[Senate Hearing 117-496]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






                            


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-496
 
   THE PATH FORWARD ON U.S-SYRIA POLICY: STRATEGY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS



                             SECOND SESSION



                               __________

                              JUNE 8, 2022

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       
       
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
                               ______
 
              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 49-629PDF          WASHINGTON : 2023
 
 

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS     
                 

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

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                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     4

Leaf, Hon. Barbara, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC..............     6
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle 
  East, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC...............     9
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

The Gravedigger, Witness to Mass Graves in Syria.................    33
    Prepared Statement...........................................    36

Sterio, Dr. Milena, the Charles R. Emrick Jr.-Calfee Halter and 
  Griswold Professor of Law and LL.M. Programs Director, 
  Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, Ohio.............    38
    Prepared Statement...........................................    40

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    50

Responses of Ms. Dana Stroul to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    55

Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    57

Statement of Dr. Muhammad Bakr Ghbeis, President, Citizens for a 
  Secure and Safe America Educational Committee, Inc.............    66

Article From The Guardian Dated April 26, 2022 Titled, ``Massacre 
  in Tadamon: How Two Academics Hunted Down a Syrian War 
  Criminal''.....................................................    67

                                 (iii)

  


   THE PATH FORWARD ON U.S.-SYRIA POLICY: STRATEGY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, 
Romney, Portman, Young, Cruz, and Rounds.
    Also Present: Mouaz Moustafa, Interpreter.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Assistant Secretary Leaf, we are glad to get to welcome you 
in your new role. We are glad you finally made it and, most 
importantly, we are happy that you are here. Thank you for 
coming before us today.
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Stroul, thank you for 
coming back to the committee. As I am sure many know, the 
assistant secretary was our Middle East expert for a while so 
we are glad to see her back.
    I have been asking a simple, but important, question for 
some time that I hope this hearing will answer. What is the 
Administration's strategy on Syria?
    During the last presidential election, Secretary Blinken 
wrote, ``When Joe Biden is President, we will restore U.S. 
leadership on humanitarian issues.''
    Yet, with the frozen conflict in Syria leading to immense 
humanitarian, political, and security dilemmas, leadership from 
the United States or elsewhere seems lacking.
    Flights to Syria are resuming. Embassies in Damascus are 
reopening. When Bashar Al-Assad landed in the United Arab 
Emirates in March, he was given a warm welcome as any other 
head of state would have received, as if he had never ordered a 
barbaric bombardment of innocent Syrian civilians, as if Assad 
never ordered chemical weapon attacks that left children 
gasping for their lives on ventilators.
    This comes within weeks of new evidence of Syrian 
atrocities coming to light--video of Assad's soldiers forcing 
victims to climb down into a mass grave before massacring them.
    Think of the message this sends to other dictators around 
the world who would butcher innocent civilians. You can commit 
war crimes in broad daylight on camera, and the global 
community will just shrug its shoulders.
    This is not lost on Iran. After propping up Assad with 
billions of dollars, after supporting him with Hezbollah and 
the Revolutionary Guard Corps, such impunity only fuels Iran's 
regional aggression, whether through attacks on U.S. personnel 
and assets or threatening our allies and partners in Iraq and 
Jordan, not to mention fueling an active battleground on 
Israel's border.
    It is not lost on Putin. No one who has followed Putin's 
brutality in Syria for the past decade should be surprised that 
he is starving and shelling Ukrainians just as he starved and 
shelled Syrians.
    While I have seen the Administration's written strategy for 
Syria, as required in the NDAA, which was skeletal, from my 
perspective, I look forward to delving a bit more in detail 
into the tools and U.S. international political will to execute 
that strategy.
    I would like to hear whether you believe U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 2255 has lived up to the path we thought it 
once could because it seems the roads we need to be traveling 
on are crumbling.
    Earlier this year, in an attempt to free imprisoned 
extremists, ISIS launched a massive jailbreak in Hasakah. They 
attacked a Syrian prison with car bombs and gunmen in a battle 
that lasted more than a week.
    On top of that, the Assad regime and Hezbollah are 
manufacturing addictive amphetamine pills called Captagon, 
effectively turning Syria into a narco state, trafficking the 
drug throughout Europe and the Middle East to obtain hard 
currency despite sanctions.
    With the U.N. mandate for cross-border humanitarian aid 
expiring next month, there is a real question as to whether 
Russia will support an extension, particularly as the war in 
Ukraine has ushered in a food crisis that has hit Syria and a 
number of its neighbors.
    We need to continue to prioritize our response to this dire 
humanitarian situation. We must continue to support our 
partners in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and across Europe who have 
absorbed the Syrian refugee community that amounts to 6.8 
million people worldwide, added to this another 6.7 million who 
have been displaced within Syria, leaving an entire generation 
of Syrian children growing up with dim prospects of ever 
returning home or the possibility of a bright future.
    So to close, let me lay out what I see as priorities that 
the U.S. and the international community must continue to hold 
the Assad regime accountable for its crimes. We need a 
comprehensive strategy, one that enforces fully the robust set 
of U.S. sanctions as a means to build leverage that will 
sharpen Assad's choices and maintain his political isolation.
    This includes using such sanctions against Assad's 
benefactors in Moscow and Tehran. It also means sending the 
clear signal that we cannot tolerate a return to business as 
usual with Assad and his murderous regime.
    A strategy would lean in with aggressive U.S. diplomacy to 
continue to marshal the international community in support of 
this leverage and to reinvigorate the political process.
    To this end, I am glad that the NEA Bureau now has an 
appointed and confirmed leader in you, Assistant Secretary. 
However, there remain a number of nominees for vital positions 
in the Middle East that need to move forward, including, 
crucially for Syria, Tamara Wittes as USAID's Assistant 
Administrator for the Middle East.
    A U.S. strategy would continue to prioritize bringing its 
own resources and the resources of the international community 
to bear on Syria's humanitarian crisis while being judicious to 
focus our assistance in ways that does not benefit the regime.
    It would include how to help--continue to help--Syria's 
neighbors, especially Jordan and Lebanon, who have shown 
incredible hospitality to those fleeing Assad's brutality, but 
nevertheless are bearing a significant strain.
    To that end, we need a full court press at the United 
Nations to address a possible Russian veto of the mandate for 
the last remaining border crossing for desperately needed 
humanitarian assistance, coupled with a ready to implement 
strategy for pushing that assistance if and when Russia uses 
its veto.
    Putin cannot be allowed to hold desperate Syrians as ransom 
for demands of relief in the Ukrainian context. That strategy 
should include new consideration of Russia's role in Syria 
following its invasion of Ukraine and the steps needed to 
reduce Russian activities while denying Iran and Hezbollah the 
ability to fill any vacuum created by Russia's preoccupation 
with Ukraine.
    It should also address Turkey's role in Syria, taking into 
consideration its hosting of millions of refugees and its 
position as a launch point for humanitarian assistance, to its 
destructive campaigns against our Kurdish partners in the fight 
against ISIS, including renewed threats to invade northern 
Syria.
    It would further flesh out steps needed to counter the 
danger posed by Hezbollah and the Iranian weapons it traffics 
across Syria, and it should lay out concrete steps to be taken 
to secure the release of U.S. citizens Austin Tice and Majd 
Kamalmaz, who have been detained by the Assad regime since 2012 
and 2017, respectively.
    It must provide a path forward that allows unfettered 
humanitarian access and war crime investigations, and it must 
provide a long-term legal strategy for ensuring that the 
horrors that Bashar Al-Assad and his regime have inflicted on 
the Syrian people do not go unanswered, and it should describe 
how the U.S. can help rally the weight of international 
pressure on Assad to pursue the political path to unfreeze this 
conflict.
    On this, Congress has been clear. We overwhelmingly passed 
the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act, whose primary 
purpose is to sanction companies or individuals who facilitate 
Assad's brutality whether they are doing business with the 
Syrian Government or its security services, providing aircraft 
or spare parts, and I would like to see the Administration use 
all these tools.
    We cannot simply allow the regime to return to business as 
usual. We cannot turn our backs on the Syrian people and we 
cannot give up supporting them as so many desperately try to 
work towards a free and democratic Syria.
    America's values, its principles, and its reputation on the 
world stage hang in the balance.
    With that, let me turn to Senator Risch, the ranking 
member.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 
put my statement into context before I start and that is there 
is no daylight between the chairman and I on the Syrian issue.
    I think he has, as clearly as can be, laid it out, and I am 
going to talk about it a little bit more and then we will turn 
it over to you.
    Now more than ever, particularly in the face of Putin's 
brutality in Ukraine, it is absolutely crucial we confront 
Assad's ongoing crimes against the Syrian people.
    Over the past 12 years, the Assad regime, with the support 
of its Russian and Iranian backers, has carried out countless 
chemical weapons attacks on innocent civilians, intentionally 
targeted hospitals and schools, used starvation as a weapon of 
war, and forced the disappearance of thousands.
    The world had never seen atrocities on this scale since the 
Second World War and what we are uncovering now in Ukraine.
    These crimes are well documented. In addition to the Caesar 
file, the international community has amassed hundreds of 
thousands of government documents linking these crimes directly 
to Bashar Al-Assad.
    Stephen Rapp, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes, has argued we have more evidence against the Assad 
regime than we did against the Nazis in Nuremberg.
    In a previous hearing, we heard directly from the Caesar 
Act's namesake about the regime's continued atrocities. Today, 
we will hear from another brave Syrian who risked his life to 
bring these accounts of gross human rights violations to the 
international community.
    Accountability for Assad has been slow and mechanisms are 
few. Neither Syria nor the United States are members of the 
International Criminal Court and it remains a dangerously 
politicized body.
    However, nations have begun to pursue accountability under 
their own domestic courts. I was heartened to hear of the 
recent conviction of a senior Assad regime official in Germany 
who was involved in the torture of Syrian civilians on a mass 
scale.
    This is a start, but we need to do more. We must establish 
a more robust, formalized accountability mechanism.
    Turning to Syria policy, moving forward, the United States 
has long maintained a policy of economic and diplomatic 
isolation to force a political solution to the Syrian conflict.
    Unfortunately, that long-standing policy is beginning to 
crumble and I remain concerned this Administration has accepted 
Assad's rule as a foregone conclusion.
    Worse, I fear this Administration is tacitly approving 
outreach to the regime. Caesar sanctions enforcement has been 
lacking and the Administration's support for energy deals 
through Syria to Lebanon violates the Caesar Act.
    Further, I am deeply concerned with the Administration's 
funding of so-called early recovery projects in regime-held 
areas. These activities cross the line against Caesar-
prohibited reconstruction and open the door to normalization 
with Assad.
    The Administration's stated Syria policy consists of four 
lines of effort: counter the Islamic State, maintain the 
ceasefire in Syria, expand humanitarian access, and seek 
accountability for crimes.
    While all these are laudable, it is my concern that the 
Administration's efforts have expanded beyond humanitarian 
access and into the realm of reconstruction while we have seen 
little movement on seeking accountability to the Assad regime.
    It is virtually--it is vitally important that the U.S. hold 
the line against rehabilitating the regime. Current and future 
autocrats are watching our actions. We cannot send the message 
that we will forget these atrocities over time and welcome 
Assad back to the international community. We cannot.
    In that right, I am gravely concerned by the number of our 
Arab partners who have increased formal and informal 
relationships with the regime in recent years, including 
through the establishment of official diplomatic outposts in 
pursuit of economic relationships. The UAE's outreach has been 
particularly problematic.
    The law on normalization and reconstruction is clear. Any 
engagement with the Assad regime, whether diplomatic or 
economic, must be met with a firm response using the tools laid 
out in the Caesar Act.
    We must ensure our policy does not entrench the Assad 
regime, energize its progress under the U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 2254, and is commensurate with American values.
    In that light, I asked unanimous consent that a recent 
video documenting regime war crimes in Tadamon, Syria, be added 
to the record. While exceptionally difficult to watch, it is 
vitally important that we put these crimes out in the light of 
day.
    So to the witnesses, again, thank you for being here. The 
chairman and I have talked now about the situation, about the 
problems. Unfortunately, we get a lot of witnesses who come 
here and just reiterate what we have said.
    We have outlined the problems. We have given you the tools 
with the Caesar Act. We want to hear how you are going to use 
them to do what you have said is the policy of the United 
States.
    Thank you again for being here.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch, and your video will 
be included in the record, without objection.

[Editor's note.--The video referred to above can be found at 
the following link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/
16sdYjaxGSF2Mjx
SPaS2TDgzBRky_sxdK/view. The video will also be retained in the 
permanent record of the committee.]

    The Chairman. We will start our witness testimony. We will 
start off with Secretary Leaf and then Assistant Secretary 
Stroul.
    Your full statements will be included in the record without 
objection. We would ask you to summarize them in about 5 
minutes or so, so we can enter into a conversation with you.
    With that, Secretary Leaf, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEAF, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
   STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Leaf. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, for the past year the 
Administration has led our allies and partners in crafting a 
common diplomatic approach to Syria and pursuing concrete 
actions to improve the lives of Syrians and protect vital U.S. 
national security interests.
    Let me be frank with you. After more than a decade of 
conflict, prospects remain limited for advancing a political 
solution worthy of Syrians who bravely demanded change more 
than 10 years ago.
    Syrians today are also hungrier and more impoverished than 
they have been at any point in the conflict with over 12 
million food insecure. The ultimate responsibility for this 
continued tragedy rests with Bashar Al-Assad, backed by Russia 
and Iran, who has brought his country to the brink of ruin and 
remains intransigent.
    The Administration has led international coordination on 
Syria in the face of this intransigence. We focused on 
bettering conditions for Syrians, pursuing justice for those 
wronged by the regime, mitigating the risks to Syria's 
neighbors of this terrible conflict.
    We have the following priorities: defeating ISIS and Al-
Qaeda, increasing access to humanitarian aid, keeping violence 
down by maintaining ceasefires, promoting accountability for 
the Assad regime's atrocities.
    These are all critical steps on the path to advancing a 
just political settlement under 2254. We continue to strongly 
support U.N. Special Envoy Pedersen's efforts and, in fact, I 
look forward to speaking with him this week.
    Of course, we remain absolutely committed to working 
relentlessly to bring home fellow American citizens wrongfully 
detained or held hostage in Syria to include Austin Tice.
    In terms of reducing suffering on the ground, humanitarian 
needs are higher than ever, compounded by the pandemic, 
historic levels of drought, decades of mismanagement and 
corruption and, of course, the terrible effects on global food 
security of Putin's war on Ukraine.
    Expanding humanitarian access throughout Syria is central 
to our strategy.
    Last year, we successfully negotiated a new resolution--
renewal of a resolution for 2585 to keep the sole border 
crossing open in northwestern Syria and we are deeply committed 
to doing the same this year.
    We have also been committed from day one to the enduring 
defeat of ISIS, preserving our military presence in the 
northeast, coalescing international support to increase 
stabilization funding.
    We press countries of origin to repatriate their nationals 
from northeast Syria, including foreign terrorist fighters, and 
in areas liberated from ISIS, stabilization assistance and new 
economic opportunities will help address growing economic 
insecurity and keep ISIS at bay.
    On existing ceasefires, I would note we are deeply 
concerned by recent increased rhetoric from Turkey about 
potential military moves into the north of Syria and we have 
stepped up our diplomatic engagements to attempt to stop that.
    I would note that in the past 2 years, violence in Syria is 
at its lowest ebb compared to other decades--other periods in 
the decades, but we are working assiduously to keep it so.
    The Administration is committed to promoting accountability 
and justice, and enduring peace and stability in Syria will not 
be possible without justice for the Syrian people, and I am 
mindful that your next panel will include testimony from the 
brave Syrian whistleblower known as the Gravedigger, whom I had 
the honor to meet and whose harrowing account of atrocities in 
Syria shook me to the core.
    We will continue to promote accountability for Assad and 
his atrocities. Our sanctions, including those under the Caesar 
Act, are critical elements in that regard. We are grateful to 
Congress for adding to the bipartisan effort to broaden our 
toolkit and will continue to use all of our tools, including 
Caesar, again, to press the regime.
    All of our efforts also support wider security and regional 
stability to offset the deleterious effects that Assad's 
criminal war has had on Syria's neighbors. Iranian forces in 
Syria, including the IRGC, Hezbollah, Iran-backed armed groups 
threaten the security directly of our allies and partners, most 
certainly Israel and Jordan, and they play a destabilizing role 
in Syria.
    In that regard, the U.S. wholly supports Israel's ability 
to exercise its inherent right of self-defense.
    Finally, while I have outlined the necessary building 
blocks for regional stability and prerequisites to building a 
road to a political resolution in Syria, I want to be clear on 
what we have not done in Syria and what we will not do, which 
is support efforts to normalize or rehabilitate Bashar Al-Assad 
in any way, lift sanctions on the regime, or change our 
position opposing reconstruction in Syria until there is 
authentic, enduring progress towards a political solution.
    Bashar Al-Assad and the coterie around him remain the 
single largest impediment to that goal. They must and will be 
held accountable.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Leaf follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Ms. Barbara Leaf

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the Committee, for the past year this Administration has led our allies 
and partners in crafting a common diplomatic approach to Syria and 
pursuing concrete actions to improve the lives of Syrians and protect 
vital U.S. national security interests.
    Let me be frank with you. After more than a decade of conflict, 
prospects remain limited for advancing a political solution worthy of 
the Syrians who bravely demanded change more than 10 years ago. Syrians 
today are also hungrier and more impoverished than they have been at 
any point in this conflict, with over 12 million food insecure.
    The ultimate responsibility for this continued tragedy rests with 
Bashar al-Assad, backed by Russia and Iran, who brought his country to 
this terrible state and remains intransigent, refusing to provide 
Syrians any hope for a better future.
    This Administration has led international coordination on Syria in 
the face of this intransigence. We have focused on bettering conditions 
for Syrians, pursuing justice for those wronged by the regime, and 
mitigating the risk to Syria's neighbors of the effects of this 
disastrous conflict.
    We believe that pursuing the following priorities: defeating ISIS 
and al Qa'ida; increasing access to humanitarian aid; keeping violence 
down by maintaining ceasefires; and promoting accountability for the 
Assad regime's atrocities are critical steps on the path to advancing a 
just political settlement to the Syrian conflict consistent with UN 
Security Council Resolution 2254. We continue to strongly support UN 
Special Envoy Pedersen's efforts to reach a political resolution to the 
crisis.
    And of course, we remain absolutely committed to working 
relentlessly to bring home U.S. citizens wrongfully detained or held 
hostage in Syria, to include Austin Tice.
    In terms of reducing suffering on the ground inside Syria--
humanitarian needs are higher than ever, compounded by the COVID 19 
pandemic, historic levels of drought, decades of mismanagement and 
corruption by Assad and his cronies, and the terrible effects on global 
food security of Putin's war on Ukraine.
    Expanding humanitarian access throughout Syria is central to our 
strategy. Last year, we successfully negotiated with members of the 
UNSC, including Russia, to adopt UN Security Council Resolution 2585 
and keep the Bab al-Hawa border crossing open, allowing the continued 
delivery of life-saving aid to over three million people in NW Syria. 
We are now working closely with Security Council members, UN 
leadership, and allies to maintain and expand the cross-border mandate 
before UNSCR 2585 expires this July.
    This Administration has also been committed from day one to the 
enduring defeat of ISIS--preserving our military presence in the 
northeast and coalescing international support to increase 
stabilization funding. We have pressed countries of origin to 
repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria, including foreign 
terrorist fighters. In areas liberated from ISIS, stabilization 
assistance and new economic opportunities will help address growing 
economic insecurity; restore essential services; bolster livelihood 
opportunities; and support critical initiatives against malign 
influence, be it Iran or its proxies
    On existing ceasefires--I would note that we are deeply concerned 
by recent increased rhetoric from Turkey about potential escalation in 
Northern Syria and we have stepped up our diplomatic engagements to try 
and continue to de-escalate any tensions. At the same time, I would 
note that in the past 2 years, violence in Syria is at its lowest ebb 
compared to other periods in this decade-long conflict and we have 
worked to keep it low by pressing armed actors to avoid escalation and 
keeping ceasefire lines calm, speaking out forcefully against any 
threat of renewed violence.
    The Administration is also committed to promoting accountability 
and justice. An enduring peace and stability in Syria will not be 
possible without justice for the Syrian people. I am mindful your next 
panel will include testimony from the brave Syrian whistleblower known 
as the ``Gravedigger,'' whom I had the honor to host at the White House 
and whose harrowing account of atrocities in Syria shook me to the 
core. We will continue to promote accountability for the Assad regime's 
atrocities and to support the brave individuals working to bring Assad 
and his regime to justice.
    Our sanctions, including those under the Caesar Act, are critical 
elements in the fight for accountability. We are grateful to Congress 
for the bipartisan efforts to broaden our toolkit. We will continue to 
use all our tools, including the Caesar Act, to press the Assad regime. 
In July and December of 2021, we imposed sanctions on groups and 
individuals who undertook human rights abuses in Syria, including in 
prisons and detention centers, as well as through chemical weapons 
attacks.
    All of our efforts also support wider security and regional 
stability, to offset the deleterious effects Assad's war has had on 
Syria's neighbors. Iranian forces in Syria, including the IRGC, as well 
as Hizballah and Iran-backed armed groups, threaten the security of our 
allies and partners, including Israel and Jordan, and play a 
destabilizing role in Syria. The United States wholly supports Israel's 
ability to exercise its inherent right of self-defense. We know that 
until Iran's military and intel networks, its weapons inside Syria, are 
reduced, the crisis in Syria will continue unabated. Similarly, we 
recognize and are deeply grateful to Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan for 
hosting millions of Syrian refugees; we remain committed to working 
with them to mitigate the spillover effects of Syria's war.
    Finally, while I have outlined the necessary building blocks for 
regional stability and prerequisites to building a road to a political 
resolution in Syria--I want to be clear on what we have not done in 
Syria, and what we will not do, which is: support efforts to normalize 
or have not done in Syria, and what we will not do, which is: support 
efforts to normalize or have not done in Syria, and what we will not 
do, which is: support efforts to normalize or rehabilitate Bashar al-
Assad; lift sanctions on the regime; or change our position opposing 
reconstruction in Syria until there is authentic, enduring progress 
towards a political solution.
    Bashar al-Assad and the coterie around him remain the single 
largest impediment to that goal. They must be held accountable for the 
actions they have undertaken that violate international law, even as we 
work to find ways to advance our other priorities.
    I would be happy to take your questions at this time and discuss 
any of these points in more depth.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Stroul.

STATEMENT OF DANA STROUL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Stroul. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to 
testify before you today, particularly because U.S. policy for 
Syria is an issue set I spent significant time working on with 
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle as a professional 
staff member for this committee.
    It is also a pleasure to join Assistant Secretary Leaf in 
her first testimony before you leading the State Department's 
NEA Bureau.
    Senators, DoD's role in Syria is limited by geography and 
mission. The department supports the lines of effort identified 
and outlined by Assistant Secretary Leaf, but our activities on 
the ground are solely focused on the enduring defeat of ISIS.
    To achieve this objective, DoD, as part of the Global 
Coalition to Defeat ISIS, works by, with, and through vetted 
capable partner forces in northeast Syria and in the vicinity 
of the al-Tanf Garrison in southern Syria.
    DoD also remains capable of rapidly deploying forces to 
conduct operations in other areas of Syria, exemplified by the 
February 22 raid that resulted in the death of former ISIS 
leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi.
    ISIS remains a real and potent threat. The group continues 
to conduct attacks and maintains the intent to direct, support, 
and inspire attacks across the globe and against the homeland.
    In northeast Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, 
remain our most capable partner in the D-ISIS fight. The 
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund--CTEF--is an essential tool 
for enabling the SDF and other vetted partners to achieve the 
enduring defeat of ISIS.
    Tremendous thanks to Congress for your continuing support 
in authorizing and appropriating CTEF funds. We direct CTEF 
toward basic life support, stipends, detention facility 
construction, training, and sustainment.
    Military tools alone cannot achieve ISIS' enduring defeat. 
The international community must do more to prevent ISIS from 
reconstituting by, number one, increasing support for 
stabilization in areas liberated from ISIS and, number two, 
prioritizing reducing the ISIS fighter population and displaced 
persons camps currently managed by the SDF across Syria.
    This includes more than 10,000 ISIS fighters and 
approximately 60,000 displaced persons. The department is 
placing urgent emphasis on enabling the SDF to provide for the 
humane and secure detention of these populations and working 
with the SDF to grow and professionalize the guard force 
responsible for securing these facilities.
    The January 2022 ISIS attack in Hasakah is a reminder that 
ISIS is still a serious threat and sees these detention 
facilities as an area from which to reconstitute its forces.
    Countries of origin must repatriate, rehabilitate, 
reintegrate, and, where appropriate, prosecute their nationals 
residing in northeast Syria. DoD supports State Department 
efforts by providing logistical support to countries willing to 
bring their nationals home.
    Furthermore, we support efforts to work with the Government 
of Iraq to accelerate the pace of its repatriation efforts.
    Beyond DoD's focus on the D-ISIS mission, I do want to 
touch briefly on the threats that pose a risk to forces or a 
risk to mission in Syria.
    Number one, Iran. Iran enables its aligned militias in Iraq 
and Syria to execute indirect fire and unmanned aerial system--
UAS--attacks against U.S. and coalition forces. The department 
will not hesitate to take necessary and proportionate action in 
self-defense to protect our service members.
    Number two, Russia. Syria remains the one area in the world 
where U.S. and Russian forces operate in close proximity on a 
daily basis. The coalition maintains deconfliction channels 
with the Russian military to protect coalition forces and 
reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation or miscalculation.
    Number three, Turkish military operations in northern 
Syria. We are working to maintain focus on the D-ISIS mission, 
ensure the safety of the civilian operation in northeast Syria, 
and, above all, the protection of U.S. and coalition forces.
    Large-scale incursions will undermine and jeopardize these 
core missions and priorities. We have communicated our concerns 
to Turkey across the U.S. Government.
    It should go without saying here that Iran and Russia's 
military interventions and ongoing activities inside Syria in 
service of the Assad regime have enabled brutal violence and 
human rights abuses against the Syrian people.
    DoD supports the State Department's whole-of-government 
strategy to end this violence by focusing on concrete actions 
to improve the lives of Syrians and address the underlying 
causes of this conflict.
    Thank you, Senators. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Ms. Dana Stroul

    Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of 
the Committee. It is an honor to testify before you today, alongside 
Assistant Secretary Leaf, to discuss the Department of Defense (DoD) 
mission in Syria and how DoD's activities align with the United States' 
whole-of-government Syria policy.
    In Syria, the Department is committed to maintaining its military 
presence to achieve the enduring defeat of ISIS. DoD works by, with, 
and through vetted, capable partner forces in northeast Syria and in 
the vicinity of al-Tanf Garrison in southern Syria to fulfill this 
mission. DoD also remains capable of rapidly deploying forces to 
conduct operations in other areas of Syria, exemplified by the February 
2022 raid that resulted in the death of former ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim 
al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. In both Syria and Iraq, the United States 
operates as part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which brings 
together 80 nations and five international organizations to provide an 
array of military capabilities, funding, and political support.
    Even as much of global attention has moved on from ISIS since the 
defeat of its so-called caliphate, ISIS remains a real and potent 
threat. The group operates primarily in small rural-based cells focused 
on conducting ambush attacks against security forces and plotting 
periodic high profile attacks in urban areas. ISIS also tries to 
infiltrate population centers by exploiting sectarian and other 
demographic tensions, including by targeting community and tribal 
leaders for assassination. ISIS maintains the intent to direct, 
support, and inspire attacks across the globe and continues efforts to 
rebuild its organization and re-establish a viable insurgency to regain 
territorial and social control.
    In northeast Syria, the Coalition partners with the Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF), who have proven a capable and dependable 
partner to maintain pressure on ISIS. The SDF continues to demonstrate 
increased capabilities to plan and conduct unilateral Defeat (D)-ISIS 
operations, including disrupting smuggling networks and conducting 
capture/kill raids on improvised explosive device (IED) facilitation 
and assassination cells, clearance operations, wide-area security 
operations, and route clearance activities. Coalition presence and 
support remains critical to enabling SDF operations. In particular, the 
SDF relies on Coalition air support, including intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and benefits from Coalition 
advice and support to maintain pressure on ISIS.
    DoD is authorized to provide assistance to vetted partners in Syria 
under Section 1209 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2015, as amended, and through the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip 
Fund (CTEF) appropriation. CTEF remains an essential tool for enabling 
the SDF and other vetted partners to achieve the enduring defeat of 
ISIS. Current CTEF support to vetted Syrian partner forces include 
basic life support services, stipends, detention facility construction 
support, guard and security force training, and sustainment.
    Despite the Coalition's progress in maintaining pressure on ISIS, 
military tools alone cannot achieve the group's enduring defeat. DoD's 
counterterrorism activities are a critical pillar nested within a State 
Department-led whole-of-government and Coalition strategy to ensure the 
enduring defeat of ISIS. The international community must do more to 
stabilize areas liberated from ISIS, by addressing the economic and 
social conditions that facilitated ISIS's rise. Moreover, long-term 
solutions are urgently needed for the over 10,000 ISIS fighters in SDF 
custody and the approximately 60,000 displaced persons in al-Hol and 
al-Roj camps. Through its military presence, DoD supports civilian-led 
humanitarian and stabilization efforts to address these underlying 
causes of instability.
    The Department is placing urgent emphasis on enabling the SDF to 
provide for the humane and secure detention of fighters in SDF custody. 
Seeking to reconstitute its ranks, ISIS executed a complex attack in 
Hasakah in January 2022 on the largest SDF-managed facility for 
detained ISIS fighters in northeast Syria. The SDF was able to foil 
ISIS's efforts due to its swift response to the attack, which resulted 
in numerous SDF casualties. Congressional support on this issue is 
critical--particularly the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act 
waiver for select funding caps that otherwise limit the amount DoD can 
spend on D-ISIS related construction projects in Iraq and Syria. The 
goal is to ensure that the SDF can securely and humanely maintain 
custody of ISIS detainees, instead of relying on re-purposed school 
houses and other buildings in which a majority of detainees are 
currently held. DoD is also working with the SDF to grow and 
professionalize the guard force responsible for securing these 
facilities. These new facilities will also help enable critical U.S. 
stabilization priorities, to ensure detainee access to medical care, 
and provide youth detainees with distinct programming and facilities to 
address their safety and rehabilitation.
    Regarding al-Hol, the Department continues to work with the SDF to 
disrupt ISIS activity and networks that threaten the camp's residents 
as well as the broader population of northeast Syria. This support 
includes efforts to reinforce the camp's physical security 
architecture, increase the number of security forces operating in the 
camp, and ensure those forces are appropriately trained to provide 
security. These improvements will also enable greater access and 
services for camp residents, ameliorating the acute humanitarian 
crisis. As part of this effort, DoD is working closely with interagency 
partners, including the State Department, to facilitate coordination 
with camp administration and nongovernmental organizations.
    The most durable solution to the challenges at these detention 
centers and displaced persons camps is for countries of origin to 
repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and where appropriate, prosecute 
their nationals residing in northeast Syria. To this end, DoD supports 
State Department efforts by providing logistical support to countries 
seeking to bring their nationals home. Furthermore, recognizing that 
Iraqis comprise a majority of the population at al-Hol, DoD continues 
to support State Department efforts to work with the Government of Iraq 
to accelerate the pace of its repatriation efforts.
    Syria is one of the most crowded and contested military operating 
environments in the world. Numerous potential spoilers could slow or 
jeopardize progress on the D-ISIS campaign in Syria, including attacks 
from Iran-aligned militia groups, escalation with Russian forces, and 
the potential for a new Turkish offensive in northern Syria.
    First, Iran enables its aligned militias in Iraq and Syria to 
conduct indirect fire and unmanned aerial system (UAS) attacks against 
U.S. and Coalition forces. Attacks against DoD personnel are 
unacceptable and the Department will not hesitate to take necessary and 
proportionate action in self-defense to protect our service members. 
Iranian forces and their partners and proxies play a destabilizing role 
in Syria and also threaten the security of our allies and partners, 
including Israel. The United States recognizes Israel's inherent right 
to take actions necessary for self-defense. Until the presence of the 
Iranian military and its weapons is reduced, regional instability will 
persist.
    Second, Syria remains the one area in the world where U.S. and 
Russian forces operate in close proximity on a daily basis. The 
Coalition maintains air and ground de-confliction channels with the 
Russian military to protect Coalition forces and reduce the risk of 
inadvertent escalation or miscalculation. The United States continues 
to urge Russia to adhere to mutual de-confliction processes and not to 
take any provocative action. Movements and interactions that are not 
properly de-conflicted are a concern, but the professionalism of U.S. 
service members in Syria has been essential to preventing these 
interactions from escalating. Russia's military campaign in service of 
the Assad regime has enabled brutal violence and human rights abuses 
against the Syrian people, including the deaths of innocent civilians, 
the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, and the 
destruction of large parts of the country.
    Finally, Turkish senior leader comments regarding renewed 
operations in northern Syria risk a negative impact to the D-ISIS 
mission. The United States expects Turkey to uphold the October 17, 
2019, Joint Statement, in which Turkey committed to halt offensive 
operations in northeast Syria. Any escalation risks disrupting D-ISIS 
operations, impacting the safety of the civilian population, and 
jeopardizing the security of SDF-managed detention facilities holding 
ISIS fighters. The United States recognizes Turkey's legitimate 
security concerns--and regularly communicates to all sides the need to 
deescalate tensions. However, any new offensive could further undermine 
regional stability and put at risk U.S. forces and the Coalition's 
campaign against ISIS.

    The Chairman. I thank you both.
    We will start a series of questions.
    Let me ask you both, without the benefit of further 
details, the strategy that it was provided by the 
Administration seems largely to be a continuation of what is 
already being done in Syria.
    Can you provide further details on the strategy that can 
shed light on whether and how it represents a course correction 
from earlier attempts to address the crisis?
    Simply put, what about this is different from what has been 
already done, and if there are no significant changes, what 
makes you think it will work now after 11 years of conflict?
    Ms. Leaf. Chairman, thank you for that question.
    I am not sure I would call it a course correction as such, 
but rather the Administration undertook a thorough-going 
evaluation of the situation in Syria as it is presented today 
and defined core U.S. national security interests, as I 
outlined, and elaborated a set of ways to pursue them.
    This is a part of a larger multilateral effort in the set 
of discussions that we are having with partners in the region, 
partners in Europe. Obviously, Russia's war on Ukraine has 
substantially taken attention towards that conflict and away 
from Syria.
    I would just emphasize to you that I plan to make Syria a 
priority within the bureau, within the Department of State, to 
marshal a whole-of-government approach to enhance, sharpen--as 
you noted, as the ranking member noted, sharpen the pressure on 
Assad and work in very close collaboration with Geir Pedersen 
to define how we might best use the leverage that we have--the 
isolation, enhance the isolation, enhance the pressure on Assad 
to get substantial gains.
    I think, among other things, I would say, even if the 
political peace seems very much blocked right now, there are a 
whole series of things that lie within the regime's ability to 
change which would be the conditions that--such as 
accountability for the disappeared, ceasing conscription, 
setting conditions for the safe return of IDPs and refugees.
    So I view all of these pieces assembled as being the 
elements that we can pursue in close coordination with----
    The Chairman. Let me tell you what I hear from leaders in 
the region and basically their argument is, look, you all are 
not doing anything about Assad. He is still there. We need to 
deal with it in the absence of seeing any concrete measures.
    I mean, you saw that the UAE hosted Assad on the eleventh 
anniversary of the Syrian uprising, which is a rather callous 
moment to host him, if any moment would have been good.
    What further steps are the Administration taking to prevent 
countries like the UAE, but others from normalizing ties with 
the Assad regime?
    Ms. Leaf. Chairman, one thing that I have looked at very 
closely is sort of the difference between the rhetoric and the 
sort of--the misinformation, disinformation, much of it 
propagated by Damascus, by its backers--the Russians and the 
Iranians--to suggest that there is a sweeping wave towards 
Assad in the region.
    The fact of the matter opinion is quite divided with a 
number--a significant number of Arab states having no desire to 
travel down that road.
    What I hear from some of the partners of ours in the 
region, the theory of their case is, well, there is an Arab 
voice--Arab voices missing in Damascus for too long. The way to 
get at mitigating, diminishing, pushing out Iranian presence 
and Iranian activities in Syria is to reinsert that Arab voice.
    That is the theory of their case. I, frankly, am wholly 
skeptical. I think Assad takes from every direction and he 
gives nothing in return and what I have--what I intend to urge 
is that that engagement must produce results for the benefit of 
the Syrian people.
    The Chairman. Two final questions.
    We have the emergent cross-border issue that will expire. 
How do you see that playing out, and is a political solution 
under U.N. SCR 2254 still viable? It seems rather moribund to 
me, but--even though I think it is a desirable path--but there 
is no energy behind it.
    Ms. Leaf. To your first question, Chairman, 2585, last year 
Russia lofted the same threat of a veto and the 
Administration--across the Administration worked assiduously to 
bring like-minded countries together to corral the votes in the 
Council and we had a 15 to 0 passage of that resolution.
    We are doing a similar aggressive diplomatic strategy. If 
anything, there is even a greater sense of consensus around the 
urgency and the critical nature of a border access point--
cross-border access point and, if anything, we are going to 
look for further such points. We are very committed to that.
    As to 2254, look, I agree there is not a lot of room for 
optimism right now. I am an eternal optimist, but more to the 
point, I am relentlessly focused on making progress on this 
file.
    Whether it is in the first instance on the humanitarian 
conditions for the Syrian people, measures that lie within 
Assad's remit to grant, but I also intend to work aggressively 
on the political aspects.
    The Chairman. I hope you are right about the cross-border 
issue. That was pre-Ukraine, and that makes it far more 
difficult.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think 
the situation with the Russians is going to be a lot tougher 
now than it was last time we went through that.
    About 10--a little over 10 years ago, I was in this room 
sitting here and we had people sit in the chairs you are 
sitting in and they assured us that Assad could not last more 
than 30 days.
    That was over 10 years ago and, of course, he is still 
there, and during that 10 years he has committed offenses that 
it is hard to find anyone who has ever been on this planet 
before that has done worse. Certainly, there are some that have 
done the same, but he is right up there.
    When you see something like him being welcomed by another 
country as some type of a distinguished head of state, it is 
sickening, really, and particularly when that is being done by 
states that purport to be friends of ours and share our values.
    There is nothing in welcoming this man as a conquering hero 
that reflects America's values at all. I hope you will continue 
in the strongest terms to communicate to those people how 
nauseating that is to us. The chairman and I have both done 
that and we would, certainly, welcome the Administration to 
join in that.
    What we are going through in Ukraine is somewhat like this 
now. We cannot have this thing end just as what has happened in 
Syria where, like you pointed, the hostilities have cranked 
down, but we cannot have this end and say, okay, it is over.
    No, it is not over. This will never be over until the 
people are held to account for what they have done and we are a 
long, long ways away from that. I think the one case I referred 
to in Germany is merely scratching the surface.
    This is something that has got to go on for a long time. I 
would appreciate hearing from each of you, your efforts, as the 
chairman and I have done, to push back on allies of ours from 
doing what they appear to be doing and saying, well, it is 
over. No, it is not.
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, I could not agree with you more. I spent 
3 years in post-conflict Bosnia about 8 years after the guns 
had fallen silent.
    It was a devastated country, and years later it is still 
socially, economically, the walking wounded, and there was a 
deep acute feeling among the public that accountability was 
missing and that they were forced to live cheek by jowl with 
people who had only a few years earlier killed--massacred--
their loved ones.
    I know how the failure for accountability haunts a society 
and that is why I am deeply committed to this piece of it 
because a society without the means to gain accountability, to 
understand where their loved ones went, who was responsible, 
and how they will be held accountable is a society that simply 
cannot heal.
    I am completely dedicated to that proposition.
    As to your comments 10 years ago, I will admit at the time 
I was working on Iraq. I was a deputy assistant secretary for 
Iraq. I was deeply concerned about the spillover effects of 
Syria's roiling conflict, that it would act as a bellows on 
Iraq and, indeed, it did.
    I was never confident that Assad would fall, not because I 
had a crystal ball, but I think it is in the nature of such 
regimes that they cling. They are the last man to go down and 
they do not crack easily.
    All of that said, I will--my own conversations with our 
partners in the region, be they very close or not so close, 
will be informed by these values. I was shocked to see Bashar 
Al-Assad welcomed as any head of state by the UAE.
    We have made that clear to the Emiratis that it is really 
just enormous propaganda value and nothing more. I will 
continue those efforts as a key piece of my engagements.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that. I am almost out of time.
    Ms. Stroul, you made reference--passing reference in your 
opening statements to the prisoner situation in northeast 
Syria. Both the chairman and I have had heads of state and 
others from the region underscore what a really serious problem 
this is and that it is a powder keg.
    What can you tell us, A, about the situation you see 
there--what you see there today and what your efforts are to do 
something about it?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    First of all, as I noted in my opening statement, the only 
long-term viable solution both for the future stabilization and 
stability of this area and for the enduring defeat of ISIS is 
the reduction of this population and the repatriation of these 
ISIS fighters to their countries of origin.
    Some will need to go back beyond Iraq and Syria. We, led by 
the State Department, are continually engaging through 
diplomacy and offering support to those countries.
    Number two, tremendous efforts both through the United 
Nations, through the U.S. Government, and through our partners 
in the coalition to support the Iraqi Government. The majority 
of these fighters are Iraqi in origin. Then, of course, a long-
term solution for the reintegration of Syrian fighters into 
their communities, which will be difficult without a broader 
political process in Syria.
    That is a long-term proposition and will require intense 
and painstaking diplomacy supported by humanitarian and 
stabilization aid, which we will continue to do.
    In the short term, we are focused on ensuring that 
facilities are secure and humane for the housing of these 
fighters and that the SDF, who are bearing the burden for the 
international community of securely and humanely housing these 
detainees, have the support that they require.
    Number one, we are working with the authorities Congress 
gave us to construct purpose-built facilities for the secure 
and humane detention of ISIS fighters and ensuring that SDF 
guards at these detention areas have the proper training to 
address the needs of this population and securely continue to 
detain them.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. My time is up.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin is with us virtually.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank 
both of our witnesses.
    Secretary Leaf, I want to follow up on the accountability 
issue because it is extremely concerning to know the wealth 
that Assad has been able to accumulate through corruption and 
the way that he has led Syria and the misuse of power, and to 
see him welcomed--and you said that you made it clear to the 
UAE.
    There are other countries in the region that have done 
similar types of accommodations for the Assad regime, which is 
contrary to our policies, that have good ties, strong strategic 
partnerships, with the United States.
    Can you sort of drill down a little bit more with us as to 
the game plan on isolating the Assad regime, particularly in 
the region, and how we are engaging our traditional strategic 
partners in the region to make it clear that the welcoming of 
Assad is not welcomed here in the United States?
    Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
    Over the course of the past year, I would say, you have had 
a couple of really high-profile events such as Bashar Al-Assad 
being hosted in the UAE. There have been phone calls and other 
interactions between some regional governments and the regime.
    We have not highlighted every time we have had those 
discussions, but I can assure you that they are ongoing with 
each and every government in the region, and I would just add 
last year there was quite a bit of RUMINT and more than RUMINT 
that there was consideration of unfreezing, essentially, 
reinstating Syria's membership in the Arab League.
    That is a sovereign decision for the League and its 
members, but suffice to say we had a number of conversations 
and, in the end, there was no appetite for that and that is why 
I said earlier there is the effort ongoing by the regime to 
convey--to paint a picture that it is being reembraced by the 
region.
    It is not the case, but we are making sure that it is not 
the case. As I said earlier, I plan to use a variety of tools 
to that end to sharpen his isolation and it will be part of the 
roadmap with every one of our chiefs of mission and charges.
    I hope, eventually, that all of our missions will be led by 
confirmed ambassadors, but they will have as part of their 
playbook that conversation with their host government to ensure 
that we muster the greatest, deepest sense of leverage on Assad 
against all the elements of 2254.
    Senator Cardin. Let me talk a little bit about what the 
Assad regime has done in trying to reach out to the Syrians who 
disagree with him and that are in other countries, the use of 
Interpol. Of course, the Congress has acted on the TRAP Act.
    What strategies do we have in order to make it clear that 
we will not allow the international organizations such as 
Interpol to be able to be manipulated by the Assad regime? What 
reforms are we working on and how much success have we had?
    Ms. Leaf. Senator that is something I will need to get more 
deeply briefed on, but suffice to say I recognize that this is 
a key piece of our approach.
    We do not want the abuse of Interpol to, essentially, go 
after dissidents or even just everyday Syrians living abroad--
expatriates--pressured by the regime. I will make that part of 
the playbook.
    Senator Cardin. I appreciate that.
    Lastly, let me just underscore we have a lot of tools at 
our disposal, including enhanced sanctions and other ways that 
we can express our concerns about the continued conduct of the 
Assad regime.
    I would suggest that the timing on some of these issues 
could very well be impacted by the--what is happening in the 
region as far as Assad being welcomed in other countries.
    It is an issue that I think we have to be very sensitive as 
to how we handle the timing of our activities to make it clear 
that we do not accept Assad being welcomed as a normal partner 
in the region.
    Ms. Leaf. That is point well taken, Senator. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Leaf. That is a point well taken.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Portman is with us virtually.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate it. 
Secretary Leaf, thanks for your testimony today.
    For what it is worth, my sense is that other countries in 
the region are looking to us to figure out what is our plan 
long-term for Assad, and until we have a clearer picture and 
can give them a better sense of what we intend to have happen, 
I think it is difficult for us to get them to help us in terms 
of isolating him and certainly not developing a normal 
relationship with him.
    So our U.S. policy on Assad, does he deserve any official 
role in the post-civil war Syria--those are questions, I think, 
have to be answered.
    That is not my question today because you have talked about 
that issue, unless you are interested in answering that.
    I want to focus instead on two issues. One is food and 
using food as a weapon. We have seen President Putin do this in 
Ukraine. He is doing it as we talk. We have also seen Assad and 
his supporters in Russia do that.
    The Russian diplomats at the United Nations Security 
Council have consistently abused their veto power, as you know, 
to gradually close down these aid corridors going into Syria 
and aid groups from around the world who have been trying to 
feed some of the, literally, starving people in Syria, are 
frustrated by it. Russia is making their work much harder.
    I guess they believe that by taking away this ability for 
NGOs to help on the food front, that it forces people to rely 
on Assad and somehow that his legitimacy would be enhanced by 
that. One, I would like to know whether you think that is true.
    My question to you is there is a resolution coming up next 
month to hopefully reauthorize the one remaining border 
crossing for aid that is still being used, so the one corridor 
left.
    Will Russia veto that resolution and what are you doing and 
what is Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield doing to engage 
other countries to ensure that this resolution passes and that 
these food corridors--this one last food corridor can continue?
    Your comments on all that would be appreciated.
    Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Senator.
    To your question of food as a weapon and is this--is the 
theory of the case that by making people--Syrians--more food 
insecure, it makes them more dependent Assad, I mean, I think, 
frankly, the answer is a bit simpler. It is just cruelty for 
cruelty's sake. It is brutality. It is punitive. It is because 
they can do it.
    All of that said--and that it was the sorry record of over 
a decade of the conflict.
    As to your question about 2585, we are already well 
underway in terms of a very methodical and aggressive effort to 
have that expanded--to have Bab al-Hawa renewed as a cross-
border checkpoint--as a cross-border access point into 
northwestern Syria and we will look for further access points.
    It is more critical this year than even last year when it 
was quite urgent that that be maintained. Food insecurity is 
all the greater because of Putin's brutal war on Ukraine and 
what it has done to lock up Ukrainian wheat stores and other 
commodities in the ports--Odessa and other ports.
    So it is more critical than ever, and the humanitarian 
community is fixated on it. The donor community is fixated on 
it and, frankly, I think there is a very wide consensus already 
that that cross-border point must be renewed.
    Senator Portman. You have anticipated my second question, 
which was about Ukraine and whether, indeed, that the Black Sea 
blockage that the Russians are insisting on--the blockades, 
particularly, of Odessa--are having an impact on Syria as they 
are having an impact on global food insecurity, and you said it 
does have an impact and, in fact, that those grains from 
Ukraine, including the wheat that is part of these humanitarian 
aid packages is necessary to export because it is keeping 
people alive. I thank you for that.
    On the SDF issue, this is a constant frustration with 
Turkey. As you know, the Turks believe that somehow the SDF is 
a significant threat to them and, once again, my understanding 
is they have threatened to go on the offensive against some of 
our allies and the SDF and the SDF has even signaled in some 
cases, as I understand it, they might be willing to partner 
with the illegitimate Assad regime out of desperation to be 
able to repel these attacks.
    One, do you agree with that assessment and, two, have you 
engaged with your Turkish counterparts to urge them not to 
attack our allies in Syria and, if so, what has been their 
response?
    Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Senator.
    The Turkish Government is very well aware of our views. We 
have had a series of high-level engagements with them. I have 
not yet--I am about a week or so into my job. I am looking for 
an early opportunity to engage the government on this.
    Any venture, any military operation, across the border into 
northern Syria, first and foremost, puts the civilian 
population in the crosshairs and, secondly, severely puts at 
risk a critical mission that the global D-ISIS coalition--the 
U.S.--is undertaking and, obviously, it puts into the 
crosshairs around partners in that mission. We are completely 
unstinting in our efforts with the Turkish Government to back 
them off on this ill-considered venture.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just to do a follow-up on that question, is Turkey going to 
back off on this venture? I mean, we are expressing our 
concern, but so far they have not seemed very amenable to 
respond to our concerns, not only on this issue, but in other 
areas.
    Ms. Leaf. To be quite candid, Senator, I could not give you 
the assurance that they are going to.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Stroul, last August you were 
before this committee and you gave a very thorough whole-of-
government approach toward addressing ISIS fighters, just as 
you did this morning with Senator Risch when he raised concerns 
about the ISIS detainees.
    Unfortunately, the situation has gotten worse since that 
time, not better, and we have passed legislation to create an 
ISIS detainee coordinator who, right now, as I understand, is 
dual-hatted to look at counterterrorism as well as ISIS 
detainees. I think that is probably not the best way to get 
something done in that area.
    Can you talk about what we need to do to actually have a 
functioning detainee coordinator who can do the kinds of things 
that you have laid out so eloquently with Senator Risch that 
need to be done to address this problem?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    On the specific question of identifying one coordinator, I 
am going to defer to Assistant Secretary Leaf on how that--how 
she intends to address that now that she is in her position.
    Senator Shaheen. Great.
    Ms. Stroul. I will just say from a DoD perspective, within 
the authorities and resources we have, number one, is what we 
can do in the near to medium term, which is support the SDF and 
ensuring that these facilities where ISIS fighters are housed--
detainees--are more secure and more humane.
    Then at the al-Hol and al-Raj displaced persons camps, 
again, it is not a military mission. Those are humanitarian 
camps, but what we can do is support the SDF by giving them the 
tools and the training for addressing the security and 
humanitarian needs of that unique population set as well.
    Third, of course, is engaging constantly with the SDF about 
ensuring that humanitarian NGO and U.N. access to these 
populations----
    Senator Shaheen. I do not want to cut you off.
    Ms. Stroul. No problem.
    Senator Shaheen. Let me ask Assistant Secretary Leaf then 
to respond, please.
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, I have had several discussions about al-
Hol in particular with the CENTCOM commander, General Kurilla, 
and he and I are going to work together on the set of issues 
around al-Hol.
    I hope to make an early trip to Iraq, for one, and engage 
with the government since so many of the women and children in 
that camp and also, of course, the fighters in Hasakah are of 
Iraqi origin.
    I am going to also, obviously, work very closely with CT on 
this issue because it does really require beyond the D-ISIS 
coalition's efforts to secure the camp to ensure constant 
humanitarian support to the residents of the camp.
    Ultimately, we have got to get the camp down, and I have 
seen the numbers over the last couple of years go from 73,000, 
60,000. They are now, actually, I think, around 56,000. We have 
just got to be relentless on this effort and I do plan to work 
to that effect with CT.
    Senator Shaheen. So do you expect to have an ISIS detainee 
coordinator who will be functioning in that capacity?
    Ms. Leaf. Honestly, Senator, I do not know. I will take 
your question back and I will come back to you on that.
    Senator Shaheen. So even though we passed legislation that 
says that needs to happen, that has not happened yet?
    Ms. Leaf. It has not happened yet. As you said, the CT 
Bureau is double-hatted, but I will take your question back.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, Mr. Chairman, clearly, I think we 
need to pass legislation. If we are going to--if we are really 
going to see something done in this area and be serious about 
it, then we have to have somebody who is in charge of that.
    While I understand that CT is still a problem, when other 
Middle Eastern leaders are coming to members of this committee 
and saying, this is a problem that has to be addressed and we 
cannot do it by ourselves, then we need to figure out how to 
get this done, and so far, we are not making much progress.
    I want--I have one final question and that is Secretary 
Menendez talked about Captagon in his opening remarks, and we 
are seeing more and more that the availability of Captagon is 
not only helping to fund the Assad regime, but it is also 
creating an even more destabilizing synthetic drug trade.
    We are already dealing in the United States with fentanyl. 
I have seen that very directly in my home state of New 
Hampshire so I know the potential problems from the synthetic 
drug trade.
    So what can we do to help address that and are you 
confident that the Lebanese Armed Forces can help control that 
trade that is coming across the border with Lebanon?
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, I think the dimensions of the trade, the 
production and the trafficking, which, by the way, yes, as you 
said, this is something that is associated with members of the 
Assad family, the regime, ISIS, you name it, criminal and 
terrorist elements from Lebanon to Syria are involved in that.
    I do think it is an effort that goes well beyond the limits 
of one actor however much they may attempt to deal with it. We 
have had discussions with the Jordanians, Saudis, others, who 
are deeply concerned about the spreading--the toxic nature of 
this trade and what it is doing to their society.
    I will make it part of my mission to work this with all of 
these governments. We do, in fact, have a number of U.S. 
agencies who are already engaged with regional partners in 
information sharing, coordinating operations, and targeting of 
financial and trafficking networks and we just really need to 
enhance those efforts.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    It is an another reason why we need to ensure that the 
Lebanese Armed Forces continues to function.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a personal 
word, congratulations on your son's achievement yesterday. That 
was very, very--just exciting to see.
    I want to ask about refugees and I want to ask about Syrian 
refugees and asylum seekers in neighboring countries and the 
effect they are having in those countries. I do not want to ask 
about our policy here in the United States. Let me begin with 
neighboring countries.
    Sizable--6 million refugees and asylum seekers, sizable 
populations in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, elsewhere, certainly, 
some in refugee camps, many just kind of living as they can in 
the societies and, obviously, in small countries--Lebanon--the 
number of refugees compared to the population is sizable, very 
taxing on the school system and other services.
    In Jordan, a very water-poor country without many water 
resources, these refugee communities are significant challenges 
for them.
    So to talk about just work we are doing, even--we have 
challenging relationships with Turkey now, but Turkey is 
hosting huge numbers of refugees, both in camps and in society.
    What are we doing with the neighboring countries to help 
them deal with the refugee issue so they do not become real 
trouble spots in countries that have their own internal 
challenges to deal with?
    Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    You have touched on one of the most enduring, troubling, 
tragic dimensions of Assad's war on his own people, which is 
this essential displacement of half of the population either 
internally or externally, and as you said, this has been an 
enormous set of stressors on countries that are already 
stressed.
    Lebanon, you would think, would have broken by now. Jordan 
equally struggles at times, both in terms of the scarce water 
resources, but creation of jobs and so forth.
    Turkey has something on the order of 4 million people and 
it has become a hot topic domestically. We are using the 
generosity of the American taxpayer and, of course, of this 
Congress.
    We are using the funding streams that we have to offset in 
every way possible this burden, and one of the things, as I 
touched upon earlier, was my desire to work in this space that 
would help to set conditions in the first instance in Syria for 
IDPs to return, again, in a safe and secure unmolested manner 
to their villages.
    The U.N. assesses, and we agree, that conditions writ large 
are not there for the safe, voluntary--and I stress voluntary--
dignified return of refugees and, indeed, there is some 
question whether Assad--or maybe less a question than a 
conviction that Assad is happy to keep all of those refugees 
outside his borders.
    We work with each country in turn to assist with the nature 
of the pressures and the problems that hosting these refugees 
presents, and I will say we led--Ambassador Linda Thomas-
Greenfield led our May pledging conference and announced over, 
I think, $808 million in assistance, which will help towards 
that end.
    Senator Kaine. Let me switch to the United States. The 
previous Administration drove down the refugee admissions to 
quite a low level compared to our historic norms. President 
Biden indicated that we would raise the refugee cap back up to 
about 120,000.
    Last year--2021--we allowed 1,200 Syrian refugees into the 
United States, and just by order of magnitude that was 1,200 in 
a year when we brought 76,000 Afghans into the United States 
within a period of 90 days.
    We have made a pledge to 100,000 Ukrainians because of the 
turmoil there should be able to come to the United States. I 
support that on the Afghan side. I support that on the 
Ukrainian side.
    The Syria numbers are pretty low, and they have been in 
refugee status for some time. So it is not as if they are just 
brand new in terms of being vetted. Many of these have been 
vetted through U.N. refugee processes for some time now.
    What do you understand the Administration's plan to be with 
respect to additional Syrian refugees to the United States?
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, this is something that is under review. 
I do not have a firm answer for you today. I will come back to 
you with that.
    I am--will be having consultations with my colleague and 
friend, Julieta Noyse, who, of course, sits over this 
responsibility. I will get you an answer on that.
    I agree that the numbers are really quite low. The needs 
are enormous, and my concern is that we manage these set of 
stressors on the neighboring countries with a variety of tools, 
including welcoming Syrians to the United States.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I have no other members virtually 
or here, so I have one final question.
    Ms. Stroul, there have been conflicting accounts of the 
effect that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had on its posture 
in Syria and the overall security situation there. Russian 
airstrikes have continued, but perhaps at a reduced tempo.
    There are now reports that Russia is scaling back its 
presence on the ground in Syria, raising concerns that Iran may 
be filling the vacuum.
    Have you seen a notable change in Russia's Syria posture 
because of Ukraine and, if so, how and where has Iran taken 
advantage of that change?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman.
    No, we have not seen a notable change in Russian activities 
in Syria nor in its commitment to backing Assad in its brutal 
campaign that terrorizes Syrian people.
    I should note here, again, that Russian forces are still 
active in Syria. They operate in close proximity to U.S. forces 
in Syria. It is a testament to the professionalism of the U.S. 
forces that there has not been an inadvertent escalation or 
miscalculation.
    We are there, of course, for the enduring defeat of ISIS. 
Although we have seen Russian disinformation and misinformation 
about its work against ISIS in Syria, there is no indication 
that they are taking meaningful action against that mission 
set.
    The Chairman. Okay.
    This has been alluded to, but the January prison break in 
northeastern Syria as well as other complex attacks and the 
open extortion of civilians in Syria and Iraq are, at worse, a 
reminder that ISIS remains a threat in both countries even 
after the end of the physical caliphate.
    What gaps have these recent attacks exposed in the SDF's 
capacity to secure prisons and continue the hunt for ISIS 
cells, and what is the Administration doing to address these 
gaps and to boost SDF capacity?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question.
    The SDF are under tremendous pressure, both because they 
are operating in an area that has not stabilized or recovered 
since the depravities of ISIS holding territory. There are food 
insecurity--food security challenges in northeast Syria that 
are particularly acute, placing stress on both SDF, the SDF 
family members, and their communities, and, of course, having 
access to medicines, supplies, et cetera, are very complicated 
in this part of northeast Syria.
    What the U.S. military is doing with the coalition is using 
the authority and appropriations Congress has granted us 
through CTEF funding to continue to provide stipends, training, 
and equipment focused exclusively on defeating ISIS and 
supporting the humane and secure detention of those ISIS 
detainees and, again, just trying to support the SDF.
    I should note again here that the SDF will be under even 
more strain to maintain the focus we want it to maintain on 
ISIS should there be a large-scale Turkish invasion into 
northern Syria.
    The Chairman. All right.
    I understand that Senator Van Hollen has logged on under 
the wire here, so let us go to him, and then Senator Risch has 
a question.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
to both our witnesses.
    That is a good jumping off point for my question, really, 
following up on Senator Portman's question.
    Has the Administration made clear to Turkey in no uncertain 
terms that an attack on Kurdish groups in northern Syria is 
unacceptable to the United States? After all, as has been said, 
the SDF is critical to the fight against ISIS. So have we 
communicated that that is a clear no-go zone for the United 
States?
    Ms. Leaf. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Van Hollen. Ambassador Leaf, and then Ms. Stroul.
    Ms. Stroul. Let me just add to what Ambassador Leaf just 
confirmed, which is that we are focused on the enduring defeat 
of ISIS, on maintaining protections for the civilian population 
in northeast Syria and, of course, on the protection of U.S. 
forces and coalition forces.
    Large-scale incursions either by Turkish military or by 
Turkish-supported opposition in Syria would have a negative 
impact and jeopardize our commitment to the D-ISIS mission. We 
make that clear consistently.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    As you know, Turkey has indicated that they would like to 
purchase additional F-16s and upgrades for some of their 
existing F-16s. How would a Turkish military action in northern 
Syria impact the Administration's decision-making on that?
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, it is predecisional and I would not have 
anything that I could offer you today.
    Senator Van Hollen. I hope we are communicating very 
clearly to Turkey that that would be an unacceptable step. As 
we know, Turkey is currently threatening to hold up the 
admission of both Finland and Sweden to NATO because of those 
countries' support for Syrian Kurds. So it seems to me a moment 
where we have to communicate very clearly to Turkey what the 
red lines are here.
    Let me ask you about economic support in northern Syria, 
and I want to commend the Administration for the granting of 
general licenses.
    Ambassador Leaf, can you talk a little bit about how those 
additional economic support funds are being implemented on the 
ground?
    Ms. Leaf. In terms of General License 22, Senator, this 
came about through the very helpful suggestion by the chairman 
and Senator Rubio that we look to enhance the opportunities for 
economic regeneration in the areas liberated from ISIS and that 
is what this license is all about is assisting the communities, 
the people of those areas, to engage in commercial activity and 
so forth that will create resiliency and put at bay the 
prospects for ISIS returning to those areas.
    Senator Van Hollen. Are there any new initiatives that have 
been undertaken? Can you just talk a little more specifically 
about how some of those funds are being used?
    Ms. Leaf. I am sorry, Senator. I thought you were talking 
about the general license. You are talking about economic 
support?
    Senator Van Hollen. Actually, I was--I did mention both. 
You are right. In terms of the general license, how is that--
have you seen any positive impacts to date from that?
    Ms. Leaf. It is a relatively new development. I will dig 
into to that and come back to you with a more detailed 
assessment as to how that--what impact that is happening--
having, rather.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thanks.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    Northern Syria remains a challenging environment for economic 
activity. Issuing this General License was a first step towards 
improving economic conditions in non-regime areas of northern Syria; 
U.S. and third-country companies, Syrian diaspora groups, and local 
authorities in northern Syria have conveyed their interest in bringing 
investment to the region. We continue to have discussions with regional 
partners, local authorities, and private sector entities about ways to 
further encourage commercial activity in non-regime areas and address 
barriers to private sector investment in northwest and northeast Syria.

    My final question relates to the upcoming July vote in the 
U.N. Security Council about the humanitarian corridor, and I 
understand that Senator Risch asked about this and you 
indicated that we went through this last year and, of course, 
at the end we were able to maintain the corridor. Obviously, 
big things happened since last July and this July--the Russian 
invasion of Ukraine.
    What would be the impact if Russia was to veto it or 
prevent that action this year?
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, not to put too fine a point upon it, it 
would trigger a massive humanitarian crisis. There is no 
substitute for the Bab al-Hawa cross-border access point.
    As part of last year's discussions, the 2585 language 
included a commitment that cross-line assistance would also be 
prioritized and, indeed, there have been those efforts 
throughout the year.
    To give you a sense of the scale, something on the order of 
1 and a half million Syrians are serviced through Bab al-Hawa 
on an average month. There have been four cross-border 
conveyances of materiel and foodstuffs and other commodities to 
Syrians in the northwest over the course of the year. The last 
one, I think, was able to provide provisions for about 43,000 
Syrians. So the scale is entirely different.
    The U.S. is committed to getting humanitarian assistance 
through to the needy through all possible means, but there is 
no question that cross-border access is the single most 
important piece of that.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. We have colleagues that have now 
joined us.
    Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
    Ms. Stroul, as you know, Senator Kaine and I have been 
working to repeal the 1991 and 2002 authorizations for the use 
of military force, and my understanding is that Operation 
Inherent Resolve does not rely on either of these two 
justifications. Rather, it is authorized pursuant to the 2001 
AUMF.
    Is that accurate?
    Ms. Stroul. Yes, Senator. That is accurate.
    Senator Young. Okay.
    I just want to confirm my understanding. Would repeal of 
the 2002 and 1991 AUMFs negatively impact our mission or 
endanger our service members whatsoever in Syria under 
Operation Inherent Resolve?
    Ms. Stroul. The Administration's review is that repeal of 
the 2002 AUMF would be unlikely to constrain our reasonably 
foreseeable range of operations in Syria or Iraq, or to impact 
our ability to protect U.S. national security. There are no 
ongoing military activities that rely solely on the 2002 AUMF 
as a domestic legal basis.
    Senator Young. Right. The 1991 AUMF is so far into the past 
that it is really not even at issue in most people's minds. Is 
that accurate?
    Ms. Stroul. Yes, it is accurate.
    Senator Young. Okay.
    Does DoD have the authorities and resources necessary to 
counter Islamic State in the eastern Syria security area and to 
conduct related counterterrorism operations?
    Ms. Stroul. Yes, Senator. As a matter of domestic law we 
rely on the 2001 AUMF to authorize the use of force in Syria 
against al-Qaeda and ISIS.
    Senator Young. All right. Thank you.
    Put me on record. I still think it is a good idea since we 
are allies with the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi people, to send 
that message that we are not any longer at war with them. The 
2002 AUMF was, of course, targeted at Saddam Hussein's regime.
    Assistant Secretary Leaf, despite your opening statement, I 
am concerned the Administration is signaling it is open to some 
normalization through its brokered deal to deliver gas to 
Lebanon via a pipeline in Syria.
    The Assad regime will receive gas in recompense for 
facilitating this flow. This seems in direct contravention to 
our policy in Syria and counter to the intent of the Caesar 
Act.
    How does the Lebanon gas deal not violate U.S. sanctions 
barring transactions with the Syrian Government?
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, thank you for that question and it is a 
great opportunity to lay out what we are intending--what we are 
hoping to do through this prospective arrangement, and I would 
just stress that no decisions have been made because no 
contracts have been finalized. There is a process underway 
right now.
    Let me start by saying there is a process underway right 
now to finalize those contracts between the various 
governments. Let me start by saying that the driver for any 
such arrangement is the benefit of the Lebanese people.
    Lebanon has been in a powerless state for several years and 
is now on the verge of state collapse--of societal collapse. We 
are trying through a variety of measures to put a floor under 
such a prospect because the repercussions for the Lebanese 
people are one thing, but the repercussions for the wider 
region would be even greater for Israel, for Jordan, and 
others.
    We are working on a variety of measures and this is one of 
them. This was proffered by regional governments, regional 
governments coming forward with regional solutions--that is 
Egypt and Jordan--transferring Egyptian natural gas via Jordan 
and, as you said, through Syrian pipelines.
    There is--as we understand it, there is no cash transfer of 
any kind to the Syrian Government. It would be in kind, and I 
would stress the Lebanese people have about 2 hours of 
electricity today.
    Senator Young. Sure.
    Ms. Leaf. It would be a matter of minutes of power provided 
to----
    Senator Young. I do not have a lot of time.
    Ms. Leaf. I am sorry.
    Senator Young. It is your belief, because you alluded to 
our allies and having done this in consultation with at least 
some of the regional allies--you do not think this sends mixed 
messages or any sort of negative message to allies who are 
fighting against the Assad regime and countries in the region 
who are concerned about isolating the Assad regime and holding 
Mr. Assad accountable?
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, I think it is--I think people are very 
clear who this is intended for, and I will tell you, the king 
of Jordan is one of the most concerned of our partners about 
the prospect of collapse in Lebanon and he would like to do 
whatever is possible to mitigate that prospect.
    Senator Young. Thank you both.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and thank you to our panel both for your service and for 
your testimony.
    As we all know, Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine has 
garnered significant global attention, but it is critical that 
we also sustain our focus on an engagement with Syria, a 
country where Russia's engagement, exploitation, meddling, 
commission of human rights abuses have led to massive suffering 
and widespread displacement.
    More than 14 million people inside Syria are in need of 
humanitarian aid and nearly all--97 percent--of the Syrian 
population lives under the poverty line.
    As chairman of the Appropriations Committee responsible for 
humanitarian assistance, I keep pushing for robust assistance, 
including for Syrian refugees and those most vulnerable as this 
conflict grinds on into its 11th year.
    I think it is critical we do everything in our power to 
maintain humanitarian cross-border access into northwestern 
Syria and to continue pressing for other routes of humanitarian 
access.
    I am concerned the prospect of a Russian veto at the 
Security Council when the cross-border mandate renewal comes up 
this July will lead to further suffering. Russia has used its 
seat on the Security Council to weaken international resolve 
across a wide range of issues to spread disinformation.
    How are we working--if I might, Assistant Secretary Leaf, 
how are we working with other like-minded Security Council 
members to prevent a veto and to counter Russian influence 
within the Security Council?
    Ms. Leaf. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    It is an abiding preoccupation for us in the Department of 
State for our mission in New York, and we are working all 
channels.
    I would just say that there are some pretty significant 
players in this space in terms of their channels with Russia. 
One of them is, in fact, Turkey.
    Turkey will be directly affected by the scale of a 
humanitarian crisis unleashed by Russia vetoing this border 
crossing and I know that the Turkish Government is quite 
engaged in those discussions, as are a number of others.
    As I have looked at this and as we are working together 
hand-in-hand with other partners outside the Council and in, I 
think there is a very deep consensus on this matter.
    Russia will stand alone, completely alone, if it does go 
forward with this. Really, this is a strictly humanitarian 
matter and I am not going to say whether I am optimistic or 
pessimistic at this point. I am just very focused on getting 
the results that we need.
    Senator Coons. One of the things I have been focused on is 
the food crisis that is resulting from Russia's unprovoked and 
illegal attack on Ukraine, the way in which the 400 million 
people who were fed by Ukrainian agricultural products last 
year are now at risk of famine. Something like 12 and a half 
million Syrians suffer from food insecurity, according to the 
World Food Programme.
    What is the status of the food supply in Syria? What 
actions is the Administration taking to address the critical 
need to get access to the agricultural products of Ukraine and 
how might we address both the cooking oil and food shortages 
brought about by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and continued 
blockade of the Black Sea ports of Ukraine?
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, in fact, I know that there are efforts 
underway in a number of channels in our government to get to 
the heart of the problem, which is the blockade of Ukraine's 
ports, the targeting, of course, of Ukraine's wheat and other 
supplies.
    You are absolutely right that Syria is made all the more 
vulnerable by--Syria's population is made all the more 
vulnerable by Putin's war in Ukraine and so is Lebanon next 
door. Lebanon used to import something on the order of 80 
percent of its needs from Ukraine and, of course, the port 
explosion blew to pieces all of the supplies.
    We are focusing our humanitarian assistance and, certainly, 
our early recovery efforts in this space as part of a larger 
effort to identify how we can get to the most vulnerable 
populations.
    Senator Coons. If I might ask one last question.
    For both of you, how is Russia repositioning as a result of 
the war in Ukraine and to what extent are you seeing the 
likelihood of increased Iranian involvement in Syria as the 
Russians' principal security focus as their ongoing war in 
Ukraine?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
    We have seen no meaningful changes in Russia's intervention 
in Syria and its support to the Assad regime or in its 
commitment to backing the Assad regime in its continued war 
against the Syrian people in Syria.
    With respect to Iran, Iran's ultimate objectives in Syria 
and for the region have also not changed. Iran remains 
committed to both pushing U.S. forces and the United States out 
of the region and it continues its commitment to supporting a 
network of violent proxies and terrorists in terrorizing and 
destabilizing regional governments, as well as threatening 
Israel.
    From a Department of Defense perspective, our commitment to 
pushing back on these activities and supporting Israel and her 
inherent right to self-defense also has not changed.
    Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you both for your 
testimony.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to each 
of you.
    Assistant Secretary Leaf, I want to begin by asking you 
questions about the Administration's plan to route Egyptian gas 
to Lebanon through Jordan and Syria and, in the process, using 
the energy infrastructure of the Iranian-controlled Assad 
regime.
    In January, the United States Ambassador to Lebanon said 
that Lebanon did not need to worry about American sanctions for 
this scheme and that, indeed, the U.S. had conveyed assurances 
to that effect.
    I publicly stated at the time that that was exceptionally 
poor advice, that Lebanon should absolutely worry about 
violating U.S. sanctions and so should every other country 
involved in these schemes.
    I added that Congress would strongly oppose the Biden 
administration trying to enrich Assad and, indeed, we have seen 
and heard some of that opposition already today.
    Congress, to say nothing of this committee, will ensure 
that United States sanctions are fully ensured--enforced. The 
actions of this Administration are endangering the American 
allies involved in these deals and exposing them to acute 
future sanctions risks.
    It is also worrying that the Biden administration, again, 
has been deliberately vague about this Middle East policy. 
Administration officials sometimes say they will provide 
letters, licenses, or waivers to exempt countries from 
sanctions on Assad. Other times they have said, oddly enough, 
that the sanctions passed by Congress do not apply at all.
    I would like to ask you about that. Last October, Under 
Secretary Nuland said that one scheme ``falls under the 
humanitarian category. No sanctions waiver would be required in 
this instance.''
    Even earlier, the State Department's energy envoy said--had 
said that gas deals do not count as transactions at all.
    I would like you to be specific. Is it your understanding 
that the energy project to bring Egyptian gas to Lebanon via 
Jordan and Syria would be exempt from Caesar Act sanctions or 
would it require waivers and licenses to avoid sanctions 
exposure?
    Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Senator, for those questions.
    We have not seen the final details of these contracts so I 
reserve judgment. We have made no decision. We have made no 
commitments of exemptions, waivers, or what have you.
    We will look at the details of these contracts. Treasury, 
OFAC, State, will look at these details and make a finding 
then.
    What we have seen, what we have been privy to in terms of 
the arrangements that are under discussion, would involve the 
World Bank providing a 2-year loan that would also be 
conditioned on far-reaching extensive reform of the electricity 
sector to put it on a sounder, enduring footing.
    Once the World Bank looks at this, we would look at the 
details of the contract and make a judgment at that time.
    Senator Cruz. Are the public reports accurate that you have 
given assurances that sanctions would not apply?
    Ms. Leaf. No, they are not accurate. What I am aware of we 
have given what are termed preassurances that governments may 
engage in discussions--discussions--about these arrangements. 
The final decision will be the final decision by the Treasury--
Department of Treasury.
    Senator Cruz. I will note that the final decision by 
Treasury will not, in fact, be the final decision.
    There will be successor administrations, and in successor 
administrations, I think, it is quite likely that a future 
Administration will immediately move to restore pressure on 
Iran and its proxies, and is very likely to revoke any waivers 
or licenses granted and, as a result, the conduct of the Biden 
administration is exposing our allies to a serious and acute 
risk of sanctions.
    Ms. Leaf. Senator, this--these set of arrangements--of 
prospective arrangements came about precisely because of the 
concern on the part of the governments of Jordan and Egypt and, 
indeed, a number of others about the prospect for the state of 
Lebanon to collapse, given the diminishing level of energy 
available, the resort to propaganda stunts by Hezbollah to 
bring in sanctioned Iranian oil, oil that did not go to the 
public, did not go to the national electricity grid. Just 
disappeared into the black market.
    This is a way of transparently--the theory of the 
arrangement is that it will transparently provide that life-
sustaining, economic-sustaining, economy-sustaining energy to 
the public because otherwise the state and the society itself 
is on the point of collapse with all of the repercussions.
    Senator Cruz. That may be the theory of the arrangement, 
but it does not give the Administration the ability to 
disregard binding and mandatory sanctions passed by Congress.
    Ms. Leaf. Of course.
    Senator Cruz. A final question.
    You mentioned Hezbollah, and the United States has spent 
billions of dollars over the last two decades to build up the 
Lebanese Armed Forces.
    Are you aware of the Lebanese Armed Forces stopping 
Hezbollah weapons convoys into Lebanon and how many times?
    Ms. Leaf. I would have to look at that in detail and come 
back to you with an answer, sir.
    Senator Cruz. Is it concerning that we are giving billions 
to an armed forces that is not in any meaningful way opposing 
Hezbollah?
    Ms. Leaf. What I could say is the following about the 
Lebanese Armed Forces. They are on the verge of being the only 
remaining national institution that has the capability to 
sustain the security and to mitigate some of the effects of 
Lebanon's collapse.
    They are the one institution nationally that is trusted by 
the Lebanese public. They are struggling to carry out their 
responsibilities. The last thing we want to see is the LAF 
collapse as well.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch has some final questions. Then we are going 
to move to a very important second panel.
    Senator Risch. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, because we do 
need to move to the next group.
    I am not satisfied with the discussion we have had about 
the lack of Caesar sanctions and I have got some matters I want 
to pursue there, not totally unlike what Senator Cruz has been 
pursuing.
    The answer that Syria is going to be paid in kind in no way 
exempts it since from Caesar sanctions. So what I would like to 
do is I would like to propound some questions for the record, 
please, and ask that they commit to respond to those.
    The Chairman. Absolutely.
    Senator Markey, I had just announced we are going to go to 
the next panel, but since you have just arrived in the nick of 
time, we will recognize you.
    After this--I am just making a public announcement--we are 
moving to the next panel. If someone has not arrived here they 
will have to submit their questions for the record.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Wednesdays every committee schedules at 10 o'clock, and 
while you can be ubiquitous in some instances here, it is very 
difficult only because of the distances you would have to 
travel.
    So I apologize, Mr. Chairman, and to the committee members.
    The Assad regime repeatedly broke the century-old taboo 
against the use of chemical weapons. We obviously want to 
eliminate the scourge of chemical weapons, which is all the 
more important given the threat that Russia could use chemical 
weapons in its illegal war in Ukraine.
    On Syria, we know that the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons has not received certain requested 
information from Syria, and the deployment of the OPCW 
declaration assessment team has been delayed because of 
difficulties acquiring visas to enter Syria.
    Assistant Secretary of State Leaf, what is your department 
doing to work on getting an inspection team into Syria to 
verify the elimination of Syria's declared and nondeclared 
chemical weapons program?
    Ms. Leaf. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
    There is no doubt that the Assad regime's retention of the 
capability of using these terrifying weapons against its own 
public has to remain a top priority--is a top priority.
    I will commit to you that I will put my own personal 
efforts to that end to clear the way for this team to get into 
Syria and to do its work.
    Senator Markey. Yes. I think we have to put special 
emphasis on it, given what the implications are for Ukraine, 
because there is complete uncertainty as to the sustainability 
of the Russian incursion, and desperation could breed actions 
that are otherwise unacceptable.
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Stroul, according to the Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights, over 40,000 Syrians have 
registered to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine and 
deployment is now beginning.
    Is there anything the United States and its partners can do 
to prevent thousands and thousands of Syrian mercenaries from 
successfully transiting to Ukraine?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    We have also seen the open source reporting about large 
numbers of Syrians being relocated by Russia to the Ukraine 
theater of war.
    We have not seen large-scale movements like that on the 
ground. If there are smaller groups, ones and twos here and 
there, fine, but we have not seen and our intelligence 
assessments does not see large-scale movements. We are 
continuing to monitor that very closely.
    Senator Markey. Okay. So you are saying that 40,000 number 
has not translated in Ukraine into operational troops for the--
--
    Ms. Stroul. Yes, Senator. That is what I am saying. I also 
think it is important to take note of the massive amounts of 
disinformation and misinformation in the environment by Russia 
both in the Syria theater and in the Ukraine theater.
    Senator Markey. Again, that disinformation that you are 
referring to is that there are Syrian troops there or that 
there are not Syrian troops there?
    Ms. Stroul. We have not seen indications of large--tens of 
thousands of forces from Syrian fighters being moved to 
Ukraine. That is disinformation.
    Senator Markey. Okay. Great. Thank you. That is very 
helpful to be clarified. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    With the thanks of the committee to both of you for your 
testimony, we look forward to continuing to engage with you.
    As you can see, there is about a dozen members who came 
here, so this is a topic of great significance. For the--and 
you are both excused. Thank you.
    For the purposes of the committee's information, it is the 
chair's intention, in consultation with the ranking member, to 
move through the second panel to hear their testimony and then 
we will see how far we can get to questions, and as we call 
upon them to join us in the hearing room, we will just 
introduce them.
    After 11 years of conflict, Syria remains as far as ever 
from a durable solution to the conflict that will allow Syrians 
to live in peace and dignity.
    In those 11 years, one of the few constants to the conflict 
has been the Assad regime's barbarous treatment of fellow 
Syrians with the active support and participation of Russia and 
Iran, from barrel bombs and double tap airstrikes on first 
responder to the regime's industrial-scale torture and murder 
of dissidents, actors, and their family members in a network of 
detention facilities.
    The numbers give a grim accounting of the suffering 
unleashed on Syrians by the regime that would claim to govern 
them: over half a million killed, nearly 7 million internally 
displaced, 6.6 million registered as refugees around the 
world--more than half of Syria's pre-war population--14.6 
million inside of Syria in need of humanitarian assistance.
    The numbers alone do not provide a full sense of the 
horrors inflicted by the regime and the continuing importance 
of holding Bashar Al-Assad and his Syrian cronies and Russian 
and Iranian enablers accountable for their crimes against 
Syria's people.
    We would like to welcome a man known only as the 
Gravedigger, who will provide a harrowing and courageous 
eyewitness account of the regime's atrocities and its attempt 
to literally bury the evidence of those crimes by burying its 
victims in mass graves.
    Although we normally ask witnesses to limit their spoken 
testimony to 5 minutes, we have agreed to allow the Gravedigger 
10 minutes for his opening statement to allow the full weight 
of his testimony to be felt.
    I would also like to welcome Professor Milena Sterio, the 
Charles R. Emrick, Jr.-Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of 
Law at the Cleveland Marshall College of Law. Professor Sterio 
is an expert on international criminal law and international 
human rights law.
    She has written extensively on atrocity accountability in 
general and its application to the Syrian conflict, in 
particular.
    Thank you both for joining us today. With that, we will 
recognize--both of your statements will be fully included for 
the record.
    With that, we will recognize the Gravedigger for his 
remarks.

                 STATEMENT OF THE GRAVEDIGGER, 
                WITNESS TO MASS GRAVES IN SYRIA

    [The following statement and answers were delivered through 
an interpreter.]
    The Gravedigger. Thank you, Chairman Menendez.
    Thank you, Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Risch, for 
holding this hearing, and thank you, Senator Risch, for 
inviting me to speak.
    I am honored to give testimony before this storied 
committee. Thank you for giving me a chance to bring my voice 
to the United States Congress, government, and, most 
importantly, to the American people, whose democracy inspired 
our revolution in Syria over a decade ago.
    On March 11, 2020, the military photographer and defector 
Caesar shared his story with you. Every day he photographed 
bodies that had been detained, tortured, murdered in Syrian 
regime dungeons.
    The signs of torture were clear and the photographs were 
here on display in front of your honorable committee. You saw 
it with your own eyes, innocent civilians experiencing the most 
brutal methods of torture--burning, strangulation, sodomy, and, 
ultimately, death, all for daring to dream of a free Syria.
    Now, over 2 years later, nothing has changed in Syria. The 
Assad regime is no less brutal. The Syrian people are no less 
at risk. How many more times does a witness to war crimes need 
to sit in front of you and describe the horrors of the Assad 
regime?
    I hope that by sharing my story it may spark something 
inside you and maybe even renew hope for the future of Syria. 
Every time I tell my story, it takes a toll on me, but all I 
have is my voice and I will speak until I cannot anymore.
    I was witness to mass graves in Syria from 2011 to 2018 
where men and women, children and elderly, were tortured, 
executed, gassed, and bombed by the Assad regime, Iran, and 
Russia, and carelessly thrown into trenches, their fate unknown 
to loved ones.
    Their lives have been lost. They cannot be saved, and they 
demand accountability. The reason I am sharing my story today 
is to tell you that they are digging mass graves right now to 
bury more victims of Assad, Iran, and Russia.
    I am a civilian. Before the war, I was an administrative 
employee of the Damascus municipality. My job was to help 
families make final preparations for their loved ones' passing. 
Each funeral was dignified with religious prayers and rituals 
and all were properly laid to rest. Family members were given 
an opportunity to say goodbye and the sanctity of every grave 
was respected.
    In 2011, my office was visited by regime intelligence 
officials and I was ordered to work for them, and when the 
regime asks for something; you do not say no.
    I was not prepared for the horror of my duties. Every week, 
twice a week, three trailer trucks arrived packed with 300 to 
600 bodies of victims of torture, bombardment, and slaughter.
    Twice a week three to four pickup trucks with 30 to 40 
bodies of civilians that had been executed inside Saydnaya 
Prison also arrived for disposal in the most inhumane way.
    After 7 years of bearing witness to these atrocities, 
thanks to God and the ineptitude of the regime, I was able to 
escape Syria and follow my family to Europe.
    There, it was not only my duty, but my honor to testify 
before the German National Court in Koblenz and seek some 
semblance of justice to hold war criminals accountable for the 
ongoing atrocities in Syria.
    I have never been able to forget what I saw, the countless 
bodies I buried. It keeps me up at night and I will never sleep 
soundly carrying this burden. No one should because these 
massacres are still happening.
    There are, according to conservative estimates, at least 
150,000 missing unaccounted for Syrians. Their families have no 
closure, holding out hope for any bit of information.
    My heart is heavy with the knowledge that many are at this 
very moment experiencing inhumane torture at the hands of the 
Assad regime and some I know exactly where they are piled up 
into mass graves that are still being dug today. I know this 
because others who worked with me on the mass graves have very 
recently escaped and confirmed what we have been hearing.
    The Syrian people have suffered enough. Over the 11 years 
of war, hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians have not 
just been executed, but starved, tortured, raped, burned, and 
murdered in the most sadistic ways anyone can imagine.
    Men and women, children and elderly, innocent people, 
slowly tortured to death, screaming in the darkness while the 
world looks the other way. Those lucky enough not to be 
imprisoned live in fear every day, fear of being targeted with 
chemical weapons, cluster bombs, and internationally banned 
weapons.
    Among those murdered are Americans, including journalists 
and humanitarian workers. I will never forget how Assad's 
forces ridiculed and laughed about the fact that they tortured, 
murdered, and buried Americans and Europeans, too.
    As the leader of the free world, America should set the 
example and live up to its values. The international order 
depends on it.
    When the international community fails to condemn crimes 
against humanity, genocidal massacres, the bombardment of 
hospitals and schools, enforced disappearances in detention, 
criminal regimes will continue to push the limits unhindered.
    Russia, by its own admission, tested over 200 weapons on 
civilians in Syria. The international community looked the 
other way, and now Russia is using those same weapons and 
tactics in Ukraine that it honed in its 7 years waging war 
against the Syrian people.
    Where is the line? Chemical weapons against innocent 
civilians was not the line in Syria. The playbook of these 
tyrants is written and I fear the worst for the Ukrainian 
people.
    Enabling Assad enables Putin and stopping Assad hurts the 
Russian dictator. We must finally learn from the past and not 
let this never again moment happen yet again.
    I lived with death for 7 years with dead bodies and 
soulless intelligence officers. It might seem unimaginable to 
you so let me share some of the horrors that have never left my 
mind.
    One day, one of the trailer trucks with hundreds of bodies 
dumped its content of these hundreds of bodies, dead mangled 
corpses, into the trench in front of us. Unexpectedly, we saw a 
flicker of movement. There was a man near death, but still 
alive, desperately using his last reserve of energy to signal 
to us that somehow he was still alive.
    One of the civilian workers started crying, said that we 
had to do something. The intelligence officer supervising us 
ordered the bulldozer driver to run him over.
    The driver could not hesitate or else he would have been 
next. He ran over the man in the trenches, killing him. As for 
the young man in our workshop who dared to shed tears over the 
victim of Assad's regime, we never saw him again.
    Once I had--I was told to visit a farm of an intelligence 
officer. When I arrived, there was about 10 intelligence 
officers--senior officers. They were eating and drinking 
alcohol, and more surprisingly, there were over 15 young men 
handcuffed, blindfolded, and naked on the ground.
    One of the intelligence officers ordered one of the 
soldiers to untie the civilians and let them go. The blindfolds 
and handcuffs were removed, and I remember the confusion and 
the fear in a young men's eyes. An intelligence officer asked 
what they were waiting for to the young men. He told them to 
run and they took off.
    Then another officer grabbed his rifle and picked the young 
men off one by one. Every last one was murdered, and then 
Assad's officers continued with their festivities.
    I buried so many children tortured to death and I remember 
them all. I buried a mother still holding her infant to her 
breast as their lifeless bodies were thrown into the trench 
among the others.
    One day I was at a military hospital where the bodies are 
processed before being sent to the mass graves, and there was a 
body of a little girl only 6 or 7 years old. Her little 
lifeless body showed signs of terrible torture.
    The doctor at the hospital took me aside and told me he was 
ordered to write that she died of cardiac arrest. In reality, 
she had died as she was being continuously and horrifically 
raped by 11 senior--by 11 Assad regime intelligence officers.
    As members of the United States Senate, you all have the 
power to change the world. By sharing my story, I am taking 
this burden off of my shoulders and sharing it with you all.
    This is now on your shoulders, on your conscience. Take 
heed of what is happening in Syria. Although hundreds of 
thousands have already been murdered and disappeared and 
millions displaced, the worst is still yet to come.
    It can be prevented. I beg of you do not wait a second 
longer. I beg of you to take action.
    Recently, I was contacted by a bulldozer driver that worked 
during the same time that I worked there. There is a video that 
he has submitted that I would like to submit for the record.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of the Gravedigger follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of The Gravedigger

    Thank you, Chairman Menendez and Ranking member Risch for holding 
this hearing, and thank you Senator Risch for inviting me to speak. I 
am honored to give my testimony before this storied committee. Thank 
you for giving me a chance to bring my voice to the United States 
Congress, government, and most importantly to the American people whose 
democracy inspired our revolution in Syria over a decade ago.
    On March 11, 2020 the military photographer and defector Caesar 
shared his story with you. Every day, he photographed bodies that had 
been detained, tortured, and murdered in Syrian regime dungeons. The 
signs of torture were clear, and the photographs were here, on display 
in front of your honorable committee. You saw it with your own eyes. 
Innocent civilians experiencing the most brutal methods of torture--
burning, strangulation, sodomy, and ultimately death. All for daring to 
dream for a free Syria.
    Now, over 2 years later, nothing has changed in Syria. The Assad 
regime is no less brutal, the Syrian people are at no less risk. How 
many more times does a witness to war crimes need to sit in front of 
you and describe the horrors of the Assad regime?
    I hope that by sharing my story, it may spark something inside you, 
and maybe even renew hope for the future of Syria. Every time I tell my 
story, it takes a toll on me. But all I have is my voice, and I will 
speak until I can't anymore.
    I was witness to mass graves in Syria from 2011 to 2018 where men 
and women, children and elderly, were tortured, executed, gassed, and 
bombed by the Assad regime, Iran, and Russia and then callously thrown 
into trenches, their fate unknown to loved ones. Their lives have been 
lost; they cannot be saved. And they demand accountability. But the 
reason I am sharing my story today, is to tell you that they are 
digging mass graves right now to bury more victims of Assad, Iran, and 
Russia.
    I am a civilian. Before the war, I was an administrative employee 
of the Damascus municipality. My job was to help families make final 
preparations for their loved ones' passing. Each funeral was dignified 
with religious prayers and rituals, and all were properly laid to rest. 
Family members were given the opportunity to say goodbye, and the 
sanctity of every grave was respected.
    In 2011, my office was visited by regime intelligence officials, 
and I was ordered to work for them. When the regime asks for something, 
you don't say no.
    I was not prepared for the horror of my duties. Every week, twice a 
week, three trailer trucks arrived, packed with 300 to 600 bodies of 
victims of torture, bombardment, and slaughter. Twice a week, three to 
four pickup trucks with 30 to 40 bodies of civilians that had been 
executed in Saydnaya Prison, arrived for disposal in the most inhumane 
way.
    After 7 years of bearing witness to these atrocities, thanks to God 
and the ineptitude of the regime, I was able to escape Syria and follow 
my family to Europe. There, it was not only my duty, but my honor to 
testify before the German national court in Koblenz, and seek some 
semblance of justice to hold war criminals accountable for the ongoing 
atrocities in Syria.
    I have never been able to forget what I saw; the countless bodies I 
buried. It keeps me up at night, and I will never sleep soundly 
carrying this burden. No one should, because these massacres are still 
happening. There are, according to conservative estimates, at least 
150,000 missing and unaccounted for Syrians. Their families have no 
closure, holding out hope for any bit of information. My heart is heavy 
with the knowledge that many are, at this very moment, experiencing 
inhumane torture at the hands of the Assad regime, and some--I know 
exactly where they are--piled into mass graves that are still being dug 
today. I know this because others who worked with me on the mass graves 
have very recently escaped and confirmed what we have been hearing.
    The Syrian people have suffered enough. Over the 11 years of war, 
hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians have not just been 
executed, but starved, tortured, raped, burned, and murdered in the 
most sadistic ways one can imagine. Men and women, children and 
elderly, innocent people slowly tortured to death, screaming in the 
darkness while the world looks the other way. Those lucky enough not to 
be imprisoned live in fear every day, targeted with chemical weapons, 
cluster bombs, and internationally banned weapons. Among those murdered 
are Americans, including journalists and humanitarian workers. I will 
never forget how Assad's forces ridiculed and laughed about the fact 
that they tortured, murdered and buried Americans and Europeans too.
    As the leader of the free world, America should set the example and 
live up to its values-the international order depends on it. When the 
international community fails to condemn crimes against humanity-
genocidal massacres, the bombardment of hospitals and schools, enforced 
disappearances and detention-criminal regimes will continue to push the 
limits, unhindered.
    Russia, by its own admission, tested over 200 weapons on civilians 
in Syria. The international community looked the other way, and now, 
Russia is using those same weapons and tactics in Ukraine that it honed 
in its 7 years waging war against the Syrian people. Where is the line? 
Chemical weapons against innocent civilians was not the line in Syria. 
The playbook of these tyrants is written, and I fear the worst for the 
Ukrainian people. Enabling Assad enables Putin, and stopping Assad 
hurts the Russian dictator. We must finally learn from the past and not 
let this never again moment happen, yet again.
    I lived with death for 7 years; with dead bodies and soulless 
intelligence officers. It might seem unimaginable to you, so let me 
share some of the horrors that have never left my mind. One day, one of 
the trailer trucks dumped its contents of several hundred dead, mangled 
corpses into the trench in front of us. Unexpectedly, we saw a flicker 
of movement. There was a man near-death desperately using his last 
reserve of energy to signal to us that somehow, he was still alive. One 
of the civilian workers, crying, said that we had to do something. The 
intelligence officer supervising us ordered the bulldozer driver to run 
him over. The driver could not hesitate, or else he would have been 
next. He ran over the man in the trenches, killing him. As for the 
young man who had dared to shed tears over the victim of Assad's 
regime, we never saw him again.
    Once, I had to visit the farm of an intelligence officer. When I 
arrived, there were about 10 of them there eating and drinking. More 
surprisingly, there were also 15 young men handcuffed, blindfolded, and 
naked on the ground. One of the intelligence officers ordered another 
soldier to untie the civilians and let them go. The blindfolds and 
handcuffs were removed, and I remember the confusion and fear in the 
young mens' eyes. An intelligence officer asked what they were waiting 
for, and told them to run, and they took off. Then, another officer 
grabbed his rifle, and picked the young men off, one by one. Every last 
one was murdered, and then Assad's officers continued on with their 
festivities.
    I buried so many children tortured to death, and I remember them 
all. I buried a mother still holding her infant to her breast as their 
lifeless bodies were thrown in the trench. One day, I was at Tishreen 
military hospital where bodies are processed before being sent to the 
mass graves, and there was a body of a little girl only 6 or 7 years 
old. Her little lifeless body showed signs of terrible torture. The 
doctor at the hospital took me aside and told me he was ordered to 
write that she died of cardiac arrest, but in reality she had died as 
she was being continuously and horrifically raped by 11 Assad regime 
intelligence officers.
    As members of the United States Senate, you all have the power to 
change the world. By sharing my story, I am taking this burden off of 
my shoulders, and sharing it with all of you. This is now on your 
shoulders, and your conscience. Take heed of what is happening in 
Syria. Although hundreds of thousands have already been murdered and 
disappeared, and millions displaced, the worst is still yet to come. It 
can be prevented but I beg of you--do not wait a second longer. Take 
action.

    The Chairman. Thank you. That is the same video I believe 
Senator Risch has asked for consent and it is included in the 
record.

[Editor's note.--The video being referenced can be found at the 
following link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/16sdYjaxGSF2Mjx
SPaS2TDgzBRky_sxdK/view. The video will also be retained in the 
permanent record of the committee.]

    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Gravedigger.
    Professor Sterio, you are recognized.

   STATEMENT OF DR. MILENA STERIO, THE CHARLES R. EMRICK JR.-
CALFEE HALTER AND GRISWOLD PROFESSOR OF LAW AND LL.M. PROGRAMS 
  DIRECTOR, CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW, CLEVELAND, OHIO

    Dr. Sterio. Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and members of the committee. It is an honor to testify 
before you today.
    It is also a privilege to share this platform with the 
other individuals testifying before the committee and, 
especially, the Gravedigger.
    The conflict in Syria has continued over the past 11 years 
and has resulted in the commission of countless atrocities such 
as mass executions, widespread rapes, systematic torture, and 
repeated use of chemical weapons against civilians.
    These crimes require prosecution from a global deterrence 
standpoint. In light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the 
ordering of atrocities there by Russian leaders, establishing 
accountability for those who ordered the commission of atrocity 
crimes, whether in Syria or in Ukraine, has become paramount.
    Accountability options for the prosecution of Syrian 
leaders range from prosecutions in the courts of Syria and 
prosecutions in the national courts of various countries under 
the principle of universal jurisdiction, to the establishment 
of a hybrid tribunal for Syria and prosecutions in the 
International Criminal Court at The Hague in the Netherlands.
    First, prosecutions in the courts of Syria. Assuming that 
there may be a transition of leadership in Syria at some point 
in the future, a new Syrian regime may be interested in 
imposing accountability on individuals associated with the 
Assad regime.
    Examples of countries where domestic courts have 
investigated similar crimes after a change in the governing 
regime include East Timor, Cambodia, and Colombia.
    If prosecutions were to occur in the Syrian courts, the 
international community, including the United States, could 
assist Syria by supporting the establishment of specialized 
internationalized chambers dedicated to the prosecution of 
atrocity crimes within the Syrian judicial system.
    Such internationally-supported domestic chambers have 
already been created in Iraq, in Bosnia, as well as in the 
context of piracy prosecutions in Kenya and in the Seychelles.
    Second, prosecutions in various national courts under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction 
provides every state with the authority to prosecute a limited 
category of offenses generally recognized as of universal 
concern regardless of where the offence occurred, the 
nationality of the perpetrator, or the nationality of the 
victim.
    Crimes over which universal jurisdiction extends include 
piracy, slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and torture.
    In the context of the Syrian conflict, some national level 
courts have already relied on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction to initiate investigations and prosecutions.
    For example, on January 13, 2022, the Higher Regional Court 
in Koblenz, Germany, convicted senior Assad government official 
Anwar Raslan for a crime against humanity and sentenced him to 
life in prison.
    In February 2021, the same German court also convicted 
Raslan's co-defendant, Eyad al-Gharib, and a new case is 
currently being prosecuted in the courts in Frankfurt, Germany.
    A number of other European states have begun prosecuting 
Syrian perpetrators found in their territory and some of these 
states include France, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, and the 
Netherlands.
    Third, the establishment of a hybrid tribunal for Syria. 
Hybrid tribunals are courts that combine elements of 
international and national prosecutions and some recent 
examples of these hybrid tribunals include the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of 
Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
    Many have already advocated for the creation of a hybrid 
tribunal for Syria. Such a tribunal could be created through an 
agreement signed by the United Nations General Assembly or 
Secretary General and the Government of Syria, or through a 
Security Council resolution.
    Both options are unlikely in the context of Syria at the 
present, but these options are important accountability avenues 
and should remain part of any future accountability discussions 
regarding Syria.
    Fourth, prosecutions at the International Criminal Court. 
The ICC is the only permanent International Criminal Court and 
it is located at The Hague in the Netherlands and has 
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, as well as aggression.
    In the context of Syria, the ICC is a limited option. Syria 
is not a member state of the ICC, and as this court has 
jurisdiction only in situations where the alleged perpetrator 
is a citizen of a member state or if the alleged crime takes 
place on the territory of a member state, the court can only 
launch prosecutions against individuals who committed crimes in 
Syria, but who are nationals of ICC member states.
    Moreover, although in theory a case can be referred to the 
ICC through a Security Council resolution, any such resolution 
regarding Syria is unlikely in light of the Russian and Chinese 
veto.
    The ICC is an important global accountability option at a 
theoretical level and its involvement in Syria should continue 
to be explored.
    One current idea is a group of human rights lawyers has 
recently advanced the argument that crimes committed in Syria 
have a link to Jordan, where many of the victims have fled to, 
in order to create territorial jurisdiction for the court as 
Jordan is a member state.
    As this testimony has documented, there is a pressing need 
to establish accountability for atrocities committed during the 
Syria conflict. Different accountability options, as mentioned, 
include prosecutions in Syrian courts, national level 
prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdiction, the 
establishment of a hybrid tribunal for Syria, as well as 
prosecutions at the International Criminal Court.
    It is time that the international community, with support 
from the United States, act towards accountability. Imposing 
accountability on Syrian leaders in particular is paramount in 
the wake of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the commission 
of atrocities there by Russian forces.
    It is crucial to establish that accountability attaches to 
all those who order the commission of atrocities, whether they 
be located in Syria or in Ukraine.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Sterio follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Dr. Milena Sterio

                              introduction
    Good morning Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members 
of the Committee. It is an honor to testify before you today. It is 
also a privilege to share this platform with the other individuals 
testifying before the committee.
    The conflict in Syria has continued over the past 10 years, and has 
resulted in the commission of countless atrocities, ordered and 
orchestrated by the Syrian Government as well as by other non-state 
actors, rebel and terrorist groups.\1\ The need for accountability for 
such atrocities committed by Syrian officials, rebel commanders, and 
terrorist leaders has grown. As documented by the United Nations Human 
Rights Council's Independent and International Commission of Inquiry, 
the atrocities in Syria are among the worst in history.\2\ They include 
mass executions, widespread rapes, systematic torture, intentionally 
targeting hospitals, and repeated use of chemical weapons against 
civilians. The vast majority of international crimes have been 
committed in a methodical fashion by the Syrian Government, encouraged 
by the long-standing culture of impunity. These crimes require 
prosecution to bring justice for the victims, deter vigilantism, and 
prevent recurrence.\3\ In particular, crimes ordered by Syrian 
Government leaders require prosecution from a global deterrence 
standpoint: in light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and the 
ordering of atrocities there by Russian leaders, establishing 
accountability for those who order the commission of atrocity crimes--
whether in Syria or in Ukraine--has become paramount.
    Accountability options for the prosecution of Syrian leaders who 
have ordered the commission of atrocity crimes range from prosecutions 
in the courts of Syria and prosecutions in the national courts of 
various countries under the principle of universal jurisdiction, to the 
establishment of a hybrid tribunal for Syria, and prosecutions in the 
International Criminal Court at The Hague.
                  prosecutions in the courts of syria
    While the Assad regime remains in power, it is unlikely that Syrian 
courts will investigate and prosecute any government leaders who have 
ordered the commission of atrocity crimes. However, assuming that there 
may be a transition of leadership in Syria at some point in the future, 
a new Syrian regime may become interested in imposing accountability on 
individuals associated with the Assad regime. Should that be the case, 
then Syrian courts would have territorial jurisdiction over any crimes 
committed in Syria and would be well-placed to investigate and 
prosecute the commission of such crimes. Examples of countries where 
domestic courts have investigated similar crimes after a change in the 
governing regime include East Timor, Cambodia, and Colombia.\4\
    If prosecutions were to occur in the Syrian courts at some point in 
the future, the international community could assist Syria by 
supporting the establishment of special internationalized chambers 
dedicated to the prosecution of atrocity crimes within the Syrian 
judicial system. Such internationally-supported domestic chambers have 
already been created in Iraq, in Bosnia, as well as in the context of 
piracy prosecutions in Kenya and in The Seychelles.
    In order to prosecute Saddam Hussein, the deposed leader of Iraq, 
as well as other members of his regime, the Iraqi Special Tribunal was 
established in 2003 through an Iraqi law approved by the United States. 
Located in Baghdad, the Court was a domestic tribunal that employed 
domestic judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and applied Iraqi law. 
The tribunal was heavily supported by the international community, 
particularly the United States, which provided various forms of support 
and training for the Court's personnel. Thus, this tribunal is a model 
of an ``internationalized'' domestic court: a justice mechanism 
embedded in the domestic system of the relevant nation, aided by 
various international organizations and authorities in order to enhance 
its effectiveness. The Iraqi Special Tribunal successfully convicted 
Saddam Hussein, and in addition, has prosecuted several other members 
of the deposed Ba'athist regime.\5\
    The Bosnian War Chamber is a specialized domestic chamber that 
handles various war crimes cases, either handed down by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia as part of its 
completion strategy, or investigated on its own. The Chamber is a 
domestic tribunal within the Bosnian judicial system; it applies local 
law and it is located in capital city of Sarajevo. The Chamber, 
however, employs a mix of international staff, as well as local Bosnian 
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Like the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the 
Bosnian War Chamber has benefitted from generous international support, 
and its processes have been ``internationalized'' to ensure procedural 
quality of prosecutions and to guarantee the delivery of justice 
pursuant to international standards.\6\
    Finally, more recent examples of internationalized domestic 
chambers include special piracy courts in Kenya and the Seychelles, 
where captured Somali pirates are being transferred for prosecution 
under the national systems of these two countries. A piracy chamber has 
developed in Mombasa, Kenya, where several successful prosecutions have 
taken place since 2006. Kenyan piracy courts are domestic; they also 
employ Kenyan lawyers, apply Kenyan law, and are located in this host 
nation. In the Seychelles, piracy prosecutions have been taking place 
since 2009 in the Supreme Court located in the capital city of 
Victoria. The Seychellois prosecutions are conducted using local law by 
Seychellois judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. The piracy 
prosecutions in both Kenya and the Seychelles have benefited from 
international assistance by the United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime, which has provided both monetary and logistical support, as well 
as personnel in the form of ``loaned'' prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
translators, and interpreters. In this sense, piracy prosecutions in 
Kenya and the Seychelles, although conducted in national courts, have 
been ``internationalized,'' due to support and involvement by the 
United Nations.\7\
    Thus, if domestic-level prosecutions were to occur in the courts of 
Syria, such prosecutions could occur either at regular Syrian courts or 
at specialized internationalized chambers created through the support 
of the international community.
             prosecutions in various national courts under 
                the principle of universal jurisdiction
    Syrian perpetrators of atrocities can be prosecuted by different 
national-level courts of various countries under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction provides every state 
with the authority to prosecute a limited category of offenses 
generally recognized as of universal concern, regardless of where the 
offense occurred, the nationality of the perpetrator, or the 
nationality of the victim. While other bases of jurisdiction require 
connections between the prosecuting state and the offense, the 
perpetrator, or the victim, universal jurisdiction assumes that every 
state has a sufficient interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat 
egregious offenses that states universally have condemned.\8\
    There are two premises underlying universal jurisdiction. The first 
involves the gravity of the crime. Crimes subject to universal 
jurisdiction are so threatening to the international community or so 
heinous in scope and degree that they offend the interest of all 
humanity, and any state may, as humanity's agent, punish the offender. 
The second involves the locus delicti (place of the act). Crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction occur in territory over which no 
country has jurisdiction or in situations in which the territorial 
State and State of the accused's nationality are unlikely to exercise 
jurisdiction, because, for example, the perpetrators are State 
authorities or agents of the State.\9\
    There are two approaches to universal jurisdiction. The first is 
the ``no safe haven'' approach, pursuant to which states may exercise 
universal jurisdiction over perpetrators found in their territory to 
avoid becoming a refuge for perpetrators of grave international crimes. 
The second is the ``global enforcer'' approach, under which domestic 
courts conduct prosecutions on behalf of humanity. Under this second 
approach, investigations, indictments, and requests for extradition may 
be initiated even where the perpetrator is not located within the 
state's territory.\10\
    The first widely accepted crime of universal jurisdiction was 
piracy. For 500 years, States have exercised jurisdiction over 
piratical acts on the high seas, even when neither the pirates nor 
their victims were nationals of the prosecuting state.\11\
    In the aftermath of the atrocities of the Second World War, the 
international community extended universal jurisdiction to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Trials exercising this jurisdiction took 
place in international tribunals at Nuremberg, as well as domestic 
courts across the globe.\12\ Some individuals faced trial in the states 
in which they had committed their crimes, but others were tried by 
other states in which they were later captured, surrendered, or found--
including such far off countries as Canada and Australia.\13\ Thus, on 
the basis of universal jurisdiction, Israel tried Adolph Eichmann in 
1961 and John Demjanjuk in 1988 for crimes committed before Israel even 
existed as a State.\14\ In extending universal jurisdiction to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, an analogy was made between those 
offenses and piracy. Like piracy, the Nazi offenses during the war 
involved violent and predatory action and were typically committed in 
locations where they would not be prevented or punished through other 
bases of jurisdiction.
    On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly 
unanimously affirmed the principles of international law recognized by 
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal, 
thereby codifying the jurisdictional right of all States to prosecute 
perpetrators of the offenses addressed by the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of 
aggression.\15\ The General Assembly has subsequently confirmed that no 
statute of limitations or amnesty may be applied to bar prosecution of 
such crimes and that all states have a duty to cooperate in their 
prosecution.\16\ International courts have repeatedly cited the 
Nuremberg precedent as crystallizing universal jurisdiction for the 
core international crimes under customary international law.\17\
    In the 1990s, domestic courts of Denmark, Austria, and Germany 
relied on universal jurisdiction in trying Croatian and Bosnian Serb 
nationals for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 
Bosnia in 1992.\18\ Courts in Belgium cited universal jurisdiction as a 
basis for issuing arrest warrants and prosecuting persons involved in 
the atrocities in Rwanda in 1994, including cases that did not involve 
Belgian victims.\19\ And courts in Spain relied on universal 
jurisdiction to request the extradition of former Chilean leader, 
General Augusto Pinochet, for crimes against humanity committed during 
his reign.\20\ Crimes over which universal jurisdiction extends include 
piracy, slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and torture.\21\
    In the context of the Syrian conflict, some courts have already 
relied on the principle of universal jurisdiction to initiate 
investigations and prosecutions. Soon after the outbreak of the Syrian 
civil war, the German Federal Prosecutor's War Crimes Unit opened 
several ``structural investigations'' into more than 2,800 crimes 
committed in Syria. This involves investigating specific structures 
within which international crimes have been allegedly committed rather 
than investigating specific persons.\22\
    This technique serves several purposes. First, it can enable the 
prosecutor to react swiftly when a suspect enters Germany in the 
future. Second, it can facilitate future proceedings in a third state 
or before an international court. Third, it can lead to the opening of 
an investigation against a specific individual and can serve as the 
basis for an international arrest warrant or extradition request.\23\
    Taking advantage of the thousands of Syrian refugees pouring into 
Germany starting in 2011, the staff of the German War Crimes Unit 
interviewed 200 witnesses in two structural investigations. One, based 
on the ``Caesar photos,'' is focused on crimes committed by the Syrian 
regime as captured in thousands of photos smuggled out by a former 
Syrian official. The other, based on interviews of Yazidi refugees in 
Germany, is focused on crimes committed by the ISIS terrorist 
organization against that ethnic group in Syria.\24\ So far, the 
structural investigations have led to multiple investigations against 
more than two dozen suspects.
    In June 2018, Germany issued an international arrest warrant for 
Syrian General Jamil Hassan, a member of Assad's inner circle, charging 
him with war crimes and crimes against humanity. In February 2019, 
after the general traveled to Lebanon seeking medical treatment, 
Germany made a formal extradition request of Lebanon for Hassan's 
surrender. A few days later, the United States Government issued a 
statement supporting Germany's extradition request for the high-ranking 
Syrian official. By taking this step, the United States placed itself 
on the record in support of Germany's exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.\25\
    On Jan. 13, 2022, the Higher Regional Court in Koblenz, Germany, 
convicted senior Bashar al-Assad government official Anwar Raslan for a 
crime against humanity--in the form of killing, torture, serious 
unlawful detention, rape and sexual assault--and sentenced him to life 
in prison. Raslan was the former head of the Syrian General 
Intelligence Directorate's investigation department--specifically 
overseeing the investigations section of Branch 251 and later Branch 
285, detention centers where officials held and interrogated suspected 
anti-government activists.\26\ The court found it had been proved that 
Raslan was ``a co-offender in a protracted and systematic attack that 
was launched against the civilian population of Syria, resulting in 27 
people being murdered and 4,000 others having their physical freedom 
impaired in a serious manner, they also having been subjected to 
torture during their times in prison.'' \27\ In February 2021, the same 
German court also convicted Raslan's co-defendant, Eyad al-Gharib.\28\
    Germany is the first country to have launched these structural 
investigations related to Syria, and it established a model for other 
states wishing to serve the interests of a broader international fight 
against impunity. France has also embraced the strategy of structural 
investigations, with the limitation that French law requires that one 
or more of the victims of each case be a French national or that the 
suspect is located in French territory.\29\ Using this authority, in 
2018, a French court issued international arrest warrants for three 
high level Assad regime officials (Ali Mamluk, director of the National 
Security Bureau; Jamil Hassan, head of Syrian Air Force Intelligence, 
and Abdel Salam Mahmoud, director of an Air Force Intelligence 
investigative branch), charging them with complicity in the 
disappearance of dual French-Syrian nationals.\30\
    Meanwhile, a number of other European states have begun prosecuting 
Syrian perpetrators found in their territory under the ``no safe haven 
approach.'' Most of these have ended with convictions, such as the 
Austrian case against a 27-year old Syrian asylum seeker and former 
member of the opposition Farouq Brigade, who was sentenced to life in 
May 2017 for the multiple murders of government soldiers near Homs 
between 2013 and 2014.\31\ In Sweden, a 28-year old Syrian Asylum 
seeker and former member of the Free Syrian Army was sentenced to 8 
years in 2013 for war crimes and torture.\32\ In September 2017, a 
collective of Swiss lawyers disclosed the existence of a criminal 
investigation into Rifaat Al-Assad--Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad's 
uncle, often referred to as the ``Butcher of Hama''--for war crimes 
allegedly committed in 1982.\33\ In the Netherlands, in 2020 and 2021, 
an Amsterdam court prosecuted a Syrian national on charges of war 
crimes and terrorism under the principle of universal jurisdiction.\34\
    As a result, after falling out of favor during the past 20 years, 
countries around the world are expanding the use of the global enforcer 
approach to universal jurisdiction to prosecute Syrian officials and 
rebels for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The prosecution of 
Syrian leaders for atrocity crimes in the national courts of different 
countries around the globe, under the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, is thus an important accountability option.
            the establishment of a hybrid tribunal for syria
    In addition to national-level prosecutions under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, another important accountability option is the 
establishment of a hybrid tribunal for Syria.
    Hybrid tribunals are courts that combine elements of international 
and national prosecutions. They employ a mix of international and 
national judges; they apply both international and domestic criminal 
laws; they may be located in a host country whose violent past they may 
be attempting to address; and they strive to fulfill goals of 
international justice while also helping to promote the growth of the 
local judiciary, court system, and civil society in general. Recent 
examples of these hybrid tribunals include the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).\35\
    The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in 2002, through 
an international agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, 
the host country. The Court had jurisdiction over atrocities that took 
place in 1996 during Sierra Leone's civil war. It was located in 
Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, but employed a mix of 
international and local judges. Its statute included both international 
law offenses and crimes derived from Sierra Leone, which were specific 
to the conflict that ravaged this nation for many years. The most 
prominent defendant prosecuted in the Special Court is Charles Taylor, 
the former President of Liberia, who was accused of supporting violent 
rebel groups in Sierra Leone during the 1990s.\36\ The SCSL completed 
its mandate in 2013 and formally closed; it its place, the so-called 
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in order to 
continue to carry out the Special Court's mandate. Many have described 
the Special Court as a model hybrid tribunal.\37\
    The ECCC was established in 2003, through an agreement between the 
United Nations Secretary-General and the Cambodian Government in order 
to try the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime for atrocities 
committed between 1975 and 1979 when Pol Pot ruled Cambodia and 
orchestrated a series of devastating policies, which resulted in the 
death of almost a third of the country's population. The ECCC is 
composed of a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and a Supreme Court 
Chamber; all the chambers consist of international as well as Cambodian 
judges. The Court also has an international and a domestic prosecutor. 
The Court's statute is a mix of international and domestic law 
offenses, similar to the statute of the aforementioned Special Court 
for Sierra Leone. Since 2009, the ECCC, located in the capital city of 
Phnom Pen, has prosecuted several high-level members of the Khmer Rouge 
regime.\38\
    The STL was created in 2007 by the Security Council to try persons 
responsible for assassinations, and those attempted, of prominent 
Lebanese political and media figures since 2004. In particular, the STL 
has investigated the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri. Because of security concerns, the STL was located at The Hague, 
unlike the aforementioned tribunals, which have all been located in 
host countries.\39\ The Tribunal was composed of both international and 
Lebanese judges, but it applied Lebanese law. Also, unlike the 
aforementioned hybrid tribunals, which have had jurisdiction over both 
international and national crimes, the STL had jurisdiction solely over 
national crimes, as they relate to the Hariri assassination and other 
assassination attempts. Thus, this Tribunal did not investigate 
``traditional'' international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, or 
crimes against humanity, but instead has focused on terrorism. The STL 
had a 3-year mandate, which can be extended by the Security Council 
upon review. The Tribunal began its work in 2009, and it has already 
investigated several individuals and issued nine indictments.\40\ The 
STL is different from the hybrid tribunals because it was created 
through the Security Council Chapter VII powers, but it contains 
similarities because its creation was requested by the Lebanese 
Government and because the tribunal employed so many features of 
domestic Lebanese law.
    Many have already advocated for the creation of a hybrid tribunal 
for Syria.\41\ Such a tribunal could be created through a United 
Nations General Assembly or Secretary-General and the Government of 
Syria, similar to the SCSL and the ECCC. Or, such a tribunal could be 
established through a Security Council Resolution, such as the STL. 
Both options are unlikely in the context of Syria at the present. It is 
unlikely that the Assad government will agree to the creation of an ad 
hoc tribunal, and the Security Council remains paralyzed in light of 
the Russian and Chinese veto. However, these options are important 
accountability avenues and should remain part of any future 
accountability discussions regarding Syria.
            prosecutions at the international criminal court
    The International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute was negotiated in 
1998; the Court became operational in 2002 and has commenced 
investigations in 17 situations, resulting in a total of 31 cases since 
its inception.\42\
    The ICC is the only permanent international criminal court. It is 
located at The Hague, in the Netherlands, and it has jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, as well as aggression. 
While many have applauded the creation of the ICC as a tremendous 
development in the field of international criminal law, others have 
remained skeptical about its ability to accomplish many of the existing 
goals of international justice.\43\ The ICC has limited resources and 
can only prosecute a handful of cases. Its jurisdiction is limited 
temporally, to 2002 onward, and its ability to hear any case depends on 
its ability to properly acquire power over a situation--the Court can 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to a Security Council referral, pursuant 
to a referral by a state party, or pursuant to the prosecutor's 
decision to initiate an investigation.\44\ In some instances, political 
forces and influences may prevent the Court from investigating a case. 
Finally, the ICC functions based on the ``complementarity' principle''; 
it can only exercise jurisdiction if a state is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute.\45\
    In the context of Syria, the ICC is a limited accountability 
option. Syria is not a member state of the ICC. As this Court has 
jurisdiction only in situations where the alleged perpetrator is a 
citizen of a member state or if the alleged crimes take place on the 
territory of a member state, the Court can only launch prosecutions 
against individuals who committed crimes in Syria but who are nationals 
of ICC member states. Moreover, although in theory a case can be 
referred to the ICC through a Security Council resolution, any such 
resolution regarding Syria is highly unlikely in light of the Russian 
and Chinese veto. The ICC is an important global accountability option 
at a theoretical level, and its involvement in Syria should continue to 
be explored.\46\
      international, impartial and independent mechanism for syria
    Although the international community has thus not acted in terms of 
imposing accountability on Syrians who have committed atrocities during 
this decade-long conflict, the United Nations General Assembly has 
acted and has established the International Impartial and Independent 
Mechanism for Syria.
    Despite significant evidence of atrocity crimes being committed by 
all sides to the conflict--particularly by government forces--the UN 
Security Council has been paralyzed by the Russian and Chinese veto, 
unable to take any steps towards accountability in Syria. In May 2014, 
Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have referred 
the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.\47\ Later, 
Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have established 
an investigative mechanism to document Syrian use of chemical weapons 
and other atrocities. In all, Russia has vetoed 12 resolutions to 
prevent accountability of the Syrian Government since the outbreak of 
the Syrian civil war.\48\
    On December 21, 2016, the United Nations General Assembly took a 
historic step in establishing a Mechanism to investigate and preserve 
evidence of international crimes in Syria, the first time the Assembly 
has established such a body.\49\ Despite objection by Russia, the 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/248 by a vote of 105 to 15 with 
52 abstentions, creating the International, Impartial and Independent 
Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those 
Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law 
Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, known in 
shorthand as the IIIM.\50\
    The IIIM is empowered to collect evidence from other bodies 
including the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
established by the Human Rights Council, and to conduct its own 
investigations ``including interviews, witness testimony, documentation 
and forensic material.'' \51\ The General Assembly Resolution further 
envisages that the IIIM will analyze the collected evidence and prepare 
files of evidence that could be provided to ``national, regional or 
international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have 
jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law.'' 
\52\
    This was the first time in history that the General Assembly has 
established an investigative body to assemble and analyze evidence of 
international crimes for the purpose of preserving evidence for future 
international or domestic trials.
    Article 10 of the UN Charter gives the General Assembly the power 
to ``discuss'' and make ``recommendations'' concerning ``any questions 
or matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the 
powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present 
Charter.'' \53\ A limitation on this power is set forth in Article 12 
of the Charter which stipulates that the General Assembly cannot make 
recommendations when the Security Council is exercising its functions 
with respect to a particular dispute or situation, unless the Council 
requests the General Assembly to do so. \54\ But this limitation has 
been honored increasingly in the reach and was not seen as limiting the 
General Assembly's involvement in major crises including the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Libya, and Syria over the past 30 years. As such, 
it is within the mandate of the General Assembly to consider questions 
of threats to peace and security in Syria and whether a referral to the 
ICC or the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal is warranted. Further, 
Article 22 of the Charter empowers the General Assembly to ``establish 
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions.'' \55\ Therefore, the General Assembly has the authority to 
establish a ``subsidiary organ'' to collect and assess the available 
evidence of international crimes in Syria in order to inform the 
General Assembly's discussion and recommendations on these matters. 
Now, the evidence collected by the IIIM would undeniably not be used 
solely (or even primarily) for the purpose of the General Assembly's 
discussion and recommendations, but it is not clear that additional 
uses of the information would render the creation of the IIIM beyond 
the power of the General Assembly.
    The establishment of this novel institution by the General Assembly 
clearly evinces a fundamental power shift away from the Security 
Council and to the General Assembly caused by the international 
community's frustration with the abuse of the veto to prevent action to 
deal with international atrocities.
    On July 3, 2017, the Secretary General appointed as the head of the 
IIIM Catherine Marchi-Uhel, a former French judge with broad 
international experience trying and adjudicating war crimes. During her 
27-year career, Marchi-Uhel has provided legal support to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the UN 
Mission in Liberia, and the UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo. She has also adjudicated for the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia and served as Ombudsperson to the UN Security 
Council's Sanctions Committee. Before, that, she has served as Head of 
Chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, and as an international judge at the Pre-Trial Chamber of 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.\56\
    At a lecture at Case Western Reserve University School of Law soon 
after her appointment, Marchi-Uhel said: ``I believe that the creation 
of the Mechanism is an important demonstration of the international 
community's will to ensure that crimes committed in Syria do not go 
unpunished.'' \57\ She noted that the Mechanism can play an immediate, 
significant role in supporting ongoing and future investigation of 
crimes committed in Syria by national prosecutors.\58\
                               conclusion
    The massive number of Syrians that have fled the violence in Syria 
has had an undeniable impact on the international community's approach 
to international criminal justice. Over 1 million Syrian refugees have 
migrated to Europe, with 530,000 settling in Germany, 110,000 in 
Sweden, 50,000 in Austria, and smaller numbers in other countries.\59\ 
Many of the refugees are victims of international crimes. Others are 
perpetrators. The issue of accountability was quite literally delivered 
to the doorsteps of the European States by the refugees arriving from 
Syria and there is reason to believe that the stream of universal 
jurisdiction cases will continue to increase in the coming years.
    As this testimony has documented, there is a pressing need to 
establish accountability for atrocities committed during the Syria 
conflict. Different accountability options, as mentioned above, 
including prosecutions in Syrian courts, national-level prosecutions 
under the principle of universal jurisdiction, the establishment of a 
hybrid tribunal for Syria, as well as prosecutions at the International 
Criminal Court. The international community has already acted, through 
the United Nations General Assembly, to establish an investigative 
mechanism for Syria, the IIIM. It is time that the international 
community, with support from the United States, act toward 
accountability. Imposing accountability on Syrian leaders in particular 
is paramount in the wake of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and the 
commission of atrocities there by Russian forces. It is crucial to 
establish that accountability attaches to all those who order the 
commission of atrocities, whether they be located in Syria or in 
Ukraine.
    The United States should continue to support accountability for 
Syrian leaders accused of having ordered the commission of atrocities. 
In particular, the United States could provide financial and logistical 
support to the IIIM, as well as to countries which have initiated 
domestic-level prosecutions under the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. The United States could also support the creation of an 
ad hoc tribunal for Syria. United States' support in closing the 
accountability gap in Syria is particularly important today, in the 
wake of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, from the perspective of 
both deterrence as well as the notion of individual criminal 
responsibility for leaders who order the commission of atrocities.

----------------
Notes

    \1\ For a detailed timeline of the ongoing conflict in Syria, see 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, MILENA STERIO & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, THE SYRIAN 
CONFLICT'S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-16 (2020).
    \2\ Wolfgang Kaleck & Patrick Kroker, Syrian Torture Investigations 
in Germany and Beyond: Breathing New Life into Universal Jurisdiction 
in Europe? 16 J. INT'L CRIM. L. 165, 166 (2018).
    \3\ GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF 
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 284 (2000).
    \4\ See e.g., James D. Meernik, Angela Nichols and Kimi L. King, 
The Impact of International Tribunals and Domestic Trials on Peace and 
Human Rights After Civil War, 11 INT'L STUDIES PERSPECTIVES 309 (2010).
    \5\ Michael P. Scharf, Forward: Lessons from the Saddam Trial, 39 
CASE WESTERN J. INT'L L. 1 (2007).
    \6\ Hybrid Justice, The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, https://hybridjustice.com/the-war-crimes-chamber-in-
bosnia-and-herzegovina/.
    \7\ Milena Sterio, Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia: The Argument 
for Pirate Prosecutions in the National Courts of Kenya, The 
Seychelles, and Mauritius, 4(2) AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM 104 (2012).
    \8\ Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International 
Law, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 785, 786 (1988).
    \9\ See id.; see also Lee. A. Steven, Genocide and the Duty to 
Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States Is in Breach of Its 
International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425, 435 (1999).
    \10\ Devika Hovell, The Authority of Universal Jurisdiction, 29 
EJIL 427, 439 (2018).
    \11\ Randall, supra note 8.
    \12\ See Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of 
Aggression, 53 HARV. INT'L L. J. 357, 390 (2012). Between 1945 and 
2010, there were prosecutions for crimes under international law based 
on universal jurisdiction in 17 states (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United 
States). Amnesty Int'l, UN General Assembly Should Support this 
Essential International Justice Tool (2010), https://www.amnesty.org/
en/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ior530152010en.pdf.
    \13\ R. v. Imre Finta [1994] 28 C.R. (4th) 265 (S.C.) (Canada); 
Polyukovich v. Commonwealth, (Austl. 1991) 172 C.L.R. 501.
    \14\ The Supreme Court of Israel held in the Eichmann case that 
``[t]here is full justification for applying here the principle of 
universal jurisdiction since the international character of crimes 
against humanity . . . dealt with in this case is no longer in doubt . 
. .. The State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant to the 
principle of universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian 
of international law and an agent for its enforcement, to try the 
appellant.'' Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 
299, 304 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962). For a more detailed account of the 
Demjanjuk case, see Scharf, Sterio & Williams, supra note 1, at 100, n. 
50.
    \15\ G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946).
    \16\ See, e.g., Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, 
22 U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); 
United Nations Resolution on War Criminals, G.A. Res. 2712, U.N. GAOR, 
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 78-79, U.N. Doc. A/8028; Questions of the 
Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes 
against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, 
at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); United Nations Resolution on Principles 
of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 
G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 79, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1973).
    \17\ Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 62 (Int'l Crim. Trib. 
For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Prosecutor v. Ntuyuhaga, Case 
No. ICTR-96-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the 
Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar. 18, 1999); Prosecutor v. 
Kallon and Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15 AR72(E),SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 
Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty 67-71 
(Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, Mar. 13, 2004); Case No. STL-11-01/1 
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging 103 (Special Trib. for Leb. 
Feb. 16, 2011).
    \18\ Scharf, Sterio & Williams, supra note 1, at 101-102 and n. 56.
    \19\ See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal 
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 577 (1995).
    \20\ Human Rights Watch, The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims Can 
Pursue Human Rights Criminals Abroad, Nov. 1, 1998, https://
www.hrw.org/report/1998/11/01/pinochet-precedent/how-victims-can-
pursue-human-rights-criminals-abroad.
    \21\ Scharf, Sterio & Williams, supra note 1, at 102-103 (noting 
also that universal jurisdiction has been extended by treaty to other 
crimes, including several terrorism offenses).
    \22\ Hovell, supra note 10, at 448.
    \23\ Kaleck & Kroker, supra note 2, at 179-180.
    \24\ Id.
    \25\ Ryan Goodman, Breaking: United States Supports Germany's 
International Arrest Warrant for Accused Syrian War Criminal, JUST 
SECURITY (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63079/breaking-
united-states-supports-germanys-international-arrest-warrant-accused-
syrian-war-criminal-a-rare-exercise-universal-jurisdiction-general-
jamil-hassan/.
    \26\ Hayley Evans, A Survey of Recent Developments and Trends in 
Universal Jurisdiction, LAWFARE, Feb. 9, 2022, https://
www.lawfareblog.com/survey-recent-developments-and-trends-universal-
jurisdiction.
    \27\ Id.
    \28\ BBC, Syria torture: German court convicts ex-intelligence 
officer, Feb. 24, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56160486.
    \29\ Kaleck & Kroker, supra note 2, at 173.
    \30\ Trial International, Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 
2019, https://trialinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
Universal_Jurisdiction_Annual-Review2019.pds.
    \31\ Kaleck & Kroker, supra note 2, at 173.
    \32\ Id.
    \33\ Switzerland Judicial Development, in TRIAL International Make 
Way for Justice 4: Momentum towards accountability 78, 79 
(2018).
    \34\ Alexandra Lily Kather, ``Water Finds Its Way''? Universal 
Jurisdiction as an Avenue for Justice in Syria, ARTICLES OF WAR, Jul. 
28, 2021, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/water-finds-way-universal-
jurisdiction-justice-syria/.
    \35\ Milena Sterio, The Future of Ad Hoc Tribunals: An Assessment 
of Their Utility Post-ICC, 19 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 237 (2013).
    \36\ Id.
    \37\ Special Court for Sierra Leone, Residual Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, http://www.rscsl.org.
    \38\ See, e.g., Open Society Justice Initiative, Performance and 
Perception: The Impact of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of 
Cambodia, February 2016, https://www.justiceinitiative.org/
publications/performance-and-perception-impact-extraordinary-chambers-
court-cambodia.
    \39\ Special Tribunal for Lebanon, About the STL, https://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/about-the-stl.
    \40\ Id.
    \41\ RADWAN ZIADEH, ACCOUNTABILITY IN SYRIA: ACHIEVING TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETY (2020).
    \42\ International Criminal Court, About the Court, https://
www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court.
    \43\ For a discussion of challenges facing the ICC, see Milena 
Sterio, The International Criminal Court: Current Challenges and 
Prospect of Future Success, 52 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 467 (2020).
    \44\ Id.
    \45\ Linda E. Carter, The Principle of Complementarity and the 
International Criminal Court: The Role of Ne Bis in Idem, 8 SANTA CLARA 
J. INT'L L. 165 (2010).
    \46\ Patrick Wintour, Human rights lawyers attempt to bring Syria 
war crimes cases to ICC, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 16, 2022 (describing 
efforts by human rights lawyers to argue that the ICC should have 
jurisdiction in Syria because some of the victims have fled to Jordan, 
which is a state party to the ICC).
    \47\ I. Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to 
International Criminal Court, THE GUARDIAN, May 22, 2014.
    \48\ RTE, Russia's 12 Vetoes on Syria, Apr. 11, 2018, https://
www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0411/953637-russia-syria-un-veto.
    \49\ Alex Whiting, An Investigation Mechanism for Syria: The 
General Assembly Steps Into the Breach, 15 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 231 
(2017).
    \50\ UN Doc. A/71/L.48, Dec. 21, 2016.
    \51\ Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Implementation of the resolution establishing the International, 
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under 
International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 
2011, UN Doc. A/71/755, Jan. 19, 2017, at para. 12.
    \52\ UN Doc. A/71/L.48, 21 Dec. 2016, at para. 4.
    \53\ UN Charter, art. 10.
    \54\ Id., art. 12.
    \55\ UN Charter, art. 22.
    \56\ Scharf, Sterio & Williams, supra note 1, at 96.
    \57\ Catherine Marchi-Uhel, Klatsky Endowed Lecture in Human 
Rights, 51 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223-235 
(2019).
    \58\ Id.
    \59\ See generally Scharf, Sterio & Williams, supra note 1, at 110.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, and, first of all, I want to 
thank our witnesses for testifying here today. Certainly, these 
are hard to listen to, but it is something that, as I said 
before, when this is over it is not over and it is important we 
keep this in front of everyone.
    I am interested in the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
I think we are at the very early stages of what that will be in 
the overall scheme of things.
    It was interesting to see it used, I think, probably for 
the first time in the German prosecutions, but I suspect that 
this body of law is going to grow and it will be interesting to 
follow that and that certainly will be an important aspect of 
the--our belief of never again and our belief that it is not 
over until we--until everyone has been held accountable that 
should be.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Thank you both for your testimony.
    Ukraine is dominating the global headlines, but Syria is 
the place where the laws of war and accountability have been 
flouted for years. The Assad regime and Vladimir Putin have 
made the violation of international humanitarian law the norm 
in Syria, and the international community has largely failed 
when it comes to pursuing accountability for more than a decade 
of horrific violations in Syria.
    Professor, I heard your exposition of the possibilities. 
One of the challenges truly frustrating obstacles to 
accountability, is the frequent inability to take the 
perpetrators into custody because they remain outside of any 
relevant legal jurisdiction.
    Can you explain even in the face of that why it is so 
important to pursue these legal cases? Obviously, beyond the 
overriding importance of giving a voice and hope to the victims 
of these crimes, are there tangible diplomatic political 
benefits to pursuing perpetrators even when apprehension seems 
unlikely, especially in the context of a conflict like Syria?
    Dr. Sterio. Thank you for the question.
    Absolutely. It is important to pursue accountability, and 
before I answer your question let me just add that these cases 
that I mentioned in Germany, in those particular cases the 
perpetrators were actually in Germany. Some of them had sought 
asylum in Germany and were in German territory.
    German prosecutors realized that they were there and were 
able to actually capture that moment, if you will, and arrest 
them in Germany and bring them to prosecution. Some of these 
trials are actually able to be conducted because these 
countries, mostly western European nations, have actually found 
the perpetrators to be on their territory.
    Even in the absence of the ability to capture some of these 
individuals it is important to establish the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility for those who order the 
commission of atrocities or for those who commit atrocities 
themselves.
    The short answer as to why is that it is the right thing to 
do. The slightly longer answer is that international law and 
international criminal law since Nuremberg--since the end of 
World War II--has established this principle of responsibility 
for those who commit these atrocity crimes.
    The other reason that this is so important is from a global 
deterrence standpoint. Leaders like Vladimir Putin probably 
today do not expect that they will face accountability someday, 
but international criminal justice is patient and persistent, 
and many leaders have actually faced accountability for their 
action many decades after they committed or ordered those 
actions to be committed.
    So it is important to establish accountability for global 
deterrence because it is the right thing to do, because 
international law provides for this principle of international 
criminal responsibility.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Finally, to the Gravedigger, your testimony at the trial in 
Koblenz was both brave and moving. What do you think made a 
conviction possible in that case?
    The Gravedigger. I believe that the bravery of the victims 
and the witnesses--both the victims of the crimes of those that 
were arrested in Germany in the Koblenz case and the bravery of 
witnesses that came forward--is what helped bring about the 
conviction.
    The Chairman. We appreciate that bravery and your testimony 
as to the horrors that Assad has inflicted on his own people. 
It is riveting, and I look forward to looking to the video, 
even though I am sure it will be rather consequential.
    We appreciate the testimony of both of you. This record 
will remain open until the close of business tomorrow.
    With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


              Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. On UN Cross-Border. Are there members of the UN Security 
Council that you are concerned may side with Russia? We have heard 
particular concerns from the NGO community regarding India, Brazil and 
the UAE. If so, what leverage will the Administration bring to bear and 
would Congressional engagement be helpful in that regard?

    Answer. We believe there is a clear humanitarian imperative to 
maintain the UN cross-border mechanism, and that this view is shared by 
the majority of Council members. We continue to work actively with our 
allies and partners as well as the United Nations and UNSC members in 
support of a re-authorization and expansion of this mechanism. We 
welcome engagement by Congress with those same member states in support 
of the mechanism.

    Question. What is our contingency plan to sustainably ensure 
humanitarian assistance continues to get to people inside Syria even if 
Russia vetoes the mandate renewal?

    Answer. We will use all means available to advocate for continued 
humanitarian access and to deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the 
Syrian people, including in the northwest, in coordination with the UN, 
NGOs, other donors, and partners. Preparations to date have confirmed 
our assessment that any contingency operations in the event of a non-
authorization will only cover a fraction of the UN's current caseload 
of assisting 2.4 million people per month through cross-border aid. The 
Department is available to provide further details in response to this 
question in an appropriate setting.

    Question. Normalization: The UAE's hosting of Bashar al-Assad 
around the 11th anniversary of the Syrian uprising was callous in its 
disregard for the suffering of the Syrian people and a worrying sign 
that regional partners may accept an Iranian and Russian client state 
back into the fold. I joined the Administration in expressing my 
opposition to such visits, but more concrete action must be taken to 
discourage normalizing ties with the Assad regime. An element of that 
is a firm signal to anyone who engages with Assad that the U.S. is 
prepared to use the Caesar sanctions the Congress has provided. What 
further steps is the Administration taking to prevent countries like 
the UAE from normalizing ties with the Assad regime?

    Answer. We were profoundly disappointed and troubled by the UAE's 
apparent attempt to rehabilitate the international stature of Bashar 
al-Assad, who has overseen the death and suffering of countless 
Syrians. We have made clear to our partners both in the Middle East and 
beyond that we oppose normalizing relations with the Assad regime. In 
those discussions, we continue to underline the Assad regime's ongoing 
horrific atrocities against Syrians, as well as its continuing efforts 
to deny much of the country access to humanitarian aid and security. We 
make clear that U.S. sanctions remain in place and that companies, 
countries, and any other entities seeking to invest in Syria risk 
exposure to U.S. sanctions. The existence of those sanctions has also 
had a chilling effect on such investment.

    Question. What further messaging can we expect and what 
consequences will the Administration consider imposing if countries 
continue to move forward?

    Answer. We continue to remind our partners and allies that Bashar 
al-Assad is a brutal dictator responsible for the death and suffering 
of countless Syrians, the displacement of more than half of the pre-war 
Syrian population, and the arbitrary detention or disappearance of over 
130,000 Syrian men, women, and children. We continue to emphasize to 
our partners that engaging with Assad while he continues to commit 
atrocities against innocent people would accomplish nothing but 
embolden the regime, prolong the suffering of the Syrian people, and 
undermine our shared goal to achieve an inclusive political solution 
consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. We 
continue to make clear that U.S. sanctions remain in place and that 
companies, countries, and any other entities seeking to invest in Syria 
risk exposure to U.S. sanctions.

    Question. Is the Administration prepared to use sanctions to limit 
and deter such normalization?

    Answer. We continue to make clear that U.S. sanctions remain in 
place and that companies, countries, and any other entities seeking to 
invest in Syria could risk exposure to U.S. sanctions. The existence of 
the sanctions have a chilling effect on investment activity. The 
Department of State and USAID work closely with the U.S. Treasury 
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to ensure all 
partners are operating in accordance with the U.S. Syria sanctions 
program.

    Question. Russia and Iran: One of the arguments I have heard in 
favor of normalizing relations with the Assad regime is that it is to 
fill the vacuum in Syria left by Russia's focus on Ukraine that will 
otherwise be filled by Iran. I also have heard the argument that 
bringing Assad closer to his neighbors will provide a means of 
containing and controlling him. I am skeptical of this logic. Have you 
seen a noticeable reduction in Russia's military or non-military 
support for the Assad regime and, if so, has it left a void that Iran 
is filling? How?

    Answer. We have not seen any credible evidence of a significant 
reduction in Russia's military or non-military support for the Assad 
regime. In February, the Russian defense minister visited Damascus to 
discuss military cooperation between Russia and Syria. Russia's 
military campaign in Syria--and its direct support to the Syrian 
military--is continuing to contribute to massive destruction and the 
death or displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians.

    Question. What can we do to counter any increase in Iranian 
political influence in Syria without allowing for others to upgrade 
relations with Syria and lend Assad legitimacy?

    Answer. Our likeminded allies and partners in Europe and in the 
Middle East agree that Iran continues to play a destabilizing role in 
Syria and undermine our shared goal to reach a political settlement 
consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. We are 
committed to deterring, containing, and countering Iranian provocation 
in the region, including in Syria. We are also working closely with 
partners and allies to deny Assad restored status on the international 
stage, including by opposing the regime's reentry into the Arab League.

    Question. Sanctions License for Northeast Syria: I am concerned by 
the economic situation across Syria but especially outside of regime-
held areas and I believe that the recent announcement of a general 
license to Syria sanctions in non-regime-held Syria is a potentially 
useful tool returning some level of economic opportunity to those parts 
of Syria. At the same time, I am concerned about the potential for the 
regime to exploit this general license in order to evade sanctions, as 
I'm sure you are as well. So I want to understand better how you plan 
to administer and monitor the license. What steps is the Administration 
taking to prevent such sanctions evasion?

    Answer. The Department of State is working closely with the 
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to ensure 
compliance with U.S. sanctions. The General License does not authorize 
transactions involving the Government of Syria or any other person 
whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to the 
Syrian Sanctions Regulations or the Caesar Act. Our Syria sanctions 
remain fully in force, including on the Assad regime. We will continue 
to monitor the impact of the General License and work closely with OFAC 
on compliance issues.

    Question. Is the Administration willing to withdraw the general 
license in the event of significant sanctions evasions? How will you 
measure such possible evasions? If so, what are the red lines that 
would trigger a withdrawal of the license?

    Answer. The Department of State will work closely with the Treasury 
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to monitor the 
effect of the General License within Syria and ensure compliance with 
U.S. sanctions. Syria General License 22 authorizes activities in 
specific geographical locations as described in the Annex to the 
license. The Administration developed this list with the intent to 
authorize activities only in identified non-regime-held areas of 
northeast and northwest Syria in support of ongoing U.S.-led D-ISIS 
stabilization efforts. We will continue our monitoring efforts to help 
make sure our efforts are reaching this goal. The Administration can 
revoke the General License at any time should the circumstances on the 
ground change and/or the license no longer meets the U.S. policy 
objective of improving the economic situation in non-regime held areas 
of Syria liberated from ISIS.

    Question. What is the capacity of the authorities in these non-
regime areas to investigate, detect and stop regime attempts to exploit 
the general license?

    Answer. Several agencies across the U.S. Government work closely in 
order to ensure compliance with U.S. economic sanctions, including the 
General License. In addition, local authorities in non-regime areas of 
northwest and northeast Syria have expressed support for existing 
sanctions on the Assad regime, including under the Caesar Act, and are 
developing regulatory structures to facilitate and manage economic 
development in northern Syria. The USG will encourage these authorities 
to promote economic investment in non-regime areas while conducting 
their own due diligence to comply with the terms of the General 
License, avoid violations of counter-terrorism sanctions, and minimize 
benefits to the Assad regime.

    Question. What training, equipment or other assistance will the 
U.S. provide in order to boost that capacity?

    Answer. The Department regularly engages with local actors 
responsible for affairs in northern Syria to discuss a range of issues, 
including economic development and U.S. sanctions. The Department has 
no plans to provide training, equipment, or other assistance related to 
sanctions enforcement, however, we will continue to encourage robust 
compliance with U.S. sanctions against the Assad regime. Sanctions 
enforcement falls under the authority of the Department of the 
Treasury, and the Department of State is working closely with the 
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to ensure 
compliance with U.S. sanctions.

    Question. Captagon: Congress has become increasingly concerned by 
the Assad regime's manufacturing and trafficking of Captagon, a 
powerful amphetamine, throughout the region, often in partnership with 
Hezbollah. What assistance is the State Department and USAID providing 
to neighboring countries to both reduce demand for the drug and 
increase interdiction capacity?

    Answer. Department of State programming, such as programs run by 
our Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
seeks to strengthen the capacities of states' criminal justice and law 
enforcement agencies, better enabling countries to respond to narcotics 
issues within their borders. Furthermore, we are working with our law 
enforcement colleagues, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), to identify ways to support and work with our foreign partners 
to interdict and investigate the trafficking of Captagon and other 
drugs, including through the exchange of information, identification of 
targets, and coordination of operations to combat Captagon trafficking 
and distribution. INL is conducting Captagon analysis through their 
international toxic adulterants database (ITAD). This analysis details 
the public health effects of Captagon, which countries are trafficking 
the most Captagon, and what substances are used in adulterating the 
contents of each seizure.

    Question. What does the regime use the hard currency earned from 
Captagon for? How much of it is used to re-pay loans to Russia or Iran?

    Answer. We assess elements affiliated with the Assad regime, as 
well as Hizballah and other terrorist groups in Syria and Lebanon have 
been associated with narcotics production and trafficking in Syria, 
including of Captagon, and likely profit from the illicit trade. The 
Department would be happy to share more information in a classified 
setting.

    Question. U.S. Detainees: I was pleased and relieved to see the 
safe return of Trevor Reed to the U.S. but I remain gravely concerned 
for the safety of both Austin Tice and Majd Kamalmaz (MAH-jd KAM-il-
mahz) who have been detained by the Assad regime since 2012 and 2017, 
respectively. What steps is the Administration taking to bring about 
their safe return? Can you provide an update on where their cases 
stand?

    Answer. Bringing home U.S. nationals held hostage or wrongfully 
detained is a top priority for the Administration. The Special 
Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA) leads the diplomatic 
strategy for the safe return of hostages and wrongful detainees. 
President Biden and Secretary Blinken are personally committed to doing 
everything we can to bring U.S. nationals home who are held unjustly. 
We continue to seek the Syrian Government's assistance to help resolve 
these cases and, as the President has stated, we will continue to work 
through all available avenues to secure the return home of U.S. 
nationals.

    Question. Will you commit to providing my staff with a classified 
briefing on the well-being and status of both Austin and Majd before 
the August recess?

    Answer. Yes. We are committed to working closely with Congress to 
secure the release of Austin and Majd. The Special Presidential Envoy 
for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA) leads the diplomatic strategy for the safe 
return of hostages and wrongful detainees and continues to engage as 
appropriate in close coordination with relevant stakeholders across the 
U.S. Government to promote progress on these cases.

    Question. ISIS-affiliated Detainees: It is estimated that there are 
approximately 2,000 non-Syrian, non-Iraqi foreign terrorist fighters in 
SDF custody and approximately 10,000 FTF-associated family members in 
displaced persons camps in NE Syria. The recent prison breaks by ISIS 
have highlighted the continuing need to reduce this population through 
repatriations. How are we engaging with other countries to ensure that 
ISIS-affiliated foreign nationals are repatriated and receive a fair 
trial, if warranted, and proper rehabilitation and reintegration in 
their home countries?

    Answer. The January 20 ISIS attack on the Hasakah Provincial 
Internal Security Forces detention center in northeast Syria highlights 
the need for the international community to support and fully fund the 
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS's initiatives to improve the secure and 
humane detention of ISIS fighters, including by strengthening detention 
facility security. The United States encourages countries of origin to 
repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and, where appropriate, 
prosecute FTFs and associated family members in northeast Syria. We 
provide logistical and other support to facilitate such repatriations 
on a case-by-case basis. We also assist foreign countries to develop 
and implement rehabilitation and reintegration protocols that are 
designed to ensure the safe and orderly return of those countries' 
nationals.

    Question. What obstacles do we face in repatriating ISIS-affiliated 
foreign nationals and how are we addressing countries where detainees 
will not receive a fair trial?

    Answer. The United States encourages countries of origin to 
repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and, where appropriate, 
prosecute FTFs and associated family members in northeast Syria. 
Political will remains the largest obstacle to repatriations, in 
addition to unwillingness to engage northeast Syrian authorities as 
non-state actors and legal challenges related to potential prosecution 
in areas of origin. The United States provides logistical and other 
support to facilitate repatriations on a case-by-case basis. We also 
assist foreign countries to develop and implement rehabilitation and 
reintegration protocols that are designed to ensure the safe and 
orderly return of those countries' nationals.

    Question. What steps are being taken to improve humanitarian 
conditions for detainees in northeastern Syria?

    Answer. The United States and Coalition continue to support the 
humane and secure detention of over 10,000 ISIS fighters in SDF 
custody. In the long-term, the only durable solution to this problem 
set is repatriation. State Department and DoD are placing urgent 
emphasis on improving the secure and humane detention of these fighters 
and are working together on construction and refurbishment of purpose-
built detention facilities, as well as the training and 
professionalization of the SDF guard forces there. Congressional 
support on this has been critical--particularly the FY 2022 National 
Defense Authorization Act waiver for select funding caps that otherwise 
limit the amount DoD can spend on Defeat-ISIS construction projects in 
Iraq and Syria. We continue to urge countries to support and fully fund 
the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS's initiatives to improve the secure 
and humane detention of ISIS fighters, including medical needs in 
detention centers. Current shortfalls include a lack of medical 
supplies, equipment, and nutritional supplements.

    Question. U.S. Assistance: There is bipartisan concern over reports 
of the Assad regime's frequent interference in crossline assistance and 
attempts to use currency manipulation to skip aid dollars under its 
jurisdiction. At the same time, the needs across all of Syria are 
desperate and only getting worse. How does the U.S. plan on expanding 
humanitarian aid from regime held areas to northwest and northeast 
Syria?

    Answer. The Administration is committed to expanding humanitarian 
access in Syria through all modalities, including crossline. We support 
efforts by the United Nations to move assistance from regime-held areas 
to Idlib and welcome the UN's plan for additional crossline shipments 
between June and December 2022. We also support and fund UN efforts to 
move aid crossline between regime-held areas and the northeast. 
However, crossline aid throughout the country remains constrained by 
insecurity and regime obstacles, which is why we maintain that cross-
border aid into non-regime held areas is essential.

    Question. What measures are in place to counter regime attempts to 
steer such crossline assistance towards more cooperative communities?

    Answer. We take all possible steps to ensure that humanitarian 
assistance funded by American taxpayers reaches those for whom it is 
intended. We carefully monitor the risks associated with providing aid 
in all parts of Syria and work closely with our partners, other donors, 
and the United Nations on this issue.

    Question. What measures are in place to prevent regime attempts at 
diverting or siphoning such assistance, including through currency 
manipulations?

    Answer. We take all possible steps to ensure that humanitarian 
assistance funded by American taxpayers reaches those for whom it is 
intended. We carefully monitor the risks associated with providing aid 
in all parts of Syria, and our partners have robust monitoring and risk 
mitigation measures to prevent aid diversion. With respect to currency 
manipulation, a preferential exchange rate for aid provided in regime-
held areas, which would be used for the UN's humanitarian transactions, 
is the best solution to minimize this risk. In addition, the majority 
of UN-provided goods in Syria are purchased outside of the country, and 
thus not affected by the Syrian pound's exchange rate. The United 
States helped establish a Regional Dialogue Mechanism with the UN and 
major donors in the field to enhance information sharing on issues of 
concern, identify risks, and agree on mitigation measures.

    Question. What measures is the U.S. insisting on for UN assistance 
to prevent the diverting or siphoning of such assistance, including 
through currency manipulations?

    Answer. We require our partners to have robust risk mitigation 
measures and monitoring to prevent aid diversion throughout Syria, and 
we take all possible steps to ensure that humanitarian assistance 
funded by American taxpayers reaches those for whom it is intended. We 
are pressing the UN to accelerate its negotiations for a preferential 
exchange rate for UN aid provided in regime-held areas. Additional 
mitigation measures are currently being discussed by donors.

    Question. Rukban Camp: While the U.S. does not have a civilian or 
military presence at the Rukban internally displaced persons camp in 
southern Syria, camp conditions continue to worsen. While the security 
situation in the camp is currently stable, the continued deterioration 
of living conditions could lead to increased instability and security 
threats. How does the U.S. plan on working with the U.N. and relevant 
actors, including Jordan, to increase humanitarian access to the camp?

    Answer. The Administration remains committed to increasing 
humanitarian access to all parts of Syria, which includes humanitarian 
access to Rukban. It is the Assad regime and Russia that have 
consistently blocked those efforts. The U.S. Government continues to 
support the UN's attempts to bring life-saving aid to the Rukban camp, 
and we remain in close contact with the United Nations and our partners 
about this effort.

    Question. Donor Fatigue and the Secondary Impacts of Ukraine: 
Despite the fact that the U.S. continues to be the largest humanitarian 
donor to Syria, funding to meet the humanitarian needs in Syria is 
still lacking. The secondary impacts of Putin's illegal war in Ukraine 
are also being felt by vulnerable Syrians as fuel and food prices 
increase leading to a vicious cycle of decreasing aid needed to reach 
Syria's 12 million people who are food insecure. What are we doing to 
address the resource gap in Syria, particularly in regard to 
engagements with other governments? How can we in Congress help in 
ensuring our global partners also step up to the task?

    Answer. We continually urge allies and partners to increase their 
support for Syrians. In one recent such example, Ambassador Thomas-
Greenfield traveled to Brussels for meetings on May 10, during the U.S. 
Presidency of the UN Security Council, to emphasize that the United 
States has not forgotten the Syrian people, that continuing and 
expanding the UN cross-border mechanism is essential, and that our 
leadership of the humanitarian response is intended to rally--and not 
replace--the efforts of other donors. We welcome Congressional 
engagement with foreign governments to underline the need for increased 
funding, and greater burden-sharing, in response to the Syria crisis.

    Question. Refugees: In a continued effort to draw Syrians back to 
their country of origin, President Erdogan has announced plans to 
construct buildings in the Idlib Province to house 1 million Syrian 
refugees. In the past, reports documented the deportation of Syrian 
refugees from Turkey to Syria, and President Erdogan has previously 
threatened to deport millions of Syrian refugees. Experts question 
whether under the current plans there would be large numbers of Syrians 
willingly return given their fear of arrest by Assad's regime, lack of 
money to start over, or limited opportunities in an economy wrecked by 
years of war. Is the Administration monitoring returns of Syrians from 
Turkey to ensure that all returns are voluntary? How is the 
Administration working with international partners to monitor 
conditions for Syrian refugees who return to their country of origin?

    Answer. We closely monitor statements by governments around the 
world--including our allies and partners--regarding Syrian refugees, 
and we regularly urge them to maintain protection for Syrians, to 
uphold their respective international obligations, to respect the 
principle of non-refoulement, and to ensure that any individual returns 
are voluntary, safe, and dignified. We are grateful for Turkey's 
continued support to over 3 million Syrian refugees who fled the 
conflict and recognize that Turkey is home to more refugees than any 
other country in the world. We support the efforts of the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and others to monitor conditions in 
areas of return within Syria. However, we concur with UNHCR and Syrian 
civil society's assessment that Syria is not yet safe for refugee 
returns. Those returning risk facing unlawful or arbitrary detention, 
torture, and other ill-treatment including rape and sexual violence, 
and enforced disappearance.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Ms. Dana Stroul to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Russia: While I appreciate your answer that there is no 
noticeable change to Russia's posture in Syria, I continue to be 
concerned by reports from regional partners that Russia is scaling back 
or changing its military presence on the ground in Syria, raising 
concerns that Iran is filling the vacuum.
    Has the number of active duty Russian military personnel increased 
or decreased since Russia invaded Ukraine?
    Has the number of personnel from Wagner or other Russian private 
military companies (PMCs) increased or decreased since Russia invaded 
Ukraine?
    Has Russian military or PMC activity changed since Russia invaded 
Ukraine? If so, how?
    Are the Russians consistently using the de-confliction line? Has 
their use of the deconfliction line increased or decreased since Russia 
invaded Ukraine?
    Have there been any incidents of close contact or unprofessional 
conduct by Russian forces or PMCs like Wagner towards U.S. forces in 
Syria post Ukraine? If so, has the frequency of those incidents 
increased or decreased since Russia invaded Ukraine?

    Answer. Russia has not significantly altered its force posture, 
including the number of active duty personnel, or its military 
activities in Syria since invading Ukraine. The Russian military 
continues to enable the Assad regime's brutal violence against the 
Syrian people. Coalition forces maintain air and ground de-confliction 
channels with the Russian military to protect Coalition forces and 
reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation or miscalculation; this 
engagement occurs daily and has not notably changed since Russia 
invaded Ukraine. The United States continues to urge Russia to adhere 
to mutual de-confliction processes and not to take any provocative 
action. Although Russian forces occasionally engage in unsafe and 
unprofessional behavior, there have not been any notable incidents of 
unprofessional close contact toward U.S. forces in Syria since Russia 
invaded Ukraine. DoD is aware of reports of Russian PMCs supporting 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. However, DoD cannot verify from where 
these fighters arrived, or the numbers of fighters involved.

    Question. Iran: Has the number of personnel from Iranian or Iran-
backed forces like Hezbollah increased or decreased since Russia 
invaded Ukraine?
    If so, can you attribute this change to a change in Russian 
military personnel in Syria?
    What effect has this change had on the security of U.S. personnel 
operating on the ground in Syria and in the air and what has been the 
U.S. response?

    Answer. There has not been a notable change in the number of 
Iranian or Iran-backed forces in Syria since Russia invaded Ukraine. 
Iranian military, economic, and political support to the Assad regime 
continues to enable and deepen the Syrian conflict and humanitarian 
crisis. Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and other Iran-aligned militia groups 
continue to threaten regional stability and the security of our allies 
and partners. Moreover, Iran continues to enable Iran-aligned militia 
groups to conduct attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces. Attacks on 
Coalition forces are unacceptable, and as the President has made clear, 
we will not hesitate to take necessary and proportionate action in 
self-defense to protect our service members.

    Question. ISIS: The January prison-break in northeastern Syria, as 
well as other complex attacks and the open extortion of civilians in 
Syria and Iraq are a worrisome reminder that ISIS remains a threat in 
both countries, even after the end of the physical Caliphate.
    What gaps have these recent attacks exposed in the SDF's capacity 
to secure prisons and continue the hunt for ISIS cells? What is the 
Administration doing to address these gaps and boost SDF-capacity?
    What is your assessment of ISIS's freedom of movement in Syria, 
Iraq, and between the two countries? More broadly, what do you assess 
is ISIS' current operational capability and the trajectory of its 
possible reassembly?
    How is the Administration working with the SDF and Iraqi Security 
Forces to limit that freedom of movement across the Syria-Iraq border?

    Answer. Although it no longer holds territory, ISIS remains a 
capable and dangerous threat. ISIS continues to operate primarily in 
small rural-based cells focused on conducting ambush attacks against 
security forces and plotting periodic high profile attacks in urban 
areas. ISIS also tries to infiltrate population centers by exploiting 
sectarian and other demographic tensions, including by targeting 
community and tribal leaders for assassination. ISIS maintains the 
intent to direct, support, and inspire attacks across the globe and 
continues efforts to rebuild its organization and re-establish a viable 
insurgency to regain territorial and societal control.
    More than 10,000 ISIS fighters remain in predominantly makeshift 
and overpopulated detention facilities across northeast Syria guarded 
by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are under significant 
pressure from multiple armed adversaries, a deteriorating economy 
inflamed by historic drought, and a potential Turkish operation into 
northern Syria. These detention facilities have historically been 
guarded by an undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained SDF guard 
force.
    To address these issues, DoD is continuing to leverage the Counter-
ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) appropriation to work with the SDF 
through three lines of effort: (1) the construction of new detention 
facilities and the repair and renovation of some existing facilities to 
support humane and secure conditions in SDF detention facilities; (2) 
training and professionalizing the guard force responsible for securing 
these facilities; and (3) facilitating the repatriation of non-Syrian 
detainees to their home-countries through efforts led by the State 
Department. These efforts have been accelerated in the wake of the ISIS 
attack in Hasakah.
    DoD also leverages CTEF to support vetted partner forces' efforts 
to secure their shared border from ISIS threats. For example, since 
2020, DoD has provided the Iraqi Border Guard Force $7.76 million in 
barrier material, $6.5 million in equipment, $1.25 million in uniform 
items, $1.84 million in class IX repair parts, and $55,000 in 
logistical support.

    Question. Turkey: I am concerned by recent statements by President 
Erdogan and others in his government that Turkish forces will mount an 
offensive to expand the Turkish-controlled buffer zone across northern 
Syria.
    What is the likelihood of such an operation and where along the 
Syria-Turkey border would it be most likely to happen?
    What effect would such an operation have on the SDF's capacity as 
an effective U.S. partner in the fight against ISIS?
    How have security cooperation and joint patrols between Russia and 
Turkey changed since Russia invaded Ukraine? Can we expect the Turks to 
try to fill in any vacuum that Russia leaves on the ground, especially 
in Kurdish areas like Manbij?

    Answer. DoD remains concerned by Turkish leaders' comments 
regarding the potential for an operation in northern Syria. Although we 
recognize Turkey's legitimate security concerns regarding the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S. designated foreign terrorist organization, 
the United States remains deeply concerned by the prospect of a Turkish 
offensive in northern Syria. Such an operation, which would likely draw 
SDF's attention, personnel, and resources away from the Defeat-ISIS 
fight, would put at risk the Coalition's campaign against ISIS and 
introduce more instability to Syria at a time when violence is at its 
lowest levels since the outset of the conflict. Any Turkish operation 
would effectively end a ceasefire that has been in place since 2019.
    At risk are D-ISIS operations, but also the safety of the civilian 
population and the security of SDF-managed detention facilities holding 
ISIS fighters. ISIS remains committed to attacking these facilities to 
reconstitute its forces and would try to exploit any instability or 
loss of focus on the D-ISIS fight.
    Although Russia does not appear to support Turkey's proposed 
operation in northern Syria, the two countries have continued to 
conduct joint patrols in parts of northern Syria. Turkish operations 
could provide space for the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran to exploit 
instability and advance their aims.

    Question. Captagon: Congress has become increasingly concerned by 
the Assad regime's manufacturing and trafficking of Captagon, a 
powerful amphetamine, throughout the region, often in partnership with 
Hezbollah.
    What assistance is the Defense Department providing to partner 
forces in Syria or to neighboring countries to increase interdiction 
capacity?

    Answer. DoD has provided training and equipment for border security 
operations pursuant to Section 333 of Title 10, U.S. Code, and 
reimbursement for border security operations pursuant to the authority 
in Section 1226 of the NDAA for FY 2016, as amended, to both Jordan and 
Lebanon, which has helped to bolster their counter-narcotics and 
counter-drug smuggling capabilities. The Government of Jordan 
identified Captagon and drug smuggling as a top national security 
priority, and, as of May 25, had seized approximately 20 million 
Captagon pills in 2022, in addition to seizing more than the 15.5 
million pills in 2021, and 1.4 million in 2020. The United States has 
highlighted the importance of this issue to the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) as well. In 2022, the LAF have conducted several successful 
counter-narcotics operations, raided a large Captagon manufacturing 
plant, and seized vehicles at the border carrying large quantities of 
Captagon.
    In addition, DoD CTEF-funded support enables the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) to conduct wide-area security in northeast Syria to enable 
the enduring defeat of ISIS. Such wide-area security can also have the 
additional benefit of disrupting efforts to counter narcotics 
trafficking in those areas.
    DoD also provides intelligence analysis support to partners within 
the U.S. Government, including the Department Homeland Security's 
Homeland Security Investigations' and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration's actions, targeting illicit Captagon trafficking. In 
particular, these efforts are focused on finding and disrupting 
Captagon trafficking on the northern border of Jordan and in the 
greater Levant. DoD's ongoing efforts have helped identify primary 
targets and associated entities involved in Captagon trafficking, which 
are shared with U.S. law enforcement partners.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Ms. Barbara Leaf to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Is this Administration fully committed to upholding its 
legal obligations under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (22 
U.S.C. 8791 note)?

    Answer. Yes. The Administration is fully committed to upholding all 
legal obligations under the Caesar Act. Our sanctions, including those 
under the Caesar Act, are important tools as we seek to promote 
accountability for the Assad regime's atrocities, some of which rise to 
the level of war crimes or crimes against humanity. This Administration 
continues to prioritize holding the Assad regime and its supporters 
accountable for their actions. We look forward to consulting with 
Congress as we continue to use our Syria sanctions authorities, 
including the Caesar Act.

    Question. Why has the Biden administration used Executive Orders as 
the authority for Syria sanctions rather than the Caesar Syria Civilian 
Protection Act? Are sanctions issued under EO compliant with the Caesar 
law?

    Answer. The U.S. Government continues to prioritize holding the 
Assad regime and its supporters accountable for their actions targeting 
the Syrian people and we will not hesitate to use our Syria sanctions 
authorities, including the Caesar Act. Over multiple Administrations, 
the United States has announced roughly 700 sanctions designations 
related to Syria under the 11 Syria and Syria-related sanctions 
authorities available, including the Caesar Act and several Executive 
Orders (E.O.). These E.O.s give the Departments of the Treasury and 
State sanctions authorities to target various actors in Syria, 
including Assad regime officials, who are complicit in corruption, 
human rights abuses, support for terrorism, and other malign actions. 
Among other things, the various Syria E.O.s enable Treasury to 
promulgate regulations and provide for blocking of Caesar-designated 
persons, including blocking their imports, which we cannot block under 
the Caesar Act alone because of Section 7434. All property and 
interests in property of persons designated pursuant to the Syria E.O.s 
that are or come within the United States or the possession or control 
of U.S. persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited 
from engaging in transactions with them. Additionally, entities owned 
50 percent or more, individually or in the aggregate, directly or 
indirectly, by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. This 
ensures the sanctions imposed are as robust as possible and constitute 
full blocking.

    Question. Since the Biden administration took office, we've seen 
few Caesar sanctions. Under the previous Administration we saw months 
of sanctions targeting Assad, his family members, his security 
apparatus, and those building luxury properties on confiscated land. 
How do you explain the slow pace of designations under the Biden 
administration?

    Answer. The Administration is fully committed to upholding legal 
obligations under the Caesar Act and values its role in promoting 
accountability. The Administration has taken multiple actions to 
promote accountability for human rights abuse in Syria. In July and 
December of 2021, we designated numerous Syrian regime officials in 
response to human rights abuses, including those committed with 
chemical weapons and those committed against detainees. We are 
continuing to seek opportunities to build evidence packages for new 
sanctions designations under the Caesar Act. We look forward to 
consulting with Congress as we continue this process.

    Question. Have the Departments of State and Treasury been unable to 
identify suitable targets?

    Answer. The Administration continues to work actively on an 
interagency basis to identify suitable targets for sanctions 
designations, including under the Caesar Act. We prioritize promoting 
accountability for the Assad regime for their actions targeting Syrians 
and we will not hesitate to use our sanctions authorities to address 
this issue. The Administration values the Caesar Act--which was passed 
by a bipartisan majority of the U.S. Congress--and its role in 
promoting accountability. Its ``chilling effect'' has successfully 
deterred countries and other entities from investing in Syria or 
engaging economically with Assad's government.

    Question. Why did the State Department dismantle and reduce the 
number of personnel assigned to the Caesar targeting team? To what 
extent did a lack of resources contribute to the Administration's lack 
of Caesar sanctions enforcement?

    Answer. Personnel changes within the U.S. Government occur at the 
start of every new Administration. We have a talented team of 
individuals across the interagency who continue to focus and coordinate 
on this issue. This Administration remains committed to using all tools 
at our disposal to promote accountability in Syria, including by 
issuing sanctions under multiple authorities and the Caesar Act.

    Question. I'm deeply concerned with this Administration's support 
for energy projects that would benefit the Assad regime. Specifically, 
the movement of Egyptian gas through Jordan and Syria into Lebanon. 
Some sources cite an 8 percent transit fee payable to Assad. How are 
these energy projects not subject to sanctions under the Caesar Act?

    Answer. We have not lifted or waived Syria-related sanctions in 
this case; we have not seen the final contracts. Under the proposed gas 
and electricity arrangements being negotiated by Jordan, Egypt, and 
Lebanon, we understand that the Syrian regime would receive no cash. 
Instead, it would receive in-kind gas/electricity for transiting Syrian 
territory; estimates suggest this would add a matter of minutes of 
electricity to Syria per day. No financial payments will be provided to 
Assad. The Departments of the Treasury and State will need to receive 
the final contracts from the parties and the final financing details 
from the World Bank before reviewing the details to assess any possible 
sanctions concerns.

    Question. The State Department's energy envoy, Amos Hochstein, has 
asserted these deals are exempt from sanctions because Assad is likely 
to be paid in-kind, not in cash, for his participation in these deals. 
How do in-kind contributions to the Assad regime circumvent U.S. law 
and Caesar Act enforcement?

    Answer. As Secretary Blinken has made clear, we have not lifted or 
waived Syria-related sanctions in this case. The Departments of the 
Treasury and State will need to receive the final contracts from the 
parties and the final financing details from the World Bank before 
reviewing the details to assess any possible sanctions concerns.

    Question. Russia has been traditionally responsible for maintenance 
on the Syrian portion of the pipeline. How does this Administration 
plan to ensure the Gas Pipeline project does not benefit sanctioned 
Russian entities as they assault Ukraine?

    Answer. The Departments of the Treasury and State will need to 
receive the final contracts from the parties and the final financing 
details from the World Bank before reviewing the details to assess any 
possible sanctions concerns.

    Question. How does the Administration plan to address Syria's work 
with a sanctioned Russian entity, Stroytransgaz, with known connections 
to the Kremlin as it continues to undermine Ukraine's security? Does 
this Administration feel waiving sanctions on Stroytransgaz under E.O. 
13662 is necessary to repair and maintain the Arab Gas Pipeline?

    Answer. Speaking broadly, a number of Syrian and Russian entities 
involved in the Syrian economy are designated under various sanctions 
authorities. We are aware of reports that the Russian firm 
Stroytransgaz was involved in construction of the Syrian portion of the 
Arab Gas Pipeline, which was completed in February 2008. Stroytransgaz 
has been on the OFAC SDN list since 2014. The Departments of the 
Treasury and State will need to receive the final contracts from the 
parties and the final financing details from the World Bank before 
reviewing the details to assess any possible sanctions concerns.

    Question. How much does Stroytransgaz and its subcontractors stand 
to gain from any deal related to the Arab Gas Pipeline financially?

    Answer. Speaking broadly, a number of Syrian and Russian entities 
involved in the Syrian economy are designated under various sanctions 
authorities. We are aware of reports that the Russian firm 
Stroytransgaz was involved in construction of the Syrian portion of the 
Arab Gas Pipeline, which was completed in February 2008. Stroytransgaz 
has been on the OFAC SDN list since 2014. The Departments of the 
Treasury and State will need to receive the final contracts from the 
parties and the final financing details from the World Bank before 
reviewing the details to assess any possible sanctions concerns. We 
understand that there are no cash transactions involved in these 
contracts, but we will review the final contracts with U.S. law and 
sanctions as the framework for our decisions.

    Question. Given that Stroytransgaz is under sanctions for its role 
in destabilizing Ukraine, do you not feel this project runs counter to 
the Administration's Russia policy?

    Answer. We are aware of reports that the Russian firm Stroytransgaz 
was involved in construction of the Syrian portion of the Arab Gas 
Pipeline, which was completed in February 2008. The Departments of the 
Treasury and State will need to receive the final contracts from the 
parties and the final financing details from the World Bank before 
reviewing the details to assess any possible sanctions concerns.

    Question. How does this Administration plan to ensure the ``in 
kind'' benefit to the regime will not be diverted to chemical weapons 
facilities, military bases, or prisons run by the Assad regime or its 
backers?

    Answer. The Departments of the Treasury and State will need to 
receive the final contracts from the parties and the final financing 
details from the World Bank before reviewing the details to assess any 
possible sanctions concerns. With regard to the Syrian regime's 
military apparatus, the United States will continue to use all 
available tools, including Caesar Act sanctions, to further press for 
accountability for the ongoing atrocities of the Assad regime.

    Question. The Arab Gas pipeline physically feeds Assad's military, 
intelligence, and detention facilities--in addition to civilian 
infrastructure. How does the pipeline not contribute to continued 
atrocities against the Syrian people given its physical proximity to 
these sites?

    Answer. The Departments of the Treasury and State will need to 
receive the final contracts from the parties and the final financing 
details from the World Bank before reviewing the details to assess any 
possible sanctions concerns. Our understanding from the draft 
agreements is that the Syrian regime will receive in kind payments of 
natural gas and potentially electricity worth additional minutes per 
day of electricity. With regard to the Syrian regime's military 
apparatus, the United States will continue to use all available tools, 
including Caesar Act sanctions, to further press for accountability for 
the ongoing atrocities of the Assad regime.

    Question. UNSCR 2254 calls for a ceasefire, a constitutional 
committee and free and fair elections that reflect the will of the 
Syrian people. Progress on 2254 has been frustrated at all turns, the 
constitutional committee has been hampered by regime intransigence, and 
the de facto ceasefire in Syria lacks any formal mechanisms. Is UNSCR 
2254 an appropriate construct to further a political solution to the 
Syria crisis?

    Answer. UNSCR 2254, unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council 
in 2015, remains the best internationally supported framework for 
advancing a political resolution to the Syria crisis. The Assad regime 
remains the real impediment to any progress on the political process. 
The continued stalling tactics by the regime have resulted in no 
meaningful outcomes to date in the Constitutional Committee. I plan to 
continue to work closely with the United Nations as well as our 
partners and allies to push to find ways to advance all aspects of UN 
Security Council Resolution 2254, which include releasing arbitrarily 
detained persons, maintaining a nationwide ceasefire, and creating 
conditions that will eventually allow for the voluntary, safe, and 
dignified return of refugees.

    Question. How can we accelerate progress on UNSCR 2254 provisions?

    Answer. We are working closely with the United Nations and our 
likeminded allies and partners to advance the political process and 
continue to support the Syrian opposition, civil society, and other key 
Syrian stakeholders to reach an inclusive and lasting political 
solution consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 
2254. We believe our priorities--keeping violence down, increasing 
access to aid, promoting accountability for human rights violations and 
abuses, and defeating ISIS and al Qa'ida--are important steps on the 
road to advancing a broader political settlement to the Syrian conflict 
consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

    Question. Given reports of the Assad regime's diversion of 
humanitarian assistance, including through currency manipulation of UN-
provided assistance, what mechanisms are in place to prevent diversion 
that would enrich the regime and its backers? Please provide details.

    Answer. We require all of our partners to have robust risk 
mitigation measures and monitoring to prevent aid diversion throughout 
Syria, and we take all possible steps to ensure that humanitarian aid 
funded by American taxpayers reaches those for whom it is intended. We 
are pressing the UN to continue negotiating the resumption of a moving 
preferential exchange rate for UN aid provided in regime-held areas. 
Additionally, the United States helped establish a Regional Dialogue 
Mechanism with the UN and major donors to enhance information sharing 
on issues of concern, identify risks, and press for solutions. Most of 
the goods provided by the UN in Syria are purchased outside of the 
country, and thus not affected by the Syrian pound's exchange rate.

    Question. Do you concur that the Assad regime stole $100 million of 
aid money by manipulating exchange rates, as documented by analysts at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies?

    Answer. We have reviewed this analysis but do not concur with its 
assessment of the scale of currency-related losses. We agree that loss 
of any value is concerning, but we assess that currency-related loss is 
lower than the $100 million estimated by CSIS. In addition, the UN 
notes the majority of the goods it provides in Syria are purchased 
outside of the country, and thus not affected by the Syrian pound's 
exchange rate. The gap between the official exchange rate and the 
unofficial rate has fluctuated over recent years, based on inflation 
and the financial crisis currently affecting the country. Official 
banks, which our partners are required to use in regime-held areas, 
follow the official exchange rate set by the Central Bank of Syria, 
with which the UN is seeking to address the effect of rates on 
humanitarian organizations through mechanisms such as preferred 
exchange rates.

    Question. Does the State Department track amounts of aid stolen or 
otherwise diverted by the regime and its partners?

    Answer. We take all possible steps to ensure that humanitarian 
assistance funded by American taxpayers reaches those for whom it is 
intended. We carefully monitor the risks associated with providing aid 
in all parts of Syria and work closely with our partners, other donors, 
and the United Nations on this issue. Exchange rate issues are not 
unique to Syria alone: they affect partners working in many countries 
experiencing significant economic distress. However, our partners 
inform us of these issues when they begin affecting their ability to 
effectively deliver and meet the terms of their contracts with the 
United States. The Department, USAID, and other international donors 
have been discussing these issues with partners in response to 
fluctuations of the Syrian pound, and we are currently working with the 
UN and other donors to address the issue.

    Question. What is the best estimate of the total amount lost in the 
last 12 months?

    Answer. We cannot definitively estimate the total amount of 
currency lost through the exchange-rate differential in the last 12 
months, but we assess it to be comparable to other humanitarian 
contexts where official and unofficial exchange rates have diverged. 
Nevertheless, we are working closely with other donors and the UN to 
address the issue through negotiations on a preferential exchange rate 
that will enable greater control over currency fluctuations.

    Question. Please provide descriptions of the legal and programmatic 
distinction between early recovery, reconstruction, and stabilization 
expenditures in Syria in both northeast Syria and regime-controlled 
areas.

    Answer. Early recovery programs are a form of humanitarian 
assistance based on community needs and humanitarian imperatives and 
conducted by independent and impartial humanitarian agencies across 
Syria, without direction from the Assad regime or other local 
authorities. It should not be confused with reconstruction, which is 
directed by the state in support of conflict transformation and entails 
political support to civil institutions. Stabilization assistance is 
driven by and implemented entirely in support of U.S. foreign policy 
goals, and only provided in non-regime held areas of Syria. The United 
States neither supports nor engages in reconstruction directed by the 
Assad regime, which would be designed to benefit its own narrow 
interests; nor will we do so absent authentic, enduring progress toward 
a political solution to the Syrian conflict.

    Question. The Biden administration is supporting ``early recovery 
projects'' in regime-held areas, to include refurbishment of hospitals 
destroyed and damaged in Syrian regime airstrikes. How does the 
Administration characterize these projects? Are these projects a 
violation of the Caesar Act, why or why not?

    Answer. Early recovery is a form of humanitarian assistance that 
aims to reduce immediate and protracted humanitarian needs by 
strengthening the self-reliance of affected populations, improving 
individual, household, and community welfare, and therefore reducing 
dependence on external assistance. The U.S. has long supported early 
recovery efforts across all parts of Syria. Official U.S. Federal 
Government business, including early recovery activities, in regime-
held areas of Syria, such as the rehabilitation of health and other 
service infrastructure, are authorized pursuant to  542.522 and  
542.211(d) of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations. The general license in 
 542.516 of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, the 2019 version of 
which was codified by the Caesar Act, authorizes nongovernmental 
organizations to support humanitarian projects to meet basic human 
needs in Syria, including early recovery activities.

    Question. There are currently 10,000-12,000 displaced Syrians now 
living at a camp in Rukban, in the no man's land that separates the 
Syrian and Jordanian borders. There had been more than 50,000 displaced 
persons living in Rukban, yet Russia and the Assad regime starved most 
of them out by refusing permission for deliveries by UN aid convoys--a 
clear violation of international humanitarian obligations. Until last 
March, a UN clinic on the Jordanian border provided treatment for the 
population at Rukban. The challenge of COVID is cited as the reason for 
the clinic remaining closed, but this means the population has no 
access to a physician, even when lives are at risk. It is our 
understanding that any remaining medical supplies or medical attention 
is smuggled in through outside channels and is rapidly dwindling.
    What steps are this Administration prepared to take if Assad and 
his Russian backers continue to prevent aid from getting through to the 
thousands of displaced persons remaining at Rukban camp?

    Answer. The Administration remains committed to increasing 
humanitarian access to all parts of Syria, which includes humanitarian 
access to Rukban. It is the Assad regime and Russia that have 
consistently blocked those efforts. The U.S. Government continues to 
support the UN's attempts to bring life-saving aid to the Rukban camp, 
and we remain in close contact with the United Nations and our partners 
about this effort.

    Question. What options remain for the camp's population short of 
returning to Assad-held territory where they face the threat of 
enforced detention and disappearance?

    Answer. We continue to explore all possible durable solutions for 
the residents of Rukban, and we routinely stress to the United Nations 
and our partners that any movements of individuals from the camp should 
be fully informed, safe, voluntary, and dignified.

    Question. Will the Administration consider the provision of aid to 
Rukban via the U.S. garrison at al-Tanf in eastern Syria, which is less 
than 30 miles away?

    Answer. We continue to review all options for improving the 
humanitarian situation in Rukban. The mission of our military forces at 
al-Tanf garrison is to defeat ISIS. We are ready to support future UN 
humanitarian convoys and reject efforts by the Assad regime and Russia 
to impede UN access to the camp. The Administration stands ready to 
provide further details in an appropriate setting.

    Question. After a year-long review, the Biden administration 
affirmed U.S. policy toward Syria would be based on a four-pronged 
approach: expanding humanitarian access, countering the threat of 
terrorism, upholding ceasefire agreements, and promoting 
accountability. Despite the ostensibly expansive nature of this 
Administration's approach to Syria policy, it seems as though the focus 
has almost exclusively been expanding humanitarian access.
    The Caesar Act authorizes the Secretary of State of provide 
technical assistance to entities seeking proof of war crimes in Syria. 
What technical assistance has the State Department provided to date? To 
which entities has the Department provided assistance?

    Answer. U.S. stabilization assistance supports Syrian and other 
civil society organizations (CSOs), to collect evidence of the regime's 
atrocities in Syria, some of which rise to the level of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. This work has focused on gathering and 
analyzing evidence of atrocities, which may be used to build case files 
to prosecute those responsible for atrocity crimes. These efforts help 
provide critical evidence to both informal and formal mechanisms, such 
as the UN Commission of Inquiry, the International, Impartial, and 
Independent Mechanism (IIIM), and criminal proceedings in third 
countries under the principle of universal jurisdiction, to promote 
accountability. U.S. assistance also supports survivors of atrocities 
and their families with critical resiliency, mental health, and 
psychosocial support.

    Question. What specific steps has the Biden administration 
undertaken to promote justice and accountability for war crimes in 
Syria?

    Answer. The United States Government remains firmly committed to 
securing accountability for the atrocities the Assad regime continues 
to inflict upon Syrians. The Administration supports Syrian and other 
civil society organizations (CSOs) in their efforts to advance justice 
and accountability through activities that preserve and analyze 
documentation of human rights violations and abuses, contribute to 
criminal prosecutions, empower survivors of war crimes and support 
healing, and begin the process of identifying Syria's missing. 
Supporting Syrian CSOs, NGOs, and UN agencies in these capacities 
ensures relevant information and evidence are collected, secured, 
analyzed, and appropriately shared to promote and pursue accountability 
for those responsible for atrocities. In addition, a number of State 
Department grantees have provided critical data, information and 
expertise to prosecutions brought on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction for atrocities and crimes in Syria.

    Question. To what extent do you feel there is an opportunity to 
coordinate between accountability mechanisms as relates to war crimes 
committed in Ukraine and those being perpetrated in Syria?

    Answer. Because Syrians understand Russia's human rights abuses all 
too well, a number of Syrian civil society organizations are now 
assisting Ukrainians to document the atrocities committed in Ukraine, 
including by applying their technological expertise to preserve 
documentation of human rights abuses and violations. Additionally 
Syrian organizations are consulting with Ukrainian civil defense 
authorities on lessons learned including on medical evacuation, 
responses to bombing, as well as urban search and rescue. The State 
Department regularly consults with these organizations; we also support 
their work through elevating their research and activities. The State 
Department will consider all mechanisms to promote accountability, 
including sanctions, to reinforce respective efforts.

    Question. What specific measures, beyond verbal condemnation, is 
the Administration taking to deal with Assad's continuing war crimes? 
What role can and should sanctions play in holding Assad and his 
backers accountable?

    Answer. The Administration continues to support Syrian CSOs, as 
well as NGOs, and UN entities in their efforts to advance justice and 
accountability through activities that preserve and analyze 
documentation of human rights violations and abuses, contribute to 
criminal prosecutions, empower survivors of war crimes and support 
healing, and begin the process of identifying Syria's missing. We 
believe that sanctions are an important tool to press for 
accountability for the Assad regime and other perpetrators of abuses. 
In the past year, we sanctioned Syrian officials in the intelligence 
and security apparatus in connection with human rights abuses, as well 
as the regime-affiliated militia Saraya al-Areen, which participated in 
offensive operations which contributed to the mass displacement of 
Syrian civilians. We also sanctioned the armed opposition group Ahrar 
al-Sharqiya for human rights abuses in northern Syria. We will continue 
to use our sanctions authorities, including the Caesar Act, to press 
for accountability.

    Question. What specific measures is the Administration taking to 
deal with the ongoing torture and killing in Assad's prisons?

    Answer. We continue to condemn and highlight ongoing violations and 
abuses, including through the three resolutions in the UN Human Rights 
Council and the Syria resolution in the UN Third Committee. In the past 
year, the Administration sanctioned eight Syrian prisons run by the 
Assad regime's intelligence apparatus, which reportedly have been sites 
of human rights abuses against political prisoners and other detainees. 
We have also sanctioned Syrian officials in the intelligence and 
security apparatus in connection with human rights abuses, and the 
regime-affiliated militia Saraya al-Areen, which participated in 
offensive operations which contributed to the mass displacement of 
Syrian civilians.

    Question. What plans does the Administration have to hold the Assad 
regime accountable for its violations of the ban on chemical weapons?

    Answer. We will continue to pursue accountability for the Assad 
regime at the OPCW and in other fora, including the UNSC. The United 
States spearheaded an April 2021 decision by the OPCW Conference of the 
States Parties condemning Syria's use of chemical weapons and 
suspending certain of Syria's rights and privileges under the 
Convention--the first time this authority has been used at the OPCW. We 
have fended off, and will endeavor to continue fending off, attempts by 
malign actors including Syria, Russia, Iran and China to weaken the 
OPCW's Syria accountability efforts, including their attempts to defund 
the attribution mechanism, the Investigation and Identification Team.

    Question. In January, the chairman and ranking member of this 
committee, along with their counterparts in the House, sent a letter to 
Secretary Blinken in which they observed, ``Tacit approval of formal 
diplomatic engagement with the Syrian regime [by America's Arab 
partners] sets a dangerous precedent for authoritarians who seek to 
commit similar crimes against humanity.''
    Have you threatened Caesar sanctions against countries normalizing 
with Assad?

    Answer. We have made clear with our partners both in the Middle 
East and beyond that we vehemently oppose normalizing relations with 
the Assad regime. We discourage our partners from normalizing relations 
with the Assad regime and urge states considering engagement to weigh 
carefully the immutable fact that the Assad regime continues to subject 
Syrians to horrific atrocities and deny much of the country access to 
humanitarian aid and security. We also continue to make clear that U.S. 
sanctions remain in place and that companies, individuals or 
governments seeking to invest in Syria risk exposure to U.S. sanctions. 
The existence of the sanctions in itself has had a deterrent effect on 
such investment.

    Question. What specific measures have you taken to push back 
against normalization with Assad?

    Answer. We continue to make clear to partners in the Middle East 
and beyond that we oppose efforts to normalize with the brutal dictator 
Bashar al-Assad. We also oppose Syria's return to the Arab League and 
continue to oppose the reconstruction of Syria until there is 
authentic, durable progress towards a political solution. In 
discussions with partners, we continue to underline the Assad regime's 
ongoing horrific atrocities against Syrians, including over the last 
decade, as well as its continuing efforts to deny much of the country 
access to humanitarian aid and security. The United States will 
continue to lead the international community in pressuring the Assad 
regime--and its Russian and Iranian backers--to cease its brutal war 
against its own people.

    Question. In your view, has the Administration been successful in 
dissuading our partners from pursing active engagement with the Assad 
regime?

    Answer. Most states continue to oppose normalization with the Assad 
regime absent significant and enduring progress on the political track. 
Additionally, there is no consensus among Arab League members to 
readmit Syria. We will continue to urge states considering engagement 
with the Assad regime to weigh carefully the ongoing horrific 
atrocities visited by the regime on the Syrian people, including over 
the last decade, as well as the regime's continuing efforts to deny 
much of the country access to humanitarian aid and security.

    Question. You noted in your testimony that the Assad regime has 
used our regional partners' engagement to craft a narrative of a 
groundswell of support. What actions has the Department taken to combat 
this narrative?

    Answer. We are profoundly disappointed and troubled by efforts from 
some states to repair the international reputation of Bashar al-Assad, 
who has overseen the death and suffering of hundreds of thousands of 
Syrians, the displacement of more than half of the pre-war Syrian 
population, and the arbitrary detention or disappearance of over 
130,000 Syrian men, women and children. We continue to work with 
likeminded partners to urge states considering engagement with the 
Assad regime to weigh carefully the horrific atrocities visited by the 
regime on the Syrian people, including over the last decade, as well as 
the regime's continuing efforts to deny much of the country access to 
humanitarian aid and security.

    Question. In a January letter to Secretary Blinken, the Chair and 
Ranking Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House 
Foreign Affairs Committee called on the Administration to use all tools 
necessary to cut off the Assad regime's access to illicit revenue 
streams, including those garnered through the Captagon trade. What is 
your assessment of the Assad regime's involvement in the Captagon 
trade?

    Answer. We assess elements affiliated with the Assad regime, as 
well as Hizballah and other terrorist groups in Syria and Lebanon, have 
been associated with illicit narcotics production and trafficking in 
Syria, including of Captagon. Entities with known or suspected links to 
Assad regime officials and Hizballah are reportedly producing the drug 
in both Syria and across the border in Lebanon.

    Question. Captagon smuggling clearly presents a very serious threat 
to our regional partners. What is this Administration's plan for 
addressing this threat?

    Answer. This Administration is concerned about illicit narcotics 
trafficking originating in Syria and actively working on this issue. 
The U.S. Government is engaging with countries across the region, as 
well as other allies to increase coordination between governments to 
fight Captagon trafficking, including through the exchange of 
information, identification of targets, and coordination of operations 
to combat Captagon trafficking and distribution. We will use all 
available tools to address illicit narcotics trafficking originating in 
Syria, including, as appropriate, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection 
Act.

    Question. Why was Assad's income from Captagon omitted from the 
NDAA-mandated Assad wealth report?

    Answer. The report on the Assad family's wealth described certain 
members of the Assad family potentially receiving financial gain from 
involvement in illicit drug trafficking, specifically Captagon. In 
providing the estimates for Assad's income, the interagency sought to 
include verifiable information that came from a range of sources. The 
Administration is available to provide further details in response to 
this question in an appropriate setting.

    Question. Is countering the Captagon trade a pillar of U.S. policy 
toward Syria?

    Answer. There is a robust interagency effort within the U.S. 
Government to counter the Captagon trade in the Levant. The Department 
of State coordinates with Treasury on the use of the Transnational 
Criminal Organizations Sanctions and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin 
Sanctions programs to target transnational criminal actors and drug 
trafficking, respectively. We are committed to using all available 
tools to address illicit narcotics trafficking originating in Syria, 
including, as appropriate, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.

    Question. What measures did last year's strategic review of Syria 
policy recommend to counter Captagon trade?

    Answer. The U.S. Government seeks to combat the Captagon trade by 
working through diplomatic engagements with key regional and global 
partners to identify the extent of Syrian-origin Captagon production; 
cooperating directly with international law enforcement partners to 
disrupt the drug trafficking infrastructure directly and indirectly; 
using additional law enforcement and other tools to target individuals 
and entities associated with the Syrian narcotics infrastructure, which 
could include further legal actions or sanctions when appropriate; and 
increasing information exchange and cooperation with and assistance to 
countries in the region.

    Question. Is the Administration already preparing an interagency 
strategy to address Captagon trafficking? If not, why?

    Answer. The U.S. Government is already engaging with countries 
across the region, as well as other allies to increase coordination 
between governments to fight Captagon trafficking, including through 
the exchange of information, identification of targets, and 
coordination of operations to combat Captagon trafficking and 
distribution. The Department of State coordinates with Treasury on the 
use of the Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions and the 
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions programs to target transnational 
criminal actors and drug trafficking, respectively. We will use all 
available tools to address illicit narcotics trafficking originating in 
Syria, including the Syrian Sanctions Regulations and the Caesar Syria 
Civilian Protection Act, which may apply to persons whose illicit 
activities provide significant benefit to the Assad regime.

    Question. What would be the consequences of a Russian veto of 
cross-border aid when the issue comes before the Security Council next 
month?

    Answer. The loss of UN cross-border humanitarian access through the 
Bab al-Hawa crossing would have disastrous repercussions, cause a 
precipitous decline in assistance reaching the people of northwest 
Syria, and the attendant effects on the food security, health, and 
protection of its 4.1 million residents.

    Question. What percentage of UN aid could be replaced by supplies 
from other sources?

    Answer. Preparations to date have confirmed our assessment that any 
contingency operations in the event of a non-authorization of the 
cross-border mechanism would only cover a fraction of the UN's current 
caseload of assisting 2.4 million people per month through cross-border 
aid, which includes recipients of food, health, shelter, water and 
sanitation, and protection. The Department is available to provide 
further details in response to this question in an appropriate setting.

    Question. In the event of a Russian veto, does the Administration 
have a plan to rapidly increase its ability to dispatch aid to 
northwest Syria?

    Answer. We will use all means available to advocate for continued 
humanitarian access and to deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the 
Syrian people, including in the northwest, in coordination with the UN, 
NGOs, other donors, and partner countries. In any emergency response, 
including in Syria, we expect humanitarian agencies to prepare for all 
reasonable scenarios so life-saving aid keeps flowing to those who need 
it. However, any contingency operations in the event of a non-
authorization will only cover a fraction of the UN's current caseload. 
Such operations would be constrained by both logistical challenges and 
the limits of funding, including our humanitarian appropriations 
provided by Congress. The Department is available to provide further 
details in response to this question in an appropriate setting.

    Question. How many weeks or months would pass before this fallback 
plan could ship half as much aid to northwest Syria as the UN currently 
provides?

    Answer. The Department is available to provide a detailed response 
to this question in an appropriate setting.

    Question. How many months would be required for full replacement of 
UN-provided aid to northwest Syria?

    Answer. We assess that any contingency operations in the event of a 
non-authorization will only cover a fraction of the UN's current 
caseload. We will use all means available to advocate for continued 
humanitarian access and to deliver U.S. humanitarian assistance to the 
Syrian people, including in the northwest, in coordination with the UN, 
NGOs, other donors, and partner countries.

    Question. At this point in time, how likely does the Administration 
assess a Russian veto?

    Answer. Russia has threatened to veto past resolutions and forced 
the closure of other UN-authorized border crossings. Last year, the 
Administration led an intensive diplomatic effort and was able to 
secure unanimous support of the cross-border mandate in the UN Security 
Council. We will devote our efforts to doing the same this year. The 
Department is available to provide a detailed response to this question 
in an appropriate setting.

    Question. What concessions is the Administration prepared to offer 
to Moscow to prevent a Russian veto, or do you believe that we should 
not reward the use of desperate civilians as hostages?

    Answer. We believe there is a clear humanitarian imperative to 
maintain the UN cross-border mechanism, and that this view is shared by 
the vast majority of Council members. Any negotiations in the UN to 
avoid a Russian veto will be conducted with the well-being of 
vulnerable Syrians as our core interest and objective, consistent with 
our Syria and Russia policies.
                                 ______
                                 

Statement of Dr. Muhammad Bakr Ghbeis, President, Citizens for a Secure 
              and Safe America Educational Committee, Inc.

    Mr. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
Committee, we are all gripped with the horrors and destruction Vladimir 
Putin is raining down on Ukraine. The attacks on civilians and the 
murder of thousands of innocent souls have united the world in horror. 
But it is not the only place where a murderous government led by a 
dictator has killed countless men, women, and children.
    For the past decade, the Assad regime--with the support of the 
Kremlin--has carried out a war against its own people. The have 
attacked civilians with the worst weapons of war. From chemical weapons 
to barrel bombs designed only to kill, Assad has murdered hundreds of 
thousands of Syrian citizens.
    To take on Assad, the United States needs an active strategy to 
implement UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and the Biden 
administration needs to lobby the free world to align behind that. As 
spelled out in 2254, only an inclusive and Syrian-led political process 
that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people, including 
through the establishment of an inclusive transitional governing body 
with full executive powers, will allow Syria to have future free from 
the death and destruction brought by Assad and his backers in Teheran 
and Moscow.
    We're already starting to consider how to hold accountable those 
responsible for the war of aggression against Ukraine. Unfortunately, 
the world has not yet brought this level of seriousness and urgency to 
the imperative of justice for the killed, wounded, and missing Syrians.
    Today, that is changing. This hearing discussing accountability for 
the crimes perpetrated by the regime of Bashar Assad is a critical step 
forward. Assad's crimes are so vast and the depravity so grave that the 
violations cry out for attention. I believe that the Committee's work 
will help provide a road map for one of the most vexing questions 
facing victims of crimes against humanity: how to bring to justice the 
leaders of regimes which commit horrific crimes in the names of their 
states.
    The International Criminal Court is one obvious venue to haul 
indicted leaders in front of a judicial panel. But, several states, 
including the United States, Russia, and Syria, are not members of the 
ICC. Specific tribunals have been created to handle certain infamous 
acts of genocide. The Nuremberg Trials and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia adjudicated the crimes perpetrated 
by the Nazi and Milosevic regimes. But, those are sadly the exception, 
not the rule as creating an internationally-accepted court is 
exceedingly difficult.
    Other mechanisms exist. Some countries have extraterritorial 
criminal laws under which they can try offenders from other countries 
indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In fact, Germany 
recently convicted a Syrian military officer for crimes against 
humanity due to his links to the torture of more than 4000 people. 
Syrians around the world applauded this verdict in the hope that 
charges would be brought against other Assad lieutenants. But those 
laws are the cutting edge of international justice and most states 
don't have similar laws. Further, perpetrators must be found within the 
jurisdiction of that country or other countries to be arrested and 
charged.
    So, Mr. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
Committee, thank you for taking on the question of justice for victims 
of Assad's atrocities in Syria. The work of this Committee is vital in 
the effort to hold the Assad regime--and its backers in Moscow, 
Teheran, and elsewhere--accountable for their crimes.
                                 ______
                                 

 Article From The Guardian Dated April 26, 2022 Titled, ``Massacre in 
     Tadamon: How Two Academics Hunted Down a Syrian War Criminal''

[Editor's note.--This article can also be found at: https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/27/massacre-in-tadamon-how-two-

academics-hunted-down-a-syrian-war-criminal]