[Senate Hearing 117-314]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-314
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST,
SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA,
AND COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 2, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-117 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA,
CENTRAL ASIA, AND COUNTERTERRORISM
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire TODD YOUNG, Indiana
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MITT ROMNEY, Utah
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator From Connecticut.......... 1
Young, Hon. Todd, U.S. Senator From Indiana...................... 2
Lu, Hon. Donald, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Donald Lu to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 26
Responses of Mr. Donald Lu to Questions Submitted by Senator Todd
Young.......................................................... 28
Response of Mr. Donald Lu to Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne
Shaheen........................................................ 29
Responses of Donald Lu to Questions Submitted by Senator Edward
J.
Markey......................................................... 29
Response of Mr. Donald Lu to Question Submitted by Senator Chris
Van Hollen..................................................... 30
(iii)
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia,
Central Asia, and Counterterrorism,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Murphy presiding.
Present: Senators Murphy [presiding], Shaheen, Van Hollen,
Young, Cruz, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Murphy. Good afternoon. I am pleased to bring the
subcommittee together today with Senator Young for a hearing on
a critical topic, U.S. policy towards India, and we are
grateful to have with us today a panel of one, but an august
panel of one, Assistant Secretary Donald Lu.
I will introduce our speaker in a moment, but we will begin
with brief remarks from both myself and Senator Young.
For the information of the committee, to the extent anybody
is listening online waiting to come here, we are going to keep
this hearing going through the vote. We will try to switch off
to make sure that we make efficient use of all of our time.
The U.S.-India relationship, arguably, has never been
stronger, and the United States is grateful to the people of
India and Prime Minister Modi for our growing friendship.
Our relationship is growing for good reason. Five years
from now, India will become the world's most populous country,
home to about one out of every six people.
It is already the world's sixth largest economy and last
year it was the world's fastest growing major economy. India
possesses the world's second largest military if you look at
numbers of active personnel, second only to China. During the
global pandemic of the last 2 years, India's biopharmaceutical
industry has emerged as a key producer to the United States and
the rest of the world of PPE, therapeutics, and vaccines.
Having the world's most populous country be a democracy
when so many other large and growing nations are not, is
clearly a great benefit to the United States and that is why
Democratic and Republican administrations over the course of
the last several decades have worked to strengthen this
relationship.
For instance, the United States, through the four-nation
partnership of the Quad, has a growing and very important
defense relationship with India to secure a free and open Indo-
Pacific.
India and the United States also work constructively on
climate policy. While China was largely missing in action from
the most recent climate summit, India made a significant pledge
to become net zero by 2060.
Our relationship with India is multi multifaceted and it
is, rightly, deepening across a number of critical fields, but
as with many countries in the world, we have some important
differences in the relationship that we need to work out.
Most timely for today's hearing is India's position on the
Russian invasion of Ukraine where, frankly, many of my
colleagues and I are puzzled by India's equivocation in the
face of the biggest threat to democracy since World War II.
At a time when democracies are closing ranks to condemn
Russia's invasion, it is troubling, to say the least, to see
India, the world's largest democracy, sitting on the sidelines.
I understand India has a history of nonalignment in foreign
policy matters, but this is a unique moment that demands clear-
eyed conviction about right and wrong, sovereignty, and
democracy.
I note India abstained on today's vote before the U.N.
while at the same time many countries that had previously
declared neutrality voted with us. We hope that India soon will
get on the right side of history.
I am sure we will also discuss today India's recent
purchase and acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense
system.
We are in an active debate about whether CAATSA sanctions
for that purchase should be waived. I know the ranking member
has a view on that, and I look forward to hearing the pros and
cons and the options available from our witness today.
Lastly, we need to be able to talk honestly with India
about the things that they can do to improve the health of
their big, thriving, but still young democracy.
We have got a lot of work to do here at home to strengthen
American democracy so we need to be a little careful about
being too preachy these days, but India's Muslim minority
continues to face discrimination and all too often violence,
and Kashmir remains a crisis without any resolution on Prime
Minister Modi's promise that the people of Kashmir will have a
say in the region's future.
With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator
Young.
STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
Assistant Secretary for appearing before the committee today.
We are holding this hearing at an incredibly dynamic and
volatile time. Our thoughts, of course, continue to be with the
Ukrainian people, who are suffering under an onslaught by
Vladimir Putin's Russia.
Unprovoked aggression by an authoritarian regime is doing
something that the experts said was impossible in today's
interconnected world.
We are witnessing a ground war in Europe, the largest since
World War II. This sobering reality must serve as an immediate
wake-up call to the United States and our allies around the
globe.
First, that we live in a world where authoritarians in
Moscow and Beijing are willing to impose their will on others
through force, and second, and more worrisome, is that both
governments seem to only respond to strength and hard power.
These dynamics bring along the risk of a catastrophic
escalation that we have not seen since the Cold War. It is
important to maintain this perspective as we approach today's
hearing, examining the critical importance of the bilateral
relationship between the United States and India.
Many have said that our interconnected economies make wars
of the past unthinkable in today's age. What we are witnessing
in Europe challenges this assertion to its core.
Sadly, we must recognize that this same reality is also
true in Asia. India has been and remains on the front lines of
Chinese aggression with skirmishes breaking out on their
northern border.
They remain the only member of the Quad to see members of
their armed forces die in direct combat with China's People's
Liberation Army.
This reality, coupled with the fact that India has for
decades relied upon Russian-made military equipment for their
defensive needs, offers some important context for today's
discussion.
Again, let me be clear that Vladimir Putin remains a KGB
thug who has invaded a peaceful democratic Ukraine. He must be
held accountable for the atrocities occurring there.
At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that
the Chinese Communist Party is a regime hell bent on creating
vassal states and fundamentally remaking the globe to serve its
interests.
In this complex world it is essential that we prioritize
and work to build alliances with the unique challenges of
Europe and Asia in mind.
As such, I think it would be foolish and deeply
shortsighted for the United States to harm our relationship
with India over what is occurring in Ukraine.
Rather, in today's hearing, I look forward to examining how
we should encourage India to continue deepening its ties with
the Quad.
As we do, we should be mindful of the fact that just a
short time ago, India's traditional nonaligned posture made a
partnership with like-minded allies to counter a nation like
China almost unthinkable.
Yet, today, as a result of fighting along their northern
border, the outbreak of COVID-19, and the global predatory
behavior of the Chinese Communist Party, we have witnessed a
dramatic shift in Delhi's position.
This is a welcome shift and we must encourage our friends
in India to continue their wariness of Beijing while partnering
with like-minded allies in the U.S., Japan, Australia, and
elsewhere.
Today, I look forward to hearing from the Administration on
how they are approaching this goal. I look forward to exploring
in what areas we can deepen our cooperation with India and
addressing how we can strengthen cooperation with India through
things like intel sharing, cooperative logistics, and
cooperative defense planning.
How can we help India continue its shift away from
dependence on Russian arms toward American-made equipment that
will enhance our ability to work together?
Secretary Lu, I believe that we have only scratched the
surface in terms of what is possible and I am pleased that we
are here to discuss such important matters.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Young.
It is now my privilege to welcome to the subcommittee,
Assistant Secretary Lu. He is the Assistant Secretary of State
for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.
Prior to this assignment, Assistant Secretary Lu served as
a U.S. Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic and the U.S.
Ambassador to the Republic of Albania. Ambassador Lu is a
Foreign Service officer with more than 30 years of U.S.
Government service.
So we thank you for being here today. We will, of course,
include your full statement in the record. We would ask you to
summarize your remarks before we begin rounds of questions.
Welcome to the committee.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD LU, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lu. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, our
relationship with India is one of the defining partnerships
that will determine the security of Asia, of the United States,
and of the world.
It is a relationship that we have to get right and the only
way we are going to get it right is if the Administration is
working with the Congress.
If you will allow me, I would like to share today our
thinking on India-China relations, the future of the Quad,
cooperation on counterterrorism, defense sales, and human
rights and religious freedom in India.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, of course, is foremost in all
of our minds. The State Department continues to engage India
closely to underscore the importance of a collective response
in condemning Russia's invasion.
Just as an increasingly provocative PRC is challenging the
United States, it is also provoking India at every turn.
India staged a boycott of a diplomatic boycott of the
Beijing Olympic Games after the PRC selected a regiment
commander responsible for the attack on the Indian border that
resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers as one of its
Olympic torch bearers.
Beijing has also recently published new PRC maps
reiterating claims to large swaths of territory in the Indian
state of Arunachal Pradesh and renaming India's cities with
Chinese names.
We remain committed to accelerating progress in our major
defense partnership and strengthening India's capacity to deter
PRC provocation through robust naval cooperation, enhanced
information and intelligence sharing, and increased cooperation
in emerging domains such as space and cyberspace.
I joined Secretary Blinken in Melbourne for the fourth Quad
Ministerial last month. I was struck by how much the Quad is
accomplishing and the determination of all four Quad partners
to support a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The Quad is making huge strides in achieving our goal of
delivering 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines to the world.
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation has
provided $50 million dollars in long-term financing to an
Indian pharmaceutical company to develop manufacturing capacity
to produce at least 1 billion doses of vaccine by the end of
this year.
The Quad is also working together on maritime cooperation
and security. We are sharing data on maritime domain awareness,
fighting illegal fishing together, and our four countries have
conducted complex and large-scale naval exercises in our annual
Malabar exercise.
We also share concerns with India about terrorism. With the
Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, both of our countries are
concerned about the resurgence of terrorist groups operating
there.
We have worked to hold accountable terrorist groups
responsible for the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack that killed
166 people, including six Americans.
Our cooperation over the past year has included meetings of
the Counterterrorism Joint Working Group, the Quad
Counterterrorism Tabletop Exercise, and working groups of the
Homeland Security Dialogue.
India is the world's second largest importer of defense
technology. Over 22 years, U.S. defense sales to India have
grown to over $20 billion, and India is considering purchasing
an additional six P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft for $2.1
million.
Since 2011, India has reduced its arms imports from Russia
by 53 percent and increased its defense purchases from the
United States and other partners as well as increasing its own
domestic production capability.
India continues to report infiltration by militants into
Jammu and Kashmir, although rates of infiltration have reduced
markedly over the past 2 years.
Since the 2019 Pulwama attack, which killed 40 Indian
soldiers, and under pressure from the international community,
Pakistan has taken positive steps to address cross-border
terrorism and we continue to encourage Pakistan to prosecute
terrorist leaders and dismantle all terrorist groups.
As the world's largest democracy, India has a vibrant civil
society, a free media, and an independent judicial system.
However, we are concerned about human rights challenges,
including the lack of state assembly elections in Jammu and
Kashmir, and reports of ongoing human rights abuses.
Similarly, across the country, we are closely monitoring
reports of discrimination against Muslim communities and other
religious minority groups as well as limits on free speech in
NGOs.
It is critical that India's partners speak up when we
witness troubling events, but that we also support India's
democratic institutions, which are the country's key defense
against the erosion of human rights.
In conclusion, we see growing strategic convergence between
the United States and India. I look forward to working with the
Congress to push forward this indispensable relationship
between our two great nations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Donald Lu
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young: Our relationship with India
is one of the key partnerships that will determine the security of
Asia, the United States, and the world. This is a relationship that we
must get right. And the only way we will get it right is if the
Administration and the Congress work together.
I will today share our thinking about India-China relations, the
future of the Quad, climate and clean energy, cooperation on
counterterrorism, defense sales, and human rights and religious freedom
in India. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, of course, is foremost on our
minds, and the Department continues to engage India closely to
underscore the importance of a collective response condemning Russia's
invasion.
Just as an increasingly provocative PRC is challenging the United
States, it is also provoking India at every turn. India staged a
diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games after the PRC selected
the regiment commander responsible for the attack on the Indian border
that resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers in 2020 as an Olympic
torchbearer. Beijing also recently published new PRC maps reiterating
claims to large swaths of territory in the Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh, renaming its cities with new Chinese names. We remain
committed to accelerating progress in our Major Defense Partnership and
strengthening India's capacity to deter PRC provocations, through
robust naval cooperation, enhanced information and intelligence
sharing, and increased cooperation in emerging domains such as space
and cyberspace.
I joined Secretary Blinken in Melbourne for the Quad Ministerial
last month. I was struck by how much the Quad is accomplishing and the
determination of all Quad partners to support a free and open Indo-
Pacific. The Quad is making huge strides in achieving our goal of
delivering 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines to the world. The U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation provided $50 million in
long-term financing to Biological E Ltd to develop manufacturing
capacity to produce at least one billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines by
the end of 2022. We have held discussions via the Quad on critical and
emerging technologies and are also cooperating to support clean energy
and decarbonization efforts in the Indo-Pacific region, including
through green shipping and clean hydrogen initiatives. The Quad is also
working together on maritime cooperation and security. We are sharing
data on maritime domain awareness, fighting illegal fishing together,
and our four countries have conducted complex and large-scale naval
exercises in the annual Malabar exercise.
India will be the largest source of global energy demand growth
through 2030 and could become the world's largest carbon emitter unless
it can change its current trajectory. We are focused on mobilizing
finance and technology to accelerate India's clean energy transition
through the U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030
Partnership.
We also share concerns with India about terrorism. With the Taliban
takeover of Afghanistan, both of our countries are concerned about the
resurgence of terrorist groups operating from there. We have worked to
hold accountable terrorist groups responsible for the 2008 Mumbai
terrorist attack that killed 166 people, including six Americans. Our
cooperation over the last year has included meetings of the
Counterterrorism Joint Working Group, the Quad Counterterrorism
Tabletop Exercise, and working groups of the Homeland Security
Dialogue.
India is the world's second largest importer of defense technology.
Over the last 22 years, U.S. defense sales to India have grown to over
$20 billion, and India is considering purchasing six additional P-8I
maritime surveillance aircraft for $2.1 billion. Since 2011, India has
reduced its arms imports from Russia by 53 percent and increased its
defense purchases from the United States and other partners, as well as
increasing its own domestic production capability.
India continues to report infiltration by militants into Jammu and
Kashmir, although rates of infiltration have reduced markedly over the
past 2 years. Since the 2019 Pulwama attack which killed 40 Indian
security officials and under pressure from the international community,
Pakistan has taken positive steps to address cross-border terrorism. We
continue to encourage Pakistan to prosecute terrorist leaders and
dismantle all terrorist groups.
As the world's largest democracy, India has a vibrant civil
society, a free media, and an independent judicial system. However, we
are concerned about human rights challenges, including the lack of
assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir and reports of ongoing human
rights abuses. Similarly, across the country, we are closely monitoring
reports of discrimination against Muslim communities and other
religious minority groups, as well as limits on free speech and NGOs.
It is critical that India's partners speak up when we witness troubling
events, but that we also support India's democratic institutions which
are the country's key defense against the erosion of human rights.
In conclusion, we see a growing strategic convergence between the
United States and India. I look forward to working with Congress to
push forward this indispensable relationship between our two great
countries.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony and for your
service. I will begin rounds of 5-minute questions and let me
start on this question of India's dependence on Russian
military equipment.
This is a legacy dependence. It predates a decision to
integrate more fully with the United States and our military,
but the reality is you still have the majority of its air
force, submarines, and its main battle tank force using Russian
equipment.
So let me just ask a simple question. What limits does that
reality impose on our security cooperation with India?
Mr. Lu. Senator, thank you for that important question.
It is a question that we are looking at very closely as the
Administration is looking at the broader question of whether to
apply sanctions under CAATSA or to waive those sanctions.
It is critical that with any partner that the United States
is able to assure itself that any defense technology that we
share is sufficiently protected, and so we are in the process
of trying to understand whether defense technology that we are
sharing with India today can be adequately safeguarded, given
India's historical relationship with Russia and its defense
sales.
I have been working on India for almost three decades.
Three decades ago, we could not have imagined selling anything
to India on the defense side. The amount and the sophistication
of what today we are transferring to India is staggering.
I mentioned the P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft. India
is the first foreign partner to get that capability and that
capability will allow them to patrol the Indian Ocean and also
to secure their land borders to make sure that they understand
threats that are coming from Chinese opponents coming by land,
but also Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean. It is critical
not only for India's security. I would argue it is critical for
American security.
I am of the belief that for every bullet, every radar,
every fighter plane that we sell to India, that is one piece of
defense equipment that we will not have to field ourselves in
Asia.
Thank you.
Senator Murphy. I think the integration of Indian security
interests and U.S. security interests to the extent they now
overlap in greater measure is one of the most important
developments for U.S. security in the last two decades.
At the same time, we have to have eyes wide open that while
much of this dependence comes from prior commitments, even
since CAATSA has been passed India has made decisions, in
particular with the S-400, to continue to move forward on
integration with Russian partners. Maybe in the wake of the
invasion of Ukraine that may change.
I found your comments on a reduction in terrorist transit
across the border over the last 2 years as encouraging.
I wanted to ask you to maybe go a little bit deeper with
respect to the threats from these militant groups, whether it
be LeT or JeM coming out of Afghanistan.
What does the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan mean for
India and India's security, and what is India's thought process
around--it had a presence in Afghanistan. Even though it is a
developing nation, it was contributing to the redevelopment of
Afghanistan.
How do our interests in Afghanistan overlap right now with
Indian interests? We are obviously struggling with this
question of what to do with the Taliban, what to do with the
humanitarian crisis, how to continue to track terrorist groups
there.
What is the potential overlap?
Mr. Lu. Thank you. I see tremendous convergence in our
interests with respect to Afghanistan. As you mentioned, India
has for 20 years been a key player there, invested heavily in
society.
As you may have seen, they have recently sent 50,000 metric
tons of wheat as humanitarian assistance just at the same time
that the EU and the United States and many other countries are
stepping up to prevent a collapse of the economy in the
humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.
The place that we share the most common interest is this
question of the possibility that there could be emerging
terrorist threats coming from Afghan territory. We are far away
from Afghanistan, yet, we have felt terrorism that has emanated
from that soil.
India is very close to Afghanistan and feels every day that
the fall of Kabul is a turning point in their estimation of the
threat to India, but also to other partner countries within
South Asia.
On the subject you raised of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammed, we remain concerned that these organizations are
present in Pakistan.
As a result of work that we have done with Pakistan, other
partners have done with Pakistan, the Financial Action Task
Force has done with Pakistan, we have seen real progress
forward in prosecution of leaders of these groups, dismantling
of some of these groups.
As you point out, these groups still remain and we are
working with Pakistan to encourage them to fully dismantle and
to prosecute members of these terrorist organizations.
Senator Murphy. Great. We have got plenty of other
questions. I will save them for a second round and turn it over
to Senator Young.
Senator Young. Assistant Secretary, each of us has spent a
little bit of time discussing the Russian-Indian defense
partnership.
I know successive Indian governments have valued Russian-
produced weapon systems. India continues to have all manner of
Russian legacy systems, and as they acquire new weapons they
cannot immediately sever their weapons supply from what are
interoperable systems.
So it is going to take some time to wean themselves off of
the Russian defense industrial sector.
Can you help me contextualize? Can you put a little meat on
the bones of that defense relationship between India and Russia
and explain, from the Indian standpoint, why that relationship
is so important to the government and their people?
Mr. Lu. Interesting question. I certainly think India is
able to articulate its own relationship with Russia far better
than I could.
As an American diplomat who spent many years in India, I
would say that that is a relationship of the Cold War, just as
our very deep relationship and alliance with Pakistan was so
critical during the Cold War years.
Yet, as we emerged from the Cold War 30 years ago, a new
India emerged, a new Pakistan emerged, a new Russia has been
created.
Yes, it is true that much of India's land-based forces,
some of its navy, a few of its aircraft, are either of Soviet
origin or now of Russian origin.
I would argue, of the major defense systems acquired over
the past decade, the majority of the major defense systems have
been American, European, Israeli. They have come from a
diversity of countries.
Senator Young. So let me pick up on that thread.
Mr. Lu. Please.
Senator Young. I asked the original question that of what
H.R. McMaster called strategic empathy trying to understand
your allies, your adversaries, and everyone in between, as
opposed to what we occasionally engage in, which is strategic
narcissism--trying to impose our vision of the world on other
countries and leaders.
So given the predicate you have laid, what are the Biden
administration's priorities for further advancing the position
of the U.S. and our allies as alternative suppliers to India's
future defense needs?
Mr. Lu. Let me say, to begin with, that it is my view that
it is going to be very hard for anyone to buy major weapons
systems from Moscow in the coming months and years, given the
sweeping financial sanctions that the Administration, with the
support of Congress, has leveled on the Russian banking system.
Senator Young. I am sorry, could you----
Mr. Lu. Please.
Senator Young. We are going to be voting momentarily and my
team is doing its job, which is whispering into my ear, but it
happened to occur at a moment of time which you were covering
something that I need to get clarity on.
So in coming months, perhaps years, it will not be very
easy for governments to procure weapons systems from Russia. I
could imagine a situation where their defense export industry
will become increasingly important to the Russian Government.
So maybe you could walk me through the challenge.
Mr. Lu. If you do not have a banking system, it is very
hard for other countries to pay millions of dollars in rubles--
--
Senator Young. I understand.
Mr. Lu. --or in yen or in euros to pay for these defense
systems. So I do think many countries that have these legacy
Russian systems will be worried, not only worried about buying
new fancy systems like the S-400, but worried just about
getting ammunition, spare parts, basic supplies for Russian
legacy systems that they already have. I would guess that India
is one of those countries worried about that.
It does, in my opinion, provide an opportunity for the
United States, opportunity for Europe, and an opportunity for
many countries around the world that produce advance defense
technology now to go after new markets, to make sure we are not
only selling the high end, we are selling the middle and the
low end as well.
I would think--if I was a consumer right now of Russian
technology, I would want to make sure that I have diversity
because we are seeing--we will see a problem for Russia's
customers in securing reliable suppliers.
Senator Young. Absolutely. With the Chinese Communist Party
on their border and with the recent aggression we have seen
towards the Indian Government and its people, I agree with that
assessment and I also see an opportunity.
I will yield back to the chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Assistant
Secretary Lu, thank you for being here this afternoon.
I want to continue the discussion about the relationship
between India and Russia because I have been disappointed.
I recognize the weapons connection that has been discussed,
but I did not think that that also covered values. India is the
world's largest democracy, and so I had hoped that India would
side with the rest of the world's democracies in support of
Ukraine in this current war on Ukraine that Russia is waging.
So I was really disappointed to see India abstain and sit
on the sidelines at the U.N. rather than weighing in in support
of Ukraine as the rest of the world's democracies did.
So can you speak to that a little bit?
Mr. Lu. Senator Shaheen, wonderful to see you again today.
I want to describe a pitched battle we have been having.
Secretary Blinken has been on the front lines of that battle.
The President, other senior officials in the State
Department, have been relentlessly conducting very serious,
high-level dialogue with their Indian counterparts over Ukraine
over the course of months now, but culminating in this past
week.
We can already see an evolution in some of India's public
position. I will describe that, but maybe first I will say I
had several conversations with Indian officials in the last 24
hours.
You may know, yesterday an Indian student was killed in the
Russian bombing in Kharkiv, and what we can see already very
quickly is that action has begun to turn public opinion in
India against a country they perceived as a partner.
Undeniably, that partner has just killed an Indian young person
who is an innocent victim in Ukraine.
Let me say that all of us have been working to urge India
to take a clearer position, a position opposed to Russia's
actions, but what have we seen so far? We have seen a number of
abstentions. We have seen this interesting evolution just in
the past couple of days.
So you may have seen yesterday the Indian Government said
it would send a humanitarian airlift of humanitarian supplies
from India to Ukraine. That is important. That is a request
that is coming from Ukraine's leadership.
Second, it said in a U.N. session that it called for all
states to abide by the U.N. Charter, to respect sovereignty and
the territorial integrity of other states. That was not
criticism of Russia, but a very clear reference to Russia's
violation of the U.N. Charter and a violation of Ukraine's
sovereignty.
So we are making small steps, Senator Shaheen. I assure you
we are on this and working every day to make sure that we are
trying to close the gap between where we are and where our
Indian partners are.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate all of the State
Department's diplomatic efforts in this regard and, again, it
seems to me that India should be on notice that this is a time
when it should stand up for its values and that an important
value in a democracy is that you do not wage war on other
sovereign nations.
So I hope that it is paying attention and will continue to
listen to the diplomatic overtures that are underway.
I want to switch topics a little bit because one of the
concerns that has come to the fore in India in the last several
years has been the plight of women, and I wonder if you could
talk a little bit about how you and USAID are working to
address the rights of women in India and also to improve access
to family planning, which has been a concern in India.
Mr. Lu. Senator Shaheen, I last worked in India about a
decade ago and during that assignment there was this terrible
case of rape and murder that you may remember. This young
student, she was a physiotherapy student, boarded a bus in New
Delhi and she was then raped and assaulted and died of her
injuries a few days later.
Senator Shaheen. Yes, I remember that.
Mr. Lu. In the press, they called her Nirbhaya. It is a
Hindi word for fearless one, but it galvanized the whole
country to recognize that its laws were weak and that its
enforcement of those laws were even weaker on questions about
gender-based violence.
I saw a hundred thousand people--men, women, young people,
and old people--pour into the streets of New Delhi and demand
that their government make change. The laws were passed within
a week.
It is, to me, a sign that democracy really works in India
that the people have a voice, and the people will not put up
with this sort of violation of rights.
I had a chance to meet with the family of that young woman.
The Secretary of State at the time awarded her posthumously the
International Woman of Courage Award, and we had the
opportunity to present it to her. This issue of gender-based
violence is very close to my heart and the heart of my family.
We are doing a couple of important things right now in
Mission India. One is that we have dedicated programs to
advance women's safety and empowerment, and those include law
enforcement programming and broader public outreach to counter
gender-based violence.
One of the new exciting things that Samantha Power
announced when she visited India earlier at the end of last
year was a public-private partnership between USAID, the State
Department, the Indian private sector, academia, and civil
society that is called the U.S.-India Alliance for Women's
Economic Empowerment.
I was just out in Silicon Valley meeting with business
leaders to talk about how they can get involved. The goal of
this is to figure out how we catalyze our civil society, their
civil society, all of our governmental efforts to support the
rise of women in India.
So many new businesses are women-owned businesses and, yet,
they lack the resources, the financing, the mentorship that
their male counterparts have.
One of the goals of this alliance is to mentor a million
Indian women. We have got a commitment for a hundred thousand
at this point and we are moving very quickly towards a million.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Can I just do a follow-up, Mr.
Chairman?
I appreciate that and I was heartened to see the reaction
among the Indian people to that horrific and tragic killing.
I want to just follow up on the family planning aspect of
that question, because India has a long history of family
planning programming, but it has struggled to make modern
contraception available countrywide to families.
So can you talk about whether we are doing anything in that
sphere to help support their efforts?
Mr. Lu. Senator, my experience with that issue goes back to
decades. So what I want to do, if you will allow me, is to make
sure I have the most up-to-date information so I am giving you
the straight facts and not a story from 10 years ago.
So if I can take that as a taken question we will get you a
clear and precise picture of what we are doing on family
planning.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I would appreciate it.
Senator Murphy. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lu, welcome.
India and America, I believe, are natural friends and
natural allies. India is the world's largest democracy. We
share values.
Under President Trump our countries moved together
significantly. We saw a significant closening of the relations
between the two countries.
I traveled to India in 2019. I had the privilege of
welcoming Prime Minister Modi to Texas, to my hometown of
Houston when he came to the United States.
In the past year under the Biden administration, relations
with India have worsened significantly, as was manifested,
among other things, in their latest abstention at the United
Nations on the issue of Russia and Ukraine.
Assistant Secretary Lu, why is that? What mistakes has the
Biden administration made to cause the relationship between our
nation and the nation of India to deteriorate over the last 14
months?
Mr. Lu. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
I will acknowledge that India and the United States have
not voted the same at the United Nations over this past week.
I assure you that we continue to have an important dialogue
with India at the highest levels to try to narrow that gap and
to help India to see the importance that we place on a
coordinated message to Moscow.
Let me say, though, that in our outreach to India, we have
not failed to try to leverage India's relationship with Russia
to try to call for a Russian withdrawal and a ceasefire, that
in the days immediately following the Russian invasion we have
been in touch with Indian leaders and Prime Minister Modi
called both President Putin and President Zelensky to call for
an end to the fighting.
In addition, we are asking for India to do more and as I
mentioned----
Senator Cruz. Mr. Lu, the problem is I recognize you are
asking them to do more, but the relationship keeps getting
worse, and one of the aspects that has driven that; India is a
critical part of the security architecture that coalesced
during the Trump administration against China.
Countering China's aggressive behavior requires viable
partners in Asia and beyond, and the U.S.-India relationship is
a cornerstone of our multilateral efforts.
As you know and as we have discussed, our efforts to
counter China were institutionalized in recent years in the
Quad framework, but under the Biden administration, the
security dimensions of the Quad have been significantly
deprioritized in favor of other priorities such as climate
change and developmental assistance.
Meetings in March and in September emphasized those issues
at the expense of countering China. The Quad statement for
March emphasized climate change, but did not even mention
China.
Candidly, I am worried that these moves--about these moves
and I have also heard from regional partners that they are also
worried about these moves.
Why has the Biden administration shifted the focus of the
Quad to issues like climate and away from vital national
security interests and, in particular, why has the Biden
administration pivoted the Quad away from countering Communist
China?
Mr. Lu. Senator, one thing I will agree about your
statement is that one of the key ways that we will help our
Indian partners to become more aligned with the world's
position towards condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine is by
making sure we continue to talk about the Russia-China nexus.
This is critical in terms of India's interests. It is
critical in terms of our interests. I completely agree that
part of the answer here is that India understand what is
happening in Ukraine will affect China's behavior.
Senator Cruz. Okay. Mr. Lu, you are a talented diplomat and
so you know that you are not answering the question I asked.
Mr. Lu. I look forward to answering that question. So I was
at the Quad Ministerial in Melbourne. I saw our cooperation on
defense and security.
That includes serious discussion and an action plan on
growing interoperability, on intelligence sharing, discussion
of the sale of advanced U.S. defense technology, complex multi-
service exercises between our militaries, including now our
Quad partners of Japan and Australia.
Senator Cruz. Mr. Lu, let me try one more time. Why has the
Biden administration significantly deprioritized countering
Communist China in the Quad?
Mr. Lu. I sat in on every session of Quad discussions and
in every session of those discussions we, together with our
three Quad partners, were talking about countering China.
We were talking about countering China with security and
defense activities. We were also talking about countering China
with COVID vaccines as we know that this is part of China's
reach into the Indo-Pacific.
So I take exception to that statement. That is not what I
witnessed in Melbourne.
Senator Cruz. It is what the public record indicates, and I
will say your efforts with respect to India, they are not
working and they are harming America's relationship with India
to the detriment of both countries.
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Ambassador Lu, it is good to see you.
I want to pick up where Senator Shaheen and some of my
colleagues have left off, which is expressing extreme
disappointment in India's decision to abstain on the vote to
condemn unprovoked aggression in violation of Ukraine's
sovereignty, an attack on a democratic country.
As you well know, India is the most populous democratic
country in the world and you would think this would be a moment
that India would stand up in support of the people of Ukraine.
So I would like to ask you what efforts were undertaken by
you and the Secretary and at what level to persuade India to
vote with 141 other countries in the world to condemn the
attack on Ukraine?
Mr. Lu. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen. Wonderful to see you
today.
We have spared no effort to try to convince India both to
vote in U.N. sessions, but also to show support for Ukraine at
this critical moment. Those efforts were led by Secretary
Blinken. He has multiple times been on the phone with Minister
Jaishankar.
Senator Van Hollen. Ambassador, let me--if you could,
because I heard your testimony about the humanitarian
assistance and other things. Let me ask it a little different
way.
What was India's rationale? When Secretary Blinken said,
vote with us to condemn this violation of sovereignty, what was
the response from the Indian foreign minister?
Mr. Lu. Thank you.
India has focused on two things when trying to explain its
position: one that it continues to want to leave on the table
the possibility of a diplomatic resolution of this conflict
and, as we have said, that looks more and more unlikely as the
Russian troops continue to pound civilian targets in Ukraine,
but this remains their public position. It remains what we hear
from them in private.
The second thing that they emphasize is that India has
18,000 students still in Ukraine, and they are trying to work
with both the government of Ukraine and with the government of
Russia to safeguard those----
Senator Van Hollen. I would think if they were concerned
about their students, as we are concerned about our students,
that that--all the more reason to vote to condemn unprovoked
aggression.
Let me ask you about the CAATSA sanctions, because I am one
of those who was very open to the idea that we might want to
consider a waiver for India to the CAATSA sanctions.
I thought there were good arguments. I think it is clear
that CAATSA covers India's planned purchase of S-400s. So then
the question was going to be whether or not a waiver is
granted.
Will this vote by India in any way impact the
Administration's consideration of whether or not India should
be covered by CAATSA?
Mr. Lu. Senator, maybe I could just restate, I think it is
going to be very hard for any country on the globe to buy major
weapon systems from India because of the sweeping sanctions now
placed on Russian banks.
What we have seen from India in just the last few weeks is
the cancellation of MiG-29 orders, Russian helicopter orders,
and anti-tank weapon orders, and I can assure you that the
Administration will follow the CAATSA law and fully implement
that law and will consult with the Congress as we move forward
with any----
Senator Van Hollen. Will this be--look, you just have--had
Russia, obviously, invading Ukraine, and these are S-400s, a
major air defense system. Will this be a factor in the
Administration's consideration of whether or not to waive
CAATSA?
Mr. Lu. What, unfortunately, I am not able to say is to
prejudge the decisions of the President or the Secretary on the
waiver issue or on the sanction issue, or whether Russia's
invasion of Ukraine will bear on that decision.
What I can say is that India is a really important security
partner of ours now and that we value moving forward in that
partnership, and I hope that part of what happens with the
extreme criticism that Russia has faced is that India will find
it is now time to further distance itself, including on the----
Senator Van Hollen. Right. Mr. Ambassador, evolution, which
is the phrase you used for India's sort of progression on this
issue, moves very slowly.
In my final seconds here, if I could ask you, there are two
other countries in your jurisdiction under South Asia--
obviously, you have the Stans as well--Pakistan and Sri Lanka,
that also voted to abstain from this vote.
Can you talk briefly about your disappointment in those
decisions and what efforts were made with respect to those
countries?
Mr. Lu. I was on the phone at 6 o'clock last night speaking
to the Sri Lankan ambassador here. My colleague in the bureau
was on the phone with the Indian DCM.
We have worked very hard--I am sorry, the Pakistani DCM--to
try to convince them to vote in favor of this resolution. What
is--it is disappointing how many countries have abstained. I
would also look to how many of the countries voted in favor----
Senator Van Hollen. Can I just ask, Mr. Ambassador, did
anybody in the Administration pick up the phone and call the
Pakistani foreign minister or the Prime Minister of Pakistan?
Mr. Lu. No. As you know, our charge has met recently with
the Pakistani foreign minister, but as you may know----
Senator Van Hollen. On this topic? No, on this topic?
Mr. Lu. On votes in the U.N.
Senator Van Hollen. On the Ukraine vote?
Mr. Lu. On the Ukraine--on Ukraine votes not specific to
the U.N. General Assembly vote, but as you may know, Prime
Minister Khan has recently visited Moscow, and so I think we
are trying to figure out how to engage specifically with the
Prime Minister following that decision.
Senator Van Hollen. As you know, the--there was a meeting
in Delhi with the Russians as well. The point is we need a
strong concerted effort with respect to all of these
countries--Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and India. I understand that
you made some efforts. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Murphy [presiding]. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Lu, it is good to be with you today. I would
like to talk with you first about Taiwan, if I might.
In the Quad leaders' joint statement from back in March of
2021, they talked about a shared vision based on rule of law,
democratic values, respect for territorial integrity of states,
and while they did not mention Taiwan specifically, I have got
to believe that Taiwan security would remain crucial to the
perspective of all of the Quad members.
As a member of the Quad, I think India can play a very
important and critical role in Taiwan security, particularly on
the economic dimension, and India and Taiwan have actually
started discussions to create a semiconductor manufacturing
hub.
This is designed to meet growing demand in India. I think
it has a great opportunity to deepen economic ties and I think
that the United States should be supportive of cooperation
between our allies like India and Taiwan.
I was hoping that you might give me an update on the latest
with respect to India's engagements on economic ties with
Taiwan, if you might.
Mr. Lu. Thank you, Senator.
This was, indeed, discussed during the Quad meetings in
Australia. We are very focused on critical supplies like
semiconductors and looking for ways that we can partner not
only between the four Quad countries, but we can have
partnerships beyond the Quad to other key partners.
When we think of semiconductors, we absolutely think of
Taiwan. We think of Singapore, South Korea. There are natural
partnerships to be had there.
India has, at the level of prime minister, signaled a
desire to be a powerhouse in semiconductors for the same reason
that Taiwan is able to produce these very sophisticated pieces
of equipment. India has those same attributes--a very talented
workforce, highly educated.
India graduates a million engineers every year. We graduate
70,000. India has relatively low labor costs. All these things
suggest India could be successful in this. I have also seen
that India is exploring close relationships with Taiwan.
As you know, India is a naval power. It has one of the
longest coastlines of any country in the world. They have,
historically, a very powerful navy. We have seen the Indian
navy sail into the Taiwan Straits.
I think that is symbolically very important at a time when
we all are looking to provide reassurance to Taiwan about their
security.
Senator Hagerty. I could not agree more. Freedom of
navigation is critical to the region. India can play an
important role there.
I appreciate everything that you can do, you are doing, and
that you will continue to do to help facilitate deeper economic
ties.
I would like to stay on Taiwan, but turn to a different
perspective now and that has to do with China. I am certain
that China is watching very closely what is happening in
Ukraine right now.
I am sure they are watching with an eye toward what that
might mean for their intentions with respect to Taiwan.
I fear that Xi Jinping may be drawing all the wrong lessons
from what he is seeing take place there, and I think it is
absolutely critical that we work with our Quad partners to
deter China and to prevent them from any adverse undertaking
toward Taiwan.
I understand that India may not want to be militarily
involved, but can you take me through how you are thinking
about how India could be helpful to us in deterring China from
taking an adverse move toward Taiwan?
Mr. Lu. Maybe I will start with what we are doing to
support India at the line of actual control and then move to
what the Quad is doing to support countries throughout the
Indo-Pacific, but including Taiwan.
So you may know we have been working very actively with
India in the last 2 years to safeguard their sovereignty after
provocations by the Chinese along the Indian border.
We are looking very closely at the talks that the Chinese
and the Indians are having along that border. Our policy is to
support direct dialogue, but what we are seeing is that the PRC
has shown no sign of any sincere efforts at deescalating the
situation.
We see a clear pattern, a clear pattern not only with the
Indians, but with other neighbors of the PRC attempting to
intimidate its neighbors, and it is a time when we need to
stand by our Indian partners.
As concerns to Quad and security, all four countries are
committed to working on the security of the Indo-Pacific and
that means interoperability of our militaries.
That means intelligence sharing between our four countries,
but also beyond those four countries with other partners in the
Indo-Pacific, the transfer and sale of advanced U.S. and other
Quad country technologies in the defense fields so we are
properly armed for this new challenge, complex multi-service
exercises.
Tiger Triumph is an exercise we do every year with India
that has some of our most elite forces working with Indian
forces, and the Malabar exercises have not only the United
States and India, it now has Japan and Australia participating
annually in a major naval exercise that must have the Chinese
going crazy.
I believe we are going to see more of that, going forward,
particularly with what is happening with Ukraine.
Senator Hagerty. I can only encourage you to keep that up.
I have had the benefit of witnessing the Yama Sakura exercises
year over year. I have seen the increased competence that that
delivers.
I think we should continue joint exercises. I would
encourage you to do everything you can to continue to
streamline the FMS--the foreign military sales--process so that
we can become more interoperable.
We will do everything we can here to help in that process,
but it is a big process. It is far too big, from my
perspective, in terms of the number of bureaucratic entities
that touch the FMS process.
It is critical, particularly, given the speed and rate of
technology development right now that we figure out how to
compress the time and speed that up.
Finally, I would encourage you--I just had a meeting with
the South Korean Ambassador to the United States. They can play
an important role, too.
As I think of the Quad, I think, as you might as well, we
need to think about our allies broadly in the region, and South
Korea can play a role.
Mr. Lu. Completely agree. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Hagerty.
We will begin another round of questions. I know there may
be a member or two arriving or joining via the Web.
Let me begin on the topic of climate. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change released a report earlier this week
which spelled out in pretty harrowing terms how India is going
to face the devastating impacts of climate change sooner and
more harshly than other parts of the world, water scarcity, in
particular, from rivers that are relied upon as water sources
drying up, flooding threats from Glacier Lake melt, hotter
summers that are going to come with it pretty significant
health consequences to populations.
It is a big topic, but let me drill down on the feasibility
of the commitments that India has made already. I mentioned
that they made a significant commitment at the Scotland
conference. They have also committed to reach 500 gigawatts of
renewable energy by 2030.
How feasible are the commitments they have made? What help
do they need from the United States in order to get there?
Mr. Lu. Thank you, Senator.
The commitments are not feasible at all if they do not get
the help of the whole world, and I think Prime Minister Modi
knows that. He has thrown on the table this concept of India
having 500 gigawatts of installed non-fossil fuel clean energy
and he knows they are not on track to do that. They are not
even close to being on track.
The only way they get to do that is if the whole world
gathers together to provide the technology and the financing
for India's search for cleaner sources of fuel.
Deputy Secretary Sherman uses this term all the time with
respect to India--it is going to be the biggest everything. By
2030, as you suggested, the biggest population. It is also
going to have--will, potentially, be the biggest emitter of
greenhouse gases unless we do something now. This is like if we
could have caught China 20 years ago before its big surge in
growth, what would the climate picture look like today? Very
different.
We are doing several things in the Administration.
President Biden announced the Agenda 2030 Climate Action
Program which has two parts.
One of those parts is led by the Secretary of Energy with
her counterpart in India, and that is focused on the
technology, making sure India has access to the latest green
technologies so that it can efficiently and in a cost-effective
way move to a greener energy future.
The second part is John Kerry's part, which is on finance
mobilization. John Kerry is looking for the money all around
the world. It is not just American money. It is money from
international financial institutions, from the EU, from
everywhere, to make sure that this climate miracle in India is
possible and it is financed and it is realistic.
Senator Murphy. Let me just ask a follow-up question on
finance. I assume this is some mixture of subsidy and creative
finance. One thing I am greatly frustrated at is the artificial
limits that we put on U.S. international development finance,
especially in the area of renewable energy.
I assume that India's system is so inefficient that there
is a mechanism by which to gain something on climate with a
return to the investors that are putting in money.
Is this a question of subsidy or is this a question of
trying to come up with some creative finance vehicles for
renewable installation?
Mr. Lu. It is absolutely going to have to be based upon
return on investment. We have taken the lead. Ours is the first
major investment of what we hope is a whole series of
international investments in clean energy.
The Development Finance Corporation just announced in
December half a billion dollars for a U.S. company called First
Solar to create a solar farm in Chennai, in the south of India,
that will fuel huge cities across the south of the country.
It will be the biggest solar farm you have ever seen and it
is going to make money. We know that right now. We have looked
at the books. We looked at the business plan. DFC will get its
money back with interest, and that is how we are going to have
to do this.
No one is asking for handouts from the world. We are asking
banks to provide money that will be returned with returns on
investment because we can see that is possible, given the
tremendous demand for energy in India.
Senator Murphy. There is, obviously, a tremendous
possibility for the expansion of manufacturing and assembly in
India of renewable technology. China saw this train coming and
made the investment early on.
India is playing catch up, but it is, certainly, a win-win
for India in the long run to be able to reduce their emissions
while also making a lot of this domestically.
Let me, quickly, turn to some domestic political topics. As
I mentioned, we have got to be honest about our points of
disagreement.
There was a report recently that Prime Minister Modi used
this NSO spyware to target a range of his political opponents
and perceived critics, including his top rival, Rahul Gandhi.
The United States has added NSO to what we call our Entity
List for engaging in activities that are contrary to our
national security interests.
Have we raised concerns with the Modi Government about
their use of this spyware and what does this alleged
weaponization of spyware against the Prime Minister's political
opponents tell us about the state of democracy and political
competition in India?
Mr. Lu. Senator, I think much of that controversy when it
was in the front pages happened before my time in the bureau. I
am aware of lots of issues we are raising in terms of digital
trade, digital economy.
On the specific issue of the spyware, if you will allow me
to take that back as a taken question, we will get you exactly
the answer of who raised it, in what context, on which dates.
I am confident it has been raised, but I could not give you
the details today. If it would be helpful, I would be able to
talk about the digital economy and what we are doing on that
score.
Senator Murphy. I guess my predicate was a lead into a
broader conversation about the state of political competition
in India today. Again, India is the world's largest democracy.
Our interests in aligning with India are, certainly, tied to
our mutual security interests, but also our mutual values.
So maybe a word on the state of political competition, the
health of electoral democracy, in India today.
Mr. Lu. I am a political officer by training. What I have
done for 30 years is go into embassies and report on politics.
India is politics as it was meant to be. It is a blood sport.
They are ruthless in their politics.
We are just ending now a series of local elections in
India. One of the great things about Indian democracy is
despite the fact that it is winner take all between political
parties, the electoral system--the biggest in the world--is
able to function so efficiently and without any sense of a
challenge to the legitimacy of this massive system that
operates around the country including in places like Kashmir
and the northeast that have had security problems.
One of the great things that I feel confident about, as
someone who has spent a lot of time in India, is that the
electoral system itself is very strong. Is there a lot of
political competition today?
I think we are going to see in the election returns that
come out in March later this month that the current ruling
coalition retains a lot of authority in India. We will see.
The returns are, largely, in at this point. They have
rolling elections, but Prime Minister Modi and his party appear
to me, as an observer from the outside, to retain a lot of
support within the country.
Senator Murphy. Let me just ask one final follow-up. Do you
attribute that to the organic popularity of the ruling party or
are there tactics utilized?
Again, I am referencing one that maybe predates your time,
but are there tactics utilized by the governing party to
achieve such popularity that would be outside the bounds of
norms in the United States?
Mr. Lu. I have served overseas for almost 30 years. I have
seen some terrible elections in parts of the globe. I have
never seen that in India, honestly.
I have not seen the kind of dirty tricks and the stealing
of elections and the use of anti-democratic tools that I have
seen in many, many places that I have served. It does not mean
they do not exist. Maybe they are just better at hiding them,
but I do not see that.
What I see today, having lived in India under Congress
Party rule and under BJP rule, is, today, I think the Congress
Party is really trying to find its identity again. I think it
is searching for its appropriate leaders and its message to the
Indian public, and I think until the Congress Party is able to
do that it is going to be very hard for the opposition to
coalesce and to reform.
Senator Murphy. Senator Young.
Senator Young. Assistant Secretary Lu, you discuss all the
reasons why we might believe that India will come to play an
increasingly important global role in the 21st century, from
the many highly-educated graduates of top STEM programs to its
massive and growing population to its strategic location.
I have become hopeful about the possibilities that might
exist as we partner, increasingly, with the Indian people. I
think about the Quad and how it might, potentially, become a
venue for partnering in some areas that have not historically
been areas of partnership between the United States and India--
broaden expanded defense partnerships, intel sharing,
logistical cooperation.
I think about our joint efforts to police the waters and
prevent illegal fishing, and if time permits, I would like to
get into some of that.
Much of today has, understandably and rightly, been focused
on this here and now situation--the Indian Government, its
response, or lack thereof, to Vladimir Putin's invasion of
Ukraine, and I am still trying to disentangle a number of
different factors that might be responsible for India's
seemingly weak reaction--I think, by most accounts, a fairly
weak reaction.
I am trying to be empathetic. Is it institutional stasis?
Do we have either a structure or a culture of government
challenge in getting the government to be responsive? Are there
particular bureaucrats or government officials who, personally,
are resisting any sort of change?
Is there an ideological resistance to change? Maybe the
years of being a nonaligned power can be cited and, perhaps,
after a period of time that has become a tradition not
critically reviewed during moments of crisis.
Is it an issue of self-interest? I have given you three
potential factors that--you can weight them as you choose.
Maybe there are other factors.
Is it an institutional stasis? Is it an ideological
resistance? Are there, perhaps, some factors of self-interest
that we have not yet accounted for? Because I cannot see self-
interest driving India to resist speaking with a louder voice,
acting more boldly in concert with others in the West against
this aggressive action.
It seems to be--it runs afoul of their self-interest. You
have said it yourself. In the future, this country, which is
highly dependent on Russia for weapon systems, will not be able
to procure weapons. This is, seemingly--it is antithetical to
the self-interest of India. What am I missing?
Mr. Lu. Senator, I completely agree with everything you
just said. I agree that in India's position today is one that
looks like a decision that India would have taken decades ago.
Having said that, when I sit here in Washington, it looks
like a pro-Russian position that they have taken. They are
quick to try to paint this as a decision that is neither pro-
Russian nor pro-Ukrainian or pro-NATO.
I do not personally believe this is the ideological
difference. I had the honor of being part of the meeting that
Prime Minister Modi had with President Biden in September. You
could not have seen two leaders that saw closer--a closer
vision of the world, not only our bilateral relations, but how
we view China and the rest of the planet.
We have really common interests today with India. What I do
see is what you just said, which is there are some narrow self-
interests that, I believe, are motivating the short-term
thinking of our Indian colleagues. We have talked about many of
them.
You just mentioned a reliance on spare parts and defense
equipment, ammunition--very simple things to put in their
legacy defense hardware that they still have that protects
their border with China and other key infrastructure.
Eighteen thousand students--I just spent almost 2 hours
with the Indian ambassador yesterday. We spent almost the
entire time talking about Ukraine. I know a lot about the
Indian students there and what they are facing, not only the
dangers from falling Russian bombs, but the sense that they are
having a hard time getting out because of perceived lack of
welcomeness now in Ukraine.
Then India has maintained that it wants not to take either
side because it wants to be a partner that is trying to work
towards a diplomatic solution. We have seen them make the right
phone calls that suggests they are serious about that.
Unfortunately, they have not yet been effective in doing so.
Senator Young. I am just going to pick up on some of those
narrow areas of self-interest that you have helpfully
enumerated for me--ammunition for weapon systems.
It would not surprise me if we were to inventory, system by
system, their need for ammo to continue to supply those weapon
systems if, indeed, that is the narrow category we are talking
about, the United States could either, through our defense
enterprise or working with partners and allies, be able to at
least in fairly short order come up with alternative sourcing
mechanisms for the Indian Government.
Indian students and the ability to get them out of the
country--we could partner with the Indian Government,
conceivably. I mean, historically, we have been pretty good at
this and each of these other areas it seems like we could work
together with their government.
Maybe you have just, inadvertently or intentionally,
publicly articulated some of the areas that they perceive to be
in their short-term self-interest that we could mitigate any
risks they might be feeling.
The last one you mentioned was--and I will say it less
delicately than you have, sir--I think they are trying to pick
the winning side.
That may be a bit of the concern of some of them in their
government, and we need to demonstrate a firm resolve and unity
so that they understand that we are not going away. We are
going to stand with the Ukrainian people and make Vladimir
Putin's life hell in coming years.
It appears I am well over my time. How quickly it goes. I
am going to yield back to the chairman.
Senator Murphy. Thank you. It is interesting how many
potential interlocutors there are today between Ukraine and
Russia. Lots of nations that are remaining neutral appear to be
very interested in justifying that position based on their
interest to try to play a mediating role.
I have one last question. I do not think we can do this
hearing without an update on Kashmir.
Mr. Lu. Great.
Senator Murphy. I mentioned in my opening remarks Prime
Minister Modi had suggested that there would be progress, that
the people of Kashmir would have an opportunity to have a say
in their future, that there would be elections. It continues to
be one of the most heavily militarized places in the world. You
still have lethal clashes.
Tell us a little bit about the way forward in 2022 for
Kashmir and what the United States is doing to try to bring
that voice to the people of Kashmir.
Mr. Lu. Senator, I spent my wasted youth as a reporting
officer in New Delhi covering Kashmir in the late nineties and
had the opportunity to travel there eight times, including
during the Kargil War when the Indians and Pakistanis were
facing off on a glacier at 15,000 feet.
It is an important issue for all of us. Yes, I think a lot
of promises have been made. Some have been kept both by
Pakistan and India. I can summarize those that are kept and
those that are remaining to be fulfilled.
We do see the Indian Government taking some steps to
restore normalcy. The Prime Minister had outreach to a range of
Kashmiri Indian politicians in June.
We saw visits by cabinet ministers to Kashmir in September,
and during that same time we saw the restoration of 4G
connections for cell phones, which is the way most people get
their information in the Kashmir Valley.
We are keeping a close eye on the security situation,
including terrorist threats. What I can tell you is cross-
border insurgency has really gone down over 2 years, and I have
been in meetings with General Bajwa in Pakistan in which they
have taken credit for closing off that border for militant
groups.
Those militant groups themselves, as you suggest, have not
gone away entirely, but they have sealed the border in a way we
have not seen before and I think that is a positive thing, and
I think that is partly a reflection of encouragement by FATF,
encouragement by Washington and other partners of Pakistan.
Just to go back to the human rights situation, we see
troubling remaining work. As you suggested, we have not seen
the holding of Legislative Assembly elections in Jammu and
Kashmir.
We have not seen free movement of journalists. We have seen
the detention, in fact, of some prominent journalists in the
Kashmir Valley. We believe all Kashmiris deserve the right to
live in dignity and enjoy the protections afforded to them by
the Indian constitution.
We look forward to continuing to encourage India to fulfill
those commitments.
Senator Murphy. Anything?
Senator Young. Assistant Secretary, I mentioned the Quad
earlier. How might it be expanded as we look to the future to
include some of the missions that I mentioned--defense, intel,
logistical cooperation?
How might we expand our cooperation on those fronts so that
the Quad does not lose its ability to remain nimble--that is
one of the advantages of the Quad as opposed to a formal
defense alliance--but it will still meet the many needs of
members and nonmembers, moving forward?
Mr. Lu. I would argue that we are working in each of those
areas right now, but we may not be publicly working in those
areas. Certainly, in logistics, we are very explicitly working
on supply chain issues in all of our countries and throughout
Asia with partners.
In terms of defense, we are working to coordinate the
actions of our navies on the high seas, both in the Quad and
parallel to the Quad, meaning the four countries, not with the
Quad hats on, but working together. That is happening, whatever
you call it. We are doing that today.
On the intelligence--the sharing of information side, every
day we are finding new ways to share critical security
information with each other, but I think one of the things to
look for in the years ahead is how will the Quad grow? Not
maybe grow into five or six or seven members, but how will we
then rope in Taiwan? That was discussed earlier today by
Senator Hagerty. How will we rope in Singapore? How will we
rope in North Korea?
Senator Young. Yes. How?
Mr. Lu. The idea currently on the table from the United
States is we have a series of working groups. You have the
ministerial level and you have the presidential/prime
ministerial level, but then each of them have working groups.
It is a blinding amount of work for all of us. I think we
are up to 20 different groups that are meeting constantly. The
idea is to work in those partners at the working group level,
and maybe one day, there will be an appetite to increase the
number of actual Quad members, but we can already see that it
makes sense. If we are talking about supply lines, it is not
just the 4 of us, but it should be 6 or 8 or 12 of us in Asia
working on supply lines.
We are working on cyberspace. There are key cyber actors in
Asia that are not in the Quad. We should get those folks
knitted up with the working group, and we have seen real
interest by South Korea, by Taiwan, by Singapore, to be part of
those groups.
Senator Young. This is fantastic. Is it the intention of
the working groups to be always updating their work within the
working groups? Always updating their plans, assessing the
common objectives and goals and figuring out what efforts the
participants might engage in to support one another?
Mr. Lu. Correct. The ministerial level meets twice a year.
The leaders level meets once a year, but the groups are meeting
constantly. They should be meeting three or four times between
ministerial level activities. They should define an agenda.
They need to report out at the ministers meetings what they
accomplished. All of that is happening.
Senator Young. Who are the U.S.' representatives in those
meetings?
Mr. Lu. It depends on the topic. For example, if it has
something to do with supply lines, it is the Commerce
Department. It is USTR. It is the State Department. It is NSC.
These are all interagency representatives.
Senator Young. Related to that initiative, is the Biden
administration, perhaps through the working groups, working to
empower and encourage India and other Quad members to serve as
a more active enforcer of maritime security in the Indian
Ocean? Is that also occurring through the working group
mechanism?
Mr. Lu. I would say the opposite. I think India is
asserting its leadership in the Indian Ocean on the high seas.
It wants more technology to be able to do this job better, to
find and track Chinese submarines, to look for Chinese illegal
fishing vessels.
Senator Young. Understood.
Mr. Lu. It is very much not us convincing India. India
wants that role.
Senator Young. So they have every incentive to do so. Have
they either needed to or found benefit from working with our
INL bureau on this mission, perhaps, in coordination with other
relevant agencies like our Coast Guard?
Mr. Lu. Absolutely. We are seeing new transit routes of
narcotics in the Indian Ocean as a result of the fall of
Afghanistan to the Taliban, and the Indian Navy--I was just at
Western Naval Command in October.
They are tracking these vessels, but they figure they are
missing some, too, and they are looking at how can they
cooperate more closely with us to make sure that heroin and
those methamphetamines are not being missed by the Indian navy
and are being picked up. We are actively coordinating with our
Indian partners on the high seas.
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Lu. Chairman.
Senator Murphy. I guess if the Big 10 can have 14 members,
then the Quad can have 5 or 6.
Senator Young. That is right.
[Laughter.]
Senator Murphy. Assistant Secretary Lu, thank you very much
for your testimony today. By the fairly robust attendance at
the subcommittee from members on both sides of the aisle you
can see how interested this committee is in the growing
relationship between the United States and India, and we thank
you for your great work.
Members are going to be allowed to submit questions for the
record until the close of business on Friday.
With thanks to the subcommittee, this hearing is now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Donald Lu to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. The AR6 Working Group II IPCC report stressed the impact
of climate change on health and well-being and underscored the
disproportionate impact of climate change on vulnerable populations,
like those in India. As a result of harm caused, vulnerable
populations, many of whom already suffer discrimination at the hands of
the Indian Government, will be displaced both internally and
externally. Demand for humanitarian assistance for these peoples will
increase. How will State work within the inter-agency to help build
resilience and adaptation capacities in India to ensure the safety of
those most vulnerable and severely impacted by climate change?
Answer. The State Department is working closely with the
interagency to build resilience and adaptation capacity in India in
both bilateral and multilateral forums. For example, the State-led
Climate Action and Finance Mobilization Dialogue includes a pillar
working group, chaired by USAID, which focuses on adaptation and
resilience together with Indian counterparts. Multilaterally, the Quad
climate working group also includes a pillar on adaptation, resilience,
and preparedness work which State, along with interagency and
Australian, Japanese, and Indian partners, participates in.
Additionally, USAID has supported, and Administrator Samantha Power
will co-chair, the Indian-launched Coalition for Disaster Resilient
Infrastructure (CDRI), which seeks to implement climate resilient
infrastructure world-wide. Our work on disaster resilient
infrastructure and adaption supplements the carbon mitigation work
undertaken by the Department of Energy, the Development Finance
Corporation (DFC), State, Treasury, and others to avoid the worst
outcomes of climate change.
Question. How are you coordinating with agencies like the
Department of Energy and the Development Finance Corporation to promote
U.S. private investment in the Indian clean energy market and R&D
cooperation? Is State taking the lead on these efforts? If not, what
agency is, and is State being properly consulted?
Answer. Deepening climate and clean energy cooperation with India
is a top priority for the Administration. The State Department is
coordinating closely with the interagency--including the Department of
Energy, USAID, and the DFC--to accelerate India's clean energy
transition through the Department of Energy-led Strategic Clean Energy
Partnership and the State-led Climate Action and Finance Mobilization
Dialogue (CAFMD), the two main pillars under the Agenda 2030
partnership. The U.S. Department of Treasury convenes the Finance
Mobilization pillar of the CAFMD in consultation with State. DFC
participates in the CAFMD's Finance Mobilization pillar. In November
2021, DFC's board, which State chairs, approved a $500 million loan to
an Indian subsidiary of U.S. solar module manufacturer First Solar,
which will construct a 3.3 GW solar module manufacturing facility in
southern India. In February, USAID launched the South Asia Regional
Energy Partnership project, which is a $50 million initiative to drive
energy transformation in India and the region.
Question. How is India responding to Western efforts to divert U.S.
LNG exports under contract to Asian countries like India to Europe? Are
they being cooperative?
Answer. India--a large energy consumer--has been cooperative in
coordinating with the U.S. Government to stabilize energy markets with
their support of our collective Strategic Petroleum Reserves release in
November. Although India has not been requested to divert LNG exports,
the Indian Government released a statement on February 26 that aligns
with our common focus and willingness to take appropriate actions to
address significant market volatility or supply shortages.
Question. How is the Administration deepening counterterrorism
cooperation with India amid the more permissive environment for
extremist groups, like Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Answer. The United States and India share several fundamental goals
in Afghanistan including a determination to ensure that the country
never again becomes a haven for terrorists. India shares our long-
standing concerns about terrorism and instability in South Asia.
Bilaterally and through the Quad mechanism, the United States and India
continue to engage substantively on security and counterterrorism
issues, including through the annual Counterterrorism Joint Working
Group and the working groups of the Homeland Security Dialogue.
Question. I remain deeply concerned about India's S-400 purchase
and Russia-India defense ties, especially in light of Russia's invasion
of Ukraine. The presence of the S-400 systems, and the Russian
personnel who will presumably have to be present to monitor, train and
service them, could compromise U.S. technology should India seek to
purchase advanced fighter aircraft from the United States or otherwise
deepen our military and security partnership. How has the Department's
approach to a potential CAATSA waiver for India's purchase of the S-400
shifted since the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
Answer. I cannot pre-judge sanctions determinations or a potential
waiver with respect to Indian arms transactions with Russia or
speculate on whether Russia's further invasion of Ukraine will impact
the decision. The Department, however, continues to urge Indian
counterparts to diversify from Russian military equipment purchases,
especially given CAATSA.
Question. How is the Administration ensuring any U.S. defense
technology shared with India is adequately safeguarded?
Answer. The United States and India have several binding legal
foundational agreements that cover the protection of U.S. sensitive
content across the broad spectrum of cooperation. The Biden
administration, led by the Department of Defense, continues its work to
ensure U.S. technology is safeguarded in India and globally including
through detailed technical discussions with the Indian Government and
Indian compliance with end-use monitoring requirements and checks. The
Indian Government has a strong track record of protecting U.S.
technology.
Question. If the Administration proceeds with a waiver, will it at
least secure a commitment from India to cease defense purchases from
Russia with a deadline, such as 5 years?
Answer. The Biden administration has not yet made a determination
regarding potential sanctions or a waiver and cannot speak to what
conditions may be placed on India if such a waiver were granted. The
Department continues to urge Indian counterparts not to purchase major
defense equipment from Russia to avoid triggering sanctions under
CAATSA.
Question. For years, India has proven unwilling to resolve U.S.
concerns with certain market access barriers, ultimately leading to
termination of India's GSP benefits in 2019. Can you discuss the
Administration's approach to India's participation in the Indo-Pacific
Economic Framework? If India were to express interest in the trade
module, what assurances would you seek as to its intentions for
negotiations?
Answer. As President Biden announced at the East Asia Summit, the
United States is eager to work with India and other Indo-Pacific
partners on the development of an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
(IPEF) to deepen economic relations in the region and coordinate
approaches to addressing global economic challenges, while advancing
broadly shared economic growth. We will encourage India's participation
in IPEF, including a pillar that will focus on fair and resilient
trade. All countries that choose to participate in this pillar,
including India, will be expected to support all elements of the
pillar, including advancing labor rights, protecting the environment,
and promoting transparency.
Question. In recent months, the Indian Government denied the
renewal of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Acts (FCRA) licenses of
several prominent civil society organizations, including Oxfam India
and the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. Without a foreign funding
license, civil society organizations will be severely impacted in their
ability to mobilize funds and carry out critical programs, including
humanitarian service delivery in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. How
is the Biden administration engaging the Modi Government on the
importance of a robust civil society sector for areas of mutual
priority, including as it relates to sustainable development and COVID-
19 recovery?
Answer. I respect the essential work of civil society to advance
respect for democratic principles and human rights. While governments
have the legitimate right to regulate the inflow of foreign funding, I
do have concerns about how the enforcement of FCRA has negatively
affected the work of both local and international NGOs, including some
affiliated with U.S.-based organizations. Senior Department officials,
including myself, have raised our concerns about the enforcement of
FCRA with our senior Indian Government counterparts and will continue
to do so. The Department will also continue to communicate closely with
Indian and international NGOs on the impact of FCRA as well as continue
to message to the Indian Government the vital role that civil society
organizations play in democratic governance and press for equitable,
transparent, and timely review and adjudication of FCRA license
requests.
______
Responses of Mr. Donald Lu to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. What opportunities and challenges exist for bilateral
engagement on Indo-Pacific trade issues with India? To what extent is
India influenced by protectionism or restrictive policies?
Answer. Protectionist policies remain a serious challenge in India.
Reducing regulatory and market access barriers in India is an important
priority to enable our trade and investment relationship to reach its
full potential. I am working closely with USTR, the Department of
Commerce, and private sector groups to engage with India on expanding
market access and improving its regulatory environment for American
businesses. USTR Tai traveled to India last November to reactivate the
U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum. She made progress resolving several
trade policy concerns and established an agenda for increasing the pace
and depth of engagement on a full range of U.S. trade and investment
priorities.
Question. How would you characterize the importance having
bilateral talks with India on IP theft, forced data transfer, and
localization requirements as it relates to national security? Are these
issues major impediments to strengthening trade with India?
Answer. The Department works closely with our colleagues at USTR to
address issues such as intellectual property theft and cross-border
data flows with our Indian Government partners. The re-launching of the
Trade Policy Forum will enhance our engagement on intellectual
property, specifically through the Intellectual Property Working Group.
The Department regularly raises concerns about data transfers and
localization requirements with Indian Government counterparts,
including through the Information and Communications Technology Working
Group in January, and closely consults with the private sector to
understand their concerns. The Department believes the protection and
enforcement of IP and free and secure cross-border data flows
contribute to the promotion of innovation as well as bilateral trade
and investment with India.
Question. How do you and the State Department coordinate with U.S.
Trade Representative Ambassador Tai to promote digital trade priorities
with respect to India?
Answer. The Department consults regularly with USTR, the Department
of Commerce, and the private sector to determine U.S. digital trade
priorities with India. The Department and interagency, including USTR,
coordinate closely on discussions of digital trade priorities with the
Government of India through the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum, the
Information and Communications Technology Working Group, and other
bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Through this engagement, the
Department, USTR, and others advocate for India to ensure sound
regulatory policies for digital trade and a level playing field for
U.S. firms to compete in this growing sector.
Question. What are the risks to a transparent and open digital
economy that China poses in the region?
Answer. The Government of India is aware of the risks that PRC
companies pose to a transparent and open digital economy in the Indo-
Pacific region and has taken steps to limit the ability of those
companies to operate within the country. Since June 2020, around 300
PRC-linked apps, including TikTok, WeChat, and Helo, have been banned
in India. In addition, the Government of India did not select any PRC
firms when it approved 13 applications to conduct 5G field trials last
year. The government and Indian industry are eager to pursue an open
architecture approach to 5G networks using open Radio Access Network
(Open RAN) technology which enables interoperability among equipment
from different vendors and greater software vendor diversity, thus
limiting the risks of PRC equipment in the region.
Question. Press reports indicated on February 25 that India was
exploring a rupee-ruble payment system to facilitate trade with Russia
and soften the impact of global sanctions. What is the current status
of this project?
Answer. The Department has not received information to suggest the
Indian Government is proceeding with a new rupee-ruble payment system
to facilitate trade with Russia and soften the impact of global
sanctions.
Question. India reportedly depends on Russia and Belarus for
fertilizer inputs critical to its agricultural sector. What options is
the Administration exploring to reduce Indian dependence on Russian and
Belarusian-sourced potash and other agricultural inputs?
Answer. The Administration will work with the Government of India
and other allies and partners to explore options for trade
diversification to ensure alternative supplies of agricultural inputs
and mitigate the potentially negative impact from U.S. sanctions.
______
Response of Mr. Donald Lu to Question
Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. India has a long history of family planning programing,
but it has struggled to make modern contraceptive methods widely
available. Like most countries around the world, COVID-19 has forced
India to redirect limited public health efforts towards combating the
virus at the expense of family planning programs. Around the world,
this pandemic threatens to roll back years of progress in universal
access to family planning.
Assistant Secretary Lu, how are you working with USAID and others
to prioritize the rights of women in India and improve access to family
planning? What specifically are we doing to improve family planning
access in India?
Answer. The United States has a long history of providing support
for family planning and women's health as an integral part of our
public health cooperation with India. USAID provides technical
assistance to the Government of India and works with the private
sector, other development partners, and civil society to ensure the
adoption of high impact approaches and solutions for reproductive,
maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health programs in areas with
the highest burden. These efforts have been especially significant
during the COVID-19 pandemic as many Indian states were forced to
constrain other public health resources to focus on COVID-19
diagnostics and treatment. Specific areas of focus include expanding
access and awareness of family planning methods, improving quality of
family planning care throughout India, and strengthening an enabling
environment for family planning.
______
Responses of Donald Lu to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. Human rights organizations have continued to highlight
the increasing pressure placed on non-governmental organizations,
journalists, activists, and religious minorities under the BJP-led
Hindu nationalist government. India is a key strategic partner for the
United States and the world's largest democracy, which makes its
democratic backsliding particularly concerning. In your role, how are
you engaging with and putting pressure on the Indian Government to
respect the freedoms and human rights enshrined in its constitution?
Answer. Our support for human rights is a fundamental principle of
U.S. foreign policy. The United States and India share many of the same
institutional pillars of true democracies--a vibrant civil society, a
free media, free and fair elections, and an independent judiciary.
As democracies, it is important for the United States and India to
speak frankly about the democratic challenges we each face. Senior
Department leaders, including me, regularly share our human rights
concerns, such as protections for the freedom of expression and freedom
of religion, and India's application of its Foreign Contribution
Regulation Act, directly with our Indian counterparts and will continue
to do so.
The Department of State continues to demonstrate our support for
Indian and diaspora civil society and media organizations seeking to
advance human rights and the promotion of democratic principles through
sustained engagement. During his visit to India in July, Secretary
Blinken met with a diverse group of interfaith leaders to discuss their
perspectives on inclusive and sustainable development. Deputy Secretary
Sherman met with a panel of LGBTQI+ activists from Mumbai during her
October visit to India to underscore our support for inclusivity.
Question. How has the BJP's crackdown on human rights in India
impacted American companies that have a presence in the country and
what steps is the Department of State taking to raise these concerns
with the Indian Government?
Answer. The Department has engaged Indian and international
companies, including those that are U.S.-based, and civil society
representatives to better understand the impact of the Indian
Government's enforcement of digital content regulations. Using these
conversations to inform our advocacy, the Department has raised
concerns about how these new regulations negatively impact U.S.
economic interests and the exercise of freedom of expression in the
digital space in line with the shared values outlined in the G-7 Open
Societies Statement that both of our countries signed last year.
Question. The Quad is an important initiative to sustain and expand
cooperation between the United States, Australia, Japan, and India to
tackle the climate crisis, as well as authoritarianism and the COVID-19
pandemic. What concrete steps can the United States, Japan, and
Australia, as members of the Quad, take to help India meet its
ambitious climate-related targets?
Answer. The Quad Climate Working Group is one of many important
mechanisms for the United States to engage with India and other Quad
partners to support ambitious climate targets, including India's goal
of installing 500 GW of non-fossil fuel power generation capacity by
2030. The Quad countries have various initiatives centered around
climate, but two of special interest are centered around green shipping
networks and green hydrogen technologies. More broadly, climate efforts
through the Quad complement our extensive climate change and clean
energy engagement with India through tracks led by the Special
Presidential Envoy for Climate's Office and the Department of Energy
under the Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership and include
activities such as Development Finance Corporation (DFC) lending,
collaboration with DoE labs, the Department's Bureau of Energy
Resources funded power sector decarbonization roadmap, and USAID
programming for disaster resilient infrastructure, energy
transformation, and biodiversity preservation.
Question. The United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,
passed by the Senate and the America COMPETES Act passed by the House,
both include a provision to create a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working
Group. In what ways can this group support the work being done through
the Quad to build sustainable infrastructure, ensure the Quad COVID-19
vaccine effort prioritizes vaccine equity, while also calling for the
elevation of the Quad Climate Change Working Group within the overall
structure of the Quad?
Answer. Quad cooperation supports the United States' goal of
realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific, and our vision for this
partnership is ambitious and far-reaching. I look forward to engaging
with members of Congress on how best to support that goal and advance
the work of the Quad, including through an intra-parliamentary working
group.
At the Quad Leaders' Summit last September, Quad partners committed
to deepen cooperation on COVID-19 vaccines and climate and announced a
new Quad Working Group on Infrastructure. The Intra-Parliamentary
Working Group would provide another opportunity to advance the Quad's
ongoing efforts by mobilizing support from the legislative branch.
______
Response of Mr. Donald Lu to Question
Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
Question. What actions is the State Department taking to engage
Pakistan on religious freedom issues, particularly the protection of
minority populations and reform of the country's blasphemy laws?
Pakistani courts continue to convict individuals of blasphemy charges
and impose sentences of life imprisonment or death, including in at
least three cases over January-February 2022. What is the Department
doing to address this worrying trend?
Answer. By delegation from the President, the Secretary of State
has designated Pakistan as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended since 2018
for engaging in or tolerating particularly severe violations of
religious freedom, including the government's continued enforcement of
blasphemy laws and persecution and denial of rights of minority faiths.
Consequentially, unless a waiver has been granted or an exception
applies, the President is required to impose one of several actions
listed in the IRF Act. With respect to Pakistan, it has been determined
that a waiver is required in the important national interest of the
United States. The U.S. Government strongly opposes blasphemy laws.
State Department officials, including Undersecretary Zeya and
Ambassador Hussain, consistently urge Pakistani counterparts to curb
the abuse of blasphemy laws. Arrests of those wrongfully accused have
led to years of unjust imprisonment and targeted assassinations of the
accused and their legal representatives. Blasphemy and apostasy laws
are too often used by individuals either as a pretext to justify
violence in the name of religion or as a false pretense to settle
personal grievances. Pakistan continues to detain, prosecute, and abuse
individuals for blasphemy and has the harshest and most frequently
enforced blasphemy laws of any country in the world.
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