[Senate Hearing 117-563]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-563
VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM:
EXAMINING THE THREAT TO HOUSES OF WORSHIP AND PUBLIC SPACES
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 16, 2022
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
49-911 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
Naveed Jazayeri, Senior Professional Staff Member
Moran banai, Senior Professional Staff Member
Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
Clyde E. Hicks, Jr., Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
Maggie Frankel, Minority Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Peters............................................... 1
Senator Portman.............................................. 2
Senator Hassan............................................... 16
Senator Lankford............................................. 18
Senator Ossoff............................................... 23
Senator Padilla.............................................. 26
Senator Hawley............................................... 28
Senator Scott................................................ 31
Senator Carper............................................... 33
Prepared statements:
Senator Peters............................................... 39
Senator Portman.............................................. 41
WITNESSES
Wednesday, March 16, 2022
Ryan T. Young, Executive Assistant Director, Intelligence Branch,
Federal Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Department of Justice... 5
Stephanie Dobitsch, Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence
Enterprise Operations, Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security........................... 7
Christopher Logan, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Grant Programs
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 8
Marcus Coleman, Director, Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood
Partnerships, U.S. Department of Homeland Security............. 10
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Coleman, Marcus:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Joint prepared statement..................................... 49
Dobitsch, Stephanie:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Joint prepared statement..................................... 49
Logan, Christopher:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Joint prepared statement..................................... 49
Young, Ryan T.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 44
APPENDIX
Portman DOD IG Report............................................ 55
Anti-Defamation League Statement for the Record.................. 89
Jewish Federation of Northern America Statement for the Record... 98
Muslim Public Affairs Council Statement for the Record........... 100
Sikh Coalition Statement for the record.......................... 103
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Young.................................................... 110
Ms. Dobitsch................................................. 114
Mr. Logan and Mr. Coleman.................................... 136
VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM:
EXAMINING THE THREAT TO HOUSES OF WORSHIP AND PUBLIC SPACES
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., via
Webex and in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon.
Gary Peters, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Peters, Carper, Hassan, Rosen, Padilla,
Ossoff, Portman, Johnson, Lankford, Scott, and Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\
Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appear in the Appendix
on page 39.
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In recent years, we have seen an unacceptable number of
violent threats, and deadly attacks, on some of our most
vulnerable public places in communities all across the country.
These targets have included spaces where Americans are going
about their daily lives, and where they should have no reason
to fear for their safety. Places like shopping centers,
entertainment venues, schools, and frequently, houses of
worship, including synagogues, churches, and mosques.
Last month, a man attempted to start a fire at the Al-Huda
Islamic Center in Dearborn, Michigan, and few weeks before
that, an armed British citizen held hostages for 11 hours at
Congregation Beth Israel, a synagogue in Colleyville, Texas.
These are two recent incidents after years and years of
attacks, from attempted arsons to deadly shootings, at
synagogues, African American churches, mosques and gurdwaras
across our Nation.
These insidious, hateful attacks not only take lives and
cause physical injuries, they also destroy sacred property and
leave deep traumatic scars on entire communities.
Everyone across this nation deserves to feel safe where
they live, where they work, and where they pray. That is why
resources, like those provided by the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP), are
so important to keeping our communities safe and secure from
these attacks. This program provides grants to faith-based and
nonprofit organizations to help secure their facilities and
fund training and resources to protect congregations from these
threats.
I have long fought to increase the resources available to
nonprofits and houses of worship who are looking to strengthen
their security, and I was proud to work alongside Senator
Portman last Congress to lead the authorization of this vital
program. I look forward to continuing our work together to
strengthen and expand the resources available for this high-
demand program, to ensure we are effectively meeting the needs
of our religious communities.
Although this important program is available to many
organizations, it is all too clear that the evolving threats to
our homeland security are targeting many other public spaces.
We have seen pervasive threats and devastating attacks
wherever people gather, from the Pulse nightclub attack to the
shooting at the Walmart in El Paso, Texas, and more recently
during the nationwide bomb threats targeting Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCU). These diffuse and rising
threats raise serious questions about the rapidly evolving
landscape of homeland security threats that communities across
the country are facing, and how Federal agencies can better
address these to protect Americans as they go about their daily
lives.
Increasingly, lone offenders and small cells, who are often
motivated by personal grievances or ideological beliefs,
present the most lethal threat to the homeland. Many of them
are radicalized online, through conspiracies, misinformation,
and disinformation that merge to create a volatile environment
and the potential for real-world violence.
To effectively address these threats, we rely on the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS components,
including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
the Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, as
well as State and local partners, to respond and disseminate
information to our communities to better protect people.
I look forward to today's discussion about what more
Congress and our national security agencies can do to tackle
this rapidly shifting threat environment and keep all Americans
safe.
Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for his opening
remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\
Senator Portman. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses for being here. I look forward to hearing from you.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the
Appendix on page 41.
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This is another important hearing we are having to discuss
the elevated threat of violence and terrorism against our
houses of worship. Over two months ago, a terrorist made his
way into Congregation Beth Israel in Colleyville, Texas, and
held four people hostage for over 10 hours. The perpetrator,
Malik Faisal Akram, traveled to the United States from the
United Kingdom (UK) with the intent to commit violence.
I am concerned that this attack was not prevented. Why was
this person not on the government's radar, considering his
criminal record and history of being investigated for terrorism
in the United Kingdom? Why was he granted access to the United
States under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), especially after he
lied on his paperwork to Customs and Border Protection (CBP)?
In spite of his dangerous past, he was able to travel to the
United States, fly from New York to Texas, illegally purchase a
firearm. It was only after he attacked a synagogue that our law
enforcement or homeland security officials detected the threat.
The incident in Colleyville was a blatant act of
antisemitism and terrorism against the Jewish community. For
too long, Jews in the United States have been targeted and
attacked for their faith, facing threats of harassment and
violence at an exceptionally high rate. The Jewish community is
the target now of more than half of all religious-based crimes,
and yet the community only makes up two percent of the U.S.
population.
The antisemitic violence has taken the lives of too many
people. In 2019, one person was killed and three were injured
at the horrific attack against the Chabad of Poway in
California. In 2018, 11 congregants were killed and six were
injured at the Tree of Life synagogue outside of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. In the last five years, antisemitic incidents
across the country have nearly doubled.
Threats of violence go beyond just targeting the Jewish
community. I often hear from faith leaders in Ohio that the
Christian, Muslim, and Sikh communities continue to face
threats of terrorism and violence. According to the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD), terrorist attacks against religious
institutions accounted for over 25 percent of all terrorist
attacks within the United States between 2009 and 2019. That
statistic is deeply troubling and threatens our First Amendment
right to freedom of religion.
Terrorists and extremists often target crowded spaces with
little or no security. Three years ago, an assailant with white
supremacist views, targeting the Mexican community, opened fire
at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, killing 23 and injuring 24. The
following night, an assailant with extremist left-wing views
killed nine and injured 27 on a busy Dayton street, in my home
State of Ohio.
After seeing the devastating effects of terrorism across
our houses of worship and communities, we are fortunate that
the attack on the Beth Israel Congregation this January did not
end in the loss of innocent life. While the ultimate goal is to
prevent these attacks from happening in the first place, this
incident showed us how preparedness and security can prevent
violent attacks from escalating to lethal ones.
In particular, Congregation Beth Israel was a recipient of
FEMA's Nonprofit Security Grant Program. This program funded
the synagogue's camera system, among other things, and improved
the facility's overall security and provided first responders
with situational awareness during the standoff. There was also
training provided.
I have been a longtime supporter of the Nonprofit Security
Grant Program. In 2019, I authored its first authorization,
working with the Chairman and others, working to expand it to
all 50 States. I have also worked to double the funds from $90
million to $180 million. In January, I led a letter to the
Appropriations Committee for increasing funding to a level that
reflects the growing terrorist threat to nonprofits and houses
of worship. Last week, I was pleased that Congress appropriated
$250 million to the program for fiscal year (FY) 2022. It is an
increase that unfortunately is needed.
In addition to the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, Rabbi
Charlie Cytron-Walker, who was a hostage in Colleyville, has
credited security workshops and training sessions by Federal
and local law enforcement and nonprofits for providing the
knowledge that saved his life. Unfortunately, many religious
communities still do not know how to access these trainings or
grants available through the Nonprofit Security Grant Program.
We need to do better.
That is why last year I introduced the bipartisan Pray Safe
Act with Senators Hassan, who is here today, Senator Peters,
Senator Johnson, Senator Rosen, and Senator Rounds. The Pray
Safe Act directs the Federal Government to establish a
centralized clearinghouse of safety and security best
practices, training opportunities, grant application
information, and other assistance, all dedicated toward the
simple goal of securing houses of worship against terrorism and
violence. In the aftermath of the Colleyville attack, it is
more necessary than ever that Congress quickly passes this
legislation.
We called conferences in Ohio where we bring in the FBI and
bring in Homeland Security to make sure that people understand
what is available to them, and it is amazing the uptake. When
houses of worship understand what they can have access to,
including best practices, simple things, how to make their
houses of worship more secure, they respond.
As we work to prevent violent incidents from occurring we
must acknowledge that religious communities and other targets
of terrorism are threatened by actors that hold a variety of
ideological belief systems and motivations. We cannot lose
sight of the fact that there are concerning trends and threats
posed by both homegrown and international terrorists.
Again, I thank the witnesses for coming today. I look
forward to your testimony and to your commitment to keeping
Americans safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
It is the practice of the Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses, so if each of
you will stand and raise your right hand, including those who
are joining us by video.
Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before
this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Young. I do.
Ms. Dobitsch. I do.
Mr. Logan. I do.
Mr. Coleman. I do.
Chairman Peters. I heard affirmative from all of you. You
may be seated.
Our first witness today is Ryan Young. Mr. Young is
Executive Assistant Director of the Intelligence Branch (IB) at
the FBI. In his current role he is the strategic leader of the
FBI's intelligence program and external partnerships,
overseeing the Bureau's intelligence strategy, resources,
policies, and functions.
Mr. Young has over two decades of experience at the FBI,
and most recently served as Assistant Director of the
Directorate of Intelligence, where he helped manage the
directorate with the authority and responsibility of all FBI
intelligence operations.
Mr. Young, welcome to the Committee. You may proceed with
your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF RYAN T. YOUNG,\1\ EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Young. Good morning, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
Portman, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and to discuss current
threats to the houses of worship and other public spaces here
in the United States.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Young appears in the Appendix on
page 44.
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In these uncertain times, the FBI needs the support and
confidence of the American people to secure public spaces where
Americans gather every day. The FBI's partnership with the
affected communities are critical to both perceived threat
information and to provide training on preventative measures.
The FBI directly reaches out to various groups to hear their
concerns, build cultural understanding, and foster trust.
FBI headquarters divisions and field offices across the
Nation have strong community outreach and work with minority
groups, academic institutions, religious, civic, and nonprofit
organizations toward crime prevention. The FBI also recognizes
that hate crimes remain a concern for communities across the
country, and collects mandatory reporting from Federal law
enforcement agencies. Reporting remains voluntary for State,
local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement agencies.
The FBI has hate statistics from 2020. However, reporting from
2021 will not be available until the fall.
Additionally, the FBI created a Multi-Cultural Engagement
Council (MCEC), composed of ethnic, religious, and minority
leaders to both better understand and devise solutions to
support these communities.
The FBI's outreach efforts are dedicated to helping
individuals and families stay safe, protect houses of worship,
fortify academic institutions and workplaces against violent
rampages, and raise public awareness to potential acts of
terrorism and extremism.
Another area that the FBI is focusing on is transnational
repression. Emigre communities are victims of harassment,
stalked, assault, or coerced in any way, especially by foreign
governments. This is a violation of their individual rights and
freedoms. The FBI has more information about transnational
repressions on our FBI.gov site, which also houses the Threat
Intimidation Guide (TIG), that has been translated into 28
languages.
Our Office of the Private Sector's (OPS) essential function
is to strengthen the FBI relationships with private industry
and academia to protect the nation's economy and national
security. OPS builds trust among FBI and its partnerships by
facilitating the FBI voice and providing consistent points of
contact to promote meaningful dialog. OPS works closely with
operational divisions to communicate threats across different
industries, sectors, companies, and public spaces.
In the past month, in response to numerous bomb threats
targeting the Historically Black Colleges and Universities, OPS
partnered with Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) and DHS to
host the first of several calls with HBCUs across the country.
Approximately 1,400 participants were on the first call, and we
provided a situational update, points of contact to report
additional threats, and resources available to the academic
institutions.
Although outreach with houses of worship and faith-based
communities falls under the purview of our Office of Public
Affairs (OPA), our Office of Partner Engagement may change
relationships with the security elements in the faith-based
communities. OPE works with the faith-based communities on
safety, initiatives, and order to ensure coordination on
matters pertaining to houses of worship.
The FBI created the internal working group consisting of
OPA, our Criminal Investigative Divisions (CID), and others.
The creation of the working group directly led to Director Wray
hosting two calls with approximately 30 faith-based leaders
nationwide.
The recent incidents involving the Colleyville hostage
crisis and the threats to HBCUs underscores the importance of
having strong relationships before a crisis. As part of the
FBI's response, OPA was able to quickly contact local faith
leaders, minority and academic HBCU connections, because the
FBI had pre-existing patterns of engagement, established by our
community outreach specialist.
In January 2022, OPA and OPE met with U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops and also conducted a partner call with the
Congregation of Beth Israel to discuss related to their
protection and security. In these discussions, FBI shared
information about resources developed along with DHS, including
detailed guidance and plans to respond to crises, such as
active shooters and bomb threats.
In February 2022, OPA and OPS hosted a partner call about
the bomb threats to the HBCUs with our national faith-based and
minority partners. OPA provided FBI resources and active
shooter training to help protect academic institutions. OPA
also led the large webinar planned with the Church of God and
Christ to discuss protection of houses of worship.
In closing, houses of worship and HBCUs, along with other
public spaces where people gather require robust protection
effort. The efforts require effective partnerships, and the FBI
places a strong emphasis on partnering with community leaders
to build trust and share relevant information to protect public
spaces and fulfill our obligation to the American people.
Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, Members of the
Committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the
FBI efforts to protect houses of worship. I appreciate your
continued support and look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Young.
Our next witness is Stephanie Dobitsch. Ms. Dobitsch is the
Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence Enterprise Operations
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) at DHS. In this
role, she has guided a broad range of enduring initiatives,
including a whole-of-government action to integrate and
leverage the Department's unique data. She also oversees I&A's
collection strategy and policies, reviews analysis and
production of bulletins, and actively engages with internal and
external partners on behalf of I&A.
Ms. Dobitsch has over a decade of Federal Government
experience, serving in a variety of leadership, analytic, and
policy assignments while supporting multiple departments and
agencies.
Ms. Dobitsch, welcome to the Committee. You may proceed
with your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF STEPHANIE DOBITSCH,\1\ DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
Portman, and fellow Senators. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify today. I also want to thank the Chairman
and his staff for quickly accommodating my virtual attendance
today.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Ms. Dobitsch appears in the
Appendix on page 49.
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As many have said already, the United States remains in a
heightened threat environment. This is due, in part, to the
growing convergence of several factors that have increased the
volatility, the unpredictability, and the complexity of the
threats we face.
First, false and misleading narratives continue to be
proliferated across social media and the internet, often with
the intent to sow discord, promote violence, and undermine
public trust in U.S. Government institutions.
Second, a range of threat actors continue to call for
violence directed at U.S. critical infrastructure, soft targets
and mass gatherings, faith-based institutions, institutions for
higher education, racial and religious minorities, government
facilities and personnel, the media, and perceived ideological
opponents.
Third, foreign terrorist organizations remain committed to
conducting and calling for attacks against the United States.
The most significant terrorism threat facing the United
States today stems from lone offenders and small groups,
including home-grown and domestic violent extremists (DVE) who
are inspired by a broad range of ideological motivations and/or
personal grievances, often fueled by mis-and disinformation on
the internet.
The attack on the synagogue in Colleyville, Texas,
demonstrates that we remain in a heightened threat environment
as well as the persistent threat of violence faced by faith-
based organizations from the full spectrum of threat actors.
The attack also marks a divergence in the type of recent
activity we have seen surrounding religious institutions, in
that the threat actor traveled from another country, held
congregants hostage, and intended to use the hostage situation
as leverage to release a convicted felon.
As Secretary Mayorkas has noted in several instances, DHS
is a department of partnerships. This is the core of what we
do, and DHS cannot be successful in countering these threats of
terrorism or acts of violence without strong partnerships
across the Federal Government and with the local communities
that we serve.
DHS is working closely with State and local governments,
industry, academia, faith-based partners to share information
related to terrorism and targeted violence. The Department
works closely with homeland security advisors in every State
and territory to increase the resiliency and preparedness of
our communities, and through our partnership with the national
network of fusion centers. The Office of Intelligence and
Analysis relies on its intelligence officers located across the
Nation to share intelligence on threats to the homeland.
We remain omitted to working closely with our partners,
including the sharing of timely and actionable information, and
as the threat evolves so too will our efforts to address it.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ms. Dobitsch.
Our next witness is Christopher Logan. Mr. Logan serves as
the Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Grant Programs
Directorate (GPD) at FEMA, and in this role Mr. Logan is
responsible for agency-wide grants management policy,
overseeing the agency's multi-billion-dollar preparedness
grants portfolio.
Mr. Logan has over a decade of experience at FEMA where he
has served in numerous senior roles, including as Deputy
Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs, Director of Public
Assistance, and Director of National Training and Education.
Mr. Logan, welcome to our Committee. You may proceed with
your opening comments.
TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER LOGAN,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, GRANT PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Logan. Thank you, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
Portman, Members of the Committee. Good morning. My name is
Christopher Logan. I serve as the Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Grant Programs at the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. On behalf of Secretary Mayorkas and
Administrator Criswell thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the critical role the Department of Homeland Security's grant
programs serve in protecting the Nation, and particularly the
nation's houses of worship and nonprofit organizations.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Logan appears in the
Appendix on page 49.
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The Department's preparedness grant programs address the
nation's immediate security needs. They enhance public safety,
protect lives and property, and support the nation's response
to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Since
2003, Congress has appropriated, and the Department has
administered, more than $56 billion in preparedness grant
funding to State, local, tribal, and territorial governments,
the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and
nonprofit organizations. In the last year alone, we awarded
more than $2 billion in preparedness grant funds across nine
programs, to improve the nation's ability to prevent, prepare
for, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks and
other hazards.
Of particular importance to places of workshop, the
Nonprofit Security Grant Program provides funding to nonprofit
organizations that are at a high risk of terrorist attack. From
2007 through 2021, the Department of Homeland Security awarded
about $594 million in funding to 6,500 nonprofit organizations
through the Nonprofit Security Grant Program.
This competitive program provides up to $450,000 to
nonprofit organizations for training and physical security
enhancements, including contract security, fencing,
surveillance systems, access controls, and lighting. The
program also is intended to promote coordination and
collaboration in emergency preparedness activities among public
and private community organizations and with State and local
government agencies.
As part of our effort to ensure that all nonprofit
organizations in need of security resources have access to this
funding, and in support of the President's Executive Order (EO)
on advancing racial equity and support for underserved
communities, FEMA is conducting extensive outreach to
historically underserved and marginalized communities to
provide information and technical assistance in preparing for
the upcoming 2022 grant cycle.
In addition, we are identifying and addressing barriers to
program participation, including a lack of awareness about the
program, difficult and sometimes confusing application
processes, administrative burdens, and uncertainty about
eligibility and qualification requirements. Our analysis also
is illuminating where grant dollars historically have not been
awarded so that we can more effectively address the security
needs of these underserved and marginalized communities.
The Nonprofit Security Grant Program is part of a suite of
programs designed to build the capacity of our State, local,
tribal, and territorial partners to prepare for terrorism.
Recipients of these grants have regularly used the funding to
better protect soft targets and crowded places, and, in fact,
in 2021, Homeland Security grant recipients were required to
spend at least five percent of their grant funding on projects
that project soft targets and crowded places.
This funding also has improved communication and
coordination with the owners and operators of entertainment
venues, shopping centers, large office buildings, and similar
locations. In addition, between 2018 and 2020, States sub-
awarded approximately $38 million in Homeland Security funding
to colleges and universities to address their specific security
needs.
The recent hostage situation at the Congregation Beth
Israel Synagogue in Colleyville, Texas, underscores the
importance of these programs and particularly the Nonprofit
Security Grant Program, in protecting houses of worship and
public spaces from terrorists and domestic violent extremists.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, Members of the
Committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the
assistance provided through the Department's preparedness grant
programs, and particularly the assistance that supports the
nation's houses of worship and nonprofit organizations. I am
happy to respond to any questions that you might have.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Logan.
Our final witness is Marcus Coleman. Mr. Coleman serves as
the Director of the Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood
Partnerships at DHS, where he leads efforts to foster
partnerships between government and faith-based organizations.
Mr. Coleman joined FEMA in 2010, as a Program Manager for
the Individual and Community Preparedness Division (ICPD), then
served at the DHS Partnership Division, where he supported more
than 15 disaster activations, including responding to Hurricane
Harvey, Hurricane Irma, and Hurricane Maria, and several active
shooter incidents.
Mr. Coleman, welcome to our Committee. You may proceed with
your opening remarks.
TESTIMONY OF MARCUS COLEMAN,\1\ DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR FAITH-
BASED AND NEIGHBORHOOD PARTNERSHIPS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Coleman. Good morning, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
Portman, and Members of the Committee. My name is Marcus
Tillman Coleman, Jr. I serve as the Director for the Center for
Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships at the Department of
Homeland Security. I am honored to appear before you today to
discuss the role the DHS plays to foster partnerships that
improve the safety and security for places of worship,
nonprofits, and other public spaces.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Coleman appears in the
Appendix on page 49.
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The DHS Center carries out the policies and program
priorities of the White House Office of Faith-Based and
Neighborhood Partnerships, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, related to all
hazards and looking at all aspects of preparedness, mitigation,
emergency disaster response recovery, and combating human
trafficking.
Originally established in 2006, the DHS Center has a focus
on the vital role faith-based and community-based organizations
play in emergency management and in promoting safety and
security in the places that people worship, fellowship, and
serve. The DHS intercollaborates with our Federal interagency
partners through research, outreach, building partnerships and
capacity-building across a diverse network of faith-based and
community-based leaders, alongside our colleagues at the
Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial level, and our
first responders and partners from the private sector.
The DHS Center provides opportunities for listening and
learning from faith-based and community leaders and local first
responders as well. This dialog focuses on what works at the
local level and where government can be more helpful in
communication, capacity-building, and as partners to reaffirm
our commitment to safeguard faith communities and persons at
risk of discrimination, harassment, and hate-based acts of
violence and vandalism.
The top priority for the Center for Faith-Based and
Neighborhood Partnerships is to support and bolster a whole-of-
government and whole-community approach to increasing the
safety and security of places of worship and community spaces.
In 2021 alone, the center partnered across the Federal family
to reach more than 6,000 faith-based and community leaders.
One example of some national-level engagements occurred in
August 2021, on the topic of preventing targeted violence and
protecting safety and security for houses of worship, where the
center features voices and perspectives of a wide variety of
faith-based leaders, including the Sikh Coalition, the African
Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, and Secure Community Network
(SCN). More than 2,000 registered to participate in that
engagement to provide, and also to learn about steps to improve
their safety and security of their facilities and the many
spaces where people meet alongside local and first responders.
In addition to this effort, the center continues to partner
with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice
(DOJ), and others to ensure participants receive actionable and
practical information or addressing their questions, including
how to apply for the Nonprofit Security Grant Program.
Additionally, the center continues to partner with various
other components to facilitate timely outreach and respond to
invitations from faith-based and community-based organizations
seeking technical assistance and providing that technical
assistance through webinars for the fiscal year 2022 Nonprofit
Security Grant cycle.
The center remains focused on working with communities of
diverse faiths, backgrounds, and experiences to prevent,
respond to, and be resilient against such acts of violence,
whether they are spurred by ideologies of hate, false
narratives, or otherwise.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Coleman.
Before I begin questioning I would like to note that the
Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Sikh Coalition, and the
Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA) have submitted
statements for the record\1\ for today's hearing. I think I
speak for all Committee members. I appreciate the important
work that they do on a daily basis to highlight the threats
faced by houses of worship and public spaces nationwide to
support the communities as they deal with these threats.
I would ask for unanimous consent (UC) that these
statements be entered into the record. Hearing no objection,
they will be entered into the record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The statements submitted for the Record appears in the Appendix
on page 89.
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Certainly one of the greatest challenges that we confront
are lone actors who are being radicalized online and then
commit acts of violence in our communities. My first question
is to Mr. Young. Mr. Young, how does the FBI determine whether
an individual making alarming comments online presents an
imminent threat of violence in the real world? If you could
tell the Committee how are decisions made by the FBI to
interdict in such a scenario.
Mr. Young. Good morning again. Let me note from the
beginning that counterterrorism is our highest priority,
seconding the point that lone actors do present, from the home-
grown to the domestic violent extremists, present the hardest
and most difficult task for us in identifying.
The key, though, is we do rely on the more than 5,000 tips
we get a day in identifying, anybody that sees something, say
something. And really where we draw the line is at violence and
threats. There is a lot of free speech out there. We are in the
business of revealing speech and dialog, or different
ideologies, but when people cross the line to threats of
violence, we go through an assessment and look to determine if
it warrants further predication for an investigation.
Chairman Peters. Does the FBI have necessary tools and
authorities to track these types of individuals, in your
opinion, and also if you could let the Committee know how you
balance the individual's First Amendment rights versus the need
to protect the public.
Mr. Young. Based upon the review, especially in our
domestic terrorism front, not only are any matters reviewed for
meeting legal standards, that it has to be more than just
ideology. It has to be crossing the line to threats and
violence.
When it comes to tools, one of our strongest tools is our
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Across our 56 offices, every
office has a Joint Terrorism Task Force comprised of Federal,
local, and State partners, and where we can share information
and engage with the communities.
When it comes to tools, we start with the lowest level of
intrusion, and based upon the severity of the threat we
increase our investigative methods to ensure that we disrupt
attacks or any of those vulnerabilities before they happen.
Chairman Peters. Thank you.
Certainly the current threat environment for houses of
worship and religious nonprofits and community gathering spaces
is extremely complex. Ms. Dobitsch, in your opinion what is the
greatest threat to these community spaces?
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you, Chairman Peters. As we continue to
discuss throughout this hearing today, obviously the greatest
threat we see comes from lone offenders and small groups,
again, inspired by the full range of domestic and foreign
violent ideologies and personal grievances.
The faith-based community continues to face an enduring
threat, both from domestic and foreign violent extremists. The
greatest threat really stems from racially and ethnically
motivated violent extremists who believe in the superiority of
the white race, militia violent extremists, and individuals who
are inspired by foreign terrorist groups overseas.
In looking back over the last 10 years, we have observed
about 30 incidents of domestic violent extremists targeting
mosques, synagogues, churches, and other religious centers and
institutions. Jewish communities were targeted nearly twice as
often as other religious communities, followed by Muslim,
Christian, and Sikh communities.
The most common weapons in these attacks or these plots was
arson and then firearms. The use of arson, in particular, is
more common in the targeting of faith-based communities
compared to other targets perceived by domestic violent
extremists.
To underscore again, really the threat to faith-based
communities, in particular, spans the ideological spectrum, and
we see them as a target of multiple groups and individuals
seeking to target those communities.
Chairman Peters. Ms. Dobitsch, a follow-up question. The
folks who respond to these threats and these attacks are local
law enforcement. The question for you is how does I&A make sure
that both our State and local law enforcement are getting the
information that you are collecting through your work, so that
they can do their job protecting their local communities?
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you for the question. First and
foremost I&A seeks to produce intelligence and information at
the lowest classification possible, so that it can reach the
broadest spectrum of homeland security stakeholders including
our faith-based communities and organizations.
We have also increased our direct engagement and outreach
with faith-based organizations and State and local partners to
have ongoing and regular dialog about the threats they face.
Then ensuring that they have ready and quick access to any
threats associated with these communities, or broader threats,
we help to facilitate access to clearances and information on
the Department's Homeland Security Information Network Critical
Infrastructure Portal (HSIN-CI), where I&A's intelligence
assessments and information are disseminated.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. FEMA's Nonprofit Security Grant
Program is, as we are talking about today, is the critical
source of funding for houses of worship and other community
organizations at risk of these terrorist attacks. We recently
passed an omnibus that contained $250 million for the program.
My question for you, Mr. Logan, is how will FEMA ensure
that next year's grants reach more diverse and more underserved
communities?
Mr. Logan. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. Over
the past year we have engaged in a significant outreach effort
with nonprofit and faith-based community in partnership with
Marcus Coleman's office and national organizations. We have
participated in more than 37 virtual outreach sessions that
have reached 7,800 individuals representing more than 2,700
different organizations. Those webinars, that outreach,
continues. In fact, we have a webinar scheduled for later this
afternoon with the nonprofit community. As we move into the
application period, which will begin shortly, we will continue
those outreach efforts to help organizations understand how to
apply, understand what good applications look like.
We know that there are parts of the country, there are
particular communities that have not accessed this program. Our
analysis has shown that it is not simply a matter of them being
noncompetitive. It is that they are not competing at all, and
we need to solve that problem.
We are looking, as I said in my testimony, at some of the
barriers to participation to see where we can help
organizations more easily access this program, sir.
Chairman Peters. It is critical you do that so thank you
for those efforts.
Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for your
questions.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Colleyville incident highlights, obviously, the dangers
of allowing unvetted individuals with terrorist motivations
into our country. I have had a serious concern about the Afghan
evacuees, as some of you know, for some time. I do not think
they have been adequately vetted or tracked.
Unfortunately, this concern was confirmed in a Department
of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) report that came out
recently, that said that the Department of Homeland Security,
who are here today, failed to use Department of Defense
information collected from the battlefield, that included such
things as fingerprints of terrorist involved in planting bombs.
DOD checked the records after DHS paroled evacuees into the
United States and flagged that at least 50 evacuees have what
they considered a significant security problem. Most of these
flagged evacuees could not be located due to DHS failing to
update their location fields in their records.
I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to place this
report into the hearing record.\1\
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\1\ The DOD IG Report appears in the Appendix on page 55.
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Chairman Peters. Without objection.
Senator Portman. Given the stated goals of al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K, based on Afghanistan, I am concerned about the threats
to our homeland security this failure has introduced, not only
to our public spaces but to our houses of worship we are
talking about today.
Mr. Young, what is the FBI doing to locate these evacuees
who were flagged in these tactical databases collected from the
battlefield in Afghanistan?
Mr. Young. I was going to say, sir, we are definitely
coordinating with DOD, State Department, as well as DHS. We do
hold much of your concerns. We have lessons learned from Iraq
previously, and understanding that we need to be able to check
any of these individuals, screen not only against our common
databases but some of our classified databases as well as
information sharing with foreign partners.
This remains a challenge for us. I would second that even
some of the concerns of individuals as al-Qaeda has been in the
business for a long time, they understand how to move clean
operatives, and these continue to be challenges for us.
Senator Portman. OK. I think it is important that we have
learned lessons, and I hope we have. It is incredible to me
that we did not just do the basic interviews that you would do
for a refugee, obviously, and far more extensive, but anybody
coming into the country, even on a visa. Specifically with
regard to these 50 individuals, my question is have you found
them? But perhaps you can provide that information to the
Committee.
To Ms. Dobitsch, has your Office of Intelligence and
Analysis changed its focus in light of these DOD Inspector
General findings?
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you, sir. While I&A is not a screening
and vetting agency we do support the Department's screening and
vetting efforts through the production of our strategic
analysis examining threats, and working closely to evaluate
programs like the Visa Waiver Program, which is overseen by our
Office of Policy.
We also maintain senior officers co-located at the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to help with screening and
vetting, and we support, through information technology (IT)
and technical service perspective, the National Vetting Agency
and the Department's efforts in the screening and vetting
mission space.
The Department is working closely with the Department of
Defense to evaluate the findings and the recommendation and
data cited in the DOD Inspector General report. DHS was not
consulted as part of that work to prepare, and I understand
that subject matter experts will be providing Congress with
more detailed updates related to that report.
Senator Portman. OK. I hope you are taking it seriously and
I hope you will make changes in your approach.
The Colleyville incident we have talked about, our
intelligence and counterterrorism efforts failed there. They
failed to detect a known terrorist, Malik Faisal Akram. He
applied for the Visa Waiver Program via an Electronic System
for Travel Authorization (ESTA) application. When asked to
self-report he lied about his criminal history and terrorist
activities. This program, as you know, is run by the Customs
and Border Protection folks, and I am hopeful that the
witnesses might be able to shed some light on these failures.
So back to you, Mr. Young and Ms. Dobitsch. In light of the
attack on Congregation Beth Israel, what changes, if any, have
the FBI and DHS taken to prevent terrorist from exploiting our
Visa Waiver Program? Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. I would defer that one to DHS.
Ms. Dobitsch. Sure. Thanks, Ryan. In the wake of the
incident we have been in active contact with our UK partners
discussing Akram's case. Indications have surfaced that Akram
had several criminal and potentially terrorist-related
interactions with the UK government. However, none of these
resulted in information that rose to the threshold to passing
to the United States. The Department is looking to re-evaluate
the information-sharing agreements we have under the Visa
Waiver Program and looking for opportunities to close any gaps
on the sharing of----
Senator Portman. Our understanding is the UK government
knew that this man was a terror risk. Is that understanding
wrong?
Ms. Dobitsch. I think, sir, from our perspective, the
information that the UK government had did not reach the
threshold for the sharing of that----
Senator Portman. But did they think he was a terror risk?
Yes or no.
Ms. Dobitsch. I am not sure, sir, what the UK government
has----
Senator Portman. Yes. Our information is that they did, and
so if that did not rise to the level of creating a red flag, I
am not sure what would. I hope we are working to improve our
intelligence and information-sharing with the UK, but also we
have to look more broadly at this issue, and I know this
Committee is doing that.
Thank you all for your testimony today and thank you for
your service. Let's tighten things up. Let's avoid having
another Colleyville event with more damaging consequences.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
Senator Hassan, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
Portman, and thank you to our witnesses, not only for coming
before this Committee today to discuss some really critical
issues but also for your service to our country and for your
commitment to our security.
I want to start with a question to you, Mr. Coleman. As
Senator Portman mentioned, he and I introduced bipartisan
legislation, the Pray Safe Act. It directs the Federal
Government to establish a centralized clearinghouse of safety
and security best practices, training resources, grant
application information, and other assistance, all dedicated to
securing houses of workshop and faith-based organizations.
Recently the Pray Safe Act passed out of this Committee with
bipartisan support and now awaits action by the full Senate.
Mr. Coleman, do you agree that passing the Pray Safe Act,
creating this clearinghouse, would help houses of worship
access Federal resources to secure these communities?
Mr. Coleman. I do agree. In conversations with many faith-
based and community-based partners I think one of the
challenges that they often have is that they have to go to
multiple sources of information to get information from a
Federal perspective, and also I think many faith-based and
community-based organizations often overlook the opportunities
to connect with our State partners.
Senator, a good example, I think, is the New Hampshire
Houses of Worship Resources webpage, which kind of consolidates
information at the State level. Being able to have best
practices like that, in addition to the resources that help to
promote training and preparedness for faith-based and
community-based organizations, from a Federal perspective would
be very helpful and welcome by many of our faith-based and
community-based organizations.
Our White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood
Partnerships, through their preparing places of worship's
interagency policy committee is also looking at similar efforts
to come alongside to consolidate those resources and make sure
that we can help ease the burden on navigating all of the
different sources of information from our Federal partners.
Senator Hassan. Thank you very much. I think it is just
critically important. When you talk to faith leaders and their
congregations right now there just seems so much literally to
absorb and do, right?
Mr. Coleman. Yes.
Senator Hassan. So thank you for that testimony.
Mr. Logan, Senator Peters mentioned this too. The fiscal
year 2022 funding bill that recently passed included $250
million for the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, which is an
increase of $70 million from the previous year. FEMA's Grants
Directorate is responsible for administering this program in
addition to FEMA's suite of preparedness grants.
As demand and funding for these grant programs increase,
how can Congress ensure that both FEMA and State administrative
agencies have the staffing and resources to effectively
administer these grants?
Mr. Logan. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for that. First, we
appreciate that the Congress, in the appropriation bill that
was recently passed, did include a provision that allows States
to use some of the grant funding, up to five percent, for their
management and administrative costs. That is going to be
incredibly helpful to them. They have struggled in the past to
administer this program, because they have to take those
management costs out of another grant program. This would be
extremely helpful to them.
I also want to thank the Congress for providing additional
resources to FEMA in the appropriation. It is going to be very
helpful to us as we take on additional responsibilities and as
this program grows. We appreciate the additional operation and
support funding that the Congress has provided, and should we
need more we will certainly work back through.
Senator Hassan. You feel like at least it is a first step
that what was provided now is something that gives you the
tools to be able to address this expanded group and level of
responsibilities?
Mr. Logan. I do, yes.
Senator Hassan. Thank you. Ms. Dobitsch, I want to turn
back to the issue that Senator Portman was talking about with
you. I want to drill down a little bit more about the recent
attack on the Congregation Beth Israel Synagogue in
Colleyville. As we have talked about, because he was a British
citizen the attacker in Colleyville was able to travel to the
United States without a travel visa. That is because the UK
participates in the Visa Waiver Program.
I am concerned that current information-sharing agreements
do not adequately require criminal record information-sharing
with the United States as a condition of participation in the
program. Senator Portman really focused on what the British
government knew about the attacker's status as a potential
terrorist, or engaged in terrorist activities.
You mentioned that you are going back, DHS, to your British
counterparts to look at your information-sharing agreement. But
what I am really curious about here, I want to make sure that
we are addressing, is how do we find a way to access criminal
record data from the UK or from other visa waiver countries
that allows for automated searches? How can we do this so that
criminal record information does not fail to show up when we
are vetting people?
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you for that question, ma'am. I would
say that certainly from an intelligence perspective we want to
leverage the most robust data that we can have available to
help evaluate the extent to which someone may pose a threat if
they enter the United States. Part of that is through
evaluating and understanding the data that our partners have
and how we can improve our information-sharing agreements and
our routine and ongoing engagements with those partners to
understand that information.
I would defer to my CBP colleagues and my colleagues at the
Office of Policy on more details in terms of the methods in
which we will formally pursue that process. But in the wake of
the attack we certainly have re-engaged with our partners to
understand what information they had and to really further find
ways to integrate similar and like information into our
evaluation of individuals who are seeking travel here to the
United States.
Senator Hassan. Thank you. What I would be very interested
in following up with you on is how we determine what criminal
records, if any, trigger an alert that would prevent an
individual from participating in the Visa Waiver Program and
having to go through the regular visa application and vetting
process. I hope we can follow up with you and related agencies
about that, because it seems to me in the world of much more
automated data we should be able to drill down on this much
more effectively and protect our security accordingly.
My time is about up. I did want to mention to Mr. Coleman
and Mr. Logan, you answered a question from Senator Peters
about how to make sure that the awards in our grant programs
are really equitably disbursed, and I would note that an awful
lot of the entities, for instance, who would be applying for
houses of worship protection grants rely on volunteers. They
are not heavily staffed places. They do not have professional
grant writers. They do not even have full-time office staff
often.
I would really encourage the Department to be creative and
thoughtful. Mr. Logan, your answer about what you all are doing
was very helpful. But I would really look forward to continuing
to work with you on that, because you are going to get grant
applications where people are doing their best but they do not
have the kind of depth that sometimes the Federal Government
expects them to have, but they desperately need this help. So
thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
Senator Lankford, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD
Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thanks for this
hearing as well. For all of our witnesses, thank you.
Let me follow up on what Senator Hassan was saying. I
worked with faith-based nonprofits for 20 years before I came
here to Congress, and I would tell you she is exactly right.
Most of them do not have full-time staff. They do not have a
grant writer. They do not even know these programs exist. They
have been around several years now and we continue to increase
funding. The information-sharing to be able to get out to
leadership of different denominations, organizations, to let
them know, and then to be able to work through the systems and
structures will be exceptionally important to be able to help
individuals know that they have access to this. Most folks
would have no idea that this kind of training even exists, and
would be very grateful to be able to receive it, if they were
aware of it. The continued outreach will be very important on
this.
For Mr. Young and Ms. Dobitsch, I want to ask you both this
question. What definition does Department of Justice and DHS
use for antisemitism? It is an important issue because we
struggle sometimes to say is that anti-Semitic or not. What is
the definition the Department of Justice uses, and DHS uses,
for antisemitism?
Mr. Young. Yes, Senator. At the FBI we recently got the
Holocaust definition of antisemitism. We have passed that to
the Department of Justice. They manage the definitions for us
for consideration.
Senator Lankford. Thank you. Ms. Dobitsch.
Ms. Dobitsch. Sir, I am not aware that the Department has a
single definition that it uses for antisemitism. From the
intelligence perspective we would say that antisemitism is a
real and persistent threat to the American people, and the
Jewish community remains one of the most targeted religious
communities in the United States, whether from domestic violent
extremists or individuals by foreign terrorists.
From an intelligence and threat perspective we are focused
on the violence, and certainly antisemitism is an indicator of
the potential for individuals to commit acts of violence based
on those grievances.
Senator Lankford. No, I get that, and that is very helpful.
This is one of the areas we have to be able to clarify by the
agency. The State Department, years ago, accepted the
International Holocaust Remembrance definition. Our definition
is important. Dozens of countries around the world have
accepted that definition. It is something the State Department
has recognized.
Mr. Young, if I am hearing you correctly, you are saying
that Department of Justice is now using that IHRA definition as
well for antisemitism?
Mr. Young. No. We were made, Senator, of this request, we
have passed that to Department of Justice for consideration as
they manage definitions for the Department.
Senator Lankford. OK. That would be helpful, and that is
one of the areas where we need to have clarity of what is your
definition. That allows everyone to be able to work off the
same page on this and it is exceptionally important to provide
that kind of clarity for us.
Mr. Logan, I want to be able to follow up on something. The
breakdown of how the grants are used, is there a certain set of
priorities to say more for training, more for physical
hardening, more for security cameras, whatever it may be, so
that when you are going through all the grant requests on this,
how do you set the priorities for the type of action that would
be needed? Because every location is going to need something
different.
Mr. Logan. I think that is exactly the point, sir, is that
every location is going to need something different. The
challenge is to differentiate between need. To the Senator's
point, we try to look at and discern what the actual need is.
We try not to just fund the shiny applications but the ones
that are actually telling us that they have a threat and that
they have gone through the work to identify their
vulnerabilities. Then they tell us how they are planning on
using that.
In some cases these could be multiyear investments. It
could be a combination of cameras and access controls and
training. In other places their physical security may be in a
good place and they are really focused on the training, either
of their staff or of their congregants, in many cases.
The challenge that we have is identifying a good use of the
money and making awards accordingly.
Senator Lankford. I just had a practical question. As I go
through the different awards that have been done in different
places and look at them, a lot of them are round numbers. They
are $25,000, $50,000, $100,000. Then I see numbers like
$28,639, that are very exactly, and there are quite a few of
those--$144,517.
Tell me what I am looking at. I am not going to go through
all the details and I am not asking you what it is. But how am
I getting many of these that are nice, clear, round numbers,
and if they are just an estimate that has been put out there,
how is FEMA following up to make sure that that actually
occurred on it? Because we want to make sure that equipment was
actually installed, and all those things as well, and then
versus those that are giving us a very exact number.
Mr. Logan. Yes. I think part of that, sir, maybe that it is
that differentiation again between organizations that have the
infrastructure to develop grant applications and have fully
built-out budgets and organizations that are new to the program
and are providing estimates, as you suggested. There may be
organizations that are learning about the program. They have
already costed out what they need. They have already costed out
a camera system or access controls. Then they find out about
the program and they are simply translating their invoices into
a grant application, prior to having made those investments, of
course. Then in other cases they may just be sort of
guesstimating on the budget, and then we will follow up with
them afterward.
Senator Lankford. But there is the follow-up there.
Mr. Logan. Yes, absolutely. We monitor these programs
pretty closely.
Senator Lankford. Yes, again, we are grateful to be able to
have the engagement here, to be able to help in all these
areas, to be able to help harden these facilities, but we want
to make sure it actually got applied at the end of the day and
that it is actually making a difference on this.
To Mr. Young, I want to follow up, as well, Ms. Dobitsch. I
am not sure which of you would take this, but I want to follow
up again on what Senator Hassan was saying about the Visa
Waiver Program. It is my understanding that we are not sharing
our criminal history information with other countries, in other
words, not telling them exactly what criminal offense has
occurred from someone. We are not getting that information from
a lot of visa waiver countries as well.
My question is, are we getting from other countries a list
of just, yes, they have a felony record? We may not know what
that felony is, but yes, they do have a criminal record or no,
they do not have something on record. Because then we will know
if someone checks the box on it, no, I have no felonies in the
background, but we are getting information from that country,
yes, they do. That allows us to do a secondary screening there.
Are we getting that information or is that in process, and if
so, how many countries do we get that from?
Ms. Dobitsch. I can start, and I will defer to FBI if they
have any more to add. But typically, particularly for Visa
Waiver Program countries, it is not common to share criminal
information its citizens who are not deemed to be serious
criminals. Again, there is potentially an issue in terms of the
case Akram, where there were indications that suggested that
Akram had criminal and potentially terrorist-related
interactions with U.S. Government.
In terms of the information agreement, countries enter an
agreement with the United States to share information regarding
whether citizens and nationals of that country traveling to the
United States represent a threat to the security or the welfare
of the United States or its citizens, and those agreements are
unique and different in terms of the type of information that
is shared between those countries. I am not aware currently
that information on criminal background is currently shared.
Senator Lankford. Mr. Young, do you have a quick comment?
Mr. Young. Yes. I would just add we continue to have robust
intelligence discussions with many of our partners, within the
Five Eyes and many other countries, and we utilize the
information shared in those intelligence channels to use at the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). Right now we do not say, I
was going to say, based upon that agreement, to get the
criminal information, but we do engage heavily with foreign
partners, and we do have robust sharing agreements in those
intel channels.
Senator Lankford. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, this may be an
area that we need to talk about, to follow up, to determine if
we need to change some of those agreements to get basic
criminal history and information. Even if we just knew they do
have a criminal history, and we would not even have to know
what all it is, we at least have a way to do secondary
screening as folks are actually coming through the system as
well. That is something we will have to be able to work through
in the days ahead.
Chairman Peters. Yes, I agree. We will look into that,
Senator Lankford, because this issue has come up a few times in
some of our conversations, and we will explore it further.
Senator Rosen, you are recognized for your questions.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Peters. This is such an
important hearing. I want to thank all the witnesses for being
here today and for your service.
Of course, you have heard all of my colleagues talk about
Beth Israel, about all the threats, about the nonprofit
security grant, so I am not going to belabor that. I am going
to build a little bit upon that, because as we reflect on these
growing threats to our institutions, the demand for these
grants have far outpaced their availability. Of course, we know
that we need to do all we can to protect houses of worship and
other faith-based institutions. I was really glad to have
helped work with my colleagues, on and off this Committee, to
secure nearly 40 percent increase of NSGP funds for the
remainder of this fiscal year.
But I really want to build on what both Senator Hassan
Senator Lankford said. A lot of our institutions, these smaller
congregations, they do not have grant-writing staff. They do
not have a robust staff. They may be all volunteers, even.
Could establishing a FEMA grant office specifically for the
nonprofit security grant improve outreach and enable them to be
able to use these funds in ways that make sense for them, and
that we are using the money that we have allocated in smart
ways, giving them technical assistance where they may not have
it? Mr. Logan.
Mr. Logan. Yes. Thank you, Senator. As the programs grows
we are looking internally in the way that the grant program's
directorate is structured, to determine whether splitting off
the nonprofit program into a standalone branch makes sense.
What I will say on technical assistance is that the
assistance that we are providing to the nonprofit community
goes beyond the webinars that I mentioned, beyond the
informational webinars. Once a grant has been awarded we
provide a significant amount of technical assistance to help
these organizations actually manage the grant.
We a grants management technical assistance program that we
established several years ago. It is a three-day class that we
historically have delivered in the field. The pandemic forced
us to change our approach to that, but I think there was a
benefit there because what we have done is broken the program
down into small modules that are available online, any time
anyone needs it. We started by doing some trend analysis on our
audits to identify the things that trip up our grant recipients
the most, things like procurement, things like keeping a good
record of expenditures.
For a grant recipient who is about to try to purchase
something, to ensure that they do that in compliance with
Federal regulations they can go online and they take a 15-
minute course on how to conduct a compliant procurement. We are
building that out across the entire lifecycle of the grant.
The technical assistance is there, is getting better. I
think the challenge that we have, that you all have pointed
out, quite rightly, is getting people into the program,
breaking down those barriers to participation. As I mentioned,
we are doing a fair amount of outreach to help people
understand the application process, how they need to work with
their States to work through the application process, what a
good narrative looks like to help make the case for this
funding.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I think that breaking it up into
smaller modules, doing it online, allows for more people to
participate, get the information they need, so I will be
looking forward to seeing that and being sure that you are
getting that out robustly across the country so our communities
can see that.
I also want to build a little bit upon antisemitism and
domestic extremism. Of course, all the statistics that my
colleagues have already mentioned, Jewish Americans make up two
percent of the population but crimes targeting the Jewish
community, 55 percent of religiously motivated crimes go
against the Jewish community.
I was really surprised and disappointed that Department of
Homeland Security's 20-page internal review of domestic violent
extremism, released last Friday, did not even mention
antisemitism once. I am also concerned by the finding in the
report that DHS does not, and I am going to quote here, ``track
domestic violent extremism allegations as their own subcategory
of misconduct. Instead, such allegations were classified under
another subcategory.''
Ms. Dobitsch, we need accurate information to be nimble in
the fight against violent extremism. We have to get actionable
data out to our communities. Why doesn't I&A track antisemitism
and other forms of hate as their own categories? So again,
people have their grants, we are doing all these other things.
We need to be sure that we can act on it.
Ms. Dobitsch, can you tell me a little bit about why I&A
does not track antisemitism?
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you for that question, ma'am. For us,
we look at all threats of violence and try to understand and
analyze those threats that are politically or ideologically
motivated in some way. In terms of the threat, we absolutely
see antisemitism as a real threat to the American people. We
have seen antisemitism fuel racially----
Senator Rosen. So why not report on it? What is the issue?
Why is it not mentioned?
Ms. Dobitsch. Ma'am, I am not aware of the details of the
internal review, which is----
Senator Rosen. I will be glad to provide them for you. I
think there has to be coordination between the internal review
at DHS and how everyone is talking, FBI and DHS getting our
definitions together. We have a lack of standardized reporting,
of standardized definition, and again, communities are
suffering out there, and not just the Jewish community. Asian
communities, our African American communities.
I am not wanting to stop your answer but I am glad you are
analyzing it. But if you are not defining it for people to
really understand it, I feel that that data is not worthy.
I am just going to move, in my last 35 seconds, again to
Ms. Dobitsch. Can you comment on a finding? There is a finding
that the Department's Domestic Violent Extremism Internal
Review--again, you said you are not familiar so maybe you can
write back to me on this--that you lack, and I am going to
quote again, ``standardized reporting and information-sharing
mechanisms for investigating allegations of violent extremist
activity.''
Perhaps you can comment off the record or in writing for us
on that finding and what I&A is doing to address the reporting
gap and the information-sharing gap.
I have a lot more questions. I will be submitting them for
the record on online domestic extremism as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Ossoff, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
panelists for your service to the American people as well to
those joining us remotely.
My first question is for you, Mr. Young. As you are no
doubt aware, this week we are marking the one-year anniversary
of the brutal attack on three Asian-owned small businesses in
the State of Georgia. Eight were murdered, six of them Asian-
American women. These attacks shocked and devastated my State
and shook the whole country.
Last May, Congress passed, and the President signed into
law, the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act, among other things,
requiring DOJ to issue guidance for State, local, and tribal
law enforcement agencies to establish and improve online hate
crime reporting processes, collect data on hate crimes, and
expand public education campaigns.
From the Bureau's perspective, what progress has been made,
please, in the implementation of this law? How is the FBI
involved? Can you please reassure my constituents in Georgia,
particularly those in the Asian-American community, that
progress is being made to protect vulnerable and targeted
communities from these sorts of attacks?
Mr. Young. Thank you, Senator. In regard to the current
act, it is with DOJ. We are coordinating with DOJ on that. When
it comes to violence against the Asian community, hate crimes,
as you are aware, are on the rise, and the Asian community has
been affected by that.
With our community outreach specialists in all 56 offices,
the directive to those leaders in those offices is building
those relationships, making sure that they are aware that they
could be victims. We have also put out, with our transnational
repression these other diaspora communities out there, that
they are not to be victims, and if they are being intimidated
by any foreign actors, as well, there are reporting procedures
for that.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Young. As has been discussed
in this hearing, just weeks ago, Congregation Beth Israel in
Colleyville, Texas, suffered a horrific attack, and this
incident follows other high-profile attacks on American Jews,
including those at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh,
the Chabad of Poway, New Jersey, and a Jewish school in Boston.
We all recall the imagery and the audio of white supremacists
marching through Charlottesville, chanting, ``Jews will not
replace us.''
The Jewish community in Georgia and Jews across the country
have been shocked by these events and are deeply disturbed by
the significant increase in antisemitic hate crimes and hate
speech. What is the Federal Bureau of Investigation doing
please, Mr. Young, to strengthen law enforcement's efforts to
prevent, investigate, and prosecute antisemitic hate crimes in
America?
Mr. Young. Thank you, Senator. As you are aware, with the
hate crimes we track this through hate crimes with our Criminal
Investigative Division. Also when it comes to domestic violent
extremism with the 56-State Terrorism Task Force we do
communicate with the Anti-Defamation League, we do strong
engagement with our Office of Partner Engagement, with the
Security Community Network, so that we make sure that we are
passing on any threats, any tips. We ask that community to
continue to be vigilant and communicate those threats. If they
see something, say something. And just the second is we remain,
across our 56 offices, having strong relationships with those
communities.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Young. Mr. Young, can you
please update the Committee, to the extent you are able--and I
recognize that you cannot comment in great detail in ongoing
criminal investigations--but HBCUs across the country,
including three in Georgia--Spelman, Albany State, and Fort
Valley State University--received bomb threats in recent weeks.
I have been in close touch with the leadership at all those
schools, as well as State and local law enforcement, and the
students and faculty are resilient and determined to continue
their work and education in the face of these threats.
I would like assurances, please, Mr. Young, as well as from
you, Ms. Dobitsch, from the DHS standpoint, that the Bureau and
DHS are doing everything in their power to investigate these
threats and using every available resource to support and
protect these institutions and their students and faculties.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Yes. Thank you, Senator. This continues to be
our highest priority for our Counterterrorism Division. As you
are aware, we are at 60-plus threats, and this spans across 31
of our field offices. We have engagements at the highest levels
with those institutions.
We have conducted a number of phone calls with our Office
of Partner Engagement as well as with DHS, with those HBCUs,
with those historically Black churches, as well as our law
enforcement partners. As you are aware, we also conducted ones
with Members of Congress that had heightened concern on this
matter.
We need to continue to keep those lines of communication
up. We need those institutions and institutions like that to
understand that the threat is still viable, even though we have
not found any explosive devices at any of those locations. We
respond the same way. We respond with all of our critical
incident response services. We investigate these the same way,
comprehensively, and we need to make sure that those offices
and those institutions understand that we do not want to lull
them into ``this is not real,'' as we need to make sure that
that is not used against them if there is a device at any one
of these locations.
We need to ensure that the vigilance stays high, that those
institutions and those members keep those lines of
communication open, and if they see something, they say
something. Right we have it where we believe it is a group of
individuals, as we have said. One individual has a number tied
back to a number of phone calls. But we are going through all
the legal process, all the investigative methods, to make sure
that we can take this to the right conclusion.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Young, and I do want to
thank and commend the leadership at the Atlanta Field Office
for their collaboration and for keeping my team and me well
briefed on those efforts. With the Chairman's indulgence, just
briefly, Ms. Dobitsch, if you could comment on the same matter.
Thank you.
Ms. Dobitsch. Sir, thank you. I want to underscore what my
FBI colleague said about the strong partnership. We have also
participated in numerous calls with our State, local, private
sector partners on this threat, and we will continue to remain
engaged. From I&A's perspective, our goal is to make sure that
those institutions, academia and others, have ready access to
the information and that we share that quickly and efficiently.
We have also encouraged the Fusion Centers to incorporate
academia, faith-based organizations, and other institutions
into their daily work as they evaluate these threats.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff.
Senator Padilla, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PADILLA
Senator Padilla. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Colleagues, as many
of you have expressed I share the grave concern about the
ongoing bomb threats against HBCUs throughout the country. The
FBI has announced that it is investigating these threats as
racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism, and
currently right-wing extremist violence poses a huge threat to
the general public, and particularly to HBCUs and other public
institutions that serve significant minority populations.
My first question is for Mr. Young. Mr. Young, the
Administration released a natural strategy to counter the
domestic terrorism in June of last year. The Administration
hoped to bolster information-sharing between Federal, State,
and local law enforcement. I would like to know, what
unintended or unexpected barriers have you encountered while
implementing this strategy, if any, and an overall assessment
of how implementation has gone.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Senator. I would first like to say
that I will get back to you with precise information on any
barriers. Initially, we remain very close with our Federal
partners. We utilize our Office of Partner Engagement, our
Joint Terrorism Task Force, our other law enforcement task
forces in the field, and we also utilize information-sharing
through our Fusion Centers, to make sure that we are not only
getting out raw information on threats and tips and that we are
sharing what we call threat-to-life guardians. But we also are
ensuring that our other law enforcement partners are getting
either the classified briefing on these threats--we bring them
in, if they do not have the security clearance at the time, we
give them one-time read-ins, but we make sure that we are
sharing information across all levels.
Senator Padilla. Thank you. I look forward to the follow-
up.
On a slightly different topic and a follow-up to something
that Senator Ossoff was mentioned, last week the Senate
Judiciary Committee, where we are both members, heard testimony
from Rabbi Charlie Cytron-Walker of the Congregation Beth
Israel in Colleyville, Texas. The rabbi highlighted his
experience with active shooters and preparedness seminars
offered by the Anti-Defamation League, the FBI, and local law
enforcement as being very helpful in that situation.
I also believe that partnerships similar to those mentioned
by the rabbi are critical building an atmosphere that ensures
the safety and security for those gathering to practice their
religion.
Mr. Coleman, this question is for you. Rabbi Cytron-Walker
credits the training that he received in helping him survive
the hostage situation. Can you comment on the infrastructure,
the capacity, the resources that exist? Is it ample enough to
provide security training for all houses of worship, or at
least those who may be interested, across the country, and if
not, how else can the Federal Government improve the
accessibility and availability of such trainings?
Mr. Coleman. Thank you for the question, Senator, and I am
deeply appreciative to the rabbi, and many other faith leaders
who have talked about the importance of training and
preparedness.
I had the opportunity to spend some time with the rabbi and
other faith leaders actually last week in Keller, Texas, right
outside of Colleyville, where we had joined the Multifaith
Neighbors Network to talk specifically about some of the
preparedness training and resources available, not just from
the Federal Government but from our State and local partners as
well.
As part of our efforts for the Center for Faith-Based
Neighborhood Partnerships, in addition to promoting
preparedness and training such as active shooter training that
is provided by our colleagues at CISA and the FBI, the DHS
Center is also looking forward to building partnerships
directly with organizations like the Anti-Defamation League,
the Sikh Coalition, Multifaith Neighbors Network, Southern
Baptists and others, because we ultimately know that those
faith-based organizations are best positioned to take a lot of
the Federal programs and language and put it in a way that is
more accessible to faith and community leaders.
I think, in addition to helping them build partnerships
from a Federal perspective and to help support our faith-based
organizations directly, we also need to have continued
investment for our State and local government counterparts as
well. Many of the trainings that are happening day-to-day in
communities are led by local law enforcement, local fire, and
local and county emergency managers.
In addition to continuing to build an infrastructure,
working across our Federal family to deliver programs through
our protective security advisors that help with facility
assessments, particularly for places of worship, I think that
it would be encouraging and a helpful addition to help support
some of our local first responders who are also going to be
doing some of the day-to-day work to provide practical
information and steps that are most relevant for their
communities.
Senator Padilla. Thank you. I look forward to working with
you to continue to advance those efforts in California and
beyond.
A follow-up question for Mr. Logan. Congress has provided
increased funding for security grants for nonprofits. I know
that has also been discussed in the hearing already. My
specific question is, acknowledging that in some vulnerable
communities, communities with maybe not the best historical
experience with law enforcement agencies, where there is that
lack of trust and confidence, including but not limited to
immigrant communities, for example, where there is a hesitancy
and in applying for funds or participating in some of these
programs, how can DHS continue to outreach, build these
partnerships, and advance the purpose of providing not just
grants but the training and remove these barriers to
communication, or basically overcome the hesitancy in some more
vulnerable communities?
Mr. Logan. Senator, thank you for that question. It is
certainly an issue that we are well aware of and working
through. It is the kind of partnerships that we have with Mr.
Coleman's office that help us address those issues. There is no
substitute for face-to-face communication. Part of the
challenge is helping communities understand what these programs
are and what they are not.
I think some of the hesitancy that we see in communities,
in working with the Department of Homeland Security, is a
skepticism about what we are about, about why we are coming
into their community, and what we are really after. So helping
to explain the purpose of the program, helping to explain why
it is FEMA that is administering these programs, and then
again, building on the trust that Mr. Coleman's shop is
creating I think will help to break down some of those
barriers. But again, there is no substitute for face-to-face
engagement.
Senator Padilla. OK. As part of our follow-up, I want to
get a better sense, after today's hearing, on how responsive we
are to community leaders, organizations, other entities that
approach you for that type of partnership or training or
information, but how do we overlay that with knowing where
there is risk, knowing where there is vulnerability, where
there may be threats, and if there are leaders, organizations,
et cetera, serving those communities that are not reaching out
to you, how we are proactive in reaching out, knowing full well
that overcoming the hesitancy, skepticism may be part of the
work here, but no less important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Padilla.
Senator Hawley, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWLEY
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks
to all of the witnesses for being here.
If I could start with you, Mr. Young, I want to give you a
chance to address a question that I asked another FBI
representative who came before this Committee following the
Colleyville attack, the terrorist attack in Texas. As you
remember, of course, the FBI special agent in charge at the
time said, on the ground, and said repeatedly that that attack
was not related to the Jewish community. Of course, that turned
out to be exactly wrong, and at the time he was saying these
things he knew it to be wrong.
I asked at the last hearing we had on this, which was,
regrettably, behind closed doors--no fault of the Chairman--I
asked the FBI representative there, Assistant Director Langan
of the Counterterrorism Division, why the FBI had taken so long
to acknowledge that this was, in fact, a terrorist attack
against the Jewish community. To my total bewilderment, he said
that the FBI had not made a mistake, and the FBI special agent
in charge (SAC) had been correct in wrongly saying that that
attack was not related to the Jewish community.
I do not understand this at all. I want to make sure that
we are on a level set here and we all understand the real
facts. I am going to give you a chance, Mr. Young, to say to
us, directly and clearly, that this was indeed a terrorist
attack by an Islamic radical against American Jews. Right? You
can agree with that, right?
Mr. Young. Yes, we looked at it as the Jewish community is
a vulnerable and targeted community. We had an individual that
came into the United States from London with aspirations of
targeting that community, and freeing a hostage. I do not know
what information the SAC had at that time, but I can tell you
all of our investigative steps were consistent with us
conducting a terrorism investigation.
Senator Hawley. Great. It was a terrorist attack by a
radical Islamist, Islamic terrorist, against American Jews. I
think it is important to say the truth. The fact that the FBI
took as long as it did, and it took the FBI Director I think to
the next day to actually acknowledge the truth, and then you
would have people come to Congress and continue to foot-drag on
this baffles me. Frankly, it is totally unacceptable.
Let us talk a little bit, if we could, more about some of
the details of that terrorist incident against those worshipers
in Colleyville. If I could come to you now, Ms. Dobitsch. I
understand that Malik Faisal Akram was a British citizen. He
had a lengthy history of extremism and antisemitism, in
particular.
For example, according to reports, he frequently traveled
to Pakistan. He was a member of an ultra-orthodox Islamic sect
that was banned in several countries and known for its ties to
terrorism. He spent time in prison for violent offenses. He had
been investigated by British intelligence for extremism as
recently as 2020. He was a subject of interest to the British
and on their watch list. British law enforcement reported that
made comments about his desire to ``kill and bomb Jews''--that
is a quote.
Despite all of this, however, he was allowed entry into our
country through the Visa Waiver Program. I want to ask and get
this on the record in public, was the United States government
informed of his background by UK intelligence when he
attempted, and successfully entered our country in December of
last year?
Ms. Dobitsch. Sir, to the best of my knowledge the
Department certainly was not aware of this information prior to
the individual's travel, and all of the security checks that
had occurred, even through the ESTA process, did not reveal any
derogatory information on Akram.
Senator Hawley. How is that possible?
Ms. Dobitsch. Sir, my understanding is that much of the
detail that the UK was tracking was considered criminal, and as
I mentioned earlier, particular common among VSP members is not
to share criminal information on its citizens, and that the
information-sharing agreements, that information did not meet
the thresholds.
Senator Hawley. You are certainly right that he engaged in
a lot of criminal activity. In 1996, he served a six-month jail
sentence for violent disorder following a baseball bat attack
on a member of his family. In 1997, he served another jail term
for destruction of property. In 1999, he was jailed for
harassment, and after release he was jailed again for violating
the terms of his sentence. In September 2001, he was banned
from a courthouse in the UK after threatening staff and ranting
about the September 11th attacks.
In 2012, he was arrested for theft and robbery. While in
prison, he was reported by a prison Imam for concerning and
disruptive behavior, and he regularly participated in
antisemitic demonstrations, marched for the release of
terrorists held at Guantanamo, and then, of course, held
hostage those worshipers in Colleyville, demanding the release
of another terrorist, and he had been investigated by British
intelligence for extremism.
So you are telling me that none of this was shared with or
known to the United States government?
Ms. Dobitsch. Sir, again, my understanding is in all the
security checks that were conducted prior to Akram's arrival,
and once he had arrived in the United States, did not reveal
any of this information. But in the wake of the incident we
have been engaged with our UK partners to discuss this case, in
particular, and to find ways to close gaps that we have in our
information-sharing agreements that would allow for more
sharing of information related to individual similar to Akram.
Senator Hawley. Is this a failure with the British not
being willing to share? For instance, not all of this is
criminal. That is a long criminal rap sheet, but then British
intelligence was tracking this person as a person of interest.
There are multiple intelligence reports here. None of that was
shared with the United States government either? Is that
because we did not ask for it, or is it because they did not
share it?
Ms. Dobitsch. Sir, I would have to get back to you on the
more specific details regarding this case.
Senator Hawley. I think that would be good, considering
that this is a terrorist incident in our country, on our soil,
that this guy was admitted to, where he walked right through,
in December of this last year. Despite all of this, despite
this extensive rap sheet, he was allowed into the country, and
apparently, you told me that there were no flags that were
raised. Right? Did you not say that there was no derogatory
information that was flagged when he was admitted to the
country?
Ms. Dobitsch. As an inbound traveler, Akram's biographic
information was checked against our intelligence-holding, lost
and stolen passports, visa history, and charting rules prior to
his departure. His biographic information as also collected
upon his arrival, and this information did not yield any
derogatory results on the individual.
Senator Hawley. That is extraordinary. That is just
extraordinary. I would imagine a Google search could probably
have turned up much of this information in the UK, considering
his extensive criminal history. That is astounding, and
frankly, it is frightening. Because who knows if that is the
extent of our vetting, who knows who else is just walking
across the border or walking through our airports? That is
really exceptional.
I am going to ask you to follow up, as you offered to, Ms.
Dobitsch. I will have additional questions for you. My time has
expired, and other Members are here to question. But I think
there is a lot more to learn here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Scott, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCOTT
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Peters. I want to thank
each of you for being here.
I come from Florida. Florida has a very vibrant and strong
Jewish community, a lot of Jewish communities throughout our
State. Jewish Floridians are our neighbors, friends, and
colleagues. They have made incredible contributions to our
State.
I recently had a roundtable with some rabbis and Jewish
leaders in South Florida, and I was pretty saddened to
discuss--I mean, they just feel under constant threat right
now, and I think it is proven out by what the FBI said. Jewish
Americans make up less than three percent of the U.S.
population but they are a target of more than 50 percent of all
religious-related hate crimes in our country. I think that is
pretty repulsive, and it is hard to believe. You try and figure
out, why is this happening?
Earlier this year we saw a disgusting antisemitic
demonstration in Central Florida. When I became Governor, back
in January 2011, we had issues in one of our universities, so
any time you see this it is just disgusting.
In January, just days after the horrific terrorist attack
and hostage standoff in Texas, Jewish families in Miami Beach
woke up to find antisemitic flyers in their yards. It was
pretty bad. We have seen swastikas drawn on restaurants and car
windows. Threats have been made toward Jewish day schools.
There were so many threats to a Jewish day school when I was
Governor that we actually gave them specific State funding to
help with their security. Threats have been made to day schools
all across our State. In Colleyville, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles,
and Miami we have seen devastating attacks on our synagogues.
These attacks are disgusting, and they should never be
tolerated. Our Jewish neighbors are increasingly worried about
their own safety. They are asking themselves, are they going to
be safe in synagogues? They are asking, are their children
going to be safe? Is somebody going to deface their property or
is somebody going to do something worse?
My first couple of questions are for Mr. Ryan and Ms.
Dobitsch. My understanding is the attack in Colleyville is
clearly being investigated as a terrorist attack. Is that
right?
Mr. Young. That is correct. I was going to say it was
investigated as a case of domestic terrorism.
Senator Scott. Does the FBI and DHS believe that the Jewish
community was specifically targeted?
Mr. Young. The Jewish community was targeted and continues
to be a target.
Senator Scott. Yes. Media reports say the suspect's brother
described his sibling as a deeply troubled man who had grown
distant from his family members in recent years, and according
to his brother had been known to the counterterrorism police in
Britain.
So I guess what you have said before is that he was not
known to U.S. authorities. Is that right?
Mr. Young. That is correct, sir.
Senator Scott. So we had four mass shootings when I was
Governor of Florida, and as a result of that, in the FBI, some
prior knowledge, they made some changes on how they dealt with
information that was coming through their hotline. Is there
something that you all recommend that we ought to change to
deal with something like this, making sure something like this
does not happen again?
Mr. Young. I can definitely follow up, I think, as Ms.
Dobitsch said as well, on some of the information-sharing. I
would say, based upon some of the incidents you are talking
about, we went through a national restructuring of our Criminal
Justice Information Services (CJIS) facility and how we take in
what we call tips. We take in, through the phone, over 5,000 a
day. We added, one of the elements to that is what we call
``threat to life,'' so that we understand that we action those
immediately. We also do get our internet tips as well. There
have been procedures put in place to make sure that we are
actioning those appropriately.
Senator Scott. Yes. I had the opportunity to go visit. I
think the FBI made some big changes, and I think it appears
that it is working.
Do you believe that the suspect in the Colleyville attack
acted alone, or was he part of a cell in the United States?
Mr. Young. I cannot go into too much of the investigation.
What we know at the time was he acted alone.
Senator Scott. OK. Can each of you talk about what DHS and
FBI are doing to counter the increasing hate crimes, especially
these attacks against our Jewish communities?
Mr. Young. Yes, Senator. I will start. I would say with DHS
we are having many, with our Office of Partner Engagement and
with DHS's Partner Engagement, with State and locals, we do a
lot of security awareness, threat awareness, understanding
those vulnerabilities, making sure that we are sharing that
information. Especially right after incidents we get a lot of
high demand from our law enforcement partners. Is this
contained? Is this a situation that we need more information?
With that we also do an inordinate amount of engagement
across our 56 field offices, from our community outreach
specialists, to make sure that those communities have a voice,
that they understand that they can reach the Bureau, what is
the information we look at, and that goes through our
engagement. Then, as well, with our engagement with the Secure
Community Network, which a lot of the synagogues report to. We
ensure that we get those threat information or any tips that
have been provided to us as well.
Ms. Dobitsch. Sir, from I&A's perspective we have
intelligence officers located throughout the United States who
are working directly with faith-based organizations in each
State. With their help, I&A conducts routine threat briefings
with faith-based organizations. We share relative intelligence
and analysis on threats facing religious communities and
institutions, working with our colleagues at FBI. We support
the broader departmental, Federal, State, and local initiatives
to support these organizations.
We believe it is critical that they have ready access to
the information they need to protect their communities, and as
I mentioned earlier, I&A works at the lowest possible
classification level to share that intelligence and information
with the broadest Homeland Security stakeholders in addition to
the faith-based communities.
In the last year, we have briefed members of the Secure
Communications Network, the Jewish Federations of Pennsylvania,
Ohio, and Kentucky, and we have also engaged other faith-based
communities like the Sikh American Legal Defense Fund, and we
are expected to speak at a kickoff they are doing in March,
looking at protecting places of worship 101. We are actively
engaged and we have redoubled our efforts in this space.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Ms. Dobitsch, can you talk a
little bit about what DHS is doing to make sure that we do not
have terrorism coming across our Southern Border?
Ms. Dobitsch. Absolutely. We are working closely with our
colleagues at CBP to understand the threat we face along our
Southwest Border and working diligently to ensure that our
screening and vetting procedures are in place and that we are
doing robust screening and vetting using intelligence to ensure
that terrorist do not cross our borders.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Carper, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks so much. I apologize for being in
and out. We have a number of hearings going on simultaneously
and we are trying to be in three places at once. I am pretty
good at two at once but not so good at three at once. So thank
you.
As former Chairman of this Committee, these issues are very
important to me. They are important to my State. The Jewish
Community Center was under a bomb threat a couple of years ago,
and we have a Jewish student facility at the University of
Delaware which has also been damaged in the recent past. We
care about these issues and it is personal.
We thank you all for joining us. This will be a question
for, let us see, codification of partnership offices at DHS,
for DHS witnesses. This question is for any of our DHS
witnesses. As you all well know, the DHS Center for Prevention
Programs and Partnerships (CP3), aims to expand the
Department's ability to prevent terrorism and targeted violence
through the development of local prevention frameworks.
CP3 office has been rebranded any number of times in the
past, as you know. In fact, it used to be called the Office for
Community Partnerships. I remember that. In previous Congresses
I have introduced legislation to codify an office to work with
building partnerships to counter violent extremism.
Question. Is CP3 something that Congress should work to
codify? What benefits would that provide to the Department, and
how would having dedicated staff and leadership help strengthen
DHS efforts to combat domestic terrorism?
Mr. Coleman. As part of the Center for Faith-Based
Neighborhood Partnerships, while I cannot speak to the
codification of CP3, I can say that our office works very
closely with CP3, because we know that many of the faith-based
and community-based organizations that want to help keep their
communities safe need to be actively involved in prevention.
Our office was able to collaborate with CP3 in October
2021, to talk specifically about targeted acts of violence, and
I am encouraged by their intentional outreach and engagement
and their humble posture to listen and learn from faith-based
and community-based organizations on how they can improve their
programs.
I would defer to my colleagues at DHS Policy and the DHS
Office of the Secretary as it relates to positional
codification.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you for that response. Let
me ask Ms. Dobitsch the same question, and Mr. Logan, the same
question.
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you, Mr. Senator. Obviously, we would
also defer to the Office of Policy and the Secretary on the
codification, but we also work very closely with CP3,
particularly on the public awareness aspect. We help to share
information, newsletters, on threats facing the homeland and
our vulnerable communities, focused on prevention
professionals, and ensuring that they have a good understanding
of the threats they face.
Senator Carper. All right. Mr. Logan.
Mr. Logan. Senator, thank you. I would similarly defer to
the Office of Policy and the Secretary on the question of
codification. We also work very closely with CP3 on their
Targeted Violence Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program. We
help them administer that program. I also personally serve on
the Department's Targeted Violence Terrorism Prevention
Executive Steering Committee, where we collectively address
these issues and ensure that there is close collaboration and
coordination among the various grant programs that we are
responsible for.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. I have a second
question here, and the question is, my colleagues have
frequently heard me say, ``Find out what works and do more of
that, and find out what does not work and do less of that.''
But when it comes to countering domestic terrorism we know that
collaboration, we know that communication are keys to both the
efforts of DHS and also the FBI. We also know that information-
sharing at all levels of government gives us a better picture
of the threat landscape that our faith-based organizations and
higher education institutions are facing.
Ms. Dobitsch, Mr. Young, Mr. Coleman, how are you working
to share best practices and relevant information with your
counterparts across all levels of State, local, and Federal
Government? Ms. Dobitsch, Mr. Young, Mr. Coleman. Ms. Dobitsch,
would you go first?
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you, Mr. Senator. So yes, we have
redoubled our efforts in the information-sharing space. In May
of last year I&A established a new, dedicated domestic
terrorism branch, focused on producing sound and timely
intelligence needed to counter these threats. Most of the
intelligence that is produced from this branch and others is
produced at the unclassified level, which is available to our
State, local, and private sector partners.
We have also significantly increased and improved our
information-sharing across the threat spectrum, including
disseminating that intelligence. We have had more than 50
engagements focused on informing our partners of the threat
environment. This includes standing biweekly calls with State
and local law enforcement and national-level calls with broader
groups and stakeholders on emerging threats. These engagements
have ranged from dozens of participants to over 800
participants on national-level outreach efforts. We have really
focused on, again, engaging, maintaining consistency in that
engagement, and making sure that we are speaking to the broad
range of threats.
Most recently, DHS, NCTC, and FBI released the U.S. Violent
Extremism Mobilization Indicators booklet, which is available
online, and covers indicators of violence from the domestic
violent extremist actors, which is the first time that this
mobilization booklet has featured indicators associated with
that threat actor.
We are also working to support our efforts to inform the
public. In addition to what we are doing with the office at
CP3, I&A has worked with our partners across the Department to
release several national terrorism advisory system bulletins
that specifically reference threats to our faith-based
communities and others.
Senator Carper. I am going to ask Mr. Young and Mr. Coleman
to respond to that question for the record.
My last question is, very briefly, Ms. Dobitsch, in your
testimony with your colleagues you mentioned that since, I
think it was 2010, there have been at least 30 likely
ideologically motivated attacks, or attempted attacks targeting
mosques, synagogues, churches, and religious centers, and
faith-based communities. We have seen some of that in my own
State. My guess is we have in Michigan too.
But while these statistics are deeply disturbing they are
important when it comes to painting the picture of the current
threat landscape that houses of worship and faith-based
communities face. Ms. Dobitsch and Mr. Young, very briefly, are
engagements with local communities helping to thwart these
attacks? Additionally, how can Congress be helpful in ensuring
you have what you need to stop these attacks before they occur?
A two-part question. Ms. Dobitsch, you go first. Are
engagements with local communities helping to thwart these
attacks? How can we help in ensuring you have what you need to
stop the attacks before they occur? Ms. Dobitsch.
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you, sir. Yes, we believe, we hope that
these engagements are helping to thwart attacks. We believe
that anticipatory intelligence is a primary way in which these
partners can be prepared and focused on prevention efforts. Our
job, again, is to identify these threats and make sure that our
partners have access to this information so that they can focus
on preparedness, resilience, and prevention.
I will defer to Mr. Young.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks. Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Yes. I would echo what Ms. Dobitsch said. We
partner on those calls, those engagements. We remain very close
with that.
The one other thing in regard to your question, any time
that we do a counterterrorism arrest we put out a joint
intelligence bulletin, which is shared across our law
enforcement communities so they understand what the indicators
were. It helps them understand what to look for, what were the
highlights, and what information are we looking for in our
engagements.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
hanging in there and giving me a chance to ask a couple of
questions. Thanks to our witnesses. This is really important
stuff and we are grateful. Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Carper.
I have one last question, and this last question is for Ms.
Dobitsch. A DHS Office of Inspector General report came out
last week that found that I&A identified open-source threat
information in advance of the January 6th attacks on the
Capitol but did not issue any intelligence products until
January 8th. The Office of the IG found that this was both
because of inexperienced collectors who received inadequate
training and did not fully consider the guidelines for
reporting information and because they were hesitant to report
threats after mistakes I&A made in Portland earlier in 2020.
The report also found that one product that was submitted
for review was not distributed until after the attacks, and
that the Counterterrorism Mission Center identified indicators
that there may be violence on January 6th but did not share
that information outside of I&A. Further, the Field Operations
Division considered issuing intelligence products in advance of
January 6th but decided not to.
Ms. Dobitsch, what has I&A done since January 6th to fix
these mistakes?
Ms. Dobitsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the report
highlights the complexity and sensitivity that the Office of
the Intelligence and Analysis works through every day as it
relates to identifying threats online. We must work diligently
to equally balance protecting individuals' privacy and civil
rights and civil liberties while also anticipating and warning
of threats of violence.
Since the tragic events that took place on 6 January, I&A
has made substantial changes to the management policies,
equipment, personnel, organization, and training associated
with our open-source intelligence activities, focused on
improving our ability to rapidly identify, assess, and
communicate threats to Homeland Security stakeholders and
leadership.
We have appointed new leadership and expanded the number of
supervisors that oversee our open-source intelligence
activities. We have implemented new technical solutions that
improve the efficiency and oversight of our dissemination of
our open-source report.
We have also doubled the size of our Privacy and
Intelligence Oversight Office in I&A, and one of those new
intelligence oversight officers work exclusively with I&A's
open-source team to do exactly this work. This enables the
open-source collectors to have real-time feedback and access to
these officers, to help us navigate these very sensitive
issues, again, ensuring that we do not violate our Attorney
General (AG) guidelines and that we carefully balance, again,
the need to protect individuals' civil rights, civil liberties,
their privacy, while also warning of the threats.
Chairman Peters. I appreciate your making efforts. This
will likely be a topic of further discussion in future hearings
as well as future communications with members of this Committee
and your office.
I want to thank all of the witnesses for participating
today, and for the Members who were here today for their
thoughtful questions. I also want to thank Ranking Member
Portman for holding this hearing with me.
Today's hearing provided, I think, an important opportunity
for this Committee to conduct oversight on the Federal
Government's actions to protect houses of worship as well as
public spaces in general. The threat landscape is clearly
evolving at an increasingly alarming rate, and the Federal
Government's response capabilities absolutely must keep pace.
No American should have to fear that attending their house of
worship, visiting a supermarket, or sending their child to
school will end in violence.
The testimony we have heard today will help inform our
legislative efforts, and I certainly look forward to holding
additional hearings on this topic in the future as well.
The record for this hearing will remain open for 15 days,
until 5 p.m. on March 31, 2022, for the submission of
statements and questions for the record.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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