[Senate Hearing 117-652]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-652

                    PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM UNMANNED 
                              AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

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                                 HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
               HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS


                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             JULY 14, 2022

                               __________

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                       Printed for the use of the
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
        
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                                __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
51-532 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
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        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California             MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                   David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                    Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
         Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
            Benjamin J. Schubert, Professional Staff Member
                Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
            Sam J. Mulopulos, Minority Deputy Staff Director
         Clyde E. Hicks, Minority Director of Homeland Security
          Roland Hernandez, Minority Professional Staff Member
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                     Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk

                            C O N T E N T S

                                 ------                                
Opening statements:
                                                                   Page
    Senator Peters...............................................     1
    Senator Portman..............................................     3
    Senator Johnson..............................................    15
    Senator Hawley...............................................    18
    Senator Carper...............................................    21
    Senator Lankford.............................................    24
    Senator Scott................................................    27
    Senator Rosen................................................    29
    Senator Padilla..............................................    32
    Senator Sinema...............................................    34
Prepared statements:
    Senator Peters...............................................    39
    Senator Portman..............................................    41

                               WITNESSES
                        Thursday, July 14, 2022

Samantha Vinograd, Acting Assistant Secretary for 
  Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention and Law Enforcement 
  Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. Department 
  of Homeland Security...........................................     4
Brad Wiegmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, National 
  Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice..................     6
Tonya D. Coultas, Deputy Associate Administrator for Security and 
  Hazardous Materials Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 
  U.S. Department of Transportation..............................     9

                     Alphabetical List of Witnesses

Coultas, Tonya D.:
    Testimony....................................................     9
    Prepared statement...........................................    58
Vinograd, Samantha:
    Testimony....................................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................    43
Wiegmann, Brad:
    Testimony....................................................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................    51

                                APPENDIX

Senator Rosen's letter from Sports Organizations.................    69
Response to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record
    Ms. Vinograd.................................................    72
    Mr. Wiegmann.................................................    87
    Ms. Coultas..................................................    89

 
         PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2022

                                     U.S. Senate,  
                           Committee on Homeland Security  
                                  and Governmental Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in 
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gary Peters, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Peters, Carper, Hassan, Sinema, Rosen, 
Padilla, Ossoff, Portman, Johnson, Lankford, Romney, Scott, and 
Hawley.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\

    Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appears in the 
Appendix on page 39.
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    I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us and for 
their continued service to the American people.
    Today's hearing will highlight the threat posed by unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS), commonly known as drones, and discuss 
how Federal agencies are working together to combat this 
evolving threat. We will also examine what additional 
authorities and resources the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) need to successfully 
counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS), while working together 
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
    In recent years, the market for commercial UAS has rapidly 
expanded due to the affordability and utility of drones that 
are readily accessible to government, to industry, and to 
recreational users.
    The FAA estimates that by 2024, about 2.3 million UAS, 
including 1.5 million recreational drones and model aircraft, 
and about 800,000 commercial UAS, will be registered to fly in 
U.S. airspace. Between 2016 and 2019, airline pilots reported, 
on average, more than 100 drone sightings per month to the FAA.
    The increase in the number of UAS operating in our air 
space creates a higher risk of rogue drones either failing to 
obey safety rules or operating with nefarious intentions, 
threatening manned aircraft operations, airports, critical 
infrastructure facilities, and high-profile, widely attended 
events such as sporting events, concerts, and more.
    While most individuals operate their drones responsibly, we 
have already seen careless and malicious actors misuse these 
technologies to engage in reckless or criminal activities.
    In September 2017, a privately operated drone in Brooklyn, 
New York, was intentionally flown beyond the operator's line of 
sight and collided with a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter 
patrolling a temporary no-fly zone around New York City. 
Thankfully, the Black Hawk and its crew landed safely, but 
there was significant damage to the helicopter, and the 
incident created an unacceptable risk to the servicemembers in 
that helicopter.
    In 2019, a drone significantly disrupted flight operations 
at Newark Liberty Airport for 90 minutes, causing nine flights 
to be diverted, halting 43 planes inbound to the airport, and 
also causing significant delays for passengers.
    These events demonstrate the severity of the threat posed 
by UAS, and if we do not act, it could only be a matter of time 
before someone who is recklessly operating this technology 
causes an accident that can have catastrophic effects.
    As we work to avoid unintentional disasters, we must also 
account for the escalating threat of weaponized drones from 
terrorist and criminal organizations who could launch domestic 
drone attacks on mass gatherings, high-profile landmarks and 
buildings, or Federal property. This includes foreign 
adversaries, who have deployed drones in conflicts abroad, and 
could have the capability to deploy them here in the United 
States as well.
    We must also be prepared to counter drones operated by 
criminal organizations that are reportedly using UAS for 
illegal activities including trafficking illicit drugs across 
our borders.
    I am grateful to my colleagues who have led past efforts to 
address these concerns and to improve the safe integration of 
UAS into American airspace, including Senator Johnson for 
authoring the Preventing Emerging Threats Act. Since 2018, the 
authorities created by this law have bolstered our nation's 
ability to protect numerous large public events, including the 
Super Bowl, from UAS threats.
    Today's hearing is an opportunity to discuss renewing and 
updating these authorities, which are set to expire this 
October, as well as the Biden administration's Domestic 
Counter-UAS National Action Plan, the first coordinated, whole-
of-government plan to address the evolving security threats 
posed by UAS. I am working on bipartisan legislation that I 
plan to introduce in the coming weeks to reauthorize and 
strengthen counter-UAS authorities to better tackle this 
threat.
    Today I am pleased that we have a panel of expert witnesses 
from DHS, DOJ, and the FAA who can discuss what lawmakers can 
do to ensure the Federal Government is better equipped to 
safeguard against potential threats from UAS.
    I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Portman for 
his opening comments.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\

    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the 
witnesses for being here. I look forward to hearing from you. 
We are here today to discuss the emerging threats posed by 
unmanned aircraft systems, or drones. In 2018, under the 
leadership of Senator Ron Johnson, who is here this morning, we 
provided, as Congress, some new authorities to the Department 
of Homeland Security and Department of Justice to counter the 
threats posed by the use of drones.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the 
Appendix on page 41.
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    Unfortunately, those authorities are about to expire, and 
this expiration could not come at a worse time, in my view. 
Cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) use 
drones to smuggle drugs and surveil U.S. law enforcement in 
furtherance of illicit cross-border activity. These cartels 
have also begun to weaponize drones in order to commit attacks. 
So far these attacks, as far as we know, have been in Mexico, 
but I think weaponized drones along the border are now an 
emerging threat.
    To give you a sense of the scale of the problem, in joint 
testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security in 
March, representatives from DHS said that in a previous five-
month period U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
identified more than 30,000 individual flights near or at the 
Southern Border, where half of those flights violated FAA 
regulations.
    Again, we know that at a minimum these drones are used for 
surveilling our U.S. law enforcement efforts and for smuggling 
drugs into the country, including fentanyl, the deadly 
synthetic opioid. Relatively small amounts of it can kill 
hundreds of thousands, millions of people. I is subject to 
being smuggled in relatively small drones.
    My office has repeatedly asked DHS, since February of this 
year, for more information and statistics on these drone border 
incursions and how they plan to address this emerging threat. 
Moreover, the Biden administration's Domestic Counter-Drone 
National Action Plan provides no explicit additional 
authorities for DHS to counter unmanned aircraft systems as it 
pertains to the border.
    Make no mistake. The Mexican transnational criminal 
organizations will benefit from the lack of additional counter-
drone authority for CBP and other agencies with responsibility 
for securing our nation's borders. For these reasons, I am 
eager to hear how DHS, DOJ, and the FAA have used their 
existing authority to mitigate the threats posed by illicit use 
of drones. I also hope to discuss what new authorities this 
Committee can give the Administration to improve the counter-
drone mission, especially at the border.
    Recently, the Biden administration provided this Committee 
with a comprehensive legislative proposal which seeks a number 
of changes and expansions to existing counter-drone 
authorities. I look forward to working with Senator Peters, 
Senator Johnson, and other Members of this Committee to review 
this proposal.
    The Committee has already done good work to address the 
threat to national security and economic competitiveness 
imposed by Chinese-made drones, when we reported out the 
bipartisan American Security Drone Act last year. Among other 
things, this legislation would prohibit the Federal Government 
from purchasing and using drones manufactured by our 
adversaries.
    I am very concerned about reports of the purchase by DHS 
and DOJ law enforcement of Chinese drones and the national 
security risk that this poses. I am pleased that our 
legislation that we reported out of Committee but has not yet 
gone to the floor is included in the Senate-passed the U.S. 
Innovation and Competition Act of 2021 (USICA) package, and I 
urge our leadership, particularly Speaker Pelosi and the House, 
to swiftly pass USICA so this can become law.
    With that said, I look forward to a productive conversation 
about the current drone threats to our homeland and actions 
being taken to prevent them. I look forward to hearing from the 
witnesses.
    Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
    It is the practice of the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses. 
So if each of you would please stand and raise your right hand.
    Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this 
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you, God?
    Ms. Vinograd. I do.
    Mr. Wiegmann. I do.
    Ms. Coultas. I do.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. You may be seated.
    Today's first witness is Samantha Vinograd, the Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention 
and Law Enforcement Policy in the office of Strategy, Policy, 
and Plans at the Department of Homeland Security. Ms. Vinograd 
began her career serving President George W. Bush as the Deputy 
U.S. Treasury Attache to Iraq, and subsequently served on 
President Barack Obama's National Security Council (NSC) as 
Director for Iraq, Director for International Economics, and 
Senior Advisor to the National Security Advisor.
    Previously she was a Cable News Network (CNN) national 
security analyst, a senior advisor at the Biden Institute, and 
a visiting fellow at the University of Chicago Institute of 
Politics.
    Ms. Vinograd, welcome. You may proceed with your opening 
remarks.

 TESTIMONY OF SAMANTHA VINOGRAD,\1\ ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND THREAT PREVENTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY, OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                      OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Ms. Vinograd. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and 
distinguished Members, thank you for inviting me to testify 
about the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to protect 
the homeland from the increasing threat posed by unmanned 
aircraft systems or drones.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Vinograd appears in the Appendix 
on page 43.
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    Today I will explain how the Department has relied on 
authorities granted in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 
2018 to counter the malicious use of drones and why we are 
asking Congress to reauthorize and expand our counter-drone 
authorities to fill specific gaps that are exposing the 
homeland to serious threats. We are committed to judiciously 
and responsibly implementing our authority so that we can stay 
ahead of the threat while protecting privacy and civil rights 
and civil liberties in absolutely everything that we do.
    The threat landscape from drones is heightened, and 
candidly, escalating extremely fast. Drones have been used to 
conduct dangerous kinetic attacks, have interfered with 
aircraft and airports, have been used to survey, disrupt, and 
damage critical infrastructure and services, and more. Nearly 
every day, transnational criminal organizations use drones to 
convey narcotics and contraband across U.S. borders. In fact, 
CBP has detected more than 8,000 illegal cross-border drone 
flights at the Southern Border just since August 2021.
    In light of this threat environment, it is critical that 
DHS has the authorities to protect the homeland from UAS 
threats, consistent with our statutory missions. To date, DHS 
has relied on the Preventing Emerging Threat Act to carry out 
critical C-UAS mission sets, including protecting the President 
and Vice President, safeguarding sensitive assets, facilities, 
and special events in the maritime sector, protecting Federal 
facilities and personnel, and countering illicit narcotic and 
contraband trafficking.
    Based on our experience through over 300 deployments there 
is clear evidence that there are gaps in our authorities which 
are exposing the American people to significant risk. For 
example, even though the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), is responsible for protecting airports it lacks 
authority to proactively and persistently protect 
transportation infrastructure from drone threats and avert 
disruptions and real tragedies. This is especially concerning 
since TSA has reported nearly 2,000 drone sightings near U.S. 
airports since 2021, several of which have resulted in pilots 
taking evasive action, 65 evasive actions in fact, and the 
disruption of airport operations.
    Furthermore, State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) 
law enforcement are often the first responders when a malicious 
drone incident occurs, but they are not currently authorized to 
detect or mitigate drone threats, thereby delaying a response. 
Critical infrastructure owners and operators are often the 
victims of drone surveillance and have even been targeted for 
kinetic attacks, but they have no authority to detect drones or 
to request mitigation from authorized law enforcement.
    Bottom line, air partners are absolutely critical to 
protecting the homeland from UAS threats but lack the 
authorities to do so, which again exposes the homeland and the 
American people to significant risk. DHS, therefore, strongly 
supports the Administration's legislative proposal to 
reauthorize DHS's and DOJ's current C-UAS authorities as well 
as to expand them to remedy the gaps that I have identified. It 
would grant TSA the authorities it needs to protect the 
nation's transportation system from UAS threats. It would also 
authorize SLTT partners and critical infrastructure owners and 
operators to engage in detection of C-UAS.
    Last, it would create a limited pilot program for SLTT law 
enforcement to engage in C-UAS protection activities in their 
jurisdictions under the strict oversight of DHS and DOJ. The 
proposal would require that authorized SLTT and critical 
infrastructure owners and operators adhere to comparable 
safeguards and standards to those that we Federal entities 
follow. Non-Federal entities would be required to use federally 
approved equipment, receive standardized training and 
certification, conduct risk-based assessments, coordinate with 
FAA to ensure aviation safety, and very importantly, adhere to 
Federal privacy and civil rights and civil liberties 
protections.
    We cannot keep pace with this threat environment without 
these additional counter-drone authorities--it just is not 
possible--and we hope that this Committee will champion them. 
Congressional action is urgently required as our current 
authority will expire in less than three months, and a lapse 
would be catastrophic.
    I thank the Committee for holding a hearing on this 
important topic and look forward to your questions.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ms. Vinograd.
    Our next witness is Brad Wiegmann, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General (AG) in the National Security Division at the 
Department of Justice. Mr. Wiegmann brings a wealth of 
government experience, having served in legal positions at the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Security Council 
over the span of two decades.
    Previously, Mr. Wiegmann worked at the private law firm of 
Shea and Gardner, where he focused on civil litigation and 
legal policy matters. He has also served as a law clerk for 
Judge Patrick Higginbotham on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
    Mr. Wiegmann, welcome to the Committee. You may proceed 
with your opening comments.

   TESTIMONY OF BRAD WIEGMANN,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

    Mr. Wiegmann. Thank you, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member 
Portman, and Members of the Committee. Thanks for the 
opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Department of 
Justice.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Wiegmann appears in the Appendix 
on page 51.
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    We strongly support the Administration's legislative 
proposal to allow us to continue to protect major national 
events and important Department facilities from the threat 
posed by misuse of drones. This legislation would also enable 
us, as Assistant Secretary Vinograd just said, to expand our 
counter-drone efforts both with respect to the types of 
facilities that we can protect and to empower our State and 
local partners to participate in this critical mission.
    We understand at DOJ that drones are bringing great 
benefits to our society and our economy, but like many advances 
in technology, drones also bring serious risk to the public 
when they are misused. As has been alluded to already in the 
opening statements, we are seeing an increase in the use of 
drones for a wide spectrum of criminal and other dangerous 
activities. They can be weaponized to conduct attacks using 
firearms, explosives, or other materials, they can conduct 
cyberattacks against wireless devices or networks, and they can 
conduct espionage or trafficking narcotics and contraband.
    Beyond these nefarious uses, drones are often used 
carelessly to create hazards to the public. Let me just give 
you a few recent examples.
    In February 2020, a subject was arrested and charged in 
connection with his efforts to use a drone to drop explosives 
near a Georgia mobile home park. Between September 2021 and 
February 2022, four defendants pled guilty to a conspiracy to 
deliver contraband via drones into Fort Dix Prison in New 
Jersey. We have recently seen Mexican drug cartels using drones 
to drop bombs on their rivals in Mexico as well as to traffic 
drugs into the United States.
    In May of this year, a defendant was sentenced after using 
a drone to drop flyers over spectators at two separate National 
Football League (NFL) games in California, and it obviously 
could have been something much worse than flyers.
    Under the current authority that Congress has granted, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has conducted 70 counter-
drone protection operations at large events, ranging from the 
Super Bowl to New Year's Eve celebration in Times Square. That 
represents only 0.05 percent of the over 121,000 events during 
that time for which an assessment was requested so that 
counter-drone support could be provided. The demand for 
counter-drone support has far outstripped the Federal 
Government's limited resources.
    During those 70 operations by FBI, our counter-drone teams 
detected 974 noncompliant drones in restricted airspace. They 
located the operator in 279 cases, and they attempted 
mitigation against 50 drones.
    Our current authority, as Chairman Peters mentioned, to 
counter drones expires in October, if it is not extended by 
Congress. The reason we need this authority is because our use 
of this technology would otherwise run afoul of various 
criminal statutes. Our legislative proposal would extend our 
current authority permanently and would expand it to address 
some critical gaps. I want to talk about a few of those briefly 
in my opening statement.
    First, as has been mentioned, the legislation would 
authorize State and local law enforcement and owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure to use certain detection-
only capabilities. We need to empower others to help us take on 
this responsibility. Notably, the detection-only technology 
does not jam or otherwise disrupt drones or other aircraft, and 
therefore it does not pose any risk to the safety of the 
national airspace system (NAS). This can be safely done today.
    Second, the legislation would authorize a limited pilot 
program for up to 12 State and local law enforcement entities 
each year to engage in both detection and mitigation 
activities. By mitigation I mean actually interfering with the 
flight of the drone. This would allow our State and local 
partners to protect sensitive State facilities and mass 
gatherings in their jurisdictions. The participants in the 
program would be required to receive training and vetting and 
to follow the same rules as Federal agencies must currently 
follow, and all of their activities would have to be 
coordinated in advance with Federal partners, including the 
FAA, which could withhold approval if there was a risk to the 
national airspace.
    Third, the legislation would enable the Marshals Service to 
protect high-risk prisoner transports. Current authority covers 
our prisons and our courthouses but it does not expressly 
address high-risk prisoner transport, so it would fill that 
gap.
    Finally, I want to say a word about privacy and civil 
liberties. We are committed to ensuring that we respect all 
constitutional rights and privacy as we conduct our counter-
drone activities. The technologies we employ typically detect 
only communications being passed between the controller and the 
drone to direct its activities. They do not extract text 
messages, email, or internet search histories from phones or 
tablets used to control drones, nor do they allow us to listen 
to voice calls.
    We typically collect information such as the drone vendor 
and model, the controlling device serial number, the 
geolocation of the drone, the location of the controller, and 
the most recent takeoff location. This is much like the 
information that is going to be required to be broadcast by the 
new remote identification (ID) rule and is currently required 
for manned aircraft.
    As is required in current law, DOJ would continue to have 
guidance that contains express protections for privacy and 
civil liberties and State and locals would be required to 
follow these same rules.
    I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look 
forward to answering your questions.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Wiegmann.
    Today's final witness is Tonya Coultas, Deputy Associate 
Administrator for Security and Hazardous Materials Safety at 
the Federal Aviation Administration at the Department of 
Transportation (DOT). In her role, she provides executive 
oversight of national security policies, plans, and programs 
involving manned and unmanned systems in addition to several 
other security-related topics.
    Ms. Coultas has over 30 years of combined local, State, 
Federal, executive, and military experience, supporting 
defense, intelligence, safety, disaster response, and crisis 
management efforts. Previously Ms. Coultas served as a senior 
executive for the DHS National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD), now Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA), at the Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (OIP), and for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA).
    Ms. Coultas, welcome to the Committee. You may proceed with 
your opening remarks.

      TESTIMONY OF TONYA D. COULTAS,\1\ DEPUTY ASSOCIATE 
  ADMINISTRATOR FOR SECURITY AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY, 
      FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                         TRANSPORTATION

    Ms. Coultas. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, and 
Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak 
with you today about the FAA's role in assuring safety, 
security, and efficiency of the nation's airspace as it 
pertains to unmanned aircraft system or drones. At the FAA, we 
are constantly working to welcome these beneficial new 
technologies into the national air system while minimizing any 
impacts to our existing air transportation system and to the 
public.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Coultas appears in the Appendix 
on page 58.
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    Every day, commercially operated UAS contribute to our 
economy by inspecting infrastructure, supporting agriculture 
and other industries, assisting public safety agencies, and 
conducting a myriad of other tasks. Congress has recognized 
these tremendous benefits to our economy and society and has 
been fully supportive as we integrate this technology into our 
airspace in a safe and secure manner.
    However, the FAA does acknowledge that potential misuse of 
this technology poses unique security challenges that enable 
malicious actors to exploit vulnerabilities or circumvent 
traditional ground-based security measures for our security 
partners.
    For that reason, Congress authorized the Departments of 
Defense, Energy (DOE), Justice, and Homeland Security to use 
technologies designed to response to UAS that pose a threat 
within their mission responsibilities. You directed the FAA to 
work with these agencies to ensure that detection and 
mitigation measures do not compromise the safety and efficiency 
of the airspace.
    The FAA's chief role is to support our partners' testing 
and eventual use of these detection and mitigation systems, 
many of which use radio frequency (RF) and other technologies 
that could potentially interfere with air navigational systems, 
communication, avionics systems which are all critical to 
safety of flight.
    Along with developing our plans for certification of USA 
detection and mitigation systems, the FAA is also tasked with 
testing and evaluating these technologies for potential use 
near airports. We and our security partners have developed 
agency-specific and jointly agreed upon processes to determine 
when, how, and what detection or mitigation technologies can be 
safely used in a particular location. We also develop 
notification protocols to be used during an active detection or 
counter-UAS event.
    The Administration's proposal to expand UAS detection and 
mitigation authorities so that other Federal departments and 
agencies, as well as other public and private critical 
infrastructure entities, will be able to use tested system to 
safely protect sensitive facilities, operations, and people 
from the malicious or errant use of UAS.
    The proposal, which the FAA does support, would, among 
other things, give limited UAS detection-only authority to the 
non-Federal law enforcement community as well as airports and 
critical infrastructure owners and operators. It would also 
create a temporary pilot program for non-Federal law 
enforcement to begin using UAS mitigation technologies under 
Federal oversight.
    In addition, the FAA would be authorized to assess civil 
penalties against those who use detection or mitigation 
technologies in an unauthorized manner that endangers the 
national airspace, all areas of new or expanded authorities 
include robust safeguards to ensure the current level of safety 
in the NAS is preserved.
    We recognize that expanding UAS mitigation authorities 
beyond our current Federal partners will present challenges, 
and for that reason the proposal for the pilot program reflects 
an incremental approach to evaluating such authorities and 
safeguards that include interagency coordination on participant 
selection, training of system operators, and requires program 
participants to work through DHS and DOJ in coordination with 
the FAA.
    There is no question that a seamless security framework is 
critical to advancing the Administration's goal of fully 
integrating UAS into the NAS, maximizing the public benefits 
from this technology. By taking deliberate steps to support 
those entities, with duties to protect against emerging UAS 
base threats, the United States will continue to lead the way 
in the full integration of UAS while maintaining the safest, 
most efficient, and most secure airspace system in the world.
    We thank the Committee for its leadership on this issue and 
look forward to working together to balance safety and 
innovation with security.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ms. Coultas.
    This Committee is constantly focused on all of the threats 
that the homeland faces on a daily basis. Clearly the three of 
you have outlined significant threats posed by UAS. My question 
for you, Mr. Wiegmann, is how would the FBI assess the 
potential threat from UAS along the threat spectrum? Is this 
low, is this medium, or is this high, and why?
    Mr. Wiegmann. I think what I would say, as the FBI director 
has testified before, this is a very significant threat. Given 
the easy ability to buy a drone, commercially, it is easy to 
get, they are very easy to use, and not that difficult to 
weaponize, as we have talked about. That is what we are seeing 
some of already.
    The FBI Director predicted a few years ago that we would 
see a drone attack on a mass gathering. Happily, we have not 
seen one yet but I think it is a matter of time until we do see 
that type of misuse of drones for an attack in the United 
States.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. Ms. Vinograd, in your testimony 
you discussed the potential use of UAS as both weapons as well 
as interference tools that could target airports as well as 
other types of critical infrastructure here in the country. I 
would like to explain for the Committee more specifically what 
authorities does DHS currently lack to counter this threat, and 
what should this Committee focus on as we draft legislation to 
reauthorize the current legislation?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator Peters, thank you. As my colleague 
just noted, the threat posed by the malicious use of drones 
represents a significant and increasing risk to the homeland 
and the American people. Currently, under the Preventing 
Emerging Threats Act of 2018, we are authorized to engage in 
protective measure against credible threats posed by UAS to the 
safety and security of certain DHS protective missions. That 
includes, for example, the protection of government personnel--
President, Vice President--Federal facilities, sensitive assets 
in the maritime sector and elsewhere, as well as mass 
gatherings like Special Event Assessment Rating Events (SEARs) 
and National Security Special Events (NSSEs) in addition.
    What we have witnessed over the last four years as we have 
judiciously and responsibly implemented our existing 
authorities is that there are significant gaps in our ability 
to protect the homeland from drones. We have seen an increasing 
number of malicious drone incidents in and around airports. We 
have witnessed 2,000 sightings of drones in and around airports 
since 2021. Since 2021, aircraft have had to engage in 64 
evasive actions. That includes four commercial carriers doing 
so. There have been, on average, 30 airport disruptions each 
year. In these scenarios, seconds matter.
    What we are seeking for the Transportation Security Agency 
is the ability, based upon this escalating threat environment, 
to engage in the proactive and persistent protection of the 
transportation sector, to include airports. This will 
literally, sir, help avert tragedy, tragedy both as it pertains 
to the potential loss of human life and economic impact. When 
airports have to shut down that costs millions of dollars. This 
will help avert tragedy.
    Second, we are seeking authority for State, local, tribal, 
and territorial partners, as well as critical infrastructure 
owners and operators, to be authorized to engage in the 
detection of UAS. Those authorities would be implemented under 
the supervision and oversight of Federal departments and 
agencies.
    We are also seeking the ability for a time limit of a six-
year pilot program for State, local, tribal, and territorial 
partners to engage in mitigation of C-UAS, as it pertains to 
State, local, tribal, and territorial partners and critical 
infrastructure owners and operators. As the Committee knows, 
DHS relies on partners all around the country to help protect 
the homeland. We cannot be everywhere. What we know is that the 
threat posed by UAS is widespread across the country, and it is 
critical that our partners have the authority to help protect 
the homeland in addition to TSA getting the authority to 
critically protect the transportation sector.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. Certainly we know that State 
and local enforcement agencies need additional authorities. 
Certainly they are going to be the tip of the spear when it 
comes to protecting our country from these threats, and working 
closely with the Federal Government agencies. However, there 
have been concerns that have been raised by folks that such an 
expansion creates some significant challenges in terms of 
training and preparedness.
    Mr. Wiegmann, I want to ask this question. The 
Administration's proposal would establish a pilot program to 
test out these expanded authorities to State and local law 
enforcement. However, these entities need to have proper 
training, including how to protect individual rights to privacy 
as well as effectively executing this pilot program.
    How would the Department of Justice ensure that these 
entities have the necessary training to properly execute these 
authorities?
    Mr. Wiegmann. Thanks for that question, Senator. Yes, 
training is a big part of it, as you recognize. We need to 
ensure that if State and locals are going to do this they know 
how to do it and they need to be operating under the right 
rules.
    One of the elements of our bill is to establish a training 
center that the FBI would operate in conjunction with DHS. 
First of all, it would only be, under the pilot, up to 12 
entities per year, but we would work with each of those 
entities that are designated to participate in the pilot 
program, do the training. They would have to learn what 
equipment could be used, learn how to operate it, learn what 
the rules are because they would have to follow the same 
Federal rules in terms of any data they collect, how it can be 
retained, disseminated, and used, when they can engage in 
mitigation activity, what the rules of engagement are. All of 
those are things they would have to be trained on and then 
certified.
    Then even after that point, when they are doing their risk-
based assessments as to which facilities or events they are 
going to protect, that is all subject to Federal oversight as 
well. This is not the kind of thing where we just hand it off 
to the States and let them take over. It is something that we, 
the Federal authorities, would continue to be actively involved 
in, both in training and making sure they are using the 
authorities appropriately.
    Chairman Peters. Ms. Vinograd, how will providing 
additional authorities to State and local enforcement better 
prepare the Department of Homeland Security to protect--and let 
us focus on mass gatherings such as National Security Special 
Events and Special Event Assessment Rating Events?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, as I mentioned, DHS cannot be 
everywhere? We rely on State, local, tribal, and territorial 
partners to help us protect and to advance a variety of DHS 
missions.
    If SLTT partners are granted this authority they can help 
prevent catastrophic attacks against mass gatherings, a variety 
of sizes and in a variety of venues. As my colleague, Mr. 
Wiegmann, just mentioned, these authorities would be 
implemented under strict supervision and oversight of the 
Federal Government, including ensuring that these individuals 
authorized to conduct these operations are operating under 
comparable Federal safeguards as they pertain to privacy and 
civil rights and civil liberties.
    As I mentioned in the context of TSA and airports, when we 
are witnessing a drone threat seconds matter. Currently, SLTT 
authorities that are on the ground cannot detect proactively 
drones nor can they mitigate them. Those seconds that I 
mentioned, Senator, really matter, and the inability of our 
SLTT partners in their jurisdictions to respond could cost 
lives if our partners are not granted these authorities.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. Ranking Member Portman, you are 
recognized for your questions.
    Senator Portman. Great. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the 
witnesses for the testimony. This is obviously a serious issue, 
and I agree with Ms. Vinograd who said that a lapse in the 
authorization would be catastrophic. I think it would help 
these transnational criminal organizations, among others, and 
yet we need better data to be able to put together the right 
authorization to write sound policy.
    We know already what happens on the border with these 
drones. We know they are used for deliveries, not just for 
drugs but also currency and firearms, other contraband. This 
Committee has, among its responsibilities, oversight of DHS and 
these border activities, and we have a particular interest--I 
certainly do--in this issue of the synthetic opioids that are 
streaming across our border today. The number, unfortunately, 
are higher than ever. Last month, enough fentanyl was seized--
which is the synthetic opioid that is killing about two-third 
of those who die from overdoses, which is at a record level--we 
know that there was enough seized to kill about 200 million 
Americans in one month, and no one on the border thinks that we 
are seizing most, and not even a significant percentage of what 
is coming across. It is a big issue.
    Ms. Vinograd, a question for you. Understanding this 
increased threat from these transnational criminal 
organizations, how do you assess DHS's current performance in 
countering the use of drones for cross-border illicit activity?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, thank you. I share your concern 
about transnational criminal organizations and the malicious 
use of drones over the border, both as it pertains to smuggling 
contraband as well as surveillance of law enforcement, in 
addition to other threats.
    Currently, DHS, the Secretary of Homeland Security, has 
designed three areas of operations along the Southwest Border 
as covered facilities or assets. This allows DHS, CBP more 
specifically, to engage in C-UAS operations in these areas of 
operations.
    Senator Portman. Let me be more specific because I do not 
have much time. In your testimony you state that from August 
2021 to May 2022, CBP detected more than 8,000 illegal cross-
border drone flights at the Southern Border. Of these 8,000 
flights, how many were successfully mitigated by DHS?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, I can ask CBP to get back to you and 
your staff with the specific statistics on that.
    Senator Portman. We have been asking them for this since 
February, persistently, and we are not getting the information. 
I think it is important that we have an authorization, but we 
have to have information. If we do not have the statistics 
today, if you do not have it, despite many inquiries from us, 
that concerns me. I want to work with, again, on this 
reauthorization, but we have to have better information to be 
able to do it properly.
    With regard to drones, let's talk about China for a moment. 
Recently the Directors of the FBI and British M-15 warned of 
the national security and economic threats posed by China. They 
identified it our greatest long-term threat, stealing our 
technology, dominating our markets, and they talked about the 
U.S. drone market, and they talked about the use of drones.
    Here is an example. According to a report by The Washington 
Post, China's Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI) is the leading 
provider of drones to U.S. law enforcement agencies, they say. 
DJI has servers in China. They have support from the Chinese 
government. The Chinese State Security Services is one of their 
customers. Here is our own Commerce Department saying DJI has 
been added to an export blacklist last after Bloomberg reported 
that it supplied surveillance technology to Chinese security 
forces in Xinjiang, where millions of Uighur Muslims have been 
forced into internment camps.
    There is a report last year that the U.S. Secret Service 
(USSS) purchased eight of DJI's drones. The FBI purchased 18 of 
them. Let me ask you these questions on the record. We will 
start with Mr. Wiegmann. Does the FBI currently purchase and 
use Chinese-made drones? Yes or no.
    Mr. Wiegmann. We do.
    Senator Portman. You do. Ms. Vinograd, does DHS currently 
purchase and use Chinese-made drones?
    Ms. Vinograd. DHS has prohibited the purchase of foreign-
made drones, small UAS, absent waivers in very specific 
circumstances.
    Senator Portman. OK. This report that I mentioned said that 
the Secret Service had purchased eight of DJI's drones. Are you 
saying that is inaccurate?
    Ms. Vinograd. I am saying that with certain waivers----
    Senator Portman. My question to you is are you purchasing 
DJI drones or not, yes or no?
    Ms. Vinograd. With specific waivers, DHS can purchase 
certain foreign-made----
    Senator Portman. Are you purchasing DJI drones, yes or no?
    Ms. Vinograd. With certain waivers we are purchasing 
certain foreign-made----
    Senator Portman. So you are.
    Ms. Vinograd. I can follow up with more specific details.
    Senator Portman. OK. But the answer is yes.
    Ms. Vinograd. In a closed hearing I can provide more 
specific details, sir.
    Senator Portman. OK. Ms. Coultas, I do not want to leave 
you out. Does FAA currently purchase and use Chinese-made 
drones?
    Ms. Coultas. FAA's responsibility is for the integration of 
UAS into the NAS and testing of the UAS technology to ensure 
its safety and its use in the NAS. We do not actually purchase 
drones. We do the testing of the drones.
    Senator Portman. Thank you. Again, given what the FBI has 
told us, what the Commerce Department has told us, what we know 
from reports, I cannot believe we have to write legislation to 
force U.S. agencies to ban the use of Chinese-made drones, 
particularly where the servers are in China where the Chinese 
government is a part owner and a supporter of this particular 
company.
    But we do have that in the USICA bill. It is a requirement 
in the USICA bill, and I hope we can get that legislation 
passed. If we cannot get that legislation passed, would you all 
support, including this kind of legislation, in whatever we do 
in terms of reauthorization? Ms. Vinograd.
    Ms. Vinograd. I share your concerns about these drones and 
would welcome a conversation on specific language, sir, yes.
    Senator Portman. Mr. Wiegmann.
    Mr. Wiegmann. Just to be clear, we share the concern as 
well, Senator. We want to shift away from the use of Chinese 
drones, and the FBI and other parts of DOJ are working on that 
objective. Right now they kind of dominate the market so we are 
working to shift our use of drones away from Chinese drones to 
other alternatives.
    In the meantime, FBI takes steps to do thorough 
cybersecurity and supply chain reviews to ensure that any risk 
posed by use of the technology is mitigated. But we do want to 
shift away from it.
    We definitely support the aims of the sponsors of the bill. 
I think we have provided some technical assistance on some 
technical issues about changes we would make to the bill to 
make sure that we could support it and we could conduct our 
mission consistent with the provisions. But we share the 
objectives of shifting away from these drones and using other 
alternatives that do not pose the same type of supply chain 
risk.
    Senator Portman. Yes. Thank you. The Administration 
supports the legislation, the USICA legislation, and we did 
negotiate it with the Administration as well as Democrats and 
Republicans here in the U.S. Senate. We appreciate your support 
of the broader legislation and I hope we continue to work with 
each of you on both of these issues, getting better data as to 
what is actually happening, particularly along the border we 
have a special interest in this Committee, but also with regard 
to the use of these drones and the potential national security 
threat of having this information be relayed back to China and 
used against us.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Portman. Senator 
Johnson, you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON

    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Five years ago 
when we were drafting and passing the Preventing Emerging 
Threats Act of 2018, we obviously understood the threat that 
drones pose to this Nation, the very serious threat. I was very 
frustrated at the time that we could not offer greater 
authority. After being here five years later I am enormously 
frustrated that we have not made greater progress. I mean, we 
are still taking what I would consider baby steps when to me it 
is out of control. 2,000 sightings around airports, 69 evasive 
actions.
    Let us get down to brass tacks here. Let us find out what 
our capabilities are. Have we, under the current authorities, 
have we actually brought down drones around the types of events 
that DHS can counter?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, DHS has engaged in detection and 
mitigation of drones, concurrent with the authorities----
    Senator Johnson. So we have taken down drones. Have we 
advanced our technology in five years?
    Ms. Vinograd. We have certainly advanced our technology in 
five years. Yes, sir.
    Senator Johnson. Do we have the capability right now to 
prevent drones from entering restricted airspace around an 
airport?
    Ms. Vinograd. Currently DHS assesses that TSA could respond 
to an emergency in and around an airport. What we are seeking 
in the legislation is the ability for TSA to proactively and 
persistently----
    Senator Johnson. OK. I am asking what is our capability 
right now, if you have the authority. First I have to find out 
who has the authority to establish a restricted airspace, 
around an airport, around a stadium, around power plants? Who 
has that authority?
    Ms. Coultas. The FAA, sir.
    Senator Johnson. The FAA. Have we established that 
restricted airspace?
    Ms. Coultas. We work with our Federal partners as well as 
our non-Federal stakeholders, when requested----
    Senator Johnson. Is the airspace around an airport 
restricted to drone use right now?
    Ms. Coultas. Yes.
    Senator Johnson. All airports?
    Ms. Coultas. Yes.
    Senator Johnson. Do we have the capability of knocking down 
drones if they enter that restricted airspace? Do we have that 
capability--maybe not the authority but do we have the 
capability, technologically?
    Ms. Coultas. Technologically, yes, we have the ability to 
mitigate malicious drone threats.
    Senator Johnson. So should not this legislation, at a 
minimum, grant you the authority so we can almost immediately 
start knocking down drones when they enter that restricted 
airspace around airports?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, DHS is deeply supportive of TSA 
getting the authority to mitigate drones around airports.
    Senator Johnson. Now let us start expanding it, because to 
me that would be the No. 1 priority.
    Mr. Wiegmann, there is no constitutional right to have a 
drone. Correct?
    Mr. Wiegmann. No.
    Senator Johnson. You mentioned civil liberties. What civil 
liberty are contemplated if we are knocking down drones 
entering into a restricted airspace?
    Mr. Wiegmann. We would want to do so responsibly, only when 
it posed a threat.
    Senator Johnson. Sure. We do not want to knock them down 
and create a greater problem. But, there would be no civil 
liberties issues. If we established a restricted airspace and 
somebody flies in a drone, they have no civil liberties to 
worry about. We are going to knock down that drone safely, if 
we can.
    Mr. Wiegmann. I agree, Senator. I do not think that 
presents a civil liberties issue.
    Senator Johnson. I could not quite understand you.
    Mr. Wiegmann. I agree with you, Senator. I do not think it 
poses a risk----
    Senator Johnson. OK.
    Mr. Wiegmann. When a drone is flying in restricted 
airspace, to interdict that drone is not a civil liberties 
issue, in my view.
    Senator Johnson. In the proposal the Administration gave 
us, have we contemplated the priorities of establishing 
restricted airspace and granting the authority to be knocking 
down drones when they enter restricted airspace? For example, I 
am contemplating around a stadium on game day. Establish that 
as temporary restricted airspace so that State and local 
authorities, working with DHS, have the ability to knock those 
drones down, take them out of the sky before they pose a 
threat.
    Mr. Wiegmann. We have that authority now, Senator. That is 
what we are asking to extend. But yes.
    Senator Johnson. Have we knocked down any drones around 
stadiums?
    Mr. Wiegmann. When you say ``knock down,'' yes, we have 
disabled them. We have required them to divert and land or we 
have interdicted them. Yes, we have. At a number of events, as 
I mentioned in my opening testimony, we have done that, yes.
    Senator Johnson. OK. Again, my main point here is we have 
to move faster. It is great to have pilot programs, but that is 
five, six years in the future. Trust me. The public is going to 
demand that we act a whole lot quicker if a commercial aircraft 
hits a drone that is in the restricted airspace.
    I want to make sure, in this piece of legislation, we have 
that authority, and then the funding and the personnel to start 
protecting our restricted airspace as soon as possible. Is 
there anything that is going to prevent that from happening in 
this piece of legislation?
    Mr. Wiegmann. That is why we are here, Senator. We agree 
with you and we are seeking the authority to do just that.
    Senator Johnson. But again, I am a little concerned about a 
pilot program that is going to work with 12 State, local, and 
tribal----
    Mr. Wiegmann. It is going to take some time.
    Senator Johnson. That is a pretty slow rollout, is it not?
    Mr. Wiegmann. It is going to take some time to ramp up, but 
it is 12 every year. It takes some time to do the training, to 
get up and make sure they are doing this and know how to do it, 
and get the technology down.
    They will be able to do multiple missions, and over time we 
think that is----
    Senator Johnson. My point is we have already taken five 
years, which I find enormously frustrating. Sure, it takes 
time, but we can ensure that it takes less time if we 
prioritize this as a serious threat and we establish this as a 
priority for putting more personnel to make sure it takes less 
time. Do you understand what I am saying?
    I think 12 pilot programs a year is completely too little, 
and I am hoping it will not be too late. Let us look at this 
piece of legislation. Let us start ramping it up, OK? We spend 
trillions of dollars in the Federal Government. We ought to 
focus on this because this is a serious threat. Again, I do not 
want to have it be too little, and I certainly do not want us 
to be too late on this.
    Mr. Chairman, again, I appreciate you pushing this. I want 
to work with you to strengthen this. I do not think this is 
strong enough yet. Again, let us not have a piece of 
legislation that is too little, too late. The bill we passed 
five years ago was too little. Fortunately, it has not been too 
late yet. Let us make sure we do a good job on this one.
    Chairman Peters. Absolutely, Senator, and we look forward 
to working with you. I appreciate your continued leadership on 
this issue.
    Senator Johnson. Thank you.
    Chairman Peters. We will make it as strong as we possibly 
can. We appreciate that. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
    Senator Hawley, you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY

    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the 
witnesses for being here. Ms. Vinograd, if I could just start 
with you.
    You work in the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans. Is 
that right?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, let me just say I had my first visit 
to the State of Missouri on Friday.
    Senator Hawley. Oh, good.
    Where did you go?
    Ms. Vinograd. I went to Jefferson City.
    Senator Hawley. OK.
    Ms. Vinograd. I just want to share I am deeply impressed by 
your Homeland Security professionals.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Vinograd. I look forward to going back. Yes, I work in 
the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans.
    Senator Hawley. And you work with Robert Silvers there, is 
that right, the Under Secretary?
    Ms. Vinograd. I do, sir.
    Senator Hawley. Your name is on a memo with Mr. Silvers 
dated September 13, 2021. The subject is ``Organizing DHS 
efforts to counter disinformation.'' This is the memo that 
recommended the establishment of the Disinformation Governance 
Board (DGB). It was turned over to me and to Senator Grassley 
by a whistleblower.
    I have to tell you we have had the darndest time getting 
any information about this board out of your agency. We have 
asked and we have asked. Members of this Committee have asked. 
We would know virtually nothing had it not been for this 
whistleblower who turned over a tranche of documents, all of 
which are now public.
    Since I have you here and you wrote the memo let me just 
ask you a question or two about it. Whose idea was it to 
establish this board?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, the Department of Homeland Security 
has engaged in disinformation work pertaining to threats to the 
homeland and the American people for over a decade. With 
respect to this internal working group there were discussions 
about the need to ensure that there were guardrails in place 
across the Department to protect civil rights and civil 
liberties and privacy, and as such there were discussions about 
creating this internal working group.
    Senator Hawley. Yes, all of that I know is in the passive 
voice. My question is whose idea was it to set it up? You used 
the words ``working group'' but I notice that that is not at 
all what the memo says. It does not call it a working group. 
The directive that Mr. Mayorkas eventually signed off on does 
not make this board a working group. It had managerial 
authority. It had directive authority. All of that is in these 
documents. So let us please not go back to those tired and now 
disproven talking points.
    Let me come back to my question. Whose idea was it to 
establish the board? Was it yours?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, without going into internal 
deliberations of the Department of Homeland Security there were 
a series of discussions among personnel.
    Senator Hawley. Who?
    Ms. Vinograd. I am not going to go into the internal 
deliberations of the Department.
    Senator Hawley. Why not? You are under oath?
    Ms. Vinograd. I am under oath, sir. That said, these are 
internal deliberations at the Department. As you know, sir, the 
charter was signed by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
    Senator Hawley. Yes. I only know that, by the way, because 
of the whistleblower documents. We would not know that 
otherwise.
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, the charter was signed by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. The working group included 
representation----
    Senator Hawley. Does the charter call it a working group, 
since you bring up the charter?
    Ms. Vinograd. This was a working group, sir.
    Senator Hawley. Does the charter call it a working group?
    Ms. Vinograd. I do not recall the charter----
    Senator Hawley. No. The answer is it does not. Was it your 
idea to establish the board?
    Ms. Vinograd. As I testified, Senator, under oath, the 
establishment of the working group was a decision taken, a 
conversation that was had among multiple individuals at the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    Senator Hawley. OK. So you are not going to answer my 
question. Nina Jankowicz, she was appointed to run this 
Disinformation Board. How was she chosen?
    Ms. Vinograd. Ms. Jankowicz was chosen consistent with 
practices for the hiring and vetting of political appointees.
    Senator Hawley. Walk me through that process. Who was 
involved?
    Ms. Vinograd. I do not know the full scope of that process.
    Senator Hawley. You were not involved in it?
    Ms. Vinograd. I was involved in one piece of that process.
    Senator Hawley. What was the piece that you were involved 
in?
    Ms. Vinograd. I spoke with Ms. Jankowicz.
    Senator Hawley. At what point?
    Ms. Vinograd. As part of the standard process for political 
appointees I spoke with Ms. Jankowicz.
    Senator Hawley. What timeframe would this have been?
    Ms. Vinograd. I do not want to give you an incorrect 
answer.
    Senator Hawley. That is OK. Give me just a frame.
    Ms. Vinograd. Early 2021.
    Senator Hawley. OK. January?
    Ms. Vinograd. I do not recall the exact date, sir. I can 
get back to you on that.
    Senator Hawley. OK. January, February time period, perhaps? 
That would be early 2021. The Secretary signed the charter, I 
believe in February 2021. When did the Secretary sign off on 
Ms. Jankowicz being the head of the board?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, I do not know that the Secretary 
signed off on Ms. Jankowicz or not.
    Senator Hawley. Oh, really?
    Ms. Vinograd. I am not aware.
    Senator Hawley. He testified it was his decision.
    Ms. Vinograd. I believe the Secretary testified that he was 
ultimately responsible for Ms. Jankowicz.
    Senator Hawley. So it was not his decision?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, I just said I do not know the full 
scope of----
    Senator Hawley. Did you recommend favorably Ms. Jankowicz 
to the Secretary?
    Ms. Vinograd. After speaking with Ms. Jankowicz I was 
impressed by her expertise during our conversation and noted my 
recommendation to others in the Department.
    Senator Hawley. So you recommended, yes. I think that 
sounds like a yes. You recommended favorably.
    Did you, at the time that you spoke with her and 
recommended with her, were you aware of her long history of 
comments on Twitter and other platforms of disinformation, 
anti-free speech rhetoric, and so forth, which has since 
become, I think it is safe to say, infamous?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, I was aware of Ms. Jankowicz's 
expertise in the field of disinformation and was impressed by 
her expertise----
    Senator Hawley. But did you know about her many comments, 
spreading disinformation about Russia, about the Trump 
administration, about conservatives. Secretary Mayorkas, just 
by comparison, said he was not aware of any of this at the 
time. I am just curious, were you aware at the time you 
recommended her to him?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, in my capacity as Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Counterterrorism, Threat Prevention, and Law 
Enforcement Policy, I had not read all of Ms. Jankowicz's 
tweets, but as I said I was aware of her expertise in the 
field.
    Senator Hawley. When you said you had not read all of her 
tweets, I am sure she has a lot of tweets, but were you 
familiar with the ones that have since become public?
    Ms. Vinograd. I was not, sir.
    Senator Hawley. OK. You were not aware at the time. Did 
anybody bring those to your attention, at any time, before they 
became publicly released in this vetting process?
    Ms. Vinograd. No. Not to my recollection.
    Senator Hawley. OK. Somehow she got through this vetting 
process with no one, including all the way up to the Secretary, 
apparently aware of what she had said on these public 
platforms. I find that sort of extraordinary.
    Was the White House involved in the selection of Ms. 
Jankowicz?
    Ms. Vinograd. I am not aware of the full scope of the 
process, sir. As a political appointee the standard processes 
were followed.
    Senator Hawley. To your knowledge the White House was not 
involved. Is that fair to say?
    Ms. Vinograd. My knowledge is a political appointee. The 
White House was involved in my process, so I believe that that 
is standard process for the White House to be involved.
    Senator Hawley. OK. So you think that they were involved in 
the selection of Ms. Jankowicz.
    Ms. Vinograd. I am not aware of the full scope of the 
hiring or vetting process. It was the same as pertains to other 
political appointees.
    Senator Hawley. I am just trying to get at what your 
knowledge is. I am not asking you what you think may have 
happened, but to your knowledge was the White House involved in 
selecting Ms. Jankowicz? Just yes or no.
    Ms. Vinograd. I really do not know, sir.
    Senator Hawley. OK. You have no idea. All right. What is 
the current status of the Disinformation Board, to your 
knowledge?
    Ms. Vinograd. It is on pause.
    Senator Hawley. What does that mean exactly?
    Ms. Vinograd. It means the Disinformation Governance Board 
never met. The Secretary has asked the Homeland Security 
Advisory Committee (HSAC), to review how the Department can 
most effectively address disinformation and how to do so in a 
way that protect civil rights and civil liberties. He has also 
asked that the HSAC review how the Department can be as 
transparent as possible with the American public and increase 
trust in the work that we do. The HSAC was asked to conduct 
their review within 75 days, and while that work is pending the 
Disinformation Governance Board, is on pause. It is not 
meeting. There is not work underway.
    Senator Hawley. Last question, and I know there are other 
Senators waiting to ask questions. Did the board every meet? 
Did any members of the board ever meet with Twitter executives? 
We have minutes of planned meetings with Twitter executives to 
ask for cooperation in tracking speech. Did that ever happen at 
any point, to your knowledge?
    Ms. Vinograd. I disagree with your characterization of----
    Senator Hawley. Did the meetings with the Twitter 
executives ever happen, to your knowledge?
    Ms. Vinograd. If I can finish, I disagree with your 
characterization of the purpose of a meeting that never 
happened. The meeting with Twitter never happened.
    Senator Hawley. OK. To your knowledge it never happened.
    Listen, I have to let other Senators question. I will just 
say that I regret that it has taken months to get the most 
basic information about this board, and again, we would know 
none of this, none, had it not been for a whistleblower who 
turned over these documents. Frankly, that is totally 
unacceptable.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator Carper, 
you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

    Senator Carper. Thanks. Welcome to each of our witnesses. I 
want to start with Ms. Coultas. Do you pronounce your name 
Coultas?
    Ms. Coultas. That is correct, Senator.
    Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. In your testimony I 
believe, ma'am, that you mentioned that unmanned aircraft 
systems, also known as drones, represent the fastest-growing 
sector in aviation today. I understand that as of September 
2020, about two years ago, there were 1.7 million drones that 
were registered with the FAA and that this number will only 
increase in the years to come.
    That said, could you just take a minute or two and explain 
to us how the expansion of drone use has impacted the current 
threat landscape and how the FAA plans to grapple with 
continued disruption to U.S. airspace by drone users?
    Ms. Coultas. Thank you, Senator, for that question. What 
the FAA currently does to contribute to the security of the 
airspace----
    The FAA has been doing a number of things, working with our 
security partners and our non-Federal stakeholders over the 
last several years as UAS continue to be integrated and grow 
across the economy, both with industrial users of the drones as 
well as hobbyists and industry. Things that we have been doing 
to help mitigate and work with our security partners and ensure 
the safety of the NAS, which obviously is FAA's No. 1 priority 
is to ensure that as drones are integrated into the NAS that it 
is done in a safe manner and does not affect the rest of the 
NAS as well as passenger commercial flights.
    Things that we have been doing is we authorize and we put 
in existing what we call temporary 99.7s, working with our 
security partners who will request temporary air restrictions 
over certain events, who meet certain security measures and 
needs necessary. Some of those may be mass gathering events. We 
have talked here about stadiums, Super Bowl, and other types of 
events, the borders. There are other events that go on 
nationwide throughout the year that we work with our security 
partners to put in also those additional air restrictions 
around those events.
    We also look at conducting tabletop exercises (TTXs), again 
working with the State, local, tribal, and territorial and 
Federal partners when they are at these events and using such 
scenarios that if a drone would come into the airspace or if we 
have, as you heard said, careless or clueless or maybe a 
noncompliant or potentially a criminal actor of a drone, how 
would we actually respond? Who has those authorities? What does 
that response and coordination look like? We have been working 
on that for the last several years.
    In addition, we have remote ID, which starting September of 
this year manufacturers will be required to have all drones 
manufactured to have what we call a self-identifier or a 
licensed place. All drones manufactured after September will 
have to have that on all drones, and operators of drones will 
have to be compliant with the remote ID rule by September of 
next year.
    Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
    My second question would be one I would address to each of 
you, and all take a shot at it, if you would, please. 
Protecting our homeland security is, I think, of the utmost 
importance when it comes to addressing threats posed by drones. 
Ironically, last week my family was at a beach together, and 
one of the visitors that joined us at the beach brought their 
drone, and sat it down in front of us, sent it out over the 
ocean some distance, and almost out of sight, brought it back, 
taking pictures of us and others. Pretty amazing.
    Two or three days ago I was back home in Wilmington, 
Delaware, and we are experiencing an epidemic of off-road dirt 
bikes in Wilmington, and all kinds of cities across the 
country, where these people get on the streets and they ride 
their dirt bikes all over the place and create mayhem and 
havoc. One of the tools to try to stop that is to track them 
using drones. Actually, the drone can be used not just to 
support criminal activity but actually to stop them, and I 
think we need to be mindful of that.
    Protecting our homeland security is of the utmost 
importance when it comes to addressing the threats posed by 
drones, given that they can be used by criminals to conduct 
illegal surveillance and espionage as well as trafficking of 
drugs and firearms. As such, close coordination with the 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and 
Federal Aviation Administration is critical when it comes to 
mitigating these threats.
    Could each of you take a moment or two to explain how your 
respective agencies work together, not as a stovepipe but work 
together, and with your State and local counterparts to monitor 
and counter threats posed by drones?
    Ms. Vinograd, would you take the first shot at that, 
please?
    Ms. Vinograd. Certainly, and let me just say, sir, that I 
agree. The Department of Homeland Security agrees that drones 
have a variety of beneficial uses--emergency response, 
deliveries, recovery, investigative purposes, and so much more. 
What we are focused on is the malicious use of drones, whether 
intentional or unintentional.
    Your question about cooperation is critical because the 
Department of Homeland Security just could not utilize its 
current C-UAS authorities absent incredibly close participation 
with our Federal partners, to include, for example, the FAA. As 
we seek the Secretary's authorization, for example, to 
designate a covered facility or asset, which would then allow 
us to engage in C-UAS activities, we are coordinating every 
piece of that authorization with the FAA, for example.
    When we get a request for C-UAS activities to protect a 
SEAR event or an NSSE event or a mass gathering at the request 
of the State executive, that request goes into an interagency 
working group that reviews the risk, reviews the threat, 
reviews capabilities, reviews who is best positioned to 
respond, and more. We got a question earlier, sir, and I will 
stop here, about temporary flight restrictions (TFRs). DHS 
works incredibly closely with the FAA when DHS or parts of DHS 
request a TFR with FAA to implement that TFR, and we are 
necessary to grant waivers to allow for authorized activity to 
include First Amendment-protected activity as well.
    Senator Carper. All right. Thank you, ma'am. Mr. Wiegmann.
    Mr. Wiegmann. Yes. I would just heartily agree with that. I 
think the counter-drone business is very much a team sport. 
Everything we do we work hand-in-glove with DHS and with FAA. 
We have to whether we want to or not, to work on TFRs and so 
forth, to get them. So everything we do we work together. 
Horizontally, there is a lot of collaboration, and then also we 
are starting to do more of the what I would say vertical, with 
our State and local partners, including in Delaware. My 
understanding is that Delaware State Police is part of our 
State and local working group on drone activity, and so that is 
a group that we have and convene. If we get the authority that 
we are asking for today we will be working more much 
intensively with State and locals all across the country, both 
on their detection-only activities but also with the pilot 
program that we described.
    This is an activity where law enforcement and Homeland 
Security officials are working together all the time, together 
with FAA.
    Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. My time has expired. 
I will have the opportunity to submit some questions for the 
record because I have several more I would like to offer. 
Thanks so much for joining with us today and for your 
collaboration and for your commitment. Thanks so much.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Carper. Senator 
Lankford, you are recognized for your questions.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD

    Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you to all 
of our witnesses as well today and for the ongoing work. I do 
have some questions about the collaboration you all were 
discussing at this point.
    When I was visiting with some of the folks at our Southern 
Border several months ago, there were some of our border 
stations that were trying to get counter-UAS equipment up and 
running and operable. In one of our areas along the border we 
had over 10,000 incursions in just that area with the UAS 
coming across the border from Mexico into the United States, 
and they were very eager to be able to get that.
    When I asked what is the issue, the equipment was there, 
the people were there, they waiting on authorization and there 
was an ongoing dialog between DHS and FAA to be able to discuss 
how we were going to get this up. So literally the equipment, 
the people, the need, everything was there.
    My question is about this collaboration. How long does it 
take? In this particular instance we had a situation where that 
same equipment along the border was being used in a different 
region of the border, and had been used for a while, but in 
this particular region it took month to actually get counter-
UAS equipment up and working in that area. How do we speed up 
this process? Where is the slowdown?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, as noted earlier I share your 
concern about the malicious drone threat at the Southwest 
Border. I will turn to my colleague from FAA in a moment.
    As you know, sir, the Secretary of Homeland Security has 
authorized three areas of operations along the Southwest Border 
as covered facilities or assets, so we have three up and 
running, if you will. There are four additional AORs that are 
pending.
    We have taken significant steps internally to make the 
process internally more efficient between CBP and the Program 
Management Office (PMO), which is part of my team. In addition, 
we have started doing, safely, concurrent processes with FAA 
such that this can move as expeditiously as possible.
    There are four areas of operations--I do not know if it is 
one of the ones that you visited--four areas of operations 
still pending. I will tell you it is a priority for me, it is a 
priority for the Secretary, to get these authorized as quickly 
as possible.
    Senator Lankford. What is the holdup, because this is 
months when that same technology is used in other places along 
the border. Where is the spot where it is getting stuck?
    Ms. Vinograd. I will turn to my colleague from FAA in a 
moment, but as these AORs are in the process of being 
authorized there is a lot of coordination with the FAA, and 
each covered facility or asset, sir, is different, so there are 
different complexities in each area of operations.
    Now again, we are committed to doing this quickly. The 
threat is significant. But each area of operations is 
different, which is why we coordinate with the FAA.
    Senator Lankford. I get it. We are still back to the same 
spot. This seems to be defining quickly along geologic time 
rather than clock time on it, because it is taking months in 
process. When I have interacted with the Secretary it is on 
FAA's desk, and then I talk to the FAA and they would say, no, 
it is on the Secretary's desk. It just seems to be getting 
lost. What I am trying to figure out is how to get this 
unstuck.
    Ms. Vinograd. I cannot go into further details in this 
hearing except on one thing. On one of the AORs, sir, it is a 
matter of just a few weeks, at a maximum. The others are a 
little bit more complex, and I would be glad to speak with you 
in a closed session, just more specifically about what that 
looks like. But we are committed to doing this with urgency and 
with care.
    Senator Lankford. Great. Thanks. How long does it take to 
be able to get one of these coordinations done with FAA, to be 
able to look at an existing technology that is out there in a 
new geographic region?
    Ms. Coultas. It varies based on the technology and the 
location and the complexity of the request that we receive. In 
some cases it can take just a matter of days to issue a TFR, 
but then others it does take longer, depending on what the 
actual area is and other TFRs that may be in the area.
    Senator Lankford. Can you define ``longer'' for me? Because 
a matter of days I can get. What does ``longer'' mean?
    Ms. Coultas. I am not in the area of issuing the TFRs, so 
it varies. We are working with our security partners now and 
also other areas of the country where they are trying to get 
TFRs. So it can vary. As long as we have the information, 
working closely with our security partners, in getting that. I 
cannot give you a definitive how long, because the operations 
in all vary.
    Senator Lankford. Here is my challenge on this, and I will 
just take one specific region on the Southwest Border. When I 
go there and I see the people, I see the equipment, everyone is 
trained, everyone is ready to go, and they are waiting on a 
piece of paper to be signed somewhere in Washington, I get on 
the phone and start calling around and saying, ``Where is this? 
How do we get this unstuck?'' because they are dealing with, 
literally, at that point, thousands of UAS coming across from 
Mexico, carrying narcotics, doing surveillance. We have the 
technology sitting there. I am trying to figure out how do we 
get this unstuck, because it is on someone's desk, moving, 
doing something. If there is a need to assist in process, this 
Committee is very engaged to be able to help get processes 
unstuck, but we are trying to figure out why it is still stuck.
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, I try to be in the business of 
unsticking things as well, and I will tell you that for the one 
that I mentioned that is forthcoming in just a small number of 
weeks, what we are waiting for in that particular context, and 
in others, is to ensure that this equipment can be safely used 
and operated in that airspace. I am happy to follow up with 
more details in a closed session, but we, again, are deeply 
committed to ensuring that this first AOR happens in a very 
small number of weeks and that the other additional AORs that, 
again, are just more complex from the airspace perspective, are 
unstuck quickly as well.
    Senator Lankford. Yes. How long has that one been pending? 
You said that one is going to get unstuck in weeks. How long 
since when it first started?
    Ms. Vinograd. I do not have the exact date in front of me, 
sir, but when you say ``first started,'' it has been just a few 
weeks since we can move to this next stage of basically looking 
at this particular airspace and the complexities there and 
ensuring that the equipment can be safely used. But I can get 
you a more specific answer in writing.
    Senator Lankford. That would be helpful. Let me ask this 
same question when we deal with Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and how 
this is managed. Obviously, a huge issue with cellphones being 
snuck in, individuals that are actually operating their gangs 
and criminal activity, stalking people that they had threatened 
outside of that facility from inside the facility, bringing 
narcotics in. This has been a big issue for our Bureau of 
Prisons.
    What would slow us down now? Those are fixed locations, 
most of them in remote areas. What would be the challenge of 
trying to get this counter-UAS across all of our Bureau of 
Prisons facilities, starting with the most remote? Why is that 
not already happening?
    Mr. Wiegmann. We are working on that. We have deployed 
technology at a number of prisons. I know it is several, and I 
think there is another 20 that are going to be coming on board. 
It is really just a question of getting people trained, getting 
the technology, working with the FAA on the TFRs and so forth.
    Look, I understand your impatience and I share it, so we 
want to do this because it is a huge problem. I share your 
view, and we are working with BOP, which is definitely 
concerned about this issue. We just had charges this past week 
in a prison in Texas where people were smuggling in contraband 
into the prison. That is not the first one. There are others. 
So I share your concern and BOP is ramping up.
    Senator Lankford. OK. That is helpful. I would say good 
except that this is something that we have talked about often 
around this dais, to try to say what is the slowdown. We are 
always trying to figure out what is the issue, because we will 
allocate funds, we will do the studies, we will do the pilots, 
we will approve all the process, and it seems to be years to 
actually get to execution on something that should be pretty 
straightforward, especially a Bureau of Prisons area that is 
very remote, that we are not dealing with the complexities of 
being in a city. This one should not just be as hard as it 
seems to be.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Lankford. Senator 
Scott, you are recognized for your questions.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT

    Senator Scott. First I want to thank Chair Peters and 
Ranking Member Portman for holding this hearing on a critical 
and important topic. Plus, I mean, clearly from listening to 
you all you know the importance of this and you are taking it 
seriously.
    As you know, Communist China funds technology like drones 
to spy on Americans and steal our data. I proposed legislation 
such as the Counter Chinese Drone Act and the American Security 
Drone Act to help protect national security and the privacy of 
American citizens. I am proud to have led the effort to pass 
the American Security Drone Act in the Senate, but I think we 
have to go further and pass the Countering CCP Drone Act.
    The legislation is the next step to ensure that the Federal 
funds from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) cannot 
be used to obtain communications equipment and services 
provided or produced by Communist China's drone company like 
DJI. I have a few questions on the reauthorization of the 
Preventing Emergency Threats Act.
    Mr. Wiegmann, I know. I practiced it. I said it the wrong 
way. Current law already waives certain specific provisions and 
prohibitions under Title 18 for action taken by DOJ and DHS 
against drones. This proposed bill waives all of Title 18. Why 
do you need to waive all of Title 18 and why not just keep the 
existing waivers in place?
    Mr. Wiegmann. a couple of things. DOD and DOE have a broad 
Title 18 waiver, so it helps us interoperate with them if we 
have the same authorities they have. So that is one.
    Two, is while you are correct that our current authority 
for DHS and DOJ only extends to certain provisions in Title 
18--and we have been able to use that effectively thus far--we 
cannot predict, as this is a changing technology landscape that 
other statutes could come into play in the future. We would be 
back in Congress, asking again if there is some new technology 
that is going to implicate a different statute that we were not 
thinking of.
    We think the cleanest approach, given that we do not think 
that law enforcement officials using this technology that we 
have all talked about here today to try to prevent threats from 
drones, it should not be criminal at all. It should not be any 
criminal provision that they are subject to rather than just a 
few statutes.
    We think it is a cleaner approach. We are obviously happy 
to discuss that with the Committee if that is not their view. 
But we think it is cleaner to have the same authority that DOD 
and DOE have, which a full sweep.
    Senator Scott. Do you have examples where you needed it? If 
this was not in place, where have you needed this in the past?
    Mr. Wiegmann. Thus far we have been able to work with the 
existing exemptions that we have from specific statutes. We 
cannot predict, necessarily, whether in the future, as 
technology changes, whether other statutes could come into 
play.
    Senator Scott. OK. Senator Lankford talked a little bit 
about the prisons. We know use of drones over prisons is a real 
threat. They have been used to drop drugs, weapons, and other 
contrabands in to inmates. Drug cartels, we know they are using 
drones for smuggling contraband across the border, into 
prisons, and for surveillance. How will this bill improve the 
law enforcement efforts to counter this threat?
    Mr. Wiegmann. To counter drug threat?
    Senator Scott. Yes. To deal with the prison fight, issues 
of our prisons. How would this bill change anything?
    Mr. Wiegmann. We already have the authority to protect our 
prisons so it would extend it. The key thing is it expires in 
October if we do not extend it, so we would not have the 
authority unless we get the extension.
    Senator Scott. I imagine it does not really change 
anything.
    Mr. Wiegmann. But other than that we have the authority in 
prisons, so we are good. We just need to extend that authority 
for prisons.
    Senator Scott. OK. All right. Ms. Vinograd, under the 
proposed reauthorization of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act 
it authorizes a limited pilot program under which DHS and DOJ, 
in consultation with the Department of Transportation, could 
designate certain State and local law enforcement entities to 
use counter-drone detection mitigation authorities.
    Can you talk about the selection process for this pilot 
program and how State and local entities would be selected? By 
the way, have you talked to agencies in Florida?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, thank you. I will turn to my 
colleagues from the Department of Justice in a moment. What we 
are seeking in this legislation is two things for State, local, 
tribal, and territorial partners. No. 1 is the ability for SLTT 
partners--excuse my acronym--to engage in detection of drones 
or UAS. In addition to that--and I should say compliant with 
all Federal standards and safeguards--what we are seeking is a 
six-year pilot program for SLTT partners to engage in 
mitigation.
    That selection process would be an interagency process. 
These individuals would comply with Federal standards and 
certifications. They would use equipment from an authorized 
equipment list that has been coordinated with FAA and FCC. We 
believe that this is critical, such that SLTT partners, as the 
first responders on the ground, in Florida and elsewhere, would 
be able to take urgently needed action to detect and mitigate 
drone threats.
    I will turn to my colleague from the Department of Justice.
    Mr. Wiegmann. I am going to look, if it is OK, in the back 
row to see if we have been talking with anyone in Florida about 
the potential. Yes, we have.
    Senator Scott. Is that typically through, what, the 
Sheriff's Departments or police?
    Mr. Wiegmann. Daytona, I am hearing that we have talked to 
them about this. As we select cities around the country to 
participate in the program it is going to be their level of 
interest----
    Senator Scott. It is really, they are going to drive this.
    Mr. Wiegmann [continuing]. Their expertise, and so forth, 
and if they would apply, and we will see how that process 
works. We have not exactly figured out what the criteria are or 
how we are going to select jurisdictions to do it, but I 
imagine it will be in locations all over the country and 
buildup.
    Senator Scott. You know when I talked about it with DJI, 
the drones, do you all have thoughts about whether we ought to 
just blanket outlaw the ability for a Chinese company to be 
able to sell drones in this country, or whether the Federal 
Government ought to be able to buy them or not? Do you guys 
have any thoughts on that?
    Ms. Vinograd. From the Department's perspective we share 
your concerns about China, generally, and Chinese-manufactured 
drones. Senator, DHS has issued guidance internally that 
prohibits the procurement of small UAS manufactured by foreign 
countries. There are some limited circumstances in which 
waivers may be granted, but generally we share your concern 
about Chinese-manufactured drones.
    Mr. Wiegmann. Yes. The problem is that right now, as you 
know, they dominate the market.
    Senator Scott. I have found some.
    Mr. Wiegmann. What is that?
    Senator Scott. We found a little bit but not much.
    Mr. Wiegmann. They have a huge chunk of the market, and so 
if we need to use drones for law enforcement purposes they are 
kind of the main game. We are working to transition away from 
that. There is impatience. It is a question of time. In the 
interim we are taking steps to mitigate whatever risks, supply 
chain risks or others, from use of the drones, but eventually 
we want to transition away from it. The waivers that Sam 
mentioned are necessary for that purpose. They do serve a 
useful purpose for all manner of things that we do. It is not 
ideal, but we are trying to transition away from them, is how I 
would say it.
    Ms. Coultas. From the FAA's perspective, we are really 
responsible for the integration of drones into the national 
airspace and testing of the drones to ensure the safety as they 
are integrated. But we do not have a position on the purchasing 
of or acquiring.
    Senator Scott. OK. Ms. Vinograd, I have one quick question. 
Did you see this stuff that came out in Ukraine that DJI drones 
were being tracked? Have you guys looked into that at all, or 
is that classified? Do you know?
    Ms. Vinograd. I have seen that and I would be glad to 
follow up in a closed hearing.
    Senator Scott. OK. Yes, that would be great. I would love 
to learn what happened on that.
    Ms. Vinograd. Certainly.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Rosen, 
you are recognized for your questions.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN

    Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Peters. I appreciate you 
holding the hearing and I appreciate all of you being here 
today and what you have been working on. I want to focus on 
protecting our stadiums, because my home State of Nevada, it is 
the entertainment capital of the world. We are quickly emerging 
as a sports capital of the world as well. We have a new 
Allegiant Stadium, home of the Raiders. Las Vegas is the first 
city to secure the NFL draft, the Super Bowl, and the Pro Bowl 
all at once. This, unfortunately, continues to make Las Vegas a 
target-rich environment for bad actors.
    Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, Congress, 
Executive Branch, you have recognized the need to protect 
stadiums and supports events, and the FAA initially imposed, 
like you talked about, temporary flight restrictions, over 
stadium events, including for unmanned aircraft. Congress 
subsequently strengthened and codified these requirements. 
However, sports leagues have reported an increase in violations 
of flight restrictions by drones.
    Mr. Chairman, I ask that I be permitted to enter into the 
record a letter from a coalition of sports organizations\1\ in 
support of the Administration's counter-UAS proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The letter referenced by Senator Rosen appears in the Appendix 
on page 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Peters. Without objection it will be entered.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you.
    Ms. Coultas, as the FAA considers new drone policies, do 
you think it is important to take into account these 
longstanding protections for stadiums, ensure that Federal 
policies keep up with evolving threats? How do you plan to do 
that?
    Ms. Coultas. Thank you for your question, Senator. The FAA, 
yes, we do agree that as the technology continue integrating 
drones into the airspace that the ability for the detection and 
then, when necessary, mitigation is in place as well. We are 
working closely with our stadium stakeholders to ensure--as you 
mentioned, we already do have standing TFRs for the NFL, Major 
League Baseball (MLB), National Association for Stock Car Auto 
Racing (NASCAR), as well as the Division I colleges. Then we 
also work very closely, for the Super Bowl and other types of 
larger events, to ensure that we put the appropriate air 
restrictions around those mass gathering events that are held 
at stadiums and other venues, to both ensure the safety of that 
event and security but also to ensure the safety of the 
airspace over that event.
    Senator Rosen. Let me ask you this follow-up then. There is 
draft legislation from the Administration that does extend the 
authorities for critical infrastructure but it does not 
specifically mention stadiums. You are talking about all the 
things that you are already doing. Shouldn't we be specific in 
identifying stadiums and other types of critical infrastructure 
so we are sure that we want to avoid confusion and we are sure 
that communities have the resources to protect themselves? Ms. 
Coultas and then Ms. Vinograd.
    Ms. Coultas. So yes, the legislation specifically says 
critical infrastructure, and we did not define exactly which 
sectors or entities within the critical infrastructure sectors. 
I would say I would leave that up to Congress, if they wanted 
to give us more specifics and mention. But we take that as it 
is all entities, because critical infrastructure encompasses, 
in addition to stadiums, as you know, it is chemical 
facilities, it is the energy sector, it is dams, it is a whole 
host of different sectors that may want to come and petition, 
through DHS or to Justice, to the FAA, to get both temporary 
restrictions or permanent restrictions in addition to being 
able to use detection equipment and then eventually may 
mitigation.
    I would defer to my DHS colleague if she wants to expand on 
that.
    Ms. Vinograd. I concur with my FAA colleague. We have no 
objections to more specificity. We want to ensure that all 
critical infrastructure owners and operators, to include 
stadiums and sports venues, have the authority that we are 
requesting in the bill.
    Senator Rosen. I am just worried that there is going to be 
confusion, and so we can at least maybe define, as a minimum, a 
certain group, allowing for the flexibility, of course, to add 
more as needed. We will continue to work with you on that.
    But I do want to build on what Senator Scott asked about 
the pilot program to extend the counter-drone capabilities, to 
work with State and local law enforcement, again protecting all 
the critical infrastructure. First of all, do you agree that 
the pilot program should include stadiums? I think you do. As 
you say, you have been talking to Florida. We have a great 
Fusion Center in Las Vegas. We have a lot of things to protect 
there.
    Have you been speaking with anyone in Nevada, and do you 
believe that the training and surveillance should be shared 
across these multiple law enforcement agencies and that that is 
a good thing to involve the communities?
    Mr. Wiegmann. Yes, I agree, and I am going to look again in 
the back row to see if we are in touch with folks in Nevada. 
Yes, we are in touch with folks in Nevada. Look, right now we 
can only protect the Super Bowl, the World Series, et cetera, 
and one of the main purposes of the bill is, there are a couple 
thousand NFL games every year. There are 20,000 baseball games 
every year. We are only covering the super high profile. The 
big advantage of this State and local pilot is to allow that 
force multiplier, right, for the people who are on the front 
lines to be able to protect those venues for the ordinary game 
that is going on. That is a big piece of it, and including in 
Nevada. I fully expect that the jurisdictions that participate 
in the pilot would be scattered across the country.
    Senator Rosen. I think your force multiplier, that is the 
way we should look at our State and local communities as force 
multipliers. You cannot do it all alone.
    I have about a minute left. I would like to quickly move on 
to cybersecurity because we know that the drones really present 
significant cybersecurity risks. Of course, country of origin, 
as we have talked about with China, manufacturing. But there 
are malicious actors. They can exploit data. They can spoof our 
Global Positioning System (GPS). They can hijack control of 
drones that are necessary, law enforcement drones perhaps.
    Assistant Secretary Vinograd, can you talk about some of 
the specific threats, and could you list them in what you might 
think are the highest threats we need to be worried about 
first, to the least, if that is possible? All threats may be 
not quite equal.
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, just to clarify, cybersecurity 
threats or drones threats more broadly?
    Senator Rosen. Cybersecurity threats, to the drones, I 
guess.
    Ms. Vinograd. Certainly. Senator, you mentioned several key 
ones, which are the exploitation of information on that drone 
or information that is being transmitted between the command-
and-control center. Just to clarify, our C-UAS authorities, the 
hearing today is about counter-UAS authorities or questions 
more specifically about drones. Moving back to the subject of 
the hearing, which is the counter piece of it, how we stop the 
stuff, we only, when we are countering UAS, intercept the 
signal between the command and the control center, and that is 
the only information that we interrupt and that we, in certain 
cases, retain.
    When we look at drones being used for malicious purposes we 
are certainly concerned about a malicious actor of some kind 
trying to engage in a cyberattack to change the course of that 
drone, weaponize it, and/or use it for its own malign purposes, 
like surveillance, like intrusion into an unauthorized 
facility, and things of that nature.
    From a counter-UAS perspective, again we are focused on the 
signal between the command-and-control center, and then from 
the actual drone perspective we are very aware of cybersecurity 
risks that could allow the drone to be manipulated for a range 
of malign purposes.
    Senator Rosen. I guess we will have to work on that with 
CISA. I am just concerned that making sure that our State and 
local communities understand which threats they have to deal 
with, the highest threats going down, so that we can be sure to 
protect the ones we love.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Padilla, 
you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PADILLA

    Senator Padilla. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Before I ask my 
questions I want to be very clear that the potential threat 
posed by UAS is one that Congress must address before the 
existing authorities expire. We absolutely agree on that. I 
know in California we have seen how a rogue UAS can disrupt 
critical function, including wildfire suppression efforts.
    My questions are not related to the need for 
reauthorization but making sure that we do so in a responsible 
way. The first area of questions has already been covered by 
Senator Scott, and that had to deal with the sort of broad 
exemptions to Title 18 that are called for in the 
Administration's proposal. I know there was a recognition, a 
back and forth of that is not currently the case. There are a 
lot of specific exemptions and it may not be easy but you are 
making it work. There is more than one way to get this done.
    Instead of just asking that question over again I will 
follow up, Mr. Wiegmann, with this. Title 18 for the U.S. Code 
includes prohibitions against, for example, committing war 
crimes, intimidating voters, and engaging in video voyeurism. I 
understand why the Department of Justice and DHS might need to 
be exempt from the Wiretap Act, but why do you need to be 
exempt from prohibitions against the examples I just gave?
    Mr. Wiegmann. Yes, we do not, although, again, to be 
honest, none of those activities would be authorized by this 
statute, because you can only take under the statutory regime 
those actions which are necessary to detect and then mitigate a 
credible threat. It is hard for me to imagine a voyeurism or 
war crime coming into play there.
    The statute would not give protection against those 
offenses because of the way it is structured. It would not 
exempt you from those offenses because those would never come 
into play.
    Senator Padilla. I hear you, but sadly, as we have seen, 
from administration to administration, interpretations and 
philosophies can shift. What we do put into statute, in terms 
of exemptions, does matter. I think it is critical and 
important.
    A question in a different area. Whether it is broad 
exemptions or more specific exemptions is one thing, but we are 
also discussing the proposal to have a reauthorization that is 
permanent and not one with a sunset provision. The 
proliferation of drone usage as well as the rapid development 
of drone technology itself demonstrates why the government 
needs to have clear authorities, in my opinion, to engage in 
UAS mitigation activities. But as I mentioned, the pace of 
technological develop as well as the ever-growing uses for 
drones, including for valuable journalistic and civic 
engagement purposes, seems to suggest that there is 
considerable value in Congress regularly revisiting this area 
of the law.
    The Administration's proposed legislation seeks permanent 
C-UAS authorities rather than including a sunset provision that 
would require not just Congress but the Executive Branch to 
come together in a few years to evaluate how well the expanded 
authorities called for in the statute are working. I am happy 
to debate whether it is three years, five years, or whatever 
the timeframe makes sense.
    Ms. Vinograd, let me direct a question to you. Why should 
we not all be required to revisit the broad authorities being 
granted in this bill in a few years?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, just to be clear, what we are 
seeking in this legislation is the lack of a sunset clause for 
most of the authorities. SLTT pilot program, we are not 
requesting indefinite authorities for.
    The sunset clause, as it currently stands, is really 
impeding the Department's ability to effectively use our 
authorities, insofar as it makes it incredibly difficult for us 
to engage in multi-year planning, multi-year testing, and 
things of that nature.
    We agree that there is a critical need to regularly engage 
with the congressional branch on how these authorities are 
being exercised. Under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 
2018, we are required to report to Congress every six months, 
which DHS has done judiciously. In addition, in this bill, for 
the SLTT pilot program, two years after the enactment of this 
bill we are also required to report to Congress on just that 
SLTT pilot program.
    Senator Padilla. Yes. You may disagree but what I am 
hearing is an argument for a longer reauthorization, not a 
shorter one. But I still believe in the power of the sunset 
mechanism to force these conversations. I think it keeps us 
from talking every day, every week, every month, not just every 
six months, not just every two years. But as I mentioned in my 
preface here, the continuously evolving technology, innovation 
makes additional things possible, additional performance and 
capabilities, let alone the growing number of uses of the 
technology. I think more regular required conversation from 
Congress to Congress and from administration to administration 
would be worthwhile.
    I know it has been a long morning for all three of you. I 
will leave my comments and that, but look forward to working 
with you as this proceeds.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Wiegmann. Thank you, Senator.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Padilla. Senator 
Sinema, you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SINEMA

    Senator Sinema. Thank you to our witnesses for joining us 
today.
    The counter-drone, or C-UAS, authorities expiring this 
October are critical to our homeland security. These 
authorities allow DHS and DOJ to protect Arizona's critical 
infrastructure and communities. As Chair of this Committee's 
Border Subcommittee and the Commerce Committee's Aviation 
Subcommittee, I am also keenly aware of the threats posed by 
drones to our nation's borders and airports.
    In Arizona, cartels are using drones to smuggle drugs 
across the border in an attempt to evade law enforcement, and 
across our nation there are too many examples of drones 
blocking flight paths and even shutting down airports.
    We must maintain and enhance our nation's C-UAS 
capabilities while also safeguarding privacy and the rights of 
legitimate drone users. I look forward to working with the 
Chairman, the Administration, and my colleagues to do just 
that.
    My first question about future threats is for Mr. Wiegmann 
and Ms. Vinograd. Drone technology is rapidly evolving and 
while most drones currently rely on RF technology, in the 
future more advanced drones may become the norm. At DOJ and DHS 
what are you doing to prepare for the drone-related threats of 
the future, including autonomous, unmanned systems and drone 
swarms that could conduct synchronized operations? As Congress 
considers reviewing the existing C-UAS authorities, what can we 
do to help you research and mitigate these threats?
    Ms. Vinograd. Senator, thank you. As you mentioned, the 
technology is evolving incredibly rapidly, and that is why at 
the Department of Homeland Security we have designed research 
testing and evaluation.
    Senator, we agree that the technology is evolving 
incredibly rapidly, and what the Department of Homeland 
Security is committed to is trying to ahead of that evolving 
threat. We do so through our Science and Technology (S&T) 
Directorate, where we are engaged in a significant amount of 
critical research, testing, and evaluation, such that we can 
try to stay ahead of the curve as it pertains to the evolving 
technology.
    In addition, as my colleague, Mr. Wiegmann, mentioned, we 
are seeking exemption from Title 18 such that we can ensure 
that we have the ability to keep pace and/or stay ahead of the 
evolving threat environment as this technology rapidly 
increases, and candidly proliferates the kinds of threats that 
drone may pose to the American people and to the homeland.
    Mr. Wiegmann. Yes, I do not have much to add to that other 
than we obviously work with our colleagues at DHS and DOD also 
in technology kind of working groups, to make sure that we are 
doing the best we can to have the state-of-the-art technology 
to counter this threat.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Ms. Vinograd, as Chair of the 
Border Subcommittee and the Aviation Subcommittee I am 
particularly concerned about the threat that drones pose to our 
border and our airports. If the current C-UAS authorities 
expire in October can you discuss the impact that would have on 
our border security?
    Ms. Vinograd. The expiration of existing counter-UAS 
authorities would be catastrophic from a border security 
perspective. Our counter-UAS authorities currently allow for 
critical counter-UAS operations at our borders, and the 
expiration of those authorities would allow a range of 
adversaries, including transnational criminal organizations to 
increase their malicious use of drones to engage in smuggling, 
surveillance, and other malicious activities.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. My third question for Ms. 
Vinograd and Ms. Coultas. Can you describe how the 
Administration's legislative proposal would help protect 
airports and flight paths from drones, and specifically, how do 
the current gaps in the Federal Government's C-UAS authorities 
hinder your agencies from achieving this?
    Ms. Vinograd. I will say that of all the things that keep 
me awake at night, one that is foremost on my mind is the 
potential for major tragedy at an airport. We currently, at the 
Department of Homeland Security, work in close partnership with 
the FAA at airports. However, DHS, the Transportation Security 
Agency, lacks the authority to engage in proactive or 
persistent C-UAS operations at airports. What that means is TSA 
is not authorized to be on the ground at airports engaging in 
proactive detection and, as necessary, proactive mitigation.
    I will tell you, just from a threat perspective, we have 
had 2,000 sightings of drones in and around airports since 
2021. In 2021 and 2022, year to date, we have had 64 evasive 
actions by aircraft, including four commercial carriers taking 
evasive action, Senator. We have had 30 airport disruptions 
just in 2021. This already amounts in significant economic 
damage and a potential for real loss of human life. I am very 
concerned about the lack of explicit authority at airports. 
That is why we are seeking explicit authority for TSA to engage 
in proactive and persistent detection and mitigation in close 
partnership with FAA.
    Ms. Coultas. To build off of my colleague from DHS, 
obviously the No. 1 priority for the FAA is the safety and 
security of the airspace, and around airports we, too, are very 
concerned about the number of drone sightings that we 
consistently see across this country.
    We are working very closely with our DHS partners, and the 
FAA is supportive of expanding the authorities to TSA, to give 
them the authority to be able to do not just the detection but 
the mitigation, if necessary, at the airport environment.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. My next question is for Mr. 
Wiegmann. Like all technologies, drones old both promise and 
peril. The same drones that our adversaries could use to 
surveil a sensitive government facility can be used by 
journalists to ship footage for the news and to hold government 
accountable.
    I know that DOJ has devoted considerable time and resources 
to ensuring that privacy and civil liberties are protected 
during C-UAS operations. Can you discuss some of these 
safeguards, and how often are drones that in a restricted 
airspace are actually interdicted, and when they are what data 
is intercepted, and for how long?
    Mr. Wiegmann. OK. Under the statute we can only intercept 
data that is necessary for countering a threat. As I mentioned 
in my opening testimony, what we are typically talking about 
is--and I have a list here of the types of data--the drone 
vendor and model, the drone and controlling device serial 
number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the 
controller, and the most recent takeoff location and home 
location.
    We are not talking about content of communications. We are 
talking about metadata, signals information, essentially, that 
the drone is generating, that will allow us to find out where 
it is, where it is going, where it has been, and who is 
controlling it, so that we can hopefully interdict it.
    Once we collect that information, the ordinary course, if 
it is not of any use we discard that information right away. 
But under the statute we can only keep it as long as it is 
necessary and in no event longer than 180 days, unless it is 
necessary to keep it longer for a specific purpose, like for a 
criminal investigation, if someone has violated the airspace 
and we need the information in order to pursue a criminal 
investigation or prosecution.
    So all of this is laid out in existing law, in the statute. 
Restrictions on what you can collect, how long you can retain 
it, and when you can disseminate it are all in the statute, and 
those would be carried over under the new bill. We would 
continue all of those same privacy protections into the new 
bill and they would also be applied to State and locals. To the 
extent State and locals are engaged in the same activity under 
the pilot program they would also be bound to respect all of 
those privacy protections.
    I do not know if that answers your question.
    Senator Sinema. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Sinema.
    I would like to take this opportunity to thank our 
witnesses once again for participating in today's hearing and 
in discussing the Administration's proposal to both extend and 
expand current authorities to counter UAS, to protect our 
homeland from serious threats posed by unmanned aircraft 
systems.
    As we heard today very clearly from each of our witnesses, 
a malicious actor could deploy UAS to cause a catastrophic 
incident at any time, and we cannot and must not wait for that 
incident to occur. As Chairman of this Committee I will work to 
ensure that these authorities do not lapse in October, so our 
Federal law enforcement partners can continue their very 
crucial missions to protect us from these threats.
    I also plan to introduce legislation, in the very near 
future, with Senator Johnson that both extends and provide a 
careful expansion of these counter-UAS authorities.
    The record for this hearing will remain open for 15 days, 
until 5 p.m. on July 29, 2022, for the submission of statements 
and questions for the record.
    This hearing now stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

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