[Senate Hearing 117-639]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-639
ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS VENEZUELA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
51-701 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Nichols, Hon. Brian, Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC... 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Escobari, Hon. Marcela, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin
America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC.................................... 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 9
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by
Senator James E. Risch......................................... 29
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by
Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin............................................. 32
Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions Submitted by
Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin............................................. 32
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio............................................ 34
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young............................................. 39
Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young............................................. 40
(iii)
ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS VENEZUELA
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Risch, Rubio, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Assistant Secretary Nichols, Assistant Administrator
Escobari, thank you for appearing before us today as we talk
about United States policy towards Venezuela and a crisis which
has not only serious consequences for our national security,
but the stability of our entire hemisphere.
Three years ago, I walked out on the bridge at the
Colombia-Venezuela border in Cucuta and I looked out at
Venezuela and saw firsthand the misery and desperation in
family after family forced to flee their homeland as if it was
a building on fire.
The collapse of a once thriving modern country, a beacon of
stability in our hemisphere, turned into a failed state, run
into the ground by Maduro and his thugs.
Today, the situation is even more dire. Venezuela is the
epicenter of the second largest refugee and migration crisis in
the world.
The Maduro regime has overseen the collapse of the economy,
taking down with it the country's entire education and health
care systems. Basic household items are unaffordable for most
Venezuelans.
Maduro has weaponized starvation, using it as a political
tool to drive over 95 percent of the country--over 26 million
people--below the poverty level. As his regime perpetrates
crimes against humanity, Maduro traffics cocaine. He enriches
himself and his kleptocratic buddies. He invites the Russian,
Cuban, Iranian, and Chinese governments into the country.
As we review United States policy towards Venezuela we must
reckon with how in the span of a generation a trusted
democratic partner has become a mafia state, a criminal
enterprise that uses brute force to cling to power.
I want to be clear, this committee believes in diplomacy
and Congress has long supported and continues to support a
negotiated solution to Venezuela's crisis, but a one-sided deal
with a regime that kidnaps American citizens to increase its
leverage is simply unacceptable.
Unilateral concessions to a leader that tortures his
political opponents is unacceptable. It is not the path towards
a successful negotiation and it is something the Biden
administration, as well as newly-elected leaders across Latin
America, should keep in mind because, given Maduro's track
record, given that he makes Al Capone look tame, there can be
no return to normality with this regime, not without the
release of American hostages and Venezuela's political
prisoners, not without a path to free and fair elections, the
restoration of human rights, and a return to the rule of law.
If the regime will not seriously commit to these
conditions, we will use the power of our peaceful diplomatic
tools imposing swift and severe consequences on the regime,
because while Maduro uses the prospects of negotiations to buy
himself time, the physical and mental health of American
hostages is deteriorating by hour as is the Venezuelan people's
hopes for freedom as they face violence, imprisonment, and
hunger every day.
Let us not forget that this crisis has forced nearly 7
million people--we talk about the Ukrainians who have fled and,
certainly, we are in solidarity with them, but the world hardly
whispers about the nearly 7 million people who have fled
Venezuela since 2014.
Think about that. That says almost as many refugees as the
entire population of the state of New Jersey. In fact, that is
more refugees than the combined populations of Idaho,
Connecticut, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
Everyone needs to do more to protect Venezuelan refugees
and migrants across the hemisphere, and the United States
should be leading the way protecting Venezuelans who are
already here.
President Biden's decision to provide Venezuelans with
temporary protected status last year was the right choice,
after President Trump only paid lip service to Venezuelan
Americans, but I am very disappointed that President Biden has
only provided what was an extension instead of a full
redesignation, and I have been disappointed by the
international community's failure to keep up with the severity
of the humanitarian crisis inside Venezuela.
It seems when these crises take place in other parts of the
world, we get people's attention. When it is in the Western
Hemisphere, we do not. We must all do more.
Today, I hope to hear the Biden administration's strategy.
What are you doing to bring home Matthew Heath, members of the
Citgo 6, and other American hostages?
What is the Administration doing to raise the price the
regime pays for taking American hostages? What is the plan to
tackle this sprawling humanitarian crisis?
What is your plan to maintain our support for democratic
actors including, but not limited to interim President Juan
Guaido and how will you empower them to lead negotiations? What
is your plan B if negotiations fail or never even seriously
start?
When I authored the bipartisan VERDAD Act with many on this
committee joining as co-sponsors I was hopeful for a diplomatic
solution, but Venezuela's crisis endures and that is why I will
be introducing the VERDAD Expansion Act in the coming weeks,
comprehensive new legislation to tighten the screws on the
regime.
It defines U.S. policy on Venezuela's political crisis. It
guides humanitarian assistance. It addresses the Maduro
regime's malfeasance, and it sends a message to the Venezuelan
opposition, to Venezuelan refugees, and to the Venezuelan
community here in the United States that we stand with them in
their effort to build a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic
Venezuela.
With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator
Risch, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The political, humanitarian, and economic crisis provoked
by Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela are among the worst
pressing national security concerns in the Western Hemisphere.
Since 2013, Maduro has dramatically deepened relations with
the most dangerous forces in the world. On his watch, Cuba,
Russia, China, Iran, and transnational criminal organizations
have turned Venezuela into their playground and are using their
presence to expand their reach throughout Latin America.
Russian exports of sophisticated military technologies and
repressive practices of the Maduro regime are a growing threat
to the security of Colombia and stability of northern South
America.
Venezuela's $62 billion debt to China is a formidable
challenge to its sovereignty, and its adoption of
telecommunication technologies developed and controlled by
firms vulnerable to pressure by the Chinese Communist Party
undermines privacy and human rights.
A series of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to end Maduro's
illegitimate regime, compounded by his ability to stay in power
through violence, have emboldened the regime and left
Venezuelan democratic forces facing daunting challenges.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration has squandered the
position of strength it inherited from the previous
administration, which was a campaign of maximum and
multilateral pressure on the Maduro regime.
In 2020, candidate Biden promised the use of multilateral
pressure and smart sanctions to stop the Maduro regime and
transition to free and fair elections.
Instead, the Administration is pursuing flawed and
incoherent efforts which strengthen the Maduro regime and its
criminal network, exacerbate the already horrific humanitarian
crisis, and allow malign actors like China, Russia, and Iran to
continue interfering in our hemisphere, putting American lives
at risk.
Nearly 2 years in the Administration has not sanctioned a
single entity or individual tied to the Maduro regime, and the
European Union has failed to match existing U.S. and Canadian
sanctions.
In fact, the Administration is conceding to the Maduro
regime by easing sanctions without any concrete progress
towards democratic order.
I say these things not to start a partisan brawl. I think
it is time to look forward, and I think the chairman and I are
in full agreement that it is time to do things differently than
what we have done in the past.
It is past time we reassert American leadership in our
hemisphere. The Administration should reverse course and
increase pressure on the Maduro regime and its enablers until
unjustly-detained Americans and political hostages are released
and the conditions are right to conduct free and fair elections
in Venezuela.
Over 10 unlawfully-detained Americans languish in
Venezuelan prisons and detention sites. I urge the
Administration to prioritize North American energy production
and infrastructure, persuade our European allies to promptly
match U.S. and Canadian sanctions on the Maduro regime, conduct
robust freedom of navigation and counter narcotic operations
targeting the Maduro regime's transnational criminal
activities, and enhance the capacity of democratic countries in
the region to confront the humanitarian and security crisis his
regime is generating.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on whether and
how the Biden administration plans to recommit to meaningful
policies that address the security threat emanating from
Venezuela, and I fully agree with the description of the dire
situation that the chairman has laid out. I am anxious to hear
how we can all work together to try to move this forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
We will turn to our witnesses.
We are pleased to welcome the Honorable Brian Nichols back
on the 1-year anniversary of his tenure as Assistant Secretary
of State for the Western Hemisphere.
Assistant Secretary Nichols previously served as U.S.
Ambassador to Zimbabwe and Peru, was the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs. Also serves as the deputy Chief of
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Colombia. Welcome back.
It is also a pleasure to have the Honorable Marcela
Escobari, Assistant Administrator for USAID's Bureau for Latin
America and the Caribbean, as a witness for today's hearing.
During her prior tenure in this position under the Obama
administration, she was responsible for preparing a proactive
strategy to confront the political and humanitarian crisis in
Venezuela.
She has also served as a senior fellow at Brookings and as
Executive Director for the Center for International Development
at Harvard University. Welcome back to you as well.
We will start off with you, Mr. Secretary.
As to both of you, your full statements will be included in
the record, without objection. We would ask you to summarize
them in 5 minutes or so so that members of the committee can
have a conversation with you.
Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. BRIAN NICHOLS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on this important
issue.
The situation in Venezuela remains one of the worst crises
in our hemisphere's history. A country with a proud democratic
tradition, blessed with natural resources and a rich
biodiversity, and with a vibrant and resourceful population has
suffered decades of misery.
Venezuela's vital sectors--health care, energy,
agriculture, manufacturing, and education--have all, but
collapsed. It holds the world's largest proven oil reserves yet
it does not even feature in the world's top 20 oil-producing
countries.
Whole tracts of its rich biodiversity have been destroyed
by illegal mining and logging. Its lawless border regions
provide shelter to myriad illegal actors, not the least of
which are narco terrorists who threaten its population and its
neighbors.
Because more than 90 percent of its people live in poverty,
Venezuela has lost 20 percent of its population to the largest
displacement of people in our hemisphere's history. Six point
eight million Venezuelans have fled their homes in the last 5
years, approaching similar exoduses from Ukraine and Syria.
The U.N. Human Rights Commissioner lists a litany of
abuses, illegal detentions, and even killings and torture. In
two reports, the independent international fact-finding mission
on Venezuela documented extrajudicial executions, enforced
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, trafficking in persons,
torture, cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment, including
sexual and gender-based violence committed by Venezuelan state
actors.
Beyond the abuses the regime inflicts on its own
population, it also wrongfully jails and abuses U.S. citizens,
attempting to use them as bargaining chips with the United
States.
As I underscored during my testimony earlier this year
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the responsibility
for the crisis in Venezuela falls squarely on the shoulders of
the late Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro.
The U.S. Government remains firmly committed to the belief
that Venezuelans have a right to democracy and deserve a
government of their choosing that protects and defends their
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We have a role and a responsibility to empower Venezuelans
as they work to resolve the many regime-created crises facing
their nation and to, once again, choose their government
through free and fair elections.
The United States continues to recognize and support the
interim presidency of Juan Guaido and the 2015 democratically-
elected National Assembly, the last truly democratic exercise
of popular will in Venezuela.
We coordinate closely with President Guaido and his
administration, the Unitary Platform, and those in and outside
of Venezuela who support the return to democracy in their
homeland.
Consistent with the VERDAD Act, we continue supporting a
negotiated solution out of Venezuela's crisis. In a call on
June 8, President Guaido and President Biden expressed their
support for Venezuelan-led negotiations as the best path
forward toward a peaceful restoration of democratic
institutions, free and fair elections, and respect for human
rights and the freedoms of all Venezuelans.
The Administration's visits to Venezuela earlier this year
resulted in renewed meetings and negotiations between the
regime and the opposition in both Oslo and Caracas. Those
visits also achieved the return of two wrongfully-detained
Americans.
The safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas is of the
utmost importance and we will always support the efforts of the
President's Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs to bring all
wrongfully-detained Americans in Venezuela home.
U.S. sanctions policy will continue to exert pressure on
the Maduro regime while providing ample room for humanitarian
relief, including our own commitment of over $2 billion since
2017.
As we have previously made clear, we will review our
sanctions policies in response to constructive steps by the
Maduro regime. The U.S. Government, in coordination with
allies, will also pursue criminals and fugitives and interdict
criminal activity associated with the regime.
The seizure of an Iranian Venezuelan jet in the Southern
Cone and the extradition of a regime money launderer from Cape
Verde are but two examples of our tireless campaign to seek
accountability and justice wherever criminals may hide.
We will continue to relentlessly pursue accountability for
all actors that engage in corruption or abuse human rights in
Venezuela. We also seek humane treatment and freedom for
Venezuelan political prisoners.
The United States maintained relations and friendship with
Venezuela for nearly 200 years. Now the Maduro regime looks to
Russia, the People's Republic of China, and Iran for political
and economic partnerships that bring few benefits to the
Venezuelan people and threaten regional security.
We will continue working with our international partners to
help return Venezuela to the community of democracies and
improve the lives of all Venezuelans and we will continue to
work with Congress in advancing these goals.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the committee
today and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Brian A. Nichols
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today on this important issue.
The situation in Venezuela remains one of the worst crises in our
hemisphere's history. A country with a proud democratic tradition,
blessed with natural resources and a rich biodiversity, and with a
vibrant and resourceful population, has suffered decades of misery.
Venezuela's vital sectors--healthcare, energy, agriculture,
manufacturing, and education--have all but collapsed. It holds the
world's largest proven oil reserves yet does not even feature among the
world's top-20 oil-producing countries. Whole tracts of its rich
biodiversity have been destroyed by illegal mining and logging. Its
lawless border regions provide shelter to myriad illegal actors, not
least narcoterrorists, who threaten its population and neighbors.
Because more than 90 percent of its people live in poverty,
Venezuela has lost nearly 20 percent of its population to the largest
displacement of people in our hemisphere's history. Six point eight
million Venezuelans have fled their homes in the last 5 years,
approaching similar exodus from Ukraine and Syria.
The UN Human Rights Commissioner lists a litany of abuses, illegal
detentions, and even killings and torture. In two reports, the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela documented
extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary
detentions, torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,
including sexual and gender-based violence, committed by Venezuelan
state actors. Beyond the abuses the regime inflicts on its own
population, it also wrongfully jails and abuses U.S. citizens,
attempting to use them as bargaining chips with the United States.
As I underscored during my testimony earlier this year before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, the responsibility for the crisis in
Venezuela falls squarely on the shoulders of the late Hugo Chavez and
Nicolas Maduro.
The U.S. Government remains firmly committed to the belief that
Venezuelans have a right to democracy and deserve a government of their
choosing that protects and defends their human rights and fundamental
freedoms. We have a role and a responsibility to empower Venezuelans as
they work to resolve the many regime-created crises facing their
nation, and to once again choose their government through free and fair
elections.
The United States continues to recognize and support the interim
Presidency of Juan Guaido and the 2015 democratically elected National
Assembly, the last truly democratic exercise of popular will in
Venezuela. We coordinate closely with President Guaido and his
administration, the Unitary Platform, and those in and outside
Venezuela who support the return of democracy to their homeland.
Consistent with the VERDAD Act, we continue supporting a negotiated
solution out of Venezuela's crisis. In a call on June 8, President
Guaido and President Biden expressed their support for Venezuelan-led
negotiations as the best path toward a peaceful restoration of
democratic institutions, free and fair elections, and respect for the
human rights and freedoms of all Venezuelans.
The Administration's visits to Venezuela earlier this year resulted
in renewed meetings and negotiations between the regime and the
opposition, in both Oslo and Caracas. Those visits also achieved the
return of two wrongfully detained Americans--the safety and security of
U.S. citizens overseas is of the utmost importance and we will always
support the efforts of the President's Special Envoy for Hostage
Affairs to bring all wrongfully detained Americans in Venezuela home.
U.S. sanctions policy will continue to exert pressure on the Maduro
regime, while providing ample room for humanitarian relief, including
our own commitment of over $2 billion since 2017. As we have previously
made clear, we will review our sanctions policies in response to
constructive steps by the Maduro regime. The U.S. Government, in
coordination with allies, will also pursue criminals and fugitives, and
interdict criminal activity associated with the regime. The seizure of
an Iranian-Venezuelan jet in the southern cone, and the extradition of
a regime money launder from Cape Verde, are but two examples of our
tireless campaign to seek accountability and justice wherever criminals
may hide. We will continue to relentlessly pursue accountability for
all actors that engage in corruption or abuse human rights in
Venezuela. We also seek humane treatment and freedom for Venezuelan
political prisoners.
The United States maintained relations and friendship with
Venezuela for nearly 200 years. Now, the Maduro regime looks to Russia,
the Peoples' Republic of China, and Iran for political and economic
partnerships that bring few benefits to the Venezuelan people and
threaten regional stability.
We will continue working with our international partners to help
return Venezuela to the community of democracies and improve the lives
of all Venezuelans. And we will continue to work with Congress in
advancing these goals.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the Committee today and
I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Administrator Escobari.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. MARCELA ESCOBARI, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Escobari. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
Venezuela's humanitarian crisis is a manmade disaster and
the Venezuelan people's suffering is a direct result of the
corruption, failed policies, and the repression of the Maduro
regime.
USAID responds to the Venezuelan crisis every day. We
provide humanitarian assistance to those in the country and
those forced to flee. We support the integration of Venezuelan
migrants into neighboring countries and we provide support for
a peaceful democratic transition.
The regime seems to be betting that with most Venezuelans
too focused on feeding their families to protest, that it can
outlast the international community and improve its image.
We cannot let that happen and we must retain a sense of
urgency. Let me share what we see on the ground and how USAID
is responding.
On the economic front, Maduro's mismanagement has led to
the worst collapse in the region's history, a contraction of
over 86 percent of GDP in the last decade.
The distortions to the economy have made Venezuela the most
unequal country in the Americas. The monthly pension is
equivalent to just 50 cents a day, while prices are similar to
those in the U.S., given the de facto dollarization.
Most people cannot afford basic medications, which has led
to a rise in preventable diseases, infant mortality, and
malnutrition across the country. No wonder millions of
Venezuelans see leaving the country as their only option.
This massive out migration of now 6.8 million Venezuelans
continues to grow. To put this in perspective, nearly one in
four Venezuelans have migrated since 2014. This is tearing
families apart and it is also placing tremendous pressure on
Venezuela's neighbors, who are still trying to dig out from the
pandemic.
On the governance side, Maduro is ramping up his repression
and has sealed off virtually every opportunity for citizens to
exercise their basic rights.
In the face of this dire context, USAID focuses on two
levels--on exerting as much pressure as possible on the regime
and providing as much relief as possible to the Venezuelan
people.
The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to
Venezuela and has provided $1.9 billion in the last 5 years.
Our assistance inside Venezuela is managed end-to-end by
independent organizations and it does not bolster the Maduro
regime.
USAID also provides humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans
throughout the region and helps partner nations to integrate
Venezuelans into their countries.
Colombia is the most notable example, and we have worked
hand-in-hand with Colombia to implement its historic decision
to provide temporary protected status to 2.4 million
Venezuelans. We know that successful integration can turn this
human tragedy into an engine of growth in the region.
Our humanitarian work is saving lives, yet we know that
only through a democratic transition can Venezuelans build a
more prosperous country, restore institutions, and reunite
their families. To that end, USAID supports a return to
democracy in three ways.
One, we hold the regime accountable for its abuses. USAID
supports human rights defenders that courageously document the
regime's repression and advocate for political prisoners and
their families.
Evidence gathered by these groups has been used by the U.N.
fact-finding mission and the International Criminal Court.
Because there is no independent justice system in Venezuela,
international bodies are the only hope for holding the regime
accountable as evidence of crimes against humanity continues to
mount.
USAID also supports journalists and independent media to
counter the regime's disinformation.
Second, we work to improve electoral conditions with a
focus on the 2024 elections. We expect the regime may subvert
the elections, but the Venezuelan people want elections, the
opposition has decided to participate, and we saw in last
year's local elections, including the governor's race in
Barinas, that a unified opposition can compete and win even
when Maduro cheats.
Third, USAID continues to support the interim government of
Venezuela and the opposition. A unified opposition and a
mobilized citizenry are the best hope for creating democratic
change.
USAID will continue to stand with the courageous people of
Venezuela as they fight to end repression, restore democracy,
and build a better future for themselves and their families.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Escobari follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Marcela Escobari
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on USAID's
work and discuss our vision for a free and democratic future in
Venezuela.
Venezuela's humanitarian crisis is a man-made disaster, and the
Venezuelan people's continued suffering is a direct result of the
corruption, incompetence, failed policies, and repression of the Maduro
regime. Despite the pressure from democratic nations and the Venezuelan
people, the regime has doubled down on its security apparatus and
enriching cronies. Maduro seems to be betting that, with most
Venezuelans too focused on feeding their families to protest, he can
outlast the international community and whitewash his image.
We must retain a sense of urgency and sharp awareness of the human
toll of this man-made tragedy. And we must use our diplomatic and
economic tools to support the Venezuelan people and their desire for a
democratic transition.
USAID responds to the Venezuelan crisis every day. First, we
provide humanitarian assistance to those in the country and to those
who flee--often at great personal risk--to escape the regime. Second,
we support the integration of Venezuelans into host communities to
minimize the potentially destabilizing impact of this crisis on the
rest of the region.
And third, we provide support for a peaceful democratic transition.
We draw attention to the regime's criminal behavior to mobilize the
international community, to hold the regime accountable for its crimes,
provide alternatives to regime disinformation, and to provide
Venezuelans with an avenue for justice. We seek the revival of
Venezuelan democracy and support citizens' democratic aspirations,
including their fight for free and fair elections, with a focus on
presidential elections in 2024.
economic crisis: maduro's mismanagement has led to the worst economic
contraction in the region's history
The Maduro regime is responsible for the country's economic
implosion. According to the IMF, Venezuela's economy contracted from
$352.2 billion in 2012 to $46.5 billion in 2021, a decline of 86.8
percent.\1\ Even if the economy were to grow by the regime's estimate
of 10 percent in 2022--and that is unlikely--the decline would still be
85.5 percent. Not only is Venezuela's economic contraction without
comparison in modern history, but Maduro has managed to destroy almost
all lawful sources of value creation. As much as 21 percent of
Venezuela's GDP is generated by criminal activity like smuggling,
corruption, and black markets.\2\
The distortions to the economy caused by the Maduro regime have
also led to the most unequal country in the Americas.\3\ Recent GDP
gains are concentrated among the wealthy while the number of vulnerable
people in need of humanitarian assistance has increased from 7 million
in 2020 \4\ to 7.7 million today.\5\ The regime's decision to stop
enforcing many import and exchange controls and the de facto
dollarization of the Caracas economy have benefitted its criminal
allies and portions of Venezuela's private sector, but most Venezuelans
continue to see their purchasing power decline in the face of rising
costs and an inadequate supply of electricity, water, and health
services.
Jobs are scarce. Venezuela has the lowest level of labor
participation in the entire region--only 53.8 percent of people of
working age participate in the labor market, of which 60 percent are in
the informal sector. Nearly 9 million Venezuelans between 15 and 64
years of age are without work.\6\
In this de facto dollarized economy, where prices are similar to
those in the U.S., health care workers, teachers, and others without
access to dollars are the ones who suffer. The monthly pension is 130
Bolivares, equivalent to just about 50 cents a day.\7\ A defunct health
system and high inflation mean that most people cannot afford the cost
of basic medications, leading to a rise of preventable diseases. The
infant mortality rate has risen to a level not seen in 30 years; and in
a survey conducted in Venezuela's poorest neighborhoods, 42 percent of
children showed signs of stunting or wasting, an indication of a
growing crisis of malnutrition across the country.\8\ No wonder
millions of Venezuelans see leaving the country as their only option.
migration crisis: massive out-migration will continue, pressuring
venezuela's neighbors
The Maduro regime has generated a humanitarian crisis that has
inflicted tremendous costs and instability throughout the region. The
mass exodus of more than 6.8 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants
since 2014 is second only to the 7 million who have left an active war
in Ukraine.\9\ There are nearly 2.5 million Venezuelan refugees and
migrants residing in Colombia alone.\10\ With the entire region
recovering from an economic contraction caused by the pandemic, refugee
and migrant populations can become an easy scapegoat for growing
resentment and frustration. The international community cannot relent
in the face of the Venezuelan crisis given the prospect of continued
migration flows, and the human suffering it represents.
The Maduro regime is the root cause of the Venezuelan migrant
crisis. So long as Maduro continues to undermine all democratic
institutions and exert full control over the population, the outflow
will continue. Yet, the Maduro regime continues to exert control over a
weakened population and undermine all democratic institutions.
governance crisis: the maduro regime continues to instill fear and
repression, while cutting off avenues for accountability
The Maduro regime is characterized by coercion, corruption, and
censorship. Maduro has sealed off virtually every opportunity for
citizens to exercise their basic rights by continuing Chavez' work of
co-opting democratic institutions like the courts and electoral
council; persecuting political opponents and civil society leaders;
muzzling the media; and controlling the military and police through
bribery, surveillance, and arbitrary arrests. Since 2014, the regime
has locked up over 15,000 political prisoners and 11 of them have died
in state custody. In 2021 alone, regime security forces carried out
1,414 extrajudicial executions.\11\ Currently, there are 245 political
prisoners in Venezuela. These prisoners are denied due process and, in
many cases, subjected to torture. The United States welcomes the
opening of an investigation by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court into crimes against humanity in Venezuela, which is a
State Party to the Rome Statute. Evidence of such crimes--compiled by
the OAS Panel of Independent Experts, the UN Fact Finding Mission, and
Venezuelan human rights defenders--continues to mount, and the Maduro
regime must be held to account.
Bottom line: the situation is dire, and conditions for Venezuelans
continue to deteriorate. The combination of worsening humanitarian
conditions on the ground, massive migrant flows into the region and a
hardened regime call us to redouble our efforts to address the
Venezuelan crisis.
usaid response: our commitment is to the venezuelan people
USAID's resolve remains strong. Our work focuses on promoting
democracy, human dignity, and basic freedoms, and on delivering
humanitarian support to those most in need. We will continue to stand
with the people of Venezuela in their pursuit of justice and
prosperity.
humanitarian assistance inside venezuela: since 2018, usaid has
provided over $315 million in humanitarian assistance inside venezuela
First, we will continue to provide humanitarian relief inside
Venezuela. U.S. assistance is managed end-to-end by humanitarian
organizations and is not bolstering the Maduro regime. USAID and other
donors are working with a strong and committed humanitarian community
in Venezuela. We work in close coordination with the UN and NGOs that
are providing life-saving hot meals in community kitchens; food kits to
vulnerable households in communities and schools; health care through
mobile units; including the prevention and treatment of acute
malnutrition, and guidance to mothers on healthy feeding practices.
Our assistance relies on the expertise of Venezuelan organizations
that know their country best and understand where the needs are
greatest.
The United States is the largest humanitarian donor for Venezuela
and in FY21 alone, USAID provided $138 million in humanitarian
assistance for Venezuela. But we know the need is far greater than what
we provide. Only 14 percent of the United Nations' 2022 request for
Venezuela has been filled.\12\ We will continue to work with other
donors to increase total commitments from the international community.
regional support for venezuelans: usaid provides support for
venezuelans in transit and helps them integrate into host communities
Second, USAID will continue our humanitarian support for
Venezuelans throughout the region and will step up our work on the
integration of Venezuelans into host communities.
Humanitarian assistance is the first thing a Venezuelan encounter
when they cross into a neighboring country, often in a precarious and
vulnerable state. Venezuelans walking from the border town of Cucuta,
in Colombia, to Lima, Peru is the equivalent of walking from New York
to Utah. USAID provides meals and cash transfers that have proved life-
saving.
As Venezuelans begin to integrate into host communities, they are
desperate to earn a living and provide for their loved ones. In an
effort to manage these dramatic flows, several countries have adopted
generous policies that welcome Venezuelans and incorporate them into
the labor force. Colombia has led the way with its decision last year
to provide temporary protected status (TPS) to more than 2.4 million
Venezuelans. Migrants who are successfully integrated can access the
health system, can send their kids to school, are accountable to the
justice system, and can get jobs. They pay taxes and contribute to the
economic and social fabric of their host communities.
USAID is committed to working with Venezuela's neighbors to help
them shoulder the high and unanticipated costs of attending to almost 6
million Venezuelans and turning migration into an engine of growth. In
Colombia, for example, we have worked alongside the government and the
private sector to register Venezuelans and connect them to social
services and jobs. In Peru and Ecuador, USAID support focuses on
helping migrants gain legal status and enter the formal labor market.
One of my top priorities as Assistant Administrator is to help
advance a more cohesive, regional approach to migration. This approach
involves three parallel strategies: addressing the root causes driving
people to leave their homes; expanding legal labor pathways for
migrants; and promoting sustainable integration of migrants into host
communities. We saw progress toward this vision at the Summit of the
Americas, where 21 countries supported the Los Angeles Declaration on
Migration and Protection and many announced concrete commitments to
address migration in a more humane, safe, and orderly way. We applaud
and support the Government of Ecuador's new registration process for
all migrants, including the over 500,000 Venezuelans in Ecuador, that
paves the way to their regularization. Implementing policies that allow
migrants to live and work in the countries where they arrive isn't just
virtuous; it's also smart policy. Colombia's GDP is predicted to grow
by $2.5 billion over the next decade as a result of the TPS
program.\13\ Pro-integration policies have the potential to turn this
human tragedy into an economic boon for host communities by leveraging
migrants' talent, determination and creativity.
Successful integration of Venezuelans will require sustained
investment, policy harmonization and regional coordination. Despite
around 20 percent of Venezuela's population having already fled the
country, the net outflow will continue as long as, based on income,
more than 94.5 percent live in poverty.\14\ While humanitarian aid and
the potential use of frozen assets can provide critically needed short-
term assistance in Venezuela, in the long run a democratic transition
away from kleptocracy, intimidation, and ineptitude is the only
sustainable path.
support toward a democratic transition: usaid helps venezuelans
reassert control over their country's future
While we believe deeply in our humanitarian work and our support
for integrating Venezuelans into host communities in South America, we
know that these efforts are addressing symptoms of Venezuela's crisis
and not the root cause. Our central goal is to help Venezuelans restore
their democracy and reclaim control over their country's future.
USAID will work in three areas to promote opposition unity and
press for improved electoral conditions.
First, USAID will continue to provide support to the Interim
Government of Venezuela and the Venezuelan opposition. USAID assists
the democratic opposition as they work to turn the public's widespread
resentment toward the Maduro regime into pressure for democratic
change. The opposition has chosen primaries as the vehicle to reunify
and regain momentum, and USAID will support them in that process. The
2021 subnational elections revealed the value of competing even in
unfree elections. Despite the Maduro regime employing its usual tactics
to manipulate the electoral playing field, non-regime candidates won a
majority of the overall vote. In the state of Barinas, the opposition
won the governor's election twice by remaining unified, ultimately
defeating Maduro loyalist Jorge Arreaza by an even wider margin than it
had won the original election in November. With 75 percent of
Venezuelans planning to vote in presidential elections regardless of
the conditions,\15\ there is a real potential for change.
Second, USAID supports democratic civil society and independent
media organizations in holding the regime accountable. USAID supports
the generation and wide dissemination of unbiased, fact-based
information to help citizens make sense of the man-made catastrophe
unfolding in their country, where disinformation and lies are the
currency of the regime. These efforts increase public scrutiny on the
regime and expose ways in which it uses electoral institutions to push
its advantage. The world would know much less about the scope and scale
of the regime's neglect and malfeasance, if not for the work of
watchdog and media organizations supported by USAID.
USAID will also continue to support human rights defenders that
tirelessly document the regime's repression, advocate for political
prisoners and their families, and--in the absence of an independent and
functioning justice system--are obliged to seek recourse outside the
country. Human rights organizations are providing verifiable data,
evidence and fact patterns to international organizations like the
United Nations Fact Finding Mission and the International Criminal
Court, so that they can unmask the pariah regime's crimes against
humanity and seek to hold it accountable.
We are focused on presidential elections in 2024 and legislative
and regional elections in 2025 as windows of opportunity for
Venezuelans to advance a peaceful transition. We have no illusions
about the prospects for free and fair elections and we are preparing
for the possibility that the regime could subvert, postpone, cancel, or
not recognize the results of elections. But the Venezuelan people want
elections, the opposition has collectively decided to participate, and
preparing for and participating in elections is a way for the
opposition to rebuild unity and regain momentum. Constitutionally
required elections are a problem for Maduro: If he goes too far in
preventing a competitive process, he further erodes the international
legitimacy he so desperately craves. A unified opposition and mobilized
citizenry are currently the best hope for regaining the upper hand and
increasing the pressure for Maduro and his cronies.
Overcoming Venezuela's humanitarian and migration crises is only
possible via a democratic transition. We remain fully committed to
using U.S. foreign assistance so generously appropriated by this
Congress to relentlessly pursue that goal.
USAID stands with the courageous people of Venezuela as they press
on to end repression and man-made suffering, restore dignity and
democracy, and build a better future for themselves and their children.
----------------
Notes
\1\ https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/VEN#countrydata; GDP, current
prices (Billions of U.S. dollars)
\2\ Transparency Venezuela: https://transparenciave.org/economias-
ilicitas/a estimate
\3\ Venezuela's GINI coefficient is 56.7 percent. https://
www.proyectoencovi.com/encovi-2021
\4\ https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/venezuela-bolivarian-
republic-crisis-response-plan-2020
\5\ https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/venezuela-bolivarian-
republic-crisis-response-plan-2022
\6\ https://thinkanova.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ANOVA-Policy-
Brief-Notas-Sobre-Distribucio%CC%81n-1.pdf
\7\ https://efectococuyo.com/la-humanidad/condenados-a-muerte-
temprana-pension/
\8\ https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2021.638042/
full
\9\ https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine
\10\ Distribucion de Venezolanos en Colombia, Migracion Colombia,
February 2022; https://www.r4v.info/sites/default/files/2022-08/
2022.08.R4V_R%26M_Map_Eng%28note%29.pdf
\11\ https://lupaporlavida.org/informe-ano-2021-lupa-por-la-vida/
\12\ https://app.powerbi.com/
view?r=eyJrIjoiZmE0MTNkNWUtYjYwOC00ZDI0LT
kyYjgtMWVlYmNiMjAyNTU1IiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBj
LTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9&pageName=ReportSectione4e3bdbea6d35032e8f1
\13\ https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/america/registro-de-
migrantes-del-estatuto-temporal-arranco-con-fuerza/
\14\ https://assets.website-files.com/5d14c6a5c4ad42a4e794d0f7/
6153ad6fb92e4428cada4fb7_
Presentacion%20ENCOVI%202021%20V1.pdf
\15\ https://elestimulo.com/destacados/2022-05-28/jose-virtuoso-75-
de-los-venezolanos-quiere-votar-en-unas-presidenciales/
The Chairman. Thank you both. We will start our series of
rounds of questions.
Assistant Secretary Nichols, I believe clarity is needed on
the Administration's policies regarding efforts towards
negotiations, the lifting and potential snapback of sanctions,
and the stewardship of Venezuelan state assets in the United
States.
The Administration has lifted targeted sanctions on one of
Maduro's henchmen, provided a license to Chevron, comfort
letters to European oil companies Repsol and Eni.
However, as far as I can discern, Maduro has not made any
meaningful concessions or concrete step to return to
negotiations in Mexico City.
As Congress' support for a negotiated solution in Venezuela
is neither a blank check nor an open-ended invitation, I would
like to ask does the Administration intend to make any more
changes to U.S. sanctions absent specific irreversible steps by
Maduro?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our focus is upon returning the parties to formal
negotiations. We have been engaged actively to promote that.
We coordinate closely with the interim government and the
broad opposition, the Unitary Platform, in Venezuela. The
efforts so far have led to multiple rounds of informal
negotiations both in Oslo and Caracas and significant advances
toward a return to a formal process in Mexico City.
The Chairman. How long we are going to wait for a formal
process to take place? He is buying time. He is taking gold out
of the country. He is letting our adversaries actively engage
in the Western Hemisphere through Venezuela.
How long are we going to--he has got U.S. citizens held
hostage. How long are we going to tolerate that? How long is
this aspiration to get to some formal negotiations going to
take place?
Mr. Nichols. Nicolas Maduro is going to--is making a
critical mistake if he thinks that our patience is infinite and
that dilatory tactics will serve him well.
We stand ready to snap back sanctions and ready to take
comprehensive measures if this process does not move forward.
The Chairman. How long will the U.S. wait before snapping
back changes to sanctions?
Mr. Nichols. We consult very closely with the interim
government and the Unitary Platform, as well as our allies in
Europe, the U.K., and Canada, as well as in the region on our
collective approach to Venezuela.
We had a meeting just yesterday. I was traveling back from
Mexico. My deputy led that conversation with key allies on this
process and we will be informed by the views of the interim
government and the Unitary Platform, as well as our partners
and allies around the region.
The Chairman. Okay. That does not give me any sense of
our--is our patience infinite or is it finite? You do not give
me any sense of it. It has already taken quite a long time.
In the interim, he has turned the nation into a narco
state, bilking it of its national patrimony and nothing is
happening. Nothing is happening.
If Maduro refuses to negotiate in good faith or even
negotiate at all, what is your plan B to degrade the regime?
Mr. Nichols. We will use the various tools that you have
given us--sanctions, law enforcement action. We will work with
our partners and allies around the world to ensure that the
regime does not secure access to assets that are currently
frozen or held by the interim government.
We will work assiduously to promote investigations by the
international fact-finding mission and other international
bodies like the ICC into the events to shed light on what is
going on in Venezuela, and we will----
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, our sanctions are like a
sieve. We are allowing a whole host of countries to get around
our sanctions and Maduro knows it--Turkey, Russia, China. They
are doing it with impunity--of course, Cuba, which provides the
security apparatus for the whole Maduro regime to exist in the
first place.
You talk about independent investigations. The U.N. Human
Rights Council established an independent fact-finding mission
on Venezuela 2019.
That mission played a central role in investigating and
documenting the Maduro regime's systematic violations of
international law, including extrajudicial executions, forced
disappearances, torture, arbitrary detention, but there is much
more to be done.
Mr. Secretary, the fact-finding mission and others have
mounted damning evidence that the Maduro regime has committed
grave human rights abuses that constitute crimes against
humanity.
Is it your assessment the regime has committed crimes
against humanity?
Mr. Nichols. The United Nations, the OAS, a large number of
nongovernmental organizations focused on human rights, have all
said that the regime has committed crimes against humanity. I
think that is the international consensus.
The Chairman. Yes. Is that our consensus as well?
Mr. Nichols. That is a----
The Chairman. That is what others said. I agree with that.
Mr. Nichols. Yes.
The Chairman. What do we say?
Mr. Nichols. I think the facts of the offenses of this
regime are undeniable and I point to those others. The
definition of crimes against humanity, as far as I know, is not
codified in U.S. statute.
It is clear that they have committed all of these actions
and that the key international bodies of the United Nations and
the OAS consider them responsible for crimes against humanity.
If you ask me my personal opinion, my personal opinion is they
have committed crimes against humanity.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In April of 2020, the prior administration proposed a
formal democratic transition framework to facilitate a peaceful
negotiated return to democracy in Venezuela.
What is this Administration's view of that framework? Have
you abandoned that? Embraced it? Ignored it? Where are you on
that?
Mr. Nichols. We continue to view a priority maintaining
international cohesion and pressure on the Maduro regime,
working with allies to deny the regime access to diplomatic
benefits and economic benefits, to work to support the interim
government and the Unitary Platform as they seek to forge a
path toward a free fair election in 2024.
We believe that we should use all of the tools available to
achieve that goal and we will continue to do that.
Senator Risch. Is that your interpretation of how you are
implementing this transition framework or is that off the
table? The transition framework itself, is it off the table?
Mr. Nichols. We continue to work with the interim
government. I think that the structure of the interim
government has changed over time and the range of recognition
of the government and the status over time has also changed.
We need to adapt our policies to continue to move forward
so that serious, profound, and irreversible reforms are
undertaken to allow for a free, fair, transparent election in
2024.
Senator Risch. I keep coming back to the framework, but you
have not answered the question yet. Are there parts of it that
you have embraced? Parts of it you have abandoned?
How is your--are you following the same path as what this
framework laid out or are you doing things different than what
the framework laid out?
Compare what you are doing to the framework that was put
forth in April of 2020.
Mr. Nichols. The framework put forward in April of 2020, I
think, imagined a scenario where the regime would collapse. We
are not seeing--we have not seen that over time.
The diplomatic recognition of the regime has grown during
that period. More countries now recognize the Maduro regime
than they did previously and we have to adapt our strategy to
take those factors into account.
Senator Risch. Let me try a different line here.
In February of this year, 2022, a senior White House
official claimed the sanctions imposed on Russia for invading
Ukraine were designed to pressure the Maduro regime. I do not
understand that, but that was the claim.
A week later that same official met with Maduro in Caracas
in an attempt to buy oil from Venezuela and soon thereafter the
Administration started to ease sanctions on the regime.
Can you explain to us how the Administration plans to
pressure Maduro while deepening U.S. reliance on Venezuela?
Mr. Nichols. Venezuelan hydrocarbons are not entering the
United States, to my knowledge. I do not think our reliance on
Venezuela has increased.
The visit to Venezuela by Special Presidential Envoy for
Hostage Affairs Carstens, Ambassador Story, and the senior NSC
official, Juan Gonzalez, resulted in the release of two
wrongfully-detained Americans and resumption of serious
conversations between the regime and the Unitary Platform.
Those conversations have continued for quite some time and have
made notable progress.
In my conversations with the Norwegian mediators, they
believe that the prospects for a return to a formal negotiating
process are good and we will continue to use both incentives
and sticks in close coordination with the interim government
and the Unitary Platform to encourage progress.
Senator Risch. Let me take just a little different line
here. What are you--specifically, what are you doing to help
the Guaido administration?
Mr. Nichols. We provide funding and resources to the
democratic opposition in Venezuela as well as funding for the
interim government. We work with allies to ensure that the
regime does not have access to assets either in the United
States or in foreign areas.
We consult with them on various negotiating strategies and
policies. Our Ambassador to Venezuela, Jimmy Story, is in
almost daily contact with senior officials in the interim
government.
I, myself, have met virtually with President Guaido on
multiple occasions as well as regular contact with the interim
government ambassador in Washington and other interim
government officials.
Senator Risch. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin has graciously agreed to chair for a period
of time. I have to go to Banking.
Senator Kaine is recognized.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
Risch, and to our colleagues who are here.
We just have to be realistic. I think the efforts of the
last three administrations to use U.S. influence for a
significant positive outcome in Venezuela have all been
failures. Our intentions have been good and our efforts have
been strong, and our generosity, particularly when compared
with other nations, has been notable.
We have not seen the outcome that we want. I do not think
the last administration had us in a strong position with
respect to Venezuela. They did announce a maximum pressure
campaign.
Pretty quickly in that campaign, the Trump administration
floated the possibility of military intervention in Venezuela
and that stopped many of the nations that were--that had been
willing to recognize the interim government of Juan Guaido. It
stopped them from going further with us and embracing the
sanctions regime.
I talked to leaders of some of the nations that were with
us on the recognition of Guaido and said, as soon as the U.S.
starts talking about military intervention, even if you
ultimately do not go that direction, we are on the off-ramp now
and we cannot go further.
The last administration had witnesses before us, too,
telling us that the Maduro government was within days of
collapse. When we talked to the Colombians, they said, what are
they smoking.
I mean, they could see across the border with this neighbor
that they are so close to that there was no danger of the
Maduro government collapsing. That was not likely the case.
Blue sky optimism that is unrealistic and bellicose
rhetoric that is counterproductive did not lead to success, but
I do not really fault them--the Administration--just like I do
not fault the Obama administration, just like I do not fault
the Biden administration for not being able to produce an
outcome in Venezuela that we are happy with. This is on the
Venezuelan people.
We have limited ability to influence the outcome and it
strikes me that the best thing that we can do is something we
are doing, but we might be able to do more of and that is
humanitarian support for the Venezuelan people and hopefully
creating space for them so that the day may come, possibly in
connection with these 2024 elections, where mayors and local
officials and others and opposition will have enough force
because of the disastrous nature of the Maduro government to
start to write a new chapter for their country. I think we have
to be humble about our own expectations about what the United
States can do.
On that score, the U.S. Government in the humanitarian
space we are the single largest donor to the U.N. humanitarian
response inside Venezuela. Seventy-four percent of the
humanitarian contributions for humanitarian aid through the
U.N. program are from the United States.
What is the Department doing to get some of our European
and other allies to step up their humanitarian support?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
The regular engagement with our partners around the
hemisphere and around the world continues. As I alluded to
earlier, on Tuesday we had another key meeting with partners to
talk about both our policies and the importance of providing
robust assistance to the Venezuelan people both within
Venezuela and those who have migrated, fled the horrible
conditions in that country.
We regularly stress the importance of donations to the
humanitarian relief fund and we lead by example in those
donations. We will soon--next week, the U.N. General Assembly
Leaders Week, there will be another opportunity for us to
engage at a high level with that.
Senator Kaine. If I could, because I want to ask one more
question.
Please do that. I mean, we are being very, very generous to
refugees in Europe--the Ukrainian refugees, for example--and I
think to ask our European allies please help us with this
massive crisis, there is not--we are leading by example, but
there is not a reason for the United States to be footing 75
percent of this bill when we are also doing so much elsewhere.
What are the--the opposition has announced they are going
to have a primary next year to try to forward a candidate for
the presidential elections that are hopefully going to happen
in 2024.
What are the prospects--your assessment--for the opposition
sort of unifying behind a figure who can bring together some
pretty disparate elements among the opposition?
Mr. Nichols. I think the prospects are quite good. There is
a recognition. As my colleague said, the elections last year
in, for example, Barinas State demonstrated that a united
opposition could win even under the most harrowing
circumstances.
However, they should not have to carry out either primaries
or an election under the most harrowing circumstances.
It is vital that the regime implement the recommendations
of the European Union Electoral Observation Mission and the
Carter Center recommendations, which would allow for a more
level playing field for a general election and allow the
primary process to proceed without outside interference.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Let me thank both of you for
your testimonies and your work.
There are many tragedies in Venezuela, including the human
rights violations and the lack of democratic governance. I want
to talk about the migration issue.
We know the impact it has on the surrounding countries, but
the United States has been willing to accept Venezuelans that
are here. It is my understanding we have close to 300,000 that
are eligible for temporary protective status.
If I might, let me just ask Administrator Escobari if you
could elaborate as to how we are dealing with the Venezuelans
that are here. What is our work visa issues?
What are their needs? What outreach are we making in order
to carry out our responsibilities in our hemisphere due to the
migration issues of Venezuelans?
Ms. Escobari. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
I know that we have provided TPS to Venezuelans here and I
will refer back to my colleague on our U.S. position.
I think what is important to deal with the flows of
Venezuelan migrants to our border is, as you said and started
your comment, that this is a regional phenomenon.
Of the 7 million migrants in Latin America, 6 million of
those are Venezuelans, and of these Venezuelans only 3 percent
have actually reached our border so far.
The displacement in Latin America is 17 times larger than
from Latin America to the U.S. To be able to deal with those
flows, the strategy that we are pursuing--our root causes
approach, which is clear in Venezuela it involves a democratic
transition, expanding legal pathways, which--so that migrants
can migrate with dignity, safety, and in a condition of
greatest mutual benefit.
Probably the most important activity in terms of numbers is
helping countries integrate migrants into their communities
like the example I gave with Colombia, and we are helping and
pursuing these three avenues to deal with this massive
migration crisis.
Senator Cardin. One of our concerns is that whenever there
are vulnerable people who migrate, there is always the risk
factor of traffickers and victims of trafficking and the
dangers, et cetera, so clear information is vitally important.
What steps are we taking to make it clear our abilities in
the United States to handle those that are at risk?
Ms. Escobari. No, you are correct that the journey is
terrifying. It is extremely dangerous, and we work with civil
society organizations, for example, in Colombia so that they
can inform people of the dangers of their travels north.
I traveled to the Darien Gap with Secretary Mayorkas and
was able to see firsthand what that 8-day journey means for
people.
Doctors Without Borders has shown that close to or over 80
percent of women that make this journey are victims of sexual
violence.
We are using our work in Colombia and throughout Central
America to try to inform migrants of the perils of this journey
and, of course, our Central America governments are also
working to penalize and increase the penalty for smugglers and
human traffickers.
Senator Cardin. Secretary Nichols, I want to follow up on
Senator Kaine's point. He was concentrating on humanitarian
assistance and the global sharing of burden.
On the migrant issues--the surrounding countries--I work
with Senator Blunt in regards to Colombia. We know the impact
it is having on that country as far as the numbers that are
from Venezuela in that country, making it more challenging for
Colombia to deal with its other challenges.
What efforts are the United States leading to help the
surrounding countries deal with the influx of Venezuelans?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
The United States has provided nearly $800 million dollars
for the communities that host migrants and migrants themselves
within Colombia. We coordinate closely with Colombian officials
on migration issues under the previous Duque administration.
In Colombia, the government agreed to grant their version
of temporary protected status and the Petro administration has
vowed to continue and deepen that policy.
In addition, we work with governments around the hemisphere
under the structure of the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration
and Protection, which was agreed to under President Biden's
leadership at the last Summit of the Americas.
We talk and work on concrete burden sharing and information
sharing activities with governments from Canada to Tierra del
Fuego. We are working to increase law enforcement cooperation
to take down illicit trafficking networks.
We work to provide training and equipment to migration
officials in countries around the hemisphere. Secretary Blinken
has co-chaired two migration ministerials in Colombia and
Panama focused on mobilizing hemispheric and international
resources to address the problem.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you both for being here
today.
I guess the--Secretary Nichols, has the Biden
administration ever offered sanction relief in return for the
release of American citizens in Venezuela?
Mr. Nichols. No. The conversations led by our Special Envoy
for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens are active and ongoing. I
believe that he has briefed in the past along with our
Ambassador, Jimmy Story, on some of the conversations that we
have had.
Our focus is securing the release of all wrongfully-
detained Americans worldwide. If you are in a conversation with
Roger Carstens and you are a foreign country, that is not a
normal relationship.
That means that you are engaging in activity which is
reprehensible, and we will do everything in our power to secure
the freedom of wrongfully-detained Americans.
I have a photo of Tomeu Vadell given to me by his family
that I keep in my office to remind me of the priority of this
effort.
Senator Rubio. No, and I understand, but earlier this year
the Ambassador to Venezuela, Jimmy Story, and the National
Security Council's Juan Gonzalez visited Caracas, ostensibly,
as it was discussed to--as it was reported to discuss the
release of American citizens.
They were there for that particular purpose, and then there
were these leaks or stories out there about how they had
offered sanction relief in return for releasing, for example,
the Citgo Five.
Were those stories, those media accounts, of the Ambassador
and Mr. Gonzalez's visit to Caracas were those inaccurate
stories?
Mr. Nichols. The visit had two purposes. One was to, in
close concert with the interim government and the Unitary
Platform, to create a framework for a return to negotiations in
Mexico City and, two, to negotiate with the regime on the
release of wrongfully-detained Americans, and we took advantage
of that opportunity to also visit imprisoned U.S. citizens and
provide them with----
Senator Rubio. Right. I guess that is my question.
We sent the Ambassador to Venezuela. We sent a member of
the National Security Council staff to meet with the regime.
That was not the hostage individuals in charge of that. It was
them.
They went to talk about two things, a framework to get
Maduro back to the negotiating table and a framework to release
unlawfully-detained, unjustifiably-detained, Americans. In
exchange, I imagine the Venezuelans would want something in
return other than a visit.
As part of that conversation, were there offers made that
if you return to negotiations, here is sanctions relief, if you
release these people, here is sanctions relief?
I understand the hostage negotiator and the Ambassador in
charge of that has not done it, as you have testified. As part
of that meeting, is it--because there are these stories out
there.
I just want to know, do you know are those stories false
that they actually offered sanctions relief in exchange for
whether it is returning to negotiations or releasing Americans?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
As I said in my opening statement, we are willing to modify
our sanctions policy in response to progress toward
negotiations and concrete steps by the Maduro regime in
negotiations and that was discussed with the Maduro regime in
close coordination with interim President Guaido and the
Unitary Platform.
Senator Rubio. Just to be clear, the sanctions
modifications relief would be an exchange, for example, for
them returning to negotiations--agreeing to return to
negotiations?
Mr. Nichols. The substantive progress in the negotiations.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Because you are aware they have used
negotiations repeatedly over the years to buy time and even the
Vatican no longer is willing to step in the breach and put that
together. I hope that has not been forgotten.
I do not want to run out of time, but I want to ask you
about something else that has happened. A couple of things.
In June of this year, a cargo plane landed in Buenos Aires.
The plane used to be owned by U.S.-sanctioned Iranian airline,
Mahan Air. It was illegally transferred to the U.S.-sanctioned
Venezuelan state airline, Conviasa. I understand that it is now
subject to a seizure warrant from the U.S. Department of
Justice.
Last month, I, along with Senator Ernst, sent a letter to
the attorney general asking him to cooperate with law
enforcement. What is the status of the judicial process in
Argentina concerning the confiscation of that plane?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you for that, and we will continue to
use all the law enforcement tools available to stop criminality
and sanctions violations.
Senator Rubio. What is the status of those processes?
Mr. Nichols. There is an investigating judge in Argentina
who is conducting an investigation and we are cooperating in
that process. I would have to refer you to the Department of
Justice for additional details.
Senator Rubio. We are waiting for the Argentine judge?
Mr. Nichols. We are----
Senator Rubio. It is their process. I understand.
Mr. Nichols. It is their process. We are supporting that
process. We have provided information into that process at
various points, which led to the final judicial order to seize
the plane.
Senator Rubio. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here.
In the last hearing that we had in this committee on
Venezuela, which was 2 years ago, we discussed the
disproportionate impact that the humanitarian crisis is having
on women in the country who have been forced to flee, and since
then health indicators including infant and maternal mortality
rates have continued to decline.
As you pointed out, Ms. Escobari, women are--a high
percentage of the women are subject to sexual assault. They are
also, obviously, vulnerable to human trafficking and other
abuses.
You have talked about the--a number of the initiatives that
we have to try and help address that. Can you talk about how
helpful you think it might be if we had a fully operating
Office of Global Women's Issues with an ambassador to that
position who had been approved so that we could help address
some of those disproportionate impacts on women as the result
of this crisis?
Ms. Escobari. Thank you, Senator, and for your commitment
to girls and women across the globe.
As you said, women are disproportionately affected in these
crises, the Venezuela--it is clear on sexual trafficking, but
also just the humanitarian needs because they are the ones
taking care of kids.
It is a big part of what we do and the lens that we take
and I would support, as you suggest, any additional support on
elevating this issue.
Senator Shaheen. Ambassador Nichols, do you have a view on
that?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, for your leadership.
The issues around gender and women, peace, and security are
vital. The confirmation of Dr. Gupta, the President's nominee
to lead the Office of Global Women's Issues, I think, is vital.
As we work in the Department on these issues and the broad
range of issues, having confirmed--Senate-confirmed people in
these positions imbues them with an authority and a power
inside our system and internationally that no matter how
talented an acting career officer is, they cannot match.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I really appreciate your
explaining the difference in that way because as we look at the
number of nominees who are still pending in the Senate, it is
really important to remember the difference they could be
making for that very reason, not because they are necessarily
any more talented, but because that official moniker gives them
added credibility.
One of the things that I think has gone mostly unnoticed
over the summer is the Russian-backed war games in July with
forces that participated from both China and Iran, and can you
discuss what the regional implications are of that and to what
extent we ought to be paying attention?
That is not something the Armed Services Committee has
talked about as we have talked about war games that are going
on in other parts of the world.
Again, those have not gotten the attention that some others
have.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
The presence of Russian forces in Venezuela and Nicaragua,
the relations between Venezuela and Iran, serve to promote
instability in our region. They seek to be provocative.
They seek to interject the conflicts from other parts of
the world in our hemisphere and we watch them very closely. We
coordinate with our allies on them.
I have had conversations with colleagues across the
interagency on this issue. I note that our superb SOUTHCOM
Commander, General Laura Richardson, has been traveling
extensively in the region and talking about our positive vision
for security cooperation.
Secretary Austin participated in the Hemispheric Defense
Ministerial in Brazil earlier this year to further that message
about a positive vision of democratic security cooperation and
we will continue to watch with vigilance the activities of
Russia and others in Venezuela and Nicaragua, in particular.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to start with you, Assistant Secretary
Nichols. Good day. I have got two issues to talk to you about.
The first one is a constituent of mine named Matthew Heath.
I am sure you are aware of the situation there. Matthew has
been wrongfully detained by the Maduro regime in Venezuela.
In early 2020, Matthew was arrested in Venezuela's
borderlands near Columbia under very questionable circumstances
and on highly specious charges. Since then, the Maduro regime
has held Matthew hostage, imprisoning him in horrible
conditions and reportedly subjecting him to unspeakable acts of
torture.
In fact, last week marked 2 years of Matthew Heath's
wrongful detention in Venezuela. That is 2 years too long for
Matthew, it is 2 years too long for his family and, certainly,
it is 2 years too long for me.
Assistant Secretary Nichols, the Maduro regime should
immediately and unconditionally release my fellow Tennessean,
Matthew Heath, and I would like to know from you what is
currently being done to bring Matthew back to his family in
Tennessee. What is the plan?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. I share your views
entirely.
Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens has, as
well as our ambassador, have raised this issue on multiple
occasions with the Maduro regime.
We have sought to do all that we can to secure his
immediate and unconditional release and in the meantime we have
insisted that the regime should ensure his safety and his
health by improving the conditions of his confinement. We will
continue to work tirelessly to secure the release of all
wrongfully-detained Americans in Venezuela.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate that. You know how concerned
I am about this situation. I appreciate your continued
attention and focus on the issue. It is tragic and it is
certainly something that Tennesseans all have their eye on.
The next topic is another one that you and I have discussed
before and are very familiar with and that is the Maduro
regime's growing cooperation with Communist China.
In 2014, China and the Maduro regime upgraded their
diplomatic relations to the highest levels, signing a
comprehensive strategic partnership. The Maduro regime is the
region's biggest borrower from China. They have accepted an
estimated $62 billion in loans over the last decade and a half.
More generally, as Communist China has become Latin
America's overall top trading partner, China has used the Belt
and Road Initiative and other instruments to provide foreign
direct investment and lending for energy and other critical
infrastructure in Venezuela and also other parts of Latin
America.
For example, China has aggressively invested in Latin
America's space sector such as the Manuel Rios Bamari
Terrestrial Satellite Control Base in Venezuela.
The Maduro regime and China have also significantly
increased their military cooperation. Between 2009 and 2019,
Beijing reportedly sold more than $615 million dollars worth of
weapons to Venezuela, making the Maduro regime a top purchaser
of China's military equipment in that region.
China strongly supports the Maduro regime's digital
authoritarianism in Venezuela. ZTE, a CCP-directed Chinese
telecoms and technology company, directly helped the Maduro
regime construct the databases and identity card program for
the country's ``fatherland card'' system that rolled out in
January of 2017. The Maduro regime has used the ``fatherland
card'' system to increase social control, to increase their
coercion, and their vote buying.
Assistant Secretary Nichols, what is the Biden
administration doing to counter the Maduro regime's efforts
there in Venezuela to counter China's growing interference and
malign influence in Latin America, more broadly?
Mr. Nichols. We continue to talk with our friends and
partners throughout the hemisphere about the real costs of
relations with the People's Republic of China and the Chinese
Communist Party.
We focus our efforts on what is the real cost of lending,
what is the quality of the projects that PRC companies are
building, and I have seen with my own eyes--I think you have as
well--collapsing stadiums, faulty foreign ministries, bad roads
that have been built by Chinese companies, in this hemisphere.
We have seen the debt trap that countries in our hemisphere
have fallen into, and the depth of the relationship between the
PRC and Venezuela demonstrates, I think, to the democratic
countries in our hemisphere exactly what kind of a partner the
PRC is in engaging with one of the worst countries in terms of
respect for human rights, rule of law, and everything else we
value in our region.
Before time runs out, Senator, I just want to note that I
was in Mexico. I followed up on the issue we discussed before.
I can brief you offline.
Senator Hagerty. Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate
it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to both of our witnesses for being here today.
I was in both Mexico and Colombia over the August recess,
in part to take a look at our Venezuela policy. It is really
hard to over hype what a disaster President Trump's Venezuela
policy was. This decision to push all of our chips into the
middle of the table all at once, recognize Guaido, and try to
facilitate a coup made us look ham-handed and, in the end,
feckless.
Recognizing someone as the leader of a country who is not
actually the leader of the country, it does not actually make
us look strong. It makes us look weak, and we are stuck
inheriting a policy that did not work, that has, in part,
contributed to a humanitarian disaster that now brings
thousands and thousands of Venezuelans to our border seeking
salvation.
I support strategic engagement with a purpose and that
purpose has to be an election that draws the participation of
all political groups and gives Venezuelans the chance to
exercise their right to determine the future of the country.
I have heard--since, Secretary Nichols, you suggest that
there is a possibility of being able to get to an election in
2024, but what does a free and fair election look like in
Venezuela?
What are our benchmarks to know whether this is an election
that we can support and that the Venezuelan people actually
have a chance at exercising their free will?
Listen, I understand it is not going to look like an
election in our country, right, and I do not know that we
should hold it to that standard, but we have to have some
pretty clear baselines.
What are we looking for as we try to get towards a viable
election?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
The European Union's Electoral Observation Mission, I
think, has provided the most comprehensive roadmap, along with
the Carter Center, to what that would look like and it involves
things like an equality of access and equality of access to the
media, rules that ensure that electoral authorities cannot
disqualify candidates arbitrarily, access to areas to campaign,
and a cessation of the abuses by security forces of opposition
candidates, transparency in the preparations technically for
the election, and the conducting of the election.
It means allowing the opposition to carry out a primary
process. As we have seen, when they have unified candidates
they will beat the regime candidates, even when everything else
is tilted against them.
A key part of the discussions between the Unitary Platform
and the regime will be the implementation of this process and
we support that.
Senator Murphy. Ms. Escobari, there is no doubt that the
humanitarian disaster in Venezuela is first, second, and third
a consequence of the regime's unconscionable policies, but I
think we should be honest that our sanctions contribute to the
humanitarian nightmare, and we can argue that there are good
reasons for our sanctions.
What worries me is a GAO report from last year that
suggests we actually do not have real good information about
how and if our sanctions are contributing to the humanitarian
crisis inside Venezuela.
The report found that Treasury and its interagency partners
are limited in their ability to develop further actions to
ensure that U.S. sanctions do not disrupt humanitarian
assistance.
Are you familiar with this report and, if so, how is USAID
engaged with our implementing partners to mitigate these
challenges and how do we make sure that we have visibility
inside Venezuela to understand what the actual impact of our
sanctions are?
Ms. Escobari. As you said, it is very hard to separate the
secondary effects. It is also very clear that the deterioration
of the economy preceded the sanctions and that we have this
capacity to work on humanitarian aid and the government also
has the capacity to have invested in many of the services that
are now not functioning in Venezuela.
A lot of our financing and our work goes to create a
network of human rights defenders, universities, and civil
society organizations that are getting information about where
the most vulnerable people are, the nature of the crisis as to
target our humanitarian aid in--to those that are most
vulnerable.
There is actually a very sophisticated and courageous
network of humanitarian organizations that are on the ground,
that know where the most vulnerable people are, and it is where
we focus our humanitarian assistance inside the country.
Senator Murphy. I look forward to speaking with you more
directly about this specific report and your responses to it.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me turn to Maduro's unbridled criminality
lest some forget who we are dealing with.
I want to remind everyone that Maduro and his henchmen from
his government, his supreme court, and the party are facing
charges in the United States for drug trafficking with rewards
for their capture.
As we all know, financial institutions in the United States
and around the world have found billions--billions--of dollars
in bank accounts linked to Maduro's mafia state--not using it
for the benefit of the people of Venezuela--billions of dollars
in bank accounts linked to Maduro's mafia state, and that is
just likely the tip of the iceberg. That is without all the
gold that is being taken out through Turkey and Russia.
I certainly do not believe that the plight of the
Venezuelan people is of any consequence except primarily that
of the Maduro regime. There is a reason 7 million people have
fled.
How are the Departments of State and Justice collaborating
to advance the international law enforcement cooperation needed
to address the Maduro regime's criminality?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I could not agree more. The efforts through the Department
of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security continue to
investigate illegality surrounding the regime.
Obviously, there is an ongoing case with regard to Alex
Saab in the United States, who was extradited precisely because
of his role in criminality.
There are numerous other regime figures who are under
investigation, and the international community and the
international law enforcement community is attuned to this.
I would just note that we discussed earlier the Conviasa
plane that is in Argentina, seized as a result of our law
enforcement cooperation for sanctions violations, and we will
continue to work with governments around the world to pursue
investigations.
The Chairman. What additional steps can be taken to
investigate, recover, and repurpose assets stolen from the
Venezuelan people?
Mr. Nichols. I think it is vital to continue coordination
among financial action task forces, coordination among
government finance ministries around the hemisphere, our
coordination in international bodies like the U.N. and the OAS,
to make sure that we are focusing not just on the regime's past
activity, but their prospective future efforts.
We see what they are trying to do in terms of evading
sanctions, trafficking in all sorts of illicit substances, and
we continue to flag that in our conversations with senior
officials from governments around the world.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this.
What foreign policy guidance has the State Department given
OFAC on targeting Maduro regime officials involved in
kleptocracy?
Mr. Nichols. We continue to tell OFAC that identifying
those responsible for illicit activity is important. It is a
complex and time-consuming process.
We also stress that as we carry out these activities we
want to ensure that they are deployed to maximum effect to
advance the negotiation process and concrete achievements in
our relationship. The goal of our sanctions policies is,
obviously, to change the behavior of the regime.
The Chairman. I am afraid that we are not achieving that
goal.
Let me ask you this. The regime continues to jail American
citizens on bogus charges. He has tortured them. He has denied
them access to legal counsel, medical treatment, and even
contact with their families.
He has used them as bargaining chips and at least in one
case he has driven them to attempt death by suicide. Matthew
Heath is not only being unjustly detained. He is being
methodically tortured and slowly killed all while the regime
keeps adding Americans to its gulags. He may have released two
Americans in March, but he has jailed several more this year.
Can you describe how hostage issues fit in the context of
broader U.S. policy objectives in Venezuela? How is the
Administration firewalling discussions with the regime related
to hostages from broader U.S. foreign policy objectives?
Absent the immediate return of U.S. hostages, what concrete
ask has the Administration made to the Maduro regime to improve
their abysmal detention conditions?
Mr. Nichols. The United States has placed Venezuela at the
highest level--level four, do not travel--in terms of our
travel warnings. We implore American citizens not to go to
Venezuela.
In 2019, our embassy in Venezuela closed so we are not able
to provide regular consular access to American citizens.
Special Presidential Envoy Roger Carstens and our
Ambassador, Jimmy Story, have repeatedly raised the issues of
wrongfully-detained Americans with the regime. We have demanded
better--we have demanded the immediate and unconditional
release of all our Americans.
In the case of Mr. Heath, as we discussed with Senator
Hagerty, we have insisted that the conditions of his
confinement be improved as well. We have stressed to the regime
that it serves no good end, its efforts to arrest wrongfully
American citizens that it finds within its borders. The border
region between Colombia and Venezuela, in particular, is a
dangerous area and should be avoided.
Anyone who is talking to Special Presidential Envoy
Carstens--any country that is talking to him, that means you do
not have a normal country or a normal relationship and you are
engaged in reprehensible conduct.
The Chairman. I appreciate that, but it seems to me that
Maduro has continued to take Americans hostages and thinks
that, actually, that is a value to him.
Let me ask you two last questions. One, is this 2024
election, that is aspirational at this point. Is that fair to
say?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It is not--there is nothing that is
established as a series of benchmarks that will get us there at
this point in time?
Mr. Nichols. The European Union's Electoral Observation
Mission laid out what, I think, is the best roadmap and
recommendations to get to a legitimate, free, fair election in
2024.
The Chairman. That has not been agreed to by Maduro?
Mr. Nichols. No, it has not and that is vital, and----
The Chairman. When we talk about 2024, it is an
aspirational thing. There may be some roadmap by the EU, but
the regime has not agreed to it.
Mr. Nichols. If the regime has any interest in legitimacy
and international acceptance, it should agree to those
recommendations and implement them immediately.
The Chairman. When you are benefiting from everything, when
you have got billions of dollars in national patrimony, when
you--basically, the state is your personal piggy bank, then I
am not sure whether you care about international legitimacy. I
wish the Maduro did. That is why I think we have pressure--that
is why we are going to offer legislation to do so.
I have one last question for both of you. It is unrelated
to our topic today, but since we have the pleasure of having
you both here at the same time, on September 2 I sent both of
you a letter regarding U.S. democracy programs for Cuba.
While I appreciate the Administration's continued
commitment to these programs, I was deeply disappointed to see
that the Administration is ending support to initiatives that
challenge the Cuban regime's trafficking of doctors and medical
personnel.
It is an unfortunate decision that comes at a time when the
State Department is actually raising the profile of the Cuban
regime's forced labor schemes in the annual Report on
Trafficking in Persons.
Why then cut off funding to programs that support the
victims of the regime's trafficking of Cuban doctors and help
raise additional international awareness about the issue?
Ms. Escobari. If I might start.
We agree with you wholeheartedly on the importance of these
programs and it is clear that the Cuban missions constitute
forced labor.
We had this program--we have this program currently that
tracks and analyzes the human rights abuses and our partners
have documented all the issues that have led to this
determination, right--the salaries, retention of identity of
documents, movement restrictions, et cetera--as well as the
threats and punishments and other labor violations.
Grants come to their natural end and that is the situation
with this one. However, this is an issue that we will continue
to work on. We have programs that are focused on educating the
Cuban workforce on labor exploitation, including Cuban medical
doctors in overseas missions, and as well as engaging
multinational institutions and human rights organizations.
We will continue to----
The Chairman. I do not understand, Madam Administrator, why
specifically end the resources that are unique to this program
and then put it into the context of broader reviews that are
taking place with other parts of the world.
I think it is regretful and, to be honest with you, I am
going to have to consider it as it relates to any requests for
transfers of money from USAID.
Senator Risch, do you have----
Senator Risch. No.
The Chairman. With that and the thanks of the committee,
there will be--I am sure there will be a series of questions,
including some from myself.
The business--the record, I should say, for the hearing
will remain open until the close of business on Friday,
September 16. Please ensure that questions for the record are
submitted no later than that day. We would ask you to have
substantive responses.
With the thanks of the committee to our witnesses, this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. What is your assessment of the extent of links between
the Maduro regime and transnational organized crime and drug
trafficking in Venezuela?
Answer. Maduro and his regime tolerate, ignore, and often cooperate
or collude with known criminal networks, non-state armed groups, and
narcotics traffickers. The Maduro regime and the Venezuelan armed
forces also often develop mutually beneficial ad hoc relationships with
criminal groups to derive revenue from illicit activities.
In situations where we have sufficient information, we have worked
closely with law enforcement and the Department of Justice to extradite
these individuals, offer rewards for their arrest or conviction, and
worked with the Department of the Treasury to impose sanctions. For
example, in February, the Secretary of State approved a reward of up to
$10 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of
illegitimate Maduro regime oil minister Tareck Zaidan El Aissami
Maddah. Tareck El Aissami is a Specially Designated Narcotics
Trafficker who was designated in 2017 pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act for playing a significant role in international
narcotics trafficking.
We will continue to pressure the regime and hold its members
accountable for undermining democracy, engaging in corruption, and
abusing human rights, as exemplified this year by the extradition of
Alex Saab and the seizure of Venezuela's Emtrasur aircraft.
Question. The President has designated Venezuela a major drug
transit or major illicit drug producing country, and the Department of
State estimates that up to 10 percent of Colombian cocaine is
trafficked through Venezuela. As part of the basis for this
designation, the President found that Venezuela ``failed demonstrably''
during the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to
its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. What
is the Administration's policy or strategy to address drug trafficking
from Venezuela moving forward?
Answer. We maintain international pressure on the Maduro regime
using a toolkit of sanctions, visa restrictions, law enforcement
actions, diplomatic engagement, and other mechanisms. We also continue
to work multilaterally via the UN system, the OAS, and other
institutions to isolate and minimize the regime's influence in the
region and internationally.
Question. President Gustavo Petro of Colombia has invited Nicolas
Maduro to serve as guarantor of negotiations with the National
Liberation Army (ELN), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned
Maduro and the Department of Justice charged him with offenses related
to narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. State's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) posted a $15 million
reward for information to bring him to justice. Does the Biden
administration consider Nicolas Maduro a fugitive of U.S. Justice? Can
Maduro be a legitimate guarantor of peace and security in Colombia?
Answer. The United States stands with the people of Venezuela, and
we remain committed to targeting the Maduro regime and its supporters.
We take every opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro regime.
We remain concerned that the Maduro regime fails to make any
meaningful efforts to combat illegal drug activity or prosecute corrupt
officials or suspected drug traffickers, including ELN members. As you
are aware, the Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Maduro in
2017 for being a current or former official of the Government of
Venezuela, and in 2020 the Department of Justice charged him with
offenses related to narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. The
Department of State also posted a reward of up to $15 million for
information leading to Maduro's arrest or conviction.
The ELN remains a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization under
U.S. law. We support efforts to bring to justice terrorists and
criminals that for too long have denied the Venezuelan and Colombian
people the peace and security they so deserve. Deciding whether or how
to enter peace talks with any group remains the Colombian government's
decision.
The Department of Justice charged Nicolas Maduro with offenses
related to narco-terrorism and drug trafficking in 2020. We support
efforts to bring to justice terrorists and criminals that for too long
have denied the Venezuelan and Colombian people peace and security. The
Department of State also posted a reward of up to $15 million for
information leading to Maduro's arrest or conviction. For additional
questions pertaining to Maduro's status, we would refer you to the
Department of Justice.
Deciding whether or how to enter peace talks with any group remains
the Colombian government's decision.
Question. On February 25, National Security Council Senior Director
Juan Gonzalez said to Voice of America that the sanctions imposed on
Russia for invading Ukraine were ``designed'' to put pressure on
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. On March 7, the same official and
Ambassador Jimmy Story met with Maduro in Caracas to, according to the
White House Press Secretary ``discuss energy security.'' Please explain
how the Administration intends to pressure Maduro while discussing
energy security with his regime.
Answer. Consistent with the VERDAD Act, we continue to support the
Venezuelan-led negotiations between the Unitary Platform and the
regime. We believe good faith negotiations represent the best path
toward restoring democracy and human rights in Venezuela.
The visit by senior U.S. officials to Venezuela in March this year
focused on checking the welfare of wrongfully detained U.S. nationals,
securing the release of U.S. wrongful detainees, and supporting a
return to negotiations with the opposition in Mexico.
Question. The regime has followed up the outreach by the Biden
administration by unlawfully detaining nearly a dozen Americans,
refusing to return to negotiations with the democratic opposition, and
increasing physical attacks on Interim President Juan Guaido.
Please explain what measures the Administration has taken to
demonstrate concern with this trajectory. Is it time to impose
additional sanctions on the Maduro regime?
Answer. Secretary Blinken has made the safety of U.S. nationals
abroad his highest priority. After the March 2022 U.S. Government
delegation trip to Caracas, the regime released two wrongfully detained
U.S. nationals. We continue to advocate for the immediate and
unconditional release of all wrongfully detained U.S. nationals in
Venezuela at every opportunity.
Accountability for human rights abuses remains one of the main
objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela. We take every
opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro regime, especially
against pro-democracy and human rights advocates.
As we have previously made clear, we will review our sanctions
policies in response to constructive steps by the Maduro regime. We
have also been very clear that we will review our sanctions posture
should the Maduro regime fail to negotiate in good faith or to follow
through on its commitments.
Question. In July, the Administration extended OFAC General License
No. 40 (GL 40), first issued in July 2021, to authorize the exportation
or re-exportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas to Venezuela. Could you
please confirm the volumes of LPG that have been imported into
Venezuela under GL 40 since July 2021?
Answer. I am unaware of any U.S. exports of Liquified Petroleum Gas
(LPG) to Venezuela since July 2021. General License 40 does not contain
any reporting requirement.
Question. On June 17, OFAC lifted sanctions on Mr. Carlos Erik
Malpica Flores, the nephew of Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores. Mr. Malpica
was sanctioned in 2017 for its involvement in rampant government
corruption.
Please provide a detailed explanation for lifting sanctions on Mr.
Malpica, including the guidance provided by your Bureau and/or the
Department of State to the Department of the Treasury on this decision.
Answer. The Department of the Treasury delisted Malpica Flores. We
have long made clear that we would review our sanctions policies to
promote a negotiated solution to the Venezuelan crisis. We have also
been very clear that we will review our sanctions posture should the
Maduro regime fail to negotiate in good faith or to follow through on
its commitments.
Question. In April 2020, the United States proposed a Democratic
Transition Framework to facilitate a peaceful negotiated return to
democracy in Venezuela. Has the Biden administration formally retracted
the 2020 Framework as U.S. policy?
Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's last
remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim
President of Venezuela.
We believe comprehensive, Venezuelan-led negotiations represent the
best mechanism available to restore Venezuelan democracy and the rule
of law.
In close coordination with Interim President Guaido, we support the
Unitary Platform's goal of immediately resuming its negotiations with
the Maduro regime to restore free and fair elections, democratic
institutions, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in
Venezuela.
Question. It is my understanding that Ambassador James Story has
encouraged the Unitary Platform to broaden the coalition for the sake
of unity.
Can you describe the standards by which the Administration would
measure whether an organization or individual should be part of the
Unitary Platform? Would the Administration support a coalition that
includes representatives of ``Fuerza Vecinal''? Can you please describe
the links between Fuerza Vecinal and Mr. Raul Gorrin Belisario, an
international fugitive sanctioned by OFAC in January 2019 for its
involvement in endemic corruption at the highest levels of the Maduro
regime.
Answer. The Venezuelan opposition--specifically the Unitary
Platform--engages directly with the regime to secure tangible progress
toward the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. We strongly support
these efforts and encourage the Unitary Platform to include political
parties, civil society, and other actors from a wide segment of
Venezuelan society in its discussions. We regularly engage with the
Unitary Platform through weekly consultations with the Venezuela
Affairs Unit and high-level coordination meetings with likeminded
partners to emphasize our shared values and the importance of a
Venezuelan-led negotiated solution. We understand Unitary Platform
members are cautious to ensure their coalition consists of legitimate
actors who share the same goal of restoring democracy and stability to
Venezuela.
______
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Implementation of sanctions on Venezuela: Venezuela
appears to be conducting some business transactions that one would
think would be constrained under current sanctions on the country. For
example, we have seen the shipment of Venezuela oil to Europe,
speculation about Chevron relaunching Venezuelan operations, and
Siemens helping with the country's electrification problems. Please
provide some clarification regarding U.S. sanctions on Venezuela in
relation to recent business activity in the country.
Answer. We believe Venezuelan-led, comprehensive negotiations
represent the best mechanism available to restore Venezuelan democracy
and the rule of law. Sanctions are one tool at our disposal to make
progress towards this objective, and we have said repeatedly that we
would review our sanctions policies in response to constructive steps
by the Maduro regime.
The United States remains steadfast in our commitment to the
Venezuelan people, which includes support for Venezuelans' democratic
aspirations and assistance to address Venezuela's humanitarian crisis.
Part of this effort includes calibrating our sanctions program to
impose costs on the Maduro regime for its corrupt practices while
making all efforts to ensure our sanctions do not unduly impact the
Venezuelan people or stand in the way of bona fide humanitarian
assistance flowing to Venezuela.
I can confirm that the U.S. Government issued two narrowly scoped
licenses to Siemens, as Siemens reported publicly. To the extent that
the media reports imply that the United States supports Siemens fully
rebuilding the energy grid, they inaccurately portray U.S. policy
towards Venezuela.
Question. How are you implementing these sanctions given the goals
the Biden administration hopes to achieve?
Answer. Our overall sanctions policy on Venezuela remains
unchanged, and we will continue to implement and enforce our Venezuela
sanctions. As we have previously made clear, we will review our
sanctions policies in response to constructive steps by the Maduro
regime. We have also been very clear that we will review our sanctions
posture should the Maduro regime fail to negotiate in good faith or to
follow through on its commitments. The United States recognizes Interim
President Guaido and closely coordinates with his administration and
with the Unitary Platform on the steps needed to move forward on a
negotiated solution that leads to the restoration of democracy to
Venezuela.
______
Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Venezuela migrant and refugee situation: As you mentioned
in your testimony, there are now more than 6.8 million Venezuelan
migrants and refugees. The scale of this crisis is staggering and
impacts the entire Western Hemisphere.
How is USAID working to respond to migration across Latin America
and the Caribbean?
Answer. USAID is supporting Venezuelan migrants and refugees with
immediate humanitarian assistance and with longer-term socio-economic
migration across Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. USAID is also
working to address the root causes of migration in Central America.
usaid development assistance
USAID has provided more than $32 million (including $6.5 million in
FY 2021) in development assistance to facilitate the socio-economic
integration of Venezuelan migrants into three receiving countries in
South America: Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. With this funding, USAID is
working to strengthen local institutions' ability to provide basic
services and effectively and equitably absorb the inflow of migrants,
supporting policy reforms and administrative changes to facilitate
migrants' integration, and supporting job skills development,
entrepreneurial activity, and labor force integration.
USAID has provided more than $148 million (including $30 million in
FY 2021) in ongoing programming in Colombia to provide assistance to
Venezuelan migrants through a variety of programs including providing
technical assistance to the Colombian Government to support the
implementation of the Temporary Protective Status (TPS) program for
Venezuelan migrants, improving access to health and education systems,
and supporting economic integration and financial inclusion of migrants
and returnees.
In FY 2021, USAID provided more than $328 million in development
programming to address the root causes of migration in Central America.
Of that, $9 million supports the dignified reception and reintegration
of repatriated Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalans and $4.4 million
supports the facilitation of access to H-2 visas in northern Central
America.
Through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), USAID
has also provided support for the reception and integration of migrants
in Costa Rica ($2.6 million), Panama ($2.4 million), and Belize ($1.14
million). In Costa Rica, this assistance has included the establishment
of three municipal migrant centers in Tarrazu, Limon, and San Carlos as
well as mobile integration services to assist migrants in their process
of achieving `regular migration status' and to enhance access to
institutions and services.
usaid humanitarian assistance
At the Summit of the Americas on June 10, U.S. President Joseph R.
Biden announced new humanitarian assistance, including more than $171
million in humanitarian funding to support life-saving assistance
inside Venezuela, as well as provide support for Venezuelan migrants,
Colombia returnees, refugees, and host communities in the region.
USAID has provided more than $1.1 billion in humanitarian
assistance since 2018 for emergency food, water, sanitation and
hygiene, health, protection, nutrition, and other urgent assistance for
people affected by this crisis in Venezuela and across the region.
Since 2018, USAID has provided more than $315 million in humanitarian
assistance for people in Venezuela, and nearly $794 million in
humanitarian assistance for Venezuelan migrants and refugees, as well
as for host communities in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru since
2018.
Question. Specifically, what are you doing on this front in
Colombia, a country which took historic action last year to provide
temporary protected status to over 2.4 million Venezuelans?
Answer. Colombia is a priority for USAID, and we are dedicated to
supporting their generous efforts to host over 2.4 million migrants and
refugees, and reintegrate returnees.
usaid development assistance
With USAID funding for migrant socio-economic integration
programming, USAID/Colombia enabled the country's historic decision to
offer TPS to Venezuelan migrants, and provided 460 surge staff and
equipment to Colombian migration authorities to help pre-register more
than 2.4 million and approve TPS for 1.5 million migrants. To date,
USAID/Colombia has launched and operationalized four migration
integration centers, which are one-stop shops for migrants to access
social services, and will launch five more in the upcoming months.
USAID's health program has supported the Colombian Government's
Ministry of Health with the enrollment of more than 90,000 migrants
into the health system. ``Together We Learn,'' USAID's migrant
education program, is currently working in 129 schools. Over the life
of the activity, USAID will reach over 400 schools in nine Colombian
municipalities. The project will improve access to education for more
than 4,000 children and train over 11,000 educators to promote the
social integration of migrant and returnee youth in schools. Finally,
USAID launched two economic integration projects that will provide
employment and entrepreneurship opportunities to more than 10,000
migrants and receptor community members, along with access to financial
services for 30,000 new clients.
usaid humanitarian assistance
USAID humanitarian assistance in Colombia totals more than $505
million and currently includes food assistance--hot meals, food kits
for families in transit, and vouchers and cash transfers--so that
vulnerable Venezuelans can buy nutritious food in local stores. In
Colombia, USAID partners have assisted more than 317,000 vulnerable
migrants and Colombian returnees with food assistance and emergency
relief. USAID also funds targeted support to Venezuelans in transit
through Colombia (caminantes) in Norte de Santander and Santander by
increasing their access to basic services.
______
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. What are the top priorities for the Biden administration
regarding policy towards Venezuela?
Answer. The situation in Venezuela remains one of the worst crises
in our hemisphere's history, and the responsibility for the crisis
falls squarely on the shoulders of the late Hugo Chavez and Nicolas
Maduro. The Biden administration has prioritized the return of
democracy to Venezuela through Venezuelan-led, comprehensive
negotiations that represent the best mechanism available to restore
democracy and the rule of law, and to limit the influence of malign
actors in the region. We will continue to review our sanctions policies
in response to constructive steps by the Maduro regime but also remain
ready to evaluate our sanctions posture should the regime fail to
negotiate in good faith or to follow through on its commitments.
Secretary Blinken has made the safety of U.S. citizens abroad his
highest priority and we continue to work aggressively, using every
available means, to bring home all U.S. nationals wrongfully detained
in Venezuela. In addition, accountability for human rights abuses
remains one of the main objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela,
and we take every opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro
regime. We continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans
who have been forced to leave their country. Since FY 2017, the
Department's Population, Refugees, and Migration bureau has provided
nearly $828 million in humanitarian assistance for Venezuelan refugees
and migrants in 17 countries throughout the region, as well as
vulnerable Venezuelans inside Venezuela.
Question. Is the Administration still committed to recognizing Juan
Guaido as the Interim President of Venezuela?
Answer. Yes, the United States continues to recognize the authority
of the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's
last remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim
President of Venezuela. President Biden spoke with Interim President
Guaido during the Summit of the Americas and reinforced our support for
him as Venezuela's president, as well as our firm commitment to
Guaido's call for a negotiated solution to Venezuela's crisis through
the Unitary Platform's negotiations with the Maduro regime to restore
free and fair elections, democratic institutions, the rule of law, and
respect for human rights in Venezuela. Additionally, Ambassador Story
met with Juan Guaido twice during his June 2022 visit to Caracas to
reinforce the support of the United States.
Question. Is seeking the release of political prisoners and holding
free and fair elections still the Administration's primary priority, or
have other considerations taken precedence, such as securing a supply
of oil from Maduro-regime controlled companies?
Answer. Accountability for human rights abuses remains one of the
main objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela and we will
continue to use all diplomatic and economic tools available to support
Venezuelan calls for greater freedom, accountability, and democracy.
The United States, joined by partners and allies across the globe,
continues to press for the release of all those unjustly detained for
political reasons, an end to human rights abuses, and conditions for
free and fair elections that allow Venezuelans to choose their leaders
freely. We remain a steadfast partner of the Venezuelan people as they
strive to build a better future for their country--one in which their
leaders respect the human rights and freedoms of all citizens. We take
every opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro regime,
especially against pro-democracy and human rights advocates.
Our overall sanctions policy on Venezuela remains unchanged, and we
will continue to implement and enforce our Venezuela sanctions. As we
have previously made clear, we will also review our sanctions policies
in response to constructive steps by the Maduro regime.
Question. In the past year, the Maduro regime and elements of the
Venezuelan democratic opposition have negotiated in Mexico City.
According to both State Department and opposition readouts of these
talks, the Maduro regime has only wanted to focus on economic relief,
with limited discussion on what they call ``social issues,'' including
elections.
Has the Maduro regime shown any willingness to discuss holding free
and fair elections in Venezuela?
Answer. The Venezuelan opposition--specifically the Unitary
Platform--engages directly with the regime to secure tangible progress
toward the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. Consistent with the
VERDAD Act, we continue to support the Venezuelan-led negotiations
between the Unitary Platform and the regime. We think that good faith
negotiations represent the best path toward restoring democracy and
respect for human rights in Venezuela. The Administration's efforts
resulted in renewed meetings and negotiations between the regime and
the opposition in both Oslo and Caracas. The United States will
continue to work with our Venezuelan and international partners to
support the negotiations and urge Maduro to return to the table.
Question. What is the Administration doing to ensure that the
Guaido government, and other elements of Venezuela's democratic
opposition, present a united front in these negotiations?
Answer. In close coordination with Interim President Guaido, we
support the Unitary Platform's goal of immediately resuming
negotiations with the Maduro regime to restore free and fair elections,
democratic institutions, the rule of law, and respect for human rights
in Venezuela. The United States regularly coordinates with Guaido's
administration and with the Unitary Platform to move forward
effectively on a negotiated solution that leads to the restoration of
democracy to Venezuela.
Question. Are there scenarios where the Administration would offer
sanctions relief without free and fair elections in Venezuela?
Answer. We will review our sanctions policies in response to
constructive steps by the Maduro regime. However, we also remain ready
to review our sanctions posture should the regime fail to negotiate in
good faith or to follow through on its commitments. We will continue to
pressure the regime and hold its members accountable for undermining
democracy, engaging in corruption, and abusing human rights as
exemplified by our extradition of Alex Saab and the seizure of
Venezuela's Emtrasur aircraft in Argentina.
Question. Given the Maduro regime's attempts to kidnap members of
the Venezuelan democratic opposition, like Freddy Guevara last year,
can we believe any commitment made by Maduro that he would obey the law
if free and fair elections were held in Venezuela?
Answer. Consistent with the VERDAD Act, we continue to support the
Venezuelan-led negotiations between the Unitary Platform and the
regime. We think that good faith negotiations represent the best path
toward restoring democracy and human rights in Venezuela.
Accountability for human rights abuses remains one of the main
objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela. We take every
opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro regime, especially
against pro-democracy and human rights advocates. As a member of the
Human Rights Council, we work to ensure the renewal of the Mandate of
the UNHRC Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to Venezuela. This important
mission shines a light on the human rights situation in the country and
serves as a critical voice for victims of the regime. We also work with
partners and allies to promote accountability for corrupt actors and
those who undermine democracy and abuse human rights.
Question. The Trump administration successfully mobilized almost 60
countries in recognizing the Guaido government and joining the U.S.-led
effort to press for Venezuelans' right to free and fair elections.
Under this administration's watch, we've seen the EU formally switch to
recognizing Guaido as an opposition leader rather than as an interim
president. As they elect left-wing leaders, more countries in Latin
America also shift their recognition.
How is the Administration coordinating sanctions policy with
European and Latin American governments, including those that have de-
recognized the Guaido government?
Answer. The Department of State regularly engages European
counterparts, including officials from EU member countries and the
European External Action Service (EEAS), on Venezuela and the need to
maintain pressure on the Maduro regime to return to negotiations and
improve economic and political conditions. For example, during a July
27, 2022, coordination conference on Venezuela, I pressed the EU to
support our sanctions implementation and preserve the incentive
structure with the Maduro regime, and Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary Ricardo Zuniga reiterated the importance of coordination on
Venezuela policy, including recognition and sanctions, with European
and other international partners during a meeting on September 13,
2022. Other State Department officials have regular interactions with
our international partners to follow up on these issues, including
sanctions.
Question. In your communications with these governments, have you
or anyone in the State Department conveyed the U.S. plans to continue
recognizing the Guaido government?
Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's last
remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim
President of Venezuela, a position that is well known and regularly
shared with our international partners. Recent examples of this include
a September 13, 2022, high-level coordination meeting on Venezuela,
sponsored by the Government of Canada, where Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Zuniga affirmed our determination to continue
supporting the interim government. Additionally, in a July 27, 2022,
small-group meeting of likeminded partners, I reaffirmed our
recognition of Juan Guaido to our closest partners and allies.
Question. In the last year, has the Administration considered
following the EU in withdrawing its recognition of Juan Guaido as the
interim president of the legitimate Government of Venezuela?
Answer. No. The United States continues to recognize the authority
of the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's
last remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim
President of Venezuela.
Question. In July, you briefed my staff, and the staff of other
members of this committee, on your initial round of talks with the
then-incoming government of Gustavo Petro. You indicated then that
compared to the topic of environmental protection and economic reform,
Petro himself was not enthusiastic about talking about confronting the
illiberal forces in Latin America, including Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Maduro. Since then, Petro has sought a thaw in bilateral relations with
Caracas. This includes restoring full diplomatic ties, sending an
ambassador to Caracas, and reopening the border. I understand that the
Petro administration, as the democratically elected Government of
Colombia, has the full right to express its sovereignty and decide its
own foreign policy.
Can you tell me whether you view President Petro's opening to the
Maduro regime as a positive or a negative development as far as U.S.
interests are concerned?
Answer. We have engaged the new Colombian Government on issues of
mutual interest including foreign affairs. We have had open and frank
high-level discussions with Petro Administration Foreign Minister
Alvaro Leyva and Petro Administration Ambassador to Venezuela Armando
Benedetti to emphasize continued U.S. concerns about Venezuela's human
rights record and to encourage the Colombian Government to consider how
its increased engagement with Venezuela can advance our mutual interest
to promote a return to democracy in Venezuela.
Question. What is your assessment of the Petro administration's
continued willingness to protect Venezuelan political exiles currently
residing there?
Answer. The Petro administration has vowed publicly and privately
to continue to provide refuge to Venezuelan political exiles to reside
in Colombia. President Petro publicly rebuffed Maduro regime official
Diosdado Cabello's call for the extradition of political exiles from
Colombia, stating: ``Colombia guarantees the right to asylum and
refuge.'' We welcome President Petro's public assurances that
Venezuelan political exiles will not be subject to extradition to
Venezuela.
Question. Will the Petro government continue to vote in
multilateral forums, such as the Organization of American States, to
support Venezuela's opposition and condemn Maduro's human rights
violations?
Answer. We do not have information on how the Petro government
plans to vote on individual issues. However, President Petro publicly
said on September 13 that he would support the Maduro regime reclaiming
its seat at the OAS. We urge Colombia and other partners to press for
improved political and human rights conditions in Venezuela, including
through support for relevant resolutions in multilateral organizations.
Question. For decades, Colombia has struggled to deal with the
scourge of narcotics production and trafficking, burdening its society
with drug addiction and all of its problems and funding terrorist
movements seeking to overthrow Colombia's government. These include
both the FARC and the ELN, which last year carried out attacks against
Colombian Government officials, likely with the support of Venezuela.
Has the Administration communicated to the Petro government, via
classified channels or other means, the danger posed to Colombia by
Venezuela's sponsoring of the ELN and other armed Colombian terrorist
groups?
Answer. The Biden administration has made clear the threats posed
to Colombian security forces and the Colombian people by the ELN and
other armed terrorist groups, including the dangers of foreign support
for those groups. The ELN remains a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization under U.S. law.
Question. Do you believe the Petro government will seek
accountability for the ELN's continued practice of sparking violence
along the Colombian-Venezuelan border?
Answer. The Colombian Government is starting the process to reopen
peace negotiations with the ELN. We expect that the Colombian
Government will seek to address ELN-sponsored violence as a part of
those discussions given the ELN's attacks on Colombian citizens over
decades and the importance of ending such harmful actions. The Petro
government publicly indicated that one of its first priorities in
discussions with the ELN is a humanitarian ceasefire.
Question. In 2016, the Maduro regime transformed 12 percent of its
national territory into a mining region named the Orinoco Mining Arc
(el Arco Minero). Since then, it has been subjected to predatory mining
and wanton destruction in order to fill the regime's coffers with the
profits accrued by illegal gold mining. Criminality is rife in the
gold-mining areas of Venezuela. Venezuelan migrants, particularly those
lacking documents, are vulnerable to human trafficking and other
crimes. Given the Biden administration's focus on climate change and
environmental protection, you would think that it would be concerned
about how illegal mining has polluted the Orinoco River, aquifers, and
even the Gulf of Mexico, but this barely figures in its communications
with Venezuela. Chairman Menendez and I have been working on the Legal
Goldmining Partnership Act of 2022 to crack down on the harmful
practice of illegal gold mining, and hope to introduce that legislation
in short order.
What, if any, punitive action can be undertaken to target those
responsible for this ecological disaster?
Answer. The United States works with partners through the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to
promote responsible mineral supply chains, and specifically supported
the OECD's report and follow-on forum on illicit gold flows from
Venezuela. The United States has called for governments, civil society,
and the private sector to work together to combat human rights abuses,
including human trafficking and other crimes stemming from this
industry.
As a State Party to the World Heritage Convention (WHC), Venezuela
is accountable for protecting its heritage sites, including the Canaima
National Park, which the Maduro regime included in the Orinoco Mining
Arc in 2016. The United States and other States Parties supported a WHC
decision for the regime to report on park conditions and host an
inspection by December 2022.
Question. In addition to my legal gold mining partnership act, what
other options should the United States and multilateral organizations
consider to deter these types of crimes, protect victims, and detect
and prosecute their perpetrators?
Answer. The United States works with partners bilaterally and
through the OECD to promote responsible mineral supply chains. Through
the OECD, the United States and other partners sponsored the report
``Gold Flows from Venezuela,'' which described the armed groups,
corruption, and money laundering associated with gold extraction in
Venezuela.
The Bureau of International Narcotic and Law Enforcement Affairs,
in partnership with the Organization of American States' Department
against Transnational Organized Crime, works with countries in the
region to identify and prosecute illicit mining, criminal gold flows,
including flows from Venezuela, and gold-based money laundering. These
efforts help provide better information about the illicit gold flows in
the region, which in turn will help inform effective policy responses.
Question. Last year, an Iranian plot was revealed to kidnap Iranian
dissident Masih Alinejad in New York City. The plot, coordinated by
Iranian regime agents, sought to kidnap Ms. Alinejad and have her
smuggled out to Venezuela by boat. The plot exposed Venezuela's
complicity in Iran's terrorist activities against a U.S. citizen.
Which Venezuelan officials were directly or indirectly involved in
the plot to kidnap an American citizen?
Answer. The Department closely monitors relations between the
Maduro regime and malign actors like Iran in the Western Hemisphere. We
refer you to the Department of Justice for additional details on the
plot by Iranian intelligence services to kidnap a U.S. journalist and
any connections with Venezuelan officials.
Question. And what punitive actions are being taken or being
contemplated against Venezuelan officials for their complicity with
Tehran?
Answer. We remain concerned by the Maduro regime's continued
attempts to circumvent U.S. sanctions and we closely monitor the
activities of malign actors like Iran in our hemisphere and globally.
We maintain international pressure on the Maduro regime using a toolkit
of sanctions, visa restrictions, law enforcement actions, diplomatic
engagement, and other mechanisms.
Question. For years, the communist regime in Cuba has
systematically violated the human rights of Cuban medical professionals
through its practice of dispatching so-called ``medical missions''
abroad. The State Department's annual human rights reports and
trafficking in persons reports have determined that these missions
constitute the use of forced labor. Venezuela is among the most
frequent destinations for these missions. Last year, Senator Menendez
and I introduced the Combatting Trafficking of Cuban Doctors Act of
2021 to strengthen U.S. efforts to stop this practice.
How is the Administration holding the communist regime in Cuba and
countries that host these missions accountable?
Answer. Every year since 2010, the State Department has documented
indicators of forced labor in Cuba's labor export programs overseas. We
believe all countries should comply with their international
obligations and commitments to combat human trafficking, including
forced labor. As such, we continually urge countries to seek
transparency on contractual agreements between the Cuban Government and
Cuban overseas workers, to screen those associated with this program
for trafficking indicators, and to protect victims identified. We urge
foreign governments to investigate the specific conditions government-
affiliated Cuban workers in their countries face and to ensure these
programs comply with international labor standards, including ensuring
workers are paid directly and fully, keep their travel and identity
documents, review their contracts, have freedom of movement, and are
not penalized or retaliated against for leaving the program.
Since 2019, USAID has supported a portfolio of programs that track
and analyze human rights abuses committed against Cuban medical
personnel. This data, including testimony collected from participants
in the medical missions, has informed other organizations' reporting,
including a July 2020 report from Human Rights Watch which outlined the
Cuban Government's violation of Cuban medical personnel's human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
Question. Earlier this year, U.S. courts determined that
international organizations sued in U.S. courts do not enjoy immunity
from legal suit that is greater than what is granted by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). This opens the door for potentially
Cuban doctors who served in Cuban medical missions in Venezuela and
elsewhere to sue the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) for
facilitating Cuban medical missions.
Does the Administration support such lawsuits?
Answer. We have long expressed serious concerns about allegations
of forced labor in Cuba's labor export program overseas. We support the
right of those affected by these practices to use all legal means
available to seek justice.
Question. Is the Administration considering imposing sanctions on
PAHO for facilitating human rights abuses against Cuban medical
professionals as current and past administrations have imposed human
rights sanctions on foreign governments?
Answer. The Administration's focus remains on the Cuban people and
their political and economic wellbeing. Accordingly, we continue to
monitor allegations of human rights abuses by the Government of Cuba
and consider steps to promote accountability. We have engaged with
PAHO's leadership to increase PAHO's transparency and accountability
and to protect U.S. interests following its involvement in Brazil's
Mais Medicos program. We also proposed governance reforms to prevent
the recurrence of PAHO's involvement in projects like Mais Medicos, and
PAHO's Directing Council approved the reform proposal by consensus in
September 2020.
______
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. Is the Department actively considering returning our
diplomats to Caracas? And if not, under what circumstances would
President Biden make such a move?
Answer. The Department does not currently have plans to re-
establish a diplomatic presence in Venezuela. In March 2019, the
Department announced the withdrawal of all diplomatic personnel from
U.S. Embassy Caracas. All consular services in Venezuela remain
suspended and we have extremely limited ability to provide emergency
services to U.S. citizens in Venezuela. Visits by U.S. officials to
Venezuela this year focused on checking the welfare of wrongfully
detained U.S. nationals, securing the release of U.S. wrongful
detainees, and supporting a return to negotiations with the opposition
in Mexico. The United States continues to recognize the authority of
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's last
remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim
President of Venezuela. We strongly support the Unitary Platform in its
engagements with the Maduro regime to secure tangible progress toward
the restoration of democracy in Venezuela.
Question. How is the State Department working to discourage the
arrest of American citizens for political purposes?
Answer. Secretary Blinken has made the safety of U.S. citizens
abroad his highest priority. The Department continues to press the
Maduro regime for the immediate and unconditional release of all
wrongfully detained U.S. nationals in Venezuela. We have consistently
advocated against the wrongful detention of U.S. nationals and will
continue to do so.
Venezuela has a Level 4 (Do Not Travel) Travel Advisory due to
crime, civil unrest, poor health infrastructure, kidnapping, and the
arrest and detention of U.S. citizens without due process or fair trial
guarantees that includes a level 2 (exercise increased caution) warning
for risk of terrorism and wrongful detentions.
On July 19, 2022, the Department of State introduced a new ``D''
risk indicator for wrongful detentions as part of our ongoing efforts
to provide clear and comprehensive safety and security information to
U.S. citizens traveling and living abroad. Prior Travel Advisories
already included information on unjust detentions. The ``D'' indicator
was added to highlight for the traveling U.S. public the elevated risk
of the wrongful detention of U.S. nationals in particular countries
overseas whose governments have engaged in that practice. The ``D''
indicator is active for the Venezuela Travel Advisory.
Question. What efforts has the Department undertaken to secure the
release of other Americans under the Maduro regime's custody?
Answer. Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger
Carstens leads the effort, joined by U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela James
Story and the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, to identify ways to
secure the release of all wrongfully detained U.S. nationals. On the
March 2022 U.S. delegation trip, the regime released two wrongfully
detained U.S. citizens, and Special Envoy Carstens and Ambassador
Story, along with the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, continue to
advocate the immediate and unconditional release of all wrongfully
detained U.S. nationals in Venezuela at every opportunity, including in
their June 2022 trip to Venezuela.
Question. Would you say the present use of the Consular Travel
Advisory system is effective at warning American citizens about the
risks of traveling to Venezuela?
Answer. The Department's Travel Advisories and Travel Alerts
effectively provide U.S. citizens with accurate, actionable, and timely
information about travel risks abroad so that they can make informed
travel decisions. The Department updated its Travel Advisory for
Venezuela most recently on July 19, 2022. The travel advisory and
travel alerts are emailed to U.S. citizens who register with STEP
(Smart Traveler Enrollment Program) and is publicly available on
Department websites (travel.state.gov, www.osac.gov and embassy
websites) and social media and is regularly updated based on the
changing security circumstances within Venezuela.
Question. Which U.S. adversaries play the strongest role in
propping up the regime and how would you recommend the United States
engage these players in support of our objectives in Venezuela?
Answer. The Maduro regime continues to seek commercial, political,
and diplomatic ties with malign actors like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and
China, to its own detriment. We remain concerned by the Maduro regime's
continued attempts to circumvent our sanctions and we closely monitor
the activities of malign actors and strategic competitors in our
hemisphere. In coordination with international partners and allies, the
Department maintains pressure on the Maduro regime using a toolkit of
sanctions, visa restrictions, law enforcement actions, diplomatic
engagement, and other mechanisms. We remain firmly committed to the
Venezuelan people and continue to work with the international community
to support the restoration of democracy and the rule of law.
Question. Noting Colombia's restoration of formal relations with
Maduro, how would you characterize our engagement with President Petro
on the issue of U.S.-Venezuelan relations?
Answer. We have engaged the new Colombian Government on issues of
mutual interest including foreign affairs. We have had open, frank, and
high-level discussions with President Petro, as well as Petro
Administration Foreign Minister Alvaro Leyva and Petro Administration
Ambassador to Venezuela Armando Benedetti to emphasize continued U.S.
concerns about Venezuela's human rights record and to encourage the
Colombian Government to consider how its increased engagement with
Venezuela can advance our mutual interest to promote a return to
democracy in Venezuela.
______
Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. In its $40 million appropriation for democracy programs
for Venezuela, Congress directed USAID to address violence against
Venezuelan women and child migrants. Can you expand on USAID's efforts
in this regard?
Answer. The SFOAA FY22 bill specifies that, ``Of the funds
appropriated by this Act under the heading ``Economic Support Fund,''
not less than $40,000,000 shall be made available for democracy
programs for Venezuela.'' USAID makes use of these funds to implement a
range of programs in partnership with local civil society
organizations, independent media outlets, and human rights actors to
advance democracy and protect human rights inside Venezuela.
USAID will use FY 2022 funds to continue to raise awareness about
gender issues--including gender-based violence (GBV)--and work with a
broad range of civil society and democratic actors--including media,
labor, watchdog, human rights, university, women, and youth groups--to
effectively document and influence regime actions, monitor and report
on human rights, expand civil political dialogue, and support demands
for electoral and other institutional reform.
FY 2022-funded activities will continue and expand on the following
activities that USAID has implemented to address violence and other
injustices against Venezuelan women.
USAID supported a human rights observatory to survey the
prevalence of gender-based violence in a major Venezuelan city.
USAID supported another human rights observatory to collect
evidence of impunity in Venezuela's judicial system, as it
pertains to cases of gender-based human rights violations,
human trafficking, and forced migration.
USAID provided gender training to the Interim Government and
provided leadership training to women.
USAID's media partners actively hire women reporters, engage
women leaders as community journalists to report on local
issues, and report on the work of women human rights defenders
and the differentiated impact of the humanitarian crisis on
women.
usaid humanitarian assistance for venezuelans
USAID is committed to the Venezuelan people, with a key focus on
the most vulnerable including women and children. The United States
remains the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to people
affected by the crisis in Venezuela. In addition to the $40 million for
democracy assistance in Venezuela, USAID has provided $1.3 billion in
humanitarian assistance since 2018, both in Venezuela as well as for
Venezuelan migrants and refugees across the region. This humanitarian
funding supports broader USAID efforts to address violence against
Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
Since 2018, USAID has provided nearly $794 million in humanitarian
assistance to meet the needs of Venezuelan migrants and refugees
seeking refuge in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. USAID
programming also targets vulnerable host community members in areas
with high numbers of Venezuelans. USAID's assistance helps Venezuelan
migrants and refugees to meet their immediate food needs through hot
meals, cash transfers, food vouchers, and food kits. This programming
is complemented by State/PRM programs addressing protection and
additional humanitarian needs.
Since 2018, USAID has also provided more than $315 million in
humanitarian assistance inside Venezuela. USAID humanitarian
programming inside Venezuela prioritizes support for healthcare, food,
protection including support for survivors of GBV, water, sanitation
and hygiene, nutrition, and other urgent assistance.
usaid development programs for venezuelan migrants
USAID has provided $35.9 million in FY 2021 development funds to
support integration programming for Venezuelan migrants and support for
receptor communities in South America, with $29.9 million for Colombia
and $6 million for programs in Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru.
Colombia
In Colombia, USAID support enabled the country's historic decision
to offer Temporary Protective Status (TPS) to Venezuelan migrants.
USAID continues to launch and operationalize migration integration
centers or Integrate centers, which are one-stop shops for migrants to
access social services.
In Colombia, USAID supported the strengthening of the national and
local GBV prevention hotlines at the national level and in Bogota to
respond to GBV cases against migrants through six training sessions
with 48 agents that will improve information and referrals for migrants
on GBV response. USAID also established the Network of Gender
Observatories with the Women's Observatory of the Presidential
Counselor for Women's Equity (CPEM), aiming to improve coordination
between government, civil society organizations, academia, and
international organizations to collect data for prevention and
attention of gender-based violence. Additionally, USAID grantees
trained 162 migrant women, as well as sex workers and 83 of their
children on GBV prevention and response. Moreover, grantees in Cali
trained 4,580 participant migrant girls and youth to increase their
awareness of Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and GBV risks, and in the
city and Cartagena another grantee trained 418 participants and 67
public officials on GBV prevention and attention routes. USAID programs
also developed a GBV toolbox to be used with public officials and civil
society representatives that addresses specific GBV risks and
vulnerabilities faced by migrants. This toolbox was subsequently
presented to 27 public officials and 42 civil society representatives
in Bucaramanga, Cali, Medellin and Riohacha to improve their knowledge
on attention routes, prevent and address GBV against migrants, and
identify cases and improve institutional response.
South America Regional
USAID's regional program supports the socio-economic integration of
Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. Half of the migrants
USAID supports in Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil are women who continue to
face sexual exploitation and abuse, GBV, discrimination, and
xenophobia. They are routinely denied access to stable employment,
financial resources, or social protections because of their gender and
status as migrants/refugees. Transgender women migrants, often escaping
violence and torture in Venezuela, face continued abuse and
discrimination based on their gender identity. Gender-based violence,
which has exploded during the pandemic, traps migrants in a cycle of
dependence on their abusers.
USAID's updated Migrant Gender Analysis in Peru revealed that up to
94 percent of migrants work in the informal sector and report routine
harassment and predatory practices on behalf of their employers. It
revealed that systemic barriers include inferior socio-economic
positioning, gender norms, and the hyper-sexualization of women and
girls.
USAID's programming in Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil supports the
socio-economic integration of these vulnerable groups. USAID
programming recognizes that economic security is dependent on the
ability to enter the formal economy and access financial resources and
work to facilitate that access for migrants and local populations.
Question. I appreciate your highlighting regional partners' efforts
to better support and integrate displaced Venezuelans. What kind of
effect has this had with regard to the crisis at our southern border?
Answer. While it is impossible to know what would happen in a world
where regional partners did not step up to support and integrate
displaced Venezuelans, it stands to reason that Venezuelan migration to
our southern border would be even greater. The reason is simple: If
Venezuelan migrants and refugees cannot get a foothold in a country
closer to home, they continue searching. For this reason--and because
migration is a regional phenomenon presenting real development
opportunities and challenges for our neighbors in the hemisphere--USAID
encourages its regional partners to do more to support the
socioeconomic integration of Venezuelan migrants closer to home. Of the
more than 6 million Venezuelans who have fled their home country, so
far only about 3 percent have reached the U.S. southern border. If not
for generous policies like Colombia's issuance of temporary protected
status to more than 2 million Venezuelan migrants, we know this number
would be far higher. For this reason, USAID is working to support
validation of professional degrees for Venezuelan migrants in Peru and
helping to increase access to bank accounts and other financial
services for Venezuelans in Ecuador, among other programs.
USAID's programming supports partner governments to integrate
migrants by providing technical assistance to help them regularize and
link migrants to subnational public services, supporting host countries
and local organizations to reduce xenophobia and increase community
cohesion and social inclusion. Maybe most importantly, USAID supports
the economic integration of migrants, including through job training,
re-certification of professional licenses, foreign credential
verification, small business development, and financial inclusion.
USAID is laser focused on helping migrants access work opportunities
and build livelihoods closer to home so that they are less likely to
embark on the dangerous journey north toward the United States.
Question. Where might we best focus our humanitarian efforts to
better support vulnerable migrants so they reconsider a perilous
overland journey north?
Answer. Humanitarian aid is critical to save lives and ease
people's suffering, but it cannot address the underlying conditions
that caused Venezuela's crisis and led to over 6.8 million people
leaving Venezuela. Only a peaceful, political solution can address the
corruption, failed policies, and economic mismanagement of the Maduro
regime, which are at the root of this crisis.
USAID's humanitarian and development programming teams work
together to provide immediate lifesaving relief to vulnerable
populations while contributing to the sustainable socioeconomic
integration of migrants, which enables migrants to settle in the
countries where they arrive and reduces the need for them to continue
traveling north.
For example, USAID-supported socio-economic integration programming
supports Venezuelans who are living in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Brazil. These ongoing efforts create longer-term employment, stable
housing, and access to legal status, which facilitates the integration
of Venezuelan migrants into these South American communities. In the
immediate term, USAID humanitarian assistance meets basic needs such as
food assistance. This needs-based assistance targets the region's most
vulnerable populations, addressing food needs, and saving lives.
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