[Senate Hearing 117-529]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 


                                 ______



                                                        S. Hrg. 117-529
 
INSTABILITY AND THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE SAHEL AND THE U.S. POLICY 
                                RESPONSE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS



                             SECOND SESSION



                               __________

                             JULY 12, 2022

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
                  
                  
                         ______
 
              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 50-082PDF          WASHINGTON : 2023                


                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Rounds, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator From South Dakota................     2

Phee, Hon. Molly, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
  Affairs, U.S. 
  Department of State, Washington, DC............................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Jenkins, Robert, Assistant to the Administrator, Bureau for 
  Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, United States Agency for 
  International Development, Washington, DC......................     9
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

Blyden, Chidi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC............    13
    Prepared Statement...........................................    15

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    31

Responses of Mr. Robert Jenkins to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    33

Responses of Ms. Chidi Blyden to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    35

Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    35

Responses of Mr. Robert Jenkins to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    39

Responses of Ms. Chidi Blyden to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    45

Responses of Ms. Chidi Blyden to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Tim Kaine......................................................    46

                                 (iii)

  


INSTABILITY AND THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE SAHEL AND THE U.S. POLICY 
                                RESPONSE

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Coons, Murphy, 
Kaine, Van Hollen, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Young, and Rounds.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing will come to order. Let me thank 
our witnesses for joining us today to discuss the turmoil and 
instability plaguing the Sahel. While the region may not often 
make front page news, millions of people continue to face 
threats from militaries that are supposed to protect them, 
ethnically-based militias, and dire food insecurity. These 
threats had displaced 2.4 million people in the central Sahel 
by this May and more than 30 million people in the Sahel will 
need lifesaving assistance and protection this year, nearly 2 
million more than last year, according to the U.N. Coordinator 
for Humanitarian Affairs.
    Unfortunately, some of the militaries in the subregion, 
militaries which we trained and equipped, by the way, have 
contributed to the problems that have been a stabilizing force. 
They have undertaken coups in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and 
attempted one in Niger. Particularly in Mali, the military has 
committed gross human rights abuses in the course of 
counterterrorism operations with little to no accountability.
    Making matters worse, Russia has established a foothold in 
Mali through the Wagner Group and is also involved in human 
rights violations including extrajudicial killings of 
civilians.
    In the wake of the coup in Chad, the junta fired live 
ammunition at peaceful protesters, killing seven, wounding 
dozens more, and it has yet to commit to the transition 
timeline the African Union articulated a ago.
    For two decades, the United States and our partners have 
spent billions of dollars to aid stability efforts by 
supporting military operations against terrorist actors and by 
strengthening the military capacity of countries in the Sahel 
to counter the threat of violent extremists. Successive 
administrations have used both State and Defense Department 
programs to provide equipment and train militaries, including 
deploying U.S. forces to assist African soldiers at the 
devastating cost of American lives.
    All of us remember the tragic deaths of four American 
Special Operations soldiers who were killed in Niger in 2017, 
when they were ambushed by militants belonging to the Islamic 
State in the Greater Sahara, and our partners have suffered 
casualties as well. Scores of soldiers from Mali, Niger, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, and France have deployed in successive 
operations and have lost their lives.
    The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali is the deadliest in 
the world. Just last month, two more peacekeepers were killed 
by an improvised explosive. Despite all of our efforts, we have 
little positive to show. In 2019, the head of Special 
Operations in Africa, General Marcus Hicks, told Voice of 
America with regard to the fight against terrorism in the 
Sahel, and I quote, ``I would tell you at this time we are not 
winning.''
    Clearly the situation has only deteriorated. While we 
invested billions in the security sector, our diplomatic and 
development efforts have been undercut by a lack of resources 
and presence. Significant staffing shortages at our embassies 
and lack of a robust USAID presence in the Sahel are limiting 
our ability to balance our security programs with tackling the 
root causes of extremism in the Sahel.
    I appreciate the engagement from the Administration with 
regard to the requirement to consult with this committee on 
that strategy, and in the wake of this hearing I and other 
members will provide you with feedback on your approach.
    Yesterday, I introduced a resolution calling for a 
democratic transition in the Republic of Chad. It demands 
General Deby release those arrested during the protests this 
spring, it supports the African Union's push to organize 
elections by October 22, it calls on the military junta to 
abide by the African Union's transition timeline, and it asks 
the Secretary of State to identify coup leaders and their 
accomplices in order to target them with visa restrictions and 
financial sanctions.
    In addition to this, in March, Congress passed the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act of 2021, which 
I sponsored in the Senate. This legislation aims to ensure that 
we have a strategy to address the political, governance, and 
development challenges in North and West Africa.
    At today's hearing I expect our witnesses to share their 
frank assessments of whether the U.S. approach over the years 
have yielded the results that we expected, and if not, what do 
we need to change.
    With that let me turn to the Ranking Member, both on the 
subcommittee and for this hearing, Senator Rounds.

                STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROUNDS, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure 
to serve as the Ranking Member for this hearing on U.S. policy 
toward the Sahel. This topic is an important one, and I 
appreciate the Chairman prioritizing it for a full committee 
hearing today. It is also good to see that we have essential 
leaders working on Africa policy for DoD, State, and USAID to 
have this critical discussion.
    During this hearing we have a lot to cover regarding the 
myriad challenges to regional security and development in the 
Sahel, including many vital issues creating a humanitarian 
crisis and impacting U.S. national security. The Sahel has been 
a region of significant insecurity and underdevelopment for 
decades, owing to a profound lack of development. Niger is 
ranked last on the U.N. Human Development Index. Mali, Chad, 
and Burkina Faso also feature in the bottom 10.
    The people of the Sahel are among the poorest in the world 
and face acute hardships, from desert terrain, isolation, and 
an increasing threat from violent extremist groups affiliated 
with al Qaeda and the Islamic State. I am concerned that U.S. 
foreign policy toward the Sahel has been challenged to keep 
pace with the threat or level of need. Deficits in our policy 
and approach and those of our allies seem to have allowed the 
situation in the Sahel to worsen.
    Despite the initial success of France's military 
intervention in Mali in 2013, these violent extremist groups 
have only grown in capacity and expanded their areas of 
control, such as they now directly threaten our partners south 
of the Sahel on the coast of West Africa. I am concerned Africa 
has not received the U.S. diplomatic focus it deserves.
    Congress continues to follow closely the wave of military 
coups that have affected sub-Saharan Africa in the last 2 
years. The majority of these recent coups have occurred in the 
Sahel. I look forward to hearing about the Administration's 
assessment of what is driving these coups and how it plans to 
address them in a manner that promote our interests while 
working behind the scenes with these regimes to promote our 
interests and values.
    In this context, Mali is worthy of emphasis. I look forward 
to a clear vision from the Administration about how to enable 
the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Mali to make a positive 
contribution to regional stability and not just soak up 
resources.
    The entrance of the Russia-backed Wagner Group in Mali last 
year and the subsequent hasty withdrawal of French troops only 
compound the challenges faced by the U.S. and our European 
allies in the region. Concurrently, these developments create 
an opportunity for a renewed U.S. focus on Niger, which has 
been for some time the most promising partner in the region for 
the United States.
    Two weeks ago, the NSC shared the Biden administration's 
strategy in the Sahel with this Committee. The strategy 
reflects the Biden administration's aspirational view of its 
plans to approach the region. It will hopefully drive important 
policy and resource discussions that need to occur. While the 
interagency approval and rollout of the Sahel strategy is a 
welcome development, I look forward to the Administration's 
ability to implement such a strategy.
    My concerns focus on two main areas. First is concerning 
regarding interagency coordination to implement the strategy, 
including vital coordination between the State Department and 
Department of Defense, and second, the personnel deficit at 
many State Department posts across the Sahel. We must place 
qualified personnel with professional experience working on 
African policy and issues critical in Africa in the Sahel if it 
is indeed a region of strategic priority. Senior leaders at our 
diplomatic posts in the Sahel should have essential 
qualifications, the least of which should be previous Africa 
experience and the ability to speak French. For junior-level 
positions, the State Department urgently needs to figure out 
creative ways to incentivize service in this complex part of 
Africa. In the event that this requires additional resources, I 
look forward to the interagency providing these need requests 
to Congress.
    We have built up a great deal of goodwill through security 
cooperation and programs like PEPFAR. However, it is 
increasingly clear, in this renewed age of strategic 
competition, that what we have been doing in the past may not 
be enough. Losing influence in Africa to authoritarian 
competitors, whether their origin is African or from outside of 
the continent, has increased the likelihood that if we do not 
give our Africa policy the resources it deserves we will lose 
influence to these competitors.
    Finally, I would be interested to hear your thoughts on 
whether the ways the State Department and DoD have organized 
themselves on Africa policy optimally supports U.S. diplomatic 
and security objectives. In particular, I am curious as to how 
the decision to depose Libya's Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 may have 
played a role in sparking the negative, unintended consequences 
for the Sahel that we are discussing today.
    My interest stems from the fact that Libya was located 
within the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 
while Sahel policy was governed by the State Department Bureau 
of African Affairs. Meanwhile, the African Union included all 
of Africa within its mandate, and AFRICOM included all of 
Africa except for Egypt. With an eye towards the future, I am 
interested in how these differences may have impeded 
information flows and policy coordination for the Sahel.
    I look forward to today's conversation. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    With us today on behalf of the Administration is Ambassador 
Molly Phee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. 
Ambassador Phee is a career member of the Senior Foreign 
Service, who most recently served as the Deputy Special 
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation. Ambassador Phee 
was U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan from 2015 to 2017, Deputy 
Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, and as Chief 
of Staff in the Office of the Special Envoy for Sudan and South 
Sudan. So she has extensive experience in this regard.
    Mr. Robert Jenkins serves as Assistant to the Administrator 
for the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization. A 
career member of the Senior Executive Service, Mr. Jenkins was 
previously a Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for 
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance and the 
Director of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives. Prior to 
joining USAID in 1998, Mr. Jenkins designed and implemented 
emergency relief and recovery programs with World Vision 
International in southern Sudan and Sierra Leone.
    Our final witness today is Ms. Chidi Blyden, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs. Ms. Blyden 
is an expert on Africa's conflict security development issues. 
She served in the Obama administration as a Special Assistant 
to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African 
Affairs from 2013 to 2017. She managed several functional and 
regional responsibilities including U.S.-Africa defense policy 
for East and Central Africa. She served as the African 
Peacekeeping Advisor to the Stability and Humanitarian Affairs 
Office and was the department's lead on the President's Africa 
Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership Initiative.
    So again, welcome to all of you. Your full statements will 
be included for the record, without objection. We would ask you 
to summarize them in about 5 minutes so the Committee and its 
members can have a conversation with you on these issues. We 
thank you for your service and we ask that you proceed with 
your testimonies in the order in which I introduced you. So 
Ambassador Phee, you will start.

STATEMENT OF HON. MOLLY PHEE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
   AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rounds, and 
other colleagues of the Committee. I want to start by thanking 
you for your longstanding interest and engagement in the Sahel.
    Instability in the Sahel is a security problem with a 
governance solution. A decade of a security-focused approach 
has underscored this lesson as armed groups continue to expand 
their presence and capabilities despite French counterterrorism 
operations and significant western investments in African 
national security capabilities.
    Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership Program. I think it is clear that 
that progress, to put it nicely, has not been linear, and 
increasingly inadequate given the expanding number of terrorist 
incidents and civilian casualties, but our efforts have 
afforded us numerous lessons learned that we continue to take 
into account as we revise our approach to the Sahel.
    As we have found in the Middle East and in Southwest Asia, 
we must address the underlying drivers of insecurity to 
effectively support efforts by African partners to turn the 
tide. First, we must be realistic about the daunting social, 
environmental, political, and economic conditions that 
overwhelm the Sahel. In order to contend with violent extremist 
groups, governments in the region must dramatically reform and 
improve. We can best encourage this required change by 
investing in governance. The new interagency Sahel strategy 
seeks to build the capacity of governments in the Sahel to 
provide equitable delivery of government services and to adapt 
measures to improve accountability, anti-corruption, and 
dialogue between capitals and the periphery and among 
communities. These are the keys to winning the support of 
civilian populations.
    The 5-year strategy is sufficiently broad to withstand the 
blows of the kinds of crises and shifts we have seen recently. 
It allows U.S. embassies the flexibility to implement to 
greatest effect at the local level. I tell you frankly, 
however, that neither our African partners nor we will 
transform the Sahel within the first 5 years of the strategy. 
The goals we have identified call for action to promote 
fundamental policy and governance reforms that will take many 
years to undertake and implement. These are societal endeavors 
which by their very nature are incremental, but the 
reorientation explicit in the strategy is an essential first 
step.
    Recent extraconstitutional changes of government in three 
of the five Sahelian countries have complicated the task. We 
need greater investment in democracy and governance programing 
as well as more development assistance that targets underlying 
social, environmental, and economic deficiencies.
    In Mali, we welcome the recent agreement to a 24-month 
timeline between the regional bloc known as ECOWAS, the 
Economic Community of West African States, and the transition 
government. We join ECOWAS in insisting that the transition 
government turn its full attention to implementing the reforms 
necessary to set Mali on the path to democracy. We stand ready 
to assist as long as the transition government moves towards a 
constitutional referendum and elections, as envisioned. We are 
committed to the Malian people and their aspiration for 
responsive democratic governance.
    We know the Malian people also want security. The civilian 
casualties resulting from the reported tactics used by the 
Wagner Group, alongside Malian Armed Forces will only serve to 
sow further divisions in Malian society, undermine the 
credibility of those armed forces, and drive communities into 
the hands of violent extremists.
    The U.N. mission, known as MINUSMA, shares our goal of 
protecting civilians. We will be watching closely to see how 
the mission operates without French reassurance flights from 
Operation Barkhane. We also welcome to review envisioned in the 
new mandate to see how we can strengthen the mission's 
operations.
    We are very concerned by the statement made by Mali's 
transition government expressing its intent to deny MINUSMA the 
freedom of movement it needs to fulfill its mandate. We will be 
working closely to make sure that MINUSMA can carry out its 
mandate, despite these verbal threats.
    In Burkina Faso, we are encouraged by the transition 
government's proposal to shorten the timeline to return Burkina 
to democratically elected, civilian-led governance by 6 months. 
While the January 24 military coup d'etat triggered 
restrictions on U.S. assistance, we remain committed to helping 
the country under available authorities in order to address 
instability, prevent the spread of violent extremism, and 
support reforms to advance accountable democratic rule.
    Chad has an historic opportunity to change direction after 
decades of authoritarian rule. To capitalize on this 
opportunity, we have emphasized the importance of a peaceful, 
timely political transition, in line with the principles 
outlined by the African Union 2021 Communique. These include 
peaceful resolution of negotiations with the country's 
insurgent groups now taking place in Doha, hosting a national 
dialogue that is inclusive of all voices, and holding free and 
fair elections that lead to a democratically elected and 
civilian-led government.
    Mauritania remains one of our most stable partners in the 
Sahel. We continue to support the president's leadership in 
tackling terrorism and improving governance.
    The same is true in Niger, one of our most reliable and 
most willing partners in the Sahel. We value their partnership 
and are committed to supporting the leadership of the 
president.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, the new Sahel strategy identifies 
the threat to border countries in Coastal West Africa which are 
most at risk from violent extremist spillover from the Sahel as 
well as vulnerable to internal factors that mirror the 
governance challenges in the Sahel. We will use the lessons 
learned from the innovative approach outlined in the Global 
Fragility Act in Coastal West Africa to inform and reinvigorate 
our programming and coordination in the Sahel.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Phee follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Ms. Molly Phee

    Mr. Chairman, Senator Rounds and Senator Van Hollen, other 
Committee members, allow me to begin by thanking the committee for your 
longstanding interest and engagement in the Sahel. We share your 
concern about surging instability and democratic backsliding in the 
region.
    Instability in the Sahel is a security problem with a governance 
solution. A decade of a security-focused approach has underscored this 
lesson as armed groups continue to expand their presence and 
capabilities despite French counterterrorism operations and significant 
western investments in African national security capabilities.
    The Department of State, together with our colleagues from DoD and 
USAID, have previously provided substantial counterterrorism support 
across the Sahel through the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP). While progress has not proved linear, and increasingly 
inadequate given the expanding number of terrorist incidents and 
civilian casualties, our efforts have afforded us numerous lessons 
learned that we continue to take into account as we revise our approach 
to the Sahel.
    As we have found in the Middle East and in Southwest Asia, we must 
address the underlying drivers of insecurity to effectively support 
efforts by African partners to turn the tide. First, we must be 
realistic about the daunting social, environmental, political and 
economic conditions that overwhelm the Sahel. In order to contend with 
violent extremist groups, governments in the region must dramatically 
reform and improve. We can best encourage this required change by 
investing in governance. The new interagency Sahel strategy seeks to 
build the capacity of governments in the Sahel to regain public 
confidence at the national and local levels by providing the equitable 
delivery of government services, law enforcement, and justice. In other 
words, we will provide the resources and guidance to encourage 
accountability, anti-corruption measures, and dialogue between capitals 
and the periphery and among communities. These are the keys to winning 
the support of civilian populations.
    The 5-year strategy is sufficiently broad to withstand the blows of 
the kinds of crises and shifts we have seen in the Sahel in recent 
years. It allows U.S. embassies the flexibility to implement to 
greatest effect at the local level. I tell you frankly, however, that 
neither our African partners nor we will transform the Sahel within the 
first 5 years of the strategy. The goals we have identified call for 
action to promote fundamental policy and governance reforms that will 
take many years to undertake and implement. These are societal 
endeavors which by their nature are incremental, but the reorientation 
explicit in the strategy is an essential first step.
    Recent extraconstitutional changes of government in three of the 
five Sahelian countries political degradations that illustrate the 
pressures of governance in this volatile region have complicated the 
task. We need greater investment in democracy and governance 
programing, as well as more development assistance that targets 
underlying social, environmental and economic deficiencies--so that the 
United States is positioned to assist these transitions in moving 
toward a more stable democratic future.
    In Mali, we welcome the agreement to a 24-month timeline between 
the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) and the 
transition government. We will join ECOWAS in insisting that the 
transition government turn its full attention to implementing the key 
reforms necessary to set Mali on the path to restore its democracy. The 
United States provided technical assistance for the creation of the 
electoral law. We stand ready to assist as long as the transition 
government moves towards a constitutional referendum and elections. We 
are committed to the Malian people and their aspiration for responsive 
democratic governance.
    We know the Malian people also want security. The civilian 
casualties resulting from the reported tactics used by the Wagner 
Group, alongside Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), will only serve to sow 
further divisions in Malian society, undermine the credibility of the 
FAMa, and drive communities into the hands of violent extremist groups.
    The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) shares our goal of protecting civilians. We will be watching 
closely to see how the mission operates without French reassurance 
flights from Operation Barkhane. The United States is deeply concerned 
by the statement made by Mali's transition government expressing its 
intent to deny MINUSMA the freedom of movement necessary to fulfill its 
mandate. To act in this contrary manner would be a blatant violation of 
the status of forces agreement (SOFA) that the transition government is 
obligated to uphold.
    In Burkina Faso, we are encouraged by the transition government's 
proposal to shorten the timeline to return Burkina Faso to 
democratically elected civilian-led governance by 6 months. While the 
January 24 military coup d'etat triggered restrictions on U.S. 
assistance for the Government of Burkina Faso, we remain committed to 
assistance to the country under available authorities in order to 
address instability, prevent the spread of violent extremism, and 
support reforms to advance accountable democratic rule. The 
installation of a democratically elected government would open the door 
for deeper cooperation.
    Chad has an historic opportunity to change direction after decades 
of authoritarian rule. To capitalize on this moment, we have emphasized 
the importance of a peaceful, timely political transition. It is the 
responsibility of the Transitional Military Council to fulfill its 
commitments to Chadian citizens, and to the principles outlined in the 
African Union 2021 Communique. These include peaceful resolution of 
negotiations with the country's insurgent groups--known as politico-
military groups--that have been underway in Doha for 6 months, hosting 
a national dialogue that is inclusive of all voices, and holding free 
and fair elections that lead to a democratically elected and civilian-
led government.
    Mauritania remains one of our most stable partners in the Sahel. 
The country's 2019 election was a watershed moment which saw the 
country's first transition from one democratically elected president to 
another. President Ghazouani is tackling long-standing human rights 
issues. We applaud Mauritania's internal reforms to its security sector 
which have strengthened its capability in responding to violent 
extremist groups. Mauritania has not suffered a terrorist attack on its 
soil since 2011. The United States appreciates Mauritania's efforts to 
combat terrorism within its borders and its partnership with the United 
States in countering terrorism in the region.
    Niger continues to be our most reliable and willing partner in the 
Sahel and a country with a firm commitment to democratic processes, as 
demonstrated in 2021 by the nation's first peaceful democratic 
transition of power. We applaud President Bazoum's forward-leaning 
pledge to strengthen and expand the High Authority Against Corruption 
and Related Crimes to counter corruption and impunity. The United 
States values Niger's partnership and the country's contributions to 
regional peace and security.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, the new Sahel strategy identifies the threat 
to border countries in coastal West Africa which are most at risk from 
violent extremist spillover from the Sahel as well as vulnerable to 
internal factors that mirror the governance challenges in the Sahel. We 
are grateful for the resources and flexibilities provided by the Global 
Fragility Act. We are taking advantage of the GFA to forge a holistic 
approach to bolstering resiliencies and mitigating risks in 
marginalized communities. We are seeking to strengthen social cohesion 
between and among communities along the border, with a focus on 
improving access to livelihoods for unemployed youth. We also intend to 
strengthen civilian-security force relations through training to 
professionalize security forces and enhance their capacity to protect 
civilians. We will use the lessons learned from the innovative GFA 
approach in coastal West Africa to inform and reinvigorate our 
programming and coordination in the Sahel.

    The Chairman. Thank you. Administrator Jenkins.

 STATEMENT OF ROBERT JENKINS, ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, 
BUREAU FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND STABILIZATION, UNITED STATES 
      AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Jenkins. Chairman Menendez, thank you. Senator Rounds, 
distinguished members of the Committee, thank you very much for 
the opportunity to testify today and for bringing attention to 
the urgent needs of this critically important region.
    I am particularly glad to be testifying with my colleagues 
from the State and Defense Departments, as we are actively 
working to prevent the Sahel's problems from creeping into West 
African countries as we implement the Global Fragility Act and 
the U.S. strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability.
    Looking across the Sahel, we see a region where the 
confluences of U.S. national security interests means we must 
devote attention and resources to supporting key partners. We 
also see a region that is particularly fragile, with weak 
governments characterized by corruption and lack of 
accountability, unprofessional security forces, limited 
services and opportunities for citizens, intercommunal 
conflicts, large gender inequalities, and armed groups looking 
to recruit.
    The Sahel is beset by problems, many problems all 
exacerbating each other. It is a region where decades of 
undelivered promises have continuously eroded what were never 
strong, thriving democracies. It is a region where we have seen 
young people dancing in support of military takeovers, waving 
Russian flags, and repeating the disinformation that targets 
them relentlessly. It is a region where violent extremists prey 
on a generation that sees little promise, holds little hope, 
feels little agency, and is desperate for many of life's most 
basic needs.
    Add the effects of climate change, like desertification and 
multi-seasonal drought, the impact of the pandemic on fragile 
political and public health systems, and the global food 
security crisis brought on by Putin's invasion of Ukraine and 
you have a region in crisis. Each factor exacerbates the other, 
fragility begetting fragility.
    So what is to be done? U.S. foreign assistance has an 
important role to play in supporting partner governments to 
manage threats and improve stability and security. We need to 
bring fresh thinking and new tools to bear in reducing 
democratic backsliding, corruption, and other drivers of 
illegitimacy, combatting disinformation and limiting openings 
from malign external influence in the countries of the Sahel. 
We must support timely democratic transitions in Burkina Faso, 
Chad, and Mali, and critical political, social, economic, and 
governance reforms across the region to reduce corruption and 
prevent further democratic erosion.
    We should enable governments to enhance their presence in 
underserved areas and decentralize their service delivery, 
foster increased citizen trust in their governments, mitigate 
the risk of intercommunal conflict, improve business-enabling 
environments, and reduce cycles of political instability by 
demonstrating that democracy can deliver tangible benefits for 
all.
    We must help our partners adapt and manage consequences of 
ongoing climate change and displacement. This will require 
close and genuine partnerships with local actors, including 
governments, civil society, and the private sector. None of 
this will take root without strengthening and expanding the 
role of African institutions and balancing regional threats and 
opportunities with underlying macroeconomic conditions.
    We will have to get better at shifting more leadership, 
ownership, decision-making, and implementation to the people 
and institutions who possess the capability, connectedness, and 
credibility to drive change in their own countries and 
communities.
    How can Congress help us? We cannot do this important work 
without the resources you generously provide every year. USAID 
and other partners of the U.S. Government working this problem 
set cannot know with certainty the shape of the conflict years 
out. We ask you to consider granting more flexibility to allow 
us to adapt as the facts and needs on the ground change 
quickly. It is a model that has succeeded and one USAID wants 
to scale to the size of the problem.
    Similarly, USAID sees great utility in further conversation 
on flexible hiring mechanisms and better incentivizing our 
people to fill positions in the field where they are needed, 
often side-by-side with the Department of Defense and 
Department of State colleagues. Our missions and offices in the 
region are chronically understaffed, even though the work is 
critical to our national security. For all the enthusiasm of an 
integrated approach between departments and agencies here in 
Washington, the greatest difference comes in the field, 
alongside colleagues and international partners tackling these 
complex challenges together.
    Thank you again for convening this important hearing. I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Mr. Robert W. Jenkins

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for 
bringing attention to the urgent needs of this critically important 
region.
    Looking across the Sahel, USAID sees a region where the confluence 
of U.S. national security interests means that we must devote attention 
and resources to supporting key partners. We also see a region that is 
particularly fragile, with weak governments characterized by corruption 
and lack of accountability, unprofessional security forces, limited 
services and opportunities for citizens, intercommunal conflicts, large 
gender inequalities, and armed groups looking to recruit.
    Each country has a youth bulge, which presents tremendous 
opportunities, but could prove dangerous if other issues are not 
addressed. In addition, countries are still grappling with the COVID-19 
pandemic, which has not only placed already weak health systems under 
strain, but also reduced the overall presence of states, exacerbated 
social fragmentation, created economic hardship, and opened spaces for 
armed groups to exploit. Climate change is taking a particularly strong 
toll on countries across the Sahel, prompting increased competition and 
opening fissures between communities. Putin's war on Ukraine is harming 
food security and economic growth in the region. Meanwhile, democratic 
governance--the best mechanism to identify peaceful solutions to 
political problems, including those underpinning much of this 
violence--is under assault, with several extra-constitutional changes 
in governments in recent years.
    These diverse conflicts and societal fractures in turn give violent 
extremist organizations, both international and local, opportunities to 
exploit, recruit, and perpetuate existing conflict. While our 
development and humanitarian assistance programs--from the fight 
against COVID-19 to education to a variety of life saving 
interventions--are achieving positive results for people in the Sahel, 
we cannot ignore the growing violence and instability threatening the 
progress we hope to achieve in the region.
    The Sahel provides a striking example of the threats and challenges 
posed by violent extremists and conflict. In Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, 
and Chad, armed groups have challenged states' authority and 
legitimacy, recruited disaffected youth into their ranks, exacerbated 
ethnic tensions, aligned themselves with groups like Al Qaeda, the 
Islamic State, and Boko Haram, and used an extended period of simmering 
war and violence to grow and expand their influence. According to the 
2022 Global Terrorism Index, 48 percent of terrorism deaths worldwide 
occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, and three countries in the Sahel--
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger--suffered some of the largest annual 
increases. Since 2007, terrorism deaths in the region have increased by 
more than 1,000 percent, and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), 
Al Qaeda's branch in the Sahel, is the world's fastest growing 
terrorist organization. This violence has caused widespread 
displacement, including more than 2 million people in Burkina Faso--10 
percent of its population. Worryingly, several extremist groups have 
evolved beyond simply carrying out attacks; they now look to fill roles 
of the state, whether collecting revenue, administering so-called 
justice, or expanding their recruitment pool, including not just 
fighters, but also their families.
    The governments of the Sahel are ill-equipped to manage and respond 
to these unprecedented threats to security, despite substantial support 
from the United States and its allies. Recent coups in Mali and Burkina 
Faso are both a symptom of the ineffectiveness of their civilian 
governments and a barrier to continued U.S. security assistance. Niger, 
with its democratically elected government and more capable security 
forces, remains a linchpin in our efforts to promote stability in the 
region, but it too is vulnerable as it has four separate violent 
extremist groups active in its borders. Many of the grievances that 
have led to increasing vulnerability to extremist influence in 
neighboring countries are also present in Niger, including poor service 
delivery, lack of economic opportunity, and an ill-functioning justice 
system. We must therefore reinforce our partnership with the Government 
of Niger to help it withstand the threat posed by terrorist 
organizations; our support must also include strengthening the 
resilience of vulnerable communities against the influence of violent 
extremists. We should also continue to support Mauritania, particularly 
as an example of how democratic governments can deliver for their 
people. Meanwhile, we must think creatively about how the United States 
can work with military-led governments to support their return to 
democracy while also tackling the grave security challenges that 
threaten U.S. interests.
    Other developments in the region--most notably the ongoing 
withdrawal of French forces from Mali--are shifting the landscape and 
necessitating a recalibration about how to address the threat posed by 
violent extremist groups in concert with our international partners. 
Continued support for and coordination with regional political and 
security organizations, like the Economic Community of West Africa 
States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), will need to play a more 
prominent role in our strategic approach going forward. We appreciate, 
for instance, recent efforts by ECOWAS to encourage timely democratic 
transitions in Mali and Burkina Faso, as well as Guinea. We can also 
leverage our new membership in the Sahel Alliance to influence other 
like-minded donors active in the region.
    Violent extremist groups are not, however, the only threat to U.S. 
interests in the Sahel. Our strategic rivals also seek to exploit the 
situation to pursue their own nefarious interests. Most notably, the 
Kremlin-backed Wagner Group has deployed to Mali, among other countries 
on the continent and throughout the world, and is credibly accused of 
atrocities against civilians. In April, Human Rights Watch reported 
that Malian armed forces and ``associated foreign soldiers'' executed 
300 civilians in the town of Moura. Meanwhile, disinformation campaigns 
have targeted Western governments and promoted Russia as a more 
suitable security partner for countries in the region.
    Compounding the deterioration of conditions in the Sahel is the 
territorial spread of violent extremist groups. Countries like Benin, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo must now grapple with the risk of 
attacks and recruitment from violent extremist groups. A decade ago, 
many of us would not have imagined these scenarios for a place like 
Ghana. In light of this risk, USAID is investing people and resources 
in Coastal West African countries as part of an integrated U.S. 
Government effort through the Global Fragility Act (GFA) and the U.S. 
Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability with the goal of 
weakening violent extremist groups' appeal, curbing their opportunities 
to make inroads in these places, and building the resilience of 
governments and societies. Part of how we will define success in West 
Africa is keeping violent extremist groups from challenging 
governments, recruiting disaffected citizens, and carrying out attacks 
in coastal states the way they have elsewhere in the region. 
Complementary to that effort will be tackling instability in the Sahel.
    On top of the security challenges facing the Sahel, the region is 
also experiencing a food security emergency. The combined effects of 
Russia's war on Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, long-term complex 
emergencies, and multiseason droughts and other effects of climate 
change have created an unprecedented crisis. The United Nations 
estimates that more than 40 million people will face food shortages 
during the upcoming lean season in West Africa. In the Sahel, this is 
exacerbated by an existing poor harvest and the effects of conflict 
that continue to deplete household food stocks and resources. Countries 
across the Sahel are also struggling to secure imports of fertilizer, 
grains, and other critical commodities. For example, the International 
Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) estimates that Mali, Niger, and 
Burkina Faso have less than half of their typical fertilizer stocks. 
Shortfalls of this scale could significantly reduce crop yields, food 
availability, and household incomes. Lessons learned from severe food 
security emergencies in 2017 indicate that incidence of gender-based 
violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, early and forced marriage, 
child labor, family separation, and other negative coping strategies 
increase sharply during periods of acute food insecurity.
    The human toll of these overlapping crises is enough to give us 
pause, but the proliferation of violent extremist activity in the 
Sahel--on top of ongoing conflicts already stressing under-capacitated 
governments with competing interests--has implications for American 
security. While USAID supports a rebalanced approach to 
counterterrorism, a number of increasingly experienced armed violent 
extremist groups with links to international terrorist groups still 
presents risks to Americans, the United States, and our interests, 
allies, and partners. As violent extremist groups grow, recruit, 
network, and become more emboldened, so too do the risks to our 
overseas facilities and personnel. The United States must prepare to 
confront future threats, but in our recalibration, we must continue to 
pay attention to the threat posed by violent extremist groups in places 
like the Sahel.
    I firmly believe U.S. foreign assistance has a role to play in 
promoting stability and preventing the expansion of violent extremism 
in the Sahel, supporting partner governments to manage and transform 
conflict and violence, and ensuring communities are more resilient to 
recurrent threats. U.S. policy and our approach to advancing our 
strategic objectives in the years ahead requires fresh thinking and a 
new set of tools. Our approach must entail elevating policies and 
programs that simultaneously limit or reduce democratic backsliding, 
corruption, and other drivers of illegitimacy, combat disinformation, 
and limit openings for malign external influence in the five Sahelian 
states and their neighbors. In particular, we will need to work with 
the region's military-led governments to achieve timely and credible 
transitions to democracy. To counter disinformation campaigns by malign 
actors, we must improve our public outreach to better convey the 
benefits of partnering with the United States and the generosity of the 
American people. We will build on our excellent development programs 
that are delivering results and we must strengthen coordination across 
the interagency and cooperation with like-minded allies and partners to 
build institutional capacity across sectors. In addition, our work will 
require close, genuine partnerships with local actors, including 
governments and civil society, to shift more leadership, ownership, 
decision making, and implementation to the people and institutions who 
possess the capability, connectedness, and credibility to drive change 
in their own countries and communities.
    It will be important for U.S. foreign assistance to the Sahel to 
include bolstering national institutions and policy reforms; promoting 
local-level civilian protection, service delivery, and development; 
improving partner coordination; optimizing coordination around food 
security and humanitarian assistance; and countering unhelpful external 
actors and disinformation campaigns. We must support timely democratic 
transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, and critical political, 
social, economic, and governance reforms across the region to reduce 
corruption and prevent further democratic erosion. U.S. assistance 
should also enable governments to enhance their presence in underserved 
areas and decentralize their service delivery, foster increased citizen 
trust in their governments, mitigate the risk of inter-communal 
conflict, improve business-enabling environments, and reduce cycles of 
political instability by demonstrating that democracy can deliver 
tangible benefits to all. We must also help our partners adapt to and 
manage consequences of ongoing climate change and displacement in the 
Sahel. None of this work will take root without strengthening and 
expanding the role of African institutions in balancing regional 
threats and opportunities with underlying macroeconomic conditions. The 
United States must similarly improve its coordination with other donors 
and allies to increase synchronization across development, 
humanitarian, and peace-building programming, and burden sharing while 
also countering the propaganda and disinformation generated by 
strategic competitors.
    Finally, I appreciate this opportunity to share my views on what 
more Congress could do to help USAID and the rest of the U.S. 
Government protect its interests and advance its objectives in the 
Sahel. The scale of the challenges facing the region and the ever-
changing nature of conflicts there have and would continue to benefit 
from increased flexibility in appropriated funding. These flexible 
contingency resources have allowed us to adapt as fast as the facts and 
needs on the ground change. It is a model that has succeeded and one 
USAID wants to scale to the size of the problem; we appreciate your 
continued consideration of flexible funds. Similarly, USAID sees great 
utility in a further conversation on flexible hiring mechanisms and 
better incentivizing our people to fill positions in the field where 
they are needed, often side-by-side with Department of Defense and the 
Department of State colleagues. Our Missions and offices in the region 
are chronically understaffed even though the work is critical to our 
national security. For all the enthusiasm of an integrated approach 
between departments and agencies here in Washington, the greatest 
difference comes in the field, alongside colleagues and international 
partners tackling these complex challenges together.
    Thank you again for convening this important hearing.

    The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Blyden.

   STATEMENT OF CHIDI BLYDEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
   DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Blyden. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, Senator Rounds, and members of the Committee. It is an 
honor to testify before you today, alongside Assistant 
Secretary Phee, to discuss the Department of Defense--DoD's 
Sahel policy and how DoD is working to align its activities 
within the United States' whole-of-government Sahel Strategy.
    The National Defense Strategy outlines three high-level 
security priorities in Africa, namely: countering violent 
extremist organizations--VEOs--that pose a threat to the U.S. 
homeland and U.S. interests; strengthening allies and 
partnership to support mutual security objectives; and 
addressing targeted strategic competition concerns that present 
a military risk to the United States. In the Sahel, these three 
priorities intersect in a manner that requires not only an 
integrated approach, but a whole-of-government approach.
    Over the past 6 months we have seen the intersection of 
these three challenges in the Sahel has resulted in military 
coups, unconstitutional political transitions, democratic 
backsliding in West Africa, the inherent spread of VEOs and an 
exponential increase in their attacks, the destabilizing 
presence of Russia's Wagner Group, and the withdrawal of French 
and other allied forces from Mali. These challenges transcend 
national borders, and therefore require a coordinated regional 
approach. As such, it would behoove us to address them together 
with our African partners.
    VEOs are increasingly exploiting power vacuums, 
instability, local tensions, and weak government institutions 
and governing practices. These groups jeopardize stability, 
democracy, and peace, which further provides opportunities for 
extremism to proliferate, creating a vicious feedback loop that 
is fueled by a lack of good governance and human rights 
accountability. When governments struggle to maintain security, 
deliver essential services, uphold humanitarian principles, or 
even provide economic opportunities in conflict environments, 
conditions are ripe for VEOs to exploit and appeal to 
vulnerable and unprotected marginalized populations,
    Furthermore, illicit networks that traffic drugs, weapons, 
and persons across the continent create the conditions that 
empower VEOs and serve as lucrative sources of revenue for 
these groups and allows for their expansion across the 
continent. There are over a dozen active ISIS and al Qaeda 
affiliates on the continent, from the Sahel to the Lake Chad 
Basin, from Somalia to the DRC. These groups vary in their 
intent and capability to attack U.S. interests, with those in 
the Sahel among the most capable.
    In the Sahel we have seen the rapid expansion and open 
movement of Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, otherwise known 
as JNIM, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, ISGS, 
within Mali, into neighboring Burkina Faso, Niger, and 
southward to the West African littoral countries. VEOs continue 
to spread towards coastal West Africa, and if left unchecked, 
will add to existing security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea 
and Coastal West Africa.
    DoD is working closely with State and USAID to develop 
programs for Coastal West Africa countries as part of the 
Global Fragility Act, as mentioned by my colleague, and the 
U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability. The 
strategy implementation in Coastal West Africa will help 
bolster coastal states against the encroachment of VEOs from 
the Sahel. An already complex situation in Mali has been 
exacerbated by the presence of Russia-backed Wagner Group, and 
additionally, the withdrawal of forces under the French 
Operation BARKHANE have also created challenges to allowing the 
MINUSMA, or the United Nations mission in Mali, to continue its 
operations.
    Given these new and increasing challenges, we--the U.S., 
our allies, and especially our African partners--need to 
consider the root of our counterterrorism efforts. As we have 
experienced in other key theaters, failing to understand the 
root causes at the local levels and understand our partners, 
their will to fight can have significant consequences. We need 
to integrate our entire approach in the Sahel with our African 
partners or we risk undermining our own efforts, and providing 
additional opportunities for VEOs and strategic competitors to 
gain access and influence.
    Niger is one of our most critical and crucial security 
partners in the Sahel, and they continue to set the example of 
democracy in the region. We need to continue to support the 
Government of Niger as our partnership with them is critical to 
success in the region.
    In Mauritania we hope to increase professionalization 
engagements with Sahel partners. Given its lengthy border with 
Mali, and hosting the G5 Sahel Defense College, enabling 
Mauritania into a more active role as part of the broader Sahel 
strategy is important.
    While Chad remains one of the most capable partners in the 
region, ending U.S. security cooperation has affected our 
bilateral engagement. As the Transitional Military Council 
works towards a return to democratically elected and civilian-
led government, we remain committed to supporting the will of 
the Chadian people. Chad was one of only six countries on the 
African continent to endorse Russia's suspension from the U.N. 
Human Rights Council.
    Chad is faced by terrorist threats, humanitarian crises, 
and malign Russian influence in its own region. The United 
States has the potential to provide meaningful security 
cooperation to train Chad's military and civilian services, 
especially given its role as a troop contributor in U.N. and 
regional peace operations.
    We are encouraging our European allies and African partners 
operating in the Sahel to adopt a similar approach to what you 
will hear about from the Sahel strategy, one that seeks 
solutions that are integrated, whole-of-government, and 
African-led. We assess that unilateral military action is 
insufficient to address the scope of threats we face on the 
continent. Although the continent is awash in new initiatives, 
it would truly benefit from management of the international 
communities' support to our partners and their locally 
supported efforts.
    To this end, we continue to better understand our partners' 
security needs, designing and implementing our programs and 
engagements along mutual priorities.
    As we examine a new approach in the Sahel, it is critical 
for us to work with our African partners in order to implement 
a shared vision for the future of African security. Our role 
here is to enable our African partners to be successful in 
owning their own security, for their benefit and ours. The best 
way to help them own their own security is to allow them to 
lead, shaping our support to their efforts.
    Our adversaries are well aware of Africa's strategic 
potential and are devoting resources and time to strengthen 
their partnerships on the continent. As part of its engagement, 
Russia and the PRC routinely provide training and defense 
articles to African nations. While our African partners have 
stated repeatedly that they prefer our training and defense 
articles, they turn to our competitors when we are not 
responsive to their requests. We must work to be more 
responsive and more present if we are to succeed in this arena.
    Let us not forget the PRC seeks to expand its access, and 
the PRC basing on the continent remains a key concern. As this 
Committee is probably aware, the PRC seeks to open additional 
bases, tying their commercial seaport investments in East, West 
and Southern Africa closely with involvement by Chinese 
military forces in order to further their geo-strategic 
interests.
    The Chairman. Ms. Blyden, you have been about 7 minutes, so 
if you can summarize for us.
    Ms. Blyden. I will wrap up.
    In conclusion, the Sahel is a region where our three NDS 
priorities in Africa intersect, requiring an integrated, whole-
of-government approach that leverages our allies and partners, 
but puts our African partners in the lead with respect to 
restoring and preserving security on the continent.
    I apologize for taking a little extra time.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Blyden follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Ms. Chidi Blyden

    Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of 
the Committee. It is an honor to testify before you today, alongside 
Assistant Secretary Phee, to discuss the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Sahel Policy and how DoD is working to align its activities within the 
United States' whole-of-government Sahel Strategy.
    The National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines three high-level 
security priorities in Africa, namely: (1) countering violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs) that pose a threat to the U.S. homeland and U.S. 
interests; (2) strengthening allies and partners to support mutual 
security objectives; and, (3) addressing targeted strategic competition 
concerns that present a military risk to the United States. In the 
Sahel, these three priorities intersect in a manner that requires not 
only an integrated approach, but a whole-of-government approach.
    Over the past 6 months we have seen the intersection of these three 
challenges in the Sahel has resulted in military coups, armed coup 
attempts, unconstitutional political transitions, and democratic 
backsliding in West Africa; the spread of VEOs and an exponential 
increase in their attacks; the destabilizing presence of Russia's 
Wagner Group; and the withdrawal of French and other allied forces from 
Mali. These challenges transcend national borders, and therefore 
require a coordinated regional approach. As such, it would behoove us 
to address them together with our African partners.
                                  veos
    VEOs are increasingly exploiting power vacuums, instability, local 
tensions, and weak government institutions and governing practices. 
These groups jeopardize stability, democracy, and peace, which further 
provides opportunities for extremism to proliferate, creating a vicious 
feedback loop that is fueled by a lack of good governance and human 
rights accountability. When governments struggle to maintain security, 
deliver essential services, uphold humanitarian principles, or provide 
economic opportunities in conflict environments, and neglect or 
actively press communities, conditions are ripe for VEOs to exploit and 
appeal to vulnerable and unprotected marginalized populations, thus 
enabling their recruitment efforts to be more effective.
    Further, illicit networks that traffic drugs, weapons, and persons 
across the continent create the conditions that empower VEOs and serve 
as lucrative sources of revenue for these groups and which allows for 
their expansion across the continent. There are over a dozen active 
ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates on the continent, from the Sahel to the 
Lake Chad Basin, from Somalia to the DRC, from northern Mozambique to 
southern Libya. These groups vary in their intent and capability to 
attack U.S. interests, with those in the Sahel among the most capable.
    In the Sahel we have seen the rapid expansion and open movement of 
Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the 
Greater Sahara (ISGS) within Mali, into neighboring Burkina Faso and 
Niger, and southward to West African littoral states with attacks in 
Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Togo. VEOs continue to spread towards 
coastal West Africa, and if left unchecked, will add to the already 
existing security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. DoD is working with 
State and USAID to develop programs for Coastal West Africa countries 
as part of the Global Fragility Act (GFA) and the U.S. Strategy to 
Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability. Strategy implementation in 
Coastal West Africa will help bolster coastal states against the 
encroachment of VEOs from the Sahel. An already complex situation in 
Mali has been exacerbated by the presence of Russia-backed Wagner 
Group. Additionally, the withdrawal of forces under the French 
Operation BARKHANE, including Task Force TAKUBA, and the critical 
enablers Operation BARKHANE provides to the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 
and the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), pose increased 
challenges for the region. Given these new and increasing challenges, 
we--the U.S., allies, and especially our African partners--need to 
consider the future of our counterterrorism efforts. As we have seen in 
other key theaters, failing to understand root causes at local levels 
and understand our partners, and especially their will to fight, can 
have significant consequences. We need to integrate our entire approach 
in the Sahel with our African partners or risk undermining our own 
efforts, providing additional opportunities for VEOs and strategic 
competitors to gain access and influence.
    Niger is one of our most crucial security partners in the Sahel, 
and continues to set the example of democracy in the region. We need to 
continue to support the Government of Niger as our partnership with 
them is critical to success in the region.
    In Mauritania we hope to increase engagement in professionalization 
engagements with Sahel partners. Given its lengthy border with Mali, 
and with Nouakchott hosting the G5 Sahel Defense College, bringing 
Mauritania into a more active role as part of the broader Sahel 
strategy is important.
    While Chad remains one of the most capable partners in the region 
and N'Djamena is the new host of the G5 Sahel Headquarters, ending U.S. 
security cooperation has affected our bilateral engagement. As the 
Transitional Military Council works towards a return to democratically 
elected and civilian-led government, we remain committed to supporting 
the Chadian people. Chad was one of only six countries on the African 
continent to endorse Russia's suspension from the UN Human Rights 
Council. Chad is faced by terrorist threats, humanitarian crises, and 
malign Russian influence in its own region. The United States has the 
potential to provide meaningful security cooperation to train Chad's 
military and civilian services, especially given its role as a troop 
contributor in UN and regional peace operations.
                    u.s. relationships in the sahel
    We are encouraging our European allies operating in the Sahel to 
adopt a similar approach--one that seeks solutions that are integrated, 
whole-of-government and, African-led. We assess that unilateral 
military action is insufficient to address the scope of threats we face 
on the continent. Although the continent is awash in new initiatives, 
it would truly benefit from better management of the international 
communities' support to our partners and their locally supported 
efforts.
    To this end, we continue to work to better understand our partners' 
security needs, designing and implementing our programs and engagements 
along mutual priorities. Through improved management of these 
processes, and with Africans in the lead, together we can tackle VEOs, 
support the growth of good governance, and reduce instability on the 
continent.
    As we examine a new approach in the Sahel, it is critical for us to 
work with our African partners in order to implement a shared vision 
for the future of African security. Our role is to enable our African 
partners to be successful in owning their own security, for their 
benefit and ours. The best way to help them own their own security is 
to allow them to lead, shaping our support to their efforts.
                         strategic competition
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia
    Our adversaries are well aware of Africa's strategic potential and 
are devoting resources and time to strengthen their partnerships on the 
continent. As part of its engagement, Russia and the PRC routinely 
provide training and defense articles to African nations. While our 
African partners have stated repeatedly they prefer our training and 
defense articles, they turn to our competitors when we are not 
responsive to their requests. We must work to be more responsive and 
more present if we are to succeed in this space.
    Let us not forget the PRC seeks to expand its access, and PRC 
basing on the continent remains a key concern. As this committee is 
probably aware, the PRC seeks to open additional bases, tying their 
commercial seaport investments in East, West and Southern Africa 
closely with involvement by Chinese military forces in order to further 
their geo-strategic interests.
    PRC and Russian security investments in Africa are also largely 
unencumbered by international norms. These investments pose a 
significant challenge to our own security investments, which must meet 
rigorous standards in accordance with U.S. values, including democracy, 
human rights, and internationally accepted legal constructs. 
Furthermore, PRC and Russian security assistance often prioritizes 
regime preservation over long-term institutional capacity building, 
which undermines stability as well as good governance and respect for 
human rights.
                               conclusion
    In conclusion, the Sahel is a region where our three NDS priorities 
in Africa intersect, requiring an integrated, whole-of-government 
approach that leverages other allies and partners, but puts our African 
partners in the lead with respect to restoring and preserving security 
on the continent. Thank you.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much. I will start a round of 
5 minutes.
    I am pleased to know that the Administration is on track to 
deliver a strategy for the Sahel in keeping with the 
requirements of the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership 
Program Act of 2021, which I sponsored. I appreciate the 
consultations that have occurred today on the staff level, and 
I consider this hearing a continuation of those consultations.
    As I mentioned during my opening statement, I will have 
input into the strategy as a result of our conversations today 
and those that have taken place, but I would like each of our 
witnesses to elaborate on the following question. For two 
decades, successive administrations have focused heavily on 
security in the Sahel. I agree that security must be one 
element of our approach, but I also think we need to balance 
defense assistance with our development and diplomatic efforts. 
How does the draft strategy differ from the approach of 
previous administrations with respect to balancing these so-
called three D's?
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, you will recall a year ago when I 
came before this Committee for my confirmation hearing, I 
reviewed the testimony of the confirmation hearing of my 
predecessor in 2017, and at that time you asked him for a Sahel 
strategy, and when I assumed office we still did not have a 
Sahel strategy. So that was one of the first tasks I took on.
    The Chairman. For the record, that is 5 years.
    Ms. Phee. Yes. I know. I tried to bring the lessons we have 
learned collectively, as a nation, from other theaters that are 
reflected in the Global Fragility Act. So you will see, as your 
staff has looked at the new strategy, an explicit shift away 
from a security-dominated focus to a diplomatic and development 
emphasis. Those, of course, are difficult tasks, as I mentioned 
in my initial statement, that will take some time.
    As my colleagues have said and as I have said, we could use 
more resources to help us implement those tasks. In the current 
budget discussions underway in the Administration, there is an 
effort to address the allocation of resources to reinforce the 
outcomes and the strategy.
    So I would say we absolutely have taken the lessons that we 
have learned, again, as a nation over the past 20 years, 
specifically in the Sahel in the past 10 years, and reoriented 
the strategy to reflect the concerns and the lessons we have 
learned.
    The Chairman. Administrator Jenkins, any observations on 
that?
    Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Senator. I have seen a lot of these 
strategies before, and for many of them you can cut and paste 
the name of the country and the same objectives are in there. 
This is not like that. This is a real, clear-eyed, honest 
assessment of where things are in the Sahel. It is not a pretty 
picture. What we have to do first, let's get these three 
countries back on democratic rails, and how do we help them 
address the problems that they find themselves in?
    As Assistant Secretary Phee said, these are generational 
problems. They will not be fixed in 5 years, but we have to 
start now, and we now have a new strategy to do that, that 
emphasizes not killing terrorists, but addressing the root 
causes. It is hard work. It is slow work. It needs to be 
resourced, but now we have a strategy and we can get on with 
it.
    The Chairman. Secretary Blyden.
    Ms. Blyden. I would offer that we have learned that the 
counterterrorism approach that we have employed in the Sahel in 
working with our allies and partners is not the only solution 
to addressing the growing insecurity. I think we are shifting 
our approach from solely only focusing on the CT approach to 
being more inclusive of not just the whole-of-government 
approach, but also addressing things at the local level, so 
ensuring that African initiatives and initiatives that are led 
by African institutions and frameworks are being enabled to be 
able to address the security concerns on their own. That, 
alongside with what we are doing on the governance end and what 
we are doing from a diplomatic end is helping provide a more 
holistic approach to addressing these. I think as both of my 
colleagues have said, this takes time, and allowing the African 
partners to give us what they know will work is also key.
    The Chairman. Well let me follow up with you. In your 
written testimony you mentioned, and I am quoting you, ``Ending 
U.S. security cooperation has affected our bilateral engagement 
with Chad.'' So did the coup affect our relationship at all? 
Are you suggesting that we engage in business as usual with a 
military junta? How would doing so reflect U.S. values, in your 
view, and what message would that send throughout the region, 
and for that fact, throughout the world, by continuing to 
support a junta as though the coup had not taken place?
    Ms. Blyden. Senator, I would not suggest that we should 
support a junta. I would say that in our pulling back and not 
engaging regularly with the militaries and many of the 
governments, our absence and our ability to be able to provide 
influence, whether it be at the governance structure or even 
training, where we emphasize human rights values, where we 
emphasize a democratic approach, has inhibited our ability to 
be able to have access. Our influence, I think, is one of the 
key things that the U.S. has been able to provide.
    So while I do not necessarily propose that we should 
continue to work with juntas, I do think having an ability to 
be able to work and talk to them, to be able to report our 
influence, is key.
    The Chairman. Well talking to them is different than 
engaging in security cooperation with them, in which we are 
providing potentially resources, right? So one of the 
Committee's jurisdictions is the question of arms sales. It is 
very difficult to be engaged in selling arms to a junta that 
has upended constitutional order in a country. That is one of 
the challenges that I believe we have here, and it seems to me 
that our focus in the region has been, for some time, on a 
purely counterterrorism--and I understand that that is an 
important function, but when it becomes the sole driver, and 
when our engagement with the military entities that are not 
under civilian control ultimately continues and perpetuates 
them, that is a problem.
    Let me ask one final question. I know that the draft 
strategy is a 5-year strategy. How will the Administration 
implement this strategy if three of the five countries in the 
Sahel are governed by illegitimate military juntas with 
shifting timelines for yielding power back to civilian 
authorities?
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, as we saw recently with the 
engagement by the regional bloc ECOWAS, with each of the 
governments in the region, excluding Chad which I can address 
separately, there is now a path to restore the transition to a 
stronger and more stable democracy. We can use--7008 does not 
deny us the use of resources to non-government entities to 
support the practices and policies of, for example, civil 
society, to encourage those successful transitions.
    In Chad, which is not a member of ECOWAS, the Government of 
Qatar has been hosting, for the past 5 to 6 months, talks 
between the government and their traditional insurgent rivals, 
known as the political-military groups. Those talks, they are 
now down to a final draft, which again would lay out milestones 
to have a national dialogue, to draft a constitution, to have 
an election.
    So our proposal is that we would use the resources that are 
available to us and any increase in resources to help 
consolidate these plans to move towards democratic rule.
    The Chairman. Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to 
follow up quickly with Ms. Blyden. How is the Department of 
Defense adjusting its approach to training military personnel 
of countries in the Sahel, given the four coups that have 
affected the region in just the last 2 years? I know that it is 
one of the really important things that we are able to do in 
terms of providing assistance is training military officers. 
What has changed within this region due to those four coups?
    Ms. Blyden. We now have less partners to be able to work 
with. I think as Ambassador Phee noted, the G5 partners, which 
included five of the Sahelian partners, we are now down to two 
that we can actively work with, and that training, in our 
absence, of being able to provide our influence through 
security cooperation and human rights training and values that 
we typically put forth is now absent from the larger force 
borders. I think what we are hoping to do, how I mentioned in 
my statement, is work with those two partners that we still can 
work with, to increase their involvement.
    We are also doubling down, I think, on other African 
partners who are willing and are capable and are interested in 
providing additional support to the Sahel. So we have partners 
in other regions, as you mentioned in the onset, North African 
partners who have been doing training in the Sahel already with 
Sahel partners, and we are asking actively for them to take a 
stronger role in being able to provide what they have already 
learned from us in a secondary or tertiary training, a security 
model, if you will.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you. Ambassador Phee, challenges with 
staffing at U.S. embassy posts in the Sahel is currently a 
significant challenge in implementing U.S. policy in the Sahel, 
and will be a major constraint to implementing the new 
interagency approved Sahel strategy. How is the State 
Department making certain that President Biden's nominees for 
ambassadorial posts in the Sahel are well qualified, with prior 
experience, serving in the region?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. The challenge in staffing our 
posts goes from ambassadors down to the most entry-level 
officers, and it is something that consumes our time. We are 
working to give the State Department [inaudible] to overcome 
challenges from the previous era, where there was a freeze on 
hiring and we did not hire [inaudible] attrition. The 
Administration has put forward a strategic staffing initiative 
to help build up from that deficit and to help with the 
phenomenon affecting all of Americans, the sort of Great 
Resignation feature. Within the Africa Bureau, where it has 
been historically a difficult post to staff, we are undertaking 
critical reforms in how we hire. I am working with the Deputy 
Secretary for Management and Resources and the Under Secretary 
for Management on options for new incentives. We are looking at 
new ways of handling our bidding process, what if somebody 
cyclical goes out first, to offer handshakes first on the job. 
We are also developing a [inaudible] to reach out to members of 
the Foreign Service.
    So it is a big problem which has many elements, and in 
terms of not having sufficient staff in the entire State 
Department as well as specific challenges for the Africa 
Bureau.
    As you are aware, what is known as the D Committee, the 
Deputies Committee, handles the selection of nominees for Chief 
of Mission, and they look for diversity and background in all 
ways in making those nominations that they present to the 
Secretary and to the President.
    Senator Rounds. Let me ask one more question with regards 
to the State Department and how it is organized and how that 
may very well bear on the issues taking place in the Sahel 
today.
    In my opening statement I laid out the differences between 
different organizations as to how we treat different 
geographical parts of Africa. If you go back to 2011, when NATO 
began its campaign against Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, Mali's 
government warned that Gaddafi's removal would destabilize 
Mali. Shortly after Gaddafi's fall in 2011, ethnic Tuaregs who 
had served in Gaddafi's military, returned to Mali, joining an 
insurgency against Mali's government, in January of 2012, that 
was eventually co-opted by Islamist groups.
    Does this experience provide any lessons learned with 
regard to how our North African policy can affect the Sahel?
    Ms. Phee. Senator, as I mentioned when I spoke to the 
Chairman, I did a lot of research before I took this position, 
and I found that AF, the Africa Bureau, used to be part of the 
NEA Bureau, the Near Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, and it 
was broken apart about the time of decolonization to reflect 
the interests and priorities of sub-Saharan African nations.
    Absolutely, the overthrow of Gaddafi resulted in dramatic 
and negative impacts in the Sahel and in North Africa. So I 
absolutely agree with your concern about those outcomes.
    However, I think we have a very strong relationship with 
the NEA Bureau, and we are able to work together to look at the 
cross-cutting issues. I meet regularly with the newly confirmed 
Assistant Secretary of State, Barbara Leaf, for Near Eastern 
Affairs, and our embassies are in regular contact, including 
travel back and forth to coordinate and collaborate on issues. 
In Mali, specifically, we are looking at the implementation of 
the Algiers Accord, which resulted from the Tuareg Rebellion.
    So it is absolutely important that we work together, and I 
think this issue of how we organize ourselves has been under 
discussion in different ways for decades, but it is important 
that those of us in positions now work together continuously. 
Thank you.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 
witnesses. Ms. Blyden, I think I am going to focus on you 
because I am an Armed Services Committee member and these are 
questions that might be more appropriate there, but I am 
curious.
    The French have been doing counterterrorism operations in 
Mali since 2013. They have about 2,000 troops there. They have 
announced this year that they are going to withdraw those 
troops because of conflicts between their operations there and 
the Government of Mali. They are likely to redeploy some of 
those troops in Niger, where we have about 800 troops.
    How is the withdrawal of French and EU forces from Mali 
likely to affect U.S. military operations in the region?
    Ms. Blyden. The shift in the French location and the 
repositioning is seen both as a challenge, but I think it is 
also a positive. I think, as we have talked about, we see the 
spread moving towards the Coastal West Africa countries, and we 
are seeing an opportunity with the French repositioning to 
really rethink where it is that we might need bolstering of 
African partners to be able to continue to counter the violent 
extremist threat.
    So the French are thinking through that with us. They are 
working with us, and the positioning of where we have our 
troops, to make sure that there is enough coverage between the 
African partners, the French operations that they are doing, as 
well as looking at where the peacekeeping mission is in Mali 
and where African partners have provided their own initiatives, 
to be able to, as I said, ensure we have coverage across the 
Sahel to try and prevent and counter what we see as a spread 
towards the littorals.
    I think our operations and the support that we provide will 
continue in a way, but it will be spread more widely, I think, 
across the number of partners who will be doing the work that 
they do.
    I did not want to take too long with this answer, but I do 
think it is important to note that there are other partners 
besides the French, who we have been working with as well in 
this region, Task Force Takuba, which has had some European 
allies as well. They are also thinking about how we can ensure 
that we have enough coverage to prevent the spread.
    Senator Kaine. The second of the three goals you mentioned 
in terms of the National Defense Strategy was shoring up 
partners, and you testified that Niger is the most solid 
partner in the region. So if we take the U.S. forces, about 
800, which is, I think, second-highest, only following 
Djibouti, we take those 800 forces, and if some of the French 
forces come there too that can serve both goals one and two of 
the three goals that you mentioned.
    I am interested in following up on the deadly ambush that 
happened in Niger in 2017. Four U.S. Army Green Berets lost 
their lives. Four troops from Niger were killed. It was an 
unusual mission. It was an advise-and-assist training mission. 
There was not an expectation that it would be kind of in a 
conflict zone. A conflict developed. The group that killed our 
troops in Niger was not a group that the U.S. had designated as 
a terrorist group at that time.
    What has been the assessment or alteration or reassessment 
of the advise-and-assist missions in the Sahel following the 
death of these Green Berets?
    Ms. Blyden. Senator, I would have to come back to you on an 
answer on that. As you know, the Tongo Tongo incident has been 
researched and widely investigated to ensure that there has 
been accountability for the challenges that happened and 
occurred during that particular mission. I would be remiss if I 
told you I knew exactly what the details of that were. So I 
would like to take that question for the record, if I can.
    Senator Kaine. We will submit it in writing, and in 
particular, I am aware of some of the analysis of what 
happened, but I am particularly interested in whether the DoD 
has done adjustments or alterations to the advise-and-assist 
missions in the region as a result of those lessons learned. So 
we will do a written question for the record that is 
specifically on that point.
    With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. So let me ask another question since I have 
the opportunity. There is no other member seeking recognition 
at this point.
    I want to follow on on the Ranking Member's comments about 
hiring. Numerous State Department direct-hire positions at U.S. 
embassies in the Sahel remain unfilled. In Niger, for instance, 
more than 40 percent of State Department direct-hire jobs in 
our embassy are vacant. Overall in the Sahel, 22 percent of 
U.S. direct-hire positions remain unfilled.
    So how is it that regardless of the strategy that we put 
together and that hopefully we will mutually agree upon, we 
will be able to implement such a strategy in the absence of 
that many direct-hires and the absence of full USAID missions 
in Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, in terms of implementing the 
strategy? Isn't a call for a real commitment to beef up and to 
ensure that these direct-hires and other important positions 
get staffed in order to implement the strategy? Otherwise, we 
have a strategy on paper, but not an implementation.
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, we agree with you wholeheartedly. I 
simply cannot do my job if we do not have people in the field, 
and that is where I expect the fingertip confidence to 
understand what is going on and to make recommendations and to 
implement U.S. policy effectively.
    I think there are many components to this problem set. I 
talked about the general insufficient staffing for the State 
Department. We have talked about what the Administration is 
trying to do to compensate for previous years that led us to 
that deficit. I have talked about the challenges. Some of those 
percentages you are referring to are specific specialties like 
medical personnel or IT personnel, very hard to compete in the 
current environment. We also lost a lot of consular officers 
because we have tied the staffing of our consular's cone to 
visa fees, and visa fees went down during the COVID era.
    We are missing Chiefs of Mission in a lot of posts, as you 
know. Chiefs of Mission are one way to attract and invigorate a 
post's staffing morale. Then there are steps we can take, that 
I have talked to you about, that we are working on to increase 
incentives and to adjust the way in which we recruit for those 
positions. So it is a multi-pronged approach.
    The Chairman. It seems there needs to be a commitment from 
the top to ensure that this happens. Administrator, how about 
at USAID?
    Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much. As the Secretary alluded 
to, it is a complex problem. Those vacancies are partly due, 
that we have many more positions around the world than we 
actually have Foreign Service Officers to fill those positions, 
for a variety of reasons. So it is not as though they are not 
in the Sahel, but they are somewhere else. There just are not 
enough qualified staff.
    Senator, as you mentioned, it is not just having the people 
in those places. We want the right people in those places. So 
that is where we are excited to be having a conversation about 
possible additional hiring authorities, other mechanisms. We 
are doing everything we can to hire more Foreign Service 
Officers after what was a hiring freeze in the last 
administration. That affected the entire throughput at various 
levels.
    So I could not agree more that we want the right people and 
more of them in the region to implement this strategy.
    The Chairman. It seems to me that when you have difficulty 
in finding the right people and the people necessary that you 
create some type of incentive to attract the right people that 
maybe you normally do not do.
    One other question. I am deeply concerned about the 
negative influence of Russian mercenaries and the Wagner Group 
in Mali and across the Sahel. The draft strategy acknowledges 
the seriousness of this problem, but in the most recent State 
Department budget request there does not appear to be a line 
item for countering Russia's malign influence in the Sahel.
    So what actions are each of your agencies taking to counter 
Russia propaganda and the Wagner Group's influence in Mali? Is 
there a specific fund to support countering malign influence in 
Africa in the budget request? I am trying to understand how we 
are going to do this. We recognize there is a problem, though. 
What are we going to do about it?
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, some of the steps that are under 
consideration and actual planning include trying to dry up the 
source of financing, so looking at possible sanctions, looking 
at possible nontraditional measures such as the illegal export 
of gold, which is something that is of great interest to 
Wagner. How can we address those concerns?
    We are looking at deepening our exchange of information 
with African governments to make sure they understand fully 
what we understand about the impact of Wagner.
    A third element, which our Bureau of Political and Military 
Affairs is undertaking is trying to develop other options for 
security assistance. We are the best, but we are expensive and 
we are slow, and sometimes quite rightly, as has been 
illustrated in this hearing, we suspend security assistance to 
reflect our values. So we want to deter governments in the 
region from turning to Wagner to fill their security needs. So 
we are looking to see what we can do in terms of developing 
alternative sources of security assistance.
    Those are some of the three areas in which we are trying to 
work to address the problem.
    The Chairman. Secretary Blyden.
    Ms. Blyden. For the Department of Defense we have had 
Legislation 1332, which was in this year's NDAA, which provides 
funding to both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM to counter strategic 
competition on the continent, and specifically we're looking at 
China and also the Wagner Group in Mali and across the Sahel.
    Mr. Jenkins. We have global resources towards 
disinformation, but in the Sahel specifically, where 
disinformation, including pro-Russia disinformation, was a 
problem for some time, in Mali that problem became 
exponentially larger once Wagner group arrived and once the 
French left.
    I would never have thought I would see the day where people 
in Burkina Faso and Mali were waving pictures of Richard 
Wagner, a German composer who died in 1883, as some sort of 
hero.
    So we immediately pivoted some of our civil society 
programs, programs working with youth and working with civil 
society on elections, towards disinformation. We are about to 
send a CN up to you all for an additional $5.5 million, Mali 
specific. It is for tracking disinformation, the production of 
responsible consumption of information, and also a very robust 
monitoring and evaluation and learning component so we can 
learn from this project as we go to other countries and spread 
that out, because unfortunately I think we are stuck with 
disinformation problems for quite some time.
    The Chairman. I look forward to the CN. Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 
Ranking Member Rounds. I am very encouraged by the level of 
engagement and persistence here and by the engagement by the 
Administration, the release of the strategy by the 
Administration for how to deal with this region. As each of you 
referenced in your testimony, the Global Fragility Act, which I 
worked on for a number of years with members of this Committee, 
calls for a coordinated strategic approach to challenges very 
similar to what we see in the Sahel, on challenges of fragility 
where we need to work across the silos of defense, development, 
diplomacy and bring in other partners, not just European 
partners, regional partners to work with nations on the ground 
who are having challenges, to deliver not just the right 
strategy, but the right people from the United States, and to 
bring in NGOs and other partners.
    So I would be interested in your view. The Global Fragility 
Act did not identify the Sahel. It identified other countries 
of the--so the Global Fragility Act, based on Plan Columbia and 
the experience of many who served before me, of investing in 
stabilizing, at one point one of the most fragile countries in 
the Western Hemisphere and gradually moving through a 
coordinated strategy towards a less conflict-ridden country. 
There are already ways in which the conflict and the 
instability in the Sahel are leeching into each of the coastal 
countries of West Africa.
    Taking that general approach, hearing the questions of the 
members of the Committee, how are we going to work better 
together as a country in addressing the pressing, the critical 
governance development and security needs of countries like 
Mali and Burkina? How are we sustaining any coordinated 
regional strategy, and what do you most need from us? I happen 
to also chair an Appropriations subcommittee, and spoke as 
recently as last night to the Administrator of USAID about some 
of these hiring flexibilities. We want to make sure that you 
are communicating effectively with this Committee and with 
other committees about exactly what do you need to deliver to 
meet this moment.
    If you would, please, in order. I would just be interested 
in hearing, what is our strategy for engagement with our 
partners and allies in the region and the other donors and the 
other countries that are capable of delivering development, 
diplomacy, and security assistance?
    Ms. Phee. Senator, thank you for your leadership and 
interest in innovating our policy in this area. One of the 
other components of the Sahel strategy, as I described when I 
first took on this task and started looking at it, is I 
recommended that USAID join the Sahel Alliance, which is a 
grouping of donors, to make sure that we were working in 
partnership, as this Committee has directed us to do, 
particularly with our European partners in the Sahel.
    I do not know if you have been informed, but we recently 
had a Global Chiefs of Mission Conference, and we had a seminar 
with all of us involved in implementing the Global Fragility 
Act in Coastal West Africa. Everyone is extremely excited about 
the new flexibilities and the new resources, and there are 
detailed plans that have been set forward.
    One of the key components of the conversation was how to 
make sure that we stay coordinated and knit it up and how we 
can demonstrate that we are using those resources and 
flexibilities not only to good effect in the Sahel, but perhaps 
to come back to you to recommend maybe how to carry over that 
approach to other problem sets.
    Of course, the Sahel is in a different place than Coastal 
West Africa, regrettably in a worse place. We have, frankly, a 
little bit more to work with in terms of partners and 
capabilities in Coastal West Africa. So I think it is a good 
first, if you will, demonstration effect of the approach.
    I have joked with Rob that I wish State had an OTI. I have 
been looking very hard at the challenges we have faced in the 
Sahel and elsewhere in Africa in terms of military coups, and 
how can we respond. Are we agile enough? Do we have the right 
staff? Do we have the right resources to go in and help 
governments put things back on track to take actions, like the 
ones Rob referred to with regard to countering disinformation?
    It is hard for me, for example, to predict. Chad, it looks 
to me like they may get to this agreement, but I cannot really 
tell you where they will be in 3 months or 6 months. So 
sometimes it is hard, given our budget planning cycle, to be 
adequately prepared for a very fluid and dynamic environment. 
Thank you.
    Senator Coons. I would be happy to talk with you about that 
in more detail. Mr. Chairman, can the other two answer? If you 
could, briefly.
    Mr. Jenkins. Senator, first thank you so much for your 
leadership on the Global Fragility Act. My team is on point at 
USAID for working with our regional bureaus on implementation 
of the strategy. I can talk for a long time. You do not have a 
lot of time. We would love to spend time getting into detail on 
exactly what we are doing, how we are doing it, what we are 
looking to do, and what we need.
    We do need additional flexibility. Thank you so much, all 
of you, for the flexibility we have been given, not just under 
the terms of GFA, but lately, but we could always use more, 
much more. We need to do more to get your trust so that we can 
have more flexible resources and keep that communication going. 
That is something we would like to have from you, that 
partnership.
    We need your patience. Ten years is a long time, but we are 
still 23\1/2\--10-year plans in our own country, and we are not 
sure what the Constitution always means when we are in 
agreement with each other.
    So I love that you referenced Plan Columbia. Columbia is an 
example I often use because once security was there and the 
political will was there and the strategic patience was there, 
our government worked in an interagency fashion that is 
extremely rare. That is what we need to do and have to do if we 
are going to make the Global Fragility Act succeed the way we 
need it to be. Thank you.
    Ms. Blyden. I will be even briefer. Flexibility of funding 
and resources, I think also giving a little bit of latitude on 
time. I had the privilege of working on Plan Columbia when I 
sat on the Hill, and used that to work with a number of 
congressional members on the House Armed Services and HVAC to 
develop an Africa Act that I think mirrored what Plan Columbia 
did. I think the interagency coordination and the ability to be 
able to look out over a period of time is something that is 
needed for Africa as well. I would encourage to maybe revisit 
that legislation that was introduced a few years ago to see if 
it could be something that could be employed in the Africa 
context as well.
    I think from a security side, coordination. The U.S. 
Department of Defense has an ability, and the U.S. in general 
has an ability to be able to convene partners together, and 
that is a strength that we have that I think will enable us to 
be able to be more successful in the Africa context.
    Senator Coons. Thank you all very much. I am very concerned 
about Russian disinformation, particularly around Ukraine and 
whether or not it is their aggression or our sanctions that are 
causing significant hunger and development disruptions around 
the world. I look forward to working with all of you and your 
agencies around that challenge.
    Thank you very much for your forbearance, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Just a comment before I turn to Senator 
Rounds. There is always the friction--I am sorry. I turn to 
Senator Van Hollen first. There is always the friction of you 
want flexibility, but we need justification because we are 
responsible for the fiduciary responsibilities here to the 
American people, as well as understanding the policies. So if 
you help us understand what you are going to do with the 
flexibility and give us some universe of what it is, the type 
of thing you are going to do, it will be far more helpful to 
achieve the goal.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of 
you for your testimony and for your service. I know there has 
been a lot of focus, at least conceptually, on the new 
strategy, and I have long been concerned that we do not strike 
the adequate balance between going after terrorists and 
investing in long-term stability in terms of democracy and 
development. So I am pleased to see this strategy being 
unfolded.
    I would like to get a little more granularity. Maybe, 
Assistant Secretary Phee, you could give me an example, whether 
it is Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, how we are doing something 
different because of this new strategy in one of those 
countries, or pick another example. Just a little bit of meat 
on the bone would be helpful, I think, in terms of aligning 
resources with the new strategy.
    Ms. Phee. Great. What we are trying to do right now in 
discussions about FY22, is work within the Administration to 
reallocate resources into the democracy and governance space. 
We have talked a little bit here about the difficulty of 
working with military-led governments, but there are many 
components of a society that support a transition--women, NGO 
activists, constitution-drafting exercises, those types of 
things. We are looking to apply those resources to implementing 
partners that have a long track record, like NDI, IRI, IFES and 
whatnot. Also, working with the regional organization, ECOWAS, 
to support technical advisors that they might provide.
    I mentioned also that we are discussing how we can identify 
resources, targeted personnel resources, to go out and help 
advise on how to move out of a military-run government to a 
democratic government.
    So that is, I think, the first priority that we are looking 
to reshift our allocation into those types of programs.
    Senator Van Hollen. Got it. We can expect to see that in 
the allocation of USAID resources, principally? Or what other 
resources are we talking about?
    Ms. Phee. I have a very, very tiny budget, and I have 
worked hard to befriend ``F'' in the State Department, but 
seriously, I support, from our leadership, to try and implement 
the strategy, and we are doing that in partnership with USAID.
    Senator Van Hollen. Assistant Administrator Jenkins, so 
that is an area that you continue to brief this Committee and 
subcommittees with respect to--as you said, there is a long 
list and it gets in detail. I would be interested in seeing how 
exactly you are implementing this.
    Mr. Jenkins. We would be very happy to start that 
conversation and have that an active conversation.
    I will just add the way we got to the strategy was new as 
well, with development, USAID as a full partner at the table, 
working on this together, and stressing the need for the 
development work we do, not just the counterterrorism thing. 
That in itself--in fact, we have this now strategy that is a 
shared strategy that we all are committed to, is something that 
is a great innovation.
    Senator Van Hollen. Got it. Ms. Blyden, I know that Senator 
Rounds asked you about the number of countries where we have 
seen recent coups, and I think you responded that, well, that 
does mean we have fewer partners going forward. I guess I want 
to back that up, because what we have seen over time is a lot 
of the coup leaders, in many cases, are organizations, 
individuals that we have had a previous relationship with. I 
think that is probably what drove some of the new strategy is 
trying to rethink how we go about doing that.
    Congresswoman Sara Jacobs and I today are introducing 
legislation that would--it is called the Upholding Human Rights 
Abroad Act, and what it would do is expand the Leahy Law 
requirements to also include a couple other DoD-based programs 
that are not currently included. This is not an effort to tie 
people's hands, but it is an effort to accomplish what I think 
is the goal of this new strategy, to make sure that we are not 
unwittingly supporting and funding those who turn around and 
undermine democracy and development.
    So could you talk a little bit about lessons we learned in 
some of these countries where despite what we thought were our 
best efforts, we ended up having the boomerang come around and 
hit us in the head?
    Ms. Blyden. Absolutely. I think maybe to answer part of 
your last question and then transition into this one, what we 
are doing differently, even though we have always had a by-
with-and-through approach, and you will hear AFRICOM talk about 
that, it has been by, with, and through a number of different 
partners. We are really focusing now on the African partners 
and looking at the multiple levels of where it is that we see 
engagement has been successful and where we maybe have lacked 
in providing additional support.
    For us, and our support to the Sahel strategy, we are 
looking at investing more in our civilian-led defense 
institutions. So regional centers like the Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies that focuses on institutional capacity 
building when it comes to governance and parliamentary and 
managing security resources. We are doing more to invest in 
that area. We are also working more with our Institute for 
Security Governance, which is under the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, to provide additional training at the 
multiple level. So whether it is senior leaders, emerging 
security sector leaders, or at the training and sort of foot 
soldier level, we are ensuring that we are giving the entire 
holistic approach to what it means to have security assistance 
and security cooperation from both a governance standpoint as 
well as the train, advise, and assist, which we are typically 
known for.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we are 
getting down close to the end of this particular meeting. I 
have one question. I would like it to go to each of you, and 
perhaps in less than a minute you could respond back. Whether 
it be in our diplomatic efforts or our economic development 
efforts or our national defense efforts, we have to recognize 
that there is a great powers competition going on. Russia and 
China are both very actively engaged on the African continent, 
and they are also very actively engaged within the Sahel.
    What is it that we are doing that perhaps China and Russia 
are not doing, and vice versa, what is it that Russia and China 
are doing that we are not doing with regard to this particular 
area, in your specific areas of expertise? I would begin with 
the Ambassador, please.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. That is almost an easy 
question because I think, generally speaking, we are the 
preferred partner in every sector for Africans. We care about 
humans. We care about civilians. We care about unleashing their 
potential. Those are not areas of focus for Russia or China. So 
that, I think, is the biggest difference, that we work beyond 
governments, with all sectors of society, to encourage 
governance that is inclusive, and unleashes the potential of 
society.
    Senator Rounds. Mr. Jenkins.
    Mr. Jenkins. I agree wholeheartedly. I would sum it up as 
partnership. Russia and China enter into transactional 
relationships. We, if we are doing what we should be doing, is 
listening, partnering, and working not just at a national 
level, but localization, working with local people, finding 
them where they are, helping them with what they want help on, 
and working in true partnership.
    Senator Rounds. Ms. Blyden.
    Ms. Blyden. I agree with both of my colleagues and would 
say that we stand on the foundations of democracy, human 
rights, and governance. I think the other thing that we offer 
is civil-military relations and the understanding of how this 
works symbiotically to ensure that there is good governance in 
a country. I think the transactional approach that both Russia 
and China take have resonated with our partners. They 
understand that we care and they understand that we are there 
to enable them for the long haul and that we understand that 
organic African solutions are critical to the success of 
security in the region.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    One final question, and the rest I will submit for the 
record. Following the 2012 military coup in Mali we imposed 
travel bans on more than 80 individuals responsible for 
orchestrating or supporting the coup. We imposed similar travel 
bans on military coup leaders in Mauritania in 2008, Guinea in 
2009, Guinea-Bissau in 2012, and the Central African Republic 
in 2013. Both ECOWAS as the European Union have imposed 
personal, targeted sanctions on the leaders of the latest 
military coup in Mali. The United States, however, has yet to 
take such actions in response to recent coups in Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, and Guinea for that matter.
    So, Ambassador, how do you explain this break with 
precedent? Shouldn't we have a consistent policy for imposing 
travel bans or other sanctions on military officers who seize 
power unconstitutionally?
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, such sanctions authority is an 
important tool that we can apply, and we should continuously 
review when are the appropriate circumstances to apply, in 
partnership, in particular, with ECOWAS, so that our actions 
are reinforcing.
    I think these particular changes in government, while very 
unwelcome, reflected complex circumstances, and there was an 
effort underway to see if we could encourage these leaders to 
get back on track. I think we have seen, with the recent ECOWAS 
negotiations, at least a stated commitment to get back on 
track, and so we should keep that tool in mind, but the 
objective was to drive the parties back towards democratic 
transition.
    The Chairman. Well, I would just say that both ECOWAS and 
the European Union have imposed those type of sanctions. So if 
we want to be in concert with them, I do not understand why we 
have not. I understand it is a powerful tool. I get the sense 
that the Bureau is adverse to sanctions use and reticent about 
doing it, and I do not understand, the limited tools of 
peaceful diplomacy that we have, why we refrain from it when 
other elements are not pursuing our interests, and when we 
would be in synchrony with those entities in Africa that saw it 
important to go ahead and do.
    So we would love to hear from you on that, and I would like 
you to more fully respond for me in the record.
    I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming before the 
Committee to give their testimonies. While ultimately our 
African partners must lead the way in addressing the problems 
in the Sahel, the least we can do is ensure that the assistance 
we provide is as impactful as possible. I look forward to 
continuing to dialogue with the Administration on the strategy 
as it is finalized.
    The record for this hearing will remain open until the 
close of business on Thursday, July 14, 2022. Please ensure 
that questions for the record are submitted no later than that 
date. Please be as responsive as you can, as fully as you can, 
when you receive them.
    Thanks to the Committee for your testimony. This hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

               Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Have our embassies in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso made 
similar public statements making it clear that the leaders of military 
juntas cannot double as candidates in elections organized to restore 
democratic governance? If not, why not? If the Administration's new 
Sahel strategy entails a more unified approach to coup leaders and 
military juntas across the Sahel, shouldn't this be standard language?

    Answer. Regarding Mali, we insisted that the MINUSMA mandate state 
that ``the Head of the Transition and the Prime Minister of the 
Transition should not under any circumstances be candidates for the 
forthcoming presidential election.'' We also publicly reiterated the 
Economic Community of West African States' position that senior members 
of the transition government may not run for election in our 2021 
explanation of the vote which followed the May 2021 military takeover. 
We further noted in various public statements that Mali must return to 
a democratic, civilian-led government.
    Guinea's Transition Charter prohibits the Transition President, 
Transition Prime Minister, and National Transition Council members from 
running in national and local elections. The U.S. Ambassador to Guinea 
has publicly commended the charter's prohibition of transition 
government candidates. Burkina Faso's transition charter prohibits the 
Transition President and the president of the legislative assembly from 
running for office. For this reason, the United States has not publicly 
called on the Transition Government to stand-down from running in their 
country's next Presidential elections.
    Regarding all three, we continuously espouse our support for the 
positions of ECOWAS and African Union, which have maintained from the 
outset that the transition leaders may not run for office.

    Question. Does France agree with the AU principle that junta leader 
Gen. Mahamat Deby and other members of the transitional government in 
Chad cannot run in elections they are supposed to organize? If not, 
what diplomatic efforts do we need to take to garner French agreement 
and support?

    Answer. The United States and France share interest in seeing 
concrete and consistent progress toward long-term stability in Chad and 
in the region, and believe that civilian-led and democratically elected 
government and increased economic opportunity is the best path to long-
term stability. Chad is a critical security partner for France, and a 
longtime center of gravity for the French military in West/Central 
Africa. In the past, France has intervened in Chad's leadership 
contests and believes that security in the Sahel has a direct impact on 
the French homeland. As such, France has shown some restraint recently 
in public messaging around this topic; however, they have supported the 
AU position in the past. The U.S. Embassy in N'Djamena continues to 
coordinate with France and other likeminded partners in the region on 
joint public messaging to emphasize the importance of a peaceful, 
inclusive, democratic transition.

    Question. Following the 2012 military coup in Mali, we imposed 
travel bans on more than 80 individuals responsible for orchestrating 
or supporting the coup. We imposed similar travel bans on military coup 
leaders in Mauritania in 2008, Guinea in 2009, Guinea Bissau in 2012, 
and the Central African Republic in 2013. Both ECOWAS and the European 
Union have imposed personal, targeted sanctions on the leaders of the 
latest military coup in Mali. The United States, however, has yet to 
take such actions in response to recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, or Guinea, for that matter. Ambassador Phee:
    How do you explain this break with precedent? Shouldn't we have a 
consistent policy for imposing travel bans or other sanctions on 
military officers who seize power unconstitutionally?

    Answer. Our policy objective has been to work with the transition 
governments to get the countries back on the path to democracy. We 
continually review all tools available to us to determine what is the 
best tool to use to advance foreign policy goals. Imposing visa 
restrictions or financial sanctions as a blanket response to adverse 
political activity may be incongruent with the task of working with 
these transition governments to undertake reforms that are demanded by 
their people to form the foundation of a more responsive democratic 
system. In Mali, following the May 2021 military takeover, the United 
States immediately suspended security assistance that had continued 
under available authorities, ultimately cutting programs amounting to 
$9.1 million. Following Guinea's September 2021 military coup d'etat, 
security assistance for the Government of Guinea was restricted under 
section 7008 of the annual appropriations act. Ending security 
assistance, which the Mali and Guinea coup leaders monitor closely as 
military officers, had a significant impact and advanced foreign policy 
goals in country.
    Likewise, in Burkina Faso, our Embassy is working to advance our 
mutually shared priorities focused on ensuring a democratic transition, 
development, and security. While we remain open to all available tools, 
we want to keep the door open with our Burkinabe partners to allow us 
the space to collaborate on supporting the country's democratic 
transition.
    The Department carefully reviewed the events in Chad and concluded 
that the military coup restriction in section 7008 of the annual 
appropriations act had not been triggered with respect to Chad. 
Separately, the African Union carefully examined the events in Chad and 
did not assess that the actions that led to the formation of a 
Transitional Military Council taking power in the aftermath of the 
battlefield death of the former president was a military coup d'etat.

    Question. There are credible reports that the Malian military and 
Russian mercenaries hired by the Malian junta have massacred hundreds 
of civilians and perpetrated gross violations of human rights. 
Assistant Secretary Phee: Has the Administration taken any steps to 
support accountability for these killings?

    Answer. We have repeatedly called for MINUSMA to have freedom of 
movement to investigate the allegations of human rights violations and 
abuses perpetrated by the Malian Armed Forces in conjunction with the 
Kremlin-backed Wagner Group. We have publicly raised our concerns over 
these reports, noting that such violence perpetrated by state security 
forces will only result in more Malian citizens enlisting in the ranks 
of violent extremist organizations. The Administration is reviewing the 
allegations of human rights violations and abuses by the Malian Armed 
Forces.

    Question. When the military junta in Guinea in 2009 massacred more 
than 150 pro-democracy demonstrators in Conakry, we imposed sanctions 
in the form of travel bans. Shouldn't we now do the same for senior 
Malian junta leaders responsible for extra judicial killings and other 
gross violations of human rights against civilians Mali?

    Answer. The Department will consider using all tools at its 
disposal to respond to reports that senior Malian transition government 
leaders are responsible for human rights violations and abuses against 
civilians.

    Question. How will the Administration work with the EU and France 
in particular to ensure that international support for democracy, 
development, and defense in the Sahel is more equally balanced given 
France's predominately security-focused approach?

    Answer. The Department engages regularly with the EU and France at 
various levels--both in capitals and in the field--and has good working 
relationships with their respective Sahel Special Envoys and Assistant 
Secretaries for African Affairs equivalents. The Bureau of African 
Affairs consulted with the EU and France as well as other likeminded 
partners when crafting the new Sahel strategy, which focuses on 
diplomacy, development, and cross-sector institutional capacity 
building, in addition to operational and tactical defense requirements. 
Many of our partners share our view that the Sahel requires a 
governance-first approach. We strengthened our cooperation with our 
likeminded partners by joining the development-focused Sahel Alliance 
in March 2022.

    Question. What do you assess will be the impact of the French 
military withdrawal on the security situation in Mali? Are there 
implications for the security of U.S. personnel, and if so, what steps 
are we taking to mitigate such impacts? What will be the impact on the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali? Will a significant deterioration in the security situation impact 
the Administration's approach in the Sahel? If so, how?

    Answer. The security situation is already worsening pending the 
French withdrawal. Mali experienced a 340 percent increase in conflict 
fatalities in the first quarter of 2022 as compared to the previous 
year. ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) is gaining ground in eastern Mali. 
In the first quarter of 2022 ISIS-GS was responsible for 455 civilian 
fatalities, two-thirds of which occurred in Mali against mainly Tuareg 
communities. The al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-
Muslimin' (JNIM) continues to dominate the militant milieu, staging 
complex attacks on security forces and exercising control over 
populations. The absence of French reassurance flights for MINUSMA and 
the loss of the hospital in Gao, which European troop-contributing 
countries rely on, could affect MINUSMA' security and effectiveness. 
French repositioning of Operation Barkhane and Task Force Takuba has 
complicated efforts to maintain a secure posture and to pursue discreet 
counterterrorism goals in the region.
    We are preparing for a deterioration of the security situation by 
increasing resilience efforts in coastal West Africa, including through 
implementation of the Global Fragility Act strategy, shoring up Niger 
and Mauritania, focusing on keeping Kremlin-backed Wagner Group forces 
out of Burkina Faso, and maintaining a forward-leaning posture using 
available authorities on security assistance while we have a willing 
partner in the Burkinabe transition government.

    Question. How is the Administration adjusting to the relocation of 
French troops to Niger? What steps are we taking to ensure that a 
substantial increase in the number of French troops in Niger does not 
cause a backlash against western governments perceived to be closer to 
national militaries than to local populations, or against the already 
fragile government in Niamey?

    Answer. The United States maintains an excellent relationship 
across the board with the Government of Niger, and we are continuing 
that close collaboration as France increases its presence in Niger. We 
are currently working with the Government of France to enhance our 
coordination specific to Niger in order to support our shared interest 
in bolstering security, governance, and development, prioritizing first 
and foremost the needs of the Nigerien Government and people in 
alignment with U.S. priorities.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Mr. Robert Jenkins to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Mr. Jenkins, you mention in your written testimony that 
``we must think creatively about how the United States can work with 
military-led governments to support their return to democracy while 
also tackling the grave security challenges that threaten U.S. 
interests.'' Presumably you are speaking of Chad.
    Shouldn't we also--and perhaps primarily--be working with civil 
society actors, multilateral and local and international non-
governmental organizations to, as you put it, ``achieve timely and 
credible transitions to democracy''?

    Answer. USAID programming in Chad is limited, but with the small 
amount of funding available, the team is very focused on working with 
civil society actors and local non-governmental organizations. One such 
program is the Chad Civil Society Strengthening Activity (CCSSA), which 
primarily works with civilian actors to advocate for a civil society 
voice in the National Dialogue process. USAID grant-funded civil 
society organizations (CSOs) are working to raise awareness on peace 
and social cohesion through online and traditional media, and public 
assembly points equipped with loudspeakers in the capital with a focus 
on raising women's voices to ensure a more inclusive and robust 
dialogue and reconciliation process.
    In Chad, USAID also supports civic education in schools where 
children learn their rights and responsibilities, including updating 
civics education textbooks for primary and secondary school, and 
developing a teachers' manual and teaching modules to improve the 
quality of civics instruction.
    Supporting civil society organizations is one tool of many that the 
entire U.S. Government response can employ while advocating for a 
timely and credible transition to democracy. USAID, and others, 
development interventions are positioned to raise awareness of 
transparent, inclusive and fair elections. USAID civil society efforts 
in Chad, through the CCSSA, are working on furthering these pillars of 
democracy.

    Question. Mr. Jenkins, you also mention the need to ``build on our 
excellent development programs'' in the Sahel.
    What programs are we building on in Chad that will help foster the 
outcomes we are hoping for?

    Answer. The multi-year Chad Civil Society Strengthening Activity 
(CCSSA), launched in 2019, is managed by USAID's Sahel Regional Office 
(SRO) in Dakar. The activity will run through 2024, has a ceiling of 
$8.5 million, and received $3 million for fiscal year 2020. This 
activity is the only bilateral-funded USAID activity in Chad.
    Over the course of decades, Chadians have been denied opportunities 
to engage with government institutions and witnessed the arrest and 
repression of civil society actors throughout the country. CCSSA aims 
to rebuild Chadians' interest in such engagement and provide training, 
workshops, and networking opportunities for Chadian civil society 
organizations (CSOs) to better equip them with tools to productively 
and effectively engage Chadian institutions and citizens.
    The activity's focus on civil society capacity building creates 
flexibility for the activity to pivot from priority area to priority 
area by working with specialized CSOs, as needed. This has been 
extremely helpful in the ever-changing circumstances over the last 3 
years in Chad. The activity started out with a diverse portfolio, doing 
things like contributing to tech and innovation or entrepreneurship 
hubs in Chad as well as cultural associations advocating for unity and 
peace messages.
    The activity pivoted at the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic to 
work with civil society to both build capacity and trust between CSOs 
and communities while also doing important work in the midst of the 
pandemic such as spreading health-related information and fighting 
COVID-19 disinformation.
    USAID has further built on this foundational work by turning the 
focus of CCSSA to the upcoming National Dialogue and ongoing 
reconciliation efforts. USAID is utilizing Complex Crisis Funds in the 
wake of the unconstitutional leadership transition in Chad to enable 
CCSSA to take on this expanded role. Recently, grant-funded CSOs are 
currently working on efforts to raise awareness on peace and social 
cohesion through the web, the media, and seven public assembly points 
equipped with loudspeakers in the capital. There are also efforts to 
identify and amplify women's voices to ensure a more inclusive and 
robust dialogue and reconciliation process.

    Question. In your testimony, you indicate that ``missions and 
offices in the region are chronically understaffed even though the work 
is critical to our national security.''
    Is it possible to increase what we are doing in Chad to the degree 
envisioned in the strategy in the absence of a USAID mission? Does 
USAID have any direct hire positions in Chad? If so how many? What 
about Burkina Faso and Mauritania--how are there missions there? How 
many USAID direct hires are in each country?

    Answer. USAID does not have any direct-hire positions in Chad. 
USAID employs one U.S. Personal Services Contractor as our Country 
Program Manager, overseeing USAID bilateral funding and program 
implementation. USAID's Sahel Regional Office, in Senegal, provides 
additional assistance as needed to ensure our programs are executed to 
their full potential.
    In 2019, USAID launched the Chad Civil Society Strengthening 
Activity (CCSSA). CCSSA is a 5-year, $8.5 million project that aims to 
rebuild Chadians' interest in engaging with government institutions by 
providing training and networking opportunities for Chadian civil 
society organizations (CSOs) to better equip them with tools to 
productively and effectively engage Chadian institutions. USAID has 
been able to start this activity as well as add new activities in 
health and implement humanitarian response funding in Chad without a 
Mission or Office designation.
    USAID does not have missions in Mauritania or Burkina Faso. USAID 
has a U.S. Personal Services Contractor as our Country Program Manager 
and a Foreign Service National in Mauritania to support our program 
implementation there. In addition to these two staff, USAID's Sahel 
Regional Office provides additional help as necessary, similar to Chad, 
to ensure that our programs are well executed.
    Burkina Faso hosts an Office of the USAID Representative. This 
office has an organization chart with 25 positions, of which 20 are 
currently filled. This includes five U.S. Direct Hire positions, two of 
which are currently filled, two of which have been assigned and will be 
arriving next month and early 2023, and one that is unassigned and will 
be recruited for in the upcoming bidding cycle.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Chidi Blyden to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Ms. Blyden, in your written testimony you mention that 
``ending U.S. security cooperation has affected our bilateral 
engagement'' with Chad. Do you agree that the junta must make space for 
an inclusive national dialogue, hold elections according to the 
timeline endorsed by the African Union, and, as our Charge d' Affaires 
in N'Djamena said in her July 4th speech, that members of the junta 
must commit publicly not to run as candidates?

    Answer. The U.S. Government desires a peaceful transition to 
democracy in Chad. I believe the U.S. should support democracy, 
governance, and human rights, especially in countries where coups or 
other unconstitutional transitions have occurred. I also believe we 
should leverage all bilateral relationships, especially military-to-
military relationships, in order to underscore that civilian control of 
the military is part of U.S. doctrine and is fundamental to democracy. 
This message carried to coup leaders through the U.S. military can have 
a significant positive impact and reinforces our values through 
demonstrated action.

    Question. Does DoD maintain a database of individuals who have 
received training under Title 10 programs? Is the U.S. Government aware 
of whether or not individuals who are part of the juntas in Mali, 
Burkina Faso, or Chad are the beneficiaries of U.S. training under 
Title 10? Which junta members in the three aforementioned countries 
have received U.S. training? What did that training entail?

    Answer. All foreign recipients of U.S. security assistance are 
vetted in accordance with U.S. law, to include human rights vetting 
conducted in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 362 (``Leahy vetting''), local 
screenings conducted by U.S. Embassy personnel, and biometric data 
collection when required. DoD and DoS strictly adhere to vetting laws 
and requirements for military partners. All individuals that have been 
Leahy vetted for training are in a database maintained by the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). We are aware that the individuals 
who are part of the juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso are the 
beneficiaries of U.S. training under Title 10. Colonel Goita of Mali 
and Lieutenant Colonel Damiba of Burkina Faso all received U.S. 
training in the past. This training included, but may not be limited 
to, special operations training, participation in partnership, joint 
exercises such as Flintlock, and attendance at programs.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Molly Phee to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. What do you ascribe to this trend in coups and 
transitions of power by non-democratic means in the Sahel region and 
wider Africa?

    Answer. Over the past 2 years, we have seen increasingly negative 
trends in African democracies. Among the most troubling trends are 
extra-constitutional and other seizures of power, most egregiously 
demonstrated by several coup d'etats across the continent. A lack of 
genuine representation for marginalized groups, poor service delivery, 
and a feeling of insecurity coupled with a lack of trust in governments 
and security institutions has exacerbated anti-democratic trends in the 
region.

    Question. What is the role of the U.S. in helping nations through 
these problematic periods without over-engaging democratically 
illegitimate regimes?

    Answer. While transitional governments are often rife with 
corruption and lack the credibility to advance genuine reform, they are 
also opportunities to reframe historical grievances, establish 
accountability mechanisms for past abuses, and support reconciliation 
needed for social cohesion and long-term peace and prosperity. A 
successful democratic transition needs to be built from the ground up, 
ensuring public consultation and buy-in throughout the process, 
including a wide range of civil society actors.
    We need greater investment in democracy and governance programing, 
as well as more development assistance that targets underlying social, 
environmental, and economic deficiencies so that the United States is 
positioned to assist these transitions in moving toward a more stable 
democratic future.

    Question. Where do you see this trend going in the months and years 
ahead? Have we entered a new era of change through force than the 
ballot box?

    Answer. While we have seen a significant number of extra-
constitutional seizures of power in the region, the most prevalent form 
of democratic backsliding continues to be through limiting political 
space, repressing opposition voices, and extrajudicial constitutional 
changes to extend term limits. Military seizures of power, military 
coups, and other measures to take over by force create significant 
challenges for militaries and transitional governments, as well as 
significant international attention. It is more likely we will see a 
slow erosion of democracy by those looking to maintain power for the 
longer-term.

    Question. How can the United States implement a policy and invest 
in governments either under the rule of military juntas or constantly 
under threat of being overthrown?

    Answer. We must address the underlying drivers of insecurity to 
effectively support efforts by African partners to turn the tide. We 
must be realistic about the daunting social, environmental, political, 
and economic conditions that overwhelm the Sahel. In order to contend 
with violent extremist groups, governments in the region must 
dramatically reform and improve. We can best encourage this required 
change by investing in governance.
    The new interagency Sahel strategy seeks to build the capacity of 
governments in the Sahel to regain public confidence at the national 
and local levels by providing equitable delivery of government 
services, including security, law enforcement, and justice. We will 
provide the resources and guidance to encourage accountability, anti-
corruption measures, and dialogue between capitals and communities. 
These are the keys to winning the support of civilian populations.

    Question. Challenges with staffing at U.S. embassy posts in the 
Sahel is currently one of the greatest challenges to implementing U.S. 
policy in the Sahel, and will be a major constraint to implementing the 
new inter-agency approved Sahel Strategy.
    How is the State Department working to improve staffing for Embassy 
posts in the Sahel?

    Answer. AF is working with GTM to improve the incentives for 
serving in Sahel countries. AF Bureau also successfully lobbied to put 
two Sahel countries (Mali and Burkina Faso) on the Special Incentive 
Post bid season, allowing for bidders who were looking at SIP to have 
an early look at positions at these critical posts. AF also recently 
instituted a Bespoke Bidding Tool to help prospective bidders find 
positions in countries that can fit their needs. With this hands-on 
approach, we hope to direct qualified bidders to these extremely 
important positions in the Sahel.

    Question. Is filling the post for U.S. Ambassador to Niger a 
priority for the State Department? If yes, how is the Department 
engaging with the White House on this appointment? If no, why not?

    Answer. President Biden nominated Kathleen A. FitzGibbon to be 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Niger 
on August 3, 2022. Filling the Ambassador position in Niamey is a 
priority to the Administration and the State Department due to the 
importance Niger has in our Sahel policy. We look forward to engaging 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as Ms. FitzGibbon's nomination 
is considered for confirmation.

    Question. You mentioned in your remarks in the hearing that, as a 
way to ensure the quality of individuals and the increase of staff 
hired for Embassy posts in the Sahel, the State Department is 
``providing incentives.'' Please elaborate what those incentives are 
and on adjustments to the bidding process being implemented at the 
State Department?

    Answer. AF Bureau worked with GTM to increase the incentives for 
all Sahel countries to hopefully improve staffing at these important 
Missions. The following shows the changes: Bamako: increase in Rest & 
Recuperation (R&R) trips from 3 to 4 for a 2-year tour; N'djamena: 
increase of R&Rs from 2 to 3 for a 2-year tour along with an increase 
in differential from 30 to 35 percent; Niamey: increase in R&Rs from 2 
to 3 for a 2-year tour; Nouakchott: increase in R&Rs from 2 to 3 and an 
increase in differential from 30 to 35 percent.

    Question. Given recent developments in Mali, including two coups in 
2020 and 2021, the withdrawal of French troops and conclusion of 
Operation Barkhane, and the entrance of Russia-backed Wagner Group, do 
you feel that MINUSMA has a sufficient mandate to effectively provide 
for protection of civilians and promote stability in Mali?

    Answer. MINUSMA has a broad mandate to support the Algiers Accord, 
protect the civilians of Mali, and support the political transition. We 
assess the difficulty MINUSMA has faced in Mali lies not with the 
mandate, but with the restrictions placed on MINUSMA by the transition 
government following the arrival of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group. We 
have communicated to the transition government both privately and 
publicly the need for it to respect MINUSMA's freedom of movement in 
order to implement all aspects of the mission's mandate, including 
investigating allegations of human rights abuses and violations. 
Restricting MINUSMA flights, movements, or access limits MINUSMA's 
ability to anticipate, deter, and effectively respond to threats and 
effectively protect civilians. MINUSMA's inability to fully operate due 
to Mali's restrictions leaves the people of Mali and UN peacekeepers 
vulnerable.
    Furthermore, MINUSMA's effectiveness is at-risk following the 
withdrawal of Operation Barkhane. When the UN deployed MINUSMA in 2013, 
it was with the recommendation that it be deployed alongside a parallel 
counterterrorism force, a role played by French and European forces 
until recently. The absence of French reassurance flights and the 
departure of advanced French hospital facilities that European troop-
contributing countries rely upon will have ramifications for MINUSMA in 
terms of where and how it can operate.
    We continually monitor the mission to assess its effectiveness.

    Question. In your opinion, should the United States continue to 
support MINUSMA if sufficient adjustments to its mandate are not made, 
in part due to objections from Russia and China?

    Answer. Our larger concern is a Permanent Member of the UN Security 
Council actively undermining UN peacekeeping operations through the 
Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, whose brutal tactics and disinformation 
campaigns, linked to Wagner Group's manager and financier Russian 
oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, put civilians and peacekeepers at risk. For 
this reason, we pushed to add a new requirement to be included in 
MINUSMA's most recent mandate to strengthen its capacities to monitor 
and counter disinformation. We also imposed conditions on MINUSMA's 
support to the Malian Security and Defense Forces. We believe MINUSMA's 
mandate is sufficiently broad, but it is not permitted to fulfill its 
mandate completely due to restrictions placed on it by the Malian 
transition government in partnership with the Wagner Group. We continue 
to urge the transition government to end its partnership with the 
Wagner Group. Wagner will not bring peace to Mali. Instead, Wagner will 
only divert natural and economic resources away from Mali's fight 
against terrorism.

    Question. In your opinion, should the United States continue to 
support MINUSMA if Mali's military junta continues to place 
restrictions on the ability of MINUSMA to operate in-country?

    Answer. While movement restrictions on MINUSMA have largely been in 
central Mali, MINUSMA is also deployed to the north and east where it 
continues to improve the safety of Malian civilians and their access to 
aid; deter conflict between signatory parties to the Algiers Accord; 
and keep international attention and pressure on the Mali transition 
government to uphold its responsibilities related to the Algiers 
Accord, elections, institutions reforms, and human rights. MINUSMA's 
civilian staff monitors and reports on human rights, supports 
elections, mediates intercommunal tensions, facilitates the 
participation of women in political processes, and provides technical 
assistance on institutional reforms among other activities. The UN 
Country Team, responsible for development and humanitarian aid, and 
MINUSMA civilians would not be able to access or operate in parts of 
Mali without the mission's force protection and protective environment 
around MINUSMA bases and during operations. Malians who directly 
benefit from MINUSMA clearly understand and appreciate the mission's 
role, even if misunderstood by mainstream media. If MINUSMA is 
continuously unable to fulfill its role due to restrictions by the 
transition government, it will necessitate a review of U.S. support for 
the mission.

    Question. Given the coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, and Mali's 
current rule of Mali by a military junta, do you feel the Algiers 
Accords [or Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali] remain 
relevant for framing U.S. policy toward Mali? Why or why not?

    Answer. Supporting the Algiers Accord is one aspect of our policy 
towards Mali. We assess that full implementation of the Algiers Accord 
remains the best path to peace in northern Mali. The Accord itself 
addresses key grievances of northern populations and calls for 
important steps towards decentralization of power, security sector 
reform, development, and reconciliation. These priorities are now 
applicable to other areas of the country suffering from instability. If 
fully implemented, the Accord's provisions will provide greater 
stability and facilitate efforts to address the growing terrorist 
threats in the country.
    As we assess the main driver of instability in Mali and the broader 
Sahel is a lack of state presence and responsive governance, the tenets 
of the Algiers Accord are exactly the kind of improved governance 
measures we believe will address root causes of instability. The 
Embassy in Bamako is active as an observer to the international 
mediation. The United States also works closely with regional and 
international partners to push for rapid and full implementation of the 
agreement. However, no level of international involvement can secure 
peace for Mali. The signatory parties themselves must be driving the 
effort to bring peace throughout Mali.

    Question. If the Algiers Accords [or Agreement for Peace and 
Reconciliation in Mali] remain relevant in your opinion, what are the 
most pressing current threats to its implementation? How is the State 
Department adjusting its approach to Mali in response?

    Answer. The signatory parties to the Accord have fallen well short 
of their commitments and the Accord Monitoring Committee chaired by 
Algeria has not met since October 2021. The political transition has 
taken much of the transition government's focus away from 
implementation of the Accord. The appointment of longtime Accord critic 
Choguel Maiga as transition prime minister in June 2021 and the arrival 
of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group in December 2021 have injected 
uncertainty into the relationship between the signatory armed groups 
and the transition government.
    The Department continues to message that the Accord remains the 
best path to peace in northern Mali and its implementation would 
benefit Mali as a whole. We also continue to warn Mali about the costs 
of continuing to partner with the Wagner Group, which makes countries 
poorer, weaker, and less secure. At the local level, we continue to 
engage signatory parties bilaterally and as part of the international 
mediation to urge meaningful progress toward implementation of the 
Accord.

    Question. What lessons can be drawn from the U.S.' experience 
supporting the implementation of the Algiers Accords [or Agreement for 
Peace and Reconciliation in Mali] since 2015?

    Answer. The United States can only play a supporting role in 
implementation of a peace accord such as the Algiers Accord. 
Implementation requires buy-in and political will from the parties 
themselves.

    Question. To what extent is the State Department engaging with 
rebel movements in northern Mali, including CMA?

    Answer. The Embassy in Bamako engages regularly with the signatory 
armed groups in northern Mali, including the Coordination of Azawad 
Movements (CMA), both bilaterally and as part of the international 
mediation. The Embassy in particular has strongly supported the 
introduction and participation of women into the mediation process.

    Question. U.S. foreign assistance in the areas of democracy and 
governance, economic development, conflict prevention and resolution, 
and youth empowerment, and other types of foreign assistance are 
important tools in supporting the development of strong, representative 
democratic institutions, resilient societies and countering violent 
extremism. In your assessment, has the U.S. provided sufficient 
targeted assistance in these areas in the Sahel?

    Answer. Increased and dedicated resources are needed to advance the 
Sahel Strategy over the next 5 years. There is a need for more funding 
for democracy and governance, climate change, economic development, and 
education to prepare countries pre- and post-transition. Democracy and 
governance funding is required to build resilience, advance timely and 
peaceful transitions, prevent and counter violent extremism, increase 
human rights protections, especially for women and youth, and increase 
civic participation to build strong civil societies. State and USAID 
will need to increase funding to respond to the negative effects of 
climate change and help communities to withstand shocks caused by 
droughts, pandemics and other stressors. We must continue to create 
more educational and economic opportunities to reduce the risks of the 
most vulnerable (i.e. youth and men) joining extremist organizations.
    In the near term, we are using funding from the second supplemental 
appropriation for Ukraine to mitigate food insecurity and the economic 
impacts exacerbated by the war on Ukraine and ongoing State and USAID 
programs to promote democracy and governance, economic development, 
conflict prevention and resolution, and youth empowerment across the 
Sahel. We will work with the Department's Office of Foreign Assistance 
(F) to prioritize FY 2022 resources to increase support in these areas 
and will continue to do so with budgets in future years.

    Question. Beyond assistance, how is the State Department, in 
coordination with partner agencies and departments, engaged in building 
resilient institutions in the Sahel, supporting a return to or 
maintenance of democratic rule, and countering violent extremism?

    Answer. The Department engages at all levels of government and with 
civil society to promote tenets of responsive democratic governance. We 
use our public messaging strategically to speak out in support of 
respect for democratic norms, human rights, media freedom, civil 
society, and government transparency and accountability and express our 
solidarity with the people in the Sahel who are suffering from violent 
extremist attacks. Our full range of educational and cultural exchange 
programs address issues such as good governance, countering violent 
extremism, journalism, and civic engagement, which all contribute to 
these ends.
    We exposed Yevgeny Prighozin's harmful disinformation campaigns and 
networks in Africa via a recent public bulletin on the Department 
website so that local populations and media can be informed about 
malign influences which poison fact-based narratives in their 
countries. We continue to counter disinformation through analysis of 
disinformation networks and network building in numerous African 
countries. The United States founded the Global Coalition to Defeat 
ISIS to coordinate international counterterrorism efforts and worked 
with Italy to create the Coalition's Africa Focus Group, which has held 
its first three meetings and was followed in May by the first Coalition 
Ministerial meeting, held in Africa. The United States joined the Sahel 
Alliance in March 2022 to improve coordination with other donors and is 
an unofficial observer of the Coalition for the Sahel, which seeks to 
foster a unified approach to countering instability.

    Question. Are there lessons from the U.S. approach to Mali over the 
last 10 years that can be applied to the U.S. engagement with and 
approach to Niger?

    Answer. Underpinning the Sahel Strategy is the assessment that 
instability in the Sahel is a security problem with a governance 
solution. For the last 10 years, our and the international community's 
approach to the Sahel, led primarily by French military reinforcement, 
placed an overemphasis on security. As we enter a new phase of 
engagement based on the Sahel Strategy, we will shift our primary focus 
to governance, democracy, and development assistance to accompany smart 
investments in national security capabilities. The Department has also 
enhanced coordination with France and likeminded partners on diplomacy, 
development, and cross-sector institutional capacity building, in 
addition to operational and tactical defense requirements. In Niger, 
this means supporting the Government of Niger's social and economic 
development plan, which prioritizes reform of the education system with 
an emphasis on girl's education; reinforcing the judicial system with a 
focus on corruption prevention; and returning Niger to its pre-COVID 19 
economic growth trajectory.

    Question. What lessons were learned from the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership Program and how are those lessons being 
applied in preparation to implement President Biden's Sahel Strategy?

    Answer. Progress in achieving our counterterrorism objectives 
through the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has been 
uneven but programming and planning improvements have supported our 
revised approach to countering violent extremism across the Sahel. The 
Department has adopted a more strategic and knowledge-based approach to 
programming security and non-security assistance, including a more 
effective predictive analysis for drivers of terror and crime in the 
region. More effectively deploying these tools will be game changing 
and will substantially improve the outcomes of U.S. policy and 
programs. TSCTP provides a useful interagency coordination structure 
for policy and program coordination we have used to maximize outcomes.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Mr. Robert Jenkins to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad mark a 
low point for democracy in the Sahel. Add to this Guinea's coup in West 
Africa and the coup attempt in Niger in March 2021, and it seems these 
extra-constitutional power changes remain an ever-present threat, 
particularly in this region of Africa.
    What do you ascribe to this trend in coups and transitions of power 
by non-democratic means in the Sahel region and wider Africa?

    Answer. Those who have led coups and extra-constitutional 
transitions in the Sahel region and other parts of Africa have offered 
widely varying reasons for their seizures of power, both publicly and 
in private, making it difficult to ascribe a singular reason or trend. 
Additionally, while there have been a number of coups and extra-
constitutional regime changes over the past few years, a robust 
majority of citizens in the Sahel and throughout sub-Saharan Africa 
still favor democratic rule.
    In Burkina Faso, in advance of the coup, the democratically elected 
government was not able to provide security to the population, which 
cost it legitimacy. The Burkinabe military was meanwhile frustrated 
with its lack of resources as it battled violent extremist groups, 
opening the door for a military takeover. In Guinea, a non-inclusive 
and arguably illegal referendum was held to allow the then sitting 
president, Alpha Conde, to run for a previously banned third term. 
Public anger over Conde's constitutional change paved the way for a 
military coup. In Sudan, the military seized power in advance of a 
promised handover of power from the military to civilians.
    Despite the wide array of political circumstances and reasons given 
for regime change, the societies experiencing them share common traits 
that include frustration with a government that has been unable or 
unwilling to provide basic services such as health, economic growth, 
and education; a lack of security; and a lack of inclusive political 
participation.

    Question. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad mark a 
low point for democracy in the Sahel. Add to this Guinea's coup in West 
Africa and the coup attempt in Niger in March 2021, and it seems these 
extra-constitutional power changes remain an ever-present threat, 
particularly in this region of Africa.
    What is the role of the U.S. in helping nations through these 
problematic periods without over-engaging democratically illegitimate 
regimes?

    Answer. Our efforts to promote and strengthen democracy and 
democratic values must be long-term, multi-faceted, and interconnected. 
During problematic periods, USAID recognizes the importance of 
bolstering civil society and improving the capacity of individuals to 
advocate for their needs, creating fertile conditions for democratic 
consolidation and fighting against democratic backsliding. In 
transitional or restrictive political spaces, USAID's efforts 
demonstrate solidarity with pro-democratic forces, provide protection, 
and prevent further backsliding by enabling civil society to adapt and 
maintain pressure to restore democratic and deliberative processes.
    At the same time, USAID carefully identifies opportunities to lay 
the groundwork for a democratic transition and strengthen existing 
checks and balances where possible. In addition, USAID coordinates with 
like-minded international partners (including regional institutions) to 
amplify international efforts to strengthen democracy. This approach 
allows partners to organize and protect against coups and other extra-
constitutional regime changes while marshaling efforts should such 
events take place.
    USAID also works with host governments in burgeoning democracies to 
demonstrate to citizens that democracy delivers services such as 
health, economic growth and education, enhanced gender equality and 
social inclusion, access to justice, security, and the ability to play 
a role in decisions that most affect their lives. This serves to limit 
potential backsliding, improving the potential for countries to come 
through problematic periods and maintain their democratic legitimacy.
    It is also important to strengthen democratic values across all of 
USAID's work. To that end, USAID is further integrating democratic 
accountability into economic growth, stabilization, global health, 
humanitarian assistance, gender equality, inclusive development, and 
human rights programming. Embedding strong participation, inclusion, 
transparency, accountability, and oversight measures in health, 
education, and economic programming enhances sustained, resilient 
recovery efforts and can reduce fragility in the long-term. Moreover, 
USAID enables civil society and media actors to detect and counter 
efforts at mis- and disinformation, particularly by external 
authoritarian actors, that seek to undermine democratic processes and 
bolster illiberalism.

    Question. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad mark a 
low point for democracy in the Sahel. Add to this Guinea's coup in West 
Africa and the coup attempt in Niger in March 2021, and it seems these 
extra-constitutional power changes remain an ever-present threat, 
particularly in this region of Africa.
    Where do you see this trend going in the months and years ahead? 
Have we entered a new era of change through force than the ballot box?

    Answer. There are many factors that impact the democratic fragility 
of sub-Saharan Africa. These include low socioeconomic development, 
conflict, insecurity, weak institutions, a lack of judicial 
independence and access to justice, and poor overall government 
legitimacy. Additionally, authoritarian regimes have become more 
creative in their attempts to consolidate and legitimize their power. 
However, sub-Saharan Africa also demonstrates opportunities for 
democracy and elections. Zambia and Malawi have both recently taken 
significant democratic steps forward at the ballot box. Leadership 
transitions in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo over 
the last few years create openings--however tenuous--for positive 
democratic movement. In 2021, Niger saw the first transfer of power 
between two democratically elected presidents in the nation's history. 
Also, the continent's large youth population presents tremendous 
opportunities for economic growth and innovation, civil society and 
democracy.
    As the most recent Afrobarometer public opinion data shows, a 
majority of citizens across the continent still favor democratic rule. 
It is this citizen support for democracy that can ultimately help stem 
or even turn the tide of undemocratic political practices. This is the 
basis for assisting democratic actors to demonstrate that democratic 
governance delivers services, security, gender equality, access to 
justice, economic growth and political accountability. Such advancement 
must be inclusive, bringing in youth, women, and other traditionally 
marginalized populations, to improve government legitimacy and fend off 
resentment that could potentially lead disaffected groups to join 
malign actors.
    This demand for democracy also provides a substantial opportunity 
to work with democratic actors in transitional or restrictive political 
spaces, elevating their voices and providing technical expertise on a 
variety of issues, further advancing their own goals of rights-
respecting democracy in their home countries.
    This trend underscores the need for a coordinated development, 
diplomatic, and defense partnership as well as strong partnerships with 
host-country counterparts and other local partners to achieve peace and 
stability. It is through these partnerships that the USG can enhance 
partner country efforts to improve security sector governance; 
reinforce the principles of human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance; and mitigate the grievances that drive instability.

    Question. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad mark a 
low point for democracy in the Sahel. Add to this Guinea's coup in West 
Africa and the coup attempt in Niger in March 2021, and it seems these 
extra-constitutional power changes remain an ever-present threat, 
particularly in this region of Africa.
    How can the United States implement a policy and invest in 
governments either under the rule of military juntas or constantly 
under threat of being overthrown?

    Answer. In restrictive political spaces, USAID's efforts 
demonstrate solidarity with pro-democratic forces, provide protection, 
and guard against further backsliding by helping civil society to 
adapt, learn and coordinate, while also strengthening checks and 
balances on authoritarian governments. This often includes efforts to 
decentralize decision making and service provision and working with 
local communities to develop and further democratic goals.
    In fragile states, including burgeoning and new democracies, USAID 
works to improve government capacity and legitimacy while working with 
civil society to build capacity to advocate for government 
accountability and citizen preferences and needs. This reduces the risk 
of extra-constitutional regime change by demonstrating the ability of 
democracy to deliver services such as healthcare and education, 
economic growth, security, and access to justice. Further, it 
demonstrates the ability of such governments to provide individuals a 
voice in the decisions made that most affect their lives, limiting 
potential frustration and disaffection that often leads to support for 
such regime change.
    Further, across both fragile and restricted countries, USAID's 
long-term investments in peacebuilding, including efforts to build 
resilient social ties between identity groups and mitigate the risks of 
inter-communal conflict, are also an important tool in building the 
stable, peaceful societies that allow democracies to thrive. 
Communities reconciling differences and working together on shared 
interests are more likely to effectively lobby government, establish 
civil society organizations, improve their own capacity to manage 
conflict, and demand commitment, accountability, and transparency. 
Reconciled communities are also more likely to be inclusive, resilient 
to external threats, respect human rights, and monitor public service 
delivery, thus supporting a return to or refocus on positive norms and 
standards.

    Question. Please describe the various responsibilities of USAID 
missions and regional offices in the Sahel or supporting USAID 
activities in the Sahel. In particular, what is the division of labor 
between the USAID Missions in Mali and Niger, the Sahel Regional Office 
in Dakar, Senegal, the Sahel Regional Office in Niamey, Niger and the 
West Africa Regional Mission in Accra Ghana?

    Answer. USAID has bilateral missions in Mali and Niger, an Office 
of the USAID Representative in Burkina Faso, and USAID Program Managers 
(but no direct hire staff) in the U.S. embassies in Chad and 
Mauritania. Besides these operating units, the Agency also has regional 
platforms in Accra, Ghana, and Dakar, Senegal, that oversee the 
implementation and coordination of our efforts in the Sahel. The West 
Africa Regional Mission in Accra, Ghana implements regionally funded 
programs in the Sahel and partners with regional organizations, the 
private sector and with local partners to achieve peace and prosperity. 
USAID/Senegal's Sahel Regional Office implements bilaterally funded 
programs and provides oversight, mentoring, and technical backstopping 
to USAID staff in the countries where USAID has a limited presence or 
non-presence: Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania.

    Question. How is USAID working with other bilateral and 
multilateral actors in the Sahel to address humanitarian needs and 
build resilience?

    Answer. USAID coordinates closely with the major bilateral donors 
in the Sahel on humanitarian issues, meeting regularly at the country 
and regional level to discuss the evolution of the humanitarian context 
and response priorities. USAID has actively participated in a number of 
high-level events including the recent April 6, 2022 European Union 
organizing conference on the Food and Nutrition Crises in the Sahel and 
Lake Chad regions, where USAID urged greater burden sharing and called 
on new donors to contribute toward the growing needs in the region. At 
the working level, USAID enjoys good relations with the other major 
bilateral donors and we often agree on common messages regarding issues 
impacting the humanitarian response and we coordinate our advocacy 
towards key stakeholders and partners, including multilateral 
organizations such as the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). USAID also co-funds specific 
projects with other donors such as the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) 
in Niger that supports a network of actors to provide immediate 
lifesaving assistance to recently displaced populations affected by the 
armed conflict in the Sahel or vulnerable households impacted by other 
shocks such as floods.
    Multilateral organizations such as OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, and IOM are 
key partners in USAID's response to the humanitarian crisis in the 
Sahel, and USAID frequently engages with these organizations to assess 
key response needs and gaps. Through our engagement, USAID influences 
their strategic priorities and resource allocation, works to improve 
the delivery of assistance, and monitors the effectiveness of our 
programs.
    USAID has longstanding relationships and partnerships with 
bilateral and multilateral actors in the Sahel to strengthen resilience 
to recurrent crises, including droughts, flooding, and conflict. One 
example of this is the Resilience in the Sahel Enhanced (RISE) II 
program (2018-2023) in Niger and Burkina Faso that seeks to improve the 
capacities of individuals, households, communities and institutions to 
maintain and improve well-being in a dynamic and challenging operating 
environment. Under RISE II, USAID is partnering with over 30 
implementing partners, including the World Food Program and UNICEF, 
government stakeholders and civil society on a multi-sectoral, 
integrated, community-based approach to strengthening resilience 
through land rehabilitation, water management, nutrition, community 
planning, smallholder farmer support, seasonal assistance, and school 
feeding. Since 2014, USAID's partnership with WFP in Niger alone has 
helped rehabilitate more than 110,000 hectares of land to improve 
agricultural and livestock production, diversify livelihoods, and 
reduce conflict. These investments are helping communities better cope 
with the unprecedented shocks facing the Sahel this year.

    Question. Food insecurity is a persistent challenge for the people 
of the Sahel. Recent events, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
war in Ukraine, have exacerbated challenges related to the global food 
and agricultural input supplies and ability of humanitarian actors to 
respond to hunger in the Sahel, across Africa and globally.
    How would you characterize USAID's relationship with the World Food 
Programme in the Sahel? Are there areas where coordination can be 
improved?

    Answer. USAID has very good working relationships with the United 
Nations Food Programme in the Sahel, and coordinates closely at both 
the country and regional level. We appreciated WFP for being proactive 
in raising awareness about the food crisis in West Africa and for 
sharing information and quickly responding to inquiries from the United 
States. Nevertheless, there is a need for greater transparency from WFP 
on its resource capacities and the operational challenges it faces. 
This includes earlier and more regular proactive discussion on 
individual country funding situations as well as greater clarity on 
resources that WFP has been able to secure from other actors and 
donors. In addition, we would like to have greater clarity from WFP on 
their country priorities and the tradeoffs that are required given 
resource availability in terms of depth versus breadth of a response. 
USAID is coordinating with other major humanitarian donors to the 
Sahel, including the EU's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection (ECHO) and the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & 
Development Office (FCDO) to reinforce the need for improved 
transparency from WFP. This is essential for us to have a more 
effective working partnership that allows us as donors to act as a 
``critical friend'' and, where relevant, support the response to the 
most acute needs through policy and programme.

    Question. Food insecurity is a persistent challenge for the people 
of the Sahel. Recent events, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
war in Ukraine, have exacerbated challenges related to the global food 
and agricultural input supplies and ability of humanitarian actors to 
respond to hunger in the Sahel, across Africa and globally.
    How is USAID working with communities in the Sahel to address 
chronic food insecurity beyond humanitarian food assistance?

    Answer. The Agency's primary tool to address food insecurity beyond 
humanitarian food assistance in the Sahel draws on resilience 
programming strategies that focus multiple layers of well-sequenced and 
integrated multisectoral, gender equitable and socially inclusive 
activities, and funding in communities that have historically received 
humanitarian assistance. The goal of resilience programming is to build 
the human and financial capacities of these communities so they can 
better withstand and recover from environmental, economic, and 
political shocks and avoid reliance on emergency and humanitarian food 
assistance. Resilience programming helps communities move from 
humanitarian assistance toward agriculture-led economic growth and 
market-based development activities.
    Additionally, USAID is using its trade and investment activities, 
including the new Africa Trade and Investment (ATI) program, to 
strengthen established businesses, farming associations, and sourcing 
partnerships that can rapidly scale access to key inputs such as seeds 
and fertilizers. Programs such as ATI, the Agency's flagship effort for 
Prosper Africa, helps USAID establish partnerships with diverse 
companies to scale production of food crops critical to food security 
and nutrition across multiple markets, enable export deals for key 
inputs to food insecure regions, and facilitate trade deals that 
deliver food from regions of surplus to those of scarcity.

    Question. Food insecurity is a persistent challenge for the people 
of the Sahel. Recent events, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
war in Ukraine, have exacerbated challenges related to the global food 
and agricultural input supplies and ability of humanitarian actors to 
respond to hunger in the Sahel, across Africa and globally.
    As the U.S. places more emphasis on Niger as the lynchpin for 
stability and democratic governance in the Sahel, how is USAID adapting 
programming to reflect this? In what areas is Niger in need of support 
that USAID is currently unable to provide, and how can Congress be 
helpful? Are there lessons learned from our support to the Government 
of Mali that should be applied to our approach to Niger?

    Answer. Niger is the only country in the world with ISIS on 
multiple borders. Security remains a principal concern of the 
Government of Niger (GoN) and imposes an increasingly heavy burden on 
its national budget. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) target 
national security forces, international actors, and local populations. 
VEOs leverage existing inter-communal friction, including farmer-herder 
and ethnic tensions, and use gender-based violence to create greater 
operating space.
    Despite these challenges, Niger is a country of strategic 
importance, and we remain committed to strengthening its efforts to 
inoculate itself against regional instability. At the same time, we 
need to continue to promote citizen-responsive governance and the 
consolidation of democracy, expand the role of women in government, and 
promote a human rights-based approach by security forces and the 
judiciary.
    In late 2020, USAID swore in its first Niger Mission Director in 24 
years, completing the transition from a USAID Office to a USAID 
Mission. USAID invests approximately $200 million yearly in Niger (half 
of which is humanitarian assistance), focusing programs on youth and 
women with activities in good governance, rule of law, countering 
violent extremism, conflict prevention and mitigation, health, water 
and land management, community resilience to natural disasters and man-
made shocks, food security, and agriculture. USAID implements the 
President's Malaria Initiative, the Global Health Security Agenda, as 
well as the Presidential Feed the Future Initiative in Niger. USAID's 
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) implements activities to 
increase community engagement with government leaders and identify the 
key drivers of youth isolation and VEO recruitment.
    The limitations on assistance in Niger are due to the complex and 
dynamic operating environment in Niger and not necessarily to any one 
specific constraint. However, the strong and sustained commitment by 
the Government of Niger to address the persistent security threats 
while continuing to promote development action in more secure areas is 
a constant. The lessons from Mali may not be as relevant in Niger 
except to note the need to be adaptive to maintain assistance even in 
challenging situations.
    Flexible human and financial resources allow us to adapt to 
evolving conditions in the Sahel. Flexible hiring mechanisms and better 
incentives will help us fill positions in the field.

    Question. Food insecurity is a persistent challenge for the people 
of the Sahel. Recent events, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
war in Ukraine, have exacerbated challenges related to the global food 
and agricultural input supplies and ability of humanitarian actors to 
respond to hunger in the Sahel, across Africa and globally.
    When it comes to the appropriation of global resources to combat 
Russian disinformation, how do you foresee the allocation of funds to 
civil society programs working to deter civilians from misinformation 
and disinformation in the Sahel?

    Answer. USAID provides assistance to local civil society and media 
partners in African countries through training, technical assistance 
and subgrants that can help address urgent threats to civic and 
political space. For example, this has included assistance for radio 
and print journalists to combat COVID 19-related misinformation and 
provide more timely, accessible, user friendly, and accurate 
information to citizens. This work has also included a focus on remote 
areas of a country where reporting and information is limited and where 
there may be a greater risk of malign influence.
    Further, this has included grants to civil society organizations to 
conduct training on recognizing mis- and disinformation. Such training 
focused on both traditional and social media. In a recent round of 
training in Mali, participants reported that these efforts allowed them 
to understand that the information they receive through social media 
and sometimes traditional media is not always accurate. The 
participants also became aware of the impact that mis- and 
disinformation can have on communities, and especially on the attitudes 
and behavior of community members. Using newly acquired skills, 
participants committed to verifying information and being more 
judicious in sharing information received through social media 
platforms.
    USAID/Mali is submitting a Congressional Notification for Complex 
Crisis Funds proposal to launch a more holistic approach to addressing 
the proliferation of disinformation in Mali. The activity will 
strengthen countering disinformation approaches in four key areas: (1) 
Tracking disinformation in partnership with local and international 
organizations. (2) Improving the responsible production of information 
through supply-side programming, including providing journalists with 
information garnered through disinformation tracking to counter false 
narratives. (3) Improving the responsible consumption of information 
through demand-side programming, including online engagement with 
consumers to discourage sharing disinformation and activities to debunk 
disinformation spread offline. (4) Evaluating rigorously the 
effectiveness of interventions, such as online demand side 
interventions, to inform future programming throughout the Sahel and 
other countries impacted by disinformation.

    Question. Food insecurity is a persistent challenge for the people 
of the Sahel. Recent events, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
war in Ukraine, have exacerbated challenges related to the global food 
and agricultural input supplies and ability of humanitarian actors to 
respond to hunger in the Sahel, across Africa and globally.
    You mentioned that the ``generational problems'' in the region 
cannot be fixed within the next 5 years. Once the U.S. strategy is 
implemented, do you expect the generational problems to resolve 
themselves, or do you foresee additional assistance and effort being 
required?

    Answer. The Sahel suffers from high levels of poverty, water 
scarcity, weak governance, low youth literacy rates, rising 
temperatures, longer droughts, and pronounced gender inequality. A 
complex set of drivers have resulted in a chronically vulnerable 
population that lacks sufficient income and assets, with limited means 
to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from economic and climatic shocks 
and stresses. The U.S. Sahel Strategy reflects a collective assessment 
of the current development challenges and the tools, including 
development assistance, that the United States can bring to bear to 
help address these complex drivers. The Sahel Strategy alone will not 
resolve these problems and, as we do in many of the countries and 
regions where USAID has a long-term presence, our approaches will need 
to be adapted over time to continue to address or mitigate the complex 
drivers. We have provided a few examples herein.
    The Agency is guided by the U.S. Government Global Food Security 
Strategy (GFSS) 2022-2026. A key focus of the GFSS is economic 
empowerment of youth (about 65 percent of the population is under the 
age of 30 in the Sahel) and women in agriculture and agribusiness. One 
of the ways that USAID addresses the ``generational problem'' is by 
working to improve youth and women's access to finances and business 
services. Sahelian youth suffer from socio-economic exclusion and are 
severely affected by unemployment and underemployment. Around 44 
percent of young people in the region are neither in school nor 
actively employed. Two-thirds of these youth are women and the majority 
live in rural areas. Therefore, more equitable economic opportunities 
for youth and women are needed to improve their livelihoods and 
participate more fully in the economic and political development of 
their communities. Another way that USAID tackles the ``generational 
problem'' is by addressing the drivers of child marriage; 18 of the 20 
countries globally with the highest prevalence of child marriage are in 
sub-Saharan Africa, most are in the Sahel. By improving economic 
opportunity, keeping girls in school, and working with local leaders to 
change social norms, USAID aims to end child marriage and improve the 
health, wealth, and empowerment of Sahel's youth and their communities.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Chidi Blyden to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad mark a 
low point for democracy in the Sahel. Add to this Guinea's coup in West 
Africa and the coup attempt in Niger in March 2021, and it seems these 
extra-constitutional power changes remain an ever-present threat, 
particularly in this region of Africa. What do you ascribe to this 
trend in coups and transitions of power by non-democratic means in the 
Sahel region and wider Africa?

    Answer. The recent coups and transitions of power by non-democratic 
means in the Sahel region and wider Africa may be attributed to many 
things, and specific causes are sometimes difficult to identify. While 
there are some similarities between the countries where power 
transitions have occurred through non-democratic means, these power 
transitions are usually complex events involving countries whose 
democratic traditions, maturity, and processes vary, and in which the 
spread of violent extremist organizations has resulted in governmental 
breakdowns in or in a complete lack of governance. The challenges are 
further exacerbated by weakened economies and institutions, among 
multiple drivers of insecurity.

    Question. What is the role of the U.S. in helping nations through 
these problematic periods without over-engaging democratically 
illegitimate regimes?

    Answer. The U.S. has primarily played a diplomatic and advisory 
role in helping nations and regional institutions through these 
political transitions. I defer to my Department of State colleagues 
regarding the policies driving U.S. engagement with governments 
empowered via non-democratic means. However, we should be clear in our 
communication and our intentions that we will not provide certain types 
of assistance to governments which attain power via non-democratic 
means. Also, some elements of defense diplomacy can, we believe, help 
restore civilian control and help influence leaders to expedite 
transitions to democratically elected governments. Therefore, the 
United States should remain engaged in dialogue with non- 
democratically created governments and not shut the door completely, as 
this will only create wider opportunities for malign actors to replace 
us.

    Question. Where do you see this trend going in the months and years 
ahead? Have we entered a new era of change through force than the 
ballot box?

    Answer. I believe the months and years ahead will be a test for 
African partners and institutions. If this is indeed a trend, we should 
examine root causes and potential response mechanisms. The U.S. should 
also examine what is happening and consider whether we need to increase 
our institutional capacity building to strengthen defense and security 
governance, adherence to the rule of law and human rights, and respect 
for civilian control of militaries.

    Question. How can the United States implement a policy and invest 
in governments either under the rule of military juntas or constantly 
under threat of being overthrown?

    Answer. Within a whole-of-government approach, the Department of 
Defense has the ability to strengthen fundamental elements within the 
security sectors of at-risk countries. DoD can strengthen institutional 
functions such as human resource management, budgeting and financial 
management, strategy and policy development, and acquisition and 
logistics. In keeping with the U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption, 
DoD can help strengthen national systems to ensure funds appropriated 
to a nation's defense establishment result in thoughtfully acquired 
defense equipment and adequate logistics support to armed forces. DoD 
can emphasize respect for the rule of law and human rights, and the 
benefits of civilian control of the military.

    Question. How is AFRICOM adjusting its posture in the Sahel to 
account for the French drawdown in the region?

    Answer. AFRICOM has updated its approach in light of the 
redeployments in the region. The plan is currently under review.

    Question. How is the Department of Defense coordinating with the 
State Department's Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage 
Affairs (SPEHA) and other federal departments and agencies to recover 
U.S. hostage Jeffery Woodke?

    Answer. The Department of Defense will continue to work with 
intergovernmental partners including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell, the Department of State, 
the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, and the U.S. 
intelligence community to facilitate the safe recovery and return of 
Mr. Woodke and all other U.S. persons held hostage or wrongfully 
detained abroad.

    Question. How has the U.S. adjusted its level of effort and 
approach to recovering hostage Jeffrey Woodke given the French drawdown 
in the region?

    Answer. The Department of Defense is reviewing potential effects of 
the French relocation in the Sahel and will continue to work with both 
European allies present in the region and African regional partners to 
locate and recover Mr. Woodke and all other U.S. persons held hostage 
or wrongfully detained abroad.

    Question. How is the Department of Defense adjusting its approach 
to force protection given the growing terrorist threats and rise of 
government coups in the Sahel?

    Answer. Protection of U.S. citizens and service members is always a 
critical mission for the Department of Defense. To mitigate the 
increasing risks in the Sahel, the Department of Defense will continue 
to ensure U.S. forces are fully trained and prepared for their 
missions, provide support to allies and partners also engaged in 
counter-terrorism actions, and support interagency efforts to affect 
the political, social and economic root causes of terrorism and 
political instability.

    Question. How is the Department of Defense going to juggle the 
implementation of the U.S. Regional Strategy for the Sahel while also 
making the protection and safety of U.S. personnel and U.S. security, a 
priority?

    Answer. Force protection remains our highest priority. We will 
continue to use the ``by, with, and through'' partners approach to 
achieve security and stability in the Sahel with a limited forward 
presence of U.S. forces.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Chidi Blyden to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. Nearly 800 U.S. military personnel are deployed in Niger, 
the second-largest U.S. military presence in Africa after Djibouti. 
Following the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, where four U.S. Special 
Forces soldiers and four Nigerien soldiers were killed, how has AFRICOM 
adjusted or updated its ``advise and assist'' missions throughout Niger 
and the region as a result of the incident?
    Answer. Following the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, AFRICOM 
made adjustments in various areas. Broadly, these changes include 
establishing clear and unambiguous guidance for the planning and 
approval of military operations, conducting a holistic review of 
certain equipment requirements, ensuring appropriate turnover 
procedures within the theater, and taking certain actions with respect 
to coordinating support from partner nation forces.