[Senate Hearing 117-682]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-682
THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 17, 2022
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
51-543 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
Sarah C. Pierce, Senior Counsel
Sterlin A. Waters, Research Assistant
Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
Sam J. Mulopulos, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Clyde E. Hicks Jr., Minority Director of Homeland Security
Jeremy H. Hayes, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
Margaret E. Frankel, Minority Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Ashley A. Gonzalez, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Peters............................................... 1
Senator Portman.............................................. 3
Senator Carper............................................... 18
Senator Johnson.............................................. 21
Senator Hassan............................................... 23
Senator Paul................................................. 25
Senator Lankford............................................. 28
Senator Scott................................................ 31
Senator Romney............................................... 34
Senator Hawley............................................... 36
Senator Rosen................................................ 38
Senator Sinema............................................... 41
Senator Padilla.............................................. 44
Senator Ossoff............................................... 46
Prepared statements:
Senator Peters............................................... 55
Senator Portman.............................................. 58
WITNESSES
Thursday, November 17, 2022
Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice...................... 9
Hon. Christine Abizaid, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence........ 11
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Abizaid, Hon. Christine:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 103
Mayorkas, Hon. Alejandro N.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Wray, Hon. Christopher A.:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 85
APPENDIX
U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions at the Southwest Border FY 2012
FY 2022 Chart.................................................. 113
Joint Cybersecurity Advisory................................. 114
Raul Ortiz Testimony Transcript.............................. 128
Senator Hawley Charts........................................ 135
Intercept Article............................................ 138
Response to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record
Mr. Mayorkas................................................. 160
Mr. Wray..................................................... 209
Ms. Abizaid.................................................. 214
THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Peters,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Peters, Carper, Hassan, Sinema, Rosen,
Padilla, Ossoff, Portman, Johnson, Paul, Lankford, Romney,
Scott, and Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\
Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the
Appendix on page 55.
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First of all, I would like to thank our witnesses for
joining us and for your continued service to the American
people. This hearing is an important opportunity for this
Committee to hear from our nation's top national security and
law enforcement officials about the threats facing our nations,
and how Congress can ensure the Federal Government is prepared
to protect our communities from them.
More than 20 years ago, the September 11th (9/11) terrorist
attacks changed our nation forever. In response, Congress
created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and our
entire national security apparatus focused on keeping Americans
safe from international terrorism.
However, in the more than two decades following those
attacks the threats to our communities have evolved and have
become increasingly complex.
While we must continue to monitor international terror
threats, there is no question that we must be better prepared
to defend against what top national security officials,
including those before us today have called the most lethal
terrorist threat to Americans: domestic terrorism fueled by
white nationalist and anti-government ideologies.
Yesterday, I released a report detailing the results of my
investigation. Alarmingly, my investigation found that DHS and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are not adequately
addressed the evolving domestic terrorism threat. Despite a
requirement in law, written by myself and Senator Johnson, DHS
and FBI have failed to effectively measure and share
comprehensive data on the threat posed by violent domestic
extremists (DVE), and specifically white supremacist and anti-
government violence.
Without this comprehensive data it is impossible for
Congress, and for this Committee, to determine whether our
nation's counterterrorism (CT) resources are effectively
aligned to tackle the domestic terrorism threat. We need a
data-driven approach to preventing deadly incidents like the
January 6th Capitol breach, the tragic shooting in Buffalo, and
countless other domestic terrorist attacks that have been
fueled by hateful extremist ideologies. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses today about what resources and tools
their agencies need to effectively collect data on domestic
terrorism and to prevent these crimes.
Today we will also have the opportunity to discuss the
significant threat that cyberattacks pose to our national and
our economic security. I am proud of the bipartisan work
Senator Portman and I have led this Congress to enact some of
the most significant reforms to our nation's cybersecurity
policy in history. Our reforms will ensure that DHS has the
tools, resources, and authorities needed to protect critical
infrastructure, State and local governments, and other targets
from cyberattacks. However, there is more that must be done to
continue securing our vulnerabilities from criminal hackers and
foreign adversaries, and I look forward to discussing these
topics today.
One of the most serious threats, and one of the toughest to
tackle, is the threat posed by increasingly severe natural
disasters and climate change. This is an existential threat to
our planet, and unless it is addressed it will have a
significant impact on our homeland security. Today we will hear
more about how our national security agencies are tracking
these challenges and how they are planning to address the
security threats they present now and in the future.
We also have a challenging situation at our Southern
Border, and today we will discuss the Administration's work to
secure both our Northern and Southern Borders, and prevent
illegal trafficking and stop the flow of deadly illicit drugs
like fentanyl into our communities. Those are difficult
missions that must be accomplished, ensuring that lawful
international trade and travel can continue to flow smoothly at
our ports of entry (POEs), and keep States like my home State
of Michigan a hub for international commerce.
As our national security agencies continue to tackle these
longstanding threats, they must also be prepared to counter
emerging ones. Over the last few years the threat posed by
unmanned aerial systems (UAS), or drones, has become
increasingly perilous. Small drones, which can be purchased off
the shelf at any electronic store, can be weaponized by
malicious actors to damage our nation's critical infrastructure
or inflict mass casualties.
Today's drones could be used to launch remote attacks on
everything from government buildings to crowds at public
events, including large sports stadiums. We cannot let the
current authorities that help address this grave threat expire
in December, and I will continue working to ensure those
important authorities are extended and that they are updated.
Similarly, weaponized biological, chemical, nuclear and
radioactive materials also remain a significant threat to our
homeland security. I have introduced bipartisan legislation
with Senator Portman to reauthorize and strengthen the office
in DHS charged with overseeing these threats, and I will
continue working with my colleagues to pass it as soon as
possible.
The scope and volume of these and many other national
security threats requires Congress and this Administration to
work together to ensure we are doing everything we can to keep
Americans safe.
Today I am pleased to welcome back each of our witnesses to
hear more about how their agencies are working to effectively
carry out this daunting and essential mission, and I look
forward to a productive discussion.
Before I turn things over I want to take a moment to
recognize my colleague, Senator Portman, who is retiring this
year.
Rob, it has been a real pleasure to work with you for the
past two years on this Committee. I am grateful for all of your
hard work and your diligence to help us pass so much
meaningful, bipartisan legislation through this Committee, from
providing important financial relief to the U.S. Postal Service
(USPS), to strengthening our ability to detect and deter
cyberattacks, and working to make our nation more secure and
more effective for taxpayers. It has certainly been a real
pleasure and I wish you Godspeed in all your future endeavors,
but all the work you did here will certainly never ever be
forgotten.
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, will you yield to me for just
a minute. I just want to say I am Tom Carper, and I approve
that message. [Laughter.]
Chairman Peters. I would also like to thank your Staff
Director Pam Thiessen. You have been exceptional, and you have
put together an incredible team. We have worked together,
accomplished a lot together. Always have been open, maybe not
agreeing fully, but always finding a way to try to find common
ground. We wish you Godspeed as well in your future as well,
Pam. Thank you. Thank you so much for that.
With that, Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized your
opening remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\
Senator Portman. Thank you, Chairman Peters, and just to
respond to those comments, we appreciate the relationship we
have had and the work we have gotten done. This Committee has
done a lot on a bipartisan basis, and some of it does not get
any notice because it is noncontroversial by the time we finish
our process, but in the process I want to thank you and all the
Members of the Committee for working with us to pass dozens of
bills that are making an important difference to our
constituents.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the
Appendix on page 58.
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And to you and David Weinberg of your staff, we want to
thank you for your willingness to work with us. Again, we have
not agreed on everything, but we have been able to find common
ground where possible and move the country forward. Thank you
very much for that.
Today is my last hearing as Ranking Member, and it is
appropriate that it be this hearing because it is so important
to the oversight responsibilities of this Committee and more
importantly, important to our country right now. We have,
unfortunately, a proliferation of threats facing the homeland,
and I appreciate the fact that the right people are here today
before us to be able to address those concerns and particularly
to talk about what the Administration is doing to counter those
threats. Welcome to Secretary Mayorkas, Director Wray, and
Director Abizaid. We look forward to hearing from you.
As the respective leaders of your agencies, you are
responsible for overseeing thousands of career employees, men
and women who wake up every day at DHS, the FBI, and the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), with a mission to
safeguard our Nation, and on behalf of the entire Committee I
want to thank those employees who are patriots and are doing
their best to further that mission.
Every fall since the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, we have had this hearing. We are a little late this year
because of scheduling issues, but I think it is really
important that we hold it because it is a time to stand back a
little bit and reflect on where we are and how we can work
together to address these potential threats, and active
threats. I can think of no greater priority for this Committee.
I am going to start with the crisis at the Southern Border
because sadly, I am leaving at a time when we really have not
made the progress we should have made on a bipartisan basis.
But again, we have to raise these issues and attempt to solve
some of these very significant problems.
The failed border policies from this Administration has
ensured that not only do our nation's borders remain unsecure,
but foreign adversaries, transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs), and other nefarious actors can too easily enter our
country now, and therefore threaten the safety and the security
of our public.
This issue has not gotten better. It has gotten worse. In
the past year, Border Patrol apprehended more than 2 million
total unlawful migrants. This is up 143 percent since 2019.
This chart\1\ behind me shows, in color, kind of the blue,
green, and red of where we have been. Fiscal year (FY) 2021 and
fiscal year 2022 figure are on the right. We just got the final
figures for fiscal year 2022, and unfortunately it tells a very
dramatic story of us failing to secure that Southern Border.
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\1\ The chart referenced by Senator Portman appears in the Appendix
on page 113.
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This does not include the number of ``got-aways,'' or
individuals who are not detected. What we hear from the Border
Patrol is that the number of got-aways has increased
significantly as well.
These are criminals, often, who engage in human
trafficking, criminals who involve themselves in the drug
trade. This is about people but it is also about the fact that
we have a record number of fentanyl shipments coming through
the border, both through ports of entry and between the ports
of entry now. We know this from anecdotal evidence but also
because there is a record number of seizures of these deadly
fentanyl shipments into our communities.
Fentanyl, of course, is what is causing the most number of
overdose deaths at time when we have a record number, sadly, of
overdose deaths in our country. In Ohio, we think it is between
two-thirds and three-quarters of the deaths related to this one
drug, deadly fentanyl, which is primarily coming across the
Mexican border now.
This has been a tough couple of years, the worst two years
of unlawful migration and the worst two years of drug seizures
in our nation's history. I look forward to talking about that.
We have to figure out how to move forward. Again, on a
bipartisan basis, we have to figure out how to fix what is
clearly a broken system.
Another issue I want to address today is the chaotic
withdrawal from Afghanistan, what that means in terms of the
United States. Afghans who stood with us and our allies were
left behind to suffer under Taliban rule, and meanwhile more
than 36,000 Afghans with no record of ever having partnered
with us, some of whom may have ties to terrorist groups, were
paroled into our country without proper screening and vetting.
I appreciate the fact that, Director Wray, you are here to
talk about that in addition to Secretary Mayorkas, because,
this is one, again, where if we made mistakes, and we can
correct those mistakes. We can go back, and I know you are
starting to do that, from testimony we have had both publicly
and privately.
But, we had this unfortunate, chaotic, and precipitous
withdrawal that caused a lot of issues, but one was paroling
people into our country who were not properly screened. There
have been three reports now from two inspectors general (IGs)
documenting the failures of DHS vetting and then paroling known
or suspected terrorist into our communities, and yet we just do
not have an acknowledgment of that problem from DHS.
President Biden requested and received an additional $15
million for the FBI to conduct counterterror investigations of
known or suspected terrorists among the Afghan evacuees
released into our country by DHS. In other words, he asked for
$15 million to give to the FBI to do this additional vetting,
and yet the Administration says it is not a problem. Those two
are inconsistent, of course. Perhaps we can talk about those
divergent views on this panel this morning.
We all recognize the grave threat posed by our adversaries,
such as Russia, Iran, and China, who rely on disinformation
tactics to weaken our democracy. I think there is a consensus
about that. But at home, we have to be much more careful around
issues of domestic speech. We must respond to imminent threats
of violence, of course--I do not think anybody on this
Committee disagrees with that--but censoring constitutionally
protected speech is an entirely different matter. To be
precise, that should be a redline.
I hope we can all agree that the United States government
should not censor the speech of our own citizens. Americans'
speech, differences of opinion, and political viewpoints are
not a threat to democracy, but actually a bedrock of it.
We know now that DHS disbanded its disturbing
Disinformation Governance Board after significant public
outcry, but we also know that it has continued its efforts to
curb speech under the guise of countering misinformation or
disinformation. The entanglement of the FBI and DHS with social
media platforms for the purposes of controlling narratives is
something we need to talk about today. I think it is a deep
concern that all Americans have that we not cross that red
line.
Recent reports allege that DHS is colluding with Big Tech
to moderate content in a way that conforms with the Biden
administration's political views, including on the Afghanistan
withdrawal and things like the origin of Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19).
Our democracy is also under threat because Congress and the
Administration have been unwilling to confront the systematic
theft of U.S. intellectual property by China which is
undermining our national security and our economic security.
Secretary Wray has been outspoken on this. His quote is,
``There is no country that presents a broader, more severe
threat to our innovation, our ideas, and our economic security
than China.'' I could not agree more.
But every day, China reinforces the findings of our various
investigations of this Committee, showing the staggering extent
of the Chinese government's efforts to conduct influence and
espionage operations in our country, and to steal American
technology, research, and information for their own military
and economic benefit. Addressing what the Communist Party of
China is doing is more urgent than ever, and yet the
Safeguarding American Innovation Act, which was reported out of
this Committee, has been blocked from becoming law because of
the unwillingness of Congress to confront this issue.
Cyberattacks are another significant issue facing every
sector of our country. We talked about this a moment ago with
Senator Peters. We have made some progress here in this
Committee. I appreciate that. But cyberattacks are growing and
they are a force multiplier for our adversaries. We have to
understand that this is an issue that they are going to
continue to use. Our economic and security is depending on
technology, and we have to be sure that we are not vulnerable
here. Compounding that problem is the inherent difficulty of
attributing cyberattacks to specific nation-states or criminal
groups.
Terrorism and targeted violence also remain serious threats
to our country. This year, an Islamist terrorist gained entry
to the United States and attacked a synagogue in Colleyville,
Texas. In a separate incident, an Ohio-based Islamic State
operative plotted to assassinate former President Bush. We are
not out of the woods in terms of the Islamic terrorist threat.
I remain convinced that we can deal with these issues on a
bipartisan basis, as we have in the past, but I am concerned
about the threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations
(FTOs), especially in the wake of our withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda continues to pose a threat. The Islamic
State continues to expand and mobilize. Iranian-sponsored Shi'a
terrorist groups target key U.S. interests and government
officials consistently. We must remain vigilant as these
organizations regroup and evolve.
We must restore confidence in the American public that we
are committed to protect our nation from terrorism, espionage,
and other homeland security threats, and this should be a
bipartisan effort. We all have the same goal, a safe, secure
American homeland.
With that said, I look forward to the testimony this
morning, Mr. Chairman, but most importantly, the responses to
our questions regarding the record of the Administration
addressing these threats, what we can do going forward
together. I will note that only last week did we finally
receive overdue answers to questions that we had from last
year's hearing. It took over a year. I hope that in this case
we will get more prompt responses to Committee questions that
are posed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
Before I swear in the witnesses I want to make sure
everyone knows how this will proceed, both our witnesses and
Members. We are going to have two rounds of questions today.
The first round, as we normally do, will be seven minutes for
each person. Then second round we are going to have five
minutes per person on the second round, due to time constraints
with all of our witnesses.
I am going to enforce those time limits perhaps a little
more aggressively than I have in the past for everyone--seven
minutes first round, five minutes the second round.
It is the practice of the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses,
so if each of you will stand and raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Secretary Mayorkas. I do.
Mr. Wray. I do.
Ms. Abizaid. I do.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, you may be seated.
Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas is the seventh Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security. Over his distinguished 30-
year career as a law enforcement official and nationally
recognized lawyer he has served as the Department's Deputy
Secretary, as Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), and at the Department of Justice (DOJ) as
Assistant United States Attorney (ASUA) in the Central District
of California.
Mr. Secretary, thank you again for being here before the
Committee. You may proceed with your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS,\1\ SECRETARY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
Portman, distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for
inviting me to join you today. Ranking Member Portman, thank
you for your unwavering support of our Department.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Secretary Mayorkas appears in the
Appendix on page 62.
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Next week marks the 20th anniversary of the Homeland
Security Act being signed into law. This act brought together
many components of the Federal Government to safeguard the
United States against foreign terrorism in the wake of the
devastation wrought on September 11, 2001. It remains the
largest reorganization of the Federal Government's national
security establishment since 1947. It is a testament to the
grave threat we faced as a nation from terrorism brought to our
shores by foreign actors and foreign terrorist organizations.
Congress created a department that has significantly
reduced the risk foreign terrorism poses to the homeland by
increasing our capacity to prepare for and respond to those
events.
Foreign terrorist organizations remain committed to
attacking the United States from within and beyond our borders.
They use social media platform to amplify messaging intended to
inspire attacks in the homeland. They have adapted to changing
security environments, seeking new and innovative ways to
target the United States.
The evolving terrorism threat to the homeland now includes
lone actors or small cells, domestic violent extremists seeking
to further some political or social goal or act on a grievance,
and home-grown violent extremists (HVE) looking to advance the
interest of a foreign terrorist organization. From cyberattacks
on our critical infrastructure to increasing destabilizing
efforts by hostile nation-states, the threats facing the
homeland have never been greater or more complex.
Flouting internationally accepted norms of responsible
behavior in cyberspace, our adversaries, hostile nations, and
non-nation state cybercriminals continue to advance in
capability and sophistication. Their methods vary, but their
goals of doing harm are the same. Hostile nations like Russia,
the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea,
and cybercriminals around the world continue to sharpen their
tactics and create more adverse consequences. Their ransomware
attacks target our financial institutions, hospitals,
pipelines, electric grids, and water treatment plants,
attempting to wreak havoc on our daily lives. They exploit the
integrated global cyber ecosystem to sow discord, undermine
democracy, and erode trust in our institutions, public and
private. These cyber operations threaten the economic and
national security of every American and many others around the
world.
In particular, China is using its technology to tilt the
global playing field to its benefit. They leverage
sophisticated cyber capabilities to gain access to the
intellectual property, data, and infrastructure of American
individuals and businesses. Russia's unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine intensified the risk of a cyberattack, impacting our
critical infrastructure earlier this year. Nation-state
aggression is creating a heightened risk of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) related threats to
Americans as well.
While fast-emerging technologies like unmanned aerial
systems, artificial intelligence (AI), internet communications,
and cryptocurrencies are helping societies be more productive,
creative, and entrepreneurial, they also are introducing new
risks. Transnational criminal organizations are deploying these
technologies to commit a wide array of crimes as they continue
to grow in size, scale, sophistication, and lethality.
With respect to unmanned aerial systems in particular, it
is vital that Congress act before the end of this year to
extend our counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) authorities
in order to protect the American people from malicious drone
activity.
The risk of targeted violence, perpetrated by actors abroad
and at home, is substantial. Emerging technology platforms
allow individuals and national States to fan the flames of hate
and personal grievances to large audiences, and are encouraging
people to commit violent acts.
Those driven to violence are targeting critical
infrastructure, soft targets, faith-based institutions,
institutions of higher education, racial and religious
minorities, government facilities and personnel, including law
enforcement and the military, and perceived ideological
opponents.
Addressing these threats requires a whole-of-society
approach across Federal, State, and local governments, the
private sector, nonprofits, academia, and most importantly,
every citizen. Congress may not have predicted the extent of
today's threat environment when our department was created 20
years ago, but our mission has never been more vital. Our
components have never collaborated more closely, our
extraordinary workforce has never been more capable, and our
nation has never been more prepared. We must harness the same
deliberative and bipartisan spirit in which this Department was
created to combat the vast threats Americans face today.
I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Secretary Mayorkas.
Director Christopher Wray is the eighth Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Director Wray began his law
enforcement career over two decades ago, serving in the
Department of Justice as the Assistant U.S. Attorney for the
Northern District of Georgia.
He has also served on the President's corporate Fraud Tax
Force and supervised the Enron Tax Force, in addition to
playing a key role in the national security objectives for the
Department.
Director Wray, thank you for appearing before the Committee
once again. You may proceed with your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY,\1\ DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Wray. Good morning, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
Portman, and Members of the Committee. I am honored to be here
today on behalf of the FBI's 38,000 men and women to discuss
some of the most pressing threats facing our homeland.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Wray appears in the Appendix on
page 85.
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When it comes to the current threat landscape, what makes
our current situation unique, and I would add particularly
serious, is the fact that we are seeing so many different
threat areas all elevated at the same time. I am proud of the
work the FBI's agents, analysts, and professional staff are
doing all across the country and around the world every day to
rise to that challenge and protect the American people.
Protecting the American people from terrorist attack
remains the FBI's No. 1 priority. As I have said before, the
greatest threat we face on the terrorism front here in the
homeland is from what are effectively lone actors or small
cells. Whether you are talking about a domestic violent
extremist acting in furtherance of some ideological goal or a
home-grown violent extremist looking to advance the interest of
a foreign terrorist organization, these actors often move very
quickly from radicalization to action and often use easily
obtainable weapons--think a gun, a knife, a car, a crude
improvised explosive device (IED)--against soft targets, which
is really just intelligence community (IC)-speak for everyday
people going about their everyday lives.
Overseas, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-
Qaeda still aim to inspire, plan, and launch attacks against
the United States and our allies, both abroad and here at home.
As the Zawahiri strike this summer in Kabul reinforces, the
threat of foreign terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda
attempting to reconstitute in Afghanistan following our
withdrawal is very real, and our ability to gather valuable
intelligence on the ground inside Afghanistan has been reduced.
That is just a reality, and all of that places a premium on our
continued collaboration with our partners, both within the U.S.
Government and internationally. We have to stay on the balls of
our feet and use all of the tools available to us.
On top of that, countries like China, Russia, Iran, and
North Korea are all growing more aggressive, more brazen, more
capable. They are coming at us from all angles to undermine our
core democratic institutions, our national security, and our
rule of law.
Of those countries, the greatest long-term threat to our
nation's ideas, innovation, and economic security, our national
security, is that from China. The Chinese government aspires to
equal or surpass the United States as a global superpower and
influence the world with a value system shaped by undemocratic,
authoritarian ideals.
But we are confronting that threat head on. Three weeks
ago, for example, we unsealed charges against 13 individuals,
10 of them Chinese intelligence officers and government
officers, for a variety of criminal efforts to exert influence
right here in the United States on behalf of Beijing, and we
have scores of investigations into the China threat in all 56
FBI field offices.
On the cyber front, China's vast hacking program is the
world's largest by a mile, and they have stolen more of
Americans' personal and business data than every other nation
combined.
But, of course, China is not our only challenge in
cyberspace, not even close. The FBI's cyber investigations are
growing in frequency, scale, and complexity, consistent with
the evolution of the threat. We are investigating over 100
different ransomware variants, each with scores of victims, as
well as a host of other novel threats posed by both cyber
criminals and nation-states alike. It is becoming more and more
difficult to discern where the cybercriminal activity ends and
the nation-state activity begins, as the line between those two
continues to blur.
Just last month, for example, we announced the indictment
of three Iranian nationals for their roles in a multiyear
scheme to compromise the networks of hundreds of organizations,
many of which offer critical services Americans rely on every
day.
These sort of actors nothing is off limits, not even, for
example, Boston Children's Hospital, which they set their
sights on in the summer of 2021. Now fortunately, before they
could successfully launch their attack we received a tip from a
partner, and working closely with the hospital we were able to
identify and defeat the threat, protecting both the network and
the sick kids who depend on it.
Our opponents in this space are relentless, and we have to
keep responding in kind. I can assure you that we are going to
continue to be aggressive and creative as we run joint
sequenced operations with our partners against those
adversaries, removing their malware, taking down their botnets,
and hunting them down all over the world.
Now that is just a snapshot really of some of the many
threats we are tackling and does not even include things like
our efforts to combat violent crime, where this summer, working
with our State and local partners, we arrested, on average, 50
violent criminals every day.
Or our continued focus on human trafficking, where this
August, through our annual Operation Cross Country, for
instance, the FBI and our partners located more than 200
victims of human trafficking, many of them little kids.
Or the work our transnational organized crime section is
doing, in partnership with agencies like DHS, to investigate
the movement of people, drugs, guns, and money into the United
States across our southern border.
The breadth and depth of the threats the FBI's dedicated
men and women are tackling each and every day is staggering,
and I continue to be inspired by their commitment to our
mission of protecting the American people and upholding the
Constitution. I know we will continue to answer the call.
Thank you again for having me here today, and I would be
happy to address your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Director Wray.
Director Christine Abizaid is the eighth Senate-confirmed
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Previously,
she served on the National Security Council staff as both
Director for Counterterrorism and Senior Policy Advisor to the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism.
She has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, and as a
Senior Intelligence Analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA).
Ms. Abizaid, thank you again for appearing before this
Committee. It is good to have you back. You may proceed with
your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE ABIZAID,\1\ DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much. Chairman Peters, Ranking
Member Portman, and Members of the Committee, thank you very
much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the overall terrorism landscape.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid appears in the Appendix
on page 103.
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Despite significant progress in diminishing the terrorist
threat to the United States, the country continues to face a
diversified, transnational, and in many ways, unpredictable
threat environment at home and abroad. An array of actors,
whether foreign terrorist organizations, state sponsors of
terrorism, or lone actors, are shaping the nature of today's
threat.
This changed environment exists amid an ongoing transition
for the counterterrorism community where CT, while still
critical, is one of many competing priorities the U.S. national
security community must be postured to address.
In today's testimony I will start by giving an overview of
the terrorist threat to the homeland, turn to the overseas
threat environment, and then end with some comments on the
importance of our continued CT effort.
Regarding the United States homeland, terrorist
organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda remain committed to
attacking inside the United States. However, unlike 21 years
ago, the threat today is more likely to take the form of an
individual attacker inspired by these groups rather than a
networked and hierarchically directed plot. In fact, since 9/
11, 37 of the 45 ISIS or al-Qaeda-linked attacks in the
homeland have been inspired by these groups, rather than
centrally directed by them.
This trend toward lone actor threats inside the United
States extends beyond ISIS and al-Qaeda. It also characterizes
the threat we face from domestic actors, such as racially or
ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs), militia
violent extremists (MVEs), and anarchist violent extremists
(AVEs).
In particular, the racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremist threat has the most obvious links to transnational
actors, whose plots and professed ideology encourage
mobilization to violence by those vulnerable to their message.
This threat is fluid, it is fragmented, lacking in hierarchical
structures, with proponents around the globe framing actions
around the concept of leaderless resistance.
Transitioning to the overseas environment, Sunni- and Shia-
driven terrorist movements worldwide continue to dominate the
threat to Americans. ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to aspire to
attack United States and other Western interests overseas, but
have been more effective at pursing operations against regional
and local adversaries.
For its part, ISIS in Iraq and Syria remains an intact,
centrally led organizations that will most likely continue to
pose both a global and local threat, this despite the death of
its emir, Haji Abdullah, in February.
While significantly weaker than its peak in 2015 through
2017, ISIS leaders from Iraq and Syria have been successful at
spurning branches and networks across Africa and as far as
South and East Asia, with its two most effective branches
currently operating out of West Africa and Afghanistan.
Likewise, al-Qaeda maintains its regional affiliate
structure positioned effectively in parts of North and East
Africa, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent South Asia. The
July death of longtime al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was
a strategic and symbolic setback for the organization, but it
does not put an end to al-Qaeda.
In particular, in the Middle East, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula is a destabilizing actor in Yemen and remains among
the most intrepid al-Qaeda affiliates intent on attacks inside
the U.S. homeland.
Two other prominent al-Qaeda affiliates also stand out,
both for their growing regional influence and their significant
capabilities, the Sahel-based al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat
al-Is lam al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Somalia-based affiliate, al-
Shabaab.
Of note, we continue to monitor for signs al-Qaeda has
chosen a successor to Zawahiri, now three months since his
death. In addition to al-Qaeda affiliate leaders, we are
particularly focused on the role that Iran-based legacy
leaders, such as Sayf al-'Adl, may play in the future of the
organization.
Transitioning from Sunni terrorism to threats emanating
from Iran, its partners, and its proxies, Iran continue to
plan, encourage, and support plots against the United States,
both at home and in the Middle East, where we have a
significant U.S. military presence. Iran and Lebanese Hizballah
have sought to plot attacks against former U.S. officials to
retaliate for the death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) Qods Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, raising the
threat both at home and abroad for those that Iran deems
responsible.
In closing, I would just highlight that the complexity of
the international terrorism and extremism environment that I
just outlined continues to demand a collaborate, agile, and
sufficiently resourced counterterrorism effort to mitigate
terrorist threats to the United States.
It is clear that the significant CT pressure brought to
bear against terrorist groups over the last two decades, along
with investment in effective CT defenses here at home, has
resulted in a diminished threat to the United States homeland.
NCTC and its CT partners across the government are working
toward a sustainable and enduring level of support to this
mission that maintains the strategic success. In fact, the role
of NCTC today is perhaps more important than ever. Charged with
integrating and analyzing all terrorism information across the
United States government and sharing that information with
partners, both foreign and domestic, organizations like NCTC
can help ensure that CT remains a foundational element of
national security, even as other organizations must shift to
other pressing priorities.
Finally, I want to assure this Committee that the
interagency enterprise of CT practitioners remains committed to
this mission and are working behind the scenes every day to
protect the American people, both at home and abroad. It is
with great gratitude and privilege that I appear before you
today and have the opportunity to recognize the incredible
community of intelligence, diplomatic, military, and law
enforcement professionals whose dedication to the CT mission
has done so much to protect this country and its citizens.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I am subject to your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Director Abizaid.
Yesterday I released a report following a multiyear
investigation on the growing domestic terrorism threat. I
believe we provided it to each of the witnesses yesterday. This
is also available through the website, the Homeland Security
Committee website, to read in its entirety.
In the report we found that despite being required by law,
my investigation found that DHS and FBI have failed to
systematically track and report data on domestic terrorism,
they have not appropriately allocated resources to match the
current threat, and have not aligned definitions of domestic
terrorism to ensure consistency across the investigations of
these crimes. Quite frankly, it is hard to address this rising
threat if we cannot quantify and define the scope of the
problem so that we can tailor an appropriate response to, and
the agencies appear not to be doing that.
Director Wray, we have seen think tanks and nonprofits
collect more comprehensive about domestic terrorism attacks
than the U.S. Government has been able to do. Why has the FBI
been unable to collect and report complete data about domestic
terrorism despite a Federal law requiring you to do so?
Mr. Wray. Mr. Chairman, I know all too well that there have
been frustrations in the reports that have been generated under
the law that you are referring to. I think we have made
progress between the first report and the second report, and we
are committed to continuing to make progress. Some of the
issues have to do with, if you go further back in time, before
2015 for example, we were using paper as opposed to electronic
and so the ability to go back and track earlier than 2015 I
know has been a source of tension at times.
In addition, State and local law enforcement and tribal law
enforcement are not required to report domestic terrorism to
us. While we do get lots of reports of that through our Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), it is not as systematic as any of
us would like it to be.
Then you mentioned the terminology change. We have changed
terminology over time. There are good reasons for that. But
there is some risk then at having sort of an apple-to-orange
type effect in the comparisons.
But we are committed to continuing to work with the
Committee on this topic, and our data-tracking limitations
should in no way be confused with our commitment to
prioritizing this issue. I elevated racially motivated violent
extremism to a national threat priority all the way back in
June, I think it was, or the summer of 2019, and we have surged
resources to address that, and the pace of investigations and
arrests over my first 3.5 years as director, doubled, or in the
case of arrests even tripled in this space.
We have been working hard on it but we do need more
resources in this space, and our fiscal 2022 budget
specifically asks for more resources to help address the
domestic terrorism threat.
Chairman Peters. I appreciate your work on this, you were
right. The second report was better than the first report, and
I would hope that we could work closely together to make the
third report even better, because that information is obviously
critical for us to understanding the scope of the problem and
then design appropriate responses to it. But I appreciate your
active engagement in that, Director Wray.
I also remain extremely concerned about the threat posed to
our nation from bad actors using unmanned aircraft systems, to
disrupt our society, or worse, to potentially conduct a lethal
attack on our Nation.
Earlier this year this Committee unanimously passed a bill,
authored by Senator Johnson and I, to protect our nation's
airports, critical infrastructure, and public spaces from these
evolving threats.
Secretary Mayorkas, as you are well aware, these
authorities are set to expire next month, on the 16th of
December. Could you explain to this Committee the consequences
of allowing these authorities to lapse?
Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Peters, I am deeply
appreciative of your and Senator Johnson's bipartisan effort to
propose legislation to not only continue our authority to
counter unmanned aerial systems but also to expand it
critically, and that need is very grave.
Just yesterday I was meeting with experts who were speaking
of the increased efficiency, sophistication, and capability of
drones in terms of their visibility, the speed with which they
can move, the distance with which they can move, and also the
loads that they can carry. This poses a real threat, and we see
it very often, sometimes by innocent operators who mistakenly
interfere with the airspace and cause aircraft to reroute their
journeys, to bad actors, and we see it quite tragically in the
war zone that Russia created with its unprovoked assault on
Ukraine.
These are extraordinarily sophisticated tools that can
carry drugs, that can launch weaponry, and we must be able to
counter it. It is only an increasing threat, and we hope that
Congress passes the legislation that you and Senator Johnson
have proposed.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Secretary. We have limited time
and I am going to keep strict to seven minutes for everybody.
Director Wray, the FBI is the lead on protecting mass
gatherings like the Super Bowl and other areas. How concerned
are you about these authorities lapsing?
Mr. Wray. We are deeply concerned, and we appreciate this
Committee's leadership on this topic. It is important for
Americans to understand that if that authority is not
reauthorized next month that public gatherings like the Super
Bowl in Arizona, like New Year's Eve in Times Square, like
Formula One in Las Vegas, and I could go on, none of those
things will have protection from this threat. All the times
that we have deployed with the authority that this Committee
has led the passage of before, we have located hundreds of
drones that have been acting in violation of Federal law each
time.
As the threat continues to grow, we are investigating, even
as we speak, several incidents within the United States, of
attempts to weaponize drones with homemade IEDs. That is the
future that is here now, and this authority desperately needs
to be reauthorized.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Director Wray, with eight
seconds left of my time.
Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for your
questions.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to thank
you and Senator Johnson for working on a bipartisan basis to
put together this legislation. I am a co-sponsor of it. I know
the House has a different view in terms of how they would like
to approach it, but we have to get this one done. I mean, we
just heard about the importance of it, so I thank both of you
for working on this issue, and it is less than a month when it
expires, so we have to move, and move quickly.
I spoke in my opening statement about the appreciation we
have for the men and women who you represent. We just learned
from media accounts that five Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) agents were shot, one fatally, during a vessel
interdiction against suspected drug smugglers off the coast of
Puerto Rico. This just happened, and our thoughts and prayers,
of course, are with the family of the agent who was fatally
shot and also with those agents who were wounded.
But I think it is a sober reminder of the sacrifices that
the individuals who you represent today here make every day,
and we owe them our support. It is a dangerous time, and this
is an unfortunate example of that.
With regard to the Southern Border, we have talked a lot
about this over the months, and years even. How do you take a
broken system and fix it? Because clearly, if you look at this
chart\1\ behind me, it is broken. We have had all kinds of
charts in this Committee and all kinds of discussions about it.
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\1\ The chart referenced by Senator Portman appears in the Appendix
on page 113.
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There was an interesting back-and-forth recently between
President Biden's Chief of Border Patrol, Raul Ortiz, who works
for you, as you know, Mr. Secretary, and the State of Florida.
The Attorney General (AG) in Florida has a lawsuit against the
Department with regard to the Southern Border. I just thought I
would go over that quickly.
This has been the worst year of apprehensions ever, the
last fiscal year, but the second-worst year was last year.
These numbers speak for themselves. More than two million
people apprehended between the ports of entry in 2022.
This summer, when the Chief of Border Patrol was questioned
by the State of Florida he gave his answers under oath, and I
would ask unanimous consent (UC) to place the transcript of the
Border Patrol Chief's testimony into the record, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Without objection.
Senator Portman. Secretary, I am going to ask you the same
questions that the Chief of Border Patrol was asked to see if
you agree with him, and if you could, please just give me a yes
or no answer, as he did.
The first question, is the Southern Border currently in
crisis? Yes or no.
Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Portman, the entire
hemisphere is suffering a migration crisis. We are seeing an
unprecedented movement of people from country to country. It is
not restricted to the Southern Border. We are seeing an
unprecedented movement of people throughout the Western
Hemisphere, and I think the case of Venezuela is the most
compelling example. With a population of between 25 and 28
million people, approximately eight million of them have left
that country. Colombia is hosting 2.4 million Venezuelans.
Senator Portman. I would ask you for a yes-or-no answer to
the Southern Border. I have been to Colombia twice in the last
year. I am very aware of what is going on with regard to the
displaced people out of Venezuela, and for that matter
Nicaragua and Cuba.
But the question is all the more pressing. What are we
doing about? Should we not be changing our policies at the
border to deal with it instead of having this result.
My question to you again, is the Southern Border current in
crisis? Yes or no.
Secretary Mayorkas. We are seeing a significant challenge
at the Southern Border, as we are seeing it throughout the
hemisphere.
Senator Portman. Chief Ortiz stated yes, just so you know.
He said the obvious, which is yes.
Second question. Would you agree that an unprecedented
number of unlawful migrants are entering the United States
right now? Yes or no.
Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Portman, I believe that
the number of encounters that we have had the border, I think
it is approximately 2.3 million this past year, is the highest
on record.
Senator Portman. OK. So the answer is yes by Chief Ortiz,
and it sounds like you agree with him on that.
Mr. Secretary, since when President Biden took office is it
true that the number of migrants trying to unlawfully enter the
United States has increased substantially? Yes or no.
Secretary Mayorkas. It has, and there are many different
factors that contribute to that.
Senator Portman. OK. But I ask you these questions
obviously because the answer was yes. He was candid and gave
short answers. We cannot fix the problem unless we acknowledge
it. We cannot fix the problem unless we understand the facts.
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes.
Senator Portman. We cannot fix the problem unless we are
willing to be honest Republicans, Democrats, everyone alike,
saying we have a crisis. If we do not fix this crisis at the
border we will continue to see these same rules.
Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Portman, if I may, there
has been a problem with our immigration system, an acknowledge
one, unanimously, for years and years.
Senator Portman. For years and years, but again, look at
this chart. This is the numbers, so it has gotten far worse.
Look, we do not have time to go into the details as to how we
fix it, but you and I have talked about this a lot, Mr.
Secretary. If the asylum system is not fixed, this will not
end. If we do not give the Border Patrol more resources, this
is not going to end. If we do not figure out a way to provide
for deportations when people are here illegally, particularly
when they are committing other crimes, this will continue.
We are unfortunately looking at a situation where, you
mentioned Colombia, if you go to the countries throughout the
hemisphere they believe this is a pull factor, our policies.
The leadership of these countries actually do not want their
people moving into the United States. That might seem
counterintuitive to some people, but some of their best and
brightest are leaving because of our pull factor, because we
are not putting in place the right policies to go to control
our own Southern Border.
I have so many other questions, and we will get a chance in
the second round. I hope to talk about some of these. With
regard to the cyberattacks we talked about earlier, the
agencies that have been compromised in some of these attacks
concern us greatly. Yesterday, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) and the FBI issued a joint advisory
detailing suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors'
compromise of the Federal agencies using this Log4j
vulnerability. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, to include that
advisory in the record\2\ so we have it as part of this record.
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\2\ The information referenced by Senator Portman appears in the
Appendix on page 114.
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We have discussed this vulnerability at length in this
Committee, another example of the issues.
My time is expiring here in a second, but can you just tell
us, Secretary Mayorkas, what agencies are agency was
compromised with regard to this latest announcement you made
regarding the Iranian government-sponsored attack?
Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Portman, that identity
has not been disclosed, and I would need to speak with my
colleagues to determine whether I would be compromising any
security interest in doing so.
Senator Portman. Are you confident that the actors have
been expelled from our Federal networks?
Secretary Mayorkas. I will once again need to confer with
my colleagues to determine the status of the effort by the bad
actors.
Senator Portman. We are considering, as you know, this
Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA)
reauthorization to trigger cyber incident reporting to
Congress. Would this be considered a major incident?
Secretary Mayorkas. I believe so, Ranking Member Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
Senator Carper, you are recognized for your seven minutes
of questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Seven. OK.
To each of our witnesses, welcome. It is great to see you
all again. Some of you I have known for a while and pretty
well, and I even know your families. I just want to say, to
begin with, we do not do these jobs by ourselves, whether you
are on that side of the table or this side of the table. Our
families put up with a lot, and we just want to thank your
families for sharing you with us, especially as Thanksgiving
approaches.
The first Secretary of Homeland Security was a guy named
Tom Ridge from Pennsylvania, from Erie, Pennsylvania. We are
both Vietnam veterans. We were congressmen together in the same
freshman class. We were Governors together for a number of
years. He remains a very close friend.
I joined this Committee, I was elected in, oh Lord, I want
to say 22 years ago, and Joe Lieberman said, when I tried to
decide what Committees to be on, he said, ``You should try to
get on the Governmental Affairs Committee.'' I said, ``Well, I
am interested in that,'' and he said, ``It is just the perfect
fit for you, a former Governor, former State treasurer. You
care about things working well.'' And he said, ``You should
join the Committee,'' and I did. Two years later, 9/11 came
along, and we ended up the whole world changed. Our whole world
changed.
The nature of the threats that we faced the day that Tom
Ridge was sworn into office to be our Secretary, and what we
face today is unbelievable. It is just incredible how the world
has changed, in not so good ways. I just want to say a special
thanks to each of you and the folks you work with that help us
try to address and be ready for the threats that are coming our
way, almost every day.
I will start with Secretary Mayorkas, and in the second
round of questions, if I am lucky, I will ask questions of our
other two witnesses. But Mr. Secretary, again, my first
question is to you. I know your job is not an easy one. Between
leading a workforce of almost a quarter of a million people,
whose duties range anywhere from aviation to border security,
enhancing our nation's cyber posture, responding to natural
disasters, and protecting the homeland, I hope that everyone
here today can respect that and that your dedication and
service to our nation is commendable. That goes for all three
of our witnesses here today, and I thank you again for your
service.
As we continue to see a number of encounters at our
Southern Border, the Department of Homeland Security has been
leading a whole-of-government response to address these
challenges and to help keep our borders more secure. Mr.
Secretary, can you just talk about some of the changes in
migration patterns that we have seen at our Southern Border in
the last year and a half, and what policies the Department has
put in place to address these challenges? Specifically, can you
speak to the investments in border technology and legal
migration pathways and your level of engagement with other
countries in the region, given that the migration patterns have
been a hemispheric challenge? Please.
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator Carper, thank you for
acknowledging the challenge that these positions present. Of
course, a challenge is all relative. Ranking Member Portman
mentioned the tragic loss of one of our frontline personnel.
Several other were gravely wounded. I was briefed on the
situation very early this morning. These are brave members of
our Air and Marine Operations within U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. The difficulty of this job cannot be compared to
the difficulty that our frontline personnel face every day, and
their bravery and selfless service should be recognized. I
appreciate Ranking Member Portman acknowledging that.
The migration patterns in the hemisphere have changed
dramatically. When I was the Deputy Secretary we were very
concerned about migration from the Central American countries
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. We have encountered
now the highest level of encounters by Venezuelans, Cubans, and
Nicaraguans, and that demographic, that changed demographic
makes the challenge even more acute because our diplomatic
relations with these countries is obviously quite strained and
we are unable to remove as easily individuals from these
countries of origin.
Of course, we implemented thus far, at an early stage, a
very successful response to the Venezuelan migration, in
particular.
We have six lines of effort, Senator Carper. We have surged
resources to the Southern Border--personnel, technology,
facilities, transportation capabilities. We have increased our
processing efficiency. We are increasingly digitizing our
processes, modernizing them so that the intake process and the
screening and vetting process is enhanced and more efficient.
We are delivering consequences for unlawful entry. We have
increased the level of prosecution of illegal entry when
individuals seek to evade law enforcement. We have sought to
bolster the capacity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and State and local jurisdictions. We are conducting an
unprecedented disruption campaign against the smuggling
organizations and the transnational criminal organizations.
We are also working very closely with our partners to the
south to deter irregular migration. The declaration that was
signed in the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles several
months ago speaks powerfully of that. We need countries
throughout the hemisphere to enforce their laws of humanitarian
relief as well as their laws of enforcement.
This is a multipronged effort to address a multinational
challenge throughout the hemisphere.
Senator Carper. Thank you for that response.
Most of us are people of faith, and there is a verse of
scripture in Matthew 25 that I think a lot of us are familiar
with, ``When I was hungry, you would feed me. When I was
thirsty, you gave me drink. When I was naked, you clothed me.
When I was sick and imprisoned, you visited. When I was a
stranger in your land, did you welcome me?'' When I was a
stranger in your land, did you welcome me?
The last one is hard. In fact, they are pretty difficult.
But the last one is especially hard.
In an effort to try to reduce the likelihood that people
are going to risk life and limb to come to this country and
relocate here, they leave, in some cases, hellacious conditions
in which they lived. They have come many miles, hundreds of
miles sometimes, to reach our borders, and some of us think,
why do we not give them the opportunity if they want to come
here, to actually go to our embassies or our consulates and let
those intentions be known and to work from there?
Would you respond to that idea, please? Just briefly?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator Carper, our laws are laws of
humanitarian relief and laws of accountability. We have an
asylum system that is one of the sources of pride of our
country and we enforce the law. When an individual qualifies
for humanitarian relief they are, under the law, entitled to
remain here, and if they do not qualify they are to be removed,
and we are enforcing the laws in every respect.
Senator Carper. Thanks so much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Senator Johnson, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Wray,
you made a comment here, in answer to the Chairman's
questioning, that you were committed to working with this
Committee. You will excuse me if I find those words ringing
incredibly hollow. I had to subpoena you, as Chairman of this
Committee. I really did not get anything. I have written
repeated letters, either with no response whatsoever or a
nonresponse response.
It is one of the reasons that I am very grateful to all the
whistleblowers that are coming forward, to various committees,
to various members, people of integrity within your
organizations, blowing the whistle on the corruption at some of
the highest levels of the FBI.
First question. Do you commit, publicly, that the FBI will
not retaliate against those whistleblowers?
Mr. Wray. Senator, we will not retaliate against
whistleblowers. I take the protections that are in law and
regulation of whistleblowers extremely seriously.
Senator Johnson. I will hold you to that.
Mr. Wray. Just like I take compliance with all of our other
rules very seriously.
Senator Johnson. Yes. Senator Grassley wrote you a letter
on July 25, 2020, in which he said that whistleblowers to his
office reported that FBI officials initiated a scheme to
downplay derogatory information on Hunter Biden for the purpose
of shutting down investigatory activity related to his
potential criminal exposure by labeling it, ``disinformation.''
Boy, that is a familiar term. That scheme was hatched in August
2020.
Also included, he said, in August 2020, FBI supervisory
intelligence analyst, Brian Auten, opened an assessment which
was used by FBI headquarters team to improperly discredit
negative Hunter Biden information as disinformation and caused
investigative activity to cease.
Have you responded to Senator Grassley's letter that he
wrote over three months ago?
Mr. Wray. Senator, I know there have been a whole slew of
letters, and I believe we have responded to a number of them.
But sitting here I cannot tell you which ones----
Senator Johnson. You have not.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. Which ones we have responded to and
which ones we have not.
Senator Johnson. Have you looked into those charges, that
there was a scheme hatched in August 2020, to downplay the
derogatory information on Hunter Biden? Have you looked into
that personally?
Mr. Wray. We have, as we speak, a number of personnel
matters that are underway, and for reasons which I am sure you
can appreciate we cannot discuss personnel matters.
Senator Johnson. I know that is always your excuse. No, I
got it. I understand how you remain above the law by using that
excuse repeatedly.
The reason I am a little sensitive on August 2020 is that
on August 6th, both Senator Grassley and I received an
unsolicited briefing by members of the FBI, which I knew
immediately was a setup. No new information whatsoever. I knew
it was a setup, and I was correct because nine months later, on
May 1st, it was leaked to The Washington Post to smear me.
I have written you publicly a number of times, asking who
directed that briefing. Are you prepared to tell me, in public,
who directed that briefing now?
Mr. Wray. Senator, first off, I cannot discuss specific
defensive briefings, more broadly, and that is a longstanding
practice.
Senator Johnson. Tell me then why have you refused to meet
with us to privately tell us who directed that briefing?
Mr. Wray. If I may finish my answer to the question. It is
a longstanding practice not to discuss specific defensive
briefings. We have, as my understanding, responded in writing
to a letter that you sent. I think responded back----
Senator Johnson. It is bureaucratic----
Mr. Wray [continuing]. At the end of 2021.
Senator Johnson. It is bureaucratic gobbledygook, is what
that is.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. And----
Senator Johnson. That is not a response.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. We offered in that letter to provide
a senior executive of the FBI to walk through, in detail, our
process.
Senator Johnson. What your process is but not specifically
who directed a briefing that was used to smear me.
Have you looked into the leaking of that briefing The
Washington Post? Have you investigated that?
Mr. Wray. I am not going to discuss specific
investigations. As to the briefing question, and who directs
it, let me be very clear about this. When it comes to election-
related defensive briefings there is not a single person who
makes that decision. That is an interagency process that was
set up by the prior administration, signed off on by the former
President prepared by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI)----
Senator Johnson [continuing]. There are persons in that
interagency. Correct? There would be persons. We should know
who those persons are. Why will you not tell us who directed
that briefing, the persons then?
Mr. Wray. I would refer you to the process that was put in
place, and we can give you more information about the process
if you would like.
Senator Johnson. Have you read Senator Grassley's and my
report on Hunter Biden's corruption, issued in September 2020
and November 2020? Have you read those reports?
Mr. Wray. I have had a chance to look at it.
Senator Johnson. Do you see any sign of Russian
disinformation in those reports?
Mr. Wray. That would be a hard question for me to answer.
Senator Johnson. No, it is very easy.
Mr. Wray. What I would say----
Senator Johnson. It is a very easy answer. There is no
Russian disinformation. That report is completely clean of any
interference of foreign influence, although we have been
falsely accused, including by the Chairman of this Committee,
of spreading Russian disinformation.
Are you aware of the FBI having any involvement whatsoever
in the October 19, 2020, public statement by 51 former
intelligence officials?
Mr. Wray. I am not aware of any involvement by the FBI in
what you are describing.
Senator Johnson. The reason I ask is, if it is true that in
August 2020, the FBI initiated a scheme to downplay derogatory
information on Hunter Biden, it would seem like maybe part of
that scheme would be to get intelligence officials to issue a
letter that stated that the laptop had all the earmarks of a
Russian information operation. That was totally false. We now
know that the Hunter laptop is completely authentic.
The point I am trying to make here is the unsolicited
briefing that was leaked in May 2021, was used to smear me and
interfered into the U.S. Senate election of November 2022. One
of the whistleblowers to my committee has stated that the FBI
was no longer going to interfere in elections, something to
that effect. I cannot find it right now and I am running out of
time. Oh, here it is. The FBI is, ``not going to change the
outcome of the election again.''
The FBI certainly tried to by leaking, or somebody leaked
that FBI briefing. Are you going to investigate that? Because
that is the election interference, and let us face it--this
letter by 51 intelligence officials, this interfered in the
2020 election to a far greater extent than anything Russia or
China ever could have hoped to accomplish. You have to
acknowledge that. It has to be investigated. I have no faith
that you will do so.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
Senator Hassan, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Chair Peters, and I want to
thank you and Ranking Member Portman for holding this hearing
today. Thank you to our witnesses for being here. I want to add
my prayers and thoughts for the CBP officers, the officer who
was fatally wounded and those who were gravely wounded, and to
their families. I think it is fair to say that the people of
New Hampshire and the United States are holding these brave men
and women in our prayers.
Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you.
Senator Hassan. I also wanted to take the opportunity,
although he has stepped out for a moment, just to thank Ranking
Member Portman for his years of service and for his work on
this Committee and for the bipartisan work that he has led.
Again, to all of the witnesses, but more importantly to the
men and women you lead, thank you to you, to them, their
families. The first priority of government is to ensure the
safety and security of its citizens, and your work is really
critical to that mission.
Director Abizaid, I want to start with a question to you
and then a follow-up to the other two witnesses. When we held
this hearing a year ago some assessments indicated that in the
wake of the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan al-Qaeda
would have the ability to reconstitute itself and threaten the
United States homeland within one to two years. Here we are,
one year later.
To the extent that you can discuss it in an unclassified
setting, what is the National Counterterrorism Center's
assessment of al-Qaeda's capability to threaten the U.S.
homeland?
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much for the question. Al-
Qaeda's capability to threaten the United States homeland from
Afghanistan is quite limited, in part thanks to the operation
that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul here recently, but also
because the al-Qaeda elements that are still present in
Afghanistan are really not focused on external operations, as
far as we can tell.
There are other terrorist elements in Afghanistan that we
are concerned about, primarily ISIS's branch there, ISIS
Khorasan. But the threat from al-Qaeda should be disaggregated
from that, I think given the very unique circumstances around
that group, its relationship with the Taliban, and some of the
specifics in which it has evolved over the years.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Director Wray and Secretary Mayorkas, do you agree with
this assessment, and what are your agencies doing to mitigate
the threat? I will start with you, Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. I would add a couple of things to what Director
Abizaid had to say. One is we are obviously very concerned
about ISIS-K as one of the threats. Second, I think as time
progresses I am concerned that we will have fewer and fewer
good sources of information about what al-Qaeda is or is not
doing in Afghanistan, so we always have to be mindful of, as
Secretary Rumsfeld famously said, ``the known unknown'' that
goes there. Third, we are very concerned about al-Qaeda and
ISIS's ability to inspire attacks, even from over there. Those
are a few points I would add.
Senator Hassan. Thank you. Secretary?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, I think the point that my
colleagues have made underscores a broader point, which is that
we have spoken about the evolving threats, but we should keep
in mind that the threats of the past remain the threats of the
present. Only new ones have been added. I defer to the experts
to my left.
Senator Hassan. Thank you. Now, Secretary Mayorkas, I want
to move on to a different topic. Every week a new drug seizure
along the border makes headlines, but the flow of drugs across
the Southwest Border is unrelenting. The drugs that DHS seizes
accounts for just a fraction of the total that criminal
organizations attempt to smuggle into our country.
What specific steps is DHS taking to stem the flow of drugs
crossing the border, and what additional resources are you
using to address this problem? What additional resources do you
need?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, thank you so much. It is a
fact that the smugglers seek to transport controlled
substances, illegal drugs into the United States, primarily
through the ports of entry, through trucks, vehicles, and the
like. What we have done is we have surged technological
resources that can most effectively defect the effort to
smuggle those dangerous substances into our country,
specifically, for example, non-intrusive inspection (NII)
technology, which has remarkable x-ray capabilities that can be
implemented very swiftly.
We have deployed forward operating labs so personnel,
scientists, can detect the controlled substances and we can
effect the seizure immediately and refer to law enforcement the
persons who have sought to smuggle them.
What we need is more resources like that, and we really
hope that Congress passes our fiscal year 2023 budget. We are
already six weeks into the new fiscal year without the
resources that we need financially to invest in that technology
and deploy additional personnel as well.
Senator Hassan. Thank you. One additional question I think,
given my time, to you, Secretary Mayorkas. Over the last few
years, cyberattacks have plagued State and local governments
and other public entities. Toward that end, as part of the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Senator Cornyn and I helped
create a Federal grant program for State and local entities to
improve their cybersecurity. The application period for the
first year of the grant program concluded just this past
Tuesday.
I understand that the Department of Homeland Security is
still reviewing applications, but can you explain what the
Department's goals are for this first year of grants and how
you intend to achieve them?
Secretary Mayorkas. We are so grateful for that grant
program. It is a multi-billion-dollar grant program, over
several years. This first year of its implementation we are
dedicating $185 million in resources to State and local
governments. This is all about building their capacity to
enhance the security of the cyber ecosystem.
In cybersecurity, Senator, we say we are only as strong as
our weakest link, and the fact of the matter is that there are
target-rich and resource-poor localities that we need to
strengthen, and that is what this grant program is going to
enable us to do.
Senator Hassan. So your goal right now, is making sure that
the State and local governments that have applied get the
resources they need and really focus on strengthening that
level of cybersecurity. Is that fair to say is a priority
there?
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes it is, Senator.
Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr.
Chair.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
Senator Paul, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL
Senator Paul. Director Wray, is Facebook or any other
social media company supplying private messages or data on
American users that is not compelled by the government or the
FBI?
Mr. Wray. Not compelled, in other words, not in response to
the legal process?
Senator Paul. No warrant. No subpoena. They are just
supplying you information on their users.
Mr. Wray. I do not believe so, but I cannot sit here and be
sure of that, as I sit here.
Senator Paul. Can you give us a yes or no by going back to
your team and asking? Because it is a very specific question,
because if they are, it is against the law. The law, the Stored
Communications Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986, prohibits providers from sharing electronic
communications with any person or entity unless it is
compelled. This was done to protect the privacy of people so we
could feel like we can send an email or direct message to
people without having that information given over.
It is a very specific question. Will you get with your team
of lawyers and give us a specific answer? Because this is the
law. If you are doing it, then we need to go to court to
prevent you from receiving this information.
Mr. Wray. I can tell you that I am quite confident we are
following the law, but what I will also----
Senator Paul. that is not the answer.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. Follow up with you to make sure that
we get you more detailed information.
Senator Paul. Is the FBI obtaining anonymous social media
data and then using technical methods to pierce the anonymous
nature of the data?
Mr. Wray. Anonymous social media data?
Senator Paul. You purchase data. People purchase data all
the time, and we sort of tolerate it, for advertisings and
things, because it is anonymous data. Are you purchasing what
is said to be anonymous data, through the marketplace, and then
piercing the anonymous nature to attach individual names to
that data?
Mr. Wray. Right. When you asked about anonymous data I was
thinking more in terms of----
Senator Paul. No. I am talking about data that is out
there, and are you purchasing data and then piercing the
anonymous nature of that data?
Mr. Wray. So the manner in which we usually use the term
``commercial data''--is probably longer than I could explain
here. But again, let me have one of our----
Senator Paul. You will not answer the question of whether
or not you are attaching names to anonymous data.
Mr. Wray. I think it is a more complicated answer than I
can give here.
Senator Paul. So far we are 0 for 2 with getting you to
answer this, but you are pledging you will actually answer the
question, because you have to realize the frustration. We will
write you a letter and your team of lawyers will write back a
15-page letter that says nothing, and you will not answer the
question.
These are very specific. This is whether you are obeying
the law, whether we can have confidence. I want to have
confidence in the FBI.
Mr. Wray. We are obeying the law.
Senator Paul. You are saying that but you will not tell us
the answer.
Mr. Wray. That is not what I said.
Senator Paul. No, you are not telling me the answer, and
the answer is, are you collecting data not compelled by a
warrant? That would not be in compliance with the law. But you
will not answer that you are not collecting that data.
Mr. Wray. I said two things. One, we are following the law,
and second, that we would have somebody follow up with you with
more detailed, specific information.
Senator Paul. So those are two specific questions. Are you
getting data from them that is not compelled, and then are you
piercing the anonymous nature of that, technically.
Are you receiving private messages from social media
companies through the use of confidential human sources. From
Facebook, social media companies. Do you have people working
over there who you are paying or who are volunteering to give
you information, even though it would be against the law for
Facebook to do this, but now you are saying, ``We will get
around the law by using confidential human sources?''
Mr. Wray. Just to be clear I am following the question, you
mean, in effect, recruiting a human source inside the company?
Senator Paul. Exactly.
Mr. Wray. No, I do not believe so. I think we have had
situations where we have confidential human sources, not
employees of those companies but who report to us on their own
communication. If the two of us had a communication, and
Secretary Mayorkas was a human source, he could report to us
about what he is saying to me.
Senator Paul. Once again, I would like the answer to be
more specific from your team, not that ``I do not believe so''
but that you are or are not using human confidential resources
within Facebook.
We get back to the idea of whether or not you are getting
information for them outside the warrant process, because the
next question is--which you probably will not answer either--
are you taking information that you are getting not through the
warrant process and then going around and coming back and using
that as a predicate for getting a warrant to actually get the
information you have already been given?
Mr. Wray. I am not sure I am completely following.
Senator Paul. Basically you get information that Facebook
is volunteering. This has all been written up in The Post
article. You are familiar with The Post article with the
accusations. The question is, are you getting information they
are giving to you. They say, ``Oh, somebody says January 6th
was great. Here is information on this guy.'' Then you are
taking it and then using it as a predicate to say, ``Well, now
let us go to the court and get a real warrant and get the
information we already actually got without a warrant.''
Mr. Wray. We get tips and leads from all over the place,
from members of the public, from businesses, from community
leaders, from other in-government partner, all the time, and we
use the tips and leads that we get to often----
Senator Paul. Are you getting tips and leads from Facebook
and social media companies?
Mr. Wray. We get tips and leads from companies. Absolutely.
Senator Paul. That includes private information.
Mr. Wray. I am not aware of us receiving any tips or leads
in a way that----
Senator Paul. See, here is the point. You may think it is
just jolly well to get all this stuff without a warrant, that
people volunteer to you, but many of us are alarmed that you
are getting this information that are private communications
between people, because it is against the law. It is against
the law for Facebook or social media companies to give it to
you, but it is also against the law for you to receive it.
You are going to have to very specifically go back with
your team and search over whether you are doing it or not, and
just say, ``Oh, probably not. We obey the law. We are good
people.'' Well, no, there are doubts, because this has been
reported. Even the FBI, when you responded to the New York Post
article, said that companies are referring information to the
FBI with investigative value relating to foreign malign
influence.
Now there would probably be a great deal more tolerance
about that if it is foreign malign influence, but the question
is are you also receiving information on so-called domestic?
What would that mean? Is someone questioning whether paper
ballots are an accurate way of running election? Is that good
enough for you to be getting our private information because we
have a political beef with the way votes are counted or
recorded in our country? Is that something that you are
collecting information on? Are they giving you information on
private things that you have told them, ``People who question
the election, we want to hear about these people,'' and so they
are giving you this information. Are you receiving information
like that?
Mr. Wray. I will give you two classic examples that I think
happened with some frequency. One, if we supply information to,
say, Facebook or any number of other technology companies about
foreign accounts, Russian Intelligence Service, for example,
accounts, when they look in their system for those accounts
they often find other accounts related to those and they
provide tips and leads back to us about those. That is one
example.
A second would be a situation where a technology company
encounters a threat of violence on their platform, on their
services, and they provide tips and leads to us, and we follow
up on those.
Senator Paul. There is really not a lot of disagreement
about that. The question is, is when we start to talk about
political speech, and that is the question. Are you receiving
things that could be interpreted, and we would want to know,
and if you are not going to admit to us, whether it is
political speech, someone who questions the election, someone
who is mad about something that is going on. They are not
saying they are directly going to commit violence. They are mad
about things.
What the New York Post article said is yes, you are getting
this, and then when they are finally read in context--and this
is from a whistleblower, which makes us suspect you are not
being forthcoming or honest with us--is that whistleblowers are
saying you are receiving this information from Facebook and
others and that you are going around the Constitution and to
come back and try to get warrants for it. But then once you
read it there has been no actionable intelligence on this, but
this is an active program that you have got.
You work for the government. You should admit to us whether
or not you have a program going after our speech.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Paul.
Mr. Wray. We investigate violence, not speech.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Paul.
Senator Lankford, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD
Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you to all
three of you and the service that you give to the country on
this. We do have lots of questions, just about process and how
things are going on this.
Secretary Mayorkas, you and I have talked about Title 42
for about 18 months, and I have asked you the question, what
happens when Title 42 goes away? For 18 months you have said,
``We are working on it.''
Judge Sullivan just stepped in and unilaterally canceled
out Title 42. We are at this very odd situation right now where
DHS is in one court, asking to extend Title 42 a little longer,
and then another court asking to cancel Title 42 altogether.
But we are still waiting to try to figure out what happens now
and how many people are about to cross the border.
What is the plan for dealing with this illegal immigration
coming now, post Title 42?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, what we requested of Judge
Sullivan in the District Court of D.C. was an orderly wind-down
period of 35 days, which was unopposed and which was granted by
the court.
What we are doing is precisely what we announced we would
do in April of this year, and we have indeed been executing on
the plan. It is six different lines of effort, and I will
review them very quickly, given the limited time.
Surging resources to the Southern Border, including
personnel, technology, facilities, capabilities, and
transportation, medical support.
Two, increasing our Customs and Border Protection
processing efficiency to mitigate potential overcrowding. We
have been digitizing, for example, our electronic A-files
(Alien files), the immigration files, when individuals are
placed in proceedings.
Three, we are enhancing the consequences for unlawful
entry, especially with respect to individuals who seek to evade
law enforcement, including removal, detention, and criminal
prosecution when warranted.
Four, we are seeking to bolster the capacity of nonprofit
organizations, State and local officials, and working very
closely with them.
Fifth, we are targeting and disrupting the smuggling
organizations and transnational criminal organizations. In
fact, we have effected more than 5,000 arrests and more than
6,000 disruption events, and that means arrests of individuals,
the breakdown of smuggling of stash houses, the seizure of the
instrumentalities that these smuggling organizations use.
Sixth, we are working with our partners to the south to
deter irregular migration. I spoke earlier in response to
Ranking Member Portman's question about the fact that this is a
tremendous hemispheric challenge. We are seeing the movement of
people, and the demographics of the population that we are
encountering at the border has changed dramatically.
Senator Lankford. It has, and there are a couple of big
challenges in this. One is the numbers just came in for
October. It is the third-highest number in recorded history.
While those things were implemented, the numbers continue to
accelerate. This goes back to the estimates when Title 42 goes
away, there was an expectation from intel to be able to say
these numbers will surge even greater. You built a Venezuelan
policy on trying to be able to deter Venezuelans, based on
title 42. That just went away.
What we are trying to figure out is what is the plan,
because the plan you just articulated has led to the third-
highest number for any single month in history.
Secretary Mayorkas. There are few points, if I may,
Senator, and thank you. No. 1, the number of encounters is not
equal to the number of unique individuals we encounter----
Senator Lankford. Correct. Yes, we know that.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Because Title 42 creates a
potential for the ease of recidivism.
No. 2, we are working with our partners to the south, with
Mexico, with respect to the end of Title 42, and whether we
will be able to continue our thus-far successful program with
respect to Venezuelan nationals, and use our Title 8
authorities.
But we also have other opportunities ahead of us, because
as we sought to do earlier, and we will resume this effort, is
an enhanced use of expedited removal, which is a Title 8
authority. We are looking at our consequence regimes and how we
can most effectively employ them.
Senator Lankford. There are a lot of people counting on
these numbers coming down, and they are not. They are going up,
and they continue to be able to rise. While we are examining
these things and looking at it, the numbers continue to rise.
With the end of Title 42 coming in 35 days, we expect it is
going to accelerate even higher. There is an expectation that
your Department is going to change this number dramatically.
Let me ask a point-blank question that is challenging on
this. What percentage of the individuals that are encountered
at our Southern Border do we know their criminal history from
the country they are coming from? I am not talking about if
they have an American criminal history or they are on our
Terror Watch List, that we know their criminal history of the
country they are coming from. Do we know that history?
Secretary Mayorkas. I will have to get back to you on that,
Senator, whether we have the capability of identifying the
percentage, which is what you have inquired about.
Senator Lankford. It is my understanding that we do not
know the criminal history of the vast majority. Can you give me
an estimate on this? I am not asking for a 0.8 percent, but
give me a guess.
Secretary Mayorkas. I understand. I am quite hesitant to
guess on information that is so important to our mission. But I
will certainly get back to you with whatever information we can
provide.
Senator Lankford. It is incredibly important because I
think there is an assumption that the American people feel that
the 2 million-plus individuals that were encountered just in
the last 12 months have been vetted in some way at our Southern
Border or they have been checked. We do not know if these
individuals are fleeing poverty or fleeing from the law. We do
not know.
Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, if I may----
Senator Lankford. There is a check to see if they have an
American criminal history record, but we do not know if they
have a criminal history record of where they are coming from.
Secretary Mayorkas. As my colleagues here will attest as
well, Senator, we conduct screening and vetting of individuals
whom we encounter. We have a robust screening and vetting
process. It actually is recurrent vetting, and it is not just
with respect to criminal history in the United States.
Senator Lankford. I would like to get in a good guess of
how many people we know their criminal history when they come
in then.
Secretary Mayorkas. As I mentioned, Senator, I will get
back to you and see if we have that data, and if so, I will
certainly provide it to you.
Senator Lankford. That would be great. Thank you.
We have asked your team, and you and I have talked about it
before, about the information for the Migrant Protection
Protocols (MPP) and the decisionmaking process for the Remain
in Mexico policy on this. We asked about that for a while. We
just recently got a letter back saying that there are no
responsive documents that have been withheld. Basically you
have everything that we would have. But the implication then is
the decisionmaking process of who qualifies for the MPP and who
does not was left up to a case-by-case basis, and there are no
guidance documents. I find that hard to believe that there were
no guidance documents given to anyone on your team anywhere
along the border, on how to be able to decide. Yet your team is
so far telling me, ``Hey, we do not have anything. We never
printed anything.'' I find that exceptionally hard to believe,
and I would like to be able to follow up and be able to get
access to those documents.
Secretary Mayorkas. I look forward to discussing that with
you because I certainly have some very important points to make
in response to your concern.
Senator Lankford. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Lankford.
Senator Scott, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT
Senator Scott. First, Secretary Mayorkas, thanks for your
calls around the hurricanes. I have a very positive experience
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), so I think
you have a great team there, and everybody there does a good
job.
Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Scott. I think the last time, Director Wray, you
testified I had the opportunity afterwards to go to West
Virginia, and I just want to compliment you on what you have
done to revamp the call center operation. I am sure it is still
hard to catch everything that goes on out there, but I want to
thank you for that.
Secretary Mayorkas, you know that I have been disappointed
in the border. It just seems like it is open, with all of this
fentanyl coming across. We have people dying.
But here is my question, and I do not know if Secretary
Mayorkas or Director Wray, if you want to answer it. It has
been reported that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are
operating police stations in the United States in an effort to
surveil Chinese dissidents. It seems obvious the U.S. should
not allow its most significant geopolitical rival, an
oppressive communist regime, to establish police stations in
the United States what authority or jurisdiction does the CCP
have in the United States?
I do not know which one wants to testimony.
Mr. Wray. Senator, like you I am very concerned about this.
We are aware of the existence of these stations. I have to be
careful about discussing our specific investigative work, but
to me it is outrageous to think that the Chinese police would
attempt to set up shop in New York, let us say, without proper
coordination. It violates sovereignty and circumvents
standards, judicial and law enforcement cooperation processes.
The reason this is so important is because we have seen a
clear pattern of the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist
Party exporting their repression right here into the United
States. We have had now a number of indictments that you may
have seen of the Chinese engaging in uncoordinated, quote/
unquote, ``law enforcement'' action right here in the United
States--harassing, stalking, surveilling, blackmailing people
who they just do not like or who disagree with the Xi regime.
It is a real problem and it is something that we are
talking with our foreign partners about as well, because we are
not the only country where this has occurred.
Senator Scott. They do not have any right to be here?
Mr. Wray. We are looking into the legal parameters of it. I
want to be a little bit careful not to get out over my skis on
that. But suffice it to say, I can tell you from an FBI
director perspective, I am deeply concerned about this, and I
am not just going to let it lie.
Senator Scott. Secretary, does it impact homeland security
at all?
Secretary Mayorkas. Of course. The threat of China is one
of the most significant threats that we face in the homeland.
It is not only a matter of national security, it is a matter of
homeland security, in a number of arrays, in a number of areas
of our mission.
Senator Scott. Do you think you have the ability to shut
them down? Do you know if you have the right to shut them down?
Secretary Mayorkas. I would have to defer to the Department
of Justice with respect to that.
Senator Scott. It would go to Justice, not Homeland
Security? OK. So it would be under FBI?
Mr. Wray. Well, or to the extent that the remedies might be
some part of the Justice Department, outside of the FBI, that
could also be a possibility. Then there may be a State
Department dimension to this that we are looking into.
Senator Scott. When you know they are here, do you know if
they are surveilling U.S. citizens? Do you know that yet? Do
you have enough information to know if they are?
Mr. Wray. Again, I do not want to get too far into our
ongoing investigative work, but as I said, we have seen plenty
of situations, plenty of situations in the past, where the
Chinese government, under the pretext of going after
corruption, have essentially used that as vehicle to surveil.
We have had situations where they have planted bugs inside
Americans' cars, for example.
One of the things that we are seeing more and more is them
hiring private investigators here in the United States to
essentially be their agents, if you will, to conduct some of
this work.
This is something we are trying to call out, and it is
important the Chinese Americans and Chinese dissidents who are
here know to call the FBI to report when they think they may
have been targeted with this conduct.
Senator Scott. Because you probably cannot talk about it in
here. I would like to get a classified briefing on what they
are doing, at some point, whenever it works out for you.
Mr. Wray. We would be happy to set that up.
Senator Scott. Director Wray, I am going to ask you and you
can tell me if it is accurate or not. I am not suggesting all
of this is accurate. But it appears that DOJ have become
politicized with regard to pro-life things. There is a recent
rise in high-profile FBI investigations of pro-life Americans,
which raises the concern that the FBI is weaponizing Federal
law enforcement as becoming a partisan tool, which I do not
think, when we have talked, that has been your goal.
There appears to be investigations that arrest the pro-life
community, and it is just the opposite of what has happened. We
have had numerous firebombings, violent attacks, acts of
vandalism against churches, pro-life organizations, and crisis
pregnancy centers in the days and weeks following the Dobbs
decision.
Is this right? Is that happening? Not happening?
Mr. Wray. First let me say I firmly believe that the FBI is
going about its work, doing the right thing in the right way.
Now, I am glad you raised this topic because it gives me an
opportunity to speak to it.
My view, plainly expressed to all of our people, including
in the context of abortion-related violence, is that I do not
care what side of the issue you are on, you do not get to
engage in violence, and we are equal opportunity when it comes
to that.
Now we have quite a number of investigations, as we speak,
into attacks or threats against pregnancy resource centers,
faith-based organizations, and other pro-life organizations.
You might be interested to know that since the Dobbs Act
decision probably in the neighborhood of 70 percent of our
abortion-related violence cases or threats cases are cases of
violence or threats against pro-life, so where the victims are
pro-life organizations. We are going after that through our
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, through our criminal authorities,
and things like that. We have about 20 field offices involved
in this.
We take it very seriously, and again, I do not care whether
you are motivated by pro-life views or pro-choice views, you do
not get to use violence to express it.
Senator Scott. We have talked about this before. It just
seems to me that in DOJ, and FBI in particular, they might be
doing the right thing, but you guys allow information to go
out, not talking about what you are doing. Because if you read
the press you would think that you guys are only going after
pro-life groups and not going after groups that attack pro-
life.
I have never understood this about the FBI and DOJ, in that
you guys are not more proactive about what you are actually
doing. Because I am pro law enforcement, as you know, but I
cannot defend you with no information.
Mr. Wray. Senator, we do not have the time for me to tell
you how frustrated I sometimes get by some of the news
reporting about our work and the misreporting about our work.
The circumspection that we display with regard to discussing
our investigations is based on rules and practices that are
important to people having confidence in the integrity of our
work, and go back decades, in multiple administrations.
Sometimes it can be very frustrating to agents on the ground
when they see things being misreported about their work.
But we have all been taught that we have to bite our lips
and let the facts come out in the right way, through court
proceedings, and sometimes that can be very frustrating, to us
and it sounds like to you too.
Senator Scott. It makes it harder for me. It makes it hard
for us, right, because people come to us and say, ``Oh yes,
they must have done that.'' So thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Scott.
We will have a second round.
Senator Hawley has deferred to Senator Romney. Senator
Romney, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMNEY
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Hawley. I appreciate the chance to be able to ask a few
questions.
Director Wray, I begin by saying how much I appreciate the
work of your agents and how much I respect them, and I am
convinced of their quality. One of my sons, years ago,
interviewed to become a member of the FBI. He was turned down.
He was able to go on and get a degree at Harvard Business
School and has done quite well. He survived. But we learned
from that experience that the qualifications for getting into
the FBI are high, indeed, as they should be, and I have great
respect for the men and women who work for the FBI.
There is a great deal of discussion about the political
orientation of the FBI. My experience with your organization is
that that is not the case, by and large. I am sure there are
individuals among the 38,000 who work with you who have
political points of view, may leak things, and may do things
from time to time that are not appropriate, and I hope that you
are able to evaluate them and evaluate where those come from
and correct them.
Can you give us a sense of how the resources the FBI are
directed, how much goes into looking at violent crimes of
various kinds and human trafficking? How much goes into
terrorist-related prevention? Are there categories of effort
that are carried out? Because I think there is a public
perception that the whole FBI, we ought to defund it because it
is only doing political work. What is the FBI doing? Where are
the resources devoted?
Mr. Wray. If you were to look at our allocation of
resources, and I cannot give you the numbers off the top of my
head, but if you were to look at the allocation of our
resources you would see that the single largest chunk is
devoted to traditional criminal programs, and of which the
violent crime is by far and away the biggest. We have Safe
Streets Task Forces all over the country. We have Transnational
Organized Crime Task Forces all over the country. We have
Violent Crimes Against Children Task Forces. So those remain
our bread and butter. Those remain our biggest programs.
We do have unique responsibility for national security
threats as well. If you were to look at our strategy you might
see the national security threats listed first because those
are places where if we do not do it, no one will, whereas
violent crimes, crimes against children, we work much more
shoulder-to-shoulder with our State and local law enforcement
partners. A lot of times those national security threats--
terrorism, counterintelligence work, cybercrime--get most of
the, to Senator Scott's point, the media attention. But day in,
day out, the FBI that most Americans, and certainly most law
enforcement professionals--and I talk to chiefs and sheriffs
every week--the FBI they experience most is really more focused
on the traditional criminal stuff.
Senator Romney. Yes, thank you. You have spoken a great
deal about the cyberattacks from State actors, from China, as
well as non-state actors. Secretary Mayorkas has spoken about
that as well. I do not know that it is possible, through a
process of defending against attacks, to prevent all the
potential attacks and all the theft that will come from our
businesses and into our government.
It strikes me that the only effective way to stop the
attacks that come, of a cyber nature, is to attack back, that
the best defense is a good offense. I know your respective
organizations are not responsible for the offensive of this,
but to get China to stop attacking, they have all these private
enterprises that are doing these attacks into our systems.
Fighting against all these things will never stop it unless
China recognizes that if they do not stop it that they are
going to be hurt more than we are.
Do you believe we have a sufficient effort, an offensive
effort, to push back against the cyberattacks that come from
State and non-state actors, and should we expand on that, and
where should that reside? I will ask both Director Wray as well
as Secretary Mayorkas and Director Abizaid to respond.
Mr. Wray. Certainly when it comes to offense, offense is a
critical part of our overall effort to push back against cyber
adversaries, in addition to some of the offensive cyber
operations that we probably could not talk about in this kind
of a setting.
There is actually a lot of progress being made in what I
obliquely referred to earlier as joint sequenced operations,
where we, with our intelligence community partners, law
enforcement partners, foreign partners--go with the whole ``2
plus 2 to make 5'' kind of effect. We are going after the
adversaries' infrastructure, we are going after their
cryptocurrency, we are going after the individual actors. Some
of them we can extradite. Some of them we can have charged
there. We are engaging in other sort of more sensitive
counterintelligence type work to amplify those effects.
But what we have found is that when we go after the actors,
the infrastructure, and the money all simultaneously we can
degrade and disrupt their effectiveness. That is, I think,
ultimately the real goal is to degrade, disrupt, and defend in
that way. In some ways the deterrence model is harder, much the
same way, we are not going to deter the Chinese or the Russians
from spying but we can make it hellishly difficult for them to
do it. That is what we are after now, is imposing risks and
consequences on the adversaries, to hit them where it hurts, to
make it harder and harder for them to really come after us with
cyber means.
Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, Senator, add a point. Of
course, I do not need to speak of the criticality of a strong
defense, and you are, of course, focused on offensive behavior.
A few weeks ago I was in Singapore to speak to our allies
in the Indo-Pacific region about the importance, or I should
say the peril of having China own or operate other nations'
critical infrastructure and the perils it presents from a
cybersecurity and other security perspectives. It was a very
important dialog, not only with our Singaporean partners, our
Japanese partners, but other countries in the region because
China is very aggressive in seeking to own or operate the
infrastructure in telecommunications and other technologies.
Senator Romney. Thank you. Director.
Ms. Abizaid. Senator, I would just say I will defer to my
colleagues on the cyber-specific piece of your question, but
what I would say from a counterterrorism community perspective,
there is so much that we have learned as a collaborative
community about both offense and defense at the same time.
Those lessons learned applied to things like transnational
organized crime or cyber threats I think really position us
well as a government to take it to the threat actors.
Senator Romney. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Romney.
Senator Hawley, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks
to the witnesses for being here.
Director Wray, let me start with you if I could. I think
the last time that I got to visit with you was back in August.
On August 4th of this year you were at the Senate Judiciary
Committee. You remember that, I assume.
We had to cut that hearing short. We were supposed to do
two rounds of questions. You said you had to be somewhere so we
cut it short. Republicans were not able to ask a second round
as we had been informed we would.
The press reported shortly thereafter that the reason that
the hearing had to be cut short is because you were flying on a
Gulfstream jet for a personal vacation in the Adirondacks.
Please tell me that is not accurate.
Mr. Wray. Senator, the hearing was not cut short from my
experience. We had agreed beforehand on the time and length of
it, and I was very surprised to find that anyone on the
Committee was surprised as to how I fly. I am required, not
only permitted but required to fly on an FBI plane wherever I
go.
Senator Hawley. So you were going on vacation?
Mr. Wray. I was, yes.
Senator Hawley. You left a statutorily required oversight
hearing in order to go on a personal vacation in the
Adirondacks.
Mr. Wray. I took a flight to go visit my family, as had
been previously arranged in conjunction----
Senator Hawley. No.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. With the leadership of the
Committee.
Senator Hawley. The Ranking Member, Chuck Grassley, asked
you during the hearing. He said, ``I assume you must have other
business.'' You said, ``Yes.'' He then said, ``If you have a
business trip, you have your own plan. Can't it wait a while.''
He then said, Chuck Grassley, ``We only just heard half an hour
ago that now you have to leave. We were going to have a seven
minute round followed by a three minute round. I have seven
people on my side of the aisle''--that included me--``who are
waiting for this additional round. Is there any reason we
cannot accommodate them for 21 minutes?'' You said you had a
plane to catch. You had somewhere to go. Now we find out it was
for vacation?
Mr. Wray. The reference to other business was not a
reference to that day. It was a reference to the following week
where Senator Grassley and I were going to see each other in
Iowa, when I had other business in Iowa, and I did in fact see
him then.
Senator Hawley. So wait. You had to leave the hearing early
because you were going to see him later in Iowa, in a week?
Mr. Wray. No. I had to leave when I said I was going to
have to leave, as had been previously organized with the
leadership of the Committee.
Senator Hawley. You left an oversight hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, required by statute, so you could
vacation with your family. I find that absolutely unbelievable,
and frankly, indefensible.
Now is it your practice to use government planes? You say
you do this all the time. You flew in a Gulfstream 550, I
think, that was originally purchased for counterterrorism
purposes. You were using it to go to, what is it, Saranac Lake?
Is that how I say it? I have never been there. Is that the
right pronunciation, Saranac Lake? That was your destination?
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Senator Hawley. Did you enjoy the flight? I mean, did you
pay for it?
Mr. Wray. Yes, I paid for it.
Senator Hawley. Will you turn over all receipts and
reimbursement to this Committee?
Mr. Wray. Senator, we will be happy to comply with
oversight requests related to the use of the plane. As I said,
it is important for people to understand----
Senator Hawley. Why do you not just give me a yes. Will you
turn over the receipts----
Mr. Wray. I will turn over the information----
Senator Hawley [continuing]. For this flight to the
Committee?
Mr. Wray [continuing]. Related to my use of the plane. The
use of the plane, I am required, not just permitted, required,
even for personal travel, to use the FBI plane.
Senator Hawley. How convenient for you.
Mr. Wray. I pay every single time that I use the plane for
personal reasons.
Senator Hawley. I am glad it is available for you to jet
away from your statutorily required hearings and oversight
before this Congress, where you denied the ability of Members
of Congress to ask you questions because you had to go on a
personal vacation using a government plane.
Let us just look at some of the things, while you have been
vacationing, that your FBI has been doing. According to
numerous whistleblowers who have come forward to members of
this body, to members of the House, the FBI has been sending
more than, in one instance, a dozen armed agents to a rural
Pennsylvania home of a Catholic pro-life demonstrator to arrest
him at gunpoint in front of his children in the early morning
hours, despite the fact that he posed no risk of violence or
threat and had previously offered to turn himself in.
Numerous whistleblowers, field agents, have alleged that
D.C., your headquarters, has pulled them off working on child
sex abuse cases, working on human trafficking cases, in order
to work on January 6th matters for this reason, to give the
appearance, they say, that there are hundreds of new domestic
terrorism cases in the country when in fact there are not.
Whistleblowers, field agents, have also said that D.C. has
ordered the use of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams on
nonviolent suspects who may have attended a January 6th rally,
and they have been ordered to conduct surveillance and knock on
doors of people who were not even in D.C. on January 6th.
Again, all of this, according to the whistleblowers--these are
your agents--all of this in order to make it look as if there
is a mass surge in domestic terrorism all across the country
when, in fact, the stats are being padded by political
directive in your office.
They also say, these whistleblowers, the D.C. leadership
deliberately suppressed investigations into Hunter Biden,
contrary to FBI procedure, and have also retaliated against FBI
agents and whistleblowers who have contacted Congress, which,
by the way, they are protected by statute to do so.
This is what is happening at your FBI while you are evading
oversight hearings. Mr. Director, do you think you are still up
to this job?
Mr. Wray. I absolutely think I am still up to this job, and
I think our workforce feels the same way.
Senator Hawley. I do not, and frankly, I think you should
have been gone a long time ago. Given your behavior recently, I
think it only makes it more clear.
Are there any travel plans today that we should be aware of
that you have? We are supposed to have a second round. Will you
be here for that?
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Rosen, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN
Senator Rosen. Thank you all for being here today. I
appreciate it.
I wanted to thank DHS, before I get started with my
questions, for extending Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to
several countries last week. It is going to provide critical
relief to thousands of families in Nevada. Those families
appreciate that very much.
We do know that Congress must take action to enact
immigration reform that both secures our borders and provides a
path to citizenship for TPS recipients, dreamers, and others,
but as we work toward this goal I do appreciate, and the
families in Nevada appreciate your consideration.
I am going to turn now to the topic of the hearing, threats
to the homeland. Difficult subject, again, like all things
here, but rising antisemitism. Every day, in every way we see
more and more attacks, outbreaks of antisemitism here in the
United States. The recorded incidents nationwide, I believe
they are at an all-time high. Not a day goes by without another
report of an antisemitic hate crime or prominent individuals
inciting anti-Jewish conspiracy theories.
With Jewish communities around the world facing increasing
discrimination as well as threats and acts of violence, a
whole-of-government approach is needed to effectively address
antisemitism.
Because many individual agencies play a critical role in
combating antisemitism, we need closer interagency coordination
to share best practices, share that ever-important data that
keeps us safer when we share it, that intelligence, the same
thing, identify gaps in our efforts between agencies, and
streamline overlapping activities and roles so that we can best
combat antisemitism where we see it, and I believe execute a
unified national strategy.
Secretary Mayorkas, how is DHS coordinating with other
Federal agencies in the fight against antisemitism? Would you
support the development of a national strategy that uses a
whole-of-government approach, cohesive, comprehensive approach
to address this rising threat for all of us?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator Rosen, thank you. I think
Director Wray spoke very powerfully, but a couple of weeks ago,
I believe it was in New York City, about the rise in
antisemitism. Of course, where we become involved in the
Department of Homeland Security is the connectivity between an
ideology of hate, regardless of the ideology in particular, and
violence.
That is where we become involved. We are working very
closely with the FBI and our Federal, State, local, tribal,
territorial (SLTT) campus law enforcement partners to address
violence, an increasing level of violence borne of ideologies
of hate, and quite clearly antisemitism is one of the rising
ones, and it was at a high level to begin with.
We are very grateful for your and this Committee's support
of the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP). We are seeking,
in the fiscal year 2023 budget, an increase from $250 to $360
million. That assists religious institutions, faith-based
institutions, and other nonprofit organizations to really raise
their level of security in response to increasing violence
borne of hate.
The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have
published an unprecedented number of alerts and bulletins to
our local State law enforcement personnel about an increasing
threat level borne of ideologies of hate.
Senator Rosen. So you would support a national strategy to
combat antisemitism?
Secretary Mayorkas. I would.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Director Wray, I want to move over to you because I know
that the FBI, as you have stated, found antisemitic hate crimes
rose by six percent in 2020. It represents the highest total in
12 years. It constitutes 60 percent of all incidents based on
religion. In your estimation, your research, data, what it is
telling you, what is driving this alarming trend? How is the
FBI working with communities, State and local law enforcement,
again to be sure we are coordinating? Would you support a
national strategy to combat antisemitism?
Mr. Wray. Taking the last part first, certainly I would
support a national strategy. Second, the percentage is even
worse than you summarized it. I think it is 63 percent of all
religiously motivated violent extremism incidents are motivated
by antisemitism, and that is against a population that is only
2.4, I think, percent of the American public. So it is pretty
stark.
From our perspective we see the Jewish community getting it
from all sides, which may contribute to what is driving it.
Because not only have they long been a target of foreign
terrorist organizations, and we have disrupted attacks by
foreign terrorist organizations and foreign-inspired violent
extremists against synagogues, for example, but then in
addition to that they are, of course, the target of domestic
violent extremists. As you may remember, we disrupted an
attempt to blow up a synagogue in the Las Vegas area just a
couple of years ago, for example.
Senator Rosen. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Wray. We are trying to tackle it both through the
domestic terrorism lens, through our Joint Terrorism Task
Forces, and through the hate crime lens, through our civil
rights program. We created a Domestic Terrorism Hate Crimes
Fusion Cell which brings those two things together to ensure
that we are pushing out information to our partners, whether it
is at DHS or State and local law enforcement, or the community,
and particularly the Jewish community, to be better able to
anticipate what might be coming and prevent attacks.
Senator Rosen. That is good, and it really goes to my next
question because we do believe that hate crimes are vastly
underreported because of fear sometimes, right? Since the
enactment of the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act last year, do you
feel that there has been an improvement in local and State law
enforcement reporting hate crimes to the FBI, and just
reporting in general, or how has that been helping us?
Mr. Wray. Two things. One, I think overall reporting of
hate crimes has gone up, and frankly, the Jewish community has
been ahead of other communities that are victims in reporting,
historically. We have been trying to preach the importance of
reporting, and we have seen reporting coming up.
The only caveat I would put on that is that we are in the
midst of a multiyear transition to a different crime statistics
reporting mechanism, that has been anticipated for about a
decade, I think. This particular year the number may be
somewhat flawed or underreported in terms of the recordkeeping,
just because of the transition that some police departments are
making over from the old system to the new system.
But I would expect as we go forward next year and beyond it
will get back to being more comprehensive, and I fully expect
it to show exactly what you are saying, which is that hate
crimes are on the rise.
Senator Rosen. The analyst in me hopes that everyone who is
converting to this is all using the same algorithm so we have
good reports.
Thank you so much for being here.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Sinema, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SINEMA
Senator Sinema. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Before I begin I want
to express my sorrow with the news from Puerto Rico today. Air
and Marine Operations (AMO) agents perform a very dangerous job
with honor and integrity, and my thoughts are with our injured
agents and their families, the family of the deceased agent,
and all of Air and Marine Operations. News like this today
underscores why our work and our oversight is so important, and
we owe it to our agents and our officers to do our part to
secure the border and keep our communities safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and
thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
Fiscal year 2022 saw a record number of encounters at our
Southwest Border, over 2.3 million individuals. While just
under half of these migrants were removed under Title 42
authorities, the current system had multiple points of failure
throughout the summer. In Arizona, local governments were
forced to step in to provide emergency support to avoid street
release and have reassigned staff from other important roles to
help manage the release of migrants from CBP custody.
Border areas outside of Arizona have seen significant
street releases, some coming in recent weeks. These releases
directly onto city streets are inhumane and leave migrants
vulnerable to the elements and bad actors intent on preying
upon the most vulnerable.
The Administration's continued failures on the border
places Arizona communities and our nation's security at risk.
The ongoing influx of migrants puts serious strain on our CBP
resources, and it forces our Border Patrol agents out of the
field and into processing and administrative roles.
With the sudden announcement that Title 42 will be
terminated in December, I am extremely worried that DHS is not
ready and that border communities and migrants will suffer the
costs for this lack of preparation. It is obvious that the
current strategy being implemented at our Southwest Border is
not working and that change is necessary.
Secretary Mayorkas, thank you for being here today. These
current levels of migration are unprecedented. Following the
D.C. Circuit's recent ruling regarding Title 42, Arizonans are
concerned that we will soon see these numbers surge even
higher, and we need to send a clear message to potential
migrants that we will be fair and humane, but we will secure
our border and enforce our laws.
Given the recent developments regarding Title 42, do you
have a plan to ensure that those who enter without inspection
are facing swifter and more certain consequences?
Secretary Mayorkas. We do, Senator, and at the outset thank
you very much for recognizing the tragedy that our Air and
Marine Operations personnel within CBP suffered off the coast
of Puerto Rico, and we pray for the family of the officer who
lost his life and we pray for the swift recovery of those who
have been injured.
We do. We do have a plan, and I think there are a number of
examples. One is how we have approached the increased number of
encounters of Venezuelan nationals, by building a lawful
pathway for them to arrive in a safely and orderly way in the
United States, should they qualify and should they pass through
our screening and vetting, and to deliver a consequence regime
should they not avail themselves of that lawful pathway.
The asylum rule that we have promulgated is a way of taking
a broken asylum system, and we are grateful for your bipartisan
work with Senator Cornyn in your proposed bill, as a starting
point to fix a broken asylum system. But we promulgated a
regulation in the absence of much-needed legislation to fix the
system, which takes a six-to eight-year asylum period, which is
just unmanageable, and reduces it potentially to under a year,
which is going to change the migratory patterns of individuals
seeking asylum in this country.
Also with respect to the fact that you mentioned that
Border Patrol agents have not been out in the field, we have
actually surged resources to the Southern Border, not only from
different parts of our department but contract personnel, an
incredible number of contract personnel, so that we can get
those agents out in the field, doing what they swore to uphold,
which is the detection and interdiction of individuals, to
enhance their swift removal should they not qualify for relief,
and their ability to remain in the United States should the law
so permit.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Secretary, according to data
from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), in
fiscal year 2022, over 20 percent of initial cases were
completed with an in absentia removal order. While that is a
steep decline from the 50 percent mark that we reached in
fiscal year 2022, that number is still far too high.
In order for our immigration system to function we must
ensure that individuals who refuse to comply with our
immigration laws and are ordered removed from the United States
actually experience that enhanced consequence regime. How is
DHS planning to ensure that people who willfully defy our
immigration process are promptly removed from the country?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, I would say two things. No. 1,
the data evidence is quite powerful, that individuals who are
represented by counsel have a much higher appearance rate in
the immigration enforcement proceedings that we commence. The
immigration system is extraordinarily complex, and we are
dealing with vulnerable populations without counsel.
No. 2, we have expanded our alternatives to detention and
technologized our ability to keep track of individuals, not
just by the rather primitive ankle bracelets but by a phone
system that does not allow people to make calls. It is not a
phone inoperable in that sense, but actually enables us to keep
track and make sure that they are checking in with us.
The expansion of the alternatives to detention is an effort
that we have very well underway.
Senator Sinema. My Bipartisan Border Solutions Act, which
you just referenced and of course highlighted in our budget
hearing earlier this year, creates regional processing centers
across the United States. These centers would co-locate offices
and agencies that play a role in the asylum process which would
enhance the processing of migrants seeking asylum to the United
States. I believe that these centers are key to any reforms
intended to limit the strain currently placed on DHS.
As introduced, the text placed Border Patrol in charge of
detention, but this year, as noted earlier, we have seen
additional agents being pulled out of the field due to
processing needs, which has limited some of the operational
control.
Which DHS component would be best suited to take over the
responsibility of those processing centers?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, your bipartisan bill with
Senator Cornyn is a very important start to fix a broken asylum
system. I would want to study actually which personnel would be
best suited. Our goal is to make sure that our Border Patrol
agents are out in the field, doing the work that they signed up
to do, and that, frankly, they are funded to do.
We have made tremendous strides in getting them out in the
field. This is a problem that arose last year, given the
increase in the number of encounters. We really have made
tremendous strides, and I could provide specific data.
But with respect to your detailed question, I would want to
study the profile of the individuals that should maintain the
custody of migrants encountered and placed in those processing
centers at the border.
Senator Sinema. Mr. Chairman, I know that my time has
expired. May I ask one quick follow-up question?
Chairman Peters. We do have a second round, but be real
quick.
Senator Sinema. Thanks. I have heard concerns that some of
the timelines in the bill that Cornyn and I introduced may be
too restrictive. So now that you have had some time to
implement the asylum processing rule we would like to get your
feedback on what a more feasible timeline would be in which
credible fear interviews could be performed.
Secretary Mayorkas. We would be pleased to provide that.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Sinema.
We have, for our witnesses, we have one, perhaps two
Senators to finish up the first round. Then we will take a
five-minute break to let you stretch your legs a little bit,
and then we will be back for the second round.
Senator Padilla, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PADILLA
Senator Padilla. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for
being here today.
The first question is going to be for Secretary Mayorkas.
As you recall, Mr. Secretary, last year I expressed significant
concerns about the critical incident teams with Customs and
Border Protection and their involvement with internal
investigations of CBP agents. These units, as we understand,
have operated since 1987, but their investigations were never
authorized because they are not legitimate Federal criminal
investigators and their actions seem to shield CBP agents from
liability.
I was pleased to hear that Commissioner Magnus issued a
directive to end the use of critical incident teams by the end
of the fiscal year, prior to his resignation. However, the
existence of such an entity for over three decades is
disturbing and undermines the transparency needed with the
nation's largest law enforcement agency.
I hope you share my concerns regarding the need to protect
the integrity of DHS and all its components. Do you agree that
there is no place for shadow police units within Customs and
Border Patrol, and can you speak to any of the efforts that the
Department has taken to ensure that entities similar to the
critical incident teams are not reestablished?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, there is no place for a shadow
investigative authority in any part of the Department or any
part of the government, and what we have done is actually
commenced a wholesale review, department-wide, of our
investigative discipline and accountability processes.
Senator Padilla. How is the status of the termination or
phase-out?
Secretary Mayorkas. I will check and get back to you with
respect to the status of their termination.
Senator Padilla. Please do.
Next question is both for you and Director Wray. Earlier
this year, the Department released a report that detailed the
need for improvements to information sharing as a means to
addressing violent extremist activity. Mr. Secretary, I was
pleased to see that your agency planned to develop a central
case management system, an information-sharing mechanism for
investigating allegations.
Can you provide an update on where DHS is with these
developments and whether there have been any significant
roadblocks?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, I am not aware of any
significant roadblocks, and in partnership with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation we have promulgated more products, more
information-sharing products than I can remember for the
Department of Homeland Security in the many years that I have
been there.
The National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Bulletin,
other less formal bulletins and alerts to our State and local,
tribal, territorial campus partners. We have really built a
very cohesive operation in disseminating threat information
throughout the country, to really ensure that our local
communities are aware of the threat information and law
enforcement is able to prevent it, to the best of its
capabilities.
Senator Padilla. Director Wray, the Department of Justice
similarly responded to President Biden's National Strategy for
Countering Domestic Terrorism by highlighting the changes it
would make to improve information-sharing with State, local,
tribal, and territorial partners as well. What specific changes
have been made at the FBI to eliminate any gaps in information-
sharing?
Mr. Wray. I think we engage in information-sharing on this
with State and local partners in two principal ways, the
biggest one being through our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
where we have lots of State and local law enforcement agencies
as task force officers on those task forces. One of the things
that we have done over the last little while now is improve the
amount of training that we provide to participants on those
task forces and to State and local agencies, more broadly,
about indicators of violence, indicators of mobilization to
violence, symbology, iconography, things like that, to put them
in a better position to be the eyes and ears that we need them
to be and then have information flow kind of in a virtual cycle
back with us. That would be one of the things that I mentioned.
Obviously the bulletins that Secretary Mayorkas referenced
is a product of great work between the FBI and the Department
of Homeland Security to share information, and including with
the Fusion Centers, which is a very important piece of the
information-sharing infrastructure, if you will, that exists in
this country.
Senator Padilla. In that spirit, a couple of the most
critical areas in which to apply improved information-sharing
is when it comes to combating gun violence and domestic
terrorism.
According to a joint report issued in May of last year, the
FBI and DHS determined that the greatest domestic terrorism
threat is posed by lone offenders who are radicalized online,
and who look to attack soft targets with easily accessible
weapons. Sadly, we have seen too many instances, even since
Highland Park, Uvalde, Buffalo, and even in my home State of
California at the Geneva Presbyterian Church. The common threat
here in each case was the ease with which the perpetrator
acquired a weapon.
Can you detail what steps are being taken by the bureau to
ensure that threats to our schools and places of worship and
other important places are identified and neutralized?
Mr. Wray. I guess there are a number of things that we do
on that front. When it comes schools specifically we have been
engaged in a very proactive outreach campaign to schools. We
have done active shooter training, for example, at schools.
Lots of our field offices meet with school officials in their
areas of responsibility to help them identify better what to be
on the lookout for.
Because one of the things that we have learned in studying
this issue over time, when it comes to school shootings, for
example, is that there is almost always somebody--a classmate,
a teacher, a family member, someone--who saw the transformation
in the person, and that if they had known to speak up, known to
report, it might have been preventable. In those instances
where we have successfully prevented a school shooting, for
example, those often do not get reported. But there are any
number in which we have successfully prevent, have almost
always been because somebody in that situation did report. We
are trying to get the word out that way.
Obviously, our National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NICS), which does the background checks, to ensure the
people who are legally prohibited from having firearms do not
get them, is very active processing background checks. Of
course, with the recently passed legislation there will be
additional steps we are taking to implement that.
Senator Padilla. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Padilla.
Senator Ossoff, you are recognized for your questions, and
after these questions we will take a five-minute break.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our panelists for your service to the country and the national
defense, the defense of public safety.
Director Wray, always a pleasure to see a fellow Georgian,
and thank you for your continued service as well. Each time we
have engaged in a setting like this one I have asked you to
assess the drivers of elevated levels of violent crime, in
Georgia and nationwide.
According to FBI data, violent crime did increase from 2020
to 2021. Could you please provide the Committee with an updated
assessment of what is driving this dynamic?
Mr. Wray. There are a lot of things driving the violent
crime crisis that is occurring in this country, in Georgia and
elsewhere. There are a few things. First I would say the
traditional drivers are all there--drugs, illegal gun
trafficking, gangs, socioeconomic factors. Those are all still
present.
But in addition to that we are seeing--and I hear this from
chiefs and sheriffs all the time as well as from our own
agents--an alarming uptick in the incidence of juveniles
engaging in violence, often graduating from carjackings to even
worse violence. That is a real challenge for the legal system
because we are not set up to very effectively deal with crimes
committed by minors.
We are also seeing, not everywhere but in an awful lot of
places, we are seeing way too many dangerous offenders getting
back out on the streets. The only thing more frustrating to the
hard-working men and women of law enforcement than having to
arrest somebody who should have been behind bars is having to
arrest the same person over and over again. That is a product
of any number of things. It could be backlogs. It could be
certain prosecution practices, certain kind of bail practices.
Of course, the juvenile issue that I mentioned.
So those are some of the things that are driving it. In
Georgia in particular, pretty much every week I feel like our
Atlanta field office is engaging in some kind of operation
where they are seizing drugs, guns, cash, whether it is meth,
whether it is fentanyl. And so they are experiencing a lot of
the same things that we are seeing nationally. Certainly
neighborhood gangs are a big phenomenon in our home State.
We are also seeing two other things that have a little bit
of a Georgia wrinkle to it. One is juveniles who post-COVID
have not returned to school, and so that may contribute to the
juvenile effect. And we are seeing violent criminals who are
either detained or imprisoned because they are serving a
sentence who still have access to their cellular phones and are
able to continue to participate in the activity, despite best
efforts by the corrections officials, to continue to
participate in the violent activity.
Those are some of the things. I guess one last one, an
alarming phenomenon of switches which convert otherwise lawful
weapons into fully automatic, and that, of course, increases
the violent potential.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Wray. You have a new
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in that Atlanta office, and I
welcomed her upon her arrival, and I wish her and her team the
best.
What can the FBI continue to do, and what more can you do
to help protect communities in Georgia who are fearful, who are
fearful that they may face carjacking or mugging or aggravated
assault out on the sidewalk or at a shopping mall? What are you
doing and what more can you do, and will you continue to work
with local law enforcement in Georgia to crack down on the
violent crime that is preying on innocent citizens?
Mr. Wray. Violent crime is a major priority for the FBI. As
I think I said in response to an earlier question, it still
continues to be the place where we have the most single
allocation of resources in terms of personnel. We have Safe
Streets Task Forces that focus on sort of the gang violence. We
have other kinds of violent crime task forces, all of which
allow us to bring together what the FBI has to bear with State
and local partners who participate on those task forces.
We do active shooter training and things like that to help
the community better protect itself. Our lab, close to half of
the work that they do, from a forensic side, is in support of
violent crime cases often for our State and local partners.
Senator Scott and I had a conversation about the tip line that
we have in West Virginia, where we prioritize getting threats
to life out to State and local partners on the violent crime
side.
There is a whole host of things that we are doing, but this
remains top of mind for me and for my team. When I am talking
to chiefs and sheriffs this is always the first topic we talk
about and the last topic we talk about, because it is so much
on everyone's mind.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for joining us. Could you please
assess the most significant threats to port infrastructure in
the United States? Of course we have, in Georgia, the Port of
Savannah. It is the fourth-busiest deepwater port in the
country.
Secretary Mayorkas. With respect to the infrastructure
itself?
Senator Ossoff. To ports.
Secretary Mayorkas. To ports? One of the concerns that we
have is, of course, the cybersecurity threat to ports. We are
increasing the level of technology by which our ports operate,
and that is why not only does Customs and Border Protection
have a focus on cybersecurity but so do does the United States
Coast Guard (USCG).
I would identify, with respect to our ports, cybersecurity
as a significant threat stream, and we are, of course, very
focused on defending against it and strengthening our
cybersecurity.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Will you and your
staff continue to work with the Georgia Ports Authority, State
and local law enforcement in Georgia to help harden the Port of
Savannah and other critical port infrastructure in Georgia
against that threat and other threats?
Secretary Mayorkas. We absolutely will, and, through the
infrastructure bill that has been passed fortunately we have
tremendous funding to dedicate to not only the improvement of
the infrastructure itself but also its hardening.
Senator Ossoff. I want to close very briefly, Secretary
Mayorkas. I thank you for your cooperation in providing to the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) the documents
and records that allowed us to conduct an 18-month
investigation of medical mistreatment of women in detention. We
held that hearing, as you likely know, earlier this week. The
bipartisan findings that Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin and I
have presented are deeply disturbing and suggest there are
major gaps in the vetting and oversight of DHS contracted
physicians who treat the detainee population.
I ask that you review those findings in detail and that we
will have a follow-up engagement to discuss the steps that DHS
is taking and needs to take to ensure that the dignity and
human rights and constitutional rights of all detainees are
upheld.
Secretary Mayorkas. I look forward to doing so, Senator.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff.
To our witnesses, we have had you there for quite some time
so we are going to take a brief break. We will come back for a
second round for those Senators who want a second round, but
the time will be just five minutes in the second round. But let
us take a recess for five minutes and we will reconvene.
[Recess.]
The Committee will come back into order. Senator Ossoff,
you are recognized for a second round.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you for the extraordinary courtesy,
Mr. Chairman, and welcome back to our panel.
I would like to begin, Director Wray, by requesting an
update--to the extent you are able to provide details it would
be appreciated--on your efforts to defend Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in Georgia and across the
country from threats. Of course, threats have targeted Spelman
College, other HBCUs in the State of Georgia. This is of deep
concern to me and the whole community. Please provide an update
on your efforts.
Mr. Wray. Senator, certainly we share your concern. The
fear and disruption that those threats have caused is utterly
unconscionable, and this investigation, or really, I should say
these investigations, plural, have been a priority for the FBI,
including multiple field offices, Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
et cetera.
The update that I can give is that for the first tranche of
the threats nationwide, the ones that generated probably the
most initial media attention, if you will, there has been a
recent development. An individual, who is a juvenile, a little
bit like the exchange that we had right before the break, has
been identified, and because of the Federal limitations on
Federal charging of juveniles for most relevant offenses, we
have worked with State prosecutors on an unrelated State charge
which ensures restrictions and monitoring of the individual and
disruption of his behavior.
Now that still leaves two other subsequent tranches of
threats against Historically Black Colleges and Universities
and other historically Black religious institutions, for
example, that we are still very much actively investigating.
Because of that there is not much I can share on those, but
suffice it say we have a lot of people working on this and we
are determined to see it through.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Wray.
Director Abizaid, I have not had a chance yet to ask you a
question, and I would like to hear from you what do you assess
to be the most significant threats to the United States when it
comes to transnational terrorism?
Ms. Abizaid. By far it is ISIS and al-Qaeda in terms of
transnational terrorism, though racially and ethnically
motivated extremists also present a dramatic threat. The
hierarchically organized groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are
actually transitioning their way of attacking to lone actor
type threats and inspired violence here in the United States
homeland, and we see very similar trends in the racially and
ethnically motivated violent extremist bucket of ideologically
motivated threats as well.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, ma'am. Thank you all. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff.
The authorization from the Office of Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction (CWMD) is set to expire next year. In
preparation, Senator Portman and I introduced a bill that
reauthorizes CWMD Office and empowers the newly created Office
of Health Security (OHS) at DHS. The bill clarifies roles and
responsibilities for both offices and adds important
accountability and oversight measures.
Secretary Mayorkas, could you explain to this Committee how
the expiration of the authorization for CWMD would impact it if
it expires, and particularly, how important the legislation is
to deal with local, tribal, and territorial partners on this
critical issue?
Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, the Office of Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction is of vital importance to the
Department of Homeland Security. I think if we look back in
time and we see the use of chemical weapons in Syria and the
tragedies that that inflicted on the people there, that is one
powerful example, and we do not have to look that far back in
history to understand the importance of the office.
Just the fact that the potential, the specter of the use of
nuclear weapons was discussed in public fora in light of
Russia's unprovoked aggression against Ukraine speaks of the
criticality of this office, and we do hope that the bipartisan
bill that you have presented is passed. We need this office
reauthorized.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Secretary.
Director Abizaid, how has the threat from weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) increased or decreased over the last five
years?
Ms. Abizaid. The threat that terrorists would use WMD, and
particularly CBRN capabilities I think has been sustained over
that five -year time period, certainly.
Chairman Peters. Very good.
Secretary Mayorkas, you ordered an internal review of DHS
after the tragic shootings in Buffalo and Uvalde to assess
whether the Department was effectively using its resources to
address domestic terrorism and targeted violence. As a result
of that review that you did you announced the appointment of
Nick Rasmussen as the full-time Counterterrorism Coordinator.
What goals have you asked him to accomplish and what is the
timeframe for him to achieve those goals?
Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, Nick Rasmussen comes with
impeccable credentials to be the Counterterrorism Coordinator
for the Department of Homeland Security. He used to be the
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and just a
distinguished career.
What I have asked him to do in the first instance is take a
look at our counterterrorism efforts across the Department and
make sure that we are being as impactful and effective as
possible. One of the efforts that I have across the Department
in every mission set is to drive greater cohesion so that our
impact is maximized. That is the first thing that I have asked
him to take a look at, and I am actually meeting with him in a
few days to discuss the setting of a timeline and incremental
goals along the way. I look forward to discussing that with
you.
Chairman Peters. Great. We will look forward to that.
Certainly we do have to have a coordinator overseeing all of
this, so I appreciate the efforts that you are making in that
area.
The Administration just released an updated strategy and
implementation plan on countering biological threats. This new
strategy implements recommendations learned from the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic and the monkeypox public health emergency.
Certainly global shortcomings in preparedness for the pandemic
and biosecurity may inspire adversaries to develop and use
biological weapons in the future, certainly a major concern for
all of us.
Secretary Mayorkas, could you discuss how DHS is working to
implement the National Biodefense Strategy and how has the
creation of the Office of Health Security better aligned DHS
efforts in this space?
Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, that strategy really
speaks of a whole-of-society approach. It is not something that
the Federal Government can do alone, but we need State and
local partners and private citizens, nonprofit organizations,
academia. It is a very holistic, inclusive approach to the
problem, and that is the approach that we are taking in the
Department through CWMD, the Office of Health Affairs, and
importantly, our Office of Science and Technology (OSTP), with
the research and development (R&D) that it spearheads. I am
grateful to this Committee for really moving forward with the
confirmation of Dimitri Kusnezov as our new Under Secretary for
the Office of Science and Technology.
It is really a very all-of-society approach, and our leader
of the Office of Health Affairs, our Chief Medical Officer
(CMO) is a tremendous leader in identifying what are the
greatest threats that are imminent or upon us, and developing a
strategy to address it. He was instrumental in our protocols to
address COVID-19 in immigration detention centers along the
Southwest Border, working with border communities to develop a
real infrastructure to address that.
We are taking an all-of-department approach in the context
of an all-of-society approach that the strategy calls for.
Chairman Peters. That is good. This Committee will deal
with this issue extensively over the next couple of years so I
look forward to working closely with your team to address the
challenge and the threat.
Senator Hawley, you are recognized for your questions.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks
again to the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Secretary, nice to see you. I did not get to visit with
you last time so let us start with you. I think my colleagues
have established, given what we are seeing on the Southern
Border, the massive increase in illegality there, that that is
clearly not a priority for your agency, so let us talk about
what appears to be and that is spying on Americans and
censoring their speech. You have turned your agency into a
censorship machine.
Now you said earlier this year that you disbanded the
Disinformation Governance Board (DGB), which I thought was
totally unconstitutional, but that turns out to be, at best,
misleading. That is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of
what you are doing.
Your own Quadrennial Review, which was just reported in the
press, says that disinformation is going to be the new focus at
DHS. The Quad Review says that DHS plans to target--I am
quoting now--``inaccurate information domestically on a wide
array of subjects, including the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic, the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines, racial justice,
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the nature of U.S.
support for Ukraine.'' This is what you are devoting your
agency's resources to.
I guess my first question is, is an American citizen who
criticizes COVID mandates now to be treated as a domestic
terrorist?
Secretary Mayorkas. Of course, and I would like to say
three things since you have three inaccuracies in the question
you posed to me. No. 1, border security is a priority of ours.
No. 2, the Department does not censor speech. And No. 3, we did
not publish a Quadrennial Review.
Senator Hawley. Does it exist, the Quadrennial Review?
Secretary Mayorkas. I believe it is being worked on.
Senator Hawley. It has been published in the media. Will
you make it public?
Secretary Mayorkas. When it is final it will be public.
Senator Hawley. Mr. Chairman, without objection I would
like to enter this article called ``The Truth Cops,'' published
in The Intercept.\1\
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\1\ The article referenced by Senator Hawley appears in the
Appendix on page 138.
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Chairman Peters. Without objection.
Senator Hawley. Here is my question then. If you are not
censoring speech and if you are not treating Americans as
domestic terrorists, then why is it that you are pressuring Big
Tech to treat American citizens as if they are threats to the
homeland? Why are you pressuring them to censor speech?
Let us take a look at some new documents that have come to
light that show what your administration is doing, this
Administration is doing to censor speech. Let us take a look at
this email from July 16, 2021. It is over my shoulder here.
Facebook emailing the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) saying, ``I know our teams met today to better understand
the scope of what the White House expects from us on
misinformation going forward.'' Are you familiar with that
email?
Secretary Mayorkas. No.
Senator Hawley. Let us try another one.
Here is one from July 20, 2021. The White House emails
Facebook, saying, ``Any way we can get this pulled down?''
Forty-six seconds later, Facebook responds, ``Yep. We are on
it.'' Are you familiar with that email?
Secretary Mayorkas. No.
Senator Hawley. OK. How about this one? July 23, 2021.
Facebook employee writes to HHS and says, ``Thank you for
taking the time to meet today. Wanted to make sure you saw the
steps we took just this past week to adjust policies on what we
are removing with respect to misinformation.'' Are you familiar
with that one?
Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, we do not instruct----
Senator Hawley. Just yes or no.
Secretary Mayorkas. No, because I am the Secretary of DHS.
Senator Hawley. I am asking you that because it is funny
you say that. A Federal judge has just found, as a finding of
fact, Mr. Secretary, that your office, and I am going to quote
now, is ``supervising the nerve center of federally directed
censorship.'' It is a Federal judge in a Federal lawsuit. You
are supervising the nerve center of federally directed
censorship.''
Here is another email, August 20, 2021. Facebook writes
again to HHS and highlights that Facebook is ``increasing the
strength of our demotions for COVID and vaccine-related
content.'' April 16, 2021. Rob Flaherty at the White House
circulates a Zoom meeting invitation to Twitter employees,
stating, ``White House staff will be briefed by Twitter on
vaccine misinformation.''
We have example after example of this Administration,
coordinated apparently, according to a Federal court, by your
agency, pressuring, coercing social media companies to engage
in censorship. Is that constitutional?
Secretary Mayorkas. That is unequivocally false.
Senator Hawley. It is what the emails show.
Secretary Mayorkas. It is unequivocally false, Senator.
Senator Hawley. You are not pressuring the Big Tech
companies to take down accounts. You are not meeting with them
to ask them to censor on your behalf.
Secretary Mayorkas. That is correct. We are not.
Senator Hawley. You are not having any meetings with them
whatsoever.
Secretary Mayorkas. We meet with the tech companies----
Senator Hawley. How often?
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To address the homeland
security mission.
Senator Hawley. How often do you meet with them?
Secretary Mayorkas. For example, online child sexual
exploitation is a scourge in this country, and we have an
obligation to address it.
Senator Hawley. You are saying that no one in your office
has ever met with, coordinated, or otherwise engaged in any
contact with a social media company in which you spoke to them
about vaccine mandates, about COVID mask mandates, about the
withdrawal from Afghanistan, about the current U.S. involvement
in Ukraine. None of that has ever happened.
Secretary Mayorkas. I do not what you are referring to,
Senator, and I can----
Senator Hawley. Read the emails.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. I can tell you this. You
have actually cited emails outside of our department.
Senator Hawley. I have cited Federal judge who says your
department is engaged in supervising the nerve center of
federally directed censorship.
Here is my point, Mr. Secretary. It has been established
for years in this country, as you very well know because you
are a lawyer, that the Federal Government may not use private
third parties to engage in activities that are
unconstitutional. That is exactly what you and this
Administration are doing. You are leveraging private companies
to carry out censorship on your behalf. It is dystopian, but
worse than that, it is unconstitutional.
Secretary Mayorkas. It is also false.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Seeing no other Senator here I want to thank our witnesses
once again for joining us today. We recognize that you all have
very busy schedules and we appreciate you joining us to help
the Committee better understand some of the most pressing
security issues that our nation is facing. This Committee will
continue to work to address many of the issues that we
discussed today. For example, as we heard today, the threat
posed by drones is extremely serious, and we cannot let
legislation that protects Americans from unmanned aircraft
system expire in December. I look forward to working with my
colleagues here in the Senate and in the House to ensure that
the Federal Government is effectively managing this threat.
I will also continue to work with the Department and the
FBI on improving the government's response to the threat posed
by domestic violent extremism. I appreciate the
Administration's efforts to tackle this issue but more can and
must be done. Without a more data-driven approach to understand
the threat, the government will continue to face challenges
addressing this issue.
I will also continue to press the Administration on meeting
mandatory congressional reporting requirements so that we can
ensure the Federal Government has the authorities and the
resources needed to help prevent deadly incidents, like the
tragic shooting in Buffalo, from occurring again.
Finally, as several Members have done, on behalf of
everyone on this Committee, I would like to express our sincere
condolences on the absolutely tragic news of loss and injury to
CBP Air and Marine Operations agents. Each and every day
throughout the pandemic the frontline personnel of DHS have put
their lives on the line to protect Americans from serious
threats that we have discussed today, and we all thank them for
their commitment.
While we have spent several productive hours this morning
examining our nation's greatest security threats, there is more
work to do for our Committee to continue conducting oversight
and ensuring national security agencies are effectively focused
on their critical mission.
For the record, this hearing will remain open for 15 days,
until 5 p.m. on December 2, 2022, for the submission of
statements and questions for the record.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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