[Senate Hearing 117-344]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





                                                        S. Hrg. 117-344
 
                  RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: ASSESSING 
                  THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS



                             SECOND SESSION



                               __________

                               MARCH 8, 2022

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       
       
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]       
       
       




                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
                  
                            ______                       


             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
48-350 PDF           WASHINGTON : 2022 
                  
                  


                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC..............     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Jim Risch..............................................    44

Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................    58

Letter From Ruslan Stefanchuk, Parliament of Ukraine, Dated March 
  8, 2022........................................................    62

                                 (iii)

  


  RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: ASSESSING THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL 
                                RESPONSE

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:59 p.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van 
Hollen, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Young, 
Barrasso, and Cruz.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. Now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearing on ``Russia's invasion of Ukraine: Assessing the U.S. 
and International Response'' will come to order.
    Let me thank Secretary Nuland for coming before us today to 
testify on the crisis facing Ukraine, Europe, and the world and 
for being with us yesterday in a classified session so that all 
of the questions that members would want to ask, some which 
could not be conducted in this forum, could be answered. We 
appreciate you being there.
    In just 12 days, the world has changed. As we sit here, 
Ukraine is fighting for its life. A ruthless dictator is 
shelling civilians, refusing calls for diplomacy, and 
threatening the stability of a region.
    As of this morning, at least 470 Ukrainian civilians have 
lost their lives because of Putin's brutality. At least 29 of 
them were innocent children.
    The last 12 days have been an entire lifetime for the 
people of Ukraine, forced to leave their lives behind, spending 
days in subways and makeshift bomb shelters, fleeing from 
mortars with their children in hand, and sometimes they do not 
make it.
    The rest of the world is being called upon to stand with 
Ukraine to make this war untenable for the dictator in Moscow. 
The United States and much of the world has rallied with 
impressive urgency and coordination.
    I commend the Administration's efforts--the result of 
months of relentless diplomacy--to build a strong international 
coalition that has stood up and imposed sweeping costs on the 
Putin regime.
    To date, we, along with the European allies and partners 
and others, have levied serious costs that are already having a 
devastating effect on the Russian economy. The central bank of 
Russia is subject to unprecedented sanctions. The top banks in 
Russia are sanctioned along with Putin himself, and company 
after company is cutting off Russian ties.
    We have made clear that with this unjustified, unprovoked 
invasion, Putin has miscalculated. He has chosen to turn the 
Russian state into a pariah and to have the Russian people 
suffer as a result of it.
    I am afraid, and I hope I am dead wrong, that this may just 
be the beginning of the fight for Ukraine's existence.
    We are here and we are prepared to support the Ukrainian 
people, but it may be a long road. While the response of the 
past 12 days is valiant, it cannot be the end.
    Until Putin relents, we must keep the pressure on. That 
means holding Belarus and the Lukashenko regime to account for 
their role and acquiescence. It means continuing to squeeze 
Putin's oligarchs as well as the political elites and seizing 
their assets so they feel and respond to the pain.
    In some respects, Europe has been somewhat ahead of us on 
this score. I think we should be doing what Europe has done. It 
means ensuring every bank is cut off from SWIFT. It means 
pressuring those countries who have not yet ended economic ties 
or arms sales to do so.
    It means tariffs on non-oil imports and advocating for the 
private sector to follow the lead of some of our companies to 
divest and cease operations in Russia and, of course, it means 
staying laser focused on providing Ukraine every weapon, every 
piece of lethal assistance, every defense article possible, so 
that it can defend itself.
    Many of us are working to do just that as we speak and to 
respond urgently to the personal appeals of President Zelensky 
and the Ukrainian ambassador in Washington.
    I hope this week will result in a bipartisan demonstration 
of support for Ukraine through the omnibus bill as we heed 
their calls for additional assistance and weapons. We must also 
be thinking about the months ahead and recognize that the 
threat of Kremlin aggression is not going away.
    I believe we must engage in a revitalized diplomatic effort 
to counter Russian aggression not only beyond Europe's borders, 
but globally.
    Today, I am calling on the Administration to do just that. 
I have sent letters to the State Department's regional 
assistant secretaries asking that each detail their diplomatic 
strategies to counter Russia.
    This must be a global effort. We need to match our words 
with action to fend off Putin's attempts to tighten his grip 
around the world and grasp at political legitimacy.
    Most immediately, while I have broader concerns about the 
JCPOA, I am specifically concerned that returning to the JCPOA 
will benefit Russia economically at a time when the 
international community is committed to squeezing Moscow.
    I am also extremely concerned that the Administration would 
consider purchasing oil from Venezuela. The Biden 
administration's efforts to unify the entire world against the 
murderous tyrant in Moscow is commendable, but it should not be 
undercut by propping up a dictator under investigation for 
crimes against humanity in Caracas.
    The democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people, much 
like the resolve and courage of the people of Ukraine, are 
worth more than a few thousand barrels of oil.
    These are extraordinary times and, yes, we are all looking 
for extraordinary measures in response, but we cannot lose 
sight of our core principles of our basic values.
    We must turn Putin back, out of Ukraine, and out of the 
regions across the world where his influence has grown.
    In closing, the people of Ukraine refuse to back down. 
Their cause is our cause because they should not have to fight. 
They should not have to flee their borders or leave their 
homes. They deserve to live and thrive in freedom.
    The fight for Ukraine is a fight for democracy, a fight for 
freedom, a fight against a murderous dictatorship, and we 
cannot forget that.
    Senator Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you to Under Secretary Nuland for joining us today to discuss 
Russia's unprovoked, unwarranted criminal and murderous 
invasion of Ukraine.
    I also want to thank you for appearing yesterday and 
participating in our closed discussion on the issues. I think 
probably you were impressed, as I was, with the unanimity 
amongst Republicans and Democrats about how to approach this 
issue and what should be done about it.
    I also appreciated your agreement to convey the deep 
concerns that we had, on a bipartisan basis, on some issues 
that we are facing, and I truly appreciate that.
    I look forward to your information, today in open session, 
about the Administration's actions to help Ukraine, the 
additional sanctions on Russia we can expect, and what the U.S. 
is doing to assist the massive humanitarian crisis that is 
growing both inside Ukraine and in Europe.
    I also ask you to address the Administration's larger 
strategy for dealing with this crisis. My goal for security 
assistance to Ukraine is simple. Enable the Ukrainian people to 
expel the murderous invaders from their land and defeat Putin.
    I am disappointed the U.S. did not send more to Ukraine 
before the invasion began, but I am glad to see the vast amount 
of international military support Ukraine has received in the 
past 2 weeks.
    The U.S. has now sent healthy amounts of equipment to 
Ukraine. We all know they need more and they need it faster.
    The international outpouring of disgust at Putin's actions 
has enabled sanctions on Russia to be more effective than we 
predicted. There are still huge loopholes that must be closed.
    I am glad the Administration has cut off oil purchases from 
Russia. That said, it is imperative that we do not replace 
Russia's heavy crude with supplies from the dictators in Iran 
and Venezuela.
    We are in the enviable position of having the oil and gas 
reserves needed to increase production in our own country right 
under our own feet. It boggles my mind the Biden administration 
would pander to dictators when we can meet our own needs 
without blood on our hands.
    Secondary sanctions on banks that undertake transactions 
with Russia also have not yet been imposed. This leaves open 
many different avenues for Russia to continue its transactions 
as usual.
    As you know, I have been pushing for secondary sanctions 
since the beginning of this. I understand that the secondary 
sanctions are complex and I understand they must be handled 
delicately.
    Obviously, with the waivers that are always provided, 
secondary sanctions can be an excellent tool. I predict that 
secondary sanctions are going to have to be grabbed and put 
into place at some point in time, in the not too distant 
future.
    I also want to say a word about the people of Russia. We 
are not at war with Russia and we do not seek war with Russia. 
Putin has led the Russian people into disaster.
    I know how much Putin is suppressing his own people. I urge 
them to refuse to be complicit in his crimes. There is much 
ordinary Russian people can do to push back on Putin's ugly 
humanitarian crimes.
    On the humanitarian front, I applaud the work that State 
and USAID have done so far to prepare for and engage with the 
huge flow of refugees coming from Ukraine.
    The stream of refugees looks to be even larger than 
estimated. Our EU partners are very capable of dealing with 
this challenge, but we can certainly assist.
    I am particularly concerned about Moldova, one of Europe's 
poorest countries, which has one of the largest refugee 
populations per capita. It is struggling with high Russian-
imposed energy prices and may have to deal with the activation 
of 1,500 Russian troops in its occupied region of Transnistria.
    This senseless invasion at the hands of a madman is a 
threat not just to the innocent people of Ukraine, but to all 
of us in the democratic world. This conflict has immense 
implications for the people of Ukraine. It also speaks to the 
credibility of the U.S. and the West to defend the freedom and 
sovereignty of countries that want to decide their own futures.
    We must do more to help the innocent civilians, women, and 
children who are dying each day, and the men and women who are 
fighting on the frontlines in a war they do not want.
    I think we all know this can and will get much worse, and I 
look forward to hearing more from you in this public forum 
about what more the Biden administration will do to respond to 
Putin and help the Ukrainian people.
    Finally, this struggle that Ukrainians are going through 
reminds us that freedom is not free, as we learned in our 
struggle to be a free people, and that the value of freedom 
cannot be measured, but its costs can be burdensome in the 
extreme.
    However, at the end of the struggle, there is no greater 
gift one generation can pass to the next generation than the 
gift of freedom.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Nuland, we will start with your testimony. There 
is a lot to cover so I normally say if you can try to summarize 
it in 5 minutes, but we will give you a little latitude and 
then there is, I am sure, by the attendance here you see there 
will be a lot of questions.
    So the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF 
    STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Nuland. Thanks very much, Chairman Menendez, Ranking 
Member Risch, and distinguished members of this committee for 
the opportunity to be with you here today and for the 
opportunity yesterday to talk in classified session to discuss 
Russia's premeditated, unprovoked, brutal attack on Ukraine and 
what the United States and our allies and partners are doing 
together in response.
    To start, let me first thank all the members of this 
committee and the vast majority of members of Congress for your 
strong bipartisan support for the brave and resilient people of 
Ukraine and their government over many years, but especially 
now in the face of Russia's bloody aggression.
    The United States, together with our allies and partners 
around the world, stand united in condemning Russia's war on 
Ukraine, a war that offends human decency, violates 
international law, and the core principles of democracy and 
international peace and security, and has created a 
catastrophic humanitarian crisis.
    As we speak, Ukrainian men and women fight for their lives, 
for their country, for their freedom in the face of President 
Putin's imperial ambitions. We honor their sacrifice and 
bravery. Slava Ukrayini; Heroyam Slava.
    First, what we are doing. We continue to provide defensive 
lethal security assistance to Ukraine. Just 10 days ago, 
President Biden and Secretary Blinken authorized the immediate 
delivery of an additional $350 million of military support, and 
I am pleased to say that two-thirds of that has already gotten 
into Ukraine and, in total, the Administration has provided 
more than a billion dollars in security assistance in just this 
last year.
    With Congress' bipartisan support, we are also facilitating 
third party transfers of weapons and have seen unprecedented 
international assistance to Ukraine from our allies and 
partners.
    Second, we are providing urgently needed humanitarian 
assistance to Ukraine and its neighbors. Working with the 
Government of Ukraine, U.N. agencies, humanitarian 
organizations, and European partners, the United States is 
providing food, medicine, hygiene supplies, health care, and 
protection services, shelter support and other assistance.
    Last week, Secretary Blinken announced an additional $54 
million in U.S. assistance, and countries around the world have 
met the U.N.'s humanitarian appeal with an additional $1.5 
billion in support. As you know, with 2 million refugees 
already and more than 1.2 million IDPs, needs will go up.
    Third, we have imposed severe sanctions on Russia's 
financial institutions, its oligarchs, and political leaders, 
including President Putin and his cronies.
    We have levied export controls on key industries and the 
Russian military in close coordination with almost 40 countries 
around the world, representing over half the world's economy, 
and those sanctions have had an immediate impact.
    We are seeing a continued flight of capital, a tumbling of 
the ruble--it has lost half its value--rising inflation, higher 
borrowing costs, and evaporating access for Russia to global 
financial markets.
    There is more on the way from the G-7, our EU partners, and 
countries around the world if President Putin does not end this 
vicious war.
    We are also working with our allies and partners to limit 
the disruption of global energy supplies and to prevent Russia 
from weaponizing its global energy exports while also 
accelerating diversification of energy supplies.
    We sanctioned the parent company of Nord Stream 2 and its 
CEO, and the German Government, as you know, has cancelled its 
support for the pipeline so that it will not become 
operational.
    We are also using all multilateral fora to rally the world 
in condemning Russia and Belarus. As you know, last week, a 
record 141 countries voted in favor of the U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution, calling for Russia to end its war and 
withdraw from Ukraine--a historic outpouring of support and 
international solidarity.
    Days later, the Human Rights Council overwhelmingly passed 
a resolution establishing a Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate and call out Russia's human rights abuses in 
Ukraine, and in close cooperation with our NATO allies, we are 
strengthening the defense and the deterrence of the alliance's 
Eastern Flank.
    Allies agreed for the first time in the alliance's history 
to give the Supreme Allied Commander authority to deploy NATO's 
response force, including its spearhead component, the Very 
High Readiness Joint Task Force--the VJTF--and it is already 
beginning to deploy.
    U.S. military personnel in Europe and in its waters now 
total approximately 100,000. We have more than doubled our U.S. 
forces in Poland and sent thousands of troops to the Baltics, 
to Romania, and elsewhere along the flank, along with advanced 
combat aviation.
    A number of our allies are also starting to flow forces to 
NATO's east to bolster their presence and to fulfill their NATO 
obligations.
    The message to Russia is clear. NATO is united and our 
commitment to Article 5 is iron clad. President Putin has not 
only attacked Ukraine, he has trashed the U.N. principle of 
self-determination of states and questioned Ukraine's very 
right to exist.
    He is testing the foundations of international law and he 
is testing all of us and NATO and the EU and the G-7 and 
democracies around the world.
    As President Biden said, we are now in a battle between 
democracy and autocracy, and free people, free nations, and a 
free Ukraine must prevail.
    As Putin tries to reduce Ukraine to rubble, he is also 
turning Russia into a prison. Credit cards and ATMs have 
stopped working, capital controls are biting deeply, imported 
food, technology, and other goods are drying up, and the last 
of Russia's free press has been strangled, all while the 
government hemorrhages money--money that belongs to the Russian 
people--to fund its war effort and to prop up the ruble.
    Last week, President Putin criminalized anti-war protests 
and efforts to support Ukraine. The so-called consultancy laws 
with Kyiv can result in 20 years in a penal colony. Thirty 
years of progress in Russia has been wiped out in just 12 days.
    This is a war launched by one man for his own twisted 
reasons. It is a war built on lies he has told the world, he 
has told his own people, and his military, and now it is a war 
also built on the suffering and grief of so many Ukrainians and 
also Russians--parents, spouses, partners, children--who will 
never see their loved ones again, all because of one man's evil 
choices.
    Ukrainians are fighting for their nation's survival, but 
they are also fighting for all of us and for the principles of 
freedom and democracy that are foundational for our nation and 
for our allies and partners.
    Together, we must do all we can to ensure Ukraine not only 
survives, but it thrives again. We in the Administration are 
proud to work with all of you towards that difficult, but 
righteous goal.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Ms. Victoria Nuland

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members 
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today to discuss Russia's premeditated, unprovoked, and brutal attack 
on Ukraine and what the United States and Allied partners are doing in 
response.
    To start, let me thank the members of this committee and the vast 
majority of Members of Congress for your strong bipartisan support for 
the brave and resilient people of Ukraine and their government over 
many years, but especially now, in the face of Russia's bloody 
aggression. The United States, together with our Allies and partners 
around the world, stand united in condemning Russia's war on Ukraine--a 
war that offends human decency, violates international law, and the 
core principles of democracy and international peace and security, and 
has created a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. As we speak, Ukrainian 
men and women fight for their lives, their country, and their freedoms 
in the face of Russian President Putin's imperial ambitions. We honor 
their sacrifice and bravery. Slava Ukrayini; Heroyam Slava [Honor to 
Ukraine; to its Heroes, Honor].
    Our immediate focus has been to provide Ukraine the help it needs 
to defend its sovereignty, protect its democratic government, and 
support Ukrainians seeking aid and refuge.
    First, we continue to provide security assistance to Ukraine, 
including equipment needed to defend against threats from the air, from 
armored assault, as well as to ensure the people standing up to defend 
Ukraine have the body armor and medical support they need. On February 
25, President Biden and Secretary Blinken authorized the immediate 
delivery of an additional $350 million in military support, and two-
thirds of that has already gotten into Ukraine. In total, the 
Administration has provided more than $1 billion in security assistance 
in the last year and more than $3 billion since 2014.
    We continue to urge Allies and partners to contribute security 
assistance to Ukraine as swiftly as possible. With Congress's 
bipartisan support we are facilitating third party transfers of weapons 
and have seen unprecedented international assistance to Ukraine. Some 
of our closest allies and partners have made dramatic policy shifts and 
are providing lethal assistance for the first time.
    Second, we are providing urgently needed humanitarian assistance to 
Ukraine and its neighbors, led by a forward-based team of dedicated 
humanitarian response experts from USAID and the Department of State. 
Partnering closely with the Government of Ukraine, as well as UN 
agencies, humanitarian organizations, and European partners, the U.S. 
is providing food, medicine, hygiene supplies, health care and 
protection services, shelter support, and other assistance, including 
an emergency announcement last week of an additional $54 million in 
assistance to those affected by Russia's invasion. As with other forms 
of assistance, we are encouraged by the contributions of Allies and 
partners who continue to receive and support all those who are fleeing 
Ukraine, and who together have pledged nearly $1.5 billion in support 
of the UN's humanitarian appeal.
    Third, we have imposed severe sanctions on Russian financial 
institutions, oligarchs, and political leaders--including President 
Putin and his cronies--and levied export controls on key industries and 
the Russian military. We have taken these actions in close coordination 
with almost 40 countries--representing over half the world's economy--
and they have had immediate impact. We are seeing a continued flight of 
capital, a tumbling ruble, rising inflation, higher borrowing costs, 
and evaporating access to global financial markets. Additionally, with 
Allies and partners, we are launching a joint task force to hunt down 
and freeze the assets--including mega yachts and mansions--owned by 
sanctioned Russian companies, oligarchs, and government officials. And 
we're not done. There is more on the way from the G7 and our EU 
partners as early as this week if President Putin does not end his 
vicious war.
    We are also coordinating closely with our Allies and partners to 
limit disruption to global energy supplies and to prevent Russia from 
weaponizing its global energy exports while also accelerating 
diversification of energy supplies. And as President Biden promised, we 
sanctioned the parent company of Nord Stream 2, Nord Stream AG and its 
CEO, and the German Government has also cancelled its support for the 
pipeline, which will not become operational.
    We are using all multilateral fora to rally the world in condemning 
Russia and Belarus. As you know, last week 141 countries voted in favor 
of the UN General Assembly resolution calling for Russia to end its war 
and withdraw from Ukraine, a historic outpouring of support for and 
international solidarity with the Ukrainian people. Days later, the 
Human Rights Council overwhelmingly passed a resolution establishing a 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate and call out Russia's human rights 
abuses in Ukraine.
    At the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE), we are 
resolved to hold Russia and its forces accountable for any and all 
human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, and 
war crimes they commit in Ukraine--including sexual and gender-based 
violence, as we are seeing reports of this and other potential abuses.
    And in close cooperation with NATO Allies, we are adjusting our 
force posture to strengthen the defense and deterrence of the 
Alliance's eastern flank. Allies agreed for the first time in history 
to give Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) authority to deploy 
the NATO Response Force (NRF), including its spearhead component, the 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).
    In recent weeks, we have significantly increased U.S. military 
personnel positioned in Europe and its waters, which now total 
approximately 100,000. We have more than doubled our forces in Poland 
and sent thousands of troops to the Baltics, Romania, and elsewhere on 
NATO's eastern flank--along with advanced combat aviation. Several 
Allies including France, Germany, and the UK, have also bolstered their 
troop presence. The message to Russia is clear: NATO is united, and our 
commitment to Article 5 is ironclad.
    President Putin has not only attacked Ukraine, he has trashed the 
UN principle of the self-determination of states and questioned 
Ukraine's right to exist. He is testing the foundations of 
international law and he is testing all of us. He is testing the 
resolve of NATO, the EU, the G7, and democracies around the world. As 
President Biden said, we are in a battle between democracy and 
autocracy, and free people, free nations, a free Ukraine must prevail.
    As Putin tries to reduce Ukraine to rubble, he is also turning 
Russia into a prison. Credit cards and ATMs have stopped working; 
capital controls are biting deeply; imported food, technology, and 
other goods are drying up; international travel is getting difficult 
and expensive; the last of a free press plus Twitter, Facebook, and 
other social media outlets are strangled, all while the government 
hemorrhages state funds on the war effort and to prop up the ruble. And 
last week President Putin criminalized anti-war protests and all 
sympathy with Ukraine--so called ``consultancy'' with Kyiv can result 
in 20 years in a penal colony. Thirty years of progress in Russia has 
been wiped out in 10 days.
    This is a war launched by one man for his own twisted reasons. It 
is a war built on the lies he has told the world, his own people, and 
his military. And now it is a war built on the suffering and grief of 
so many Ukrainians--and Russians too--parents, spouses, partners, 
children--who will never see their loved ones again, all because of one 
man's evil choices.
    Ukrainians are fighting for their nation's survival. But they are 
also fighting for all of us and for the principles of freedom and 
democracy that are foundational for our nation and our allies and 
partners. Together, we must do all that we can to ensure Ukraine not 
only survives, but thrives again. We in the Administration are proud to 
work with all of you toward that difficult, but righteous goal.
    Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary. We will start 5-
minute rounds.
    Let me start off with a letter that the Ukrainian 
parliament has sent us, and I want to read one paragraph of it 
because I think it creates context for everything we are 
deciding.

        ``As you read this, Russian troops are indiscriminately 
        shelling civilians, residential areas, schools, and 
        hospitals. The aggressor is using weapons prohibited by 
        the Geneva Convention and international humanitarian 
        law such as cluster bombs and vacuum thermobaric bombs, 
        intended to cause severe suffering to human beings, and 
        when civilians try to escape the combat zones Russian 
        soldiers shoot at humanitarian `green corridors,' 
        turning them blood red.''

    I ask unanimous consent that the letter be included in 
today's record, without objection.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. The spokesperson for UNICEF has said 1 
million children have fled Ukraine, calling it, ``a dark 
historical first.'' That spokesperson said, ``We have not seen 
a refugee crisis of this speed and scale since World War II, 
and this is a children's crisis.''
    So against that backdrop, I understand that the Government 
of Poland a very little while ago, after consultations between 
their president and the government, are ready to deploy 
immediately and free of charge their MiG-29 jets and place them 
at the disposal of the United States of America. They have 
decided not to go directly, but--and, of course, they are--they 
have concerns about the backfilling of that at some point in 
time in some way.
    Can you speak to that and where we are at in that regard 
now that the Government of Poland has made that decision?
    Ms. Nuland. Chairman, I saw that announcement by the 
Government of Poland as I was, literally, driving here today.
    To my knowledge, it was not preconsulted with us that they 
planned to give these planes to us. As you know, we have been 
having consultations with them for a couple of days now about 
this request from the Ukrainians to receive their aircraft and 
were they to donate them whether we would be able to help 
support backfill in their own security needs.
    I look forward, when this hearing is over, to getting back 
to my desk and seeing how we will respond to this proposal of 
theirs to give the planes to us.
    The Chairman. They have moved forward now and they have 
said that their planes are now disposable. They are willing to 
give it. The one thing that we have heard consistently is a 
call for a no-fly zone.
    I understand the challenges of that--NATO and other 
countries not willing to engage in a direct conflict with 
Russia. Giving Ukrainians the wherewithal to fight over their 
own airspace and to be able to have some control over their 
airspace is, clearly, desirable.
    Now that Poland has made this decision and, it would be my 
hope, that other countries in the region as well, that we would 
be forward-leaning in finding a pathway forward because the one 
thing about all of this is time is of the essence. If we are 
going to make a difference, time is of the essence.
    Let me ask you this. We are doing all these sanctions. 
There is no one who has been an advocate of sanctions, 
generally speaking, and, certainly, in this case, more than I 
have on this committee.
    I am wondering about cryptocurrency because we are 
sanctioning all of the traditional financial and banking 
systems. Cryptocurrency is an opportunity for Russian oligarchs 
and others to move in a different direction.
    Are we having our Treasury Department and others think 
about how we deal with that challenge?
    Ms. Nuland. Mr. Chairman, we are. In fact, we have in the 
past, as you know, drained designated hacker wallets from 
Russia.
    We have other authorities that allow us to go after crypto. 
Not only are we looking at it ourselves, we are consulting with 
our European allies and partners on how we might do more 
together to close down this dangerous spigot of revenue.
    The Chairman. I think it is going to be one of the 
essential elements to continue to dry up every resource that 
Putin can have and to continue to tighten the noose--the 
economic noose--around his neck, at the end of the day.
    Lastly, what are we doing in having a full-scale assault? I 
said that I sent letters to all the regional secretaries. It 
seems to me that Putin should feel the consequences 
everywhere----
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    The Chairman. --and that means whether it be Latin America 
or Asia or Africa, we need to be at the forefront of pressuring 
Russia in all of those continents, in all of those countries.
    Are we actively engaged in doing that?
    Ms. Nuland. Mr. Chairman, we are. Not only are we pressing 
every country that we speak to at the president and secretaries 
level and all the levels in the department, every single one of 
our ambassadors has instructions to work with their host 
nations to try to get them to match U.S. and EU and allied 
sanctions to the extent that they can and are willing to 
condemn Russia.
    You saw the vote in the UNGA--141 countries. There was 
significant, how should we say, diplomatic elbow grease went 
into that from allies and partners around the world. As you 
know, we have a number of big countries who have abstained from 
this fight so far and we are trying to use our influence with 
them as well to get on the right side of history.
    The Chairman. I hope they get on the right side of history. 
Some of them I like very much, but they need to get on the 
right side of history.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the 
chairman regarding the JCPOA. As I told you in the private 
session yesterday, I want to say it publicly here and I hope 
you will commit--you will transmit this to the Administration 
as you said you would yesterday. That is, there could not be a 
worse time for the Administration to be trying to come together 
on a JCPOA and announce it when we are in the middle of the 
mess we are in right now.
    The chairman mentioned reasons for it. There is another 
reason for it, obviously, and I think you saw that yesterday, 
how united we are as the United States Senate in helping 
Ukraine and what is going on diplomatically and otherwise, when 
it comes to this struggle.
    I cannot think of something you could do that would be 
worse to try to tear that apart than announce a JCPOA because 
we are going to be very divided on it. They started out saying 
it was going to be stronger and longer. There were two 
different bumper stickers, I guess. One was stronger and the 
other was longer.
    Both of those, as we know, are by the by. They then said, 
well, they were going to work to get less for less. That has 
gone by the by, and from what everything that is leaking out 
now, it sounds like it is going to be worse for worse. I just 
cannot fathom that we want to enter into that at this point.
    As the chairman properly notes, it is going to cause a 
tremendous amount of cash to be transmitted to the Russians as 
a result of a new JCPOA for the reasons he discussed.
    There is no logical reason to be doing that at this time. 
Look, this thing has been dragging on. I know that 
Administration wanted to immediately reverse what Trump had 
done and I get that.
    They have been at it now for a year and a half and it, 
certainly, can be put off for another 6 months. I am not asking 
that you end it.
    I know what you are going to do and I know--when I say you, 
I mean the Administration--I know what the Administration is 
going to do and I know how it is going to wind up. At least put 
it on ice for 6 months until we get this mess behind us.
    So that is the plea I have on the JCPOA. I think it would 
be in everybody's best interest to do that.
    As I talked about in our closed hearing yesterday, I hope 
you will focus on this. We hear a lot about Stingers. We hear a 
lot about the Javelin. We hear a lot about the Russian MiGs 
that other countries have. We would like to get into the fight.
    One thing that has not been discussed are other surface-to-
air missiles between the Patriots, which are the big gun, and 
the Stingers, which are the small gun, I guess. I really think 
they could do some good with some of those intermediate 
missiles and I hope you will convey that to the Administration 
and work on that.
    Finally, let me just close with secondary sanctions. I know 
the Administration has not reached for the secondary sanction 
tool in their toolbox yet. I would say and I would urge, the 
minute we see somebody trying to get around these sanctions or 
somebody trying to actually do business with the Russians, the 
secondary sanctions need to come into play.
    They can be used surgically. They can be used in a targeted 
fashion so that we do not injure somebody through collateral 
damage, either us or one of our partners. That can be done 
easily with the waivers.
    So I would urge, again, that they keep that tool at the 
ready in case they need to use it, and if you want to respond 
to any of that you got a minute and 16 seconds.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch.
    Let me just say with regard to the weapons that we are 
sending to Ukraine, as you know, we talked about some of this 
in classified session yesterday and we, generally, do not talk 
in specifics in an open session.
    With regard to other systems that we might be able to send, 
we are working very hard and fast on that now so--and we can 
speak further about it in another setting, if you would like.
    Senator Risch. That is good to hear.
    Ms. Nuland. With regard to secondary sanctions, I think you 
know that some of what we have done already, particularly, the 
export control constraints, has a global impact in the sense 
that anybody seeking to transfer American high-tech--any 
component--anything at all to Russia that has American high-
technology in it, whether that country is Singapore or China or 
Germany or whatever, has to have a license. So that is our 
effort to create a global regime here.
    As I said, we are also seeking to get more and more 
countries to join us in as much of this regime as possible, but 
we will continue to look at all of these things that you 
raised.
    Look, we are not having a hearing about the JCPOA. I will 
simply say that there was extreme concern that this is not an 
issue that can wait, given Iran's acceleration of its 
development of technology towards a weapon, and the last thing 
we need is this war and Iran with a nuclear weapon. Thanks.
    The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Secretary Nuland, first of all, thank you 
very much, and we, certainly, appreciate the unity that the 
Biden administration has been able to achieve with our allies 
in the global community in isolating Russia and providing 
needed help to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.
    So we talk about that there is strong agreement to supply 
Ukraine with the defensive lethal weapons they need, and we 
have done that and our allies have done that. Countries have 
done that. We have been pretty effective in getting that type 
of equipment to the Ukrainians.
    So I am a little bit baffled as to why it is taking so long 
in regards to aircraft getting into Ukraine. President Zelensky 
has made it clear he needs it. There is strong unity among all 
of us that we should be supplying that, and I know that you are 
not up to date as to the most recent announcements made by the 
Poles in regards to the aircraft being delivered to Germany.
    I would ask that if this is not going to be handled quickly 
to please advise this committee. Time is of the essence and we 
would like to see those planes there yesterday.
    So if there is additional bureaucratic delays in making 
this available, I think we want to know about it because we 
would like to be helpful in getting it to the Ukrainians as 
soon as possible and we mean, like, today.
    So if you could just make a commitment to let us know if 
there is going to be any delays in accommodating those aircraft 
I would appreciate that. I know the committee would appreciate 
that.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you very much. I did convey the strong 
bipartisan sentiment of the committee yesterday with regard to 
these aircraft and will do so again, based on this hearing. 
Thanks.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you.
    I want to talk a little bit about Moldova and Georgia. If 
it were not for the Ukrainian resistance and Mr. Putin was able 
to overtake Ukraine in the timeframe that he thought he would 
be able to do it, I daresay that there would be a real concern 
that Mr. Putin may be on his way to Moldova and Georgia--non-
NATO countries.
    What steps are we taking today to help Moldova and Georgia, 
recognizing that if the circumstances change and Mr. Putin 
believes he has the ability he would not hesitate to cross 
those borders? He already has. I mean, he is already in Moldova 
and Georgia in contested areas. They are not contested, but 
only by Mr. Putin believing they are contested.
    What steps are being taken so that those countries are 
going to be in the best possible position to defend themselves 
in the event that Mr. Putin decides he is going to move more 
aggressively in those two countries?
    Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator Cardin.
    First, with regard to Georgia, as you know, we have a 
longstanding security relationship with Georgia. They have also 
contributed regularly to all kinds of NATO operations and NATO 
exercises and have received lots of U.S. military training and 
equipment over the years, which--and that program accelerated 
quite a bit after President Putin's invasion of Georgia in 
2008. That relationship is strong and continues to be strong.
    With regard to Moldova, as you know, Secretary Blinken was 
in Moldova. I cannot remember--Saturday, maybe--Friday or 
Saturday. He went with the intention of showing U.S. support 
and seeking to understand better what their concerns are in the 
context of this war and, as you know, were Putin's troops to 
make that landing in Odessa, it is just a short hop up 
Transnistria and Moldova would be next.
    In response to the president of Moldova's request, we are 
looking at increasing not only our humanitarian support to 
Moldova, because they are also hosting lots of Ukrainian 
refugees, but border security and energy security and other 
things that that government has asked for, and we will continue 
to be responsive as we can.
    Senator Cardin. So let me ask one additional question.
    As early as Thursday or Friday, we are going to pass an 
omnibus appropriation bill. It is going to contain a 
significant amount of funds for humanitarian assistance.
    Is the State Department prepared to be able to implement 
major supplying of humanitarian needs in regards to the 
refugees that have fled as well as the people within Ukraine 
that need help? Are we--have the capacity to make sure those 
relief funds and relief efforts are implemented immediately?
    Ms. Nuland. We are, Senator. In fact, as we saw these 
troops mounting on Ukraine's borders, we began working with 
U.N. agencies, with the Ukrainians, with neighboring states to 
stockpile humanitarian support.
    Much of what was initially available was the result of that 
stockpiling. We are now continuing to push humanitarian support 
into Ukraine as are the U.N. agencies and into Moldova, as I 
said, and Poland is also getting a huge amount of international 
support as are Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, other countries on 
the front line, and we will do more together with our partners 
at AID and in the U.N. agencies.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
    Senator Rubio. Secretary Nuland, does the United States 
recognize Juan Guaido as the president of Venezuela?
    Ms. Nuland. We recognize his leadership in Venezuela, yes.
    Senator Rubio. Do we recognize him as the president of 
Venezuela? Is that not--is that not our official position?
    Ms. Nuland. It is.
    Senator Rubio. So why would we meet with a dictator, 
Nicolas Maduro, without telling Juan Guaido or the ambassador 
here in the United States that it was happening? I know you 
told him afterwards. Why would we not coordinate with them 
beforehand?
    Ms. Nuland. We did coordinate with them beforehand. We met 
with the opposition before that meeting.
    Senator Rubio. You met with the opposition after that 
meeting.
    Ms. Nuland. I will take that. I think it was the other way 
around, Senator.
    Senator Rubio. I assure you it was after that meeting and, 
certainly, the ambassador feels that way. He was not aware of 
it until after that meeting.
    You are aware that the Venezuelan oil industry is in 
shambles after years of mismanagement, corruption. It is a 
personal piggy bank.
    They produce about--on a good day about a quarter of what 
they used to produce, what we would all remember as Venezuela, 
and every informed person in the oil industry will tell you 
that if we were to buy all of it--and we cannot because some of 
it is already contractually committed--it would be an 
insignificant impact on U.S. economy.
    It is--but it would be a huge benefit to Maduro. It would 
be millions of dollars for his personal piggy bank. So is this 
meeting--the secret meeting that occurred this weekend, which 
is published everywhere--is this part of a Russia strategy or 
is it part of a general pivot in the broader Venezuela matter?
    Ms. Nuland. There is zero pivot in our Venezuela strategy, 
Senator. First and foremost, and I can only talk about it to 
some extent in this setting--I am happy to talk to you about it 
in another setting if you would like or after this hearing.
    Senator Rubio. It is not--not because it is classified, but 
because it is confidential with another government, another 
country.
    Ms. Nuland. For a number of reasons. First and foremost, 
the mission was about visiting and checking on the welfare of 
our incarcerated Americans--the CITGO 6 and the other two--and 
as you know, we have made regular visits to Caracas for that 
purpose.
    We were also seeking to get the Venezuelan Government back 
to the table with the opposition in the internationally 
monitored peace talks, and then there were a number of other 
things that we discussed that I can talk to you about in 
another----
    Senator Rubio. Why did they leave those negotiations? Do 
you recall?
    Ms. Nuland. They left them because they objected to the 
extradition of one of----
    Senator Rubio. Alex Saab.
    Ms. Nuland. Yes, exactly. One of the----
    Senator Rubio. The guy that was helping them to steal gold 
and sell it to Iran.
    Ms. Nuland. Right. I think you would agree that if they 
were willing to come back to the table with the opposition that 
would be a good thing for the opposition's goals.
    Senator Rubio. Actually, I do not really think it would 
matter. Maduro has had habitual--he is a habitual negotiator, 
but he never leads to anything. That is why the Vatican will 
not even host him anymore. Other countries do not even want to 
be involved anymore. He uses negotiations the way Putin does, 
habitually, to divide and demoralize his opposition.
    I just do not understand why we think that cutting a deal 
with Maduro now to lift sanctions, as he yesterday bragged on 
television about that meeting and how it is the end of--and as 
they mocked Guaido.
    That meeting did tremendous damage to the person that we 
recognize as the President of Venezuela. It is incredibly 
troubling and it would mean nothing. We would notice nothing. 
He is more than happy to agree to negotiations. He uses them to 
divide the opposition and demoralize them, habitually, the way 
Putin has done as well.
    I only have a minute left. Let me ask you, does Ukraine 
have chemical or biological weapons?
    Ms. Nuland. Ukraine has biological research facilities 
which, in fact, we are now quite concerned Russian troops, 
Russian forces, may be seeking to gain control of.
    We are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent 
any of those research materials from falling into the hands of 
Russian forces should they approach.
    Senator Rubio. I am sure you are aware that the Russian 
propaganda groups are already putting out there all kinds of 
information about how they have uncovered a plot by the 
Ukrainians to release biological weapons in the country and 
with NATO's coordination.
    If there is a biological or chemical weapon incident or 
attack inside of Ukraine, is there any doubt in your mind that 
100 percent it would be the Russians that would be behind it?
    Ms. Nuland. There is no doubt in my mind, Senator, and it 
is classic Russian technique to blame on the other guy what 
they are planning to do themselves.
    Senator Rubio. Last question. I am certain that the 
Russians were looking at their foreign--their reserves as a way 
to buffer sanctions. Do you know how--now that we have 
sanctioned the central bank along with others, what--do we have 
an idea of what percentage of their reserves are frozen or 
inaccessible to them?
    Ms. Nuland. Virtually all of them are now frozen. You 
notice that the country has been under currency controls for 
almost 2 weeks now, and the whole point of putting so many of 
these top 10 banks under sanctions is to make it impossible for 
them to get access to their cash in hard currency.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
being here and for everything that the State Department and the 
Administration is doing to help Ukraine.
    As I am sure you are aware, I weighed in with Senator 
Portman over the weekend on the importance of providing jets 
through Poland for the Ukrainians after we heard from President 
Zelensky that that was his number-one request, and I understand 
that we are still working on that issue that we had not 
coordinated with Poland before they made their announcement. Is 
that correct?
    Ms. Nuland. Not to my knowledge, and I was in a meeting 
where I ought to have heard about that just before I came. I 
think that actually was a surprise move by the Poles.
    Senator Shaheen. One of the challenges is being able to 
backfill any planes that are provided to Ukraine. Is there a 
willingness on the part of other--of our European allies to 
help support this effort?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think what is most important in the 
short run with regard to Poland is that they benefit from full 
air security from the NATO alliance and, as you know, the U.S. 
has increased our support to Poland as has--as have other NATO 
allies so--and we are also looking at putting some Patriot 
batteries into Poland.
    So I think that the main issue is to evaluate together what 
Poland's immediate needs are in the context of being a neighbor 
of this conflict.
    Senator Shaheen. I, certainly, agreed with the line of 
questioning that you heard from Senator Rubio about the 
disinformation and what--if you want to know what Russia is 
planning look at what they are accusing us of.
    Ms. Nuland. Exactly.
    Senator Shaheen. To what extent are we working with our 
allies on the responding to the disinformation that is out 
there that Russia is putting out? Because, obviously, the 
Baltic countries, Poland, a number of our Eastern European 
allies, have long experience with responding to disinformation 
on the part of Russia. Are we coordinating that effort in any 
way?
    Ms. Nuland. Absolutely, Senator. I think you know the State 
Department's Global Engagement Center, which you all helped us 
stand up and supported, works 24/7 to--with other allies and 
partners not just in Europe, but around the world to bring to 
light Russian disinformation campaigns and who is pushing them. 
We also work with the tech companies to try to take down false 
stories and we are working very assiduously on all of that now.
    We are also working to try to get truth into Russia in the 
context of a complete freeze on independent news going there, 
and that is an issue that is of paramount concern to all of us.
    Senator Shaheen. So how are we replacing the information 
that might have been shared through social media that is no 
longer operating in Russia? Are we looking specifically in that 
area?
    Ms. Nuland. What I would say to you without getting into it 
in too much detail there are a large number of Russian 
independent journalists who are now active outside the country 
who make use of the internet and telegram and other channels to 
get truth into Russia. There are huge numbers of influencers 
and vloggers and videographers who are themselves working to 
push the truth into Russia and I think that is partly why the 
Kremlin came down so hard on independent media.
    We, ourselves, were doing interviews at all levels with 
what was left of Russian independent media and any Russian 
state media that would have us.
    We are continuing to work with lots of the journalists that 
we already had been working with, as have our allies and 
partners, and trying to find as many creative ways as we can to 
get truth into Russia.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Finally, as you are aware, this--the European Subcommittee 
did a hearing on the Black Sea region a month or so ago and one 
of the things we heard is that the Administration was working 
on a strategy for the Black Sea.
    Can you talk about how what Russia has done affects what 
that strategy might look like in the future?
    Ms. Nuland. I think the greatest concern is the fact that 
as Putin has installed more and more weapons and more 
sophisticated weapons onto the Crimean Peninsula, he has used 
that weaponry to threaten freedom of navigation and to claim 
greater and greater parts of the Black Sea, well beyond 
territorial limits.
    You will remember from the fall--I cannot remember the name 
of the British ship that came under fire when it was well in 
international waters.
    We have a regular rotation of NATO exercises and U.S. 
exercises into the Black Sea to show presence and try to keep 
the Black Sea open. We are also working on the capability of 
all of those states on the littoral--Romania, Bulgaria, 
Turkey--and I will say that Turkey has taken some very strong 
moves since this conflict began under the Montreux Convention 
to deny warships access.
    We are working on all of those things, and then the 
strategy will, of course, also look at cyber collaboration, 
economic integration, fishing, clean Black Sea, all of those 
things.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Under Secretary Nuland, welcome. I have done a fair amount 
of negotiating in my private sector life. Generally, when a 
negotiation proceeds and I realize the negotiating partner is 
not negotiating in good faith, I walk away. Actually, always if 
I am not proceeding in a good faith negotiation I walk away.
    I have never, ever tried to negotiate with somebody who 
would refuse to even sit down and talk to me. In fact, is that 
not what is happening with the JCPOA negotiations right now 
where Iran refuses to meet with our negotiators?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Johnson, we do not sit face-to-face 
with Iran, but we have nearly completed this agreement on the 
basis of----
    Senator Johnson. Okay. Again----
    Ms. Nuland. --face-to-face negotiations that they do have 
with our European partners. So it is not ideal.
    Senator Johnson. Again, it is--but it is true Iran refuses 
to meet with us, correct? Is that not an automatic admission 
that they are not good faith negotiations? Why would the 
Administration--why would President Biden participate in 
something like that? That is a charade. It is not a 
negotiation.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Johnson, I will say that I, too, have 
done a lot of negotiating in my life, and whereas it is not 
ideal not to sit in the same room, it can work and proximity 
talks have been known to produce very good agreements. Over 
time, we will see if we can get there on this one.
    Senator Johnson. Okay. Following up on Senator Rubio's 
questioning on Venezuela, it sounds like you really were not 
talking about buying their oil. Is that true?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I am happy to talk in some detail 
about all the contours of that trip in another setting or, 
perhaps, in a little while. We are still in the process of 
working on a number of things there. The primary purpose of 
that mission was to go see our eight Americans who are 
incarcerated.
    Senator Johnson. Again, Senator Rubio is more familiar with 
what their oil capacities are. It sounds like they really could 
not add much to anything we would do. I mean, can you just 
state categorically that we will not be buying Venezuelan oil? 
We will not--if we are going to buy oil we will buy American 
oil? We will not buy from a tyrant like Maduro?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, let me try to put this whole oil issue 
in some context, if I may. When we ban Russian oil, as we are--
as the President very clearly did today, that has an impact on 
all kinds of things.
    We already have a situation, thanks to the international 
efforts that we have galvanized where 70 percent of Russian 
fuel is stuck. The particular kind of Russian fuel that the 
U.S. imports or had been importing was heavy fuel and that is 
only produced in a couple of countries around the world.
    Whereas we have--we want to ban Russian oil, we also need 
to find a way--if we do not want to have major economic impacts 
as a result of this war and the squeeze on oil around the 
world, we have to find a way to get more capacity into the 
system.
    Senator Johnson. Okay. Again, you are not ruling out buying 
oil from the tyrant Maduro in Venezuela? You are not ruling 
that out?
    Ms. Nuland. I will come back to you on that question.
    Senator Johnson. Okay. We have seen some protests in 
Russia. Seems like they are being suppressed pretty 
effectively. People are being jailed.
    What information are those individuals getting, how are 
they getting it, and what is the U.S. doing to make sure that 
the Russian people get more of the truth and less Russian 
propaganda?
    Ms. Nuland. Again, President Putin is scared of what we 
were already doing, so scared that he had to choke off the rest 
of the--what was left of the free press in Russia.
    As I mentioned to Senator Shaheen, we have--we and our 
allies have broad and deep relationships with lots of Russian 
journalists and lots of Russian brave influencers outside--
operating outside of Russia who are able to push their 
information into Russia by various means.
    We also have RFE/RL, which, though it has been closed down 
in Russia, has a relatively sizable listenership and viewership 
through the web, which--through the internet, which the--
President Putin has not yet closed down in Russia.
    We are working on lots of different ways to try to get 
truth into Russia. I will say that brave Ukrainians, whether 
they are individual citizens with their cell phones or 
Ukrainian journalists, have documented mass--the same pictures 
that we are seeing on our TV are now being packaged by some of 
these Russian journalists to get back into Russia and to get 
the truth to them despite President Putin's effort to blind his 
own people.
    Senator Johnson. I hope part of the truth we are going to 
be broadcasting to Russia is just how much the oligarchs, 
Putin, has stolen from the Russian people. I hope we--as we 
confiscate that wealth, which I hope we do, I hope we lay it 
out for the Russian people.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez.
    Thank you, Under Secretary Nuland, both for this hearing 
and for last night's classified briefing. I wish the American 
people could see the determined and strong and bipartisan 
engagement that I am, at least, experiencing from this 
committee and from Congress.
    Over the weekend, more than 280 members of Congress took a 
call--participated in a call with President Zelensky and, if 
anything, I have been encouraged, even surprised at times, by 
the unanimity within Congress of support for stronger and 
stronger measures against Putin and Putin's Russia for his 
unjustified and immoral invasion of Ukraine.
    You have served for 32 years, at least, our nation and our 
public in the State Department and in other roles, and your 
advice and your insight is greatly appreciated and welcome, and 
I believe that President Biden's forceful leadership, the 
decision to proactively release intelligence in order to make 
it clear to Russia we knew what they were planning, to 
proactively invest time and effort and diplomatic resources in 
rebuilding our ties with the EU, with NATO, with other vital 
partners laid the groundwork for what has been in just 12 days 
a striking, swift, broad action by the West to impose crippling 
sanctions on Russia and Russia's economy.
    I am very concerned about the humanitarian situation in 
Ukraine. The United Nations is planning for 5 million refugees 
and 7 million internally-displaced people. There are, as of 
today, 2 million Ukrainians who have fled the country, a 
million of them children. That is more in 12 days than fled 
Syria in 3 years.
    I am hopeful that this week we will pass an emergency 
supplemental for Ukraine that will be no less than $12 billion 
and that more than half of that will be dedicated to the 
humanitarian crisis.
    Please help us understand. The U.N. is playing a key role--
the World Food Programme, UNHCR--as well as, of course, USAID 
and some other impressive private groups like World Central 
Kitchen are responding quickly. Our partners and allies like 
Poland, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, as you have mentioned, are 
responding.
    What more can we and should we do to meet this humanitarian 
crisis, which is coming on top of refugee and food insecurity 
crises in a dozen other countries around the world?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Coons, I think you put your finger on 
it that, unfortunately, at 2 million refugees now we may not 
have even half of what we will see here.
    What I will say is that they are fleeing into, by and 
large, European Union countries who are relatively prosperous 
and are doing a spectacular job in their own right of welcoming 
them, managing them.
    EU agencies are also--EU ECHO and others--working actively 
with the U.N. and a large number of them are also going to 
relatives who already live in Europe.
    That might be just the beginning of this, and I think as it 
gets worse we will have more and more of the infirm, of the 
young, of those who have special needs.
    What we are trying to do is to ensure that we are 
continuing to get humanitarian assistance into Ukraine. You 
have seen the horrendous pictures of people sleeping week after 
week now in subway stations or in their bombed out houses, et 
cetera. The needs there appear to be moving from early on need 
for hygiene products and health products and those kinds of 
things to now needing foodstuffs and other things.
    Then we are trying to help Poland not only with its ability 
to flow through refugees, but with its border management 
because those--that first day as they come off the border is 
where it is most congested, and we are----
    Senator Coons. Senator Shaheen and I were in Poland just 2 
weeks ago----
    Ms. Nuland. So you saw----
    Senator Coons. --and are impressed with the level of 
partnership. Let me just, in closing, mention this supplemental 
will include something many of us have supported, more funding 
for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to try and get into Russia 
and Ukraine truthful, accurate reporting.
    I am a co-sponsor as well of a resolution that is 
bipartisan condemning Russian war crimes and calling on 
international bodies like the ICC to investigate, and I want 
just to be reassured that we are doing everything we can to 
document the atrocities against civilians being committed by 
Russians and to hold Russia's military and political leadership 
and, specifically, Vladimir Putin accountable for crimes 
against humanity.
    Ms. Nuland. To say their, it is Ukrainians who are doing a 
spectacular job as they confront these horrific incidents in 
getting documentation and ensuring that they get that out to 
the world, and we are preparing, as an international community, 
to respond to all of that and to deal with it and to hold 
President--to hold Putin accountable as well as those who 
helped him prosecute this war.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, and thank you for your service.
    The Chairman. Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Secretary. I appreciate your willingness to provide this 
information to us today and again yesterday.
    With regards to the aircraft that are now under U.S. 
control, apparently--MiG aircraft that will be in Ramstein and 
it will be--able to be sent to Ukraine--I know there will be 
hand wringing and concern about what might happen and how 
Russia might respond.
    I did receive a note from a friend who said this. He said, 
it seems to me that this war will be over when Putin is more 
worried about what NATO might do than NATO being worried about 
what Putin might do.
    I know that all things associated with this conflict have a 
certain degree of risk, but at the same time there are people 
dying and there is, I think, a worldwide clamoring, including 
by our people here, to provide support and help to the people 
of Ukraine and to help end this outrage.
    You spent a lot of your career looking at Mr. Putin and 
trying to understand his reasoning, perhaps, not his 
psychology. There are a number of people that said he is not 
going to invade Ukraine. He realizes that is a terrible 
decision, would not be in his best interest. Nonetheless, he 
did.
    There are others that are writing, oh, it was because we 
sort of opened the door to him--to Ukraine joining NATO that 
precipitated this. What is your view? As you look at Putin, why 
did he decide to go in? What precipitated this?
    I do not just mean this immediate action, but, I mean, why 
did he make such an extraordinary investment of his country 
with such enormous repercussions? What drove this? I say that 
not because I am just curious for the past, but to try and get 
a sense of where we might be headed.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think, obviously, those questions 
should best be directed to Mr. Putin. I will give you a few 
thoughts here anyway.
    I think, over the years, President Putin's imperial 
ambition has grown and he is dissatisfied with the last 30 
years of Russian history and has longed for some time to be the 
guy that helps recreate the Soviet Union, the fall of which, he 
said, was one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. 
Imagine that, the 20th century.
    I think he has had that ambition. I think in the last 
couple of years he has been particularly obsessed with this and 
particularly consumed. He has created, as you know, a whole bed 
of lies about how the U.S. would use Ukraine as a springboard 
to Russia or that NATO would, and he has, frankly, made clear 
in the last couple of days that he does not actually think that 
Ukraine is an independent country from Russia.
    I think his interior mind is now out there for everybody to 
see. That is what makes me worried that not only do we have to 
ensure that this Ukraine gambit is a strategic failure for 
Putin for Ukraine's sake, but also for all of the other 
countries in the region, and his appetite has only grown with 
the eating. We cannot allow this to stand.
    Senator Romney. Do you have a sense of what the end game 
might be for Putin? Because losing is not acceptable, I am 
sure, in his psyche. Is there an off ramp? Are there some 
options that you consider that might be ways for this conflict 
to end?
    Ms. Nuland. The way this conflict will end is when Putin 
realizes that this adventure has put his own leadership 
standing at risk with his own military, with his own people, 
that he is hemorrhaging the lives of the people of Russia, the 
army of Russia, and their future to his own vain ambition, and 
he will have to change course or the Russian people take 
matters into their own hands.
    From the U.S. perspective, the end game is the strategic 
defeat of President Putin in this adventure.
    Senator Romney. Would China have the capacity to influence 
his decisions at this stage and are they trying to do so?
    Ms. Nuland. The Chinese like to say that they are neutral 
in this conflict. As we discussed a little bit yesterday, we 
believe that it is incumbent on all of us and our leadership 
is, certainly, involved in this and so are many of our allies 
and partners.
    I think you know that President Scholz and President 
Macron--Chancellor Scholz and President Macron talked to Xi 
Jinping just today to impress upon the Chinese that neutrality 
is not an option here, that this is a violation of 
international humanitarian law, violation of sovereignty, that 
they should not want to stand with somebody who would exact 
this kind of brutality on his own people, that they should be 
pushing Putin to stop, that they should be pushing for 
humanitarian corridors, that they should be thinking about 
their own strategic and economic interests as this war ramps up 
energy prices and makes it harder for them, ramps up global 
commodity prices. As you know, they just reported the slowest 
growth in some 15 years of their own.
    They have an opportunity for leadership here and we are all 
urging them to take it.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your opening comments. We are 
all standing today in awe of the bravery and heroism of the 
Ukrainian people, of their government, and I am so pleased that 
this committee and this Congress has, by and large, been able 
to come together in our support for their efforts.
    Madam Secretary, I want to thank you personally because I 
do not know that there is an American diplomat who has fought 
more vigorously for Ukraine, for Ukrainian sovereignty, for 
Ukrainian independence over the course of the last decade than 
you have.
    First, second, and third, we thank the Ukrainian people for 
what they are doing right now on behalf of global democracy. It 
is the U.S.-Ukrainian partnership--an economic partnership, a 
political partnership, a military partnership--that you have 
helped forge, I think, that has been contributory to their 
ability to stand up and defend themselves. So I am grateful for 
the work that you have done and for your friendship and your 
candor, as always, time after time with this committee.
    Let me just say, I think it is a curious decision by Poland 
to announce their gift of several $100 million worth of jets to 
the United States without alerting us first, especially since, 
frankly, they would be the more natural direct partner with 
Ukraine, given that these are MiG jets that the Poles know how 
to use and will, ultimately, have to help transfer to the 
Ukrainians, and I look forward to consultations that we will 
have with them about their recent announcement.
    I did want to turn just for a moment to some of the 
questions that have been raised about Russia's role within the 
talks inside Vienna, and let me just ask you a pretty simple 
predicate question to make sure we sort of level set what this 
committee needs to worry about.
    The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not the only security 
challenge posed to the United States today, correct?
    Ms. Nuland. Correct.
    Senator Murphy. Listen, I, frankly, think it would be 
national security malpractice for the United States to kick 
down the road another 6 months a nuclear deal with Iran, given 
what this Congress has learned about the progress of the 
Iranian nuclear program since the withdrawal.
    To give it another 6 months is to, essentially, put Iran on 
the doorstep of a nuclear weapon. So because you have been 
asked questions already about the particulars of these 
negotiations, maybe just draw us back for a moment and talk to 
us for a minute about the consequences of not entering--
reentering a deal with the Iranians and, in particular, the 
prospects for a nuclear arms race in the Middle East to be set 
off by a sort of final failure of the United States and Iran to 
get back to a diplomatic agreement.
    Ms. Nuland. Thanks for the opportunity, Senator, and thanks 
for your very kind words--my home state senator, we should 
admit here and a long friend.
    Let me just say that, as you put it, the last thing we need 
on top of Putin's bloody war is a nuclear-armed Iran and, you 
know, what we can say in this setting is that nuclear 
capability of the kind that we do not want to see could come to 
Iran in a matter of weeks and months if we do not get them back 
into this agreement.
    That is not good for the planet, and to have both Iran and 
Russia able to threaten all of us in that way would be 
catastrophic at this time, not to mention what they might do if 
they teamed up.
    We have got to be able to walk and chew gum at the same 
time and that is what we are trying to do, and we do appreciate 
the fact that we have been able to come up to the Congress 
again and again and again to try to work on these issues 
together.
    Senator Murphy. So just spend the last moment here talking 
about what Russia's role is at that table, what their equities 
are. I know many of my colleagues are worried about the 
benefits that may accrue to Russia through an agreement.
    How do we workshop their role in these negotiations?
    Ms. Nuland. I remember earlier in my career working with 
the Russians during the Bush administration and we were 
concerned about Iran's nuclear program, and they would say they 
cannot do it.
    It is not going to happen. Then a switch flipped at some 
point in the mid odd years where they began to understand that 
Iran with a nuclear weapon could threaten them, and that is 
what got them involved in working with us and bringing China 
along in this negotiation.
    They have been--they were partners in the first JCPOA and 
they have been actually very helpful in trying to get us back 
to where we are now, first and foremost, because a nuclear-
armed Iran is closer to them than they are to us and the range 
of the weapons that Iran would have, first, could hit them 
before they could hit us.
    That said, they also have the--some unique capacity to 
downgrade uranium, et cetera, so one of the roles that they 
would play in this deal would be to take higher grade uranium 
fuel that is only appropriate for weapons and blend it down so 
that it could be used in reactors, et cetera.
    There have been--we have had some questions about whether 
Russia stands to gain financially from this deal. Russia has 
relatively small trade relations with Iran so it is primarily 
in the interest of their own national security and their own 
concerns about a nuclear Iran that they participate in all of 
this and offer to be the blender down of the fuel.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Just an observation--they are not 
the only country who can do that.
    Senator Portman.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Nuland, unfortunately, you were right about Putin 
and so here we are. We have a brutal, illegal, totally 
unprovoked unjustified attack on our ally, a democratic 
country, a sovereign country, and tonight, as we sit here in 
Ukraine they are continuing to bomb civilian targets.
    They shelled civilians who chose to walk down the 
humanitarian corridors that they had agreed to. They killed 
people who were on these corridors.
    We have to remember this is something that requires us, 
along with our allies--all countries, really--certainly, all 
freedom-loving countries who care about what might happen to 
them to step up and do more.
    I appreciate what was said today, but we have got to do 
more, both in terms of military assistance and in terms of 
sanctions, and it is a matter of days or weeks, not months, 
that we have to do more because it will be too late otherwise.
    I think Putin miscalculated. He miscalculated about the 
resolve of the Ukrainian people and the competence of their 
military. He miscalculated about the resolve of the alliance to 
respond.
    Let us get these planes into the country. I think it is a 
good sign that today the Polish Government sent out a release 
saying, you can have these MiGs. There are 29 of them. By the 
way, I wish they would also provide the 18 SU-25s, some of 
which are dual bomber fighters, because they could use those, 
too. I wish Slovakia would do the same thing with their 11 MiGs 
and Bulgaria has 13 MiGs, as far as we know. Maybe more.
    I hope that you will commit today, and I suppose this is in 
the form of a question--do you commit to do everything possible 
to make this arrangement work, whatever it takes?
    The response that I have gotten from some in the 
Administration is we are not sure--it might make Putin mad. He 
has invaded his neighbor and he is killing innocent people, and 
everything makes him mad. I mean, he has said the sanctions are 
an act of war. He gets mad over the Javelins and the Stingers.
    Are you going to do everything you possibly can to get 
these airplanes that the Ukrainians want badly? We have heard 
it directly from the president. We have heard it from other 
Ukrainian officials.
    Can we get these planes into Ukraine to begin to provide 
some protection for these innocent civilians?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, as I committed yesterday, I will 
continue to convey the very strong bipartisan view of this 
committee that these planes need to get to Ukraine.
    As we discussed in another setting, there are a number of 
factors to consider here and there are some mixed views among 
allies and even within the Administration.
    Obviously, I will convey your strong views and the strong 
views of everybody that we have spoken today on this issue.
    Senator Portman. My time is clicking here, but it is not 
really a concern to me that there is some disagreement in the 
Administration because all it requires is for the President and 
his team to decide this is the way we are going to go.
    Finally, the oil was blocked today or will be blocked. That 
is great, but it took a long time. Took too long.
    On sanctions, so many questions for you. The most favored 
nation--I think we should use our Article 21 ability under the 
WTO to revoke that. If you have thoughts on that, I would 
appreciate it. We should seize assets, not just freeze assets.
    Specific question about U.S. sanctions against Russia's 
biggest banks, including VTB Bank. They do not apply to energy 
transactions, we are told, until June 24. Is that true?
    Ms. Nuland. All of the things that you listed are things 
that we are looking at. As I said in my opening statement, we 
are not done with sanctions if he is not done with this war, 
and we will continue to escalate. You named a number of the 
things that we are and will look at.
    With regard to VTB, as you know, part of the strength--the 
strength of sanctions is when we can do them multilaterally 
and, particularly, transatlantically with our European allies 
and partners in Japan.
    Because of the energy dependency of a number of our 
European allies, we did agree to a phase-in of some of the VTB 
sanctions to allow energy processing for Europe and that will 
fade out over time.
    Senator Portman. June 24--why that late date? By June 24, 
it may be too late.
    Ms. Nuland. It was part of our building of this package 
with the Europeans to have a 90-day wind-down on this energy 
carve out so that is--was part of the deal that we struck to 
maintain unity.
    Senator Portman. My time has expired. So many other 
questions. Penetrating the Kremlin's information firewall, it 
seems to me, is a critical step here to allow the Russian 
people to know the truth.
    Ms. Nuland. I agree with you, Senator.
    Senator Portman. Anything we can do in that regard to be 
helpful I would like you to follow up with us on that, please.
    Ms. Nuland. I will.
    Senator Portman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, thank you, 
Secretary Nuland.
    I add my words to those of my colleagues to just commend 
the cooperation of the United States and the leadership of the 
United States with other nations.
    If the world wanted to see what U.S. leadership in 
assembling a coalition of democracies could produce, I believe 
the world has seen that, and for anyone who has questioned the 
value of alliances or NATO, I think they understand it now.
    My colleagues have asked many of my questions so this is 
maybe more of a comment. There is 195 countries in the world. 
Two have Jewish heads of state--Israel and Ukraine. Two other 
nations--Panama and Latvia--have heads of state who have Jewish 
family members.
    Vladimir Zelensky is a particular case. His great 
grandfather and many siblings were murdered in the Holocaust. 
His grandfather fought with the Red Army against the Nazis.
    Yet, he has been subject to three assassination attempts, 
by public reporting, by this invasion, by war criminal Vladimir 
Putin, and the Russian missile strikes have hit Babyn Yar, the 
ravine in Kyiv that was the site of the largest single massacre 
of Jews during World War II in September of 1941.
    I mention these facts because you were asked by Senator 
Romney how Vladimir Putin was justifying his actions and you 
said he has kind of put it out there, and one of the things 
that is amazing--this is the person we are dealing with--he 
said that this invasion was needed to denazify Ukraine.
    So he is attempting to decapitate a government that is led 
by one of two Jewish heads of state in the world who is the 
survivor of a family of those who were killed in the Holocaust 
and he is doing it in a way where he is putting at risk sacred 
sites that are known throughout the world and across history 
for the massacre of Jews during World War II.
    This is the person that we are dealing with. Just that 
simple phrase ``I am trying to denazify Ukraine'' suggests that 
he is thinking about this as if we are living in 1945 or 1941, 
rather than 2020.
    He is willing to repeat the big lie, ``I am going to 
denazify this country'' by killing one of two Jewish heads of 
state in the world and decapitating the government, repeating 
the big lie over and over and over again, and even willing to 
attack the sites like Babyn Yar and also there is Russia 
attacks in Odessa going on, and the massacre of Jews in Odessa 
was even larger later in the war than the massacres at Babyn 
Yar in 1941.
    We have got to win. Democracies have to win this. The 
challenge, I think, that we are really grappling with is that 
the strategies that this Administration has put together with 
other democracies are showing great resolve and the Ukrainian 
people are showing even greater resolve, and there are early 
signs of resistance in Russia--runs on ATMs and banks and 
protests, despite repeated arrests that are ongoing.
    Nations that we would not have expected to participate with 
NATO--Sweden and Finland, non-NATO members--delivering weapons 
to Ukraine. Germany, which has had this post-World War II 
policy of not putting weapons into a war zone, willing to 
deliver weapons into Ukraine. Moldova, which has much to fear, 
announcing just last week that they desperately want to be 
members of the EU.
    What Vladimir Putin did in the 2014 invasion of Ukraine and 
the establishment of these puppet states in Donetsk and 
Luhansk, everyone could look at those states and see the grim 
Stalinist camps they were becoming from what had been thriving 
cities and realize, we do not want any part of that.
    Vladimir Putin is chasing many nations that were not 
previously leaning toward the EU or leaning toward NATO. He has 
done the best possible job to chase them in to a Western 
orientation.
    We need to continue to harvest that. Yet, the challenge of 
all of that is that may not be enough to change Vladimir 
Putin's calculation. There does not seem to be easy off ramps, 
and we talked about this during the classified hearing that we 
had yesterday and I do not need you to comment further on it.
    If the world wants to know the character of this individual 
there are a lot of ways to measure it. Someone who would 
attempt to decapitate the government of one of two nations in 
the world led by a Jewish head of state whose family perished 
in the Holocaust and claiming that the motivation behind that 
is denazification of Ukraine this tells you the kind of person 
we are dealing with.
    That is all I have to say, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Welcome, Under Secretary.
    I wanted to follow up on the enquiries of the ranking 
member and Senator Murphy. Like them, I, too, am extremely 
concerned with reports Russia is attempting to link Iran deal 
negotiations to sanctions imposed on Russia for its invasion.
    This situation looks to me more like Russia is trying to 
blackmail the United States, hoping the Administration is going 
to sacrifice Ukraine in a misguided effort to finalize an Iran 
deal at all costs.
    Reports indicate that Lavrov has requested written 
guarantees from the U.S. with regard to sanctions relief for 
transactions between Russia and Iran for the negotiations to 
continue as a precondition for closing out those negotiations.
    My question is this, Under Secretary. Has the 
Administration provided any written guarantees to Russia that 
its trade investment or military cooperation with Iran will not 
be subject to sanctions?
    Ms. Nuland. No.
    Senator Young. Thank you. Has anything about your 
negotiations with the Russians changed as a result of their 
invasion of Ukraine?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, in this open setting, I will simply 
say that you are right, Russia is trying to up the ante and 
broaden its demands with regard to the JCPOA, and we are not 
playing ``Let's Make a Deal.''
    Senator Young. I look forward to following up this line of 
inquiry in a closed setting. Before I move on, in light of the 
gravity of this dynamic, how can the Administration negotiate 
in good faith with Russia in these Iranian talks? Would not any 
announced deal be immediately undermined by Russia's ongoing 
behavior?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, we are not negotiating with Iran--with 
Russia vis-a-vis Iran. As we talked about earlier, Russia, for 
its own reasons, has chosen to be a participant in these 
negotiations because it wants to see Iran's ability to get a 
nuclear weapon constrained.
    This is one of those rare instances where we have the same 
strategic objective and, I would argue, as I did earlier, that 
for us that strategic objective becomes even more important 
because we do not want a nuclear Iran and a rampaging Putin in 
Ukraine at the same time.
    Senator Young. I am not sure we still do have the same 
strategic objective. That argument might have been made until 
just the recent days when the Iranian--rather, the Russian 
negotiator put himself on the internet, indicating that his 
position was, indeed, shaped not by--if I recall, he said that 
his position was shaped by the current circumstances in 
Ukraine--the recent developments.
    Is that accurate, that the dynamics have changed on account 
of this intervention? If so, does Russian participation 
undermine the negotiations?
    Ms. Nuland. What I can say in this open setting is that 
there may be some in Russia seeking to get extra benefits for 
their cooperation and participation in seeking to get Iran back 
into the JCPOA, but they are not going to be successful.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Under Secretary.
    I am going to move on just another couple of questions here 
I will bundle together in light of time.
    China is watching this entire Ukraine conflict with close 
interest and, surely, seeking to make the most of the 
situation.
    Can you provide more details on the Saturday call between 
Secretary Blinken and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang? 
Specifically, what did Foreign Minister Wang mean when he 
stated that the situation in Ukraine has, ``reached a point 
that China did not wish to see''?
    Ms. Nuland. I am going to let the Chinese side speak for 
themselves. I will simply say what I said earlier in this 
hearing, that our intention in our regular engagement with 
China, including Secretary Blinken's call with his counterpart, 
was to underscore that this war is not good for China--that we 
want to see China use its influence with Russia to get this war 
ended, and, at a minimum, to help get these humanitarian 
corridors going and that if they are concerned about their 
economic situation, as they should well be with the lowest 
growth rates in 15 years, that this war is contributing to it.
    Senator Young. I am out of time. Thank you, Under 
Secretary.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 
great work, Madam Secretary.
    As you may remember, you and I discussed in a hearing 
before this committee in December the fact that the United 
States cannot preach temperance from a bar tool when it comes 
to Russian energy.
    At the same time as many voices were railing against Europe 
for their reliance on Russian natural gas, American fossil fuel 
companies were importing nearly $20 billion of Russian oil just 
last year.
    At that hearing we discussed the fact that American 
consumers were unwittingly financing the ill-gotten gains of 
Putin and his inner circle, the same ``oil-ligarchs'' 
responsible for enabling Putin's human rights abuses within 
Russia and now the unjustified invasion of Ukraine.
    President Biden made the right decision today and I applaud 
him for that. Now we need to make it a permanent ban to build 
on the steps that the President announced today.
    We have to permanently wean ourselves off of corrupt 
foreign oil and gas by investing in a clean energy revolution. 
I introduced legislation, the SPIGOT Act, last week to do just 
that and I think we should enact it so that we have that 
permanent ban.
    Madam Secretary, do you agree that there would be value in 
a comprehensive United States Government report that lifts the 
veil on oil and gas oil-ligarchs and their involvement in a 
vast array of Russian human rights abuses?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I love the word ``oil-ligarchs.'' It 
sounds like a very good idea to me.
    Senator Markey. Excellent. The reality is, though, that the 
only way that we can do that and make it sustainable is if we 
can prevent these fossil-fueled conflicts by ending our own 
addiction to oil.
    It happened in the Middle East. It is happening here, and 
President Biden acknowledged in making today's announcement 
that we cannot wait for big oil to do the right thing or we 
will be waiting for as long as it takes for carbon to become a 
fossil fuel. We have to act as a Senate in order to take those 
steps.
    On the question of the nuclear power plants in Russia, how 
is the United States supporting efforts by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to ensure the continued safe operation of 
all 15 Ukrainian nuclear plants?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Merkley, I think you know that the IAEA 
is trying to negotiate some rules of the road between Russia 
and Ukraine as Russia tries to seize physical control of all of 
these plants even as it insists that the Ukrainian operators 
continue to operate the plants for them.
    I think the attack on Zaporizhzhia was a wakeup call for 
not only Ukrainians and Russians, but for the whole world about 
the danger of close combat near these facilities.
    We are strongly supporting this effort to negotiate safe 
practices and, as you know, at Zaporizhzhia the Ukrainian 
operators performed magnificently in closing down all, but that 
last bit of power that is needed to keep the core from melting 
down such that it was less subject to an accident.
    I think that also speaks to all the work that they have 
done since Chernobyl on nuclear safety. They are some of the 
best in the world now, frankly, with our support over many 
decades.
    Senator Markey. President Biden nominated Laura Holgate to 
be his ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Given the potential threat to the safe operation of Ukraine's 
reactors and Ukraine's overall energy security, how important 
is it that Ambassador Holgate be confirmed by the United States 
Senate without delay, given what we are seeing in Ukraine right 
now?
    Ms. Nuland. Extremely important. Laura is a friend of 20 
years and an excellent specialist.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. I agree with you, and I hope we 
can get it on the committee's agenda very promptly.
    How concerned are you that Ukraine's other nuclear 
facilities could be in the crossfire or be subject to a 
deliberate attack?
    Ms. Nuland. I think we are all concerned that the Russians 
want to gain physical and military control, at least of the 
outskirts and so, again, we are continuing to work with the 
Ukrainians on safe procedures and we are supporting this IAEA 
initiative to get some rules of the road going. We will see if 
the Russians do more than pay lip service to it.
    Senator Markey. I agree with you 100 percent. We just have 
to move very, very rapidly if we are going to deal with these 
threats as they are unfolding.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Under Secretary Nuland, thank you for testifying today.
    We are sitting here watching the most significant military 
conflict in Europe unfold since 1945--since the end of World 
War II, and I am sorry to say that this war, I believe, is the 
direct result of repeated mistakes made by President Biden and 
the Biden administration, two mistakes in particular: number 
one, the disastrous withdrawal in Afghanistan and surrender to 
the Taliban that emboldened our enemies across the globe, but 
then, number two, with respect to Russia and Ukraine, very 
specific mistakes. You and I have talked at great length about 
Nord Stream 2.
    As you know, this committee and the Congress won a 
bipartisan victory stopping Nord Stream 2 in 2019. I authored 
that legislation.
    As a result, Putin was deterred from invading Ukraine. When 
Joe Biden became President, he came in bound and determined to 
surrender the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Russia and Putin, 
notwithstanding the enormous risks that came from it.
    When President Biden surrendered to Putin on Nord Stream 2, 
waived the sanctions that had been passed by Congress, at that 
time Ukraine told us, if you do this Russia will invade 
Ukraine.
    At that time, Poland told us, if you do this Russia will 
invade Ukraine. At that time, I told the Administration and 
others on this committee told the Administration if you do this 
Russia will invade Ukraine. We will see tanks in the streets of 
Kyiv.
    I wish those predictions had proven wrong. This weekend all 
hundred senators were on a video conference call with President 
Zelensky from Ukraine. President Zelensky told us if the United 
States Government had put sanctions in place last year on Nord 
Stream 2, Putin would not have invaded Ukraine.
    Yet, the Administration was bound and determined to 
continue surrendering to Russia even as Russian troops massed 
on the border of Ukraine, so much so that the White House put 
political pressure and forced 44 Democrats to vote to support 
Russia and Putin just weeks before this invasion.
    Now, after the invasion, finally, once there were Russian 
troops invading Ukraine, finally then the Biden administration 
was dragged kicking and screaming to implementing sanctions on 
Nord Stream 2. As soon as you did, Nord Stream 2 declared 
bankruptcy and fired its employees.
    In my judgment, Putin does not believe any promise from Joe 
Biden to maintain sanctions on Nord Stream 2 is credible. I 
think Putin is gambling that when the crisis passes the 
sanctions will be lifted and Nord Stream 2 will be turned on.
    I have introduced legislation to make Nord Stream 2 
sanctions permanent. In your judgment, do you believe sanctions 
on Nord Stream 2 should be permanent or should the pipeline be 
allowed to be turned on?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think Nord Stream 2 is now dead, and 
as you have said, it is a hunk of metal at the bottom of the 
sea. I do not think it will ever be revived.
    Senator Cruz. So you do not think it will. So let me 
reiterate my question. Should the sanctions be permanent as a 
matter of law, in your judgment?
    Ms. Nuland. I do not think it matters one way or the other. 
I think the pipeline will never come back.
    Senator Cruz. You are testifying you have no objections 
then and State has no objections to Congress making the 
sanctions permanent?
    Ms. Nuland. We have not looked at what this would do. I do 
not think it is relevant one way or the other.
    Senator Cruz. It is relevant because Biden waived them once 
in the face of massive congressional pressure----
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, if I may----
    Senator Cruz:--and put politics ahead of national security, 
and I believe Putin believes Biden will do it again.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator----
    Senator Cruz. When the Administration announced sanctions 
on Russia, it glaringly exempted energy from those sanctions.
    This morning, the Biden administration listened to calls 
for me and from many others to finally include a boycott of 
Russian oil and gas. That was the right thing to do, but it 
should have been done at the outset.
    Europe continues to rely on Russian energy. In your 
judgment, will our European allies follow suit and also boycott 
Russian energy?
    Ms. Nuland. As you have made clear, Senator, and as we all 
know, the Europeans have a much higher level of dependence 
today to heat their homes, to keep the lights on. They are----
    Senator Cruz. Is the Biden administration pressing the 
Europeans----
    Ms. Nuland. May I finish?
    Senator Cruz. --to end their reliance on Russia and is the 
Biden administration pressing them to rely on alternative 
sources, including American energy, which is abundant and does 
not fuel a dictator like Putin?
    Ms. Nuland. Among the things that we have done as this 
crisis was emerging and since it started was to ship more 
American LNG and to create more global alternatives to Putin's 
gas going into Europe, as you know, including working with 
our----
    Senator Cruz. There are six applications pending with the 
Biden administration to export LNG. None of them have been 
approved. Do you have any expectations that any of them will 
be?
    Ms. Nuland. The European LNG terminals right now are at 
full capacity to receive.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. You are not answering my question.
    Ms. Nuland. One of the things that we are pressing Europe--
--
    Senator Cruz. Are you going to answer the question?
    Ms. Nuland. Can I try to answer the question?
    Senator Cruz. You can answer the question.
    Ms. Nuland. Can I try to answer the question?
    We have taken advantage of this tragedy to, again, speak to 
Europe about its over reliance on Russian energy and to say to 
them----
    Senator Cruz. The question was simple. Do you anticipate 
the applications to export LNG will be approved? You are not 
answering that question.
    Ms. Nuland. I, frankly, do not do LNG licensing. I expect 
that licenses will be approved for as much LNG as can be 
shipped.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Nuland. That is what I expect. I do not have 
responsibility for that so I do not actually know how it works.
    Senator, I have to say to you President Putin was going to 
launch this vicious, brutal war with or without Nord Stream 2.
    Senator Cruz. That is not what Zelensky told us.
    Ms. Nuland. That is my opinion.
    Senator Cruz. That is also not what you said when you 
testified before the Senate.
    The Chairman. The time of the senator has expired.
    Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Ambassador Nuland, thank you for being 
with us today.
    Reflecting on the fact that the people of Ukraine in 2004 
launched the Orange Revolution to, essentially, say an unfair 
rigged election had been held and insisted on a new election 
being held and they got that, that new election, and 10 years 
later the people of Ukraine launched the Revolution of Dignity 
and the result was that the leader, Yanukovych, who was 
subjecting Ukraine to the shadow of Russia, fled the country 
and was impeached, and in 2019, a patriot named Zelensky 
proceeded to win by a landslide campaigning against corruption.
    Time after time, the people of the Ukraine have said, we 
choose government by the people, not the Russian model of 
government by a dictator, and perhaps nothing is more 
threatening to Putin than having a neighbor--a close cousin, if 
you will--choosing government by the people.
    So here we are today with Putin determined to crush 
Ukraine, engaging in siege tactics, bombardment, and shelling 
of population centers. Untold numbers of civilians will die. A 
thousand residences have been destroyed. Two hundred schools 
have been destroyed.
    I anticipate, but I ask this as a question, that we are 
going to continue to see this siege strategy by Russia 
attacking population centers, killing civilians, and driving 
millions of people out of the country.
    Is that a fair expectation?
    Ms. Nuland. I do not think that Russia's tactics will 
become less brutal, Senator Merkley. I worry that they will 
become more brutal as they become more desperate that their 
vicious military campaign is slowing, is stalling, is not 
succeeding because, as you said, the Ukrainian people again and 
again and again have stood up for their freedom, have stood up 
for their choice and now, when it is a matter of life and 
death, they are doing it again, and not just for them, but for 
all of us.
    Senator Merkley. Seeing the determination of the Ukrainian 
people to resist Russian strategy and Russian oppression, it 
seems like we can anticipate that Russia will face a 
longstanding insurgency of all kinds, of proceeding to smuggle 
weapons in, anti-tank weapons, anti-plane weapons, and 
improvised explosive devices and in combination we are seeing 
the current sanctions having a huge impact on the Russian 
economy.
    Is the combination, the fact that Russia is going to face 
an enormously determined insurgency and crushing economy give 
us hope that there is a deal to be struck or is--with time, or 
is Putin so determined to bet his presidency, his office, on 
crushing Ukraine that this--there is nothing that is going to 
stop this train until he is removed?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Merkley, only President Putin knows if 
sanity will ever prevail inside his own head. It is clear that 
Russia will lose this conflict. Whether they lose it quickly or 
whether they lose it extremely slowly, it is only--it is a 
matter of time.
    The problem is that if this can be lost quickly, many, 
many, many lives will be saved, which is why we have to 
continue to pour on the economic pressure. We have to continue 
to support the defensive needs of the Ukrainian people and help 
them to resist because, as we have said, they are fighting for 
themselves, but they are also fighting for us and our way of 
life.
    Senator Merkley. Our strategy is maximum support for the 
Ukrainian patriots in their opposition to Russian military 
occupation and forces, massive humanitarian assistance, massive 
economic pressure on the Government of Russia, and I fully 
support that threefold strategy and just to accentuate the need 
to do everything we can to coordinate the world to support it, 
and I praise the Biden administration for having brought 
together such a significant coalition of freedom-loving nations 
to be engaged in supporting Ukraine.
    So I just want to close by noting this is such a 
representation of the challenge we face worldwide and the 
vision of authoritarian control of people with control of the 
press, control of freedom speech.
    We see Russia crushing every form of free press in its 
nation. Shutting down every form of social media can prevent 
the Russian people from knowing what is going on, and then we 
see Ukraine, which embraced government of, by, and for the 
people.
    We have to stand with the people of Ukraine, and thank you 
very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to 
see you again. Thanks for spending time with us in closed 
session yesterday.
    Earlier today Ukrainian President Zelensky asked the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom to designate Russia as a 
terrorist country. Is Russia a state sponsor of terrorism?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, we had not put it that way before. I 
have to tell you that every day that goes by, as they commit 
these egregious brutal acts on the ground, it is something we 
should look at.
    Senator Barrasso. One of the things we visited about a 
little bit last night in closed session--I want to go to an 
open session now--and that is the Russians involved with the 
Iranian nuclear deal and negotiations there.
    It does seem, as I mentioned, in Congress, to me, that we 
would be dealing with Russia as a--somewhat of a partner in 
coming up with an Iran deal at the same time what we see is 
this brutal, terrorist murderer, Vladimir Putin, killing 
people.
    So I have a lot of problems with that decision regularly. I 
see the Russian envoy recently bragged about how much they 
helped Iran get much more than they would have expected in this 
Iranian deal with the United States, and Ulyanov stated, 
``Realistically speaking, Iran got more than, frankly, I 
expected or others expected.'' So that is from us, the United 
States.
    The people on this side of the aisle are not for this Iran 
deal at all. We think it is a mistake for our nation and our 
nation's security. Reports indicate Russia worked to secure 
Iran's rights for nuclear energy, to--and to remove sanctions.
    So how much money is Iran going to get from these proposed 
sanctions relief as part of the Biden administration Iran deal 
that they are cutting now while Russia is in the middle of 
attacking Ukraine?
    Ms. Nuland. As you know, Senator, if Iran comes back to the 
JCPOA and we come back into the deal and stop their nuclear 
development and stop their ability to get a bomb in the short 
run, they will get access to some of the funds that have been 
frozen. That is part of the deal.
    That said, Russia is not doing this out of the goodness of 
its heart. It is doing it because it, too, worries about an 
Iran that lives closer to Russia than they do to us having a 
bomb that could threaten them.
    Senator Barrasso. When John Kerry negotiated the last deal 
he said, well, of course, some of this money is going to be 
used for terrorism and we know that Iran did use some of the 
money for terrorism.
    Do you expect some of this sanctions relief is going to be 
funneled to terrorist proxies and activities by Iran?
    Ms. Nuland. We are working as hard as we can in the 
crafting of this deal to ensure that the money is used for the 
needs of the Iranian people and not for external aggression.
    Senator Barrasso. In terms of the Black Sea, and as we had 
a chance to look at some maps last night and we think about an 
overview of the Black Sea, I think about what NATO did very 
successfully with the Baltic Air Policing Mission to safeguard 
the integrity of the NATO alliance members a number of years 
ago in terms of airspace, I am wondering if that could serve as 
a model for efforts to maintain a robust NATO presence in the 
Black Sea.
    What are your views on NATO establishing a Black Sea 
maritime patrol mission--a regular rotational maritime presence 
in the Black Sea?
    Ms. Nuland. I, personally, have been in favor of it for a 
long time and, as you know, NATO has a regular exercise 
schedule, as does the U.S.
    I think what we have not done is taken appropriate account 
of what it meant when Putin seized Crimea and then began 
putting all kinds of advanced weaponry on it and that gave him 
the capacity to close aspects of the Black Sea in a way that we 
cannot tolerate, and we need to get back to that business.
    Senator Barrasso. In terms of energy security and the 
decision made by the President today, which I agree with the 
decision, I think that energy to replace what we have gotten 
from Russia ought to be coming from the United States.
    I think it is a mistake to go and ask Iran for more energy, 
a mistake to go to Venezuela for more energy, which is what 
seems to be what this Administration is doing, going from one 
dictator thug to another.
    Can I get your thoughts on that?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Barrasso, in the context of, first of 
all, high energy prices even before we got into this conflict, 
then the impact of the war on energy prices and then the impact 
of sanctions, as the President said today, there is going to be 
some pain in this for us.
    What we are doing is going all around the world, working 
with partners and organizations and entities to try to increase 
the amount of oil on the market.
    Russia, I think you know, 70 percent of the oil that it 
puts on the market has already been constrained by a 
combination of sanctions, but also self-sanctioning of trading 
entities. So that is a massive loss to the global need.
    Frankly, we have got to look everywhere that we can, 
including in terms of increased U.S. production, Canadian 
production, Mexican production. The Japanese are shipping gas 
now to Europe.
    We have got to all work together to increase the supply so 
that the pain of all of this goes primarily on Russia, which is 
losing revenue and dumping product, in fact, and paying a high 
price for that, and less on us and the American consumer and 
the European consumer.
    Senator Barrasso. I appreciate your comments that energy 
prices were high prior to all of this and that, to me, is a 
direct result of the policies of this Administration as John 
Kerry, former Secretary of State, said he hoped that what was 
happening in Russia and in--by Russia in Ukraine did not 
distract from his climate agenda, and I think that is a very 
terrible mistake to be the position of the United States.
    Thanks. Thanks, Madam Secretary.
    The Chairman. Senator Booker.
    Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It is so good to see you. Thank you for staying for this 
long hearing.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
    Senator Booker. You are at the tail end here.
    We talked yesterday in the classified briefing about food 
issues and this data you know, but Russia and Ukraine account 
for, roughly, 14 percent of the global wheat production and 
even more so about 30 percent of the global share of exports.
    We are already seeing an unprecedented increase in global 
food insecurity around the globe due to COVID-19 and, of 
course, climate change impacts which we are seeing in places 
like Afghanistan.
    The World Food Programme has already issued before the 
Ukraine crisis a special appeal for $6 billion to cover the 
increase in assistance that is going to be providing to, 
literally, the tens and tens of millions of people, including 
millions of children, to save them from starvation and death in 
places like Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.
    The crisis is already having an impact on what is an 
already dire situation with making it worse, wheat prices 
jumping almost 50 percent and hitting record highs.
    I am seeing already this omnibus shape up and I have a lot 
of concerns that it is not going to be anywhere near meeting 
the crisis. The spending bill that we are seeing is going to 
include billions of dollars for humanitarian assistance that 
can be used by the State Department in Ukraine, but also, with 
some flexibility, I am being told, around the globe, and I 
expect a substantial portion of these funds will be provided 
through the Migration and Refugee Assistance Program.
    I guess, with your earlier comment to Senator Coons where 
you said that a lot of the resources we are putting there will 
not even--I think the quote, ``will not even have half of what 
we need,'' given the growth of this refugee crisis that is 
going to probably come.
    I am wondering, do you think the State Department will have 
the ability to really use any portions of these emergency MRA 
funds to meet the needs of refugees not just in Ukraine, but 
also around the globe?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Booker, I want to thank you for raising 
these issues yesterday. I have already taken them back with 
regard to what it means when a Ukraine at war may not be able 
to plant this season and what it means to global food 
insecurity, and a lot of smart people had apparently already 
been thinking about this.
    We are meeting on it and planning on it, including how to 
use some of this support that the Congress is looking at giving 
us not just in Ukraine, but for the larger impacts globally of 
that breadbasket not being able to supply.
    We will work with you on all of these issues.
    Senator Booker. I am so grateful.
    I am wondering, is there a plan already in place, given 
our--how much our infusion of resources was propping up the 
Afghani economy for 20 years and then pulling us out and all 
the other military, civilian, diplomatic corps out of there, 
crashing their economy in addition to climate change, in 
addition to COVID?
    We know that, right now, unless something changes, roughly, 
1 million children will die alone of famine, and I am just 
wondering what is our ongoing commitment to that crisis?
    Ms. Nuland. We have been engaged in a lot of different 
efforts to get humanitarian support--appropriate humanitarian 
support directly to the Afghan people, including increasing 
licensing for humanitarians, both our own and other 
internationals, increasing our own contributions to U.N. 
agencies that are active in Afghanistan, as well as trying to 
create banking flexibilities for remittances and other things 
that are going to alleviate the cash crunch.
    We can arrange a separate session for you if that is--yes.
    Senator Booker. I would appreciate that.
    In my 1 minute I just--I know you are on top of this issue, 
but I really would like your testimony.
    Obviously, we have seen reports that refugees from ethnic 
and racial minorities----
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    Senator Booker. --in Ukraine are experiencing 
discrimination as they try to flee Ukraine. Many of them, we 
have seen images of them being blocked from the ability to 
enter other countries or, in many ways, get the kind of 
resources other Ukrainians are.
    Can you just tell me what the State Department is doing 
about this to encourage our European allies to process all 
refugees coming from Ukraine equally and what is the State 
Department doing to ensure that our assistance is being used in 
ways that adheres to our humanitarian assistance principles--
neutrality, impartiality, and independence?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Booker, it was a very acute problem, as 
you know, in the first days of the conflict as a number of 
students and workers from other countries as well as Ukrainian 
Africans and others tried to get out across the borders and 
faced significant discrimination, primarily on the Ukrainian 
side, out of local ignorance, I will tell you, and Secretary 
Blinken took that issue up immediately with Foreign Minister 
Kuleba, and within hours we began to see the situation improve.
    We have also done advocacy for specific groups that have 
gotten trapped--groups of African students, Indian students--
who we helped to get on a bus to get out of Ukraine when we had 
some advocacy from the Ukrainian--from the Indian Government.
    We will continue to take on those cases as we see them. We 
are, largely, not seeing the problem in EU countries. I think 
we were dealing with quite a bit of early ignorance at the 
local level in Ukraine.
    Senator Booker. Great. I just want to say, you can see from 
both sides of the aisle this is a very emotional and as well as 
patriotic interest and passion. We are putting a lot of time 
here. I know you and your team have the same deep feelings, 
have the same passion, patriotism, and concern.
    I can only imagine you all are working around the clock and 
I just want to give you my gratitude for that commitment and 
the incredible work you all are putting in and the hours, I am 
sure, as well.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator.
    I just want to say that on behalf of the men and women of 
the State Department, who I am proud to have been a part of for 
most of my life, to see folks in every generation of service 
and all around the world jump in and say, what can I do, and to 
participate and put their intellectual capital, their time, 
into this has just been amazing and it is the best of America 
and the best of the State Department.
    Senator Booker. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Secretary, for your service and thank you for being here for 
such a long hearing.
    I have three basic questions. The first is what is the 
status of the negotiation as it relates to the humanitarian 
corridors? We are reading different things. I am wondering what 
is real and what is not and what is possible.
    Ms. Nuland. On the humanitarian corridors, I think you know 
we are on our third day of disappointment where we thought we 
had something agreed. U.N. agencies have been the main 
negotiators--ICRC and UNHCR--and in those--the first two 
attempts we actually had local firing by Russian forces on 
folks seeking to flee.
    We are now attempting, or they are now attempting to try 
again in Mariupol. We also had in those first two rounds very 
cynical Russian response--sure, you can have a corridor up to 
Russia, but not into the rest of Ukraine, which was, obviously, 
rejected.
    We are trying--they are trying again now in Mariupol and we 
will see how that goes.
    Senator Schatz. So there were sort of two issues. One was 
the ridiculous, sure, you can get a corridor back to Russia. 
The other--I guess I am wondering whether that was a sort of 
command and control problem where the locals--so that is not 
your assessment? Your assessment is they were violating it from 
the jump.
    Ms. Nuland. I cannot say whether it was local malfeasance 
or more general malfeasance on the part of the Russian 
military. Neither would be beyond comprehension. It was 
egregious and yet another violation of human rights in Ukraine.
    Senator Schatz. Absolute atrocity. A war crime.
    Belarus--is the free world doing enough to punish Belarus?
    Ms. Nuland. We have now imposed sanctions on Belarus that 
match what we have done in Russia. That was part of the package 
that we imposed last week, and we are continuing to look at 
other ways to squeeze the economy that fuels Lukashenko's rule 
and we are continuing to look at leaders in Belarus.
    I would note here that it is pretty clear that Russia would 
have liked to have seen more Belarusian military participation 
in this conflict, and there has been a lot of lack of 
enthusiasm for that and even desertion.
    Senator Schatz. When you say lack of enthusiasm, at all 
levels? At the sort of soldier level all the way up to 
government leaders?
    Ms. Nuland. Certainly at the soldier level.
    Senator Schatz. Fair enough. We are seeing a lot of 
resistance from countries that have traditionally had a close 
relationship with Russia, certainly, over the past decades--
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, outright refusing to participate in 
this invasion, and my assessment is that they do not want to 
stipulate to the legitimacy of what is happening because they 
may, in fact, be next.
    So what is the State Department's view of those 
relationships and how do we--without sort of overplaying our 
hand, how do we be supportive or become more supportive of 
Uzbekistan, of Kazakhstan, of these countries that very well 
could be next if this becomes a successful precedent?
    Ms. Nuland. Since their independence, we have had very--we 
have had relations with all of those countries. I would say 
that in the last year we have really accelerated our work with 
them collectively, what we call the C5+1, but also our effort 
to work with them individually.
    As you know, in the aftermath of the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan there were a lot of issues. They collaborated and 
helped us in getting some of--some Americans and LPRs across. 
We have other things that we work with them on.
    We are also working with them intensively on having 
diversity of economic options, diversity of political options, 
and in the aftermath of the events in Kazakhstan of a couple of 
months ago, the Kazakhs have come back to us and said that they 
are not interested in getting involved in Ukraine, as have 
another--a number of the other countries there, and we think 
that any effort by Putin to involve the CSTO, collectively, 
will also fail in this conflict because, as you say, they have 
their own independent interests and it is not an easy decision 
for them because they are also very dependent.
    Senator Schatz. Final question--and I can take this for the 
record if you do not want to do this off the top of your head--
I just want to be reassured that we are constantly assessing 
and reassessing and reestimating the number of refugees that we 
expect.
    I have seen this sort of range of between 1 and 5 million. 
That, I am sure, was based on some analysis. It seems to me 
that that analysis has to change in real time if we are already 
approaching 2 million as of today or around that number.
    I just want to be reassured that people are not going to 
stick with the 5 million if it looks like we are going to break 
through that threshold.
    Ms. Nuland. I will say, Senator Schatz that we, 
unfortunately, internally estimated 5 million from the 
beginning and before the invasion even started just based on 
how broad it was or it could--it looked like it was going to 
be.
    Obviously, we will have to reassess if it goes above that.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Madam Secretary. I am grateful for your wisdom and experience 
and passion on this issue. Thank you for the briefing last 
night in a classified setting.
    Let me associate myself with the comments others have made 
about the efforts to transfer the Polish MiG-29s to Ukrainians 
and Ukrainian pilots.
    I wanted to raise another effort in the defense of Ukraine, 
which was the first item that the Ukrainian parliamentarians 
mentioned in this letter they sent to members of Congress 
today, which had to do with missile defense.
    Because as we have seen in published reports, we do not see 
that many Russian planes in the air these days, but we do see a 
lot of missiles--their incoming. In fact, published reports I 
have seen estimate over 600 missiles.
    Here is the number-one ask from the Ukrainian 
parliamentarians: ``Military assistance suitable for countering 
Russian attacks and military advances. Ukraine needs surface-
to-air missile systems such as Iron Dome or NASAMS to protect 
civilian areas from incoming Russian missiles. We implore the 
United States to work with all allies and partners to provide 
Ukraine with these life-saving missile defense systems 
immediately.''
    Can you talk to both the systems that they have requested 
there and what the status of our efforts to secure those would 
be?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, what I would rather do is talk to you 
about the specifics in a classified setting. I will tell you 
that we have provided a large number of counter battery radars 
and we are looking at some of these other things, as I 
mentioned at the top, that you mentioned.
    Senator Van Hollen. Let me ask you this. Are there any 
political obstacles to moving forward with either of the 
systems that were mentioned?
    Ms. Nuland. I would only say with regard to Iron Dome, you 
cannot just snap your fingers and you have an Iron Dome. It 
takes training. It takes the ability to emplace it and all of 
those kinds of things, but there are other things on your list 
and their list which we think that we can do.
    Senator Van Hollen. Good.
    Ms. Nuland. I will leave it at that.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay. I look forward to following up 
with you on this.
    Now, on the sanctions front and, again, I applaud the 
Administration for the approach you have taken--the sanctions 
and the efforts with our allies to make sure that to the extent 
possible we can do that in unison and in a coordinated way, and 
the fact that you have imposed the same sanctions on Belarus.
    I looked at that U.N. vote. It was impressive, 141--35 
abstentions, 5 noes. Probably the noes we expected.
    I will say among the 35 abstentions there were many 
disappointments, many countries that we consider our friends 
and fellow democracies who stood on the sidelines at an 
important moment.
    In terms of the sanctions, many of those countries that 
abstained are not joining us right now in terms of the 
sanctions, and I do understand that the arms export control 
sanctions have a long arm effect so that it is not necessarily 
their choice as to whether to comply.
    When it comes to banking sanctions they do not have the 
long arm effect unless we apply secondary sanctions. So the 
Administration has the authority to apply secondary sanctions. 
I do not think you need any more authority or hoops you need to 
jump through in order to justify not imposing them in certain 
circumstances.
    With respect to countries that are participating in 
allowing Russia relief from our banking sanctions, are you 
considering applying secondary sanctions in those cases?
    Ms. Nuland. You are talking about some of the no votes on 
the list there, I assume?
    Senator Van Hollen. I am talking about countries who are 
not currently voluntarily participating with us in our 
economic--the banking sanctions.
    Ms. Nuland. I would say----
    Senator Van Hollen. The good news was the EU is with us. 
Other countries are with us, but there are other major 
countries that Russia could turn to as a sort of off-ramp on 
some of those sanctions.
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Van Hollen, our first choice is to try 
to persuade those countries that this is not a moment to try to 
be neutral or sit on the fence, and to join us in sanctions.
    That will be far better, far better for their 
sustainability, et cetera, and far better in terms of ensuring 
that those countries themselves do not become havens for dirty 
Russian money.
    That is the case that we are making. All of us are working 
very hard on that with, I am going to guess, the same countries 
of concern to you.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. I just think that 
the major step was to have the major economic powers on board--
the European community. You did that.
    Ms. Nuland. And the Asians. Asian----
    Senator Van Hollen. Japan and Singapore and South Korea and 
Australia. All really good.
    Ms. Nuland. Yes. New Zealand.
    Senator Van Hollen. There are, as you just indicated, we 
know, big exceptions. So it seems to me at some point all of 
the countries that are already in----
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. --would have an interest in joining 
with us in putting pressure on those who are still out.
    Ms. Nuland. We have been making that point as well. The 
President did in his conversation yesterday with other major 
country leaders, and we are trying to get the support of the G-
7 to broaden this community as much as we possibly can, and I 
think you will see us making some forays to some of those 
places in the days and weeks ahead.
    Senator Van Hollen. I hope you are successful.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. In following up on what Senator 
Van Hollen said, first of all, I have no difficulty at all with 
you guys trying to persuade other countries to go along.
    If he is suggesting what I think he was suggesting, and 
that is that secondary sanctions ought to be on the table and 
you ought to have them at the ready in the toolbox to use if it 
is necessary to help these other countries get to where they 
need to be, I hope you are all in on that.
    I, certainly, am and I suspect maybe that is what Senator 
Van Hollen was suggesting. If he is, I want to associate myself 
with those remarks.
    Let me turn to another subject, just briefly. We have got a 
vote started and so I will try to make this brief.
    You and I are, obviously, in a different place on JCPOA, as 
we have discussed over the many years. Let us see if we can get 
some stuff with that we do agree with.
    Let us set JCPOA aside. Let us say it never happened or it 
is never there. Is there a major impediment for Iran to be able 
to finish the completion of a nuclear weapon?
    Ms. Nuland. For it to be able to finish the completion of 
the nuclear----
    Senator Risch. Weapon.
    Ms. Nuland. Is there a major impediment?
    Senator Risch. Yes. Let me suggest this. Would you agree 
with me that the country of Israel is a major impediment for 
them to be able to complete a nuclear weapon?
    Ms. Nuland. I would agree with you that Israel has 
regularly and frequently taken matters into their own hands 
with regard to trying to slow or stop a weapon.
    I would not----
    Senator Risch. Indeed, they are the only ones that have, 
really.
    Ms. Nuland. I do not think I would agree with that, but we 
can talk about that in a classified setting.
    Senator Risch. All right. That is fine.
    Ms. Nuland. I would not say that I believe that that is 
achievable as a complete end state in the short run by Israel 
alone.
    Senator Risch. I would disagree with you on that, but I 
would agree that it is an arguable point.
    You have heard Israel, as I have, probably face-to-face, as 
I have, over and over, state in very plain simple language, 
they will never permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon of 
which could threaten their existence. Is that a fair statement?
    Ms. Nuland. They have said that, and they have said that 
across two Administrations.
    Senator Risch. Do you believe them?
    Ms. Nuland. I believe that that is their intent. I think 
there is a question of--I think we should--yes, talk about this 
probably in another setting.
    Senator Risch. That is fair. I agree with that.
    I, for one, believe them. I have long said if you believe 
them, that threat for Iran is a significantly stronger threat 
than anything the JCPOA could put on the table. In any event, 
at least part of this we agree on. Let me ask another question, 
see if you agree with this.
    Ms. Nuland. I always like it, Ranking Member Risch, when we 
can find places to agree.
    Senator Risch. I could not agree more. So let us see if we 
can find one more area and then I will let this be. Did you 
watch the debates of the 18 Republican candidates for President 
in the last election?
    Ms. Nuland. I sure did, to the extent I could stand it.
    Senator Risch. Yes. What did they say--including one of 
them who was just sitting here--what did they say they were 
going to do with the agreement the first day they were in 
office?
    Ms. Nuland. Rip it up, I guess.
    Senator Risch. Yes, that is what they said. Indeed, the 
successful person actually did that. My guess is that we are 
going to have 18 again here in a few years and my guess is that 
they are probably all going to take the exact same position 
that happened last time.
    Do you think that that is more likely than not?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I do not think I want to get out my 
crystal ball with regard to where your colleagues and your 
fellow party members might be.
    I would hope that if the--if we come back into the 
agreement and it begins to prove its worth that we will not 
have that debate again. We will see where the world turns.
    Senator Risch. Yes. I would like to be that optimistic 
about it, but I cannot be inasmuch. I know a number of those 
people and I know what they are going to do.
    Ms. Nuland. I am a diplomat. I am paid to be an optimist.
    Senator Risch. Yes. That is the difficulty with this whole 
thing. I cannot tell you how many times I had to deal with 
people--and you probably did, too--who say, well, you 
Americans, you broke the deal. You breached the date.
    I said no. No. No. No. No. You had no deal with us. Our 
Constitution is crystal clear. If you want to deal with 
America, it has got to be done by submitting it to the United 
States Senate and get a two-thirds vote, at which point their 
eyes glaze over and say, I do not know about that. I said, but 
you did have an agreement with Barack Obama. I will agree with 
that. This time, they will have an agreement with Joe Biden.
    You would agree with me that the efficacy of the agreement 
with the President without Senate ratification will have the 
same legal effect the previous JCPOA had on the next 
Administration. Would you agree with that?
    Ms. Nuland. I mean, obviously, whenever you have an 
agreement that has Senate ratification that tends to indemnify 
it better against being ripped up by one side or the other, but 
not always, as we have seen with some treaties.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, and I am glad we found 
some common ground.
    [Laughter.]
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Madam Secretary, one final question. You have 
been extraordinarily insightful here for the better part of 2 
hours. Is it fair to say that Ukraine is the epicenter in 
Europe of oil and gas lines?
    Ms. Nuland. You mean the main crossing point? I mean, 
technically speaking, I think there are more lines that cut 
through Germany than Ukraine. Ukraine is an essential node, if 
that is what you mean.
    The Chairman. Right.
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    The Chairman. So if Putin were to achieve his conquest of 
Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 would be insignificant to him?
    Ms. Nuland. Yes, of course. Yes.
    The Chairman. Yes. Because he would have all of these 
pipelines that he could control. So I just find it--everybody 
is welcome to their opinion, but they are not welcome to their 
facts.
    To believe that Nord Stream is the reason that Vladimir 
Putin invaded Ukraine is--it is a bit of a stretch, to say the 
least.
    I do think that the incredible importance of this issue is 
exemplified by the fact that 19 of 22 members have been here 
today, asking questions and engaging with you. That is not 
always the case on the subject matters that we have before the 
committee, but it just shows the intensity on both sides of the 
aisle.
    I want to send a message to our friends across the globe 
who did not join us at the United Nations and who are not 
joining us in some of the actions they could be taking.
    You really should rethink what side of history you want to 
be on. You really should think, again, about what side of 
history you want to be on, because the world is watching and we 
are watching.
    Then, lastly, I hope that the 44 nominees before the 
committee and the 22 that are pending on the floor can see 
swift justice in terms of getting a vote because we need 
everybody on the fields to make sure that Putin loses, at the 
end of the day.
    I am thankful with the ranking member for those who have 
gotten out today, but we need to do more.
    With that, the record for this hearing will remain open 
until the close of business on Wednesday, March the 9th. Please 
ensure the questions for the record are submitted no later than 
Wednesday.
    With the deep thanks of the committee for your appearance 
and all of the insights, this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. U.S. Government Policy Towards Russia: Given Russia's 
recent invasion of Ukraine, are there any areas that remain in which we 
might be able to work with the Russian Federation?

    Answer. The United States has been clear that President Putin and 
his enablers are solely responsible for isolating Russia from the 
international community by launching his further invasion of Ukraine. 
Ultimately, it is up to Russia to determine whether they want to end 
this isolation and work together in a rules-based international order.

    Question. How successful do you consider Russia's efforts around 
the globe to sway public opinion in favor of their invasion of Ukraine?

    Answer. While many Russian disinformation efforts are ineffective 
and easily ignored by audiences, the Department has conducted overseas 
audience research that indicates Kremlin disinformation narratives 
about its invasion of Ukraine have had some effect in eroding 
perceptions of the United States and the West in some locations. This 
data indicates that Kremlin disinformation can weaken U.S. favorability 
and the perception that the U.S. wants peace, while also decreasing the 
proportion of respondents who perceive Russia as the aggressor. Similar 
patterns exist across all regions.

    Question. Is the U.S. doing enough to counter Russia's efforts to 
sway public opinion in favor of their invasion of Ukraine?

    Answer. Our biggest challenge with audiences farther from the war 
zone is not countering Russia's efforts to sway public opinion in its 
favor, but rather countering Russia's efforts to cause people to become 
confused about or apathetic to the human devastation that the Kremlin 
has wrought from Bucha to Grozny to Aleppo. It is this disengagement 
and apathy that opens the door to Russian narratives. The United States 
is working overtime with Allies and partners to shine a light on the 
atrocities and humanitarian disaster for which Putin is responsible, 
but we need to keep these stories in front-page news in every corner of 
the world.

    Question. How can the U.S. improve its efforts to counter Russia's 
actions to sway public opinion in relation to the invasion of Ukraine?

    Answer. By working with and through allied and partner voices we 
illuminate the human consequences of Putin's war of choice and remind 
audiences around the world of the values and concerns they share with 
the Ukrainian people and other victims of unprovoked Russian 
aggression. U.S. Government senior leaders and all our embassies around 
the world are giving a steady stream of interviews to journalists in 
all regions, including in Russia, to help get out the truth. We are 
also developing and implementing projects with local civil society 
organizations, journalists, and governments to build whole of society 
resilience to identify and counter Russian disinformation narratives 
targeting their media space.

    Question. Sanctions on Russia: What do you see as the main goal of 
this most recent round of sanctions on Russia?

    Answer. The United States has taken significant and unprecedented 
action to respond to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine by imposing 
severe economic costs that will have both immediate and long-term 
effects on the Russian economy and financial system. These actions are 
specifically designed to impose immediate costs and disrupt and degrade 
future economic activity, isolate Russia from international finance and 
commerce, and degrade the Kremlin's future ability to project power. We 
have been able to take these efforts in a comprehensive multilateral 
manner with our partners. We will continue to impose economic costs on 
the Russian Government for its brutal war.

    Question. It is early yet, but how do you assess the effectiveness 
of the sanctions placed on Russia since February 24, 2022?

    Answer. The United States and more than 30 allies and partners 
across the world have imposed severe and immediate costs on Russia for 
its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. We will continue to impose 
costs on Russia so long as it continues on its current path. Experts 
predict Russia's GDP will contract up to 15 percent this year, wiping 
out the last 15 years of economic gains. Moody's downgraded Russia's 
long-term government bond rating to ``junk'' or ``non-investment grade 
status.'' A major portion of the Central Bank of Russia's reserves are 
frozen. Major state-owned companies have lost between 70-90 percent of 
their market capitalization. More than 600 multinational companies 
across a wide variety of sectors have suspended operations in Russia. 
The Russian Government has had artificial success at stabilizing the 
ruble and the Russian financial sector, but only at considerable cost, 
to include strict capital controls, and expense by the Central Bank. We 
are monitoring the situation closely for signs that Russia is adjusting 
to our sanctions pressure, and for sanctions evasion globally.

    Question. Have some Western sanctions had unintended positive 
effects on Russia and its economy?

    Answer. Since the imposition of our sanctions as well as those of 
our partners, we have further isolated Russia from the global financial 
system and limited access to a major part of its foreign currency 
reserves. While Russia has worked to stabilize the ruble, its emergency 
adjustments will not stop economic pressure from building over time, 
particularly as wind-down licenses issued by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury expire.

    Question. What effect would further sanctions have on the Russian 
economy?

    Answer. Experts predict Russia's GDP will contract up to 15 percent 
this year, wiping out the last fifteen years of economic gains. Russia 
has had to implement extensive capital controls to prevent money from 
fleeing the country, further cutting itself off from the global 
financial system. Moody's downgraded Russia's long-term government bond 
rating to ``junk.'' Continuing to impose sanctions would further 
isolate Russia from the global financial system and increase pressure 
on institutions that are systemically significant to Russia's economy 
and those that have benefited from Putin's kleptocracy. Prospects for 
an economic recovery remain limited for the foreseeable future. The 
Administration will continue to assess all options to impose costs on 
the Russian economy.

    Question. What effect would further sanctions have on Putin's 
regime?

    Answer. We need to continue imposing economic costs on Putin, those 
around him, and his regime as long as his war in Ukraine continues. 
Continuing to impose sanctions will increase pressure on the Russian 
economy, including institutions that are systemically significant to 
Russia's war machine and technological advancement, and those that have 
benefited from Putin's kleptocracy. The impact of our sanctions will 
grow with every passing day, and we will continue to increase pressure 
against his regime until Putin withdraws from Ukraine.

    Question. As of today, U.S. sanctions targeting the Central Bank of 
Russia (CBR) and Sberbank come with no secondary sanctions. These 
institutions are not on Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons List (SDN) list. That leaves many countries open to 
doing business with Russia. Will the Administration consider a full 
secondary sanctions designation for the CBR and Sberbank?

    Answer. As of April 6, 2022, Sberbank has been added to the SDN 
list, subject to full blocking sanctions, and is also subject to 
restrictions by the UK, EU, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Republic of Korea, and the Bahamas. The UK, EU, Japan, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Singapore have joined the 
United States in imposing restrictions on the CBR. These restrictions 
severely limit where Sberbank and the CBR can do business. We also are 
prepared to take action against sanctions evaders, including those 
providing material support to sanctioned Russian entities.

    Question. Secondary sanctions on entities that continue to do 
business with sanctioned Russian companies, banks, and financial 
institutions are key to shuttering Russia's economy. Why has the 
Administration not imposed secondary sanctions on such entities?

    Answer. In order to maximize the impact of sanctions imposed by the 
United States, our allies, and partners, it is critical to maintain 
unity on our actions. In that context, we are coordinating closely with 
our partners and allies on the potential use of secondary sanctions. We 
have made clear to countries considering sanctions evasion schemes and 
backfilling that we are ready to use our discretionary authority to 
sanction those that provide material support to sanctioned persons and 
entities, if necessary. We are conducting outreach around the world to 
stress the importance of countering evasion activities, as well as the 
provision of material support to sanctioned persons, wherever those 
activities occur.

    Question. What conditions must be met for the Administration to 
consider secondary sanctions on such entities?

    Answer. We continue to monitor the situation on the ground, and as 
the President has stressed, no options are off the table. Presently, 
the United States and our partners and allies have taken significant 
and unprecedented action to respond to Russia's further invasion of 
Ukraine, while also seeking to minimize the impact on our own economies 
wherever feasible. Maintaining this unity will remain critical to 
ensuring our collective sanctions remain impactful. We continue to 
coordinate closely with our partners on additional steps we can take to 
close sanctions gaps, prevent backfilling, address sanctions evasion, 
and strengthen sanctions enforcement.

    Question. What waiver authorities would the Administration need to 
responsibly impose secondary sanctions and mitigate collateral damage 
to U.S. and friendly economies?

    Answer. Executive Order 14024 provides authority for the Secretary 
of State and the Secretary of Treasury (subject to the relevant 
consultation) to impose sanctions on individuals or entities that have 
materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or 
technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, 
individuals or entities sanctioned under the executive order. 
Maintaining flexibility and discretion to impose such sanctions is 
critical to ensuring that our actions do not fray existing unity around 
sanctioning Russia for its actions in Ukraine and that they remain 
impactful.

    Question. How is the Administration making it clear to the Russian 
people that the destruction of Russia's economy is directly linked to 
Putin's malign leadership?

    Answer. As long as Vladimir Putin continues this war, the United 
States and our Allies and partners are committed to ensuring the 
Kremlin feels the compounding effects of our current and future 
economic sanctions. While the Russian economy continues to deteriorate, 
we continue to push public messages into Russia by all means possible 
to ensure that the Russian people understand that the Kremlin is fully 
responsible for this unjust war. We continue to reiterate what 
President Biden has said: that we hold President Putin and his enablers 
solely responsible for this unjust war and its repercussions, not the 
Russian people.

    Question. How is the State Department working to debunk the 
narrative that the West is sanctioning Russia because we want to hurt 
the Russian people?

    Answer. Our sanctions are specifically designed to impose immediate 
costs on Putin's regime, disrupt and degrade future economic activity, 
isolate Russia from international finance and commerce, and reduce the 
Kremlin's future ability to project power. Our sanctions are carefully 
calibrated to allow for humanitarian activities including trade in 
medicine, medical devices, and agricultural commodities. In particular, 
the Department of the Treasury has issued general licenses to authorize 
transactions in important areas that would otherwise be blocked such as 
humanitarian goods (including food, agricultural products, and COVID-19 
related items) and personal telecommunications to maintain the Russian 
people's access to information.

    Question. Has the Administration considered imposing unilateral 
sanctions measures on Russia in order to persuade our allies to do the 
same?

    Answer. The United States and our partners and allies have taken 
significant and unprecedented action to respond to Russia's further 
invasion of Ukraine by imposing severe economic costs that will have 
both immediate and long-term effects on the Russian economy and 
financial system. We have coordinated our actions with our partners, 
and while our actions are similar in most cases, they are often not 
identical. In a number of cases, the United States has been able to 
take action first, and others have followed. Maintaining unity among 
our allies and partners is critical to ensuring our collective 
sanctions remain impactful on Putin's regime.

    Question. Russia in Syria: Russia has gained valuable experience in 
Syria since its intervention in support of the regime of the brutal 
dictator Bashar al Assad. Russia's intervention, in 2015, helped turn 
the tide of the conflict decisively in Assad's favor, giving him space 
to continue to torture, kill, and kidnap Syrian civilians. For Moscow, 
Syria has proved a fertile training ground. In addition to reports 
indicating the Russians are recruiting Syrian fighters with urban 
combat experience to fight in Ukraine, we are also witnessing the same 
tactics and weapons being replicated in Ukraine with equally 
devastating cost to civilian lives. As in rebel strongholds like Aleppo 
and Eastern Ghouta, Russian forces are encircling and besieging 
Ukrainian cities attempting to bomb the populace into submission, and 
like Syria, meeting equally with fierce resistance. How can the U.S. 
Government leverage its expertise related to Russian actions in Syria 
to help inform its engagement on Ukraine?

    Answer. Russia is employing similar tactics in Ukraine to those it 
used and supported in Syria, including military tactics against urban 
population centers, the use of disinformation to discredit the 
opposition, and strikes hitting civilian infrastructure. We are already 
deploying some of the lessons learned from Syria in Ukraine. These 
include working to counter disinformation, immediately supporting civil 
society defenders on the ground, and documenting human rights abuses 
and violations and possible war crimes now to subsequently pursue 
accountability. We will continue to share these and other such lessons 
learned with Ukraine.

    Question. The international community's failure to hold Russia to 
account for its actions in Syria, which, according to the UN, amount to 
war crimes, has provided the Kremlin an opening to rewrite history. 
What more can the U.S. do to ensure Russia is held to account for its 
intervention in Syria?

    Answer. Promoting accountability for those responsible for past and 
ongoing atrocities in Syria remains a key component our Syria policy. 
We are coordinating closely with the UN, allies, and partners, and with 
Syrian civil society to promote accountability for the most serious 
crimes committed in Syria. The United States, in close coordination 
with our allies, successfully helped renew the mandate of the UN's 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria on April 1. The United States will 
continue to support the important work of the UN International, 
Impartial, and Independent Mechanism, and will continue supporting 
civil society organizations that collect, document, and preserve 
evidence of human rights violations and abuses in Syria.

    Question. To what extent do you feel the international community's 
failure to hold Russia to account contributed to President Putin's 
calculus in authorizing Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

    Answer. It is unclear what, if anything, could have altered Putin's 
calculus, which by his own statements is based on holy misguided and 
false assumptions about the resolve of the Ukrainians, the United 
States, and the international community to defend Ukrainian sovereignty 
and uphold the right of states to determine their own future. The 
Department of State is committed to holding Russia to account for its 
brutal war in Ukraine and to making crystal clear to Putin and the 
world that the United States will continue to provide Ukraine with all 
support necessary to defend its territory and its people from Russian 
aggression.

    Question. Do you agree with the UN's assessment that Russian 
actions amount to war crimes?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. What threat does Russian entrenchment in Syria pose to 
U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East and beyond?

    Answer. Russia's military campaign in Syria has led to massive 
destruction, the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians, and the 
largest displacement crisis since WWII. The Assad regime, with Russian 
support, actively obstructs a political resolution to the Syrian 
conflict, which continues to threaten regional stability and the 
security of our regional partners, including Israel and Jordan. Russian 
support denies much of the country access to humanitarian aid. By 
enabling the regime to continue functioning with impunity, Russia has 
prolonged the situation that prevents the safe, dignified, and 
voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to Syria, which in 
turn imposes an ongoing and destabilizing refugee burden on neighboring 
states such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Russia's support for the 
regime also prolongs the absence of good governance, policing, and 
security, and permits the presence of terrorist groups in Syria and the 
consequent threat to U.S. interests. Russia has also used its UN veto 
to block international efforts to hold the Assad regime accountable for 
the ongoing atrocities committed in Syria.

    Question. Syria plays a central role in the Kremlin's strategy to 
position itself as a ``great power.'' Through Syria, it's worked to 
expand its global influence, pointing towards its support for the Assad 
regime as evidence of its ``reliability'' as a partner and ally. The 
Kremlin does so with the objective of undermining American interests in 
the region. How can the U.S. better position itself to pushback against 
Russian disinformation in the Middle East, and reassure our regional 
partners and allies of the U.S.'s long-term commitment to the region?

    Answer. In Syria, Russia uses its disinformation and propaganda 
networks to distract from its role in the conflict and the Assad 
regime's atrocities (as well as its own). The United States is 
discrediting Moscow's disinformation by demonstrating and delivering 
upon an affirmative agenda that builds long-term partnerships to 
promote regional integration, economic investment that drives 
prosperity and jobs, and people-to-people ties. We also counter 
Moscow's disinformation through engagement with people in the region on 
digital literacy training, sharing best practices to the challenges 
posed by Russian disinformation, and debunking specific Kremlin 
disinformation in the public sphere, denying Russia the ability to 
propagate unanswered false narratives.

    Question. Why, in your view, has Russian propaganda been so 
successful in penetrating the Arab media landscape?

    Answer. Moscow takes advantage of existing elite and popular 
skepticism about U.S. policy and intentions in the Middle East, playing 
on tropes about Western colonialism and regional interference stemming 
from U.S. support for Israel and interventions in Libya, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. Russia's information operations efforts include overt 
Russian Government voices, diplomatic missions' platforms, state-funded 
media, proxy websites, inauthentic or inorganic social media accounts, 
and partnerships with Arabic media outlets. At the same time, the 
disinformation ecosystems of Russia, the People's Republic of China 
(PRC), and Iran opportunistically converge, amplify, and reinforce each 
other's propaganda and disinformation narratives.

    Question. What role can, and should, the Caesar Syrian Civilian 
Protection Act play in any strategy to combat Russian influence in 
Syria?

    Answer. Seeking accountability for human rights abuses committed by 
the Assad regime and its backers and allies in Syria remains a key 
component of U.S. Syria policy. Our Syria sanctions, including under 
the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act, are vital tools to press for 
accountability for the Assad regime and its backers, including Russia, 
notably with respect to human rights violations and abuses--some of 
which rise to the level of war crimes--inflicted on the Syrian people. 
We will continue to use these tools to deter support for the Assad 
regime's ongoing atrocities.

    Question. How does the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act impact 
Russian influence in the wider Middle East?

    Answer. In both Syria and Libya, Russian military and paramilitary 
forces have exploited conflicts for Moscow's own selfish interests, 
posing grave threats to regional stability and global commerce. In 
Syria, the Russian military campaign has led to massive destruction in 
service of the Assad regime, as well as the death or displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of civilians. This Administration considers Syria 
sanctions authorities, including the Caesar Act, to be important tools 
to pursue accountability for the Assad regime and its enablers. The 
United States will continue to work closely with our allies and 
partners to impose further costs on Putin and his enablers until Putin 
changes course.

    Question. The international community has long argued that any 
reconstruction funds in Syria must be tied to tangible progress towards 
reform by the Assad regime. Reconstruction funds give the international 
community critical leverage over any final settlement in Syria and must 
not be extended lightly. There is, however, growing concerns Moscow is 
successfully undermining international unity on this issue, and 
blurring the lines between reconstruction funding and early recovery 
projects. In fact, this Administration by its own admission is 
supporting UN projects to rebuild hospitals and schools in regime 
strongholds and cultivating economic development in Russian port cities 
of Latakia and Tartus. What is the U.S. position with respect to 
reconstruction in Syria?

    Answer. This Administration has not changed its policy of opposing 
reconstruction by or for the Assad regime until there is irreversible 
progress toward a political resolution to the conflict in line with UN 
Security Council Resolution 2254, which we have not yet seen. The 
United States has long supported humanitarian early recovery programs 
that ensure Syrians in need have access to basic services. Humanitarian 
early recovery projects are needs-based and conducted by independent 
and impartial humanitarian agencies, while reconstruction projects are 
conducted by or for the Assad regime to benefit its own narrow 
interests. Humanitarian early recovery projects are generally smaller 
scale than reconstruction, primarily occurring at the individual, 
family, or community level.

    Question. How do business development and livelihood support in 
Assad-held areas further U.S. strategic interests in Syria?

    Answer. The primary goal of U.S. humanitarian assistance, including 
livelihood-focused activities, is to save lives and alleviate the 
suffering of the Syrian people by insuring that vulnerable and crisis-
affected individuals receive assistance and protection, regardless of 
their geographic location. U.S.-supported livelihood-focused activities 
in areas controlled by the Assad regime help the most vulnerable 
Syrians become less dependent on U.S. humanitarian aid. They are small-
scale and humanitarian in nature, are implemented by impartial and 
independent organizations, and are based entirely on humanitarian need.

    Question. How does Moscow stand to gain financially from such 
initiatives?

    Answer. The Department assesses that the risk of financial gain to 
Russia from livelihood-focused humanitarian programs in regime-held 
areas is low. The Department takes all possible steps to carefully 
monitor and mitigate against fiduciary and other risks associated with 
providing humanitarian assistance in all areas of Syria during this 
period of severe economic deterioration and unprecedented need, 
including the risks involving any financial gain to malign actors in 
the region. Humanitarian early recovery programs in regime-controlled 
areas such as livelihood-focused activities are small-scale and 
household/community-focused projects implemented by thoroughly screened 
impartial and independent organizations based on humanitarian needs, 
not regime demands.

    Question. Having spent years bombing opposition strongholds into 
submission, the regime and its Russian backers are now successfully 
making inroads with our Arab partners, cultivating support to 
rehabilitate Bashar al Assad and rebuild the country he broke. What 
steps should the U.S. take to limit our Arab partners from legitimizing 
the regime and by extension further Russian influence in the region?

    Answer. The United States will not upgrade its relations with the 
Assad regime or legitimize the actions of the brutal dictator Bashar 
al-Assad. This Administration opposes other countries normalizing their 
relations with Assad's regime, and we have repeatedly made that clear 
to our Arab partners. The Department has expressed its deep 
disappointment to those states that have taken actions to legitimize 
the regime, actions the Department believes are especially 
inappropriate given the atrocities the regime continues to inflict on 
the Syrian people. We will continue to convey concern with the signal 
such actions send. The Department has also cautioned regional partners 
that economic engagement with the Assad regime risks U.S. sanctions 
consequences.

    Question. What are the risks of a greater Russian role in Libya to 
U.S. interests in Syria?

    Answer. Russians in Libya benefit from Russian military basing in 
Syria, but they do not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests in Syria 
from Libya. A ceasefire in Libya has held since the summer of 2020, and 
Libyan leaders are seeking to resolve their disputes peacefully. That 
said, Russia has proven to be a divisive force in Libya, complicating 
national reconciliation and U.S. efforts to promote a political 
transition to a sovereign, stable, unified, and secure Libya with no 
foreign interference. In Libya, as in Syria, Russian military and 
paramilitary forces have exploited conflicts for Moscow's own selfish 
interests, posing grave threats to regional stability and global 
commerce. The Administration believes that stability in Syria and Libya 
can only be achieved through an inclusive political process facilitated 
by the UN.
    The United States is committed to working with allies, partners, 
and the UN to ensure that durable political solutions remain within 
reach in both Libya and Syria.

    Question. Russia in Libya: In Libya, Russia has deployed Wagner 
mercenaries in support of the rebel commander Khalifa Haftar. According 
to successive UN reports, Russian affiliated righters are violating the 
UN arms embargo with total impunity. How do you plan to address 
reported violations of the UN arms embargo?

    Answer. The United States continues to call on all external 
parties, including Russia, to respect Libyan sovereignty, comply with 
the UN arms embargo, and respect the October 2020 ceasefire agreement 
through the full withdrawal of all foreign forces, fighters, and 
mercenaries. Individuals and entities that have violated or assisted 
the evasion of the UN arms embargo are eligible for designation for 
asset freeze and travel ban measures. The United States will work 
closely with our international partners to implement the UN arms 
embargo and to consider adopting measures against those who violate it. 
The United States and our partners continue to explore a range of 
options for curtailing the influence of Russian-backed paramilitary 
forces. The United States, the UK, and the EU have sanctioned Wagner 
and its leader, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and we have publicized Wagner's 
extensive links to the Kremlin, and their human rights abuses and other 
malign activities in Libya.

    Question. While current policy has been to publicize Russian 
adventurism in Libya, how does the United States impose real costs for 
Russia's use of private military contractors, i.e., Wagner, in Libya?

    Answer. The United States and our partners continue to pursue a 
range of policies to curtail the influence of Russian-backed 
paramilitary forces. The United States, the UK, and the EU have 
sanctioned Wagner and its leader, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and we have 
publicized Wagner's extensive links to the Kremlin, and their human 
rights abuses and other malign activities in Syria, Libya, and sub-
Saharan Africa. The U.S. Government also supports the work of the UN 
Panel of Experts to identify violations of the UN Libya arms embargo. 
We continue to work with the UN and our international partners to 
support the Libyan-defined path towards elections, which could pave the 
way for a new government to establish full control over Libya's entire 
territory, an essential step for removing foreign forces.

    Question. What are the risks of a greater Russian role in Libya to 
U.S. interests in North Africa, including U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts?

    Answer. Russia has proven to be a divisive force in Libya, 
complicating national reconciliation and U.S. efforts to promote a 
political transition to a sovereign, stable, unified, and secure Libya 
with no foreign interference. Although terrorist groups have been 
weakened, Russia-backed paramilitary forces operating in Libya 
contribute to a volatile security dynamic that enables the possibility 
that terrorist cells could re-group. Russia has used its position in 
Libya as a springboard to project power across North Africa and the 
Sahel, exacerbating the instability that has led to the resurgence and 
spread of violent extremist groups.

    Question. What are the threats of Russia successfully gaining a 
foothold in Libya, which borders NATO's southern flank?

    Answer. An official Russian military presence, or a Russia-backed 
Wagner presence, will undermine political negotiations in Libya and 
provide a foothold for Russia to expand its destabilizing influence 
throughout the African continent.

    Question. Egypt Policy: Egypt is located at a strategic crossroads 
between the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa, remains an 
important U.S. partner in the region, and is important to Israel's 
security. However, in light of Egypt's growing cooperation with Russia 
and reports of potential Su-35 sales, is Egypt pivoting irrevocably 
towards Russia?

    Answer. The U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership is strong. In the last 
year, we have secured nearly $5 billion in new foreign military sales 
to Egypt. Egypt has joined the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces and 
will assume leadership of a taskforce on Red Sea security. Egypt has 
yet to take delivery of any Su-35s. Egypt has consistently voted in 
favor of resolutions condemning Russia's aggression in Ukraine 
including at the UN General Assembly and the IAEA Board of Governors. 
My team will follow up to discuss the Russia-Egypt relationship in 
further detail.

    Question. Bearing in mind that a stronger Egypt-Russia relationship 
poses risks to U.S. interests and human rights concerns in Egypt, how 
would you and the Biden administration frame or modify U.S. policy 
towards Egypt?

    Answer. The Administration has shown that we can balance our 
security interests and human rights concerns in our relationship with 
Egypt. The Secretary's decision to condition, and ultimately withhold 
$130 million in FY 2020 FMF yielded concrete human rights progress and 
underscored that we will not compromise our values. At the same time, 
the Administration has expanded our security, economic, and regional 
cooperation with Egypt to historic levels, including by holding our 
first Strategic Dialogue with Egypt since 2015.

    Question. Would you characterize a potential Egyptian purchase of 
Su-35s from Russia as a significant transaction as described under the 
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)?

    Answer. We are committed to fully implementing the law and have 
repeatedly cautioned Egypt and all other U.S. partners and allies that 
any major new purchase of military equipment from Russia, such as Su-
35s, would pose a severe risk of triggering CAATSA sanctions or other 
Russia-related sanctions, as well as damage our bilateral security 
assistance and cooperation.

    Question. Russia in Latin America: What do you believe will be the 
impact of Russia's current economic and geopolitical encumbrances on 
the survival of the Diaz-Canel regime in Cuba?

    Answer. Sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and 
atrocities, combined with the broader effects of Russia's pre-mediated 
and unnecessary war in Ukraine, will negatively impact Cuba's economy 
through decreased Russian tourism, higher costs for Cuba's food imports 
from Russia, potential challenges obtaining Russian oil, decreased 
Russian investment, and international banks' reluctance to engage with 
countries perceived to support Russia.
    The Cuban Government consistently blames Russia's aggression on the 
United States and NATO and amplifies Russia's disinformation on the 
war.

    Question. What do you believe will be the impact of Russia's 
current economic and geopolitical encumbrances on the survival of the 
Maduro regime in Venezuela?

    Answer. The Maduro regime likely feels increased pressure because 
of Russia's current international isolation and the second order 
effects of U.S. and European sanctions on Russia. Strains on global 
supply chains caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine will also increase 
costs and reduce supplies of numerous products into Venezuela. In 
addition to Russia, the Maduro regime continues to rely on Cuba, the 
People's Republic of China, Iran, and others, to seek legitimacy and 
promote its political and economic survival.

    Question. Is the Administration seriously considering reopening oil 
imports from Venezuela and Iran to make up for the supply lost from 
Russia?

    Answer. While the Administration has engaged in intensive efforts 
to address the issue of disruption of oil supplies due to Russia's war 
in Ukraine, other foreign policy considerations would guide any 
potential changes in our sanctions posture with respect to Iran's and 
Venezuela's oil sectors.
    A mutual return to full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the best available option to constrain Iran's 
nuclear program and provide a platform to address Iran's other 
destabilizing conduct. If Iran were prepared to return to full 
implementation of the JCPOA's limits on its nuclear program, the United 
States would be prepared to lift sanctions necessary for JCPOA 
compliance, including certain sanctions related to Iran's petroleum 
sector.
    Current Venezuela-related sanctions remain in effect. While the 
Administration does not preview sanctions actions, it has made clear 
that the United States will review some sanctions policies if the 
Venezuelan parties make meaningful progress toward a democratic 
solution.

    Question. U.S. oil production is better for our economy, better for 
the environment, and better for our national security, so why is the 
Administration refusing to increase domestic capacity?

    Answer. The United States is currently the world's largest producer 
of both oil and natural gas. President Biden has said, ``(Nothing 
stands) in the way of domestic oil and gas production.'' The Energy 
Information Administration predicts U.S. crude oil production will 
average 12 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2022 and a record-high 12.6 
million bpd by 2023. The release of more than 1 million bpd of 
strategic petroleum reserves for the next 6 months by the United 
States, allies, and partners will provide time for domestic industry to 
ramp up. We are working with European allies and partners to accelerate 
their efforts to end their reliance on Russian fossil fuels. The United 
States will also accelerate our clean energy transition to combat 
climate change and enhance energy security.

    Question. Russia-China Collaboration: The Russian invasion of 
Ukraine has many of our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific 
increasingly worried about the timeline and possibility of a Taiwan 
contingency scenario. What do you see as the main lessons to learn from 
the situation in Ukraine?

    Answer. We continue to work with these allies and partners to 
ensure that the People's Republic of China and President Xi Jinping 
learn the right lessons from Russia's brutal and unjustified war 
against Ukraine, including that launching such an attack will lead to a 
devastating response from the international community. We continue to 
engage with our allies and partners on the importance of preserving 
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

    Question. Based on that, how can the U.S. better work with Taiwan 
to deter further Chinese military aggression now, before a contingency 
occurs?

    Answer. Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and contributes to 
the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and 
within the region. We are in regular and close communication with 
allies and partners who are also committed to preserving this peace and 
stability in the face of increasing pressure. Consistent with the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the United States makes available to Taiwan 
defense articles and services necessary to enable it to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability in a manner commensurate with the 
People's Republic of China's threat to Taiwan.

    Question. Does the Administration support increasing defense 
engagement with Taiwan to prepare for various contingencies? If so, 
what is the Administration doing in this regard?

    Answer. Our defense relationship with Taiwan continues to be 
commensurate with the threat from the People's Republic of China, 
consistent with our one-China policy.
    The U.S. Government supports Taiwan through the acquisition of 
asymmetric capabilities. The Departments of State and Defense are also 
coordinating closely with Taiwan on non-material solutions to improve 
its defenses. This includes working with Taiwan to increase resiliency 
across the military and non-military domains, including through 
reserve/mobilization reforms and civil-military integration.
    The United States is also working with Taiwan to realize economic 
resiliency through supply chains that are transparent, secure, 
sustainable, and diverse.

    Question. Does the Administration support providing Foreign 
Military Financing to Taiwan (starting sooner rather than later) as one 
way to bolster Taiwan's ability to deter Chinese military action? If 
so, will the Department of State commit to working with Congress to 
make this happen? If not, why does the Department of State not support 
it?

    Answer. The Department of State welcomes the opportunity to discuss 
security assistance funding with Congress, and we are already engaged 
in discussions with congressional committees on the proposed Taiwan 
Deterrence Act and other proposed bills. Historically, the Department 
of State has not provided any security assistance, including Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and 
Training, to Taiwan due to its high-income status and because it can 
use its own funds for foreign military sales. Approximately 93 percent 
of the FMF global topline has historically been subject to earmarks and 
directives, leaving very little flexibility for other emerging 
priorities. As such, the Department of State would require significant 
appropriations to support the capabilities Taiwan needs.

    Question. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we have seen 
Chinese leaders vehemently defend China's relationship with Russia, 
make no moves to condemn Russia at the United Nations or in its 
messaging, deploy no sanctions or punitive measures against Russia, and 
take on Russian propaganda about the war. Given this, what is your 
assessment of the China-Russia relationship, and how it might be 
changing?

    Answer. We have deep concerns about the People's Republic of 
China's (PRC) alignment with Russia and the potential implications and 
consequences of that alignment. President Biden was candid and direct 
with President Xi about this concern during their March 18 call and 
about the direct reputational costs associated with standing by Putin 
as he perpetrates this senseless war.

    Question. What is the Administration's theory of the case that 
China would be willing to help the United States first to deter 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine and then to press for Russia to pull back 
from it?

    Answer. We have expressed clearly and directly to the PRC the 
consequences of providing support to Russia as it wages its brutal war 
against Ukraine--committing atrocities and causing a humanitarian 
crisis--and flagrantly violates the principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity that the PRC claims to stand for.

    Question. Does the Administration believe that China would be 
willing to take actions to support the United States and Europe, but 
could undermine its relationship with Russia?

    Answer. No.

    Question. Does the Department of State agree with Josep Borrell's 
comments with respect to mediation and diplomacy on Russia's invasion 
of Ukraine? Please describe why or why not: ``There is no alternative . 
. . It must be China, I am sure of that . . . Diplomacy cannot only be 
European or American. Chinese diplomacy has a role to play here . . . 
We have not asked for it and neither have they (China), but since it 
has to be a power and neither the U.S. nor Europe can be (mediators), 
China could be.''

    Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has failed to use its 
influence with Moscow to stop Putin's war against Ukraine. We are 
actively coordinating with our European Union and European partners to 
increase pressure on the PRC to reconsider its tacit support for 
Putin's war of aggression.

    Question. If the Department of State does not agree with comments 
by Mr. Borrell and other European leaders on China playing a mediation 
role, are we clearly sending that message to our European allies and 
partners?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. If so, how are we doing this? If not, why not?

    Answer. We utilize direct and open lines of communication with 
European leaders. I will lead the first meeting of the U.S.-EU high-
level dialogue on Russia on March 30, where we will also discuss 
People's Republic of China (PRC)-Russia relations in the context of 
Putin's war. Additionally, on April 21, Deputy Secretary Sherman and 
European External Action Service Secretary General Stefano Sannino will 
meet for their semi-annual U.S.-EU dialogue on China, and the PRC's 
role in Russia's war against Ukraine is a central agenda item.

    Question. On February 26, the New York Times reported that the 
Administration shared intelligence with top Chinese officials on 
Russia's troop build-up along Ukraine's border, as part of evidence to 
convince China to help the United States deter a Russian invasion. The 
article also reported that China shared this intelligence with the 
Russians. Is the article correct?

    Answer. I am not going to comment on matters of intelligence in an 
unclassified setting.

    Question. If so, in what aspects?

    Answer. I am not going to comment on matters of intelligence in an 
unclassified setting.

    Question. If not, what is incorrect?

    Answer. I am not going to comment on matters of intelligence in an 
unclassified setting.

    Question. What further details can you provide on these efforts and 
the intelligence shared in an unclassified setting?

    Answer. I am not going to comment on matters of intelligence in an 
unclassified setting.

    Question. Will you commit that appropriate officials in the 
Administration will brief the Foreign Relations and Intelligence 
committees in a classified space on what was shared with China, what 
they shared with Russia, and any harm this may have caused to U.S. 
national security?

    Answer. A classified briefing can be requested through the standard 
channels.

    Question. The U.S. defense and security assistance budgets are 
stretched thin as is, and now we are facing multiple active security 
crises. Do you agree that the United States must ensure our defense 
resources are up to the task of responding to the Ukraine crisis, while 
also ensuring we have enough resources to solidify our presence in the 
Indo-Pacific and deter a future contingency there?

    Answer. We must ensure our security assistance resources are 
sufficient to meet current and projected partner demands and flexible 
enough to respond to multiple active and emerging security crises. We 
look forward to ongoing and upcoming discussions with you regarding the 
balance of security assistance not only to ensure sufficient funds are 
planned, requested, and appropriated for global defense needs, but also 
to ensure that the Secretary of State remains the lead with respect to 
foreign assistance--to include security assistance--as a tool used in 
support of U.S. foreign policy priorities.

    Question. If so, what is the State Department doing that achieve 
this balance and to make sure we continue to prioritize sufficient 
funding and security cooperation efforts in the Indo-Pacific?

    Answer. Approximately 93 percent of the Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) global topline has historically been subject to earmarks and 
directives, which limits the Department's flexibility to use FMF funds 
for emerging needs, particularly when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. In 
recent years, the Department of State has allocated to the Indo-Pacific 
nearly a third (32 percent in FY 2021) of the FMF that is not subject 
to other earmarks and directives. We look forward to continued 
engagement with the committees regarding FY 2022 resource allocations 
in support of the Administration's new Indo-Pacific Strategy, including 
in upcoming testimony and other engagements on the President's FY 2023 
Budget Request.

    Question. Embassy Issues: What, specifically, is the U.S. 
Government doing to support the Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) 
working for the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development in-and-around Ukraine?

    Answer. The Department of State and interagency colleagues continue 
to pursue multiple initiatives to ensure the safety and well-being of 
our locally employed (LE) staff both in Ukraine and those who have 
temporarily relocated outside of Ukraine. Some of the initiatives 
included making salary advances to all LE staff as well as a one-time 
supplemental payment and ensuring LE staff have resources to depart 
Ukraine if they so choose or are able.

    Question. Has specific guidance been issued to the U.S. Embassy and 
Mission in Ukraine, regardless of the operative status of such embassy 
and mission, to indicate that U.S. personnel are expected to make and 
maintain contact with the FSNs under their management authority?

    Answer. Mission Ukraine has implemented routine accountability 
drills. U.S. supervisors maintain contact with locally employed (LE) 
staff via email, phone, and/or text message. U.S. Embassy Kyiv's Human 
Resources Office is tracking locations of all LE staff. Our U.S. staff 
send updates at least once a week to our LE staff and hold virtual town 
halls hosted by the charge d'affaires, with participation by subject 
matter experts in the Department of State, to explain benefits, 
processes, and updates.

    Question. Will FSNs and their dependents who must evacuate Ukraine 
be prioritized for support by the U.S. Government, or will they be 
forgotten and left behind, as so many were in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Department of State is doing everything it can legally 
do to support our Mission Ukraine LE staff. To date, more than 300 
locally employed (LE) staff and family members have relocated outside 
of Ukraine. Most of our staff, even those who remain in country, are 
outside conflict zones. The Department of State has shifted and 
streamlined the processing of special immigrant visas (SIVs) for our 
Ukrainian LE staff to other posts. A statutory length of service 
requirement of 15 years must be met. Adjusting the length of service 
requires a change in legislation.

    Question. Human Rights in Russia: How can the Administration 
empower the opposition politicians, leaders and activists remaining in 
Russia?

    Answer. We stand in solidarity with the brave opposition 
politicians, civil society activists, and human rights defenders who 
choose to remain in Russia despite the Kremlin's unprecedented efforts 
to suppress dissent. We will continue to use all platforms to shine a 
light on the Kremlin's abuses and violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. We are working to promote accountability through 
visa restrictions and sanctions authorities for the actions of Russian 
officials and their widespread suppression of dissent. We also 
coordinate closely with partners and Allies, bilaterally and 
multilaterally, to demonstrate our shared support for independent 
democracy and human rights advocates both in Russia and abroad.

    Question. How is the Administration supporting independent press 
and free speech through Putin's current crackdown?

    Answer. We strongly condemn the Kremlin's shuttering of independent 
media outlets and censorship of online platforms, and Russia's adoption 
of a new law that threatens prison sentences for unbiased reporting on 
Putin's war. We will continue to speak out in defense of freedom of 
expression, including as it relates to members of the press in Russia, 
and to stand with those independent journalists who continue their work 
at great personal risk. I have given a number of interviews to 
independent Russian journalists in recent weeks to support their 
efforts to report truthfully on the war. Together with European 
partners, we are committed to supporting media freedom and the free 
flow of information and access to the internet in Russia and the 
broader region. The people of Russia deserve to know the truth about 
the suffering that is being inflicted by their government on the people 
of Ukraine.

    Question. Military Support to Ukraine and NATO Allies: Has the 
Administration considered offering Turkey a deal; if Turkey transfers 
all of its S-400s to Ukraine, the United States will backfill them with 
Patriot systems and let them back into the F-35 program?

    Answer. The Administration has consistently encouraged Turkey to 
dispose of the S-400 system in a manner that would allow Ankara to 
comply with U.S. law. The Administration offered to sell Turkey 
Patriots on multiple occasions and remains willing to providing a 
similarly capable and competitive offer, as we have done in the past. 
Turkey's removal from the F-35 program was directed by the Department 
of Defense. The Department of Defense is best suited to answer 
questions on a potential return to the F-35 program.

    Question. I understand Ukraine has pilots trained to fly A-10 
Warthogs. Will the United States supply them to Ukraine?

    Answer. The Department of Defense is best able to answer if there 
are qualified Ukrainian pilots who could effectively employ the A-10 in 
combat and if there are A-10s and the supporting weapons, maintenance, 
and training support that could be transferred to Ukraine.

    Question. What is the objective behind the deployment of troops to 
Romania and Poland?

    Answer. The objective of our troop deployment to Romania and Poland 
is to deter Russian aggression and reassure Allies on the eastern 
flank--who are geographically closest to Ukraine--that the United 
States and NATO stand ready to defend them if they are attacked. These 
deployments demonstrate the United States' iron-clad commitment to our 
NATO Allies. NATO unity is the strongest deterrent against Russian 
aggression.

    Question. How will U.S. troop deployments to Eastern European NATO 
allies scale up in response to Russian advances in Ukraine?

    Answer. We defer to the Department of Defense for responses on 
these issues.

    Question. Is the United States considering providing Ukraine with 
the Mi-17 helicopters formerly flown by the Afghan military that are 
now on the ground in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Administration has already provided five Mi-17 
helicopters as Excess Defense Articles to Ukraine. The Administration 
is reviewing the current stock of other Excess Defense Articles, to 
include Mi-17s, which may be provided to Ukraine to address a range of 
operational requirements.

    Question. What kinds of air defense capabilities is the United 
States considering sending to eastern European allies?

    Answer. The Administration has worked with Eastern flank Allies and 
partners to enhance their air defense capabilities. Recent purchases of 
Patriot air and missile defense systems, F-16 and F-35 fighters, as 
well as supporting weapons and training have bolstered the ongoing 
efforts to transition countries from Russian-origin equipment to modern 
NATO interoperable systems.

    Question. In addition to the Patriot systems now on the ground in 
Poland, is there any possibility to temporarily send MLRS to the Baltic 
states while they (Estonia) wait for their already-ordered systems to 
be delivered?

    Answer. The Administration is actively pursuing options to increase 
partner capabilities for Baltic state countries, to include increasing 
MLRS purchases and speeding deliveries. Temporary solutions--in 
addition to recent rotations of U.S. and partner nation military 
units--provide capable deterrents as current and future purchases are 
delivered.

    Question. Ukraine and Humanitarian Concerns: The Russian Government 
first agreed to establish ``humanitarian corridors'' to enable safe 
passage of civilians, then changed the terms of where such corridors 
could be established, then ultimately bombarded them anyway. Now the 
Russian Government reportedly is seeking to further manipulate the 
internationally protected right of civilians to leave the territory 
(i.e., evacuate) by forcing them into ``green corridors,'' which 
provide passage from besieged areas of Kyiv, Mariupol, and Sumy 
exclusively to Russia or Belarus. Can you confirm that the Russian 
Government is, once again, violating the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols in Ukraine by forcing civilians who wish to leave 
besieged areas into so-called ``green corridors'' that lead such 
civilians directly toward their aggressors?

    Answer. We have assessed that members of Russia's forces committed 
war crimes. We condemn attacks on civilians and humanitarian efforts. 
We will continue working with our allies and partners to gather any 
evidence of war crimes and other atrocities and make it available to 
the appropriate bodies to hold those responsible accountable. The 
United States has been clear that all parties to the conflict must 
abide by obligations under international humanitarian law related to 
the protection of civilians, including those who are fleeing conflict, 
and those who are trying to protect and assist them. Humanitarian aid 
deliveries must be allowed to operate without interference, and 
humanitarian workers must have safe passage to deliver aid and 
assistance to those in need.

    Question. What specific actions are being taken by the Biden 
administration to enable the safe passage of civilians seeking to leave 
Ukraine?

    Answer. The United States is the largest single-country donor of 
humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, providing nearly $302 million to 
independent humanitarian organizations so far this year. This 
assistance facilitates our humanitarian organization partners' ability 
to work tirelessly to provide safe passage for evacuees trying to leave 
danger after terms are negotiated directly by the parties to the 
conflict. The United States and our allies continue to call on all 
parties to the conflict to allow unhindered humanitarian access in 
Ukraine and to allow people to flee to their country of choice.

    Question. What specific actions are being taken by the UN to enable 
the safe passage of civilians seeking to leave Ukraine?

    Answer. Safe passage agreements are negotiated by the parties to 
the conflict. Humanitarian organizations are working tirelessly to 
advise the parties, and when agreement is reached with sufficient 
detail, humanitarian organizations escort convoys of civilians to safer 
parts of Ukraine and provide assistance. From there, civilians may 
choose if they want to stay in Ukraine or seek asylum in a neighboring 
country. If they choose to leave, transport is provided by local 
authorities and humanitarian organizations. In addition to the 
vulnerable Ukrainian citizens who are fleeing conflict in their 
country, humanitarian organizations are providing support for third-
country nationals fleeing the conflict.

    Question. Ukraine is a major exporter of grains and one of the top 
sources of wheat for the World Food Program. April is planting season. 
If the planting season is missed due to the Russian Government's 
illegal, unjustified, and immoral invasion of Ukraine, the 
repercussions for food security could be far-reaching. As we saw during 
the global food price crisis between 2007-2008, there is a direct 
correlation between food price spikes, food insecurity, and social and 
political instability. What contingency plans have been put in place to 
mitigate the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on global prices of 
staple commodities, including wheat?

    Answer. To respond to the challenges that Russia has created with 
its unjustified, brutal invasion of Ukraine, the United States is 
acting to bolster food security around the globe, in conjunction with 
allies and partners. One way we are doing this is by supporting the 
United Nations World Food Program to assist up to 3.1 million conflict-
affected individuals in Ukraine, as well as 300,000 crisis-affected 
individuals in neighboring countries. We are also urging our partners 
to consider how to expand production of key cereal crops, oil seeds, 
and associated commodities in a non-trade distorting way, and we remain 
committed to maintaining strong and open global markets for staple 
agricultural commodities that feed the world. We will continue to work 
to mitigate the many harmful effects of Putin's war.

    Question. Do you agree that the World Food Program, to the greatest 
extent practicable, should continue to prioritize the local and 
regional purchase of wheat from Ukraine in an effort not only to meet 
immediate needs in real time, but also to help promote early recovery 
of Ukraine's agricultural economy?

    Answer. I agree that the World Food Program (WFP) should prioritize 
the local and regional purchase of wheat from Ukraine, if WFP deems it 
practicable. WFP sources 50 percent of its wheat from Ukraine. Russia's 
unprovoked war against Ukraine has severely impacted the planting, 
harvest, and export of wheat from Ukraine. WFP estimates that Russia's 
further invasion of Ukraine will cost it $29-$50 million more per month 
in increased wheat costs alone. If WFP determines it can procure wheat 
from Ukraine in the quality and quantities it needs at a reasonable 
price and in a reasonable timeframe, it should do so. Ultimately, these 
decisions rest with WFP.

    Question. Should the World Food Program halt all purchase of 
agricultural commodities from Russia? If not, why not?

    Answer. Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine has stopped trade in 
Black Sea wheat and put at risk 50 percent of WFP's wheat supply. WFP 
estimates that Russia's invasion will cost it $29-$50 million more per 
month in wheat costs alone, hurting the world's most vulnerable people. 
U.S. sanctions in response to Putin's war are carefully calibrated to 
allow for humanitarian activities by individuals, companies, and NGOs 
to continue, including transactions related to agricultural 
commodities. The goal of allowing trade in these commodities is to 
mitigate the impact of sanctions on humanitarian conditions around the 
world. The WFP should exercise discretion when sourcing wheat, noting 
Russia stands to benefit from the higher prices caused by its war.

    Question. Should the President seek a global waiver of U.S. 
purchase and shipping requirements under the Food for Peace Act, so 
that existing resources can be used for the local and regional 
procurement of lifesaving food aid commodities, thereby helping to meet 
needs in areas beset by conflict that are dependent upon Ukraine's 
exports in real time? If not, why not?

    Answer. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
relies on a variety of modalities to meet emergency food assistance 
needs in an efficient, responsible, and timely manner, to include both 
local, regional, and U.S. sourcing of commodities. The food and 
nutrition needs of vulnerable groups vary significantly based on 
location, market access, food availability, nutritional status, 
security concerns, and other factors, and thus it is critical for USAID 
to have flexibility in procurement and shipping requirements in order 
to appropriately respond to the growing complexity and number of global 
humanitarian crises. With the disruptions to Ukrainian exports and 
future production prospects, Title II emergency food assistance funding 
is an important tool that allows USAID to provide U.S. in-kind 
commodities to vulnerable people where markets may not be functioning 
and where food is scarce.

    Question. Non-Ukrainian Refugees Fleeing Ukraine: Which African 
governments has the Department of State engaged concerning the 
challenges their nationals face evacuating from Ukraine?

    Answer. The United States advocates that all people should have 
access to international protection. When we learned third country 
nationals' fleeing Russia's aggression against Ukraine faced barriers, 
we engaged the government of Ukraine and Ukraine's neighbors. They 
immediately took action to ensure protection for third country 
nationals seeking refuge. The U.S. has engaged with counterparts from 
the African Union, Nigeria, Uganda, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and 
others. We continue to work with our African and international 
organization partners to provide protection and assist those who wish 
to return home.

    Question. How has the Department of State engaged the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the challenges being faced by non-
Ukrainian refugees fleeing Ukraine?

    Answer. The United States has regularly engaged with and supported 
UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other 
international humanitarian organizations as they respond to the needs 
of refugee populations, including third country nationals, in 
coordination with the states neighboring Ukraine. U.S. supported 
assistance from UNHCR, IOM, and other international organizations 
specifically addressed the unique protection needs of third country 
nationals, as well as other groups with additional vulnerabilities. In 
addition, the United States has allocated $5.5 million to our 
international organization partners for the safe and voluntary return 
of third country nationals to their home countries.

    Question. Understanding the potential for propaganda and 
disinformation stemming from the allegations and cases of racism 
recounted by non-Ukrainians, particularly those from Africa, the Middle 
East, and South Asia, which messages and public diplomacy tools has the 
Department of State used to engage on this issue?

    Answer. We consider it essential that every individual seeking 
refuge from conflict and violence be treated equitably, with dignity, 
and with respect for their human rights. We are coordinating closely 
with allies and partners to help ensure every individual, regardless of 
race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, or disability status, crossing from Ukraine into 
neighboring countries is received with dignity and respect, and with 
the protection assistance circumstances require. We are encouraging 
countries in the region to adhere to their respective international 
refugee law and human rights obligations and to respect the principle 
of non-refoulement. We are also spreading these messages widely on all 
Department of State media platforms globally. More broadly, the United 
States condemns racism in all its forms around the globe.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. India announced February 25 it was exploring a rupee-
ruble payment system to facilitate trade with Russia, despite global 
sanctions. What is the current status of this project?

    Answer. The Government of India is discussing a rupee-ruble 
currency trade arrangement to address payment issues faced by Indian 
exporters and importers. Indian media reported such an arrangement 
would focus on sectors not subject to sanctions, including energy, 
agriculture, and pharmaceuticals, while avoiding the defense sector. 
The U.S. Government has discouraged India from pursuing payment 
mechanisms or taking other steps that could undermine the impact of 
sanctions on Russia.

    Question. What options is the Administration exploring to reduce 
Indian dependence on Russian and Belarussian-sourced potash and other 
agricultural inputs?

    Answer. The Administration is encouraging allies and partners to 
implement emergency measures that incentivize domestic producers to 
temporarily increase fertilizer production and ensure adequate supply. 
We are also consulting with Multilateral Development Banks, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) to encourage financing of projects to 
expand fertilizer production, as well as increase the efficient use of 
fertilizer.

    Question. Given that India has legacy Russian military equipment, 
is the Administration considering military sales to India that would 
enable the country to provide its used military equipment to Ukraine?

    Answer. The Administration values India as a partner and has 
encouraged India's ongoing efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian 
military equipment. Total U.S. defense trade with India has grown 
significantly in recent years, from near zero in 2008 to over $20 
billion in 2021. Indian-Russian defense collaboration goes back to the 
1960's, and divestiture from legacy equipment is a slow process. We are 
working with India on alternatives.

    Question. What other opportunities are available for India to 
signal its support for Ukraine and international democratic norms?

    Answer. In the Joint Statement issued following the April 11 U.S.-
India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, the United States and India ``urged an 
immediate cessation of hostilities,'' ``unequivocally condemned 
civilian deaths,'' and ``underscored that the contemporary global order 
has been built on the UN Charter, respect for international law, and 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states.'' However, 
India so far has not publicly condemned Russia's invasion, which is in 
clear contravention to the rules-based order India seeks to uphold. 
India has provided Ukraine with valuable humanitarian assistance, 
including medical supplies.

    Question. How have allies and the private sector responded to 
sanctions imposed to date on Russia? Are there unexpected side effects 
from our sanctions efforts on allies?

    Answer. Since the start of the Russia's war in Ukraine, more than 
30 allies and partners have joined us in rolling out sanctions on more 
than 2,100 Russian and Belarusian targets. Our allies and partners have 
shown an unprecedented, shared commitment to work together to impose 
costs on Russia. For example, New Zealand has joined in national 
sanctions for the first time in its history. Similarly, more than 600 
multinational companies have pulled out of Russia. We are continuing 
our engagement with the private sector in order to answer questions 
and, along with our Treasury colleagues, are working with our allies 
and partners on ways to mitigate the impacts of our sanctions on them.

    Question. Is the Administration considering seizure of frozen 
Russian-related assets held in U.S. accounts?

    Answer. We have worked with foreign counterparts on a number of 
high-profile asset seizures, such as the April seizure in Spain of 
Viktor Vekselberg's $90 million yacht the Tango. On April 28, the 
Administration submitted a comprehensive proposal to expand forfeiture 
authorities. We will work with our interagency partners to act on these 
authorities, provided they are granted.

    Question. The existing licenses are written with remarkably broad 
language, authorizing transactions across a variety of sectors. Is the 
Administration considering further restricting the scope of permitted 
transactions under existing sanctions?

    Answer. Since Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, the United 
States has imposed a rigorous set of sanctions on Russia for Putin's 
brutal war. In order to focus the impact of these measures on Russia 
and avoid inadvertent harm to our allies and partners, we have issued a 
set of General Licenses which provide for the timely wind down of 
business activity with the Russian Federation. In addition, the 
Administration is committed to supporting humanitarian activities and 
avoiding restrictions on life-essential goods like food and medicine.

    Question. The company behind Nordstream 2 fired all its employees, 
but there are conflicting reports as to whether it will declare 
bankruptcy. What is the latest legal status of the Nordstream 2 
companies?

    Answer. On February 23, Secretary Blinken terminated the waiver and 
imposed sanctions under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act 
(PEESA), as amended, on Nord Stream 2 AG (NS2AG), and its CEO, Matthias 
Warnig. Pursuant to PEESA and Executive Order 14039, the corporate 
officers of NS2AG are also subject to visa restrictions. On February 
28, Swiss Economics Minister Guy Parmelin announced all NS2AG staff 
were ``made redundant.'' We have seen--but cannot confirm--media 
reports of NS2AG's intention to declare bankruptcy in late March 2022.

    Question. How will the Administration proceed if the Nordstream 2 
assets are liquidated or sold to another party?

    Answer. The Administration remains committed to implementing 
sanctions targeting Nord Stream 2, including PEESA, as amended. 
Individuals and entities knowingly engaged in sanctionable conduct 
related to Nord Stream 2 face similar sanctions risks. The 
Administration continues to examine entities potentially engaged in 
sanctionable behavior. All property and interests in property of 
persons sanctioned under PEESA, as amended, that are in or come within 
the United States or are in the possession or control of U.S. persons 
must be blocked.

    Question. What is the status of Gazprom oil deliveries to Europe 
via existing Ukraine pipelines?

    Answer. Russia continues to deliver oil to Europe including through 
pipelines that transit Ukraine. The Administration supports European 
efforts to diversify away from Russian energy supplies, including 
through the European Commission-U.S. Joint Task Force to Reduce 
Europe's Dependence on Russian Fossil Fuels.

    Question. How is the Administration working with Taiwan in 
reviewing and learning from the Ukraine war?

    Answer. Public polling suggests Russia's invasion has focused 
Taiwan and its leaders on the need to undertake reforms to improve its 
ability to repel a PRC attack. The U.S. Government has focused 
extensively on supporting Taiwan through the acquisition of asymmetric 
capabilities and the Departments of State and Defense are also 
coordinating closely with Taiwan on non-material solutions to improve 
Taiwan's defenses. This includes working with Taiwan on increasing its 
resiliency across the military and non-military domains by looking at 
its reserve/mobilization reforms and civil-military integration.

    Question. Does the Administration have any insight into U.S. 
citizens in Ukraine that are participating as military combatants?

    Answer. We do not have authoritative numbers of U.S. citizens 
fighting in Ukraine, as U.S. citizens are not required to register 
their travel to a foreign country with the Department of State or 
update us on changes to their travel plans.
    U.S. citizens who travel to Ukraine, especially to participate in 
fighting, face significant risks to personal safety, including the very 
real risk of capture or death. The Department Travel Advisory for 
Ukraine states U.S. citizens should not travel to Ukraine and those in 
Ukraine should depart immediately if safe to do so using commercial or 
other private available options for ground transportation.

    Question. Are we providing any diplomatic assistance to U.S. 
citizens traveling into Ukraine?

    Answer. The U.S. Government is extremely limited in its ability to 
provide consular service to U.S. citizens in Ukraine. The Department 
Travel Advisory indicates that U.S. citizens should not travel to 
Ukraine and those in Ukraine should depart immediately if it is safe to 
do so.
    The United States is not able to evacuate U.S. citizens from 
Ukraine, including those U.S. citizens who travel to Ukraine to engage 
in the ongoing war.

    Question. What would be the implications of U.S. citizens killed or 
captured by Russian forces in Ukraine?

    Answer. The United States expects Russia to respect its obligations 
under the law of war and other applicable international law. The 
Department's Travel Advisory states that U.S. citizens should not 
travel to Ukraine due to, among other reasons, reports of Russian 
Government security officials singling out U.S. citizens in Ukraine. 
U.S. citizens who are detained by Russian authorities in Ukraine may be 
subject to potential attempts at criminal prosecution and may be at 
heightened risk of mistreatment.

    Question. How would the Administration respond if Russia claimed 
private U.S. citizen actions signaled direct U.S. involvement in the 
conflict?

    Answer. The United States would respond that it is not a 
participant in the war and caution Russia not to take further 
escalatory action. We continue to advise U.S. citizens against travel 
to Ukraine and that those in Ukraine should depart immediately if it is 
safe to do so.

    Question. What is the Administration's assessment of the strength, 
influence, and role of the Azov Battalion with Ukrainian defense 
structure?

    Answer. The militia formed in 2014 that called itself the ``Azov 
Battalion'' has not existed for several years.
    The unit called the Special Purpose Regiment Azov is part of the 
National Guard of Ukraine. It reports to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy 
through the Minister of Internal Affairs. Under martial law, all 
National Guard units fall under military command. As one unit among 
many in the National Guard, it does not have any particular influence 
over the structure or policy of Ukraine's defense forces.
    The Special Purpose Regiment Azov, together with Patrol Police and 
KORD (SWAT) officers and members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, remain 
at the Azovstal plant in Russian-besieged Mariupol. Russian forces, 
many of which are suspected of war crimes, continue to subject the 
Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol to intensive, daily attacks and 
bombardment. Mariupol's bravery has become a symbol of Ukraine's 
determination to resist Russia's subjugation.

    Question. What steps are the Administration and European allies 
taking to prevent Azov units from utilizing U.S.-made munitions and 
weapons?

    Answer. Since 2014, Embassy Kyiv has routinely performed 
comprehensive vetting for all security force recipients of U.S.-
provided training, equipment, or other security assistance to ensure 
compliance with the Leahy law. The United States also provided human 
rights training as part of the transfer of military equipment. These 
vetting mechanisms precluded groups like the 2014-era Azov Battalion 
from being direct recipients of our assistance.
    During the ongoing war in Ukraine, Embassy Kyiv personnel retain 
the capability to conduct Leahy Vetting of security assistance 
recipients and have been doing so. The Embassy, in coordination with 
relevant offices in Washington, DC, also conducts regular end-use 
monitoring in accordance with international law and consistent with 
agreements and licensing to ensure that security and defense articles 
are used only for the purpose they were provided for.
    The State Department continues to monitor, to the best of our 
ability during wartime, reports of human rights abuses by groups and 
entities that could be of concern.
    We have also engaged with the Ukrainian Government about steps it 
can take to avoid playing into Russia's disinformation efforts which 
conflate the current Azov Regiment--which is not the same entity as the 
disbanded 2014-era Azov Battalion and groups formerly affiliated with 
the Battalion.
    The Azov Regiment is currently encircled in the Azovstal steel 
works in Mariupol, where it is defending both the city and its civilian 
population against attacks by Russia's forces.

    Question. How is the Administration supporting efforts to document 
alleged mass atrocity crimes and other forms of civilian harm by 
Russia?

    Answer. Given the justice and accountability imperatives Ukraine is 
facing, the U.S. Government is investing in multiple lines of effort. 
One flagship program out of the Office of Global Criminal Justice 
offers direct support to the Office of the Prosecutor General and 
Mobile Justice Teams that support OPG War Crimes Unit and regional 
prosecutor efforts to conduct field investigations. Other programs 
include: training and technical assistance for civil society efforts to 
gather, document, and report on violations of international 
humanitarian law; expanding access to justice for victims of atrocities 
and other abuses; data collection, reporting, and information sharing 
on atrocities and other human rights abuses including through analysis 
of satellite imagery and other data feeds; laying the foundation for 
restorative justice; and enhancing the ability of civil society, 
journalists, and other partners to safely and securely share 
information.

    Question. How is the Administration supporting accountability for 
Russia including through multilateral investigation mechanisms as well 
as the collection and protection of evidence of mass atrocity crimes 
and other human rights violations?

    Answer. The United States supports international efforts to examine 
atrocities in Ukraine, including those conducted by the International 
Criminal Court, the UN, the Experts Mission under the Moscow Mechanism 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and others. 
We will continue to assist with documentation efforts, including by 
supporting efforts to ensure that evidence collected can be safely and 
securely transmitted and stored. We helped establish the Human Rights 
Council's Commission of Inquiry, ensuring it has a mandate to 
investigate, document, analyze, and share evidence of violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses 
with appropriate judicial bodies--and to identify the individuals and 
entities responsible. We will also continue to support the UN Human 
Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine to expand its work in response to 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
                                 ______
                                 

         Letter From Ruslan Stefanchuk, Parliament of Ukraine, 
         
                          Dated March 8, 2022
                          
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