[Senate Hearing 117-639]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]








                                                        S. Hrg. 117-639

                ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS VENEZUELA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS



                             SECOND SESSION



                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 15, 2022

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations













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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  






















                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Nichols, Hon. Brian, Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
  Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     6

Escobari, Hon. Marcela, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin 
  America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International 
  Development, Washington, DC....................................     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................     9

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch.........................................    29

Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator 
  Benjamin L. Cardin.............................................    32

Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator 
  Benjamin L. Cardin.............................................    32

Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Marco Rubio............................................    34

Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................    39

Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................    40

                                 (iii)

  

 
                ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS VENEZUELA

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Risch, Rubio, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols, Assistant Administrator 
Escobari, thank you for appearing before us today as we talk 
about United States policy towards Venezuela and a crisis which 
has not only serious consequences for our national security, 
but the stability of our entire hemisphere.
    Three years ago, I walked out on the bridge at the 
Colombia-Venezuela border in Cucuta and I looked out at 
Venezuela and saw firsthand the misery and desperation in 
family after family forced to flee their homeland as if it was 
a building on fire.
    The collapse of a once thriving modern country, a beacon of 
stability in our hemisphere, turned into a failed state, run 
into the ground by Maduro and his thugs.
    Today, the situation is even more dire. Venezuela is the 
epicenter of the second largest refugee and migration crisis in 
the world.
    The Maduro regime has overseen the collapse of the economy, 
taking down with it the country's entire education and health 
care systems. Basic household items are unaffordable for most 
Venezuelans.
    Maduro has weaponized starvation, using it as a political 
tool to drive over 95 percent of the country--over 26 million 
people--below the poverty level. As his regime perpetrates 
crimes against humanity, Maduro traffics cocaine. He enriches 
himself and his kleptocratic buddies. He invites the Russian, 
Cuban, Iranian, and Chinese governments into the country.
    As we review United States policy towards Venezuela we must 
reckon with how in the span of a generation a trusted 
democratic partner has become a mafia state, a criminal 
enterprise that uses brute force to cling to power.
    I want to be clear, this committee believes in diplomacy 
and Congress has long supported and continues to support a 
negotiated solution to Venezuela's crisis, but a one-sided deal 
with a regime that kidnaps American citizens to increase its 
leverage is simply unacceptable.
    Unilateral concessions to a leader that tortures his 
political opponents is unacceptable. It is not the path towards 
a successful negotiation and it is something the Biden 
administration, as well as newly-elected leaders across Latin 
America, should keep in mind because, given Maduro's track 
record, given that he makes Al Capone look tame, there can be 
no return to normality with this regime, not without the 
release of American hostages and Venezuela's political 
prisoners, not without a path to free and fair elections, the 
restoration of human rights, and a return to the rule of law.
    If the regime will not seriously commit to these 
conditions, we will use the power of our peaceful diplomatic 
tools imposing swift and severe consequences on the regime, 
because while Maduro uses the prospects of negotiations to buy 
himself time, the physical and mental health of American 
hostages is deteriorating by hour as is the Venezuelan people's 
hopes for freedom as they face violence, imprisonment, and 
hunger every day.
    Let us not forget that this crisis has forced nearly 7 
million people--we talk about the Ukrainians who have fled and, 
certainly, we are in solidarity with them, but the world hardly 
whispers about the nearly 7 million people who have fled 
Venezuela since 2014.
    Think about that. That says almost as many refugees as the 
entire population of the state of New Jersey. In fact, that is 
more refugees than the combined populations of Idaho, 
Connecticut, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
    Everyone needs to do more to protect Venezuelan refugees 
and migrants across the hemisphere, and the United States 
should be leading the way protecting Venezuelans who are 
already here.
    President Biden's decision to provide Venezuelans with 
temporary protected status last year was the right choice, 
after President Trump only paid lip service to Venezuelan 
Americans, but I am very disappointed that President Biden has 
only provided what was an extension instead of a full 
redesignation, and I have been disappointed by the 
international community's failure to keep up with the severity 
of the humanitarian crisis inside Venezuela.
    It seems when these crises take place in other parts of the 
world, we get people's attention. When it is in the Western 
Hemisphere, we do not. We must all do more.
    Today, I hope to hear the Biden administration's strategy. 
What are you doing to bring home Matthew Heath, members of the 
Citgo 6, and other American hostages?
    What is the Administration doing to raise the price the 
regime pays for taking American hostages? What is the plan to 
tackle this sprawling humanitarian crisis?
    What is your plan to maintain our support for democratic 
actors including, but not limited to interim President Juan 
Guaido and how will you empower them to lead negotiations? What 
is your plan B if negotiations fail or never even seriously 
start?
    When I authored the bipartisan VERDAD Act with many on this 
committee joining as co-sponsors I was hopeful for a diplomatic 
solution, but Venezuela's crisis endures and that is why I will 
be introducing the VERDAD Expansion Act in the coming weeks, 
comprehensive new legislation to tighten the screws on the 
regime.
    It defines U.S. policy on Venezuela's political crisis. It 
guides humanitarian assistance. It addresses the Maduro 
regime's malfeasance, and it sends a message to the Venezuelan 
opposition, to Venezuelan refugees, and to the Venezuelan 
community here in the United States that we stand with them in 
their effort to build a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic 
Venezuela.
    With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator 
Risch, for his opening statement.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The political, humanitarian, and economic crisis provoked 
by Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela are among the worst 
pressing national security concerns in the Western Hemisphere.
    Since 2013, Maduro has dramatically deepened relations with 
the most dangerous forces in the world. On his watch, Cuba, 
Russia, China, Iran, and transnational criminal organizations 
have turned Venezuela into their playground and are using their 
presence to expand their reach throughout Latin America.
    Russian exports of sophisticated military technologies and 
repressive practices of the Maduro regime are a growing threat 
to the security of Colombia and stability of northern South 
America.
    Venezuela's $62 billion debt to China is a formidable 
challenge to its sovereignty, and its adoption of 
telecommunication technologies developed and controlled by 
firms vulnerable to pressure by the Chinese Communist Party 
undermines privacy and human rights.
    A series of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to end Maduro's 
illegitimate regime, compounded by his ability to stay in power 
through violence, have emboldened the regime and left 
Venezuelan democratic forces facing daunting challenges.
    Unfortunately, the Biden administration has squandered the 
position of strength it inherited from the previous 
administration, which was a campaign of maximum and 
multilateral pressure on the Maduro regime.
    In 2020, candidate Biden promised the use of multilateral 
pressure and smart sanctions to stop the Maduro regime and 
transition to free and fair elections.
    Instead, the Administration is pursuing flawed and 
incoherent efforts which strengthen the Maduro regime and its 
criminal network, exacerbate the already horrific humanitarian 
crisis, and allow malign actors like China, Russia, and Iran to 
continue interfering in our hemisphere, putting American lives 
at risk.
    Nearly 2 years in the Administration has not sanctioned a 
single entity or individual tied to the Maduro regime, and the 
European Union has failed to match existing U.S. and Canadian 
sanctions.
    In fact, the Administration is conceding to the Maduro 
regime by easing sanctions without any concrete progress 
towards democratic order.
    I say these things not to start a partisan brawl. I think 
it is time to look forward, and I think the chairman and I are 
in full agreement that it is time to do things differently than 
what we have done in the past.
    It is past time we reassert American leadership in our 
hemisphere. The Administration should reverse course and 
increase pressure on the Maduro regime and its enablers until 
unjustly-detained Americans and political hostages are released 
and the conditions are right to conduct free and fair elections 
in Venezuela.
    Over 10 unlawfully-detained Americans languish in 
Venezuelan prisons and detention sites. I urge the 
Administration to prioritize North American energy production 
and infrastructure, persuade our European allies to promptly 
match U.S. and Canadian sanctions on the Maduro regime, conduct 
robust freedom of navigation and counter narcotic operations 
targeting the Maduro regime's transnational criminal 
activities, and enhance the capacity of democratic countries in 
the region to confront the humanitarian and security crisis his 
regime is generating.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on whether and 
how the Biden administration plans to recommit to meaningful 
policies that address the security threat emanating from 
Venezuela, and I fully agree with the description of the dire 
situation that the chairman has laid out. I am anxious to hear 
how we can all work together to try to move this forward.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    We will turn to our witnesses.
    We are pleased to welcome the Honorable Brian Nichols back 
on the 1-year anniversary of his tenure as Assistant Secretary 
of State for the Western Hemisphere.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols previously served as U.S. 
Ambassador to Zimbabwe and Peru, was the Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs. Also serves as the deputy Chief of 
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Colombia. Welcome back.
    It is also a pleasure to have the Honorable Marcela 
Escobari, Assistant Administrator for USAID's Bureau for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, as a witness for today's hearing.
    During her prior tenure in this position under the Obama 
administration, she was responsible for preparing a proactive 
strategy to confront the political and humanitarian crisis in 
Venezuela.
    She has also served as a senior fellow at Brookings and as 
Executive Director for the Center for International Development 
at Harvard University. Welcome back to you as well.
    We will start off with you, Mr. Secretary.
    As to both of you, your full statements will be included in 
the record, without objection. We would ask you to summarize 
them in 5 minutes or so so that members of the committee can 
have a conversation with you.
    Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.

  STATEMENT OF THE HON. BRIAN NICHOLS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today on this important 
issue.
    The situation in Venezuela remains one of the worst crises 
in our hemisphere's history. A country with a proud democratic 
tradition, blessed with natural resources and a rich 
biodiversity, and with a vibrant and resourceful population has 
suffered decades of misery.
    Venezuela's vital sectors--health care, energy, 
agriculture, manufacturing, and education--have all, but 
collapsed. It holds the world's largest proven oil reserves yet 
it does not even feature in the world's top 20 oil-producing 
countries.
    Whole tracts of its rich biodiversity have been destroyed 
by illegal mining and logging. Its lawless border regions 
provide shelter to myriad illegal actors, not the least of 
which are narco terrorists who threaten its population and its 
neighbors.
    Because more than 90 percent of its people live in poverty, 
Venezuela has lost 20 percent of its population to the largest 
displacement of people in our hemisphere's history. Six point 
eight million Venezuelans have fled their homes in the last 5 
years, approaching similar exoduses from Ukraine and Syria.
    The U.N. Human Rights Commissioner lists a litany of 
abuses, illegal detentions, and even killings and torture. In 
two reports, the independent international fact-finding mission 
on Venezuela documented extrajudicial executions, enforced 
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, trafficking in persons, 
torture, cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment, including 
sexual and gender-based violence committed by Venezuelan state 
actors.
    Beyond the abuses the regime inflicts on its own 
population, it also wrongfully jails and abuses U.S. citizens, 
attempting to use them as bargaining chips with the United 
States.
    As I underscored during my testimony earlier this year 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the responsibility 
for the crisis in Venezuela falls squarely on the shoulders of 
the late Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro.
    The U.S. Government remains firmly committed to the belief 
that Venezuelans have a right to democracy and deserve a 
government of their choosing that protects and defends their 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
    We have a role and a responsibility to empower Venezuelans 
as they work to resolve the many regime-created crises facing 
their nation and to, once again, choose their government 
through free and fair elections.
    The United States continues to recognize and support the 
interim presidency of Juan Guaido and the 2015 democratically-
elected National Assembly, the last truly democratic exercise 
of popular will in Venezuela.
    We coordinate closely with President Guaido and his 
administration, the Unitary Platform, and those in and outside 
of Venezuela who support the return to democracy in their 
homeland.
    Consistent with the VERDAD Act, we continue supporting a 
negotiated solution out of Venezuela's crisis. In a call on 
June 8, President Guaido and President Biden expressed their 
support for Venezuelan-led negotiations as the best path 
forward toward a peaceful restoration of democratic 
institutions, free and fair elections, and respect for human 
rights and the freedoms of all Venezuelans.
    The Administration's visits to Venezuela earlier this year 
resulted in renewed meetings and negotiations between the 
regime and the opposition in both Oslo and Caracas. Those 
visits also achieved the return of two wrongfully-detained 
Americans.
    The safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas is of the 
utmost importance and we will always support the efforts of the 
President's Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs to bring all 
wrongfully-detained Americans in Venezuela home.
    U.S. sanctions policy will continue to exert pressure on 
the Maduro regime while providing ample room for humanitarian 
relief, including our own commitment of over $2 billion since 
2017.
    As we have previously made clear, we will review our 
sanctions policies in response to constructive steps by the 
Maduro regime. The U.S. Government, in coordination with 
allies, will also pursue criminals and fugitives and interdict 
criminal activity associated with the regime.
    The seizure of an Iranian Venezuelan jet in the Southern 
Cone and the extradition of a regime money launderer from Cape 
Verde are but two examples of our tireless campaign to seek 
accountability and justice wherever criminals may hide.
    We will continue to relentlessly pursue accountability for 
all actors that engage in corruption or abuse human rights in 
Venezuela. We also seek humane treatment and freedom for 
Venezuelan political prisoners.
    The United States maintained relations and friendship with 
Venezuela for nearly 200 years. Now the Maduro regime looks to 
Russia, the People's Republic of China, and Iran for political 
and economic partnerships that bring few benefits to the 
Venezuelan people and threaten regional security.
    We will continue working with our international partners to 
help return Venezuela to the community of democracies and 
improve the lives of all Venezuelans and we will continue to 
work with Congress in advancing these goals.
    Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the committee 
today and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Brian A. Nichols

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 
today on this important issue.
    The situation in Venezuela remains one of the worst crises in our 
hemisphere's history. A country with a proud democratic tradition, 
blessed with natural resources and a rich biodiversity, and with a 
vibrant and resourceful population, has suffered decades of misery.
    Venezuela's vital sectors--healthcare, energy, agriculture, 
manufacturing, and education--have all but collapsed. It holds the 
world's largest proven oil reserves yet does not even feature among the 
world's top-20 oil-producing countries. Whole tracts of its rich 
biodiversity have been destroyed by illegal mining and logging. Its 
lawless border regions provide shelter to myriad illegal actors, not 
least narcoterrorists, who threaten its population and neighbors.
    Because more than 90 percent of its people live in poverty, 
Venezuela has lost nearly 20 percent of its population to the largest 
displacement of people in our hemisphere's history. Six point eight 
million Venezuelans have fled their homes in the last 5 years, 
approaching similar exodus from Ukraine and Syria.
    The UN Human Rights Commissioner lists a litany of abuses, illegal 
detentions, and even killings and torture. In two reports, the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela documented 
extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary 
detentions, torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
including sexual and gender-based violence, committed by Venezuelan 
state actors. Beyond the abuses the regime inflicts on its own 
population, it also wrongfully jails and abuses U.S. citizens, 
attempting to use them as bargaining chips with the United States.
    As I underscored during my testimony earlier this year before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, the responsibility for the crisis in 
Venezuela falls squarely on the shoulders of the late Hugo Chavez and 
Nicolas Maduro.
    The U.S. Government remains firmly committed to the belief that 
Venezuelans have a right to democracy and deserve a government of their 
choosing that protects and defends their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. We have a role and a responsibility to empower Venezuelans as 
they work to resolve the many regime-created crises facing their 
nation, and to once again choose their government through free and fair 
elections.
    The United States continues to recognize and support the interim 
Presidency of Juan Guaido and the 2015 democratically elected National 
Assembly, the last truly democratic exercise of popular will in 
Venezuela. We coordinate closely with President Guaido and his 
administration, the Unitary Platform, and those in and outside 
Venezuela who support the return of democracy to their homeland.
    Consistent with the VERDAD Act, we continue supporting a negotiated 
solution out of Venezuela's crisis. In a call on June 8, President 
Guaido and President Biden expressed their support for Venezuelan-led 
negotiations as the best path toward a peaceful restoration of 
democratic institutions, free and fair elections, and respect for the 
human rights and freedoms of all Venezuelans.
    The Administration's visits to Venezuela earlier this year resulted 
in renewed meetings and negotiations between the regime and the 
opposition, in both Oslo and Caracas. Those visits also achieved the 
return of two wrongfully detained Americans--the safety and security of 
U.S. citizens overseas is of the utmost importance and we will always 
support the efforts of the President's Special Envoy for Hostage 
Affairs to bring all wrongfully detained Americans in Venezuela home.
    U.S. sanctions policy will continue to exert pressure on the Maduro 
regime, while providing ample room for humanitarian relief, including 
our own commitment of over $2 billion since 2017. As we have previously 
made clear, we will review our sanctions policies in response to 
constructive steps by the Maduro regime. The U.S. Government, in 
coordination with allies, will also pursue criminals and fugitives, and 
interdict criminal activity associated with the regime. The seizure of 
an Iranian-Venezuelan jet in the southern cone, and the extradition of 
a regime money launder from Cape Verde, are but two examples of our 
tireless campaign to seek accountability and justice wherever criminals 
may hide. We will continue to relentlessly pursue accountability for 
all actors that engage in corruption or abuse human rights in 
Venezuela. We also seek humane treatment and freedom for Venezuelan 
political prisoners.
    The United States maintained relations and friendship with 
Venezuela for nearly 200 years. Now, the Maduro regime looks to Russia, 
the Peoples' Republic of China, and Iran for political and economic 
partnerships that bring few benefits to the Venezuelan people and 
threaten regional stability.
    We will continue working with our international partners to help 
return Venezuela to the community of democracies and improve the lives 
of all Venezuelans. And we will continue to work with Congress in 
advancing these goals.
    Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the Committee today and 
I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Administrator Escobari.

       STATEMENT OF THE HON. MARCELA ESCOBARI, ASSISTANT 
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. 
      AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Escobari. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today.
    Venezuela's humanitarian crisis is a manmade disaster and 
the Venezuelan people's suffering is a direct result of the 
corruption, failed policies, and the repression of the Maduro 
regime.
    USAID responds to the Venezuelan crisis every day. We 
provide humanitarian assistance to those in the country and 
those forced to flee. We support the integration of Venezuelan 
migrants into neighboring countries and we provide support for 
a peaceful democratic transition.
    The regime seems to be betting that with most Venezuelans 
too focused on feeding their families to protest, that it can 
outlast the international community and improve its image.
    We cannot let that happen and we must retain a sense of 
urgency. Let me share what we see on the ground and how USAID 
is responding.
    On the economic front, Maduro's mismanagement has led to 
the worst collapse in the region's history, a contraction of 
over 86 percent of GDP in the last decade.
    The distortions to the economy have made Venezuela the most 
unequal country in the Americas. The monthly pension is 
equivalent to just 50 cents a day, while prices are similar to 
those in the U.S., given the de facto dollarization.
    Most people cannot afford basic medications, which has led 
to a rise in preventable diseases, infant mortality, and 
malnutrition across the country. No wonder millions of 
Venezuelans see leaving the country as their only option.
    This massive out migration of now 6.8 million Venezuelans 
continues to grow. To put this in perspective, nearly one in 
four Venezuelans have migrated since 2014. This is tearing 
families apart and it is also placing tremendous pressure on 
Venezuela's neighbors, who are still trying to dig out from the 
pandemic.
    On the governance side, Maduro is ramping up his repression 
and has sealed off virtually every opportunity for citizens to 
exercise their basic rights.
    In the face of this dire context, USAID focuses on two 
levels--on exerting as much pressure as possible on the regime 
and providing as much relief as possible to the Venezuelan 
people.
    The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to 
Venezuela and has provided $1.9 billion in the last 5 years. 
Our assistance inside Venezuela is managed end-to-end by 
independent organizations and it does not bolster the Maduro 
regime.
    USAID also provides humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans 
throughout the region and helps partner nations to integrate 
Venezuelans into their countries.
    Colombia is the most notable example, and we have worked 
hand-in-hand with Colombia to implement its historic decision 
to provide temporary protected status to 2.4 million 
Venezuelans. We know that successful integration can turn this 
human tragedy into an engine of growth in the region.
    Our humanitarian work is saving lives, yet we know that 
only through a democratic transition can Venezuelans build a 
more prosperous country, restore institutions, and reunite 
their families. To that end, USAID supports a return to 
democracy in three ways.
    One, we hold the regime accountable for its abuses. USAID 
supports human rights defenders that courageously document the 
regime's repression and advocate for political prisoners and 
their families.
    Evidence gathered by these groups has been used by the U.N. 
fact-finding mission and the International Criminal Court. 
Because there is no independent justice system in Venezuela, 
international bodies are the only hope for holding the regime 
accountable as evidence of crimes against humanity continues to 
mount.
    USAID also supports journalists and independent media to 
counter the regime's disinformation.
    Second, we work to improve electoral conditions with a 
focus on the 2024 elections. We expect the regime may subvert 
the elections, but the Venezuelan people want elections, the 
opposition has decided to participate, and we saw in last 
year's local elections, including the governor's race in 
Barinas, that a unified opposition can compete and win even 
when Maduro cheats.
    Third, USAID continues to support the interim government of 
Venezuela and the opposition. A unified opposition and a 
mobilized citizenry are the best hope for creating democratic 
change.
    USAID will continue to stand with the courageous people of 
Venezuela as they fight to end repression, restore democracy, 
and build a better future for themselves and their families.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Escobari follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Ms. Marcela Escobari

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members 
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on USAID's 
work and discuss our vision for a free and democratic future in 
Venezuela.
    Venezuela's humanitarian crisis is a man-made disaster, and the 
Venezuelan people's continued suffering is a direct result of the 
corruption, incompetence, failed policies, and repression of the Maduro 
regime. Despite the pressure from democratic nations and the Venezuelan 
people, the regime has doubled down on its security apparatus and 
enriching cronies. Maduro seems to be betting that, with most 
Venezuelans too focused on feeding their families to protest, he can 
outlast the international community and whitewash his image.
    We must retain a sense of urgency and sharp awareness of the human 
toll of this man-made tragedy. And we must use our diplomatic and 
economic tools to support the Venezuelan people and their desire for a 
democratic transition.
    USAID responds to the Venezuelan crisis every day. First, we 
provide humanitarian assistance to those in the country and to those 
who flee--often at great personal risk--to escape the regime. Second, 
we support the integration of Venezuelans into host communities to 
minimize the potentially destabilizing impact of this crisis on the 
rest of the region.
    And third, we provide support for a peaceful democratic transition. 
We draw attention to the regime's criminal behavior to mobilize the 
international community, to hold the regime accountable for its crimes, 
provide alternatives to regime disinformation, and to provide 
Venezuelans with an avenue for justice. We seek the revival of 
Venezuelan democracy and support citizens' democratic aspirations, 
including their fight for free and fair elections, with a focus on 
presidential elections in 2024.
 economic crisis: maduro's mismanagement has led to the worst economic 
                  contraction in the region's history
    The Maduro regime is responsible for the country's economic 
implosion. According to the IMF, Venezuela's economy contracted from 
$352.2 billion in 2012 to $46.5 billion in 2021, a decline of 86.8 
percent.\1\ Even if the economy were to grow by the regime's estimate 
of 10 percent in 2022--and that is unlikely--the decline would still be 
85.5 percent. Not only is Venezuela's economic contraction without 
comparison in modern history, but Maduro has managed to destroy almost 
all lawful sources of value creation. As much as 21 percent of 
Venezuela's GDP is generated by criminal activity like smuggling, 
corruption, and black markets.\2\
    The distortions to the economy caused by the Maduro regime have 
also led to the most unequal country in the Americas.\3\ Recent GDP 
gains are concentrated among the wealthy while the number of vulnerable 
people in need of humanitarian assistance has increased from 7 million 
in 2020 \4\ to 7.7 million today.\5\ The regime's decision to stop 
enforcing many import and exchange controls and the de facto 
dollarization of the Caracas economy have benefitted its criminal 
allies and portions of Venezuela's private sector, but most Venezuelans 
continue to see their purchasing power decline in the face of rising 
costs and an inadequate supply of electricity, water, and health 
services.
    Jobs are scarce. Venezuela has the lowest level of labor 
participation in the entire region--only 53.8 percent of people of 
working age participate in the labor market, of which 60 percent are in 
the informal sector. Nearly 9 million Venezuelans between 15 and 64 
years of age are without work.\6\
    In this de facto dollarized economy, where prices are similar to 
those in the U.S., health care workers, teachers, and others without 
access to dollars are the ones who suffer. The monthly pension is 130 
Bolivares, equivalent to just about 50 cents a day.\7\ A defunct health 
system and high inflation mean that most people cannot afford the cost 
of basic medications, leading to a rise of preventable diseases. The 
infant mortality rate has risen to a level not seen in 30 years; and in 
a survey conducted in Venezuela's poorest neighborhoods, 42 percent of 
children showed signs of stunting or wasting, an indication of a 
growing crisis of malnutrition across the country.\8\ No wonder 
millions of Venezuelans see leaving the country as their only option.
   migration crisis: massive out-migration will continue, pressuring 
                         venezuela's neighbors
    The Maduro regime has generated a humanitarian crisis that has 
inflicted tremendous costs and instability throughout the region. The 
mass exodus of more than 6.8 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants 
since 2014 is second only to the 7 million who have left an active war 
in Ukraine.\9\ There are nearly 2.5 million Venezuelan refugees and 
migrants residing in Colombia alone.\10\ With the entire region 
recovering from an economic contraction caused by the pandemic, refugee 
and migrant populations can become an easy scapegoat for growing 
resentment and frustration. The international community cannot relent 
in the face of the Venezuelan crisis given the prospect of continued 
migration flows, and the human suffering it represents.
    The Maduro regime is the root cause of the Venezuelan migrant 
crisis. So long as Maduro continues to undermine all democratic 
institutions and exert full control over the population, the outflow 
will continue. Yet, the Maduro regime continues to exert control over a 
weakened population and undermine all democratic institutions.
  governance crisis: the maduro regime continues to instill fear and 
        repression, while cutting off avenues for accountability
    The Maduro regime is characterized by coercion, corruption, and 
censorship. Maduro has sealed off virtually every opportunity for 
citizens to exercise their basic rights by continuing Chavez' work of 
co-opting democratic institutions like the courts and electoral 
council; persecuting political opponents and civil society leaders; 
muzzling the media; and controlling the military and police through 
bribery, surveillance, and arbitrary arrests. Since 2014, the regime 
has locked up over 15,000 political prisoners and 11 of them have died 
in state custody. In 2021 alone, regime security forces carried out 
1,414 extrajudicial executions.\11\ Currently, there are 245 political 
prisoners in Venezuela. These prisoners are denied due process and, in 
many cases, subjected to torture. The United States welcomes the 
opening of an investigation by the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court into crimes against humanity in Venezuela, which is a 
State Party to the Rome Statute. Evidence of such crimes--compiled by 
the OAS Panel of Independent Experts, the UN Fact Finding Mission, and 
Venezuelan human rights defenders--continues to mount, and the Maduro 
regime must be held to account.
    Bottom line: the situation is dire, and conditions for Venezuelans 
continue to deteriorate. The combination of worsening humanitarian 
conditions on the ground, massive migrant flows into the region and a 
hardened regime call us to redouble our efforts to address the 
Venezuelan crisis.
       usaid response: our commitment is to the venezuelan people
    USAID's resolve remains strong. Our work focuses on promoting 
democracy, human dignity, and basic freedoms, and on delivering 
humanitarian support to those most in need. We will continue to stand 
with the people of Venezuela in their pursuit of justice and 
prosperity.
    humanitarian assistance inside venezuela: since 2018, usaid has 
 provided over $315 million in humanitarian assistance inside venezuela
    First, we will continue to provide humanitarian relief inside 
Venezuela. U.S. assistance is managed end-to-end by humanitarian 
organizations and is not bolstering the Maduro regime. USAID and other 
donors are working with a strong and committed humanitarian community 
in Venezuela. We work in close coordination with the UN and NGOs that 
are providing life-saving hot meals in community kitchens; food kits to 
vulnerable households in communities and schools; health care through 
mobile units; including the prevention and treatment of acute 
malnutrition, and guidance to mothers on healthy feeding practices.
    Our assistance relies on the expertise of Venezuelan organizations 
that know their country best and understand where the needs are 
greatest.
    The United States is the largest humanitarian donor for Venezuela 
and in FY21 alone, USAID provided $138 million in humanitarian 
assistance for Venezuela. But we know the need is far greater than what 
we provide. Only 14 percent of the United Nations' 2022 request for 
Venezuela has been filled.\12\ We will continue to work with other 
donors to increase total commitments from the international community.
     regional support for venezuelans: usaid provides support for 
 venezuelans in transit and helps them integrate into host communities
    Second, USAID will continue our humanitarian support for 
Venezuelans throughout the region and will step up our work on the 
integration of Venezuelans into host communities.
    Humanitarian assistance is the first thing a Venezuelan encounter 
when they cross into a neighboring country, often in a precarious and 
vulnerable state. Venezuelans walking from the border town of Cucuta, 
in Colombia, to Lima, Peru is the equivalent of walking from New York 
to Utah. USAID provides meals and cash transfers that have proved life-
saving.
    As Venezuelans begin to integrate into host communities, they are 
desperate to earn a living and provide for their loved ones. In an 
effort to manage these dramatic flows, several countries have adopted 
generous policies that welcome Venezuelans and incorporate them into 
the labor force. Colombia has led the way with its decision last year 
to provide temporary protected status (TPS) to more than 2.4 million 
Venezuelans. Migrants who are successfully integrated can access the 
health system, can send their kids to school, are accountable to the 
justice system, and can get jobs. They pay taxes and contribute to the 
economic and social fabric of their host communities.
    USAID is committed to working with Venezuela's neighbors to help 
them shoulder the high and unanticipated costs of attending to almost 6 
million Venezuelans and turning migration into an engine of growth. In 
Colombia, for example, we have worked alongside the government and the 
private sector to register Venezuelans and connect them to social 
services and jobs. In Peru and Ecuador, USAID support focuses on 
helping migrants gain legal status and enter the formal labor market.
    One of my top priorities as Assistant Administrator is to help 
advance a more cohesive, regional approach to migration. This approach 
involves three parallel strategies: addressing the root causes driving 
people to leave their homes; expanding legal labor pathways for 
migrants; and promoting sustainable integration of migrants into host 
communities. We saw progress toward this vision at the Summit of the 
Americas, where 21 countries supported the Los Angeles Declaration on 
Migration and Protection and many announced concrete commitments to 
address migration in a more humane, safe, and orderly way. We applaud 
and support the Government of Ecuador's new registration process for 
all migrants, including the over 500,000 Venezuelans in Ecuador, that 
paves the way to their regularization. Implementing policies that allow 
migrants to live and work in the countries where they arrive isn't just 
virtuous; it's also smart policy. Colombia's GDP is predicted to grow 
by $2.5 billion over the next decade as a result of the TPS 
program.\13\ Pro-integration policies have the potential to turn this 
human tragedy into an economic boon for host communities by leveraging 
migrants' talent, determination and creativity.
    Successful integration of Venezuelans will require sustained 
investment, policy harmonization and regional coordination. Despite 
around 20 percent of Venezuela's population having already fled the 
country, the net outflow will continue as long as, based on income, 
more than 94.5 percent live in poverty.\14\ While humanitarian aid and 
the potential use of frozen assets can provide critically needed short-
term assistance in Venezuela, in the long run a democratic transition 
away from kleptocracy, intimidation, and ineptitude is the only 
sustainable path.
    support toward a democratic transition: usaid helps venezuelans 
              reassert control over their country's future
    While we believe deeply in our humanitarian work and our support 
for integrating Venezuelans into host communities in South America, we 
know that these efforts are addressing symptoms of Venezuela's crisis 
and not the root cause. Our central goal is to help Venezuelans restore 
their democracy and reclaim control over their country's future.
    USAID will work in three areas to promote opposition unity and 
press for improved electoral conditions.
    First, USAID will continue to provide support to the Interim 
Government of Venezuela and the Venezuelan opposition. USAID assists 
the democratic opposition as they work to turn the public's widespread 
resentment toward the Maduro regime into pressure for democratic 
change. The opposition has chosen primaries as the vehicle to reunify 
and regain momentum, and USAID will support them in that process. The 
2021 subnational elections revealed the value of competing even in 
unfree elections. Despite the Maduro regime employing its usual tactics 
to manipulate the electoral playing field, non-regime candidates won a 
majority of the overall vote. In the state of Barinas, the opposition 
won the governor's election twice by remaining unified, ultimately 
defeating Maduro loyalist Jorge Arreaza by an even wider margin than it 
had won the original election in November. With 75 percent of 
Venezuelans planning to vote in presidential elections regardless of 
the conditions,\15\ there is a real potential for change.
    Second, USAID supports democratic civil society and independent 
media organizations in holding the regime accountable. USAID supports 
the generation and wide dissemination of unbiased, fact-based 
information to help citizens make sense of the man-made catastrophe 
unfolding in their country, where disinformation and lies are the 
currency of the regime. These efforts increase public scrutiny on the 
regime and expose ways in which it uses electoral institutions to push 
its advantage. The world would know much less about the scope and scale 
of the regime's neglect and malfeasance, if not for the work of 
watchdog and media organizations supported by USAID.
    USAID will also continue to support human rights defenders that 
tirelessly document the regime's repression, advocate for political 
prisoners and their families, and--in the absence of an independent and 
functioning justice system--are obliged to seek recourse outside the 
country. Human rights organizations are providing verifiable data, 
evidence and fact patterns to international organizations like the 
United Nations Fact Finding Mission and the International Criminal 
Court, so that they can unmask the pariah regime's crimes against 
humanity and seek to hold it accountable.
    We are focused on presidential elections in 2024 and legislative 
and regional elections in 2025 as windows of opportunity for 
Venezuelans to advance a peaceful transition. We have no illusions 
about the prospects for free and fair elections and we are preparing 
for the possibility that the regime could subvert, postpone, cancel, or 
not recognize the results of elections. But the Venezuelan people want 
elections, the opposition has collectively decided to participate, and 
preparing for and participating in elections is a way for the 
opposition to rebuild unity and regain momentum. Constitutionally 
required elections are a problem for Maduro: If he goes too far in 
preventing a competitive process, he further erodes the international 
legitimacy he so desperately craves. A unified opposition and mobilized 
citizenry are currently the best hope for regaining the upper hand and 
increasing the pressure for Maduro and his cronies.
    Overcoming Venezuela's humanitarian and migration crises is only 
possible via a democratic transition. We remain fully committed to 
using U.S. foreign assistance so generously appropriated by this 
Congress to relentlessly pursue that goal.
    USAID stands with the courageous people of Venezuela as they press 
on to end repression and man-made suffering, restore dignity and 
democracy, and build a better future for themselves and their children.

----------------
Notes

    \1\ https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/VEN#countrydata; GDP, current 
prices (Billions of U.S. dollars)
    \2\ Transparency Venezuela: https://transparenciave.org/economias-
ilicitas/a estimate
    \3\ Venezuela's GINI coefficient is 56.7 percent. https://
www.proyectoencovi.com/encovi-2021
    \4\ https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/venezuela-bolivarian-
republic-crisis-response-plan-2020
    \5\ https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/venezuela-bolivarian-
republic-crisis-response-plan-2022
    \6\ https://thinkanova.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ANOVA-Policy-
Brief-Notas-Sobre-Distribucio%CC%81n-1.pdf
    \7\ https://efectococuyo.com/la-humanidad/condenados-a-muerte-
temprana-pension/
    \8\ https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2021.638042/
full
    \9\ https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine
    \10\ Distribucion de Venezolanos en Colombia, Migracion Colombia, 
February 2022; https://www.r4v.info/sites/default/files/2022-08/
2022.08.R4V_R%26M_Map_Eng%28note%29.pdf
    \11\ https://lupaporlavida.org/informe-ano-2021-lupa-por-la-vida/
    \12\ https://app.powerbi.com/
view?r=eyJrIjoiZmE0MTNkNWUtYjYwOC00ZDI0LT
kyYjgtMWVlYmNiMjAyNTU1IiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBj
LTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9&pageName=ReportSectione4e3bdbea6d35032e8f1
    \13\ https://www.elespectador.com/mundo/america/registro-de-
migrantes-del-estatuto-temporal-arranco-con-fuerza/
    \14\ https://assets.website-files.com/5d14c6a5c4ad42a4e794d0f7/
6153ad6fb92e4428cada4fb7_
Presentacion%20ENCOVI%202021%20V1.pdf
    \15\ https://elestimulo.com/destacados/2022-05-28/jose-virtuoso-75-
de-los-venezolanos-quiere-votar-en-unas-presidenciales/

    The Chairman. Thank you both. We will start our series of 
rounds of questions.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols, I believe clarity is needed on 
the Administration's policies regarding efforts towards 
negotiations, the lifting and potential snapback of sanctions, 
and the stewardship of Venezuelan state assets in the United 
States.
    The Administration has lifted targeted sanctions on one of 
Maduro's henchmen, provided a license to Chevron, comfort 
letters to European oil companies Repsol and Eni.
    However, as far as I can discern, Maduro has not made any 
meaningful concessions or concrete step to return to 
negotiations in Mexico City.
    As Congress' support for a negotiated solution in Venezuela 
is neither a blank check nor an open-ended invitation, I would 
like to ask does the Administration intend to make any more 
changes to U.S. sanctions absent specific irreversible steps by 
Maduro?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Our focus is upon returning the parties to formal 
negotiations. We have been engaged actively to promote that.
    We coordinate closely with the interim government and the 
broad opposition, the Unitary Platform, in Venezuela. The 
efforts so far have led to multiple rounds of informal 
negotiations both in Oslo and Caracas and significant advances 
toward a return to a formal process in Mexico City.
    The Chairman. How long we are going to wait for a formal 
process to take place? He is buying time. He is taking gold out 
of the country. He is letting our adversaries actively engage 
in the Western Hemisphere through Venezuela.
    How long are we going to--he has got U.S. citizens held 
hostage. How long are we going to tolerate that? How long is 
this aspiration to get to some formal negotiations going to 
take place?
    Mr. Nichols. Nicolas Maduro is going to--is making a 
critical mistake if he thinks that our patience is infinite and 
that dilatory tactics will serve him well.
    We stand ready to snap back sanctions and ready to take 
comprehensive measures if this process does not move forward.
    The Chairman. How long will the U.S. wait before snapping 
back changes to sanctions?
    Mr. Nichols. We consult very closely with the interim 
government and the Unitary Platform, as well as our allies in 
Europe, the U.K., and Canada, as well as in the region on our 
collective approach to Venezuela.
    We had a meeting just yesterday. I was traveling back from 
Mexico. My deputy led that conversation with key allies on this 
process and we will be informed by the views of the interim 
government and the Unitary Platform, as well as our partners 
and allies around the region.
    The Chairman. Okay. That does not give me any sense of 
our--is our patience infinite or is it finite? You do not give 
me any sense of it. It has already taken quite a long time.
    In the interim, he has turned the nation into a narco 
state, bilking it of its national patrimony and nothing is 
happening. Nothing is happening.
    If Maduro refuses to negotiate in good faith or even 
negotiate at all, what is your plan B to degrade the regime?
    Mr. Nichols. We will use the various tools that you have 
given us--sanctions, law enforcement action. We will work with 
our partners and allies around the world to ensure that the 
regime does not secure access to assets that are currently 
frozen or held by the interim government.
    We will work assiduously to promote investigations by the 
international fact-finding mission and other international 
bodies like the ICC into the events to shed light on what is 
going on in Venezuela, and we will----
    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, our sanctions are like a 
sieve. We are allowing a whole host of countries to get around 
our sanctions and Maduro knows it--Turkey, Russia, China. They 
are doing it with impunity--of course, Cuba, which provides the 
security apparatus for the whole Maduro regime to exist in the 
first place.
    You talk about independent investigations. The U.N. Human 
Rights Council established an independent fact-finding mission 
on Venezuela 2019.
    That mission played a central role in investigating and 
documenting the Maduro regime's systematic violations of 
international law, including extrajudicial executions, forced 
disappearances, torture, arbitrary detention, but there is much 
more to be done.
    Mr. Secretary, the fact-finding mission and others have 
mounted damning evidence that the Maduro regime has committed 
grave human rights abuses that constitute crimes against 
humanity.
    Is it your assessment the regime has committed crimes 
against humanity?
    Mr. Nichols. The United Nations, the OAS, a large number of 
nongovernmental organizations focused on human rights, have all 
said that the regime has committed crimes against humanity. I 
think that is the international consensus.
    The Chairman. Yes. Is that our consensus as well?
    Mr. Nichols. That is a----
    The Chairman. That is what others said. I agree with that.
    Mr. Nichols. Yes.
    The Chairman. What do we say?
    Mr. Nichols. I think the facts of the offenses of this 
regime are undeniable and I point to those others. The 
definition of crimes against humanity, as far as I know, is not 
codified in U.S. statute.
    It is clear that they have committed all of these actions 
and that the key international bodies of the United Nations and 
the OAS consider them responsible for crimes against humanity. 
If you ask me my personal opinion, my personal opinion is they 
have committed crimes against humanity.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    In April of 2020, the prior administration proposed a 
formal democratic transition framework to facilitate a peaceful 
negotiated return to democracy in Venezuela.
    What is this Administration's view of that framework? Have 
you abandoned that? Embraced it? Ignored it? Where are you on 
that?
    Mr. Nichols. We continue to view a priority maintaining 
international cohesion and pressure on the Maduro regime, 
working with allies to deny the regime access to diplomatic 
benefits and economic benefits, to work to support the interim 
government and the Unitary Platform as they seek to forge a 
path toward a free fair election in 2024.
    We believe that we should use all of the tools available to 
achieve that goal and we will continue to do that.
    Senator Risch. Is that your interpretation of how you are 
implementing this transition framework or is that off the 
table? The transition framework itself, is it off the table?
    Mr. Nichols. We continue to work with the interim 
government. I think that the structure of the interim 
government has changed over time and the range of recognition 
of the government and the status over time has also changed.
    We need to adapt our policies to continue to move forward 
so that serious, profound, and irreversible reforms are 
undertaken to allow for a free, fair, transparent election in 
2024.
    Senator Risch. I keep coming back to the framework, but you 
have not answered the question yet. Are there parts of it that 
you have embraced? Parts of it you have abandoned?
    How is your--are you following the same path as what this 
framework laid out or are you doing things different than what 
the framework laid out?
    Compare what you are doing to the framework that was put 
forth in April of 2020.
    Mr. Nichols. The framework put forward in April of 2020, I 
think, imagined a scenario where the regime would collapse. We 
are not seeing--we have not seen that over time.
    The diplomatic recognition of the regime has grown during 
that period. More countries now recognize the Maduro regime 
than they did previously and we have to adapt our strategy to 
take those factors into account.
    Senator Risch. Let me try a different line here.
    In February of this year, 2022, a senior White House 
official claimed the sanctions imposed on Russia for invading 
Ukraine were designed to pressure the Maduro regime. I do not 
understand that, but that was the claim.
    A week later that same official met with Maduro in Caracas 
in an attempt to buy oil from Venezuela and soon thereafter the 
Administration started to ease sanctions on the regime.
    Can you explain to us how the Administration plans to 
pressure Maduro while deepening U.S. reliance on Venezuela?
    Mr. Nichols. Venezuelan hydrocarbons are not entering the 
United States, to my knowledge. I do not think our reliance on 
Venezuela has increased.
    The visit to Venezuela by Special Presidential Envoy for 
Hostage Affairs Carstens, Ambassador Story, and the senior NSC 
official, Juan Gonzalez, resulted in the release of two 
wrongfully-detained Americans and resumption of serious 
conversations between the regime and the Unitary Platform. 
Those conversations have continued for quite some time and have 
made notable progress.
    In my conversations with the Norwegian mediators, they 
believe that the prospects for a return to a formal negotiating 
process are good and we will continue to use both incentives 
and sticks in close coordination with the interim government 
and the Unitary Platform to encourage progress.
    Senator Risch. Let me take just a little different line 
here. What are you--specifically, what are you doing to help 
the Guaido administration?
    Mr. Nichols. We provide funding and resources to the 
democratic opposition in Venezuela as well as funding for the 
interim government. We work with allies to ensure that the 
regime does not have access to assets either in the United 
States or in foreign areas.
    We consult with them on various negotiating strategies and 
policies. Our Ambassador to Venezuela, Jimmy Story, is in 
almost daily contact with senior officials in the interim 
government.
    I, myself, have met virtually with President Guaido on 
multiple occasions as well as regular contact with the interim 
government ambassador in Washington and other interim 
government officials.
    Senator Risch. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin has graciously agreed to chair for a period 
of time. I have to go to Banking.
    Senator Kaine is recognized.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member 
Risch, and to our colleagues who are here.
    We just have to be realistic. I think the efforts of the 
last three administrations to use U.S. influence for a 
significant positive outcome in Venezuela have all been 
failures. Our intentions have been good and our efforts have 
been strong, and our generosity, particularly when compared 
with other nations, has been notable.
    We have not seen the outcome that we want. I do not think 
the last administration had us in a strong position with 
respect to Venezuela. They did announce a maximum pressure 
campaign.
    Pretty quickly in that campaign, the Trump administration 
floated the possibility of military intervention in Venezuela 
and that stopped many of the nations that were--that had been 
willing to recognize the interim government of Juan Guaido. It 
stopped them from going further with us and embracing the 
sanctions regime.
    I talked to leaders of some of the nations that were with 
us on the recognition of Guaido and said, as soon as the U.S. 
starts talking about military intervention, even if you 
ultimately do not go that direction, we are on the off-ramp now 
and we cannot go further.
    The last administration had witnesses before us, too, 
telling us that the Maduro government was within days of 
collapse. When we talked to the Colombians, they said, what are 
they smoking.
    I mean, they could see across the border with this neighbor 
that they are so close to that there was no danger of the 
Maduro government collapsing. That was not likely the case.
    Blue sky optimism that is unrealistic and bellicose 
rhetoric that is counterproductive did not lead to success, but 
I do not really fault them--the Administration--just like I do 
not fault the Obama administration, just like I do not fault 
the Biden administration for not being able to produce an 
outcome in Venezuela that we are happy with. This is on the 
Venezuelan people.
    We have limited ability to influence the outcome and it 
strikes me that the best thing that we can do is something we 
are doing, but we might be able to do more of and that is 
humanitarian support for the Venezuelan people and hopefully 
creating space for them so that the day may come, possibly in 
connection with these 2024 elections, where mayors and local 
officials and others and opposition will have enough force 
because of the disastrous nature of the Maduro government to 
start to write a new chapter for their country. I think we have 
to be humble about our own expectations about what the United 
States can do.
    On that score, the U.S. Government in the humanitarian 
space we are the single largest donor to the U.N. humanitarian 
response inside Venezuela. Seventy-four percent of the 
humanitarian contributions for humanitarian aid through the 
U.N. program are from the United States.
    What is the Department doing to get some of our European 
and other allies to step up their humanitarian support?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    The regular engagement with our partners around the 
hemisphere and around the world continues. As I alluded to 
earlier, on Tuesday we had another key meeting with partners to 
talk about both our policies and the importance of providing 
robust assistance to the Venezuelan people both within 
Venezuela and those who have migrated, fled the horrible 
conditions in that country.
    We regularly stress the importance of donations to the 
humanitarian relief fund and we lead by example in those 
donations. We will soon--next week, the U.N. General Assembly 
Leaders Week, there will be another opportunity for us to 
engage at a high level with that.
    Senator Kaine. If I could, because I want to ask one more 
question.
    Please do that. I mean, we are being very, very generous to 
refugees in Europe--the Ukrainian refugees, for example--and I 
think to ask our European allies please help us with this 
massive crisis, there is not--we are leading by example, but 
there is not a reason for the United States to be footing 75 
percent of this bill when we are also doing so much elsewhere.
    What are the--the opposition has announced they are going 
to have a primary next year to try to forward a candidate for 
the presidential elections that are hopefully going to happen 
in 2024.
    What are the prospects--your assessment--for the opposition 
sort of unifying behind a figure who can bring together some 
pretty disparate elements among the opposition?
    Mr. Nichols. I think the prospects are quite good. There is 
a recognition. As my colleague said, the elections last year 
in, for example, Barinas State demonstrated that a united 
opposition could win even under the most harrowing 
circumstances.
    However, they should not have to carry out either primaries 
or an election under the most harrowing circumstances.
    It is vital that the regime implement the recommendations 
of the European Union Electoral Observation Mission and the 
Carter Center recommendations, which would allow for a more 
level playing field for a general election and allow the 
primary process to proceed without outside interference.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Senator Cardin [presiding]. Let me thank both of you for 
your testimonies and your work.
    There are many tragedies in Venezuela, including the human 
rights violations and the lack of democratic governance. I want 
to talk about the migration issue.
    We know the impact it has on the surrounding countries, but 
the United States has been willing to accept Venezuelans that 
are here. It is my understanding we have close to 300,000 that 
are eligible for temporary protective status.
    If I might, let me just ask Administrator Escobari if you 
could elaborate as to how we are dealing with the Venezuelans 
that are here. What is our work visa issues?
    What are their needs? What outreach are we making in order 
to carry out our responsibilities in our hemisphere due to the 
migration issues of Venezuelans?
    Ms. Escobari. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
    I know that we have provided TPS to Venezuelans here and I 
will refer back to my colleague on our U.S. position.
    I think what is important to deal with the flows of 
Venezuelan migrants to our border is, as you said and started 
your comment, that this is a regional phenomenon.
    Of the 7 million migrants in Latin America, 6 million of 
those are Venezuelans, and of these Venezuelans only 3 percent 
have actually reached our border so far.
    The displacement in Latin America is 17 times larger than 
from Latin America to the U.S. To be able to deal with those 
flows, the strategy that we are pursuing--our root causes 
approach, which is clear in Venezuela it involves a democratic 
transition, expanding legal pathways, which--so that migrants 
can migrate with dignity, safety, and in a condition of 
greatest mutual benefit.
    Probably the most important activity in terms of numbers is 
helping countries integrate migrants into their communities 
like the example I gave with Colombia, and we are helping and 
pursuing these three avenues to deal with this massive 
migration crisis.
    Senator Cardin. One of our concerns is that whenever there 
are vulnerable people who migrate, there is always the risk 
factor of traffickers and victims of trafficking and the 
dangers, et cetera, so clear information is vitally important.
    What steps are we taking to make it clear our abilities in 
the United States to handle those that are at risk?
    Ms. Escobari. No, you are correct that the journey is 
terrifying. It is extremely dangerous, and we work with civil 
society organizations, for example, in Colombia so that they 
can inform people of the dangers of their travels north.
    I traveled to the Darien Gap with Secretary Mayorkas and 
was able to see firsthand what that 8-day journey means for 
people.
    Doctors Without Borders has shown that close to or over 80 
percent of women that make this journey are victims of sexual 
violence.
    We are using our work in Colombia and throughout Central 
America to try to inform migrants of the perils of this journey 
and, of course, our Central America governments are also 
working to penalize and increase the penalty for smugglers and 
human traffickers.
    Senator Cardin. Secretary Nichols, I want to follow up on 
Senator Kaine's point. He was concentrating on humanitarian 
assistance and the global sharing of burden.
    On the migrant issues--the surrounding countries--I work 
with Senator Blunt in regards to Colombia. We know the impact 
it is having on that country as far as the numbers that are 
from Venezuela in that country, making it more challenging for 
Colombia to deal with its other challenges.
    What efforts are the United States leading to help the 
surrounding countries deal with the influx of Venezuelans?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    The United States has provided nearly $800 million dollars 
for the communities that host migrants and migrants themselves 
within Colombia. We coordinate closely with Colombian officials 
on migration issues under the previous Duque administration.
    In Colombia, the government agreed to grant their version 
of temporary protected status and the Petro administration has 
vowed to continue and deepen that policy.
    In addition, we work with governments around the hemisphere 
under the structure of the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration 
and Protection, which was agreed to under President Biden's 
leadership at the last Summit of the Americas.
    We talk and work on concrete burden sharing and information 
sharing activities with governments from Canada to Tierra del 
Fuego. We are working to increase law enforcement cooperation 
to take down illicit trafficking networks.
    We work to provide training and equipment to migration 
officials in countries around the hemisphere. Secretary Blinken 
has co-chaired two migration ministerials in Colombia and 
Panama focused on mobilizing hemispheric and international 
resources to address the problem.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you.
    Senator Rubio.
    Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you both for being here 
today.
    I guess the--Secretary Nichols, has the Biden 
administration ever offered sanction relief in return for the 
release of American citizens in Venezuela?
    Mr. Nichols. No. The conversations led by our Special Envoy 
for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens are active and ongoing. I 
believe that he has briefed in the past along with our 
Ambassador, Jimmy Story, on some of the conversations that we 
have had.
    Our focus is securing the release of all wrongfully-
detained Americans worldwide. If you are in a conversation with 
Roger Carstens and you are a foreign country, that is not a 
normal relationship.
    That means that you are engaging in activity which is 
reprehensible, and we will do everything in our power to secure 
the freedom of wrongfully-detained Americans.
    I have a photo of Tomeu Vadell given to me by his family 
that I keep in my office to remind me of the priority of this 
effort.
    Senator Rubio. No, and I understand, but earlier this year 
the Ambassador to Venezuela, Jimmy Story, and the National 
Security Council's Juan Gonzalez visited Caracas, ostensibly, 
as it was discussed to--as it was reported to discuss the 
release of American citizens.
    They were there for that particular purpose, and then there 
were these leaks or stories out there about how they had 
offered sanction relief in return for releasing, for example, 
the Citgo Five.
    Were those stories, those media accounts, of the Ambassador 
and Mr. Gonzalez's visit to Caracas were those inaccurate 
stories?
    Mr. Nichols. The visit had two purposes. One was to, in 
close concert with the interim government and the Unitary 
Platform, to create a framework for a return to negotiations in 
Mexico City and, two, to negotiate with the regime on the 
release of wrongfully-detained Americans, and we took advantage 
of that opportunity to also visit imprisoned U.S. citizens and 
provide them with----
    Senator Rubio. Right. I guess that is my question.
    We sent the Ambassador to Venezuela. We sent a member of 
the National Security Council staff to meet with the regime. 
That was not the hostage individuals in charge of that. It was 
them.
    They went to talk about two things, a framework to get 
Maduro back to the negotiating table and a framework to release 
unlawfully-detained, unjustifiably-detained, Americans. In 
exchange, I imagine the Venezuelans would want something in 
return other than a visit.
    As part of that conversation, were there offers made that 
if you return to negotiations, here is sanctions relief, if you 
release these people, here is sanctions relief?
    I understand the hostage negotiator and the Ambassador in 
charge of that has not done it, as you have testified. As part 
of that meeting, is it--because there are these stories out 
there.
    I just want to know, do you know are those stories false 
that they actually offered sanctions relief in exchange for 
whether it is returning to negotiations or releasing Americans?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    As I said in my opening statement, we are willing to modify 
our sanctions policy in response to progress toward 
negotiations and concrete steps by the Maduro regime in 
negotiations and that was discussed with the Maduro regime in 
close coordination with interim President Guaido and the 
Unitary Platform.
    Senator Rubio. Just to be clear, the sanctions 
modifications relief would be an exchange, for example, for 
them returning to negotiations--agreeing to return to 
negotiations?
    Mr. Nichols. The substantive progress in the negotiations.
    Senator Rubio. Okay. Because you are aware they have used 
negotiations repeatedly over the years to buy time and even the 
Vatican no longer is willing to step in the breach and put that 
together. I hope that has not been forgotten.
    I do not want to run out of time, but I want to ask you 
about something else that has happened. A couple of things.
    In June of this year, a cargo plane landed in Buenos Aires. 
The plane used to be owned by U.S.-sanctioned Iranian airline, 
Mahan Air. It was illegally transferred to the U.S.-sanctioned 
Venezuelan state airline, Conviasa. I understand that it is now 
subject to a seizure warrant from the U.S. Department of 
Justice.
    Last month, I, along with Senator Ernst, sent a letter to 
the attorney general asking him to cooperate with law 
enforcement. What is the status of the judicial process in 
Argentina concerning the confiscation of that plane?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you for that, and we will continue to 
use all the law enforcement tools available to stop criminality 
and sanctions violations.
    Senator Rubio. What is the status of those processes?
    Mr. Nichols. There is an investigating judge in Argentina 
who is conducting an investigation and we are cooperating in 
that process. I would have to refer you to the Department of 
Justice for additional details.
    Senator Rubio. We are waiting for the Argentine judge?
    Mr. Nichols. We are----
    Senator Rubio. It is their process. I understand.
    Mr. Nichols. It is their process. We are supporting that 
process. We have provided information into that process at 
various points, which led to the final judicial order to seize 
the plane.
    Senator Rubio. Okay. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
both for being here.
    In the last hearing that we had in this committee on 
Venezuela, which was 2 years ago, we discussed the 
disproportionate impact that the humanitarian crisis is having 
on women in the country who have been forced to flee, and since 
then health indicators including infant and maternal mortality 
rates have continued to decline.
    As you pointed out, Ms. Escobari, women are--a high 
percentage of the women are subject to sexual assault. They are 
also, obviously, vulnerable to human trafficking and other 
abuses.
    You have talked about the--a number of the initiatives that 
we have to try and help address that. Can you talk about how 
helpful you think it might be if we had a fully operating 
Office of Global Women's Issues with an ambassador to that 
position who had been approved so that we could help address 
some of those disproportionate impacts on women as the result 
of this crisis?
    Ms. Escobari. Thank you, Senator, and for your commitment 
to girls and women across the globe.
    As you said, women are disproportionately affected in these 
crises, the Venezuela--it is clear on sexual trafficking, but 
also just the humanitarian needs because they are the ones 
taking care of kids.
    It is a big part of what we do and the lens that we take 
and I would support, as you suggest, any additional support on 
elevating this issue.
    Senator Shaheen. Ambassador Nichols, do you have a view on 
that?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, for your leadership.
    The issues around gender and women, peace, and security are 
vital. The confirmation of Dr. Gupta, the President's nominee 
to lead the Office of Global Women's Issues, I think, is vital.
    As we work in the Department on these issues and the broad 
range of issues, having confirmed--Senate-confirmed people in 
these positions imbues them with an authority and a power 
inside our system and internationally that no matter how 
talented an acting career officer is, they cannot match.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I really appreciate your 
explaining the difference in that way because as we look at the 
number of nominees who are still pending in the Senate, it is 
really important to remember the difference they could be 
making for that very reason, not because they are necessarily 
any more talented, but because that official moniker gives them 
added credibility.
    One of the things that I think has gone mostly unnoticed 
over the summer is the Russian-backed war games in July with 
forces that participated from both China and Iran, and can you 
discuss what the regional implications are of that and to what 
extent we ought to be paying attention?
    That is not something the Armed Services Committee has 
talked about as we have talked about war games that are going 
on in other parts of the world.
    Again, those have not gotten the attention that some others 
have.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    The presence of Russian forces in Venezuela and Nicaragua, 
the relations between Venezuela and Iran, serve to promote 
instability in our region. They seek to be provocative.
    They seek to interject the conflicts from other parts of 
the world in our hemisphere and we watch them very closely. We 
coordinate with our allies on them.
    I have had conversations with colleagues across the 
interagency on this issue. I note that our superb SOUTHCOM 
Commander, General Laura Richardson, has been traveling 
extensively in the region and talking about our positive vision 
for security cooperation.
    Secretary Austin participated in the Hemispheric Defense 
Ministerial in Brazil earlier this year to further that message 
about a positive vision of democratic security cooperation and 
we will continue to watch with vigilance the activities of 
Russia and others in Venezuela and Nicaragua, in particular.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Cardin. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to start with you, Assistant Secretary 
Nichols. Good day. I have got two issues to talk to you about.
    The first one is a constituent of mine named Matthew Heath. 
I am sure you are aware of the situation there. Matthew has 
been wrongfully detained by the Maduro regime in Venezuela.
    In early 2020, Matthew was arrested in Venezuela's 
borderlands near Columbia under very questionable circumstances 
and on highly specious charges. Since then, the Maduro regime 
has held Matthew hostage, imprisoning him in horrible 
conditions and reportedly subjecting him to unspeakable acts of 
torture.
    In fact, last week marked 2 years of Matthew Heath's 
wrongful detention in Venezuela. That is 2 years too long for 
Matthew, it is 2 years too long for his family and, certainly, 
it is 2 years too long for me.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols, the Maduro regime should 
immediately and unconditionally release my fellow Tennessean, 
Matthew Heath, and I would like to know from you what is 
currently being done to bring Matthew back to his family in 
Tennessee. What is the plan?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. I share your views 
entirely.
    Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens has, as 
well as our ambassador, have raised this issue on multiple 
occasions with the Maduro regime.
    We have sought to do all that we can to secure his 
immediate and unconditional release and in the meantime we have 
insisted that the regime should ensure his safety and his 
health by improving the conditions of his confinement. We will 
continue to work tirelessly to secure the release of all 
wrongfully-detained Americans in Venezuela.
    Senator Hagerty. I appreciate that. You know how concerned 
I am about this situation. I appreciate your continued 
attention and focus on the issue. It is tragic and it is 
certainly something that Tennesseans all have their eye on.
    The next topic is another one that you and I have discussed 
before and are very familiar with and that is the Maduro 
regime's growing cooperation with Communist China.
    In 2014, China and the Maduro regime upgraded their 
diplomatic relations to the highest levels, signing a 
comprehensive strategic partnership. The Maduro regime is the 
region's biggest borrower from China. They have accepted an 
estimated $62 billion in loans over the last decade and a half.
    More generally, as Communist China has become Latin 
America's overall top trading partner, China has used the Belt 
and Road Initiative and other instruments to provide foreign 
direct investment and lending for energy and other critical 
infrastructure in Venezuela and also other parts of Latin 
America.
    For example, China has aggressively invested in Latin 
America's space sector such as the Manuel Rios Bamari 
Terrestrial Satellite Control Base in Venezuela.
    The Maduro regime and China have also significantly 
increased their military cooperation. Between 2009 and 2019, 
Beijing reportedly sold more than $615 million dollars worth of 
weapons to Venezuela, making the Maduro regime a top purchaser 
of China's military equipment in that region.
    China strongly supports the Maduro regime's digital 
authoritarianism in Venezuela. ZTE, a CCP-directed Chinese 
telecoms and technology company, directly helped the Maduro 
regime construct the databases and identity card program for 
the country's ``fatherland card'' system that rolled out in 
January of 2017. The Maduro regime has used the ``fatherland 
card'' system to increase social control, to increase their 
coercion, and their vote buying.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols, what is the Biden 
administration doing to counter the Maduro regime's efforts 
there in Venezuela to counter China's growing interference and 
malign influence in Latin America, more broadly?
    Mr. Nichols. We continue to talk with our friends and 
partners throughout the hemisphere about the real costs of 
relations with the People's Republic of China and the Chinese 
Communist Party.
    We focus our efforts on what is the real cost of lending, 
what is the quality of the projects that PRC companies are 
building, and I have seen with my own eyes--I think you have as 
well--collapsing stadiums, faulty foreign ministries, bad roads 
that have been built by Chinese companies, in this hemisphere.
    We have seen the debt trap that countries in our hemisphere 
have fallen into, and the depth of the relationship between the 
PRC and Venezuela demonstrates, I think, to the democratic 
countries in our hemisphere exactly what kind of a partner the 
PRC is in engaging with one of the worst countries in terms of 
respect for human rights, rule of law, and everything else we 
value in our region.
    Before time runs out, Senator, I just want to note that I 
was in Mexico. I followed up on the issue we discussed before. 
I can brief you offline.
    Senator Hagerty. Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate 
it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you to both of our witnesses for being here today.
    I was in both Mexico and Colombia over the August recess, 
in part to take a look at our Venezuela policy. It is really 
hard to over hype what a disaster President Trump's Venezuela 
policy was. This decision to push all of our chips into the 
middle of the table all at once, recognize Guaido, and try to 
facilitate a coup made us look ham-handed and, in the end, 
feckless.
    Recognizing someone as the leader of a country who is not 
actually the leader of the country, it does not actually make 
us look strong. It makes us look weak, and we are stuck 
inheriting a policy that did not work, that has, in part, 
contributed to a humanitarian disaster that now brings 
thousands and thousands of Venezuelans to our border seeking 
salvation.
    I support strategic engagement with a purpose and that 
purpose has to be an election that draws the participation of 
all political groups and gives Venezuelans the chance to 
exercise their right to determine the future of the country.
    I have heard--since, Secretary Nichols, you suggest that 
there is a possibility of being able to get to an election in 
2024, but what does a free and fair election look like in 
Venezuela?
    What are our benchmarks to know whether this is an election 
that we can support and that the Venezuelan people actually 
have a chance at exercising their free will?
    Listen, I understand it is not going to look like an 
election in our country, right, and I do not know that we 
should hold it to that standard, but we have to have some 
pretty clear baselines.
    What are we looking for as we try to get towards a viable 
election?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    The European Union's Electoral Observation Mission, I 
think, has provided the most comprehensive roadmap, along with 
the Carter Center, to what that would look like and it involves 
things like an equality of access and equality of access to the 
media, rules that ensure that electoral authorities cannot 
disqualify candidates arbitrarily, access to areas to campaign, 
and a cessation of the abuses by security forces of opposition 
candidates, transparency in the preparations technically for 
the election, and the conducting of the election.
    It means allowing the opposition to carry out a primary 
process. As we have seen, when they have unified candidates 
they will beat the regime candidates, even when everything else 
is tilted against them.
    A key part of the discussions between the Unitary Platform 
and the regime will be the implementation of this process and 
we support that.
    Senator Murphy. Ms. Escobari, there is no doubt that the 
humanitarian disaster in Venezuela is first, second, and third 
a consequence of the regime's unconscionable policies, but I 
think we should be honest that our sanctions contribute to the 
humanitarian nightmare, and we can argue that there are good 
reasons for our sanctions.
    What worries me is a GAO report from last year that 
suggests we actually do not have real good information about 
how and if our sanctions are contributing to the humanitarian 
crisis inside Venezuela.
    The report found that Treasury and its interagency partners 
are limited in their ability to develop further actions to 
ensure that U.S. sanctions do not disrupt humanitarian 
assistance.
    Are you familiar with this report and, if so, how is USAID 
engaged with our implementing partners to mitigate these 
challenges and how do we make sure that we have visibility 
inside Venezuela to understand what the actual impact of our 
sanctions are?
    Ms. Escobari. As you said, it is very hard to separate the 
secondary effects. It is also very clear that the deterioration 
of the economy preceded the sanctions and that we have this 
capacity to work on humanitarian aid and the government also 
has the capacity to have invested in many of the services that 
are now not functioning in Venezuela.
    A lot of our financing and our work goes to create a 
network of human rights defenders, universities, and civil 
society organizations that are getting information about where 
the most vulnerable people are, the nature of the crisis as to 
target our humanitarian aid in--to those that are most 
vulnerable.
    There is actually a very sophisticated and courageous 
network of humanitarian organizations that are on the ground, 
that know where the most vulnerable people are, and it is where 
we focus our humanitarian assistance inside the country.
    Senator Murphy. I look forward to speaking with you more 
directly about this specific report and your responses to it.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Let me turn to Maduro's unbridled criminality 
lest some forget who we are dealing with.
    I want to remind everyone that Maduro and his henchmen from 
his government, his supreme court, and the party are facing 
charges in the United States for drug trafficking with rewards 
for their capture.
    As we all know, financial institutions in the United States 
and around the world have found billions--billions--of dollars 
in bank accounts linked to Maduro's mafia state--not using it 
for the benefit of the people of Venezuela--billions of dollars 
in bank accounts linked to Maduro's mafia state, and that is 
just likely the tip of the iceberg. That is without all the 
gold that is being taken out through Turkey and Russia.
    I certainly do not believe that the plight of the 
Venezuelan people is of any consequence except primarily that 
of the Maduro regime. There is a reason 7 million people have 
fled.
    How are the Departments of State and Justice collaborating 
to advance the international law enforcement cooperation needed 
to address the Maduro regime's criminality?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I could not agree more. The efforts through the Department 
of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security continue to 
investigate illegality surrounding the regime.
    Obviously, there is an ongoing case with regard to Alex 
Saab in the United States, who was extradited precisely because 
of his role in criminality.
    There are numerous other regime figures who are under 
investigation, and the international community and the 
international law enforcement community is attuned to this.
    I would just note that we discussed earlier the Conviasa 
plane that is in Argentina, seized as a result of our law 
enforcement cooperation for sanctions violations, and we will 
continue to work with governments around the world to pursue 
investigations.
    The Chairman. What additional steps can be taken to 
investigate, recover, and repurpose assets stolen from the 
Venezuelan people?
    Mr. Nichols. I think it is vital to continue coordination 
among financial action task forces, coordination among 
government finance ministries around the hemisphere, our 
coordination in international bodies like the U.N. and the OAS, 
to make sure that we are focusing not just on the regime's past 
activity, but their prospective future efforts.
    We see what they are trying to do in terms of evading 
sanctions, trafficking in all sorts of illicit substances, and 
we continue to flag that in our conversations with senior 
officials from governments around the world.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you this.
    What foreign policy guidance has the State Department given 
OFAC on targeting Maduro regime officials involved in 
kleptocracy?
    Mr. Nichols. We continue to tell OFAC that identifying 
those responsible for illicit activity is important. It is a 
complex and time-consuming process.
    We also stress that as we carry out these activities we 
want to ensure that they are deployed to maximum effect to 
advance the negotiation process and concrete achievements in 
our relationship. The goal of our sanctions policies is, 
obviously, to change the behavior of the regime.
    The Chairman. I am afraid that we are not achieving that 
goal.
    Let me ask you this. The regime continues to jail American 
citizens on bogus charges. He has tortured them. He has denied 
them access to legal counsel, medical treatment, and even 
contact with their families.
    He has used them as bargaining chips and at least in one 
case he has driven them to attempt death by suicide. Matthew 
Heath is not only being unjustly detained. He is being 
methodically tortured and slowly killed all while the regime 
keeps adding Americans to its gulags. He may have released two 
Americans in March, but he has jailed several more this year.
    Can you describe how hostage issues fit in the context of 
broader U.S. policy objectives in Venezuela? How is the 
Administration firewalling discussions with the regime related 
to hostages from broader U.S. foreign policy objectives?
    Absent the immediate return of U.S. hostages, what concrete 
ask has the Administration made to the Maduro regime to improve 
their abysmal detention conditions?
    Mr. Nichols. The United States has placed Venezuela at the 
highest level--level four, do not travel--in terms of our 
travel warnings. We implore American citizens not to go to 
Venezuela.
    In 2019, our embassy in Venezuela closed so we are not able 
to provide regular consular access to American citizens.
    Special Presidential Envoy Roger Carstens and our 
Ambassador, Jimmy Story, have repeatedly raised the issues of 
wrongfully-detained Americans with the regime. We have demanded 
better--we have demanded the immediate and unconditional 
release of all our Americans.
    In the case of Mr. Heath, as we discussed with Senator 
Hagerty, we have insisted that the conditions of his 
confinement be improved as well. We have stressed to the regime 
that it serves no good end, its efforts to arrest wrongfully 
American citizens that it finds within its borders. The border 
region between Colombia and Venezuela, in particular, is a 
dangerous area and should be avoided.
    Anyone who is talking to Special Presidential Envoy 
Carstens--any country that is talking to him, that means you do 
not have a normal country or a normal relationship and you are 
engaged in reprehensible conduct.
    The Chairman. I appreciate that, but it seems to me that 
Maduro has continued to take Americans hostages and thinks 
that, actually, that is a value to him.
    Let me ask you two last questions. One, is this 2024 
election, that is aspirational at this point. Is that fair to 
say?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. It is not--there is nothing that is 
established as a series of benchmarks that will get us there at 
this point in time?
    Mr. Nichols. The European Union's Electoral Observation 
Mission laid out what, I think, is the best roadmap and 
recommendations to get to a legitimate, free, fair election in 
2024.
    The Chairman. That has not been agreed to by Maduro?
    Mr. Nichols. No, it has not and that is vital, and----
    The Chairman. When we talk about 2024, it is an 
aspirational thing. There may be some roadmap by the EU, but 
the regime has not agreed to it.
    Mr. Nichols. If the regime has any interest in legitimacy 
and international acceptance, it should agree to those 
recommendations and implement them immediately.
    The Chairman. When you are benefiting from everything, when 
you have got billions of dollars in national patrimony, when 
you--basically, the state is your personal piggy bank, then I 
am not sure whether you care about international legitimacy. I 
wish the Maduro did. That is why I think we have pressure--that 
is why we are going to offer legislation to do so.
    I have one last question for both of you. It is unrelated 
to our topic today, but since we have the pleasure of having 
you both here at the same time, on September 2 I sent both of 
you a letter regarding U.S. democracy programs for Cuba.
    While I appreciate the Administration's continued 
commitment to these programs, I was deeply disappointed to see 
that the Administration is ending support to initiatives that 
challenge the Cuban regime's trafficking of doctors and medical 
personnel.
    It is an unfortunate decision that comes at a time when the 
State Department is actually raising the profile of the Cuban 
regime's forced labor schemes in the annual Report on 
Trafficking in Persons.
    Why then cut off funding to programs that support the 
victims of the regime's trafficking of Cuban doctors and help 
raise additional international awareness about the issue?
    Ms. Escobari. If I might start.
    We agree with you wholeheartedly on the importance of these 
programs and it is clear that the Cuban missions constitute 
forced labor.
    We had this program--we have this program currently that 
tracks and analyzes the human rights abuses and our partners 
have documented all the issues that have led to this 
determination, right--the salaries, retention of identity of 
documents, movement restrictions, et cetera--as well as the 
threats and punishments and other labor violations.
    Grants come to their natural end and that is the situation 
with this one. However, this is an issue that we will continue 
to work on. We have programs that are focused on educating the 
Cuban workforce on labor exploitation, including Cuban medical 
doctors in overseas missions, and as well as engaging 
multinational institutions and human rights organizations.
    We will continue to----
    The Chairman. I do not understand, Madam Administrator, why 
specifically end the resources that are unique to this program 
and then put it into the context of broader reviews that are 
taking place with other parts of the world.
    I think it is regretful and, to be honest with you, I am 
going to have to consider it as it relates to any requests for 
transfers of money from USAID.
    Senator Risch, do you have----
    Senator Risch. No.
    The Chairman. With that and the thanks of the committee, 
there will be--I am sure there will be a series of questions, 
including some from myself.
    The business--the record, I should say, for the hearing 
will remain open until the close of business on Friday, 
September 16. Please ensure that questions for the record are 
submitted no later than that day. We would ask you to have 
substantive responses.
    With the thanks of the committee to our witnesses, this 
hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


            Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. What is your assessment of the extent of links between 
the Maduro regime and transnational organized crime and drug 
trafficking in Venezuela?

    Answer. Maduro and his regime tolerate, ignore, and often cooperate 
or collude with known criminal networks, non-state armed groups, and 
narcotics traffickers. The Maduro regime and the Venezuelan armed 
forces also often develop mutually beneficial ad hoc relationships with 
criminal groups to derive revenue from illicit activities.
    In situations where we have sufficient information, we have worked 
closely with law enforcement and the Department of Justice to extradite 
these individuals, offer rewards for their arrest or conviction, and 
worked with the Department of the Treasury to impose sanctions. For 
example, in February, the Secretary of State approved a reward of up to 
$10 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of 
illegitimate Maduro regime oil minister Tareck Zaidan El Aissami 
Maddah. Tareck El Aissami is a Specially Designated Narcotics 
Trafficker who was designated in 2017 pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics 
Kingpin Designation Act for playing a significant role in international 
narcotics trafficking.
    We will continue to pressure the regime and hold its members 
accountable for undermining democracy, engaging in corruption, and 
abusing human rights, as exemplified this year by the extradition of 
Alex Saab and the seizure of Venezuela's Emtrasur aircraft.

    Question. The President has designated Venezuela a major drug 
transit or major illicit drug producing country, and the Department of 
State estimates that up to 10 percent of Colombian cocaine is 
trafficked through Venezuela. As part of the basis for this 
designation, the President found that Venezuela ``failed demonstrably'' 
during the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to 
its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. What 
is the Administration's policy or strategy to address drug trafficking 
from Venezuela moving forward?

    Answer. We maintain international pressure on the Maduro regime 
using a toolkit of sanctions, visa restrictions, law enforcement 
actions, diplomatic engagement, and other mechanisms. We also continue 
to work multilaterally via the UN system, the OAS, and other 
institutions to isolate and minimize the regime's influence in the 
region and internationally.

    Question. President Gustavo Petro of Colombia has invited Nicolas 
Maduro to serve as guarantor of negotiations with the National 
Liberation Army (ELN), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned 
Maduro and the Department of Justice charged him with offenses related 
to narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. State's Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) posted a $15 million 
reward for information to bring him to justice. Does the Biden 
administration consider Nicolas Maduro a fugitive of U.S. Justice? Can 
Maduro be a legitimate guarantor of peace and security in Colombia?

    Answer. The United States stands with the people of Venezuela, and 
we remain committed to targeting the Maduro regime and its supporters. 
We take every opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro regime.
    We remain concerned that the Maduro regime fails to make any 
meaningful efforts to combat illegal drug activity or prosecute corrupt 
officials or suspected drug traffickers, including ELN members. As you 
are aware, the Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Maduro in 
2017 for being a current or former official of the Government of 
Venezuela, and in 2020 the Department of Justice charged him with 
offenses related to narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. The 
Department of State also posted a reward of up to $15 million for 
information leading to Maduro's arrest or conviction.
    The ELN remains a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization under 
U.S. law. We support efforts to bring to justice terrorists and 
criminals that for too long have denied the Venezuelan and Colombian 
people the peace and security they so deserve. Deciding whether or how 
to enter peace talks with any group remains the Colombian government's 
decision.
    The Department of Justice charged Nicolas Maduro with offenses 
related to narco-terrorism and drug trafficking in 2020. We support 
efforts to bring to justice terrorists and criminals that for too long 
have denied the Venezuelan and Colombian people peace and security. The 
Department of State also posted a reward of up to $15 million for 
information leading to Maduro's arrest or conviction. For additional 
questions pertaining to Maduro's status, we would refer you to the 
Department of Justice.
    Deciding whether or how to enter peace talks with any group remains 
the Colombian government's decision.

    Question. On February 25, National Security Council Senior Director 
Juan Gonzalez said to Voice of America that the sanctions imposed on 
Russia for invading Ukraine were ``designed'' to put pressure on 
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. On March 7, the same official and 
Ambassador Jimmy Story met with Maduro in Caracas to, according to the 
White House Press Secretary ``discuss energy security.'' Please explain 
how the Administration intends to pressure Maduro while discussing 
energy security with his regime.

    Answer. Consistent with the VERDAD Act, we continue to support the 
Venezuelan-led negotiations between the Unitary Platform and the 
regime. We believe good faith negotiations represent the best path 
toward restoring democracy and human rights in Venezuela.
    The visit by senior U.S. officials to Venezuela in March this year 
focused on checking the welfare of wrongfully detained U.S. nationals, 
securing the release of U.S. wrongful detainees, and supporting a 
return to negotiations with the opposition in Mexico.

    Question. The regime has followed up the outreach by the Biden 
administration by unlawfully detaining nearly a dozen Americans, 
refusing to return to negotiations with the democratic opposition, and 
increasing physical attacks on Interim President Juan Guaido.
    Please explain what measures the Administration has taken to 
demonstrate concern with this trajectory. Is it time to impose 
additional sanctions on the Maduro regime?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken has made the safety of U.S. nationals 
abroad his highest priority. After the March 2022 U.S. Government 
delegation trip to Caracas, the regime released two wrongfully detained 
U.S. nationals. We continue to advocate for the immediate and 
unconditional release of all wrongfully detained U.S. nationals in 
Venezuela at every opportunity.
    Accountability for human rights abuses remains one of the main 
objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela. We take every 
opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro regime, especially 
against pro-democracy and human rights advocates.
    As we have previously made clear, we will review our sanctions 
policies in response to constructive steps by the Maduro regime. We 
have also been very clear that we will review our sanctions posture 
should the Maduro regime fail to negotiate in good faith or to follow 
through on its commitments.

    Question. In July, the Administration extended OFAC General License 
No. 40 (GL 40), first issued in July 2021, to authorize the exportation 
or re-exportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas to Venezuela. Could you 
please confirm the volumes of LPG that have been imported into 
Venezuela under GL 40 since July 2021?

    Answer. I am unaware of any U.S. exports of Liquified Petroleum Gas 
(LPG) to Venezuela since July 2021. General License 40 does not contain 
any reporting requirement.

    Question. On June 17, OFAC lifted sanctions on Mr. Carlos Erik 
Malpica Flores, the nephew of Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores. Mr. Malpica 
was sanctioned in 2017 for its involvement in rampant government 
corruption.
    Please provide a detailed explanation for lifting sanctions on Mr. 
Malpica, including the guidance provided by your Bureau and/or the 
Department of State to the Department of the Treasury on this decision.

    Answer. The Department of the Treasury delisted Malpica Flores. We 
have long made clear that we would review our sanctions policies to 
promote a negotiated solution to the Venezuelan crisis. We have also 
been very clear that we will review our sanctions posture should the 
Maduro regime fail to negotiate in good faith or to follow through on 
its commitments.

    Question. In April 2020, the United States proposed a Democratic 
Transition Framework to facilitate a peaceful negotiated return to 
democracy in Venezuela. Has the Biden administration formally retracted 
the 2020 Framework as U.S. policy?

    Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of 
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's last 
remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim 
President of Venezuela.
    We believe comprehensive, Venezuelan-led negotiations represent the 
best mechanism available to restore Venezuelan democracy and the rule 
of law.
    In close coordination with Interim President Guaido, we support the 
Unitary Platform's goal of immediately resuming its negotiations with 
the Maduro regime to restore free and fair elections, democratic 
institutions, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in 
Venezuela.

    Question. It is my understanding that Ambassador James Story has 
encouraged the Unitary Platform to broaden the coalition for the sake 
of unity.
    Can you describe the standards by which the Administration would 
measure whether an organization or individual should be part of the 
Unitary Platform? Would the Administration support a coalition that 
includes representatives of ``Fuerza Vecinal''? Can you please describe 
the links between Fuerza Vecinal and Mr. Raul Gorrin Belisario, an 
international fugitive sanctioned by OFAC in January 2019 for its 
involvement in endemic corruption at the highest levels of the Maduro 
regime.

    Answer. The Venezuelan opposition--specifically the Unitary 
Platform--engages directly with the regime to secure tangible progress 
toward the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. We strongly support 
these efforts and encourage the Unitary Platform to include political 
parties, civil society, and other actors from a wide segment of 
Venezuelan society in its discussions. We regularly engage with the 
Unitary Platform through weekly consultations with the Venezuela 
Affairs Unit and high-level coordination meetings with likeminded 
partners to emphasize our shared values and the importance of a 
Venezuelan-led negotiated solution. We understand Unitary Platform 
members are cautious to ensure their coalition consists of legitimate 
actors who share the same goal of restoring democracy and stability to 
Venezuela.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Implementation of sanctions on Venezuela: Venezuela 
appears to be conducting some business transactions that one would 
think would be constrained under current sanctions on the country. For 
example, we have seen the shipment of Venezuela oil to Europe, 
speculation about Chevron relaunching Venezuelan operations, and 
Siemens helping with the country's electrification problems. Please 
provide some clarification regarding U.S. sanctions on Venezuela in 
relation to recent business activity in the country.

    Answer. We believe Venezuelan-led, comprehensive negotiations 
represent the best mechanism available to restore Venezuelan democracy 
and the rule of law. Sanctions are one tool at our disposal to make 
progress towards this objective, and we have said repeatedly that we 
would review our sanctions policies in response to constructive steps 
by the Maduro regime.
    The United States remains steadfast in our commitment to the 
Venezuelan people, which includes support for Venezuelans' democratic 
aspirations and assistance to address Venezuela's humanitarian crisis. 
Part of this effort includes calibrating our sanctions program to 
impose costs on the Maduro regime for its corrupt practices while 
making all efforts to ensure our sanctions do not unduly impact the 
Venezuelan people or stand in the way of bona fide humanitarian 
assistance flowing to Venezuela.
    I can confirm that the U.S. Government issued two narrowly scoped 
licenses to Siemens, as Siemens reported publicly. To the extent that 
the media reports imply that the United States supports Siemens fully 
rebuilding the energy grid, they inaccurately portray U.S. policy 
towards Venezuela.

    Question. How are you implementing these sanctions given the goals 
the Biden administration hopes to achieve?

    Answer. Our overall sanctions policy on Venezuela remains 
unchanged, and we will continue to implement and enforce our Venezuela 
sanctions. As we have previously made clear, we will review our 
sanctions policies in response to constructive steps by the Maduro 
regime. We have also been very clear that we will review our sanctions 
posture should the Maduro regime fail to negotiate in good faith or to 
follow through on its commitments. The United States recognizes Interim 
President Guaido and closely coordinates with his administration and 
with the Unitary Platform on the steps needed to move forward on a 
negotiated solution that leads to the restoration of democracy to 
Venezuela.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Venezuela migrant and refugee situation: As you mentioned 
in your testimony, there are now more than 6.8 million Venezuelan 
migrants and refugees. The scale of this crisis is staggering and 
impacts the entire Western Hemisphere.
    How is USAID working to respond to migration across Latin America 
and the Caribbean?

    Answer. USAID is supporting Venezuelan migrants and refugees with 
immediate humanitarian assistance and with longer-term socio-economic 
migration across Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. USAID is also 
working to address the root causes of migration in Central America.
                      usaid development assistance
    USAID has provided more than $32 million (including $6.5 million in 
FY 2021) in development assistance to facilitate the socio-economic 
integration of Venezuelan migrants into three receiving countries in 
South America: Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. With this funding, USAID is 
working to strengthen local institutions' ability to provide basic 
services and effectively and equitably absorb the inflow of migrants, 
supporting policy reforms and administrative changes to facilitate 
migrants' integration, and supporting job skills development, 
entrepreneurial activity, and labor force integration.
    USAID has provided more than $148 million (including $30 million in 
FY 2021) in ongoing programming in Colombia to provide assistance to 
Venezuelan migrants through a variety of programs including providing 
technical assistance to the Colombian Government to support the 
implementation of the Temporary Protective Status (TPS) program for 
Venezuelan migrants, improving access to health and education systems, 
and supporting economic integration and financial inclusion of migrants 
and returnees.
    In FY 2021, USAID provided more than $328 million in development 
programming to address the root causes of migration in Central America. 
Of that, $9 million supports the dignified reception and reintegration 
of repatriated Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalans and $4.4 million 
supports the facilitation of access to H-2 visas in northern Central 
America.
    Through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), USAID 
has also provided support for the reception and integration of migrants 
in Costa Rica ($2.6 million), Panama ($2.4 million), and Belize ($1.14 
million). In Costa Rica, this assistance has included the establishment 
of three municipal migrant centers in Tarrazu, Limon, and San Carlos as 
well as mobile integration services to assist migrants in their process 
of achieving `regular migration status' and to enhance access to 
institutions and services.
                     usaid humanitarian assistance
    At the Summit of the Americas on June 10, U.S. President Joseph R. 
Biden announced new humanitarian assistance, including more than $171 
million in humanitarian funding to support life-saving assistance 
inside Venezuela, as well as provide support for Venezuelan migrants, 
Colombia returnees, refugees, and host communities in the region.
    USAID has provided more than $1.1 billion in humanitarian 
assistance since 2018 for emergency food, water, sanitation and 
hygiene, health, protection, nutrition, and other urgent assistance for 
people affected by this crisis in Venezuela and across the region. 
Since 2018, USAID has provided more than $315 million in humanitarian 
assistance for people in Venezuela, and nearly $794 million in 
humanitarian assistance for Venezuelan migrants and refugees, as well 
as for host communities in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru since 
2018.

    Question. Specifically, what are you doing on this front in 
Colombia, a country which took historic action last year to provide 
temporary protected status to over 2.4 million Venezuelans?

    Answer. Colombia is a priority for USAID, and we are dedicated to 
supporting their generous efforts to host over 2.4 million migrants and 
refugees, and reintegrate returnees.
                      usaid development assistance
    With USAID funding for migrant socio-economic integration 
programming, USAID/Colombia enabled the country's historic decision to 
offer TPS to Venezuelan migrants, and provided 460 surge staff and 
equipment to Colombian migration authorities to help pre-register more 
than 2.4 million and approve TPS for 1.5 million migrants. To date, 
USAID/Colombia has launched and operationalized four migration 
integration centers, which are one-stop shops for migrants to access 
social services, and will launch five more in the upcoming months.
    USAID's health program has supported the Colombian Government's 
Ministry of Health with the enrollment of more than 90,000 migrants 
into the health system. ``Together We Learn,'' USAID's migrant 
education program, is currently working in 129 schools. Over the life 
of the activity, USAID will reach over 400 schools in nine Colombian 
municipalities. The project will improve access to education for more 
than 4,000 children and train over 11,000 educators to promote the 
social integration of migrant and returnee youth in schools. Finally, 
USAID launched two economic integration projects that will provide 
employment and entrepreneurship opportunities to more than 10,000 
migrants and receptor community members, along with access to financial 
services for 30,000 new clients.
                     usaid humanitarian assistance
    USAID humanitarian assistance in Colombia totals more than $505 
million and currently includes food assistance--hot meals, food kits 
for families in transit, and vouchers and cash transfers--so that 
vulnerable Venezuelans can buy nutritious food in local stores. In 
Colombia, USAID partners have assisted more than 317,000 vulnerable 
migrants and Colombian returnees with food assistance and emergency 
relief. USAID also funds targeted support to Venezuelans in transit 
through Colombia (caminantes) in Norte de Santander and Santander by 
increasing their access to basic services.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. What are the top priorities for the Biden administration 
regarding policy towards Venezuela?

    Answer. The situation in Venezuela remains one of the worst crises 
in our hemisphere's history, and the responsibility for the crisis 
falls squarely on the shoulders of the late Hugo Chavez and Nicolas 
Maduro. The Biden administration has prioritized the return of 
democracy to Venezuela through Venezuelan-led, comprehensive 
negotiations that represent the best mechanism available to restore 
democracy and the rule of law, and to limit the influence of malign 
actors in the region. We will continue to review our sanctions policies 
in response to constructive steps by the Maduro regime but also remain 
ready to evaluate our sanctions posture should the regime fail to 
negotiate in good faith or to follow through on its commitments.
    Secretary Blinken has made the safety of U.S. citizens abroad his 
highest priority and we continue to work aggressively, using every 
available means, to bring home all U.S. nationals wrongfully detained 
in Venezuela. In addition, accountability for human rights abuses 
remains one of the main objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela, 
and we take every opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro 
regime. We continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans 
who have been forced to leave their country. Since FY 2017, the 
Department's Population, Refugees, and Migration bureau has provided 
nearly $828 million in humanitarian assistance for Venezuelan refugees 
and migrants in 17 countries throughout the region, as well as 
vulnerable Venezuelans inside Venezuela.

    Question. Is the Administration still committed to recognizing Juan 
Guaido as the Interim President of Venezuela?

    Answer. Yes, the United States continues to recognize the authority 
of the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's 
last remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim 
President of Venezuela. President Biden spoke with Interim President 
Guaido during the Summit of the Americas and reinforced our support for 
him as Venezuela's president, as well as our firm commitment to 
Guaido's call for a negotiated solution to Venezuela's crisis through 
the Unitary Platform's negotiations with the Maduro regime to restore 
free and fair elections, democratic institutions, the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights in Venezuela. Additionally, Ambassador Story 
met with Juan Guaido twice during his June 2022 visit to Caracas to 
reinforce the support of the United States.

    Question. Is seeking the release of political prisoners and holding 
free and fair elections still the Administration's primary priority, or 
have other considerations taken precedence, such as securing a supply 
of oil from Maduro-regime controlled companies?

    Answer. Accountability for human rights abuses remains one of the 
main objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela and we will 
continue to use all diplomatic and economic tools available to support 
Venezuelan calls for greater freedom, accountability, and democracy. 
The United States, joined by partners and allies across the globe, 
continues to press for the release of all those unjustly detained for 
political reasons, an end to human rights abuses, and conditions for 
free and fair elections that allow Venezuelans to choose their leaders 
freely. We remain a steadfast partner of the Venezuelan people as they 
strive to build a better future for their country--one in which their 
leaders respect the human rights and freedoms of all citizens. We take 
every opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro regime, 
especially against pro-democracy and human rights advocates.
    Our overall sanctions policy on Venezuela remains unchanged, and we 
will continue to implement and enforce our Venezuela sanctions. As we 
have previously made clear, we will also review our sanctions policies 
in response to constructive steps by the Maduro regime.

    Question. In the past year, the Maduro regime and elements of the 
Venezuelan democratic opposition have negotiated in Mexico City. 
According to both State Department and opposition readouts of these 
talks, the Maduro regime has only wanted to focus on economic relief, 
with limited discussion on what they call ``social issues,'' including 
elections.
    Has the Maduro regime shown any willingness to discuss holding free 
and fair elections in Venezuela?

    Answer. The Venezuelan opposition--specifically the Unitary 
Platform--engages directly with the regime to secure tangible progress 
toward the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. Consistent with the 
VERDAD Act, we continue to support the Venezuelan-led negotiations 
between the Unitary Platform and the regime. We think that good faith 
negotiations represent the best path toward restoring democracy and 
respect for human rights in Venezuela. The Administration's efforts 
resulted in renewed meetings and negotiations between the regime and 
the opposition in both Oslo and Caracas. The United States will 
continue to work with our Venezuelan and international partners to 
support the negotiations and urge Maduro to return to the table.

    Question. What is the Administration doing to ensure that the 
Guaido government, and other elements of Venezuela's democratic 
opposition, present a united front in these negotiations?

    Answer. In close coordination with Interim President Guaido, we 
support the Unitary Platform's goal of immediately resuming 
negotiations with the Maduro regime to restore free and fair elections, 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, and respect for human rights 
in Venezuela. The United States regularly coordinates with Guaido's 
administration and with the Unitary Platform to move forward 
effectively on a negotiated solution that leads to the restoration of 
democracy to Venezuela.

    Question. Are there scenarios where the Administration would offer 
sanctions relief without free and fair elections in Venezuela?

    Answer. We will review our sanctions policies in response to 
constructive steps by the Maduro regime. However, we also remain ready 
to review our sanctions posture should the regime fail to negotiate in 
good faith or to follow through on its commitments. We will continue to 
pressure the regime and hold its members accountable for undermining 
democracy, engaging in corruption, and abusing human rights as 
exemplified by our extradition of Alex Saab and the seizure of 
Venezuela's Emtrasur aircraft in Argentina.

    Question. Given the Maduro regime's attempts to kidnap members of 
the Venezuelan democratic opposition, like Freddy Guevara last year, 
can we believe any commitment made by Maduro that he would obey the law 
if free and fair elections were held in Venezuela?

    Answer. Consistent with the VERDAD Act, we continue to support the 
Venezuelan-led negotiations between the Unitary Platform and the 
regime. We think that good faith negotiations represent the best path 
toward restoring democracy and human rights in Venezuela.
    Accountability for human rights abuses remains one of the main 
objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela. We take every 
opportunity to highlight the abuses of the Maduro regime, especially 
against pro-democracy and human rights advocates. As a member of the 
Human Rights Council, we work to ensure the renewal of the Mandate of 
the UNHRC Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to Venezuela. This important 
mission shines a light on the human rights situation in the country and 
serves as a critical voice for victims of the regime. We also work with 
partners and allies to promote accountability for corrupt actors and 
those who undermine democracy and abuse human rights.

    Question. The Trump administration successfully mobilized almost 60 
countries in recognizing the Guaido government and joining the U.S.-led 
effort to press for Venezuelans' right to free and fair elections. 
Under this administration's watch, we've seen the EU formally switch to 
recognizing Guaido as an opposition leader rather than as an interim 
president. As they elect left-wing leaders, more countries in Latin 
America also shift their recognition.
    How is the Administration coordinating sanctions policy with 
European and Latin American governments, including those that have de-
recognized the Guaido government?

    Answer. The Department of State regularly engages European 
counterparts, including officials from EU member countries and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), on Venezuela and the need to 
maintain pressure on the Maduro regime to return to negotiations and 
improve economic and political conditions. For example, during a July 
27, 2022, coordination conference on Venezuela, I pressed the EU to 
support our sanctions implementation and preserve the incentive 
structure with the Maduro regime, and Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Ricardo Zuniga reiterated the importance of coordination on 
Venezuela policy, including recognition and sanctions, with European 
and other international partners during a meeting on September 13, 
2022. Other State Department officials have regular interactions with 
our international partners to follow up on these issues, including 
sanctions.

    Question. In your communications with these governments, have you 
or anyone in the State Department conveyed the U.S. plans to continue 
recognizing the Guaido government?

    Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of 
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's last 
remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim 
President of Venezuela, a position that is well known and regularly 
shared with our international partners. Recent examples of this include 
a September 13, 2022, high-level coordination meeting on Venezuela, 
sponsored by the Government of Canada, where Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Zuniga affirmed our determination to continue 
supporting the interim government. Additionally, in a July 27, 2022, 
small-group meeting of likeminded partners, I reaffirmed our 
recognition of Juan Guaido to our closest partners and allies.

    Question. In the last year, has the Administration considered 
following the EU in withdrawing its recognition of Juan Guaido as the 
interim president of the legitimate Government of Venezuela?

    Answer. No. The United States continues to recognize the authority 
of the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's 
last remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim 
President of Venezuela.

    Question. In July, you briefed my staff, and the staff of other 
members of this committee, on your initial round of talks with the 
then-incoming government of Gustavo Petro. You indicated then that 
compared to the topic of environmental protection and economic reform, 
Petro himself was not enthusiastic about talking about confronting the 
illiberal forces in Latin America, including Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
Maduro. Since then, Petro has sought a thaw in bilateral relations with 
Caracas. This includes restoring full diplomatic ties, sending an 
ambassador to Caracas, and reopening the border. I understand that the 
Petro administration, as the democratically elected Government of 
Colombia, has the full right to express its sovereignty and decide its 
own foreign policy.
    Can you tell me whether you view President Petro's opening to the 
Maduro regime as a positive or a negative development as far as U.S. 
interests are concerned?

    Answer. We have engaged the new Colombian Government on issues of 
mutual interest including foreign affairs. We have had open and frank 
high-level discussions with Petro Administration Foreign Minister 
Alvaro Leyva and Petro Administration Ambassador to Venezuela Armando 
Benedetti to emphasize continued U.S. concerns about Venezuela's human 
rights record and to encourage the Colombian Government to consider how 
its increased engagement with Venezuela can advance our mutual interest 
to promote a return to democracy in Venezuela.

    Question. What is your assessment of the Petro administration's 
continued willingness to protect Venezuelan political exiles currently 
residing there?

    Answer. The Petro administration has vowed publicly and privately 
to continue to provide refuge to Venezuelan political exiles to reside 
in Colombia. President Petro publicly rebuffed Maduro regime official 
Diosdado Cabello's call for the extradition of political exiles from 
Colombia, stating: ``Colombia guarantees the right to asylum and 
refuge.'' We welcome President Petro's public assurances that 
Venezuelan political exiles will not be subject to extradition to 
Venezuela.

    Question. Will the Petro government continue to vote in 
multilateral forums, such as the Organization of American States, to 
support Venezuela's opposition and condemn Maduro's human rights 
violations?

    Answer. We do not have information on how the Petro government 
plans to vote on individual issues. However, President Petro publicly 
said on September 13 that he would support the Maduro regime reclaiming 
its seat at the OAS. We urge Colombia and other partners to press for 
improved political and human rights conditions in Venezuela, including 
through support for relevant resolutions in multilateral organizations.

    Question. For decades, Colombia has struggled to deal with the 
scourge of narcotics production and trafficking, burdening its society 
with drug addiction and all of its problems and funding terrorist 
movements seeking to overthrow Colombia's government. These include 
both the FARC and the ELN, which last year carried out attacks against 
Colombian Government officials, likely with the support of Venezuela. 
Has the Administration communicated to the Petro government, via 
classified channels or other means, the danger posed to Colombia by 
Venezuela's sponsoring of the ELN and other armed Colombian terrorist 
groups?

    Answer. The Biden administration has made clear the threats posed 
to Colombian security forces and the Colombian people by the ELN and 
other armed terrorist groups, including the dangers of foreign support 
for those groups. The ELN remains a designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization under U.S. law.

    Question. Do you believe the Petro government will seek 
accountability for the ELN's continued practice of sparking violence 
along the Colombian-Venezuelan border?

    Answer. The Colombian Government is starting the process to reopen 
peace negotiations with the ELN. We expect that the Colombian 
Government will seek to address ELN-sponsored violence as a part of 
those discussions given the ELN's attacks on Colombian citizens over 
decades and the importance of ending such harmful actions. The Petro 
government publicly indicated that one of its first priorities in 
discussions with the ELN is a humanitarian ceasefire.

    Question. In 2016, the Maduro regime transformed 12 percent of its 
national territory into a mining region named the Orinoco Mining Arc 
(el Arco Minero). Since then, it has been subjected to predatory mining 
and wanton destruction in order to fill the regime's coffers with the 
profits accrued by illegal gold mining. Criminality is rife in the 
gold-mining areas of Venezuela. Venezuelan migrants, particularly those 
lacking documents, are vulnerable to human trafficking and other 
crimes. Given the Biden administration's focus on climate change and 
environmental protection, you would think that it would be concerned 
about how illegal mining has polluted the Orinoco River, aquifers, and 
even the Gulf of Mexico, but this barely figures in its communications 
with Venezuela. Chairman Menendez and I have been working on the Legal 
Goldmining Partnership Act of 2022 to crack down on the harmful 
practice of illegal gold mining, and hope to introduce that legislation 
in short order.
    What, if any, punitive action can be undertaken to target those 
responsible for this ecological disaster?

    Answer. The United States works with partners through the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to 
promote responsible mineral supply chains, and specifically supported 
the OECD's report and follow-on forum on illicit gold flows from 
Venezuela. The United States has called for governments, civil society, 
and the private sector to work together to combat human rights abuses, 
including human trafficking and other crimes stemming from this 
industry.
    As a State Party to the World Heritage Convention (WHC), Venezuela 
is accountable for protecting its heritage sites, including the Canaima 
National Park, which the Maduro regime included in the Orinoco Mining 
Arc in 2016. The United States and other States Parties supported a WHC 
decision for the regime to report on park conditions and host an 
inspection by December 2022.

    Question. In addition to my legal gold mining partnership act, what 
other options should the United States and multilateral organizations 
consider to deter these types of crimes, protect victims, and detect 
and prosecute their perpetrators?

    Answer. The United States works with partners bilaterally and 
through the OECD to promote responsible mineral supply chains. Through 
the OECD, the United States and other partners sponsored the report 
``Gold Flows from Venezuela,'' which described the armed groups, 
corruption, and money laundering associated with gold extraction in 
Venezuela.
    The Bureau of International Narcotic and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
in partnership with the Organization of American States' Department 
against Transnational Organized Crime, works with countries in the 
region to identify and prosecute illicit mining, criminal gold flows, 
including flows from Venezuela, and gold-based money laundering. These 
efforts help provide better information about the illicit gold flows in 
the region, which in turn will help inform effective policy responses.

    Question. Last year, an Iranian plot was revealed to kidnap Iranian 
dissident Masih Alinejad in New York City. The plot, coordinated by 
Iranian regime agents, sought to kidnap Ms. Alinejad and have her 
smuggled out to Venezuela by boat. The plot exposed Venezuela's 
complicity in Iran's terrorist activities against a U.S. citizen.
    Which Venezuelan officials were directly or indirectly involved in 
the plot to kidnap an American citizen?

    Answer. The Department closely monitors relations between the 
Maduro regime and malign actors like Iran in the Western Hemisphere. We 
refer you to the Department of Justice for additional details on the 
plot by Iranian intelligence services to kidnap a U.S. journalist and 
any connections with Venezuelan officials.

    Question. And what punitive actions are being taken or being 
contemplated against Venezuelan officials for their complicity with 
Tehran?

    Answer. We remain concerned by the Maduro regime's continued 
attempts to circumvent U.S. sanctions and we closely monitor the 
activities of malign actors like Iran in our hemisphere and globally. 
We maintain international pressure on the Maduro regime using a toolkit 
of sanctions, visa restrictions, law enforcement actions, diplomatic 
engagement, and other mechanisms.

    Question. For years, the communist regime in Cuba has 
systematically violated the human rights of Cuban medical professionals 
through its practice of dispatching so-called ``medical missions'' 
abroad. The State Department's annual human rights reports and 
trafficking in persons reports have determined that these missions 
constitute the use of forced labor. Venezuela is among the most 
frequent destinations for these missions. Last year, Senator Menendez 
and I introduced the Combatting Trafficking of Cuban Doctors Act of 
2021 to strengthen U.S. efforts to stop this practice.
    How is the Administration holding the communist regime in Cuba and 
countries that host these missions accountable?

    Answer. Every year since 2010, the State Department has documented 
indicators of forced labor in Cuba's labor export programs overseas. We 
believe all countries should comply with their international 
obligations and commitments to combat human trafficking, including 
forced labor. As such, we continually urge countries to seek 
transparency on contractual agreements between the Cuban Government and 
Cuban overseas workers, to screen those associated with this program 
for trafficking indicators, and to protect victims identified. We urge 
foreign governments to investigate the specific conditions government-
affiliated Cuban workers in their countries face and to ensure these 
programs comply with international labor standards, including ensuring 
workers are paid directly and fully, keep their travel and identity 
documents, review their contracts, have freedom of movement, and are 
not penalized or retaliated against for leaving the program.
    Since 2019, USAID has supported a portfolio of programs that track 
and analyze human rights abuses committed against Cuban medical 
personnel. This data, including testimony collected from participants 
in the medical missions, has informed other organizations' reporting, 
including a July 2020 report from Human Rights Watch which outlined the 
Cuban Government's violation of Cuban medical personnel's human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.

    Question. Earlier this year, U.S. courts determined that 
international organizations sued in U.S. courts do not enjoy immunity 
from legal suit that is greater than what is granted by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). This opens the door for potentially 
Cuban doctors who served in Cuban medical missions in Venezuela and 
elsewhere to sue the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) for 
facilitating Cuban medical missions.
    Does the Administration support such lawsuits?

    Answer. We have long expressed serious concerns about allegations 
of forced labor in Cuba's labor export program overseas. We support the 
right of those affected by these practices to use all legal means 
available to seek justice.

    Question. Is the Administration considering imposing sanctions on 
PAHO for facilitating human rights abuses against Cuban medical 
professionals as current and past administrations have imposed human 
rights sanctions on foreign governments?

    Answer. The Administration's focus remains on the Cuban people and 
their political and economic wellbeing. Accordingly, we continue to 
monitor allegations of human rights abuses by the Government of Cuba 
and consider steps to promote accountability. We have engaged with 
PAHO's leadership to increase PAHO's transparency and accountability 
and to protect U.S. interests following its involvement in Brazil's 
Mais Medicos program. We also proposed governance reforms to prevent 
the recurrence of PAHO's involvement in projects like Mais Medicos, and 
PAHO's Directing Council approved the reform proposal by consensus in 
September 2020.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. Is the Department actively considering returning our 
diplomats to Caracas? And if not, under what circumstances would 
President Biden make such a move?

    Answer. The Department does not currently have plans to re-
establish a diplomatic presence in Venezuela. In March 2019, the 
Department announced the withdrawal of all diplomatic personnel from 
U.S. Embassy Caracas. All consular services in Venezuela remain 
suspended and we have extremely limited ability to provide emergency 
services to U.S. citizens in Venezuela. Visits by U.S. officials to 
Venezuela this year focused on checking the welfare of wrongfully 
detained U.S. nationals, securing the release of U.S. wrongful 
detainees, and supporting a return to negotiations with the opposition 
in Mexico. The United States continues to recognize the authority of 
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela's last 
remaining democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the Interim 
President of Venezuela. We strongly support the Unitary Platform in its 
engagements with the Maduro regime to secure tangible progress toward 
the restoration of democracy in Venezuela.

    Question. How is the State Department working to discourage the 
arrest of American citizens for political purposes?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken has made the safety of U.S. citizens 
abroad his highest priority. The Department continues to press the 
Maduro regime for the immediate and unconditional release of all 
wrongfully detained U.S. nationals in Venezuela. We have consistently 
advocated against the wrongful detention of U.S. nationals and will 
continue to do so.
    Venezuela has a Level 4 (Do Not Travel) Travel Advisory due to 
crime, civil unrest, poor health infrastructure, kidnapping, and the 
arrest and detention of U.S. citizens without due process or fair trial 
guarantees that includes a level 2 (exercise increased caution) warning 
for risk of terrorism and wrongful detentions.
    On July 19, 2022, the Department of State introduced a new ``D'' 
risk indicator for wrongful detentions as part of our ongoing efforts 
to provide clear and comprehensive safety and security information to 
U.S. citizens traveling and living abroad. Prior Travel Advisories 
already included information on unjust detentions. The ``D'' indicator 
was added to highlight for the traveling U.S. public the elevated risk 
of the wrongful detention of U.S. nationals in particular countries 
overseas whose governments have engaged in that practice. The ``D'' 
indicator is active for the Venezuela Travel Advisory.

    Question. What efforts has the Department undertaken to secure the 
release of other Americans under the Maduro regime's custody?

    Answer. Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger 
Carstens leads the effort, joined by U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela James 
Story and the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, to identify ways to 
secure the release of all wrongfully detained U.S. nationals. On the 
March 2022 U.S. delegation trip, the regime released two wrongfully 
detained U.S. citizens, and Special Envoy Carstens and Ambassador 
Story, along with the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, continue to 
advocate the immediate and unconditional release of all wrongfully 
detained U.S. nationals in Venezuela at every opportunity, including in 
their June 2022 trip to Venezuela.

    Question. Would you say the present use of the Consular Travel 
Advisory system is effective at warning American citizens about the 
risks of traveling to Venezuela?

    Answer. The Department's Travel Advisories and Travel Alerts 
effectively provide U.S. citizens with accurate, actionable, and timely 
information about travel risks abroad so that they can make informed 
travel decisions. The Department updated its Travel Advisory for 
Venezuela most recently on July 19, 2022. The travel advisory and 
travel alerts are emailed to U.S. citizens who register with STEP 
(Smart Traveler Enrollment Program) and is publicly available on 
Department websites (travel.state.gov, www.osac.gov and embassy 
websites) and social media and is regularly updated based on the 
changing security circumstances within Venezuela.

    Question. Which U.S. adversaries play the strongest role in 
propping up the regime and how would you recommend the United States 
engage these players in support of our objectives in Venezuela?

    Answer. The Maduro regime continues to seek commercial, political, 
and diplomatic ties with malign actors like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and 
China, to its own detriment. We remain concerned by the Maduro regime's 
continued attempts to circumvent our sanctions and we closely monitor 
the activities of malign actors and strategic competitors in our 
hemisphere. In coordination with international partners and allies, the 
Department maintains pressure on the Maduro regime using a toolkit of 
sanctions, visa restrictions, law enforcement actions, diplomatic 
engagement, and other mechanisms. We remain firmly committed to the 
Venezuelan people and continue to work with the international community 
to support the restoration of democracy and the rule of law.

    Question. Noting Colombia's restoration of formal relations with 
Maduro, how would you characterize our engagement with President Petro 
on the issue of U.S.-Venezuelan relations?

    Answer. We have engaged the new Colombian Government on issues of 
mutual interest including foreign affairs. We have had open, frank, and 
high-level discussions with President Petro, as well as Petro 
Administration Foreign Minister Alvaro Leyva and Petro Administration 
Ambassador to Venezuela Armando Benedetti to emphasize continued U.S. 
concerns about Venezuela's human rights record and to encourage the 
Colombian Government to consider how its increased engagement with 
Venezuela can advance our mutual interest to promote a return to 
democracy in Venezuela.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. In its $40 million appropriation for democracy programs 
for Venezuela, Congress directed USAID to address violence against 
Venezuelan women and child migrants. Can you expand on USAID's efforts 
in this regard?

    Answer. The SFOAA FY22 bill specifies that, ``Of the funds 
appropriated by this Act under the heading ``Economic Support Fund,'' 
not less than $40,000,000 shall be made available for democracy 
programs for Venezuela.'' USAID makes use of these funds to implement a 
range of programs in partnership with local civil society 
organizations, independent media outlets, and human rights actors to 
advance democracy and protect human rights inside Venezuela.
    USAID will use FY 2022 funds to continue to raise awareness about 
gender issues--including gender-based violence (GBV)--and work with a 
broad range of civil society and democratic actors--including media, 
labor, watchdog, human rights, university, women, and youth groups--to 
effectively document and influence regime actions, monitor and report 
on human rights, expand civil political dialogue, and support demands 
for electoral and other institutional reform.
    FY 2022-funded activities will continue and expand on the following 
activities that USAID has implemented to address violence and other 
injustices against Venezuelan women.

   USAID supported a human rights observatory to survey the 
        prevalence of gender-based violence in a major Venezuelan city.

   USAID supported another human rights observatory to collect 
        evidence of impunity in Venezuela's judicial system, as it 
        pertains to cases of gender-based human rights violations, 
        human trafficking, and forced migration.

   USAID provided gender training to the Interim Government and 
        provided leadership training to women.

   USAID's media partners actively hire women reporters, engage 
        women leaders as community journalists to report on local 
        issues, and report on the work of women human rights defenders 
        and the differentiated impact of the humanitarian crisis on 
        women.
             usaid humanitarian assistance for venezuelans
    USAID is committed to the Venezuelan people, with a key focus on 
the most vulnerable including women and children. The United States 
remains the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to people 
affected by the crisis in Venezuela. In addition to the $40 million for 
democracy assistance in Venezuela, USAID has provided $1.3 billion in 
humanitarian assistance since 2018, both in Venezuela as well as for 
Venezuelan migrants and refugees across the region. This humanitarian 
funding supports broader USAID efforts to address violence against 
Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
    Since 2018, USAID has provided nearly $794 million in humanitarian 
assistance to meet the needs of Venezuelan migrants and refugees 
seeking refuge in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. USAID 
programming also targets vulnerable host community members in areas 
with high numbers of Venezuelans. USAID's assistance helps Venezuelan 
migrants and refugees to meet their immediate food needs through hot 
meals, cash transfers, food vouchers, and food kits. This programming 
is complemented by State/PRM programs addressing protection and 
additional humanitarian needs.
    Since 2018, USAID has also provided more than $315 million in 
humanitarian assistance inside Venezuela. USAID humanitarian 
programming inside Venezuela prioritizes support for healthcare, food, 
protection including support for survivors of GBV, water, sanitation 
and hygiene, nutrition, and other urgent assistance.
           usaid development programs for venezuelan migrants
    USAID has provided $35.9 million in FY 2021 development funds to 
support integration programming for Venezuelan migrants and support for 
receptor communities in South America, with $29.9 million for Colombia 
and $6 million for programs in Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru.
Colombia
    In Colombia, USAID support enabled the country's historic decision 
to offer Temporary Protective Status (TPS) to Venezuelan migrants. 
USAID continues to launch and operationalize migration integration 
centers or Integrate centers, which are one-stop shops for migrants to 
access social services.
    In Colombia, USAID supported the strengthening of the national and 
local GBV prevention hotlines at the national level and in Bogota to 
respond to GBV cases against migrants through six training sessions 
with 48 agents that will improve information and referrals for migrants 
on GBV response. USAID also established the Network of Gender 
Observatories with the Women's Observatory of the Presidential 
Counselor for Women's Equity (CPEM), aiming to improve coordination 
between government, civil society organizations, academia, and 
international organizations to collect data for prevention and 
attention of gender-based violence. Additionally, USAID grantees 
trained 162 migrant women, as well as sex workers and 83 of their 
children on GBV prevention and response. Moreover, grantees in Cali 
trained 4,580 participant migrant girls and youth to increase their 
awareness of Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and GBV risks, and in the 
city and Cartagena another grantee trained 418 participants and 67 
public officials on GBV prevention and attention routes. USAID programs 
also developed a GBV toolbox to be used with public officials and civil 
society representatives that addresses specific GBV risks and 
vulnerabilities faced by migrants. This toolbox was subsequently 
presented to 27 public officials and 42 civil society representatives 
in Bucaramanga, Cali, Medellin and Riohacha to improve their knowledge 
on attention routes, prevent and address GBV against migrants, and 
identify cases and improve institutional response.
South America Regional
    USAID's regional program supports the socio-economic integration of 
Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. Half of the migrants 
USAID supports in Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil are women who continue to 
face sexual exploitation and abuse, GBV, discrimination, and 
xenophobia. They are routinely denied access to stable employment, 
financial resources, or social protections because of their gender and 
status as migrants/refugees. Transgender women migrants, often escaping 
violence and torture in Venezuela, face continued abuse and 
discrimination based on their gender identity. Gender-based violence, 
which has exploded during the pandemic, traps migrants in a cycle of 
dependence on their abusers.
    USAID's updated Migrant Gender Analysis in Peru revealed that up to 
94 percent of migrants work in the informal sector and report routine 
harassment and predatory practices on behalf of their employers. It 
revealed that systemic barriers include inferior socio-economic 
positioning, gender norms, and the hyper-sexualization of women and 
girls.
    USAID's programming in Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil supports the 
socio-economic integration of these vulnerable groups. USAID 
programming recognizes that economic security is dependent on the 
ability to enter the formal economy and access financial resources and 
work to facilitate that access for migrants and local populations.

    Question. I appreciate your highlighting regional partners' efforts 
to better support and integrate displaced Venezuelans. What kind of 
effect has this had with regard to the crisis at our southern border?

    Answer. While it is impossible to know what would happen in a world 
where regional partners did not step up to support and integrate 
displaced Venezuelans, it stands to reason that Venezuelan migration to 
our southern border would be even greater. The reason is simple: If 
Venezuelan migrants and refugees cannot get a foothold in a country 
closer to home, they continue searching. For this reason--and because 
migration is a regional phenomenon presenting real development 
opportunities and challenges for our neighbors in the hemisphere--USAID 
encourages its regional partners to do more to support the 
socioeconomic integration of Venezuelan migrants closer to home. Of the 
more than 6 million Venezuelans who have fled their home country, so 
far only about 3 percent have reached the U.S. southern border. If not 
for generous policies like Colombia's issuance of temporary protected 
status to more than 2 million Venezuelan migrants, we know this number 
would be far higher. For this reason, USAID is working to support 
validation of professional degrees for Venezuelan migrants in Peru and 
helping to increase access to bank accounts and other financial 
services for Venezuelans in Ecuador, among other programs.
    USAID's programming supports partner governments to integrate 
migrants by providing technical assistance to help them regularize and 
link migrants to subnational public services, supporting host countries 
and local organizations to reduce xenophobia and increase community 
cohesion and social inclusion. Maybe most importantly, USAID supports 
the economic integration of migrants, including through job training, 
re-certification of professional licenses, foreign credential 
verification, small business development, and financial inclusion. 
USAID is laser focused on helping migrants access work opportunities 
and build livelihoods closer to home so that they are less likely to 
embark on the dangerous journey north toward the United States.

    Question. Where might we best focus our humanitarian efforts to 
better support vulnerable migrants so they reconsider a perilous 
overland journey north?

    Answer. Humanitarian aid is critical to save lives and ease 
people's suffering, but it cannot address the underlying conditions 
that caused Venezuela's crisis and led to over 6.8 million people 
leaving Venezuela. Only a peaceful, political solution can address the 
corruption, failed policies, and economic mismanagement of the Maduro 
regime, which are at the root of this crisis.
    USAID's humanitarian and development programming teams work 
together to provide immediate lifesaving relief to vulnerable 
populations while contributing to the sustainable socioeconomic 
integration of migrants, which enables migrants to settle in the 
countries where they arrive and reduces the need for them to continue 
traveling north.
    For example, USAID-supported socio-economic integration programming 
supports Venezuelans who are living in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Brazil. These ongoing efforts create longer-term employment, stable 
housing, and access to legal status, which facilitates the integration 
of Venezuelan migrants into these South American communities. In the 
immediate term, USAID humanitarian assistance meets basic needs such as 
food assistance. This needs-based assistance targets the region's most 
vulnerable populations, addressing food needs, and saving lives.

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