[Senate Hearing 117-366]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





                                                        S. Hrg. 117-366
 
                                TREATIES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS



                             SECOND SESSION



                               __________

                  INSERT DATE HERE deg.APRIL 6, 2022

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       
       
       
       
   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
       
       
       
       
       
       
       




                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                          ______
 
              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 48-585 PDF          WASHINGTON : 2022 
                 
                  
                  


                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Visek, Richard, Acting Legal Adviser, Office of the Legal 
  Adviser, U.S. 
  Department of State, Washington, DC............................     4
    Prepared Statement...........................................     5

Ary, Major General Vaughn, [Ret.], Director of the Office of 
  International Affairs, Department of Justice, Washington, DC...     7
    Prepared Statement...........................................     8

Thompson, Dr. John, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, 
  Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC..............    10
    Prepared Statement...........................................    12

Yurek, Stephen, President and CEO, Air-Conditioning, Heating, and 
  Refrigeration Institute [AHRI], Arlington, Virginia............    20
    Prepared Statement...........................................    21

Sousa, Jim, President of the American Tunaboat Association, 
  Director at GS Fisheries, San Diego, California................    26
    Prepared Statement...........................................    27

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Dr. John Thompson to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  John Barrasso..................................................    35

Letters of Support for the Kigali Amendment From the Business 
  Community......................................................    40

                                 (iii)

  


                                TREATIES

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Murphy, Kaine, Van 
Hollen, Risch, and Johnson.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 
come to order. Today's treaty hearing comes at a time when the 
importance of strengthening our bonds and reinforcing the rule 
of law is as clear as ever.
    I am grateful to the ranking member for helping make this 
hearing happen and I also want to thank both panels of highly-
qualified experts for appearing today.
    Our committee has a critical constitutional role to play in 
the treaty-making process and what we do directly impacts U.S. 
national security, law enforcement, businesses, and consumers.
    While the treaties on the agenda today cover varied subject 
matters, they have a common feature. They all make technical 
updates to frameworks from years past, updates that are 
required to maximize our engagement with other countries, and 
in the case of the Tuna Treaty amendments and Kigali, for our 
industries to stay competitive.
    Turning first to the pair of bilateral law enforcement 
treaties with Croatia, we know that modern criminal networks do 
not observe international borders. Terrorists, cyber criminals, 
drug traffickers are not limited to one country or another, and 
addressing the threat they pose requires intense cooperation.
    These treaties with Croatia will improve our law 
enforcement relationship with Croatia, enhancing the ability to 
extradite criminals, share information, and exchange evidence 
for investigations and prosecutions.
    Next, we will hear testimony about amendments to the 1987 
South Pacific Tuna Treaty. The Tuna Treaty has long been a 
cornerstone of U.S. economic interests in the South Pacific and 
our relations with other countries in the region.
    Reinforcing those bonds is more important than ever, 
especially in the face of growing Chinese influence. Our 
fishing industry and U.S. consumers have long benefited from 
access to fishing waters in the Pacific, but our fishing fleet 
needs a better deal, which these amendments would provide.
    For instance, the amendments would make it easier for U.S. 
fishing vessels to fish on the high seas, and the new 
amendments would allow U.S. businesses to negotiate commercial 
fishing arrangements directly with our Pacific Island partners 
without the Federal Government as a middleman.
    The Tuna Treaty has long been vital to U.S. economic 
interests and our strategic influence in the region, and 
modernizing it will support even more economic activity and 
further burnish our relationships with important partners.
    Finally, we will look at the Kigali Amendment to the 
Montreal Protocol. The United States ratified the Montreal 
Protocol more than three decades ago, and as U.S. companies 
have innovated and developed new technologies and products, the 
Senate has approved four amendments to keep up with those 
advances.
    The Kigali Amendment modernizes the Montreal Protocol by 
addressing chemicals called hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs. HFCs 
became a commonplace alternative to dangerous ozone-depleting 
substances in response to the Montreal Protocol.
    We know now that they are dangerous in their own right. 
Beginning with the engagement and encouragement of the George 
W. Bush administration, U.S. manufacturers have led the 
development of the next generation of refrigerants and 
technologies to replace HFCs and President Trump took a major 
step towards domestic adoption of this next-gen technology by 
signing the AIM Act into law.
    Senate approval of the Kigali will help U.S. businesses, 
including manufacturers in Texas, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, 
develop and access global markets, and it is necessary so that 
they do not get locked out from trade with other partners to 
the treaty.
    We have received an outpouring of support for the Kigali 
Amendment from the business community, including many letters. 
This includes letters from Wal-Mart, Carrier, Lennox, and 
others, and I asked for consent to enter these letters into the 
record and we will provide them to the clerk.
    Without objection, so ordered.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. Industry estimates calculate that ratifying 
the Kigali Amendment will help increase U.S. exports by $5 
billion and create 33,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs.
    In contrast, our exports and export-related jobs are 
predicted to contract significantly if we fail to do so. All 
four previous amendments passed with bipartisan support and I 
hope this one will as well.
    I am pleased that we have an opportunity today to hear from 
government experts on international cooperation in these areas: 
Acting Legal Adviser to the State Department, Richard Visek; 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Thompson from the 
Oceans, Environment, and Science Bureau; and Vaughn Ary, the 
director of the Office of International Affairs at the 
Department of Justice.
    Testifying on our second panel of industry experts we have 
Mr. Stephen Yurek, CEO of the Air Conditioning, Heating, and 
Refrigeration Institute, based in Arlington, Virginia, who will 
testify on the significance of the Kigali Amendment, and Mr. 
Jim Sousa, president of the America Tunaboat Association and 
director of GS Fisheries from San Diego, California, who is 
here to testify on the amendments to the South Pacific Tuna 
Treaty.
    With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member, 
Senator Risch, for his remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this 
hearing. Obviously, treaties is one of the important things 
that this committee does, and it kind of gets lost with the 
swamp of the nominations that we have to do, but it is 
important and deserves our attention.
    From the State Department and Department of Justice, we 
will hear how the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Croatia 
will help streamline the process for securing the evidence and 
testimony we need to enforce our laws.
    It will also update our current extradition treaty, making 
it adaptable to advances in criminal law in the United States. 
The State Department will also discuss the South Pacific Tuna 
Treaty. This agreement, submitted under the last 
Administration, established stable and predictable fishing 
rights for U.S. vessels fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
waters of certain island nations of the South Pacific.
    This treaty updates our existing agreements and strengthens 
our cooperation and partnership with these island nations, 
particularly at a time when China is attempting to increase its 
influence in that part of the Pacific.
    Finally, we will hear from the State Department on the 
Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. The Senate has 
consented to ratification of the previous four amendments to 
the Montreal Protocol with strong bipartisan votes.
    With ratification of this treaty, the U.S. will join more 
than 120 countries in a multi-decade plan to phase down the 
production and consumption of 18 highly-polluting substances 
known as HFCs.
    The treaty will facilitate the transition to the next 
generation of refrigerants. This benefits our U.S. industry, 
which enjoys a strong competitive advantage in the production 
of successor substances to HFCs.
    Finally, I will note that we passed legislation last 
Congress, the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act, which 
implements U.S. obligations under this treaty.
    With ratification of this amendment, the U.S. can better 
position itself to uphold our interest as we transition away 
from these substances to the newer, more efficient substances 
that will replace HFCs globally.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    We will start with our first panel, and I will start with 
Mr. Visek from the State Department.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD VISEK, ACTING LEGAL ADVISER, OFFICE OF THE 
    LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Visek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to 
appear before you today to testify in support of two law 
enforcement treaties being considered by the committee, the 
Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with the 
Republic of Croatia.
    I am also pleased to be joined on this panel by two 
distinguished colleagues, Vaughn Ary from the Department of 
Justice's Office of International Affairs, who will also be 
testifying in support of these important law enforcement 
agreements, and Dr. John Thompson from the Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, who will 
testify in support of two other important treaties, the Kigali 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol and the amendments to the 
Treaty on Fisheries with certain Pacific Island states.
    The agreements with Croatia will modernize and strengthen 
our law enforcement cooperation relationship with an important 
European partner and improve our ability to combat trans-border 
crime including terrorism, other forms of violent crime, drug 
trafficking, cybercrime, and the laundering of the proceeds of 
criminal activity.
    In addition, these treaties will further our project to 
conform our law enforcement treaties with member states of the 
European Union to the standards established in our extradition 
and mutual legal assistance agreements with the European Union.
    The U.S. extradition relationship with Croatia is currently 
governed by a 1901 treaty with the then Kingdom of Serbia, 
which is not as effective as the modern treaties we have in 
force with other countries, and does not contain provisions 
required by the agreement on extradition between the United 
States of America and the European Union.
    We do not currently have a mutual legal assistance 
agreement in place with Croatia and the treaty now before you 
would serve to implement bilaterally the Agreement on Mutual 
Legal Assistance between the United States of America and the 
European Union.
    Together, these two treaties would establish a modern law 
enforcement cooperation relationship with Croatia. Updating 
outdated extradition treaties with modern ones is necessary to 
create a seamless web of mutual obligations to facilitate the 
prompt location, arrest, and extradition of international 
fugitives.
    For their part, treaty-based mutual legal assistance 
mechanisms facilitate our ability to obtain evidence and other 
forms of assistance in support of our criminal investigations 
and prosecutions.
    As a result, these treaties are an important part of the 
Administration's efforts to ensure that those who commit crimes 
against Americans will face justice in the United States.
    The new U.S.-Croatia extradition agreement contains several 
important provisions that will serve our law enforcement 
objectives. I will touch briefly on these provisions.
    First, it incorporates the contemporary dual criminality 
approach. Whereas the 1901 treaty provides for extradition only 
for offences appearing on a closed list, the new agreement 
covers any offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of 
more than 1 year under the laws of both states.
    The dual criminality approach eliminates the need to 
renegotiate treaties to cover new offenses in instances in 
which both states pass laws to address new types of criminal 
activity.
    Second, a new Extradition Treaty contains a provision that 
permits the temporary surrender to the United States of a 
person facing prosecution or serving a sentence in Croatia.
    This provision can be important so that, for example, 
charges pending against the person can be resolved earlier 
while evidence is fresh or so he or she can be prosecuted 
alongside any co-defendants.
    Third, the new Extradition Treaty incorporates other 
improvements that can expedite or streamline extradition 
processes, including by providing clarity on the materials 
required for formal extradition requests as well as 
incorporating a simplified procedure when an individual 
consents to extradition.
    For its part, the new U.S.-Croatia Mutual Legal Assistance 
Agreement formalized as a framework for cooperation on those 
issues regulated by the U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance 
Agreement, such as the identification of bank information, the 
use of video conference technology, and a process to transmit 
expedited requests. This agreement will facilitate assistance 
between our countries in criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.
    For all these reasons, U.S. ratification of these two law 
enforcement treaties will help us and our colleagues at the 
Justice Department deepen our law enforcement relationship with 
Croatia and advance our objective combating transnational 
crime.
    Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before 
you to address these treaties and I look forward to your 
questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Visek follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Richard C. Visek

    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear 
before you today to testify in support of two law enforcement treaties 
being considered by the committee: the Extradition and Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties with Croatia.
    The administration appreciates the committee's prioritization of 
these treaties. Both the Croatia extradition and mutual legal 
assistance treaties advance U.S. interests. They will modernize and 
strengthen our law enforcement cooperation relationship with an 
important European partner, and thereby improve our ability to combat 
transborder crime, including terrorism, other forms of violent crime, 
drug trafficking, cybercrime, and the laundering of the proceeds of 
criminal activity. In addition, these treaties will advance our project 
to conform our law enforcement treaties with Member States of the 
European Union to the standards established in the extradition and 
mutual legal assistance agreements we have concluded with the European 
Union. The administration supports both of these treaties and urges the 
Senate to provide its advice and consent to their ratification.
    The U.S. extradition relationship with Croatia is currently 
governed by the Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Kingdom of Servia for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, 
signed on October 25, 1901 (``the 1901 Treaty''). This treaty is not as 
effective as the modern treaties we have in force with other countries 
in ensuring that fugitives may be brought to justice, and it does not 
incorporate the provisions required by the Agreement on Extradition 
between the United States of America and the European Union signed on 
June 25, 2003 (``the U.S.-EU Extradition Agreement''), and to which the 
Senate gave its advice and consent in 2008.
    We do not currently have a mutual legal assistance agreement in 
place with Croatia, and the treaty now before you would fill that gap 
and serve to implement the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between 
the United States of America and the European Union, signed on June 25, 
2003 (``the U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement''), and to which 
the Senate gave its advice and consent in 2008.
    Both of the treaties before you today are self-executing and were 
ratified by Croatia in April of 2020. As such, U.S. ratification would 
allow the parties to bring these instruments into force and immediately 
begin making use of them for enhanced law enforcement cooperation.
    These two treaties would establish a modern law enforcement 
relationship with Croatia. Replacing outdated extradition treaties with 
modern ones (as well as negotiating extradition treaties with new 
partners where appropriate) is necessary to create a seamless web of 
mutual obligations to facilitate the prompt location, arrest and 
extradition of international fugitives. Similarly, treaty-based mutual 
legal assistance mechanisms facilitate our ability to obtain evidence 
and other forms of assistance in support of our criminal investigations 
and prosecutions. As a result, these two treaties are an important part 
of the administration's efforts to ensure that those who commit crimes 
against Americans will face justice in the United States.
    The new U.S.-Croatia Extradition Agreement contains several 
important provisions that will serve our law enforcement objectives:

    First, it defines extraditable offenses to include conduct that is 
punishable by imprisonment or deprivation of liberty for a period of 
more than 1 year in both States. This is the so-called ``dual 
criminality'' approach. Our older treaties, including the 1901 Treaty, 
provide for extradition only for offenses appearing on a list contained 
in the instrument. The problem with this approach is that, as time 
passes, the lists grow increasingly out of date. The dual criminality 
approach eliminates the need to renegotiate treaties to cover new 
offenses in instances in which both States pass laws to address new 
types of criminal activity. By way of illustration, so called ``list 
treaties'' from the beginning of the 20th century do not clearly cover 
various forms of cybercrime or money laundering. The new treaty would 
fix this problem.
    Second, unlike the 1901 Treaty, the new extradition treaty contains 
a provision that would permit the temporary surrender of a fugitive to 
the United States of a person facing prosecution, or serving a 
sentence, in Croatia. This provision is important because it can enable 
pending charges against a person to be resolved while the evidence is 
still fresh, as well as enable the prosecution of a person together 
with his or her codefendants.
    And third, the new extradition treaty incorporates a number of 
other improvements over the 1901 Treaty, including procedural 
improvements that have the potential to expedite extradition processes 
by streamlining and clarifying the requirements for extradition. For 
example, the new treaty provides clarity on the materials required to 
be included in a formal extradition request, allows for direct 
transmission of provisional arrest requests through Justice Department 
channels, and sets out criteria for situations where more than one 
State has requested the extradition of an individual. The treaty also 
provides for a simplified procedure when an individual consents to 
extradition.

    For its part, the new U.S.-Croatia Mutual Legal Assistance 
Agreement formalizes a framework for effective cooperation on the 
issues covered by the U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, 
including provisions on: the identification of bank information 
relating to individuals suspected or charged with criminal offenses; 
the establishment and operation of joint investigative teams; the use 
of video-conferencing technology to take testimony; the ability to make 
requests by expedited means; and the provision of assistance to 
administrative authorities that are conducting investigations of 
criminal activity. The new treaty also contains provisions concerning 
limitations on use, confidentiality, and grounds for refusal of a 
request. This treaty is consistent with treaties concluded with other 
EU Member States with which the United States did not have an existing 
mutual legal assistance treaty and establishes a crucial framework to 
facilitate assistance between our countries in criminal investigations 
and prosecutions.
    For all these reasons, U.S. ratification of these two law 
enforcement treaties will help us and our colleagues at the Department 
of Justice to deepen an important law enforcement relationship and 
advance our objective of combatting transnational crime.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Ary, you are next.

 STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHN ARY [RET.], DIRECTOR OF THE 
    OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Ary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
    I am pleased to appear before you today to express the 
support of the Department of Justice for the Extradition and 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties between the United States and 
the Republic of Croatia.
    It is my privilege to serve as the director of the Office 
of International Affairs, which is the section within the 
Justice Department that implements Extradition and Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties for the benefit of all federal, state, and 
local law enforcement investigations and prosecutions.
    As an initial matter, I would like to thank our colleagues 
at the Department of State for working with us for many years 
to negotiate these agreements with Croatia.
    We work closely with our partners at State to execute our 
law enforcement treaties, and the Office of International 
Affairs relies on these treaty relationships to return 
international fugitives to face prosecution in the United 
States and to obtain essential evidence.
    Prosecutors benefit from this network of treaties and we 
are grateful to this committee for its work in building and 
modernizing them to meet the law enforcement challenges of the 
21st century.
    I would like to highlight three important reasons why the 
new treaties with Croatia will be vital law enforcement tools 
for prosecutors across the nation.
    First, the new Extradition Treaty will allow extradition 
for a wider range of serious crimes. The United States and 
Croatia currently operate under the 1901 extradition treaty 
between the United States and Kingdom of Serbia. This new 
treaty replaces a short list of extraditable offenses that is 
well over a century old.
    The more modern dual criminality approach will enable us to 
extradite individuals for conduct punishable under the laws of 
both countries by more than a year of imprisonment.
    This means the new Extradition Treaty will now cover 
terrorism, cybercrime, child pornography, money laundering, and 
other offenses. It also future proofs the treaty by ensuring 
that new crimes remain covered as the criminal codes of both 
countries evolve to meet future challenges.
    Second, the new treaty includes provisions that make the 
extradition process more efficient. For example, the new 
temporary transfer provision means we will be able to seek the 
extradition of someone imprisoned in Croatia for immediate 
trial in the United States and return him or her to serve out 
the remainder of their sentence in Croatia.
    The simplified extradition provision allows a person sought 
in extradition to consent to surrender, resulting in a more 
expeditious transfer to the requesting country, and the new 
treaty also modernizes provisions for providing supplemental 
information and the authentication of extradition documents.
    Third, the new MLAT with Croatia will augment the tools 
available to U.S. authorities for investigating and prosecuting 
modern crime. The new MLAT will authorize the identification of 
bank information relating to persons suspected of a criminal 
offense, the use of video conferencing technology to take 
testimony, and the expedited transmission of requests for 
assistance.
    These new provisions will add to the evidence-gathering 
tools available and build upon the strong cooperative law 
enforcement relationship we have with our Croatian 
counterparts.
    In addition to being vital law enforcement tools, these 
treaties give effect to agreements that the United States made 
with the European Union in 2003. Since then, the United States 
and the member states of the EU have updated their extradition 
and mutual legal assistance relationships, all but one.
    Croatia joined the European Union in 2013 and is the only 
EU member state that has not yet implemented new agreements. 
The treaties with Croatia now before this committee accomplish 
that goal.
    For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, we join the State 
Department in respectfully requesting the prompt and favorable 
consideration of these important law enforcement treaties.
    I would be pleased to answer any questions.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ary follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Mr. Vaughn A. Ary

    Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear 
before you today to present the views of the Department of Justice on 
the extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties between the United 
States and the Republic of Croatia. These treaties directly advance the 
interests of the United States in fighting terrorism and transnational 
crime and were negotiated jointly by the Departments of State and 
Justice. Accordingly, the Department of Justice joins the Department of 
State in urging the Committee to report favorably to the Senate and 
recommend its advice and consent to ratification of these treaties.
    The Departments of Justice and State have prepared and submitted to 
the Committee detailed analyses of these treaties in the Letter of 
Submittal. The Department of State has elaborated further on the 
provisions of the treaties that improve upon the existing extradition 
treaty framework currently in force between the United States and 
Croatia. I will address why the treaties are important for U.S. 
authorities engaged in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism 
and other serious crime.
                 the u.s.-croatia extradition agreement
    The United States and Croatia currently operate under the 1901 
extradition treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of Servia 
(the 1901 treaty). Croatia is a successor state to that antiquated 
treaty. This treaty does not adequately meet the law enforcement 
challenges that we face in the 21st century. For example, the 1901 
treaty applies a ``list'' approach to offenses for which extradition 
may be granted, with the list having been established more than a 
century ago.
    In 2003, the United States and the European Union (EU) signed the 
U.S./EU Extradition Agreement and the U.S./EU Mutual Legal Assistance 
Agreement. These agreements were designed to modernize and streamline 
the extradition and mutual legal assistance relationship between the 
United States and individual EU Member States. The Senate gave advice 
and consent to ratification of those agreements in 2008 and they 
entered into force in 2010. The United States and the Member States of 
the EU have updated their extradition and mutual legal assistance 
relationships to reflect the obligations undertaken between the United 
States and the European Union. Croatia joined the European Union in 
2013 and is the only EU Member State with which the United States has 
not yet implemented the modern provisions of the U.S./EU Extradition 
and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements. The treaties with Croatia now 
before this Committee accomplish that goal. The new extradition treaty 
with Croatia replaces a number of provisions in the 1901 treaty to 
expand the scope of offenses, streamline procedures and facilitate 
broader cooperation in extradition matters.
    The new extradition treaty with Croatia replaces the old list of 
extraditable offenses with a modern ``dual criminality'' approach that 
expands the scope of criminal conduct that will be subject to 
extradition. This dual criminality approach makes subject to 
extradition conduct that is punishable under the laws of both countries 
by deprivation of liberty by more than one year or for a more severe 
penalty. Application of the dual criminality standard will now bring 
within the scope of offenses covered by the new extradition treaty 
conduct constituting terrorism, cybercrime, child pornography, money 
laundering and other offenses. This expanded reach is critical to 
effective law enforcement in 2022 and beyond. Moreover, this 
improvement will ensure that, in the future, extradition will be 
possible with respect to the broadest possible range of serious 
offenses, without the need to update treaties repeatedly as new forms 
of conduct are criminalized.
    Other aspects of the new extradition treaty will facilitate the 
ability of the United States to prosecute offenders effectively. These 
include the new provisions on requests from more than one state, 
temporary surrender, and simplified extradition. These modern 
provisions will expand the reach of the United States to extradite and 
prosecute offenders in a timely fashion. The provision regarding 
requests from more than one state will allow the treaty partners to 
apply fair criteria when deciding to surrender a person sought in 
extradition by more than one country. This provision, originally 
negotiated with the EU in the U.S./EU Extradition Agreement, was 
intended to position the United States on equal footing with EU Member 
States that may be using the EU Arrest Warrant as the mechanism for 
extradition among EU countries. In a world where transnational crime is 
prevalent and multiple countries may target the same actors, this 
provision is intended to ensure that the United States is not adversely 
impacted when competing for the extradition of the same person. 
Similarly, the temporary transfer provision of the new treaty would 
allow for the transfer for prosecution of a person who is also being 
proceeded against, or is serving a sentence, in Croatia. This modern 
mechanism allows for an expeditious resolution of criminal charges 
before significant delays cause either prejudice to defendants, or 
prosecution evidence to become stale. The simplified extradition 
provision allows for persons sought in extradition to consent to their 
surrender and transfer to the requesting country as expeditiously as 
possible. This is another way that the new treaty will facilitate the 
prosecution of offenders.
    Finally, the new treaty imports from the U.S./EU Extradition 
Agreement other provisions intended to make the extradition process 
work more expeditiously. As my State Department colleague has noted, 
these include provisions on the authentication and transmission of 
extradition documents and provisional arrest requests, providing 
supplemental information, the submission of sensitive information and 
the transit of persons in custody. All of these provisions will improve 
the everyday handling of extradition request between the United States 
and Croatia.
    As noted previously, because these provisions in the new 
extradition treaty with Croatia originate in the U.S./EU Extradition 
Agreement, they are not novel for the United States. In fact, such 
provisions are already found in our extradition treaties with other EU 
Member States. Moreover, those provisions from the 1901 extradition 
treaty with Croatia that are left undisturbed in this new treaty 
already are in force and simply maintain the status quo. We expect that 
the inclusion of the U.S./EU provisions in the new extradition treaty 
with Croatia will yield the intended benefits that we have already 
experienced with other EU countries.
           the u.s.-croatia mutual legal assistance agreement
    Although the United States and Croatia are not parties to a mutual 
legal assistance treaty (MLAT), they do have an active and cooperative 
relationship in the area of mutual legal assistance in criminal 
matters. The Department of Justice believes that the MLAT with Croatia 
will further strengthen that relationship.
    Like the extradition treaty, the MLAT with Croatia has its origin 
in the U.S./EU Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement. Unlike the 
extradition treaty, however, the MLAT with Croatia does not revise a 
previous text. Rather, the MLAT with Croatia applies only the 
provisions of the U.S./EU Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement. In this 
regard, the Croatian treaty is not unique. The United States concluded 
similar MLATs with several other EU Member States, specifically, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Malta, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia.
    The MLAT with Croatia will augment the tools available to U.S. 
authorities investigating and prosecuting modern crime. The MLAT with 
Croatia authorizes the identification of bank information, including 
accounts and transactions, relating to persons suspected of or charged 
with a criminal offense; the formation of joint investigative teams; 
the use of video conferencing technology to take testimony; the 
expedited transmission of requests for assistance; and assistance to 
administrative authorities conducting investigations with a view to 
criminal prosecution or referral of the conduct to criminal 
investigation or prosecuting authorities. All of these provisions will 
facilitate criminal investigations and prosecutions. In addition, the 
MLAT contains provisions on limitations on use to protect personal and 
other data, protecting confidentiality, and grounds for refusal of 
assistance. Among all of these, the provision on the grounds for 
refusal is the only one that does not originate with the U.S./EU Mutual 
Legal Assistance Agreement. This provision is critical to permit the 
requested state to decline to assist in appropriate circumstances. The 
provision adopted in the Croatian MLAT includes an essential interest 
denial, a standard basis for denial in all the MLATs of the United 
States. In this way, too, the MLAT with Croatia comports with existing 
U.S. legal requirements and practice.
                               conclusion
    The Department of Justice appreciates the Committee's support in 
our efforts to strengthen the network of treaties that assist us in 
combatting crime. The modern provisions in these new treaties with 
Croatia will allow us to advance the protection of our citizens and 
hold accountable those who commit crime. Accordingly, we join the State 
Department in urging the prompt and favorable consideration of these 
law enforcement treaties.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Thompson.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN THOMPSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
 ENVIRONMENT, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
 AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, 
                               DC

    Dr. Thompson. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
thank you for having me here today and for the opportunity to 
testify in support of amendments to two treaties that are vital 
to ensuring our continued prosperity and advancing the 
interests of American workers and important sectors of the U.S. 
economy.
    I am Dr. John Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the 
Environment. The Administration requests that the Senate review 
the following treaty amendments with a view to providing advice 
and consent to the ratification as soon as possible: the Kigali 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer and amendments to the Treaty on Fisheries 
between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and 
the Government of the United States of America, or the Tuna 
Treaty.
    The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, which the United States ratified in 1988, is one of the 
world's most successful international environmental agreements. 
The Kigali Amendment adds a new class of chemicals known as 
hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs, as controlled substances under the 
Protocol.
    The Kigali Amendment will gradually drive global markets 
towards lower production and consumption of HFCs and towards 
the use of more environmentally benign replacement 
technologies.
    Industry estimates indicate U.S. ratification would support 
33,000 new manufacturing jobs in the United States and $12.5 
billion in new investments in the U.S. economy over the next 
decade.
    This includes achieving a substantial increase in the U.S. 
global export market share for heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning, and refrigeration equipment, which is especially 
important, given the rapid growth and sales of these products 
in many developing countries.
    The United States will benefit economically from Kigali 
ratification because we have the most innovative and dynamic 
business community in the sectors that use HFCs and their 
alternatives.
    U.S. companies are not the only ones developing 
alternatives to HFCs. Our competitors in the EU, Japan, Mexico, 
China, and elsewhere are developing their own technologies.
    If the United States does not join Kigali, our industry 
risks losing out on this growing global export market and we 
may also face a ban on HFC trade with parties to the amendment 
starting in 2033, which is not far away in an industry that 
looks many years ahead when planning investments.
    Joining Kigali maximizes our ability to continue to protect 
U.S. interests in the Montreal Protocol's governing body. 
Congress has already taken the actions needed to provide 
sufficient domestic authority to implement the Kigali Amendment 
through the American Innovation in Manufacturing Act, or AIM 
Act. We do not envision the need for further rulemaking for the 
United States to meet the obligations it would have under the 
Kigali Amendment beyond what is already planned to implement 
the AIM Act.
    Amendments to the Tuna Treaty--the Tuna Treaty has been a 
cornerstone of U.S. cooperation with the Pacific Islands for 
over three decades and is a vital component of the wide range 
of U.S. engagement and financial assistance to the region.
    The Tuna Treaty serves broad U.S. diplomatic interests by 
providing a multilateral framework to cooperate with the 
Pacific Island parties on one of their highest policy 
priorities and by supporting security, stability, and 
prosperity.
    Both the Tuna Treaty and a related economic assistance 
agreement with Pacific Island parties reinforce the goals of 
the U.S.-Indo-Pacific strategy to preserve a free and open 
Indo-Pacific, drive regional prosperity, and bolster Indo-
Pacific security.
    The Tuna Treaty provides fishing access for U.S. commercial 
purse seine vessels to fish for tuna within the Exclusive 
Economic Zones of 16 Pacific Island parties in the western and 
central Pacific Ocean.
    The United States and the Pacific Island parties concluded 
7 years of negotiations and adopted amendments to the Tuna 
Treaty on December 3, 2016.
    These amendments to the Tuna Treaty make it a more viable 
and sustainable model to manage U.S. fishing access to areas 
under the national jurisdiction of Pacific Island parties.
    The 2016 amendments to the Tuna Treaty are supported by 
U.S. fishing stakeholders. The United States and the Pacific 
Island parties have historically viewed the Tuna Treaty not 
simply as a fisheries agreement, but as a foundation of the 
economic and political relationship between the United States 
and the Pacific Island parties.
    In February, when Secretary Blinken met with Pacific Island 
leaders, several of them commented on the importance of the 
Tuna Treaty to their relationship with the United States and to 
their economies.
    I appreciate your consideration of the Kigali Amendment and 
the amendments to the Tuna Treaty, and I am happy to respond to 
any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Dr. John Thompson

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
Committee, thank you for having me here today and for the opportunity 
to testify in support of amendments to two treaties that are vital to 
ensuring our continued prosperity and advancing the interests of 
American workers and important sectors of the U.S. economy. I am Dr. 
John Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Environment 
within the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs. I am pleased to represent the State Department 
today in support of both treaties, particularly given the Department's 
long and productive working relationship with the impacted business 
community. I look forward to engaging the Committee and answering your 
questions. The Administration requests that the Senate review the 
following treaty amendments, with a view to providing advice and 
consent to their ratification as soon as possible:

   Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
        Deplete the Ozone Layer; and

   Amendments to the Treaty on Fisheries Between the 
        Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government 
        of the United States of America (Tuna Treaty).
               kigali amendment to the montreal protocol
    I am pleased to testify on the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol, which was adopted in October 2016 as the 5th Amendment to the 
Protocol.
    The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
which the United States ratified in 1988, is one of the world's most 
successful international environmental agreements. The United States is 
Party to the Montreal Protocol and its four previous amendments, all of 
which received the Senate's advice and consent to ratification. There 
are currently 131 Parties to the Kigali Amendment, including most of 
our major trading partners such as Canada, Mexico, Japan, the EU, 
China, and India.
    The Kigali Amendment adds a new class of chemicals known as 
hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs, as controlled substances under the 
Protocol. HFCs came into use as replacements for ozone-depleting 
substances being phased out under the Protocol. The principal features 
of the Kigali Amendment closely parallel the Montreal Protocol's 
provisions for other controlled substances. They provide for the 
gradual phase down of the production and consumption of 18 types of 
HFCs, subject to certain exemptions, and establish related requirements 
for licensing systems, reporting, technical and financial assistance, 
destruction of byproducts, and restricting trade in HFCs with non-
Parties. Through these measures, the Kigali Amendment will gradually 
drive global markets towards lower production and consumption of HFCs, 
and towards use of more environmentally benign replacement 
technologies.
    To reap the economic benefits of the Kigali Amendment, the U.S. 
must ratify it. The sectors that use HFCs and their alternatives, 
primarily the refrigeration and air-conditioning sectors, produce $178 
billion in output each year in the United States. Industry estimates 
indicate U.S. ratification would support 33,000 new manufacturing jobs 
in the United States, and $12.5 billion in new investments in the U.S. 
economy over the next decade. This includes achieving a substantial 
increase in the U.S. global export market share for heating, 
ventilation, air conditioning and refrigeration equipment, which is 
especially important given the rapid growth in sales of these products 
in many developing countries.
    The United States will benefit economically from Kigali 
ratification because we have the most innovative and dynamic business 
community in the sectors that use HFCs and their alternatives. At each 
stage of the Montreal Protocol's history, U.S. companies benefited by 
being leaders in innovation, having developed alternatives to the prior 
generation technology. The Kigali Amendment is again facilitating a 
transition to a next generation of technology to the benefit of 
innovative American companies that hold a strong competitive advantage 
in these sectors, and to the benefit of the environment.
    U.S. companies aren't the only ones developing alternatives to 
HFCs; our competitors in the European Union, Japan, Mexico, China, and 
elsewhere are developing their own technologies. Because these 
jurisdictions are Parties to the Kigali Amendment, their companies are 
recognized as stable long-term suppliers of alternative technologies 
that Kigali Parties across the world will need in order to meet their 
obligations to phase down HFC production and consumption. If the United 
States does not join Kigali, our industry risks losing out on this 
growing global export market, and we may also face a ban on HFC trade 
with Parties to the Amendment starting in 2033, which is not far away 
in an industry that looks many years ahead when planning investments. 
Joining Kigali maximizes our ability to continue to protect U.S. 
interests in the Montreal Protocol's governing body.
    Congress has already taken the actions needed to provide sufficient 
domestic authority to implement the Kigali Amendment through the 
American Innovation and Manufacturing Act (AIM Act). The first HFC 
allowance allocation and trading rule that EPA issued in September 2021 
under the AIM Act established the baseline and phase down schedule for 
HFCs and put in place most of the key elements required to implement 
Kigali obligations, including those related to production, consumption, 
byproducts, and reporting. EPA provided the methodology to issue 
allowances (i.e. licensing) for the first phasedown step and is now 
developing the proposed rule for subsequent reduction steps set out 
under the AIM Act. EPA intends to promulgate one or more additional 
rules under the AIM Act concerning the allocation and trading system 
for years beyond 2023. We do not envision the need for further 
rulemaking for the United States to meet the obligations it would have 
under the Kigali Amendment beyond what is already planned to implement 
the AIM Act. The United States already has the domestic regulatory plan 
to phase down HFCs consistent with what would be required under the 
Kigali Amendment, but without ratification we will not realize its full 
benefits.
    Joining the Kigali Amendment can produce economic benefits here at 
home by promoting and rewarding the innovation of American companies 
and workers. We can achieve this outcome because we worked so closely 
with the U.S. business community throughout the multiyear process of 
negotiating the Amendment, during which we had strong and unwavering 
support from their associations. The Chamber of Commerce; the National 
Association of Manufacturers; the American Chemistry Council; the Air-
Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute; and the Alliance 
for Responsible Atmospheric Policy all strongly support ratification, 
and they represent the vast majority of U.S. industry that use or 
produce HFCs or their alternatives. I can think of no better way to 
recommend this treaty for your consideration than to highlight their 
strong endorsement.
                     amendments to the tuna treaty
    The Tuna Treaty has been a cornerstone of U.S. cooperation with the 
Pacific Islands for over three decades and is a vital component of the 
wide range of U.S. engagement and financial assistance in the region. 
We appreciate your consideration of these amendments given the 
continued importance of the Tuna Treaty to our stakeholders and to our 
broader engagement with our Pacific Island partners in support of the 
Biden Administration's recently released Indo-Pacific Strategy.
    The Tuna Treaty, which entered into force in 1988, serves broad 
U.S. diplomatic interests by providing a multilateral framework to 
cooperate with the Pacific Island parties on one of their highest 
policy priorities and by supporting the security, stability, and 
prosperity of this strategically located part of the Indo-Pacific 
region. Both the Tuna Treaty and a related Economic Assistance 
Agreement with Pacific Island parties, which supports development 
projects and programs in the region, reinforce the goals of the U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Strategy to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific, drive 
regional prosperity, and bolster Indo-Pacific security.
    The Tuna Treaty provides fishing access for U.S. commercial purse 
seine vessels to fish for tuna within the Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs) of 16 Pacific Island parties (Australia, Cook Islands, Federated 
States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) in a vast area of the western and central Pacific 
Ocean. Approximately 60 percent of the world's tuna catch occurs in the 
western and central Pacific Ocean, mostly in waters under the 
jurisdiction of these Pacific Island parties--many of which are small 
island developing states.
    Though the role of the Tuna Treaty as part of our broader 
relationship with the Pacific Islands has evolved in recent years, the 
United States and the Pacific Island parties have historically viewed 
the Tuna Treaty not simply as a fisheries agreement, but as a 
foundation of the economic and political relationship between the 
United States and the Pacific Island parties. In February, when 
Secretary Blinken met with Pacific Islands leaders, several of them 
commented on the importance of the Tuna Treaty to their relationship 
with the United States and to their economies.
    Using mechanisms like the Tuna Treaty to strengthen our 
relationships with Pacific Island parties is critically important, now 
more than ever, and especially on issues of mutual interest and 
concern, including maritime security; monitoring, control, and 
surveillance; countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; 
and blue carbon and blue economies. The Tuna Treaty is a central 
component for continuing economic cooperation with the Pacific Region, 
particularly as it weathers changes from declining fishing vessels and 
tourism revenues from COVID-19. In the long run, maintaining a strong 
relationship with our Pacific Island partners--with a focus on 
resilience--is a strategic priority, and will overlap with development 
of maritime security, digital technologies, and the blue economy.
    The Tuna Treaty is unique in that it is the only truly multilateral 
framework for fisheries access and cooperation in the Pacific, as well 
as the most transparent access agreement of any kind in the region. 
Beyond fishing access, the Tuna Treaty supports the sustainable 
management of fisheries stocks in this region and provides for broad 
cooperation between the United States and Pacific Islands on some of 
their highest priorities, including on maritime security to combat 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Along with our Pacific 
Island partners, we will continue to lead by example together in this 
region to advance sustainable, responsible, and transparent fisheries, 
including working to address issues that impact the entirety of the 
seafood supply chain.
    The United States and the Pacific Island parties concluded 7 years 
of negotiations and adopted amendments to the Tuna Treaty on December 
3, 2016. These amendments to the Tuna Treaty make it a more viable and 
sustainable model to manage U.S. fishing access to areas under the 
national jurisdiction of Pacific Island parties. The 2016 amendments to 
the Tuna Treaty are supported by U.S. fishing stakeholders, who 
participated on U.S. delegations to negotiate the amendments, and by 
the Pacific Island parties. The Parties are currently applying the 2016 
Tuna Treaty amendments on a voluntary basis pursuant to a nonbinding 
memorandum of understanding while awaiting their entry into force.
    The new business model envisioned by the 2016 amendments has proven 
adaptable to changing circumstances, many of which we could not have 
foreseen during the 2016 negotiations. The flexibility that the 2016 
amendments to the Tuna Treaty offer to all Parties has helped us 
weather shifting dynamics. This added flexibility has been useful in 
addressing the many challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
which has significantly affected not only the operation of U.S. fishing 
vessels in the region, but also the economies and revenues of the 
Pacific Island parties.
    We request the advice and consent of the Senate so the United 
States can ratify the Tuna Treaty amendments and build upon the 
foundation of this agreement to benefit the U.S. and our diplomatic and 
strategic relationships in the Pacific Islands region to preserve a 
free and open Indo-Pacific.
    I appreciate your consideration of the Kigali Amendment and the 
amendments to the Tuna Treaty and will now take any questions you may 
have.

    The Chairman. I thank you all for your testimony. We will 
start at a series of 5-minute rounds. Let me start with myself.
    I understand that efforts to phase out HFCs have been 
supported for a few decades on a bipartisan and multi-
stakeholder basis. For example, that U.S. industry began to 
develop HFC alternatives with the support and encouragement of 
the George W. Bush administration.
    The U.S. industry was heavily engaged in ensuring that 
Kigali is favorable to our business and competition interests 
and that President Trump, with broad bipartisan support, signed 
into law the AIM Act, which provides the authority to implement 
Kigali.
    Mr. Thompson, is that accurate?
    Dr. Thompson. Yes, Chairman, it is.
    The Chairman. In 2019, President Trump signed into law 
Senator Kennedy of Louisiana's American Innovation and 
Manufacturing Act, which phases down HFCs in the United States, 
consistent with the Kigali Amendment.
    Mr. Visek, I understand no additional authorities beyond 
the AIM Act are needed for the U.S. Government to comply with 
Kigali. Is that accurate?
    For the record, you said that is accurate. The only reason 
I want you to put your microphone on is we have a recording 
going on. I want to make sure the record reflects it.
    Then I also understand the EU, Japan, South Africa, India, 
China, Vietnam, Mexico, Canada, are all among the 130 parties 
to Kigali and new prohibitions under Kigali will kick in for 
parties beginning in 2033, which will impact trade with 
nonparties.
    Secretary Thompson, under the provisions in Kigali on trade 
between parties and nonparties, what do U.S. businesses stand 
to lose if we do not ratify?
    Dr. Thompson. Thank you, Chairman.
    The description you have provided of the nonparty trade 
provisions in the Kigali Amendment are--they are accurate and, 
in fact, we do stand to lose quite a lot because effective 
January 1, 2033, parties under the Kigali Amendment will be 
required as a default to prohibit trade in HFCs with 
nonparties.
    As you said, most of our major trading partners are already 
in the Kigali Amendment. A number of others we know are joining 
in the years coming, and so this default trade ban could have 
the potential for significant disruption for U.S. businesses 
that would continue to trade HFCs at that time, which is what 
is expected because the HFC controls are a phase down, not a 
phase out.
    Even in 2033, there will still be a substantial amount of 
HFC trade that U.S. businesses would want to be involved in. 
Thank you.
    The Chairman. By not ratifying, we hurt U.S. businesses 
and, at the same time, we--ultimately, instead of being at the 
table to set those standards for trade, we will not be there. 
Is that a fair statement?
    Dr. Thompson. That is correct.
    The Chairman. Okay. Let me turn to the question of the Tuna 
Treaty. You described in your comments how they are central to 
the health of our diplomatic relationship with other countries 
in the region.
    How does this effort counter Chinese influence, Secretary 
Thompson?
    Dr. Thompson. Thank you, Chairman.
    I would say--so there are several ways where this, I would 
say, directly counters Chinese influence. I think the first 
category is in the economic competitiveness area. This is a 
very strong economic tool because it--the changes that we have 
here, a lot of what we are talking about are the benefits to 
the U.S. fleet.
    They also strongly benefit the Pacific Island parties 
themselves. These Pacific Island parties have economies that 
are highly dependent on the fisheries industry and so this 
really is a cornerstone of our economic engagement with them.
    We are not the only ones fishing in these waters. We have 
distant water fleets from other countries, in particular, 
China, that are operating there as well. It is vital for our 
economic diplomacy that we continue to be involved there.
    Secondly, I would say, this is a--the model that we operate 
by is well understood, clear, and transparent and it is to some 
extent a gold standard for transparency and sustainable fishing 
in the area.
    Some of these other countries, including China, do not 
operate by the same rules and I think, oftentimes, the way we 
do it is used to set the benchmark for other countries, 
including China, to operate in a more transparent and 
appropriate way.
    Then, finally, I would say we also use this agreement as 
the foundation for a broader cooperative engagement with the 
Pacific Island countries and for a wide range of assistance in 
areas like security, countering illegal, unregulated, and 
unreported fishing, sustainable fisheries, as well as maritime 
surveillance.
    So we also garner benefits from that as well, in 
particular, as it relates to countering China.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I have got just a couple of questions here, and I do not 
want you to take these as being contentious. I just--I want to 
understand where we are headed here.
    On the HFC question, China can claim Article 5 developing 
country status, which gives it a longer period of time to phase 
down, as opposed to the United States.
    Is that going to--is that going to cause us difficulty 
going forward, where they can use this in what I would think of 
would be an anti-competitive nature?
    What is the situation on that?
    Dr. Thompson. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch.
    You are correct. China, looking back at the long history of 
the Montreal Protocol, they are, in fact, classified as an 
Article 5 party because--in part because those classifications 
were made many years ago, and it is accurate they do have 
additional time to make the reductions in HFC production and 
consumption because of that.
    I think, overall, we do not believe it really gives them a 
competitive advantage because, fundamentally, what the Kigali 
Amendment is doing is it is pushing global markets away from 
HFCs and towards HFC alternatives, and if you look at the 
nature of these businesses now, China is actually quite strong 
in the HFC production and consumption business.
    They are the world's largest producer and consumer of HFCs, 
whereas where we are pushing these markets towards 
alternatives, U.S. industry has a competitive advantage in that 
area and we are the world's leader in developing and deploying 
alternatives.
    So I think, overall, you are right, there are some 
accommodations there. I think at a strategic level where this 
amendment is pushing these technologies is absolutely to the 
benefit of U.S. businesses and that is why we have heard so 
much from them.
    Senator Risch. That is clarifying. Thank you. I appreciate 
it.
    One more question on China having to do with tuna fishing. 
Do they operate under a similar treaty with these countries or 
not?
    Dr. Thompson. My understanding is they do not have a 
similar multilateral arrangement with these governments and 
that is part of what I was talking about. The arrangements that 
they operate under are far less clear and transparent in 
nature.
    Senator Risch. I get that. I cannot imagine they would not 
take advantage of that situation, whether it be seasons or 
amount of catch or anything else.
    With all due respect, you said that these would be--my 
words, not yours--trendsetting or the gold standard or what 
have you. I cannot imagine China would look to us for that kind 
of guidance, but one can always be hopeful.
    In any event, it does--it has got to be done. I understand 
that, and I hope it works better than what I think it is going 
to work.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I understand Senator Van Hollen is with us virtually. He is 
not with us virtually.
    Okay. Senator Johnson.
    Nobody is there? Okay. Our list has expired, it seems.
    I just have one--two final questions.
    Secretary Thompson, the fishing industry has played a role 
in developing these amendments to the Tuna Treaty?
    Dr. Thompson. Absolutely, Chairman. We work very closely 
with them throughout the negotiations of the amendment, sir.
    The Chairman. In what way do those changes benefit the U.S. 
fishing industry?
    Dr. Thompson. Sir, if you could just give me one moment.
    The Chairman. Sure.
    I am sure our second panel can answer that, but----
    Dr. Thompson. Thank you, Chairman, and sorry for the delay.
    The Chairman. No problem.
    Dr. Thompson. There are several beneficial aspects of this 
that I can go through quickly. I think the next panel can speak 
in more detail.
    First, I would say that portions of the high seas are no 
longer covered under the treaty area which is deleted in these 
amendments. That means the amendments will eliminate a 
requirement under the treaty for U.S. vessels to obtain a 
license to fish on portions of the high seas.
    Secondly, individual vessel owners make commitments each 
year to purchase up front fishing days in the waters of the 
Pacific Island parties. Under the previous model, the entire 
U.S. purse seine fleet was obligated to contribute towards a 
lump sum total price for fishing access each year.
    The new, more flexible, model empowers individual vessel 
owners to decide how many days to buy or not buy, depending on 
their own economic and operating conditions, and to be 
individually accountable for those commitments.
    Finally, I would say the new model for fishing access also 
empowers U.S. industry to negotiate and purchase additional 
bilateral days with individual island parties and they get to 
do that directly, removing U.S. Government officials from 
serving as intermediaries in what are really purely commercial 
negotiations.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Okay. Now I understand Senator Van Hollen is online. 
Senator Van Hollen?
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 
thank you, all of you, for your testimony on these different 
proposals.
    I have a couple questions regarding the Kigali Amendment.
    Dr. Thompson, according to a 2021 report from the U.S. 
Department of Energy, we see that energy efficiency 
technologies and services employ over 2.1 million Americans and 
that efficiency workers manufacture, sell, and install 
products, build well-insulated buildings, and weatherize homes 
to save energy and reduce energy bills, and in order to phase 
down HFCs in refrigerants and installation materials, we will 
rely on this technological innovation of our domestic 
manufacturing workforce.
    A study from the University of Maryland, my home state, 
their study on inter-industry forecasting project estimates 
that joining Kigali and its global implementation will result 
in 33,000 new domestic manufacturing jobs.
    Can you share any insights you have on how ratifying the 
Kigali Amendment and introducing new, more efficient--energy 
efficient technologies can support the expansion of our energy 
efficiency workforce?
    Dr. Thompson. Thank you, Senator, and I am familiar with 
the study that you cite.
    I would, perhaps, say two things. I think, first, you 
mentioned the 33,000 additional jobs. We have seen the same 
estimate and I think that stems from a couple of things.
    One, as I said before, the Kigali Amendment is really 
pushing global markets towards technologies where the U.S. is a 
global leader and we are going to be advantaged without a doubt 
by that, and that should help us increase our market share in 
exports of this type of equipment, especially to developing 
countries and many of those developing countries are still 
growing rapidly and, in particular, in air conditioning and 
refrigeration are--have rapid growth in those particular 
industries in terms of consumers purchasing those products.
    There is, as you said, a strong energy efficiency linkage 
here that will play out over time. Maybe what I would say is, 
going back a little bit, under the Montreal Protocol, as we 
have done previous technology transitions, the Montreal 
Protocol is really primarily focused on the refrigerant 
transition, but in doing so what we have seen much more broadly 
is that that modernization effort to move to new technology and 
new refrigerants has also resulted in each new generation with 
improved energy efficiency in equipment.
    So I think there are, certainly, as a part of this 
opportunities to see energy efficiency improvements and to also 
see some of the strength in job--U.S. jobs to support those 
gains.
    Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, and that addition in 
American jobs in this area, as you say, will be matched by U.S. 
exports. I mean, these are areas--these technologies are areas 
where U.S. businesses are playing a leading role.
    That same University of Maryland report that I cited also 
estimates that the global implementation of Kigali will result 
in $8.4 billion a year of increased U.S. exports and $12.5 
billion of increased economic output per year.
    Are those figures in line with your own internal estimates?
    Dr. Thompson. Thank you, Senator. I think, certainly, we 
would concur with the direction of those benefits. We have not 
conducted our own internal estimate of those specific figures.
    In fact, we have looked at that study and we have consulted 
extensively with industry throughout the negotiations of the 
Kigali Amendment and, in fact, that that was a major driver of 
what we wanted to achieve in those negotiations was to have 
this push towards more environmentally benign technologies and 
to do it in a way that benefited U.S. businesses and the U.S. 
economy.
    Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen, would you have cited that report if it 
was not the University of Maryland?
    Senator Van Hollen. I am not sure, if it was from New 
Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to share the credit with----
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. We are very happy the University of Maryland 
did that research. I think it speaks very strongly to the case. 
Thank you very much.
    All right. No other members seeking recognition, with the 
thanks of the committee this panel is excused and we will bring 
up our second panel.
    Having heard from government experts on the importance of 
international cooperation in these areas, I want to welcome our 
two industry experts, each to testify on the Kigali Amendment 
and the South Pacific Tuna Treaty.
    Our witnesses know firsthand how U.S. manufacturers and 
business in their sectors will benefit from the Senate 
approving the Kigali Amendment and the amendments to the Tuna 
Treaty, respectively, and the risks of not approving them.
    Stephen Yurek is the CEO of the Air Conditioning, Heating, 
and Refrigeration Institute--AHRI--based in Arlington, 
Virginia, one of the largest trade associations in the nation, 
representing more than 300 heating, water heating, ventilation, 
air conditioning, and commercial refrigeration manufacturers 
within the global HVACR industry.
    Jim Sousa is a long-serving director of GS Fisheries and 
president of the American Tunaboat Association--ATA--which 
represents the owners and operators of the large-scale tuna 
purse seine fleet that operates in the Pacific Ocean.
    With that, and our thanks for your appearance and sharing 
your expertise, let me first turn to Mr. Yurek. Your full 
statement will be included in the record. You can summarize it 
more or less in 5 minutes. We would appreciate it so we can ask 
you questions.
    You are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF STEPHEN YUREK, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AIR-
  CONDITIONING, HEATING, AND REFRIGERATION INSTITUTE [AHRI], 
                      ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

    Mr. Yurek. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and members of the committee for inviting me to testify 
today.
    My name is Stephen Yurek and I am the president and CEO of 
the Air Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute. 
AHRI's 320 members manufacture safe, efficient, and innovative 
air conditioning, space heating, water heating, and commercial 
refrigeration equipment for sale in North America and for 
export around the world.
    With a U.S. annual economic activity of approximately $256 
billion and employing more than 1.3 million people, I urge the 
United States Senate to provide its advice and consent and 
approve the Kigali Amendment, paving the way for its 
ratification by the United States.
    AHRI and its member companies strongly support U.S. 
ratification of the amendment along with numerous other major 
U.S. industry associations, including the American Chemistry 
Council, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
    Ratification serves critical business needs for American 
manufacturers and workers. There is no credible scenario where 
the failure of the United States to ratify Kigali helps 
American manufacturers and workers.
    To the contrary, failure to ratify materially harms their 
interests and compromises their future. This amendment will 
drive the growth of U.S. businesses, stimulate investment in 
the U.S. economy, sustain U.S. technology leadership, open 
export markets to U.S. products, protect U.S. workers and 
consumers, and ensure U.S. interests shape future international 
agreements.
    To sustain their advantage and expand their share of the 
global market, U.S. manufacturers have invested billions in 
next-generation technologies and spent more than a decade 
advocating for worldwide phase down of HFCs.
    Today, American factories manufacture market-leading next-
generation products and a federal law is phasing down domestic 
HFC production and consumption under the American Innovation 
and Manufacturing Act of 2020.
    Ratifying Kigali extends the commercial advantages of the 
AIM Act to U.S. products in export markets around the world. 
These export markets represent the most significant growth 
opportunity for U.S. manufacturers.
    With ratification, the U.S. share of these export markets 
is projected to increase by more than $6 billion annually, 
supporting approximately 17,000 new U.S. manufacturing jobs.
    Kigali represents a successful effort by the United States, 
with the support of American manufacturers, to establish the 
policy platform for international trade by creating and 
maintaining a level playing field in the global market, which 
favors superior performing American-made products.
    Failure to ratify would close those markets to U.S. 
manufacturers after 2032 since the Montreal Protocol prohibits 
trade with countries not a party to the protocol or its 
amendments.
    Ratification signals support for U.S. technology 
leadership, encourages global competitors to follow our lead, 
and assures capturing the projected economic benefits for the 
U.S. industry, workers, and the overall economy.
    The Montreal Protocol and all four prior amendments were 
ratified by the United States with broad bipartisan support 
under both Republican and Democratic administrations.
    Fear of higher costs accompanied past refrigerant 
transitions, but, in fact, equipment prices did not increase 
materially over the course of those transitions since 
refrigerants comprise such a small part of the overall system 
cost.
    Studies show no significant increases in equipment prices 
even if substitute refrigerant costs are multiples of the 
current costs.
    The AIM Act phases down HFCs in the United States. The 
Kigali Amendment phases down HFCs around the world. The world's 
leading producers of substitutes for HFCs are in Louisiana, New 
Jersey, Texas, and elsewhere in the United States.
    The world's fastest growing markets for refrigerators and 
air conditioners are overseas. U.S. ratification of the Kigali 
Amendment forces those markets into HFC substitutes.
    This is a viciously competitive, globally integrated 
industry, and ratification increases the U.S. share of overseas 
markets and benefits U.S. manufacturers.
    Again, the AIM Act helps U.S. manufacturers within our 
borders. The Kigali Amendment helps U.S. manufacturers 
overseas. Both are essential to sustaining U.S. competitiveness 
and technology leadership.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I am 
available to answer any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Yurek follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Stephen R. Yurek

                              introduction
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of the 
Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important 
topic. My name is Stephen Yurek, and I am the President and CEO of the 
Air-Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute (AHRI).
    AHRI has 320 member companies that manufacture quality, safe, 
efficient, and innovative residential, commercial, and industrial air 
conditioning, space heating, water heating, and commercial 
refrigeration equipment and components for sale in North America and in 
export markets around the world.
    It is an internationally recognized advocate for the heating, 
ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration (HVACR) industry and 
certifies the performance of many of the products manufactured by its 
members. In North America, the annual economic activity resulting from 
the HVACR industry is approximately $256 billion. In the United States 
alone, AHRI's members, along with distributors, contractors, and 
technicians, employ more than 1.3 million people.
    I am here to testify as to the importance of the Kigali Amendment 
to the Montreal Protocol and to urge the United States Senate to 
exercise its duty under Article II of the Constitution to provide its 
advice and consent and approve the Kigali Amendment, paving the way for 
its ratification by the United States.
      american manufacturers strongly support kigali ratification
    AHRI and its member companies strongly support U.S. ratification of 
the Kigali Amendment. Numerous other major U.S. trade and industry 
associations similarly support ratification, including the Alliance for 
Automotive Innovation, the Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, 
the American Chemistry Council, the Association of Home Appliance 
Manufacturers, the Heating, Air-conditioning & Refrigeration 
Distributors International, the National Association of Manufacturers, 
the Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors--National Association, the 
Semiconductor Industry Association, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
    Ratification serves critical business needs for American 
manufacturers and workers. There is no credible scenario where the 
failure of the United States to ratify the Kigali Amendment helps 
American manufacturers and workers. To the contrary, failure to ratify 
materially harms their interests and compromises their future.
    The Kigali Amendment will drive the growth of U.S. businesses, 
stimulate investment in the U.S. economy, sustain U.S. technology 
leadership, open export markets to U.S. products, protect U.S. workers 
and consumers, and ensure U.S. interests will shape future 
international agreements.
  kigali ratification strengthens u.s. competitiveness in key export 
                                markets
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
    Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are compounds used as refrigerants, foam-
blowing agents, etchants, solvents, propellants, and fire suppressants. 
HFCs were commercialized in the 1990s as substitutes for ozone 
depleting substances (ODSs) including chlorinated and brominated 
chemical compounds such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and halons which were phased out 
under the Montreal Protocol.
    In the United States, an estimated 230,000 tons of HFCs are 
produced and imported each year. Of this amount, the U.S. heating, 
ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration (HVACR) industry uses 
an estimated 70 percent for refrigeration and air conditioning 
applications in American homes and businesses.
    The Kigali Amendment provides for a global phase down of the 
production (i.e., manufacture) and the consumption (i.e., imports net 
of exports) of HFCs.
HFC Substitutes & Export Markets
    The market for next generation products and equipment (i.e., HFC 
substitutes), is globally integrated, highly competitive, and rapidly 
growing.
    To sustain its technological advantages and expand its share of the 
global market, U.S. manufacturers have invested billions in next 
generation technologies and--beginning in the mid-2000s--spent more 
than a decade advocating for a worldwide phase down of HFC production 
and consumption. This culminated in the adoption of the Kigali 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol in October 2016.
    Today, American factories now manufacture market-leading next 
generation equipment and refrigerants, and federal law is phasing down 
domestic HFC production and consumption under the American Innovation 
and Manufacturing Act of 2020 (AIM Act). These are unambiguous wins for 
American manufacturing and pro-business domestic policymaking.
    Ratifying the Kigali Amendment extends the commercial advantages of 
the AIM Act to U.S. HVACR products and equipment in export markets 
around the world, while U.S. manufacturers lead in new technology 
development. These advantages are necessary to expanding the U.S. share 
of these markets, the largest of which are projected to grow by at 
least 6 percent per year between now and 2030.\1\ These export markets 
represent the most significant growth opportunity for U.S. 
manufacturers of HVACR equipment.
    With Kigali ratification, the U.S. share of these export markets is 
projected to increase from 7.2 percent to 9 percent.\2\ This translates 
to an increase in net exports worth $6 billion annually, supporting 
approximately 17,000 of the 33,000 new manufacturing jobs created by 
the AIM Act.\3\ Failure to ratify Kigali risks shrinking the U.S. share 
of export markets to 6.2 percent.\4\
    This is because, while many of the fastest growing export markets 
still use HFCs or HFC predecessors, U.S. ratification will draw these 
markets into the Kigali Amendment and drive them out of HFCs and toward 
next generation technologies, many of which are made in the United 
States.
U.S. Leadership in Multilateral Forums
    The Kigali Amendment represents a successful effort by the United 
States, with the support of American HVACR manufacturers, to establish 
the policy platform for international trade in HFCs and HFC 
substitutes. If the United States does not ratify the Kigali Amendment, 
these opportunities for market growth will be lost and the next round 
of international trade practices will be more heavily influenced by 
foreign competitors--to the detriment of American economic, trade, and 
competitive interests.
    U.S. ratification also prevents foreign governments and 
international institutions from favoring HFC substitutes made by 
foreign competitors. Indeed, failure to ratify means foreign 
competitors can tilt the playing field toward next generation 
technologies made outside the United States.
    That is, as transitions in refrigerant technologies occur, U.S. 
ratification allows the United States to use its standing within the 
Montreal Protocol and related international forums to maintain a 
technology neutral policy landscape for next generation technologies. 
This creates and maintains a level playing field in the global HVACR 
market, which favors superior-performing American-made products and 
equipment.
Prohibition on Trade With Non-Parties
    The Montreal Protocol prohibits trade with countries not party to 
the Protocol or its amendments. This applies to countries not party to 
the Kigali Amendment after 2032, meaning U.S. manufacturers could lose 
access to export markets in about a decade.
    However, as a practical matter, because importing countries want to 
be assured continuous access to Kigali-compliant products and services, 
continued uncertainty associated with U.S. ratification could cause 
U.S. manufacturers to lose market share sooner.
    Ratifying the Kigali Amendment eliminates the risks of trade 
disruption and loss of market access for U.S. manufacturers.
Protecting American Investments in Innovation
    American companies hold patents both in the United States and 
abroad on next generation refrigerant technologies. Foreign competitors 
have benefitted from the delay in U.S. ratification of the Kigali 
Amendment, as they know the clock is running for intellectual property 
protection on American-made products and equipment. Their enthusiasm 
for a global HFC phase down will increase significantly once the HFC 
substitutes made by American companies lose their patent protection.
    The failure to ratify the Kigali Amendment--and thereby ensure its 
enforcement beyond U.S. borders--serves to undermine American 
investment in innovation and proprietary technologies. Conversely, U.S. 
ratification of Kigali signals support for U.S. technology leadership, 
encourages global competitors to follow our lead, and assures capture 
of the projected economic benefits U.S. industry, workers, and the 
overall U.S. economy.
  the montreal protocol consistently attracts broad bipartisan support
Overview
    For the past three decades, the U.S. HVACR industry has benefited 
from the unwavering bipartisan support of presidential administrations 
and leadership in Congress in the development, implementation, and 
administration of sensible federal policies involving refrigeration and 
air conditioning products and equipment.
    Indeed, there are few areas where American companies can make 
multi-billion-dollar investments in research and development fully 
confident the policy landscape will evolve in step with American 
innovation and technology leadership.
    Fortunately, the U.S. HVACR industry has significant experience 
with refrigerant transitions. In the 1980s, the issue of stratospheric 
ozone depletion led to our industry making substantial investments in 
R&D to develop new classes of refrigerants that had no effect on the 
ozone layer--largely, HFCs.
    In transitioning to HFCs in the 1990s and early 2000s, we 
introduced improvements in equipment design and performance, especially 
greater energy efficiency.
    By leading the way with innovation and technology, we addressed an 
important environmental issue, expanded our market share at home and 
abroad, and provided American consumers with world-leading 
refrigeration and air conditioning equipment without meaningful 
increases in cost. Indeed, new equipment generally costs less to 
operate, due to energy efficiency gains made in conjunction with the 
transition, and also less to service and maintain, due to smaller 
refrigerant charge sizes and fewer leaks.
    The transition from HFCs into next generation refrigerant 
technologies--many of which are made in the United States--represents 
an opportunity to continue to lead the world in these technologies and 
reap the benefits this leadership affords to American manufacturers, 
workers, consumers, and economy.
The Montreal Protocol
    In the 1980s, the U.S. HVACR industry worked constructively with 
the Reagan administration and the George H. W. Bush administration to 
develop policies capable of guiding an orderly transition into next 
generation refrigerant technologies.
    These policies took the form of the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, negotiated by President Reagan in 1987 
and ratified by the United States Senate in 1988 by a vote of 83-0.\5\ 
The Montreal Protocol was implemented in the United States under Title 
VI of the Clean Air Act, which was signed into law by President George 
H. W. Bush as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.\6\
    All four prior amendments to the Montreal Protocol were ratified by 
the United States with broad bipartisan support. The London Amendment 
of 1990 was ratified by the United States in November 1991 and entered 
into force in 1992. The Copenhagen Amendment of 1992 was ratified by 
the United States in November 1993 and entered into force in 1994. The 
Montreal Amendment of 1997 was ratified by the United States in October 
2002 after having entered into force in 1999. The Beijing Amendment of 
1999 was ratified by the United States in October 2002 after having 
entered into force in 2002.
The Kigali Amendment
    The origins of the Kigali Amendment date to the George W. Bush 
administration in the mid-2000s, in response to multi-billion-dollar 
investments by the U.S. HVACR industry in the development of next 
generation refrigerant technologies. These technologies had the 
potential to replace the HFCs, with the promise of performing better in 
equipment and facing fewer and less stringent regulatory requirements. 
At that time, HFCs were regulated under the Kyoto Protocol and included 
in proposed cap-and-trade bills before Congress, which would have 
saddled HVACR manufacturers with disproportionately costly compliance 
obligations and potentially undermined the competitiveness of our 
domestic manufacturing base.
    By contrast, phasing down the production and consumption of HFCs 
under the Montreal Protocol represents a practical, common sense 
regulatory approach that could be modeled on the successful transitions 
from earlier generations of refrigerant technologies, including CFCs, 
HCFCs, and halons. At the time, this was a radical idea. The Bush 
administration, in partnership with our industry, was an early champion 
of this approach and after a decade of multilateral negotiations 
spanning both a Republican and a Democratic administration culminated 
in the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
          kigali ratification helps protect american consumers
Overview
    For decades, consumers and business owners have benefitted from the 
technological innovation of the U.S. HVACR industry. Fears of higher 
costs accompanied past transitions from CFC and HCFC refrigerants, but 
in fact refrigerant and equipment prices did not increase materially 
over the course of those transitions.\7\ Indeed, such fears proved to 
be unfounded.
Past Transitions Produced Innovation in Equipment Design and Improved 
        Performance
    Consumers and business owners rarely noticed the CFC and HCFC 
transitions, as the refrigerant represents less than 1 percent of the 
overall cost for air conditioning systems in homes \8\ and chiller 
systems for commercial buildings.\9\ In addition, supplies of CFC and 
HCFC refrigerants remain available to this day for servicing older 
equipment.\10\
    The next generation of equipment is more energy efficient, uses 
smaller amounts of refrigerant, and has fewer leaks--meaning it costs 
less to run and to service. Indeed, we anticipate that many consumers 
and business owners will choose to replace older equipment due to 
improvements in energy efficiency, irrespective of the type of 
refrigerant used.
Predictions of Consumer Harm in Past Refrigerant Transitions Proved 
        Totally Wrong
    When HFC-134a was introduced in the early 1990s, the predictions 
for its long-term pricing were between $4 and $12 per pound ($7 to $20 
per pound in today's dollars, adjusted for inflation).\11\ Today, bulk 
HFC-134a is priced at approximately $3 per pound in today's 
dollars.\12\
    Also, in the early 1990s, some predicted the cost of recharging an 
automobile's AC system would be $200 by the middle of the decade ($318 
in today's dollars, adjusted for inflation).\13\ Today, that cost is 
between $123 and $156 in today's dollars.\14\
Consumers and Small Business Owners Benefit From an Orderly Transition 
        Out of HFCs
    Many U.S. manufacturers have already announced new product and 
equipment lines using next generation refrigerants, such as HFOs. With 
an orderly transition from HFCs, the average price among all 
refrigerants is expected to be approximately $7 per pound.\15\ HFO 
refrigerants are currently priced 2 percent to 7 percent higher than 
HFCs, but are expected to be priced approximately the same early in the 
transition.\16\
    Experience with past transitions has shown that as a transition 
progresses, manufacturing costs and consumer prices are reduced due to 
economies of scale, with larger facilities coming online to produce new 
classes of refrigerants to meet growing demand. Plus, some next 
generation refrigerants are simpler versions of current products, which 
also yields reductions in cost.
    Moreover, new hydrofluoro-olefin (HFO)-based products and equipment 
can be up to 18 percent more energy efficient, which further lowers 
operational costs.\17\ New products and equipment will have smaller 
refrigerant charge sizes and lower leak rates, which also lowers 
maintenance and servicing costs.\18\
    Because refrigerants comprise such a small part of overall system 
cost, estimates show no significant increases in equipment prices even 
if substitute refrigerants costs are multiples of current HFC 
costs.\19\
                               conclusion
    The AIM Act phases down HFCs in the United States. The Kigali 
Amendment phases down HFCs around the world. The world's leading 
producers of substitutes for HFCs are in Louisiana, New Jersey, Texas, 
and elsewhere in the United States. The world's fastest growing markets 
for refrigerators and air conditioners are overseas. U.S. ratification 
of the Kigali Amendment forces those markets into HFC substitutes. This 
is a viciously competitive, globally integrated industry, and 
ratification increases the U.S. share of overseas markets and benefits 
U.S. manufacturers.
    The AIM Act helps U.S. manufacturers within our borders. The Kigali 
Amendment helps U.S. manufacturers overseas. Both are essential to 
sustaining U.S. competitiveness and technology leadership.

----------------
Notes

    \1\ ``Economic Impacts of U.S. Ratification of the Kigali 
Amendment.'' Industry Forecasting at the University of Maryland 
(INFORUM) and JMS Consulting, 2018.
    \2\ Id.
    \3\ Id.
    \4\ Id.
    \5\ ``The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, done at Montreal on September 16, 1987, to the Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.'' United States, Congress, 
Senate. Government Printing Office, 1988, 100th Congress.
    \6\ ``S.1630--Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.'' United States, 
Congress. Government Printing Office, 1990, 101st Congress.
    \7\ ``Refrigerants: Market Trends and Supply Chain Assessment.'' 
Clean Energy Manufacturing Analysis Center, 2020. https://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy20osti/70207.pdf. See also ``The High Cost of Cool: The Economic 
Impact of the CFC Phaseout.'' Lieberman, Ben. Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, 1994, https://cei.org/sites/default/files/
Ben%20Lieberman%20-%20The%20High%20
Cost%20of%20Cool%20The%20Economic%20Impact%20of%20the%20CFC%20Phaseout%2
0in%20
the%20United%20States.pdf.
    \8\ ``TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM FOR 
CONSUMER PRODUCTS: Residential Central Air Conditioners and Heat 
Pumps.'' Docket No. EERE-2014-BT-STD-0048-0098. Department of Energy, 
2016, Table 8.2.39. ``Consumer Life-Cycle Cost Impacts of Energy-
Efficiency Standards for Residential-Type Central Air Conditioners and 
Heat Pumps.'' Rosenquist et. al. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 
2001, https://eta.lbl.gov/publications/consumer-life-cycle-cost-
impacts.
    \9\ ``Purchasing Energy-Efficient Water-Cooled Electric Chillers.'' 
Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 
https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/purchasing-energy-efficient-water-
cooled-electric-chillers.
    \10\ ``Purchasing Energy-Efficient Air-Cooled Electric Chillers.'' 
Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 
https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/purchasing-energy-efficient-air-
cooled-electric-chillers.
    \11\ ``The High Cost of Cool: The Economic Impact of the CFC 
Phaseout.'' Lieberman, Ben.
Competitive Enterprise Institute, 1994, https://cei.org/sites/default/
files/Ben%20
Lieberman%20-%20The%20High%20Cost%20of%20Cool%20The%20Economic%20
Impact%20of%20the%20CFC%20Phaseout%20in%20the%20United%20States.pdf.
    \12\ ``How Much is R-134a Refrigerant Per Pound in 2019?'' Johnson, 
Alex. RefrigerantHQ, 2019, https://refrigeranthq.com/how-much-is-r-
134a-per-pound-in-2019/.
    \13\ Id. at 15.
    \14\ ``AC Recharge Costs--Know what price you should pay to get 
your vehicle fixed.'' Repair Pal, 2019, https://repairpal.com/
estimator/air-conditioning-recharge-cost.
    \15\ ``Consumer Cost Impacts of U.S. Ratification of the Kigali 
Amendment.'' Industry Forecasting at the University of Maryland 
(INFORUM) and JMS Consulting, 2018.
    \16\ ibid.
    \17\ A comparative study on the performance of HFO-1234yf and HFC-
134a as an alternative in automotive air conditioning systems.'' 
Daviran et. al. Applied Thermal Engineering, Volume 110, 2017, https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.applthermaleng.2016.09.034. pp. 1091-1100.
    \18\ Decision XXIX/10 Task Force Report on Issues Related To Energy 
Efficiency While Phasing Down Hydrofluorocarbons. Report of the 
Technology and Economic Assessment Panel. Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, May 2018. https://
ozone.unep.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/TEAP_DecisionXXIX-
10_Task_Force_EE_May2018.pdf
    \19\ Id. at 11.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Sousa.

  STATEMENT OF JIM SOUSA, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN TUNABOAT 
  ASSOCIATION, DIRECTOR AT GS FISHERIES, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

    Mr. Sousa. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, I am Jim Sousa, 
president of the American Tunaboat Association, which 
represents the U.S. Pacific purse seine tuna fleet that 
operates under the Tuna Treaty.
    A large majority of the ATA members are multigenerational 
family businesses with a long history in the U.S. fishing 
industry. My own family has been involved in the industry for 
over 90 years, starting with my grandfather, who came to San 
Diego in 1931.
    Even before that, my family was a family of fishers dating 
back to the origins in Portugal generations ago. The same is 
true for many of my ATA colleagues whose families share that 
same fishing heritage, whether they came from Portugal, Italy, 
Croatia, Japan, or elsewhere.
    Mr. Chairman, ATA strongly supports the South Pacific Tuna 
Treaty and the amendments to the treaty you are considering 
here today. We urge this committee and the full Senate to take 
the necessary steps to provide advice and consent to 
ratification.
    For the small island developing states across the Pacific, 
fisheries' resources are often the most significant natural 
resource available to support their economic development.
    Engagement in the fisheries sector is often seen by the 
Pacific Island states as a litmus test for the commitment of 
other states to support their development aspirations.
    Swift action by this committee and the full Senate will 
demonstrate the commitment of the United States to maintaining 
relationships established under the treaty framework.
    This is particularly important now as China continues to 
expand its influence and presence across the Pacific. Because 
ATA vessels fish widely across the Pacific Ocean, we see the 
impact of China's activities in the region firsthand.
    Maintaining a strong and economically viable U.S. fishing 
fleet in the region is vital to the United States' efforts to 
counter China's growing influence across the Pacific.
    Mr. Chairman, in addition to a range of technical changes, 
the amendments before the committee resolve two fundamental 
problems that have previously threatened not only the future of 
the treaty, but the future of the U.S. fleet itself.
    First, the amendments remove the requirements that the U.S. 
industry payment be paid as a collective lump sum. 
Historically, the U.S. fleet paid a lump sum to the Pacific 
Island states for access to fish under the treaty.
    In late 2015, some U.S. vessel owners were unable to pay 
their share of the collective licensing fees and, as a result, 
the entire U.S. fleet was shut down.
    Under these amendments, each vessel is responsible for a 
specific payment. If a vessel cannot pay, it does not get a 
license, but the other vessels in the fleet will not be 
adversely affected.
    Second, the amendments remove the provision that U.S. 
vessels must have a treaty license to fish in the western and 
central Pacific Ocean, including large areas of high seas that 
previously fell within the defined treaty licensing area.
    Among other things, U.S. vessels no longer need a treaty 
license to fish these areas of the high seas. This is a 
critically important change for the U.S. fleet that, absent 
action by the Senate, has not yet been fully implemented.
    Although some changes are being implemented on a 
provisional basis, Senate action remains vital. Without this 
action and appropriate amendments to the implementing 
legislation, the U.S. fleet may never fully realize the 
benefits the U.S. delegation worked so hard to achieve through 
the 2016 negotiations.
    Ensuring full range of these benefits is critical to the 
future of the U.S. fleet, which, as a result of these and other 
issues, has seen the number of vessels decrease substantially 
in recent years.
    Mr. Chairman, if you may allow me, I will conclude with my 
personal observation.
    My first trip to the Pacific Islands was in 1989. At that 
time, the Pacific Island leaders were of an older generation 
that showed great respect for the United States due to the 
sacrifices of this country in liberating the Pacific Islands 
during World War II and in helping rebuild the destruction left 
behind in many places.
    Today, Mr. Chairman, the United States is viewed in a 
different way by a new generation. In many places, this 
generation sees China rather than the United States as more 
committed to the future of the Pacific Islands. This perception 
is something that must be addressed and reversed.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. 
I am happy to answer any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sousa follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Mr. James Sousa

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, Distinguished Members of 
the Committee: I am Jim Sousa, President of the American Tunaboat 
Association (ATA). ATA represents the owners and operators of the 
large-scale tuna purse seine fleet that operates in the Pacific Ocean 
under the Treaty you are considering here today. The large majority of 
ATA Members are family-owned, multi-generational businesses that have a 
long and distinct history as a significant component of the U.S. 
fishing industry. Speaking personally, my own family has been involved 
in the industry for over 90 years, starting with my grandfather who 
came to San Diego in 1931. Even before that, my family was a family of 
fishers dating back to their origins in Portugal generations ago. The 
same is true for many of my ATA colleagues whose families share that 
same fishing heritage, whether they came from Portugal, Italy, Croatia, 
Japan, or elsewhere.
    Mr. Chairman, ATA strongly supports the South Pacific Tuna Treaty 
and the amendments to the Treaty you are considering here today. The 
industry's commitment to the Treaty is reflected in the fact that over 
the past decade, industry payments to the Pacific Islands for access 
under the Treaty total hundreds of millions of dollars. We urge this 
Committee and the full Senate to take the necessary steps to provide 
advice and consent to ratification, and for the Congress to pass 
corresponding amendments to the relevant implementing legislation to 
ensure that the benefits of these Treaty amendments can be fully 
realized by all parties.
    Since its inception in 1987, the Treaty has provided the basis for 
the U.S. purse seine fleet to fish across wide areas of the Pacific 
Ocean in close cooperation with the Pacific Island States that are 
parties to the Treaty. As a result, the Treaty has served as more than 
just a fisheries access agreement; it is a cornerstone of the economic 
and political relationship between the United States and the Pacific 
Island States that are parties to the Treaty. For the small island 
developing States across the Pacific, fisheries resources, and tuna in 
particular, are often the greatest, if not the only, natural resource 
available to support their economic development. As a result, 
engagement in the fisheries sector is often seen by the Pacific Island 
States as a litmus test for the commitment of other States to support 
their development aspirations. Through its history, the Treaty has been 
the single most important means of engagement between the United States 
and these Pacific Island States on a wide range of fisheries issues and 
related matters.
    Swift action by this Committee and the full Senate will be a clear 
demonstration of the commitment of the United States to maintaining the 
relationships established under the Treaty framework during these last 
35 years. This is particularly important now as China continues to 
expand its influence and presence across the Pacific, often using the 
fisheries sector as the opportunity for engagement. Because ATA vessels 
fish across wide swaths of the Pacific Ocean, we see the impact of 
China's activities in the region firsthand. China is actively 
implementing a specific set of policies, programs, subsidies, and 
investments focusing on the fisheries sector because they recognize the 
importance of this sector to the economic development and food security 
of these small and vulnerable island States. Maintaining a strong and 
economically viable U.S. fishing fleet, operating throughout the 
region, is vital in helping the United States' efforts to counter 
China's growing influence across the Pacific region.
    Mr. Chairman, the amendments to the Treaty being considered by the 
Committee today were negotiated to address specific deficiencies in the 
Treaty that, just a few years ago, threatened not only the future of 
the Treaty, but the very future of the U.S. fleet. In early 2016, due 
to what appeared to be an irreconcilable impasse in negotiations to 
extend the Treaty, the United States notified the Pacific Islands 
Parties of its intent to withdraw from the Treaty. In response, the 
Pacific Island States quickly reengaged in negotiations to resolve 
outstanding differences. Those negotiations, which were concluded in 
June of 2016, resulted in the amendments before the Committee today. In 
addition to a range of technical changes, these amendments resolve two 
fundamental problems of the Treaty that had previously put the U.S. 
fleet in an increasingly untenable negotiating position.
    First, the Amendments remove the requirement that the U.S. industry 
payment be paid as a collective lump sum. Historically, the U.S. fleet 
made a lump sum payment to the Pacific Island States for access to fish 
under the Treaty. In 2008, that sum began to increase dramatically as 
the Pacific Island States implemented a new ``Vessel Day Scheme'' to 
maximize their revenue from the fisheries in waters under their 
jurisdiction. In late 2015, some vessel owners were unable to pay their 
share of the collective licensing fees for the following year and, as a 
result, the entire U.S. fleet was shut down.
    The amendments resolve this problem by no longer requiring a lump 
sum payment from the industry. Instead, each vessel is responsible for 
a specific payment. If a vessel can't pay, it doesn't get a license, 
but the other vessels in the fleet will not be adversely affected.
    Second, the amendments remove the provision that U.S. vessels must 
have a Treaty license, issued by the Treaty Administrator at the Forum 
Fisheries Agency, in order to fish in vast portions of the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean, including large areas of the high seas that 
previously fell within the defined Treaty ``Licensing Area'' (see map 
at Figure 1). These high seas areas have been important and productive 
fishing grounds for the U.S. fleet, and they provide a critical 
alternative to the increasingly high cost of access to fish in waters 
under the jurisdiction of the Pacific Island States. The amendments 
modify the definition of ``Licensing Area'' so that U.S. vessels no 
longer need a Treaty license to fish these areas of the high seas. 
Additionally, the amendments allow U.S. vessels to fish with a Treaty 
license or to make separate commercial arrangements outside the Treaty 
with individual Pacific Island States for access in waters under their 
jurisdiction under agreed terms.
    These two aspects in the original Treaty allowed the Pacific Island 
States to dictate negotiating terms on a ``take it or leave it'' basis, 
which often left the industry with no choice but to agree or be shut 
down. The amendments resolve these problems by providing U.S. vessels 
with more options, greater flexibility, and the ability to negotiate 
for fishing access on more equitable terms.
    Although some of the changes described above are being implemented 
on a provisional basis, action by the Senate for advice and consent to 
ratification remains vital. Without this action and appropriate 
amendments to the implementing legislation, the U.S. fleet may never 
fully realize the benefits the U.S. delegation worked so hard to obtain 
through the 2016 negotiations. Ensuring the full range of these 
benefits is critical to the future of the U.S. fleet which, as a result 
of these and other issues, has seen the number of vessels decrease 
substantially in recent years.
    Another key aspect of the Treaty, Mr. Chairman, is the relationship 
between the U.S. tuna purse seine fleet and the U.S. Pacific Territory 
of American Samoa, which serves as the home port for the large majority 
of the U.S. fleet. The economy of American Samoa is overwhelmingly 
dependent on the tuna industry, which provides over 80 percent of the 
private sector employment and over 90 percent of exports from the 
territory. Without a viable U.S. flag tuna fleet based in Pago Pago, 
the effect on American Samoa's tuna dependent economy would be 
devastating. Conversely, without a StarKist plant in American Samoa, 
the operation of the U.S. fleet in the region would not be economically 
viable.
    Mr. Chairman, let me also comment on the state of the conservation 
and management of the tuna resources in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean that are the target species for the U.S. fleet operating under 
the Treaty. The press and popular media often highlight the depletion 
of fisheries resources due to overfishing and adverse impacts of 
fishing activities on non-target species such as marine mammals, 
sharks, rays, sea turtles, and other marine life. What never seems to 
make the press reports is the good news. And the good news here is that 
all species of tropical tunas being fished in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye tunas) are rated as 
fully sustainable by the International Seafood Sustainability 
Foundation (ISSF). This means the level of fishing effort by vessels of 
all countries is below the level that would threaten sustainability of 
these stocks, and the biomass of the stocks is above the level that 
would put the stocks at risk. These stocks are managed under the 
authority of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC) of which the United States is a full member. In addition to 
strict fisheries management requirements, the WCPFC has a full range of 
requirements designed to minimize the impacts of the fishery on the 
non-target species listed above.
    The U.S. fleet is held to the highest standards of accountability 
and compliance, not only with the requirements of the WCPFC, but with 
the full range of U.S. laws including the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the 
Endangered Species Act, Coast Guard safety and environmental 
requirements, and other applicable U.S. law and regulations. Moreover, 
ATA Members are actively engaged with conservation groups to trial new 
fishing gear and techniques to minimize fishing impacts on non-target 
species, including improved handling and release techniques for shark, 
rays, and other species. ATA Members have also adopted a comprehensive 
policy regarding ``industry best practices'' for labor standards and 
working conditions for vessels crews. The absence of a U.S. fleet 
operating in the region, would simply mean that the United States would 
import more tuna from countries whose vessels operate at nothing 
approaching the standards of U.S. vessels.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I hope you will allow me to conclude with a 
personal observation. My first trip to the Pacific Islands was in 1989. 
At that time, the Pacific Island leaders were of an older generation, 
that showed great respect for the United States due to the sacrifices 
of this country in liberating the Pacific Islands during World War II 
and in rebuilding from the destruction left behind in many places. 
Today, Mr. Chairman, the United States is viewed in a different way by 
a new generation. In many places, this generation sees China, rather 
than the United States, as more committed to the future of the Pacific 
Islands. This perception is something that must be addressed and 
reversed.
    For all of these reasons, Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of 
this Committee, ATA and its member companies and vessels express once 
again our strong support for the Treaty amendments and urge quick 
action to bring them into full legal effect as soon as possible.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

Figure 1. Previous delineation of the ``Treaty Area,'' prior to the 
2016 Amendments.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



    The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you both. We will start a 
series of 5-minute rounds.
    Let me turn to Kigali, which entered into force in 2019, 
and while the schedule for phase downs does not begin right 
away, the barriers to trade restriction and access to markets 
is just on the horizon.
    Mr. Yurek, what risks do you see to your member 
organization for the United States being a nonparty to Kigali?
    Mr. Yurek. I think, as you stated and Dr. Thompson stated, 
the treaty itself has very high enforcement provisions which 
would make as of 2033 that there could not be trade. However, 
this is going to start well before that and the impact on U.S. 
manufacturers is going to be before 2033.
    Since we are going to be exporting our technology and 
products into those countries that are looking for that 
expertise, they are going to want to make sure that they are 
going to then be able to select technologies, products, and 
other things that are going to be there not just today, but 
also in the future, and if we are not a party, we will start 
losing out immediately rather than in 2032. The impact would be 
great.
    The Chairman. Many, if not most, of your organization's 
design and manufacture of equipment and appliances here in the 
United States, I imagine, that many of those products made in 
the USA are also built for foreign markets as export goods.
    What role has U.S. industry played in the negotiation of 
Kigali? What about prior amendments to the Montreal Protocol 
and the protocol itself?
    Mr. Yurek. The U.S. industry and the U.S. Government were 
the leaders and instrumental in the original Montreal Protocol. 
They were instrumental in all of the amendments, including the 
Kigali Amendment.
    We were talking earlier with Dr. Thompson where it was in 
2008, 2009, where the U.S. industry came to the U.S. Government 
and started the plan to actually come up with the Kigali 
Amendment that occurred in 2016.
    We have been there since the beginning. We have been 
involved in all the negotiations, and what has been agreed upon 
in that amendment has been what the U.S. industry wanted as 
well as the U.S. Government to make sure that not only our 
technology, but our expertise and the benefit of our U.S. 
manufacturers and economy would be realized.
    The Chairman. Now, how far ahead are your member companies 
in manufacturing and marketing to the next generation of what 
is covered by the Kigali Amendment and as compared to your 
foreign competitors?
    Mr. Yurek. To look at just the refrigerants, the U.S. 
manufacturers are leading in the alternative refrigerants that 
are out there. We have spent, just as an industry association, 
millions of dollars in research to help us get ready for this 
transition and make sure that we have products as well as 
refrigerants that would be available not only in the U.S. 
market, but globally.
    So it has been billions that have been spent by U.S. 
industry in developing this and they want the benefit of being 
able to sell that technology not only here in the U.S., but 
also globally.
    The Chairman. If we are in the Kigali and are also helping 
to set standards we do much better?
    Mr. Yurek. We do, and I think the statement, Ranking 
Member, you were talking about in questioning with Dr. Thompson 
related to the gold standard, and the U.S. still is in this 
area.
    The U.S. developed the refrigeration technology with Willis 
Carrier and we have continued to lead in developing that 
technology and we want to continue to do that in the future as 
we look at not only implementing Kigali, but also looking at 
making these products more efficient and addressing the indoor 
air quality needs that we have seen with the COVID crisis as 
well, where our products and our technology and expertise is 
being looked for.
    The Chairman. Studies indicate that consumers may benefit 
over the long term if we ratify Kigali, and like the Montreal 
Protocol, Kigali was designed with consumer interests in mind.
    Over the long term, do American consumers stand to pay more 
if we ratify Kigali?
    Mr. Yurek. The consumers paying more for our equipment will 
not be the result of the Kigali Amendment and the changing in 
refrigerants.
    What drives the cost of our products are the raw materials 
that go into it, which is the copper, the aluminum, the steel 
and other things, and they are actually going to benefit from 
the Kigali Amendment because those raw costs are going up and 
the expenses.
    With the refrigerants they are more productive, they are 
more efficient, thereby, requiring less of the refrigerant, but 
also decreasing consumers' energy costs for operating the 
equipment.
    If you look at just Kigali and where the refrigerants are, 
it is a net benefit. Where they are going to see increases is 
because of the supply chain issues and the raw materials that 
go into the products.
    The Chairman. That would happen regardless of Kigali?
    Mr. Yurek. Correct.
    The Chairman. If we ratify Kigali, would U.S. consumers 
need to go out and buy new appliances?
    Mr. Yurek. They would not. That is why it is a phased down 
over a series of years and in making sure, and what the EPA and 
the AIM Act does for implementation in the U.S. is to make sure 
that if you buy an air conditioner today or a refrigerator you 
will be able to use that refrigerator throughout its useful 
life and not have to replace it early because of a change in 
refrigerants.
    The Chairman. I have some questions for Mr. Sousa, but I 
want to turn to the ranking member.
    Senator Risch. I will yield back to you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would just say that these have been good panels, these 
really need to move, and I appreciate the way this has been set 
up. If I have any more I will submit them for the record.
    I will yield time back to you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I agree with you.
    Mr. Sousa, your company and your cohorts are represented by 
the American Tunaboat Association, have so during the 
tumultuous years that you have been without the certainty that 
these amendments would provide.
    Can you tell the committee how things have changed during 
the last 6 years in terms of the increased presence of foreign 
fishing fleets and how they operate, how your cohorts are 
leaving for other waters, and if so how that has impacted their 
catch and profitability?
    Mr. Sousa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We have seen an unfair playing field for the U.S. fleet 
over the last several years, especially with China.
    They do not adhere to the labor standards we do nor to the 
conservation standards, and it has been something that has put 
us at a competitive disadvantage, and part of the reason for 
these amendments within the treaty is to be able to help even 
the playing field for us, in some ways, because if we have the 
right to fish in the high seas we can negotiate a deal with 
some of the island countries.
    We have a negotiating point where they cannot hold it over 
our heads where we cannot fish anywhere, and our concern always 
is you have an influence like China that gets involved with one 
of these Pacific Island states and tries to undermine the U.S. 
fleet by telling them to raise the price of access so high that 
it is impossible for us to pay it.
    The Chairman. These amendments would actually, as you 
suggest by your statement, make it easier to fish on the high 
seas?
    Mr. Sousa. What it allows us to do, Mr. Chairman, is if we 
have not come to an agreement yet, we can start fishing on the 
high seas and concurrently continue our negotiations with the 
Pacific Island countries and come to an agreement on fishing in 
their waters. Versus right now, if we do not have an agreement, 
if we do not get the treaty ratifications that are here right 
now, then we cannot fish anywhere in the western Pacific. We 
would have to look elsewhere to fish.
    The Chairman. Now, one last question and it is based on 
your statement. I found it interesting.
    You talked about two different generations in the Pacific 
Island nations and that this one is more inclined towards 
China.
    I find that interesting because from everything I 
understand about this subject, China does not live under the 
treaty, does not obey necessarily the treaty. We are more 
cognizant of appropriate fishing practices and conservation 
questions.
    Why would they look towards China more so when China 
actually abuses their fishing grounds?
    Mr. Sousa. I think, to try and put it tactfully, they 
approach them in a financial way that provides them incentive 
to look the other way, in many instances.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. When you do not want to fish anymore, we will 
send you to the State Department.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Sousa. Thank you, sir.
    The Chairman. You mean they bribe them. Okay. All right. 
Thank you. Thank you very much. That makes it clear.
    All right. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Forgive me, I will 
probably ask questions that you might have been digging into, 
but it is good to join you and this is a question for Mr. 
Yurek.
    Those who oppose the Kigali Amendment advance the argument 
that U.S. consumers might suffer because of a higher cost for 
new products that do not use HFCs. The market transition away 
from HFCs is already underway, and that is going to occur 
whether or not the U.S. ratifies the treaty.
    It is an important point to be able to respond to when the 
issue is raised. Can you talk about the impact of the Kigali 
Amendment on U.S. consumers?
    Mr. Yurek. Yes, Senator.
    This is something that we think about every day. As an 
industry, you want to make sure, one, the products that we 
manufacture are there to make sure that people are comfortable, 
safe, and productive, and they also need to be cost effective.
    What the Kigali Amendment does and what the AIM Act does is 
deal with the refrigerants. The amount of costs from the 
refrigerants is actually less than 1 percent of the entire cost 
of the system.
    Where the biggest cost is is with the raw materials--the 
copper, the steel, the aluminum--that go into the equipment, 
and a lot of times you have the technology, but to get higher 
efficiency requires more copper and steel because you need more 
heat transfer area.
    There is actually a benefit with these changes in 
refrigerants, as we have seen even with the Montreal Protocol, 
the prior amendments, as well as the Kigali Amendment.
    These new refrigerants are more efficient, thereby, not 
only requiring less refrigerant, but also reducing the energy 
costs and the need to have copper, steel, and aluminum.
    Overall, the impact will be minimal and, hopefully, that 
will reduce the energy use and, therefore, the energy costs 
over the operation of that system.
    Senator Kaine. That is the only question I have. I 
appreciate that answer.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. All right. There are no other 
members seeking recognition now.
    I normally do not do this, but because we have your 
expertise here, is there anything that you have not made in 
your statements that we have not talked about in the Q&A that 
you want us to know about these treaties that we have not 
talked about?
    Mr. Yurek. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe there is, other 
than I think the importance of moving expeditiously through the 
process, giving the advice and consent of the Senate towards 
the Kigali Amendment and the other amendments, and moving 
towards ratification so that we can then continue the 
implementation and get the benefits that these treaties 
provide.
    The Chairman. Anything else, Mr. Sousa?
    Mr. Sousa. Mr. Chairman, probably one last thing that just 
came to my mind is that the treaty does provide a framework for 
the U.S. Government to deal with the Pacific Island nations out 
there in a very efficient manner, because a lot of these 
meetings are in one area and everyone is there at one time.
    I think it is an efficient way for the interaction between 
multi-governments and it saves a lot of time and effort having 
to travel around. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I agree with the ranking member 
that I think these treaties are important.
    They go to economic interests of the United States and, in 
some cases, they certainly go to the ability of the United 
States to extend its influence and counter Chinese influence, 
particularly in the Pacific.
    I hope that we can pursue them in short order and that they 
will be--we have not had a treaty approved for quite some time 
in the United States Senate. This would be a great breakthrough 
to be able to do that.
    Let me thank our witnesses, once again, for taking the time 
to give us the insights of the benefits of joining each of 
these treaties.
    The record will remain open until the close of business on 
Friday, April 8, for senators to submit questions for the 
record.
    With the thanks to the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


              Responses of Dr. John Thompson to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. If the U.S. ratified the Kigali amendment, would our 
nation be banned from trading in HFCs with non-parties to the Kigali 
amendment in 2033?

    Answer. All Montreal Protocol controlled substances are subject to 
non-Party trade provisions as set out in Article 4. In the case of 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) controlled under the Kigali Amendment, each 
Party to the Kigali Amendment will be prohibited from trading in HFCs 
with any non-Parties to the Amendment effective January 1, 2033. The 
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol could decide to defer 
the applicability of this prohibition if it determines that a non-Party 
is complying de facto with the Protocol's phase-down and reporting 
requirements for HFCs.
    One hundred thirty-one Montreal Protocol Parties, including most 
major U.S. trading partners, have ratified the Kigali Amendment. These 
Parties already account for the vast majority of global HFC consumption 
and production outside the United States, and we expect most other 
countries will join the Amendment by 2033. If the United States were 
not to ratify the Kigali Amendment, all of those Kigali Amendment 
Parties would be prohibited from trading in HFCs, including those 
contained in innovative HFC blends, with the United States, subject to 
the exception described above. This exception has on occasion been 
applied by Montreal Protocol Parties on a year-to-year basis for non-
Party trade in other substances controlled under the Protocol, though 
in the case of HFCs, U.S. industry has raised concerns about expected 
negative impacts to U.S. exports if the United States were to remain a 
non-Party to the Kigali Amendment, even if we were to seek such an 
exception for trade in HFCs.

    Question. Please list the countries the U.S. currently trades with 
in HFCs.

    Answer. The primary countries the United States trades with in HFCs 
are Mexico, the Netherlands, Canada, Saudi Arabia, India, Japan, the 
United Arab Emirates, Brazil, the United Kingdom, China, Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Republic of Korea, and Argentina. This is not an 
exhaustive list because a number of countries trade only in small 
amounts and not every year.

    Question. What is the position of the United States on exemptions 
of certain HFC uses from our phase down requirements?

    Answer. The Kigali amendment allows the parties to exempt certain 
HFC uses from its phase down requirements. The mechanism to apply the 
exemptions has not been created.
    Article 2J(5) of the Montreal Protocol, as amended by the Kigali 
Amendment, provides that the phasedown levels specified for HFCs will 
apply save to the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of 
production and consumption that is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by 
the Parties to be exempted uses. In 2016, the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Montreal Protocol decided to consider mechanisms for certain 
exemptions for HFC production and consumption, including for essential 
uses and critical uses, in 2029.
    It is expected that any potential need for such exemptions under 
the Kigali Amendment may become clearer over time, as countries begin 
to reduce HFC production and consumption in accordance with the Kigali 
Amendment. The United States supports considering the potential need 
for exemptions under the Kigali Amendment in 2029 based on the best 
information available at that time. We have not taken a position on 
whether or not such exemptions are needed and would only plan to do so 
when the issue arises later this decade.
    Finally, it is important to recall the Kigali Amendment provides 
for a phasedown, rather than a complete phaseout, of the consumption 
and production of HFCs. This additional flexibility as compared to 
earlier transitions under the Montreal Protocol already envisions that 
certain uses for HFCs may continue well into the future irrespective of 
the consideration of any exemptions.

    Question. How would the United States define ``essential uses and 
critical uses''?

    Answer. The Parties to the Protocol have decided to consider the 
potential need for HFC exemptions in the future, as noted in Answer 3, 
but have not taken any decisions yet to define how HFC essential or 
critical use exemptions would operate under the Protocol. The United 
States has not taken a position on essential or critical uses for HFCs 
beyond expressing support for the already-planned consideration of any 
potential need for such exemptions in 2029. We would expect to take a 
position on any such exemptions at that time, taking into account the 
provisions of the AIM Act that relate to essential uses.
    The Montreal Protocol created a Multilateral Fund for grants and 
concessional loans to cover the costs incurred in converting to 
technologies that do not rely on controlled substances.

    Question. How much funding in total has been provided to the 
Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol?

    Answer. Total contributions to the Multilateral Fund by all Parties 
to the Montreal Protocol amount to approximately $4 billion.

    Question. What countries have received grants and concessional 
loans from the Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol?

    Answer. The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol provides 
technical and financial assistance to those Parties that qualify under 
the criteria set out in Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol. There are 
147 countries categorized as ``Article 5'' Parties under the Protocol, 
three of which do not receive assistance through the Multilateral Fund: 
the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Republic of Korea. The 
criterion for a developing country to have Article 5 status under the 
Protocol is based on its per capita consumption of controlled 
substances at the time of entry into force of the Montreal Protocol for 
that country.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Afghanistan           51. Georgia              101. Panama
2. Albania               52. Ghana                102. Papua New Guinea
3. Algeria               53. Grenada              103. Paraguay
4. Angola                54. Guatemala            104. Peru
5. Antigua and Barbuda   55. Guinea               105. Philippines
6. Argentina             56. Guinea Bissau        106. Qatar
7. Armenia               57. Guyana               107. Republic of Korea
8. Bahamas               58. Haiti                108. Republic of
                                                   Moldova
9. Bahrain               59. Honduras             109. Rwanda
10. Bangladesh           60. India                110. Saint Kitts and
                                                   Nevis
11. Barbados             61. Indonesia            111. Saint Lucia
12. Belize               62. Iran (Islamic        112. Saint Vincent and
                          Republic of)             the Grenadines
13. Benin
14. Bhutan               63. Iraq                 113. Samoa
15. Bolivia              64. Jamaica              114. Sao Tome and
 (Plurinational State                              Principe
 of)
                         65. Jordan               115. Saudi Arabia
16. Bosnia and           66. Kenya                116. Senegal
 Herzegovina
                         67. Kiribati             117. Serbia
17. Botswana             68. Kuwait               118. Seychelles
18. Brazil               69. Kyrgyzstan           119. Sierra Leone
19. Brunei Darussalam    70. Lao People's         120. Singapore
                          Democratic Republic
20. Burkina Faso                                  121. Solomon Islands
21. Burundi              71. Lebanon              122. Somalia
22. Cabo Verde           72. Lesotho              123. South Africa
23. Cambodia             73. Liberia              124. South Sudan
24. Cameroon             74. Libya                125. Sri Lanka
25. Central African      75. Madagascar           126. Sudan
 Republic
                         76. Malawi               127. Suriname
26. Chad                 77. Malaysia             128. Syrian Arab
                                                   Republic
27. Chile                78. Maldives             129. Thailand
28. China                79. Mali                 130. Timor-Leste
29. Colombia             80. Marshall Islands     131. Togo
30. Comoros              81. Mauritania           132. Tonga
31. Congo                82. Mauritius            133. Trinidad and
                                                   Tobago
32. Cook Islands         83. Mexico               134. Tunisia
33. Costa Rica           84. Micronesia           135. Turkey
                          (Federated States of)
34. Cuba                                          136. Turkmenistan
35. Cote d'Ivoire        85. Mongolia             137. Tuvalu
36. Democratic People's  86. Montenegro           138. Uganda
 Republic of Korea
                         87. Morocco              139. United Arab
                                                   Emirates
37. Democratic Republic  88. Mozambique           140. United Republic
 of the Congo                                      of Tanzania
                         89. Myanmar
38. Djibouti             90. Namibia              141. Uruguay
39. Dominica             91. Nauru                142. Vanuatu
40. Dominican Republic   92. Nepal                143. Venezuela
                                                   (Bolivarian Republic
                                                   of)
41. Ecuador              93. Nicaragua
42. Egypt                94. Niger                144. Viet Nam
43. El Salvador          95. Nigeria              145. Yemen
44. Equatorial Guinea    96. Niue                 146. Zambia
45. Eritrea              97. North Macedonia      147. Zimbabwe
46. Eswatini (the        98. Oman
 Kingdom of)
                         99. Pakistan
47. Ethiopia             100. Palau
48. Fiji
49. Gabon
50. Gambia
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Question. How much funding was provided by the United States to the 
Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol?

    Answer. Of the approximately $4 billion contributed to the 
Multilateral Fund, $936 million was from the United States.

    Question. How much funding has China received from the Multilateral 
Fund?

    Answer. China has received approximately $1.4 billion in assistance 
since the inception of the Multilateral Fund in 1990. Since joining the 
Montreal Protocol more than 30 years ago, China has been classified as 
an ``Article 5'' Party, which roughly correlates to being a developing 
country and having low per capita consumption of certain controlled 
substances at the time of entry into force of the Protocol. Therefore, 
China has been eligible to receive assistance from the Multilateral 
Fund to implement control measures under the Montreal Protocol. The 
United States led a multi-year effort that concluded in 2019 that has 
reduced Multilateral Fund assistance to China by approximately two-
thirds relative to previous funding levels. We intend to continue to 
push for reduced funding for China and our influence will be stronger 
in this regard if we are a Party to the Kigali Amendment.

    Question. How much more funding from the United States would be 
required or requested under the Kigali Amendment?

    Answer. The Multilateral Fund is replenished on a 3-year basis 
through decisions of the Montreal Protocol's Meeting of the Parties and 
informed by analysis of funding needs for the relevant triennium 
provided by the Protocol's Technology and Economic Assessment Panel's 
(TEAP). Consistent with past practice under the Montreal Protocol, 
there is no up-front decision on the total amount of assistance to 
facilitate implementation of HFC control measures under the Protocol. 
Instead, Parties decide on an amount to replenish the Multilateral Fund 
every 3 years, relying on the technical and economic analysis provided 
by TEAP. It is therefore difficult to assess overall funding levels for 
the entire phasedown timeline, but our preliminary assessment is that 
the costs for phasing down HFCs under the Montreal Protocol will be 
similar to those associated with the phaseout of the prior generation 
of Montreal Protocol controlled substances known as 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). Current U.S. contributions to the 
Multilateral Fund continue to provide support for the phaseout of 
HCFCs. U.S. contributions to the Multilateral Fund are made on a 
voluntary basis to support implementation of the Montreal Protocol in 
its entirety.

    Question. How much funding would China receive from the 
Multilateral Fund under the Kigali Amendment?

    Answer. As noted in the previous answer, there is no up-front 
decision on the overall amount of Multilateral Fund assistance for 
phasing down HFCs, or funding for any specific country. Thus, 
considerable uncertainty about future funding needs for implementation 
of the Kigali Amendment still exists at this early stage of the 
process, and Montreal Protocol Parties in the future will decide on the 
amounts to replenish the Multilateral Fund. However, as a result of 
prior U.S. efforts referenced in a previous answer, we expect future 
Multilateral Fund support for China will be substantially lower than it 
was in past years. U.S. ratification of the Kigali Amendment will put 
us in an even better position to reduce funding for China.
    China is included in the list of Article 5 countries. Under Article 
5 of the Montreal Protocol, developing countries have longer timeframes 
to phase down and phase out listed substances.

    Question. What are the differences between the requirements, 
assistance and obligations provided under the Montreal Protocol for the 
United States versus China?
    What are the differences between the requirements, assistance and 
obligations provided under the Kigali Amendment for the United States 
versus China?

    Answer. The United States is subject to the control measures 
outlined in Article 2 of the Montreal Protocol. The Multilateral Fund 
is financed by contributions from Parties operating under Article 2 of 
the Protocol (``non-Article 5 Parties''), which include the United 
States.
    Parties operating under Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol 
(``Article 5 Parties'') have a delayed schedule for many control 
measures under the Protocol. In addition, Article 10 provides that 
Article 5 Parties are eligible for assistance from the Multilateral 
Fund in implementing those control measures. China is one of 147 
Article 5 Parties under the Protocol, based on the criteria in Article 
5.
    Like prior amendments to the Montreal Protocol, the Kigali 
Amendment preserves the key features of the Montreal Protocol and 
extends them to a new class of controlled substances, HFCs. Under the 
Kigali Amendment, the HFC phasedown schedule for non-Article 5 Parties, 
such as the United States, includes a freeze at baseline levels in 
2019, a 40 percent reduction in 2024, a 70 percent reduction in 2029, 
an 80 percent reduction in 2034, and an 85 percent reduction in 3036. 
The Kigali Amendment also extends the scope of the Protocol's financial 
mechanism to support implementation of the HFC phasedown.
    As a country that meets the criteria set out in Article 5 of the 
Montreal Protocol, China is one of 147 Article 5 Parties eligible for 
assistance and a delayed HFC phasedown schedule. Under the Kigali 
Amendment, China's HFC phasedown schedule includes a freeze at baseline 
levels in 2024, a 10 percent reduction in 2029, a 20 percent reduction 
in 2035, a 30 percent reduction in 2040, and an 85 percent reduction in 
2045.
    China is the world's largest producer and consumer of HFCs, and the 
United States is the world's leader in the development and deployment 
of HFC alternatives. As a general matter, the Kigali Amendment will 
push the global technology market away from HFCs and towards HFC 
alternatives, to the benefit of the United States.
    Under the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act, there 
are domestic restrictions on hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs, which 
Congress is able to revisit and consider changing if the costs to the 
consumer are considered to be too high.

    Question. Why would the United States need to ratify the Kigali 
amendment when our nation already has a law to phase down production 
and consumption of HFCs?

    Answer. U.S. ratification of the Kigali Amendment would yield 
substantial economic benefits beyond those from domestic laws, such as 
the AIM Act. Estimates endorsed by five major industry associations 
indicate Kigali ratification will support 33,000 new U.S. manufacturing 
jobs and $12.5 billion in new investments in the U.S. economy, among 
other benefits. U.S. industry representatives have also testified 
ratification will lead to substantially increased U.S. exports to 
rapidly growing refrigeration and air conditioning markets overseas 
that will support these jobs. U.S. businesses indicate they are already 
suffering reputational harm relative to competitors in other countries, 
such as China, that have joined the Amendment. If we do not join, 
Parties to the Amendment may also be prohibited from trading in HFCs 
with the United States starting in 2033, which is not far away in an 
industry that looks years ahead when planning investments. This could 
also have the effect of disrupting trade with the United States in 
innovative HFC blends produced by U.S. companies as next-generation 
refrigerants. Finally, ratification would put the United States in the 
strongest possible position in future Meetings of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol to ensure U.S. technologies are not disadvantaged 
relative to those from China or other competitors as Kigali Amendment 
implementation proceeds.

    Question. Would the ratification of the Kigali Amendment make it 
more difficult for the United States to make changes to domestic laws 
on HFCs in order to protect American consumers should the cost of the 
treaty requirements be deemed too high?

    Answer. The United States is already phasing down HFCs under the 
AIM Act, and the Kigali Amendment does not require further reductions 
beyond what is already provided for under U.S. law. Kigali Amendment 
ratification therefore is not anticipated to impact U.S. consumers 
because production and consumption controls are already being 
implemented in the United States. Thus, there should be no incremental 
cost to consumers from the implementation of Kigali Amendment phasedown 
requirements as referenced in the question, because the AIM Act already 
calls for the same reductions as set out in the Kigali Amendment. 
Moreover, in its rulemaking under the AIM Act, EPA estimated the rule 
would yield cumulative compliance savings for industry. For historical 
context, prior Montreal Protocol transitions proceeded with minimal 
price impacts on consumers. The Kigali Amendment provides even further 
flexibility through its phasedown approach for HFCs, as compared to the 
complete phaseout implemented for previous generations of controlled 
substances under the Montreal Protocol. Montreal Protocol Parties have 
also decided to undertake technical reviews every 5 years to assess the 
availability of HFC alternatives and consider challenges in 
implementation; these reviews could inform consideration of provisions 
for additional flexibility such as the exemptions referenced in Answers 
3 and 4, should countries face such challenges.

    Question. What are the options for the United States to withdraw 
from the Kigali Amendment should compliance costs prove too high for 
American consumers?

    Answer. Like prior amendments to the Montreal Protocol, the Kigali 
Amendment preserves the key features of the Montreal Protocol and 
extends them to a new class of controlled substances, HFCs. The Kigali 
Amendment does not contain a separate withdrawal clause. Article 19 of 
the Montreal Protocol provides that any Party may withdraw from the 
Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary at any time 
after 4 years of assuming the obligations specified in paragraph 1 of 
Article 2A (relating to the control of chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs). 
Any such withdrawal would take effect upon expiry of 1 year after the 
date of its receipt by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be 
specified in the notification of the withdrawal.
                                 ______
                                 

Letters of Support for the Kigali Amendment From the Business Community

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]