Question. On April 20, 2022, I wrote a letter concerning U.S.
diplomats in the People's Republic of China (PRC), their families, and
other U.S. Government personnel under Chief of Mission authority being
subjected to unacceptable treatment by Chinese authorities under the
PRC's COVID-19 laws. When will I receive a response to this letter?
Please be specific.
Answer. The United States has no higher priority than the safety,
health, and well-being of U.S. citizens overseas, including U.S.
diplomats, their families, and other U.S. Government personnel. We are
actively working with and assisting our citizens, including Mission
personnel and their families, experiencing disruptions related to
recent COVID-19 outbreaks in China. The Department takes seriously the
responsibility to respond to Member inquiries. The Department has not
received the letter referenced and will respond upon receipt. Please
send the letter to [email protected].
If you have records to indicate that the letter was sent to the
Department, please notify us on where it was sent so we can remedy this
issue ASAP.
Question. I have also sent two letters to Ambassador Linda Thomas-
Greenfield who represents the United States to the United Nations and
have not received a response. On June 14, 2021, I and three other
senators wrote a letter to express serious concern over the systematic
and widespread human rights abuses perpetrated by the Iranian-backed
Houthis in Yemen. When will I receive a response to this letter? Please
be specific.
Answer. The Department of State makes every effort to respond
substantively and expeditiously to the many communications it receives
from Members of Congress. With regard to your letter expressing well-
founded concerns about the human rights environment in Yemen, I
understand a response from the Acting Assistant Secretary for
Legislative Affairs was sent to your office on October 28 of last year.
We are attaching that letter here.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Why has a response to my June 14, 2021 letter taken over
317 days?
Answer. The Department of State makes every effort to respond
substantively and expeditiously to the many communications it receives
from Members of Congress. With regard to your letter expressing well-
founded concerns about the human rights environment in Yemen, I
understand a response from the Acting Assistant Secretary for
Legislative Affairs was sent to your office on October 28 of last year.
We are attaching that letter here.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. On August 9, 2021, I and Senator Richard Durbin wrote a
letter to propose further action by the United States Government to
respond to the increasingly concerning situation in Belarus. Given
Russia's invasion of Ukraine from Belarussian territory, how will you
respond to their actions and when will I receive a response to this
letter? Please be specific.
Answer. We are committed to hold Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his
regime to account for their role in supporting Russia's war in Ukraine.
This has included sanctions action on Belarusian enterprises and
individuals, as well as export controls and visa restrictions. With
regard to your letter, I understand a response from the Acting
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs was sent to your office on
October 27 of last year. We are attaching that letter here.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Why has a response to my August 9, 2021 letter taken over
261 days?
Answer. The Department of State makes every effort to respond
substantively and expeditiously to the many communications it receives
from Members of Congress. With regard to your letter expressing well-
founded concerns about the situation in Belarus, I understand a
response from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs
was sent to your office on October 27 of last year. We are attaching
that letter here.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. I have submitted questions for the record to State
Department officials for previous hearings for which I have not
received responses, despite officials from more recent hearings having
submitted their answers to my questions. On March 9, 2022, I submitted
a series of questions for the record to Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs Victoria Nuland regarding Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. When will I receive a response to these questions? Please be
specific.
Answer. The Department of State makes every effort to respond
substantively and expeditiously to questions for the record submitted
by Members of Congress. The Department provided the questions for the
record from Under Secretary Nuland's hearing to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee May 9, 2022, prior to the May 10, 2022 hearing for
Ambassador Bridget Brink.
Question. The Biden administration continues to finalize and
prepare for the public roll-out of elements of its interagency `Africa
strategy.' Will this strategy be accompanied by a review of and, where
necessary, a request to Congress for the resources necessary to ensure
its successful implementation?
Answer. Aligning our resources to the ``U.S. Strategy toward Sub-
Saharan Africa'' is critical to ensuring the strategy's successful
implementation. We will conduct this alignment and resource review
through our regular strategic planning processes and budget requests. I
look forward to continued consultations with Congress on the resources
needed to advance U.S. interests in Africa, including staffing
requirements.
Question. On March 9, 2022, Senator Durbin and I introduced S. Res.
538, a bipartisan resolution expressing support for a second U.S.-
Africa Leaders' Summit, which would provide a significant opportunity
to strengthen ties with our African partners and build upon areas of
mutual interest. S. Res. 538 sought to build upon a speech you
delivered in Nigeria on November 19, 2021, in which you declared the
Biden administration's intention to host a second U.S.-Africa Leaders'
Summit ``to drive the kind of high-level diplomacy and engagement that
can transform relationships and make effective cooperation possible.''
Our resolution also reflected concern for the lack of publicly
available information about the Summit and the failure to include
Congress and other stakeholders in planning. What steps is the
Administration taking to build upon the first U.S.-Africa Leaders'
Summit, hosted during the Obama administration in 2014, and create more
regular, sustainable, and enduring engagement between top U.S.
Government, NGO, and private sector leaders, and those of our partner
African nations?
Answer. The next U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit will be hosted by
President Biden with whole-of-cabinet participation, as well as
bipartisan engagements with Members of Congress and official events
with civil society and the private sector. In line with the format of
the first U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit hosted in 2014, President Biden
will convene select heads of state from both North and sub-Saharan
Africa, including the African Union Commission Chair. We believe it is
critical to engage various stakeholders and partners by starting with a
series of listening sessions early in the process, and these
discussions have already been undertaken. Exact timing of the Summit is
still being evaluated and we look forward to a public announcement very
soon.
Question. How exactly has the Biden administration coordinated with
African leaders, the African Diaspora, and U.S. and African educational
institutions, private sector and civil society organizations, and
public policy institutions in planning for the Summit?
Answer. We, along with other members of the interagency, have had
listening sessions with members of the African diplomatic corps; the
African Union; members of the African diaspora; representatives from
educational institutions, including youth from the U.S. and the African
continent; and representatives from think tanks that focus on issues
pertaining to the African continent to hear their concerns for a new
and innovative leadership summit. Additional sessions are planned with
the private sector and civil society organizations. Their input will
help us develop a more innovative set of sessions for the summit.
Question. How does the Administration plan to engage governors,
mayors, and other leaders from U.S. states to ensure their active
participation in the Summit, with a view toward transforming our
relationship with our African partners, particularly in areas of trade
and investment?
Answer. We, along with other members of the interagency, have had
listening sessions with members of the African diplomatic corps; the
African Union; members of the African diaspora; representatives from
educational institutions, including youth from the U.S. and the African
continent; and representatives from think tanks that focus on issues
pertaining to the African continent to hear their concerns for a new
and innovative leadership summit. Additional sessions are planned with
the private sector and civil society organizations. Their input will
help us develop a more innovative set of sessions for the summit.
Question. What areas were identified by the Administration during
the EU-AU Summit in February as opportunities for the United States to
work with our transatlantic partners to tackle massive challenges,
including countering global malign actors, and building on the enormous
opportunities ahead for the African continent?
Answer. The United States and EU coordinate regularly to leverage
efforts and maximize impact. We are working with the EU to expand
cooperation on countering malign actors; responding to the COVID-19
pandemic; supporting peace and security, on the principal of
strengthening African defense capabilities; addressing the climate
crisis and facilitating energy transition from fossil fuels; fostering
economic development, including infrastructure and the digital economy;
and promoting democratization, good governance, and respect for human
rights, including gender equity.
Question. What resources does the Administration plan to commit,
and what mechanisms does it plan to create, to ensure that the U.S.-
African Leaders Summit is not merely an episodic event, but rather a
sustained initiative?
Answer. In the FY 2023 Budget, the Administration has requested
$230 million to projects to sustain initiatives related to ALS.
Question. The United Nations currently has six active peacekeeping
operations on the African continent: in Western Sahara (MINURSO);
Central African Republic (MINUSCA); Mali (MINUSMA); the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); the disputed area of Abyei (UNISFA);
and South Sudan (UNMISS). The Biden administration's FY2023 budget
includes $730 million to pay down ``arrears'' and requests authority to
waive the statutory 25 percent cap on U.S. contributions for United
Nations peacekeeping. While each UN mission in Africa plays an
important role in the maintenance of peace and security in a particular
country or sub-region, the United States is seeking to increase its
investment at a time when security dynamics are shifting rapidly.
Several peacekeeping operations remain the only viable option for
international or African regional responses to the peace and security
challenges. What are the most significant challenges facing existing UN
peacekeeping operations in Africa?
Answer. Peacekeeping missions facilitate post-conflict recovery by
protecting civilians, preserving security, and creating the space for
political solutions. While the UN Secretary-General and many Member
States stress the importance of peacekeeping missions supporting
political solutions, these are long-term endeavors that require
persistence, political will, and resources that are provided in a
timely manner. Political solutions to complex, recurring, and often
intractable conflicts in Africa take years to achieve and can challenge
the competing imperative to measure progress and plan an exit strategy
for peacekeeping missions. Disinformation, inter-communal conflict, and
armed group spoilers threaten to undermine progress in many African
peacekeeping missions.
Question. To what extent is the Department working with
counterparts at the United Nations to reform UN peacekeeping, including
by ensuring that operations are instruments that respond to immediate
needs and opportunities rather than as permanent fixtures?
Answer. The United States prioritizes peacekeeping effectiveness,
performance, and accountability to ensure that missions have realistic
and achievable mandates, host country cooperation, and the resources
and trained personnel to carry out their mandates. We actively led
efforts to adopt UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 2272 (2016) on
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and 2436 (2018) on performance.
UNSCR 2436 called for development of a comprehensive and integrated
performance policy framework to hold peacekeepers accountable for
patterns of underperformance and misconduct, including SEA. That
framework has been developed, and we are now pressing the UN to
implement it fully and consistently.
Question. How is the Administration working to ensure that
peacekeeping missions in Africa cooperate more closely with the
continent's multilateral bodies and host countries to ensure more
equitable burden sharing and timely transitions?
Answer. We support close cooperation between the UN, the African
Union (AU), and the AU's subsidiary Regional Economic Communities
(RECs), to advance more equitable burden sharing on peace and security
efforts in Africa. We also support cooperation and coordination between
UN peacekeeping missions and other UN agencies, funds, and programs,
which helps provide the foundation for sustainable transitions to a
Special Political Mission or UN Country Team.
Question. How does the Department measure the effectiveness of the
UN peacekeeping operations, and how does this factor into planning and
budgeting for related bilateral and regional U.S. peace and security
programs for Africa?
Answer. We use a variety of tools to measure the effectiveness of
UN peacekeeping operations, including valuable reporting from our
posts, the U.S. Mission to the UN, and, where appropriate, the U.S.
Mission to the African Union. We also conduct annual monitoring and
evaluation visits to missions to meet with stakeholders across all
levels and all functions of the mission, the host nation government,
other international actors, and civil society representatives to assess
the performance and effectiveness of these missions. We share reporting
and readouts from these visits with the interagency and use that
information to shape bilateral and regional peace and security program
planning efforts.
Question. In 2016, the African Union (AU) backed a proposal under
which AU member states would commit to covering an increased share of
the cost of African-led stabilization operations, in exchange for a
commitment, on a case-by-case basis, that the remainder of such costs
could be covered by assessed contributions for UN peacekeeping. In
2018, the three African members of the Security Council introduced a
draft resolution that could have paved the way for financing future AU-
led operations through UN assessed contributions under specific
conditions. The draft resolution did not advance to a vote. What is the
Biden administration's position on using UN assessed contributions to
fund AU-led stabilization operations?
Answer. The Biden administration is committed to working with the
AU and its member states to explore options for predictable and
sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations. This
includes the potential use of UN assessed contributions, in line with
the conditions outlined in UN Security Council Resolutions 2320 and
2378.
Question. What conditions would African countries and the AU need
to meet for the United States to support such an initiative at the
Security Council?
Answer. In order for the United States to consider supporting the
use of UN assessed contributions to support AU-led peace support
operations, the African Union would need to meet a number of
conditions. Key conditions include the African Union (1) recognizing
UNSC oversight over any mission partially financed through assessed
contributions; (2) adopting and implementing performance, human rights,
and conduct and discipline frameworks; and (3) paying at least 25
percent of the cost of any mission partially financed through assessed
contributions.
Question. Would the Biden administration support using UN assessed
contributions to fund AU-led stabilization operations without a UN
Security Council vote on each mandate?
Answer. The Biden administration would not support the use of UN-
assessed contributions to fund an AU-led peace support operation
without a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate. UN Security Council
(UNSC) oversight is one of the key preconditions of any agreement on
the use of UN assessed-funds for AU-led peace support operations.
Appropriate UN oversight bodies, including the UNSC through resolutions
authorizing mission mandates, must oversee UN funds.
Question. How would the Biden administration ensure transparency
and accountability in AU-led, UN-financed stabilization operations,
including in cases of sexual exploitation and abuse?
Answer. I will ensure the Department continues to communicate our
expectations regarding transparency and accountability in all
engagements with the African Union and its member states on the subject
of UN financing for AU-led peace support operations. We will continue
to use our seat on the Security Council to ensure future resolutions
maintain the conditions set forth under UN Security Council Resolutions
2320 and 2378, while also identifying opportunities to strengthen the
capabilities of the AU and its member states to implement frameworks
related to performance, accountability, and transparency.
Question. In updated, written responses to Questions for the Record
that you submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you committed
to working ``with the White House and relevant State Department bureaus
and offices to ensure that all posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are
sufficiently and consistently staffed with the appropriate personnel.''
While the process for nominating and confirming U.S. ambassadors is not
entirely within the Department's control, recruitment and placement of
junior and senior positions within the Africa Bureau and at U.S.
Missions in Africa is. Under your leadership, how has the Department
budgeted for and taken steps to ensure that Department ``sufficiently
and consistently'' staffs ``all posts'' in the region?
Answer. Recruiting and assignments of Foreign Service (FS) officers
are controlled by the Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM). We
expect to increase our FS hiring by at least 30 percent this fiscal
year from the previous year, which will be the highest FS hiring in a
decade. The Entry Level Division of GTM's Career Development and
Assignments Office works closely with the AF Bureau staff to ensure
entry-level positions in AF are filled in a timely manner. Similarly,
we strive to fill every available mid-level job in AF. However, the
pool of potential candidates for AF service is diminished due to
medical care and schooling concerns, particularly for parents of high
schoolers or children with special needs. The Department continues to
explore ways to remove such barriers to service. The majority of the
vacancies in AF are at the FS-02 and FS-03 level, which reflects both
the global shortage of FSOs due to reduced hiring and a Department-wide
shortage of specialists in IT, facilities management, security, and
office support.
Question. Several recent career State Department nominees put
forward to serve overseas in Africa, as well as here in Washington, DC,
have demonstrated little-to-no experience working on the African
continent. What steps is the Department taking to develop talent with
more significant experience in Africa?
Answer. We are always striving to send the best and the brightest
to serve as ambassadors worldwide. We take every opportunity to lobby
senior officers to seek ambassadorial assignments, using the HR system,
Department notices, and reaching out to affinity groups. AF is no
exception. Of 24 confirmed or nominated ambassadors, only three lack
prior service in Africa. Of those three, one has served as a principal
officer and has extensive management experience, one has served as a
DCM and as the NSC Office Director for Afghanistan, and the third is a
political appointee with a distinguished private sector career.
Question. What incentives has the Department employed or
contemplated for attracting more senior personnel, including
ambassadors, with extensive Africa experience, particularly for hard-
to-fill posts on the continent?
Answer. We regularly have ample interest in leadership positions
among senior career officers, as service in the African Affairs Bureau
is perceived to provide more opportunities for advancement. There are
no additional incentives specific to senior personnel. Due to security
concerns, several posts in Africa limit or prohibit accompanying family
members, which is a limiting factor for some senior foreign service
officers.
Question. Economic, Trade and Investment Policy in updated written
responses to Questions for the Record that you submitted to the
Committee on February 1, 2021, you stated that increased U.S. trade and
investment are ``critical to building stronger ties'' with Africa. How
has the United States increased its ties with African countries through
trade and investment under the Biden administration?
Answer. Under the Biden administration, the United States has
engaged Africa through a number of programs to increase trade and
investment. Prosper Africa has increased diaspora outreach and
financing opportunities, such as the San Francisco Employees'
Retirement System investing $100 million in clean energy solutions. The
Africa Women's Entrepreneurship Program is an incubator and networking
platform for African women entrepreneurs. Direct Line for American
Business provides information on opportunities and market conditions
abroad. The Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi) increases
women entrepreneurs' access to financing, markets, technology, and
networks.
Question. What more does the United States need to do to accelerate
these efforts?
Answer. The United States, while not a party to the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), supports its goals of enhancing
regional value chains and increasing African integration. We will
continue to support the AfCFTA to achieve sustainable economic
development, build regional value chains, and increase both
competitiveness and investment opportunities for mutual benefit. We
continue to engage the private sector to increase trade and investment
with Africa in pursuit of inclusive economic development, including by
supporting increased African utilization of the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA).
Question. You stated in the same written responses, ``In Africa, we
compete with China by ensuring that American companies can compete on
an even playing field, providing a meaningful alternative to China's
economic approach, promoting entrepreneurship and fair practices.'' Can
you provide specific examples where the United States has affected how
``we compete with China'' in Africa through the Prosper Africa
initiative?
Answer. Prosper Africa coordinates the tools and resources of the
U.S. Government to facilitate two-way trade and investment with Africa
and provide alternatives to PRC involvement. Embassy Deal Teams are an
integral part of this effort, assisting U.S. companies to identify and
close deals. The Djibouti Deal Team helped CR Energy Concepts close a
deal with the Government of Djibouti to construct a $190 million
renewable energy park--the first infrastructure project in Djibouti to
be built by a U.S. company. Another example involved Prosper Africa
advisors working with an Africa diaspora-owned company to secure
financing that enabled them to prevail over a Chinese competitor on a
cybersecurity contract.
Question. Do you have the resources and staffing--overseas and
domestically--to successfully manage the full range of public affairs,
public diplomacy, and strategic communications across sub-Saharan
Africa?
Answer. Our public diplomacy work across sub-Saharan Africa needs
additional resources and support. Overseas, the Bureau of African
Affairs has the second-largest number of Public Diplomacy Sections
(50), but ranks last in both the number of U.S. Direct Hire positions
and overall public diplomacy budget. Of those public diplomacy
sections, more than 40 percent are staffed by a single American
officer. AF is slated to receive six PD positions through the FY 2022
budgetary process, and the FY 2023 request includes 6 PD positions for
AF both in the field and in Washington. With your support, this will be
an important step to matching resources to priorities across sub-
Saharan Africa.
Question. What tools or authorities can Congress provide to help
support these important efforts?
Answer. Approving the President's FY 2023 budget request will help
ensure critical positions are open for recruitment as soon as possible.
After many years of being chronically understaffed, we view this
request as especially important in meeting needs across our missions
and within the Bureau of African Affairs in Washington. Global power
competitors have dedicated human and financial resources in Africa on a
scale that puts us at a distinct disadvantage in efforts to challenge
their influence and counter propaganda, disinformation, and malign
activities. As you and your colleagues consider a State Department
Authorization Bill this year, I encourage you to meet with our public
diplomacy leadership to best understand the constraints and challenges
we face.
Question. Is the Department considering appointing a U.S. Special
Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa? If not, what are the
Department's plans for managing the ever-complex crises and challenges
facing the Great Lakes and wider Central African region?
Answer. At this time, I do not plan to appoint a Special Envoy for
the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The Bureau of African Affairs and our
U.S. Ambassadors to the Great Lakes countries ensure our policy
objectives are aligned and our teams are coordinated to address the
complex crises and challenges in this region. This is a priority and
senior State Department officials are in close contact with Great Lakes
country leaders, the United Nations, and multilateral partners to
encourage progress on security, governance, economic development,
climate adaptation, and health infrastructure.
Question. Burundi: In March, the Burundi Human Rights Initiative
noted, ``2021 was not a good year for human rights in Burundi. The
national intelligence service tortured dozens of detainees, some of
whom died as a result. Others were forcibly disappeared or held
incommunicado. Many of the victims were opposition party members.'' The
Department's most recent annual country reports on human rights
practices noted for Burundi ``significant human rights abuses'' and
cited many cases of abuse committed by or on behalf of the Burundian
Government. The Biden administration terminated the Burundi Sanctions
Program in 2021, and opened up several aspects of the bilateral
relationship as part of an aggressive engagement policy with Evariste
Ndayishimiye's government. The comparative lack of vigor by the United
States in publicly addressing gross human rights abuses committed by
Burundi's Government under Ndayishimiye's leadership is notable. In
updated written responses to Questions for the Record that you
submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you stated, ``Our
Administration will restore democracy and human rights to the center of
U.S. foreign policy, including in Africa.'' Can you explain how the
Administration's current U.S. foreign policy approach to Burundi is
centered on democracy and human rights?
Answer. Prior to and since the termination of the Burundi Sanctions
Program in November 2021, the Department has consistently raised our
concerns in both Bujumbura and Washington about ongoing allegations of
human rights violations and abuses, the space for civil society, media
freedom, and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms. In
addition to continuing Embassy work on this issue, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lisa Peterson visited
Burundi in March 2022 where she pressed these issues directly with
government interlocutors and held numerous meetings with civil society
organizations and individuals working on good governance and human
rights.
Question. How has the Biden administration addressed, publicly,
openly, and with the same level of vigor as its diplomatic and
bilateral re-engagement with the Ndayishimiye's government, the glaring
record of human rights abuses committed against the Burundian people?
Answer. The Department regularly raises our concerns about
allegations of human rights violations and abuses in Burundi, both in
public and private. Our messaging and engagements by senior U.S.
officials in Bujumbura and Washington, interventions and support for
resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, and most recently, the
publication of the 2021 Burundi Country Report on Human Rights
Practices in April 2022, all demonstrate publicly the full range of
concerns we have about reported human rights violations and abuses in
the country. We will continue to publicly press the Government of
Burundi to improve the human rights situation in the country and use
all other appropriate tools to do so.
Question. How does the Ndayishimiye government's performance on
human rights abuses rate against other African governments in the East
Africa/Great Lakes region?
Answer. The Great Lakes Region of Africa continues to experience
widespread reports of human rights violations and abuses as covered in
the Department's 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Although the reports do not rank countries or draw comparisons across
them, Burundi's human rights record is concerning. The 2021 Burundi
Country Report on Human Rights Practices contains credible reports of
significant human rights issues including extrajudicial killings,
forced disappearances, torture, and restrictions on fundamental
freedoms. The Department continues to actively engage the Government of
Burundi and other regional governments on the importance of advancing
the protection of human rights.
Question. Which is more important to the Biden administration: the
reform-minded focus projected by the Ndayishimiye's government or its
well-documented human rights abuses?
Answer. I welcome the reforms undertaken by President Ndayishimiye
since June 2020. We are encouraging the Government of Burundi to
continue progress and deepen reforms, especially in the area of human
rights. Our messaging and engagements by senior U.S. officials in
Bujumbura and Washington, interventions and support for resolutions at
the UN Human Rights Council, and most recently, the publication of the
2021 Burundi Country Report on Human Rights Practices demonstrate our
concerns about reported human rights violations and abuses. We will
continue to press the Government of Burundi to ensure accountability
and respect for human rights, even as we engage in other areas to
advance the Government of Burundi's reforms.
Question. Does the Administration plan to re-designate, under other
U.S. sanctions or related accountability mechanisms, those individuals
previously designated under the Burundi Sanctions program terminated in
November 2021?
Answer. In line with our global commitment to promote respect for
human rights and accountability, the Department continues to consider
the use of all available tools to respond to any new or continuing
human rights violations and abuses in Burundi. These include assessing
the applicability of visa restrictions and economic sanctions,
including Section 7031(c) and the Global Magnitsky sanctions program,
in connection with allegations of serious human rights abuses. While we
do not preview potential visa restriction or sanctions actions, we
regularly assess individuals and entities reportedly involved in
serious human rights abuses for designation under appropriate
authorities.
Question. Cameroon: In updated written responses to Questions for
the Record related to Cameroon that you submitted to the Committee on
February 1, 2021, you stated, ``An end to violence, and accountability
for its perpetrators, is needed. It is important that children attend
school and that aid can be delivered. More broadly, political dialogue
is needed to resolve this ongoing conflict and to improve respect for
human rights. If confirmed, I will review the different tools we have
to press for a resolution of this conflict and to hold human rights
violators accountable, including sanctions.'' What specific actions has
the Department taken under your leadership to ``press for the
resolution of'' the Anglophone conflict and to ``hold human rights
violators accountable, including sanctions''?
Answer. I have directed our efforts to work with likeminded nations
to condemn violence against civilians in Cameroon by government and
nonstate actors and to urge an inclusive dialogue with a broad range of
stakeholders. We have imposed visa restrictions on those undermining
the peaceful resolution of the crisis and we have maintained
suspensions on U.S. security assistance and AGOA eligibility to
Cameroon. We continue to work within the interagency to hold
accountable individuals living in the United States for any illegal
actions that perpetuate violence. Ambassador Lamora in Yaounde has
underscored these principles and expectations in his full range of
engagements since arriving in country earlier this year.
Question. Does the Department continue to believe that the `Swiss
process' remains the most viable path to getting all parties to the
conflict to the table to agree to cease hostilities and find a
sustainable approach to peace?
Answer. We and likeminded partners, including the Swiss, continue
to encourage constructive actions by all parties to bring a peaceful
resolution to the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest regions. While
that process must be Cameroonian-owned to be successful, the
international community can play a positive role in facilitating a
resolution through continued engagement with key government officials
and a range of stakeholders, particularly those both in Cameroon and in
the diaspora who are actively seeking peaceful solutions for their
communities.
Question. What other avenues exist to end hostilities in the
Anglophone conflict and to begin working toward peace?
Answer. There are positively inclined actors in government, as well
as civil society members and others, who are pursing pathways to peace.
The government should accelerate decentralization and special status to
the Northwest/Southwest regions, as agreed during the 2019 Grand
National Dialogue. Armed groups must allow children to go to all
schools and end kidnappings, lockdown days, and forced contributions.
Diaspora leaders should demonstrate a willingness to engage peacefully
with a range of stakeholders in Cameroon, including the government, and
cease activities and statements that fuel violence. We encourage
exploring Cameroonian stakeholders' receptivity to facilitation from
senior, well-respected African leaders.
Question. What specific steps can the United States take--on its
own or in coordination with international and regional partners--to
help improve the conditions affecting the education of more than
700,000 children because of conflict in Cameroon?
Answer. We and likeminded partners have engaged Cameroon on the
need to ensure access to education throughout the country as a critical
step towards peace. Nonstate armed groups must cease the violence that
has prevented children from attending school. The government must
engage in an inclusive national dialogue to address the root causes of
the conflict, to include calls for access to bilingual education. We
support civil society working in education and humanitarian assistance,
and the World Bank's Prevention and Resilience Allocation, which seeks
to improve education access, among other fragility indicators. We also
work with UN and NGO partners to facilitate school enrollment of
displaced children in host communities.
Question. Central African Republic: In updated written responses to
Questions for the Record that you submitted to the Committee on
February 1, 2021, you committed to assessing ``what more can be done to
counter malign Russian influence in the CAR mining and security
sectors.'' After more than a year, what have you assessed regarding
``what more can be done to counter malign Russian influence the CAR
mining and security sectors''?
Answer. We have consistently raised concerns with President
Touadera related to CAR's partnership with the Kremlin-backed Wagner
Group, including human rights abuses by Wagner and national security
forces, which limits traditional partners' ability to work with the CAR
government. To address CAR's security needs, we support the UN mission
in CAR, which helps build the capacity of Central African security
forces and supports security sector reform. The Department engages with
the Kimberley Process, UN, and CAR authorities to prioritize
transparency in the mining sector. We are also exploring actions with
countries that import illicit minerals to limit Wagner and other
Yevgeny Prigozhin-linked entities' profitability.
Question. What specific actions has the Department taken under your
leadership to respond to these challenges in CAR?
Answer. To counteract the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and Yevgeny
Prigozhin-linked entities' destabilizing activities in CAR and Africa,
the bureaus of African and European affairs--along with our embassies
abroad, other Department offices, and interagency partners--have
coordinated closely to: (1) hinder Wagner's ability to operate with
impunity; (2) in meetings with African leaders and civil society,
spotlight Wagner's destabilizing activities; (3) engage with UN members
and offices to highlight Wagner's human rights abuses and obstruction
of the UN mission in CAR (MINUSCA); and (4) counter pro-Russian and
anti-UN disinformation in collaboration with partners.
Question. Chad: What is the United States doing to help restore
civilian rule in Chad, and does the Biden administration believe that
the military-led junta supports democratic rule?
Answer. Since April 2021, the United States has called for a
peaceful, timely transition of power to a democratically elected,
civilian-led government in Chad. I continue to support efforts,
diplomatic and through programming of modest appropriated resources,
that will lead to an inclusive national dialogue, constitutional
referendum, and free and fair elections, which includes reaching a
peace agreement between the Chadian transitional government and rebel
groups at the negotiations underway in Doha. Transitional Military
Council President Mahamat Deby has publicly stated his intentions not
to stand for election and that the Transitional Military Council will
cede power following elections--we must hold him to his pledge.
Question. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Do you believe the
funds committed to support the DRC's 2023 elections are sufficient,
given the importance the United States has placed on democratic and
economic reforms in post-Kabila policy toward the country?
Answer. The Administration is prioritizing support for free and
fair DRC 2023 elections, held within the prescribed constitutional
timelines and using inclusive electoral processes, as part of its
efforts to ensure that the U.S.-DRC Privileged Partnership for Peace,
Prosperity, and Preservation of the Environment (PP4PPP) delivers for
the Congolese and American people. USAID is supporting the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which provides
direct technical assistance to the DRC's electoral commission (CENI).
USAID and the Department of State are reviewing allocated resources to
determine if additional support is needed, including from other
international partners, ahead of the 2023 elections.
Question. Equatorial Guinea: Senior officials from the Biden
administration reportedly made several trips to Equatorial Guinea to
meet with the country's leaders about vital bilateral issues, but
chiefly to discuss reported plans by the People's Republic of China
(PRC) to increase military cooperation with and presence in this
coastal Central African state, located along the Atlantic Ocean. Does
the United States regard Equatorial Guinea as an ally? If so, why? If
not, why not?
Answer. Equatorial Guinea is a potential partner of the United
States in maritime security and other areas. The United States has not
worked closely with the Equatoguinean Government for many years. We are
still evaluating what new bilateral initiatives will achieve our aims.
What we do know is that our nonengagement has not affected the desired
change. As we have stepped up our level of cooperation with Equatorial
Guinea over the past year, we are affording them an opportunity to
change their mindsets and behaviors by word and deed and become a more
responsible partner.
Question. The Government of Equatorial Guinea is authoritarian,
notoriously corrupt, and has one of the worst human rights records in
the world. Does the Biden administration regard the government as a
reasonable actor with whom the United States can engage in normal
diplomatic relations to address our reported national security concerns
regarding the PRC?
Answer. Promotion of respect for human rights and good governance
remain central to our efforts and is a cornerstone of U.S. policy
towards Equatorial Guinea. We prioritize the fight against corruption
globally and seek real commitment from the Government of the Republic
of Equatorial Guinea to counter the corruption that threatens security,
economic equity, and development. We welcome greater partnership across
the full spectrum of Equatoguinean society to advocate for responsive
governance that will increase transparency and promote respect for
human rights.
Question. At what point in the reported developing military and
security relationship between Equatorial Guinea and the PRC would the
United States publicly regard the Central African country as a threat
to the United States and change its policy approach to treat the
government as such?
Answer. The United States does not expect the Government of the
Republic of Equatorial Guinea to end partnerships with other countries,
but we have made clear that certain potential steps involving PRC-
basing activity would raise U.S. national-security concerns both for
the United States and Equatorial Guinea's neighbors.
Question. What current or planned regional initiatives are the
United States using or developing to counter the reported threats posed
by an increased PRC military presence in Equatorial Guinea and,
potentially, the wider littoral region along Africa's Atlantic Coast?
Answer. We share the concern of our African and European partners
over potential militarization of the Gulf of Guinea. This includes the
possible construction of a PRC military installation. We engage
frequently with countries facing security challenges in the maritime
domain. Our long-term and emerging partnerships with African states are
vital for addressing immediate threats such as trafficking and piracy
and building capacity in the region to ensure long-term security and
economic growth. We would like to support Equatorial Guinea and other
African states to collaborate on shared concerns, including maritime
security, support for blue economies, and environmental preservation.
Question. Rwanda: In updated written responses to Questions for the
Record that you submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you
committed through your team to follow closely Paul Rusesabagina's case
in Rwanda. In your comment regarding the issue, you also noted, ``I
will make clear that the human rights of all prisoners, including Paul
Rusesabagina, should be respected.'' Understanding that Deputy
Secretary Wendy Sherman and other Department officials recently made
direct reference to Rusesabagina's trial and treatment to Rwanda's
Foreign Minister, have you ever personally made clear to any Rwandan
officials that ``the human rights of all prisoners, including Paul
Rusesabagina, should be respected''?
Answer. The Department presses the Government of Rwanda (GOR) to
respect the human rights of all prisoners. Mr. Rusesabagina's case
highlights the critical importance of fair trial guarantees and all
applicable legal protections that Rwanda owes to all persons. We remind
the GOR that these guarantees and protections are recognized in
applicable domestic laws of Rwanda, as well as in Rwanda's
international obligations as a party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. In addition, the publication of the 2021
Rwanda Country Report on Human Rights Practices communicates the full
range of concerns we have about reported human rights violations and
abuses, including those related to prisoner conditions and treatment.
Question. Do you plan to raise this matter of Paul Rusesabagina
personally to Rwandan officials at your next opportunity?
Answer. The Department regularly engages the Government of Rwanda
on this case at high levels in both Kigali and Washington, and we
evaluate all diplomatic engagements with Rwanda with this case in mind.
In recent months, we escalated our engagement to senior level U.S.
Government officials, including the Deputy Secretary and the USAID
Administrator. We will continue to evaluate all appropriate
opportunities for engagement in the future that could lead to the
release of Mr. Rusesabagina.
Question. The Horn of Africa in the updated written responses to
the Questions for the Record you submitted to the Committee on February
1, 2021, you agreed when asked if the United States would better serve
its national security interests in the region if we had a more
comprehensive and coordinated interagency approach toward the Greater
Horn of Africa. Throughout your tenure as Secretary, the complexities
and acute need for such an approach have only grown. Under your
leadership as Secretary, what specific actions have the Department, and
the broader Biden administration, taken to ensure a more comprehensive
and coordinated interagency approach regarding the Greater Horn of
Africa?
Answer. I appointed a U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa in
April 2021 to boost our international diplomatic effort in addressing
the broader political, security, and humanitarian crises in the Horn of
Africa. Since then, we have seen some positive steps in de-escalating
the conflict and improving humanitarian access in Ethiopia, as well as
in coordinating a humanitarian response to the drought in the region.
We will continue this work, while also focusing on supporting a
democratic transition in Sudan, mitigating the negative impact of
Eritrea's activities in the region, and addressing other regional and
transnational issues.
Question. Do you believe the Administration used the U.S. Special
Envoy for the Horn of Africa adequately to address the myriad of
challenges in the region beyond just those in Ethiopia and Sudan?
Answer. The Special Envoy and his team have been critical in
addressing several transnational and transregional challenges that are
beyond the scope of any single U.S. embassy in the region. In addition
to his work on internal crises in Ethiopia and Sudan, the Special Envoy
has been a key interlocutor with Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia on the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and maintained close contacts
with Gulf states who play a key role in various issues in the region.
Question. Would the United States having a more dedicated Special
Envoy or another senior advisor better serve our response to crises in
Ethiopia and Sudan, particularly given crises elsewhere in the Horn of
Africa region?
Answer. The Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa (SEHOA) and his
team have done well in advancing U.S. interests and assisting in the
de-escalation and resolution of various crises in the region. The
current SEHOA office remains well-suited for the challenges we face,
and we remain open to adjusting as needed.
Question. Eritrea: What is the U.S. policy toward containing the
malign and increasingly destabilizing role of Eritrean President Isaias
Afwerki in the Horn of Africa region, including Eritrea's growing
cooperation with China and other malign regional actors?
Answer. Eritrea's continued intervention in the conflict in
northern Ethiopia and the horrendous human rights abuses Eritrean
forces have committed there threaten regional stability. The United
States has consistently and publicly called for Eritrean forces to
withdraw from Ethiopia. We have imposed financial and other sanctions
on Eritrea for obstructing efforts to resolve the conflict and for
committing human rights violations. We are closely monitoring Eritrea's
growing diplomatic relationship with strategic competitors, including
the PRC and Russia.
Question. Ethiopia: How is the United States holding those
countries or foreign contractors accountable that have and continue to
sell lethal drone and other weapons systems to the parties to the
conflict in northern Ethiopia?
Answer. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) has announced sanctions on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and its expeditionary unit, the IRGC Qods Force,
for, among other things, proliferating lethal UAVs to Ethiopia.
The United States encourages other countries to impose restrictions
on defense trade with Ethiopia and Eritrea. On November 1, 2021, the
Department of State amended the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) to codify that it is the policy of the United States
to deny licenses and other approvals for exports of defense articles
and defense services to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence,
or other internal security forces of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Question. What metrics is the United States using to gauge the
progress and intention of the major parties to the conflict in northern
Ethiopia regarding existing efforts towards, provision of humanitarian
access, and accountability for atrocities committed in the course of
the conflict?
Answer. The United States uses a combination of metrics and
benchmarks to help gauge the intention of the parties to the conflict.
Examples of metrics are the number of trucks entering Tigray or the
amount of cash approved for humanitarian NGOs. Benchmarks, which we
associate with the steps required for the Ethiopian Government to
restore African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) benefits, include
engaging in ceasefire talks, allowing unhindered humanitarian
assistance, and granting access to human rights monitors. The United
States uses these to complement statements and concrete actions by the
parties, such as ceasing airstrikes on the part of the Ethiopian
Government or withdrawing forces into Tigray on the part of the TPLF.
Question. Do you agree or disagree that there is important value in
the United States providing a clear determination regarding the
atrocities committed during the conflict in northern Ethiopia? Please
explain.
Answer. Making a determination that atrocity crimes have occurred
is an important tool available to the Secretary of State. In the case
of the conflict in northern Ethiopia, we believe a diplomatic
resolution is the most effective means to halt and prevent atrocities
in the immediate term. This is our urgent priority, and we are actively
working to that end. Throughout the conflict, we have repeatedly called
out alleged human rights abuses as credible evidence has been reported
or shared. This is why we support the independent UN commission of
experts and encourage the government to allow them access to the
country.
Question. Kenya plans to hold general elections in August 2022,
which we expected to be contentious, have a strong ethnic dimension,
and risk likely violence. How is the U.S. engaging with Kenya's leaders
in the lead up to these elections, and what specific efforts is the
Administration making to help ensure the country holds free, fair,
credible, transparent and peaceful elections?
Answer. The United States continues to promote free, fair, and
peaceful elections in Kenya through our diplomatic engagement,
programs, and public messages. Our Charge d'Affaires, a.i. in Nairobi
and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs have engaged directly
with the two leading presidential candidates to underscore our
expectations that they will support a free, fair, and peaceful election
in word and deed. President Biden and Secretary Blinken met directly
with President Uhuru Kenyatta to encourage a peaceful transition of
power. Together with the UK and other likeminded partners, we are
working with the government and civil society to strengthen civic
education, improve electoral processes and oversight, increase human
rights protections, and mitigate violence.
Question. Somalia: Does the Department view Somaliland as a viable
candidate for a closer defense and security partnership in the Horn of
Africa region?
Answer. There are prospects for closer security and defense
cooperation with Somaliland nested within the framework of our single
Somalia policy given our recognition of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The Department is
implementing border security and financial intelligence capacity
building and collaborated with Somaliland on man-portable air defense
system collection and destruction. We have offered to discuss
additional security assistance with Somaliland within the framework of
our single Somalia policy and strategy.
Question. What specific steps has the Department taken, or plan to
take, to build a stronger defense and security relationship with
Somaliland?
Answer. In 2021, the Bureau of Counterterrorism offered targeted
border security and watch listing assistance to Somaliland and began a
program to strengthen the Bank of Somaliland Financial Intelligence
Unit's capacity to combat terrorist financing and money laundering. The
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provided
technical assistance on vessel boarding, search, and seizure operations
and maintenance to the Somaliland Coast Guard to increase Somaliland's
capacity to patrol coastal waters, interdict illicit goods, and
cooperate with land-based police investigators, as well as provided
limited communications and maritime patrol equipment.
Question. In a recent Congressional Notification from USAID, there
was a distinct change of focus in programming from Somalia's federal
government in Mogadishu toward Federal Member States and structures.
Does this reflect a broader U.S. policy change regarding Somalia?
Answer. The United States supports the development of effective
democratic institutions at all levels of the Somali Government. USAID's
FY 2021 Congressional Notification is consistent with last year's
requests for two priorities: (1) addressing the structural conditions
that allow violent extremist organizations such as al-Shabaab to
maintain a foothold in Somali society; and (2) reducing chronic
humanitarian need that compromises the wellbeing and stability of the
Somali people. The Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration via partners engages with all regional administrations in the
parameters of the U.S. Government's single Somalia policy.
Question. Tanzania: Has the Department assessed Tanzanian President
Samia Suluhu Hassan's role in eroding the country's democratic
institutions and suppressing opposition voices and democratic actors
while she served as Vice President of Tanzania under the administration
of President John Pombe Magufuli? Please explain.
Answer. As former President Magufuli's vice president, President
Hassan publicly supported many of his policies that undermined
democratic institution, although while serving in this role, President
Hassan was not involved in many major policy decisions of the Magufuli
administration. Since assuming the presidency, President Hassan has
changed the government's tone and rhetoric, re-engaged with the
international community, loosened media restrictions, and engaged with
opposition leaders. The Department remains cautiously optimistic about
President Hassan's willingness to engage on more substantive democratic
reforms.
Question. Has the Department determined if President Hassan bears
any responsibility for the anti-democratic actions and rights abuses
that occurred under the previous president?
Answer. As former President Magufuli's vice president, President
Hassan publicly supported policies that resulted in the shrinking of
democratic and civil society space, limits on media freedom, and the
rise in politically motivated violence that occurred during the
Magufuli presidency. Given that President Hassan has changed the
government's tone and rhetoric, re-engaged with the international
community, loosened media restrictions, and engaged with opposition
leaders, we are focused on working constructively with President
Hassan's government to support a political environment that protects
democratic institutions, civil and political rights, and human rights,
including as related to accountability.
Question. What benchmarks is the Biden administration using to
gauge the level and pace of U.S. re-engagement with Tanzania under
President Hassan's government?
Answer. We are assessing the direction of President Hassan's
administration using a variety of factors, including the following: (1)
substantive improvements to democracy, human rights, and governance,
including changes to legislation; (2) Tanzania's level of re-engagement
with the international community; (3) progress on anti-trafficking-in-
persons efforts; (4) improving responsible security cooperation; (5)
improving the investment climate; (6) continued efforts to mitigate the
spread of COVID-19; (7) improving the environment for refugees; and (8)
Zanzibar addressing 2020 election violence, electoral reform, and
political reconciliation.
Question. Uganda: The Department's most recent annual country
reports on human rights practices noted for Uganda, ``human rights
organizations, opposition politicians, and local media reported that
security agencies tortured suspects as well as dissidents to extract
self-incriminating confessions and as punishment for their opposition
to the government, leading to several deaths.'' Why has this
Administration been slow to act with available tools beyond Global
Magnitsky sanctions on one individual to hold those in Uganda's
security agencies and government accountable for the long-running and
ongoing trend of torture to suppress democratic actors in Uganda?
Answer. The Department remains gravely concerned about credible
allegations of the use of torture by Ugandan security forces. In March,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Lisa
Peterson conveyed these concerns during her trip to Uganda and urged
government officials to seek accountability for alleged abuses. In
April 2021, the Department announced an INA Section 212(a)(3)(C) visa
restriction policy for persons whose actions undermine Ugandan
democracy, ``including through use of violence and excessive force
against opposition candidates and supporters.'' Since then, we have
designated numerous individuals and continue to assess others under
this authority and other authorities at our disposal.
Question. Angola: Angola's ruling People's Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the government's security and
intelligence services have a long record of manipulating and
interfering in electoral processes in their country for their political
benefit. During the current electoral cycle, in the lead-up to the
polls in August, worrying signs of history repeating have emerged. How
is the United States engaging with the Angolan Government to encourage
the country to hold free, fair, credible, and transparent democratic
elections in August, free from interference from the Angolan security
forces and intelligence services?
Answer. We have consistently communicated to high-level Angolan
officials, including to President Lourenco, the desire to see free,
fair and transparent elections, including the timely provision to
accommodate international observers. Deputy Secretary of State Sherman
emphasized these same points during her recent travel to Angola and
meeting with President Lourenco. In response, President Lourenco has
said Angola will allow international observers and facilitate their
applications for the credentials they need before election day. U.S.
assistance programs have also supported civil society groups and all
political parties working with the public to increase civic engagement.
Question. What specific steps is the Department contemplating to
hold election spoilers accountable, and how is the United States
communicating this to Angolan officials?
Answer. In the months leading up to the elections, U.S. officials
have repeatedly raised and will continue to emphasize with Angolan
officials that electoral transparency and integrity are fundamental
priorities and hallmarks of a democratic nation. The Department will
continue to use engagement around its annual Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices and periodic Bilateral Dialogues on Human Rights to
hold Angola accountable on issues including anti-corruption, access to
justice and accountability for past abuses, expansion of democratic
governance, and protection of fundamental freedoms.
Question. Hakainde Hichilema's presidential victory in 2021 served
as a critical moment in both Zambia and the region's democratic
development. The success or failure of President Hichilema's presidency
will hinge on his reforms, approach to governance, and an essential
factor not entirely within his control--restructuring Zambia's
approximately $17.3 billion in external debt, of which Chinese state
and commercial creditors account for about one-third. How is the United
States supporting the government of Hakainde Hichilema to deleverage
their country from the stranglehold of Chinese debt?
Answer. The United States uses its position on Zambia's creditor
committee to call for an immediate end to Beijing's intransigence on
multilateral debt restructuring negotiations. Deputy Secretary Wendy
Sherman met the Zambian Foreign Minister and Treasury Secretary on May
19 to discuss a coordinated response to Beijing's continued
obstructionism. Our public and private diplomacy has highlighted the
centrality of private sector-led growth to sustainable development in
Zambia. Under Secretary Jose Fernandez conveyed this message to
President Hichilema and U.S. business leaders during his May 12-13
visit to Lusaka. We are also pursuing programs that help Zambia
scrutinize PRC contracts and expose problematic debt.
Question. What steps can the United States take alongside its like-
minded allies to support Zambia's democratic consolidation under
President Hichilema while also minimizing the country's exposure to
China's (often-malign) influence?
Answer. Public, private, and financial support for accountability
institutions, civil society, and independent media will bolster
Zambia's democratic resilience. The United States can work with
likeminded partners to develop and deploy targeted programs in support
of Zambia's Summit for Democracy Year of Action commitments to enshrine
media freedoms, protect civil liberties, and strengthen the
independence and transparency of the Elections Commission of Zambia.
Supporting the government's planned fiscal reforms with an emphasis on
transparency and reducing opportunities for corruption will help re-
establish fiscal stability and deliver a ``democratic dividend'' to the
Zambian people.
Question. How is the United States supporting the continuation of
multi-party democracy in Zambia to continue the consolidation of
democracy in Zambia and ensure checks and balances on the Hichilema
administration?
Answer. U.S.-funded programming advances the decentralization of
power in Zambia, moving decision-making and critical services from the
capital city to local governments. Embassy officials work closely with
civil society and media, government, and political parties to improve
the legal and regulatory framework for elections, political reforms,
and greater transparency in public resource allocation. U.S. technical
assistance and financial support also build the viability and quality
of independent media and the capacity of civil society organizations to
monitor government actions and ensure citizen perspectives are
considered. Our support for Zambia's participation in the Summit for
Democracy will also spur democratic reforms.
Question. In the updated written responses to the Questions for the
Record you submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you
committed to assessing ``the current U.S. approach to Zimbabwe,
including opportunities for greater regional engagement'' and to
``review the sanctions program as well as our democracy assistance
(political party support, anti-corruption work, and support to the
media).''
After more than a year as Secretary and with potentially violent
undemocratic general elections held in Zimbabwe in 2023, what has been
your assessment of the current U.S. approach to Zimbabwe, particularly
opportunities for African regional engagement?
Answer. I share the Committee's concern around ongoing democratic
backsliding and potential for escalating violence in advance of the
2023 general elections. The current U.S. approach to Zimbabwe supports
democratic governance programs that improve electoral processes, refine
citizen advocacy strategies, and enhance public accountability
measures. We will continue these programs while leveraging our targeted
sanctions to promote accountability for corrupt actors and those who
abuse human rights and undermine democratic processes. We will continue
to work with regional governments, civil society organizations, and
likeminded partners to increase the pressure on the Government of
Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human rights.
Question. What conclusions have you drawn regarding the U.S.
approach to sanctions on Zimbabwean officials and entities and our
democracy assistance, notably supporting strengthening political
parties?
Answer. The U.S. approach to sanctions promotes accountability of
corrupt actors and those who abuse human rights and undermine
democratic processes. Our democracy assistance improves electoral
processes, refines citizen advocacy strategies, and enhances public
accountability. We do not currently support strengthening political
parties in Zimbabwe due to the assessment that it would not be
effective so close to 2023 elections, and that it could bolster a
perception that we are intent on regime change vice free and fair
elections. We will continue democratic governance programs, working
with civil society, regional governments, and likeminded partners to
increase the pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe to respect
democratic principles and human rights.
Question. What changes to U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe occurred
under the Biden administration?
Answer. U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe has been clear and consistent
during the Biden-Harris administration and several prior
administrations. We call on the Government of Zimbabwe to respect the
fundamental freedoms enshrined in Zimbabwe's 2013 constitution and
required through its international commitments. We publicly voice
support for those who speak out against government corruption and
abuses. We leverage our targeted sanctions program to deter bad acts
and promote accountability for bad actors. We support many democracy-
assistance programs and work with civil society, regional governments,
and likeminded partners to increase pressure on the Government of
Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human rights.
Question. The Sudans: Are there plans to appoint a Special Envoy to
Sudan and South Sudan following the departure of Ambassador Booth from
the role in late 2021?
Answer. Both Sudan and South Sudan remain a policy focus for the
Biden-Harris administration. Assistant Secretary Phee is actively
engaged on developing and implementing administration policy on both
countries and, in the case of Sudan, coordinates closely with the
Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa. The Administration continues to
monitor the situation in both countries closely and engage at senior
levels to achieve policy objectives.
Question. Are there plans to reorganize the Bureau of African
Affairs to eliminate the Office of South Sudan and Sudan?
Answer. Both Sudan and South Sudan remain a policy focus for the
Biden-Harris administration. Assistant Secretary Phee is actively
engaged on developing and implementing Administration policy on both
countries. There are no plans to eliminate the Office of South Sudan
and Sudan.
Question. Sudan: Why is the United States not leading the charge in
restoring Sudan's civilian-led transition to democracy, but instead
supporting a diplomatic and political path that continues to entrench
military-led rule and the restoration of officials from the autocratic
regime of Omar al-Bashir?
Answer. The United States continues to lead in pressing for the
establishment of a civilian-led transition to democracy in Sudan. We
have been clear that the military needs to cede authority to civilian
leadership and exit politics in line with the views of the Sudanese
people. We are supporting an inclusive political process facilitated by
UNITAMS, the AU, and IGAD as the best vehicle to establish a framework
for civilian leadership of the transition. In coordination with the
Friends of Sudan, we are increasing financial pressure on the military
leadership by maintaining a pause on certain international assistance
and debt relief and will continue to use, as appropriate, available
domestic authorities to apply sanctions on persons responsible for,
inter alia, serious human rights abuse such as the Central Reserve
Police.
Question. What steps is the Administration taking to hold
accountable those military and security officials responsible for the
October 2021 coup in Sudan that resulted in the ousting of the
civilian-led transitional government?
Answer. Immediately following the military takeover, the United
States paused new obligations from the $700 million in Title IX ESF
while evaluating next steps. We subsequently redirected certain foreign
assistance to avoid benefitting the Government of Sudan. We also worked
with international partners to encourage them to do the same, including
pausing debt relief, and have engaged with the international financial
institutions in this regard. The United States sanctioned the Sudanese
Central Reserve Police (CRP) to impose costs on those perpetrating
serious human rights abuse, including the use of lethal force against
protesters. We remain poised to use all tools at our disposal to
support the Sudanese people in their pursuit of a democratic and
prosperous Sudan that respects human rights.
Question. At the end of 2020, Congress appropriated $700 million in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the FY21 budget to support Sudan's
democratic transition. Due to delays in programming the $700 million,
and the October 25, 2021 coup that removed Sudan's civilian leadership
from power, the majority of the $700 million remains unobligated and is
set to expire on September 30, 2022. What are the Department's
priorities for the balance of the $700 million in ESF for Sudan?
Answer. The Administration is planning for the FY 2021 $700 million
in Title IX Economic Support Funds that Congress appropriated. Our
plans focus on areas that we assess are most likely to establish and
further a civilian-led transition to democracy in Sudan. Priorities
include support to the tripartite facilitated and/or related
negotiation processes; democracy, human rights, and governance;
accountability and transparency; peacebuilding in the peripheries; and
food security and resilience. We have initiated consultations with
Congressional committee staff and look forward to working closely with
Congress to shape priorities and programs.
Question. Is the Administration considering options for using the
balance of the $700 million that do not directly involve Sudan, the
broader Horn of Africa, or the African continent? If so, please
explain.
Answer. The Administration's priority is to work with Congress to
use these funds in a responsible way to establish and further a
civilian-led transition to democracy in Sudan and are continuing our
planning in that regard. All of the funds in the draft spend plan are
for Sudan at this time.
Question. South Sudan: Does the Administration regard President
Salva Kiir as the legitimate democratic leader of the Republic of South
Sudan? Please explain your answer.
Answer. While not democratically elected, Salva Kiir is the
President of the Republic of South Sudan during the transitional period
as agreed by the signatories of the Revitalized Agreement on the
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan signed on
September 12, 2018. The transitional period originally planned for 36
months has been extended to February 2023.
Question. As discussed in my S. Res. 380, which passed the Senate
by unanimous consent on December 9, 2021, the United States spends more
than $1 billion per year on the fallout of the conflict in South Sudan,
mostly for humanitarian assistance and through contributions to the UN
peacekeeping mission UNMISS. In 2018, President Trump called for a
review of U.S. assistance to South Sudan, to ensure that U.S. funds are
not contributing to the war economy or inadvertently perpetuating
conflict.
What is the status of the assistance review begun under the Trump
administration with the State Department as the lead agency underway?
Answer. The Administration is concluding our assessment of the
assistance review of South Sudan proposed by the prior administration
and will be sharing data from that review with Congress in due course.
The Administration is committed to ensuring that foreign assistance
programs in South Sudan are consistent with our objectives to promote
political, economic, and security sector reform. The Department will
continue to work with the NSC, USAID, and others to ensure that
programs are strategic, effective, and have adequate oversight to
mitigate risks of diversion or obstruction of aid or perpetuation of
kleptocratic governance.
Question. What policies is the Department pursuing to reduce the
need for U.S. humanitarian assistance to South Sudan due to persistent
conflict?
Answer. Pursuing the sustainment of the permanent ceasefire and
advancing political, economic, and security sector reforms are our key
policies objectives and are necessary to reduce South Sudan's
dependence on international humanitarian assistance. To further these
policy objectives, the Department regularly presses South Sudan's
leaders to expand political space, to advance legal and policy reforms
necessary to establish functioning government institutions, and to end
ongoing human rights violations and abuses. The United States--in
rotation with Norway and the United Kingdom--co-chairs South Sudan's
Public Financial Management Oversight Committee and uses this forum to
press the South Sudanese Government to use its resources transparently
for the benefits of its citizens. We continue to support financially
the regional mechanisms responsible for monitoring and verifying South
Sudan's peace agreement and its associated ceasefire, and as a vocal
participant in those mechanisms we continue to press all sides to live
up to their obligations under the peace agreement, including through
the advancement of promised security sector reforms.
Question. Is the United States discussing any novel policy
approaches to South Sudan related to the country's leaders, the peace
agreement (R-ARCSS), and pervasive corruption?
Answer. The United States, in close consultation with our
international partners, is actively working on a range of policy
initiatives to support the South Sudanese people's demands for
meaningful political and economic transformation in their country. This
includes helping the people in South Sudan establish the necessary
conditions to allow them to choose their leaders freely and to hold
leaders accountable for their actions.
Question. The Sahel: Which Sahelean country is the most stable and
reliable U.S. security and diplomatic partner? Please explain why.
Answer. The United States engages with the countries of the Sahel
to advance our security, diplomatic, and economic interests. Niger and
Mauritania stand out as key partners that are stable democracies
focused not only on security, but on improving citizen-responsive
governance to ensure longer-term stability and prosperity. Niger is a
reliable and willing partner with a firm commitment to democratic
processes. It is a member of the Multinational Joint Task Force, the G-
5 Sahel Joint Force, and the D-ISIS Coalition, where it co-chairs the
Africa Focus Group. Our engagement with Mauritania focuses on shoring
up a key U.S. ally and reformist government in the Sahel, one that can
serve as a model of good governance and countering violent extremism in
the region.
Question. In the updated written responses to the Questions for the
Record you submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you stated
that you were ``concerned about rising violent extremism, growing
humanitarian concerns, and increasing governance challenges in the
Sahel.''After more than a year as Secretary, what has the Department
done to address your concerns in the Sahel?
Answer. The Department participated extensively in a National
Security Council process to finalize a 5-year Sahel Strategy. The
strategy is based on the assessment that instability in the Sahel is a
political problem with security implications, thereby necessitating a
greater governance-focused solution. Given the persistent, negative
trend lines for stability in the region, we see this as a moment to
address the root causes and core grievances in the region to support
stability. Senior leaders from Washington have joined our embassies in
pressing for political and development reforms, urging accountability
in security efforts, and identifying openings for greater security and
development support. We joined the Sahel Alliance in order to better
coordinate with partners on non-security projects for long-term
stability. Without more resources, however, our impact will be limited.
Question. Should the Biden administration appoint a U.S. Special
Envoy for the Sahel to better address and coordinate the United States'
response to this myriad of challenges?
Answer. At this time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for West
Africa is undertaking the activities of the Special Envoy role. The
remit for the Sahel as part of the broader West Africa allows better
integration of efforts across the Sahel and Coastal West Africa, which
I view as an asset as threats from the Sahel spread. The DAS is in
constant engagement with the Sahel Special Envoys of our closest
partners and travels regularly to the region. The Department hosts
monthly interagency meetings with our embassies across the Sahel to
ensure policy synergy. Central to our approach, as codified in the
Sahel Strategy, is working closely with international partners to
address drivers of conflict, with an emphasis on support for African
institutions and mechanisms.
Question. Given the equally daunting and complex challenges in West
Africa and the Sahel, should the Department have two deputy assistant
secretary positions--one for the Sahel and one West Africa?
Answer. We are increasingly concerned by the spread of insecurity
emanating from the Sahel into Coastal West Africa. A deputy assistant
secretary responsible for the Sahel as part of the broader West Africa
region allows us to look at this problem-set as a whole. It provides
for a more holistic analysis of the drivers of conflict and the means
to address those drivers while keeping our embassies in the field
apprised of critical developments in their region. A single deputy
assistant secretary helps us to maintain policy consistency on cross-
cutting issues and streamlines officers and offices with Sahel and West
Africa equities. It also allows us to engage, leverage, and support
West Africa's primary regional bloc, the Economic Community of West
African States, from a shared perspective.
Question. If having a separate Deputy Assistant Secretary is not
possible, should the Department consider a more dedicated Sahel
coordinator to divide the large workload of the Sahel and wider West
Africa region?
Answer. Given the dynamic interplay between the Sahel and the
broader West Africa region, as well as the Economic Community of West
African States' (ECOWAS) active engagement on the Sahel, the Department
assesses that retaining a Deputy Assistant Secretary to cover the Sahel
and the wider West Africa region remains preferable. The Deputy
Assistant Secretary for West Africa currently advances efforts in the
Sahel, as guided by the Sahel Strategy as well as collaborates with the
interagency, which include our Sahelian Embassies, via daily policy
coordination in Washington. With appropriate staffing, this arrangement
optimally advances U.S. interests.
Question. Nigeria: Should the United States support strengthening
the institutions of political parties in Nigeria's democratic system?
If so, how? If not, why not?
Answer. The United States believes political parties constitute an
important component of Nigeria's democratic evolution. Ahead of
Nigeria's 2023 general elections, we are focusing our election support
on providing technical assistance to Nigeria's independent electoral
commission and bolstering civil society capacity. One objective of our
support to civil society is to promote public discourse and encourage a
greater focus on issue-based politics. We engage on a regular basis
with Nigeria's leaders, including during my November trip to Abuja, to
urge continued steps towards a more responsive and transparent
political system.
Question. Why is it in the national interests of the United States
to sell AH-1Z Cobra attack helicopters to Nigeria?
Answer. The primary goal of U.S.-Nigerian security cooperation is
to build a more professional and accountable Nigerian Armed Forces
(NAF) that respects human rights and protects civilians. Military
assistance is only one aspect--albeit a critical one--of addressing
Nigeria's security crises. This potential sale of a more modern
platform fulfills the NAF's requirement for a close air support
capability to advance Nigerian and U.S. shared interests of defeating
terrorist forces, protecting humanitarian convoys, defending vulnerable
communities, and reducing the risk of civilian casualties. Furthermore,
this sale builds on the successful A-29 Super Tucano sale and the
subsequent training and engagement between DoD and the NAF.
Question. How will the Administration monitor Nigeria's adherence
to human rights-related commitments to the United States and
specifically related to equipment provided through U.S. foreign
military sales and security assistance?
Answer. The Administration consistently raises the importance of
respect for human rights and accountability for human rights violations
and abuses at all levels of the Nigerian Government. We also consult an
array of Nigerian and international civil society organizations to
understand their perspectives on Nigeria's adherence to its human
rights-related commitments. Regarding U.S. foreign military sales and
security assistance, the Administration provides human rights-focused
training and technical assistance to the Armed Forces of Nigeria,
including training on international human rights law, international
humanitarian law, and mitigation of civilian casualties. We will not
provide assistance to units implicated in human rights violations.
Question. Iran and JCPOA: The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) requires the President to submit to Congress any agreement
related to Iran's nuclear program. Will you commit to submitting any
deal with Iran for review and a vote by Congress, as required by the
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)?
Answer. We are committed to ensuring the requirements of INARA are
satisfied.
Question. Do you plan to comply with the law and submit any Iran
nuclear agreement to Congress for a vote?
Answer. We are committed to ensuring the requirements of INARA are
satisfied.
Question. We previously discussed that the decision to delist the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist
organization was with the President for final decision. As we're all
aware, the IRGC arms Iranian proxies across the Middle East, is
actively trying to assassinate former U.S. officials, and was
responsible for the deaths of over 600 Americans in Iraq. Are you
prepared to remove the IRGC designation as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO)?
Answer. The IRGC's FTO designation will only be revoked if Iran
takes necessary actions to merit a revocation.
Question. Has the IRGC stopped behaving as a terrorist organization
in a way that would support removing the listing?
Answer. The IRGC's FTO designation will only be revoked if Iran
takes necessary actions to merit a revocation. Beyond its FTO
designation, the IRGC and several of its components are also designated
a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) and Iran is designated
as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Question. You and the National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan,
have indicated that Russia will be allowed to continue nuclear work
under a new nuclear deal with Iran. In fact, the Russian state-owned
company RosAtom, currently on the ground in Ukraine, will likely reap
up to $10 billion for continued nuclear work under the JCPOA. How are
you ensuring that Russia does not use a financial windfall from a new
nuclear deal with Iran to continue Putin's assault on Ukraine?
Answer. The JCPOA, UNSCR 2231, and previous UN Security Council
Resolutions related to Iran all acknowledge Russia's engagement with
Iran regarding the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Such cooperation was
never sanctioned under any of these tools. It remains in our interest,
and the interest of our partners in the region, that Russia continues
to provide the support necessary for the safe operation of this nuclear
facility. Separately, we are working with our allies and partners to
reduce our reliance on the Russian energy sector, including in the
nuclear energy area.
Question. What specific mechanisms are in place to ensure this
money is not used to commit war crimes in Ukraine or Syria?
Answer. The Administration has a robust, interagency effort
dedicated to monitoring and implementing our sanctions regimes with
respect to Russia, Iran, and Syria. We will watch developments closely
and are committed to working with our allies and partners to counter
any attempts to evade these sanctions.
Question. American Disengagement from the Middle East: This
Administration's relationships with our Middle East partners are at an
all-time low. Our partners bemoan the Administration's Iran policy,
view the Afghanistan withdrawal as a measure of American commitment,
and saw an initially weak embrace of the Abraham Accords and greater
restrictions placed on security assistance. Many of our traditional
partners are moving closer to Russia and China. Would you characterize
your Middle East policies as effective?
Answer. Our efforts in Yemen have led to a truce that continues to
hold, allowing a vital respite for a weary population. Working groups
established at the Negev Summit, which brought together ministers from
the United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and the UAE in Israel,
will advance cooperation on security, food and water security,
education, energy, health, and tourism. Our diplomatic and economic
engagements with regional security partners show our commitment to
long-term relationships with broad benefits. Elevation of the
Administration's priorities of human rights and democratic values
support fundamental freedoms and civil society. The PRC and Russia have
not shown the will nor capacity to resolve regional conflicts. Their
indifference to human rights and human dignity limits their ability to
strengthen relations in the region.
Question. What are you doing to rebuild relationships in an
important region?
Answer. We are deepening our relationships in the Middle East in
order to deescalate conflicts, better integrate the region, and improve
the lives of the millions of people. I fully support the Abraham
Accords and normalization agreements with Israel, which are yielding
greater stability and security. Beyond security, we are committed to
multilateral diplomacy, engaging the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on
innovation, climate change, and food insecurity. In recent meetings
with leaders across the region, I have reaffirmed our commitment to
close cooperation and to our enduring presence. The Administration's
elevated attention to human rights will create space for people in the
region to realize their aspirations and strengthen bilateral
relationships. The U.S.-brokered Project Prosperity creates tangible
energy and water cooperation between Israel, Jordan, and the UAE.
Question. What role should high-level visits play in the effort to
rebuild relationships in an important region?
Answer. In March, I met with foreign ministers from Israel, the
UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at the Negev Ministerial to build on
the Abraham Accords and normalization agreements in the region, and I
traveled to Morocco and Algeria to promote greater regional stability.
Most recently, I joined the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, and
CIA Director in a delegation to the UAE. These visits and others from
senior leaders across the U.S. Government signal our commitment to
long-term partnerships in the region and are important for addressing
global challenges together with our Middle East partners. Engaging
directly with civil society leaders and other individuals also deepens
our relationships within these societies.
Question. Syria Policy and Caesar Act Enforcement: The Caesar Act
is intended to prevent rehabilitation of the Assad regime, seek
accountability for the regime's atrocities, and advance a political
solution to the conflict. Unlike the previous administration, we have
seen very few Caesar sanctions under the Biden administration. Why have
you issued so few sanctions?
Answer. Our sanctions, including under the Caesar Act, are an
important tool as we seek accountability from the Assad regime, notably
with respect to its human rights abuses. This Administration remains
committed to pressing for accountability and justice for the Syrian
people, including through the use of targeted sanctions. On July 28,
2021, the United States imposed sanctions on eight Syrian prisons and
five Syrian regime officials who were implicated in human rights abuses
and the ongoing suffering of the Syrian people. On December 7, 2021,
the United States designated two senior Syrian Air Force officers
responsible for killing civilians in chemical weapons attacks and three
senior officers in Syria's repressive security and intelligence
apparatus. We will continue to use all available tools, including
Caesar Act sanctions, to further press for accountability for the
ongoing atrocities of the Assad regime.
Question. While you may not be encouraging normalization with
Assad, you are certainly not discouraging it. What are you doing to
prevent our Arab partners from normalizing with Assad?
Answer. We continue to make clear to partners in the Middle East
and beyond that we do not support efforts to normalize with Damascus.
We also do not support Syria's return to the Arab League and continue
to oppose the reconstruction of Syria until there is irreversible
progress towards a political solution. We clearly and publicly conveyed
our profound disappointment with Bashar al-Assad's recent visit to the
United Arab Emirates. In discussions with partners, we continue to
underline the Assad regime's ongoing horrific atrocities against
Syrians, including over the last decade, as well as its continuing
efforts to deny much of the country access to humanitarian aid and
security. Targeted sanctions and multilateral resolutions we lead at
the UN deter investment and underscore the reputational risk of
normalizing with Assad. We have made this position clear to governments
across the region and beyond at the highest level.
Question. The Caesar Act mandates that you provide technical
assistance to document war crimes. What assistance have you issued to
date?
Answer. U.S. stabilization assistance supports the work of
grantees, including Syrian civil society organizations, to collect
evidence of atrocities in Syria, some of which the United States has
determined rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
This work has focused on gathering and analyzing evidence of
atrocities, which may be used to build case files to prosecute
perpetrators of these crimes. These efforts help provide critical
evidence to both informal and formal transitional justice mechanisms,
such as the Commission of Inquiry, the International, Impartial, and
Independent Mechanism (IIIM), and national criminal proceedings, to
promote accountability. U.S. assistance also supports survivors of
atrocities and their families with critical resiliency, mental health,
and psychosocial support.
Question. Syria: The upcoming UN Security Council (UNSC) Syria
Cross Border mandate renewal is of grave concern to me and my
colleagues in Congress. Not only should this Administration work to
renew the one remaining crossing, Bab Al-Hawa, but it should actively
work to build consensus in the Security Council to re-open previously
closed crossings. How would you or our Ambassador to the UN engage with
partners in the UNSC to ensure this mandate renewal passes?
Answer. We are working actively with our allies and partners, as
well as the United Nations and fellow members of the Security Council,
in support of the renewal and expansion of the cross-border mechanism.
As part of this effort, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield attended the
Brussels VI Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region
on May 10, during the United States' presidency of the UNSC, to
emphasize that continuing and expanding UN-facilitated cross-border aid
is a top U.S. priority. She also conveyed this message at a separate,
Syria-focused ministerial meeting convened by the United States, which
was attended by several UNSC members. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield
plans to travel to Bab al-Hawa, the last remaining UN border crossing,
in the next few weeks to highlight the importance of renewing the
mandate. We will continue to coordinate with like-minded states on the
Security Council and to urge all members to support the renewal,
including by explaining the humanitarian consequences of a non-renewal.
Question. Would you recommend that President Biden engage at the
highest possible levels on this important issue?
Answer. This Administration engaged with UN Security Council
members at the highest levels of government to secure passage of
Security Council Resolution 2585 last year. We will do whatever is
necessary and appropriate, to secure the renewal of the mandate for
cross-border aid this July.
Question. How will you work to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars
that fund UN humanitarian assistance are not being used to effectively
subsidize the Assad regime, which blockades assistance to Syrians
through seizure of cross-line assistance delivery attempts?
Answer. We take all possible steps to ensure that humanitarian
assistance funded by American taxpayers reaches those for whom it is
intended. We carefully monitor the risks associated with providing aid
in all parts of Syria and work closely with our partners, other donors,
and the United Nations on this issue. We also support the UN's efforts
to negotiate a new preferential exchange rate for aid provided in
regime-held areas.
Question. Do you believe that cross-line assistance is an
acceptable modality of delivery of humanitarian assistance or as an
alternative to cross-border?
Answer. We support using all modalities to deliver humanitarian
assistance to Syrians in need, including both crossline and cross-
border mechanisms. However, we have been clear and consistent with
Security Council members, allies, partners, and the United Nations that
given the numerous challenges of delivering crossline aid, it cannot
match the scale and scope of cross-border aid into northwest Syria.
Since the passage of UNSC Resolution 2585, there have been four UN
crossline missions to northwest Syria. However, the latest crossline
mission delivered food aid for 43,500 people. By contrast, in a typical
month, UN cross-border aid through Bab al-Hawa delivers enough food for
1.4 million people. Frankly, there is no comparing the two.
Question. In the event of non-renewal of the Syria cross border
mandate, what preparations have been made to continue to support
Syrians with life-saving aid?
Answer. We will use all means available to advocate for continued
humanitarian access and to deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the
Syrian people, in coordination with the UN, NGOs, other donors, and
partner countries. Preparations to date have confirmed that any
contingency operations in the event of a non-renewal will only cover a
fraction of the UN's current caseload of assisting 2.4 million people
per month through cross-border aid, which includes food, health,
shelter, and water. In any emergency response, we expect humanitarian
agencies to prepare for all reasonable scenarios, so life-saving aid
reaches those who need it. The Department is available to provide
further details in response to this question in an appropriate setting.
Question. Has the U.S. Government consulted with partners and
allies on alternatives and contingency plans for continuing to support
Syrians with life-saving aid? If so, what are those plans?
Answer. Since the start of this Administration, we have had regular
consultations with partners and allies on the best ways to maintain
humanitarian access and deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the
Syrian people, including in the northwest. Those channels will remain
open up to and beyond the vote to reauthorize UN cross-border aid to
Syria this July. The Department is available to provide further details
in response to this question in an appropriate setting.
Question. What steps are the United Nations and UN agencies taking
to appropriately plan for the event of non-renewal?
Answer. We are in constant discussion with the UN about
humanitarian needs in northwest Syria and the importance of meeting
them through all means available. In any emergency response, including
in Syria, we expect humanitarian agencies to prepare for all reasonable
scenarios, so life-saving aid keeps flowing to those who need it. The
Department is available to provide further details in an appropriate
setting.
Question. Have all UN agencies operating in NW Syria adequately
planned for this event?
Answer. We are in regular contact with all UN agencies about
humanitarian needs in northwest Syria and the unique mandates and
capabilities that each agency brings to this humanitarian response. We
constantly stress to UN agencies the importance of meeting needs in
northwest Syria through all means available. The Department is
available to provide further details in an appropriate setting.
Question. Have all UN agencies operating in NW Syria created plans
for eventual hand-off to local partners if non-renewal happens?
Answer. We are in constant discussion with all UN agencies and our
NGO partners about the need to support local humanitarian partners in
northwest Syria and across the whole of Syria. NGOs play an
indispensable role in this response, and we support efforts to enhance
their capacities, up to and beyond the July vote to re-authorize UN
cross-border aid. The Department is available to provide further
details in an appropriate setting.
Question. Global Health Security: We have spoken repeatedly--
publicly and privately--about the need for the Department of State to
take a stronger leadership role in global health security. This
committee has approved bipartisan legislation--the International
Pandemic Preparedness and COVID-19 Response Act--that would help
achieve that goal by establishing a structure for effective leadership
and coordination, built upon PEPFAR's proven model. The Department was
repeatedly consulted on the bill, and relevant technical assistance has
been incorporated. What is the status of efforts to establish an
organizational structure within the Office of the Secretary that
elevates global health diplomacy and ensures effective coordination of
USAID and CDC global health security activities without diminishing
PEPFAR?
Answer. The Department is conducting a review of our organizational
structure related to global health security and diplomacy. The review
has involved consultations with stakeholders across the Department,
U.S. Government interagency, non-governmental sector, and Congress. We
seek to strengthen the Department's organizational structure to best
advance U.S. interests in building global health and global health
security capacity and ensures that we have enhanced policy and
programmatic leadership as well as better integration of global health
within the Department. We will continue to consult with Congress as
this process moves to conclusion.
Question. The bill also provides a roadmap for establishing an
accountable international financing mechanism for pandemic
preparedness. Here again, I understand planning is advancing quickly,
yet there has been little conversation with Congress. The President's
budget request includes $6.5 billion in mandatory spending, reportedly
so you can make a multi-year commitment to this yet-to-be-consulted-or-
established financing mechanism. This is a major departure from past
practice, and it certainly wasn't envisioned in the bill approved by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. What is the status of efforts
to establish an international financing mechanism for international
pandemic preparedness?
Answer. The United States is closely collaborating with
international partners to establish a pandemic preparedness and global
health security financial intermediary fund (FIF). On April 20, most
G20 members agreed on the need for a new financing mechanism, and the
Indonesian G20 Presidency called for the World Bank (WB) to launch the
process to establish the FIF. This success carried into the Second
Global COVID-19 Summit on May 12, where World Bank President Malpass
reiterated the Bank's commitment to establish the FIF by end of June.
An additional U.S. pledge of $200 million unlocked new donor
commitments (EU $450 million; Germany 50 million euros), and we look
forward to additional announcements in the coming months.
Question. Why would the President request $6.5 billion in mandatory
spending, reportedly to support the establishment of an international
financing mechanism for pandemic preparedness, before knowing how it
will be governed, how and where resources will be targeted, how
progress will be measured, and how implementers will be held
accountable for results?
Answer. The Administration believes strongly that the United States
can lead an effort to develop a pandemic preparedness and global health
security financial intermediary fund (FIF) that would fill well mapped
investment gaps. Resources from the FIF would be channeled to programs/
projects at the global, regional, and country level through a set of
accredited implementing partners. These entities would be required to
meet agreed standards as well as following their own established
operating policies and procedures for implementation. The World Bank
would apply its fiduciary standards as trustee and the governing body
will draw on best practices to ensure transparency, accountability,
clear results indicators.
Question. The budget request also includes $2 billion (+$440
million) to support the first year of an anticipated $6 billion
commitment to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
(the Global Fund) while reducing funds available for bilateral
tuberculosis programs (^$21.5 million) and the bipartisan,
Congressionally-authorized President's Emergency Program for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR) program (^$20 million). Is it your view that the Global
Fund is more efficient and effective than PEPFAR, thereby justifying a
major shift in funding, or is it the intent of the Administration that
the Global Fund would take on greater responsibility for procuring
antiretrovirals, thereby enabling PEPFAR to focus its shrinking
resources on service delivery?
Answer. The Administration did not cut the PEPFAR program in the FY
2023 budget request. In FY 2022, Congress provided $20 million more to
PEPFAR than the Administration had requested. However, after the
appropriation was finalized, we were unable to incorporate the $20
million increase for PEPFAR in the Congressional Budget Justification
given time constraints resulting from delays in the appropriation. The
Administration's FY 2023 budget request, therefore, reflects a flatline
for PEPFAR rather than a decrease. The Global Fund and PEPFAR have
worked effectively to leverage the strengths the Global Fund brings,
for example, in procurement, with PEPFAR's on-the-ground service
delivery strengths at the country level.
Question. The Putin regime's unprovoked, brutal war against Ukraine
has exacerbated the conditions driving food insecurity globally and has
had a particularly damaging impact on fragile states in East Africa,
North Africa, and the Middle East. Given how the 2007-2008 global food
price crisis provoked riots and economic and political instability in
countries from Africa to South America, it is clearly in the national
security interests of the American people to respond. Remarkably, and
despite claims that the Administration is seeking to ``reinvigorate
U.S. humanitarian leadership'', the FY 2023 budget request proposes to
cut humanitarian assistance by nearly 18 percent, relative to FY 2022
enacted levels. While in full agreement that other donors need to step
up and do more, how can you justify an 18 percent decrease in
humanitarian assistance accounts at a time when displacement and food
insecurity levels are at all-time highs?
Answer. The Department is concerned with the unprecedented and
growing global humanitarian needs, which have been exacerbated by
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The FY 2023 request includes $10.45
billion for humanitarian assistance worldwide in base IDA, FFP-Title
II, MRA, and ERMA, which will maintain U.S. leadership in the global
humanitarian response and continue to grow the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program. The FY 2023 request level is $1.8 billion--or 21 percent--more
than the FY 2022 base enacted level of $8.65 billion. We are grateful
for the nearly $5 billion in supplemental resources Congress provided
in FY 2022 to address unanticipated circumstances in Afghanistan and
Ukraine, as well as the global food crisis. We will continue to assess
evolving humanitarian needs, and consultation with Congress is an
important part of our effort to ensure we have sufficient resources to
respond.
Question. The proposal to reduce international food assistance
accounts was accompanied by a vague reference to an interest in
reforming the Food for Peace program. While Food for Peace has served
as America's flagship food aid program since 1964, its success is
hampered by arcane U.S. purchase and shipping requirements that
unnecessarily drive up costs. These inefficiencies led Congress to
authorize an alternative, the International Disaster Assistance--
Emergency Food Security Program (IDA-EFSP), which enables the United
States utilize the right tool in the right place at the right time.
Specifically, what reforms are do you intend to propose to make the
Food for Peace program more efficient and effective?
Answer. It is my understanding that USAID seeks to streamline the
provisions in the Food for Peace Act to make implementation of the Food
for Peace program simpler and more efficient for USAID and the
providing USAID reduce eliminate implementing partners, including local
organizations. I am committed to working with Congress to make
programming to combat rising food insecurity and build the resilience
of vulnerable communities as effective and efficient as possible.
Question. Will those reforms include a change to U.S. cargo
preference requirements, which have outlived their usefulness purpose?
If not, why not?
Answer. At this time of unprecedented global humanitarian need, I
agree that the U.S. Government's ability to reach additional hungry
people and improve the efficiency of U.S. programs is of utmost
importance. I look forward to working with Congress with respect to
reforms to U.S. cargo preference requirements, given the important and
diverse humanitarian and maritime interests at stake.
Question. The U.S. and the United Nations: The recent establishment
of the office of ``Multilateral Personnel and Strategy'' within the
bureau of International Organizations structure presents new avenues to
address the growing malign influence across the UN system. How have you
empowered this office to address the systematic Chinese and/or Russia
malign influence within the UN?
Answer. Established in July 2021, the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs' Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel
(IO/MSP) has grown to 13 staff and coordinates efforts to counter PRC
and others' initiatives that reshape or undermine the principles and
values enshrined in the UN Charter; supports U.S. and likeminded
candidates for priority UN elections and appointments; and facilitates
strategic engagements with emerging partners. These efforts have helped
build coalitions to counter the PRC's promotion of its ideology and
foreign policy platforms throughout the UN and multilateral system. The
office is also developing and implementing strategies to strengthen the
United States' relationships with emerging partners and ensure we
advance our affirmative view of a strong, effective, and resilient UN
capable of delivering for all member states.
Question. What is your strategy for increasing American
representation in the UN system including through the Junior
Professional Officer Program, appointments, and elections?
Answer. Increasing U.S. citizen representation in the UN system
requires a multifaceted approach to support and advocate for qualified
candidates at all levels. Thanks to Congress's support, the Department
has increased financial resources and staffing to promote U.S. citizens
for senior leadership and mid-level appointments, as well as entry-
level talent through the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program,
across the UN system. We are also executing strategies to support U.S.
candidates in high-priority elections for leadership and independent
expert positions in the UN and international organizations. These
initiatives are increasing U.S. citizen representation in the UN and
advancing U.S. values such as innovation, ethical conduct,
transparency, and accountability.
Question. UNRWA: U.S. Taxpayers have sent billions to UN Relief and
Works Agency since the 1950s when it was originally established. Will
the United States continue to fund UNRWA? If so, please explain what
reforms you have secured from UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority.
Answer. The best way for the United States to influence UNRWA's
operations and ensure its provision of quality services consistent with
UN principles is to provide assistance to UNRWA. The United States will
continue to pursue the reforms outlined in the U.S.-UNRWA Framework for
Cooperation. The United States has secured reforms to uphold
humanitarian principles, including neutrality, by increasing
inspections of facilities to four times per year; institute digital
beneficiary identity verification to reduce the risk of fraud; improve
financial and procurement regulations; and increase accountability for
staff misconduct. The State Department will continue to monitor UNRWA's
reform efforts closely.
Question. Do you believe that UNRWA is currently operating beyond
its mandate?
Answer. UNRWA's mandate, set by the UN General Assembly, is to
provide essential services directly to Palestinian refugees in the five
regions it covers. UNRWA does not have a mandate to engage in political
negotiations or to seek durable solutions (such as resettlement,
repatriation, and local integration) for Palestinian refugees as these
matters are final status issues to be negotiated directly between
Israel and the Palestinians. UNRWA's activities include providing
emergency services, education, health, protection, and livelihoods
programming for vulnerable Palestinian refugees, all of which are
within its mandate.
Question. Do you believe that UNRWA has serious budget issues and
should solicit enduring funds from regional partners outside of the
United States?
Answer. UNRWA faces recurring financial challenges and must
diversify its donor base. This is an issue on which we routinely engage
with UNRWA's leadership. We directly advocate with ongoing and
potential donors to support UNRWA financially, including regional
partners. We also support UNRWA's efforts to broaden its donor base by,
for example, increasing fundraising with private donors and Islamic
charitable organizations. I believe it is in the United States'
interest to contribute robustly to UNRWA to demonstrate our commitment
to humanitarian assistance and regional stability.
Question. In your recent visit to Israel, you met with the
Palestinian Authority. Did you discuss neutrality issues and if so,
what were the major takeaways from this discussion?
Answer. Yes. During my visit, I met with President Mahmoud Abbas
and with representatives of Palestinian civil society. In these
meetings, I underscored the Administration's commitment to re-building
our relationship with the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinians on
a basis of trust, cooperation, and shared values, that advance respect
for Palestinians' civil and human rights. We are working to prevent
actions on both sides that raise tensions and make achievement of our
goal of a negotiated two state solution more difficult, including
settlement expansion, settler violence, incitement to violence,
demolitions, payments to individuals convicted of terrorism, and
evictions of families from homes they have lived in for decades.
Question. U.S. and the UN: What is your view of the relationship
between the United States and the United Nations (UN) after the first
year of the Biden administration?
Answer. President Biden has prioritized U.S. engagement with the
UN, not only as a means to advance U.S. national interests and counter
our international competitors, but also to strengthen the international
system to face today's global challenges and deliver benefits to the
American people. Early actions to implement the President's vision
include re-engaging with the World Health Organization (WHO), the Paris
Climate Accords, and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The early
returns of the President's direction are promising, with new momentum
on reform at the WHO, strong unity in the UN General Assembly and the
UNHRC related to Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and growing
international solidarity behind U.S. initiatives to address global food
insecurity. While multilateral diplomacy can be frustrating, the Biden
administration's positive U.S. multilateral leadership has allowed us
to make progress on important objectives that would otherwise be
unattainable without our participation and influence.
Question. UN Budget Issues: U.S.-assessed and voluntary
contributions to the UN, as appropriated under the Contributions to
International Organizations (CIO), Contributions for International
Peacekeeping Operations (CIPA), and International Organizations and
Program (IO&P) accounts, represent only a small fraction of total U.S.
contributions to the UN system. Will you assist in compiling and
sharing with Congress a comprehensive report on total U.S.
contributions, from all sources, to the UN and its specialized agencies
and programs?
Answer. Yes. The State Department reports to Congress annually on
U.S. Government contributions to international organizations. The
report tracks all U.S. contributions by agency, funding account, and
recipient organization. These reports are publicly available and can be
found on the State Department website: https://www.state.gov/u-s-
contributions-to-international-organizations/.
Question. Will you ensure that other donors remain apprised of the
full depth and breadth of U.S. contributions from all sources?
Answer. Yes. We frequently point to the fact that the United States
is the single largest financial contributor to the U.N. system. We note
the breadth and depth of U.S. contributions across all facets of the
multilateral system as an important indication of our commitment to
multilateral leadership. However, we often hear from other Member
States that our failure to pay our assessed contributions in full and
on time jeopardizes U.S. credibility and therefore diminishes our
ability to advance our positive agenda, counter our strategic
competitors, and advance reform efforts at the UN.
Question. Whereas assessed contributions are determined on a scale
and provide no discretion to nations, voluntary contributions are
provided to advance specific U.S. goals and objectives. Moreover,
voluntarily funded agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP)
and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), must compete for resources and are
subject to rigorous transparency and accountability measures. Will you
seek to ensure that the Secretary General adopts a rigorous performance
matrix, transparency requirements, and accountability measures that
apply across the UN system, including to agencies and programs funded
through assessed contributions?
Answer. I share your strong commitment to ensuring transparency and
accountability across the UN system. The United States will continue to
work closely with the Secretary General to ensure rigorous performance
and accountability measures are in place for all UN organizations.
Question. Last Congress, I introduced the Multilateral Aid Review
Act to assess the value of U.S. taxpayer investments in multilateral
entities, including the UN and its affiliated agencies. Would you
support a comprehensive review of U.S. investments in multilateral
organizations?
Answer. I support rigorous performance and evaluation measures for
multilateral entities to ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are aligned to
achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. The United States is committed
to ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in international organizations
to maximize their ability to deliver on their important mandates.
Question. UN Reform: What are your views on the need for management
reform at the UN?
Answer. An efficient, effective UN is essential to achieving
America's strategic objectives. We consistently work to ensure
organizations in the UN system adhere to best management and oversight
practices in the areas of protecting whistleblowers, addressing sexual
exploitation and abuse, promoting zero tolerance for corruption, and
ensuring financial and managerial transparency. The United States also
continues to support strong U.S. and likeminded candidates for UN
technical, budget, and oversight bodies. Our membership and leadership
on these bodies enable us to promote fiscal discipline and
accountability.
Question. How will you work to address barriers to advancing UN
management reforms, especially those created by the different
priorities among member states?
Answer. We are working with allies and likeminded member states who
strongly support UN management reform to overcome any barriers that
stand in the way of advancing reforms. And we will continue this work,
emphasizing the need for strong oversight and implementation of
necessary reforms to ensure the United Nations is the effective,
efficient, and responsive organization it needs to be to address the
global challenges of the 21st century.
Question. How will you measure success in implementing management
reforms at the UN?
[No response received.]
Question. What policies does the UN need to implement to maintain
fiscal responsibility and accountability within the UN system?
Answer. The Department is working to ensure international
organizations in the UN system adhere to best fiscal management and
oversight practices in the areas of protecting whistleblowers,
promoting zero tolerance for corruption, and ensuring financial and
managerial transparency in order to promote a more effective UN. The
U.S. Missions to international organizations are working to support
strong U.S. candidates for UN technical, budget, and oversight bodies.
Our membership and leadership on these bodies enable us to promote
fiscal discipline, greater transparency, and accountability.
Question. Do you support reform in the United Nations Security
Council? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I remain open to a modest expansion of both permanent and
non-permanent Security Council members in a way that does not diminish
the Security Council's effectiveness or efficiency, nor alter or expand
the veto. A well-executed expansion of the Security Council could help
modernize the body to better reflect 21st century global realities and
increase its effectiveness.
Question. While the UN has taken steps to improve its efficiency,
operational effectiveness, and accountability, the continuing need for
reform is obvious to most observers, including strong supporters of the
institution. The UN Secretary-General has committed to an agenda of
reform. The push for reform by the United States is one of the main
drivers behind the reform movement's progress to date. In your opinion,
what are the top three reforms that the UN could undertake over the
next 2 years that will have the greatest impact?
Answer. The UN should continue to ensure organizations in the UN
system are adhering to best management and oversight practices that
advance accountability and transparency. These practices include
increasing financial transparency and promoting budget discipline;
promoting a culture of accountability, including in the areas of
protecting whistleblowers and ensuring that the United Nations is
taking steps to address sexual harassment, exploitation, and abuse; and
strengthening rigorous evaluation of its program activities. The United
States will continue to press for these reforms.
Question. The United States is the largest donor to the World Food
Programme, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and other UN
agencies. Will you continue this pattern of voluntary donations to
address some of the world's most pressing issues?
Answer. The United States will continue to support the vital work
of international organizations, including UNHCR, WFP, IOM, the ICRC,
the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), as
well as more than 80 nongovernmental partners. The United States is the
single largest donor of humanitarian assistance worldwide for people in
need, including refugees, conflict victims, internally displaced
persons, stateless persons, and other vulnerable populations. We fund
life-saving humanitarian assistance, including food, water, shelter,
emergency healthcare, sanitation and hygiene, and critical nutrition
services. We also fund resilience-building activities, including access
to education, school meals, employment for forcibly displaced persons,
and other services which contribute to local, regional, and
international stability. The United States acknowledges we cannot
address these issues alone. We continue to engage with other donors to
encourage increased funding contributions to humanitarian responses
around the world.
Question. UN Human Rights Council: The United States recently
rejoined the UN Human Rights Council and in the first few months were
successful in removing Russia from the Council to hold the regime
accountable for its provocation in Ukraine. What is the position of the
Biden administration regarding additional reforms in the UN Human
Rights Council?
Answer. We advance America's interests best when we have a seat at
the table, including in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), where the
United States is once again a member. In addition to suspending Russia
from its Council seat, the United States led the campaign to create an
HRC Commission of Inquiry on Russia's actions in Ukraine. Furthermore,
I consistently articulate our top reform objectives including defending
Israel from unfair bias and improving the Council's membership.
Russia's former seat is now occupied by a U.S. ally, the Czech
Republic, and we will pursue further improvements in HRC membership.
And in partnership with Israel, the United States continues to lead
efforts to reduce the number of actions against Israel.
Question. Did the Administration clearly articulate its desired
reforms before rejoining the Council? If so, please describe the
reforms.
Answer. We advance America's national interests best when we have a
seat at the table, including in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC),
where we are once again members. I consistently articulate our top HRC
reform objectives including defending Israel from unfair bias and
improving the Council's membership. The Administration made these
reform objectives clear during our campaign for HRC election and we
have made concrete progress on them since that time.
Question. Does the Biden administration believe the Council spends
a disproportionate amount of attention on criticizing Israel?
Answer. Yes, the Human Rights Council spends a disproportionate
amount of attention on criticizing Israel. I will continue to uphold
President Biden's strong commitment to defend Israel. This includes
opposing efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through
actions across the United Nations, including in the Human Rights
Council.
Question. Understanding that the Human Rights Council is ``broken''
because it allows human rights abusers to obtain seats on the council,
do you believe that the current composition on the Council is a
productive one that allows for beneficial discussions of the promotion
and protection of human rights?
Answer. I believe the current composition of the Human Rights
Council is problematic. I also believe the Council allows for
beneficial discussions on the promotion and protection of human rights.
Since our return to the body, and with our backing, the Council has
condemned Russia's unprovoked war in Ukraine; shined a powerful light
on Beijing's human rights atrocities; pressured problematic regimes
around the world, such as Belarus, Burma, Eritrea, Syria, and Russia,
by sharpening investigative mechanisms into their human rights
violations and abuses; and worked to advance equality for all,
including for women, LGBTQI+ individuals, and members of racial and
ethnic minority groups. We will continue to seek reforms of the
Council, particularly with respect to its problematic membership.
Question. There have been credible allegations that the UN Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights shared the names of Chinese
dissidents who were attending UN Human Rights Council sessions with the
Chinese Government. How have you investigated these allegations?
Answer. I remain committed to defending the right of activists,
human rights defenders, members of ethnic and religious minorities, and
journalists around the world to speak their minds freely without fear
of persecution and violence. Department officials continue to raise
these allegations with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and we will continue to monitor the issue closely.
Question. What actions have you taken to ensure that this practice
is never again used?
Answer. Department officials continue to raise these allegations
with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and we will
continue to monitor the issue closely.
Question. UN Peacekeeping: The United States is the single largest
financial contributor to UN peacekeeping activities. Congress
authorizes and appropriates U.S. contributions, and it has an ongoing
interest in ensuring such funding is used as efficiently and
effectively as possible. Do you believe that any nation, including the
United States, should pay more than 25 percent of the UN peacekeeping
budget?
Answer. I believe that the United States' influence in the UN, our
ability to strengthen the integrity of the rules-based international
system, and our ability to lead reform efforts is greatest when we pay
our bills in full and on time. We continue to work to ensure that all
countries pay their fair share and successfully negotiated a 1 percent
reduction to our peacekeeping rate of assessment to 26.94 percent for
calendar year 2022-2024, down from 27.89 percent for calendar years
2019-2021. I welcome the opportunity to work with Congress to take the
steps necessary to allow the United States to meet our financial
obligations.
Question. What is your position on U.S. repayment of UN
peacekeeping arrears?
Answer. Our failure to live up to our financial obligations--both
on the UN regular budget and the peacekeeping budget--undermines U.S.
credibility and leadership at the United Nations. I welcome the
opportunity to work with Congress to take the steps necessary to allow
the United States to meet our financial obligations, including
addressing the substantial level of arrears that have accumulated. The
United States' influence in the UN, our ability to strengthen the
integrity of the rules-based international system, and our ability to
lead reform efforts is greatest when we pay our bills in full and on
time.
Question. As memorialized in the 1999 Helms-Biden agreement, the
Late Ambassador Holbrooke, then-President Clinton, then-Secretary
General Kofi Anan, and then-Senator Biden all believed that the United
States has no obligation to pay, and thus should not pay, the roughly
$500 million in ``contested arrears'' that were explicitly excluded
from the $1.6 billion Helms-Biden agreement. However, since then, the
UN has insisted upon keeping on its books, and the Obama administration
sought to pay over Congressional objections. Do you commit not to pay
these ``contested arrears'' per Congressional intent as outlined in the
Helms-Biden agreement?
Answer. I continue to welcome the opportunity to work with Congress
to allow the United States to meet our financial obligations to the
United Nations, including addressing the arrears that have accumulated
over the past 5 years due to the 25-percent cap on peacekeeping
funding. Our ability to pay our dues on time and in full strengthens
our credibility and influence to advance our priorities and counter our
adversaries at the UN.
Question. Are there any specific steps you believe the UN should
take to reduce the overall size of the UN peacekeeping budget? If so,
what are they?
Answer. UN peacekeeping operations are among the most effective
mechanisms of burden-sharing to address the global challenges to
international peace and security. The United States continues to
evaluate peacekeeping missions with a view to making them as efficient
and effective as possible, while also providing missions with the
necessary resources to fully implement their mandates. The
Administration is committed to prioritizing reforms in annual budget
negotiations, increasing the efficiency of missions, and minimizing the
cost to U.S. taxpayers, including reducing or closing missions where
appropriate and when conditions allow.
Question. Are there any specific UN peacekeeping missions you would
support reducing or terminating in order to reduce UN peacekeeping
costs? If so, what active and ongoing missions do you believe should be
reduced or terminated?
Answer. The Administration continually reviews and assesses all
existing peacekeeping missions to ensure they are making a meaningful
and substantive contribution to international peace and security. For
missions where that work remains imperative, the United States is
focused on making them as effective and efficient as possible and
providing them with the necessary resources to fully implement their
mandates, including well-trained and well-equipped troops and police.
For missions in countries where conditions allow, the United States
works with the UN Secretariat and UN Security Council to press for
early strategic planning and sustainable transitions that preserve the
advances in host nation peace and security.
Question. The UN and the Palestinians: The United Nations maintains
several particular bodies and departments that focus on the
Palestinians. These include the Division on Palestinian Rights (DPR),
the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People (CEIRPP), and the United Nations Information System
on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL). Will you work to challenge the
existence and funding of these departments?
Answer. The United States will continue to oppose efforts to
unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through one-sided
resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United Nations. We
will continue to publicly and privately call on Member States to join
us in opposing the perpetuation of the DPR, CEIRPP, and UNISPAL.
Question. The United States lacks a veto over membership decisions
in UN-specialized agencies that the Palestinians could target for
membership. When the Palestinians obtain membership, the United States
must cut funding to that organization as required under two laws
enacted by a Democratic-led Congress in the early 1990s. What steps
have you taken as Secretary of State to disincentivize the PA from
attempting to join International Organizations or other UN bodies?
Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join
international entities as a state are premature and counterproductive.
There are no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct
negotiations between the parties and this includes counterproductive
steps to gain membership in UN entities.
The United States continues to make clear, both with the parties
and with international partners, that the only realistic path forward
to end this conflict is through direct negotiations aimed at achieving
a comprehensive and lasting peace.
Question. Israel at the United Nations: The United States has long
maintained a policy of opposing many one-sided Security Council
resolutions that, more often than not, criticize Israel, but fail to
address other issues such as Palestinian terrorism. Do you support the
use of an American veto to block one-sided anti-Israel resolutions in
the Security Council?
Answer. The United States takes seriously its privilege of veto
power over the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions. We work
closely with the other members of the Security Council to ensure that
resolutions advance international peace and security, engaging in good
faith to reach agreed texts. However, we will not hesitate to veto a
resolution if its adoption does not meaningfully advance international
peace and security. In this vein, we will oppose biased resolutions
that delegitimize Israel, subject it to unfair standards, or undermine
the prospects for a negotiated two-state solution in which Israel lives
in peace and security alongside a viable Palestinian state.
Question. What do you believe should be the standard employed in
deciding whether to veto or not?
Answer. The use of a veto to prevent the adoption of a UN Security
Council resolution is a responsibility that must be respected. The
United States will veto a resolution if we conclude its adoption will
not advance international peace and security. The UN General Assembly
adopted, on April 26, 2022, a resolution supported by the United States
that automatically convenes the General Assembly after a veto in the
Security Council. Such a meeting allows the state that cast the veto to
explain why the resolution would not have advanced international peace
and security. U.S. vetoes of Security Council resolutions on Israel
have often led to General Assembly meetings. Formalizing this standard
will force other permanent members including Russia to explain their
use of veto power.
Question. Do you believe that there is a disproportionate focus on
Israel at the UN? How would you counter this at the UN?
Answer. Yes. I believe the United Nations spends a disproportionate
amount of attention on criticizing Israel. I will continue to uphold
President Biden's ironclad commitment to defend Israel. This includes
opposing efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through
actions across the United Nations, including the Security Council, the
General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and other bodies. The
United States will also continue working with our Israeli diplomatic
colleagues to promote Israel's inclusion in UN working groups, as well
as support qualified Israeli candidates for UN positions.
Question. As of April 2022, there are over 40 public cases of
Americans who are classified as hostages or those who are unlawfully
detained abroad, some having been in detention for several years. To
date, the Biden administration has only brought a few Americans home
while others like Paul Whelan, Austin Tice, Paul Rusesabagina, and
others languish away. I previously asked about these cases in March,
but I have not received answers to them. There are currently nine
Americans who are unlawfully detained in Venezuela. I know that Special
Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Carstens recently traveled to
Caracas to visit with them and engage in diplomatic talks on their
potential release. What was the outcome of this trip?
Answer. SPEHA Carstens traveled to Venezuela in early March and
returned to the United States on March 9 with two U.S. citizens who
were wrongfully detained in Venezuela, Gustavo Cardenas, and Jorge
Fernandez. Upon return, he went to Texas to engage with families of the
remaining wrongful detainees in Venezuela. There are still six U.S.
nationals who are wrongfully detained in Venezuela. Five of them are
remaining former CITGO executives. The sixth is former U.S. Marine
Matthew Heath.
While in Caracas, SPEHA Carstens was able to conduct welfare visits
with U.S. national detainees. One of our main priorities is to ensure
their health and wellbeing while we continue to advocate for their
release
Question. What do you believe to be the biggest obstacle to
securing the release of the CITGO6, Matthew Heath, Adrian Berry, and
Luke Denman?
Answer. The biggest challenge to securing their release is that the
Maduro regime wants to engage in hostage diplomacy and make
transactional exchanges for their release that we cannot or will not
give them. We struggle to find options that are amenable to all sides.
Question. The Government of Rwanda's Paul Kagame lured Paul
Rusesabagina, hero in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and noted Kagame
critic, from his home in the U.S., stood trial on terrorism charges in
Rwanda, and denied due process. My staff visited Mr. Rusesabagina in
prison in Kigali and verified many of the issues raised by his family.
What is your assessment of Mr. Rusesabagina's case and what are
potential next steps?
Answer. The Department has been engaged on Paul Rusesabagina's case
since his August 2020 detention and remains committed to assuring his
welfare and securing his release. Pursuant to the Robert Levinson
Hostage Recovery and Hostage-taking Accountability Act, the Department
determined the Government of Rwanda wrongfully detained Paul
Rusesabagina. To date, the Department has pursued a quiet diplomacy
strategy to seek Rusesabagina's release. Unfortunately, this approach
has not yielded much fruit, and the Department is currently exploring
other options to use moving forward.
Question. How can the United States better leverage its
relationship with the Rwandan Government to force discussions about Mr.
Rusesabagina's release?
Answer. The Department regularly discusses the Rusesabagina case
with the Government of Rwanda at high levels in both Kigali and
Washington. We are currently reevaluating our strategy to identify the
best options moving forward.
Question. Do you believe that you have all the tools necessary to
bring Americans home? Why or why not?
Answer. We are committed to doing everything we possibly can to
bring home U.S. nationals who are wrongfully detained or held hostage,
wherever they are around the world. Until every single U.S. national
that is wrongfully detained or held hostage is brought home, we will
continue to seek new opportunities to help us in our shared goal to see
them reunited with their loved ones. As we continue to implement the
Levinson Act, engage with families, and analyze areas for improvement,
we will be sure to continue our engagement with you and your
Congressional colleagues, whom we view as valuable partners in our
efforts.
Question. Atrocity Prevention: The Administration's FY23 budget
request decreased the amount of funding for the Atrocities Prevention
Fund from $5 million as enacted in FY22 to $2.5 million. Could you
please explain the rationale for the reduction?
Answer. The President's Budget ensures that Atrocities Prevention
will remain a top priority for the Department. Since FY 2020, we have
programmed $15 million in ESF and INCLE funds to support atrocities
prevention work in Iraq and Syria, as well as other regions. This work
is critical in our efforts to promote justice and accountability by
aiding in the collection, preservation, and maintenance of chains of
custody of evidence, including for use in prosecutions. These funds are
also used in the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.
Question. Do you feel this reduction accurately represents the
USG's whole-of-government approach to atrocity prevention?
Answer. The U.S. Government coordinates routinely on atrocity
prevention through the interagency Atrocity Prevention Task Force,
enabling unity of focus and effort across departments and agencies, and
allowing each to fund relevant programming from funds outside the
framework of the Atrocity Prevention Fund. In a whole-of-government
approach to preventing and mitigating atrocity risk around the globe,
the U.S. Government uses all of the tools at its disposal--including
diplomacy, foreign assistance, investigations and fact-finding
missions, financial tools and engagements, training, and reports--to
raise awareness and generate coordinated international pressure in
response.
Question. How do you plan to synthesize atrocity prevention within
the State Department's existing programs and initiatives and improve
and expedite the implementation of the Elie Wiesel Act?
Answer. We continue to provide training to our teams in Washington
and around the world on how to spot warning signs or indicators of
potential atrocities and how to take early steps to disrupt possible
atrocity crime continuums. Thus far we have trained almost 2,000
people. We also work with embassy country teams to incorporate atrocity
risk mitigation into country planning and strategy efforts. In
addition, we are currently working on a government-wide strategy to
anticipate, prevent, and respond to atrocities, as called for in the
Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018. The
strategy and its corresponding workplan will help improve the
implementation of the Act.
Question. How does the State Department plan to work with other
U.S. agencies and multilateral and international partners and
institutions to synchronize atrocity prevention strategies and
coordinate prevention and mitigation efforts?
Answer. Working closely with the interagency Atrocity Prevention
Task Force, the State Department coordinates regularly with other U.S.
agencies and departments to forge a whole-of-government unity of focus
and effort to synchronize atrocity prevention strategies and coordinate
prevention and mitigation efforts. The State Department also leads
efforts to develop a U.S. whole-of-government strategy to anticipate,
prevent, and respond to atrocities, as called for in the Elie Wiesel
Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, that lays out roles and
responsibilities across the interagency, sets goals, and orients the
interagency Atrocity Prevention Task Force's priority actions towards
achieving these goals. The State Department coordinates regularly with
international partners and shares best practices. The State Department
also leads efforts with multilateral and international partners on
joint actions on atrocity prevention, including coordination of
diplomatic, programmatic, and accountability efforts. The State
Department has also planned joint engagements, statements, training,
and assistance efforts through UN mechanisms.
Question. Special Issuance Visas (SIVs): After the fall of Kabul
and the subsequent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, the backlog
of SIV applicants (including those post-chief-of-mission approval and
others) totals more than 50,000. What steps are you taking to alleviate
this backlog?
Answer. Relocating Afghan qualified SIV applicants is a priority
for me and the Department. Despite having no consular presence in
Afghanistan since the suspension of the U.S. Embassy operations on
August 31, 2021, we continue to process SIV applications at every stage
of the SIV process, including by transferring cases to other U.S.
embassies and consulates around the world where applicants are able to
appear. We are committed to identifying where additional investments
can be most effective in expediting SIV processing as well as the
expected costs, and find ways to get SIV applicants out of Afghanistan
in light of significant challenges with outbound travel. The
Coordinator for Afghanistan Relocation Efforts is dedicated to
assisting SIV applicants through the logistical process.
Question. Provide those with credible and legitimate pathways to
the U.S. through the SIV program with the resources they need?
Answer. We have increased the resources dedicated to SIV processing
and have undertaken steps to streamline the process at every stage of
the application under State Department control. In FY 2021, the
Department was able to increase resources dedicated to COM approval
processing and take steps to prioritize applications from interpreters
and translators. While we are currently unable to provide consular
services in Afghanistan, we continue to process applications at every
stage, including by transferring interview-ready cases to U.S.
embassies and consulates where applicants are able to travel.
Question. Provide resources to personnel at intake facilities
abroad and at home for expeditious screening and vetting?
Answer. The Department of State has the highest respect for the men
and women who have taken enormous risks to support our military and
civilian personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. We take these threats very
seriously, and we are committed to providing efficient and secure SIV
processing while maintaining national security as our highest priority.
The Department of State supports the interagency community's efforts to
complete screening and vetting of SIV applicants in the most efficient
manner possible, both abroad and domestically. Overseas, SIV cases are
interviewed and screened through interagency vetting partners.
Question. Human Rights: Do you believe that the FY23 budget
accurately and completely represents the Administration's efforts to
put human rights at the center of its foreign policy?
Answer. Yes. The FY 2023 budget fully supports the democracy and
human rights core objectives of the Administration's 2022-2026 Joint
Strategic Plan and U.S. foreign policy priorities in line with Interim
National Security Guidance goals. U.S. foreign assistance plays a key
role in supporting the Administration's efforts to put human rights at
the center of foreign policy, including by strengthening democratic
institutions, upholding universal values, and promoting human dignity.
Question. How much U.S. foreign assistance and State Department
resources have been dedicated to the Summit to Democracy?
Answer. The Department's dedicated funding is coming from
appropriated funding for programs with the same intent as those
associated with the Summit. As part of the Presidential Initiative for
Democratic Renewal, DRL supports eight foreign assistance lines of
effort. For FY 2021, DRL has $18 million from regularly allocated
funding and a similar amount of FY 2022, pending availability,
dedicated to Summit initiatives. INL has attributed $5.6 million in FY
2021 INCLE funding to Summit initiatives, a level anticipated to
increase in FY 2022, pending availability of funds. S/GWI has $2
million in FY 2021 ESF for Summit-related programs. We will conduct
activities that do not require dedicated funding including advancing
U.S. policy commitments.
Question. Migration: The FY 2023 budget request states the
Administration's intention to ``support a renewed focus on migration
management'' including ``climate migration programming.'' What are the
details of this plan and how, if at all, does it complement other
humanitarian priorities?
Answer. The Administration issued a Report on the Impact of Climate
Change on Migration in October 2021 that recognizes the relationship
between climate change, migration, and displacement. Using a whole-of-
government approach to address this urgent problem, a working group led
by State and the NSC is now taking stock of all bilateral and
multilateral assistance to countries impacted by climate change and
migration. The working group is studying, for example, expanding
climate resilience and preparedness activities in U.S. foreign
assistance programs to prevent or mitigate displacement as an
adaptation to climate change, and how to address critical gaps in
development, humanitarian, and climate finance. The work is ongoing.
Question. UNFPA: The FY23 Budget Request includes $56 million for
the UN Population Fund. How will you ensure that none of these funds
are used in the support or participates in the management of a program
of coercive abortion or involuntary stabilization in violation of Kemp-
Kasten amendment?
Answer. UNFPA opposes any form of coercive sexual and reproductive
health policies or programs, including but not limited to forced
abortion and forced sterilization. I will continue our government's
oversight of UNFPA activities as a member of its executive board,
including through the board's country program review mechanism.
Question. Gender Equity & Equality Action Fund: The FY23 Budget
request includes $200 million for the Gender Equity & Equality Action
Fund. How will this money be spent compared to the previous fund which
was named Women's Global Development and Prosperity Fund?
Answer. The Gender Equity and Equality Action (GEEA) Fund advances
the economic security of women and girls globally, including from
marginalized and underserved populations, and addresses the
disproportionate impacts of the COVID-19, climate change, conflict, and
crisis on women and girls. The GEEA Fund builds upon the successes and
lessons learned from the Women's Global Development and Prosperity (W-
GDP) Fund including upon the three W-GDP pillars with a comprehensive
set of priorities and principles. The priority areas incorporate
addressing gender-based violence as it impacts economic development,
focus on green jobs and building resilience to climate change, and
address issues such as unpaid care responsibilities.
Question. Consular Affairs: Last year, President Biden issued an
Executive Order on Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service
Delivery to Rebuild Trust in Government. One aspect of this executive
order was a commitment to ``design and deliver a new online passport
renewal experience that does not require any physical documents to be
mailed.'' Please provide to the Committee update on the progress of
online passport renewal, including an estimated date of when this
service will be made available to the entire American public.
Answer. I remain committed to ensuring the Department launches
Online Passport Renewal (OPR) to the American public this year. The
Bureau of Consular Affairs initiated a controlled pilot of the OPR
system in February to validate it will meet usability and performance
expectations. The pilot will conclude this summer. The Department will
determine the official public launch date soon thereafter. OPR will
enable certain applicants to submit their renewal application and pay
their fees online. This will eliminate the need to print and mail the
application and payment. OPR will eventually enable employees to
adjudicate renewal applications remotely and the Department to balance
workload across sites, promoting increased efficiency.
Question. What additional technological resources and investments
does the Department of State, specifically Consular Affairs need to
deliver this service to the American public?
Answer. I remain committed to ensuring the Department launches
Online Passport Renewal (OPR) to the American public this year. The
Bureau of Consular Affairs initiated a controlled pilot of the OPR
system in February to validate it will meet usability and performance
expectations. The pilot will conclude this summer. The Department will
determine the official public launch date soon thereafter. The
Department does not anticipate needing additional resources to complete
the delivery of OPR. OPR will enable certain applicants to submit their
renewal application and pay their fees online. This will eliminate the
need to print and mail the application and payment. OPR will eventually
enable employees to adjudicate renewal applications remotely and the
Department to balance workload across sites, promoting increased
efficiency.
Question. An OIG Report released at the end of the 2021 reviewed
Consular Affair's ConsularOne modernization program. OIG's best
estimate was that the total cost of the ConsularOne program ranged
between $200-600 million since 2009. The report further concludes that
Consular Affairs has failed to meet performance goals and has delayed
delivery of modernization services to the public.
In light of the finding of the OIG report and the Biden
administration's commitment to providing online passport renewal to the
American public, please outline for the Committee how the Department of
State's Bureau of Consular Affairs plans to employ technological
solutions to ensure that this service is provided to the taxpayer in a
timely manner without continued wasteful spending?
Answer. I remain committed to ensuring the Department launches
Online Passport Renewal (OPR) to the American public this year. The
Bureau of Consular Affairs initiated a controlled pilot of the OPR
system in February to validate it will meet usability and performance
expectations. The pilot will conclude this summer. The Department will
determine the official public launch date soon thereafter. OPR will
allow certain applicants to submit their renewal application and pay
their fees online. This will eliminate a need to print and mail the
application and payment. Further, OPR will enable employees to
adjudicate applications remotely and the Department to balance workload
across sites, promoting efficient service.
Question. Last year, President Biden issued an Executive Order on
Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service Delivery to
Rebuild Trust in Government. One aspect of this executive order was a
commitment to ``design and deliver a new online passport renewal
experience that does not require any physical documents to be mailed.''
Yet, an initial rollout of online passport renewal revealed significant
security issues with taxpayers most private information. What specific
steps is the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs taking to
deploy technological solutions to provide online passport renewal
service without compromised privacy and security issues?
Answer. Security and protection of Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) has always been a priority of the Department. The
vulnerabilities found were related to the widely publicized Log4j
vulnerability affecting most private and public sector websites. We
remediated the vulnerabilities and implemented additional security-
strengthening measures. Department security teams from Consular Systems
and Technology, Information Resource Management, and Diplomatic
Security conducted evaluations of OPR, including the internal Web
platform, our Travel Document Issuance System, and the public facing
MyTravelGov account portal over a period of 7 weeks and deemed it
secure.
Question. Diplomatic Security: It is vitally important that our
diplomats are empowered to get outside of embassy walls to meet with
local leaders and populations. Unfortunately, far too often at high-
threat posts, security concerns take precedence over diplomatic
necessity, and our FSOs are trapped in their embassies. Effective
diplomacy cannot be conducted from behind the walls of a compound, and
our adversaries do not face similar restrictions on their diplomatic
activity. The department needs to take a more forward leaning approach
towards risk management, as opposed to risk avoidance. Do you believe
that the Department's current risk tolerance in high-threat posts is
appropriately tailored? Do you believe that it should be improved, and
if so, how? What will you do to bring about that improvement?
Answer. Our Chiefs of Mission and security professionals make hard
decisions every day to balance security while pursuing engagements and
furthering critical national security priorities. While we have no
higher priority than the safety and security of our people, I have said
before that we have to accept risk, and manage it smartly, and I am
proud to report that our High Threat/High Risk posts maintained a 95
percent approval rate for engagement requests for the second
consecutive year. Additionally, we are updating and revising our risk
management policies and exploring both procedural and legislative
changes to better enable us to quickly establish new facilities and
continue to expand our diplomatic outreach.
Question. I was glad to see you voice support for reform of the
Accountability Review Board (ARB) process in your testimony. Are you
familiar with S. 816, the Diplomatic Support and Security Act of 2021?
Answer. I am aware of the Act and want to assure you that the
Department of State has shared its sentiments and concerns that aim at
reforming the ARB process. While we are in sync on the broader goals,
we would urge that if legislation were to proceed, it should preserve
maximum flexibilities to ensure diplomacy operates effectively. We look
forward to an opportunity to engage with the Committee as the Act
proceeds.
Question. Do you support this bill?
Answer. I appreciate that SFRC included in the Act certain
flexibilities recommended by the Department of State. While we are very
much in sync on the broader goal of reforming the ARB process, it
should preserve greater flexibility in convening an incident review, to
ensure the Department of State will operate with agility. Flexible
authorities could advance important U.S. national security priorities
and U.S. foreign policy, while considering the Department's physical
security priorities. We look forward to working with Committee staff on
this critical issue.
Question. The Secure Construction and Counterterrorism Act (SECCA)
is now more than 20 years old. Are there updates that you would like to
see to SECCA? If yes, what?
Answer. SECCA has been in place, unchanged, since 1999. It mandates
setback and collocation requirements for diplomatic facilities at all
U.S. posts unless a waiver is exercised by the Secretary of State.
SECCA was part of the U.S. response to the 1998 East Africa bombings
and reflected the tactics deployed at the time against our facilities.
In the intervening period, threats have evolved and our understanding
of effective countermeasures and the technology we use to defend
ourselves has changed. As we seek to reshape our diplomatic footing and
acceptance of risk in the pursuit of the nation's foreign policy
mission, the Department will propose amendments to reflect the new
realities facing our diplomatic platforms.
Question. Do SECCA restrictions lead to much higher costs of
building embassies and consulates, even though the Department is
building farther and farther from city centers?
Answer. Yes, SECCA constraints directly increase both land purchase
and construction cost. SECCA's one-size-fits-all standard impedes a
nuanced approach to construction. Construction logistics costs, such as
restrictions on noise, truck access, and laydown areas, combined with
the cost of a full setback site in a dense urban center, especially in
the highly developed world, increases the overall cost of delivery.
Increased flexibility to determine embassy locations based on
operational needs would decrease costs.
Question. Do you believe that reforms are necessary to give the
Department the needed flexibility to build in convenient locations?
Answer. Yes, I believe reform is needed to locate our missions in
the most operationally advantageous locations. Existing legislation
imposes a single standard regarding the setback of facilities
irrespective of the threat level, footprint size, or the nature of the
facility. This impairs the Department's ability to rapidly shift staff,
create or expand our presence, and adds time, complexity, and cost. A
reformed SECCA would allow the Department to pursue diplomacy from a
mindset of managed risk.
Question. Would SECCA reforms also empower the Department to build
embassies that address the threats of today, not just those of 20 years
ago?
Answer. The Department designs and constructs facilities to address
both current and future threats. Over time, security threats have
evolved, and we cannot leverage distance alone as a defensive measure.
The one-size-fits-all nature of the law, especially with smaller posts,
does not adequately address the realities of varied environments around
the world. While the Department enhanced its construction methodologies
and provides greater performance against extended threats, SECCA
reforms would allow more flexibility to adjust our defensive standards
and implement mitigation or construction strategies that replicate the
stand-off defense equivalent to a 100-foot setback without a waiver
process, i.e., build to an engineering standard where feasible.
Question. Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs): After years of being
the interagency laggard in providing care for victims of AHIs, I am
glad to see the State Department catch up to the other departments and
agencies whose employees have also been affected by AHIs. These brave
people were harmed while doing their duty, and it is the department's
responsibility to care for them. What is the department currently doing
to provide care for AHI victims? What more could you do?
Answer. There is nothing more important to me than protecting the
health, safety, and security of our people. I believe our current
efforts reflect the personal priority I place on this issue. I can
assure you that we are continually improving the care and support we
provide, including access to the best, state-of-the-art care available
at facilities such as Johns Hopkins and Walter Reed and other
facilities that are part of the military health system. We are active
in the interagency investigation into the cause of AHI, discussions on
preventative measures, and how we can best protect our people.
I am grateful for the bipartisan support of Congress, including the
specific support provided through the FY 2022 NDAA and HAVANA Act and
the FY 2022 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act.
Question. Unfortunately, USAID personnel have also suffered from
AHIs, yet they do not have the access to care that their State
Department colleagues have. Do you commit to assisting your colleagues
at USAID to get the access to care that they deserve?
Answer. Yes. The Department works closely with USAID on AHI,
including on the provision of care to USAID colleagues who have been
affected by AHI. USAID personnel working overseas are eligible to
access care and support at post, as are all U.S. Government employees
and their families under Chief of Mission authority. I commit to
ensuring that USAID personnel, like all mission personnel, have the
information they need to access and utilize the resources available to
them at post.
Question. Since incidents of AHIs first became public, the
executive branch, especially the State Department, has been very close-
lipped about the problem. Do you commit to promptly providing Congress
with full, accurate, regular, and up-to-date information and
intelligence regarding AHIs when requested?
Answer. There is nothing more important to me than protecting the
health, safety, and security of our people. I believe that the flow of
information has improved since I arrived at the Department. My team,
coordinated by the Department's Health Incidents Response Task Force,
has been providing briefings on anomalous health incidents (AHI) on a
regular basis and is available to members and staff. Further, in
response to the FY 2022 NDAA, the Department will join the interagency
briefings that will be conducted regularly. I understand the first of
those interagency briefings is tentatively scheduled for June.
I am grateful for your continuing support for the Department's
efforts to address AHI.
Question. Public Diplomacy: The Global Engagement Center (GEC) has
a vital role to play in our great power competition with China and
Russia. How is the Department leveraging the GEC's capabilities to
address Russian disinformation and propaganda regarding its invasion of
Ukraine?
Answer. The GEC works closely with other parts of the Department,
other U.S. Government agencies, and like-minded foreign partners to
coordinate support efforts, exchange expertise, and provide analysis on
ongoing Russian disinformation campaigns. The GEC creates content for
State's Disarming Disinformation website and distributes analytical
``Russian Disinformation Snapshots on Ukraine'' to more than 1,500 U.S.
Government and like-minded government contacts twice a week. We also
share selected unclassified reporting with the Ukrainian Government's
Center for Strategic Communication (CSC) and are working with them to
strengthen their relationships with social media platforms to protect
the information environment from malign Russian influence.
Question. What is the GEC doing to address disinformation from the
Chinese Communist Party regarding the origins of the COVID-19 virus?
Answer. The GEC has proactively monitored PRC disinformation and
propaganda about COVID-19, including its origins, since the beginning
of the pandemic. The GEC shares analyses with Department regional
bureaus, the interagency, and foreign partners to inform messaging that
punctures or debunks Beijing's false narratives. The GEC also exchanges
insights on PRC tactics with social media companies to help them
identify examples of information manipulation. In addition, GEC
programs bolster the awareness of foreign civil society and media to
encourage the amplification of accurate information about the pandemic
and to counter COVID-19-related disinformation.
Question. Cybersecurity: The State Department's cybersecurity is
seriously lacking, evidenced by major, damaging cybersecurity attacks
conducted against the department over the last several years. What are
you doing to shore up the Department's cyber defenses?
Answer. The Department takes our cybersecurity responsibilities
seriously. We are establishing new policies and programs to provide
more proactive cybersecurity practices. The Department's top
cybersecurity initiative is the implementation of Executive Order
14028. This will ensure that we deliver a Zero Trust architecture and
emphasize preventive cyber hygiene measures to maintain system health
across the enterprise. Our efforts include improving identity,
credential, and access management; requiring multifactor authentication
for users; and instituting multiple layers of data encryption across a
multi-cloud ecosystem. We are also working with CISA, NSA and other
federal partners to implement cybersecurity best practices.
Question. What are you doing to increase the number of IT workers
within the Department while also providing greater incentives for
professional growth throughout the IT workforce?
Answer. The Department initiated an IT skills incentive program (IT
SIP) as part of a long-term strategy to attract, train, and retain IT
professionals in both the Foreign Service (FS) and Civil Service (CS)
within the State Department. FS and CS IT employees can apply to the IT
SIP and receive a base salary increase by earning industry-recognized
certifications or acquiring a certain bachelor's or master's degree in
an IT field. Additionally, the Department is implementing cybersecurity
skills incentives. Occupational series or skill codes with approved
cybersecurity certifications can be eligible for a retention incentive
payment based on duties that contribute to cybersecurity and protection
of Departmental assets. We are also developing a recruitment incentive
package for newly hired CS and FS IT employees that we hope will go
into effect as early as this year.
Question. Mission China: Last week, I sent you a letter regarding
the deplorable treatment of our diplomats in China at the hands of the
CCP. Do you agree that the CCP's treatment of our diplomatic personnel
is unacceptable?
Answer. The United States has no higher priority than the safety,
health, and well-being of U.S. citizens overseas, including Mission
China's personnel and their families. The United States expects all
governments, including the People's Republic of China, to adhere to
their commitments under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Senior Department officials have raised our concerns in Washington and
Beijing regarding the challenging circumstances as the PRC responds to
the COVID-19 pandemic and will continue to defend our interests. A
response to your letter is forthcoming.
Question. Do you believe that such treatment violates the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations?
Answer. While the Department strives to comply with reasonable
COVID-19 containment measures for its diplomatic personnel and their
families, many of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) measures are
inconsistent with the privileges and immunities such personnel enjoy
under the Vienna Conventions. We have pushed back on numerous occasions
both in the PRC and in the United States on measures we believe are
inconsistent with the privileges and immunities of our personnel.
Question. Have you or any senior State Department officials raised
this issue with your Chinese counterparts? If not, why not?
Answer. We have raised on numerous occasions with People's Republic
of China (PRC) interlocutors both in Beijing and in Washington measures
we believe are inconsistent with the privileges and immunities of our
personnel. Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Deputy Secretary Sherman, and I
have conveyed to senior PRC officials our deep concerns with how the
challenging pandemic environment impacts the operations of the U.S.
embassy and consulates in China. The Department strives to comply with
reasonable COVID-19 containment measures for its diplomatic personnel
and their families.
Question. What must be done now to bolster Taiwan's defense and
deter Chinese aggression?
Answer. Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and contributes to
the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and
within the region. In that vein, the United States will continue to
make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,
consistent with our one China policy. We are also working with allies
and partners to highlight the positive role that Taiwan plays in
addressing global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in
defending against threats to its democratic values.
Question. Is the Department considering security assistance
programs for Taiwan? In particular, is the Department considering
initiatives or funding focused not just for arms, but also more
training for Taiwan?
Answer. The Department welcomes the opportunity to further discuss
tools such as security assistance with Congress. The U.S. Government
continues to support Taiwan through the acquisition of asymmetric
capabilities, and the Departments of State and Defense are also
coordinating closely with Taiwan to support non-materiel and
indigenously produced solutions to improve Taiwan's defenses. Our
expanding security cooperation seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize
reserve force reform.
Question. Do you commit to working with Congress on advancing
proposals that bolster Taiwan's defenses?
Answer. Yes, the Department is committed to working with Congress
on bolstering Taiwan's defenses, and we are already engaged in
discussions with Congressional committees on possible security
assistance programs. The Department has notified Congress of more than
$32 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, and we also are
encouraging Taiwan to implement necessary reforms that will strengthen
Taiwan's ability to deter PRC aggression and coercion.
Question. Sanctions: What are the Department's specific budgeting
and personnel plans for ensuring the Office of Sanctions Coordination
has the necessary tools for success?
Answer. While Congress created the Office of Sanctions Coordination
(S/SC) in statute, a former sanctions coordination office remained
within the structure of the Department. This office--assumed by S/SC--
has not had an adjustment of funding or personnel resources since 2014.
The sanctions landscape, however, has changed dramatically over this
period of time--with sanctions becoming a primary foreign policy tool
of the both the executive and legislative branches. To date, the
Department has relied on the legacy funding and staffing pattern, used
its regular authorities to hire a deputy coordinator from the Senior
Foreign Service, and used the authorizing statute's special hiring
authorities to extend offers to three sanctions experts. However, we
need additional resources to enable S/SC to succeed in its mandate. S/
SC is working to identify its needs and on a request for additional
funding to support the office's robust travel needs and hiring of
additional personnel to engage and coordinate with allies, new
sanctions partners, and other stakeholders.
Question. What specific role has the State Department played in
coordinating with foreign partners on the roll out of sanctions against
the Russian Federation after the invasion of Ukraine? Please provide
specific examples. In your view, what has been working well and where
is there room for improvement?
Answer. Since Putin began his war of choice, the Department of
State has worked directly with nearly 40 allies and partners across the
world to levy coordinated, wide-ranging sanctions and export controls
against Russia in response to its unprovoked war against Ukraine.
Countries such as New Zealand, Switzerland, and San Marino, among
others, have enacted new or expanded existing unilateral sanctions
authorities to join global efforts to support Ukraine and isolate
Russia. We continue to coordinate with our allies and partners to
ensure unity on sanctions actions, including to target and capture the
ill-gotten gains of Russia's oligarchs.
Question. What specific role has the State Department played in
coordinating with foreign partners on the roll out of sanctions
implementation and enforcement guidance associated with sanctions
against the Russian Federation after the invasion of Ukraine? Please
provide specific examples. In your view, what has been working well and
where is there room for improvement?
Answer. Since Putin began his war of choice, the State Department
has coordinated with nearly 40 allies and partners to impose
unprecedented sanctions in response to Russia's war against Ukraine. We
are now focused on closing any potential gaps in sanctions and export
controls measures between the United States and our allies and partners
as well as targeting sanctions evasion networks, broadening our
multilateral coalition, and launching the REPO and KleptoCapture
interagency taskforces to enhance enforcement. Our outreach to foreign
partners and industry to expand and sustain these efforts are ongoing.
Question. In March, the United States and other international
partners announced the creation of the Russian Elites, Proxies, and
Oligarchs (REPO) multilateral task force. Please describe in detail the
role the State Department has played in engaging and coordinating with
allies and partners on issues before the REPO task force. In your view,
should seized assets be confiscated and then used to support Ukraine?
Answer. The Department has coordinated between U.S. agencies and
our posts abroad to communicate relevant information on the REPO and
KleptoCapture task forces, including related to engaging with host
governments. Together we have focused on identifying and seizing
assets, including boats, planes, helicopters, and real estate. We have
also focused on freezing financial accounts in the United States and
foreign jurisdictions with a view towards possible forfeiture/
confiscation and/or criminal prosecution where the facts and law would
support such a result. We will continue to work with interagency and
multilateral partners to hunt down the assets of those individuals and
entities that have been sanctioned in connection with Russia's
premeditated, unjust, and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and the
continuing aggression of the Russian regime.
Question. In a recent vote on Russia's removal from the Human
Rights Council, over 50 nations abstained from the vote. With regards
to sanctions policy and enforcement, how does the Department plan to
engage with nations that could provide alternative markets or avenues
to evade sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation?
Answer. We understand that many nations have a policy of not
supporting unilateral sanctions, only joining in UN sanctions. The
Department is conducting outreach to many nations which abstained to
stress to them the importance of taking actions against the Kremlin,
including sanctions cooperation and enforcement, while also explaining
our authority under E.O. 14024 to impose sanctions on persons who
provide material support to sanctioned persons.
Question. What specific benchmarks is the Department utilizing to
measure the impact of sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation?
Answer. The Department of State is closely monitoring a range of
economic indicators from private sector analysts, the Kremlin, and
national statistics agencies around the world, as well as reporting
from our embassies and information shared by partners and allies, to
assess the economic impact of our sanctions. Extraordinary policy
actions taken by the Kremlin and the Central Bank of Russia to limit
capital flows, stabilize stock markets, and prop up the value of the
Russian Ruble are additional evidence of the effectiveness of our
measures.
Question. Guantanamo Bay: When considering whether to transfer a
detainee from U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to another
country, what requirements must be met before you would authorize or
consent to such a transfer?
Answer. The State Department leads the U.S. Government's efforts to
identify suitable transfer destinations for individuals in U.S. custody
at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility who have been approved for
transfer. The Department leads efforts to negotiate non-legally binding
transfer frameworks, including mutually acceptable humane-treatment and
security assurances to mitigate the threat posed by former Guantanamo
detainees to the United States or U.S. persons or interests. In most
cases, the Secretary of Defense must certify to Congress, 30-days in
advance of a repatriation or resettlement, inter alia that the
receiving government ``has taken or agreed to take appropriate steps to
substantially mitigate any risk the individual may pose.''
Question. What safeguards would you demand to ensure that any
detainee subject to transfer does not support or engage in future acts
of terrorism or violence against the United States, U.S. personnel,
citizens, or property, or U.S. allies or partners?
Answer. The Department of State vigorously pursues efforts to
identify suitable repatriation or resettlement locations that will
substantially mitigate the threat that may be posed by any former
Guantanamo Bay detention facility detainee post-transfer. State does so
by developing mutually acceptable security and humane-treatment
assurances with receiving countries that are designed to appropriately
mitigate post-transfer risk. Recognizing some risk will still attend
any detainee transfer, the Department of State and other U.S.
Government agencies and departments regularly communicate with
receiving countries to share information and to resolve challenges as
they arise.
Question. Please describe the status of any and all negotiations
that the State Department is currently engaged in with any foreign
country with respect to the possible transfer of any detainee currently
detained at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Answer. It has been our longstanding practice to not share the
specifics of any negotiations the State Department undertakes
concerning Guantanamo Bay detention facility detainees due to the
sensitive diplomatic nature of these ongoing discussions. In general,
the process involves identifying and engaging suitable countries to
which detainees may be repatriated to countries of origin or resettled
to third countries. Whenever possible, we pursue repatriation before
resettlement. After we identify a suitable transfer location, we
approach the host government to begin negotiations to accept the
detainee. After the receiving government agrees to accept the detainee,
we then negotiate mutually acceptable security and humane treatment
measures.
Question. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate: On November 23,
2020, then-President-elect Joe Biden announced his intent to appoint
former Secretary of State John Kerry to be a ``Special Presidential
Envoy for Climate.'' In response to committee questions regarding
whether Special Envoy John Kerry is legally required to be submitted to
the Senate for Advice and Consent, the State Department has informed
the committee an administration legal view that: ``Envoys who have only
a discrete and temporary mission and do not fill a ``continuing
position established by law,'' see Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051
(2018), historically have not been considered ``public ministers'' or
``Officers of the United States'' to whom the Appointments Clause
applies. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 102-05 (2007). Special Envoy
Kerry remains in his position. Is this position still ``discrete and
temporary''? Why?
Answer. The work of the Special Envoy remains fixed and finite,
``to elevate the issue of climate change and underscore the commitment
my Administration will make toward addressing it'' as outlined in
section 102(c) of E.O. 14008 of January 27, 2021, issued by President
Biden. The nature of this position is consistent with special envoy
positions appointed by administrations on a bipartisan basis to respond
to focused and urgent foreign policy priorities.
Question. At what point is this position no longer considered
discrete and temporary? Why?
Answer. This inquiry involves a fact-specific assessment depending
on the relevant circumstances at that time. For example, the position
would no longer be considered discrete and temporary if a federal
statute were to confer permanent status on the position.
Question. Yes or no. Is it possible for the Special Envoy Kerry's
position to be considered ``discrete or temporary'' if the position is
retained for a complete 4-year Presidential term? Why?
Answer. This inquiry involves a fact-specific assessment depending
on the relevant circumstances at that time, and there is no specific,
fixed time-period beyond which a position may not be considered
discrete and temporary. The existence of the same position for a period
of 4 years would not, by itself, prevent it from being considered
discrete and temporary.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Afghanistan: The Foreign Assistance budget proposed for
Afghanistan in FY23 is $268.0 million and reflects a decrease of $95.8
million, 26 percent below the FY 2022 Request. How do you justify this
26 percent decrease, given the many needs still in Afghanistan for U.S.
assistance?
Answer. Support for Afghanistan remains a key Administration
priority. This means prioritizing critical sectors: humanitarian
assistance first then meeting the needs that underpin a functioning
society--food security, livelihoods, health, and education--as well as
civil society, with a focus on the protection of women and girls and
human rights. Given the new realities on the ground, the
Administration's Afghanistan assistance request reflects reduced
funding requirements for the following security sector assistance
accounts: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement;
International Military Education and Training; and Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs.
Question. The FY23 budget for the State Department's Bureau of
South and Central Asian Affairs includes $10.9 million to sustain the
Coordinator for Afghanistan Relocation Efforts (CARE) and a $7.0
million increase for Afghan Affairs Unit Operations in Doha. How do you
justify these amounts, especially with the lack of progress in getting
many individuals out of Afghanistan who are in danger--such as USAGM
journalists, American Spaces staff, and SIV applicants?
Answer. Since August 2021, the United States has directly supported
the relocation of over 70,000 Afghans, including at least 672 U.S.
citizens and 555 Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs). The Department of
State, under the leadership of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation
Efforts, continues to support travel out of Afghanistan for eligible
travelers, including U.S. citizens, LPRs, our Afghan allies and their
eligible family members--including USAGM journalists and staff,
American Spaces staff, Afghanistan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
holders, and SIV applicants who have received Chief of Mission
approval. Since the non-combatant evacuation operation ended, CARE has
evacuated thousands of SIV holders and eligible applicants.
Question. Burma: The FY23 Burma request is 109.1 million which is
20 percent below the FY 2021 actual and consistent with the FY22
request. With the human rights situation worsening in Burma due to the
military coup, why did the Department decrease the budget from FY21
actual by 20 percent?
Answer. The FY 2023 President's Budget request for Burma reflects
the Administration's commitment to advance democratic governance and
the rule of law, bolster civil society groups, promote basic and higher
education, promote access to justice, support humanitarian needs,
address human rights violations and abuses, support independent media,
and strengthen processes and mechanisms for an eventual return to the
path to democracy. The request adjusts some accounts, including
eliminating law enforcement and other criminal justice assistance, as
the coup restricted our ability to work with the military-led
government. The request also shifts bilateral HIV/AIDS funding to a
regional EAP fund to allow greater flexibility and responsiveness to
health needs.
Question. This funding is meant to support a large pool of items
including supporting civil society, grassroots organizations, food
security, healthcare programs, etc. Is this enough funding to support
these broader issues?
Answer. Yes. No cuts were made to our support for civil society,
grassroots organizations, food security, healthcare programs, or other
critical programs promoting the restoration of Burma's path to
democracy, as well as human rights and support for the people of Burma.
Note: While not shown in the bilateral line, the request shifts
bilateral HIV/AIDS funding to a regional fund consistent with our
request for the broader the EAP region to allow great flexibility and
responsiveness to health needs.
Question. Ethiopia: The FY23 budget for Ethiopia, which totals $267
million, is 17 percent below the actual amount expended for FY 2021,
and 12 percent below the FY 2022 request. Given the protracted
humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia, how can the State Department justify a
decrease in funding for FY23?
Answer. The request reflects programming shifts given required
assistance restrictions to Ethiopia under U.S. law, as well as the
protracted humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia. We continue to actively
engage on the humanitarian response and its drivers in Ethiopia. Our
funding levels for the humanitarian response are robust. The U.S.
Government has funded almost $1 billion in humanitarian assistance for
northern Ethiopia between FY 2020 and FY 2022. The State Department
will continue to monitor the situation on the ground to inform future
funding levels.
Question. Combatting Global Corruption Act, S.14: This bill
requires the Department of State to develop a series of reports on how
well the countries of the world are living up to the commitments they
have made to combat corruption. The President has said time and again
that combatting corruption is a vital national security interest of the
United States. Secretary Blinken, are you aware of this bill and do you
support it? Why or why not?
Answer. The Department is deeply committed to the goals of this
bill. The Department has concerns with some elements of the
legislation, which may present unintentional challenges for our
multilateral engagement and undermine our support for the strong
international anti-corruption architecture. Many multilateral bodies
already assess countries' implementation of anti-corruption obligations
through peer-review processes. We believe reinforcing and complementing
these existing multilateral reviews by focusing our engagement and
analysis on the substance of each country's achievements or
shortcomings--instead of new ranked reports--would better advance the
Act's goals.
Question. Funding for State Department Personnel and ``Training
Float'': The Biden administration is requesting funding for 570
additional Foreign Service and Civil Service positions. I understand
that this request includes 250 positions to expand the State
Department's ``Training Float.'' During the hearing, you stated that
these additional 250 positions ``will get us where we need to be'' in
terms of a training float.'' However, given that the State Department
will have added only 450 positions to achieve the training float for FY
2022 and FY 2023 combined, for a workforce of approximately 24,500
Foreign Service Officers and Civil Service Staff (not including Locally
Employed Staff overseas)--that figure seems low. Please clarify the
current size of the State Department's training float, and when the
Department of State is projected to arrive at the 15 percent training
float as required in the FY22 State Authorization Act.
Answer. The current training and professional development float is
composed of 1,112 positions (approximately 4 percent of our combined
Civil Service and Foreign Service workforce). The Department is
expanding by adding 80 additional opportunities in FY 2022 and has
requested another 250 opportunities in FY 2023. Implementing a 15
percent training and professional development float to accommodate the
number of career employees would require a total of 4,143 positions or
assignments (1,848 Civil Service and 2,295 Foreign Service), a goal
that is fiscally unachievable in the short-term without leaving
significant gaps in operational staffing. Therefore, the Department
will gradually implement increased training and professional
development opportunities, as expanding too fast will lead to overseas
and domestic vacancies.
Question. Paid Internships: I am happy to see that $10 million is
included in the FY23 budget request for paid internships at State. Can
you speak to the progress paid internships are expected to make on DEIA
(diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility) at the Department?
Answer. Existing paid internship and fellowship opportunities have
had a significant impact on DEIA. The Pickering and Rangel fellowships
have been responsible for increasing the overall Foreign Service
generalist minority rate by 33 percent. The additional $10 million
requested in FY 2023 will allow the Department to transition all
student internships to paid, as part of the Department of State's
continued efforts to diversify the ranks of its employees by
encouraging applications from populations traditionally
underrepresented in the Department and that reflect the diversity of
the United States. This paid internship program will help remove
barriers for students who may not have the financial means to accept an
unpaid internship.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. We have seen time and again in the last year the critical
importance of having sufficient diplomatic staff to support our
national security, from having ambassadors in place to having diplomats
on the ground to report on and respond to crises as they happen. Your
budget request seeks funding to add 570 new positions in the State
Department, 288 in the Foreign Service, and 282 in the Civil Service.
In your testimony, you stated that additional positions funded by the
FY23 request would allow a float of 250 people. In your request, you
note that would fund a ceiling of 16,091 positions. A training float of
250 people would be a float of less than 2 percent, leaving a long way
to go from Congressional requests to have a float of 15 percent. How
would a training float of 2 percent meet the goals of allowing more
employees to take time for training?
Answer. The current training and professional development float is
composed of 1,112 positions. This is approximately 4 percent of our
combined Civil Service and Foreign Service workforce. The Department is
expanding by adding 80 additional positions in FY 2022 and has
requested another 250 positions in FY 2023. We are committed to
expanding training and professional development opportunities,
including interagency details, to ensure employees have the right
skills throughout their career to support and defend United States'
interests.
Question. What number is your target number for a training float,
and how do you plan to get there?
Answer. The Department's current training and professional
development float is 1,112 positions--approximately 4 percent of our
combined Civil Service and Foreign Service workforce. Implementing a 15
percent float to accommodate the number of career employees would
require a total of 4,143 positions or assignments, a goal that is
fiscally unachievable in the short term without leaving significant
gaps in operational staffing. Therefore, we will gradually implement
increased opportunities, as expanding too fast will lead to overseas
and domestic vacancies. We plan to gradually expand the training float
by adding 80 additional opportunities in FY 2022 and another 250
opportunities in FY 2023.
Question. You stated early in your tenure that our diplomatic corps
should reflect the diversity of America, and you have taken steps by
hiring the first-ever Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer at State.
How does this budget request help you achieve State's goal of improving
diversity in recruitment, retention, and promotion to leadership
positions?
Answer. The Department's FY 2023 DEIA budget request is $78.6
million and includes projected expenditures across several offices and
bureaus. Together, these elements will build an infrastructure for new
and enhanced programs, accelerate hiring and recruitment modernization
to support diversity outreach, increase the collection and analysis of
DEIA-oriented data so that potential barriers to equal employment
opportunities can be identified and eliminated, reduce backlog of
discipline case reviews, and improve work-life programs. This is a
significant increase from the Department's DEIA budget for FY 2021,
which totaled $21.4 million, and the FY 2022 budget request of $43.8
million.
Question. Can you share statistics that disaggregate State's
workforce data by region and diversity?
Answer. When I became Secretary, I stated that our diversity is one
of our great national strengths, and I was committed to ensuring a
State Department workforce that reflects the full diversity of our
country. Our Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer has been leading an
effort to develop the first-ever demographic baseline report for the
State Department. This report, which is accessible to the entire
workforce, provides a comprehensive snapshot of our workforce
demographics and is one of several tools the Department will use to
assess DEIA progress. It is disaggregated by sex, race, ethnicity,
disability status, bureau, employment category, and grade or rank. In
the coming weeks, we look forward to sharing our demographic baseline
information with the respective Congressional oversight committees.
Question. Our world-class U.S. diplomats should receive the support
they need in all circumstances, including for those afflicted by
directed energy attacks. These diplomats rightly deserve an institution
that has their full support, especially when attacked in the line of
service. I appreciate your leadership in ensuring that after years of
doubt, they have access to the services that they need. Has the
Department established the procedures necessary to refer patients with
brain injuries to Walter Reed's medical facilities?
Answer. Our diplomats deserve the world's finest care and support.
Recognizing that and building on the FY 2022 National Defense
Authorization Act, the Department has established the necessary
procedures to get patients into the military health system, including
at Walter Reed. We also have procedures in place to get patients access
to other centers of excellence quickly, including Johns Hopkins, among
other places. No two patients are alike; we want to ensure that they
receive the best and most appropriate care.
Question. What obstacles, if any, hinder the State Department from
making use of these facilities for affected employees?
Answer. I am pleased to report potential obstacles associated with
getting treatment and care for those patients affected since January 1,
2016, have been resolved, and we are able to quickly get those affected
by a potential AHI to a medical facility. For those affected by a
possible AHI prior to January 1, 2016, or who may no longer be
affiliated with the Department, treatment and care are available via
Johns Hopkins Hospital and other centers of excellence.
Question. And what can Congress do to support this effort?
Answer. Congressional engagement has helped us ensure we are doing
everything we can to get this right. I look forward to continued
engagement with Congress related to these efforts and am grateful for
Congressional support for our diplomats around the world.
Question. Has the Department established procedures for handling
reports of ``Havana Syndrome,'' either at our diplomatic posts abroad
or here in the United States?
Answer. Yes, the Department of State has established procedures for
reporting and responding to reports of AHI, and regularly provides
updates to our workforce.
Question. Do your employees know what to do if they experience
symptoms?
Answer. The Department works to ensure all employees under Chief of
Mission authority abroad and all State Department employees
domestically know what to do if they experience a suspected AHI. Upon
arrival at post, employees are briefed on AHI and reporting protocols,
so they know what sensations or symptoms to look for and where to go
for help. We regularly provide information and updates to the entire
workforce through cables, security briefings, Department notices, and
training opportunities.
Question. What instructions have your Chiefs of Mission received
about how to handle these types of reports?
Answer. Chiefs of Mission are briefed on AHI during their initial
training in Washington, including an intelligence briefing, and upon
arrival at post. The briefings include information on how to identify
the sensations and symptoms associated with potential AHI and the
process for reporting potential incidents to the health and security
offices at post. In addition, Chiefs of Mission are briefed on the
protocols for reporting incidents to Washington and when to convene an
emergency action committee. We also provide guidance for Chiefs of
Mission on communicating with employees and family members at post,
host governments, and the press.
Question. Late last year the State Department proposed increasing
many nonimmigrant visa fees--including business, tourist, and student
visas. These fee increases are very untimely, considering the travel
industry is still reeling from the pandemic. International inbound
travel was still down 78 percent in 2021, compared to 2019 levels,
according to the U.S. Travel Association. Meanwhile business travel
continues to struggle to recover, last year generating just 44 percent
of 2019 travel spending levels. Domestic leisure travel is really the
only thing keeping the industry afloat in many communities, but it's
not enough. With that in mind, would you support delaying the fee
increases or exploring other ways to cover added funding needs that
wouldn't needlessly harm the travel community at a time when they're
most vulnerable?
Answer. The Department appreciates the concerns regarding the
Nonimmigrant Visa (NIV) fee recommendations. We are closely examining
all options. The Bureau of Consular Affairs relies on revenue from NIV
fees to fund visa operations and does not receive appropriated funds to
cover these operations. Based on fee statutes, the bureau calculates
the fee for full cost recovery using historical and projected demand
and costs. The Department has concluded the 60-day public comment
period for the fee change, and we are now reviewing comments. We
continue to monitor demand and costs for these visa services and the
impact these may have on the fee recommendations.
Question. Lebanon: In spite of the Russia-Ukraine war's impact on
Lebanon's wheat imports, fuel, and inflation, the struggling country
took the courageous step to condemn Russian atrocities and voted with
the U.S. at the UN. Given competing pressures (i.e., the war and
humanitarian emergency in Ukraine), the U.S. must continue to engage
with Lebanon. Is the Administration prepared to ensure that supporting
humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon is a priority?
Answer. U.S. humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon are
priorities for the Administration and are some of the tools used to
demonstrate our commitment to the Lebanese people, civil society, and
institutions critical to building a sovereign state responsive to its
people's legitimate needs. The FY 2023 President's budget request seeks
robust assistance levels for Lebanon, including nearly $170 million in
overall security assistance, bolstering our support to Lebanese
security services. The request includes $10.45 billion in State and
USAID humanitarian assistance, which aims to reduce the pain and
suffering resulting from conflict and disaster globally, including in
Lebanon where the United States provided more than $400 million in FY
2021.
Question. Lebanon is voting in important elections in May. I'm
concerned that there are efforts to suppress vote and that anything
less than a fully free and fair election will further undermine any
remaining stability in Lebanon. Please detail your department's
engagements with the Government of Lebanon ahead of their elections.
Will the state Department publicly call for free and fair elections in
May? While I understand concern about not appearing to weigh in on
either side of an election, but calling for free and fair elections
should not be considered an endorsement of any party or politician.
Answer. The Administration publicly and privately called for free,
fair, and on-time elections in Lebanon. The International Support Group
for Lebanon, of which the United States is a member, issued a statement
on February 11 urging the Lebanese authorities to hold free, fair, and
inclusive elections. On February 7, Ambassador Shea told media that
``elections must be held on time in a fair and transparent manner.
There is no wiggle room.'' The U.S. Government also worked to include
language in a February 4 UN Security Council statement on the
importance of election integrity. Moreover, senior U.S. officials
frequently emphasized in their conversations with Lebanese leaders and
with key partners responsible for election security that Lebanon's
elections should be in line with international standards.
Question. The expansion of the global gag rule under the previous
administration has resulted in the disruption of U.S. global health
programs. According to the State Department's own report, the global
gag rule negatively affected a wide range of people and programs,
including family planning access for women in rural areas in West
Africa, HIV testing and treatment for key populations, and TB
programming in India. The Biden-Harris administration rescinded the
global gag rule as an early executive action, yet the toll of the
policy continues to be felt by organizations who are trying to rebuild
lost partnerships, networks and programs while navigating the threat of
it coming back under the next administration. This is why I lead the
Global Health, Empowerment and Rights Act to permanently end it. Can
you describe for us why repealing the Global Gag Rule is good policy
and how permanently repealing the Global Gag Rule would support the
strengthening of health systems in fragile communities?
Answer. The permanent repeal of the Global Gag Rule goes beyond
good policy, especially for health systems in fragile communities. The
slightest disruption to fragile health systems can have a negative
ripple effect on multiple aspects of a community, including peace and
security. Policies like the Global Gag Rule heighten the risk of
destabilization, placing women and girls at disproportionate risk for
negative health and socioeconomic outcomes. I support the permanent
repeal of the Global Gag Rule and strengthening of health systems,
because the United States is the preeminent leader in providing life-
saving foreign assistance that safeguards the human rights and dignity
of women and girls through essential gender-equitable healthcare.
Question. National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality: The
Administration rightly prioritized protecting, improving, and expanding
access to sexual and reproductive health care as one of 10 key
priorities in their National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality.
The State Department is due to release their implementation plan for
the strategy this summer. Can you preview how you will contribute to
this critical piece of the strategy and what additional funding and
policy change you need to expand access to sexual and reproductive
health care around the world to advance gender equity and equality?
Answer. As the State Department develops its implementation plan
for the National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, I will
continue to support strengthened efforts to expand access to sexual and
reproductive health (SRH) care around the world to advance the goals of
the strategy. We are currently doing this through supporting key
multilateral partners like the UN Population Fund. Furthermore, our
continued support for PEPFAR's DREAMS program remains a critical pillar
of our SRH efforts to reach adolescent girls and young women.
Question. Egypt Assistance: The regime of President Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi systematically brutalizes its citizens, cracks down on
independent civil society, shows flagrant disregard for human rights in
the country, and represses dissidents and their families across
national borders. Given these enduring and serious rights violations,
does the Administration support conditions on foreign military
financing to Egypt?
Answer. The Administration has elevated human rights in our
engagement with the Egyptian Government to press for political prisoner
releases and to support implementation of systemic human rights
reforms, including to protect freedom of expression and association. We
continue to make clear that our bilateral relationship with Egypt will
be strengthened by tangible progress on human rights issues. The
Department reprogrammed some of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
this past year after Egypt did not meet specific human rights requests
within a specified timeframe. Retaining maximum flexibility on FMF
allows us to seek concrete improvements in human rights while also
advancing our regional security interests.
Question. In comparison, the Administration requested that some
assistance to Jordan be conditioned on ``negotiated benchmarks towards
reforms.'' Can you explain this discrepancy?
Answer. The President's FY 2023 budget request includes $1.45
billion for Jordan to support the first year of an anticipated fourth
U.S.-Jordan MOU, expected to take effect in FY 2023 and for which
negotiations are ongoing. We anticipate the MOU will include consistent
annual request levels for Foreign Military Financing and Economic
Support Funds (ESF), including critical assistance programs and budget
support to adequately address Jordan's needs. Additional ESF would be
provided if Jordan implements meaningful and achievable reforms
negotiated through the MOU. This additional ESF is part of our
political commitment to support economic reforms and Jordan's long-term
fiscal health in the interest of strengthening this key strategic
partnership. We will work closely with Jordan to pursue and support
these reforms.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Putin's war against Ukraine has destabilized the oil and
gas market. We're now looking at gas prices reaching four dollars, even
five dollars a gallon in the United States--these are prices that will
destroy America's economic recovery from the COVID-19 caused downturn
and financially hurt millions of Americans. The Biden Administration
should look at all options to decrease the price of oil, most of all by
unleashing investment in America's unrivaled energy resources, but also
by looking to expand oil and gas production by our allies and partners.
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana and Brazil are ready and eager to step in to
the breach and export to the United States. This should be common
sense; it would help lower prices here, while also driving up the
economies of other countries that stand with us. Instead of working
with these countries, the Administration instead sent officials to
Caracas to explore the idea of receiving oil from the Maduro regime. I
should not have to say that Nicolas Maduro has actively worked to
undermine the United States at every opportunity--from sponsoring
terrorism in Colombia, cooperating with Iran and Russia, to holding
American citizens hostage. How would financing the Maduro regime
advance any American interest, knowing that both the creaky oil
infrastructure in Venezuela makes its oil more carbon intensive than
other countries, and that its regime is a source of transnational crime
and terrorism in the region?
Answer. The U.S. officials' visit to Venezuela focused on securing
the release of U.S. wrongful detainees and urging the Maduro regime to
return to the negotiating table in Mexico with the democratic
opposition's Unitary Platform to restore democracy in Venezuela. The
visit reinforced U.S. support for the Verdad Act and for Interim
President Juan Guaido's call for a negotiated solution through the
Mexico process. We remain steadfast in our commitment to the Venezuelan
people, which includes supporting their democratic aspirations and
providing assistance to address Venezuela's humanitarian crisis. We
will continue to implement and enforce our Venezuela sanctions, and
ensure they help contribute to a peaceful democratic transition. The
Administration has ongoing discussions with other energy-producing
countries in the Americas, such as Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and
Brazil, and remains committed to preventing benefits accruing to
malicious actors.
Question. Can you confirm that the meeting between U.S. and Maduro-
affiliated officials in Caracas occurred only after the Administration
exhausted efforts to secure oil from allies and partners? Like
Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Guyana?
Answer. U.S. officials' visit to Venezuela focused on securing the
release of U.S. wrongful detainees and urging the Maduro regime to
return to the negotiating table in Mexico with the democratic
opposition's Unitary Platform to restore democracy in Venezuela. The
visit reinforced U.S. support for the Verdad Act and for Interim
President Juan Guaido's call for a negotiated solution through the
Mexico process. We welcomed the return of two wrongfully detained U.S.
citizens from Venezuela.
Question. Should the U.S. receive oil imports from the Maduro
Regime, how would it remain true to its policy of supporting the
democratically-elected interim government of Juan Guaido?
Answer. Consistent with the sense of Congress reflected in the
VERDAD Act of 2019, we support the Venezuelan-led negotiations between
the Unitary Platform and the regime as the best path to restore
democracy and human rights in Venezuela. While the Administration does
not preview sanctions actions, it has made clear that the United States
would review some sanctions policies if the Venezuelan parties make
meaningful progress toward a democratic solution.
Question. Of the appropriated funds to Venezuela to support
political competition and consensus building, it is my understanding
that the Administration will support democratic electoral events,
according to a recent congressional notification.
Answer. Free and fair local, regional, National Assembly, and
presidential elections remain at the forefront of our objectives in
Venezuela.
Question. Does the Biden administration recognize Interim President
Juan Guaido?
Answer. The United States recognizes the Interim Presidency of Juan
Guaido and the 2015 democratically elected National Assembly as the
legitimately elected representatives of the Venezuelan people.
Question. Does the Biden administration support efforts to hold
free and fair presidential elections?
Answer. The need for a peaceful restoration of democracy, free and
fair elections, and respect for the rights and freedoms of Venezuelans
continues to drive our policy toward Venezuela. The United States
considers free and fair local, regional, National Assembly, and
presidential elections essential for Venezuelans to reach a peaceful
and democratic solution to the crises their country faces.
Question. On March 18, President Biden had a video call with
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. The White House
said the call focused on Ukraine. Beijing said it focused on U.S.-China
relations. Beijing blamed the Trump administration for disrupting the
``stable relationship'' we had since Carter--the one that terribly
disadvantaged America and sold out our most basic principles for
corporate interests--and suggested that the Biden administration needed
to do more to redeem itself. The official Chinese state news agency
quoted President Biden as having stated the following: ``I am willing
to reaffirm that America does not seek to fight a `new Cold War' with
China, does not seek to change China's system, does not seek to use the
strengthening of alliances to counter China, does not support `Taiwan
independence,' and has no intention of entering into a conflict with
China.'' Biden further pledged to ``effectively control and manage the
competition and disagreements.'' This sounds like a return to the
policy of acquiescence that left us economically weaker, sold out
American workers, and made us dangerously dependent on Beijing. Does
this Chinese readout depict an accurate representation of what the
President said?
Answer. We do not want a return to a world divided into rigid
blocs. The United States remains focused on the longer-term challenge
to the international system posed by the PRC, which is the only country
with the desire to reshape key elements of the international system if
left unchallenged. As I made clear in my speech, over the last year,
the Biden administration has implemented a comprehensive, whole-of-
government strategy to compete responsibly with the PRC while advancing
our shared affirmative vision with allies and partners.
Question. The claim that the United States ``does not seek to
change China's system'' is especially wrongheaded, and far from a slip
up, it echoes a line in the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific
strategy released in February: ``Our objective is not to change the
PRC, but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates.''
This sounds exactly like the defeatism that I feared when I warned in
November 2020 that Biden would bring back the ``caretakers of American
decline.'' What exactly does winning look like in a ``strategic
competition'' if China's political system--a system that conducts
genocide, that covers up the spread of a pathogen of pandemic
potential, that systematically steals our intellectual property and
technology--does not change?
Answer. As I have said, we cannot rely on Beijing to change its
trajectory, so we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing
to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system. U.S.
global leadership is defined by what we are for, not by what we are
against. It's about supporting and improving the international order
that has brought about security and prosperity for over 70 years. It's
about revitalizing relationships with key allies and partners to
effectively counter Beijing's coercive practices as needed and to set
the rules of the road that will shape the coming decade. We will be
forthright in opposing PRC actions that challenge or bend the rules
which we have all, including the PRC, accepted.
Question. How can U.S. leadership be maintained unless our
worldview continues to shape the global order, and Beijing's
worldview--what they call ``socialism with Chinese characteristics''--
is tossed onto the ash heap of history where it belongs?
Answer. Our vision is about what we are for, not what we are
against. We are for a world where technology is used to lift people up,
not suppress them; where trade and commerce protect and lift up our
workers and grow the middle class; where universal rights are
respected; and where nations can write their own futures and work
together in common cause. We are defending and revitalizing the system
of norms and institutions which has created the conditions for
development and prosperity around the world, including, it is worth
mentioning, for the PRC.
Question. How can we ignore General Secretary Xi's statements that
he wants the Chinese Communist Party to ``liberate all of humanity''
and serve as the ``gravediggers of capitalism?''
Answer. We are confident in the strength of our values, and the
resilience of the rules-based international order that has enabled so
much of the world to prosper over the past seven decades. We are also
committed to vigorously defending that system against those that would
seek to undermine or replace it. The United States consistently engages
with Beijing at the highest levels to responsibly manage the
competition. We are committed to maintaining open lines of
communication at all levels, including the President with Xi Jinping
and the Secretary, the National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of
Defense with their PRC interlocutors.
Question. Why does the President of the United States, with all of
the power at his disposal, display a weaker commitment to the cause of
democracy and freedom than unarmed Hong Kong protesters did?
Answer. As the President has told President Xi, standing up for
human rights is in our DNA as Americans. We have a fundamental
commitment to defending human rights and dignity. And we will continue
to take actions to advance respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms in China and beyond. The Administration has called out human
rights abuses against all who suffer them in the PRC, including
Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and others. We have also worked to protect the
rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers in the face of the PRC's draconian
policies. We will continue to promote accountability for the PRC's
atrocities and other human rights abuses and violations against all of
its citizens and repressive acts beyond its borders.
Question. Why is this Administration so prone to timidity when
confronted by what is nothing less than an existential threat?
Answer. Over the 16 months, the Biden administration has
implemented a comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy to compete
responsibly with the PRC while advancing our shared affirmative vision
with allies and partners. We are investing in the foundations of our
strength at home; aligning with partners and allies on our approach
abroad; and harnessing those two key assets to compete with the PRC to
defend our interests and build our vision for the future. It is an
approach that will enable us to carry forward this long-term
competition effectively and responsibly, in a way that leverages our
extraordinary strengths, in common cause with our unmatched network of
allies and partners.
Question. Last week, Cuba's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs met
with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Emily Mendrala to discuss
implementation of the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords. This week, the Cuban
Deputy Minister is making the rounds to spread the lies of the
Communist Regime he represents--that the policies of the United States
are to blame for the suffering experienced by the people of Cuba. The
people of Cuba suffer only because of the radical, Marxist-Leninist
policies implemented by Fidel Castro and carried out by his successors.
It is not hard to understand why people seek to flee a regime that
detains children, executes its own citizens without trial, and prevents
them from profiting from the natural abundance of their country. So
long as the regime continues to exploit its own citizens, I am worried
that platforms like these talks will only serve the purposes of the
regime. What issues did DAS Mendrala raise with the Cuban Deputy
Minister?
Answer. Talks held April 21 to discuss implementation of the U.S.-
Cuba Migration Accords represent a continuation of our nearly 30-year
engagement with Cuba on migration matters to promote safe, orderly, and
legal migration. Discussions under the meeting's limited agenda covered
migration trends, irregular migration, returns and repatriations of
citizens, Embassy functions, and other related issues. Enabling safe,
legal, and orderly migration between Cuba and the United States is
consistent with U.S. interests in fostering family reunification and
promoting greater respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Cuba.
Question. Did DAS Mendrala convey the primacy of human rights and
democracy in U.S. policy towards Cuba?
Answer. Our policy toward Cuba focuses on support for the Cuban
people, including their political and economic well-being, and human
rights. We consistently raise our serious concerns directly with the
Cuban Government through multiple diplomatic channels, including our
view that poor human rights conditions represent a major reason Cubans
choose to leave their homeland. The Migration Talks focused on mutual
obligations under the Migration Accords.
Question. Did DAS Mendrala urge her counterparts that the United
States seeks the immediate release of dissidents and democracy
activists, like Jose Daniel Ferrer, artists Luis Manuel Otero Alcantara
and El Osorbo, the Damas de Blanco Aymara Nieto Munoz, Sayli Navarro
and many more who peacefully demonstrated against the regime?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration, including DAS Mendrala,
consistently and regularly urges the Cuban Government in private
diplomatic conversations to release all political prisoners.
Additionally, we continue to call on the Cuban Government publicly and
in multilateral fora to respect the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of Cubans and to release Jose Daniel Ferrer, Luis Manuel Otero
Alcantara, Maykel Osorbo, Aymara Nieto Munoz, Sayli Navarro and the
hundreds of detained protestors from last year's historic July 11
demonstrations.
Question. Last year, when President Biden took office, I was
extremely concerned that the President would return to the failed
policy of engagement with the Castro-Diaz-Canel regime that President
Obama pursued. I was pleasantly surprised when the Biden administration
announced it would put its Cuba policy review on hold. Of course, this
only came after the Cuban people rose up in unprecedented protests
across the island against the now 63-year old communist regime. After
the events of July 11, the Biden administration promised that the Cuba
Policy Review would reflect the new environment in Cuba created by
these historic, organic protests. Now, 10 months later, our policy
towards Cuba appears to be in a holding pattern. Does the United States
still ``stand with the Cuban people and their clarion call for
freedom,'' as President Biden said in July?
Answer. Our policy toward Cuba continues to focus first and
foremost on support for the Cuban people, their human rights, and their
political and economic well-being. We stand with the Cuban people in
their fight for freedom by holding Cuban Government officials
accountable for oppressive actions, condemning restrictions on freedom
of expression, calling for the unconditional release of political
prisoners, urging our allies to do the same, and finding meaningful
ways to support the Cuban people. We are committed to increasing our
capacity to reunite family members, support independent entrepreneurs,
and ensure remittances flow more freely to the Cuban people while not
enriching those who perpetuate human rights abuses.
Question. When can Congress expect to receive the Cuba Policy
Review?
Answer. Our policy toward Cuba focuses first and foremost on
support for the Cuban people, including their political and economic
well-being, and human rights. Per the Biden administration's
announcement on May 16, 2022, the Administration plans to implement a
series of measures in the coming weeks and months to increase support
for the Cuban people and safeguard our national security interests. As
we implement these measures, we will continue to call on the Cuban
Government to respect freedom and human rights for all Cubans as they
work to determine their own futures, and we will continue to hold Cuban
Government officials accountable for human rights abuses through the
imposition of appropriate sanctions and visa restrictions.
Question. What can you tell us about that review and its proposed
policies to support protesters, activists, and journalists in Cuba?
Answer. We continue to have serious concerns about human rights
abuses in Cuba, including harsh sentencing for protestors, extensive
restrictions on fundamental freedoms, and the passage of a restrictive
Penal Code. We remain committed to promoting respect for Cubans' human
rights and accountability for Cuban Government officials involved in
human rights abuses. We consistently condemn human rights abuses in our
diplomatic conversations with the Cuban Government and in our public
statements, and we urge the Cuban regime to release political prisoners
unconditionally and to protect and respect the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of individuals in Cuba.
Question. What has the State Department done to ensure unfettered
access to the internet in Cuba, beyond providing VPNs to protesters?
Answer. The Administration supports efforts globally to counter
Internet censorship, restrictions on content access, and shutdowns,
including in Cuba. We have bolstered that support since nationwide
protests on July 11 and will continue to do so. We continue to study
options and solicit opinions from stakeholders to advance the
Administration's policy goals.
We remain dedicated to expanding information flow for the Cuban
people, recognizing that no easy fixes exist to address the limitations
we see in Cuba.
Question. China's aggression against Taiwan has increased steadily
in recent years, particularly incursions into its airspace and
territorial waters. It seems the goal is to exhaust and intimidate
Taiwan's forces without engaging in open combat. As Beijing's tactics
change, so too should our response. What do you make of these gray zone
warfare tactics?
Answer. We agree that PRC gray zone tactics are destabilizing, risk
miscalculation, and undermine peace and stability in the region. We
have engaged extensively with both Taipei and our allies and partners
to calibrate our response. In terms of specifics, I would recommend a
classified briefing to you or your staff.
Question. Is the Administration taking concrete steps to counter
them, and if so, what are they?
Answer. In response, we are pursuing multiple lines of effort.
Consistent with our one China policy, we will continue deepening our
security relationship with Taiwan to ensure it has sufficient
capabilities to defend itself.
We will continue to urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic,
and economic pressure, and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with
Taiwan.
We will also continue to work with allies and partners to highlight
the positive role that Taiwan plays in addressing global challenges and
encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending against threats to its
democratic values.
Question. Have you gamed out a series of proportional responses if
Beijing continues to escalate the scale of these provocations against
Taiwan?
Answer. We remain resolutely committed to make available to Taiwan
the defense articles and services necessary to enable it to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan
Relations Act.
We also seek to minimize miscalculations on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait and ensure the future of Taiwan is determined peacefully
and free of PRC coercion.
We are pursuing deterrence on a number of fronts to complicate the
PRC's calculus and to force Beijing to think very carefully about
precipitating a crisis that would have terrible consequences for the
region and the world and not be in the PRC's own best interest.
Question. Have you warned your PRC counterparts that there would be
serious consequences if they took any coercive action against Taiwan?
Answer. I would be happy to answer this in a closed session.
Question. As you know, our friends in Taiwan need to acquire
military capabilities to deter aggression by the PRC as quickly as
possible. Business-as-usual in our foreign military sales process
simply will not cut it. Arming Taiwan must be among our top security
assistance priorities. What is the State Department doing to revamp the
Foreign Military Sales process to prioritize and expedite transfers to
Taiwan?
Answer. The Administration processes each sale as soon as it is
received. However, the speed of arms sales also depends on Taiwan
moving as quickly as possible to confirm transfers and U.S. industry
delivering these capabilities as soon as possible.
We are looking at the entire defense trade enterprise to find
efficiencies and also working with industry to find ways to ensure
Taiwan has the capabilities it needs in a timely manner. We are
exploring every possible avenue to expedite cases.
Question. Putin's war against Ukraine has demonstrated the
viability of new and old technology in countering the equipment
deployed by our authoritarian adversaries in Beijing and Moscow. One of
the most successful tools in the war has been FIM-92 Stingers and FGM-
148 Javelins. While the United States itself has not really needed
these tools in recent conflicts, because we have almost always enjoyed
air and armor superiority, they are critical assets for our partners
going up against Russian jets and tanks or maybe soon Chinese jets and
tanks. I am concerned that the need for these weapons has already
outstripped our defense industry's ability to produce more. What is the
State Department doing to assure our allies that their needs and
requests for additional Stingers and Javelins will continue to be met,
despite reduced production of both of these weapons in the United
States?
Answer. Long production timelines are one of the top concerns we
consistently hear from our partners, especially considering recent
increased demand. We are working very closely with our Allies and the
Department of Defense--which has the lead on this issue--to ensure the
defense readiness of our partners and prevent any potential capability
gaps. This includes making sure DoD has an accurate picture of and
accounts for the foreign demand for these systems as it works with
primes and sub-tier suppliers to increase production. We are also
engaging industry on multiple fronts to support and encourage increased
production of high-demand weapon systems.
Question. Is the State Department working with the Defense
Department on the production of these weapons in order to support
Ukraine and even Taiwan's defense needs, even as the DoD looks to
invest in next generation technology?
Answer. Absolutely. The U.S. Government is looking closely at what
we and industry can do to improve production timelines to get needed
defense capabilities to our Allies. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is
leading an effort to examine production processes for several items,
including Javelins and Stingers. And the National Security Council has
convened interagency discussions to examine this broader issue.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Rob Portman
Question. Energy revenues continue to be the main source of income
fueling Russia's war machine. Energy is Russia's top export and
accounts for roughly half of its entire federal budget, and we must
continue to work to cut off this funding. I was pleased the
Administration--at the urging of myself and other members of Congress--
banned the import of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal into the U.S.
in early February. However, the U.S. imported only a small amount of
energy from Russia. In 2021, the U.S. imported approximately 670,000
barrels of oil and petroleum products per day, which was about 8
percent of all U.S. petroleum imports. The larger issue at hand is the
E.U.'s reliance on Russian energy: approximately 40 percent of E.U. gas
comes from Russia, as well as more than a quarter of its oil. This
means, Europe is continuing to send Russia nearly $1 billion per day in
energy revenues (approximately $870 million/day from the EU27 to
Russia), compared with the approximately $50 million the U.S. was
purchasing on a daily basis. Specifically, estimates show that Europe
is purchasing each day: roughly $22 million of coal, $415 million of
oil, and $433 million in natural gas, for a total of $870 million. I
recognize shutting off Russian energy flows into Europe is complicated,
and is a large undertaking that would have an impact on consumers and
prices. However, is a matter of saving lives, and immediate action must
be taken. Last month, I was pleased with the announcement of the joint
Task Force on Energy Security, which is aimed at strengthening the
coordination between the U.S. and the E.U. to reduce Europe's reliance
on Russian energy. It has been almost exactly a month since this task
force was established. Can you please provide us with an update on its
efforts and progress as it relates to reducing European reliance on
Russian energy?
Answer. The European Commission and the United States understand
and are working to address the imperative of reducing energy imports
from Russia through the Joint Task Force. We have held meetings with EU
member states and industry representatives to support diversifying
Europe's supply of natural gas and accelerating deployment of energy
efficiency and smart grid technologies in European homes and
businesses, electrify heating, and increase clean energy output to
reduce demand for fossil fuels. Separate from the Task Force, the EU
has announced a phased ban on imports of Russian coal and a ban on
seaborne oil imports that immediately affects around 75 percent of
imports of Russian oil.
Question. Can we expect a plan or report to be released detailing
the objectives the task force and a strategy to achieve them?
Answer. The March 25 public announcement of the Joint Task Force by
the White House and the European Union provides details on the Task
Force's objectives to strengthen European energy security, including
its overarching aims to diversify liquefied natural (LNG) supplies and
reduce demand for natural gas in alignment with climate objectives.
Since then, the Commission and the White House released two joint
statements on April 29 here (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2022/04/29/joint-statement-between-the-united-
states-and-the-european-commission-on-european-energy-security-2/) and
May 24 here (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/05/24/joint-statement-between-the-united-states-and-the-
european-commission-on-european-energy-security-3/) that provided
additional details on our strategic priorities and efforts towards
achieving them. As the Joint Task Force makes further progress towards
its goals, the Administration is committed to providing further
updates.
Question. Increasing LNG shipments to the E.U. is a central
component of this joint initiative. Specifically, under this agreement,
the U.S. will ensure an additional 15 bcm of LNG to Europe this year,
with an additional 50 bcm of U.S. LNG annually over the next decade.
How has the Task Force engaged with energy producers in the U.S. to
help follow through on these commitments?
Answer. The United States committed to working with international
partners and striving to identify additional LNG volumes for the EU
market of at least 15 bcm in 2022. The EU has committed to working with
Member States toward the goal of ensuring, until at least 2030, demand
for approximately 50 bcm/year of additional U.S. LNG consistent with
our shared net-zero goals. Since that announcement, the Task Force has
met with key energy industry representatives and EU Member States. We
have seen tangible progress, such as Finland's contract to lease a
floating LNG import terminal from a U.S. provider that will be
operational by the end of 2022.
Question. In addition to increasing shipments of U.S. LNG to the
EU, what other options is the Task Force exploring to help shift
Europe's energy reliance away from Russia?
Answer. In addition to facilitating increased LNG supplies to
Europe, the U.S.-European Commission Joint Task Force is focused on
reducing overall demand for natural gas by accelerating deployment of
clean energy technologies and energy efficiency solutions. The United
States and European Commission have also convened representatives of EU
Member States, industry participants, and other stakeholders to solicit
views and promote government-private sector cooperation on steps and
actions the United States, the EU, and its Member States can take to
accelerate the deployment of heat pumps, energy efficiency
technologies, and renewable energy.
Question. Which will have the most immediate impacts?
Answer. As part of the task force, the Administration and the
European Commission committed to reduce overall gas demand by
accelerating market deployment of clean energy technologies. These
include energy efficiency solutions such as increasing demand response
devices, including smart thermostats, and deployment of heat pumps to
reduce gas demand through electrification. The REPowerEU plan estimates
that reductions through energy savings in homes and electrified heating
can replace up to 15.5 bcm of Russian natural gas in 2022.
Question. What ways can Congress help support these efforts?
Answer. The Administration appreciates Congress's continued support
for our efforts to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian fossil fuels
and diversify its energy sources and suppliers, and welcomes
constructive engagement with Congress in furtherance of these efforts.
Question. Ukraine Security Assistance Coordinator: Now that LTG
(Ret) Terry Wolff has been appointed to the National Security Council
as the Ukraine Security Assistance Coordinator, there are two issue
areas that I believe we need to continue to make progress in: The
initial strategy of providing Warsaw Block equipment to the Ukrainians
was the right one--they know how to use them and our Eastern European
allies had stocks they were willing to provide. As the war continues we
are now providing them with more NATO standard equipment--to include
our own 155mm howitzer artillery and NATO standard tanks and personnel
carriers. What discussions are you having with Secretary Austin about
developing a strategic plan to train Ukraine's forces on NATO standard
equipment?
Answer. The Department of State is working closely with the
interagency to determine how best to get Ukraine the security
assistance it needs to defend itself as quickly as possible. Throughout
the course of the war Ukraine's defensive requirements have changed,
and we have worked closely with the Department of Defense to adapt the
assistance provided. The Department has engaged extensively with our
NATO Allies and other partners to provide both Warsaw Pact and NATO
standard equipment. The United States and key Allies have also provided
training to our Ukrainian partners to ensure that they can operate this
equipment effectively and safely. We do anticipate that Ukraine will
increasingly require NATO standard and similar equipment from other
countries as the war continues. We seek to transition all of our Allies
and partners away from Russian equipment, but that process will take
time and resources, such as the significant assistance Congress
recently appropriated to help countries that have been impacted by the
war in Ukraine.
Question. How is the State Department going to coordinate with
Lieutenant General Wolff in improving the arms transfer process? Does
he report to you or the President?
Answer. The State Department coordinates closely with Lieutenant
General Wolff (Ret) to improve the provision of security assistance to
Ukraine, working with the National Security Council, Department of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others. Our collaboration
ensures coordinated policy and timely, effective provision of arms
transfers and security assistance to Ukraine and coordinated diplomatic
outreach to secure security assistance from our Allies and partners.
Lieutenant General Wolff reports to the President, as he is a Senior
Director at the NSC.
Question. After their initial hesitancy, Germany has stepped up
their support of Ukraine, but are still unwilling to provide them with
the heavy weapons they need. Germany's ruling coalition appears to be
fractured on the issue of sending additional heavy weaponry to Ukraine,
and Austria has spoken out against Ukraine's bid to join the EU. What
discussions have you had with our allies to reverse these trends?
Answer. We coordinate closely with Germany through diplomatic and
defense channels both bilaterally and multilaterally (i.e., through
NATO, the EU, and G7) to support Ukraine. Germany is a key ally in
maintaining unity in the face of Russia's invasion. Germany has sent
lethal weapons to Ukraine, increased troop deployments to the Eastern
flank, suspended the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, committed to spending 2
percent of GDP on defense, established a new 100-billion-euro defense
fund, and announced it would end Russian coal and oil imports by August
1 and December 31, 2022, respectively. We were pleased that the
European Council unanimously approved Ukraine's EU candidate status on
June 23 and continue to engage Austria and other partners on the
integration of Ukraine and the Western Balkans into the EU.
Question. Global Engagement Center: In last year's testimony for
the FY22 budget request, you gave me your commitment that you would
follow through on President Zelenskyy's request to set up a Center for
Combatting Disinformation in Ukraine in partnership with the Global
Engagement Center. You also stated that appointment of a special
coordinator to lead the Center was being reviewed. Can you provide an
update as to the efforts of the GEC in Ukraine today, as well as why a
special coordinator of the GEC has not been appointed for over 2 years
into this Administration to lead the GEC?
Answer. I respectfully defer any questions regarding the
appointment of a special coordinator to the White House.
GEC regularly communicates with the Ukrainian Government's Center
for Strategic Communication and shares selected unclassified reporting
to help inform their counter-disinformation efforts within Ukraine and
assist with programming and content creation. The GEC's collaborative
approach to countering Russian propaganda and disinformation in Ukraine
is conducted in close coordination with others in the Department and
the interagency, with our international partners and directly with the
Government of Ukraine.
Question. The FY23 Budget Request only asks for $5 million increase
toward the Global Engagement Center--is this an adequate increase to
tackle the disinformation environment we face today?
Answer. The FY 2023 Request includes a $5 million increase for the
Global Engagement Center's programmatic activities, as well as a $2.7
million increase to support 15 new positions requested for GEC. When
including current services adjustments, the overall increase for GEC is
approximately $8.07 million, or 15 percent above FY 2022. In the near
term, the Department anticipates providing GEC with additional
resources from the recently enacted Ukraine supplementals. The current
information environment includes principal actors such as Russia and
the PRC surging resources toward disinformation and propaganda, making
GEC's coordination of broader State and interagency resources all the
more vital.
Question. The White House has been hesitant at times to impose
stricter sanctions. Russian officials admitted last week that sanctions
had harmed their economy, we remain concerned that the Administration
is not being aggressive enough in impacting the Russian economy.
However, sanctions against VTB Bank do not go into effect until nearly
2 months from today. Placing full blocking sanctions on all Russian
banks and adding secondary sanctions would make it really difficult for
the world to pay for Russian energy exports. Secretary Blinken, can you
provide an update on sanctions on Russia?
Answer. We continue to impose sanctions on Russia for its
unjustified war against Ukraine. Together with more than thirty
partners, we have designated over 2,400 individuals and entities. These
include sanctions on oligarchs, their networks, and assets, along with
hundreds of political, financial, and corporate leaders. Our sanctions
have imposed severe costs on Russia's financial sector and key sources
of revenue and economic sectors. We have also degraded Russia's defense
and other critical sectors feeding Putin's war machine. Our most recent
actions targeted major Russian defense companies like Rostec and United
Aircraft. We have coupled sanctions with extensive export controls that
cut Russia off from critical goods.
Question. Why are we not implementing full blocking sanctions on
all banks and why have you not instituted secondary sanctions?
Answer. All options remain on the table when it comes to promoting
accountability for Russia's atrocities and its continued war against
Ukraine. As President Biden said, our goal is to ``maximize the impact
on Putin and Russia and minimize the harm on us and our allies and
friends around the world.'' We routinely assess and analyze targets to
ensure our sanctions have the intended impact and help achieve our
foreign policy goals. Before we move forward with any designations, we
want to make sure they will not have undesirable consequences.
Question. Denial of Tax Benefits: Since Russia's invasion began, we
have seen hundreds of companies around the world pull their businesses
out of Russia or modify them to reduce their presence. Given the
atrocities we are witnessing in Ukraine, it is clear why many companies
would not want to be paying taxes to a foreign government who is using
that revenue to finance its war machine. However, right now, many
companies who continue to operate in Russia still benefit from U.S.
foreign tax credits, which are generally provided to offset the double
taxation that results from operating in multiple countries. Senator
Wyden and I now have a bipartisan agreement to change this and ensure
American taxpayers are not subsidizing the Russian war machine. If
companies choose to keep doing business in Russia and paying taxes to
Putin's government in the face of these atrocities, they should forfeit
their foreign tax credits and deductions for taxes paid to Russia in
the United States. This effort follows my work with Senator Cardin to
end the exchange of tax information with Russia and to suspend our tax
treaty. I was glad to see the Administration suspend the exchange of
tax information. In your view, how has the exodus of companies from
Russia impacted its war-making capacity, and would you agree that
Russia and Belarus have earned their place amongst the list of nations,
currently including North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Sudan, in which we
deny tax benefits for multinational companies who continue to operate
there?
Answer. The exodus of foreign companies has negatively impacted
Russia's economy by reducing imports and domestic production,
contributing to job losses, cutting access to technologies, and
lowering Russia's tax revenues. We continue to use sanctions and export
controls to squeeze the Russian Government's revenues, and they have
slowed the economy. The economic steps we took with respect to Russia
with our allies and partners have been in effect for almost 6 months.
We expect to see the impacts on Russia's ability to wage war grow in
the coming months. Thank you for raising the potential role of an
updated tax policy, including the possibility of legislation to deny
credits and deductions for taxes paid to Russia or Belarus.
Question. Last week, the Administration announced a new program to
accept refugees called Uniting for Ukraine. My understanding is that
this will be a new streamlined process for Ukrainian citizens who have
been displaced to apply for humanitarian parole in the United States. I
have heard personally from many generous Ohioans who want to open their
homes to these refugees, more than 500 people have called or emailed my
office and a number of businesses have expressed interest in offering
jobs. Is there a website where people can go to today to apply for this
program?
Answer. Uniting for Ukraine is a program administered by the
Department of Homeland Security. More information on the program can be
found on their website, www.dhs.gov/Ukraine. I respectfully refer you
to the Department of Homeland Security for more information on Uniting
for Ukraine and its application process.
Question. When will Uniting for Ukraine be operational so that
people here and abroad can apply and begin the process?
Answer. Uniting for Ukraine is a program administered by the
Department of Homeland Security. More information on the program can be
found on their website, www.dhs.gov/Ukraine. It is currently
operational, and I respectfully refer you to the Department of Homeland
Security for more information on the program and its application
process.
Question. How long do you envision the application process taking?
Weeks or months?
Answer. The Department of State does not have a role in the
application or approval process for Uniting for Ukraine. I respectfully
refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more information
on that program and its application process.
Question. I fully support bringing in Ukrainian refugees so long as
they are vetted, can you speak to how State will be administering
biometric and biographic screening and vetting security checks for
those who apply for this program?
Answer. Uniting for Ukraine is a program administered by the
Department of Homeland Security. More information on the program can be
found on their website, www.dhs.gov/Ukraine. I respectfully refer you
to the Department of Homeland Security for more information, including
the screening and vetting process for applicants and sponsors.
Question. There are approximately 300 children who are caught with
no options to complete an adoption with a U.S. family. My office has
been in touch with at least 7 families in Ohio who are directly
impacted. A portion of these children have severe medical problems and
lack access to quality health care. Other children have participated in
host programs where they have come to the United States multiple times
to visit with their adoptive families. It seems, from communications
with agencies and families that Department of State, thus far, has not
engaged with the Ukrainian Ministry about a path to preserve these
children's connections to these families. What has Department of State
done to advocate for these children and families?
Answer. I have tremendous empathy for families who have hosted
Ukrainian children in the past and for families at the earliest stages
of the intercountry adoption process. Many families develop an
emotional attachment to the children well before a legal parent-child
relationship is established. Until a final adoption order is issued,
Ukrainian authorities have sole jurisdiction over decisions about the
best interests of these children. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is in
regular communication with the Government of Ukraine's Ministry of
Social Policy and National Social Service, as well as with U.S.
families and adoption service providers. We have shared U.S. families'
concerns. Ukraine has repeatedly indicated that they prefer the
children to remain in Europe or nearby countries, in closer proximity
to Ukraine.
Question. Who has been the Ukraine point of contact?
Answer. The Department's primary points of contact for intercountry
adoption in Ukraine are the National Social Service of Ukraine (NSS)
and the Ministry of Social Policy (MSP). We are also in close
communication with the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, DC.
Question. Some of these children were previously eligible for B1/B2
visas. Do you plan to make these children eligible for the Uniting in
Ukraine program?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has sole authority to
grant parole, including under the Uniting for Ukraine parole program.
We respectfully refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for
any questions regarding parole eligibility for children under Uniting
for Ukraine. Additionally, a B1/B2 nonimmigrant visa is not a suitable
alternative to a permanent resettlement or immigration process.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. As the Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy stated, the
Indo-Pacific is ``the epicenter of the climate crisis.'' My provision
calling on the United States Government to facilitate a robust
interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy was
included in the Senate-passed U.S. Innovation and Competition Act. How
will the Fiscal Year 2023 budget request for the Department of State
support U.S. efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change in the
Indo-Pacific?
Answer. The FY 2023 budget request to Congress supports U.S.
coordination bilaterally and regionally with institutions and groupings
including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
Australia-India-Japan-U.S. ``Quad,'' Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to build capacity
and address the key regional challenge of climate change. These
investments are essential for the global effort to limit temperature
rise to no more than 1.5+C and will reduce the need for costly
humanitarian aid following extreme-weather events and safeguard decades
of U.S. investment in global development.
Question. What additional resources does the Department of State
need to adopt and execute this strategy?
Answer. The FY 2023 budget request to Congress includes more than
$11 billion in international climate assistance and finance across the
U.S. Government, of which $2.28 billion is for Department of State and
USAID climate programs. If enacted, this funding will meet the
President's historic pledge to quadruple international climate finance
while strengthening global stability, increasing energy security,
enhancing U.S. competitiveness, and strengthening climate resilience in
key geographies around the world.
Question. The 2018 Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which I
championed with former Senator Cory Gardner, invests more than $1.7
billion per year for 5 years to support democracy, human rights, the
rule of law, and security in the Indo-Pacific. What will the Fiscal
Year 2023 State Department budget request do to push back against the
authoritarian playbook of repression in the Indo-Pacific and make
investments in people-to-people exchanges, democracy promotion, rule of
law, and the protection of human rights?
Answer. In order to achieve the goal of a free and open Indo-
Pacific, U.S. assistance will build collective capacity of partners and
allies to update and adapt the rules-based order to new challenges.
U.S. foreign assistance will support efforts to modernize the
architecture of international cooperation for the challenges of this
century. Pooling shared resources and ambitions with like-minded
partners amplifies the reach and effect of U.S. foreign assistance
programs. Investments in multilateral fora, including ASEAN and the
Mekong-U.S. Partnership (MUSP), highlight the United States' commitment
to these institutions and their ability to forge solutions to shared
challenges and reflect shared values. Foreign assistance will elevate
U.S. coordination with Quad partners to meet current and emerging
challenges. The United States will continue to increase its engagement
with Pacific Island nations, bilaterally and multilaterally, through
programs that seek to build their resilience to current and future
health shocks, respond to the climate crisis, and advance their long-
term prosperity and security.
Question. China has been aggressively moving to secure its access
to critical minerals and block other countries, including the United
States, from the supply chain. China has acquired over 50 percent of
the world's lithium supply through investments in Australia and the
Lithium Triangle. Furthermore, Argentina, one of the key producers in
the Lithium Triangle, has signed a Memorandum of Understanding to join
the Belt and Road Initiative, positioning China for further investment
in the region. While China has a plan for lithium, the United States
does not. An issue of this magnitude spans multiple agencies, but what
is the State Department doing in order to protect the United States'
stake in the international market for critical minerals?
Answer. The State Department is leading diplomatic efforts to
strengthen resiliency, ensure mining and processing adhere to the
highest environmental, social, and governance standards, and create a
level-playing field for U.S. producers. The State Department achieves
this through its Energy Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI), which
promotes sound mining-sector governance practices in more than 15
mining and processing countries globally. We are also expanding our
coordination with likeminded countries that are significant off takers
of critical minerals to share information and identify investment
opportunities in minerals exploration, mining, processing, and
recycling.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Merkley
Question. Transnational Repression: In yesterday's briefing,
Secretary Blinken responded to my question on transnational repression
that he shared my concerns about authoritarian governments increasingly
reaching across their own borders, including into democracies like the
United States and Europe, to silence dissent among diasporas and
exiles. How does the President's budget reflect that transnational
repression is a priority for the Administration?
Answer. The President's budget request includes funding for the
Department of State to support a variety of programs addressing and
countering transnational repression. Some programs aim to enable civil
society protection providers to identify, investigate, and take action
to protect targets of transnational repression; others make emergency
holistic security and legal assistance available to support civil
society actors worldwide who have come under threat or attack for their
work or aim to ensure global civil society can preemptively engage in
advocacy efforts to reduce instances of transnational repression and
raise the cost of using those tactics.
Question. In addition, Blinken noted that the Administration has a
number of initiatives in development with like-minded allies to
pushback against transnational repression. Could you expand on what
these initiatives are?
Answer. The Department is working together with our like-minded
partners to shine a spotlight on transnational repression, strengthen
resiliency against the practice, and take steps in international
organizations, including the United Nations, to stigmatize
transnational repression and hold its perpetrators accountable. We have
implemented financial sanctions and visa restrictions on individuals
for their transnational repression activity, including under the global
visa restriction policy known as the ``Khashoggi Ban,'' and we
encourage our partners to take similar measures. Furthermore, we work
with likeminded countries to prevent INTERPOL being abused to
facilitate acts of transnational repression.
Question. Burma: The President's budget requests $48.2 million in
economic support funds (ESF) for Burma. How will that money be used and
how will the U.S. Government ensure that it does not go to the military
junta?
Answer. The requested $48.2 million in ESF funds for Burma will
build upon State and USAID efforts to provide necessary services to the
people of Burma. With these resources, USAID and State will work with
communities and civil society organizations across the country to
address the impacts of violent conflict, address human rights
violations, and strengthen processes and mechanisms for an eventual
return to democratic governance. We convened an interagency working
group after the military coup through which we continue to review
planned USG engagements with and assistance to Burma, ensuring that all
assistance is consistent with applicable restrictions and does not
benefit the regime.
Question. Can you break down the difference between how ESF will be
used versus the $31.8 billion in development assistance that was also
requested for Burma in the President's budget?
Answer. The $48.2 million in ESF requested for Burma will directly
support pro-democracy and civil society organizations, think tanks, and
private businesses that support the restoration of Burma's path to
democracy. The $31.8 million in DA requested for Burma will strengthen
civil society, as well as advance food security, basic education,
private sector growth, and sustainable land use practices.
Question. How has the United States adapted its support to Burmese
civil society in the aftermath of the coup?
Answer. Since the February 2021 military coup d'etat, the United
States has increased support for Burma's civil society, pro-democracy,
and human rights actors. We continue to engage at all levels, including
at senior levels, with representatives of Burma's pro-democracy
movement as well as ethnic and religious leaders. We have directed
significant attention and resources to support civil society activists
working to build an inclusive, representative democracy, to enable them
to exercise their human rights, and to support those most at risk,
including journalists and human rights defenders. We have also provided
life-saving humanitarian assistance to meet the needs of vulnerable
populations, including strengthening the capacities of civil society
organizations to deliver essential health services.
Question. How is the Department able to get humanitarian assistance
to the over 14 million in Burma in need without working through the
military junta?
Answer. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)
works through partners, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
and the International Committee of the Red Cross, to provide life-
saving humanitarian assistance to the people of Burma. These partners
provide protection services, shelter materials, non-food items, mental
health support, and other life-saving assistance. This assistance is
carefully monitored to ensure it is not diverted by the military regime
nor can they claim credit for its implementation. PRM has also provided
funding to partners who provide assistance on both sides of the
Thailand-Burma border to refugees and internally displaced persons.
Question. Where do conversations with the Government of Thailand
stand on delivering cross-border humanitarian assistance to Burma from
Thailand?
Answer. The Department strongly supports cross-border humanitarian
assistance from Thailand to Burma and continually advocates with the
Royal Thai Government (RTG) on the importance of lifesaving, cross-
border assistance. Building off our long history of working together to
advance humanitarian assistance, we are engaging the RTG and other
stakeholders in identifying solutions for the people of Burma to
receive the help they need. Currently, PRM funds partners on the
Thailand-Burma border who provide assistance to refugees and internally
displaced persons on both sides of the border.
Question. Bangladesh has relocated a total of 30,000 Rohingya to
Bhasan Char and recent trips by senior U.S. officials have offered the
opportunity to put pressure on the Government of Bangladesh to improve
conditions. Bangladesh is invested in having the Bhasan Char relocation
considered a success, but I remain troubled by forced relocations and/
or limited mobility once refugees arrive at the island. What is the
U.S. position on providing assistance for Rohingya that may have been
forcibly relocated to Bhasan Char especially as other donors like Japan
and Canada provide funding?
Answer. We are currently assessing humanitarian needs on Bhasan
Char. We welcome the improvement in the conditions and availability of
services on Bhasan Char since the Government of Bangladesh and UN
signed the memorandum of understanding in October 2021. However, any
U.S. Government funding will depend on the Government of Bangladesh's
respect for freedom of movement. Bhasan Char's long-term viability
requires Bangladesh's continued commitment to fully informed and
voluntary relocations, improved health services, expanded livelihood
opportunities, and frequent opportunities to move to and from the
mainland.
Question. Irrespective of U.S. funding for activities on Bhasan
Char, how can the U.S.--as by far the largest donor to the response and
to UNHCR--leverage its position to ensure the rights of Rohingya such
as freedom of movement, are protected, including by holding UNHCR
accountable to its protection mandate?
Answer. After nearly 5 years since the 2017 outbreak of violence in
Burma forced nearly 740,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh and with no
prospects for voluntary repatriation to Burma in the near term, we
continue to work with UN partners, including UNHCR, and Bangladesh on
this protracted displacement crisis. This includes urging Bangladesh to
allow Rohingya refugees to exercise greater self-reliance through
expanded access to education, work opportunities, and greater freedom
of movement. We emphasize that self-reliance is key to decreasing
tensions with host communities and mitigating growing hopelessness
among Rohingya refugees.
Question. Honduras: In fiscal year 2022, Congress zeroed out
Foreign Military Financing to the three Northern Triangle countries,
and conditioned 60 percent of the remainder of U.S. assistance to the
central governments of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala on the
successful completion of anti-corruption and rule of law metrics. For
Fiscal Year 2023, however, the President's Budget Request provides
$10.5 million in Foreign Military Financing throughout the Central
America region, though it does not specify a country-by-country
breakdown. What is the Administration's current approach to U.S.
security assistance in each Northern Triangle country, and how does the
State Department plan to program Foreign Military Financing in
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, respectively?
Answer. The approach for FMF in northern Central America will be
complex, but there are areas for cooperation. The key factors will be
countries making verifiable progress on anti-corruption efforts and
developing clear plans and actions for removing the military from
policing roles. The Department would like to ensure FMF is available to
support humanitarian assistance and disaster response capabilities with
those militaries, but would need Congressional support.
Question. To what extent does the FY23 Budget Request factor in
recent developments--both positive and negative--on democracy and the
rule of law throughout the region, including President Xiomara Castro's
promising anti-corruption agenda in Honduras, on the one hand, and
crackdowns on judicial independence in El Salvador and Guatemala, on
the other?
Answer. The FY 2023 Request includes $986.8 million in support of
the Administration's Root Causes Strategy and Collaborative Migration
Management Strategy, and to help meet the President's 4-year commitment
for Central America. The request includes $97.6 million in funding for
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and $219.8 million in regional
funding for democracy, human rights, and governance programs. We have
already pivoted our assistance to support the new Castro administration
and will consider reprogramming funding away from government
institutions undermined by the Bukele and Giammattei administrations if
needed.
Question. Can you provide more details on the programming of U.S.
security assistance to enhance Honduras' border security as part of the
U.S.-Honduras Strategic Dialogue?
Answer. Our assistance to Honduras includes an interagency
agreement with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) which provides
mentoring, equipment, and technical assistance to Honduran Frontier
Police's special operations unit. CBP advisors teach Honduran officers
how to improve their intelligence gathering techniques and use scanners
to search for drugs, contraband, and smuggled human cargo. We also fund
programs with the Department of Homeland Security's investigations arm,
which works in conjunction with Honduran units to combat cross-border
criminal activity in Honduras such as human smuggling and drug
trafficking.
Question. What does our border security cooperation with the
Government of Honduras involve, and what are the Administration's
policy objectives there?
Answer. Our border security cooperation involves training,
mentoring, and equipping our Honduran counterparts to target smugglers,
deter irregular migration, and develop strategic plans to better
monitor and control borders. We fund the deployment of U.S. Custom and
Border Protection advisors to Honduras, who assess the state of border
security, monitor trends in migration and narcotics smuggling, and
develop training for their Honduran counterparts to address the issues.
Our objective is to help Honduras increase its capacity to better
secure its borders, stem irregular migration, and stop the flow of
narcotics into the United States.
Question. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act: Now that Senator
Rubio and my Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is law, the interagency
is working diligently to implement it. We secured over $27 million to
bolster enforcement in Fiscal Year 2022, and the Administration has
asked for a sizable increase for FY23. But as the United States ramps
up its efforts we need to make sure that companies benefiting from
Uyghur slave labor don't just ship their products to other markets.
What is the Administration doing to push other countries to enact their
own prohibitions on these imports?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has been utilizing a whole-
of-government approach to increase awareness of the PRC's use of forced
labor in Xinjiang. The United States continues to coordinate with
partners and allies, NGOs, and the private sector to prevent the
importation of goods produced with forced labor. The Department
submitted a report to Congress outlining the U.S. diplomatic strategy
to address forced labor in Xinjiang and underscoring our continued
efforts to coordinate with like-minded countries to end forced labor in
Xinjiang. We will continue to encourage foreign governments to use the
Act as a model for their own national efforts to prevent the
introduction into their own markets of goods produced by forced labor.
Question. Can the Administration use the Summit for Democracy
process to push for other countries to take concrete action like we
have?
Answer. We are leveraging the Summit for Democracy to maintain
momentum by partners and allies for democratic renewal and seizing the
Summit's Year of Action as an opportunity for countries to translate
words into action. Under our own commitments in the Presidential
Initiative for Democratic Renewal, the United States has launched the
Multilateral Partnership for Organizing, Worker Empowerment, and Rights
(M-POWER), a global initiative to unite governments, unions, labor
academics and CSOs committed to promoting worker empowerment and
rights. We are using ``democracy cohorts'' to bring governments, civil
society, private sector, and philanthropies together to support the
fulfillment of countries' Summit commitments.
Question. Ethiopia: The United Nations and international NGOs have
all found that atrocities and crimes against humanity have happened in
Ethiopia during the current conflict. What is the status of
consideration of these atrocities?
Answer. The United States closely examines the assessments of UN
bodies and credible NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, and incorporates them into the development of U.S.
policy. In the case of Ethiopia, such assessments have contributed to
our decisions to impose sanctions, restrict some forms of foreign
assistance, and terminate AGOA privileges. The United States also co-
sponsored the UN Human Rights Council resolution creating a Commission
of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, an independent, international
investigative mechanism.
Question. Is the Department pursuing a genocide determination? If
not, why not?
Answer. Making a determination that atrocity crimes have occurred
is an important tool available to the Secretary of State. In the case
of the conflict in northern Ethiopia, we believe that a diplomatic
resolution is the most effective means to halt and prevent atrocities
in the immediate term. This is our urgent priority, and we are actively
working to that end. Throughout the conflict, we have repeatedly called
out alleged human rights abuses as credible evidence has been reported
or shared. This is why we support the independent UN commission of
experts and encourage the government to allow them access to the
country.
Question. I have been pleased to see that truckloads of
humanitarian assistance have been arriving in Tigray in recent weeks
after months and months of a blockade that has resulted in widespread
famine conditions and unnecessary deaths. This is no doubt in part
because of the advocacy of the State Department. However, the United
Nations estimates that at least 500 truckloads of aid, medicine, and
fuel are needed on a weekly basis. What is the Department doing to
ensure that the Government of Ethiopia will facilitate meaningful
levels of assistance to arrive in Tigray?
Answer. The continuous, uninterrupted flow of overland assistance
must become regularized in order to meet the immense needs of the
millions of people in northern Ethiopia. We are pressing the Ethiopian
Government, regional authorities, and all other actors to accelerate,
uphold, and expand these efforts to ensure immediate, sustained, and
unimpeded humanitarian access to all Ethiopians affected by this
conflict, in coordination with humanitarian organizations. We will not
hesitate to consider all options should parties block or divert
humanitarian assistance. E.O. 14046 authorizes sanctions against those
who obstruct such assistance.
Question. Critics assess that Prime Minister Abiy is allowing in
just enough aid to prevent sanctions. Has the Department considered
putting sanctions on those actors that have taken steps that have
worsened the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia?
Answer. We are encouraged that the Government of Ethiopia and
regional authorities in Tigray and Afar have taken steps in recent
weeks to enable the delivery of desperately needed food aid to war-
affected communities. However, the continuous, uninterrupted flow of
overland assistance must become regularized to meet the immense needs
of the millions of people in northern Ethiopia. We are pressing the
Ethiopian Government, regional authorities, and all other actors to
accelerate, uphold, and expand these efforts to ensure sustained and
unimpeded humanitarian access to all Ethiopians. We will consider all
options, including sanctions, if actors take steps to worsen the
humanitarian crisis.
Question. Philippines: Following the May 9 Presidential election in
the Philippines, the United States will have an opportunity to revisit
its relationship with that country with a strong focus on promoting
human rights and democracy. How does the Department's proposed budget
center protections for human rights and democracy in our assistance to
the Philippines, especially that that goes to the Philippines National
Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines?
Answer. We look forward to working with the next president of the
Philippines to strengthen the alliance between our countries. That
includes focusing on the importance of promoting respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms in our bilateral engagements, including
with respect to the armed forces and police. Sustained constructive
engagement with all levels of the Philippine military is essential for
promoting both respect for human rights and U.S. security interests,
and our proposed budget reflects this. Human rights and ethics are
integral parts of training for law enforcement units, and, in
compliance with the Leahy Law, no assistance is provided to Philippine
security units credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights.
Question. Can you breakdown what types of programming and arms
sales comprise the $40 million for foreign military financing as well
as the $14.025 million for international narcotics and law enforcement
(INCLE), nonproliferation, anti-Terrorism, Demining and related
programs (NADR), and International Military Education and Training
(IMET)?
Answer. The FY 2023 $40 million FMF request will improve maritime
security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and
counterterrorism capacity in support of multi-year efforts to enhance
upgraded Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine Coast Guard
maritime, air, and land assets. The $2.1 million IMET request is
commensurate with prior years and will support professional military
education. The $5.5 million NADR request is consistent with prior year
funding, which will support counterterrorism training. The $6.4 million
INCLE request will support programs to combat transnational crime,
improve the capacity of Philippine maritime security institutions, and
strengthen the justice sector and rule of law.
Question. What foreign assistance programs benefit the Philippines
National Police?
Answer. The Department provides limited assistance to the
Philippines National Police (PNP) and focuses on programs that provide
training on human rights, ethics, and professional skills. The United
States also works with Leahy-eligible specialized units of the PNP,
such as maritime units engaged in countering transnational crime; the
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit of the PNP, which fights
child exploitation and trafficking in persons; as well as specialized
cybercrime units. Focused law enforcement assistance also includes
units charged with investigating ISIS-affiliated and other
transnational terrorist groups, such as the Special Action Force. No
U.S. assistance to the PNP benefits units involved with the country's
drug war.
Question. How does the Department ensure that these funds do not go
to human rights violators?
Answer. All security force units in the Philippines, including the
Philippines National Police nominated for applicable assistance, are
vetted consistent with the Leahy law, and are denied assistance if
credible information is found that the unit committed a gross violation
of human rights. Leahy vetting occurs at both the unit and individual
levels consistent with Department guidance.
Question. What is the Department's long-term view on how to reform
the Philippines National Police?
Answer. Ongoing engagement with the Philippines National Police
(PNP) focuses heavily on human rights, ethics, and professional skills.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in
partnership with the Department of Justice's International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program, trains police cadets and
officers on human rights, ethics, leadership, instructor development,
and professionalization. Enduring institutional change takes time, and
the Department's goal is to institutionalize respect for human rights
within core PNP training curricula to give early and mid-career
officers a foundational understanding of these concepts as they rise
through the ranks.
Question. Ukraine Food Security: For Fiscal Year 2023, the
President's Budget Request provides approximately $1 billion in
bilateral agriculture and food security programming. This is the same
amount as Fiscal Year 2022 enacted levels, despite the tremendous shock
to global agriculture and food prices, including for wheat and
fertilizer, prompted by Putin's war in Ukraine. How does the
Administration plan to mitigate the war's impact on the global food
supply and the risk of elevated food insecurity in humanitarian
settings and conflict zones, from Yemen to Syria, Afghanistan, and
Ethiopia, if not in the Budget Request?
Answer. In addition to the approximately $1 billion for agriculture
and food security programming, the President's FY 2023 budget requests
provides $10.45 billion in humanitarian assistance, part of which will
help address the risk of elevated food insecurity in humanitarian
settings. The FY 2023 Request will be complemented by the Ukraine
Supplemental Appropriations Act, which included $4.15 billion in
humanitarian assistance. On April 26, 2022, the President also
submitted an additional supplemental appropriations request to Congress
that contained $1.6 billion in additional humanitarian and food
security assistance, along with additional funds for the Departments of
Agriculture and Treasury, to people around the world facing food
insecurity due to Putin's war in Ukraine and other drivers of global
food insecurity. If passed by Congress, these resources would
significantly increase our ability to respond.
Question. How will this request complement the $670 million in food
aid that the Biden administration announced on April 27?
Answer. The funding for humanitarian assistance and agriculture and
food security programming in the FY 2023 President's Budget Request,
the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, and the President's April
2022 supplemental funding request will complement and support ongoing
efforts by the U.S. Government to respond to global food insecurity
exacerbated by Putin's war in Ukraine. The $670 million in food
assistance, which includes $282 million from the Bill Emerson
Humanitarian Trust, is a part of these efforts and will provide much-
needed assistance to countries and people facing food insecurity around
the world.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. In January 2021, you acknowledged that China was
committing genocide and crimes against humanity towards the Uyghurs. On
March 21, 2022, you once again called on China to ``end its ongoing
genocide and crimes against humanity.'' Is China continuing to commit
genocide and crimes against humanity?
Answer. Yes. Despite increased global attention and actions to
promote accountability, we have seen no indications that PRC
authorities have ceased committing genocide or crimes against humanity
in Xinjiang, which include imprisonment, enforced sterilization,
torture, persecution through the use of forced labor, and imposition of
draconian restrictions on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of
expression, and freedom of movement. We reiterate our call upon the PRC
to immediately cease committing atrocities against predominantly Muslim
Uyghurs, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in
Xinjiang, immediately release those unjustly detained, and allow
independent investigators unhindered access to the region.
Question. How effective have U.S. efforts been in ending the
genocide and human rights abuses committed by the Chinese Communist
Party?
Answer. The United States has implemented visa restrictions,
financial sanctions, export controls, and import restrictions to
promote accountability for PRC officials and entities connected to
human rights abuses and violations in Xinjiang. Through sustained
diplomatic engagement, we have convinced like-minded partners and
allies to impose similar actions. These measures have, as applicable,
effectively imposed costs on PRC officials connected to human rights
abuses and violations by prohibiting them from traveling to the United
States and using the U.S. financial system. Import measures are helping
to ensure the PRC cannot derive financial benefits from U.S. markets
for perpetrating human rights abuses, including forced labor.
Question. What is your strategy to hold China accountable for its
serious human rights abuses?
Answer. The United States will continue to work with our allies and
partners to promote accountability for those responsible for human
rights abuses and violations. Working bilaterally and through
multilateral fora, we will continue to seek to support victims and
jointly impose costs on PRC officials and entities responsible for
perpetrating these abuses and violations. We will also continue to call
upon the PRC to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. We
remain steadfastly committed to promoting accountability for PRC
officials responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity and will
continue to consider the use of all appropriate tools to promote
accountability for those responsible and deter future abuses.
Question. China is developing capabilities with the potential to
threaten global security and stability. At the end of last year, China
reportedly tested a hypersonic missile. What threats does the Chinese
Communist Party pose to the United States?
Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) hypersonic missile
test is concerning to us as it should be to all who seek peace and
stability in the region and beyond. The PRC's nuclear build-up and
development of delivery systems raises questions about Beijing's intent
and reinforces the importance of pursuing practical measures to reduce
nuclear risks. Despite PRC obfuscation, this rapid build-up has become
more difficult to hide and highlights how the PRC is deviating from
decades of nuclear strategy based on minimum deterrence. We will
continue to advance our capabilities to defend and deter against a
range of threats from the PRC to ourselves, our allies, and partners.
Question. What is your assessment of the risk associated with
China's military modernization?
Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) military-civil
fusion doctrine and military modernization efforts are components of
how the PRC seeks to prepare internally to combat the U.S. and our
allies and partners, and hence are contrary to U.S. interests. We will
continue to shine a light on PRC influence efforts and on PRC-based
companies that support military modernization or commit human rights
abuses and impose appropriate restrictions on those firms. President
Biden is firmly committed to ensuring PRC-based companies cannot
misappropriate and misuse U.S. technology and that U.S. technology does
not support the PRC's military modernization and is not acquired for
use by the People's Liberation Army.
Question. Is the United States keeping pace with China's rapid
military expansion and modernization?
Answer. We are committed to protecting U.S. national security and
technological edge, including through domestic investments in research
and development, and manufacturing. President Biden is firmly committed
to making sure that PRC-based companies cannot misappropriate and
misuse U.S. technology and that U.S. technology does not support the
PRC's military modernization and is not acquired for use by the
People's Liberation Army, including through the PRC's military civil
fusion doctrine.
Question. Last year, the Biden administration rejoined the World
Health Organization (WHO) claiming the best way to reform the WHO is
from within. It provided $200 million in taxpayer dollars without
requiring a single reform. Despite the inability to make progress on
good governance, transparency, or better warning and response times,
the State Department is asking Congress to provide $200 million more
for the WHO in Fiscal Year 2023. Please outline the meaningful reforms
achieved at the World Health Organization since the United States
rejoined the organization.
Answer. The United States has been a leading voice in calling for
reforms to improve the WHO's efficiency, accountability, transparency,
and effectiveness. The forthcoming report to Congress on WHO reform
outlines significant progress. Of note, the WHO Working Group for
Sustainable Financing recently adopted a U.S.-led proposal that calls
for WHO's budget proposal for the 2024-2025 biennium to be accompanied
by an implementation plan for governance, budget, financial, and other
reforms. We also continue to work to improve pandemic prevention,
preparedness, and response, including through negotiations on
amendments to the International Health Regulations and a new pandemic
instrument. These amendments are designed to clarify early-warning
triggers for international pandemic response, promote rapid information
sharing, and improve WHO decision-making regarding public health
emergencies. These capabilities, in turn, will allow the United States
and other countries to exercise their ability to make more informed
public health decisions.
Question. What specific reforms has the Administration requested be
adopted and implemented at the WHO?
Answer. We have advocated that the WHO undertake concrete reforms
to strengthen WHO governance; budget and financial transparency and
oversight; prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual
harassment; accountability; compliance, risk management, and ethics;
and human resources management. We proposed to increase transparency
and Member State engagement through a new Standing Committee on Health
Emergencies, which will be launched at the 151st Executive Board. We
also continue to work with WHO and our multilateral partners to improve
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, including through
ongoing negotiations on targeted amendments to the International Health
Regulations (2005) and a new pandemic instrument. These amendments are
designed to clarify early-warning triggers for international pandemic
response, promote rapid information sharing, and improve WHO decision-
making regarding public health emergencies. These capabilities, in
turn, will allow the United States and other countries to exercise
their ability to make more informed public health decisions.
Question. What is the United States' agenda for the World Health
Assembly meeting in May 2022?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to advancing
U.S. public health interests and leading the global community toward a
safer, more equitable future. The U.S. delegation to the World Health
Assembly will advance multilateral efforts to combat COVID-19, as well
as to detect, prevent, prepare for, and respond to future pandemic
threats. The United States will also work within the World Health
Assembly to address a broad range of global health topics, including
polio, HIV/AIDS, nutrition, and non-communicable diseases. In addition,
the U.S. delegation will advocate for WHO governance and administrative
reforms; prevention of sexual abuse and exploitation and sexual
harassment; multilateral cooperation to address the global health
impact of the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine; and inclusive engagement
of non-state actors and other partners, including Taiwan's meaningful
participation in the World Health Organization's activities.
Question. Does the Biden administration support the WHO's proposal
to increase assessed contributions?
Answer. The WHO Working Group on Sustainable Financing recently
reached consensus on a U.S.-led proposal that links any increase in
assessed contributions to progress on reform. The proposal calls on WHO
to provide a budget proposal for the first proposed increase of 20
percent at the World Health Assembly in May 2023 alongside an
implementation plan on reforms. Additional increases, up to a level of
50 percent of the base budget, will be considered in line with standard
WHO budgetary processes and progress on reform through 2031.
Question. Last year, China succeeded in blocking Taiwan's
participation at the World Health Assembly. What efforts have been
taken to push the World Health Organization to allow the participation
of Taiwan?
Answer. We have strongly advocated with likeminded partners for
Taiwan's participation as an observer at the WHA through bilateral and
multilateral engagements with WHO Director-General Tedros and senior
WHO leaders. We have also sought to grow broad international support
for Taiwan's participation through diplomatic engagement in member
state capitals, public statements, and public affairs campaigns that
highlight Taiwan's valuable expertise and the need for inclusive
processes to address today's global health challenges.
Question. Our nation should be a strategic energy supplier to
Europe. American natural gas is reliable, affordable, and abundant. The
United States has the energy resources needed to help our allies reduce
their dependence on Russian energy. Do you support increasing exports
of American liquefied natural gas to help our allies and partners
escape their dependence on Russia?
Answer. We are in constant conversation with Allies and partners
about the most effective ways to decrease their dependence on Russian
energy. For example, we established the U.S.-EU Task Force on Energy
Security to diversify LNG supplies to Europe and to reduce demand for
natural gas. We have nearly doubled our LNG exports to Europe over the
past 4-5 months and are working to secure an additional 15 billion
cubic meters of LNG this year compared to 2021 from global sources.
Question. How is Russia using its energy resources to coerce,
intimidate and manipulate other countries?
Answer. Russia exploits its energy supplies and export pipelines to
create national and regional dependencies on Russian energy, which it
leverages to expand its political, economic, and military influence;
weaken European security; and undermine transatlantic security and
foreign policy interests. Gazprom's unilateral breach of natural gas
contracts with NATO Allies Bulgaria and Poland over Russia's demand for
payments in rubles exemplifies how Russia uses energy as an instrument
of economic coercion and demonstrates its unreliability as an energy
supplier. Our focus is on helping our Allies and partners, who have
been an integral part of our unprecedented sanctions, reduce
dependencies on Russian fossil fuels as quickly as possible.
Question. The security and stability of the Black Sea is critically
important to U.S. national security. When Defense Secretary Austin was
in the Black Sea region last year, he stated, ``Russia's destabilizing
activities in and around the Black Sea reflect its ambitions to regain
a dominant position in the region and to prevent the realization of a
Europe that is whole, free and at peace.'' What is the Administration's
strategy for increasing security in the Black Sea?
Answer. Our strategy focuses on building the capacity of our
partners in the region. The Biden administration has provided more than
$6.3 billion in security assistance to Ukraine and approximately $70
million to Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The Administration also
allocated $650 million in foreign military financing (FMF) funds
provided in the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (USAA)
to help Allies and partners defend against Russian aggression in the
Black Sea region and elsewhere. With additional Congressional
notifications forthcoming, we have notified an additional $317.6
million for Ukraine, $34.5 million for Bulgaria, and $35 million for
Georgia in foreign military financing under the USAA.
Question. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created a
very successful Baltic Air Policing Mission to safeguard the integrity
of the NATO alliance members' airspace. This mission could serve as a
model for efforts to maintain a robust NATO presence in the Black Sea.
What are your views on NATO establishing a Black Sea Maritime Patrol
mission?
Answer. Along with our NATO Allies, we already conduct air policing
operations for Romania and Bulgaria and are constantly exploring ways
to bolster the integrity of NATO member airspace, including over the
Black Sea. We regularly analyze the security environment and make
decisions in consensus with our NATO Allies and other littoral states
in the region, in line with existing international obligations and
commitments. We also conduct regular NATO exercises in the region and
have deployed NATO battlegroups to Romania and Bulgaria.
Question. What are some of the challenges and opportunities of a
regular and rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea?
Answer. The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits
of 1936 regulates maritime traffic through the Black Sea and requires
NATO Ally Turkey to implement restrictions and limitations on the
passage of military vessels. The convention places limits on the
ability of states, especially non-Black Sea states, to maintain a
regular maritime presence in the Black Sea. Turkey continues to enforce
the Montreux Convention, which has denied Russia a critical military
supply route. We are constantly exploring ways to bolster the security
of NATO littoral states in the region under existing bilateral defense
cooperation agreements and through NATO.
Question. Do NATO members have the capacity, capabilities,
commitment to create this type of mission?
Answer. The NATO Alliance is the most successful and enduring
military alliance in history. With our NATO Allies, we conduct regular
exercises in the Black Sea region and constantly explores ways to
bolster the security of NATO Allies in the region, in line with
existing international agreements and law. We have established
bilateral and NATO military presence in Allied countries that border
the Black Sea, and our commitment to them under Article 5 on mutual
defense is ironclad. Any change in mission would require consensus
agreement among all Allies before implementation.
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