[Senate Hearing 117-490]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 117-490

                 DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE
                               
            COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            SPECIAL HEARING

                      MAY 12, 2021--WASHINGTON, DC

                               __________

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                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                    PATRICK LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
PATTY MURRAY, Washington             RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Vice 
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California             Chairman
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
JACK REED, Rhode Island              SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JON TESTER, Montana                  LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 ROY BLUNT, Missouri
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West 
JOE MANCHIN, III, West Virginia          Virginia
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi
                                     MIKE BRAUN, Indiana
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                                     MARCO RUBIO, Florida

                   Charles E. Kieffer, Staff Director
               Shannon H. Hines, Minority Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Opening Statement of Chairman Patrick Leahy......................     1
    Prepared Statement...........................................     2

Statement of Senator Richard C. Shelby...........................     3

Statement of Hon. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, U.S. 
  Department of Justice..........................................     6
    Prepared Statement...........................................     8

Statement of Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. 
  Department of Homeland Security................................    11
    Prepared Statement...........................................    13
        Introduction.............................................    13
        The Current Threat Landscape.............................    13
        Addressing Domestic Violent Extremism....................    14
        Expanding Our Partnerships...............................    15
        Conclusion...............................................    16

Department of Justice Approach to Combatting Domestic Violent 
  Extremism......................................................    16
Federal Prosecution of Domestic Violent Extremism................    19
Domestic Violent Extremism Within Law Enforcement................    20
Federal Prosecution of Domestic Violent Extremist Criminal 
  Activity.......................................................    22
Commission on Information Literacy...............................    24
Protecting Constitutional Rights During Criminal Investigations..    25
Social Media and Self-Radicalization.............................    27
Studying Domestic Radicalization.................................    28
Violent Crime in Chicago.........................................    29
Domestic Violent Extremist Access to Weaponry....................    31
Domestic Violent Extremist Links to International Terrorist 
  Groups.........................................................    34
Misinformation Driving Domestic Violent Extremism................    38
Additional Committee Questions...................................    41

Questions Submitted to Attorney General Merrick B. Garland.......    41
    Questions Submitted by:
        Chairman Patrick Leahy...................................    41
        Senator Brian Schatz.....................................    44
        Senator Joe Manchin, III.................................    45
        Senator Susan M. Collins.................................    48
        Senator Roy Blunt........................................    49
        Senator John Hoeven......................................    50
        Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith.................................    51

Questions Submitted to Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas...........    52
    Questions Submitted by:
        Chairman Patrick Leahy...................................    52
        Senator Brian Schatz.....................................    54
        Senator Joe Manchin, III.................................    55
        Senator Richard C. Shelby................................    59
        Senator Roy Blunt........................................    63
        Senator John Hoeven......................................    64
        Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith.................................    68
        Senator Mike Braun.......................................    69
        Senator Bill Hagerty.....................................    69

Conclusion of Hearing............................................    73

 
                 DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICA

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met at 10:08 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate 
Office Building, Hon. Patrick Leahy (chairman) presiding.
    Present: Senators Leahy, Durbin, Reed, Shaheen, Coons, 
Murphy, Van Hollen, Shelby, Collins, Murkowski, Hoeven, 
Kennedy, Braun, and Hagerty.


              opening statement of chairman patrick leahy


    Chairman Leahy. Good morning. Good morning, everybody. 
Appreciate being here, all of you. This is somewhat an unusual 
way to meet, and I would mention this to our two distinguished 
witnesses. It is a little bit more difficult to keep the 
distances we want, but I think it is important for the 
Appropriations Committee to have this meeting.
    The January 6th images--all of us remember that--of 
insurrectionists flying Confederate flags as they stormed the 
U.S. Capitol are stark reminders that domestic violence 
extremism in America is hardly a new threat. The Nation's 
history has been marred by the violent deadly acts of 
extremists pushing a range of hateful white supremacist 
ideologies.
    From the Ku Klux Klan to Timothy McVeigh, we have witnessed 
and we have suffered through as a people extremists killing 
innocent people in the name of usually morally, always morally 
bankrupt causes.
    The violence on January 6th was simply the latest chapter 
in this long history of domestic extremism in America. Attacks 
and plots by domestic extremists are at historic highs, the 
majority of them being planned by those in the far right 
espousing White supremacist and related ideologies.
    In 2020 alone, White nationalists and like-minded 
extremists conducted 66 percent of terrorist plots and attacks 
in the United States. It appears we are facing a class of 
criminals who feel more emboldened than ever, and in asking 
why, we cannot ignore a simple fact.
    Over the last 4 years, extremists who were once relegated 
to the fringes of our society, uniformly condemned by our 
Nation's leaders, both parties, suddenly felt they had support 
at the highest level of the United States Government, and 
indeed in the Oval Office.
    We had a President who, instead of simply condemning the 
violence in Charlottesville, where a woman was killed during a 
White nationalist rally, said to the Nation, ``There are very 
fine people on both sides.'' When asked if he denounced White 
supremacy during an election debate, doing so without 
equivocation, he told the right-wing Proud Boys, ``Stand back 
and stand by.'' He urged the crowd to fight like hell moments 
before they did just that, storming the U.S. Capitol.
    We cannot strike a match near gas and then act surprised 
when it catches fire. We need moral clarity in leadership in 
these troubled times. I am hopeful this Administration, the two 
witnesses before us, can bring that to the difficult task 
before them.
    I believe it is critical for us to confront domestic 
violent extremism in all forms. As Chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, I am firmly committed to doing just 
that. But let us not ignore the plain fact repeatedly asserted 
by the Department of Homeland Security, FBI Director Wray, and 
others, that White supremacists and extremists are the most 
persistent and lethal threat in the homeland.
    Now violent extremism in any form is wrong, but drawing 
false equivalence between this form of violent extremism and 
others only detracts from our shared goal of focusing our 
resources on the greatest threat we face as Americans. We have 
to confront this threat to the American way. That means 
protecting the constitutional right and civil liberties that 
define our way of life.
    In the wake of September 11th, we let our deep wounds 
occasionally blind us to the rights and liberties we sacrificed 
in the name of security. I steadfastly defended those liberties 
and rights then, even when it was highly unpopular to do so. I 
will not hesitate to do so again now.
    If we secure our Nation at the expense of our precious 
liberties, then we could hardly claim victory at all. We expect 
to see the President's budget by the end of May. It is my 
understanding the President will seek significant resources to 
address the threat of domestic extremism.
    So let us come together, not as Republicans or Democrats, 
but as Americans to confront this threat to our society. I am 
under no illusion that we are going to eliminate the threat of 
domestic violent extremism overnight. I am hopeful if we work 
together, again both parties, we can force it into retreat.
    I think we should be able to also do what we have done in 
the past: show the world that America is capable of confronting 
its greatest challenges while living up to its highest ideals.
    [The statement follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Chairman Patrick Leahy
    The January 6th images of insurrectionists flying confederate flags 
as they stormed the U.S. Capitol are stark reminders that domestic 
violent extremism in America is hardly a new threat. Our nation's 
history has been marred by the violent, deadly acts of extremists 
pushing a range of hateful white supremacist ideologies. From the Ku 
Klux Klan to Timothy McVeigh, we have witnessed--and suffered through--
extremists killing innocent people in the name of their morally 
bankrupt causes. The violence on January 6th was simply the latest 
chapter in this long history of domestic extremism in America.
    But the threat we face today is uniquely dangerous. Attacks and 
plots by domestic extremists are at historic highs, with the majority 
of them being planned by those on the far right espousing white 
supremacist and related ideologies. In 2020 alone, white nationalists 
and like-minded extremists conducted 67% of terrorist plots and attacks 
in the United States. We cannot deny we are facing a class of criminals 
who feel more emboldened than ever.
    In asking why, we cannot ignore a simple fact. Over the last four 
years, extremists who were once relegated to the fringes of our society 
and uniformly condemned by our nation's leaders suddenly felt they had 
support at the highest levels of the United States government--indeed, 
from within the Oval Office itself. We had a President who instead of 
simply condemning the violence in Charlottesville where a woman was 
killed during a white nationalist rally, he said to a nation there were 
``very fine people on both sides.'' When asked to denounce white 
supremacy during an election debate, instead of doing so without 
equivocation, he told the right-wing Proud Boys to ``stand back and 
stand by.'' And he urged the crowd to ``fight like hell'' moments 
before they did just that, storming the Capitol. You cannot strike a 
match near gas and act surprised when it catches fire.
    We need moral clarity and leadership in these troubled times, and I 
am hopeful that this Administration and the two witnesses before us can 
bring that to the difficult task before them.
    Now, I believe it is critical for us to confront domestic violent 
extremism in all its forms. And as Chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, I am firmly committed to doing just that. But 
let's not ignore the plain fact--as repeatedly asserted by the 
Department of Homeland Security, FBI Director Wray, and others--that 
white supremacist extremists are the ``most persistent and lethal 
threat in the homeland.'' Violent extremism in any form is wrong; 
however, drawing false equivalence between this form of violent 
extremism and others only detracts from our shared goal of focusing our 
resources on the greatest threats we face as Americans.
    But we must confront this threat the American way. That means 
protecting the constitutional rights and civil liberties that define 
our way of life. In the wake of September 11th, we let our deep wounds 
occasionally blind us to the rights and liberties we sacrificed in the 
name of security. I steadfastly defended those liberties and rights 
then, even when it was highly unpopular to do so. I won't hesitate to 
do so again now. If we secure our nation at the expense of our precious 
liberties, then we can hardly claim victory at all.
    We expect to receive the President's budget by the end of May. It 
is my understanding that the President will seek significant resources 
to address the threat of domestic extremism. So let us come together--
not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans--and confront this 
existential threat to our society. I am under no illusions that we will 
eliminate the threat of domestic violent extremism. But I am hopeful 
that, if we work together, we can force it into retreat. Let us show 
the world that America is capable of confronting its greatest 
challenges while living up to its highest ideals.

    Chairman Leahy. We are joined by the Vice Chairman of the 
committee, Senator Shelby, and I will yield to him.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

    Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling 
today's hearing.
    I also want to welcome our distinguished witnesses to the 
committee.
    Mr. Chairman, the Rule of Law, the very foundation upon 
which America was built, is paramount to our future as 
Americans and the future of our democracy. Selective 
enforcement of our Nation's laws erodes that foundation.
    Today, we have before the committee two of our Nation's top 
law enforcement officials, the two individuals most directly 
responsible for faithfully and fairly upholding the Rule of 
Law, the Attorney General and the Secretary.
    You both know, as we do, that our country cannot afford to 
pick and choose the laws we enforce and yet we watch that 
happen every day. Domestic violent extremists threaten the Rule 
of Law but so, too, does turning a blind eye to the flood of 
illegal immigration at our southern border.
    I'll address each of these issues in turn from this 
perspective. First, violent extremism is a very serious topic. 
Unfortunately, many of my Democratic colleagues have sought to 
make it about politics and race. They would have the American 
people believe that all domestic violent extremists are far 
right-wing White supremacists and that all Republicans are 
complicit in their actions. Of course both are false.
    I believe the overwhelming majority of Americans watched 
the events of January 6th with shock and horror. I also believe 
that just as many watched the endless string of riots in cities 
across America last summer with the same emotions. They saw 
Antifa thugs beat and intimidate innocent people. They saw 
violent anarchists burn police cars and precincts and attack 
law enforcement officers. They also saw far-left extremists 
hijack Seattle and destroy the livelihoods of so many small 
business owners there. Yes, and they saw Black Lives Matter 
activists trash cities and loot businesses from coast to coast 
night after night.
    None of these actions is excusable, not those of January 
6th and not those of last summer. They're all wrong. They all 
violate the Rule of Law. Yet in the face of this utter contempt 
for the Rule of Law, so many have chosen to stand idly by 
excusing one while condemning another. Such rationalization of 
inappropriate and even illegal behavior, I think, is dangerous 
and I believe the American people see right through it. 
Moreover, it's dangerous for our leaders and law enforcement to 
focus on one threat to our Nation while ignoring the other. 
Such behavior raises questions as to whether justice is still 
blind and whether the Rule of Law still has meaning and force 
in America.
    Let me be clear. This isn't about taking up for one side or 
the other or about advocating for the enforcement of one law 
over another. I believe the vast majority of the American 
people believe in the Rule of Law and they see it under attack. 
I also believe that they want to see anyone who transgresses it 
to be held to account, regardless of race, political dogma, or 
other motivation.
    FBI Director Christopher Wray recently testified before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and he said, ``We at the FBI don't 
tend to think of violent extremism in terms of right, left. 
That's not a spectrum that we look at.'' I wonder if that will 
be clear to those who watch today's hearing. I hope so. I hope 
we hear from each of our witnesses about their efforts to 
combat domestic violent extremism, no matter where it falls on 
the political spectrum.
    I also hope that we will hear that there is a uniform 
approach to enforcing all the laws that are on the books. That 
includes our immigration laws. Illegal immigration has long 
plagued this country. It undermines American sovereignty and 
makes a mockery of our immigration laws.
    The failure to secure our border has for decades has 
allowed the cartels, the drug smugglers, and human traffickers 
to continue their practices largely unabated.
    The Trump Administration made a strong commitment to border 
security and achieved significant gains in restoring the Rule 
of Law along the southern border. Yet President Biden, in one 
of his first acts in office, halted construction of the border 
wall that was ongoing and announced plans to unwind the 
immigration policies put in place by our previous 
Administration. Sections of border wall literally lay on the 
ground next to gaping holes in the existing barrier system. 
Gapes in the wall that need repair remain wide open and require 
Border Patrol officers to stand guard while they're needed in 
other hot spots along the border. Essential technologies, such 
as sensors and cameras embedded in the border wall, system, 
have not been activated. All of this while record numbers of 
individuals pour across the southern border.
    The impact of these actions is not theoretical or abstract. 
Our border officials and facilities are over-whelmed. Tens of 
thousands, yes, tens of thousands of migrant children are in 
U.S. custody as we speak.
    This Administration has restored catch and release, setting 
thousands of illegal crossers free in cities and towns across 
America without consequence for breaking the law, and 
inexplicably amid the ongoing crisis, the Justice Department 
recently rescinded restrictions on Federal funding for 
sanctuary cities which themselves embody contempt for the Rule 
of Law. This action can have no other effect than further 
fueling the crisis by enticing those who seek to come here 
illegally. More parents in desperate circumstances in Central 
American countries will pay human smugglers to drop their 
children off at the border because the prospect and promise of 
sanctuary just got brighter.
    The ultimate source of laws in America, the Constitution, 
provides Congress with the power of the purse. Congress over 
the past few years has provided billions of dollars to the 
Department of Homeland Security for further construction of a 
border wall system which includes functional gates and 
essential technology. Yet this Administration has blatantly 
ignored the will of the people to secure the border as 
expressed in duly-enacted laws.
    I believe that the Rule of Law must be restored for the 
good of this country. It must govern whether we are talking 
about domestic violent extremism or illegal immigration. It 
cannot come down in full force on one group of bad actors while 
giving a pass to the others and officials tasked with enforcing 
it cannot pick and choose which laws they will follow based on 
political considerations. If those things happen, the Rule of 
Law will lose its meaning and its force in America and we as a 
nation will be in serious, serious trouble.
    I hope that our witnesses today, two of our top law 
enforcement officials in this country, will make a serious and 
credible effort to restore the American people's faith in the 
Rule of Law, and I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to the question 
and answer period.
    Thank you for the hearing.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
    Before I introduce the witnesses, this hearing is a hybrid 
hearing. We have some members attending virtually and some in 
person. I thank the two witnesses for being here in person. We 
will have 5-minute question rounds when we get to the 
questions. Members will be called upon in order of their 
seniority in the Full Committee. If they are not available at 
the time they are called upon, we will go to the next person in 
seniority. If they rejoin the committee later, we will try to 
put them back in order. I would ask the Senators to mute 
themselves when not speaking. For those joining virtually, I 
would ask you to not log out of the meeting before asking your 
questions. If you need to step away, just turn off your 
cameras.
    I am glad to see the two witnesses are here and I know you 
have had to juggle your schedule to make it possible. I am glad 
to have the Attorney General with us today. I have known him 
for years. I have followed his career ever since he led the 
prosecution of Timothy McVeigh after the bombing of the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City 26 years ago. The Attorney 
General brings with him a heightened understanding of the 
threat domestic violent extremism brings to our Nation just 
from the deaths that resulted from that.
    I want to welcome Secretary Mayorkas to the panel. We have 
known each other for a long time. We look forward to hearing 
from you, Mr. Secretary, about the work the Department of 
Homeland Security is doing on this important issue. We will 
take your opening statement.
    I did note--for the committee, before you came in, I raised 
a question with Secretary Mayorkas. I am concerned about the 
number of attacks, cyber attacks, most recently on the oil 
pipeline. I think we are going to want to have a briefing for 
members at some point. What are we doing to increase security 
in these companies? To what extent should it be the 
responsibility of the companies if hundreds of millions of 
dollars are being stolen? Can they take it as a way of doing 
business, and just pass the cost on to the consumers, when they 
fail to put in the kind of security, cybersecurity, that they 
should have in the first place?
    But I will yield now for the opening statement of Attorney 
General Garland. Would you please start? And then Secretary 
Mayorkas.
STATEMENT OF HON. MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
            U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
    Hon. Garland. Good morning, Chairman Leahy, Vice Chairman 
Shelby, and distinguished members of the committee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the 
Department of Justice, and it's nice to see you here, Secretary 
Mayorkas.
    Combating domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism 
has long been a core part of the Justice Department's mission. 
Immediately upon its founding more than a 150 years ago, the 
Department pursued White supremacists who sought to deny newly-
freed slaves their rights under the Constitution, including the 
right to vote. Members of the first incarnation of the Ku Klux 
Klan attacked and murdered Black people, assassinated Black 
political leaders, drove Black farmers off their land, and 
burned their houses and their churches. The Department poured 
its resources into combating the Klan, successfully prosecuting 
hundreds of Klansmen.
    Twenty-six years ago in 1995, the perpetrators of the 
bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building sought to spark a 
revolution that would topple the Federal Government. One 
hundred sixty-eight people died, including 19 children. 
Hundreds of others were seriously injured.
    The efforts to successfully prosecute the perpetrators, 
which I supervised, required unprecedented interagency 
cooperation at all levels of Government and a major commitment 
of the Department's resources and personnel.
    Unfortunately, the horror of domestic violent extremism is 
still with us. Indeed, the FBI (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) assessed that 2019 was the deadliest year for 
violent domestic extremism since 1995. In March of this year, 
the intelligence community in a report drafted by DHS 
(Department of Homeland Security), the FBI, and the National 
Counter-terrorism Center, under the auspices of the Director of 
National Intelligence, assessed that domestic violent 
extremists pose an elevated threat in 2021. In the FBI's view, 
the top domestic violent extremist threat we face comes from 
racially or ethically motivated violent extremists, 
specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the 
White race.
    Many communities have experienced this horror over the past 
several years. In El Paso, 23 people, most of whom are Latino, 
were gunned down while shopping at a Walmart. In Pittsburgh, 11 
Jewish worshippers were shot and killed at their synagogue. In 
Charleston, a White supremacist shot and killed nine Black men 
and women who were praying at their church. And many acts of 
hate-fueled violence don't make the national news but they 
still terrorize entire communities.
    The FBI has also highlighted a recent increase in attacks 
perpetrated by those that categorize this as anti-government or 
anti-authority violent extremists. The Unabomber, whom I 
investigated and prosecuted in the mid-1990s, is by some 
measures the most high-profile example of the latter.
    As with the Ku Klux Klan, Oklahoma City, and Unabomber 
investigations, the Justice Department is once again engaged in 
a complex nationwide resource-intensive investigation: the 
investigation of the heinous attack on the U.S. Capitol on 
January 6th.
    In just under a 130 days, the Justice Department has made 
more than 430 arrests. The prosecution efforts, which are being 
led by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of 
Columbia, remain ongoing.
    In all of our efforts to combat domestic violent extremism 
and domestic terrorism, the Justice Department is guided by our 
commitment to protecting civil liberties. In our country, 
espousing an extremist ideology is not a crime nor is 
expressing hateful views or associating with hateful groups, 
but when someone tries to promote or impose an ideology through 
acts of violence, those acts can be the most dangerous crimes 
we confront as a society.
    Regardless of the motivating ideology, we will use every 
appropriate tool at our disposal to deter and disrupt such 
criminal acts and to bring their perpetrators to justice. My 
written statement for the record describes those efforts in 
detail.
    In the past year, the Justice Department has shifted 
significant resources to focus on this area. The President's 
discretionary budget request for fiscal year 2022 seeks over 
$100 million in additional funds to address the rising threat 
of domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism. It 
includes additional funding for the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's 
Offices, the Marshall Services, and other components.
    The Department is equally committed to fighting violence 
and terrorism that is directed or inspired by foreign actors, 
but I recognize that is not the topic of today's hearing.
    As to both, we will pursue justice in a manner that honors 
the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States.
    Thank you for inviting me to testify at this important 
hearing, and thank you for your support in ensuring that we 
have the resources necessary to carry out this vital mission.
    [The statement follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Hon. Merrick B. Garland
    Good morning Chairman Leahy, Vice Chairman Shelby, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity 
to testify today on behalf of the Department of Justice.
    Combatting domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism has 
long been a core part of the Justice Department's mission. Immediately 
upon its founding 150 years ago, the Department pursued white 
supremacists who sought to deny newly freed slaves their rights under 
the Constitution, including the right to vote. Members of the first 
incarnation of the Ku Klux Klan attacked and murdered Black people, 
assassinated Black political leaders, drove Black farmers off their 
land, and burned their houses and churches. The Department put its 
energies into combatting the Klan, successfully prosecuting hundreds of 
Klansmen.
    Twenty-six years ago, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, including 19 
children. Hundreds of others were seriously injured. Last month, I 
travelled to Oklahoma to speak at the annual memorial ceremony. My trip 
brought back vivid memories of what I saw when I first arrived on the 
scene 26 years ago to lead the Justice Department's prosecution: It 
looked like a war zone. The front of the Murrah Building, which had 
housed a children's center, was gone. The parking lot across the street 
still held cars that had been flattened by the blast. And an army of 
first responders, from across Oklahoma and across the nation, was 
crawling over the wreckage, sifting through the rubble for survivors 
and the dead.
    We promised then that we would find the perpetrators, that we would 
bring them to justice, and that we would do so in a way that honored 
the Constitution. The effort required unprecedented interagency 
cooperation at all levels of government, careful management of the 
evidence, and scrupulous adherence to the Constitution and the law. It 
also required a major commitment of the Department's resources and 
personnel to see that justice was done.
    Investigators conducted 28,000 interviews, collected nearly 3.5 
tons of evidence, and searched through more than one billion pieces of 
information. Juries ultimately convicted both McVeigh and his co-
conspirator, Terry Nichols.
    The horror of domestic violent extremism is still with us. Indeed, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assesses that ``2019 was the 
deadliest year for domestic violent extremism'' since 1995. \1\ And in 
March, the Intelligence Community (IC), in a report drafted by the 
Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the National 
Counterterrorism Center under the auspices of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, assessed that domestic violent 
extremists ``pose an elevated threat'' in 2021. \2\ The IC assessed 
that ``racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists and militia 
violent extremists present the most lethal [domestic violent extremist] 
threats.'' \3\ In the FBI's view, the top domestic violent extremist 
threat we face comes from ``racially or ethnically motivated violent 
extremists, specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the 
white race.'' \4\ The IC assessed that the militia violent extremist 
threat also ``increased last year and that it will almost certainly 
continue to be elevated throughout 2021.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Statement Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/
worldwide-threats-to-the- homeland-092420.
    \2\ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Domestic 
Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021 (March 1, 2021), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/
UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment- 17MAR21.pdf [hereinafter IC Report].
    \3\ Id.
    \4\ Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (March 2, 2021), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/oversight-of-the-federal-bureau-of-
investigation-the-january- 6-insurrection-domestic-terrorism-and-other-
threats.
    \5\ IC Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many communities have experienced the horror inflicted by this 
threat over the past several years. In El Paso, 23 people, most of whom 
were Latino, were gunned down while shopping at a Walmart. In 
Pittsburgh, eleven Jewish worshippers were shot and killed at their 
synagogue. In Charleston, nine Black men and women were shot and killed 
while praying at their church.
    We have also seen the burning and bombing of places of worship 
throughout the country, as well as other acts of hate-fueled violence 
that are less likely to make national news but that still terrorize 
entire communities. In addition to the threat of racially or ethnically 
motivated violent extremism--and sometimes in conjunction with it--the 
FBI has highlighted a recent increase in attacks perpetrated by those 
it categorizes as ``Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent 
Extremists.'' \6\ The Unabomber, whom I also investigated and 
prosecuted in the mid-1990s, is perhaps by some measures the most high-
profile example of the latter, although (as is not infrequently the 
case) his writings and ideology defy straightforward classification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Jill Sanborn, Executive Assistant Director National Security 
Branch, FBI, Statement Before the House Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies 3 (Apr. 
29, 2021), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP19/20210429/112510/
HHRG-117-AP19-Wstate-SanbornJ-20210429.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    And as with the Oklahoma City and Unabomber investigations, the 
Justice Department is once again engaged in a complex and resource-
intensive investigation--one of the largest in our history--the 
investigation of the heinous attack on the United States Capitol on 
January 6th.
    While much has changed at the Department of Justice since my last 
tour of duty, the professionalism, commitment, and dedication of the 
Department's workforce have remained constant. Every day, Department 
employees enforce and uphold the rule of law. Many risk their own 
safety to protect the American public from violent crime or other 
threats, including those perpetrated by domestic violent extremists. 
Unfortunately, as the attack on the U.S. Capitol underscores, there is 
still much work to do.
    At the Justice Department, we are committed to using every 
appropriate tool at our disposal to deter, disrupt, and punish acts of 
domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism. This whole-of-
Department commitment includes the FBI, the Department's other law 
enforcement agencies, the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the National 
Security Division, the Civil Rights Division, the Criminal Division, 
the Tax Division, our grant-making offices, and our other components:
  --The FBI is the lead federal law enforcement agency for 
        investigating and preventing acts of domestic and international 
        terrorism. As part of the FBI's efforts to counter terrorism 
        and violent extremism, the FBI has established nearly 200 Joint 
        Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) across its 56 field offices 
        nationwide. The JTTFs combine specialists from the law 
        enforcement and intelligence communities into a single team 
        that can pursue leads, gather evidence, make arrests, and 
        quickly respond to terrorist threats and incidents.
  --The Department prosecutes violent extremism and terrorism by 
        drawing on the capabilities and expertise of our 94 U.S. 
        Attorneys' Offices, the National Security Division, the Civil 
        Rights Division, the Criminal Division, and other attorneys 
        across the Department. Each U.S. Attorney's Office has an Anti-
        Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) to coordinate federal, state, 
        local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement efforts in its 
        district.
  --Through the ATACs and JTTFs, the Department promotes information 
        sharing among federal, state, local, Tribal and territorial law 
        enforcement entities. This information sharing is critical 
        because local law enforcement officers may be the first to 
        identify individuals planning violent extremist and terrorist 
        acts in their communities. Close cooperation with private-
        sector partners also provides an essential avenue for detecting 
        specific threats that may develop. Just as important, we depend 
        on private citizens to report threats they see around them.
  --Through our grant-making components, the Department has funding 
        available to address domestic violent extremism and domestic 
        terrorism. The Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) 
        administers an anti-terrorism program that provides technical 
        assistance and training to state, local, Tribal, and 
        territorial law enforcement partners. In addition, BJA supports 
        the investigation and prosecution of cold case homicide 
        investigations and prosecutions in which the race of the victim 
        may have been a factor under the Emmett Till Unsolved Civil 
        Rights Crime Act and provides funding to law enforcement for 
        outreach, education, investigation, and prosecution of hate 
        crimes.
  --The Department's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
        (COPS) also funds efforts aimed at preventing domestic violent 
        extremism and domestic terrorism. The COPS Office is including 
        combatting hate crimes and domestic extremism as an area of 
        special consideration in the 2021 Community Policing 
        Development (CPD) Microgrants Program solicitation. CPD 
        Microgrants Program funds are used to develop the capacity of 
        law enforcement to implement community policing strategies.
  --The Department is also improving the state of research and analysis 
        in this area. For nearly a decade, the Department's National 
        Institute of Justice (NIJ) has administered a domestic violent 
        extremism and domestic terrorism research program. Last year, 
        NIJ published Understanding Domestic Radicalization and 
        Terrorism: A National Issue Within a Global Context, a review 
        of the most up-to date research and an analysis that 
        highlighted areas where more work is needed. In FY 2021, NIJ 
        will fund research that focuses on the radicalization process, 
        reintegration of offenders incarcerated for terrorism-related 
        offenses, and terrorism prevention programs. The President's FY 
        2022 discretionary request includes a $4 million increase for 
        NIJ to further research on the root causes of radicalization.
  --The Justice Department must also confront the distinct challenges 
        federal prisons face. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) guards 
        against the spread of violent extremist ideologies within 
        federal prisons through a variety of management controls, task 
        force collaboration, and staff training. Appreciating the 
        evolving nature of the threat, BOP is currently undertaking a 
        review of its risk-assessment tools, placing renewed focus on 
        available programming, and formulating proposals for increased 
        staffing and other resources.
  --The United States Marshals Service (USMS) also contributes in 
        critical ways to these efforts. As part of its judicial 
        security mission, USMS conducts threat investigations and, in 
        appropriate cases, provides protective details for the federal 
        judiciary against violent extremist and terrorist threats. The 
        USMS Investigative Operations Division and Special Operations 
        Group work to support USMS's fugitive apprehension mission.
  --Another key component within the Department is the Bureau of 
        Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), which 
        investigates violations of the federal firearms laws, 
        investigates the origin and cause of explosions, and provides 
        support for explosives, fire, canine, and response operations 
        through its National Center for Explosives Training and 
        Research. Together with the FBI, ATF jointly manages the 
        Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, the interagency 
        organization that analyzes all terrorist improvised explosive 
        devices of interest to the United States.
  --The Department's efforts include supporting an interagency, whole-
        of-government approach to these threats. Department of Justice 
        personnel collaborate on this mission on a daily basis with the 
        Department of Homeland Security--working closely on everything 
        from aviation and border security, to sharing intelligence on 
        emerging threats, to training and engagement with state, local, 
        Tribal, and territorial law enforcement.
  --Finally, the Department also coordinates the Domestic Terrorism 
        Executive Committee (DTEC), a group that provides a forum for 
        information sharing among federal agencies at a leadership 
        level. The DTEC was originally established following the 
        Oklahoma City bombing, and its mission and role remain 
        important today.
    Although this general structure within the Department has long been 
in place, we are now reassessing our existing activities and 
authorities to ensure that we have the right posture to confront the 
threat of domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism, are 
devoting appropriate resources to the task, and are nimble enough to 
make any changes that may be necessary to bolster our efforts and adapt 
as the threat evolves. This includes dedicating more resources as 
needed; ensuring that we are sharing as much information as we can with 
federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial partners; deepening 
collaboration with foreign partners to explore any links to the 
international counterparts of domestic violent extremists; sharing 
information as appropriate with technology companies to help them 
address the spread of domestic violent extremist activity online; and 
ensuring that we have sufficient training at the federal, state, and 
local levels. Collaboration within the Department and with our 
colleagues in federal government, the private sector, our foreign 
partners, and civil society is critical to our approach.
    The Department of Justice recently issued guidance to all federal 
prosecutors emphasizing the need for coordination and consistency in 
prosecutions involving domestic violent extremism and imposing new 
requirements for identifying and tracking such matters. That guidance 
and other efforts will strengthen coordination within the Department. 
We have also been actively engaged with our partners at DHS, in the IC, 
and throughout relevant parts of the federal government, in a 100-day 
interagency assessment of our whole-of-government efforts to counter 
domestic terrorism, as called for by President Biden.
    In the past year, the Justice Department has shifted significant 
discretionary resources to focus on this area. The President's 
discretionary request for FY 2022 seeks to provide over $100 million in 
additional funds to address the rising threat of domestic violent 
extremism and domestic terrorism, including funding for the FBI, the 
U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the U.S. Marshals Service, and other 
components of the Department.
    The Department's strong commitment and resolve in this effort has 
been evident in the unprecedented speed and scale of our response to 
the January 6th attack on the Capitol. The violence we witnessed that 
day was an intolerable assault not only on the Capitol building and the 
brave law enforcement personnel who sought to protect it, but also on a 
fundamental aspect of our democracy--the peaceful transfer of power.
    In response to that attack, the Department has undertaken an 
extraordinary effort to hold accountable those who engaged in criminal 
acts that day. In just under 130 days, the Department has made more 
than 430 arrests, and that number continues to grow. The FBI's 
investigations span almost the entire country. The prosecution efforts, 
which are being led by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of 
Columbia, remain ongoing.
    The Justice Department has also focused on countering federal hate 
crimes. To address the recent rise in hate crimes and hate incidents--
particularly the disturbing trend in violence against members of the 
Asian American and Pacific Islander community since the start of the 
pandemic--my first directive as Attorney General was to launch an 
accelerated review of the ways in which the Department can enhance its 
efforts to deter and combat such crimes. Hate crimes have no place in 
our society, and the Department, led by our Civil Rights Division, is 
committed to prosecuting those who commit them.
    In all our efforts to combat these domestic threats, the Justice 
Department is guided by our commitment to protecting civil liberties. 
In our country, espousing an extremist ideology is not a crime. Nor is 
expressing hateful views or associating with hateful groups.
    But when someone tries to promote or impose an ideology through 
acts of violence, those acts can be among the most dangerous crimes we 
confront as a society. My experience in Oklahoma City has seared that 
point into my mind. Regardless of the motivating ideology, we will use 
every appropriate tool at our disposal to deter and disrupt such acts 
and to bring their perpetrators to justice.
    The Department of Justice is deeply committed to combatting 
domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism. We are equally 
committed to fighting violence and terrorism that is directed or 
inspired by foreign actors--but I recognize that is not the focus of 
this hearing. As to both, we will pursue justice in a manner that 
honors the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States.
    Thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing. And 
thank you for your partnership with the Justice Department in ensuring 
that we have the resources we need to carry out this vital mission.

    Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much, Mr. Attorney General.
    Secretary Mayorkas, glad to have you here. Please go ahead, 
sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, 
            U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    Hon. Mayorkas. Good morning, Chairman Leahy, Vice Chairman 
Shelby, and distinguished members of the committee. I am 
honored to appear before you today. Attorney General Garland.
    Every day, the Department of Homeland Secretary's more than 
240,000 dedicated public servants work tirelessly to keep our 
communities safe and secure. Today, I will highlight the work 
our Department is undertaking to combat the most significant 
and immediate terrorism-related threat to our homeland, which 
is the threat posed by domestic violent extremism.
    The terrorism-related threats we face as a nation have 
significantly evolved since the Department's creation in the 
wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. The threat 
landscape is now more complex, more dynamic, and more 
diversified.
    Today, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists 
are the most likely to conduct mass casualty attacks against 
civilians and anti-government or anti-authority violent 
extremists, specifically militia violent extremists, are the 
most likely to target law enforcement, government personnel, 
and government facilities.
    The threats posed by domestic violent extremism are often 
fueled by false narratives, conspiracy theories, and extremist 
rhetoric spread throughout social media and other online 
platforms. Further, domestic violent extremists who act alone 
continue to pose significant detection and disruption 
challenges because of their capacity for independent 
radicalization to violence, their ability to mobilize 
discreetly, and their access to weapons. As a result, the 
Department is redoubling its efforts to detect and disrupt all 
forms of foreign and domestic terrorism and targeted violence 
while safeguarding privacy protections, civil rights, and civil 
liberties.
    The Department is taking a new approach to addressing 
domestic violent extremism, both internally and externally. In 
January, DHS released the National Terrorism Advisory System or 
NTAS Bulletin highlighting the threat posed by domestic violent 
extremists. It was the first NTAS issued in over a year and 
also the first solely focused on a domestic threat.
    In addition, this year I designated for the first time 
domestic violent extremism as a national priority area within 
the Department's Homeland Security Grant Program. This means 
that State and urban areas across the Nation will spend at 
least $77 million to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and 
respond to acts of domestic violent extremism.
    The Department is currently expanding its analytic focus to 
more comprehensively review how extremists exploit and leverage 
social media and other online platforms and how online 
activities are linked to real-world violence. We are also 
enhancing our ability to analyze, produce, and disseminate 
products that address the full range of terrorism and targeted 
violence. We recently established a dedicated Domestic 
Terrorism Branch within our Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
to ensure the Department develops the expertise necessary to 
combat this threat using sound, timely intelligence.
    One of the Department's most important missions is to 
provide actionable intelligence to the broadest audience at the 
lowest classification level possible. As a result, DHS is 
working closely with its partners to augment its intelligence 
and information capabilities to inform public safety and 
security planning efforts across the country.
    In the coming months, the Department will increase training 
options and other support to help identify individuals at risk 
of radicalization.
    Among my top priorities is to ensure that our personnel can 
perform their critical missions, that they feel safe and secure 
at work, and that the fabric of our Department is not 
penetrated by hate or violent extremism. In light of this 
commitment, I announced last month an internal review to 
address potential threats related to domestic violent extremism 
within DHS and ensure we are not compromised in our ability to 
protect our country.
    As I have said before, the Department of Homeland Security 
is fundamentally a department of partnerships. Our success 
depends on the strength of these partnerships as we cannot 
accomplish our mission alone.
    DHS will remain focused on strengthening its partnerships 
across every level of government, the private sector, and the 
diverse communities we serve to enhance together our collective 
prevention capabilities nationwide.
    We recently established a new Center for Prevention 
Programs and Partnerships, or CP3, to improve the Department's 
ability to combat terrorism and targeted violence by leveraging 
behavioral threat assessment and management tools capable of 
identifying early risk factors that can lead to violence in 
communities across the country. Individuals who may be 
radicalizing or have radicalized to violence typically exhibit 
behaviors that are recognizable to many but are best understood 
by those closest to them, such as friends, family, and 
classmates. CP3 will help build local prevention frameworks to 
provide communities with the tools they need to combat 
terrorism and targeted violence consistent with privacy 
protections, civil rights and civil liberties, and our laws.
    Further, the Department will continue working closely with 
its partners to build greater public awareness of and 
resilience to disinformation.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today and for your continued support of our Department. I look 
forward to working closely with this committee and with other 
members of Congress on our shared priorities and I look forward 
to answering your questions.
    Thank you.
    [The statement follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
                              introduction
    Chairman Leahy, Vice Chairman Shelby, and distinguished Members of 
the Committee,
    Thank you very much for the opportunity to join you here today for 
this important and timely hearing. Every day, the Department of 
Homeland Security confronts grave challenges, both seen and unseen, 
that threaten to harm our communities and our way of life. Since the 
Department was created in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, terrorist threats to our Nation have evolved and 
diversified. DHS remains committed to preventing, detecting, and 
disrupting all forms of foreign and domestic terrorism and targeted 
violence, consistent with privacy protections, civil rights and civil 
liberties, and other laws.
                      the current threat landscape
    Foreign terrorist organizations still seek to attack the United 
States and we remain vigilant in addressing that threat. While doing 
so, we recognize that the most significant and immediate terrorism-
related threat currently facing our Nation is domestic violent 
extremism.
    Domestic violent extremists pose a grave threat to our homeland. 
They are individuals or groups based and operating primarily within the 
United States or its territories who seek to further political or 
social goals through acts dangerous to human life that are in violation 
of criminal law. These extremists are distinguished from foreign 
terrorists and homegrown violent extremists in that they are not 
receiving direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or 
other foreign power, although foreign actors may amplify or attempt to 
show support for certain threats. Domestic violent extremists can fit 
within one or multiple categories of ideological motivation or 
grievances aligned with a broad range of groups or movements. They 
often exploit popular social media platforms, smaller websites with 
targeted audiences, and encrypted chat applications to recruit new 
adherents to violent causes, plan and rally support for in-person 
violent or otherwise criminal actions, and disseminate materials that 
contribute to radicalization and mobilization to violence.
    Domestic violent extremists who are motivated by a range of 
ideologies and galvanized by recent political and societal events in 
our country pose an elevated threat to our country, as stated in the 
recent joint report drafted by DHS, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center--under the 
auspices of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence--
entitled, Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021. 
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs) and Anti-
Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists, specifically Militia 
Violent Extremists (MVEs), present the most lethal domestic violent 
extremism threats, with RMVEs most likely to conduct mass-casualty 
attacks against civilians and MVEs most likely to target law 
enforcement, government personnel, and government facilities.
    Let me be clear: the mere advocacy of political or social 
positions, political activism, and use of strong rhetoric is 
constitutionally-protected speech and does not constitute domestic 
violent extremism. DHS's efforts to combat domestic violent extremism 
focus on preventing acts of violence.
    The danger and lethality of the threat posed by domestic violent 
extremism is evidenced by the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. 
Capitol and other recent attacks across our country, including against 
government buildings, federal personnel, and communities of color. 
Addressing this type of violence therefore requires a whole-of-society 
approach. Domestic violent extremists who act alone continue to pose 
significant detection and disruption challenges because of their 
capacity for independent radicalization to violence, their ability to 
mobilize discreetly, and their access to weapons.
                 addressing domestic violent extremism
    Enhancing our collective ability to prevent all forms of terrorism 
and targeted violence is a top priority for the Biden-Harris 
Administration and for DHS specifically. We must make it harder to 
carry out an attack and we must reduce the potential for loss of life 
by preventing radicalization and mobilization to violence. The federal 
government cannot do this alone. As a result, I have directed DHS to 
embrace a whole-of-society approach to combatting domestic terrorism 
and targeted violence by building trust, partnerships, and 
collaboration across every level of government, the private sector, 
non-governmental organizations, and the communities we serve. We can 
only combat domestic terrorism and targeted violence if we work 
together.
    In January, we designated a senior official to organize, plan, and 
oversee the Department's operational coordination and response to all 
terrorism-related threats, including those posed by domestic violent 
extremists. That same month, DHS released a National Terrorism Advisory 
System (NTAS) Bulletin highlighting the threat posed by domestic 
violent extremists. It was the first NTAS issued in over a year and 
also the first NTAS to focus solely on a domestic threat. Further, I 
designated domestic violent extremism as a ``National Priority Area'' 
within the Department's Homeland Security Grant Program for the first 
time.
    This means that in Fiscal Year 2021, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) governments will spend at least $77 million to 
prevent, protect against, and respond to domestic violent extremism.
    Objective and timely intelligence is the foundation for so much of 
what we do. That is why DHS's Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) 
is enhancing its ability to analyze, produce, and disseminate products 
that address the full spectrum of terrorism and targeted violence. We 
have established a dedicated domestic terrorism branch within I&A to 
ensure we develop the expertise necessary to combat this threat by 
using sound, timely intelligence. I&A will also continue leveraging the 
National Network of Fusion Centers and our more than 120 deployed 
intelligence professionals who collect and analyze threat information 
alongside SLTT and private sector partners to increase timely 
information-sharing in accordance with applicable law and DHS privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties policies.
    One of the Department's most important missions is to provide 
actionable intelligence to the broadest audience at the lowest 
classification level possible. As a result, DHS is redoubling its 
efforts to augment its intelligence and information-sharing 
capabilities in collaboration with SLTT and private sector partners. 
This includes publishing and disseminating intelligence bulletins that 
provide our partners with greater insight into evolving threats, and 
situational awareness notifications that inform public safety and 
security planning efforts to prevent violence.
    More than 240,000 dedicated DHS employees carry out our 
Department's mission to safeguard the American people, our homeland, 
and our values every day. It is among my top priorities to ensure our 
personnel feel safe and secure at work, and the fabric of our 
Department is not penetrated by hateful acts or violent extremism. In 
light of the dynamic threat environment and my commitment to protecting 
our workforce and the people we serve, I announced last month an 
internal review to address potential threats related to domestic 
violent extremism within DHS. As we work to safeguard our Nation, we 
must be vigilant in our efforts to identify and combat domestic violent 
extremism within both the broader community and our own organization. 
This review will help ensure that domestic violent extremism does not 
compromise our ability to keep our communities safe and secure.
    We also are increasing our efforts to more comprehensively assess 
how domestic violent extremists exploit and leverage social media and 
other online platforms, and how those online activities are linked to 
real-world violence. I have directed our experts to enhance the 
Department's ability to assess and respond to the risk of violence 
posed by those who are inspired by domestic violent extremist 
narratives. DHS is also executing a Department-wide effort to ensure 
operational coordination and establish common standards and processes 
so that we are able to fully integrate information in the public domain 
into our aggregate threat analysis in a manner consistent with the law.
    In the coming months, the Department will increase training options 
and other support to help identify individuals at risk of radicalizing 
to violence. DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Secret 
Service, and Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers will provide 
training to SLTT law enforcement partners on topics such as the use of 
crisis intervention teams and multidisciplinary threat assessment and 
management teams to prevent terrorism and targeted violence. I&A's 
National Threat Evaluation and Reporting program will also continue 
providing our partners with training and enhanced information sharing 
capabilities through the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative and other behavioral threat assessment training, which is 
designed to assist in the identification and evaluation of potential 
threats.
                       expanding our partnerships
    As I have said before, the Department of Homeland Security is 
fundamentally a department of partnerships. DHS will remain focused on 
strengthening its partnerships with the communities we serve to enhance 
our targeted violence and terrorism prevention capabilities nationwide. 
A core component of this effort is empowering our partners to identify 
and build resilience to the false and harmful narratives that can 
incite violence and are often spread through social media and other 
online platforms.
    We have increased our collaboration with the FBI, Intelligence 
Community, and Department of State to more comprehensively understand 
and assess the extent of operational collaboration between violent 
extremists in the United States and those operating in other parts of 
the world. This increased collaboration will improve our watchlisting 
process, screening and vetting protocols, and travel pattern analyses 
to detect and assess travel by known or suspected terrorists.
    The Department is also working closely with industry partners, 
academia, and faith-based and non-governmental organizations to better 
understand online narratives associated with domestic terrorism and 
targeted violence, including to solicit input on how best to address 
this threat. We are working with technology companies to help inform 
their development of voluntary, innovative approaches to identify and 
mitigate violent extremist content under their terms of service and 
community standards, and to identify effective ways to share 
generalized threat information, consistent with the law, privacy 
protections, and civil rights and civil liberties. We are also working 
to build greater public awareness and resilience to disinformation by 
developing, evaluating, and sharing digital media literacy tools and 
critical thinking resources.
    Preventing potential violence requires DHS to work closely with 
every local community across our country. That is why we are engaged in 
multiple, complimentary efforts to raise public awareness about both 
the indicators of terrorism and how to report related activities. We 
are updating existing programs like the ``If You See Something, Say 
Something'' campaign and Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
(SAR) Initiative to ensure they are appropriately designed and 
implemented in a dynamic threat environment.
    We are also elevating our main effort to prevent domestic terrorism 
and targeted violence through community partnerships. The new Center 
for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, or CP3, will replace the 
Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, while ensuring 
our prevention efforts are grounded in an approach to violence 
prevention that leverages behavioral threat assessment and management 
tools and addresses early-risk factors that can lead to radicalization 
to violence. CP3 will continue to expand financial, educational, and 
technical assistance to SLTT partners to build local prevention 
frameworks tailored to each community's unique needs and challenges. 
These frameworks will provide concerned community members and 
organizations with the tools they need to help individuals who may be 
radicalizing, or have radicalized, to violence as these individuals 
typically exhibit behaviors that are recognizable to many, but are best 
understood by those closest to them, such as classmates, friends, and 
family.
    The Department's CP3 will work closely with federal partners such 
as the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services to drive 
a whole-of-society approach to building trusted partnerships across all 
levels of government, the private sector, non-governmental 
organizations, and the communities we serve. In the coming months, CP3 
will also launch a nationwide public outreach campaign designed to 
provide practical information on how to participate in local prevention 
efforts. This campaign will be similar to DHS's Blue Campaign, which 
has successfully raised public awareness about and driven action toward 
combatting human trafficking.
                               conclusion
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for 
this Committee's continued support of our Department. I look forward to 
continuing to work closely with you and other Members of Congress to 
keep our communities safe and secure.

    Chairman Leahy. Thank you. Thank you.
    We are going to try to stay on schedule because I know we 
have votes coming up. Secretary Mayorkas, you talked about this 
internal review. We have to detect and respond to domestic 
violence extremism within the Department of Homeland Security. 
That sends chills down my spine that we have to even be doing 
that.
    Will you commit to making the results of that review 
available to Congress and the American public?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, I certainly will. It is 
vitally important that our Department reflects the Nation that 
we seek to achieve, protect, and keep secure.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
    Attorney General Garland, I mentioned earlier you were the 
lead prosecutor in the Oklahoma City bombing case. In some ways 
I feel like that was yesterday, but I am sure even more so to 
you. You had a pretty unique perspective into our country's 
efforts to counter domestic violent extremism.
    When you commemorated the 26th Anniversary of the Oklahoma 
City bombing last month, you noted that ``the terror we faced 
then is still with us.'' It appears to me that the threat has 
evolved in part because of violent extremist groups.
    So my question to you, Attorney General: how will the 
Justice Department adapt its approach at combating domestic 
violent extremism to address how the threat has evolved over 
the past few years?

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROACH TO COMBATTING DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM

    Hon. Garland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and that is an 
excellent question. That's what we've been working on for 
several months and which is something that the Department has 
been working on over the years.
    That threat has changed. There are a lot of different 
factors that have made it change, but, of course, the most 
significant is the ability to communicate over the Internet at 
high speed and to be able to communicate in secret through 
encrypted and other channels.
    In the days of Oklahoma City, the co-conspirators had to 
meet together and it took a considerable amount of time. In 
addition, the degree of lethal weaponry available now is 
substantially higher than it was then. Then it took 2,000 
pounds of ammonium nitrate to bring down that building. It 
would take considerably less of modern explosives to do the 
same. So that threat is considerably with respect to its risk 
of lethality higher than it ever was.
    We are using all the lessons that were learned over the 
past decades, including those involved in fighting foreign 
terrorists in the United States. We have a much more robust 
intelligence situation than we had then. We have much more 
joint sharing of information between state and local agencies 
and the Federal Government. The FBI has joint task forces 
across the country of about a hundred or so covering every 
field office and many more.
    The U.S. Attorney's Offices likewise have joint anti-
terrorism task forces that work with State and local law 
enforcement sharing information all the time, and we're giving 
out considerable amounts of grants to help the State and local 
and territorial and Tribal law enforcement to up their game in 
recognizing these kind of threats, as well.
    Chairman Leahy. I am going to give you a question which you 
can then answer if you want for the record. Think seriously on 
this.
    What more do your Departments need from Congress, and 
particularly this committee, to root our violent extremism so 
we are not faced with this discussion again 26 years from now?
    I would hope you would be very specific in answering that 
question and answer it directly. You know, we hear so much 
about domestic violent extremism in all its manifestations. I 
think it is safe to say that your Departments are committed to 
fighting extremism in whatever form it exists.
    We have to start with some common facts. In October of last 
year, the Department of Homeland Security concluded that white 
supremacist extremists remain the most persistent and lethal 
threat in the homeland. That was what the Department of 
Homeland Security said during the last Administration.
    So let me ask first Secretary Mayorkas. Is it still your 
assessment that White supremacist extremists are the most 
lethal threat we face in the homeland today?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that the 
intelligence reflects the fact that indeed that is the case, 
and I very much appreciate your question with respect to the 
resources that we could utilize to enhance our efforts to 
combat domestic violent extremism and three lines of work come 
immediately to mind.
    Of course, as I mentioned earlier, we have created a branch 
to focus exclusively on this particular threat stream and that 
branch can use additional resources so that we have the 
analytic capabilities to best assess the threat and provide 
information to our State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
partners to equip and empower them to address it in their 
communities.
    Chairman Leahy. But you do agree with your predecessors 
that White supremacist extremists remain the most persistent 
lethal threat in the homeland?
    Hon. Mayorkas. I do believe they do at this time, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Leahy. And, Attorney General Garland, do you 
agree?
    Hon. Garland. I do, and that's the most recent assessment 
of the FBI.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you. I will have further questions 
which I will submit for the record. Again, I thank you both for 
being here.
    I yield to the Vice Chairman.
    Senator Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It's my understanding that the latest operational 
statistics provided by DHS that this year in the Rio Grande 
Valley sector alone, more than 19,000 persons apprehended by 
the Border Patrol were released into the interior of the 
country without a court date to adjudicate their illegal entry. 
Even under the Obama Administration's catch and release policy, 
illegal crossers were given a notice to appear before a judge.
    My question to both of you is this. What is the plan for 
these 19,000 illegal immigrants and how are you planning to 
track them once they've been let into the country, and are you 
in essence conceding that these people will be allowed to stay 
in the country indefinitely? In other words, what's going on 
here? Mr. Attorney General, I'll start with you.
    Hon. Garland. Well, the specific program you're talking 
about, I'm going to have to defer to the Secretary of DHS.
    I know that the Secretary is trying to prioritize his 
enforcement efforts. The resources are limited and the most 
important thing is to remove those who are a danger to national 
security and a danger to the public safety, and I understand 
those to be his enforcement priorities.
    Senator Shelby. Okay. Mr. Attorney General, Federal law 
defines domestic terrorism as a violation of the criminal laws 
of the U.S. or any State that appears intended to intimidate or 
coerce. As I said in my opening statement, that was the case 
with the events of January 6th and the individuals who 
committed those acts should be punished to the fullest extent 
of the law. I believe that.
    At the same time, sir, I'm trying to understand the 
difference between those acts and the ones perpetuated last 
summer by groups like Antifa and others that rioted, 
vandalized, and, frankly, terrorized cities, like Portland, 
Minneapolis, and Washington, DC, all in an effort to deliver, 
as they say, a message.
    My question is this. Sir, what is the actual difference 
between these acts, besides the groups carrying them out, and 
if there is not one, how can you assure this committee and the 
American people that the Department of Justice under your 
leadership is pursuing all who commit such acts with equal 
vigor?
    In other words, you're not selectively prosecuting but 
you're going after all lawbreakers?

           FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM

    Hon. Garland. Senator, as I said in my opening statement 
and as you said in your statement, the role of the Justice 
Department is to investigate and prosecute violations of the 
criminal law, regardless of ideology.
    Your quotation from Director Wray is one I would join 
myself that we don't care what the ideology is. Violations of 
law are pursued and are prosecuted.
    I think it is fair to say that in my career as a judge and 
in law enforcement, I have not seen a more dangerous threat to 
democracy than the invasion of the Capitol. This was an attempt 
by some, and I want to be very careful to not ascribe it to all 
because every case is individually decided, but there was an 
attempt to interfere with the fundamental passing element of 
our democracy, the peaceful transfer of power, and there has to 
be a hierarchy of things that we prioritize. This would be the 
one we prioritize because it is the most dangerous threat to 
our democracy.
    But that does not mean that we don't focus on other threats 
and that we don't focus on other crimes. We do, and we don't 
care about the ideology behind them.
    Senator Shelby. Is rioting and pilfering and all of this in 
our cities where it breaks the law, is that subject to 
prosecution?
    Hon. Garland. Of course. Anything that breaks the law----
    Senator Shelby. Just like any other breaking----
    Hon. Garland. Anything that breaks the law is subject to 
prosecution, may not be subject to Federal prosecution. There 
has to be a Federal crime involved, but if it breaks the law, 
of course it's subject to prosecution.
    Senator Shelby. A lot of it could be subject to Federal 
prosecution.
    Hon. Garland. It could, yes, absolutely, it could, and the 
Justice Department looks for where there are violations of 
Federal crimes.
    Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, in the past 5 years Congress 
has directly provided the Department of Homeland Security with 
billions of dollars for the construction of a border wall and 
we know where it is today.
    I think it's an affront to this committee and to a lot of 
us for Congress and to Congress's power of the purse, but, 
worse, it makes the work of our dedicated Border Patrol agents 
more difficult and more dangerous on what's been going on 
there.
    I think these agents must stand constant guard by 
incomplete sections of the border wall which now serves as 
funnels for illegal immigrants, human trafficking, and drug 
smuggling. You know, I think the dynamics there are straining 
the resources of our Border Patrol under your leadership.
    Mr. Secretary, what is your plan, if you have one, to 
relieve Border Patrol agents from guarding gaps that remain in 
the wall due to this Administration's refusal to finish 
construction that was near completion and abruptly halted in 
January, and are you planning to turn on the gates in complete 
sections of the border wall that's finished so your agents can 
safely patrol the other areas of responsibility? In other 
words, what's going on there?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Vice Chairman Shelby, we are dedicated to 
securing our border. That is one of our most significant 
priorities, and we have a multifaceted approach to that 
critical mission.
    Let me say, if I can, for just one moment. You mentioned 
traffickers and human smuggling organizations. We are very 
focused on combating their efforts to cause damage in our 
country and, in fact, just over the past few weeks, we launched 
Operation Sentinel to increase our resources and dedication of 
efforts to combat human smugglers and traffickers in every way 
possible.
    The border is most secure when we take a multifaceted 
approach where we not only rely exclusively on the physical 
barrier but we have physical barriers, the use of technology, 
and a focus on innovation to make sure that we're harnessing 
the most recent technological innovations to secure our border 
and, of course, the brave men and women of the United States 
Border Patrol.
    It's that multifaceted approach that delivers the greatest 
security to our border.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
    And we will turn to Senator Durbin, who is also the Chair 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee and is deeply involved in 
these issues.
    Senator Durbin. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Attorney General, you've identified the dilemma of 
democracy where we state unequivocally you can believe what you 
care to believe. That's your right in this country, this free 
country, but when you take action in pursuance of your beliefs, 
the new have to take a critical eye toward that action to 
determine whether or not it has broken the law and endangers 
the rights of others.
    During the January 6th insurrection, New York Police 
Department Officer Thomas Webster has been charged with 
assaulting a DC Metropolitan Police Department officer during 
the attack. Body camera footage shows Webster attacking the 
Metropolitan Police Department officer with a metal flag pole, 
tackling him and trying to rip off his face shield and gas 
mask.
    This raises a question which is painful to consider but we 
have to consider it and that is whether or not in the ranks of 
law enforcement, either at the Federal level or State and local 
level, there are those who would use their political beliefs in 
a manner which is inconsistent with your earlier statement.
    What are your thoughts about how we can deal with this?

           DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM WITHIN LAW ENFORCEMENT

    Hon. Garland. Well, you put your finger on the most 
difficult problem we have, which is balancing First Amendment, 
free association, free speech rights, with protection of our 
communities against criminal acts.
    Within the Justice Department itself, we are beginning our 
own review of our procedures. Over the last couple of weeks, 
we've been discussing how to go about this. Deputy Attorney 
General has met with the heads of all of our law enforcement 
agencies to determine how we can carefully vet our own 
employees, again always being mindful of First Amendment and 
free associational rights, but at the same time being careful 
that we don't have people in our ranks who would commit 
criminal acts or who are not able to carry on their duties. So 
that's one set of things, looking within ourselves.
    The second are we have with respect to our Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces, we have a vetting procedure, like we have for our 
own agents, with respect to careful backgrounds, but with 
respect to law enforcement of the local and State level, this 
would require using some of our grant money for the purpose of 
incentivizing anti-domestic extremist training of people so 
that law enforcement is aware of what to look for and of how to 
go about the kind of training necessary to make sure that 
people who are involved in it are excluded from the ranks.
    Senator Durbin. Thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas, Senator Shelby raised a question 
earlier about 19,000 people who were caught and released by 
your agency at the southern border, and I want to give you a 
chance to respond to that, and would you also comment on the 
chart that says there are thousands of migrant children in U.S. 
custody, so that the record can be clear as to whether that is 
accurate?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
    As I mentioned earlier, our priorities to secure the border 
in a time of pandemic, we are employing the Department of 
Health and Human Services, specifically the Center for Disease 
Control's Title 42 authority, to expel families and single 
adults.
    We made a decision because the President and this 
Administration is dedicated not only to a safe and orderly 
immigration system but one that is humane, as well, to not 
expel children.
    Families who are not able to be expelled are placed in 
immigration proceedings pursuant to the law.
    Senator Durbin. Does that mean they have a court date?
    Hon. Mayorkas. That is indeed the case. They do have a 
court date and if we are not able to identify a court date at 
the time that they are apprehended in a Customs and Border 
Protection facility, a Border Patrol station, they are issued a 
Notice to Appear at an Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
facility.
    With respect to the photograph that I have trouble seeing 
but I do again discern what it is, we have focused our efforts 
on ensuring that children are moved as quickly as possible from 
a Border Patrol station to a shelter and care of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS). I have repeatedly stated 
that a Border Patrol station is no place for a child.
    We have made dramatic improvement in the movement of those 
unaccompanied children to the Department of Health and Human 
Services. We've reduced the time in Border Patrol custody from 
a height of a 133 hours on average on March 28th to an average 
below 30 hours as I sit here and testify today, and those 
facilities are far better than a Border Patrol station and we 
are likewise reducing the time that a child spends in an HHS 
facility, so that we can unite that child with a parent, legal 
guardian, or family relative, qualified foster here in the 
United States.
    Senator Durbin. But you do not forcibly remove children 
from their families, do you?
    Hon. Mayorkas. We absolutely do not continue the cruel and 
extraordinarily inhumane policy of the past.
    Senator Durbin. And you do make every effort to establish 
reunification possibility?
    Hon. Mayorkas. We are dedicated to that. We are very proud 
of the fact that we reunited four families last week, and I 
want to acknowledge that that is only the beginning, Senator.
    Senator Durbin. Thank you.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
    Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Attorney General, welcome. I commend you and the 
Department of Justice for seeking to identify and prosecute 
those responsible for the terrible riots and attack on our 
Capitol on January 6th.
    As the Chairman mentioned, starting last summer, our 
country also experienced attacks threatening other significant 
government institutions, such as a courthouse, police stations. 
That occurred in Minneapolis and what we in Maine call the 
other Portland.
    You have made very clear that the ideological outlook of 
the individuals committing these alleged crimes is not 
important to the Department of Justice, but what resources has 
the Department dedicated to identifying and prosecuting the 
individuals responsible for the violent acts last summer that 
were aimed at institutions like courthouses and police 
stations?

  FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

    Hon. Garland. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
    As you might expect, I know more about the resources we're 
putting into January 6th because most of those resources have 
been put in on my watch during the time I've been here. I 
wasn't the Attorney General nor in the Department of Justice in 
the summer. So I'm not completely familiar with the resources 
that were put in during that period.
    But the U.S. Attorney's Offices in both the other Portland 
and in Minneapolis are continuing to work those cases as is the 
FBI field offices in both of those cases, and I have not heard 
any suggestion that insufficient resources are available for 
those continuing prosecutions.
    Senator Collins. If you could get back to me with more 
specifics on that, I'd really appreciate it.
    Hon. Garland. I'll ask my staff to contact yours. Thank 
you.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas, first of all, let me say that I very 
much appreciate the work of the Department of Homeland Security 
and I personally learned a lot from a recent trip, my second, 
to the border, to Texas, where I went with Border Patrol agents 
on a midnight tour of the Rio Grande, and across the river we 
could see the bright lights of the Mexican cartels and hear 
them taunting the border agents as they were controlling 
completely the flow of migrants across the river.
    I know that you visited the Donna facility in Texas last 
week. When I was there, the conditions were dire. This looks 
great compared to what I saw. What I saw were children in pens, 
on floors, with no spaces between them, with just mylar 
blankets, and those conditions were truly dire.
    We are, however, despite the improvements that you're 
working hard to make, we're seeing decades-high numbers of 
encounters at the border, and I asked the Border Patrol agents 
and also the migrants through a translator why the migrants 
were coming now, and they pointed to changes in policies that 
have been made by the Biden Administration, particularly with 
regard to the migrant protection protocols, and one woman, very 
young women with a young child told me that she was here to 
escape the violence and because President Biden told her to 
come.
    You had said that we will build the legal processes for 
migrants to come to the U.S. when they are qualified to do so 
under the laws that Congress passed and that is exactly right.
    So how can we now reform or amend our practices and our 
laws to end the various incentives that spur this flood of 
illegal migration which has led to very vulnerable people being 
exploited by smugglers, human traffickers, the cartels? What 
should we do now?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, thank you very much. I have a 
three-part answer, but before I provide the three-part answer, 
let me say two important things, if I may.
    First of all, I want to articulate my extraordinary pride 
in working alongside and supporting the men and women of the 
United States Border Patrol. Truly, their efforts are heroic.
    Secondly, the Donna facility I visited twice, once in March 
and once last week, and the change in the conditions there is 
extraordinary and that is because of the men and women of the 
Border Patrol as well as the men and women throughout the 
Department of Homeland Security who have dedicated their 
resources and talents to the effort.
    It's really a three-part solution. It is investing in the 
countries of origin, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and 
tackling the root causes that cause the regular migration, that 
caused loving parents to actually send their children alone and 
sometimes in the hands of human smugglers to traverse Mexico to 
reach our southern border.
    Secondly, it's to construct lawful pathways so that 
individuals, such as those loving parents, don't feel they have 
to rely on those irregular and dangerous pathways, but a safe 
and orderly process when they qualify under United States law 
for them to travel here safely.
    And third, Senator, is immigration reform. There is 
unanimity that our current immigration system is broken. We 
have bills pending before Congress and it is time for that 
reform to be enacted.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
    I agree with that last comment. Several members here are 
also members of the Judiciary Committee and a few years ago, we 
spent months putting together a comprehensive immigration bill. 
It passed the U.S. Senate in a bipartisan 65 or 63 vote, 
Republicans and Democrats for it. The then Speaker of the 
House, even though there were votes that would have passed it, 
refused to bring it up because it would have violated a rule 
that he considered sacred, the Dennis Hastert Rule. I think 
they call it something different now that former Speaker 
Hastert went to prison.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Attorney General, welcome. Mr. Secretary, welcome. You have 
described misinformation and disinformation as fueling a great 
deal of this violent extremism activity. In your view, would a 
commission to provide information literacy tools that people 
can use to make sounder judgments about what they're seeing on 
social media and this would apply to all communities, but 
there's a particular concern with veterans and service members, 
would such a commission be useful, Mr. General, please?

                   COMMISSION ON INFORMATION LITERACY

    Hon. Garland. I think all forms of civics education that 
help provide education about misinformation that lead to 
radicalization or misinformation in general would be helpful.
    Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary.
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator Reed, I would welcome the 
opportunity to learn the specifics. We're eager to have 
additional resources and additional vehicles to address 
misinformation and disinformation.
    I should say that our Department is partnering with the 
Department of Education to develop a program in the K through 
12 arena and so to amplify that effort, we would welcome the 
opportunity to study the commission of which you speak.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Mr. Secretary, we have also seen increasing evidence that 
Russia is using this type of misinformation and disinformation 
to support and amplify a message of violence that we saw in 
Charlottesville and the killing of George Floyd designed to 
disunite this country, inflame racial tensions, and to 
undermine in many respects our democracy.
    A recent joint assessment indicates that they're using the 
January 6th assault on the Capitol in such a manner to amplify 
narratives in furtherance of their policy which is to disrupt 
and disunite and to indeed destroy, if they could, our 
democracy.
    So are you concerned about this nexus between Russia and 
these domestic terrorists?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Very much so, Senator. We are intensely 
focused on the information with respect to Russia's effort to 
sow discord and disunity in our country and, of course, we are 
bringing an all of government effort to respond to that, and I 
would welcome the opportunity to brief you in a more 
appropriate forum to address the information we have in that 
regard.
    Senator Reed. In this forum, can you give an indication of 
what you think the best way might be to do that?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, some of the actions that we have 
taken certainly are public. We have imposed sanctions. We have 
attributed to Russia publicly the actions that we have learned 
they have committed. Those are two examples that I certainly 
can speak of in a public forum.
    Senator Reed. Thank you. One of my impressions from being 
on the Armed Services Committee is that there is a disconnect 
between our defense-related intelligence services, the 
Cybercom, NAS, CIA, et cetera, many because of constitutional 
issues of the inability of these agencies to operate in the 
United States.
    Has that left a seam in which it's being exploited and are 
we making efforts to sort of close that seam constitutionally?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, you are correct in addressing the 
fact that some authorities are domestic in nature, others are 
not. The issue of seams, of course, is a longstanding one. We 
are very, very focused on closing any seams that remain or any 
residual of past issues. We're very, very focused on and 
developing resources to address that.
    Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Attorney General, 
if there are legislative initiatives that are required to close 
these seams or to disrupt the flow of disinformation, please 
forward those to not just this committee but to other 
committees that have jurisdiction and interest, and thank you 
all for your service, gentlemen.
    Hon. Mayorkas. Thank you.
    Senator Durbin. Senator Shelby, Senator Leahy, oh, he's 
back now. I'm sorry.
    Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Secretary, welcome, and thank you 
for all you do.
    Attorney General Garland, I would like to ask a question 
regarding the ongoing investigations following the events of 
January 6th. A couple weeks ago, the FBI executed a search 
warrant on a couple living in Homer, Alaska, related to the 
investigation surrounding the events of January 6th. The search 
warrant was unsealed just last week.
    We had opportunity to take a look at it. We now understand 
that the wife was or has been identified as a person that the 
FBI believes may have been connected to the laptop of Speaker 
Pelosi based on a picture and at least two tips. The couple in 
Homer adamantly assert that this is a case of mistaken 
identity. Certainly a lot of back and forth going on as to 
whether or not that is the case, but understanding that this 
investigation is ongoing, how are the Department of Justice and 
Homeland Security working with the FBI and others to ensure 
that while we have a thorough investigation that is ongoing, 
that it respects the constitutional rights of all Alaskans in 
this case but all Americans?
    But part of this is just to ensure that public trust in law 
enforcement is maintained during the course of this 
investigation. There's a lot of discussion about how long is it 
going to take until this investigation is concluded.
    You have a small town in a state with a small population 
and there's a lot of discussion about the merits of this going 
forward. So if you can address that, please?

    PROTECTING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

    Hon. Garland. I think this is a central question for all of 
law enforcement to always be careful to balance. Balance isn't 
even the right word. The right word is to pursue law 
enforcement objectives consistent with the statutes of the 
United States and the Constitution. This is exactly what we 
endeavored to do in Oklahoma City, facing enormous number of 
deaths and injuries, but we took care at each step to make sure 
that the law was followed.
    We are doing the same with respect to the January 6th 
investigation. The U.S. Attorney's Office in the District of 
Columbia is the lead force on the prosecution side and the FBI 
on the law enforcement side. Both are subject to ongoing 
supervision by the National Security Division in the Justice 
Department, by the Deputy Attorney General, and myself.
    So we take your point completely. I know I can't talk, as 
you obviously recognize, about a particular case, but we look 
carefully and we will revise our perceptions as new facts 
arise.
    I can't tell you how long this will take. This is only at 
this point around a 130, I guess a 145 days or so. It's 
relatively short in the lifetime of an investigation, 
particularly one that has required such a large number of 
separate investigations in different places as far-flung as 
Alaska, and the huge amount of data to be examined in video 
that's been made available.
    So the investigation is not over and we will pursue each 
lead till we're confident that we have reached the end.
    Senator Murkowski. Thank you for that.
    Mr. Secretary, a lot of focus this week in the news about 
the shutdown of the Colonial pipeline due to the series of 
cyber attacks.
    When you think about what we are discussing here in this 
committee right now, you've got the issues of immigration, 
you've got violent extremism, and certainly cyber in the news 
today. How is DHS balancing all of these very significant but 
clearly competing priorities, and if you can quickly describe 
how DHS is working with the Department of Energy and FERC, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, to help the industry 
counter these attacks to ensure that our critical energy 
infrastructure is secure?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, thank you very much. Intensely 
proud of the men and women of the Department of Homeland 
Security in addressing the urgent threats that we face across 
the homeland security enterprise.
    You correctly note cybersecurity as one of those urgent 
threats and just last week, I spoke to the chamber of Commerce 
and thousands of people across the country, representatives of 
small businesses, about ransomware, the very type of attack 
that Colonial Pipeline has experienced and that has galvanized 
correctly our attention.
    More than $350 million in losses that are attributable to 
ransomware just this year and over a 300 percent increase over 
the last year.
    We have the capability to address and the dedication to 
address border security, cybersecurity threats, the security of 
our homeland in all dimensions. We are working at the direction 
of the President in an all of government way to address the 
cybersecurity threat that Colonial Pipeline suffered and that 
other businesses and institutions across our country are 
vulnerable to.
    We are looking at the Jones Act and the need to exercise 
our waiver authority to ensure that fuel carried by vessels can 
actually reach the impacted areas. We're working very closely 
with the Department of Transportation, the Department of 
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, all across the 
government, including the Department of Defense and its 
logistics agency, to bring all of the resources and 
capabilities to bear to ensure the well-being of the American 
people and those impacted in the regions within Colonial 
Pipeline's jurisdiction.
    Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
    We will take a 5-minute break now and then come back.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Leahy. Who is next? Senator Shaheen? Where is she? 
Let us see. Senator Shaheen is not here. So we will go to 
Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to our two distinguished witnesses. You are the 
right leaders for this difficult moment, and I am grateful for 
your service and for the agencies which you lead.
    Two weeks ago, Senator Sasse and I held a hearing of the 
Subcommittee on Privacy and Technology where we focused on the 
role that social media platforms' algorithms play in amplifying 
misinformation and extremist content.
    Secretary Mayorkas, you note in your testimony that you're 
increasing your Department's efforts to assess how domestic 
extremists are leveraging social media and other online 
platforms. Can you tell us more about those efforts?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Senator.
    The challenge really is, number one, the anonymity with 
which people are able to navigate through social media and 
really exploit the medium for improper and unlawful purposes, 
and two, the speed with which they can do so, and so what we 
are doing is dedicating analysts to understanding the 
narratives that are being communicated on the social media 
platforms and identifying linkages between those narratives and 
indicators of intention to commit violent acts.
    Right now we are doing that through the human resource, not 
yet leveraging algorithms, but we are, of course, planning 
different methodologies as we proceed in this endeavor.
    Senator Coons. Attorney General Garland, you and other 
leaders, in fact Chris Wray at the FBI has also spoken about 
self-radicalization, and I assume that what that really means 
is folks who are largely sitting at home and consuming hours 
and hours of extremist content through YouTube and Facebook and 
other social media platforms.
    Would you agree that if platforms have algorithms that are 
actually designed to hold the attention of viewers and to 
engage them by delivering more and more extremist content to 
people who start going down these so-called rabbit holes then 
they perhaps unintentionally are fueling some of this problem 
and we should take some actions to help address that challenge?

                  SOCIAL MEDIA AND SELF-RADICALIZATION

    Hon. Garland. Well, I agree with Secretary Mayorkas that 
what's happening on our social media platforms certainly can 
lead to self-radicalization. The precise mechanism, I'm no 
expert on and I wouldn't want to pretend to be, but self-
radicalization does--we've seen it most dangerously with 
respect to those who are influenced by Jihadist websites, who 
watch those websites over and over again and become persuaded 
and then self-radicalize, and this accelerates very quickly.
    Somebody can go from a circumstance where no one around 
them thinks that they are likely to be a violent extremist to 
one who then acts out. And I think that this is the way in 
modern society people get disinformation is through the 
Internet.
    Senator Coons. And I notice an increase in budgetary 
requests in both of your Departments to fund grant programs 
that build State and local capacity and to increase funding for 
U.S. Attorney's Offices.
    Will any of that go towards further research on this exact 
point and will any of that go to help focus on what the mental 
health issues are that might make people more vulnerable to 
recruitment or radicalization and what the local initiatives 
might be that could help tamp down or deter radicalization?
    Hon. Mayorkas. If I may----
    Senator Coons. Secretary Mayorkas.
    Hon. Mayorkas. If I may take that, Senator coons, a few 
efforts, if I may. Number one, we help resource centers of 
excellence to conduct research in precisely the area that you 
have identified. We have grant programs to equip and enable 
local communities to conduct research and also to develop 
programs that are in fact focused on mental health issues and a 
holistic approach to the challenge that we face.
    That is precisely one of the reasons why we actually 
changed the office's name to become the Center for Prevention 
Programs and Partnerships. It's about prevention, first and 
foremost, which does include mental health efforts, and 
partnership, working with our State, local, Tribal, territorial 
partners to equip them in the communities to develop these 
programs, to develop educational efforts as well as response 
and resilience programs.
    Senator Coons. Thank you. Anything you wanted to add?

                    STUDYING DOMESTIC RADICALIZATION

    Hon. Garland. Yes, and the same for us. So the National 
Institute of Justice did a study on just this topic, 
understanding domestic radicalization and terrorism, which came 
out last year, which I mentioned in my written statements. We 
have $4 million in our budget request for them to continue and 
to do further analysis of root causes of radicalization.
    Senator Coons. Well, thank you. Thank you both. Thank you 
for your testimony.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
    Senator Kennedy.
    Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, I've read that police officers have 
encounters every year with about 60 million Americans and in 10 
million of those encounters, the person has an encounter with 
the copy is arrested, and in 2 million of those encounters, the 
police officer either has to use force or threaten to use 
force.
    Now every case is different and needs to be investigated 
when force is used or threatened to be used. We had a very 
unfortunate event happen, as you know, in Columbus, Ohio, last 
month. A police officer, who happens to be White, shot a young 
woman who happened to be an African American and she, at least 
according to the video, was about to stab another young woman 
who happened to be African American.
    All we had at the time was this video. We had nothing else, 
nothing else, and I think it's still being investigated. Put 
this up for me right quick. We have an NBA, a National 
Basketball Association athlete immediately after this happened 
put out an Instagram post identifying the police officer. 
Here's his face, and this is what the NBA player said. ``You're 
next.''
    Do you think that contributes to domestic violence in 
America?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, I can't comment on a particular 
case that is under investigation nor can I comment on a case 
when I don't know all of the facts and I hope you do understand 
that.
    I served 12 years as a Federal prosecutor----
    Senator Kennedy. Yes, sir.
    Hon. Mayorkas [continuing]. And I understand----
    Senator Kennedy. Let me put it another way. I understand 
you----
    Hon. Mayorkas. Please, if you would frame it more 
generally, perhaps----
    Senator Kennedy. Sure. Would you have sent out an Instagram 
like this?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, I think you know the answer to that 
question.
    Senator Kennedy. Is it no? It the answer no?
    Hon. Mayorkas. That is correct, and I'd like to, if I can, 
amplify something very important that my colleague, the 
Attorney General, articulated.
    Senator Kennedy. Okay. Before you do, if you could, before 
you do, my time is so limited, and I want to ask the General a 
question because I'm going to run out of time, and then if it's 
okay, Mr. Secretary, I'll come back to you.
    Hon. Mayorkas. I'd welcome that.
    Senator Kennedy. Thank you, sir.
    General, I appreciate all your efforts.
    Hon. Garland. Thank you.
    Senator Kennedy. I think it's fair to say that Chicago has 
become unfortunately the world's largest outdoor shooting 
range.
    What's the Department of Justice doing to help remedy this 
problem in Chicago?

                        VIOLENT CRIME IN CHICAGO

    Hon. Garland. Well, violent crime has been a priority of 
the Justice Department since I was last in the Department. That 
may have been the first time the Department actually created an 
anti-violent crime initiative, which has now over the years had 
different names.
    We are going to put a large amount of money into grants 
with respect to violent crimes, gang violence, BJA, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, grants. We spent $8.6 billion in fiscal 
year 2021 on violent crime, both on prevention----
    Senator Kennedy. What about Chicago?
    Hon. Garland. Yeah. On the specifics of Chicago, I don't 
know, but we will provide the resources that the city needs to 
assist it in its efforts against violent crime. I don't know 
specifically, although having been born and raised in Chicago, 
I'm at least as concerned as you are about violent crime in 
that city.
    Senator Kennedy. Yeah. So you're giving them money?
    Hon. Garland. We're giving them money and we have law 
enforcement. We have a United States Attorney's Office. We have 
the FBI. We have the DEA. We have ATF. We have the U.S. 
Marshals. All are focused on many different areas, but one of 
which is violent crime and, in particular, gang violence.
    Senator Kennedy. Okay. Let me get back to the Secretary. I 
think he had something he wanted to say.
    Hon. Mayorkas. Oh, thank you so much for the opportunity.
    Senator Kennedy. Yes, sir.
    Hon. Mayorkas. We take great pride in the fact that as a 
Department we have statutorily created the Offices of Privacy 
and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and it is very, very 
important constitutionally, as a matter of constitutional law, 
that we both protect and safeguard individuals' right of speech 
and right of assembly, yet we address with all our law 
enforcement capabilities those who really predicate acts of 
violence on false narratives and dangerous ideologies, and it's 
the acts of violence that we are focused upon, but I wanted to 
draw a clear line which is not always easy to draw, but we're 
very focused on it because it speaks to the principles and 
values that guide everything that we do.
    Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
    Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good to see you both. Secretary Mayorkas, we look forward 
to seeing you before the subcommittee later this year to talk 
about the Department's budget request. Thank you both for your 
service to protect the country.
    I have two questions, three if I have time. The first is 
with respect to comments that you both made regarding the 
access that domestic extremist groups have to weapons and bomb-
making materials.
    I would note the incredibly disturbing story of the 13 
individuals in Michigan, who were very far along in a plot to 
kidnap and try for treason the Governor of Michigan, had in 
their possession upwards of 70 firearms, an arsenal that 
included many AR-15-style rifles, ghost guns, guns that are 
designed by their nature to be untraceable, and 2,000 rounds of 
ammunition.
    I'll direct this to you, Attorney General Garland, because 
you are undergoing right now a review about the ways in which 
we can make sure that firearms are traceable for law 
enforcement purposes.
    You volunteered this in your testimony, as I think 
Secretary Mayorkas did. What are your concerns regarding the 
ability of these groups to arm themselves with significant 
weaponry and weaponry that increasingly is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to trace?

             DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACCESS TO WEAPONRY

    Hon. Garland. So I appreciate your picking up on the point 
that I was making and I think the increased availability of 
extraordinarily lethal weaponry is what makes domestic violent 
extremism and domestic terrorism such a serious priority for 
the Justice Department and DHS and of concern to the country.
    We are putting a significant amount of money into our 
investigations of domestic violent extremism terrorist groups. 
We have a budget request of $1.6 billion for ATF for the work 
that it does on this and another request for $401 million for 
State and local grants.
    On the specific question you asked about traceability, we 
have just issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with respect 
to ghost guns, which, as you point out, do not have serial 
numbers but equally important because they are sold as kits, 
it's not necessarily clear that they were subject to background 
checks when they were sold.
    So under the rule, they would both be subject to background 
checks and the manufacturers would be required to put serial 
numbers on them and a licensed firearms dealer who comes in to 
possession of one without a serial number would be required to 
put one on it.
    Senator Murphy. I will remind the committee on this general 
topic that right now, individuals that are on what we would 
commonly refer to as the Terrorist Watch List are able to buy 
weapons in gun stores today. They are not automatically added 
to the list of those that are prohibited to purchase weapons.
    It's inconceivable to me that at least on that topic we 
cannot find common ground.
    Turning to the question of the border, Secretary Mayorkas, 
Senator Shelby raised the question of border security at a 
hearing about domestic violence, domestic extremism, and I 
wanted to sort of ask you to give an assessment of the risk of 
terrorists entering this country through the southern border.
    It's important to remember that undocumented immigrants in 
this country have a lower arrest rate than U.S. citizens and 
from what I can understand, there's fairly scant evidence that 
international extremist groups are using the southwest border 
as a mechanism to bring their members into the country.
    What evidence do we have that the southwest border is being 
used by international extremist groups or domestic extremist 
groups to try to bring individuals into this country to do harm 
to American citizens?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, we don't have any evidence that 
suggests that the threat on the border with respect to foreign 
terrorists is any greater today than it was last year, the year 
prior, or the years over the past decade.
    The fact of the matter is that we are vigilant in guarding 
against foreign terrorist influences through all avenues, not 
just, of course, our land borders, but air and maritime. That 
is what we do, and, fortunately, we have extraordinary 
capabilities to address it.
    Senator Murphy. Great. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you, and by early agreement, Senator 
Braun.
    Senator Braun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So in listening to the tone and direction of the 
conversation today that idea of hierarchy and priority between 
domestic terrorism and threats from afar, to me, it is easy to 
get into a false equivalency there.
    I'm going to use my reason for discussion of the visit I 
made down to the border a little over a month ago and I think 
also it's kind of tricky when you generalize on something like 
January 6th with all of us acknowledge as being a horrific 
occurrence here in the Capitol.
    I want to cite a couple things that really stood out when I 
was there and this would be kind of the rule of numbers being 
something that we should be most concerned about.
    A 150,000 illegal crossings in March, just saw it on the 
tube today, a 178,000 in April, 14,000 of whom would have been 
unaccompanied minors. When I was down there, that was the part 
that looked most tragic from a humanity point of view, but the 
thing that caught me more than anything and it sticks in my 
mind like it was yesterday, we get down to the border at the 
Rio Grande and, of course, nothing was happening as we arrived 
and then the heckling that floated across the river from 
smugglers and coyotes. I asked what were they saying--``We're 
going to keep doing it regardless of what you try to do to stop 
it.''
    Now that might be an idle threat, other than I think it's 
arrived now close to $1.5 to $2 billion business where you've 
got a logistics enterprise in the country, and I think the 
tragic thing is so much of it is about people trying to escape 
a life that forces them on that journey.
    Here's the point that stuck in my mind and this wasn't in 
the RGV, it was in the Del Rio District, and this was the 
Border Patrol telling me everything I'm telling you, that 54 
different nationalities crossed the border in the 3 months 
prior to our visit.
    Now questions of do we have more threat of terrorists from 
afar that come across or I don't even think it makes sense 
domestic folks or people on domestic terrorism crossing the 
border, I guess I wouldn't rule that out, but just by that 
volume, it would seem to me that we need to be more worried 
about what could happen again, based upon 9/11, then maybe 
something that happened here on January 6th, horrific, but 
might have been more to do with lack of security and having a 
place that was easy to breach and not saying that that was the 
reason that we shouldn't look at all angles.
    I just wonder because I also heard you say, and my question 
is going to be for you, Secretary Mayorkas, multifaceted. I 
agree with we need to do something. I heard you say earlier 
about addressing the smugglers, the coyotes, the operation that 
is benefiting from it, but here is what the Border Patrol told 
us, as well.
    The two most effective things by far, this is the Border 
Patrol, would have been the wall in high traffic places now 
that has gaps in it and maybe just out of politics we're 
refusing to complete it to make it easy for them. They say that 
was number one.
    Number two was a stay in Mexico policy because at least we 
don't have what we've got now and at the Donna facility that I 
witnessed, it was worse than it had ever been and now we've 
spread that out among other locations maybe to take that kind 
of bad look away.
    Two questions. It was working. We were at a 45-year low. 
Will you try to complete the border wall, even if you don't do 
any more where you've got gaps in it, gates not working, and 
will you try to reinstitute the stay in Mexico policy at least 
until we get this thing down to a manageable level and that's 
not trying to spread out all the people that come across the 
border currently, 150-178, is it 200,000 in May? Just would 
love to know what you're intending to do.
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, thank you. There's a lot packed in 
there. So I'm going to try to be concise.
    We are indeed focused on smugglers and traffickers, as I 
mentioned earlier. That has been a many-years problem. We do in 
fact take a multifaceted approach to securing our border. I 
remember my conversation with Senator McCain about the fact 
that we need to use physical borders, technology, and 
personnel.
    The border is very dynamic. It is changing, and when we 
speak of physical barriers, the ability to be mobile is 
critically important.
    I think there's something very important to articulate in 
response to your point about the foreign threats and the 
domestic threats. The foreign threats persist. It's not as 
though they have disappeared, but the threat landscape is 
always evolving.
    We have collectively, the Attorney General and I and our 
partners across the Federal Government enterprise, have our eye 
on the foreign threat as well as the domestic threat. We don't 
take our eye off one and focus on the other.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
    Hon. Mayorkas. We are reviewing the gaps in the gates and 
seeing what is the best response to achieve our security while 
upholding our values and principles as a country.
    Senator Braun. What about the stay in Mexico policy, just 
very quickly, because I know we're out of time?
    Hon. Mayorkas. That is not something that we as an 
Administration have continued.
    Senator Braun. Thank you.
    Chairman Leahy. And thank you.
    We are going to have votes soon.
    Senator Shaheen, you are next.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
thank you to both of you for being here today and for your 
testimony.
    I want to go back to the domestic extremist versus national 
organizations and one of the concerns that I have, which I'm 
sure you share, is the one that Senator Reed referenced about 
the connections between some of our domestic violent extremist 
organizations and international terrorist groups.
    There's been reporting of Americans involved with those 
right-wing extremist groups in the U.S. communicating online 
and sometimes traveling overseas for training with other 
extremist groups and not just in Russia, although we know of at 
least one leader of the base who has resettled to St. 
Petersburg, Russia.
    So can you talk about the extent to which you're seeing an 
increase or if you are seeing an increase in those connections 
and what we're doing to try and address that? For either of 
you.

   DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS

    Hon. Garland. Yes, Senator. Well, you are right to be 
concerned. I can't give a sense of the magnitude of the 
problem, but I do think that we have to worry about 
interactions between domestic violent extremists, particularly 
racially motivated and ethnically motivated ones, where there 
are similar groups, particularly in Europe, with similar 
ideological bends, sharing information, and we have the benefit 
in that respect of being able to coordinate with our national 
intelligence partners and the Director of National Intelligence 
is very seized with this problem.
    The seam that was talked about before in one of the other 
questions is one that we have worked very hard to eliminate 
where there is a foreign aspect of the risk and our 
intelligence agency partners whose eyes are abroad are being 
very cooperative in that respect.
    But we are looking at this problem and it is very much on 
our mind.
    Hon. Mayorkas. If I could add one point, Senator, if I may, 
the Attorney General and I participated in a multi-nation 
ministerial and, of course, the issue of violent extremism was 
uppermost in our minds and it's something that we share with 
our partners and are working very closely together with them to 
address.
    Senator Shaheen. One of the potential sources--this is not 
specifically on domestic terrorism, but one of the potential 
sources of international terrorist activity are the detainee 
camps that have resulted from the crisis in Syria and Iraq with 
ISIS and there are now tens of thousands of people in those 
detainee camps that are really serving as a incubator for 
further terrorist activity.
    I, along with my colleagues on the Armed Services 
Committee, put in language in, I believe, 2 years ago to create 
a detainee coordinator to work with not only our Government but 
other governments that were the home of some of those detainees 
who have been in custody as the result of the military 
activities in Syria and Iraq, and no one has yet been appointed 
to that position.
    I don't know if either of you were aware that that had even 
passed and exists, but it seems to me that that would be an 
opportunity for us as we're thinking about future international 
terrorist activities to begin to have a way to address what's 
happening in those detainee camps and to try and get some of 
those foreign detainees repatriated into the countries where 
they came from.
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, that's something certainly we'll 
commit to looking into. I'm not expert in that area. I will 
stay in the area where I am expert, in the refugee camps with 
individuals who have fled persecution by reason of their 
membership in particular social groups, we are aware of 
influences potentially in those camps and, of course, we modify 
our screening and vetting of those individuals accordingly and 
that's based on the expertise and qualifications of our refugee 
officers.
    But I will look at the issue of the detainee coordinator 
and follow up. We look forward to following up with you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I just have 
one final question and that is, I'm a little troubled by the 
suggestion of some at the hearing that this is a question of 
should we focus on the southern border and illegal immigration 
or should we focus on domestic violent extremism, and I'm sure 
you both would agree that we've got to do both and that none of 
us want to see more illegal immigration any more than we want 
to see domestic terrorists increase.
    But, Secretary Mayorkas, do you think that statements made 
by public officials claiming that the 2020 presidential 
election was stolen or the result of fraud increased the threat 
of violence by domestic extremists? Have we seen that as we're 
pursuing--also for the Attorney General--as we're pursuing the 
cases against those people involved on January 6th? Has that 
been something that we've heard from the defendants?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, first, yes, we can do both. We can 
secure our border and we can effectively combat the rise of 
domestic violent extremism and I want to make sure that we draw 
a clear line between those two. Even though we can address 
both, those are two very, very different challenges.
    Senator, false narratives, the spread of false narratives 
are used to fuel extremist ideologies and we are focused on the 
connection between extremist ideologies and the threat or 
intention to commit acts of violence.
    Senator Shaheen. And is there any evidence that elected 
officials' statements have contributed to that?
    Hon. Mayorkas. We do see in the narratives that we have 
studied the fact that false narratives attributed to public 
officials gained traction in social media.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Leahy. Senator Hoeven.
    Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I was recently down at the border with fellow Senators. 
Actually Senator Shaheen and I toured the border together a 
number of years back when we chaired and were ranking member on 
DHS Appropriations Subcommittee. So I've been down there before 
previously, as well.
    When I talk to the Border Patrol agents, they tell me they 
need barriers, technology, and people to address the situation. 
Do you agree with that?
    Hon. Mayorkas. I do, Senator, and it's something I've 
spoken of in this hearing.
    Senator Hoeven. So then what about continuing completion of 
the wall, particularly where it's already been contracted for 
construction? That's something they said they want and need to 
control the border.
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, not all physical barriers are the 
same and one of the things that we've learned in our multiyear 
study of the border is the fact that the challenges at the 
border are quite dynamic not only because of variables in 
topography but variables month to month and sometimes year to 
year with respect to the movement of people and the 
methodologies they employ.
    Senator Hoeven. Would you agree with me when you talk to 
your Border Patrol agents, they tell you they need barriers, 
physical barriers, technology, and people?
    Right now the situation where there are almost 180,000 
migrants coming across the border illegally just in the month 
of April, that'd be almost two million annualized, almost 
18,000 unaccompanied minors. They're saying they don't have 
time to do their job securing the border because they need the 
three things I just mentioned: barriers, technology, and 
people.
    Do you agree with the professionals down there that say 
they need those things or disagree with them and are you 
getting them those things?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, if I can just complete the thought 
that I was about to complete, if I may, that I remember when I 
was the Deputy Secretary and we were analyzing the utility and 
effectiveness of fixed towers and then we said, you know what, 
we can actually move more effectively from fixed towers to 
mobile towers because of the dynamism of which I spoke a minute 
ago.
    I have spoken with the Border Patrol. I've been down to the 
border multiple times and on each visit spoken with the men and 
women who secure our border and one will discern different 
approaches and different opinions with respect to the 
challenges of the border.
    It is ultimately my responsibility to pursue those 
instruments and tools that I consider most effective in the 
service of American people.
    Senator Hoeven. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I only 
have 5 minutes for questions. So I'm trying to get my questions 
in.
    So towers are technology. I asked you about a barrier, and 
the Border Patrol says they need all three and so, yes, whether 
you have mobile or fixed tower, that's technology.
    I'm asking you barriers, technology, and people, and on the 
people question, if you don't change the protocols, the third 
safe country and the remain in Mexico, how are you going to--
your people down there are overwhelmed. They're overwhelmed, 
these professionals.
    How are they going to be able to do their job so that they 
can handle what's going on on the southern border? I live on 
the northern border. People from the northern border are at 
about the normal staffing level because they're going down to 
help on the southern border.
    What are you doing to get on top of the flow so that we 
cannot only manage our southern border but I'm also asking for 
your help on the northern border to get our people back and get 
staffed at the level on the northern border?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, we are vigilant in securing all of 
the borders and all of the avenues. We have a three-part plan 
or I should say three pillars to our plan.
    One is to address the root causes and to deter individuals 
from seeking the dangerous and perilous journey by addressing 
the reasons why they feel forced to flee the countries in which 
they live and in which they want to raise their children.
    We are also building legal pathways so that there are 
avenues of relief under the laws that the United States 
Congress has passed and they don't feel compelled by dint of 
the tragic circumstances in their countries of origin to take 
the perilous journey.
    And lastly is our dedication and commitment and our 
prioritization of achieving immigration reform because we are 
all in agreement, regardless of party, that the current 
immigration system is fundamentally broken.
    Senator Hoeven. But your metric, based on what you're doing 
right now, is that in April almost 180,000 migrants crossed 
illegally and it doesn't seem to be slowing down. It seems to 
be increasing.
    So again back to doing what the professionals are asking 
for, I asked you that question. I didn't get an answer in terms 
of specifics. I guess it's also now affecting the northern 
border.
    Are you willing to help us with the issues on the northern 
border? That's a simple yes or no.
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, the answer is yes, and the 
Department of Homeland Security's obligation is to secure all 
of our borders and the challenge of migration is not----
    Senator Hoeven. Would you say that's happening now, based 
on what's going on at the border? Do you feel----
    Hon. Mayorkas. I do.
    Senator Hoeven [continuing]. That's a secure border?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Yes, Senator, I do, and let me just say that 
the challenge of migration is not a new phenomenon in 2021. We 
experienced a tremendous surge in migration in 2019, in 2016, 
in 2014, and many years prior.
    Senator Hoeven. How does it compare to last year with the 
policies that were in place last year?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, the surge in migration is greater 
this year thus far than we observed and experienced in 2020.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
    Senator Hoeven. And----
    Hon. Mayorkas. 2020 was less than what it was----
    Senator Hoeven [continuing]. Are you willing to----
    Hon. Mayorkas [continuing]. In 2019.
    Senator Hoeven [continuing]. Make changes to the current 
policy to address that?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, yes, I am, and I will----
    Senator Hoeven. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Garland----
    Chairman Leahy. I try to be flexible but a vote has started 
and the Senator is over his time. We have one more Senator.
    Senator Hoeven. All right, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Leahy. If he could be heard, then the witnesses 
will be able to go on.
    Senator Hoeven. I'll submit my other questions for the 
record.
    Chairman Leahy. All right. And I would urge that his 
questions as submitted be answered.
    Senator Hoeven. Thank you.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both 
of you for your service and for your testimony today.
    Both of you referenced in your testimony the March 
intelligence community report on domestic violent extremism 
poses heightened threat and both of you and your Departments 
had input into that report.
    The very first finding in the executive summary of that 
report includes the following statement: ``Newer socio-
political developments, such as narratives of fraud, in the 
recent general election, and the emboldening impact of the 
violent breach of the U.S. Capitol will almost certainly spur 
some domestic violent extremists to try to engage in violence 
this year.''
    Mr. Attorney General, do you agree with that finding?

           MISINFORMATION DRIVING DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM

    Hon. Garland. I do. That's a finding of all three of the 
entities that wrote the report and of the intelligence 
community as a whole.
    Senator Van Hollen. And, Mr. Secretary, do you concur?
    Hon. Mayorkas. I do, as well, Senator.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, Senator Shaheen raised this 
issue, and I really don't think we can just gloss over it. It's 
not just a question of a lie about the elections. It's not only 
a question of deception. That's bad enough.
    As this intelligence community report points out, it can 
have lethal consequences. In fact, they predict that it will 
almost certainly spur some domestic violent extremists.
    Gentlemen, yesterday on the Floor of the House, 
Congresswoman Liz Cheney said the following, and I'm quoting, 
``Today we face a threat America has never seen before. A 
former president who provoked a violent attack on this Capitol 
in an effort to steal the election has resumed his aggressive 
effort to convince Americans that the election was stolen from 
him. He risks inciting further violence.''
    Do you agree with that statement, which is consistent with 
the finding in the intelligence community report?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, let me say this, that false 
narratives create a lack of confidence in our democratic 
institutions and sometimes worse and those false narratives can 
lead people who are predisposed to violence to commit acts of 
violence against our institutions and tragically we saw that on 
January 6th.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Mr. Attorney General, you're doing the investigations into 
what happened here at the Capitol on January 6th, and is it a 
fact that many of the people that you've talked to and are 
pursuing have said they were inspired to commit the violence 
because of President Trump's claims that the election was 
stolen? Isn't that a fact?
    Hon. Garland. Because this is an ongoing investigation, the 
Department's longstanding principle is to not talk about what 
we've learned in the investigation, other than through the 
filings that we make in the court.
    We have in each of the cases of arrests and also search 
warrants reproduced some elements of what people have told us 
and I think that's the place to look, but I don't think it's an 
appropriate thing for me as supervising those prosecutions to 
make in the comments outside of court record.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, much of this is in the public 
domain. I'm not asking you for the internal findings of your 
investigation at this point in time.
    I understood the response to Senator Shaheen's question and 
certainly this intelligence community report indicates that 
those kind of false narratives have dangerous consequences, is 
that not true?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Most certainly, and it's something that 
we're very focused on addressing. False narratives, as I 
mentioned, create strands of dialogue that we see propagated on 
social media and then we see those strands picked up on and we 
are detecting connectivity between those strands and an 
intention to commit violent acts and that is what we are 
focused on.
    Senator Van Hollen. Mr. Attorney General.
    Hon. Garland. So if you put it at that level of generality 
rather than the specific questions about people being 
investigated in a particular circumstance, it is right as the 
intelligence community has reported that particularly those who 
end up committing acts of domestic violence get ideas from the 
Internet and from statements and where there are false 
narratives and false statements, those are the kind of things 
that can, depending upon the person in the end who acts out, 
lead to violence.
    Senator Van Hollen. Look, I disagree with Congresswoman Liz 
Cheney on a lot of things, but I think everybody needs to stand 
with her regardless of political party when she stands up to 
talk about the truth and what she is saying in her Floor 
remarks squares fully with the finding from this intelligence 
community report that both your Departments participated in.
    The report is not ambiguous here. It says these kind of 
false narratives will almost certainly spur domestic extremists 
to try to engage in violence this year.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I would just encourage all of our 
colleagues to recognize that words matter. I mean, people have 
a First Amendment right and they can say what they want, but 
they should also recognize the very dangerous consequences of 
the false narratives that continue to be peddled around this 
place and coming from the former president.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Leahy. Thank you, and I thank all the witnesses 
that were here today and our committee members who are here.
    We will keep the hearing record open for a week. If 
Senators have written questions to submit, please do so by 5 
p.m. next Wednesday, May 19th.
    We have two more Full Committee hearings scheduled in the 
coming months. The next will be on May 25th on Global 
Leadership and the State Department Budget with Secretary of 
State Antony Blinken, the other Full Committee hearing will be 
in mid-June with Defense Secretary Austin and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs Milley.
    As I said, I gaveled closed, but as a courtesy to Senator 
Hagerty, who just came in, the vote has started, but we will 
limit it to the 5 minutes.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Leahy. I appreciate 
that.
    Secretary Mayorkas, welcome. I just checked your 
Department's website this morning and according to the data on 
your website, 92 percent of the people--of the illegal aliens 
that ICE deported have been convicted or charged with crimes 
here, 92 percent. Yet the ICE deportations under your 
Administration have plummeted dramatically.
    Now we know the surge is occurring at the border. We know 
many more people are arriving here illegally. Yet the 
deportations have gone down. That means that we have more 
criminals being deposited into our Nation every day.
    I want to talk with you about the resources that we've 
committed to this problem and how law-abiding Americans can 
feel more comfortable knowing that this increase in criminal 
elements is occurring in their communities. It's occurring in 
my State of Tennessee.
    Isn't it correct that you're choosing not to deport these 
people, that ICE is not deporting these people and increasing 
the risk to American citizens?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, that is actually not correct, and 
if I may, I served for 12 years as a Federal prosecutor and 
some of those years I was privileged to have our current 
Attorney General in the Department of Justice Headquarters here 
in Washington, DC.
    The criminal justice system is based on qualitative 
outcomes, not quantitative, and we are focused on the greatest 
threats to public safety because we do not have limited 
resources and so our focus is on three priorities: national 
security, public safety, and border security. And we're 
delivering consequences, as well we should, to most effectively 
serve those priorities. It's qualitative, not quantitative.
    Senator Hagerty. From the quantitative perspective, what 
we've seen is a massive drop in deportations. Last year between 
10 and 20,000 deportations per month, under your Administration 
that number's dropped to 2,500-3,000 per month. You've got 
2,500 agents, 2,500 ICE agents. They're down to deporting one 
criminal per month versus five per month last year.
    Hon. Mayorkas. And----
    Senator Hagerty. Have the number of criminals dropped that 
much?
    Hon. Mayorkas. I didn't mean to interrupt. Senator, let me 
put this in context because there is one data point that we 
shouldn't take off the table and neglect to consider, which is 
the fact that for a good deal of the year thus far and 
certainly with respect to the fiscal year, our agents, our 
brave men and women on the frontlines were addressing the 
COVID-19 pandemic and for a period of that time, they were not 
fully deployed for reasons that we can all agree upon.
    And so we have to remember to consider that and the 
constrains on our facilities and our resources in a time of 
extraordinary pandemic, but be that as it may, the fundamental 
point is key that it's qualitative, and I would rather as an 
individual supervising law enforcement and as a former 
Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting crimes, I would 
rather dedicate resources to an individual who poses the 
greatest public safety threat and the apprehension and removal 
of which may take a greater amount of time and a greater amount 
of resources than someone who has been here for 25 years, who 
has not committed an offense, and yet can swallow up resources 
that we can best otherwise use.
    Senator Hagerty. I'm talking about the people that have 
committed crimes and been charged with crimes. Last year during 
the pandemic, you mentioned the pandemic as an excuse, last 
year even during the pandemic, we were deporting 6,000 per 
month. Now those numbers have dropped to less than half of 
that.
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, we have, if I may, we have defined 
our public safety, national security and border security 
threats to most effectively address them and combat them so 
that our consequence regime is brought to bear on the greatest 
threats that we confront.
    Senator Hagerty. So we see a dramatic decrease in the 
number of criminals being deported as a result.
    Secretary, isn't it true that you've received more funding 
from this committee on a bipartisan basis for your Criminal 
Alien Program, more funding than you had last year?
    Hon. Mayorkas. I believe that is correct.
    Senator Hagerty. That is correct. Isn't it true that you 
got more funding for Fugitive Operations than you had last 
year?
    Hon. Mayorkas. That is correct, as well, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. And isn't it true that you've got capacity 
to house between 18 and 20,000 deportation prospects that is 
going unused right now?
    Hon. Mayorkas. That is correct, as well.
    Senator Hagerty. How is it then that with more resources, 
you're accomplishing such fewer number of deportations? How is 
it that the results could have plummeted so much with more 
money from this Appropriations Committee?
    Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, if I may repeat an answer I 
provided, which is our focus is on quality, not quantity, and 
sometimes achieving qualitative results can consume 
considerable resources.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, I think going beyond axe murderers 
to people that have committed other grave crimes should be your 
focus, as well, to utilize this capacity and utilize the funds 
we've provided you more effectively.

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Chairman Leahy. The Senator----
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
    Chairman Leahy [continuing]. From Tennessee, who was not 
here for all of the hearing, but we reopened the hearing to 
enable him to have his 5 minutes and he will be able to submit 
questions.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but 
were submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to 
the hearing:]
       Questions Submitted to Attorney General Merrick B. Garland
             Questions Submitted by Chairman Patrick Leahy
    Question. What more does the Department of Justice need from 
Congress-and in particular, the Appropriations Committee-to root out 
violent extremism? Please be specific about what particular Justice 
Department programs, accounts, and initiatives require additional 
resources from Congress in order to comprehensively address the threat 
of domestic violent extremism.
    Answer. Combating the threat of domestic terrorism and domestic 
violent extremism is a core priority of the Justice Department. The 
President's request for FY 2022 seeks an additional $101 million for 
the Justice Department to address the rising threat of domestic 
terrorism, while protecting civil rights and civil liberties. This 
requested increase includes:
  --$45 million for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for 
        domestic terrorism investigations.
  --$40 million for the U.S. Attorneys to manage increasing domestic 
        terrorism caseloads.
  --$12 million for additional response capabilities at the U.S. 
        Marshals Service.
  --$4 million to the National Institute of Justice to support research 
        on domestic terrorism threats.
    Question. When FBI Director Wray came before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in March of this year, I asked him about the role that white 
supremacist extremists played in the January 6th attack on our Capitol. 
He noted that racially-motivated extremists, specifically those 
advocating for white supremacy, represent the largest subsection of 
racially-motivated extremism cases investigated by FBI. Now that over 
two months have passed since that hearing, and you've had to time to 
step into your new role, I would like to ask you about the prosecutions 
pursued by your Department related to the January 6th Capitol attack.
    Approximately how many rioters charged in connection with the 
January 6th attack are affiliated with extremist groups? Of those 
groups, how many would you classify as racially-motivated and, more 
specifically, those advocating white supremacist ideologies?
    Answer. As of June 22, 2021, the FBI has arrested more than 490 
individuals on charges related to the events of January 6, 2021. These 
investigations are ongoing, and we continue to review information, 
including video footage, photos, and other tips and information, to 
identify and hold accountable those who violated the law.
    Several of the individuals arrested to date for involvement of the 
Capitol attack self- identify with various organizations as described 
in the charging documents. Additionally, as has been stated in publicly 
available court documents, the Department of Justice has charged a 
number of defendants involved in the attack on the U.S. Capitol with 
conspiracy charges.
    In order to protect the integrity of all investigations, as a 
general practice, the Department does not comment on the details of 
particular ongoing investigations beyond the charging and other public 
documents, and does not comment on the existence or status of any 
potential investigative matter.
    Question. There is no criminal offense expressly prohibiting 
``domestic terrorism.'' In what ways, if any, has that impacted the 
Justice Department's ability to investigate and prosecute these cases 
against the January 6th rioters?
    Answer. The Department has long used existing criminal laws to 
successfully disrupt and prosecute domestic terrorists. The Department 
has brought a wide range of charges against those involved in the 
January 6 attack, including assaulting federal officers, destruction of 
government property, conspiracy, civil disorder and obstruction of 
official proceedings.
    We are currently considering whether there are any gaps in our 
capabilities that should, consistent with the civil rights and civil 
liberties of the American people, be addressed through legislation. If 
we determine that new authorities are needed to address the threat, we 
will advise the Congress and would welcome working with you on these 
issues.
    Question. After the attack on the Capitol on January 6th, what is 
the Department of Justice doing to improve intelligence sharing and 
communications with its federal, state, and local law enforcement 
partners?
    Answer. Earlier this month, I announced the release of the Biden 
Administration's National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, 
which is designed to coordinate and provide a principled path for the 
federal government's efforts to counter the heightened domestic 
terrorism threat, using all available tools. The strategy makes clear 
that Department of Justice and the federal government more broadly are 
committed to enhancing the government's domestic terrorism research and 
analysis.
    The FBI is increasing the domestic terrorism threat information it 
provides to our state, local, Tribal, and territorial partners; 
enhancing training provided to these important partners; continuing to 
work closely with those partners in our Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
across the country on enhancing critical information sharing.
    We are also reinvigorating the Department's Domestic Terrorism 
Executive Committee, an interagency group that Attorney General Janet 
Reno established in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing.
    In addition, for nearly a decade, the Department's National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) has administered a domestic violent 
extremism and domestic terrorism research program. In FY 2021, NIJ will 
fund research that focuses on the radicalization process, reintegration 
of offenders incarcerated for terrorism-related offenses, and terrorism 
prevention programs. The President's FY 2022 Budget request includes a 
$4 million increase for NIJ to further research on the root causes of 
radicalization.
    Question. Lieutenant General Honore was tasked by House leadership 
to conduct an after-action review of the Capitol attack on January 6th 
and provide recommendations to improve security of the Capitol. One of 
the suggestions in his report was the establishment of a ``quick-
reaction force'' to rapidly respond to any future events.
    Will the Justice Department participate in this type of task force? 
Should it have dedicated funding from Congress? Or would DHS be better 
positioned to participate in a law enforcement-based task force that is 
activated when called upon, were the Department provided resources to 
do so?
    Answer. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security have a 
range of authorities and resources available to them to enforce the law 
and support other law enforcement entities. The Justice Department is 
committed to working with Congress regarding its ongoing reviews of the 
events of January 6th and identifying areas for improvement and greater 
cooperation in law enforcement responses.
    As the Department of Justice Inspector General announced on January 
15, 2021, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has initiated a 
comprehensive review to examine the role and activity of the Department 
and its components in preparing for and responding to the events at the 
U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The review will be coordinated with 
reviews also being conducted by the Offices of Inspector General of the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of the Interior. The Department of Justice OIG review will 
include examining information relevant to the January 6th events that 
was available to the Department in advance of January 6th; the extent 
to which such information was shared by the Department with the U.S. 
Capitol Police and other federal, state, and local agencies; and the 
role of Department personnel in responding to the events at the 
Capitol. The OIG also will assess whether there are any weaknesses in 
Department protocols, policies, or procedures that adversely affected 
the Department's ability to prepare effectively for and respond to the 
events at the Capitol on January 6th.
    In addition, the Department of Justice is considering whether there 
are any gaps in our capabilities that should, consistent with our needs 
and shared values, be addressed through legislation. If we determine 
that new authorities are needed to address the threat, we will advise 
the Congress and would welcome working with you on these issues.
    Question. With the prevalence of militia, white supremacist, and 
other far-right extremist activities, we increasingly see that 
extremists motivated by hate are using high-powered firearms in their 
attacks.
    What more can the Justice Department do to keep firearms out of the 
hands of violent extremists?
    Answer. Combating the threat of domestic terrorism and domestic 
violent extremism is a core priority of the Justice Department. And a 
key element of our fight against domestic violent extremism involves 
preventing firearms from falling into the wrong hands.
    Alongside the $1.5 billion that the Justice Department is seeking 
for our counterterrorism efforts, our FY 2022 budget request includes a 
total of nearly $1.6 billion in base funding for the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), an increase of $70 million or 
nearly 5% over FY 2021, to support the Agency's work to fight violent 
crime and oversee the safe sale, storage, and ownership of firearms. A 
portion of this increase would both expand ATF's Crime Gun Intelligence 
through the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBN) 
and would nearly double ATF's capacity to investigate theft from 
Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs). Every firearm stolen from an FFL 
poses a threat to community safety, as well as to our law enforcement 
partners.
    In addition, the Department's budget request would allow us to 
continue the critical work of the FBI's National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS) to prevent prohibited persons from 
unlawfully acquiring firearms. And it would enable the Office of 
Justice Programs to distribute more than $1 billion in grants to 
support local, State, and Tribal law enforcement agencies in their 
efforts to improve criminal history record information and ensure 
effective nationwide implementation of background check systems.
    The Justice Department is also undertaking a comprehensive new 
study of firearm trafficking that will help agents, prosecutors, and 
policymakers tackle criminal gun trafficking enterprises. And the 
Department recently announced a proposed rule to curb the proliferation 
of untraceable ghost guns that are increasingly recovered from crime 
scenes and often assembled from kits that are sold without background 
checks. The rule will not fully solve the problem, but it will help 
prevent some guns from ending up in the wrong hands and help law 
enforcement apprehend criminals who use them.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Brian Schatz
    Question. Deradicalization and diversion programs can prevent 
domestic violent extremism from happening in the first place. Are there 
programs or initiatives at the Justice Department that have been 
effective in identifying at-risk individuals and steering them away 
from domestic violent extremism? Are there efforts to prevent 
radicalization in prisons, or among justice-involved people broadly?
    Answer. The Justice Department is dedicated to countering domestic 
violent extremist and domestic and foreign terrorist threats in all 
their forms, consistent with our values and the protection of civil 
rights and civil liberties. On June 15, I announced the release of the 
Biden Administration's National Strategy for Countering Domestic 
Terrorism, which is designed to coordinate and provide a principled 
path for the federal government's efforts to counter the heightened 
domestic terrorism threat, using all available tools.
    Many of the Department's components are engaged in efforts aimed at 
preventing and deterring domestic terrorism. For instance, the 
Department's grant-making and research-based work can help us 
understand and counter these threats. The Department's National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) will fund research that focuses on the 
radicalization process, reintegration of offenders incarcerated for 
terrorism- related offenses, and terrorism prevention programs. And the 
President's FY 2022 Budget request seeks a $4 million increase for NIJ 
to further research on the root causes of radicalization.
    Working with local communities and local law enforcement, 
disruption and early engagement programs in our U.S. Attorney's Offices 
provide options for intervention and counseling where an individual is 
radicalizing to violence but federal prosecution is inappropriate or 
unavailable. These interventions may draw on the resources of federal 
law enforcement, local law enforcement, mental health professionals, 
schools, and community-based groups.
    The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) guards against the spread of violent 
extremist ideologies within federal prisons through a variety of 
management controls, task force collaboration, and staff training. 
Appreciating the evolving nature of the threat, BOP is currently 
undertaking a review of its risk-assessment tools, placing renewed 
focus on available programming, and formulating proposals for increased 
staffing and other resources. BOP is committed to ensuring that its 
approach remains effective and grounded in research.
    Question. The Justice Department should work to reduce domestic 
extremist radicalization among people leaving prisons. Individuals who 
were radicalized prior to prison or radicalized in prison should return 
to their communities with reentry support aimed at preventing further 
radicalization. Does the Federal Bureau of Prisons have programs in 
federal prisons, as well as reentry programs, that target people who 
are or were radicalized toward domestic extremism? And if not, do I 
have your commitment that this will be a priority for the Justice 
Department?
    Answer. If history is any indication, we should be concerned about 
this problem, and I am fully committed to addressing it. The Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP) is currently undertaking a full review that is aimed at 
developing a more robust understanding of risk factors and will make 
recommendations about more targeted programming to counter 
radicalization in U.S. prisons, including reentry programming. In 
addition, the Department's FY 2022 budget request seeks additional 
resources to support research on the root causes of domestic 
radicalization, which would help inform BOP's evaluation of additional 
programs on specific treatment interventions.
    Question. Prison rape continues to be a problem in our country. 
Will you make Prison Rape Elimination Act enforcement a priority for 
the Justice Department? I also introduced bipartisan legislation with 
Senator Cornyn--the Sexual Abuse Services in Detention Act--to make 
sexual abuse services more available in prisons and jails. Do I have 
your commitment to work with us on that bill?
    Answer. Yes. The Justice Department strongly supports the goals of 
the Sexual Abuse Services in Detention Act, which would establish a 
national hotline for sexual abuse victims and abuse settings. 
Preventing, detecting, and responding to the scourge of prison rape 
remains a priority of the Justice Department. The Department continues 
to work hard to ensure the full implementation of Prison Rape 
Elimination Act (PREA) through our PREA Management Office, including by 
overseeing audits, administering a robust grant program, and providing 
training and technical assistance to support PREA implementation 
efforts in State, local, and Tribal correctional agencies across the 
country.
    In addition, as a reflection of the Department's support for and 
commitment to the Sexual Abuse Services in Detention Act, in FY 2021, 
the Department is funding a strategic planning process to determine how 
best to create and implement a national service line for incarcerated 
victims of sexual abuse so that state, local, and tribal correctional 
agencies can respond effectively to the needs of victims and achieve 
and maintain compliance with the related PREA standards. The Department 
anticipates this work will help advance the successful implementing a 
national service line for incarcerated victims.
    Question. Will you support domestic extremism prevention efforts 
through the Justice Department's state and local law enforcement 
grants, community-oriented policing grants, or victims of crime grants?
    Answer. A variety of the Justice Department's grant programs are 
available to help counter domestic violent extremism and domestic 
terrorism. For instance, the Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance 
administers an anti-terrorism program that provides technical 
assistance and training to state, local, Tribal, and territorial law 
enforcement partners. The Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services (COPS) has also started prioritizing grants to local law 
enforcement agencies committed to community-based approaches to 
combating racially motivated violence and domestic terrorism. Domestic 
violent extremism prevention efforts are also an allowable use of funds 
under the Byrne/JAG formula grant program.
    Question. The Justice Department's budget proposal includes funding 
for research on domestic terrorism threats. In addition to looking at 
the causes of domestic extremist radicalization, this research should 
also evaluate effective deradicalization efforts. Do I have your 
commitment that the Justice Department will support deradicalization 
research--such as research on effective domestic terrorism prevention 
and diversion programs? Will you also support research on resiliency 
efforts--such as programs that help to maintain social cohesion in 
communities following domestic terrorist attacks?
    Answer. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has funded research 
that explores the dynamics surrounding deradicalization and 
disengagement. Much of that research focuses on how law enforcement can 
use semantics and language in online arenas to identify potentially 
radicalized content and speech. NIJ-funded evaluation research has not 
yet identified programs that are effective at steering individuals away 
from domestic violent extremism (DVE), and none of these evaluations 
were of DOJ-sponsored programs. Nevertheless, this research has 
produced guidelines and handbooks on what a successful extremism 
prevention program might look like, based on the lessons learned from 
the research. NIJ has funded ongoing research, assessing the needs of 
extremist offenders as they reenter communities across the U.S. This 
research is being carried out in conjunction with probation and parole 
offices across the U.S., as well as the Administrative Office of U.S. 
Courts.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin, III
    Question. Like many of my colleagues on the Committee, I am aware 
of a number of my constituents who took it upon themselves to 
participate in the events that occurred on January 6th here at the 
Capitol complex. While private West Virginian citizens engaged in the 
insurrection, our state also saw two public servants, one a former 
state delegate and the other a former town councilman, charged due to 
their actions. Fortunately, both men no longer serve in their 
respective posts. I believe, as many of my colleagues do, that we need 
individuals serving in public office that respect the rule of law and 
our institutions, not those that actively seeking to disrupt our 
governmental functions and duties. Unfortunately, it feels like now, 4 
months removed from that tragic day, the only time the public hears of 
arrests being made or charges being brought against people is when it 
involves higher profile individuals like the two elected leaders from 
my state. I feel like it is imperative that the public have access to 
the most up to date information so they can best be informed about how 
our government is dealing with the aftermath of the insurrection. While 
I am appreciative of the efforts that the Department of Justice has 
made in making the public aware of those individuals who have 
participated in the January 6th insurrection through their website 
currently, I am concerned that the information is available is not as 
comprehensive as it could be.
    Does the Department of Justice plan to make any alterations to 
their current online database of Capitol Breach Cases?
    Answer. The Justice Department provides the public with frequent 
updates about new charges and updates to pending criminal actions in 
connection with the events of January 6, 2021. For each charged case 
involving the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, the U.S. 
Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia posts publicly available 
information on a searchable webpage (https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/
capitol-breach-cases). While laws and regulations, court orders, 
Department policies, and our professional obligations limit our ability 
to provide some information concerning the events of January 6th, each 
posting includes the name of the defendant, the charges filed, links to 
any court-filed documents, an updated case status, and a notation of 
when the entry was last updated.
    The FBI also maintains a database of individuals for about whom it 
seeks information in connection with violent acts committed on January 
6, 2021. That chart is available at https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/capitol-
violence.
    Question. While I understand that arrests and ultimate charging of 
individuals is ongoing, does the DOJ anticipate releasing a 
comprehensive report examining and studying the events of January 6th 
and the actions being taken by DOJ?
    Answer. On January 15, 2021, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office 
of the Inspector General (OIG) announced that it was initiating a 
comprehensive review to examine the role and activity of DOJ and its 
components in preparing for and responding to the events at the U.S. 
Capitol on January 6, 2021. The DOJ OIG will coordinate its review with 
reviews also being conducted by the Offices of Inspector General of the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of the Interior.
    The DOJ OIG review will include examining information relevant to 
the January 6th events that was available to DOJ and its components in 
advance of January 6; the extent to which such information was shared 
by DOJ and its components with the U.S. Capitol Police and other 
federal, state, and local agencies; and the role of DOJ personnel in 
responding to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. The DOJ 
OIG also will assess whether there are any weaknesses in DOJ protocols, 
policies, or procedures that adversely affected the ability of DOJ or 
its components to prepare effectively for and respond to the events at 
the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. If circumstances warrant, the DOJ OIG 
will consider examining other issues that may arise during the review.
    Question. The behavior we witnessed on January 6th in the U.S. 
Capitol was un-American. The individuals that participated in this 
insurrection--including those from my own state--should be prosecuted 
to the fullest extent of the law. It is time now to move forward as one 
nation to focus on helping Americans suffering from the pandemic. Now 
more than ever, it is on each of us to seek unity over division and put 
partisanship aside for the good of our country. Bipartisanship and 
compromise are not always easy, but they are essential. The issues 
facing our democracy today are not insurmountable if we choose to 
tackle them together. We all must commit to restoring decency and 
civility to our politics and being that shining city upon a hill whose 
beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere. That is what 
American people deserve and the world expects. As members of Congress, 
we have a responsibility to be the example for our constituents and for 
the American people. This Administration, and this President, has the 
same responsibility.
    What can we all do to show Americans that we can work together, 
even if we strongly disagree on some issues?
    Answer. The Department of Justice works tirelessly to keep 
Americans safe from violent crime, including international and domestic 
terrorism, no matter the underlying ideology. By holding accountable 
those who commit federal crimes, while protecting individuals' civil 
liberties, the Department can help deter such behavior and promote 
peaceful, civil discourse as a means of resolving disputes.
    Question. Intelligence reports prior to the January 6th riot warned 
Capitol Police that supporters of President Trump were actively 
promoting violence and targeting Congress itself. The Department of 
Homeland Security specifically notified Capitol Police that they had 
identified a map of the Capitol's tunnel system in online messages 
between ``Stop the Steal'' supporters, and the FBI field office in 
Norfolk also warned the Capitol Police. However, the Capitol Police 
Inspector General also found a lack of consensus among key official 
about whether these reports indicated specific known threats. Facebook 
employs more than 15,000 content moderators across the globe, and other 
platforms like Twitter and Google have their own teams of moderators 
that enforce their policies and take down illegal or offensive content 
on their sites. My bipartisan bill with Senator Cornyn would require 
these companies to proactively flag major crimes, including drug 
trafficking and terrorism, to law enforcement.
    Did any of these companies proactively reach out to law enforcement 
with reports of illegal activity?
    Answer. The FBI works with the private sector to share information 
and better prepare them to detect illegal conduct on their sites and 
platforms. We encourage companies to share information for the FBI to 
investigate; and conversely, the FBI may share information, as 
appropriate, with the private sector. In order to protect the integrity 
of ongoing investigations, the FBI is not in a position to provide 
further details at this time regarding information that may have been 
received from social media companies prior to the January 6th attacks.
    Question. What more could social media companies have done to alert 
law enforcement prior to the January 6th riots?
    Answer. The FBI welcomes tips and information to support its 
federal law enforcement efforts, be it from social media companies or 
the general public. As I have noted previously, I am struck by the 
frequency with which a critical tip or lead in an investigation comes 
from law enforcement partners or from a member of the public. The FBI 
reports that roughly 50 percent of our cases originate from tips and 
leads from law enforcement or private sector partners and private 
citizens, who identify potential threats and report them to the FBI or 
our partners.
    Question. Do you believe that we need to update Section 230 to 
address illegal activity, including how groups like ``Stop the Steal'' 
can use these platforms for illegal activities?
    Answer. The scope of immunity for communications services providers 
under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act raises important 
questions of law and policy, and I know that you and other Members of 
the Committee have ideas about how the statute should be amended. I 
look forward to talking with you and others about those ideas.
    Question. As you both know it's impossible to prepare or respond to 
a threat without as much reliable information as possible, and we 
certainly saw what happens when threat information isn't handled 
effectively on January 6th. This brings up a larger issue that I've 
grown more concerned about during my time on the Cyber Subcommittee for 
Armed Services. Which is how potential threats, both physical and 
cyber, are shared within the federal government.
    In your positions so far, do you feel both your departments have 
been sufficiently receiving and relaying threat information with each 
of the other federal departments, and are you aware if that information 
can then be shared with a specific private industry partner if we 
identify a specific threat toward them?
    Answer. The Department of Justice supports continuous information 
sharing within the government and with the private sector, whether the 
threat is national security, cybersecurity, or criminal in nature.
    In the cybersecurity context in particular, the partnerships 
between the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and their 
component agencies, are critical. For instance, coordination between 
the FBI and DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
occurs daily and is critical in helping the private sector protect 
itself from cyber attacks. Both agencies work with each other and with 
private sector partners to share information about threats, investigate 
attacks, and provide mitigation in the event of a cyber incident. Among 
other things, the Department of Justice participates in the Cyber 
Response Group that is hosted by the National Security Council and that 
facilitates information sharing across agencies.
    The Department of Justice also encourages strong partnerships with 
private industry. In 2020, FBI Cyber Division representatives were a 
part of approximately 450 external engagements and provided briefings 
to approximately 1,700 private sector and non-federal law enforcement 
individuals. The FBI also regularly disseminates information and 
reporting to help inform the private sector and the public about what 
the FBI is seeing in its cyber investigations.
    Question. In your own opinions how do we increase the coordination 
within the federal government to respond more quickly and in a 
uniformed way no matter the threat?
    Answer. The Department of Justice is continually looking at ways to 
increase coordination and information sharing within the federal 
government to respond more quickly and in a uniform way no matter the 
threat. In order to meet this priority and facilitate such ongoing 
coordination, the Department, through the FBI, established the National 
Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) in 2008 to address this 
evolving cyber challenge. Through the coordination, collaboration, and 
sharing that occurs at the NCIJTF, members across the U.S. Government 
work to place cyber criminals behind bars and to remove them from the 
nation's networks.
    In addition, earlier this year, the Justice Department established 
a dedicated Ransomware and Digital Extortion Task Force to combat the 
growing number of ransomware and digital extortion attacks. The Task 
Force's focus is on tackling this threat strategically by cooperating 
with domestic and foreign partners as well as private sector partners 
to combat this significant criminal threat. The Task Force prioritizes 
the disruption, investigation, and prosecution of ransomware and 
digital extortion activity by tracking and dismantling the development 
and deployment of malware, identifying the cybercriminals responsible, 
and holding those individuals accountable for their crimes. And earlier 
this month, the Department announced that the Task Force coordinated 
our efforts to seize 63.7 bitcoins--currently valued at approximately 
$2.3 million--in proceeds paid to individuals in the group known as 
Darkside, which had targeted Colonial Pipeline.
    The President's FY 2022 budget requests a total of $1.1 billion to 
enhance cybersecurity and fight cybercrime, including by addressing 
data breach issues. This request would be the largest increase in cyber 
resources for the Justice Department in more than a decade and includes 
more than $150 million in cyber program enhancements to help us to meet 
these threats by drawing upon partnerships across all levels of 
government and with private sector partners to identify actors and 
their supporting infrastructure; arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate 
them; seize their ill-gotten assets; and require them to pay 
restitution to their victims.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
    During the May 12, 2021 hearing, I commended you and the Department 
of Justice for seeking to identify and prosecute the individuals 
responsible for the events of January 6, 2021. I also asked you about 
the Department of Justice resources being committed to identify and 
prosecute the individuals responsible for the violence last summer that 
was aimed at government institutions like courthouses and police 
stations, including in Minneapolis, MN and Portland, OR. You agreed to 
provide me with additional information on this topic. To assist in that 
effort, I have the following questions:
    Question. What resources has the Department of Justice dedicated to 
identifying and prosecuting the individuals who were involved in this 
violent activity?
    Answer. The Justice Department has dedicated substantial 
investigative and prosecutorial resources from components across the 
Department and in dozens of jurisdictions nationwide to bring charges 
in numerous cases in connection with violence during the summer and 
fall of 2020 that was aimed at government institutions. In particular, 
the Department's Justice Management Division advises that Investigative 
resources totaling more than $48 million, including thousands of DOJ 
personnel, have been deployed from the Department's law enforcement 
components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
United States Marshals Service (USMS), the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
    The Justice Department has and will continue to aggressively pursue 
those who engage in violent criminal activity such as the destruction 
of property and violent assaults on law enforcement. The Department is 
committed to working with Congress regarding its ongoing reviews of 
these events and identifying areas for improvement and greater 
cooperation in law enforcement responses.
    Question. What is the status of the Department of Justice's efforts 
to identify and prosecute these individuals?
    Answer. Justice Department investigations and cases to identify and 
prosecute individuals in connection with violence aimed at government 
institutions during the summer and fall of 2020 are ongoing. The 
Department continues to review information and hold accountable those 
who violated the law.
    In order to protect the integrity of all investigations, as a 
general practice, the Department does not comment on the details of 
particular investigations beyond the charging and other public 
documents, and does not comment on the existence or status of any 
potential investigative matter.
    Question. How many Department of Justice personnel are involved in 
those efforts, and how has that number changed over time?
    Answer. The Department's Justice Management Division advises that 
thousands of Justice Department personnel from the FBI, USMS, BOP, ATF, 
and DEA across more than three dozen jurisdictions nationwide have been 
involved in efforts to investigate and prosecute violence during the 
summer and fall of 2020 that was aimed at government institutions. In 
addition, prosecutors U.S. Attorneys' Offices across the country and 
attorneys from the Criminal Division and the National Security Division 
have been involved in these efforts.
    Question. Has the Department of Justice's approach to investigating 
and prosecuting crimes associated with this violent activity changed in 
any way since last summer? If so, please describe the nature of those 
changes and identify the date(s) on which those changes were made. 
Information responsive to this question includes, but is not limited 
to, any changes in staffing levels, resource allocations, and/or 
guidance regarding charges, dismissals, and/or plea bargains.
    Answer. I am not aware of any Departmental guidance that has been 
issued since I became Attorney General on March 11, 2021 addressing the 
Justice Department's approach to investigations and prosecutions 
stemming from violence that occurred during the summer and fall of 
2020.
    On January 29, 2021, on the subject of the Justice Department's 
general charging and sentencing policy, the Department rescinded a 
directive entitled Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 
2017) and reinstated the guidance articulated in Department Policy on 
Charging and Sentencing (May 19, 2010) to ensure that decisions about 
charging, plea agreements, and advocacy at sentencing are based on the 
merits of each case and reflect an individualized assessment of 
relevant facts.
    In addition, as I testified before the Committee last month, the 
Department issued guidance to all federal prosecutors on March 8, 2021 
emphasizing the need for coordination and consistency in prosecutions 
involving domestic violent extremism and imposing new requirements for 
identifying and tracking such matters.
    Question. How has the Department of Justice worked to support state 
and local law enforcement agencies in connection with their efforts to 
identify and prosecute the individuals responsible for this violent 
activity?
    Answer. The Justice Department has provided investigative and 
prosecutorial support to State and local law enforcement partners 
through the Department's law enforcement components, U.S. Attorneys' 
offices, litigating components, and grant programs administered by the 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), the Office of 
Justice Programs (OJP), and the Office of Victims of Crime (OVC). Among 
other critical programs, Project Safe Neighborhood remains the Justice 
Department's unified violent crime reduction initiative within each of 
our federal districts.
    This critical support to State and local law enforcement partners 
will expand under the Department's recently announced Comprehensive 
Strategy for Reducing Violent Crime. The Department has directed each 
United States Attorneys' Office to work with its State, local, Tribal, 
and community partners to establish an immediate plan to address spikes 
in violent crime that are typically seen during the summer. In 
particular, the FBI will make available cutting-edge analytical 
resources to support state and local law enforcement efforts to 
identify the most violent and dangerous threats and deploy agents to 
assist with enforcement operations targeting these entities. The ATF 
will embed with local homicide units and expand the availability of its 
National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBN) Correlation 
Center. And the United States Marshals Service, in coordination with 
State and local authorities, will conduct fugitive sweeps throughout 
the country focused on individuals subject to state or local warrants 
for violent crimes.
    The President's FY 2022 budget requests a total of $9.4 billion for 
the Justice Department to address violent crime across the country, 
including grants totaling more than $1 billion to support State and 
local partners.
                                 ______
                                 
                Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
    Question. Operation Legend was a violent crime interdiction 
initiative to fight the sudden surge in violent crime (narcotics and 
firearms-related offenses, homicide, rape, and theft) last summer in 9 
cities across the country. It began in Kansas City, MO, following the 
death of 4-year-old LeGend Taliferro, who survived open-heart surgery 
only to later die by bullets fired into the apartment where he was 
sleeping. While Operation LeGend was meant to be targeted to a specific 
time period, I believe we must stay focused on violent crime 
interdiction initiatives. In 2020, there were almost 700 homicides in 
Missouri, and of those homicides, there were 250 in St. Louis and over 
150 in Kansas City. Violent crime should have no place in Missourians' 
expectations for their everyday lives. Do you plan to reassign any 
agents in the FBI or in the U.S. Attorney's Office from their work in 
violent crime? How will you ensure that violent crime prevention and 
prosecution remain a priority for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)?
    Answer. I share your concern about the increase in violent crime in 
Missouri and across the country. As I testified before the Committee, 
protecting our communities from the recent increase in major violent 
crimes is among the most pressing challenges facing the Department of 
Justice and a top Justice Department priority. The Department's 
recently announced violent crime reduction strategy harnesses all our 
relevant components to that end, including the Department's U.S. 
Attorneys' offices, litigating divisions (including the Criminal 
Division), law enforcement agencies, and grantmaking offices. The FY 
2022 budget request includes $9.4 billion, an increase of more than 8% 
above the 2021 enacted level, to support both the Justice Department's 
law enforcement resources and State and local law enforcement agencies 
in their efforts to achieve safer communities.
    Question. Your budget calls for a $12 million program increase for 
the U.S. Marshals Service to support additional response capabilities. 
I support more resources to the Marshals, particularly to establish a 
regional fugitive task force that covers Missouri, Kansas, and the 
surrounding area. Currently, no fugitive task force covers Missouri, 
and my state relies on locally recruited task forces between the major 
metro areas to catch fugitives. While I value those efforts, there are 
over 10,000 fugitives, and the support of a regional task force is 
necessary to take down fugitives and minimize their criminal activity. 
Would you commit to establishing a regional fugitive task force that 
covers Missouri and the surrounding area even while DOJ pursues your 
goals for domestic terrorism?
    Answer. The United States Marshals Service (USMS) is working to 
increase the size and effectiveness of its regional and district-based 
fugitive apprehension task forces to reduce violent crime across the 
nation. The President's FY 2022 budget request seeks program increases 
for the USMS totaling $173.2 million, which will, among other things, 
enable the USMS to scale up efforts to work with State and local 
partners to more rapidly and safely arrest violent fugitives. The USMS 
is currently developing a comprehensive expansion plan to ensure the 
coverage of regional task force networks across all 94 federal judicial 
districts, including those in Missouri.
    Question. I have worked across the aisle with my colleagues to 
address data breach issues. The ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, 
a Georgia-based pipeline operator, is a stark reminder that breaches in 
data security can constitute a major national security threat. A 
thoughtful threat assessment demands that DOJ focus on cybersecurity 
and the impact that data breaches have on the average citizen. Will you 
commit to dedicating the resources needed to maintain or reinforce 
DOJ's response to cyber intrusions by criminal actors? What tools do 
you think DOJ needs to better attribute and pursue persistent threat 
actors?
    Answer. As I testified before the Committee, protecting our 
national security requires countering cyber threats from foreign and 
domestic actors--whether nation states, terrorists, or criminals--who 
seek to conduct espionage, invade our privacy, steal our intellectual 
property, damage our critical financial and physical infrastructure, or 
extort ransom payments.
    These threats are grave and escalating. That is why the Justice 
Department established a dedicated Ransomware and Digital Extortion 
Task Force to combat the growing number of ransomware and digital 
extortion attacks. Our focus is on tackling this threat strategically 
by cooperating with domestic and foreign partners as well as private 
sector partners to combat this significant criminal threat. The Task 
Force prioritizes the disruption, investigation, and prosecution of 
ransomware and digital extortion activity by tracking and dismantling 
the development and deployment of malware, identifying the 
cybercriminals responsible, and holding those individuals accountable 
for their crimes. And earlier this month, the Department announced that 
the Task Force coordinated our efforts to seize 63.7 bitcoins--
currently valued at approximately $2.3 million--in proceeds paid to 
individuals in the group known as Darkside, which had targeted Colonial 
Pipeline.
    The President's FY 2022 discretionary budget requests a total of 
$1.1 billion to enhance cybersecurity and fight cybercrime, including 
by addressing data breach issues. This request would be the largest 
increase in cyber resources for the Justice Department in more than a 
decade and includes more than $150 million in cyber program 
enhancements to help us to meet these threats by drawing upon 
partnerships across all levels of government and with private sector 
partners to identify actors and their supporting infrastructure; 
arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate them; seize their ill-gotten assets; 
and require them to pay restitution to their victims.
    We look forward to working with Congress to support law 
enforcement's efforts to better identify and pursue these threat 
actors, and on ways to give the Department greater visibility into 
ransomware incidents and data breaches.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator John Hoeven
    Questions. What is the Department of Justice's role in addressing 
drug trafficking and human trafficking, particularly along the southern 
border? What is the Department of Justice witnessing when it comes to 
drug trafficking at our southern border? What is the Department of 
Justice witnessing when it comes to human trafficking at our southern 
border? When it comes to the crisis at our southern border, as Border 
Patrol agents work diligently to address the humanitarian needs present 
with the high flow of migrants and are unable to devote the entirety of 
their time to securing the border, what challenges does that present to 
our national security?
    Answer. Drug Trafficking. The Justice Department's role in 
addressing drug trafficking is multi-dimensional and includes the 
interdiction of drugs; the investigation and prosecution of a wide 
variety of drug offenses; and the seizure of proceeds of the drug 
trade. By prosecuting the leaders and members of drug trafficking 
organizations at home and abroad, the Department strives to curtail the 
availability of potentially deadly and harmful drugs that impact the 
public health, public safety, and national security of the United 
States. The Justice Department's FY 2022 budget request seeks a total 
of $2.4 billion for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
including $690 million to support the fight against violent drug gangs 
and cartels that continue to use the southwest border as an entry point 
for bringing fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine into the United 
States. DEA is currently coordinating and supporting operations to 
combat transnational criminal organizations operating along our 
southwest border that involve more than 35 federal and international 
law enforcement partners as well as the Justice Department's drug 
prosecutors from our U.S. Attorneys Offices, Criminal Division, 
Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), and High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Forces (HIDTA).
    Human Trafficking & Smuggling. Transnational human trafficking and 
smuggling networks pose serious criminal threats and pose a significant 
risk to many innocent people who are trafficked or smuggled. Last 
month, I announced the establishment of Joint Task Force Alpha, a joint 
law enforcement effort that will marshal the investigative and 
prosecutorial resources of the Department of Justice, in partnership 
with DHS, to disrupt and dismantle human smuggling and trafficking 
networks that pose national security threats, have links to 
transnational organized crime, or exploit and endanger migrants. The 
Joint Task Force brings Justice Department prosecutors from the 
Criminal Division, U.S. Attorneys' Offices along the southwest border, 
and the Civil Rights Division to investigate and prosecute those who 
are criminally smuggling and trafficking individuals into the United 
States. Together with DHS partners, the Task Force will engage and 
utilize each of the Department's law enforcement components, including 
from the FBI and DEA. In addition to the work of the Joint Task Force, 
I have also directed the Office of Prosecutorial Development, 
Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) and the International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), in coordination 
with the State Department, to enhance the assistance provided to 
counterparts in the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico to support 
their efforts to prosecute trafficking and smuggling networks in their 
own courts.
    Protecting National Security. The Justice Department is committed 
to protecting national security while also building a safe, orderly and 
humane immigration system. The Justice Department supports the 
Department of Homeland Security in its efforts to take appropriate 
steps to fulfill those commitments, including effectively deploying its 
existing resources and obtaining additional support and resources for 
the border as needed to prioritize national security and public safety.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith
    Question. One of the outcomes of the COVID pandemic has been a 
desire from citizens and enforcement personnel to use more contactless 
technologies. We understand that the TSA has yet to receive approval 
from the FBI to deploy mobile biometric capture technologies that will 
enable travelers to submit fingerprints to the TSA as part of their 
application for PreCheck even though that was mandated three years ago 
in the TSA Modernization Act. Law enforcement officials have stressed 
they could use contactless technology at the roadside and in 
investigations. When will the FBI be prepared to accept mobile 
fingerprints from law enforcement and partner agencies like the TSA to 
check criminal records?
    Answer. The FBI advises that it does not currently accept 
contactless fingerprints for non- criminal justice background check 
purposes, such as the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) 
Pre-Check Program, for two primary reasons.
    First, the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 
1998 (Compact) established the Compact Council (Council) which governs 
the use of criminal history record information (CHRI) for non-criminal 
justice purposes. The Compact, to which the federal government is a 
party, requires that positive identification be established to receive 
FBI CHRI for non-criminal justice purposes. Further, the Council has 
purview over any biometric approved for positive identification 
pertaining to the exchange of FBI CHRI for noncriminal justice 
purposes. As in the past, the Council will consider any proposals and 
supporting studies validating positive identification before 
determining if the proposal is approved. Under current regulations, any 
proposal approved by the Council must be published in the Federal 
Register. Currently, ten rolled or ten flat fingerprints are the only 
forms of positive identification that have been approved by the 
Council. See 70 Fed. Reg. 36209. Therefore, to ensure positive 
identification, any background check for non-criminal justice purposes 
that obtains FBI CHRI must be conducted through the submission of ten 
rolled or ten flat fingerprints to the FBI.
    Second, the FBI advises that the technology has not reached the 
necessary level of accuracy to be deemed sufficient for positive 
identification purposes. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) is currently conducting studies pertaining to 
contactless fingerprinting. The timetable will be based on NIST studies 
pertaining to contactless fingerprinting. However, it may be some years 
before the accuracy is sufficient to be utilized for purposes of 
positive identification. Thus, the FBI cannot accept contactless 
fingerprints unless approved by the Council as positive identification 
for non-criminal justice purposes.
    Question. What is the TSA doing to accelerate approval of mobile 
biometric technologies through the FBI's advisory processes?
    Answer. The TSA initiated conversations with the FBI regarding 
mobile contactless fingerprint technology in October 2020. A working 
group was established to discuss the efficacy of mobile contactless 
fingerprint technology for the TSA PreCheck program. Members of the 
working group include representatives from the FBI, TSA, other 
Department of Homeland Security components, and NIST. As a result of 
the working group's collaboration as well as the Council's purview over 
any biometric approved as positive identification for non-criminal 
justice purposes, the TSA requested the opportunity to present its 
mobile contactless fingerprint initiative to the Council in May 2021 to 
receive initial feedback. The FBI understands that TSA intends to 
conduct a pilot project to further evaluate mobile contactless 
fingerprint technology for the TSA PreCheck application. While the 
Council did not provide any formal recommendations at the May 2021 
meeting, once the studies are complete, the information may be 
presented to the Council for consideration.
                                 ______
                                 
         Questions Submitted to Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas
             Questions Submitted by Chairman Patrick Leahy
    In live testimony, you committed to making the results of your 
internal review to prevent, detect, and respond to domestic violent 
extremism within the Department of Homeland Security available to the 
public. I appreciate that commitment.
    Question. Can you specify the full range facts and factors that 
prompted the internal review in the first place? When can we expect the 
review to be completed?
    Answer. The Intelligence Community assesses that domestic violent 
extremists who are motivated by a range of ideologies and galvanized by 
recent political and societal events in the United States continue to 
pose one of the most significant terrorist-related threats to the 
homeland. To ensure we can continue executing our critical mission with 
honor and integrity, we will not tolerate hateful acts or violent 
extremist activity within our Department. DHS will implement the 
report's recommendations with urgency and will share the report with 
Congress and the public once finalized.
    Question. Can DHS commit to giving the Appropriations Committee a 
briefing within the next 30 days about the status of this internal 
review?
    Answer. DHS is committed to transparency and will provide the 
Appropriations Committee with the review's analysis and 
recommendations.
    Question. What more does the Department of Homeland Security need 
from Congress--and, the Appropriations Committee--to root out violent 
extremism? Please be specific about what DHS programs, accounts, and 
initiatives require additional resources from Congress in order to 
comprehensively address the threat of domestic violent extremism.
    Answer. The Department is focused on increasing its partnerships 
with local communities to provide them with enhanced tools and 
resources to prevent individuals from radicalizing to violence. The 
Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) provides 
financial, educational, and technical assistance to state and local 
partners to empower them to lead and maintain prevention programs that 
reduce the number of people susceptible to radicalization to violence 
and that help individuals on a pathway to violence to disengage before 
violence occurs.
    Two specific programs at CP3 require additional resources from 
Congress to comprehensively address the threat of domestic violent 
extremism. First, CP3 seeks to expand its Regional Prevention 
Coordinators (RPCs) to provide training and technical assistance to 
jurisdictions across the country. RPCs convene and engage local 
stakeholders, share information, provide trainings, host prevention-
related exercises, and provide support to grantees and stakeholders. 
Currently, CP3 faces a limit on the number of RPCs it can hire and 
deploy, and requests from state and local partners far exceed the 
capacity of these limited number of RPCs. The result is limited 
coverage across the United States for technical support for local 
prevention efforts.
    Technical assistance and engagement are not the only mechanisms CP3 
uses to build local prevention frameworks. The Targeted Violence and 
Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program, managed by CP3 and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), invests in developing local 
violence prevention frameworks. Financial assistance for this program 
was doubled from $10 million in FY 2020 to $20 million in FY 2021. 
Applications to the TVTP grant program continue to outpace the 
increased amount of funds available. As such, CP3 continues to seek 
greater funding to support this grant program.
    In order for DHS to continue its long-term efforts to identify and 
combat any potential DVE-related threats within the Department, it is 
imperative that Congress prioritize and fully fund Trusted Workforce 
2.0 initiatives and the modernization of DHS information technology 
systems that directly support personnel background investigations and 
continuous vetting.
    In order to detect, deter, and mitigate insider threats, the DHS 
Insider Threat Program (ITP) requires funding to expand protection and 
monitoring capabilities across the DHS Operational Components' 
Sensitive But Unclassified networks. The user activity monitoring tools 
utilized by DHS ITP are vital to reducing the Department's exposure to 
these threats and mitigating the risk of DVE within its ranks.
    Question. In the wake of September 11, 2001, the National Security 
Agency began indiscriminately collecting vast amounts of Americans' 
internet and phone records, seriously encroaching on their civil 
liberties and privacy. Eventually, Congress had to step in and reform 
our surveillance laws to balance the need to protect our homeland and 
the need to preserve our most precious rights and liberties. I was 
concerned by recent reporting that DHS plans to ``expand its 
relationships with companies that scour public data for intelligence.'' 
Reports also indicate this partnership with private third-party 
entities would allow DHS to evade legal restrictions on the 
government's surveillance of U.S. persons.
    Please describe all plans to work or contract with third party 
entities in order to collect data on or otherwise surveil Americans.
    Answer. This response contains FOUO/Classified information and can 
be provided under separate cover upon request.
    Question. Please explain what efforts are being made to ensure that 
all laws regarding government surveillance of U.S. persons are complied 
with, and what safeguards are in place to ensure that Americans' 
privacy and civil liberties are not infringed upon.
    Answer. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Privacy 
Office, and Office of the General Counsel regularly provide advice, 
guidance, and oversight to ensure DHS programs, policies, and 
operations--including those related to counterterrorism and DVE-
prevention activities--protect privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties. Further, DHS is committed to providing transparency and 
engaging with key stakeholders, including the diverse communities it 
serves, to inform its programs, policies, and operations.
    DHS policy prohibits profiling, targeting, or discriminating 
against any individual for exercising First Amendment rights. DHS 
policy directs that ``DHS personnel shall not collect, maintain in DHS 
systems, or use information protected by the First Amendment unless: 
(a) an individual has expressly granted their consent for DHS to 
collect, maintain and use that information; (b) maintaining the record 
is expressly authorized by a Federal statute; or (c) that information 
is relevant to a criminal, civil, or administrative activity relating 
to a law DHS enforces or administers. In addition, DHS personnel should 
not pursue by questioning, research or other means, information 
relating to how an individual exercises [their] First Amendment rights 
unless one or more of the same conditions applies.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Policy Statement 140-12, Information Regarding First Amendment 
Protected Activities (May 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Question. Lieutenant General Honore was tasked by House leadership 
to conduct an after-action review of the Capitol attack on January 6th 
and provide recommendations to improve security of the Capitol. One of 
the suggestions in his report was the establishment of a ``quick-
reaction force'' to rapidly respond to any future events.
    Will the Department of Homeland Security participate in this type 
of task force? Should it have dedicated funding from Congress? Or would 
DHS be better positioned to participate in a law enforcement-based task 
force that is activated when called upon, were the Department provided 
resources to do so?
    Answer. DHS is actively involved in several discussions to improve 
the security of the U.S. Capitol and the wider National Capital Region 
(NCR). This includes reviewing how we can best support our partners, 
including the U.S. Capitol Police, when responding to short or no-
notice events in the NCR such as the January 6th attack. In those 
conversations, we are considering numerous ways to improve efficiency 
and communications, bolster intelligence and information sharing, and 
evaluate the efficacy of immediate response capabilities.
    DHS is working closely with the Metropolitan Washington Council of 
Governments (MWCOG) on this issue. The MWCOG's Mutual Assistance 
Operational Plan currently provides an effective structure to address 
most NCR security incidents, using a fabric of mutual assistance 
agreements with regional partners. When an incident exceeds state and 
local response capability, DHS can offer limited law enforcement 
support, including through the cross-designation and/or deputation of 
federal law enforcement officers consistent with the Department's 
applicable legal authorities and implementing policies.
    Question. How does DHS define targeted violence and domestic 
violent extremists? Is there a meaningful distinction between the DHS 
definitions and those used by the Justice Department?
    Answer. In recent technical drafting assistance, DHS proposed to 
define targeted violence as ``a premeditated act of violence directed 
at a specific individual, group, or location, regardless of motivation, 
that violates the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or 
subdivision of the United States.''
    DHS defines a domestic violent extremist (DVE) as an individual 
based and operating primarily within the United States or its 
territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist 
group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social 
goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence. 
The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, 
use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent 
tactics does not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally 
protected. DVEs can fit within one or multiple categories of 
ideological motivation and can span a broad range of groups or 
movements.
    DHS would be supportive of a process to develop Federal Government-
wide definitions of these terms and defers to the Department of Justice 
on their current definitions.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Brian Schatz
    Question. The Department of Homeland Security plays an integral 
role in preventing violent extremism. However, that has previously 
focused on foreign threats, leaving domestic extremism prevention 
efforts underfunded in comparison. How will the Department increase its 
support for domestic extremism prevention efforts-for example, by 
awarding Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grants to combat 
domestic violent extremism?
    Answer. The Department is redoubling its efforts to provide timely 
and actionable intelligence and information to the broadest audience at 
the lowest classification level possible. As a result, DHS is 
augmenting its intelligence and information-sharing capabilities in 
collaboration with other government agencies; state, local, tribal, 
territorial, and campus law enforcement partners; and private sector 
partners. This includes publishing and disseminating intelligence 
bulletins that provide our partners with greater insight into evolving 
threats, and situational awareness notifications that inform public 
safety and security planning efforts to prevent terrorism and targeted 
violence. We are also reviewing how we can better access and use 
publicly available information to inform our analysis. DHS's Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis has enhanced its ability to analyze, produce, 
and disseminate products that address DVE threats, including violent 
extremist narratives shared via social media and other online 
platforms. Further, the Department is continuing to enhance the 
financial, educational, and technical assistance it provides to local 
communities to prevent radicalization to violence. This includes 
ensuring equitable access to related grant programs.
    Question. The Department of Homeland Security recently announced an 
effort to monitor and analyze public social media posts to detect 
extremist activity and prevent violent attacks. This builds on the 
Department's previous collection of social media information of both 
foreign and U.S. travelers. Please provide a detailed explanation of 
this effort, including considerations of civil liberties protections 
for monitored individuals.
    Answer. DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) leverages 
its longstanding open source collection capabilities to inform its 
assessment of homeland security-related threats, consistent with 
applicable law and in a manner that protects individuals' privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties. All I&A collection activities are 
conducted consistent with its Intelligence Oversight Guidelines and 
subject to oversight by the DHS Privacy Office, Office for Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties, and Office of the General Counsel. DHS 
continuously reviews its activities to ensure they are lawful and in 
alignment with best practice.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin, III
    Recently, a cybersecurity attack forced the closure of the largest 
fuel pipeline in the United States. Colonial Pipeline Company closed 
its entire 5500-mile conduit carrying gasoline and other fuels from the 
Gulf Coast to New York after it was the target of a ransomware attack 
on its network. This is deeply troubling. I am glad that the White 
House announced that it was forming an interagency task force in 
response to the Colonial ransomware attack, but I couldn't help but 
notice that the press briefing didn't even mention the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), which has oversight over pipeline 
cybersecurity. This shouldn't be surprising, since a 2019 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report noted that only 6 staff at TSA were 
responsible for reviewing the cybersecurity performed by approximately 
2.5 million miles of pipeline and 3000 pipeline companies across the 
U.S. These same weaknesses were documented by the Congressional 
Research Service in 2012, and yet nothing has been done. So, I'll ask 
the same question I asked this time last year.
    Question. What percentage of the nearly 3000 pipeline companies are 
complying with TSA's voluntary cybersecurity guidelines? How is TSA in 
a position to evaluate compliance if they have never performed any 
assessments?
    Answer. TSA has developed and implemented a plan for reviewing 
pipeline security plans and administering assessments of the most 
critical pipeline owners and operators, as determined by the Pipeline 
Relative Risk Ranking Tool (PRRRT). Of the 3,000 pipeline companies 
nationwide, TSA conducts voluntary assessments with the top 100 
critical pipeline owner and operators, which represent approximately 85 
percent of all throughput.
    TSA assesses that critical pipeline owner and operators' current 
adherence to these measures is over 80 percent. TSA is conducting 
assessments and providing guidance to owners and operators on how to 
implement related recommended or necessary improvements.
    In addition, TSA conducts Critical Facility Security Reviews, which 
are on-site evaluations of the physical security of key critical 
pipeline facilities. In addition to the assessment of newly listed 
sites, TSA follows up with operators to evaluate the implementation 
status of previous critical facility security recommendations.
    Through the recent issuance of the Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity 
Security Directive, the measures outlined in the aforementioned 
Guidelines and additional Information Technology (IT) security 
requirements are now required to be assessed and mitigated if any gaps 
are identified.
    Per the requirements of the Security Directive, TSA has received or 
authorized extensions for all required cybersecurity vulnerability 
self-assessments from applicable critical pipeline owner and operators.
    Since 2001, TSA has engaged extensively with the pipeline industry, 
including taking clear and specific actions to address the industry's 
cybersecurity gaps and vulnerabilities. Prior to the issuance of the 
May 28, 2021 Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity Security Directive, TSA 
conducted security assessments of the pipeline industry, which continue 
today. This approach lends itself to a very close review and evaluation 
of pipeline cybersecurity standards and practices. These programs 
include, but are not limited to, the Corporate Security Review, 
Critical Facility Security Review, and Validated Architecture Design 
Reviews (VADR). VADRs are conducted with the Department's Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
    To date, TSA has conducted over 730 assessments to assess physical 
and cybersecurity measures of critical pipeline owner and operators, 
including to ensure cybersecurity measures are compliant with TSA 
Pipeline Security Guidelines, other standards identified through the 
VADR review process, and other related best practices. TSA and CISA 
continue to evaluate and improve their cybersecurity assessment 
capabilities.
    Question. I'll be even more blunt this year. If TSA can't do its 
job, and it isn't even included in the interagency task force on this 
issue, why is it even in charge of pipeline cybersecurity?
    Answer. TSA has statutory authority over transportation security, 
including over the pipeline sector under (49 U.S.C. Sec. 114 (d), (f)), 
and the progress made to date to advance security in the pipeline 
sector is noteworthy.
    Since the passage of the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, TSA has 
expanded the number of personnel dedicated to pipeline security and 
collaborates closely with CISA on related work. TSA currently has 54 
full-time employees supporting this mission and receives additional 
support from other offices. The TSA team includes 20 Surface 
Transportation Security Inspectors who serve on the field-based 
Pipeline Security Assessment Team (PSAT). PSAT members are located 
throughout the country, have received specialized training, and conduct 
critically needed pipeline security assessments. A subset of these 
members have received additional comprehensive cybersecurity training 
in partnership with CISA and the Idaho National Laboratory to provide 
long-term cybersecurity support to the sector.
    In the immediate wake of the Colonial pipeline ransomware attack, 
TSA took steps to further strengthen pipeline cybersecurity by issuing 
a Security Directive on May 27, 2021 mandating that owners and 
operators of critical hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines and 
liquefied natural gas facilities report to CISA within 12 hours of any 
cybersecurity incident. It further requires that owners and operators 
of critical pipelines designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator that is 
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to coordinate with TSA and CISA 
in response to any incident. Finally, critical pipeline owners and 
operators must review their current activities to assess cyber risk, 
identify needed remediation measures, and establish a timeline for 
achieving them. TSA continues to work closely with CISA on developing 
additional cybersecurity mitigation measures.
    These actions supplement TSA's efforts over the past two years to 
improve pipeline security, and particularly pipeline cybersecurity, 
despite challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic. With an 
appropriation of $8.4 million received in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, and 
support from pipeline cybersecurity experts at CISA and the Idaho 
National Laboratory, TSA and CISA completed 51 in-depth cybersecurity 
assessments in FY 2021. In FY 2021, Congress appropriated approximately 
$4.5 million to TSA to continue cybersecurity assessments. TSA also 
received about $3 million in support of surface-related cybersecurity 
activities, such as additional cybersecurity assessment tools and 
workshops. These are critically important investments that will help 
ensure a stronger cybersecurity posture amongst our Nation's most 
critical pipelines going forward.
    TSA has addressed many of the issues raised in the GAO Report 19-
48: Actions Needed to Address Significant Weaknesses in TSA's Pipeline 
Security Program Management (December 2018). Of GAO's 10 
recommendations, seven have been closed. The open recommendation 
regarding the Strategic Workforce Plan, was submitted to GAO for review 
on June 26, 2021. Among other changes, TSA conducted extensive 
coordination with the pipeline industry to update the criteria for the 
identification of critical facilities, which was recently published as 
Change 1 to the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines. TSA is continuing to 
work on the two remaining recommendations: (1) to incorporate 
additional factors into TSA's PRRRT; and (2) to coordinate an external, 
independent peer review of the PRRRT.
    Question. While I understand the primary purpose of the hearing was 
to discuss the events of January 6th, no discussion of domestic 
extremism can take place without discussing the opioid epidemic. The 
opioid epidemic has been devastating to many American communities, 
especially in West Virginia, which has had to deal with the 
consequences of the epidemic longer and more directly than nearly any 
other state. China and India have been cited as the primary source 
countries for illicitly produced fentanyl and carfentanil in the United 
States. Companies based in these and other foreign countries take 
advantage of weaknesses in international mail security standards to 
break U.S. customs laws and regulations by shipping drugs directly 
through the U.S. postal system. CBP, ICE, and DHS play critical roles 
in seizing these illegal substances, and last year during the COVID-19 
pandemic, their jobs were as important as ever. I'm supportive of these 
efforts as they play a critical role in stopping the opioid crisis.
    About how many opioids has TSA seized in the last year? Are there 
any resources we can provide you with to assist in accurately 
identifying and confiscating opioids?
    Answer. TSA screening is designed to detect items and persons who 
may pose a threat to transportation security and prevent them from 
entering the transportation system. TSA Officers are trained to detect 
prohibited items through computed tomography, x-ray, and other 
screening technology. If evidence of narcotics trafficking is 
discovered during screening processes, TSA reports the situation to on-
site local law enforcement to investigate any suspected violations of 
federal, state, or laws. TSA has appropriate procedures in place for 
contacting law enforcement if criminal activity is suspected during 
passenger and/or baggage screening.
    TSA is not always informed of the outcome of the referral to law 
enforcement, including the amount or type of contraband, including 
illegal opioids, discovered. However, a review of TSA's incident 
database revealed two confirmed incidents within the past year during 
which opioids were discovered during the screening process.
    Question. Do you believe more can be done to prevent these drugs 
from coming into our country? How can we empower DHS to do this?
    Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration and DHS are prioritizing 
combatting the opioid epidemic. Transnational criminal organizations 
(TCOs) play a major role in facilitating the entry of illicit drugs and 
precursor chemicals into the United States, which further fuels this 
epidemic. The Biden-Harris Administration has taken decisive action to 
address this issue. On December 15, 2021, President Biden signed an 
executive order establishing the U.S. Council on Transnational 
Organized Crime, an interagency organization whose purpose is to ensure 
that the U.S. Government effectively leverages all appropriate tools to 
counter the threats posed by transnational organized crime (TOC). On 
that date, the President also signed an executive order on imposing 
sanctions on foreign persons involved in the global illicit drug trade. 
Pursuant to that executive order, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control immediately announced the designation of 25 targets, including 
10 individuals and 15 entities. The Treasury designation targets an 
array of illicit actors involved in the international proliferation of 
illicit drugs or their means of production. Five of these actors are 
based in China and are engaged in either trafficking fentanyl or other 
synthetic drugs to the United States or in the export of various 
precursor chemicals essential to the production of fentanyl. Seven 
targets designated are Mexican nationals, all of whom are directly or 
indirectly linked to the trafficking of deadly drugs, including 
fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine to the United States. 
Additionally, Treasury designated all nine Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations identified by the Drug Enforcement Administration as 
having the greatest drug trafficking impact on the United States.
    DHS, as the largest law enforcement organization in the Federal 
Government, is uniquely positioned to lead whole-of-government efforts 
to address TOC. In recent years, DHS has taken important steps to 
optimize our counter-TOC activities. Through intelligence-based 
operations, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has interdicted record 
amounts of cocaine and other drugs destined for the United States, 
leading to the disruption and dismantlement of TCOs. U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) has reported record fentanyl seizures at the 
southwest border. Further, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) and CBP have interdicted major drug loads and built major cases 
against TCOs, while adjusting to counter a new and dangerous drug 
trend--the production and trafficking of opioids and other synthetic 
narcotics. USCG, ICE, and CBP efforts are enhanced by the intelligence 
provided by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the advanced 
technological capabilities provided by the Department's Science and 
Technology Directorate.
    The Biden-Harris Administration's Statement on Drug Policy 
Priorities sets forth six specific actions to reduce the supply of 
illicit substances, including fentanyl, in the United States. These 
actions, all of which bolster DHS's counternarcotics efforts include: 
(1) working with key partners in the Western Hemisphere to address 
production, trafficking, and public health facets of the illicit drug 
problem; (2) exercising leadership in regional and multilateral forums 
to advance and shape collective and comprehensive approaches; (3) 
engaging with China, India, and other source countries to disrupt the 
global flow of synthetic drugs and their precursor chemicals; (4) 
strengthening the U.S. Government's capacity to comprehensively disrupt 
the production and supply chain of synthetic drugs; (5) supporting 
enforcement efforts through the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
(HIDTA) program to disrupt and dismantle domestic drug trafficking 
networks; and (6) supporting multi-jurisdictional task forces and other 
law enforcement efforts.
    With the changing tactics of TCOs, we are continually adjusting our 
enforcement activities to include not only the interdiction of illicit 
narcotics, but also precursors that are used to make synthetic drugs 
such as fentanyl.
    In the context of the current TOC threat, however, DHS will 
continue to optimize its capabilities in this mission area, including 
by enhancing ICE's investigative capabilities, USCG and CBP's 
enforcement capabilities, and the counter-TOC coordination 
responsibilities of the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans. The 
criticality of the threat further requires that we devote renewed 
attention to DHS's counter-TOC mission in several areas, including: (1) 
operational planning and coordination; (2) adequacy of operational 
force levels; (3) intelligence and information-sharing; (4) partner 
nation capacity-building; (5) integration with state, local tribal, and 
territorial partners; and (6) employment of advanced technologies. We 
must also identify and employ new management and funding tools that 
will enable our Department to remain sufficiently agile to address 
evolving TOC-related threats.
    DHS is assessing requirements in this area and looks forward to 
working with Congress to ensure appropriate related resourcing.
    Question. The behavior we witnessed on January 6, 2021 in the U.S. 
Capitol was un-American. The individuals that participated in this 
insurrection--including those from my own state--should fully be 
prosecuted to the full extent of the law. It is time now to move 
forward as one nation to focus on helping Americans suffering from the 
pandemic. Now more than ever, it is on each of us to seek unity over 
division and put partisanship aside for the good of our country. 
Bipartisanship and compromise are not always easy, but they are 
essential. The issues facing our democracy today are not insurmountable 
if we choose to tackle them together. We all must commit to restoring 
decency and civility to our politics and being that shining city upon a 
hill whose beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere. That 
is what American people deserve and the world expects. As members of 
Congress, we have a responsibility to be the example for our 
constituents and for the American people. This Administration, and this 
President, has the same responsibility.
    What can we all do to show Americans that we can work together, 
even if we strongly disagree on some issues?
    Answer. DHS remains committed to ensuring the safety and security 
of communities across our country, while safeguarding First Amendment-
protected activities, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
    The attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021 was a violent 
assault on our democracy. Since January 2021, DHS has strengthened 
intelligence analysis, information sharing, and operational 
preparedness to help prevent acts of violence and keep our communities 
safe.
    DHS is prioritizing combating all forms of terrorism and targeted 
violence, including through its efforts to support the first-ever 
National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. Since January 
2021, DHS has taken several steps in this regard, including:
  --established a new domestic terrorism branch within I&A dedicated to 
        producing sound, timely intelligence needed to counter domestic 
        terrorism-related threats;
  --launched the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) 
        to provide communities with resources and tools to help prevent 
        individuals from radicalizing to violence;
  --designated domestic violent extremism as a ``National Priority 
        Area'' within DHS's Homeland Security Grant Program for the 
        first time, resulting in at least $77 million being spent on 
        preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding 
        to related threats nationwide;
  --provided $180 million in funding to support target hardening and 
        other physical security enhancements to non-profit 
        organizations at high risk of terrorist attack through DHS's 
        Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP);
  --increased efforts to identify and evaluate mis- dis- and mal-
        information (MDM), including false or misleading conspiracy 
        theories spread on social media and other online platforms, 
        that endorse violence; and,
  --enhanced collaboration with public and private sector partners--
        including U.S. critical infrastructure owners and operators--to 
        better protect our cyber and physical infrastructure and 
        increase nationwide cybersecurity resilience through CISA.
    Further, DHS has renewed its commitment to share timely and 
actionable information and intelligence to the broadest audience 
possible, including through regular briefings for public and private 
sector partners and National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) bulletins 
to contextualize the threat environment for the public and provide 
resources for how to stay safe. All of the Department's efforts to 
combat all forms of terrorism and targeted violence are conducted in 
ways that protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and 
adhere to applicable laws.
    Question. Intelligence reports prior to the January 6th riot warned 
Capitol Police that supporters of President Trump were actively 
promoting violence and targeting Congress itself. The Department of 
Homeland Security specifically notified Capitol Police that they had 
identified a map of the Capitol's tunnel system in online messages 
between ``Stop the Steal'' supporters, and the FBI field office in 
Norfolk also warned the Capitol Police. However, the Capitol Police 
Inspector General also found a lack of consensus among key official 
about whether these reports indicated specific known threats. Facebook 
employs more than 15,000 content moderators across the globe, and other 
platforms like Twitter and Google have their own teams of moderators 
that enforce their policies and take down illegal or offensive content 
on their sites. My bipartisan bill with Senator Cornyn would require 
these companies to proactively flag major crimes, including drug 
trafficking and terrorism, to law enforcement.
    Did any of these companies proactively reach out to law enforcement 
with reports of illegal activity?
    Answer. DHS is continuing to work with technology companies to 
develop innovative approaches to combat online incitement and 
radicalization to violence and other criminal activity, while 
maintaining a two-way dialogue and sharing materials related to 
emerging, online narratives and mitigating the risk of radicalization 
to violence.
    Question. What more could social media companies have done to alert 
law enforcement prior to the January 6th riots?
    Answer. Combatting all forms of terrorism and targeted violence 
requires a whole-of-society effort that includes collaboration with 
social media and technology companies. DHS collaboration with these 
companies includes (1) information sharing; (2) informing the work of 
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism; and (3) exploring how 
to expand partnerships social media and other online platform to 
lawfully share relevant information, while protecting privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties.
    Question. Do you believe that we need to update Section 230 to 
address illegal activity, including how groups like ``Stop the Steal'' 
can use these platforms for illegal activities?
    Answer. We can and must take action to stop unlawful activity 
online. Section 230 does not stop that from occurring. Separately, we 
can and should continue the ongoing conversation as to whether and how 
to update Section 230, consistent with the need to safeguard First 
Amendment-protected activity.
    Question. As you both know it's impossible to prepare or respond to 
a threat without as much reliable information as possible, and we 
certainly saw what happens when threat information isn't handled 
effectively on January 6th. This brings up a larger issue that I've 
grown more concerned about during my time on the Cyber Subcommittee for 
Armed Services. Which is how potential threats, both physical and 
cyber, are shared within the federal government.
    In your positions so far, do you feel both your departments have 
been sufficiently receiving and relaying threat information with each 
of the other federal departments, and are you aware if that information 
can then be shared with a specific private industry partner if we 
identify a specific threat toward them?
    Answer. DHS has renewed its commitment to share timely and 
actionable information and intelligence to the broadest audience 
possible, including through regular briefings for public and private 
sector partners and NTAS bulletins to contextualize the threat 
environment for the public and provide resources for how to stay safe. 
All of the Department's efforts to combat all forms of terrorism and 
targeted violence are conducted in ways that protect privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties, and adhere to applicable laws.
    DHS continues to strengthen the mechanisms it leverages to share 
information and intelligence with key partners and the public.
    Question. In your own opinions how do we increase the coordination 
within the federal government to respond more quickly and in a 
uniformed way no matter the threat?
    Answer. To continue combatting the evolving threat environment 
through increased federal coordination, DHS seeks to enhance 
information and intelligence sharing capabilities and expand its 
participation in the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTFs). JTTFs 
investigate and respond to threats and incidents as they occur. DHS is 
currently identifying priority locations for increased DHS 
participation in JTTFs. To ensure that we are making contributions to 
the JTTF in the most meaningful and uniformed way possible, the 
Department recently developed and approved a new management directive 
that facilitates organizational direction for how DHS will participate 
and work within JTTFs. Further, DHS and the FBI are working to update a 
Memorandum of Understanding to modernize our approaches to 
investigating and mitigating emerging threat trends.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
    Secretary Mayorkas, in the last five fiscal years, Congress has, on 
a bipartisan basis, directly provided the Department of Homeland 
Security with billions of dollars for the construction of a border wall 
system. That system is a critical border security tool, which helps our 
Border Patrol agents safely and effectively maintain operational 
control of our southern border. Since President Biden took office, your 
Department has impounded these funds, in direct violation of federal 
law. It is an affront to this Committee and to Congress's power of the 
purse, but worse: it makes the work of our dedicated Border Patrol 
agents more difficult and more dangerous.
    Those agents must stand constant guard by incomplete sections of 
border wall, which now serve as funnels for illegal immigration, human 
trafficking, and drug smuggling. Gates that are not operational 
compromise agents' ability to apprehend illegal traffic. And by not 
allowing them to operationalize available technology and sensors 
leaves, Border Patrol agents are left blind in trying to do their job. 
These dynamics are straining resources across the southwest border.
    Question. What is your plan to relieve Border Patrol agents from 
guarding gaps that remain in the wall due to this administration's 
refusal to finish construction that was near completion and abruptly 
halted in January?
    Answer. On June 11, 2021, DHS released its Border Wall Plan 
Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 10142 (the Plan).\2\ This Plan 
outlines the Department's approach to the border barrier construction 
projects, which include prioritizing the use of appropriated funds for 
urgent life, safety, environmental, or other remediation requirements 
resulting from previous border wall construction. On July 27, 2021 DHS 
approved additional work in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV), San Diego and 
El Centro Sectors needed to address life, safety, environmental, and 
operational considerations. This work includes make safe activities on 
paused construction, such as completing make safe and punch list items 
in the RGV Sector, repairing and reinforcing a small gap in the border 
barrier, powering secondary gates, and replacing drainage grates in the 
San Diego Sector as well as completing a utility relocation project in 
El Centro Sector to ensure power is fully restored to local 
municipalities. These projects are reflective of the commitment of DHS 
to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of communities along the 
border, individuals encountered there, and our Border Patrol Agents who 
patrol these areas. DHS continues to review other paused border barrier 
projects presenting life, safety, environmental, or other remediation 
needs consistent with the Border Wall Plan.
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    \2\ https://www.dhs.gov/publication/department-homeland-security-
border-wall-plan-pursuant-presidential-proclamation-10142
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    While completing the border security mission, the U.S. Border 
Patrol (USBP) relies upon a combination of personnel, technology, and 
infrastructure. This approach requires adaptability and flexibility in 
a constantly changing work environment. As technology continues to 
improve, the Border Patrol makes use of enhanced technology to augment 
manpower and increase mission effectiveness. In the FY 2022 President's 
Budget, CBP requested funding for border security technology, including 
for Common Operating Picture, Small Unmanned Aircraft System, and Team 
Awareness Kit, which integrates surveillance devices used by Border 
Patrol and other CBP components. Agents will continue to use all 
available tools to secure our border.
    Question. When are you planning to turn on the gates in completed 
sections of the border wall so your agents can safely and efficiently 
patrol their areas of responsibility?
    Answer. The DHS Border Wall Plan Pursuant to Presidential 
Proclamation 10142 sets forth guiding principles for barrier system 
construction. For instance, the Plan permits DHS to prioritize projects 
for completion if they are needed to address life, safety, 
environmental, or other remediation requirements. In addition, for 
projects that do involve life, safety, environmental, or other 
remediation requirements, prior to further construction, the Department 
will undertake a thorough review and planning process. On July 27, 
2021, DHS approved additional work in the RGV, San Diego, and El Centro 
Sectors that is needed to address life, safety, environmental, 
remediation, and operational considerations. This work includes 
powering secondary gates in the San Diego Sector. DHS continues to 
review other paused border barrier projects presenting life, safety, 
environmental, or other remediation needs.
    Question. At what point will you allow Border Patrol to install or 
activate the border wall technology and sensors Congress funded to make 
their incredibly difficult job more manageable?
    Answer. As of June 23, 2021, approximately 50 miles of detection 
technology has been installed, using funds appropriated by Congress in 
FYs 2017 and 2018. DHS is working to develop a path forward for border 
barrier projects consistent with the guiding principles outlined in 
DHS's Border Wall Plan Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 10142. 
Prior to the installation of additional border system attributes, DHS 
will undertake a thorough review and planning process as called for by 
the Plan.
    Question. Secretary Mayorkas, you are no doubt aware of the threat 
posed by ``fake families'' presenting themselves at the border--that 
is, single adults who cross the border illegally with children not 
their own and claim to be family units in order to avoid detention or 
deportation. These children are at the greatest risk of being victims 
of human trafficking, or worse yet, victims of sex trafficking, 
especially given recent reports about an increase in apprehensions of 
convicted sex offenders crossing the border. In one area of Texas, for 
example, the Border Patrol's arrest of sex offenders is reportedly up 
2,500% this year.
    Current statistics indicate that groups claiming to be family units 
make up about one quarter of the apprehensions at the border. Under 
your leadership, however, the Department has significantly reduced its 
reliance on DNA testing as a means of determining whether children are 
truly related to the adults that accompany them across the border. 
Moreover, the Department recently announced that it will not collect 
biometric data from those apprehended while crossing illegally or from 
those looking to sponsor children crossing the border alone.
    Why have you curtailed the Department's use of these extremely 
important tools, which are ultimately intended to protect children?
    Answer. Protecting children and others who are vulnerable remains a 
top priority for DHS and its partners. The reduction in the use of DNA 
testing is not a reflection of a change to that priority, but more an 
indication of the evolution in the type of fraud being encountered at 
the border. During FY 2020, CBP and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) referrals to ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 
for testing significantly decreased from the previous fiscal year. For 
this reason, Rapid DNA testing has been utilized less frequently than 
in prior years.
    HSI initiated Rapid DNA testing in May 2019 as a pilot at two 
locations. In July 2019, it was expanded to 10 locations along the 
Southwest Border. Procedurally, HSI only conducted DNA testing based on 
referrals from CBP or HHS. HSI administered Rapid DNA tests as an 
investigative tool and with consent of the individuals. The suspected 
fraudulent family remained in CBP custody pending the results of the 
test. If the test resulted in a negative parent-child relationship 
match, the case was turned over to HSI, and, in coordination with the 
U.S. Attorney, considered for prosecution.
    During FY 2019 and FY 2020, based on referrals from CBP and HHS, 
HSI tested approximately 3,300 family units, with nearly 300 returning 
negative parent-child relationship matches. Approximately 230 of these 
cases were accepted for Federal prosecution. In FY 2021 (through 
September 12, 2021), HSI conducted over 130 Rapid DNA tests, finding 
only 12 instances negative for parentage, six of which have been 
accepted for prosecution.
    On September 12, 2021, HSI concluded the Rapid DNA program as the 
number of CBP and HHS referrals, investigative leads, and overall 
benefits of the program as an effective investigative tool declined. An 
analysis of Rapid DNA testing revealed a steep reduction in negative 
parent-child relationship matches and subsequent prosecutions over the 
last year that, when combined with the relatively high cost of the 
program, no longer support its continuance.
    However, DHS continues to meet the need to identify fraudulent 
families through a different process. As of September 12, 2021, USBP 
started their own DNA testing program, using the United States Postal 
Service to send and receive results and findings.
    Question. Is it not important to ensure that we know that the 
children crossing the border are in a safe and secure environment with 
individuals that we are certain will not do them harm?
    Answer. Protecting children and other vulnerable individuals is a 
top priority for DHS. In accordance with the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), CBP screens all undocumented 
unaccompanied children (UCs) for signs or indications of trafficking. 
In September 2019, CBP implemented a revised screening form (CBP Form 
93) to improve and assist in identifying UCs who may be victims of 
trafficking. CBP also revised mandatory annual training for law 
enforcement personnel.
    When minors are encountered, their safety and security is always of 
paramount importance to CBP. Consistent with the TVPRA, UCs from non-
contiguous countries are transferred to the custody of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS). All minors (accompanied and 
unaccompanied) are prioritized for processing and transferred out of 
USBP custody as expeditiously as possible. Additionally, all minors in 
USBP custody are afforded the amenities and treatment required by the 
Flores Settlement Agreement, the CBP's National Standards on Transport, 
Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) policy, and the CBP Medical 
Directive.
    I understand from the latest operational statistics provided by DHS 
that this year, in the Rio Grande Valley sector alone, more than 19,000 
persons apprehended by the Border Patrol were released into the 
interior of the country without a court date to adjudicate their 
illegal entry. Instead, these illegal immigrants were requested to 
report to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement office at some 
undetermined future date.
    Even under the Obama Administration's catch and release policy, 
illegal crossers were given a notice to appear before a federal judge.
    Question. What is the plan for these 19,000 illegal immigrants?
    Answer. CBP is releasing certain family units via an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion to relieve processing bottlenecks and to avoid 
unsafe overcrowding of CBP facilities due to the large number of 
individuals encountered in locations such as the RGV. Many of these 
family units have been released from CBP custody without issuance of 
charging documents, such as a Notice to Appear (NTA). When CBP 
apprehends certain family units along the Southwest Border, the agency 
releases them via prosecutorial discretion and they are issued a Form 
G-56, Interview Notice, or Form I-385, Request to Report, and 
instructed to report to an ICE field office at their final destination. 
When those individuals report to an ICE field office, ICE will enter 
their information into an ICE database, provide them with updated 
reporting requirements, and, for those who qualify, enroll them into 
ICE's Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program. Family units will report 
to ICE field offices for issuance of appropriate charging documents if 
they were released from CBP custody without one, thus beginning the 
process of formal removal proceedings in accordance with Section 240 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
    ICE works hand-in-hand with interagency partners to identify 
opportunities for process improvements, including to increase 
operational efficiency, and improved communications and coordination.
    Question. Do you know how many of these 19,000 illegal immigrants 
have previously tried to enter the country illegally? Do you know 
whether any of them have criminal records?
    Answer. USBP conducts checks on subjects in custody prior to making 
a processing disposition. Dispositions are made on a case-by-case 
basis. Upon encounter at the border, CBP collects each migrant's 
biographic and biometric information (fingerprints, photographs, 
telephone numbers, and an address in the United States), creating a 
record of apprehension, and runs their information against CBP 
databases. When determining the appropriate processing pathway, agents 
assess whether the noncitizen poses a threat to national security, 
border security, or a public safety. From January through June 2021, 
9.4 percent of family unit apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol were 
repeat encounters with a previous encounter in the preceding 12 months 
under Title 42 or Title 8 of the U.S. Code.
    Question. If persons in this group of illegal immigrants do not 
report to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement office, as requested, 
how does your Department track them to ensure they do not escape the 
lawful immigration process?
    Answer. Most of the individuals who are released at the border with 
instructions to report to an ICE field office check in within their 
reporting window. ICE has an online appointment system to facilitate 
the scheduling of check-in appointments at ICE field offices around the 
country. Community partners play an important role in helping 
communicate to these individuals and their families the requirement to 
report to ICE and ultimately the immigration court. Those who do not 
report are subject to enforcement action by ICE based on current 
enforcement priorities.
    Question. Are you in essence conceding that these people will be 
allowed to stay in the country indefinitely?
    Answer. When individuals report to an ICE field office pursuant to 
a Notice to Report, ICE will enter their information into an ICE 
database, provide them with updated reporting requirements, and, for 
those, who qualify, enroll them into ICE's ATD program. They will be 
issued charging documents (i.e., a NTA) to initiate removal proceedings 
in accordance with Section 240 of the INA. The noncitizen appears 
before an immigration judge from the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice for their removal 
proceedings. The immigration judge then determines if the noncitizen is 
eligible to remain in the United States through a form of relief or 
protection from removal or issues the noncitizen a final order of 
removal, after which the noncitizen is subject to removal from the 
United States.
    Individuals who do not report to an ICE field office within their 
reporting window are subject to enforcement action by ICE based on 
current enforcement priorities.
                                 ______
                                 
                Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
    Question. I am a longtime supporter of the Nonprofit Security Grant 
and Urban Area Security Initiative (NPSG/UASI) programs, which provide 
financial support to nonprofits at high risk of a terrorist attack, 
such as religious and cultural centers, for physical security 
enhancements. In late March, after an unprovoked attack on a Roman 
Catholic abbey in Gower, MO, the nuns at the abbey expressed that they 
had ``long desired more privacy and protection.'' In 2014, three people 
were murdered in front of Overland Park's Jewish Community Center in 
the Kansas City metro area. The perpetrator was motivated by a white 
supremacist ideology. Recent news reports of his death are a reminder 
of the suffering wrought by the attack. It is my understanding that 
Missouri historically receives only a sliver of funding from the NPSG/
UASI programs. How would the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
use the money it requests and ensure that it appropriately allocates 
resources from the NPSG/UASI programs to Missouri law enforcement 
departments both large and small?
    Answer. Law Enforcement departments are not eligible subrecipients 
of the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP). In order to be eligible 
to receive NSGP funds through the State Administrative Agencies (SAAs), 
an organization must be exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 based on meeting the description in 
section under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. Law enforcement 
departments are not nonprofit entities under section 501(c)(3) of the 
code, as such they are not eligible NSGP subrecipients. See, e.g., 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 
116-260. However, law enforcement departments are eligible 
subrecipients of the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), as well as 
the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program.
    As required under sections 2003 and 2004 the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, as amended by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, the eligibility and allocations for the SHSP 
and UASI program are informed by a relative risk methodology based on 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence from terrorism. Under the FY 
2021 SHSP program, the state of Missouri will be awarded $4,602,500. 
Under the FY 2021 UASI program, the St. Louis, Missouri urban area will 
be awarded $3,800,000. This funding is available for the implementation 
of risk-driven, capabilities-based homeland security strategies to 
address capability targets and to enhance regional preparedness and 
capabilities in designated high-threat, high-density areas. For both 
SHSP and UASI funding, all projects must have a nexus to terrorism 
preparedness and align to closing capability gaps or sustaining 
capabilities identified in the state's Threat and Hazard Identification 
and Risk Assessment/Stakeholder Preparedness Review.
    The SAA is the only eligible recipient of SHSP and UASI funds, and 
they are required to pass-through at least 80 percent of SHSP and UASI 
funding to local and tribal units of government, including law 
enforcement entities. Additionally, at least 25 percent of SHSP and 
UASI funding must be dedicated to law enforcement terrorism prevention 
activities. In that vein, UASI funding would be appropriate for law 
enforcement departments, regardless of size, in St. Louis, while SHSP 
funding would be appropriate for law enforcement departments, 
regardless of size, anywhere in the state outside of the St. Louis 
area. While FEMA does not dictate how the SAAs must sub allocate their 
SHSP and UASI funds, FEMA does require that the SAA establish and 
consult with a Senior Advisory Committee (for SHSP funding) and an 
Urban Area Working Group (for UASI funding) to ensure that funds are 
sub allocated to areas within the state and urban area that best 
address the regional and local threats and risk in preparing for and 
responding to potential terrorist attacks. FEMA's Preparedness Grants 
Manual \3\ outlines the composition and consultation requirements 
between the SAA, Senior Advisory Committee, and Urban Area Working 
Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ https://www.fema.gov/grants/preparedness/manual
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The state of Missouri also receives funding through the NSGP, which 
is dedicated funding for nonprofit organizations to secure their 
infrastructure against potential acts of terrorism. Similar to SHSP and 
UASI, the SAA is the only eligible recipient, and passes through 100% 
of NSGP funding to eligible nonprofit organizations that have been 
approved for NSGP funding through a competitive review process. In FY 
2021, Missouri will receive $320,400 in NSGP-Urban Area funds for 
nonprofit organizations within the St. Louis area, and $1,304,263 in 
NSGP-State funds for nonprofit organizations within Missouri that are 
outside the St. Louis area.
    Question. President Biden has ended many effective border policies, 
such as suspending funding for the border wall, eliminating the Migrant 
Protection Protocols, ending asylum agreements, and placing 
restrictions on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Following 
these actions, have any agents within the relevant DHS components been 
reassigned from their work at the border to other initiatives like 
domestic terrorism? If so, which ones? Do you plan to reassign any 
agents within the relevant DHS components currently working at the 
border to efforts to combat domestic terrorism?
    Answer. DHS personnel on the border have not been reassigned to 
focus on non-border related mission areas.
    Question. Your budget provides $131 million for domestic terrorism 
prevention programs for research on the root causes of radicalization 
and for enhanced community outreach. Program grantees under the now-
obsolete Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program have 
said they would promote collaboration between law enforcement and 
mental health professionals, promote resilience, and pursue a number of 
other measures in order to achieve the goal of addressing the root 
causes of radicalization. Would DHS request that all $131 million go to 
the newly established Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships 
and Office of Intelligence & Analysis? How would DHS allocate the money 
between the two new initiatives, if so? Has DHS identified any 
effective evidence-based programs that measurably prevent domestic 
terrorism, particularly in programs that involve mitigating the impact 
of mental health problems on people who would be subject to the 
program?
    Answer. Currently, the $131 million budget for targeted violence 
and terrorism prevention supports several DHS offices and components 
supporting this mission. While CP3 and I&A have significant equities, 
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Office for Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties, Privacy Office, CISA, FEMA, and Secret Service, 
among others, also meaningfully contribute to the prevention mission. 
DHS would welcome the opportunity to work with your office and the 
Committee to ensure that these resources are appropriately allocated, 
including as it relates to supporting CP3's continued growth and 
enhancing the Department's prevention mission.
    CP3's violence prevention framework is informed by an evidence-
based public health model that recognizes that individuals on a pathway 
to violence typically experience a variety of social and psychological 
factors that increase their probability of engaging in terrorism 
(``risk factors'') or decrease their probability of engaging in 
terrorism (``protective factors''). By supporting local communities to 
develop their own, locally informed prevention framework, these 
communities can address risk factors, build protective factors, and 
help prevent individuals from radicalizing to violence. These 
frameworks build on and enhance existing local resources, and provide 
the opportunity to develop new tools.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator John Hoeven
    Question. As Secretary, what do you see as the Department's role in 
helping to solve the ongoing crisis at the southern border?
    Answer. DHS continues to use all relevant resources to secure the 
southwest border, while building an immigration system that upholds our 
nation's laws.
    Question. How will the Department of Homeland Security tackle the 
pressing issues that continue to drive migration and enrich human 
traffickers?
    Answer. DHS and other federal agencies, including the Department of 
State, are coordinating a whole-of-government approach to regional 
migration management. The Administration's root causes strategy 
addresses the lack of economic opportunity and inequality, weak 
governance and corruption, and violence and insecurity that compel 
people to flee their homes. For DHS, this includes expanding the work 
of the ICE Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit, partnering with 
the interagency to strengthen economic security in the region, and 
assisting in investigations to prosecute human smugglers.\4\ The 
strategy aims to address urgent humanitarian needs in the Northern 
Triangle, promote greater access to protection through legal pathways, 
improve secure and humane border management through CBP capacity 
building initiatives, provide support for returnees through ICE 
Enforcement and Removal Operations, and enhance access to legal 
pathways for migration through a temporary worker program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ For contextual clarity, human trafficking involves exploiting 
men, women, or children for the purposes of forced labor or commercial 
sexual exploitation. Conversely, human smuggling involves the provision 
of a service-typically, transportation or fraudulent documents-to an 
individual who voluntarily seeks to gain illegal entry into a foreign 
country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Question. Of the 178,622 persons that attempted to enter the U.S. 
via the southwest border in April 2020, how many have remained in the 
United States and how many have been returned to their home countries?
    Answer. As of July 31, 2021, there have been 9,205 individuals 
removed \5\ who previously had been apprehended by CBP \6\ after April 
1, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ ICE Removals include non-citizens processed for Expedited 
Removal (ER) or Voluntary Return (VR) that are turned over to ERO for 
detention. Non-citizens processed for ER and not detained by ERO or VR 
after June 1st, 2013 and not detained by ERO are primarily processed by 
Border Patrol. CBP should be contacted for those statistics.
    \6\ USBP data were received on 08/02/2021 and are through 07/31/
2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Question. When it comes to the crisis at our southern border, as 
Border Patrol agents work diligently to address the humanitarian needs 
present with the high flow of migrants and are unable to devote the 
entirety of their time to securing the border, what challenges does 
that present to our national security?
    Answer. Increased irregular migration at our southwest border can 
present operational challenges. From a border security perspective, 
transnational criminal organizations may capitalize on areas that have 
reduced situational awareness and response capability due to the shift 
in resources to assist with increased detention, transportation, and 
processing requirements.
    To assist USBP with these increasing operational demands, in March 
2021, OFO began deploying CBP officers from interior airports and 
seaports to support the USBP with the rise of migrants encountered at 
the southern border. Over 250 CBP officers were deployed for up to 60 
days at USBP soft-sided facilities to assist with intake, custody, 
processing, and safeguarding undocumented noncitizens.
    In addition to the CBP officers that were temporarily detailed to 
assist USBP, USBP agents from northern and coastal border sectors were 
also deployed to the southern border to maintain a secure border and 
provide humanitarian care for those in custody. Currently USBP has 445 
agents temporarily detailed to assist with processing, transportation, 
escort, and detention duties due to the unprecedented non-citizen 
migrant surge.
    Also, in March 2021, DHS activated the DHS Volunteer Force to 
support USBP and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to 
address the needs of unaccompanied children arriving at the southwest 
border. This support has increased the number of USBP agents available 
for patrol and related border security and law enforcement operations. 
Additionally, as traffic waxes and wanes by location, CBP utilizes 
short term duty assignments that bring agents and officers from lower 
traffic locations the areas of greatest need.
    With funding appropriated by Congress, CBP recently created the 
Border Patrol Processing Coordinator. The Border Patrol Processing 
Coordinator position will focus solely on post-apprehension processing 
tasks, which enables frontline agents to return to interdiction 
postures more quickly. Additionally, Border Patrol Processing 
Coordinators will be assisting with transport, hospital watch and other 
non-law enforcement functions. CBP recently graduated the first five 
classes of Border Patrol Processing Coordinators and is working to hire 
and on-board additional Processing Coordinator staff as quickly as 
possible, with two more classes set to graduate by the end of November. 
The first five classes are currently working across the southwest 
border.
    Question. I represent a state that shares its northern border with 
Canada. Recently, I met with sheriffs and local law enforcement in our 
state's northern counties who are assisting Customs and Border 
Protection because of personnel shortages in part due to resources 
being shifted to the southern border.
    As Secretary, what are you doing to address this crisis and ensure 
your agents and officers are well-staffed at our country's borders, 
including at the northern border?
    Answer. CBP continually evaluates conditions on the ground. When 
conditions change, CBP reevaluates its personnel posture to best 
address mission requirements across the United States within the 
resources provided to perform its missions. As the threat to one area 
or sector increases, CBP adjusts resources accordingly from other 
lesser affected areas.
    Question. When do you anticipate being able to send agents and 
officers back to the northern border so that the northern border is 
sufficiently staffed?
    Answer. CBP continually evaluates conditions on the ground. When 
conditions change, CBP reevaluates its personnel posture to best 
address mission requirements across the United States within the 
resources provided to perform its missions. As the threat to one area 
or sector increases, CBP adjusts resources accordingly from other 
lesser affected areas.
    Question. How will the Department ensure that the northern border 
has the personnel it needs?
    Answer. CBP continually evaluates conditions on the ground. When 
conditions change, CBP reevaluates its personnel posture to best 
address mission requirements across the United States within the 
resources provided to perform its missions. As the threat to one area 
or sector increases, CBP adjusts resources accordingly from other 
lesser affected areas. Further, with the use of recruitment incentives, 
CBP has closed, or is closing, the staffing gaps in many of its 
critical POEs and several its remote northern border POEs.
    Question. Do you believe that the northern border currently has the 
personnel it needs?
    Answer. CBP continually evaluates conditions on the ground. When 
conditions change, CBP reevaluates its personnel posture to best 
address mission requirements across the United States within the 
resources provided to perform its missions. As the threat to one area 
or sector increases, CBP adjusts resources accordingly from other 
lesser affected areas. Further, with the use of recruitment incentives, 
CBP has closed, or is closing, the staffing gaps in many of its 
critical POEs and several its remote northern border POEs.
    Question. Not only is the northern border experiencing staffing 
shortages, but the northern border also faces technological shortages.
    What is the Department's plan to ensure that there is adequate 
technology available to secure our northern border?
    Answer. CBP continues to work to ensure the latest technology is 
available on the northern border, especially as gaps in functionality 
are identified and new technology emerges. In those cases, additional 
funding may be warranted to close such capability discrepancies.
    CBP continuously assesses the threat to border security to allocate 
vital resources to higher risk areas. Complexities associated with 
patrolling the northern border align with traditional border 
enforcement challenges--including inadequate technology to support 
operations. The agency would like to meet all operational requirements 
with adequate technological assets to address the operational need. In 
the interim, we will continue to mitigate the greatest risk areas 
through the deployment of available resources. In the President's FY 
2022 Budget, CBP requested funding for border security technology, 
including the Common Operating Picture, Small Unmanned Aircraft System, 
and the Team Awareness Kit, which integrates surveillance devices used 
by Border Patrol and other CBP components. Agents will continue to use 
all available tools to protect the American people.
    At the POEs, CBP is actively planning to refresh legacy systems and 
applications, replacing current technology with new major system 
software and hardware at both northern and southern border locations. 
CBP needs to refresh aging technology for privately-owned vehicle lanes 
and Free and Secure Trade (FAST) cargo lanes, including license plate 
readers (LPRs), laser trigger systems, cameras, radio frequency 
identification (RFID) document readers, lane computers, touch screens, 
dynamic signage, processing software, non-intrusive inspection (NII) 
systems, and other infrastructure to enable the timely movement of 
trade and travelers.
    Specifically, the existing applications CBP officers use to 
interview travelers seeking admission at the U.S. POEs have been 
replaced at most pedestrian locations with new, streamlined software; 
software and hardware for vehicle crossings is being finalized for 
pilot testing. Further, the I-94 process required for some travelers 
has also been modernized, including transitioning to paperless 
operations in many cases. CBP is making advances in cargo screening 
technology, and work is underway integrating both immigration and cargo 
data information to present pertinent crossing data to CBP officers in 
the most timely and useful format possible.
    CBP continues to work with the General Services Administration and 
the Office of Management and Budget on its annual five-year plan for 
Land Port of Entry Modernization, promoting security, travel, and 
trade. The plan is based on CBP's operational priorities and should 
include plans to complete the modernization of pre-9/11 POEs along the 
northern border.
    The President's FY 2022 Budget includes $32 million to fund up to 
six NII systems for cargo processing on the northern border at the 
Peace Bridge in Buffalo, New York, and Gordie Howe International Bridge 
in Detroit, Michigan. CBP continues progressing through the acquisition 
decision process for the emerging NII Integration Program.
    To increase scanning rates, CBP will implement a drive-through NII 
Concept of Operations (CONOP) in pre-primary inspection, where 
feasible. The CONOP requires system integration to securely and quickly 
transmit NII data to the CBP network. The NII-Integration Program will 
effectively integrate NII systems with other CBP trade and travel 
operations technology and tools, and secure data transmission to the 
CBP network. These improvements increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of CBP's inspection process at POEs.
    Planned activities include continued deployment of large-scale (LS) 
NII systems, including 12 replacement systems located at rail border 
crossings on the northern border (six systems) and southern border (six 
systems), and initiating deployment and integration of drive-through LS 
NII systems at Southwest border LPOEs with a goal of increasing vehicle 
scanning, while enhancing facilitation of trade and travel.
    CBP's Air and Marine Operations (AMO) provides air and maritime 
technology capabilities from airborne platforms as well as land-based 
air and maritime domain sensors. AMO is actively exploring technologies 
to reduce gaps in coverage and capabilities from a localized capability 
to a persistent wide-area surveillance footprint. Through strong 
congressional support over the past two years, CBP has acquired and 
deployed 11 new H-125 Light Enforcement Helicopters to northern border 
air branches. In addition, CBP has completed the deployment of four 
Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft to the Bellingham and Great Lakes Air 
Branches. Both modern platforms are equipped with sensor and 
communications systems to provide greater domain awareness across the 
northern approaches to the United States.
    Question. Do you believe that the northern border currently has the 
technology it needs? If not, how will the Department ensure that the 
northern border has the technology it needs?
    Answer. CBP has invested significant resources to advance national 
security while facilitating lawful trade and travel along our northern 
border. Technology is an invaluable force multiplier that enhances our 
situational awareness and improves our ability to detect, deter, and 
respond to all kinds of threats. CBP embraces technology to efficiently 
screen both people and cargo to secure our borders. Deployment of 
emerging technology applications, mobile screening capabilities, and 
innovative enhancements to lane structures have significantly expedited 
the screening process for both goods and people. However, much of the 
infrastructure on the northern border is nearing or beyond its 
designated life cycle and lacks the structural or technological 
capacity to fully maximize these innovations. The Department must 
continue to support infrastructure and lane technology enhancements as 
well as maintenance, repair, and modernization to ensure it is 
operating at the required capacity.
    The CBP and USBP Innovation Teams currently have three Autonomous 
Surveillance Towers deployed across Montana and New York under a 
developmental work program focused on maturing a tower-based system 
capable of operation in the remote, cold weather environments 
encountered along the Northern Border. Like the southwest border 
variant, this system autonomously monitors the border area and alerts 
agents and officers to potential illicit activity.
    AMO acknowledges there are surveillance, detection, and tracking 
gaps in the current sensor suites AMO can access. AMO is working with 
the DHS Science and Technology to identify the gaps, develop a plan to 
reduce the gaps, and acquire existing and new technologies to address 
these breaches in surveillance coverage.
    In the President's FY 2022 Budget, CBP requested funding for border 
security technology, including the Common Operating Picture, Small 
Unmanned Aircraft System, and the Team Awareness Kit, which integrates 
surveillance devices used by Border Patrol and other CBP components. 
Additionally, CBP requested funding for the Border Enforcement 
Coordination Network, which modernizes IT systems that support the 
planning, detection, classification, and analysis of illegal border 
activity. Agents and officers will continue to use all available tools 
to protect the American people. Additionally, the President's FY 2022 
Budget includes $32 million to fund up to six NII systems for cargo 
processing on the northern border at the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, New 
York, and Gordie Howe International Bridge in Detroit, Michigan.
    Question. Many areas along the northern border, including in North 
Dakota, are in remote areas, where installing sensors and cameras would 
be beneficial to securing the border and assisting Border Patrol in 
monitoring our northern border. One of the challenges I have heard 
about is the lack of reliable broadband access in these remote areas 
that make live footage of the border impossible.
    Is this something you are aware of?
    Answer. Communications and sensor connectivity remain priority 
areas for CBP and the CBP Innovation Team. Environments with little 
communication capability or facilities with bandwidth constraints 
require a communication network that can integrate with various sensors 
to improve operational awareness, officer safety, and resource 
allocation decision-making processes.
    The CBP and USBP Innovation Teams are actively pursuing cutting-
edge technology to enable data connectivity through low- and high-
bandwidth satellite communications, tethered small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems with LTE cellular nodes, and hybrid communication 
infrastructures that combine different communications modalities 
forming an integrated network in austere and remote border 
environments. These capabilities can extend the communication range and 
capacity of frontline personnel both in the field and at CBP 
facilities, and support sensor and technology connectivity to monitor 
vast border areas.
    To provide analysis of Air Domain Awareness on the northern border, 
CBP AMO is characterizing existing/emerging Air Domain Awareness 
technologies through the Northern Border Test Bed established by Domain 
Awareness Standards and Analysis. This provides analysis building 
seamless coverage along the border region out to 20 nautical miles from 
500-8,000 feet above ground level to detect low altitude and slow-
moving threats.
    Question. How can Congress work with the Department to address this 
challenge?
    Answer. CBP appreciates continued support from Congress and seeks 
its support of the requests put forward in the FY 2022 Presidential 
Budget.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith
    Question. One of the outcomes of the COVID pandemic has been a 
desire from citizens and enforcement personnel to use more contactless 
technologies. We understand that the TSA has yet to receive approval 
from the FBI to deploy mobile biometric capture technologies that will 
enable travelers to submit fingerprints to the TSA as part of their 
application for PreCheck even though that was mandated three years ago 
in the TSA Modernization Act. Law enforcement officials have stressed 
they could use contactless technology at the roadside and in 
investigations. When will the FBI be prepared to accept mobile 
fingerprints from law enforcement and partner agencies like the TSA to 
check criminal records?
    Answer. TSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have met 
regularly since October 2020 to determine how to advance mobile phone-
based contactless fingerprint capture technology. While the FBI and 
NIST support TSA's efforts to evaluate contactless fingerprint capture 
technology, they estimate it will be at least two years until mobile 
phone-based contactless technology has sufficiently advanced to meet 
the required level of accuracy (determined by the ability to accurately 
match mobile phone-based contactless fingerprint to existing contact 
fingerprints that make up the FBI's criminal history database). This 
timeline is largely based on the gap between the quality of the 
existing mobile-phone based fingerprint capture technology and the 
quality of traditional, contact fingerprint capture technology. Until 
this quality gap is closed, the FBI and NIST will not accept lower 
quality fingerprints for use in criminal history records checks. In 
addition, the FBI has raised significant concerns about remote 
fingerprint capture, as this will negatively impact fingerprint quality 
and accuracy.
    While the FBI has the authority to determine when it will accept 
remote, mobile phone-based contactless fingerprints when used for law 
enforcement purposes, TSA and other agencies conducting criminal 
history records check for non-criminal justice purposes must receive 
approval from the Compact Council before using contactless 
fingerprints. The Compact Council, which was created as part of the 
National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 1998 and includes 
state law enforcement representatives, establishes policy, in 
partnership with the FBI, on Federal/State cooperation on use of 
criminal history information, including biometrics. See 34 U.S.C. 
Sec. 40316. As TSA is using the fingerprints for non-criminal justice 
purposes, contactless fingerprints must be approved by the Compact 
Council as well as the FBI.
    Question. What is the TSA doing to accelerate approval of mobile 
biometric technologies through the FBI's advisory processes?
    Answer. TSA, supported by the FBI and NIST, is working to sponsor a 
pilot with the current TSA PreCheck enrollment provider to collect 
data and test the accuracy of mobile phone-based contactless 
fingerprint technology. Participants in this pilot would submit 
fingerprints using both a contactless mobile phone device and the 
traditional contact fingerprints method, both under the oversight of a 
contracted enrollment agent. The FBI and NIST will evaluate the quality 
and matching accuracy of these contactless fingerprints.
    Beyond the technology requirements and FBI approval of that 
technology, TSA must also receive approval from the Compact Council, to 
capture mobile phone-based contactless fingerprints ``remotely'' and 
not during an in-person enrollment. The Compact Council is the entity 
responsible for overseeing the sharing of state criminal history record 
information for noncriminal justice purposes, which includes TSA 
PreCheck. On May 12, 2021, TSA provided the Compact Council, a 
presentation on its planned mobile phone-based contactless fingerprint 
pilot and long-term use case to allow individuals to remotely enroll in 
TSA PreCheck using contactless fingerprint capture technology. The 
Compact Council was supportive of TSA's proposed pilot, as they see 
broader use for mobile phone-based contactless fingerprint capture, but 
expressed significant concerns with allowing individuals to provide 
fingerprints remotely without in-person oversight by an approved agent. 
The FBI has expressed similar concerns regarding capturing fingerprints 
remotely without in-person oversight by an approved agent.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Braun
    In your testimony you note that the department will be analyzing 
social media information to identify potential sources of domestic 
extremism.
    Question. What protections are you implementing at DHS to ensure 
that the constitutional rights, including our fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable search and seizure are protected?
    Answer. All I&A intelligence activities are conducted in accordance 
with Intelligence Oversight guidelines approved by the Attorney 
General. I&A collection requirements are vetted by our Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties, Office of the General Counsel, Privacy 
Office, and Intelligence Oversight Officer. Further, I&A continuously 
reviews its procedures and guidelines to ensure they align with best 
practices and are consistent with applicable laws. I&A also ensures its 
personnel receive relevant training, including on how to safeguard 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
    Question. Just two weeks ago, the White House rejected a DHS 
proposal to collect social media information of foreign migrants when 
processing immigration forms.
    What is the justification for reviewing the social media activity 
of American citizens, but not foreign nationals trying to enter our 
country?
    Answer. I&A is authorized to collect information overtly or from 
publicly available sources per Executive Order 12333. I&A can and does 
engage in open source collection activities involving both U.S. and 
foreign nationals. I&A's collection and reporting of threats occurs 
when I&A personnel have reasonable belief that the collection and 
reporting furthers one of I&A's enumerated missions.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
    Question. Do you agree with me that the United States of America is 
the most exceptional nation in the history of the world?
    Answer. Our country's values make America exceptional.
    Question. What percentage of migrants that have arrived at our 
southern border during the Biden Administration have been required to 
remain in Mexico pending adjudication of their immigration claims?
    Answer. There have been no new enrollments in the Migrant 
Protection protocols (MPP) since its suspension on January 21, 2021. 
MPP was terminated on June 1, 2021 via memorandum. CBP continued to 
process at land ports of entry (POE) those individuals previously 
enrolled in MPP who had pending cases before EOIR as part of an 
established MPP Wind Down Plan. Those migrants found not eligible for 
return to the United States through the established MPP Wind Down Plan 
were processed under Title 8 or Title 42 authorities, as appropriate. 
Processing under the MPP Wind Down was suspended on August 21, 2021 
when the Federal Government was enjoined by the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas from implementing or enforcing the June 
1, 2021 memorandum terminating MPP. The Federal Government was further 
ordered to ``enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such time as 
it has lawfully been rescinded in compliance with the APA.''
    Question. How many migrants encountered by CBP or ICE during the 
Biden Administration--which does not include those who have evaded law 
enforcement--have been released into the United States with the 
instruction to return for a hearing sometime in the future?
    Answer. From January 20, 2021 through July 31, 2021, CBP issued 
146,751 NTAs/Orders of Recognizance (OR). As noted above, the NTA 
initiates removal proceedings before an immigration judge. CBP's 
website provides data regarding the issuance of Notices to Appear/
Orders of Recognizance and I-385s (Notices to Report) by month.\7\
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    \7\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/custody-and-transfer-
statistics.
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    Question. Have any migrants have been released without a specific 
instruction to return for a hearing?
    Answer. From January 20, 2021, through July 31, 2021 CBP issued 
67,997 (NTRs (Form I-385). The NTR instructs the migrant to report to a 
local ICE field office when they arrive at their destination to be 
placed into proceedings. When they report to a field office, the 
migrant receives an NTA that places them into removal proceedings and 
provides instructions regarding how to report for an immigration 
proceeding hearing.
    Question. What percentage of migrants currently enrolled in 
Alternatives to Detention are you actively tracking day-to-day?
    Answer. As of June 21, 2021, there were 104,373 active participants 
enrolled in the ATD program.
    Question. According to your Department's website, in fiscal year 
2020, 92 percent of illegal aliens deported by ICE were convicted of or 
charged with crimes. However, under the Biden administration, ICE 
deportations have plummeted by approximately 60 percent--in fact, the 
lowest one-month deportation total on record occurred last month--while 
apprehensions at the border are at an all-time high. Based on fiscal 
year 2020 data, it is self-evident that many the illegal aliens your 
department is choosing not to deport have been convicted of or charged 
with crimes. How does it benefit the law-abiding American public to 
allow thousands of criminal aliens every month--who are already here 
illegally--to remain in American communities?
    Answer. The Department's primary responsibility is to keep the 
homeland and the American people safe while ensuring DHS policies are 
consistent with American values and U.S. immigration laws and 
regulations. In this vein, on January 20, 2021, then Acting Secretary 
Pekoske issued a memorandum entitled, Review of and Interim Revision to 
Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities, 
which, established interim civil immigration enforcement priorities. On 
February 18, 2021, ICE Acting Director Johnson issued interim guidance 
entitled, Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal 
Priorities, in support of the interim civil immigration enforcement and 
removal priorities in accordance with the DHS memorandum. This interim 
guidance, which applies to all civil immigration enforcement and 
removal actions, directs ICE to focus its limited enforcement and 
removal resources on cases presumed to be national security, border 
security, or public safety priorities. By focusing its limited law 
enforcement resources on these priorities, ICE can ensure its arrests 
and removals are consistent with its important national security and 
public safety mission, thus protecting and ensuring the safety of U.S. 
communities.
    Question. Given that ICE arrests have dropped by approximately 60 
percent during the Biden Administration, for which types of criminal 
charges or convictions is ICE no longer arresting illegal immigrants 
under the Biden Administration, despite having done so under the 
previous administration?
    Answer. The Department's enforcement priorities do not prohibit the 
arrest, detention, and removal of any noncitizen. Instead, ICE officers 
and agents are expected to exercise their discretion on a case-by-case 
basis to focus the Department's limited resources on the apprehension 
and removal of noncitizens who pose a threat to our national security, 
border security, and public safety.
    Question. How many migrants have been admitted into the interior of 
the United States during the Biden Administration who would not have 
been admitted under Title 42 pandemic prevention policies that were in 
effect when the Biden administration began?
    Answer. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has excepted 
unaccompanied children from this authority. This does not represent a 
significant operational change as the previous administration was 
enjoined from expelling unaccompanied children under PJES v. Wolf. The 
Biden Administration is still expelling under Title 42 all amenable 
single adults and family units across the Southwest Border.
    Recent policy changes in the Mexican State of Tamaulipas have 
significantly complicated efforts to utilize Title 42 in South Texas, 
which experiences the highest levels of irregular migrant encounters 
along the Southwest Border. Specifically, officials in Tamaulipas do 
not accept Title 42 expulsions of family units with children aged six 
or younger DHS has started daily lateral flights, transporting Northern 
Triangle family units from the RGV to both San Diego and El Paso, in 
order to expel them where Mexican officials have reception capacity; 
and additional flights to the interior of Mexico and Guatemala to 
effectuate these expulsions.
    Question. Under the Biden Administration, what percentage of 
migrants claiming to be family units received DNA tests to confirm 
those claims? Of those who have received DNA tests, what percentage 
were actual family units?
    Answer. Since January 20, 2021, approximately 91 percent of the 
family units tested by ICE were positive for parentage. A total of 134 
family units were tested across 10 individual sites with 122 family 
units testing positive for parentage (all members in family were 
related by parentage DNA), and 12 family units testing negative for 
parentage (the accompanying child was not related to parent/s by 
parentage DNA, although they may have a different type of family 
relationship such as a sibling, grandparent, aunt/uncle, or cousin). 
Note that DNA testing is only used when there is reason to question 
parentage.
    There were 312,341 family unit/family group encounters along the 
Southwest Border between January 20, 2021 and July 31, 2021. Encounters 
include USBP Apprehensions and Expulsions and Office of Field 
Operations Inadmissible Noncitizens and Expulsions.
    Question. Please provide the number of minors of each age 14-17 
encountered by CBP, by age, and the number of single adults of each age 
18-21 encountered by CBP, by age, during the Biden administration.
    Answer. This response contains FOUO/Classified information and can 
be provided under separate cover upon request.
    Question. Is the situation on the border an emergency?
    Answer. After inheriting a broken and dismantled immigration 
system, since January 2021 DHS has effectively managed an historically 
high numbers of noncitizens seeking to enter the United States and 
interdicted more drugs and disrupted more smuggling operations than 
ever before. We have been able to manage increased encounters because 
of prudent planning and execution, and the talent and unwavering 
dedication of the DHS workforce and our state, local, and community 
partners. To continue addressing this challenge successfully, we need 
the partnership of Congress, state and local officials, NGOs, and 
communities. We are operating within a fundamentally broken immigration 
system that only Congress can fix.
    Question. Should President Biden issue an emergency declaration for 
the southwest border pursuant to the Stafford Act given that the Biden 
Administration is deploying Federal Emergency Management Agency 
personnel there to respond to the ongoing crisis?
    Answer. DHS continuously reviews the situation at the Southwest 
Border as we respond to current conditions. Alongside our interagency 
partners, DHS is focused on building a safe, orderly, and humane 
immigration system that upholds our nation's laws and keeps our borders 
secure and well managed.
    Question. Would an emergency declaration pursuant to the Stafford 
Act harm your efforts to respond to the crisis at the southwest border?
    Answer. DHS is leveraging all relevant resources to appropriately 
address the situation on the southwest border.
    Question. Do you plan to reinstate any of the policies implemented 
by the previous administration that alleviated the 2019 border crisis? 
If so, which policies do you plan to reinstate?
    Answer. DHS constantly reviews current and past practices to apply 
lessons from previous efforts to better accomplish our mission. 
President Biden has laid out a comprehensive strategy to ensure a safe, 
orderly, and humane process.
    Question. Are the migrants being released into the interior of the 
United States pending adjudication of their immigration proceedings 
being granted permits to work in the U.S.? If not, how do they support 
themselves in the interior of the United States for the months or years 
while they await their immigration proceeding?
    Answer. Employment authorization adjudications are made on a case-
by-case basis. Individuals released from the border and placed into 
removal proceedings are generally not immediately eligible for 
employment authorization on that basis. Individuals may become eligible 
to request employment authorization at a later date based on the 
individual circumstances of their case.
    Question. According to the latest data from your Department, in 
April 2021, CBP had the most border encounters of any month in the last 
20 years. In response, are you planning to request, hire, or deploy 
more CBP or other border security or immigration-enforcement personnel 
in order to ensure that core CBP functions--such as its capacity to 
screen and prevent sex trafficking, contraband and drug trafficking, 
and human trafficking--are not compromised as personnel surge to 
process asylum claims?
    Answer. CBP is working diligently to fill critical frontline 
positions. CBP's ability to hire agents and officers has never been 
stronger. With critical resources and support from Congress, CBP has 
enhanced its hiring system and built the capability to provide 
dedicated support to applicants throughout every step of the process. 
The new hiring system recruits qualified candidates as efficiently as 
possible. CBP will continue to use its resources to build on this 
momentum and ensure that our workforce can keep pace with an 
increasingly demanding mission.
    In March 2021, OFO began deploying CBP officers from interior 
airports and seaports to support the USBP with the rise of migrants 
encountered at the southern border. Over 250 CBP officers were deployed 
for up to 60 days at USBP soft-sided facilities to assist with intake, 
custody, processing, and safeguarding undocumented noncitizens. These 
deployments did not compromise operations at the interior airports or 
seaports.
    In addition to the CBP officers that were temporarily detailed to 
assist USBP, USBP agents from northern border stations were also 
deployed to the southern border to maintain a secure border and provide 
humanitarian care for those in custody. These deployments did not 
compromise operations at the interior airports, seaports, or northern 
border.
    Also, in March 2021, DHS activated the DHS Volunteer Force to 
support USBP and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to 
address the needs of unaccompanied children arriving at the southwest 
border. This support has increased the number of USBP agents available 
for patrol and related border security and law enforcement operations. 
Additionally, as traffic waxes and wanes by location, CBP utilizes 
short term duty assignments that bring agents and officers from lower 
traffic locations to areas of greatest need.
    With funding appropriated by Congress, CBP recently created the 
position of Border Patrol Processing Coordinator. The Border Patrol 
Processing Coordinator position will focus solely on post-apprehension 
processing tasks, which enables frontline agents to return to 
interdiction postures more quickly. Additionally, Border Patrol 
Processing Coordinators assist with transport, hospital watch and other 
non-law enforcement functions. CBP recently graduated the first two 
classes of Border Patrol Processing Coordinators and is working to hire 
and on-board additional Processing Coordinator staff as quickly as 
possible, with two more classes set to graduate by the end of November. 
The first five classes are currently working across the southwest 
border.
    Question. I have heard from law enforcement officials in Tennessee 
that the number of fentanyl-related deaths and incidents is on the rise 
in recent months, which results from China working with drug cartels to 
ship more fentanyl across our southwest border, leading to more 
American deaths. How do you plan to combat this deadly practice?
    Answer. CBP collaborates with both domestic and foreign 
investigative and intelligence partners to strategically target key 
transnational criminal organizations that procure, produce, and traffic 
fentanyl and/or heroin.
    CBP's National Targeting Center hosts liaisons from key agencies 
and international partners to actively share critical information. 
Agencies represented include ICE Homeland Security Investigations 
(HSI), the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Diversion 
Control Division, U.S. Coast Guard, TSA, Department of State's Bureau 
of Consular Affairs, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, New York 
Police Department, Border 5, (Australian Department of Home Affairs, 
Canada Border Services Agency, New Zealand Customs Service, and the 
United Kingdom Border Force), Mexican Customs, French Customs, and the 
national police from Brazil, France, Germany, and Spain.
    CBP partners with HSI at the national and field level, which is 
critical in driving investigations, collecting intelligence, and 
disrupting TCO efforts through real time communication and information 
sharing.
    CBP liaison placement at DEA's Special Operations Division enables 
CBP's direct case coordination, operations support, and deconfliction. 
Through this liaison arrangement, CBP also supports DEA's 
Pharmaceutical, Chemical and Internet Section on both domestic and 
foreign investigations involving cyber trafficking organizations, 
precursor chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.
    Through collaboration and information sharing, CBP exploits 
communications, logistic capabilities, and financial transactions to 
illuminate criminal networks. This critical identification of criminal 
entities enables investigative partners to obtain warrants for 
electronic interceptions, orchestrate significant seizures, make 
arrests, and present findings for prosecution and ultimately dismantle 
these networks.
    CBP seeks opportunities to work collaboratively with the Government 
of Mexico (GOM) and other international partners to intercept fentanyl 
and prevent its production.
    CBP leverages its global operations, including Preclearance, Joint 
Security and Immigration Advisory Programs, Police Liaisons, Container 
Security and Secure Freight initiatives, and CBP attaches at U.S. 
embassies. CBP's international footprint and layered resources allow 
the agency to mitigate nefarious activities beyond U.S. borders and 
operationalize multiple data streams to disrupt and dismantle criminal 
networks.
    Question. In terms of how to stop drug cartels from shipping more 
fentanyl across our southwest border, isn't the obvious answer securing 
that southwest border and preventing persons from moving across it?
    Answer. CBP uses all available resources to secure the border.
    CBP leverages a layered enforcement approach at and between POEs to 
detect and intercept fentanyl crossing our borders. CBP Office of Field 
Operations uses intelligence, targeting, officers, canine detection, 
and non-intrusive technology to screen and intercept fentanyl 
shipments. Through June 2021, fentanyl seizures by weight were 93 
percent higher than the FY 2020 total across southwest border POEs.

                         CONCLUSION OF HEARING

    Chairman Leahy. On behalf of myself and Senator Shelby, we 
thank the witnesses. Thank you for this hearing.
    We stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., Wednesday, May 12, the hearing 
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene 
subject to the call of the Chair.]

                                   [all]