[Senate Hearing 117-653]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]







                                                        S. Hrg. 117-653
 
                 ADDRESSING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
              AND HEALTH SECURITY THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                              COMMITTEE ON
               HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS


                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             JULY 19, 2022

                               __________

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                       Printed for the use of the
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
        
        
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	               U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 	                    
   51-533 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2023
   

                   GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California             MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                   David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                    Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
         Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
           Naveed Jazayeri, Senior Professional Staff Member
                   Ashley M. Grant, Brookings Fellow
                Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
            Sam J. Mulopulos, Minority Deputy Staff Director
      Clyde E. Hicks, Jr., Minority Director of Homeland Security
           Justin Brooks, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee
   Timothy Harris III, Minority Federal Emergency Management Agency 
                                Detailee
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                     Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk

                            C O N T E N T S

                                 ------                                
Opening statements:
                                                                   Page
    Senator Peters...............................................     1
    Senator Portman..............................................     7
    Senator Carper...............................................    13
    Senator Hawley...............................................    15
    Senator Ossoff...............................................    17
    Senator Romney...............................................    19
    Senator Rosen................................................    21
    Senator Scott................................................    24
Prepared statements:
    Senator Peters...............................................    27
    Senator Portman..............................................    29

                               WITNESSES
                        Thursday, July 19, 2022

Gary Rasicot, Acting Assistant Secretary, Countering Weapons of 
  Mass Destruction Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security..     3
Pritesh Gandhi, MD, MPH, Chief Medical Officer, U.S. Department 
  of Homeland Security...........................................     4
Tina Won Sherman, Ph.D., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 
  U.S. Government Accountability Office..........................     6

                     Alphabetical List of Witnesses

Gandhi, Pritesh MD, MPH:
    Testimony....................................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................    39
Rasicot, Gary:
    Testimony....................................................     3
    Prepared statement...........................................    30
Sherman, Tina Won, Ph.D.:
    Testimony....................................................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................    44

                                APPENDIX

Response to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record
    Mr. Rasicot..................................................    55
    Mr. Gandhi...................................................    61


                       ADDRESSING WEAPONS OF MASS



        DESTRUCTION AND HEALTH SECURITY THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2022

                                     U.S. Senate,  
                           Committee on Homeland Security  
                                  and Governmental Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 
SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Peters, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Peters, Carper, Hassan, Sinema, Rosen, 
Ossoff, Portman, Johnson, Lankford, Romney, Scott, and Hawley.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\

    Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the 
Appendix on page 27.
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    I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us here 
today and for your continued service to the American people. 
Today's hearing will examine our nation's readiness to respond 
to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and health security 
threats. The goal of this hearing is to assess the Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office housed within the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its ability to combat 
these threats. We will also discuss the newly established 
Office of Health Security (OHS), which will be tasked with 
streamlining the health and safety operations of Department 
personnel and overseeing medical and public health matters all 
across the Department of Homeland Security.
    Chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN) 
materials, is an umbrella term to describe hazard agents that 
can be weaponized and that can cause everything from mass 
casualties and incapacitation to agricultural destruction. For 
example, in April 2019, a technician was arrested after 
stealing three radioactive devices from his workplace in 
Arizona. According to a court filing, the technician intended 
to release the radioactive materials at a shopping mall. The 
local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
arrested him before he could do so.
    Similarly, biological weapons such as anthrax and ricin 
have been used by terrorists in attempted attacks against 
civilians, including elected officials. As technology has 
advanced, the threats posed by these weapons only continue to 
grow and give malicious actors more opportunities to cause 
significant harm.
    The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office was 
established to detect, mitigate, and deter these significant 
national security threats. Initially, the office faced serious 
setbacks after its creation, including unsteady leadership, low 
morale, and high staff turnover, among other challenges. 
Despite these initial setbacks we have recently seen promising 
signs of the office's improvement, including better morale and 
feedback from stakeholders, indicated by a recent Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report.
    I remain optimistic that the forthcoming structural changes 
in the office and increased coordination between law 
enforcement and State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) 
partners will dramatically bolster the office's ability to 
tackle these challenges head on.
    Last month, Ranking Member Portman and I introduced 
bipartisan legislation to significantly enhance the Federal 
Government's ability to detect, recognize, and evaluate 
chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear threats. The 
Offices of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and Health 
Security Act reauthorizes the CWMD Office, which is set to 
expire next year, and authorizes the new Office of Health 
Security.
    Our bipartisan legislation more clearly defines the CWMD 
Office's responsibilities, eliminating ineffective or 
duplicative functions, institute a number of accountability and 
oversight measures, and appoints the Chief Medical Officer 
(CMO) to lead the Office of Health Security. Serving as a dual 
appointment as the Assistant Secretary for Health Security and 
reporting to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security.
    All of these changes will ensure that our nation can 
develop a comprehensive national strategy to protect all of our 
communities from these dangerous materials and public health 
threats that can have absolutely catastrophic effects. In 
addition to strengthening our homeland security and our 
preparedness, these changes will also make these offices more 
accountable to Congress and to the American people.
    Today I am pleased to welcome a panel of experts, witnesses 
who can discuss whether DHS is equipped with the necessary 
tools and the resources to prevent possible attacks, and to 
ensure that our nation is prepared to respond to and recover 
from them. I look forward to a comprehensive and insightful 
discussion.
    My Ranking Member, Senator Portman, is at another committee 
hearing right now. He will be joining us shortly. I will 
immediately move to swearing in witnesses.
    It is the practice of the Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses, so if each of 
you would please stand and raise your right hand.
    Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before 
this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you, God?
    Mr. Rasicot. I do.
    Dr. Gandhi. I do.
    Ms. Sherman. I do.
    Chairman Peters. You may be seated.
    Today's first witness is Gary Rasicot, Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Countering Weapons of mass Destruction Office at 
the Department of Homeland Security. Previously, Mr. Rasicot 
served as Chief of Operations (COO) at the Safety Security 
Administration (SSA) as well as several senior roles at the 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), including as Director of Marine 
Transportation Systems (MTS), Director of the Global Maritime 
Operational Threat Response (MOTR), and as Deputy Commandant 
for Mission Support, Deputy for Personnel Readiness.
    Mr. Rasicot was also an active-duty Coast Guard officer for 
more than 24 years.
    Welcome to our Committee, sir. You may proceed with your 
opening remarks.

   TESTIMONY OF GARY RASICOT,\1\ ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                      OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Rasicot. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting 
me to speak to you today about the reauthorization of the 
Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office. I have had the privilege of leading this 
office twice, most recently since January 2021, and previously 
from October 2019 through July 2020.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rasicot appears in the Appendix 
on page 30.
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    The 2018 CWMD Act authorized the merger of two legacy 
offices with different missions and cultures as a means to 
elevate and streamline the Department's efforts to safeguard 
the homeland from chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear threats. While the implementation of this merger, like 
all mergers of this type, has seen its share of peaks and 
valleys, with the assistance and guidance of this Committee, 
the GAO, State and local stakeholders, and most importantly, 
the dedicated CWMD workforce, I believe that we have made great 
strides in maturing this critical organization over the past 
three years.
    Today I am proud to ask you to reauthorize a fully 
functional, unified office with a clear focus, strategic 
intent, and strong forward momentum that makes the Nation safer 
and meets Congress' original goal. I am confident that CWMD is 
the right office at the right time to face the threats emerging 
in this mission space. I would like to thank the Committee and 
your staff for the exceptional collaborative, bipartisan effort 
toward the introduction of 
S. 4465, and for the strong working relationship that we have.
    Readiness for CBRN threats requires specialized expertise, 
skills, and equipment. Within DHS, CWMD maintains a dedicated 
focus on these threats to ensure that we do not lose sight of 
this core Department responsibility among the range of threats 
and issues that DHS components face every day.
    Our mission is to make sure that Federal, State, local, 
tribal, and territorial frontline responders are aware of these 
threats and have the capabilities to protect against them. 
Indeed, our working relations with State and local partners are 
among our most critical. Through flagship programs in over 30 
U.S. jurisdictions, including BioWatch and Securing the Cities, 
we provide detection equipment, training, exercise support to 
help frontline operators detect CBRN threats early and take 
quick action to save lives.
    Last fall, I issued the first-ever CWMD State and Local 
Engagement Strategy in recognition of the key role our State 
and local partners play in countering CBRN threats. With the 
easing of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) travel 
restrictions we have recently re-energized our in-person 
engagements with these partners. In June, I visited with State 
and local BioWatch coordinators from Cincinnati, Cleveland, and 
Columbus, Ohio, to hear directly how we can continue to best 
support their efforts.
    At CWMD our workforce is truly our greatest asset. As our 
office matures we remain focused on continuing to strengthen 
employee engagement. Though we have more work to do, I was 
pleased to see the improved employee engagement scores in 
CWMD's most recent Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) 
results, which now are above the DHS average. We also look 
forward to continuing our close working relationship with our 
colleagues in the Office of Health Security as they provide 
expert medical and public health guidance to all of our 
efforts.
    Once again, we are grateful to the Committee for the bill 
to reauthorize CWMD. Given the potentially devastating nature 
of CBRN events, reauthorization is vital to ensure continuity 
of critical programs while supporting frontline operators and 
local communities. It is also key to the morale and retention 
of the office's highly skilled workforce and highly in-demand 
workforce.
    Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, distinguished 
Members of the Committee, thank you again for your attention to 
this important mission and for the opportunity to talk about 
CWMD's work. I look forward to answering your questions.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Rasicot, for your opening 
statement.
    Our next witness is Pritesh Gandhi, Chief Medical Officer 
of the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Gandhi is 
responsible for DHS's medical and public health response on all 
health security issues, including border health, migration, 
chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological acts of 
terrorism, natural and man-made disasters and threats to the 
nation's food and agricultural system.
    Prior to his current role, Dr. Gandhi was the Associate 
Chief Medical Officer and Director of Adult Medicine at 
People's Community Clinic. Dr. Gandhi has experience in 
multiple sectors including food system infrastructure, 
microfinance, early childhood education, and health 
informatics.
    Dr. Gandhi, welcome to the Committee. You may proceed with 
your opening remarks.

TESTIMONY OF PRITESH GANDHI, MD, MPH,\1\ CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, 
              U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Dr. Gandhi. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today, the very first week of this new 
Office of Health Security. It is truly an honor. I have 
submitted written testimony for the record.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Gandhi appears in the Appendix on 
page 39.
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    These past two years, the Department of Homeland Security 
and our nation have faced several unprecedented challenges. 
From terror attacks to an enduring global pandemic, a global 
migration surge, to cyberattacks directed at critical 
infrastructure sectors, including health care, multiple disease 
outbreaks worldwide, and engagements with Afghanistan and 
Ukraine, the breadth of the DHS portfolio has been truly 
stunning. As much as each of these events have had a Homeland 
Security nexus, these events have also all been bound by the 
indelible linkage to our nation's health security.
    Perhaps no mission over the past 18 months demonstrates 
this relationship more than Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). 
Last August, as Operation Allies Refuge was underway, our 
medical team gathered at Dulles Airport to begin coordinating 
the domestic health response for the mission. The gentleman 
right behind me, Dr. Herbert Wolfe, my deputy, whose storied 
career spans three decades of public service, commanded the 
early public health response at Dulles. Multiple additional 
members from our team deployed to Philadelphia airport and safe 
havens across the country, and as Operation Allies Refuge 
transitioned to Operation Allies Welcome, DHS was named lead 
Federal agency and our team continued to lead, and still leads 
the public health response.
    Over this 11-month mission, we have worked together with 
the public health and medical experts from the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), including the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Public Health 
Service (USPHS), Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR), the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and the Department of State (DOS) to coordinate a 
dynamic, nimble Federal health response rooted in clinical best 
practices to safeguard the health and well-being of the 
American people and the health and well-being of our Afghan 
guests.
    We held countless briefings with State and local public 
health, met with hospital leadership in all safe haven States, 
and had daily medical syncs with the clinical experts across 
the Federal Government. This was truly an all-of-nation public 
health and medical effort and one that reflects the very best 
of what a coordinated Federal public health response should 
look like.
    I stand in awe and am humbled by the commitment of my 
colleagues who, on a moment's notice, left their families and 
their loved ones for weeks on end as a part of this mission and 
so many others during the last 18 months. I have had the 
privilege to lead these same individuals as we immobilize in 
partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to 
vaccinate the DHS workforce, to stand up our domestic public 
health measures in response to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, to 
deploy to the Southwest Border to provide technical public 
health assistance to ensure we had optimized mental health and 
wellness resources for our workforce during these challenging 
times and to assist our agent emergency medical technicians 
(EMTs) and paramedics on missions around the United States, and 
so much more.
    The dogged dedication of our staff and our earnest response 
to these challenges reflects the hope and vision of this new 
office, a central office that serves as the principal medical, 
public health, and workforce health and safety authority for 
DHS and one that is grounded in agility, technical excellence, 
and deep relationships with our State and local partners, and a 
fierce commitment to protect the physical and mental health of 
our workforce, those in our care and custody, and our Nation.
    Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and the Members 
here today, on behalf of the incredibly talented and dedicated 
individuals who work within the Office of Health Security at 
the intersection of health security and homeland security, 
thank you for your support, and I look forward to our 
conversation.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Gandhi.
    Today's final witness is Tina Sherman, Director of Homeland 
Security and Justice at the Government Accountability Office. 
Since joining the GAO in 2002, Dr. Sherman has led review of 
telecommunications and transportation issues in the physical 
infrastructure team and served in various roles at the 
Department of Defense.
    Previously, Dr. Sherman contributed to agency-wide efforts 
on Hurricane Katrina along with GAO's annual Duplication and 
Cost-Savings report and biennial High-Risk Update.
    Prior to GAO, Dr. Sherman worked at New America, a 
nonpartisan think tank that focuses on a range of public policy 
issues including national security studies.
    Dr. Sherman, welcome to our Committee. You may proceed with 
your opening remarks.

  TESTIMONY OF TINA WON SHERMAN, PH.D,\1\ DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 
  SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. Sherman. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here 
today to discuss the reauthorization of the Department of 
Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Office alongside Acting Assistant Secretary Rasicot and Chief 
Medical Officer Gandhi.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman appears in the Appendix 
on page 44.
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    CWMD's mission to support its domestic and international 
partners in safeguarding our nation against chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats is a most 
critical one. As we have all witnessed, responding to even a 
single one of these threats can be a significant challenge. An 
effective and coordinated effort is needed to combat a threat 
landscape that has become increasingly complex, highly dynamic, 
and potentially more catastrophic.
    Given the importance of CWMD's mission, my agency, GAO, has 
been studying the office and its predecessors for over a decade 
on topics such as biosurveillance, chemical defense, nuclear 
terrorism, and more.
    This past April, we reported on the status of functions 
transferred to CWMD from the former Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office and the Office of Health Affairs. To conduct that work 
we spoke with State and local partners from across the country 
involved in key CWMD programs, such as BioWatch and Securing 
the Cities and the former Chemical Defense Demonstration Cities 
Initiative. We heard from public safety officials and public 
health experts about their satisfaction with the office's 
support while, at the same time, their desire to see increased 
communication and coordination from CWMD and with their 
partners.
    We also heard from the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Homeland Security's component officials that 
capability gap analysis in the radiological and nuclear space 
are unique and of great value but no longer conducted by CWMD.
    In addition, we revisited the low employee morale the 
office has faced since its establishment five years ago. This 
type of change takes time and sustained attention to 
effectively manage it. We understand from Acting Assistant 
Secretary Rasicot that the office is actively working on 
implementing the recommendations from our April report to 
strengthen its efforts.
    The legislation this Committee recently introduced to 
reauthorize CWMD shows promise to help address these and other 
issues GAO has previously identified, specifically the emphasis 
placed on clarifying mission responsibilities and building in 
greater accountability or positive steps forward. We also hope 
that this legislation, along with CWMD's continued efforts, 
will increase the level of engagement and with greater mission 
understanding by its employees.
    Finally, with yesterday's establishment of the Office of 
Health Security, we asked Dr. Gandhi and his team to consider 
GAO's leading practices for organizational transformation which 
we have highlighted to this Committee in the past as a resource 
for setting up this new office.
    Thank you for holding this hearing today and for inviting 
me to participate in this conversation.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Sherman.
    Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for your opening 
comments.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\

    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Sherman, 
thank you for the work you have done on this, and in particular 
some of the concerns you have raised, which we will go over 
again today and we did in our last hearing. Chairman Peters, 
thank you for holding this hearing and more importantly for 
your work on this issue and our work together to try to come up 
with legislation that deals with some of the concerns that have 
been raised.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the 
Appendix on page 29.
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    Combating WMD threats is very complex. They can be 
naturally occurring, accidental, and certainly human made. The 
Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office, which was talked about, has a critical role 
in our nation's ability to detect, to prevent, and to safeguard 
the American people from these threats. In addition to 
developing and implementing countering WMD capability, CWMD is 
responsible for coordinating, of course, with Federal, State, 
local, tribal, and territorial partners to ensure that they 
have the expertise and the tools needed to detect and prevent 
threats.
    In our February Committee hearing, which was called 
``Addressing the Gaps in America's Biosecurity Preparedness,'' 
Members of this Committee heard from the witnesses and the 
panel a lot of concerns about the CWMD, about the office, 
ranging from employee morale, as was just talked about, to 
effectiveness of programs such as BioWatch. These findings are 
concerning and the purpose of today's hearing is to discuss how 
to address these issues as part of the CWMD reauthorization.
    To that end, we did reintroduce legislation, Senator Peters 
and myself, that will reauthorize and strengthen the CWMD 
Office with updated requirements, standards, and accountability 
measures to address these concerns, and more importantly, to 
ensure our country is properly safeguarded from chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
    Legislation, by the way, also authorizes the DHS Chief 
Medical Officer as the head of the new Office of Health 
Security. DHS has made some news on that in the last 24 hours. 
This change will bolster oversight efforts of all medical, 
public health, and workforce safety of the Department. It will 
also perform the pivotal role in all health matters relating to 
DHS's broad mission set.
    I look forward to discussing the strategic vision of this 
new Office of Health Security and actions it will take to 
coordinate with CWMD on WMD health matters, and I want to make 
sure that we are lining up well with the reauthorization and 
the actions that the Department has taken over the last 24 
hours.
    The authorities of the CWMD Office are set to expire late 
next year, and again as this Committee considers 
reauthorization legislation that we have introduced I look 
forward to hearing all the witnesses' assessments, as we just 
did, on the current WMD threat landscape and how our bipartisan 
legislation will help strengthen our nation's level of 
preparedness.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
    Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, 
are certainly among the most fatal and disruptive potential 
attacks that our nation faces. Recent examples of CBRN agents 
used by nefarious actors include the use of an advanced nerve 
agent in an assassination attempt by Russians in the United 
Kingdom (UK), and it certainly demonstrates the need for an 
increased ability to prevent, to detect, and to respond to 
these types of weapons in the future.
    Mr. Rasicot, as someone who works on these threats each and 
every day I would like to know what keeps you up at night. Let 
the Committee know that, and why is the existence of a CWMD 
Office so important to counter these threats?
    Mr. Rasicot. Thanks for the question, Senator, and I think 
you kind of hit the answer right up in the opening of that 
question. I think the chemical piece is one that we need to 
continue to address, and we are working very hard on that. In 
2018, we were funding that at about $800,000 a year. We are up 
to $6.1 million a year now as we try to get more information 
out to our State and local stakeholders as to how to recognize 
chemical threats and then how to take immediate action to avoid 
injury.
    The other piece of that is I really think that CWMD is the 
right place, because as I said in my opening statement, 
countering WMD take specialized skills, training, and 
equipment. You cannot get that overnight. You need to invest in 
that. You need to stay current in it. The threat is 
continuously evolving. The Department needs an office whose 
sole focus is to maintain this capability within the Department 
and share that knowledge and capability with our State and 
local first responders.
    I believe CWMD is the right office to do that. I believe 
that we have the expertise, we have the skills, we have the 
capacity, and we have the knowledge, and we are getting much 
better. I will admit we stumbled a little bit as we 
transitioned in the merger on our State and local engagement, 
but we are getting much better at that. We are doing a lot more 
outreach. We have refined many of our products so they speak to 
the end user. I think, the GAO is telling us that our 
stakeholders are responding to that.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. On June 23rd of this year, 
Senator Portman and I introduced S. 4465, the Offices of 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and Health Security Act. 
The bill reauthorizes the CWMD Office and formally authorizes 
the newly created Office of Health Security at the Department 
of Homeland Security, it clarifies roles and responsibilities 
for both offices, and adds important accountability and 
oversight measures.
    My question is for you, Mr. Rasicot and Dr. Gandhi. We will 
start with you Dr. Gandhi. Can you briefly discuss how this 
legislation will help you achieve your mission to protect the 
homeland against weapons of mass destruction and health 
threats?
    Dr. Gandhi. Senator, thank you. For the last 18 months our 
team has served as a nerve center for everything public health 
and medical that the Department has had to face, ranging from 
Operation Allies Welcome, Uniting for Ukraine, the medical and 
public health implications of both of those efforts, the 
implications of what we are seeing at the Southwest Border, 
thinking critically about how we ensure our workforce health 
and safety in the midst of a pandemic. Seemingly every critical 
issue that DHS has engaged in over the last couple of years has 
had this strong public health and medical nexus, yet our 
responses, while strong and robust, in many respects were ad 
hoc because we were working in a system that was not designed 
for the kinds of threats that we have faced over the last 
couple of years.
    The benefit of having faced those threats and dealt with 
them head-on is that there are a slew of lessons learned, and 
the hope is to institutionalize those lessons learned so that 
we can, one, pioneer the best-in-class workforce health and 
safety programs that we need to; two, focus deeply on how we do 
coordination and oversight and standardization, and 
accountability all across the Department; three, ensure that we 
are centralizing the medical and public health safety data and 
public health data; and last, continue what has been a full-
scale engagement with our State and local partners. Our ability 
to do all of that, to be engaged and have a strong ground game 
locally, to do the coordination and standardization that is 
required, and to lead on policy is predicated on having a 
strong central office that can speak with one voice.
    I think there is an opportunity here where we 
institutionalize the lessons learned from the last couple of 
years and move forward.
    Chairman Peters. Mr. Rasicot.
    Mr. Rasicot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We want to thank you 
for the exceptional bipartisan effort to put the bill together. 
We have no recommended changes to it, and I think it really 
starts to strengthen the office.
    One of the key ways it strengthens the office is it really 
clarifies our roles in the chemical and the biological threat 
spaces. It also helps that it is permanent. It is very hard to 
get out and do all this partnership with both our Federal 
family as well as the State and locals without that permanence 
to the office. These people are very busy people. They want to 
invest in the right people. I think we are the right people. I 
think we can help them. But I just want to make sure that they 
know that this is an enduring relationship.
    Last, I really like the collaboration parts of it, the 
advisory council that is in the bill, because we have done this 
on an ad hoc basis and I think a lot of that is based on my 
personality. But I think we need to institutionalize that 
outreach to stakeholders and make it a requirement.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. Dr. Sherman, I believe that you 
have had a chance to review the legislation that Senator 
Portman and I have introduced. I would like you to comment on 
the potential impact of the accountability measures included in 
that legislation on the CWMD Office and the Office of Health 
Security.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you. I think the accountability measures 
and mechanisms that are in place in the bill that was 
introduced are, as I mentioned in my opening statement, quite 
positive steps forward and can have a great impact in ensuring 
that the steps that CWMD has taken and will take in the future 
will be aligned with its mission and with ensuring that, among 
other things, that engagement with State and local partners 
continues. The advisory council that Mr. Rasicot mentioned, in 
addition to some specific requirements for the office itself, a 
role that GAO can play in taking a look at several different 
issues as well as the National Academies and the support that 
they would provide in the biological and chemical space we 
think is all really reassuring and very beneficial.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Sherman.
    Senator Portman, you are recognized for your questions.
    Senator Portman. First of all, thanks for the help on the 
reauthorization bill. You all seem to like it, in part because 
you gave us a lot of input in writing it, so I guess that is 
the way it should work.
    I do think that we need to look at it critically and be 
sure that it is keeping up with the times, and we did again, 
have you all set up this medical office that I think, is 
entirely consistent with what we would like to authorize but we 
need to be sure that that is the case. We have time to do this. 
This new Office of Health Security is going to perform a really 
important medical function for DHS but also should continue to 
play a critical role as it relates to this full range of WMD 
threats.
    I guess my major question is not so much about the 
reauthorization, because you have answered those and thank you, 
but it is about what has happened since our last hearing as 
regard to biosecurity. You remember at that last hearing we had 
some very disturbing information about what was going on with 
regard to the BioWatch program, the need for an updated 
biodetection capability. Our nation's biosecurity preparedness 
was one of the things that stood out for me and I think other 
colleagues as an area for more work.
    I guess my question, Mr. Rasicot, would be to you. Given 
that the biodefense for the 21st century (BD21) acquisition and 
the deployment of an updated biodetection capability is still 
at least a few years away--and I want to hear from you what is 
the timing on that--what actions is the CWMD Office taking 
right now to address the shortcomings of the BioWatch program?
    Mr. Rasicot. Thank you for that question, Senator. BioWatch 
provides over 30 U.S. jurisdictions with the capability to 
detect a biological terrorist attack in time to save lives. The 
technology it uses is proven. It is reliable. The coordination 
exercises that we do with the State and locals often serve to 
help improve the coordination of their response.
    BioWatch itself, in January I initiated a strategic review 
of all of our biosurveillance programs, and in part, we hear 
the feedback and we understand that, and we want to do the job 
as well as we can do it. Part of that is some near-term 
improvements in BioWatch. The first of three of those 
improvements is a greater emphasis on stakeholder engagement in 
visiting with our local BioWatch coordinators. I think you read 
in the GAO report that our people in the field meet with them 
all the time but they were not hearing from the headquarters 
level where the program is going and how we are going to 
support them.
    In the fall of last year, I signed out the first CWMD State 
and Local Engagement Strategy, and in pursuit of the objectives 
outlined in that strategy we have begun our local visits again. 
I was just in Columbus, Ohio, visiting with Cincinnati, 
Cleveland, and the Columbus BioWatch coordinators, visited the 
State lab there, just to see how we are doing in a post-COVID 
environment, if we can say that, but as we move through COVID, 
how they are doing and how our support is.
    The other piece is we are working with our Federal partners 
as well as the National Labs to validate are we looking for the 
right agents given the emerging threats.
    Last, and this is really based on all the feedback we have 
received from the stakeholders, I am exploring ways that I can 
give more financial support to the exercise program in 
BioWatch. The State and locals are picking up a lot of the tab 
on that. I think we can do better, so we are looking at that.
    On the BD21 side, as part of that strategic review we are 
working with our partners at DHS's Science and Technology (S&T) 
Directorate to do a capabilities assessment of all current and 
planned capabilities that will address this sort of ever-
changing mission and threat when it comes to biothreats. 
Biodetection 21, is part of that effort, and that effort, as 
you are aware, seeks to shorten the timeline to detection 
through use of technology, a concept of operations that 
continuously monitors the air in search of anomalies.
    In January, I notified the Under Secretary for Management, 
who oversees all of our major acquisitions, that we were doing 
this comprehensive analysis. In June, he directed the BD21 
program to focus only on agent-agnostic detector solutions and 
to pursue technology maturation. He also deferred all of our 
acquisition milestones until we complete that capability 
assessment.
    That is a lot of words, but what it means is we are on hold 
there until we understand what the technology can provide, what 
other capabilities are out there. We are investing in the 
current BioWatch to ensure that it stays dynamic and responsive 
to emerging threats. The last piece, I want to thank the 
Committee again for including the advisory commission and the 
instructions to interact with the National Academy of Science 
on biosurveillance, because I think both of these interactions 
will be very helpful in charting our way forward.
    Senator Portman. Let me follow up briefly on that, and then 
I want to ask Dr. Gandhi a question. On the BD21 acquisition, 
you are basically saying you are on hold so you do not have a 
timeframe of a few years or even several years because you do 
not know. I understand you want to have the right technology 
and you want to be able to respond to the ever-changing 
biothreats, but it seems to me it is important for us to expand 
beyond those existing sites, and that was what we decided after 
the last hearing, that we needed to move forward with the 
acquisition of this more comprehensive system.
    I would love to hear more, perhaps if you could respond in 
writing, to what the timeframe is. If we do not set a timeframe 
it seems to me we are going to continue to have evolving 
technology and evolving threats, and again, improving our 
current system is important. I am glad you are doing that. That 
would be my response to your comments.
    With regard to, Dr. Gandhi, one thing you said earlier that 
caught my attention, you said at the Southwest Border you have 
been busy. You have lots of responsibilities and one of them, 
of course, is what we are talking about today, the WMD 
responsibility. Were you suggesting that at the Southwest 
Border that you have been engaged in those activities, or was 
that with regard to other health concerns at the border?
    Dr. Gandhi. Senator, the overwhelming majority of our work 
at the border has been related to border health issues, public 
health issues, infectious disease issues. But we have not been 
involved on the WMD side at the Southwest Border.
    Senator Portman. OK. I appreciate that. As you know, we 
have had a large increase, relatively speaking, in the number 
of people who we find on the Terror Watch List who are coming 
across our Southwest Border. Already in this fiscal year (FY) 
it is over 50 individuals, as an example, whereas in past years 
it has been single digits. I do think we have an enhanced 
security threat at the Southwest Border from terrorist groups, 
some of whom might want to use some of this WMD weaponry. It is 
something that unfortunately we have to be more cognizant of. 
Are you doing any activities along the Southwest Border in 
relationship, for instance, to the biothreat we just talked 
about?
    Dr. Gandhi. We have done a number of things on the 
Southwest Border to be engaged with our local partners. As it 
relates to biothreats what we have learned over the last couple 
of years is that, this is a recurring theme--our best foot 
forward is to provide clinical expertise to our local partners 
so that, one, they are aware of what they need to be looking 
for as it relates to detection, and then, two, clinical 
expertise to our partners in the field, at CBP and elsewhere, 
CWMD, so that we can further enhance their response.
    We have engaged in that by expanding our regional 
footprint. When I first started we had two doctors out in the 
field. We are now moving forward with a plan to align clinical 
experts in CBRN and other public health matters to regions 
across the country. Because what we have realized, and we will 
have a chance to talk about this, is that some of the biggest 
lessons learned from this pandemic is that our response is 
entirely predicated on our ability to stand that up at the 
local level.
    Senator Portman. My time has expired so I have to move on 
here, but I would like to follow up with you on this specific 
issue of the border and are your regional offices providing 
some of that expertise to these border communities and to your 
own CBP, because CBP has to deal with this on the border with 
regard to potential for threats that are WMD.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
    Senator Carper, you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

    Senator Carper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, 
everybody. I already had a chance to say hello to our witnesses 
before the hearing began, but we are delighted that you are 
here, grateful to you for your service, and I am grateful that 
you are here today.
    Let me just say, Mr. Rasicot, have you ever met the former 
Governor or former Attorney General of Montana?
    Mr. Rasicot. I have not.
    Senator Carper. His name is Racicot, and he spells it 
almost exactly the same way. One of you is wrong. We will come 
back to that for another day. But he is a great guy. You would 
love meeting him.
    Mr. Rasicot, in your testimony you state that the 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office was established 
to consolidate the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to 
counter threats from biological, from chemical, from 
radiological, and nuclear weapons. You also stated, I think in 
your testimony, that the office has brought together expertise 
from I think four or five distinct Department of Homeland 
Security components into one single office.
    Could you please take a moment with all of us to explain 
how the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office has 
streamlined what was previously a fragmented approach to 
addressing chemical, biological, nuclear, and other relevant 
threats? That is one part of my question. What is working and 
what needs improvement? How might we help?
    OK. I have three questions all in one. Do you want me to 
give them to you again?
    Mr. Rasicot. No. I have it, sir.
    Senator Carper. Good. All right.
    Mr. Rasicot. Thanks for the questions, Senator. We 
streamlined things by bringing it all together. I know you have 
worked with the Department of for a long time. You remember the 
legacy offices of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and 
the Office of Health Affairs. I was not here for the merger but 
I think what the merger actually was able to do was to bring 
some of the discipline and the definitive engineering processes 
that DNDO used in the nuclear world to some of the very 
innovative thinking that was over in the Office of Health 
Affairs as they addressed the evolving health threats.
    As we merged those two things together we have a center of 
gravity of experts working on chemical, biological, and nuclear 
threats whose synergies serve to make the Department better. 
But more importantly, we have people whose only job it is, is 
to focus on those threats. When this was spread across those 
components, like many of the other entities in the government, 
are pulled in a million different ways every day by all the 
things they have to deal with.
    At CWMD, our sole focus is on countering weapons of mass 
destruction. As I stated in my opening remarks, that requires 
specialized skills, training, and equipment, as well as 
expertise. You cannot get that overnight. You have to have it 
when you need it, and this office has it. I firmly believe this 
office is the right office to address this threat within DHS, 
and really, some of our efforts across the government. I think 
we have done what we set out to do.
    Senator Carper. The second half of my question is what is 
working and what needs improvement? Focus on the what needs 
improvement and how can we help.
    Mr. Rasicot. What needed improvement was the clear 
definitions, especially when it came to our chemical and 
biological roles and responsibilities, and the bill does that 
wonderfully. I appreciate the bipartisan effort and really the 
level of knowledge shown as it was put together. If you read 
the CWMD Act of 2018, it is a little bit confusing as to where 
we go outside the nuclear realm. It is crystal clear now, sir. 
It is clear to my own staff, it is clear to the Department, it 
is clear to our partners, and it is clear to State and locals.
    I guess the other thing is that you are covering with the 
bill, which we really need, is permanence.
    Senator Carper. It is what?
    Mr. Rasicot. Permanence. We expire in 2023.
    Senator Carper. Oh, permanence. OK.
    Mr. Rasicot. It is hard to build long-lasting relationships 
at the State and local level when they do not know if you are 
coming next year, because they have to invest time in us just 
like we invest in them. We have stuff we can give them that is 
valuable to keep their people safe. They need to invest in us 
but they need to know I am going to be there next year.
    Senator Carper. Good. Morale issues. Thank you very much 
for that response. Dr. Sherman, do you feel up to responding to 
a question on morale?
    Ms. Sherman. Absolutely.
    Senator Carper. Oh, good. As the folks on this Committee 
know, certainly, and I suspect a lot of you know too, the 
Department of Homeland Security has struggled with employee 
engagement and morale issues for many years. This is an issue 
that I care deeply about. This is an issue I think that we care 
deeply about.
    Unfortunately, the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Office ranked the lowest, I am told--the lowest--of all DHS 
components in 2019, with regard to employee engagement. While 
improvements have been made since 2019, employee morale and 
engagement issues persist.
    Dr. Sherman, in your testimony you stated that the 
Government Accountability Office has found that it takes time, 
oftentimes multiple years, to see real change in employee 
morale. As we seek to reauthorize this office, what steps can 
Congress, what steps can we take, or what steps can the 
leadership at the Department of Homeland Security take to 
ensure that employee morale remains a focus and that it 
actually continues to improve? Go ahead.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you. As part of CWMD's implementation 
plan there four guiding principles that actually speak to and 
help highlight, in part, some of these issues related to 
employee morale, including ensuring that there is the building 
of a collaborative and inclusive environment and also working 
to ensure the empowerment of employees within the office. Those 
specific guiding principles actually align very nicely with 
drivers of employee engagement that do come out of the Federal 
Employee Viewpoint Survey, which we have been discussing this 
morning.
    We feel that CWMD, the office has really taken steps to 
continue that focus. Yes, it does take time, but having 
conversations to identify root causes of that lack of 
engagement is important, and it is something that the office 
has done. Also thinking about how to connect mission to 
employee engagement, we felt that is really important, and the 
office has done that as well.
    But we would like them to continue to further engage, 
provide support, and incorporate employee viewpoints and 
perspectives into their activities to better, again, bring the 
mission with the focus on employees closer so that they feel 
more satisfaction, they feel as if they can see the line of 
sight with the work that they are carrying out, and ultimately 
feel more engaged with the work overall that they are 
providing.
    Senator Carper. Good. Thank you for that. I will close with 
this thought. I go home almost every night to Delaware, an hour 
and a half train ride away, and I like to go home and come back 
the next morning. I do customer calls all the time to 
businesses, to schools, to nonprofits in Delaware, and I love 
asking people this quick question: What gives you joy in your 
work? You know what most people say? Helping people.
    One of the things that I think it is important that we do 
better, maybe a better job, the folks that are working in this 
area as part of the Department of Homeland Security is that we 
better connect how they are actually helping people and making 
a difference in the lives of those people. I think that would 
help make us feel better, make them feel better about the work 
that they do.
    All right. Thank you very much. Thanks for your leadership 
and for joining us today. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Carper. Senator Hawley, 
you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY

    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks 
to all the witnesses for being here.
    Mr. Rasicot, if I could start with you. I want to ask you 
about one of the most potent drugs that is crossing our border 
and is flooding into my State, and unfortunately just about 
every State in the country, and that is fentanyl. In 2021, CBP 
seized more than 10,000 pounds of fentanyl in Missouri, where I 
am from. Fentanyl seizures are up 204 percent. Between 2020 and 
2021, about 80,000 people between 18 and 45 died of fentanyl 
overdoses, and the number of Missourians who have overdosed on 
fentanyl or related opioids has risen 40 percent just in the 
last two years.
    A number of Members of Congress have called for designating 
fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction. I was just looking at 
the list here: Senator Markey has talked about it, Congressman 
Ryan from Ohio has talked about it, Congresswoman Boebert has 
talked about it. I think the Florida Attorney General (AG) just 
yesterday urged the Administration to declare fentanyl a WMD.
    I am wondering if you have a view on this, designating 
fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction.
    Mr. Rasicot. Yes, thanks for the question, Senator. DHS 
recognizes the lethality of fentanyl. We also recognize the 
potential for it to be weaponized, with devastating 
consequences. From a CWMD perspective, we address the risks of 
weaponized fentanyl, or any really weaponized pharmaceutical in 
our broader efforts that we work on chemical warfare agents.
    That said, any declaration of fentanyl as a WMD, I think 
that you have to carefully consider that because there are 
legitimate medical uses for fentanyl. In regard to illicit 
fentanyl, I think you have to proceed with caution there as 
well, because what I think you want to avoid is creating 
overlapping jurisdictions or even diverting limited WMD 
resources into a counternarcotics arena.
    I think we have to think that through a little bit more. 
But I yield to Dr. Gandhi perhaps on some of the medical issues 
associated with fentanyl.
    Senator Hawley. Yes, Dr. Gandhi, go ahead, and then I want 
to come back, Mr. Rasicot, to the weaponization of fentanyl. Go 
ahead, Doctor.
    Dr. Gandhi. Sure. No, I will add a couple of thoughts. 
Fentanyl is absolutely lethal, as we know. I have seen it in my 
clinical practice. We have a significant role to play at DHS on 
the significant knowledge gaps that exist with our frontline 
workforce who have to engage with it all the time. What we have 
done to that end is deploy our regional medical officers to do 
training and education with our CBP officers so that they are 
up to date on this topic, and of course to engage with local, 
State, and public health on it.
    In a couple of weeks I think we are doing a first responder 
safety to fentanyl as a request from the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). We have to do better there because 
the knowledge gaps are still significant, Senator.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Mr. Rasicot, just back to this 
possibility of terrorists or foreign nations weaponizing 
fentanyl. Can you give me your assessment of is that likely, 
what are the concerns around that? Could you speak to that 
issue?
    Mr. Rasicot. Yes, Senator. I would be happy to give you 
that assessment but I think it is probably more appropriately 
done in a different forum, and I would like to follow up with 
you on that.
    Senator Hawley. Sure. Great. I will take you up on that. 
More generally, national security, are there any other threats 
to natural security that fentanyl presents that we should be 
aware of and tracking? Anybody on the panel who wants to 
respond to that.
    Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of my 
time.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator Ossoff, 
you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF

    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our 
witnesses for your service.
    Mr. Rasicot, I would like to raise with you a matter that 
is of particular significance to my constituents in Georgia 
given that we host the Port of Savannah, the fourth-largest 
deepwater port in the country, a vital logistics hub for the 
Southeast United States and a host of major shipping terminals. 
A 2022 GAO report found significant issues in delays with the 
deployment of new radiation monitors that Customs and Border 
Protection operates at ports like Savannah. What impact might 
these delays and issues have on port operations? How can 
operators of ports like the Port of Savannah be confident that 
CWMD will take into account their specific needs and provide 
them with the tools needed to ensure cargo is scanned for 
radiological and other threats at the Port of Savannah?
    Mr. Rasicot. Thank you for the question, Senator, and we 
certainly appreciate GAO's looking at the Radiation Portal 
Monitors (RPM) program, and we are taking all of their 
recommendations to heart. Actually, I am raising the level of 
how we address those issues. I think we were sort of stuck in a 
little bit of middle management on that. But I met with the 
Deputy Commissioners at Customs and we continue to meet to make 
sure we are aligned in our expectations. As you know, we 
provide those systems for CBP and they work in the port.
    We are in the middle of sort of a modernization, a 
recapitalization of the radiation portal monitors. We are 
providing 200 of the new ones to high-volume ports, to try and 
reduce the nuisance alarms, which is what slows down the flow 
through the ports. Savannah is on that list to get those. I 
believe that they are waiting until the ocean terminal is 
finished before they actually do the deployment. We work 
closely with CBP on that, and we are very willing to facilitate 
any conversation between ourselves, CBP, and your port 
officials. I can get you a name and we will get it going.
    The other piece is even though we are not deploying the 
news units to Savannah, we have been working, through our 
transformational research and development (R&D) programs, on 
some machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI). It is a 
program called ERNIE, it is a way to reduce the nuisance 
alarms, and that technology is going forward in Savannah.
    I would be happy to either sit with your staff and give a 
full brief on that or really just meet with the port partners 
and make sure they are up to speed with what is going on.
    Senator Ossoff. I appreciate that. That was going to be my 
next question, for your commitment to communicate directly with 
port leadership and other relevant parties at the port to 
ensure that those lines of communication are open.
    Mr. Rasicot. Absolutely, Senator. We are very willing to do 
that.
    Senator Ossoff. Will you commit to working with my office 
to expedite, as possible and practical, the deployment of those 
technologies, whether it is the software platforms or the new 
hardware, as possible, to ensure the Port of Savannah is 
secure, that the people of Georgia are save, and national 
security is protected?
    Mr. Rasicot. Yes.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you. I appreciate that commitment.
    I would like to ask you as well about DHS collaboration 
with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention based in 
Atlanta. CDC has worked closely with your office in the past, 
including to test and in public spaces for dangerous pathogens, 
and CDC is part of the BioWatch program, analyzing air filters 
for biological threats.
    How can you deepen your partnerships with the CDC and what 
role does the CDC currently play in your ongoing programs and 
activities?
    Mr. Rasicot. Actually, sir, through the COVID pandemic I 
would say that we have become closer to CDC than we have ever 
been before. We have worked hand-in-glove with them on many of 
the travel and transportation issues that we had, be it airport 
screening and other things. I talk nearly daily to the 
leadership at CDC. I have worked with them for the airline 
issues, for the cruise ship issues. We also work with them on 
biodetection issues, and I spoke about earlier, we are taking a 
new strategic direction in biosurveillance. They are a big 
partner with that, along with the HHS and ASPR.
    The other piece of that is we do biosurveillance with our 
National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC). Your staffs 
get these reports. We put out reports on all that is going on 
in the world in the biothreat arena. CDC is creating a similar 
but complementary capability under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security (CARES) Act. We have got people down 
there, on the ground floor, helping them. We do not need two 
NBICs. We need another entity that does what NBIC does not do. 
We are working hand-in-glove with them to make sure that the 
government gets the most out of these two surveillance centers.
    I do not think our relationship with CDC can be stronger. 
We just signed a letter of agreement with them that will ease 
our support of their operations, be it at the airports or at 
other ports of entry (POE), based on the lessons learned 
through COVID. As I said, sir, I talk to their leadership 
nearly daily.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Rasicot. Final question for 
you, Mr. Rasicot, and also for you, Dr. Sherman, please. Over 
the long run what are the potential privacy or Fourth Amendment 
or health privacy implications of the deployment of these 
sensors at scale, perhaps in some future scenarios beyond just 
at ports of entry? Have you given any thought to that, to the 
privacy implications of the proliferation of biosensors across 
our economy?
    We can start with you, Dr. Sherman.
    Ms. Sherman. Yes. Thank you. The issue of privacy with 
respect to the biosensors is not something that we looked 
closely at as part of our review in April, so if you would be 
willing I would like to take that question back and provide a 
response to your office.
    Senator Ossoff. Certainly. Thank you, Dr. Sherman. Mr. 
Rasicot, based upon your experience and expertise I would 
invite you, even if it is not something that you have recently 
committed deep thought to, to give the Committee of how you 
approach that issue and how you consider it.
    Mr. Rasicot. Yes. The Department, at large--and you have 
heard Secretary Mayorkas say how important privacy is to all of 
us. Today is one of our primary concerns whenever we put out 
any sort of surveillance piece. We consult regularly with our 
Chief Privacy Officer on any these types of issues, sir. It is 
in the foreground of all of these discussions, and the 
Secretary is clear on how that works.
    Senator Ossoff. These technologies are obviously vital to 
national security and public health, but as with any system of 
sensors, as they become more advanced and more prevalent, we do 
need to consider the potential long-term implications for 
privacy and civil liberties.
    Dr. Sherman, let's have my office and yours have a 
conversation about that.
    Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff. Senator Romney, 
you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROMNEY

    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rasicot, how 
do you avoid the failure of imagination that obviously was part 
of the experience from 9/11? How do you have within your 
organization the kind of creative, out-of-the-box thinking to 
imagine what possible threats might come our way?
    Mr. Rasicot. I appreciate that question, Senator. It really 
goes to sort of the atmosphere you set up in the office, right? 
I think the CWMD is an unheralded gem within DHS. The best and 
brightest work there, and they are so dedicated to the country. 
They are very willing to think sort of out of the box and think 
about where it is going.
    One of the things I always ask them is, ``What should I 
have asked you that I did not even think to ask you? What are 
you actually thinking about. Besides the questions I am asking, 
what else are you thinking about?'' We try to probe and think 
about, OK, that is maybe how we always have done it but how is 
somebody else who is maybe not dedicated to the cause that we 
are thinking about doing it?
    I am sure you are familiar with one of our predecessor 
offices, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. They have a 
process, which we are pushing out. It was a nuclear-related 
process called the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 
(GNDA), where they sort of mapped out, from inspiration or 
aspiration to execution, what does a terrorist or a bad actor 
have to go through to execute? By policy, by screening, by 
whatever--do we have in place, and where are the gaps? That has 
atrophied a little bit, but we are re-energizing that thinking 
and we are pushing it out across chemical and biological threat 
streams. Because it all comes down to human behavior, right? 
Technology is one thing, but if you know how the human is going 
to behave going across the spectrum, from aspiration to 
execution, you can find a way to stop them.
    Senator Romney. I would think, as well, that there would be 
some benefit to probing and listening to people outside of 
government----
    Mr. Rasicot. Oh, absolutely.
    Senator Romney [continuing]. Having some of the, if you 
will, not just brilliant thinkers but individuals of all kinds 
suggesting the kinds of things that you might need to look for 
and consider. I hope our eyes and ears are attuned to what 
people outside government are thinking about as potential 
threats or vulnerabilities.
    Mr. Rasicot. Senator, that is why I am so pleased with the 
bill because it institutionalizes an advisory council. It 
mandates that we will consult with our peers in the government, 
outside the government, academia, industry, on a regular basis, 
to understand what they are seeing. We do that now but my 
concern is it is a little bit personality based. It needs to be 
institutionalized so it is done in a repeatable, reliable 
fashion.
    Senator Romney. Now I understand that sensor technology and 
capability to determine what kinds of attacks might occur, what 
types of attacks have occurred is a big part of what you do. To 
what extent are you also involved in thinking about how to 
respond to or mediate the conditions, the health conditions, 
for instance, if an event were to occur, whether it is nuclear, 
biological, chemical? Does your organization get involved in 
actually thinking about how to protect the public in the event 
of an event of that nature?
    Mr. Rasicot. Actually, Senator, if you do not mind I would 
like to defer that question to Dr. Gandhi, because that really 
is the focus of the Office of Health Security.
    Senator Romney. All right. Dr. Gandhi.
    Dr. Gandhi. Senator, thank you. We are very focused on 
ensuring that we are expanding the clinical experts in our 
office who can provide counsel to CWMD and work hand-in-hand 
with our partners across the Federal Government to deal with 
that response. Whether it is our partners at ASPR, at HHS, or 
our partners with the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), we have clinical experts now who have expertise in 
chemical response, biological response, rad/nuc response. The 
gentleman behind me is skilled in biodefense.
    Our role here is to provide that counsel not just to our 
Federal partners, if and when one of those attacks happened, 
but also to our State and local partners, and we participate in 
exercises across the country, preparedness exercises, again, 
with our partners and then with those across the Federal 
family.
    Senator Romney. Are there any lessons that you have learned 
from our response to COVID-19, for instance, that inform your 
own planning and have adjusted your own planning as a result of 
what we learned from that ongoing pandemic?
    Dr. Gandhi. Sure. Senator, perhaps the two most important 
lessons are, one, that the local ground game matters. I think 
you have heard often that there is, at times, little you can do 
with a screwdriver from Washington to what is happening at the 
local level. Last year I spent nearly three months on the road, 
and I realized in that process that if we do not equip our 
local and State partners with data, information, resources, and 
best practices we are doing a disservice.
    We are forward leaning now in ensuring that as we build our 
regional apparatus we have those experts in the field and we 
are delivering a product to our local and State partners, and 
that product may either be our expertise, it may be our ability 
to integrate data and to share that in real time with our 
partners, but there is a need for that, and that is what we are 
focused on building moving forward.
    I think the second answer to that is that this pandemic has 
showed us that we have to absolutely be agile. In medicine we 
often talk about doing Quality Improvement (QI) work. When we 
see a problem we want to improve we take a plan-do-study-act 
approach. We plan something; we execute. We study the results 
of that. If that does not work, we repeat.
    This pandemic has, for us, moving forward, for OHS, has 
entrained in us the importance of having that quality 
improvement, that plan-do-study-act mentality so that we never 
get stuck or too ingrained in our practices, because the 
pandemic is dynamic, threats to our homeland are dynamic, and 
our responses need to be dynamic moving forward. We are hoping 
to institutionalize that in the thought process of this office.
    Senator Romney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Romney. Senator Rosen, 
you are recognized for your questions.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN

    Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Peters, and I appreciate 
all of you being here today and for the work that you are 
doing. I am going to build a little bit upon what has already 
been discussed, and specifically on monitoring and detecting 
our biological threats, because Las Vegas is the entertainment 
capital of the world. We feature world-class hotels, fine 
dining, live entertainment, lots of special events, 
conventions, we are about to have a Super Bowl in a few years, 
and those things attract tens of thousands and sometimes 
hundreds of thousands of people to our own.
    It is our strength but it makes us a target for bad actors, 
including those who really like to use biological weapons, 
which, if unleashed, could have devastating impact on the large 
concentration of people closely clustered on these sites, just 
on and off the Las Vegas Strip.
    Assistant Secretary Rasicot, as you know biological attacks 
remain a significant threat as our nation-state adversaries and 
terrorist groups continue to bolster their biological weapons 
capabilities. Through the BioWatch program, CWMD, you do lead 
the effort to effectively prepare for, detect, and respond to 
those bioterrorism threats to the homeland. However, GAO has 
questioned CWMD's ability to implement BioWatch effectively to 
detect aerosol attacks.
    Specifically, in 2021, the Inspector General (IG) report 
says BioWatch only monitors and detects 16 of the 14 biological 
agents known to be threats, only six of the 14--excuse me, not 
16. What are you doing to expand the capabilities to monitor 
and detect all 14 agents known to be threats and help us 
protect against these aerosol attacks, and what is your 
estimated timeline to do that?
    Mr. Rasicot. Senator, thank you for the question. As you 
know, BioWatch provides over 30 U.S. jurisdictions with the 
capability to detect a biological attack in time to save 
people's lives. The technology is reliable. It is proven.
    Senator Rosen. Do you work with the State and local 
partners on this training?
    Mr. Rasicot. We do.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you.
    Mr. Rasicot. We provide training. We provide exercises 
through our jurisdictional coordinators who are out there in 
each of the 30 jurisdictions.
    Specifically, let me take a step back. In January, we 
initiated a strategic review of DHS's entire biosurveillance 
program, and part of that review was a very hard look at 
BioWatch, where we are and where we need to go.
    There are three things where we are going in BioWatch. One, 
we are enhancing State and local coordination. I think COVID 
had a little bit to do with it but it is more than that, so we 
are out there. In the fall, I issued the first-ever CWMD State 
and Local Engagement Strategy in support of those objectives. 
We met with all the BioWatch coordinators from across the 
country in April, explained to them what the program direction 
was for the rest of the year, solicited their input as to what 
they needed in a post-COVID environment to continue monitoring.
    Specific to your agent question, we are partnering with 
HHS, FBI, and other Federal partners as well as the National 
Labs to validate the current agent list and see where we need 
to go with regard to emerging threats. Now there are a couple 
of schools of thought on emerging threats so that is why we are 
bringing in people from outside of our own organization, to 
make sure we get the full picture.
    Last, based on the stakeholder input I have received, we 
are exploring some options as to whether we can provide State 
and locals more funding for the training and exercises. We hear 
a lot of that. I think there are some opportunities there, but 
we are working through that right now.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you, and I want to move on to you, Dr. 
Gandhi, because last week I know that you announced the 
creation of the Office of Health Security. As the COVID-19 
pandemic has demonstrated, as Mr. Rasicot has just alluded to, 
we have to have a whole-of-government approach with our State 
and locals and everyone involved to tackle these health 
emergencies when it comes to chemical and biological threats 
specifically. I know you will partner closely with them.
    Can you talk a little bit about DHS, the collaboration, DHS 
and CDC, other health agencies, how they are collaborating 
together, our Federal medical response infrastructure, 
including the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). What role 
does DHS play in determining the quantities and types of 
medicines, vaccines, medical supplies that we might need to 
protect us from an attack? I am going to ask you to kind of tag 
onto that, if you will, what lessons we have learned from the 
COVID-19 pandemic that is informing your decisions about the 
Strategic National Stockpile as it relates to chemical and 
biological weapons.
    Dr. Gandhi. Senator, thank you. DHS has a clear role to 
play here. We participate on the Public Health Emergency 
Medical Countermeasures (PHEMCE) group, which is a 
collaboration led by ASPR. We sit on the advisory board of that 
group. What that group does, over time, is provide advice and 
counsel as it relates to how we deploy our Strategic National 
Stockpile. The process for this is quite clear where if there 
are questions that arise or issues that require further 
investigation or study they reach back out to DHS, DHS does a 
material threat determination, and we decide to move forward. 
We are very tied with our colleagues at ASPR.
    In the broader question, in the last 18 months we have 
operated as a nerve center for everything public health and 
medical that this Department has faced. All of these major 
issues--COVID, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Southwest Border--have 
clear public health linkages. In that process what we have done 
is we have learned how to engage at a high level with our 
colleagues at CDC, with our colleagues as ASPR, the Public 
Health Service. Our responses are actually all-of-government 
responses, and then we lead those when they have DHS equities.
    As it relates to engagement with State and locals, as 
engaged as we are at the Federal level, we have partnerships at 
the State level. We lead an every-other-week call with 
Southwest Border public health and medical officials across the 
entirety of the Southwest Border. Just a couple of weeks ago we 
presented on highly pathogenic avian flu to all 50 State health 
leads. We are all in on that.
    As it relates to COVID and the lessons learned, the most 
important lessons here are twofold. One, that we are focused on 
our ability to be agile. These threats change daily. Our team 
works 24 hours, seven days a week. The pandemic has shown that 
we have to be agile, and so we are building into our office and 
institutionalizing a quality improvement mantra of plan-do-
study-act. When we see something we plan what we are going to 
do about it, we will execute on that, we will study the results 
of that, and then we will move forward.
    We are focused on that as one lesson, and the other lessons 
is, as you have so rightly pointed out, our ability to be 
successful in the face of chem, biorad, nuke attacks or 
threats, in the face of changing pandemics is only as good as 
the capability and capacity and preparedness of our State and 
local partners. If we fail them in not providing appropriate 
data, in resources, in lessons learned, and expertise, we are 
doing a disservice.
    We are very focused on ensuring that we have a strong and 
true partnership with our State and local partners across the 
country.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that thoughtful 
answer. I understand how dynamic it is. I hope in the resources 
you do include what we think we will need in the Strategic 
National Stockpile so we can be sure it is there. Thank you.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Scott, 
you are recognized for your questions.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT

    Senator Scott. First I want to thank Chair Peters for 
holding the hearing on this important topic.
    Each of you have a very important job to deal with. Do you 
guys go to the office every day, and how many people work for 
you, and what percentage go to work every day in the office, or 
are people still working at home?
    Mr. Rasicot. I go to the office most every day, sir. We 
have a lot of classified work so we have to go in for that. 
Right now we have 229 people on board out of 265 authorized 
positions, about an 86 percent fill rate. We are very focused 
on hiring, but it is a tough market out there. We have hired 18 
people this year. But what gives me heart in that regard is 
that our last two major solicitations for applicants, we put 
out a solicitation for our Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and we 
had 50 applicants, and in solicitation for our Deputy Chief of 
Staff we got over 150 applications.
    We have a blend of telework and in-place work. What I did 
about a year and a half ago was ask the staff to really 
classify the billets or the positions, if you will, as to 
whether they needed to be onsite, you work in the Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), you have to be 
here--whether there was an opportunity for telework, or whether 
it could be remote work. Some of our work is just that, some of 
our acquisitions work.
    We have a blend of that going on, and we recently just 
moved. We were over at Vermont Avenue and we moved the entire 
staff--it is about 400 when you add in the contractors--over to 
St. Elizabeths. so that was a big event for us over the 
springtime. But I think people are adjusting to the new 
environment.
    The third, in COVID it offered a little more challenge to 
making sure you get everybody in, because, we were going to 
have an awards ceremony and it turned out the entire team put 
new awards together, came up positive COVID so we had to 
postpone it. That was going to be a big, in-person event.
    I think like the rest of the government we are moving 
forward as best we can, or I would say the rest of the business 
world as well. There are fits and starts but I think we are 
getting back to normal.
    Senator Scott. What percentage are coming in on a daily 
basis?
    Mr. Rasicot. I would say about 30 percent probably.
    Dr. Gandhi. Senator, we have a bit of a distributed 
workforce. We have our workforce that are based in California 
and Texas and the Midwest, as a response to the theme that I 
have talked about, which is we have to be local. Right now we 
have about 80 staff or so, 30 or so vacancies. Those vacancies 
are reflective, though, of growth over the past year as it 
relates to our expanding mission set. That is our current 
status.
    Senator Scott. How many go in the office?
    Dr. Gandhi. For our regional staff we do not have offices 
yet, but we are working on that. As we expand our regional 
presence we are going to work with our partners at DHS to find 
where we want to put folks. Right now our regional staff are 
mostly at their home, home office. Then for our staff here I do 
not have the numbers right now but I can certainly get that 
information for you.
    Senator Scott. So do you go in?
    Dr. Gandhi. I do not go in because I am actually based out 
of Texas. I spent nearly two or three months on the border last 
year. I am based out of Texas, travel a lot, and visit 
Southwest Border, Northwest, CDC, and everywhere else.
    Senator Scott. So you do not know what percentage of your 
office----
    Dr. Gandhi. No. I could hazard a guess but I would be 
reticent to do so. But I will certainly discuss with our team 
and we can get that information for you right after the 
hearing.
    Ms. Sherman. We are an agency of approximately 3,000 
individuals, and the return to work has been slow to date. We 
have individuals who come in on a regular basis, similar to Mr. 
Rasicot, to work on classified issues or other efforts that 
require them to be present and to be in the office.
    One thing, though, we have steadily increased in, I would 
say, the past six months or more, is growth in travel, to be 
able to go to locations and carry out our work, to be able to 
talk to, for example, State and local officials about a range 
of issues, including the ones that we are discussing today, to 
get a better understanding of the work that they are carrying 
out.
    I do not have a specific number that I can give you. It is 
something that I can come back to you with, in terms of how 
many individuals on a regular basis are coming in.
    Senator Scott. Do you go into the office every day?
    Ms. Sherman. Not every day, I do not. Only as needed. I 
will say that the workforce is positioned to as something comes 
up, individuals do go in. There be able to come in and work out 
of the office space. I think that process is very well laid 
out, and so as issues arise or as needs arise I and those that 
I work with, my colleagues and team members, come in as needed.
    Senator Scott. You do not know the number that comes in.
    Ms. Sherman. No. That is something that I would need to get 
back to your office on.
    Senator Scott. OK. Do you all measure productivity if you 
do not see people? How do each of you measure productivity? How 
do you know that you are getting something accomplished?
    Dr. Gandhi. I am happy to hop in, sir. We are absolutely a 
mission-focused office, and so as we look at the last 18 months 
and engage on where we have been--Ukraine, Afghanistan, 
Southwest Border, what we are doing with medical 
countermeasures--all of our programs require a profound 
dedication to the work and real deliverables. If those 
deliverables are not met and we are not meeting our metrics, 
our key performance metrics, we know. We follow those very 
closely.
    We have laid out a clear approach to what people are 
working on, when that work is due, what their reporting 
mechanism looks like, and how we hold people accountable on a 
regular basis. We do not have an option of failure given the 
kind of nerve center approach that we have to take. We are very 
aware and engaged all day, every day, every week.
    Mr. Rasicot. In some ways I believe, Senator, that we are 
more productive now than we were prior to COVID. I see that in 
the work product. I see that in the things we get done. In the 
height of the pandemic I am watching conference calls go on at 
eight and nine o'clock at night. I am like, ``Guys, let's take 
a break here.'' I know it is important work because we do 
important work, but we really need to just work the core hours 
that we worked when we were in the office, because I cannot 
have you burning out. I think this thing is going to last, and 
it has lasted a little longer than anybody thought, right?
    But I have seen higher productivity within our office, 
based on products, our instructions, written products, the 
things that we do, the things that we provide the field. I 
think the productivity is higher because, one, I do not think 
there is a lot of time wasted commuting. People are working 
their hours.
    You missed my comments earlier, but the CWMD workforce, I 
consider it to be one of the unsung gems within the government. 
It is the best and brightest, and these people are dedicated to 
doing their work. It is not about where they sit. It is about 
what they do.
    Ms. Sherman. I will try to go quick here. I see my team 
members on a regular basis, if not daily certainly several 
times a week. But I will say that in terms of productivity we 
have individual performance measures that we revisit on a 
regular basis within the agency and then we also have agency-
wide performance measures that we publicly report on every 
year. While I think that 2020 year was very challenging, the 
productivity levels of the reports that we issue, the briefing 
assistance that we provide, and other support to committees, 
including this one, and also testifying at hearings, we report 
out on those numbers every year and they have remained 
relatively consistent.
    I would say the productivity levels are something that we 
are constantly focused on and are measuring to ensure that we 
are providing the service to Congress that it needs.
    Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair Peters.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Scott.
    I would like to take this opportunity to thank our 
witnesses for joining us here today and for your testimony. 
Congress must do its part to ensuring that we are better 
prepared for weapons of mass destruction and health security 
threats, including by passing legislation that Ranking Member 
Portman and I introduced that authorizes the CWMD Office and 
the Office of Health Security. As mentioned earlier, we plan to 
mark up this important legislation in the next few weeks.
    To all the witnesses, we look forward to our continued work 
together to improve Federal Government's ability to prevent, to 
detect, and respond to these types of threats.
    The record for this hearing will remain open for 15 days, 
until 5 p.m. on August 3, 2022, for the submission of 
statements and questions for the record.
    This hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

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