    [Senate Hearing 117-682]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 117-682

                            THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               NOVEMBER 17, 2022

                                   __________

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    51-543 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2025

            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                       GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
    MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              RAND PAUL, Kentucky
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
    ALEX PADILLA, California             MITT ROMNEY, Utah
    JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                         JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                       David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                        Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
             Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
                        Sarah C. Pierce, Senior Counsel
                     Sterlin A. Waters, Research Assistant
                    Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
                Sam J. Mulopulos, Minority Deputy Staff Director
           Clyde E. Hicks Jr., Minority Director of Homeland Security
           Jeremy H. Hayes, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
            Margaret E. Frankel, Minority Professional Staff Member
                         Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                       Ashley A. Gonzalez, Hearing Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Peters...............................................     1
        Senator Portman..............................................     3
        Senator Carper...............................................    18
        Senator Johnson..............................................    21
        Senator Hassan...............................................    23
        Senator Paul.................................................    25
        Senator Lankford.............................................    28
        Senator Scott................................................    31
        Senator Romney...............................................    34
        Senator Hawley...............................................    36
        Senator Rosen................................................    38
        Senator Sinema...............................................    41
        Senator Padilla..............................................    44
        Senator Ossoff...............................................    46
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Peters...............................................    55
        Senator Portman..............................................    58

                                   WITNESSES
                          Thursday, November 17, 2022

    Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security..............................................     7
    Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
      Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice......................     9
    Hon. Christine Abizaid, Director, National Counterterrorism
      Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence........    11

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Abizaid, Hon. Christine:
        Testimony....................................................    11
        Prepared statement...........................................   103
    Mayorkas, Hon. Alejandro N.:
        Testimony....................................................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................    62
    Wray, Hon. Christopher A.:
        Testimony....................................................     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    85

                                    APPENDIX

    U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions at the Southwest Border FY 2012
      FY 2022 Chart..................................................   113
        Joint Cybersecurity Advisory.................................   114
        Raul Ortiz Testimony Transcript..............................   128
        Senator Hawley Charts........................................   135
        Intercept Article............................................   138
    Response to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record
        Mr. Mayorkas.................................................   160
        Mr. Wray.....................................................   209
        Ms. Abizaid..................................................   214

                            THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2022

                                         U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Peters,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Peters, Carper, Hassan, Sinema, Rosen,
    Padilla, Ossoff, Portman, Johnson, Paul, Lankford, Romney,
    Scott, and Hawley.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\

        Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the
    Appendix on page 55.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        First of all, I would like to thank our witnesses for
    joining us and for your continued service to the American
    people. This hearing is an important opportunity for this
    Committee to hear from our nation's top national security and
    law enforcement officials about the threats facing our nations,
    and how Congress can ensure the Federal Government is prepared
    to protect our communities from them.
        More than 20 years ago, the September 11th (9/11) terrorist
    attacks changed our nation forever. In response, Congress
    created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and our
    entire national security apparatus focused on keeping Americans
    safe from international terrorism.
        However, in the more than two decades following those
    attacks the threats to our communities have evolved and have
    become increasingly complex.
        While we must continue to monitor international terror
    threats, there is no question that we must be better prepared
    to defend against what top national security officials,
    including those before us today have called the most lethal
    terrorist threat to Americans: domestic terrorism fueled by
    white nationalist and anti-government ideologies.
        Yesterday, I released a report detailing the results of my
    investigation. Alarmingly, my investigation found that DHS and
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are not adequately
    addressed the evolving domestic terrorism threat. Despite a
    requirement in law, written by myself and Senator Johnson, DHS
    and FBI have failed to effectively measure and share
    comprehensive data on the threat posed by violent domestic
    extremists (DVE), and specifically white supremacist and anti-
    government violence.
        Without this comprehensive data it is impossible for
    Congress, and for this Committee, to determine whether our
    nation's counterterrorism (CT) resources are effectively
    aligned to tackle the domestic terrorism threat. We need a
    data-driven approach to preventing deadly incidents like the
    January 6th Capitol breach, the tragic shooting in Buffalo, and
    countless other domestic terrorist attacks that have been
    fueled by hateful extremist ideologies. I look forward to
    hearing from our witnesses today about what resources and tools
    their agencies need to effectively collect data on domestic
    terrorism and to prevent these crimes.
        Today we will also have the opportunity to discuss the
    significant threat that cyberattacks pose to our national and
    our economic security. I am proud of the bipartisan work
    Senator Portman and I have led this Congress to enact some of
    the most significant reforms to our nation's cybersecurity
    policy in history. Our reforms will ensure that DHS has the
    tools, resources, and authorities needed to protect critical
    infrastructure, State and local governments, and other targets
    from cyberattacks. However, there is more that must be done to
    continue securing our vulnerabilities from criminal hackers and
    foreign adversaries, and I look forward to discussing these
    topics today.
        One of the most serious threats, and one of the toughest to
    tackle, is the threat posed by increasingly severe natural
    disasters and climate change. This is an existential threat to
    our planet, and unless it is addressed it will have a
    significant impact on our homeland security. Today we will hear
    more about how our national security agencies are tracking
    these challenges and how they are planning to address the
    security threats they present now and in the future.
        We also have a challenging situation at our Southern
    Border, and today we will discuss the Administration's work to
    secure both our Northern and Southern Borders, and prevent
    illegal trafficking and stop the flow of deadly illicit drugs
    like fentanyl into our communities. Those are difficult
    missions that must be accomplished, ensuring that lawful
    international trade and travel can continue to flow smoothly at
    our ports of entry (POEs), and keep States like my home State
    of Michigan a hub for international commerce.
        As our national security agencies continue to tackle these
    longstanding threats, they must also be prepared to counter
    emerging ones. Over the last few years the threat posed by
    unmanned aerial systems (UAS), or drones, has become
    increasingly perilous. Small drones, which can be purchased off
    the shelf at any electronic store, can be weaponized by
    malicious actors to damage our nation's critical infrastructure
    or inflict mass casualties.
        Today's drones could be used to launch remote attacks on
    everything from government buildings to crowds at public
    events, including large sports stadiums. We cannot let the
    current authorities that help address this grave threat expire
    in December, and I will continue working to ensure those
    important authorities are extended and that they are updated.
        Similarly, weaponized biological, chemical, nuclear and
    radioactive materials also remain a significant threat to our
    homeland security. I have introduced bipartisan legislation
    with Senator Portman to reauthorize and strengthen the office
    in DHS charged with overseeing these threats, and I will
    continue working with my colleagues to pass it as soon as
    possible.
        The scope and volume of these and many other national
    security threats requires Congress and this Administration to
    work together to ensure we are doing everything we can to keep
    Americans safe.
        Today I am pleased to welcome back each of our witnesses to
    hear more about how their agencies are working to effectively
    carry out this daunting and essential mission, and I look
    forward to a productive discussion.
        Before I turn things over I want to take a moment to
    recognize my colleague, Senator Portman, who is retiring this
    year.
        Rob, it has been a real pleasure to work with you for the
    past two years on this Committee. I am grateful for all of your
    hard work and your diligence to help us pass so much
    meaningful, bipartisan legislation through this Committee, from
    providing important financial relief to the U.S. Postal Service
    (USPS), to strengthening our ability to detect and deter
    cyberattacks, and working to make our nation more secure and
    more effective for taxpayers. It has certainly been a real
    pleasure and I wish you Godspeed in all your future endeavors,
    but all the work you did here will certainly never ever be
    forgotten.
        Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, will you yield to me for just
    a minute. I just want to say I am Tom Carper, and I approve
    that message. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Peters. I would also like to thank your Staff
    Director Pam Thiessen. You have been exceptional, and you have
    put together an incredible team. We have worked together,
    accomplished a lot together. Always have been open, maybe not
    agreeing fully, but always finding a way to try to find common
    ground. We wish you Godspeed as well in your future as well,
    Pam. Thank you. Thank you so much for that.
        With that, Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized your
    opening remarks.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\

        Senator Portman. Thank you, Chairman Peters, and just to
    respond to those comments, we appreciate the relationship we
    have had and the work we have gotten done. This Committee has
    done a lot on a bipartisan basis, and some of it does not get
    any notice because it is noncontroversial by the time we finish
    our process, but in the process I want to thank you and all the
    Members of the Committee for working with us to pass dozens of
    bills that are making an important difference to our
    constituents.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the
    Appendix on page 58.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        And to you and David Weinberg of your staff, we want to
    thank you for your willingness to work with us. Again, we have
    not agreed on everything, but we have been able to find common
    ground where possible and move the country forward. Thank you
    very much for that.
        Today is my last hearing as Ranking Member, and it is
    appropriate that it be this hearing because it is so important
    to the oversight responsibilities of this Committee and more
    importantly, important to our country right now. We have,
    unfortunately, a proliferation of threats facing the homeland,
    and I appreciate the fact that the right people are here today
    before us to be able to address those concerns and particularly
    to talk about what the Administration is doing to counter those
    threats. Welcome to Secretary Mayorkas, Director Wray, and
    Director Abizaid. We look forward to hearing from you.
        As the respective leaders of your agencies, you are
    responsible for overseeing thousands of career employees, men
    and women who wake up every day at DHS, the FBI, and the
    National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), with a mission to
    safeguard our Nation, and on behalf of the entire Committee I
    want to thank those employees who are patriots and are doing
    their best to further that mission.
        Every fall since the terrorist attacks on September 11,
    2001, we have had this hearing. We are a little late this year
    because of scheduling issues, but I think it is really
    important that we hold it because it is a time to stand back a
    little bit and reflect on where we are and how we can work
    together to address these potential threats, and active
    threats. I can think of no greater priority for this Committee.
        I am going to start with the crisis at the Southern Border
    because sadly, I am leaving at a time when we really have not
    made the progress we should have made on a bipartisan basis.
    But again, we have to raise these issues and attempt to solve
    some of these very significant problems.
        The failed border policies from this Administration has
    ensured that not only do our nation's borders remain unsecure,
    but foreign adversaries, transnational criminal organizations
    (TCOs), and other nefarious actors can too easily enter our
    country now, and therefore threaten the safety and the security
    of our public.
        This issue has not gotten better. It has gotten worse. In
    the past year, Border Patrol apprehended more than 2 million
    total unlawful migrants. This is up 143 percent since 2019.
    This chart\1\ behind me shows, in color, kind of the blue,
    green, and red of where we have been. Fiscal year (FY) 2021 and
    fiscal year 2022 figure are on the right. We just got the final
    figures for fiscal year 2022, and unfortunately it tells a very
    dramatic story of us failing to secure that Southern Border.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The chart referenced by Senator Portman appears in the Appendix
    on page 113.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This does not include the number of ``got-aways,'' or
    individuals who are not detected. What we hear from the Border
    Patrol is that the number of got-aways has increased
    significantly as well.
        These are criminals, often, who engage in human
    trafficking, criminals who involve themselves in the drug
    trade. This is about people but it is also about the fact that
    we have a record number of fentanyl shipments coming through
    the border, both through ports of entry and between the ports
    of entry now. We know this from anecdotal evidence but also
    because there is a record number of seizures of these deadly
    fentanyl shipments into our communities.
        Fentanyl, of course, is what is causing the most number of
    overdose deaths at time when we have a record number, sadly, of
    overdose deaths in our country. In Ohio, we think it is between
    two-thirds and three-quarters of the deaths related to this one
    drug, deadly fentanyl, which is primarily coming across the
    Mexican border now.
        This has been a tough couple of years, the worst two years
    of unlawful migration and the worst two years of drug seizures
    in our nation's history. I look forward to talking about that.
    We have to figure out how to move forward. Again, on a
    bipartisan basis, we have to figure out how to fix what is
    clearly a broken system.
        Another issue I want to address today is the chaotic
    withdrawal from Afghanistan, what that means in terms of the
    United States. Afghans who stood with us and our allies were
    left behind to suffer under Taliban rule, and meanwhile more
    than 36,000 Afghans with no record of ever having partnered
    with us, some of whom may have ties to terrorist groups, were
    paroled into our country without proper screening and vetting.
        I appreciate the fact that, Director Wray, you are here to
    talk about that in addition to Secretary Mayorkas, because,
    this is one, again, where if we made mistakes, and we can
    correct those mistakes. We can go back, and I know you are
    starting to do that, from testimony we have had both publicly
    and privately.
        But, we had this unfortunate, chaotic, and precipitous
    withdrawal that caused a lot of issues, but one was paroling
    people into our country who were not properly screened. There
    have been three reports now from two inspectors general (IGs)
    documenting the failures of DHS vetting and then paroling known
    or suspected terrorist into our communities, and yet we just do
    not have an acknowledgment of that problem from DHS.
        President Biden requested and received an additional $15
    million for the FBI to conduct counterterror investigations of
    known or suspected terrorists among the Afghan evacuees
    released into our country by DHS. In other words, he asked for
    $15 million to give to the FBI to do this additional vetting,
    and yet the Administration says it is not a problem. Those two
    are inconsistent, of course. Perhaps we can talk about those
    divergent views on this panel this morning.
        We all recognize the grave threat posed by our adversaries,
    such as Russia, Iran, and China, who rely on disinformation
    tactics to weaken our democracy. I think there is a consensus
    about that. But at home, we have to be much more careful around
    issues of domestic speech. We must respond to imminent threats
    of violence, of course--I do not think anybody on this
    Committee disagrees with that--but censoring constitutionally
    protected speech is an entirely different matter. To be
    precise, that should be a redline.
        I hope we can all agree that the United States government
    should not censor the speech of our own citizens. Americans'
    speech, differences of opinion, and political viewpoints are
    not a threat to democracy, but actually a bedrock of it.
        We know now that DHS disbanded its disturbing
    Disinformation Governance Board after significant public
    outcry, but we also know that it has continued its efforts to
    curb speech under the guise of countering misinformation or
    disinformation. The entanglement of the FBI and DHS with social
    media platforms for the purposes of controlling narratives is
    something we need to talk about today. I think it is a deep
    concern that all Americans have that we not cross that red
    line.
        Recent reports allege that DHS is colluding with Big Tech
    to moderate content in a way that conforms with the Biden
    administration's political views, including on the Afghanistan
    withdrawal and things like the origin of Coronavirus Disease
    2019 (COVID-19).
        Our democracy is also under threat because Congress and the
    Administration have been unwilling to confront the systematic
    theft of U.S. intellectual property by China which is
    undermining our national security and our economic security.
    Secretary Wray has been outspoken on this. His quote is,
    ``There is no country that presents a broader, more severe
    threat to our innovation, our ideas, and our economic security
    than China.'' I could not agree more.
        But every day, China reinforces the findings of our various
    investigations of this Committee, showing the staggering extent
    of the Chinese government's efforts to conduct influence and
    espionage operations in our country, and to steal American
    technology, research, and information for their own military
    and economic benefit. Addressing what the Communist Party of
    China is doing is more urgent than ever, and yet the
    Safeguarding American Innovation Act, which was reported out of
    this Committee, has been blocked from becoming law because of
    the unwillingness of Congress to confront this issue.
        Cyberattacks are another significant issue facing every
    sector of our country. We talked about this a moment ago with
    Senator Peters. We have made some progress here in this
    Committee. I appreciate that. But cyberattacks are growing and
    they are a force multiplier for our adversaries. We have to
    understand that this is an issue that they are going to
    continue to use. Our economic and security is depending on
    technology, and we have to be sure that we are not vulnerable
    here. Compounding that problem is the inherent difficulty of
    attributing cyberattacks to specific nation-states or criminal
    groups.
        Terrorism and targeted violence also remain serious threats
    to our country. This year, an Islamist terrorist gained entry
    to the United States and attacked a synagogue in Colleyville,
    Texas. In a separate incident, an Ohio-based Islamic State
    operative plotted to assassinate former President Bush. We are
    not out of the woods in terms of the Islamic terrorist threat.
        I remain convinced that we can deal with these issues on a
    bipartisan basis, as we have in the past, but I am concerned
    about the threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations
    (FTOs), especially in the wake of our withdrawal from
    Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda continues to pose a threat. The Islamic
    State continues to expand and mobilize. Iranian-sponsored Shi'a
    terrorist groups target key U.S. interests and government
    officials consistently. We must remain vigilant as these
    organizations regroup and evolve.
        We must restore confidence in the American public that we
    are committed to protect our nation from terrorism, espionage,
    and other homeland security threats, and this should be a
    bipartisan effort. We all have the same goal, a safe, secure
    American homeland.
        With that said, I look forward to the testimony this
    morning, Mr. Chairman, but most importantly, the responses to
    our questions regarding the record of the Administration
    addressing these threats, what we can do going forward
    together. I will note that only last week did we finally
    receive overdue answers to questions that we had from last
    year's hearing. It took over a year. I hope that in this case
    we will get more prompt responses to Committee questions that
    are posed.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
        Before I swear in the witnesses I want to make sure
    everyone knows how this will proceed, both our witnesses and
    Members. We are going to have two rounds of questions today.
    The first round, as we normally do, will be seven minutes for
    each person. Then second round we are going to have five
    minutes per person on the second round, due to time constraints
    with all of our witnesses.
        I am going to enforce those time limits perhaps a little
    more aggressively than I have in the past for everyone--seven
    minutes first round, five minutes the second round.
        It is the practice of the Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses,
    so if each of you will stand and raise your right hand.
        Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this
    Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth, so help you, God?
        Secretary Mayorkas. I do.
        Mr. Wray. I do.
        Ms. Abizaid. I do.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, you may be seated.
        Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas is the seventh Secretary of
    the Department of Homeland Security. Over his distinguished 30-
    year career as a law enforcement official and nationally
    recognized lawyer he has served as the Department's Deputy
    Secretary, as Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
    Services (USCIS), and at the Department of Justice (DOJ) as
    Assistant United States Attorney (ASUA) in the Central District
    of California.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you again for being here before the
    Committee. You may proceed with your opening remarks.

    TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS,\1\ SECRETARY,
                  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
    Portman, distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for
    inviting me to join you today. Ranking Member Portman, thank
    you for your unwavering support of our Department.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Secretary Mayorkas appears in the
    Appendix on page 62.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Next week marks the 20th anniversary of the Homeland
    Security Act being signed into law. This act brought together
    many components of the Federal Government to safeguard the
    United States against foreign terrorism in the wake of the
    devastation wrought on September 11, 2001. It remains the
    largest reorganization of the Federal Government's national
    security establishment since 1947. It is a testament to the
    grave threat we faced as a nation from terrorism brought to our
    shores by foreign actors and foreign terrorist organizations.
        Congress created a department that has significantly
    reduced the risk foreign terrorism poses to the homeland by
    increasing our capacity to prepare for and respond to those
    events.
        Foreign terrorist organizations remain committed to
    attacking the United States from within and beyond our borders.
    They use social media platform to amplify messaging intended to
    inspire attacks in the homeland. They have adapted to changing
    security environments, seeking new and innovative ways to
    target the United States.
        The evolving terrorism threat to the homeland now includes
    lone actors or small cells, domestic violent extremists seeking
    to further some political or social goal or act on a grievance,
    and home-grown violent extremists (HVE) looking to advance the
    interest of a foreign terrorist organization. From cyberattacks
    on our critical infrastructure to increasing destabilizing
    efforts by hostile nation-states, the threats facing the
    homeland have never been greater or more complex.
        Flouting internationally accepted norms of responsible
    behavior in cyberspace, our adversaries, hostile nations, and
    non-nation state cybercriminals continue to advance in
    capability and sophistication. Their methods vary, but their
    goals of doing harm are the same. Hostile nations like Russia,
    the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea,
    and cybercriminals around the world continue to sharpen their
    tactics and create more adverse consequences. Their ransomware
    attacks target our financial institutions, hospitals,
    pipelines, electric grids, and water treatment plants,
    attempting to wreak havoc on our daily lives. They exploit the
    integrated global cyber ecosystem to sow discord, undermine
    democracy, and erode trust in our institutions, public and
    private. These cyber operations threaten the economic and
    national security of every American and many others around the
    world.
        In particular, China is using its technology to tilt the
    global playing field to its benefit. They leverage
    sophisticated cyber capabilities to gain access to the
    intellectual property, data, and infrastructure of American
    individuals and businesses. Russia's unprovoked invasion of
    Ukraine intensified the risk of a cyberattack, impacting our
    critical infrastructure earlier this year. Nation-state
    aggression is creating a heightened risk of chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) related threats to
    Americans as well.
        While fast-emerging technologies like unmanned aerial
    systems, artificial intelligence (AI), internet communications,
    and cryptocurrencies are helping societies be more productive,
    creative, and entrepreneurial, they also are introducing new
    risks. Transnational criminal organizations are deploying these
    technologies to commit a wide array of crimes as they continue
    to grow in size, scale, sophistication, and lethality.
        With respect to unmanned aerial systems in particular, it
    is vital that Congress act before the end of this year to
    extend our counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) authorities
    in order to protect the American people from malicious drone
    activity.
        The risk of targeted violence, perpetrated by actors abroad
    and at home, is substantial. Emerging technology platforms
    allow individuals and national States to fan the flames of hate
    and personal grievances to large audiences, and are encouraging
    people to commit violent acts.
        Those driven to violence are targeting critical
    infrastructure, soft targets, faith-based institutions,
    institutions of higher education, racial and religious
    minorities, government facilities and personnel, including law
    enforcement and the military, and perceived ideological
    opponents.
        Addressing these threats requires a whole-of-society
    approach across Federal, State, and local governments, the
    private sector, nonprofits, academia, and most importantly,
    every citizen. Congress may not have predicted the extent of
    today's threat environment when our department was created 20
    years ago, but our mission has never been more vital. Our
    components have never collaborated more closely, our
    extraordinary workforce has never been more capable, and our
    nation has never been more prepared. We must harness the same
    deliberative and bipartisan spirit in which this Department was
    created to combat the vast threats Americans face today.
        I look forward to answering your questions.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Secretary Mayorkas.
        Director Christopher Wray is the eighth Director of the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation. Director Wray began his law
    enforcement career over two decades ago, serving in the
    Department of Justice as the Assistant U.S. Attorney for the
    Northern District of Georgia.
        He has also served on the President's corporate Fraud Tax
    Force and supervised the Enron Tax Force, in addition to
    playing a key role in the national security objectives for the
    Department.
        Director Wray, thank you for appearing before the Committee
    once again. You may proceed with your opening remarks.

     TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY,\1\ DIRECTOR,
      FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Mr. Wray. Good morning, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
    Portman, and Members of the Committee. I am honored to be here
    today on behalf of the FBI's 38,000 men and women to discuss
    some of the most pressing threats facing our homeland.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Wray appears in the Appendix on
    page 85.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        When it comes to the current threat landscape, what makes
    our current situation unique, and I would add particularly
    serious, is the fact that we are seeing so many different
    threat areas all elevated at the same time. I am proud of the
    work the FBI's agents, analysts, and professional staff are
    doing all across the country and around the world every day to
    rise to that challenge and protect the American people.
        Protecting the American people from terrorist attack
    remains the FBI's No. 1 priority. As I have said before, the
    greatest threat we face on the terrorism front here in the
    homeland is from what are effectively lone actors or small
    cells. Whether you are talking about a domestic violent
    extremist acting in furtherance of some ideological goal or a
    home-grown violent extremist looking to advance the interest of
    a foreign terrorist organization, these actors often move very
    quickly from radicalization to action and often use easily
    obtainable weapons--think a gun, a knife, a car, a crude
    improvised explosive device (IED)--against soft targets, which
    is really just intelligence community (IC)-speak for everyday
    people going about their everyday lives.
        Overseas, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-
    Qaeda still aim to inspire, plan, and launch attacks against
    the United States and our allies, both abroad and here at home.
    As the Zawahiri strike this summer in Kabul reinforces, the
    threat of foreign terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda
    attempting to reconstitute in Afghanistan following our
    withdrawal is very real, and our ability to gather valuable
    intelligence on the ground inside Afghanistan has been reduced.
    That is just a reality, and all of that places a premium on our
    continued collaboration with our partners, both within the U.S.
    Government and internationally. We have to stay on the balls of
    our feet and use all of the tools available to us.
        On top of that, countries like China, Russia, Iran, and
    North Korea are all growing more aggressive, more brazen, more
    capable. They are coming at us from all angles to undermine our
    core democratic institutions, our national security, and our
    rule of law.
        Of those countries, the greatest long-term threat to our
    nation's ideas, innovation, and economic security, our national
    security, is that from China. The Chinese government aspires to
    equal or surpass the United States as a global superpower and
    influence the world with a value system shaped by undemocratic,
    authoritarian ideals.
        But we are confronting that threat head on. Three weeks
    ago, for example, we unsealed charges against 13 individuals,
    10 of them Chinese intelligence officers and government
    officers, for a variety of criminal efforts to exert influence
    right here in the United States on behalf of Beijing, and we
    have scores of investigations into the China threat in all 56
    FBI field offices.
        On the cyber front, China's vast hacking program is the
    world's largest by a mile, and they have stolen more of
    Americans' personal and business data than every other nation
    combined.
        But, of course, China is not our only challenge in
    cyberspace, not even close. The FBI's cyber investigations are
    growing in frequency, scale, and complexity, consistent with
    the evolution of the threat. We are investigating over 100
    different ransomware variants, each with scores of victims, as
    well as a host of other novel threats posed by both cyber
    criminals and nation-states alike. It is becoming more and more
    difficult to discern where the cybercriminal activity ends and
    the nation-state activity begins, as the line between those two
    continues to blur.
        Just last month, for example, we announced the indictment
    of three Iranian nationals for their roles in a multiyear
    scheme to compromise the networks of hundreds of organizations,
    many of which offer critical services Americans rely on every
    day.
        These sort of actors nothing is off limits, not even, for
    example, Boston Children's Hospital, which they set their
    sights on in the summer of 2021. Now fortunately, before they
    could successfully launch their attack we received a tip from a
    partner, and working closely with the hospital we were able to
    identify and defeat the threat, protecting both the network and
    the sick kids who depend on it.
        Our opponents in this space are relentless, and we have to
    keep responding in kind. I can assure you that we are going to
    continue to be aggressive and creative as we run joint
    sequenced operations with our partners against those
    adversaries, removing their malware, taking down their botnets,
    and hunting them down all over the world.
        Now that is just a snapshot really of some of the many
    threats we are tackling and does not even include things like
    our efforts to combat violent crime, where this summer, working
    with our State and local partners, we arrested, on average, 50
    violent criminals every day.
        Or our continued focus on human trafficking, where this
    August, through our annual Operation Cross Country, for
    instance, the FBI and our partners located more than 200
    victims of human trafficking, many of them little kids.
        Or the work our transnational organized crime section is
    doing, in partnership with agencies like DHS, to investigate
    the movement of people, drugs, guns, and money into the United
    States across our southern border.
        The breadth and depth of the threats the FBI's dedicated
    men and women are tackling each and every day is staggering,
    and I continue to be inspired by their commitment to our
    mission of protecting the American people and upholding the
    Constitution. I know we will continue to answer the call.
        Thank you again for having me here today, and I would be
    happy to address your questions.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Director Wray.
        Director Christine Abizaid is the eighth Senate-confirmed
    Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Previously,
    she served on the National Security Council staff as both
    Director for Counterterrorism and Senior Policy Advisor to the
    Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
    Counterterrorism.
        She has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, and as a
    Senior Intelligence Analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency
    (DIA).
        Ms. Abizaid, thank you again for appearing before this
    Committee. It is good to have you back. You may proceed with
    your opening remarks.

      TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE ABIZAID,\1\ DIRECTOR,
      NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
                         NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

        Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much. Chairman Peters, Ranking
    Member Portman, and Members of the Committee, thank you very
    much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
    the overall terrorism landscape.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid appears in the Appendix
    on page 103.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Despite significant progress in diminishing the terrorist
    threat to the United States, the country continues to face a
    diversified, transnational, and in many ways, unpredictable
    threat environment at home and abroad. An array of actors,
    whether foreign terrorist organizations, state sponsors of
    terrorism, or lone actors, are shaping the nature of today's
    threat.
        This changed environment exists amid an ongoing transition
    for the counterterrorism community where CT, while still
    critical, is one of many competing priorities the U.S. national
    security community must be postured to address.
        In today's testimony I will start by giving an overview of
    the terrorist threat to the homeland, turn to the overseas
    threat environment, and then end with some comments on the
    importance of our continued CT effort.
        Regarding the United States homeland, terrorist
    organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda remain committed to
    attacking inside the United States. However, unlike 21 years
    ago, the threat today is more likely to take the form of an
    individual attacker inspired by these groups rather than a
    networked and hierarchically directed plot. In fact, since 9/
    11, 37 of the 45 ISIS or al-Qaeda-linked attacks in the
    homeland have been inspired by these groups, rather than
    centrally directed by them.
        This trend toward lone actor threats inside the United
    States extends beyond ISIS and al-Qaeda. It also characterizes
    the threat we face from domestic actors, such as racially or
    ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs), militia
    violent extremists (MVEs), and anarchist violent extremists
    (AVEs).
        In particular, the racially or ethnically motivated violent
    extremist threat has the most obvious links to transnational
    actors, whose plots and professed ideology encourage
    mobilization to violence by those vulnerable to their message.
    This threat is fluid, it is fragmented, lacking in hierarchical
    structures, with proponents around the globe framing actions
    around the concept of leaderless resistance.
        Transitioning to the overseas environment, Sunni- and Shia-
    driven terrorist movements worldwide continue to dominate the
    threat to Americans. ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to aspire to
    attack United States and other Western interests overseas, but
    have been more effective at pursing operations against regional
    and local adversaries.
        For its part, ISIS in Iraq and Syria remains an intact,
    centrally led organizations that will most likely continue to
    pose both a global and local threat, this despite the death of
    its emir, Haji Abdullah, in February.
        While significantly weaker than its peak in 2015 through
    2017, ISIS leaders from Iraq and Syria have been successful at
    spurning branches and networks across Africa and as far as
    South and East Asia, with its two most effective branches
    currently operating out of West Africa and Afghanistan.
        Likewise, al-Qaeda maintains its regional affiliate
    structure positioned effectively in parts of North and East
    Africa, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent South Asia. The
    July death of longtime al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was
    a strategic and symbolic setback for the organization, but it
    does not put an end to al-Qaeda.
        In particular, in the Middle East, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula is a destabilizing actor in Yemen and remains among
    the most intrepid al-Qaeda affiliates intent on attacks inside
    the U.S. homeland.
        Two other prominent al-Qaeda affiliates also stand out,
    both for their growing regional influence and their significant
    capabilities, the Sahel-based al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat
    al-Is lam al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Somalia-based affiliate, al-
    Shabaab.
        Of note, we continue to monitor for signs al-Qaeda has
    chosen a successor to Zawahiri, now three months since his
    death. In addition to al-Qaeda affiliate leaders, we are
    particularly focused on the role that Iran-based legacy
    leaders, such as Sayf al-'Adl, may play in the future of the
    organization.
        Transitioning from Sunni terrorism to threats emanating
    from Iran, its partners, and its proxies, Iran continue to
    plan, encourage, and support plots against the United States,
    both at home and in the Middle East, where we have a
    significant U.S. military presence. Iran and Lebanese Hizballah
    have sought to plot attacks against former U.S. officials to
    retaliate for the death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    (IRGC) Qods Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, raising the
    threat both at home and abroad for those that Iran deems
    responsible.
        In closing, I would just highlight that the complexity of
    the international terrorism and extremism environment that I
    just outlined continues to demand a collaborate, agile, and
    sufficiently resourced counterterrorism effort to mitigate
    terrorist threats to the United States.
        It is clear that the significant CT pressure brought to
    bear against terrorist groups over the last two decades, along
    with investment in effective CT defenses here at home, has
    resulted in a diminished threat to the United States homeland.
        NCTC and its CT partners across the government are working
    toward a sustainable and enduring level of support to this
    mission that maintains the strategic success. In fact, the role
    of NCTC today is perhaps more important than ever. Charged with
    integrating and analyzing all terrorism information across the
    United States government and sharing that information with
    partners, both foreign and domestic, organizations like NCTC
    can help ensure that CT remains a foundational element of
    national security, even as other organizations must shift to
    other pressing priorities.
        Finally, I want to assure this Committee that the
    interagency enterprise of CT practitioners remains committed to
    this mission and are working behind the scenes every day to
    protect the American people, both at home and abroad. It is
    with great gratitude and privilege that I appear before you
    today and have the opportunity to recognize the incredible
    community of intelligence, diplomatic, military, and law
    enforcement professionals whose dedication to the CT mission
    has done so much to protect this country and its citizens.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I am subject to your questions.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Director Abizaid.
        Yesterday I released a report following a multiyear
    investigation on the growing domestic terrorism threat. I
    believe we provided it to each of the witnesses yesterday. This
    is also available through the website, the Homeland Security
    Committee website, to read in its entirety.
        In the report we found that despite being required by law,
    my investigation found that DHS and FBI have failed to
    systematically track and report data on domestic terrorism,
    they have not appropriately allocated resources to match the
    current threat, and have not aligned definitions of domestic
    terrorism to ensure consistency across the investigations of
    these crimes. Quite frankly, it is hard to address this rising
    threat if we cannot quantify and define the scope of the
    problem so that we can tailor an appropriate response to, and
    the agencies appear not to be doing that.
        Director Wray, we have seen think tanks and nonprofits
    collect more comprehensive about domestic terrorism attacks
    than the U.S. Government has been able to do. Why has the FBI
    been unable to collect and report complete data about domestic
    terrorism despite a Federal law requiring you to do so?
        Mr. Wray. Mr. Chairman, I know all too well that there have
    been frustrations in the reports that have been generated under
    the law that you are referring to. I think we have made
    progress between the first report and the second report, and we
    are committed to continuing to make progress. Some of the
    issues have to do with, if you go further back in time, before
    2015 for example, we were using paper as opposed to electronic
    and so the ability to go back and track earlier than 2015 I
    know has been a source of tension at times.
        In addition, State and local law enforcement and tribal law
    enforcement are not required to report domestic terrorism to
    us. While we do get lots of reports of that through our Joint
    Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), it is not as systematic as any of
    us would like it to be.
        Then you mentioned the terminology change. We have changed
    terminology over time. There are good reasons for that. But
    there is some risk then at having sort of an apple-to-orange
    type effect in the comparisons.
        But we are committed to continuing to work with the
    Committee on this topic, and our data-tracking limitations
    should in no way be confused with our commitment to
    prioritizing this issue. I elevated racially motivated violent
    extremism to a national threat priority all the way back in
    June, I think it was, or the summer of 2019, and we have surged
    resources to address that, and the pace of investigations and
    arrests over my first 3.5 years as director, doubled, or in the
    case of arrests even tripled in this space.
        We have been working hard on it but we do need more
    resources in this space, and our fiscal 2022 budget
    specifically asks for more resources to help address the
    domestic terrorism threat.
        Chairman Peters. I appreciate your work on this, you were
    right. The second report was better than the first report, and
    I would hope that we could work closely together to make the
    third report even better, because that information is obviously
    critical for us to understanding the scope of the problem and
    then design appropriate responses to it. But I appreciate your
    active engagement in that, Director Wray.
        I also remain extremely concerned about the threat posed to
    our nation from bad actors using unmanned aircraft systems, to
    disrupt our society, or worse, to potentially conduct a lethal
    attack on our Nation.
        Earlier this year this Committee unanimously passed a bill,
    authored by Senator Johnson and I, to protect our nation's
    airports, critical infrastructure, and public spaces from these
    evolving threats.
        Secretary Mayorkas, as you are well aware, these
    authorities are set to expire next month, on the 16th of
    December. Could you explain to this Committee the consequences
    of allowing these authorities to lapse?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Peters, I am deeply
    appreciative of your and Senator Johnson's bipartisan effort to
    propose legislation to not only continue our authority to
    counter unmanned aerial systems but also to expand it
    critically, and that need is very grave.
        Just yesterday I was meeting with experts who were speaking
    of the increased efficiency, sophistication, and capability of
    drones in terms of their visibility, the speed with which they
    can move, the distance with which they can move, and also the
    loads that they can carry. This poses a real threat, and we see
    it very often, sometimes by innocent operators who mistakenly
    interfere with the airspace and cause aircraft to reroute their
    journeys, to bad actors, and we see it quite tragically in the
    war zone that Russia created with its unprovoked assault on
    Ukraine.
        These are extraordinarily sophisticated tools that can
    carry drugs, that can launch weaponry, and we must be able to
    counter it. It is only an increasing threat, and we hope that
    Congress passes the legislation that you and Senator Johnson
    have proposed.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Secretary. We have limited time
    and I am going to keep strict to seven minutes for everybody.
        Director Wray, the FBI is the lead on protecting mass
    gatherings like the Super Bowl and other areas. How concerned
    are you about these authorities lapsing?
        Mr. Wray. We are deeply concerned, and we appreciate this
    Committee's leadership on this topic. It is important for
    Americans to understand that if that authority is not
    reauthorized next month that public gatherings like the Super
    Bowl in Arizona, like New Year's Eve in Times Square, like
    Formula One in Las Vegas, and I could go on, none of those
    things will have protection from this threat. All the times
    that we have deployed with the authority that this Committee
    has led the passage of before, we have located hundreds of
    drones that have been acting in violation of Federal law each
    time.
        As the threat continues to grow, we are investigating, even
    as we speak, several incidents within the United States, of
    attempts to weaponize drones with homemade IEDs. That is the
    future that is here now, and this authority desperately needs
    to be reauthorized.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Director Wray, with eight
    seconds left of my time.
        Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for your
    questions.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to thank
    you and Senator Johnson for working on a bipartisan basis to
    put together this legislation. I am a co-sponsor of it. I know
    the House has a different view in terms of how they would like
    to approach it, but we have to get this one done. I mean, we
    just heard about the importance of it, so I thank both of you
    for working on this issue, and it is less than a month when it
    expires, so we have to move, and move quickly.
        I spoke in my opening statement about the appreciation we
    have for the men and women who you represent. We just learned
    from media accounts that five Customs and Border Protection
    (CBP) agents were shot, one fatally, during a vessel
    interdiction against suspected drug smugglers off the coast of
    Puerto Rico. This just happened, and our thoughts and prayers,
    of course, are with the family of the agent who was fatally
    shot and also with those agents who were wounded.
        But I think it is a sober reminder of the sacrifices that
    the individuals who you represent today here make every day,
    and we owe them our support. It is a dangerous time, and this
    is an unfortunate example of that.
        With regard to the Southern Border, we have talked a lot
    about this over the months, and years even. How do you take a
    broken system and fix it? Because clearly, if you look at this
    chart\1\ behind me, it is broken. We have had all kinds of
    charts in this Committee and all kinds of discussions about it.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The chart referenced by Senator Portman appears in the Appendix
    on page 113.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        There was an interesting back-and-forth recently between
    President Biden's Chief of Border Patrol, Raul Ortiz, who works
    for you, as you know, Mr. Secretary, and the State of Florida.
    The Attorney General (AG) in Florida has a lawsuit against the
    Department with regard to the Southern Border. I just thought I
    would go over that quickly.
        This has been the worst year of apprehensions ever, the
    last fiscal year, but the second-worst year was last year.
    These numbers speak for themselves. More than two million
    people apprehended between the ports of entry in 2022.
        This summer, when the Chief of Border Patrol was questioned
    by the State of Florida he gave his answers under oath, and I
    would ask unanimous consent (UC) to place the transcript of the
    Border Patrol Chief's testimony into the record, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Peters. Without objection.
        Senator Portman. Secretary, I am going to ask you the same
    questions that the Chief of Border Patrol was asked to see if
    you agree with him, and if you could, please just give me a yes
    or no answer, as he did.
        The first question, is the Southern Border currently in
    crisis? Yes or no.
        Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Portman, the entire
    hemisphere is suffering a migration crisis. We are seeing an
    unprecedented movement of people from country to country. It is
    not restricted to the Southern Border. We are seeing an
    unprecedented movement of people throughout the Western
    Hemisphere, and I think the case of Venezuela is the most
    compelling example. With a population of between 25 and 28
    million people, approximately eight million of them have left
    that country. Colombia is hosting 2.4 million Venezuelans.
        Senator Portman. I would ask you for a yes-or-no answer to
    the Southern Border. I have been to Colombia twice in the last
    year. I am very aware of what is going on with regard to the
    displaced people out of Venezuela, and for that matter
    Nicaragua and Cuba.
        But the question is all the more pressing. What are we
    doing about? Should we not be changing our policies at the
    border to deal with it instead of having this result.
        My question to you again, is the Southern Border current in
    crisis? Yes or no.
        Secretary Mayorkas. We are seeing a significant challenge
    at the Southern Border, as we are seeing it throughout the
    hemisphere.
        Senator Portman. Chief Ortiz stated yes, just so you know.
    He said the obvious, which is yes.
        Second question. Would you agree that an unprecedented
    number of unlawful migrants are entering the United States
    right now? Yes or no.
        Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Portman, I believe that
    the number of encounters that we have had the border, I think
    it is approximately 2.3 million this past year, is the highest
    on record.
        Senator Portman. OK. So the answer is yes by Chief Ortiz,
    and it sounds like you agree with him on that.
        Mr. Secretary, since when President Biden took office is it
    true that the number of migrants trying to unlawfully enter the
    United States has increased substantially? Yes or no.
        Secretary Mayorkas. It has, and there are many different
    factors that contribute to that.
        Senator Portman. OK. But I ask you these questions
    obviously because the answer was yes. He was candid and gave
    short answers. We cannot fix the problem unless we acknowledge
    it. We cannot fix the problem unless we understand the facts.
        Secretary Mayorkas. Yes.
        Senator Portman. We cannot fix the problem unless we are
    willing to be honest Republicans, Democrats, everyone alike,
    saying we have a crisis. If we do not fix this crisis at the
    border we will continue to see these same rules.
        Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Portman, if I may, there
    has been a problem with our immigration system, an acknowledge
    one, unanimously, for years and years.
        Senator Portman. For years and years, but again, look at
    this chart. This is the numbers, so it has gotten far worse.
    Look, we do not have time to go into the details as to how we
    fix it, but you and I have talked about this a lot, Mr.
    Secretary. If the asylum system is not fixed, this will not
    end. If we do not give the Border Patrol more resources, this
    is not going to end. If we do not figure out a way to provide
    for deportations when people are here illegally, particularly
    when they are committing other crimes, this will continue.
        We are unfortunately looking at a situation where, you
    mentioned Colombia, if you go to the countries throughout the
    hemisphere they believe this is a pull factor, our policies.
    The leadership of these countries actually do not want their
    people moving into the United States. That might seem
    counterintuitive to some people, but some of their best and
    brightest are leaving because of our pull factor, because we
    are not putting in place the right policies to go to control
    our own Southern Border.
        I have so many other questions, and we will get a chance in
    the second round. I hope to talk about some of these. With
    regard to the cyberattacks we talked about earlier, the
    agencies that have been compromised in some of these attacks
    concern us greatly. Yesterday, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
    Security Agency (CISA) and the FBI issued a joint advisory
    detailing suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors'
    compromise of the Federal agencies using this Log4j
    vulnerability. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, to include that
    advisory in the record\2\ so we have it as part of this record.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The information referenced by Senator Portman appears in the
    Appendix on page 114.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We have discussed this vulnerability at length in this
    Committee, another example of the issues.
        My time is expiring here in a second, but can you just tell
    us, Secretary Mayorkas, what agencies are agency was
    compromised with regard to this latest announcement you made
    regarding the Iranian government-sponsored attack?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Portman, that identity
    has not been disclosed, and I would need to speak with my
    colleagues to determine whether I would be compromising any
    security interest in doing so.
        Senator Portman. Are you confident that the actors have
    been expelled from our Federal networks?
        Secretary Mayorkas. I will once again need to confer with
    my colleagues to determine the status of the effort by the bad
    actors.
        Senator Portman. We are considering, as you know, this
    Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA)
    reauthorization to trigger cyber incident reporting to
    Congress. Would this be considered a major incident?
        Secretary Mayorkas. I believe so, Ranking Member Portman.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
        Senator Carper, you are recognized for your seven minutes
    of questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

        Senator Carper. Seven. OK.
        To each of our witnesses, welcome. It is great to see you
    all again. Some of you I have known for a while and pretty
    well, and I even know your families. I just want to say, to
    begin with, we do not do these jobs by ourselves, whether you
    are on that side of the table or this side of the table. Our
    families put up with a lot, and we just want to thank your
    families for sharing you with us, especially as Thanksgiving
    approaches.
        The first Secretary of Homeland Security was a guy named
    Tom Ridge from Pennsylvania, from Erie, Pennsylvania. We are
    both Vietnam veterans. We were congressmen together in the same
    freshman class. We were Governors together for a number of
    years. He remains a very close friend.
        I joined this Committee, I was elected in, oh Lord, I want
    to say 22 years ago, and Joe Lieberman said, when I tried to
    decide what Committees to be on, he said, ``You should try to
    get on the Governmental Affairs Committee.'' I said, ``Well, I
    am interested in that,'' and he said, ``It is just the perfect
    fit for you, a former Governor, former State treasurer. You
    care about things working well.'' And he said, ``You should
    join the Committee,'' and I did. Two years later, 9/11 came
    along, and we ended up the whole world changed. Our whole world
    changed.
        The nature of the threats that we faced the day that Tom
    Ridge was sworn into office to be our Secretary, and what we
    face today is unbelievable. It is just incredible how the world
    has changed, in not so good ways. I just want to say a special
    thanks to each of you and the folks you work with that help us
    try to address and be ready for the threats that are coming our
    way, almost every day.
        I will start with Secretary Mayorkas, and in the second
    round of questions, if I am lucky, I will ask questions of our
    other two witnesses. But Mr. Secretary, again, my first
    question is to you. I know your job is not an easy one. Between
    leading a workforce of almost a quarter of a million people,
    whose duties range anywhere from aviation to border security,
    enhancing our nation's cyber posture, responding to natural
    disasters, and protecting the homeland, I hope that everyone
    here today can respect that and that your dedication and
    service to our nation is commendable. That goes for all three
    of our witnesses here today, and I thank you again for your
    service.
        As we continue to see a number of encounters at our
    Southern Border, the Department of Homeland Security has been
    leading a whole-of-government response to address these
    challenges and to help keep our borders more secure. Mr.
    Secretary, can you just talk about some of the changes in
    migration patterns that we have seen at our Southern Border in
    the last year and a half, and what policies the Department has
    put in place to address these challenges? Specifically, can you
    speak to the investments in border technology and legal
    migration pathways and your level of engagement with other
    countries in the region, given that the migration patterns have
    been a hemispheric challenge? Please.
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator Carper, thank you for
    acknowledging the challenge that these positions present. Of
    course, a challenge is all relative. Ranking Member Portman
    mentioned the tragic loss of one of our frontline personnel.
    Several other were gravely wounded. I was briefed on the
    situation very early this morning. These are brave members of
    our Air and Marine Operations within U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection. The difficulty of this job cannot be compared to
    the difficulty that our frontline personnel face every day, and
    their bravery and selfless service should be recognized. I
    appreciate Ranking Member Portman acknowledging that.
        The migration patterns in the hemisphere have changed
    dramatically. When I was the Deputy Secretary we were very
    concerned about migration from the Central American countries
    of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. We have encountered
    now the highest level of encounters by Venezuelans, Cubans, and
    Nicaraguans, and that demographic, that changed demographic
    makes the challenge even more acute because our diplomatic
    relations with these countries is obviously quite strained and
    we are unable to remove as easily individuals from these
    countries of origin.
        Of course, we implemented thus far, at an early stage, a
    very successful response to the Venezuelan migration, in
    particular.
        We have six lines of effort, Senator Carper. We have surged
    resources to the Southern Border--personnel, technology,
    facilities, transportation capabilities. We have increased our
    processing efficiency. We are increasingly digitizing our
    processes, modernizing them so that the intake process and the
    screening and vetting process is enhanced and more efficient.
        We are delivering consequences for unlawful entry. We have
    increased the level of prosecution of illegal entry when
    individuals seek to evade law enforcement. We have sought to
    bolster the capacity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
    and State and local jurisdictions. We are conducting an
    unprecedented disruption campaign against the smuggling
    organizations and the transnational criminal organizations.
        We are also working very closely with our partners to the
    south to deter irregular migration. The declaration that was
    signed in the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles several
    months ago speaks powerfully of that. We need countries
    throughout the hemisphere to enforce their laws of humanitarian
    relief as well as their laws of enforcement.
        This is a multipronged effort to address a multinational
    challenge throughout the hemisphere.
        Senator Carper. Thank you for that response.
        Most of us are people of faith, and there is a verse of
    scripture in Matthew 25 that I think a lot of us are familiar
    with, ``When I was hungry, you would feed me. When I was
    thirsty, you gave me drink. When I was naked, you clothed me.
    When I was sick and imprisoned, you visited. When I was a
    stranger in your land, did you welcome me?'' When I was a
    stranger in your land, did you welcome me?
        The last one is hard. In fact, they are pretty difficult.
    But the last one is especially hard.
        In an effort to try to reduce the likelihood that people
    are going to risk life and limb to come to this country and
    relocate here, they leave, in some cases, hellacious conditions
    in which they lived. They have come many miles, hundreds of
    miles sometimes, to reach our borders, and some of us think,
    why do we not give them the opportunity if they want to come
    here, to actually go to our embassies or our consulates and let
    those intentions be known and to work from there?
        Would you respond to that idea, please? Just briefly?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator Carper, our laws are laws of
    humanitarian relief and laws of accountability. We have an
    asylum system that is one of the sources of pride of our
    country and we enforce the law. When an individual qualifies
    for humanitarian relief they are, under the law, entitled to
    remain here, and if they do not qualify they are to be removed,
    and we are enforcing the laws in every respect.
        Senator Carper. Thanks so much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Carper.
        Senator Johnson, you are recognized for your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON

        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Wray,
    you made a comment here, in answer to the Chairman's
    questioning, that you were committed to working with this
    Committee. You will excuse me if I find those words ringing
    incredibly hollow. I had to subpoena you, as Chairman of this
    Committee. I really did not get anything. I have written
    repeated letters, either with no response whatsoever or a
    nonresponse response.
        It is one of the reasons that I am very grateful to all the
    whistleblowers that are coming forward, to various committees,
    to various members, people of integrity within your
    organizations, blowing the whistle on the corruption at some of
    the highest levels of the FBI.
        First question. Do you commit, publicly, that the FBI will
    not retaliate against those whistleblowers?
        Mr. Wray. Senator, we will not retaliate against
    whistleblowers. I take the protections that are in law and
    regulation of whistleblowers extremely seriously.
        Senator Johnson. I will hold you to that.
        Mr. Wray. Just like I take compliance with all of our other
    rules very seriously.
        Senator Johnson. Yes. Senator Grassley wrote you a letter
    on July 25, 2020, in which he said that whistleblowers to his
    office reported that FBI officials initiated a scheme to
    downplay derogatory information on Hunter Biden for the purpose
    of shutting down investigatory activity related to his
    potential criminal exposure by labeling it, ``disinformation.''
    Boy, that is a familiar term. That scheme was hatched in August
    2020.
        Also included, he said, in August 2020, FBI supervisory
    intelligence analyst, Brian Auten, opened an assessment which
    was used by FBI headquarters team to improperly discredit
    negative Hunter Biden information as disinformation and caused
    investigative activity to cease.
        Have you responded to Senator Grassley's letter that he
    wrote over three months ago?
        Mr. Wray. Senator, I know there have been a whole slew of
    letters, and I believe we have responded to a number of them.
    But sitting here I cannot tell you which ones----
        Senator Johnson. You have not.
        Mr. Wray [continuing]. Which ones we have responded to and
    which ones we have not.
        Senator Johnson. Have you looked into those charges, that
    there was a scheme hatched in August 2020, to downplay the
    derogatory information on Hunter Biden? Have you looked into
    that personally?
        Mr. Wray. We have, as we speak, a number of personnel
    matters that are underway, and for reasons which I am sure you
    can appreciate we cannot discuss personnel matters.
        Senator Johnson. I know that is always your excuse. No, I
    got it. I understand how you remain above the law by using that
    excuse repeatedly.
        The reason I am a little sensitive on August 2020 is that
    on August 6th, both Senator Grassley and I received an
    unsolicited briefing by members of the FBI, which I knew
    immediately was a setup. No new information whatsoever. I knew
    it was a setup, and I was correct because nine months later, on
    May 1st, it was leaked to The Washington Post to smear me.
        I have written you publicly a number of times, asking who
    directed that briefing. Are you prepared to tell me, in public,
    who directed that briefing now?
        Mr. Wray. Senator, first off, I cannot discuss specific
    defensive briefings, more broadly, and that is a longstanding
    practice.
        Senator Johnson. Tell me then why have you refused to meet
    with us to privately tell us who directed that briefing?
        Mr. Wray. If I may finish my answer to the question. It is
    a longstanding practice not to discuss specific defensive
    briefings. We have, as my understanding, responded in writing
    to a letter that you sent. I think responded back----
        Senator Johnson. It is bureaucratic----
        Mr. Wray [continuing]. At the end of 2021.
        Senator Johnson. It is bureaucratic gobbledygook, is what
    that is.
        Mr. Wray [continuing]. And----
        Senator Johnson. That is not a response.
        Mr. Wray [continuing]. We offered in that letter to provide
    a senior executive of the FBI to walk through, in detail, our
    process.
        Senator Johnson. What your process is but not specifically
    who directed a briefing that was used to smear me.
        Have you looked into the leaking of that briefing The
    Washington Post? Have you investigated that?
        Mr. Wray. I am not going to discuss specific
    investigations. As to the briefing question, and who directs
    it, let me be very clear about this. When it comes to election-
    related defensive briefings there is not a single person who
    makes that decision. That is an interagency process that was
    set up by the prior administration, signed off on by the former
    President prepared by the Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence (ODNI)----
        Senator Johnson [continuing]. There are persons in that
    interagency. Correct? There would be persons. We should know
    who those persons are. Why will you not tell us who directed
    that briefing, the persons then?
        Mr. Wray. I would refer you to the process that was put in
    place, and we can give you more information about the process
    if you would like.
        Senator Johnson. Have you read Senator Grassley's and my
    report on Hunter Biden's corruption, issued in September 2020
    and November 2020? Have you read those reports?
        Mr. Wray. I have had a chance to look at it.
        Senator Johnson. Do you see any sign of Russian
    disinformation in those reports?
        Mr. Wray. That would be a hard question for me to answer.
        Senator Johnson. No, it is very easy.
        Mr. Wray. What I would say----
        Senator Johnson. It is a very easy answer. There is no
    Russian disinformation. That report is completely clean of any
    interference of foreign influence, although we have been
    falsely accused, including by the Chairman of this Committee,
    of spreading Russian disinformation.
        Are you aware of the FBI having any involvement whatsoever
    in the October 19, 2020, public statement by 51 former
    intelligence officials?
        Mr. Wray. I am not aware of any involvement by the FBI in
    what you are describing.
        Senator Johnson. The reason I ask is, if it is true that in
    August 2020, the FBI initiated a scheme to downplay derogatory
    information on Hunter Biden, it would seem like maybe part of
    that scheme would be to get intelligence officials to issue a
    letter that stated that the laptop had all the earmarks of a
    Russian information operation. That was totally false. We now
    know that the Hunter laptop is completely authentic.
        The point I am trying to make here is the unsolicited
    briefing that was leaked in May 2021, was used to smear me and
    interfered into the U.S. Senate election of November 2022. One
    of the whistleblowers to my committee has stated that the FBI
    was no longer going to interfere in elections, something to
    that effect. I cannot find it right now and I am running out of
    time. Oh, here it is. The FBI is, ``not going to change the
    outcome of the election again.''
        The FBI certainly tried to by leaking, or somebody leaked
    that FBI briefing. Are you going to investigate that? Because
    that is the election interference, and let us face it--this
    letter by 51 intelligence officials, this interfered in the
    2020 election to a far greater extent than anything Russia or
    China ever could have hoped to accomplish. You have to
    acknowledge that. It has to be investigated. I have no faith
    that you will do so.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
        Senator Hassan, you are recognized for your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN

        Senator Hassan. Thank you, Chair Peters, and I want to
    thank you and Ranking Member Portman for holding this hearing
    today. Thank you to our witnesses for being here. I want to add
    my prayers and thoughts for the CBP officers, the officer who
    was fatally wounded and those who were gravely wounded, and to
    their families. I think it is fair to say that the people of
    New Hampshire and the United States are holding these brave men
    and women in our prayers.
        Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you.
        Senator Hassan. I also wanted to take the opportunity,
    although he has stepped out for a moment, just to thank Ranking
    Member Portman for his years of service and for his work on
    this Committee and for the bipartisan work that he has led.
        Again, to all of the witnesses, but more importantly to the
    men and women you lead, thank you to you, to them, their
    families. The first priority of government is to ensure the
    safety and security of its citizens, and your work is really
    critical to that mission.
        Director Abizaid, I want to start with a question to you
    and then a follow-up to the other two witnesses. When we held
    this hearing a year ago some assessments indicated that in the
    wake of the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan al-Qaeda
    would have the ability to reconstitute itself and threaten the
    United States homeland within one to two years. Here we are,
    one year later.
        To the extent that you can discuss it in an unclassified
    setting, what is the National Counterterrorism Center's
    assessment of al-Qaeda's capability to threaten the U.S.
    homeland?
        Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much for the question. Al-
    Qaeda's capability to threaten the United States homeland from
    Afghanistan is quite limited, in part thanks to the operation
    that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul here recently, but also
    because the al-Qaeda elements that are still present in
    Afghanistan are really not focused on external operations, as
    far as we can tell.
        There are other terrorist elements in Afghanistan that we
    are concerned about, primarily ISIS's branch there, ISIS
    Khorasan. But the threat from al-Qaeda should be disaggregated
    from that, I think given the very unique circumstances around
    that group, its relationship with the Taliban, and some of the
    specifics in which it has evolved over the years.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you.
        Director Wray and Secretary Mayorkas, do you agree with
    this assessment, and what are your agencies doing to mitigate
    the threat? I will start with you, Director Wray.
        Mr. Wray. I would add a couple of things to what Director
    Abizaid had to say. One is we are obviously very concerned
    about ISIS-K as one of the threats. Second, I think as time
    progresses I am concerned that we will have fewer and fewer
    good sources of information about what al-Qaeda is or is not
    doing in Afghanistan, so we always have to be mindful of, as
    Secretary Rumsfeld famously said, ``the known unknown'' that
    goes there. Third, we are very concerned about al-Qaeda and
    ISIS's ability to inspire attacks, even from over there. Those
    are a few points I would add.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. Secretary?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, I think the point that my
    colleagues have made underscores a broader point, which is that
    we have spoken about the evolving threats, but we should keep
    in mind that the threats of the past remain the threats of the
    present. Only new ones have been added. I defer to the experts
    to my left.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. Now, Secretary Mayorkas, I want
    to move on to a different topic. Every week a new drug seizure
    along the border makes headlines, but the flow of drugs across
    the Southwest Border is unrelenting. The drugs that DHS seizes
    accounts for just a fraction of the total that criminal
    organizations attempt to smuggle into our country.
        What specific steps is DHS taking to stem the flow of drugs
    crossing the border, and what additional resources are you
    using to address this problem? What additional resources do you
    need?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, thank you so much. It is a
    fact that the smugglers seek to transport controlled
    substances, illegal drugs into the United States, primarily
    through the ports of entry, through trucks, vehicles, and the
    like. What we have done is we have surged technological
    resources that can most effectively defect the effort to
    smuggle those dangerous substances into our country,
    specifically, for example, non-intrusive inspection (NII)
    technology, which has remarkable x-ray capabilities that can be
    implemented very swiftly.
        We have deployed forward operating labs so personnel,
    scientists, can detect the controlled substances and we can
    effect the seizure immediately and refer to law enforcement the
    persons who have sought to smuggle them.
        What we need is more resources like that, and we really
    hope that Congress passes our fiscal year 2023 budget. We are
    already six weeks into the new fiscal year without the
    resources that we need financially to invest in that technology
    and deploy additional personnel as well.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you. One additional question I think,
    given my time, to you, Secretary Mayorkas. Over the last few
    years, cyberattacks have plagued State and local governments
    and other public entities. Toward that end, as part of the
    Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Senator Cornyn and I helped
    create a Federal grant program for State and local entities to
    improve their cybersecurity. The application period for the
    first year of the grant program concluded just this past
    Tuesday.
        I understand that the Department of Homeland Security is
    still reviewing applications, but can you explain what the
    Department's goals are for this first year of grants and how
    you intend to achieve them?
        Secretary Mayorkas. We are so grateful for that grant
    program. It is a multi-billion-dollar grant program, over
    several years. This first year of its implementation we are
    dedicating $185 million in resources to State and local
    governments. This is all about building their capacity to
    enhance the security of the cyber ecosystem.
        In cybersecurity, Senator, we say we are only as strong as
    our weakest link, and the fact of the matter is that there are
    target-rich and resource-poor localities that we need to
    strengthen, and that is what this grant program is going to
    enable us to do.
        Senator Hassan. So your goal right now, is making sure that
    the State and local governments that have applied get the
    resources they need and really focus on strengthening that
    level of cybersecurity. Is that fair to say is a priority
    there?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Yes it is, Senator.
        Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr.
    Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
        Senator Paul, you are recognized for your questions.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL

        Senator Paul. Director Wray, is Facebook or any other
    social media company supplying private messages or data on
    American users that is not compelled by the government or the
    FBI?
        Mr. Wray. Not compelled, in other words, not in response to
    the legal process?
        Senator Paul. No warrant. No subpoena. They are just
    supplying you information on their users.
        Mr. Wray. I do not believe so, but I cannot sit here and be
    sure of that, as I sit here.
        Senator Paul. Can you give us a yes or no by going back to
    your team and asking? Because it is a very specific question,
    because if they are, it is against the law. The law, the Stored
    Communications Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
    of 1986, prohibits providers from sharing electronic
    communications with any person or entity unless it is
    compelled. This was done to protect the privacy of people so we
    could feel like we can send an email or direct message to
    people without having that information given over.
        It is a very specific question. Will you get with your team
    of lawyers and give us a specific answer? Because this is the
    law. If you are doing it, then we need to go to court to
    prevent you from receiving this information.
        Mr. Wray. I can tell you that I am quite confident we are
    following the law, but what I will also----
        Senator Paul. that is not the answer.
        Mr. Wray [continuing]. Follow up with you to make sure that
    we get you more detailed information.
        Senator Paul. Is the FBI obtaining anonymous social media
    data and then using technical methods to pierce the anonymous
    nature of the data?
        Mr. Wray. Anonymous social media data?
        Senator Paul. You purchase data. People purchase data all
    the time, and we sort of tolerate it, for advertisings and
    things, because it is anonymous data. Are you purchasing what
    is said to be anonymous data, through the marketplace, and then
    piercing the anonymous nature to attach individual names to
    that data?
        Mr. Wray. Right. When you asked about anonymous data I was
    thinking more in terms of----
        Senator Paul. No. I am talking about data that is out
    there, and are you purchasing data and then piercing the
    anonymous nature of that data?
        Mr. Wray. So the manner in which we usually use the term
    ``commercial data''--is probably longer than I could explain
    here. But again, let me have one of our----
        Senator Paul. You will not answer the question of whether
    or not you are attaching names to anonymous data.
        Mr. Wray. I think it is a more complicated answer than I
    can give here.
        Senator Paul. So far we are 0 for 2 with getting you to
    answer this, but you are pledging you will actually answer the
    question, because you have to realize the frustration. We will
    write you a letter and your team of lawyers will write back a
    15-page letter that says nothing, and you will not answer the
    question.
        These are very specific. This is whether you are obeying
    the law, whether we can have confidence. I want to have
    confidence in the FBI.
        Mr. Wray. We are obeying the law.
        Senator Paul. You are saying that but you will not tell us
    the answer.
        Mr. Wray. That is not what I said.
        Senator Paul. No, you are not telling me the answer, and
    the answer is, are you collecting data not compelled by a
    warrant? That would not be in compliance with the law. But you
    will not answer that you are not collecting that data.
        Mr. Wray. I said two things. One, we are following the law,
    and second, that we would have somebody follow up with you with
    more detailed, specific information.
        Senator Paul. So those are two specific questions. Are you
    getting data from them that is not compelled, and then are you
    piercing the anonymous nature of that, technically.
        Are you receiving private messages from social media
    companies through the use of confidential human sources. From
    Facebook, social media companies. Do you have people working
    over there who you are paying or who are volunteering to give
    you information, even though it would be against the law for
    Facebook to do this, but now you are saying, ``We will get
    around the law by using confidential human sources?''
        Mr. Wray. Just to be clear I am following the question, you
    mean, in effect, recruiting a human source inside the company?
        Senator Paul. Exactly.
        Mr. Wray. No, I do not believe so. I think we have had
    situations where we have confidential human sources, not
    employees of those companies but who report to us on their own
    communication. If the two of us had a communication, and
    Secretary Mayorkas was a human source, he could report to us
    about what he is saying to me.
        Senator Paul. Once again, I would like the answer to be
    more specific from your team, not that ``I do not believe so''
    but that you are or are not using human confidential resources
    within Facebook.
        We get back to the idea of whether or not you are getting
    information for them outside the warrant process, because the
    next question is--which you probably will not answer either--
    are you taking information that you are getting not through the
    warrant process and then going around and coming back and using
    that as a predicate for getting a warrant to actually get the
    information you have already been given?
        Mr. Wray. I am not sure I am completely following.
        Senator Paul. Basically you get information that Facebook
    is volunteering. This has all been written up in The Post
    article. You are familiar with The Post article with the
    accusations. The question is, are you getting information they
    are giving to you. They say, ``Oh, somebody says January 6th
    was great. Here is information on this guy.'' Then you are
    taking it and then using it as a predicate to say, ``Well, now
    let us go to the court and get a real warrant and get the
    information we already actually got without a warrant.''
        Mr. Wray. We get tips and leads from all over the place,
    from members of the public, from businesses, from community
    leaders, from other in-government partner, all the time, and we
    use the tips and leads that we get to often----
        Senator Paul. Are you getting tips and leads from Facebook
    and social media companies?
        Mr. Wray. We get tips and leads from companies. Absolutely.
        Senator Paul. That includes private information.
        Mr. Wray. I am not aware of us receiving any tips or leads
    in a way that----
        Senator Paul. See, here is the point. You may think it is
    just jolly well to get all this stuff without a warrant, that
    people volunteer to you, but many of us are alarmed that you
    are getting this information that are private communications
    between people, because it is against the law. It is against
    the law for Facebook or social media companies to give it to
    you, but it is also against the law for you to receive it.
        You are going to have to very specifically go back with
    your team and search over whether you are doing it or not, and
    just say, ``Oh, probably not. We obey the law. We are good
    people.'' Well, no, there are doubts, because this has been
    reported. Even the FBI, when you responded to the New York Post
    article, said that companies are referring information to the
    FBI with investigative value relating to foreign malign
    influence.
        Now there would probably be a great deal more tolerance
    about that if it is foreign malign influence, but the question
    is are you also receiving information on so-called domestic?
    What would that mean? Is someone questioning whether paper
    ballots are an accurate way of running election? Is that good
    enough for you to be getting our private information because we
    have a political beef with the way votes are counted or
    recorded in our country? Is that something that you are
    collecting information on? Are they giving you information on
    private things that you have told them, ``People who question
    the election, we want to hear about these people,'' and so they
    are giving you this information. Are you receiving information
    like that?
        Mr. Wray. I will give you two classic examples that I think
    happened with some frequency. One, if we supply information to,
    say, Facebook or any number of other technology companies about
    foreign accounts, Russian Intelligence Service, for example,
    accounts, when they look in their system for those accounts
    they often find other accounts related to those and they
    provide tips and leads back to us about those. That is one
    example.
        A second would be a situation where a technology company
    encounters a threat of violence on their platform, on their
    services, and they provide tips and leads to us, and we follow
    up on those.
        Senator Paul. There is really not a lot of disagreement
    about that. The question is, is when we start to talk about
    political speech, and that is the question. Are you receiving
    things that could be interpreted, and we would want to know,
    and if you are not going to admit to us, whether it is
    political speech, someone who questions the election, someone
    who is mad about something that is going on. They are not
    saying they are directly going to commit violence. They are mad
    about things.
        What the New York Post article said is yes, you are getting
    this, and then when they are finally read in context--and this
    is from a whistleblower, which makes us suspect you are not
    being forthcoming or honest with us--is that whistleblowers are
    saying you are receiving this information from Facebook and
    others and that you are going around the Constitution and to
    come back and try to get warrants for it. But then once you
    read it there has been no actionable intelligence on this, but
    this is an active program that you have got.
        You work for the government. You should admit to us whether
    or not you have a program going after our speech.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Paul.
        Mr. Wray. We investigate violence, not speech.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Paul.
        Senator Lankford, you are recognized for your questions.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD

        Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you to all
    three of you and the service that you give to the country on
    this. We do have lots of questions, just about process and how
    things are going on this.
        Secretary Mayorkas, you and I have talked about Title 42
    for about 18 months, and I have asked you the question, what
    happens when Title 42 goes away? For 18 months you have said,
    ``We are working on it.''
        Judge Sullivan just stepped in and unilaterally canceled
    out Title 42. We are at this very odd situation right now where
    DHS is in one court, asking to extend Title 42 a little longer,
    and then another court asking to cancel Title 42 altogether.
    But we are still waiting to try to figure out what happens now
    and how many people are about to cross the border.
        What is the plan for dealing with this illegal immigration
    coming now, post Title 42?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, what we requested of Judge
    Sullivan in the District Court of D.C. was an orderly wind-down
    period of 35 days, which was unopposed and which was granted by
    the court.
        What we are doing is precisely what we announced we would
    do in April of this year, and we have indeed been executing on
    the plan. It is six different lines of effort, and I will
    review them very quickly, given the limited time.
        Surging resources to the Southern Border, including
    personnel, technology, facilities, capabilities, and
    transportation, medical support.
        Two, increasing our Customs and Border Protection
    processing efficiency to mitigate potential overcrowding. We
    have been digitizing, for example, our electronic A-files
    (Alien files), the immigration files, when individuals are
    placed in proceedings.
        Three, we are enhancing the consequences for unlawful
    entry, especially with respect to individuals who seek to evade
    law enforcement, including removal, detention, and criminal
    prosecution when warranted.
        Four, we are seeking to bolster the capacity of nonprofit
    organizations, State and local officials, and working very
    closely with them.
        Fifth, we are targeting and disrupting the smuggling
    organizations and transnational criminal organizations. In
    fact, we have effected more than 5,000 arrests and more than
    6,000 disruption events, and that means arrests of individuals,
    the breakdown of smuggling of stash houses, the seizure of the
    instrumentalities that these smuggling organizations use.
        Sixth, we are working with our partners to the south to
    deter irregular migration. I spoke earlier in response to
    Ranking Member Portman's question about the fact that this is a
    tremendous hemispheric challenge. We are seeing the movement of
    people, and the demographics of the population that we are
    encountering at the border has changed dramatically.
        Senator Lankford. It has, and there are a couple of big
    challenges in this. One is the numbers just came in for
    October. It is the third-highest number in recorded history.
    While those things were implemented, the numbers continue to
    accelerate. This goes back to the estimates when Title 42 goes
    away, there was an expectation from intel to be able to say
    these numbers will surge even greater. You built a Venezuelan
    policy on trying to be able to deter Venezuelans, based on
    title 42. That just went away.
        What we are trying to figure out is what is the plan,
    because the plan you just articulated has led to the third-
    highest number for any single month in history.
        Secretary Mayorkas. There are few points, if I may,
    Senator, and thank you. No. 1, the number of encounters is not
    equal to the number of unique individuals we encounter----
        Senator Lankford. Correct. Yes, we know that.
        Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Because Title 42 creates a
    potential for the ease of recidivism.
        No. 2, we are working with our partners to the south, with
    Mexico, with respect to the end of Title 42, and whether we
    will be able to continue our thus-far successful program with
    respect to Venezuelan nationals, and use our Title 8
    authorities.
        But we also have other opportunities ahead of us, because
    as we sought to do earlier, and we will resume this effort, is
    an enhanced use of expedited removal, which is a Title 8
    authority. We are looking at our consequence regimes and how we
    can most effectively employ them.
        Senator Lankford. There are a lot of people counting on
    these numbers coming down, and they are not. They are going up,
    and they continue to be able to rise. While we are examining
    these things and looking at it, the numbers continue to rise.
    With the end of Title 42 coming in 35 days, we expect it is
    going to accelerate even higher. There is an expectation that
    your Department is going to change this number dramatically.
        Let me ask a point-blank question that is challenging on
    this. What percentage of the individuals that are encountered
    at our Southern Border do we know their criminal history from
    the country they are coming from? I am not talking about if
    they have an American criminal history or they are on our
    Terror Watch List, that we know their criminal history of the
    country they are coming from. Do we know that history?
        Secretary Mayorkas. I will have to get back to you on that,
    Senator, whether we have the capability of identifying the
    percentage, which is what you have inquired about.
        Senator Lankford. It is my understanding that we do not
    know the criminal history of the vast majority. Can you give me
    an estimate on this? I am not asking for a 0.8 percent, but
    give me a guess.
        Secretary Mayorkas. I understand. I am quite hesitant to
    guess on information that is so important to our mission. But I
    will certainly get back to you with whatever information we can
    provide.
        Senator Lankford. It is incredibly important because I
    think there is an assumption that the American people feel that
    the 2 million-plus individuals that were encountered just in
    the last 12 months have been vetted in some way at our Southern
    Border or they have been checked. We do not know if these
    individuals are fleeing poverty or fleeing from the law. We do
    not know.
        Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, if I may----
        Senator Lankford. There is a check to see if they have an
    American criminal history record, but we do not know if they
    have a criminal history record of where they are coming from.
        Secretary Mayorkas. As my colleagues here will attest as
    well, Senator, we conduct screening and vetting of individuals
    whom we encounter. We have a robust screening and vetting
    process. It actually is recurrent vetting, and it is not just
    with respect to criminal history in the United States.
        Senator Lankford. I would like to get in a good guess of
    how many people we know their criminal history when they come
    in then.
        Secretary Mayorkas. As I mentioned, Senator, I will get
    back to you and see if we have that data, and if so, I will
    certainly provide it to you.
        Senator Lankford. That would be great. Thank you.
        We have asked your team, and you and I have talked about it
    before, about the information for the Migrant Protection
    Protocols (MPP) and the decisionmaking process for the Remain
    in Mexico policy on this. We asked about that for a while. We
    just recently got a letter back saying that there are no
    responsive documents that have been withheld. Basically you
    have everything that we would have. But the implication then is
    the decisionmaking process of who qualifies for the MPP and who
    does not was left up to a case-by-case basis, and there are no
    guidance documents. I find that hard to believe that there were
    no guidance documents given to anyone on your team anywhere
    along the border, on how to be able to decide. Yet your team is
    so far telling me, ``Hey, we do not have anything. We never
    printed anything.'' I find that exceptionally hard to believe,
    and I would like to be able to follow up and be able to get
    access to those documents.
        Secretary Mayorkas. I look forward to discussing that with
    you because I certainly have some very important points to make
    in response to your concern.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Lankford.
        Senator Scott, you are recognized for your questions.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT

        Senator Scott. First, Secretary Mayorkas, thanks for your
    calls around the hurricanes. I have a very positive experience
    with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), so I think
    you have a great team there, and everybody there does a good
    job.
        Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Scott. I think the last time, Director Wray, you
    testified I had the opportunity afterwards to go to West
    Virginia, and I just want to compliment you on what you have
    done to revamp the call center operation. I am sure it is still
    hard to catch everything that goes on out there, but I want to
    thank you for that.
        Secretary Mayorkas, you know that I have been disappointed
    in the border. It just seems like it is open, with all of this
    fentanyl coming across. We have people dying.
        But here is my question, and I do not know if Secretary
    Mayorkas or Director Wray, if you want to answer it. It has
    been reported that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are
    operating police stations in the United States in an effort to
    surveil Chinese dissidents. It seems obvious the U.S. should
    not allow its most significant geopolitical rival, an
    oppressive communist regime, to establish police stations in
    the United States what authority or jurisdiction does the CCP
    have in the United States?
        I do not know which one wants to testimony.
        Mr. Wray. Senator, like you I am very concerned about this.
    We are aware of the existence of these stations. I have to be
    careful about discussing our specific investigative work, but
    to me it is outrageous to think that the Chinese police would
    attempt to set up shop in New York, let us say, without proper
    coordination. It violates sovereignty and circumvents
    standards, judicial and law enforcement cooperation processes.
        The reason this is so important is because we have seen a
    clear pattern of the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist
    Party exporting their repression right here into the United
    States. We have had now a number of indictments that you may
    have seen of the Chinese engaging in uncoordinated, quote/
    unquote, ``law enforcement'' action right here in the United
    States--harassing, stalking, surveilling, blackmailing people
    who they just do not like or who disagree with the Xi regime.
        It is a real problem and it is something that we are
    talking with our foreign partners about as well, because we are
    not the only country where this has occurred.
        Senator Scott. They do not have any right to be here?
        Mr. Wray. We are looking into the legal parameters of it. I
    want to be a little bit careful not to get out over my skis on
    that. But suffice it to say, I can tell you from an FBI
    director perspective, I am deeply concerned about this, and I
    am not just going to let it lie.
        Senator Scott. Secretary, does it impact homeland security
    at all?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Of course. The threat of China is one
    of the most significant threats that we face in the homeland.
    It is not only a matter of national security, it is a matter of
    homeland security, in a number of arrays, in a number of areas
    of our mission.
        Senator Scott. Do you think you have the ability to shut
    them down? Do you know if you have the right to shut them down?
        Secretary Mayorkas. I would have to defer to the Department
    of Justice with respect to that.
        Senator Scott. It would go to Justice, not Homeland
    Security? OK. So it would be under FBI?
        Mr. Wray. Well, or to the extent that the remedies might be
    some part of the Justice Department, outside of the FBI, that
    could also be a possibility. Then there may be a State
    Department dimension to this that we are looking into.
        Senator Scott. When you know they are here, do you know if
    they are surveilling U.S. citizens? Do you know that yet? Do
    you have enough information to know if they are?
        Mr. Wray. Again, I do not want to get too far into our
    ongoing investigative work, but as I said, we have seen plenty
    of situations, plenty of situations in the past, where the
    Chinese government, under the pretext of going after
    corruption, have essentially used that as vehicle to surveil.
    We have had situations where they have planted bugs inside
    Americans' cars, for example.
        One of the things that we are seeing more and more is them
    hiring private investigators here in the United States to
    essentially be their agents, if you will, to conduct some of
    this work.
        This is something we are trying to call out, and it is
    important the Chinese Americans and Chinese dissidents who are
    here know to call the FBI to report when they think they may
    have been targeted with this conduct.
        Senator Scott. Because you probably cannot talk about it in
    here. I would like to get a classified briefing on what they
    are doing, at some point, whenever it works out for you.
        Mr. Wray. We would be happy to set that up.
        Senator Scott. Director Wray, I am going to ask you and you
    can tell me if it is accurate or not. I am not suggesting all
    of this is accurate. But it appears that DOJ have become
    politicized with regard to pro-life things. There is a recent
    rise in high-profile FBI investigations of pro-life Americans,
    which raises the concern that the FBI is weaponizing Federal
    law enforcement as becoming a partisan tool, which I do not
    think, when we have talked, that has been your goal.
        There appears to be investigations that arrest the pro-life
    community, and it is just the opposite of what has happened. We
    have had numerous firebombings, violent attacks, acts of
    vandalism against churches, pro-life organizations, and crisis
    pregnancy centers in the days and weeks following the Dobbs
    decision.
        Is this right? Is that happening? Not happening?
        Mr. Wray. First let me say I firmly believe that the FBI is
    going about its work, doing the right thing in the right way.
    Now, I am glad you raised this topic because it gives me an
    opportunity to speak to it.
        My view, plainly expressed to all of our people, including
    in the context of abortion-related violence, is that I do not
    care what side of the issue you are on, you do not get to
    engage in violence, and we are equal opportunity when it comes
    to that.
        Now we have quite a number of investigations, as we speak,
    into attacks or threats against pregnancy resource centers,
    faith-based organizations, and other pro-life organizations.
    You might be interested to know that since the Dobbs Act
    decision probably in the neighborhood of 70 percent of our
    abortion-related violence cases or threats cases are cases of
    violence or threats against pro-life, so where the victims are
    pro-life organizations. We are going after that through our
    Joint Terrorism Task Forces, through our criminal authorities,
    and things like that. We have about 20 field offices involved
    in this.
        We take it very seriously, and again, I do not care whether
    you are motivated by pro-life views or pro-choice views, you do
    not get to use violence to express it.
        Senator Scott. We have talked about this before. It just
    seems to me that in DOJ, and FBI in particular, they might be
    doing the right thing, but you guys allow information to go
    out, not talking about what you are doing. Because if you read
    the press you would think that you guys are only going after
    pro-life groups and not going after groups that attack pro-
    life.
        I have never understood this about the FBI and DOJ, in that
    you guys are not more proactive about what you are actually
    doing. Because I am pro law enforcement, as you know, but I
    cannot defend you with no information.
        Mr. Wray. Senator, we do not have the time for me to tell
    you how frustrated I sometimes get by some of the news
    reporting about our work and the misreporting about our work.
    The circumspection that we display with regard to discussing
    our investigations is based on rules and practices that are
    important to people having confidence in the integrity of our
    work, and go back decades, in multiple administrations.
    Sometimes it can be very frustrating to agents on the ground
    when they see things being misreported about their work.
        But we have all been taught that we have to bite our lips
    and let the facts come out in the right way, through court
    proceedings, and sometimes that can be very frustrating, to us
    and it sounds like to you too.
        Senator Scott. It makes it harder for me. It makes it hard
    for us, right, because people come to us and say, ``Oh yes,
    they must have done that.'' So thank you.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        We will have a second round.
        Senator Hawley has deferred to Senator Romney. Senator
    Romney, you are recognized for your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMNEY

        Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
    Hawley. I appreciate the chance to be able to ask a few
    questions.
        Director Wray, I begin by saying how much I appreciate the
    work of your agents and how much I respect them, and I am
    convinced of their quality. One of my sons, years ago,
    interviewed to become a member of the FBI. He was turned down.
    He was able to go on and get a degree at Harvard Business
    School and has done quite well. He survived. But we learned
    from that experience that the qualifications for getting into
    the FBI are high, indeed, as they should be, and I have great
    respect for the men and women who work for the FBI.
        There is a great deal of discussion about the political
    orientation of the FBI. My experience with your organization is
    that that is not the case, by and large. I am sure there are
    individuals among the 38,000 who work with you who have
    political points of view, may leak things, and may do things
    from time to time that are not appropriate, and I hope that you
    are able to evaluate them and evaluate where those come from
    and correct them.
        Can you give us a sense of how the resources the FBI are
    directed, how much goes into looking at violent crimes of
    various kinds and human trafficking? How much goes into
    terrorist-related prevention? Are there categories of effort
    that are carried out? Because I think there is a public
    perception that the whole FBI, we ought to defund it because it
    is only doing political work. What is the FBI doing? Where are
    the resources devoted?
        Mr. Wray. If you were to look at our allocation of
    resources, and I cannot give you the numbers off the top of my
    head, but if you were to look at the allocation of our
    resources you would see that the single largest chunk is
    devoted to traditional criminal programs, and of which the
    violent crime is by far and away the biggest. We have Safe
    Streets Task Forces all over the country. We have Transnational
    Organized Crime Task Forces all over the country. We have
    Violent Crimes Against Children Task Forces. So those remain
    our bread and butter. Those remain our biggest programs.
        We do have unique responsibility for national security
    threats as well. If you were to look at our strategy you might
    see the national security threats listed first because those
    are places where if we do not do it, no one will, whereas
    violent crimes, crimes against children, we work much more
    shoulder-to-shoulder with our State and local law enforcement
    partners. A lot of times those national security threats--
    terrorism, counterintelligence work, cybercrime--get most of
    the, to Senator Scott's point, the media attention. But day in,
    day out, the FBI that most Americans, and certainly most law
    enforcement professionals--and I talk to chiefs and sheriffs
    every week--the FBI they experience most is really more focused
    on the traditional criminal stuff.
        Senator Romney. Yes, thank you. You have spoken a great
    deal about the cyberattacks from State actors, from China, as
    well as non-state actors. Secretary Mayorkas has spoken about
    that as well. I do not know that it is possible, through a
    process of defending against attacks, to prevent all the
    potential attacks and all the theft that will come from our
    businesses and into our government.
        It strikes me that the only effective way to stop the
    attacks that come, of a cyber nature, is to attack back, that
    the best defense is a good offense. I know your respective
    organizations are not responsible for the offensive of this,
    but to get China to stop attacking, they have all these private
    enterprises that are doing these attacks into our systems.
    Fighting against all these things will never stop it unless
    China recognizes that if they do not stop it that they are
    going to be hurt more than we are.
        Do you believe we have a sufficient effort, an offensive
    effort, to push back against the cyberattacks that come from
    State and non-state actors, and should we expand on that, and
    where should that reside? I will ask both Director Wray as well
    as Secretary Mayorkas and Director Abizaid to respond.
        Mr. Wray. Certainly when it comes to offense, offense is a
    critical part of our overall effort to push back against cyber
    adversaries, in addition to some of the offensive cyber
    operations that we probably could not talk about in this kind
    of a setting.
        There is actually a lot of progress being made in what I
    obliquely referred to earlier as joint sequenced operations,
    where we, with our intelligence community partners, law
    enforcement partners, foreign partners--go with the whole ``2
    plus 2 to make 5'' kind of effect. We are going after the
    adversaries' infrastructure, we are going after their
    cryptocurrency, we are going after the individual actors. Some
    of them we can extradite. Some of them we can have charged
    there. We are engaging in other sort of more sensitive
    counterintelligence type work to amplify those effects.
        But what we have found is that when we go after the actors,
    the infrastructure, and the money all simultaneously we can
    degrade and disrupt their effectiveness. That is, I think,
    ultimately the real goal is to degrade, disrupt, and defend in
    that way. In some ways the deterrence model is harder, much the
    same way, we are not going to deter the Chinese or the Russians
    from spying but we can make it hellishly difficult for them to
    do it. That is what we are after now, is imposing risks and
    consequences on the adversaries, to hit them where it hurts, to
    make it harder and harder for them to really come after us with
    cyber means.
        Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, Senator, add a point. Of
    course, I do not need to speak of the criticality of a strong
    defense, and you are, of course, focused on offensive behavior.
        A few weeks ago I was in Singapore to speak to our allies
    in the Indo-Pacific region about the importance, or I should
    say the peril of having China own or operate other nations'
    critical infrastructure and the perils it presents from a
    cybersecurity and other security perspectives. It was a very
    important dialog, not only with our Singaporean partners, our
    Japanese partners, but other countries in the region because
    China is very aggressive in seeking to own or operate the
    infrastructure in telecommunications and other technologies.
        Senator Romney. Thank you. Director.
        Ms. Abizaid. Senator, I would just say I will defer to my
    colleagues on the cyber-specific piece of your question, but
    what I would say from a counterterrorism community perspective,
    there is so much that we have learned as a collaborative
    community about both offense and defense at the same time.
    Those lessons learned applied to things like transnational
    organized crime or cyber threats I think really position us
    well as a government to take it to the threat actors.
        Senator Romney. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Romney.
        Senator Hawley, you are recognized for your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY

        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks
    to the witnesses for being here.
        Director Wray, let me start with you if I could. I think
    the last time that I got to visit with you was back in August.
    On August 4th of this year you were at the Senate Judiciary
    Committee. You remember that, I assume.
        We had to cut that hearing short. We were supposed to do
    two rounds of questions. You said you had to be somewhere so we
    cut it short. Republicans were not able to ask a second round
    as we had been informed we would.
        The press reported shortly thereafter that the reason that
    the hearing had to be cut short is because you were flying on a
    Gulfstream jet for a personal vacation in the Adirondacks.
    Please tell me that is not accurate.
        Mr. Wray. Senator, the hearing was not cut short from my
    experience. We had agreed beforehand on the time and length of
    it, and I was very surprised to find that anyone on the
    Committee was surprised as to how I fly. I am required, not
    only permitted but required to fly on an FBI plane wherever I
    go.
        Senator Hawley. So you were going on vacation?
        Mr. Wray. I was, yes.
        Senator Hawley. You left a statutorily required oversight
    hearing in order to go on a personal vacation in the
    Adirondacks.
        Mr. Wray. I took a flight to go visit my family, as had
    been previously arranged in conjunction----
        Senator Hawley. No.
        Mr. Wray [continuing]. With the leadership of the
    Committee.
        Senator Hawley. The Ranking Member, Chuck Grassley, asked
    you during the hearing. He said, ``I assume you must have other
    business.'' You said, ``Yes.'' He then said, ``If you have a
    business trip, you have your own plan. Can't it wait a while.''
    He then said, Chuck Grassley, ``We only just heard half an hour
    ago that now you have to leave. We were going to have a seven
    minute round followed by a three minute round. I have seven
    people on my side of the aisle''--that included me--``who are
    waiting for this additional round. Is there any reason we
    cannot accommodate them for 21 minutes?'' You said you had a
    plane to catch. You had somewhere to go. Now we find out it was
    for vacation?
        Mr. Wray. The reference to other business was not a
    reference to that day. It was a reference to the following week
    where Senator Grassley and I were going to see each other in
    Iowa, when I had other business in Iowa, and I did in fact see
    him then.
        Senator Hawley. So wait. You had to leave the hearing early
    because you were going to see him later in Iowa, in a week?
        Mr. Wray. No. I had to leave when I said I was going to
    have to leave, as had been previously organized with the
    leadership of the Committee.
        Senator Hawley. You left an oversight hearing before the
    Senate Judiciary Committee, required by statute, so you could
    vacation with your family. I find that absolutely unbelievable,
    and frankly, indefensible.
        Now is it your practice to use government planes? You say
    you do this all the time. You flew in a Gulfstream 550, I
    think, that was originally purchased for counterterrorism
    purposes. You were using it to go to, what is it, Saranac Lake?
    Is that how I say it? I have never been there. Is that the
    right pronunciation, Saranac Lake? That was your destination?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Senator Hawley. Did you enjoy the flight? I mean, did you
    pay for it?
        Mr. Wray. Yes, I paid for it.
        Senator Hawley. Will you turn over all receipts and
    reimbursement to this Committee?
        Mr. Wray. Senator, we will be happy to comply with
    oversight requests related to the use of the plane. As I said,
    it is important for people to understand----
        Senator Hawley. Why do you not just give me a yes. Will you
    turn over the receipts----
        Mr. Wray. I will turn over the information----
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. For this flight to the
    Committee?
        Mr. Wray [continuing]. Related to my use of the plane. The
    use of the plane, I am required, not just permitted, required,
    even for personal travel, to use the FBI plane.
        Senator Hawley. How convenient for you.
        Mr. Wray. I pay every single time that I use the plane for
    personal reasons.
        Senator Hawley. I am glad it is available for you to jet
    away from your statutorily required hearings and oversight
    before this Congress, where you denied the ability of Members
    of Congress to ask you questions because you had to go on a
    personal vacation using a government plane.
        Let us just look at some of the things, while you have been
    vacationing, that your FBI has been doing. According to
    numerous whistleblowers who have come forward to members of
    this body, to members of the House, the FBI has been sending
    more than, in one instance, a dozen armed agents to a rural
    Pennsylvania home of a Catholic pro-life demonstrator to arrest
    him at gunpoint in front of his children in the early morning
    hours, despite the fact that he posed no risk of violence or
    threat and had previously offered to turn himself in.
        Numerous whistleblowers, field agents, have alleged that
    D.C., your headquarters, has pulled them off working on child
    sex abuse cases, working on human trafficking cases, in order
    to work on January 6th matters for this reason, to give the
    appearance, they say, that there are hundreds of new domestic
    terrorism cases in the country when in fact there are not.
        Whistleblowers, field agents, have also said that D.C. has
    ordered the use of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams on
    nonviolent suspects who may have attended a January 6th rally,
    and they have been ordered to conduct surveillance and knock on
    doors of people who were not even in D.C. on January 6th.
    Again, all of this, according to the whistleblowers--these are
    your agents--all of this in order to make it look as if there
    is a mass surge in domestic terrorism all across the country
    when, in fact, the stats are being padded by political
    directive in your office.
        They also say, these whistleblowers, the D.C. leadership
    deliberately suppressed investigations into Hunter Biden,
    contrary to FBI procedure, and have also retaliated against FBI
    agents and whistleblowers who have contacted Congress, which,
    by the way, they are protected by statute to do so.
        This is what is happening at your FBI while you are evading
    oversight hearings. Mr. Director, do you think you are still up
    to this job?
        Mr. Wray. I absolutely think I am still up to this job, and
    I think our workforce feels the same way.
        Senator Hawley. I do not, and frankly, I think you should
    have been gone a long time ago. Given your behavior recently, I
    think it only makes it more clear.
        Are there any travel plans today that we should be aware of
    that you have? We are supposed to have a second round. Will you
    be here for that?
        Mr. Wray. Yes.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Rosen, you are recognized for your questions.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN

        Senator Rosen. Thank you all for being here today. I
    appreciate it.
        I wanted to thank DHS, before I get started with my
    questions, for extending Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to
    several countries last week. It is going to provide critical
    relief to thousands of families in Nevada. Those families
    appreciate that very much.
        We do know that Congress must take action to enact
    immigration reform that both secures our borders and provides a
    path to citizenship for TPS recipients, dreamers, and others,
    but as we work toward this goal I do appreciate, and the
    families in Nevada appreciate your consideration.
        I am going to turn now to the topic of the hearing, threats
    to the homeland. Difficult subject, again, like all things
    here, but rising antisemitism. Every day, in every way we see
    more and more attacks, outbreaks of antisemitism here in the
    United States. The recorded incidents nationwide, I believe
    they are at an all-time high. Not a day goes by without another
    report of an antisemitic hate crime or prominent individuals
    inciting anti-Jewish conspiracy theories.
        With Jewish communities around the world facing increasing
    discrimination as well as threats and acts of violence, a
    whole-of-government approach is needed to effectively address
    antisemitism.
        Because many individual agencies play a critical role in
    combating antisemitism, we need closer interagency coordination
    to share best practices, share that ever-important data that
    keeps us safer when we share it, that intelligence, the same
    thing, identify gaps in our efforts between agencies, and
    streamline overlapping activities and roles so that we can best
    combat antisemitism where we see it, and I believe execute a
    unified national strategy.
        Secretary Mayorkas, how is DHS coordinating with other
    Federal agencies in the fight against antisemitism? Would you
    support the development of a national strategy that uses a
    whole-of-government approach, cohesive, comprehensive approach
    to address this rising threat for all of us?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator Rosen, thank you. I think
    Director Wray spoke very powerfully, but a couple of weeks ago,
    I believe it was in New York City, about the rise in
    antisemitism. Of course, where we become involved in the
    Department of Homeland Security is the connectivity between an
    ideology of hate, regardless of the ideology in particular, and
    violence.
        That is where we become involved. We are working very
    closely with the FBI and our Federal, State, local, tribal,
    territorial (SLTT) campus law enforcement partners to address
    violence, an increasing level of violence borne of ideologies
    of hate, and quite clearly antisemitism is one of the rising
    ones, and it was at a high level to begin with.
        We are very grateful for your and this Committee's support
    of the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP). We are seeking,
    in the fiscal year 2023 budget, an increase from $250 to $360
    million. That assists religious institutions, faith-based
    institutions, and other nonprofit organizations to really raise
    their level of security in response to increasing violence
    borne of hate.
        The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have
    published an unprecedented number of alerts and bulletins to
    our local State law enforcement personnel about an increasing
    threat level borne of ideologies of hate.
        Senator Rosen. So you would support a national strategy to
    combat antisemitism?
        Secretary Mayorkas. I would.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you.
        Director Wray, I want to move over to you because I know
    that the FBI, as you have stated, found antisemitic hate crimes
    rose by six percent in 2020. It represents the highest total in
    12 years. It constitutes 60 percent of all incidents based on
    religion. In your estimation, your research, data, what it is
    telling you, what is driving this alarming trend? How is the
    FBI working with communities, State and local law enforcement,
    again to be sure we are coordinating? Would you support a
    national strategy to combat antisemitism?
        Mr. Wray. Taking the last part first, certainly I would
    support a national strategy. Second, the percentage is even
    worse than you summarized it. I think it is 63 percent of all
    religiously motivated violent extremism incidents are motivated
    by antisemitism, and that is against a population that is only
    2.4, I think, percent of the American public. So it is pretty
    stark.
        From our perspective we see the Jewish community getting it
    from all sides, which may contribute to what is driving it.
    Because not only have they long been a target of foreign
    terrorist organizations, and we have disrupted attacks by
    foreign terrorist organizations and foreign-inspired violent
    extremists against synagogues, for example, but then in
    addition to that they are, of course, the target of domestic
    violent extremists. As you may remember, we disrupted an
    attempt to blow up a synagogue in the Las Vegas area just a
    couple of years ago, for example.
        Senator Rosen. Yes, thank you.
        Mr. Wray. We are trying to tackle it both through the
    domestic terrorism lens, through our Joint Terrorism Task
    Forces, and through the hate crime lens, through our civil
    rights program. We created a Domestic Terrorism Hate Crimes
    Fusion Cell which brings those two things together to ensure
    that we are pushing out information to our partners, whether it
    is at DHS or State and local law enforcement, or the community,
    and particularly the Jewish community, to be better able to
    anticipate what might be coming and prevent attacks.
        Senator Rosen. That is good, and it really goes to my next
    question because we do believe that hate crimes are vastly
    underreported because of fear sometimes, right? Since the
    enactment of the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act last year, do you
    feel that there has been an improvement in local and State law
    enforcement reporting hate crimes to the FBI, and just
    reporting in general, or how has that been helping us?
        Mr. Wray. Two things. One, I think overall reporting of
    hate crimes has gone up, and frankly, the Jewish community has
    been ahead of other communities that are victims in reporting,
    historically. We have been trying to preach the importance of
    reporting, and we have seen reporting coming up.
        The only caveat I would put on that is that we are in the
    midst of a multiyear transition to a different crime statistics
    reporting mechanism, that has been anticipated for about a
    decade, I think. This particular year the number may be
    somewhat flawed or underreported in terms of the recordkeeping,
    just because of the transition that some police departments are
    making over from the old system to the new system.
        But I would expect as we go forward next year and beyond it
    will get back to being more comprehensive, and I fully expect
    it to show exactly what you are saying, which is that hate
    crimes are on the rise.
        Senator Rosen. The analyst in me hopes that everyone who is
    converting to this is all using the same algorithm so we have
    good reports.
        Thank you so much for being here.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
        Senator Sinema, you are recognized for your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SINEMA

        Senator Sinema. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Before I begin I want
    to express my sorrow with the news from Puerto Rico today. Air
    and Marine Operations (AMO) agents perform a very dangerous job
    with honor and integrity, and my thoughts are with our injured
    agents and their families, the family of the deceased agent,
    and all of Air and Marine Operations. News like this today
    underscores why our work and our oversight is so important, and
    we owe it to our agents and our officers to do our part to
    secure the border and keep our communities safe.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and
    thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
        Fiscal year 2022 saw a record number of encounters at our
    Southwest Border, over 2.3 million individuals. While just
    under half of these migrants were removed under Title 42
    authorities, the current system had multiple points of failure
    throughout the summer. In Arizona, local governments were
    forced to step in to provide emergency support to avoid street
    release and have reassigned staff from other important roles to
    help manage the release of migrants from CBP custody.
        Border areas outside of Arizona have seen significant
    street releases, some coming in recent weeks. These releases
    directly onto city streets are inhumane and leave migrants
    vulnerable to the elements and bad actors intent on preying
    upon the most vulnerable.
        The Administration's continued failures on the border
    places Arizona communities and our nation's security at risk.
    The ongoing influx of migrants puts serious strain on our CBP
    resources, and it forces our Border Patrol agents out of the
    field and into processing and administrative roles.
        With the sudden announcement that Title 42 will be
    terminated in December, I am extremely worried that DHS is not
    ready and that border communities and migrants will suffer the
    costs for this lack of preparation. It is obvious that the
    current strategy being implemented at our Southwest Border is
    not working and that change is necessary.
        Secretary Mayorkas, thank you for being here today. These
    current levels of migration are unprecedented. Following the
    D.C. Circuit's recent ruling regarding Title 42, Arizonans are
    concerned that we will soon see these numbers surge even
    higher, and we need to send a clear message to potential
    migrants that we will be fair and humane, but we will secure
    our border and enforce our laws.
        Given the recent developments regarding Title 42, do you
    have a plan to ensure that those who enter without inspection
    are facing swifter and more certain consequences?
        Secretary Mayorkas. We do, Senator, and at the outset thank
    you very much for recognizing the tragedy that our Air and
    Marine Operations personnel within CBP suffered off the coast
    of Puerto Rico, and we pray for the family of the officer who
    lost his life and we pray for the swift recovery of those who
    have been injured.
        We do. We do have a plan, and I think there are a number of
    examples. One is how we have approached the increased number of
    encounters of Venezuelan nationals, by building a lawful
    pathway for them to arrive in a safely and orderly way in the
    United States, should they qualify and should they pass through
    our screening and vetting, and to deliver a consequence regime
    should they not avail themselves of that lawful pathway.
        The asylum rule that we have promulgated is a way of taking
    a broken asylum system, and we are grateful for your bipartisan
    work with Senator Cornyn in your proposed bill, as a starting
    point to fix a broken asylum system. But we promulgated a
    regulation in the absence of much-needed legislation to fix the
    system, which takes a six-to eight-year asylum period, which is
    just unmanageable, and reduces it potentially to under a year,
    which is going to change the migratory patterns of individuals
    seeking asylum in this country.
        Also with respect to the fact that you mentioned that
    Border Patrol agents have not been out in the field, we have
    actually surged resources to the Southern Border, not only from
    different parts of our department but contract personnel, an
    incredible number of contract personnel, so that we can get
    those agents out in the field, doing what they swore to uphold,
    which is the detection and interdiction of individuals, to
    enhance their swift removal should they not qualify for relief,
    and their ability to remain in the United States should the law
    so permit.
        Senator Sinema. Thank you. Secretary, according to data
    from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), in
    fiscal year 2022, over 20 percent of initial cases were
    completed with an in absentia removal order. While that is a
    steep decline from the 50 percent mark that we reached in
    fiscal year 2022, that number is still far too high.
        In order for our immigration system to function we must
    ensure that individuals who refuse to comply with our
    immigration laws and are ordered removed from the United States
    actually experience that enhanced consequence regime. How is
    DHS planning to ensure that people who willfully defy our
    immigration process are promptly removed from the country?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, I would say two things. No. 1,
    the data evidence is quite powerful, that individuals who are
    represented by counsel have a much higher appearance rate in
    the immigration enforcement proceedings that we commence. The
    immigration system is extraordinarily complex, and we are
    dealing with vulnerable populations without counsel.
        No. 2, we have expanded our alternatives to detention and
    technologized our ability to keep track of individuals, not
    just by the rather primitive ankle bracelets but by a phone
    system that does not allow people to make calls. It is not a
    phone inoperable in that sense, but actually enables us to keep
    track and make sure that they are checking in with us.
        The expansion of the alternatives to detention is an effort
    that we have very well underway.
        Senator Sinema. My Bipartisan Border Solutions Act, which
    you just referenced and of course highlighted in our budget
    hearing earlier this year, creates regional processing centers
    across the United States. These centers would co-locate offices
    and agencies that play a role in the asylum process which would
    enhance the processing of migrants seeking asylum to the United
    States. I believe that these centers are key to any reforms
    intended to limit the strain currently placed on DHS.
        As introduced, the text placed Border Patrol in charge of
    detention, but this year, as noted earlier, we have seen
    additional agents being pulled out of the field due to
    processing needs, which has limited some of the operational
    control.
        Which DHS component would be best suited to take over the
    responsibility of those processing centers?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, your bipartisan bill with
    Senator Cornyn is a very important start to fix a broken asylum
    system. I would want to study actually which personnel would be
    best suited. Our goal is to make sure that our Border Patrol
    agents are out in the field, doing the work that they signed up
    to do, and that, frankly, they are funded to do.
        We have made tremendous strides in getting them out in the
    field. This is a problem that arose last year, given the
    increase in the number of encounters. We really have made
    tremendous strides, and I could provide specific data.
        But with respect to your detailed question, I would want to
    study the profile of the individuals that should maintain the
    custody of migrants encountered and placed in those processing
    centers at the border.
        Senator Sinema. Mr. Chairman, I know that my time has
    expired. May I ask one quick follow-up question?
        Chairman Peters. We do have a second round, but be real
    quick.
        Senator Sinema. Thanks. I have heard concerns that some of
    the timelines in the bill that Cornyn and I introduced may be
    too restrictive. So now that you have had some time to
    implement the asylum processing rule we would like to get your
    feedback on what a more feasible timeline would be in which
    credible fear interviews could be performed.
        Secretary Mayorkas. We would be pleased to provide that.
        Senator Sinema. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Sinema.
        We have, for our witnesses, we have one, perhaps two
    Senators to finish up the first round. Then we will take a
    five-minute break to let you stretch your legs a little bit,
    and then we will be back for the second round.
        Senator Padilla, you are recognized for your questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PADILLA

        Senator Padilla. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for
    being here today.
        The first question is going to be for Secretary Mayorkas.
    As you recall, Mr. Secretary, last year I expressed significant
    concerns about the critical incident teams with Customs and
    Border Protection and their involvement with internal
    investigations of CBP agents. These units, as we understand,
    have operated since 1987, but their investigations were never
    authorized because they are not legitimate Federal criminal
    investigators and their actions seem to shield CBP agents from
    liability.
        I was pleased to hear that Commissioner Magnus issued a
    directive to end the use of critical incident teams by the end
    of the fiscal year, prior to his resignation. However, the
    existence of such an entity for over three decades is
    disturbing and undermines the transparency needed with the
    nation's largest law enforcement agency.
        I hope you share my concerns regarding the need to protect
    the integrity of DHS and all its components. Do you agree that
    there is no place for shadow police units within Customs and
    Border Patrol, and can you speak to any of the efforts that the
    Department has taken to ensure that entities similar to the
    critical incident teams are not reestablished?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, there is no place for a shadow
    investigative authority in any part of the Department or any
    part of the government, and what we have done is actually
    commenced a wholesale review, department-wide, of our
    investigative discipline and accountability processes.
        Senator Padilla. How is the status of the termination or
    phase-out?
        Secretary Mayorkas. I will check and get back to you with
    respect to the status of their termination.
        Senator Padilla. Please do.
        Next question is both for you and Director Wray. Earlier
    this year, the Department released a report that detailed the
    need for improvements to information sharing as a means to
    addressing violent extremist activity. Mr. Secretary, I was
    pleased to see that your agency planned to develop a central
    case management system, an information-sharing mechanism for
    investigating allegations.
        Can you provide an update on where DHS is with these
    developments and whether there have been any significant
    roadblocks?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, I am not aware of any
    significant roadblocks, and in partnership with the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation we have promulgated more products, more
    information-sharing products than I can remember for the
    Department of Homeland Security in the many years that I have
    been there.
        The National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Bulletin,
    other less formal bulletins and alerts to our State and local,
    tribal, territorial campus partners. We have really built a
    very cohesive operation in disseminating threat information
    throughout the country, to really ensure that our local
    communities are aware of the threat information and law
    enforcement is able to prevent it, to the best of its
    capabilities.
        Senator Padilla. Director Wray, the Department of Justice
    similarly responded to President Biden's National Strategy for
    Countering Domestic Terrorism by highlighting the changes it
    would make to improve information-sharing with State, local,
    tribal, and territorial partners as well. What specific changes
    have been made at the FBI to eliminate any gaps in information-
    sharing?
        Mr. Wray. I think we engage in information-sharing on this
    with State and local partners in two principal ways, the
    biggest one being through our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
    where we have lots of State and local law enforcement agencies
    as task force officers on those task forces. One of the things
    that we have done over the last little while now is improve the
    amount of training that we provide to participants on those
    task forces and to State and local agencies, more broadly,
    about indicators of violence, indicators of mobilization to
    violence, symbology, iconography, things like that, to put them
    in a better position to be the eyes and ears that we need them
    to be and then have information flow kind of in a virtual cycle
    back with us. That would be one of the things that I mentioned.
        Obviously the bulletins that Secretary Mayorkas referenced
    is a product of great work between the FBI and the Department
    of Homeland Security to share information, and including with
    the Fusion Centers, which is a very important piece of the
    information-sharing infrastructure, if you will, that exists in
    this country.
        Senator Padilla. In that spirit, a couple of the most
    critical areas in which to apply improved information-sharing
    is when it comes to combating gun violence and domestic
    terrorism.
        According to a joint report issued in May of last year, the
    FBI and DHS determined that the greatest domestic terrorism
    threat is posed by lone offenders who are radicalized online,
    and who look to attack soft targets with easily accessible
    weapons. Sadly, we have seen too many instances, even since
    Highland Park, Uvalde, Buffalo, and even in my home State of
    California at the Geneva Presbyterian Church. The common threat
    here in each case was the ease with which the perpetrator
    acquired a weapon.
        Can you detail what steps are being taken by the bureau to
    ensure that threats to our schools and places of worship and
    other important places are identified and neutralized?
        Mr. Wray. I guess there are a number of things that we do
    on that front. When it comes schools specifically we have been
    engaged in a very proactive outreach campaign to schools. We
    have done active shooter training, for example, at schools.
    Lots of our field offices meet with school officials in their
    areas of responsibility to help them identify better what to be
    on the lookout for.
        Because one of the things that we have learned in studying
    this issue over time, when it comes to school shootings, for
    example, is that there is almost always somebody--a classmate,
    a teacher, a family member, someone--who saw the transformation
    in the person, and that if they had known to speak up, known to
    report, it might have been preventable. In those instances
    where we have successfully prevented a school shooting, for
    example, those often do not get reported. But there are any
    number in which we have successfully prevent, have almost
    always been because somebody in that situation did report. We
    are trying to get the word out that way.
        Obviously, our National Instant Criminal Background Check
    System (NICS), which does the background checks, to ensure the
    people who are legally prohibited from having firearms do not
    get them, is very active processing background checks. Of
    course, with the recently passed legislation there will be
    additional steps we are taking to implement that.
        Senator Padilla. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Padilla.
        Senator Ossoff, you are recognized for your questions, and
    after these questions we will take a five-minute break.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF

        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    our panelists for your service to the country and the national
    defense, the defense of public safety.
        Director Wray, always a pleasure to see a fellow Georgian,
    and thank you for your continued service as well. Each time we
    have engaged in a setting like this one I have asked you to
    assess the drivers of elevated levels of violent crime, in
    Georgia and nationwide.
        According to FBI data, violent crime did increase from 2020
    to 2021. Could you please provide the Committee with an updated
    assessment of what is driving this dynamic?
        Mr. Wray. There are a lot of things driving the violent
    crime crisis that is occurring in this country, in Georgia and
    elsewhere. There are a few things. First I would say the
    traditional drivers are all there--drugs, illegal gun
    trafficking, gangs, socioeconomic factors. Those are all still
    present.
        But in addition to that we are seeing--and I hear this from
    chiefs and sheriffs all the time as well as from our own
    agents--an alarming uptick in the incidence of juveniles
    engaging in violence, often graduating from carjackings to even
    worse violence. That is a real challenge for the legal system
    because we are not set up to very effectively deal with crimes
    committed by minors.
        We are also seeing, not everywhere but in an awful lot of
    places, we are seeing way too many dangerous offenders getting
    back out on the streets. The only thing more frustrating to the
    hard-working men and women of law enforcement than having to
    arrest somebody who should have been behind bars is having to
    arrest the same person over and over again. That is a product
    of any number of things. It could be backlogs. It could be
    certain prosecution practices, certain kind of bail practices.
    Of course, the juvenile issue that I mentioned.
        So those are some of the things that are driving it. In
    Georgia in particular, pretty much every week I feel like our
    Atlanta field office is engaging in some kind of operation
    where they are seizing drugs, guns, cash, whether it is meth,
    whether it is fentanyl. And so they are experiencing a lot of
    the same things that we are seeing nationally. Certainly
    neighborhood gangs are a big phenomenon in our home State.
        We are also seeing two other things that have a little bit
    of a Georgia wrinkle to it. One is juveniles who post-COVID
    have not returned to school, and so that may contribute to the
    juvenile effect. And we are seeing violent criminals who are
    either detained or imprisoned because they are serving a
    sentence who still have access to their cellular phones and are
    able to continue to participate in the activity, despite best
    efforts by the corrections officials, to continue to
    participate in the violent activity.
        Those are some of the things. I guess one last one, an
    alarming phenomenon of switches which convert otherwise lawful
    weapons into fully automatic, and that, of course, increases
    the violent potential.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Wray. You have a new
    Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in that Atlanta office, and I
    welcomed her upon her arrival, and I wish her and her team the
    best.
        What can the FBI continue to do, and what more can you do
    to help protect communities in Georgia who are fearful, who are
    fearful that they may face carjacking or mugging or aggravated
    assault out on the sidewalk or at a shopping mall? What are you
    doing and what more can you do, and will you continue to work
    with local law enforcement in Georgia to crack down on the
    violent crime that is preying on innocent citizens?
        Mr. Wray. Violent crime is a major priority for the FBI. As
    I think I said in response to an earlier question, it still
    continues to be the place where we have the most single
    allocation of resources in terms of personnel. We have Safe
    Streets Task Forces that focus on sort of the gang violence. We
    have other kinds of violent crime task forces, all of which
    allow us to bring together what the FBI has to bear with State
    and local partners who participate on those task forces.
        We do active shooter training and things like that to help
    the community better protect itself. Our lab, close to half of
    the work that they do, from a forensic side, is in support of
    violent crime cases often for our State and local partners.
    Senator Scott and I had a conversation about the tip line that
    we have in West Virginia, where we prioritize getting threats
    to life out to State and local partners on the violent crime
    side.
        There is a whole host of things that we are doing, but this
    remains top of mind for me and for my team. When I am talking
    to chiefs and sheriffs this is always the first topic we talk
    about and the last topic we talk about, because it is so much
    on everyone's mind.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you for joining us. Could you please
    assess the most significant threats to port infrastructure in
    the United States? Of course we have, in Georgia, the Port of
    Savannah. It is the fourth-busiest deepwater port in the
    country.
        Secretary Mayorkas. With respect to the infrastructure
    itself?
        Senator Ossoff. To ports.
        Secretary Mayorkas. To ports? One of the concerns that we
    have is, of course, the cybersecurity threat to ports. We are
    increasing the level of technology by which our ports operate,
    and that is why not only does Customs and Border Protection
    have a focus on cybersecurity but so do does the United States
    Coast Guard (USCG).
        I would identify, with respect to our ports, cybersecurity
    as a significant threat stream, and we are, of course, very
    focused on defending against it and strengthening our
    cybersecurity.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Will you and your
    staff continue to work with the Georgia Ports Authority, State
    and local law enforcement in Georgia to help harden the Port of
    Savannah and other critical port infrastructure in Georgia
    against that threat and other threats?
        Secretary Mayorkas. We absolutely will, and, through the
    infrastructure bill that has been passed fortunately we have
    tremendous funding to dedicate to not only the improvement of
    the infrastructure itself but also its hardening.
        Senator Ossoff. I want to close very briefly, Secretary
    Mayorkas. I thank you for your cooperation in providing to the
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) the documents
    and records that allowed us to conduct an 18-month
    investigation of medical mistreatment of women in detention. We
    held that hearing, as you likely know, earlier this week. The
    bipartisan findings that Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin and I
    have presented are deeply disturbing and suggest there are
    major gaps in the vetting and oversight of DHS contracted
    physicians who treat the detainee population.
        I ask that you review those findings in detail and that we
    will have a follow-up engagement to discuss the steps that DHS
    is taking and needs to take to ensure that the dignity and
    human rights and constitutional rights of all detainees are
    upheld.
        Secretary Mayorkas. I look forward to doing so, Senator.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff.
        To our witnesses, we have had you there for quite some time
    so we are going to take a brief break. We will come back for a
    second round for those Senators who want a second round, but
    the time will be just five minutes in the second round. But let
    us take a recess for five minutes and we will reconvene.
    [Recess.]
        The Committee will come back into order. Senator Ossoff,
    you are recognized for a second round.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you for the extraordinary courtesy,
    Mr. Chairman, and welcome back to our panel.
        I would like to begin, Director Wray, by requesting an
    update--to the extent you are able to provide details it would
    be appreciated--on your efforts to defend Historically Black
    Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in Georgia and across the
    country from threats. Of course, threats have targeted Spelman
    College, other HBCUs in the State of Georgia. This is of deep
    concern to me and the whole community. Please provide an update
    on your efforts.
        Mr. Wray. Senator, certainly we share your concern. The
    fear and disruption that those threats have caused is utterly
    unconscionable, and this investigation, or really, I should say
    these investigations, plural, have been a priority for the FBI,
    including multiple field offices, Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
    et cetera.
        The update that I can give is that for the first tranche of
    the threats nationwide, the ones that generated probably the
    most initial media attention, if you will, there has been a
    recent development. An individual, who is a juvenile, a little
    bit like the exchange that we had right before the break, has
    been identified, and because of the Federal limitations on
    Federal charging of juveniles for most relevant offenses, we
    have worked with State prosecutors on an unrelated State charge
    which ensures restrictions and monitoring of the individual and
    disruption of his behavior.
        Now that still leaves two other subsequent tranches of
    threats against Historically Black Colleges and Universities
    and other historically Black religious institutions, for
    example, that we are still very much actively investigating.
    Because of that there is not much I can share on those, but
    suffice it say we have a lot of people working on this and we
    are determined to see it through.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Wray.
        Director Abizaid, I have not had a chance yet to ask you a
    question, and I would like to hear from you what do you assess
    to be the most significant threats to the United States when it
    comes to transnational terrorism?
        Ms. Abizaid. By far it is ISIS and al-Qaeda in terms of
    transnational terrorism, though racially and ethnically
    motivated extremists also present a dramatic threat. The
    hierarchically organized groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS are
    actually transitioning their way of attacking to lone actor
    type threats and inspired violence here in the United States
    homeland, and we see very similar trends in the racially and
    ethnically motivated violent extremist bucket of ideologically
    motivated threats as well.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, ma'am. Thank you all. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff.
        The authorization from the Office of Countering Weapons of
    Mass Destruction (CWMD) is set to expire next year. In
    preparation, Senator Portman and I introduced a bill that
    reauthorizes CWMD Office and empowers the newly created Office
    of Health Security (OHS) at DHS. The bill clarifies roles and
    responsibilities for both offices and adds important
    accountability and oversight measures.
        Secretary Mayorkas, could you explain to this Committee how
    the expiration of the authorization for CWMD would impact it if
    it expires, and particularly, how important the legislation is
    to deal with local, tribal, and territorial partners on this
    critical issue?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, the Office of Countering
    Weapons of Mass Destruction is of vital importance to the
    Department of Homeland Security. I think if we look back in
    time and we see the use of chemical weapons in Syria and the
    tragedies that that inflicted on the people there, that is one
    powerful example, and we do not have to look that far back in
    history to understand the importance of the office.
        Just the fact that the potential, the specter of the use of
    nuclear weapons was discussed in public fora in light of
    Russia's unprovoked aggression against Ukraine speaks of the
    criticality of this office, and we do hope that the bipartisan
    bill that you have presented is passed. We need this office
    reauthorized.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Secretary.
        Director Abizaid, how has the threat from weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) increased or decreased over the last five
    years?
        Ms. Abizaid. The threat that terrorists would use WMD, and
    particularly CBRN capabilities I think has been sustained over
    that five -year time period, certainly.
        Chairman Peters. Very good.
        Secretary Mayorkas, you ordered an internal review of DHS
    after the tragic shootings in Buffalo and Uvalde to assess
    whether the Department was effectively using its resources to
    address domestic terrorism and targeted violence. As a result
    of that review that you did you announced the appointment of
    Nick Rasmussen as the full-time Counterterrorism Coordinator.
        What goals have you asked him to accomplish and what is the
    timeframe for him to achieve those goals?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, Nick Rasmussen comes with
    impeccable credentials to be the Counterterrorism Coordinator
    for the Department of Homeland Security. He used to be the
    Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and just a
    distinguished career.
        What I have asked him to do in the first instance is take a
    look at our counterterrorism efforts across the Department and
    make sure that we are being as impactful and effective as
    possible. One of the efforts that I have across the Department
    in every mission set is to drive greater cohesion so that our
    impact is maximized. That is the first thing that I have asked
    him to take a look at, and I am actually meeting with him in a
    few days to discuss the setting of a timeline and incremental
    goals along the way. I look forward to discussing that with
    you.
        Chairman Peters. Great. We will look forward to that.
    Certainly we do have to have a coordinator overseeing all of
    this, so I appreciate the efforts that you are making in that
    area.
        The Administration just released an updated strategy and
    implementation plan on countering biological threats. This new
    strategy implements recommendations learned from the ongoing
    COVID-19 pandemic and the monkeypox public health emergency.
    Certainly global shortcomings in preparedness for the pandemic
    and biosecurity may inspire adversaries to develop and use
    biological weapons in the future, certainly a major concern for
    all of us.
        Secretary Mayorkas, could you discuss how DHS is working to
    implement the National Biodefense Strategy and how has the
    creation of the Office of Health Security better aligned DHS
    efforts in this space?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, that strategy really
    speaks of a whole-of-society approach. It is not something that
    the Federal Government can do alone, but we need State and
    local partners and private citizens, nonprofit organizations,
    academia. It is a very holistic, inclusive approach to the
    problem, and that is the approach that we are taking in the
    Department through CWMD, the Office of Health Affairs, and
    importantly, our Office of Science and Technology (OSTP), with
    the research and development (R&D) that it spearheads. I am
    grateful to this Committee for really moving forward with the
    confirmation of Dimitri Kusnezov as our new Under Secretary for
    the Office of Science and Technology.
        It is really a very all-of-society approach, and our leader
    of the Office of Health Affairs, our Chief Medical Officer
    (CMO) is a tremendous leader in identifying what are the
    greatest threats that are imminent or upon us, and developing a
    strategy to address it. He was instrumental in our protocols to
    address COVID-19 in immigration detention centers along the
    Southwest Border, working with border communities to develop a
    real infrastructure to address that.
        We are taking an all-of-department approach in the context
    of an all-of-society approach that the strategy calls for.
        Chairman Peters. That is good. This Committee will deal
    with this issue extensively over the next couple of years so I
    look forward to working closely with your team to address the
    challenge and the threat.
        Senator Hawley, you are recognized for your questions.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks
    again to the witnesses for being here.
        Mr. Secretary, nice to see you. I did not get to visit with
    you last time so let us start with you. I think my colleagues
    have established, given what we are seeing on the Southern
    Border, the massive increase in illegality there, that that is
    clearly not a priority for your agency, so let us talk about
    what appears to be and that is spying on Americans and
    censoring their speech. You have turned your agency into a
    censorship machine.
        Now you said earlier this year that you disbanded the
    Disinformation Governance Board (DGB), which I thought was
    totally unconstitutional, but that turns out to be, at best,
    misleading. That is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of
    what you are doing.
        Your own Quadrennial Review, which was just reported in the
    press, says that disinformation is going to be the new focus at
    DHS. The Quad Review says that DHS plans to target--I am
    quoting now--``inaccurate information domestically on a wide
    array of subjects, including the origins of the COVID-19
    pandemic, the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines, racial justice,
    U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the nature of U.S.
    support for Ukraine.'' This is what you are devoting your
    agency's resources to.
        I guess my first question is, is an American citizen who
    criticizes COVID mandates now to be treated as a domestic
    terrorist?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Of course, and I would like to say
    three things since you have three inaccuracies in the question
    you posed to me. No. 1, border security is a priority of ours.
    No. 2, the Department does not censor speech. And No. 3, we did
    not publish a Quadrennial Review.
        Senator Hawley. Does it exist, the Quadrennial Review?
        Secretary Mayorkas. I believe it is being worked on.
        Senator Hawley. It has been published in the media. Will
    you make it public?
        Secretary Mayorkas. When it is final it will be public.
        Senator Hawley. Mr. Chairman, without objection I would
    like to enter this article called ``The Truth Cops,'' published
    in The Intercept.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The article referenced by Senator Hawley appears in the
    Appendix on page 138.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Peters. Without objection.
        Senator Hawley. Here is my question then. If you are not
    censoring speech and if you are not treating Americans as
    domestic terrorists, then why is it that you are pressuring Big
    Tech to treat American citizens as if they are threats to the
    homeland? Why are you pressuring them to censor speech?
        Let us take a look at some new documents that have come to
    light that show what your administration is doing, this
    Administration is doing to censor speech. Let us take a look at
    this email from July 16, 2021. It is over my shoulder here.
    Facebook emailing the Department of Health and Human Services
    (HHS) saying, ``I know our teams met today to better understand
    the scope of what the White House expects from us on
    misinformation going forward.'' Are you familiar with that
    email?
        Secretary Mayorkas. No.
        Senator Hawley. Let us try another one.
        Here is one from July 20, 2021. The White House emails
    Facebook, saying, ``Any way we can get this pulled down?''
    Forty-six seconds later, Facebook responds, ``Yep. We are on
    it.'' Are you familiar with that email?
        Secretary Mayorkas. No.
        Senator Hawley. OK. How about this one? July 23, 2021.
    Facebook employee writes to HHS and says, ``Thank you for
    taking the time to meet today. Wanted to make sure you saw the
    steps we took just this past week to adjust policies on what we
    are removing with respect to misinformation.'' Are you familiar
    with that one?
        Secretary Mayorkas. Senator, we do not instruct----
        Senator Hawley. Just yes or no.
        Secretary Mayorkas. No, because I am the Secretary of DHS.
        Senator Hawley. I am asking you that because it is funny
    you say that. A Federal judge has just found, as a finding of
    fact, Mr. Secretary, that your office, and I am going to quote
    now, is ``supervising the nerve center of federally directed
    censorship.'' It is a Federal judge in a Federal lawsuit. You
    are supervising the nerve center of federally directed
    censorship.''
        Here is another email, August 20, 2021. Facebook writes
    again to HHS and highlights that Facebook is ``increasing the
    strength of our demotions for COVID and vaccine-related
    content.'' April 16, 2021. Rob Flaherty at the White House
    circulates a Zoom meeting invitation to Twitter employees,
    stating, ``White House staff will be briefed by Twitter on
    vaccine misinformation.''
        We have example after example of this Administration,
    coordinated apparently, according to a Federal court, by your
    agency, pressuring, coercing social media companies to engage
    in censorship. Is that constitutional?
        Secretary Mayorkas. That is unequivocally false.
        Senator Hawley. It is what the emails show.
        Secretary Mayorkas. It is unequivocally false, Senator.
        Senator Hawley. You are not pressuring the Big Tech
    companies to take down accounts. You are not meeting with them
    to ask them to censor on your behalf.
        Secretary Mayorkas. That is correct. We are not.
        Senator Hawley. You are not having any meetings with them
    whatsoever.
        Secretary Mayorkas. We meet with the tech companies----
        Senator Hawley. How often?
        Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To address the homeland
    security mission.
        Senator Hawley. How often do you meet with them?
        Secretary Mayorkas. For example, online child sexual
    exploitation is a scourge in this country, and we have an
    obligation to address it.
        Senator Hawley. You are saying that no one in your office
    has ever met with, coordinated, or otherwise engaged in any
    contact with a social media company in which you spoke to them
    about vaccine mandates, about COVID mask mandates, about the
    withdrawal from Afghanistan, about the current U.S. involvement
    in Ukraine. None of that has ever happened.
        Secretary Mayorkas. I do not what you are referring to,
    Senator, and I can----
        Senator Hawley. Read the emails.
        Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. I can tell you this. You
    have actually cited emails outside of our department.
        Senator Hawley. I have cited Federal judge who says your
    department is engaged in supervising the nerve center of
    federally directed censorship.
        Here is my point, Mr. Secretary. It has been established
    for years in this country, as you very well know because you
    are a lawyer, that the Federal Government may not use private
    third parties to engage in activities that are
    unconstitutional. That is exactly what you and this
    Administration are doing. You are leveraging private companies
    to carry out censorship on your behalf. It is dystopian, but
    worse than that, it is unconstitutional.
        Secretary Mayorkas. It is also false.
        Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
        Seeing no other Senator here I want to thank our witnesses
    once again for joining us today. We recognize that you all have
    very busy schedules and we appreciate you joining us to help
    the Committee better understand some of the most pressing
    security issues that our nation is facing. This Committee will
    continue to work to address many of the issues that we
    discussed today. For example, as we heard today, the threat
    posed by drones is extremely serious, and we cannot let
    legislation that protects Americans from unmanned aircraft
    system expire in December. I look forward to working with my
    colleagues here in the Senate and in the House to ensure that
    the Federal Government is effectively managing this threat.
        I will also continue to work with the Department and the
    FBI on improving the government's response to the threat posed
    by domestic violent extremism. I appreciate the
    Administration's efforts to tackle this issue but more can and
    must be done. Without a more data-driven approach to understand
    the threat, the government will continue to face challenges
    addressing this issue.
        I will also continue to press the Administration on meeting
    mandatory congressional reporting requirements so that we can
    ensure the Federal Government has the authorities and the
    resources needed to help prevent deadly incidents, like the
    tragic shooting in Buffalo, from occurring again.
        Finally, as several Members have done, on behalf of
    everyone on this Committee, I would like to express our sincere
    condolences on the absolutely tragic news of loss and injury to
    CBP Air and Marine Operations agents. Each and every day
    throughout the pandemic the frontline personnel of DHS have put
    their lives on the line to protect Americans from serious
    threats that we have discussed today, and we all thank them for
    their commitment.
        While we have spent several productive hours this morning
    examining our nation's greatest security threats, there is more
    work to do for our Committee to continue conducting oversight
    and ensuring national security agencies are effectively focused
    on their critical mission.
        For the record, this hearing will remain open for 15 days,
    until 5 p.m. on December 2, 2022, for the submission of
    statements and questions for the record.
        This hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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