[Senate Hearing 117-350]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





                                                        S. Hrg. 117-350
 
                     COMBATTING AUTHORITARIANISM: 
                        U.S. TOOLS AND RESPONSES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS



                             SECOND SESSION



                               __________

                             MARCH 15, 2022

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       
       
       
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                             ______                       


             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 48-396PDF           WASHINGTON : 2022 
 
                  


                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Zeya, Hon. Uzra, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, 
  Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State, 
  Washington, DC.................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Godfrey, Jennifer Hall, Senior Bureau Official for Public 
  Diplomacy and Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................     9

Applebaum, Anne, Atlantic Magazine Staff Writer, Senior Fellow at 
  the SNF Agora Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, 
  DC.............................................................    22
    Prepared Statement...........................................    24

Twining, Daniel, President, International Republican Institute, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    28
    Prepared Statement...........................................    30

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    44

Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Robert Menendez........................................    48

Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya and Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez...........................    48

Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    50

Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch.........................................    55

Responses of Ms. Anne Applebaum to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    58

Responses of Dr. Daniel Twining to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  James E. Risch.................................................    58

Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions Submitted by Senator Todd 
  Young..........................................................    61

Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................    62

Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions Submitted by Senator Ted 
  Cruz...........................................................    64

                                 (iii)

  


         COMBATTING AUTHORITARIANISM: U.S. TOOLS AND RESPONSES

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Coons, 
Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, 
Romney, and Young.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. The hearing will come to order, ``Combatting 
Authoritarianism: The U.S. Tools and Responses.''
    When I returned to chair this committee, I believed it was 
critical that our first hearing explore the state of democracy 
around the world amid a resurgence of authoritarianism to 
remind ourselves that the U.S. support of human rights, good 
governance, and individual rights are not simply lofty policy 
goals in and of themselves.
    One year later, Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine is 
showing the world exactly what is at stake. At this moment, a 
democracy forged from the hard-fought tenacity of the Ukrainian 
people is fighting for its very existence while a ruthless 
dictator is shelling civilians, blowing up schools and 
hospitals, and threatening regional stability.
    To authoritarians like Putin, liberal democracy is not just 
a nice concept. It is a formidable, dangerous ideology that 
threatens their power and wealth, and they will deploy whatever 
means necessary to protect that power, from propaganda, 
corruption and, tragically, ruthless violence.
    In response to this threat, however, we are witnessing a 
democratic reawakening. Democracies across the globe have 
rallied to deliver a swift, unified response to Putin and his 
enablers and have offered support to Ukrainians fighting for 
their freedom.
    We must capitalize on this resurgence of democratic fervor 
to successfully combat the growing threat of authoritarianism 
and the United States must lead the way.
    Over the past two decades, a new type of 21st century 
authoritarian support system has arisen. Rather than working in 
despotic isolation, authoritarian leaders operate through 
networks of new kleptocratic financial mechanisms, 
disinformation professionals, and an array of security services 
to protect one another from democratic pressures and to secure 
their repressive rule.
    Autocrats from Venezuela to Cuba, Belarus, and Burma are 
sustained through support from China and Russia.
    Today, I look forward to hearing about the Administration's 
efforts to counter authoritarianism and bolster democracies. I 
believe that if we are to be successful in this fight we must 
redouble our efforts.
    Specifically, we must aggressively lead with our values and 
actions and not just in words. We must support and protect 
human rights defenders, democracy activists, and civil society 
organizations who are on the frontlines of this global 
struggle.
    In the coming weeks, I will be introducing the Global 
Voices of Freedom Act, which will strengthen protections for 
democracy and human rights defenders across the world. We must 
combat the complex web of kleptocracy sustaining autocrats from 
around the world. We must cut off their lifeblood and impair 
their ability to buffer one another from sanctions.
    We must combat digital authoritarianism, including 
disinformation, propaganda, and censorship used to subvert 
democratic principles and advance autocrats' interests.
    We must counter the dangerous narratives which 
authoritarians spread to manipulate, to distract, and to cause 
people to question whether democracy has anything to offer the 
modern world.
    We must also bolster fledgling democracies from Niger to 
Tunisia, including through economic support, and counter the 
rise of illiberal forces, from El Salvador to Turkey.
    For too long authoritarianism has lured national leaders 
with the promise of easy pathways to wealth and power. In 
response, we must strengthen our solidarity with nations 
striving to pursue security and prosperity for their people 
through just and democratic means.
    Our efforts must be well funded, and I am glad that we have 
the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations, State 
Authorization, and Subcommittee on Foreign Ops. Our efforts 
have to be well funded.
    How many more titles do you have? Did I add extra to it 
or----
    Senator Coons. I greatly appreciate the description of 
myself as distinguished, but what I deliver is the goals of our 
committee----
    The Chairman. It will--you will be even very distinguished 
when it is well funded.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. What the United States has invested in 
democracy assistance pales in comparison to the billions that 
autocrats pour into protecting one another's wealth and power.
    The Administration's Summit for Democracy last year 
represented a significant opportunity to galvanize our allies 
in these efforts, but if the goals of the Summit are not 
translated into concrete and well-funded actions the democracy 
movement will be worse off, left only with empty promises.
    We must also get our own house in order, as demonstrated 
when rioters stormed the Capitol on January 6 to overturn the 
results of the presidential election.
    We must fill critical roles at home including the Assistant 
Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the 
Ambassador for War Crimes, and ambassadorships around the 
world. My colleagues' obstruction of these nominees impedes our 
ability to stand up to autocrats and support our allies and, at 
the same time, the Administration must nominate an Under 
Secretary for Public Diplomacy.
    In recent weeks, we have witnessed what authoritarians are 
willing to do to protect their power and wealth and to 
eliminate democracy. Today, it is Russia and Ukraine. Tomorrow 
it will be other nations.
    We have watched as Ukrainians have taken up arms and risked 
their lives in defense of freedom and democracy. What are we, 
in turn, as democracies and the United States willing to do?
    That is a question I hope we begin to answer today, and 
with that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member for 
his comments.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Every American can turn on the TV and see that 
authoritarianism is on the rise. From Putin's personal war--
very personal war--against Ukraine to China's genocide of the 
Uighurs and technology-fueled repression, autocrats are busy 
quashing political dissent and actively working to undermine 
our open democratic society.
    While Russia and China are the most egregious models of 
authoritarianism, Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, and Zimbabwe 
also demonstrate the global nature of this rise. Clearly, the 
United States and our allies need to step up our game against 
these regimes.
    The Biden administration has made supporting democracy a 
focal point of its foreign policy, and last December, the 
President hosted the Summit for Democracy with much fanfare. 
Unfortunately, there were few, if any, results there from the 
Summit.
    Ukraine was a participant in the Summit and is now fighting 
for its sovereignty against an authoritarian Russian regime. 
Ukrainian lives will not be saved by the declarations or 
pledges from a summit.
    Instead, the Ukrainians need air defense systems, including 
surface-to-air missiles, fighter planes, anti-tank missiles, 
ammunition, small arms, and bulletproof vests. The United 
States once called itself the arsenal of democracy. We can 
become so again.
    Ukraine is fighting for its freedom, but also for ours. We 
must continue to give it the tools now to combat Putin's 
authoritarianism. Russia's repression goes beyond its current 
war and uses disinformation and cyber warfare to stir 
discontent abroad, including in Georgia, Moldova, the Baltics, 
and the Balkans.
    We have also allowed the ill-gotten financial gains of 
Putin's cronies to find a home in the West, including in the 
United States. I am glad to see the Administration has stood up 
a task force to remove the Kremlin's influences from our 
systems and their holdings, but it is long overdue.
    We have been far too permissive for too long, and the 
results of that complacency are seen in Ukraine.
    Turning to China, the Chinese Communist Party has a long 
history of malign influence that takes a variety of forms. Its 
coordination with Russia on the misinformation about the war in 
Ukraine is only the latest example.
    The CCP is justifying Russia's horrific and unjustified 
invasion by spreading disinformation about U.S.-supported 
biological research labs in Ukraine. This is similar to the 
false narratives China used to cover up the origins of COVID-19 
and delay the global pandemic response.
    In other instances, the CCP is using transnational 
repression to target dissidents and even U.S. citizens outside 
of China, bullying media outlets overseas that publish negative 
coverage of China, and silencing debate in U.S. universities.
    Funding from China into universities is another major 
problem. From 2019 to 2021 alone, U.S. universities received 
$545 million in gifts and contracts from China--$545 million. 
In one example, Chinese company Alibaba contracted with a U.S. 
university to develop facial surveillance technology.
    In Europe, multiple universities have ties with Chinese 
universities that directly support the People's Liberation 
Army. These partnerships support bad actors that do not share 
the interests of democratic nations.
    It is a simple question. Why are we funding Chinese 
authoritarianism? As autocrats get more creative in pushing 
their agenda, the United States and its allies need to increase 
their efforts to block and tackle disinformation and 
authoritarian narratives before they take root.
    The U.S. should continue its support for democracies around 
the globe through our foreign assistance programs. We need to 
better coordinate within our agencies to focus on programs that 
are most effective at pushing back against the lies and 
propaganda of our adversaries.
    We should also work with our allies and partners to promote 
democratic institutions, good governance, and understanding of 
the playbooks of authoritarian governments.
    On universities, for example, the U.S. and our partners 
should improve scrutiny of foreign donations and contracts. We 
must continue to counter authoritarian tactics through a free 
media and civil society.
    I look forward to hearing more today about our current U.S. 
Government efforts to combat authoritarianism and how we can 
improve upon those efforts immediately.
    We must not let the authoritarians win. As we see in 
Ukraine today, no one wants to live in a world controlled by 
Putin or Xi.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    All right. So we will start with our witnesses. Let me 
introduce them.
    It is my privilege to welcome Under Secretary for Civilian 
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya.
    In her role, Under Secretary Zeya leads the department 
efforts to prevent and counter threats to civilian security, 
works to advance the security of the American people by 
assisting countries around the world to build more democratic, 
secure, stable, and just societies.
    Under Secretary Zeya also serves concurrently as the U.S. 
Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, and she is a veteran 
diplomat, having served our country in the Foreign Service over 
27 years in Syria, Egypt, Oman, Jamaica, and France, and we 
welcome you.
    We are also joined virtually by another formidable 
diplomat, Acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs Ms. Jennifer Hall Godfrey.
    In her role, Ms. Godfrey leads department efforts to expand 
and strengthen the relationships between the people of the 
United States and our foreign counterparts.
    She works to advance our national interests by seeking to 
engage, inform, and understand the perspectives of foreign 
audiences. Ms. Godfrey is a career member of the Senior Foreign 
Service and has served our country with distinction in Jordan, 
Turkmenistan, Libya, Austria, and Saudi Arabia. So welcome to 
you both.
    Thank you for being here. Your full statements will be 
included in the record. I would ask you to try to summarize 
them in about 5 minutes or so so we can have a conversation 
with you.
    Madam Secretary, we start with you.

   STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE UZRA ZEYA, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 
CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                    OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Zeya. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today.
    With Russia's premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war 
of choice against Ukraine, generating Europe's worst 
humanitarian crisis since World War II, never in my lifetime 
has the contest between democracy and autocracy been more 
important, and we will prevail, thanks to the strong bipartisan 
support of Congress.
    Across the globe, authoritarianism threatens democratic 
governments and societies. According to Freedom House, almost 
40 percent of the global population live in countries 
categorized as not free. This is a defining challenge of our 
time and this Administration is responding with decisive and 
collective action.
    Today, I would like to highlight three core lines of 
effort: one, shoring up our alliances and partnerships to 
advance a common vision and unified front in the face of 
authoritarianism; two, broadening the chorus of those active in 
defending democracy, countering corruption, and advancing human 
rights globally beyond our traditional transatlantic partners; 
and three, modernizing our foreign policy and assistance 
toolkit to push back on authoritarians while supporting civil 
society actors and institutions often under siege.
    There is no greater proof of the need for bold action to 
combat authoritarianism than Putin's brutal effort to occupy 
Ukraine and destroy its democracy, but Putin grossly 
underestimated the will of the Ukrainian people and the 
international community.
    The United States and the rest of the responsible world are 
uniting to stand with Ukraine and surge assistance across all 
sectors.
    Together with allies, we are exposing the Kremlin's 
disinformation and lies while imposing massive costs through 
powerful sanctions and export controls that have cratered 
Russia's economy and left it more politically isolated than 
ever before.
    We will use every tool available to hold the Government of 
Russia, its enablers in Belarus, and the Russian oligarchs who 
have profited from this corrupt violent regime to account.
    We are also clear eyed and resolute about other threats to 
democracy. A more assertive People's Republic of China is 
attempting to redefine global norms to privilege 
authoritarianism and avert international scrutiny.
    The PRC has good reason to fear the latter, as it continues 
to commit genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, 
strangle democracy and press freedom in Hong Kong, and suppress 
Tibetan Buddhists and other religious minorities from 
practicing their faith.
    PRC authorities externalize their system further through 
acts of transnational repression, including on our own shores.
    To counter these efforts, the United States is forging a 
common approach with like-minded partners, enhancing their 
resilience to coercion, promoting accountability for the PRC's 
abuses, and pushing back against the use of forced labor and 
misuse of advanced and emerging technologies for repression.
    Congress has provided us with important tools to promote 
accountability for the PRC's human rights abuses, including the 
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and the Uighur 
Forced Labor Prevention Act.
    Over the course of this hearing, I hope to discuss other 
grave examples of authoritarian leaders challenging 
international norms, suppressing the rights of their citizens, 
and supporting one another, from Iran, Belarus, Syria, the 
DPRK, and Burma to Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, but hope is 
not lost.
    One more way we are countering authoritarians worldwide is 
through the President's Summit for Democracy. Last December, 
more than half of U.N. member states came together to make 
commitments to strengthen our own democracies and reject 
authoritarianism.
    We are already seeing these governments translate words 
into action, demonstrated by the 93 out of 100 Summit 
participants who supported the historic March 2 U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution to condemn Russia's Ukraine invasion.
    Through the Summit, we have rolled out a suite of new tools 
to combat authoritarianism and bolster democracy, including 
efforts to stem authoritarians' misuse of technology, 
accelerate solutions to combat corruption worldwide, expand 
access to local independent media and reduce the impact of 
disinformation, and bolster democratic reformers and support 
more inclusive, resilient, and equitable societies.
    In short, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, we are 
responding with allies and partners to the immediacy of 
Russia's autocratic attack on democracy as well as the PRC's 
long-term challenge to democratic norms, while reinvesting with 
our partners and more resilient democracies that deliver 
security, prosperity, and freedom.
    In the words of our President, in the battle between 
democracy and autocracy, democracies are rising to the moment 
and the world is, clearly, choosing the side of peace and 
security.
    Thank you, and I welcome your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Zeya follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Ms. Uzra Zeya

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of 
the Committee; thank you for the opportunity to testify today. With 
Russia's premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war of choice 
against Ukraine generating Europe's worst humanitarian crisis since 
World War II, never in my lifetime has the contest between democracy 
and autocracy been more important. And we will prevail, thanks to the 
strong bipartisan support of Congress.
    Across the globe, authoritarianism--enabled by economic freefall, 
inequality, alienation and most recently pandemics--threatens 
democratic governments and societies. According to Freedom House, 
almost 40 percent of the global population live in countries 
categorized as ``not free.'' This is a defining challenge of our time, 
and this Administration is responding with decisive and collective 
action. While such action can take many forms, today I would like to 
highlight three core lines of effort: 1) shoring up our alliances and 
partnerships to advance a common vision and unified front in the face 
of authoritarianism; 2) broadening the chorus of those active in 
defending democracy, countering corruption, and advancing human rights 
globally, beyond our traditional Transatlantic partners; and 3) 
modernizing our foreign policy and foreign assistance toolkit to push 
back on authoritarians, while supporting civil society actors and 
institutions vital to resilient, democratic societies and increasingly 
under siege.
    There is no greater proof of the need for bold action to combat 
authoritarianism than Putin's brutal effort to occupy Ukraine and 
destroy its democracy. But Putin grossly underestimated the will of the 
Ukrainian people and the international community. The United States and 
the rest of the responsible world are uniting to stand with Ukraine and 
surge assistance across all sectors. Together with allies, we are 
exposing the Kremlin's disinformation and lies, while imposing massive 
costs through powerful sanctions and export controls that have cratered 
Russia's economy and left it more politically isolated than ever 
before. In the 47-member UN Human Rights Council (HRC), only Eritrea 
joined Russia in voting against a new Commission of Inquiry that will 
document the massive, ongoing violations of human rights in Ukraine. 
Building on this milestone, we will use every tool available to hold 
the Government of Russia, its enablers in Belarus, and the Russian 
oligarchs who have profited from this corrupt, violent regime, to 
account.
    We are also clear-eyed and resolute about other threats to 
democracy. A more assertive People's Republic of China (PRC) Government 
is attempting to redefine global norms to privilege authoritarianism 
and avert international scrutiny. The PRC has good reason to fear the 
latter, as it continues to commit genocide and crimes against humanity 
in Xinjiang, strangle democracy and press freedom in Hong Kong, and 
suppress Tibetan Buddhists and other religious minorities from 
practicing their faith. PRC authorities externalize their system 
further through acts of transnational repression, including on our own 
shores.
    To counter these efforts, the United States is forging a common 
approach with like-minded partners, enhancing their resilience to 
coercion, promoting accountability for the PRC's abuses, and pushing 
back against its use of forced labor and misuse of advanced and 
emerging technologies for repression. Congress has provided us 
important tools to promote accountability for the PRC's human rights 
abuses, including the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 
(GLOMAG) and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which we are 
urging other like-minded governments to emulate. Adoption of GLOMAG-
like legislation by the European Union, the UK, and Australia are 
encouraging steps.
    Over the course of this hearing, I hope to discuss other grave 
examples of authoritarian leaders challenging international norms, 
suppressing the rights of their citizens, and supporting one another, 
from Iran, Belarus, Syria, the DPRK, and Burma to Venezuela, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua. All too often, we see autocratic regimes propped up with 
support from Russia, the PRC, or Iran, among others, and it is the 
domestic activists, civil society, journalists, and others who pay the 
highest price.
    But hope is not lost. One more way we are countering authoritarians 
worldwide is through the President's Summit for Democracy. Last 
December, more than half of UN Member States came together to make 
commitments to strengthen our democracies and reject authoritarianism. 
We are already seeing these governments translate these words into 
action, demonstrated by the 93 out of 100 Summit participants who 
supported the historic March 2 UNGA resolution to condemn Russia's 
Ukraine invasion. On the affirmative side, through the Summit, we have 
rolled out a suite of new tools to combat authoritarianism and bolster 
democracy, including:

   Working with allies to develop a new voluntary code of 
        conduct on export controls to help stem authoritarians' misuse 
        of technology.

   Accelerating solutions to combat corruption worldwide, 
        including through the creation of a U.S. Anticorruption 
        Solutions through Evolving Technology (ASET) Project innovation 
        lab; and increasing our investments in the Global Anti-
        Corruption Consortium (GACC) to expose ill-gotten gains.

   Working with Congress to provide up to $30 million to the 
        International Fund for Public Interest Media (IFPIM) and 
        launching a Media Viability Accelerator to expand access to 
        high-quality local independent media and reduce the impact of 
        disinformation.

   Laying the groundwork to provide career professionals in 
        closed political spaces the skills and resources to navigate 
        democratic openings when they occur through the Bridging 
        Understanding, Integrity, and Legitimacy for Democracy (BUILD) 
        Initiative.

   Bolstering democratic reformers and building more inclusive, 
        resilient, and equitable democratic societies through the 
        Advancing Women's and Girls' Civic and Political Leadership 
        Initiative and the Global LGBTQI+ Inclusive Democracy and 
        Empowerment (GLIDE) Fund.

    In short, Mr. Chairman, we are responding with allies and partners 
to the immediacy of Russia's autocratic attack on democracy, as well as 
the PRC's long-term challenge to democratic norms, while re-investing 
with our partners in more resilient democracies that deliver security, 
prosperity, and freedom for our own citizens and for the world. In the 
words of our President, ``[i]n the battle between democracy and 
autocracy, democracies are rising to the moment, and the world is 
clearly choosing the side of peace and security.''

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Godfrey.

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER HALL GODFREY, SENIOR BUREAU OFFICIAL FOR 
    PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Godfrey. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and members of the committee for inviting me to speak 
with you today about how we confront the challenges posed by 
authoritarian regimes, a very timely conversation.
    Authoritarianism poses a clear threat to the global 
interests of the United States, democracies, and open 
societies.
    A key weapon in the arsenal of repressive governments is 
their willingness to lie to public audiences, limit freedom of 
expression and independent media in their own nations, and 
exploit freedom of expression and independent media in open 
societies.
    These dynamics are not new, but modern communications 
greatly exacerbate the impact of their deceptive public 
engagement.
    Competition for the attention of foreign audiences is 
intense, and earning attention, trust, and favorable opinion 
requires intentional, principled, and consistent engagement.
    To this end, the Department of State maintains a full 
spectrum approach to both counter the influence of 
authoritarian regimes and, equally as important, to demonstrate 
in word and in deed the value of democratic governance.
    The department's 4,000 public diplomacy----
    [Technical issue.]

    [The prepared statement of Ms. Godfrey follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey

    Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of 
the Committee for inviting me to speak with you today about how we 
confront the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes.
    Authoritarianism poses a clear threat to the global interests of 
the United States, democracies, and open societies. A key weapon in the 
authoritarian arsenal is their willingness to lie to public audiences, 
limit freedom of expression and independent media in their own nations, 
and exploit freedom of expression and independent media in open 
societies. These dynamics are not new, but modern communications 
greatly exacerbate the impact of their deceptive public engagement.
    Competition for the attention of foreign audiences is intense, and 
earning attention, trust, and favorable opinion requires intentional, 
principled, and consistent engagement. To this end, the Department, 
working with interagency partners, maintains a full-spectrum approach 
to both counter the influence of authoritarian regimes, and--equally as 
important--to demonstrate in word and in deed the value of democratic 
governance, government transparency, and the rules-based international 
order. The Department's 4,000 Public Diplomacy professionals at 185 
U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide engage publics through social 
media, traditional media, and in-person interactions.
    The Department's Global Engagement Center works to counter the 
foreign disinformation and propaganda of the governments of Russia, 
China, Iran, and others, who leverage information manipulation to 
negatively impact U.S. national security or that of our allies and 
partners. As one aspect of this mission, the GEC exposes Kremlin-funded 
media disinformation campaigns. Recent GEC reporting, for example, has 
informed efforts by major social media companies to address false 
content, ensure platform accounts are appropriately identified, and 
suspend accounts that violate their terms of service. The GEC also 
actively exposes information authoritarian regimes seek to hide. The 
GEC's support for the development of the largest online repository of 
open-source data on the PRC's atrocities in the Xinjiang region of 
China has provided people around the world access to the truth.
    It is not enough to expose foreign disinformation and propaganda. 
We must also engage global publics with honest and credible information 
about U.S. values, priorities, and policy objectives and the strengths 
of alternatives to authoritarian governance. The Bureau of Global 
Public Affairs executes global communications campaigns with messages 
tailored to audiences overseas. The Bureau employs data analytics to 
monitor evolving narratives, understand shifting perceptions, and 
inform content deployed through traditional media and our 1,200 social 
media accounts.
    Because we understand it is not enough for the United States to 
state the truth or call out disinformation and propaganda in messaging, 
we also cultivate networks of like-minded individuals who champion the 
same ideas we do and are trusted voices within their communities. We 
seek partners who share a mutual interest in promoting human rights and 
democratic principles.
    Through exchange programs led by the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, we build lasting relationships. Over 1.7 million 
people globally have participated in U.S. Government exchanges, and 
approximately one in three current world government leaders are alumni 
of those programs. Alumni from all over the world also account for 
thousands of leaders in business, civil society, and academia, and work 
every day with Americans in the public and private sector.
    While bringing aspiring foreign leaders to the United States is one 
of the best ways to give them first-hand exposure to the democratic 
principles we support, we also understand the value of engaging people 
in their local communities and through digital networks. In addition to 
the many Americans we send abroad on our exchanges, our 600 American 
Spaces provide programming to promote understanding of American and 
democratic values. Our digital networks allow us to regularly engage 
almost a million partners in discussions about U.S. policy priorities. 
These are citizens and leaders who question authoritarian regimes and 
their assault on democracy. They do so not because we told them to, but 
because they believe in what they are doing, and know they are part of 
a global community that supports them. We do not anticipate or require 
they will always share our point of view, agree with us on policy or 
practice, or convey government talking points.
    Our efforts stand in stark contrast to the manipulation and 
censorship of authoritarian regimes, who build networks of proxies who 
disguise their funding and direction, serve as mouthpieces for 
government talking points, or worse--actively lie and conceal to sow 
confusion and contempt and improve their own global standing albeit 
with false information and propaganda.
    The relationships Public Diplomacy professionals build through 
engagement with foreign citizens require us to model the integrity and 
principles we advocate. The relationships require trust and 
credibility, characteristics authoritarian regimes lack. Earning trust 
and credibility is neither easy nor to be taken for granted. The 
Department's Public Diplomacy efforts are critical to combatting 
authoritarianism. We must show up for this fight and hold firm.
    Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. All right. I guess we have lost Ms. Godfrey 
and so we will go to questions and then we will see if we can 
reconvene her at some point. We will start a series of 5-minute 
rounds.
    Secretary Zeya, last Congress I released a report about new 
digital authoritarianism. For both of our witnesses--I am not 
sure that we can get Ms. Godfrey on.
    As autocrats deploy new digital tools to spread 
disinformation, unlawfully surveil civil society, and repress 
dissenting voices, how is the Administration building a 
consistent and strategic approach for combating digital 
authoritarianism and ensuring that new technologies work for 
democracy, and how has the State Department engaged and 
mobilized the private sector in this work?
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising a critically 
important question and for the report that you referenced.
    Certainly, as both you and the ranking member have 
mentioned, digital authoritarianism represents one of the most 
concerning aspects of 21st century authoritarianism and it is a 
core element of the Administration's approach to countering 
authoritarianism and strengthening democracies throughout the 
world.
    I would describe this as an offense and defense effort 
where the offense piece is focused on our international efforts 
to combat and counter disinformation, which, I think, have seen 
some remarkable success in recent weeks thwarting at every turn 
egregious Russian, Chinese, and other nations' effort to 
distort what is actually happening on the ground in Ukraine 
and, really, shift narratives and, essentially, neutralize 
longstanding Russian disinformation efforts.
    We are also countered on the resilience piece in terms of 
strengthening democracies' and including emerging democracies' 
ability to counter and resist disinformation.
    This was one of the core lines of effort in the Summit for 
Democracy under a line of effort we call Technology for 
Democracy where we will be working with allies and partners to 
strengthen digital literacy, to open resource streams for free 
and independent media, which is a critical aspect of countering 
the distortions of authoritarians' disinformation with truth 
and accountability towards authoritarian governments.
    The Chairman. I think in the case of--the most recent case, 
the Administration deserves a lot of credit for declassifying 
intelligence and getting ahead of the curve and, basically, 
creating a clear narrative as to what Russia is up to and I 
think that has worked well.
    In the broader context outside of the conflict in Ukraine 
and Russia, I am not sure that we are doing so well on the 
question of digital authoritarianism as it relates to meeting 
that challenge globally, and I think that countries like China, 
Russia, and others are ahead of the curve on this.
    We would very much like to hear from the Department how we 
achieve success more globally. I understand what is happening 
in Ukraine has been a success, but more globally, I would like 
to follow up with you in that regard.
    2021 was the deadliest year on record for human rights 
defenders, which--with at least 358 killed, thousands attacked 
and thousands more unjustly imprisoned. The U.S. Government has 
a long bipartisan history of supporting human rights defenders, 
but our efforts remain, largely, ad hoc.
    Under Secretary Zeya, how is the Administration working to 
create a cohesive and coordinated strategy to provide support 
to human rights defenders?
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you. I think you have raised a critically 
important, Senator, and this is the reality of human rights 
defenders increasingly under siege and paying with their lives 
for their vitally important work.
    This also is a core aspect of the Presidential Initiative 
for Democracy emerging from the Summit for Democracy where we 
are working to build up stronger allied and partner efforts to 
support democratic reformers worldwide.
    Here, I have to absolutely credit congressional support for 
the resourcing of direct emergency financial assistance to 
human rights defenders, which has been led by our State 
Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
    I just want to point out that since 2007 these global 
programs have supported over 4,000 human rights defenders and 
organizations in over 105 countries and allowed them to 
continue to do their work under very difficult circumstances.
    The Chairman. Finally, access to accurate, factual, and 
timely information is, in my view, a fundamental human right. 
Yet, authoritarian and repressive governments all over the 
world now possess the tools and technology needed to limit 
citizens' access to information.
    Senator Blackburn and I have recently unveiled our Internet 
Freedom in Operations Act, which authorizes over $125 million 
in funding for various internet freedom programs as well as the 
internet censorship circumvention technologies.
    What are some of the most frequent methods that these 
regimes use to control access to information and independent 
media outlets, and what initiatives and tools does the State 
Department have to circumvent this sort of government 
censorship of independent media?
    Ms. Zeya. Sir, I would like to give my colleague, Senior 
Acting Under Secretary Hall Godfrey the chance to weigh in 
here, but I will elaborate on similar key----
    The Chairman. I understand that she is now on the phone and 
can give her testimony through the phone. So you want to have 
her answer that question?
    Ms. Zeya. I would like to give her the chance to weigh in. 
I would just point out that some of the key methods that we are 
seeing authoritarians use include through misinformation and 
disinformation, the use of bots and other state-sponsored 
efforts, as you and the ranking member mentioned, to, 
basically, inject lies into public discourse, whether it is 
accusing the United States falsely of having chem bio 
facilities in Ukraine or----
    The Chairman. I know what they do. What I want to know is 
what we are doing in response.
    Ms. Zeya. Oh, in the counter effort. Yes.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Ms. Zeya. I would put that in the context of our efforts to 
support the expansion and resources of free and independent 
media and its own ability to defend itself under successive 
efforts to defame and even through legal action cut off their 
efforts, but I would like to give Acting Under Secretary Hall 
Godfrey the opportunity to weigh in.
    The Chairman. All right. Because of the nature of what is 
happening here--Secretary Godfrey, did you hear that question?
    Ms. Godfrey. Yes, sir. I would start off by saying that the 
key tactics that authoritarian regimes use to limit access to 
information are the same tactics they have been using for a 
long time now, which is censorship and limiting freedom of 
expression and independent media in their own nations.
    Those challenges are, certainly, exacerbated by modern 
communications technologies. Fundamentally, we are still 
talking about governments who lie and work to keep other people 
from telling the truth.
    They do so by kicking out independent media, as we have 
seen Russia do with international media. They do so by telling 
their own journalists and citizens what they may and may not 
say.
    Just last week, the Government of Russia made clear that 
speakers in Russia cannot refer to the invasion of Ukraine as 
an invasion or as a war, and then they, certainly, continued 
the pursuit of their own lies, such as Russia blaming the 
United States or NATO or Western nations for their own invasion 
of Ukraine.
    Those tactics are not new. What is, of course, different 
today is the scale and reach of digital communications, and we 
see autocracies both exploiting those digital communications, 
but also seeking to control them in their own countries.
    Right now, Russians and Ukrainians can still access the 
internet, independent media. They can speak freely, and that is 
a good thing.
    I am very concerned--the State Department and the U.S. 
Government is very concerned--about actions the Russian 
governments and other autocracies will take to limit freedom of 
speech and freedom of media through controlling the physical 
means of internet and data connectivity.
    Right now, we still see Russians and Ukrainians in 
particular, with access to independent voices.
    The Chairman. All right. I am going to turn to Senator 
Risch. My goal is to hear not what our adversaries are doing. I 
understand what they are doing.
    My goal is to understand what we are doing in response to 
that. I will come back to you at the end of other members' 
questions.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Probably the most effective pushback I have seen in a long 
time was on TV last night when I turned on the news, saw the 
employee of the Russian TV station jump up with a sign and tell 
the Russian people that what they were hearing was lies and 
that the whole thing was misrepresented to the Russian people.
    She was escorted off, and her attorney, this morning, said 
she could not find her. So I suspect she is probably headed for 
Siberia or something like that.
    There were millions and millions of people in Russia that 
saw that, and I suspect it is--a lot of discussion this morning 
around the country.
    I want to talk about--I would like to hear what work you 
are doing regarding the countries that will be next. I think 
most of us believe that if Putin gets away with this, Moldova 
will, certainly, be next and be quite easy.
    After that, of course, will come Georgia, which probably 
would be a little bit tougher. Then after that, he has long 
lusted after the Baltic states, and after that, Poland and 
Czech Republic, and then he is on his way to putting the USSR 
back together again.
    What is being done to fend off the Russian aggression in 
these particular embattled countries? I would like to hear some 
specifics, if I can.
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Ranking Member. I think you raised a 
critically important question to which we are very well attuned 
that, certainly, Russia's--the threat that Russia represents is 
not solely with respect to Ukraine and we are absolutely 
shoring up our support in collaboration with allies and 
partners, including all the frontline states that you 
mentioned.
    I would note that the Baltic States, Moldova, and Georgia 
were all part of our Summit for Democracy effort. All of these 
countries are also part of the substantial U.S. humanitarian 
assistance that Congress has enabled so rapidly as we contend 
with what I described earlier as the worst humanitarian crisis 
in Europe since World War II.
    I think, in critical--in concrete terms, a case such as 
Lithuania--we have seen Lithuania, basically, embattled from 
all sides from taking a principled stand with respect to 
opening a liaison office with Taiwan and also, certainly, 
taking a very resolute stand against Putin's aggression.
    We have offered substantial support to Lithuania to stand 
up to Chinese economic coercion in the form of Export-Import 
Bank support, other supply chain-enabled assistance, and 
Moldova would be another case where we are offering 
considerable democracy assistance support.
    I would be happy to provide you later with some specific 
numbers where we have the positive development of the elections 
last year and a reformist government that, I think, is very 
well aligned with the goals of the Summit, countering 
authoritarianism, elevating the fight against corruption and 
advancing human rights internally and internationally.
    Senator Risch. Yes. I am sure glad to hear that--the 
efforts you are making with Lithuania. They really have been 
brave standing up to China and Russia, and, of course, they are 
right on the front line in Russia.
    Nobody knows the Russians better than they do, and I think 
we all need to help them move forward, if we can. Moldova is 
going to be a heavy lift. They are a very small country, and it 
is going to be very difficult for them to defend if and when 
Putin decides to go there.
    I have just got a short period of time left. I, and other 
my colleagues, including the chairman, have been very concerned 
with the activities of China in the--on the colleges and 
universities, and you heard the number I talked about--half a 
billion dollars going in.
    These monies are not put there out of the generosity of 
their heart, by any stretch. Do you have any initiatives 
pushing back on that on college campuses?
    Ms. Zeya. Ranking Member, I am going to ask Acting Under 
Secretary Hall Godfrey to respond here, given her 
responsibilities on the U.S. education side.
    Ms. Godfrey. Thank you very much for the question about 
Chinese influence in American colleges and universities--PRC 
influence, I should say.
    In 2020, sir, I think, as you know, with congressional 
support the Department of State began an earnest effort to 
ensure that American colleges and universities had a good 
understanding and visibility into the activities of the PRC on 
their campus and that their hosting of Chinese nationals in 
American universities was consistent with exchange program 
directives and policies.
    The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs began a 
considerable effort to ensure that updated guidance made it to 
colleges and universities who are sponsoring Confucius 
Institutes, the institutes that the Chinese educational--higher 
educational system uses to support Chinese scholars around the 
world--in 2020 when that initiative began, 55 American 
universities were hosting Confucius Institutes.
    Over the course of the past 2 years as American 
universities have sought to better understand the impact and 
activities of staff of Confucius Institutes on their campuses, 
today, only nine American colleges and universities continue to 
support Confucius Institutes.
    I should say we do continue to wholeheartedly welcome 
legitimate exchange in scholarship, including by citizens of 
China. We do very much want to make sure that the PRC--the 
Chinese Government--is not exploiting our open educational 
system to more malevolent ends.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that on the Confucius 
Institutes. Those numbers coming down are a good sign that 
there is some recognition going on. I am still very concerned 
about the flow of money with either grants or contracts with 
universities.
    My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Godfrey. Thank you. If I can add, sir, I do think the 
new requirements in place for American universities to make 
sure that they are declaring publicly what their foreign 
sources of funding for have had an impact as well.
    Senator Risch. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Let me just announce that because 
we had to take our WebEx system down several members had booked 
in via WebEx, and if they come physically to the hearing I will 
recognize them in that order, but right now, it is Senator 
Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, for this timely and important hearing, and, Under 
Secretaries, great to be with you again.
    Later today President Biden will sign into law the Omnibus. 
As was referenced in the introduction, I have the unique 
challenge of leading, along with my ranking member, Senator 
Graham, the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations 
Subcommittee, and we got the lowest allocation of any 
Appropriations Subcommittee.
    We were the victim of a last-minute bait and switch where 
nearly $2 billion got stripped from my subcommittee. Yet, we 
are in the moment when pushing back on authoritarianism, 
strengthening the tools of democracy, and responding to a whole 
series of global crises is exactly what we should prioritize 
investing in. Let me try and look forward and be positive, if I 
can.
    There were some pieces of the Omnibus that, I think, matter 
directly to this conversation, one of them the nearly $300 
million Countering Russian Information Fund, $860 million for 
the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
    The dialogue you were just having with the chairman and the 
ranking member about Russian disinformation and its influence 
in Eastern Europe and our ability to effectively push back on 
that in the middle of this brutal and tragic war in Ukraine, 
there are resources now, moving forward.
    In total, about $2.6 billion is being dedicated to 
democracy programs and about $300 million to the National 
Endowment for Democracy.
    Following the virtual Democracy Summit, I worked with 
Senator Graham to introduce the Democracy in the 21st Century 
Act, which would increase global democracy assistance to $3 
billion, modernize the tools that we have available to defend 
democracy with an emphasis on emerging technologies, combatting 
kleptocracy, and election integrity, and establish funds with 
flexible resources for confronting emerging challenges to 
democracy across the State Department, USAID, and the National 
Endowment for Democracy.
    Have you had a chance to review this bill? Do you think 
this committee taking up and passing and then Congress passing 
this bill before the next Democracy Summit would be useful and 
do you have any specific feedback for me on how we could make 
this an effective moment for both implementing this legislation 
and then fully funding our work to defend democracy in the 
world?
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you so much, Senator, for your commitment 
to resourcing our efforts to counter authoritarianism and, 
particularly, for putting forward this bill.
    I am well aware of it and I want to share with you that we 
share many of the bill's sentiments, and I think the 
prioritizations that you have put forward in the bill are well 
in line with President Biden's initiative for democratic 
renewal, which prioritized five lines of effort, including 
supporting free and independent media, elevating the fight 
against corruption, supporting election integrity against 
malign foreign influence, supporting democratic reformers, as 
well as what we call technology for democracy solutions.
    We look forward to working with you to ensure the bill can 
provide flexibility for the Secretary and deconflict any 
potential overlap in programs, and we really look forward to 
consulting with you and your team on specific provisions, and 
thank you for your commitment in putting it forward.
    Senator Coons. Given the experience of the last month 
where, frankly, I think President Biden and his national 
security team did a masterful job of pushing Putin off his game 
by proactively releasing the products of intelligence so that 
it was clear to our European partners and allies that we were 
well aware of Putin's next move and then he did things that 
confirmed, tragically, our predictions.
    Given the flood of Russian disinformation, obviously, both 
within Russia and into the region, how would you reshape some 
of these priorities in the context of the developments of the 
last few weeks?
    Ms. Zeya. Senator, I think the developments of the last 3 
weeks, in particular, only underscore the need for us to invest 
more in our efforts to combat disinformation and support free 
and independent media, and this is why the President's fiscal 
year 2022 request to Congress for media freedom represented a 
40 percent increase from the previous fiscal--from fiscal year 
2020.
    This will help us bolster the capacity of legitimate media 
outlets to provide trusted news, to operate as sustainable 
businesses, and leverage digital platforms to enhance audience.
    It will also support media literacy, teaching audiences 
around the world to better discern the real from the fake, and 
strengthen the legal and regulatory environment for press 
freedom so that sector can fulfill its watchdog function and 
counter so much of the noxious and destabilizing disinformation 
that we have seen issued from Russia, the PRC, and others.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Madam Under Secretary. Senators 
Shaheen and Durbin and I were, literally, in Lithuania as the 
war began. The day before we were in Poland.
    In both cases, we had the chance to visit in Poland, in 
particular, with a cable channel that is under a lot of 
pressure in terms of maintaining a free and open media.
    You requested a 40 percent increase. That is not what we 
were able to deliver here and I, frankly, think we need the 
bipartisan focus of this committee on making sure that we are 
actually delivering the resources to defend democracy at this 
critical moment.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you so much for being with us today, 
and I want to turn to this issue of transnational repression--
autocratic repression--and I am thinking very much about the 
huge number of tactics that we are seeing--assassinations, 
assaults, detentions, renditions, disappearances, surveillance, 
online surveillance, online stalking, and threats to family 
members back home, and about the variety of real-life examples 
that keep coming up, some of them happening abroad, some of 
them happening here in the United States.
    For example, a Chechen exile who was assassinated in Vienna 
who was very much a critic of Ramzan Kadyrov or however it is 
pronounced, or a Uighur activist who neighbors observed men 
photographing his home, rummaging through his mail.
    Then an individual approached him speaking to him in 
Mandarin at a protest at the Chinese Embassy and said, ``If you 
get poisoned, do you know how to treat yourself? You know the 
Chinese Government is very powerful. You could die in a car 
accident or you could get poisoned.''
    Intimidation of all forms, and this is just expanding with 
the kind of modern technology allows countries to keep track of 
dissidents abroad and to coordinate activities against them.
    How are we acting and responding to protect, in free 
countries, individuals from the assault from autocratic 
regimes?
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you so much, Senator, for raising this 
escalating concern--transnational repression--which we are 
elevating in the President's overall approach in countering 
authoritarianism.
    Just last week I had the privilege to host with my 
counterpart from DHS a closed roundtable with individuals 
impacted by transnational repression from all over the world 
and they described the very--absolutely disturbing practices 
that you just elaborated.
    We are on the case and we are working with our allies and 
partners to build international opposition to transnational 
repression, to deter and promote accountability for those who 
are perpetrating it, and we are offering increased support to 
protect human rights activists, journalists, political 
dissidents, defectors, and others, and encouraging like-minded 
governments to do the same.
    This is also part of our engagement with the private sector 
to try to identify and implement specific measures that will 
protect vulnerable individuals and communities, particularly 
online, and also support reforms that strengthen safeguards 
against the misuse of Interpol systems, in particular, which we 
have seen one tactic of the transnational repressors' playbook.
    Senator Merkley. I so much applaud the set of goals you 
just laid out. Apart from the--strengthening the protections 
for the misuse of Interpol, their goals--and they are not 
actually specific strategies--can you elaborate at all on 
specific ideas and strategies that we are promoting in terms of 
changes in regulations, changes in enforcement, our strategies 
of targeting and arrest of individuals engaged? What are--or is 
it just that difficult to get from the very important goals to 
the actual strategies on the street?
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you, sir. I mean, I would describe our 
strategy in three parts.
    One is strengthening our whole-of-government efforts. So 
this is not simply the job for the Department of State, but we 
are very closely looped up with Department of Justice, DHS, as 
well as Treasury and Commerce, who all have a role to play in a 
more effective and strategic U.S. response.
    We are also working to impose costs for the practice of 
transnational repression. One specific example with that--of 
that would be the creation last year of the global Khashoggi 
ban visa restriction policy, which promotes specific 
accountability for authoritarian regimes engaged in 
transnational repression.
    Then the other piece, I would say, is the global networking 
piece to ensure that other governments are aware and attuned to 
this increasing threats and that they do not allow their own 
territory to be misused for the practice of transnational 
repression against diaspora or exiled citizens.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you very much. I will just close 
with saying I think this is such an important area in this 
global competition between freedom-loving nations and 
autocracies that I am very concerned about the trends.
    Freedom House reports that in the last 16 consecutive years 
we have seen a decline in global freedom and that now only 20 
percent of the world lives in a free country, and those 
autocratic regimes they are going after dissent across the 
planet, including right inside our own borders, and we have to 
find every possible measure to address it.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our 
witnesses. I want to follow up on Senator Merkley's point 
because it is alarming.
    It is not just a 1-year trend. It has been a multi-year 
trend in the decline of countries that are free. Freedom House 
has said now we are--I think we are in our 16th consecutive 
year of declining democracies.
    We need to look at why that is happening, and there is no 
simple answer to it and we need a comprehensive strategy, 
including how we invest our international assistance budgets to 
support democratic institutions around the world.
    I want to talk about what we have seen in Ukraine and Mr. 
Putin--Mr. Putin's ability to wage war not only against 
Ukraine, but he has waged war against democratic institutions 
around the globe, including here in the United States.
    So how does he do it? He has an asymmetric arsenal that 
allows him to do things that are horrible, including supporting 
coups, including misinformation, including use of his military, 
weaponizing energy, et cetera.
    His ability to do that is because of the corrupt finances, 
the corrupt systems in which he has the ability to use the 
fruits of his corruption in order to advance those causes not 
only against his immediate neighbors, but, really, around the 
world.
    So we have two pieces of legislation and I want to get your 
comment on that. One is the Magnitsky sanctions that we have 
talked about frequently. It has gotten an awful lot of 
attention around the world today, and I think it is beyond any 
question about its effectiveness as we see Russian oligarchs 
trying to find a place to hide their assets that cannot be 
seized or places that they can visit. The visa bans and banking 
bans have really had a major impact on the ability to develop 
the kleptocracies around the world.
    We started that here in the United States Congress with the 
Magnitsky sanctions. Now it has grown through Europe and other 
countries--Canada. We have executive orders, but we have--the 
Magnitsky Global sanctions expire this year.
    My question to you, how important is it for Congress to 
make it clear that the Magnitsky sanctions are here to stay and 
to reauthorize and expand that law?
    Then, secondly, that bill, by the way, has passed this 
committee and it has been--it has passed--the Senate has acted 
on it a couple times. It just has not gotten to the finish 
line.
    The third is the Global--Combatting Global Corruption Act. 
These are both bipartisan acts. This was with Senator Young. 
The other bill I did was with Senator Wicker.
    Which is to have a global index on how well countries are 
fighting corruption so that we recognize the vulnerability of a 
country. If it is not fighting corruption it is very much part 
of the challenge we have in declining democracies.
    My question to you is how important is it for the U.S. 
leadership in both of these areas to make it clear that we will 
take action against those that are supporting these corrupt 
regimes and, secondly, we will have objective international 
standards on judging how well countries are fighting corruption 
that will influence our bilateral relations with those 
countries?
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you so much, Senator, and I just want to 
underscore that I believe the Global Magnitsky Act has been an 
essential tool in our work with international partners to deny 
corrupt actors, and you mentioned the Russian regime is a just 
absolutely critical example of that, using their ill-gotten 
gains.
    It is a vital accountability tool for us that we will 
continue to use to impose costs on kleptocrats and their 
authoritarian enablers.
    As far as the--your Global Corruption Act, I just want to 
say the Department is deeply committed to the bill's anti-
corruption goals and I think you have seen that from this 
Administration with our elevation of anti-corruption as a 
national security priority with the National Security 
Memorandum from June last year and the strategy that we 
released last December in tandem with the Summit for Democracy.
    As your bill prescribes, we will not hesitate to call upon 
governments to implement their anti-corruption commitments 
publicly and privately. We are going to continue to use visa 
restrictions and GLOMAG to apply pressure, and I think we look 
forward to discussing with you and your team some of the 
specific measures of the bill with respect to the tiering 
element and how we can best strengthen our efforts to push 
other countries to follow the U.S. example in creating more 
effective responses to kleptocratic corruption and holding 
others accountable.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Coons [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to 
both of our witnesses.
    I want to pursue the line of questioning about digital 
autocracies. We have seen in Putin's Russia him bringing down 
an Iron Curtain to keep out truth and information. In China, we 
see a Great Wall to keep out information and truthful 
information.
    We witnessed yesterday, many of us, a very brave Russian 
journalist who told the truth. She was an editor for TV1, a 
state-controlled TV station, who put up a poster saying, ``Do 
not believe the propaganda. They are lying to you.'' That is 
the kind of bravery we are witnessing for people who are trying 
to bring the truth.
    My question is, today, in terms of our own efforts--and I 
think this is probably a question for Ms. Godfrey to start 
with--what technologies are we using to try to both breach the 
Iron Curtain when it comes to information and the Great Wall 
when it comes to information?
    We had Radio Free Europe. We still do. Russians tried to--
continue to block that. We have a lot of new technologies. What 
are we doing right now to try to bring the Russian people the 
truth? Because the information I have seen to date indicates 
that a majority of Russians believe Putin's lies.
    Ms. Godfrey. Thank you, sir. Thank you for the question and 
for--both for calling out the bravery of Russian voices who are 
standing up and speaking out, potentially, at great personal 
cost to themselves, as well as for acknowledging the very real 
challenges that autocratic governments like Russia and China 
are imposing to keep their own citizens from accessing 
information and from knowing the truth.
    Senator Van Hollen. I guess my question is what are we 
doing to counter it. I just have limited time.
    Ms. Godfrey. Thank you.
    So we are continuing to do extensive media outreach, in 
particular, in Russia today. That includes to Russian language 
media like Dozhd and Meduza as well as to U.S. Government-
supported Russian language media like RFE/RL and Voice of 
America.
    While the Russian Government has tried to shut down these 
outlets and kick them out, Russians seeking access to them 
online has increased.
    Just this morning, USAGM confirmed to me that their reach 
in Russia has doubled since the Russian Government shut down 
access to RFE and VOA online.
    So while the Russian Government is trying, they are not yet 
succeeding in keeping Russian citizens from accessing 
independent media and we must continue to support independent 
media and make sure we are speaking up through that media.
    We are also engaging on new digital platforms in Russia. We 
have Telegram and VKontakte, which have not yet been shut down 
by the Russian Government. These are indigenous Russian 
language platforms that we are engaging on.
    We continue to engage through Twitter, Facebook, all of the 
other platforms that we used in Russia that, again, even though 
the Russian Government has tried to shut down those platforms, 
we still see Russian citizens accessing them and we will 
continue to use all of those means to continue to communicate 
with Russians.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    No, I think we need to continue to push the technological 
edge. I mean, this is the information equivalent of an arms 
race and Russia will continue to put up blockades and we need 
to use all the latest technology to try to make sure that we 
get information to the Russian people.
    The ranking member brought up in his opening statement the 
misinformation that both Russia and China are spreading with 
respect to biological laboratories in Ukraine and that started, 
in some ways, at a hearing in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee when Under Secretary Nuland answered a question 
accurately about the fact that we have been working with 
Ukrainians to make sure that these biological weapons labs are 
used for civilian purposes and not for military purposes--not 
for biological weapon purposes.
    As it turns out, a lot of the material that both Russia and 
China have used to make that propaganda claim originated, 
actually, on some right wing--very alt-right U.S. medium, and 
there was a memo that was surfaced by David Corn. The Kremlin 
sent a memo to the Russian media saying it is, ``essential to 
feature Tucker Carlson,'' who has been spreading this 
misinformation on his own show.
    Could you, Ms. Godfrey, respond a little bit to how 
Russians use that misinformation here in the United States to 
try to buttress their claims that their propaganda is accurate?
    I do find it extraordinary that in a moment that a Russian 
journalist is getting locked up for speaking the truth we have 
a Kremlin memo urging their state-controlled TV to push 
statements from U.S. commentators.
    Could you just talk to that issue?
    Ms. Godfrey. The information environment is not easily 
divided up into foreign speakers and domestic speakers. There 
is a great deal of overlap in that environment.
    It should be surprising to no one that governments like 
Russia and China will take remarks from anyone, whether it is 
Under Secretary Nuland or you or Tucker Carlson and seek to 
manipulate and exploit those remarks to their own ends, right. 
This is a tactic that purveyors of disinformation use routinely 
and regularly.
    Senator Van Hollen. Ms. Godfrey, I know my time is up. 
There is a distinction. It is harder to--it is harder for them 
to use accurate statements for propaganda, although they will 
try.
    In the case of Mr. Carlson, he actually provided the 
Russian talking point for them.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Coons. If there is no other member seeking, I would 
just like to thank our first witness and thank you for your 
testimony, and invite our second panel of Anne Applebaum and 
Dr. Daniel Twining to come forward to offer their testimony.
    Thank you, Madam Under Secretary.
    Senator Coons. In the interest of time, I am going to 
proceed with introductions as our witnesses for the second 
panel are getting seated.
    I would like to welcome Anne Applebaum, an accomplished 
journalist, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, author, political 
analyst, current Senior Fellow at the SNF Agora Institute Johns 
Hopkins, and staff writer for The Atlantic magazine.
    Her recent writing and research focus on the rise of global 
authoritarianism and the threats facing open society and 
liberal democratic ideals.
    Throughout her illustrious career, Ms. Applebaum has 
written extensively on issues of nationalism, corruption, 
xenophobia, disinformation, politics and history of Central 
Europe, and Russia's actions on the world stage over the past 
three decades.
    Her writing is timely, incisive, and a significant 
contribution to our deliberations at this critical moment in 
modern history.
    Welcome, Ms. Applebaum. It is a pleasure to have you here 
with us today.
    I would like to also introduce Dr. Daniel Twining. Dr. 
Twining is the president of the International Republican 
Institute where he leads the institute's efforts to advance 
democracy and freedom around the world.
    Dr. Twining served as counsel to the President, director of 
the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund, as a member of 
the Secretary of State's policy planning staff, and as the 
foreign policy adviser to my friend and former colleague, the 
late U.S. Senator John McCain.
    He has also been an associate at the National Intelligence 
Council, taught at Georgetown University, and served as a 
military instructor with the Naval Postgraduate School.
    Welcome, Dr. Twining. We are also very encouraged to have 
your timely and important testimony today.
    Ms. Applebaum.

 STATEMENT OF ANNE APPLEBAUM, ATLANTIC MAGAZINE STAFF WRITER, 
    SENIOR FELLOW AT THE SNF AGORA INSTITUTE, JOHNS HOPKINS 
                   UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Applebaum. Thank you very much and good morning, Mr. 
Acting Chairman and Ranking Member Risch, members of the 
committee. Thank you so much for inviting me here today.
    I am going to begin where Chairman Menendez left off. He 
spoke of how, in the 21st century, the old idea of an autocrat 
being a single person operating by himself is no longer true.
    Nowadays, autocracies are run not just by one bad guy, but 
by networks composed of kleptocratic financial structures, 
security services, and professional propagandists.
    The members of these networks are connected not only within 
a given country, but among many countries. The corrupt state-
controlled companies in Russia do business with the corrupt 
state-controlled companies in Venezuela and Iran.
    China sells surveillance technology all over the world, to 
Zimbabwe, to others. Oligarchs from multiple countries use the 
same accountants and lawyers to hide their money in Europe and 
here in the United States.
    Propagandists, whether from communist or nationalist or 
theocratic autocracies, pound home the same messages about the 
chaos of democracy and the evil of America. Their goal is to 
confuse audiences at home and abroad in order to make all of us 
believe that change is impossible.
    In my roles as a journalist in Poland, as a historian of 
Soviet communism, and as a member of the board of the National 
Endowment for Democracy, I have been writing about our 
responses to this new challenge for the past decade, and they 
are inadequate.
    Western sanctions alone have no impact on autocrats, who 
know they can continue to trade with one another. Accusations 
from human rights organizations mean nothing to dictators, who 
are protected by surveillance technology and vast personal 
wealth.
    Russia invaded Ukraine, in part, because the Russian 
president believed he would pay no price. After all, Russian 
invasions of Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, Russian 
assassinations carried out in Britain and Germany, Russian 
disinformation and political funding campaigns designed to 
impact democratic elections in America, France, and Germany, 
among many other places, none of this received a strong 
response either from us or from our democratic allies.
    Going forward, we need a completely new strategy towards 
Russia, towards China, and the rest of the autocratic world. 
Instead of always reacting to the latest outrage, we need to 
change the rules of the game altogether.
    Instead of imposing sanctions after the fact, punishing 
oligarchs who are already rich, we must alter our own financial 
system so that kleptocratic elites cannot use our company laws 
and our property markets to hide their stolen wealth and so 
that they cannot use that wealth to influence our own political 
system.
    Instead of merely responding to the virulent propaganda 
that comes out of Moscow or Beijing or Caracas, we should help 
deliver better information on a much broader scale to those 
countries in the languages that people speak.
    Instead of assuming we are protected by old norms on 
inviolability of borders, we need strategies of deterrence that 
take into account the real possibility that autocracies will 
use military force.
    In my written testimony, I suggest some specific steps. The 
elimination of secrecy in company ownership and real estate 
transactions, a more coherent organization of public diplomacy 
pulling together our excellent, but underfunded foreign 
language broadcasters, the media monitoring and research now 
done by the intelligence community, the Global Engagement 
Center at the State Department, and the tools of cultural 
diplomacy.
    All of these things should be connected to one another. 
They should know what one another is doing and they should work 
together.
    With thousands of talented Russians fleeing Moscow, this is 
also the time to think big. Why not create a Russian language 
television station that can compete with Putin's propaganda? 
Why not do the same in Mandarin or in other languages?
    We also need to put democracy back at the heart of our 
foreign policy thinking and we can start by imagining a 
different future for Ukraine.
    If Ukraine emerges from this war with its democracy and 
sovereignty intact, that victory would provide a 
transformational boost in confidence not only to democratic 
activists in Belarus and Russia, but also to those in Hong Kong 
and Caracas.
    By contrast, a defeat would be a terrible blow to all of 
them. The stakes of this war are already much higher than most 
in Washington have acknowledged, affecting NATO's credibility, 
the cohesion of the democratic camp, even Americans' own sense 
of their place in the world.
    It is not enough to avoid the worst outcomes. We need to 
think about achieving real victories in Ukraine and in the 
other struggles to come.
    Many thanks to the committee, once again, for this 
invitation and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Applebaum follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Ms. Anne Applebaum

    Good morning Chairman Menendez, Senator Risch, Members of the 
Committee: All of us have in our minds a cartoon image of what an 
autocratic state looks like. There is a bad man at the top. He controls 
the police. The police threaten the people with violence. There are 
evil collaborators, and maybe some brave dissidents.
    But in the 21st century, that cartoon bears little resemblance to 
reality. Nowadays, autocracies are run not by one bad guy, but by 
networks composed of kleptocratic financial structures, security 
services (military, police, paramilitary groups, surveillance 
personnel) and professional propagandists. The members of these 
networks are connected not only within a given country, but among many 
countries. The corrupt, state-controlled companies in one dictatorship 
do business with their counterparts in another, with the profits going 
to the leader and his inner circle. Oligarchs from multiple countries 
use the same accountants and lawyers to hide their money in Europe and 
America. The police forces in one country can arm, equip, and train the 
police forces in another; China notoriously sells surveillance 
technology all around the world. Propagandists share resources and 
tactics--the Russian troll farms that promote Putin's propaganda can 
also be used to promote the propaganda of Belarus or Venezuela. They 
also pound home the same messages about the weakness of democracy and 
the evil of America. Chinese sources are right now echoing fake Russian 
stories about non-existent Ukrainian chemical weapons. Their goal is to 
launch false narratives and confuse audiences in the United States and 
other free societies. They do so in order to make us believe that there 
is nothing we can do in response.
    This is not to say that there is a conspiracy, some super-secret 
room where bad guys meet, as in a James Bond movie. The new autocratic 
alliance doesn't have a structure, let alone an ideology. Among modern 
autocrats are people who call themselves communists, nationalists, and 
theocrats. Washington likes to talk about China and Chinese influence 
because that's easy, but what really links the leaders of these 
countries is a common desire to preserve their personal power. Unlike 
military or political alliances from other times and places, the 
members of this group don't operate like a bloc, but rather like a 
loose agglomeration of companies--call it Autocracy, Inc. Their links 
are cemented not by ideals but by deals--deals designed to replace 
Western sanctions or take the edge off Western economic boycotts, or to 
make them personally rich--which is why they can operate across 
geographical and historical lines.
    They protect one another and look after one another. In theory, for 
example, Venezuela is an international pariah. Since 2019, U.S. 
citizens and U.S. companies have been forbidden to do any business 
there; Canada, the European Union, and many of Venezuela's South 
American neighbors continue to increase sanctions on the country. And 
yet Venezuela receives loans as well as oil investment from Moscow and 
Beijing. Turkey facilitates the illicit Venezuelan gold trade. Cuba has 
long provided = advisers and security technology to Venezuela's rulers. 
The international narcotics trade keeps individual members of the 
regime well-supplied with designer shoes and handbags. Leopoldo Lopez, 
a onetime star of the opposition now living in exile in Spain, observes 
that although Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro's opponents have 
received some foreign assistance, it's a drop in the bucket, ``nothing 
comparable with what Maduro has received.''
    In the face of this new challenge, Western and American responses 
have been profoundly inadequate. Expressions of ``deep concern'' mean 
nothing to dictators who feel secure thanks to their high levels of 
surveillance and their personal wealth. Western sanctions alone have no 
impact on autocrats who know they can continue to trade with one 
another. As the war in Ukraine illustrates, our failure to use military 
deterrence had consequences. Russia did not believe that we would arm 
Ukraine because we had not done so in the past.
    For all of these reasons, we need a completely new strategy toward 
Russia, China and the rest of the autocratic world, one in which we 
don't merely react to the latest outrage, but change the rules of 
engagement altogether. We cannot merely slap sanctions on foreign 
oligarchs following some violation of international law, or our own 
laws: We must alter our financial system so that we stop kleptocratic 
elites from abusing it in the first place. We cannot just respond with 
furious fact-checking and denials when autocrats produce blatant 
propaganda: We must help provide accurate and timely information where 
there is none, and deliver it in the languages people speak. We cannot 
rely on old ideas about the liberal world order or the inviolability of 
borders, or even international institutions and treaties to protect our 
friends and allies: We need a military strategy, based in deterrence, 
that takes into account the real possibility that autocracies will use 
military force.
    The war in Ukraine has been launched because we did not do any of 
these things in the past. As he was preparing for this conflict, the 
Russian president calculated that the cost of international criticism, 
sanctions and military resistance would be very low. He would survive 
them. Past Russian invasions of Ukraine and Georgia; Russian 
assassinations carried out in Britain and Germany; Russian 
disinformation campaigns during democratic elections in America, 
France, Germany and elsewhere; Russian support for extremist or anti-
democratic politicians; none of this received any real response from us 
or from the democratic alliances that we lead. Vladimir Putin assumed, 
based on his own experience, that we would not react this time either. 
China, Belarus and other Russian allies assumed the same.
    Going forward, we cannot let this happen again. In my written 
testimony I will suggest some broad areas where we need to completely 
reimagine our policy. I will leave the necessary changes in military 
and intelligence strategy, especially the question of deterrence, to 
others who have more expertise in this area, and will focus on 
kleptocracy and disinformation. But I hope this hearing sparks a 
broader conversation. We need far more creative thinking about how we 
cannot just survive the war in Ukraine, but win the war in Ukraine--and 
how we can prevent similar wars from taking place in the future.
                put an end to transnational kleptocracy
    Currently a Russian, Angolan or Chinese oligarch can own a house in 
London, an estate on the Mediterranean, a company in Delaware and a 
trust in South Dakota without ever having to reveal to his own tax 
authorities or ours that these properties are his. A whole host of 
American and European intermediaries makes these kinds of transactions 
possible: lawyers, bankers, accountants, real estate agents, PR 
companies. Their work is legal. We have made it so. We can just as 
easily make it illegal. All of it. We don't need to tolerate a little 
bit of corruption, we can simply end the whole system, altogether.
    Although this testimony is being presented to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, which does not traditionally have oversight over 
the regulation of international finance, it is time to recognize the 
problem of international kleptocracy as a matter not just for the 
Treasury, but for those who make American foreign policy. After all, 
many modern autocrats hold on to power not just with violence, but by 
stealing from their own countries, laundering the money abroad, and 
then using their fortunes to maintain power at home and buy influence 
abroad. The Russian oligarchs in the news at the moment are not just 
wealthy men with yachts, they have been acting for many years as agents 
of the Russian state, representing the interests of the Russian 
leadership in myriad commercial and political transactions.
    We have the power to destroy this business model. We could require 
all real estate transactions, everywhere in the United States, to be 
totally transparent. We could require all companies, trusts and 
investment funds to be registered in the name of their real owners. We 
could ban Americans from keeping their money in tax havens, and we 
could ban American lawyers and accountants from engaging with tax 
havens. We could force art dealers and auction houses to carry out 
money-laundering checks, and close loopholes that allow anonymity in 
the private-equity and hedge-fund industries. We could launch a 
diplomatic crusade to persuade other democracies to do the same. Simply 
ending these practices would make life much more uncomfortable for the 
world's kleptocrats. It might have the benefit of making our own 
country more law-abiding, and freer of autocratic influence, as well.
    In addition to changing the law, we also need to jail those who 
break it. We need to step up our enforcement of the existing money-
laundering laws. It is not enough to sanction Russian oligarchs now, 
when it is too late, or to investigate their enablers, when it is too 
late for that, too. We need to prevent new kleptocratic elites from 
forming in the future. It must become not only socially toxic but also 
a criminal liability for anyone to handle stolen money, and not only in 
America.
    Now is the time to deepen the international conversation with our 
allies all over the world, to assess what they are doing, whether they 
are succeeding, and which steps we all need to take to ensure we are 
not building the autocracies of the future. Now is the time to reveal 
what we know about hidden money and who really controls it. The Biden 
administration has created a precedent, revealing intelligence leading 
up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Why not build on that precedent, 
and reveal what intelligence we have on Putin's money, Maduro's money, 
Xi Jinping's money or Alexander Lukashenko's money?
    Just as we once built an international anti-communist alliance, so 
we can build an international anti-corruption alliance, organized 
around the idea of transparency, accountability, and fairness. Those 
are the values that we should promote, not only at home but around the 
world. They are consistent with our democratic constitutions and with 
the rule of law that underlies all of our societies. Once again: Our 
failure to abide by those values in the past is one of the sources of 
today's crisis.
             don't fight the information war, undermine it
    Modern autocrats take information and ideas seriously. They 
understand the importance not only of controlling opinion inside their 
own countries, but also of influencing debates around the world. They 
spend accordingly: on television channels, local and national 
newspapers, bot networks. They buy officials and businessmen in 
democratic countries in order to have local spokesmen and advocates. 
China's United Front program also targets students, younger journalists 
and politicians, seeking to influence their thinking from an early age.
    For three decades, since the end of the Cold War, we have been 
pretending that we don't have to do any of this, because good 
information will somehow win the battle in the ``market of ideas.'' But 
there isn't a market of ideas, or not a free market. Instead, some 
ideas have been turbocharged by disinformation campaigns, by heavy 
spending, and by the social media algorithms that promote emotional and 
divisive content because that's what keeps people online. Since we 
first encountered Russian disinformation inside our own society, we've 
also imagined that our existing forms of communication could beat it 
without any special effort. But a decade's worth of studying Russian 
propaganda has taught me that fact-checking and swift reactions are 
useful but insufficient.
    We have a living example of how this works, right in front of us. 
We can watch the Ukrainians get their viewpoint across, by telling a 
moving, true story, by speaking in language used by ordinary people and 
by showing us the war as they see it. In doing so, they are reaching 
Americans, Europeans and many others. But at the same time, the false 
Russian narrative is the only one reaching Russians at home. It is also 
reaching many people in the broader, Russian-speaking world, as well as 
in India and the Middle East. The same is true of Chinese propaganda, 
which might not work here but has a strong impact in the developing 
world, where China presents its political system as a model for others 
to follow. Right now, for example, Chinese private technology groups, 
including Tencent, Sina Weibo and ByteDance, are promoting content 
backing Putin's war and suppressing posts that are sympathetic to 
Ukraine.
    In this new atmosphere, we need to rethink how we communicate. Much 
as we assembled the Department of Homeland Security out of disparate 
agencies after 9/11, we now need a much more carefully targeted effort 
that would pull together some of the departments in the U.S. Government 
that think about communication, not to do propaganda but to reach more 
people around the world with better information and to stop autocracies 
from distorting that knowledge. The building blocks already exist, even 
if they are not currently coordinated. U.S.-funded international 
broadcasting, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of 
America and the rest of the services now housed at the U.S. Agency for 
Global Media; the Global Engagement Center, currently in the State 
Department; the Open Source Center, a large media monitoring and 
translation service currently squirreled away in the intelligence 
community where its work is hard to access; research into foreign 
audiences and internet tactics; public diplomacy and cultural 
diplomacy.
    The teams who work on these things should be jointly thinking about 
the best way to communicate democratic values in undemocratic places, 
jointly sharing experiences, jointly informing and engaging other parts 
of the U.S. Government. In any given country there are different kinds 
of audiences and there may be different tools and tactics needed to 
reach them. Parts of the U.S. Government may have thought about this 
problem, but others have not. The dysfunction and scandal that have 
dogged international broadcasting, with Michael Pack's disastrous 
tenure at USAGM only the latest example, needs to end. Congressional 
leadership is needed to put these services on a different and better 
footing.
    Some of what we should do is simply provide more and better 
information to people who want it. RFE/RL's online performance 
increased by 99 percent during the first 2 weeks of the war in Ukraine. 
Viewership of YouTube videos of RFE/RL programming tripled. This proves 
the value of communicating with Russian speakers all over Eurasia--
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Baltic States, even Germany, 
home to some 3 million native Russian-speakers. But small increases in 
funding for this vital population are insufficient.
    We need to provide real, long-lasting competition for the Russian 
state-run cable and satellite television that most of the people in 
these regions watch. Hundreds of talented Russian journalists and media 
professionals have just fled Moscow: Why not start a Russian television 
channel, perhaps jointly funded by Europe and America, to employ them 
and give them a way to work? At the same time, we should increase 
funding for existing Russian independent media outlets, most now 
expelled from the country, and provide support for the many grassroots 
efforts to run social media campaigns inside and outside the country.
    But although Russia is of special interest at the moment, we also 
need to consider, as Congress is already doing, an expansion of funding 
for Radio Free Asia, which has received only a third of the funding of 
RFE/RL, despite its potential to reach a large audience inside China 
and the Chinese diaspora around the world. Although relatively small, 
RFA was the first news organization to uncover mass detentions in 
Xinjiang; RFA also provided the first documentation of China's cover-up 
of the first coronavirus fatalities in Wuhan. We need RFA to be able to 
counter Chinese propaganda, to put China's Belt and Road projects in 
Southeast Asia into context for audiences in Cambodia, Laos, Burma, and 
Vietnam, to enhance its digital global initiative to engage younger, 
Mandarin-speaking audiences wary of Beijing's dominant media 
narratives. We also need to scale up the work of the Open Technology 
Fund, which supports internet freedom technologies at every stage of 
development. OTF makes it possible for millions to access independent 
journalism in closed media environments.
    In all of the foreign languages that we work, we need to shift from 
an era of ``bullhorn digital broadcasting'' to a new era of ``digital 
samizdat,'' mobilizing informed citizens and teaching them to 
distribute information. These tactics may not get to everyone, but they 
can be targeted at younger audiences, diasporas and elites who have 
influence within their countries.
    In this new era, funding for education and culture need some 
rethinking too. Shouldn't there be a Russian-language university, in 
Vilnius or Warsaw, to house all of the intellectuals and thinkers who 
have just left Moscow? Don't we need to spend more on education in 
Hindi and Persian? Existing programs should be recast and redesigned 
for a different era, one in which so much more can be known about the 
world, but in which so much money is being spent by the autocracies to 
distort that knowledge. The goal should be to ensure that there is a 
different idea of ``Russianness'' available to the Russian diaspora, 
aside from the one provided by Putin, and that alternative outlets are 
available for people in other autocratic societies as well.
           put democracy back at the center of foreign policy
    It is no accident that Americans are united in their support for 
Ukraine. A large, bipartisan majority, for example, back the U.S. 
decision to boycott Russian oil, even if it led to higher prices. This 
is because Americans identify with people who are clearly fighting for 
their freedom, their independence and their democracy. It is a central 
part of how we define ourselves, and who we are.
    I recognize that it is naive to assume we can have the same policy 
towards every dictator, that we cannot give the same support to every 
democracy movement; I understand that there are tradeoffs to make in 
diplomacy as in everything else. This is not the Cold War, there is no 
Warsaw Pact, and not every judgement about every autocracy is black and 
white. But our preference for democracy and our willingness to defend 
key democracies should never be in doubt. The fact is that Russians 
clearly doubted whether we and our allies were even willing to help 
Ukraine fight back. We failed, in advance, to telegraph the fact that 
we would. We cannot let that happen again.
    In addition to being a historian and journalist, I am also on the 
board of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the independent 
organization that Congress has generously funded for years. I want to 
express here my thanks for that support, as well as my hope that it 
will continue. NED is ahead of the curve in its thinking about these 
issues, has supported networks of journalists to help in international 
investigations of kleptocracy as well as independent journalism of all 
kinds, on top of its support for democracy activism all over the world. 
Funding NED is necessary but not sufficient, however. U.S. foreign 
policy is in fact made by dozens of different actors, all across the 
government and American society. Congressional leadership can help 
focus all of them not just on the defense of existing institutions, but 
on the creative thinking we now lack.
    To put it bluntly, we need to be able to imagine a different kind 
of future, one in which our nation and its ideas are not in retreat, 
but in the ascendance. We need to approach displaced diasporas all over 
the world as an opportunity, not a burden: How can we prepare them to 
take back the countries that they have lost, in Syria, Afghanistan or 
Russia? We need to break the links between autocracies, to forge new 
and better links between democracies, to reinvent existing 
international institutions that are no longer fit for purpose. It is 
alarming, even astonishing, that the United Nations has played no role 
in preventing or mitigating the war in Ukraine because Russia, as a 
Security Council member, has so successfully blocked it from doing so. 
In fact, Russia and China have been seeking for years to undermine the 
UN and all of the other international organizations that conventional 
wisdom said would promote human rights and prevent exactly the kind of 
unprovoked war that we are seeing unfold today. It may be time to 
create some alternatives, to think about how the democratic world can 
organize alternatives, in the event that the UN is no longer interested 
in pursuing peaceful development.
    Finally, it's extremely important that we imagine a different 
future for Ukraine. A victory in this conflict, whatever that means--a 
Russian retreat, or a negotiated settlement following Russia's failure 
to conquer the country--would provide an enormous, transformational 
boost in confidence to the entire democratic world, including to the 
democratic activists in Belarus and Ukraine who oppose the war, even to 
democratic activists in places as far away as Hong Kong, Burma, or 
Venezuela.
    A defeat--defined as the end of Ukrainian sovereignty--would be a 
terrible blow to all of them. The consequences are much higher than 
most in Congress and the Administration seem to have yet acknowledged. 
Ukraine is not in NATO, but it is a de facto member of the European 
world, and the democratic world. Ukrainian failure will have an impact 
on NATO's credibility and on the democratic world's cohesion, whether 
we like it or not.
    We need to think about victory, and how to achieve it, not only in 
this conflict but in the others to come, over the next years and 
decades.
    Thank you very much for your attention.

    The Chairman [presiding]. Mr. Twining.

     STATEMENT OF DANIEL TWINING, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL 
              REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Twining. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, 
members of this distinguished committee, it is really a 
pleasure to be back in the Senate to testify before you on 
countering authoritarianism, a topic at the heart of our work 
at IRI to advance democracy worldwide.
    Foreign authoritarians and the Chinese Communist Party and 
the Kremlin want to make the world safe for autocracy. Their 
tools include economic leverage, influence operations, digital 
disinformation, and the export of repressive technologies.
    IRI's programming equips countries to push back. We equip 
democrats around the world with knowledge and tools to expose 
and counter foreign malign influence, bolstering democracies 
against the corrosive effects of this rising tide.
    The Chinese Communist Party is engaging the rest of the 
world with the same philosophy it uses to govern its own 
country.
    It claims to be promoting respect for every country's 
individual political path, but it seeks to create a world 
molded in its authoritarian image. Harsh coercion is only half 
the story of how the Party keeps control at home.
    The offer the Party makes to its elites is actually two-
sided--oppose us and we will crush you, but support us and we 
can help make you rich. The CCP has now taken this approach 
global.
    When offering other countries gold does not work, the CCP 
offers the sword. Political leaders who stand up to Chinese 
bullying and aggression find their countries on the receiving 
end of economic coercion with China using its economic might to 
impose political compliance.
    The Party tries to aggressively shape discourse about China 
including here at home. We see cornerstones of American life 
like the NBA, Hollywood, and Wall Street go out of their way to 
placate the CCP's warped notions of political correctness, 
including on the atrocities in Xinjiang.
    China's coercive efforts to influence other countries also 
target the Chinese diaspora, attempting to turn them into tools 
of Beijing's design.
    The democratic world has an advantage. No country wants to 
import China's political Leninist model, and democracies, 
historically, have been far more resilient than autocracies. We 
have found that civil society and democratic activism remain 
the most effective tools to identify and push back against CCP 
influence.
    A free and competitive media landscape is a crucial way 
democracies can inoculate themselves against Chinese malign 
influence in the information space.
    Independent media and investigative journalists are some of 
the best checks against state-curated propaganda as well as 
useful assets in exposing foreign authoritarian corruption.
    Political parties play a central role in combatting Chinese 
political interference. Political parties in countries like 
Australia and Lithuania have formed cross-partisan coalitions 
to push back against PRC economic coercion.
    Parties shown to be in the pocket of a foreign 
authoritarian power will not succeed in open democratic 
competition anywhere. The U.S. really must do more to help 
friendly democracies protect themselves from malign Chinese 
influence.
    A few ideas include supporting collective economic defense, 
number one. NATO stands as a bulwark against Russian aggression 
in the military domain, but there is no institution that 
provides collective economic security to countries coerced by 
China for standing up for democratic values. Protecting the 
free world requires a credible deterrent to Chinese economic 
aggression.
    Two, providing technical support to countries negotiating 
Belt and Road deals. Some countries have signed bad deals with 
China because they lacked technical expertise to negotiate good 
ones. The U.S. and our allies can fill this gap, helping 
nations secure high-quality deals that are transparent, 
citizen-centric, and noncorrupt.
    Three, supporting independent journalism. China cultivates 
journalists around the world to advance pro-CCP narratives, 
effectively removing independent voices from the conversation 
on China.
    The U.S. should support independent media to investigate 
and expose corruption, counter state-sponsored propaganda, 
bolster the integrity of the information space, and build media 
literacy to mitigate the impact of authoritarian 
disinformation.
    Four, investing in responsive governance. Supporting 
democracy around the world creates a comparative forward policy 
advantage for America.
    In an era of ideologically-driven great power competition, 
supporting the aspiration to freedom abroad is not only the 
right thing to do, it produces tangible national security 
benefits, including preventing friendly countries from 
succumbing to state capture by foreign authoritarians.
    Polls show Americans support this kind of values-based 
leadership and believe we should stand with democracies against 
authoritarian assault. The U.S. should allocate more resources 
to steal the foundations of global democracy against 
authoritarian powers' insidious attacks.
    Just to wrap up, over the past few years the work of IRI, 
the National Democratic Institute, the National Endowment for 
Democracy, and others--through that work, we have developed 
networks, tools, and resources to bolster democratic resilience 
to authoritarian overtures.
    Democracy requires active defense. Political 
accountability, transparency, innovation, and resilience remain 
the most effective antidotes to authoritarian aggression and 
when democracies stand together authoritarians take note.
    It is essential to invest in democracy assistance, to help 
champions of government of the people, by the people, and for 
the people build institutions strong enough to stand against 
authoritarian subversion.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Twining follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Dr. Daniel Twining

                              introduction
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of 
the Committee, it is my pleasure to testify before you to today on 
countering authoritarianism, a topic at the heart of the International 
Republican Institute's work to advance democracy worldwide.
    More than ever, foreign authoritarian actors like the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and Putin's regime in Russia are taking an 
increasingly aggressive approach to exerting influence in democracies 
around the world. Using economic leverage, influence operations, 
digital disinformation, and the export of repressive technologies, 
China and Russia are propping up other repressive states and placing 
pressure on democratic actors. But these tools are often poorly 
understood, as are the ways by which democratic governments and civil 
societies can work together to fight back.
    IRI's Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence (CFAI) programming 
equips democracies to do just that. Through cutting-edge research, 
global convening, and equipping civil society, the media, government 
officials, political parties, and the private sector with the knowledge 
and tools to expose and counter foreign authoritarian influence, IRI 
and its partners are bolstering democracies against the corrosive 
effects of this rising authoritarian tide.
    Today I will explore how the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
interferes in democratic countries, underscoring the strengths of the 
PRC's approach as well as weaknesses to leverage. I will highlight key 
sources of democratic resilience IRI has observed that offer lessons 
and opportunities for future efforts to counter authoritarian 
aggression.
         why and how the ccp interferes in democratic countries
    The question of why we are seeing the PRC attempts to malignly 
influence democratic countries is impossible to understand without 
understanding the Chinese Communist Party's goals. Since the PRC's 
founding, all of its top leaders have spoken of the ``great renewal of 
the Chinese race.'' CCP political slogans come and go, but this one 
remains, precisely because it encapsulates both of the CCP's strongest 
political rallying tools: potent ethno-nationalism, and a promise to 
return China to the center of world events.
    Under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, the great renewal of the 
Chinese race has been given practical form in what Xi calls the 
``community of common destiny.'' As explained by former NSC Director 
for China Liza Tobin, the realization of the community of common 
destiny would entail a world where ``the international community would 
regard Beijing's authoritarian governance model as a superior 
alternative to Western electoral democracy, and the world would credit 
the Communist Party of China for developing a new path to peace, 
prosperity, and modernity that other countries can follow.''
    To lead the world, one must engage with the world. And the CCP is 
engaging with the rest of the world with the same philosophies it uses 
to govern its own country. The community of common destiny is notable 
mainly for what it does not envision: robust limits on state power over 
citizens, vibrant press freedom, or the supervision of government 
officials through competitive elections. The CCP claims to be promoting 
respect for every country's individual political path, but it is 
unabashedly seeking to create a world molded in its authoritarian 
image.
    The CCP is also seeking leadership over other countries through 
many of the same tools it uses domestically. Understanding these tools 
is key to discerning how the U.S. and its partners should respond.
    IRI's research on PRC interference globally demonstrates 
unequivocally that China's economic strength is at the center of the 
CCP's attempts to bend other countries to its will. This should not 
come as a surprise, since it is of a piece with how it maintains 
control domestically. Many think harsh coercion is the only way the 
Party keeps control at home. But that is only half the story. The offer 
the Party makes to its elites at home is actually two-sided: openly 
oppose us, and yes, we will crush you. But support us, and we can help 
make you rich.
    The CCP has now taken this approach global. Its infrastructure 
deals are frequently padded with extra costs, to better pad the pockets 
of local elites, and to the detriment of ordinary people. Apart from 
potentially turning other governments into client states, this 
willingness to dispense largesse without upfront strings attached is 
exacerbating pre-existing issues with corruption and governance in the 
process. For example, a major railroad-construction project in Kenya 
was won by PRC contractors in a closed tender at prices per mile far 
above international standards, for reasons that remain poorly 
explained. The railroad has failed to turn its projected profits. 
Indeed, it has failed to turn any profit, and the Kenyan Government 
recently raised taxes on essential commodities like cooking gas and 
internet data, in part to cope with the county's unwieldy external debt 
burden.\1\
    An unfinished Chinese-built highway in North Macedonia has now 
become one of the most expensive in the world per mile and has saddled 
the country with debts that may take generations to pay down.\2\ In 
2017, the PRC offered to extend a lifeline to the floundering 
government of a former Malaysian prime minister by spying on Wall 
Street Journal reporters who were reporting on the Malaysian 
Government's corruption. In return, the PRC demanded in writing that 
Malaysia sign onto enormous infrastructure deals financed at ``above-
market'' lending rates.
    Just like at home, when offering other countries gold does not 
work, the CCP offers the sword. Political leaders around the world who 
have taken steps to stand up to PRC bullying and aggression have found 
themselves on the receiving end of economic coercion designed to turn 
their business communities against them. Beijing cut off some of 
Australia's most important exports after Canberra passed a series of 
laws designed to limit foreign interference in its elections. And even 
as we speak, the CCP is punishing the freedom-loving people of 
Lithuania for standing with Taiwan by pressuring German and French 
multinationals to drop Lithuanian suppliers. These are but two from a 
long list of similar efforts by Beijing to use China's economic might 
to impose political compliance on smaller democracies.
    Secondly, our research shows that the PRC tries to aggressively 
shape discourse about China in every country it influences. Just as 
inside China, this is often as much about shaping what people don't 
say, as much as what they do say. Examples of CCP-induced self-
censorship in open societies are undoubtedly well known to this 
committee. In recent years we have seen cornerstones of American life 
like the NBA, Hollywood, and Wall Street go out of their way to placate 
the PRC's warped notions of political correctness.
    But I must single out the example of Xinjiang for special 
discussion. The ongoing suffering of the Uyghur people of Xinjiang--and 
the feebleness of the international community's response to what 
independent tribunals have determined is an ongoing genocide--show that 
in at least one important way, China has already succeeded in building 
a new world, even if many people in Washington and other world capitals 
do not yet realize it.
    Previous instances of genocide in Darfur and Myanmar saw the 
pillars of our collective international conscience mobilizing to demand 
a halt. Heads of state declared that such unconscionable crimes must 
cease. UN general secretaries stepped in to personally mediate between 
conflict-ridden parties. Celebrities like George Clooney and Angelina 
Jolie went out of their way to make sure the calls for an end to 
killing carried well beyond the halls of power, helping to mobilize 
publics around the world.
    The silence around Xinjiang, in contrast, remains deafening. While 
democratic legislatures like the U.S. Congress have sounded the alarm, 
precious few heads of state have directly addressed the genocide, for 
fear of endangering ties with China. Some people within the UN, like 
the Human Rights Council's special rapporteurs for freedom of religion 
and slavery, have done their jobs by shining a light on the horrific 
abuses Uyghurs have suffered. But UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres 
has gone out of his way to avoid the issue, while a report on Xinjiang 
supposedly completed by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights remains unpublished for unexplained reasons.\3\ And apart from a 
declaration by director Judd Apatow that ``China has bought our 
silence'' on Xinjiang,\4\ A-list celebrities have had almost nothing to 
say about the largest mass internment of an ethnic group since the 
Holocaust.
    China's coercive efforts to influence other countries also target 
the Chinese diaspora, attempting to turn them into tools for Beijing's 
whims. This is undoubtedly the most corrosive way the CCP interferes in 
other countries. Research by IRI and many others has shown that Chinese 
diaspora communities around the world are already seen with undeserved, 
racially-focused suspicion by people who--falsely--believe them to be 
unthinking vessels for Beijing's will. As a result, attacks on Chinese 
communities around the world are tragically commonplace.
    Last November, for example, following dissatisfaction with the 
Solomon Islands' switch of recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, rioters 
burned down large parts of the Chinatown in the capital city of 
Honiara, leaving several dead and hundreds homeless.\5\ Needless to 
say, the ordinary Chinese people deprived of life and property had very 
little to do with the grey men in Beijing who engineered the switch in 
recognition. Despite this and many other such events, Beijing is 
unapologetic in its efforts to claim the diaspora for its own. It has 
shown no regard--or even awareness--for how it is stoking preexisting 
racism and placing Chinese communities the world over at risk.
                          the ccp's strengths
    We have to take seriously these and other forms of the CCP's 
interference in democracies, because they are abetted by genuine 
domestic strengths. China ruled by the CCP is not the USSR of 
yesteryear. Its challenge to the international order is arguably more 
potent, and we must understand its strengths, so that we understand 
that attempts to push back on PRC interference will be neither quick 
nor easy.
    First and most importantly, the Party remains a capable manager of 
its own enormous economy. This is despite growing economic headwinds 
and pressure from U.S. sanctions. It employs some of the world's best-
trained economic technocrats, and takes some, if not all, of their 
advice.\6\ This means that over the short- to medium-term, China is 
likely to remain a market Western businesses want to be in, and Western 
countries want to trade with.
    Second, the Party's command over the economy gives it enormous 
ability to shape the incentives of foreign interlocutors. China is the 
world's biggest trading nation and has the world's largest retail 
market. The Party guards access to this market zealously. The Party 
arguably has more economic resources at its direct command than the 
U.S. Government. At the end of 2020, for example, the 92 state-owned 
enterprises directly managed by the PRC central government had assets 
worth $14.8 trillion, or about 64 percent of U.S. GDP.\7\
    Another unfortunate but potent factor to consider is that the CCP 
is unrepentantly corrupt, and corruption remains, in many cases, an 
extremely effective way of making inroads with political elites around 
the world.\8\ As I illustrated before, much of China's corrosive effect 
on other countries stems from the fact that its companies don't have to 
worry about being accountable to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
while trying to win foreign project tenders.
    And finally, I must mention that despite China's growing global 
footprint, we have found in our IRI research and trainings around the 
world that levels of knowledge about China remain relatively low. Many 
people--including political and business elites who engage with China--
still don't know what they're dealing with, and do not grasp the 
danger.
                          the ccp's weaknesses
    While the Party's rule of China gives it certain advantages in 
projecting authoritarianism abroad, there are also significant 
weaknesses that should give us real optimism about democracies' 
resilience in the face of CCP interference.
    First, it is not clear that the Party under Xi Jinping has the 
diplomatic agility to carry its techno-authoritarian control beyond 
China's borders. Since Xi took command in 2012, his hard turn into 
retrograde, inward-looking politics has been reflected in a willingness 
to alienate other countries for domestic political benefit. Xi's harsh, 
coercive brand of ``wolf-warrior'' diplomacy has repeatedly proven 
itself to be a strategic own-goal. Under Xi, China's external overreach 
has almost single-handedly summoned into being geopolitical balancing 
coalitions that a cannier strategist would have avoided.
    We should also be optimistic because of our own relative strengths. 
Like Isaiah Berlin's proverbial hedgehog, the Party understands one big 
thing very well: that money matters, and that controlling and using 
money is crucial to winning consent for China's rise. But for that one 
strength, it is weak in many places where the U.S. and our democratic 
partners excel.
    Firstly and most importantly, the Party has difficulty winning 
other countries' trust and building genuine partnerships, to say 
nothing of deep alliances. Secondly, despite ongoing efforts to attract 
global talent, Chinese society is fundamentally unequipped to 
effectively integrate people of different races and nationalities in 
the way the U.S. can. Per capita, China has fewer residents born in 
other countries than any nation in the world, making it the opposite of 
a global cosmopolitan center to which the world's best and brightest 
flock. Finally, in our work we have found that, the more other 
democracies come to understand the true nature of the Chinese Communist 
Party, the less they like it. Stifling, self-centered, surveillance 
authoritarianism is, it turns out, not very attractive to anyone.
                    sources of democratic resilience
    The lack of appeal of the CCP's political model is just one of the 
reasons for hope. Another is the fundamental resilience of democracies 
around the world. Despite advances made by the PRC and other 
authoritarian actors in recent years, our work has thrown light on deep 
reserves of this resilience, even in nations most deeply impacted by 
CCP political interference.
    We have found that civil society and democratic activism remain the 
most effective tools democracies have to identify and push back against 
PRC influence. IRI partners around the world, from Panama to Kenya, 
have led groundbreaking campaigns to expose the corrosive impact of PRC 
influence on local democratic institutions. The opacity of Chinese 
development bank loan contracts has been met, in many places, with 
society-wide mobilization demanding government transparency and 
accountability. In many instances, the illiberal nature of PRC 
engagement with countries in the `global South' has given rise to a new 
generation of bottom-up movements seeking to realize the inclusive, 
equitable, and transparent governance their elites have promised.
    A free and competitive media landscape is also a crucial way 
democracies can inoculate themselves against malign PRC influence on 
their information space. Independent media and investigative 
journalists are some of the best checks against state-curated 
propaganda. We have seen, in countries like Kenya, Malaysia, and 
Ecuador, that journalists can prompt demands for reform in their 
nations' relationship with China through investigations that bring 
opaque deals to light and unearth the negative impact of Chinese 
investment on local communities.
    Lastly, I would like to discuss the central role that political 
parties can play in combatting PRC political interference. Despite the 
CCP's aggressive attempts to co-opt other political parties through its 
International Liaison Department, democratic political parties in many 
corners of the world are proving their resilience. Political parties in 
countries such as Australia and Lithuania have formed bipartisan and 
multi-partisan coalitions in the face of PRC economic coercion. 
Lithuania's ruling party coalition has pushed to take a more critical 
stance against the authoritarian actions of the PRC, leading to 
significant policy shifts that favor democratic outcomes. To scale and 
spur this type of action with parties around the globe, it will be 
imperative to share both Australia's and Lithuania's story with broader 
audiences, as we do at IRI in our global political-party programming to 
counter Chinese malign influence.
               china and russia in the context of ukraine
    One final subject deserves attention given the events of recent 
days: the growing authoritarian nexus between China and Russia. 
Alongside China, other authoritarian actors, including Russia, are 
trying to further their political interests by weakening democratic 
institutions. Of particular concern is strengthening cooperation 
between Russia and China, which are both pursing strategies to create a 
world safe for their authoritarian aggression--whether against Ukraine 
or Taiwan.
    Historically, collaboration between Beijing and Moscow was 
inhibited by their competing goals: the PRC aims to bolster its 
international reputation, while Russia seeks to undermine trust in 
Western institutions. However, where their mutual interests converge, 
we now see increasing alignment, particularly in their information 
operations. Russia and China have coordinated their propaganda 
narratives on the development of COVID-19 vaccines, U.S. and European 
sanctions regimes, and allegations of Western interference in 
opposition movements, including pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and 
Russia.
    The ongoing war in Ukraine highlights the extent to which China 
will align itself with Russian interests--Beijing refused to call 
Russia's attack on Ukraine an invasion and opposes the economic 
measures that have been taken against Russia. Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
has emphasized that China-Russia relations remain ``ironclad,'' and 
China is actively amplifying Russian disinformation claiming the U.S. 
is developing biological weapons in Ukraine.\9\ Although their methods 
differ, both Putin and Xi have clearly stated their ambition to 
dismantle the free and open international order led by the United 
States and replace it with one centered on authoritarianism and spheres 
of influence.
                         policy recommendations
    The United States has many strengths in this competition. Aside 
from comprehensively bolstering our own competitiveness, there is much 
we can do to support democracies standing against PRC interference 
globally. Some specific ways we could do so:

   Support collective economic defense: NATO is currently 
        proving its worth as a bulwark against Russian aggression. But 
        there is no institution to provide collective economic security 
        to countries being coerced by the PRC simply for standing up 
        for democratic values. Bills such as the Countering China 
        Economic Coercion Act are a good start, but the U.S. and our 
        partners need to do more. We should immediately begin 
        undertaking serious efforts to construct a credible deterrent 
        to PRC economic aggression.

   Provide technical support to countries negotiating BRI 
        deals: Some countries have signed bad deals with China because 
        they lacked technical expertise to negotiate good ones. The 
        U.S. and our allies can fill this gap, and we should find ways 
        to do so--if only because infrastructure shortfalls around the 
        world provide leaders with compelling rationales to continue to 
        turn to the PRC for lending. If they do so, their publics and 
        political opposition should know that technical support is 
        available to make sure the deals are good ones, so that they 
        can demand to know why leaders failed to take advantage of such 
        a facility.

   Support independent journalism globally: Chinese propaganda 
        outlets like CGTN have seen success in places like Africa 
        because they have the money to offer higher salaries to 
        credible journalists and recognized early on the importance of 
        cultivating local talent to advance pro-PRC narratives, 
        effectively removing independent voices from the conversation 
        on China. The CCP has gone as far as outright attempts to buy 
        public broadcasters in many African countries, in addition to 
        its efforts to coopt local media and spread pro-PRC 
        disinformation and propaganda. The U.S. and our allies have 
        prioritized support for independent journalism for many years, 
        but our efforts do not currently match the scale of the 
        challenge. The U.S. must invest additional resources in 
        democracy, rights, and governance programming to support 
        independent media to investigate and expose authoritarian 
        aggression; counter state-sponsored propaganda and 
        disinformation; bolster the integrity of the information space; 
        and build media literacy to mitigate the impact of 
        disinformation on popular perceptions of actors like the PRC 
        and the Kremlin.

   Support democracy and responsive governance: Supporting 
        democracy around the world creates a comparative foreign policy 
        advantage for the United States. U.S. support for democratic 
        principles through institutions like IRI, the National 
        Democratic Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy 
        has had measurable impact on democratic development and 
        resilience around the world. In an era of ideologically driven 
        great-power competition, supporting the aspiration to freedom 
        abroad is not only the right thing to--it produces tangible 
        national security benefits for the United States, including 
        preventing friendly countries from succumbing to state capture 
        by foreign authoritarian adversaries. Polling by the Bush 
        Institute, the Penn-Biden Center, and the Reagan Institute 
        shows that Americans support such values-based leadership and 
        believe the United States should stand with democracies against 
        authoritarian assault. Building on the Democracy Summit and 
        working with the Department of States and United States Agency 
        for International Development, the U.S. can and must allocate 
        the resources to steel the foundations of global democracy 
        against authoritarian powers' insidious attacks.
                               conclusion
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of 
the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony today. 
Over the past few years, through the work of IRI, the National 
Endowment for Democracy, and others, we have developed the networks, 
tools, and resources to bolster democratic resilience to authoritarian 
overtures. As the convergent disinformation campaign waged by Russia 
and China over Russia's invasion of Ukraine reverberates from Italy to 
Indonesia, we are reminded that democracy requires active defense in 
the face of unprecedented challenges. Democratic accountability, 
transparency, innovation, and resilience remain the most effective 
antidotes to authoritarian aggression. And when democracies stand 
together in a show of democratic unity, backed by the tools of 
political and economic statecraft, authoritarians take note. So do our 
partners. It is--and it will remain--essential that we continue to 
invest in democracy assistance to help champions of government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people the world over to build 
institutions strong enough to stand against a rising tide of 
authoritarian subversion. Thank you and I look forward to your 
questions.

----------------
Notes

    \1\ Warah, Rasna. ``COVID-19 only heightened Kenya's existing 
economic problem.'' One, 10 February 2022, https://www.one.org/africa/
blog/covid19-kenya-economy-inflation/.
    \2\ Higgins, Andrews. ``A Pricey Drive Down Montenegro's Highway 
`From Nowhere to Nowhere'.'' The New York Times, 14 August 2021, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/14/world/europe/montenegro-highway-
china.html.
    \3\ ``Open Letter to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: OHCHR 
Report on Grave Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang Can Wait No 
Longer.'' Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/
2022/03/08/open-letter-un-high-commissioner-human-rights-ohchr-report-
grave-human-rights#.
    \4\ Evans, Zachary. ```China Has Bought Our Silence:' Director Judd 
Apatow Criticizes Film Industry for Ignoring Uyghur `Genocide.''' 
National Review, 16 September 2020. https://www.nationalreview.com/
news/china-has-bought-our-silence-director-judd-apatow-criticizes-film-
industry-for-ignoring-uyghur-genocide/.
    \5\ Zhuang, Yan. ``3 Bodies Found Amid Violence in Solomon 
Island.'' The New York Times, 26 November 2021. https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/11/27/world/asia/solomon-islands-protests-
bodies.html.
    \6\ Li, Cheng. ``China's Economic Decisionmakers.'' Brookings, 
March-April 2008. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
03_china_li.pdf.
    \7\ ``Comprehensive Report of the State Council on the Management 
of State-Owned Assets in 2020.'' The National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China, 21 October 2021. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/
c30834/202110/c63f586559e84bc0ae85fa752d358f0c.shtml.
    \8\ Jirous, Filip. ``China in the Balkans: Neutral Business Partner 
or a Foreign Power?'' European Western Balkans, 28 June 2019. https://
europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/06/28/china-in-the-balkans-neutral-
business-partner-or-a-foreign-power/; Martin, Wes. ``Corruption is 
China's Friend in its Quest to Dominate Africa.'' The National 
Interest, 13 September 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/
corruption-chinas-friend-its-quest-dominate-africa-31242;``United 
Nations with Chinese Characteristics: Elite Capture and Discourse 
Management on a Global Scale.'' Sinopsis, 20 July 2019, https://
sinopsis.cz/en/united-nations-with-chinese-characteristics-elite-
capture-and-discourse-management-on-a-global-scale/
    \9\ Kim, Patricia M. ``China's Choices and the Fate of the Post-
Post-Cold War Era.'' Brookings, The Brookings Institution, 8 Mar. 2022, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/03/08/chinas-
choices-and-the-fate-of-the-post-post-cold-war-era/.

    The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. We will 
start a series of questions of 5-minute rounds.
    Dr. Applebaum, your testimony is exactly in line with my 
sentiments and thinking, what I was trying to get our previous 
witnesses to engage in--what are we doing--and there are some 
parts of your testimony that, I think, deserve to be 
highlighted and I want to engage with you on it.
    You say that we have to change the rules of engagement 
altogether, that we must alter our financial system so that we 
stop kleptocratic elites from abusing it in the first place, 
that we must provide accurate and timely information where 
there is none and deliver it in the languages people speak, and 
we need a military strategy based in deterrence that takes into 
account the real possibility the autocracies will use military 
force.
    You go on to say when we talk about transnational 
kleptocracy that ``a whole host of American and European 
intermediaries make these kind of transactions possible--
lawyers, bankers, accountants, real estate agencies, PR 
companies'' and you say their work is legal.
    ``We have made it so. We can just as easily make it 
illegal. We do not need to tolerate a little bit of corruption 
when we can simply end the whole system altogether.''
    Finally, you say ``Just as we once built an international 
anti-communist alliance, so can we build an international anti-
corruption alliance organized around the idea of transparency, 
accountability, and fairness,'' and ``We need to provide real 
long-lasting competition for Russian state-run cable and 
satellite television that most of the people in these regions 
ultimately follow.''
    That is what I was trying to drive with our previous panel. 
Could you elaborate on some of those things? How would we go 
about, in your mind, doing that?
    Ms. Applebaum. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for those 
comments.
    Let me say two things. One is that, in this new atmosphere 
we need to rethink how we communicate.
    This is a real emergency, and much as we assembled the 
Department of Homeland Security out of disparate agencies after 
9/11, I think we now need a much more carefully targeted effort 
that will pull together some of the disparate parts of the U.S. 
Government that think about public diplomacy, but do not 
necessarily act together.
    We have the very talented, but underfunded Radio Free 
Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the others. They 
are now at this U.S. Agency for Global Media. We have the 
Global Engagement Center currently at the State Department, the 
Open Source Center, which is a large media monitoring and 
translation service, which is now in the intelligence community 
where its work is hard to access. It would help a lot to put 
these together.
    I do not mean a major departmental reorganization, but if 
they are thinking together, if they are acting together, if 
they--using the same research, I think they will be more 
effective.
    One of the things that we have learned about disinformation 
in the last several years is that fact checking and counter 
disinformation are never as good as offering an alternate 
narrative--a better story.
    Reaching Russians with a Russian-language television 
station run by Russians--among them the hundreds if not 
thousands of Russians who have just escaped Moscow would be a 
good start.
    The second part of the answer requires an understanding 
that kleptocracy is not something that happens on Caribbean 
islands, far away. It happens here in American states, in South 
Dakota, in Delaware. Changing our own rules will help push back 
against it. For example, there is no reason why Americans need 
to own companies anonymously or own property anonymously or why 
anybody else should be able to do that in America either.
    I know these are not normally questions for the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, but international financial 
markets are now part of foreign policy in a way that they did 
not used to be.
    I hope that we will consider making changes at home and 
getting our allies to do the same. It is much better not just 
to sanction people, but to prevent them from getting wealthy 
illegally in the first place.
    The Chairman. Finally, both to you and Mr. Twining, it 
seems to me that we dramatically underfund these initiatives 
when, in fact, they would be as powerful and, in some cases, I 
believe, more powerful than what we do in the Department of 
Defense, because if we succeed at this then we are less likely 
to find ourselves in the need of conflict.
    Is that a fair statement and if not, why not?
    Dr. Twining. Mr. Chairman, could I just point out that the 
Chinese and the Russians both spend an inordinate amount of 
money to subvert and weaken and attack democracy all over the 
world, that it is central to their grand strategy as 
authoritarian great powers.
    So we should take the fact that they care about this dead 
seriously in our own country. I would not suggest taking it out 
of the defense budget, but I would suggest, for instance, that 
the reason that Ukrainians are fighting so valiantly is because 
they have a real democracy to defend, that they are fighting 
for their freedom.
    They are not fighting for a leader, and that investing in 
democratic resilience is a sure source of security. It also 
helps produce great allies for the United States.
    The Chairman. Yes. I was not suggesting taking it out of 
the Defense Department. What I was saying is that it is as 
powerful as some of what we do in the Defense Department and, 
in my mind, more preventative that we do not end up sending 
America's sons and daughters abroad.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Applebaum, I think that those remarks you made and 
reminding us all that autocracy is not one person, that it is a 
person sitting on top of a pyramid of people who are just as 
bad as the autocrat themselves and, in some respects, even 
worse, and I think that is appropriate that we think about it 
like that, and I think it is appropriate that we act towards 
that, the whole system and not just one individual. So I 
appreciate that.
    I was--really enjoyed hearing your comments about thinking 
bigger when it comes to promoting democracy. Here is the 
problem I have with it, and maybe you can give us some 
suggestions how we get past this.
    I want to talk about Voice of America. Voice of America 
puts out some good stuff. I have done some stuff for them, and 
I imagine everybody on this committee has probably done some 
things for them.
    Some of the other stuff I have heard them put out is just 
stunningly an attack on America itself, and I have heard 
programs where they use some of the difficulties we have--and 
we have difficulties in America, whether you are talking about 
race relations, whether you are talking about income equity and 
those kinds of things that people do not like--but I have heard 
some of those things Voice of America puts out, and I have 
complained about it and I am told to mind my own business, that 
they have editorial freedom and they can put out whatever they 
want to put out, which, I guess, is true.
    My gosh, the stuff I heard, I would not want--I was 
dismayed that U.S. taxpayer money was using this to put--if I 
were somebody sitting somewhere and listening to this say, boy, 
that is an awful place, this America place. We have, certainly, 
got things better here under an autocracy than they have under 
a democracy.
    So what are your thoughts on that? I mean, I really like 
the idea about having TV in addition to radio. We have all been 
around the world and turned on the TV and when you turn on--in 
any major African city you turn on the TV and you will find a 
Chinese program that is done in Chinese and with translations 
for the people to watch.
    I am intrigued by that. Because of our freedoms and because 
of the disdain some Americans have for their own country 
because of some detail that they do not particularly like, how 
do you get around that? Have you had some thoughts on that?
    Ms. Applebaum. Thank you so much for that question, 
Senator. I think we could ask it about almost any journalism--
who controls it, how it should be, how it should be shaped.
    I do think that the one difference between an American 
funding program for journalism and, say, a Russian state 
funding program is precisely the fact that it is not controlled 
by this body or any other.
    It is precisely because it is not controlled directly by 
the U.S. Government that is has some credibility, even though 
you might not like everything that it says or I might not like 
everything that it says.
    Its credibility comes from the sense of independence it 
has, and the more independence that it is given the better an 
advertisement for our political system and for our media it 
will be.
    That does not mean that every journalist is perfect and 
every report is ideal. I think the aim with U.S. broadcasting 
should always be to show at least a range of ideas.
    Senator Risch. Yes. I think that is a legitimate argument, 
and you make that well.
    I am telling you, the stuff I heard was just poisonous. I 
mean, it was not--it was stuff that I was embarrassed and 
ashamed that we were using taxpayers' money to tell the rest of 
the world about what an awful place America was.
    I appreciate that independence--editorial independence is 
important. Boy, I will tell you, we were sure going in the 
wrong direction, and I think we are doing more damage than we 
were good by putting that out.
    Anyway, I think that is a problem, but I agree with you. I 
mean, our adversaries are spending a tremendous amount of money 
on these, as we all see when we turn on the TV, whether you are 
in Europe or in Africa or anywhere else.
    Thanks for those thoughts.
    Mr. Twining, do you have any thoughts in that regard?
    Dr. Twining. Sir, just that our way of life is very 
attractive and compelling, and I think we have spent a few 
years convincing ourselves that it is not. It is very 
compelling to people all over the world.
    The leaders of Russia and China have put their people in 
big propaganda bubbles and they want to convince them that 
somehow we are decadent, we are internally divided, America is 
violent--all of these caricatures.
    So anything we can do to help just tell the truth about the 
great country that we live in. We should not forget that people 
around the world, including across Russia and China, actually 
would love to live in the United States if they could.
    So information should be working for us, not for our 
competitors, and I really appreciate the focus of this hearing 
because we have a lot of work to do to get the real story in, 
not just about ourselves, but including about the corruption 
and just extraordinary totalitarian abuses that are happening 
in Russia and China.
    Senator Risch. That is a good thought, and I think if you 
could get enough of that in people's hands, they would have a 
clear understanding of what a wonderful country this is.
    I was in China right after China opened up, and there were 
actually a group of people watching a U.S. TV station off a 
satellite, and I said to the guide--I said, what is going on 
here, and he said, oh, they love American TV, blah, blah, blah.
    I said, I cannot help, but think that somebody over there 
is going to have a problem with this because they were watching 
American TV with advertising. They were advertising Cadillacs 
and Coca Cola and new homes and everything else.
    I said, what do people think about that? He says, oh, the 
government tells them that is all--that is all American 
propaganda. That is not really the way it is over here.
    I suspect the more of that that got out, probably the 
better off we would be.
    My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the 
witnesses.
    Ms. Applebaum, I want to start with your testimony. You 
talked about a couple of things we should do and one of the 
things you talked about was public diplomacy, education, 
cultural--having that be strong.
    Since I am not shy about criticizing Republican colleagues 
for slowing down the confirmation of Biden nominees, here is 
one where I got to ask the Biden administration what is up.
    The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs--I do not believe the Administration has sent us a 
nominee. This is a position that is a top 10 position at the 
State Department. It has been a position since 1999 and, yet, 
in the entire history of this position it has only had a 
confirmed Under Secretary about 35 percent of the time.
    It was about 37 percent of the time during President Bush's 
8 years. It was vacant 37 percent of the time during the Bush 
administration. It was vacant 20 percent of the time during the 
Obama administration. It was vacant 90 percent of the time 
during the Trump administration.
    This is a top 10 position in the State Department, and if 
we are going to try to compete in this information and public 
diplomacy we have got to have people in place.
    What kind of a message does it send when the U.S. has a 
position like this and just decides, both either an 
Administration or Congress, not to bother to confirm anyone?
    Ms. Applebaum. Senator, thank you so much for that 
question. I was reading some of that research myself a couple 
of days ago.
    I think the truth is that we have underestimated the role 
and the need for public diplomacy and I think it is a 
bipartisan problem. It has somehow been a less prestigious part 
of our foreign policy, and this is why I am suggesting pulling 
together some of the public diplomacy functions that exist, 
actually, spread across the U.S. Government.
    You would be best positioned to decide whether these 
functions should be their own agency or part of some other 
department. What matters is that we focus them, bring them 
together, have them jointly discuss what are the values that we 
are trying to get across, how are we going to do it, what do we 
understand about foreign audiences, have we really looked at 
who is on the Russian internet, have we thought about how to 
reach the people who use it.
    Of course, we can reach Russian liberals, and we might not 
be able to reach Russian Putinists, but there are a lot of 
people in the middle and there might be ways of reaching them 
that we have not thought about yet.
    Doing some of that research, having some of that knowledge, 
and then having it spread through different parts of the 
government, with different people working on this problem from 
different angles, I think, could be incredibly valuable.
    Senator Kaine. Dr. Twining, I want to direct a different 
question to you. You could say something about this in 
answering if you want.
    I really appreciate your answer, Ms. Applebaum, and I would 
just encourage the Administration. We are 14 months into the 
Administration. Send us a good nominee for this position. The 
acting is doing a good job. I do not have a dog in the hunt in 
terms of who should be the nominee. Why have it be a position 
that is downgraded by not sending us someone to confirm?
    The Summit for Democracy that happened in December, I want 
to ask each of you, and maybe beginning with Dr. Twining, about 
the prospects for this.
    I think it was sort of--because it was virtual, it probably 
was not all it could be. It was a first step. I will say the 
Administration did zero outreach to the senators.
    I surveyed my Senate colleagues to see is anybody reaching 
out and saying, hey, Senators, what should we emphasize? What 
priorities should we put? The answer that I got back, at least 
from my Democratic colleagues, was no.
    I do think there is an opportunity to involve the Article 1 
branch in matters like this and give it a higher level of 
importance.
    What might you hope--since there is going to be, hopefully, 
an in-person summit at the end of this calendar year, what 
might you each hope we could accomplish through that venue?
    Dr. Twining. Thanks, Senator, and thanks for your 
leadership on the NED Board. We really appreciate it.
    My brief answer would be we need to focus on what unites 
us, not what divides us, as free and open societies. The Biden 
administration asked countries to each make a set of domestic 
commitments on democratic reform and renewal. That is all well 
and good.
    At the end of the day, we just have a lot more in common 
with free and open societies and we should understand that our 
adversaries are out there.
    They are not internally in our own societies, that we live 
in a free and open order that is upheld by the United States 
and our democratic friends and allies and that this is a group 
of countries that has the most stake in defending and 
supporting that order.
    That includes taking on these very difficult issues we have 
been discussing around digital authoritarianism, around all 
sorts of difficulties for democracy.
    Fundamentally, the authoritarians have had momentum for the 
past decade or so, and it is bizarre because there has never 
been higher levels of political participation.
    There is this enormous bottom-up energy in the world. 
Before COVID in 2019 there were more street protests than any 
time since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
    There is this enormous energy that is welling up, yet there 
is this top-down clamp down, and we need to join, essentially, 
the street and those small democratic actors creating that 
democratic momentum.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would just like to note that I deeply respect both of the 
panelists today. I had the occasion to work with Daniel Twining 
at IRI and have watched him over the years, an extraordinary 
leader of that organization and an extraordinary mind.
    Anne Applebaum, I have enjoyed reading her books and her 
articles at Atlantic. Her book ``Twilight of Democracy'' is one 
which has, obviously, captivated many of us that follow the 
great battle that is going on between authoritarianism and 
freedom.
    I would note, Senator Kaine, as you know, I spent most of 
my career in the private sector, and I look at how the Federal 
Government is organized and managed and I see nothing like it 
in any corporation anywhere in the world.
    Any entity that was trying to accomplish a significant 
purpose would be organized very differently than our 
government. We have agency after agency, department after 
department. Who is the chief operating officer? Who are the 
group vice presidents?
    We are not organized to take on something as important as 
communicating who we are and communicating the power of 
freedom, and we have, as Ms. Applebaum has pointed out, people 
throughout government doing a little bit of communication, but 
we have not put that together.
    Even the Russians have a department of propaganda, as I 
understand it. Why we do not have a single entity responsible 
for communicating our message throughout the world I do not 
quite know.
    Ms. Applebaum, you have spoken about the need to get public 
information to the people in Russia, for instance. Is there a 
way of doing that? Maybe you do not know the answer to that.
    I wonder even today how much are they hearing about what is 
really happening in Ukraine? The idea that we still have 
something called Voice of America and Radio Free Europe I sort 
of--I scratch my head.
    Does anyone listen to the radio anymore? I mean, do we not 
communicate in the methods that the Russians, for instance, are 
using and more effectively and what are they hearing?
    Ms. Applebaum. Senator Romney, thank you so much for those 
comments and for that question. I am not going to pretend that 
Russians are still getting the same amount of information that 
they got even 3 weeks ago.
    The Russian internet is being shut down. Facebook and 
Twitter are both gone. Instagram is gone. The digital space 
inside Russia is closing.
    I think that this means that we need to shift from an era 
of bullhorn digital broadcasting, where we just put stuff out, 
to a new era of digital samizdat.
    That means mobilizing informed citizens, contacting people 
either in the diaspora or inside the country who we know are 
able to pass messages on, or who are influencers or who can 
pass on information, and target them.
    We need more careful targeting of who our information goes 
to and, as I said in one of my previous answers, put much more 
careful thought into who are the audiences, what are the 
audiences hearing, what media are they actually getting, and 
how can we get our point of view into it.
    I do not think that we know the answer right now because I 
do not think we have thought that way in a long time. I do 
think the answers are knowable and it could be done.
    Senator Romney. Daniel, do you have a sense of what 
Russians are hearing today? You have colleagues that are 
working in Russia. Are they giving you a sense of what the 
Russian people are hearing?
    I saw a brave employee or broadcaster who actually jumped 
into a live broadcast with a sign saying, there is a war we are 
committing in Ukraine--we need to protest, but this is, 
obviously, the exception. How much is getting through?
    Dr. Twining. Thanks, Senator. Thanks for all your support 
for IRI and the cause.
    Not enough is getting through. Most Russians, it sounds 
like anecdotally, support Putin's war because they believe 
Kremlin propaganda that Ukraine conducted aggression against 
Russia and NATO conducted aggression against Russia.
    We have a fundamental problem. Russians also do not see--
the Kremlin has been very sharp in censoring images of the 
battlefield, of wounded Russian--captured Russian soldiers, 
that sort of thing.
    In addition to telling America's story in a country like 
Russia, really, we should be doing a better job of getting 
information into Russia showing what Russians are doing to 
their Slavic brothers in Ukraine, using Chechen--terrorists is 
probably the best word to call that--literally, recruiting 
foreign fighters from Syria and countries in the Middle East to 
go and kill Ukrainians. Russians do not know that these things 
are going on.
    We just have so much work to do, and I think if Russians 
understood the truth they would see very clearly that this war 
is a big mistake.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you both.
    One last question. We have talked about the 
authoritarianism. We have talked about the need for a more 
comprehensive and cohesive strategy.
    We also see countries, democracies, being harmed from 
corrosive forces within, unscrupulous leaders who use the 
democratic process to rise to power and then seek to, 
basically, subvert it, at the end of the day, in order to stay 
in power and I think of places like Brazil and Hungary as 
examples of that.
    What can we do or should we do as it relates to working 
against the hollowing out of democracies?
    Ms. Applebaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an excellent 
question.
    In fact, most democracies nowadays fail not because of a 
coup d'etat or some young colonel who breaks into the 
presidential palace, but precisely because somebody who has won 
power by democratic means then seeks to undermine the 
institutions.
    I think the United States can make a big difference in 
fighting this phenomenon which, as you say, is now visible all 
over the world, firstly, by talking about it and speaking about 
it and making it a central part of our diplomacy. Also, if we 
can, by living it ourselves, making sure that we talk about our 
own democratic institutions and making sure that they are 
strong.
    People do watch what we do. The United States is an example 
around the world. Making it clear to our foreign partners that 
we care about this, that it matters to us, that we have--we are 
not just interested in trade, we are not just interested in 
questions of hard power, but that these aspects of life also 
make a difference to us and then become part of our diplomacy.
    The Chairman. Dr. Twining.
    Dr. Twining. It is a great question, Chairman.
    Part of----
    The Chairman. We only ask great questions here.
    [Laughter.]
    Dr. Twining. I mean, part of, I think, the critique is that 
with respect to some of our allies that you mentioned is that 
the degradation of democracy in those countries has become a 
vector for malign foreign authoritarian influence.
    In other words, the degradation of democracy in allied 
countries actually undermines the core security component of 
our alliances with those countries.
    We need to, as Anne suggests, make democracy more central 
to our approach to alliances, but we also really have to invest 
in countervailing institutions.
    Most what we have seen over the past decade play out in 
many countries, including allied countries, is leaders take 
over in free and fair elections and then systematically 
dismantle countervailing institutions: parliaments that could 
check and balance their power, free and open media, independent 
courts, civil society.
    So investing in those countervailing institutions. I mean, 
frankly, I am not saying this because we are sitting in the 
U.S. Senate.
    I do not think there is a whole lot more effective in 
checking executive power than a very strong parliament that can 
conduct effective oversight. We do a lot of that work around 
the world.
    Young people--particularly, young people--are often 
disenchanted with, ``democracy'' not because they want an 
authoritarian solution, but because they see elections produce 
leaders who then do this systematic hollowing out and then 
engage in corruption, use public funds for their private ends, 
et cetera.
    Some of these activities, frankly, have given democracy a 
bad name, but we look at Afrobarometer polling, for instance, 
in Africa--and I will close with this.
    There is stronger support among people in Africa for 
democracy and open government than ever. It is just that they 
are not getting supplied with that open and effective 
government. The demand is stronger than ever and we should meet 
it.
    The Chairman. Thank you both for some incisive testimony. 
This is one of my passions and I intend to use your testimony 
as a foundation for a legislative initiative in this regard, 
and we look forward to being able to call upon both of you in 
the future if you are so willing.
    With the thanks of the committee for your participation, 
the record will remain open until the close of business 
tomorrow. This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


                Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Authoritarian regimes are responsible for countless 
refugee and forced migration crises across the globe, including 
Ukraine. President Lukashenko of Belarus sought to weaponize the misery 
of tens of thousands of migrants along its border with Poland. Millions 
of Venezuelans suffering under the Maduro regime have fled, and 
thousands of Nicaraguans have been forcibly displaced since 
demonstrations were brutally suppressed. Under Secretary Zeya, rather 
than attempting to deter refugees and migrants with harsh border 
infrastructures and asylum systems, how should democratic host 
countries create refugee and asylum policies that reflect their shared 
interest in the struggle for freedom?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working 
with host governments and other partners to support solutions for those 
forcibly displaced from their homes. In the Western Hemisphere, the 
Collaborative Migration Management Strategy (CMMS) emphasizes the 
importance of working closely with international organizations that 
provide support for refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), and returned migrants, providing assistance to address 
the humanitarian needs of these populations, expanding access to 
protection, increasing opportunities for refugees to integrate in the 
region, increasing shelters and other safe space networks, meeting 
needs for water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and expanding U.S. 
resettlement of refugees from the region.
    Around the world, we encourage governments to adhere to 
international protection obligations for the more than 84 million 
forcibly displaced persons across the globe, including those affected 
by conflicts and crises generated by authoritarian regimes in Europe, 
the Americas, and beyond. Through humanitarian assistance and 
diplomacy, the Department is working with host countries to support 
their capacity to protect and assist refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, 
and stateless persons, and advocate for their access to identity 
documentation, legal employment, and inclusion in national health and 
education services, easing pressure on local host communities and 
enhancing self-reliance opportunities for those forcibly displaced. 
Such efforts include the push for regional progress on regularization 
for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Ecuador and Peru, as well as 
strong support for Colombia's 10-year temporary protected status for 
Venezuelans, a model for the region and beyond. This also includes the 
humanitarian assistance we are providing in response to the historic 
humanitarian crisis for those fleeing the conflict in Ukraine. We also 
continue to actively engage multilaterally and through regional fora to 
promote safe, orderly, and humane international migration policies.

    Question. As the world's largest democracy, India has a special 
role and responsibility in exemplifying good governance and upholding 
democratic principles. But India's recent track record--both at home 
and abroad--has been mixed. The current government is clamping down on 
domestic press and media freedoms, discriminating against religious 
minorities, and suppressing opposition voices. Internationally, India 
has yet to take a clear stand against Russia's unprovoked and illegal 
invasion of Ukraine, a fellow democracy. Under Secretary Zeya, what is 
the Department doing to ensure India remains committed to its 
constitutional principles of secularism and equality?

    Answer. The Department is committed to supporting democratic 
principles in our engagements with India, including an open, inclusive, 
empowered, and fully functioning civil society and respect for human 
rights, including the freedoms of religion or belief, expression, 
peaceful assembly, and association.
    The United States and India share many of the same characteristics 
that demonstrate the strength of our democracies. We appreciated Prime 
Minister Modi's participation in the Summit for Democracy and hope to 
coordinate with India on meaningful progress during the ``Year of 
Action'' ahead of the next Summit.
    As fellow democracies, it is important for the United States and 
India to speak frankly about the importance of upholding democratic 
principles. The Department at the most senior levels has engaged and 
will continue to engage senior Indian officials on human rights 
concerns, such as protection of freedom of expression and freedom of 
religion or belief. In addition, the Department will continue to 
regularly consult Indian and international civil society organizations 
to learn from their expertise and concerns related to these issues. We 
look to further deepen these engagements once a U.S. Ambassador to 
India is confirmed.

    Question. And how is the Department communicating to our friends in 
New Delhi that becoming a closer ally of the United States requires 
addressing our concerns over democratic backsliding rather than simply 
ignoring them?

    Answer. The U.S.-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership 
is multifaceted and multidimensional; our shared democratic principles 
must underscore this partnership. Senior Department officials, 
including me, regularly engage senior Indian officials on human rights 
concerns, such as protection of freedom of expression and freedom of 
religion or belief. In addition, the Department will continue to 
regularly consult Indian and international civil society organizations 
to learn from their expertise related to these issues and to hear their 
concerns.

    Question. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Chinese and Russian 
technologies are enabling the region's dictators to increasingly 
control internet access, traffic in misinformation and disinformation, 
and monitor citizens. In Venezuela, the regime uses the information 
collected from its national identity system, which uses Chinese 
technology, to inform decisions on censorship, internet shutdowns, and 
arrests. Cuba's internet infrastructure was also built with equipment 
acquired from Chinese companies. Following the July 2021 protests in 
Cuba, the regime shut down the internet in an attempt to disrupt the 
unprecedented countrywide protests. In El Salvador, President Bukele 
uses disinformation to paper over his dismantling of democratic 
governance. Under Secretary Zeya, how can we use new technologies to 
counteract rising authoritarianism in Latin America?

    Answer. The PRC and Russia have spent years working to undermine 
the U.S. vision of an Internet that is open, interoperable, secure, and 
reliable, as well as governed through a multistakeholder approach. 
While doing so, they have provided support to authoritarian regimes in 
Latin America to facilitate their repressive practices. Stemming the 
misuse of technologies by governments, including in Latin America, is a 
priority for the Department.
    Making digital technologies work for, not against, democracies and 
combating digital authoritarianism is a key priority for the Biden 
administration. For example, one U.S. Government commitment during the 
Summit for Democracy was launching the International Grand Challenges 
on Democracy-Affirming Technologies to galvanize innovation in 
technologies that support democratic values asymmetrically, such as 
privacy-enhancing technologies and tools to combat government-imposed 
Internet shutdowns with peer-to-peer technology. The Department also 
launched the U.S. Anticorruption Solutions through Emerging Technology 
(ASET) program to accelerate technological solutions to counter 
corruption worldwide. Emerging technologies such as artificial 
intelligence are also critical tools to promote human rights--for 
example, by combatting human trafficking; analyzing data to flag 
patterns of discrimination or abuse; and helping human rights defenders 
comb through photos, videos, or text to hold governments accountable.
    For over a decade, the Department has funded programs to advance 
Internet freedom globally, especially in Internet-repressive 
environments. These include the development, deployment, and 
localization of anti-censorship circumvention and secure communications 
tools and technologies, as well as digital security capacity building 
and emergency response to support members of civil society, independent 
media, and human rights defenders to securely and reliably access the 
global Internet in contexts where governments restrict human rights 
online.

    Question. The atrocities perpetrated against the Uyghur population 
by the Chinese Government in Xinjiang are well documented. Especially 
troubling is the support of this ongoing genocide through genetic 
surveillance by the Chinese Government and Chinese companies. Under 
Secretary Zeya, what is the State Department doing to address this 
threat and what additional resources or tools does the Department need 
in this area?

    Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by the People's 
Republic of China's use of technology to surveil, control, and repress 
predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious 
minority groups, as well as, but not limited to, those who are 
activists, at home and abroad.
    We are strengthening our whole-of-government effort to respond. We 
continue to work closely with the Commerce Department to add entities 
to their Entity List, when appropriate, if an entity is connected to 
human rights abuses. We continue to promote accountability for those 
involved in such conduct using available visa restriction and sanctions 
authorities, in coordination with allies and partners. The Department 
is encouraging businesses and individuals exporting technology, 
products, and services with surveillance capabilities, including those 
pertaining to genetic collection and analysis, to undertake due 
diligence, in line with guidance we have publicly issued, to prevent 
the misuse of their technology, products, and services to commit human 
rights abuses. We are also working with our allies and partners to 
develop common principles on the responsible use of surveillance 
technologies globally and a code of conduct for ensuring human rights 
concerns factor into export licensing decisions on such technologies.

    Question. Under Secretary Zeya, what approach should the United 
States take when dealing with entrenched authoritarian leaders like Mr. 
Kagame and Mr. Museveni who do not respect democratic norms? Doesn't 
our continued support for Kagame and Museveni in particular undermine 
our efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance in 
Africa and around the world?

    Answer. The Department counters authoritarianism through bilateral 
and multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, and restrictive 
measures such as sanctions and visa restrictions, among others. In 
Rwanda and Uganda, the Department has utilized a variety of tools to 
promote accountability for human rights abuses and violations and to 
support democracy, including by denying officials who have committed 
such abuses or undermined democratic processes entry to the United 
States and designating individuals responsible for serious human rights 
abuses and corruption under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program. Our 
support for the people of Rwanda and Uganda, whether it is through 
democratic institution-building, public health partnerships, or 
economic growth programming, does not equate to U.S. Government support 
or approval of undemocratic policies and actions taken by the 
governments of Rwanda and Uganda.
    We continue to engage officials in both countries at all levels of 
government on the need to expand space for civil society and political 
pluralism, promote respect for human rights, and allow free and fair 
elections. For example, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lisa Peterson traveled to Uganda in 
March 2022 to emphasize the Department's concern with Uganda's 
faltering democratic trajectory, including our serious concerns about 
continuing reports of torture, enforced disappearances, and other human 
rights violations.

    Question. In the last 18 months there were 6 coups in Africa, 
prompting alarm among policy makers, and for good reason. At the same 
time, there are countries that are quietly moving in the right 
direction and merit additional support and assistance. Under Secretary 
Zeya, what does the U.S. provide to countries as a democracy dividend 
when they do show progress or begin transitions? What are we doing to 
support newly-elected governments in Niger, Mauritania, and Zambia, for 
example, where there was no guarantee that the last elections in these 
countries would result in the incumbent stepping down?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is focused both on 
preventing further backsliding in countries at greatest risk of coups 
and expanding our support to those African nations that are 
demonstrating their commitment to democracy. The Summit for Democracy, 
which included participation of 16 African countries (including Niger 
and Zambia), provides a new platform for the United States to showcase 
partners' democratic progress.
    In Niger, an increase in high-level visits further showcases our 
diplomatic support for its historic democratic transition. In 
Mauritania, we actively engage the Mauritanian Government on economic 
and security issues of mutual interest while pressing the government to 
act on human rights abuses in the country. As a sign of our deepening 
partnership with the Government of Mauritania, Mauritania hosted 2020 
Flintlock, U.S. AFRICOM's largest annual special operations exercise. 
In Zambia we are supporting President Hakainde Hichilema's ambitious 
efforts to restructure Zambia's debt and protect independent voices in 
the media and opposition.

    Question. Under Secretary Zeya, how can the U.S. help protect and 
strengthen the ability of Tunisian civil society to advocate for the 
promotion of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms within 
Tunisia?

    Answer. I traveled to Tunisia this month to underscore the 
importance of strengthening democracy in Tunisia and implementing an 
inclusive political and economic reform process, in coordination with 
civil society, political parties, and unions. Over the course of my 
visit, I met with representatives of Tunisia's vibrant civil society, 
including human rights defenders, anti-corruption activists, and 
journalists. In our public messaging and private diplomacy, we 
consistently emphasize that an independent and strong civil society is 
integral to an effective democracy, helping promote accountability, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the Government of Tunisia 
should view civil society as an essential partner in reform. We are 
coordinating with other like-minded democracies to support Tunisian 
civil society and reiterate the need for the Government of Tunisia to 
respect human rights, including freedom of expression and association. 
U.S. assistance aims to strengthen democratic institutions by helping 
civil society advocate for government transparency and accountability. 
U.S. support to civil society has been and will continue to be a 
critical component of our assistance to Tunisia.

    Question. Under Secretary Zeya, how can U.S. actions and messaging, 
in coordination with our allies and partners, help to keep the space 
open within Tunisia for freedom of assembly and public debate?

    Answer. To date, the United States has coordinated effectively with 
allies and partners, in particular members of the Group of Seven (G7), 
to work to keep space open in Tunisia for public debate, freedom of 
assembly, and peaceful protests. Since July 25, 2021, when President 
Saied invoked article 80 of the constitution to dismiss the government 
and freeze parliament, the United States and its G7 partners have, 
among other diplomatic engagements, issued four public statements 
calling for the restoration of democracy and supporting the Tunisian 
people's aspirations for a more responsive government that protects 
human rights. In coordination with our allies, we will continue to 
emphasize to the Tunisian Government that freedom of expression and 
assembly are critical to a strong democracy, and that civil society is 
an essential partner in reform.

    Question. Under Secretary Zeya, what steps must the Tunisian 
Government take to ensure a fair and inclusive process for these 
elections? How will you work with NEA and MCC to make clear to the 
Tunisians that these steps must be met in order to proceed with the 
compact ratification process?

    Answer. During my recent trip to Tunisia, I consistently 
underscored to the government the importance of strengthening democracy 
and implementing an inclusive political reform process, in coordination 
with political parties, unions, and civil society. We continue to 
emphasize that the government must protect human rights, including 
freedom of expression, throughout the reform process and elections. A 
commitment to democratic governance is an eligibility requirement for 
Millennium Challenge Corporation compact countries. MCC has paused 
signature of the proposed $498.7 million MCC compact with Tunisia until 
significant progress is made toward democratic governance. Compact 
signature is distinct from compact ratification; it is only upon 
ratification, which must be completed by an elected Tunisian 
parliament, that the vast majority of compact funds would be released.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Ms. Hall-Godfrey, can you explain how the State 
Department uses the GEC to counter malign actions of authoritarian 
regimes within the global information space? To the extent that you can 
discuss the details, what sort of programs is the GEC currently 
conducting in foreign countries? How do these programs work with host 
governments, civil society and other groups to build a country's 
ability to fight disinformation?

    Answer. The GEC works to counter foreign disinformation and 
propaganda through a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach. 
The GEC sponsors programs globally to counter disinformation and 
propaganda by building resilience, promoting free media, and exposing 
malign actors. As examples, the GEC worked with European partners on 
its Media Literacy Accelerator program and the Resiliency Support 
Project to train members of the community to actively counter Russian 
disinformation and propaganda, including on such activities as helping 
governments prevent and address disinformation during national 
elections. The GEC focuses on building coalitions of like-minded 
partners from government and civil society to protect our shared 
values, including in international bodies such as the G7. The GEC 
continues to expand its network of international partnerships to deter 
and counter Russia's and China's malign influence operations, 
propaganda, and disinformation. Our programmatic work identifies and 
exposes foreign-origin malign influence tactics and techniques, and 
punctures false narratives with credible third-party research. The GEC 
posts Counter-Disinformation Dispatches on the Department of State's 
website that educate the public on disinformation and how to counter 
it. We also support third-party efforts to expose and counter 
propaganda and disinformation in information environments abroad. GEC's 
work with its partner on the Xinjiang Data Project created the largest-
ever open-source data on the cultural destruction and internment of 
Uyghurs to deflate Beijing's efforts to cover up these atrocities.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya and Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Ms. Hall-Godfrey, I know that the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) also supports internet and media freedom 
programs and activities. Where does GEC's mandate end, and DRL's begin? 
What is the nature and extent of GEC's coordination with other U.S. 
Government agencies and bureaus?

    Answer. As the U.S. Government works to support a trustworthy 
information environment, counter the disinformation and other 
activities of those who seek to undermine that environment, and advance 
our priorities through principled engagement with foreign publics, the 
GEC and other Department bureaus and offices coordinate daily to 
complement each other's work.
    The GEC's programs and lines of effort support its congressional 
mandate to counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and 
disinformation. Many GEC programs, alongside the overall public 
diplomacy toolkit, reinforce core values that DRL's programs promote 
and build capacity on, while leveraging the GEC's expertise and focus 
on countering disinformation: how to recognize it, and how to build 
resilience to it. The GEC works closely with DRL daily to coordinate, 
identify gaps, and avoid duplication in our programs and activities.
    The GEC coordinates within the Department of State through regular 
synchronization meetings with regional bureaus and ongoing 
collaboration with DRL and many other bureaus. The GEC coordinates 
across the interagency through frequent interactions with other 
Departments and Agencies such as DHS--including the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency--Justice, Defense, FBI, and the 
intelligence community. In addition, liaison officers from and to the 
GEC ensure a constant two-way exchange of information between the GEC 
and the interagency community.

    Question. China and Russia: China has sought to bolster its image 
abroad and suppress overseas criticism while leveraging its economic 
power as a coercive tool. Russia has actively stoked political 
divisions within target countries and attempted to influence political 
outcomes, including by engaging in cyber-based election interference 
efforts in 38 elections and referendums in 26 states over the past 
decade.
    How is the Administration coordinating across agencies--including 
State, Treasury, and USAID--to counter these threats?

    Answer. The Administration is working on a whole-of-government 
basis--together with an integrated public-private coalition--to ensure 
the security of America's elections. This Administration has imposed 
serious sanctions on Russia for prior attempts at election 
interference, and has been clear that there will be serious 
consequences should Russia or its proxies attempt to interfere in our 
electoral processes again. The Department will continue to emphasize 
that Russia will meet swift costs for attempts to interfere in 
democratic processes.
    The Department of State uses diplomatic engagement and cyber 
capacity building programs to strengthen our international 
partnerships, promote rights-respecting cybersecurity best practices, 
and defend the stability of cyberspace. The United States has 
specifically targeted outreach and support to partner countries with 
upcoming elections where the risk of cyber-based election interference 
is high. Similarly, the GEC has worked with partner countries to 
prevent and address disinformation during national elections.
    The Department of State is coordinating across the U.S. Government 
to deploy instruments and coordinate actions to mitigate the impact of 
PRC economic coercion on targeted countries. In Lithuania, for example, 
which is subject to PRC coercion efforts, Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Fernandez and his team are 
working with agencies across the U.S. Government on this effort, 
including with the U.S. Export-Import Bank, to secure the signing of a 
memorandum of understanding that provides up to $600 million in export 
credits; U.S. Department of Agriculture, to help address Lithuania's 
request for import licenses of Lithuanian poultry and dairy; the 
Federal Aviation Administration, to facilitate Lithuania's request for 
direct cargo flights to the United States; the Department of Commerce, 
to facilitate reverse trade mission and supply chain diversification; 
and Department of Defense, to address Lithuania's request to establish 
a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement. The State Department is 
also coordinating across the interagency to exchange information and 
coordinate potential actions to address likely future cases of PRC 
economic coercion against other partners.

    Question. Latin America & Digital Authoritarianism: In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Chinese and Russian technologies are 
enabling the region's dictators to increasingly control internet 
access, traffic in misinformation and disinformation, and monitor 
citizens. In Venezuela, the regime uses the information collected from 
its national identity system, which uses Chinese technology, to inform 
decisions on censorship, internet shutdowns, and arrests. Cuba's 
internet infrastructure was also built with equipment acquired from 
Chinese companies. Following the July 2021 protests in Cuba, the regime 
shut down the internet in an attempt to disrupt the unprecedented 
countrywide protests. In El Salvador, President Bukele uses 
disinformation to paper over his dismantling of democratic governance.
    Ms. Hall-Godfrey, how can we bolster our engagement with the 
private sector to counteract misinformation and disinformation in 
Spanish, the internet's third language?

    Answer. The GEC monitors disinformation in Spanish from China, 
Russia, and other global threat actors. Our posts in the region and the 
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) also monitor misinformation 
and disinformation in Spanish. As resources permit, the GEC assists 
posts and WHA with monitoring and analysis of disinformation.
    The GEC engages social media companies to share analyses in those 
cases when the GEC assesses that disinformation from a global threat 
actor is occurring on their platforms. Posts and WHA also engage 
traditional and local digital media platforms. Department efforts to 
identify and expose Spanish language disinformation by RT and Sputnik, 
for example, have contributed to decisions by private sector media 
operators to curtail their relationships with Kremlin sources of 
disinformation.
    Additional resources would allow the GEC and WHA to increase 
monitoring and analysis of Spanish language disinformation, especially 
by sources of disinformation outside of the GEC's core monitoring of 
disinformation from China, Russia, Iran, and violent extremists. 
Expanded monitoring and analysis would in turn position the GEC and WHA 
to be able to more frequently and identify and expose such 
disinformation, and engage the private sector and others on the scale 
and sources of disinformation in Spanish.

    Question. Xinjiang & Surveillance: The atrocities perpetrated 
against the Uyghur population by the Chinese Government in Xinjiang are 
well documented. Especially troubling is the support of this ongoing 
genocide through genetic surveillance by the Chinese Government and 
Chinese companies.
    Ms. Hall-Godfrey, how is the Department raising public awareness of 
these threats, including those posed by BGI and two of its subsidiaries 
that were recently placed on the Entity List for their role in 
Xinjiang?

    Answer. The Department shares this concern and condemns the 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and other human rights abuses 
occurring in Xinjiang. We raise public awareness regarding these 
atrocities and the PRC's mass surveillance through several means. For 
example, the Bureau of Global Public Affairs ran a messaging sprint 
that used traditional and digital media to counter Beijing's 
undermining of the rules-based international order. The campaign 
rallied international support for collective action to respond to the 
PRC's widespread violation of international law, including 
condemnations for its genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. 
During the sprint, the volume of international press articles 
discussing forced labor in Xinjiang increased by 57 percent compared to 
the preceding 14-week period, but PRC messengers' share of voice in 
forced labor coverage dropped from 38 percent to 22 percent.
    We also draw international attention to these issues in 
multilateral forums such as the UN Human Rights Council and UN General 
Assembly Third Committee, including in joint statements with 
international partners condemning the PRC's abuses. We also have raised 
awareness of the PRC's abuses in the business community through a 
public Business Advisory and engagements with the private sector, 
including to highlight the risks associated with assisting or investing 
in the development of genetic and other surveillance tools for the PRC 
Government in Xinjiang.
    The Global Engagement Center has collaborated with the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute on the Xinjiang Data Project, a website 
repository of the largest-ever open-source data on the cultural 
destruction and internment of Uyghurs which uses empirical and 
satellite data, survivor interviews, and PRC Government documents. 
These public reports and online tools raise awareness among global 
decision makers and the public. Among other impacts, the website was 
cited in a European Parliament resolution on Xinjiang and in a draft 
customs amendment before the Australian Parliament.
    By facilitating public engagement with academic and research 
communities, we have increased awareness of the means through which 
PRC-backed entities gain access to technology and data, which are used 
to further the PRC's strategic goals. We link interagency experts with 
key policy makers to share practical solutions regarding managing the 
potential for surveillance, manipulation, extortion, and the impact 
these practices have on strategic sectors. In many cases, we also 
educate public audiences about PRC atrocity crimes and human rights 
abuses in Xinjiang, often by bringing in Chinese speakers and other 
third-party speakers who speak with the most credibility on this topic.
                                 ______
                                 

                Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Please compare and contrast State Department's versus 
USAID's democracy assistance efforts. What is the extent of 
coordination of these efforts?

    Answer. Most of USAID's democracy assistance efforts focus on 
longer-term, field-managed programs working through deep networks and 
systems that prioritize capacity development for local actors and 
contribute to sustainable development, including through democracy, 
human rights, and governance integration in other sectoral programs. 
USAID's DRG Center also has over $40 million in annual funding 
available to respond to urgent emerging and unanticipated issues.
    The State Department's democracy programs are aligned to support 
specific foreign policy goals. As the lead for democracy and human 
rights programming in the Department, the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor (DRL) uses centrally managed funds to retain the 
flexibility needed to respond quickly to emerging opportunities and 
challenges. Over 85 percent of DRL's programs operate in restrictive or 
conflict-ridden environments.
    The Department coordinates with USAID on democracy programming in 
Washington and in the field. For example, in the budget planning 
process, DRL and USAID conduct briefings together to help set 
priorities for the coming year. At a programmatic level, DRL seeks 
USAID clearance of solicitations and invites USAID to participate in 
proposal panels. When DRL conducts in-country program monitoring, DRL 
consults with USAID Missions whenever appropriate. DRL and USAID also 
coordinate on country-specific democracy assistance efforts and on 
shared thematic concerns, such as combatting corruption, Internet 
freedom, and global labor programming.

    Question. What steps have been taken to improve this coordination 
as well as coordination with other foreign donors?

    Answer. The Department and USAID have been in touch at various 
levels to improve coordination between our agencies. For example, we 
are conducting regular, high-level and working-level engagement to 
coordinate programmatic approaches, align deliverables, and sustain 
programming for the U.S. Summit for Democracy's Presidential Initiative 
for Democratic Renewal (PIDR), in order to support the objectives of 
the Summit most effectively.
    The Department and USAID are also continually looking for ways to 
enhance coordination with other donors. USAID and the Department have 
increased outreach to foreign donors, especially in relation to country 
commitments that were made at the Summit for Democracy and to support 
the PIDR deliverables. For example, DRL is working through U.S. 
embassies to increase the contributions of foreign counterparts to the 
multi-donor Global Anti-Corruption Consortium, as well as other DRL 
public-private partnerships such as Lifeline and the Global Equality 
Fund. USAID has provided start-up funding to the International Fund for 
Public Interest Media as a means to garner greater global donor 
assistance for media financial sustainability and is collaborating with 
a range of donors on initiatives such as Powered by the People seed 
funding and the Election Integrity Fund.

    Question. How has the U.S. Government engaged to ensure that the UN 
High Commissioner Bachelet releases her overdue report on human rights 
abuses in Xinjiang?

    Answer. We continue to press the High Commissioner both publicly 
and privately to release her report on the dire human rights situation 
in Xinjiang. For example, Secretary Blinken urged the High Commissioner 
to release the report without delay during his March 1 address to the 
UN Human Rights Council.

    Question. If UN High Commissioner Bachelet does not release her 
overdue report on human rights abuses in Xinjiang soon, how do you plan 
to put pressure on her to release it?

    Answer. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has a 
mandate to respond to serious violations of human rights, including 
what the United States has determined constitute genocide and crimes 
against humanity occurring in Xinjiang. High Commissioner Bachelet has 
a responsibility to fulfill her mandate and release the overdue report 
without further delay. If she does not release it soon, we will 
increase our calls, both public and private, for her to do so, in 
coordination with our allies and partners. We will continue raising 
this issue so long as the report is not released.

    Question. China has become much bolder in using its foreign 
embassies and media to silence critics of the Party and promote its own 
agenda. What can we do to better combat Chinese transnational 
aggression, and protect those targeted by Chinese Government bullying 
tactics?

    Answer. The United States rejects efforts by People's Republic of 
China (PRC) officials to harass, intimidate, surveil, abduct, or 
forcibly return individuals abroad, including those who have sought 
safety outside of the PRC as well as U.S. citizens who speak out on 
behalf of these populations. We seek to address this challenge in a 
range of ways. For example, the Department of State has imposed visa 
restrictions on current and former Chinese Communist Party and PRC 
officials who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, 
policies or actions aimed at repressing religious and spiritual 
practitioners, members of ethnic and religious minority groups, 
dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, labor organizers, 
civil society organizers, and peaceful protesters both inside and 
outside China. The Department of Justice has also charged individuals 
with crimes related to efforts by the PRC Government to stalk, harass, 
and spy on PRC nationals residing in the United States. Additionally, 
we press third countries to uphold their international obligations, 
respect the principle of non-refoulement, and not forcibly return, 
under pressure from the PRC Government, individuals who have fled due 
to fear of persecution or torture.

    Question. How can we ensure our universities are not vulnerable to 
Chinese malign political influence?

    Answer. The open and collaborative ecosystem in U.S. universities 
is one of our greatest advantages, attracting the world's best minds 
and driving U.S. innovation. The American people deserve a clear 
understanding of the organizations and entities Beijing uses to attempt 
to influence U.S. society--including on U.S. university campuses. Since 
2020, the Department has provided more regular, updated guidance to 
colleges and universities sponsoring Confucius Institutes which 
continue to have visa regulatory concerns and lack of transparency 
regarding the activities of their teachers and staff. Over the past 2 
years, the number of U.S. universities and colleges which support 
Confucius Institutes has declined from 55 to 9.
    The Department of State supports the Biden-Harris administration's 
efforts to ensure the PRC cannot exploit our university ecosystem to 
support the People's Liberation Army military modernization and the use 
of PRC surveillance technology in human rights abuses. As a component 
of its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the PRC has instructed PRC 
universities to establish partnerships with leading foreign 
universities and research labs to gain access to innovation and to 
collaborate on research with dual-use, civilian and military 
applications. The PRC tries to exploit these and other relationships to 
acquire innovative technologies through licit and illicit means. When 
the PRC diverts these technologies to military programs, U.S. national 
security is put in jeopardy, as are the norms that underpin open 
innovation and collaboration.

    Question. We understand that the Administration seeks to lift 
sanctions on the Supreme Leader's office and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) as a part of JCPOA re-entry. What impact will the 
lifting of sanctions have on the human rights abuses of the Iranian 
regime inside of its own borders?

    Answer. The Administration is committed to promoting respect for 
human rights in Iran and will continue to call out and stand up to 
human rights abuses and violations in Iran, whenever they occur. We 
will continue to consider all appropriate tools to promote 
accountability for individuals and organizations responsible for human 
rights abuses. The Department will maintain and, as appropriate, impose 
new sanctions on those in Iran perpetrating human rights abuses. We 
will continue to work with our allies, including in international fora, 
to promote accountability for these Iranian abuses, and we will 
absolutely continue to work to hold all violators accountable.

    Question. What impact will the lifting of sanction have on Iran's 
neighbors?

    Answer. Negotiations over a mutual return to full implementation of 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are ongoing.
    A mutual return to full implementation of the JCPOA is the best 
available option to constrain Iran's nuclear program and provide a 
platform to address Iran's other destabilizing conduct. The maximum 
pressure campaign had virtually no impact on Iran's destabilizing 
behavior in the region. Instead, it only got worse.
    The U.S. Government maintains a range of tools to combat support 
for terrorism, including terrorist financing, and we will continue to 
use these to counter Iran's support for terrorism and other 
destabilizing activities regardless of the outcome in Vienna.
    Finally, our means of countering malign Iranian behavior are not 
limited to sanctions. Working with our allies and partners in the 
region to counter and disrupt Iranian threats, as well as using tools 
such as interdictions and export controls, has been effective in 
countering this behavior, and we will continue to expand our efforts in 
these areas.

    Question. Reflective of the pervasive influence of Tehran and its 
``axis of resistance,'' the Houthis are known to wield their power 
through violent tactics, using fear, repression, and intimidation to 
suppress dissent. Numerous human rights groups, including Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, and others have documented the Houthis 
gradual expansion of autocratic state structures. How do you plan to 
address the Houthis' systematic and widespread human rights abuses 
which pose a very real threat to regional stability?

    Answer. The best way to help ensure that the rights of all Yemenis 
are respected is through a comprehensive and inclusive peace settlement 
that includes the meaningful participation of women, civil society, and 
members of marginalized groups and that addresses their calls for 
justice, accountability, and redress for human rights abuses and 
violations. The U.S. Government continues to demand that all parties to 
the conflict, particularly the Houthis, end human rights abuses, 
including those involving the recruitment and use of child soldiers; 
killings; abductions, including on the basis of religion; gender-based 
violence; torture and other abuses; and interference with the exercise 
of freedom of expression, including for members of the press. We are 
committed to supporting all appropriate measures to address these 
challenges. We have supported language condemning the unlawful use of 
child soldiers and other abuses in several recent UN Security Council 
statements on Yemen. We have also listed Yemen under the Child Soldiers 
Prevention Act and regularly cite Houthi human rights abuses in public 
messaging to increase pressure on them to stop these activities.

    Question. How can the U.S. work to prevent any expansion of Houthi 
influence inside Yemen itself?

    Answer. The best way to ensure an end to any Houthi military 
expansion is through a durable peace settlement for Yemen in which the 
Yemeni people decide their own future. Similarly, the best way to 
ensure that the rights of all Yemenis are respected is to seek a 
comprehensive and inclusive peace agreement that includes the 
meaningful participation of women, civil society, and members of 
marginalized groups and that incorporates their calls for justice, 
accountability, and redress for human rights abuses and violations. The 
United States is leading international efforts in support of the UN to 
demonstrate to the Houthis that the only sustainable path forward is 
through dialogue. We will not hesitate to use the tools at our 
disposal, including sanctions, to pressure the Houthis to cease their 
military offensives and engage sincerely with the UN Special Envoy for 
Yemen to resolve the conflict.

    Question. How does the U.S. intend to draw attention to the 
Houthis' ongoing human rights abuses?

    Answer. The Department supports ongoing efforts to document 
evidence of abuses committed by the Houthis and by all parties to the 
conflict, and publicly emphasizes to our partners the importance of 
using such documentation in current and future legal, reconciliation, 
and transitional justice processes. The Department has highlighted the 
Houthis' abuses in the annual Human Rights Report for Yemen. The 
worsening harassment of independent journalists and human rights 
advocates by the Houthis throughout the country poses a significant 
obstacle to sustaining reporting and attention on ongoing abuses and to 
a durable peace. The Department remains committed to supporting Yemeni 
journalists and advocating for their protection, and we consistently 
raise human rights violations and abuses in Yemen in public messaging 
and multilateral fora.

    Question. Despite the Taliban's efforts to portray a more liberal 
face, its actions suggest we are headed toward a style of rule similar 
to that which dominated the 1990s, when women were banished from public 
life, media was strictly controlled, and all forms of entertainment 
banned. Since taking power, they've violently assaulting peaceful 
protestors, arbitrarily detained journalists, and imposed restrictions 
on the rights of Afghan women. Given the Taliban's proven record of 
serious human rights abuses, how can the United States hold the Taliban 
accountable for their actions? Do you intend to hold the Taliban 
accountable?

    Answer. In every engagement with the Taliban, we raise the 
criticality of respecting human rights and of holding perpetrators of 
abuses accountable. We advocated strongly for both the renewal of the 
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan with a strong human rights 
mandate, and the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in Afghanistan.
    We continue to explore all available diplomatic options, including 
levying sanctions and working with likeminded international partners, 
including Muslim-majority countries in the region, to hold the Taliban 
accountable for human rights abuses. In order for the Taliban to obtain 
international legitimacy, they need to respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, including for women, children, 
journalists, human rights defenders, members of minority groups, 
persons with disabilities, and members of the LGBTQI+ community.

    Question. How does the U.S. plan to ensure no funds directly 
benefit the Taliban or the Haqqani network, given their ongoing role in 
the commission of human rights abuses?

    Answer. Since August 2021, the United States has provided more than 
$516 million in humanitarian assistance to independent international 
humanitarian organizations. These funds support vulnerable Afghans 
inside Afghanistan, as well as those who have fled to neighboring 
countries. We are looking at other ways, including in conjunction with 
the UN and local Afghan non-governmental organizations, that we might 
be able to provide support to the people of Afghanistan--importantly, 
in a way that does not directly benefit the Taliban.
    For all U.S. assistance, we require our partners to mitigate 
against diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse, including such incidents 
involving the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The State Department and 
USAID and our implementers have experience using similar mechanisms, 
such as in Syria. In addition, both agencies have years of experience 
in successfully managing projects remotely or through third-party 
monitors inside and outside of Afghanistan.

    Question. What type of relationship do you envision the United 
States having with the Taliban if they continue to perpetrate 
widespread human rights violations? What would this mean for the future 
of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan?

    Answer. The United States and the international community need the 
Taliban to answer several important questions and take corresponding 
action to earn legitimacy and credibility. Secretary Blinken has been 
extremely clear that the Taliban must take action to establish 
inclusive governance and respect the human rights of all Afghans, 
including for women, children, journalists, human rights defenders, 
members of minority groups, persons with disabilities, and members of 
the LGBTQI+ community. All U.S. assistance is specifically targeted 
directly to the Afghan people, not to the Taliban.

    Question. Given the Taliban's lack of adherence to fundamental 
human rights, like the freedom of religion, what dangers remain for 
religious minorities, including Christians, Hazara Shia Muslims, 
Hindus, and Sikhs?

    Answer. We continue to be deeply concerned about religious freedom 
and the situation of religious minorities in Afghanistan. The Taliban 
takeover in August 2021 has driven Christians, particularly converts, 
into deeper hiding, according to multiple NGOs. Amnesty International 
reported that Taliban fighters killed 13 Shia Hazaras in Daykundi 
Province on August 31 while Human Rights Watch reported that the 
Taliban expelled Shia Hazara members from their homes in several 
provinces in October, in part to redistribute land to Taliban 
supporters. Civil society reports continued Taliban persecution of 
Ahmaddiya Muslims.
    In November and December, high-level Taliban representatives held 
meetings with leaders of Shia, Sikh, and Hindu communities and laid out 
rules for the behavior of women, forbade the playing of music, and 
presented restrictions on businesses owned by minority religious group 
members.
    Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Sunni Muslim minority 
groups have also continued to report that some Sunni Muslims verbally 
harassed them, and that public sentiment remained hostile towards 
converts and to Christian proselytization.

    Question. Do you feel that the United States turned its back on 
Afghan women and children? Did our withdrawal create an environment 
that will set women back even farther?

    Answer. The United States has made it clear that the Taliban should 
respect and uphold the rights of women and children in every aspect of 
Afghan society including in schools, workplaces, and the home. The 
Department is collaborating with civil society organizations to 
coordinate standing, consultative bodies for Afghan women, girls, and 
minorities. These mechanisms will be available for any U.S. Government 
official so the diverse voices of Afghan women can be heard and 
considered in U.S. policymaking. We are also working with international 
likeminded partners to align on clear, measurable standards that the 
Taliban can be held to.

    Question. How do you plan to continue to promote women and girls 
rights in Afghanistan without a U.S. diplomatic presence on the ground?

    Answer. The United States is working with our international allies 
to press for respect of the rights of Afghan women and girls, including 
the right to education, work, safety, and freedom of movement, 
including as part of the humanitarian response. We have been clear to 
the Taliban that to earn legitimacy and credibility from the Afghan 
people and the international community, they will need to consistently 
respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans. For 
women to have a role in the future of Afghanistan, we must create space 
for Afghan women themselves to meaningfully participate. We will 
continue advocating for their inclusion in dialogues and political 
processes outside and inside Afghanistan, and consulting with them to 
inform our own policy positions.

    Question. On March 5, 2022, President Biden sent to Venezuela a 
senior U.S. delegation to discuss ``energy security'' with Nicolas 
Maduro, whom the U.S. Justice Department has indicted on criminal drug 
charges. The delegation did not meet with democratically-elected 
Interim President Juan Guaido. Would you agree that such initiatives 
undermine U.S. and international efforts to combat authoritarianism in 
Venezuela and Latin America?

    Answer. U.S. officials' visit to Venezuela focused on securing the 
release of U.S. wrongful detainees and urging the Maduro regime to 
return to the negotiating table in Mexico with the democratic 
opposition's Unitary Platform to restore democracy in Venezuela. The 
visit reinforced U.S. support for interim President Juan Guaido's call 
for a negotiated solution through the Mexico process.
    We welcome the return of two wrongfully detained U.S. citizens from 
Venezuela. Their release would not have been possible without months of 
groundwork by the State Department, especially Special Presidential 
Envoy Carstens.
    We also noted Maduro's statement that he is willing to return to 
negotiations with the opposition's Unitary Platform, which represents a 
positive step. We continue to believe Venezuelan-led, comprehensive 
negotiations represent the best mechanism available to restore 
Venezuelan democracy and the rule of law. We support the Unitary 
Platform's goal of immediately resuming negotiations with the Maduro 
regime to restore free and fair elections, democratic institutions, the 
rule of law, and a respect for human rights in Venezuela.
    The United States, along with our partners and allies, will 
continue to press for the fundamental changes needed to enable a 
peaceful return to democracy, including the immediate release of all 
those unjustly detained for political reasons, the independence of 
political parties, freedom of expression (including for members of the 
press), and an end to human rights abuses.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The GEC is one of the U.S. Government's best tools in 
identifying and addressing disinformation campaigns by our adversaries. 
This is especially timely and important with the on-going Russian war 
on Ukraine. What is the GEC seeing right now in regards to Ukraine 
disinformation?

    Answer. The Kremlin is carrying out an extensive and purposeful 
global disinformation campaign against Ukraine to erode support among 
NATO allies, attempt to justify Russia's unprovoked invasion, and break 
Ukrainian resolve. Every part of Russia's disinformation ecosystem--
including official statements, state media, and proxy websites--spread 
and amplify these messages. Kremlin disinformation attempts to justify 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine as necessary to free Ukraine from 
``Nazism'' and a corrupt government in Kyiv. Moscow also claims to be 
protecting ethnic Russians in the Donbas from genocide. Increasingly, 
Kremlin disinformation purveyors have sought to spread and amplify 
narratives about Ukraine or the United States using or developing 
chemical or biological weapons in connection with U.S. Biological 
Threat Reduction Program laboratories in Ukraine, which is especially 
concerning given the Kremlin's penchant for blaming its own atrocities 
on Ukraine's military forces.

    Question. The GEC is one of the U.S. Government's best tools in 
identifying and addressing disinformation campaigns by our adversaries. 
This is especially timely and important with the on-going Russian war 
on Ukraine. Where is Russia directing disinformation on Ukraine?

    Answer. Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem has 
mobilized to justify the Kremlin's unprovoked war to the Russian 
population and international audiences. Russia continues to target 
European and Western Hemisphere foreign audiences with disinformation 
attempting to paint Ukraine, NATO, and the United States as the 
aggressors in this war. Russian disinformation is targeted at audiences 
in the Latin America to garner strategic support in a region closely 
affiliated with the United States. Non-democratic actors in the region, 
such as the Cuban Government and the Maduro regime, parrot and promote 
Russian disinformation narratives through both state-run media outlets 
and social media. Most government leaders and citizens in the Western 
Hemisphere support Ukraine and condemn Russia's invasion. Pro-Kremlin 
disinformation is, however, circulating on social media, particularly 
on Telegram and RT's Spanish-language accounts, and Russian embassies 
in the region have pushed out a steady stream of disinformation via op-
eds, social media, and public engagements.
    In the Middle East/North Africa region, we see Russia shifting 
tactics as a result of the removal of RT and Sputnik's channels 
targeting Arabic-speaking audiences. Russia is using its diplomatic 
missions' social media platforms across the Middle East/North Africa 
region to amplify Kremlin talking points and deflect and obfuscate its 
atrocities in Ukraine.
    Across Africa, Russian embassies are similarly using a network of 
new Telegram accounts to share sometimes graphic content that claims to 
tell ``the other side of the story.'' This content includes falsified 
documents purportedly from Ukraine's national guard and supposed 
examples of Western media censorship.

    Question. The GEC is one of the U.S. Government's best tools in 
identifying and addressing disinformation campaigns by our adversaries. 
This is especially timely and important with the on-going Russian war 
on Ukraine. Are other countries parroting and amplifying Russian 
disinformation on Ukraine?

    Answer. Likely due to effective pre-bunking (debunking the lie 
before it appears) by U.S. officials, independent media, and civil 
society actors, Russia's attempts to create a pretext or false flag to 
justify its further invasion of Ukraine have achieved little success. 
Globally, most governments have refrained from parroting Russian 
disinformation on Ukraine. However, the PRC and Iran use official 
platforms and networks to amplify Russian disinformation, including 
claims the United States develops biological weapons in labs in 
Ukraine. PRC and Iranian messaging on Ukraine has decreased in the last 
week, but still resonates with audiences such as the Lebanese 
Hezbollah.
    In Latin America, Russia uses Venezuela as a regional 
disinformation launchpad on Twitter by deploying Spanish language 
messages through Venezuelan troll farms to countries throughout the 
region. Latin American governments aligned with Russia, including the 
Maduro regime and the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments, pushed the 
narrative blaming the invasion on NATO and false stories about U.S. 
bioweapons in Ukraine. Government-linked actors in El Salvador and 
Bolivia amplified disinformation painting Russia as the victim. 
However, pro-Russian disinformation efforts in Latin America have not 
significantly shifted popular opinion, as populations across the region 
generally sympathize with Ukraine and see Russia as the aggressor.
    In the Middle East, the Syrian regime, Iran, and Hizballah-linked 
media outlets amplify Russian narratives accusing the United States of: 
1) funding Ukraine's alleged bio-weapons program; 2) relocating ISIS 
fighters from Syria to Ukraine; and 3) depicting Ukraine as the 
aggressor and justifying Russia's so-called ``special military 
operation.''

    Question. China spends billions on its public diplomacy, pushing 
false narratives that advance the Chinese Communist Party's interests. 
What is the GEC doing to identify and push back against Chinese 
disinformation?

    Answer. The GEC collaborates across the Department, interagency, 
and with foreign partners to actively address PRC disinformation and 
propaganda by prioritizing acute risks, maximizing limited resources, 
and avoiding duplication. The GEC conducts and shares research on PRC 
tactics, identifies counter-disinformation technologies, leads efforts 
to expand multilateral action to deter PRC information manipulation, 
and executes evidence-based and data-driven programming to expose and 
counter such activities. The GEC's programs, developed with regional 
bureaus and U.S. embassies, seek to puncture PRC propaganda narratives 
through high-quality open-source research; to build resilience among 
foreign civil society and media; and to limit the space where PRC 
information manipulation can thrive.
    The GEC leads the Xinjiang Data Project, which is countering 
Beijing's efforts to cover up its atrocities against the Uyghurs; the 
Mekong Dam Monitor, which empowered local influencers from downriver 
communities to push back against PRC's exploitation of the Mekong River 
flow; and two other programs with partners to map out the PRC's malign 
activities. The GEC and a partner developed the China Defense 
Universities Tracker to help universities and researchers understand 
institutions in China and manage the risks of engaging with PRC 
universities or avoid harmful collaborations. The GEC worked with 
another partner on the Mapping China's Tech Giants public database. 
This program mapped the global footprint of Chinese companies across 
the Internet, telecommunications, biotech sectors, artificial 
intelligence, and surveillance technology sectors. This website is a 
tool for the public to better understand the enormous scale, complexity 
and increasing global reach of some of China's tech giants.
    In sub-Saharan Africa, the GEC supported an 8-week-long virtual 
seminar on PRC sharp power in Africa by China subject matter experts to 
local African civil society leaders. The Hoover Institution published 
several participants' capstones on PRC problematic behavior in their 
home countries, while Hoover also published project key findings and 
recommended mitigation measures in English and French for African 
governments and civil society.

    Question. China spends billions on its public diplomacy, pushing 
false narratives that advance the Chinese Communist Party's interests. 
Does the GEC have enough financial support to robustly combat Chinese 
(and Russian) disinformation across the globe?

    Answer. The scale of Beijing's and Moscow's investments in their 
respective foreign propaganda and disinformation apparatuses requires a 
holistic, whole-of-government response from the United States. The PRC 
spends at least five times more than the United States on its public 
diplomacy and influence activities. The Kremlin's budget for its 
disinformation ecosystem is difficult to decipher but the reported 
total amount allocated for state media is 211 billion rubles 
(approximately $2.8 billion). This does not include funds spent on 
proxy websites or other vectors of disinformation. Additional funding 
would enable the GEC to better understand the PRC disinformation 
ecosystem, expand its counter-disinformation lines of effort, and 
execute tailored programs and grants to support communities overseas to 
identify, counter, and address PRC disinformation. Additional funding 
would also allow other elements of the Department's Public Diplomacy 
family to better compete with the influence efforts of our rivals. 
Identifying the resources to meet the global challenges posed by our 
long-term strategic rivals, the PRC and Russia, will be critical into 
the future.

    Question. GEC's funding has drastically increased since FY2016 from 
$6 million to $60 million. How has this surge in resources translated 
to greater effectiveness in U.S. Government efforts to combat foreign 
disinformation and propaganda?

    Answer. In 2016, the GEC had the singular mission to support 
government-wide counterterrorism communications. In FY2017, responding 
to security risks of foreign propaganda and disinformation, Congress 
expanded the GEC's mission and funding to include coordinating U.S. 
Government-wide efforts in countering foreign state and non-state 
propaganda and disinformation.
    While the GEC maintained its counterterrorism threat team, the 
funding increase allowed the GEC to establish additional teams focused 
on specific threat-actors, an Analytics and Research team, and 
subsequently the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit and a Technology 
Engagement Team. These functional teams brought new expertise and focus 
to the GEC, creating robust new lines of effort countering 
disinformation and propaganda, while our Monitoring and Evaluation Unit 
has gradually expanded from evaluating federal assistance awards to 
include strategic M&E across the organization. The new threat-focused 
teams also inform strategy and programming and, as a result, the GEC's 
programming is more data-driven and includes whole-of-society efforts. 
Moreover, by leveraging and extending foreign partnerships and 
programming interventions that build resilience to disinformation and 
propaganda, GEC has created greater and more sustainable impact.
    For example, the GEC's Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and 
Propaganda special report provided the first public, comprehensive view 
of how the Russian disinformation and propaganda ecosystem operates, 
helping shape the global narrative about Russian disinformation. The 
GEC plans to use the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations funds to: 1) 
identify and expose global Russian disinformation and propaganda 
narratives, practices, and proxy outlets; 2) identify and expose 
Russian-linked narratives amplified by the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and Iran, which are taking advantage of the Ukraine crises to 
advance their own agendas through disinformation; 3) leverage the GEC's 
capability to expand testing and support long-term use of technology-
based tools to counter disinformation, including artificial 
intelligence; and 4) allocate resources, including staffing and 
translations, for these initiatives. These efforts would not be 
possible without the additional funding provided by Congress.
    The GEC recognized that the challenges of disinformation require a 
holistic approach that leverages the resources of the entire U.S. 
Government to increase effectiveness and has accordingly stood up 
interagency coordination functions. This interagency coordination has 
been crucial to the success of countering Russian disinformation about 
Ukraine, for example. Similarly, the GEC has dramatically expanded 
coordination with foreign government partners, to deter and counter 
Russia's and China's malign influence operations as advanced through 
their propaganda and disinformation.

    Question. Some, including members of this Committee, have argued 
for a substantially increased budget for the GEC. What more could the 
GEC do with a large increase in funding?

    Answer. We are grateful for the substantial funding Congress has 
provided to the Department for foreign counter-disinformation and 
counter-propaganda efforts, including resources granted in the Ukraine 
Supplemental, as well as Congress' ongoing bipartisan support for the 
GEC. Our most urgent ask is for Congress to remove GEC's sunset clause, 
which currently requires GEC to close its doors in 2024 and inhibits 
budgeting, hiring, and other operational priorities.
    With this clause removed and increased resources, the GEC would be 
more fully capable of realizing its broad mandate. Specifically, a 
significant increase in resources would allow the GEC to: 1) bolster 
global capabilities, including expanding counter-disinformation efforts 
beyond Russia, China and Iran to incorporate more routine monitoring 
and analysis of disinformation by other actors; 2) broaden counter-
disinformation technology assessment capabilities, including artificial 
intelligence-based technology; and 3) strengthen coordination 
capabilities within the growing counter-disinformation community in the 
U.S. interagency, the inter-governmental community, and private sector 
tech companies and international partners.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Anne Applebaum to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Because of its invasion of Ukraine, the world is united 
against Russian aggression, how do we use this moment to unite the 
world against Russian authoritarianism?

    Answer. We should broaden and deepen what we are doing already, 
coordinating the response in the military sphere, in energy policy, and 
in sanctions. Now is the time to start planning to deter Russia in 
Poland and the Baltic states; to move rapidly away from Russian oil and 
gas, and perhaps oil and gas altogether; to build an anti-corruption 
alliance that stretches around the world. Anti-communism once united us 
with our allies, perhaps now we should be linked by anti-kleptocracy. 
This moment is really ripe for some radical policy changes and we 
should take advantage of it.

    Question. On March 5, a delegation of senior Biden administration 
officials, including Ambassador Jimmy Story met with Nicolas Maduro in 
Venezuela to discuss ``energy security.'' The delegation did not meet 
with democratically-elected Interim President Juan Guaido, whom the 
United States as the legitimate President of Venezuela. Please explain 
efforts such as the March 5 meeting with Maduro have on U.S. and 
international efforts to combat authoritarianism in Venezuela and Latin 
America.

    Answer. Many thanks. Of course, any effort this Administration 
makes that loosens the ties between Russia and Venezuela is useful. 
However, I don't think this is a good moment to be trying to negotiate 
over the heads of the democratic opposition in that country. There is 
no oil production deal that we can come up with in the short term that 
will make a difference to U.S. gas prices, and the discussion itself 
undermines years of effort made to promote democracy in Venezuela.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Dr. Daniel Twining to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. How has Chinese transnational aggression, including 
promoting disinformation and targeting dissidents abroad, become more 
pronounced in the past few years?

    Answer. Since IRI initiated its Countering Foreign Authoritarian 
Influence (https://www.iri.org/what-we-do/countering-foreign-
authoritarian-influence/) work, China's influence campaigns have become 
sharper and less restrained. The CCP has used initial entry points 
garnered from foreign direct investment and high-dollar-value 
infrastructure loans to extend its reach into critical elements of 
countries' political, economic and information infrastructure. The CCP 
is also taking more direct action to shape political processes to 
ensure outcomes more favorable to China's growing global interests, 
whether timing infrastructure investments to coincide with presidential 
elections to boost the chances of pro-China candidates, as it did in 
the August 2021 elections in Zambia, or engaging in actual campaigning 
for a preferred political candidate, as was reported during the June 
2020 elections in Kiribati.
    The introduction of tools such as the National Security Law in Hong 
Kong empowers Beijing to threaten its critics anywhere in the world. 
Earlier this week, we learned that the Hong Kong Government's security 
bureau accused the advocacy organization Hong Kong Watch and its 
founder Benedict Rogers of ``engaging in activities seriously 
interfering in the affairs of the HKSAR and jeopardizing national 
security of the People's Republic of China.'' Rogers was threatened 
with life imprisonment and was ordered to shut down the NGO and take 
down its website. Cases such as this highlight the scope of PRC efforts 
to eliminate dissent and the tools it uses to do so.

    Question. What tools are the most effective to combatting Chinese 
authoritarianism?

    Answer. Across different political contexts, IRI has found (https:/
/www.iri.org/resources/china-expands-global-authoritarian-influence-
efforts-some-fragile-democracies-show-resilience-against-ccp-
aggression/)investigative journalism and civil society activism to be 
the most effective means of identifying, exposing, and combatting PRC 
authoritarian aggression. Investigative journalism has consistently 
proven to be the most effective tool in bringing to light inappropriate 
PRC influence around the world. From Australia to Kenya to Ecuador, 
journalists--often working at personal risk--have consistently changed 
the conversation around China in their home countries through brave, 
dogged reporting. Just as important, we have seen that reporting lead 
to political change, incentivizing governments to be more cautious and, 
sometimes, more transparent about their dealings with the CCP.
    Where journalism provides information, civil society provides 
action. Particularly across the global South, we have seen that robust 
civil society movements have proven key to slowing or stopping PRC-
backed infrastructure projects that could increase corruption, damage 
local communities, and drive countries further into debt.
    Organizations such as IRI and the rest of the National Endowment 
for Democracy family play a significant role in helping to raise 
awareness about the PRC's malign influence (https://www.iri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/chinese_malign_
influence_report.pdf). Often, we are able to serve a convening role 
that local actors cannot, either because of lack of resources, 
political sensitivities, or because other coordinating mechanisms just 
do not exist. We have found that, often as not, simply getting the 
right people together in a room to discuss the problem and build 
connections, as well as understanding what proven tools they can deploy 
to fight back, is a critical first step in helping to change the 
conversation around China in a given country.

    Question. How would you assess the threat of Chinese malign 
influence in U.S. universities?

    Answer. This important question is not one that IRI has direct 
programmatic engagement on, but we see parallels around the world. Open 
university systems that provide space for collaboration and innovation 
are susceptible to malign influence, but overzealous efforts to address 
what is a genuine problem risk stifling the very ability to collaborate 
and innovate that sets our universities apart from the rest of the 
world. We see the threat of PRC malign influence in U.S. universities 
as two-fold: PRC funding of universities and related co-optation of 
academics, and the role of some Chinese students in the U.S. The latter 
usually fall into two camps: (1) strong nationalists who are willing to 
speak out and attempt to shape the discourse within universities on 
China-related issues to promote pro-CCP narratives; (2) those with more 
nuanced ideas who are afraid to give their point of view. Even in the 
U.S., Chinese students fear reprisals against family members back home, 
against themselves when they return, or even while they remain resident 
in the United States.
    To address the issue of PRC funding, American universities quite 
simply need to do better at policing themselves when it comes to how 
they interact with their PRC counterparts. Universities should fully 
disclose their funding sources--if they have nothing to hide, 
transparency should be a strength, not a constraint. I would recommend 
the following steps to help address this:

   Continue, and institutionalize, the outreach to universities 
        on China by scientific agencies such as the National Institutes 
        of Health or the Department of Energy begun under the previous 
        administration. Often educational outreach by agencies who work 
        on science and have preexisting relationships with universities 
        and researchers is more effective than a blunter approach by 
        agencies such as the FBI.

   Amend the Higher Education Act to require disclosure of the 
        identity of non-American donors. At the moment, the act 
        requires only disclosure of the country of donors' country of 
        origin. Americans should know if universities accept large 
        donations from individuals with questionable ties to repressive 
        regimes like China, Russia, or Saudi Arabia.

   Close Confucius Institutes. This is a trend already; though 
        they bring universities funding, it is not worth the potential 
        and actual loss of academic freedom that too often comes with 
        it.

    To address Chinese student attempts to dominate China-related 
discourse, universities should:

   Make clear that any student who attempts to coerce another, 
        whether in the U.S. or back in China, will be expelled from 
        that university. Such bullying must be policed.

   Work to integrate Chinese (and all foreign) students better. 
        Chinese students often live in a bubble--their friends are 
        often other Chinese students and they get their news from 
        Chinese news apps--which means that they are often in a Chinese 
        nationalistic bubble.

    Question. What can we do in international organizations such as the 
United Nations to combat authoritarianism and Chinese influence?

    Answer. Many of these organizations are highly flawed, but robust 
engagement is often better than walking away from them. The UN--and 
particularly its human rights bodies--have come in for much justified 
criticism in the United States and elsewhere. However, the partner 
governments and civil society organizations we work with around the 
world value the United Nations and will continue to engage through it 
even if the United States does not. China is hell-bent on bending fora 
like the UN to its will, and we do ourselves, our partners, or the 
cause of freedom any favors by absenting ourselves from them in ways 
that allow CCP authoritarian values to predominate.
    In addition, as I mentioned in my testimony, the organizations we 
use to govern international trade such as the WTO are not configured to 
handle the PRC's use of economic coercion to bully democracies. The 
U.S. and its partners need to start discussing seriously how to address 
this, be it through informal or formal forms of free-world economic 
cooperation, so that China cannot divide and conquer us through our 
business communities. Reforming the WTO or joining yet another regional 
trade deal will not cut it. Those are not solutions. Neither will do 
anything to deter China's coercive use of its economic heft. Free 
markets should work for free people rather than empowering 
authoritarian adversaries, and most-favored-nation trade status should 
actually reflect nations Americans most favor.

    Question. How can we work more closely with Taiwan to expose and 
counter Chinese disinformation?

    Answer. Taiwan is well-positioned to serve as an example and 
partner to other countries struggling with this problem. But Taipei 
sometimes struggles with capacity issues, as well as a foreign policy 
that can be too narrowly focused on Washington and Taiwan's remaining 
diplomatic partners, leaving it poorly positioned to offer the benefits 
of its experience to other countries in need. The Tsai Government has 
made a great deal of progress in transitioning Taiwan to a ``post-ROC'' 
diplomatic mindset, but much work remains to be done. The U.S. can 
assist, and help leverage Taiwan's experience in combatting PRC 
disinformation (https://www.iri.org/resources/detecting-digital-
fingerprints-tracing-chinese-disinformation-in-taiwan/), by:

   Working through the Global Cooperation and Training 
        Framework, a preexisting platform for cooperation between the 
        U.S., Taiwan, and Japan already approved and funded by 
        Congress. The GCTF already addresses disinformation. Last year, 
        for example, it convened a forum with officials and experts 
        from 20 countries on the issue. Congress should consult closely 
        with AIT as to whether current funding levels are appropriate 
        to meet Congressionally mandated goals and revise the relevant 
        appropriation statutes to explicitly call for combined efforts 
        to tackle malign disinformation from authoritarian actors.

   Continue to encourage Taiwan's transition to a diplomacy 
        that looks beyond the U.S. and those countries that recognize 
        it, toward partners in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa. 
        Taiwan has lessons--and resources--to share that will be well 
        received around the world, if only it can make the needed 
        connections.

   Continue to encourage Taiwan to decentralize its efforts to 
        combat PRC disinformation (and other forms of malign PRC 
        influence) to NGOs and other non-government actors, and work 
        through Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure those 
        non-governmental actors are strongly networked with their 
        counterparts overseas.

    Question. On March 5, a delegation of senior Biden administration 
officials, including Ambassador Jimmy Story, met with Nicolas Maduro in 
Venezuela to discuss ``energy security.'' The delegation did not meet 
with democratically elected Interim President Juan Guaido, whom the 
United States views as the legitimate President of Venezuela. Please 
explain efforts such as the March 5 meeting with Maduro have on U.S. 
and international efforts to combat authoritarianism in Venezuela and 
Latin America.

    Answer. Authoritarian regimes have gained ground in Latin America 
these past two decades. Among them is the Maduro regime, which 
continues to tighten its grip on power through illegitimate means. For 
the past 3 years, democratic movements in Venezuela have pushed for a 
democratic transition, helping the country take steps towards a free 
and fair electoral process to solve the country's political crisis. In 
an unexpected turn, a broad democratic force participated in the 
November 21, 2021 regional election, which did not meet international 
electoral integrity standards. While it was risky to participate in 
such an unfair and unequal process, democratic forces regained 
significant political space at the local level.
    Despite these advances, the Maduro regime will likely take measures 
to restrict the influence and governance capacity of these 
democratically elected officials. Maduro has repeatedly proven to be an 
unreliable negotiator. While he occasionally shows signs of openness to 
dialogue, he falls short of coming through with meaningful commitments 
to create democratic space in his country.
    U.S. and international efforts to combat authoritarianism in 
Venezuela can and should continue to support an inclusive political 
process in-country that paves the way for a peaceful democratic 
transition. This inclusive process will build resiliency and prevent 
additional backsliding in the country and the region at large. However, 
both internal and external factors hinder this process in Venezuela. 
For instance, as a cornerstone of its strategy, the Maduro regime has 
deployed information operations through propaganda to influence the 
emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of 
organizations, groups of people, and individuals. This fills the 
information space in-country with state-curated narratives that distort 
information and divide democratic forces. Moving forward, support in 
Venezuela must focus on promoting freedom of expression and 
strengthening the capacity of governmental and non-governmental 
democratic forces, such as independent media and civil society, to 
track, expose, and counter authoritarian influence. This will enable 
democratic forces to control the narrative and push back on 
authoritarian expansions both in Venezuela and broadly within Latin 
America.
                                 ______
                                 

                Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. What steps is the Biden administration taking to restrict 
access to technologies used for surveillance of repressed minorities 
and at-risk groups in authoritarian regimes such as China, Venezuela, 
and Iran?

    Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by the misuse of 
cutting-edge technology and other measures to surveil, control, and 
repress certain populations, including members of ethnic and religious 
minority groups, human rights defenders, dissidents, and other 
independent voices. This problem is most severe in the People's 
Republic of China, where authorities deploy these technologies in 
Xinjiang, Tibet, and beyond, but as you note, is also present in other 
authoritarian countries.
    We are taking steps to address this. We continue to work closely 
with the Commerce Department to put entities that enable human rights 
abuses on its Entity List, when appropriate. Throughout the Summit for 
Democracy's Year of Action, we will lead efforts to convene likeminded 
partners to develop a voluntary code of conduct to guide the 
application of human rights criteria for export controls. In addition, 
we are working with our allies and partners to develop common 
principles on the responsible use of surveillance technologies. In 
October 2020, the Department of State released human rights due 
diligence guidance and best practices to assist U.S. businesses seeking 
to prevent their products or services with surveillance capabilities 
from being misused by government end-users to commit human rights 
abuses. We continue to engage with businesses on best practices and the 
challenges they may face in implementing the guidance.

    Question. What emerging technologies and tools can be better 
leveraged to counter authoritarianism by promoting transparency and 
supporting human rights and democracy defenders?

    Answer. Making digital technologies work for, not against, 
democracies and combating digital authoritarianism is a key priority 
for the Biden administration. For example, the White House announced at 
the Summit for Democracy, the International Grand Challenges on 
Democracy-Affirming Technologies to galvanize innovation in 
technologies that support democratic values, such as privacy-enhancing 
technologies and tools to combat government-imposed Internet shutdowns 
with peer-to-peer technology. The Department also launched the U.S. 
Anticorruption Solutions through Emerging Technology (ASET) program to 
accelerate technological solutions to counter corruption worldwide.
    Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence can also 
promote human rights--for example, by empowering persons with 
disabilities; combatting human trafficking; analyzing data to flag 
patterns of discrimination or abuse; and helping human rights defenders 
comb through vast troves of photos, videos, or text to hold governments 
accountable. In addition, rising global cryptocurrency adoption may 
provide funding avenues for activists whose authoritarian governments 
seek to surveil and control financial transactions, though it also 
presents many challenges. More broadly, blockchain-based technologies 
can allow users to exchange information and value with others without 
an intermediary. Such capabilities may prove challenging for 
authoritarian regimes to monitor and control.

    Question. How can digital assets and cryptocurrencies be utilized 
and promoted as tools for human rights defenders and democracy 
advocates in authoritarian regimes?

    Answer. The United States is committed to the responsible 
development and design of digital assets and the technology that 
underpins new forms of payments and capital flows in the international 
financial system. The Administration's Executive Order on ``Ensuring 
Responsible Development of Digital Assets'' demonstrates our 
determination to lead and shape financial innovation to promote 
prosperity, prevent abuse, and advance democratic values without 
restricting Americans' ability to hold and exchange digital assets.
    The decentralized and censorship-resistant nature of 
cryptocurrencies can help human rights defenders and democracy 
activists who otherwise cannot transfer funds due to restrictions on 
their bank accounts engage in financial transactions, such as in 
Nigeria, Belarus, and Russia. Cryptocurrency can also be stored without 
a financial institution, which can assist individuals to safeguard 
their wealth while fleeing oppressive regimes.
    We continue to assess how the State Department should approach the 
use of anonymous or decentralized peer-to-peer transfer of wealth while 
combating the illicit use of these digital assets by bad actors such as 
terrorists, human and drug traffickers, and ransomware actors. All 
efforts in this area must work to advance and respect human rights, 
strengthen the rule of law, combat money laundering and financing of 
terrorism, and counter weapons proliferation financing.

    Question. What are the potential risks for human rights and digital 
freedom of the adoption of China's digital currency, the eCNY, within 
China? What are the potential risks if the eCNY is adopted in countries 
other than China?

    Answer. The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has 
a poor record of responsible behavior in cyberspace and has misused 
technology to surveil for the purposes of repression. This raises 
serious concerns about the widespread adoption of platforms and 
standards related to technology developed by the PRC in general, 
including the e-CNY. Given the PRC's disregard for privacy and human 
rights, we have concerns that the e-CNY could pose heightened privacy 
and consumer protection risks and enhance the PRC's surveillance and 
social control capabilities, as well as extend that globally. We urge 
individuals, businesses, and global financial institutions to assess 
the risks cautiously and fully, including to human rights, of using the 
e-CNY.
    The PRC's crackdowns on private cryptocurrency transactions are 
taking place in concert with the rollout of the e-CNY and will prevent 
their citizens from using financial systems outside government control. 
In contrast with the PRC's misuse of technology, the Secretary has 
stated that our task is to put forth and carry out a compelling vision 
for how to use technology in a way that serves our people, protects our 
interests, and upholds our democratic values. The Administration's 
Executive Order on ``Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital 
Assets'' will drive government agencies to better understand private 
digital assets so reasonable guardrails can be implemented, and commits 
that any development of a central bank digital currency, if judged to 
be in the interest of the United States, will be done in line with 
democratic values.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ms. Jennifer Godfrey to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. How have perceptions of the Government of China changed 
within countries in Asia and Africa in the aftermath of the global 
COVID pandemic?

    Answer. We provide a strong contrast to the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) messaging by continually sharing U.S. values and U.S. 
global health leadership through public diplomacy messaging and 
programs, including through a dedicated strategic messaging campaign 
focused on U.S. Government vaccine donations to date. Message testing 
by the Bureau of Global Public Affairs (GPA) in countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia found that the majority of respondents did not 
trust COVID-19 social media messaging by the PRC or PRC-backed 
accounts. GPA research has also identified higher positive perceptions 
of the U.S. response to the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the PRC in 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

    Question. How is the Department leveraging America's global 
response to the COVID pandemic to highlight the power of transparency, 
free enterprise, and private sector innovation in contrast to 
authoritarian command and control?

    Answer. Transparency and equitable distribution of vaccines are at 
the heart of our COVID-19 global response. The United States has 
donated more than 498 million COVID-19 vaccine doses to more than 110 
countries and economies worldwide--with no political strings attached. 
We make these donations public on our website at www.state.gov/covid-
19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/ and amplify them publicly through the 
Department's public engagement events, media engagement, and social 
media properties, including U.S. embassies' and consulates' accounts. 
Research by the Bureau of Global Public Affairs demonstrated that 
international publics trust local voices and counsel from experts such 
as doctors and pharmacists, which informs our global messaging to 
ensure that we are leveraging local voices as we highlight the efforts 
of the United States to end the pandemic.
    We have invested and supported the expansion of regional COVID-19 
vaccine manufacturing in Africa and Asia. For instance, on March 7, 
Moderna Therapeutics and the Government of Kenya, in collaboration with 
the U.S. Government, announced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that 
will bring production and manufacturing of Moderna mRNA vaccines to 
Africa, for Africa. The MOU marks the first time that mRNA COVID-19 
vaccine drug substance will be produced on the continent at this scale. 
The brand-new facility in Kenya will produce safe and effective COVID-
19 vaccines and will create a lasting capability to produce vaccines 
against both longstanding health threats (malaria, yellow fever) and 
emerging health threats in the future.
    We also continue to work extensively with governments and 
international organizations, vaccine and medical goods producers, NGOs, 
the broader private sector, and others to deliver vaccines, get shots 
in arms, increase testing and treatment, support and protect healthcare 
workers and the public, and more. The Department has also provided more 
than 100 small grants of up to $10,000 to our State Department exchange 
program alumni to implement innovative COVID-19 response projects in 
local communities around the world. For example, a State Department 
grant helped a citizen of Malawi build an app to respond to the rapid 
spread of misinformation and disinformation across social media. Called 
COVID-19 NEBA, or ``Hey Neighbor,'' the app is offered in three 
languages--Chichewa, Tumbuka, and English--and increases access to 
fact-based information from trusted sources including U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control, the World Health Organization, and Malawi's Ministry 
of Health. The app has helped more than 648,000 citizens of Malawi 
access accurate COVID-19 information. In Thailand, State Department 
exchange alumni used a small grant to support Chiang Dao residents in 
the Chiang Mai Province. Alumni joined community organizations to 
create visual and audio media in seven languages on COVID-19 prevention 
best practices, collaborated with public health officials to conduct 
COVID-19 prevention workshops for village health volunteers, and 
provided effective communication tools and techniques to village 
leaders to help residents stay updated on COVID-19 - reaching more than 
70,000 people.
    We are working at every level, with partners from all sectors, to 
lead a coordinated, international response to this pandemic to save 
lives around the world and to bolster resilient, diverse, adaptable, 
and secure public health supply chains.

    Question. How does the Department evaluate or quantify the 
effectiveness of the Global Engagement Center in countering 
disinformation campaigns from Russia, China, Iran, and others?

    Answer. In addition to tracking specific impacts of Global 
Engagement Center's (GEC) work on policy outcomes and narratives 
globally, the GEC's Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit works with 
each of the GEC's threat-focused teams to develop metrics of success. 
The GEC's M&E Unit utilizes evidence-based and social science 
approaches, such as testing hypotheses to refine program design, to 
determine each program's effectiveness. For example, the GEC led an 
interagency and multinational campaign to delegitimize former ISIS 
leader Al Mawla. After the success of the first phase of the campaign, 
the GEC coordinated with partners to refine and conduct a second phase 
with more materials and a tailored media plan. As a result of the 
campaign's success, ISIS followers are so disillusioned with their 
leadership that Google analytic indices now show that ``al-Mawla'' 
related searches have shifted from references of ``The Destroyer'' to 
``The Canary Caliph'' and ``The Betrayer.'' The GEC also evaluates its 
programs, using its in-house evaluation capabilities and external 
third-party evaluators, to inform future planning and design and to 
refine methodologies and indicators of effectiveness.
    Additionally, consistent with the Evidence Act of 2018, the GEC is 
working with the Department's Bureau of Budget and Planning (BP) and 
the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F) on their ``Learning Agenda'' 
--a 4-year strategic process to use evidence-based data to inform 
foreign policy decisions across a select group of questions. The GEC 
leads on the portion of the Agenda focused on strategic implementation 
of counter-disinformation and propaganda efforts throughout the 
Department.
                                 ______
                                 

                Responses of Ms. Uzra Zeya to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. To what extent has DRL previously issued notices for 
projects aimed at documenting human rights violations occurring in 
Israel? Please explicitly cite and convey any notices you believe are 
precedents for or similar to SFOP0008613 in that context.

    Answer. In 2019, DRL solicited in SFOP0006474, through an open 
competition, proposals for programs supporting civil society 
organizations to reduce barriers to full inclusion of members of 
marginalized groups in Israel in political and economic processes. DRL 
funds a wide range of programs aimed at promoting civil society 
engagement at the local level as well as on issues related to human 
rights violations by security forces around the world. We have not 
issued any solicitations for these specific activities with respect to 
Israel or the West Bank/Gaza previously.

    Question. What ``legal or security sector violations and housing, 
land, and property rights'' violations that have occurred or are 
occurring in Israel that you believe are relevant to projects described 
by SFOP0008613?

    Answer. This solicitation allows local civil society organizations 
to design and submit proposals based on their assessment of local 
conditions and which they deem relevant to the context in which they 
would work.

    Question. What sorts of products or deliverables you envision 
receiving from projects described by SFOP0008613?

    Answer. Local civil society organizations who apply under this 
solicitation will propose potential products or deliverables based on 
their assessment of local conditions.

    Question. What proposals have already been submitted for projects 
described by SFOP0008613?

    Answer. The number and organizational specifics of proposals are 
not known as the Notice of Funding Opportunity has not closed yet. 
Additionally, Department grants policy directs the process remain 
confidential until a Federal Assistance Award has been granted.