[Senate Hearing 117-673]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                          S. Hrg. 117-673

                  AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL LEADER-
                   SHIP: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2023 
                   STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             APRIL 26, 2022

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        

                              (ii)        

  
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Blinken, Antony J., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, 
  Washington, DC.................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     8

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez...........................    62

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch............................    76

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin........................   124

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen............................   126

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio...............................   129

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Rob Portman...............................   134

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey..........................   139

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Jeff Merkley..............................   140

Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator John Barrasso.............................   145

                                 (iii)

 
  AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 
                  2023 STATE DEPARTMENT BUDGET REQUEST

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, APRIL 26, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, 
Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Young, Barrasso, 
Cruz, Rounds, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order. Mr. Secretary, welcome back to 
the committee. We appreciate you being here with us today.
    As we look across the world from Cuba, to Mali, to Iran, to 
China, and, of course, Russia, authoritarians are crushing free 
speech, arresting dissidents, utilizing technology to control 
their citizens, relying on mercenaries and illicit weapons to 
target innocent civilians and topple governments. This is a 
confrontation between violent autocrats and those of us 
fighting for a rules-based international order for democracy, 
human rights, and the cause of freedom around the world. Our 
diplomats, and development professionals, and our budget for 
these efforts, which we are examining today, are our front 
lines in this fight. With that in mind, I would like to take a 
moment to highlight some of our most pressing areas of 
concerns. I am sure members on both sides will want to talk 
about these and others.
    In Europe, we must maintain absolute unity, as President 
Biden has said, and I believe your recent trip to Kyiv with 
Secretary Austin to show support for President Zelensky and the 
Ukrainian people, and to continue shining a light on Russia's 
military brazen abuse of civilians that certainly amount to war 
crimes, was a critical display of that unity, and we salute you 
for that visit. More broadly, this means countering Russian 
aggression with security assistance that aligns with our 
foreign policy, combatting disinformation and election 
interference, delivering humanitarian relief, and helping 
neighboring countries with a huge influx of Ukrainian refugees 
fleeing violence. We have a responsibility to the American 
people and to the Ukrainians themselves to ensure that we are 
effectively spending the $13.6 billion package Congress 
approved back in March.
    With only a minor increase in foreign military financing 
funds, I would like to hear the Administration's plans for 
countries in NATO's Eastern flank and for Taiwan for that fact, 
which is facing a similar threat from China. Whether it is 
Japan, South Korea, or Australia, when it comes to countering 
China, a strong alliance with our partners is vital. Xi 
Jinping's hypernationalism is more assertive around the globe 
than ever before. The State Department must work on a pragmatic 
appraisal of how to best combat China's predatory economic and 
trade practices so we have the ability to outcompete China in 
the generation ahead, bilaterally and through robust presence 
and action in regional and international institutions.
    Authoritarianism also threatens Latin America and the 
Caribbean in a part of the world hit hard by the COVID 
pandemic. From Cuba, to Venezuela, and even Nicaragua, we are 
seeing arbitrary detentions, the dismantling of civil society, 
the weaponization of hunger and migration, all as Maduro 
carries out systematic extrajudicial executions. On top of 
this, an epidemic of criminal violence, stretching from Mexico, 
to Haiti, to El Salvador is fueling a serious refugee and 
migration crisis. The Americas now host more than 18.4 million 
displaced people. This budget is a good down-payment, but more 
will be needed to address these challenges across the 
hemisphere.
    Countering authoritarianism also requires serious 
investment across Africa where Moscow has reasserted itself 
over the past several years and democracy seems on the retreat. 
Civilians from the Central African Republic to Mali have paid a 
heavy price with Russian Wagner mercenaries reportedly 
committing human rights abuses. Despite concerted diplomatic 
efforts by the Administration, the democratic aspirations of 
the Ethiopian and Sudanese people have yet to be realized. 
Looking further north from there, I am also expecting an update 
on what is happening with the JCPOA and negotiations with Iran. 
We were told that the end of February was the date in which we 
needed to conclude an agreement. It is going to be end of 
April, so we look forward to hearing about that as well as 
Iran's malign actions across the region.
    I am pleased that the security of our important ally, 
Israel, is fully funded in this request, and I am supportive of 
the funding request for Jordan, but I am concerned by cuts to 
security assistance in Iraq as we transition away from combat 
operations to bilateral diplomacy. In Tunisia, we would love to 
hear a strategy confronting democratic backsliding, and in 
South and Central Asia, we need clarity on whether the 
Administration will waive CAATSA sanctions for India's purchase 
of the Russian S-400 missile defense system and what role, if 
so, are they going to continue to play in the Quad. Also, in 
the wake of the Taliban's broken promise to allow girls to 
attend secondary school, their media crackdown, and the 
unfolding humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, we need a better 
sense of the Administration's diplomatic strategy.
    Across the globe today, we are facing multiple humanitarian 
challenges, refugee crises on several continents, and one of 
the worst food insecurity crises we have seen in a generation. 
Considering all of this, I do not think the Administration's 
budget requests to address humanitarian and resettlement needs 
reflects current global realities. The United States must 
elevate the needs of women, girls, and other at-risk 
populations. We must document war crimes. Added to this, 
climate change is a force multiplier, which will exacerbate 
humanitarian crises and conflicts around the world. It requires 
us to rethink how we prepare for the future, from the energy 
security crisis in Europe and Ukraine, to increasing sea-level 
severe weather and drought, including working multilaterally to 
help partner countries advance clean, sustainable energy 
solutions. We must also think about how to better prevent, 
detect, and respond to future pandemics.
    I want to applaud the State Department's push to modernize 
and increase diversity by adding internships, a chief diversity 
and inclusion officer across foreign affairs agencies, and 
equity strategies in our overseas policies and programs, 
including the Department's high-level representative on racial 
equity. The Senate Foreign Relations has also taken steps to 
join in that effort. Finally, I would like to congratulate the 
Department on launching the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital 
Policy, which will be essential in our diplomacy on cyber and 
technology issues.
    There is a lot to discuss, Mr. Secretary. We look forward 
to hearing your thoughts on how you see the Department tackling 
some of these issues and challenges we face as a Nation. I 
certainly want to say that we appreciate your service to our 
country, and with that, let me turn to the distinguished 
Ranking Member, Senator Risch, for his opening remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. Secretary, 
thank you for visiting with us today. On a personal note, thank 
you for visiting with Senator Menendez and I earlier and giving 
us your thoughts on your visit there and the systems that are 
operating in the Ukraine.
    At the present time, as the world becomes more dangerously 
complicated, we need the State Department to prioritize 
national security diplomacy and effectively spend taxpayer 
money to defend U.S. national interests. Now is the time for 
the Department to rebalance its risk calculus and get our 
diplomats back in the field, particularly in the Ukraine, 
advance U.S. values and interests, and compete against 
adversaries across the globe.
    However, in certain places like China, the Administration 
appears to be recalcitrant, giving up the privileges and 
immunities that keep them and their families safe in order to 
appease Beijing's extreme response to COVID. I have heard 
reports of U.S. diplomats forced into government-run fever 
hospitals for lengthy periods, living in squalid conditions, 
and being forced to take medical tests for no legitimate 
reason. In response, the Administration has not moved on this, 
and it should.
    Against this backdrop, we have been asked to consider 
whether the funding priorities set out in the President's FY 
2023 budget request align with our most pressing national 
security interests. Just as last year, there are bright spots. 
For example, while I have major concerns about the ambiguous 
request for $6.5 billion in mandatory spending, I do appreciate 
the emphasis on global health security within the discretionary 
budget. Chairman Menendez and I continue to advance legislation 
to improve international pandemic preparedness and response, 
and I urge the Administration to help us align those efforts.
    I am disappointed by the failure to present a concrete 
proposal to reform U.S. international food aid, particularly in 
light of the global food crisis exacerbated by Russia's brutal 
war in Ukraine. I am, however, pleased to hear the President 
and Administration is open to ideas. Let us get to work on 
that. However, overall, the request continues a destructive 
pattern of asking for more resources to advance policies that 
run counter to U.S. interests, including for energy projects 
utilizing slave labor from Xinjiang, providing billions of 
dollars to an unaccountable green climate fund, and proposing 
to increase U.S. contributions for U.N. peacekeeping in 
contravention of the historic Helms-Biden Agreement. Meanwhile, 
this budget request undercuts security and humanitarian 
assistance.
    Mr. Secretary, I am very glad that you and Secretary Austin 
went to Kyiv just a few days ago to show U.S. support for 
Ukraine. Our embassy needs to open up again. All our European 
partners are already back there. We need people on the ground 
to help Ukraine meet its needs immediately, and I was impressed 
by your description of what you found there that would 
certainly open the door for us to reopen our embassy there. 
Despite the unprecedented military assistance the U.S. and our 
allies have sent to Ukraine, there is still more we can do. The 
tenor of this war has changed, and Ukraine needs different 
items than they did just 1 month ago. I urge the Administration 
to transfer more advanced capabilities, including U.S.-origin 
multiple launch rocket systems, medium-range air defense 
systems, and anti-ship cruise missiles, among other things, and 
I was impressed with what you reported to us in confidence this 
morning. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Russia provided 
our enemies with aircraft and trained our enemy's pilots. It is 
high time we return that favor.
    Further, we must see expedited production of our new 
systems to backfill our allies to deter Russia, new sanctions, 
and tighter export controls to starve the Russian war machine 
and expand humanitarian assistance. It is time to act 
aggressively, not perform another deep dive that will take 
months to complete. After its victory, Ukraine will need 
extensive support to rebuild the country. The State Department 
should plan now for this huge undertaking, which will require 
participation from the entire civilized world.
    This all relates in a very real way with U.S. response to 
China's ambitions, the most important challenge facing the 
United States today. We started too late in providing security 
assistance to Ukraine. We cannot make the same mistake with 
Taiwan. Supporting an island during a war is much more 
difficult. Our assistance must be there beforehand. We must 
accelerate existing foreign military sales to Taiwan so they 
get there quicker, and we should use security assistance to 
help Taiwan acquire additional capabilities. I have introduced 
language to do this, and we need it now. In March, Chairman 
Menendez and I spearheaded an effort to get funding into the 
appropriate package for security assistance to Taiwan, and I 
fully agree with Senator Shelby's recent comments that we 
should absolutely spend more to help with Taiwan's defense. 
Secretary Blinken, I hope you can commit to that during today's 
hearing.
    Turning to the Middle East, it is clear that America's 
relationship with our Middle East partners is in desperate need 
of some work. These are longtime partnerships that we really 
need to maintain. Instead of America as a steadfast partner, 
our Middle Eastern friends have seen increasingly restrictive 
security assistance policies, the botched Afghanistan 
withdrawal, and an Iran policy that fails to deter regional 
terrorism and a previously lukewarm embrace of the Abraham 
Accords. The Biden administration's Middle East policies have 
reinforced a claim of American disengagement and pushed our 
longstanding partners towards China and Russia. This cannot 
happen.
    In Syria, we have seen a lack of seizure sanctions 
enforcement. While our Administration is not explicitly 
encouraging normalization with Assad, it is clear there are no 
repercussions for others doing so. We cannot ignore this or 
teach the world that a despot and a murderer can be 
rehabilitated just by hanging on for a long period of time. On 
Iran, we have been on the cusp of a nuclear deal for several 
weeks apparently. Given the sunsets and short-term gains of 
rejoining the JCPOA, Israel, the Gulf, and other members of 
Congress have voiced loud opposition to rejoining the 2015 
accord.
    Our Iran policy must be one that can survive successive 
Administrations and one both parties can support. To accomplish 
this, you need to get it right. From what we are seeing and 
what we are being told right now, you are in the process of 
getting it wrong again. No other issue divides this 
Administration from Congress and U.S. allies than this issue. 
If you cannot get it right, and it looks like you are not, walk 
away from this. That will be a victory, and you will be 
applauded for that. No agreement is far better than a bad one. 
Israel will see that Iran never completes a nuclear weapon.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. With that, Mr. 
Secretary, the floor is yours. Your full statement will be 
included in the record, without objection.

   STATEMENT OF ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. 
              DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, 
Ranking Member Risch, thank you. It is very good to be with 
you, to be with every member of this committee today. Thank you 
for the opportunity to speak with you about the 
Administration's proposed budget for the State Department. As 
both of you noted, I just returned from Kyiv with Defense 
Secretary Lloyd Austin, where, together, we demonstrated the 
United States' commitment to the Government and to the people 
of Ukraine.
    I have to tell you, the trip left an indelible impression. 
We had a chance to talk about it a little bit before the 
hearing. As we took the train across the border and rode 
westward into Ukraine, we saw mile after mile of Ukrainian 
countryside, territory that, just a couple months ago, the 
Russian Government thought that it could seize in a matter of 
weeks. Today, it is firmly Ukraine's. In Kyiv, we saw the signs 
of a vibrant city coming back to life, people eating outside, 
sitting on benches, strolling. It was right in front of us. The 
Ukrainians have won the battle for Kyiv.
    For all the suffering that they have endured, for all the 
carnage that Russia's brutal invasion continues to inflict, 
Ukraine was and will continue to be a free and independent 
country. It is impossible not to be moved by what the 
Ukrainians have achieved. It is also impossible not to believe 
that they will keep succeeding because they know why they 
fight. Seeing this, I have to tell you I felt some pride in 
what the United States has done to support the Ukrainian 
Government and its people, and an even firmer conviction that 
we must not let up.
    Moscow's war of aggression against Ukraine has underscored 
the power and purpose of American diplomacy. Our diplomacy is 
rallying allies and partners around the world to join us in 
supporting Ukraine with security, economic, humanitarian 
assistance, imposing massive costs on the Kremlin, 
strengthening our collective security and defense, addressing 
the war's mounting global consequences, including the refugee 
and food crises that you both alluded to. We have to continue 
to drive that diplomacy forward to seize what I believe are 
strategic opportunities, as well as address risks presented by 
Russia's overreach as countries are reconsidering their 
policies, their priorities, their relationships. The budget 
request before you predated this crisis, but fully funding it 
is critical, in my judgment, to ensuring that Russia's war in 
Ukraine is a strategic failure for the Kremlin and serves as a 
powerful lesson to those who might consider following its path.
    As we are focused intensely on this urgent crisis, the 
State Department continues to carry out the missions 
traditionally associated with diplomacy, like responsibly 
managing a great power competition with China, facilitating a 
halt to fighting in Yemen and Ethiopia, pushing back against 
the rising tide of authoritarianism and the threat that it 
poses to human rights. We also face evolving challenges that 
require us to develop new capabilities, such as the emergence 
and reemergence of infectious disease, an accelerating climate 
crisis, and, of course, a digital revolution that holds both 
enormous promise, but also some peril.
    Last fall, I had an opportunity to set out a modernization 
agenda for the Department and for U.S. diplomacy to respond to 
these complex demands. In no small part thanks to the FY22 
budget approved by Congress, we have been able to make real 
progress on this agenda, though much remains to be done. To 
give just a few examples, we have strengthened our capacity to 
shape the ongoing technical revolution so that it actually 
protects our interests, it boosts our competitiveness, it 
upholds our values. With bipartisan congressional support and 
encouragement, we recently launched a new Bureau for Cyber 
Station Digital Policy with 60 team members to start, and I am 
grateful to Congress, to this committee, for long supporting 
this effort, for the ideas that you shared in how best to do 
it.
    We are also making headway in ensuring that our diplomats 
reflect America's remarkable diversity, which is one of our 
greatest strengths, including in our diplomacy. We have, as the 
chairman notes, our first-ever chief diversity inclusion 
officer, who is spearheading an effort to analyze and address 
the obstacles that prevent underrepresented groups from joining 
and advancing at State. We have expanded the Pickering and 
Rangel fellowships and created, for the first time, thanks to 
the support of Congress and this committee, paid internships at 
State, along with strong congressional input and support for 
all of these efforts, and we are showing results. We recently 
welcomed a new cohort of 179 exceptional Foreign Service 
professionals. That is putting our Department on track for its 
largest annual intake in a decade.
    My first 15 months in this job have only strengthened my 
own conviction that these and other reforms are not just 
worthwhile, they are essential to our national security and to 
delivering for the people we represent. Today's meeting marks, 
by our count, the 100th time that I have had an opportunity to 
brief Congress, which is one of the ways I have worked to meet 
the commitment that I made in my confirmation before this 
committee: to restore Congress' role as a partner, both in our 
foreign policymaking and in revitalizing the State Department. 
Ensuring that we can deliver on the agenda will require 
sustained funding, some new authorities, and maybe, most 
important of all, partnership from Congress. That is why I am 
grateful for the chairman and ranking member's request to 
establish a formal dialogue on the State Department 
authorization, a request that we have delivered on, and we are 
going to look forward to working in detail with you as the 
authorization process moves forward.
    If we want to deepen our capability in key areas like 
climate, like pandemic preparedness, like multilateral 
diplomacy, if we want to expand on Secretary Powell's vision of 
a Foreign Service training float and equip our workforce with 
the training, with the tools, with the technology that we need 
for today's challenges, we need some additional resources, and 
those are set out in the budget. If we want to be able to 
swiftly stand up new missions, deploy diplomats when and where 
they are needed, and I very much agree with the ranking member 
on this, and make those decisions based on risk management 
rather than on risk aversion, we need to reform the State 
Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act and the 
Accountability Review Board statute. That is laid out as well.
    If we want to rapidly scale up our response to crises, like 
refugee surges and epidemics, while also avoiding costly 
overhead, we need more flexible domestic hiring authorities. 
This is not about advancing the goals of any one 
Administration, any one party. It is about refocusing our 
mission and purpose on the forces that really affect the lives 
of our fellow citizens, their livelihoods, their security for 
decades to come.
    I very much appreciate this opportunity to speak today 
about why this matters and look very much forward to continuing 
to make this committee and Congress a full partner in these 
efforts. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Blinken follows:]

           Prepared Statement of Secretary Antony J. Blinken

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, I'm grateful for the 
opportunity to speak with you about the Administration's proposed 
budget for the State Department.
    I just returned from Kyiv, where Secretary of Defense Austin and I 
demonstrated the United States' stalwart commitment to the Government 
and people of Ukraine.
    Moscow's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has brought into 
sharp focus the power and purpose of American diplomacy, and why it's 
more crucial than ever to our national security and the interests of 
the American people. Our diplomacy is rallying allies and partners 
around the world to join us in supporting Ukraine with security, 
economic, and humanitarian assistance, imposing greater costs on the 
Kremlin, strengthening our collective security and defense, and 
addressing the war's mounting global consequences, including the 
refugee and food crises.
    President Putin's war of choice has achieved the exact opposite of 
his objectives. Uniting, rather than dividing, Ukrainians. 
Strengthening, rather than weakening, NATO and the U.S.-EU partnership. 
Undercutting, rather than asserting, the Kremlin's claims of military 
might. And that's not only because of Ukraine's bravery and resilience. 
It's also because of effective U.S. diplomacy.
    We must continue to drive that diplomacy forward to seize to the 
strategic opportunities and address risks presented by Russia's 
overreach, as countries reconsider their policies, priorities, and 
relationships. The budget request before you predated this crisis, but 
fully funding it is critical to ensuring Russia's war in Ukraine is a 
strategic failure for the Kremlin and serves as a powerful lesson to 
those who might consider following its path.
    As we focus on this urgent crisis, the State Department continues 
to carry out the missions traditionally associated with diplomacy, like 
responsibly managing great power competition with China, facilitating a 
halt to fighting in Yemen and Ethiopia, and pushing back against the 
rising tide of authoritarianism and the threat it poses to human 
rights.
    We also face evolving challenges that require us to develop new 
capabilities, such as the emergence and reemergence of infectious 
diseases, an accelerating climate crisis, and a digital revolution that 
holds both enormous promise and peril.
    Last fall, I set out a modernization agenda for the State 
Department and U.S. diplomacy to respond to these complex demands, 
built on five pillars. Deepening our expertise in areas that are 
critical to the future of America's national security. Continuing to 
attract, retain, and develop the world's best diplomats. Fostering 
greater innovation and feedback. Modernizing our technology, 
communications, and analytical capabilities. And reinvigorating in-
person diplomacy and public engagement--to get our diplomats beyond 
embassy walls and engage the people we need to reach most.
    In no small part thanks to the significant FY22 budget approved by 
Congress, we've been able to make real progress on this agenda, though 
much remains to be done.
    To give just a few examples, we've strengthened our capacity to 
shape the ongoing technological revolution, so it protects our 
interests, boosts our competitiveness, and upholds our values. With 
bipartisan Congressional support and encouragement, we recently 
launched a new bureau for cyberspace and digital policy, with 60 team 
members to start.
    We're also making headway on ensuring our diplomats reflect 
America's remarkable diversity, which is one of our nation's greatest 
strengths. Our Department's first ever Chief Diversity and Inclusion 
Officer, Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, has spearheaded an 
effort to analyze the obstacles that prevent underrepresented groups 
from joining and advancing at State, and will soon release a 4-year 
strategic plan to tackle these problems. We've expanded the Pickering 
and Rangel fellowship programs, and created, for the first time, paid 
internships at State, also with strong Congressional input and support.
    These efforts are showing results. We recently welcomed a new 
cohort of 179 exceptional Foreign Service professionals, putting the 
Department on track for its largest annual intake in a decade.
    My first 15 months in this job have only strengthened my conviction 
that these and other reforms are not just worthwhile, but essential to 
delivering for the American people.
    Today's meeting marks the 100th time I've briefed Congress in 
meetings or calls, which is one of the ways I've worked to meet the 
commitment I made in my confirmation hearing to restore Congress's role 
as a partner both in our foreign policymaking and in revitalizing the 
State Department. These engagements have also helped further refine and 
strengthen our modernization agenda.
    Ensuring we can deliver on that agenda will require sustained 
funding, new authorities, and most importantly, partnership from 
Congress. That's why I was grateful for the Chairman and Ranking 
Member's request to reestablish a formal dialogue on the State 
Department Authorization, a request we've delivered on. Last month, we 
sent your staff the first package of legislative authorities required 
to meet the complex challenges we face, and we expect to send another 
in the coming weeks.
    If we want to deepen our capability in key areas like climate, 
pandemic preparedness, and multilateral diplomacy; expand on Secretary 
Powell's vision of a foreign service training float; and equip our 
workforce with the training, tools, and technology that today's 
challenges demand--we need additional resources.
    If we want to be able to swiftly stand up new missions . . . deploy 
diplomats when and where they're needed . . . and make those decisions 
based on risk management rather than risk aversion--we need to reform 
the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act and 
Accountability Review Board statute to enable greater flexibility, 
while meeting important security standards.
    If we want to rapidly scale up in response to crises like refugee 
surges and epidemics, while also avoiding costly overhead, we need more 
flexible domestic hiring authorities.
    This is not about advancing the goals of any one administration or 
party. It's about refocusing our mission and purpose on the forces that 
will affect Americans' lives, livelihoods, and security for decades to 
come.
    So I appreciate the opportunity to speak today about why this 
matters, and look forward to continuing to make this committee, and 
Congress as a whole, a partner in these efforts.
    Thank you.

    The Chairman. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your 
opening statement. I will start a round of questions. I will 
start, myself.
    Your visit to Ukraine, I am sure members of the committee 
will want to hear, in terms of President Zelensky's request for 
assistance, both militarily and otherwise, are we aligned with 
his requests? Are we going to move forward and seek to fulfill 
his request? In that regard, what can you tell us about your 
several-hour meeting with him?
    Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, in short, yes, and let me 
speak very briefly to this. First, we started making sure that 
the Ukrainians have the equipment that they needed to repel 
potential Russian aggression way back before the aggression 
started. The first presidential drawdown was back Labor Day of 
last year, a very significant drawdown, a second one of about 
$200 million around Christmas time, again, well before the 
aggression, and then, of course, we are now on our eighth 
drawdown. We have tried to focus these drawdowns on the 
equipment that we believe the Ukrainians need and can most 
effectively use right away to repel the Russians. Indeed, their 
success is primarily because of their incredible courage and 
determination, but it is also because we were able to equip 
them with what they needed.
    For every tank that the Russians have had in Ukraine, we 
have managed, with 30 allies and partners in one way or 
another, to provide about 10 anti-armor systems. For every 
plane that the Russians have flown in the skies, there have 
been about 10 anti-aircraft munitions of one kind or another, 
but as you point out, the nature of this battle is changing to 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine. They are adapting to that. We are 
adapting to that. We spent a great deal of time with President 
Zelensky, the chief of his military, their defense secretary 
going through what it is they believe they need to effectively 
prosecute the battle going forward.
    Secretary Austin is in Germany today with representatives 
from, I think, close to 40 countries, focused on making sure 
that we are either delivering ourselves or finding the 
countries to deliver what it is the Ukrainians need. I can just 
say broadly, and we can go in more detail in a different 
setting, I think we are largely aligned in what they say they 
need and what we think we are able to provide.
    The last thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, we are doing this 
very quickly. In the past, it has taken, from the time a 
President made a drawdown decision to getting equipment into 
the hands of the people who needed it, weeks. Now, often it is 
72 hours, from the time of the drawdown decision to the time 
that equipment is actually in the hands of the Ukrainians.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Based upon that, I will 
assume that we will be looking at a supplemental request 
because this budget, as you said, was drawn together before, 
and I think there is bipartisan support for such a supplemental 
request. Is that something we should be expecting shortly?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. Yes, it is.
    The Chairman. Okay. As we move forward, my final question 
is, keeping our allies engaged with us, and putting the 
sanctions pressure on Russia, and continuing an all-out effort 
to try to tighten the noose around Putin's neck, is it your 
sense at this point in time that we will be able to keep the 
allies on board in the longer term?
    Secretary Blinken. I believe so, yes. We have had 
remarkable solidarity to date. A lot of work went into this. 
One of the advantages, in the sense of having a long lead into 
this, because we, as you know and we told the world, we saw 
this coming for some months, is we were able to prepare 
effectively, not only in terms of the military assistance, but 
also in terms of getting countries together to be prepared to 
impose massive consequences on Russia. Back in October of last 
year, President Biden got together with the leaders of France, 
the United Kingdom, and Germany, including the incoming 
chancellor as well as the outgoing chancellor, and showed them 
in detail the information that we had about the looming Russian 
aggression. This really concentrated minds on the need to be 
prepared. We spent several months working intensely with allies 
and partners, including on sanctions. That is why, in December, 
we were able to say that there would be massive consequences 
and mean it, know that we could back it up, and there have 
been. The challenge now is making sure that we not only sustain 
that, but that we build on that, and I believe we will.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Now, let me turn to a different 
topic: Iran. Your negotiator on the Iran nuclear deal said back 
in February if there was no deal by the end of February, the 
benefits we would receive would be dramatically diminished. It 
is now the end nearly of April, 2 months later. Can you give us 
where we are at on that, and, importantly, can I get a 
commitment from you on holding an open Iran hearing before the 
Memorial Day recess?
    Secretary Blinken. On the latter question, in short, yes. 
We will make sure that we get that done. Second, in terms of 
where we are, without belaboring it, we inherited a very 
challenging situation--an Iranian nuclear program that was 
galloping forward, Iranian provocations and malicious 
activities that had ramped up throughout the region, the 
decision to pull out of the agreement--and the effort to exert 
maximum pressure on Iran, whatever the intent, did not produce 
results. On the contrary, it produced a more dangerous nuclear 
program, a breakout time that went from a year to a matter of 
weeks. Iran was acting with an even more destabilizing effect 
throughout the region, including endangering and attacking our 
own forces in ways that it had not before. That is what we have 
to deal with.
    We continue to believe that getting back into compliance 
with the agreement would be the best way to address the nuclear 
challenge posed by Iran and to make sure that an Iran that is 
already acting with incredible aggression does not have a 
nuclear weapon or the ability to produce one on short notice.
    The Chairman. Here is the challenge we have, Mr. Secretary, 
because my time is running out.
    Secretary Blinken. Please.
    The Chairman. I have been generous and want to make sure 
your answers are full.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you.
    The Chairman. Six months, which is what I hear is the 
ability to get into an agreement of breakout time, is far less 
than it was a year ago, and I understand why.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    The Chairman. It will do nothing in terms of Iran's missile 
program, which the CENTCOM commander already says it has 
overmatched in the region their abilities between themselves 
and their proxies. It will do nothing about the destabilization 
of the region. At the end of the day, while I understand the 
breakout time now is maybe a matter of publicly reported, a 
week or two, that, at the end of the day, it is not going to 
meet the essential challenge that we have with Iran. It has its 
missile capacities, which is one of the third parts of the bomb 
delivery. It has the fissile material capability whether we 
push it back 6 months or not, and recreating the sanctions 
regimes if it were to violate, but with the knowledge it has, 
that 6 months will be nothing. Then finally, the weaponization 
element of that, which is the one point that we still believe 
they are not at.
    When you look at the totality of it, 2022 is not 2014 or 
2015, and the sunsets are on the horizon even if a deal was to 
be made, and that is part of the challenge that I see. I 
appreciate your commitment to come before the committee, either 
because we have an agreement, in which case you will testify 
about that agreement, or if there is no agreement, to 
understand what is our strategy moving forward on Iran.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did not 
intend to start with Iran, but I will since that is where you 
finished. Mr. Secretary, you can see there is little, if any, 
daylight between myself and the chairman on this issue. I think 
he has stated for you as clearly and concisely as he can the 
lack of benefits of entering into an agreement at this point in 
time, particularly as it relates to the bad activities of Iran 
aside from its nuclear ambitions. As I have said, I believe 
that the Israelis when they say publicly that Iran will never 
complete a nuclear weapon, and they will see to it. The 
question for you is here, do you think the Iranians believe 
that today?
    Secretary Blinken. Ranking Member Risch, I think that what 
we have seen and have assessed over many years is that the 
Iranians have sought to move forward with their fissile 
material program, which is exactly what the JCPOA stopped, and, 
if we were to resume compliance, would continue to stop and 
would buy us a decade on the critical sunsets in terms of the 
stockpile of fissile material in terms of the enrichment level. 
At the same time, their efforts to actually weaponize, based on 
public information, paused, stopped some years ago, but, of 
course, we look very carefully to see if they resume. We would 
be focused on this like a hawk either way.
    To your point and to the chairman's point, which I agree 
with, the agreement does not address their other malicious 
activities. We have two premises. One is that when it comes to 
those activities, things would be even worse if they had a 
nuclear weapon or the ability to get one on short notice. It 
would encourage them to act with even greater impunity. Second, 
an agreement, were we to reach one, does not take away--in any 
way from our ability and determination to go at them in all 
these other areas in concert with allies and partners. We have 
spent a lot of time working with them on exactly that, 
everything from sanctions, to interdictions, to stopping the 
money flow that they need to produce these weapons and to move 
these weapons about. All of that would continue.
    Senator Risch. Well, thanks. That did not really answer my 
question directly. I am going to gather from what you said that 
you at least have some agreement with me that the Iranians do 
believe the Israelis when they say what is going to happen if 
they move towards weaponization, and if that is the case, look, 
they are going to do that. The Israelis are going to act, and 
they have said so, regardless of what the agreement says. We 
can make any agreement we want. They are going to act in their 
national interest. If that is the case, then we really need to 
focus on the other bad activities that Iran engages in as were 
laid out by the chairman, and this agreement, I think you would 
have to agree, does not cover that, and it seems to me that 
that is really where we ought to be focused. In any event, I 
come back to no agreement is better than a bad agreement, and I 
would urge you to move on. They have given us every indication 
that that would be appropriate for us to do, and I would 
encourage you to do that.
    Let us talk about Ukraine for a moment. We have an 
ambassador in place in Russia still on the ground. Without 
obviously disclosing any classified material, what can you tell 
us about the cables that are coming back from Russia about the 
conditions on the ground in Russia and what is happening there, 
what people are thinking there? Can you enlighten us on that 
publicly at all?
    Secretary Blinken. It is very challenging because what 
Putin has done over many, many years is set up, among other 
things, a state propaganda system that is such that whatever he 
says, whatever he communicates, a lot of people believe. Never 
mind the facts, never mind what is actually going on, so 
penetrating that information system is incredibly challenging. 
Having said that, I think what we are seeing is that people 
increasingly in Russia are feeling the effects of the 
disastrous decision by Putin to attack Ukraine. For example, 
upward of 600 companies have left Russia, including many of the 
major consumer brands that we all know and are familiar with. 
Increasingly, Russians are finding the things they thought they 
could take for granted, they cannot. They cannot buy the things 
they have been used to buying for the last almost 30 years.
    Their economy is contracting in a dramatic way. We see 
about a 15-percent contraction. The gains of the last 15, 20 
years of opening are being erased. That is being increasingly 
felt in people's lives. The Russians' ability to modernize key 
sectors of their economy as a result of the export controls, 
that increasingly is biting. They are not going to be able to 
do it. All of this is going to be felt more and more. There is 
a tension between the information and propaganda system that 
Putin has set up that is very effective and the actual facts. I 
think the facts increasingly will encroach and make themselves 
felt, but for now, I think what we are seeing is Russian 
people, to the extent that they are informed, continue to 
support, for the most part, President Putin.
    Senator Risch. Well, thank you for that. I would encourage 
you to continue to tighten that screw. That is going to make a 
lot of difference as far as what actually happens on the ground 
in Russia. You are right. At least people publicly proclaim 
that they support Putin and want to go along with the war 
effort. I am not so sure that actually exists privately, but--
--
    Secretary Blinken. Well, that is a very good point because, 
to your point, there are severe penalties for doing or saying 
anything in opposition to Putin's war, including 15 years in 
prison. To the extent we are able to read public opinions, some 
portion of that is definitely colored by the fact that people 
are afraid to speak their minds. The final thing is, this gets 
to the heart of the Achilles heel of any autocracy, which is 
the inability of anyone to speak truth to power, and this has 
severely misinformed Putin himself about what is actually going 
on.
    Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. Briefly, since my 
time is almost up, obviously we need to focus on China. Over 
this century, China is going to continue to be the major 
challenge that we have. With what we have just gone through 
with Ukraine, I think it is important that we walk and chew gum 
at the same time and understand that the Taiwan issue is there 
and that we ought to be thinking about that as we go forward, 
and obviously, the chairman and I have worked on bolstering 
Taiwan's defense. We are going to continue to do that. We look 
for you as a partner in that. It is certainly important as we 
go forward. It is going to be another challenge.
    With that, my time is up. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Let me follow up first on one of Senator Risch's points, 
and that is what is going on in Russia. We saw that Vladimir 
Kara-Murza was just recently arrested----
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Cardin. --following in the path of what happened 
with Alexei Navalny and Sergei Magnitsky, and the list goes on 
and on and on. Mr. Secretary, I hope that you will be following 
that case very closely, recognizing that those responsible for 
his illegal detention, we do have tools available as a result 
of the Magnitsky statute, and I hope that that will be 
considered in regards to what is happening and that we will 
speak out strongly in support of Mr. Kara-Murza.
    Secretary Blinken. In short, yes. First of all, let me just 
say how much we appreciate your leadership for many years on 
this, including on Global Magnitsky, including as part of the 
Helsinki Commission. We are very focused on this, very focused 
on making sure that Russia continues to be held to account for 
its human rights abuses, not only in Ukraine, but in Russia 
itself.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. I appreciate that. Let me focus 
on Ukraine for one moment. Senator Hagerty and I have sent you 
a letter in regards to the subcommittee on the management of 
the State Department in regards to returning our mission to 
Kyiv. You have indicated that we are trying to comply with all 
the requests that are being made by President Zelensky. One is 
certainly to have our mission locate again in Kyiv. It is 
critically important. We have a new ambassador that has been 
named. We would like her to be stationed in Kyiv.
    We recognize that you are doing some work in Lviv, but Kyiv 
is the capital. Can you just tell us your plans on returning 
our mission to Kyiv and whether you will comply with the 
request we made, that we have a briefing as to the steps 
necessary to make sure that our mission is safe in Kyiv?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. First of all, when it comes to a 
briefing, yes, we will certainly do that. I appreciated your 
letter, the letter from you and Senator Hagerty. There are two 
things. We are sending diplomats back to Ukraine this week, and 
they will begin to assess how we can most effectively and 
securely reopen the embassy in Kyiv. Without going into too 
much detail in this setting, I anticipate that we will be in 
Lviv and then head to Kyiv, subject to the President's final 
decision on that, but we are moving forward on that. We want to 
have our embassy reopened, and we are working to do that.
    Senator Cardin. Let me switch to the war crimes issues. 
There was a report today in The Washington Post as to the 
cooperation the United States is giving--I am glad to hear 
this--in regards to the--how to collect the necessary evidence, 
and how to interview, and what is necessary in order to proceed 
with war crimes against those who have perpetrated those in 
Ukraine under Mr. Putin's guidance. Could you just briefly tell 
us what additional steps we need to take? We recognize we have 
a challenge in regards to the ICC, but what steps is America 
taking to make sure there will be accountability for these 
atrocities that are taking place in Ukraine?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, we are working on this on 
multiple fronts. First and foremost, we are supporting the work 
of the Ukrainian prosecutor general to build the cases 
necessary, and we are doing that with bringing tremendous 
expertise in support of that effort. Technical advice, we have 
people on the ground in surrounding countries working on this, 
working with the Ukrainian investigators and prosecutors. We 
are compiling, collecting information that we will share with 
the Ukrainians. That is one major line of effort. Second, we 
have a commission of inquiry that we helped establish through 
the Human Rights Council at the U.N. We are supporting its 
efforts as well and, again, providing information, advice as 
that work moves forward.
    Finally, we welcome the fact that the ICC is seized with 
this, and we have in the past supported work by the ICC. Just 
recently, in fact, the prosecution of a Janjaweed human rights 
violator went forward successfully, in part, as a result of 
information that we supplied to the ICC. We will look to do 
that as well.
    Senator Cardin. If there is anything that Congress needs to 
do in order to support these efforts--we recognize the 
challenges that you may have, so if there is a role for us to 
play, please let us know. I think there is just about unanimous 
support here in Congress to make sure that, at the end of the 
day, there is accountability for these atrocities and war 
crimes that have been committed.
    Let me go to the budget for one moment. You mentioned that 
you just recently had close to 200 new Foreign Service 
officers. That is certainly good news. The budget, if I am 
correct, provides for 570 additional personnel. We have been 
concerned in the Subcommittee on the State Department in 
regards to the ability for training for our Foreign Service 
officials. In order to do that, you have to have a training 
float. We have put in a 15-percent goal on the training float 
in order that you can have individuals assigned for training 
without a loss of their capacity within the mission. Can you 
tell us how well we are doing in regards to meeting that 
objective and what additional resources are necessary in order 
to achieve that level?
    Secretary Blinken. First of all, I really want to thank 
Congress, this committee, as well as the appropriators last 
year as well as hopefully this year, in to giving us the 
resources we needed to bring in a record number of new people 
to the Department, and this budget would fund an additional 
500-plus new positions. This would allow us to have a float of 
about 250 people, which would get us to pretty much where we 
need to be in making sure that we have that. This is--to your 
point, it is something that you have worked on for some time 
for the Department. This would be an extremely meaningful way 
of making sure that we have the flexibility to continuously 
train and modernize the Department, allow people to have 
opportunities for--not only for training, but for different 
ways to expand their capacities with mid-career abilities to 
come here, for example, as well as to universities, et cetera, 
to do that while maintaining the full operations of the 
Department. In short, the budget that we are proposing would 
allow us to get the float that we think that we need to really 
move forward and have the flexibilities for ensuring that we 
are continuously professionalizing the Department.
    Senator Cardin. I appreciate it. This committee has passed 
two bills in regards to improving the training capacity of the 
State Department, so you need to have the personnel in order to 
take advantage of that. I am glad to see that we are going to 
track in order to accomplish that.
    Next will be--Senator Romney is recognized.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it 
is good to see you and appreciate your willingness to be here 
today, and appreciate, in particular, your visit to Kyiv, 
making clear to the people of the world our commitment to the 
people of Ukraine and to its leadership. This follows on the 
heels of what I and many others across the country had to feel 
was the disastrous departure from Afghanistan and obviously the 
diplomatic, and military, and human crisis continues, stories 
of hundreds of people who worked with us in Afghanistan being 
murdered by the Taliban, girls not being able to go to school. 
These things are obviously very troubling, and I think I and 
others were apprehensive about how we would deal with Ukraine 
given how badly we had dealt with the situation in Afghanistan.
    Credit where credit is due. I think you and the 
Administration deserve a great deal of credit for how well we 
have acted, providing intelligence to our allies early on, 
collaborating with our allies to have a united front on 
sanctions, and our military support. I am sure that, looking 
back, there are things that we will say we did not get it 
exactly right, but, overall, it has been a success so far and 
want to compliment you on that. I think it was unfortunate that 
one of the headlines that came back from your trip was that our 
purpose was to diminish the Russian military capacity. That may 
be a byproduct, but our mission there is to help the people of 
Ukraine have freedom and sovereignty, which they richly 
deserve.
    One of the great challenges that has already been mentioned 
is with regards to China. You know that they have a 
comprehensive strategy, that China's economic power is 
continuing to rise. Their military power likewise. Their 
investments both in ICBMs over the coming years and their navy 
and so forth is really daunting. They have attempted to pacify 
the world. They, of course, monitor and pacify their own 
citizenry and propagandize their own citizenry. One of the 
things that Chairman Menendez and I made part of the NDAA this 
last year was a provision requiring the Administration to 
develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with the emergence of 
China as a great power. Your Department, along with other 
departments, will be tasked with that as soon as the National 
Security Strategy is released. I just want to underscore how 
important that is, and I do believe that we are still not 
making the kind of progress strategically we would like to on 
that front.
    I was concerned with the report about the Solomon Islands 
entering into a military agreement with China. That is 
alarming. I wonder if you have a perspective on that, whether 
you know whether there is a military component. It is a 
military agreement, but will there be potentially a military 
presence in the Solomon Islands by the Chinese? What is your 
sense of that, and is there a way of recovering?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you very much, Senator Romney. 
First, with regard to the strategy, we very much agree with 
you, and I will have an opportunity, I think, very soon in the 
coming weeks to speak publicly and in some detail about the 
strategy. We appreciate the work that, in many ways, Congress 
has done to give us some of the tools that we need to make that 
strategy effective. I look forward to having an opportunity to 
lay that out in some detail and then continuing to refine it 
with you and others.
    With regard to the Solomon Islands, yes, we share the 
concern about this agreement. We sent a very high-level 
delegation to the Solomons just a few days ago. Our lead China 
expert at the White House, Kurt Campbell, along with the 
assistant secretary for the region, Dan Kritenbrink, led a 
delegation to the Solomon Islands. I had previously announced 
some months ago that we intend to open an embassy there that we 
are moving forward on. We want to have day-in, day-out presence 
there. We are moving forward on that. The delegation met with 
the Prime Minister. He vowed publicly, as well as privately, 
that there would be no Chinese military base, no long-term 
presence, no power projection capability. We will be watching 
that very, very closely in the weeks and months ahead.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to 
conclude in the brief time I have with indicating my support 
with the comments of Ranking Member Risch and Chairman Menendez 
with regards to Iran. I happen to believe that Iran will be 
hellbent on having a nuclear weapon at some point, that they 
will negotiate and delay as long as they can the negotiations 
with us, but that they ultimately intend to have a nuclear 
capacity. I do hope that that is not going to be the case, but 
I believe that in that circumstance, that giving into them is 
not the right course, but instead that there needs to be a very 
heavy price paid for them pursuing that path, and not only to 
hope in some way to delay them or dissuade them, but, more 
importantly perhaps, to dissuade anyone else in the world from 
taking a path to become a nuclear power because the cost of 
doing so would be demonstrated by what we do with Iran.
    I would encourage the Administration to once again bring 
this matter to Congress for an up or down vote for a level of 
support on the part of the national interest. This is, I think, 
critical for--not just for what is happening in Iran and the 
Middle East, but around the world. As more and more nations are 
looking at becoming nuclear powers, I think they have to see 
that the cost is enormous for doing so and would hope that we 
do not in any way lessen the cost in negotiations. I would be 
more than happy to hear that we have walked away. Iran asks for 
more and more and more, the answer is no, and that we need to 
show extraordinary backbone and make a solid commitment that 
America will not stand still as they or other nations seek to 
become nuclear powers.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator. I can simply say 
that we share the same objective, which is to make sure that 
Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. The question is what is 
the most effective way to do that. We have now tested two 
propositions. One was the nuclear agreement that was originally 
reached and that significantly set back Iranian capabilities to 
pursue a nuclear weapon, particularly the fissile material for 
such a weapon, and that agreement was working by all objective 
accounts. In fact, now we have many Israeli colleagues from the 
security establishment who have come and said publicly that it 
was a huge mistake to pull out of the agreement because, on its 
own terms, preventing Iran from acquiring the fissile material 
necessary for a weapon, it was succeeding. That does not 
address the other concerns that you rightly and we rightly have 
with Iran, but on its terms, it was working.
    We have tested the other proposition, which was pulling out 
of the agreement, trying to exert more pressure, and we have 
also seen the result. The result has been that that nuclear 
program, which had pushed back the breakout time to a year in 
terms of being to produce fissile material for a weapon, that 
is now down to a matter of weeks. Their program has galloped 
forward--more sophisticated centrifuges are spinning, a greater 
stockpile of fissile material--and Ranking Member Risch was 
talking about this earlier. I think it is important to 
underscore the reason the agreement originally reached--focused 
on fissile material is because this is something we can see. 
With the most intrusive inspections regime ever in an arms 
control agreement, we could see it, and if there was breakout, 
do something about it.
    The problem with focusing on weaponization is, which we 
believe that they halted in the early 2000s, but could resume 
if there is a decision. The problem with that is, that work 
happens in a room a tenth of the size of this one at a computer 
in ways that we or the Israelis may not be able to see 
immediately in real time, may not be able to track. Hanging 
your hat on the peg of weaponization is a very risky one. That 
is why this agreement was designed around fissile material, and 
we continue to believe that whatever the imperfections, if, on 
its own terms, we can back into the agreement, it would be, of 
all of the answers that we have, the best one for the nuclear 
issue. However, we are not there, and I could not agree with 
you more, first of all, on the overriding objective that we 
have and also with both the chairman, the ranking member, and 
you, the need to confront Iran on its other malicious 
activities.
    Senator Cardin. It is our understanding we will have a 
separate opportunity in regards to the Iran agreement, and we 
appreciate the Secretary's willingness to work with our 
committee in that regard.
    It is my understanding Senator Murphy is available through 
Webex.
    Senator Murphy. Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you for taking the time with us. I am 
sorry that I cannot be there with you in person. I do not share 
my colleagues' skepticism of a renewed nuclear agreement with 
Iran, in part, because the whole world has watched how 
difficult it is to craft a Western response to Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine given Russia's status as a nuclear power. I 
simply cannot imagine why we would wish for a policy that will 
allow Iran to be weeks, maybe months away from a nuclear weapon 
given all of their malevolent activity in the Middle East. What 
about the last 2 months has been an advertisement that we would 
be better off if more of our adversaries had nuclear weapons?
    I appreciate the clarification you made to Senator Romney's 
question because it is true: we have tried the alternative. We 
have indeed attempted to apply significant costs on the Iranian 
economy and through President Trump's maximum pressure 
campaign, and, in fact, the result was not that Iran came to 
the table on all of their other behaviors in the region. It was 
not that they held firm on the commitments that they had made 
in the JCPOA. It was, in fact, that they moved faster towards a 
potential nuclear weapon. They accelerated their research 
program.
    I want to maybe ask you one more sort of question to level 
set where we are today. You have stated, I think very 
effectively, that the maximum pressure campaign did not, in 
fact, have the effect of constraining Iran's nuclear weapon 
program, but for my colleagues that have significant concerns, 
rightly so, about Iran's support for terrorist organizations, 
for regional proxies, the money they put into their ballistic 
missile program, is there any evidence that during the period 
of time in which we have been out of the nuclear agreement, 
during the period of time in which we have applied these 
significant sanctions, including sanctions on the IRGC, that 
Iran has lessened their support for terrorist organizations or 
proxy organizations or lessened the amount of money that they 
put into their ballistic missile program?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, to the contrary, no. What we 
have seen is two things. First, during the period of time when 
the original agreement was being negotiated--go back to 2012--
through its entry into Force and the time when the Trump 
administration pulled out--2018--2012 to 2018, there were 
virtually no attacks on American presence in the Middle East. 
When we pulled out of the agreement, when we imposed the 
foreign terrorist organization designation on the IRGC, and 
when Soleimani was killed, and no one is shedding any tears for 
his demise, but I am just stating the facts, when those things 
happened, the attacks on our forces, on our personnel, on our 
people went up dramatically. In fact, from 2019 to 2020, they 
went up 400 percent, so we have seen that effect.
    Similarly, and it is an unfortunate fact of life that Iran 
is willing to dedicate what resources it has to supporting its 
military, to supporting its various tools of destabilization 
and terror, including the IRGC Quds Force, irrespective of what 
its revenues are from other sources. We have seen sustained 
support for those forces even during maximum pressure. Again, 
we share the same objectives. The question is how do we most 
effectively reach those objectives? That is what we are 
concerned with.
    Senator Murphy. Well, thank you for that response, and I 
think you will find many of us on this committee very 
supportive of your efforts to re-enter that agreement. Let me 
turn to one other topic, and that is the topic of human rights. 
The assault on Ukrainian democracy, I think, has elevated the 
need for us to be incredibly consistent between our words and 
our actions on supporting human rights and democracy. You and I 
have had a number of conversations about the pace of reform in 
Egypt, a country that enjoys more direct U.S. military support 
than almost any other in the world prior to the war in Ukraine
    Buried inside your budget request is a curious proposal; 
that is, a proposal to de-link human rights conditions from 
military aid to Egypt. I worry about the message that this 
would send to Sisi, but also the world. They have made tepid 
progress even when presented with fairly minimalist requests 
for reforms, and I wonder why this would be a moment that the 
Administration would be asking to separate the money we send to 
Egypt for military support from our human rights requests and 
our human rights work in Egypt.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, first, I really appreciate your 
focus on human rights. Indeed, it is central to President 
Biden's foreign policy, and that applies across the world, 
including when it comes to Egypt. Let me just say quickly a 
couple of things. First, Egypt is a vital partner for us. It is 
a vital partner in trying to sustain and advance stability in 
the Middle East to combat terrorism. It played a critical role 
last year when tensions rose dramatically in Gaza, and it has 
played an important role now in trying to keep things in check 
as well. In many ways, it is a vital partner. It is also an 
important economic partner for us. At the same time, that does 
not divorce from our policy and our approach the need to focus 
on human rights and the concerns that we have about the 
Egyptian approach when it comes to civil society, when it comes 
to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, political 
detentions, abuses, et cetera.
    I have engaged President el-Sisi directly on this at some 
length, including the first meeting that we had. We continue to 
meet and engage with human rights defenders, with civil 
society. Last year, we signed the Human Rights Council 
statement at the U.N. expressing our grave concerns for the 
first time since 2014, and reprogrammed some of the foreign 
military financing this past year because Egypt did not meet 
some of the objectives that we set out in terms of making 
progress on human rights, and that will continue to be the case 
going forward. It is, however, important to us to have maximum 
flexibility in being able to deal with this and deal with this 
effectively.
    I would also say that, going back to the conversation on 
Russian and Ukraine, this is a critical time, too, in the 
relationship with a number of countries, particularly countries 
that may be reconsidering their own relationships and potential 
dependencies on Russia. They are seeing how Russian military 
equipment is performing or not performing in Ukraine. They are 
seeing growing challenges to Russia being able to sustain and 
ultimately export its military equipment. They are making 
different decisions about the future. That presents a strategic 
opportunity for us, one we want to make sure that we also have 
flexibility to take advantage of.
    I completely share your focus on and concern about human 
rights, including in Egypt. It is and it will remain a central 
part of our policy even as we work to strengthen what is a 
vital partnership for us.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy. Well, very briefly, just count me amongst 
those who think it would be unwise at this moment to de-link 
our human rights conditions from military aid. This is a 
country that still has more political arrests than Russia does. 
Sixty thousand people have been arrested for political crimes 
in Egypt. That is a stunning number. As to your point, finally, 
about countries that are rethinking their traditional 
association with Russia; Senator Shaheen, Tillis, and I are 
just back from a trip to the Balkans. I think Assistant 
Secretary Donfried was there this week. Tremendous 
opportunities in the Balkans to try to shift alliances and 
allegiances there. Bosnia is a place where there is a rapid 
deterioration of the security situation. We have to pay close 
attention there, but many opportunities around Russia's 
periphery to convince folks that it is time for them to stop 
sitting on two chairs--
    The Chairman. Thank you. The senator's time has expired. 
Thank you.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you. I look forward to working 
with you on that.
    The Chairman. I would ask the clerk to make sure he starts 
the clock because we have a lot of members who want to ask 
questions.
    Senator Portman.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Secretary Blinken, for appearing before us again. It is very 
important you went to Kyiv both to meet with President Zelensky 
and, importantly, to demonstrate our support for the people of 
Ukraine. It has now been 2 months since the war in Ukraine 
began, and with our help, they are fighting with heart, with 
conviction, with some success, and with our help, we can win 
this thing, but it needs a lot more help. I am glad we are 
returning the U.S. embassy to Kyiv. I am pleased the 
Administration just appointed a Ukraine security assistant 
coordinator. As you know, some of us had called for that. We 
continue to be concerned about some of the red tape that is 
involved in some of the military transfers, so this should help 
quite a bit.
    We must continue to address Russia's barbaric actions with 
speed, with urgency, and with confidence that the right weapons 
can contribute to a victory. The Kremlin must know that the 
free world stands united against them. I am also pleased the 
Administration has finally nominated a U.S. ambassador to 
Ukraine. As you know, I believe this is long overdue, and I 
look forward to Bridget Brink's testimony before this committee 
as soon as possible. I want to talk to the chairman about that.
    Energy revenues continue to be the main source of income 
fueling Russia's war machine. As you know, energy is their top 
export. In fact, receipts from energy alone accounts for about 
40 to 50 percent of the Russian budget. We have got to cut off 
this funding if we want to stop the increasing war effort from 
Russia. I was pleased that the Administration banned the import 
of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal in the United States in 
early February, but that was only about 8 percent of our total 
petroleum imports. Other countries import a lot more. The 
larger issue at hand, of course, is the EU and their reliance 
on Russian energy. Approximately 40 percent of EU gas comes 
from Russia as well as more than a quarter of its oil. This 
means, Mr. Secretary, Europe is continuing to send Russia--
roughly $870 million a day--$870 million a day in energy 
revenues compared to about $50 million a day the U.S. was 
purchasing on a daily basis. Again, money used to fuel the 
Putin war machine.
    Last month, I was pleased with the announcement of the 
joint task force with the EU on energy security for better 
coordination. It has now been exactly a month since this task 
force was established. Can you please provide us today with an 
update on the efforts and progress as it relates to reducing 
European reliance on Russian energy, and when can we expect a 
plan detailing the objectives of the task force and a strategy 
to achieve them?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, thank you very much. Can I 
first just start by applauding your leadership on Ukraine, both 
as head of the caucus here, but also just your continuous 
engagement going back from the Munich Security Conference and 
well before that. It is greatly appreciated. It has made a real 
difference.
    With regard to energy, you are right. This is one of the 
critical areas where we have to continue to move forward, and 
we are and we will. The big challenge is, of course, European 
dependence on Russian energy that has built up over decades, 
particularly natural gas, but also oil, and let me say a couple 
of things very quickly. First, the Europeans have, I think, 
genuinely ambitious plans to move away from this reliance on 
Russian energy. The challenge is to put them into effect, and 
the other challenge is that, in some cases, this is not--no pun 
intended--like flipping a light switch. It is a process, and 
that is what we are working with them on implementing.
    A few things to that end. First, I think you are likely to 
see in the coming weeks further progress on the oil side of the 
equation in terms of Russian imports. Gas is a bigger 
challenge. It is particularly acute for certain countries, 
including, notably, Germany, but also others. We have 
redirected significant amounts of LNG to Europe in the short 
term to help them compensate for any losses that they might 
have in moving away from Russian gas. That process is 
continuing, and we want to make sure that as they do that, 
there is backfill and there is a significant amount that is 
going to that.
    Senator Portman. Mr. Secretary, just two quick questions, 
one, with regard to the task force. When can we expect a report 
from the task force detailing what the objectives are and what 
the strategy is? Then second, with regard to LNG shipments, you 
just mentioned that actually this is a central component of the 
initiative. The U.S. is now saying that we are going to give 
them 15 billion cubic meters this year----
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Portman. --an additional 50 over the next decade. 
How has the Administration and the task force engaged with 
energy producers in the United States to follow through on 
those commitments? Your budget increases taxes on natural gas 
production. As you know, the Administration continues to take 
steps to discourage new leasing for oil and gas development on 
public lands and waters. These and other policies have stifled 
domestic natural gas production are going to make it difficult, 
it seems to me, to meet our objectives. How can we keep our EU 
commitment and reduce this massive flow of funds into Russia?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am not an expert on the 
domestic policy component of this. I will say a couple of 
things. First, we have doubled the LNG exports to Europe since 
last year--actually since early this year. They have already 
doubled. The President has urged domestic producers to speed up 
production. There are, as you know, thousands of licenses that 
have gone unused, and hopefully they will be used to increase 
production. The task force--let me come back to you on when we 
can anticipate providing a report, but it is focused on 
diversification. It is focused on curbing demand and making 
sure that the backfill is there. It is also necessary to focus 
on an energy transition because, ultimately, that is going to 
be the most effective way, over time, in making sure that there 
is genuine energy security. One thing that you cannot do----
    Senator Portman. Secretary Blinken, I want to ask you, let 
me just say the obvious, which is that you have a strong 
interest in these domestic policy issues now because to stop 
the Russian war machine getting all this funding, which is your 
strong interest I know, you are going to have to be a voice for 
some reason in terms of an all-of-the-above energy strategy, 
including not stifling fossil fuels at this point because we 
need them in terms of natural gas to Europe.
    On the coordinator, Lieutenant General Terry Wolff has now 
been appointed. I was glad to see that.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Portman. As you know, I am delighted we have 
somebody to be there as a coordinator. How is the State 
Department going to coordinate with him on improving the arms 
transfer process, which is your bailiwick, and does he report 
to you, the President, or the national security advisor?
    Secretary Blinken. Terry is someone that I have worked with 
for a long time. He, as you may remember, was one of the lead 
coordinators for the counter-ISIL coalition that was 
established back in 2015, 2016. We worked very closely 
together. We will continue to work very closely together in 
this effort, and he will be working both with us at the State 
Department as well as reporting to the White House, but we have 
a long history of working closely together.
    Let me say--just repeat very quickly something I said 
earlier, which is that this process of transferring equipment 
to the Ukrainians is moving, in my judgment, very effectively 
and very efficiently. The drawdown authorities that we have 
used now eight times, whereas it used to take sometimes weeks 
to get equipment to the Ukrainians, we are now getting things 
from the point the decision is made to draw down to getting it 
into Ukrainian hands in as little as 72 hours, so this is 
moving quickly. We have cut through a lot of red tape. At the 
same time, we have been going around the world looking for 
other countries that may have equipment that Ukraine can find 
useful. When it has come to authorizing the transfer of that 
equipment if it has U.S. origin technology in it, I have done 
those authorizations in 24 hours or less to make sure, to your 
point, that we are moving things quickly.
    Having said all of that, we want to make sure that we 
continue to drive this as effectively and efficiently as 
possible. Terry will focus on that. I will work directly with 
him. So will the White House and the Pentagon.
    Senator Portman. Who will General Wolff report to? Who will 
he report to is the question?
    Secretary Blinken. Let me come back to you on exactly what 
the reporting line is. I do not know what the exact reporting 
line is, but I can tell you that he will work directly with me 
as well as with the White House, and, of course, the Pentagon.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. 
Secretary, welcome. Thank you for taking that trip to Kyiv with 
Secretary Austin. I was just listening to Secretary Austin 
address some of our NATO partners about the need to continue to 
push and coordinate more weapons into Ukraine, and I do want to 
commend you for accelerating that process as the war has gone 
on.
    I want to start with a question about the Foreign Service 
Families Act. This was legislation that I teamed up with 
Senator Sullivan on. We co-chair the Foreign Service Caucus 
here. I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for 
working with us to include that in the passage of the last 
national defense authorization bill. It extends to Foreign 
Service officers some of the same benefits we extend to our 
military folks deployed overseas and also includes more 
opportunities for family members in order to continue to 
attract and retain a world-class Foreign Service. Thank you for 
your input as we worked on that passage. We are trying to 
implement the provisions now, and I am not going to go through 
the entire list, Mr. Secretary, but just to give you one 
example. The legislation allows Foreign Service officers who 
are getting orders to deploy----
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. --and who go to their missions overseas 
to be able to terminate contracts, leases, that kind of thing, 
but in order to make that work in the real world, we need a 
system to make sure that landlords, for example, can verify 
that a Foreign Service officer does have, in fact, those orders 
to go overseas. The military has created a successful system to 
do that. We have been working with your team to try and do it. 
I want your commitment that we can accelerate this process.
    Secretary Blinken. You have got it.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay.
    Secretary Blinken. First of all, you have been an 
incredible champion for the Foreign Service for a long time, 
and that is appreciated very much by the men and women of the 
State Department. Second, we want to make sure that we are 
putting in place these necessary tools and efficiencies to do 
right by the men and women who work for us. Yes, in short, we 
will try to move forward on that as expeditiously as possible.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Yes, there 
are series of things. It is just question of implementation, 
but the sooner we can get them in effect, the sooner the 
benefits will flow to the men and women of the Foreign Service.
    I want to follow up a little bit on Senator Portman's line 
of questioning with respect to sanctions and the issue of 
Russian exports of oil, and gas, and other commodities, and, 
again, salute the Administration for working with our allies to 
put in place punishing sanctions right away, and we have 
expanded those sanctions over time. To my knowledge, and 
correct me if I am wrong, we have not used any of the existing 
authorities to date to apply secondary sanctions to 
institutions overseas that may be aiding and abetting Russian 
oligarchs and others who may be aiding and abetting Putin. Is 
that right?
    Secretary Blinken. I do not believe that we have, but that 
does not mean that we will not. Thanks to this committee, we 
now have at the State Department a senior sanctions 
coordinator, Jim O'Brien, a deeply experienced diplomat. One of 
the things that he is looking intensely at is sanctions evasion 
by other countries or entities. This is something that we are 
going to focus on relentlessly as we move forward.
    Senator Van Hollen. I am glad to hear that, Mr. Secretary, 
because I think leakage in the sanctions only hurts our 
alliances and helps Putin. I recognize that a lot of our 
European partners are working to reduce their reliance on 
Russian oil and gas, and that we are working with them to do 
that, and obviously we want to accelerate that process as much 
as possible. What I am worried about is reports of certain 
countries that are increasing their imports of Russian oil, and 
gas, and commodities. Are you aware of countries that are doing 
that?
    Secretary Blinken. We have been watching this carefully, 
and we have engaged with some countries where we have had 
concerns that they might be increasing their purchases, taking 
advantage of discounted prices that Russia has been forced to 
offer in order to get anyone to take this. In short, yes, there 
are few countries that we have engaged with to dissuade them 
from doing that.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, Mr. Secretary, we have not been 
successful doing that, right? According to the information I 
have got, in the month of March, China increased its trade with 
Russia by 12 percent in terms of actually additional goods 
being imported to China from Russia, and there are a number of 
countries. The question is, we made the right decision by 
saying that the United States is not going to continue to 
import Russian gas and oil, but if that oil is just on the 
international market and Putin is able to sell it to somebody 
else, it obviously does not do us any good at all. I guess my 
question is very blunt: why are we not applying secondary 
sanctions against countries that are increasing their imports 
from Russian commodities?
    Secretary Blinken. I would say two things. First, where we 
can, it is far preferable to get countries to voluntarily not 
engage in these practices, and that is where our diplomacy is 
focused. Second, as we are dealing with the energy piece of 
this, and, again, I agree with the general tenor of Senator 
Portman's remarks, we have to do it not only effectively, we 
have to be as smart as possible about how we do it and when we 
do it. For example, we want to be sure that we are not taking 
actions in the near term that may have the result of spiking 
energy prices and, thus, lining Putin's pockets instead of 
taking resources away.
    The more that we can do things voluntarily, deliberately, 
make sure that we have the necessary backfill, including from 
our own sources, make sure that energy is on the market. The 
President, as you know, did a historic release from the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve on that front. We have got a 
million barrels a day over 6 months. We have got many countries 
to join in doing the same thing. We have to do it in a 
deliberate way so that we do not have an effect contrary to the 
one that we are trying to achieve.
    Senator Van Hollen. I agree with that, Mr. Secretary, but 
as you point out, there are countries that are taking advantage 
of discounted Russian oil prices. They are able to unload it at 
lower prices, and they are taking advantage of it, which only 
helps Putin. Just a statement in closing which is, one of the 
consequences of Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been our 
European partners have watched China's response, and I think 
that they have been extremely concerned with the fact that 
China first said that we are all in together. I do think this 
is an opportunity to work even more closely in practical ways 
with our European and other allies with respect to a 
coordinated approach with respect to China.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Blinken. I very much agree with you. Deputy 
Secretary of State Wendy Sherman was just in Europe for a 
dialogue that we established with the European Union on China. 
She had a very, I think, productive session with the EU. You 
saw the results of the summit between the EU leaders and 
President Xi Jinping, which, I think, did not go to China's 
benefit because of the increasingly deep skepticism about China 
in Europe. China is paying a reputational cost for, to be 
charitable about it, sitting on the fence when it comes to 
Russia's aggression against Ukraine, never mind falling on the 
Russian side of the fence, something that it has to factor in. 
I think it is seeing that play out in its relationships with 
other countries, notably in Europe.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Paul.
    Senator Paul. While there is no justification for Putin's 
war on Ukraine, it does not follow that there is no explanation 
for the invasion. John Mearsheimer writes that the trouble over 
Ukraine actually started in NATO's Bucharest Summit in 2008 
when the George W. Bush administration pushed the alliance to 
announce that Ukraine and Georgia will become members. Even 
with this 2008 announcement, though, most analysts acknowledge 
that it was unlikely that either country would ever be admitted 
to NATO because of opposition from France and Germany. 
Nevertheless, the U.S., including the Biden administration, 
insisted on beating the drums to admit Ukraine to NATO.
    Just last fall, you signed the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on 
Strategic Partnership, which renewed a commitment to the 2008 
Bucharest Declaration supporting Ukrainian admission to NATO. 
Knowing full well that Ukraine was unlikely to ever join NATO 
since it had already been 14 years since they said they were 
going to become members, why was it so important last fall 
before this invasion to continue agitating for Ukraine's 
admission to NATO?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator. Not a question of 
agitating for Ukraine's admission. It is a question of standing 
up for the basic principal that we strongly adhere to that 
there should be and will be an open-door policy when it comes 
to their membership. These are sovereign decisions for European 
countries to make, and, of course, a decision for the NATO 
alliance to make in terms of making sure that a country that 
wishes to join actually adds value to NATO. This goes to the 
heart of the international system and the international order, 
and part of that is a basic principal that one country cannot 
dictate to another the choices it makes about with whom it 
allies. It is foreign policies. It is a decision or not to try 
to engage with the European Union, with NATO.
    The other thing----
    Senator Paul. Yet, as we speak and we see the destruction 
of Ukraine, we also hear pronouncements from President Zelensky 
saying, well, you know what? Maybe we might consider a 
neutrality as a possibility. There could have been voices 
before this invasion instead of agitating for something that we 
knew our adversary absolutely hated and said was a red line. As 
recently as last September, before you signed the agreement, 
once again, agitating for NATO, Russia said that it was a red 
line. Now, there is no justification to the invasion. I am not 
saying that, but there are reasons for the invasion, and I 
think it has added nothing. In fact, had Ukraine been in NATO, 
as you have advocated for and many others have advocated for, 
we would now have troops in Ukraine. We may still have the 
destruction, but we would also have troops in Ukraine.
    If you were to put them in now, if it is still your policy 
that you want them in now, that means American troops go. The 
one good thing about them not being in is the most bellicose of 
our members here are not advocating for U.S. troops right now. 
That is a good thing. We have not had advocacy for U.S. troops 
because they are not part of NATO. Had they been or are they to 
become part of NATO, that means U.S. soldiers will be fighting 
in Ukraine, and that is something I very much oppose.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, could I just say to that, 
because, look, these are important conversations and arguments. 
My judgment is different. If you look at the countries that 
Russia has attacked over the last years--Georgia, leaving 
forces in Transnistria and Moldova, and then repeatedly 
Ukraine--these were countries that were not part of NATO. It 
has not attacked NATO countries for probably----
    Senator Paul. You could also argue the countries they have 
attacked were part of Russia.
    Secretary Blinken. Well----
    Senator Paul. Were part of the Soviet Union or whatever.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, and I firmly disagree with that 
proposition. It is the fundamental right of these countries to 
decide their own future and their own destiny.
    Senator Paul. I am not saying it is not, but I am saying 
that the countries that have been attacked--Georgia and 
Ukraine--were part of the Soviet Union, were----
    Secretary Blinken. That does not give Russia the right to 
attack them.
    Senator Paul. They were a part of the Soviet Union since 
the 1920s.
    Secretary Blinken. That does not give Russia the right to 
attack them. On the contrary----
    Senator Paul. No one is saying it does, but it really has 
nothing to do----
    Secretary Blinken. They were liberated from being part of 
this empire by force. Let me just say this because I do think 
it is important. If you look at why President Putin went into 
Ukraine this time, we took very seriously the arguments that 
some Russians were putting forward back last fall that they had 
concerns about Ukraine's eventual membership in NATO in terms 
of Russia's security posture. What would this mean in terms of 
the placement of forces near Russia, weapons systems, et 
cetera? We sought to engage them on those issues in real 
seriousness as well as engage them on deep concerns we have 
about many of the things that undermine our security.
    When everything came to a head, it is abundantly clear, in 
President Putin's own words, that this was never about Ukraine 
being potentially part of NATO, and it was always about his 
belief that Ukraine does not deserve to be a sovereign, 
independent country, that it must be reassumed into Russia in 
one form or another, and that is not something we can let----
    Senator Paul. Yet the discussions between Zelensky and the 
Russians have included discussions of them assuming an 
unaligned or neutral posture. That has been part of the 
discussion.
    Secretary Blinken. This is a sovereign decision for Ukraine 
to make.
    Senator Paul. Yes, but at the same time, we are all over 
the place thinking we are coming to the rescue, and then maybe 
sometimes we are not. Maybe sometimes we are agitating for 
something, like admission to NATO, that makes it worse. Maybe 
Ukraine has more of an ability to make this decision if they 
are not being pushed and goaded by half the members of the 
Senate who want them in NATO. Perhaps it is not useful to be 
pushing them into NATO, and perhaps they will come to an 
agreement. The other thing to remember about war is war very 
rarely ends in complete victory by either side.
    I am proud of how well the Ukrainians have fought. I am 
supportive of their cause, but I would say it is very unlikely 
they are going to now invade--take over Russia and depose 
Putin. I think the most likely and the best outcome would be 
some sort of stalemate, perhaps pushing them completely out of 
Ukraine, but even pushing them out of Ukraine is still a great 
step from where we are now. There may well be a negotiated 
peace. Would the U.S.--would President Biden be open to 
accepting Ukraine as an unaligned, neutral nation?
    Secretary Blinken. We, Senator, are not going to be more 
Ukraine than the Ukrainians. These are decisions for them to 
make. Our purpose is to make sure that they have within their 
hands the ability to repel the Russian aggression and, indeed, 
to strengthen their hand at an eventual negotiating table. We 
have seen no sign to date that President Putin is serious about 
meaningful negotiations. If he is and if the Ukrainians engage, 
we will support that.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Secretary Blinken. With a 7-minute round, I am going to start 
with three compliments and then get to my tougher questions 
about a region in the world that nobody has yet talked about, 
which is Central America. Three compliments. First, in my time 
on this committee and in the Senate, I have not seen an 
instance where the gap between U.S. prediction of activity and 
our European allies' prediction of activity was wider than with 
respect to Ukraine, what was Russia's intent amassing troops on 
the border, and we could see this going back into about 
October. Everyone had the same facts, but the prediction of 
what Russia's behavior would be from the U.S. and many of our 
allies was very, very different.
    The compliment that I want to give you and the 
Administration is you basically took the position with European 
nations that said there is not going to be an invasion, we hope 
you are right, but if we are right, what can we set up in 
advance so that if there is an invasion, Nord Stream 2 can be 
closed down, sanctions can be immediately put in place, we can 
pursue humanitarian and military aid. I think that was very, 
very adept diplomacy. Recognizing that there was a difference 
of opinion about what was going to happen, you nevertheless put 
the plans in place before February 24 that enabled you to 
assemble a quite significant coalition not only of NATO 
nations, but others to really put pressure on in multiple 
domains. That is compliment one.
    Compliment two. The U.S. vaccine diplomacy in the world has 
been extremely successful, and this bears on a matter we are 
talking about now, whether in a COVID bill we should do more 
vaccine diplomacy in the world, and I want to focus just 
particularly on the Americas. I took six of us--bipartisan 
delegation to South and Central America in July, right at the 
time that U.S. vaccines were being delivered. These are nations 
that have felt like the U.S. has kind of ignored them. China 
and Russia are paying a lot of attention to them. They do not 
really feel like we are, but for the first time, I could really 
see they love the U.S. vaccines, high quality. We were not 
charging him. They thought the Russian and Chinese vaccines 
were substandard quality, and they were being charged for them. 
The shipments were being delayed, and if they happen to say 
something nice about Taiwan, suddenly the contract would 
expire.
    We really did good work in vaccine diplomacy in the 
Americas. I would argue we still probably did not allocate 
enough there. With 30 percent of the world's deaths, they only 
got 8 percent of our vaccine distribution, but we built up a 
lot of good will. I would argue that thinking forward, it would 
be a really smart investment in the Americas and elsewhere if 
we could continue to be great partners in nations that are 
still trying to find more vaccines.
    Then the third compliment is, I think it was my first 
hearing when I was on Foreign Relations was about the ARB, the 
Accountability Review Board, report on the Benghazi attack, and 
it was in 2013, and what should we be doing to provide more 
security for State Department personnel. One of the 
recommendations was dramatically increasing the security 
training of our FSOs. I just had the chance last Friday to go 
see this state-of-the-art FASTC Center at Fort Pickett and 
watch a final exercise. Forty-one weeks a year we put cohorts 
of FSOs through a 1-week-long security training facility that 
they have to repeat during their career, and it culminates with 
a fairly adrenaline-producing and shocking exercise where 
people get to put in place what they have learned during the 
week, so that if it ever happens on a post overseas, it is not 
the first time they are seeing it. I was in the facilities as 
this was happening, and even though I knew what was going to 
happen, I will say it made a huge impression on me, but the 
fact that you are investing in that kind of training for our 
folks is really important.
    Okay. Now, on to the Americas. I still do not think we are 
paying the attention to the region that we should. Now, this is 
a budget hearing, and I applaud the fact that you have sought 
significantly more funds for Central America to help them deal 
with their own issues, but also deal with this push that has 
led so many to leave the Northern Triangle to come to the 
United States. We will not deal with this migration question 
effectively unless we deal with root causes, but let us be 
honest. We have got some real weak partners there, so you have 
proposed a bulk-up investment, but in both El Salvador and, to 
a lesser degree, Guatemala, we see real backsliding toward 
authoritarianism. The Honduran elections were fair, and there 
was a clear outcome, which is positive. President Castro is 
fairly new in. How do you propose to increase investments in 
the Northern Triangle to make a difference for people there and 
on this migration challenge when at least two of the three 
governments are probably getting to be less reliable partners 
rather than more reliable partners?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, and let me just start by 
thanking you for the visit that you made on Friday. It was 
greatly appreciated, and, indeed, we have really bulked that 
up, bolstered that up. We have also, thanks to Congress, been 
able to invest greater resources in diplomatic security, which 
plays a vital role in enabling us to do our job. I thank you 
for that.
    When it comes to our own region, and I personally have been 
intensely engaged on a number of fronts. I just came back, even 
in the midst of Ukraine, from a conference that brought 
together most of the foreign ministers in the region in Panama, 
focused on migration, which is obviously an immediate challenge 
for everyone, as well as a long-term challenge, and we can 
speak more about that. The bottom line there is, as a result of 
a lot of work that we have done over the last year, including 
getting together in Panama, and Colombia before that, at the 
United Nations, we are building a generally-shared sense of 
responsibility when it comes to dealing with what is a historic 
migration challenge that is affecting, in one way or another, 
every country in our region, whether they are countries of 
origin, countries of transit, countries of destination. We have 
now bilateral agreements with Costa Rica and Panama with more 
to come. We have the Summit of the Americas that the President 
will be hosting over the course of a week in Los Angeles in 
June where on migration, I anticipate there will be a 
declaration of shared principles on how we work this together, 
but also, on virtually every other aspect of the relationship 
with our closest neighbors.
    Second, when it comes to these--I could not agree with you 
more that even as we take near-term steps to deal with what is 
a historic migratory flow in our own region and around the 
world, the ultimate answer has to be addressing the so-called 
root causes, because it takes a lot for someone to decide that 
they want to pick up, give up everything they know, leave their 
families, leave their friends, their communities, their 
culture, their language, and make a hazardous journey to the 
United States or anywhere else in the region. One of the things 
that we have seen in our own region is the primary driver, not 
the only one, but the primary driver is the lack of economic 
opportunity. We know that, and so what we have to do is help 
these countries create greater opportunities.
    The Vice President, who has been leading these efforts, did 
a call to action some months ago with the private sector that 
resulted in $1.2 billion in new investments in the Northern 
Triangle countries that will create job opportunities over time 
and give people a means to stay. We have a series of programs 
reflected in this budget to work in that way to create 
opportunities for people, also to address, of course, many of 
the other challenges that are drivers of migration, including 
corruption, including poor governance, including insecurity. In 
many cases, we have to work around some of the governments or 
individual leaders. We are doing that effectively with the 
private sector, with NGOs, with civil society, with components 
of governments that we can work effectively with. I think it 
varies from country to country, but we are deeply engaged on 
that.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. 
Chair.
    The Chairman. Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 
first of all, thank you for your service to our country.
    Let me just begin by bringing back in a discussion that 
Senator Portman began and that you have shared. I think it has 
been a pretty frank discussion regarding the need to have 
additional energy production and the impact that that would 
have on your ability to work with our allies in Europe. It 
seems to me that not only does it impact the foreign policy, 
but with regard to our domestic policy and with regard to our 
economy, it would seem that the production of those products--
energy products here--fossil fuels, natural gas, and so forth--
from North America would make your job a lot easier with regard 
to not only would it be good in terms of--it is such a large 
part of the inflationary trends that we are seeing right now, 
in terms of cost of supply chains and just basically the cost 
of basic services and transportation here. The fact that, as 
you stated, Mr. Putin receives significant dollars from energy, 
and when you inflate the value of those commodities, that goes 
to his bottom line and makes it easier for him to wage war.
    Are you sensing that the Administration or the people that 
you work with within the White House are recognizing the need 
to increase that, not just for domestic purposes, but also 
because of what is going on in Europe right now?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. In short, yes. As I mentioned, 
Senator, just when it comes to making sure that we could try to 
create some flexibility for Europeans to really start this move 
away from dependence on Russian energy in the short term, as I 
noted, we have doubled our LNG exports to Europe just in the 
past 3 months from where they were a year ago. That is 
significant. We are committed to adding to that to make sure 
that there is some cushion as they engage in this process. It 
has to be a process, though, because, as you know, this has 
built up over many decades. Overall, European dependence on 
Russian gas is about 40 percent, but in individual countries, 
it is a lot higher than that. That is part of the challenge.
    Second, we want to make sure that as we do this, we are 
doing it in a way that does not create the effect that you just 
cited, which is to actually inflate energy prices and line 
Putin's pockets. That is one of the reasons the President did 
this historic release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve that 
will extend over 6 months. We got other countries to join in 
doing that. At the same time, he has called, as you know, for 
increased production in the United States. We are doing that.
    The last thing, if I could quickly, is this: we also have 
to do this in a way that does advance, in my judgment at least, 
the transition over time to renewables because one of the 
things that is true about renewables is you cannot weaponize 
the sun, you cannot weaponize the wind. Both as a matter of 
climate, but also as a matter of strategy, I think we have a 
good reason to reinforce that effort, even as we are making 
sure that there is sufficient energy on the market now and in 
the near term for Europeans to really start this transition.
    Senator Rounds. I think the all-of-the-above approach is a 
very good approach.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Rounds. I do not think it should exclude those 
consistent, conventional energy sources that we have got, and I 
appreciate your comments on that. I also think the one thing 
that is missing in this discussion is the fact that we have to 
have a stable, long-term plan of not having those go up, or our 
European allies will not trust us. If they think that our 
policy is going to change in 6 months, they are probably not 
going to be interested in having a short-term LNG proposal and 
then find out that, well, we are going to change it again. I 
think it has got to be consistent, and I think you are in 
agreement with that.
    Secretary Blinken. That is a very fair point, and part of 
the reason we have this task force with the EU is precisely to 
address that, to make sure that there is a long-term plan in 
place, not just one that meets the immediate needs.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. I would like to change 
subjects here for just a minute on something that has been very 
important, and we have been trying to work with the State 
Department on. There was a huge, very challenging time period 
in which the Department was working on processing special 
immigrant visas, specifically coming from Afghanistan. 
Unfortunately, this process is excruciatingly slow, and Afghans 
who risked their lives for our service members do remain in 
grave danger. For one example, we have an applicant that I had 
brought to your attention that received a chief of mission 
approval the day before your September hearing, yet he was 
stuck in Afghanistan until early March and just received his 
visa last week. This outcome would not have been even possible 
had it not been for his risky move to flee to a third country. 
Yet he and his family still remain in a fourth country waiting 
for travel orders, and the final resolution of an application 
submitted in 2018. A second individual received a denial the 
day of your hearing, but his appeal, which was submitted in 
December, still has not been viewed by the State Department 
office which adjudicates these requests.
    Mr. Secretary, I and my staff have asked your people on 
multiple occasions if the Department has the resources to 
execute this mission, and the answer I have always received has 
been ``yes.'' I just want to be specific. I am looking to be of 
assistance in terms of making sure that the appropriate 
resources are made available, and it seems to me that right 
now, when we cannot get these completed in a timely fashion, 
there has got to be a reason for it. If it is resources, we 
need someone to say it is resources. If it is something else, 
we need to know. I do not think we are talking about the issue 
of just we need background checks. I think there is more to it.
    Could you help us understand what the resources are that 
would be needed to expedite appeals within, say, 30 days, 
because right now, it does not seem to be working.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, let me first start just by 
thanking you for your personal and sustained engagement on this 
issue, on the SIVs, in general, and on specific cases, in 
particular. It is greatly appreciated. I know it is especially 
appreciated by the people on behalf of whom you have been 
advocating. We want to continue to work closely with you, with 
your staff, on this. Let me just say a couple of things about 
this.
    This committee knows very well the very laborious and 
multi-step proposal that goes into the SIV Program that was 
legislated and then regulated over many years. It involves six 
different agencies, not just the State Department, that has 
more than a dozen steps involved in it. Of course, it has been 
made more complicated by the fact that we are not on the ground 
in Afghanistan.
    There are two things I want to focus on. First, the process 
of getting chief of mission approval, that authority, that is 
the most critical step because what we have found historically, 
well back before leaving Afghanistan, was that of those who 
applied for an SIV, about 40 percent did not ultimately get the 
approval from the chief of mission because they did not qualify 
in one way or another, sometimes, tragically, because the 
documentation necessary and required, they could not produce. 
We have worked very hard to expedite that process. We have cut 
the processing time for chief of mission approval in half in 
recent months. We are doing it much faster than we did when we 
were actually in Afghanistan, but we are looking to see if we 
can make it even faster, and we would like to work with you on 
that.
    Second, a big part of the challenge that we have is for 
those who are in Afghanistan and actually have SIVs or are well 
along in the process and have chief of mission approval, part 
of the challenge is being able to make sure that they can leave 
the country. We are working on that day-in, day-out to try to 
encourage the Afghans to regularize transportation out so that 
people can leave. We have a processing facility now, as you 
know, in Doha where we have the capacity, once someone has 
chief of mission approval, to process about 1,000 a month, and 
that is there. It is active. We are working on it, but we need 
the in-flow, if you will, to make that real.
    We have dedicated increasing resources to this. I will go 
back and triple check that I am confident that we actually have 
the resources we need given the constraints of the program to 
do this as efficiently as possible. I commit to you if, in my 
judgment, we do not, we will come to you and ask for more 
resources.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Thank 
you, Mr. Secretary, for the work which you are doing and to 
Secretary Austin, the President. I think it is first-class 
work. Thank you.
    Senator Booker, and Senator Kelly, and Senator Gillibrand, 
and I visited the Polish-Ukrainian border at Rzeszow, and we 
saw all the work the 82nd Airborne is doing to facilitate the 
transfer of our assistance to the Ukrainians into that country, 
and it is absolutely a first-class operation. We were in Krakow 
as well, and we could see the humanitarian effort in place, 
and, again, very impressive. I just think that, in general, we 
should just roll out the red carpet and just say however many 
Ukrainians want to come to our country, they should come here. 
As a Congress, we should finance that resolve so that we help 
the Ukrainians to ultimately defeat the Russians. I just wanted 
to congratulate you on that.
    I appreciate the commitment which the Biden administration 
is making for our country to be a leader in vaccinating the 
world, but we are falling far behind. The world has a goal of 
70 percent vaccination by the fall of this year. That is not 
happening, and, as we know, we are just going to be setting 
ourselves up for a boomerang effect in terms of it coming back 
to us. As the co-chair of the COVID-19 Global Vaccination 
Caucus, I have been repeatedly calling for a significant 
Federal investment in those efforts. We have called for 
inclusion of a substantial global COVID-19 response funding and 
any COVID-19 supplemental. That funding remains stalled.
    Mr. Secretary, a recent Harvard study indicated that the 
economic toll of COVID-19 so far is $16 trillion. We just 
cannot afford to keep repeating history. Could you talk about 
how important it is for the Congress to pass a global COVID 
relief package so that the funding is there to put shots in the 
arms of people around the world so that, once again, a variant 
does not come back to haunt us in the United States?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I could not agree with you 
more, and I appreciate your comments on this and leadership on 
this as well as Senator Kaine's. Let me say a few things 
quickly. First, substantively I am absolutely convinced this is 
the necessary and right thing to do for the very reasons that 
you say, which is that we know that as long as COVID is 
somewhere, it could produce a variant that ultimately 
undermines everything that we have done and even defeats the 
vaccines that we have developed or the therapeutics that we put 
in place. We have, I think, a very strong national interest and 
incentive to make sure that we are doing everything we can to 
put an end to this, not only in our own country, but around the 
world. Second, what we seen is this. As Senator Kaine said, 
this has been also a tremendous benefit to our foreign policy 
and to our standing in the world. The fact that the President 
has committed to donate 1.2 billion vaccines around the world, 
and we are now over 500 million that have actually been 
delivered, to do it primarily through COVAX to make sure that 
it is done equitably, to do it with no strings attached in 
stark contrast to other countries like China. That has inured 
to our benefit and to our standing in palpable ways. I get this 
virtually every place I go. It is good for our foreign policy 
and our standing.
    Here is the challenge that we have, and it goes to your 
question. Right now, we have a relative abundance of actual 
vaccines. The challenge that we have is, as you said, getting 
shots into arms. There are in many places around the world, 
nowhere more so than in Africa, real challenges in making sure 
that there is cold storage, that there are distribution 
networks, that there are healthcare workers, and other experts 
who can administer the vaccines to deal basically with the last 
mile. We also have real information or misinformation problems, 
and that contributes to vaccine hesitancy, so we need to be 
doing work on that.
    Senator Markey. Is it critical that we pass funding?
    Secretary Blinken. It is, in my judgment, absolutely 
critical that we do this because if we do not, we will not have 
the resources we need to see this through.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Yes, this disease, because of 
global travel and trade, is just a flight away from our 
country.
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Markey. The more that we build barriers further 
away from us, the way we are trying to do with confronting the 
Russians so that it does not go any further in terms of its 
incursion into other countries, we have to do the same thing 
with COVID. We are not doing it. We just cannot allow this 
Congress to not fund a global explanation program.
    Earlier, we heard my colleagues on the committee suggest 
that we should walk away from the negotiating table with Iran. 
Let us be clear. Plan B is really plain bad. That is what it 
stands for. It means that Saudi Arabia's nuclear program will 
accelerate. It means that Iran's nuclear facilities that are 
above ground will go underground. It means our troops in the 
region will face increased threats which could require sending 
our brave men and women in the armed forces into another 
conflagration in the Middle East. Secretary Blinken, you just 
covered this before, but before Trump and Bolton blew up the 
deal, how far was Iran towards acquiring enough material for a 
nuclear weapon?
    Secretary Blinken. A year or more.
    Senator Markey. How far away is Iran today?
    Secretary Blinken. By public records, it is a matter of 
weeks.
    Senator Markey. Based on experience, would kinetic or non-
kinetic attacks on Iran prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon?
    Secretary Blinken. The judgment of our military over many 
years is that the military could certainly set back the 
program, but Iran would rebuild it, rebuild it probably even 
more underground and rebuild it a lot faster than a nuclear 
agreement would allow the Iranians to resume.
    Senator Markey. Has not Mohammed bin Salman pledged that 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would acquire a nuclear weapon if 
Iran did so?
    Secretary Blinken. I think the Saudis and other countries 
have made clear in one way or another that they would be likely 
to pursue nuclear weapons in the event that Iran actually gets 
one, yes.
    Senator Markey. Did the Trump administration's campaign of 
maximum pressure lead to an increase or decrease of Iran's 
attacks on its neighbors in the region?
    Secretary Blinken. We have seen what the causality is. 
People can make their judgments, but as I mentioned earlier, 
what we have seen is this: from 2012 to 2018 when we were 
negotiating the agreement, then when we had the agreement and 
it was in effect, there were very few attacks on our forces in 
the region. After we pulled out of the agreement, designated 
the IRGC, and killed Soleimani, we saw the attacks go up 
dramatically. From 2019 to 2020, they went up 400 percent on 
our personnel and our forces in the region.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. It is clear, I think, to any 
objective analysis that we just cannot listen to the same 
voices who rejected a good deal in search of the impossible and 
who preached brinksmanship over diplomacy. The Iran deal is not 
perfect, but it is our best path to prevent Iran from acquiring 
the ultimate weapon to back its coercion in the region, a 
nuclear bomb. We are seeing right now the saber rattling in 
Russia because they have a nuclear program. We have to avoid 
that in Iran. The ripple effect would be catastrophic. We are 
either going to live together, or we are going to die together.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Markey. We are either going to know each other. Are 
we going to exterminate each other? We have to put a new regime 
in place to make sure Iran does not get this bomb. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, 
Ranking Member Risch, and thank you, Secretary Blinken, for 
taking the time with our committee today.
    First, I would just like to note that Chairman Cardin is 
the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee 
on the State Department. I am sorry. He is the chairman. I am 
the ranking member. We both sent you a letter last week 
encouraging you to reopen diplomatic relations in Ukraine. I 
want to thank you for taking the steps in that direction to do 
that, and I appreciate your willingness to brief us as that 
moves forward. I wanted to say thanks again for that 
acknowledgement.
    I would like to turn to the Indo-Pacific, if I might. 
Recently, I led the first congressional delegation to Japan 
since the pandemic began in early 2020, and I was honored to be 
joined by Senator Benjamin Cardin and by Senator John Cornyn. I 
want to first thank you, Ambassador Emanuel, and the entire 
staff at the State Department for helping make that trip a 
success. I also want to thank you personally for your efforts 
to bring home my constituent, Greg Kelly, who was wrongly 
detained there in Japan, and you were very helpful in making 
that happen and it made a very big difference. Thank you, Mr. 
Secretary, for that.
    During our week in Japan, our Senate delegation met with 
Prime Minister Kishida with his senior officials there. We met 
with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. We met with a number of 
Japanese parliamentarians and also with leaders of some of the 
most formidable and innovative companies in the Japanese 
private sector. In each of our meetings, we saw a great deal of 
promise in terms of the United States' ability to further 
strengthen our alliance with Japan, and they want an 
increasingly special relationship with us, and we see that 
possibility. Secretary Blinken, I think you would agree with me 
that the U.S.-Japan alliance is one of our most important 
strategic and special relationships.
    Secretary Blinken. I would. Absolutely.
    Senator Hagerty. Amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Japan 
has shown leadership and proactively supported the 
international pressure campaign against Vladimir Putin's war 
machine. I also want to note that that Yoshimasa Hayashi, your 
counterpart there as the foreign minister, became the first 
Japanese foreign minister to attend a NATO ministerial when he 
traveled to Brussels on April 7. As other international 
conflicts and crises emerge, I believe the United States will 
need to be even more aligned and move in lockstep with our 
ally, Japan. There is a real appetite that I could sense there 
to do that with us, and I would like to encourage you along 
those lines to see that the United States can proactively 
ensure that Japan, as the world's third-largest economy after 
the U.S. and China, can be a pillar of peace and security. They 
always would like a seat at the table in discussions on how we 
can increase multilateral pressure. If we can include them in 
as many critical issues as we can, I think it will go a long 
way to deepen that relationship.
    After Foreign Minister Hayashi broke new ground by 
attending the NATO ministerial in April, would you support the 
United States exploring opportunities for Japan and NATO to 
have further high-level interactions and more formal 
information sharing?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, absolutely, and I want to address 
that just a little bit more, but first to say thank you. You 
have been an extraordinary leader in building this 
relationship, first as ambassador to Japan and now as a member 
of this committee. I could not agree more on the strategic 
imperative of this for us.
    Senator Hagerty. Yes.
    Secretary Blinken. This partnership is vital, and, as you 
said, Japan has stood up in remarkable ways on the Ukraine 
crisis. When it comes to NATO and Japan, we are doing a few 
things. First, one of the things we have been advancing is 
increasing NATO focus on working with partners that are not 
part of NATO, including what we call the Asia-Pacific Four, and 
that, of course, includes Japan. We just had a foreign 
ministers meeting of NATO where we had the AP Four, including 
my good friend and colleague, the foreign minister. At the NATO 
summit that the President will attend the AP Four and Japan 
will be there.
    Senator Hagerty. Yes.
    Secretary Blinken. The President is going to have an 
opportunity, I think, in the coming weeks to visit. I think his 
first actual visitor was the former Prime Minister Suga, and 
this is something we are very focused on and really are eager 
to continue to work with you on.
    Senator Hagerty. I appreciate it.
    Secretary Blinken. By the way, I am very glad that Rahm 
received you in the appropriate fashion when you were in----
    Senator Hagerty. Oh, he absolutely did, and he and I agreed 
that he would work hard to deliver Greg Kelly at the airport, 
and I would be on the other side to receive him, and with your 
help and the help of many others, that is exactly what 
happened. I very, very much appreciate that. If I could turn 
just a little bit more to the role that we are playing to 
advance the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, I support 
the Biden administration's efforts to build on that legacy, 
including the AUKUS Agreement that really enhances trilateral 
security between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. I was very glad to see that NSC coordinator for the 
Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, and your assistant secretary for 
East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Ambassador Dan Kritenbrink, 
recently led an interagency delegation to the Solomon Islands 
and met with both ruling party and opposition party members. I 
appreciate those actions, and I sincerely hope that our efforts 
can help the Solomon Islands reach the right conclusions, that 
granting China a military base in the middle of the Pacific 
Ocean would really undermine the security and stability of the 
entire region.
    During our congressional delegation visit to Japan, many of 
our Japanese interlocutors, both the Japanese Government side 
and the business side, expressed concerns about the broader 
trends in the Indo-Pacific. Our bipartisan delegation sought to 
instill confidence and optimism that the United States remains 
committed to advancing the vision of a free and open Indo-
Pacific. Amid recent international shocks, I believe the United 
States should really work to strengthen energy security in the 
Indo-Pacific region, particularly among the Quad countries.
    Like the rest of the world, the Quad countries seek 
reliable access to cost-effective sources of energy. Energy 
security is in inextricably linked with economic security and 
national security. I worked on this a great deal in my previous 
position when I served at Embassy Tokyo. I worked on the Japan-
U.S. strategic energy partnership. They call that JUSEP. The 
idea there, the goal, to promote universal access to affordable 
and reliable energy in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad should have a 
similar mechanism, in my view, to strengthen energy security in 
the Indo-Pacific, especially since the Quad includes Japan, 
which is the world's third-largest economy, India, the world's 
most populous democracy, and Australia, which is a significant 
industry exporter. I would just like to ask you to consider 
supporting the idea of the Quad standing up a working group on 
energy security that would help ensure reliable access to cost-
effective energy sources, especially from like-minded partners.
    Secretary Blinken. That is a really interesting idea, 
Senator. I will take that back and then come back to you on it.
    Senator Hagerty. I would be happy to work with your team 
and share the experience that I had earlier, but I do think 
that there is a real opportunity, but also a concern, right 
now.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Hagerty. The Japanese reflected the concerns in a 
very blunt term to me because I worked hard to get them 
positioned, particularly with billions of dollars of 
infrastructure investment, to bring in more LNG to that area. 
They see a worldwide market. They see the challenges that 
Europe is facing being dependent on Russia in LNG from there. 
They are very concerned that there could be, in some respect, a 
diversion of exports that would be harmful from them.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Hagerty. I think a focus and an intent focus there, 
again, assets in the region that we could help with, but I 
think it would be extremely helpful. Thank you.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary, thank 
you for being here. Let us stay in the Pacific. I want to 
follow up on the COFA negotiations. The U.S. agreements with 
the freely-associated states expire soon. The current 
agreements with the RMI and FSM expire in 2023, and the 
agreement with Palau expires in 2024. GAO estimates that the 
assistance that the United States provides constitutes about 
one-third of FAS' annual budgets, making them heavily reliant 
on U.S. support promised through the current compacts. As you 
know, FAS countries and island nations are aligned with us, but 
that is not a permanent situation. Senator Rubio and I wrote a 
letter expressing some concern about the pace of negotiations, 
especially since you are dealing with small nations, but they 
are nations so, and you are dealing with your own Department of 
Defense. Can you reassure me that we are either on track or 
about to be on track for a compact renegotiation and 
ratification, 2023 and 2024?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, in short, yes. This is 
something that I have been focused on. I have met with the 
leadership in a variety of ways, the Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Palau. I was in the region just a couple of months 
ago. We have appointed a very experienced diplomat, Ambassador 
Joseph Yun, as the negotiator for this. I know you know that. 
We are very focused on the pieces that expire in FY23 and FY24. 
I want to make sure that these get done. We need support from 
Congress for this. There may be some appropriations, as you 
know, that need to go along with this, but I am committed to 
getting this done.
    We have, I think, a longstanding obligation/responsibility. 
It is also in our strategic interest to do this. I look forward 
to working with you to make sure that we have what we need to 
try to bring this to closure as rapidly as possible.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you. Back to NATO. Article 6 of the 
NATO treaty states in part that, ``For the purpose of Article 
5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack on the territory of the parties in 
Europe or North America, on the Algerian Department of France, 
on the Territory of Turkey or on the islands under the 
jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area 
north of the Tropic of Cancer.'' The 1949 treaty excludes 
Hawaii. Now, if Hawaii were ever attacked, it is an attack on 
the free world. I do not have any doubt that the entire free 
world would rally to our defense, but this is no small problem. 
Alaska is covered. All other 49 States are covered. Hawaii is 
not covered because statehood came afterwards. What are we 
going to do about that, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Blinken. You are right about Article 6 of the 
treaty. It does define the alliance area exactly as you 
suggested. I think a few things. First, to emphasize the most 
important part, any attack on the United States or its 
territories, even if outside the geographic scope of Article 5, 
would almost certainly, of course, garner our reaction, but 
would almost certainly, in my judgement, draw allied reaction 
to include via the consultation procedures that exist under 
Article 4 of the treaty. I am very confident about that.
    I think an effort to, for example, amend the treaty to 
cover Hawaii and/or other U.S. territory would be unlikely to 
gain consensus because we are not the only ally, as you know, 
that has territory that is outside the geographic scope of 
Article 6. This would open something of a Pandora's box that, I 
think, would be very difficult to get a safe landing on because 
so many other allies have territories that would then 
potentially claim to want to be covered, so I am not sure that 
we could get there. I would also refer you to our colleagues at 
DoD to talk about military considerations raised by this 
question.
    The main thing I want to emphasize is I am very confident, 
of course, not only about our own response, but also confident 
about the response of allies and partners were something of 
that nature to happen.
    Senator Schatz. So am I, but I am not satisfied with your--
I understand the Pandora's box argument, and you are probably 
right, but there has got be something in between leaving this 
alone and endeavoring to change it in a failed way. Look, we 
are the 50th State. We ought to be covered, and if we cannot 
amend Article 6, then we got to do something here. Let us 
explore----
    Secretary Blinken. I am happy to continue the conversation 
and see if there are ideas that make sense.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you. During a March 2021 SFRC 
hearing, I asked the Deputy Secretary of State about 
integrating an emphasis on climate action throughout the 
Department, and he replied that it is not just going to be 
Secretary Kerry's team. Can you update me on how the Department 
is fully integrating climate action throughout the 
organization? I am specifically interested in the extent to 
which we can depoliticize climate action. Climate adaptation 
seems to be a space where we can all work together. I just do 
not think American foreign policy and the State Department as 
its instrument ought to be swinging wildly back and forth on 
the question of whether or not the sea levels are rising, or 
whether or not storms are becoming more frequent and severe, 
and whether or not the United States should continue to lead in 
this space. I am wondering what you are doing to 
institutionalize climate action throughout the Department.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you. First, we thought that it was 
vital not only to institutionalize, but to elevate, climate in 
everything that we are doing. The reason that the President 
asked former Secretary Kerry to take it on was to do exactly 
that, to make sure that as we headed into an incredibly 
challenging period, that we were doing everything possible to 
reengage the United States in leading these efforts, and we did 
through reengaging Paris, through the summit the President 
held, through COP26 and the successful parts of that endeavor, 
through sustained diplomacy that John Kerry has been leading.
    To your point, we also wanted to make sure that this is 
truly institutionalized throughout the Department, and we are 
doing that in a number of ways. First, every regional bureau 
has within it someone who is focused and expert on these issues 
and is fully coordinated with the climate office that John 
Kerry is leading to make sure that in all of our engagements 
with allies, partners, and those who are not, the climate 
issues are very much a part of the agenda, and that has been 
institutionalized. Second, we have a bureau, OES, that, as a 
general matter, is the locus of focus, if I can, on climate. We 
have very strong leadership of that bureau in Monica Medina, 
who has been partnered closely with John Kerry on a lot of 
these efforts. That bureau and its work will continue well into 
the future.
    We are also making sure as well, as part of our training 
and the efforts that we are putting into that, that climate 
factors in and features in so that as officers, no matter where 
they are serving, take on their responsibilities, this is part 
of their thinking.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 
welcome.
    Secretary Blinken. Nice to see you, Senator.
    Senator Cruz. Let us talk Iran. As you know, Iran is the 
world's top state sponsor of terrorism, and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps is their premier terrorist 
organization. As the State Department noted in 2019, ``Iran is 
an outlaw regime that uses terrorism as a key tool of 
statecraft, and the IRGC has engaged in terrorist activity or 
terrorism since its inception 40 years ago.'' The IRGC's 
support for terrorism ``is foundational and institutional.'' 
The IRGC has killed over 600 Americans in Iraq. They control 
vast parts of the Iranian economy, and they use them for 
financing terrorism.
    Right now, the IRGC is actively trying to murder additional 
Americans, including former Trump administration officials. We 
know from public reports that the State Department spends $2 
million every month protecting former officials, including 
former Secretary of State Pompeo, and the Secret Service is 
providing similar protection to protect former National 
Security Advisor Bolton. Because of such activities, the Trump 
administration rightly designated the IRGC as a foreign 
terrorist organization, an FTO.
    As you know, the FTO designation is the most powerful we 
have. It includes a criminal prohibition on knowingly 
supporting the IRGC up to life in prison. It imposes vast 
immigration restrictions. It allows victims, including the Gold 
Star families of those killed in Iran, to sue for civil damages 
from such support. Just as importantly, it is a signal to our 
allies in the Middle East and across the world that we will use 
our most powerful tools to counter the threats that Iran poses 
to them, including existential threats.
    The Iranian regime knows all of this, of course, which is 
why they have refused to reenter a nuclear deal unless the 
Biden administration agrees to lift the FTO designation. 
According to public reports, the negotiations have stalled over 
this issue. To advance the talks, American negotiators and the 
Biden administration officials have tried to find ways to 
rationalize meeting Iran's demands. You, yourself, have 
downplayed concerns over such a move by saying the IRGC would 
remain designated under other weaker sanctions. Back in Vienna, 
American negotiators have also reportedly asked Iranians to 
make commitments to stop conducting terrorism in exchange for 
removing the FTO, and, specifically, to stop trying to murder 
former American officials. According to these reports, the 
Iranians told you ``no.''
    I have to admit it is flabbergasting that the Biden 
administration would take such Iranian commitments at face 
value, let alone consider dismantling terrorism sanctions. I 
want to ask you is it true that American negotiators made 
specific requests for a commitment that the IRGC will stop 
trying to murder former American officials, and is it true that 
they said no?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am not going to get into the 
details of any discussions or negotiations in a public forum. I 
am happy to come back and talk privately about that. Let me 
address a few things that you have raised because I do think 
that they are important.
    First of all, I share your views on the IRGC and, 
especially, a number of its component parts, notably the Quds 
Force, which is primarily responsible for the egregious actions 
that it has taken in terms of targeting Americans, and, as you 
rightly say, continuing to do so. We very much share with that 
view. I agree with you. We have over the course of this 
Administration, of the sanctions we have issued, 86 of the 107 
designations by this Administration have been against the IRGC 
or its component parts, again, for the reasons you cite. None 
of this is inconsistent with the nuclear agreement, whether it 
was enforced or not enforced. There are myriad sanctions as you 
know, as you have cited, against the IRGC in one way or 
another, both the entity as a whole, its component parts, 
individual members that will remain on the books, irrespective, 
but there are a few other factors that are worth at least 
considering, and I will come to the bottom line in a moment if 
I can.
    First, when the question of designating the IRGC as a whole 
first came up the Bush administration many years ago----
    Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, as you know, we have limited 
time.
    Secretary Blinken. Well, no, but it is important----
    Senator Cruz. I am going to try to focus on the specific 
question I asked. Let me start off with this. Is it true that 
the IRGC is actively trying to murder former senior officials 
of the United States?
    Secretary Blinken. I am not sure what I can say in an open 
setting, but let me say generically that there is an ongoing 
threat against American officials, both present and past, and--
--
    Senator Cruz. Is it true that the State Department is 
spending roughly $2 million a month to protect those officials?
    Secretary Blinken. --we are making sure and we will make 
sure for as long as it takes that we are protecting our people, 
present and former, if they are under threat.
    Senator Cruz. I am assuming you would agree that attempting 
to murder a Secretary of State or a former Secretary of State 
is a pretty damn big deal.
    Secretary Blinken. I would certainly agree with that, yes.
    Senator Cruz. There have been multiple public reports that 
we asked them to make the simple promise to not murder a former 
Secretary of State, and they refused. There is nothing 
classified about that. If they are actively refusing, saying, 
no, we are going to keep trying to murder your former Secretary 
of State, the idea that our negotiators are sitting in Vienna 
saying, okay, that is great, so how many more billions can we 
give you, that does not make any sense. I just want to know the 
factual question. Did you ask them to stop trying to murder the 
former Secretary of State, and did they sit there and tell you, 
no, we are going to keep trying to murder him?
    Secretary Blinken. Of course within the context of any 
engagements that we have, directly or indirectly, with 
Iranians, one of the strong messages we send to them is they 
need to stop targeting our people, period, and here are the 
facts, as I mentioned a few minutes ago.
    Senator Cruz. Did they tell you no?
    Secretary Blinken. Again, I am not going to characterize 
what they said. They know what they would need to do to address 
this problem, and that is pretty straightforward. We have seen 
these attacks go up 400 percent from 2019 to 2020 after we got 
out of the nuclear agreement, after we designated the IRGC, 
after we killed Soleimani for whom no one is shedding any 
tears. Those are the facts. We have to deal with the facts in 
terms of what represents a threat to our people and how we can 
most effectively----
    Senator Cruz. Let me ask a final question just because my 
time has expired on a topic you and I have talked a great deal 
about, Nord Stream 2. We have finally gotten to sanctioning 
Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream 1 continues to deliver an enormous 
amount of natural gas. Stopping Nord Stream 1 would benefit our 
Ukraine allies significantly. What are we doing to urge Europe 
to stop taking deliveries on Nord Stream 1, which, in turn, 
would benefit Ukraine substantially?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, we are working across the board 
to help Europeans move away from dependency on Russian oil and, 
especially, on Russian gas, including gas that is coming 
through Nord Stream 1. I am glad we got to where we got on Nord 
Stream 2. I think we went about it the right way. We did it in 
a way that kept the Germans fully allied with us. They made 
that decision, as you know, like that after the Russian 
invasion. That has been very, very meaningful, and we are 
looking across the board at steps that we can take to support 
them as they continue to move away from a reliance on Russian 
gas wherever it is coming from, including the Nord Stream 1 
population.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here 
today. I am going to touch on a number of issues very quickly. 
I will submit follow-up questions, and then I want to turn to 
in terms of your thoughts, address transnational repression.
    First on Burma, thank you for the genocide determination. I 
know that that was a long, lengthy, complicated process, but 
the State Department did reach a conclusion. I think it is 
incredibly important for our position in the world that when 
genocide occurs, that we call it out clearly and effectively. 
Otherwise, the other times that we criticize human rights, it 
is ineffective. I will follow-up in questions regarding some of 
the budgeted funds for Burma. I want to make sure they are 
going to support civilian groups and in no way assists the 
government of that country.
    Second, turning to Honduras. Thank you for the strategic 
dialogue that was begun yesterday and will continue in regards 
how to support their anti-corruption agenda and, in general, 
how to support the resetting of that relationship. Congress 
sent a strong message by zeroing out the foreign military 
financial assistance to the Northern Triangle countries and 
making 60 percent of the rest contingent upon completion, 
implementation of an anti-corruption agenda. If we do not 
tackle the corruption successfully there, we will not 
successfully address any of the issues we are trying to help 
with.
    Third, Uyghur Force Labor Protection Act, I was very 
pleased to partner with my colleague from Florida, Senator 
Marco Rubio, to do that. I know the Administration is asking 
for more funds to implement it, support that. Thank you very 
much. Ethiopia, we pressed hard to get the truckloads of food 
into Tigray Province. Thank you for doing that. Finally, there 
were three successful convoys in April, but they amount to 200 
truckloads. We are told there needs to be 2,000 per month, that 
there are some 700,000 families in famine-like condition. 
Please keep pressing hard. They need to get those convoys 
through basically every couple days in order to alleviate that 
famine.
    Philippines. New election is coming up. I am pleased that 
we have not supported the Philippine National Police, and there 
have been some estimated 20,000 extrajudicial killings, really 
violating human rights in a massive way. We have a chance to 
reset that relationship with the upcoming election. I know you 
are aware of that. I know your team is working to prepare for 
that. Thank you. I echo my colleagues' statements of support 
for your actions on Ukraine. I will follow up in terms of our 
help for very poor countries affected by the increased cost of 
wheat and fertilizer. There will be profound reverberations. 
Then I will follow up a lot on climate issues.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Merkley. Complicated world. Many things to touch 
on, but I wanted to take your time today on a topic that I did 
not hear addressed, and that is transnational repression. We 
are seeing more and more countries engaged in retaliation for 
both what companies do outside of their borders, what countries 
do, what individuals do, basically compromising freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly. Those nations include China, 
and Turkey, and Russia, and Saudi Arabia, and Rwanda, and a 
couple dozen more at a lower scale. It is a growing strategy of 
authoritarian-leading countries to not just new technologies, 
surveillance technology for repression at home, but to do 
repression abroad.
    The worst country in this regard is China, and think about 
kind of this long list of things that they have done. They took 
up economic measures against Mongolia for hosting the Dalai 
Lama; South Korea for deploying U.S. missile defense; Canada 
for Huawei's arrest--the arrest of the Huawei CFO; to Sweden 
for giving a human rights prize to a Swedish dissident under 
detention in China; Taiwan for refusing to acknowledge that it 
is part of China; United Kingdom for supporting pro-democracy 
protestors; Australia for calling for an independent inquiry 
into the origins of COVID; Lithuania for establishing a 
Taiwanese representative office in its capital. That list goes 
on.
    Then in terms of individuals, the China Commission held a 
hearing, and we heard from folks from Hong Kong, from Tibet, 
from Shenyang Province talk about the impact on their families, 
being impacted. Just to give you one example, there is a Uyghur 
activist who had encouraged the development of mother tongue 
schools. His name is Abduweli Ayup, and initially there was 
some significant support for this concept, and then China 
evolved its policy and said we don't want these native language 
schools. We want to force everyone into, if you will, the major 
Chinese dialect, and he had to flee to Norway. His in-laws were 
threatened. They were pressured to bring their daughter home, 
his niece home, back to China where she was detained, and she 
died in detention. The parents were threatened with 
imprisonment if they said anything to the world about her 
death. I just was amazed at his courage to continue to speak 
out against repression with his family being threatened. It is 
an incredibly effective tool.
    We see China undertaking these massive strategies both with 
trade policy and with deliberate strategies targeting 
dissidents abroad and family members at home. Huge threat to 
the vision of democracy and freedom of speech, freedom of 
assembly. Big issue for the State Department to undertake. 
Could you expand on your efforts?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator. First of all, let me 
say I appreciate the comments you made briefly about Burma, 
about Honduras, about Ethiopia, about the Uyghurs, and also 
about food security, all things that we look forward to coming 
back to you with and on because all are very important, very 
much a focus of what we are doing. I very much share your 
concern about the growing practice of using tools of 
transnational repression to attack those, in one way or 
another, who are speaking up, speaking out on behalf of human 
rights, on behalf of democracy, on behalf of basic freedoms.
    We have put in place a number of measures to try to address 
this problem. You will recall that with regard to Saudi Arabia, 
for example, the so-called Khashoggi ban specifically goes not 
just with regard to Saudi Arabia, but around the world. It goes 
at countries that engage in this practice, to include visa 
bans, to include sanctions, so that if they are trying to use 
tools of transnational repression, we have means to go at them. 
More broadly, we are seeing this, as you rightly cited, being 
used in different ways in different places. This is very much a 
part of the conversation that we are having with other 
likeminded countries who share the concern, and we are looking 
at tools that we can put into place to push back effectively 
against this.
    You cited the example of Lithuania and China using coercion 
with Lithuania. I think we have supported them along with other 
countries in the European Union effectively to help them 
resist. We had a Summit for Democracy, as you know, a few 
months ago. Part of that was doing exactly what you suggest, 
which is developing tools for pushing back against this kind of 
coercion and providing support to those who may be on the 
receiving end of it. I am happy to share with you some of the 
specific initiatives that we are working on with other 
countries to try to, in effect, arm ourselves and others 
against this practice.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 
welcome back from the Ukraine. You have obviously dealt with 
issues relating to energy. You have heard a lot from the 
members of the Republican side today, energy--the way Russia 
uses energy as a weapon and the impact it has brought to 
Ukraine. Senator Rounds asked a question on energy, and you 
stated that we need to accelerate transition to renewables, and 
you said you cannot weaponize the sun, you cannot weaponize the 
wind, but you also cannot run a modern economy on sunshine and 
whether it is a windy day or not. I would say from the first 
days in this Administration, the Biden administration has 
failed to prioritize energy security, which I have always said 
is part of our national security.
    Now, under your leadership, the State Department is looking 
to cut deals with dictators in order to access more energy 
resources. The State Department is in negotiations to remove 
sanctions on Iran's energy sector as part of the Iran nuclear 
deal. The State Department officials have traveled Venezuela to 
meet with Maduro to discuss removing sanctions to access 
additional crude oil. You personally called on OPEC Plus to 
increase production to ``stabilize global energy markets'' to 
make sure that there remains an abundant supply of energy 
around the world. Your State Department then went to Qatar and 
other foreign countries to ask them to export more liquefied 
natural gas to Europe. Now, all this happening at the same time 
that the Administration that you serve on has made it harder to 
produce American energy, and I heard about it again this week 
back home in Wyoming.
    To me, energy security is critically important. Our 
adversaries would love to see us even more dependent upon them 
to meet our own energy needs at home in America. I think we 
should not be removing energy sanctions on brutal dictators. It 
is unacceptable to bankroll the terrorist activities of Iran. 
It is a mistake to go to Venezuela and ask for more energy, and 
I think it is dangerous to rely on Russia for energy 
resources--oil, gas, coal, and uranium. I think we need to 
increase production of American energy resources. Our Nation 
has plenty of energy to power our Nation and to provide our 
allies and friends with a stable energy supply.
    Could you just explain why the Administration is more 
focused on buying energy from our enemies than finding ways to 
increase American energy exports and production here?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator. A few things. First, 
we are focused primarily in the near term in making sure that 
there are abundant supplies of energy on world markets to our 
benefit, to the benefit of American consumers so that prices 
are held in check, also to help Europeans to make this 
transition, especially in the midst of the Russian aggression 
against Ukraine. We want to make sure that we are doing that in 
a way, as I said, that does not spike prices and line President 
Putin's pockets. That makes, I think, good sense.
    We have taken a number of steps, as I mentioned, to support 
this effort, including doubling our LNG exports to Europe just 
in the last few months. The President has called as well for 
increased domestic production. As you know well, there are 
thousands of licenses that have not been used that exist, and 
we will see if production increases as a result. As it comes to 
renewables, we have been very clear all along that this is a 
process and a transition. It is not flipping a light switch, 
and so we have to have abundant sources of energy of various 
kinds going forward even as we make the transition. There are 
tremendous opportunities over time in this transition, 
particularly when it comes to American technology, in leading 
this effort and having vast new markets, but it is a process. 
It is a transition, and we need to make sure that we have 
abundant supplies of energy on the market.
    When it comes to other countries, first of all, with regard 
to Venezuela, the visit to Venezuela was made with the 
objective of getting released Americans who are being unjustly 
detained, and, in fact, we were able to bring home two of those 
Americans as well as to press the Venezuelans to reengage in 
talks with the united opposition on moving back to free 
elections and democracy. That was the focus of the visit. With 
regard to Iran, the purpose of the negotiations with Iran is to 
see if we can get the Iranians back into compliance with the 
Iranian Nuclear Agreement, which has clear benefits to the 
United States and making it much more difficult for Iran to get 
fissile material for a nuclear weapon. That is the purpose of 
that engagement. The purpose is not to get more Iranian oil on 
the markets.
    Senator Barrasso. Let me move to the crisis at the Southern 
border. Last month, 220,000 illegal immigrants apprehended at 
the U.S.-Mexico border, 2021, after President Biden was sworn 
into office, 1.9 million apprehensions. Currently on pace for 2 
million this year. President Biden tasked the Vice President 
with addressing the crisis at the Southern border. The 
President is talking about removing Article 42 because 
apparently COVID is behind us, although since you started 
testifying this morning, there has been news reports that 
Senator Wyden, Senator Murphy from this committee, and the Vice 
President are all right now with COVID.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Barrasso. During the Vice President's visit to 
Guatemala last year, Vice President Kamala Harris sent a 
message to illegal immigrants attempting to enter the United 
States. She said, ``I want to be clear to folks in this region 
who are thinking about making this dangerous trek to the United 
States-Mexico border. Do not come. Do not come.'' She went on 
to say, I believe, if you come to the border, you will be 
turned back. Well, do you agree with those statements by the 
Vice President that if you come, you will be turned back?
    Secretary Blinken. I would agree. If people come to the 
border and cannot show a legal basis for coming into the United 
States under asylum or other rules, they will be removed. That 
is the policy. Let me just say when it comes to Title 42, as 
you know, Senator, this is a CDC authority. It is not 
immigration policy. The CDC will make its judgment. They made a 
judgment to terminate the Title 42 next month, but if that 
happens, as I said, what will happen as a practical matter, if 
people come to the border and try to get in without the 
necessary legal basis to do so, they will be sent away.
    Senator Barrasso. That is not happening, and it is not 
going to happen, and that is how you go from more illegal 
immigrants coming into the country in the first 14 months of 
President Biden in office than over the previous 4 years with 
President Trump in the White House. Now we are at a point where 
we are facing a crisis that the Administration appears to be 
sending a different message with this revoking Title 42. I 
think it is an important border control tool. It is a critical 
border control tool. As you mentioned, it is a public health--
to protect the public. It is going to result--what we are going 
to see, I think, is a massive surge. The head of Homeland 
Security from this Administration said they are not prepared. 
The head of the Homeland Security from President Obama's term 
said we are not prepared to handle what is coming this way.
    Elizabeth Warren explained on CNN this weekend, and, Mr. 
Chairman, this will be my final question. She said, ``The Biden 
administration is putting plans in place to deal with people 
who are asking for amnesty and relief at the border.'' Would 
you please describe the plans that the Biden administration is 
putting in place, that Senator Warren alluded to, to deal with 
this surge of migrants attempting to enter our country 
illegally?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I would refer you to DHS, which 
is responsible for the border and for those plans. The focus 
that I am bringing to this is making sure that, to the best of 
our ability, we are getting countries throughout our 
hemisphere, where we have an unprecedented situation. We have 
not only migrants from the Northern Triangle. We have, as you 
know, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, and then other 
countries that have had populations from some of these 
countries who are also seeing them move north. What is vital 
from the perspective of the State Department is to build a 
sense of shared responsibility for dealing with this. That is 
exactly what we have been doing.
    I just got back from Panama where we had the foreign 
ministers from virtually of the all concerned countries in 
place to take practical steps to deal with this. For example, 
we have bilateral arrangements now with Costa Rica and Panama, 
and we are working on more, where countries will take steps, 
for example, to put in place transit visas so that people 
cannot go through their countries to try to come to the United 
States, to do repatriations themselves, to treat people 
humanely, to apply protections, to grant asylum themselves as 
opposed to having people come to the United States to seek it. 
All of these things are practical steps that we are working on 
and putting into effect as the State Department to help deal 
with what is an unprecedented situation. In addition, there is 
going to be a Summit of the Americas, as I mentioned earlier, 
led by President Biden in a couple of months, where this will 
be a major topic of issue.
    Look, I would, again, refer you to DHS. We obviously have 
over many years challenges in effectively, humanely, and 
efficiently processing those who come to our country and make 
claims of asylum. We need more resources to do that 
effectively, efficiently so that their cases can be adjudicated 
very quickly, and if they do not have a legal basis for being 
here, they are returned.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Booker.
    Senator Booker. Thank you very much. It is good to see you, 
Mr. Secretary. Thank you for taking so much time to endure all 
of our questioning and being so responsive.
    I just want to jump right in. I am just back from a long 8 
days overseas going from Poland all the way to Nepal and India. 
One thing, when I was in Germany, which was our last stop, we 
just really pressed both German officials we met with as well 
our State Department folks about, as we all are focused 
obviously on Ukraine, not losing focus on China's influence in 
the region. Germany is obviously now after Brexit the center of 
economic power in the EU. Our relationship with them is 
critical. I was stunned as I probed our officials there about 
how China's influence is just growing in their country, and we 
are not, I do not believe, just allocating the necessary 
resources to really counter Chinese influence in Europe.
    I know you are doing a lot of things already. Your budget 
proposal includes funding for new initiatives to counter 
Chinese influence globally, such as increasing the number of 
China watchers, but I want to make sure that this includes 
adequate funding for countering China in Europe. I was alarmed 
when I started asking questions to find out, for example, that 
China's COSCO Shipping has struck a deal to take a 35 percent 
stake in Hamburg's Tollerort Terminal, one of Germany's largest 
ports. When I started asking our ambassador there, she was 
telling me we have actually plans to sell American property 
there, and none of them could tell me anything when I started 
probing them with questions, other than the fact that they all 
think it would be a terrible mistake to sell that property 
there because it sends the exact wrong message in Hamburg, that 
the Chinese are buying everything up they can, and we are 
selling property that might just be bought by the Chinese. When 
I pressed even further, and they could not escape my 
questioning, they had to admit to me that they are threadbare 
there in our consulates in the second- and third-largest 
cities, and agreed with me that when it comes to countering 
China, one of the most important economic powers, we are not 
keeping up. In fact, we are losing ground.
    The first thing I just want to offer you an opportunity is, 
why does your budget not reflect the importance of adding 
investment in Germany? Why are we selling critical property 
there? That makes no sense whatsoever.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, and I will look into the 
specifics that you mentioned just to make sure that I fully 
understand.
    Senator Booker. Could you get back to me in writing or call 
me, one of the two?
    Secretary Blinken. I am happy to. Sure. No, happy to do 
that.
    We are focused on this relentlessly, including in Europe, 
both at the level of the European Union and with individual 
countries. We have done a number of things to make sure that we 
not only are focused on it, but we are doing something about 
it. We established a dialogue with the European Union on China 
and all of the aspects of its engagement in Europe that the 
Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, just came back from. 
One of the things that it is focused on is Chinese investment 
that poses potentially a strategic challenge or threat to us.
    We have been going across the continent and urging 
countries to adopt investment screening tools. I have done that 
personally. It is in virtually all of my engagements with 
countries that do not have them, for the purposes of making 
sure that they can identify and, as necessary, do something 
about potential investments by China that could pose a security 
threat. The purpose is not to cut off trade or investment from 
or with China. That is not the issue. The issue is focusing in 
on specific areas of strategic importance, including ports as 
well as telecommunications and other things, that we have eyes 
on it, and that we or they have the tools to do something about 
it.
    Senator Booker. So please----
    Secretary Blinken. Third, we also reorganized the 
Department to have a whole-of-enterprise focus on China, again 
led by the deputy secretary. Part of our instruction to all of 
our embassies around the world, including in Europe, is to 
focus on and report on the kinds of potential investment----
    Senator Booker. I am grateful for that. I will probably 
have a conversation with the deputy secretary as well.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Booker. It is just tough when I talk to the staff 
over there face-to-face that they do not seem to have the 
resources they need to do the work that you are talking about. 
As I said to them, as Secretary Mattis once said, if you cut my 
State Department, buy me more bullets. Well clearly, it is a 
pivotal country that we just watched a decade or two of 
terrible policy with the Russians, with increased engagement, I 
do not want to see the same story repeated with China. Talking 
to my peers in that country, they really needed to hear from us 
and see from us that this was a priority for us, that we were 
going to be holding them to account, and that we were not 
retracting from Germany, but actually upping our investments 
across the board. I understand that you value this. I have only 
got a minute and 55 seconds.
    Secretary Blinken. I would love to pursue this with you 
because we have expanded the regional China Officer Program so 
that in each of our regional bureaus, we have people who are 
expert in this, who expanding our capacity to engage on 
economic issues. This is part of my modernization agenda, in 
part, to be able to do----
    Senator Booker. I appreciate that. Real quick. I see this 
every time I travel abroad, the lack of diversity in our State 
Department. It does not reflect America.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Booker. It is stunning to me at times where I sit 
in rooms with no diversity whatsoever in a large group of a 
State team with me. You have increased the funding for the paid 
internship programs. I think that is important.
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Booker. There are $10 million in addition to the $8 
million in fiscal year 2022. Just it is something that is a 
priority to me and other members of this committee. I just 
really hope that is enough, and I hope we do more because it is 
disappointing to me whenever I come back from traveling abroad. 
Then when I talk to people of color that do serve in our 
embassies, they sort of feel like I do, and Warnock, and 
perhaps Tim Scott probably does here in the Senate, like, wow, 
we need more diversity. I am hoping that--I know that is a 
priority for you from private conversations. I am just hoping 
we can do something about it.
    My last point. I am so concerned about food security 
globally. This, to me, is stunning that we are--we do not 
understand the connection, besides a moral urgency, everywhere 
from Yemen, to Afghanistan, to the Horn of Africa, the moral 
urgency to do something about this, how critical it is for 
global security to meet this food crisis because, if not, as we 
have learned and I talked with obviously Mr. Beasley from the 
World Food Programme, just to calculate for me that dollars 
invested in food security now save us hundreds of dollars in 
terms of the instability that is created when we do not meet 
these crises.
    I am hoping that the Biden administration in their next 
Ukraine package, because these are related issues, is asking 
for the resources necessary to meet this crisis. We know that 
there is probably about a $10 billion urgent need for resources 
to meet the food crisis alone, and I would like you just to 
conclude by maybe giving me, which I know does reflect my sense 
of urgency, of the gravity of this crisis and the need for us 
to put in $5-7 billion of American resources, especially to 
trigger other of our allies to join us in trying to meet this 
crisis, further exacerbated by the crisis in Ukraine.
    Secretary Blinken. Let me--very quickly, I fully share that 
concern. This is an area of intense focus for us. We are going 
to use our presidency of the U.N. Security Council next month 
to focus on food security. We will be looking to work with 
Congress to provide $11 billion over 5 years for programs like 
Feed the Future. We are working right now with countries around 
the world to get them to increase the donations they are making 
and resources they are giving to the World Food Programme, to 
the Food and Agriculture Organization.
    We are pressing on countries that have large stockpiles of 
food to make those available, not to put in place export 
restrictions. We are--the President has made--created 
incentives for fertilizer production in the United States to 
make sure that more of that is getting on the market because as 
you know, that goes to making sure that next year's crops and 
the years after are abundant and prices do not further go up. 
We have given an additional--more than $100 million just 
recently to--from the Humanitarian Assistance Fund to Ethiopia, 
to Kenya, to Somalia to deal with their acute problems.
    I could not agree with you more, and we are intensely 
focused on it.
    Senator Booker. Mr. Secretary, I am sure this was said, but 
I want to thank you for your courageous trip you just took, 
coming from a meeting with Ukrainians when I was in Poland. 
Your extraordinary leadership, in my opinion, has been a light 
during this crisis, and I want to thank you for that and the 
entire State Department staff and what they are doing under 
difficult circumstances.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Johnson.
    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. 
Secretary.
    Can you describe to me what your and what the 
Administration's definition of, is a ``win'' in Ukraine?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, on the terms that President 
Putin himself set, Ukraine has already succeeded and Russia has 
failed. The terms that Putin set was to eliminate the 
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to subsume it back 
into Russia. I can state with confidence that that has failed 
and that will fail. I do not see a scenario by which that 
happens. As we are speaking, the Ukrainians are doing an 
extraordinary job, thanks to their courage, but also because of 
the support that we have led in providing in pushing back the 
Russians. They have done that from Kyiv, and Western Ukraine, 
and Northern Ukraine.
    They are now engaged, as you know, in a ferocious battle in 
the East and South. We are doing everything we can to make sure 
that they have the means to continue to do that. Ultimately, it 
will be up to them, the Ukrainians, as a sovereign, independent 
country, how they want to resolve this, and we will see if 
President Putin ever gets to the point of being willing to 
engage in any meaningful negotiation about that. That will be 
up to the Ukrainians. They will have our full support as they 
do now.
    Senator Johnson. You are not really willing to lay out what 
the Administration's view of what the end state ought to be to 
consider it a win?
    Secretary Blinken. The end state should be determined by 
the Ukrainians as a sovereign, independent country. We will 
back that. We will continue to back that, however they choose 
to do it.
    Senator Johnson. When you were with President Zelensky, did 
he talk to you about what he considered his objectives are, and 
I would say his objectives would be probably the definition of 
what he would consider a win.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I do not want to put words in 
his mouth. I think what it would be fair and safe to say is 
that his objective would be to push the Russians out of the 
territory that they are trying to occupy in Eastern Ukraine. 
Also, let me add to this because I think it is important, to 
try to make sure that when that is accomplished, Russia is not 
in a position to repeat this exercise next month, next year, or 
in 5 years. That goes to making sure that Ukraine has the 
effective capacity to deter and defend itself, and it also goes 
to something that Secretary Austin said yesterday, was also 
making sure in various ways that Russia does not have the 
effective means to do this again.
    Senator Johnson. Putting your two answers together, 
President Zelensky would view his objective is to push Russia 
out, certainly out of Eastern Ukraine, and you said the 
Administration will support President Zelensky in his 
objectives. Are you willing to state that that is the U.S. 
objective, as well? That that aligns with President Zelensky 
that we will provide the support? Our goal is for them to win, 
according to the definition of the Ukrainians and President 
Zelensky. We will support them in their efforts to win in 
Ukraine, which means pushing Russia out of at least Eastern 
Ukraine?
    Secretary Blinken. If that is how the Ukrainians continue--
let me just say again, I do not want to put words in his mouth, 
but if that is how they define their objectives as a sovereign, 
democratic, independent country, that is what we will support. 
I come back to my initial proposition, which was that on 
Putin's own terms, which was trying to subjugate Ukraine fully 
to Russia and eliminate its sovereignty and independence, that 
has already failed.
    Senator Johnson. I understand. Now it appears that Putin's 
goal is establishing a land bridge at least between Eastern 
Ukraine to Crimea.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Johnson. Is that a very--are you willing to state 
that is definitely the U.S. objective, our NATO partners' 
objective, to deny him that land bridge?
    Secretary Blinken. Our objective is to make sure that the 
Ukrainians have the means to repel and deal with this Russian 
aggression wherever it is taking place in Ukraine, including in 
Southern Ukraine, and that is exactly what we are doing.
    Senator Johnson. Again, I was at a subcommittee 
investigation hearing on the way, we still have not addressed 
military housing, so I missed some of the testimony, so maybe 
you already covered this, but are we going to provide them the 
types of weaponry they need, recognizing that what worked when 
Kyiv was surrounded, and now it is flatter terrain, in some 
cases almost trench warfare, are we committed to providing the 
type of weaponry that President Zelensky was asking for?
    Secretary Blinken. In short, yes, and the point you make is 
an important one. The nature of the battle has changed from 
what was necessary for Western Ukraine and Kyiv to where things 
are now. We spent 3 hours with President Zelensky, with the 
Secretary of Defense. A big focus of that conversation was what 
it is that Ukraine needs to deal with the current state of the 
Russian aggression. The Secretary of Defense, as we speak, is 
actually in Germany with the ministers of defense from about 40 
countries focused on making sure that we are all providing to 
Ukraine what it needs to deal with this aggression.
    Senator Johnson. To what extent are we aware that China is 
helping Russia in their aggression against Ukraine? Is the 
Russian--do we know if they are using Chinese drones?
    Secretary Blinken. We are very focused on this in a number 
of ways. President Biden made directly clear to President Xi 
Jinping that it would not be in China's interest to materially 
support Russia in this aggression or, for that matter, to 
undermine sanctions. This is something we are looking at very, 
very carefully. I think you are seeing that China is having to 
deal with the significant reputational risk that it is already 
incurring by being seen as, in the most charitable 
interpretation, on the fence and, more practically, supportive 
of Russia. We can in a different session get into more detail, 
but for now, we are not seeing significant support by China for 
Russia's military actions.
    Senator Johnson. Finally, in the remaining seconds I have, 
I have been attempting to get from the State Department a 
report that the State Department conducted on an inspection 
from the Wuhan Lab. I think we understand that the overall 
thrust of that report is it was not a lab that had the type of 
safety standards that we would have expected. I am somewhat 
baffled that is a report that I am simply not able to get my 
hands on. This report came from--it is April 19, 2018. The 
cable describing it was January 19 of 2018. Is that something 
you will commit to me today to turn over to my committee?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I will look back into that. My 
recollection is this. There was a program that ended in 2019. 
There was no funding of that program since, and I think any--
there was a report that may have been done by an outside 
contractor that, I think, was seen as problematic in its 
methodology. In any event, I will follow up. I do not know the 
status of that, but we will come back to you with it.
    Senator Johnson. Okay. I would appreciate that, and I will 
expect that response. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Mr. Secretary, for your testimony this morning and for your 
trip to Ukraine. I think it was something that the entire world 
watched with great appreciation.
    I really want to start this afternoon with the Western 
Balkans because I think Senator Murphy mentioned that he, and 
I, and Senator Tillis traveled through Serbia, Kosovo, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina last week. I think it is fair to say that if 
Putin has stalled in Ukraine, he may look elsewhere to sow 
chaos and that his fingerprints of malign influence could be 
found throughout the Western Balkans. I am particularly 
concerned about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has 
been plagued by corruption, a lack of leadership, and a 
tripartite presidency that is at war with itself, but there is 
also a very troubling security outlook there. We had a chance 
to meet with representatives from the EUFOR and NATO mission 
there, the European Union Force and BIH, and everyone we talked 
to indicated a growing concern about the potential for Russia 
to play games with reauthorization of the EUFOR Force when it 
comes up this fall. It does not appear that there is any Plan B 
for what to do about that. We raised this concern with our 
ambassador. Obviously, we heard from a number of people, and we 
raised it when we were at NATO headquarters in Brussels as 
well.
    Can you tell me whether we have a plan in place to maintain 
a peacekeeping presence?
    Secretary Blinken. First, let me just say thank you for 
your engagement and for your leadership on these issues, not 
only your recent trip, but just across the board. I remember 
well from my days working for this committee----
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Secretary Blinken. --Senator Voinovich was the sort of flag 
bearer and really appreciate the fact that you have sort of 
taken the flag on the Western Balkans, and it remains very 
important.
    Let me say two things very quickly. First, I think, 
generally speaking, the situation with the Russian aggression 
against Ukraine only underscores the broader urgency of 
integration for all of these countries into European 
structures, something that, in a variety of ways, we are 
continuing to encourage, work on, support. We have a number of 
programs that try to help them advance their candidacies and 
qualifications and meeting criteria for these things that I 
know that you know very well. That is just as a general 
proposition. Diplomatically, we have been engaged in every 
aspect of this, whether it is the relationship between Kosovo 
and Serbia, whether it is helping get North Macedonia and as 
well as Albania across the line in the direction of the EU. 
Finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where I very much share all of the 
concerns that you have cited.
    When it comes to the Force, I would say two things. First, 
I very much agree with you that some kind of international 
force with an adequate mandate is essential to trying to 
maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. What I can tell you about where we are is this is 
a work in progress we are--because of the concerns that you 
have raised about the mandate and whether it will be blocked, 
in effect, and not continued. We are engaged with a variety of 
stakeholders in this on contingency planning in the event that 
the Security Council is not in a place where it renews the 
mandate or it expires, which is, I think, in November. We are 
trying to make sure that we have something to back this up if 
that happens. Very happy to work with you on that and share 
ideas on how we can do that.
    Senator Shaheen. I would very much appreciate that, and we 
were able to speak with Deputy Secretary Donfried, who is in 
the Balkans this week I know and share with her what we had 
heard and our concerns about what is happening there. I look 
forward to that because I--you mentioned Senator Voinovich. I 
first traveled with him to the Western Balkans in 2010. I think 
it is fair to say that in each of the countries we visited, I 
was more concerned about the political situation today than I 
was in 2010.
    We need to pay attention, and I know that there are people 
within the Department who are trying to do that. I want to go 
now to the Office of Global Women's Issues because I was 
pleased to see that the budget increased funding for that 
office, which is long overdue. I wonder if you could talk a 
little bit about why you think this is important and really the 
gender lens with which we should be looking at foreign policy 
in many ways.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, and, again, thank you as well 
for your ongoing leadership on this. I think the budget request 
is substantial and by design. We are looking overall for about 
$2.6 billion to try to do a number of things to advance gender 
equality, to prevent and respond, as necessary, to gender-based 
violence, and to promote women peace and security. Simply put, 
all of these things are not only, in my judgment, the right 
thing to do, they are also the necessary thing to do if we are 
going to have societies that are making the most of their 
potential with the full inclusion of women across the board--
economically, politically, et cetera.
    It is necessary as well in terms of, I think, effectively 
dealing with conflict and making sure that women's voices and 
women's leadership is engaged to both prevent and deal with 
that. We know the track record when that happens is much better 
than when it does not, and because there are significant and 
severe threats, some of which have been accentuated by COVID-19 
where we know that vulnerabilities, for a variety of reasons, 
have increased, not decreased, in recent years. We have a 
number of things that we are trying to do that are reflected in 
the budget and in our programs.
    With regard to gender-based violence, there are a series of 
programs that would be funded by this request to offer support, 
to offer services, to use our foreign assistance as well as our 
diplomatic action, again, to prevent and to deal with, as 
necessary. One of the critical aspects of this that I know you 
know very well and that you have spoken about is, for example, 
making sure that we have, in refugee situations, a gender-based 
approach to making sure that there is safe access to food, 
water, medicine, sanitation, hygiene, and that these are 
factored in not only into our programs, but into the work that 
we are doing with the organizations that provide these 
services, and the budget and our programs reflect that. We also 
are very focused, again, on women peace and security and 
working to support the participation, the leadership, the 
empowerment of women in decisionmaking on peace and security 
issues. This is very much a part of our diplomacy, again, 
because we know that it produces better outcomes.
    We are pushing with diplomacy, with public diplomacy, 
amplifying voices of local women, women-led organizations. All 
of these things have programs and the programs, of course, have 
a price tag attached to them.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I am out of 
time, but I hope we are keeping the women and girls of 
Afghanistan----
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Shaheen. --included in that equation as well. Thank 
you very much.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. Good to see you, 
Secretary.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    Senator Young. As a former staff member to this committee, 
I know you agree that robust oversight of the workings of the 
Department is incredibly important. With that understanding, I 
have been disappointed in the Department and the 
Administration's communication with and transparency to 
Congress as it relates to the negotiations with Iran. Any sort 
of deal, so to speak, that might be cut with the Government of 
Iran that inadequately curbs Iran's appetite to develop nuclear 
weapons, to continue to carry out malign activities within the 
region and beyond, will not be in American interests, that of 
our allies, or, I believe, of the Iranian people themselves. I 
was encouraged earlier that you gave a commitment to the 
chairman to work with the committee on an open hearing at some 
point in this work period to discuss negotiations. I would just 
build on that and ask you, sir, if you commit to making Special 
Envoy Malley, our chief negotiator, available to appear before 
this committee before an agreement is announced and agreed to.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, thank you, and, look, I want to 
make sure that we are doing exactly as you say, which is to be 
communicating effectively and in as real a time as possible on 
this issue and, for that matter, on virtually every other 
issue. I know that Special Envoy Malley has been engaged in, 
one way or another, with members of this committee and Congress 
throughout the course of these negotiations as well as, of 
course, with allies and partners. I want to make sure that that 
continues to happen, so we will look for an opportunity to make 
sure that people are brought as up-to-date as we possibly can, 
including by him or other members of his team. We are happy to 
work with you on that.
    Senator Young. I understand the sensitivities of 
negotiations and the practical realities that would prevent an 
hour-by-hour, perhaps even a day-by-day update, but in light of 
the gravity of this situation and the news reports that a deal 
may be forthcoming soon, could we have Special Envoy Malley 
appear before this committee--can I have an agreement from you 
to that end, if not before this work period has ended, 
certainly before an agreement is announced and agreed to?
    Secretary Blinken. I will go back and see what we can do to 
make something happen. Now, I will say that I would assume that 
for that purpose, we would probably need to do something in a 
closed session because this is in the midst of a negotiation, 
but let me come back to you on that. I want to find a way to 
make that happen.
    Senator Young. Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate 
that. Staying on Iran just briefly, do you commit that the 
IRGC's foreign terrorist organization designation will not be 
lifted as part of any agreement the Administration reaches with 
Iran?
    Secretary Blinken. The only way I could see it being lifted 
is if Iran takes steps necessary to justify the lifting of that 
designation. It knows what it would have to do in order to see 
that happen.
    Senator Young. Do you agree that IRGC's FTO designation 
will not be lifted merely at the negotiating table, meaning not 
just concessions made at the negotiating table. A pattern of 
constructive behavior would have to occur over a period of 
time. I can speak vaguely only to this matter in order for the 
FTO designation to be removed.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, this would--irrespective of the 
nuclear negotiation, just with regard to the FTO, it would 
require Iran to take certain actions and to sustain them. Of 
course, if it purported to do something and then did not, and a 
designation--any kind of designation were lifted, it can always 
be reimposed. As you know, there is a long history to this when 
it comes to the IRGC designation. The Bush administration 
looked at it, did not do it. The advice was not to do it 
because it did not gain anything, but might create actually 
more dangers for our people and forces in the region. The Obama 
administration came to the same conclusion. When President 
Trump decided to do it, it was against the advice of his 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his military, and the 
intelligence community, because in the judgment of those--the 
two administrations and senior leadership in President Trump's 
administration, the gain was minimal and the pain was 
potentially great.
    Again, as a practical matter, the designation does not 
really gain you much because there are myriad other sanctions 
on the IRGC. The primary sanction when it comes to the FTO 
designation actually is a travel ban, and the people affected 
by that ban when it comes to the IRGC, as you know, the IRGC is 
a large----
    Senator Young. Yes.
    Secretary Blinken. --force that has a lot of conscripts in 
it. They would not be able to travel. The people who are the 
real bad guys have no intention of traveling here anyway.
    Senator Young. I am going to move on to Burma because I 
have a very large Burmese-American diaspora community, and I 
care a lot about this issue. I applaud the Administration's 
decision to formally declare the persecutions and killings of 
Rohingya people by the Burmese military a genocide. It is 
something Senator Merkley, Cardin, and many of my colleagues on 
this committee have pushed for, and I commend the 
Administration for that. The situation in Burma following last 
year's coup continues to inflict deep suffering on the people 
in the country and many diaspora families, like those in 
Indiana.
    As you know, the FY22 NDAA required a briefing to Congress 
within 60 days of passage examining a variety of policy options 
as it relates to the United States' response to the ongoing 
crisis in Burma. Among those issues are a determination on the 
legitimacy and recognition of the national unity government, 
holding those in the military accountable for their crimes, 
including sanctions, and looking into strategic interests and 
actions of the People's Republic of China. We are long overdue 
for said briefing, and legislative response is, of course, 
suffering on account of this. I fully acknowledge how many 
challenges the Administration is tending to, but we do need 
action here, and so I just ask you, Mr. Secretary, would you 
commit to working with others in the Administration to follow 
the law and brief Congress on these matters as soon as 
possible?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Young. Thank you. I will be following up.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Well, Mr. Secretary, just some 
final questions to wrap up. I just came back from a trip with a 
series of colleagues, both on this committee and off, on 
Australia, Japan, and Taiwan, and what became clear to me, not 
only on this trip, but with all of the ambassadors that we 
hosted of the ASEAN nations here in Washington, is that unless 
we have an economic and trade agenda, we will not meet the 
strategic competition challenge that we have with China, and we 
will not necessarily meet the reach for some of these countries 
to engage in a way that we want them on the security question, 
because they just feel that we are not engaged.
    In the interagency process--I know you do not drive this 
agenda on your own, but in the interagency process, I hope that 
you are advocating for some robust economic, which is not 
necessarily a trade agenda, but economic and/or plus a trade 
agenda, because in the absence of that, even though we consider 
China our single-biggest geostrategic threat, we cannot win it 
without this dimension.
    Secretary Blinken. I strongly agree with you, Mr. Chairman. 
I think that is exactly right. We are pursuing that. We are 
launching what we call the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework that 
addresses, I think, part of this challenge. It includes a 
number of things. It includes trade facilitation. It includes 
standards for the digital economy and technology. It includes 
building supply chain resilience, infrastructure investments, 
including in clean energy, worker standards. There are a number 
of----
    The Chairman. It does not include market access, which is 
probably the single-most significant thing they are looking 
for. Look, this is a good initiative. I said it in the Finance 
Committee to our trade representative.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    The Chairman. All of these nations, when we have talked to 
them, have suggested their aspiration for a much more robust 
engagement by the United States is necessary. That is why I add 
the economic equation, which is not necessarily a trade agenda, 
because whether it is the DFC, or whether it is Millennium 
Challenge, or whether it is USAID, or whatever else, we cannot 
meet something with nothing.
    Secretary Blinken. Again, I very much agree with your 
premise.
    The Chairman. I hope you will just be a strong voice within 
the interagency process. I intend to make that point to the 
President and others as well. In that context, in our visit to 
Taiwan, it is very clear to me that if China could ultimately 
overcome Taiwan, which produces 90 percent of all the high-end 
semiconductors in the world, which means, for the average 
American who may be watching, in everything that we use--the 
phone that we have, the car that we drive, the refrigerator we 
keep our food in, and I could go on and on--there are 
semiconductors. If, in fact, China could overwhelm and take 
Taiwan and now have control of 90 percent of the world's 
semiconductors, the world would be in a world of hurt, and that 
is just one dimension.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    The Chairman. Not to mention the message that we heard it 
would send within the region if, in fact, we do not come to 
Taiwan's assistance here because other countries will say, 
well, if they did not do it for Taiwan, they are not going to 
do it for us. Do we have that sense of urgency?
    Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, we do, and we are focused 
on this in a number of ways. First of all, with regard to 
semiconductors themselves, we have a significant advantage 
right now over China in the ability to produce the highest-end 
semiconductors and the chips. As you know very well, a small 
number of countries, to include Taiwan, are at the forefront of 
that, and we are taking very significant steps with Taiwan, 
with Japan, with the Netherlands which is critical to this, and 
a few other countries, to make sure that when it comes to the 
highest-end semiconductors, they are not transferred to China 
or China does not get the technology to manufacture them. 
Taiwan is integral to that.
    At the same time, when it comes to Taiwan itself, we are 
determined to make sure that it has all necessary means to 
defend itself against any potential aggression, including 
unilateral action by China to disrupt the status quo that has 
been in place now for many decades. I think there have been, in 
foreign military sales, close to $20 billion in such sales 
since 2017. That is ongoing as we speak. There has been another 
almost $2\1/2\ billion in direct commercial sales that we have 
authorized or facilitated. We have been expediting third party-
transfers to Taiwan. We have been supporting an indigenous 
industrial defense capability, and we are focused on helping 
them think about how to strengthen asymmetric capabilities, 
again, as a deterrent----
    The Chairman. I think we are now aligned between our views 
of what their asymmetric capabilities need to be and their 
views, which is an important thing. I look forward to our 
robust engagement to help them have the capacity capabilities 
of that asymmetric capability.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    The Chairman. Finally, I requested a GAO report on the 
State Department's annual waiver of Section 907 of the Freedom 
Support Act, which was released in March. The report found that 
the State Department's reporting to Congress on fulfillment of 
waiver conditions did not address required elements, including 
the impact on proposed assistance on the military balance 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over a 7-year period. It also 
found that State did not provide detailed instruction to 
agencies about reporting requirements, and that state and DoD 
did not document their consideration of waiver requirements 
over a 6-year period.
    I look at this budget now, and I see a $1.4 million 
discrepancy between the support for Armenia and Azerbaijan. I 
see what the Azerbaijanis are doing in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
including trying to eradicate the presence of Armenians who 
have lived there. How is it that we are going to provide more 
money, which, in my mind, is in violation--forgetting about the 
waiver--is in direct violation of Section 907? That is not 
something I am going to support, just to have you know.
    Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to go back and 
take a look at that--the specifics of the concerns you have 
raised about the adequacy of the reporting. I will take that 
on. Section 907 is, as you know, an annual decision. We have 
interagency review going on, and that review is underway, but I 
take what you say seriously, and I will take a look at that. 
More broadly, I have been very actively and directly engaged 
with leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, including, just 
as recently as a week ago, phone calls with Prime Minister 
Pashinyan and with President Aliyev, as well as their foreign 
ministers, trying to help advance prospects for a long-term 
political settlement. With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, we have 
been developing and promoting various confidence-building 
measures. We have been trying to push back on any unilateral 
actions, particularly by Azerbaijan, that would only inflame 
the situation, and we have a number of programs in place that 
are part of the budget to try to help advance more peaceful 
prospects.
    That is very much on my agenda. Happy to work closely with 
you and your team on that.
    The Chairman. Well, we look forward to working with you on 
it. Finally, let me just say, and, listen, you have a difficult 
job. I think the breadth and scope of--and the depth that you 
have exhibited today is one of the reasons you make a great 
Secretary of State, and we appreciate you have spent here 
nearly 3 hours, but I have to tell you something. We see--we 
cannot seem to get--to call things as they are sometimes.
    The State Department put out a statement with reference to 
the decision to convict Osman Kavala in Turkey that we are 
troubled and disappointed. This is why authoritarian figures 
like Erdogan, they get away with continuing to do what they are 
doing. We should have condemned the conviction. The Department 
goes on to say that he should be released in keeping with the 
European Court of Human Rights rulings as well as to free all 
other arbitrary incarceration. It goes on to talk about the 
harassment of civil society, media, political and business 
leaders in Turkey to prolonged detention. It goes on to talk 
about--there are more lawyers and journalists in prison in 
Turkey than any other place in the world. That says something 
considering some of the terrible places in the world.
    We express trouble and disappointment. Our ally, India, 
that is in the Quad, they go buy oil from Russia. They buy the 
S-400. They abstain at the United Nations, but they are a 
member of the Quad. At some point, messages that we send 
globally here are inconsistent. I have heard President Biden 
say that he stands up for human rights and democracy in the 
world. I believe him. That is his history from the time he sat 
where I am sitting today, but, man, when we say we are troubled 
and disappointed, that does not cut it.
    When we allow someone who we have invited to be part of the 
Quad to go ahead and purchase the S-400, go ahead and purchase 
Russian oil in violation of the global sanctions we are 
creating, go ahead and vote against our position and most of 
the world's position at the United Nations, if you think you 
can do all those things and still get whatever it is that we 
give, which is a lot, then you will. I just hope that, Mr. 
Secretary, you will look at some of the positions that we take, 
and equivocate less, and be more forcefully directed as to what 
people should or should not be able to do.
    Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, first, I take your point 
about that specific statement, and I will go back and have a 
look at that myself. More broadly, and I said this at the 
outset, I think we are at a very important strategic moment as 
various countries, to include the countries you have cited, are 
thinking about and possibly reconsidering some of their other 
relationships, including with Russia. As a strategic 
proposition, I think it is very much in our interest to 
encourage that, and work with that, and see what we can do to 
make sure that, along with success for Ukraine in Ukraine, we 
also take advantage of other strategic opportunities that may 
present themselves as a result of Russia's aggression, as well 
as dealing with some of the new challenges we face.
    I think that also has to factor into our thinking about how 
we approach things. Some countries have had decades-long 
relationships, as you know very well, with Russia that take 
time to change and to adjust. I hope that as we do this, we 
want to be as effective as we can in getting the right 
strategic result, even as, to your point, we keep faith with 
our basic principles, especially when it comes to human rights.
    The Chairman. Listen, I agree with you. Look, on India, I 
want India to be aligned not with us, is the final point I 
make. As I traveled all over this region and to receive foreign 
dignitaries here, I say the choice is not between the United 
States and China. The choice is what type of world do you want 
to live in?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    The Chairman. One that is ultimately governed by the rule 
of law where you get to choose who governs you, where you get 
to worship as you please, where you get to ultimately achieve 
economic success by the use of your intellect or the sweat of 
your brow, or is it a world where you are minded, where you do 
not get to choose who governs you, where you do not get to 
worship as you please, where you are put in a concentration 
camp because of who you are, and the list goes on. That is the 
choice. At the end of the day, in the pursuit of making that 
choice clear, I hope that we will hold higher expectations of 
some of those who we describe as allies because, historically, 
some of these countries who view themselves as non-aligned, 
ultimately, if they can have it both ways, they will. At some 
point, there has to be a definition of which type of world do 
you want to live in.
    With the thanks of the committee for your very extensive 
responses to everybody's questions here and your service to our 
country, this record will remain open until the close of 
business tomorrow. This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. China: Russia is an urgent threat, but China clearly 
remains a serious long-term competitor for the United States, with 
global ambitions to overturn the rules-based order that has benefited 
the entire international community--perhaps, ironically, no one as much 
as China--for the past 75 years. Given the imperative of responding to 
Putin in Ukraine, how can the United States best position itself to 
work with partners and allies to assure that Xi does not exploit our 
attention in Europe?

    Answer. The February 4 joint statement between the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) and Russia signals alignment between Beijing 
and Moscow in challenging the rules-based international order. The 
statement endorsed spheres of influence and rejected democracy and 
broadly recognized human rights. Investing in our network of allies and 
partners is a critical part of our approach to the PRC, and we are 
coordinating our response with allies and partners to ensure the PRC 
learns the right lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine as it 
considers its own foreign policy actions. Working with allies and 
partners to respond to Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine has 
not distracted us from strategic competition with the PRC, but is 
instead a part of these important efforts.

    Question. Are there particular issues--with Taiwan, in the Pacific, 
China's export of its model of digital authoritarianism, or elsewhere--
where you believe China is stepping up pressure and where a more 
concerted U.S. response is needed?

    Answer. Beijing uses cutting-edge technology for control and 
oppression domestically and indiscriminately exports these tools to 
those that would like to replicate the People's Republic of China's 
(PRC) model of digital authoritarianism. The Administration is 
coordinating with allies and partners to ensure technology advances 
reflect democratic values and to support an Internet that remains 
interoperable, secure, and reliable, including through the recent 
Declaration for the Future of the Internet (DFI). Taiwan, Micronesia, 
Palau, and other key Indo-Pacific partners are among the more than 50 
DFI signatories.

    Question. Climate Preparedness: The time that we have to address 
the climate crisis contracts with each passing year. The 
Administration's Climate Adaptation and Resilience Plan represents a 
pragmatic approach to the reality that climate change, as a threat 
multiplier, must be accounted for across U.S. diplomatic missions. This 
is something that my U.S. CLIMATE Act calls for and I'm glad to see 
that the Administration is making efforts to regularize the practical 
application of climate change forecasting data into our national 
security planning. The Administration has said that the Budget's 
request for international investment in climate change programming, 
assistance, and contributions go to help those at risk, but can you 
please expand on how this broad cross-cutting initiative informs these 
investments and if executed properly, could help reduce costs in the 
future?

    Answer. In our 2021 Climate Adaptation and Resilience Plan, the 
Department committed to assessing its exposure to climate hazards and 
developing a priority list of locations for action. From droughts in 
South Africa to wildfires in Australia, our diplomats and their 
families are all too aware that we need to prepare for worsening 
disasters caused by climate change. If resourced, this analysis and 
preparedness work will help reduce risk to our staff and their 
families, and avoid costs and financial risks from disrupted 
operations, poor siting, and equipment failures. Further, as a cross-
cutting emerging issue, this analysis will also enable us to prioritize 
work with host governments on climate adaptation and resilience 
projects that both benefit the local population and our operations.

    Question. What additional resources does the Climate Adaptation and 
Resilience Plan initiative require?

    Answer. The FY 2023 Presidential Budget Request includes more than 
$11 billion government-wide in international climate finance, including 
$2.28 billion in foreign assistance for State Department and USAID 
climate programs, underscoring the President's commitment to tackling 
the climate crisis. A key initiative supported by these investments 
includes the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience 
(PREPARE), for which the request more than quadruples adaptation 
finance government-wide from the U.S. FY 2013-2016 average. If enacted, 
the FY 2023 request will ensure that PREPARE remains on track to meet 
the U.S. pledge of $3 billion in annual adaptation finance by FY 2024.

    Question. What can the United States do to better lead on the 
global stage and fund U.S. foreign assistance for energy and resilience 
programs?

    Answer. Our foreign assistance programs tangibly demonstrate the 
benefits of establishing open, transparent, and market-based energy and 
mineral sectors and building low-carbon, resilient economies. We are 
carrying out assistance programs to help governments develop their 
regulatory environment, technical capacity, and governance structures 
to become reliable contributors to the global clean energy technology 
market and improve supply chain resilience. Our targeted assistance 
promotes competitive procurement of energy assets and creates 
opportunities for U.S. companies to compete on a level playing field.

    Question. Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion: I have long championed 
a diverse workforce at the Department and equity in the implementation 
of U.S. foreign policy, which is why I commended last year's 
appointment of the Department's first Chief Diversity and Inclusion 
Officer--Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley. Given longstanding 
racism around the globe affecting numerous communities and our American 
troops, diplomats, students, and business professionals living and 
working overseas, I also welcomed the Department's announcement of a 
Special Representative for Racial Equity and Equity Action Plan last 
week. Both efforts demonstrate our commitment to democratic values and 
are critical to the long-term success of our foreign policy interests 
overseas, which is why I would like to work closely with you to ensure 
their success. Given the Department cited equity as a ``strategic 
National Security imperative'' and included equity in the Joint 
Strategic Plan with USAID, will the Special Representative for Racial 
Equity sit in the Secretary's front office and hold the status of 
Ambassador similar to others appointed to lead critical efforts of the 
Department?

    Answer. The Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice 
(SRRE), a Senior Executive Service-level position, will be located in 
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Front Office, given 
DRL's responsibility for a range of equity, social justice, and human 
rights. The SRRE will work with the Secretary and State Department 
leadership multilateral institutions, civil society, and host 
governments worldwide to combat systemic racism and advance the human 
rights of members of marginalized racial and ethnic communities. The 
SRRE is responsible for successfully integrating E.O. 13985 into all 
aspects of the Department's foreign affairs mission.

    Question. While the work of the Chief Diversity and Inclusion 
Officer was included in this year's budget request, I did not see a 
funding request for the Department's large-scale equity efforts, from 
increasing procurement opportunities for minority-owned businesses to 
establishing a new Special Representative for Racial Equity's office 
and work. Will you be submitting a budget request for this important 
equity work to this Committee?

    Answer. The Department Congressional Budget Justification includes 
a table on page 10 outlining DEIA priorities included in the FY 2023 
Request. The Department intends to create the Special Representative 
for Racial Equity and Justice based in DRL to embed racial equity in 
State's policies and programs and support E.O. 13985. Similar equity-
based efforts include work of the Office of Global Women's Issues, 
Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, Special Envoy for the 
Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons, Special Advisor for International 
Disability Rights, Agency Equity Team, and CDIO Officer.

    Question. We understand you completed your new Diversity and 
Inclusion Strategic Plan as required by Executive Order 14035 in March. 
We have not yet received this Plan. When do you anticipate providing us 
with this Plan?

    Answer. Pursuant to the executive order, the Department submitted 
its 5-year diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility strategic 
plan. We look forward to sharing the plan once it is released by the 
White House.

    Question. Do you intend to release it to the public?

    Answer. Yes, I intend to share the Department's diversity, equity, 
inclusion, and accessibility strategic plan with the public once it is 
released by the White House.

    Question. What steps are you taking to ensure that everyone in the 
Department is held accountable for the goals in this Plan?

    Answer. The Office of Diversity and Inclusion will lead the 
Department's diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) 
implementation team composed of senior officials from the various 
action offices and bureaus. The implementation team will meet 
quarterly, starting in the summer of 2022, to identify new DEIA 
initiatives for action that will help the Department achieve the goals 
established in the plan, measure Department-wide progress on the plan's 
DEIA goals, and update the Department's Diversity and Inclusion 
Leadership Council (DILC).

    Question. You've talked about the need to track progress in 
advancing DEIA--how does State plan to track and measure progress in 
advancing its DEIA goals?

    Answer. The Department recently established the first-ever 
demographic baseline of its direct-hire Foreign Service and Civil 
Service workforce. It is the most detailed picture the Department has 
ever had of the demographic composition of the organization--broken 
down by race, gender, and disability status across bureau, employment 
category, and rank. We just launched the first-of-its-kind Department-
wide DEIA climate survey, which, among other analyses, assesses how 
employees' experiences differ by demographic group, for all direct-hire 
Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel. We will update this 
baseline annually and conduct the DEIA climate survey biennially to 
track the Department's progress on advancing its DEIA goals.

    Question. Authoritarianism in the Americas: As President Biden has 
rallied our democratic allies and partners against the threats posed by 
authoritarian regimes globally, we must be candid about the challenges 
we face from dictatorships in our hemisphere. The Diaz-Canel regime is 
sentencing Cuba's citizens, including children, to lengthy prison terms 
for protesting peacefully. In Venezuela, Maduro is perpetrating crimes 
against humanity and deepening a humanitarian crisis that has forced 
over 6 million people to flee the country. The Ortega regime has jailed 
presidential candidates and political opponents in Nicaragua, and even 
expelled the Pope's chief diplomat from the country. These campaigns of 
repression have enabled the worst forms of lawlessness and the rise of 
illicit activities, directly threatening regional stability and U.S. 
national security interests. What additional resources are needed to 
support civil society, democratic activists, and human rights defenders 
in these three countries as a counter to the authoritarian resurgence 
we've seen in our hemisphere?

    Answer. The FY 2023 Request includes robust funding to continue 
supporting civil society, independent media and journalists, democratic 
actors, and human rights defenders in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. 
The United States will continue to stand with the people of all three 
countries, where authoritarian governments continue to suffocate 
democratic aspirations and access to information and have failed to 
protect human rights. We work to counter these threats to the region in 
all three countries and will seek to intensify our efforts.

    Question. Ukraine: What is the Administration's perspective on what 
circumstance might trigger Putin to use nuclear weapons?

    Answer. Russia's provocative rhetoric about nuclear weapons is the 
height of irresponsibility. It is dangerous and it adds to the risk of 
miscalculation. That said, there are no indications Russia has changed 
its nuclear posture in any way.

    Question. How will the Administration respond to a Russian 
demonstration of its nuclear capabilities or in the worst 
circumstances, a nuclear strike in Ukraine?

    Answer. There are no indications Russia has changed its nuclear 
posture in any way. That said, we have been very clear to Russia that 
there would be a very serious and severe response not just from us, but 
from the international community, if Russia uses a nuclear weapon. This 
Administration takes this risk very seriously and is actively engaged 
in planning for all contingencies.

    Question. President Biden warned of a ``response in kind'' to a 
Russian chemical or biological weapons attack in Ukraine; what sort of 
response is the Administration considering?

    Answer. As President Biden has said repeatedly, any use of chemical 
or biological weapons is unacceptable. If Putin does launch a chemical 
weapons attack, Russia would pay a severe price as such use would both 
be inhumane and contrary to Russia's international legal obligations. 
We will continue to make clear that there is no benefit for Russia to 
use such weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere and will coordinate closely 
with our allies and partners on any response. Additionally, we would 
impose sanctions on Russia for any confirmed use of chemical or 
biological weapons as required by U.S. law.

    Question. Do you anticipate Russian cyber tactics changing in the 
next phase of the invasion?

    Answer. Russia's cyber activities targeting Ukraine may be less 
visible than its missile and artillery bombardments, but they are key 
pieces of the Kremlin's unjustified war. I believe Russia will continue 
to use cyber operations in support of its strategic objectives in 
Ukraine and to influence public opinion regarding the conflict. Russia 
views cyber disruptions as a foreign policy lever to shape other 
countries' decisions, as well as a deterrence and military tool.

    Question. And what measures is the State Department taking to 
prepare other Eastern European countries for potential Russian 
cyberattacks?

    Answer. We are actively working with Allies and partners to ensure 
that crisis response mechanisms are in place in the event of major 
cyber incidents affecting critical infrastructure. Additionally, since 
FY 2016, the United States has provided more than $63 million in 
foreign assistance to support cybersecurity capacity development across 
Europe and Eurasia, prioritizing front-line states facing the greatest 
threat from Russia, including Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Our work 
has already improved cyber resilience and public-private partnership 
across the region. Cybersecurity capacity development and cooperation 
with Eastern Europe will remain a critical priority for the foreseeable 
future, and we will continue to prioritize this support.

    Question. How are you prioritizing the protection of women and 
girls in Ukraine as a central component of our assistance efforts?

    Answer. The U.S. Department of State's programs emphasize the 
protection of women, girls, and other vulnerable populations in 
Ukraine, in countries in Europe receiving refugees from Ukraine, and 
around the world. Whether through direct assistance or by funding 
international organizations and third parties, our programs have built 
in mechanisms to prevent and deter violence against women and girls, 
discrimination, and human trafficking in Ukraine. We also provide 
support to Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General to investigate 
and prosecute war crimes involving sexual violence. We plan to increase 
support for projects that prevent and respond to gender based violence 
(GBV) and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in the context of the 
Ukraine war, including provision of emergency assistance to individuals 
at threat of and survivors of GBV and CRSV. Programming will support 
survivor-centered, trauma-informed approaches that foster survivor and 
community resilience during and after the conflict.

    Question. Western Hemisphere Migration: The international 
community's collective inability, across successive U.S. 
administrations, to preserve democracy, curb criminal violence, 
alleviate poverty, and reverse climate change in the Americas, has led 
untold numbers of people to flee their homes. At our Southwest border, 
Venezuelans, Cubans, Mexicans, Central Americans, and Haitians, are 
hopeful that the imminent end of Title 42 means that they will again 
have a fair chance at having their asylum cases heard. But, the 
combined effects of the pandemic, deepening poverty, and protracted 
violence mean that many more will likely attempt the dangerous journey 
to the United States. While the Department's budget is a notable down 
payment to address the root causes of migration from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras, we need much larger, hemisphere-wide 
programming, to address the factors driving migration from other 
countries. So my question is two-fold: First, beyond the funding for 
Central America, can you please describe how this budget will expand 
our approach to address the ``root causes'' of migration across the 
Americas?

    Answer. The request includes nearly $100 million in bilateral and 
regional funding for hemispheric migration management to support the 
Administration's Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, the new 
Regional Migration Framework, and bilateral migration arrangements to 
reduce the number of encounters with irregular migrants at the U.S. 
southern border and to expand Colombia's model of supporting the social 
and economic integration of long-term migrants into host communities. 
Funding would expand bilateral and regional support to stabilize 
communities and reduce push factors and repeat irregular migration, 
including through community-based interventions and lawful pathway 
referral mechanisms.

    Question. And second, given the hemisphere-wide nature of the 
challenge, will you commit to ensuring that the Department of State--
not DHS--remains firmly in the lead of any discussions and/or 
negotiations with international partners on addressing regional refugee 
and migration challenges?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to lead hemispheric 
cooperation on humanely managing migration. I co-hosted the Migration 
Ministerial in Bogota in October 2021, and the Ministerial Conference 
on Migration in Panama in April 2022. The Under Secretary for Civilian 
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights traveled to the region to make 
progress on humanely managing migration, increasing access to 
protection, and discussing legal pathways with our regional partners. 
The Department of State remains the leader on all aspects of our 
bilateral relationships with foreign partners.

    Question. India-Russia: Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we 
have seen India fail to join with the rest of the international 
community in imposing punitive costs on the Kremlin. While I understand 
the shared history between Moscow and New Delhi, India has long 
championed the principles of territorial integrity and non-aggression 
in its foreign policy. As the world's most populous democracy, India 
must now stand up for those principles when it comes to Ukraine. What 
concrete steps has the Administration taken to make clear that further 
Indian purchases of discounted Russian oil or setting up a rupee-ruble 
exchange mechanism would be unacceptable?

    Answer. I am encouraging steps to reduce long-term dependence on 
energy supplies from Russia and coordinating with India to mitigate the 
impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on global energy markets. I have 
also engaged with India at senior levels to discourage any steps to set 
up alternative payment mechanisms or other measures that could 
undermine the impact of global sanctions on Russia. In those 
conversations, I relayed the United States' readiness to serve as a 
reliable supplier of energy and to support India in diversifying its 
imports.

    Question. When will the Administration provide Congress an update 
on whether it will provide a CAATSA sanctions waiver for New Delhi's 
acquisition of the S-400?

    Answer. We have not yet made a determination pursuant to CAATSA 
Section 231 regarding India's S-400 acquisition. The Administration 
will continue to provide updates to Congress as there are further 
developments. The Department continues to urge Indian counterparts to 
refrain from new purchases of Russian military equipment, given the 
potential impact of CAATSA and other sanctions authorities.

    Question. North Korea: Since the start of 2022, North Korea has 
conducted at least nine ballistic missile test, including two that the 
United States Government has determined to be part of a ``new'' 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems. Experts contend that 
the most recent ICBM launch was the heaviest ICBM North Korea has ever 
tested, capable of carrying one nuclear warhead to anywhere on Earth or 
two warheads to the United States. How is the Biden administration 
responding to these developments?

    Answer. The Biden administration has made clear that the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) unlawful and destabilizing 
ballistic missile launches have consequences, that the international 
community will not accept these actions as normal, and the only viable 
path forward for the DPRK is through diplomacy.
    We have no hostile intent toward the DPRK and remain open to 
meeting without preconditions. However, we also have a responsibility 
to address the DPRK's continued efforts to advance its unlawful WMD and 
ballistic missile programs, including by implementing existing UN 
Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).

    Question. While U.S. officials have offered to meet with North 
Korea without preconditions, suggesting that ``the ball is in their 
court,'' what active steps are we currently taking to achieve the 
complete denuclearization of the Korea peninsula?

    Answer. We have condemned the DPRK's 20 ballistic missiles launches 
as of May 18, all of which violated multiple UN Security Council 
resolutions (UNSCR) and demonstrated that the DPRK continues to seek to 
advance the capabilities of its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile 
programs.
    UN sanctions on the DPRK remain in place, and we will continue to 
press all member states to fully implement them, including through 
diplomacy at the UN and with the DPRK's neighbors. We are also in the 
process of negotiating a new UNSCR to restrict the DPRK's ability to 
advance its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs, streamline 
sanctions implementation, and further facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian aid.

    Question. Afghanistan: The reports coming out of Afghanistan now--
of Taliban executions of former government officials, street thugs 
beating female protestors, young girls prevented from attending 
school--prove what I told you last fall, Mr. Secretary. There is no 
such thing as a reformed Taliban. What we are seeing in terms of the 
regression of the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan is truly 
horrific. What is the Administration's diplomatic strategy toward 
Afghanistan in the wake of the Taliban's broken promise to allow girls 
to attend secondary school?

    Answer. Within hours of the Taliban's March 23 decision to ban 
girls' access to secondary school, we were undertaking energetic and 
focused diplomacy with our allies, regional partners, and Muslim 
majority countries and organizations to ensure that the world would 
stand united and vocal in its abject opposition to this indefensible 
decision. G7 Foreign Ministers, joined by counterparts from the United 
States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the United 
Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union condemned 
this move against Afghan women and girls' fundamental rights. Qatar, 
Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation also condemned the decision. Within days, ulemma leaders 
from across Afghanistan, as well as leaders in Pakistan, likewise 
called on the Taliban to reverse their decision. The United States 
cancelled a high-level session on economic stabilization with Taliban 
leaders that was to take place on the margins of the Doha Forum March 
26-27. We also issued instructions to our missions abroad to discourage 
any further steps by any country toward normalized relations with the 
Taliban in the wake of the March 23 decision. We will continue to work 
with allies, regional partners, and the Muslim world to ensure we are 
all undertaking concerted public and private action that leads to a 
reversal of the Taliban's ban. I cannot commit that this engagement 
will produce the reversal we all wish to see, but it is essential that 
the world speak and act with one voice on this basic human right for 
half of Afghanistan's population.

    Question. What is the status of the Administration's review of its 
Pakistan policy that it promised to conduct after the fall of Kabul 
last summer?

    Answer. The Department continuously reviews its policies and 
adjusts priorities for engagement with Pakistan, including during the 
period following the August 2021 Taliban takeover of Kabul and through 
the April 2022 political transition in Islamabad. We view our 
partnership with Pakistan as critical to our broader regional and 
global interests, including counterterrorism, stability and inclusive 
governance within Afghanistan, relocations of U.S.-affiliated Afghans, 
health security, and climate action. We will continue to brief you and 
your staff on our evolving policy towards Pakistan.

    Question. Cyber Bureau: I was glad to see the official launch of 
the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy a few weeks ago--and to see 
that building capacity in cyberspace and emerging technologies is a 
priority for this year's budget; these steps will be essential in 
addressing some of the most critical challenges in the coming decades. 
What will be the key priorities for this new bureau in the next year? 
The next 5 years?

    Answer. I see building an integrated team, while also advancing our 
diplomatic objectives, as crucial to our success over the next year. 
That means hiring the right leadership and staff throughout the bureau, 
as well as coordinating and advancing the security, economic, and 
values-based elements of cyberspace policy and diplomacy. Within the 
next 5 years, the Cyberspace and Digital Policy Bureau will be leading 
and coordinating, at State and throughout the interagency, on work with 
foreign and domestic counterparts to prove that the United States can 
build the open digital future essential to preventing cyberattacks that 
target our businesses, regulating technology that threatens our 
privacy, and defending our democratic values.

    Question. Will you commit to keeping this Committee appraised of 
the new bureau's work and to consult with this Committee on significant 
developments and decisions?

    Answer. Yes, we are committed to maintaining open and regular 
communications with the Hill on issues related to the Cyberspace and 
Digital Policy Bureau's mission, objectives, and progress. In 
introductory conversations with authorizing committees, the Bureau 
leadership will discuss its plans for proactive, regular Hill 
engagement in coordination with the Legislative Affairs Bureau. We are 
grateful for the bipartisan support as the Department re-organized to 
elevate and institutionalize these critical foreign policy issues.

    Question. Will you commit to the same [to keeping this Committee 
appraised of the new bureau's work and to consult with this Committee 
on significant developments and decisions] with respect to the planned 
Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technologies?

    Answer. Yes, my team will continue to keep the Committee informed 
about significant developments in the process for establishing the 
Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology.

    Question. Foreign Military Financing: The vast amount of Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) funds are committed every year to just three 
countries, leaving little available for the entire rest of the world. 
While this funding for those countries is important and should not be 
reduced--except, maybe, for Egypt--earmarking over 80 percent of those 
funds leaves the State Department little to allocate to other friendly 
states and partners, and little flexibility. Would you support moving 
the funding for those three countries to a new appropriated fund--to be 
used for the same purposes as FMF--and plus-up the general FMF fund 
accordingly?

    Answer. Our recent experiences with security cooperation are 
driving the Department to take a new look at possible changes to our 
authorities and our current security sector assistance framework. FMF 
remains a vital tool for the Department within this framework. But as 
you rightly point out, there is a tension between the need to signal 
U.S. commitment to certain partners through the provision of 
predictable resources that allow for long-range planning, and the 
availability of more flexible resources to respond to emerging crises 
and the changing needs for building military capabilities. This tension 
results in budgetary tradeoffs within the FMF account that may decrease 
the effectiveness of both priorities. I fully support our ongoing 
discussions with the oversight committees to explore wholesale 
modernization of our security assistance authorities.

    Question. Russia/New Start: Earlier this month, the State 
Department published the unclassified bits of the data exchange about 
the status of the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces as required under New 
START. The publication confirms that Russia and the United States 
continue to abide by the treaty. Further, the United States has paused 
its Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia following its invasion of 
Ukraine. While I am pleased that the data exchange confirms that the 
United States and Russia continue to abide by the New START treaty, 
does the Department expect New START inspections to resume when the 
COVID-related suspension expires in June?

    Answer. Although inspections have been paused by mutual 
understanding because of pandemic conditions, we are actively working 
to resume inspections as soon as possible.

    Question. Under what conditions would the United States consider 
returning to the Strategic Stability Dialogues?

    Answer. Due to Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war on Ukraine, 
we suspended the Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia and are not 
planning another session. Our objectives for next steps in nuclear arms 
control have not changed, nor has the expiration date for New START. We 
will continue working internally to be prepared to engage Russia on 
follow-on measures to New START when we assess such measures as serving 
the U.S. interest.

    Question. East Africa: East Africa is in the midst of an 
unprecedented wave of instability, including in Somalia and South 
Sudan, but particularly in Sudan and Ethiopia. The United States has 
been active in responding to the major crises of the moment by naming a 
Special Envoy early in the Administration, among other actions. 
However, fairly or not, actors on the ground point to the departure of 
Ambassador Satterfield--the second Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa 
to resign in 3 months--and the lack of a confirmed Ambassador in Addis 
as signs of policy disarray. What are the next steps in terms of U.S. 
efforts to help resolve the conflicts in Tigray, Oromia and elsewhere 
in Ethiopia?

    Answer. U.S. policy toward Ethiopia has been consistent across the 
interagency and not dependent on any one actor. Normal personnel 
changes should not indicate a policy in disarray. Our policy will 
maintain course to secure a durable ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian 
access, transparent investigations into human rights abuses, and a 
negotiated resolution to the conflict.

    Question. Iraq: The Administration's move to end combat operations 
and transition the U.S.-Iraq relationship to a strategic one centered 
on bilateral diplomacy are positive steps, which I fully support. 
However, I am concerned that the Administration's proposed cut to Iraqi 
FMF comes at a time when ISIS is trying to reconstitute itself while 
attacks on U.S. facilities by Iranian-backed proxy forces continue. 
What Iraqi priorities would no longer be funded if FMF to Iraq is 
funded at the level of the Administrations' request?

    Answer. FMF is part of the U.S. Government's strategic effort to 
build effective, civilian-controlled, self-sustaining Iraqi forces, to 
include the Peshmerga, that operate in accordance with the rule of law. 
FMF provides equipment and tactical counterterrorism training for the 
continued development and professionalization of the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) and to improve their interoperability with U.S. and 
regional forces. It also allows for the sustainment of U.S. systems 
purchased to date and assists the ISF in maintaining critical 
capabilities and previous U.S. Government investments, while providing 
training, assistance, and time for the ISF to generate self-sufficient 
sustainment capabilities.

    Question. Do you believe that Iraqi Security Forces have reached a 
level of professionalism and capability that the previous level of FMF 
is no longer warranted? If so, what led you to that assessment?

    Answer. The Iraqi Security Forces have historically received a 
range of assistance from several authorities. FMF plays an important--
but not sole--part in the U.S. Government's strategic effort to build 
effective, civilian-controlled, self-sustaining Iraqi forces that 
operate in accordance with the rule of law. I support continuing 
military assistance to Iraq in support of building capabilities and 
professionalism, and we are working to ensure that the resources are 
commensurate with validated requirements.

    Question. Embassy Baghdad Staffing: I remain concerned that the 
drawdowns of the previous Administration left Embassy Baghdad 
understaffed, relative to the size and scope of its mission. While the 
safety and security of U.S. personnel is always paramount, I believe 
that a robust diplomatic presence, including in southern Iraq, will be 
key to this new phase of the U.S.-Iraq relationship that is centered on 
bilateral diplomacy. What is your assessment of current staffing levels 
at Embassy Baghdad and what do you need to see on the ground before 
considering an increase to those levels?

    Answer. I and the team at Embassy Baghdad are committed to ensuring 
the Embassy is not only secure, but appropriately staffed to meet 
Department goals. While current in-country staffing levels in Iraq are 
temporary and reversible, they are consistent with the existing Ordered 
Departure status. As with all our posts, we continue to assess both the 
security and health environment in Iraq and hope to revert to higher 
in-country staffing levels as soon as circumstances permit.

    Question. Similarly, what would you need to see on the ground 
before reopening the U.S. Consulate in Basrah?

    Answer. The Department suspended operations at U.S. Consulate 
General Basrah in 2018 as a result of heightened security threats. We 
continue to evaluate the security situation in Basrah and will, of 
course, keep Congress appraised of any decisions.

    Question. Jordan: The Administration's request for assistance to 
Jordan is the highest such request by any administration to date and 
reflects a strong and continuing commitment to an incredibly valuable 
U.S. partner in the Middle East. I appreciate this Administration's 
commitment to helping the Jordanian Government reach a sound fiscal 
footing and would appreciate further details on how U.S. economic 
assistance will be used to incentivize important reforms by the 
Jordanian Government.

    Answer. Negotiations are ongoing with the Jordanians on the new 
assistance MOU, which we expect will include consistent annual request 
levels for Foreign Military Financing and Economic Support Fund (ESF) 
assistance, including for direct budget support. The MOU is also 
intended to include ESF-funded assistance to be provided if Jordan 
implements meaningful and achievable reforms in key sectors, which will 
be developed in consultation with the Jordanians and are intended to 
bolster Jordan's long-term fiscal health.

    Question. Syria: Eleven years on, the conflict in Syria still has 
no clear end in sight. While fighting is down, the Assad regime 
continues to escape true accountability for its heinous crimes against 
the Syrian people. Additionally, it is enabled by its support from Iran 
and Russia, which continues to threaten to veto the cross-border 
provision of desperately needed assistance, while also being emboldened 
by renewed outreach from countries like the UAE. Given the ongoing 
deadlock on a political solution under the auspices of UN Security 
Resolution 2254, what are the Administration's priorities for its $125 
million request for Economic Support Funds for Syria?

    Answer. U.S. stabilization activities are vital to preventing the 
resurgence of terrorist groups, keeping violence levels low, promoting 
accountability for the Assad regime's atrocities, and supporting an 
inclusive political solution to the conflict consistent with UN 
Security Council Resolution 2254. President Biden's budget requests for 
Syria stabilization assistance in both FY 2022 and FY 2023 reflect the 
urgent need to address the impacts of drought and food insecurity, 
deteriorating economic conditions, and the lingering impacts of COVID-
19. Stabilization assistance also provides critical support for the 
reintegration of displaced Syrians returning home to areas liberated 
from ISIS, and for the communities receiving them, promoting social 
cohesion and preventing cleavages that could drive conflict.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking to renew or 
expand the UN cross-border assistance mandate this summer?

    Answer. We are working with our allies and partners, as well as the 
United Nations and fellow members of the Security Council, in support 
of the renewal and expansion of the cross-border mechanism. As part of 
this effort, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield attended the Brussels VI 
Conference on Syria on May 10, during the United States' presidency of 
the UNSC, to emphasize that continuing and expanding UN-facilitated 
cross-border aid is a top U.S. priority. She also conveyed this message 
at a separate, Syria-focused ministerial meeting convened by the United 
States, which was attended by several UNSC members. Ambassador Thomas-
Greenfield plans to travel to Bab al-Hawa, the last remaining UN border 
crossing, in the next few weeks to highlight the importance of renewing 
the mandate. We will continue to coordinate with like-minded members of 
the UNSC to seek the support of all others for the renewal, including 
by explaining the humanitarian repercussions of a non-renewal.

    Question. What will the Administration do if Russia vetoes that 
mandate?

    Answer. We will use all means available to advocate for continued 
humanitarian access and to deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the 
Syrian people, including in the northwest, in coordination with the UN, 
NGOs, other donors, and partners. Preparations to date have confirmed 
our assessment that any contingency operations in the event of a non-
renewal will only cover a fraction of the UN's current caseload of 
assisting 2.4 million people per month through cross-border aid. The 
Department is available to provide further details in response to this 
question in an appropriate setting.

    Question. Tunisia: President Saied's continued consolidation of 
executive powers has raised many concerns that Tunisia is rapidly 
sliding back into a state of authoritarian rule. President Saied must 
recommit to the democratic principles that underpin longstanding U.S.-
Tunisia relations and work constructively with all Tunisians to further 
an inclusive and transparent reform process. Economic support funds 
(ESF) are dedicated to programs that strengthen independent 
judiciaries, protect human rights and freedom of the press, combat 
corruption, and increase public accountability and access to justice. 
The $45 million ESF request for Tunisia is nearly a 50 percent decrease 
from the requested FY22 amount. Given that Tunisia may be holding 
elections in December and is currently facing increasing economic 
problems, can you elaborate on the reasoning for the proposed cuts to 
Tunisia's economic support funding, which could be used to support rule 
of law and improved governance?

    Answer. I share your concerns about Tunisian democracy and have 
relayed them to President Saied. Reductions in the FY 2023 Request for 
economic assistance, in comparison to the FY 2022 Request, reflect 
these concerns and the priority the Administration places on democracy 
and human rights. Through our FY 2023 request, the United States will 
continue to support programming that strengthens civil society, 
government accountability, inclusive economic growth, and access to 
higher education--programming designed to help Tunisians preserve their 
democratic institutions and promote inclusive economic reform.

    Question. Lebanon: The economic crisis gripping Lebanon continues 
to push Lebanese deeper into poverty while eroding the ability of the 
government to provide services, including for upcoming elections, and 
straining the readiness of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The 
Administration's reduction of FMF for Lebanon from last year's request 
is significant, especially in light of the amount ultimately obligated 
and reprogrammed to assist the LAF last year. What is the 
Administration's assessment of the LAF's readiness and capacity used to 
justify the FMF reduction in this year's budget request?

    Answer. Despite facing the greatest challenges to operational 
readiness and internal cohesion since the Lebanese civil war, the LAF 
continues to play a critical role in mitigating further instability in 
Lebanon, without which conditions in Lebanon would certainly worsen. 
U.S. assistance bolsters the LAF's ability to maintain operational 
readiness while continuing to develop its capabilities. The Department 
works with the LAF to maintain a 5-Year Security Assistance Roadmap 
that aligns State and DoD funding with the LAF's prioritized needs. The 
FY 2023 FMF request for Lebanon rebalances FMF support to other vital 
needs globally, but maintains steadfast support for the LAF, which 
remains one of our most important partners in the region.

    Question. What steps, including funding, is the Administration 
taking to support upcoming elections in Lebanon and implement reforms 
for subsequent elections in Lebanon?

    Answer. Senior U.S. officials frequently emphasize to Lebanese 
leaders the importance of free, fair, and transparent elections, 
including the parliamentary elections which took place on May 15. The 
Administration also provides robust assistance to Lebanon. For example, 
USAID provided $2 million through the UN Development Programme's 
Lebanese Elections Assistance Project to strengthen elections 
management and promote inclusive public participation. The 
Administration also continues its support to the Lebanese Armed Forces 
and Internal Security Forces, key partners tasked with securing polling 
stations and ballot boxes. The Administration will review official 
election observation reports to guide any efforts related to reforms 
for future elections in Lebanon.

    Question. Food Security: As many countries in the MENA region 
heavily depend on Black Sea grain and other food commodity imports, 
Russia's continued illegal invasion of Ukraine threatens to have 
serious short- and long-term ripple effects in the region. In countries 
such as Syria and Yemen, who rely on food aid from the U.N. and USAID 
programs, the surging prices and shortage of essential food supplies 
risks further exacerbating food insecurity, while in other countries 
such as Lebanon, Tunisia and Egypt, increasing prices have led to 
widespread public anger and social unrest. What is the U.S. doing to 
address the worsening food security crisis in the MENA region?

    Answer. President Putin's brutal war against Ukraine has had a 
devastating effect on food security in the MENA region. Since February, 
the United States has provided more than $2 billion in emergency food 
assistance globally, including more than $450 million for Yemen and $64 
million for Lebanon. We announced an additional $337 million in 
emergency food assistance for Syria on May 10 at the EU Donor's 
Conference in Brussels. We hosted a UN Global Food Security Ministerial 
on May 18, with high level MENA representatives attending. I will 
discuss with the UN Secretary General our shared concerns about the 
growing humanitarian crisis exacerbated by Putin's war and encourage 
multilateral organizations to swiftly address the situation.

    Question. How are you considering emergency or other authorities to 
address the emerging food crisis in MENA countries that as of now are 
not considered recipients of humanitarian assistance?

    Answer. We are working with multilateral organizations including 
the World Bank and UN World Food Program to identify near term food 
security solutions. To that end, the President has also submitted a 
supplemental appropriations funding request that contains $1.6 billion 
in additional humanitarian and food security assistance to people 
around the world, including the MENA region, facing increased food 
insecurity due to Putin's war in Ukraine and other drivers. The 
supplemental request also includes additional requested funds for the 
Departments of Agriculture and Treasury to address global food 
insecurity.

    Question. Are there mechanisms that can be used to address this 
gap?

    Answer. The Department believes that multilateral institutions such 
as the UN World Food Program oversee the most effective mechanisms to 
deliver immediate and coordinated food assistance.

    Question. How does the U.S. plan to use the presidency of the U.N. 
Security Council to address the global food security crisis?

    Answer. We have used our presidency of the U.N. Security Council 
actively to address the global food security crisis exacerbated by 
Russia's brutal further invasion of Ukraine. For example, on May 18, I 
hosted a Ministerial at the U.N. attended by the Secretary General and 
a diverse group of 46 Member State Ministers, Permanent 
Representatives, and heads of multilateral agencies. Dozens of Member 
States endorsed the resulting global food security call to action, 
which reaffirms our commitment to respond to the urgent food security 
and nutrition needs of millions of people around the world. In 
addition, on May 19, I chaired an open debate in the UN Security 
Council to discuss the relationship between conflict and global food 
insecurity.

    Question. Russian Influence in Africa: Russia has expanded its 
influence in Africa through particularly insidious activities--
including the deployment of mercenaries and trainers to conflict zones, 
the use of disinformation campaigns, unscrupulous arms sales, and 
corrupt business practices. Most shocking has been the alleged 
participation of Wagner Group mercenaries in human rights abuses, 
including massacres in Mali and the Central African Republic. However, 
there seems to be surprisingly little in the budget request to deal 
specifically with the threat of malign Russian influence in Africa. How 
serious of a threat do Russian activities pose to Africa and to our 
interests on the continent?

    Answer. Russia has increasingly exploited insecurity in order to 
expand its presence in Africa, threatening African and U.S. interests 
of promoting stability, good governance, and human rights in the 
process. For example, Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other elements of 
Yevgeniy Prigozhin's enterprise have stoked conflict; obstructed UN 
missions; engaged in human rights abuses; and eroded African leaders' 
control of their national security forces in several countries. We are 
addressing Russia's malign activities by maximizing Department 
resources and diplomatic tools, including through sanctions, 
multilateral fora, countering disinformation, and bilateral 
engagements.

    Question. What are we doing to counter Russian malign influence?

    Answer. We are countering Russian malign influence in Africa in 
several ways, including support for UN and other investigations into 
allegations of wrongdoing, messaging around sanctions, and a large-
scale diplomacy campaign to warn those considering engaging with the 
Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other elements of Yevgeniy Prigozhin's 
enterprise on the threats to regional stability. For example, we are 
coordinating with partners to maximize the impact of our sanctions 
against the Wagner Group and related entities to disrupt its operations 
in Central African Republic, Mali, and elsewhere. Meanwhile, we are 
working with African partners to strengthen governance and security 
institutions, along with exposing, countering, and building resiliency 
to Kremlin-sponsored disinformation aimed at undermining the stability 
and the integrity of African democratic systems.

    Question. Suspension and Reprogramming of Assistance to Central 
America: According to a recent GAO report, the 2019 suspension and 
reprogramming of assistance to the Northern Triangle adversely affected 
implementation of many State projects. Specifically, 65 of State's 168 
projects were adversely affected. State reported that commonly 
experienced adverse effects on project implementation were delays from 
planned timeframes and decreased frequency, quality, or types of 
services provided to beneficiaries. (GAO-21-104366). What is State 
doing to overcome the effects of the suspension and reprogramming of 
assistance on the implementation of projects?

    Answer. The Department used existing prior year funding and FY 2019 
and FY 2020 funds to continue implementing programs consistent with 
U.S. Government priorities in Central America and to expand programs 
delayed and reduced due to the reprogramming.

    Question. Will you provide an update on the level of assistance 
State is currently providing compared to prior to the suspension?

    Answer. The Department and USAID allocated nearly $804 million in 
FY 2021 bilateral, regional, and humanitarian assistance for Central 
America, and the President's FY 2022 Request included nearly $861 
million to support the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of 
Migration in Central America. Prior to the reprogramming of assistance, 
the Department and USAID allocated approximately $807.5 million in FY 
2016 and $769.3 million in FY 2017 bilateral, regional, and 
humanitarian assistance to Central America.

    Question. Democracy Assistance: Multiple State bureaus are involved 
in providing democracy assistance around the world. In 2020, GAO 
reported that State officials in its case study countries said they 
generally lacked information about the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor's (DRL) democracy assistance projects, including 
project descriptions and funding amounts. State's existing information-
sharing mechanisms, including data systems and strategies, do not 
consistently address these gaps (GAO-20-173). What actions has State 
taken to improve information sharing on democracy assistance projects 
between the HQ-based DRL bureau and embassies abroad?

    Answer. DRL coordinates closely at all stages of the procurement 
cycle with relevant stakeholders, including regional offices, 
embassies, and USAID. As part of the Office of Foreign Assistance-led 
planning process, all Department offices and bureaus, including 
regional offices and embassies, can review and request changes to DRL's 
intended programming. Per DRL policy, all program solicitations require 
regional office and embassy clearance and, in consultation with the 
relevant embassy, regional desk officers serve as voting members on all 
application review panels. DRL strives to improve information flows 
with embassies by sharing information biannually regarding on-going 
programming to address knowledge gaps due to turnover at posts.

    Question. U.S. Assistance to the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen: 
Since 2015, the United States has provided intelligence, military 
advice, and logistical support to the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition in 
Yemen. In February 2021, the President announced an end to all American 
support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including 
relevant arms sales. How, if at all, has State sought to determine 
whether requested equipment is offensive or defensive in nature?

    Answer. The Department adheres to the President's February 2021 
guidance that suspended arms sales relevant to offensive operations in 
Yemen while maintaining support for Saudi Arabia's capabilities to 
defend its territory, where more than 70,000 U.S. citizens reside.
    Based on this guidance, the Administration evaluates proposed arms 
transfers on a case-by-case basis and consistent with previous use.

    Question. We understand that the Administration plans to release a 
new version of the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy in the near 
future. How, if at all, does State plan to use this policy to guide its 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transfer decisions in a way that aligns 
with the Administration's policy not to support offensive operations in 
the war in Yemen?

    Answer. The Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy provides a 
global framework under which U.S. Government agencies review and 
evaluate proposed transfers of military articles, defense services, and 
certain commercial items, to foreign countries or organizations. Under 
the CAT Policy, proposed arms transfer decisions continue to be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis to ensure transfers align with U.S. 
foreign policy and national security interests. The Administration will 
continue the policy of denying arms transfers where we believe there is 
significant risk of diversion, civilian harm, or misuse, including 
human rights abuses. While the CAT Policy does not specifically address 
the conflict in Yemen, we apply the same standards to those partners 
who are operating in Yemen.
    In reviewing and updating the CAT Policy, the Biden-Harris 
administration is working to emphasize our foreign policy priorities, 
including leading with diplomacy, elevating human rights, and renewing 
and revitalizing America's alliances.

    Question. Promoting Equity Abroad: Protests around the world 
against racism and injustice have highlighted opportunities for U.S. 
leaders to advance racial and ethnic equity and to support historically 
marginalized groups around the world. To this end, in 2021, the 
President issued several executive directives that outlined policy 
commitments for his Administration. These include advancing racial 
equity and support for underserved communities, preventing and 
combating discrimination based on gender identity and sexual 
orientation, and promoting and protecting the human rights of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transsexual, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) persons. The 
2023 Budget request provides $2.6 billion to advance gender equity and 
equality and to support underserved communities across a broad range of 
sectors. This includes $200 million for the Gender Equity and Equality 
Action Fund to advance the economic security of women and girls. How 
does State plan to spend the remaining $2.4 billion?

    Answer. The FY 2023 President's Budget Request includes an historic 
request of $2.6 billion for gender equity and equality across the 
Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, more 
than doubling such funding over the FY 2022 Request. In addition to the 
Gender Equity and Equality Action Fund (GEEA Fund), the request 
includes funding with a primary purpose of advancing gender equality 
and women's empowerment, preventing and responding to gender-based 
violence, and promoting Women, Peace, and Security. The request also 
includes funding for other assistance programming across development 
sectors and security assistance that will integrate gender equality and 
women's empowerment.

    Question. Given the Administration's focus on racial equity and 
equity for all, how does State plan to promote equity amongst other 
underserved populations?

    Answer. The Department of State employs a range of diplomatic and 
programmatic tools to address the intersectional barriers that limit 
members of all marginalized communities from fully participating in 
civic and economic life, including by integrating racial equity and 
support for underserved communities into the Department's strategic 
plans at the mission, bureau, and agency levels. For example, DRL 
champions the access, inclusion, and equality of all people by leading 
and supporting Department efforts to identify and address barriers for 
marginalized and underserved groups within a society, including those 
experiencing discrimination, violence, or other forms of injustice, 
through both diplomacy and programming.

    Question. Definitions for marginalized groups are somewhat 
expansive due to the need to include all those who may experience 
marginalization. Do you anticipate any challenges with directing 
sufficient resources to any particular group due to the number of 
populations covered by expansive definitions?

    Answer. As the lead for democracy and human rights in the 
Department, DRL supports programs that contribute to the promotion, 
protection, and advancement of nondiscriminatory practices and laws 
around the globe through strategic resource allocation to ensure that 
we are meeting the needs of all marginalized populations. DRL 
prioritizes inclusive and integrated programming to address the 
barriers to access for individuals and groups based on their unique 
needs, including communities that experience intersectional 
discrimination. Our resources are targeted based on connections between 
discrimination and the weakening of democratic institutions, and where 
specific types of marginalization are a global issue.

    Question. Your budget request expands programs to foster diversity 
and inclusion. In support of the President's DEIA-related Executive 
Orders, the Department's request is $65.6 million, which includes 
funding for 30 new positions for DEIA efforts. What efforts and how 
many positions, if any, will be directed to promoting DEIA in State's 
foreign assistance provided abroad?

    Answer. As outlined in the Department's recently released Equity 
Action Plan, the United States is addressing systemic racism and 
strengthening democracy and human dignity worldwide as a core tenet of 
President Biden's foreign assistance. In addition to orienting our 
external work around the values of diversity, equity, inclusion, and 
access, we are placing just as much emphasis on bolstering Department 
leadership to amplify and accelerate assistance that is comprehensive 
in its approach to advancing equity for all. Accordingly, we expect to 
see new and enhanced leadership across sectors and regions, the details 
of which will correspond to Department personnel announcements and 
staffing timelines.

    Question. State has taken numerous actions in response to E.O. 
13985, such as creating the Agency Equity Team and increasing the focus 
on equity in new strategy documents. How does State plan to 
institutionalize these changes, such as through multi-year funding or 
permanent dedicated staffing?

    Answer. The Department created an equity action plan outlining 
actions, commitments, and accountability mechanisms to integrate equity 
across our foreign affairs work. We will institutionalize this plan by 
prioritizing engagements with diplomatic partners from underrepresented 
and underserved communities, establishing reporting requirements and 
equity analysis tools for international aid, embedding the executive 
order principles into public diplomacy programming and communications 
strategies, updating the interpretation and application of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, and requiring reviews under current 
federal contracting processes to provide more equitable access to 
underserved and small business partners.

    Question. Child Trafficking Programs: In 2013, Congress authorized 
Child Protection Compacts (CPCs), multi-year bilateral agreements 
between the U.S. Government and selected partner countries that are 
managed by the Department of State's Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP). These compacts focus on bilateral 
efforts to prevent child trafficking, protect victims, and prosecute 
cases of child trafficking. Since 2015, J/TIP has selected five CPC 
partner countries to work collaboratively with the government through a 
joint commitment (with a sixth CPC to be negotiated soon). How, if at 
all, are these bilateral government partnerships more effective than 
individual State awards/projects in combatting trafficking?

    Answer. Child Protection Compact (CPC) Partnerships are negotiated 
with the partner government and are multidisciplinary in nature, 
engaging a wide variety of governmental institutions and systems across 
the three ``Ps'' of prevention, protection, and prosecution to reduce 
child trafficking and protect victims. Unlike our typical foreign 
assistance, foreign governments make formal commitments to address 
child trafficking and often their own investments to advance the goals 
of the partnership. This level of coordination with the CPC partner 
government is deeper than typical bilateral programs, which tend to 
focus on one or two issues or institutions within a country and are not 
intended to take the multidisciplinary approach that the CPC program 
does.

    Question. Does State believe it would be useful to adopt this type 
of compact partnership model for delivering foreign assistance in other 
areas?

    Answer. The Department is constantly examining new and innovative 
ways to be more effective with our foreign assistance funding. We 
examine each proposal on a case-by-case basis to determine what is most 
appropriate for a given program and account. However, per our response 
to your earlier question about Child Protection Compact Partnerships, 
the TIP Office has found that programs can have particularly strong and 
sustainable impacts when there is a multidisciplinary approach that 
includes increased engagement with government stakeholders at all 
levels.

    Question. Global Health Programs Funds: The Global Health Programs 
(GHP) account funds health-related foreign assistance to control the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, prevent child and maternal deaths, and combat 
infectious disease threats. Between fiscal years 2018 through 2020, 
State typically carried over an average of about $9 billion in 
unobligated balances. In fiscal year 2021, Congress appropriated $4 
billion in emergency funds to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Please 
provide an update on State's GHP obligations and describe how, if at 
all, the global pandemic is affecting your ability to obligate and 
distribute funding before available GHP funds expire.

    Answer. Please see the chart below for an update on unobligated GHP 
balances.
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    Thus far, the pandemic has not significantly impacted PEPFAR's 
ability to obligate funds before they expire. While there have been 
some costs that decreased (e.g. travel, certain program interventions 
like Voluntary Male Medical Circumcisions), there have been other costs 
that increased (e.g. virtual platforms, increased internet bandwidth, 
increased need for personal protective equipment, and increased supply 
chain costs). One significant program disruption has been to our Peace 
Corps programming given that volunteers departed most programs during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this has not yet specifically resulted 
in the expiration of funding.
    USAID fully obligated the $4 billion in FY 2021 COVID-19 emergency 
funds during FY 2021. While there continue to be challenges in the 
programming, obligation, and implementation of GHP funds as a result of 
the global pandemic, USAID remains committed to the timely obligation 
of GHP funds to achieve our three strategic global health goals. USAID 
doesn't foresee any insurmountable challenges to fully obligating FY 
2021 funds this fiscal year.

    Question. Migration and Refugee Assistance Funds: The Migration and 
Refugee Assistance (MRA) account funds assistance programs to protect 
vulnerable people around the world, including refugees, conflict 
victims, internally displaced people, stateless persons, and vulnerable 
migrants. The fiscal year 2022 request included $550 million for 
refugee admissions and resettlement efforts that would be used to 
rebuild the refugee resettlement infrastructure within the United 
States and admit up to 125,000 refugees in fiscal year 2022. Is State 
on track to admit the planned 125,000 refugees into the United States?

    Answer. In the FY 2022 Presidential Determination on Refugee 
Admissions, President Biden established a refugee admission target of 
125,000 individuals. After several years of decreasing arrivals and a 
significant reduction in the global resettlement infrastructure, we 
expect to see increased refugee arrivals this year, but do not expect 
to reach 125,000 arrivals. This ambitious goal requires significant 
effort to rebuild and expand the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, which 
the Administration remains fully committed to undertaking this work 
across the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and 
Human Services. As we rebuild, we are prioritizing efforts to restore 
the program's infrastructure and staffing, address historic backlogs of 
pending applicants, invest in new innovations to make the program more 
efficient, and increase public outreach.

    Question. Does State have allocations on the number of refugees it 
plans to admit from different geographic areas?

    Answer. In the Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions, 
President Biden approved a refugee admissions ceiling of 125,000 
individuals, with regional allocations as follows:
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    At this time, we cannot project how many refugees in total will 
arrive under each regional allocation in FY 2022.

    Question. Specifically, how many refugees from Europe, Africa, and 
Latin America does State plan to admit to the United States?

    Answer. At this time, we cannot project how many refugees in total 
will arrive under each regional allocation in FY 2022.
                                 ______
                                 

    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. On October 29, 2021, I and Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Chairman Robert Menendez wrote a letter expressing concern 
over the political and economic crisis facing Lebanon and urging the 
Administration to complement the European Union's announced sanctions 
framework. When will I receive a response to this letter? Please be 
specific.

    Answer. The Administration shares your concern over the compounding 
crises facing Lebanon and coordinates closely with our like-minded 
partners, including the European Union, to urge implementation of 
political and economic reforms and promote accountability for 
corruption in Lebanon. On October 28, 2021, the Department worked 
closely with the Department of Treasury to sanction two Lebanese 
businessmen and a member of Parliament whose actions contributed to the 
breakdown of good governance and the rule of law in Lebanon under 
Executive Order 13441. The Department takes seriously the 
responsibility to respond to Member inquiries. The Department has not 
received the letter referenced and will respond upon receipt. Please 
send the letter to [email protected].
    If you have records to indicate that the letter was sent to the 
Department, please notify us on where it was sent so we can remedy this 
issue ASAP.

    Question. Why has a response to my October 29, 2021 letter taken 
over 180 days?

    Answer. The Department has not received the letter and will respond 
upon receipt. Please send the letter to 
[email protected].

    Question. On February 1, 2022, I and House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Ranking Member McCaul wrote a letter to express serious 
concerns regarding the energy deals the Biden administration is 
facilitating between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt that would 
enrich the Assad regime and trigger U.S. sanctions under the Caesar 
Syria Civilian Protection Act. When will I receive a response to this 
letter? Please be specific.

    Answer. I understand that the Department received your letter and 
is working to finalize the response to it. We apologize for the delay, 
but given newly-confirmed leadership in the NEA bureau, we expect to 
send this letter to you very soon.

    Question. Why has a response to my February 1, 2022 letter taken 
over 85 days?

    Answer. The Department endeavors to respond to all correspondence 
from the Congress in a timely manner. We also want to make sure that 
our response appropriately addresses the concerns you have raised. We 
apologize for the delay, but given newly-confirmed leadership in the 
NEA bureau, we expect to send this letter to you very soon.

    Question. On April 20, 2022, I wrote a letter concerning U.S. 
diplomats in the People's Republic of China (PRC), their families, and 
other U.S. Government personnel under Chief of Mission authority being 
subjected to unacceptable treatment by Chinese authorities under the 
PRC's COVID-19 laws. When will I receive a response to this letter? 
Please be specific.

    Answer. The United States has no higher priority than the safety, 
health, and well-being of U.S. citizens overseas, including U.S. 
diplomats, their families, and other U.S. Government personnel. We are 
actively working with and assisting our citizens, including Mission 
personnel and their families, experiencing disruptions related to 
recent COVID-19 outbreaks in China. The Department takes seriously the 
responsibility to respond to Member inquiries. The Department has not 
received the letter referenced and will respond upon receipt. Please 
send the letter to [email protected].
    If you have records to indicate that the letter was sent to the 
Department, please notify us on where it was sent so we can remedy this 
issue ASAP.

    Question. I have also sent two letters to Ambassador Linda Thomas-
Greenfield who represents the United States to the United Nations and 
have not received a response. On June 14, 2021, I and three other 
senators wrote a letter to express serious concern over the systematic 
and widespread human rights abuses perpetrated by the Iranian-backed 
Houthis in Yemen. When will I receive a response to this letter? Please 
be specific.

    Answer. The Department of State makes every effort to respond 
substantively and expeditiously to the many communications it receives 
from Members of Congress. With regard to your letter expressing well-
founded concerns about the human rights environment in Yemen, I 
understand a response from the Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Legislative Affairs was sent to your office on October 28 of last year. 
We are attaching that letter here.

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Question. Why has a response to my June 14, 2021 letter taken over 
317 days?

    Answer. The Department of State makes every effort to respond 
substantively and expeditiously to the many communications it receives 
from Members of Congress. With regard to your letter expressing well-
founded concerns about the human rights environment in Yemen, I 
understand a response from the Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Legislative Affairs was sent to your office on October 28 of last year. 
We are attaching that letter here.

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    Question. On August 9, 2021, I and Senator Richard Durbin wrote a 
letter to propose further action by the United States Government to 
respond to the increasingly concerning situation in Belarus. Given 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine from Belarussian territory, how will you 
respond to their actions and when will I receive a response to this 
letter? Please be specific.

    Answer. We are committed to hold Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his 
regime to account for their role in supporting Russia's war in Ukraine. 
This has included sanctions action on Belarusian enterprises and 
individuals, as well as export controls and visa restrictions. With 
regard to your letter, I understand a response from the Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs was sent to your office on 
October 27 of last year. We are attaching that letter here.

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Question. Why has a response to my August 9, 2021 letter taken over 
261 days?

    Answer. The Department of State makes every effort to respond 
substantively and expeditiously to the many communications it receives 
from Members of Congress. With regard to your letter expressing well-
founded concerns about the situation in Belarus, I understand a 
response from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs 
was sent to your office on October 27 of last year. We are attaching 
that letter here.

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Question. I have submitted questions for the record to State 
Department officials for previous hearings for which I have not 
received responses, despite officials from more recent hearings having 
submitted their answers to my questions. On March 9, 2022, I submitted 
a series of questions for the record to Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs Victoria Nuland regarding Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine. When will I receive a response to these questions? Please be 
specific.

    Answer. The Department of State makes every effort to respond 
substantively and expeditiously to questions for the record submitted 
by Members of Congress. The Department provided the questions for the 
record from Under Secretary Nuland's hearing to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee May 9, 2022, prior to the May 10, 2022 hearing for 
Ambassador Bridget Brink.

    Question. The Biden administration continues to finalize and 
prepare for the public roll-out of elements of its interagency `Africa 
strategy.' Will this strategy be accompanied by a review of and, where 
necessary, a request to Congress for the resources necessary to ensure 
its successful implementation?

    Answer. Aligning our resources to the ``U.S. Strategy toward Sub-
Saharan Africa'' is critical to ensuring the strategy's successful 
implementation. We will conduct this alignment and resource review 
through our regular strategic planning processes and budget requests. I 
look forward to continued consultations with Congress on the resources 
needed to advance U.S. interests in Africa, including staffing 
requirements.

    Question. On March 9, 2022, Senator Durbin and I introduced S. Res. 
538, a bipartisan resolution expressing support for a second U.S.-
Africa Leaders' Summit, which would provide a significant opportunity 
to strengthen ties with our African partners and build upon areas of 
mutual interest. S. Res. 538 sought to build upon a speech you 
delivered in Nigeria on November 19, 2021, in which you declared the 
Biden administration's intention to host a second U.S.-Africa Leaders' 
Summit ``to drive the kind of high-level diplomacy and engagement that 
can transform relationships and make effective cooperation possible.'' 
Our resolution also reflected concern for the lack of publicly 
available information about the Summit and the failure to include 
Congress and other stakeholders in planning. What steps is the 
Administration taking to build upon the first U.S.-Africa Leaders' 
Summit, hosted during the Obama administration in 2014, and create more 
regular, sustainable, and enduring engagement between top U.S. 
Government, NGO, and private sector leaders, and those of our partner 
African nations?

    Answer. The next U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit will be hosted by 
President Biden with whole-of-cabinet participation, as well as 
bipartisan engagements with Members of Congress and official events 
with civil society and the private sector. In line with the format of 
the first U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit hosted in 2014, President Biden 
will convene select heads of state from both North and sub-Saharan 
Africa, including the African Union Commission Chair. We believe it is 
critical to engage various stakeholders and partners by starting with a 
series of listening sessions early in the process, and these 
discussions have already been undertaken. Exact timing of the Summit is 
still being evaluated and we look forward to a public announcement very 
soon.

    Question. How exactly has the Biden administration coordinated with 
African leaders, the African Diaspora, and U.S. and African educational 
institutions, private sector and civil society organizations, and 
public policy institutions in planning for the Summit?

    Answer. We, along with other members of the interagency, have had 
listening sessions with members of the African diplomatic corps; the 
African Union; members of the African diaspora; representatives from 
educational institutions, including youth from the U.S. and the African 
continent; and representatives from think tanks that focus on issues 
pertaining to the African continent to hear their concerns for a new 
and innovative leadership summit. Additional sessions are planned with 
the private sector and civil society organizations. Their input will 
help us develop a more innovative set of sessions for the summit.

    Question. How does the Administration plan to engage governors, 
mayors, and other leaders from U.S. states to ensure their active 
participation in the Summit, with a view toward transforming our 
relationship with our African partners, particularly in areas of trade 
and investment?

    Answer. We, along with other members of the interagency, have had 
listening sessions with members of the African diplomatic corps; the 
African Union; members of the African diaspora; representatives from 
educational institutions, including youth from the U.S. and the African 
continent; and representatives from think tanks that focus on issues 
pertaining to the African continent to hear their concerns for a new 
and innovative leadership summit. Additional sessions are planned with 
the private sector and civil society organizations. Their input will 
help us develop a more innovative set of sessions for the summit.

    Question. What areas were identified by the Administration during 
the EU-AU Summit in February as opportunities for the United States to 
work with our transatlantic partners to tackle massive challenges, 
including countering global malign actors, and building on the enormous 
opportunities ahead for the African continent?

    Answer. The United States and EU coordinate regularly to leverage 
efforts and maximize impact. We are working with the EU to expand 
cooperation on countering malign actors; responding to the COVID-19 
pandemic; supporting peace and security, on the principal of 
strengthening African defense capabilities; addressing the climate 
crisis and facilitating energy transition from fossil fuels; fostering 
economic development, including infrastructure and the digital economy; 
and promoting democratization, good governance, and respect for human 
rights, including gender equity.

    Question. What resources does the Administration plan to commit, 
and what mechanisms does it plan to create, to ensure that the U.S.-
African Leaders Summit is not merely an episodic event, but rather a 
sustained initiative?

    Answer. In the FY 2023 Budget, the Administration has requested 
$230 million to projects to sustain initiatives related to ALS.

    Question. The United Nations currently has six active peacekeeping 
operations on the African continent: in Western Sahara (MINURSO); 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA); Mali (MINUSMA); the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); the disputed area of Abyei (UNISFA); 
and South Sudan (UNMISS). The Biden administration's FY2023 budget 
includes $730 million to pay down ``arrears'' and requests authority to 
waive the statutory 25 percent cap on U.S. contributions for United 
Nations peacekeeping. While each UN mission in Africa plays an 
important role in the maintenance of peace and security in a particular 
country or sub-region, the United States is seeking to increase its 
investment at a time when security dynamics are shifting rapidly. 
Several peacekeeping operations remain the only viable option for 
international or African regional responses to the peace and security 
challenges. What are the most significant challenges facing existing UN 
peacekeeping operations in Africa?

    Answer. Peacekeeping missions facilitate post-conflict recovery by 
protecting civilians, preserving security, and creating the space for 
political solutions. While the UN Secretary-General and many Member 
States stress the importance of peacekeeping missions supporting 
political solutions, these are long-term endeavors that require 
persistence, political will, and resources that are provided in a 
timely manner. Political solutions to complex, recurring, and often 
intractable conflicts in Africa take years to achieve and can challenge 
the competing imperative to measure progress and plan an exit strategy 
for peacekeeping missions. Disinformation, inter-communal conflict, and 
armed group spoilers threaten to undermine progress in many African 
peacekeeping missions.

    Question. To what extent is the Department working with 
counterparts at the United Nations to reform UN peacekeeping, including 
by ensuring that operations are instruments that respond to immediate 
needs and opportunities rather than as permanent fixtures?

    Answer. The United States prioritizes peacekeeping effectiveness, 
performance, and accountability to ensure that missions have realistic 
and achievable mandates, host country cooperation, and the resources 
and trained personnel to carry out their mandates. We actively led 
efforts to adopt UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 2272 (2016) on 
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and 2436 (2018) on performance. 
UNSCR 2436 called for development of a comprehensive and integrated 
performance policy framework to hold peacekeepers accountable for 
patterns of underperformance and misconduct, including SEA. That 
framework has been developed, and we are now pressing the UN to 
implement it fully and consistently.

    Question. How is the Administration working to ensure that 
peacekeeping missions in Africa cooperate more closely with the 
continent's multilateral bodies and host countries to ensure more 
equitable burden sharing and timely transitions?

    Answer. We support close cooperation between the UN, the African 
Union (AU), and the AU's subsidiary Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), to advance more equitable burden sharing on peace and security 
efforts in Africa. We also support cooperation and coordination between 
UN peacekeeping missions and other UN agencies, funds, and programs, 
which helps provide the foundation for sustainable transitions to a 
Special Political Mission or UN Country Team.

    Question. How does the Department measure the effectiveness of the 
UN peacekeeping operations, and how does this factor into planning and 
budgeting for related bilateral and regional U.S. peace and security 
programs for Africa?

    Answer. We use a variety of tools to measure the effectiveness of 
UN peacekeeping operations, including valuable reporting from our 
posts, the U.S. Mission to the UN, and, where appropriate, the U.S. 
Mission to the African Union. We also conduct annual monitoring and 
evaluation visits to missions to meet with stakeholders across all 
levels and all functions of the mission, the host nation government, 
other international actors, and civil society representatives to assess 
the performance and effectiveness of these missions. We share reporting 
and readouts from these visits with the interagency and use that 
information to shape bilateral and regional peace and security program 
planning efforts.

    Question. In 2016, the African Union (AU) backed a proposal under 
which AU member states would commit to covering an increased share of 
the cost of African-led stabilization operations, in exchange for a 
commitment, on a case-by-case basis, that the remainder of such costs 
could be covered by assessed contributions for UN peacekeeping. In 
2018, the three African members of the Security Council introduced a 
draft resolution that could have paved the way for financing future AU-
led operations through UN assessed contributions under specific 
conditions. The draft resolution did not advance to a vote. What is the 
Biden administration's position on using UN assessed contributions to 
fund AU-led stabilization operations?

    Answer. The Biden administration is committed to working with the 
AU and its member states to explore options for predictable and 
sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations. This 
includes the potential use of UN assessed contributions, in line with 
the conditions outlined in UN Security Council Resolutions 2320 and 
2378.

    Question. What conditions would African countries and the AU need 
to meet for the United States to support such an initiative at the 
Security Council?

    Answer. In order for the United States to consider supporting the 
use of UN assessed contributions to support AU-led peace support 
operations, the African Union would need to meet a number of 
conditions. Key conditions include the African Union (1) recognizing 
UNSC oversight over any mission partially financed through assessed 
contributions; (2) adopting and implementing performance, human rights, 
and conduct and discipline frameworks; and (3) paying at least 25 
percent of the cost of any mission partially financed through assessed 
contributions.

    Question. Would the Biden administration support using UN assessed 
contributions to fund AU-led stabilization operations without a UN 
Security Council vote on each mandate?

    Answer. The Biden administration would not support the use of UN-
assessed contributions to fund an AU-led peace support operation 
without a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate. UN Security Council 
(UNSC) oversight is one of the key preconditions of any agreement on 
the use of UN assessed-funds for AU-led peace support operations. 
Appropriate UN oversight bodies, including the UNSC through resolutions 
authorizing mission mandates, must oversee UN funds.

    Question. How would the Biden administration ensure transparency 
and accountability in AU-led, UN-financed stabilization operations, 
including in cases of sexual exploitation and abuse?

    Answer. I will ensure the Department continues to communicate our 
expectations regarding transparency and accountability in all 
engagements with the African Union and its member states on the subject 
of UN financing for AU-led peace support operations. We will continue 
to use our seat on the Security Council to ensure future resolutions 
maintain the conditions set forth under UN Security Council Resolutions 
2320 and 2378, while also identifying opportunities to strengthen the 
capabilities of the AU and its member states to implement frameworks 
related to performance, accountability, and transparency.

    Question. In updated, written responses to Questions for the Record 
that you submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you committed 
to working ``with the White House and relevant State Department bureaus 
and offices to ensure that all posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
sufficiently and consistently staffed with the appropriate personnel.'' 
While the process for nominating and confirming U.S. ambassadors is not 
entirely within the Department's control, recruitment and placement of 
junior and senior positions within the Africa Bureau and at U.S. 
Missions in Africa is. Under your leadership, how has the Department 
budgeted for and taken steps to ensure that Department ``sufficiently 
and consistently'' staffs ``all posts'' in the region?

    Answer. Recruiting and assignments of Foreign Service (FS) officers 
are controlled by the Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM). We 
expect to increase our FS hiring by at least 30 percent this fiscal 
year from the previous year, which will be the highest FS hiring in a 
decade. The Entry Level Division of GTM's Career Development and 
Assignments Office works closely with the AF Bureau staff to ensure 
entry-level positions in AF are filled in a timely manner. Similarly, 
we strive to fill every available mid-level job in AF. However, the 
pool of potential candidates for AF service is diminished due to 
medical care and schooling concerns, particularly for parents of high 
schoolers or children with special needs. The Department continues to 
explore ways to remove such barriers to service. The majority of the 
vacancies in AF are at the FS-02 and FS-03 level, which reflects both 
the global shortage of FSOs due to reduced hiring and a Department-wide 
shortage of specialists in IT, facilities management, security, and 
office support.

    Question. Several recent career State Department nominees put 
forward to serve overseas in Africa, as well as here in Washington, DC, 
have demonstrated little-to-no experience working on the African 
continent. What steps is the Department taking to develop talent with 
more significant experience in Africa?

    Answer. We are always striving to send the best and the brightest 
to serve as ambassadors worldwide. We take every opportunity to lobby 
senior officers to seek ambassadorial assignments, using the HR system, 
Department notices, and reaching out to affinity groups. AF is no 
exception. Of 24 confirmed or nominated ambassadors, only three lack 
prior service in Africa. Of those three, one has served as a principal 
officer and has extensive management experience, one has served as a 
DCM and as the NSC Office Director for Afghanistan, and the third is a 
political appointee with a distinguished private sector career.

    Question. What incentives has the Department employed or 
contemplated for attracting more senior personnel, including 
ambassadors, with extensive Africa experience, particularly for hard-
to-fill posts on the continent?

    Answer. We regularly have ample interest in leadership positions 
among senior career officers, as service in the African Affairs Bureau 
is perceived to provide more opportunities for advancement. There are 
no additional incentives specific to senior personnel. Due to security 
concerns, several posts in Africa limit or prohibit accompanying family 
members, which is a limiting factor for some senior foreign service 
officers.

    Question. Economic, Trade and Investment Policy in updated written 
responses to Questions for the Record that you submitted to the 
Committee on February 1, 2021, you stated that increased U.S. trade and 
investment are ``critical to building stronger ties'' with Africa. How 
has the United States increased its ties with African countries through 
trade and investment under the Biden administration?

    Answer. Under the Biden administration, the United States has 
engaged Africa through a number of programs to increase trade and 
investment. Prosper Africa has increased diaspora outreach and 
financing opportunities, such as the San Francisco Employees' 
Retirement System investing $100 million in clean energy solutions. The 
Africa Women's Entrepreneurship Program is an incubator and networking 
platform for African women entrepreneurs. Direct Line for American 
Business provides information on opportunities and market conditions 
abroad. The Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi) increases 
women entrepreneurs' access to financing, markets, technology, and 
networks.

    Question. What more does the United States need to do to accelerate 
these efforts?

    Answer. The United States, while not a party to the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), supports its goals of enhancing 
regional value chains and increasing African integration. We will 
continue to support the AfCFTA to achieve sustainable economic 
development, build regional value chains, and increase both 
competitiveness and investment opportunities for mutual benefit. We 
continue to engage the private sector to increase trade and investment 
with Africa in pursuit of inclusive economic development, including by 
supporting increased African utilization of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA).

    Question. You stated in the same written responses, ``In Africa, we 
compete with China by ensuring that American companies can compete on 
an even playing field, providing a meaningful alternative to China's 
economic approach, promoting entrepreneurship and fair practices.'' Can 
you provide specific examples where the United States has affected how 
``we compete with China'' in Africa through the Prosper Africa 
initiative?

    Answer. Prosper Africa coordinates the tools and resources of the 
U.S. Government to facilitate two-way trade and investment with Africa 
and provide alternatives to PRC involvement. Embassy Deal Teams are an 
integral part of this effort, assisting U.S. companies to identify and 
close deals. The Djibouti Deal Team helped CR Energy Concepts close a 
deal with the Government of Djibouti to construct a $190 million 
renewable energy park--the first infrastructure project in Djibouti to 
be built by a U.S. company. Another example involved Prosper Africa 
advisors working with an Africa diaspora-owned company to secure 
financing that enabled them to prevail over a Chinese competitor on a 
cybersecurity contract.

    Question. Do you have the resources and staffing--overseas and 
domestically--to successfully manage the full range of public affairs, 
public diplomacy, and strategic communications across sub-Saharan 
Africa?

    Answer. Our public diplomacy work across sub-Saharan Africa needs 
additional resources and support. Overseas, the Bureau of African 
Affairs has the second-largest number of Public Diplomacy Sections 
(50), but ranks last in both the number of U.S. Direct Hire positions 
and overall public diplomacy budget. Of those public diplomacy 
sections, more than 40 percent are staffed by a single American 
officer. AF is slated to receive six PD positions through the FY 2022 
budgetary process, and the FY 2023 request includes 6 PD positions for 
AF both in the field and in Washington. With your support, this will be 
an important step to matching resources to priorities across sub-
Saharan Africa.

    Question. What tools or authorities can Congress provide to help 
support these important efforts?

    Answer. Approving the President's FY 2023 budget request will help 
ensure critical positions are open for recruitment as soon as possible. 
After many years of being chronically understaffed, we view this 
request as especially important in meeting needs across our missions 
and within the Bureau of African Affairs in Washington. Global power 
competitors have dedicated human and financial resources in Africa on a 
scale that puts us at a distinct disadvantage in efforts to challenge 
their influence and counter propaganda, disinformation, and malign 
activities. As you and your colleagues consider a State Department 
Authorization Bill this year, I encourage you to meet with our public 
diplomacy leadership to best understand the constraints and challenges 
we face.

    Question. Is the Department considering appointing a U.S. Special 
Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa? If not, what are the 
Department's plans for managing the ever-complex crises and challenges 
facing the Great Lakes and wider Central African region?

    Answer. At this time, I do not plan to appoint a Special Envoy for 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The Bureau of African Affairs and our 
U.S. Ambassadors to the Great Lakes countries ensure our policy 
objectives are aligned and our teams are coordinated to address the 
complex crises and challenges in this region. This is a priority and 
senior State Department officials are in close contact with Great Lakes 
country leaders, the United Nations, and multilateral partners to 
encourage progress on security, governance, economic development, 
climate adaptation, and health infrastructure.

    Question. Burundi: In March, the Burundi Human Rights Initiative 
noted, ``2021 was not a good year for human rights in Burundi. The 
national intelligence service tortured dozens of detainees, some of 
whom died as a result. Others were forcibly disappeared or held 
incommunicado. Many of the victims were opposition party members.'' The 
Department's most recent annual country reports on human rights 
practices noted for Burundi ``significant human rights abuses'' and 
cited many cases of abuse committed by or on behalf of the Burundian 
Government. The Biden administration terminated the Burundi Sanctions 
Program in 2021, and opened up several aspects of the bilateral 
relationship as part of an aggressive engagement policy with Evariste 
Ndayishimiye's government. The comparative lack of vigor by the United 
States in publicly addressing gross human rights abuses committed by 
Burundi's Government under Ndayishimiye's leadership is notable. In 
updated written responses to Questions for the Record that you 
submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you stated, ``Our 
Administration will restore democracy and human rights to the center of 
U.S. foreign policy, including in Africa.'' Can you explain how the 
Administration's current U.S. foreign policy approach to Burundi is 
centered on democracy and human rights?

    Answer. Prior to and since the termination of the Burundi Sanctions 
Program in November 2021, the Department has consistently raised our 
concerns in both Bujumbura and Washington about ongoing allegations of 
human rights violations and abuses, the space for civil society, media 
freedom, and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms. In 
addition to continuing Embassy work on this issue, Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lisa Peterson visited 
Burundi in March 2022 where she pressed these issues directly with 
government interlocutors and held numerous meetings with civil society 
organizations and individuals working on good governance and human 
rights.

    Question. How has the Biden administration addressed, publicly, 
openly, and with the same level of vigor as its diplomatic and 
bilateral re-engagement with the Ndayishimiye's government, the glaring 
record of human rights abuses committed against the Burundian people?

    Answer. The Department regularly raises our concerns about 
allegations of human rights violations and abuses in Burundi, both in 
public and private. Our messaging and engagements by senior U.S. 
officials in Bujumbura and Washington, interventions and support for 
resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, and most recently, the 
publication of the 2021 Burundi Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices in April 2022, all demonstrate publicly the full range of 
concerns we have about reported human rights violations and abuses in 
the country. We will continue to publicly press the Government of 
Burundi to improve the human rights situation in the country and use 
all other appropriate tools to do so.

    Question. How does the Ndayishimiye government's performance on 
human rights abuses rate against other African governments in the East 
Africa/Great Lakes region?

    Answer. The Great Lakes Region of Africa continues to experience 
widespread reports of human rights violations and abuses as covered in 
the Department's 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
Although the reports do not rank countries or draw comparisons across 
them, Burundi's human rights record is concerning. The 2021 Burundi 
Country Report on Human Rights Practices contains credible reports of 
significant human rights issues including extrajudicial killings, 
forced disappearances, torture, and restrictions on fundamental 
freedoms. The Department continues to actively engage the Government of 
Burundi and other regional governments on the importance of advancing 
the protection of human rights.

    Question. Which is more important to the Biden administration: the 
reform-minded focus projected by the Ndayishimiye's government or its 
well-documented human rights abuses?

    Answer. I welcome the reforms undertaken by President Ndayishimiye 
since June 2020. We are encouraging the Government of Burundi to 
continue progress and deepen reforms, especially in the area of human 
rights. Our messaging and engagements by senior U.S. officials in 
Bujumbura and Washington, interventions and support for resolutions at 
the UN Human Rights Council, and most recently, the publication of the 
2021 Burundi Country Report on Human Rights Practices demonstrate our 
concerns about reported human rights violations and abuses. We will 
continue to press the Government of Burundi to ensure accountability 
and respect for human rights, even as we engage in other areas to 
advance the Government of Burundi's reforms.

    Question. Does the Administration plan to re-designate, under other 
U.S. sanctions or related accountability mechanisms, those individuals 
previously designated under the Burundi Sanctions program terminated in 
November 2021?

    Answer. In line with our global commitment to promote respect for 
human rights and accountability, the Department continues to consider 
the use of all available tools to respond to any new or continuing 
human rights violations and abuses in Burundi. These include assessing 
the applicability of visa restrictions and economic sanctions, 
including Section 7031(c) and the Global Magnitsky sanctions program, 
in connection with allegations of serious human rights abuses. While we 
do not preview potential visa restriction or sanctions actions, we 
regularly assess individuals and entities reportedly involved in 
serious human rights abuses for designation under appropriate 
authorities.

    Question. Cameroon: In updated written responses to Questions for 
the Record related to Cameroon that you submitted to the Committee on 
February 1, 2021, you stated, ``An end to violence, and accountability 
for its perpetrators, is needed. It is important that children attend 
school and that aid can be delivered. More broadly, political dialogue 
is needed to resolve this ongoing conflict and to improve respect for 
human rights. If confirmed, I will review the different tools we have 
to press for a resolution of this conflict and to hold human rights 
violators accountable, including sanctions.'' What specific actions has 
the Department taken under your leadership to ``press for the 
resolution of'' the Anglophone conflict and to ``hold human rights 
violators accountable, including sanctions''?

    Answer. I have directed our efforts to work with likeminded nations 
to condemn violence against civilians in Cameroon by government and 
nonstate actors and to urge an inclusive dialogue with a broad range of 
stakeholders. We have imposed visa restrictions on those undermining 
the peaceful resolution of the crisis and we have maintained 
suspensions on U.S. security assistance and AGOA eligibility to 
Cameroon. We continue to work within the interagency to hold 
accountable individuals living in the United States for any illegal 
actions that perpetuate violence. Ambassador Lamora in Yaounde has 
underscored these principles and expectations in his full range of 
engagements since arriving in country earlier this year.

    Question. Does the Department continue to believe that the `Swiss 
process' remains the most viable path to getting all parties to the 
conflict to the table to agree to cease hostilities and find a 
sustainable approach to peace?

    Answer. We and likeminded partners, including the Swiss, continue 
to encourage constructive actions by all parties to bring a peaceful 
resolution to the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest regions. While 
that process must be Cameroonian-owned to be successful, the 
international community can play a positive role in facilitating a 
resolution through continued engagement with key government officials 
and a range of stakeholders, particularly those both in Cameroon and in 
the diaspora who are actively seeking peaceful solutions for their 
communities.

    Question. What other avenues exist to end hostilities in the 
Anglophone conflict and to begin working toward peace?

    Answer. There are positively inclined actors in government, as well 
as civil society members and others, who are pursing pathways to peace. 
The government should accelerate decentralization and special status to 
the Northwest/Southwest regions, as agreed during the 2019 Grand 
National Dialogue. Armed groups must allow children to go to all 
schools and end kidnappings, lockdown days, and forced contributions. 
Diaspora leaders should demonstrate a willingness to engage peacefully 
with a range of stakeholders in Cameroon, including the government, and 
cease activities and statements that fuel violence. We encourage 
exploring Cameroonian stakeholders' receptivity to facilitation from 
senior, well-respected African leaders.

    Question. What specific steps can the United States take--on its 
own or in coordination with international and regional partners--to 
help improve the conditions affecting the education of more than 
700,000 children because of conflict in Cameroon?

    Answer. We and likeminded partners have engaged Cameroon on the 
need to ensure access to education throughout the country as a critical 
step towards peace. Nonstate armed groups must cease the violence that 
has prevented children from attending school. The government must 
engage in an inclusive national dialogue to address the root causes of 
the conflict, to include calls for access to bilingual education. We 
support civil society working in education and humanitarian assistance, 
and the World Bank's Prevention and Resilience Allocation, which seeks 
to improve education access, among other fragility indicators. We also 
work with UN and NGO partners to facilitate school enrollment of 
displaced children in host communities.

    Question. Central African Republic: In updated written responses to 
Questions for the Record that you submitted to the Committee on 
February 1, 2021, you committed to assessing ``what more can be done to 
counter malign Russian influence in the CAR mining and security 
sectors.'' After more than a year, what have you assessed regarding 
``what more can be done to counter malign Russian influence the CAR 
mining and security sectors''?

    Answer. We have consistently raised concerns with President 
Touadera related to CAR's partnership with the Kremlin-backed Wagner 
Group, including human rights abuses by Wagner and national security 
forces, which limits traditional partners' ability to work with the CAR 
government. To address CAR's security needs, we support the UN mission 
in CAR, which helps build the capacity of Central African security 
forces and supports security sector reform. The Department engages with 
the Kimberley Process, UN, and CAR authorities to prioritize 
transparency in the mining sector. We are also exploring actions with 
countries that import illicit minerals to limit Wagner and other 
Yevgeny Prigozhin-linked entities' profitability.

    Question. What specific actions has the Department taken under your 
leadership to respond to these challenges in CAR?

    Answer. To counteract the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and Yevgeny 
Prigozhin-linked entities' destabilizing activities in CAR and Africa, 
the bureaus of African and European affairs--along with our embassies 
abroad, other Department offices, and interagency partners--have 
coordinated closely to: (1) hinder Wagner's ability to operate with 
impunity; (2) in meetings with African leaders and civil society, 
spotlight Wagner's destabilizing activities; (3) engage with UN members 
and offices to highlight Wagner's human rights abuses and obstruction 
of the UN mission in CAR (MINUSCA); and (4) counter pro-Russian and 
anti-UN disinformation in collaboration with partners.

    Question. Chad: What is the United States doing to help restore 
civilian rule in Chad, and does the Biden administration believe that 
the military-led junta supports democratic rule?

    Answer. Since April 2021, the United States has called for a 
peaceful, timely transition of power to a democratically elected, 
civilian-led government in Chad. I continue to support efforts, 
diplomatic and through programming of modest appropriated resources, 
that will lead to an inclusive national dialogue, constitutional 
referendum, and free and fair elections, which includes reaching a 
peace agreement between the Chadian transitional government and rebel 
groups at the negotiations underway in Doha. Transitional Military 
Council President Mahamat Deby has publicly stated his intentions not 
to stand for election and that the Transitional Military Council will 
cede power following elections--we must hold him to his pledge.

    Question. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Do you believe the 
funds committed to support the DRC's 2023 elections are sufficient, 
given the importance the United States has placed on democratic and 
economic reforms in post-Kabila policy toward the country?

    Answer. The Administration is prioritizing support for free and 
fair DRC 2023 elections, held within the prescribed constitutional 
timelines and using inclusive electoral processes, as part of its 
efforts to ensure that the U.S.-DRC Privileged Partnership for Peace, 
Prosperity, and Preservation of the Environment (PP4PPP) delivers for 
the Congolese and American people. USAID is supporting the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which provides 
direct technical assistance to the DRC's electoral commission (CENI). 
USAID and the Department of State are reviewing allocated resources to 
determine if additional support is needed, including from other 
international partners, ahead of the 2023 elections.

    Question. Equatorial Guinea: Senior officials from the Biden 
administration reportedly made several trips to Equatorial Guinea to 
meet with the country's leaders about vital bilateral issues, but 
chiefly to discuss reported plans by the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) to increase military cooperation with and presence in this 
coastal Central African state, located along the Atlantic Ocean. Does 
the United States regard Equatorial Guinea as an ally? If so, why? If 
not, why not?

    Answer. Equatorial Guinea is a potential partner of the United 
States in maritime security and other areas. The United States has not 
worked closely with the Equatoguinean Government for many years. We are 
still evaluating what new bilateral initiatives will achieve our aims. 
What we do know is that our nonengagement has not affected the desired 
change. As we have stepped up our level of cooperation with Equatorial 
Guinea over the past year, we are affording them an opportunity to 
change their mindsets and behaviors by word and deed and become a more 
responsible partner.

    Question. The Government of Equatorial Guinea is authoritarian, 
notoriously corrupt, and has one of the worst human rights records in 
the world. Does the Biden administration regard the government as a 
reasonable actor with whom the United States can engage in normal 
diplomatic relations to address our reported national security concerns 
regarding the PRC?

    Answer. Promotion of respect for human rights and good governance 
remain central to our efforts and is a cornerstone of U.S. policy 
towards Equatorial Guinea. We prioritize the fight against corruption 
globally and seek real commitment from the Government of the Republic 
of Equatorial Guinea to counter the corruption that threatens security, 
economic equity, and development. We welcome greater partnership across 
the full spectrum of Equatoguinean society to advocate for responsive 
governance that will increase transparency and promote respect for 
human rights.

    Question. At what point in the reported developing military and 
security relationship between Equatorial Guinea and the PRC would the 
United States publicly regard the Central African country as a threat 
to the United States and change its policy approach to treat the 
government as such?

    Answer. The United States does not expect the Government of the 
Republic of Equatorial Guinea to end partnerships with other countries, 
but we have made clear that certain potential steps involving PRC-
basing activity would raise U.S. national-security concerns both for 
the United States and Equatorial Guinea's neighbors.

    Question. What current or planned regional initiatives are the 
United States using or developing to counter the reported threats posed 
by an increased PRC military presence in Equatorial Guinea and, 
potentially, the wider littoral region along Africa's Atlantic Coast?

    Answer. We share the concern of our African and European partners 
over potential militarization of the Gulf of Guinea. This includes the 
possible construction of a PRC military installation. We engage 
frequently with countries facing security challenges in the maritime 
domain. Our long-term and emerging partnerships with African states are 
vital for addressing immediate threats such as trafficking and piracy 
and building capacity in the region to ensure long-term security and 
economic growth. We would like to support Equatorial Guinea and other 
African states to collaborate on shared concerns, including maritime 
security, support for blue economies, and environmental preservation.

    Question. Rwanda: In updated written responses to Questions for the 
Record that you submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you 
committed through your team to follow closely Paul Rusesabagina's case 
in Rwanda. In your comment regarding the issue, you also noted, ``I 
will make clear that the human rights of all prisoners, including Paul 
Rusesabagina, should be respected.'' Understanding that Deputy 
Secretary Wendy Sherman and other Department officials recently made 
direct reference to Rusesabagina's trial and treatment to Rwanda's 
Foreign Minister, have you ever personally made clear to any Rwandan 
officials that ``the human rights of all prisoners, including Paul 
Rusesabagina, should be respected''?

    Answer. The Department presses the Government of Rwanda (GOR) to 
respect the human rights of all prisoners. Mr. Rusesabagina's case 
highlights the critical importance of fair trial guarantees and all 
applicable legal protections that Rwanda owes to all persons. We remind 
the GOR that these guarantees and protections are recognized in 
applicable domestic laws of Rwanda, as well as in Rwanda's 
international obligations as a party to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. In addition, the publication of the 2021 
Rwanda Country Report on Human Rights Practices communicates the full 
range of concerns we have about reported human rights violations and 
abuses, including those related to prisoner conditions and treatment.

    Question. Do you plan to raise this matter of Paul Rusesabagina 
personally to Rwandan officials at your next opportunity?

    Answer. The Department regularly engages the Government of Rwanda 
on this case at high levels in both Kigali and Washington, and we 
evaluate all diplomatic engagements with Rwanda with this case in mind. 
In recent months, we escalated our engagement to senior level U.S. 
Government officials, including the Deputy Secretary and the USAID 
Administrator. We will continue to evaluate all appropriate 
opportunities for engagement in the future that could lead to the 
release of Mr. Rusesabagina.

    Question. The Horn of Africa in the updated written responses to 
the Questions for the Record you submitted to the Committee on February 
1, 2021, you agreed when asked if the United States would better serve 
its national security interests in the region if we had a more 
comprehensive and coordinated interagency approach toward the Greater 
Horn of Africa. Throughout your tenure as Secretary, the complexities 
and acute need for such an approach have only grown. Under your 
leadership as Secretary, what specific actions have the Department, and 
the broader Biden administration, taken to ensure a more comprehensive 
and coordinated interagency approach regarding the Greater Horn of 
Africa?

    Answer. I appointed a U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa in 
April 2021 to boost our international diplomatic effort in addressing 
the broader political, security, and humanitarian crises in the Horn of 
Africa. Since then, we have seen some positive steps in de-escalating 
the conflict and improving humanitarian access in Ethiopia, as well as 
in coordinating a humanitarian response to the drought in the region. 
We will continue this work, while also focusing on supporting a 
democratic transition in Sudan, mitigating the negative impact of 
Eritrea's activities in the region, and addressing other regional and 
transnational issues.

    Question. Do you believe the Administration used the U.S. Special 
Envoy for the Horn of Africa adequately to address the myriad of 
challenges in the region beyond just those in Ethiopia and Sudan?

    Answer. The Special Envoy and his team have been critical in 
addressing several transnational and transregional challenges that are 
beyond the scope of any single U.S. embassy in the region. In addition 
to his work on internal crises in Ethiopia and Sudan, the Special Envoy 
has been a key interlocutor with Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia on the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and maintained close contacts 
with Gulf states who play a key role in various issues in the region.

    Question. Would the United States having a more dedicated Special 
Envoy or another senior advisor better serve our response to crises in 
Ethiopia and Sudan, particularly given crises elsewhere in the Horn of 
Africa region?

    Answer. The Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa (SEHOA) and his 
team have done well in advancing U.S. interests and assisting in the 
de-escalation and resolution of various crises in the region. The 
current SEHOA office remains well-suited for the challenges we face, 
and we remain open to adjusting as needed.

    Question. Eritrea: What is the U.S. policy toward containing the 
malign and increasingly destabilizing role of Eritrean President Isaias 
Afwerki in the Horn of Africa region, including Eritrea's growing 
cooperation with China and other malign regional actors?

    Answer. Eritrea's continued intervention in the conflict in 
northern Ethiopia and the horrendous human rights abuses Eritrean 
forces have committed there threaten regional stability. The United 
States has consistently and publicly called for Eritrean forces to 
withdraw from Ethiopia. We have imposed financial and other sanctions 
on Eritrea for obstructing efforts to resolve the conflict and for 
committing human rights violations. We are closely monitoring Eritrea's 
growing diplomatic relationship with strategic competitors, including 
the PRC and Russia.

    Question. Ethiopia: How is the United States holding those 
countries or foreign contractors accountable that have and continue to 
sell lethal drone and other weapons systems to the parties to the 
conflict in northern Ethiopia?

    Answer. The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) has announced sanctions on Iran's Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) and its expeditionary unit, the IRGC Qods Force, 
for, among other things, proliferating lethal UAVs to Ethiopia.
    The United States encourages other countries to impose restrictions 
on defense trade with Ethiopia and Eritrea. On November 1, 2021, the 
Department of State amended the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) to codify that it is the policy of the United States 
to deny licenses and other approvals for exports of defense articles 
and defense services to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, 
or other internal security forces of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

    Question. What metrics is the United States using to gauge the 
progress and intention of the major parties to the conflict in northern 
Ethiopia regarding existing efforts towards, provision of humanitarian 
access, and accountability for atrocities committed in the course of 
the conflict?

    Answer. The United States uses a combination of metrics and 
benchmarks to help gauge the intention of the parties to the conflict. 
Examples of metrics are the number of trucks entering Tigray or the 
amount of cash approved for humanitarian NGOs. Benchmarks, which we 
associate with the steps required for the Ethiopian Government to 
restore African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) benefits, include 
engaging in ceasefire talks, allowing unhindered humanitarian 
assistance, and granting access to human rights monitors. The United 
States uses these to complement statements and concrete actions by the 
parties, such as ceasing airstrikes on the part of the Ethiopian 
Government or withdrawing forces into Tigray on the part of the TPLF.

    Question. Do you agree or disagree that there is important value in 
the United States providing a clear determination regarding the 
atrocities committed during the conflict in northern Ethiopia? Please 
explain.

    Answer. Making a determination that atrocity crimes have occurred 
is an important tool available to the Secretary of State. In the case 
of the conflict in northern Ethiopia, we believe a diplomatic 
resolution is the most effective means to halt and prevent atrocities 
in the immediate term. This is our urgent priority, and we are actively 
working to that end. Throughout the conflict, we have repeatedly called 
out alleged human rights abuses as credible evidence has been reported 
or shared. This is why we support the independent UN commission of 
experts and encourage the government to allow them access to the 
country.

    Question. Kenya plans to hold general elections in August 2022, 
which we expected to be contentious, have a strong ethnic dimension, 
and risk likely violence. How is the U.S. engaging with Kenya's leaders 
in the lead up to these elections, and what specific efforts is the 
Administration making to help ensure the country holds free, fair, 
credible, transparent and peaceful elections?

    Answer. The United States continues to promote free, fair, and 
peaceful elections in Kenya through our diplomatic engagement, 
programs, and public messages. Our Charge d'Affaires, a.i. in Nairobi 
and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs have engaged directly 
with the two leading presidential candidates to underscore our 
expectations that they will support a free, fair, and peaceful election 
in word and deed. President Biden and Secretary Blinken met directly 
with President Uhuru Kenyatta to encourage a peaceful transition of 
power. Together with the UK and other likeminded partners, we are 
working with the government and civil society to strengthen civic 
education, improve electoral processes and oversight, increase human 
rights protections, and mitigate violence.

    Question. Somalia: Does the Department view Somaliland as a viable 
candidate for a closer defense and security partnership in the Horn of 
Africa region?

    Answer. There are prospects for closer security and defense 
cooperation with Somaliland nested within the framework of our single 
Somalia policy given our recognition of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The Department is 
implementing border security and financial intelligence capacity 
building and collaborated with Somaliland on man-portable air defense 
system collection and destruction. We have offered to discuss 
additional security assistance with Somaliland within the framework of 
our single Somalia policy and strategy.

    Question. What specific steps has the Department taken, or plan to 
take, to build a stronger defense and security relationship with 
Somaliland?

    Answer. In 2021, the Bureau of Counterterrorism offered targeted 
border security and watch listing assistance to Somaliland and began a 
program to strengthen the Bank of Somaliland Financial Intelligence 
Unit's capacity to combat terrorist financing and money laundering. The 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provided 
technical assistance on vessel boarding, search, and seizure operations 
and maintenance to the Somaliland Coast Guard to increase Somaliland's 
capacity to patrol coastal waters, interdict illicit goods, and 
cooperate with land-based police investigators, as well as provided 
limited communications and maritime patrol equipment.

    Question. In a recent Congressional Notification from USAID, there 
was a distinct change of focus in programming from Somalia's federal 
government in Mogadishu toward Federal Member States and structures. 
Does this reflect a broader U.S. policy change regarding Somalia?

    Answer. The United States supports the development of effective 
democratic institutions at all levels of the Somali Government. USAID's 
FY 2021 Congressional Notification is consistent with last year's 
requests for two priorities: (1) addressing the structural conditions 
that allow violent extremist organizations such as al-Shabaab to 
maintain a foothold in Somali society; and (2) reducing chronic 
humanitarian need that compromises the wellbeing and stability of the 
Somali people. The Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration via partners engages with all regional administrations in the 
parameters of the U.S. Government's single Somalia policy.

    Question. Tanzania: Has the Department assessed Tanzanian President 
Samia Suluhu Hassan's role in eroding the country's democratic 
institutions and suppressing opposition voices and democratic actors 
while she served as Vice President of Tanzania under the administration 
of President John Pombe Magufuli? Please explain.

    Answer. As former President Magufuli's vice president, President 
Hassan publicly supported many of his policies that undermined 
democratic institution, although while serving in this role, President 
Hassan was not involved in many major policy decisions of the Magufuli 
administration. Since assuming the presidency, President Hassan has 
changed the government's tone and rhetoric, re-engaged with the 
international community, loosened media restrictions, and engaged with 
opposition leaders. The Department remains cautiously optimistic about 
President Hassan's willingness to engage on more substantive democratic 
reforms.

    Question. Has the Department determined if President Hassan bears 
any responsibility for the anti-democratic actions and rights abuses 
that occurred under the previous president?

    Answer. As former President Magufuli's vice president, President 
Hassan publicly supported policies that resulted in the shrinking of 
democratic and civil society space, limits on media freedom, and the 
rise in politically motivated violence that occurred during the 
Magufuli presidency. Given that President Hassan has changed the 
government's tone and rhetoric, re-engaged with the international 
community, loosened media restrictions, and engaged with opposition 
leaders, we are focused on working constructively with President 
Hassan's government to support a political environment that protects 
democratic institutions, civil and political rights, and human rights, 
including as related to accountability.

    Question. What benchmarks is the Biden administration using to 
gauge the level and pace of U.S. re-engagement with Tanzania under 
President Hassan's government?

    Answer. We are assessing the direction of President Hassan's 
administration using a variety of factors, including the following: (1) 
substantive improvements to democracy, human rights, and governance, 
including changes to legislation; (2) Tanzania's level of re-engagement 
with the international community; (3) progress on anti-trafficking-in-
persons efforts; (4) improving responsible security cooperation; (5) 
improving the investment climate; (6) continued efforts to mitigate the 
spread of COVID-19; (7) improving the environment for refugees; and (8) 
Zanzibar addressing 2020 election violence, electoral reform, and 
political reconciliation.

    Question. Uganda: The Department's most recent annual country 
reports on human rights practices noted for Uganda, ``human rights 
organizations, opposition politicians, and local media reported that 
security agencies tortured suspects as well as dissidents to extract 
self-incriminating confessions and as punishment for their opposition 
to the government, leading to several deaths.'' Why has this 
Administration been slow to act with available tools beyond Global 
Magnitsky sanctions on one individual to hold those in Uganda's 
security agencies and government accountable for the long-running and 
ongoing trend of torture to suppress democratic actors in Uganda?

    Answer. The Department remains gravely concerned about credible 
allegations of the use of torture by Ugandan security forces. In March, 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Lisa 
Peterson conveyed these concerns during her trip to Uganda and urged 
government officials to seek accountability for alleged abuses. In 
April 2021, the Department announced an INA Section 212(a)(3)(C) visa 
restriction policy for persons whose actions undermine Ugandan 
democracy, ``including through use of violence and excessive force 
against opposition candidates and supporters.'' Since then, we have 
designated numerous individuals and continue to assess others under 
this authority and other authorities at our disposal.

    Question. Angola: Angola's ruling People's Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the government's security and 
intelligence services have a long record of manipulating and 
interfering in electoral processes in their country for their political 
benefit. During the current electoral cycle, in the lead-up to the 
polls in August, worrying signs of history repeating have emerged. How 
is the United States engaging with the Angolan Government to encourage 
the country to hold free, fair, credible, and transparent democratic 
elections in August, free from interference from the Angolan security 
forces and intelligence services?

    Answer. We have consistently communicated to high-level Angolan 
officials, including to President Lourenco, the desire to see free, 
fair and transparent elections, including the timely provision to 
accommodate international observers. Deputy Secretary of State Sherman 
emphasized these same points during her recent travel to Angola and 
meeting with President Lourenco. In response, President Lourenco has 
said Angola will allow international observers and facilitate their 
applications for the credentials they need before election day. U.S. 
assistance programs have also supported civil society groups and all 
political parties working with the public to increase civic engagement.

    Question. What specific steps is the Department contemplating to 
hold election spoilers accountable, and how is the United States 
communicating this to Angolan officials?

    Answer. In the months leading up to the elections, U.S. officials 
have repeatedly raised and will continue to emphasize with Angolan 
officials that electoral transparency and integrity are fundamental 
priorities and hallmarks of a democratic nation. The Department will 
continue to use engagement around its annual Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices and periodic Bilateral Dialogues on Human Rights to 
hold Angola accountable on issues including anti-corruption, access to 
justice and accountability for past abuses, expansion of democratic 
governance, and protection of fundamental freedoms.

    Question. Hakainde Hichilema's presidential victory in 2021 served 
as a critical moment in both Zambia and the region's democratic 
development. The success or failure of President Hichilema's presidency 
will hinge on his reforms, approach to governance, and an essential 
factor not entirely within his control--restructuring Zambia's 
approximately $17.3 billion in external debt, of which Chinese state 
and commercial creditors account for about one-third. How is the United 
States supporting the government of Hakainde Hichilema to deleverage 
their country from the stranglehold of Chinese debt?

    Answer. The United States uses its position on Zambia's creditor 
committee to call for an immediate end to Beijing's intransigence on 
multilateral debt restructuring negotiations. Deputy Secretary Wendy 
Sherman met the Zambian Foreign Minister and Treasury Secretary on May 
19 to discuss a coordinated response to Beijing's continued 
obstructionism. Our public and private diplomacy has highlighted the 
centrality of private sector-led growth to sustainable development in 
Zambia. Under Secretary Jose Fernandez conveyed this message to 
President Hichilema and U.S. business leaders during his May 12-13 
visit to Lusaka. We are also pursuing programs that help Zambia 
scrutinize PRC contracts and expose problematic debt.

    Question. What steps can the United States take alongside its like-
minded allies to support Zambia's democratic consolidation under 
President Hichilema while also minimizing the country's exposure to 
China's (often-malign) influence?

    Answer. Public, private, and financial support for accountability 
institutions, civil society, and independent media will bolster 
Zambia's democratic resilience. The United States can work with 
likeminded partners to develop and deploy targeted programs in support 
of Zambia's Summit for Democracy Year of Action commitments to enshrine 
media freedoms, protect civil liberties, and strengthen the 
independence and transparency of the Elections Commission of Zambia. 
Supporting the government's planned fiscal reforms with an emphasis on 
transparency and reducing opportunities for corruption will help re-
establish fiscal stability and deliver a ``democratic dividend'' to the 
Zambian people.

    Question. How is the United States supporting the continuation of 
multi-party democracy in Zambia to continue the consolidation of 
democracy in Zambia and ensure checks and balances on the Hichilema 
administration?

    Answer. U.S.-funded programming advances the decentralization of 
power in Zambia, moving decision-making and critical services from the 
capital city to local governments. Embassy officials work closely with 
civil society and media, government, and political parties to improve 
the legal and regulatory framework for elections, political reforms, 
and greater transparency in public resource allocation. U.S. technical 
assistance and financial support also build the viability and quality 
of independent media and the capacity of civil society organizations to 
monitor government actions and ensure citizen perspectives are 
considered. Our support for Zambia's participation in the Summit for 
Democracy will also spur democratic reforms.

    Question. In the updated written responses to the Questions for the 
Record you submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you 
committed to assessing ``the current U.S. approach to Zimbabwe, 
including opportunities for greater regional engagement'' and to 
``review the sanctions program as well as our democracy assistance 
(political party support, anti-corruption work, and support to the 
media).''
    After more than a year as Secretary and with potentially violent 
undemocratic general elections held in Zimbabwe in 2023, what has been 
your assessment of the current U.S. approach to Zimbabwe, particularly 
opportunities for African regional engagement?

    Answer. I share the Committee's concern around ongoing democratic 
backsliding and potential for escalating violence in advance of the 
2023 general elections. The current U.S. approach to Zimbabwe supports 
democratic governance programs that improve electoral processes, refine 
citizen advocacy strategies, and enhance public accountability 
measures. We will continue these programs while leveraging our targeted 
sanctions to promote accountability for corrupt actors and those who 
abuse human rights and undermine democratic processes. We will continue 
to work with regional governments, civil society organizations, and 
likeminded partners to increase the pressure on the Government of 
Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human rights.

    Question. What conclusions have you drawn regarding the U.S. 
approach to sanctions on Zimbabwean officials and entities and our 
democracy assistance, notably supporting strengthening political 
parties?

    Answer. The U.S. approach to sanctions promotes accountability of 
corrupt actors and those who abuse human rights and undermine 
democratic processes. Our democracy assistance improves electoral 
processes, refines citizen advocacy strategies, and enhances public 
accountability. We do not currently support strengthening political 
parties in Zimbabwe due to the assessment that it would not be 
effective so close to 2023 elections, and that it could bolster a 
perception that we are intent on regime change vice free and fair 
elections. We will continue democratic governance programs, working 
with civil society, regional governments, and likeminded partners to 
increase the pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe to respect 
democratic principles and human rights.

    Question. What changes to U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe occurred 
under the Biden administration?

    Answer. U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe has been clear and consistent 
during the Biden-Harris administration and several prior 
administrations. We call on the Government of Zimbabwe to respect the 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in Zimbabwe's 2013 constitution and 
required through its international commitments. We publicly voice 
support for those who speak out against government corruption and 
abuses. We leverage our targeted sanctions program to deter bad acts 
and promote accountability for bad actors. We support many democracy-
assistance programs and work with civil society, regional governments, 
and likeminded partners to increase pressure on the Government of 
Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human rights.

    Question. The Sudans: Are there plans to appoint a Special Envoy to 
Sudan and South Sudan following the departure of Ambassador Booth from 
the role in late 2021?

    Answer. Both Sudan and South Sudan remain a policy focus for the 
Biden-Harris administration. Assistant Secretary Phee is actively 
engaged on developing and implementing administration policy on both 
countries and, in the case of Sudan, coordinates closely with the 
Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa. The Administration continues to 
monitor the situation in both countries closely and engage at senior 
levels to achieve policy objectives.

    Question. Are there plans to reorganize the Bureau of African 
Affairs to eliminate the Office of South Sudan and Sudan?

    Answer. Both Sudan and South Sudan remain a policy focus for the 
Biden-Harris administration. Assistant Secretary Phee is actively 
engaged on developing and implementing Administration policy on both 
countries. There are no plans to eliminate the Office of South Sudan 
and Sudan.

    Question. Sudan: Why is the United States not leading the charge in 
restoring Sudan's civilian-led transition to democracy, but instead 
supporting a diplomatic and political path that continues to entrench 
military-led rule and the restoration of officials from the autocratic 
regime of Omar al-Bashir?

    Answer. The United States continues to lead in pressing for the 
establishment of a civilian-led transition to democracy in Sudan. We 
have been clear that the military needs to cede authority to civilian 
leadership and exit politics in line with the views of the Sudanese 
people. We are supporting an inclusive political process facilitated by 
UNITAMS, the AU, and IGAD as the best vehicle to establish a framework 
for civilian leadership of the transition. In coordination with the 
Friends of Sudan, we are increasing financial pressure on the military 
leadership by maintaining a pause on certain international assistance 
and debt relief and will continue to use, as appropriate, available 
domestic authorities to apply sanctions on persons responsible for, 
inter alia, serious human rights abuse such as the Central Reserve 
Police.

    Question. What steps is the Administration taking to hold 
accountable those military and security officials responsible for the 
October 2021 coup in Sudan that resulted in the ousting of the 
civilian-led transitional government?

    Answer. Immediately following the military takeover, the United 
States paused new obligations from the $700 million in Title IX ESF 
while evaluating next steps. We subsequently redirected certain foreign 
assistance to avoid benefitting the Government of Sudan. We also worked 
with international partners to encourage them to do the same, including 
pausing debt relief, and have engaged with the international financial 
institutions in this regard. The United States sanctioned the Sudanese 
Central Reserve Police (CRP) to impose costs on those perpetrating 
serious human rights abuse, including the use of lethal force against 
protesters. We remain poised to use all tools at our disposal to 
support the Sudanese people in their pursuit of a democratic and 
prosperous Sudan that respects human rights.

    Question. At the end of 2020, Congress appropriated $700 million in 
Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the FY21 budget to support Sudan's 
democratic transition. Due to delays in programming the $700 million, 
and the October 25, 2021 coup that removed Sudan's civilian leadership 
from power, the majority of the $700 million remains unobligated and is 
set to expire on September 30, 2022. What are the Department's 
priorities for the balance of the $700 million in ESF for Sudan?

    Answer. The Administration is planning for the FY 2021 $700 million 
in Title IX Economic Support Funds that Congress appropriated. Our 
plans focus on areas that we assess are most likely to establish and 
further a civilian-led transition to democracy in Sudan. Priorities 
include support to the tripartite facilitated and/or related 
negotiation processes; democracy, human rights, and governance; 
accountability and transparency; peacebuilding in the peripheries; and 
food security and resilience. We have initiated consultations with 
Congressional committee staff and look forward to working closely with 
Congress to shape priorities and programs.

    Question. Is the Administration considering options for using the 
balance of the $700 million that do not directly involve Sudan, the 
broader Horn of Africa, or the African continent? If so, please 
explain.

    Answer. The Administration's priority is to work with Congress to 
use these funds in a responsible way to establish and further a 
civilian-led transition to democracy in Sudan and are continuing our 
planning in that regard. All of the funds in the draft spend plan are 
for Sudan at this time.

    Question. South Sudan: Does the Administration regard President 
Salva Kiir as the legitimate democratic leader of the Republic of South 
Sudan? Please explain your answer.

    Answer. While not democratically elected, Salva Kiir is the 
President of the Republic of South Sudan during the transitional period 
as agreed by the signatories of the Revitalized Agreement on the 
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan signed on 
September 12, 2018. The transitional period originally planned for 36 
months has been extended to February 2023.

    Question. As discussed in my S. Res. 380, which passed the Senate 
by unanimous consent on December 9, 2021, the United States spends more 
than $1 billion per year on the fallout of the conflict in South Sudan, 
mostly for humanitarian assistance and through contributions to the UN 
peacekeeping mission UNMISS. In 2018, President Trump called for a 
review of U.S. assistance to South Sudan, to ensure that U.S. funds are 
not contributing to the war economy or inadvertently perpetuating 
conflict.
    What is the status of the assistance review begun under the Trump 
administration with the State Department as the lead agency underway?

    Answer. The Administration is concluding our assessment of the 
assistance review of South Sudan proposed by the prior administration 
and will be sharing data from that review with Congress in due course. 
The Administration is committed to ensuring that foreign assistance 
programs in South Sudan are consistent with our objectives to promote 
political, economic, and security sector reform. The Department will 
continue to work with the NSC, USAID, and others to ensure that 
programs are strategic, effective, and have adequate oversight to 
mitigate risks of diversion or obstruction of aid or perpetuation of 
kleptocratic governance.

    Question. What policies is the Department pursuing to reduce the 
need for U.S. humanitarian assistance to South Sudan due to persistent 
conflict?

    Answer. Pursuing the sustainment of the permanent ceasefire and 
advancing political, economic, and security sector reforms are our key 
policies objectives and are necessary to reduce South Sudan's 
dependence on international humanitarian assistance. To further these 
policy objectives, the Department regularly presses South Sudan's 
leaders to expand political space, to advance legal and policy reforms 
necessary to establish functioning government institutions, and to end 
ongoing human rights violations and abuses. The United States--in 
rotation with Norway and the United Kingdom--co-chairs South Sudan's 
Public Financial Management Oversight Committee and uses this forum to 
press the South Sudanese Government to use its resources transparently 
for the benefits of its citizens. We continue to support financially 
the regional mechanisms responsible for monitoring and verifying South 
Sudan's peace agreement and its associated ceasefire, and as a vocal 
participant in those mechanisms we continue to press all sides to live 
up to their obligations under the peace agreement, including through 
the advancement of promised security sector reforms.

    Question. Is the United States discussing any novel policy 
approaches to South Sudan related to the country's leaders, the peace 
agreement (R-ARCSS), and pervasive corruption?

    Answer. The United States, in close consultation with our 
international partners, is actively working on a range of policy 
initiatives to support the South Sudanese people's demands for 
meaningful political and economic transformation in their country. This 
includes helping the people in South Sudan establish the necessary 
conditions to allow them to choose their leaders freely and to hold 
leaders accountable for their actions.

    Question. The Sahel: Which Sahelean country is the most stable and 
reliable U.S. security and diplomatic partner? Please explain why.

    Answer. The United States engages with the countries of the Sahel 
to advance our security, diplomatic, and economic interests. Niger and 
Mauritania stand out as key partners that are stable democracies 
focused not only on security, but on improving citizen-responsive 
governance to ensure longer-term stability and prosperity. Niger is a 
reliable and willing partner with a firm commitment to democratic 
processes. It is a member of the Multinational Joint Task Force, the G-
5 Sahel Joint Force, and the D-ISIS Coalition, where it co-chairs the 
Africa Focus Group. Our engagement with Mauritania focuses on shoring 
up a key U.S. ally and reformist government in the Sahel, one that can 
serve as a model of good governance and countering violent extremism in 
the region.

    Question. In the updated written responses to the Questions for the 
Record you submitted to the Committee on February 1, 2021, you stated 
that you were ``concerned about rising violent extremism, growing 
humanitarian concerns, and increasing governance challenges in the 
Sahel.''After more than a year as Secretary, what has the Department 
done to address your concerns in the Sahel?

    Answer. The Department participated extensively in a National 
Security Council process to finalize a 5-year Sahel Strategy. The 
strategy is based on the assessment that instability in the Sahel is a 
political problem with security implications, thereby necessitating a 
greater governance-focused solution. Given the persistent, negative 
trend lines for stability in the region, we see this as a moment to 
address the root causes and core grievances in the region to support 
stability. Senior leaders from Washington have joined our embassies in 
pressing for political and development reforms, urging accountability 
in security efforts, and identifying openings for greater security and 
development support. We joined the Sahel Alliance in order to better 
coordinate with partners on non-security projects for long-term 
stability. Without more resources, however, our impact will be limited.

    Question. Should the Biden administration appoint a U.S. Special 
Envoy for the Sahel to better address and coordinate the United States' 
response to this myriad of challenges?

    Answer. At this time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for West 
Africa is undertaking the activities of the Special Envoy role. The 
remit for the Sahel as part of the broader West Africa allows better 
integration of efforts across the Sahel and Coastal West Africa, which 
I view as an asset as threats from the Sahel spread. The DAS is in 
constant engagement with the Sahel Special Envoys of our closest 
partners and travels regularly to the region. The Department hosts 
monthly interagency meetings with our embassies across the Sahel to 
ensure policy synergy. Central to our approach, as codified in the 
Sahel Strategy, is working closely with international partners to 
address drivers of conflict, with an emphasis on support for African 
institutions and mechanisms.

    Question. Given the equally daunting and complex challenges in West 
Africa and the Sahel, should the Department have two deputy assistant 
secretary positions--one for the Sahel and one West Africa?

    Answer. We are increasingly concerned by the spread of insecurity 
emanating from the Sahel into Coastal West Africa. A deputy assistant 
secretary responsible for the Sahel as part of the broader West Africa 
region allows us to look at this problem-set as a whole. It provides 
for a more holistic analysis of the drivers of conflict and the means 
to address those drivers while keeping our embassies in the field 
apprised of critical developments in their region. A single deputy 
assistant secretary helps us to maintain policy consistency on cross-
cutting issues and streamlines officers and offices with Sahel and West 
Africa equities. It also allows us to engage, leverage, and support 
West Africa's primary regional bloc, the Economic Community of West 
African States, from a shared perspective.

    Question. If having a separate Deputy Assistant Secretary is not 
possible, should the Department consider a more dedicated Sahel 
coordinator to divide the large workload of the Sahel and wider West 
Africa region?

    Answer. Given the dynamic interplay between the Sahel and the 
broader West Africa region, as well as the Economic Community of West 
African States' (ECOWAS) active engagement on the Sahel, the Department 
assesses that retaining a Deputy Assistant Secretary to cover the Sahel 
and the wider West Africa region remains preferable. The Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for West Africa currently advances efforts in the 
Sahel, as guided by the Sahel Strategy as well as collaborates with the 
interagency, which include our Sahelian Embassies, via daily policy 
coordination in Washington. With appropriate staffing, this arrangement 
optimally advances U.S. interests.

    Question. Nigeria: Should the United States support strengthening 
the institutions of political parties in Nigeria's democratic system? 
If so, how? If not, why not?

    Answer. The United States believes political parties constitute an 
important component of Nigeria's democratic evolution. Ahead of 
Nigeria's 2023 general elections, we are focusing our election support 
on providing technical assistance to Nigeria's independent electoral 
commission and bolstering civil society capacity. One objective of our 
support to civil society is to promote public discourse and encourage a 
greater focus on issue-based politics. We engage on a regular basis 
with Nigeria's leaders, including during my November trip to Abuja, to 
urge continued steps towards a more responsive and transparent 
political system.

    Question. Why is it in the national interests of the United States 
to sell AH-1Z Cobra attack helicopters to Nigeria?

    Answer. The primary goal of U.S.-Nigerian security cooperation is 
to build a more professional and accountable Nigerian Armed Forces 
(NAF) that respects human rights and protects civilians. Military 
assistance is only one aspect--albeit a critical one--of addressing 
Nigeria's security crises. This potential sale of a more modern 
platform fulfills the NAF's requirement for a close air support 
capability to advance Nigerian and U.S. shared interests of defeating 
terrorist forces, protecting humanitarian convoys, defending vulnerable 
communities, and reducing the risk of civilian casualties. Furthermore, 
this sale builds on the successful A-29 Super Tucano sale and the 
subsequent training and engagement between DoD and the NAF.

    Question. How will the Administration monitor Nigeria's adherence 
to human rights-related commitments to the United States and 
specifically related to equipment provided through U.S. foreign 
military sales and security assistance?

    Answer. The Administration consistently raises the importance of 
respect for human rights and accountability for human rights violations 
and abuses at all levels of the Nigerian Government. We also consult an 
array of Nigerian and international civil society organizations to 
understand their perspectives on Nigeria's adherence to its human 
rights-related commitments. Regarding U.S. foreign military sales and 
security assistance, the Administration provides human rights-focused 
training and technical assistance to the Armed Forces of Nigeria, 
including training on international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, and mitigation of civilian casualties. We will not 
provide assistance to units implicated in human rights violations.

    Question. Iran and JCPOA: The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
(INARA) requires the President to submit to Congress any agreement 
related to Iran's nuclear program. Will you commit to submitting any 
deal with Iran for review and a vote by Congress, as required by the 
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)?

    Answer. We are committed to ensuring the requirements of INARA are 
satisfied.

    Question. Do you plan to comply with the law and submit any Iran 
nuclear agreement to Congress for a vote?

    Answer. We are committed to ensuring the requirements of INARA are 
satisfied.

    Question. We previously discussed that the decision to delist the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist 
organization was with the President for final decision. As we're all 
aware, the IRGC arms Iranian proxies across the Middle East, is 
actively trying to assassinate former U.S. officials, and was 
responsible for the deaths of over 600 Americans in Iraq. Are you 
prepared to remove the IRGC designation as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO)?

    Answer. The IRGC's FTO designation will only be revoked if Iran 
takes necessary actions to merit a revocation.

    Question. Has the IRGC stopped behaving as a terrorist organization 
in a way that would support removing the listing?

    Answer. The IRGC's FTO designation will only be revoked if Iran 
takes necessary actions to merit a revocation. Beyond its FTO 
designation, the IRGC and several of its components are also designated 
a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) and Iran is designated 
as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.

    Question. You and the National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, 
have indicated that Russia will be allowed to continue nuclear work 
under a new nuclear deal with Iran. In fact, the Russian state-owned 
company RosAtom, currently on the ground in Ukraine, will likely reap 
up to $10 billion for continued nuclear work under the JCPOA. How are 
you ensuring that Russia does not use a financial windfall from a new 
nuclear deal with Iran to continue Putin's assault on Ukraine?

    Answer. The JCPOA, UNSCR 2231, and previous UN Security Council 
Resolutions related to Iran all acknowledge Russia's engagement with 
Iran regarding the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Such cooperation was 
never sanctioned under any of these tools. It remains in our interest, 
and the interest of our partners in the region, that Russia continues 
to provide the support necessary for the safe operation of this nuclear 
facility. Separately, we are working with our allies and partners to 
reduce our reliance on the Russian energy sector, including in the 
nuclear energy area.

    Question. What specific mechanisms are in place to ensure this 
money is not used to commit war crimes in Ukraine or Syria?

    Answer. The Administration has a robust, interagency effort 
dedicated to monitoring and implementing our sanctions regimes with 
respect to Russia, Iran, and Syria. We will watch developments closely 
and are committed to working with our allies and partners to counter 
any attempts to evade these sanctions.

    Question. American Disengagement from the Middle East: This 
Administration's relationships with our Middle East partners are at an 
all-time low. Our partners bemoan the Administration's Iran policy, 
view the Afghanistan withdrawal as a measure of American commitment, 
and saw an initially weak embrace of the Abraham Accords and greater 
restrictions placed on security assistance. Many of our traditional 
partners are moving closer to Russia and China. Would you characterize 
your Middle East policies as effective?

    Answer. Our efforts in Yemen have led to a truce that continues to 
hold, allowing a vital respite for a weary population. Working groups 
established at the Negev Summit, which brought together ministers from 
the United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and the UAE in Israel, 
will advance cooperation on security, food and water security, 
education, energy, health, and tourism. Our diplomatic and economic 
engagements with regional security partners show our commitment to 
long-term relationships with broad benefits. Elevation of the 
Administration's priorities of human rights and democratic values 
support fundamental freedoms and civil society. The PRC and Russia have 
not shown the will nor capacity to resolve regional conflicts. Their 
indifference to human rights and human dignity limits their ability to 
strengthen relations in the region.

    Question. What are you doing to rebuild relationships in an 
important region?

    Answer. We are deepening our relationships in the Middle East in 
order to deescalate conflicts, better integrate the region, and improve 
the lives of the millions of people. I fully support the Abraham 
Accords and normalization agreements with Israel, which are yielding 
greater stability and security. Beyond security, we are committed to 
multilateral diplomacy, engaging the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on 
innovation, climate change, and food insecurity. In recent meetings 
with leaders across the region, I have reaffirmed our commitment to 
close cooperation and to our enduring presence. The Administration's 
elevated attention to human rights will create space for people in the 
region to realize their aspirations and strengthen bilateral 
relationships. The U.S.-brokered Project Prosperity creates tangible 
energy and water cooperation between Israel, Jordan, and the UAE.

    Question. What role should high-level visits play in the effort to 
rebuild relationships in an important region?

    Answer. In March, I met with foreign ministers from Israel, the 
UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at the Negev Ministerial to build on 
the Abraham Accords and normalization agreements in the region, and I 
traveled to Morocco and Algeria to promote greater regional stability. 
Most recently, I joined the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, and 
CIA Director in a delegation to the UAE. These visits and others from 
senior leaders across the U.S. Government signal our commitment to 
long-term partnerships in the region and are important for addressing 
global challenges together with our Middle East partners. Engaging 
directly with civil society leaders and other individuals also deepens 
our relationships within these societies.

    Question. Syria Policy and Caesar Act Enforcement: The Caesar Act 
is intended to prevent rehabilitation of the Assad regime, seek 
accountability for the regime's atrocities, and advance a political 
solution to the conflict. Unlike the previous administration, we have 
seen very few Caesar sanctions under the Biden administration. Why have 
you issued so few sanctions?

    Answer. Our sanctions, including under the Caesar Act, are an 
important tool as we seek accountability from the Assad regime, notably 
with respect to its human rights abuses. This Administration remains 
committed to pressing for accountability and justice for the Syrian 
people, including through the use of targeted sanctions. On July 28, 
2021, the United States imposed sanctions on eight Syrian prisons and 
five Syrian regime officials who were implicated in human rights abuses 
and the ongoing suffering of the Syrian people. On December 7, 2021, 
the United States designated two senior Syrian Air Force officers 
responsible for killing civilians in chemical weapons attacks and three 
senior officers in Syria's repressive security and intelligence 
apparatus. We will continue to use all available tools, including 
Caesar Act sanctions, to further press for accountability for the 
ongoing atrocities of the Assad regime.

    Question. While you may not be encouraging normalization with 
Assad, you are certainly not discouraging it. What are you doing to 
prevent our Arab partners from normalizing with Assad?

    Answer. We continue to make clear to partners in the Middle East 
and beyond that we do not support efforts to normalize with Damascus. 
We also do not support Syria's return to the Arab League and continue 
to oppose the reconstruction of Syria until there is irreversible 
progress towards a political solution. We clearly and publicly conveyed 
our profound disappointment with Bashar al-Assad's recent visit to the 
United Arab Emirates. In discussions with partners, we continue to 
underline the Assad regime's ongoing horrific atrocities against 
Syrians, including over the last decade, as well as its continuing 
efforts to deny much of the country access to humanitarian aid and 
security. Targeted sanctions and multilateral resolutions we lead at 
the UN deter investment and underscore the reputational risk of 
normalizing with Assad. We have made this position clear to governments 
across the region and beyond at the highest level.

    Question. The Caesar Act mandates that you provide technical 
assistance to document war crimes. What assistance have you issued to 
date?

    Answer. U.S. stabilization assistance supports the work of 
grantees, including Syrian civil society organizations, to collect 
evidence of atrocities in Syria, some of which the United States has 
determined rise to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
This work has focused on gathering and analyzing evidence of 
atrocities, which may be used to build case files to prosecute 
perpetrators of these crimes. These efforts help provide critical 
evidence to both informal and formal transitional justice mechanisms, 
such as the Commission of Inquiry, the International, Impartial, and 
Independent Mechanism (IIIM), and national criminal proceedings, to 
promote accountability. U.S. assistance also supports survivors of 
atrocities and their families with critical resiliency, mental health, 
and psychosocial support.

    Question. Syria: The upcoming UN Security Council (UNSC) Syria 
Cross Border mandate renewal is of grave concern to me and my 
colleagues in Congress. Not only should this Administration work to 
renew the one remaining crossing, Bab Al-Hawa, but it should actively 
work to build consensus in the Security Council to re-open previously 
closed crossings. How would you or our Ambassador to the UN engage with 
partners in the UNSC to ensure this mandate renewal passes?

    Answer. We are working actively with our allies and partners, as 
well as the United Nations and fellow members of the Security Council, 
in support of the renewal and expansion of the cross-border mechanism. 
As part of this effort, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield attended the 
Brussels VI Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region 
on May 10, during the United States' presidency of the UNSC, to 
emphasize that continuing and expanding UN-facilitated cross-border aid 
is a top U.S. priority. She also conveyed this message at a separate, 
Syria-focused ministerial meeting convened by the United States, which 
was attended by several UNSC members. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield 
plans to travel to Bab al-Hawa, the last remaining UN border crossing, 
in the next few weeks to highlight the importance of renewing the 
mandate. We will continue to coordinate with like-minded states on the 
Security Council and to urge all members to support the renewal, 
including by explaining the humanitarian consequences of a non-renewal.

    Question. Would you recommend that President Biden engage at the 
highest possible levels on this important issue?

    Answer. This Administration engaged with UN Security Council 
members at the highest levels of government to secure passage of 
Security Council Resolution 2585 last year. We will do whatever is 
necessary and appropriate, to secure the renewal of the mandate for 
cross-border aid this July.

    Question. How will you work to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars 
that fund UN humanitarian assistance are not being used to effectively 
subsidize the Assad regime, which blockades assistance to Syrians 
through seizure of cross-line assistance delivery attempts?

    Answer. We take all possible steps to ensure that humanitarian 
assistance funded by American taxpayers reaches those for whom it is 
intended. We carefully monitor the risks associated with providing aid 
in all parts of Syria and work closely with our partners, other donors, 
and the United Nations on this issue. We also support the UN's efforts 
to negotiate a new preferential exchange rate for aid provided in 
regime-held areas.

    Question. Do you believe that cross-line assistance is an 
acceptable modality of delivery of humanitarian assistance or as an 
alternative to cross-border?

    Answer. We support using all modalities to deliver humanitarian 
assistance to Syrians in need, including both crossline and cross-
border mechanisms. However, we have been clear and consistent with 
Security Council members, allies, partners, and the United Nations that 
given the numerous challenges of delivering crossline aid, it cannot 
match the scale and scope of cross-border aid into northwest Syria. 
Since the passage of UNSC Resolution 2585, there have been four UN 
crossline missions to northwest Syria. However, the latest crossline 
mission delivered food aid for 43,500 people. By contrast, in a typical 
month, UN cross-border aid through Bab al-Hawa delivers enough food for 
1.4 million people. Frankly, there is no comparing the two.

    Question. In the event of non-renewal of the Syria cross border 
mandate, what preparations have been made to continue to support 
Syrians with life-saving aid?

    Answer. We will use all means available to advocate for continued 
humanitarian access and to deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the 
Syrian people, in coordination with the UN, NGOs, other donors, and 
partner countries. Preparations to date have confirmed that any 
contingency operations in the event of a non-renewal will only cover a 
fraction of the UN's current caseload of assisting 2.4 million people 
per month through cross-border aid, which includes food, health, 
shelter, and water. In any emergency response, we expect humanitarian 
agencies to prepare for all reasonable scenarios, so life-saving aid 
reaches those who need it. The Department is available to provide 
further details in response to this question in an appropriate setting.

    Question. Has the U.S. Government consulted with partners and 
allies on alternatives and contingency plans for continuing to support 
Syrians with life-saving aid? If so, what are those plans?

    Answer. Since the start of this Administration, we have had regular 
consultations with partners and allies on the best ways to maintain 
humanitarian access and deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the 
Syrian people, including in the northwest. Those channels will remain 
open up to and beyond the vote to reauthorize UN cross-border aid to 
Syria this July. The Department is available to provide further details 
in response to this question in an appropriate setting.

    Question. What steps are the United Nations and UN agencies taking 
to appropriately plan for the event of non-renewal?

    Answer. We are in constant discussion with the UN about 
humanitarian needs in northwest Syria and the importance of meeting 
them through all means available. In any emergency response, including 
in Syria, we expect humanitarian agencies to prepare for all reasonable 
scenarios, so life-saving aid keeps flowing to those who need it. The 
Department is available to provide further details in an appropriate 
setting.

    Question. Have all UN agencies operating in NW Syria adequately 
planned for this event?

    Answer. We are in regular contact with all UN agencies about 
humanitarian needs in northwest Syria and the unique mandates and 
capabilities that each agency brings to this humanitarian response. We 
constantly stress to UN agencies the importance of meeting needs in 
northwest Syria through all means available. The Department is 
available to provide further details in an appropriate setting.

    Question. Have all UN agencies operating in NW Syria created plans 
for eventual hand-off to local partners if non-renewal happens?

    Answer. We are in constant discussion with all UN agencies and our 
NGO partners about the need to support local humanitarian partners in 
northwest Syria and across the whole of Syria. NGOs play an 
indispensable role in this response, and we support efforts to enhance 
their capacities, up to and beyond the July vote to re-authorize UN 
cross-border aid. The Department is available to provide further 
details in an appropriate setting.

    Question. Global Health Security: We have spoken repeatedly--
publicly and privately--about the need for the Department of State to 
take a stronger leadership role in global health security. This 
committee has approved bipartisan legislation--the International 
Pandemic Preparedness and COVID-19 Response Act--that would help 
achieve that goal by establishing a structure for effective leadership 
and coordination, built upon PEPFAR's proven model. The Department was 
repeatedly consulted on the bill, and relevant technical assistance has 
been incorporated. What is the status of efforts to establish an 
organizational structure within the Office of the Secretary that 
elevates global health diplomacy and ensures effective coordination of 
USAID and CDC global health security activities without diminishing 
PEPFAR?

    Answer. The Department is conducting a review of our organizational 
structure related to global health security and diplomacy. The review 
has involved consultations with stakeholders across the Department, 
U.S. Government interagency, non-governmental sector, and Congress. We 
seek to strengthen the Department's organizational structure to best 
advance U.S. interests in building global health and global health 
security capacity and ensures that we have enhanced policy and 
programmatic leadership as well as better integration of global health 
within the Department. We will continue to consult with Congress as 
this process moves to conclusion.

    Question. The bill also provides a roadmap for establishing an 
accountable international financing mechanism for pandemic 
preparedness. Here again, I understand planning is advancing quickly, 
yet there has been little conversation with Congress. The President's 
budget request includes $6.5 billion in mandatory spending, reportedly 
so you can make a multi-year commitment to this yet-to-be-consulted-or-
established financing mechanism. This is a major departure from past 
practice, and it certainly wasn't envisioned in the bill approved by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. What is the status of efforts 
to establish an international financing mechanism for international 
pandemic preparedness?

    Answer. The United States is closely collaborating with 
international partners to establish a pandemic preparedness and global 
health security financial intermediary fund (FIF). On April 20, most 
G20 members agreed on the need for a new financing mechanism, and the 
Indonesian G20 Presidency called for the World Bank (WB) to launch the 
process to establish the FIF. This success carried into the Second 
Global COVID-19 Summit on May 12, where World Bank President Malpass 
reiterated the Bank's commitment to establish the FIF by end of June. 
An additional U.S. pledge of $200 million unlocked new donor 
commitments (EU $450 million; Germany 50 million euros), and we look 
forward to additional announcements in the coming months.

    Question. Why would the President request $6.5 billion in mandatory 
spending, reportedly to support the establishment of an international 
financing mechanism for pandemic preparedness, before knowing how it 
will be governed, how and where resources will be targeted, how 
progress will be measured, and how implementers will be held 
accountable for results?

    Answer. The Administration believes strongly that the United States 
can lead an effort to develop a pandemic preparedness and global health 
security financial intermediary fund (FIF) that would fill well mapped 
investment gaps. Resources from the FIF would be channeled to programs/
projects at the global, regional, and country level through a set of 
accredited implementing partners. These entities would be required to 
meet agreed standards as well as following their own established 
operating policies and procedures for implementation. The World Bank 
would apply its fiduciary standards as trustee and the governing body 
will draw on best practices to ensure transparency, accountability, 
clear results indicators.

    Question. The budget request also includes $2 billion (+$440 
million) to support the first year of an anticipated $6 billion 
commitment to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
(the Global Fund) while reducing funds available for bilateral 
tuberculosis programs (^$21.5 million) and the bipartisan, 
Congressionally-authorized President's Emergency Program for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) program (^$20 million). Is it your view that the Global 
Fund is more efficient and effective than PEPFAR, thereby justifying a 
major shift in funding, or is it the intent of the Administration that 
the Global Fund would take on greater responsibility for procuring 
antiretrovirals, thereby enabling PEPFAR to focus its shrinking 
resources on service delivery?

    Answer. The Administration did not cut the PEPFAR program in the FY 
2023 budget request. In FY 2022, Congress provided $20 million more to 
PEPFAR than the Administration had requested. However, after the 
appropriation was finalized, we were unable to incorporate the $20 
million increase for PEPFAR in the Congressional Budget Justification 
given time constraints resulting from delays in the appropriation. The 
Administration's FY 2023 budget request, therefore, reflects a flatline 
for PEPFAR rather than a decrease. The Global Fund and PEPFAR have 
worked effectively to leverage the strengths the Global Fund brings, 
for example, in procurement, with PEPFAR's on-the-ground service 
delivery strengths at the country level.

    Question. The Putin regime's unprovoked, brutal war against Ukraine 
has exacerbated the conditions driving food insecurity globally and has 
had a particularly damaging impact on fragile states in East Africa, 
North Africa, and the Middle East. Given how the 2007-2008 global food 
price crisis provoked riots and economic and political instability in 
countries from Africa to South America, it is clearly in the national 
security interests of the American people to respond. Remarkably, and 
despite claims that the Administration is seeking to ``reinvigorate 
U.S. humanitarian leadership'', the FY 2023 budget request proposes to 
cut humanitarian assistance by nearly 18 percent, relative to FY 2022 
enacted levels. While in full agreement that other donors need to step 
up and do more, how can you justify an 18 percent decrease in 
humanitarian assistance accounts at a time when displacement and food 
insecurity levels are at all-time highs?

    Answer. The Department is concerned with the unprecedented and 
growing global humanitarian needs, which have been exacerbated by 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The FY 2023 request includes $10.45 
billion for humanitarian assistance worldwide in base IDA, FFP-Title 
II, MRA, and ERMA, which will maintain U.S. leadership in the global 
humanitarian response and continue to grow the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program. The FY 2023 request level is $1.8 billion--or 21 percent--more 
than the FY 2022 base enacted level of $8.65 billion. We are grateful 
for the nearly $5 billion in supplemental resources Congress provided 
in FY 2022 to address unanticipated circumstances in Afghanistan and 
Ukraine, as well as the global food crisis. We will continue to assess 
evolving humanitarian needs, and consultation with Congress is an 
important part of our effort to ensure we have sufficient resources to 
respond.

    Question. The proposal to reduce international food assistance 
accounts was accompanied by a vague reference to an interest in 
reforming the Food for Peace program. While Food for Peace has served 
as America's flagship food aid program since 1964, its success is 
hampered by arcane U.S. purchase and shipping requirements that 
unnecessarily drive up costs. These inefficiencies led Congress to 
authorize an alternative, the International Disaster Assistance--
Emergency Food Security Program (IDA-EFSP), which enables the United 
States utilize the right tool in the right place at the right time. 
Specifically, what reforms are do you intend to propose to make the 
Food for Peace program more efficient and effective?

    Answer. It is my understanding that USAID seeks to streamline the 
provisions in the Food for Peace Act to make implementation of the Food 
for Peace program simpler and more efficient for USAID and the 
providing USAID reduce eliminate implementing partners, including local 
organizations. I am committed to working with Congress to make 
programming to combat rising food insecurity and build the resilience 
of vulnerable communities as effective and efficient as possible.

    Question. Will those reforms include a change to U.S. cargo 
preference requirements, which have outlived their usefulness purpose? 
If not, why not?

    Answer. At this time of unprecedented global humanitarian need, I 
agree that the U.S. Government's ability to reach additional hungry 
people and improve the efficiency of U.S. programs is of utmost 
importance. I look forward to working with Congress with respect to 
reforms to U.S. cargo preference requirements, given the important and 
diverse humanitarian and maritime interests at stake.

    Question. The U.S. and the United Nations: The recent establishment 
of the office of ``Multilateral Personnel and Strategy'' within the 
bureau of International Organizations structure presents new avenues to 
address the growing malign influence across the UN system. How have you 
empowered this office to address the systematic Chinese and/or Russia 
malign influence within the UN?

    Answer. Established in July 2021, the Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs' Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel 
(IO/MSP) has grown to 13 staff and coordinates efforts to counter PRC 
and others' initiatives that reshape or undermine the principles and 
values enshrined in the UN Charter; supports U.S. and likeminded 
candidates for priority UN elections and appointments; and facilitates 
strategic engagements with emerging partners. These efforts have helped 
build coalitions to counter the PRC's promotion of its ideology and 
foreign policy platforms throughout the UN and multilateral system. The 
office is also developing and implementing strategies to strengthen the 
United States' relationships with emerging partners and ensure we 
advance our affirmative view of a strong, effective, and resilient UN 
capable of delivering for all member states.

    Question. What is your strategy for increasing American 
representation in the UN system including through the Junior 
Professional Officer Program, appointments, and elections?

    Answer. Increasing U.S. citizen representation in the UN system 
requires a multifaceted approach to support and advocate for qualified 
candidates at all levels. Thanks to Congress's support, the Department 
has increased financial resources and staffing to promote U.S. citizens 
for senior leadership and mid-level appointments, as well as entry-
level talent through the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program, 
across the UN system. We are also executing strategies to support U.S. 
candidates in high-priority elections for leadership and independent 
expert positions in the UN and international organizations. These 
initiatives are increasing U.S. citizen representation in the UN and 
advancing U.S. values such as innovation, ethical conduct, 
transparency, and accountability.

    Question. UNRWA: U.S. Taxpayers have sent billions to UN Relief and 
Works Agency since the 1950s when it was originally established. Will 
the United States continue to fund UNRWA? If so, please explain what 
reforms you have secured from UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority.

    Answer. The best way for the United States to influence UNRWA's 
operations and ensure its provision of quality services consistent with 
UN principles is to provide assistance to UNRWA. The United States will 
continue to pursue the reforms outlined in the U.S.-UNRWA Framework for 
Cooperation. The United States has secured reforms to uphold 
humanitarian principles, including neutrality, by increasing 
inspections of facilities to four times per year; institute digital 
beneficiary identity verification to reduce the risk of fraud; improve 
financial and procurement regulations; and increase accountability for 
staff misconduct. The State Department will continue to monitor UNRWA's 
reform efforts closely.

    Question. Do you believe that UNRWA is currently operating beyond 
its mandate?

    Answer. UNRWA's mandate, set by the UN General Assembly, is to 
provide essential services directly to Palestinian refugees in the five 
regions it covers. UNRWA does not have a mandate to engage in political 
negotiations or to seek durable solutions (such as resettlement, 
repatriation, and local integration) for Palestinian refugees as these 
matters are final status issues to be negotiated directly between 
Israel and the Palestinians. UNRWA's activities include providing 
emergency services, education, health, protection, and livelihoods 
programming for vulnerable Palestinian refugees, all of which are 
within its mandate.

    Question. Do you believe that UNRWA has serious budget issues and 
should solicit enduring funds from regional partners outside of the 
United States?

    Answer. UNRWA faces recurring financial challenges and must 
diversify its donor base. This is an issue on which we routinely engage 
with UNRWA's leadership. We directly advocate with ongoing and 
potential donors to support UNRWA financially, including regional 
partners. We also support UNRWA's efforts to broaden its donor base by, 
for example, increasing fundraising with private donors and Islamic 
charitable organizations. I believe it is in the United States' 
interest to contribute robustly to UNRWA to demonstrate our commitment 
to humanitarian assistance and regional stability.

    Question. In your recent visit to Israel, you met with the 
Palestinian Authority. Did you discuss neutrality issues and if so, 
what were the major takeaways from this discussion?

    Answer. Yes. During my visit, I met with President Mahmoud Abbas 
and with representatives of Palestinian civil society. In these 
meetings, I underscored the Administration's commitment to re-building 
our relationship with the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinians on 
a basis of trust, cooperation, and shared values, that advance respect 
for Palestinians' civil and human rights. We are working to prevent 
actions on both sides that raise tensions and make achievement of our 
goal of a negotiated two state solution more difficult, including 
settlement expansion, settler violence, incitement to violence, 
demolitions, payments to individuals convicted of terrorism, and 
evictions of families from homes they have lived in for decades.

    Question. U.S. and the UN: What is your view of the relationship 
between the United States and the United Nations (UN) after the first 
year of the Biden administration?

    Answer. President Biden has prioritized U.S. engagement with the 
UN, not only as a means to advance U.S. national interests and counter 
our international competitors, but also to strengthen the international 
system to face today's global challenges and deliver benefits to the 
American people. Early actions to implement the President's vision 
include re-engaging with the World Health Organization (WHO), the Paris 
Climate Accords, and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The early 
returns of the President's direction are promising, with new momentum 
on reform at the WHO, strong unity in the UN General Assembly and the 
UNHRC related to Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and growing 
international solidarity behind U.S. initiatives to address global food 
insecurity. While multilateral diplomacy can be frustrating, the Biden 
administration's positive U.S. multilateral leadership has allowed us 
to make progress on important objectives that would otherwise be 
unattainable without our participation and influence.

    Question. UN Budget Issues: U.S.-assessed and voluntary 
contributions to the UN, as appropriated under the Contributions to 
International Organizations (CIO), Contributions for International 
Peacekeeping Operations (CIPA), and International Organizations and 
Program (IO&P) accounts, represent only a small fraction of total U.S. 
contributions to the UN system. Will you assist in compiling and 
sharing with Congress a comprehensive report on total U.S. 
contributions, from all sources, to the UN and its specialized agencies 
and programs?

    Answer. Yes. The State Department reports to Congress annually on 
U.S. Government contributions to international organizations. The 
report tracks all U.S. contributions by agency, funding account, and 
recipient organization. These reports are publicly available and can be 
found on the State Department website: https://www.state.gov/u-s-
contributions-to-international-organizations/.

    Question. Will you ensure that other donors remain apprised of the 
full depth and breadth of U.S. contributions from all sources?

    Answer. Yes. We frequently point to the fact that the United States 
is the single largest financial contributor to the U.N. system. We note 
the breadth and depth of U.S. contributions across all facets of the 
multilateral system as an important indication of our commitment to 
multilateral leadership. However, we often hear from other Member 
States that our failure to pay our assessed contributions in full and 
on time jeopardizes U.S. credibility and therefore diminishes our 
ability to advance our positive agenda, counter our strategic 
competitors, and advance reform efforts at the UN.

    Question. Whereas assessed contributions are determined on a scale 
and provide no discretion to nations, voluntary contributions are 
provided to advance specific U.S. goals and objectives. Moreover, 
voluntarily funded agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP) 
and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), must compete for resources and are 
subject to rigorous transparency and accountability measures. Will you 
seek to ensure that the Secretary General adopts a rigorous performance 
matrix, transparency requirements, and accountability measures that 
apply across the UN system, including to agencies and programs funded 
through assessed contributions?

    Answer. I share your strong commitment to ensuring transparency and 
accountability across the UN system. The United States will continue to 
work closely with the Secretary General to ensure rigorous performance 
and accountability measures are in place for all UN organizations.

    Question. Last Congress, I introduced the Multilateral Aid Review 
Act to assess the value of U.S. taxpayer investments in multilateral 
entities, including the UN and its affiliated agencies. Would you 
support a comprehensive review of U.S. investments in multilateral 
organizations?

    Answer. I support rigorous performance and evaluation measures for 
multilateral entities to ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are aligned to 
achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. The United States is committed 
to ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in international organizations 
to maximize their ability to deliver on their important mandates.

    Question. UN Reform: What are your views on the need for management 
reform at the UN?

    Answer. An efficient, effective UN is essential to achieving 
America's strategic objectives. We consistently work to ensure 
organizations in the UN system adhere to best management and oversight 
practices in the areas of protecting whistleblowers, addressing sexual 
exploitation and abuse, promoting zero tolerance for corruption, and 
ensuring financial and managerial transparency. The United States also 
continues to support strong U.S. and likeminded candidates for UN 
technical, budget, and oversight bodies. Our membership and leadership 
on these bodies enable us to promote fiscal discipline and 
accountability.

    Question. How will you work to address barriers to advancing UN 
management reforms, especially those created by the different 
priorities among member states?

    Answer. We are working with allies and likeminded member states who 
strongly support UN management reform to overcome any barriers that 
stand in the way of advancing reforms. And we will continue this work, 
emphasizing the need for strong oversight and implementation of 
necessary reforms to ensure the United Nations is the effective, 
efficient, and responsive organization it needs to be to address the 
global challenges of the 21st century.

    Question. How will you measure success in implementing management 
reforms at the UN?

    [No response received.]

    Question. What policies does the UN need to implement to maintain 
fiscal responsibility and accountability within the UN system?

    Answer. The Department is working to ensure international 
organizations in the UN system adhere to best fiscal management and 
oversight practices in the areas of protecting whistleblowers, 
promoting zero tolerance for corruption, and ensuring financial and 
managerial transparency in order to promote a more effective UN. The 
U.S. Missions to international organizations are working to support 
strong U.S. candidates for UN technical, budget, and oversight bodies. 
Our membership and leadership on these bodies enable us to promote 
fiscal discipline, greater transparency, and accountability.

    Question. Do you support reform in the United Nations Security 
Council? Please explain your answer.

    Answer. I remain open to a modest expansion of both permanent and 
non-permanent Security Council members in a way that does not diminish 
the Security Council's effectiveness or efficiency, nor alter or expand 
the veto. A well-executed expansion of the Security Council could help 
modernize the body to better reflect 21st century global realities and 
increase its effectiveness.

    Question. While the UN has taken steps to improve its efficiency, 
operational effectiveness, and accountability, the continuing need for 
reform is obvious to most observers, including strong supporters of the 
institution. The UN Secretary-General has committed to an agenda of 
reform. The push for reform by the United States is one of the main 
drivers behind the reform movement's progress to date. In your opinion, 
what are the top three reforms that the UN could undertake over the 
next 2 years that will have the greatest impact?

    Answer. The UN should continue to ensure organizations in the UN 
system are adhering to best management and oversight practices that 
advance accountability and transparency. These practices include 
increasing financial transparency and promoting budget discipline; 
promoting a culture of accountability, including in the areas of 
protecting whistleblowers and ensuring that the United Nations is 
taking steps to address sexual harassment, exploitation, and abuse; and 
strengthening rigorous evaluation of its program activities. The United 
States will continue to press for these reforms.

    Question. The United States is the largest donor to the World Food 
Programme, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and other UN 
agencies. Will you continue this pattern of voluntary donations to 
address some of the world's most pressing issues?

    Answer. The United States will continue to support the vital work 
of international organizations, including UNHCR, WFP, IOM, the ICRC, 
the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), as 
well as more than 80 nongovernmental partners. The United States is the 
single largest donor of humanitarian assistance worldwide for people in 
need, including refugees, conflict victims, internally displaced 
persons, stateless persons, and other vulnerable populations. We fund 
life-saving humanitarian assistance, including food, water, shelter, 
emergency healthcare, sanitation and hygiene, and critical nutrition 
services. We also fund resilience-building activities, including access 
to education, school meals, employment for forcibly displaced persons, 
and other services which contribute to local, regional, and 
international stability. The United States acknowledges we cannot 
address these issues alone. We continue to engage with other donors to 
encourage increased funding contributions to humanitarian responses 
around the world.

    Question. UN Human Rights Council: The United States recently 
rejoined the UN Human Rights Council and in the first few months were 
successful in removing Russia from the Council to hold the regime 
accountable for its provocation in Ukraine. What is the position of the 
Biden administration regarding additional reforms in the UN Human 
Rights Council?

    Answer. We advance America's interests best when we have a seat at 
the table, including in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), where the 
United States is once again a member. In addition to suspending Russia 
from its Council seat, the United States led the campaign to create an 
HRC Commission of Inquiry on Russia's actions in Ukraine. Furthermore, 
I consistently articulate our top reform objectives including defending 
Israel from unfair bias and improving the Council's membership. 
Russia's former seat is now occupied by a U.S. ally, the Czech 
Republic, and we will pursue further improvements in HRC membership. 
And in partnership with Israel, the United States continues to lead 
efforts to reduce the number of actions against Israel.

    Question. Did the Administration clearly articulate its desired 
reforms before rejoining the Council? If so, please describe the 
reforms.

    Answer. We advance America's national interests best when we have a 
seat at the table, including in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), 
where we are once again members. I consistently articulate our top HRC 
reform objectives including defending Israel from unfair bias and 
improving the Council's membership. The Administration made these 
reform objectives clear during our campaign for HRC election and we 
have made concrete progress on them since that time.

    Question. Does the Biden administration believe the Council spends 
a disproportionate amount of attention on criticizing Israel?

    Answer. Yes, the Human Rights Council spends a disproportionate 
amount of attention on criticizing Israel. I will continue to uphold 
President Biden's strong commitment to defend Israel. This includes 
opposing efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through 
actions across the United Nations, including in the Human Rights 
Council.

    Question. Understanding that the Human Rights Council is ``broken'' 
because it allows human rights abusers to obtain seats on the council, 
do you believe that the current composition on the Council is a 
productive one that allows for beneficial discussions of the promotion 
and protection of human rights?

    Answer. I believe the current composition of the Human Rights 
Council is problematic. I also believe the Council allows for 
beneficial discussions on the promotion and protection of human rights. 
Since our return to the body, and with our backing, the Council has 
condemned Russia's unprovoked war in Ukraine; shined a powerful light 
on Beijing's human rights atrocities; pressured problematic regimes 
around the world, such as Belarus, Burma, Eritrea, Syria, and Russia, 
by sharpening investigative mechanisms into their human rights 
violations and abuses; and worked to advance equality for all, 
including for women, LGBTQI+ individuals, and members of racial and 
ethnic minority groups. We will continue to seek reforms of the 
Council, particularly with respect to its problematic membership.

    Question. There have been credible allegations that the UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights shared the names of Chinese 
dissidents who were attending UN Human Rights Council sessions with the 
Chinese Government. How have you investigated these allegations?

    Answer. I remain committed to defending the right of activists, 
human rights defenders, members of ethnic and religious minorities, and 
journalists around the world to speak their minds freely without fear 
of persecution and violence. Department officials continue to raise 
these allegations with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, and we will continue to monitor the issue closely.

    Question. What actions have you taken to ensure that this practice 
is never again used?

    Answer. Department officials continue to raise these allegations 
with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and we will 
continue to monitor the issue closely.

    Question. UN Peacekeeping: The United States is the single largest 
financial contributor to UN peacekeeping activities. Congress 
authorizes and appropriates U.S. contributions, and it has an ongoing 
interest in ensuring such funding is used as efficiently and 
effectively as possible. Do you believe that any nation, including the 
United States, should pay more than 25 percent of the UN peacekeeping 
budget?

    Answer. I believe that the United States' influence in the UN, our 
ability to strengthen the integrity of the rules-based international 
system, and our ability to lead reform efforts is greatest when we pay 
our bills in full and on time. We continue to work to ensure that all 
countries pay their fair share and successfully negotiated a 1 percent 
reduction to our peacekeeping rate of assessment to 26.94 percent for 
calendar year 2022-2024, down from 27.89 percent for calendar years 
2019-2021. I welcome the opportunity to work with Congress to take the 
steps necessary to allow the United States to meet our financial 
obligations.

    Question. What is your position on U.S. repayment of UN 
peacekeeping arrears?

    Answer. Our failure to live up to our financial obligations--both 
on the UN regular budget and the peacekeeping budget--undermines U.S. 
credibility and leadership at the United Nations. I welcome the 
opportunity to work with Congress to take the steps necessary to allow 
the United States to meet our financial obligations, including 
addressing the substantial level of arrears that have accumulated. The 
United States' influence in the UN, our ability to strengthen the 
integrity of the rules-based international system, and our ability to 
lead reform efforts is greatest when we pay our bills in full and on 
time.

    Question. As memorialized in the 1999 Helms-Biden agreement, the 
Late Ambassador Holbrooke, then-President Clinton, then-Secretary 
General Kofi Anan, and then-Senator Biden all believed that the United 
States has no obligation to pay, and thus should not pay, the roughly 
$500 million in ``contested arrears'' that were explicitly excluded 
from the $1.6 billion Helms-Biden agreement. However, since then, the 
UN has insisted upon keeping on its books, and the Obama administration 
sought to pay over Congressional objections. Do you commit not to pay 
these ``contested arrears'' per Congressional intent as outlined in the 
Helms-Biden agreement?

    Answer. I continue to welcome the opportunity to work with Congress 
to allow the United States to meet our financial obligations to the 
United Nations, including addressing the arrears that have accumulated 
over the past 5 years due to the 25-percent cap on peacekeeping 
funding. Our ability to pay our dues on time and in full strengthens 
our credibility and influence to advance our priorities and counter our 
adversaries at the UN.

    Question. Are there any specific steps you believe the UN should 
take to reduce the overall size of the UN peacekeeping budget? If so, 
what are they?

    Answer. UN peacekeeping operations are among the most effective 
mechanisms of burden-sharing to address the global challenges to 
international peace and security. The United States continues to 
evaluate peacekeeping missions with a view to making them as efficient 
and effective as possible, while also providing missions with the 
necessary resources to fully implement their mandates. The 
Administration is committed to prioritizing reforms in annual budget 
negotiations, increasing the efficiency of missions, and minimizing the 
cost to U.S. taxpayers, including reducing or closing missions where 
appropriate and when conditions allow.

    Question. Are there any specific UN peacekeeping missions you would 
support reducing or terminating in order to reduce UN peacekeeping 
costs? If so, what active and ongoing missions do you believe should be 
reduced or terminated?

    Answer. The Administration continually reviews and assesses all 
existing peacekeeping missions to ensure they are making a meaningful 
and substantive contribution to international peace and security. For 
missions where that work remains imperative, the United States is 
focused on making them as effective and efficient as possible and 
providing them with the necessary resources to fully implement their 
mandates, including well-trained and well-equipped troops and police. 
For missions in countries where conditions allow, the United States 
works with the UN Secretariat and UN Security Council to press for 
early strategic planning and sustainable transitions that preserve the 
advances in host nation peace and security.

    Question. The UN and the Palestinians: The United Nations maintains 
several particular bodies and departments that focus on the 
Palestinians. These include the Division on Palestinian Rights (DPR), 
the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People (CEIRPP), and the United Nations Information System 
on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL). Will you work to challenge the 
existence and funding of these departments?

    Answer. The United States will continue to oppose efforts to 
unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through one-sided 
resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United Nations. We 
will continue to publicly and privately call on Member States to join 
us in opposing the perpetuation of the DPR, CEIRPP, and UNISPAL.

    Question. The United States lacks a veto over membership decisions 
in UN-specialized agencies that the Palestinians could target for 
membership. When the Palestinians obtain membership, the United States 
must cut funding to that organization as required under two laws 
enacted by a Democratic-led Congress in the early 1990s. What steps 
have you taken as Secretary of State to disincentivize the PA from 
attempting to join International Organizations or other UN bodies?

    Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join 
international entities as a state are premature and counterproductive. 
There are no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct 
negotiations between the parties and this includes counterproductive 
steps to gain membership in UN entities.
    The United States continues to make clear, both with the parties 
and with international partners, that the only realistic path forward 
to end this conflict is through direct negotiations aimed at achieving 
a comprehensive and lasting peace.

    Question. Israel at the United Nations: The United States has long 
maintained a policy of opposing many one-sided Security Council 
resolutions that, more often than not, criticize Israel, but fail to 
address other issues such as Palestinian terrorism. Do you support the 
use of an American veto to block one-sided anti-Israel resolutions in 
the Security Council?

    Answer. The United States takes seriously its privilege of veto 
power over the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions. We work 
closely with the other members of the Security Council to ensure that 
resolutions advance international peace and security, engaging in good 
faith to reach agreed texts. However, we will not hesitate to veto a 
resolution if its adoption does not meaningfully advance international 
peace and security. In this vein, we will oppose biased resolutions 
that delegitimize Israel, subject it to unfair standards, or undermine 
the prospects for a negotiated two-state solution in which Israel lives 
in peace and security alongside a viable Palestinian state.

    Question. What do you believe should be the standard employed in 
deciding whether to veto or not?

    Answer. The use of a veto to prevent the adoption of a UN Security 
Council resolution is a responsibility that must be respected. The 
United States will veto a resolution if we conclude its adoption will 
not advance international peace and security. The UN General Assembly 
adopted, on April 26, 2022, a resolution supported by the United States 
that automatically convenes the General Assembly after a veto in the 
Security Council. Such a meeting allows the state that cast the veto to 
explain why the resolution would not have advanced international peace 
and security. U.S. vetoes of Security Council resolutions on Israel 
have often led to General Assembly meetings. Formalizing this standard 
will force other permanent members including Russia to explain their 
use of veto power.

    Question. Do you believe that there is a disproportionate focus on 
Israel at the UN? How would you counter this at the UN?

    Answer. Yes. I believe the United Nations spends a disproportionate 
amount of attention on criticizing Israel. I will continue to uphold 
President Biden's ironclad commitment to defend Israel. This includes 
opposing efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through 
actions across the United Nations, including the Security Council, the 
General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and other bodies. The 
United States will also continue working with our Israeli diplomatic 
colleagues to promote Israel's inclusion in UN working groups, as well 
as support qualified Israeli candidates for UN positions.

    Question. As of April 2022, there are over 40 public cases of 
Americans who are classified as hostages or those who are unlawfully 
detained abroad, some having been in detention for several years. To 
date, the Biden administration has only brought a few Americans home 
while others like Paul Whelan, Austin Tice, Paul Rusesabagina, and 
others languish away. I previously asked about these cases in March, 
but I have not received answers to them. There are currently nine 
Americans who are unlawfully detained in Venezuela. I know that Special 
Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Carstens recently traveled to 
Caracas to visit with them and engage in diplomatic talks on their 
potential release. What was the outcome of this trip?

    Answer. SPEHA Carstens traveled to Venezuela in early March and 
returned to the United States on March 9 with two U.S. citizens who 
were wrongfully detained in Venezuela, Gustavo Cardenas, and Jorge 
Fernandez. Upon return, he went to Texas to engage with families of the 
remaining wrongful detainees in Venezuela. There are still six U.S. 
nationals who are wrongfully detained in Venezuela. Five of them are 
remaining former CITGO executives. The sixth is former U.S. Marine 
Matthew Heath.
    While in Caracas, SPEHA Carstens was able to conduct welfare visits 
with U.S. national detainees. One of our main priorities is to ensure 
their health and wellbeing while we continue to advocate for their 
release

    Question. What do you believe to be the biggest obstacle to 
securing the release of the CITGO6, Matthew Heath, Adrian Berry, and 
Luke Denman?

    Answer. The biggest challenge to securing their release is that the 
Maduro regime wants to engage in hostage diplomacy and make 
transactional exchanges for their release that we cannot or will not 
give them. We struggle to find options that are amenable to all sides.

    Question. The Government of Rwanda's Paul Kagame lured Paul 
Rusesabagina, hero in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and noted Kagame 
critic, from his home in the U.S., stood trial on terrorism charges in 
Rwanda, and denied due process. My staff visited Mr. Rusesabagina in 
prison in Kigali and verified many of the issues raised by his family. 
What is your assessment of Mr. Rusesabagina's case and what are 
potential next steps?

    Answer. The Department has been engaged on Paul Rusesabagina's case 
since his August 2020 detention and remains committed to assuring his 
welfare and securing his release. Pursuant to the Robert Levinson 
Hostage Recovery and Hostage-taking Accountability Act, the Department 
determined the Government of Rwanda wrongfully detained Paul 
Rusesabagina. To date, the Department has pursued a quiet diplomacy 
strategy to seek Rusesabagina's release. Unfortunately, this approach 
has not yielded much fruit, and the Department is currently exploring 
other options to use moving forward.

    Question. How can the United States better leverage its 
relationship with the Rwandan Government to force discussions about Mr. 
Rusesabagina's release?

    Answer. The Department regularly discusses the Rusesabagina case 
with the Government of Rwanda at high levels in both Kigali and 
Washington. We are currently reevaluating our strategy to identify the 
best options moving forward.

    Question. Do you believe that you have all the tools necessary to 
bring Americans home? Why or why not?

    Answer. We are committed to doing everything we possibly can to 
bring home U.S. nationals who are wrongfully detained or held hostage, 
wherever they are around the world. Until every single U.S. national 
that is wrongfully detained or held hostage is brought home, we will 
continue to seek new opportunities to help us in our shared goal to see 
them reunited with their loved ones. As we continue to implement the 
Levinson Act, engage with families, and analyze areas for improvement, 
we will be sure to continue our engagement with you and your 
Congressional colleagues, whom we view as valuable partners in our 
efforts.

    Question. Atrocity Prevention: The Administration's FY23 budget 
request decreased the amount of funding for the Atrocities Prevention 
Fund from $5 million as enacted in FY22 to $2.5 million. Could you 
please explain the rationale for the reduction?

    Answer. The President's Budget ensures that Atrocities Prevention 
will remain a top priority for the Department. Since FY 2020, we have 
programmed $15 million in ESF and INCLE funds to support atrocities 
prevention work in Iraq and Syria, as well as other regions. This work 
is critical in our efforts to promote justice and accountability by 
aiding in the collection, preservation, and maintenance of chains of 
custody of evidence, including for use in prosecutions. These funds are 
also used in the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.

    Question. Do you feel this reduction accurately represents the 
USG's whole-of-government approach to atrocity prevention?

    Answer. The U.S. Government coordinates routinely on atrocity 
prevention through the interagency Atrocity Prevention Task Force, 
enabling unity of focus and effort across departments and agencies, and 
allowing each to fund relevant programming from funds outside the 
framework of the Atrocity Prevention Fund. In a whole-of-government 
approach to preventing and mitigating atrocity risk around the globe, 
the U.S. Government uses all of the tools at its disposal--including 
diplomacy, foreign assistance, investigations and fact-finding 
missions, financial tools and engagements, training, and reports--to 
raise awareness and generate coordinated international pressure in 
response.

    Question. How do you plan to synthesize atrocity prevention within 
the State Department's existing programs and initiatives and improve 
and expedite the implementation of the Elie Wiesel Act?

    Answer. We continue to provide training to our teams in Washington 
and around the world on how to spot warning signs or indicators of 
potential atrocities and how to take early steps to disrupt possible 
atrocity crime continuums. Thus far we have trained almost 2,000 
people. We also work with embassy country teams to incorporate atrocity 
risk mitigation into country planning and strategy efforts. In 
addition, we are currently working on a government-wide strategy to 
anticipate, prevent, and respond to atrocities, as called for in the 
Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018. The 
strategy and its corresponding workplan will help improve the 
implementation of the Act.

    Question. How does the State Department plan to work with other 
U.S. agencies and multilateral and international partners and 
institutions to synchronize atrocity prevention strategies and 
coordinate prevention and mitigation efforts?

    Answer. Working closely with the interagency Atrocity Prevention 
Task Force, the State Department coordinates regularly with other U.S. 
agencies and departments to forge a whole-of-government unity of focus 
and effort to synchronize atrocity prevention strategies and coordinate 
prevention and mitigation efforts. The State Department also leads 
efforts to develop a U.S. whole-of-government strategy to anticipate, 
prevent, and respond to atrocities, as called for in the Elie Wiesel 
Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, that lays out roles and 
responsibilities across the interagency, sets goals, and orients the 
interagency Atrocity Prevention Task Force's priority actions towards 
achieving these goals. The State Department coordinates regularly with 
international partners and shares best practices. The State Department 
also leads efforts with multilateral and international partners on 
joint actions on atrocity prevention, including coordination of 
diplomatic, programmatic, and accountability efforts. The State 
Department has also planned joint engagements, statements, training, 
and assistance efforts through UN mechanisms.

    Question. Special Issuance Visas (SIVs): After the fall of Kabul 
and the subsequent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, the backlog 
of SIV applicants (including those post-chief-of-mission approval and 
others) totals more than 50,000. What steps are you taking to alleviate 
this backlog?

    Answer. Relocating Afghan qualified SIV applicants is a priority 
for me and the Department. Despite having no consular presence in 
Afghanistan since the suspension of the U.S. Embassy operations on 
August 31, 2021, we continue to process SIV applications at every stage 
of the SIV process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. 
embassies and consulates around the world where applicants are able to 
appear. We are committed to identifying where additional investments 
can be most effective in expediting SIV processing as well as the 
expected costs, and find ways to get SIV applicants out of Afghanistan 
in light of significant challenges with outbound travel. The 
Coordinator for Afghanistan Relocation Efforts is dedicated to 
assisting SIV applicants through the logistical process.

    Question. Provide those with credible and legitimate pathways to 
the U.S. through the SIV program with the resources they need?

    Answer. We have increased the resources dedicated to SIV processing 
and have undertaken steps to streamline the process at every stage of 
the application under State Department control. In FY 2021, the 
Department was able to increase resources dedicated to COM approval 
processing and take steps to prioritize applications from interpreters 
and translators. While we are currently unable to provide consular 
services in Afghanistan, we continue to process applications at every 
stage, including by transferring interview-ready cases to U.S. 
embassies and consulates where applicants are able to travel.

    Question. Provide resources to personnel at intake facilities 
abroad and at home for expeditious screening and vetting?

    Answer. The Department of State has the highest respect for the men 
and women who have taken enormous risks to support our military and 
civilian personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. We take these threats very 
seriously, and we are committed to providing efficient and secure SIV 
processing while maintaining national security as our highest priority. 
The Department of State supports the interagency community's efforts to 
complete screening and vetting of SIV applicants in the most efficient 
manner possible, both abroad and domestically. Overseas, SIV cases are 
interviewed and screened through interagency vetting partners.

    Question. Human Rights: Do you believe that the FY23 budget 
accurately and completely represents the Administration's efforts to 
put human rights at the center of its foreign policy?

    Answer. Yes. The FY 2023 budget fully supports the democracy and 
human rights core objectives of the Administration's 2022-2026 Joint 
Strategic Plan and U.S. foreign policy priorities in line with Interim 
National Security Guidance goals. U.S. foreign assistance plays a key 
role in supporting the Administration's efforts to put human rights at 
the center of foreign policy, including by strengthening democratic 
institutions, upholding universal values, and promoting human dignity.

    Question. How much U.S. foreign assistance and State Department 
resources have been dedicated to the Summit to Democracy?

    Answer. The Department's dedicated funding is coming from 
appropriated funding for programs with the same intent as those 
associated with the Summit. As part of the Presidential Initiative for 
Democratic Renewal, DRL supports eight foreign assistance lines of 
effort. For FY 2021, DRL has $18 million from regularly allocated 
funding and a similar amount of FY 2022, pending availability, 
dedicated to Summit initiatives. INL has attributed $5.6 million in FY 
2021 INCLE funding to Summit initiatives, a level anticipated to 
increase in FY 2022, pending availability of funds. S/GWI has $2 
million in FY 2021 ESF for Summit-related programs. We will conduct 
activities that do not require dedicated funding including advancing 
U.S. policy commitments.

    Question. Migration: The FY 2023 budget request states the 
Administration's intention to ``support a renewed focus on migration 
management'' including ``climate migration programming.'' What are the 
details of this plan and how, if at all, does it complement other 
humanitarian priorities?

    Answer. The Administration issued a Report on the Impact of Climate 
Change on Migration in October 2021 that recognizes the relationship 
between climate change, migration, and displacement. Using a whole-of-
government approach to address this urgent problem, a working group led 
by State and the NSC is now taking stock of all bilateral and 
multilateral assistance to countries impacted by climate change and 
migration. The working group is studying, for example, expanding 
climate resilience and preparedness activities in U.S. foreign 
assistance programs to prevent or mitigate displacement as an 
adaptation to climate change, and how to address critical gaps in 
development, humanitarian, and climate finance. The work is ongoing.

    Question. UNFPA: The FY23 Budget Request includes $56 million for 
the UN Population Fund. How will you ensure that none of these funds 
are used in the support or participates in the management of a program 
of coercive abortion or involuntary stabilization in violation of Kemp-
Kasten amendment?

    Answer. UNFPA opposes any form of coercive sexual and reproductive 
health policies or programs, including but not limited to forced 
abortion and forced sterilization. I will continue our government's 
oversight of UNFPA activities as a member of its executive board, 
including through the board's country program review mechanism.

    Question. Gender Equity & Equality Action Fund: The FY23 Budget 
request includes $200 million for the Gender Equity & Equality Action 
Fund. How will this money be spent compared to the previous fund which 
was named Women's Global Development and Prosperity Fund?

    Answer. The Gender Equity and Equality Action (GEEA) Fund advances 
the economic security of women and girls globally, including from 
marginalized and underserved populations, and addresses the 
disproportionate impacts of the COVID-19, climate change, conflict, and 
crisis on women and girls. The GEEA Fund builds upon the successes and 
lessons learned from the Women's Global Development and Prosperity (W-
GDP) Fund including upon the three W-GDP pillars with a comprehensive 
set of priorities and principles. The priority areas incorporate 
addressing gender-based violence as it impacts economic development, 
focus on green jobs and building resilience to climate change, and 
address issues such as unpaid care responsibilities.

    Question. Consular Affairs: Last year, President Biden issued an 
Executive Order on Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service 
Delivery to Rebuild Trust in Government. One aspect of this executive 
order was a commitment to ``design and deliver a new online passport 
renewal experience that does not require any physical documents to be 
mailed.'' Please provide to the Committee update on the progress of 
online passport renewal, including an estimated date of when this 
service will be made available to the entire American public.

    Answer. I remain committed to ensuring the Department launches 
Online Passport Renewal (OPR) to the American public this year. The 
Bureau of Consular Affairs initiated a controlled pilot of the OPR 
system in February to validate it will meet usability and performance 
expectations. The pilot will conclude this summer. The Department will 
determine the official public launch date soon thereafter. OPR will 
enable certain applicants to submit their renewal application and pay 
their fees online. This will eliminate the need to print and mail the 
application and payment. OPR will eventually enable employees to 
adjudicate renewal applications remotely and the Department to balance 
workload across sites, promoting increased efficiency.

    Question. What additional technological resources and investments 
does the Department of State, specifically Consular Affairs need to 
deliver this service to the American public?

    Answer. I remain committed to ensuring the Department launches 
Online Passport Renewal (OPR) to the American public this year. The 
Bureau of Consular Affairs initiated a controlled pilot of the OPR 
system in February to validate it will meet usability and performance 
expectations. The pilot will conclude this summer. The Department will 
determine the official public launch date soon thereafter. The 
Department does not anticipate needing additional resources to complete 
the delivery of OPR. OPR will enable certain applicants to submit their 
renewal application and pay their fees online. This will eliminate the 
need to print and mail the application and payment. OPR will eventually 
enable employees to adjudicate renewal applications remotely and the 
Department to balance workload across sites, promoting increased 
efficiency.

    Question. An OIG Report released at the end of the 2021 reviewed 
Consular Affair's ConsularOne modernization program. OIG's best 
estimate was that the total cost of the ConsularOne program ranged 
between $200-600 million since 2009. The report further concludes that 
Consular Affairs has failed to meet performance goals and has delayed 
delivery of modernization services to the public.
    In light of the finding of the OIG report and the Biden 
administration's commitment to providing online passport renewal to the 
American public, please outline for the Committee how the Department of 
State's Bureau of Consular Affairs plans to employ technological 
solutions to ensure that this service is provided to the taxpayer in a 
timely manner without continued wasteful spending?

    Answer. I remain committed to ensuring the Department launches 
Online Passport Renewal (OPR) to the American public this year. The 
Bureau of Consular Affairs initiated a controlled pilot of the OPR 
system in February to validate it will meet usability and performance 
expectations. The pilot will conclude this summer. The Department will 
determine the official public launch date soon thereafter. OPR will 
allow certain applicants to submit their renewal application and pay 
their fees online. This will eliminate a need to print and mail the 
application and payment. Further, OPR will enable employees to 
adjudicate applications remotely and the Department to balance workload 
across sites, promoting efficient service.

    Question. Last year, President Biden issued an Executive Order on 
Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service Delivery to 
Rebuild Trust in Government. One aspect of this executive order was a 
commitment to ``design and deliver a new online passport renewal 
experience that does not require any physical documents to be mailed.'' 
Yet, an initial rollout of online passport renewal revealed significant 
security issues with taxpayers most private information. What specific 
steps is the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs taking to 
deploy technological solutions to provide online passport renewal 
service without compromised privacy and security issues?

    Answer. Security and protection of Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) has always been a priority of the Department. The 
vulnerabilities found were related to the widely publicized Log4j 
vulnerability affecting most private and public sector websites. We 
remediated the vulnerabilities and implemented additional security-
strengthening measures. Department security teams from Consular Systems 
and Technology, Information Resource Management, and Diplomatic 
Security conducted evaluations of OPR, including the internal Web 
platform, our Travel Document Issuance System, and the public facing 
MyTravelGov account portal over a period of 7 weeks and deemed it 
secure.

    Question. Diplomatic Security: It is vitally important that our 
diplomats are empowered to get outside of embassy walls to meet with 
local leaders and populations. Unfortunately, far too often at high-
threat posts, security concerns take precedence over diplomatic 
necessity, and our FSOs are trapped in their embassies. Effective 
diplomacy cannot be conducted from behind the walls of a compound, and 
our adversaries do not face similar restrictions on their diplomatic 
activity. The department needs to take a more forward leaning approach 
towards risk management, as opposed to risk avoidance. Do you believe 
that the Department's current risk tolerance in high-threat posts is 
appropriately tailored? Do you believe that it should be improved, and 
if so, how? What will you do to bring about that improvement?

    Answer. Our Chiefs of Mission and security professionals make hard 
decisions every day to balance security while pursuing engagements and 
furthering critical national security priorities. While we have no 
higher priority than the safety and security of our people, I have said 
before that we have to accept risk, and manage it smartly, and I am 
proud to report that our High Threat/High Risk posts maintained a 95 
percent approval rate for engagement requests for the second 
consecutive year. Additionally, we are updating and revising our risk 
management policies and exploring both procedural and legislative 
changes to better enable us to quickly establish new facilities and 
continue to expand our diplomatic outreach.

    Question. I was glad to see you voice support for reform of the 
Accountability Review Board (ARB) process in your testimony. Are you 
familiar with S. 816, the Diplomatic Support and Security Act of 2021?

    Answer. I am aware of the Act and want to assure you that the 
Department of State has shared its sentiments and concerns that aim at 
reforming the ARB process. While we are in sync on the broader goals, 
we would urge that if legislation were to proceed, it should preserve 
maximum flexibilities to ensure diplomacy operates effectively. We look 
forward to an opportunity to engage with the Committee as the Act 
proceeds.

    Question. Do you support this bill?

    Answer. I appreciate that SFRC included in the Act certain 
flexibilities recommended by the Department of State. While we are very 
much in sync on the broader goal of reforming the ARB process, it 
should preserve greater flexibility in convening an incident review, to 
ensure the Department of State will operate with agility. Flexible 
authorities could advance important U.S. national security priorities 
and U.S. foreign policy, while considering the Department's physical 
security priorities. We look forward to working with Committee staff on 
this critical issue.

    Question. The Secure Construction and Counterterrorism Act (SECCA) 
is now more than 20 years old. Are there updates that you would like to 
see to SECCA? If yes, what?

    Answer. SECCA has been in place, unchanged, since 1999. It mandates 
setback and collocation requirements for diplomatic facilities at all 
U.S. posts unless a waiver is exercised by the Secretary of State. 
SECCA was part of the U.S. response to the 1998 East Africa bombings 
and reflected the tactics deployed at the time against our facilities. 
In the intervening period, threats have evolved and our understanding 
of effective countermeasures and the technology we use to defend 
ourselves has changed. As we seek to reshape our diplomatic footing and 
acceptance of risk in the pursuit of the nation's foreign policy 
mission, the Department will propose amendments to reflect the new 
realities facing our diplomatic platforms.

    Question. Do SECCA restrictions lead to much higher costs of 
building embassies and consulates, even though the Department is 
building farther and farther from city centers?

    Answer. Yes, SECCA constraints directly increase both land purchase 
and construction cost. SECCA's one-size-fits-all standard impedes a 
nuanced approach to construction. Construction logistics costs, such as 
restrictions on noise, truck access, and laydown areas, combined with 
the cost of a full setback site in a dense urban center, especially in 
the highly developed world, increases the overall cost of delivery. 
Increased flexibility to determine embassy locations based on 
operational needs would decrease costs.

    Question. Do you believe that reforms are necessary to give the 
Department the needed flexibility to build in convenient locations?

    Answer. Yes, I believe reform is needed to locate our missions in 
the most operationally advantageous locations. Existing legislation 
imposes a single standard regarding the setback of facilities 
irrespective of the threat level, footprint size, or the nature of the 
facility. This impairs the Department's ability to rapidly shift staff, 
create or expand our presence, and adds time, complexity, and cost. A 
reformed SECCA would allow the Department to pursue diplomacy from a 
mindset of managed risk.

    Question. Would SECCA reforms also empower the Department to build 
embassies that address the threats of today, not just those of 20 years 
ago?

    Answer. The Department designs and constructs facilities to address 
both current and future threats. Over time, security threats have 
evolved, and we cannot leverage distance alone as a defensive measure. 
The one-size-fits-all nature of the law, especially with smaller posts, 
does not adequately address the realities of varied environments around 
the world. While the Department enhanced its construction methodologies 
and provides greater performance against extended threats, SECCA 
reforms would allow more flexibility to adjust our defensive standards 
and implement mitigation or construction strategies that replicate the 
stand-off defense equivalent to a 100-foot setback without a waiver 
process, i.e., build to an engineering standard where feasible.

    Question. Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs): After years of being 
the interagency laggard in providing care for victims of AHIs, I am 
glad to see the State Department catch up to the other departments and 
agencies whose employees have also been affected by AHIs. These brave 
people were harmed while doing their duty, and it is the department's 
responsibility to care for them. What is the department currently doing 
to provide care for AHI victims? What more could you do?

    Answer. There is nothing more important to me than protecting the 
health, safety, and security of our people. I believe our current 
efforts reflect the personal priority I place on this issue. I can 
assure you that we are continually improving the care and support we 
provide, including access to the best, state-of-the-art care available 
at facilities such as Johns Hopkins and Walter Reed and other 
facilities that are part of the military health system. We are active 
in the interagency investigation into the cause of AHI, discussions on 
preventative measures, and how we can best protect our people.
    I am grateful for the bipartisan support of Congress, including the 
specific support provided through the FY 2022 NDAA and HAVANA Act and 
the FY 2022 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act.

    Question. Unfortunately, USAID personnel have also suffered from 
AHIs, yet they do not have the access to care that their State 
Department colleagues have. Do you commit to assisting your colleagues 
at USAID to get the access to care that they deserve?

    Answer. Yes. The Department works closely with USAID on AHI, 
including on the provision of care to USAID colleagues who have been 
affected by AHI. USAID personnel working overseas are eligible to 
access care and support at post, as are all U.S. Government employees 
and their families under Chief of Mission authority. I commit to 
ensuring that USAID personnel, like all mission personnel, have the 
information they need to access and utilize the resources available to 
them at post.

    Question. Since incidents of AHIs first became public, the 
executive branch, especially the State Department, has been very close-
lipped about the problem. Do you commit to promptly providing Congress 
with full, accurate, regular, and up-to-date information and 
intelligence regarding AHIs when requested?

    Answer. There is nothing more important to me than protecting the 
health, safety, and security of our people. I believe that the flow of 
information has improved since I arrived at the Department. My team, 
coordinated by the Department's Health Incidents Response Task Force, 
has been providing briefings on anomalous health incidents (AHI) on a 
regular basis and is available to members and staff. Further, in 
response to the FY 2022 NDAA, the Department will join the interagency 
briefings that will be conducted regularly. I understand the first of 
those interagency briefings is tentatively scheduled for June.
    I am grateful for your continuing support for the Department's 
efforts to address AHI.

    Question. Public Diplomacy: The Global Engagement Center (GEC) has 
a vital role to play in our great power competition with China and 
Russia. How is the Department leveraging the GEC's capabilities to 
address Russian disinformation and propaganda regarding its invasion of 
Ukraine?

    Answer. The GEC works closely with other parts of the Department, 
other U.S. Government agencies, and like-minded foreign partners to 
coordinate support efforts, exchange expertise, and provide analysis on 
ongoing Russian disinformation campaigns. The GEC creates content for 
State's Disarming Disinformation website and distributes analytical 
``Russian Disinformation Snapshots on Ukraine'' to more than 1,500 U.S. 
Government and like-minded government contacts twice a week. We also 
share selected unclassified reporting with the Ukrainian Government's 
Center for Strategic Communication (CSC) and are working with them to 
strengthen their relationships with social media platforms to protect 
the information environment from malign Russian influence.

    Question. What is the GEC doing to address disinformation from the 
Chinese Communist Party regarding the origins of the COVID-19 virus?

    Answer. The GEC has proactively monitored PRC disinformation and 
propaganda about COVID-19, including its origins, since the beginning 
of the pandemic. The GEC shares analyses with Department regional 
bureaus, the interagency, and foreign partners to inform messaging that 
punctures or debunks Beijing's false narratives. The GEC also exchanges 
insights on PRC tactics with social media companies to help them 
identify examples of information manipulation. In addition, GEC 
programs bolster the awareness of foreign civil society and media to 
encourage the amplification of accurate information about the pandemic 
and to counter COVID-19-related disinformation.

    Question. Cybersecurity: The State Department's cybersecurity is 
seriously lacking, evidenced by major, damaging cybersecurity attacks 
conducted against the department over the last several years. What are 
you doing to shore up the Department's cyber defenses?

    Answer. The Department takes our cybersecurity responsibilities 
seriously. We are establishing new policies and programs to provide 
more proactive cybersecurity practices. The Department's top 
cybersecurity initiative is the implementation of Executive Order 
14028. This will ensure that we deliver a Zero Trust architecture and 
emphasize preventive cyber hygiene measures to maintain system health 
across the enterprise. Our efforts include improving identity, 
credential, and access management; requiring multifactor authentication 
for users; and instituting multiple layers of data encryption across a 
multi-cloud ecosystem. We are also working with CISA, NSA and other 
federal partners to implement cybersecurity best practices.

    Question. What are you doing to increase the number of IT workers 
within the Department while also providing greater incentives for 
professional growth throughout the IT workforce?

    Answer. The Department initiated an IT skills incentive program (IT 
SIP) as part of a long-term strategy to attract, train, and retain IT 
professionals in both the Foreign Service (FS) and Civil Service (CS) 
within the State Department. FS and CS IT employees can apply to the IT 
SIP and receive a base salary increase by earning industry-recognized 
certifications or acquiring a certain bachelor's or master's degree in 
an IT field. Additionally, the Department is implementing cybersecurity 
skills incentives. Occupational series or skill codes with approved 
cybersecurity certifications can be eligible for a retention incentive 
payment based on duties that contribute to cybersecurity and protection 
of Departmental assets. We are also developing a recruitment incentive 
package for newly hired CS and FS IT employees that we hope will go 
into effect as early as this year.

    Question. Mission China: Last week, I sent you a letter regarding 
the deplorable treatment of our diplomats in China at the hands of the 
CCP. Do you agree that the CCP's treatment of our diplomatic personnel 
is unacceptable?

    Answer. The United States has no higher priority than the safety, 
health, and well-being of U.S. citizens overseas, including Mission 
China's personnel and their families. The United States expects all 
governments, including the People's Republic of China, to adhere to 
their commitments under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
Senior Department officials have raised our concerns in Washington and 
Beijing regarding the challenging circumstances as the PRC responds to 
the COVID-19 pandemic and will continue to defend our interests. A 
response to your letter is forthcoming.

    Question. Do you believe that such treatment violates the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations?

    Answer. While the Department strives to comply with reasonable 
COVID-19 containment measures for its diplomatic personnel and their 
families, many of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) measures are 
inconsistent with the privileges and immunities such personnel enjoy 
under the Vienna Conventions. We have pushed back on numerous occasions 
both in the PRC and in the United States on measures we believe are 
inconsistent with the privileges and immunities of our personnel.

    Question. Have you or any senior State Department officials raised 
this issue with your Chinese counterparts? If not, why not?

    Answer. We have raised on numerous occasions with People's Republic 
of China (PRC) interlocutors both in Beijing and in Washington measures 
we believe are inconsistent with the privileges and immunities of our 
personnel. Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Deputy Secretary Sherman, and I 
have conveyed to senior PRC officials our deep concerns with how the 
challenging pandemic environment impacts the operations of the U.S. 
embassy and consulates in China. The Department strives to comply with 
reasonable COVID-19 containment measures for its diplomatic personnel 
and their families.

    Question. What must be done now to bolster Taiwan's defense and 
deter Chinese aggression?

    Answer. Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and contributes to 
the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and 
within the region. In that vein, the United States will continue to 
make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to 
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, 
consistent with our one China policy. We are also working with allies 
and partners to highlight the positive role that Taiwan plays in 
addressing global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in 
defending against threats to its democratic values.

    Question. Is the Department considering security assistance 
programs for Taiwan? In particular, is the Department considering 
initiatives or funding focused not just for arms, but also more 
training for Taiwan?

    Answer. The Department welcomes the opportunity to further discuss 
tools such as security assistance with Congress. The U.S. Government 
continues to support Taiwan through the acquisition of asymmetric 
capabilities, and the Departments of State and Defense are also 
coordinating closely with Taiwan to support non-materiel and 
indigenously produced solutions to improve Taiwan's defenses. Our 
expanding security cooperation seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize 
reserve force reform.

    Question. Do you commit to working with Congress on advancing 
proposals that bolster Taiwan's defenses?

    Answer. Yes, the Department is committed to working with Congress 
on bolstering Taiwan's defenses, and we are already engaged in 
discussions with Congressional committees on possible security 
assistance programs. The Department has notified Congress of more than 
$32 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, and we also are 
encouraging Taiwan to implement necessary reforms that will strengthen 
Taiwan's ability to deter PRC aggression and coercion.

    Question. Sanctions: What are the Department's specific budgeting 
and personnel plans for ensuring the Office of Sanctions Coordination 
has the necessary tools for success?

    Answer. While Congress created the Office of Sanctions Coordination 
(S/SC) in statute, a former sanctions coordination office remained 
within the structure of the Department. This office--assumed by S/SC--
has not had an adjustment of funding or personnel resources since 2014. 
The sanctions landscape, however, has changed dramatically over this 
period of time--with sanctions becoming a primary foreign policy tool 
of the both the executive and legislative branches. To date, the 
Department has relied on the legacy funding and staffing pattern, used 
its regular authorities to hire a deputy coordinator from the Senior 
Foreign Service, and used the authorizing statute's special hiring 
authorities to extend offers to three sanctions experts. However, we 
need additional resources to enable S/SC to succeed in its mandate. S/
SC is working to identify its needs and on a request for additional 
funding to support the office's robust travel needs and hiring of 
additional personnel to engage and coordinate with allies, new 
sanctions partners, and other stakeholders.

    Question. What specific role has the State Department played in 
coordinating with foreign partners on the roll out of sanctions against 
the Russian Federation after the invasion of Ukraine? Please provide 
specific examples. In your view, what has been working well and where 
is there room for improvement?

    Answer. Since Putin began his war of choice, the Department of 
State has worked directly with nearly 40 allies and partners across the 
world to levy coordinated, wide-ranging sanctions and export controls 
against Russia in response to its unprovoked war against Ukraine. 
Countries such as New Zealand, Switzerland, and San Marino, among 
others, have enacted new or expanded existing unilateral sanctions 
authorities to join global efforts to support Ukraine and isolate 
Russia. We continue to coordinate with our allies and partners to 
ensure unity on sanctions actions, including to target and capture the 
ill-gotten gains of Russia's oligarchs.

    Question. What specific role has the State Department played in 
coordinating with foreign partners on the roll out of sanctions 
implementation and enforcement guidance associated with sanctions 
against the Russian Federation after the invasion of Ukraine? Please 
provide specific examples. In your view, what has been working well and 
where is there room for improvement?

    Answer. Since Putin began his war of choice, the State Department 
has coordinated with nearly 40 allies and partners to impose 
unprecedented sanctions in response to Russia's war against Ukraine. We 
are now focused on closing any potential gaps in sanctions and export 
controls measures between the United States and our allies and partners 
as well as targeting sanctions evasion networks, broadening our 
multilateral coalition, and launching the REPO and KleptoCapture 
interagency taskforces to enhance enforcement. Our outreach to foreign 
partners and industry to expand and sustain these efforts are ongoing.

    Question. In March, the United States and other international 
partners announced the creation of the Russian Elites, Proxies, and 
Oligarchs (REPO) multilateral task force. Please describe in detail the 
role the State Department has played in engaging and coordinating with 
allies and partners on issues before the REPO task force. In your view, 
should seized assets be confiscated and then used to support Ukraine?

    Answer. The Department has coordinated between U.S. agencies and 
our posts abroad to communicate relevant information on the REPO and 
KleptoCapture task forces, including related to engaging with host 
governments. Together we have focused on identifying and seizing 
assets, including boats, planes, helicopters, and real estate. We have 
also focused on freezing financial accounts in the United States and 
foreign jurisdictions with a view towards possible forfeiture/
confiscation and/or criminal prosecution where the facts and law would 
support such a result. We will continue to work with interagency and 
multilateral partners to hunt down the assets of those individuals and 
entities that have been sanctioned in connection with Russia's 
premeditated, unjust, and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and the 
continuing aggression of the Russian regime.

    Question. In a recent vote on Russia's removal from the Human 
Rights Council, over 50 nations abstained from the vote. With regards 
to sanctions policy and enforcement, how does the Department plan to 
engage with nations that could provide alternative markets or avenues 
to evade sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation?

    Answer. We understand that many nations have a policy of not 
supporting unilateral sanctions, only joining in UN sanctions. The 
Department is conducting outreach to many nations which abstained to 
stress to them the importance of taking actions against the Kremlin, 
including sanctions cooperation and enforcement, while also explaining 
our authority under E.O. 14024 to impose sanctions on persons who 
provide material support to sanctioned persons.

    Question. What specific benchmarks is the Department utilizing to 
measure the impact of sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation?

    Answer. The Department of State is closely monitoring a range of 
economic indicators from private sector analysts, the Kremlin, and 
national statistics agencies around the world, as well as reporting 
from our embassies and information shared by partners and allies, to 
assess the economic impact of our sanctions. Extraordinary policy 
actions taken by the Kremlin and the Central Bank of Russia to limit 
capital flows, stabilize stock markets, and prop up the value of the 
Russian Ruble are additional evidence of the effectiveness of our 
measures.

    Question. Guantanamo Bay: When considering whether to transfer a 
detainee from U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to another 
country, what requirements must be met before you would authorize or 
consent to such a transfer?

    Answer. The State Department leads the U.S. Government's efforts to 
identify suitable transfer destinations for individuals in U.S. custody 
at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility who have been approved for 
transfer. The Department leads efforts to negotiate non-legally binding 
transfer frameworks, including mutually acceptable humane-treatment and 
security assurances to mitigate the threat posed by former Guantanamo 
detainees to the United States or U.S. persons or interests. In most 
cases, the Secretary of Defense must certify to Congress, 30-days in 
advance of a repatriation or resettlement, inter alia that the 
receiving government ``has taken or agreed to take appropriate steps to 
substantially mitigate any risk the individual may pose.''

    Question. What safeguards would you demand to ensure that any 
detainee subject to transfer does not support or engage in future acts 
of terrorism or violence against the United States, U.S. personnel, 
citizens, or property, or U.S. allies or partners?

    Answer. The Department of State vigorously pursues efforts to 
identify suitable repatriation or resettlement locations that will 
substantially mitigate the threat that may be posed by any former 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility detainee post-transfer. State does so 
by developing mutually acceptable security and humane-treatment 
assurances with receiving countries that are designed to appropriately 
mitigate post-transfer risk. Recognizing some risk will still attend 
any detainee transfer, the Department of State and other U.S. 
Government agencies and departments regularly communicate with 
receiving countries to share information and to resolve challenges as 
they arise.

    Question. Please describe the status of any and all negotiations 
that the State Department is currently engaged in with any foreign 
country with respect to the possible transfer of any detainee currently 
detained at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

    Answer. It has been our longstanding practice to not share the 
specifics of any negotiations the State Department undertakes 
concerning Guantanamo Bay detention facility detainees due to the 
sensitive diplomatic nature of these ongoing discussions. In general, 
the process involves identifying and engaging suitable countries to 
which detainees may be repatriated to countries of origin or resettled 
to third countries. Whenever possible, we pursue repatriation before 
resettlement. After we identify a suitable transfer location, we 
approach the host government to begin negotiations to accept the 
detainee. After the receiving government agrees to accept the detainee, 
we then negotiate mutually acceptable security and humane treatment 
measures.

    Question. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate: On November 23, 
2020, then-President-elect Joe Biden announced his intent to appoint 
former Secretary of State John Kerry to be a ``Special Presidential 
Envoy for Climate.'' In response to committee questions regarding 
whether Special Envoy John Kerry is legally required to be submitted to 
the Senate for Advice and Consent, the State Department has informed 
the committee an administration legal view that: ``Envoys who have only 
a discrete and temporary mission and do not fill a ``continuing 
position established by law,'' see Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 
(2018), historically have not been considered ``public ministers'' or 
``Officers of the United States'' to whom the Appointments Clause 
applies. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the 
Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 102-05 (2007). Special Envoy 
Kerry remains in his position. Is this position still ``discrete and 
temporary''? Why?

    Answer. The work of the Special Envoy remains fixed and finite, 
``to elevate the issue of climate change and underscore the commitment 
my Administration will make toward addressing it'' as outlined in 
section 102(c) of E.O. 14008 of January 27, 2021, issued by President 
Biden. The nature of this position is consistent with special envoy 
positions appointed by administrations on a bipartisan basis to respond 
to focused and urgent foreign policy priorities.

    Question. At what point is this position no longer considered 
discrete and temporary? Why?

    Answer. This inquiry involves a fact-specific assessment depending 
on the relevant circumstances at that time. For example, the position 
would no longer be considered discrete and temporary if a federal 
statute were to confer permanent status on the position.

    Question. Yes or no. Is it possible for the Special Envoy Kerry's 
position to be considered ``discrete or temporary'' if the position is 
retained for a complete 4-year Presidential term? Why?

    Answer. This inquiry involves a fact-specific assessment depending 
on the relevant circumstances at that time, and there is no specific, 
fixed time-period beyond which a position may not be considered 
discrete and temporary. The existence of the same position for a period 
of 4 years would not, by itself, prevent it from being considered 
discrete and temporary.
                                 ______
                                 

    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Afghanistan: The Foreign Assistance budget proposed for 
Afghanistan in FY23 is $268.0 million and reflects a decrease of $95.8 
million, 26 percent below the FY 2022 Request. How do you justify this 
26 percent decrease, given the many needs still in Afghanistan for U.S. 
assistance?

    Answer. Support for Afghanistan remains a key Administration 
priority. This means prioritizing critical sectors: humanitarian 
assistance first then meeting the needs that underpin a functioning 
society--food security, livelihoods, health, and education--as well as 
civil society, with a focus on the protection of women and girls and 
human rights. Given the new realities on the ground, the 
Administration's Afghanistan assistance request reflects reduced 
funding requirements for the following security sector assistance 
accounts: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; 
International Military Education and Training; and Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs.

    Question. The FY23 budget for the State Department's Bureau of 
South and Central Asian Affairs includes $10.9 million to sustain the 
Coordinator for Afghanistan Relocation Efforts (CARE) and a $7.0 
million increase for Afghan Affairs Unit Operations in Doha. How do you 
justify these amounts, especially with the lack of progress in getting 
many individuals out of Afghanistan who are in danger--such as USAGM 
journalists, American Spaces staff, and SIV applicants?

    Answer. Since August 2021, the United States has directly supported 
the relocation of over 70,000 Afghans, including at least 672 U.S. 
citizens and 555 Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs). The Department of 
State, under the leadership of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation 
Efforts, continues to support travel out of Afghanistan for eligible 
travelers, including U.S. citizens, LPRs, our Afghan allies and their 
eligible family members--including USAGM journalists and staff, 
American Spaces staff, Afghanistan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
holders, and SIV applicants who have received Chief of Mission 
approval. Since the non-combatant evacuation operation ended, CARE has 
evacuated thousands of SIV holders and eligible applicants.

    Question. Burma: The FY23 Burma request is 109.1 million which is 
20 percent below the FY 2021 actual and consistent with the FY22 
request. With the human rights situation worsening in Burma due to the 
military coup, why did the Department decrease the budget from FY21 
actual by 20 percent?

    Answer. The FY 2023 President's Budget request for Burma reflects 
the Administration's commitment to advance democratic governance and 
the rule of law, bolster civil society groups, promote basic and higher 
education, promote access to justice, support humanitarian needs, 
address human rights violations and abuses, support independent media, 
and strengthen processes and mechanisms for an eventual return to the 
path to democracy. The request adjusts some accounts, including 
eliminating law enforcement and other criminal justice assistance, as 
the coup restricted our ability to work with the military-led 
government. The request also shifts bilateral HIV/AIDS funding to a 
regional EAP fund to allow greater flexibility and responsiveness to 
health needs.

    Question. This funding is meant to support a large pool of items 
including supporting civil society, grassroots organizations, food 
security, healthcare programs, etc. Is this enough funding to support 
these broader issues?

    Answer. Yes. No cuts were made to our support for civil society, 
grassroots organizations, food security, healthcare programs, or other 
critical programs promoting the restoration of Burma's path to 
democracy, as well as human rights and support for the people of Burma. 
Note: While not shown in the bilateral line, the request shifts 
bilateral HIV/AIDS funding to a regional fund consistent with our 
request for the broader the EAP region to allow great flexibility and 
responsiveness to health needs.

    Question. Ethiopia: The FY23 budget for Ethiopia, which totals $267 
million, is 17 percent below the actual amount expended for FY 2021, 
and 12 percent below the FY 2022 request. Given the protracted 
humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia, how can the State Department justify a 
decrease in funding for FY23?

    Answer. The request reflects programming shifts given required 
assistance restrictions to Ethiopia under U.S. law, as well as the 
protracted humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia. We continue to actively 
engage on the humanitarian response and its drivers in Ethiopia. Our 
funding levels for the humanitarian response are robust. The U.S. 
Government has funded almost $1 billion in humanitarian assistance for 
northern Ethiopia between FY 2020 and FY 2022. The State Department 
will continue to monitor the situation on the ground to inform future 
funding levels.

    Question. Combatting Global Corruption Act, S.14: This bill 
requires the Department of State to develop a series of reports on how 
well the countries of the world are living up to the commitments they 
have made to combat corruption. The President has said time and again 
that combatting corruption is a vital national security interest of the 
United States. Secretary Blinken, are you aware of this bill and do you 
support it? Why or why not?

    Answer. The Department is deeply committed to the goals of this 
bill. The Department has concerns with some elements of the 
legislation, which may present unintentional challenges for our 
multilateral engagement and undermine our support for the strong 
international anti-corruption architecture. Many multilateral bodies 
already assess countries' implementation of anti-corruption obligations 
through peer-review processes. We believe reinforcing and complementing 
these existing multilateral reviews by focusing our engagement and 
analysis on the substance of each country's achievements or 
shortcomings--instead of new ranked reports--would better advance the 
Act's goals.

    Question. Funding for State Department Personnel and ``Training 
Float'': The Biden administration is requesting funding for 570 
additional Foreign Service and Civil Service positions. I understand 
that this request includes 250 positions to expand the State 
Department's ``Training Float.'' During the hearing, you stated that 
these additional 250 positions ``will get us where we need to be'' in 
terms of a training float.'' However, given that the State Department 
will have added only 450 positions to achieve the training float for FY 
2022 and FY 2023 combined, for a workforce of approximately 24,500 
Foreign Service Officers and Civil Service Staff (not including Locally 
Employed Staff overseas)--that figure seems low. Please clarify the 
current size of the State Department's training float, and when the 
Department of State is projected to arrive at the 15 percent training 
float as required in the FY22 State Authorization Act.

    Answer. The current training and professional development float is 
composed of 1,112 positions (approximately 4 percent of our combined 
Civil Service and Foreign Service workforce). The Department is 
expanding by adding 80 additional opportunities in FY 2022 and has 
requested another 250 opportunities in FY 2023. Implementing a 15 
percent training and professional development float to accommodate the 
number of career employees would require a total of 4,143 positions or 
assignments (1,848 Civil Service and 2,295 Foreign Service), a goal 
that is fiscally unachievable in the short-term without leaving 
significant gaps in operational staffing. Therefore, the Department 
will gradually implement increased training and professional 
development opportunities, as expanding too fast will lead to overseas 
and domestic vacancies.

    Question. Paid Internships: I am happy to see that $10 million is 
included in the FY23 budget request for paid internships at State. Can 
you speak to the progress paid internships are expected to make on DEIA 
(diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility) at the Department?

    Answer. Existing paid internship and fellowship opportunities have 
had a significant impact on DEIA. The Pickering and Rangel fellowships 
have been responsible for increasing the overall Foreign Service 
generalist minority rate by 33 percent. The additional $10 million 
requested in FY 2023 will allow the Department to transition all 
student internships to paid, as part of the Department of State's 
continued efforts to diversify the ranks of its employees by 
encouraging applications from populations traditionally 
underrepresented in the Department and that reflect the diversity of 
the United States. This paid internship program will help remove 
barriers for students who may not have the financial means to accept an 
unpaid internship.
                                 ______
                                 

    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

    Question. We have seen time and again in the last year the critical 
importance of having sufficient diplomatic staff to support our 
national security, from having ambassadors in place to having diplomats 
on the ground to report on and respond to crises as they happen. Your 
budget request seeks funding to add 570 new positions in the State 
Department, 288 in the Foreign Service, and 282 in the Civil Service. 
In your testimony, you stated that additional positions funded by the 
FY23 request would allow a float of 250 people. In your request, you 
note that would fund a ceiling of 16,091 positions. A training float of 
250 people would be a float of less than 2 percent, leaving a long way 
to go from Congressional requests to have a float of 15 percent. How 
would a training float of 2 percent meet the goals of allowing more 
employees to take time for training?

    Answer. The current training and professional development float is 
composed of 1,112 positions. This is approximately 4 percent of our 
combined Civil Service and Foreign Service workforce. The Department is 
expanding by adding 80 additional positions in FY 2022 and has 
requested another 250 positions in FY 2023. We are committed to 
expanding training and professional development opportunities, 
including interagency details, to ensure employees have the right 
skills throughout their career to support and defend United States' 
interests.

    Question. What number is your target number for a training float, 
and how do you plan to get there?

    Answer. The Department's current training and professional 
development float is 1,112 positions--approximately 4 percent of our 
combined Civil Service and Foreign Service workforce. Implementing a 15 
percent float to accommodate the number of career employees would 
require a total of 4,143 positions or assignments, a goal that is 
fiscally unachievable in the short term without leaving significant 
gaps in operational staffing. Therefore, we will gradually implement 
increased opportunities, as expanding too fast will lead to overseas 
and domestic vacancies. We plan to gradually expand the training float 
by adding 80 additional opportunities in FY 2022 and another 250 
opportunities in FY 2023.

    Question. You stated early in your tenure that our diplomatic corps 
should reflect the diversity of America, and you have taken steps by 
hiring the first-ever Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer at State. 
How does this budget request help you achieve State's goal of improving 
diversity in recruitment, retention, and promotion to leadership 
positions?

    Answer. The Department's FY 2023 DEIA budget request is $78.6 
million and includes projected expenditures across several offices and 
bureaus. Together, these elements will build an infrastructure for new 
and enhanced programs, accelerate hiring and recruitment modernization 
to support diversity outreach, increase the collection and analysis of 
DEIA-oriented data so that potential barriers to equal employment 
opportunities can be identified and eliminated, reduce backlog of 
discipline case reviews, and improve work-life programs. This is a 
significant increase from the Department's DEIA budget for FY 2021, 
which totaled $21.4 million, and the FY 2022 budget request of $43.8 
million.

    Question. Can you share statistics that disaggregate State's 
workforce data by region and diversity?

    Answer. When I became Secretary, I stated that our diversity is one 
of our great national strengths, and I was committed to ensuring a 
State Department workforce that reflects the full diversity of our 
country. Our Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer has been leading an 
effort to develop the first-ever demographic baseline report for the 
State Department. This report, which is accessible to the entire 
workforce, provides a comprehensive snapshot of our workforce 
demographics and is one of several tools the Department will use to 
assess DEIA progress. It is disaggregated by sex, race, ethnicity, 
disability status, bureau, employment category, and grade or rank. In 
the coming weeks, we look forward to sharing our demographic baseline 
information with the respective Congressional oversight committees.

    Question. Our world-class U.S. diplomats should receive the support 
they need in all circumstances, including for those afflicted by 
directed energy attacks. These diplomats rightly deserve an institution 
that has their full support, especially when attacked in the line of 
service. I appreciate your leadership in ensuring that after years of 
doubt, they have access to the services that they need. Has the 
Department established the procedures necessary to refer patients with 
brain injuries to Walter Reed's medical facilities?

    Answer. Our diplomats deserve the world's finest care and support. 
Recognizing that and building on the FY 2022 National Defense 
Authorization Act, the Department has established the necessary 
procedures to get patients into the military health system, including 
at Walter Reed. We also have procedures in place to get patients access 
to other centers of excellence quickly, including Johns Hopkins, among 
other places. No two patients are alike; we want to ensure that they 
receive the best and most appropriate care.

    Question. What obstacles, if any, hinder the State Department from 
making use of these facilities for affected employees?

    Answer. I am pleased to report potential obstacles associated with 
getting treatment and care for those patients affected since January 1, 
2016, have been resolved, and we are able to quickly get those affected 
by a potential AHI to a medical facility. For those affected by a 
possible AHI prior to January 1, 2016, or who may no longer be 
affiliated with the Department, treatment and care are available via 
Johns Hopkins Hospital and other centers of excellence.

    Question. And what can Congress do to support this effort?

    Answer. Congressional engagement has helped us ensure we are doing 
everything we can to get this right. I look forward to continued 
engagement with Congress related to these efforts and am grateful for 
Congressional support for our diplomats around the world.

    Question. Has the Department established procedures for handling 
reports of ``Havana Syndrome,'' either at our diplomatic posts abroad 
or here in the United States?

    Answer. Yes, the Department of State has established procedures for 
reporting and responding to reports of AHI, and regularly provides 
updates to our workforce.

    Question. Do your employees know what to do if they experience 
symptoms?

    Answer. The Department works to ensure all employees under Chief of 
Mission authority abroad and all State Department employees 
domestically know what to do if they experience a suspected AHI. Upon 
arrival at post, employees are briefed on AHI and reporting protocols, 
so they know what sensations or symptoms to look for and where to go 
for help. We regularly provide information and updates to the entire 
workforce through cables, security briefings, Department notices, and 
training opportunities.

    Question. What instructions have your Chiefs of Mission received 
about how to handle these types of reports?

    Answer. Chiefs of Mission are briefed on AHI during their initial 
training in Washington, including an intelligence briefing, and upon 
arrival at post. The briefings include information on how to identify 
the sensations and symptoms associated with potential AHI and the 
process for reporting potential incidents to the health and security 
offices at post. In addition, Chiefs of Mission are briefed on the 
protocols for reporting incidents to Washington and when to convene an 
emergency action committee. We also provide guidance for Chiefs of 
Mission on communicating with employees and family members at post, 
host governments, and the press.

    Question. Late last year the State Department proposed increasing 
many nonimmigrant visa fees--including business, tourist, and student 
visas. These fee increases are very untimely, considering the travel 
industry is still reeling from the pandemic. International inbound 
travel was still down 78 percent in 2021, compared to 2019 levels, 
according to the U.S. Travel Association. Meanwhile business travel 
continues to struggle to recover, last year generating just 44 percent 
of 2019 travel spending levels. Domestic leisure travel is really the 
only thing keeping the industry afloat in many communities, but it's 
not enough. With that in mind, would you support delaying the fee 
increases or exploring other ways to cover added funding needs that 
wouldn't needlessly harm the travel community at a time when they're 
most vulnerable?

    Answer. The Department appreciates the concerns regarding the 
Nonimmigrant Visa (NIV) fee recommendations. We are closely examining 
all options. The Bureau of Consular Affairs relies on revenue from NIV 
fees to fund visa operations and does not receive appropriated funds to 
cover these operations. Based on fee statutes, the bureau calculates 
the fee for full cost recovery using historical and projected demand 
and costs. The Department has concluded the 60-day public comment 
period for the fee change, and we are now reviewing comments. We 
continue to monitor demand and costs for these visa services and the 
impact these may have on the fee recommendations.

    Question. Lebanon: In spite of the Russia-Ukraine war's impact on 
Lebanon's wheat imports, fuel, and inflation, the struggling country 
took the courageous step to condemn Russian atrocities and voted with 
the U.S. at the UN. Given competing pressures (i.e., the war and 
humanitarian emergency in Ukraine), the U.S. must continue to engage 
with Lebanon. Is the Administration prepared to ensure that supporting 
humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon is a priority?

    Answer. U.S. humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon are 
priorities for the Administration and are some of the tools used to 
demonstrate our commitment to the Lebanese people, civil society, and 
institutions critical to building a sovereign state responsive to its 
people's legitimate needs. The FY 2023 President's budget request seeks 
robust assistance levels for Lebanon, including nearly $170 million in 
overall security assistance, bolstering our support to Lebanese 
security services. The request includes $10.45 billion in State and 
USAID humanitarian assistance, which aims to reduce the pain and 
suffering resulting from conflict and disaster globally, including in 
Lebanon where the United States provided more than $400 million in FY 
2021.

    Question. Lebanon is voting in important elections in May. I'm 
concerned that there are efforts to suppress vote and that anything 
less than a fully free and fair election will further undermine any 
remaining stability in Lebanon. Please detail your department's 
engagements with the Government of Lebanon ahead of their elections. 
Will the state Department publicly call for free and fair elections in 
May? While I understand concern about not appearing to weigh in on 
either side of an election, but calling for free and fair elections 
should not be considered an endorsement of any party or politician.

    Answer. The Administration publicly and privately called for free, 
fair, and on-time elections in Lebanon. The International Support Group 
for Lebanon, of which the United States is a member, issued a statement 
on February 11 urging the Lebanese authorities to hold free, fair, and 
inclusive elections. On February 7, Ambassador Shea told media that 
``elections must be held on time in a fair and transparent manner. 
There is no wiggle room.'' The U.S. Government also worked to include 
language in a February 4 UN Security Council statement on the 
importance of election integrity. Moreover, senior U.S. officials 
frequently emphasized in their conversations with Lebanese leaders and 
with key partners responsible for election security that Lebanon's 
elections should be in line with international standards.

    Question. The expansion of the global gag rule under the previous 
administration has resulted in the disruption of U.S. global health 
programs. According to the State Department's own report, the global 
gag rule negatively affected a wide range of people and programs, 
including family planning access for women in rural areas in West 
Africa, HIV testing and treatment for key populations, and TB 
programming in India. The Biden-Harris administration rescinded the 
global gag rule as an early executive action, yet the toll of the 
policy continues to be felt by organizations who are trying to rebuild 
lost partnerships, networks and programs while navigating the threat of 
it coming back under the next administration. This is why I lead the 
Global Health, Empowerment and Rights Act to permanently end it. Can 
you describe for us why repealing the Global Gag Rule is good policy 
and how permanently repealing the Global Gag Rule would support the 
strengthening of health systems in fragile communities?

    Answer. The permanent repeal of the Global Gag Rule goes beyond 
good policy, especially for health systems in fragile communities. The 
slightest disruption to fragile health systems can have a negative 
ripple effect on multiple aspects of a community, including peace and 
security. Policies like the Global Gag Rule heighten the risk of 
destabilization, placing women and girls at disproportionate risk for 
negative health and socioeconomic outcomes. I support the permanent 
repeal of the Global Gag Rule and strengthening of health systems, 
because the United States is the preeminent leader in providing life-
saving foreign assistance that safeguards the human rights and dignity 
of women and girls through essential gender-equitable healthcare.

    Question. National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality: The 
Administration rightly prioritized protecting, improving, and expanding 
access to sexual and reproductive health care as one of 10 key 
priorities in their National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality. 
The State Department is due to release their implementation plan for 
the strategy this summer. Can you preview how you will contribute to 
this critical piece of the strategy and what additional funding and 
policy change you need to expand access to sexual and reproductive 
health care around the world to advance gender equity and equality?

    Answer. As the State Department develops its implementation plan 
for the National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, I will 
continue to support strengthened efforts to expand access to sexual and 
reproductive health (SRH) care around the world to advance the goals of 
the strategy. We are currently doing this through supporting key 
multilateral partners like the UN Population Fund. Furthermore, our 
continued support for PEPFAR's DREAMS program remains a critical pillar 
of our SRH efforts to reach adolescent girls and young women.

    Question. Egypt Assistance: The regime of President Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi systematically brutalizes its citizens, cracks down on 
independent civil society, shows flagrant disregard for human rights in 
the country, and represses dissidents and their families across 
national borders. Given these enduring and serious rights violations, 
does the Administration support conditions on foreign military 
financing to Egypt?

    Answer. The Administration has elevated human rights in our 
engagement with the Egyptian Government to press for political prisoner 
releases and to support implementation of systemic human rights 
reforms, including to protect freedom of expression and association. We 
continue to make clear that our bilateral relationship with Egypt will 
be strengthened by tangible progress on human rights issues. The 
Department reprogrammed some of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
this past year after Egypt did not meet specific human rights requests 
within a specified timeframe. Retaining maximum flexibility on FMF 
allows us to seek concrete improvements in human rights while also 
advancing our regional security interests.

    Question. In comparison, the Administration requested that some 
assistance to Jordan be conditioned on ``negotiated benchmarks towards 
reforms.'' Can you explain this discrepancy?

    Answer. The President's FY 2023 budget request includes $1.45 
billion for Jordan to support the first year of an anticipated fourth 
U.S.-Jordan MOU, expected to take effect in FY 2023 and for which 
negotiations are ongoing. We anticipate the MOU will include consistent 
annual request levels for Foreign Military Financing and Economic 
Support Funds (ESF), including critical assistance programs and budget 
support to adequately address Jordan's needs. Additional ESF would be 
provided if Jordan implements meaningful and achievable reforms 
negotiated through the MOU. This additional ESF is part of our 
political commitment to support economic reforms and Jordan's long-term 
fiscal health in the interest of strengthening this key strategic 
partnership. We will work closely with Jordan to pursue and support 
these reforms.
                                 ______
                                 

    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. Putin's war against Ukraine has destabilized the oil and 
gas market. We're now looking at gas prices reaching four dollars, even 
five dollars a gallon in the United States--these are prices that will 
destroy America's economic recovery from the COVID-19 caused downturn 
and financially hurt millions of Americans. The Biden Administration 
should look at all options to decrease the price of oil, most of all by 
unleashing investment in America's unrivaled energy resources, but also 
by looking to expand oil and gas production by our allies and partners. 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana and Brazil are ready and eager to step in to 
the breach and export to the United States. This should be common 
sense; it would help lower prices here, while also driving up the 
economies of other countries that stand with us. Instead of working 
with these countries, the Administration instead sent officials to 
Caracas to explore the idea of receiving oil from the Maduro regime. I 
should not have to say that Nicolas Maduro has actively worked to 
undermine the United States at every opportunity--from sponsoring 
terrorism in Colombia, cooperating with Iran and Russia, to holding 
American citizens hostage. How would financing the Maduro regime 
advance any American interest, knowing that both the creaky oil 
infrastructure in Venezuela makes its oil more carbon intensive than 
other countries, and that its regime is a source of transnational crime 
and terrorism in the region?

    Answer. The U.S. officials' visit to Venezuela focused on securing 
the release of U.S. wrongful detainees and urging the Maduro regime to 
return to the negotiating table in Mexico with the democratic 
opposition's Unitary Platform to restore democracy in Venezuela. The 
visit reinforced U.S. support for the Verdad Act and for Interim 
President Juan Guaido's call for a negotiated solution through the 
Mexico process. We remain steadfast in our commitment to the Venezuelan 
people, which includes supporting their democratic aspirations and 
providing assistance to address Venezuela's humanitarian crisis. We 
will continue to implement and enforce our Venezuela sanctions, and 
ensure they help contribute to a peaceful democratic transition. The 
Administration has ongoing discussions with other energy-producing 
countries in the Americas, such as Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, and 
Brazil, and remains committed to preventing benefits accruing to 
malicious actors.

    Question. Can you confirm that the meeting between U.S. and Maduro-
affiliated officials in Caracas occurred only after the Administration 
exhausted efforts to secure oil from allies and partners? Like 
Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Guyana?

    Answer. U.S. officials' visit to Venezuela focused on securing the 
release of U.S. wrongful detainees and urging the Maduro regime to 
return to the negotiating table in Mexico with the democratic 
opposition's Unitary Platform to restore democracy in Venezuela. The 
visit reinforced U.S. support for the Verdad Act and for Interim 
President Juan Guaido's call for a negotiated solution through the 
Mexico process. We welcomed the return of two wrongfully detained U.S. 
citizens from Venezuela.

    Question. Should the U.S. receive oil imports from the Maduro 
Regime, how would it remain true to its policy of supporting the 
democratically-elected interim government of Juan Guaido?

    Answer. Consistent with the sense of Congress reflected in the 
VERDAD Act of 2019, we support the Venezuelan-led negotiations between 
the Unitary Platform and the regime as the best path to restore 
democracy and human rights in Venezuela. While the Administration does 
not preview sanctions actions, it has made clear that the United States 
would review some sanctions policies if the Venezuelan parties make 
meaningful progress toward a democratic solution.

    Question. Of the appropriated funds to Venezuela to support 
political competition and consensus building, it is my understanding 
that the Administration will support democratic electoral events, 
according to a recent congressional notification.

    Answer. Free and fair local, regional, National Assembly, and 
presidential elections remain at the forefront of our objectives in 
Venezuela.

    Question. Does the Biden administration recognize Interim President 
Juan Guaido?

    Answer. The United States recognizes the Interim Presidency of Juan 
Guaido and the 2015 democratically elected National Assembly as the 
legitimately elected representatives of the Venezuelan people.

    Question. Does the Biden administration support efforts to hold 
free and fair presidential elections?

    Answer. The need for a peaceful restoration of democracy, free and 
fair elections, and respect for the rights and freedoms of Venezuelans 
continues to drive our policy toward Venezuela. The United States 
considers free and fair local, regional, National Assembly, and 
presidential elections essential for Venezuelans to reach a peaceful 
and democratic solution to the crises their country faces.

    Question. On March 18, President Biden had a video call with 
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. The White House 
said the call focused on Ukraine. Beijing said it focused on U.S.-China 
relations. Beijing blamed the Trump administration for disrupting the 
``stable relationship'' we had since Carter--the one that terribly 
disadvantaged America and sold out our most basic principles for 
corporate interests--and suggested that the Biden administration needed 
to do more to redeem itself. The official Chinese state news agency 
quoted President Biden as having stated the following: ``I am willing 
to reaffirm that America does not seek to fight a `new Cold War' with 
China, does not seek to change China's system, does not seek to use the 
strengthening of alliances to counter China, does not support `Taiwan 
independence,' and has no intention of entering into a conflict with 
China.'' Biden further pledged to ``effectively control and manage the 
competition and disagreements.'' This sounds like a return to the 
policy of acquiescence that left us economically weaker, sold out 
American workers, and made us dangerously dependent on Beijing. Does 
this Chinese readout depict an accurate representation of what the 
President said?

    Answer. We do not want a return to a world divided into rigid 
blocs. The United States remains focused on the longer-term challenge 
to the international system posed by the PRC, which is the only country 
with the desire to reshape key elements of the international system if 
left unchallenged. As I made clear in my speech, over the last year, 
the Biden administration has implemented a comprehensive, whole-of-
government strategy to compete responsibly with the PRC while advancing 
our shared affirmative vision with allies and partners.

    Question. The claim that the United States ``does not seek to 
change China's system'' is especially wrongheaded, and far from a slip 
up, it echoes a line in the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific 
strategy released in February: ``Our objective is not to change the 
PRC, but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates.'' 
This sounds exactly like the defeatism that I feared when I warned in 
November 2020 that Biden would bring back the ``caretakers of American 
decline.'' What exactly does winning look like in a ``strategic 
competition'' if China's political system--a system that conducts 
genocide, that covers up the spread of a pathogen of pandemic 
potential, that systematically steals our intellectual property and 
technology--does not change?

    Answer. As I have said, we cannot rely on Beijing to change its 
trajectory, so we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing 
to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system. U.S. 
global leadership is defined by what we are for, not by what we are 
against. It's about supporting and improving the international order 
that has brought about security and prosperity for over 70 years. It's 
about revitalizing relationships with key allies and partners to 
effectively counter Beijing's coercive practices as needed and to set 
the rules of the road that will shape the coming decade. We will be 
forthright in opposing PRC actions that challenge or bend the rules 
which we have all, including the PRC, accepted.

    Question. How can U.S. leadership be maintained unless our 
worldview continues to shape the global order, and Beijing's 
worldview--what they call ``socialism with Chinese characteristics''--
is tossed onto the ash heap of history where it belongs?

    Answer. Our vision is about what we are for, not what we are 
against. We are for a world where technology is used to lift people up, 
not suppress them; where trade and commerce protect and lift up our 
workers and grow the middle class; where universal rights are 
respected; and where nations can write their own futures and work 
together in common cause. We are defending and revitalizing the system 
of norms and institutions which has created the conditions for 
development and prosperity around the world, including, it is worth 
mentioning, for the PRC.

    Question. How can we ignore General Secretary Xi's statements that 
he wants the Chinese Communist Party to ``liberate all of humanity'' 
and serve as the ``gravediggers of capitalism?''

    Answer. We are confident in the strength of our values, and the 
resilience of the rules-based international order that has enabled so 
much of the world to prosper over the past seven decades. We are also 
committed to vigorously defending that system against those that would 
seek to undermine or replace it. The United States consistently engages 
with Beijing at the highest levels to responsibly manage the 
competition. We are committed to maintaining open lines of 
communication at all levels, including the President with Xi Jinping 
and the Secretary, the National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of 
Defense with their PRC interlocutors.

    Question. Why does the President of the United States, with all of 
the power at his disposal, display a weaker commitment to the cause of 
democracy and freedom than unarmed Hong Kong protesters did?

    Answer. As the President has told President Xi, standing up for 
human rights is in our DNA as Americans. We have a fundamental 
commitment to defending human rights and dignity. And we will continue 
to take actions to advance respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in China and beyond. The Administration has called out human 
rights abuses against all who suffer them in the PRC, including 
Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and others. We have also worked to protect the 
rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers in the face of the PRC's draconian 
policies. We will continue to promote accountability for the PRC's 
atrocities and other human rights abuses and violations against all of 
its citizens and repressive acts beyond its borders.

    Question. Why is this Administration so prone to timidity when 
confronted by what is nothing less than an existential threat?

    Answer. Over the 16 months, the Biden administration has 
implemented a comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy to compete 
responsibly with the PRC while advancing our shared affirmative vision 
with allies and partners. We are investing in the foundations of our 
strength at home; aligning with partners and allies on our approach 
abroad; and harnessing those two key assets to compete with the PRC to 
defend our interests and build our vision for the future. It is an 
approach that will enable us to carry forward this long-term 
competition effectively and responsibly, in a way that leverages our 
extraordinary strengths, in common cause with our unmatched network of 
allies and partners.

    Question. Last week, Cuba's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs met 
with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Emily Mendrala to discuss 
implementation of the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords. This week, the Cuban 
Deputy Minister is making the rounds to spread the lies of the 
Communist Regime he represents--that the policies of the United States 
are to blame for the suffering experienced by the people of Cuba. The 
people of Cuba suffer only because of the radical, Marxist-Leninist 
policies implemented by Fidel Castro and carried out by his successors. 
It is not hard to understand why people seek to flee a regime that 
detains children, executes its own citizens without trial, and prevents 
them from profiting from the natural abundance of their country. So 
long as the regime continues to exploit its own citizens, I am worried 
that platforms like these talks will only serve the purposes of the 
regime. What issues did DAS Mendrala raise with the Cuban Deputy 
Minister?

    Answer. Talks held April 21 to discuss implementation of the U.S.-
Cuba Migration Accords represent a continuation of our nearly 30-year 
engagement with Cuba on migration matters to promote safe, orderly, and 
legal migration. Discussions under the meeting's limited agenda covered 
migration trends, irregular migration, returns and repatriations of 
citizens, Embassy functions, and other related issues. Enabling safe, 
legal, and orderly migration between Cuba and the United States is 
consistent with U.S. interests in fostering family reunification and 
promoting greater respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Cuba.

    Question. Did DAS Mendrala convey the primacy of human rights and 
democracy in U.S. policy towards Cuba?

    Answer. Our policy toward Cuba focuses on support for the Cuban 
people, including their political and economic well-being, and human 
rights. We consistently raise our serious concerns directly with the 
Cuban Government through multiple diplomatic channels, including our 
view that poor human rights conditions represent a major reason Cubans 
choose to leave their homeland. The Migration Talks focused on mutual 
obligations under the Migration Accords.

    Question. Did DAS Mendrala urge her counterparts that the United 
States seeks the immediate release of dissidents and democracy 
activists, like Jose Daniel Ferrer, artists Luis Manuel Otero Alcantara 
and El Osorbo, the Damas de Blanco Aymara Nieto Munoz, Sayli Navarro 
and many more who peacefully demonstrated against the regime?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration, including DAS Mendrala, 
consistently and regularly urges the Cuban Government in private 
diplomatic conversations to release all political prisoners. 
Additionally, we continue to call on the Cuban Government publicly and 
in multilateral fora to respect the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of Cubans and to release Jose Daniel Ferrer, Luis Manuel Otero 
Alcantara, Maykel Osorbo, Aymara Nieto Munoz, Sayli Navarro and the 
hundreds of detained protestors from last year's historic July 11 
demonstrations.

    Question. Last year, when President Biden took office, I was 
extremely concerned that the President would return to the failed 
policy of engagement with the Castro-Diaz-Canel regime that President 
Obama pursued. I was pleasantly surprised when the Biden administration 
announced it would put its Cuba policy review on hold. Of course, this 
only came after the Cuban people rose up in unprecedented protests 
across the island against the now 63-year old communist regime. After 
the events of July 11, the Biden administration promised that the Cuba 
Policy Review would reflect the new environment in Cuba created by 
these historic, organic protests. Now, 10 months later, our policy 
towards Cuba appears to be in a holding pattern. Does the United States 
still ``stand with the Cuban people and their clarion call for 
freedom,'' as President Biden said in July?

    Answer. Our policy toward Cuba continues to focus first and 
foremost on support for the Cuban people, their human rights, and their 
political and economic well-being. We stand with the Cuban people in 
their fight for freedom by holding Cuban Government officials 
accountable for oppressive actions, condemning restrictions on freedom 
of expression, calling for the unconditional release of political 
prisoners, urging our allies to do the same, and finding meaningful 
ways to support the Cuban people. We are committed to increasing our 
capacity to reunite family members, support independent entrepreneurs, 
and ensure remittances flow more freely to the Cuban people while not 
enriching those who perpetuate human rights abuses.

    Question. When can Congress expect to receive the Cuba Policy 
Review?

    Answer. Our policy toward Cuba focuses first and foremost on 
support for the Cuban people, including their political and economic 
well-being, and human rights. Per the Biden administration's 
announcement on May 16, 2022, the Administration plans to implement a 
series of measures in the coming weeks and months to increase support 
for the Cuban people and safeguard our national security interests. As 
we implement these measures, we will continue to call on the Cuban 
Government to respect freedom and human rights for all Cubans as they 
work to determine their own futures, and we will continue to hold Cuban 
Government officials accountable for human rights abuses through the 
imposition of appropriate sanctions and visa restrictions.

    Question. What can you tell us about that review and its proposed 
policies to support protesters, activists, and journalists in Cuba?

    Answer. We continue to have serious concerns about human rights 
abuses in Cuba, including harsh sentencing for protestors, extensive 
restrictions on fundamental freedoms, and the passage of a restrictive 
Penal Code. We remain committed to promoting respect for Cubans' human 
rights and accountability for Cuban Government officials involved in 
human rights abuses. We consistently condemn human rights abuses in our 
diplomatic conversations with the Cuban Government and in our public 
statements, and we urge the Cuban regime to release political prisoners 
unconditionally and to protect and respect the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of individuals in Cuba.

    Question. What has the State Department done to ensure unfettered 
access to the internet in Cuba, beyond providing VPNs to protesters?

    Answer. The Administration supports efforts globally to counter 
Internet censorship, restrictions on content access, and shutdowns, 
including in Cuba. We have bolstered that support since nationwide 
protests on July 11 and will continue to do so. We continue to study 
options and solicit opinions from stakeholders to advance the 
Administration's policy goals.
    We remain dedicated to expanding information flow for the Cuban 
people, recognizing that no easy fixes exist to address the limitations 
we see in Cuba.

    Question. China's aggression against Taiwan has increased steadily 
in recent years, particularly incursions into its airspace and 
territorial waters. It seems the goal is to exhaust and intimidate 
Taiwan's forces without engaging in open combat. As Beijing's tactics 
change, so too should our response. What do you make of these gray zone 
warfare tactics?

    Answer. We agree that PRC gray zone tactics are destabilizing, risk 
miscalculation, and undermine peace and stability in the region. We 
have engaged extensively with both Taipei and our allies and partners 
to calibrate our response. In terms of specifics, I would recommend a 
classified briefing to you or your staff.

    Question. Is the Administration taking concrete steps to counter 
them, and if so, what are they?

    Answer. In response, we are pursuing multiple lines of effort. 
Consistent with our one China policy, we will continue deepening our 
security relationship with Taiwan to ensure it has sufficient 
capabilities to defend itself.
    We will continue to urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, 
and economic pressure, and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with 
Taiwan.
    We will also continue to work with allies and partners to highlight 
the positive role that Taiwan plays in addressing global challenges and 
encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending against threats to its 
democratic values.

    Question. Have you gamed out a series of proportional responses if 
Beijing continues to escalate the scale of these provocations against 
Taiwan?

    Answer. We remain resolutely committed to make available to Taiwan 
the defense articles and services necessary to enable it to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan 
Relations Act.
    We also seek to minimize miscalculations on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait and ensure the future of Taiwan is determined peacefully 
and free of PRC coercion.
    We are pursuing deterrence on a number of fronts to complicate the 
PRC's calculus and to force Beijing to think very carefully about 
precipitating a crisis that would have terrible consequences for the 
region and the world and not be in the PRC's own best interest.

    Question. Have you warned your PRC counterparts that there would be 
serious consequences if they took any coercive action against Taiwan?

    Answer. I would be happy to answer this in a closed session.

    Question. As you know, our friends in Taiwan need to acquire 
military capabilities to deter aggression by the PRC as quickly as 
possible. Business-as-usual in our foreign military sales process 
simply will not cut it. Arming Taiwan must be among our top security 
assistance priorities. What is the State Department doing to revamp the 
Foreign Military Sales process to prioritize and expedite transfers to 
Taiwan?

    Answer. The Administration processes each sale as soon as it is 
received. However, the speed of arms sales also depends on Taiwan 
moving as quickly as possible to confirm transfers and U.S. industry 
delivering these capabilities as soon as possible.
    We are looking at the entire defense trade enterprise to find 
efficiencies and also working with industry to find ways to ensure 
Taiwan has the capabilities it needs in a timely manner. We are 
exploring every possible avenue to expedite cases.

    Question. Putin's war against Ukraine has demonstrated the 
viability of new and old technology in countering the equipment 
deployed by our authoritarian adversaries in Beijing and Moscow. One of 
the most successful tools in the war has been FIM-92 Stingers and FGM-
148 Javelins. While the United States itself has not really needed 
these tools in recent conflicts, because we have almost always enjoyed 
air and armor superiority, they are critical assets for our partners 
going up against Russian jets and tanks or maybe soon Chinese jets and 
tanks. I am concerned that the need for these weapons has already 
outstripped our defense industry's ability to produce more. What is the 
State Department doing to assure our allies that their needs and 
requests for additional Stingers and Javelins will continue to be met, 
despite reduced production of both of these weapons in the United 
States?

    Answer. Long production timelines are one of the top concerns we 
consistently hear from our partners, especially considering recent 
increased demand. We are working very closely with our Allies and the 
Department of Defense--which has the lead on this issue--to ensure the 
defense readiness of our partners and prevent any potential capability 
gaps. This includes making sure DoD has an accurate picture of and 
accounts for the foreign demand for these systems as it works with 
primes and sub-tier suppliers to increase production. We are also 
engaging industry on multiple fronts to support and encourage increased 
production of high-demand weapon systems.

    Question. Is the State Department working with the Defense 
Department on the production of these weapons in order to support 
Ukraine and even Taiwan's defense needs, even as the DoD looks to 
invest in next generation technology?

    Answer. Absolutely. The U.S. Government is looking closely at what 
we and industry can do to improve production timelines to get needed 
defense capabilities to our Allies. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is 
leading an effort to examine production processes for several items, 
including Javelins and Stingers. And the National Security Council has 
convened interagency discussions to examine this broader issue.
                                 ______
                                 

    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

    Question. Energy revenues continue to be the main source of income 
fueling Russia's war machine. Energy is Russia's top export and 
accounts for roughly half of its entire federal budget, and we must 
continue to work to cut off this funding. I was pleased the 
Administration--at the urging of myself and other members of Congress--
banned the import of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal into the U.S. 
in early February. However, the U.S. imported only a small amount of 
energy from Russia. In 2021, the U.S. imported approximately 670,000 
barrels of oil and petroleum products per day, which was about 8 
percent of all U.S. petroleum imports. The larger issue at hand is the 
E.U.'s reliance on Russian energy: approximately 40 percent of E.U. gas 
comes from Russia, as well as more than a quarter of its oil. This 
means, Europe is continuing to send Russia nearly $1 billion per day in 
energy revenues (approximately $870 million/day from the EU27 to 
Russia), compared with the approximately $50 million the U.S. was 
purchasing on a daily basis. Specifically, estimates show that Europe 
is purchasing each day: roughly $22 million of coal, $415 million of 
oil, and $433 million in natural gas, for a total of $870 million. I 
recognize shutting off Russian energy flows into Europe is complicated, 
and is a large undertaking that would have an impact on consumers and 
prices. However, is a matter of saving lives, and immediate action must 
be taken. Last month, I was pleased with the announcement of the joint 
Task Force on Energy Security, which is aimed at strengthening the 
coordination between the U.S. and the E.U. to reduce Europe's reliance 
on Russian energy. It has been almost exactly a month since this task 
force was established. Can you please provide us with an update on its 
efforts and progress as it relates to reducing European reliance on 
Russian energy?

    Answer. The European Commission and the United States understand 
and are working to address the imperative of reducing energy imports 
from Russia through the Joint Task Force. We have held meetings with EU 
member states and industry representatives to support diversifying 
Europe's supply of natural gas and accelerating deployment of energy 
efficiency and smart grid technologies in European homes and 
businesses, electrify heating, and increase clean energy output to 
reduce demand for fossil fuels. Separate from the Task Force, the EU 
has announced a phased ban on imports of Russian coal and a ban on 
seaborne oil imports that immediately affects around 75 percent of 
imports of Russian oil.

    Question. Can we expect a plan or report to be released detailing 
the objectives the task force and a strategy to achieve them?

    Answer. The March 25 public announcement of the Joint Task Force by 
the White House and the European Union provides details on the Task 
Force's objectives to strengthen European energy security, including 
its overarching aims to diversify liquefied natural (LNG) supplies and 
reduce demand for natural gas in alignment with climate objectives. 
Since then, the Commission and the White House released two joint 
statements on April 29 here (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2022/04/29/joint-statement-between-the-united-
states-and-the-european-commission-on-european-energy-security-2/) and 
May 24 here (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/05/24/joint-statement-between-the-united-states-and-the-
european-commission-on-european-energy-security-3/) that provided 
additional details on our strategic priorities and efforts towards 
achieving them. As the Joint Task Force makes further progress towards 
its goals, the Administration is committed to providing further 
updates.

    Question. Increasing LNG shipments to the E.U. is a central 
component of this joint initiative. Specifically, under this agreement, 
the U.S. will ensure an additional 15 bcm of LNG to Europe this year, 
with an additional 50 bcm of U.S. LNG annually over the next decade. 
How has the Task Force engaged with energy producers in the U.S. to 
help follow through on these commitments?

    Answer. The United States committed to working with international 
partners and striving to identify additional LNG volumes for the EU 
market of at least 15 bcm in 2022. The EU has committed to working with 
Member States toward the goal of ensuring, until at least 2030, demand 
for approximately 50 bcm/year of additional U.S. LNG consistent with 
our shared net-zero goals. Since that announcement, the Task Force has 
met with key energy industry representatives and EU Member States. We 
have seen tangible progress, such as Finland's contract to lease a 
floating LNG import terminal from a U.S. provider that will be 
operational by the end of 2022.

    Question. In addition to increasing shipments of U.S. LNG to the 
EU, what other options is the Task Force exploring to help shift 
Europe's energy reliance away from Russia?

    Answer. In addition to facilitating increased LNG supplies to 
Europe, the U.S.-European Commission Joint Task Force is focused on 
reducing overall demand for natural gas by accelerating deployment of 
clean energy technologies and energy efficiency solutions. The United 
States and European Commission have also convened representatives of EU 
Member States, industry participants, and other stakeholders to solicit 
views and promote government-private sector cooperation on steps and 
actions the United States, the EU, and its Member States can take to 
accelerate the deployment of heat pumps, energy efficiency 
technologies, and renewable energy.

    Question. Which will have the most immediate impacts?

    Answer. As part of the task force, the Administration and the 
European Commission committed to reduce overall gas demand by 
accelerating market deployment of clean energy technologies. These 
include energy efficiency solutions such as increasing demand response 
devices, including smart thermostats, and deployment of heat pumps to 
reduce gas demand through electrification. The REPowerEU plan estimates 
that reductions through energy savings in homes and electrified heating 
can replace up to 15.5 bcm of Russian natural gas in 2022.

    Question. What ways can Congress help support these efforts?

    Answer. The Administration appreciates Congress's continued support 
for our efforts to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian fossil fuels 
and diversify its energy sources and suppliers, and welcomes 
constructive engagement with Congress in furtherance of these efforts.

    Question. Ukraine Security Assistance Coordinator: Now that LTG 
(Ret) Terry Wolff has been appointed to the National Security Council 
as the Ukraine Security Assistance Coordinator, there are two issue 
areas that I believe we need to continue to make progress in: The 
initial strategy of providing Warsaw Block equipment to the Ukrainians 
was the right one--they know how to use them and our Eastern European 
allies had stocks they were willing to provide. As the war continues we 
are now providing them with more NATO standard equipment--to include 
our own 155mm howitzer artillery and NATO standard tanks and personnel 
carriers. What discussions are you having with Secretary Austin about 
developing a strategic plan to train Ukraine's forces on NATO standard 
equipment?

    Answer. The Department of State is working closely with the 
interagency to determine how best to get Ukraine the security 
assistance it needs to defend itself as quickly as possible. Throughout 
the course of the war Ukraine's defensive requirements have changed, 
and we have worked closely with the Department of Defense to adapt the 
assistance provided. The Department has engaged extensively with our 
NATO Allies and other partners to provide both Warsaw Pact and NATO 
standard equipment. The United States and key Allies have also provided 
training to our Ukrainian partners to ensure that they can operate this 
equipment effectively and safely. We do anticipate that Ukraine will 
increasingly require NATO standard and similar equipment from other 
countries as the war continues. We seek to transition all of our Allies 
and partners away from Russian equipment, but that process will take 
time and resources, such as the significant assistance Congress 
recently appropriated to help countries that have been impacted by the 
war in Ukraine.

    Question. How is the State Department going to coordinate with 
Lieutenant General Wolff in improving the arms transfer process? Does 
he report to you or the President?

    Answer. The State Department coordinates closely with Lieutenant 
General Wolff (Ret) to improve the provision of security assistance to 
Ukraine, working with the National Security Council, Department of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others. Our collaboration 
ensures coordinated policy and timely, effective provision of arms 
transfers and security assistance to Ukraine and coordinated diplomatic 
outreach to secure security assistance from our Allies and partners. 
Lieutenant General Wolff reports to the President, as he is a Senior 
Director at the NSC.

    Question. After their initial hesitancy, Germany has stepped up 
their support of Ukraine, but are still unwilling to provide them with 
the heavy weapons they need. Germany's ruling coalition appears to be 
fractured on the issue of sending additional heavy weaponry to Ukraine, 
and Austria has spoken out against Ukraine's bid to join the EU. What 
discussions have you had with our allies to reverse these trends?

    Answer. We coordinate closely with Germany through diplomatic and 
defense channels both bilaterally and multilaterally (i.e., through 
NATO, the EU, and G7) to support Ukraine. Germany is a key ally in 
maintaining unity in the face of Russia's invasion. Germany has sent 
lethal weapons to Ukraine, increased troop deployments to the Eastern 
flank, suspended the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, committed to spending 2 
percent of GDP on defense, established a new 100-billion-euro defense 
fund, and announced it would end Russian coal and oil imports by August 
1 and December 31, 2022, respectively. We were pleased that the 
European Council unanimously approved Ukraine's EU candidate status on 
June 23 and continue to engage Austria and other partners on the 
integration of Ukraine and the Western Balkans into the EU.

    Question. Global Engagement Center: In last year's testimony for 
the FY22 budget request, you gave me your commitment that you would 
follow through on President Zelenskyy's request to set up a Center for 
Combatting Disinformation in Ukraine in partnership with the Global 
Engagement Center. You also stated that appointment of a special 
coordinator to lead the Center was being reviewed. Can you provide an 
update as to the efforts of the GEC in Ukraine today, as well as why a 
special coordinator of the GEC has not been appointed for over 2 years 
into this Administration to lead the GEC?

    Answer. I respectfully defer any questions regarding the 
appointment of a special coordinator to the White House.
    GEC regularly communicates with the Ukrainian Government's Center 
for Strategic Communication and shares selected unclassified reporting 
to help inform their counter-disinformation efforts within Ukraine and 
assist with programming and content creation. The GEC's collaborative 
approach to countering Russian propaganda and disinformation in Ukraine 
is conducted in close coordination with others in the Department and 
the interagency, with our international partners and directly with the 
Government of Ukraine.

    Question. The FY23 Budget Request only asks for $5 million increase 
toward the Global Engagement Center--is this an adequate increase to 
tackle the disinformation environment we face today?

    Answer. The FY 2023 Request includes a $5 million increase for the 
Global Engagement Center's programmatic activities, as well as a $2.7 
million increase to support 15 new positions requested for GEC. When 
including current services adjustments, the overall increase for GEC is 
approximately $8.07 million, or 15 percent above FY 2022. In the near 
term, the Department anticipates providing GEC with additional 
resources from the recently enacted Ukraine supplementals. The current 
information environment includes principal actors such as Russia and 
the PRC surging resources toward disinformation and propaganda, making 
GEC's coordination of broader State and interagency resources all the 
more vital.

    Question. The White House has been hesitant at times to impose 
stricter sanctions. Russian officials admitted last week that sanctions 
had harmed their economy, we remain concerned that the Administration 
is not being aggressive enough in impacting the Russian economy. 
However, sanctions against VTB Bank do not go into effect until nearly 
2 months from today. Placing full blocking sanctions on all Russian 
banks and adding secondary sanctions would make it really difficult for 
the world to pay for Russian energy exports. Secretary Blinken, can you 
provide an update on sanctions on Russia?

    Answer. We continue to impose sanctions on Russia for its 
unjustified war against Ukraine. Together with more than thirty 
partners, we have designated over 2,400 individuals and entities. These 
include sanctions on oligarchs, their networks, and assets, along with 
hundreds of political, financial, and corporate leaders. Our sanctions 
have imposed severe costs on Russia's financial sector and key sources 
of revenue and economic sectors. We have also degraded Russia's defense 
and other critical sectors feeding Putin's war machine. Our most recent 
actions targeted major Russian defense companies like Rostec and United 
Aircraft. We have coupled sanctions with extensive export controls that 
cut Russia off from critical goods.

    Question. Why are we not implementing full blocking sanctions on 
all banks and why have you not instituted secondary sanctions?

    Answer. All options remain on the table when it comes to promoting 
accountability for Russia's atrocities and its continued war against 
Ukraine. As President Biden said, our goal is to ``maximize the impact 
on Putin and Russia and minimize the harm on us and our allies and 
friends around the world.'' We routinely assess and analyze targets to 
ensure our sanctions have the intended impact and help achieve our 
foreign policy goals. Before we move forward with any designations, we 
want to make sure they will not have undesirable consequences.

    Question. Denial of Tax Benefits: Since Russia's invasion began, we 
have seen hundreds of companies around the world pull their businesses 
out of Russia or modify them to reduce their presence. Given the 
atrocities we are witnessing in Ukraine, it is clear why many companies 
would not want to be paying taxes to a foreign government who is using 
that revenue to finance its war machine. However, right now, many 
companies who continue to operate in Russia still benefit from U.S. 
foreign tax credits, which are generally provided to offset the double 
taxation that results from operating in multiple countries. Senator 
Wyden and I now have a bipartisan agreement to change this and ensure 
American taxpayers are not subsidizing the Russian war machine. If 
companies choose to keep doing business in Russia and paying taxes to 
Putin's government in the face of these atrocities, they should forfeit 
their foreign tax credits and deductions for taxes paid to Russia in 
the United States. This effort follows my work with Senator Cardin to 
end the exchange of tax information with Russia and to suspend our tax 
treaty. I was glad to see the Administration suspend the exchange of 
tax information. In your view, how has the exodus of companies from 
Russia impacted its war-making capacity, and would you agree that 
Russia and Belarus have earned their place amongst the list of nations, 
currently including North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Sudan, in which we 
deny tax benefits for multinational companies who continue to operate 
there?

    Answer. The exodus of foreign companies has negatively impacted 
Russia's economy by reducing imports and domestic production, 
contributing to job losses, cutting access to technologies, and 
lowering Russia's tax revenues. We continue to use sanctions and export 
controls to squeeze the Russian Government's revenues, and they have 
slowed the economy. The economic steps we took with respect to Russia 
with our allies and partners have been in effect for almost 6 months. 
We expect to see the impacts on Russia's ability to wage war grow in 
the coming months. Thank you for raising the potential role of an 
updated tax policy, including the possibility of legislation to deny 
credits and deductions for taxes paid to Russia or Belarus.

    Question. Last week, the Administration announced a new program to 
accept refugees called Uniting for Ukraine. My understanding is that 
this will be a new streamlined process for Ukrainian citizens who have 
been displaced to apply for humanitarian parole in the United States. I 
have heard personally from many generous Ohioans who want to open their 
homes to these refugees, more than 500 people have called or emailed my 
office and a number of businesses have expressed interest in offering 
jobs. Is there a website where people can go to today to apply for this 
program?

    Answer. Uniting for Ukraine is a program administered by the 
Department of Homeland Security. More information on the program can be 
found on their website, www.dhs.gov/Ukraine. I respectfully refer you 
to the Department of Homeland Security for more information on Uniting 
for Ukraine and its application process.

    Question. When will Uniting for Ukraine be operational so that 
people here and abroad can apply and begin the process?

    Answer. Uniting for Ukraine is a program administered by the 
Department of Homeland Security. More information on the program can be 
found on their website, www.dhs.gov/Ukraine. It is currently 
operational, and I respectfully refer you to the Department of Homeland 
Security for more information on the program and its application 
process.

    Question. How long do you envision the application process taking? 
Weeks or months?

    Answer. The Department of State does not have a role in the 
application or approval process for Uniting for Ukraine. I respectfully 
refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more information 
on that program and its application process.

    Question. I fully support bringing in Ukrainian refugees so long as 
they are vetted, can you speak to how State will be administering 
biometric and biographic screening and vetting security checks for 
those who apply for this program?

    Answer. Uniting for Ukraine is a program administered by the 
Department of Homeland Security. More information on the program can be 
found on their website, www.dhs.gov/Ukraine. I respectfully refer you 
to the Department of Homeland Security for more information, including 
the screening and vetting process for applicants and sponsors.

    Question. There are approximately 300 children who are caught with 
no options to complete an adoption with a U.S. family. My office has 
been in touch with at least 7 families in Ohio who are directly 
impacted. A portion of these children have severe medical problems and 
lack access to quality health care. Other children have participated in 
host programs where they have come to the United States multiple times 
to visit with their adoptive families. It seems, from communications 
with agencies and families that Department of State, thus far, has not 
engaged with the Ukrainian Ministry about a path to preserve these 
children's connections to these families. What has Department of State 
done to advocate for these children and families?

    Answer. I have tremendous empathy for families who have hosted 
Ukrainian children in the past and for families at the earliest stages 
of the intercountry adoption process. Many families develop an 
emotional attachment to the children well before a legal parent-child 
relationship is established. Until a final adoption order is issued, 
Ukrainian authorities have sole jurisdiction over decisions about the 
best interests of these children. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is in 
regular communication with the Government of Ukraine's Ministry of 
Social Policy and National Social Service, as well as with U.S. 
families and adoption service providers. We have shared U.S. families' 
concerns. Ukraine has repeatedly indicated that they prefer the 
children to remain in Europe or nearby countries, in closer proximity 
to Ukraine.

    Question. Who has been the Ukraine point of contact?

    Answer. The Department's primary points of contact for intercountry 
adoption in Ukraine are the National Social Service of Ukraine (NSS) 
and the Ministry of Social Policy (MSP). We are also in close 
communication with the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, DC.

    Question. Some of these children were previously eligible for B1/B2 
visas. Do you plan to make these children eligible for the Uniting in 
Ukraine program?

    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has sole authority to 
grant parole, including under the Uniting for Ukraine parole program. 
We respectfully refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for 
any questions regarding parole eligibility for children under Uniting 
for Ukraine. Additionally, a B1/B2 nonimmigrant visa is not a suitable 
alternative to a permanent resettlement or immigration process.
                                 ______
                                 

    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. As the Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy stated, the 
Indo-Pacific is ``the epicenter of the climate crisis.'' My provision 
calling on the United States Government to facilitate a robust 
interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy was 
included in the Senate-passed U.S. Innovation and Competition Act. How 
will the Fiscal Year 2023 budget request for the Department of State 
support U.S. efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change in the 
Indo-Pacific?

    Answer. The FY 2023 budget request to Congress supports U.S. 
coordination bilaterally and regionally with institutions and groupings 
including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Australia-India-Japan-U.S. ``Quad,'' Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to build capacity 
and address the key regional challenge of climate change. These 
investments are essential for the global effort to limit temperature 
rise to no more than 1.5+C and will reduce the need for costly 
humanitarian aid following extreme-weather events and safeguard decades 
of U.S. investment in global development.

    Question. What additional resources does the Department of State 
need to adopt and execute this strategy?

    Answer. The FY 2023 budget request to Congress includes more than 
$11 billion in international climate assistance and finance across the 
U.S. Government, of which $2.28 billion is for Department of State and 
USAID climate programs. If enacted, this funding will meet the 
President's historic pledge to quadruple international climate finance 
while strengthening global stability, increasing energy security, 
enhancing U.S. competitiveness, and strengthening climate resilience in 
key geographies around the world.

    Question. The 2018 Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which I 
championed with former Senator Cory Gardner, invests more than $1.7 
billion per year for 5 years to support democracy, human rights, the 
rule of law, and security in the Indo-Pacific. What will the Fiscal 
Year 2023 State Department budget request do to push back against the 
authoritarian playbook of repression in the Indo-Pacific and make 
investments in people-to-people exchanges, democracy promotion, rule of 
law, and the protection of human rights?

    Answer. In order to achieve the goal of a free and open Indo-
Pacific, U.S. assistance will build collective capacity of partners and 
allies to update and adapt the rules-based order to new challenges. 
U.S. foreign assistance will support efforts to modernize the 
architecture of international cooperation for the challenges of this 
century. Pooling shared resources and ambitions with like-minded 
partners amplifies the reach and effect of U.S. foreign assistance 
programs. Investments in multilateral fora, including ASEAN and the 
Mekong-U.S. Partnership (MUSP), highlight the United States' commitment 
to these institutions and their ability to forge solutions to shared 
challenges and reflect shared values. Foreign assistance will elevate 
U.S. coordination with Quad partners to meet current and emerging 
challenges. The United States will continue to increase its engagement 
with Pacific Island nations, bilaterally and multilaterally, through 
programs that seek to build their resilience to current and future 
health shocks, respond to the climate crisis, and advance their long-
term prosperity and security.

    Question. China has been aggressively moving to secure its access 
to critical minerals and block other countries, including the United 
States, from the supply chain. China has acquired over 50 percent of 
the world's lithium supply through investments in Australia and the 
Lithium Triangle. Furthermore, Argentina, one of the key producers in 
the Lithium Triangle, has signed a Memorandum of Understanding to join 
the Belt and Road Initiative, positioning China for further investment 
in the region. While China has a plan for lithium, the United States 
does not. An issue of this magnitude spans multiple agencies, but what 
is the State Department doing in order to protect the United States' 
stake in the international market for critical minerals?

    Answer. The State Department is leading diplomatic efforts to 
strengthen resiliency, ensure mining and processing adhere to the 
highest environmental, social, and governance standards, and create a 
level-playing field for U.S. producers. The State Department achieves 
this through its Energy Resource Governance Initiative (ERGI), which 
promotes sound mining-sector governance practices in more than 15 
mining and processing countries globally. We are also expanding our 
coordination with likeminded countries that are significant off takers 
of critical minerals to share information and identify investment 
opportunities in minerals exploration, mining, processing, and 
recycling.
                                 ______
                                 

    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Jeff Merkley

    Question. Transnational Repression: In yesterday's briefing, 
Secretary Blinken responded to my question on transnational repression 
that he shared my concerns about authoritarian governments increasingly 
reaching across their own borders, including into democracies like the 
United States and Europe, to silence dissent among diasporas and 
exiles. How does the President's budget reflect that transnational 
repression is a priority for the Administration?

    Answer. The President's budget request includes funding for the 
Department of State to support a variety of programs addressing and 
countering transnational repression. Some programs aim to enable civil 
society protection providers to identify, investigate, and take action 
to protect targets of transnational repression; others make emergency 
holistic security and legal assistance available to support civil 
society actors worldwide who have come under threat or attack for their 
work or aim to ensure global civil society can preemptively engage in 
advocacy efforts to reduce instances of transnational repression and 
raise the cost of using those tactics.

    Question. In addition, Blinken noted that the Administration has a 
number of initiatives in development with like-minded allies to 
pushback against transnational repression. Could you expand on what 
these initiatives are?

    Answer. The Department is working together with our like-minded 
partners to shine a spotlight on transnational repression, strengthen 
resiliency against the practice, and take steps in international 
organizations, including the United Nations, to stigmatize 
transnational repression and hold its perpetrators accountable. We have 
implemented financial sanctions and visa restrictions on individuals 
for their transnational repression activity, including under the global 
visa restriction policy known as the ``Khashoggi Ban,'' and we 
encourage our partners to take similar measures. Furthermore, we work 
with likeminded countries to prevent INTERPOL being abused to 
facilitate acts of transnational repression.

    Question. Burma: The President's budget requests $48.2 million in 
economic support funds (ESF) for Burma. How will that money be used and 
how will the U.S. Government ensure that it does not go to the military 
junta?

    Answer. The requested $48.2 million in ESF funds for Burma will 
build upon State and USAID efforts to provide necessary services to the 
people of Burma. With these resources, USAID and State will work with 
communities and civil society organizations across the country to 
address the impacts of violent conflict, address human rights 
violations, and strengthen processes and mechanisms for an eventual 
return to democratic governance. We convened an interagency working 
group after the military coup through which we continue to review 
planned USG engagements with and assistance to Burma, ensuring that all 
assistance is consistent with applicable restrictions and does not 
benefit the regime.

    Question. Can you break down the difference between how ESF will be 
used versus the $31.8 billion in development assistance that was also 
requested for Burma in the President's budget?

    Answer. The $48.2 million in ESF requested for Burma will directly 
support pro-democracy and civil society organizations, think tanks, and 
private businesses that support the restoration of Burma's path to 
democracy. The $31.8 million in DA requested for Burma will strengthen 
civil society, as well as advance food security, basic education, 
private sector growth, and sustainable land use practices.

    Question. How has the United States adapted its support to Burmese 
civil society in the aftermath of the coup?

    Answer. Since the February 2021 military coup d'etat, the United 
States has increased support for Burma's civil society, pro-democracy, 
and human rights actors. We continue to engage at all levels, including 
at senior levels, with representatives of Burma's pro-democracy 
movement as well as ethnic and religious leaders. We have directed 
significant attention and resources to support civil society activists 
working to build an inclusive, representative democracy, to enable them 
to exercise their human rights, and to support those most at risk, 
including journalists and human rights defenders. We have also provided 
life-saving humanitarian assistance to meet the needs of vulnerable 
populations, including strengthening the capacities of civil society 
organizations to deliver essential health services.

    Question. How is the Department able to get humanitarian assistance 
to the over 14 million in Burma in need without working through the 
military junta?

    Answer. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) 
works through partners, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross, to provide life-
saving humanitarian assistance to the people of Burma. These partners 
provide protection services, shelter materials, non-food items, mental 
health support, and other life-saving assistance. This assistance is 
carefully monitored to ensure it is not diverted by the military regime 
nor can they claim credit for its implementation. PRM has also provided 
funding to partners who provide assistance on both sides of the 
Thailand-Burma border to refugees and internally displaced persons.

    Question. Where do conversations with the Government of Thailand 
stand on delivering cross-border humanitarian assistance to Burma from 
Thailand?

    Answer. The Department strongly supports cross-border humanitarian 
assistance from Thailand to Burma and continually advocates with the 
Royal Thai Government (RTG) on the importance of lifesaving, cross-
border assistance. Building off our long history of working together to 
advance humanitarian assistance, we are engaging the RTG and other 
stakeholders in identifying solutions for the people of Burma to 
receive the help they need. Currently, PRM funds partners on the 
Thailand-Burma border who provide assistance to refugees and internally 
displaced persons on both sides of the border.

    Question. Bangladesh has relocated a total of 30,000 Rohingya to 
Bhasan Char and recent trips by senior U.S. officials have offered the 
opportunity to put pressure on the Government of Bangladesh to improve 
conditions. Bangladesh is invested in having the Bhasan Char relocation 
considered a success, but I remain troubled by forced relocations and/
or limited mobility once refugees arrive at the island. What is the 
U.S. position on providing assistance for Rohingya that may have been 
forcibly relocated to Bhasan Char especially as other donors like Japan 
and Canada provide funding?

    Answer. We are currently assessing humanitarian needs on Bhasan 
Char. We welcome the improvement in the conditions and availability of 
services on Bhasan Char since the Government of Bangladesh and UN 
signed the memorandum of understanding in October 2021. However, any 
U.S. Government funding will depend on the Government of Bangladesh's 
respect for freedom of movement. Bhasan Char's long-term viability 
requires Bangladesh's continued commitment to fully informed and 
voluntary relocations, improved health services, expanded livelihood 
opportunities, and frequent opportunities to move to and from the 
mainland.

    Question. Irrespective of U.S. funding for activities on Bhasan 
Char, how can the U.S.--as by far the largest donor to the response and 
to UNHCR--leverage its position to ensure the rights of Rohingya such 
as freedom of movement, are protected, including by holding UNHCR 
accountable to its protection mandate?

    Answer. After nearly 5 years since the 2017 outbreak of violence in 
Burma forced nearly 740,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh and with no 
prospects for voluntary repatriation to Burma in the near term, we 
continue to work with UN partners, including UNHCR, and Bangladesh on 
this protracted displacement crisis. This includes urging Bangladesh to 
allow Rohingya refugees to exercise greater self-reliance through 
expanded access to education, work opportunities, and greater freedom 
of movement. We emphasize that self-reliance is key to decreasing 
tensions with host communities and mitigating growing hopelessness 
among Rohingya refugees.

    Question. Honduras: In fiscal year 2022, Congress zeroed out 
Foreign Military Financing to the three Northern Triangle countries, 
and conditioned 60 percent of the remainder of U.S. assistance to the 
central governments of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala on the 
successful completion of anti-corruption and rule of law metrics. For 
Fiscal Year 2023, however, the President's Budget Request provides 
$10.5 million in Foreign Military Financing throughout the Central 
America region, though it does not specify a country-by-country 
breakdown. What is the Administration's current approach to U.S. 
security assistance in each Northern Triangle country, and how does the 
State Department plan to program Foreign Military Financing in 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, respectively?

    Answer. The approach for FMF in northern Central America will be 
complex, but there are areas for cooperation. The key factors will be 
countries making verifiable progress on anti-corruption efforts and 
developing clear plans and actions for removing the military from 
policing roles. The Department would like to ensure FMF is available to 
support humanitarian assistance and disaster response capabilities with 
those militaries, but would need Congressional support.

    Question. To what extent does the FY23 Budget Request factor in 
recent developments--both positive and negative--on democracy and the 
rule of law throughout the region, including President Xiomara Castro's 
promising anti-corruption agenda in Honduras, on the one hand, and 
crackdowns on judicial independence in El Salvador and Guatemala, on 
the other?

    Answer. The FY 2023 Request includes $986.8 million in support of 
the Administration's Root Causes Strategy and Collaborative Migration 
Management Strategy, and to help meet the President's 4-year commitment 
for Central America. The request includes $97.6 million in funding for 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and $219.8 million in regional 
funding for democracy, human rights, and governance programs. We have 
already pivoted our assistance to support the new Castro administration 
and will consider reprogramming funding away from government 
institutions undermined by the Bukele and Giammattei administrations if 
needed.

    Question. Can you provide more details on the programming of U.S. 
security assistance to enhance Honduras' border security as part of the 
U.S.-Honduras Strategic Dialogue?

    Answer. Our assistance to Honduras includes an interagency 
agreement with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) which provides 
mentoring, equipment, and technical assistance to Honduran Frontier 
Police's special operations unit. CBP advisors teach Honduran officers 
how to improve their intelligence gathering techniques and use scanners 
to search for drugs, contraband, and smuggled human cargo. We also fund 
programs with the Department of Homeland Security's investigations arm, 
which works in conjunction with Honduran units to combat cross-border 
criminal activity in Honduras such as human smuggling and drug 
trafficking.

    Question. What does our border security cooperation with the 
Government of Honduras involve, and what are the Administration's 
policy objectives there?

    Answer. Our border security cooperation involves training, 
mentoring, and equipping our Honduran counterparts to target smugglers, 
deter irregular migration, and develop strategic plans to better 
monitor and control borders. We fund the deployment of U.S. Custom and 
Border Protection advisors to Honduras, who assess the state of border 
security, monitor trends in migration and narcotics smuggling, and 
develop training for their Honduran counterparts to address the issues. 
Our objective is to help Honduras increase its capacity to better 
secure its borders, stem irregular migration, and stop the flow of 
narcotics into the United States.

    Question. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act: Now that Senator 
Rubio and my Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is law, the interagency 
is working diligently to implement it. We secured over $27 million to 
bolster enforcement in Fiscal Year 2022, and the Administration has 
asked for a sizable increase for FY23. But as the United States ramps 
up its efforts we need to make sure that companies benefiting from 
Uyghur slave labor don't just ship their products to other markets. 
What is the Administration doing to push other countries to enact their 
own prohibitions on these imports?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has been utilizing a whole-
of-government approach to increase awareness of the PRC's use of forced 
labor in Xinjiang. The United States continues to coordinate with 
partners and allies, NGOs, and the private sector to prevent the 
importation of goods produced with forced labor. The Department 
submitted a report to Congress outlining the U.S. diplomatic strategy 
to address forced labor in Xinjiang and underscoring our continued 
efforts to coordinate with like-minded countries to end forced labor in 
Xinjiang. We will continue to encourage foreign governments to use the 
Act as a model for their own national efforts to prevent the 
introduction into their own markets of goods produced by forced labor.

    Question. Can the Administration use the Summit for Democracy 
process to push for other countries to take concrete action like we 
have?

    Answer. We are leveraging the Summit for Democracy to maintain 
momentum by partners and allies for democratic renewal and seizing the 
Summit's Year of Action as an opportunity for countries to translate 
words into action. Under our own commitments in the Presidential 
Initiative for Democratic Renewal, the United States has launched the 
Multilateral Partnership for Organizing, Worker Empowerment, and Rights 
(M-POWER), a global initiative to unite governments, unions, labor 
academics and CSOs committed to promoting worker empowerment and 
rights. We are using ``democracy cohorts'' to bring governments, civil 
society, private sector, and philanthropies together to support the 
fulfillment of countries' Summit commitments.

    Question. Ethiopia: The United Nations and international NGOs have 
all found that atrocities and crimes against humanity have happened in 
Ethiopia during the current conflict. What is the status of 
consideration of these atrocities?

    Answer. The United States closely examines the assessments of UN 
bodies and credible NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, and incorporates them into the development of U.S. 
policy. In the case of Ethiopia, such assessments have contributed to 
our decisions to impose sanctions, restrict some forms of foreign 
assistance, and terminate AGOA privileges. The United States also co-
sponsored the UN Human Rights Council resolution creating a Commission 
of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, an independent, international 
investigative mechanism.

    Question. Is the Department pursuing a genocide determination? If 
not, why not?

    Answer. Making a determination that atrocity crimes have occurred 
is an important tool available to the Secretary of State. In the case 
of the conflict in northern Ethiopia, we believe that a diplomatic 
resolution is the most effective means to halt and prevent atrocities 
in the immediate term. This is our urgent priority, and we are actively 
working to that end. Throughout the conflict, we have repeatedly called 
out alleged human rights abuses as credible evidence has been reported 
or shared. This is why we support the independent UN commission of 
experts and encourage the government to allow them access to the 
country.

    Question. I have been pleased to see that truckloads of 
humanitarian assistance have been arriving in Tigray in recent weeks 
after months and months of a blockade that has resulted in widespread 
famine conditions and unnecessary deaths. This is no doubt in part 
because of the advocacy of the State Department. However, the United 
Nations estimates that at least 500 truckloads of aid, medicine, and 
fuel are needed on a weekly basis. What is the Department doing to 
ensure that the Government of Ethiopia will facilitate meaningful 
levels of assistance to arrive in Tigray?

    Answer. The continuous, uninterrupted flow of overland assistance 
must become regularized in order to meet the immense needs of the 
millions of people in northern Ethiopia. We are pressing the Ethiopian 
Government, regional authorities, and all other actors to accelerate, 
uphold, and expand these efforts to ensure immediate, sustained, and 
unimpeded humanitarian access to all Ethiopians affected by this 
conflict, in coordination with humanitarian organizations. We will not 
hesitate to consider all options should parties block or divert 
humanitarian assistance. E.O. 14046 authorizes sanctions against those 
who obstruct such assistance.

    Question. Critics assess that Prime Minister Abiy is allowing in 
just enough aid to prevent sanctions. Has the Department considered 
putting sanctions on those actors that have taken steps that have 
worsened the humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia?

    Answer. We are encouraged that the Government of Ethiopia and 
regional authorities in Tigray and Afar have taken steps in recent 
weeks to enable the delivery of desperately needed food aid to war-
affected communities. However, the continuous, uninterrupted flow of 
overland assistance must become regularized to meet the immense needs 
of the millions of people in northern Ethiopia. We are pressing the 
Ethiopian Government, regional authorities, and all other actors to 
accelerate, uphold, and expand these efforts to ensure sustained and 
unimpeded humanitarian access to all Ethiopians. We will consider all 
options, including sanctions, if actors take steps to worsen the 
humanitarian crisis.

    Question. Philippines: Following the May 9 Presidential election in 
the Philippines, the United States will have an opportunity to revisit 
its relationship with that country with a strong focus on promoting 
human rights and democracy. How does the Department's proposed budget 
center protections for human rights and democracy in our assistance to 
the Philippines, especially that that goes to the Philippines National 
Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines?

    Answer. We look forward to working with the next president of the 
Philippines to strengthen the alliance between our countries. That 
includes focusing on the importance of promoting respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in our bilateral engagements, including 
with respect to the armed forces and police. Sustained constructive 
engagement with all levels of the Philippine military is essential for 
promoting both respect for human rights and U.S. security interests, 
and our proposed budget reflects this. Human rights and ethics are 
integral parts of training for law enforcement units, and, in 
compliance with the Leahy Law, no assistance is provided to Philippine 
security units credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights.

    Question. Can you breakdown what types of programming and arms 
sales comprise the $40 million for foreign military financing as well 
as the $14.025 million for international narcotics and law enforcement 
(INCLE), nonproliferation, anti-Terrorism, Demining and related 
programs (NADR), and International Military Education and Training 
(IMET)?

    Answer. The FY 2023 $40 million FMF request will improve maritime 
security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and 
counterterrorism capacity in support of multi-year efforts to enhance 
upgraded Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine Coast Guard 
maritime, air, and land assets. The $2.1 million IMET request is 
commensurate with prior years and will support professional military 
education. The $5.5 million NADR request is consistent with prior year 
funding, which will support counterterrorism training. The $6.4 million 
INCLE request will support programs to combat transnational crime, 
improve the capacity of Philippine maritime security institutions, and 
strengthen the justice sector and rule of law.

    Question. What foreign assistance programs benefit the Philippines 
National Police?

    Answer. The Department provides limited assistance to the 
Philippines National Police (PNP) and focuses on programs that provide 
training on human rights, ethics, and professional skills. The United 
States also works with Leahy-eligible specialized units of the PNP, 
such as maritime units engaged in countering transnational crime; the 
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit of the PNP, which fights 
child exploitation and trafficking in persons; as well as specialized 
cybercrime units. Focused law enforcement assistance also includes 
units charged with investigating ISIS-affiliated and other 
transnational terrorist groups, such as the Special Action Force. No 
U.S. assistance to the PNP benefits units involved with the country's 
drug war.

    Question. How does the Department ensure that these funds do not go 
to human rights violators?

    Answer. All security force units in the Philippines, including the 
Philippines National Police nominated for applicable assistance, are 
vetted consistent with the Leahy law, and are denied assistance if 
credible information is found that the unit committed a gross violation 
of human rights. Leahy vetting occurs at both the unit and individual 
levels consistent with Department guidance.

    Question. What is the Department's long-term view on how to reform 
the Philippines National Police?

    Answer. Ongoing engagement with the Philippines National Police 
(PNP) focuses heavily on human rights, ethics, and professional skills. 
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in 
partnership with the Department of Justice's International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program, trains police cadets and 
officers on human rights, ethics, leadership, instructor development, 
and professionalization. Enduring institutional change takes time, and 
the Department's goal is to institutionalize respect for human rights 
within core PNP training curricula to give early and mid-career 
officers a foundational understanding of these concepts as they rise 
through the ranks.

    Question. Ukraine Food Security: For Fiscal Year 2023, the 
President's Budget Request provides approximately $1 billion in 
bilateral agriculture and food security programming. This is the same 
amount as Fiscal Year 2022 enacted levels, despite the tremendous shock 
to global agriculture and food prices, including for wheat and 
fertilizer, prompted by Putin's war in Ukraine. How does the 
Administration plan to mitigate the war's impact on the global food 
supply and the risk of elevated food insecurity in humanitarian 
settings and conflict zones, from Yemen to Syria, Afghanistan, and 
Ethiopia, if not in the Budget Request?

    Answer. In addition to the approximately $1 billion for agriculture 
and food security programming, the President's FY 2023 budget requests 
provides $10.45 billion in humanitarian assistance, part of which will 
help address the risk of elevated food insecurity in humanitarian 
settings. The FY 2023 Request will be complemented by the Ukraine 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, which included $4.15 billion in 
humanitarian assistance. On April 26, 2022, the President also 
submitted an additional supplemental appropriations request to Congress 
that contained $1.6 billion in additional humanitarian and food 
security assistance, along with additional funds for the Departments of 
Agriculture and Treasury, to people around the world facing food 
insecurity due to Putin's war in Ukraine and other drivers of global 
food insecurity. If passed by Congress, these resources would 
significantly increase our ability to respond.

    Question. How will this request complement the $670 million in food 
aid that the Biden administration announced on April 27?

    Answer. The funding for humanitarian assistance and agriculture and 
food security programming in the FY 2023 President's Budget Request, 
the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, and the President's April 
2022 supplemental funding request will complement and support ongoing 
efforts by the U.S. Government to respond to global food insecurity 
exacerbated by Putin's war in Ukraine. The $670 million in food 
assistance, which includes $282 million from the Bill Emerson 
Humanitarian Trust, is a part of these efforts and will provide much-
needed assistance to countries and people facing food insecurity around 
the world.
                                 ______
                                 

    Responses of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. In January 2021, you acknowledged that China was 
committing genocide and crimes against humanity towards the Uyghurs. On 
March 21, 2022, you once again called on China to ``end its ongoing 
genocide and crimes against humanity.'' Is China continuing to commit 
genocide and crimes against humanity?

    Answer. Yes. Despite increased global attention and actions to 
promote accountability, we have seen no indications that PRC 
authorities have ceased committing genocide or crimes against humanity 
in Xinjiang, which include imprisonment, enforced sterilization, 
torture, persecution through the use of forced labor, and imposition of 
draconian restrictions on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of movement. We reiterate our call upon the PRC 
to immediately cease committing atrocities against predominantly Muslim 
Uyghurs, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in 
Xinjiang, immediately release those unjustly detained, and allow 
independent investigators unhindered access to the region.

    Question. How effective have U.S. efforts been in ending the 
genocide and human rights abuses committed by the Chinese Communist 
Party?

    Answer. The United States has implemented visa restrictions, 
financial sanctions, export controls, and import restrictions to 
promote accountability for PRC officials and entities connected to 
human rights abuses and violations in Xinjiang. Through sustained 
diplomatic engagement, we have convinced like-minded partners and 
allies to impose similar actions. These measures have, as applicable, 
effectively imposed costs on PRC officials connected to human rights 
abuses and violations by prohibiting them from traveling to the United 
States and using the U.S. financial system. Import measures are helping 
to ensure the PRC cannot derive financial benefits from U.S. markets 
for perpetrating human rights abuses, including forced labor.

    Question. What is your strategy to hold China accountable for its 
serious human rights abuses?

    Answer. The United States will continue to work with our allies and 
partners to promote accountability for those responsible for human 
rights abuses and violations. Working bilaterally and through 
multilateral fora, we will continue to seek to support victims and 
jointly impose costs on PRC officials and entities responsible for 
perpetrating these abuses and violations. We will also continue to call 
upon the PRC to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. We 
remain steadfastly committed to promoting accountability for PRC 
officials responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity and will 
continue to consider the use of all appropriate tools to promote 
accountability for those responsible and deter future abuses.

    Question. China is developing capabilities with the potential to 
threaten global security and stability. At the end of last year, China 
reportedly tested a hypersonic missile. What threats does the Chinese 
Communist Party pose to the United States?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) hypersonic missile 
test is concerning to us as it should be to all who seek peace and 
stability in the region and beyond. The PRC's nuclear build-up and 
development of delivery systems raises questions about Beijing's intent 
and reinforces the importance of pursuing practical measures to reduce 
nuclear risks. Despite PRC obfuscation, this rapid build-up has become 
more difficult to hide and highlights how the PRC is deviating from 
decades of nuclear strategy based on minimum deterrence. We will 
continue to advance our capabilities to defend and deter against a 
range of threats from the PRC to ourselves, our allies, and partners.

    Question. What is your assessment of the risk associated with 
China's military modernization?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) military-civil 
fusion doctrine and military modernization efforts are components of 
how the PRC seeks to prepare internally to combat the U.S. and our 
allies and partners, and hence are contrary to U.S. interests. We will 
continue to shine a light on PRC influence efforts and on PRC-based 
companies that support military modernization or commit human rights 
abuses and impose appropriate restrictions on those firms. President 
Biden is firmly committed to ensuring PRC-based companies cannot 
misappropriate and misuse U.S. technology and that U.S. technology does 
not support the PRC's military modernization and is not acquired for 
use by the People's Liberation Army.

    Question. Is the United States keeping pace with China's rapid 
military expansion and modernization?

    Answer. We are committed to protecting U.S. national security and 
technological edge, including through domestic investments in research 
and development, and manufacturing. President Biden is firmly committed 
to making sure that PRC-based companies cannot misappropriate and 
misuse U.S. technology and that U.S. technology does not support the 
PRC's military modernization and is not acquired for use by the 
People's Liberation Army, including through the PRC's military civil 
fusion doctrine.

    Question. Last year, the Biden administration rejoined the World 
Health Organization (WHO) claiming the best way to reform the WHO is 
from within. It provided $200 million in taxpayer dollars without 
requiring a single reform. Despite the inability to make progress on 
good governance, transparency, or better warning and response times, 
the State Department is asking Congress to provide $200 million more 
for the WHO in Fiscal Year 2023. Please outline the meaningful reforms 
achieved at the World Health Organization since the United States 
rejoined the organization.

    Answer. The United States has been a leading voice in calling for 
reforms to improve the WHO's efficiency, accountability, transparency, 
and effectiveness. The forthcoming report to Congress on WHO reform 
outlines significant progress. Of note, the WHO Working Group for 
Sustainable Financing recently adopted a U.S.-led proposal that calls 
for WHO's budget proposal for the 2024-2025 biennium to be accompanied 
by an implementation plan for governance, budget, financial, and other 
reforms. We also continue to work to improve pandemic prevention, 
preparedness, and response, including through negotiations on 
amendments to the International Health Regulations and a new pandemic 
instrument. These amendments are designed to clarify early-warning 
triggers for international pandemic response, promote rapid information 
sharing, and improve WHO decision-making regarding public health 
emergencies. These capabilities, in turn, will allow the United States 
and other countries to exercise their ability to make more informed 
public health decisions.

    Question. What specific reforms has the Administration requested be 
adopted and implemented at the WHO?

    Answer. We have advocated that the WHO undertake concrete reforms 
to strengthen WHO governance; budget and financial transparency and 
oversight; prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual 
harassment; accountability; compliance, risk management, and ethics; 
and human resources management. We proposed to increase transparency 
and Member State engagement through a new Standing Committee on Health 
Emergencies, which will be launched at the 151st Executive Board. We 
also continue to work with WHO and our multilateral partners to improve 
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, including through 
ongoing negotiations on targeted amendments to the International Health 
Regulations (2005) and a new pandemic instrument. These amendments are 
designed to clarify early-warning triggers for international pandemic 
response, promote rapid information sharing, and improve WHO decision-
making regarding public health emergencies. These capabilities, in 
turn, will allow the United States and other countries to exercise 
their ability to make more informed public health decisions.

    Question. What is the United States' agenda for the World Health 
Assembly meeting in May 2022?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to advancing 
U.S. public health interests and leading the global community toward a 
safer, more equitable future. The U.S. delegation to the World Health 
Assembly will advance multilateral efforts to combat COVID-19, as well 
as to detect, prevent, prepare for, and respond to future pandemic 
threats. The United States will also work within the World Health 
Assembly to address a broad range of global health topics, including 
polio, HIV/AIDS, nutrition, and non-communicable diseases. In addition, 
the U.S. delegation will advocate for WHO governance and administrative 
reforms; prevention of sexual abuse and exploitation and sexual 
harassment; multilateral cooperation to address the global health 
impact of the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine; and inclusive engagement 
of non-state actors and other partners, including Taiwan's meaningful 
participation in the World Health Organization's activities.

    Question. Does the Biden administration support the WHO's proposal 
to increase assessed contributions?

    Answer. The WHO Working Group on Sustainable Financing recently 
reached consensus on a U.S.-led proposal that links any increase in 
assessed contributions to progress on reform. The proposal calls on WHO 
to provide a budget proposal for the first proposed increase of 20 
percent at the World Health Assembly in May 2023 alongside an 
implementation plan on reforms. Additional increases, up to a level of 
50 percent of the base budget, will be considered in line with standard 
WHO budgetary processes and progress on reform through 2031.

    Question. Last year, China succeeded in blocking Taiwan's 
participation at the World Health Assembly. What efforts have been 
taken to push the World Health Organization to allow the participation 
of Taiwan?

    Answer. We have strongly advocated with likeminded partners for 
Taiwan's participation as an observer at the WHA through bilateral and 
multilateral engagements with WHO Director-General Tedros and senior 
WHO leaders. We have also sought to grow broad international support 
for Taiwan's participation through diplomatic engagement in member 
state capitals, public statements, and public affairs campaigns that 
highlight Taiwan's valuable expertise and the need for inclusive 
processes to address today's global health challenges.

    Question. Our nation should be a strategic energy supplier to 
Europe. American natural gas is reliable, affordable, and abundant. The 
United States has the energy resources needed to help our allies reduce 
their dependence on Russian energy. Do you support increasing exports 
of American liquefied natural gas to help our allies and partners 
escape their dependence on Russia?

    Answer. We are in constant conversation with Allies and partners 
about the most effective ways to decrease their dependence on Russian 
energy. For example, we established the U.S.-EU Task Force on Energy 
Security to diversify LNG supplies to Europe and to reduce demand for 
natural gas. We have nearly doubled our LNG exports to Europe over the 
past 4-5 months and are working to secure an additional 15 billion 
cubic meters of LNG this year compared to 2021 from global sources.

    Question. How is Russia using its energy resources to coerce, 
intimidate and manipulate other countries?

    Answer. Russia exploits its energy supplies and export pipelines to 
create national and regional dependencies on Russian energy, which it 
leverages to expand its political, economic, and military influence; 
weaken European security; and undermine transatlantic security and 
foreign policy interests. Gazprom's unilateral breach of natural gas 
contracts with NATO Allies Bulgaria and Poland over Russia's demand for 
payments in rubles exemplifies how Russia uses energy as an instrument 
of economic coercion and demonstrates its unreliability as an energy 
supplier. Our focus is on helping our Allies and partners, who have 
been an integral part of our unprecedented sanctions, reduce 
dependencies on Russian fossil fuels as quickly as possible.

    Question. The security and stability of the Black Sea is critically 
important to U.S. national security. When Defense Secretary Austin was 
in the Black Sea region last year, he stated, ``Russia's destabilizing 
activities in and around the Black Sea reflect its ambitions to regain 
a dominant position in the region and to prevent the realization of a 
Europe that is whole, free and at peace.'' What is the Administration's 
strategy for increasing security in the Black Sea?

    Answer. Our strategy focuses on building the capacity of our 
partners in the region. The Biden administration has provided more than 
$6.3 billion in security assistance to Ukraine and approximately $70 
million to Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The Administration also 
allocated $650 million in foreign military financing (FMF) funds 
provided in the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (USAA) 
to help Allies and partners defend against Russian aggression in the 
Black Sea region and elsewhere. With additional Congressional 
notifications forthcoming, we have notified an additional $317.6 
million for Ukraine, $34.5 million for Bulgaria, and $35 million for 
Georgia in foreign military financing under the USAA.

    Question. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created a 
very successful Baltic Air Policing Mission to safeguard the integrity 
of the NATO alliance members' airspace. This mission could serve as a 
model for efforts to maintain a robust NATO presence in the Black Sea. 
What are your views on NATO establishing a Black Sea Maritime Patrol 
mission?

    Answer. Along with our NATO Allies, we already conduct air policing 
operations for Romania and Bulgaria and are constantly exploring ways 
to bolster the integrity of NATO member airspace, including over the 
Black Sea. We regularly analyze the security environment and make 
decisions in consensus with our NATO Allies and other littoral states 
in the region, in line with existing international obligations and 
commitments. We also conduct regular NATO exercises in the region and 
have deployed NATO battlegroups to Romania and Bulgaria.

    Question. What are some of the challenges and opportunities of a 
regular and rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea?

    Answer. The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits 
of 1936 regulates maritime traffic through the Black Sea and requires 
NATO Ally Turkey to implement restrictions and limitations on the 
passage of military vessels. The convention places limits on the 
ability of states, especially non-Black Sea states, to maintain a 
regular maritime presence in the Black Sea. Turkey continues to enforce 
the Montreux Convention, which has denied Russia a critical military 
supply route. We are constantly exploring ways to bolster the security 
of NATO littoral states in the region under existing bilateral defense 
cooperation agreements and through NATO.

    Question. Do NATO members have the capacity, capabilities, 
commitment to create this type of mission?

    Answer. The NATO Alliance is the most successful and enduring 
military alliance in history. With our NATO Allies, we conduct regular 
exercises in the Black Sea region and constantly explores ways to 
bolster the security of NATO Allies in the region, in line with 
existing international agreements and law. We have established 
bilateral and NATO military presence in Allied countries that border 
the Black Sea, and our commitment to them under Article 5 on mutual 
defense is ironclad. Any change in mission would require consensus 
agreement among all Allies before implementation.

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