[Senate Hearing 117-350]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-350
COMBATTING AUTHORITARIANISM:
U.S. TOOLS AND RESPONSES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-396PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Zeya, Hon. Uzra, Under Secretary for Civilian Security,
Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Godfrey, Jennifer Hall, Senior Bureau Official for Public
Diplomacy and Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 9
Applebaum, Anne, Atlantic Magazine Staff Writer, Senior Fellow at
the SNF Agora Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Washington,
DC............................................................. 22
Prepared Statement........................................... 24
Twining, Daniel, President, International Republican Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 28
Prepared Statement........................................... 30
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 44
Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 48
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya and Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez........................... 48
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 50
Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions Submitted by
Senator James E. Risch......................................... 55
Responses of Ms. Anne Applebaum to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 58
Responses of Dr. Daniel Twining to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 58
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions Submitted by Senator Todd
Young.......................................................... 61
Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions Submitted by
Senator Todd Young............................................. 62
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions Submitted by Senator Ted
Cruz........................................................... 64
(iii)
COMBATTING AUTHORITARIANISM: U.S. TOOLS AND RESPONSES
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Coons,
Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson,
Romney, and Young.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order, ``Combatting
Authoritarianism: The U.S. Tools and Responses.''
When I returned to chair this committee, I believed it was
critical that our first hearing explore the state of democracy
around the world amid a resurgence of authoritarianism to
remind ourselves that the U.S. support of human rights, good
governance, and individual rights are not simply lofty policy
goals in and of themselves.
One year later, Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine is
showing the world exactly what is at stake. At this moment, a
democracy forged from the hard-fought tenacity of the Ukrainian
people is fighting for its very existence while a ruthless
dictator is shelling civilians, blowing up schools and
hospitals, and threatening regional stability.
To authoritarians like Putin, liberal democracy is not just
a nice concept. It is a formidable, dangerous ideology that
threatens their power and wealth, and they will deploy whatever
means necessary to protect that power, from propaganda,
corruption and, tragically, ruthless violence.
In response to this threat, however, we are witnessing a
democratic reawakening. Democracies across the globe have
rallied to deliver a swift, unified response to Putin and his
enablers and have offered support to Ukrainians fighting for
their freedom.
We must capitalize on this resurgence of democratic fervor
to successfully combat the growing threat of authoritarianism
and the United States must lead the way.
Over the past two decades, a new type of 21st century
authoritarian support system has arisen. Rather than working in
despotic isolation, authoritarian leaders operate through
networks of new kleptocratic financial mechanisms,
disinformation professionals, and an array of security services
to protect one another from democratic pressures and to secure
their repressive rule.
Autocrats from Venezuela to Cuba, Belarus, and Burma are
sustained through support from China and Russia.
Today, I look forward to hearing about the Administration's
efforts to counter authoritarianism and bolster democracies. I
believe that if we are to be successful in this fight we must
redouble our efforts.
Specifically, we must aggressively lead with our values and
actions and not just in words. We must support and protect
human rights defenders, democracy activists, and civil society
organizations who are on the frontlines of this global
struggle.
In the coming weeks, I will be introducing the Global
Voices of Freedom Act, which will strengthen protections for
democracy and human rights defenders across the world. We must
combat the complex web of kleptocracy sustaining autocrats from
around the world. We must cut off their lifeblood and impair
their ability to buffer one another from sanctions.
We must combat digital authoritarianism, including
disinformation, propaganda, and censorship used to subvert
democratic principles and advance autocrats' interests.
We must counter the dangerous narratives which
authoritarians spread to manipulate, to distract, and to cause
people to question whether democracy has anything to offer the
modern world.
We must also bolster fledgling democracies from Niger to
Tunisia, including through economic support, and counter the
rise of illiberal forces, from El Salvador to Turkey.
For too long authoritarianism has lured national leaders
with the promise of easy pathways to wealth and power. In
response, we must strengthen our solidarity with nations
striving to pursue security and prosperity for their people
through just and democratic means.
Our efforts must be well funded, and I am glad that we have
the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations, State
Authorization, and Subcommittee on Foreign Ops. Our efforts
have to be well funded.
How many more titles do you have? Did I add extra to it
or----
Senator Coons. I greatly appreciate the description of
myself as distinguished, but what I deliver is the goals of our
committee----
The Chairman. It will--you will be even very distinguished
when it is well funded.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. What the United States has invested in
democracy assistance pales in comparison to the billions that
autocrats pour into protecting one another's wealth and power.
The Administration's Summit for Democracy last year
represented a significant opportunity to galvanize our allies
in these efforts, but if the goals of the Summit are not
translated into concrete and well-funded actions the democracy
movement will be worse off, left only with empty promises.
We must also get our own house in order, as demonstrated
when rioters stormed the Capitol on January 6 to overturn the
results of the presidential election.
We must fill critical roles at home including the Assistant
Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the
Ambassador for War Crimes, and ambassadorships around the
world. My colleagues' obstruction of these nominees impedes our
ability to stand up to autocrats and support our allies and, at
the same time, the Administration must nominate an Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy.
In recent weeks, we have witnessed what authoritarians are
willing to do to protect their power and wealth and to
eliminate democracy. Today, it is Russia and Ukraine. Tomorrow
it will be other nations.
We have watched as Ukrainians have taken up arms and risked
their lives in defense of freedom and democracy. What are we,
in turn, as democracies and the United States willing to do?
That is a question I hope we begin to answer today, and
with that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member for
his comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Every American can turn on the TV and see that
authoritarianism is on the rise. From Putin's personal war--
very personal war--against Ukraine to China's genocide of the
Uighurs and technology-fueled repression, autocrats are busy
quashing political dissent and actively working to undermine
our open democratic society.
While Russia and China are the most egregious models of
authoritarianism, Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, and Zimbabwe
also demonstrate the global nature of this rise. Clearly, the
United States and our allies need to step up our game against
these regimes.
The Biden administration has made supporting democracy a
focal point of its foreign policy, and last December, the
President hosted the Summit for Democracy with much fanfare.
Unfortunately, there were few, if any, results there from the
Summit.
Ukraine was a participant in the Summit and is now fighting
for its sovereignty against an authoritarian Russian regime.
Ukrainian lives will not be saved by the declarations or
pledges from a summit.
Instead, the Ukrainians need air defense systems, including
surface-to-air missiles, fighter planes, anti-tank missiles,
ammunition, small arms, and bulletproof vests. The United
States once called itself the arsenal of democracy. We can
become so again.
Ukraine is fighting for its freedom, but also for ours. We
must continue to give it the tools now to combat Putin's
authoritarianism. Russia's repression goes beyond its current
war and uses disinformation and cyber warfare to stir
discontent abroad, including in Georgia, Moldova, the Baltics,
and the Balkans.
We have also allowed the ill-gotten financial gains of
Putin's cronies to find a home in the West, including in the
United States. I am glad to see the Administration has stood up
a task force to remove the Kremlin's influences from our
systems and their holdings, but it is long overdue.
We have been far too permissive for too long, and the
results of that complacency are seen in Ukraine.
Turning to China, the Chinese Communist Party has a long
history of malign influence that takes a variety of forms. Its
coordination with Russia on the misinformation about the war in
Ukraine is only the latest example.
The CCP is justifying Russia's horrific and unjustified
invasion by spreading disinformation about U.S.-supported
biological research labs in Ukraine. This is similar to the
false narratives China used to cover up the origins of COVID-19
and delay the global pandemic response.
In other instances, the CCP is using transnational
repression to target dissidents and even U.S. citizens outside
of China, bullying media outlets overseas that publish negative
coverage of China, and silencing debate in U.S. universities.
Funding from China into universities is another major
problem. From 2019 to 2021 alone, U.S. universities received
$545 million in gifts and contracts from China--$545 million.
In one example, Chinese company Alibaba contracted with a U.S.
university to develop facial surveillance technology.
In Europe, multiple universities have ties with Chinese
universities that directly support the People's Liberation
Army. These partnerships support bad actors that do not share
the interests of democratic nations.
It is a simple question. Why are we funding Chinese
authoritarianism? As autocrats get more creative in pushing
their agenda, the United States and its allies need to increase
their efforts to block and tackle disinformation and
authoritarian narratives before they take root.
The U.S. should continue its support for democracies around
the globe through our foreign assistance programs. We need to
better coordinate within our agencies to focus on programs that
are most effective at pushing back against the lies and
propaganda of our adversaries.
We should also work with our allies and partners to promote
democratic institutions, good governance, and understanding of
the playbooks of authoritarian governments.
On universities, for example, the U.S. and our partners
should improve scrutiny of foreign donations and contracts. We
must continue to counter authoritarian tactics through a free
media and civil society.
I look forward to hearing more today about our current U.S.
Government efforts to combat authoritarianism and how we can
improve upon those efforts immediately.
We must not let the authoritarians win. As we see in
Ukraine today, no one wants to live in a world controlled by
Putin or Xi.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
All right. So we will start with our witnesses. Let me
introduce them.
It is my privilege to welcome Under Secretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya.
In her role, Under Secretary Zeya leads the department
efforts to prevent and counter threats to civilian security,
works to advance the security of the American people by
assisting countries around the world to build more democratic,
secure, stable, and just societies.
Under Secretary Zeya also serves concurrently as the U.S.
Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, and she is a veteran
diplomat, having served our country in the Foreign Service over
27 years in Syria, Egypt, Oman, Jamaica, and France, and we
welcome you.
We are also joined virtually by another formidable
diplomat, Acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs Ms. Jennifer Hall Godfrey.
In her role, Ms. Godfrey leads department efforts to expand
and strengthen the relationships between the people of the
United States and our foreign counterparts.
She works to advance our national interests by seeking to
engage, inform, and understand the perspectives of foreign
audiences. Ms. Godfrey is a career member of the Senior Foreign
Service and has served our country with distinction in Jordan,
Turkmenistan, Libya, Austria, and Saudi Arabia. So welcome to
you both.
Thank you for being here. Your full statements will be
included in the record. I would ask you to try to summarize
them in about 5 minutes or so so we can have a conversation
with you.
Madam Secretary, we start with you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE UZRA ZEYA, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Zeya. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
With Russia's premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war
of choice against Ukraine, generating Europe's worst
humanitarian crisis since World War II, never in my lifetime
has the contest between democracy and autocracy been more
important, and we will prevail, thanks to the strong bipartisan
support of Congress.
Across the globe, authoritarianism threatens democratic
governments and societies. According to Freedom House, almost
40 percent of the global population live in countries
categorized as not free. This is a defining challenge of our
time and this Administration is responding with decisive and
collective action.
Today, I would like to highlight three core lines of
effort: one, shoring up our alliances and partnerships to
advance a common vision and unified front in the face of
authoritarianism; two, broadening the chorus of those active in
defending democracy, countering corruption, and advancing human
rights globally beyond our traditional transatlantic partners;
and three, modernizing our foreign policy and assistance
toolkit to push back on authoritarians while supporting civil
society actors and institutions often under siege.
There is no greater proof of the need for bold action to
combat authoritarianism than Putin's brutal effort to occupy
Ukraine and destroy its democracy, but Putin grossly
underestimated the will of the Ukrainian people and the
international community.
The United States and the rest of the responsible world are
uniting to stand with Ukraine and surge assistance across all
sectors.
Together with allies, we are exposing the Kremlin's
disinformation and lies while imposing massive costs through
powerful sanctions and export controls that have cratered
Russia's economy and left it more politically isolated than
ever before.
We will use every tool available to hold the Government of
Russia, its enablers in Belarus, and the Russian oligarchs who
have profited from this corrupt violent regime to account.
We are also clear eyed and resolute about other threats to
democracy. A more assertive People's Republic of China is
attempting to redefine global norms to privilege
authoritarianism and avert international scrutiny.
The PRC has good reason to fear the latter, as it continues
to commit genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang,
strangle democracy and press freedom in Hong Kong, and suppress
Tibetan Buddhists and other religious minorities from
practicing their faith.
PRC authorities externalize their system further through
acts of transnational repression, including on our own shores.
To counter these efforts, the United States is forging a
common approach with like-minded partners, enhancing their
resilience to coercion, promoting accountability for the PRC's
abuses, and pushing back against the use of forced labor and
misuse of advanced and emerging technologies for repression.
Congress has provided us with important tools to promote
accountability for the PRC's human rights abuses, including the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and the Uighur
Forced Labor Prevention Act.
Over the course of this hearing, I hope to discuss other
grave examples of authoritarian leaders challenging
international norms, suppressing the rights of their citizens,
and supporting one another, from Iran, Belarus, Syria, the
DPRK, and Burma to Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, but hope is
not lost.
One more way we are countering authoritarians worldwide is
through the President's Summit for Democracy. Last December,
more than half of U.N. member states came together to make
commitments to strengthen our own democracies and reject
authoritarianism.
We are already seeing these governments translate words
into action, demonstrated by the 93 out of 100 Summit
participants who supported the historic March 2 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution to condemn Russia's Ukraine invasion.
Through the Summit, we have rolled out a suite of new tools
to combat authoritarianism and bolster democracy, including
efforts to stem authoritarians' misuse of technology,
accelerate solutions to combat corruption worldwide, expand
access to local independent media and reduce the impact of
disinformation, and bolster democratic reformers and support
more inclusive, resilient, and equitable societies.
In short, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, we are
responding with allies and partners to the immediacy of
Russia's autocratic attack on democracy as well as the PRC's
long-term challenge to democratic norms, while reinvesting with
our partners and more resilient democracies that deliver
security, prosperity, and freedom.
In the words of our President, in the battle between
democracy and autocracy, democracies are rising to the moment
and the world is, clearly, choosing the side of peace and
security.
Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Zeya follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Uzra Zeya
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of
the Committee; thank you for the opportunity to testify today. With
Russia's premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war of choice
against Ukraine generating Europe's worst humanitarian crisis since
World War II, never in my lifetime has the contest between democracy
and autocracy been more important. And we will prevail, thanks to the
strong bipartisan support of Congress.
Across the globe, authoritarianism--enabled by economic freefall,
inequality, alienation and most recently pandemics--threatens
democratic governments and societies. According to Freedom House,
almost 40 percent of the global population live in countries
categorized as ``not free.'' This is a defining challenge of our time,
and this Administration is responding with decisive and collective
action. While such action can take many forms, today I would like to
highlight three core lines of effort: 1) shoring up our alliances and
partnerships to advance a common vision and unified front in the face
of authoritarianism; 2) broadening the chorus of those active in
defending democracy, countering corruption, and advancing human rights
globally, beyond our traditional Transatlantic partners; and 3)
modernizing our foreign policy and foreign assistance toolkit to push
back on authoritarians, while supporting civil society actors and
institutions vital to resilient, democratic societies and increasingly
under siege.
There is no greater proof of the need for bold action to combat
authoritarianism than Putin's brutal effort to occupy Ukraine and
destroy its democracy. But Putin grossly underestimated the will of the
Ukrainian people and the international community. The United States and
the rest of the responsible world are uniting to stand with Ukraine and
surge assistance across all sectors. Together with allies, we are
exposing the Kremlin's disinformation and lies, while imposing massive
costs through powerful sanctions and export controls that have cratered
Russia's economy and left it more politically isolated than ever
before. In the 47-member UN Human Rights Council (HRC), only Eritrea
joined Russia in voting against a new Commission of Inquiry that will
document the massive, ongoing violations of human rights in Ukraine.
Building on this milestone, we will use every tool available to hold
the Government of Russia, its enablers in Belarus, and the Russian
oligarchs who have profited from this corrupt, violent regime, to
account.
We are also clear-eyed and resolute about other threats to
democracy. A more assertive People's Republic of China (PRC) Government
is attempting to redefine global norms to privilege authoritarianism
and avert international scrutiny. The PRC has good reason to fear the
latter, as it continues to commit genocide and crimes against humanity
in Xinjiang, strangle democracy and press freedom in Hong Kong, and
suppress Tibetan Buddhists and other religious minorities from
practicing their faith. PRC authorities externalize their system
further through acts of transnational repression, including on our own
shores.
To counter these efforts, the United States is forging a common
approach with like-minded partners, enhancing their resilience to
coercion, promoting accountability for the PRC's abuses, and pushing
back against its use of forced labor and misuse of advanced and
emerging technologies for repression. Congress has provided us
important tools to promote accountability for the PRC's human rights
abuses, including the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(GLOMAG) and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which we are
urging other like-minded governments to emulate. Adoption of GLOMAG-
like legislation by the European Union, the UK, and Australia are
encouraging steps.
Over the course of this hearing, I hope to discuss other grave
examples of authoritarian leaders challenging international norms,
suppressing the rights of their citizens, and supporting one another,
from Iran, Belarus, Syria, the DPRK, and Burma to Venezuela, Cuba, and
Nicaragua. All too often, we see autocratic regimes propped up with
support from Russia, the PRC, or Iran, among others, and it is the
domestic activists, civil society, journalists, and others who pay the
highest price.
But hope is not lost. One more way we are countering authoritarians
worldwide is through the President's Summit for Democracy. Last
December, more than half of UN Member States came together to make
commitments to strengthen our democracies and reject authoritarianism.
We are already seeing these governments translate these words into
action, demonstrated by the 93 out of 100 Summit participants who
supported the historic March 2 UNGA resolution to condemn Russia's
Ukraine invasion. On the affirmative side, through the Summit, we have
rolled out a suite of new tools to combat authoritarianism and bolster
democracy, including:
Working with allies to develop a new voluntary code of
conduct on export controls to help stem authoritarians' misuse
of technology.
Accelerating solutions to combat corruption worldwide,
including through the creation of a U.S. Anticorruption
Solutions through Evolving Technology (ASET) Project innovation
lab; and increasing our investments in the Global Anti-
Corruption Consortium (GACC) to expose ill-gotten gains.
Working with Congress to provide up to $30 million to the
International Fund for Public Interest Media (IFPIM) and
launching a Media Viability Accelerator to expand access to
high-quality local independent media and reduce the impact of
disinformation.
Laying the groundwork to provide career professionals in
closed political spaces the skills and resources to navigate
democratic openings when they occur through the Bridging
Understanding, Integrity, and Legitimacy for Democracy (BUILD)
Initiative.
Bolstering democratic reformers and building more inclusive,
resilient, and equitable democratic societies through the
Advancing Women's and Girls' Civic and Political Leadership
Initiative and the Global LGBTQI+ Inclusive Democracy and
Empowerment (GLIDE) Fund.
In short, Mr. Chairman, we are responding with allies and partners
to the immediacy of Russia's autocratic attack on democracy, as well as
the PRC's long-term challenge to democratic norms, while re-investing
with our partners in more resilient democracies that deliver security,
prosperity, and freedom for our own citizens and for the world. In the
words of our President, ``[i]n the battle between democracy and
autocracy, democracies are rising to the moment, and the world is
clearly choosing the side of peace and security.''
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Godfrey.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER HALL GODFREY, SENIOR BUREAU OFFICIAL FOR
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Godfrey. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and members of the committee for inviting me to speak
with you today about how we confront the challenges posed by
authoritarian regimes, a very timely conversation.
Authoritarianism poses a clear threat to the global
interests of the United States, democracies, and open
societies.
A key weapon in the arsenal of repressive governments is
their willingness to lie to public audiences, limit freedom of
expression and independent media in their own nations, and
exploit freedom of expression and independent media in open
societies.
These dynamics are not new, but modern communications
greatly exacerbate the impact of their deceptive public
engagement.
Competition for the attention of foreign audiences is
intense, and earning attention, trust, and favorable opinion
requires intentional, principled, and consistent engagement.
To this end, the Department of State maintains a full
spectrum approach to both counter the influence of
authoritarian regimes and, equally as important, to demonstrate
in word and in deed the value of democratic governance.
The department's 4,000 public diplomacy----
[Technical issue.]
[The prepared statement of Ms. Godfrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of
the Committee for inviting me to speak with you today about how we
confront the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes.
Authoritarianism poses a clear threat to the global interests of
the United States, democracies, and open societies. A key weapon in the
authoritarian arsenal is their willingness to lie to public audiences,
limit freedom of expression and independent media in their own nations,
and exploit freedom of expression and independent media in open
societies. These dynamics are not new, but modern communications
greatly exacerbate the impact of their deceptive public engagement.
Competition for the attention of foreign audiences is intense, and
earning attention, trust, and favorable opinion requires intentional,
principled, and consistent engagement. To this end, the Department,
working with interagency partners, maintains a full-spectrum approach
to both counter the influence of authoritarian regimes, and--equally as
important--to demonstrate in word and in deed the value of democratic
governance, government transparency, and the rules-based international
order. The Department's 4,000 Public Diplomacy professionals at 185
U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide engage publics through social
media, traditional media, and in-person interactions.
The Department's Global Engagement Center works to counter the
foreign disinformation and propaganda of the governments of Russia,
China, Iran, and others, who leverage information manipulation to
negatively impact U.S. national security or that of our allies and
partners. As one aspect of this mission, the GEC exposes Kremlin-funded
media disinformation campaigns. Recent GEC reporting, for example, has
informed efforts by major social media companies to address false
content, ensure platform accounts are appropriately identified, and
suspend accounts that violate their terms of service. The GEC also
actively exposes information authoritarian regimes seek to hide. The
GEC's support for the development of the largest online repository of
open-source data on the PRC's atrocities in the Xinjiang region of
China has provided people around the world access to the truth.
It is not enough to expose foreign disinformation and propaganda.
We must also engage global publics with honest and credible information
about U.S. values, priorities, and policy objectives and the strengths
of alternatives to authoritarian governance. The Bureau of Global
Public Affairs executes global communications campaigns with messages
tailored to audiences overseas. The Bureau employs data analytics to
monitor evolving narratives, understand shifting perceptions, and
inform content deployed through traditional media and our 1,200 social
media accounts.
Because we understand it is not enough for the United States to
state the truth or call out disinformation and propaganda in messaging,
we also cultivate networks of like-minded individuals who champion the
same ideas we do and are trusted voices within their communities. We
seek partners who share a mutual interest in promoting human rights and
democratic principles.
Through exchange programs led by the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, we build lasting relationships. Over 1.7 million
people globally have participated in U.S. Government exchanges, and
approximately one in three current world government leaders are alumni
of those programs. Alumni from all over the world also account for
thousands of leaders in business, civil society, and academia, and work
every day with Americans in the public and private sector.
While bringing aspiring foreign leaders to the United States is one
of the best ways to give them first-hand exposure to the democratic
principles we support, we also understand the value of engaging people
in their local communities and through digital networks. In addition to
the many Americans we send abroad on our exchanges, our 600 American
Spaces provide programming to promote understanding of American and
democratic values. Our digital networks allow us to regularly engage
almost a million partners in discussions about U.S. policy priorities.
These are citizens and leaders who question authoritarian regimes and
their assault on democracy. They do so not because we told them to, but
because they believe in what they are doing, and know they are part of
a global community that supports them. We do not anticipate or require
they will always share our point of view, agree with us on policy or
practice, or convey government talking points.
Our efforts stand in stark contrast to the manipulation and
censorship of authoritarian regimes, who build networks of proxies who
disguise their funding and direction, serve as mouthpieces for
government talking points, or worse--actively lie and conceal to sow
confusion and contempt and improve their own global standing albeit
with false information and propaganda.
The relationships Public Diplomacy professionals build through
engagement with foreign citizens require us to model the integrity and
principles we advocate. The relationships require trust and
credibility, characteristics authoritarian regimes lack. Earning trust
and credibility is neither easy nor to be taken for granted. The
Department's Public Diplomacy efforts are critical to combatting
authoritarianism. We must show up for this fight and hold firm.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. All right. I guess we have lost Ms. Godfrey
and so we will go to questions and then we will see if we can
reconvene her at some point. We will start a series of 5-minute
rounds.
Secretary Zeya, last Congress I released a report about new
digital authoritarianism. For both of our witnesses--I am not
sure that we can get Ms. Godfrey on.
As autocrats deploy new digital tools to spread
disinformation, unlawfully surveil civil society, and repress
dissenting voices, how is the Administration building a
consistent and strategic approach for combating digital
authoritarianism and ensuring that new technologies work for
democracy, and how has the State Department engaged and
mobilized the private sector in this work?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising a critically
important question and for the report that you referenced.
Certainly, as both you and the ranking member have
mentioned, digital authoritarianism represents one of the most
concerning aspects of 21st century authoritarianism and it is a
core element of the Administration's approach to countering
authoritarianism and strengthening democracies throughout the
world.
I would describe this as an offense and defense effort
where the offense piece is focused on our international efforts
to combat and counter disinformation, which, I think, have seen
some remarkable success in recent weeks thwarting at every turn
egregious Russian, Chinese, and other nations' effort to
distort what is actually happening on the ground in Ukraine
and, really, shift narratives and, essentially, neutralize
longstanding Russian disinformation efforts.
We are also countered on the resilience piece in terms of
strengthening democracies' and including emerging democracies'
ability to counter and resist disinformation.
This was one of the core lines of effort in the Summit for
Democracy under a line of effort we call Technology for
Democracy where we will be working with allies and partners to
strengthen digital literacy, to open resource streams for free
and independent media, which is a critical aspect of countering
the distortions of authoritarians' disinformation with truth
and accountability towards authoritarian governments.
The Chairman. I think in the case of--the most recent case,
the Administration deserves a lot of credit for declassifying
intelligence and getting ahead of the curve and, basically,
creating a clear narrative as to what Russia is up to and I
think that has worked well.
In the broader context outside of the conflict in Ukraine
and Russia, I am not sure that we are doing so well on the
question of digital authoritarianism as it relates to meeting
that challenge globally, and I think that countries like China,
Russia, and others are ahead of the curve on this.
We would very much like to hear from the Department how we
achieve success more globally. I understand what is happening
in Ukraine has been a success, but more globally, I would like
to follow up with you in that regard.
2021 was the deadliest year on record for human rights
defenders, which--with at least 358 killed, thousands attacked
and thousands more unjustly imprisoned. The U.S. Government has
a long bipartisan history of supporting human rights defenders,
but our efforts remain, largely, ad hoc.
Under Secretary Zeya, how is the Administration working to
create a cohesive and coordinated strategy to provide support
to human rights defenders?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you. I think you have raised a critically
important, Senator, and this is the reality of human rights
defenders increasingly under siege and paying with their lives
for their vitally important work.
This also is a core aspect of the Presidential Initiative
for Democracy emerging from the Summit for Democracy where we
are working to build up stronger allied and partner efforts to
support democratic reformers worldwide.
Here, I have to absolutely credit congressional support for
the resourcing of direct emergency financial assistance to
human rights defenders, which has been led by our State
Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
I just want to point out that since 2007 these global
programs have supported over 4,000 human rights defenders and
organizations in over 105 countries and allowed them to
continue to do their work under very difficult circumstances.
The Chairman. Finally, access to accurate, factual, and
timely information is, in my view, a fundamental human right.
Yet, authoritarian and repressive governments all over the
world now possess the tools and technology needed to limit
citizens' access to information.
Senator Blackburn and I have recently unveiled our Internet
Freedom in Operations Act, which authorizes over $125 million
in funding for various internet freedom programs as well as the
internet censorship circumvention technologies.
What are some of the most frequent methods that these
regimes use to control access to information and independent
media outlets, and what initiatives and tools does the State
Department have to circumvent this sort of government
censorship of independent media?
Ms. Zeya. Sir, I would like to give my colleague, Senior
Acting Under Secretary Hall Godfrey the chance to weigh in
here, but I will elaborate on similar key----
The Chairman. I understand that she is now on the phone and
can give her testimony through the phone. So you want to have
her answer that question?
Ms. Zeya. I would like to give her the chance to weigh in.
I would just point out that some of the key methods that we are
seeing authoritarians use include through misinformation and
disinformation, the use of bots and other state-sponsored
efforts, as you and the ranking member mentioned, to,
basically, inject lies into public discourse, whether it is
accusing the United States falsely of having chem bio
facilities in Ukraine or----
The Chairman. I know what they do. What I want to know is
what we are doing in response.
Ms. Zeya. Oh, in the counter effort. Yes.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ms. Zeya. I would put that in the context of our efforts to
support the expansion and resources of free and independent
media and its own ability to defend itself under successive
efforts to defame and even through legal action cut off their
efforts, but I would like to give Acting Under Secretary Hall
Godfrey the opportunity to weigh in.
The Chairman. All right. Because of the nature of what is
happening here--Secretary Godfrey, did you hear that question?
Ms. Godfrey. Yes, sir. I would start off by saying that the
key tactics that authoritarian regimes use to limit access to
information are the same tactics they have been using for a
long time now, which is censorship and limiting freedom of
expression and independent media in their own nations.
Those challenges are, certainly, exacerbated by modern
communications technologies. Fundamentally, we are still
talking about governments who lie and work to keep other people
from telling the truth.
They do so by kicking out independent media, as we have
seen Russia do with international media. They do so by telling
their own journalists and citizens what they may and may not
say.
Just last week, the Government of Russia made clear that
speakers in Russia cannot refer to the invasion of Ukraine as
an invasion or as a war, and then they, certainly, continued
the pursuit of their own lies, such as Russia blaming the
United States or NATO or Western nations for their own invasion
of Ukraine.
Those tactics are not new. What is, of course, different
today is the scale and reach of digital communications, and we
see autocracies both exploiting those digital communications,
but also seeking to control them in their own countries.
Right now, Russians and Ukrainians can still access the
internet, independent media. They can speak freely, and that is
a good thing.
I am very concerned--the State Department and the U.S.
Government is very concerned--about actions the Russian
governments and other autocracies will take to limit freedom of
speech and freedom of media through controlling the physical
means of internet and data connectivity.
Right now, we still see Russians and Ukrainians in
particular, with access to independent voices.
The Chairman. All right. I am going to turn to Senator
Risch. My goal is to hear not what our adversaries are doing. I
understand what they are doing.
My goal is to understand what we are doing in response to
that. I will come back to you at the end of other members'
questions.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Probably the most effective pushback I have seen in a long
time was on TV last night when I turned on the news, saw the
employee of the Russian TV station jump up with a sign and tell
the Russian people that what they were hearing was lies and
that the whole thing was misrepresented to the Russian people.
She was escorted off, and her attorney, this morning, said
she could not find her. So I suspect she is probably headed for
Siberia or something like that.
There were millions and millions of people in Russia that
saw that, and I suspect it is--a lot of discussion this morning
around the country.
I want to talk about--I would like to hear what work you
are doing regarding the countries that will be next. I think
most of us believe that if Putin gets away with this, Moldova
will, certainly, be next and be quite easy.
After that, of course, will come Georgia, which probably
would be a little bit tougher. Then after that, he has long
lusted after the Baltic states, and after that, Poland and
Czech Republic, and then he is on his way to putting the USSR
back together again.
What is being done to fend off the Russian aggression in
these particular embattled countries? I would like to hear some
specifics, if I can.
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Ranking Member. I think you raised a
critically important question to which we are very well attuned
that, certainly, Russia's--the threat that Russia represents is
not solely with respect to Ukraine and we are absolutely
shoring up our support in collaboration with allies and
partners, including all the frontline states that you
mentioned.
I would note that the Baltic States, Moldova, and Georgia
were all part of our Summit for Democracy effort. All of these
countries are also part of the substantial U.S. humanitarian
assistance that Congress has enabled so rapidly as we contend
with what I described earlier as the worst humanitarian crisis
in Europe since World War II.
I think, in critical--in concrete terms, a case such as
Lithuania--we have seen Lithuania, basically, embattled from
all sides from taking a principled stand with respect to
opening a liaison office with Taiwan and also, certainly,
taking a very resolute stand against Putin's aggression.
We have offered substantial support to Lithuania to stand
up to Chinese economic coercion in the form of Export-Import
Bank support, other supply chain-enabled assistance, and
Moldova would be another case where we are offering
considerable democracy assistance support.
I would be happy to provide you later with some specific
numbers where we have the positive development of the elections
last year and a reformist government that, I think, is very
well aligned with the goals of the Summit, countering
authoritarianism, elevating the fight against corruption and
advancing human rights internally and internationally.
Senator Risch. Yes. I am sure glad to hear that--the
efforts you are making with Lithuania. They really have been
brave standing up to China and Russia, and, of course, they are
right on the front line in Russia.
Nobody knows the Russians better than they do, and I think
we all need to help them move forward, if we can. Moldova is
going to be a heavy lift. They are a very small country, and it
is going to be very difficult for them to defend if and when
Putin decides to go there.
I have just got a short period of time left. I, and other
my colleagues, including the chairman, have been very concerned
with the activities of China in the--on the colleges and
universities, and you heard the number I talked about--half a
billion dollars going in.
These monies are not put there out of the generosity of
their heart, by any stretch. Do you have any initiatives
pushing back on that on college campuses?
Ms. Zeya. Ranking Member, I am going to ask Acting Under
Secretary Hall Godfrey to respond here, given her
responsibilities on the U.S. education side.
Ms. Godfrey. Thank you very much for the question about
Chinese influence in American colleges and universities--PRC
influence, I should say.
In 2020, sir, I think, as you know, with congressional
support the Department of State began an earnest effort to
ensure that American colleges and universities had a good
understanding and visibility into the activities of the PRC on
their campus and that their hosting of Chinese nationals in
American universities was consistent with exchange program
directives and policies.
The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs began a
considerable effort to ensure that updated guidance made it to
colleges and universities who are sponsoring Confucius
Institutes, the institutes that the Chinese educational--higher
educational system uses to support Chinese scholars around the
world--in 2020 when that initiative began, 55 American
universities were hosting Confucius Institutes.
Over the course of the past 2 years as American
universities have sought to better understand the impact and
activities of staff of Confucius Institutes on their campuses,
today, only nine American colleges and universities continue to
support Confucius Institutes.
I should say we do continue to wholeheartedly welcome
legitimate exchange in scholarship, including by citizens of
China. We do very much want to make sure that the PRC--the
Chinese Government--is not exploiting our open educational
system to more malevolent ends.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that on the Confucius
Institutes. Those numbers coming down are a good sign that
there is some recognition going on. I am still very concerned
about the flow of money with either grants or contracts with
universities.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Godfrey. Thank you. If I can add, sir, I do think the
new requirements in place for American universities to make
sure that they are declaring publicly what their foreign
sources of funding for have had an impact as well.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me just announce that because
we had to take our WebEx system down several members had booked
in via WebEx, and if they come physically to the hearing I will
recognize them in that order, but right now, it is Senator
Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, for this timely and important hearing, and, Under
Secretaries, great to be with you again.
Later today President Biden will sign into law the Omnibus.
As was referenced in the introduction, I have the unique
challenge of leading, along with my ranking member, Senator
Graham, the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations
Subcommittee, and we got the lowest allocation of any
Appropriations Subcommittee.
We were the victim of a last-minute bait and switch where
nearly $2 billion got stripped from my subcommittee. Yet, we
are in the moment when pushing back on authoritarianism,
strengthening the tools of democracy, and responding to a whole
series of global crises is exactly what we should prioritize
investing in. Let me try and look forward and be positive, if I
can.
There were some pieces of the Omnibus that, I think, matter
directly to this conversation, one of them the nearly $300
million Countering Russian Information Fund, $860 million for
the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
The dialogue you were just having with the chairman and the
ranking member about Russian disinformation and its influence
in Eastern Europe and our ability to effectively push back on
that in the middle of this brutal and tragic war in Ukraine,
there are resources now, moving forward.
In total, about $2.6 billion is being dedicated to
democracy programs and about $300 million to the National
Endowment for Democracy.
Following the virtual Democracy Summit, I worked with
Senator Graham to introduce the Democracy in the 21st Century
Act, which would increase global democracy assistance to $3
billion, modernize the tools that we have available to defend
democracy with an emphasis on emerging technologies, combatting
kleptocracy, and election integrity, and establish funds with
flexible resources for confronting emerging challenges to
democracy across the State Department, USAID, and the National
Endowment for Democracy.
Have you had a chance to review this bill? Do you think
this committee taking up and passing and then Congress passing
this bill before the next Democracy Summit would be useful and
do you have any specific feedback for me on how we could make
this an effective moment for both implementing this legislation
and then fully funding our work to defend democracy in the
world?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you so much, Senator, for your commitment
to resourcing our efforts to counter authoritarianism and,
particularly, for putting forward this bill.
I am well aware of it and I want to share with you that we
share many of the bill's sentiments, and I think the
prioritizations that you have put forward in the bill are well
in line with President Biden's initiative for democratic
renewal, which prioritized five lines of effort, including
supporting free and independent media, elevating the fight
against corruption, supporting election integrity against
malign foreign influence, supporting democratic reformers, as
well as what we call technology for democracy solutions.
We look forward to working with you to ensure the bill can
provide flexibility for the Secretary and deconflict any
potential overlap in programs, and we really look forward to
consulting with you and your team on specific provisions, and
thank you for your commitment in putting it forward.
Senator Coons. Given the experience of the last month
where, frankly, I think President Biden and his national
security team did a masterful job of pushing Putin off his game
by proactively releasing the products of intelligence so that
it was clear to our European partners and allies that we were
well aware of Putin's next move and then he did things that
confirmed, tragically, our predictions.
Given the flood of Russian disinformation, obviously, both
within Russia and into the region, how would you reshape some
of these priorities in the context of the developments of the
last few weeks?
Ms. Zeya. Senator, I think the developments of the last 3
weeks, in particular, only underscore the need for us to invest
more in our efforts to combat disinformation and support free
and independent media, and this is why the President's fiscal
year 2022 request to Congress for media freedom represented a
40 percent increase from the previous fiscal--from fiscal year
2020.
This will help us bolster the capacity of legitimate media
outlets to provide trusted news, to operate as sustainable
businesses, and leverage digital platforms to enhance audience.
It will also support media literacy, teaching audiences
around the world to better discern the real from the fake, and
strengthen the legal and regulatory environment for press
freedom so that sector can fulfill its watchdog function and
counter so much of the noxious and destabilizing disinformation
that we have seen issued from Russia, the PRC, and others.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Madam Under Secretary. Senators
Shaheen and Durbin and I were, literally, in Lithuania as the
war began. The day before we were in Poland.
In both cases, we had the chance to visit in Poland, in
particular, with a cable channel that is under a lot of
pressure in terms of maintaining a free and open media.
You requested a 40 percent increase. That is not what we
were able to deliver here and I, frankly, think we need the
bipartisan focus of this committee on making sure that we are
actually delivering the resources to defend democracy at this
critical moment.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you so much for being with us today,
and I want to turn to this issue of transnational repression--
autocratic repression--and I am thinking very much about the
huge number of tactics that we are seeing--assassinations,
assaults, detentions, renditions, disappearances, surveillance,
online surveillance, online stalking, and threats to family
members back home, and about the variety of real-life examples
that keep coming up, some of them happening abroad, some of
them happening here in the United States.
For example, a Chechen exile who was assassinated in Vienna
who was very much a critic of Ramzan Kadyrov or however it is
pronounced, or a Uighur activist who neighbors observed men
photographing his home, rummaging through his mail.
Then an individual approached him speaking to him in
Mandarin at a protest at the Chinese Embassy and said, ``If you
get poisoned, do you know how to treat yourself? You know the
Chinese Government is very powerful. You could die in a car
accident or you could get poisoned.''
Intimidation of all forms, and this is just expanding with
the kind of modern technology allows countries to keep track of
dissidents abroad and to coordinate activities against them.
How are we acting and responding to protect, in free
countries, individuals from the assault from autocratic
regimes?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you so much, Senator, for raising this
escalating concern--transnational repression--which we are
elevating in the President's overall approach in countering
authoritarianism.
Just last week I had the privilege to host with my
counterpart from DHS a closed roundtable with individuals
impacted by transnational repression from all over the world
and they described the very--absolutely disturbing practices
that you just elaborated.
We are on the case and we are working with our allies and
partners to build international opposition to transnational
repression, to deter and promote accountability for those who
are perpetrating it, and we are offering increased support to
protect human rights activists, journalists, political
dissidents, defectors, and others, and encouraging like-minded
governments to do the same.
This is also part of our engagement with the private sector
to try to identify and implement specific measures that will
protect vulnerable individuals and communities, particularly
online, and also support reforms that strengthen safeguards
against the misuse of Interpol systems, in particular, which we
have seen one tactic of the transnational repressors' playbook.
Senator Merkley. I so much applaud the set of goals you
just laid out. Apart from the--strengthening the protections
for the misuse of Interpol, their goals--and they are not
actually specific strategies--can you elaborate at all on
specific ideas and strategies that we are promoting in terms of
changes in regulations, changes in enforcement, our strategies
of targeting and arrest of individuals engaged? What are--or is
it just that difficult to get from the very important goals to
the actual strategies on the street?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, sir. I mean, I would describe our
strategy in three parts.
One is strengthening our whole-of-government efforts. So
this is not simply the job for the Department of State, but we
are very closely looped up with Department of Justice, DHS, as
well as Treasury and Commerce, who all have a role to play in a
more effective and strategic U.S. response.
We are also working to impose costs for the practice of
transnational repression. One specific example with that--of
that would be the creation last year of the global Khashoggi
ban visa restriction policy, which promotes specific
accountability for authoritarian regimes engaged in
transnational repression.
Then the other piece, I would say, is the global networking
piece to ensure that other governments are aware and attuned to
this increasing threats and that they do not allow their own
territory to be misused for the practice of transnational
repression against diaspora or exiled citizens.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much. I will just close
with saying I think this is such an important area in this
global competition between freedom-loving nations and
autocracies that I am very concerned about the trends.
Freedom House reports that in the last 16 consecutive years
we have seen a decline in global freedom and that now only 20
percent of the world lives in a free country, and those
autocratic regimes they are going after dissent across the
planet, including right inside our own borders, and we have to
find every possible measure to address it.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our
witnesses. I want to follow up on Senator Merkley's point
because it is alarming.
It is not just a 1-year trend. It has been a multi-year
trend in the decline of countries that are free. Freedom House
has said now we are--I think we are in our 16th consecutive
year of declining democracies.
We need to look at why that is happening, and there is no
simple answer to it and we need a comprehensive strategy,
including how we invest our international assistance budgets to
support democratic institutions around the world.
I want to talk about what we have seen in Ukraine and Mr.
Putin--Mr. Putin's ability to wage war not only against
Ukraine, but he has waged war against democratic institutions
around the globe, including here in the United States.
So how does he do it? He has an asymmetric arsenal that
allows him to do things that are horrible, including supporting
coups, including misinformation, including use of his military,
weaponizing energy, et cetera.
His ability to do that is because of the corrupt finances,
the corrupt systems in which he has the ability to use the
fruits of his corruption in order to advance those causes not
only against his immediate neighbors, but, really, around the
world.
So we have two pieces of legislation and I want to get your
comment on that. One is the Magnitsky sanctions that we have
talked about frequently. It has gotten an awful lot of
attention around the world today, and I think it is beyond any
question about its effectiveness as we see Russian oligarchs
trying to find a place to hide their assets that cannot be
seized or places that they can visit. The visa bans and banking
bans have really had a major impact on the ability to develop
the kleptocracies around the world.
We started that here in the United States Congress with the
Magnitsky sanctions. Now it has grown through Europe and other
countries--Canada. We have executive orders, but we have--the
Magnitsky Global sanctions expire this year.
My question to you, how important is it for Congress to
make it clear that the Magnitsky sanctions are here to stay and
to reauthorize and expand that law?
Then, secondly, that bill, by the way, has passed this
committee and it has been--it has passed--the Senate has acted
on it a couple times. It just has not gotten to the finish
line.
The third is the Global--Combatting Global Corruption Act.
These are both bipartisan acts. This was with Senator Young.
The other bill I did was with Senator Wicker.
Which is to have a global index on how well countries are
fighting corruption so that we recognize the vulnerability of a
country. If it is not fighting corruption it is very much part
of the challenge we have in declining democracies.
My question to you is how important is it for the U.S.
leadership in both of these areas to make it clear that we will
take action against those that are supporting these corrupt
regimes and, secondly, we will have objective international
standards on judging how well countries are fighting corruption
that will influence our bilateral relations with those
countries?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you so much, Senator, and I just want to
underscore that I believe the Global Magnitsky Act has been an
essential tool in our work with international partners to deny
corrupt actors, and you mentioned the Russian regime is a just
absolutely critical example of that, using their ill-gotten
gains.
It is a vital accountability tool for us that we will
continue to use to impose costs on kleptocrats and their
authoritarian enablers.
As far as the--your Global Corruption Act, I just want to
say the Department is deeply committed to the bill's anti-
corruption goals and I think you have seen that from this
Administration with our elevation of anti-corruption as a
national security priority with the National Security
Memorandum from June last year and the strategy that we
released last December in tandem with the Summit for Democracy.
As your bill prescribes, we will not hesitate to call upon
governments to implement their anti-corruption commitments
publicly and privately. We are going to continue to use visa
restrictions and GLOMAG to apply pressure, and I think we look
forward to discussing with you and your team some of the
specific measures of the bill with respect to the tiering
element and how we can best strengthen our efforts to push
other countries to follow the U.S. example in creating more
effective responses to kleptocratic corruption and holding
others accountable.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
both of our witnesses.
I want to pursue the line of questioning about digital
autocracies. We have seen in Putin's Russia him bringing down
an Iron Curtain to keep out truth and information. In China, we
see a Great Wall to keep out information and truthful
information.
We witnessed yesterday, many of us, a very brave Russian
journalist who told the truth. She was an editor for TV1, a
state-controlled TV station, who put up a poster saying, ``Do
not believe the propaganda. They are lying to you.'' That is
the kind of bravery we are witnessing for people who are trying
to bring the truth.
My question is, today, in terms of our own efforts--and I
think this is probably a question for Ms. Godfrey to start
with--what technologies are we using to try to both breach the
Iron Curtain when it comes to information and the Great Wall
when it comes to information?
We had Radio Free Europe. We still do. Russians tried to--
continue to block that. We have a lot of new technologies. What
are we doing right now to try to bring the Russian people the
truth? Because the information I have seen to date indicates
that a majority of Russians believe Putin's lies.
Ms. Godfrey. Thank you, sir. Thank you for the question and
for--both for calling out the bravery of Russian voices who are
standing up and speaking out, potentially, at great personal
cost to themselves, as well as for acknowledging the very real
challenges that autocratic governments like Russia and China
are imposing to keep their own citizens from accessing
information and from knowing the truth.
Senator Van Hollen. I guess my question is what are we
doing to counter it. I just have limited time.
Ms. Godfrey. Thank you.
So we are continuing to do extensive media outreach, in
particular, in Russia today. That includes to Russian language
media like Dozhd and Meduza as well as to U.S. Government-
supported Russian language media like RFE/RL and Voice of
America.
While the Russian Government has tried to shut down these
outlets and kick them out, Russians seeking access to them
online has increased.
Just this morning, USAGM confirmed to me that their reach
in Russia has doubled since the Russian Government shut down
access to RFE and VOA online.
So while the Russian Government is trying, they are not yet
succeeding in keeping Russian citizens from accessing
independent media and we must continue to support independent
media and make sure we are speaking up through that media.
We are also engaging on new digital platforms in Russia. We
have Telegram and VKontakte, which have not yet been shut down
by the Russian Government. These are indigenous Russian
language platforms that we are engaging on.
We continue to engage through Twitter, Facebook, all of the
other platforms that we used in Russia that, again, even though
the Russian Government has tried to shut down those platforms,
we still see Russian citizens accessing them and we will
continue to use all of those means to continue to communicate
with Russians.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
No, I think we need to continue to push the technological
edge. I mean, this is the information equivalent of an arms
race and Russia will continue to put up blockades and we need
to use all the latest technology to try to make sure that we
get information to the Russian people.
The ranking member brought up in his opening statement the
misinformation that both Russia and China are spreading with
respect to biological laboratories in Ukraine and that started,
in some ways, at a hearing in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee when Under Secretary Nuland answered a question
accurately about the fact that we have been working with
Ukrainians to make sure that these biological weapons labs are
used for civilian purposes and not for military purposes--not
for biological weapon purposes.
As it turns out, a lot of the material that both Russia and
China have used to make that propaganda claim originated,
actually, on some right wing--very alt-right U.S. medium, and
there was a memo that was surfaced by David Corn. The Kremlin
sent a memo to the Russian media saying it is, ``essential to
feature Tucker Carlson,'' who has been spreading this
misinformation on his own show.
Could you, Ms. Godfrey, respond a little bit to how
Russians use that misinformation here in the United States to
try to buttress their claims that their propaganda is accurate?
I do find it extraordinary that in a moment that a Russian
journalist is getting locked up for speaking the truth we have
a Kremlin memo urging their state-controlled TV to push
statements from U.S. commentators.
Could you just talk to that issue?
Ms. Godfrey. The information environment is not easily
divided up into foreign speakers and domestic speakers. There
is a great deal of overlap in that environment.
It should be surprising to no one that governments like
Russia and China will take remarks from anyone, whether it is
Under Secretary Nuland or you or Tucker Carlson and seek to
manipulate and exploit those remarks to their own ends, right.
This is a tactic that purveyors of disinformation use routinely
and regularly.
Senator Van Hollen. Ms. Godfrey, I know my time is up.
There is a distinction. It is harder to--it is harder for them
to use accurate statements for propaganda, although they will
try.
In the case of Mr. Carlson, he actually provided the
Russian talking point for them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. If there is no other member seeking, I would
just like to thank our first witness and thank you for your
testimony, and invite our second panel of Anne Applebaum and
Dr. Daniel Twining to come forward to offer their testimony.
Thank you, Madam Under Secretary.
Senator Coons. In the interest of time, I am going to
proceed with introductions as our witnesses for the second
panel are getting seated.
I would like to welcome Anne Applebaum, an accomplished
journalist, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, author, political
analyst, current Senior Fellow at the SNF Agora Institute Johns
Hopkins, and staff writer for The Atlantic magazine.
Her recent writing and research focus on the rise of global
authoritarianism and the threats facing open society and
liberal democratic ideals.
Throughout her illustrious career, Ms. Applebaum has
written extensively on issues of nationalism, corruption,
xenophobia, disinformation, politics and history of Central
Europe, and Russia's actions on the world stage over the past
three decades.
Her writing is timely, incisive, and a significant
contribution to our deliberations at this critical moment in
modern history.
Welcome, Ms. Applebaum. It is a pleasure to have you here
with us today.
I would like to also introduce Dr. Daniel Twining. Dr.
Twining is the president of the International Republican
Institute where he leads the institute's efforts to advance
democracy and freedom around the world.
Dr. Twining served as counsel to the President, director of
the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund, as a member of
the Secretary of State's policy planning staff, and as the
foreign policy adviser to my friend and former colleague, the
late U.S. Senator John McCain.
He has also been an associate at the National Intelligence
Council, taught at Georgetown University, and served as a
military instructor with the Naval Postgraduate School.
Welcome, Dr. Twining. We are also very encouraged to have
your timely and important testimony today.
Ms. Applebaum.
STATEMENT OF ANNE APPLEBAUM, ATLANTIC MAGAZINE STAFF WRITER,
SENIOR FELLOW AT THE SNF AGORA INSTITUTE, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Applebaum. Thank you very much and good morning, Mr.
Acting Chairman and Ranking Member Risch, members of the
committee. Thank you so much for inviting me here today.
I am going to begin where Chairman Menendez left off. He
spoke of how, in the 21st century, the old idea of an autocrat
being a single person operating by himself is no longer true.
Nowadays, autocracies are run not just by one bad guy, but
by networks composed of kleptocratic financial structures,
security services, and professional propagandists.
The members of these networks are connected not only within
a given country, but among many countries. The corrupt state-
controlled companies in Russia do business with the corrupt
state-controlled companies in Venezuela and Iran.
China sells surveillance technology all over the world, to
Zimbabwe, to others. Oligarchs from multiple countries use the
same accountants and lawyers to hide their money in Europe and
here in the United States.
Propagandists, whether from communist or nationalist or
theocratic autocracies, pound home the same messages about the
chaos of democracy and the evil of America. Their goal is to
confuse audiences at home and abroad in order to make all of us
believe that change is impossible.
In my roles as a journalist in Poland, as a historian of
Soviet communism, and as a member of the board of the National
Endowment for Democracy, I have been writing about our
responses to this new challenge for the past decade, and they
are inadequate.
Western sanctions alone have no impact on autocrats, who
know they can continue to trade with one another. Accusations
from human rights organizations mean nothing to dictators, who
are protected by surveillance technology and vast personal
wealth.
Russia invaded Ukraine, in part, because the Russian
president believed he would pay no price. After all, Russian
invasions of Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, Russian
assassinations carried out in Britain and Germany, Russian
disinformation and political funding campaigns designed to
impact democratic elections in America, France, and Germany,
among many other places, none of this received a strong
response either from us or from our democratic allies.
Going forward, we need a completely new strategy towards
Russia, towards China, and the rest of the autocratic world.
Instead of always reacting to the latest outrage, we need to
change the rules of the game altogether.
Instead of imposing sanctions after the fact, punishing
oligarchs who are already rich, we must alter our own financial
system so that kleptocratic elites cannot use our company laws
and our property markets to hide their stolen wealth and so
that they cannot use that wealth to influence our own political
system.
Instead of merely responding to the virulent propaganda
that comes out of Moscow or Beijing or Caracas, we should help
deliver better information on a much broader scale to those
countries in the languages that people speak.
Instead of assuming we are protected by old norms on
inviolability of borders, we need strategies of deterrence that
take into account the real possibility that autocracies will
use military force.
In my written testimony, I suggest some specific steps. The
elimination of secrecy in company ownership and real estate
transactions, a more coherent organization of public diplomacy
pulling together our excellent, but underfunded foreign
language broadcasters, the media monitoring and research now
done by the intelligence community, the Global Engagement
Center at the State Department, and the tools of cultural
diplomacy.
All of these things should be connected to one another.
They should know what one another is doing and they should work
together.
With thousands of talented Russians fleeing Moscow, this is
also the time to think big. Why not create a Russian language
television station that can compete with Putin's propaganda?
Why not do the same in Mandarin or in other languages?
We also need to put democracy back at the heart of our
foreign policy thinking and we can start by imagining a
different future for Ukraine.
If Ukraine emerges from this war with its democracy and
sovereignty intact, that victory would provide a
transformational boost in confidence not only to democratic
activists in Belarus and Russia, but also to those in Hong Kong
and Caracas.
By contrast, a defeat would be a terrible blow to all of
them. The stakes of this war are already much higher than most
in Washington have acknowledged, affecting NATO's credibility,
the cohesion of the democratic camp, even Americans' own sense
of their place in the world.
It is not enough to avoid the worst outcomes. We need to
think about achieving real victories in Ukraine and in the
other struggles to come.
Many thanks to the committee, once again, for this
invitation and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Applebaum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Anne Applebaum
Good morning Chairman Menendez, Senator Risch, Members of the
Committee: All of us have in our minds a cartoon image of what an
autocratic state looks like. There is a bad man at the top. He controls
the police. The police threaten the people with violence. There are
evil collaborators, and maybe some brave dissidents.
But in the 21st century, that cartoon bears little resemblance to
reality. Nowadays, autocracies are run not by one bad guy, but by
networks composed of kleptocratic financial structures, security
services (military, police, paramilitary groups, surveillance
personnel) and professional propagandists. The members of these
networks are connected not only within a given country, but among many
countries. The corrupt, state-controlled companies in one dictatorship
do business with their counterparts in another, with the profits going
to the leader and his inner circle. Oligarchs from multiple countries
use the same accountants and lawyers to hide their money in Europe and
America. The police forces in one country can arm, equip, and train the
police forces in another; China notoriously sells surveillance
technology all around the world. Propagandists share resources and
tactics--the Russian troll farms that promote Putin's propaganda can
also be used to promote the propaganda of Belarus or Venezuela. They
also pound home the same messages about the weakness of democracy and
the evil of America. Chinese sources are right now echoing fake Russian
stories about non-existent Ukrainian chemical weapons. Their goal is to
launch false narratives and confuse audiences in the United States and
other free societies. They do so in order to make us believe that there
is nothing we can do in response.
This is not to say that there is a conspiracy, some super-secret
room where bad guys meet, as in a James Bond movie. The new autocratic
alliance doesn't have a structure, let alone an ideology. Among modern
autocrats are people who call themselves communists, nationalists, and
theocrats. Washington likes to talk about China and Chinese influence
because that's easy, but what really links the leaders of these
countries is a common desire to preserve their personal power. Unlike
military or political alliances from other times and places, the
members of this group don't operate like a bloc, but rather like a
loose agglomeration of companies--call it Autocracy, Inc. Their links
are cemented not by ideals but by deals--deals designed to replace
Western sanctions or take the edge off Western economic boycotts, or to
make them personally rich--which is why they can operate across
geographical and historical lines.
They protect one another and look after one another. In theory, for
example, Venezuela is an international pariah. Since 2019, U.S.
citizens and U.S. companies have been forbidden to do any business
there; Canada, the European Union, and many of Venezuela's South
American neighbors continue to increase sanctions on the country. And
yet Venezuela receives loans as well as oil investment from Moscow and
Beijing. Turkey facilitates the illicit Venezuelan gold trade. Cuba has
long provided = advisers and security technology to Venezuela's rulers.
The international narcotics trade keeps individual members of the
regime well-supplied with designer shoes and handbags. Leopoldo Lopez,
a onetime star of the opposition now living in exile in Spain, observes
that although Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro's opponents have
received some foreign assistance, it's a drop in the bucket, ``nothing
comparable with what Maduro has received.''
In the face of this new challenge, Western and American responses
have been profoundly inadequate. Expressions of ``deep concern'' mean
nothing to dictators who feel secure thanks to their high levels of
surveillance and their personal wealth. Western sanctions alone have no
impact on autocrats who know they can continue to trade with one
another. As the war in Ukraine illustrates, our failure to use military
deterrence had consequences. Russia did not believe that we would arm
Ukraine because we had not done so in the past.
For all of these reasons, we need a completely new strategy toward
Russia, China and the rest of the autocratic world, one in which we
don't merely react to the latest outrage, but change the rules of
engagement altogether. We cannot merely slap sanctions on foreign
oligarchs following some violation of international law, or our own
laws: We must alter our financial system so that we stop kleptocratic
elites from abusing it in the first place. We cannot just respond with
furious fact-checking and denials when autocrats produce blatant
propaganda: We must help provide accurate and timely information where
there is none, and deliver it in the languages people speak. We cannot
rely on old ideas about the liberal world order or the inviolability of
borders, or even international institutions and treaties to protect our
friends and allies: We need a military strategy, based in deterrence,
that takes into account the real possibility that autocracies will use
military force.
The war in Ukraine has been launched because we did not do any of
these things in the past. As he was preparing for this conflict, the
Russian president calculated that the cost of international criticism,
sanctions and military resistance would be very low. He would survive
them. Past Russian invasions of Ukraine and Georgia; Russian
assassinations carried out in Britain and Germany; Russian
disinformation campaigns during democratic elections in America,
France, Germany and elsewhere; Russian support for extremist or anti-
democratic politicians; none of this received any real response from us
or from the democratic alliances that we lead. Vladimir Putin assumed,
based on his own experience, that we would not react this time either.
China, Belarus and other Russian allies assumed the same.
Going forward, we cannot let this happen again. In my written
testimony I will suggest some broad areas where we need to completely
reimagine our policy. I will leave the necessary changes in military
and intelligence strategy, especially the question of deterrence, to
others who have more expertise in this area, and will focus on
kleptocracy and disinformation. But I hope this hearing sparks a
broader conversation. We need far more creative thinking about how we
cannot just survive the war in Ukraine, but win the war in Ukraine--and
how we can prevent similar wars from taking place in the future.
put an end to transnational kleptocracy
Currently a Russian, Angolan or Chinese oligarch can own a house in
London, an estate on the Mediterranean, a company in Delaware and a
trust in South Dakota without ever having to reveal to his own tax
authorities or ours that these properties are his. A whole host of
American and European intermediaries makes these kinds of transactions
possible: lawyers, bankers, accountants, real estate agents, PR
companies. Their work is legal. We have made it so. We can just as
easily make it illegal. All of it. We don't need to tolerate a little
bit of corruption, we can simply end the whole system, altogether.
Although this testimony is being presented to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, which does not traditionally have oversight over
the regulation of international finance, it is time to recognize the
problem of international kleptocracy as a matter not just for the
Treasury, but for those who make American foreign policy. After all,
many modern autocrats hold on to power not just with violence, but by
stealing from their own countries, laundering the money abroad, and
then using their fortunes to maintain power at home and buy influence
abroad. The Russian oligarchs in the news at the moment are not just
wealthy men with yachts, they have been acting for many years as agents
of the Russian state, representing the interests of the Russian
leadership in myriad commercial and political transactions.
We have the power to destroy this business model. We could require
all real estate transactions, everywhere in the United States, to be
totally transparent. We could require all companies, trusts and
investment funds to be registered in the name of their real owners. We
could ban Americans from keeping their money in tax havens, and we
could ban American lawyers and accountants from engaging with tax
havens. We could force art dealers and auction houses to carry out
money-laundering checks, and close loopholes that allow anonymity in
the private-equity and hedge-fund industries. We could launch a
diplomatic crusade to persuade other democracies to do the same. Simply
ending these practices would make life much more uncomfortable for the
world's kleptocrats. It might have the benefit of making our own
country more law-abiding, and freer of autocratic influence, as well.
In addition to changing the law, we also need to jail those who
break it. We need to step up our enforcement of the existing money-
laundering laws. It is not enough to sanction Russian oligarchs now,
when it is too late, or to investigate their enablers, when it is too
late for that, too. We need to prevent new kleptocratic elites from
forming in the future. It must become not only socially toxic but also
a criminal liability for anyone to handle stolen money, and not only in
America.
Now is the time to deepen the international conversation with our
allies all over the world, to assess what they are doing, whether they
are succeeding, and which steps we all need to take to ensure we are
not building the autocracies of the future. Now is the time to reveal
what we know about hidden money and who really controls it. The Biden
administration has created a precedent, revealing intelligence leading
up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Why not build on that precedent,
and reveal what intelligence we have on Putin's money, Maduro's money,
Xi Jinping's money or Alexander Lukashenko's money?
Just as we once built an international anti-communist alliance, so
we can build an international anti-corruption alliance, organized
around the idea of transparency, accountability, and fairness. Those
are the values that we should promote, not only at home but around the
world. They are consistent with our democratic constitutions and with
the rule of law that underlies all of our societies. Once again: Our
failure to abide by those values in the past is one of the sources of
today's crisis.
don't fight the information war, undermine it
Modern autocrats take information and ideas seriously. They
understand the importance not only of controlling opinion inside their
own countries, but also of influencing debates around the world. They
spend accordingly: on television channels, local and national
newspapers, bot networks. They buy officials and businessmen in
democratic countries in order to have local spokesmen and advocates.
China's United Front program also targets students, younger journalists
and politicians, seeking to influence their thinking from an early age.
For three decades, since the end of the Cold War, we have been
pretending that we don't have to do any of this, because good
information will somehow win the battle in the ``market of ideas.'' But
there isn't a market of ideas, or not a free market. Instead, some
ideas have been turbocharged by disinformation campaigns, by heavy
spending, and by the social media algorithms that promote emotional and
divisive content because that's what keeps people online. Since we
first encountered Russian disinformation inside our own society, we've
also imagined that our existing forms of communication could beat it
without any special effort. But a decade's worth of studying Russian
propaganda has taught me that fact-checking and swift reactions are
useful but insufficient.
We have a living example of how this works, right in front of us.
We can watch the Ukrainians get their viewpoint across, by telling a
moving, true story, by speaking in language used by ordinary people and
by showing us the war as they see it. In doing so, they are reaching
Americans, Europeans and many others. But at the same time, the false
Russian narrative is the only one reaching Russians at home. It is also
reaching many people in the broader, Russian-speaking world, as well as
in India and the Middle East. The same is true of Chinese propaganda,
which might not work here but has a strong impact in the developing
world, where China presents its political system as a model for others
to follow. Right now, for example, Chinese private technology groups,
including Tencent, Sina Weibo and ByteDance, are promoting content
backing Putin's war and suppressing posts that are sympathetic to
Ukraine.
In this new atmosphere, we need to rethink how we communicate. Much
as we assembled the Department of Homeland Security out of disparate
agencies after 9/11, we now need a much more carefully targeted effort
that would pull together some of the departments in the U.S. Government
that think about communication, not to do propaganda but to reach more
people around the world with better information and to stop autocracies
from distorting that knowledge. The building blocks already exist, even
if they are not currently coordinated. U.S.-funded international
broadcasting, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of
America and the rest of the services now housed at the U.S. Agency for
Global Media; the Global Engagement Center, currently in the State
Department; the Open Source Center, a large media monitoring and
translation service currently squirreled away in the intelligence
community where its work is hard to access; research into foreign
audiences and internet tactics; public diplomacy and cultural
diplomacy.
The teams who work on these things should be jointly thinking about
the best way to communicate democratic values in undemocratic places,
jointly sharing experiences, jointly informing and engaging other parts
of the U.S. Government. In any given country there are different kinds
of audiences and there may be different tools and tactics needed to
reach them. Parts of the U.S. Government may have thought about this
problem, but others have not. The dysfunction and scandal that have
dogged international broadcasting, with Michael Pack's disastrous
tenure at USAGM only the latest example, needs to end. Congressional
leadership is needed to put these services on a different and better
footing.
Some of what we should do is simply provide more and better
information to people who want it. RFE/RL's online performance
increased by 99 percent during the first 2 weeks of the war in Ukraine.
Viewership of YouTube videos of RFE/RL programming tripled. This proves
the value of communicating with Russian speakers all over Eurasia--
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Baltic States, even Germany,
home to some 3 million native Russian-speakers. But small increases in
funding for this vital population are insufficient.
We need to provide real, long-lasting competition for the Russian
state-run cable and satellite television that most of the people in
these regions watch. Hundreds of talented Russian journalists and media
professionals have just fled Moscow: Why not start a Russian television
channel, perhaps jointly funded by Europe and America, to employ them
and give them a way to work? At the same time, we should increase
funding for existing Russian independent media outlets, most now
expelled from the country, and provide support for the many grassroots
efforts to run social media campaigns inside and outside the country.
But although Russia is of special interest at the moment, we also
need to consider, as Congress is already doing, an expansion of funding
for Radio Free Asia, which has received only a third of the funding of
RFE/RL, despite its potential to reach a large audience inside China
and the Chinese diaspora around the world. Although relatively small,
RFA was the first news organization to uncover mass detentions in
Xinjiang; RFA also provided the first documentation of China's cover-up
of the first coronavirus fatalities in Wuhan. We need RFA to be able to
counter Chinese propaganda, to put China's Belt and Road projects in
Southeast Asia into context for audiences in Cambodia, Laos, Burma, and
Vietnam, to enhance its digital global initiative to engage younger,
Mandarin-speaking audiences wary of Beijing's dominant media
narratives. We also need to scale up the work of the Open Technology
Fund, which supports internet freedom technologies at every stage of
development. OTF makes it possible for millions to access independent
journalism in closed media environments.
In all of the foreign languages that we work, we need to shift from
an era of ``bullhorn digital broadcasting'' to a new era of ``digital
samizdat,'' mobilizing informed citizens and teaching them to
distribute information. These tactics may not get to everyone, but they
can be targeted at younger audiences, diasporas and elites who have
influence within their countries.
In this new era, funding for education and culture need some
rethinking too. Shouldn't there be a Russian-language university, in
Vilnius or Warsaw, to house all of the intellectuals and thinkers who
have just left Moscow? Don't we need to spend more on education in
Hindi and Persian? Existing programs should be recast and redesigned
for a different era, one in which so much more can be known about the
world, but in which so much money is being spent by the autocracies to
distort that knowledge. The goal should be to ensure that there is a
different idea of ``Russianness'' available to the Russian diaspora,
aside from the one provided by Putin, and that alternative outlets are
available for people in other autocratic societies as well.
put democracy back at the center of foreign policy
It is no accident that Americans are united in their support for
Ukraine. A large, bipartisan majority, for example, back the U.S.
decision to boycott Russian oil, even if it led to higher prices. This
is because Americans identify with people who are clearly fighting for
their freedom, their independence and their democracy. It is a central
part of how we define ourselves, and who we are.
I recognize that it is naive to assume we can have the same policy
towards every dictator, that we cannot give the same support to every
democracy movement; I understand that there are tradeoffs to make in
diplomacy as in everything else. This is not the Cold War, there is no
Warsaw Pact, and not every judgement about every autocracy is black and
white. But our preference for democracy and our willingness to defend
key democracies should never be in doubt. The fact is that Russians
clearly doubted whether we and our allies were even willing to help
Ukraine fight back. We failed, in advance, to telegraph the fact that
we would. We cannot let that happen again.
In addition to being a historian and journalist, I am also on the
board of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the independent
organization that Congress has generously funded for years. I want to
express here my thanks for that support, as well as my hope that it
will continue. NED is ahead of the curve in its thinking about these
issues, has supported networks of journalists to help in international
investigations of kleptocracy as well as independent journalism of all
kinds, on top of its support for democracy activism all over the world.
Funding NED is necessary but not sufficient, however. U.S. foreign
policy is in fact made by dozens of different actors, all across the
government and American society. Congressional leadership can help
focus all of them not just on the defense of existing institutions, but
on the creative thinking we now lack.
To put it bluntly, we need to be able to imagine a different kind
of future, one in which our nation and its ideas are not in retreat,
but in the ascendance. We need to approach displaced diasporas all over
the world as an opportunity, not a burden: How can we prepare them to
take back the countries that they have lost, in Syria, Afghanistan or
Russia? We need to break the links between autocracies, to forge new
and better links between democracies, to reinvent existing
international institutions that are no longer fit for purpose. It is
alarming, even astonishing, that the United Nations has played no role
in preventing or mitigating the war in Ukraine because Russia, as a
Security Council member, has so successfully blocked it from doing so.
In fact, Russia and China have been seeking for years to undermine the
UN and all of the other international organizations that conventional
wisdom said would promote human rights and prevent exactly the kind of
unprovoked war that we are seeing unfold today. It may be time to
create some alternatives, to think about how the democratic world can
organize alternatives, in the event that the UN is no longer interested
in pursuing peaceful development.
Finally, it's extremely important that we imagine a different
future for Ukraine. A victory in this conflict, whatever that means--a
Russian retreat, or a negotiated settlement following Russia's failure
to conquer the country--would provide an enormous, transformational
boost in confidence to the entire democratic world, including to the
democratic activists in Belarus and Ukraine who oppose the war, even to
democratic activists in places as far away as Hong Kong, Burma, or
Venezuela.
A defeat--defined as the end of Ukrainian sovereignty--would be a
terrible blow to all of them. The consequences are much higher than
most in Congress and the Administration seem to have yet acknowledged.
Ukraine is not in NATO, but it is a de facto member of the European
world, and the democratic world. Ukrainian failure will have an impact
on NATO's credibility and on the democratic world's cohesion, whether
we like it or not.
We need to think about victory, and how to achieve it, not only in
this conflict but in the others to come, over the next years and
decades.
Thank you very much for your attention.
The Chairman [presiding]. Mr. Twining.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL TWINING, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Twining. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch,
members of this distinguished committee, it is really a
pleasure to be back in the Senate to testify before you on
countering authoritarianism, a topic at the heart of our work
at IRI to advance democracy worldwide.
Foreign authoritarians and the Chinese Communist Party and
the Kremlin want to make the world safe for autocracy. Their
tools include economic leverage, influence operations, digital
disinformation, and the export of repressive technologies.
IRI's programming equips countries to push back. We equip
democrats around the world with knowledge and tools to expose
and counter foreign malign influence, bolstering democracies
against the corrosive effects of this rising tide.
The Chinese Communist Party is engaging the rest of the
world with the same philosophy it uses to govern its own
country.
It claims to be promoting respect for every country's
individual political path, but it seeks to create a world
molded in its authoritarian image. Harsh coercion is only half
the story of how the Party keeps control at home.
The offer the Party makes to its elites is actually two-
sided--oppose us and we will crush you, but support us and we
can help make you rich. The CCP has now taken this approach
global.
When offering other countries gold does not work, the CCP
offers the sword. Political leaders who stand up to Chinese
bullying and aggression find their countries on the receiving
end of economic coercion with China using its economic might to
impose political compliance.
The Party tries to aggressively shape discourse about China
including here at home. We see cornerstones of American life
like the NBA, Hollywood, and Wall Street go out of their way to
placate the CCP's warped notions of political correctness,
including on the atrocities in Xinjiang.
China's coercive efforts to influence other countries also
target the Chinese diaspora, attempting to turn them into tools
of Beijing's design.
The democratic world has an advantage. No country wants to
import China's political Leninist model, and democracies,
historically, have been far more resilient than autocracies. We
have found that civil society and democratic activism remain
the most effective tools to identify and push back against CCP
influence.
A free and competitive media landscape is a crucial way
democracies can inoculate themselves against Chinese malign
influence in the information space.
Independent media and investigative journalists are some of
the best checks against state-curated propaganda as well as
useful assets in exposing foreign authoritarian corruption.
Political parties play a central role in combatting Chinese
political interference. Political parties in countries like
Australia and Lithuania have formed cross-partisan coalitions
to push back against PRC economic coercion.
Parties shown to be in the pocket of a foreign
authoritarian power will not succeed in open democratic
competition anywhere. The U.S. really must do more to help
friendly democracies protect themselves from malign Chinese
influence.
A few ideas include supporting collective economic defense,
number one. NATO stands as a bulwark against Russian aggression
in the military domain, but there is no institution that
provides collective economic security to countries coerced by
China for standing up for democratic values. Protecting the
free world requires a credible deterrent to Chinese economic
aggression.
Two, providing technical support to countries negotiating
Belt and Road deals. Some countries have signed bad deals with
China because they lacked technical expertise to negotiate good
ones. The U.S. and our allies can fill this gap, helping
nations secure high-quality deals that are transparent,
citizen-centric, and noncorrupt.
Three, supporting independent journalism. China cultivates
journalists around the world to advance pro-CCP narratives,
effectively removing independent voices from the conversation
on China.
The U.S. should support independent media to investigate
and expose corruption, counter state-sponsored propaganda,
bolster the integrity of the information space, and build media
literacy to mitigate the impact of authoritarian
disinformation.
Four, investing in responsive governance. Supporting
democracy around the world creates a comparative forward policy
advantage for America.
In an era of ideologically-driven great power competition,
supporting the aspiration to freedom abroad is not only the
right thing to do, it produces tangible national security
benefits, including preventing friendly countries from
succumbing to state capture by foreign authoritarians.
Polls show Americans support this kind of values-based
leadership and believe we should stand with democracies against
authoritarian assault. The U.S. should allocate more resources
to steal the foundations of global democracy against
authoritarian powers' insidious attacks.
Just to wrap up, over the past few years the work of IRI,
the National Democratic Institute, the National Endowment for
Democracy, and others--through that work, we have developed
networks, tools, and resources to bolster democratic resilience
to authoritarian overtures.
Democracy requires active defense. Political
accountability, transparency, innovation, and resilience remain
the most effective antidotes to authoritarian aggression and
when democracies stand together authoritarians take note.
It is essential to invest in democracy assistance, to help
champions of government of the people, by the people, and for
the people build institutions strong enough to stand against
authoritarian subversion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Twining follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Daniel Twining
introduction
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of
the Committee, it is my pleasure to testify before you to today on
countering authoritarianism, a topic at the heart of the International
Republican Institute's work to advance democracy worldwide.
More than ever, foreign authoritarian actors like the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and Putin's regime in Russia are taking an
increasingly aggressive approach to exerting influence in democracies
around the world. Using economic leverage, influence operations,
digital disinformation, and the export of repressive technologies,
China and Russia are propping up other repressive states and placing
pressure on democratic actors. But these tools are often poorly
understood, as are the ways by which democratic governments and civil
societies can work together to fight back.
IRI's Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence (CFAI) programming
equips democracies to do just that. Through cutting-edge research,
global convening, and equipping civil society, the media, government
officials, political parties, and the private sector with the knowledge
and tools to expose and counter foreign authoritarian influence, IRI
and its partners are bolstering democracies against the corrosive
effects of this rising authoritarian tide.
Today I will explore how the People's Republic of China (PRC)
interferes in democratic countries, underscoring the strengths of the
PRC's approach as well as weaknesses to leverage. I will highlight key
sources of democratic resilience IRI has observed that offer lessons
and opportunities for future efforts to counter authoritarian
aggression.
why and how the ccp interferes in democratic countries
The question of why we are seeing the PRC attempts to malignly
influence democratic countries is impossible to understand without
understanding the Chinese Communist Party's goals. Since the PRC's
founding, all of its top leaders have spoken of the ``great renewal of
the Chinese race.'' CCP political slogans come and go, but this one
remains, precisely because it encapsulates both of the CCP's strongest
political rallying tools: potent ethno-nationalism, and a promise to
return China to the center of world events.
Under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, the great renewal of the
Chinese race has been given practical form in what Xi calls the
``community of common destiny.'' As explained by former NSC Director
for China Liza Tobin, the realization of the community of common
destiny would entail a world where ``the international community would
regard Beijing's authoritarian governance model as a superior
alternative to Western electoral democracy, and the world would credit
the Communist Party of China for developing a new path to peace,
prosperity, and modernity that other countries can follow.''
To lead the world, one must engage with the world. And the CCP is
engaging with the rest of the world with the same philosophies it uses
to govern its own country. The community of common destiny is notable
mainly for what it does not envision: robust limits on state power over
citizens, vibrant press freedom, or the supervision of government
officials through competitive elections. The CCP claims to be promoting
respect for every country's individual political path, but it is
unabashedly seeking to create a world molded in its authoritarian
image.
The CCP is also seeking leadership over other countries through
many of the same tools it uses domestically. Understanding these tools
is key to discerning how the U.S. and its partners should respond.
IRI's research on PRC interference globally demonstrates
unequivocally that China's economic strength is at the center of the
CCP's attempts to bend other countries to its will. This should not
come as a surprise, since it is of a piece with how it maintains
control domestically. Many think harsh coercion is the only way the
Party keeps control at home. But that is only half the story. The offer
the Party makes to its elites at home is actually two-sided: openly
oppose us, and yes, we will crush you. But support us, and we can help
make you rich.
The CCP has now taken this approach global. Its infrastructure
deals are frequently padded with extra costs, to better pad the pockets
of local elites, and to the detriment of ordinary people. Apart from
potentially turning other governments into client states, this
willingness to dispense largesse without upfront strings attached is
exacerbating pre-existing issues with corruption and governance in the
process. For example, a major railroad-construction project in Kenya
was won by PRC contractors in a closed tender at prices per mile far
above international standards, for reasons that remain poorly
explained. The railroad has failed to turn its projected profits.
Indeed, it has failed to turn any profit, and the Kenyan Government
recently raised taxes on essential commodities like cooking gas and
internet data, in part to cope with the county's unwieldy external debt
burden.\1\
An unfinished Chinese-built highway in North Macedonia has now
become one of the most expensive in the world per mile and has saddled
the country with debts that may take generations to pay down.\2\ In
2017, the PRC offered to extend a lifeline to the floundering
government of a former Malaysian prime minister by spying on Wall
Street Journal reporters who were reporting on the Malaysian
Government's corruption. In return, the PRC demanded in writing that
Malaysia sign onto enormous infrastructure deals financed at ``above-
market'' lending rates.
Just like at home, when offering other countries gold does not
work, the CCP offers the sword. Political leaders around the world who
have taken steps to stand up to PRC bullying and aggression have found
themselves on the receiving end of economic coercion designed to turn
their business communities against them. Beijing cut off some of
Australia's most important exports after Canberra passed a series of
laws designed to limit foreign interference in its elections. And even
as we speak, the CCP is punishing the freedom-loving people of
Lithuania for standing with Taiwan by pressuring German and French
multinationals to drop Lithuanian suppliers. These are but two from a
long list of similar efforts by Beijing to use China's economic might
to impose political compliance on smaller democracies.
Secondly, our research shows that the PRC tries to aggressively
shape discourse about China in every country it influences. Just as
inside China, this is often as much about shaping what people don't
say, as much as what they do say. Examples of CCP-induced self-
censorship in open societies are undoubtedly well known to this
committee. In recent years we have seen cornerstones of American life
like the NBA, Hollywood, and Wall Street go out of their way to placate
the PRC's warped notions of political correctness.
But I must single out the example of Xinjiang for special
discussion. The ongoing suffering of the Uyghur people of Xinjiang--and
the feebleness of the international community's response to what
independent tribunals have determined is an ongoing genocide--show that
in at least one important way, China has already succeeded in building
a new world, even if many people in Washington and other world capitals
do not yet realize it.
Previous instances of genocide in Darfur and Myanmar saw the
pillars of our collective international conscience mobilizing to demand
a halt. Heads of state declared that such unconscionable crimes must
cease. UN general secretaries stepped in to personally mediate between
conflict-ridden parties. Celebrities like George Clooney and Angelina
Jolie went out of their way to make sure the calls for an end to
killing carried well beyond the halls of power, helping to mobilize
publics around the world.
The silence around Xinjiang, in contrast, remains deafening. While
democratic legislatures like the U.S. Congress have sounded the alarm,
precious few heads of state have directly addressed the genocide, for
fear of endangering ties with China. Some people within the UN, like
the Human Rights Council's special rapporteurs for freedom of religion
and slavery, have done their jobs by shining a light on the horrific
abuses Uyghurs have suffered. But UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres
has gone out of his way to avoid the issue, while a report on Xinjiang
supposedly completed by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights remains unpublished for unexplained reasons.\3\ And apart from a
declaration by director Judd Apatow that ``China has bought our
silence'' on Xinjiang,\4\ A-list celebrities have had almost nothing to
say about the largest mass internment of an ethnic group since the
Holocaust.
China's coercive efforts to influence other countries also target
the Chinese diaspora, attempting to turn them into tools for Beijing's
whims. This is undoubtedly the most corrosive way the CCP interferes in
other countries. Research by IRI and many others has shown that Chinese
diaspora communities around the world are already seen with undeserved,
racially-focused suspicion by people who--falsely--believe them to be
unthinking vessels for Beijing's will. As a result, attacks on Chinese
communities around the world are tragically commonplace.
Last November, for example, following dissatisfaction with the
Solomon Islands' switch of recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, rioters
burned down large parts of the Chinatown in the capital city of
Honiara, leaving several dead and hundreds homeless.\5\ Needless to
say, the ordinary Chinese people deprived of life and property had very
little to do with the grey men in Beijing who engineered the switch in
recognition. Despite this and many other such events, Beijing is
unapologetic in its efforts to claim the diaspora for its own. It has
shown no regard--or even awareness--for how it is stoking preexisting
racism and placing Chinese communities the world over at risk.
the ccp's strengths
We have to take seriously these and other forms of the CCP's
interference in democracies, because they are abetted by genuine
domestic strengths. China ruled by the CCP is not the USSR of
yesteryear. Its challenge to the international order is arguably more
potent, and we must understand its strengths, so that we understand
that attempts to push back on PRC interference will be neither quick
nor easy.
First and most importantly, the Party remains a capable manager of
its own enormous economy. This is despite growing economic headwinds
and pressure from U.S. sanctions. It employs some of the world's best-
trained economic technocrats, and takes some, if not all, of their
advice.\6\ This means that over the short- to medium-term, China is
likely to remain a market Western businesses want to be in, and Western
countries want to trade with.
Second, the Party's command over the economy gives it enormous
ability to shape the incentives of foreign interlocutors. China is the
world's biggest trading nation and has the world's largest retail
market. The Party guards access to this market zealously. The Party
arguably has more economic resources at its direct command than the
U.S. Government. At the end of 2020, for example, the 92 state-owned
enterprises directly managed by the PRC central government had assets
worth $14.8 trillion, or about 64 percent of U.S. GDP.\7\
Another unfortunate but potent factor to consider is that the CCP
is unrepentantly corrupt, and corruption remains, in many cases, an
extremely effective way of making inroads with political elites around
the world.\8\ As I illustrated before, much of China's corrosive effect
on other countries stems from the fact that its companies don't have to
worry about being accountable to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
while trying to win foreign project tenders.
And finally, I must mention that despite China's growing global
footprint, we have found in our IRI research and trainings around the
world that levels of knowledge about China remain relatively low. Many
people--including political and business elites who engage with China--
still don't know what they're dealing with, and do not grasp the
danger.
the ccp's weaknesses
While the Party's rule of China gives it certain advantages in
projecting authoritarianism abroad, there are also significant
weaknesses that should give us real optimism about democracies'
resilience in the face of CCP interference.
First, it is not clear that the Party under Xi Jinping has the
diplomatic agility to carry its techno-authoritarian control beyond
China's borders. Since Xi took command in 2012, his hard turn into
retrograde, inward-looking politics has been reflected in a willingness
to alienate other countries for domestic political benefit. Xi's harsh,
coercive brand of ``wolf-warrior'' diplomacy has repeatedly proven
itself to be a strategic own-goal. Under Xi, China's external overreach
has almost single-handedly summoned into being geopolitical balancing
coalitions that a cannier strategist would have avoided.
We should also be optimistic because of our own relative strengths.
Like Isaiah Berlin's proverbial hedgehog, the Party understands one big
thing very well: that money matters, and that controlling and using
money is crucial to winning consent for China's rise. But for that one
strength, it is weak in many places where the U.S. and our democratic
partners excel.
Firstly and most importantly, the Party has difficulty winning
other countries' trust and building genuine partnerships, to say
nothing of deep alliances. Secondly, despite ongoing efforts to attract
global talent, Chinese society is fundamentally unequipped to
effectively integrate people of different races and nationalities in
the way the U.S. can. Per capita, China has fewer residents born in
other countries than any nation in the world, making it the opposite of
a global cosmopolitan center to which the world's best and brightest
flock. Finally, in our work we have found that, the more other
democracies come to understand the true nature of the Chinese Communist
Party, the less they like it. Stifling, self-centered, surveillance
authoritarianism is, it turns out, not very attractive to anyone.
sources of democratic resilience
The lack of appeal of the CCP's political model is just one of the
reasons for hope. Another is the fundamental resilience of democracies
around the world. Despite advances made by the PRC and other
authoritarian actors in recent years, our work has thrown light on deep
reserves of this resilience, even in nations most deeply impacted by
CCP political interference.
We have found that civil society and democratic activism remain the
most effective tools democracies have to identify and push back against
PRC influence. IRI partners around the world, from Panama to Kenya,
have led groundbreaking campaigns to expose the corrosive impact of PRC
influence on local democratic institutions. The opacity of Chinese
development bank loan contracts has been met, in many places, with
society-wide mobilization demanding government transparency and
accountability. In many instances, the illiberal nature of PRC
engagement with countries in the `global South' has given rise to a new
generation of bottom-up movements seeking to realize the inclusive,
equitable, and transparent governance their elites have promised.
A free and competitive media landscape is also a crucial way
democracies can inoculate themselves against malign PRC influence on
their information space. Independent media and investigative
journalists are some of the best checks against state-curated
propaganda. We have seen, in countries like Kenya, Malaysia, and
Ecuador, that journalists can prompt demands for reform in their
nations' relationship with China through investigations that bring
opaque deals to light and unearth the negative impact of Chinese
investment on local communities.
Lastly, I would like to discuss the central role that political
parties can play in combatting PRC political interference. Despite the
CCP's aggressive attempts to co-opt other political parties through its
International Liaison Department, democratic political parties in many
corners of the world are proving their resilience. Political parties in
countries such as Australia and Lithuania have formed bipartisan and
multi-partisan coalitions in the face of PRC economic coercion.
Lithuania's ruling party coalition has pushed to take a more critical
stance against the authoritarian actions of the PRC, leading to
significant policy shifts that favor democratic outcomes. To scale and
spur this type of action with parties around the globe, it will be
imperative to share both Australia's and Lithuania's story with broader
audiences, as we do at IRI in our global political-party programming to
counter Chinese malign influence.
china and russia in the context of ukraine
One final subject deserves attention given the events of recent
days: the growing authoritarian nexus between China and Russia.
Alongside China, other authoritarian actors, including Russia, are
trying to further their political interests by weakening democratic
institutions. Of particular concern is strengthening cooperation
between Russia and China, which are both pursing strategies to create a
world safe for their authoritarian aggression--whether against Ukraine
or Taiwan.
Historically, collaboration between Beijing and Moscow was
inhibited by their competing goals: the PRC aims to bolster its
international reputation, while Russia seeks to undermine trust in
Western institutions. However, where their mutual interests converge,
we now see increasing alignment, particularly in their information
operations. Russia and China have coordinated their propaganda
narratives on the development of COVID-19 vaccines, U.S. and European
sanctions regimes, and allegations of Western interference in
opposition movements, including pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and
Russia.
The ongoing war in Ukraine highlights the extent to which China
will align itself with Russian interests--Beijing refused to call
Russia's attack on Ukraine an invasion and opposes the economic
measures that have been taken against Russia. Foreign Minister Wang Yi
has emphasized that China-Russia relations remain ``ironclad,'' and
China is actively amplifying Russian disinformation claiming the U.S.
is developing biological weapons in Ukraine.\9\ Although their methods
differ, both Putin and Xi have clearly stated their ambition to
dismantle the free and open international order led by the United
States and replace it with one centered on authoritarianism and spheres
of influence.
policy recommendations
The United States has many strengths in this competition. Aside
from comprehensively bolstering our own competitiveness, there is much
we can do to support democracies standing against PRC interference
globally. Some specific ways we could do so:
Support collective economic defense: NATO is currently
proving its worth as a bulwark against Russian aggression. But
there is no institution to provide collective economic security
to countries being coerced by the PRC simply for standing up
for democratic values. Bills such as the Countering China
Economic Coercion Act are a good start, but the U.S. and our
partners need to do more. We should immediately begin
undertaking serious efforts to construct a credible deterrent
to PRC economic aggression.
Provide technical support to countries negotiating BRI
deals: Some countries have signed bad deals with China because
they lacked technical expertise to negotiate good ones. The
U.S. and our allies can fill this gap, and we should find ways
to do so--if only because infrastructure shortfalls around the
world provide leaders with compelling rationales to continue to
turn to the PRC for lending. If they do so, their publics and
political opposition should know that technical support is
available to make sure the deals are good ones, so that they
can demand to know why leaders failed to take advantage of such
a facility.
Support independent journalism globally: Chinese propaganda
outlets like CGTN have seen success in places like Africa
because they have the money to offer higher salaries to
credible journalists and recognized early on the importance of
cultivating local talent to advance pro-PRC narratives,
effectively removing independent voices from the conversation
on China. The CCP has gone as far as outright attempts to buy
public broadcasters in many African countries, in addition to
its efforts to coopt local media and spread pro-PRC
disinformation and propaganda. The U.S. and our allies have
prioritized support for independent journalism for many years,
but our efforts do not currently match the scale of the
challenge. The U.S. must invest additional resources in
democracy, rights, and governance programming to support
independent media to investigate and expose authoritarian
aggression; counter state-sponsored propaganda and
disinformation; bolster the integrity of the information space;
and build media literacy to mitigate the impact of
disinformation on popular perceptions of actors like the PRC
and the Kremlin.
Support democracy and responsive governance: Supporting
democracy around the world creates a comparative foreign policy
advantage for the United States. U.S. support for democratic
principles through institutions like IRI, the National
Democratic Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy
has had measurable impact on democratic development and
resilience around the world. In an era of ideologically driven
great-power competition, supporting the aspiration to freedom
abroad is not only the right thing to--it produces tangible
national security benefits for the United States, including
preventing friendly countries from succumbing to state capture
by foreign authoritarian adversaries. Polling by the Bush
Institute, the Penn-Biden Center, and the Reagan Institute
shows that Americans support such values-based leadership and
believe the United States should stand with democracies against
authoritarian assault. Building on the Democracy Summit and
working with the Department of States and United States Agency
for International Development, the U.S. can and must allocate
the resources to steel the foundations of global democracy
against authoritarian powers' insidious attacks.
conclusion
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of
the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony today.
Over the past few years, through the work of IRI, the National
Endowment for Democracy, and others, we have developed the networks,
tools, and resources to bolster democratic resilience to authoritarian
overtures. As the convergent disinformation campaign waged by Russia
and China over Russia's invasion of Ukraine reverberates from Italy to
Indonesia, we are reminded that democracy requires active defense in
the face of unprecedented challenges. Democratic accountability,
transparency, innovation, and resilience remain the most effective
antidotes to authoritarian aggression. And when democracies stand
together in a show of democratic unity, backed by the tools of
political and economic statecraft, authoritarians take note. So do our
partners. It is--and it will remain--essential that we continue to
invest in democracy assistance to help champions of government of the
people, by the people, and for the people the world over to build
institutions strong enough to stand against a rising tide of
authoritarian subversion. Thank you and I look forward to your
questions.
----------------
Notes
\1\ Warah, Rasna. ``COVID-19 only heightened Kenya's existing
economic problem.'' One, 10 February 2022, https://www.one.org/africa/
blog/covid19-kenya-economy-inflation/.
\2\ Higgins, Andrews. ``A Pricey Drive Down Montenegro's Highway
`From Nowhere to Nowhere'.'' The New York Times, 14 August 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/14/world/europe/montenegro-highway-
china.html.
\3\ ``Open Letter to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: OHCHR
Report on Grave Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang Can Wait No
Longer.'' Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/
2022/03/08/open-letter-un-high-commissioner-human-rights-ohchr-report-
grave-human-rights#.
\4\ Evans, Zachary. ```China Has Bought Our Silence:' Director Judd
Apatow Criticizes Film Industry for Ignoring Uyghur `Genocide.'''
National Review, 16 September 2020. https://www.nationalreview.com/
news/china-has-bought-our-silence-director-judd-apatow-criticizes-film-
industry-for-ignoring-uyghur-genocide/.
\5\ Zhuang, Yan. ``3 Bodies Found Amid Violence in Solomon
Island.'' The New York Times, 26 November 2021. https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/11/27/world/asia/solomon-islands-protests-
bodies.html.
\6\ Li, Cheng. ``China's Economic Decisionmakers.'' Brookings,
March-April 2008. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
03_china_li.pdf.
\7\ ``Comprehensive Report of the State Council on the Management
of State-Owned Assets in 2020.'' The National People's Congress of the
People's Republic of China, 21 October 2021. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/
c30834/202110/c63f586559e84bc0ae85fa752d358f0c.shtml.
\8\ Jirous, Filip. ``China in the Balkans: Neutral Business Partner
or a Foreign Power?'' European Western Balkans, 28 June 2019. https://
europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/06/28/china-in-the-balkans-neutral-
business-partner-or-a-foreign-power/; Martin, Wes. ``Corruption is
China's Friend in its Quest to Dominate Africa.'' The National
Interest, 13 September 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/
corruption-chinas-friend-its-quest-dominate-africa-31242;``United
Nations with Chinese Characteristics: Elite Capture and Discourse
Management on a Global Scale.'' Sinopsis, 20 July 2019, https://
sinopsis.cz/en/united-nations-with-chinese-characteristics-elite-
capture-and-discourse-management-on-a-global-scale/
\9\ Kim, Patricia M. ``China's Choices and the Fate of the Post-
Post-Cold War Era.'' Brookings, The Brookings Institution, 8 Mar. 2022,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/03/08/chinas-
choices-and-the-fate-of-the-post-post-cold-war-era/.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. We will
start a series of questions of 5-minute rounds.
Dr. Applebaum, your testimony is exactly in line with my
sentiments and thinking, what I was trying to get our previous
witnesses to engage in--what are we doing--and there are some
parts of your testimony that, I think, deserve to be
highlighted and I want to engage with you on it.
You say that we have to change the rules of engagement
altogether, that we must alter our financial system so that we
stop kleptocratic elites from abusing it in the first place,
that we must provide accurate and timely information where
there is none and deliver it in the languages people speak, and
we need a military strategy based in deterrence that takes into
account the real possibility the autocracies will use military
force.
You go on to say when we talk about transnational
kleptocracy that ``a whole host of American and European
intermediaries make these kind of transactions possible--
lawyers, bankers, accountants, real estate agencies, PR
companies'' and you say their work is legal.
``We have made it so. We can just as easily make it
illegal. We do not need to tolerate a little bit of corruption
when we can simply end the whole system altogether.''
Finally, you say ``Just as we once built an international
anti-communist alliance, so can we build an international anti-
corruption alliance organized around the idea of transparency,
accountability, and fairness,'' and ``We need to provide real
long-lasting competition for Russian state-run cable and
satellite television that most of the people in these regions
ultimately follow.''
That is what I was trying to drive with our previous panel.
Could you elaborate on some of those things? How would we go
about, in your mind, doing that?
Ms. Applebaum. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for those
comments.
Let me say two things. One is that, in this new atmosphere
we need to rethink how we communicate.
This is a real emergency, and much as we assembled the
Department of Homeland Security out of disparate agencies after
9/11, I think we now need a much more carefully targeted effort
that will pull together some of the disparate parts of the U.S.
Government that think about public diplomacy, but do not
necessarily act together.
We have the very talented, but underfunded Radio Free
Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the others. They
are now at this U.S. Agency for Global Media. We have the
Global Engagement Center currently at the State Department, the
Open Source Center, which is a large media monitoring and
translation service, which is now in the intelligence community
where its work is hard to access. It would help a lot to put
these together.
I do not mean a major departmental reorganization, but if
they are thinking together, if they are acting together, if
they--using the same research, I think they will be more
effective.
One of the things that we have learned about disinformation
in the last several years is that fact checking and counter
disinformation are never as good as offering an alternate
narrative--a better story.
Reaching Russians with a Russian-language television
station run by Russians--among them the hundreds if not
thousands of Russians who have just escaped Moscow would be a
good start.
The second part of the answer requires an understanding
that kleptocracy is not something that happens on Caribbean
islands, far away. It happens here in American states, in South
Dakota, in Delaware. Changing our own rules will help push back
against it. For example, there is no reason why Americans need
to own companies anonymously or own property anonymously or why
anybody else should be able to do that in America either.
I know these are not normally questions for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, but international financial
markets are now part of foreign policy in a way that they did
not used to be.
I hope that we will consider making changes at home and
getting our allies to do the same. It is much better not just
to sanction people, but to prevent them from getting wealthy
illegally in the first place.
The Chairman. Finally, both to you and Mr. Twining, it
seems to me that we dramatically underfund these initiatives
when, in fact, they would be as powerful and, in some cases, I
believe, more powerful than what we do in the Department of
Defense, because if we succeed at this then we are less likely
to find ourselves in the need of conflict.
Is that a fair statement and if not, why not?
Dr. Twining. Mr. Chairman, could I just point out that the
Chinese and the Russians both spend an inordinate amount of
money to subvert and weaken and attack democracy all over the
world, that it is central to their grand strategy as
authoritarian great powers.
So we should take the fact that they care about this dead
seriously in our own country. I would not suggest taking it out
of the defense budget, but I would suggest, for instance, that
the reason that Ukrainians are fighting so valiantly is because
they have a real democracy to defend, that they are fighting
for their freedom.
They are not fighting for a leader, and that investing in
democratic resilience is a sure source of security. It also
helps produce great allies for the United States.
The Chairman. Yes. I was not suggesting taking it out of
the Defense Department. What I was saying is that it is as
powerful as some of what we do in the Defense Department and,
in my mind, more preventative that we do not end up sending
America's sons and daughters abroad.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Ms. Applebaum, I think that those remarks you made and
reminding us all that autocracy is not one person, that it is a
person sitting on top of a pyramid of people who are just as
bad as the autocrat themselves and, in some respects, even
worse, and I think that is appropriate that we think about it
like that, and I think it is appropriate that we act towards
that, the whole system and not just one individual. So I
appreciate that.
I was--really enjoyed hearing your comments about thinking
bigger when it comes to promoting democracy. Here is the
problem I have with it, and maybe you can give us some
suggestions how we get past this.
I want to talk about Voice of America. Voice of America
puts out some good stuff. I have done some stuff for them, and
I imagine everybody on this committee has probably done some
things for them.
Some of the other stuff I have heard them put out is just
stunningly an attack on America itself, and I have heard
programs where they use some of the difficulties we have--and
we have difficulties in America, whether you are talking about
race relations, whether you are talking about income equity and
those kinds of things that people do not like--but I have heard
some of those things Voice of America puts out, and I have
complained about it and I am told to mind my own business, that
they have editorial freedom and they can put out whatever they
want to put out, which, I guess, is true.
My gosh, the stuff I heard, I would not want--I was
dismayed that U.S. taxpayer money was using this to put--if I
were somebody sitting somewhere and listening to this say, boy,
that is an awful place, this America place. We have, certainly,
got things better here under an autocracy than they have under
a democracy.
So what are your thoughts on that? I mean, I really like
the idea about having TV in addition to radio. We have all been
around the world and turned on the TV and when you turn on--in
any major African city you turn on the TV and you will find a
Chinese program that is done in Chinese and with translations
for the people to watch.
I am intrigued by that. Because of our freedoms and because
of the disdain some Americans have for their own country
because of some detail that they do not particularly like, how
do you get around that? Have you had some thoughts on that?
Ms. Applebaum. Thank you so much for that question,
Senator. I think we could ask it about almost any journalism--
who controls it, how it should be, how it should be shaped.
I do think that the one difference between an American
funding program for journalism and, say, a Russian state
funding program is precisely the fact that it is not controlled
by this body or any other.
It is precisely because it is not controlled directly by
the U.S. Government that is has some credibility, even though
you might not like everything that it says or I might not like
everything that it says.
Its credibility comes from the sense of independence it
has, and the more independence that it is given the better an
advertisement for our political system and for our media it
will be.
That does not mean that every journalist is perfect and
every report is ideal. I think the aim with U.S. broadcasting
should always be to show at least a range of ideas.
Senator Risch. Yes. I think that is a legitimate argument,
and you make that well.
I am telling you, the stuff I heard was just poisonous. I
mean, it was not--it was stuff that I was embarrassed and
ashamed that we were using taxpayers' money to tell the rest of
the world about what an awful place America was.
I appreciate that independence--editorial independence is
important. Boy, I will tell you, we were sure going in the
wrong direction, and I think we are doing more damage than we
were good by putting that out.
Anyway, I think that is a problem, but I agree with you. I
mean, our adversaries are spending a tremendous amount of money
on these, as we all see when we turn on the TV, whether you are
in Europe or in Africa or anywhere else.
Thanks for those thoughts.
Mr. Twining, do you have any thoughts in that regard?
Dr. Twining. Sir, just that our way of life is very
attractive and compelling, and I think we have spent a few
years convincing ourselves that it is not. It is very
compelling to people all over the world.
The leaders of Russia and China have put their people in
big propaganda bubbles and they want to convince them that
somehow we are decadent, we are internally divided, America is
violent--all of these caricatures.
So anything we can do to help just tell the truth about the
great country that we live in. We should not forget that people
around the world, including across Russia and China, actually
would love to live in the United States if they could.
So information should be working for us, not for our
competitors, and I really appreciate the focus of this hearing
because we have a lot of work to do to get the real story in,
not just about ourselves, but including about the corruption
and just extraordinary totalitarian abuses that are happening
in Russia and China.
Senator Risch. That is a good thought, and I think if you
could get enough of that in people's hands, they would have a
clear understanding of what a wonderful country this is.
I was in China right after China opened up, and there were
actually a group of people watching a U.S. TV station off a
satellite, and I said to the guide--I said, what is going on
here, and he said, oh, they love American TV, blah, blah, blah.
I said, I cannot help, but think that somebody over there
is going to have a problem with this because they were watching
American TV with advertising. They were advertising Cadillacs
and Coca Cola and new homes and everything else.
I said, what do people think about that? He says, oh, the
government tells them that is all--that is all American
propaganda. That is not really the way it is over here.
I suspect the more of that that got out, probably the
better off we would be.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the
witnesses.
Ms. Applebaum, I want to start with your testimony. You
talked about a couple of things we should do and one of the
things you talked about was public diplomacy, education,
cultural--having that be strong.
Since I am not shy about criticizing Republican colleagues
for slowing down the confirmation of Biden nominees, here is
one where I got to ask the Biden administration what is up.
The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs--I do not believe the Administration has sent us a
nominee. This is a position that is a top 10 position at the
State Department. It has been a position since 1999 and, yet,
in the entire history of this position it has only had a
confirmed Under Secretary about 35 percent of the time.
It was about 37 percent of the time during President Bush's
8 years. It was vacant 37 percent of the time during the Bush
administration. It was vacant 20 percent of the time during the
Obama administration. It was vacant 90 percent of the time
during the Trump administration.
This is a top 10 position in the State Department, and if
we are going to try to compete in this information and public
diplomacy we have got to have people in place.
What kind of a message does it send when the U.S. has a
position like this and just decides, both either an
Administration or Congress, not to bother to confirm anyone?
Ms. Applebaum. Senator, thank you so much for that
question. I was reading some of that research myself a couple
of days ago.
I think the truth is that we have underestimated the role
and the need for public diplomacy and I think it is a
bipartisan problem. It has somehow been a less prestigious part
of our foreign policy, and this is why I am suggesting pulling
together some of the public diplomacy functions that exist,
actually, spread across the U.S. Government.
You would be best positioned to decide whether these
functions should be their own agency or part of some other
department. What matters is that we focus them, bring them
together, have them jointly discuss what are the values that we
are trying to get across, how are we going to do it, what do we
understand about foreign audiences, have we really looked at
who is on the Russian internet, have we thought about how to
reach the people who use it.
Of course, we can reach Russian liberals, and we might not
be able to reach Russian Putinists, but there are a lot of
people in the middle and there might be ways of reaching them
that we have not thought about yet.
Doing some of that research, having some of that knowledge,
and then having it spread through different parts of the
government, with different people working on this problem from
different angles, I think, could be incredibly valuable.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Twining, I want to direct a different
question to you. You could say something about this in
answering if you want.
I really appreciate your answer, Ms. Applebaum, and I would
just encourage the Administration. We are 14 months into the
Administration. Send us a good nominee for this position. The
acting is doing a good job. I do not have a dog in the hunt in
terms of who should be the nominee. Why have it be a position
that is downgraded by not sending us someone to confirm?
The Summit for Democracy that happened in December, I want
to ask each of you, and maybe beginning with Dr. Twining, about
the prospects for this.
I think it was sort of--because it was virtual, it probably
was not all it could be. It was a first step. I will say the
Administration did zero outreach to the senators.
I surveyed my Senate colleagues to see is anybody reaching
out and saying, hey, Senators, what should we emphasize? What
priorities should we put? The answer that I got back, at least
from my Democratic colleagues, was no.
I do think there is an opportunity to involve the Article 1
branch in matters like this and give it a higher level of
importance.
What might you hope--since there is going to be, hopefully,
an in-person summit at the end of this calendar year, what
might you each hope we could accomplish through that venue?
Dr. Twining. Thanks, Senator, and thanks for your
leadership on the NED Board. We really appreciate it.
My brief answer would be we need to focus on what unites
us, not what divides us, as free and open societies. The Biden
administration asked countries to each make a set of domestic
commitments on democratic reform and renewal. That is all well
and good.
At the end of the day, we just have a lot more in common
with free and open societies and we should understand that our
adversaries are out there.
They are not internally in our own societies, that we live
in a free and open order that is upheld by the United States
and our democratic friends and allies and that this is a group
of countries that has the most stake in defending and
supporting that order.
That includes taking on these very difficult issues we have
been discussing around digital authoritarianism, around all
sorts of difficulties for democracy.
Fundamentally, the authoritarians have had momentum for the
past decade or so, and it is bizarre because there has never
been higher levels of political participation.
There is this enormous bottom-up energy in the world.
Before COVID in 2019 there were more street protests than any
time since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
There is this enormous energy that is welling up, yet there
is this top-down clamp down, and we need to join, essentially,
the street and those small democratic actors creating that
democratic momentum.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to note that I deeply respect both of the
panelists today. I had the occasion to work with Daniel Twining
at IRI and have watched him over the years, an extraordinary
leader of that organization and an extraordinary mind.
Anne Applebaum, I have enjoyed reading her books and her
articles at Atlantic. Her book ``Twilight of Democracy'' is one
which has, obviously, captivated many of us that follow the
great battle that is going on between authoritarianism and
freedom.
I would note, Senator Kaine, as you know, I spent most of
my career in the private sector, and I look at how the Federal
Government is organized and managed and I see nothing like it
in any corporation anywhere in the world.
Any entity that was trying to accomplish a significant
purpose would be organized very differently than our
government. We have agency after agency, department after
department. Who is the chief operating officer? Who are the
group vice presidents?
We are not organized to take on something as important as
communicating who we are and communicating the power of
freedom, and we have, as Ms. Applebaum has pointed out, people
throughout government doing a little bit of communication, but
we have not put that together.
Even the Russians have a department of propaganda, as I
understand it. Why we do not have a single entity responsible
for communicating our message throughout the world I do not
quite know.
Ms. Applebaum, you have spoken about the need to get public
information to the people in Russia, for instance. Is there a
way of doing that? Maybe you do not know the answer to that.
I wonder even today how much are they hearing about what is
really happening in Ukraine? The idea that we still have
something called Voice of America and Radio Free Europe I sort
of--I scratch my head.
Does anyone listen to the radio anymore? I mean, do we not
communicate in the methods that the Russians, for instance, are
using and more effectively and what are they hearing?
Ms. Applebaum. Senator Romney, thank you so much for those
comments and for that question. I am not going to pretend that
Russians are still getting the same amount of information that
they got even 3 weeks ago.
The Russian internet is being shut down. Facebook and
Twitter are both gone. Instagram is gone. The digital space
inside Russia is closing.
I think that this means that we need to shift from an era
of bullhorn digital broadcasting, where we just put stuff out,
to a new era of digital samizdat.
That means mobilizing informed citizens, contacting people
either in the diaspora or inside the country who we know are
able to pass messages on, or who are influencers or who can
pass on information, and target them.
We need more careful targeting of who our information goes
to and, as I said in one of my previous answers, put much more
careful thought into who are the audiences, what are the
audiences hearing, what media are they actually getting, and
how can we get our point of view into it.
I do not think that we know the answer right now because I
do not think we have thought that way in a long time. I do
think the answers are knowable and it could be done.
Senator Romney. Daniel, do you have a sense of what
Russians are hearing today? You have colleagues that are
working in Russia. Are they giving you a sense of what the
Russian people are hearing?
I saw a brave employee or broadcaster who actually jumped
into a live broadcast with a sign saying, there is a war we are
committing in Ukraine--we need to protest, but this is,
obviously, the exception. How much is getting through?
Dr. Twining. Thanks, Senator. Thanks for all your support
for IRI and the cause.
Not enough is getting through. Most Russians, it sounds
like anecdotally, support Putin's war because they believe
Kremlin propaganda that Ukraine conducted aggression against
Russia and NATO conducted aggression against Russia.
We have a fundamental problem. Russians also do not see--
the Kremlin has been very sharp in censoring images of the
battlefield, of wounded Russian--captured Russian soldiers,
that sort of thing.
In addition to telling America's story in a country like
Russia, really, we should be doing a better job of getting
information into Russia showing what Russians are doing to
their Slavic brothers in Ukraine, using Chechen--terrorists is
probably the best word to call that--literally, recruiting
foreign fighters from Syria and countries in the Middle East to
go and kill Ukrainians. Russians do not know that these things
are going on.
We just have so much work to do, and I think if Russians
understood the truth they would see very clearly that this war
is a big mistake.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you both.
One last question. We have talked about the
authoritarianism. We have talked about the need for a more
comprehensive and cohesive strategy.
We also see countries, democracies, being harmed from
corrosive forces within, unscrupulous leaders who use the
democratic process to rise to power and then seek to,
basically, subvert it, at the end of the day, in order to stay
in power and I think of places like Brazil and Hungary as
examples of that.
What can we do or should we do as it relates to working
against the hollowing out of democracies?
Ms. Applebaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an excellent
question.
In fact, most democracies nowadays fail not because of a
coup d'etat or some young colonel who breaks into the
presidential palace, but precisely because somebody who has won
power by democratic means then seeks to undermine the
institutions.
I think the United States can make a big difference in
fighting this phenomenon which, as you say, is now visible all
over the world, firstly, by talking about it and speaking about
it and making it a central part of our diplomacy. Also, if we
can, by living it ourselves, making sure that we talk about our
own democratic institutions and making sure that they are
strong.
People do watch what we do. The United States is an example
around the world. Making it clear to our foreign partners that
we care about this, that it matters to us, that we have--we are
not just interested in trade, we are not just interested in
questions of hard power, but that these aspects of life also
make a difference to us and then become part of our diplomacy.
The Chairman. Dr. Twining.
Dr. Twining. It is a great question, Chairman.
Part of----
The Chairman. We only ask great questions here.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Twining. I mean, part of, I think, the critique is that
with respect to some of our allies that you mentioned is that
the degradation of democracy in those countries has become a
vector for malign foreign authoritarian influence.
In other words, the degradation of democracy in allied
countries actually undermines the core security component of
our alliances with those countries.
We need to, as Anne suggests, make democracy more central
to our approach to alliances, but we also really have to invest
in countervailing institutions.
Most what we have seen over the past decade play out in
many countries, including allied countries, is leaders take
over in free and fair elections and then systematically
dismantle countervailing institutions: parliaments that could
check and balance their power, free and open media, independent
courts, civil society.
So investing in those countervailing institutions. I mean,
frankly, I am not saying this because we are sitting in the
U.S. Senate.
I do not think there is a whole lot more effective in
checking executive power than a very strong parliament that can
conduct effective oversight. We do a lot of that work around
the world.
Young people--particularly, young people--are often
disenchanted with, ``democracy'' not because they want an
authoritarian solution, but because they see elections produce
leaders who then do this systematic hollowing out and then
engage in corruption, use public funds for their private ends,
et cetera.
Some of these activities, frankly, have given democracy a
bad name, but we look at Afrobarometer polling, for instance,
in Africa--and I will close with this.
There is stronger support among people in Africa for
democracy and open government than ever. It is just that they
are not getting supplied with that open and effective
government. The demand is stronger than ever and we should meet
it.
The Chairman. Thank you both for some incisive testimony.
This is one of my passions and I intend to use your testimony
as a foundation for a legislative initiative in this regard,
and we look forward to being able to call upon both of you in
the future if you are so willing.
With the thanks of the committee for your participation,
the record will remain open until the close of business
tomorrow. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Authoritarian regimes are responsible for countless
refugee and forced migration crises across the globe, including
Ukraine. President Lukashenko of Belarus sought to weaponize the misery
of tens of thousands of migrants along its border with Poland. Millions
of Venezuelans suffering under the Maduro regime have fled, and
thousands of Nicaraguans have been forcibly displaced since
demonstrations were brutally suppressed. Under Secretary Zeya, rather
than attempting to deter refugees and migrants with harsh border
infrastructures and asylum systems, how should democratic host
countries create refugee and asylum policies that reflect their shared
interest in the struggle for freedom?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working
with host governments and other partners to support solutions for those
forcibly displaced from their homes. In the Western Hemisphere, the
Collaborative Migration Management Strategy (CMMS) emphasizes the
importance of working closely with international organizations that
provide support for refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced
persons (IDPs), and returned migrants, providing assistance to address
the humanitarian needs of these populations, expanding access to
protection, increasing opportunities for refugees to integrate in the
region, increasing shelters and other safe space networks, meeting
needs for water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and expanding U.S.
resettlement of refugees from the region.
Around the world, we encourage governments to adhere to
international protection obligations for the more than 84 million
forcibly displaced persons across the globe, including those affected
by conflicts and crises generated by authoritarian regimes in Europe,
the Americas, and beyond. Through humanitarian assistance and
diplomacy, the Department is working with host countries to support
their capacity to protect and assist refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs,
and stateless persons, and advocate for their access to identity
documentation, legal employment, and inclusion in national health and
education services, easing pressure on local host communities and
enhancing self-reliance opportunities for those forcibly displaced.
Such efforts include the push for regional progress on regularization
for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Ecuador and Peru, as well as
strong support for Colombia's 10-year temporary protected status for
Venezuelans, a model for the region and beyond. This also includes the
humanitarian assistance we are providing in response to the historic
humanitarian crisis for those fleeing the conflict in Ukraine. We also
continue to actively engage multilaterally and through regional fora to
promote safe, orderly, and humane international migration policies.
Question. As the world's largest democracy, India has a special
role and responsibility in exemplifying good governance and upholding
democratic principles. But India's recent track record--both at home
and abroad--has been mixed. The current government is clamping down on
domestic press and media freedoms, discriminating against religious
minorities, and suppressing opposition voices. Internationally, India
has yet to take a clear stand against Russia's unprovoked and illegal
invasion of Ukraine, a fellow democracy. Under Secretary Zeya, what is
the Department doing to ensure India remains committed to its
constitutional principles of secularism and equality?
Answer. The Department is committed to supporting democratic
principles in our engagements with India, including an open, inclusive,
empowered, and fully functioning civil society and respect for human
rights, including the freedoms of religion or belief, expression,
peaceful assembly, and association.
The United States and India share many of the same characteristics
that demonstrate the strength of our democracies. We appreciated Prime
Minister Modi's participation in the Summit for Democracy and hope to
coordinate with India on meaningful progress during the ``Year of
Action'' ahead of the next Summit.
As fellow democracies, it is important for the United States and
India to speak frankly about the importance of upholding democratic
principles. The Department at the most senior levels has engaged and
will continue to engage senior Indian officials on human rights
concerns, such as protection of freedom of expression and freedom of
religion or belief. In addition, the Department will continue to
regularly consult Indian and international civil society organizations
to learn from their expertise and concerns related to these issues. We
look to further deepen these engagements once a U.S. Ambassador to
India is confirmed.
Question. And how is the Department communicating to our friends in
New Delhi that becoming a closer ally of the United States requires
addressing our concerns over democratic backsliding rather than simply
ignoring them?
Answer. The U.S.-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership
is multifaceted and multidimensional; our shared democratic principles
must underscore this partnership. Senior Department officials,
including me, regularly engage senior Indian officials on human rights
concerns, such as protection of freedom of expression and freedom of
religion or belief. In addition, the Department will continue to
regularly consult Indian and international civil society organizations
to learn from their expertise related to these issues and to hear their
concerns.
Question. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Chinese and Russian
technologies are enabling the region's dictators to increasingly
control internet access, traffic in misinformation and disinformation,
and monitor citizens. In Venezuela, the regime uses the information
collected from its national identity system, which uses Chinese
technology, to inform decisions on censorship, internet shutdowns, and
arrests. Cuba's internet infrastructure was also built with equipment
acquired from Chinese companies. Following the July 2021 protests in
Cuba, the regime shut down the internet in an attempt to disrupt the
unprecedented countrywide protests. In El Salvador, President Bukele
uses disinformation to paper over his dismantling of democratic
governance. Under Secretary Zeya, how can we use new technologies to
counteract rising authoritarianism in Latin America?
Answer. The PRC and Russia have spent years working to undermine
the U.S. vision of an Internet that is open, interoperable, secure, and
reliable, as well as governed through a multistakeholder approach.
While doing so, they have provided support to authoritarian regimes in
Latin America to facilitate their repressive practices. Stemming the
misuse of technologies by governments, including in Latin America, is a
priority for the Department.
Making digital technologies work for, not against, democracies and
combating digital authoritarianism is a key priority for the Biden
administration. For example, one U.S. Government commitment during the
Summit for Democracy was launching the International Grand Challenges
on Democracy-Affirming Technologies to galvanize innovation in
technologies that support democratic values asymmetrically, such as
privacy-enhancing technologies and tools to combat government-imposed
Internet shutdowns with peer-to-peer technology. The Department also
launched the U.S. Anticorruption Solutions through Emerging Technology
(ASET) program to accelerate technological solutions to counter
corruption worldwide. Emerging technologies such as artificial
intelligence are also critical tools to promote human rights--for
example, by combatting human trafficking; analyzing data to flag
patterns of discrimination or abuse; and helping human rights defenders
comb through photos, videos, or text to hold governments accountable.
For over a decade, the Department has funded programs to advance
Internet freedom globally, especially in Internet-repressive
environments. These include the development, deployment, and
localization of anti-censorship circumvention and secure communications
tools and technologies, as well as digital security capacity building
and emergency response to support members of civil society, independent
media, and human rights defenders to securely and reliably access the
global Internet in contexts where governments restrict human rights
online.
Question. The atrocities perpetrated against the Uyghur population
by the Chinese Government in Xinjiang are well documented. Especially
troubling is the support of this ongoing genocide through genetic
surveillance by the Chinese Government and Chinese companies. Under
Secretary Zeya, what is the State Department doing to address this
threat and what additional resources or tools does the Department need
in this area?
Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by the People's
Republic of China's use of technology to surveil, control, and repress
predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups, as well as, but not limited to, those who are
activists, at home and abroad.
We are strengthening our whole-of-government effort to respond. We
continue to work closely with the Commerce Department to add entities
to their Entity List, when appropriate, if an entity is connected to
human rights abuses. We continue to promote accountability for those
involved in such conduct using available visa restriction and sanctions
authorities, in coordination with allies and partners. The Department
is encouraging businesses and individuals exporting technology,
products, and services with surveillance capabilities, including those
pertaining to genetic collection and analysis, to undertake due
diligence, in line with guidance we have publicly issued, to prevent
the misuse of their technology, products, and services to commit human
rights abuses. We are also working with our allies and partners to
develop common principles on the responsible use of surveillance
technologies globally and a code of conduct for ensuring human rights
concerns factor into export licensing decisions on such technologies.
Question. Under Secretary Zeya, what approach should the United
States take when dealing with entrenched authoritarian leaders like Mr.
Kagame and Mr. Museveni who do not respect democratic norms? Doesn't
our continued support for Kagame and Museveni in particular undermine
our efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance in
Africa and around the world?
Answer. The Department counters authoritarianism through bilateral
and multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, and restrictive
measures such as sanctions and visa restrictions, among others. In
Rwanda and Uganda, the Department has utilized a variety of tools to
promote accountability for human rights abuses and violations and to
support democracy, including by denying officials who have committed
such abuses or undermined democratic processes entry to the United
States and designating individuals responsible for serious human rights
abuses and corruption under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program. Our
support for the people of Rwanda and Uganda, whether it is through
democratic institution-building, public health partnerships, or
economic growth programming, does not equate to U.S. Government support
or approval of undemocratic policies and actions taken by the
governments of Rwanda and Uganda.
We continue to engage officials in both countries at all levels of
government on the need to expand space for civil society and political
pluralism, promote respect for human rights, and allow free and fair
elections. For example, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lisa Peterson traveled to Uganda in
March 2022 to emphasize the Department's concern with Uganda's
faltering democratic trajectory, including our serious concerns about
continuing reports of torture, enforced disappearances, and other human
rights violations.
Question. In the last 18 months there were 6 coups in Africa,
prompting alarm among policy makers, and for good reason. At the same
time, there are countries that are quietly moving in the right
direction and merit additional support and assistance. Under Secretary
Zeya, what does the U.S. provide to countries as a democracy dividend
when they do show progress or begin transitions? What are we doing to
support newly-elected governments in Niger, Mauritania, and Zambia, for
example, where there was no guarantee that the last elections in these
countries would result in the incumbent stepping down?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is focused both on
preventing further backsliding in countries at greatest risk of coups
and expanding our support to those African nations that are
demonstrating their commitment to democracy. The Summit for Democracy,
which included participation of 16 African countries (including Niger
and Zambia), provides a new platform for the United States to showcase
partners' democratic progress.
In Niger, an increase in high-level visits further showcases our
diplomatic support for its historic democratic transition. In
Mauritania, we actively engage the Mauritanian Government on economic
and security issues of mutual interest while pressing the government to
act on human rights abuses in the country. As a sign of our deepening
partnership with the Government of Mauritania, Mauritania hosted 2020
Flintlock, U.S. AFRICOM's largest annual special operations exercise.
In Zambia we are supporting President Hakainde Hichilema's ambitious
efforts to restructure Zambia's debt and protect independent voices in
the media and opposition.
Question. Under Secretary Zeya, how can the U.S. help protect and
strengthen the ability of Tunisian civil society to advocate for the
promotion of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms within
Tunisia?
Answer. I traveled to Tunisia this month to underscore the
importance of strengthening democracy in Tunisia and implementing an
inclusive political and economic reform process, in coordination with
civil society, political parties, and unions. Over the course of my
visit, I met with representatives of Tunisia's vibrant civil society,
including human rights defenders, anti-corruption activists, and
journalists. In our public messaging and private diplomacy, we
consistently emphasize that an independent and strong civil society is
integral to an effective democracy, helping promote accountability,
human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the Government of Tunisia
should view civil society as an essential partner in reform. We are
coordinating with other like-minded democracies to support Tunisian
civil society and reiterate the need for the Government of Tunisia to
respect human rights, including freedom of expression and association.
U.S. assistance aims to strengthen democratic institutions by helping
civil society advocate for government transparency and accountability.
U.S. support to civil society has been and will continue to be a
critical component of our assistance to Tunisia.
Question. Under Secretary Zeya, how can U.S. actions and messaging,
in coordination with our allies and partners, help to keep the space
open within Tunisia for freedom of assembly and public debate?
Answer. To date, the United States has coordinated effectively with
allies and partners, in particular members of the Group of Seven (G7),
to work to keep space open in Tunisia for public debate, freedom of
assembly, and peaceful protests. Since July 25, 2021, when President
Saied invoked article 80 of the constitution to dismiss the government
and freeze parliament, the United States and its G7 partners have,
among other diplomatic engagements, issued four public statements
calling for the restoration of democracy and supporting the Tunisian
people's aspirations for a more responsive government that protects
human rights. In coordination with our allies, we will continue to
emphasize to the Tunisian Government that freedom of expression and
assembly are critical to a strong democracy, and that civil society is
an essential partner in reform.
Question. Under Secretary Zeya, what steps must the Tunisian
Government take to ensure a fair and inclusive process for these
elections? How will you work with NEA and MCC to make clear to the
Tunisians that these steps must be met in order to proceed with the
compact ratification process?
Answer. During my recent trip to Tunisia, I consistently
underscored to the government the importance of strengthening democracy
and implementing an inclusive political reform process, in coordination
with political parties, unions, and civil society. We continue to
emphasize that the government must protect human rights, including
freedom of expression, throughout the reform process and elections. A
commitment to democratic governance is an eligibility requirement for
Millennium Challenge Corporation compact countries. MCC has paused
signature of the proposed $498.7 million MCC compact with Tunisia until
significant progress is made toward democratic governance. Compact
signature is distinct from compact ratification; it is only upon
ratification, which must be completed by an elected Tunisian
parliament, that the vast majority of compact funds would be released.
______
Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Ms. Hall-Godfrey, can you explain how the State
Department uses the GEC to counter malign actions of authoritarian
regimes within the global information space? To the extent that you can
discuss the details, what sort of programs is the GEC currently
conducting in foreign countries? How do these programs work with host
governments, civil society and other groups to build a country's
ability to fight disinformation?
Answer. The GEC works to counter foreign disinformation and
propaganda through a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach.
The GEC sponsors programs globally to counter disinformation and
propaganda by building resilience, promoting free media, and exposing
malign actors. As examples, the GEC worked with European partners on
its Media Literacy Accelerator program and the Resiliency Support
Project to train members of the community to actively counter Russian
disinformation and propaganda, including on such activities as helping
governments prevent and address disinformation during national
elections. The GEC focuses on building coalitions of like-minded
partners from government and civil society to protect our shared
values, including in international bodies such as the G7. The GEC
continues to expand its network of international partnerships to deter
and counter Russia's and China's malign influence operations,
propaganda, and disinformation. Our programmatic work identifies and
exposes foreign-origin malign influence tactics and techniques, and
punctures false narratives with credible third-party research. The GEC
posts Counter-Disinformation Dispatches on the Department of State's
website that educate the public on disinformation and how to counter
it. We also support third-party efforts to expose and counter
propaganda and disinformation in information environments abroad. GEC's
work with its partner on the Xinjiang Data Project created the largest-
ever open-source data on the cultural destruction and internment of
Uyghurs to deflate Beijing's efforts to cover up these atrocities.
______
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya and Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Ms. Hall-Godfrey, I know that the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) also supports internet and media freedom
programs and activities. Where does GEC's mandate end, and DRL's begin?
What is the nature and extent of GEC's coordination with other U.S.
Government agencies and bureaus?
Answer. As the U.S. Government works to support a trustworthy
information environment, counter the disinformation and other
activities of those who seek to undermine that environment, and advance
our priorities through principled engagement with foreign publics, the
GEC and other Department bureaus and offices coordinate daily to
complement each other's work.
The GEC's programs and lines of effort support its congressional
mandate to counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and
disinformation. Many GEC programs, alongside the overall public
diplomacy toolkit, reinforce core values that DRL's programs promote
and build capacity on, while leveraging the GEC's expertise and focus
on countering disinformation: how to recognize it, and how to build
resilience to it. The GEC works closely with DRL daily to coordinate,
identify gaps, and avoid duplication in our programs and activities.
The GEC coordinates within the Department of State through regular
synchronization meetings with regional bureaus and ongoing
collaboration with DRL and many other bureaus. The GEC coordinates
across the interagency through frequent interactions with other
Departments and Agencies such as DHS--including the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency--Justice, Defense, FBI, and the
intelligence community. In addition, liaison officers from and to the
GEC ensure a constant two-way exchange of information between the GEC
and the interagency community.
Question. China and Russia: China has sought to bolster its image
abroad and suppress overseas criticism while leveraging its economic
power as a coercive tool. Russia has actively stoked political
divisions within target countries and attempted to influence political
outcomes, including by engaging in cyber-based election interference
efforts in 38 elections and referendums in 26 states over the past
decade.
How is the Administration coordinating across agencies--including
State, Treasury, and USAID--to counter these threats?
Answer. The Administration is working on a whole-of-government
basis--together with an integrated public-private coalition--to ensure
the security of America's elections. This Administration has imposed
serious sanctions on Russia for prior attempts at election
interference, and has been clear that there will be serious
consequences should Russia or its proxies attempt to interfere in our
electoral processes again. The Department will continue to emphasize
that Russia will meet swift costs for attempts to interfere in
democratic processes.
The Department of State uses diplomatic engagement and cyber
capacity building programs to strengthen our international
partnerships, promote rights-respecting cybersecurity best practices,
and defend the stability of cyberspace. The United States has
specifically targeted outreach and support to partner countries with
upcoming elections where the risk of cyber-based election interference
is high. Similarly, the GEC has worked with partner countries to
prevent and address disinformation during national elections.
The Department of State is coordinating across the U.S. Government
to deploy instruments and coordinate actions to mitigate the impact of
PRC economic coercion on targeted countries. In Lithuania, for example,
which is subject to PRC coercion efforts, Under Secretary of State for
Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Fernandez and his team are
working with agencies across the U.S. Government on this effort,
including with the U.S. Export-Import Bank, to secure the signing of a
memorandum of understanding that provides up to $600 million in export
credits; U.S. Department of Agriculture, to help address Lithuania's
request for import licenses of Lithuanian poultry and dairy; the
Federal Aviation Administration, to facilitate Lithuania's request for
direct cargo flights to the United States; the Department of Commerce,
to facilitate reverse trade mission and supply chain diversification;
and Department of Defense, to address Lithuania's request to establish
a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement. The State Department is
also coordinating across the interagency to exchange information and
coordinate potential actions to address likely future cases of PRC
economic coercion against other partners.
Question. Latin America & Digital Authoritarianism: In Latin
America and the Caribbean, Chinese and Russian technologies are
enabling the region's dictators to increasingly control internet
access, traffic in misinformation and disinformation, and monitor
citizens. In Venezuela, the regime uses the information collected from
its national identity system, which uses Chinese technology, to inform
decisions on censorship, internet shutdowns, and arrests. Cuba's
internet infrastructure was also built with equipment acquired from
Chinese companies. Following the July 2021 protests in Cuba, the regime
shut down the internet in an attempt to disrupt the unprecedented
countrywide protests. In El Salvador, President Bukele uses
disinformation to paper over his dismantling of democratic governance.
Ms. Hall-Godfrey, how can we bolster our engagement with the
private sector to counteract misinformation and disinformation in
Spanish, the internet's third language?
Answer. The GEC monitors disinformation in Spanish from China,
Russia, and other global threat actors. Our posts in the region and the
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) also monitor misinformation
and disinformation in Spanish. As resources permit, the GEC assists
posts and WHA with monitoring and analysis of disinformation.
The GEC engages social media companies to share analyses in those
cases when the GEC assesses that disinformation from a global threat
actor is occurring on their platforms. Posts and WHA also engage
traditional and local digital media platforms. Department efforts to
identify and expose Spanish language disinformation by RT and Sputnik,
for example, have contributed to decisions by private sector media
operators to curtail their relationships with Kremlin sources of
disinformation.
Additional resources would allow the GEC and WHA to increase
monitoring and analysis of Spanish language disinformation, especially
by sources of disinformation outside of the GEC's core monitoring of
disinformation from China, Russia, Iran, and violent extremists.
Expanded monitoring and analysis would in turn position the GEC and WHA
to be able to more frequently and identify and expose such
disinformation, and engage the private sector and others on the scale
and sources of disinformation in Spanish.
Question. Xinjiang & Surveillance: The atrocities perpetrated
against the Uyghur population by the Chinese Government in Xinjiang are
well documented. Especially troubling is the support of this ongoing
genocide through genetic surveillance by the Chinese Government and
Chinese companies.
Ms. Hall-Godfrey, how is the Department raising public awareness of
these threats, including those posed by BGI and two of its subsidiaries
that were recently placed on the Entity List for their role in
Xinjiang?
Answer. The Department shares this concern and condemns the
genocide, crimes against humanity, and other human rights abuses
occurring in Xinjiang. We raise public awareness regarding these
atrocities and the PRC's mass surveillance through several means. For
example, the Bureau of Global Public Affairs ran a messaging sprint
that used traditional and digital media to counter Beijing's
undermining of the rules-based international order. The campaign
rallied international support for collective action to respond to the
PRC's widespread violation of international law, including
condemnations for its genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang.
During the sprint, the volume of international press articles
discussing forced labor in Xinjiang increased by 57 percent compared to
the preceding 14-week period, but PRC messengers' share of voice in
forced labor coverage dropped from 38 percent to 22 percent.
We also draw international attention to these issues in
multilateral forums such as the UN Human Rights Council and UN General
Assembly Third Committee, including in joint statements with
international partners condemning the PRC's abuses. We also have raised
awareness of the PRC's abuses in the business community through a
public Business Advisory and engagements with the private sector,
including to highlight the risks associated with assisting or investing
in the development of genetic and other surveillance tools for the PRC
Government in Xinjiang.
The Global Engagement Center has collaborated with the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute on the Xinjiang Data Project, a website
repository of the largest-ever open-source data on the cultural
destruction and internment of Uyghurs which uses empirical and
satellite data, survivor interviews, and PRC Government documents.
These public reports and online tools raise awareness among global
decision makers and the public. Among other impacts, the website was
cited in a European Parliament resolution on Xinjiang and in a draft
customs amendment before the Australian Parliament.
By facilitating public engagement with academic and research
communities, we have increased awareness of the means through which
PRC-backed entities gain access to technology and data, which are used
to further the PRC's strategic goals. We link interagency experts with
key policy makers to share practical solutions regarding managing the
potential for surveillance, manipulation, extortion, and the impact
these practices have on strategic sectors. In many cases, we also
educate public audiences about PRC atrocity crimes and human rights
abuses in Xinjiang, often by bringing in Chinese speakers and other
third-party speakers who speak with the most credibility on this topic.
______
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Please compare and contrast State Department's versus
USAID's democracy assistance efforts. What is the extent of
coordination of these efforts?
Answer. Most of USAID's democracy assistance efforts focus on
longer-term, field-managed programs working through deep networks and
systems that prioritize capacity development for local actors and
contribute to sustainable development, including through democracy,
human rights, and governance integration in other sectoral programs.
USAID's DRG Center also has over $40 million in annual funding
available to respond to urgent emerging and unanticipated issues.
The State Department's democracy programs are aligned to support
specific foreign policy goals. As the lead for democracy and human
rights programming in the Department, the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor (DRL) uses centrally managed funds to retain the
flexibility needed to respond quickly to emerging opportunities and
challenges. Over 85 percent of DRL's programs operate in restrictive or
conflict-ridden environments.
The Department coordinates with USAID on democracy programming in
Washington and in the field. For example, in the budget planning
process, DRL and USAID conduct briefings together to help set
priorities for the coming year. At a programmatic level, DRL seeks
USAID clearance of solicitations and invites USAID to participate in
proposal panels. When DRL conducts in-country program monitoring, DRL
consults with USAID Missions whenever appropriate. DRL and USAID also
coordinate on country-specific democracy assistance efforts and on
shared thematic concerns, such as combatting corruption, Internet
freedom, and global labor programming.
Question. What steps have been taken to improve this coordination
as well as coordination with other foreign donors?
Answer. The Department and USAID have been in touch at various
levels to improve coordination between our agencies. For example, we
are conducting regular, high-level and working-level engagement to
coordinate programmatic approaches, align deliverables, and sustain
programming for the U.S. Summit for Democracy's Presidential Initiative
for Democratic Renewal (PIDR), in order to support the objectives of
the Summit most effectively.
The Department and USAID are also continually looking for ways to
enhance coordination with other donors. USAID and the Department have
increased outreach to foreign donors, especially in relation to country
commitments that were made at the Summit for Democracy and to support
the PIDR deliverables. For example, DRL is working through U.S.
embassies to increase the contributions of foreign counterparts to the
multi-donor Global Anti-Corruption Consortium, as well as other DRL
public-private partnerships such as Lifeline and the Global Equality
Fund. USAID has provided start-up funding to the International Fund for
Public Interest Media as a means to garner greater global donor
assistance for media financial sustainability and is collaborating with
a range of donors on initiatives such as Powered by the People seed
funding and the Election Integrity Fund.
Question. How has the U.S. Government engaged to ensure that the UN
High Commissioner Bachelet releases her overdue report on human rights
abuses in Xinjiang?
Answer. We continue to press the High Commissioner both publicly
and privately to release her report on the dire human rights situation
in Xinjiang. For example, Secretary Blinken urged the High Commissioner
to release the report without delay during his March 1 address to the
UN Human Rights Council.
Question. If UN High Commissioner Bachelet does not release her
overdue report on human rights abuses in Xinjiang soon, how do you plan
to put pressure on her to release it?
Answer. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has a
mandate to respond to serious violations of human rights, including
what the United States has determined constitute genocide and crimes
against humanity occurring in Xinjiang. High Commissioner Bachelet has
a responsibility to fulfill her mandate and release the overdue report
without further delay. If she does not release it soon, we will
increase our calls, both public and private, for her to do so, in
coordination with our allies and partners. We will continue raising
this issue so long as the report is not released.
Question. China has become much bolder in using its foreign
embassies and media to silence critics of the Party and promote its own
agenda. What can we do to better combat Chinese transnational
aggression, and protect those targeted by Chinese Government bullying
tactics?
Answer. The United States rejects efforts by People's Republic of
China (PRC) officials to harass, intimidate, surveil, abduct, or
forcibly return individuals abroad, including those who have sought
safety outside of the PRC as well as U.S. citizens who speak out on
behalf of these populations. We seek to address this challenge in a
range of ways. For example, the Department of State has imposed visa
restrictions on current and former Chinese Communist Party and PRC
officials who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in,
policies or actions aimed at repressing religious and spiritual
practitioners, members of ethnic and religious minority groups,
dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, labor organizers,
civil society organizers, and peaceful protesters both inside and
outside China. The Department of Justice has also charged individuals
with crimes related to efforts by the PRC Government to stalk, harass,
and spy on PRC nationals residing in the United States. Additionally,
we press third countries to uphold their international obligations,
respect the principle of non-refoulement, and not forcibly return,
under pressure from the PRC Government, individuals who have fled due
to fear of persecution or torture.
Question. How can we ensure our universities are not vulnerable to
Chinese malign political influence?
Answer. The open and collaborative ecosystem in U.S. universities
is one of our greatest advantages, attracting the world's best minds
and driving U.S. innovation. The American people deserve a clear
understanding of the organizations and entities Beijing uses to attempt
to influence U.S. society--including on U.S. university campuses. Since
2020, the Department has provided more regular, updated guidance to
colleges and universities sponsoring Confucius Institutes which
continue to have visa regulatory concerns and lack of transparency
regarding the activities of their teachers and staff. Over the past 2
years, the number of U.S. universities and colleges which support
Confucius Institutes has declined from 55 to 9.
The Department of State supports the Biden-Harris administration's
efforts to ensure the PRC cannot exploit our university ecosystem to
support the People's Liberation Army military modernization and the use
of PRC surveillance technology in human rights abuses. As a component
of its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the PRC has instructed PRC
universities to establish partnerships with leading foreign
universities and research labs to gain access to innovation and to
collaborate on research with dual-use, civilian and military
applications. The PRC tries to exploit these and other relationships to
acquire innovative technologies through licit and illicit means. When
the PRC diverts these technologies to military programs, U.S. national
security is put in jeopardy, as are the norms that underpin open
innovation and collaboration.
Question. We understand that the Administration seeks to lift
sanctions on the Supreme Leader's office and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) as a part of JCPOA re-entry. What impact will the
lifting of sanctions have on the human rights abuses of the Iranian
regime inside of its own borders?
Answer. The Administration is committed to promoting respect for
human rights in Iran and will continue to call out and stand up to
human rights abuses and violations in Iran, whenever they occur. We
will continue to consider all appropriate tools to promote
accountability for individuals and organizations responsible for human
rights abuses. The Department will maintain and, as appropriate, impose
new sanctions on those in Iran perpetrating human rights abuses. We
will continue to work with our allies, including in international fora,
to promote accountability for these Iranian abuses, and we will
absolutely continue to work to hold all violators accountable.
Question. What impact will the lifting of sanction have on Iran's
neighbors?
Answer. Negotiations over a mutual return to full implementation of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are ongoing.
A mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA is the best
available option to constrain Iran's nuclear program and provide a
platform to address Iran's other destabilizing conduct. The maximum
pressure campaign had virtually no impact on Iran's destabilizing
behavior in the region. Instead, it only got worse.
The U.S. Government maintains a range of tools to combat support
for terrorism, including terrorist financing, and we will continue to
use these to counter Iran's support for terrorism and other
destabilizing activities regardless of the outcome in Vienna.
Finally, our means of countering malign Iranian behavior are not
limited to sanctions. Working with our allies and partners in the
region to counter and disrupt Iranian threats, as well as using tools
such as interdictions and export controls, has been effective in
countering this behavior, and we will continue to expand our efforts in
these areas.
Question. Reflective of the pervasive influence of Tehran and its
``axis of resistance,'' the Houthis are known to wield their power
through violent tactics, using fear, repression, and intimidation to
suppress dissent. Numerous human rights groups, including Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, and others have documented the Houthis
gradual expansion of autocratic state structures. How do you plan to
address the Houthis' systematic and widespread human rights abuses
which pose a very real threat to regional stability?
Answer. The best way to help ensure that the rights of all Yemenis
are respected is through a comprehensive and inclusive peace settlement
that includes the meaningful participation of women, civil society, and
members of marginalized groups and that addresses their calls for
justice, accountability, and redress for human rights abuses and
violations. The U.S. Government continues to demand that all parties to
the conflict, particularly the Houthis, end human rights abuses,
including those involving the recruitment and use of child soldiers;
killings; abductions, including on the basis of religion; gender-based
violence; torture and other abuses; and interference with the exercise
of freedom of expression, including for members of the press. We are
committed to supporting all appropriate measures to address these
challenges. We have supported language condemning the unlawful use of
child soldiers and other abuses in several recent UN Security Council
statements on Yemen. We have also listed Yemen under the Child Soldiers
Prevention Act and regularly cite Houthi human rights abuses in public
messaging to increase pressure on them to stop these activities.
Question. How can the U.S. work to prevent any expansion of Houthi
influence inside Yemen itself?
Answer. The best way to ensure an end to any Houthi military
expansion is through a durable peace settlement for Yemen in which the
Yemeni people decide their own future. Similarly, the best way to
ensure that the rights of all Yemenis are respected is to seek a
comprehensive and inclusive peace agreement that includes the
meaningful participation of women, civil society, and members of
marginalized groups and that incorporates their calls for justice,
accountability, and redress for human rights abuses and violations. The
United States is leading international efforts in support of the UN to
demonstrate to the Houthis that the only sustainable path forward is
through dialogue. We will not hesitate to use the tools at our
disposal, including sanctions, to pressure the Houthis to cease their
military offensives and engage sincerely with the UN Special Envoy for
Yemen to resolve the conflict.
Question. How does the U.S. intend to draw attention to the
Houthis' ongoing human rights abuses?
Answer. The Department supports ongoing efforts to document
evidence of abuses committed by the Houthis and by all parties to the
conflict, and publicly emphasizes to our partners the importance of
using such documentation in current and future legal, reconciliation,
and transitional justice processes. The Department has highlighted the
Houthis' abuses in the annual Human Rights Report for Yemen. The
worsening harassment of independent journalists and human rights
advocates by the Houthis throughout the country poses a significant
obstacle to sustaining reporting and attention on ongoing abuses and to
a durable peace. The Department remains committed to supporting Yemeni
journalists and advocating for their protection, and we consistently
raise human rights violations and abuses in Yemen in public messaging
and multilateral fora.
Question. Despite the Taliban's efforts to portray a more liberal
face, its actions suggest we are headed toward a style of rule similar
to that which dominated the 1990s, when women were banished from public
life, media was strictly controlled, and all forms of entertainment
banned. Since taking power, they've violently assaulting peaceful
protestors, arbitrarily detained journalists, and imposed restrictions
on the rights of Afghan women. Given the Taliban's proven record of
serious human rights abuses, how can the United States hold the Taliban
accountable for their actions? Do you intend to hold the Taliban
accountable?
Answer. In every engagement with the Taliban, we raise the
criticality of respecting human rights and of holding perpetrators of
abuses accountable. We advocated strongly for both the renewal of the
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan with a strong human rights
mandate, and the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Afghanistan.
We continue to explore all available diplomatic options, including
levying sanctions and working with likeminded international partners,
including Muslim-majority countries in the region, to hold the Taliban
accountable for human rights abuses. In order for the Taliban to obtain
international legitimacy, they need to respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, including for women, children,
journalists, human rights defenders, members of minority groups,
persons with disabilities, and members of the LGBTQI+ community.
Question. How does the U.S. plan to ensure no funds directly
benefit the Taliban or the Haqqani network, given their ongoing role in
the commission of human rights abuses?
Answer. Since August 2021, the United States has provided more than
$516 million in humanitarian assistance to independent international
humanitarian organizations. These funds support vulnerable Afghans
inside Afghanistan, as well as those who have fled to neighboring
countries. We are looking at other ways, including in conjunction with
the UN and local Afghan non-governmental organizations, that we might
be able to provide support to the people of Afghanistan--importantly,
in a way that does not directly benefit the Taliban.
For all U.S. assistance, we require our partners to mitigate
against diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse, including such incidents
involving the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The State Department and
USAID and our implementers have experience using similar mechanisms,
such as in Syria. In addition, both agencies have years of experience
in successfully managing projects remotely or through third-party
monitors inside and outside of Afghanistan.
Question. What type of relationship do you envision the United
States having with the Taliban if they continue to perpetrate
widespread human rights violations? What would this mean for the future
of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan?
Answer. The United States and the international community need the
Taliban to answer several important questions and take corresponding
action to earn legitimacy and credibility. Secretary Blinken has been
extremely clear that the Taliban must take action to establish
inclusive governance and respect the human rights of all Afghans,
including for women, children, journalists, human rights defenders,
members of minority groups, persons with disabilities, and members of
the LGBTQI+ community. All U.S. assistance is specifically targeted
directly to the Afghan people, not to the Taliban.
Question. Given the Taliban's lack of adherence to fundamental
human rights, like the freedom of religion, what dangers remain for
religious minorities, including Christians, Hazara Shia Muslims,
Hindus, and Sikhs?
Answer. We continue to be deeply concerned about religious freedom
and the situation of religious minorities in Afghanistan. The Taliban
takeover in August 2021 has driven Christians, particularly converts,
into deeper hiding, according to multiple NGOs. Amnesty International
reported that Taliban fighters killed 13 Shia Hazaras in Daykundi
Province on August 31 while Human Rights Watch reported that the
Taliban expelled Shia Hazara members from their homes in several
provinces in October, in part to redistribute land to Taliban
supporters. Civil society reports continued Taliban persecution of
Ahmaddiya Muslims.
In November and December, high-level Taliban representatives held
meetings with leaders of Shia, Sikh, and Hindu communities and laid out
rules for the behavior of women, forbade the playing of music, and
presented restrictions on businesses owned by minority religious group
members.
Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Sunni Muslim minority
groups have also continued to report that some Sunni Muslims verbally
harassed them, and that public sentiment remained hostile towards
converts and to Christian proselytization.
Question. Do you feel that the United States turned its back on
Afghan women and children? Did our withdrawal create an environment
that will set women back even farther?
Answer. The United States has made it clear that the Taliban should
respect and uphold the rights of women and children in every aspect of
Afghan society including in schools, workplaces, and the home. The
Department is collaborating with civil society organizations to
coordinate standing, consultative bodies for Afghan women, girls, and
minorities. These mechanisms will be available for any U.S. Government
official so the diverse voices of Afghan women can be heard and
considered in U.S. policymaking. We are also working with international
likeminded partners to align on clear, measurable standards that the
Taliban can be held to.
Question. How do you plan to continue to promote women and girls
rights in Afghanistan without a U.S. diplomatic presence on the ground?
Answer. The United States is working with our international allies
to press for respect of the rights of Afghan women and girls, including
the right to education, work, safety, and freedom of movement,
including as part of the humanitarian response. We have been clear to
the Taliban that to earn legitimacy and credibility from the Afghan
people and the international community, they will need to consistently
respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans. For
women to have a role in the future of Afghanistan, we must create space
for Afghan women themselves to meaningfully participate. We will
continue advocating for their inclusion in dialogues and political
processes outside and inside Afghanistan, and consulting with them to
inform our own policy positions.
Question. On March 5, 2022, President Biden sent to Venezuela a
senior U.S. delegation to discuss ``energy security'' with Nicolas
Maduro, whom the U.S. Justice Department has indicted on criminal drug
charges. The delegation did not meet with democratically-elected
Interim President Juan Guaido. Would you agree that such initiatives
undermine U.S. and international efforts to combat authoritarianism in
Venezuela and Latin America?
Answer. U.S. officials' visit to Venezuela focused on securing the
release of U.S. wrongful detainees and urging the Maduro regime to
return to the negotiating table in Mexico with the democratic
opposition's Unitary Platform to restore democracy in Venezuela. The
visit reinforced U.S. support for interim President Juan Guaido's call
for a negotiated solution through the Mexico process.
We welcome the return of two wrongfully detained U.S. citizens from
Venezuela. Their release would not have been possible without months of
groundwork by the State Department, especially Special Presidential
Envoy Carstens.
We also noted Maduro's statement that he is willing to return to
negotiations with the opposition's Unitary Platform, which represents a
positive step. We continue to believe Venezuelan-led, comprehensive
negotiations represent the best mechanism available to restore
Venezuelan democracy and the rule of law. We support the Unitary
Platform's goal of immediately resuming negotiations with the Maduro
regime to restore free and fair elections, democratic institutions, the
rule of law, and a respect for human rights in Venezuela.
The United States, along with our partners and allies, will
continue to press for the fundamental changes needed to enable a
peaceful return to democracy, including the immediate release of all
those unjustly detained for political reasons, the independence of
political parties, freedom of expression (including for members of the
press), and an end to human rights abuses.
______
Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. The GEC is one of the U.S. Government's best tools in
identifying and addressing disinformation campaigns by our adversaries.
This is especially timely and important with the on-going Russian war
on Ukraine. What is the GEC seeing right now in regards to Ukraine
disinformation?
Answer. The Kremlin is carrying out an extensive and purposeful
global disinformation campaign against Ukraine to erode support among
NATO allies, attempt to justify Russia's unprovoked invasion, and break
Ukrainian resolve. Every part of Russia's disinformation ecosystem--
including official statements, state media, and proxy websites--spread
and amplify these messages. Kremlin disinformation attempts to justify
Russia's invasion of Ukraine as necessary to free Ukraine from
``Nazism'' and a corrupt government in Kyiv. Moscow also claims to be
protecting ethnic Russians in the Donbas from genocide. Increasingly,
Kremlin disinformation purveyors have sought to spread and amplify
narratives about Ukraine or the United States using or developing
chemical or biological weapons in connection with U.S. Biological
Threat Reduction Program laboratories in Ukraine, which is especially
concerning given the Kremlin's penchant for blaming its own atrocities
on Ukraine's military forces.
Question. The GEC is one of the U.S. Government's best tools in
identifying and addressing disinformation campaigns by our adversaries.
This is especially timely and important with the on-going Russian war
on Ukraine. Where is Russia directing disinformation on Ukraine?
Answer. Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem has
mobilized to justify the Kremlin's unprovoked war to the Russian
population and international audiences. Russia continues to target
European and Western Hemisphere foreign audiences with disinformation
attempting to paint Ukraine, NATO, and the United States as the
aggressors in this war. Russian disinformation is targeted at audiences
in the Latin America to garner strategic support in a region closely
affiliated with the United States. Non-democratic actors in the region,
such as the Cuban Government and the Maduro regime, parrot and promote
Russian disinformation narratives through both state-run media outlets
and social media. Most government leaders and citizens in the Western
Hemisphere support Ukraine and condemn Russia's invasion. Pro-Kremlin
disinformation is, however, circulating on social media, particularly
on Telegram and RT's Spanish-language accounts, and Russian embassies
in the region have pushed out a steady stream of disinformation via op-
eds, social media, and public engagements.
In the Middle East/North Africa region, we see Russia shifting
tactics as a result of the removal of RT and Sputnik's channels
targeting Arabic-speaking audiences. Russia is using its diplomatic
missions' social media platforms across the Middle East/North Africa
region to amplify Kremlin talking points and deflect and obfuscate its
atrocities in Ukraine.
Across Africa, Russian embassies are similarly using a network of
new Telegram accounts to share sometimes graphic content that claims to
tell ``the other side of the story.'' This content includes falsified
documents purportedly from Ukraine's national guard and supposed
examples of Western media censorship.
Question. The GEC is one of the U.S. Government's best tools in
identifying and addressing disinformation campaigns by our adversaries.
This is especially timely and important with the on-going Russian war
on Ukraine. Are other countries parroting and amplifying Russian
disinformation on Ukraine?
Answer. Likely due to effective pre-bunking (debunking the lie
before it appears) by U.S. officials, independent media, and civil
society actors, Russia's attempts to create a pretext or false flag to
justify its further invasion of Ukraine have achieved little success.
Globally, most governments have refrained from parroting Russian
disinformation on Ukraine. However, the PRC and Iran use official
platforms and networks to amplify Russian disinformation, including
claims the United States develops biological weapons in labs in
Ukraine. PRC and Iranian messaging on Ukraine has decreased in the last
week, but still resonates with audiences such as the Lebanese
Hezbollah.
In Latin America, Russia uses Venezuela as a regional
disinformation launchpad on Twitter by deploying Spanish language
messages through Venezuelan troll farms to countries throughout the
region. Latin American governments aligned with Russia, including the
Maduro regime and the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments, pushed the
narrative blaming the invasion on NATO and false stories about U.S.
bioweapons in Ukraine. Government-linked actors in El Salvador and
Bolivia amplified disinformation painting Russia as the victim.
However, pro-Russian disinformation efforts in Latin America have not
significantly shifted popular opinion, as populations across the region
generally sympathize with Ukraine and see Russia as the aggressor.
In the Middle East, the Syrian regime, Iran, and Hizballah-linked
media outlets amplify Russian narratives accusing the United States of:
1) funding Ukraine's alleged bio-weapons program; 2) relocating ISIS
fighters from Syria to Ukraine; and 3) depicting Ukraine as the
aggressor and justifying Russia's so-called ``special military
operation.''
Question. China spends billions on its public diplomacy, pushing
false narratives that advance the Chinese Communist Party's interests.
What is the GEC doing to identify and push back against Chinese
disinformation?
Answer. The GEC collaborates across the Department, interagency,
and with foreign partners to actively address PRC disinformation and
propaganda by prioritizing acute risks, maximizing limited resources,
and avoiding duplication. The GEC conducts and shares research on PRC
tactics, identifies counter-disinformation technologies, leads efforts
to expand multilateral action to deter PRC information manipulation,
and executes evidence-based and data-driven programming to expose and
counter such activities. The GEC's programs, developed with regional
bureaus and U.S. embassies, seek to puncture PRC propaganda narratives
through high-quality open-source research; to build resilience among
foreign civil society and media; and to limit the space where PRC
information manipulation can thrive.
The GEC leads the Xinjiang Data Project, which is countering
Beijing's efforts to cover up its atrocities against the Uyghurs; the
Mekong Dam Monitor, which empowered local influencers from downriver
communities to push back against PRC's exploitation of the Mekong River
flow; and two other programs with partners to map out the PRC's malign
activities. The GEC and a partner developed the China Defense
Universities Tracker to help universities and researchers understand
institutions in China and manage the risks of engaging with PRC
universities or avoid harmful collaborations. The GEC worked with
another partner on the Mapping China's Tech Giants public database.
This program mapped the global footprint of Chinese companies across
the Internet, telecommunications, biotech sectors, artificial
intelligence, and surveillance technology sectors. This website is a
tool for the public to better understand the enormous scale, complexity
and increasing global reach of some of China's tech giants.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the GEC supported an 8-week-long virtual
seminar on PRC sharp power in Africa by China subject matter experts to
local African civil society leaders. The Hoover Institution published
several participants' capstones on PRC problematic behavior in their
home countries, while Hoover also published project key findings and
recommended mitigation measures in English and French for African
governments and civil society.
Question. China spends billions on its public diplomacy, pushing
false narratives that advance the Chinese Communist Party's interests.
Does the GEC have enough financial support to robustly combat Chinese
(and Russian) disinformation across the globe?
Answer. The scale of Beijing's and Moscow's investments in their
respective foreign propaganda and disinformation apparatuses requires a
holistic, whole-of-government response from the United States. The PRC
spends at least five times more than the United States on its public
diplomacy and influence activities. The Kremlin's budget for its
disinformation ecosystem is difficult to decipher but the reported
total amount allocated for state media is 211 billion rubles
(approximately $2.8 billion). This does not include funds spent on
proxy websites or other vectors of disinformation. Additional funding
would enable the GEC to better understand the PRC disinformation
ecosystem, expand its counter-disinformation lines of effort, and
execute tailored programs and grants to support communities overseas to
identify, counter, and address PRC disinformation. Additional funding
would also allow other elements of the Department's Public Diplomacy
family to better compete with the influence efforts of our rivals.
Identifying the resources to meet the global challenges posed by our
long-term strategic rivals, the PRC and Russia, will be critical into
the future.
Question. GEC's funding has drastically increased since FY2016 from
$6 million to $60 million. How has this surge in resources translated
to greater effectiveness in U.S. Government efforts to combat foreign
disinformation and propaganda?
Answer. In 2016, the GEC had the singular mission to support
government-wide counterterrorism communications. In FY2017, responding
to security risks of foreign propaganda and disinformation, Congress
expanded the GEC's mission and funding to include coordinating U.S.
Government-wide efforts in countering foreign state and non-state
propaganda and disinformation.
While the GEC maintained its counterterrorism threat team, the
funding increase allowed the GEC to establish additional teams focused
on specific threat-actors, an Analytics and Research team, and
subsequently the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit and a Technology
Engagement Team. These functional teams brought new expertise and focus
to the GEC, creating robust new lines of effort countering
disinformation and propaganda, while our Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
has gradually expanded from evaluating federal assistance awards to
include strategic M&E across the organization. The new threat-focused
teams also inform strategy and programming and, as a result, the GEC's
programming is more data-driven and includes whole-of-society efforts.
Moreover, by leveraging and extending foreign partnerships and
programming interventions that build resilience to disinformation and
propaganda, GEC has created greater and more sustainable impact.
For example, the GEC's Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and
Propaganda special report provided the first public, comprehensive view
of how the Russian disinformation and propaganda ecosystem operates,
helping shape the global narrative about Russian disinformation. The
GEC plans to use the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations funds to: 1)
identify and expose global Russian disinformation and propaganda
narratives, practices, and proxy outlets; 2) identify and expose
Russian-linked narratives amplified by the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and Iran, which are taking advantage of the Ukraine crises to
advance their own agendas through disinformation; 3) leverage the GEC's
capability to expand testing and support long-term use of technology-
based tools to counter disinformation, including artificial
intelligence; and 4) allocate resources, including staffing and
translations, for these initiatives. These efforts would not be
possible without the additional funding provided by Congress.
The GEC recognized that the challenges of disinformation require a
holistic approach that leverages the resources of the entire U.S.
Government to increase effectiveness and has accordingly stood up
interagency coordination functions. This interagency coordination has
been crucial to the success of countering Russian disinformation about
Ukraine, for example. Similarly, the GEC has dramatically expanded
coordination with foreign government partners, to deter and counter
Russia's and China's malign influence operations as advanced through
their propaganda and disinformation.
Question. Some, including members of this Committee, have argued
for a substantially increased budget for the GEC. What more could the
GEC do with a large increase in funding?
Answer. We are grateful for the substantial funding Congress has
provided to the Department for foreign counter-disinformation and
counter-propaganda efforts, including resources granted in the Ukraine
Supplemental, as well as Congress' ongoing bipartisan support for the
GEC. Our most urgent ask is for Congress to remove GEC's sunset clause,
which currently requires GEC to close its doors in 2024 and inhibits
budgeting, hiring, and other operational priorities.
With this clause removed and increased resources, the GEC would be
more fully capable of realizing its broad mandate. Specifically, a
significant increase in resources would allow the GEC to: 1) bolster
global capabilities, including expanding counter-disinformation efforts
beyond Russia, China and Iran to incorporate more routine monitoring
and analysis of disinformation by other actors; 2) broaden counter-
disinformation technology assessment capabilities, including artificial
intelligence-based technology; and 3) strengthen coordination
capabilities within the growing counter-disinformation community in the
U.S. interagency, the inter-governmental community, and private sector
tech companies and international partners.
______
Responses of Ms. Anne Applebaum to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Because of its invasion of Ukraine, the world is united
against Russian aggression, how do we use this moment to unite the
world against Russian authoritarianism?
Answer. We should broaden and deepen what we are doing already,
coordinating the response in the military sphere, in energy policy, and
in sanctions. Now is the time to start planning to deter Russia in
Poland and the Baltic states; to move rapidly away from Russian oil and
gas, and perhaps oil and gas altogether; to build an anti-corruption
alliance that stretches around the world. Anti-communism once united us
with our allies, perhaps now we should be linked by anti-kleptocracy.
This moment is really ripe for some radical policy changes and we
should take advantage of it.
Question. On March 5, a delegation of senior Biden administration
officials, including Ambassador Jimmy Story met with Nicolas Maduro in
Venezuela to discuss ``energy security.'' The delegation did not meet
with democratically-elected Interim President Juan Guaido, whom the
United States as the legitimate President of Venezuela. Please explain
efforts such as the March 5 meeting with Maduro have on U.S. and
international efforts to combat authoritarianism in Venezuela and Latin
America.
Answer. Many thanks. Of course, any effort this Administration
makes that loosens the ties between Russia and Venezuela is useful.
However, I don't think this is a good moment to be trying to negotiate
over the heads of the democratic opposition in that country. There is
no oil production deal that we can come up with in the short term that
will make a difference to U.S. gas prices, and the discussion itself
undermines years of effort made to promote democracy in Venezuela.
______
Responses of Dr. Daniel Twining to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. How has Chinese transnational aggression, including
promoting disinformation and targeting dissidents abroad, become more
pronounced in the past few years?
Answer. Since IRI initiated its Countering Foreign Authoritarian
Influence (https://www.iri.org/what-we-do/countering-foreign-
authoritarian-influence/) work, China's influence campaigns have become
sharper and less restrained. The CCP has used initial entry points
garnered from foreign direct investment and high-dollar-value
infrastructure loans to extend its reach into critical elements of
countries' political, economic and information infrastructure. The CCP
is also taking more direct action to shape political processes to
ensure outcomes more favorable to China's growing global interests,
whether timing infrastructure investments to coincide with presidential
elections to boost the chances of pro-China candidates, as it did in
the August 2021 elections in Zambia, or engaging in actual campaigning
for a preferred political candidate, as was reported during the June
2020 elections in Kiribati.
The introduction of tools such as the National Security Law in Hong
Kong empowers Beijing to threaten its critics anywhere in the world.
Earlier this week, we learned that the Hong Kong Government's security
bureau accused the advocacy organization Hong Kong Watch and its
founder Benedict Rogers of ``engaging in activities seriously
interfering in the affairs of the HKSAR and jeopardizing national
security of the People's Republic of China.'' Rogers was threatened
with life imprisonment and was ordered to shut down the NGO and take
down its website. Cases such as this highlight the scope of PRC efforts
to eliminate dissent and the tools it uses to do so.
Question. What tools are the most effective to combatting Chinese
authoritarianism?
Answer. Across different political contexts, IRI has found (https:/
/www.iri.org/resources/china-expands-global-authoritarian-influence-
efforts-some-fragile-democracies-show-resilience-against-ccp-
aggression/)investigative journalism and civil society activism to be
the most effective means of identifying, exposing, and combatting PRC
authoritarian aggression. Investigative journalism has consistently
proven to be the most effective tool in bringing to light inappropriate
PRC influence around the world. From Australia to Kenya to Ecuador,
journalists--often working at personal risk--have consistently changed
the conversation around China in their home countries through brave,
dogged reporting. Just as important, we have seen that reporting lead
to political change, incentivizing governments to be more cautious and,
sometimes, more transparent about their dealings with the CCP.
Where journalism provides information, civil society provides
action. Particularly across the global South, we have seen that robust
civil society movements have proven key to slowing or stopping PRC-
backed infrastructure projects that could increase corruption, damage
local communities, and drive countries further into debt.
Organizations such as IRI and the rest of the National Endowment
for Democracy family play a significant role in helping to raise
awareness about the PRC's malign influence (https://www.iri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/chinese_malign_
influence_report.pdf). Often, we are able to serve a convening role
that local actors cannot, either because of lack of resources,
political sensitivities, or because other coordinating mechanisms just
do not exist. We have found that, often as not, simply getting the
right people together in a room to discuss the problem and build
connections, as well as understanding what proven tools they can deploy
to fight back, is a critical first step in helping to change the
conversation around China in a given country.
Question. How would you assess the threat of Chinese malign
influence in U.S. universities?
Answer. This important question is not one that IRI has direct
programmatic engagement on, but we see parallels around the world. Open
university systems that provide space for collaboration and innovation
are susceptible to malign influence, but overzealous efforts to address
what is a genuine problem risk stifling the very ability to collaborate
and innovate that sets our universities apart from the rest of the
world. We see the threat of PRC malign influence in U.S. universities
as two-fold: PRC funding of universities and related co-optation of
academics, and the role of some Chinese students in the U.S. The latter
usually fall into two camps: (1) strong nationalists who are willing to
speak out and attempt to shape the discourse within universities on
China-related issues to promote pro-CCP narratives; (2) those with more
nuanced ideas who are afraid to give their point of view. Even in the
U.S., Chinese students fear reprisals against family members back home,
against themselves when they return, or even while they remain resident
in the United States.
To address the issue of PRC funding, American universities quite
simply need to do better at policing themselves when it comes to how
they interact with their PRC counterparts. Universities should fully
disclose their funding sources--if they have nothing to hide,
transparency should be a strength, not a constraint. I would recommend
the following steps to help address this:
Continue, and institutionalize, the outreach to universities
on China by scientific agencies such as the National Institutes
of Health or the Department of Energy begun under the previous
administration. Often educational outreach by agencies who work
on science and have preexisting relationships with universities
and researchers is more effective than a blunter approach by
agencies such as the FBI.
Amend the Higher Education Act to require disclosure of the
identity of non-American donors. At the moment, the act
requires only disclosure of the country of donors' country of
origin. Americans should know if universities accept large
donations from individuals with questionable ties to repressive
regimes like China, Russia, or Saudi Arabia.
Close Confucius Institutes. This is a trend already; though
they bring universities funding, it is not worth the potential
and actual loss of academic freedom that too often comes with
it.
To address Chinese student attempts to dominate China-related
discourse, universities should:
Make clear that any student who attempts to coerce another,
whether in the U.S. or back in China, will be expelled from
that university. Such bullying must be policed.
Work to integrate Chinese (and all foreign) students better.
Chinese students often live in a bubble--their friends are
often other Chinese students and they get their news from
Chinese news apps--which means that they are often in a Chinese
nationalistic bubble.
Question. What can we do in international organizations such as the
United Nations to combat authoritarianism and Chinese influence?
Answer. Many of these organizations are highly flawed, but robust
engagement is often better than walking away from them. The UN--and
particularly its human rights bodies--have come in for much justified
criticism in the United States and elsewhere. However, the partner
governments and civil society organizations we work with around the
world value the United Nations and will continue to engage through it
even if the United States does not. China is hell-bent on bending fora
like the UN to its will, and we do ourselves, our partners, or the
cause of freedom any favors by absenting ourselves from them in ways
that allow CCP authoritarian values to predominate.
In addition, as I mentioned in my testimony, the organizations we
use to govern international trade such as the WTO are not configured to
handle the PRC's use of economic coercion to bully democracies. The
U.S. and its partners need to start discussing seriously how to address
this, be it through informal or formal forms of free-world economic
cooperation, so that China cannot divide and conquer us through our
business communities. Reforming the WTO or joining yet another regional
trade deal will not cut it. Those are not solutions. Neither will do
anything to deter China's coercive use of its economic heft. Free
markets should work for free people rather than empowering
authoritarian adversaries, and most-favored-nation trade status should
actually reflect nations Americans most favor.
Question. How can we work more closely with Taiwan to expose and
counter Chinese disinformation?
Answer. Taiwan is well-positioned to serve as an example and
partner to other countries struggling with this problem. But Taipei
sometimes struggles with capacity issues, as well as a foreign policy
that can be too narrowly focused on Washington and Taiwan's remaining
diplomatic partners, leaving it poorly positioned to offer the benefits
of its experience to other countries in need. The Tsai Government has
made a great deal of progress in transitioning Taiwan to a ``post-ROC''
diplomatic mindset, but much work remains to be done. The U.S. can
assist, and help leverage Taiwan's experience in combatting PRC
disinformation (https://www.iri.org/resources/detecting-digital-
fingerprints-tracing-chinese-disinformation-in-taiwan/), by:
Working through the Global Cooperation and Training
Framework, a preexisting platform for cooperation between the
U.S., Taiwan, and Japan already approved and funded by
Congress. The GCTF already addresses disinformation. Last year,
for example, it convened a forum with officials and experts
from 20 countries on the issue. Congress should consult closely
with AIT as to whether current funding levels are appropriate
to meet Congressionally mandated goals and revise the relevant
appropriation statutes to explicitly call for combined efforts
to tackle malign disinformation from authoritarian actors.
Continue to encourage Taiwan's transition to a diplomacy
that looks beyond the U.S. and those countries that recognize
it, toward partners in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
Taiwan has lessons--and resources--to share that will be well
received around the world, if only it can make the needed
connections.
Continue to encourage Taiwan to decentralize its efforts to
combat PRC disinformation (and other forms of malign PRC
influence) to NGOs and other non-government actors, and work
through Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure those
non-governmental actors are strongly networked with their
counterparts overseas.
Question. On March 5, a delegation of senior Biden administration
officials, including Ambassador Jimmy Story, met with Nicolas Maduro in
Venezuela to discuss ``energy security.'' The delegation did not meet
with democratically elected Interim President Juan Guaido, whom the
United States views as the legitimate President of Venezuela. Please
explain efforts such as the March 5 meeting with Maduro have on U.S.
and international efforts to combat authoritarianism in Venezuela and
Latin America.
Answer. Authoritarian regimes have gained ground in Latin America
these past two decades. Among them is the Maduro regime, which
continues to tighten its grip on power through illegitimate means. For
the past 3 years, democratic movements in Venezuela have pushed for a
democratic transition, helping the country take steps towards a free
and fair electoral process to solve the country's political crisis. In
an unexpected turn, a broad democratic force participated in the
November 21, 2021 regional election, which did not meet international
electoral integrity standards. While it was risky to participate in
such an unfair and unequal process, democratic forces regained
significant political space at the local level.
Despite these advances, the Maduro regime will likely take measures
to restrict the influence and governance capacity of these
democratically elected officials. Maduro has repeatedly proven to be an
unreliable negotiator. While he occasionally shows signs of openness to
dialogue, he falls short of coming through with meaningful commitments
to create democratic space in his country.
U.S. and international efforts to combat authoritarianism in
Venezuela can and should continue to support an inclusive political
process in-country that paves the way for a peaceful democratic
transition. This inclusive process will build resiliency and prevent
additional backsliding in the country and the region at large. However,
both internal and external factors hinder this process in Venezuela.
For instance, as a cornerstone of its strategy, the Maduro regime has
deployed information operations through propaganda to influence the
emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of
organizations, groups of people, and individuals. This fills the
information space in-country with state-curated narratives that distort
information and divide democratic forces. Moving forward, support in
Venezuela must focus on promoting freedom of expression and
strengthening the capacity of governmental and non-governmental
democratic forces, such as independent media and civil society, to
track, expose, and counter authoritarian influence. This will enable
democratic forces to control the narrative and push back on
authoritarian expansions both in Venezuela and broadly within Latin
America.
______
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. What steps is the Biden administration taking to restrict
access to technologies used for surveillance of repressed minorities
and at-risk groups in authoritarian regimes such as China, Venezuela,
and Iran?
Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by the misuse of
cutting-edge technology and other measures to surveil, control, and
repress certain populations, including members of ethnic and religious
minority groups, human rights defenders, dissidents, and other
independent voices. This problem is most severe in the People's
Republic of China, where authorities deploy these technologies in
Xinjiang, Tibet, and beyond, but as you note, is also present in other
authoritarian countries.
We are taking steps to address this. We continue to work closely
with the Commerce Department to put entities that enable human rights
abuses on its Entity List, when appropriate. Throughout the Summit for
Democracy's Year of Action, we will lead efforts to convene likeminded
partners to develop a voluntary code of conduct to guide the
application of human rights criteria for export controls. In addition,
we are working with our allies and partners to develop common
principles on the responsible use of surveillance technologies. In
October 2020, the Department of State released human rights due
diligence guidance and best practices to assist U.S. businesses seeking
to prevent their products or services with surveillance capabilities
from being misused by government end-users to commit human rights
abuses. We continue to engage with businesses on best practices and the
challenges they may face in implementing the guidance.
Question. What emerging technologies and tools can be better
leveraged to counter authoritarianism by promoting transparency and
supporting human rights and democracy defenders?
Answer. Making digital technologies work for, not against,
democracies and combating digital authoritarianism is a key priority
for the Biden administration. For example, the White House announced at
the Summit for Democracy, the International Grand Challenges on
Democracy-Affirming Technologies to galvanize innovation in
technologies that support democratic values, such as privacy-enhancing
technologies and tools to combat government-imposed Internet shutdowns
with peer-to-peer technology. The Department also launched the U.S.
Anticorruption Solutions through Emerging Technology (ASET) program to
accelerate technological solutions to counter corruption worldwide.
Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence can also
promote human rights--for example, by empowering persons with
disabilities; combatting human trafficking; analyzing data to flag
patterns of discrimination or abuse; and helping human rights defenders
comb through vast troves of photos, videos, or text to hold governments
accountable. In addition, rising global cryptocurrency adoption may
provide funding avenues for activists whose authoritarian governments
seek to surveil and control financial transactions, though it also
presents many challenges. More broadly, blockchain-based technologies
can allow users to exchange information and value with others without
an intermediary. Such capabilities may prove challenging for
authoritarian regimes to monitor and control.
Question. How can digital assets and cryptocurrencies be utilized
and promoted as tools for human rights defenders and democracy
advocates in authoritarian regimes?
Answer. The United States is committed to the responsible
development and design of digital assets and the technology that
underpins new forms of payments and capital flows in the international
financial system. The Administration's Executive Order on ``Ensuring
Responsible Development of Digital Assets'' demonstrates our
determination to lead and shape financial innovation to promote
prosperity, prevent abuse, and advance democratic values without
restricting Americans' ability to hold and exchange digital assets.
The decentralized and censorship-resistant nature of
cryptocurrencies can help human rights defenders and democracy
activists who otherwise cannot transfer funds due to restrictions on
their bank accounts engage in financial transactions, such as in
Nigeria, Belarus, and Russia. Cryptocurrency can also be stored without
a financial institution, which can assist individuals to safeguard
their wealth while fleeing oppressive regimes.
We continue to assess how the State Department should approach the
use of anonymous or decentralized peer-to-peer transfer of wealth while
combating the illicit use of these digital assets by bad actors such as
terrorists, human and drug traffickers, and ransomware actors. All
efforts in this area must work to advance and respect human rights,
strengthen the rule of law, combat money laundering and financing of
terrorism, and counter weapons proliferation financing.
Question. What are the potential risks for human rights and digital
freedom of the adoption of China's digital currency, the eCNY, within
China? What are the potential risks if the eCNY is adopted in countries
other than China?
Answer. The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has
a poor record of responsible behavior in cyberspace and has misused
technology to surveil for the purposes of repression. This raises
serious concerns about the widespread adoption of platforms and
standards related to technology developed by the PRC in general,
including the e-CNY. Given the PRC's disregard for privacy and human
rights, we have concerns that the e-CNY could pose heightened privacy
and consumer protection risks and enhance the PRC's surveillance and
social control capabilities, as well as extend that globally. We urge
individuals, businesses, and global financial institutions to assess
the risks cautiously and fully, including to human rights, of using the
e-CNY.
The PRC's crackdowns on private cryptocurrency transactions are
taking place in concert with the rollout of the e-CNY and will prevent
their citizens from using financial systems outside government control.
In contrast with the PRC's misuse of technology, the Secretary has
stated that our task is to put forth and carry out a compelling vision
for how to use technology in a way that serves our people, protects our
interests, and upholds our democratic values. The Administration's
Executive Order on ``Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital
Assets'' will drive government agencies to better understand private
digital assets so reasonable guardrails can be implemented, and commits
that any development of a central bank digital currency, if judged to
be in the interest of the United States, will be done in line with
democratic values.
______
Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. How have perceptions of the Government of China changed
within countries in Asia and Africa in the aftermath of the global
COVID pandemic?
Answer. We provide a strong contrast to the People's Republic of
China (PRC) messaging by continually sharing U.S. values and U.S.
global health leadership through public diplomacy messaging and
programs, including through a dedicated strategic messaging campaign
focused on U.S. Government vaccine donations to date. Message testing
by the Bureau of Global Public Affairs (GPA) in countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia found that the majority of respondents did not
trust COVID-19 social media messaging by the PRC or PRC-backed
accounts. GPA research has also identified higher positive perceptions
of the U.S. response to the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the PRC in
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.
Question. How is the Department leveraging America's global
response to the COVID pandemic to highlight the power of transparency,
free enterprise, and private sector innovation in contrast to
authoritarian command and control?
Answer. Transparency and equitable distribution of vaccines are at
the heart of our COVID-19 global response. The United States has
donated more than 498 million COVID-19 vaccine doses to more than 110
countries and economies worldwide--with no political strings attached.
We make these donations public on our website at www.state.gov/covid-
19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/ and amplify them publicly through the
Department's public engagement events, media engagement, and social
media properties, including U.S. embassies' and consulates' accounts.
Research by the Bureau of Global Public Affairs demonstrated that
international publics trust local voices and counsel from experts such
as doctors and pharmacists, which informs our global messaging to
ensure that we are leveraging local voices as we highlight the efforts
of the United States to end the pandemic.
We have invested and supported the expansion of regional COVID-19
vaccine manufacturing in Africa and Asia. For instance, on March 7,
Moderna Therapeutics and the Government of Kenya, in collaboration with
the U.S. Government, announced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that
will bring production and manufacturing of Moderna mRNA vaccines to
Africa, for Africa. The MOU marks the first time that mRNA COVID-19
vaccine drug substance will be produced on the continent at this scale.
The brand-new facility in Kenya will produce safe and effective COVID-
19 vaccines and will create a lasting capability to produce vaccines
against both longstanding health threats (malaria, yellow fever) and
emerging health threats in the future.
We also continue to work extensively with governments and
international organizations, vaccine and medical goods producers, NGOs,
the broader private sector, and others to deliver vaccines, get shots
in arms, increase testing and treatment, support and protect healthcare
workers and the public, and more. The Department has also provided more
than 100 small grants of up to $10,000 to our State Department exchange
program alumni to implement innovative COVID-19 response projects in
local communities around the world. For example, a State Department
grant helped a citizen of Malawi build an app to respond to the rapid
spread of misinformation and disinformation across social media. Called
COVID-19 NEBA, or ``Hey Neighbor,'' the app is offered in three
languages--Chichewa, Tumbuka, and English--and increases access to
fact-based information from trusted sources including U.S. Centers for
Disease Control, the World Health Organization, and Malawi's Ministry
of Health. The app has helped more than 648,000 citizens of Malawi
access accurate COVID-19 information. In Thailand, State Department
exchange alumni used a small grant to support Chiang Dao residents in
the Chiang Mai Province. Alumni joined community organizations to
create visual and audio media in seven languages on COVID-19 prevention
best practices, collaborated with public health officials to conduct
COVID-19 prevention workshops for village health volunteers, and
provided effective communication tools and techniques to village
leaders to help residents stay updated on COVID-19 - reaching more than
70,000 people.
We are working at every level, with partners from all sectors, to
lead a coordinated, international response to this pandemic to save
lives around the world and to bolster resilient, diverse, adaptable,
and secure public health supply chains.
Question. How does the Department evaluate or quantify the
effectiveness of the Global Engagement Center in countering
disinformation campaigns from Russia, China, Iran, and others?
Answer. In addition to tracking specific impacts of Global
Engagement Center's (GEC) work on policy outcomes and narratives
globally, the GEC's Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit works with
each of the GEC's threat-focused teams to develop metrics of success.
The GEC's M&E Unit utilizes evidence-based and social science
approaches, such as testing hypotheses to refine program design, to
determine each program's effectiveness. For example, the GEC led an
interagency and multinational campaign to delegitimize former ISIS
leader Al Mawla. After the success of the first phase of the campaign,
the GEC coordinated with partners to refine and conduct a second phase
with more materials and a tailored media plan. As a result of the
campaign's success, ISIS followers are so disillusioned with their
leadership that Google analytic indices now show that ``al-Mawla''
related searches have shifted from references of ``The Destroyer'' to
``The Canary Caliph'' and ``The Betrayer.'' The GEC also evaluates its
programs, using its in-house evaluation capabilities and external
third-party evaluators, to inform future planning and design and to
refine methodologies and indicators of effectiveness.
Additionally, consistent with the Evidence Act of 2018, the GEC is
working with the Department's Bureau of Budget and Planning (BP) and
the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F) on their ``Learning Agenda''
--a 4-year strategic process to use evidence-based data to inform
foreign policy decisions across a select group of questions. The GEC
leads on the portion of the Agenda focused on strategic implementation
of counter-disinformation and propaganda efforts throughout the
Department.
______
Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. To what extent has DRL previously issued notices for
projects aimed at documenting human rights violations occurring in
Israel? Please explicitly cite and convey any notices you believe are
precedents for or similar to SFOP0008613 in that context.
Answer. In 2019, DRL solicited in SFOP0006474, through an open
competition, proposals for programs supporting civil society
organizations to reduce barriers to full inclusion of members of
marginalized groups in Israel in political and economic processes. DRL
funds a wide range of programs aimed at promoting civil society
engagement at the local level as well as on issues related to human
rights violations by security forces around the world. We have not
issued any solicitations for these specific activities with respect to
Israel or the West Bank/Gaza previously.
Question. What ``legal or security sector violations and housing,
land, and property rights'' violations that have occurred or are
occurring in Israel that you believe are relevant to projects described
by SFOP0008613?
Answer. This solicitation allows local civil society organizations
to design and submit proposals based on their assessment of local
conditions and which they deem relevant to the context in which they
would work.
Question. What sorts of products or deliverables you envision
receiving from projects described by SFOP0008613?
Answer. Local civil society organizations who apply under this
solicitation will propose potential products or deliverables based on
their assessment of local conditions.
Question. What proposals have already been submitted for projects
described by SFOP0008613?
Answer. The number and organizational specifics of proposals are
not known as the Notice of Funding Opportunity has not closed yet.
Additionally, Department grants policy directs the process remain
confidential until a Federal Assistance Award has been granted.