[Senate Hearing 117-653]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-653
ADDRESSING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND HEALTH SECURITY THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 19, 2022
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
51-533 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
Naveed Jazayeri, Senior Professional Staff Member
Ashley M. Grant, Brookings Fellow
Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
Sam J. Mulopulos, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Clyde E. Hicks, Jr., Minority Director of Homeland Security
Justin Brooks, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee
Timothy Harris III, Minority Federal Emergency Management Agency
Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Peters............................................... 1
Senator Portman.............................................. 7
Senator Carper............................................... 13
Senator Hawley............................................... 15
Senator Ossoff............................................... 17
Senator Romney............................................... 19
Senator Rosen................................................ 21
Senator Scott................................................ 24
Prepared statements:
Senator Peters............................................... 27
Senator Portman.............................................. 29
WITNESSES
Thursday, July 19, 2022
Gary Rasicot, Acting Assistant Secretary, Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.. 3
Pritesh Gandhi, MD, MPH, Chief Medical Officer, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 4
Tina Won Sherman, Ph.D., Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 6
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Gandhi, Pritesh MD, MPH:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Rasicot, Gary:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Sherman, Tina Won, Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 44
APPENDIX
Response to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record
Mr. Rasicot.................................................. 55
Mr. Gandhi................................................... 61
ADDRESSING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION AND HEALTH SECURITY THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
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THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Peters,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Peters, Carper, Hassan, Sinema, Rosen,
Ossoff, Portman, Johnson, Lankford, Romney, Scott, and Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\
Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the
Appendix on page 27.
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I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us here
today and for your continued service to the American people.
Today's hearing will examine our nation's readiness to respond
to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and health security
threats. The goal of this hearing is to assess the Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office housed within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its ability to combat
these threats. We will also discuss the newly established
Office of Health Security (OHS), which will be tasked with
streamlining the health and safety operations of Department
personnel and overseeing medical and public health matters all
across the Department of Homeland Security.
Chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN)
materials, is an umbrella term to describe hazard agents that
can be weaponized and that can cause everything from mass
casualties and incapacitation to agricultural destruction. For
example, in April 2019, a technician was arrested after
stealing three radioactive devices from his workplace in
Arizona. According to a court filing, the technician intended
to release the radioactive materials at a shopping mall. The
local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
arrested him before he could do so.
Similarly, biological weapons such as anthrax and ricin
have been used by terrorists in attempted attacks against
civilians, including elected officials. As technology has
advanced, the threats posed by these weapons only continue to
grow and give malicious actors more opportunities to cause
significant harm.
The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office was
established to detect, mitigate, and deter these significant
national security threats. Initially, the office faced serious
setbacks after its creation, including unsteady leadership, low
morale, and high staff turnover, among other challenges.
Despite these initial setbacks we have recently seen promising
signs of the office's improvement, including better morale and
feedback from stakeholders, indicated by a recent Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report.
I remain optimistic that the forthcoming structural changes
in the office and increased coordination between law
enforcement and State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
partners will dramatically bolster the office's ability to
tackle these challenges head on.
Last month, Ranking Member Portman and I introduced
bipartisan legislation to significantly enhance the Federal
Government's ability to detect, recognize, and evaluate
chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear threats. The
Offices of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and Health
Security Act reauthorizes the CWMD Office, which is set to
expire next year, and authorizes the new Office of Health
Security.
Our bipartisan legislation more clearly defines the CWMD
Office's responsibilities, eliminating ineffective or
duplicative functions, institute a number of accountability and
oversight measures, and appoints the Chief Medical Officer
(CMO) to lead the Office of Health Security. Serving as a dual
appointment as the Assistant Secretary for Health Security and
reporting to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security.
All of these changes will ensure that our nation can
develop a comprehensive national strategy to protect all of our
communities from these dangerous materials and public health
threats that can have absolutely catastrophic effects. In
addition to strengthening our homeland security and our
preparedness, these changes will also make these offices more
accountable to Congress and to the American people.
Today I am pleased to welcome a panel of experts, witnesses
who can discuss whether DHS is equipped with the necessary
tools and the resources to prevent possible attacks, and to
ensure that our nation is prepared to respond to and recover
from them. I look forward to a comprehensive and insightful
discussion.
My Ranking Member, Senator Portman, is at another committee
hearing right now. He will be joining us shortly. I will
immediately move to swearing in witnesses.
It is the practice of the Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses, so if each of
you would please stand and raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before
this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Rasicot. I do.
Dr. Gandhi. I do.
Ms. Sherman. I do.
Chairman Peters. You may be seated.
Today's first witness is Gary Rasicot, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Countering Weapons of mass Destruction Office at
the Department of Homeland Security. Previously, Mr. Rasicot
served as Chief of Operations (COO) at the Safety Security
Administration (SSA) as well as several senior roles at the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), including as Director of Marine
Transportation Systems (MTS), Director of the Global Maritime
Operational Threat Response (MOTR), and as Deputy Commandant
for Mission Support, Deputy for Personnel Readiness.
Mr. Rasicot was also an active-duty Coast Guard officer for
more than 24 years.
Welcome to our Committee, sir. You may proceed with your
opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF GARY RASICOT,\1\ ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Rasicot. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to speak to you today about the reauthorization of the
Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office. I have had the privilege of leading this
office twice, most recently since January 2021, and previously
from October 2019 through July 2020.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rasicot appears in the Appendix
on page 30.
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The 2018 CWMD Act authorized the merger of two legacy
offices with different missions and cultures as a means to
elevate and streamline the Department's efforts to safeguard
the homeland from chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear threats. While the implementation of this merger, like
all mergers of this type, has seen its share of peaks and
valleys, with the assistance and guidance of this Committee,
the GAO, State and local stakeholders, and most importantly,
the dedicated CWMD workforce, I believe that we have made great
strides in maturing this critical organization over the past
three years.
Today I am proud to ask you to reauthorize a fully
functional, unified office with a clear focus, strategic
intent, and strong forward momentum that makes the Nation safer
and meets Congress' original goal. I am confident that CWMD is
the right office at the right time to face the threats emerging
in this mission space. I would like to thank the Committee and
your staff for the exceptional collaborative, bipartisan effort
toward the introduction of
S. 4465, and for the strong working relationship that we have.
Readiness for CBRN threats requires specialized expertise,
skills, and equipment. Within DHS, CWMD maintains a dedicated
focus on these threats to ensure that we do not lose sight of
this core Department responsibility among the range of threats
and issues that DHS components face every day.
Our mission is to make sure that Federal, State, local,
tribal, and territorial frontline responders are aware of these
threats and have the capabilities to protect against them.
Indeed, our working relations with State and local partners are
among our most critical. Through flagship programs in over 30
U.S. jurisdictions, including BioWatch and Securing the Cities,
we provide detection equipment, training, exercise support to
help frontline operators detect CBRN threats early and take
quick action to save lives.
Last fall, I issued the first-ever CWMD State and Local
Engagement Strategy in recognition of the key role our State
and local partners play in countering CBRN threats. With the
easing of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) travel
restrictions we have recently re-energized our in-person
engagements with these partners. In June, I visited with State
and local BioWatch coordinators from Cincinnati, Cleveland, and
Columbus, Ohio, to hear directly how we can continue to best
support their efforts.
At CWMD our workforce is truly our greatest asset. As our
office matures we remain focused on continuing to strengthen
employee engagement. Though we have more work to do, I was
pleased to see the improved employee engagement scores in
CWMD's most recent Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS)
results, which now are above the DHS average. We also look
forward to continuing our close working relationship with our
colleagues in the Office of Health Security as they provide
expert medical and public health guidance to all of our
efforts.
Once again, we are grateful to the Committee for the bill
to reauthorize CWMD. Given the potentially devastating nature
of CBRN events, reauthorization is vital to ensure continuity
of critical programs while supporting frontline operators and
local communities. It is also key to the morale and retention
of the office's highly skilled workforce and highly in-demand
workforce.
Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you again for your attention to
this important mission and for the opportunity to talk about
CWMD's work. I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Rasicot, for your opening
statement.
Our next witness is Pritesh Gandhi, Chief Medical Officer
of the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Gandhi is
responsible for DHS's medical and public health response on all
health security issues, including border health, migration,
chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological acts of
terrorism, natural and man-made disasters and threats to the
nation's food and agricultural system.
Prior to his current role, Dr. Gandhi was the Associate
Chief Medical Officer and Director of Adult Medicine at
People's Community Clinic. Dr. Gandhi has experience in
multiple sectors including food system infrastructure,
microfinance, early childhood education, and health
informatics.
Dr. Gandhi, welcome to the Committee. You may proceed with
your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF PRITESH GANDHI, MD, MPH,\1\ CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Gandhi. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today, the very first week of this new
Office of Health Security. It is truly an honor. I have
submitted written testimony for the record.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Gandhi appears in the Appendix on
page 39.
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These past two years, the Department of Homeland Security
and our nation have faced several unprecedented challenges.
From terror attacks to an enduring global pandemic, a global
migration surge, to cyberattacks directed at critical
infrastructure sectors, including health care, multiple disease
outbreaks worldwide, and engagements with Afghanistan and
Ukraine, the breadth of the DHS portfolio has been truly
stunning. As much as each of these events have had a Homeland
Security nexus, these events have also all been bound by the
indelible linkage to our nation's health security.
Perhaps no mission over the past 18 months demonstrates
this relationship more than Operation Allies Welcome (OAW).
Last August, as Operation Allies Refuge was underway, our
medical team gathered at Dulles Airport to begin coordinating
the domestic health response for the mission. The gentleman
right behind me, Dr. Herbert Wolfe, my deputy, whose storied
career spans three decades of public service, commanded the
early public health response at Dulles. Multiple additional
members from our team deployed to Philadelphia airport and safe
havens across the country, and as Operation Allies Refuge
transitioned to Operation Allies Welcome, DHS was named lead
Federal agency and our team continued to lead, and still leads
the public health response.
Over this 11-month mission, we have worked together with
the public health and medical experts from the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), including the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Public Health
Service (USPHS), Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR), the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Department of State (DOS) to coordinate a
dynamic, nimble Federal health response rooted in clinical best
practices to safeguard the health and well-being of the
American people and the health and well-being of our Afghan
guests.
We held countless briefings with State and local public
health, met with hospital leadership in all safe haven States,
and had daily medical syncs with the clinical experts across
the Federal Government. This was truly an all-of-nation public
health and medical effort and one that reflects the very best
of what a coordinated Federal public health response should
look like.
I stand in awe and am humbled by the commitment of my
colleagues who, on a moment's notice, left their families and
their loved ones for weeks on end as a part of this mission and
so many others during the last 18 months. I have had the
privilege to lead these same individuals as we immobilize in
partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to
vaccinate the DHS workforce, to stand up our domestic public
health measures in response to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, to
deploy to the Southwest Border to provide technical public
health assistance to ensure we had optimized mental health and
wellness resources for our workforce during these challenging
times and to assist our agent emergency medical technicians
(EMTs) and paramedics on missions around the United States, and
so much more.
The dogged dedication of our staff and our earnest response
to these challenges reflects the hope and vision of this new
office, a central office that serves as the principal medical,
public health, and workforce health and safety authority for
DHS and one that is grounded in agility, technical excellence,
and deep relationships with our State and local partners, and a
fierce commitment to protect the physical and mental health of
our workforce, those in our care and custody, and our Nation.
Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and the Members
here today, on behalf of the incredibly talented and dedicated
individuals who work within the Office of Health Security at
the intersection of health security and homeland security,
thank you for your support, and I look forward to our
conversation.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Gandhi.
Today's final witness is Tina Sherman, Director of Homeland
Security and Justice at the Government Accountability Office.
Since joining the GAO in 2002, Dr. Sherman has led review of
telecommunications and transportation issues in the physical
infrastructure team and served in various roles at the
Department of Defense.
Previously, Dr. Sherman contributed to agency-wide efforts
on Hurricane Katrina along with GAO's annual Duplication and
Cost-Savings report and biennial High-Risk Update.
Prior to GAO, Dr. Sherman worked at New America, a
nonpartisan think tank that focuses on a range of public policy
issues including national security studies.
Dr. Sherman, welcome to our Committee. You may proceed with
your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF TINA WON SHERMAN, PH.D,\1\ DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Sherman. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the reauthorization of the Department of
Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Office alongside Acting Assistant Secretary Rasicot and Chief
Medical Officer Gandhi.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman appears in the Appendix
on page 44.
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CWMD's mission to support its domestic and international
partners in safeguarding our nation against chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats is a most
critical one. As we have all witnessed, responding to even a
single one of these threats can be a significant challenge. An
effective and coordinated effort is needed to combat a threat
landscape that has become increasingly complex, highly dynamic,
and potentially more catastrophic.
Given the importance of CWMD's mission, my agency, GAO, has
been studying the office and its predecessors for over a decade
on topics such as biosurveillance, chemical defense, nuclear
terrorism, and more.
This past April, we reported on the status of functions
transferred to CWMD from the former Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office and the Office of Health Affairs. To conduct that work
we spoke with State and local partners from across the country
involved in key CWMD programs, such as BioWatch and Securing
the Cities and the former Chemical Defense Demonstration Cities
Initiative. We heard from public safety officials and public
health experts about their satisfaction with the office's
support while, at the same time, their desire to see increased
communication and coordination from CWMD and with their
partners.
We also heard from the Department of Defense and the
Department of Homeland Security's component officials that
capability gap analysis in the radiological and nuclear space
are unique and of great value but no longer conducted by CWMD.
In addition, we revisited the low employee morale the
office has faced since its establishment five years ago. This
type of change takes time and sustained attention to
effectively manage it. We understand from Acting Assistant
Secretary Rasicot that the office is actively working on
implementing the recommendations from our April report to
strengthen its efforts.
The legislation this Committee recently introduced to
reauthorize CWMD shows promise to help address these and other
issues GAO has previously identified, specifically the emphasis
placed on clarifying mission responsibilities and building in
greater accountability or positive steps forward. We also hope
that this legislation, along with CWMD's continued efforts,
will increase the level of engagement and with greater mission
understanding by its employees.
Finally, with yesterday's establishment of the Office of
Health Security, we asked Dr. Gandhi and his team to consider
GAO's leading practices for organizational transformation which
we have highlighted to this Committee in the past as a resource
for setting up this new office.
Thank you for holding this hearing today and for inviting
me to participate in this conversation.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Sherman.
Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for your opening
comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Sherman,
thank you for the work you have done on this, and in particular
some of the concerns you have raised, which we will go over
again today and we did in our last hearing. Chairman Peters,
thank you for holding this hearing and more importantly for
your work on this issue and our work together to try to come up
with legislation that deals with some of the concerns that have
been raised.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the
Appendix on page 29.
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Combating WMD threats is very complex. They can be
naturally occurring, accidental, and certainly human made. The
Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office, which was talked about, has a critical role
in our nation's ability to detect, to prevent, and to safeguard
the American people from these threats. In addition to
developing and implementing countering WMD capability, CWMD is
responsible for coordinating, of course, with Federal, State,
local, tribal, and territorial partners to ensure that they
have the expertise and the tools needed to detect and prevent
threats.
In our February Committee hearing, which was called
``Addressing the Gaps in America's Biosecurity Preparedness,''
Members of this Committee heard from the witnesses and the
panel a lot of concerns about the CWMD, about the office,
ranging from employee morale, as was just talked about, to
effectiveness of programs such as BioWatch. These findings are
concerning and the purpose of today's hearing is to discuss how
to address these issues as part of the CWMD reauthorization.
To that end, we did reintroduce legislation, Senator Peters
and myself, that will reauthorize and strengthen the CWMD
Office with updated requirements, standards, and accountability
measures to address these concerns, and more importantly, to
ensure our country is properly safeguarded from chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
Legislation, by the way, also authorizes the DHS Chief
Medical Officer as the head of the new Office of Health
Security. DHS has made some news on that in the last 24 hours.
This change will bolster oversight efforts of all medical,
public health, and workforce safety of the Department. It will
also perform the pivotal role in all health matters relating to
DHS's broad mission set.
I look forward to discussing the strategic vision of this
new Office of Health Security and actions it will take to
coordinate with CWMD on WMD health matters, and I want to make
sure that we are lining up well with the reauthorization and
the actions that the Department has taken over the last 24
hours.
The authorities of the CWMD Office are set to expire late
next year, and again as this Committee considers
reauthorization legislation that we have introduced I look
forward to hearing all the witnesses' assessments, as we just
did, on the current WMD threat landscape and how our bipartisan
legislation will help strengthen our nation's level of
preparedness.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons,
are certainly among the most fatal and disruptive potential
attacks that our nation faces. Recent examples of CBRN agents
used by nefarious actors include the use of an advanced nerve
agent in an assassination attempt by Russians in the United
Kingdom (UK), and it certainly demonstrates the need for an
increased ability to prevent, to detect, and to respond to
these types of weapons in the future.
Mr. Rasicot, as someone who works on these threats each and
every day I would like to know what keeps you up at night. Let
the Committee know that, and why is the existence of a CWMD
Office so important to counter these threats?
Mr. Rasicot. Thanks for the question, Senator, and I think
you kind of hit the answer right up in the opening of that
question. I think the chemical piece is one that we need to
continue to address, and we are working very hard on that. In
2018, we were funding that at about $800,000 a year. We are up
to $6.1 million a year now as we try to get more information
out to our State and local stakeholders as to how to recognize
chemical threats and then how to take immediate action to avoid
injury.
The other piece of that is I really think that CWMD is the
right place, because as I said in my opening statement,
countering WMD take specialized skills, training, and
equipment. You cannot get that overnight. You need to invest in
that. You need to stay current in it. The threat is
continuously evolving. The Department needs an office whose
sole focus is to maintain this capability within the Department
and share that knowledge and capability with our State and
local first responders.
I believe CWMD is the right office to do that. I believe
that we have the expertise, we have the skills, we have the
capacity, and we have the knowledge, and we are getting much
better. I will admit we stumbled a little bit as we
transitioned in the merger on our State and local engagement,
but we are getting much better at that. We are doing a lot more
outreach. We have refined many of our products so they speak to
the end user. I think, the GAO is telling us that our
stakeholders are responding to that.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. On June 23rd of this year,
Senator Portman and I introduced S. 4465, the Offices of
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and Health Security Act.
The bill reauthorizes the CWMD Office and formally authorizes
the newly created Office of Health Security at the Department
of Homeland Security, it clarifies roles and responsibilities
for both offices, and adds important accountability and
oversight measures.
My question is for you, Mr. Rasicot and Dr. Gandhi. We will
start with you Dr. Gandhi. Can you briefly discuss how this
legislation will help you achieve your mission to protect the
homeland against weapons of mass destruction and health
threats?
Dr. Gandhi. Senator, thank you. For the last 18 months our
team has served as a nerve center for everything public health
and medical that the Department has had to face, ranging from
Operation Allies Welcome, Uniting for Ukraine, the medical and
public health implications of both of those efforts, the
implications of what we are seeing at the Southwest Border,
thinking critically about how we ensure our workforce health
and safety in the midst of a pandemic. Seemingly every critical
issue that DHS has engaged in over the last couple of years has
had this strong public health and medical nexus, yet our
responses, while strong and robust, in many respects were ad
hoc because we were working in a system that was not designed
for the kinds of threats that we have faced over the last
couple of years.
The benefit of having faced those threats and dealt with
them head-on is that there are a slew of lessons learned, and
the hope is to institutionalize those lessons learned so that
we can, one, pioneer the best-in-class workforce health and
safety programs that we need to; two, focus deeply on how we do
coordination and oversight and standardization, and
accountability all across the Department; three, ensure that we
are centralizing the medical and public health safety data and
public health data; and last, continue what has been a full-
scale engagement with our State and local partners. Our ability
to do all of that, to be engaged and have a strong ground game
locally, to do the coordination and standardization that is
required, and to lead on policy is predicated on having a
strong central office that can speak with one voice.
I think there is an opportunity here where we
institutionalize the lessons learned from the last couple of
years and move forward.
Chairman Peters. Mr. Rasicot.
Mr. Rasicot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We want to thank you
for the exceptional bipartisan effort to put the bill together.
We have no recommended changes to it, and I think it really
starts to strengthen the office.
One of the key ways it strengthens the office is it really
clarifies our roles in the chemical and the biological threat
spaces. It also helps that it is permanent. It is very hard to
get out and do all this partnership with both our Federal
family as well as the State and locals without that permanence
to the office. These people are very busy people. They want to
invest in the right people. I think we are the right people. I
think we can help them. But I just want to make sure that they
know that this is an enduring relationship.
Last, I really like the collaboration parts of it, the
advisory council that is in the bill, because we have done this
on an ad hoc basis and I think a lot of that is based on my
personality. But I think we need to institutionalize that
outreach to stakeholders and make it a requirement.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Dr. Sherman, I believe that you
have had a chance to review the legislation that Senator
Portman and I have introduced. I would like you to comment on
the potential impact of the accountability measures included in
that legislation on the CWMD Office and the Office of Health
Security.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you. I think the accountability measures
and mechanisms that are in place in the bill that was
introduced are, as I mentioned in my opening statement, quite
positive steps forward and can have a great impact in ensuring
that the steps that CWMD has taken and will take in the future
will be aligned with its mission and with ensuring that, among
other things, that engagement with State and local partners
continues. The advisory council that Mr. Rasicot mentioned, in
addition to some specific requirements for the office itself, a
role that GAO can play in taking a look at several different
issues as well as the National Academies and the support that
they would provide in the biological and chemical space we
think is all really reassuring and very beneficial.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Sherman.
Senator Portman, you are recognized for your questions.
Senator Portman. First of all, thanks for the help on the
reauthorization bill. You all seem to like it, in part because
you gave us a lot of input in writing it, so I guess that is
the way it should work.
I do think that we need to look at it critically and be
sure that it is keeping up with the times, and we did again,
have you all set up this medical office that I think, is
entirely consistent with what we would like to authorize but we
need to be sure that that is the case. We have time to do this.
This new Office of Health Security is going to perform a really
important medical function for DHS but also should continue to
play a critical role as it relates to this full range of WMD
threats.
I guess my major question is not so much about the
reauthorization, because you have answered those and thank you,
but it is about what has happened since our last hearing as
regard to biosecurity. You remember at that last hearing we had
some very disturbing information about what was going on with
regard to the BioWatch program, the need for an updated
biodetection capability. Our nation's biosecurity preparedness
was one of the things that stood out for me and I think other
colleagues as an area for more work.
I guess my question, Mr. Rasicot, would be to you. Given
that the biodefense for the 21st century (BD21) acquisition and
the deployment of an updated biodetection capability is still
at least a few years away--and I want to hear from you what is
the timing on that--what actions is the CWMD Office taking
right now to address the shortcomings of the BioWatch program?
Mr. Rasicot. Thank you for that question, Senator. BioWatch
provides over 30 U.S. jurisdictions with the capability to
detect a biological terrorist attack in time to save lives. The
technology it uses is proven. It is reliable. The coordination
exercises that we do with the State and locals often serve to
help improve the coordination of their response.
BioWatch itself, in January I initiated a strategic review
of all of our biosurveillance programs, and in part, we hear
the feedback and we understand that, and we want to do the job
as well as we can do it. Part of that is some near-term
improvements in BioWatch. The first of three of those
improvements is a greater emphasis on stakeholder engagement in
visiting with our local BioWatch coordinators. I think you read
in the GAO report that our people in the field meet with them
all the time but they were not hearing from the headquarters
level where the program is going and how we are going to
support them.
In the fall of last year, I signed out the first CWMD State
and Local Engagement Strategy, and in pursuit of the objectives
outlined in that strategy we have begun our local visits again.
I was just in Columbus, Ohio, visiting with Cincinnati,
Cleveland, and the Columbus BioWatch coordinators, visited the
State lab there, just to see how we are doing in a post-COVID
environment, if we can say that, but as we move through COVID,
how they are doing and how our support is.
The other piece is we are working with our Federal partners
as well as the National Labs to validate are we looking for the
right agents given the emerging threats.
Last, and this is really based on all the feedback we have
received from the stakeholders, I am exploring ways that I can
give more financial support to the exercise program in
BioWatch. The State and locals are picking up a lot of the tab
on that. I think we can do better, so we are looking at that.
On the BD21 side, as part of that strategic review we are
working with our partners at DHS's Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate to do a capabilities assessment of all current and
planned capabilities that will address this sort of ever-
changing mission and threat when it comes to biothreats.
Biodetection 21, is part of that effort, and that effort, as
you are aware, seeks to shorten the timeline to detection
through use of technology, a concept of operations that
continuously monitors the air in search of anomalies.
In January, I notified the Under Secretary for Management,
who oversees all of our major acquisitions, that we were doing
this comprehensive analysis. In June, he directed the BD21
program to focus only on agent-agnostic detector solutions and
to pursue technology maturation. He also deferred all of our
acquisition milestones until we complete that capability
assessment.
That is a lot of words, but what it means is we are on hold
there until we understand what the technology can provide, what
other capabilities are out there. We are investing in the
current BioWatch to ensure that it stays dynamic and responsive
to emerging threats. The last piece, I want to thank the
Committee again for including the advisory commission and the
instructions to interact with the National Academy of Science
on biosurveillance, because I think both of these interactions
will be very helpful in charting our way forward.
Senator Portman. Let me follow up briefly on that, and then
I want to ask Dr. Gandhi a question. On the BD21 acquisition,
you are basically saying you are on hold so you do not have a
timeframe of a few years or even several years because you do
not know. I understand you want to have the right technology
and you want to be able to respond to the ever-changing
biothreats, but it seems to me it is important for us to expand
beyond those existing sites, and that was what we decided after
the last hearing, that we needed to move forward with the
acquisition of this more comprehensive system.
I would love to hear more, perhaps if you could respond in
writing, to what the timeframe is. If we do not set a timeframe
it seems to me we are going to continue to have evolving
technology and evolving threats, and again, improving our
current system is important. I am glad you are doing that. That
would be my response to your comments.
With regard to, Dr. Gandhi, one thing you said earlier that
caught my attention, you said at the Southwest Border you have
been busy. You have lots of responsibilities and one of them,
of course, is what we are talking about today, the WMD
responsibility. Were you suggesting that at the Southwest
Border that you have been engaged in those activities, or was
that with regard to other health concerns at the border?
Dr. Gandhi. Senator, the overwhelming majority of our work
at the border has been related to border health issues, public
health issues, infectious disease issues. But we have not been
involved on the WMD side at the Southwest Border.
Senator Portman. OK. I appreciate that. As you know, we
have had a large increase, relatively speaking, in the number
of people who we find on the Terror Watch List who are coming
across our Southwest Border. Already in this fiscal year (FY)
it is over 50 individuals, as an example, whereas in past years
it has been single digits. I do think we have an enhanced
security threat at the Southwest Border from terrorist groups,
some of whom might want to use some of this WMD weaponry. It is
something that unfortunately we have to be more cognizant of.
Are you doing any activities along the Southwest Border in
relationship, for instance, to the biothreat we just talked
about?
Dr. Gandhi. We have done a number of things on the
Southwest Border to be engaged with our local partners. As it
relates to biothreats what we have learned over the last couple
of years is that, this is a recurring theme--our best foot
forward is to provide clinical expertise to our local partners
so that, one, they are aware of what they need to be looking
for as it relates to detection, and then, two, clinical
expertise to our partners in the field, at CBP and elsewhere,
CWMD, so that we can further enhance their response.
We have engaged in that by expanding our regional
footprint. When I first started we had two doctors out in the
field. We are now moving forward with a plan to align clinical
experts in CBRN and other public health matters to regions
across the country. Because what we have realized, and we will
have a chance to talk about this, is that some of the biggest
lessons learned from this pandemic is that our response is
entirely predicated on our ability to stand that up at the
local level.
Senator Portman. My time has expired so I have to move on
here, but I would like to follow up with you on this specific
issue of the border and are your regional offices providing
some of that expertise to these border communities and to your
own CBP, because CBP has to deal with this on the border with
regard to potential for threats that are WMD.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
Senator Carper, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
everybody. I already had a chance to say hello to our witnesses
before the hearing began, but we are delighted that you are
here, grateful to you for your service, and I am grateful that
you are here today.
Let me just say, Mr. Rasicot, have you ever met the former
Governor or former Attorney General of Montana?
Mr. Rasicot. I have not.
Senator Carper. His name is Racicot, and he spells it
almost exactly the same way. One of you is wrong. We will come
back to that for another day. But he is a great guy. You would
love meeting him.
Mr. Rasicot, in your testimony you state that the
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office was established
to consolidate the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to
counter threats from biological, from chemical, from
radiological, and nuclear weapons. You also stated, I think in
your testimony, that the office has brought together expertise
from I think four or five distinct Department of Homeland
Security components into one single office.
Could you please take a moment with all of us to explain
how the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office has
streamlined what was previously a fragmented approach to
addressing chemical, biological, nuclear, and other relevant
threats? That is one part of my question. What is working and
what needs improvement? How might we help?
OK. I have three questions all in one. Do you want me to
give them to you again?
Mr. Rasicot. No. I have it, sir.
Senator Carper. Good. All right.
Mr. Rasicot. Thanks for the questions, Senator. We
streamlined things by bringing it all together. I know you have
worked with the Department of for a long time. You remember the
legacy offices of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and
the Office of Health Affairs. I was not here for the merger but
I think what the merger actually was able to do was to bring
some of the discipline and the definitive engineering processes
that DNDO used in the nuclear world to some of the very
innovative thinking that was over in the Office of Health
Affairs as they addressed the evolving health threats.
As we merged those two things together we have a center of
gravity of experts working on chemical, biological, and nuclear
threats whose synergies serve to make the Department better.
But more importantly, we have people whose only job it is, is
to focus on those threats. When this was spread across those
components, like many of the other entities in the government,
are pulled in a million different ways every day by all the
things they have to deal with.
At CWMD, our sole focus is on countering weapons of mass
destruction. As I stated in my opening remarks, that requires
specialized skills, training, and equipment, as well as
expertise. You cannot get that overnight. You have to have it
when you need it, and this office has it. I firmly believe this
office is the right office to address this threat within DHS,
and really, some of our efforts across the government. I think
we have done what we set out to do.
Senator Carper. The second half of my question is what is
working and what needs improvement? Focus on the what needs
improvement and how can we help.
Mr. Rasicot. What needed improvement was the clear
definitions, especially when it came to our chemical and
biological roles and responsibilities, and the bill does that
wonderfully. I appreciate the bipartisan effort and really the
level of knowledge shown as it was put together. If you read
the CWMD Act of 2018, it is a little bit confusing as to where
we go outside the nuclear realm. It is crystal clear now, sir.
It is clear to my own staff, it is clear to the Department, it
is clear to our partners, and it is clear to State and locals.
I guess the other thing is that you are covering with the
bill, which we really need, is permanence.
Senator Carper. It is what?
Mr. Rasicot. Permanence. We expire in 2023.
Senator Carper. Oh, permanence. OK.
Mr. Rasicot. It is hard to build long-lasting relationships
at the State and local level when they do not know if you are
coming next year, because they have to invest time in us just
like we invest in them. We have stuff we can give them that is
valuable to keep their people safe. They need to invest in us
but they need to know I am going to be there next year.
Senator Carper. Good. Morale issues. Thank you very much
for that response. Dr. Sherman, do you feel up to responding to
a question on morale?
Ms. Sherman. Absolutely.
Senator Carper. Oh, good. As the folks on this Committee
know, certainly, and I suspect a lot of you know too, the
Department of Homeland Security has struggled with employee
engagement and morale issues for many years. This is an issue
that I care deeply about. This is an issue I think that we care
deeply about.
Unfortunately, the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Office ranked the lowest, I am told--the lowest--of all DHS
components in 2019, with regard to employee engagement. While
improvements have been made since 2019, employee morale and
engagement issues persist.
Dr. Sherman, in your testimony you stated that the
Government Accountability Office has found that it takes time,
oftentimes multiple years, to see real change in employee
morale. As we seek to reauthorize this office, what steps can
Congress, what steps can we take, or what steps can the
leadership at the Department of Homeland Security take to
ensure that employee morale remains a focus and that it
actually continues to improve? Go ahead.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you. As part of CWMD's implementation
plan there four guiding principles that actually speak to and
help highlight, in part, some of these issues related to
employee morale, including ensuring that there is the building
of a collaborative and inclusive environment and also working
to ensure the empowerment of employees within the office. Those
specific guiding principles actually align very nicely with
drivers of employee engagement that do come out of the Federal
Employee Viewpoint Survey, which we have been discussing this
morning.
We feel that CWMD, the office has really taken steps to
continue that focus. Yes, it does take time, but having
conversations to identify root causes of that lack of
engagement is important, and it is something that the office
has done. Also thinking about how to connect mission to
employee engagement, we felt that is really important, and the
office has done that as well.
But we would like them to continue to further engage,
provide support, and incorporate employee viewpoints and
perspectives into their activities to better, again, bring the
mission with the focus on employees closer so that they feel
more satisfaction, they feel as if they can see the line of
sight with the work that they are carrying out, and ultimately
feel more engaged with the work overall that they are
providing.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you for that. I will close with
this thought. I go home almost every night to Delaware, an hour
and a half train ride away, and I like to go home and come back
the next morning. I do customer calls all the time to
businesses, to schools, to nonprofits in Delaware, and I love
asking people this quick question: What gives you joy in your
work? You know what most people say? Helping people.
One of the things that I think it is important that we do
better, maybe a better job, the folks that are working in this
area as part of the Department of Homeland Security is that we
better connect how they are actually helping people and making
a difference in the lives of those people. I think that would
help make us feel better, make them feel better about the work
that they do.
All right. Thank you very much. Thanks for your leadership
and for joining us today. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Carper. Senator Hawley,
you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks
to all the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Rasicot, if I could start with you. I want to ask you
about one of the most potent drugs that is crossing our border
and is flooding into my State, and unfortunately just about
every State in the country, and that is fentanyl. In 2021, CBP
seized more than 10,000 pounds of fentanyl in Missouri, where I
am from. Fentanyl seizures are up 204 percent. Between 2020 and
2021, about 80,000 people between 18 and 45 died of fentanyl
overdoses, and the number of Missourians who have overdosed on
fentanyl or related opioids has risen 40 percent just in the
last two years.
A number of Members of Congress have called for designating
fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction. I was just looking at
the list here: Senator Markey has talked about it, Congressman
Ryan from Ohio has talked about it, Congresswoman Boebert has
talked about it. I think the Florida Attorney General (AG) just
yesterday urged the Administration to declare fentanyl a WMD.
I am wondering if you have a view on this, designating
fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction.
Mr. Rasicot. Yes, thanks for the question, Senator. DHS
recognizes the lethality of fentanyl. We also recognize the
potential for it to be weaponized, with devastating
consequences. From a CWMD perspective, we address the risks of
weaponized fentanyl, or any really weaponized pharmaceutical in
our broader efforts that we work on chemical warfare agents.
That said, any declaration of fentanyl as a WMD, I think
that you have to carefully consider that because there are
legitimate medical uses for fentanyl. In regard to illicit
fentanyl, I think you have to proceed with caution there as
well, because what I think you want to avoid is creating
overlapping jurisdictions or even diverting limited WMD
resources into a counternarcotics arena.
I think we have to think that through a little bit more.
But I yield to Dr. Gandhi perhaps on some of the medical issues
associated with fentanyl.
Senator Hawley. Yes, Dr. Gandhi, go ahead, and then I want
to come back, Mr. Rasicot, to the weaponization of fentanyl. Go
ahead, Doctor.
Dr. Gandhi. Sure. No, I will add a couple of thoughts.
Fentanyl is absolutely lethal, as we know. I have seen it in my
clinical practice. We have a significant role to play at DHS on
the significant knowledge gaps that exist with our frontline
workforce who have to engage with it all the time. What we have
done to that end is deploy our regional medical officers to do
training and education with our CBP officers so that they are
up to date on this topic, and of course to engage with local,
State, and public health on it.
In a couple of weeks I think we are doing a first responder
safety to fentanyl as a request from the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). We have to do better there because
the knowledge gaps are still significant, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Mr. Rasicot, just back to this
possibility of terrorists or foreign nations weaponizing
fentanyl. Can you give me your assessment of is that likely,
what are the concerns around that? Could you speak to that
issue?
Mr. Rasicot. Yes, Senator. I would be happy to give you
that assessment but I think it is probably more appropriately
done in a different forum, and I would like to follow up with
you on that.
Senator Hawley. Sure. Great. I will take you up on that.
More generally, national security, are there any other threats
to natural security that fentanyl presents that we should be
aware of and tracking? Anybody on the panel who wants to
respond to that.
Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of my
time.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator Ossoff,
you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses for your service.
Mr. Rasicot, I would like to raise with you a matter that
is of particular significance to my constituents in Georgia
given that we host the Port of Savannah, the fourth-largest
deepwater port in the country, a vital logistics hub for the
Southeast United States and a host of major shipping terminals.
A 2022 GAO report found significant issues in delays with the
deployment of new radiation monitors that Customs and Border
Protection operates at ports like Savannah. What impact might
these delays and issues have on port operations? How can
operators of ports like the Port of Savannah be confident that
CWMD will take into account their specific needs and provide
them with the tools needed to ensure cargo is scanned for
radiological and other threats at the Port of Savannah?
Mr. Rasicot. Thank you for the question, Senator, and we
certainly appreciate GAO's looking at the Radiation Portal
Monitors (RPM) program, and we are taking all of their
recommendations to heart. Actually, I am raising the level of
how we address those issues. I think we were sort of stuck in a
little bit of middle management on that. But I met with the
Deputy Commissioners at Customs and we continue to meet to make
sure we are aligned in our expectations. As you know, we
provide those systems for CBP and they work in the port.
We are in the middle of sort of a modernization, a
recapitalization of the radiation portal monitors. We are
providing 200 of the new ones to high-volume ports, to try and
reduce the nuisance alarms, which is what slows down the flow
through the ports. Savannah is on that list to get those. I
believe that they are waiting until the ocean terminal is
finished before they actually do the deployment. We work
closely with CBP on that, and we are very willing to facilitate
any conversation between ourselves, CBP, and your port
officials. I can get you a name and we will get it going.
The other piece is even though we are not deploying the
news units to Savannah, we have been working, through our
transformational research and development (R&D) programs, on
some machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI). It is a
program called ERNIE, it is a way to reduce the nuisance
alarms, and that technology is going forward in Savannah.
I would be happy to either sit with your staff and give a
full brief on that or really just meet with the port partners
and make sure they are up to speed with what is going on.
Senator Ossoff. I appreciate that. That was going to be my
next question, for your commitment to communicate directly with
port leadership and other relevant parties at the port to
ensure that those lines of communication are open.
Mr. Rasicot. Absolutely, Senator. We are very willing to do
that.
Senator Ossoff. Will you commit to working with my office
to expedite, as possible and practical, the deployment of those
technologies, whether it is the software platforms or the new
hardware, as possible, to ensure the Port of Savannah is
secure, that the people of Georgia are save, and national
security is protected?
Mr. Rasicot. Yes.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you. I appreciate that commitment.
I would like to ask you as well about DHS collaboration
with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention based in
Atlanta. CDC has worked closely with your office in the past,
including to test and in public spaces for dangerous pathogens,
and CDC is part of the BioWatch program, analyzing air filters
for biological threats.
How can you deepen your partnerships with the CDC and what
role does the CDC currently play in your ongoing programs and
activities?
Mr. Rasicot. Actually, sir, through the COVID pandemic I
would say that we have become closer to CDC than we have ever
been before. We have worked hand-in-glove with them on many of
the travel and transportation issues that we had, be it airport
screening and other things. I talk nearly daily to the
leadership at CDC. I have worked with them for the airline
issues, for the cruise ship issues. We also work with them on
biodetection issues, and I spoke about earlier, we are taking a
new strategic direction in biosurveillance. They are a big
partner with that, along with the HHS and ASPR.
The other piece of that is we do biosurveillance with our
National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC). Your staffs
get these reports. We put out reports on all that is going on
in the world in the biothreat arena. CDC is creating a similar
but complementary capability under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (CARES) Act. We have got people down
there, on the ground floor, helping them. We do not need two
NBICs. We need another entity that does what NBIC does not do.
We are working hand-in-glove with them to make sure that the
government gets the most out of these two surveillance centers.
I do not think our relationship with CDC can be stronger.
We just signed a letter of agreement with them that will ease
our support of their operations, be it at the airports or at
other ports of entry (POE), based on the lessons learned
through COVID. As I said, sir, I talk to their leadership
nearly daily.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Rasicot. Final question for
you, Mr. Rasicot, and also for you, Dr. Sherman, please. Over
the long run what are the potential privacy or Fourth Amendment
or health privacy implications of the deployment of these
sensors at scale, perhaps in some future scenarios beyond just
at ports of entry? Have you given any thought to that, to the
privacy implications of the proliferation of biosensors across
our economy?
We can start with you, Dr. Sherman.
Ms. Sherman. Yes. Thank you. The issue of privacy with
respect to the biosensors is not something that we looked
closely at as part of our review in April, so if you would be
willing I would like to take that question back and provide a
response to your office.
Senator Ossoff. Certainly. Thank you, Dr. Sherman. Mr.
Rasicot, based upon your experience and expertise I would
invite you, even if it is not something that you have recently
committed deep thought to, to give the Committee of how you
approach that issue and how you consider it.
Mr. Rasicot. Yes. The Department, at large--and you have
heard Secretary Mayorkas say how important privacy is to all of
us. Today is one of our primary concerns whenever we put out
any sort of surveillance piece. We consult regularly with our
Chief Privacy Officer on any these types of issues, sir. It is
in the foreground of all of these discussions, and the
Secretary is clear on how that works.
Senator Ossoff. These technologies are obviously vital to
national security and public health, but as with any system of
sensors, as they become more advanced and more prevalent, we do
need to consider the potential long-term implications for
privacy and civil liberties.
Dr. Sherman, let's have my office and yours have a
conversation about that.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff. Senator Romney,
you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMNEY
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rasicot, how
do you avoid the failure of imagination that obviously was part
of the experience from 9/11? How do you have within your
organization the kind of creative, out-of-the-box thinking to
imagine what possible threats might come our way?
Mr. Rasicot. I appreciate that question, Senator. It really
goes to sort of the atmosphere you set up in the office, right?
I think the CWMD is an unheralded gem within DHS. The best and
brightest work there, and they are so dedicated to the country.
They are very willing to think sort of out of the box and think
about where it is going.
One of the things I always ask them is, ``What should I
have asked you that I did not even think to ask you? What are
you actually thinking about. Besides the questions I am asking,
what else are you thinking about?'' We try to probe and think
about, OK, that is maybe how we always have done it but how is
somebody else who is maybe not dedicated to the cause that we
are thinking about doing it?
I am sure you are familiar with one of our predecessor
offices, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. They have a
process, which we are pushing out. It was a nuclear-related
process called the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
(GNDA), where they sort of mapped out, from inspiration or
aspiration to execution, what does a terrorist or a bad actor
have to go through to execute? By policy, by screening, by
whatever--do we have in place, and where are the gaps? That has
atrophied a little bit, but we are re-energizing that thinking
and we are pushing it out across chemical and biological threat
streams. Because it all comes down to human behavior, right?
Technology is one thing, but if you know how the human is going
to behave going across the spectrum, from aspiration to
execution, you can find a way to stop them.
Senator Romney. I would think, as well, that there would be
some benefit to probing and listening to people outside of
government----
Mr. Rasicot. Oh, absolutely.
Senator Romney [continuing]. Having some of the, if you
will, not just brilliant thinkers but individuals of all kinds
suggesting the kinds of things that you might need to look for
and consider. I hope our eyes and ears are attuned to what
people outside government are thinking about as potential
threats or vulnerabilities.
Mr. Rasicot. Senator, that is why I am so pleased with the
bill because it institutionalizes an advisory council. It
mandates that we will consult with our peers in the government,
outside the government, academia, industry, on a regular basis,
to understand what they are seeing. We do that now but my
concern is it is a little bit personality based. It needs to be
institutionalized so it is done in a repeatable, reliable
fashion.
Senator Romney. Now I understand that sensor technology and
capability to determine what kinds of attacks might occur, what
types of attacks have occurred is a big part of what you do. To
what extent are you also involved in thinking about how to
respond to or mediate the conditions, the health conditions,
for instance, if an event were to occur, whether it is nuclear,
biological, chemical? Does your organization get involved in
actually thinking about how to protect the public in the event
of an event of that nature?
Mr. Rasicot. Actually, Senator, if you do not mind I would
like to defer that question to Dr. Gandhi, because that really
is the focus of the Office of Health Security.
Senator Romney. All right. Dr. Gandhi.
Dr. Gandhi. Senator, thank you. We are very focused on
ensuring that we are expanding the clinical experts in our
office who can provide counsel to CWMD and work hand-in-hand
with our partners across the Federal Government to deal with
that response. Whether it is our partners at ASPR, at HHS, or
our partners with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), we have clinical experts now who have expertise in
chemical response, biological response, rad/nuc response. The
gentleman behind me is skilled in biodefense.
Our role here is to provide that counsel not just to our
Federal partners, if and when one of those attacks happened,
but also to our State and local partners, and we participate in
exercises across the country, preparedness exercises, again,
with our partners and then with those across the Federal
family.
Senator Romney. Are there any lessons that you have learned
from our response to COVID-19, for instance, that inform your
own planning and have adjusted your own planning as a result of
what we learned from that ongoing pandemic?
Dr. Gandhi. Sure. Senator, perhaps the two most important
lessons are, one, that the local ground game matters. I think
you have heard often that there is, at times, little you can do
with a screwdriver from Washington to what is happening at the
local level. Last year I spent nearly three months on the road,
and I realized in that process that if we do not equip our
local and State partners with data, information, resources, and
best practices we are doing a disservice.
We are forward leaning now in ensuring that as we build our
regional apparatus we have those experts in the field and we
are delivering a product to our local and State partners, and
that product may either be our expertise, it may be our ability
to integrate data and to share that in real time with our
partners, but there is a need for that, and that is what we are
focused on building moving forward.
I think the second answer to that is that this pandemic has
showed us that we have to absolutely be agile. In medicine we
often talk about doing Quality Improvement (QI) work. When we
see a problem we want to improve we take a plan-do-study-act
approach. We plan something; we execute. We study the results
of that. If that does not work, we repeat.
This pandemic has, for us, moving forward, for OHS, has
entrained in us the importance of having that quality
improvement, that plan-do-study-act mentality so that we never
get stuck or too ingrained in our practices, because the
pandemic is dynamic, threats to our homeland are dynamic, and
our responses need to be dynamic moving forward. We are hoping
to institutionalize that in the thought process of this office.
Senator Romney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Romney. Senator Rosen,
you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Peters, and I appreciate
all of you being here today and for the work that you are
doing. I am going to build a little bit upon what has already
been discussed, and specifically on monitoring and detecting
our biological threats, because Las Vegas is the entertainment
capital of the world. We feature world-class hotels, fine
dining, live entertainment, lots of special events,
conventions, we are about to have a Super Bowl in a few years,
and those things attract tens of thousands and sometimes
hundreds of thousands of people to our own.
It is our strength but it makes us a target for bad actors,
including those who really like to use biological weapons,
which, if unleashed, could have devastating impact on the large
concentration of people closely clustered on these sites, just
on and off the Las Vegas Strip.
Assistant Secretary Rasicot, as you know biological attacks
remain a significant threat as our nation-state adversaries and
terrorist groups continue to bolster their biological weapons
capabilities. Through the BioWatch program, CWMD, you do lead
the effort to effectively prepare for, detect, and respond to
those bioterrorism threats to the homeland. However, GAO has
questioned CWMD's ability to implement BioWatch effectively to
detect aerosol attacks.
Specifically, in 2021, the Inspector General (IG) report
says BioWatch only monitors and detects 16 of the 14 biological
agents known to be threats, only six of the 14--excuse me, not
16. What are you doing to expand the capabilities to monitor
and detect all 14 agents known to be threats and help us
protect against these aerosol attacks, and what is your
estimated timeline to do that?
Mr. Rasicot. Senator, thank you for the question. As you
know, BioWatch provides over 30 U.S. jurisdictions with the
capability to detect a biological attack in time to save
people's lives. The technology is reliable. It is proven.
Senator Rosen. Do you work with the State and local
partners on this training?
Mr. Rasicot. We do.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Mr. Rasicot. We provide training. We provide exercises
through our jurisdictional coordinators who are out there in
each of the 30 jurisdictions.
Specifically, let me take a step back. In January, we
initiated a strategic review of DHS's entire biosurveillance
program, and part of that review was a very hard look at
BioWatch, where we are and where we need to go.
There are three things where we are going in BioWatch. One,
we are enhancing State and local coordination. I think COVID
had a little bit to do with it but it is more than that, so we
are out there. In the fall, I issued the first-ever CWMD State
and Local Engagement Strategy in support of those objectives.
We met with all the BioWatch coordinators from across the
country in April, explained to them what the program direction
was for the rest of the year, solicited their input as to what
they needed in a post-COVID environment to continue monitoring.
Specific to your agent question, we are partnering with
HHS, FBI, and other Federal partners as well as the National
Labs to validate the current agent list and see where we need
to go with regard to emerging threats. Now there are a couple
of schools of thought on emerging threats so that is why we are
bringing in people from outside of our own organization, to
make sure we get the full picture.
Last, based on the stakeholder input I have received, we
are exploring some options as to whether we can provide State
and locals more funding for the training and exercises. We hear
a lot of that. I think there are some opportunities there, but
we are working through that right now.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I want to move on to you, Dr.
Gandhi, because last week I know that you announced the
creation of the Office of Health Security. As the COVID-19
pandemic has demonstrated, as Mr. Rasicot has just alluded to,
we have to have a whole-of-government approach with our State
and locals and everyone involved to tackle these health
emergencies when it comes to chemical and biological threats
specifically. I know you will partner closely with them.
Can you talk a little bit about DHS, the collaboration, DHS
and CDC, other health agencies, how they are collaborating
together, our Federal medical response infrastructure,
including the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). What role
does DHS play in determining the quantities and types of
medicines, vaccines, medical supplies that we might need to
protect us from an attack? I am going to ask you to kind of tag
onto that, if you will, what lessons we have learned from the
COVID-19 pandemic that is informing your decisions about the
Strategic National Stockpile as it relates to chemical and
biological weapons.
Dr. Gandhi. Senator, thank you. DHS has a clear role to
play here. We participate on the Public Health Emergency
Medical Countermeasures (PHEMCE) group, which is a
collaboration led by ASPR. We sit on the advisory board of that
group. What that group does, over time, is provide advice and
counsel as it relates to how we deploy our Strategic National
Stockpile. The process for this is quite clear where if there
are questions that arise or issues that require further
investigation or study they reach back out to DHS, DHS does a
material threat determination, and we decide to move forward.
We are very tied with our colleagues at ASPR.
In the broader question, in the last 18 months we have
operated as a nerve center for everything public health and
medical that this Department has faced. All of these major
issues--COVID, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Southwest Border--have
clear public health linkages. In that process what we have done
is we have learned how to engage at a high level with our
colleagues at CDC, with our colleagues as ASPR, the Public
Health Service. Our responses are actually all-of-government
responses, and then we lead those when they have DHS equities.
As it relates to engagement with State and locals, as
engaged as we are at the Federal level, we have partnerships at
the State level. We lead an every-other-week call with
Southwest Border public health and medical officials across the
entirety of the Southwest Border. Just a couple of weeks ago we
presented on highly pathogenic avian flu to all 50 State health
leads. We are all in on that.
As it relates to COVID and the lessons learned, the most
important lessons here are twofold. One, that we are focused on
our ability to be agile. These threats change daily. Our team
works 24 hours, seven days a week. The pandemic has shown that
we have to be agile, and so we are building into our office and
institutionalizing a quality improvement mantra of plan-do-
study-act. When we see something we plan what we are going to
do about it, we will execute on that, we will study the results
of that, and then we will move forward.
We are focused on that as one lesson, and the other lessons
is, as you have so rightly pointed out, our ability to be
successful in the face of chem, biorad, nuke attacks or
threats, in the face of changing pandemics is only as good as
the capability and capacity and preparedness of our State and
local partners. If we fail them in not providing appropriate
data, in resources, in lessons learned, and expertise, we are
doing a disservice.
We are very focused on ensuring that we have a strong and
true partnership with our State and local partners across the
country.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that thoughtful
answer. I understand how dynamic it is. I hope in the resources
you do include what we think we will need in the Strategic
National Stockpile so we can be sure it is there. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Scott,
you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT
Senator Scott. First I want to thank Chair Peters for
holding the hearing on this important topic.
Each of you have a very important job to deal with. Do you
guys go to the office every day, and how many people work for
you, and what percentage go to work every day in the office, or
are people still working at home?
Mr. Rasicot. I go to the office most every day, sir. We
have a lot of classified work so we have to go in for that.
Right now we have 229 people on board out of 265 authorized
positions, about an 86 percent fill rate. We are very focused
on hiring, but it is a tough market out there. We have hired 18
people this year. But what gives me heart in that regard is
that our last two major solicitations for applicants, we put
out a solicitation for our Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and we
had 50 applicants, and in solicitation for our Deputy Chief of
Staff we got over 150 applications.
We have a blend of telework and in-place work. What I did
about a year and a half ago was ask the staff to really
classify the billets or the positions, if you will, as to
whether they needed to be onsite, you work in the Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), you have to be
here--whether there was an opportunity for telework, or whether
it could be remote work. Some of our work is just that, some of
our acquisitions work.
We have a blend of that going on, and we recently just
moved. We were over at Vermont Avenue and we moved the entire
staff--it is about 400 when you add in the contractors--over to
St. Elizabeths. so that was a big event for us over the
springtime. But I think people are adjusting to the new
environment.
The third, in COVID it offered a little more challenge to
making sure you get everybody in, because, we were going to
have an awards ceremony and it turned out the entire team put
new awards together, came up positive COVID so we had to
postpone it. That was going to be a big, in-person event.
I think like the rest of the government we are moving
forward as best we can, or I would say the rest of the business
world as well. There are fits and starts but I think we are
getting back to normal.
Senator Scott. What percentage are coming in on a daily
basis?
Mr. Rasicot. I would say about 30 percent probably.
Dr. Gandhi. Senator, we have a bit of a distributed
workforce. We have our workforce that are based in California
and Texas and the Midwest, as a response to the theme that I
have talked about, which is we have to be local. Right now we
have about 80 staff or so, 30 or so vacancies. Those vacancies
are reflective, though, of growth over the past year as it
relates to our expanding mission set. That is our current
status.
Senator Scott. How many go in the office?
Dr. Gandhi. For our regional staff we do not have offices
yet, but we are working on that. As we expand our regional
presence we are going to work with our partners at DHS to find
where we want to put folks. Right now our regional staff are
mostly at their home, home office. Then for our staff here I do
not have the numbers right now but I can certainly get that
information for you.
Senator Scott. So do you go in?
Dr. Gandhi. I do not go in because I am actually based out
of Texas. I spent nearly two or three months on the border last
year. I am based out of Texas, travel a lot, and visit
Southwest Border, Northwest, CDC, and everywhere else.
Senator Scott. So you do not know what percentage of your
office----
Dr. Gandhi. No. I could hazard a guess but I would be
reticent to do so. But I will certainly discuss with our team
and we can get that information for you right after the
hearing.
Ms. Sherman. We are an agency of approximately 3,000
individuals, and the return to work has been slow to date. We
have individuals who come in on a regular basis, similar to Mr.
Rasicot, to work on classified issues or other efforts that
require them to be present and to be in the office.
One thing, though, we have steadily increased in, I would
say, the past six months or more, is growth in travel, to be
able to go to locations and carry out our work, to be able to
talk to, for example, State and local officials about a range
of issues, including the ones that we are discussing today, to
get a better understanding of the work that they are carrying
out.
I do not have a specific number that I can give you. It is
something that I can come back to you with, in terms of how
many individuals on a regular basis are coming in.
Senator Scott. Do you go into the office every day?
Ms. Sherman. Not every day, I do not. Only as needed. I
will say that the workforce is positioned to as something comes
up, individuals do go in. There be able to come in and work out
of the office space. I think that process is very well laid
out, and so as issues arise or as needs arise I and those that
I work with, my colleagues and team members, come in as needed.
Senator Scott. You do not know the number that comes in.
Ms. Sherman. No. That is something that I would need to get
back to your office on.
Senator Scott. OK. Do you all measure productivity if you
do not see people? How do each of you measure productivity? How
do you know that you are getting something accomplished?
Dr. Gandhi. I am happy to hop in, sir. We are absolutely a
mission-focused office, and so as we look at the last 18 months
and engage on where we have been--Ukraine, Afghanistan,
Southwest Border, what we are doing with medical
countermeasures--all of our programs require a profound
dedication to the work and real deliverables. If those
deliverables are not met and we are not meeting our metrics,
our key performance metrics, we know. We follow those very
closely.
We have laid out a clear approach to what people are
working on, when that work is due, what their reporting
mechanism looks like, and how we hold people accountable on a
regular basis. We do not have an option of failure given the
kind of nerve center approach that we have to take. We are very
aware and engaged all day, every day, every week.
Mr. Rasicot. In some ways I believe, Senator, that we are
more productive now than we were prior to COVID. I see that in
the work product. I see that in the things we get done. In the
height of the pandemic I am watching conference calls go on at
eight and nine o'clock at night. I am like, ``Guys, let's take
a break here.'' I know it is important work because we do
important work, but we really need to just work the core hours
that we worked when we were in the office, because I cannot
have you burning out. I think this thing is going to last, and
it has lasted a little longer than anybody thought, right?
But I have seen higher productivity within our office,
based on products, our instructions, written products, the
things that we do, the things that we provide the field. I
think the productivity is higher because, one, I do not think
there is a lot of time wasted commuting. People are working
their hours.
You missed my comments earlier, but the CWMD workforce, I
consider it to be one of the unsung gems within the government.
It is the best and brightest, and these people are dedicated to
doing their work. It is not about where they sit. It is about
what they do.
Ms. Sherman. I will try to go quick here. I see my team
members on a regular basis, if not daily certainly several
times a week. But I will say that in terms of productivity we
have individual performance measures that we revisit on a
regular basis within the agency and then we also have agency-
wide performance measures that we publicly report on every
year. While I think that 2020 year was very challenging, the
productivity levels of the reports that we issue, the briefing
assistance that we provide, and other support to committees,
including this one, and also testifying at hearings, we report
out on those numbers every year and they have remained
relatively consistent.
I would say the productivity levels are something that we
are constantly focused on and are measuring to ensure that we
are providing the service to Congress that it needs.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair Peters.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Scott.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank our
witnesses for joining us here today and for your testimony.
Congress must do its part to ensuring that we are better
prepared for weapons of mass destruction and health security
threats, including by passing legislation that Ranking Member
Portman and I introduced that authorizes the CWMD Office and
the Office of Health Security. As mentioned earlier, we plan to
mark up this important legislation in the next few weeks.
To all the witnesses, we look forward to our continued work
together to improve Federal Government's ability to prevent, to
detect, and respond to these types of threats.
The record for this hearing will remain open for 15 days,
until 5 p.m. on August 3, 2022, for the submission of
statements and questions for the record.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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