[Senate Hearing 117-520]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-520

       ADDRESSING THE GAPS IN AMERICA'S BIOSECURITY PREPAREDNESS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
               HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS


                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 17, 2022
                               __________

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                       Printed for the use of the
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

        
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                  
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
49-908PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023           
        


        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California             MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                   David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                    Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
         Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
           Naveed Jazayeri, Senior Professional Staff Member
                Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
       Clyde E. Hicks Jr., Minority Director of Homeland Security
          Justin P. Brooks, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                     Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk


                            C O N T E N T S

                                 ------                                
Opening statements:
                                                                   Page
    Senator Peters...............................................     1
    Senator Portman..............................................     2
    Senator Padilla..............................................    14
    Senator Hassan...............................................    20
    Senator Sinema...............................................    22
Prepared statements:
    Senator Peters...............................................    29
    Senator Portman..............................................    31

                               WITNESSES
                      Thursday, February 17, 2022

Christopher P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 
  U.S. Government Accountability Office..........................     4
Asha M. George, DrPH, Executive Director, Bipartisan Commission 
  on Biodefense..................................................     6
Gerald W. Parker, Jr., DVM, Ph.D., Associate Dean for Global One 
  Health College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, 
  Texas A&M University...........................................     8

                     Alphabetical List of Witnesses

Currie, Christopher P.:
    Testimony....................................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................    33
George, Asha M. DrPH.:
    Testimony....................................................     6
    Prepared statement with attachments..........................    47
Parker, Gerald W. Jr., DVM, Ph.D.:
    Testimony....................................................     8
    Prepared statement...........................................   440

                                APPENDIX

Ms. George's addendum............................................   455
Dr. Alex Garza Statement for the Record..........................   456
One Health Statement for the Record..............................   463
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
    Mr. Currie...................................................   466
    Ms. George...................................................   475
    Mr. Parker...................................................   481

 
       ADDRESSING THE GAPS IN AMERICA'S BIOSECURITY PREPAREDNESS

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2022

                                     U.S. Senate,  
                           Committee on Homeland Security  
                                  and Governmental Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., via 
Webex and in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. 
Gary Peters, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Peters, Carper, Hassan, Sinema, Padilla, 
Ossoff, Portman, Johnson, Romney, Scott, and Hawley.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\

    Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order. I would 
like to start off and thank our witnesses for joining us to 
help assess our readiness to protect Americans from biological 
threats to national security, including the Department of 
Homeland Security's (DHS) ability to detect, mitigate, and 
deter these threats.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appear in the Appendix 
on page 29.
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    We will also discuss how this Committee can work to ensure 
that the Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office and other government programs 
tasked with tackling biological threats have the resources as 
well as the tools needed to fulfill their mission.
    Biological threats can emerge from any number of disease-
causing agents such as bacteria, viruses, or toxins. Whether 
naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin, these 
agents can be used to harm humans, plants, and animals.
    We have seen how naturally occurring biological threats, 
such as the virus that causes Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-
19), can significantly harm our communities if we are not 
adequately prepared for them.
    We also face threats from biological weapons that have been 
manufactured and have been weaponized for the purpose of 
deliberately targeting Americans. For example, we have seen bad 
actors deliberately use anthrax, ricin, and other harmful 
biological agents in attempted attacks, including targeting 
elected officials. These bioweapons have the potential to cause 
everything from mass casualties to incapacitation to 
agricultural destruction and other serious disruptions to our 
economic and national security.
    Compared to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
bioweapons are cheaper to develop, can be deployed covertly, 
and often have a delayed onset, making them an appealing choice 
for bad actors to utilize in randomized and targeted acts.
    In response to these threats, DHS has taken actions to 
bolster our nation's biodefenses, including the BioWatch 
Program and its replacement, the Biological Detection for the 
21st Century Program (BD21). These programs, by all accounts, 
have not measurably improved our nation's ability to identify 
possible biological threats. They have, however, improved the 
coordination between the Federal Government and local partners 
on addressing these threats.
    In their 2021 report to Congress, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that DHS's biosurveillance 
programs, including the BD21 program, lack sufficient 
technology and other resources to carry out and define their 
mission.
    I also remain concerned about the BioWatch program which 
has suffered a number of setbacks, including high rates of 
false positive tests, significant delays in identifying 
possible threats, and an inability to detect familiar threats.
    The Committee is also responsible for considering the 
reauthorization of the Department of Homeland Security's CWMD 
office before the end of 2023. This office has previously faced 
unsteady leadership, low morale, and the inability to retain 
qualified employees. Although there are signs these issues are 
improving, this body must consider whether structural changes 
at DHS are needed to ensure they can successfully combat 
biological and other threats.
    In addition to bolstering the Federal Government's 
readiness to tackle these threats, we must also support 
innovative efforts by other public and private entities. These 
programs are evident in my home State of Michigan, which is 
home to vaccine manufacturers and experts developing 
decontamination techniques, as well as the University of 
Michigan-Flint's forthcoming biosecurity program, which I had 
the opportunity to discuss with their chancellor earlier this 
week.
    Michigan has also conducted exercises that test the 
responsiveness of State, local, and Federal partners to 
biological attacks, and uses test results to identify how we 
can improve our ability to combat these threats. Today's 
hearing will allow the Committee to examine how the Federal 
Government can build on these kinds of efforts.
    I look forward to hearing from our panel of health care and 
national security experts on how lawmakers can advance an 
effective and comprehensive strategy to protect all of our 
communities from all biological security threats.
    I now turn to Ranking Member Portman. You are recognized 
for your opening comments.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\

    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 
comments this morning, and I thank the witnesses for being 
here. Interestingly, a lot of the experts who are before us 
today are those who have been sounding the alarm as to our 
current biosecurity, and so I look forward to hearing from you 
and I thank you for being willing to stand up and speak out on 
this.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the 
Appendix on page 31.
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    I think the pandemic has taught us once again that we have 
to examine the effectiveness of our biosecurity posture. It is 
about all kinds of biosecurity threats. One is man-made, of 
course, others are accidental or naturally occurring pathogens, 
and as we have seen over the past couple of years, this can 
have a devastating impact on our country or even the entire 
globe, as we have experienced with COVID-19.
    Over the past 20 years, we have seen attempts at biological 
terrorism, notably the anthrax attacks in 2001. You remember 
following that, subsequent to the attacks there was a lot of 
activity, including setting up much of what we are going to 
talk about today. Of course, the harmful pathogens including 
H1N1, Ebola, and most recently COVID.
    Despite these threats, our nation's biosecurity efforts 
have been fragmented, in my view, among several different 
agencies and departments, which makes it tough to have 
accountability, hampers coordination, and makes us less able to 
be prepared for a large-scale biological hazard. I hope that we 
will talk about that some today and more about what more should 
be done to ensure we have the best biodetection capability out 
there, and make smart investments in research and development 
(R&D) in this area. I am concerned about our capability in 
terms of the ability to detect various pathogens that could do 
us a lot of harm and are not currently detectable.
    The Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Office, which was just talked about, and we 
will talk a lot about that today--has a very significant role 
in this mission of biosecurity. But the office is plagued with 
some challenges, some of which are perennial, some of which 
predate the formation of the office itself, and as I have said, 
some of it is lack of coordination.
    BioWatch is the primary biosecurity program at DHS, 
operated by the CWMD office. For the last 20 years ago, in my 
view, BioWatch has consistently underdelivered on its intended 
purpose to detect biological agents that could possibly pose a 
hazard to the public.
    In my view the roles need to be clarified, but also 
detection expanded, and again, I look forward to the views of 
the experts today about whether that is their opinion, and if 
so, what can we do about it.
    We have invested, as taxpayers, over $1 billion into the 
BioWatch program, and the CWMD office now wants to upgrade that 
program, as Chairman Peters just said, with this BD21 program, 
``Biodetection for the 21st Century,'' I think it is a good 
time for us to ensure that the BD21 program is based on a 
strong foundation and ensure that it is the kind of investment 
that is going to be worthwhile for taxpayers, and most 
importantly, that it is a system that can protect the American 
people from these harmful biological threats.
    The authorities of this office, CWMD at Department of 
Homeland Security are set to expire late next year. This gives 
us an opportunity here in this Committee to reauthorize, and 
with the reauthorization to make the necessary changes so it 
does have broader capability and is better organized. It may 
require more funding, but I think it mostly requires better 
organization and better accountability, and that is what I hope 
we can talk about today. We will have an opportunity, again 
with this reauthorization, to take a careful look at this and 
improve the system.
    I look forward to hearing the witnesses' assessments of 
where we are now with regard to our preparedness and their 
recommendations for improving this national effort to safeguard 
the American people from these biological threats.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman.
    It is the practice of the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in our 
witnesses, so if both of you would please stand and raise your 
right hand, including Dr. Currie, who is on video.
    Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before 
this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you, God?
    Mr. Currie. I do.
    Ms. George. I do.
    Mr. Parker. I do.
    Chairman Peters. You may be seated.
    Our first witness is Christopher Currie. Mr. Currie serves 
as the Director of Homeland Security and Justice at the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office. He leads the agency's work on 
national preparedness, emergency management, and critical 
infrastructure protection issues.
    Mr. Currie brings almost 20 years of Federal experience and 
his expertise includes the evaluation of Federal efforts and 
programs to prevent, plan for, and respond to both natural and 
man-made disasters.
    Welcome back, Mr. Currie. You may proceed with your opening 
remarks.

   TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER P. CURRIE,\1\ DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 
  SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Currie. Thank you very much, Chairman Peters and 
Ranking Member Portman. I really appreciate the opportunity to 
be here today to discuss GAO's work on biosecurity. I am sorry 
I cannot be there with you in person.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Currie appears in the Appendix on 
page 33.
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    But today I would like to focus on two key areas. First is 
how we can strengthen efforts across the Federal Government and 
second are the steps that the Department of Homeland Security 
can take to strengthen biosecurity.
    For a decade, well before the pandemic, we have been 
concerned about our preparedness for a large-scale biological 
event and have called for better strategy. This Committee has 
held many hearings over the years on this issue as well. We 
were concerned that the biodefense was too fragmented and 
uncoordinated across all levels of government and the private 
sector too. Unfortunately, COVID-19 showed that these gaps were 
real.
    The 2018 Biodefense Strategy laid the foundation for the 
type of coordination needed to better prepare for events like 
COVID-19, but the bad news is that the strategy was new when 
the pandemic hit. The good news is the pandemic put the 
spotlight on this, creating an opportunity to effectively 
implement the strategy for future events in the years to come.
    For the last two years under COVID we have been focused on 
how to successfully implement a biodefense strategy and 
implement the lessons we have learned from COVID-19. Two years 
ago, we made recommendations to better implement this strategy, 
which are even more important today, I think. For example, one 
recommendation centered around being able to make resource and 
priority decisions across agencies that just cannot tell each 
other what to do, like the Department of Defense (DOD) , 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), and DHS. This still has not been 
completed. We still do not have a system where we can do that 
fully.
    We have also recently looked back on interagency biological 
plans, exercises, and after-action reports done in the years 
before COVID-19. Many of the problems the challenges that 
occurred in COVID response were identified in prior exercises 
and after-action reviews. For example, prior exercises and 
reports from past events, like Ebola, Zika, and others found 
that coordinating at the Federal level and between the Feds and 
the States was going to be a huge challenge. We saw this to be 
the case in the COVID response, particularly as it relates to 
supply chains.
    The problem is that these gaps were not closed, because no 
one agency was accountable for closing them. While we will 
never close all the gaps, we certainly could have closed some 
of them beforehand. I think this simply just cannot happen 
again. We have to ensure that the lessons learned from COVID 
and the exercises we do in the future are not forgotten once 
this passes.
    Now I would like to turn to DHS too. In the biodefense 
area, since 2012, we have reported on challenges in 
implementing BioWatch, which as you said, the system to detect 
an aerosolized or airborne bioattack. Just last year, we 
reported on challenges in the effort to upgrade the system and 
move to BD21, as you talked about, Mr. Chairman, in your 
opening statement.
    We found that BD21 faces a number of technology challenges, 
mainly the inherent limitations in the technology and the 
uncertainties--this is important--of combining these 
technologies for use in the domestic environment in the United 
States, like in train stations and sporting events. It is very 
different than trying to do it in a lab or the war environment. 
It is a huge challenge. For example, the false alarm issue is 
still a big problem that has to be overcome if DHS is to more 
quickly detect biothreats in these environments.
    We have also found that DHS's CWMD Office has struggled to 
develop an effective surveillance system for biothreats. For 
example, the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) 
at DHS has struggled to fulfill its mandate and provide value 
to its partners at the Federal, State, and local level.
    Last, I know the Committee is also interested in the 
effectiveness of the CWMD Office in general, since the office 
was set up and reorganized. Overall, I think the office is on a 
better track and is beginning to mature now several years after 
being created. Morale has improved slightly. It is still not 
great but it has improved particularly in some of the areas of 
employee engagement, which is important.
    Also, I think the leadership there is committed to 
implementing our past recommendations, and more importantly, 
sticking to best practices that have helped other organizations 
reorganize and transform effectively in the government. For 
example, I know the office is working to better communicate 
with internal and external partners. This is something that 
faltered during the reorganization and is taking some time to 
restart effectively. We are currently finishing a review of the 
office and we plan to issue a report on that in the coming 
months.
    This completes my statement, and I look forward to the 
discussion and questions.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Currie.
    Our next witness is Dr. Asha M. George. As a public health 
security professional, Dr. George serves as the Executive 
Director of The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, a 
commission whose mission is to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of the State of U.S. biodefense efforts and issue 
recommendations.
    She has also served in the U.S. House of Representatives as 
a Subcommittee Staff Director at the House Committee on 
Homeland Security and brings a wealth of experience through her 
contracting work with DHS and the Department of Health and 
Human Services.
    Prior to her role, she served on active duty in the United 
States Army (USA) as a Military Intelligence Officer, and is a 
decorated Desert Storm veteran.
    Welcome back, Dr. George. Thank you for your service, and 
you are recognized for your opening comments.

   TESTIMONY OF ASHA M. GEORGE, DrPH,\1\ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
              BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON BIODEFENSE

    Ms. George. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Peters, 
Ranking Member Portman, Senator Romney, Senator Padilla, and 
the rest of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
speak with you today about the State of American biosecurity 
preparedness. As the Chairman said, I am Asha George. I am the 
Executive Director of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, 
which is co-chaired by former Senator and Chairman of this 
Committee, Joe Lieberman, and former Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Governor Tom Ridge. They and the rest of our 
commissioners send you their greetings and thank you for 
continuing to secure the homeland and examine national 
biodefense.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. George appears in the Appendix on 
page 47.
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    Senator Lieberman and Governor Ridge testified before this 
very Committee in 2015, when our commission released its first 
report, ``A National Blueprint on Biodefense.'' They warned 
that the biological threat to the Nation was rising and they 
informed this Committee that the Nation was insufficiently 
prepared to handle a large-scale biological event. Sadly, 
COVID-19 emerged and proved our point.
    A little over six years after that hearing, I come before 
you today to warn you that again, while COVID-19 dominates our 
national and global attention, the biological threat continues 
to increase, and while some strides have been made we are still 
not sufficiently prepared.
    Last year, the State Department released a report in which 
it started, clearly and unequivocally, that Russia and North 
Korea now possess active biological weapons programs, with 
China and Iran not far behind. We must assume that our enemies, 
both nation-states and terrorists, are paying attention to the 
vulnerabilities revealed during COVID-19 and that we must 
prepare for an attack on the U.S. homeland with biological 
weapons. We cannot afford to optimize for COVID-19 or other 
naturally occurring diseases with pandemic potential to the 
exclusion of all else.
    U.S. biopreparedness, as the Chairman said, is 
fractionated, multi-faceted, and distributed across all levels 
of government and much of the private sector. All 15 Cabinet 
departments, eight independent agencies, and one independent 
institution are responsible for biodefense, including 
preparedness.
    Since the release of our blueprint, some improvements have 
certainly been made. For example, Congress required, and the 
Trump administration released, a National Biodefense Strategy, 
to align all existing policies and programs across the Federal 
Government, and the Biden administration is said to be refining 
that strategy now.
    But in many other ways we either made no headway or took 
backward steps. For example, we participated in exercises that 
demonstrated over and over again that a large-scale biological 
event would overcome the government and nation quickly, but we 
did not take decisive action to ensure that those lessons 
observed became lessons learned.
    Many of the homeland security assets we have in place today 
are inadequate to meet a biological threat. We do not believe 
the Department of Homeland Security's BioWatch program, for 
example, will be able to detect biological attacks on our 
country effectively. Last year, we issued a report, ``Saving 
Sisyphus: Advanced Biodetection for the 21st Century,'' to 
describe our concerns and make recommendations as to what can 
be done to achieve the vision for the BioWatch program begun in 
2003.
    It has been painful watching the DHS try over and over 
again, like Sisyphus pushing the boulder up the mount, to 
create an effective biodetection system that serves the needs 
of the Nation.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, 
I suggest to you that 19 years is long enough for things to 
have gone on the way they have with this program. We recommend 
that you either shut it down or replace it with a program that 
works the way you want it to. Our States, localities, and 
taxpayers deserve no less, and the good people working in the 
Department of Homeland Security deserve some relief.
    I want to applaud the biodefense efforts of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret 
Service (USSS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 
and Cybersecurity and Infrasructure Security Agency (CISA) all 
contribute directly to defending the Nation against biological 
threats and they deserve your awareness, oversight, and 
support.
    But as you examine the Department's Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Office I urge the Committee to clarify its 
role. The legislation authorizing this office lacks direction 
and specificity, and it needs direction and guidance from you.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to come before you 
today with the concerns and recommendations of the Bipartisan 
Commission on Biodefense. I would like to thank Hudson 
Institute for serving as our fiscal sponsor, our donors for 
supporting the work of the commission, and congressional staff, 
of course, for their tireless efforts to address this important 
topic. Thank you.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. George.
    Our final witness is Dr. Gerald Parker, Associate Dean for 
Global One Health at Texas A&M University and Chair of the 
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. He is 
responsible for leading and coordinating the Global One Health 
program, which works to improve global health by collaborating 
with national and international experts to pursue ground-
breaking health solutions. He brings over 36 years of public 
service in biodefense, high-consequence emerging infectious 
diseases, and global health security. He is also a former 
Commander and Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
    Dr. Parker, welcome to our Committee, and thank you for 
your service. You may proceed with your opening remarks.

TESTIMONY OF GERALD W. PARKER, JR., DVM, PhD,\1\ ASSOCIATE DEAN 
    FOR GLOBAL ONE HEALTH COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE & 
           BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY

    Dr. Parker. Thank you. It is an honor to be here. Chairman 
Peters, Ranking Member Portman and distinguished Members of the 
Committee, I am honored to appear before you today for this 
hearing addressing gaps in America's biosecurity preparedness.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Parker appears in the Appendix on 
page 440.
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    As the Chairman said, I am Gerald Parker, Associate Dean 
for Global One Health and Director of the Pandemic And 
Biosecurity Policy Program at Texas A&M University. But today 
the views and opinions I have are my own, but they are informed 
by serving in career executive leadership positions in DOD, 
including U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Disease (USAMRIID) and in the Pentagon, as well as at Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), DHS, and a 
recent tour back to ASPR at HHS at the end of last year.
    COVID has exposed the stark reality that a novel 
respiratory virus can emerge anywhere and spread around the 
world in weeks, with devastating consequences. We knew a 
pandemic was coming, but it was difficult to predict when, 
what, where, and how a novel virus would emerge. Despite many 
acknowledged failures that continue to accrue with the 
response, I submit that actually we were more prepared before 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS-2) emerged than critics 
will acknowledge.
    After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) 
and letters containing deadly anthrax spores were mailed in the 
fall of 2001, Congress authorized new programs and appropriated 
new funds over the years as the threats evolved and we accrued 
some lessons observed. Some of them turned into lessons 
learned, some of them not.
    That evolved into learning biosecurity and pandemic and 
all-hazard preparedness enterprise. We were better prepared 
than we would have been before SARS-2 emerged, had it not been 
for the long support of Congress and importantly the work of 
many dedicated career professionals in government at all 
levels, in industry, academia, and other non-governmental 
organizations (NGO's). We need to acknowledge the hard work of 
many.
    For example, the accelerated development of safe and 
effective COVID vaccines through Operation Warp Speed (OWS) 
would not have been possible without prior congressional 
support since 2001. This enabled the Executive Branch to 
establish new programs in health security vaccines and 
therapeutics research, development, manufacturing, and 
regulatory science. This came with hard and painful lessons 
learned, but steady progress was made over its 20-year journey.
    But OWS was successful in crisis because HHS and DOD 
leaders took charge, each assuming ownership and accountability 
while they established a strict chain of command, empowered 
their subordinates, and put in place procedures to protect the 
integrity of Operation Warp Speed.
    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also provided a 
defined regulatory pathway, industry stepped up to the 
challenge, and Congress provided the appropriations. Together, 
a sort of symphony was established with countless moving parts, 
diverse expertise, and a clear conductor bringing the pieces 
together.
    But looking back on the response today it is clear we 
remain dangerously vulnerable to the next inevitable 
biosecurity crisis, whether natural, deliberate, or accidental.
    The Executive Branch, Congress, and scientists have debated 
the appropriate level of investment and intention necessary to 
defend against biological threats for over two decades. Some 
must have thought it was a hypothetical debate: COVID, 
rebuild--it was not hypothetical.
    We must be prepared for the next inevitable biosecurity 
crisis. If the COVID lessons learned do not teach us the value 
of preparedness, I do not know what will. Waiting for the next 
crisis to take action is too late. A national pandemic 
preparedness enterprise, which includes States and private 
sector partners is essential for success, but that will require 
an effective, centralized leadership structure, vision, and 
goals that transcends administrations.
    We must overcome and learn how to manage a fragmented 
interagency system. Without an effective leadership structure 
that bridges the seams in the Federal bureaucracy even the best 
of leaders, at all levels and organizations, will not be able 
to drive effective coordination, collaboration, communication, 
and innovation across the preparedness continuum during 
peacetime, nor during a crisis. Unfortunately, the inability to 
harness the fragmented interagency is a long-recognized 
biodefense health security and public health preparedness gap.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you at this 
hearing. I look forward to answering any questions you have, 
including some of the questions that are not in my opening 
remarks regarding the DHS organizational challenges. Thank you.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Dr. Parker.
    The GAP and Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense have both 
made numerous recommendations over the years that could improve 
our biosecurity posture here in the United States. I would like 
to ask my first question to Mr. Currie and then to Dr. George.
    If each of you could give me and the Committee your No. 1 
recommendation that remains open for the DHS from your 
organizations that will better prepare our nation to detect and 
respond to biological threats, if you would give us that No. 1 
recommendation and why it is your No. 1 recommendation and why 
we should deal with it urgently.
    Mr. Currie, we will start with you and then Dr. George.
    Mr. Currie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Right now, two years 
after the pandemic started, I think the No. 1 recommendation is 
about following up on the lessons learned in the after-actions 
learned from COVID. I mentioned this in the opening statement. 
Before COVID, the problem is we had a lot of these gaps 
identified and these actions identified but we did not really 
have a mechanism of accountability to figure out who was 
supposed to close them and any follow-up to see whether they 
were closed. If we do not do that after COVID, then lessons 
learned are going to be an absolute waste.
    I think for me right now that is the No. 1 thing we need to 
focus on, and whatever actions those might be, not just at the 
agency level. There could be new legislation, new roles and 
responsibilities identified and clarified as well, and that 
would require the help of Congress.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Currie. Dr. George.
    Ms. George. Mr. Chairman, because you asked about the 
recommendations that we have already made as opposed to other 
recommendations that we might make, then I will tell you that 
our No. 1 recommendation is to shut down the BioWatch and BD21 
programs and replace those programs with useful technology that 
actually works.
    I want you to know that our commission went and looked at 
other technologies. These technologies exist, they are in use 
by other departments and agencies, and in fact, the CWMD Office 
has engaged with some of those other departments and agencies 
to develop some of this technology but has not asked them to 
perhaps modify some of that technology for use in terms of 
biodetection.
    But there is no reason to keep this limping along the way 
it is. We should shut down that program and replace it with 
viable technology.
    Chairman Peters. Authorization for the CWMD Office was 
going to expire in 2023, unless Congress takes some sort of 
action. Before reauthorizing this office, this Committee is 
going to have to consider whether its current structure allows 
DHS to effectively prepare for and combat potential biosecurity 
threats. This includes examining whether aspects of the office 
should be moved to other parts of DHS such as the Chief Medical 
Officer (CMO), to ensure that it can effectively carry out its 
mission.
    Dr. George, a question for you again. If the CWMD Office is 
given more time, is given tools and resources to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to combat biosecurity threats, do you 
believe that that would address the challenges that this office 
challenges, or, in the alternative, would it be more effective 
for this Committee to revisit the decision to consolidate the 
Office of Health Affairs (OHA) and the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO)?
    Ms. George. Mr. Chairman, I believe the Committee should 
revisit this decision. The consolidation of the Department's 
nuclear detection capabilities, biodetection capabilities, 
chemical detection capabilities, and a slew of other WMD-
oriented related activities in this one office, it just simply 
has not worked out particularly well.
    There were a lot of decisions that were made that were 
actually not addressed by statute or legislation. The 
legislation just asks that where you read ``nuclear'' in the 
statute, having to do with the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office, that that should also mean reading ``chemical'' and 
``biological.'' That is too inadequate, and you should know 
that none of the committees on the House side and none of the 
committees on the Senate side actually took up that legislation 
and talked about it. There is no bill report\1\ to go with it. 
Therefore, there is no guidance for the Department of Homeland 
Security to really understand where Congress was trying to go 
with it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The addendum to Ms. George's statement appears in the Appendix 
on page 455.
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    I would absolutely recommend taking a look at the various 
elements of this office, and I would send all of those elements 
right back to the rest of the Department, down to the 
operational components and over to other parts of the 
headquarters elements.
    The ports monitors, for example, should go to the people 
who are securing the ports, CBP and Coast Guard. If you want to 
keep the BioWatch detectors, after replacing them with better 
technology, then you should send those to the Secret Service 
that handles national special security events and perhaps to 
CISA, because they are in charge of critical infrastructure and 
that is where we are putting these detectors.
    The material threat determinations that are conducted by 
the Department are, for the most part, conducted by the Science 
and Technology (S&T) Directorate. They do not need CWMD 
managing S&T and a little bit of Intelligence and Analysis 
(I&A) to get those done. I could go on, but you see where I am 
going.
    I think that if you did that and you returned the 
intelligence element--the WMD intelligence people were taken 
out of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and sent over to 
this WMD Office--I think if you return these things to where 
they started from and send them to where it makes sense to have 
those assets, I think you will have a stronger Department and a 
stronger biodefense program at the Department than what we have 
right now.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. Thank you for a very 
comprehensive answer. I appreciate that.
    Dr. Parker, in your opinion where should the Chief Medical 
Officer reside within the Department of Homeland Security?
    Dr. Parker. Thank you, and actually in my written testimony 
I do have a description about the early days of the 
establishment of the Chief Medical Officer, and I think it 
gives you some background of why initially it was established 
close to the Secretary. It was established in that time when we 
were very much more urgently concerned about the bioterrorism 
threat, and we should be more concerned about that today, as 
has already been discussed.
    Hurricane Katrina happened and there was certainly a 
realization that almost every disaster, natural or intentional, 
that the Department is going to face is going to have a huge 
medical public health implication. The Secretary needed to have 
somebody close to the Secretary's position to advise on the 
medical public health implications of an intentional or a 
natural disaster.
    I firmly believe that what transpired back in the day, when 
I was directly at DHS and HHS is where the Chief Medical 
Officer ought to be today. I think in a policy advisory role I 
think there is no reason to encumber, say, the Chief Medical 
Office with an acquisition program.
    Think about some of the models in the Department of 
Defense, say, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs. Now they 
have to run the health care system but it also an advisor to 
the Secretary on all the implications across the services when 
it comes to health and medicine and public health.
    I think there is a similar model, looking at the way DOD 
does it, and they I think it would be very helpful for DHS, and 
I think would be a big assistance to the Secretary.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you.
    Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for your 
questions.
    Senator Portman. First I appreciate all the expertise. I 
said at the outset, all three of you have been sounding the 
alarm and today you are able to give us more specifics as to 
how you would deal with the shortfalls that you see.
    I was curious in listening to your responses about how to 
not just make the structure more accountable and simpler, in 
fact--I think that is what, Dr. George, you were getting at--
but also improve the technology. One initial question I would 
have, and maybe, Dr. George you could take this, you said that 
some of our adversaries have active bioweapon programs. What do 
our adversaries, and for that matter, our allies, do with 
regard to protecting their citizens from bioattacks, and what 
can we learn from them? Has the commission been able to analyze 
comparatively what other countries do?
    Ms. George. Mr. Ranking Member, I assume when you are 
talking about the four countries that I mentioned it is very 
difficult for the intelligence community (IC) or anybody else 
to figure out what they are doing to protect themselves or not.
    But what I can tell you is that Russia and China are 
investing billions into their bioeconomy, and part of doing 
that is investment in protective technologies--vaccine, 
personal protective equipment (PPE)--and anything else that 
will bring the economic aspect of biology in the 21st century 
up to the next level. They are investing at a rate much greater 
than what we are investing here in the United States. It is 
going to start putting us at an economic disadvantage, but it 
is also going to put us at a protective disadvantage.
    Senator Portman. Excuse me, but does that relation to 
BioWatch and to the monitors as well?
    Ms. George. I do not know, Senator.
    Senator Portman. How about our European allies or Japan or 
South Korea, other countries where we would have access to 
exactly what they are doing? I was going to be happy to share 
that information, but have you learned anything from them as to 
how we could do a better job on detection?
    Ms. George. Yes, Senator. I would say especially in Europe, 
our European allies and other countries with whom we are 
friends are working biodetection, and I think their approaches 
are different from ours. I think they have viewed this as a 
technological challenge that needs to be iterated. We started 
with something in 2003 that the National Labs produced, and 18 
years, 19 years later we are still kind of hanging around, 
using that same technology. The Europeans have not done that. 
They have gone through their cycles over and over and improved.
    Now nobody, including our Department of Defense and 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), says that 
they have the absolute solution that is going to work 100 
percent of the time, but they are working on technology that is 
getting us closer and closer to that. I believe we can get that 
information from our European allies, and possibly Japan--I do 
not know--if we asked.
    Senator Portman. You are indicating they are ahead of us in 
terms of the technology, at least as to BioWatch and that 
responsibility.
    Let me ask you a basic question that I think a lot of 
people who are watching today might be interested in. Why did 
we not detect COVID-19? Why did it take us so long? I think it 
was not until January that we actually felt like we had 
discovered this COVID virus when, in fact, it had been around 
for a few months. Maybe, Director Currie, you could start on 
that.
    Mr. Currie. Thank you, sir. There are a lot of opinions as 
to why we may not have detected it as quickly as we want. But 
the point you bring up is about surveillance, which 
surveillance is basically scanning the world for potential 
biological threats so we can get them a quick as possible and 
address them. This has been a huge challenge across the 
agencies and the biodefense enterprise, and this is something 
we have pointed out, that multiple agencies have all tried to 
pursue their own surveillance system. DHS has one. HHS has been 
trying to do one. DOD has one. USDA has one for zoonotic 
diseases. They have all been pursued separately. Some of them 
have not been successful, and they certainly have not been 
integrated together. I think part of the problem is the 
fragmentation or the lack of integration.
    But one quick point I will make is during COVID we created 
some new, innovative surveillance systems to monitor COVID and 
really get down into the State and local level and the private 
sector, in the hospitals, in the pharmacies, and things like 
that. I think we need to look at what we created there and not 
just get rid of it when COVID is over. We need to use that to 
develop new surveillance systems.
    Senator Portman. I know there has been some interest for 
airports, as an example, that has not been implemented, as far 
as I know, but there is some research that could be quite 
helpful.
    Dr. Parker, any thoughts on that?
    Dr. Parker. Sure.
    Senator Portman. Let me give you the precise dates here. 
The first COVID-19 case that the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) confirmed was on January 21, 2020, and 
recent studies by public health officials suggest that it was 
undetected in the country a couple of months previous to that.
    Dr. Parker. I think it really comes down to the need to re-
envision biosurveillance and take advantage of the lessons, 
some of the things we build, as it was just recommended, with 
our COVID-19. The data analytics, it is really phenomenal now, 
today, for COVID, we can unpack and go down to the county 
level, the ZIP code level, and understand what is happening as 
far as cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. We did not have 
that capability before COVID.
    We certainly stumbled out of the gate with our laboratory 
diagnostics that has been talked about ad nauseum, and we need 
to address some of those things in the future. We need to 
address it that we are not all so focused on the public health. 
We have to focus on animal health. We have to focus on plant 
health. We have to take a one-health solution as we think about 
our strategy.
    COVID-19--we need to re-envision what biosurveillance means 
and how we can do it, and take advantage of our lessons 
observed and turn them into lessons learned. But it has to be a 
one-health approach to do this.
    It is inexcusable, the dates you mentioned, that now, 
retrospectively, we believe it may have been in the United 
States before January. We have to fix those things in the 
future so that our laboratories can pick it up and we are 
looking for the Disease X's in the future.
    Senator Portman. It could have made a huge difference had 
we had the surveillance capability.
    I hope to get a second round here--but yes or no, do you 
think we have adequate surveillance capability for bioattacks? 
Just a simple yes or no. Dr. George?
    Ms. George. No.
    Dr. Parker. No.
    Senator Portman. Director.
    Mr. Currie. No.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Portman. Senator 
Padilla, you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PADILLA

    Senator Padilla. Thank you, Mr. Chair. There are a number 
of issues I would like to raise in my allotted time, but I want 
to begin by just commenting. I appreciate, Dr. Parker, you 
mentioning that, dates. How quickly we pounced on COVID, the 
existence of a strategy, the existence of a plan, whether or 
not that plan was implemented on a timely basis or completely 
is a worthwhile discussion, because our public health experts 
and disease control personnel do not operate in a vacuum. I 
will leave it at that.
    The first question I want to raise, as the Senator who 
represents Lawrence Livermore National Lab in California, part 
of our national lab infrastructure, but Livermore, in 
particular, and the labs, in general, are critical to advancing 
our ability to counter weapons of mass destructions. The labs' 
mission includes work at the nexus of biology, engineering, and 
the physical sciences to address national challenges in 
biosecurity, chemical security, bioenergy, and human health.
    The partnership specifically between the Countering Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Office and the national labs is an 
important piece of our government's response to developing 
exceptional science and technology that can detect and mitigate 
weapons of mass destruction.
    I would like to ask each of you just some initial thoughts 
on the importance of partnerships between DHS and other 
government entities, including national labs, and how you view 
that partnership developing as this Committee considers the 
future of these efforts. We will start with Dr. George, Dr. 
Parker, and then Mr. Currie.
    Ms. George. Thank you, Senator. Of course, those kinds of 
partnerships are absolutely critical, but they need to be 
focused as well. You are talking about science and technology. 
The national labs, NASA, Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), all of these science-oriented, science, 
mission-oriented entities can be utilized and worked with in 
any number of ways.
    But, in this case we are talking about basic science. We 
are talking about the scientific endeavor. I think you have to 
ask, when we are talking about which organizational element 
ought to be working with them from the Department, we have to 
ask, is it appropriate for the CWMD Office or the Science and 
Technology Office to be conducting those partnerships?
    I submit to you that if this is a basic science issue that 
we are talking--and, for example, with BioWatch--then 19 years 
of Office of Health Affairs and then CWMD trying to engage and 
then sometimes not engaging with the national labs and so forth 
is enough, and problematic. They probably should never have 
been doing it. I think it should have been the Science and 
Technology Directorate that had been doing it.
    I think the national labs stand by. Livermore produced the 
first BioWatch detector anyhow. I am confident that the 
national labs and the other science and technology 
organizations throughout the country could address this, if 
given the opportunity.
    Senator Padilla. Dr. Parker, briefly.
    Dr. Parker. Thanks, and first I am a big fan of Lawrence 
Livermore National Lab and I get the opportunity to visit, in 
fact, I think maybe next month. But anyway, I think Lawrence 
Livermore National Lab and the other national labs actually 
have an incredibly important part to play here. One reason why 
they are so effective is that they can get into the very deep, 
basic science, but they approach it from an operational 
perspective, and that is one thing that is really unique about 
our national labs, and Livermore in particular. I think 
anything we can do to encourage actually the re-engagement of 
S&T into the transformative science that is needed for 
detection, diagnostics, and surveillance, and data informatics, 
which is another strength of the lab, needs to be encouraged, 
and take advantage of that unique scientific expertise that our 
national labs, and Livermore specifically, that has an 
operational orientation.
    Senator Padilla. Mr. Currie, I am interested in your 
thoughts but I want to actually ask you a specific question on 
a different topic here in a second.
    A follow-up question for Dr. Parker. As you know, robust 
and timely data has become an essential tool in effective 
government responses. Unfortunately, when it came to COVID, 
COVID proved how the lack of data, or timely data, can cause 
harm and stall responses to biological incidents. Multiple 
agencies reported issues tracking health data and coordinating 
with the Federal Government to ensure that we had a full and 
complete picture of the pandemic, wish we had it much earlier 
on. In some cases, States did not report or collect, whether it 
was racial data or other data that would have been 
illuminating, until we were well into the pandemic.
    Can you describe our current capabilities or lack thereof 
to track health data in a way that would allow us to more 
quickly identify and neutralize biological threats? I know we 
kind of ventured into this under Senator Portman's questions, 
but anything more precise, and what recommendations would you 
have?
    Dr. Parker. Yes, sir. I can share some personal 
observations when I had a front, when I was detailed back to 
Administration for Strategiv Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 
at the end of last year, during the COVID response. Actually, 
it took several months before the data analytics and the 
ability to have a comprehensive view, down to the ZIP code 
level, of hospitalizations, deaths, cases, and so forth. It was 
not until hospitals started being able to tap the data from the 
hospital system that we began to get that, and that was six 
months into COVID.
    We have to be able to kind of take those lessons learned as 
we go forward and not let those systems atrophy, for lack of a 
better term, at the moment. We have to do this, and it is hard. 
I mean, the data is owned by many different organizations so 
this is not an easy challenge. But we have to figure out how do 
we keep those pipes open when there is a crisis that can be 
turned on instantaneously so we can get the situational 
awareness that is needed.
    Senator Padilla. Yes, no one would have imagined a day when 
the general public is tracking cases, deaths, hospitalization 
rates, and distinction between hospitalization intensive care 
units (ICUs), ventilators, positivity rates, et cetera, and we 
have not even scratched the surface on this strain versus that 
variant by ZIP code.
    Mr. Chair, I know my time is about up but I do have one 
more topic I am eager to get Mr. Currie's thoughts on. As we 
know, COVID-19 has exposed significant inequities in our health 
care system as well as pandemic response.
    In particular, the pandemic has highlighted the racial and 
income disparities in our approach to public health. 
Hospitalization and emergency department visits were 
significantly and persistently higher among minority 
populations, while vaccination rates lagged in those very same 
communities. This was the case across the country.
    There is clear evidence of the stark contrast between those 
with resources faring better during emergencies versus 
communities, families, individuals without sufficient 
resources.
    As we think about ensuring our biodefense response and how 
we can build on the lessons learned during the COVID pandemic, 
I think it is critical that we are intentional about addressing 
equity and the unique needs of minority and other vulnerable 
populations. For example, some residents do not have access to 
reliable high-speed internet or communities whose primary or 
preferred language is not English. Linguistic barriers have 
long been recognized as a contributing factor to health 
disparities.
    Mr. Currie, how can the government better plan to address 
these racial and other disparities in biothreat response and 
what recommendations would you have for the Committee on how we 
not repeat the COVID experience and do better in the future?
    Mr. Currie. Thank you, Senator. I think the first step is 
recognizing the issue, recognizing the problem, and I think the 
Administration has put out Executive Orders last year on 
focusing Federal programs better on racial equity and other 
equity issues. That is one step.
    I think part of the problem we saw at the beginning of 
COVID--and we see this in other disasters too, or disaster 
assistance programs--is that there is really not a lot of data, 
and was not a lot of data on how these programs impact certain 
populations, certain parts of the country, rural versus urban, 
and that created a lot of questions about how effective they 
were, and makes it really difficult for the Federal Government 
to target resources as well. I think that is a first step we 
have to take to get better at this.
    Senator Padilla. Thank you very much. I look forward to 
following up with you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Padilla. I need to step 
away to briefly attend an Armed Services Committee. Ranking 
Member Portman will take the gavel and has some additional 
questions.
    Senator Portman [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 
have a number of questions, looking for some quick answers, 
just to help us to be able to figure out a better way to move 
forward in terms of the fragmentation that is currently out 
there that we have heard about today, and in terms of 
responding to biothreats, and also trying to figure out what is 
working, what is not working in the current system.
    But let me start with regard to a question about academia, 
and maybe Dr. Parker, you are the best person to answer this, 
because that is where you reside now. Does DHS and do other 
entities, including CDC, that have biosecurity programs 
effectively leverage U.S. research universities? Is there a 
good relationship with academia?
    Dr. Parker. I think early in the life of DHS there was 
creation of the university centers of excellence, and that has 
been, I think, a very good and effective program to engage 
academia. Now the threats have evolved and the priorities have 
evolved over time, and what I have observed is biosecurity has 
been kind of downgraded in importance for those university 
centers of excellence. In the early days there were two, three 
centers that were focused on agricultural biosecurity and food 
security. Those have been emeritus statused today.
    Senator Portman. It sounds like that could be revamped, as 
it was perhaps after the anthrax attacks and other incidents.
    Dr. Parker. Correct.
    Senator Portman. Because I think that is one thing that is 
missing in the current system is having a more formalized way 
to access some of our great advantages as a country, which is 
our research universities. We talked earlier about how some 
countries are ahead of us now in terms of surveillance, but we 
certainly have a huge advantage in terms of using U.S. research 
capability. That is one thing we want to work on with you.
    Dr. Currie, you may be the best person to answer this. 
There is another group we have not talked about today, at least 
in any detail, and that is the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center. Is it needed? Is it helpful? Does it add 
something beyond what CDC already does? NBIC is part of CWMD so 
it is part of DHS, and then you also have CDC with, it seems to 
me, a similar responsibility. Talk to us about NBIC.
    Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. We have reported on it several times 
over the last decade, and what we have found, pretty 
consistently, is that they have struggled to meet their mandate 
of providing broad biosurveillance. Part of that is that they 
do not really have the access to the data they need, both the 
data at other Federal agencies or down at the local level to 
produce the kind of real-time information you would need to 
make decisions.
    The other thing we heard from its partners, particularly at 
the Federal level and State level, is that since they used a 
lot of publicly available information--and they do a pretty 
good job of synthesizing that information--it is not really new 
or that novel to the people that need to make decisions in this 
arena.
    It is not that what they produce has no value, but another 
concern I have is that--I mentioned this before--there are four 
different surveillance efforts across the four big 
departments--Homeland Security, Defense, USDA, and HHS--all 
separate, all stovepiped, do not work together. Some have been 
successful for their individual purposes, some have not. I 
think that shows you the lack of coordination across this whole 
enterprise. It is very difficult to make the decision of which 
one should go and which should stay because there is no one at 
a top level that can make that decision.
    Senator Portman. I think this has been brought up by all 
three of you, in one way or another, that there is too much 
fragmentation, not enough accountability, and to have four 
different departments or agencies effectively trying to achieve 
the same mission and perhaps not sharing information, from what 
you said, between themselves, that is an opportunity for us in 
terms of reorganization.
    The problem that I see--and I do not want to get into 
anything that is classified--but is that we have surveillance 
capability in certain areas, certain urban centers, and this 
information is publicly available. I am not going to name the 
number of cities, even though it is publicly available, because 
I just like to stay away from that sort of stuff. But it is not 
comprehensive, and everybody knows that.
    Second, when you look at the biological threats we face 
today it is not comprehensive, and that goes to the technology 
issue, and that is one reason I asked earlier about what other 
countries are doing and whether we can learn and whether 
academia is fully engaged, because it seems to me we have an 
opportunity here to have better technology.
    Could you address that in the appropriate way, Dr. George? 
We do not want to give our adversaries information that they 
should not have, but we have also got to figure out how to fix 
the system so it is more effective.
    Ms. George. Senator, I think you are absolutely right. What 
we want is a comprehensive system, and that system, or 
comprehensive coverage of the entire country. What that would 
require is drawing information and data from a variety of 
different sources. So it is OK that we do not have BioWatch in 
every single jurisdiction throughout the country, but we have 
it in the number that we do have it, and that information 
should be coming into a place and combined with the information 
we are getting from NBIC, the information we are getting from 
the CDC, and so forth.
    That was the original vision for the National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center. As Chris said earlier, the 
Department does not have the access it needs to that 
information. But I think the other side of that coin, as far as 
this body is concerned, is that Congress did not mandate that 
all the other departments and agencies provide that information 
in the first place. It is just going along the way it is.
    Yes, sir.
    Senator Portman [continuing]. For a second. There are 
obviously two great opportunities here. One would be to require 
that all the information is consolidated in one place, and NBIC 
probably is the place to do it. Second, I think this was 
discussed earlier with Dr. Parker in terms of the academic 
contribution here--we have the capability to collect and assess 
data we have never had before, and did not have, frankly, after 
anthrax and other biological threats led us to try to come up 
with a national system.
    We have the capability to do this in ways we have never had 
before, and massive amounts of data being analyzed quickly and 
being able to produce something that is meaningful that can 
then be disseminated to the appropriate agencies and 
departments. Is that accurate?
    Ms. George. Senator, I think we have the capability as a 
Nation. We do not have that data analysis capability at the 
Department of Homeland Security, and certainly not in the 
National Biosurveillance Integration Center. You would have to 
decide to make that kind of investment in that part of DHS or 
somewhere else in the government, if you choose.
    But we can get there. It is going to require some more 
money and upgrading that capability.
    Senator Portman. Great. My time has expired. I am going to 
turn it to the new Chair of this Committee, Senator Hassan.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN

    Senator Hassan [Presiding.] Thank you very much. I want to 
thank you, Senator Portman, and Senator Peters for holding this 
hearing, and I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony 
and for providing your expertise and perspective on this really 
important issue.
    Because I have been in and out a little bit I may be a 
little bit repetitive, and apologies in advance if I am. But I 
want to start with a question to you, Dr. George. To detect 
biological threats the Department of Homeland Security has 
mainly focused on directly detecting airborne biological agents 
with the BioWatch program. However, BioWatch is only able to 
detect biological agents from a limited known library of 
threats, which leaves a critical blind spot in our detection 
system, especially since naturally occurring disease outbreaks 
and accidental releases are likely to consist of previously 
unknown biological agents.
    The Department is attempting to replace BioWatch with a new 
program but the readiness, as I understand it, of that 
technology is still really years away. Dr. George, can you 
speak to what a successful biodetection program looks like and 
how current Federal programs fall short?
    Ms. George. Yes, Senator. A successful biodetection program 
has a number of different kinds of detectors within it and 
spread all throughout the United States, at least for our 
Nation. It is fine to have the BioWatch detectors if you can 
get the equipment to the point where it is actually detecting 
what it is supposed to.
    But you are absolutely right. We are facing so many other 
threats than just the handful of threats that BioWatch was 
supposed to pick up on. You also need other pieces of 
equipment. For example, you could have particle detectors that 
are not looking for specific agents but are looking to see how 
many particles are in a particular room or an area, and can 
note that, hey, suddenly we are seeing a whole bunch of 
something or a whole bunch of virus in this one place--and send 
the alert to somebody else to go take a look.
    There are handheld detectors. There are all kinds of 
detectors. There are detectors you can put inside, detectors 
you can put outside. I think we need a vast panoply of those, 
spread out all over the place, and gather all that information 
together.
    Because if you look at how we detect disease anyway, 
whether we have a detector or not, we are always drawing on an 
number of pieces of information. Hey, there is something going 
on over in China. Oh look, somebody is at a hospital now. This 
seems to be unexplained. Medicare has some things to say. CVS 
is suddenly reporting that everybody is running in to get 
certain medications from them, and so forth. That is how you 
put together such a system.
    Senator Hassan. Really collecting a cross-section of data, 
each of which is signaling----
    Ms. George. Right.
    Senator Hassan [continuing]. A particular proof point, and 
doing it in a broad range of areas.
    Ms. George. Yes.
    Senator Hassan. Yes. OK. This is a question to Mr. Currie 
and Dr. Parker. One way that we can detect biological threats 
is screening patients at hospitals and other health care 
facilities. There was just a discussion, as I came in, with 
Senator Portman on this issue of what kind of data do we have.
    But as I understand, much of this data would be collected 
by non-Federal entities, so Federal agencies would need to 
closely coordinate with them. Unfortunately, as the Government 
Accountability Office reports, the current National Biodefense 
Strategy does not assess non-Federal biodefense capabilities 
nor does it establish a mechanism for better coordination with 
non-Federal entities.
    Mr. Currie and Dr. Parker, how can the Federal Government 
ensure that its non-Federal partners have the capabilities to 
detect and collect information on potential biological threats, 
and how can Congress act to better coordinate Federal and non-
Federal efforts? I will start with Mr. Currie and then we will 
go to Dr. Parker.
    Mr. Currie. Thank you, Senator Hassan. I could not think of 
a better example of a lesson learned from COVID-19 than better 
coordination with non-Federal entities. I mean, we saw this 
with not just issues related to the Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS) but how supplies are distributed throughout the 
country, that being different in every State. It just perfectly 
encapsulated the challenge there.
    Dr. Parker said earlier and made a great point that we have 
these lessons learned that we have seen in COVID. We have 
developed these monitoring systems, these tracking systems, 
these coordination mechanisms. These need to be formalized. We 
need to execute and implement these formally, post-COVID, for 
the future. I think that may require, because this issue 
crosses committees of jurisdiction, it crosses Federal 
departments, that would likely require legislation and other 
actions to do that formally.
    Senator Hassan. Dr. Parker.
    Dr. Parker. Sure, and I will just echo that and add on a 
couple of examples. I know in HHS, I observed firsthand, during 
COVID response, the establishment of the supply chain control 
tower, that was able to link SNS with all the private sector 
and get visibility of the supply chains, and be able to focus 
and actually anticipate where supplies were going to be short. 
Then that evolved into the health care control tower, that 
similarly could really anticipate whether there were going to 
be shortages in a hospital system somewhere in the United 
States, and shifts could be made in coordination with the 
Federal Government and the private sector so they could be 
working in unison.
    We have to figure out how we can tap those lessons observed 
and turn them into lessons learned. It may not be something 
that is practiced on a day-to-day basis, but when there is a 
crisis we have to be able to turn those data informatic pipes 
on so that we can have that coordination between the 
appropriate Federal and State and local authorities and the 
private sector partners.
    Senator Hassan. Yes. No, I mean, we are a system of 
federalism and we need to be able to apply that when we are 
talking about data sharing as well.
    To Mr. Currie, the Strategic National Stockpile should be a 
critical tool for responding to biosecurity incidents by 
quickly providing medical supplies to aid in the response. What 
are the most significant challenges when it comes to managing 
the Strategic National Stockpile?
    Mr. Currie. Since COVID, and really well before COVID, we 
have had a number of concerns about the Strategic National 
Stockpile. Before COVID, we were actually concerned about the 
way it was funded sporadically and what that might mean in 
terms of its readiness to handle an event like this. As you 
know, in the past it was used to handle more localized events, 
like H1N1 or Zika or things where you needed to target a 
specific area of the country or specific smaller population. Of 
course, in COVID we needed it nationwide and it was not ready.
    I think one of the biggest challenges that we have 
identified is the lack of understanding at all levels of 
government, including across the Federal partnership, about how 
this stockpile is distributed and procured. Procurement is an 
important piece of this because you cannot keep enough things 
on stock or in a warehouse to deploy throughout the whole 
country, so you have to be able to procure up and acquire those 
things when you need them, and we just were not ready to do 
that.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you. Given these challenges I am 
committed to working with my colleagues on this Committee and 
on the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee 
to pass provisions that we have in a bipartisan bill, which is 
called the Strengthening America's Strategic National Stockpile 
Act. It already passed the House. We will continue to work to 
see if we can get it through on the Senate side, because I 
think this is an opportunity for us really to make progress and 
buildup the kind of stockpile that would help. I hope there is 
not another crisis like the one we are going through right now, 
but we need to be prepared for it, to be sure.
    With that I am well over my time and I can recognize 
Senator Sinema, who should be joining us remotely.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SINEMA

    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you to 
our witnesses for joining us today.
    The testimony that we have heard today is worrisome. The 
threat of a biological event in the United States must be taken 
seriously, and we need to work together deliberately and in a 
bipartisan manner to ensure the safety of our communities. We 
must work to make sure communities in my State of Arizona and 
those all across the Nation are protected from both accidental 
and intentional events.
    My first question is for Mr. Currie. Your testimony focuses 
on what has happened since Congress first addressed the 
biosecurity risk in 2016, but since then it seems DHS has had 
the largest role. While DHS and USDA have expertise in 
biosecurity they are smaller departments with fewer resources 
than the Department of Defense. So considering the resources of 
the DOD, should we look at ways in which the DOD could take on 
a larger role, and if so, what could that entail?
    Mr. Currie. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. It is a 
great point. I mean, DOD has decades and decades of experience 
in biosecurity that they have had to do to prepare for a war 
and to protect warfighters. I agree, there are a tremendous 
number of lessons learned, research, and efforts at the 
Department of Defense that can be learned by the domestic 
agencies like Department of Homeland Security and USDA.
    I will say this, though. While the technology, I think, 
would be helpful and the coordination would be great, applying 
some of these technologies into Homeland is actually, one of 
the biggest challenges, because while basic research is part of 
this solution, when you apply these technologies to train 
stations and subway stations and crowded places in this country 
it is very different in terms of the way it needs to work. For 
example, you cannot have false alarms. That does not work, if 
you have to evacuate a subway station.
    It is a very technically complicated issue here in the 
Homeland, but I agree with you, the Department of Defense has a 
big role to play.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. With various agencies focused on 
separate pieces of our biosecurity initiatives and considering 
the broad coordination required for quick response to an 
emergency, do you believe that our Federal workforce is 
prepared to prevent or respond to an attack, and if not, where 
are the skills gaps and are there specific steps that Congress 
should take to ensure that we are hiring and retaining the 
correct staff?
    Again for you, Mr. Currie.
    Mr. Currie. Thank you. I think we are much better off today 
than we were in early 2020 or late 2019. I think, most 
departments, agencies, and the workforce in it are accustomed 
to this being part of their mission, even some departments that 
did not think they were going to have a role in a public health 
emergency in the past.
    We are much better off, but I agree. We need to continue 
focusing on preparing for this effort and putting people in 
place across the government that are going to focus on this.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Next I will turn to Dr. Parker. 
Your work shows how important it is for Congress to communicate 
and work together. You also note that COVID fatigue creates 
additional risk because it is virtually certain that our nation 
will see additional biosecurity challenges in the future.
    Taking into account what we have learned from the COVID-19 
pandemic and the reaction of Americans to the continued threat 
of the virus, what steps can we take in partnership with State 
and local governments to close existing biosecurity gaps that 
require immediate attention?
    Dr. Parker. Thank you for the question. I think the first 
and foremost thing that we really need to do is address some of 
the Federal interagency seams and figure out how to better 
manage the seams between the different Federal departments and 
agencies, and that is going to require strong, centralized 
leadership, probably in the National Security Council (NSC) or 
perhaps co-chaired by the National Security Council and Office 
of Science and Technology (OSTP) policy. We have to have a 
clear strategic vision and goals, we have to have buy-in then 
from our State and local leaders, emergency management, public 
health, and we have to get buy-in also from industry partners 
as well and university partners and NGO's.
    It starts with a good strategic plan and getting buy-in, 
leadership at the highest levels of our government that this is 
important, it takes support from Congress, this is going to be 
important, and there are going to be authorizations and 
appropriations. Then we have to have buy-in all the way through 
to say there has to be a lot of dialog. Good leaders engage 
with their partners and stakeholders, and it is a two-way 
conversation. All that is going to be essential to make sure 
that we have a national preparedness plan, not just a Federal 
plan. Thank you.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. My next question is both for Dr. 
Parker and Dr. George. You both addressed the lack of 
leadership and focus at DHS regarding biosecurity. Much of your 
analysis describes structural issues and difficulty working 
across many agencies, workgroups, and related barriers.
    Do you believe the country would be safer if we created one 
independent agency solely focused on this biosecurity or should 
this be addressed by providing DHS leadership with more 
authority and accountability, or another option?
    Dr. Parker. Who do you want to go first? Dr. George.
    Ms. George. Thank you, Senator Sinema. I think that 
creating an independent agency would be a mistake. Every 
Cabinet department, eight independent agencies, and one 
institution have responsibilities for biodefense. I think 
across the board, including the Department of Homeland 
Security, all of those responsibilities should be addressed by 
Congress, that there should be additional legislation, if 
needed, and that all those entities need to be coordinated. I 
do not think we have to pull all of that out into one 
independent agency, but perhaps we need an entity that will be 
able to coordinate across the entire government.
    We recommended that the Vice President of the United States 
be put in charge of all biodefense with the Deputy National 
Security Advisor supporting that effort. I still believe that 
that is the way to go. The commission believes that is the way 
to go, because you have so many departments and agencies 
involved. I think if you create another agency you would have 
to give them some massive authorities to be able to tell 
anybody else what to do, even to get information from them, and 
I do not think that would work very well.
    Dr. Parker. I agree with Dr. George. I think another way to 
think about it is the true strength and the potential of our 
national preparedness enterprise as we have diversity, and 
diversity by the various departments and agencies that have 
their own strengths, they have their authorities and their 
appropriations for kind of the lane that they work in, and they 
have their expertise that we need to bring to the fight for 
biosecurity preparedness and response.
    Really the challenge is how do we marshal all that strength 
and expertise across the Federal interagency. That really is 
what we need to do. Then marshal that strength in working very 
closely with our State and local partners, particularly 
emergency management and public health and in our private 
sector and university partners too.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Madam Chair, I know that my time 
has expired. I have one quick question for Dr. George. You 
specifically mentioned the need for cleaning up current 
statutory directives. I would like to submit a question for the 
record requesting that you give us and submit some specific 
recommendations for changes, so that we can make necessary 
updates. Is that something that you could provide for us, Dr. 
George?
    Ms. George. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you, and Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Chairman Peters [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Sinema.
    Senator Sinema. Oh, Mr. Chairman. I apologize.
    Chairman Peters. No worries. We have been playing a little 
bit of musical chairs up here. It is good to be back before the 
Committee here.
    Certainly I have heard some testimony today from all of our 
witnesses that the DHS's biosurveillance and detection programs 
have certainly struggle to define their mission and to carry 
out those missions. A major part of the DHS counter-
bioterrorism budget goes toward the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center and BioWatch, so my question to you, Dr. 
Parker, you have been a part of biodefense enterprises for 
decades, both in and out of government. You mentioned in your 
testimony that it is time to transition BioWatch once there are 
better technological solutions.
    Where do you think the country is in developing these 
technologies? If you could share that with the Committee I 
would appreciate it. What programs, capabilities, or 
technologies would you suggest that DHS should focus on to make 
sure that we are indeed prepared?
    Dr. Parker. Dr. George has already, I think, made some very 
good comments about kind of the status of BioWatch and what we 
need to be doing with it. My comment about, it is time to 
transition BioWatch to something new, we need to really re-
envision what biosurveillance is and what then DHS's role is in 
a national biosurveillance strategy.
    At the end of the day I do believe that we are going to 
need environmental detectors, aerosol detectors, like BioWatch, 
with improved technology. We do not need them everywhere but we 
need them for some threats. There is a reason why in the past I 
have testified, when I was still in government service, that 
the top three threats, I believe, are anthrax, anthrax, and 
anthrax, from a bioterrorism perspective. We better have some 
aerosol-collector devices that can detect that we may have been 
attacked by something like that.
    But we need to have a comprehensive biosurveillance 
strategy and implementation plan that brings together the best 
of the CDC and the USDA, Department of Interior for some of the 
wildlife surveillance as well. The original vision of NBIC was 
also to make sure that we could integrate intelligence 
information into this health and animal health information. 
That is going to be a critical part that we do this as well.
    Back to BioWatch, we are going to have to invest in some 
science and technology, research and development, to come up 
with the right tools, the better tools that we need for 
BioWatch. Maybe I might disagree with Dr. George a little bit. 
I would not want to be the Federal official who says, ``Let's 
turn it off,'' and then three months later we experience an 
aerosol release of an anthrax.
    We have to look at those tradeoffs and determine what are 
the highest priority threats and where are the highest priority 
locations that we may want to deploy, buy the current 
generation of technology that we have with the BioWatch 
detectors, and then really focus on the research and 
development that we can bring along, confirmative technologies.
    But we ought to look at, I guess, new approaches. COVID-19 
taught us a lot about wastewater surveillance. I think that is 
a ripe area for Homeland Security to look at what are some 
strategies we can do for these novel surveillance approaches, 
and wastewater surveillance is one such example. The Department 
has reach, through its different components, that there are 
opportunities for some novel, kind of really immediate 
surveillance activities that could be explored if we open up 
our mind to a new way of thinking about how to do it.
    But we have to fix our Federal interagency problems too, to 
enable that, because it is going to require interagency 
coordination for DHS to do that effectively. Thank you.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. Mr. Currie, my next question is 
for you. The GAO report reviewing the National Biodefense 
Strategy found that there are no clear, detailed processes, 
roles, and responsibilities for joint decisionmaking, including 
how agencies will identify opportunities to leverage resources 
or who will make and enforce those decisions. The GAO, as you 
know, made four priority recommendations to the DHS. All of 
them, unfortunately, remain open.
    Mr. Currie, if you could spend a little time telling this 
Committee the ways that you believe the Federal Government 
failed in implementing the National Biodefense Strategy from 
2018.
    Mr. Currie. Thank you, sir. I think the good news is that 
we got a strategy and steering committee was developed to try 
to have that kind of coordination. I think what we have not 
seen yet is the execution on some of the tough decisionmaking 
and coordination across departments. Dr. George talked about 
this when they recommended that the Vice President be 
responsible for this function.
    I think one key here is that there has to be an entity or a 
way to look across the biodefense enterprise and make resource 
and programmatic decisions, and that just has not happened. The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) would have to play a big 
role in that, looking across to look at budgets, look at 
resources. But it is very difficult to prioritize programs, for 
example, to say, let's invest in BioWatch and not HHS's public 
infrastructure or health surveillance infrastructure, because 
they cannot tell each other what to do.
    That issue still has not been sorted out, and because the 
strategy was just implemented before COVID, we have not had a 
chance to really see some of those things play out in the 
budgeting process and see if they are making those kinds of 
decisions.
    I think we still need to get there. I am not certain that 
the structure we have under the strategy is not able to get 
there eventually, but if not then we need to do something else.
    Chairman Peters. Very good. One area of particular concern 
to me is within DHS the CWMD's workforce morale is extremely 
low. In 2019, morale within CWMD was ranked the lowest among 
all sub-agencies in the Federal Government, and it only 
slightly improved in 2020. Improvement is good. There was only 
slightly an improvement. The office certainly has faced some 
leadership and attrition problems in recent years.
    My question for you, Dr. Parker. You are someone who has 
worked in numerous Federal departments addressing CWMD threats. 
What would be your top recommendation to this Committee as to 
how we might improve morale within this office?
    Dr. Parker. Yes. Moral, certainly whenever you learn and 
hear about morale issues in any organization it is always 
something that is concerning. I was encouraged to hear that 
there are some improvements, and so perhaps it is on the right 
track. But any time that there are issues in an organization it 
is always important to try to understand what are the root 
causes. Perhaps maybe all the organizational changes that have 
happened over the last several years, change is always hard on 
people. Sometimes is not surprising when you have morale issues 
when there is organizational change, but that requires 
leadership really working very closely with people to make sure 
that they are part of the change, they are part of the change 
agents, as an organization evolves from its current state to 
its next state.
    But finding the root cause is very important, and making 
sure that the workforce feels like they have a voice, that 
everybody is being treated with respect and dignity is always 
very important in organizational morale, in organizational and 
mission effectiveness.
    Chairman Peters. Very good. I would certainly like to thank 
our witnesses for joining us here today. This is an incredibly 
important discussion, and it certainly does not end today. We 
will have a lot more to discuss in the months and year ahead. 
Our nation continues to respond to COVID-19 pandemic, and it is 
certainly clear that we need to do a much better job to prepare 
for future biological incidents.
    All of your testimony will help inform the Committee in our 
legislative activities such as reorganizing and reauthorizing, 
perhaps, the CWMD Office and guide our oversight actions in 
that process.
    I also want to thank Ranking Member Portman for holding 
this hearing with me, and I look forward to working together to 
address these threats and to improve the homeland security for 
our Nation.
    I would also like to note that unfortunately Dr. Alex 
Garza, who is the former Chief Medical Officer and Assistant 
Secretary for Health Affairs at the Department of Homeland 
Security was invited but he was unable to testify today because 
of some personal circumstances. However, he was able to submit 
his written testimony,\1\ which we appreciate, and so I ask 
unanimous consent (UC) that that testimony be placed into the 
official of the hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Garza appears in the Appendix on 
page 456.
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    The record for this hearing will remain open for 15 days, 
until 5 p.m. on March 4, 2022, for the submission of statements 
and questions for the record.
    This hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

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