[Senate Hearing 117-419]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-419

                THE JCPOA NEGOTIATIONS AND UNITED STATES' 
                      POLICY ON IRAN MOVING FORWARD

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                              May 25, 2022

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-979                    WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        

                              (ii)        


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Robert Malley, Special Envoy for Iran, U.S. Department of State, 
  Washington, DC.................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Sadjadpour, Karim, Senior Fellow, the Carnegie Endowment for 
  International Peace, Washington, DC............................    36
    Prepared Statement...........................................    38

Dubowitz, Mark, Chief Executive Officer, the Foundation for 
  Defense of 
  Democracies, Washington, DC....................................    43
    Prepared Statement...........................................    46

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mr. Robert Malley to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    92

Responses of Mr. Robert Malley to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................    96

Responses of Mr. Robert Malley to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Bill Hagerty...................................................   102

Article From Wall Street Journal Titled, ``Iran Used Secret U.N. 
  Records to Evade Nuclear Probes''..............................   105

                                 (iii)
 
 
THE JCPOA NEGOTIATIONS AND UNITED STATES' POLICY ON IRAN MOVING FORWARD

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, 
Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Young, Barrasso, 
and Rounds.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Before I deliver my opening remarks on this hearing, let me 
take a moment to acknowledge the senseless massacre at Robb 
Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, an overwhelmingly Latino 
community.
    Once again, we are faced with the heartache and despair of 
witnessing a mass shooting that takes the lives of children, 
who, like any other child in America, went to school to learn, 
not to be executed.
    Let us be clear. Every mass shooting is the result of a 
policy failure. Guns, especially assault weapons equipped with 
high-capacity magazines, do not belong in our communities, and 
in no circumstances should those who seek to do harm with such 
weapons have greater rights than the nation's children, to whom 
we have a precious obligation to protect.
    While our thoughts and prayers are with each one of the 
families that are grieving this unimaginable loss, we must go 
beyond thoughts and prayers and take action. Every day that 
goes by without common-sense gun reform is a setback in our 
ability to promote American virtue and values to the rest of 
the world.
    I have three granddaughters. One is in elementary school 
now in a kindergarten. She goes through active shooter drills. 
What are we waiting for? There must be some common ground under 
which we can, ultimately, come together to prevent these 
senseless acts of violence.
    Turning to today's hearing, I appreciate, Mr. Malley, your 
appearance today. I appreciate your service to our country, and 
I appreciate the Administration's efforts in attempting to 
negotiate a longer and stronger JCPOA.
    The facts are the facts. As we meet here on May 25, 2022, 
Iran is closer than ever to developing a nuclear weapon. It is 
on the brink of enriching enough 60 percent uranium for a 
nuclear weapon.
    The Iran of May 2022 is a much more dangerous threat and a 
far less interested party in negotiating than the Iran of 2015. 
A deal under which Iran has far less than a 6-month breakout 
time with sanctions relief, in return that will unlock millions 
of dollars, and no sunset extensions, is definitely not longer 
and stronger. It is shorter and weaker.
    Now clearly this reality is in part due to President 
Trump's decision to walk away from the JCPOA without a plan, a 
strategy, or any allies alongside. The U.S. having left the 
agreement, Iran decided it no longer needed to abide by it and 
rushed forward with accelerating its enrichment capabilities to 
the doorstep of nuclear-grade uranium. Iran made this decision 
even though our European allies had stayed in the deal.
    As the Administration worked with our allies to negotiate a 
return to the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran worked to stockpile 
nuclear material. As the Administration negotiated, Iranian 
drones loaded with ball bearings and shrapnel hit American 
facilities.
    As the Administration negotiated, Iran has developed what 
former CENTCOM commander General Frank McKenzie says is 
``overmatch'' in its ballistic missile program, so it can 
launch more missiles than the United States and our partners 
can shoot down. Missiles that Iran points at U.S. troops in the 
region. Missiles that Iran points at our ally, the state of 
Israel, which Iranian leaders have said should be ``wiped off 
the face of the earth.''
    Meanwhile, Iran unlawfully detains American citizens and 
citizens of our European allies on trumped up charges for 
political chits. Lest we forget, Iran abuses, oppresses, and 
violates the human rights of its own citizens.
    In short, Iran has dragged out this process, driving up its 
demands and exerting its leverage, convincing the world that 
the United States wants the JCPOA more than the Iranian regime 
does.
    After months of negotiation, this is the Iran we must 
contend with, not the Iran you hoped would be driven by 
practical considerations at the bargaining table. Today's Iran 
is buoyed by China, who it is reported just in April imported 
650,000 barrels a day of oil from Iran, oil which should be 
subject to U.S. sanctions.
    Even at discounted prices, this has resulted in a flood of 
cash for the regime, tens of millions of dollars per day. 
Today, Iran is protected by Russia. Iran thinks it has options. 
If Iran wants to extract a better deal or concede less than 
U.S. national security demands, it can turn to its autocratic 
allies.
    Now the Administration said months ago that without a 
return to the original 2015 agreement by the end of last 
February, the nonproliferation benefits of the deal would be 
greatly diminished.
    To quote Secretary Blinken on January 21 of 2022, which is 
4 months ago, he said, ``The talks with Iran about a mutual 
return to compliance with the JCPOA have reached a decisive 
moment. If a deal is not reached in the next few weeks, Iran's 
ongoing nuclear advances will make it impossible to return to 
the JCPOA.''
    It is late May. It is 3 months later than that 
determination. So, how is it that Iran is still advancing its 
nuclear program by leaps and bounds? The knowledge Iran is 
gaining from these advancements can never be erased, and we 
continue to wait and hope, but hope is not a national security 
strategy.
    I believe in a diplomatic path, but we must ask, using 
every tool we have, how do we serve the U.S. strategic 
interests here? If Iran were to break out tomorrow, what is the 
United States prepared to do?
    If Iran begins to enrich uranium to 90 percent, what is the 
United States prepared to do? Using every bit of leverage and 
deterrence, how do we stop Iran from mastering the 
weaponization for a nuclear device?
    I want to hear the Administration's plans to better enforce 
the sanctions regime we have put in place that now looks like a 
sieve. I want to hear your plans for working in lockstep with 
our European and other allies around the globe to sharpen 
Iran's choices.
    I would like to hear the Administration's plans in detail 
for what the Administration is prepared to do to stop the 
growing oil trade between Iran and China and Iran's oil trade 
with Venezuela and Syria.
    I want to hear your plans for how to end Iran's hostage-
taking of our citizens and I want to hear your plans for how 
the Administration is going to bring home Americans wrongfully 
detained in Iran--Siamak and Baquer Namazi, Emad Sharghi, Morad 
Tahbaz--with or without the JCPOA, and, of course, we can never 
forget about Bob Levinson and his family.
    I want to hear your plans to bolster the security of our 
partners in the region, so they can defend themselves with or 
without a return to the JCPOA. The United States must 
demonstrate we have the will as well as the military 
capabilities if absolutely necessary to defend our people and 
our interest. We must back up President Biden's statement that 
Iran will ``never get a nuclear weapon on my watch.''
    I think we must prepare for the increasingly obvious 
reality we face in 2022. A return to the 2015 nuclear deal is 
not around the corner and I believe it is not in the U.S. 
strategic interest.
    We need to tackle what comes next, and we need to hear your 
plan. I hope your testimony today can begin to lay the 
groundwork of such a strategy, but if that plan includes the 
possibility of a deal with Iran, I want to make clear that it 
must be subject to congressional review under the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act of 2015. Congress has and will continue to 
play an important role with respect to Iran policy, and I would 
expect the Administration to follow the law.
    With that, let me turn to the ranking member for his 
comments.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, Mr. Malley, thank you for taking the time to 
meet with me, which you do from time to time, and I sincerely 
appreciate it. You do not have a difficult job; you have got an 
impossible job.
    The Administration has given you something that--they have 
given you a rubber hammer to do a job that a steel mallet could 
not do, and I appreciate your initial efforts in that regard.
    As we discussed in our most recent meeting, the time has 
long since passed and it is time to turn our attention in other 
directions.
    Here we go again. The Administration has argued that Iran 
is galloping towards a nuclear device and we are left with no 
choice--the choice of the JCPOA or an unconstrained Iranian 
regime.
    This is a false choice. It remains that the JCPOA was 
fatally flawed in 2015 and it is fatally flawed today. The 
JCPOA fails to adequately contain the Iranian regime and 
safeguard American national security interests.
    We are all familiar what the deal sunsets. The conventional 
weapons embargo has already expired. The deal's ban on 
ballistic missiles expires next year. The entire deal remains 
bound by a termination date in 2025 where the U.N. Security 
Council ends consideration of Iranian nuclear matters and the 
resolution snapback mechanism ceases.
    Iran's nuclear program is only one aspect of its malign 
behavior, though, as the chairman so adequately pointed out. 
Over the past four decades, the Iranian regime has murdered its 
own citizens, murdered Americans, made hostage taking a central 
tenet in its foreign policy, exported terrorism on a global 
scale, and represents the principal threat to stability in the 
Middle East.
    Despite promises of ``longer and stronger,'' which were all 
made in this room and made individually to each of us at the 
beginning of this Administration, it is clear that that was a 
bumper sticker only, which I believed and said at the time.
    The current approach does not address Iran's regional 
terrorism, ballistic missile activity, ongoing Iranian threats 
to former U.S. officials, or returning American hostages to 
their loved ones.
    In fact, sanctions relief fuel Iran's terror proxies just 
as the 2015 JCPOA did. We saw pallets of cash delivered to the 
Iranians at the conclusion of the negotiations of that in 2015.
    Where do you think that money went? We know it did not go 
to help the Iranian people for domestic programs or anything 
else. It was converted, at least partially, into missiles that 
today have been transported to Lebanon, to Syria, and are aimed 
at Israel and other places. That is where that cash wound up.
    Worse, the JCPOA provides a potential sanctions lifeline to 
Russia that will enrich Putin for continued nuclear work in the 
midst of his assault against Ukraine. Talks remain stalled and 
it is clear the Iranian regime is negotiating in bad faith as 
it always does, and while it continues to levy unreasonable 
demands to reenter the nuclear deal.
    Instead of prolonging this period of uncertainty, it is 
long past time the Administration end negotiations and 
implement a more holistic Iran policy. We would like to hear 
about that holistic policy today.
    We need to end this never-ending parade of reference to 
percent enrichment and volume of nuclear material. This is not 
the measurement of Iran's evil, but only a mere small part of 
it, and the Israelis have vowed to handle that end of the 
problem and they will, and Iran knows it and we know it.
    On the economic front, sanctions enforcement is lacking, 
sadly lacking. We must close sanctions loopholes including 
Chinese purchases of Iranian oil. Iran, confident in its 
resistance economy, must feel significantly more economic 
pressure.
    On the diplomatic front, the United States must press for a 
censure of the Iranian regime at next month's IAEA Board of 
Governors meeting. For too long Iran has harassed and 
obstructed legitimate IAEA monitoring efforts without penalty.
    In tolerating this, the Administration has greatly damaged 
the legitimacy and integrity of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty and the IAEA. We must hold Iran to its commitments and 
make clear our support for the NPT and IAEA.
    In addition to action at the IAEA we must bring 
international pressure to bear. Iran must become a renewed 
topic of discussion at the U.N. Security Council. For too long 
Iran policy has been an issue that has divided us from some of 
our European partners. They have come to realize that the 
malignancy they are dealing with and are willing to move 
forward with a new sense of reality.
    Finally, regional deterrence and U.S. response to Iran 
attacks against our troops and diplomats has been, again, 
sagging. We must increase deterrence in the region, increase 
joint military exercises with Israel, and ensure our partners 
have the right tools to defend themselves.
    Putin's unprovoked attack and murder of thousands for no 
reason whatsoever other than the fact that good people living 
in nearby free democratic countries have bound themselves 
together to respond and effectively respond to such an attack 
has, once again, reminded us that evil, real evil, exists in 
this world and we must always be vigilant and ready to respond 
when and if it erupts.
    Only through a comprehensive multilateral approach can we 
confront the Iranian challenge.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Mr. Malley, again, welcome. We would ask you to summarize 
your statement in around 5 minutes or so, so we can have a 
conversation. I know there are many members who will have 
questions. Your full statement will be included in the record, 
without objection.
    The floor is yours.

   STATEMENT OF ROBERT MALLEY, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR IRAN, U.S. 
              DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Malley. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of this 
committee, thank you for this opportunity to talk about the 
Biden administration's policy towards Iran.
    This is both an urgent and important topic. Like so many of 
us in this room, I am a parent. For all of us, the horrific 
mass murder of elementary school children makes it hard to 
focus on anything else.
    Let me begin with some basic facts upon which I am sure we 
can all agree. The Iranian Government's actions threaten the 
United States and our allies, including Israel. Iran continues 
to support terrorist groups.
    It has an appalling human rights record, the brutal 
response to ongoing protests being only the latest reminder. It 
unjustly detains foreign and dual nationals for use as 
political pawns.
    While we have been working intensively with allies and 
partners to deter and counter this dangerous array of Iranian 
activities, we have not had the luxury of focusing exclusively 
on them.
    Instead, our Administration has spent much of the past year 
seeking to restore strict limits on Iran's nuclear program, 
including an unprecedented international monitoring regime.
    We have also been repairing vitally important ties with our 
European allies that are necessary to hold Iran accountable and 
change its behavior. That is because when President Biden came 
into office he inherited an immediate crisis--an unbridled 
Iranian nuclear program that makes every other problem we have 
had with Iran more dangerous and intractable as well as badly 
frayed relations with our European allies, who were spending as 
much time arguing against U.S. policy as they were countering 
Iran.
    This is the unfortunate result of the last Administration's 
decision to unilaterally end U.S. participation in the JCPOA at 
a time when Iran was complying with it.
    To the extent there is disagreement in this room, it boils 
down to this. Are we better off reviving the nuclear deal and, 
in parallel, using all other tools at our disposal, from 
diplomatic, economic, and otherwise, to address Iran's 
destabilizing policies? Or are we better off getting rid of the 
deal and banking on a policy of pressure alone to get Iran to 
accept more onerous nuclear constraints and curb its aggressive 
policies?
    We do not need to rely on thought experiments to answer 
this question anymore for we have gone through several years of 
a real life experiment in the very policy approach critics of 
the JCPOA advocated.
    Many of us strongly disagreed with this policy at the time. 
Of course, we could not prove that it would fail. Then, we 
predicted. Now, we know.
    The simple fact is this. As a means of constraining Iran's 
nuclear program, the JCPOA was working. Leaving it has not. 
Under the JCPOA, Iran operated a tightly constrained and 
monitored nuclear program. It would have taken Iran about a 
year to make enough fissile material for a bomb, which would 
have given us and our allies the ability to know what Iran was 
doing and the time to act should Iran make that fateful 
decision.
    Without those constraints, Iran has been accumulating 
sufficient enriched uranium and made sufficient technological 
advances to leave the breakout time as short as a matter of 
weeks, which means Iran could potentially produce enough fuel 
for a bomb before we can know it, let alone stop it.
    Worse, rather than compelling Iran to make concessions, the 
prior Administration's so-called maximum pressure campaign 
resulted in Iran's maximum nonnuclear provocations. These 
included increasingly brazen attacks by Iran and the armed 
groups it supports against our Gulf partners and our own 
forces, leading to a 400 percent increase in attacks by Iran-
backed militia between 2019 and 2020.
    In this context, it is hardly surprising that a 
preponderance of former Israeli security officials, including 
two more just today, has stated unequivocally that the U.S. 
decision to leave the deal was among the most damaging to 
Israel's safety.
    These are hardened security professionals from across the 
political spectrum, all of whom were doing whatever necessary 
to defend their country. That is why we will seek a return to 
the JCPOA as long as we assess that its nonproliferation 
benefits are worth the sanctions lifting we would provide, and 
we will submit this deal for congressional review pursuant to 
INARA were we to reach it.
    Of course, as I speak to you we do not have a deal and 
prospects for reaching one are tenuous at best. If Iran 
maintains demands that go beyond the scope of the JCPOA, we 
will continue to reject them and there will be no deal.
    It is not our preference, but we are fully prepared to live 
with and confront that reality if that is Iran's choice. We 
have no illusion. Nuclear deal or no nuclear deal, this Iranian 
Government will remain a threat.
    As we have throughout the negotiations, we will continue to 
strongly push back. Today, as part of that ongoing effort, the 
Treasury Department is announcing new sanctions targeting an 
international smuggling and money laundering network that has 
facilitated the sale of hundreds of millions of dollars worth 
of oil for the IRGC-Quds Force.
    So here is our strategy: fully reviving the JCPOA if Iran 
is willing to do so, building on that deal without the specter 
of a looming nuclear crisis to seek a broader follow-on 
diplomatic outcome, and throughout, regardless, deterring, 
countering, and responding to the full array of Iranian threats 
in close coordination with Europe and, crucially, with Israel 
and our regional partners while credibly demonstrating that we 
will never permit Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Malley follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Mr. Robert Malley

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee, thank you 
for this opportunity to talk about the Biden administration's strategy 
toward Iran.
    Let me begin with some basic facts upon which I am sure we agree, 
and which are the predicate for everything we are doing. The Iranian 
Government's actions threaten the United States and our allies, 
including Israel. It has a long history of regional aggression. It 
continues to support terrorist groups. It directs attacks against our 
forces in the Middle East and against our partners. It has an appalling 
human rights record. It detains foreign and dual nationals for use as 
political pawns. It must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon, 
because of the direct threat that would pose to us and to our allies, 
and because it would make it harder for us to confront all of its other 
menacing actions.
    The Biden-Harris administration has spent much of the past year 
seeking to restore strict limits on Iran's nuclear program, including 
by reestablishing an unprecedented international monitoring regime. We 
have also been repairing vitally important ties with our European 
allies that are necessary to hold Iran accountable and to change its 
behavior.
    This is the unfortunate result of the last Administration's 
decision to unilaterally end U.S. participation in the JCPOA. Absent 
that decision, our full focus--and our leverage--could have been 
applied entirely to working with allies and partners to deter and 
counter Iran's array of dangerous non-nuclear activities--its threats 
to our citizens, allies, and partners, the violence it prompts and 
supports in its region, and of course the abuses it inflicts on its own 
people. The protests we are seeing now in Iran are a measure of the 
Government's corruption and mismanagement, and the brutal response to 
those protests are a reminder of the Government's moral bankruptcy.
    Alas, while we remain intensely focused on those issues, in 
partnership with Congress, we do not have the luxury of addressing them 
exclusively, because, when President Biden came into office, he 
inherited an immediate crisis: an unbridled Iranian nuclear program 
that presents a real and serious threat in one of the most sensitive 
regions of the globe and thus required our immediate attention. Every 
other problem we have with Iran will be made worse, more dangerous, and 
more intractable, if we fail in this effort, and it is the greatest 
potential threat to the United States and our allies, which is why it 
must now be our most urgent priority.
    This crisis, this urgent distraction from the other threats posed 
by Iran, was not inevitable. I know that the JCPOA is a deeply 
controversial issue among members of this Committee, and I respect the 
strongly held competing views. But the simple fact is this: as a means 
of constraining Iran's nuclear program, the JCPOA was working. As the 
previous Administration acknowledged when it left the deal, Iran was 
complying with its commitments. It was not enriching uranium over 3.67 
percent, not accumulating a stockpile of enriched uranium over 300 
kilograms, spinning only 5,060 of its first-generation centrifuges and 
a very limited number of research and development centrifuges, and of 
course it was allowing the most comprehensive and intrusive 
international inspection regime anywhere in the world. More than that, 
with Iran's nuclear program effectively contained, we were in a 
position to work with allies and partners to shape a powerful 
international response to the other threats posed by Iran.
    To the extent that there is a disagreement in this room, it boils 
down to this: are we better off reviving the nuclear deal and, in 
parallel, using all other tools at our disposal--diplomatic, economic, 
and otherwise--to address Iran's destabilizing policies? Or are we 
better off getting rid of the deal and banking on a policy of pressure 
alone to get Iran to accept more onerous nuclear constraints and curb 
its aggressive policies?
    When the deal was initially concluded and debated by the Congress, 
and again when the previous Administration left the deal, this question 
prompted heated arguments based on hypotheticals and counterfactuals. 
But we do not need to rely on theory or thought experiments to answer 
it now.
    For we have gone through several years of a real-life experiment in 
the very policy approach critics of the JCPOA advocated: a so-called 
maximum pressure policy, designed to strangle revenue for the Iranian 
regime, in hopes of getting Iran to accept far greater nuclear 
restrictions and engage in far less aggressive behavior. Many of us 
strongly disagreed with this policy at the time, but we could of course 
not prove that it would fail. That was then. This is now. Then we 
predicted. Now we know.
    Under the JCPOA, Iran operated a tightly constrained and carefully 
monitored nuclear program; it would have taken Iran about a year to 
make enough fissile material for a single nuclear explosive device--
what we call breakout time--which in turn would have given us and our 
allies time to take action should Iran have made that fateful decision. 
Without those constraints, Iran has been able to advance its program by 
accumulating sufficient quantities of enriched uranium and making 
technological gains that have left the breakout time as short as 
roughly a few weeks, limiting the window to warn of and react to an 
Iranian breakout. And because Iran suspended JCPOA monitoring measures 
that go above and beyond standard safeguards, international inspectors 
at the International Atomic Energy Agency have less information and 
access, including that which is provided for by the IAEA Additional 
Protocol as a means to detect and deter any new Iranian attempt to 
pursue covert nuclear activities.
    Rather than compelling them to make concessions, the prior 
Administration's so-called maximum pressure campaign resulted in Iran's 
maximum non-nuclear provocations. These included increasing--and 
increasingly dramatic--attacks by Iran and the armed groups it supports 
on our partners in the Gulf, as well as on our own forces. As Secretary 
Blinken has pointed out, attacks by Iran-backed militia in Iraq 
increased by 400 percent between 2019 and 2020--the years when maximum 
U.S. pressure was supposed to result in maximum Iranian restraint.
    ``Maximum pressure'' did not produce longer and stronger, but 
rather shorter and weaker--so short, indeed, that, in the absence of 
the JCPOA, many of the nuclear steps the deal's critics worried Iran 
might take in the future are being taken by Iran right now; so weak in 
fact that Iran's nuclear program today is operating essentially without 
any constraints at all on its size and technological advancement. At 
the time of our exit, then U.S. officials predicted that Iran would not 
restart its nuclear program and that Iran would come to negotiate on 
our other concerns. I wish they'd been right. Regrettably, they were 
proven wrong on all counts. The alternative theory JCPOA critics 
advanced was given a chance. It failed, and emphatically so.
    That is why we have sought, without any illusions, a return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA. We will do so as long as we assess that 
the non-proliferation benefits of a return to the deal are worth the 
sanctions lifting we would need to provide. Right now, we are confident 
that is true, but we and the intelligence community continuously review 
the technical analysis underpinning our view.
    To do this, and just as we did previously, we would of course need 
to lift those sanctions that were imposed in response to Iran's nuclear 
threat to achieve a deal. That was the purpose of those sanctions in 
the first place--to use them as leverage to address Iran's nuclear 
threat. The bottom line is that we are convinced, as are all our 
European partners, that we can both provide limited sanctions relief in 
exchange for Iran taking important steps to roll back and constrain its 
nuclear program, and still use the vast reservoir of remaining 
sanctions and other tools at our disposal to pressure and target its 
other dangerous activities.
    It is hardly surprising, but striking nonetheless that a 
preponderance of former Israeli officials who have served in their 
country's national security establishment have stated unequivocally 
that the U.S. decision to leave the deal was one of the recent 
decisions most damaging to Israel's security. These are hardened 
security professionals from across the political spectrum--like former 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak or former Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon--all 
of whom would do whatever necessary to defend their country, none of 
whom can be described as overly focused on diplomacy. But they know 
what we should also know: The withdrawal from the deal has left them 
and us in a far worse position.
    As I speak to you today, we do not have a deal with Iran and 
prospects for reaching one are, at best, tenuous. If Iran maintains 
demands that go beyond the scope of the JCPOA, we will continue to 
reject them, and there will be no deal. We are fully prepared to live 
with and confront that reality if that is Iran's choice, ready to 
continue to enforce and further tighten our sanctions, albeit this time 
around with Europe firmly by our side, and to respond strongly to any 
Iranian escalation, working in concert with Israel and our regional 
partners. We will have demonstrated our firm commitment to resolving 
even the most difficult problems through diplomacy, and Iran's 
Government will need to explain to its people why it has chosen 
isolation and even greater economic hardship when a realistic deal was 
readily at hand.
    We harbor no illusion. Nuclear deal or no nuclear deal, this 
Iranian Government will remain a threat. Nuclear deal or no nuclear 
deal, it will continue to sponsor terrorism, threaten Israel, sow 
instability across the region, fund, train and equip an array of 
violent non-state actors, and oppress its people.
    But the bottom line is that every single one of the problems we 
face with Iran would be vastly magnified, and our freedom of action to 
address them significantly reduced, if Iran's leaders acquired a 
nuclear weapon or if it remains as it is now, close to being able to 
obtaining the material for one. Conversely, we will be in a much 
stronger position to confront them if we restore the constraints on 
Iran's nuclear program that today are on the verge of disappearing.
    I would like to conclude with some thoughts about what we have 
learned from the experience of the previous two administrations and how 
we should integrate those lessons. From the Obama administration, we 
know that, while the JCPOA successfully addressed our nuclear concerns, 
we could and should have more deeply consulted and coordinated with our 
regional allies and partners, who stand at the front lines, whose 
interests are directly at stake, and with whose full support we are 
much stronger in confronting Iran's threats. We also learned that if we 
want a stable and sustainable deal, we are much better off with one 
that enjoys as much bipartisan support as possible. From the Trump 
administration, we learned that the U.S. has an immensely powerful tool 
in the reimposition of its sanctions. That option remains available to 
us today. And it will remain available if we return the deal and Iran 
does not meet its obligations. But we also learned that acting alone 
ensures that we--not Iran--end up isolated. And we learned that a 
policy centered on pressure alone, unmoored from a realistic policy 
objective, produces not maximum results, but maximum escalation and 
maximum danger.
    It is armed with the knowledge of these twin experiences that the 
Biden-Harris administration has devised its own strategy: committed to 
working with our European allies to fully revive the JCPOA if Iran is 
willing to do so; building on that deal to seek a broader, follow-on 
diplomatic outcome that enjoys strong congressional backing; and, 
throughout, coordinating closely with Europe and, crucially, with 
Israel and our regional partners, against the backdrop of the Abraham 
Accords, to deter, counter and respond to the full array of Iranian 
threats and to credibly demonstrate that we will never permit Iran to 
acquire a nuclear weapon.
    Thank you. I ask that my full testimony be entered into the record, 
and I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Malley.
    We will start a series of 5-minute question rounds.
    First of all, I am glad to hear your statement that if 
there is to be any deal that it will be subject to INARA. I 
appreciate the Administration's commitment to that. Also glad 
that the hearing has unveiled that the Treasury Department is 
now in a significant sanctions mode on what you just described. 
I had not heard that before, and so I am glad to hear that.
    Also glad to see that there has now been public 
confirmation that the President has made a determination not to 
revoke the IRGC foreign terrorist organization designation, 
despite Iranian demands. I salute the President and the 
Administration for keeping on that designation. So, those are 
all positive things.
    As I listened to your testimony, I heard a lot of it focus 
on the Trump administration's decision, which I join with you, 
I think was a mistake. I did not support the JCPOA.
    I did not think it was strong enough or dealt with the 
issues that it needed to deal with, and I also did not support 
the Trump administration's decision to leave it unilaterally 
without allies, without a plan, without a strategy, and we have 
seen the results of that.
    Having said that, you have had a long time since then in 
these negotiations, and Iran has not shown itself--at this 
point, you do not have a deal, and what we do have is Iran 
evading sanctions through China and others. The Administration 
has not pursued sanctions on China and others in that regard.
    What we do have is violations separately from the JCPOA 
with the IAEA's--Iran's commitment to the IAEA, which still go 
unanswered, and what we do have is that Iran's breakout time 
right now is short enough that if Iran chooses to do it, it 
could be missed totally by those who monitor it.
    So, lamenting the past, while I recognize that, is not a 
strategy to move towards the future, and the future is now.
    So question one, will we move to censure Iran at the June 7 
IAEA meeting for violating its obligations to the IAEA about 
sites that have not had the access and information that the 
Iranians have not, ultimately, provided pursuant to an 
independent obligation to the IAEA?
    Mr. Malley. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    We are consulting as we speak with the European allies and 
with Israel and others to decide exactly what we will do at the 
Board of Governors meeting in June to make sure that Iran is 
held to account.
    The Chairman. I appreciate consultations. Those are always 
good. What is our position in those consultations? Are we 
saying we believe that Iran should be censured at the IAEA for 
not meeting its obligations?
    Mr. Malley. We certainly believe that Iran needs to be 
pushed to meet its obligations. What we want to do is move in 
concert with Israel, with our European partners. So I do not 
want to be ahead of that. I think you could be certain that we 
will take action that is necessary to hold Iran to----
    The Chairman. I assume that we are leading in some of these 
discussions. We are having consultations. I have never known an 
Administration to make consultations and not have a point of 
view during the course of those consultations.
    Here is an example. If we cannot have Iran meet its 
obligations to the IAEA independently, which is the watchdog 
agency of the United Nations on these questions, then how are 
we to have faith and confidence on anything else?
    Let me ask you this. Why is it that we are still keeping 
the door open, even though the Secretary of State said that if 
it ended February, it was not much benefit anymore? Even though 
the threshold is so close, what is your plan B? Because I get 
no sense of what that plan is.
    Is it to get our European allies, who we have worked very 
hard--I give the Administration credit for that--to, 
ultimately, now join in a multilateral sanctions regime against 
Iran for its violations?
    Is it to sanction countries like China that are permitting 
millions of dollars to flow to Iran in violation of sanctions 
and others as well? Is it to show our military capability, so 
that Iran has to think twice about making any such dash over 
the end not only on enrichment, but on the detonation, which is 
still a question?
    Is it to try to constrain Iran's ballistic missiles, which 
right now have overmatch in the region, not because I say so, 
but because our former CENTCOM commander says it?
    I mean, what is the plan?
    Mr. Malley. Mr. Chairman, what I would say is that we are 
not waiting for--to see what happens with the negotiations to 
take action on all of the issues that you raised.
    The sanctions enforcement, which have not begun today, they 
began from the first day President Biden took office. We have 
imposed over 150 sanctions designations since that time, 
addressing ballistic missiles, human rights violations, support 
for terrorism, and the like.
    We are also working day in and day out with Israel, in 
particular, but also with our European allies on a strategy to 
counter, deter, and respond to any Iranian action, whether it 
has to do with attacks against our partners, its UAV program, 
its ballistic missile program.
    To come back to your question about the IAEA, we also 
working with them to make sure that Iran is held to account for 
what it has done in the past. All of these problems would be 
much worse and much more difficult and much more intractable if 
Iran were a threshold state on the verge of acquiring a nuclear 
bomb.
    That is why, together with our European allies, who want us 
to continue in this vein, we are doing what we can to resolve 
this issue diplomatically, even as we are not leaving any stone 
unturned to counter the threat.
    The Chairman. All right. At some point, maybe the 
Administration will share with this committee, preferably in 
open session, but if it must, in classified session--what is 
that plan.
    You say we are consulting and working with our allies, but 
to do what? To achieve what goals? To have what sanctions 
enforcement? To deal with what element of the Iranian nuclear 
program and its missile program, for example?
    I do not have any sense of what that is, and I do not have 
any sense of what that is. If I do not have any sense of what 
it is then I do not know how we are supposed to decide whether 
this is a path forward to achieving the goals that I believe we 
collectively want.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share the 
chairman's goals and the frustration of not knowing where the 
Administration is on this.
    You just made the statement that you have imposed 150 
sanctions. To what end? I mean, every day things seem to get 
better for Iran even though you keep putting these sanctions 
on. I heard what you just said about sanctioning the IRGC for 
oil sales, but my goodness, sanctioning the IRGC to what end?
    I mean, they have been sanctioned I do not know how many 
times. What I want to hear, just as the chairman referred to, 
is I want to hear about sanctions that will stop the oil sales 
to China.
    That is a huge problem here and it is ongoing and it is 
resulting, as the chairman described, in a very significant 
cash flow into Iran, which they smilingly take, particularly 
with the price of oil today.
    Sanctions on the IRGC, I am underwhelmed and I think 
everybody else is. I suspect the IRGC is. They probably shrug 
and laugh and continue to cash the checks that come from China.
    What can you tell us about what the Administration is going 
to do about sanctions? They are toothless.
    Mr. Malley. Ranking Member, let me say that I do not 
disagree. We have to do--we all have to do a better job, and 
this is a bipartisan issue. It is an issue that goes back 
decades about dealing with Iran's activities.
    You also make a very important point that sanctions are not 
the silver bullet. It was during the period of maximum 
pressure. President Trump imposed somewhat in the order of 
1,600 new sanctions designations, and it was during that period 
of maximum pressure, as I said, that we saw maximum 
destabilizing activities, unprecedented brazen attacks against 
oil tankers, against oil fields in Saudi Arabia, against our 
troops, all of that during the time when, supposedly, we were 
supposed to crush Iran's economy so that it would improve its 
behavior.
    So we need to do a better job. We need to have a--and we 
are working--and I would be happy, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member, to say more in a classified setting about our plans 
with our allies in the region and in Europe.
    The reality is this is a challenge that we have faced for 
decades. We need to do better, and the best path forward in 
terms of the nuclear program is to get back into the deal. That 
does not leave us off the hook for all the other issues, and we 
are working on them. We have not stopped working on them, and I 
think the Iranian leadership would beg to differ with a 
description of their economy doing well.
    The rial has lost 85 percent of its value since 2018, 25 
percent of that under President Biden's watch, inflation at 40 
percent, unemployment rising, protests in the streets. I do not 
think this is a strong regime that is basking in being able to 
circumvent sanctions. It is a regime under duress and that is 
because of its own mismanagement and our sanctions.
    Senator Risch. Mr. Malley, I think it is a fair point to 
say that the economy is not good in Iran, but it is adequate. 
They seem to be getting by and, certainly, they have got the 
weaknesses that you have described, but they keep putting one 
foot in front of the other.
    Turning to your point about, well, former President Trump 
got out of the JCPOA and, my gosh, all these terrible things 
happened. Well, what are you guys doing about it? If that was 
not the answer, what are you doing about it?
    You came in and said, do not worry, we are going to have an 
agreement that is longer and stronger. That train has left the 
station a long time ago. It is not longer and it is not 
stronger and it does not even exist.
    In fact, what we are hearing about it is it will be shorter 
and weaker if, indeed, you do wind up getting into an 
agreement, which I, for one, certainly, hope that you do not. 
What is your plan? As the chairman said, I do not know what the 
policy is. You keep sitting at the table and you keep 
negotiating. How long is this going to go on?
    Mr. Malley. Mr. Ranking Member, there was a question the 
chairman asked as well about how long we will go. Our goal is 
to--we will--we are prepared to get back into the JCPOA for as 
long as our assessment is that its nonproliferation benefits 
are worth the sanctions relief that we would provide.
    Again, that does not mean that we sit by and only 
negotiate. We have not lifted a single sanction that President 
Trump imposed. We have added to those sanctions.
    We have taken steps with our partners to go after their UAV 
program, their ballistic missile program, to strengthen both 
Israel and our Gulf allies, partners, in their ability to 
counter the threat that Iran presents.
    So we are doing all of that whether the JCPOA talks 
continue or not. At this point, it is our assessment--our 
technical expert assessment--that the nonproliferation benefits 
of the deal are worth the sanctions relief that we would 
provide.
    Senator Risch. Let me go back to the question the 
chairman--the line of question the chairman did and that is, on 
the first of the year, the Secretary of State told us 3 months 
and that is it. We are done. We are through. It is no good 
anymore.
    When does this end and why should we believe you in any 
way, shape, or form when you do not keep the commitments that 
were made before, the longer and stronger deal that was 
promised and the cutting it off if you do not get a deal? Why 
should we believe anything at this point?
    Mr. Malley. On the issue of longer and stronger, I do want 
to clarify that.
    I think what President Biden said, what Secretary Blinken 
said, what all members of the Administration said was let us 
get back into the deal and use that as a platform to get a 
longer and stronger deal, in large part because it is much 
safer to negotiate a longer, stronger deal when we know that 
their nuclear program is in check rather than have to negotiate 
with the looming threat of a threshold state before us.
    That is not a negotiation that is going to be easy to lead. 
It is going to be a long-term diplomatic effort, and to do it 
knowing that any day Iran could break out without us having 
either the ability to know it or to act against it is putting 
us in a much weaker position.
    So we hope to get back into the JCPOA. If we do not, you 
will see continued sanctions enforcement, tightened sanctions 
enforcement. You will see intensified action with our allies 
and partners. All of that is continuing, again, regardless of 
whether we get back into the JCPOA.
    So being at the table does not tie our hands any more than 
it is tying Iran's hands. If they feel free to go after us, we 
will feel free to respond and to take action against them.
    Senator Risch. So when are you going to end? When are you 
going to walk? When is this going to happen?
    Mr. Malley. I apologize. It is true that we have said 
things in the past. What has always been our guiding star is 
what are the nonproliferation benefits that our experts tell us 
and the intelligence community tells us.
    Again, being at the table does not mean we are waiting. We 
are not waiting. We are acting and we are acting to promote our 
interests, to make sure that Iran is--cannot export its 
instability and its missiles and its UAVs across the region.
    Senator Risch. I yield my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Malley, thank you very much for your service. Thank you 
for keeping us informed. We appreciate that very much.
    The Biden administration has been engaging us on a regular 
basis on these foreign policy issues, something that was 
missing during the Trump administration. So we very much 
appreciate that.
    I also am pleased to hear about the designation of the IRGC 
remaining and not on the table, and that the Administration is 
imposing additional sanctions on Iran. I am also pleased with 
the acknowledgement of the INARA review by Congress.
    I want to go back when this agreement was entered into in 
2015, taking effect in 2016, the point was made that being in 
an agreement with Iran on nuclear containment would be the 
platform for us to make additional progress to normalize 
relations with Iran and deal with their nonnuclear issues.
    We did not see any progress after we joined the JCPOA. When 
President Trump was deciding whether to withdraw from the 
JCPOA--and I agree with Chairman Menendez, I thought that was a 
terrible decision with Iran in compliance, the withdrawal--but 
the European allies met with us here on Capitol Hill. We had 
their attention.
    They were prepared to conduct very visible action with the 
United States to deal with the non-nuclear to move Iran along. 
We did not see any progress from Iran and willingness to deal 
with these other issues.
    Now we are talking about rejoining the JCPOA. I have not 
seen very visible action by our European allies in regards to 
Iran's non-nuclear activities from their support of terrorism, 
their ballistic missile violations, or their human rights 
violations.
    It is frustrating that we are told that if we are in this 
platform we will have a better chance with Iran on these non-
nuclear issues. It is very frustrating because we know 
President Biden has repaired the damage done under the Trump 
administration with our coalition of European allies.
    We see that very clearly with Ukraine. It would seem to me 
that we have negotiated--the Biden administration has 
negotiated in good faith. The Iranians are a moving target.
    Why are we not seeing greater cooperation with Europe in 
regards to isolating Iran on its non-nuclear front as well as 
imposing additional penalties for their violations of the JCPOA 
commitments and on the nuclear front?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, thank you for that important question. 
I think it really goes to the heart of what President Biden has 
sought to do since coming into office, which is, as you say, to 
make sure that we act as one with our European allies so that 
we could confront Iran rather than be in the position, 
unfortunately, we have been in since 2018 of European countries 
spending as much time trying to counter U.S. policy as they 
were trying to counter Iranian actions.
    We are now in a position where we are working lockstep with 
the Europeans and they wanted to see us--they want to see us 
make a good faith effort coming back into the JCPOA.
    They tell us, and I am sure that if you had them here they 
would tell you, the last thing they want, particularly today 
when we are dealing with the crisis in Ukraine, is have a 
nuclear crisis in the Persian Gulf.
    They are hoping and they are still pressing to see whether 
we could reach this deal and we want to show them that we are 
making every effort consistent with our national security 
interests to see whether we could resolve this through a 
reentry into the deal.
    I am absolutely confident that, regardless of the outcome, 
the Europeans will be with us whether that has to do with 
sanctions enforcement, action at the IAEA Board of Governors, 
action in terms of strengthening our partners in the Gulf to 
counter Iran.
    This has been critical. It has been critical, as you say, 
in Ukraine. It is just as critical here. We see in our 
conversations and the plans that our militaries and other----
    Senator Cardin. I would just make this one point. If we 
were to rejoin the JCPOA and we do not have specific 
commitments from our European allies in regards to these other 
issues, I am very dubious as to whether we will see the follow 
through by our European allies.
    They seem to have been restricted by being in the JCPOA 
rather than being aggressive in dealing with these issues--
these other issues. Unless there is an understanding before the 
United States were to rejoin the JCPOA, I do not hold out much 
hope that we will have the unity that you are referring to. I 
hope I am wrong about that.
    I hope that you would understand that we need to see 
definitive commitments from the Europeans to join us in 
addressing Iran's non-nuclear violations as well as containing 
their nuclear proliferation.
    Mr. Malley. If I may, we have those commitments. We have 
spoken to the Europeans extensively precisely in the direction, 
Senator, that you just indicated.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Malley, let us just state the obvious. If Iran gave up 
its nuclear program and opens itself up to inspections, all the 
sanctions to be lifted, you would have billions of dollars 
flowing into their economy and the Iranian people would be far 
better off, correct?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, if we get back into the JCPOA we 
still----
    Senator Johnson. No. No. Answer the question. If they give 
up their nuclear program, their economy will do quite well. 
What does that--what that should tell you is they are putting 
up with all these sanctions.
    They are harming their economy to a great extent because 
they are dedicated to getting a nuclear weapon, and the JCPOA 
or any new agreement that you would enter into will not prevent 
them to get to that point that we cannot do anything about it, 
correct? It may take a few more years, but they are absolutely 
dedicated to becoming a nuclear power, correct?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, President Biden, as I am sure any 
successor and all presidents before him have made clear, they 
would never ever allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon and we 
will do what it takes. The preferable ----
    Senator Johnson. Are you going to provide Israel the 
weaponry and the support for them to take out their program if 
it gets to that point?
    Mr. Malley. I am sorry. I could not hear the question.
    Senator Johnson. Are you going to provide Israel the 
weaponry they would need to take out that weapon as Iran rushes 
to become a nuclear power?
    Mr. Malley. Happy to discuss those details in a classified 
setting. I can say----
    Senator Johnson. Okay. Let me ask you how much----
    Mr. Malley. --the President has taken no option off the 
table.
    Senator Johnson. How much money flowed into Iran from--as a 
result of the original JCPOA? How many billions of dollars?
    Mr. Malley. I would have to go back to that number, but 
they did benefit from sanctions relief.
    Senator Johnson. Give me an estimate. You are negotiating 
this stuff. You ought to know this, correct?
    Mr. Malley. We are negotiating where we are today and we 
know----
    Senator Johnson. How many--how much cash was transferred in 
the first JCPOA?
    Mr. Malley. There has been a lot of misinformation. Cash 
was not transferred to----
    Senator Johnson. Okay. What is the truth then? What is the 
truth? Again, you are negotiating the deal. You ought to know 
what happened in the past. What happened in the past?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, I can tell you what we know will 
happen now. What will happen now is if they can sell their oil 
at current rates we know that they could get about $5 billion a 
month for----
    Senator Johnson. Okay. Have you read Mark Dubowitz's 
testimony? He will be providing that in the second panel from 
the Foundation of Defense of Democracies.
    Mr. Malley. No, I have not seen it. I am sorry.
    Senator Johnson. In his testimony, one of his associates, 
Saeed Ghasseminejad, an expert on the Iranian economy, said 
that your deal would provide a financial package worth up to 
$275 billion in the first year and over the next 5 years Iran 
could receive as many--as much as $800 billion in sanctions 
relief.
    By the way, he spells it out based on what assets they 
have, and this is coming from the Central Bank of Iran, also 
from the International Monetary Fund. I mean, they are showing 
the source that he lays out in quite detail. You really ought 
to look at his testimony. Do you dispute those numbers?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, those numbers are so wildly 
exaggerated compared to what our intelligence community and our 
Administration believe that I--the order of magnitude is just--
is off.
    Senator Johnson. Again, my point being is Iran is 
absolutely dedicated to becoming a nuclear power. You said 
nuclear deal or no nuclear deal, this Iranian Government will 
remain a threat.
    Why in the world would you want to enter in an agreement 
that will not literally prevent them from becoming a nuclear 
power? It might delay it a little bit, but it will not prevent 
it.
    Why would you enter into an agreement that will pump 
hundreds of billions of dollars into the economy and the 
military of the largest state sponsor of terror, who were--
again, people on this committee are talking about the JCPOA did 
not change their behavior other than maybe for the worse. It 
did not result in agreements on these other areas. Again, 
Iran's behaviors have become worse.
    With my final minute here, let me ask you a question. You 
said you will present this for congressional review. It was my 
amendment during the first JCPOA that would have deemed that a 
treaty and require Senate confirmation, and I would argue were 
that the case, had we done that, the JCPOA might have been a 
far better deal, maybe worthy of remaining in, certainly, more 
difficult to get out of.
    Will you commit to not only just congressional review, but 
submitting any deal that you make with Iran that would have a 
great--will have grave consequences on world security as well 
as U.S. security?
    Will you submit that to the U.S. Senate for confirmation as 
a treaty to make sure that this body agrees with you that it is 
a treaty worth entering into?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, as I said, we will submit it for 
review under the--under INARA, which is the requirement and 
that is what we have committed to.
    Senator Johnson. That is it? Not a treaty, not that hurdle 
of getting 67 United States senators agreeing with you that 
this was an agreement worth getting into with Iran because that 
would not have happened with the JCPOA and that was a major 
flaw in that agreement as well.
    The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Malley, thank you for being here today and for your 
efforts with Iran.
    In December of 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said 
of Iran that ``if diplomacy fails, we are prepared to turn to 
other options.''
    I recognize that that statement was made before the war in 
Ukraine and that significant international attention has been 
diverted, but can you speak to what other options are on the 
table?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, thank you.
    Of course, there is only so much I could say in this 
setting, but I want to make this as clear as I could and I 
think it will respond to some of the other questions we have 
had.
    President Biden is unequivocal Iran will not be allowed to 
obtain a nuclear weapon. That has been a long-standing 
bipartisan position by prior administrations and we are 
confident that future presidents will make the same.
    We believe that diplomacy is the best way to achieve this 
goal and, by the way, so do our Israeli allies. So does the 
defense minister of Israel, who just reiterated that when we 
met with him only a week or two ago.
    That said, we will do whatever is necessary to prevent Iran 
from acquiring a nuclear weapon, taking no option off the 
table. Again, those options we could discuss in a classified 
setting.
    Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, I hope we will have the 
opportunity to discuss those issues in a classified setting.
    Can you speak to Hezbollah's fortunes in Lebanon? They did 
not do as well in the elections as were expected. The 
leadership in Iraq continues to hold on and make progress in 
Iraq.
    How are those actions and events in other parts of the 
Middle East affecting the ability to negotiate any kind of an 
agreement with Iran?
    Mr. Malley. Thank you, Senator.
    Again, an important question which goes to the 
comprehensive approach we need to have towards Iran because 
fighting Iran's destabilizing activities does require 
sanctions. It does require an international coalition to press 
Iran in international fora.
    It requires working hand-in-hand with Israel, with our Gulf 
partners, with the Europeans, to counter their ballistic 
missile program, to counter their UAV program, to respond to 
their attacks.
    It also entails diplomacy and strengthening the central 
government in Iraq and weakening Hezbollah and weakening Iran's 
ability to take advantage of the chaos in the region, which is 
why the truce that has been achieved in Yemen is so important.
    So even as we go after Hezbollah, even after we go after 
the transfer of weapons to the Houthis, sustaining and 
consolidating that truce is a very powerful message to send to 
Iran that deescalation, ending conflict, ending the chaos from 
which it profits is in our interest and in the interests of our 
allies in the region.
    Senator Shaheen. Do we see anything happening in Syria that 
may have an impact on Iran? Do we have--are we discussing what 
is happening in Syria with any of our allies?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, my job is to deal with Iran. I am sure 
there are other of my colleagues--I would rather not step into 
something where I may err. So I am sure my colleagues at the 
State Department would be happy to address that.
    Senator Shaheen. Okay. This, I also recognize, is not part 
of your portfolio. I was pleased to see the announcement in 
March regarding the release of two British Iranian hostages to 
the United Kingdom, but as was mentioned earlier by the 
chairman we also still have a number of U.S. and European 
hostages who are being detained.
    Is the plight of those hostages being considered at all as 
part of our negotiations with Iran?
    Mr. Malley. Thank you for raising that.
    I think there is no issue that is keeping us awake more 
than this one, the four unjustly detained citizens. I think 
Chairman Menendez mentioned their names--Siamak, Baquer, Emad, 
and Morad. Some of them, I know, are your constituents and I 
have spoken to a number of members of this committee about 
them.
    We have negotiated--and first of all, I just have to say it 
is the most outrageous thing that Iran would use innocence--
innocent citizens and dual nationals, American citizens, 
others--just recently, a pair of French citizens--as pawns to 
advance other interests.
    It is inexcusable and we need to, again, find an 
international effort, which Secretary Blinken is coordinating, 
to try to make sure that those who do this are held to account 
and that it not be repeated.
    To answer your question, in parallel and separate from the 
negotiations to return to the JCPOA, we have been involved in 
indirect negotiations with Iran to secure the release of our 
four citizens.
    It is not easy. As you could imagine, Iran is making 
requests that are very difficult to meet and sometimes are 
impossible to meet.
    We are continuing and we will not stop until all four of 
them are home and reunited with their loved ones.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Malley, to 
the committee.
    I read your opening statement. Iran was complying with its 
commitments under the JCPOA. Under the JCPOA, and I am quoting 
from your testimony, ``Iran operated a tightly constrained and 
carefully monitored--carefully monitored--nuclear program.''
    Iran was neither complying with the compliance terms of the 
JCPOA nor were they operating a carefully monitored nuclear 
program. There were just side deals in that program that 
members of Congress were not made aware of that wrote off, that 
excluded certain military sites from inspection whatsoever.
    Moreover, the very terms of the deal, including those 
secret side agreements, were not being followed by Iran, which 
is why this is such an incredibly grave situation.
    So just to reframe this, we are not talking about a deal 
that Iran was completely complying with, and a nuclear deal 
that is not being complied with is not really a deal that we 
can live with.
    We need a stronger--a longer and stronger deal, as the 
Secretary of State emphasized before this committee. That was 
the objective of the Administration.
    The Wall Street Journal today wrote--released a piece 
about--title, ``Iran Used Secret U.N. Records to Evade Nuclear 
Probe.'' So we are learning more about the extent of 
noncompliance by the leaders in Iran.
    The Journal says that Iran has been stonewalling IAEA 
investigations. Iran wants the IAEA--the nuclear inspector--
their continuing investigations in the past nuclear weapons 
work closed before a deal is restored.
    Yet, the agency has blessedly pushed back, indicating that 
they cannot close these inspections because they do not have 
enough clarity on Iran's past nuclear work. All this is 
incredibly troubling.
    As Director General Rafael Grossi told the European 
Parliament just earlier this month, he said Iran, ``has not 
been forthcoming in the kind of information we need from 
them.''
    So, Mr. Malley, were you aware of these efforts by Iran to 
hide its prior nuclear work from the IAEA?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, did Iran lie? Of course. Did Iran have 
a covert nuclear program? Absolutely. That is the reason why 
prior administrations imposed such crushing sanctions on Iran.
    Senator Young. Was Iran in compliance, as you say in your 
testimony?
    Mr. Malley. Yes, Iran was in compliance with the JCPOA, and 
please do not take my word for it. You could ask the IAEA, 
which certified on numerous occasions very--until the Trump 
administration----
    Senator Young. Let me interject respectfully, sir. Does the 
JCPOA require Iran to allow IAEA inspectors in to look at 
certain nuclear sites and did Iran comply with those express 
terms of the JCPOA?
    Mr. Malley. Yes and yes. Again, do not take my word for it. 
Even the former Administration had to certify that Iran was in 
compliance and it did so repeatedly until it decided to leave 
the deal.
    Senator Young. Evidently, that was not enough then. So the 
Administration's position is there were certain terms of the 
agreement that were not robust enough and that is why the goal 
was longer and stronger.
    Yet, we still--we continue to have noncompliance by the 
Iranians and they are not allowing more information to be 
divined about their previous nuclear weapons work.
    Are we trying to reenter the old deal or are we pursuing a 
longer and stronger deal? What is the current state of things?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, the current state is we are trying to, 
if we can, reenter the deal and then build on that to get a 
longer, stronger deal.
    The problem we face is that today, as a result of the 
withdrawal from the deal, we have weaker and shorter, so short, 
in fact, that all of the steps that people feared that Iran 
might take at the expiration of some of the sunsets 10 years, 
15, 20 years from now, Iran is doing them today and so weak, in 
fact, that we do not have any binding constraints on Iran.
    Again, listen to some of what we have to--listen to what 
have a preponderance of Israeli former security officials are 
saying, including two, just coincidentally, today, and one of 
them, the former IDF head of intelligence until 6 months ago, 
General Tamir Hayman, said today the situation that would have 
happened in 2030 under the nuclear deal would not have been as 
bad as the current situation because Iran is unconstrained, and 
that is what we need to address.
    Senator Young. I am praying that we are successful in 
persuading the Iranians to adopt a longer and stronger approach 
in which they are actually compliant with the terms of that and 
allow very robust inspection safeguards.
    I do not think we have those inspection mechanisms in place 
with the JCPOA, which is why we need to still focus on longer 
and stronger. I think we are going to go in circles with 
respect to that.
    I see my time has expired. So I will--I will thank you, 
again, for being here, sir.
    The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I always like to begin where we agree, and we agree--
Republicans and Democrats on this committee--that Iran should 
not have a nuclear weapon and we should have a policy that 
makes that prospect the least likely.
    So you have got three ways to do that. You have economic 
pressure, you have a military option, and then you have 
diplomacy. All of them are imperfect. We are just in the 
business of trying to choose of those imperfect options which 
is the least imperfect.
    Let us take the first two to understand how they have 
worked or how they would work. First is economic pressure. So 
the Trump administration tried this. They pulled out of the 
deal.
    They, as you have articulated, applied hundreds of new 
unilateral sanctions, and I just want to ask you a series of 
simple questions to understand what the reality was after those 
sanctions were applied and, hopefully, these are one-word 
answers.
    After President Trump withdrew from the Iran deal and 
imposed maximum sanctions, did the pace of Iranian attacks on 
U.S. personnel in Iraq get better or worse?
    Mr. Malley. Much worse.
    Senator Murphy. Did Iran's support for regional proxies 
like the Houthis--did it get better or worse?
    Mr. Malley. It continued. In some cases, it got worse.
    Senator Murphy. Did the frequency of those proxies' attacks 
on our Gulf allies get better or worse?
    Mr. Malley. Worse.
    Senator Murphy. Did the pace of Iranians' nuclear research 
program get better or worse, from our perspective?
    Mr. Malley. Much worse.
    Senator Murphy. We tried the approach of just continuing 
sanctions and ratcheting them up, and by every measure Iran's 
behavior relative to U.S. national security interests got 
worse.
    Okay. Let us talk a little bit more about the third option, 
the other alternative to diplomacy, and that is military 
action.
    I have heard what you have said here today, Mr. Malley. You 
have said that the President leaves all options on the table. 
What I understand is that there are severe limitations to a 
military option, in part because it is difficult to bomb 
knowledge out of existence, and the risk to spillover into a 
regional war is significant.
    So I understand there are things you can say in an 
unclassified setting versus a classified setting. I want to 
make sure you do not leave the impression with the committee 
that there is a clean military option on the table to remove 
Iran from a nuclear weapons future.
    Can you just talk about your assessment of a military 
option if that is all that is left?
    Mr. Malley. Thank you, Senator, for allowing me to clarify 
that point.
    I did say all options are on the table. I also said, and 
this is President Biden's firm belief and I think it is a 
belief shared by everyone who has looked into this, that by far 
the best option is a diplomatic one.
    A military option cannot resolve this issue. It could set 
it back, and we are happy to talk about it more in a classified 
setting, but there is no military response and we have heard 
this repeatedly, including from Minister Gantz, Israel's 
defense minister.
    So absolutely correct. It is a--I do not even want to get 
into the other aspects of our experience with war in the Middle 
East. So we know what it costs. We know what it has meant to us 
and to our men and women in uniform, but let us leave it at 
this. The only real solution here is a diplomatic one.
    Senator Murphy. There are certain things we can talk about 
here and certain things we cannot, but there are significant 
limitations to the military option and there is the significant 
risk to enormous spillover that could get the United States 
drawn into a another conflict in the Middle East that would 
last a generation.
    Finally, Mr. Malley, if there is no diplomatic agreement 
and Iran remains weeks away from having enough fissile material 
for a nuclear weapon, what happens with respect to the 
decisions that our allies make in the region?
    At some point, the Gulf, Turkey, starts to recognize that 
Iran is so close to a nuclear weapon that they have to start 
making their own plans as well. The true nightmare here is a 
nuclear-armed Middle East and that becomes a much more 
realistic proposition if diplomacy does not work. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Malley. Correct.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Paul.
    Senator Paul. I think a lot of the debate begins from a 
fundamental misconception of what sanctions can do and cannot 
do.
    There seems to be an acknowledgment now that the maximum 
pressure campaign sanctions did not change Iran's behavior. I 
would go probably one step further and say that it is difficult 
to delineate what of Iran's behaviors have changed with any 
sanctions over a long period of time.
    You can argue that they came to the table when there were 
universal sanctions with Europe and others, that that brought 
them to the table, but really, also what brought them to the 
table was the carrot. The sanctions are a stick, but there was 
a carrot, and the carrot is the negotiation of releasing the 
sanctions.
    Some still have this misconception that we could forbid 
them through sanctions from selling their oil to China or 
Russia. You could have a military embargo. You could have ships 
all up and down their coast and they would still sell their oil 
and gas across pipelines and across land to both Russia and 
China.
    Even a military embargo would not prevent them from this 
and sanctions are not going to prevent them from this. We need 
to quit looking at sanctions as the way to change behavior 
because sanctions, frankly, do not change behavior.
    Sanctions are useful as a threat. If you are going to 
threaten somebody and say, if you do this we will do this, they 
might be a threat to deter behavior, or if they are already 
doing something you do not want, you would ask them to quit 
doing that in exchange for removing the sanctions, but that 
means negotiations.
    There are some members of the Senate who say they 
absolutely know in their mind that Iran is going to get a 
nuclear weapon so they are, essentially, saying there are no 
negotiations and that sanctions are just for punishment.
    I think sanctions as punishment do have some effect. They 
punish, but they do not change the behavior. The punishment has 
been extraordinary--the maximum pressure sanctions--and no 
behavior has changed.
    I guess my question to you is do you think sanctions do 
change behavior? Do you see evidence that they have changed 
Iran's behavior--not maximum pressure, but sanctions in 
general?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, thank you for that important question. 
I think we have seen the effective use of sanctions that led to 
the nuclear deal. There were sanctions--nuclear-related 
sanctions--that were imposed in order to change Iran's nuclear 
behavior. We lifted those sanctions in exchange for the 
constraints and the inspection regime that Iran agreed to.
    Senator Paul. The change in behavior was when we came to an 
agreement and to release some of the sanctions and to have----
    Mr. Malley. Absolutely.
    Senator Paul. --some relief in their trade account.
    Mr. Malley. Absolutely. The problem that we have seen is 
that the sanctions during the maximum pressure campaign--the 
sanctions were unmoored from any realistic diplomatic objective 
and, therefore, they failed.
    Senator Paul. I guess my specific question is it seems to 
be the main sticking block is the IRGC being designated as a 
foreign terrorist organization. Is that--would you characterize 
that as the main sticking point right now?
    Mr. Malley. Well, I think that sticking point has, in some 
ways, been resolved in the sense that we have made clear to 
Iran that if they wanted any concession on something that was 
unrelated to the JCPOA, like the FTO designation, we needed to 
something reciprocal from them that would address our concerns 
so that they would----
    Senator Paul. Okay. It is--you would say it is one of the 
main if not the main sticking point?
    Mr. Malley. Well, I think as--I think Iran has made the 
decision that it is not prepared to take the reciprocal steps. 
They have to decide now are they prepared to reach a deal 
without extraneous demands.
    Senator Paul. I guess that gets to my next question. You 
have made--there have been offers on our side to say, if you do 
this we might be able to do this. Are those publicly--are we 
publicly aware of what we have asked Iran to do that would be 
sufficient for removing the label?
    Mr. Malley. No, we have not negotiated in public. We can 
have this discussion in a classified setting. Again, Iran has 
rejected any reasonable proposal at this point, as you have 
heard.
    Senator Paul. I think it is important that if we do want 
negotiations and the only way we are going to get any 
behavioral change is through negotiations by actually lessening 
sanctions is the only way you get it, unless you are adamant 
that they will not change behavior, if you want them to change 
behavior we have to lessen.
    So even things such as labeling them as a foreign terrorist 
organization have to be negotiated. If we refuse to negotiate 
they will, I think, ultimately, get a nuclear weapon. If we 
want that to happen I think we have to be open to it.
    As far as advice on that front, I think it should be very 
specific, something they can actually demonstrate and do, 
whether that means something to do with funding of Hezbollah or 
activities of Hezbollah or activities of their proxies in other 
nations.
    I do not know if that has to necessarily be a secret. I 
think that could be a public debate over this and I think there 
is so much fear of removing the label of what--you will have 
political fallout from that from both sides, frankly, that I do 
not know that--I think that is probably more difficult to 
overcome is the political outbreak here at home than anything 
else.
    I think people should realize that even if we got rid of 
the foreign terrorist organization label, the IRGC has been 
under--as someone mentioned previously, they have been under 
sanctions at least since 2007 for funding Hezbollah in Lebanon. 
So there still would be sanctions.
    We have to at least think this through that the only way 
you get anywhere is you have to give something they want and 
they give something we want. That is what negotiations or 
diplomacy is. Sanctions, otherwise, are of absolutely no value 
and so, really, it gets back to the general question.
    Most of it is mischaracterizing what sanctions can do. 
Sanctions can punish and they are punishing, but they are not 
necessarily bringing them to the table. Getting rid of the 
sanctions might or using sanctions as a threat.
    I think the way that we have approached it as if, oh, we 
are going to stop them from selling oil through more severe 
sanctions, I think that misses the boat of actually what 
sanctions could be used for in a negotiation.
    From at least one senator, I would say, that there has to 
be some behavioral change that they could do and it cannot be 
an ask that is impossible. There has to be some ask. I see no 
reason why that ask cannot be a public ask. That is my advice.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Malley. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 
Malley.
    I want to encourage you to just keep the dialogue going and 
the Administration come up with the very best deal that you 
can. There are some on this committee who are, basically, 
telling you stop dialogue right now.
    Do not accept that advice. Do your best, and then if you 
find a product that you think is better than what is going on 
right now, bring it to Congress and let Congress own it. Let 
Congress own whether the U.S. is a diplomatic nation or whether 
we reject diplomacy. Let us own it. You do your job and let us 
own whether the U.S. is pro-diplomacy or not.
    The problem with the U.S. and Iran is a complete lack of 
trust on both sides. Iran is a danger to the United States and 
everything that has been said by folks prior to me about 
Iranian dangerous activity is real.
    In the Iranian perspective, the U.S. is dangerous and 
untrustworthy. The U.S. helped depose an Iranian prime minister 
in 1954. The U.S. helped install the Shah of Iran, who ruled in 
a dictatorial fashion over Iranians for 25 years.
    When the Shah was overthrown, the U.S., against the State 
Department's advice, gave him sanctuary in the United States. 
That then led to the takeover of the U.S. embassy. Because of 
that horrible treatment of Americans with the embassy takeover, 
the U.S. decided to support Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war, giving 
military assets to Iraq that were used against the Iranian 
people.
    The U.S. gave intel to the Iraqis that allowed them to use 
chemical weapons against the Iranian people. In the middle of 
the Iraq-Iran war, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian 
airliner, killing 290 civilians when that commercial airliner 
was in Iranian airspace.
    So all of the atrocities that Iran is committing in the 
region and the danger that is posed to the United States, those 
are all very, very real. Often here we would like to just talk 
about half the story and assume that we are just completely 
with clean hands in this situation and why would Iran have any 
mistrust of the United States.
    The deal that you guys got--the JCPOA in 2015--was 
dramatically better than the status quo ante. Dramatically 
better. I remember going to Israel in the months before the 
deal was struck and having off the record discussions with the 
leader of the Mossad and he said, you should do this--Tamir 
Pardo. You should do this. It is dramatically better than the 
status quo ante, even if it is not perfect.
    It was better because it constrained their nuclear program. 
It was better because it got the U.S. to not only be in 
partnership with traditional allies, but we were even in a 
negotiation and a partnership with China and Russia to try to 
constrain the nuclear program, and it opened up an opportunity 
after 65 years of hostility between the U.S. and Iran to at 
least be at the table and to see if we could work something out 
and do the only thing that ever brings trust back is win it 
back little and by little and by little. Only 2 years into the 
deal, the U.S. blew it up when the IAEA said Iran was complying 
and we shifted the focus away from Iranian activity to U.S. 
good faith.
    We destroyed the trust building opportunity that, if it had 
gone forward, it would have taken a long time to build the 
trust back. Now that the U.S. has walked out of the deal that 
Iran was complying with, why would they do a deal?
    As soon as the U.S. walked out of that deal, essentially, 
all the real negotiations with North Korea over a deal stopped 
because why would North Korea do a nuclear deal with the United 
States if the U.S. blew up a deal that was working with Iran?
    So, yes, there is a siren song up here that says stop 
talking, oh, and we will--and if Iran gets nuclear weapons, we 
will let Israel worry about it. I would urge you do not listen 
to that siren. Do not listen to that siren. Keep talking.
    If there is a deal that you think is better than what is 
happening right now, and I think you have a pretty clear-eyed 
assessment of the plusses and minuses, I urge the 
Administration to enter into it. Submit it to Congress under 
INARA. Let Congress own the decision of whether or not the U.S. 
wants to be a pro-diplomacy nation or not.
    I yield back.
    Senator Coons [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    Are there any Republicans present and waiting to be 
recognized to question?
    [No response.]
    Senator Coons. In the absence of that, I will proceed to 
question Mr. Malley. Thank you for appearing before the 
committee today.
    While the conflict in Ukraine has appropriately held a lot 
of our attention in recent weeks, we have to also remain 
focused on the ways in which Iran's nuclear program, its 
aggression in the region, its undermining of global norms, and 
its support for proxies continues to challenge and destabilize 
the region and our interests.
    I remain concerned about the prospects of returning to the 
JCPOA, given Iran's nuclear program advancement and their 
defiance of international norms. Eager to hear from you about 
what you think might be the strategy in the region and to 
confront Iran's other behaviors as well.
    Virtually every conversation I had this past weekend in 
Europe was about Russia--Russia's aggression in Ukraine, 
Russia's continued violation of global norms through the 
atrocities being committed by its troops.
    Russia played a central role in the JCPOA as the steward of 
enriched material that was exported from Iran to Russia--their 
low-enriched uranium stockpile.
    What concerns might you have about Russia's involvement in 
negotiating and implementing a return to the JCPOA?
    What safeguards are there in place to ensure that our 
sanctions against Russia, and strong and united sanctions by 
the West against Russia for their aggression in Ukraine, do not 
interfere with the implementation of a renewed JCPOA? How does 
that play out?
    Mr. Malley. Thank you, Senator.
    First, I want to make a point in response to what Senator 
Kaine said. We are seeking a return to the JCPOA, but I want to 
make it clear, as I sit today, the odds of a successful 
negotiation are lower than the odds of failure and that is 
because of the excessive Iranian demands and which--to which we 
will not succumb.
    To your question, Senator, I think there has been a lot 
written about Russia's role which has been pure fantasy. Russia 
has not played a central role in these negotiations.
    I think our European allies would take offense at hearing 
that. They have been in the driver's seat. They are the ones 
who have been negotiating. They are the ones who care about 
Iran's nuclear program, as we do.
    So Russia has played a role because it is part of the P5 of 
the permanent members of the Security Council, and as you 
mentioned, back in 2016 they played a role in taking in the 
excess enriched uranium from Iran.
    We will have to see what happens this time around, but that 
was the role they played. They supported the deal then, and we 
would expect all of--if we reach a deal that all of the P5+1 
would respect and implement.
    Senator Coons. Are any provisions being explored for an 
alternative partner in the negotiations serving as the steward 
for enriched material from Iran?
    Mr. Malley. Yes.
    Senator Coons. If I could just move on to--what else is the 
Administration planning to do to undermine Iran's destabilizing 
efforts in the region, its brutal human rights record, its 
support for proxies?
    Talk through, if you could, with us some of the details 
about what the Administration is doing to constrain or push 
back on those activities at the same time you are negotiating 
with our European partners on the nuclear program.
    Mr. Malley. Thank you. So as we mentioned earlier, we are 
still enforcing our sanctions and will continue to enforce 
sanctions that are targeting Iran's destabilizing behavior.
    More than that, we are working with Israel, with our Gulf 
partners, and with the Europeans to harden our defenses, to 
conduct dynamic force deployments in the region including long-
range bomber over flights, maritime security efforts to 
interdict, to take away Iran's ability to ship its UAVs, its 
ballistic missiles, its equipment, to militia and nonstate 
actors, disrupting financial flows, as we did today with the 
sanction we announced and, if necessary, conduct defensive 
strikes to deter Iran and its partners and proxies from 
attacking us, and we are doing that in consultation, I think, 
cooperation that has never been better with Israel on all 
aspects of our policy--and, again, things that we could talk 
about in a classified setting--so that regardless of the 
disagreement we may have about the JCPOA, that pales in 
comparison to our joint efforts to push back against Iran's 
destabilizing activities, whether it is support for proxies, 
whether it is ballistic missile program, or UAVs.
    Senator Coons. So the four Iranian Americans who are either 
detained or barred from leaving Iran--Siamak Namazi, Baquer 
Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, and Emad Sharghi--is there any prospect 
in these negotiations of a prisoner exchange and what would the 
Administration's approach be to securing their return if there 
is no nuclear deal?
    Mr. Malley. Thank you. As I said earlier, this issue is 
more important than anything else, in many respects, because of 
concerns, as you say, four unjustly detained innocent 
Americans, and I know the personal interest that you have taken 
in it and I know the families are very grateful for that.
    We have negotiated in parallel, separate from the nuclear 
deal, a possible deal with Iran that would result in the 
release of the four--of our four unjustly detained citizens. It 
is an outrageous form of behavior, and I wish we did not have 
to do anything. They should just release them tomorrow, but we 
know who we are dealing with and so we are negotiating. We hope 
to be successful. We hope that they could be soon reunited with 
their loved ones, but we are not there yet.
    Senator Coons. There is a number of regimes that do this 
around the world and I think it is important that we continue 
to work diligently, tirelessly, to secure their return and to 
not reward the Iranian regime in any way for the ways in which 
they are oppressing their own people and breaking with all 
sorts of norms.
    Thank you for your testimony. My understanding is there is 
no other Republican seeking recognition so I will move to 
Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    President Trump blew up the Iran nuclear deal and then left 
a minefield to make it difficult for any successor to cleanly 
reenter, but President Biden knows that the alternative to 
diplomacy is far worse.
    We will see more enrichment, more proxy attacks, and a risk 
to a direct war. The Iran nuclear deal is not a panacea nor was 
it ever intended to be. It is, however, a verifiable agreement 
that cuts off each of Iran's three pathways to a nuclear bomb.
    Trump's policies of maximum pressure actually led to 
maximum enrichment and maximum tension that nearly led the 
United States and Iran to war in January of 2020.
    If we hope to avoid Iran from becoming another North 
Korea--a point of no return--we have to get back into the deal 
without delay.
    So I would just like to ask you a few questions, Special 
Representative Malley, about whether or not we are better with 
a deal on no deal.
    So if we pick a deal with Iran, is it not true that Iran 
would be required to ship out of Iran an estimated 40 kilograms 
of uranium enriched to 60 percent--the enrichment level of 
greatest concern--as well as its entire stock of enriched 
uranium enriched above 3.67 percent?
    Mr. Malley. That is correct. All of it will have to be 
shipped out.
    Senator Markey. That means that Iran's current breakout 
time, the time it takes to get enough fissile material to get a 
bomb, will go from days to around 6 months to actually have the 
nuclear weapons material needed for a bomb. Is that correct?
    Mr. Malley. That is broadly accurate. We assess now that we 
are--it is a matter of very few weeks and we would get to many 
more months if we were back in the deal.
    Senator Markey. If we pick, again, no deal, is it true Iran 
could decide to enrich up to a weapons-grade level of 90 
percent in between inspections by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency?
    Mr. Malley. Correct.
    Senator Markey. That is correct. How will no deal or plan 
B--in other words, a military attack against Iran--extend 
Iran's breakout time?
    Mr. Malley. That is a difficult question to answer in this 
setting. What I said and I said in response to Senator Murphy's 
question is we know that a military strike is not an answer to 
Iran's nuclear program.
    Senator Markey. So no deal policies have not only failed to 
tighten the lid on Iran's nuclear program, it lifted them 
entirely, but let me follow on. Did President Trump's maximum 
pressure campaign effectively curb other aspects of Iran's 
malign and destabilizing activities in the region?
    Mr. Malley. Not in the least.
    Senator Markey. Not in the least. Is it true that in 2019 
and 2020, attacks by Iran-backed groups increased exponentially 
in the region and following the assassination of Iranian 
General Soleimani in January of 2020 we almost went to war with 
Iran?
    Mr. Malley. Correct.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Plan B, that is, a military 
attack or no deal at all with Iran, could also mean that there 
are going to be military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. 
Have past strikes against Iran or sabotage permanently derailed 
the progress of Iran's nuclear program?
    Mr. Malley. All I could say is that Iran's nuclear program 
continues apace.
    Senator Markey. So we know that military action will fail 
to stop an Iranian nuclear weapon. It may very well spur it to 
cross the threshold.
    If we were to use force, is it fair to expect that Iran may 
take actions such as attacks on our troops, our partners in the 
region, attacks on Saudi Arabia's energy facilities, and 
disruptions of sea traffic in the Strait of Hormuz?
    Mr. Malley. I do not want to speculate too much. I think 
those--that is a fair assessment, yes.
    Senator Markey. For me, it is a cut and dried case of why a 
deal, while imperfect, is far superior to no deal. The IAEA 
inspections and monitoring of Iran's facilities will be lost 
completely without a deal.
    We will be left in the dark about Iran's breakout time. 
That fog will lead to calls for military action by the United 
States or its allies against Iran, which, if taken, would at 
best temporarily derail Iran's nuclear program and more likely 
put American troops into harm's way in the Middle East, perhaps 
sparking an all-out Middle Eastern war. We can ill afford to 
stumble into yet another conflict in the Middle East.
    Thank you so much, Mr. Malley, for all of the superior work 
which you are doing with the Biden administration.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Coons. Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
    From the first days in office, the Biden administration, 
really, has failed--overwhelmingly failed--to prioritize energy 
security. The State Department has been working to cut deals 
with brutal dictators in order to access more energy resources. 
We saw it again last week. That is when the Administration 
announced the decision to start easing oil sanctions on 
Venezuela.
    You have been negotiating a deal to eliminate sanctions on 
Iran's energy sector. Our adversaries would love--would love to 
see us more dependent upon them to meet our energy needs.
    Our experience of buying Russian energy taught us or should 
have taught us that buying energy from tyrants is a dangerous 
proposition. It makes our nation and our allies less safe.
    Does the Iranian regime use energy revenue to fund its 
global terror campaign?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism 
and it uses its revenues to those ends.
    Senator Barrasso. How would you compare the environmental 
standards and the labor standards for energy production in Iran 
compared to those in the United States?
    Mr. Malley. Not looked at it in detail, but I would assume 
that our standards are higher. I admit that I have not looked 
at those in detail.
    Senator Barrasso. I would point out last week in the Energy 
Committee discussing this same issue, it tends to be that Iran 
and Venezuela both have much worse standards than the United 
States, the energy that we produce here much cleaner than the 
standards in either of those locations.
    Iran has the world's fourth largest reserves of crude oil. 
I am concerned about recent news on Iran's action in the energy 
sector. News reports indicate that Iran is working to revamp 
Venezuela's largest oil refinery.
    We know that Oman and Iran have signed a variety of deals 
in the oil and gas sector. Iran is increasing its oil exports. 
With the current oil prices, increased revenues means that Iran 
has more money to pursue its terrorist activities.
    Which countries do you know are currently purchasing energy 
resources from Iran?
    Mr. Malley. China is the main importer of--illicit importer 
of Iranian oil.
    Senator Barrasso. Are the reported Chinese imports of 
Iranian oil sanctionable under U.S. law?
    Mr. Malley. They are, and as of this morning we took action 
that affected a Chinese--that touched on China's efforts to 
procure Iranian oil.
    Senator Barrasso. I am not sure what exactly happened this 
morning, but I was just questioning because, if so, why has the 
Biden administration failed to enforce sanctions on entities 
involved in the transaction with Iran?
    Mr. Malley. We are imposing all our sanctions and we will 
continue to do so to make sure that we could bring down Iran's 
illicit export of oil as low as possible.
    Senator Barrasso. I want to talk about sanctioning of 
Iran's leaders. For over four decades, the Iranian Supreme 
Leader Khamenei has been personally involved in Iran's 
terrorist activities and human rights abuses.
    He has systematically oppressed his own people, committed 
extreme violence across the globe. A U.S. federal court held 
him personally responsible for the death of 19 U.S. troops in 
the bombing in Saudi Arabia.
    Federal courts also held him personally responsible for the 
deaths of U.S. civilians in three terrorist bombings in Israel. 
President Trump imposed sanctions on the Supreme Leader.
    Media reports indicate that President Biden plans to remove 
U.S. sanctions on him. Do you know if President Biden made a 
final decision on lifting sanctions on the Iranian Supreme 
Leader?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, no final decision has been made. There 
is no deal. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed and, 
as I said earlier, the prospects for a deal are, at best, 
tenuous at this point.
    Senator Barrasso. I want to talk about ballistic missiles. 
The Obama administration failed to address and adequately 
respond to Iran's ballistic missile program in the Iranian 
nuclear agreement.
    On July 7 of 2015, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Martin Dempsey, declared, ``Under no 
circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to 
ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.''
    Seven days later, the Obama administration did the complete 
opposite of what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 
stated in terms of what our military advisors recommended.
    Under the Iran agreement, the Obama administration agreed 
to lift the arms embargo after 5 years, lift restrictions on 
ballistic missile technologies after 8 years.
    Fast forward to October of 2020. The international arms 
embargo on Iran, the world's largest state sponsor of 
terrorism, was officially lifted. The restrictions on ballistic 
missile technologies are expected to be lifted next year.
    What is this Administration's strategy and plan to address 
Iran's production of ballistic missiles now?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, we have tools at our disposal to go 
after Iran's ballistic missile program. Regrettably, the U.N. 
sanctions have not had much, if any, effect on Iran, and we 
know that from experience Iran has flouted them.
    It is our interdiction efforts, it is our efforts to go 
after the financing of their procurement and their exports of 
ballistic missiles that can make a difference if we can work 
hand in hand with our allies and partners.
    Our efforts--our diplomatic efforts have restitched our 
relationship with Europe and we believe we are in a much 
stronger position now working with them to go after the very 
legitimate concerns that you raised.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, Mr. 
Malley, for being here and for your work.
    I just want to follow up on ballistic missile capability. 
Can you describe how much worse things would be with Iran and 
its current and future ballistic missile capability and if they 
reach the ability to arm those missiles with a nuclear tip?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, that goes to the heart of the question 
that we are discussing today, which is all of these problems--
and the Biden administration takes a back seat to no one at the 
level of its concern about Iran's ballistic missile program, 
support for terrorism, proxy activities--but all of them would 
be far worse if Iran were armed with a nuclear weapon, which is 
why, even as we work on the other issues, we consider this one 
an urgent priority to see whether we can restore the 
limitations and put Iran's nuclear program back in a box 
because, as your question suggests, we would be facing a much 
more dangerous reality today if Iran was nuclear armed.
    Senator Schatz. Let us talk a little bit about the reality 
since the Trump withdrawal from the JCPOA. Iran has increased 
its research, development, and enrichment activities, 
decreasing the time it needs to produce enough weapons-grade 
HEU for a nuclear weapon, and now it possesses 40 kilograms of 
uranium enriched to 60 percent.
    That is very close to the threshold where it could break 
out in between IAEA inspections, and this situation will worsen 
if Iran installs advanced centrifuges. What caused the 
significant increase in Iranian nuclear activities, including 
uranium enrichment in 2019?
    Mr. Malley. Senator, as we were discussing earlier, Iran 
was living up to its commitments under the JCPOA until 2019, a 
year after President Trump withdrew from the deal, at which 
point it announced that it would gradually violate the 
constraints and the requirements that it was under, and that is 
what has happened since 2019 and that is the situation that 
President Biden inherited.
    Senator Schatz. This whole debate is sort of actually 
difficult to metabolize because I get the criticisms of the 
original JCPOA. Valid or invalid, they have a point of view.
    What I do not get is this idea that someone gives you 
three-quarters of a cheeseburger and you say, I am so hungry I 
want a full cheeseburger. I would rather have nothing.
    I mean, that is, literally, the argument that we are 
having, which is not that--we are not at the point where we can 
criticize former Secretary of State John Kerry for--he should 
have negotiated for more. That is angels dancing on the head of 
a pin.
    We are in a reality now where things are measurably worse, 
objectively worse, because of the withdrawal. I would like you 
to comment on that.
    Mr. Malley. Senator, I could not say it any better. We are 
not talking about hypotheticals here. We are not speculating. 
This is not a thought experiment, which it may well have been 
in 2016. People could have argued one way or the other.
    Now we know. We know what life was like under the deal. We 
know what it is like today. In both cases, we have to deal with 
a dangerous Iran and one that we are going to have to push back 
against.
    In one case, we had a nuclear program that was in a box, 
that, as I have said repeatedly, senior Israeli security 
officials today, from former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, former 
Defense Minister Bogie Ya'alon, all say in unison the decision 
to withdraw from the deal was one of the most damaging to 
Israel's security and more and more are saying openly getting 
back into the deal would be far better for our security and 
would create the--put us in a much better position to confront 
those other activities. This is not a thought experiment. We 
have lived both realities and I think the verdict could not be 
any clearer.
    Senator Schatz. Yes. I mean, I remember the argument that 
the sunset should have been longer into the future. Fair 
enough, but the answer to a sunset should have been longer into 
the future is not let us sunset it now. It just does not make 
any sense to me.
    A final question about IAEA inspections. How quickly--how 
technically feasible is Iran's return to compliance, assuming 
we make a deal? Tell me about the logistics of getting the IAEA 
in there for verifiable inspections.
    Mr. Malley. Senator, as part of these negotiations, if we 
were to reach a deal and, again, it is a huge question mark--I 
am not particularly optimistic, to put it mildly--they would 
have to provide all of the access to the IAEA and as a first 
step allow the IAEA to reconstitute the baseline to know what 
has happened during the years where it has become increasingly 
blind. We focus a lot on the enrichment side, but what Iran has 
done since President Trump withdrew from the deal is it has 
curbed the IAEA's access.
    So the visibility, which was one of the main achievements 
of the deal, and what Director--General Grossi, which one of 
the senators who--one of the senators referred to earlier, what 
he would say is we are much better off with the visibility.
    We are infinitely better off, infinitely better off, with 
the visibility that the IAEA--that the monitoring and 
verification regime the JCPOA provided. Now we see less. We 
know less. We are in a much more dangerous position.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Malley, several of my colleagues who view the JCPOA as 
a good thing have tried to put the best foot forward for you. I 
hope you will entertain me with the same yes or no answers you 
did for several of them.
    When we entered into the JCPOA, 7 years later, did we make 
any advances on Iran's nuclear--I mean, missile program? Yes or 
no.
    Mr. Malley. Compared to--I am sorry. Compared to 2016?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Malley. As we said, we are in a worse position today. 
It accelerated since 2019.
    The Chairman. Well, forget about today because I know what 
you are hinting at.
    Mr. Malley. Okay.
    The Chairman. Not hinting. You made it very clear.
    Mr. Malley. Yes.
    The Chairman. We are worse off today because President 
Trump walked away. I get it. Even in the time before President 
Trump, did we--when he was in the deal--did Iran do anything to 
mitigate its missile program? Yes or no.
    Mr. Malley. It did not.
    The Chairman. Did Iran not, in fact, take hostages during 
the period of time in which we were in the JCPOA?
    Mr. Malley. It did.
    The Chairman. Did Iran actually not, ultimately, 
proliferate its proxies during the same period of time that we 
were in the JCPOA?
    Mr. Malley. It continued to support its proxies, yes.
    The Chairman. Did it not continue to destabilize the region 
during the JCPOA?
    Mr. Malley. Yes.
    The Chairman. Did it not have drone strikes against our 
allies and our own bases during the JCPOA?
    Mr. Malley. I would have to recall. I do not think during 
the time that we were in the deal. I think that started after 
President Trump.
    The Chairman. I would urge you to go back and look at the 
record. They may have increased, but we had drone strikes. So 
they--and none of those questions and the answers you gave me 
are hypotheticals, correct? They were all realities.
    Mr. Malley. Absolutely.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you, how is it that Iran is in 
compliance with its obligations to the IAEA safeguards 
agreement, given that Iran has not provided answers to the 
IAEA?
    Mr. Malley. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I have said clearly 
Iran was in compliance with its JCPOA commitments. It is not 
anymore. It has not been in compliance with its safeguards 
obligations, which are separate from the JCPOA.
    The Chairman. Okay. So it was never in compliance with its 
safeguard obligations because----
    Mr. Malley. Correct.
    The Chairman. --it never came fully forward, and those are 
not just a matter of hypothetical concerns. The IAEA found 
trace materials at various sites of uranium and what could have 
been a production program in undeclared sites and has not been 
able to get those answers satisfied. Is that a fair statement?
    Mr. Malley. We know that Iran has been concealing and 
lying, which is why we need to make sure that it is no closer 
to nuclear armed----
    The Chairman. Basically, Iran lies by not being willing to 
come--they say they have an agreement, they are going to abide 
by it, but it does not abide it with the IAEA.
    Here is the problem. By the way, you cited the IDF 
intelligence head, who said that 2030, which is when the 
sunsets end, would have been as bad as it is today, that today 
is a bad moment as it would have been in 2030. That is what you 
made a reference to, right?
    Mr. Malley. Would not have been as bad as the current 
situation was what he said.
    The Chairman. Right. Would have been as bad as the current 
situation today. So that means 2030 would have been a bad 
situation in the IDF's intelligence estimate, and guess what? 
As we speak and you are trying to negotiate, that is only 8 
years away.
    If we take the 7-year history of Iran under the JCPOA, in 
which it never showed any willingness to deal with its missile 
proliferation, in which it never, ultimately, showed any 
willingness to mitigate its destabilization of the region, in 
which it never showed any willingness to pull back on its 
proxies, in which it arrests--unlawfully detained as hostages 
American citizens, then this expectation--this is where the 
disconnect is, the expectation that bringing us back to a deal 
that is not the same deal, by the way, because everything I 
have heard publicly is that, at best, we would get 6 months, 
not a year--6 months is much different than a year--and my 
understanding is none of the sunsets would be changed.
    If that is the case, then all the aspirations of what 
supposedly comes on afterwards, and I would dispute with you 
the characterization that the Administration through the 
Secretary of State made that that was a foundational--that 
stronger and longer would come after an agreement--that was 
never the statement of the Secretary of State.
    He was here before this committee. He said from the very 
beginning that the effort was to have a stronger and longer 
agreement, which I concurred with.
    Never was it you got to get into the JCPOA as it was, and 
then we will look for a stronger, longer agreement, because 
then I would have disputed with him, as I would with you, that 
if 7 years of experience shows us that none of that was 
possible during those 7 years, then why in God's name would it 
be possible when the Iranians just have to hang in there for 
another seven to get to where they want to be?
    This is the disconnect in trying to understand why the 
fixation of getting into an agreement that is worse than the 
one we have, admittedly, because you were dealt a different set 
of cards, but nonetheless worse than the one we have, is much 
better.
    So I look forward to having a classified hearing so that we 
can explore with you and other members of the Administration 
exactly what is the plan moving forward, either while you keep 
the door open waiting, but that waiting is dangerous when the 
Iranians can now, clearly, cross the threshold at virtually any 
moment and we may even lose when they have accomplished that, 
based upon all the amassed material they have, and without 
doing anything else. I look forward to having a classified 
session, so we can explore those questions.
    With the thanks of the committee for your testimony--we 
appreciate it--we are going to excuse you now and we have 
some--a private panel coming up.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. Malley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
    The Chairman. As Mr. Malley leaves, let me welcome Mr. 
Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Mr. Sadjadpour has written extensively on 
Iran and U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East.
    He has also advised senior U.S., European, and Asian 
officials and has testified numerous times before the U.S. 
Congress, and he is an adviser to the Aspen Institute's 
Congressional Program on the Middle East, and prior to his 
current role, he was with the International Crisis Group based 
in Tehran and Washington. We welcome him to the committee.
    We also welcome to the committee Mr. Mark Dubowitz, the 
chief executive officer of the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies. Mr. Dubowitz is an expert on Iran's global threat 
network and U.S. policy.
    He has advised various administrations and lawmakers, 
testified more than 20 times before the U.S. Congress and 
foreign legislatures. He is a former venture capitalist 
technology executive who founded the FDD's Iran program and co-
founded the FDD's Center on Economic and Financial Power, 
Center on Military and Political Power in China Program.
    Thank you both for joining us. We would ask you to 
summarize your statements in about 5 minutes. Your full 
statements will be included in the record.
    Mr. Sadjadpour, we will start with you.

  STATEMENT OF KARIM SADJADPOUR, SENIOR FELLOW, THE CARNEGIE 
       ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Sadjadpour. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, 
and members of the committee for inviting me today.
    I would like to talk about the nature of the Iranian regime 
and a sober U.S. strategy to contend with it. I would argue, 
over the last four decades no government in the world has had a 
more clear and consistent grand strategy than the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and there, essentially, have been three 
components to Iran's grand strategy.
    Number one, they have sought to topple the U.S.-led world 
order, number two, they have sought to replace Israel with 
Palestine, and number three, Iran has sought to remake the 
Middle East in its image.
    These aspirations of Iran will continue regardless of 
whether or not the nuclear deal with Iran is revived. Part of 
the reason for the consistency of Iran's grand strategy over 
the last four decades is the fact that Iran has only had two 
leaders since 1989--Ayatollah Khomeini, the father of the 
Islamic Revolution, and from 1989 to the present, Iran has been 
ruled by the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He 
has not left Iran since 1989, and for Ayatollah Khamenei the 
identity of the Islamic Republic is premised on hostility 
towards the United States.
    The former president of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, in fact, 
once told me in a private setting that when he was president--
when Mr. Khatami was president, the Supreme Leader used to tell 
him that Iran needs enmity with the United States. The 
revolution needs enmity with the United States.
    So for that reason, I think, from the vantage point of U.S. 
foreign policy it is going to be very difficult for us to make 
any type of amends with a regime which needs us as an adversary 
for their own internal legitimacy.
    So what should be a U.S. strategy to contend with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran? I think there are three components to 
a sober U.S. strategy toward Iran.
    Number one, we, obviously, have to contain and counter 
Iran's nuclear ambitions. Number two, we have to contain and 
counter Iran's regional ambitions. Number three, which is, I 
think, very important and often overlooked, it is important for 
us to champion the democratic aspirations of the Iranian 
people. We oftentimes overlook this, but I would argue this is 
central to how the Cold War with the Soviet Union ended.
    Now, over the last four decades, there has been very few 
instances in which the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
compromised, the last being when they signed the JCPOA in 2015, 
and I would argue the way in which Iran is--the conditions 
under which Iran is compromised has only been one formula and 
that is that Iran compromises when it is faced with significant 
multilateral pressure coupled with direct U.S. engagement and 
firm U.S. resolve, and number three, in pursuit of a concrete 
viable outcome.
    As much as we would like to have maximalist goals vis-a-vis 
Iran to totally eradicate Iran's nuclear program or to totally 
expunge Iranian influence in the Middle East, these are not 
viable goals.
    I think the good news is that Iran is one of the most 
strategically isolated countries in the world. Its only real 
ally has been the Assad regime in Syria.
    I would like to conclude on my final point, which is that 
the greatest ally that the United States has against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran are, in fact, the people of Iran, the 
vast majority of whom aspire to be like South Korea, not North 
Korea.
    The U.S. policy tools that we have used to prevent Iran 
from becoming like North Korea have been political and economic 
isolation, but I would argue, to try to facilitate the Iranian 
society's aspirations of becoming like South Korea, it also 
requires U.S. engagement and integration, and I think the way 
we thought creatively about how to engage with societies in the 
Soviet Union and Russia and the Eastern Bloc using information, 
inhibiting those regimes' ability to control information and 
communication tools, I think we need to think much harder about 
that in the Iranian context.
    The very final thing I would like to talk about are, in 
fact, the hostages, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member, for talking about them. One of my close friends of 20 
years is Siamak Namazi.
    He has been held hostage in Iran almost 7 years now and he 
believes that his fate, his freedom, is not going to be 
resolved. He is not going to become free absent a U.S.-Iran 
agreement, and I think we really need to think hard about how 
to separate the issue of the JCPOA and the issue of freeing 
American hostages in Iran, and I think we need to think very 
hard with our like-minded allies about how to deter and 
penalize this odious Iranian practice of hostage taking.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sadjadpour follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Karim Sadjadpour

                        a u.s. strategy for iran
    Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of 
the committee. Our national discussion on Iran has focused primarily on 
tactical considerations and speculation about the likelihood of 
reviving the 2015 nuclear agreement. I would like to use this 
opportunity to briefly articulate a broader U.S. strategy for Iran that 
encompasses, but is not limited to, Iran's nuclear ambitions and is 
premised on a sober understanding of the Iranian regime, based on a 
case study of the last 43 years.
    Over the last four decades, no government in the world--including 
China or Russia--has had a more clear or consistent grand strategy to 
challenge the U.S.-led world order than the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Since the 1979 Islamist revolution transformed Iran from a U.S.-allied 
monarchy to an anti-American theocracy, Tehran has sought to expel the 
United States from the Middle East, replace Israel with Palestine, and 
remake the Middle East in its image. Tehran has not achieved its lofty 
ambitions, but it has made progress toward them--and it is feeling 
emboldened by its successes and perceived U.S. failures. Whether or not 
the nuclear deal is successfully revived, these Iranian aspirations 
will continue.
    While Iran's military budget and GDP are dwarfed by those of the 
United States, its physical size (75 times larger than Israel, four 
times larger than Germany), geostrategic location, natural resources, 
ideological zeal, and cultivation of foreign militias have made it 
central to a wide range of U.S. national security challenges. Tehran 
figures prominently in any discussions about nuclear proliferation, 
Islamist radicalism, energy security, cyberwarfare, disinformation, 
hostage taking, and drone warfare. While the malaise of the modern 
Middle East has many fathers, as long as Iran, one of the region's 
largest and wealthiest nations, is ruled by a brutal theocracy that 
uses its energy wealth to fund and train armed militias that espouse 
its intolerant revolutionary ideology, a more stable, tolerant, 
prosperous region will remain a distant dream.
    Yet a sober U.S. strategy toward Iran must distinguish between what 
is desirable and what is viable. The United States can constrain Iran's 
nuclear and missile programs; we cannot eliminate them. We should stand 
for civil and human rights in Iran; we cannot engineer regime change. 
We can limit and expose destructive Iranian policies in the Middle 
East; we cannot expunge Iranian influence from the region. We can 
attempt to manage our differences with Iran; we cannot force a 
rapprochement with a regime that needs us as an adversary.
    Iran presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United 
States. A U.S. strategy that focuses only on the nuclear and regional 
ambitions of the Iranian Government while overlooking the democratic 
aspirations of the Iranian people ignores the lessons of how the Cold 
War ended. U.S. policy should be designed to not only counter the 
destructive ambitions of the Iranian regime, but also to champion the 
constructive ambitions of the Iranian people.
                    the nature of the iranian regime
    The Islamic Republic has proved adept at surviving but, like many 
revolutionary (https://journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-durability-
of-revolutionary-regimes/) regimes, incapable of reforming. Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei, the country's 83-year-old supreme leader, is one of the 
world's longest-serving and most dogmatic autocrats. Since becoming 
supreme leader in 1989--the last time he left the country--Khamenei has 
skillfully vanquished four Iranian presidents, brutally quelled 
numerous mass uprisings, expanded Iranian power throughout the Middle 
East, and withstood efforts by seven U.S. presidents to sideline him, 
engage him, or coerce him. He has never met face-to-face with a sitting 
U.S. official and has so far prohibited Iranian diplomats from talking 
to their U.S. counterparts during current JCPOA negotiations. He has 
carefully handpicked fellow hard-line ``principlists''--so called for 
their loyalty to the revolution's principles--to run the regime's most 
powerful institutions, most importantly the powerful Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
    Khamenei's commitment to Iran's revolutionary principles is cloaked 
in ideology but driven by self-interest. Like many dictatorships, the 
Islamic Republic faces a reform dilemma in that it must open up to 
survive, but doing so could destroy it. In contrast to more pragmatic 
Iranian revolutionaries who favored a Chinese-style economic opening 
and rapprochement with the United States, Khamenei long ago concluded 
that abandoning the revolution's principles--including its opposition 
to the United States and Israel--would be like taking a sledgehammer to 
the pillars of a building. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which was 
preceded by Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost reforms, further attuned 
Khamenei to the wisdom of political philosophers like Alexis de 
Tocqueville, who warned that ``the most perilous moment for a bad 
government is one when it seeks to mend its ways.''
    Although ending the four-decade U.S.-Iran cold war would serve the 
national interests of both countries, Washington will not be able to 
reach a peaceful accommodation with an Iranian regime whose identity is 
premised on opposing the United States and whose leader believes that 
softening this opposition could cost him everything. Nor are there any 
quick fixes--whether in the form of greater U.S. engagement or 
pressure--that can swiftly change the nature of the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship or the Iranian regime. For this reason, the United States 
must deal with Iran like any adversary: communicate to avoid conflict, 
cooperate when possible, confront when necessary, and contain with 
partners.
                       a three-part u.s. strategy
    How should Washington deal with such an adversary? U.S. strategy 
toward Iran should have three broad objectives:

  1)  Contain Iran's nuclear program;

  2)  Counter Iran's regional influence; and

  3)  Champion Iranian democratic ambitions.

    It would be unrealistic to expect nuclear non-proliferation, 
regional security, and Iranian civil rights to be discussed in one 
negotiation. Rather, these three areas should be viewed as 
complementary, rather than conflicting, pieces of a unified strategy.
                  containing iran's nuclear ambitions
    The U.S. intelligence community has long assessed, including 
recently (https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-cia-chief-no-
evidence-iran-has-made-decision-to-weaponize-nuclear-program-
1.10447274), that Iran's leadership has not yet made the decision to 
weaponize its nuclear program. Despite the program's clandestine 
history, Iran's nuclear strategy has thus far been a transparent 
attempt to reap the benefits of being a nuclear weapons state without 
incurring the costs. As non-proliferation expert Robert Litwak aptly 
wrote (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-nuclear-challenge-
and-military-option-nonproliferation-precedents-and-case), ``A nuclear 
hedge is Iran's strategic sweet spot--maintaining the potential for a 
nuclear option while avoiding the regional and international 
repercussions of actual weaponization.''
    Viewed from the outside, Iran's nuclear ambitions have provided the 
country with global recognition and distracted from the regime's 
internal failings and destructive regional policies. Viewed from the 
inside, however, Iran's nuclear program has been an expensive failure, 
costing the country hundreds of billions of dollars (in sunk costs and 
sanctions) without providing electricity (less than 2 percent of Iran's 
energy needs) nor deterrence against U.S. or Israeli attacks on Iranian 
officials and nuclear infrastructure.
    The 2015 Iran nuclear deal--known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA)--illustrated that Tehran is prepared to compromise 
only when faced with a combination of significant, multilateral 
pressure and firm U.S. resolve, in pursuit of a concrete, limited 
outcome. Former Deputy Secretary of State (and current CIA Director) 
Bill Burns, one of the chief diplomat architects of the agreement, 
wrote (https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Back_Channel/
UDFeDwAAQBAJ
?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=burns+tough-minded+diplomacy,+backed+up+by+the+
economic+leverage+of+sanctions,+the+political+leverage+of+an+
international+consensus,+and+the+military+leverage+of+the+potential+
use+of+force.''&pg=PA338&printsec=frontcover) that the JCPOA was 
spawned by a U.S. strategy of ``tough-minded diplomacy, backed up by 
the economic leverage of sanctions, the political leverage of an 
international consensus, and the military leverage of the potential use 
of force.''
    Such a strategy does not currently exist. Although sanctions 
against Iran remain significant, they have not been diligently 
enforced; Iranian oil sales to China have increased (https://
www.reuters.com/business/energy/nuclear-talks-resume-irans-oil-exports-
increase-2022-02-10/) several-fold. The Biden administration's patient 
commitment to reviving the agreement, and seeming reluctance to 
consider alternative strategies, has been interpreted by Tehran as an 
opportunity to try and extract additional concessions, without fearing 
a closing window of opportunity. The polarized domestic American 
political context and the broader geopolitical context--including the 
humiliating U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S.-China tension, and 
the Russian invasion of Ukraine--has raised further questions in Iran 
about American credibility and resolve.
    To be clear, there exists no good alternative to contain and 
reverse Iran's nuclear progress other than a negotiated settlement. The 
Trump administration had 4 years to prove the alternative thesis--that 
an increase in American pressure and an absence of American diplomacy 
could force the Iranian regime into capitulation or collapse. Although 
the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign subjected Iran to 
enormous economic deprivation and humiliation--including the January 
2020 assassination of its top military commander, Qassem Soleimani--its 
regime closed ranks, its nuclear program expanded, and its regional 
influence remained intact despite diminished expenditures.
    As the Biden administration itself has acknowledged, a potential 
revival of the JCPOA must not be the finish line but rather a starting 
point for follow-on negotiations to ``lengthen and strengthen'' the 
agreement. Any nuclear settlement must also be embedded in a broader 
strategy to counter Iran's regional influence and internal repression. 
While the task of reassembling a global coalition to strengthen the 
nuclear deal will prove challenging, Europe, Russia, and China continue 
to support the underlying goal of averting an Iranian bomb and conflict 
with Iran.
    Marshaling a global response to Iran's regional ambitions will be 
harder, given China's preference for neutrality, Russia's alliance with 
Iran in supporting Assad in Syria, and European fears of provoking 
Tehran. Nevertheless, Iran remains among the world's most strategically 
isolated nations. Russia has ignored Israel's repeated attacks (https:/
/www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-attack-israel/israel-launches-major-
air-strikes-on-iran-linked-targets-in-syria-idUSKBN29H32S) on Iranian 
outposts in Syria, Chinese trade with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates exceeds (https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/18/china-wont-
rescue-iran/) its trade with Iran, and European popular views on Iran--
which is holding several European nationals hostage (https://
www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220512-activists-condemn-iran-hostage-
taking-of-foreigners)--are just as jaundiced (https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/02/iran-widely-criticized-in-14-
advanced-economies/) as American popular opinion. Russia and China are 
particularly sensitive about respecting national sovereignty, often the 
gravest concern of Iran's regional rivals.
                  countering iran's regional ambitions
    The Islamic Republic of Iran is to many U.S. partners in the Middle 
East what Putin's Russia is to Europe: An energy rich but ideologically 
bankrupt bully ruled by a paranoid autocrat who routinely violates the 
sovereignty of its neighbors and seeks security in the insecurity of 
others.
    Just as Putin's successful military incursions in Georgia, Crimea, 
and Syria led him to believe his 2022 invasion of Ukraine would be a 
similarly low-cost victory, the Islamic Republic of Iran's perceived 
regional triumphs, coupled with U.S. regional failures, has fueled 
Iran's hubris and further convinced it of America's inexorable decline.
    Over the last two decades, Iran has established outsized influence 
in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, the four failed or failing states 
that constitute what Iranian officials call their ``axis of 
resistance.'' It has done so by successfully cultivating regional 
militias, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, and by 
exploiting the power vacuums left by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 
and the Arab uprisings of 2010. Neither the United States nor Iran's 
regional rivals have demonstrated the will or the capacity to challenge 
Tehran's foothold in these countries. Arab disorder has facilitated 
Iranian ambitions, and Iranian ambitions have exacerbated Arab 
disorder.
    Although Tehran and Washington have faced numerous shared threats 
in the region since 1979--including the Soviet Union, Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State (or ISIS)--U.S. 
attempts at strategic cooperation with Iran have repeatedly failed. 
Instead of prioritizing Iran's national interests, the Islamic 
Republic's grand strategy is built on a hierarchy of enmity: any 
adversary of the United States and Israel is a potential partner for 
Tehran. As Ayatollah Khamenei put it in 2021, ``We will support and 
assist any nation or any group anywhere who opposes and fights the 
Zionist regime, and we do not hesitate to say this.''
    As the Middle East's lone theocratic state, Iran has managed to 
harness Islamist radicalism--both Shia and, at times, Sunni (https://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/al-qaeda-iran-cia/
545576/)--more effectively than any of its peers. Indeed, although the 
Iran-Saudi rivalry is commonly viewed as a sectarian war between Shia 
Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, Tehran's huge asymmetric advantage over 
Riyadh is that virtually all Shia radicals are willing to fight for 
Iran, whereas virtually all Sunni radicals, including the Islamic State 
and al-Qaeda, want to overthrow the Saudi Government.
    Iran's ideal vision is a Middle East in which there is no U.S. 
presence, a popular referendum has rendered Israel a Palestinian state, 
and Khomeinist anti-imperialism is a source of inspiration for Arab and 
Muslim hearts and minds. This strategic vision will not change as long 
as Khamenei is supreme leader, and it could well outlast him, given its 
perceived success. The United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan has 
emboldened Tehran to try to force Washington to abandon Iraq and its 
military bases in the Persian Gulf. And given the relatively low 
penalties Iran has paid for its regional policies--compared with the 
sanctions and sabotage campaigns it has endured for its nuclear 
ambitions--it has had little reason to reassess.
    Yet, for all of Iran's success in cultivating militant groups 
across the Middle East, there are tangible signs that it has 
overreached. Mutual fears of Iran helped midwife the Abraham Accords, 
the 2020 normalization agreements that gave Israel a strategic foothold 
several dozen miles from Iran's border. Opinion polls (https://
www.hoover.org/research/evolution-arab-popular-opinion-toward-iran-and-
iranian-self-perceptions) also show that nearly two-thirds of young 
Arabs in the region now view Iran as an adversary, a sizable majority 
of Arabs of all ages want Iran to withdraw from regional conflicts, and 
more than half of Arab Shiites hold an ``unfavorable'' view of Iran. In 
recent years, Iraqi protesters have attacked and set fire to the 
Iranian consulates in Najaf and Karbala--two Shiite shrine cities that 
are longtime Iranian strongholds in Iraq--and Lebanese Shiites have 
protested against Hezbollah in the southern Lebanese city of Nabatiyah. 
Recent elections in both Iraq and Lebanon showed waning support for 
Iranian-allied politicians.
    Although Iranian influence in the Middle East cannot be eliminated, 
it can be more effectively exposed, countered, and contained. The JCPOA 
proved that pressure and diplomacy can work if directed to a viable end 
game--in that case, restraining rather than eradicating Iran's nuclear 
program. A similar formula should be used to meaningfully restrain, 
rather than wholly eradicate, Iran's regional influence.
    Given Washington's limited direct leverage over Tehran--virtually 
all Iranian trade is with countries other than the United States--an 
effective strategy to contain and counter Iran will require U.S. 
leadership and international consensus building. Although the United 
States and other major powers have divergent views on Iran, a Middle 
East in which the rule of law, sovereignty, and the free flow of energy 
are all imperiled serves no one's interests (with the possible 
exception of Russia's). The same is true of a region where terrorist 
groups are resurgent.
    U.S. policy cannot change Iran's resistance ideology to counter 
American influence and end Israel's existence, but it can--with the 
help of other countries--contain the Islamic Republic until Tehran gets 
a government that seeks to do what is good for Iran instead of what is 
bad for its ideological enemies. Ultimately, the Islamic Republic's 
grand strategy will be defeated not by the United States or Israel but 
by the people of Iran, who have paid the highest price for it.
               championing iranian democratic aspirations
    The paradox of Iran is that of a society that aspires to be like 
South Korea--free, prosperous, and globally integrated--but which is 
hindered by a hardline revolutionary elite that more closely resembles 
North Korea. Iran will continue to bleed national resources to 
subsidize its costly nuclear and regional ambitions, deepening the 
Iranian public's economic, political, and social frustration and 
necessitating ever-greater repression.
    After more than four decades in power without any meaningful 
reform, many Iranians understand that the character of the Islamic 
Republic is unlikely to change. Virtually all the conduct the regime 
has exhibited since its inception--hostage taking; the cultivation of 
regional militias; the persecution of women, religious minorities, 
LGBTQ people, and free thinkers--have proceeded with the same 
intensity. Tehran's official slogan of ``Death to America'' has also 
continued uninterrupted throughout both Republican and Democratic U.S. 
administrations.
    While Iran's internal dynamics may appear of secondary strategic 
importance to the United States, as former U.S. Ambassador to Russia 
Michael McFaul (https://books.google.com/
books?id=y34sDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA161&lpg=PA161&dq=Arms+
controllers+didnt+end+the+Cold+War+with+the+Soviet+Union;+
democrats+inside+Russia+and+other+Soviet+republics+did&source=
bl&ots=AT2HKB-dtH&sig=ACfU3U3PI0z7ECa6Ou2BS2T5AI3Tq_HRRQ&hl
=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjBjKCrzIrvAhUNm1kKHUxsANgQ6AEw
AXoECBAQAw#v=onepage&q=Arms%20controllers%20didnt%20end%20the%20
Cold%20War%20with%20the%20Soviet%20Union%3B%20democrats%20inside%20
Russia%20and%20other%20Soviet%20republics%20did&f=false) said about the 
Soviet Union, ``Arms controllers didn't end the Cold War with the 
Soviet Union; democrats inside Russia and other Soviet republics did.'' 
Similarly, the U.S.-Iran cold war will likely be concluded not by 
American diplomats but by Iranian democrats.
    The stability of authoritarian regimes is inherently unpredictable, 
in part because it is premised on often unmeasurable factors such as 
the health and psychological stability of individual autocrats, the 
cohesion and morale of a regime's security forces, and the 
unpredictable events that can trigger humiliated societies to reach 
their tipping point. In August 1978, the CIA assessed with high 
confidence that Iran was not in a pre-revolutionary state; 3 months 
later, the Shah's monarchy crumbled. While today the Islamic Republic's 
security forces appear firmly in control, there are far more signs of 
popular tumult in Iran today than there was in Egypt and Tunisia in 
December 2010, weeks before their governments were overthrown.
    Until now, Washington's attempts to elicit political change in 
Tehran have failed. Efforts to empower reformists within the Iranian 
regime against hard-line rivals have shown little signs of success; 
reformists lack the will, and hard-liners have all the guns. U.S. 
attempts to incite uprisings among unarmed, unorganized, and leaderless 
Iranian civilians against a heavily armed and organized repressive 
apparatus have also achieved little. The Islamic Republic has 
repeatedly shown willingness to throttle the internet and murder 
thousands of its citizens in the dark, as it did most vividly in 
November 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-
specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-
do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR). In authoritarian 
countries, change requires not only popular pressure but also divisions 
within the elite. When the entirety of a regime and its security 
apparatus believe that they must either kill or be killed--such as in 
Syria--they unreservedly embrace option A.
    Although the United States lacks the ability to reform or remove 
the Islamic Republic, it does have the capacity to meaningfully 
champion Iranian civil rights. Just as President Ronald Reagan's 
administration negotiated arms-control agreements with Soviet leaders 
while also expressing solidarity with freedom-seeking Soviet subjects, 
nuclear negotiations with Iran should not deter the United States from 
inhibiting Tehran's control of the information and communications of 
its citizens by building a walled-off national (https://
thenetmonitor.org/bulletins/irans-national-information-network-faster-
speeds-but-at-what-cost) internet akin to China's. The Biden 
administration should also work with European and Asian allies to 
ensure a potential resumption of commercial ties with Iran does not 
simply enrich Revolutionary Guard companies and cronies at the expense 
of Iranian civil society.
    There are valid concerns, both inside Iran and in the region, that 
a revival of the nuclear deal will entrench the regime. Yet history has 
more often proved (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2089714?seq=1) that 
political dissent is not usually triggered by crushing poverty, but 
when a society's improving economic circumstances lead to elevated 
expectations that go unfulfilled. For this reason, the near-term 
economic improvements that might result from the removal of U.S. 
sanctions are likelier in the medium and long term to destabilize the 
Islamic Republic rather than ensconce it. The more that Iranians 
understand that what stands between them and a better future is 
internal corruption and mismanagement rather than external pressure, 
the more the country's most potent ideology--Iranian nationalism--will 
be harnessed against the regime rather than in service of it.
    Iran's transition from theocracy to democracy will not come easily, 
peacefully, or soon. But it is the single most important key to 
transforming the Middle East.
                   additional policy recommendations
Develop a Policy To Free U.S. Hostages in Iran and Deter Iranian 
        Hostage Taking
    My testimony cannot be complete without addressing the issue of 
Americans wrongfully detained in Iran, some of whom are my close 
friends. Regardless of one's position on the JCPOA, these innocent 
individuals are being held solely because they are U.S. citizens. As 
such, it must be the moral obligation of our government, and our 
President, to make every effort to bring these Americans home.
    At the same time, it is critical for the United States and our 
allies and partners--more than a dozen of whose citizens have also been 
taking hostage by Iran--to deploy policies and actions to 
disincentivize, deter, and penalize future hostage-taking by the 
Iranian regime. Thanks to many of you in this room we have a bipartisan 
approved law that is meant for this purpose. But these deterrence 
policies must be independent of the efforts to bring back those already 
taken.
Expose Iran's Financial and Military Support to Regional Allies and 
        Proxies
    Among the slogans commonly heard at popular protests in Iran are 
``Forget about Syria; think about us'' and ``They are lying that our 
enemy is America; our enemy is right here.'' Popular disapproval of the 
accumulating costs--in blood and treasure--of America's conflicts in 
the Middle East led to meaningful policy decisions, such as the 2021 
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Iran has spent a much greater 
percentage of its GDP on its nuclear and regional ambitions and proxy 
wars, yet there is no open debate in Iran about the wisdom and costs of 
these policies, partly because there is little information in the 
public domain about these expenditures.
    Without revealing sources and methods, the United States should 
seek to expose the military and financial aid that Tehran offers its 
regional allies in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian 
territories. As Moussa Abu Marzouk, a Hamas official said in a 2021 
interview, ``Iran is one of the countries that helps Hamas most. The 
only country that ignores the limits imposed on Hamas is Iran. It helps 
us militarily in training, weapons, and expertise.''
Declassify U.S. Intelligence About Iranian Malign Iranian Policies
    The declassification of intelligence which warned of Vladimir 
Putin's intent to attack Ukraine played a critical role in shaping 
Western public opinion and helping to alert and unify the West against 
a common threat. Whether it is Iranian attempts to kidnap Iranian 
dissidents in the United States or Iranian cyberwarfare or 
disinformation campaigns on social media, sunlight is the best 
disinfectant.
Revamp Voice of America's Persian News Network
    Voice of America's Persian News Network has the capacity to inform 
tens of millions of Iranian viewers who have access to satellite 
television, yet its production and editorial quality have woefully 
underperformed. The Broadcasting Board of Governors should take a 
renewed look to determine whether VOA Persian is capable of being 
revamped, or whether it should be taken outside the confines of Voice 
of America and transformed into a public-private partnership, like the 
BBC.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Dubowitz.

   STATEMENT OF MARK DUBOWITZ, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE 
     FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Dubowitz. Great. Thank you, Chairman Menendez and 
Ranking Member Risch and members of the committee. It is a real 
honor to testify and also present my recommendations and the 
recommendations of FDD's Iran program. It is also a great honor 
to testify alongside Karim Sadjadpour.
    With the talks currently stalled, the Biden administration 
remains, certainly, committed--you heard from Mr. Malley--to 
taking America back to an even shorter and weaker version of 
the JCPOA, and if that deal occurs, the United States is going 
to pay an enormously high price for short-term nuclear 
restrictions that last less than a decade.
    We estimate that Iran will receive $275 billion in 
sanctions relief in the first year, $800 billion by 2027, and 
over a trillion dollars by 2031. This is all detailed in my 
testimony on pages 14 and 17. Perhaps Mr. Malley should present 
his alternative estimates to the committee if he disputes what 
we have assessed.
    Of course, this is all going to be a goldmine for Iran's 
IRGC to fuel its repression, its regional aggression, and 
global terrorism, and as the committee has noted, the province 
of the agreement is that it does not put Iran's program back in 
a box. In fact, if anything, it is going to leap forward like a 
jack in the box.
    The deal initially increases breakout time from 3 weeks to 
4-6 months. The Israeli estimate is closer to 4 months, but 
Iran's nuclear program is going to expand over time. Breakout 
time drops, and key restrictions are going to sunset after a 
few years.
    In fact, by 2031, most of the restrictions are gone 
including the ban on weapons-grade uranium, which is quite 
remarkable. I want to emphasize that to the committee. By 2031, 
the ban on Iran producing weapons-grade enriched uranium will 
be gone.
    Now, constraints on advanced centrifuge installation begin 
disappearing in 2024. Breakout time actually drops to less than 
a month by 2027 and to near zero after that, and after 2031 
under the agreement, Iran's nuclear program can legally expand 
and harden in multiple sites across the country, and at that 
point neither the United States nor Israel may have the bombs 
to destroy these hardened and dispersed facilities.
    So the bottom line is in exchange for a trillion-dollar 
windfall for the regime, the deal only provides 4-6 months of 
additional breakout time. That expires after 7 years and Iran 
becomes a much more dangerous and wealthier nuclear threshold 
state with multiple pathways to nuclear weapons and ICBMs to 
hold American cities hostage.
    As one of the Senators noted, a lot of the U.N. snapback 
goes away in 2025. The conventional arms embargo is already 
gone. The missile embargo is gone next year.
    President Biden should be commended for refusing to remove 
the IRGC from the FTO list, but this committee needs to be on 
guard. Iran has a track record of making outrageous demands in 
order to trade them for egregious concessions.
    The Administration might try to sell Congress that they 
held the line on the outrageous so that they can accept the 
egregious, and we should be wary of that negotiating and 
marketing strategy.
    The question also for Congress is how the Administration 
can contemplate lifting terrorism sanctions on the Central Bank 
of Iran and the National Iranian Oil and Tanker Companies, all 
of which finance the IRGC and all of which are contemplated as 
sanctions relief under a return to the JCPOA.
    I also want to emphasize that the Administration and 
Congress really needs to support American victims of Iranian 
terrorism in their recovery of over $50 billion in U.S. court 
judgments.
    Over 1,000 Gold Star family members recently wrote to 
President Biden asking him to maintain the FTO designation and 
as well block sanctions relief until Iran settles these 
judgments.
    We have talked about how all of these fatal flaws are 
compounded by Russia's role--the $10 billion that Russia is 
expected to get under a nuclear contract with Iran, the fact 
that Putin may also hold Iran's fissile material so while he 
threatens to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine he effectively 
becomes the guarantor of Iran's nuclear behavior.
    The central problem with the current policy is that 
Khamenei does not believe that the President will use severe 
sanctions or force, and we have talked about it at this 
hearing.
    Most of Iran's nuclear expansion, including enrichment at 
20 percent and 60 percent, occurred after the election of 
President Biden, who pledged during the election to stop the 
maximum pressure campaign. You will see in Exhibit A of my 
testimony a very detailed timeline that demonstrates that.
    He also took advantage of the Biden administration's 
refusal to censure Iran at the IAEA Board of Governors. 
Hopefully, in June, that will change if Mr. Malley's commitment 
is followed through.
    He also does not fear the Biden administration with respect 
to the use of military force or any other coercive measures and 
that is why he is going to do for decades what he has done for 
the past few decades, which is he is going to escalate the 
nuclear program as these enrichment restrictions sunset.
    He is going to intensify his regional aggression and he is 
going to immunize the regime against sanctions pressure using 
this trillion-dollar windfall. He is also going to develop 
nuclear ICBMs to hold our cities hostage.
    There is a plan B. I have 16 specific recommendations in my 
testimony that cover that, and I look forward to discussing 
those and other issues with you in the Q&A.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Mr. Mark Dubowitz
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. Let me 
just start.
    Mr. Sadjadpour, you made an interesting comment--I have 
made this myself, but I would like you to expound upon it--
about the Iranian people and Iranian opposition. It seems to me 
that we have lost the mark.
    We certainly lost it during the Green Revolution. We lost 
that opportunity. What do you think we should be doing more 
decisively as it relates to Iranian opposition and the Iranian 
people?
    Mr. Sadjadpour. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman.
    I am reminded of Henry Kissinger's quote that there are few 
nations in the world with whom the United States has more 
common interests and less reason to quarrel than Iran, but Iran 
has to decide whether it is a nation or a cause, and this 
regime has chosen to be a revolutionary cause rather than a 
nation state and, really, as I said, the best ally we have in 
Iran against the regime are the people.
    I think that the reality--when you look at the collapse of 
authoritarian regimes, there are two key ingredients. You 
obviously need pressure from below, but you also need divisions 
at the top, and we have seen lots of pressure from below in 
Iran, but the current reality is that we have a regime which is 
highly armed, highly organized, and ready to kill en masse to 
preserve their power, and we have a society which is, at the 
moment, unorganized, unarmed, and not willing to die to take 
power.
    I think we, the United States, we--as I said in my 
testimony, we do not have the power to engineer regime change 
in Iran, but we can significantly try to inhibit the Iranian 
regime's ability to control communications, to control 
information.
    A concrete tool we have at our disposal, which, in my view, 
we have not been using wisely, is the Voice of America's 
Persian news network. It has the capacity to reach, perhaps, 
more than 40 million Iranians who have satellite television and 
it needs to be totally overhauled.
    So I think I would take, Senator, the playbook that we 
employed during the Reagan administration vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc. We did not shy away--while we were 
negotiating arms control deals with the Soviet Union, we did 
not shy away from expressing solidarity with Russian 
dissidents.
    We did everything in our power to fight that information 
war and we made it clear that our loyalty--as President Biden 
once said in a hearing in this chamber many years ago vis-a-vis 
South Africa, America's loyalties are not to the Government of 
Iran. It is to the people of Iran----
    The Chairman. I agree.
    Mr. Sadjadpour. --and to simply express that solidarity.
    The Chairman. I agree. Let me ask you this. What is your 
best analysis of Iranian decision-making today with respect to 
negotiations and its nuclear program?
    Mr. Sadjadpour. I think the current calculations of Iran's 
leaders are that the United States is committed to reviving the 
JCPOA and, at the moment, I have not seen from Iran's 
leadership a sense of urgency that if they do not act, the 
JCPOA will be removed from the table.
    I think the problem is, at the moment, they feel that they 
can get the JCPOA whenever they want to and they are simply now 
trying to extract as many concessions as possible.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you both this question. What is 
your view about whether a nuclear deal, such as the one that 
has been described here by Mr. Malley, can thwart Iran's long-
running nuclear ambitions?
    Mr. Dubowitz. Chairman Menendez, I opposed the JCPOA in 
2015. Like you, I opposed President Trump's withdrawal from the 
JCPOA.
    I think now, in 2022, you have got to look at Iran's 
strategy here. Their strategy is to play this out until 2031, 
at which point they can develop an industrial-sized nuclear 
program with near zero nuclear breakout--an advanced 
centrifuge-powered easier clandestine sneak out.
    They will have a trillion dollars in sanctions relief that 
will immunize their economy. They will have the potential for 
ICBMs, greater regional aggression. It is at that point in 2031 
where they know that they can then break out to multiple 
nuclear weapons without any country being able to stop them, 
which is the definition of what a nuclear threshold state is.
    So the current JCPOA actually provides patient pathways to 
nuclear weapons as opposed to actually permanently cutting off 
those pathways.
    I think you are exactly right. Secretary Blinken committed 
to a longer and stronger deal, which would permanently cut off 
those pathways. I think that is something that I would support.
    To get there, you need coercive diplomacy. You need 
diplomacy, as one of the senators said, but diplomacy needs to 
be backed up with leverage and we need to have a credible 
threat of military force.
    We need to have economic pressure. We need to support our 
allies. We need to ensure that there is regional pushback, and 
I think as Karim made very clear, the Reagan strategy against 
the Soviet Union has many interesting lessons for how we can 
counter this regime.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Dubowitz, could you comment briefly on your estimates 
of the sanctions relief that is contemplated compared to what 
Mr. Malley and that side is? If you would just, in a very 
summary fashion, describe that, generally.
    Mr. Dubowitz. Yes. So the sanctions relief, for example, in 
the first year, the $275 billion is comprised of about $134 
billion in frozen Iranian assets that they would get access to, 
and then it is a combination of an increase in oil exports, an 
increase in nonoil exports, and a decrease in import costs, 
which add up to about $275 billion, $800 billion within 5 
years, a trillion dollars by 2031.
    I am, certainly, very interested to see Mr. Malley's 
estimates and the estimates of the Administration with respect 
to sanctions relief.
    My colleague, Saeed Ghasseminejad, who is an expert in 
Iran's economy, a Ph.D. in corporate finance, has done detailed 
calculations and modeling and analysis to arrive at our number. 
I am certainly interested in the Administration's number to see 
why Mr. Malley does not agree.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much. Both of you, thank you 
for testifying here today. This is--it is refreshing to hear a 
different view of this.
    We sit in this room and talk about the volume of their 
handling of nuclear matters, material, and that sort of thing 
and breakout time and all that. You have drilled down a lot 
deeper into things that we need to widen our thinking on and we 
sincerely appreciate that.
    Mr. Chairman, we have other commitments so we are going to 
move on. It is certain--again, I cannot understate the 
refreshing view that they have that is a different view than is 
expressed by a lot of what we hear in this room.
    So thank you very much. Thank you for your testimony.
    Mr. Dubowitz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you both. As I said, your full 
testimony will be included in the record. I look forward to be 
reviewing some of the elements of your recommendations.
    We have the Prime Minister of New Zealand that is pending 
so we will have to cut it a bit short. We do appreciate your 
testimony and we look forward to speaking to both of you as 
resources on the issue.
    Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Dubowitz. Thank you.
    Senator Risch. I would like to include in the record an 
article that was--came from Wall Street Journal today entitled 
``Iran Used Secret U.N. Records to Evade Nuclear Probes.'' It 
has got some really interesting information. I would like to 
include that.
    The Chairman. Without objection, it will be included.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. This record will remain open to the close of 
business tomorrow, and with the thanks of the committee, this 
hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


              Responses of Mr. Robert Malley to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Regional Arms Race: Given Iran's ongoing policy of 
threatening its neighbors, both directly and through the support of 
proxies like the Houthis and Hezbollah, it is possible that some of our 
regional allies and partners, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey, are 
considering the development of their own nuclear arsenals.
    How would the deal that you are currently negotiating address 
concerns from regional allies and partners about Iran's ability to 
develop nuclear material after the deal's expiration?

    Answer. Some regional countries have indeed intimated that they 
might pursue nuclear ambitions if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon. 
Forestalling such a regional arms race is one key reason why rejoining 
the JCPOA is in our interest.
    The JCPOA provides strict limits on Iran's nuclear-related 
activities in the short and medium term, enhanced monitoring and 
verification for the long haul, and a platform to address the expansion 
of Iran's nuclear program over time. The alternative to the JCPOA is an 
Iranian nuclear program without these limits and enhanced monitoring, 
which is the case right now.
    This is why last November Gulf Cooperation Council member states 
issued a joint statement with the United States welcoming ongoing 
nuclear negotiations and noting that a mutual return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA is the most effective way to ensure that 
Iran's nuclear program is constrained and exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. We conduct regular consultations with our Gulf partners and 
Turkey on the progress of JCPOA talks.
    Likewise in Israel, dozens of former Israeli officials have 
lamented the U.S. departure from the JCPOA and asserted that a mutual 
return to full implementation of the JCPOA will make Israel safer. 
Recently, Defense Minister Gantz said, ``There's no doubt that a 
diplomatic solution is preferable.''
    We remain in very close coordination with the Government of Israel, 
with almost daily communications at all levels, and we are working in 
partnership with our ally on all possible scenarios. Moreover, we have 
committed to all our regional partners that, regardless of whether we 
achieve a mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA, we would 
work with them to address remaining areas of concern with Iran's 
policies.

    Question. What steps will the Administration take to prevent other 
regional partners from developing or advancing nuclear weapons 
programs? How would those steps differ if the deal does not address 
Iran's long-term nuclear ambitions, or if there is no deal?

    Answer. We remain committed to limiting the spread of enrichment 
and reprocessing technology, including in the Middle East.
    Our regional partners understand that a mutual return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA is the best available option to constrain 
Iran's program today and provide a platform to address all other 
concerns moving forward. The experiment of the previous Administration 
demonstrates clearly that exiting the JCPOA made the situation far 
worse.
    We will continue working with our partners to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons programs.

    Question. Iran's Malign Activities: I welcome OFAC's recent 
designation of an international oil smuggling and money laundering 
network led by IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officials and backed by senior 
Russian officials and economic entities.
    According to the Administration, this network has facilitated the 
sale of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil for both 
the IRGC-QF and Hezbollah. What is the U.S. doing to ensure that we 
continue to combat Iran's malign activities in the region and how can 
the U.S. continue to demonstrate commitment to our partners regarding 
issues of regional security?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has an ironclad commitment 
to Israel's security, and we are determined to help Israel and our Gulf 
partners deter, counter, and confront Iran's destabilizing activities. 
We have hardened our defenses, conducted dynamic force deployments to 
the region, including long-range bomber overflights, deepened 
intelligence cooperation with and boosted the capacity of our partners, 
interdicted Iranian weapons, and disrupted financial flows, as well as 
conducting defensive strikes in Iraq and Syria to deter Iran and Iran-
backed militia groups from conducting or supporting further attacks on 
U.S. personnel and facilities. We are committed to continuing those 
efforts in close consultation with our regional partners.

    Question. Hezbollah, with the help of Iranian support, operates 
freely as a militia force as well as a political party in Lebanon. 
Given the implications of a possible infusion of cash to Iranian proxy 
groups, how can the U.S. strengthen efforts to counter Iran's influence 
and the impact of such groups in the region?

    Answer. The United States is fully committed to working with our 
allies and partners to deter and defend against threats from Iran and 
Iran-supported groups, using the full spectrum of tools available. 
These tools include diplomatic engagement with partners, economic 
sanctions, foreign assistance and defense cooperation, interdictions of 
arms-smuggling vessels, law enforcement actions, and other options 
available to the President to address such behavior.
    It is important to remember that Iran's support of proxy groups 
continued throughout the prior Administration's ``maximum pressure'' 
sanctions. In fact, during this period, the threats to our citizens, 
interests, and partners in the region only increased. We have acted and 
will continue to act--in concert with our partners--to deter, counter, 
and contain Iran's array of dangerous non-nuclear activities. Our goal 
is to do so without the looming threat of a nuclear crisis.

    Question. Breakout Time: During the original set of negotiations, 
the Obama administration sought to increase Iran's breakout time (how 
long it would take Iran to accumulate enough fissile material for one 
nuclear weapon should it pursue one) to a minimum of 1 year. Now senior 
officials are admitting that even if Iran returns to the JCPOA the 
breakout time will be significantly less than 1 year because of the 
major advances Iran has achieved in its enrichment program.
    Is a 1-year breakout time still a key metric for the negotiating 
team?

    Answer. Iran's re-implementation of all of its JCPOA commitments 
would dramatically increase the fissile material ``breakout time'' from 
where it is today--from a matter of weeks to many months. That would 
provide the United States with the time and space necessary to detect 
and respond to any breakout attempt. We continue to assess the deal 
based on a comprehensive assessment of its nonproliferation advantages 
relative to the sanctions relief provided.

    Question. If not breakout, what are the key measures for 
determining the size and scope of Iran's nuclear program that the 
Administration is willing to leave in place?

    Answer. The JCPOA has many nonproliferation advantages, including 
but not limited to extending Iran's fissile material ``breakout time.'' 
It constrains Iran's uranium enrichment and enrichment research and 
development (R&D) programs for significant periods of time. It commits 
Iran not to engage in certain activities that could contribute to a 
nuclear weapons program indefinitely. It cuts off Iran's pathway to 
producing plutonium. And, critically, it provides the most stringent 
international inspection regime ever negotiated, which maximizes the 
likelihood that the international community would detect any covert 
Iranian nuclear activities.

    Question. What is the United States prepared to do if Iran takes 
the step to enrich uranium to 90 percent?

    Answer. Without engaging in hypotheticals, we have made clear Iran 
should not make such a dangerous move. The Administration, along with 
our allies and partners, is preparing equally for scenarios with and 
without a mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA.

    Answer. Have you sought in negotiations the dismantling or 
destruction of all of Iran's advanced centrifuges?

    Answer. As part of a mutual return to full implementation of the 
JCPOA, Iran would return to JCPOA limits regarding the number and kinds 
of centrifuges that it is allowed to produce, install, test, and 
operate. As was the case when the JCPOA was in full implementation, all 
centrifuges and centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities would 
need to be under strict IAEA surveillance.

    Question. What have you proposed regarding the Fordow nuclear 
plant--would it be permanently closed?

    Answer. As part of a mutual return to full implementation of the 
JCPOA, Iran would re-implement its commitments to cease uranium 
enrichment at Fordow, re-establish the stable isotope separation 
project, and convert the other half of the facility into a nuclear, 
physics, and technology center. In a return to full implementation of 
the JCPOA, Iran would not be permitted to enrich uranium, conduct 
enrichment related R&D, or have nuclear material at Fordow until 2031.

    Question. Can you comment on Israeli Minister of Defense Gantz's 
comments last week here in Washington suggesting there is evidence Iran 
is developing new underground capabilities? Do you agree with his 
assessment?

    Answer. The Administration would be happy to discuss this in a 
classified setting.

    Question. Weaponization: It is becoming increasingly difficult to 
limit the amount of fissile material Iran possess. Even if the United 
States re-enters the JCPOA, Iran will retain the ability to rapidly 
reconstitute its nuclear infrastructure. It may be necessary to plan 
now for how to prevent Iran from gaining the outstanding capabilities 
necessary to build a nuclear weapon.
    How can we enhance the IAEA's ability to determine if Iran, or any 
country which has a sizable uranium stockpile, might be pursuing a 
weapons program?

    Answer. The JCPOA provides for some of the most stringent and 
intrusive verification and monitoring measures ever negotiated. These 
measures provide high confidence in the ability of the IAEA to verify 
that Iran is fully implementing its nuclear-related commitments under 
the JCPOA and to detect any attempt by Iran to divert nuclear material 
or equipment.
    A major benefit of Iran resuming full implementation of its JCPOA 
commitments would be the restoration of this intensive verification 
regime, which includes and goes beyond Iran's implementation of the 
Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which 
would provide the IAEA the access and information it needs to give 
assurance about the absence of covert nuclear activities. The JCPOA 
provides for other enhanced verification and monitoring activities, 
including of uranium ore concentrate production, heavy water stocks, 
and centrifuge component manufacturing.
    Focusing on nuclear material continues to make sense, both in the 
Iran context and more broadly, for reasons we can discuss in greater 
detail in a classified setting. Additionally, regarding missile 
delivery systems, we have robust domestic and multilateral authorities 
and tools to counter Iran's ballistic missile activities.

    Question. Would it make sense to expand non-proliferation 
institutions' capacity to track weaponization programs and the ability 
of states to deliver nuclear weapons?

    Answer. This is an excellent idea and one we would welcome 
discussing with you further in a classified setting.

    Question. What kinds of resources could the United States provide 
to enhance the IAEA's ability to monitor such developments in Iran? Is 
it funding, technical assistance, and equipment?

    Answer. The United States will continue to provide the IAEA with 
the resources it needs to conduct its critical verification and 
monitoring mission in Iran, including funding, training, technical 
assistance, and equipment.

    Question. Sanctions: The Biden administration seems content to use 
the threat of snapback sanctions as a deterrent to Iran's increasing 
its enrichment to 90 percent. The Administration also has restrained 
its efforts to enforce its sanctions authorities, including sanctioning 
Chinese imports of discounted Iranian crude oil, even before the impact 
of the conflict in Ukraine on oil prices.
    Can you walk through the expected sanctions relief Iran will 
receive if there is a return to the JCPOA? How much money does Iran 
currently have in foreign bank accounts that it will gain increased 
access to if sanctions are lifted?

    Answer. Our Iran-related sanctions authorities remain in effect 
unless they are lifted, and those authorities continue to be enforced. 
As a result of sanctions lifting under a mutual return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA, which would occur as part of a step-by-
step process, Iran would be able to engage in certain international 
commerce which is now subject to U.S. sanctions as a result of the 
Trump administration's decision to leave the JCPOA.
    Iran also holds funds worth tens of billions of dollars in overseas 
accounts that are now restricted, except for use for certain 
transactions involving humanitarian goods and services. These funds 
were paid to Iran as a result of trade between Iran and third countries 
that was not sanctionable at the time of the payments, but have been 
held in restricted accounts because of U.S. sanctions. If sanctions are 
lifted pursuant to a mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA, 
Iran will gain greater access to these funds, which it will be able to 
use for non-sanctionable trade. However, these are already Iranian 
funds, and a significant portion of them are already committed to 
various purposes and would not become more accessible to Iran because 
of JCPOA sanctions lifting.

    Question. Why has the Administration elected not to target Chinese 
entities that are violating U.S. sanctions with respect to Iranian 
crude imports? Are there plans to do so?

    Answer. Our Iran-related sanctions authorities remain in effect 
unless they are lifted, and those authorities continue to be enforced. 
We are regularly and robustly engaged with the day-to-day business of 
enforcing our sanctions, including regular and effective communications 
with allies and partners about those attempting to evade our sanctions.
    For example, on May 25, 2022, the Administration designated an 
IRGC-Quds Force illicit oil smuggling and money laundering network 
connected to oil imports by firms in the People's Republic of China.

    Question. Is there any evidence that snapback deterrence has 
worked?

    Answer. The Administration would be happy to address assessments of 
Iranian intentions in a classified setting.

    Question. What does the U.S. believe are the scenarios under which 
snapback is warranted? Where do our European allies stand on the issue 
of snapback sanctions? Have we discussed the conditions under which 
we'd implement them together?

    Answer. The Administration, along with our allies and partners, is 
preparing equally for scenarios with and without a mutual return to 
full implementation of the JCPOA. We would be happy to discuss specific 
scenario planning we have done with our partners in a classified 
setting.

    Question. The existing JCPOA requires the Administration to request 
Congress permanently end a number of statutorily required sanctions on 
Iran in October 2023. If hypothetically, Iran returns to the JCPOA 
sometime this year, does the Administration still intend to call for 
fulfilling this provision whose deadline is just a year away? If not, 
what would the new proposed timeline be?

    Answer. The United States will abide by its commitments under the 
JCPOA if there is a mutual return to full implementation of the 
arrangement, including seeking legislative action on Transition Day as 
described in Annex V.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Robert Malley to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. Since President Biden came into office, the 
Administration has single-mindedly pursued renegotiating a nuclear deal 
with Iran. During this time, the Administration has ignored Congress, 
the family members of American hostages, and our allies and partners in 
the region, who all see this ``deal'' for what it is--an opportunity 
for a bloodthirsty regime to obtain a financial lifeline so it can 
continue its destructive activities. Israel Prime Minister Bennet, our 
strongest ally in the Middle East, has said, ``the emerging deal, as it 
seems, is highly likely to create a more violent, more volatile Middle 
East.''
    What is your response to concerns raised by Israel and other 
American allies in the Middle East, like Bahrain, Morocco, the UAE, and 
Egypt?

    Answer. As I said in my opening remarks to the Committee, we have 
gone through several years of a real-life experiment in the very policy 
approach critics of the JCPOA advocated: a so-called maximum pressure 
policy, designed to strangle revenue for the Iranian regime, in hopes 
of getting Iran to accept far greater nuclear restrictions and engage 
in far less aggressive behavior. However, the opposite occurred: rather 
than compelling them to make concessions, the so-called maximum 
pressure campaign saw a dramatic increase in Iran's non-nuclear and 
nuclear provocations. That is why we have sought, without any 
illusions, a return to full implementation of the JCPOA. We will do so 
as long as we assess that the nonproliferation benefits of a return to 
the deal are worth the sanctions-lifting we would need to provide.
    That is a position that is backed by our European allies, all GCC 
member states, as well as by a vast preponderance of former senior 
Israeli national security officials. Last November, GCC member states 
issued a joint statement with the United States welcoming ongoing 
nuclear negotiations and noting that a mutual return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA is the most effective way to ensure that 
Iran's nuclear program is constrained and exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. We conduct regular consultations with our Gulf partners on 
the progress of JCPOA talks. In Israel, we have seen dozens of former 
Israeli officials lamenting the U.S. departure from the JCPOA, all of 
whom have characterized the former Administration's decision as one of 
the most damaging to Israel's security. Recently, Defense Minister 
Gantz said, ``There's no doubt that a diplomatic solution is 
preferable.''
    But we are not single-minded in that approach. We have acted and 
will continue to act to deter, counter, and contain Iran's array of 
dangerous activities. Importantly, the Biden-Harris administration has 
an ironclad commitment to Israel's security. Our coordination with 
Israel has never been closer. Defense Minister Gantz's recent visit to 
Washington is only the latest in a constant series of high-level 
engagements and practical U.S.-Israeli collaboration to counter Iranian 
threats. Because of this deep coordination, we are well-prepared to 
deter and counter any Iranian threats. Our goal is to do so without the 
looming threat of a nuclear crisis, but we will confront it regardless.
    We are determined to help Israel and our Gulf partners deter, 
counter, and confront Iran's destabilizing activities. Throughout the 
talks leading up to a possible U.S. return to the JCPOA, we have been 
transparent with Israel and our regional partners, knowing that we all 
share a common interest: ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear 
weapon.

    Question. Has the Administration incorporated allied countries' 
concerns into negotiations with the Iranians?

    Answer. We are in close contact with our European allies, and we 
are grateful for the positive role they have played in trying to bring 
the JCPOA negotiations to a successful conclusion. We are fully aligned 
in our diplomatic efforts as well as in our overall posture toward 
Iran's destabilizing activities and are coordinating closely in 
anticipation of any potential scenario. The prior Administration's exit 
from the JCPOA left the United States isolated even as Iran increased 
its nuclear and non-nuclear provocations. In contrast, the Biden-Harris 
administration's substantive effort to achieve a mutual return to full 
implementation in coordination with our European allies has allowed us 
to rebuild a broad coalition working together to confront threats from 
Iran. Since the last Administration left the deal, Iran's regional 
behavior has gotten worse, not better, with U.S. forces and diplomatic 
personnel in the Middle East coming under increasing attacks by Iran 
and its proxies and partners. The JCPOA does not solve all the problems 
we and our partners have with Iran, but it keeps Iran from developing 
or obtaining a nuclear weapon, which would make it a much more 
dangerous actor in the region and on the world stage.

    Question. If so, can you provide specifics?

    Answer. I will not try to speak for our allies and partners, but I 
think they would agree that our negotiating postures are fully aligned 
and that we have pushed together to ensure that any deal we reach 
addresses our shared non-proliferation concerns. We likewise are fully 
on the same page not only with our European Allies, but also with 
Israel when it comes to deterring, countering, and confronting Iran's 
other destabilizing activities, regardless of the outcome of our JCPOA 
talks.

    Question. Is obtaining a nuclear deal, without a firm guarantee 
from Iran that it won't develop nuclear weapons, a worthwhile objective 
in return for an almost certain increase in terrorism throughout the 
Middle East?

    Answer. Iran is legally obligated under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons, and in the JCPOA, Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances 
will it ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons. But while 
these are clear obligations and commitments, we should not and will not 
rely on them alone. Returning to full implementation of the JCPOA would 
pull the world back from the brink of nuclear crisis; return the most 
comprehensive monitoring ever negotiated to Iran's nuclear program; 
reimpose stringent restrictions on Iran's nuclear-related activities 
and stockpiles for significant periods of time; and increase the 
breakout time from as short as 1 week to about half a year in the near 
term, enough time to detect and act should we need to do so. We are not 
banking on any change in Iran's regional behavior, but we believe it is 
far better to deal with it without a nuclear crisis hanging over the 
Middle East and the rest of the world, and to confront that challenge 
in unity with our allies and partners. Moreover, the simple reality is 
that Iran's non-nuclear provocations increased rather than decreased 
when the United States left the JCPOA.

    Question. The President, the Secretary of State and Chairman Milley 
have all said that the IRGC Quds Force is a terrorist organization. The 
President through a spokesperson called the Quds Forces ``terrorists.'' 
The Quds force continues to support operations against American troops 
and allied countries throughout the Middle East.
    Do you agree with the President that the Quds Forces are 
terrorists?

    Answer. Yes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force 
(IRGC-QF) is Iran's primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting 
terrorist activity abroad. Iran uses the elite IRGC-QF to provide 
support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert 
operations, and create instability in the region.

    Question. Do you still believe that it was wrong for the United 
States to take out Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Quds Force, in 
2020?

    Answer. I do not know what information the prior Administration had 
access to at the time to give you an appropriate answer.

    Question. How can you justify providing any sanctions relief that 
benefits the chief financiers of these terrorists?

    Answer. The unfortunate reality is that sanctions have not stopped 
Iran's destabilizing activities. Even during Iran's periods of greatest 
economic stress, including under the severe sanctions imposed by 
President Obama prior to reaching the JCPOA and the so-called maximum 
pressure campaign undertaken by the previous Administration, Iran has 
always funded its ballistic missile program, its regional proxies and 
terrorist activities, and other destabilizing policies. These 
activities are comparatively cheap, and Iran will prioritize these 
activities regardless of its economic condition. Regardless of the 
outcome of the nuclear talks, we will work closely with our allies and 
partners to deter, counter, and confront these activities. But the 
bottom line is that it is far better to deal with Iran's behavior 
without a nuclear crisis hanging over the Middle East and the rest of 
the world, and to confront that challenge in unity with our allies and 
partners.

    Question. The Central Bank of Iran, the National Iranian Oil 
Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, the National 
Petrochemical Company are all subject to U.S. terrorism sanctions 
specifically for financing the IRGC Quds Force. Why is it okay to lift 
sanctions on the financiers of people the President calls terrorists?

    Answer. The precise nature and sequence of the sanctions-related 
steps that the United States would take in connection with a mutual 
return to full implementation of the JCPOA is a subject of the talks. 
We have made it clear to Iran that, should we reach a deal on the 
JCPOA, we would continue to enforce sanctions to address its other 
troubling activities, including its destabilizing activities in the 
region, support for terrorism, and its human rights violations and 
abuses. It is better to deal with Iran's behavior without a nuclear 
crisis hanging over the Middle East and the rest of the world, and to 
confront that challenge in unity with our allies and partners.

    Question. If public reporting is accurate, Iran has been actively 
plotting assassination attempts on U.S. soil of current and former U.S. 
officials. Earlier this year, the Ayatollah himself posted an animated 
video demonstrating a proposed assassination attempt on President 
Trump. This is not to mention the U.S. indictment of an Iranian 
intelligence network last year for the attempted kidnapping of Iranian 
American activist Masih Alinejad from Brooklyn, NY.
    Why are we negotiating with Tehran in light of these plots, among 
numerous other reasons?

    Answer. This is an issue on which all Americans are united and that 
transcends any partisan politics: we will forcefully defend U.S. 
citizens and U.S. interests, both inside and outside the United States. 
This includes law enforcement actions, as well as the actions the 
President has taken to defend U.S. forces in the region from Iranian-
backed militia groups. We have to be clear to Iran that our response to 
any action that threatens Americans will be severe and robust. That is 
true regardless of the outcome of the nuclear talks. But, again, we are 
convinced that we will be in a better position to confront any Iranian 
threat without a looming nuclear crisis and the prospect of a nuclear-
armed Iran.

    Question. How can we ensure that the billions of dollars-worth of 
sanctions relief will not resource further plots against Americans?

    Answer. The unfortunate reality is that even the most comprehensive 
sanctions have not stopped Iran's destabilizing activities. We must 
work as closely as possible with our allies and partners to deter, 
counter, and confront those activities, regardless of the outcome of 
the nuclear talks, and the Biden-Harris administration is committed to 
that goal. We have a range of tools to combat Iran's support for 
terrorism and other malign behavior, and we will continue to use them 
aggressively. But the fact is that an Iran with a nuclear weapon would 
present a threat of far greater magnitude and could feel even more 
emboldened when it comes to supporting terrorism and threatening 
Americans as well as our allies and partners. That is why we, together 
with our European allies, believe that a mutual return to full JCPOA 
implementation is the best available option to constrain Iran's nuclear 
program and provide a platform to address Iran's other destabilizing 
conduct.

    Question. Do you believe Iran is effectively deterred from 
undertaking these missions in the U.S.?

    Answer. Iran should have no doubt that this Administration will 
forcefully defend U.S. citizens and U.S. interests, both inside and 
outside the United States. This includes the full range of tools at our 
disposal, which includes, but is by no means limited to enforcement 
actions and disrupting financial flows. We have been equally clear 
about this in forceful messages to Iran. That will be the case whether 
or not we return to the JCPOA.

    Question. A common response that we've been hearing repeatedly from 
the Administration is that without a return to the JCPOA or some other 
nuclear agreement, Iran will develop nuclear weapons--an outcome we 
absolutely cannot allow. While I agree that we must prevent this 
outcome, it is doubtful that the JCPOA would actually do this. Even 
before President Trump withdrew from the agreement, it was clear that 
Iran was violating its provisions and secretly developing its nuclear 
program.
    If this Administration does enter into a new nuclear deal, and Iran 
develops nuclear weapons anyway, that will destroy our credibility with 
allies and partners like Israel, Jordan and the UAE, which have all 
warned us that this could happen. Is the Administration prepared for 
this contingency?

    Answer. Throughout the talks leading up to a possible U.S. return 
to the JCPOA, we have been transparent with Israel and our regional 
partners, knowing that we all share a common interest: seeing to it 
that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. We believe diplomacy, in 
coordination with our allies and regional partners, is the best path to 
achieve that goal, and that a mutual return to full implementation of 
the JCPOA would give the United States the ability to detect and 
respond to any attempt by Iran to violate the deal and seek to develop 
a nuclear weapon. Indeed, not only the IAEA, but the Trump 
administration repeatedly certified that Iran remained in compliance 
with the JCPOA prior to the United States leaving the deal.
    In Israel, we have seen dozens of former senior Israeli security 
officials lamenting the U.S. departure from the JCPOA at a time when 
Iran was implementing its commitments under the arrangement and 
supporting the return to the JCPOA with stronger provisions. Likewise, 
last November, GCC member states issued a joint statement with the 
United States welcoming ongoing nuclear negotiations and noted that a 
mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA is the most effective 
way to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is constrained and 
exclusively for peaceful purposes.
    President Biden is unequivocal: Iran will not be allowed to obtain 
a nuclear weapon. This has been a longstanding, bipartisan position. 
While we believe diplomacy is the best path forward to achieve that 
goal, this Administration will do whatever is necessary to prevent Iran 
from acquiring a nuclear weapon, taking no option off the table.

    Question. Israel, for its part, has made it quite clear that it 
would take matters into its own hands if a deal failed. How has the 
Administration taken that into account during negotiations?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has an ironclad commitment 
to Israel's security. Our coordination with Israel has never been 
closer. Defense Minister Gantz's recent visit to Washington is only the 
latest in a continuing series of high-level engagements and practical 
U.S.-Israeli collaboration to counter Iranian threats. Because of this 
deep coordination, we are well-prepared to deter and counter any 
Iranian threats. We will continue to work with Israel to address these 
threats regardless of the outcome of the nuclear talks.

    Question. Is the Administration prepared to assist our allies in 
defending themselves in the event Iran develops nuclear weapons? How 
specifically would the Administration do so?

    Answer. President Biden is unequivocal: Iran will not be allowed to 
obtain a nuclear weapon. This has been a longstanding, bipartisan 
position. While we believe diplomacy is the best path forward to 
achieve that goal, this Administration will do whatever is necessary to 
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, taking no option off the 
table.
    Separately, we work closely with our allies and partners in the 
region to bolster their ability to defend themselves against threats 
from Iran and others.

    Question. The architects of the 2015 JCPOA pledged to the U.S. 
Congress and the American people that the U.S. would retain the 
authority to impose sanctions on Iran for non-nuclear malign behavior, 
including targeting organizations supporting terrorism. But in 
practice, if public reporting is accurate, the U.S. is offering to lift 
terrorism sanctions on Iran's Central Bank, the National Iranian Oil 
Company, and Iran's Oil Ministry in exchange for merely returning to 
mutual compliance with the JCPOA despite no evidence these entities 
have stopped resourcing terrorism.
    Are U.S. negotiators offering this relief? If so, why?

    Answer. If we are able to achieve a mutual return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA, we would be prepared to lift sanctions on 
those entities required for us to be in compliance with the deal. This 
would need to involve some entities in Iran's energy and banking 
sectors. Insisting on no sanctions lifting would be insisting on no 
deal at all. And this deal is good for our security. As evidenced by 
the U.S. Government's continuing efforts to seize Iranian-origin oil 
and the recent designation of entities involved in an IRGC illicit oil 
financing network, we will continue to use a broad range of tools to 
disrupt funding streams to the IRGC regardless of the mode they take.
    We reserve the right to re-designate under non-nuclear authorities, 
such as counter-terrorism or human rights, persons that would be 
delisted in connection with a U.S. return to the JCPOA where their 
conduct warrants it. Any decision about whether to re-designate an 
entity would be taken by the Administration based on the facts and its 
assessment of how best to advance our national interests.

    Question. Is there any evidence that these entities have stopped 
financing terrorism?

    Answer. The Administration would be happy to provide more detail on 
this matter in a classified setting.

    Question. How is that consistent with previous representations made 
to Congress that the JCPOA doesn't prevent the U.S. from levying non-
nuclear sanctions?

    Answer. As we have made clear, in the event of a mutual return to 
full implementation of the JCPOA, we reserve the right to designate or 
re-designate persons under non-nuclear authorities, such as counter-
terrorism or human rights. We have made clear to Iran that we would 
continue to use sanctions to address its troubling non-nuclear 
activities, including its destabilizing activities in the region, 
support for terrorism, and human rights abuses. Any decision to do so 
would be taken by the Administration based on the facts and its 
assessment of how best to advance our national security interests.

    Question. Another shortcoming of the initial JCPOA was its failure 
to provide for ``anywhere, anytime'' inspections of Iranian facilities 
where suspected nuclear activities may have been taking place.
    Are you confident that the JCPOA's monitoring and verification 
regime is adequate to ensure that inspectors have a full picture of 
Iran's nuclear program?

    Answer. A major benefit of Iran resuming full implementation of its 
JCPOA commitments would be the restoration of the most intensive 
verification regime ever negotiated, which includes, but is not limited 
to, Iran's implementation of the Additional Protocol to its 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which would provide the IAEA the 
access and information it needs to give assurance about the absence of 
covert nuclear activities. The JCPOA also provides for verification and 
monitoring that goes well beyond Iran's IAEA safeguards obligations, 
including of uranium ore concentrate production, heavy water stocks, 
and centrifuge component manufacturing.
    A return to full implementation of the JCPOA would provide the IAEA 
with the access it needs to verify that there is no undeclared nuclear 
material or activity in Iran, and that Iran is complying with its 
nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. In particular, there is no 
exemption for any locations, including military sites, under either the 
JCPOA's special access provisions or the Additional Protocol, and the 
JCPOA provides for a special process to ensure prompt access, within a 
predetermined, limited time frame to any location in Iran the IAEA 
deems necessary in order to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear 
materials or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA.

    Question. Has your negotiating team sought to enhance the 
monitoring and verification regime in its negotiations to restore the 
JCPOA, and how has Iran responded if so?

    Answer. I cannot here discuss the details of the negotiations. A 
return to full implementation of the JCPOA would restore the 
arrangement's significant constraints on Iran's nuclear program as well 
as the arrangement's stringent verification and monitoring measures, 
which go well beyond standard comprehensive safeguards and are the most 
intrusive ever negotiated. These measures provide high confidence in 
the ability of the IAEA to verify that Iran is fully implementing its 
nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and to detect any attempt 
by Iran to divert nuclear material or equipment.

    Question. According to public reporting, Iran has demanded the 
rescission of Executive Order 13876, which authorized sanctions on 
Iran's supreme leader, his office, and his appointees. This Executive 
Order's stated purpose was non-nuclear in nature. The text of the Order 
itself authorized these sanctions ``in light of the actions of the 
Government of Iran and Iranian-backed proxies, particularly those taken 
to destabilize the Middle East, promote international terrorism, and 
advance Iran's ballistic missile program and Iran's irresponsible and 
provocative actions in or over international waters.'' Under this 
authority, some of the most powerful actors of the Iranian system have 
been sanctioned, including the supreme leader, his son Mojtaba, his 
chief of staff, his foreign policy advisor, and other key figures in 
his office, not to mention his one-time military aide Hossein Dehghan, 
who served as the commander of IRGC forces in Lebanon and Syria in 1983 
when the bombing of a Marine compound in Beirut, Lebanon killed 241 
U.S. servicemembers. That is not to mention that Iran's President 
Ebrahim Raisi himself is sanctioned under this authority. He has been 
accused of crimes against humanity.
    Has the U.S. agreed to lift this Executive Order? If so, why is 
that necessary given its non-nuclear nature?

    Answer. If Iran were prepared to return its nuclear program to the 
JCPOA's limits, including with respect to the level and scale of its 
uranium enrichment activities, the United States would be prepared to 
lift the necessary sanctions to return to JCPOA compliance. We reserve 
the right to re-designate under non-nuclear authorities, such as 
counter-terrorism or human rights, persons that are delisted in 
connection with a U.S. return to the JCPOA where their conduct warrants 
it. We have made it clear to Iran that we would continue to use 
sanctions to address its troubling non-nuclear activities, including 
its destabilizing activities in the region, support for terrorism, and 
human rights abuses.

    Question. Does this undermine the representations made by the 
architects of the JCPOA to this Congress that nothing in the JCPOA 
prevents the U.S. from levying non-nuclear sanctions?

    Answer. We have made it clear to Iran that even in the event of a 
mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA, we reserve the right 
to re-designate under non-nuclear authorities, such as counter-
terrorism or human rights, persons that are delisted in connection with 
a U.S. return to the JCPOA where their conduct warrants it. We have 
made it clear to Iran that we would continue to use sanctions to 
address its troubling non-nuclear activities, including its 
destabilizing activities in the region, support for terrorism, and 
human rights abuses.

    Question. I understand that you have been in frequent contact with 
the families of Emad Shargi, Babak and Siamak Namazi, and Morad Tahbaz. 
While I am appreciative of this level of contact, I am concerned that a 
future deal will sacrifice U.S. national interest and may not result in 
these four Americans' release. Late last year, media reports indicated 
that the Iranians had rejected a demand that these four detainees be 
released in order to negotiate directly. The Obama administration 
negotiated a side deal to the JCPOA that paid for hostages with pallets 
of cash, but this did not include the Namazis. The Trump administration 
reversed the policy of paying for hostages and negotiated prisoner 
exchanges only without any payments.
    Are you confident that the United States will secure a release for 
all four Americans held in Iran?

    Answer. For decades, the Iranian regime has unjustly detained 
Americans and other foreign citizens and dual nationals for political 
purposes, including before, during, and after U.S. participation in the 
JCPOA. Iran's unjust imprisonment of U.S. nationals for use as 
political leverage is outrageous. Our priority is bringing all our 
wrongfully detained U.S. nationals home safely as soon as possible and 
resolving the cases of missing and abducted U.S. nationals. At the same 
time, we are working with our allies--many of whom have suffered from 
similar action by Iran--to make clear to Iran that this practice must 
end.
    With regard to the four unjustly detained U.S. nationals and to Bob 
Levinson, we are treating their cases independently from the 
discussions on the JCPOA but, as I have repeatedly said, it is very 
difficult for us to imagine a return to the JCPOA while our nationals 
remain unjustly detained. We are working night and day to bring home 
all wrongfully detained U.S. nationals in Iran and to reach closure in 
Bob Levinson's case.

    Question. Do the Iranians believe you are negotiating payment for 
hostages at this time?

    Answer. No. The United States will not pay Iran one cent for the 
release of wrongfully detained U.S. nationals. While we are treating 
the issue of detainees independently from the discussions on the JCPOA, 
we may consider actions to address this issue that are separate from 
our efforts to achieve a mutual return to full implementation of the 
JCPOA. We are also working with our allies, many of which also have 
nationals currently arbitrarily or wrongfully detained by the Iranian 
Government, to seek their nationals' release. Iran's unjust 
imprisonment of U.S. nationals for use as political leverage is 
outrageous. Our priority is bringing all our wrongfully detained 
nationals home safely as soon as possible and resolving the cases of 
missing and abducted U.S. nationals.

    Question. What will prevent Iran from taking more hostages in the 
future if it believes it can hold Americans or other foreign nationals 
for ransom?

    Answer. For decades, the Iranian regime has unjustly detained 
Americans and other foreign citizens and dual nationals for political 
purposes, including before, during, and after U.S. participation in the 
JCPOA. We stand with the international community against wrongful and 
arbitrary detention. Arbitrary detentions are prohibited under 
international human rights conventions. The United States signed on to 
the ``Declaration Against the Use of Arbitrary Detention in State-to-
State Relations'' and congratulates Canada for obtaining the 
endorsement of so many countries. The broad coalition of governments 
endorsing the declaration sends a clear message that history remains on 
the side of human rights and the rule of law--not the cynical use of 
law as a political tool. When arbitrary detentions are used, as too 
many nations do, to try to obtain leverage in state-to-state relations, 
they are a heinous act against the human rights of the individuals in 
question and are an affront to international law. We also strongly 
caution all Americans from traveling to Iran because of the high risk 
of arbitrary detention. We currently maintain a Level Four Travel 
Advisory advising against travel to Iran.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Robert Malley to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. An international agreement will be far more likely to 
survive multiple presidential administrations if and when the Executive 
Branch follows the Constitution by formally submitting the agreement as 
a treaty for this Senate's advice and consent. Do you disagree with 
this statement?

    Answer. I share President Biden's conviction that a bipartisan 
approach to Iran is the strongest way to safeguard U.S. interests for 
the long term, and I remain deeply committed to continued close 
engagement with Congress in a bipartisan manner as Iran policy 
continues to develop. We will be open and transparent with Congress 
about any deal that is reached on a mutual return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA, and, should we succeed in reaching such a 
deal, we will submit it to Congress for review under the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act (INARA).

    Question. Can you explain to this Committee why the Biden 
administration will not commit to submitting any agreement to revive or 
amend the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (``JCPOA'') as a treaty 
for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification under the 
Constitution?

    Answer. We will be open and transparent with Congress about any 
deal that is reached on a mutual return to full implementation of the 
JCPOA, and, should we succeed in reaching such a deal, we will submit 
it to Congress for review under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
(INARA).

    Question. Congress enacted the vast majority of Iran sanctions--
including the Menendez-Kirk secondary sanctions against the Central 
Bank of Iran and against Iranian oil exports--not only in response to 
Iran's nuclear program, but also in response to Iran's prolific support 
for international terrorism, for missile proliferation, and for 
systemic and egregious human rights abuses. Do you agree with this 
statement?

    Answer. Yes. The United States has a range of tools available to 
address Iran's support for terrorism and other malign activities, 
including sanctions, and we have made it clear to Iran that, should we 
succeed in reaching a deal on a mutual return to full implementation of 
the JCPOA, we would continue to enforce sanctions to address its other 
troubling activities, including its destabilizing activities in the 
region, missile proliferation activities, support for terrorism, and 
its human rights violations and abuses.

    Question. In seeking to negotiate with Iran and other nations on 
U.S. involvement in the JCPOA, does the Biden administration still 
support the JCPOA's requirement for Congress to repeal key U.S. 
sanctions laws against the Iranian regime--including the far-reaching 
and effective Menendez-Kirk sanctions laws--by what the Iran deal calls 
``Transition Day''--that is, by no later than October 2023?

    Answer. The United States will abide by its commitments under the 
JCPOA if there is a mutual return to full implementation of the 
arrangement, including seeking legislative action on Transition Day as 
described in Annex V.

    Question. Given the Iranian demand to remove sanctions from Iran's 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), what is the Biden 
administration's final decision on this matter? Was this decision 
transmitted to the Iranians and, if so, what was their response?

    Answer. As the Secretary told this Committee in April, we have 
communicated clearly to Iran that revoking the IRGC's FTO designation 
goes beyond the JCPOA and can only be discussed if and when Iran is 
willing to take actions outside the scope of the JCPOA to merit a 
revocation. Iran has told us it is not now willing to take such steps.

    Question. What does the Biden administration intend to do towards 
Iran in order to restore U.S. deterrence? In the absence of a revived 
JCPOA, what measures will be taken against it in order to urgently curb 
its nuclear technological progress?

    Answer. The last Administration's decision to exit the JCPOA 
resulted in a worsening of Iran's destabilizing behavior in the region, 
including increased attacks by Iran and its proxies and partners 
against U.S. forces and diplomatic personnel in the Middle East.
    The Biden administration has strengthened U.S. deterrence by 
hardening our defenses, conducting dynamic force deployments to the 
region, including long-range bomber overflights, deepening intelligence 
cooperation, boosting the capacity of our partners, interdicting 
Iranian weapons, and disrupting financial flows, as well as conducting 
defensive strikes in Iraq and Syria to deter Iran and Iran-backed 
militia groups from conducting or supporting further attacks on U.S. 
personnel and facilities.
    Moreover, with our efforts to achieve a mutual return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA, we have repaired relations with Europe 
that had been strained as a result of the previous Administration's 
exit from the deal, and we will continue to work closely with our 
allies and partners in Europe and the Middle East to counter Iran's 
destabilizing activities.
    Regarding the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program, the bottom 
line, as Iran knows perfectly well, is that President Biden is 
committed to ensuring that Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon. 
The Administration, along with our allies and partners, is preparing 
equally to meet that commitment under scenarios with and without a 
mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA.

    Question. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) has issued several reports on Iran that make clear the 
IAEA has serious outstanding concerns regarding possible undeclared 
nuclear material and activities in Iran today. Is it your understanding 
that the IAEA has not been able to provide assurances that Iran's 
nuclear program is peaceful?

    Answer. The Director General's most recent report on the 
implementation of Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement makes clear 
that Iran has not provided the substantive cooperation necessary to 
resolve the IAEA's serious outstanding safeguards concerns. The 
Director General has made clear that he needs that substantive 
cooperation in order to confirm the correctness and completeness of 
Iran's declarations under its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement and to 
provide the assurance that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively 
peaceful.

    Question. Is Iran in full compliance with the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty?

    Answer. The IAEA Director General's most recent report on the 
implementation of Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement makes clear 
that Iran still has not provided the substantive cooperation necessary 
to resolve its serious outstanding safeguards concerns related to 
possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Iran's 
continued failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA's ongoing safeguards 
investigations raises serious concerns with regard to Iran's compliance 
with its obligation to accept safeguards under Article III of the NPT. 
The Director General also made clear that he remains ready to engage 
without delay to resolve the outstanding safeguards matters.

    Question. Was Iran's secret Atomic Archive--the existence of which 
Israel revealed in May 2018 after a stunning intelligence operation--
consistent with Iran's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty and related IAEA safeguards agreements?

    Answer. Iran's legal obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its NPT-required safeguards agreement 
remain in force and are separate from its nuclear-related commitments 
under the JCPOA. Iran's safeguards obligations include the obligation 
to declare nuclear material and activities to the IAEA. Iran's 
continued failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA's ongoing safeguards 
investigations raises serious concerns with regard to Iran's compliance 
with its obligation to accept safeguards under Article III of the NPT.

    Question. Is it true that Iran routinely hampers the IAEA's ability 
to have the kind of unfettered, verifiable inspection regime you say 
will ensure Iran is not able to build a nuclear bomb?

    Answer. Prior to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran was 
implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including 
enhanced verification and monitoring measures and implementation of the 
Additional Protocol, which provided the IAEA the most significant 
inspection authorities ever negotiated. The value of a return to that 
inspection regime is one of the reasons we are committed to seeking a 
mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA.

    Question. Is it correct that Iran has not, to the best of your 
knowledge, satisfactorily answered the IAEA's questions on undeclared 
nuclear material and activities?

    Answer. The Director General's most recent report on the 
implementation of Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement makes clear 
that Iran has not provided the substantive cooperation necessary to 
resolve its serious outstanding safeguards concerns related to possible 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Biden 
administration has made clear that it is imperative that Iran fully 
cooperate with the IAEA to resolve these serious safeguards concerns 
without further delay.

    Question. Iran has demanded closure of the IAEA's investigation 
into Iran's past nuclear activities. Do you believe the United States 
should support Iran's demand?

    Answer. No. Iran's legal obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its NPT-required safeguards agreement 
remain in force. They are separate from Iran's nuclear-related 
commitments under the JCPOA. Iran must provide the required cooperation 
necessary to resolve the IAEA's concerns related to possible undeclared 
nuclear material and activities in Iran.
    We fully support the IAEA's continued efforts to resolve these 
issues consistent with standard safeguards practices. As the IAEA 
Director General has made clear, these safeguards issues will remain 
outstanding until they are clarified and resolved to the full 
satisfaction of the IAEA. We look forward to the day that these issues 
can be removed from consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors, but 
that can happen only when Iran provides the necessary cooperation to 
resolve the IAEA's concerns.

    Question. Iran is being investigated by the IAEA in as many as four 
different investigations concerning the presence of undeclared nuclear 
material at various sites in Iran. These investigations have been going 
on for nearly 4 years, with no real cooperation from Iran. A roadmap 
for assessment agreed between the IAEA and Iran in March apparently has 
failed due to a lack of Iranian cooperation. You noted in your 
testimony on May 25, 2022, that you are consulting with allies about 
action that may take place at the IAEA's Board of Governor's meeting. 
Does Iran's consistent failure to cooperate with the IAEA merit censure 
via a resolution at the upcoming IAEA Board of Governor's meeting in 
June 2022 in your view? If not, what further lack of cooperation would 
Iran have to engage in to merit censure?

    Answer. Iran must be held accountable to its obligations under its 
NPT-required comprehensive safeguards agreement. We are consulting with 
our European allies and with Israel and others to decide the best way 
to accomplish this at the Board of Governors meeting in June. We have 
made clear that Iran must cooperate fully and on an urgent basis with 
the Agency to clarify and resolve the long outstanding safeguards 
issues.

    Question. Are you committed to full, truthful accounting of Iran's 
nuclear program before the U.S. agrees to any deal?

    Answer. We have made clear that Iran must provide the 
clarifications required by its safeguards obligations. The fact that 
outstanding safeguards questions remain unresolved with respect to 
Iran's nuclear program only makes it more important to achieve a return 
to full implementation of the JCPOA's tight nuclear restrictions and 
stringent international verification regime, including Iran's 
implementation of its Additional Protocol. Open questions about 
possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran are 
especially troubling when combined with a relatively unconstrained and 
less monitored nuclear program in Iran today.

    Question. Will you commit not to lift sanctions against Iran until 
the regime complies with the IAEA's requests to satisfactorily resolve 
outstanding issues relating to undeclared nuclear material and 
activities?

    Answer. Iran's legal obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its NPT-required safeguards agreement 
remain in force and are separate from its nuclear-related commitments 
under the JCPOA. These obligations include the obligation to declare 
nuclear material and activities to the IAEA. If Iran does not provide 
the necessary cooperation, those safeguards issues will remain a 
concern for the Board of Governors.
    The fact that there are outstanding questions only makes it more 
urgent to achieve a return to full implementation of the JCPOA's tight 
nuclear restrictions and stringent international verification regime, 
including Iran's implementation of its Additional Protocol. Open 
questions about possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in 
Iran are especially troubling when combined with a relatively 
unconstrained and less monitored nuclear program in Iran today.

    Question. Is the Biden administration prepared to work with other 
nations to escalate Iran's noncompliance with the ongoing IAEA 
investigation to the U.N. Security Council, which would likely entail a 
snapback of prior U.N. sanctions resolutions? What would you assess 
would trigger that?

    Answer. The Administration fully supports the IAEA's efforts to 
resolve outstanding safeguards issues with Iran, and we will continue 
working with our allies and partners to take all necessary steps in 
that regard.
                                 ______
                                 

      Article From Wall Street Journal Titled, ``Iran Used Secret 
                 U.N. Records to Evade Nuclear Probes''
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