[Senate Hearing 117-311]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      S. Hrg. 117-311

                 REINVIGORATING U.S.-COLOMBIA RELATIONS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 16, 2022

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-086 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        


                              (ii)        

  
                       C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Nichols, Hon. Brian A. Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
  Hemisphere, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...........     4
    Prepared Statement...........................................     6

Robinson, Hon. Todd D., Assistant Secretary of State for 
  International 
  Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of 
  State, Washington, DC..........................................     7
    Prepared Statement...........................................     8

Escobari, Hon. Marcela, Assistant Administrator for Latin America 
  and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    10
    Prepared Statement...........................................    11

Restrepo, Dan, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    28
    Prepared Statement...........................................    29

Realuyo, Celina B., Adjunct Professor, the George Washington 
  University School of International Affairs, Washington, DC.....    33
    Prepared Statement...........................................    35

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Jim Risch......................................................    46

Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Jim Risch......................................................    46

Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Jim Risch..............................................    47

Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................    47

Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................    50

Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  John Barrasso..................................................    52

Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  John Barrasso..................................................    54

Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Ted Cruz.......................................................    54

Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Ted Cruz.......................................................    56

Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Ted Cruz...............................................    56

                                 (iii)


 
                 REINVIGORATING U.S.-COLOMBIA RELATIONS

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in 
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, and via Webex, 
Hon. Robert Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Shaheen, Coons, 
Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Young, Cruz, and 
Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order. Our hearing today is 
Reinvigorating the U.S.-Colombia Relations.
    As the world braces for Russia's assault against the 
Ukrainian people in defiance of a peaceful world order and in 
rejection of democratic values, it is imperative that we renew 
efforts to strengthen our alliances and closest partnerships, 
particular those close to home. We have long championed the 
United States' relationship with Colombia as one of our most 
important in South America and one of the greatest foreign 
policy successes globally. Indeed, together we have disrupted 
massive criminal networks and built an economic relationship 
worth nearly $50 billion.
    Thanks to the countless sacrifices of the Colombian people 
and our decades-long partnership, Colombia was able to end the 
world's longest civil war. Today, Colombia exports its 
expertise to help other nations combat drug trafficking and 
terrorism. Massive security improvements opened Colombia's 
doors to the world while also enabling Colombians to discover 
their own homeland.
    In a welcome first, we even have a Disney movie about 
Colombia, enabling a generational shift in global perceptions 
about the country. Personally, I am thrilled that Colombian-
American children in New Jersey will be more likely to hear 
their peers singing about Bruno rather than recycling the tired 
tropes about Colombia drug wars of the eighties and nineties. 
It is transformational on many levels.
    Of course, significant challenges still exist. The pandemic 
strained Colombia's national budgets and poverty increased, the 
government's presence in rural areas of the country diminished, 
illicit coca cultivation continued to proliferate, and armed 
criminal groups have returned to open conflict and are 
terrorizing local communities. Additionally, last year the 
world watched as an ill-fated tax reform proposal sparked 
country-wide protests and brought violence to Colombia's 
cities, unseen in decades, and Colombia has also shouldered an 
already generous response to Venezuela's protracted refugee 
crisis, a crisis that rivals the tragedy in Syria in size and 
impact.
    That said, I believe that the complexity of the world today 
demands that we embrace the opportunity to address different 
challenges, challenges like social and economic inequality, 
environmental deterioration, human rights and the creeping 
influences of extra-regional actors like Russia and China. 
These issues may not affect the lives of Americans as directly 
as drug trafficking, but they are critical to the strength of 
our democracy in our hemisphere and to the region's overall 
health and resilience. In today's world, they must be a 
priority.
    It is long past time that we modernize our relationship 
with Colombia to focus on the realities of the present rather 
than the ghosts of the past, and to elevate our partnership to 
reflect Colombia's growing leadership on the world stage. We 
cannot afford to rest on our laurels.
    As we saw, former President Trump was a wrecking ball to 
U.S.-Colombia relations, going so far as to say that Colombian 
President Duque had, ``done nothing to work with the United 
States,'' an insult that is untethered from reality.
    That is why, with our country celebrating 200 years of 
diplomatic relations this year, I am announcing the most 
expansive legislative initiative to date to reinvigorate U.S.-
Colombia relations. The U.S.-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act 
will formally designate Colombia as a major non-NATO ally of 
the United States. It will strengthen our partnership on 
international security and defense issues, as well as human 
rights and labor rights. It will also create a new enterprise 
fund to catalyze investments in Colombian businesses as they 
recover from the pandemic, and promote efforts to diversity 
U.S. supply chains away from a reliance on China.
    My bipartisan legislation will facilitate new opportunities 
for women entrepreneurs and members of Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous communities. Importantly, it will also propose 
actions to bolster Colombia's efforts to address the 
hemisphere's historic refugee and migration challenges and to 
support conservation of Colombia's truly privileged 
biodiversity. The bill reinforces the United States' support 
for the full implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord, which 
continues to be the best, albeit imperfect, tool to build peace 
and democratic governance in Colombia.
    I will close by nothing that bipartisan support for 
Colombia has directly contributed to the success of the U.S. 
approach. I look forward to working with my Senate colleagues 
on this new legislation. I welcome the views of our esteemed 
panelists on how we can modernize and strengthen our 
relationship in light of the new opportunities and challenges 
we face.
    With that let me turn to the distinguished ranking member 
for his opening remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The United States 
has an enduring interest in a prosperous, democratic, and 
stable Western Hemisphere. Strong relations with Colombia are 
important to attain these goals. This year we proudly celebrate 
200 years of diplomatic relations, the 20th anniversary of Plan 
Colombia, and the 10th anniversary of our bilateral trade 
promotion agreement. Our partnership has contributed to 
widespread economic growth and development as well as safer and 
more secure communities, both in Colombia and the hemisphere at 
large.
    At the same time, Colombia's home-grown democratic 
institutions have demonstrated extraordinary resilience in the 
face of multiple and simultaneous crises. Colombia's internal 
security is under pressure due to flaws in the 2016 deal with 
the FARC and the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis 
created by the Maduro regime in Venezuela. Our Colombian allies 
need our support in confronting transnational criminal and 
terrorist organizations and maintaining a credible deterrence 
against the rising security threats in the region.
    Equally concerning is the negative influence of malign 
state actors such as Russia and China. Russian disinformation 
campaigns and its export of sophisticated weapons and 
repressive practices to the Maduro regime are a growing threat 
to the security of Colombia and the stability of northern South 
America. China has shown growing interest in the region, and 
Colombia's neighbors have already suffered the consequences of 
China's predatory practices. The United States should work with 
credible regional institutions, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank to unleash private sector solutions to fulfill 
the Colombian people's growing expectations.
    Given its strategic location straddling the Pacific Ocean 
and the Caribbean Sea, Colombia can be a powerful ally in the 
race to secure critical supply chains. The Biden administration 
should get serious about our partnership with Colombia or risk 
squandering the strategic gains of the last few decades.
    I welcome our witnesses today and look forward to hearing 
from you about these issues.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. We have a great 
panel of Administration witnesses to start off. It is my 
privilege to welcome back to the committee Assistant Secretary 
for the Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols. Assistant Secretary 
Nichols has been an outspoken advocate for peace and prosperity 
in Colombia and regional security in our hemisphere.
    Prior to assuming his role as Assistant Secretary he served 
two ambassadorships in the Republic of Zimbabwe and in Peru. He 
served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in 
Colombia, where he managed U.S. diplomatic activities and 
oversaw over $500 million in annual assistance. Welcome back, 
Mr. Secretary.
    We also welcome Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd 
Robinson to the committee. He has played a critical role in 
strengthening the U.S.-Colombia bilateral relationship in the 
areas of governance, anti-narcotics strategies and security. 
Ambassador Robinson has served as Special Advisor for Central 
America in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Ambassador 
Robinson was also previously charge d'affaires in Caracas, 
Venezuela. He served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of 
Guatemala from 2014 to 2017. Welcome back to you as well.
    Finally, it is a pleasure to have the Honorable Marcela 
Escobari, Assistant Administrator of USAID's Bureau for Latin 
America and the Caribbean as a witness for today's hearing. Her 
leadership within USAID Latin America and the Caribbean 
portfolio has been critical for supporting efforts that advance 
economic opportunity and peace in Colombia.
    While serving in the Obama-Biden administration as 
Assistant Administrator of USAID's Bureau for Latin America and 
the Caribbean, she reinforced U.S. support for Peace Colombia 
and prepared a proactive strategy to confront the humanitarian 
crisis in Venezuela.
    So with the thanks of the committee to all of you for 
attending, we will start off with you, Secretary Nichols. We 
ask that you keep your statements to about 5 minutes so the 
committee can have a conversation with you. Your full 
statements will be included in the record, without objection. 
Secretary Nichols, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRIAN A. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT 
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                     STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, I find it fitting that 
we take the opportunity to discuss Colombia now. As you noted, 
2022 marks the bicentennial of bilateral relations between our 
two countries. The United States and Colombia stood shoulder to 
shoulder through some of the toughest tests of the 19th, 20th, 
and 21st centuries, and today we are closer partners than ever.
    We share a deep commitment to democratic governance, 
prosperity, and opportunity, the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights. We share a determination to ensure Colombia has a 
lasting peace, counters terrorism and narcotics, expands state 
services and protection throughout its territory, and finds 
rich strength in its diversity. We join forces to uphold these 
values in our countries as well as others, and we do not 
refrain from calling out and holding accountable those who 
trespass upon the standards we hold dear. In the face of 
terrorist violence and a brutal dictatorship in neighboring 
Venezuela that provides shelter and encouragement to both 
terrorist and criminal groups and caused the exodus of 
millions, Colombia's resolve has not waned.
    We continue to seek ways to improve security and prosperity 
for citizens in both our countries, and we continue to support 
comprehensive implementation of the historic 2016 Peace Accord 
with the former FARC, which will be critical to ensure 
Colombia's transition from 50 years of conflict to a just, 
inclusive, and durable peace.
    Over the past year, the United States supported Colombia's 
impressive efforts to build back from the global pandemic. We 
donated more than $117 million to response and recovery 
efforts--including surge healthcare personnel, critical 
supplies, and equipment--to curb the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
United States also donated 6 million safe, effective COVID-19 
vaccine doses and helped distribute them in hard-to-reach 
areas.
    Last week in Colombia, I witnessed the commitment of the 
Colombian Government to further professionalize its security 
forces and increase state presence and resources in remote 
areas. During my visit, I underscored our shared commitment to 
human rights with civil society leaders and encouraged U.S. 
businesses in Colombia to create new economic opportunities.
    For all that we have accomplished together, there remains 
more to do.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the precarious state 
of Colombia's most vulnerable populations. Colombia cannot 
achieve lasting peace without addressing the systematic 
inequities that have contributed to persistent violence. 
Expanding efforts to improve respect for human rights and 
accountability for past offenses remains essential. I will 
strengthen our work with Colombia to ensure historically 
disadvantaged communities of Afro-descendant and indigenous 
peoples benefit from the same opportunities as the broader 
population. I will continue prioritizing policies and programs 
that provide opportunities for women, minority ethnic 
communities, victims of violence, and other groups that remain 
disenfranchised in society today.
    The vulnerable populations in Colombia include almost 2 
million Venezuelans displaced by the poverty, kleptocracy, and 
brutality of the Maduro regime next door. With its historic 
offer of 10-year temporary protection, Colombia generously 
welcomed Venezuelan refugees within its borders and provides 
short-term access to food, services, and medical attention to 
nearly 6 million Venezuelans living in border communities, all 
at a time when resources have been stretched even thinner due 
to the pandemic.
    Colombia has also assumed an outsized leadership position 
in the hemisphere in addressing irregular migration, including 
by co-hosting a hemisphere-wide ministerial on migration with 
Secretary Blinken last October.
    An acute priority is collaborating with Colombia to fend 
off the malign activities of state and non-state actors, who 
increasingly seek opportunities to erode the hemispheric 
consensus on the importance of the rule of law and democratic 
governance. Those actors helped Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba 
turn away from this consensus, and enable the autocratic 
leaders of those countries to hold onto power by suppressing 
their own people.
    Colombia's leaders recognize that protecting democracy from 
external threats is essential. With elections on the horizon, 
the United States provides funding and technical support to 
help Colombia counter malign actors seeking to sow confusion 
and mistrust in the institutions Colombia and the United States 
worked so tirelessly to strengthen. We also continue to support 
Colombia's security efforts to ensure every citizen can 
exercise their right to vote safely.
    We will seek progress on our bilateral and regional goals 
throughout the end of the Duque administration, and we will 
engage with Colombia's next administration with the shared goal 
that governments must not only be elected democratically, but 
also govern democratically to improve the lives of all 
citizens. I am confident that this productive, democratic 
partnership will continue to deliver for Colombians and 
Americans for years to come.
    Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Brian A. Nichols

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the Committee, I find it fitting that we take the opportunity to 
discuss Colombia now, as 2022 marks the bicentennial of bilateral 
relations between our two countries. The United States and Colombia 
stood shoulder-to-shoulder through some of the toughest tests of the 
19th, 20th and 21st centuries, and today, we are closer partners than 
ever.
    We share a deep commitment to democratic governance, prosperity and 
opportunity, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. We share a 
determination to ensure Colombia has a lasting peace, counters 
terrorism and narcotics, expands state services and protection 
throughout its territory, protects the environment, and finds strength 
in its rich diversity. We join forces to uphold these values in our 
countries as well as others, and we do not refrain from calling out and 
holding accountable those who trespass upon the standards we hold dear. 
In the face of terrorist violence and a brutal dictatorship in 
neighboring Venezuela that provides shelter and encouragement to both 
terrorist and criminal groups and caused the exodus of millions, 
Colombia's resolve has not waned.
    We continue to seek ways to improve security and prosperity for 
citizens in both our countries. And we continue to support 
comprehensive implementation of the historic 2016 Peace Accord with the 
former FARC, which will be critical to ensure Colombia's transition 
from 50 years of conflict to a just, inclusive, and durable peace.
    Over the past year, the United States supported Colombia's 
impressive efforts to build back from the global pandemic. We donated 
more than $117 million to response and recovery efforts--including 
surge healthcare personnel, critical supplies, and equipment--to curb 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States also donated 6 million safe, 
effective COVID-19 vaccine doses and helped distribute them in hard-to-
reach areas.
    Last week in Colombia, I witnessed the commitment of the Colombian 
Government to further professionalize its security forces and increase 
state presence and resources in remote areas. During my visit, I 
underscored our shared commitment to human rights with civil society 
leaders and encouraged U.S. businesses in Colombia to create new 
economic opportunities.
    For all that we have accomplished together, there remains more to 
do.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the precarious state of 
Colombia's most vulnerable populations. Colombia cannot achieve lasting 
peace without addressing the systematic inequities that have 
contributed to persistent violence. Expanding efforts to improve 
respect for human rights and accountability for past offenses remains 
essential. I will strengthen our work with Colombia to ensure 
historically disadvantaged communities of Afro-descendant and 
Indigenous peoples benefit from the same opportunities as the broader 
population. I will continue prioritizing policies and programs that 
provide opportunities for women, minority ethnic communities, victims 
of violence, and other groups that remain disenfranchised in society 
today.
    The vulnerable populations in Colombia include almost 2 million 
Venezuelans displaced by the poverty, kleptocracy and brutality of the 
Maduro regime next door. With its historic offer of 10-year temporary 
protection, Colombia generously welcomed Venezuelan refugees within its 
borders and provides short-term access to food, services, and medical 
attention to nearly 6 million Venezuelans living in border 
communities--all at a time when resources have been stretched even 
thinner due to the pandemic.
    Colombia has also assumed an outsized leadership position in the 
hemisphere in addressing irregular migration, including by co-hosting a 
hemisphere-wide ministerial on migration with Secretary Blinken last 
October.
    An acute priority is collaborating with Colombia to fend off the 
malign activities of state and non-state actors, who increasingly seek 
opportunities to erode the hemispheric consensus on the importance of 
the rule of law and democratic governance. Those actors helped 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba turn away from this consensus--and 
enable the autocratic leaders of those countries to hold on to power by 
suppressing their own people.
    Colombia's leaders recognize that protecting democracy from 
external threats is essential. With elections on the horizon, the 
United States provides funding and technical support to help Colombia 
counter malign actors seeking to sow confusion and mistrust in the 
institutions Colombia and the United States worked so tirelessly to 
strengthen. We also continue to support Colombia's security efforts to 
ensure every citizen can exercise their right to vote safely.
    We will seek progress on our bilateral and regional goals 
throughout the end of the Duque administration, and we will engage with 
Colombia's next administration with the shared goal that governments 
must not only be elected democratically, but also govern democratically 
to improve the lives of all citizens. I am confident that this 
productive, democratic partnership will continue to deliver for 
Colombians and Americans for years to come.
    Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to your 
questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Robinson.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TODD D. ROBINSON, ASSISTANT 
    SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW 
 ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Robinson. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today regarding INL's efforts in 
Colombia. If I may, thank you for passage of State's 
authorization bill and your leadership in that which will help 
strengthen the Department and reaffirms this body's commitment 
to the role of the Bureau of INL and other bureaus in the 
Department.
    Together, with longstanding support for Congress, we have 
built one of the deepest bilateral partnerships in the 
Americas. Colombia's security affects the security and welfare 
of all of our citizens. A stronger, more stable Colombia is not 
just a better partner, but provides regional leadership on our 
shared priorities, including countering transnational crime, 
enhancing regional security, and training security forces 
throughout the region.
    Colombia has made significant progress over the last 20 
years, transforming into a stable democracy and economy. To 
sustain Colombia's progress we must continue to support 
Colombia's institutions and their capacity to expand state 
presence in rural areas, invest in counternarcotics efforts, 
protect human rights, and combat environmental crime.
    The Duque administration has dedicated significant 
resources and personnel to meet ambitious counternarcotics 
targets despite enormous challenges. While our combined efforts 
have helped slow years of explosive coca growth, the now 
historic levels of coca cultivation show more work is needed, 
which is why the U.S. and Colombian governments developed a new 
counternarcotics strategy.
    Last October, we committed to a comprehensive, holistic 
strategy to link state presence, development, rule of law, and 
environmental protection with reducing cocaine production. Our 
approach focuses on three pillars: integrated supply reduction, 
comprehensive rural development and security, and environmental 
protection. The strategy will define broader measures of 
success. Eradication will remain crucial, but we broadened our 
work to also focus on environmental crimes as narcotics 
traffickers also destroy the environment.
    Under the integrated supply reduction pillar, INL is 
addressing cocaine production and related illicit finances. INL 
will continue to help Colombia eradicate coca, interdict 
cocaine and precursors, and improve the government's ability to 
disrupt criminal financial networks. We also support police 
effectiveness by improving training, deployment cycles, and 
human rights practices.
    Under the rural development and security pillar we hope to 
extend state presence to expand economic opportunity, advance 
the accords, and improve security, justice, and social services 
critical to people's needs. Our efforts with USAID protect 
community leaders, make licit crops more competitive, formalize 
land ownership, and pursue environmental crimes. Our programs 
help reverse environmental degradation by enhancing detection, 
assisting Colombian efforts to pursue environmental criminals, 
and reforestation.
    Our new strategy brings together U.S. and Colombian public 
stakeholders in an integrated, sequenced fashion with broader 
metrics to produce sustainable results in three targeted areas 
to gauge their efficacy. For example, in Caceres, Antioquia, we 
sequenced programs to increase police presence, strengthen 
community police relations, remove land mines, formalize land 
ownership, improve infrastructure, provide agricultural 
training, train prosecutors, enforce environmental crimes, and 
improve local government services.
    To achieve this strategy, we recognize that Colombian 
people's confidence in their police and institutions must 
improve. We are therefore supporting the Colombian-led plan to 
increase police accountability, transparency, and protection of 
human rights. We support the Colombian Government's focus on 
transparency and accountability, its intent to fully 
investigate allegations of police misconduct, and its statement 
of zero tolerance for officials acting outside the law.
    Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, we have worked closely 
with the Duque administration to implement vital police 
reforms, achieve impressive counternarcotics results, 
strengthen rural security, and disrupt criminal networks. We 
cannot and should not underestimate the challenges we face in 
Colombia. Armed groups are resilient, adaptive, and well 
resourced. Improving rural security in Colombia, an urbanized 
country almost twice the size of Texas, is a significant 
challenge. We look forward to working with the next Colombian 
presidential administration and believe our new whole-of-
government strategy can accommodate whoever wins the next 
Colombian elections.
    Our work and success in Colombia are made possible by 
strong bipartisan congressional support. Thank you, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Mr. Todd Robinson

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of 
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 
today regarding INL's efforts to advance the United States' priorities 
in Colombia. Together, with longstanding support from Congress, we have 
built one of the deepest bilateral partnerships in the Americas.
    Colombia's security directly affects the security and welfare of 
our citizens. A stronger, more stable Colombia is not just a better 
partner but also provides regional leadership on our shared priorities, 
including countering transnational crime, enhancing regional security, 
and training security forces throughout the region.
    Colombia has made significant progress over the last 20 years, 
transforming into a stable democracy and economy. It has become more 
secure and prosperous, with a dramatic drop in violent crime statistics 
and a more than tripling of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita.
    To sustain Colombia's progress, we must continue to support 
Colombia's institutions and their capacity to expand state presence 
into rural areas, invest in counternarcotics efforts, protect human 
rights, combat environmental crime, mitigate climate change, and manage 
the Venezuelan migrant crisis.
    Despite COVID-19-related challenges, the Duque administration has 
dedicated significant resources and personnel to meeting ambitious 
counternarcotics targets. In 2021, the Colombian Government captured 
alias Otoniel, the most significant blow to Clan del Golfo in many 
years; interdicted or assisted in the interdiction of 758 tons of 
cocaine and cocaine base, the most in Colombia's history; and manually 
eradicated 103,000 hectares of coca, the second most manual eradication 
in Colombia's history. While our combined efforts have helped slow 
years of explosive coca growth, the now historic levels of coca 
cultivation show a new approach was needed to reduce overall drug 
production in Colombia, particularly as transnational criminal 
organizations find new drug markets and improve production techniques. 
With the historic cultivation numbers in mind, the U.S. and Colombian 
governments developed a new strategy to redesign our counternarcotics 
efforts.
    Last October, we committed to a comprehensive, holistic, whole-of-
government strategy to link state presence, security, development, rule 
of law, and environmental protection to reduce coca and cocaine 
production in Colombia significantly and sustainably. The new approach 
focuses on three pillars: integrated supply reduction; comprehensive 
rural development and security; and environmental protection.
    The strategy will enable us to define broader measures of success 
for counternarcotics in rural communities. Eradication will remain 
crucial and is essential to create the space for long-term solutions, 
but we have also broadened our interventions to include a focus on 
environmental crimes as criminal organizations responsible for 
narcotrafficking are often responsible for environmental destruction 
such as deforestation, soil and water pollution, and illegal mining. By 
aggressively pursuing environmental crimes, we will both protect the 
environment and apply pressure on these criminal organizations.
    Under the integrated supply reduction pillar, INL seeks to address 
the nature of the cocaine supply and counter the growing trend in coca 
cultivation and related illicit financial flows. INL will continue to 
help Colombia eradicate coca, interdict cocaine and precursor 
materials, and improve police and prosecutor's ability to disrupt the 
financial networks that sustain and support these groups. We are also 
supporting the police to improve their long-term training, deployment, 
and human rights practices to make them more effective.
    Under the rural security, development, and justice pillar, the 
United States works with our Colombian partners to extend state 
presence to rural communities to provide greater security, expand 
economic opportunity, and improve justice and other social services, 
which are critical to people's needs and to advance the accords. 
Together with USAID, our efforts include protecting community leaders; 
making licit crops more profitable and competitive; and amplifying land 
formalization.
    We have launched programming to reverse the negative impact of the 
narcotics trade on the environment by enhancing detection, supporting 
reforestation, and assisting Colombian military and police efforts to 
pursue the perpetrators of environmental crimes.
    Our new strategy brings together U.S. and Colombian public 
stakeholders in an integrated, sequenced fashion to produce optimal, 
sustainable results in three targeted geographic areas to gauge their 
efficacy. INL, in particular, is collaborating closely with USAID. For 
example, in Caceres, Antioquia, we sequenced programming to increase 
police presence, strengthen community-police relations, remove 
landmines, formalize land ownership, improve infrastructure, provide 
agriculture training, train prosecutors, enforce environmental crimes, 
and improve local government services.
    To achieve this strategy, we recognize the Colombian people's 
confidence in their police and institutions must improve. We are, 
therefore, also supporting the Colombian-led plan to increase police 
accountability, transparency, and protection of human rights. We 
support the Colombian Government's focus on transparency, 
accountability, its intent to fully investigate allegations of police 
misconduct, and its statements of zero tolerance for officials acting 
outside the law.
    Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, we have worked closely with the 
Duque administration to implement vital police reforms, achieve 
impressive counternarcotics results, strengthen rural security, and 
disrupt criminal networks. We cannot and should not underestimate the 
challenges we face in Colombia--armed groups are resilient, adaptive, 
and incredibly well-resourced--and improving rural security in 
Colombia, a highly urbanized country that is almost twice the size of 
Texas, is a significant challenge. We look forward to continuing to 
work with the Duque administration in these next few months, and to 
working with the next Colombian presidential administration. We believe 
our new whole-of-government strategy is sufficiently flexible that it 
can accommodate whoever is the eventual winner of Colombia's 
presidency. Strong and sustained bipartisan support from Congress is an 
integral component of our shared success with Colombia. Thank you, and 
I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for 
recognizing the State authorization that Senator Risch and I, 
along with other members of the committee, were able to 
achieve, something that has not been achieved in a couple 
decades, and we hope to build upon that in the future.
    Administrator Escobari.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARCELA ESCOBARI, ASSISTANT 
ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY 
         FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Escobari. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today.
    Colombia remains one of the United States' closest and most 
steadfast partners in the hemisphere. Despite daunting 
challenges, the country's people and successive governments 
have demonstrated the will and the capacity to end decades of 
civil conflict and build a more peaceful, prosperous, and just 
society.
    Today Colombia is facing severe shocks: COVID-19, the 
Venezuelan migration crisis, and a rise in coca cultivation. 
These shocks threaten progress made toward peace and inclusive 
development, and USAID is helping Colombia address these issues 
head on. USAID adjusted fast to support Colombia's COVID 
response. Aside from emergency assistance, we made adjustments 
throughout our programs to mitigate the impacts of the virus. 
Our support has helped get shots in arms, helped schools shift 
to virtual learning, protected women from gender-based 
violence, and provided food to those that lost their 
livelihoods. We are now focused on the future, getting 
Colombia's youth back to school and supporting a robust 
economic recovery.
    We remain committed to supporting Colombia in protecting 
human rights. As the FARC demobilized and stepped away from the 
battlefield, criminal gangs have entered into violent 
competition to control territory and the illegal narcotics 
trade. Social and environmental leaders who are fighting back 
have become even more vulnerable to violent attacks, and USAID 
has deepened its efforts to support them. We helped the 
National Protection Unit to make more effective use of 
collective protection for ethnic groups. We helped the Attorney 
General secure 88 sentences in human rights defender homicide 
cases to date. There is a lot more work to do, but these are 
positive steps toward greater accountability.
    Coca's rapid expansion also greatly complicates rural 
development. Last October, the White House announced the 
implementation of a more integrated and holistic approach to 
counter narcotics in Colombia. USAID supports this strategy to 
integrate and sequence assets in each municipality, in tight 
coordination with the Colombian Government and our interagency 
partners. Together we bring expanded access to state services, 
land reform, rule of law to guarantee basic rights, and income 
for licit producers. Together, this brings an expanded state 
presence that gives alternative sources of income over coca a 
real chance.
    One promising strategy has been providing land titles. 
USAID piloted the first municipal-wide titling sweep in a 
municipality, emblematic of the armed conflict, Colombia's 
Montes de Maria area. These efforts are showing positive 
results, and USAID hopes to scale this pilot program in other 
coca-growing municipalities.
    In addition, we recently launched the agency's largest 
award dedicated to ethnic inclusion, and we are advancing 
localization efforts through direct grants to four local Afro-
Colombian and indigenous organizations.
    Another massive challenge is the Venezuelan migration 
crisis. In an act of remarkable generosity, Colombia welcomed 
nearly 2 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees with open 
arms, and USAID quickly adjusted its programs to provide 
assistance. In addition to immediate relief, including food, 
medicine, and shelter, U.S. investments have helped Colombia 
ramp up registration of Venezuelans under their TPS programs, 
helping Venezuelans access basic services and employment 
opportunities. Colombia's response is a promising model for the 
region, and USAID will continue to support Colombia's 
integration efforts.
    Lastly, and similarly to migration, Colombia has responded 
to its environmental challenges with innovation and leadership. 
USAID's mission in Colombia oversees the agency's largest 
natural environment investment in the hemisphere, focused on 
tropical forests and biodiversity conservation, as well as 
addressing environmental crimes.
    The challenges I have outlined may seem daunting, but it is 
our task to make peace irreversible. It will be a long-term 
endeavor, but the trust and progress we have forged with the 
Colombian people will continue to provide a strong foundation 
for the future.
    Allow me to close with the words of Luis Fernando Arias, a 
leading voice of Colombia's indigenous movement and a close 
USAID partner, who a year ago this week died from COVID. He 
reminded us, ``We have to continue working for a country that 
is more humane, peaceful, equitable, and inclusive. We are here 
because Colombia cannot have one more victim.'' May his words 
be our call to action today?
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Escobari follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Ms. Marcela Escobari

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members 
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on USAID's 
work in Colombia and discuss our vision for the future.
    Colombia remains one of the United States' closest and most 
steadfast partners in the hemisphere. Despite daunting challenges, the 
country's people and successive governments have demonstrated the will 
and the capacity to end a 52 year civil conflict and build a more 
peaceful, prosperous, and just society.
    The achievement of the 2016 Peace Accord between the state and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rests squarely with 
Colombia. The United States is proud to have been the country's closest 
partner in advancing the transition from five decades of conflict to 
greater peace and security.
    There are few parallels to what Colombia has achieved in the 
relatively short time span of about two decades. Once a nearly failed 
state, the country has come back from the brink to establish itself as 
a stable democracy, Latin America's fourth largest economy and a close 
U.S. partner and ally. From 2000 to 2019, the gross domestic product 
more than doubled; the percent of Colombians living in poverty was 
nearly cut in half (from 54 percent to 29 percent); and violence fell 
dramatically.
    The historic 2016 Peace Accord brought important progress. It 
disarmed and demobilized 13,000 FARC combatants, with 11,000 still 
committed to the peace process; advanced justice and reparations for 
around 9 million victims; and spurred unprecedented levels of public 
investment in the country's far-flung and historically neglected rural 
areas. USAID has been Colombia's most valued partner in advancing 
implementation of the Accord.
    The Accord is not perfect, and implementation is uneven. Overall, 
it has helped the country transition to a new, more hopeful chapter 
while creating new opportunities for development investment. Its 
survival itself is notable, given that 50 percent of similar peace 
accords across the globe collapse during the first 5 years. We note the 
important progress that Colombia has won through its choice to 
negotiate an exit from conflict, even if implementation remains a 
formidable challenge.
                  usaid's support of the peace process
    USAID's support to peace implementation has been vital. Our 
assistance is closely aligned with the Accord's Rural Development, 
Transitional Justice, and Ethnic Inclusion chapters. With regard to the 
Rural Development Chapter, USAID has made implementation of Colombia's 
own Territorially-Focused Development Programs the centerpiece of our 
support under the firm belief that addressing the rural-urban divide is 
the best path for Colombia out of violent conflict.
    USAID assistance for land titling, financial inclusion, expansion 
of the Colombian State, and rapid response community development 
projects directly supports the Rural Development Chapter and is 
bringing tangible benefits to conflict-affected communities throughout 
rural Colombia. USAID's more nimble and flexible programs help pave the 
way for, and mobilize, much larger Colombian Government investments in 
the municipalities selected for peace resources.
    Notably, we have increased our assistance to the transitional 
justice system agreed to in the accords. A truth and justice response 
seen as successful and legitimate will help Colombia move decisively 
forward to reconcile and come to terms with the violent past. USAID's 
assistance seeks to help Colombia reconcile and move beyond past 
atrocities and establish consequences for transgressions committed on 
all sides during the state's conflict with the FARC. Last year, the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (or JEP) issued 34 indictments for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in two major cases. USAID assistance 
has helped accelerate JEP cases and better protect witnesses. USAID 
also has helped the Unit for the Search of Disappeared Persons and the 
Truth Commission reach victims all over the country.
    With regard to the Ethnic Inclusion Chapter, the Accord recognizes 
that the full economic, political, and social participation of Afro-
Colombians and Indigenous peoples is key to a lasting peace. USAID is 
profoundly committed to this goal. USAID recently launched the Agency's 
largest award wholly dedicated to ethnic inclusion. Moreover, and to 
advance Administrator Power's focus on aid localization, USAID is proud 
to have direct grants with four local Afro-Colombian and Indigenous 
organizations that advance self-determined development, COVID-19 
recovery, peacebuilding, and environmental conservation. Hand-in-hand 
with those organizations, representing some of the country's most 
prominent ethnic leaders, we are advancing implementation of the Ethnic 
Inclusion Chapter, building the leadership skills of young people, and 
protecting five new indigenous community conservation areas--totaling 
772 square miles of protected territories.
    USAID's comprehensive support is a recognition of the strategic 
possibilities the Accord offers to address the root causes of violence 
while expanding equity, economic opportunities, and justice throughout 
Colombia's historically neglected rural areas.
    While significant progress has been made, Colombia today faces 
severe and unanticipated shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
migration crisis from Venezuela, and the continued rise in coca 
cultivation--which has fueled violence against human rights defenders, 
social leaders and environmental defenders. These shocks have widened 
the gap between Colombia's fortunate and struggling classes and 
exacerbated long-standing grievances, resulting in widespread national 
protests. These shocks threaten progress made in Colombia's transition 
from conflict to an inclusive peace and USAID is working to help 
Colombia address these issues head on.
                       covid-19 pandemic response
    The COVID-19 pandemic has made peace implementation and integrated 
rural development more difficult. Colombia implemented one of the 
longest, and most strict quarantines in the world. The effects were 
similarly devastating across Latin America--loss of livelihoods from a 
paralyzed economy, learning losses among the youth and a marked 
increase in gender-based violence as victims were trapped with their 
aggressors. The COVID-19 pandemic also enabled illegal groups in 
Colombia's rural areas to assert territorial control and terrorize 
communities.
    USAID adjusted fast to support Colombia's COVID-19 response across 
our health, humanitarian, livelihoods, peacebuilding, and governance 
programming. We've provided food assistance and bolstered health 
capacities in rural and underserved urban areas. As the pandemic hit 
ethnic communities particularly hard, we provided over 70,000 Afro-
Colombian and Indigenous peoples from La Guajira, Choco, Amazonas and 
elsewhere with life-saving food, water, and non-medical supplies. We 
helped schools shift to virtual learning, engaging thousands of 
children at risk of falling behind or being recruited by illegal armed 
groups. The United States is also helping Colombia with COVID 
vaccinations. To date, the United States has donated 6 million 
vaccines, with USAID providing complementary technical assistance in 
support of Colombia's efforts to turn the vaccines into vaccinations. 
We're now focused on the future, getting Colombia's youth back to 
school and supporting inclusive, and sustainable economic recovery, 
including income generation and job opportunities for vulnerable 
populations.
                      addressing coca cultivation
    Coca's rapid expansion across the peace geography also greatly 
complicates rural development. As the demobilized FARC stepped away 
from the battlefield, this created a void in the control of the 
lucrative narcotics trade. In vying for control of the enterprise, 
armed groups have increased violence and innocent civilians, 
particularly social leaders, are caught in the crossfire. While this 
was predicted when the Accord was being negotiated, the situation only 
underscores the need to continue efforts to bring democratic 
governance, institutional presence, security, and licit development to 
coca growing regions.
    Last October, the White House announced the Biden-Harris 
Administration's implementation of a more integrated and holistic 
approach to counter-narcotics in Colombia. This bilateral strategy--
which USAID works closely to implement with our State Department 
colleagues--aims to make eradication gains more sustainable by better 
integrating expanded state presence, licit economic opportunities, and 
strengthening the social fabric of communities weakened by decades of 
conflict. The strategy links counter-narcotics progress to peace, as 
there is close geographic overlap between drug crops and Peace Accord 
implementation. USAID works closely with Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and others across the 
interagency to assist Colombia in the pursuit of the goals of this 
strategy that better balances a range of complementary interventions 
including access to state services, institutional presence, rule of law 
to guarantee basic constitutional rights, income for licit producers, 
eradication of coca, and permanent territorial control.
    An example of this integrated approach is our amplified focus on 
land formalization, including titling, as an important precondition to 
licit development. USAID is betting heavily on the power of land 
ownership as the best determinant of how that land is used into the 
future. Formal title to land opens access to credit and allows the 
titleholder the security to make long-term investments in their plot. 
It also creates iron-clad incentives to stay legal by giving the 
government the power to sanction the owner with confiscation. Land 
titling promises important coca reduction benefits, given estimates 
that recidivism rates for coca cultivation without a land title is 70 
to 75 percent, whereas it is 20 percent with a land title. USAID has 
piloted municipal-wide titling sweeps in areas emblematic of armed 
conflict, like Colombia's Montes de Maria area, which was victimized by 
successive waves of FARC and paramilitary abuses.
    Having partnered with the Colombian Government to deliver over 
2,500 rural titles in just one municipality in this area--the first 
massive land titling initiative in Colombia's history--USAID's approach 
takes these processes to areas where our conflict, coca, and peace 
goals coincide. The Agency is intensively mapping and collecting 
household data to process land titles in the first of three priority 
municipalities that were agreed to during last October's High Level 
Dialogue with Colombia. USAID anticipates using this as a test case for 
success in other coca growing municipalities. We know that land is at 
the heart of Colombia's conflict and are convinced that it must be 
central to the solution.
                        protecting human rights
    Coca cultivation is closely linked to violence and human rights 
violations. As the FARC laid down its arms under the Peace Accord, 
criminal gangs have entered into violent competition to control 
territory and illegal economies. Social and environmental leaders--the 
voice of peaceful advocacy for the democratic rights of rural 
communities--have become even more vulnerable to violent attack.
    What is clear is that if you are a Colombian environmental 
defender, your life may be directly at risk. If you organize to promote 
victims' rights or repossession of stolen land, you can expect to be a 
target. If you promote a vision of your territory that is less 
dependent on coca or illegal mining, you expose yourself to real 
danger. And if you are a child, vulnerable while out of school and with 
your family facing increased socio-economic hardship, you are at 
increased risk of forceful recruitment by illegal armed groups. In line 
with historic trends, violence disproportionately affects diverse 
ethnic communities.
    In the face of the chilling rise in threats and murders of social 
leaders, USAID has deepened efforts to support human rights defenders 
and environmental leaders. We helped the National Protection Unit--a 
government entity USAID was instrumental in establishing--to tailor 
life-saving protection plans for women, Afro-Colombian, and indigenous 
leaders, resulting in more effective use of collective protection.
    Increasing accountability for crimes committed against human rights 
defenders is a top priority and one that is shared across the United 
States Government. Through USAID's partnership with the U.N. Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, we helped the Attorney General 
secure 88 sentences in human rights defender homicide cases to date. We 
know there is more work to do, but are encouraged by these positive 
steps toward greater accountability. It is more important than ever 
that the United States stand beside these courageous partners.
                       venezuelan migrant crisis
    The crisis in Venezuela--the greatest migratory crisis in this 
hemisphere's history--has diverted focus and resources away from peace 
implementation. Colombia now hosts nearly 2 million Venezuelan migrants 
and refugees, all seeking a better life. Colombia welcomed them with 
open arms, and USAID quickly adjusted to help Colombia meet this 
unforeseen challenge.
    The United States helped provide a humanitarian lifeline through 
food, medicine, and shelter.
    Colombia has launched Temporary Protected Status (TPS) programs for 
Venezuelans and is just one example of Colombian generosity to the 
Venezuelan people. TPS is Colombian-led, but assistance from the United 
States has catalyzed its launch and implementation. Modest U.S. 
investments, in the form of additional staff and equipment, enabled 
Colombia to move decisively to register Venezuelans, thus allowing them 
to access basic services and seek employment.
    Colombia's response to the crisis has contributed to hemispheric 
stability; positively improves the lives of millions of vulnerable 
migrants; and helps migrants contribute productively to Colombia. 
Colombia's example offers a promising migration management model for 
the region. USAID is maximizing limited resources by working with the 
Colombian Government and the private sector to help with the socio and 
economic integration of migrants.
                       mitigating climate change
    Colombia's peace and climate change agendas are closely linked. 
Similarly to migration, Colombia has responded to its environmental 
challenges with innovation and leadership. The country's Paris 
Agreement commitments set an example through their ambitious targets of 
a 51 percent reduction over baseline by 2030, net zero deforestation by 
2030, and carbon neutrality by 2050.
    Moreover, President Duque has identified the natural environment as 
one of Colombia's most strategic assets. Protecting environmental 
assets, particularly tropical forests, carbon sinks, and the country's 
rich biodiversity in order to achieve climate change goals will require 
innovative development investments in many of the same municipalities 
where the Peace Accord is being implemented.
    USAID's Mission in Colombia oversees the Agency's largest natural 
environment investment in the hemisphere--fitting for the second most 
biodiverse country in the world. Much of our environmental work, 
particularly that related to tropical forests and biodiversity 
conservation, as well as addressing illegal gold mining, is centered in 
conflict-affected areas. We undertake this work in close collaboration 
with Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities, empowering them to 
balance development with conservation. For example, our work assisting 
Afro Colombian and Indigenous communities to conserve tropical forests 
and then sell carbon credits from the standing forests to firms seeking 
to offset their carbon footprints is generating an important income 
stream for badly needed social and economic investment in these 
communities.
    Our investments in the environment reinforce our peace and security 
goals. The same organized criminal elements who profit from coca also 
seek to capitalize on illegal logging, deforestation, illegal mining, 
and other environmental crimes, all which have increased in recent 
years. USAID's environmental protection activities work in concert with 
INL's efforts to assist Colombian law enforcement to prosecute these 
crimes and place added pressure on these organizations, while denying 
them safe havens in protected areas such as national parks and forest 
reserves.
                               conclusion
    USAID is proud to be a partner with Colombia on the path away from 
decades of conflict towards peace and prosperity. Our task now is to 
make that peace irreversible in the face of continuing challenges.
    The Accord's implementation, while on pace with international 
norms, has been slower than many would like. Yet it remains a long-
term, Colombian-led framework for stability, security, 
counternarcotics, and economic development.
    The Colombian track record of self-improvement is undeniable. Much 
has been accomplished in a short amount of time. USAID has used our 
resources to support innovative government programs, mobilize 
Colombia's own human and financial capital, and support the resilience 
and bravery of Colombian civil society. The trust and progress built in 
this relationship will continue to provide a strong foundation for our 
future investments.
    In closing, in the words of USAID partner Luis Fernando Arias, a 
leading voice of Colombia's indigenous movement and a champion of the 
Accord's Ethnic Inclusion Chapter: ``We have to continue working for a 
country that is more humane, peaceful, equitable, and inclusive . . .. 
We are here because Colombia cannot have one more victim.'' Luis 
Fernando tragically died as a result of COVID-19 last year. We honor 
his memory and may his words be our call to action today.

    The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony. 
We will start our round of 5 minutes.
    Secretary Nichols, the United States has designated 15 
countries as major non-NATO allies, including two in the 
Western Hemisphere: Argentina and Brazil. This special status 
elevates our closest partners and provides special benefits and 
security cooperation. Given the expansive security partnership 
between our countries, my new legislation would formally 
designate Colombia as a major non-NATO ally.
    It is also important to note that the ties between NATO and 
Colombia have grown over the last decade. In 2017, Colombia 
became the first country in Latin America to achieve the status 
of NATO global partner, underscoring the nation's leadership on 
security matters, not just in the Western Hemisphere but 
globally. President Biden has said that Colombia is, ``the 
keystone of U.S. policy towards Latin America.'' I fully agree 
and believe it is time we formalize Colombia's role.
    So Secretary Nichols, given the United States' close 
bilateral and multilateral security partnership with Colombia, 
what is your assessment of formally designating Colombia as a 
major non-NATO ally?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would certainly 
welcome the initiative and the framework that your bill brings 
to bear, and major non-NATO ally status is something that I 
believe sends a positive signal, given the tremendous progress 
in the relationship that we have with Colombia. Typically, the 
process for designating a country has been with the 
recommendation of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense to the President. I do not want to jump over that 
process, but I know I cannot think of any country that better 
fits that role.
    The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that. I think it is long 
overdue, personally, and I hope that this jump-starts a 
conversation within the Administration to come to that 
conclusion.
    Let me ask you one other question. In recent weeks Putin, 
as part of a desperate effort to distract from the imminent 
assault of the Ukrainian people, has sought to expand support 
for this hemisphere's dictators. In an apparent attempt to 
intimidate our closest partner, Russia's military advisors are 
accompanying Venezuelan military personnel near the Colombia 
border.
    Frankly, Russia's support for the region's dictators have 
already destabilized Latin America. Upwards of 6 million 
Venezuelans have fled their homeland as a result of Russia 
coaching the Maduro regime. The instrumentalization of 
vulnerable refugees is part of the Russian playbook to provide 
crises, overwhelm governments, deepen divisions.
    As has been testified here, nearly 2 million Venezuelans 
have sought refuge in Colombia, challenging the government's 
efforts to respond to long-term issues related to social and 
economic inequality, internal displacement, the pandemic.
    When Russia is not launching all-out attacks against 
countries it is intimidating, extorting, and sowing mis- and 
disinformation, all of which aim to shake the foundations of 
democracy around the world.
    How should we interpret Russia's presence in the region? 
What are the security implications for Colombia?
    Mr. Nichols. Russia seeks to destabilize our region, to 
inject conflict intention from other parts of the world to the 
Western Hemisphere. I had the opportunity to discuss these 
issues with our Colombian counterparts last week in a 
delegation led by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nuland. 
We remain vigilant about the Russian activities, both along the 
border with Colombia, but more broadly in our region. We also 
seek to prop up the tinpot dictators that they support in our 
hemisphere.
    The Chairman. Well, and that to me is another reason why 
this deepening of relationship with Colombia is important 
within the hemisphere as a whole.
    Administrator Escobari, Colombia's longstanding challenges 
with social and economic inequality reached an apex last year 
when the combined effects of the pandemic and the tax reform 
proposal--which, by the way, I called ill-fated, but in large 
part in response to the IMF and the IMF pressures on countries 
like Colombia. It is a broader question for another time, but 
it seems to me the IMF needs to have a smoothing period for 
these countries, not to walk away from their responsibilities.
    If you are going to require some rather dramatic financial 
challenges in the midst of a pandemic--and we have seen what we 
have had to do as a nation to try to meet that challenge, not 
every country has the wherewithal to do that--it needs to have 
a smoothing period, but that tax reform proposal led to mass 
protests, blockades, deeply concerning images of police 
violence.
    It was clear to me then and now that we have not done 
enough to work with our Colombian partners to facilitate the 
conditions for inclusive economic growth. The pandemic actually 
plunged three million Colombians into poverty. It is critically 
important that we engage, both politically and 
programmatically, to minimize these gaps and help level the 
playing field for all Colombians, including underrepresented 
communities such as Afro-Colombian and indigenous people.
    So I heard what you said that we are doing, but I want to 
challenge you and say, how do we best use our programming to 
promote and support an inclusive economic growth in Colombia, 
and how are we engaging on the issue of trying to foster 
greater engagement by the private sector as part of our 
solution to meet that economic need?
    Ms. Escobari. Thank you, Senator. There is no doubt that 
Colombia has made tremendous progress and has huge growth 
potential, right, but this growth potential needs to--we need 
to make sure that it is inclusive and that is reaches these 
neglected rural areas, and more so as Colombia tries to recover 
from COVID-19 and tries to integrate the Venezuelan migrants.
    I think there are huge opportunities for the 
diversification of the economy. It has huge opportunities in 
the agricultural sector and to modernize an entrepreneurial 
class, but what we need to do, and what we have done as USAID 
is make sure that that modern, robust, 21st century Colombia 
reaches the rural areas. We did it with financial inclusion 
where we helped mobilize over $1 billion through Colombian 
banks, to SMEs and micro-entrepreneurs in rural areas, and I 
think a lot more can be done to help these farmers link to 
supply chains, elicit development, and export their products 
abroad.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Nichols, 
in March of 2020, almost 2 years ago now, the U.S. and Colombia 
announced a joint plan to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine 
production by 50 percent by the end of 2023. We know it is 
going in the wrong direction and does not seem to be turning 
around. Do you believe that Colombia can meet these goals 
without conducting aerial eradication?
    Mr. Nichols. I believe that manual eradication, 
comprehensive alternative development programming, efforts to 
improve rural livelihoods can significantly improve Colombia's 
ability to address illicit coca cultivation. Bringing better 
rural governance to the country, fully implementing the 
chapters of the Peace Accord that deal with improving rural 
livelihood will all help achieve that goal.
    I served in both Colombia and Peru. Peru has never had 
aerial eradication programming, and made substantial gains in 
addressing illicit coca cultivation.
    Senator Risch. Well, you would agree with me, though, that 
aerial eradication is significantly more robust than the other 
methods, hand removal and those kinds of things. Do you agree 
with that?
    Mr. Nichols. I think it is a choice for each country. 
Colombia is a sovereign country and should they choose to 
pursue aerial eradication, that will be their decision, but 
whatever they determine we seek to work with them to address 
the threat of coca cultivation and trafficking.
    Senator Risch. Well, that was not really the question. The 
question was do you not agree that aerial eradication is the, 
by far, most robust and the most efficient way to do 
eradication?
    Mr. Nichols. I feel like I am taking away from my 
distinguished colleague from INL. However, I note that there 
can be ancillary effects from aerial eradication that diminish 
rural livelihoods and raise concerns. So I do not think you can 
just look at the amount of hectares that have been eradicated 
without looking at the full impact of the policy.
    I think it can be very effective, but it requires a 
thorough analysis, and it is a sovereign decision for the 
Columbians.
    Senator Risch. What is the U.S. policy in regard to that? 
Do we not have one?
    Mr. Nichols. Our policy is that it is a decision for 
Colombia to make, and if Colombia decides to pursue aerial 
eradication we will support that.
    Senator Risch. We do not encourage them either way. Is that 
what you are saying?
    Mr. Nichols. We encourage them to decide what is best for 
them.
    Senator Risch. We do not encourage them, as far as which of 
these methods of eradication to choose, they should choose.
    Mr. Nichols. We are not pushing them one way or the other.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. Secretary Robinson, it is 
estimated that the FARC has only delivered about $12.9 million 
of the $291 million it pledged to surrender by the end of 2020, 
for reparations to their victims. What is FARC doing--well, 
first of all, why has FARC not surrendered those funds?
    Mr. Robinson. I think that is probably a question for my 
distinguished colleague from the Western Hemisphere. I am not 
familiar with the FARC having to deliver this money, but I can 
get an answer and find out for you.
    Senator Risch. Well, thank you very much.
    Secretary Nichols, I guess he threw you under the bus. Can 
you answer the question?
    Mr. Nichols. I am happy to be under the bus.
    Senator Risch. It is not a good place to be.
    Mr. Nichols. The FARC has many steps that it needs to 
undertake to comply with the Peace Accord. Among that is 
reparations and implementing decisions from the Justice and 
Peace Courts. They have cited a lack of resources as part of 
their inability to provide reparations to victims, but it is an 
ongoing process.
    Senator Risch. Do you believe that to be true, that they 
lack resources?
    Mr. Nichols. I find that difficult to believe, given the 
experience that I had with the peace process in El Salvador 
when I served there.
    Senator Risch. Do you know what they are doing with those 
funds instead of surrendering them?
    Mr. Nichols. Well, I do not know what they would be doing 
with those funds, but I imagine that some funds are buried 
underground, some funds are in foreign bank accounts, some 
funds are with the individual FARC members who decided not to 
demobilize, would be my guess, but I cannot say for certain.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
each of our witnesses for being here today.
    Assistant Secretary Robinson, I want to begin with you and 
pick up a little bit on the questioning that Senator Risch had 
with respect to our policies working with the Colombian 
Government to address domestic cultivation and production of 
opioids, or opiates, because coming from a state that has had a 
real challenge with opioids, we would like to see fewer drugs 
getting across the border from South America and into the 
United States.
    So recognizing that we do not tell the Colombian Government 
that they should do aerial eradication, what are we doing to 
try and address the illicit production of drugs in the country?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you very much for that question. We 
have a very robust relationship with the Colombian Government, 
and my bureau in particular, with the Colombian National 
Police. For a number of years we have worked very closely 
training and equipping the National Police and making sure that 
they have the tools necessary to go after these networks. As I 
mentioned in my statement, in October we agreed on a new 
strategy which will broaden that effort, helping them to reduce 
the supply side by continuing with eradication, investigations, 
and targeting networks, by extending the state out to rural 
areas, both on the security side, but also on the development 
side, and by adding a new twist, helping them investigate 
environmental crimes.
    We know that what these criminals are doing is negatively 
affecting the environment, and this is another way that we 
think we can be successful in going after these networks.
    Senator Shaheen. Do we have data that shows that we are 
succeeding in those efforts? The last time--and it has been 
several years ago now, but the last time I saw a report on the 
drugs that were being produced in Colombia, the production had 
actually gone up, because of the decline in aerial eradication. 
Not gone down. So do you have any data to support the 
effectiveness of the policies?
    Mr. Robinson. Well I think, frankly, the data is mixed. We 
know that production is going down, but the cultivation is 
increasing. That is why we are working as closely as we can 
with the Colombian National Police to go to those areas. We 
continue to do eradication. We continue to do manual 
eradication, but frankly what we need to do is a better job--
what the Colombians need to do, with our help, is a better job 
of going after their finances. We are working with them on 
that. My colleagues at DHS are also working with them on that.
    Senator Shaheen. Good. I look forward to hearing what more 
we can do to address that.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols, the 2016 Peace Accords 
provided for groundbreaking and comprehensive gender 
priorities, and yet the Kroc Institute for International Peace 
Studies, which is monitoring the implementation of the Peace 
Accord has reported that implementation of the gender 
commitments of that accord is not advancing as rapidly as the 
general accord implementation. In fact, according to their 
latest report released in November, the gender commitments have 
only reached 12 percent implementation while the general accord 
implementation is considered to be 30 percent complete.
    So it has been over 5 years now. What is the State 
Department and USAID doing to ensure that the gender-related 
commitments are implemented?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much. I wholeheartedly agree 
with your question and concern. Women and girls 
disproportionately suffered under the conflict and continue to 
be disadvantaged as Colombia seeks to emerge from the COVID-19 
pandemic and economic dislocation.
    We are working comprehensively to provide support to women 
and girls through things like entrepreneurship program, small 
and micro finance programming, training, providing support to 
Colombian institutions to implement the 2016 Peace Accord. I 
can go deeper if you would like, but I want to make sure my 
colleague also has a chance.
    Ms. Escobari. Sure, no, thank you, Senator, for your focus 
on this issue. In responding to this reality, Colombia has one 
of USAID's largest standalone gender programs anywhere in the 
world, and dedicated staff in the field mission to focus on 
this problem. It actually launched this last October, a $35 
million program dealing with issues of gender equity, changing 
societal attitudes, gender-related policies, and protecting 
human rights of women and girls. We are linking with the 
Colombian Vice President, who is also very committed to these 
issues, and make sure that gender cuts through all of our 
programming. So when we are working with land titles, 50 
percent of those land titles went to women. So we want to make 
sure that gender cuts through everything that we do.
    Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you. I am pleased to hear that 
and look forward to seeing the ongoing studies that show how 
the implementation is working
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 
all of you for your testimony today. I have been concerned by 
reports of increasing violence in Colombia's rural regions, 
especially near the Venezuelan border. I understand that these 
attacks are being perpetrated primarily by FARC dissidents as 
well as the ELN, the National Liberation Army, an even more 
violent group. I especially concerned of the toll this is 
taking on civilian populations, on indigenous groups, and on 
human rights defenders, all of whom have been targeted.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols, what is the Colombian 
Government plan to address these issues, and how can we help 
them?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. The Segunda Marquetalia, a 
FARC dissident group, and the ELN have launched attacks against 
Colombian Government installations, against airports, against 
military facilities, using safe haven from Venezuela to help 
them achieve those attacks. Last week we met with a variety of 
senior Colombian officials to talk about a comprehensive 
approach under the high-level strategic security dialogue to 
our cooperation.
    Among the things that we are looking at are strengthening 
our cooperation in intelligence sharing, training, mobility, 
cybersecurity, all those areas, police and law enforcement 
strengthening, to help them deal with the threats posed by the 
FARC dissident groups and ELN.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Do you have any concerns at 
this point that that violence could lead to any unraveling of 
the Peace Accord, or are you confident that it can be 
addressed?
    Mr. Nichols. I believe it can be addressed. I believe that 
the Colombian military, and security forces broadly and broader 
government, have the capacity and training to deal with those 
threats, and I believe that those FARC members who have the 
original FARC that demobilized as part of the 2016 agreement 
remain committed to that agreement.
    Senator Van Hollen. Let me turn to some of the issues 
regarding human rights abuses among the Colombian police. As 
you know, Plan Colombia and other U.S. assistance has been very 
successful at helping Colombia consolidate its democracy, to 
improve the economic situation, but despite billions of dollars 
that we have provided, the Colombia security forces continue to 
be involved in serious human rights violations, including the 
killings of dozens of civilians during mass protests in 2021. 
As you know, Under Secretary Nuland just announced last week 
another $8 million in assistance.
    What mechanisms do we have in place to prevent our funds, 
our help, from being implicated in any way in these kinds of 
human rights abuses?
    Mr. Nichols. Well, the $8 million that was announced last 
week is precisely to support the Colombian National Police's 
human rights respect and response. It goes to vetting police 
officers, providing training for officers, providing greater 
investigatory capability when there is an accusation of human 
rights violations, and I think those are all very important 
steps. I will note that President Duque himself has repeatedly 
said that he has a zero-tolerance policy for human rights 
violations.
    The protests that took place, there have been 
investigations into police actions, both internally within the 
police as well as the Colombian attorney general, and there has 
been some accountability, but more remains to be done.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, in keeping with the stated zero-
tolerance policy, what actions have we done to cut off any 
assistance that may have gone to units who committed the 
abuses, like the anti-riot police who killed protesters in 
2021? Have we made clear that none of our funds should go to 
that unit?
    Mr. Nichols. So we cannot provide funds to any unit that 
violates human rights, under the Leahy amendment. That is part 
of our legal commitment.
    Senator Van Hollen. So, Mr. Secretary, I see my time is 
running out, so is your answer that none of our funds are going 
to that unit?
    Mr. Nichols. I will defer to my colleague from INL.
    Mr. Robinson. Yes, no. We have not funded and we are not 
funding any of the units that were involved in the human rights 
abuses.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I do not have any other members 
presently.
    Senator Risch. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cruz has indicated 
that he is on the way.
    The Chairman. Oh, I will want to wait forever for Senator 
Cruz. I should wait. I will ask another question.
    I am sure our panel would be thrilled to wait for that 
question. Let me ask you this. I heard you, Senator Robinson, 
say, you touched upon combating financial crimes. There are two 
elements as we deal with the drug trafficking--well, three 
elements. One, we have to reduce our demand in the United 
States. That is something that we need to work on. Two, is that 
we have to hit them where it hurts, and that is on the 
financial side, and three, if you have a poor Colombian farmer 
and you do not give them an alternative to a sustainable 
development opportunity they are going to grow coca, or 
cultivate it, as you noted that the cultivation is growing 
higher than production.
    So with reference to the first part, hitting them hard 
where it hurts, you touched upon it. How are we focusing our 
attention with the Colombians in terms of combatting financial 
crimes associated with the drug trade? What additional steps 
are we taking to strengthen anti-money laundering initiatives? 
Then, finally, for Administrator Escobari, how are we 
specifically targeting some of our programs to deal with those 
poor farmers who we need to give an alternative with one that 
actually helps them sustain their families instead of 
cultivating or actively engaging in the drug trade?
    So let us start off with you, Mr. Secretary.
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have, for a 
number of years now, been working very closely with 
Colombia's--I always forget the name of this--the financial 
investigative unit, and we have experts working with them to 
target the financial networks of these criminals. We have been 
doing that. We expect to enhance that relationship with our new 
strategy. That is number one.
    As I mentioned earlier, we are working closely with the 
Department of Homeland Security HSI to go after illegal 
activity at the ports. We have experts on the ground at the 
ports, working on security, investigations, and also tracking 
illicit finance.
    So those are two ways, two things that we are going to do 
to enhance going after the money laundering aspect of this side 
of the criminal activity.
    The Chairman. Administrator.
    Ms. Escobari. To answer your question on alternative licit 
livelihoods, you know, we are very optimistic with this new 
holistic and sequencing approach, where USAID complements 
eradication and interdiction, where we provide licit crops, 
land titling, local government strengthening, access to rule of 
law, and options for youth empowerment. This really 
dramatically increases the chances of success, because when you 
take this holistic approach, and this very place-based 
approach, it really gives people an option out of coca.
    Senator Shaheen had asked for data, and in one of these 
experiments or pilots that we are running on land titling, we 
have seen that without a land title about three-quarters of 
coca growers replant after eradication, but with a title, 
replanting drops to 20 percent.
    So I think this holistic approach would really make a 
different. I have seen it. I traveled to Caceres. I thought 
that it was naive to believe that people would give up this 
profitable trade, but really, people hate living under the 
thumb of these thugs and being subject to violence. So I think 
if we create the opportunities, people will take it.
    The Chairman. All right. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nichols, welcome 
back.
    As we discussed the last time you appeared before this 
committee, I am deeply concerned about the Biden 
administration's decision in November to dismantle terrorism 
sanctions against the FARC and against FARC members. The FARC 
is an organization of Marxist, Leninist, and narco-terrorists. 
For decades, they have killed and kidnapped and extorted 
Colombians. They have murdered and seized American citizens. 
They continue to pose an acute threat to Colombian security and 
to American interests across the region.
    The last time we spoke the decision to dismantle terrorism 
sanctions had just been announced. Since then, presumably, you 
have had some time to evaluate the effects. I want to ask you 
some questions about that.
    One of the reasons publicly cited for the removal of the 
FTL listing was to provide certain types of U.S. assistance to 
FARC for reintegration into Colombian society. I believe that 
justification is deeply flawed, but it was at least a reason 
that the Administration cited for dismantling the sanctions.
    So have you distributed any such aid, and if so, what 
checks were in place to ensure funding was not used for 
terrorists?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure to see 
you again. The decision to designate the FARC EP and the 
Segunda Marquetalia as the current groups engaged in terror 
activity in Colombia was one fully concordant with the process 
of implementing the Peace Accords. We have continued our 
efforts to provide broad assistance to rural areas in 
Colombia----
    Senator Cruz. Mr. Nichols, if I could ask you to answer the 
specific question I asked, which is have you distributed any 
such aid to the FARC or members of the FARC?
    Mr. Nichols. I would have to defer to my colleague from 
USAID on the specifics of their program.
    Ms. Escobari. We do not work or support terrorists. We do 
not give any funds. They are not eligible to receive funds from 
USAID, and we actually have----
    Senator Cruz. So your testimony is that the Biden 
administration has not given any funds to FARC or members of 
the FARC.
    Ms. Escobari. Right. They have not.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. Good.
    Ms. Escobari. --deserters and people who have laid down 
their arms.
    Senator Cruz. So alongside removing terrorism sanctions on 
FARC, you also removed terrorist sanctions on individual FARC 
members. The press release that the Biden administration 
published listed literally hundreds of entities. A few weeks 
later, on December 11, Colombia's Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace, an independent entity tasked with implementing the Peace 
Accords, issued summons for 47 FARC members because they had 
been involved in the forced recruitment of children for the 
conflict and for child trafficking. Five of these individuals 
had been sanctioned by the United States for their roles until 
you removed them a few weeks earlier.
    Did the State Department consult with the Colombians about 
these individuals before lifting sanctions, and did you 
reimpose sanctions after the announcement of their involvement 
with child traffickers?
    Mr. Nichols. So the process of delisting the FARC and 
listing FARC EP and Segunda Marquetalia was done in 
consultation with the government of Colombia. The FARC, as the 
organization that signed the 2016 peace agreement, is not 
listed as a terror organization in Colombia. U.S. immigration 
law prevent the entry of any of the members of the FARC who 
took up arms.
    Senator Cruz. So was the Biden State Department aware of 
the work and impending decision of Colombia's Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace at the time you lifted the sanctions on 
these individuals?
    Mr. Nichols. They do not consult their decisions with the 
United States Government before----
    Senator Cruz. So you were not aware of it?
    Mr. Nichols. Not to my knowledge.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. I want to shift, in my remaining time, 
to Mexico. Mr. Nichols, as you know and we have discussed, I am 
deeply concerned about deepening civil unrest in Mexico and the 
breakdown there of civil society. The breakdown of the rule of 
law across our southern border poses acute national security 
challenges and dangers to the United States, on issues ranging 
from counternarcotics to illegal immigration.
    The current climate faced by politicians and journalists in 
Mexico is the deadliest ever. In 2020, more journalists were 
killed in Mexico than in any other country in the world. It 
alone accounted for almost a third of the journalists killed. 
Since the start of the electoral process in September 2020, 
over 80 politicians were assassinated by criminal 
organizations, and more than 60 candidates suspended their 
campaigns under duress.
    President Lopez Obrador seems intent on making all of these 
trends worse. On Friday, he used his morning press conference 
to intimidate one of Mexico's highest profile journalists, 
Carlos Loret de Mola. He waved around private financial 
information and asked authorities to investigate it. He seems 
to be indulging in abusing power, no matter the effect on 
Mexico or the U.S.-Mexico relations.
    What steps is the Biden administration taking to convey to 
the Mexican Government that their behavior is undermining the 
rule of law and that is, in turn, endangering American security 
and the U.S.-Mexico relationship?
    Mr. Nichols. We have a deep and comprehensive relationship 
with Mexico on security issues. My colleague from INL and I 
were in Mexico last year to discuss these issues, and our 
embassy continues to be engaged on the full range of security 
questions.
    Senator Cruz. What have you expressed about the murder of 
journalists, politicians, and the intimidation of journalists?
    Mr. Nichols. We have said that we believe that the murder 
of journalists and the murder of civil society members is a 
tremendous problem and a stain for all of us. We need to take 
actions to protect those important members of Mexican society. 
It is crucial for us to redouble our efforts to protect 
politicians, journalists, civil society members. It is vital, 
and we talk about that with our Mexican colleagues all the 
time.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow 
up on Senator Cruz's questioning regarding Mexico. I, too, am 
very concerned about the situation there. I was also in Mexico 
last year. I met with government officials, but also members of 
the private sector there in Mexico and with American interests 
that are present in Mexico, where we have significant 
investments.
    We have trade agreements with Mexico that are not being 
honored properly. I am very concerned about the lack of the 
rule of law that Senator Cruz mentioned, and I would like to 
get your assessment of where we are today versus where we were, 
say, a year and a half ago.
    Mr. Nichols. I think we have a very positive, constructive, 
frank relationship with the Mexican Government. I think we 
agree on a great many things, and there are a great many issues 
that we need to work with them to move forward on.
    You talk about issues that are of great import to us. 
Working to forge a cohesive North American energy policy that 
is green, that is respectful of the rights of the private 
sector----
    Senator Hagerty. Does that include confiscation of American 
investments in Mexico? Are you for that?
    Mr. Nichols. I am against that.
    Senator Hagerty. I think you should be. This would take a 
lot more time than we have.
    I would like to turn our conversation now, though, to 
Colombia. If you think about the activity of the Chinese 
Communist Party, around the world Colombia is one of the areas 
that I am most concerned about. Back in 2019, Xi Jinping hosted 
President Duque from Colombia and they agreed on a number of 
bilateral projects. They are now developing--the Chinese are 
now developing the Bogota Metro, the Bogota Regional Railway. 
They are doing the 4G and 5G systems around many parts of 
Colombia and infrastructure projects.
    I want to talk now and turn our attention to the U.S.-
Colombia Growth Initiative. That was a significant investment 
to try to help strengthen Colombia's economic and rural 
development. The DFC committed some $1 billion to 30 projects 
there in sectors ranging from critical infrastructure to 
financial services.
    Could you give me an update of where we are on that 
commitment, where those projects stand today?
    Mr. Nichols. So DFC continues to work to develop projects 
in Colombia. I met with Pro Columbia, their government 
investment arm last week to discuss the projects. There are six 
projects that were in various stages when I met. One of our 
priorities is through DFC and other mechanisms to increase 
investment through Build Back Better World in Colombia. That is 
something that we believe can be transformative. Colombia and 
the United States have a $30 billion trade relationship, and we 
would like to see even greater investment there.
    I met with the American Chamber of Commerce to talk about 
the obstacles that American companies face when investing in 
Colombia, and we agreed to continue our efforts to support the 
U.S. investment.
    Senator Hagerty. Can I come back to what you just said? You 
said that there are six projects underway. Does that mean that 
24 of the 30 that were agreed to have not yet commenced?
    Mr. Nichols. So I am not aware of those projects that 
occurred during the prior Administration so I do not know 
specifically----
    Senator Hagerty. This is a significant investment, and our 
economic security and our ties there are going to be critical 
to our national security. So I would like to ask you if you 
could get back to me and to this committee with an update on 
where we stand with respect to those 30 projects that were 
committed by the DFC under the previous Administration, and 
what the plan is to see those executed. Again, I think those 
are going to be critical to our prosperity.

[Editor's note.--The requested information referred to above 
follows:]

    The U.S. relationship with Colombia remains strong, and the United 
States continues to support a wide array of initiatives to boost 
economic growth in the country. DFC supports highly developmental 
projects in Colombia and constantly considers new private sector 
proposals. I referenced six new projects in my previous testimony that 
were approved in 2021. More broadly, DFC has 34 portfolio projects in 
Colombia that amount to more than $1.2 billion in exposure. DFC has 
supported investments that promote rural financial inclusion, 
affordable housing, infrastructure, and forestry. DFC has about $55 
million in exposure through regional funds that cover Colombia, 
including $3.4 million in small, high-impact funds. Approximately 88 
percent of this exposure focuses on housing and commercial buildings, 
and the remaining 12 percent focuses on industrial and financial 
technologies. For quick reference, all of DFC's active projects are 
available on DFC's website, which can be filtered by region, financing 
type, commitment level, and year: https://www.dfc.gov/our-impact/all-
active-projects.
    DFC's current portfolio prioritizes promotion of affordable housing 
and increasing lending to vulnerable populations, such as Venezuela 
migrant receptor communities, rural areas, and those worst-affected by 
COVID-19. Financial inclusion in rural and conflict-affected Colombia 
aims to promote a legal economy as alternative to illicit activities 
(coca, illegal mining, armed groups). DFC supports inclusive rural 
economic growth by attracting private investment into areas which have 
been affected by conflict and where investors have been reluctant to 
make financial commitments. DFC enhances economic opportunity by 
increasing access to affordable housing in conflict-affected 
communities and helping small farmers and landowners improve food 
security by strengthening producer associations, cooperatives, 
microcredit organizations, and agricultural value chains and business 
opportunities. By supporting bankable projects in Venezuela migrant 
receptor communities, DFC increases inclusion, strengthens resilience, 
and addresses the root causes of further migration.

    Senator Hagerty. I would like to come now to the digital 
economy and the infrastructure that is being built there in 
Colombia. Are we doing anything to make certain that the 
infrastructure that is being built out for the next generation 
of Colombia telecommunications, 4G, 5G, is protected from the 
Chinese Communist Party or malign actors like Huawei?
    Mr. Nichols. We have had multiple discussions with the 
Colombian Government about that. We are in conversations about 
alternative technologies and opportunities that do not use 
Chinese technology. Telecommunications companies in Colombia 
are private companies so this will also involve working with 
them, but there is a key regulatory component, and we believe 
that we can structure this in a way that is good for Colombian 
consumers and avoids Chinese technology.
    Senator Hagerty. I think there is certainly a way. I would 
encourage you to look at what I did with the government of 
Japan when I served as ambassador there, because there are four 
private infrastructure telecommunications companies there, but 
I worked with the government of Japan to make sure that those 
remained clean. That is possible, and I encourage you to work 
on a way to do that as well in Colombia. I think that is 
important for our national security and theirs.
    Mr. Nichols. I agree.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. All right. I hope that this 
discussion has stimulated the State Department and the 
Administration to think about how we reinvigorate our 
relationship with Colombia, how we deepen it on this 200th 
anniversary. We welcome the Department's remarks to the 
legislation we will be introducing and any insights. We would 
appreciate it, and with the thanks of the committee this panel 
is excused.
    As we have our first panel depart let me begin to introduce 
our second panel. We are joined by Mr. Dan Restrepo, a senior 
fellow at the Center for American Progress, with expansive 
expertise on Colombia. Mr. Restrepo served as the principal 
advisor to President Obama on issues related to Latin America, 
the Caribbean, and Canada as Special Assistant to the President 
and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the 
National Security Council. Previously he served on the 
professional staff of the House of Representatives' Committee 
on Foreign Affairs as well as a law clerk on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
    The committee will also hear from Celina Realuyo, an 
adjunct professor at The George Washington University Elliott 
School of International Affairs. Professor Realuyo's work 
focuses on U.S. national security, illicit networks, 
transnational organized crime, counterterrorism, and economic 
sanctions issues. She has previously served as a U.S. diplomat, 
international banker with Goldman Sachs, and State Department 
Director of Counterterrorism Finance Programs. She has spoken 
and written regularly in English and Spanish about 
transnational crime, drug trafficking, and corruption in the 
Americas.
    So our thanks to both of you. We invite you to make your 
statements, around 5 minutes or so. Your full statements will 
be included in the record, and we will start with you, Mr. 
Restrepo.

 STATEMENT OF DAN RESTREPO, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN 
                    PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Restrepo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Risch. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the U.S.-
Colombia relationship.
    Chairman Menendez, allow me to take this moment to commend 
you for holding this hearing and for authoring the U.S.-
Colombia Strategic Alliance Act, both important signals of the 
abiding U.S. commitment to the people of Colombia at a critical 
juncture.
    Colombia is today a like-minded democracy in the heart of 
Latin America, through the sacrifice of generations of 
Colombians with steadfast U.S. support. Advancing core U.S. 
national interests demands continued and reinforced commitment. 
Even aside from the pandemic and its fallout, Colombia faces 
notable challenges. Implementation of the 2016 Peace Accords 
lags, illicit economies are flourishing, and insecurity is on 
the rise. Venezuela's descent into kleptocracy, criminality, 
and chaos continues to put pressure on Colombia. Much-needed 
fiscal, labor, and pension reforms and expanded investment in 
human capital have proven elusive.
    Colombia's political class continues to struggle to define 
a post-Peace Accord north star, and not coincidentally, in 
light of all of the above, Colombia has experienced one of the 
region's most pronounced declines of faith in democracy in 
recent years.
    At the same time, Colombia is a critical leader on some of 
the central issues facing the Americas and the world, including 
migration, climate, citizen security, and fostering innovation. 
Understanding that successful migration management must extend 
far beyond border measures, the Colombian Government, across 
two administrations, and the Colombian people have stepped up 
to help their neighbors in need.
    President Ivan Duque's decision to grant Venezuelans legal 
status for 10 years was one of the most commendable acts of 
leadership in the Americas in recent memory. It is an example 
to be followed as President Biden did when he granted TPS to 
Venezuelans.
    Colombia's unparalleled biodiversity makes it a wellspring 
of hope for our planet and a critical player in responding to 
the climate crisis and leading the energy transition in the 
Americas, especially at a time when countries like Brazil 
imperil our planet through anti-science denialism.
    Colombia is also home to modern entrepreneurs like Rappi, 
among Latin America's burgeoning tech unicorns, and others hot 
on its heels as well as cities like Medellin that strive to 
embrace the power of technology to better connect Colombians to 
21st century global value chains.
    The country is also, despite and in some cases 
paradoxically because of the challenges it faces, a vital 
security and citizen security partner. A new strategic alliance 
between the United States and Colombia can help address 
Colombia's challenges, consolidate its leadership, and as it 
has done repeatedly throughout history, advance key U.S. 
national interests across the hemisphere, as it did during the 
era of the Good Neighbor Policy, World War II, the birth of the 
Inter-American System, and the Alliance for Progress, to cite 
but a few examples. It is no accident that every U.S. President 
since Ronald Reagan, except President Trump, visited Colombia 
while in office.
    Against this backdrop, as you look to the next chapter in 
this storied relationship, I urge you to advance U.S. interests 
by continuing to support implementation of the Peace Accords; 
investing in a region-wide approach to mitigate, manage, and 
order irregular migration; finding ways U.S. development 
assistance financing can be catalytic in the transformation of 
the Colombian economy; leveraging Colombian climate leadership, 
supporting comprehensive efforts to roll back illicit 
economies; and respecting Colombian democracy.
    In closing, allow me to elaborate on this final point. With 
Colombians headed to the polls, everything possible must be 
done to safeguard these critical elections so they accurately 
reflect the will of the Colombian people, free from outside 
interference and mis- and disinformation. It is imperative that 
the U.S. Government and other U.S. political actors defer to 
Colombian voters, as we rightly except Colombians and others to 
defer to U.S. voters, free from influence. We should stand in 
unyielding support for Colombia's democratic process and 
institutions, not for or against particular candidates.
    Going forward, U.S. interests will best be served by a 
Colombia that vigilantly respects democracy and builds a more 
inclusive capitalism. We should trust our friends and allies in 
Colombia to choose leaders across their democratic institutions 
who will lead along such a path. We should stand ready to work 
with those leaders as we have done across the past two 
centuries to advance shared values and interests.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Restrepo follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Mr. Daniel Restrepo\1\

    It has become almost cliche to laude the strength and depth of the 
relationship between the United States and Colombia. As that 
relationship nears its 200th anniversary, it is important to move 
beyond the trite and take a step back to examine its history, its 
status today, and its promise into the future. In that spirit, I 
commend Chairman Menendez for holding this hearing and for authoring 
the U.S.-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act. The legislation is an 
important signal of the abiding U.S. commitment to the people of 
Colombia and comes at a critical juncture for Colombia and for U.S. 
relationships throughout the Americas. The broad range of topics I 
understand is encompassed within the legislation is also a testament to 
the complexity of the U.S.-Colombia relationship which profoundly 
impacts a series of U.S. strategic interests in the Americas and well 
beyond--as it has throughout the past 200 years.
    As one examines the U.S.-Colombia relationship it is vital to 
appreciate that it long predates what many consider its high-water mark 
and which still others treat as its de facto starting point--Plan 
Colombia. The recency bias of a Plan Colombia-centric way of 
understanding the U.S.-Colombia relationship is understandable even if 
unhelpful. One is hard pressed to find a more successful recent 
investment of U.S. time, energy, and resources abroad than the role the 
United States played in Colombia during the past two decades. Colombian 
democracy thrives today because of the sacrifice of countless 
Colombians and the unwavering support of the United States. First, as 
Colombia sought to project the power of the state to the entirety of 
the Colombian territory for the first time in the country's history and 
then as it executed a textbook application of counterinsurgency 
doctrine to bring an end to the hemisphere's longest-running internal 
armed conflict through political means.
    As Colombia moves forward, the Strategic Alliance Act gets it 
exactly right that we must shore up those investments and consolidate a 
cycle of success. The pursuit of core U.S. national interests does not 
afford us the luxury of walking away from Colombia thinking our work is 
done. Now is the time to deepen the relationship, not turn our backs on 
it.
    This is in part true because Colombia continues to face notable 
challenges. Recognizing the Colombian state has never managed to be 
fully present across the entirety of Colombia, implementation of the 
2016 peace accords, which at its core seeks that elusive goal, lags the 
pace we would all like to see.\2\ The need for continued support for 
the constitutionally required implementation of Colombia's peace 
agreement is one of the reasons the U.S. commitment must not waiver.
    Colombia also continues to be plagued by flourishing illicit 
economies. Coca cultivation and cocaine production are at or above 
historic highs.\3\ According to ONDCP's latest report, coca cultivation 
reached 245,000 hectares in 2020 and potential cocaine production 1,010 
metric tons.\4\ Illegal mining devastates Colombia's environment and 
fuels illegal armed groups in Colombia--and in Venezuela--putting 
further pressure on communities living in Colombia's long-neglected 
periphery. Today, revenue from illegal gold mining is said to outpace 
income from cocaine production in Colombia.\5\ As concluded by the 
bipartisan, congressionally mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy 
Commission, on which I had the privilege of serving, the United States 
must partner with Colombia to take an integrated approach to creating 
the conditions needed to reduce the size and negative impact of these 
illicit activities.\6\
    The country continues to labor under the negative effects of the 
implosion of its closest neighbor and historical partner--Venezuela. 
Since 2015, more than 6 million Venezuelans have been forced to flee 
the chaos of their country's descent into kleptocracy and criminality, 
with approximately 2 million putting down roots in Colombia. Even 
before this exodus placed enormous strain on Colombia, the economic 
trainwreck imposed by failed chavista policies eliminated one of 
Colombia's historically most important and most reliable economic 
partners.
    Colombia's economy has also regularly failed to deliver 
sufficiently for broad swaths of the Colombian people. Inequality 
remains a structural reality of Colombian society.\7\ A pre-existing 
condition only made worse by the pandemic despite a significant fiscal 
commitment--5 percent of GDP--by the Colombian Government in an attempt 
to protect Colombia's most vulnerable. Intervention that has been 
credited with softening COVID's impact on Colombia's economy and 
opening way to a stronger than expected 2021 recovery.\8\
    Colombia, like too many of our neighbors throughout the Americas, 
is burdened by stiflingly high levels of informality and the economic 
distortions that flow from it. Throughout the decade leading into the 
pandemic, for example, informality stayed stubbornly above 60 
percent.\9\ It is a country in need of fiscal, labor, and pension 
reforms and expanded investment in human capital to position its 
economy for success into the 21st Century. Reforms needed to fully 
maximize the talent and transformative capacity of Colombia's modern 
entrepreneurs embodied in success stories like Rappi--among Latin 
America's burgeoning tech unicorns--as well as in the embrace of the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution by cities like Medellin, in a way that 
addresses ongoing concerns with the gig economy and lifts the labor 
force. Sadly, such reforms have proven politically elusive in recent 
years.
    Colombia also finds itself at a crossroads in the wake of its peace 
agreement with the FARC. The past years have seen a country--and 
particularly its political class--struggling to find a path forward, to 
define a new north star and avoid lapsing into traditional divisions, 
albeit with new labels, that throughout its history have dragged 
Colombia from one internal conflict to the next.
    Although the hard work of defining and pursuing that new north star 
rests with the Colombian people and their leaders, a new strategic 
alliance between the United States and Colombia can help break that 
cycle. It can both serve as a catalyst for a more just Colombia and 
advance key U.S. national interests by anchoring U.S. policy in the 
Americas writ large.
    It would not be the first time the U.S.-Colombia relationship 
played an outsized role in advancing U.S. interests and shaping U.S. 
policy in the Americas. Shortly after laying out his ``Good Neighbor'' 
policy, President Franklin Roosevelt became the first sitting U.S. 
President to visit South America when he toured Cartagena in the 
company of Colombian President Enrique Olaya Herrera.\10\ During World 
War II, Colombia joined the United States in declaring war against the 
Axis Powers; Colombian naval assets helped hunt German U-boats in the 
Caribbean; and the U.S. Navy prepared for its Pacific Campaign off 
Colombia's west coast.\11\
    After World War II, Colombia was instrumental in establishing the 
world's oldest regional international system--the Inter-American 
System. The Organization of American States was born from the Pacto de 
Bogota, negotiated and signed in Colombia's capital city in 1948.\12\ 
The Organization's first Secretary General would be Colombia's once- 
and future-president Alberto Lleras Camargo. It was no accident that 
when President Kennedy visited Latin America to see the first programs 
launched under the Alliance for Progress, he visited then-President 
Lleras Camargo in Bogota in 1961.\13\ Every U.S. President since Ronald 
Reagan, with the exception of the last occupant of the Oval Office, has 
visited Colombia.\14\ And have done so in effective pursuit of U.S. 
national interests and in bolstering a like-minded liberal democracy in 
the heart of Latin America. In short, the U.S.-Colombia relationship 
has long, vibrant, and consequential roots, and has benefited both 
countries.
    A robust partnership with Colombia is essential for the United 
States moving forward given the central challenges facing the Americas 
today, including migration, the climate crisis, citizen insecurity, and 
democratic backsliding.
    As members of the Committee know, the Americas are experiencing 
unprecedented levels of migration. In the past 7 years, irregular 
migration has accelerated as millions have been dislocated throughout 
the region. Understanding that successful migration management must 
extend far beyond border measures, the Colombian Government--and, as 
importantly, the Colombian people--have stepped up to help their 
neighbors in need. President Ivan Duque's decision to grant Venezuelans 
in Colombia legal status for 10 years was one of the most commendable 
acts of leadership by any leader in the Western hemisphere in recent 
memory. Through its policies, Colombia has encouraged rootedness of 
otherwise irregular migrants, contributing to stability amid multiple 
regional crises. It has also set an example to be followed as President 
Biden did when he granted TPS to Venezuelans who have sought shelter in 
the United States in recent years.
    Colombia--together with Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada--is critical to shaping and implementing much-needed 
hemisphere-wide efforts to mitigate, manage, and order migration with a 
focus on supporting migrant-receiving communities throughout the 
region. To that end, Colombia's regularization efforts together with 
international backing like the November 2021 $800 million loan from the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to Colombia 
conditioned on integration efforts need to be replicated and refined to 
local circumstances throughout the hemisphere.
    Colombia is also a critical player in responding to the climate 
crisis and leading the energy transformation in the Americas. 
Colombia's unparalleled biodiversity is a wellspring of hope and 
opportunity for our planet. One the United States should work to 
protect and preserve. As an Amazonian country, Colombia is an important 
partner in climate diplomacy at a time when countries like Brazil 
imperil our planet through anti-science denialism. Despite an 
unsustainable-over-time reliance on hydrocarbon exports, Colombia's 
domestic energy matrix is one of the hemisphere's cleanest with more 
than 70 percent of the country's electricity coming from hydro. And 
thanks to a rapid acceleration of installed renewable capacity--it is 
in the midst of an expansion from 50 MW in installed capacity in 2018 
to 2,500 MW by the end of this year--it is growing more sustainable by 
the day.\15\
    Citizen insecurity remains a profound challenge in Colombia, 
although the nature of the security threat has changed in recent 
decades. As a result of enormous sacrifice by Colombians--and yes, the 
catalytic support of the United States, in the form of Plan Colombia--
Colombia no longer faces an existential threat to the state from 
illegal armed groups. It does however continue to face a significant 
challenge. Homicide rates in 2021 were at a 7-year high and far too 
many community leaders are falling victim to the power vacuums created 
in the wake of the peace agreement in a tragic replay of some of the 
darkest periods in Colombia's modern history.\16\ The country's 
security structures have been slow to adapt to Colombia's new reality 
and struggle to maintain the ability to project state authority 
throughout Colombia's territory and safeguard citizen security on a 
day-to-day basis. Other critical rule of law institutions have not yet 
achieved the operational capacity needed to ensure access to effective 
justice at all levels of Colombian society. Despite these challenges--
and in some cases paradoxically because of them--Colombia has been and 
should remain an important U.S. security and citizen security partner.
    Democracy is under enormous pressure throughout the Americas. In 
fact, in its 2021 report, The Economist's Intelligence Unit found that 
Latin America's democracy index score not only dropped for the sixth 
consecutive year but also experienced the most dramatic decline of any 
region in any year since the Democracy Index debuted in 2006.\17\ As 
governments, even before the pandemic, struggled to meet the needs and 
expectations of their populations and public policy struggled to rise 
to the challenges posed by the accelerating effects of technology on 
traditional work, space has opened across the Americas for corrosive 
populism of every ideology.
    Colombia has not been immune to these dynamics as disaffection with 
democracy is on the rise and popular unrest has manifest in sustained 
protests--both before and during the pandemic. According to the 
benchmark Latinobarometro public opinion survey, for example, Colombia 
experienced one of the region's most pronounced declines in faith in 
democracy--11 points between 2018 and 2020.\18\ With only a brief lapse 
in the mid-20th Century, Colombia has been a steadfast defender of 
democracy throughout the hemisphere. Continued U.S. support for 
Colombia and the Colombian people is an important bulwark against 
potential democratic backsliding. It is why the Biden administration's 
provision of 6 million vaccine doses to Colombia should be understood 
for what it was--important support for the vibrancy of Colombia's 
democracy. Fueled in part by those donations, Colombia's vaccine 
program was more successful than anticipated and helped make possible a 
surprisingly robust economic recovery in 2021. In short, it helped 
Colombian democracy deliver.
    It did so at a critical juncture because as we all know, Colombians 
will soon go to the polls. First on March 13 to elect a new Congress 
and select candidates from several coalitions to face off in Colombia's 
presidential election at the end of May. A first round likely to lead 
to a runoff between the top two vote getters in June. It is of critical 
importance that everything possible be done by Colombian authorities, 
candidates, and their supporters, in cooperation with the international 
community, including the United States, to safeguard these critical 
elections so they accurately and transparently reflect the will of the 
Colombian people free from outside interference and mis- and 
disinformation-driven distortions that have affected so many electoral 
processes across the hemisphere in recent years.
    Against this backdrop and as this Committee and this Congress look 
toward the next chapter in the storied U.S.-Colombia relationship, I 
urge you to seek to advance U.S. interests by:

   Continuing to support implementation of the peace accords 
        through expanding the effective presence of the Colombia state 
        throughout the country's territory;

   Investing in a region-wide approach to mitigating, managing, 
        and ordering irregular migration by supporting Colombia's 
        efforts at regularization and integration of Venezuelan 
        migrants--and efforts like it throughout the hemisphere;

   Finding those ways that U.S. development financing can be 
        catalytic in the transformation of the Colombian economy to 
        best prepare it to deliver for the Colombian people into the 
        21st Century;

   Leveraging Colombian climate leadership in deepening 
        hemispheric and global cooperation, including driving 
        modernization in green financing across all of the hemisphere's 
        multilateral development banks, for confronting the climate 
        crisis;

   Supporting comprehensive efforts to rollback illicit 
        economies understanding that even as the negative effects of 
        illicit drugs in the U.S. are less tied to Colombia given the 
        intensifying opioid crisis in the United States, the threat 
        posed to Colombian democracy is real and consequential for the 
        United States; and

   Respecting Colombia's democratic processes and institutions.

    On this final point, while it is unquestionably true that U.S. 
interests have been well served by a succession of leaders in Colombia 
with an abiding commitment to democracy as well as market-driven 
economics, the most important thing the United States can do to 
continue shoring up democracy in Colombia in the coming months is place 
its trust in the people of Colombia. It is imperative that the United 
States and political actors in the United States respect the sovereign 
will of the Colombian people as we rightly expect Colombians and other 
members of the international community to respect the sovereign will of 
U.S. voters in our own elections.
    We should stand in unyielding support for Colombia's democratic 
process and institutions, not for or against particular candidates in 
the upcoming elections. Going forward, U.S. interests will be best 
served by a Colombia that vigilantly respects democracy and builds a 
more inclusive capitalism that meets the basic needs and expectations 
of the Colombian people and fosters the conditions for innovation and 
competition needed for Colombia and the U.S.-Colombia relationship to 
thrive into its third century. We should trust our friends and allies 
in Colombia to choose leaders across their democratic institutions who 
will lead along such a path. And we should stand ready to work with 
those leaders as we have done across the past two centuries to advance 
shared values and interests.

----------------
Notes

    \1\ The views reflected in this testimony are my personal views and 
do not represent the views of any institution with which I am or have 
been affiliated.
    \2\ Matrix, Peace Accords, and Kroc Institute for International 
Peace Studies. ``Five Years of Peace Agreement Implementation in 
Colombia: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities to Increase 
Implementation Levels, December 2016-October 2021.'' 3 Dec. 2021 
available at https://curate.nd.edu/show/0c483j36025.
    \3\ Reuter, ``Colombia coca crop area expanded to 245,000 hectares 
in 2020--report,'' June 25, 2021 available at https://www.reuters.com/
world/americas/colombia-coca-crop-area-expanded-245000-hectares-2020-
report-2021-06-26/.
    \4\ The White House, ``UPDATED: ONDCP Releases Data on Coca 
Cultivation and Potential Cocaine Production in the Andean Region,'' 
July 16, 2021 available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/briefing-
room/2021/07/16/ondcp-releases-data-on-coca-cultivation-and-potential-
cocaine-production-in-the-andean-region/.
    \5\ Ryan Berg & Henry Ziemer, ``A Closer Look at Colombia's 
Illegal, Artisanal, and Small-Scale Mining,'' CSIS, December 20, 2021 
available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/closer-look-colombias-
illegal-artisanal-and-small-scale-mining.
    \6\ Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, ``Charting a New 
Path Forward,'' December 2020 available at https://whdpc.org/images/
report/2021%2001.21%20WHDPC%20FINAL
%20REPORT.pdf.
    \7\ World Bank Group, ``Building an Equitable Society in 
Colombia,'' 2021 available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/686821635218586591/pdf/Main-Report.pdf.
    \8\ OECD, ``OECD Survey: Colombia 2022,'' February 10, 2022 
available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-
surveys-colombia-2022_04bf9377-en.
    \9\ Statistica, ``Informal employment as percentage of total 
employment in Colombia 2010-2019,'' October 21, 2021 available at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1039930/informal-employment-share-
colombia/.
    \10\ Andrew Glass, ``FDR Visits Colombia, July 10, 1934,'' 
Politico, July 10, 2018 available at https://www.politico.com/story/
2018/07/10/this-day-in-politics-july-10-1934-702135.
    \11\ Leonard, Thomas M.; John F. Bratzel, Latin America during 
World War II, Rowman & Littlefield (2007).
    \12\ Organization of American States, ``Who We Are,'' available at 
https://www.oas.org/en/about/who--we--are.asp.
    \13\ John F. Kennedy, ``Address at Dinner at the San Carlos Palace 
in Bogota,'' December 17, 1961 available at https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-dinner-the-san-carlos-palace-
bogota.
    \14\ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 
``Presidential Travel Abroad: Colombia,'' available at https://
history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/colombia.
    \15\ Sandra Velandria and Sergio Gomez, ``Colombia: A renewable 
energy powerhouse?,'' Global Americans, November 10, 2021 available at 
https://theglobalamericans.org/2021/11/colombia-a-renewable-energy-
powerhouse/.
    \16\ InSight Crime, ``InSight Crime's 2021 Homicide Round-Up,'' 
InSight Crime, February 1, 2022 available at https://insightcrime.org/
news/insight-crimes-2021-homicide-round-up/.
    \17\ Economist Intelligence Unit, ``Democracy Index: less than half 
the world lives in a democracy,'' February 10, 2022 available at 
https://www.eiu.com/n/democracy-index-2021-less-than-half-the-world-
lives-in-a-democracy/.
    \18\ Latinobarometro, ``Informe 2021: Adios a Macondo,'' available 
at https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp?Idioma=0.

    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Realuyo.

 STATEMENT OF CELINA B. REALUYO, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, THE GEORGE 
    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Realuyo. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and members of the committee for the opportunity to 
testify before you on the challenges facing Colombia and the 
need for a deeper U.S. engagement.
    I have had the privilege of covering Colombia and 
counternarcotics issues since I was a junior officer at U.S. 
Embassy Panama in the 1990's, and then implementing Plan 
Colombia at the State Department Counterterrorism Office, and 
more recently specializing on illicit networks in the Americas 
as an academic. In fact, in 10 days I will head to Bogota to 
conduct a national threats and emerging threats seminar with 
the Colombian National War College.
    This year, as you know, Colombia and the United States 
celebrate 200 years of bilateral relations and enjoy a strong 
partnership promoting security and prosperity in Latin America. 
Colombia has transformed itself from a nearly failed state, 
threated by counter-insurgency, into a sound democracy, with 
the support from Plan Colombia combatting cocaine trade and 
arms groups like the FARC and ELN over the past 20 years.
    Currently, Colombia is experiencing multiple crises that 
threaten stability ahead of its presidential elections. Massive 
anti-government protests, rising violence, human rights abuses, 
increased cocaine trade, frustrations with the pandemic, and 
instability spilling over from Venezuela have made President 
Duque's government very unpopular. The COVID-19 pandemic has 
become a force multiplier for pre-existing socioeconomic 
grievances and have emboldened President Duque's opponents.
    External actors like Venezuela, China, and Russia have 
increased their activities in Colombia, compounding these 
domestic crises. The Maduro regime has exported instability to 
Colombia by supporting the FARC rebels and the ELN who are 
engaged in an illicit economy that is ever expanding, and 
spurred the mass migration of some 6 million Venezuelans, of 
which 2 million are in Colombia.
    As Colombia's second-largest trading partner after the 
United States, China is aggressively and strategically 
investing in major infrastructure and technology projects. It 
is also engaged in vaccine diplomacy to pressure the Duque 
government to allow China's telecom company, Huawei, to 
participate in the upcoming 5G spectrum auction.
    Meanwhile, Russian intelligence services have been active 
in Colombia in recent years, and Russia has close ties to 
Venezuela, selling some $11 billion in arms to Colombia's 
neighbor since 2005. This month, Colombian Defense Minister 
Molano reported that Venezuela was moving troops to the border 
region with the assistance from Russia and Iran, where there is 
fierce fighting currently between the ELN and former FARC 
rebels, who tried to control the drug trade. Russia has also 
capitalized on Latin American distrust of traditional media and 
official messaging to impact and shape public opinion and 
perceptions against incumbent governments and democratic 
institutions.
    With all these crises there are fears that new violent 
protests, disinformation campaigns, and election meddling might 
destabilize Colombia. Therefore, the U.S. must redouble its 
efforts to support Colombia to defend its democracy and market 
economy and sovereignty and to ensure free, fair, and 
transparent elections this year.
    To deepen our partnership with Colombia at this challenging 
time, I advise the Biden administration and Congress to 
increase security assistance to Colombia in support of their 
security services to counter armed groups and the lucrative 
drug trade and expand and reinforce state presence in areas 
vulnerable to transnational organized crime. Also it should 
expand the use of financial intelligence to combat, prosecute, 
dismantle, and defund these illicit networks.
    We should also be assisting with the professionalization of 
Colombia's military and police, to include more human rights 
and rule-of-law training. We should also help Colombia in its 
efforts to ensure cybersecurity of its critical infrastructure, 
including sensitive data and communications.
    With regard to external actors, the U.S. should boost 
counterintelligence capabilities to monitor what these external 
actors are doing to try to destabilize Colombia and the rest of 
Latin America. We should continue our collaborative efforts 
with the aspiration of bringing security, stability, and 
democracy back to Venezuela.
    We should also try to help civil society groups in Colombia 
address issues of misinformation and fake news, and more 
importantly, counter those efforts by hostile internal and 
foreign actors.
    On the economic side, we should promote U.S. investment in 
Colombian infrastructure projects in order to counter China's 
Belt and Road Initiative and 5G technological aspirations. 
Finally, as we look from the lessons of the pandemic, we need 
to think about increasing bilateral trade in a part of our 
attempt to near-source and provide more resilience for our 
supply chains within the Western Hemisphere.
    Thank you so much for your attention. I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Realuyo follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Ms. Celina B. Realuyo\1\

                              introduction
    Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the opportunity to appear 
before you today to testify on the current security and economic 
challenges facing Colombia and the need to deepen U.S. engagement. 
Colombia is one of the closest partners of the U.S. in Latin America, 
sharing democratic values, free-market capitalism, and mutual security 
interests. Colombia is facing a triple crisis of mass social protests, 
increased insecurity and serious fiscal and economic challenges from 
the pandemic. These internal crises along with external actors like 
Venezuela, China and Russia and an expanding illicit economy are 
destabilizing the political, economic, social, and security aspects of 
Colombia ahead of their presidential elections. The U.S. must redouble 
its efforts to strengthen its partnership with Colombia to assist the 
country confront the formidable challenges to security, democracy and 
post-pandemic economic fallout and realize free and fair elections this 
year.
                the u.s.-colombia strategic partnership
    This year, Colombia and the United States commemorate 200 years of 
bilateral relations between two of the oldest democracies in the 
Western Hemisphere. Colombia is one of the U.S.'s closest partners in 
Latin America with a strong record of promoting democracy, capitalism, 
and security in the region. With the support of the United States, 
Colombia has transformed itself over the past 20 years from a nearly 
failed state threatened by a narco-insurgency into a sound democracy 
with a thriving market economy. The two countries have been 
instrumental in promoting prosperity and security in Latin America.
    The U.S. is Colombia's largest trade and investment partner, due in 
part to the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) that was 
implemented in 2012, with a two-way goods trade of $29 billion and a 
services trade of $11.7 billion in 2019 alone. Meanwhile, Colombia is 
the U.S.' third-largest trade partner in Latin America, with two-way 
trade in goods and services totaling $29.9 billion in 2020. U.S.-owned 
affiliates account for more than 90,000 jobs in Colombia.\2\ As the 
U.S. looks for near-sourcing opportunities to decrease supply chain 
dependency on Asia that made it so vulnerable during the pandemic, 
Colombia is a logical counterpart to expand bilateral trade in Latin 
America.
    For the past 20 years, Colombia has been a steadfast U.S. ally in 
the ``war on drugs'' and security cooperation. For over five decades, 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) 
threatened to overthrow the established order in Colombia and replace 
it with a socialist dictatorship. The FARC sustained itself through the 
cocaine trade for years. In its attempts to destabilize the government, 
the FARC carried out bombings, extortions, selective assassinations, 
kidnappings and armed confrontations with Colombian police and military 
forces. In 2000, the U.S. launched a partnership called ``Plan 
Colombia'' to provide security and economic development assistance to 
help combat the spread of narcotics, train military and law 
enforcement, and promote economic growth. Through ``Plan Colombia,'' 
the U.S. and Colombia have built a strong counterterrorism and counter-
narcotics partnership to combat the cocaine trade and armed groups like 
the FARC and ELN. Since 2000, the U.S. Government has provided about 
$12 billion in bilateral aid to help implement ``Plan Colombia'' and 
its successor strategies.\3\ Further afield, Colombia has also provided 
security expertise across Latin America, training thousands of military 
and police personnel in Central and South America. This included 
Colombia's participation in the ``Merida Initiative'' in Mexico, ``Plan 
Colombia's'' Mexican cousin, which became critical to security and 
counternarcotics operations within Mexico and at the U.S. southern 
border.\4\
      colombia's history of armed groups and the farc peace accord
    With a population of approximately 50 million, Colombia has 
experienced high levels of violence and citizen insecurity due to 
internal armed conflict and narco-insurgency. Fifty years of violence 
with guerilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have resulted in over 
220,000 deaths, 81 percent of them civilians and almost made Colombia a 
failed state.\5\ More than 9 million Colombians, or roughly 17 percent 
of the population, have registered as conflict victims.\6\ Colombia's 
insurgent and other armed groups have been sustained by the shadow, 
illicit economy through the lucrative cocaine trade, as well as illegal 
gold- mining and oil-smuggling operations. Colombian organized criminal 
groups, such as drug trafficking mafias and paramilitary groups, are 
well armed and dangerous. The economic impact of conflict, terrorism, 
homicides and sexual assaults in Colombia was over $275 billion, 34 per 
cent of the country's GDP, in 2017. This figure also includes the costs 
of containing violence as well as the consequences of violence on the 
economy. Colombia was ranked 10th (out of 11 countries) in South 
America and 144th overall on the 2021 Global Peace Index. The country 
recorded a deterioration in its overall score as a result of increases 
in violence violent demonstrations and political terror.\7\
    In 2016, President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) brokered an 
historic peace accord with the FARC, the country's largest leftist 
guerrilla organization at the time. That peace agreement, ratified by 
Colombia's Congress, included an immediate cease-fire, disarmament and 
demobilization process, the creation of a transitional justice system 
and the recognition of the FARC as a legitimate political party with 10 
guaranteed seats in Congress until 2026.\8\ During a U.N.-monitored 
demobilization in 2017, some 13,300 FARC members disarmed. The FARC 
later transformed from a leftist guerrilla army into a political party 
known as Comunes. Neither the government nor the FARC have upheld all 
their commitments under the agreement. Although the FARC has formally 
demobilized, its leadership has not yet been subject to the Colombian 
justice system, and FARC dissident groups continue to engage in 
violence and illicit activities in Colombia and Venezuela. In early 
December 2021, on the fifth anniversary of the signing of the peace 
accord, the U.S. Government removed the FARC from its list of foreign 
terrorist organizations (FTOs) and designated two FARC dissident 
groups, Segundo Marquetalia and FARC-EP, as FTOs.\9\ According to one 
estimate, some 90 armed groups remain active in Colombia--including 
some former FARC and rightwing paramilitaries that continued criminal 
activities after their respective disarmaments.\10\
    The National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional--ELN) 
is another violent guerrilla group with left-wing political ideologies 
operating in Colombia. Initially a Marxist-Leninist nationalist 
movement, it is more focused on kidnapping, extortion and attacks on 
economic infrastructure and increasingly linked to the narcotics trade. 
The group has prospered since the demobilization of the FARC. In 2016, 
when the FARC was abandoning much of its territory, the ELN moved in to 
take over drug trafficking and contraband activities, especially in 
Catatumbo, Norte de Santander and in the northwestern department of 
Choco. This greatly increased the ELN's criminal profits and expanded 
its manpower and territorial control.\11\
    President Juan Manuel Santos tried to reach a peace deal similar to 
one with the FARC in 2016. In September 2017, the two sides signed a 
ceasefire which ran from October 1 to January 9, 2018, but no similar 
ceasefire has been signed since. President Ivan Duque (2018-Present) 
campaigned as a critic of the FARC peace accords and suspended existing 
talks with the ELN upon assuming office. He cited the ELN's continued 
violence and failure to comply with agreements made during the Santos 
administration. The ELN is currently considered the most powerful 
criminal group in Colombia and Venezuela, dominating much of the 
criminal economies along the border. It controls vast areas of coca 
crops, cocaine production and distribution routes and is actively 
involved in illegal gold mining. Well supported by the Maduro regime in 
Venezuela in exchange for a cut of criminal profits, the ELN has become 
a truly transnational criminal organization.\12\
    Recent clashes between the FARC dissidents and ELN has resulted 
increased violence along the Colombian-Venezuelan border as the groups 
battle over control of the lucrative narcotics and illegal gold trade. 
On January 7, 2022, Colombia's Attorney General warned that the fight 
between the FARC dissidents and ELN was expanding in three border 
areas, Norte de Santander, Arauca and Casanare. He also noted that ex-
FARC forces after taking on multiple enemies on Venezuelan soil were 
moving from their stronghold in Norte de Santander to attack the ELN in 
Arauca, a Colombian department on the border with Venezuela.\13\
                the role of external actors in colombia
    External state actors are becoming increasingly active in Colombia. 
Colombia and greater Latin America serve as an expanded theater for 
great power competition. The growing influence of China, Russia and 
Venezuela in Colombia is a direct challenge to the U.S.-Colombian 
partnership and has profound implications for regional security.
    Venezuela: The criminalized state in Venezuela under the Maduro 
regime is threatening Colombia's security and sovereignty and has 
created the largest humanitarian crisis in Latin America with some 6 
million migrants fleeing Venezuela. Colombia is a key U.S. partner in 
ongoing efforts to help Venezuela return to democracy and economic 
prosperity. Colombia has been essential in coordinating regional 
support for Interim President Juan Guaido, as well as condemning 
Maduro's authoritarian regime. Colombia has welcomed over 1.8 million 
Venezuelans fleeing the Maduro regime and providing assistance to its 
Latin American neighbors. In early 2021, President Ivan Duque reported 
that Venezuelans residing in Colombia comprised nearly 40 percent of 
the Venezuelan exodus. The U.S. Government has committed more than $700 
million to help Colombia address the Venezuelan crisis and support the 
Venezuelan refugees that Colombia hosts.\14\
    Since it assumed power in August 2018, the Duque government has 
been dealing with increased provocation by the Maduro regime. Colombia 
has been the primary target of Venezuela's national security strategy 
since the dawn of the Bolivarian revolution in 1999.\15\ Due to 
Colombia's geostrategic location and its close ties to the U.S., 
Venezuela's Chavista regime and other malign external actors have an 
asymmetric strategy to exploit illicit networks and illicit economies 
to destabilize Colombia.\16\
    The Maduro regime relies on close ties with U.S. rivals like Cuba, 
China, Iran, Nicaragua and Russia to support their economy and 
circumvent harsh economic sanctions. It also has proven ties with 
Colombian illicit armed groups including the ELN and FARC-D. In 
Venezuela's collapse, the ELN has found safe haven and opportunities to 
set up bases throughout rural Venezuela. While there has certainly been 
some friction, and at least one deadly skirmish, between the ELN and 
the Venezuelan military, the two more often cooperate with one another 
than fight each other. The Colombian military believes the Venezuelan 
armed forces are now actively training the ELN to use sophisticated 
weaponry.\17\
    China: China's diplomatic, commercial and technological interests 
in Colombia have grown in recent years. China is now Colombia's second 
most important trading partner after the U.S., with average annual 
exports between 2011 and 2020 of $3.4 billion per year almost seven 
times as large as those in the prior decade. Imports of $9.9 billion 
now represent almost a quarter of Colombia's total imports. Backed by 
Beijing with state financial support, Chinese companies have been 
winning major infrastructure projects, including the long-awaited 
Bogota metro, the Bogota regional railway, many Colombian 4G and 5G 
infrastructure projects and a major new gold mine in Antioquia. Many of 
these projects resulted after President Ivan Duque's visit to Beijing 
in 2019, when he promoted Chinese investment in Colombia. Seeking 
closer ties, he has hinted that Colombia may formally join the Belt and 
Road Initiative before he leaves office in 2022.\18\
    Another asymmetric weapon in Beijing's arsenal is vaccine 
diplomacy. China's woefully inadequate, but readily available, Sinovac 
coronavirus vaccine was used as leverage in Colombia to pressure the 
Duque government to allow China's telecommunications company (and 
direct conduit to Chinese military intelligence), Huawei, to 
participate in the 5G spectrum auction in Colombia sometime in 2022--a 
dual-track diplomatic effort that China also initiated in Brazil.\19\ 
Although Colombia has been the largest recipient of vaccine donations 
from the U.S., receiving 6 million doses out of the 38 million donated 
by the U.S. Government, the early arrival of Sinovac vaccines during 
February and March 2021 ``saved the day'' by preventing thousands of 
deaths among the elderly. Indeed, by the end of March 2021, Colombia 
had received 3.5 million doses, of which 2.5 million came from China. 
In this sense, U.S. vaccine diplomacy to Colombia was generous, but 
China came first when it most mattered.\20\
    Russia: According to Colombian security officials, the Russian 
military intelligence services have been active in Colombia in recent 
years. In December 2020, Colombia tracked unusual movements of 
diplomatic personnel from the Russian embassy in Bogota, leading to the 
expulsion of at least two ``diplomats'' in December of last year--a 
first in Colombia-Russia relations.\21\ This was followed by a Russian 
military aircraft violating Colombian airspace just days before the 
uproar of social protests began in April 2021. While the Colombian 
Government protested the incident, repeated violations of Colombian 
airspace by Russian-manufactured Venezuelan military drones has added 
to the complexity of the conflict on the Colombia-Venezuela border. In 
May 2021, Colombian Defense Minister Diego Molano accused Russia of 
conducting cyberattacks against the Colombian Army and Senate 
infrastructure, that Russia denied.\22\
    Russia is a close partner of the Maduro regime and has sold more 
than $11 billion worth of armament to Venezuela since 2005. The 
presence of Russian military advisers and contractors has become 
routine in Venezuela. In December 2021, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Sergei Ryabkov said he would not rule out Moscow deploying forces to 
allies Venezuela or Cuba if diplomacy failed with the United States 
over Ukraine, where Moscow has massed tens of thousands of troops. In 
February 2022, Russia promised Colombia's Foreign Minister and Vice 
President Marta Lucia Ramirez that military equipment given to 
Venezuela would not be used to attack Colombia, destabilize Latin 
America or end up in the hands of illegal armed groups. Colombia's 
Defense Minister Molano reported that Venezuela was moving troops to 
the countries' border with technical assistance from Russia and Iran 
and called the possible deployment ``foreign interference.'' Molano, 
citing intelligence sources, said there were troop movements opposite 
Colombia's Arauca province, which has seen fierce fighting between 
National Liberation Army (ELN) guerillas and former FARC rebels for 
control of the drugs trade.\23\
    In recent years, Russia has leveraged its sophisticated propaganda 
capability to impact public opinion and perceptions across Latin 
America. Such efforts include overt Russian media such as Sputnik and 
Russia Today, as well as social media efforts through platforms such as 
Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp. The high level of distrust in the 
region toward government discourse and traditional media has made Latin 
America and the Caribbean particularly vulnerable to such initiatives. 
Russia has used that capability not so much to create opinion favorable 
toward Russia, but rather, to foment instability and undermine regimes 
aligned with the West. Both the Colombian and Chilean governments have 
accused Russian social media agents of contributing to the 
radicalization of protests and destabilization in their countries.\24\
    Colombia has become the focal point for top U.S. adversaries in 
this era of great-power competition. Abandoning or reducing support to 
Colombia does not come without unintended consequences, of which the 
most detrimental to U.S. national security is the likely expansion of 
Russian and Chinese influence from Venezuela to Colombia.
                   current challenges facing colombia
    President Ivan Duque's popularity has declined over the past year 
as his government has struggled to address serious political, economic 
and security challenges in Colombia. These include mass anti-government 
protests, spikes in coca cultivation and cocaine production, 
frustration with pandemic response, violence against human rights and 
other social activists and instability spilling over from Venezuela. 
Without a doubt, the COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted health, 
economic security, and democratic indicators in Colombia and countries 
around the world. Colombia has been particularly hard hit by the 
pandemic with one of the highest rates of COVID-19 infections and 
deaths in Latin America \25\ and with a gross domestic product (GDP) 
contraction of ^6.8 percent in 2020 due to strict national lockdown 
policies.\26\ The pandemic became a catalyst and force-multiplier for 
the explosion of pre-existing socio-economic grievances and the 
emboldening of political opponents of both the Duque administration and 
democratic institutions, resulting in mass protests that paralyzed 
Colombian cities.
    Nationwide protests broke out over an unpopular government-proposed 
tax increase in mid-2021. The national strike lasted for nearly 8 weeks 
as diverse sectors protested about a host of grievances, including 
economic inequality, crime, police brutality against demonstrators, and 
unaddressed corruption. Colombia's large social protests, labor 
strikes, and violent clashes with police made international news in 
April 2021, but had already been underway in November 2019, well before 
the COVID-19 pandemic. These protests were similar to the social and 
political unrest witnessed in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru since 
2019. In Colombia, the protests were fueled by social and economic 
grievances due to long-standing inequalities and high youth and female 
unemployment. Unfortunately, Colombia still faces high levels of 
poverty. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), 37.5 percent of Colombians lived below the poverty 
line at the end of 2020. More than two-thirds of Colombian households 
make less than $600 USD in total monthly income.\27\
    There were allegations of agitators and fake news fueling the 
protests via social media and human rights abuses by Colombian security 
forces. Colombian Defense Minister Diego Molano reported on May 3, 2021 
that at least six criminal groups, including FARC dissidents (FARC-D), 
the ELN, and the Blue and Black Shields of the M-19 youth movement were 
behind the acts of violence and vandalism during Colombia's protests in 
2021.\28\ The crippling blockades across Colombia and vandalism 
resulted in an estimated $3 billion of damage.
    From April 28 to July 31, 2021, the United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia received more than 60 
allegations of deaths in the context of the mass protests. So far, it 
has verified the deaths of 46 people: 44 civilians and two police 
officers; most of the documented deaths, 76 percent, were from gunshot 
wounds. The UN office in Colombia conducted more than 620 interviews 
with victims and witnesses, and examined 83 videos, including mobile 
phone footage of the protests and related incidents. Based on this 
analysis, there are reasonable grounds to believe police officers were 
responsible for at least 28 of the deaths with members of the National 
Police's Mobile Anti-Riot Squad (ESMAD) involved in at least 10 cases. 
Non- state actors are believed to have killed 10 people, while there is 
insufficient information to determine the likely perpetrators of eight 
other deaths. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
called on Colombia to urgently reform how it polices protests in the 
wake of demonstrations in 2021 in which several people were killed or 
injured.\29\ In response, the Colombian Government has embarked on a 
broad reform of its police to include respect for human rights and just 
received $8 million of U.S. assistance for human rights training for 
the police on February 8, 2022.\30\
    The security situation in Colombia has been deteriorating 
significantly and will be a key issue in the upcoming presidential and 
legislative elections. In September 2021, Colombia's Military Commander 
General Luis Fernando Navarro stated that about 1,900 fighters 
belonging to Colombian rebel and crime groups are operating from 
Venezuela, where they plan attacks and engage in drug trafficking. The 
Colombian Government has long said Venezuela's leadership grants safe 
harbor to Colombian armed groups, allowing trafficking of cocaine in 
exchange for a cut of the profits. One FARC dissident group has taken 
responsibility for a car bombing at a military base in the border city 
of Cucuta which injured 44 in June and the June 25, 2021 failed 
assassination attempt against President Ivan Duque, the shooting of a 
helicopter transporting him.\31\
    According to InSight Crime, murders in Colombia rose to a level not 
seen in 7 years a turnaround for the Andean nation, which had made 
great strides in reducing killings. According to the National Police, 
the country tallied 13,709 homicides in 2021, pushing its homicide rate 
up from a low of 23.8 per 100,000 people in 2020, to 26.8 last year. 
Last year's total killings, however, rose eight percent when compared 
with 2019, and 2021 was the first year since 2013 that Colombia 
surpassed 13,000 murders. Violence, meanwhile, surged in the country's 
lawless Colombia-Venezuela border. The northeastern jungle region of 
Catatumbo, home to an abundance of coca crops, came under siege in a 
war between a dissident front of the demobilized FARC and the National 
Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional--ELN), Colombia's 
largest guerrilla group. On the other side of the country, the 
southwestern departments of Cauca and Valle de Cauca recorded nearly 
100 people killed in 26 massacres. Both departments are critical for 
moving drugs out of the Pacific or to Ecuador and are a hot spot for 
criminal actors, including three dissident FARC fronts, the ELN and the 
Urabenos drug gang, also known as the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo). In 
the central Antioquia department, 52 people were murdered in 14 
massacres.\32\ This increase in violence is linked to the lucrative 
illicit economy and is destabilizing parts of Colombia.
    Anti-government protests, frustrations over the pandemic response, 
increasing insecurity, economic concerns and instability in Venezuela 
will be on Colombians' minds at the March 13 parliamentary and May 29 
presidential elections this year. Discontent with the current 
administration has President Duque at record low approval ratings. If 
the elections were conducted today, left-leaning candidate Gustavo 
Petro, former M19 guerrilla and mayor of Bogota would likely win the 
presidency. He was a presidential candidate in 2018 who finished second 
with over 8 million votes (43 percent) in the second round against Ivan 
Duque. There are fears that new violent protests, disinformation 
campaigns and election meddling might occur and attempt to destabilize 
Colombia.
             measures to deepen u.s.-colombian cooperation
    The U.S. must redouble its efforts to support Colombia, its closest 
democratic partner in Latin America as it faces mass social protests, 
increasing insecurity, external actors and serious economic challenges 
from the pandemic. Colombia needs assistance to defend its democratic 
institutions, open economy and sovereignty and ensure free and fair 
elections in 2022. To deepen U.S. partnership with Colombia at this 
challenging time, the Biden Administration and Congress should:

  1.   Increase security assistance to Colombia to support the police 
        and the military to counter armed groups and the lucrative drug 
        trade. Security assistance should focus on the growing 
        instability and illicit economy along the shared border with 
        Venezuela and the Pacific Ocean ports.

  2.   Expand the use of financial intelligence by supporting the 
        Center for Combatting Illicit Finances (CFI) and the creation 
        of an interagency group to counter money laundering led by 
        Colombia's Attorney General to combat, prosecute and dismantle 
        illicit networks.

  3.   Assist with the professionalization and reform of Colombia's 
        military and police forces and include more human rights and 
        rule of law training.

  4.   Continue collaborative efforts towards bringing security, 
        stability and democracy back to Venezuela.

  5.   Support Colombia's broad cybersecurity efforts to safeguard its 
        sensitive data and communications and other critical 
        infrastructure.

  6.   Boost Colombia's counterintelligence capabilities to closely 
        monitor the growing activities of external actors like China, 
        Russia and Venezuela in Colombia.

  7.   Identify and assist legitimate civil society groups in Colombia 
        to address disinformation and misinformation efforts by 
        internal and hostile foreign actors.

  8.   Promote U.S. investment in Colombian infrastructure projects, 
        especially in areas that are economically isolated and 
        vulnerable to organized crime, to counter China's Belt and Road 
        Initiative and 5G technology aspirations.

  9.   Facilitate more bilateral trade between the U.S. and Colombia as 
        part of a U.S. near-sourcing and supply chain resilience 
        strategy.

  10.  Continue to work closely with Colombians in their pandemic 
        recovery efforts through both public and private sector 
        coordination.

----------------
Notes

    \1\ The views expressed in this testimony are that of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the William J. Perry Center 
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, or the 
Department of Defense. Testimony is drawn from the author's recent 
publication, ``America's Longtime Friend, Colombia, Needs U.S. Help'' 
with James M. Roberts, Mateo Haydar, and Joseph M. Humire found here: 
https://www.heritage.org/americas/report/americas-longtime-friend-
colombia-needs-us-help
    \2\ State Department Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, U.S. Relations 
with Colombia, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, July 19, 2021, 
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-colombia/
    \3\ Congressional Research Service, Colombia: Challenges for U.S. 
Policymakers in 2021, September 22, 2021, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11631/4
    \4\ Diego Felipe Vera, ``Cooperacion Internacional de Seguridad: El 
Caso de Colombia (International Cooperation and Security: The Case of 
Colombia),'' p. 44, https://esdeguelibros.edu.co/index.php/editorial/
catalog/download/28/24/404?inline=1
    \5\ Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad, Center for 
Historical Memory, at http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/
micrositios/informeGeneral/
    \6\ Government of Colombia, Victims Unit, at https://
www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es
    \7\ Institute for Economics and Peace, ``Global Peace Index 2021: 
measuring peace in a complex world'' Sydney, June 2021.
    \8\ Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-Colombia Relations 1903-
2021, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-colombia-relations
    \9\ ``U.S. Revokes Terrorist Designation for Colombia's FARC,'' 
Reuters, November 30, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-revokes-
terrorist-designation-colombias-farc-2021-11-30/
    \10\ Congressional Research Service, Colombia: Background and U.S. 
Relations, December 16, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R43813.pdf
    \11\ InSight Crime, Colombia ELN Backgrounder, October 27, 2020, 
https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile/
    \12\ Ibid.
    \13\ Juan Diego Posada, ``Ex-FARC Mafia vs. ELN: a Fight Too Far at 
Colombia-Venezuela Border?,'' InSight Crime, January 11, 2022,https://
insightcrime.org/news/is-the-ex-farc-mafia-betting-all-its-chips-on-
the-colombian-venezuelan-border/
    \14\ U.S. Embassy in Colombia, Colombia and the United States: 
Strengthening our Partnership, October 9, 2019, https://
co.usembassy.gov/colombia-and-the-united-states-strengthening-our-
partnership/
    \15\ Max Manwaring, Venezuela as an Exporter of 4th Generation 
Warfare Instability, U.S. Army War College Press, December 2012
    \16\ Joseph M. Humire, ``Assymetric Assault on Colombia,'' Secure 
and Free Society, May 17, 2021, https://www.securefreesociety.org/
research/asymmetric-assault-on-colombia/
    \17\ Francisco Toro, Venezuela's implosion is becoming Colombia's 
security nightmare,'' Washington Post, July 5, 2019, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/05/venezuelas-implosion-is-
becoming-colombias-security-nightmare/
    \18\ John Padilla and Sergio Guzman, ``As China Eyes Colombia, the 
United States Is AWOL,'' Foreign Policy, January 25, 2022, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/25/colombia-china-latin-america-belt-road-
biden/
    \19\ James M. Roberts, Mateo Haydar, Joseph M. Humire and Celina 
Realuyo, ``America's Longtime Friend, Colombia, Needs U.S. Help,'' 
Heritage Foundation, December 2021, https://www.heritage.org/americas/
report/americas-longtime-friend-colombia-needs-us-help
    \20\ Luis Fernando Mejia Colombia, ``Washington's ``Closest Ally,'' 
Looks to Beijing,'' Americas Quarterly, October 27, 2021, https://
www.americasquarterly.org/article/colombia-washingtons-closest-ally-
looks-to-beijing/
    \21\ ``Colombia Confirms Exit of Russian Officials, Local Media 
Alleges Spying,'' Reuters, December 22, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-colombia-russia/colombia-confirms-exit-of-russian-officials-
local-media-alleges-spying-idUSKBN28W2A5
    \22\ Guido L. Torres, ``Nonlinear Warfare: Is Russia Waging a 
Silent War in Latin America?,'' Small Wars Journal, January 24, 2022, 
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/nonlinear-warfare-russia-waging-
silent-war-latin-america
    \23\ ``Russia says military aid to Venezuela will not be used to 
attack Colombia,'' Reuters, February 8, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/
world/americas/russia-says-military-aid-venezuela-will-not-be-used-
attack-colombia-2022-02-08/
    \24\ R. Evan Ellis, ``Russia's Latest Return to Latin America,'' 
Global Americans, January 19, 2022, https://theglobalamericans.org/
2022/01/russia-return-latin-america/
    \25\ Congressional Research Service, ``Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19,'' October 15, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/
crs/row/IF11581.pdf
    \26\ World Bank, ``The World Bank in Colombia: Overview,'' March 
24, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/colombia/overview
    \27\ Veronica Uribe-Kessler, ``Guest View: Colombia's Struggle 
Against Poverty,'' Reuters, May 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/
breakingviews/guest-view-colombias-struggle-against-poverty-2021-05-11/
    \28\ Luis Jaime Acosta, ``Colombia Blames Armed Groups for Protest 
Violence, Death Toll Still Unclear,'' Reuters, May 3, 2021, https://
www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-blames-armed-groups-protest-
violence-death-toll-still-unclear-2021-05-03/
    \29\ OHCHR, UN rights office urges Colombia to reform policing of 
protests, December 15, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/
1107992
    \30\ EE. UU. anuncia una donacion de 8 millones de dolares a la 
Policia de Colombia, El Espectador, February 8, 2022, https://
www.elespectador.com/mundo/america/estados-unidos-donara-8-millones-de-
dolares-a-la-policia-de-colombia/
    \31\ Luis Jaime Acosta, ``Some 1,900 Colombian guerrillas operating 
from Venezuela, says Colombia military chief,'' Reuters, September 30, 
2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/exclusive-some-1900-
colombian-guerrillas-operating-venezuela-says-colombia-2021-09-30/
    \32\ InSight Crime's 2021 Homicide Round-Up, February 1, 2022, 
https://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crimes-2021-homicide-round-up/

    The Chairman. Thank you both. We will start a series of 5-
minute questions.
    Listening to the previous panel and some of your insights, 
one of our challenges is that if we do not want countries to 
use Huawei, if we do not want China to be investing in their 
infrastructure and ports, not only do we want to make it clear 
to those countries that we do not want to see that, but we have 
to compete with China. We have to offer an alternative to 
Huawei. We have to offer an alternative in investments into a 
country. Otherwise, we just say no, do not do that, but then 
leave you with nothing.
    So that is something that I think we have to focus on. That 
is why I think the IDB is a great opportunity, and I hope we 
can get a capital investment increase to be a leader in helping 
us to fashion responses to some of these economic and 
development questions where American businesses are actually 
engaged. The IDB was used previously by China. IDB was 
conducting trade shows for China. I am glad that its new 
leadership ended that, and it is focused in a different 
direction.
    It just comes to me, as I listen to various testimony, that 
this is a critical thing that we have to address. Yes, we do 
not Huawei. We do not want its security challenges to our 
telecommunications infrastructure, but we certainly have to 
have an alternative.
    Mr. Restrepo, for years numerous American officials have 
repeatedly referred to Colombia as a U.S. ally, yet we have 
never taken the step of making that formal designation. Would 
you agree that we are long overdue in formalizing the United 
States strategic alliance with Colombia?
    Mr. Restrepo. Absolutely. They are a strategic partner and 
ally and have been not just since Plan Colombia. I think there 
is a recency bias in our analysis often. As I noted, in World 
War II Colombia played a critical role in hunting U-boats in 
the Caribbean and allowing the U.S. Navy to prepare for its 
Pacific campaign off Colombia's Pacific coast, deployed troops 
to Korea during the Korean conflict, was fundamental in 
establishing the Inter-American System, was a fundamental 
partner in the Alliance for Progress.
    This is a longstanding relationship that deeply benefits 
and advances U.S. national interests and should be recognized 
formally as such.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you, throughout Plan Colombia the 
United States continuously recalibrated our foreign assistance 
to advance our strategic objectives of helping Colombia and the 
world's longest-running internal conflict, combat narcotics 
trafficking, and strengthen peace, democratic governance, and 
human rights. As we look to reinvigorate the U.S.-Colombia 
relations how do we--and set our sights, I should say, on 
addressing the opportunities and challenges of the future, not 
just deal with the ghosts of the past--what lessons can we draw 
from Plan Colombia to inform the future of our cooperation with 
Colombia and ensure that we are maximizing the impact of 
engagement on economic, social, environmental, and security 
issues, as well as addressing the emerging threats and 
challenges?
    Mr. Restrepo. So I think the fundamental lesson from Plan 
Colombia, and there are many, is where can the United States be 
catalytic? Where does the United States have a comparative 
advantage where we can help Colombia in a way distinct from 
what is on offer within Colombia or otherwise in the 
international community?
    At the onset of Plan Colombia that was air mobility and the 
ability to project the Colombian state and Colombian lethal 
reach to all of Colombia society, and at the same time human 
rights and the professionalization of its security forces.
    Today, I think that goes to the need to help Colombia 
become a much more innovative economy and a much more 
technologically advanced economy. Through the IDB, as you 
mentioned, the United States should be present in IDB Invest, 
the private sector arm, in a way that it is not today. They 
should be part of any recapitalization of the IDB. The DFC 
should be looking to put risk capital at play, to burgeon the 
kind of technological advances that economies like Colombia's 
needs to be sustainable and equitable into the 21st century.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Realuyo, what 
kind of security assistance should the U.S. be emphasizing to 
more effectively help Colombia address the security environment 
that they face today?
    Ms. Realuyo. Well, as a result of the many years that we 
have invested in security assistance on all aspects, also it is 
important to understand it has not only been at the national 
level, but actually at the more local level, where we are 
seeing the heightened violence and the rate of homicides rising 
quite dramatically.
    We have actually got a lot of what I call the building 
blocks in place. The question is how do you make them more 
sophisticated and more nimble, in terms of taking a look at 
this?
    So as you know, I have been following the money trail of 
terrorist groups and criminal organizations for the past 20 
years, and it is great sign that we are now really starting to 
invest in cultivating and harvesting what we call financial 
intelligence. These groups that have now abandoned their 
political aspirations, like the FARC dissidents and the ELN, of 
overthrowing the central government of Colombia, they are all 
in it for the money, because the cocaine trade is so lucrative 
and the illegal gold mining, which we did not really mention 
during the hearing today. They are all about securing the 
supply chain, and then more importantly, the transit routes in 
order to get these illicit products to market.
    So one piece, with our military assistance, is how to help 
the Colombians reestablish control in what were ungoverned or 
vulnerable spaces, and that is primarily right now where you 
are seeing the violence, that border region between Colombia 
and Venezuela. Sadly too, the Venezuelans regime of Maduro has 
actually given safe haven, ample safe haven and direct 
assistance to groups like the ELN, the FARC to enrich 
themselves.
    So that is an area where we are starting to now incorporate 
different types of intelligence at an operational level. So 
that is actually taking also signals intelligence, to actually 
listen to their communications, with who the money runners are. 
Then now it is quite interesting, in my research I am looking 
at what is called the digitalization of the illicit economy. 
How are they starting to use cyberspace to secure, for example, 
precursor chemicals, which we did not really talk about as 
well, that are needed in the labs to transform the coca into 
refined cocaine, which sadly is becoming even purer and more 
impactful, and it is starting to come back into the United 
States.
    So this is an area where we have seen more comprehensive 
approach to security as opposed to these silos that existed in 
our government in the United States as well as others. So we 
are looking at what we call more that kind of inter-
departmental or interagency, we would call it in the United 
States, this training of prosecutors and the financial 
intelligence units as well as the military and the police to 
actually execute a more comprehensive attack against these 
illicit armed groups.
    Senator Risch. Thanks for that. It is pretty common 
knowledge that Russia has got a growing military and 
intelligence activity in both Venezuela and Colombia. How can 
the U.S. help Colombia in safeguarding sensitive communications 
and mitigate the risks that are presented by Russia?
    Ms. Realuyo. In our bilateral academic meetings with our 
counterparts in Colombia there is tremendous demand for 
training and. more importantly, understanding what we call the 
cyber domain. So this is part of SCADA units and then, more 
importantly, the whole platform in taking a look at how to not 
just secure the installations that we have now in both 
countries--and we share a lot of lessons learned--but more 
importantly looking at how you train the next generation to be 
able to anticipate. This is where we are using concepts such as 
strategic foresight to kind of game out how there might be 
vulnerabilities in existing systems.
    Then the bigger challenge that we have seen throughout 
Latin America, and in Colombia, is that interoperability. So, 
for example, police units and military units still struggle in 
sharing real-time what we call actionable intelligence, and 
then, more importantly, how to protect. Also, we raise 
awareness about, sadly, the infiltration of corrupt actors 
inside the security services, which is a challenge in many 
countries around the world.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. My 
time is up, almost, anyway, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I have one last question for both 
of you. I mentioned Colombia's tax decision which created a 
revolt as a result of it, but that tax decision was spurred by 
requirements of the IMF to meet certain fiscal obligations, in 
the midst of a pandemic. This is not unique to Colombia. There 
are several countries in the hemisphere and beyond where these 
requirements, stringent requirements of the IMF, without the 
flexibility for what I call a smoothing period, but call it 
whatever you want.
    Not to move away from the obligation but ultimately to have 
the time to meet the obligation in a responsible way that does 
not create societal disruption is something I would be 
interested in your thoughts on.
    Mr. Restrepo. Senator, you are entirely correct, and this 
is a problem throughout Latin America and actually throughout 
many emerging markets at the moment. Countries are frankly out 
of fiscal space as a result of attempts to protect the most 
vulnerable populations during the pandemic. That is true in 
Colombia, where a significant percentage of GDP was reallocated 
or directed towards the most vulnerable portions of the 
population. Effort was stood up to reach folks in an economy 
that is deeply informal. The Colombian economy informality 
ranges in the 60 to 65 percent, which is one of the challenges 
that the economy faces.
    International financial institutions, starting with the 
IMF, right now should be providing more fiscal space for 
countries, rather than demanding quick corrections, if you 
will, as we emerge from the effects of the pandemic.
    It is one of the reasons--and we have been a little remiss 
in not focusing, I think, the Columbian response on migration. 
One of the things that Colombia has done is launch an 
unprecedented regularization program. In November of last year, 
the World Bank and the IDB, with U.S. support, allocated $800 
million in financing to Colombia to support that integration 
and regularization program, in direct budget support 
conditioned on these programs. That is the sort of thing that 
these institutions should be doing throughout the Americas 
today to help deal with a massive movement of people, and a 
historic movement of people that has been exacerbated by the 
pandemic itself.
    So yes, the IMF should be engaging in these smoothing 
periods, as you named them, and the international financial 
institutions should be using their balance sheets to help 
countries both deal with the effects of the pandemic and 
communities of reception throughout the region for vulnerable 
populations that have been dislocated over the course of the 
last 7 years.
    The Chairman. Ms. Realuyo, any observations?
    Ms. Realuyo. If we take a look at the IFF's, they also have 
their own requirements and their own constituencies and 
stakeholders, and it is unfortunate that President Duque 
decided to raise, and more importantly proposed the tax that 
would hit the middle class, that actually served as a catalyst 
for these mass protests that had never been seen before in the 
streets of Colombia.
    This also actually underscores the spirit of the hearing 
today about the importance of--reinvigorating, as you titled 
the hearing, the bilateral, economic, and trade ties with 
Colombia and the United States. Because all these countries 
that have suffered so much from the pandemic--and as you know, 
Colombia contracted its GDP by 6 percent in 2020, and was one 
of the hardest hit countries due to the COVID-19 pandemic--they 
have to grow their economy, and thankfully, Colombia has not 
just the natural resources, but the human and financial 
resources that position them very well for a quick recovery, 
and that recovery is directly linked to the U.S. economy.
    That is where we see these concepts of the strategy of 
near-sourcing, realigning global supply chains, to rebuild, if 
not reinforce the U.S. ties with our Latin American partners, 
not just in Latin America, but the Caribbean, is a way out, and 
I think as we look at what is going to grow and then, more 
importantly, not just the goods, but the services industry, I 
see a very promising future in U.S.-Colombian bilateral 
economic relations.
    We spoke a lot today about security. You cannot have 
prosperity without security, but you also cannot fund 
prosperity without actually having security to attract 
investments, and looking at alternatives.
    You had asked and mentioned earlier at a point about trying 
to counter China's aggressive advances, and the real issue, as 
well, is to offer goods and services that meet the needs of the 
Colombian people and the economy. I think that the U.S. is very 
well positioned to do that, and I look forward to seeing the 
passage of your bill to really reinforce, and then, more 
importantly, codify the relationship between Colombia and 
United States.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you. I think one of the 
challenges for countries like Colombia is when you have such a 
large informal economy, when you try to make it formal there is 
always a reluctance to have to pay your way to the state at the 
end of the day. So that will be challenging for whoever comes 
next, but I appreciate your insights.
    With that, thank you both for helping us think about this 
more deeply. We appreciate your participation here today.
    This hearing's record will remain open until the close of 
business tomorrow, and with the thanks of the committee this 
hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


              Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. In August 2020, the U.S. International Development 
Finance Corporation (DFC) announced the launch of the U.S.-Colombia 
Growth Initiative with over $1 billion invested in more than 30 
projects across Colombia. However, during your testimony, you indicated 
only six projects were currently being implemented. Can you please 
provide a status updated on the 30 projects in question?

    Answer. The U.S. relationship with Colombia remains strong, and the 
United States continues to support a wide array of initiatives to boost 
economic growth in the country. DFC supports highly developmental 
projects in Colombia and constantly considers new private sector 
proposals. I referenced six new projects in my previous testimony that 
were approved in 2021. More broadly, DFC has 34 portfolio projects in 
Colombia that amount to more than $1.2 billion in exposure. DFC has 
supported investments that promote rural financial inclusion, 
affordable housing, infrastructure, and forestry. DFC has about $55 
million in exposure through regional funds that cover Colombia, 
including $3.4 million in small, high-impact funds. Approximately 88 
percent of this exposure focuses on housing and commercial buildings, 
and the remaining 12 percent focuses on industrial and financial 
technologies. For quick reference, all of DFC's active projects are 
available on DFC's website, which can be filtered by region, financing 
type, commitment level, and year: https://www.dfc.gov/our-impact/all-
active-projects.
    DFC's current portfolio prioritizes promotion of affordable housing 
and increasing lending to vulnerable populations, such as Venezuela 
migrant receptor communities, rural areas, and those worst-affected by 
COVID-19. Financial inclusion in rural and conflict-affected Colombia 
aims to promote a legal economy as an alternative to illicit activities 
(coca, illegal mining, armed groups). DFC supports inclusive rural 
economic growth by attracting private investment into areas which have 
been affected by conflict and where investors have been reluctant to 
make financial commitments. DFC enhances economic opportunity by 
increasing access to affordable housing in conflict-affected 
communities and helping small farmers and landowners improve food 
security by strengthening producer associations, cooperatives, 
microcredit organizations, and agricultural value chains and business 
opportunities. By supporting bankable projects in Venezuela migrant 
receptor communities, DFC increases inclusion, strengthens resilience, 
and addresses the root causes of further migration.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. Your testimony seemed to have indicated that cocaine 
``production is going down but cultivation is increasing'' in Colombia. 
As you may know, a July 2021 report by the White House's Office of 
National Drug Control Policy indicated a dramatic increase in both, 
coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia. Specifically, the 
ONDCP estimated that coca cultivation had reached a record 245,000 
hectares and cocaine production stood at 1,010 metric tons--a roughly 
30 percent increase from production levels at the time of the signing 
of the Peace Accords in 2016.
    Can you clarify the record on your understanding of cocaine 
production levels in Colombia, and whether they represent a decrease or 
increase from previous years?

    Answer. Both coca cultivation and cocaine production potential 
increased in 2020 compared to the year prior, according to U.S. 
Government estimates.

    Question. How has the failure to conduct aerial spraying impacted 
this trend?

    Answer. Several factors, including the limited number of hectares 
available for aerial eradication, suspension of aerial eradication 
itself, varying levels of manual eradication, perverse incentives in 
the national crop substitution program, and an expansion of the global 
cocaine market have all contributed to the growth in coca cultivation 
since 2012. The complex problems posed by narcotics trafficking require 
a similarly broad set of interventions, and eradication in whatever 
legally available form is a core element of our strategy. The choice to 
resume aerial eradication remains for Colombia to decide. To date, 
various legal rulings in Colombia have prevented the program's launch.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. What funds from the USAID Latin America bureau, the USAID 
mission in Colombia, or USAID's Center for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Governance will be used to assist elections in Colombia in 2022?

    Answer. USAID supports government and citizen efforts in Colombia 
to promote economic prosperity through the licit economy; improve the 
living conditions of victims of violence and vulnerable groups, 
including Afro-Colombians and indigenous peoples; promote respect for 
human rights and rule of law; and address climate change and 
environmental issues in one of the most ecologically diverse countries 
in the world. As part of furthering those priorities, USAID programming 
supports advancing Colombia's transition from violent conflict to an 
inclusive peace. USAID does not have direct programming related to 
election observation in Colombia. However, USAID's priority in the 
upcoming elections is to support victims of armed conflict to 
participate as candidates and voters in the upcoming Congressional 
elections, which include elections for 16 seats for victims of the 
armed conflict. USAID will use ESF and DA funding to provide support 
for those elections, focused on ensuring that victims' organizations 
have the knowledge and tools to actively participate in their 
democracy.

    Question. Will USAID use the CEPPS mechanism and/or the Rapid 
Response Mechanism to support an electoral observation team during the 
upcoming legislative and presidential elections?

    Answer. At this time, USAID does not intend to use CEPPS or related 
mechanisms to support an electoral observation team during the upcoming 
elections. USAID does not have direct programming related to election 
observation in Colombia. Such programming ended in 2019 as USAID 
shifted its focus to furthering the Peace Accord implementation under 
USAID's Country Development Cooperation Strategy (2020-2025). As we 
approach the elections, USAID will continue to be engaged in robust 
interagency discussions on the most appropriate support the USG can 
provide to Colombia.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. It's come to my attention that the Colombian-American 
community in Florida is very concerned with the constant delays 
experienced by Colombians applying for visas to visit the United 
States. In many cases, these are for family members trying to make it 
to a funeral, wedding or other family event. While this may not seem a 
big deal at first, furthering people-to-people ties are critical in 
supporting the bilateral relationship with Colombia.
    Are you aware of the consular services backlog at the Embassy in 
Bogota?

    Answer. Yes, I am aware there is a backlog of appointments for 
consular services at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, as there is at many of 
our Embassies worldwide.

    Question. Can you explain why there is a backlog in providing visas 
to Colombians and what actions are underway to address the backlog?

    Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has created a backlog of visa 
applications around the world. As worldwide restrictions due to the 
pandemic begin to ease, and in line with the President's proclamation 
regarding the safe resumption of international travel, the Bureau of 
Consular Affairs (CA) is focusing on reducing wait times for all 
consular services at U.S. Embassy Bogota and all of our embassies and 
consulates overseas while also protecting the health and safety of our 
staff and applicants. In order to achieve this, the Consular Affairs 
Bureau has focused on reducing the number of people that need to 
schedule appointments and come into waiting rooms through expanded 
interview waiver authorities. Working with interagency colleagues, and 
always focused on protecting national security, we are finding ways to 
process visa applications more efficiently within statutory mandates.

    Question. As you know, Colombia is scheduled to hold congressional 
elections on March 13, with presidential elections to follow in May. I 
am concerned, and have raised this previously, that Cuba, Russia, China 
and Maduro's regime in Venezuela have a great interest in Colombia 
electing a new leader sympathetic to them. There's no doubt that these 
actors will try to influence the elections to their benefit.
    What are the Biden administration's top priorities in ensuring the 
integrity and legitimacy of Colombia's electoral process and what has 
the Administration done, to date, to help Colombia prepare for these 
elections?

    Answer. Colombia remains a leading example in the region of a 
successful, vibrant democracy, and we have a high level of confidence 
in Colombia's democratic institutions. We will continue to support 
Colombia's strong democratic institutions and look forward to 
Colombia's upcoming free and fair elections. The Colombian Government 
has expressed concerns about potential disruptive influence, 
misinformation, and disinformation campaigns in the lead-up to their 
elections and requested U.S. support to ensure electoral integrity free 
from outside influence. The U.S. Government interagency continues to 
work with the Government of Colombia to provide targeted assistance to 
counter mal-, mis-, and disinformation and bolster Colombia's 
cybersecurity capacity to detect and deter cyber threats and 
intrusions.

    Question. Is the Administration planning to support a large-scale 
independent election observation in Colombia?

    Answer. Independent election observation demonstrates our long-
standing support of peace and democracy in Colombia. Embassy Bogota 
will field observation teams throughout Colombia for the presidential 
election, in coordination with teams from the EU, UN, and OAS.

    Question. In the first Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in 
1994, Cuba's dictator, Fidel Castro--was not invited. This year, the 
United States will host the Summit of the Americas, and three Western 
Hemisphere nations--Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela--will not meet the 
basic conditions of democratic governance. This is a clear indication 
that democracy is in decline in the Western Hemisphere. Does the United 
States plan on extending invitations to the Diaz-Canel, Ortega, and 
Maduro regimes to attend the Summit of the Americas?

    Answer. The White House will decide which leaders to invite to Los 
Angeles. The White House will consider the commitment to democracy that 
countries made at the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 
2001 as one factor to inform its decisions on invitations. We expect 
the White House to extend invitations to leaders in the region closer 
to the date of the Summit.
    The Summit serves as the region's highest-level forum to further 
foster effective and accountable democracies in the region that deliver 
for their people. Building on the Summit for Democracy, the Ninth 
Summit will focus governments, civil society, and the private sector on 
taking concrete actions to deliver democracy, bolster transparent and 
accountable governance, and promote and protect human rights, rule of 
law, diversity, social inclusion, and gender, racial, and ethnic equity 
in order to build hope and opportunities for all the people of the 
Americas.

    Question. Is the Administration inviting Interim President of 
Venezuela Juan Guaido?

    Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of 
the 2015 National Assembly as the last democratically elected 
institution and of Juan Guaido as the interim president of Venezuela. 
As host of the Ninth Summit of the Americas, the United States has 
discretion over which heads of state and government to invite to the 
Summit. We expect the White House to extend invitations to the region's 
leaders closer to the date of the Summit.

    Question. What about other countries in the hemisphere that have 
experienced a noticeable decline in their respect for democratic 
norms--like Argentina, Mexico, or El Salvador?

    Answer. The White House will consider the commitment to democracy 
that countries made at the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City 
in 2001 as one factor to inform its decisions on which leaders to 
invite to the Summit.

    Question. Mr. Nichols, in a recent communication, you wrote to the 
Senate that the State Department looks forward to working with Congress 
to organize the Summit and that this American-led process reinforces a 
commitment to defending democracy, address migration and promote growth 
in the region. As the Summit is soon approaching, can you provide this 
committee with an update on the process?

    Answer. The Ninth Summit of the Americas will focus on ``Building a 
Sustainable, Resilient, and Equitable Future'' --a shared vision we 
developed in consultation with the region's governments, civil society, 
and private sector, and the 13 international organizations that 
comprise the Joint Summit Working Group and support the Summit process. 
People, institutions, and governments across our hemisphere have shared 
with us their priorities and concerns, and these include the COVID-19 
pandemic and the fault lines it exposed in health, economic, 
educational, and social systems. They include threats to democracy; the 
climate crisis; and a lack of equitable access to economic, social, and 
political opportunities that places a heavy burden on the most 
vulnerable and underrepresented among us.
    We recognize this as an opportunity, as Summit chair and host, to 
build consensus among the leaders of our hemisphere on concrete actions 
that we can take, together, to address challenges that all too often 
serve as root causes of irregular migration.
    The official Summit agenda will include the leaders' events as well 
as three stakeholder forums--the CEO Summit of the Americas, the Civil 
Society Forum, and the Young Americas Forum--to facilitate meaningful 
dialogue among governments, civil society, the private sector, and 
youth representatives and ensure our leaders' commitments at the Summit 
respond to the most pressing needs of the people of our hemisphere.
    Since the White House announced the dates and location for the 
Ninth Summit, preparatory work has accelerated, within the U.S. 
Government and with external partners. We have introduced our proposed 
multilateral commitments to the Summit governments and stakeholders, 
and they responded positively to our ideas on health, climate change, 
clean energy, digital transformation, and democratic governance. We 
will continue to engage closely with Summit governments and 
stakeholders, as well as Members of Congress, to further refine these 
ideas in the months ahead, as we develop bold, actionable commitments 
for our leaders to endorse at the Ninth Summit.

    Question. Can you confirm the countries that will not be 
participating at the summit?

    Answer. The White House has not yet sent out formal invitations and 
will not do so until closer to the Summit date, but we anticipate keen 
interest from many leaders and stakeholders to attend the Summit in 
person in Los Angeles.

    Question. When will I, and the members of this committee, receive a 
briefing on the upcoming summit?

    Answer. The Department looks forward to briefing you, members of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and other interested Members 
of Congress in the near future at a mutually convenient time.

    Question. On February 16, the United States held a high-level 
meeting with European and Indo-Pacific allies on Venezuela. While I'm 
glad that the Administration is encouraging allies to take a united 
stance on the Maduro regime, I'm puzzled by the fact that the 
government of Venezuela led by Interim President Juan Guaido was not 
included, especially when the participants affirmed their commitment to 
a ``Venezuelan-led process.''
    If the U.S. supports a Venezuelan-led process, why were there no 
representatives from the Interim President of Venezuela at a meeting 
about Venezuela?

    Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of 
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as the last remaining 
democratic institution and Juan Guaido as Venezuela's interim 
president.
    Consistent with the Verdad Act, we continue to support the 
Venezuelan-led negotiations between the Unitary Platform and the Maduro 
regime. We believe negotiations, undertaken in good faith, represent 
the best path toward restoring democracy and rule of law in Venezuela.
    The meeting included significant participation from Venezuelan 
representatives. Mr. Gerardo Blyde and Ms. Claudia Nikken, the 
coordinators of the Unitary Platform negotiation delegation, presented 
on the status of the negotiations and participated in a question and 
answer session with attendees.

    Question. Can you clarify for the committee, which entity was the 
Department referring to when it mentioned a ``Venezuelan-led process''? 
Was the Department referring to the Guaido government or the Maduro 
regime, which has spent the better part of a decade inflicting 
unspeakable suffering on the Venezuelan people?

    Answer. A Venezuela-led process includes the democratically elected 
representatives of the Venezuelan people, including President Guaido 
and the National Assembly, the Unitary Platform, as well as civil 
society and other Venezuelans committed to the return of democracy. The 
United States engages with Venezuelan pro-democracy partners, such as 
the Guaido-led interim government and the Unitary Platform, and 
international allies to urge Maduro to return to the negotiation table 
and support talks that help place the country on a democratic path out 
of the Maduro-created crises.

    Question. Did the involvement of Spain in the meeting result in the 
readout of not including a single mention of the interim government or 
Venezuelan opposition?

    Answer. The U.S.-led high level coordination conference, in which 
the coordinators of the Unitary Platform's negotiation team 
participated, encompassed high level representatives from 20 countries 
and the European Union.
    This conference marked an important step in United States efforts 
to expand and strengthen the group of international partners that share 
the objective of helping Venezuelans transition their nation away from 
its current regime-created crises towards a stable, prosperous, and 
democratic future.
    Partners left the conference more united and committed to 
supporting the negotiations and presenting a united front to the regime 
to drive Maduro back to the table. All also strongly supported the 
essential role of the opposition and other democratic actors in 
Venezuela's efforts to return to democracy.

    Question. The U.S. Government's unwillingness to support a 
comprehensive general capital increase for the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) in 2010 and for its private sector arm in 2015 
opened the doors to China to increase its involvement in the IDB and, 
as a result, in the whole region. The Summit of the Americas is a great 
opportunity for the U.S. to highlight its support for the region 
through a comprehensive approach for the IDB, as Senators of this 
committee have championed in a bipartisan fashion.
    Are you planning to take advantage of this opportunity to support 
an IDB general capital increase this year, or will the United States 
continue to lose opportunities to China?

    Answer. U.S. support for the IDB remains strong, and the Biden-
Harris administration engages actively with IDB management as it works 
to complete an in-depth report of financial conditions, the bank's use 
of resources and how that relates to the region's challenges, and the 
IDB's role within the hemisphere's larger financing and policy 
landscape. Following the release of this report, mandated by IDB 
Governors at the IDB Group's March 2021 annual meeting in Barranquilla, 
Colombia, the Department of State will review the report in 
collaboration with the Department of the Treasury and other U.S. 
Government agencies to ensure efficient use of IDB resources to support 
the region as it emerges from the multiple crises it faces. Discussions 
on the IDB's resources should take into account the views of all 
shareholders and we should not preempt such discussions, now in their 
early stages. We know that the United States must offer our hemisphere 
a positive vision of democratic prosperity that contrasts clearly with 
the promise of short-term gains offered by the People's Republic of 
China, but only in return for political favors, an approach that often 
exacerbates corruption and other underlying problems. We recognize that 
the IDB must play a central part in our efforts to do so.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. On November 30, the Biden administration delisted the 
FARC from its list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) while 
adding two FARC dissident groups to the list. The last time you and 
Secretary Nichols appeared before this committee, I questioned this 
move. Especially because the timing of this decision seemed to revolve 
more around announcing this on the anniversary of the peace accords and 
not because of developments on the ground in Colombia. In January, we 
saw intense violence erupt along Colombia's border with Venezuela tied 
to the drug trade that supports these armed groups.
    In your view, do you believe this [FARC delisting] was the right 
decision taken by the Biden administration?

    Answer. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department 
is required to review FTO designations every 5 years, and the Secretary 
must revoke an FTO designation if the circumstances that were the basis 
for an organization's designation have changed in such a manner as to 
warrant revocation. The FARC FTO designation was last reviewed in 2015. 
Following the 2016 Peace Accord with the Colombian Government, the FARC 
formally dissolved and disarmed, and no longer exists as a unified 
organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the 
capability or intent to do so. Since then, there is no reliable 
information indicating that the FARC has conducted attacks or otherwise 
engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity since the signing of the 
Peace Accord. New terrorist groups have emerged since the 2016 Peace 
Accord. The November 30 designations are directed at those who refused 
to demobilize and are engaged in terrorist activity.

    Question. FARC: On November 30, the Biden administration delisted 
the FARC from its list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) while 
adding two FARC dissident groups to the list. The last time you and 
Secretary Nichols appeared before this committee, I questioned this 
move. Especially because the timing of this decision seemed to revolve 
more around announcing this on the anniversary of the peace accords and 
not because of developments on the ground in Colombia. In January, we 
saw intense violence erupt along Colombia's border with Venezuela tied 
to the drug trade that supports these armed groups.
    Did the Administration consider the impact of the FARC de-listing 
on Colombia as it prepares for upcoming elections?

    Answer. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), requires that 
the Department review Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designations 
every 5 years and the Secretary must revoke an FTO designation if the 
circumstances that formed the basis for an organization's designation 
have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation. Following the 
2016 Peace Accord with the Colombian Government, the FARC formally 
dissolved and disarmed, and no longer existed as a unified organization 
that engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity or had the capability 
or intent to do so. Consistent with the INA, in 2020, the U.S. 
Government began its periodic 5-year review of the FARC's presence on 
the FTO list and determined there was no credible information 
indicating that the FARC conducted attacks or otherwise engaged in 
terrorism or terrorist activity since the signing of the Peace Accord.

    Question. Which U.S.-supported commitments, if any, will be 
affected by the de-listing changes, and how?

    Answer. The decision to delist the FARC allows USAID and other 
elements of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota to work with the Colombian 
Government on Peace Accord implementation, now, without risking the 
violation of U.S. law, in areas of the country in which demobilized 
members of the former FARC are also located. The victims of Colombia's 
decades-long conflict remain the focus of our work. This step aligns 
U.S. policy with the Colombian Government's policies and programs.

    Question. Are members of the FARC (even if they adhere to the peace 
process) currently allowed to enter the U.S. or receive funding from 
any U.S. agency?

    Answer. Even when the FTO designation is revoked, those who had 
active ties to the FARC when it was a designated FTO, including those 
who provided material support to the group, may continue to be 
inadmissible on terrorism-related grounds under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).

    Question. One of the U.S.' largest programs to assist law 
enforcement is in providing assistance to Colombia's law enforcement 
agencies so that they have the capacity to investigate and eliminate 
drug trafficking rings that cause untold damage to both Colombians and 
Americans. During last year's protests in Colombia, many voices here 
criticized these agencies' role in removing roadblocks that blocked 
Colombians' access to food and medicine. Some critics even accused the 
government of supporting human rights abuses. Unlike many of the 
repressive autocratic regimes in the hemisphere, the Colombian 
Government responded to these criticisms and the Colombian Congress 
passed the Police Disciplinary Statute in December and then also passed 
the Police Career Statute in January. Both of these laws create new 
institutions and rules to ensure the employees of Colombian National 
Police respect human rights and are punished for human rights 
violations.
    In your view, do these two laws represent tangible steps in 
modernizing and improving the Colombian police force?

    Answer. Both laws are tangible steps in Colombia's police 
modernization, reform, and transformation plan. INL has assisted, and 
will continue to assist, the Colombian Government in implementing these 
new laws and other relevant police reform plans. On February 8, the 
Department announced it would provide $8 million to help Colombia: 
incorporate human rights principles into police education and 
practices; require officers to complete human rights and use-of-force 
programs; develop a human rights plan with inputs from civil society; 
strengthen the capacity of the new Human Rights Commissioner's Office; 
accelerate police Office of the Inspector General investigation 
processes; and carry out procedural justice and relational policing 
training.

    Question. Is it advisable to require a human rights certification 
before providing counternarcotics assistance to Colombia?

    Answer. The Department is concerned increased conditionality could 
delay INL's ability to deliver assistance to address security and human 
rights priorities in Colombia, which are key to U.S. national security 
interests. An additional human rights certification requirement could 
also send the wrong message and undermine the efforts of our Colombian 
partners, who are diligently working with the United States to improve 
their human rights practices. INL remains committed to robust Leahy 
vetting and prioritizing human rights across our programming and 
believes flexibility is needed to ensure programs can be adapted to 
changing conditions on the ground.

    Question. If funding is withheld from Colombia, could this lead to 
an increase in the supply of cocaine flowing into Colombian and 
American communities?

    Answer. Yes, absent a certification, withholding INCLE funding from 
Colombia could lead to an increase in the supply of cocaine flowing 
into American communities. In 2021, INCLE assistance helped Colombia 
eradicate over 255,000 acres of coca and interdict more than 757 metric 
tons of cocaine and cocaine base. Withholding funding could contribute 
to increased instability and criminality within Colombia by limiting 
the Colombian police's ability to eradicate coca and interdict cocaine 
bound for the United States.

    Question. What steps will the Department take to ensure that 
Colombia is adequately supported to crack down on drug trafficking 
rings?

    Answer. The Department is working closely with the Colombian 
Government to dismantle narcotrafficking rings. For example, in 2021, 
Colombia made huge strides towards dismantling the Clan del Golfo, 
Colombia's largest narcotrafficking group. Working through the INL-
funded programs implemented by the Department of Justice, INL mentors, 
trains, and advises the prosecutors managing investigations and 
prosecutions to dismantle these trafficking rings.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

                           china in colombia
    As part of its Belt and Road Initiative, China offers countries the 
ability to borrow a lot of money for infrastructure projects. The 
problem is that these countries are accumulating an indebtedness to 
China that they often are unable to pay back. As financially strapped 
countries negotiate with China to escape the massive debt, China is 
demanding serious concessions, like equity in strategically important 
assets. Chinese companies have been playing a major role in Colombian 
infrastructure projects. Chinese investments include the Bogota metro, 
the Bogota regional railway, Colombian 4G and 5G infrastructure 
projects, and a major new gold mine in Antioquia.

    Question. What efforts is the United States taking to counter 
Chinese influence in Colombia?

    Answer. Colombia remains one of our most vital partners in the 
region, with the United States as Colombia's largest trade and 
investment partner. We stand committed to Colombia's sustainable 
recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, including through the U.S. 
donation of 6 million vaccines--our second highest donation in the 
region. We support Colombia in developing the structures and processes 
to ensure foreign investment, including in its development of a 5G 
network, does not harm its national security. We work with allies and 
partners to offer alternatives to problematic PRC investment in 
critical infrastructure and other sensitive sectors.

    Question. How effective has China's debt diplomacy been in 
achieving its political, economic and strategic goals in Latin America?

    Answer. Countries in the region increasingly feel the impact of 
problematic PRC influence and coercive actions. As we discuss with 
partners, PRC projects often reflect inadequate labor and environmental 
standards, which undermine workers' rights under domestic law and fall 
short of international labor standards. Countries also have concerns 
about the importation of PRC labor and equipment to complete projects; 
a general lack of transparency and a disregard for the rule of law; 
opaque and often unsustainable loan terms; and impact on corruption. 
This knowledge helps local populations discern the sources of 
disinformation and PRC attempts to gain access to critical 
infrastructure and sensitive sectors. We continue to raise problematic 
PRC influence with partners and recommend alternatives to partners such 
as investing in people-to-people relationships, including programs in 
education, entrepreneurship, English language, and professional 
exchanges.
                                  farc
    On December 1, 2021, the Biden administration delisted the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) from the State 
Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization list. Following a 2016 
Peace Accord with the Colombian Government, the FARC formally dissolved 
and disarmed. There are still former FARC leaders designated as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).

    Question. What are the current terrorist organizations in Colombia?

    Answer. Designated terrorist organizations operating in Colombia 
include Segunda Marquetalia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia--People's Army (FARC-EP), and the National Liberation Army 
(ELN). Hizballah supporters and members also exist in Colombia.

    Question. Was the Colombian Government in favor or against the 
delisting of FARC?

    Answer. The Department engaged the Government of Colombia when 
gathering facts as we conducted the legally mandated 5-year review of 
the FARC's designation. During the Counterterrorism Ministerial in 
January 2020, Colombia took steps to impose sanctions on those on 
Treasury's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, 
but specifically excluded the FARC from its own list. That same month, 
Colombia officially requested the United States designate ``FARC 
dissidents'' as FTOs. We pre-notified the Colombian Government in 
advance of the public announcement.

    Question. What were the reactions and results of the U.S. delisting 
the FARC?

    Answer. The revocation, consistent with U.S. law, aligned U.S. 
Government policy with the Colombian Government's own decision to 
delist the expired organization as part of the 2016 Peace Accord. The 
Colombian Constitution incorporates elements of that accord. The 
revocation also supports the Colombian Government's policies and 
programs to sustain the vast demobilization of former FARC combatants 
and helps prevent the 11,000 former FARC combatants committed to the 
peace process from returning to criminality. The FTO revocation does 
not remove the visa inadmissibility grounds to which specific former 
FARC leaders were and remain subject under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. We remain committed to robust security partnership 
with the Colombian Government as it works to counter the ELN, Segunda 
Marquetalia, and FARC-EP, as well as other terrorist groups. These 
designation actions allow us to target more precisely and dismantle the 
active terrorist groups that represent clear and present dangers to 
Colombian and U.S. interests.

    Question. With the delisting of the FARC, does the Department of 
State plan to change its funding in Colombia with regard to the 
demobilized FARC soldiers? If so, how?

    Answer. The decision to delist the FARC would allow USAID and other 
elements of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota to work with the Colombian 
Government on Peace Accord implementation without the risk of violating 
U.S. law, in areas of the country in which demobilized members of the 
former FARC are also located. The victims of Colombia's decades-long 
conflict remain the focus of our work. This step aligns U.S. policy 
with the Colombian Government's policies and programs.

    Question. How many FARC members demobilized and disarmed as part of 
the 2016 peace deal?

    Answer. Roughly 13,000 FARC ex-combatants have demobilized and 
participated in the reintegration process based on the 2016 Peace 
Accord.

    Question. How many FARC fighters have refused to demobilize or 
rearmed?

    Answer. The designations of FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia are 
directed at those who refused to demobilize or have rearmed and those 
who are engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity. Segunda Marquetalia 
is estimated to have 750 to 1,500 members, and FARC-EP is estimated to 
have 2,700 to 3,000 members.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

                       law enforcement and crime
    Over the years, the United States has provided U.S. assistance to 
help improve, professionalize and expand the Colombian security forces. 
In February, the U.S. announced $8 million in U.S. assistance going to 
the national police force of Colombia. The funds seek to promote within 
the institution, ``accountability of those who violate human rights, 
investigate abuses, as well as the prosecution of corruption.''

    Question. What specific types of U.S. training and police 
assistance will be provided under the recent announcement?

    Answer. The Department's newly announced programming, funded and 
implemented by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, includes efforts to help Colombia to: incorporate 
human rights principles into police education and practices; require 
officers to complete human rights and use-of-force programs; develop a 
human rights plan with inputs from civil society; strengthen the 
capacity of the police's new Human Rights Commissioner's Office; and 
carry out procedural justice and relational policing training.

    Question. What is the status of last year's announcement by the 
Colombian Government to implement a comprehensive transformation of the 
police?

    Answer. President Duque signed two laws to reform the police. In 
January 2022, he approved a law that includes additional sanctions for 
police who violate human rights; improves Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) investigations; establishes a position to investigate alleged 
human rights violations linked to social protests; requires the police 
to report annually the status of investigations; increases 
transparency; and mandates specialized training for OIG personnel and 
disciplinary judges. In December 2021, Duque enacted a law mandating 
human rights be a focus in police training and implemented recruitment 
and retention mechanisms. Both laws are part of a larger reform effort 
announced in 2021, which INL supports programmatically.

    Question. Colombia has played a critical role in the global fight 
against drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime. What 
is your assessment of the Colombian police's institutional capacity to 
counter narcotrafficking, money laundering and organized crime?

    Answer. With INL's assistance, the Colombian police have increased 
their capacity to counter narcotrafficking, money laundering, and 
organized crime; however, much work remains. Our new bilateral strategy 
will further strengthen Colombia's s capacity through holistic and 
better sequenced assistance. In addition, Colombia exports its 
expertise on anti-money laundering to other countries in the region 
through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation, 
which trains police forces on a range of issues including anti-money 
laundering.

    Question. Colombia has played a critical role in the global fight 
against drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime. What 
are the biggest challenges to disrupting the production and trafficking 
of cocaine in Colombia?

    Answer. Two major challenges to disrupting the production and 
trafficking of cocaine in Colombia are insecurity and impunity in 
neighboring Venezuela and a lack of consistent governmental presence in 
rural areas of Colombia. The Department is working to address both 
through its diplomatic and foreign assistance tools.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Brian Nichols to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

                        colombia / farc general
    Question. On Nov. 30, the Department of State announced that it was 
revoking the designations of the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), and as a Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to Executive order (EO) 13224. Among the 
reasons publicly cited for these moves, Administration officials 
suggested that the delistings would facilitate providing certain types 
of U.S. assistance to FARC for reintegration into Colombian society.
    Have you distributed any such aid and if so, what checks were in 
place to ensure the funding was not used for terrorism? Did you consult 
with Congress before doing so?

    Answer. We have distributed no such aid. The revocation of the FARC 
designation supports the Colombian Government's policies and programs 
to sustain the vast demobilization of former FARC combatants.

    Question. Do you believe that the decision to delist the FARC has 
stabilized the climate in Colombia? And if so, please describe in what 
ways that you believe it has.

    Answer. The delisting lays the groundwork for the Colombian 
Government to promote greater stability, particularly in rural areas. 
The revocation aligns with the Colombian Government's own decision to 
delist the expired organization as part of the 2016 Peace Accord. 
Colombia's Constitution now incorporates elements of that accord. The 
revocation also supports the Colombian Government's policies and 
programs to sustain the vast demobilization of former FARC combatants 
and prevent the 11,000 former FARC combatants committed to the peace 
process from returning to criminality.

    Question. Alongside removing the FTO and SDGT designations on the 
FARC, the Administration also announced that it was delisting hundreds 
of entities originally sanctioned for links to the FARC. Among those 
entities were five individuals who on January 11 were summoned by 
Colombia's Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) for their roles in the 
forced recruitment of children for the conflict and for child 
trafficking.
    Did the State Department consult with the Colombians about these 
individuals before removing sanctions on them?

    Answer. No individuals were delisted from CT authorities as a 
result of the State Department's revocation of the FARC's FTO and SDGT 
designations. We defer to Treasury regarding any individuals that were 
delisted as a result of changes to the FARC's designation under 
Treasury authorities.

    Question. Was the State Dept. aware of the work and impending 
decision of the SJP when the decision to lift terrorism sanctions was 
made?

    Answer. Revocation of the FARC's FTO designation does not impact 
prior law enforcement actions related to the FARC's past terrorist 
activities, or FARC's treatment as a terrorist organization for 
immigration purposes during the period in which it was engaged in 
terrorist activity, or if it resumed engaging in terrorist activity. 
The lifting of terrorism sanctions against members of the FARC does not 
impact the ongoing work of the SJP or efforts to hold members of the 
FARC accountable for atrocities and abuses under the law.

    Question. The current climate faced by politicians and journalists 
in Mexico is the deadliest ever. In 2020 more journalists were killed 
in Mexico than in any other country in the world. It alone accounted 
for almost a third of journalists killed around the world. Since the 
start of the electoral process in September 2020, over 80 politicians 
(including at least 48 candidates for office) were assassinated by 
criminal organizations and more than 60 candidates suspended their 
campaigns under duress. Things are if anything getting worse. In 
January, three journalists were shot dead within 10 days.
    Mexican President Lopez Obrador has recently taken several steps 
aimed at intimidating journalists. In February, he publicly revealed 
the financial information of one of Mexico's highest profile 
journalists, Carlos Loret de Mola, in an attempt to intimidate him. 
These actions come amid an increasingly deadly climate for politicians 
and journalists in Mexico, including the murder of three journalists in 
January.
    What steps are we taking to convey to the Mexican Government that 
their behavior is undermining the rule of law, and that in turn is 
endangering American security and the U.S.-Mexican relationship?

    Answer. The Department of State prioritizes cooperation with Mexico 
to increase transparency and accountability for the murder of 
journalists and politicians and will continue to urge at the highest 
levels increased action to respect human rights and ensure necessary 
protections for public figures. Under the newly established U.S.-Mexico 
Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe 
Communities, Mexico and the United States pledged to broadly work 
together to protect our people, prevent transborder crime, and pursue 
criminal networks. The Mexican Government places a priority on the 
investigation of violence against journalists, civil society members 
and politicians, which we seek to support.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. In 2019, FBI Deputy Assistant Director Thompson testified 
in front of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of this Committee that 
``The last decade has seen a boom in illicit mining operations in the 
Western Hemisphere'' and that large amounts of illegally mined gold are 
used by criminal organization and--quote--``especially those involved 
in drug-trafficking'' to move vast sums of money.
    What steps is INL taking to deter the illicit mining of gold and 
ensure U.S. assistance is being used in an effective manner to counter 
these operations?

    Answer. INL funds the Organization of American States to strengthen 
systems to combat illegal mining financial structures in South America. 
Through training financial intelligence units, customs and immigration 
authorities, and agencies responsible for seizing and confiscating 
assets, we have enhanced regional understanding of money laundering 
methodologies using illicit gold and worked with these countries to 
increase their oversight of these illicit operation.
    In Colombia, INL provides equipment and logistical support to anti-
illegal mining units within the army and police. INL, through the U.S. 
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, also mentors and trains 
prosecutors and investigators on illegal mining financing.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Ms. Marcela Escobari to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. USAID has a range of equities, responsibilities, and 
projects aimed at promoting health development in Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC), including: (1) near-term pandemic response and 
recovery, (2) long-term regional health security and health systems 
resilience, and (3) addressing the secondary economic impacts of health 
crises. Meanwhile the issue of vaccines and so-called `vaccine 
diplomacy' has become an increasingly acute one in the context of 
development assistance. USAID will require flexibility for post-
pandemic health systems strengthening.
    Congress has an essential role to play as a partner in crafting 
strategies, and in authorizing and appropriating funding. Please 
describe:

   Additional authorities or resources USAID requires to meet 
        demands for COVID-19 testing, surveillance, diagnostics, and 
        treatments in LAC countries.

   A description of current and future efforts to address 
        remaining gaps in providing adequate COVID-19 vaccine supply 
        for all eligible populations in LAC countries.

   Additional challenges that USAID faces in promoting `vaccine 
        diplomacy' in LAC countries.

    Answer. Throughout the pandemic, USAID has been able to quickly 
allocate and program funding to continue to strengthen and promote 
resilience in LAC health systems to respond to new COVID-19 variants 
and expand access to health services. USAID has rapidly obligated 
COVID-19 supplemental resources generously provided by Congress to the 
agency to support health and humanitarian responses related to the 
pandemic to 29 countries in LAC. USAID expects to fully obligate 
virtually all the funds Congress provided through supplemental and 
emergency appropriations, including the American Rescue Plan Act, over 
the next several months. Going forward USAID must also consider the 
continued need for resources to strengthen health systems (including a 
reliable, adequate oxygen supply) to address new COVID-19 variant 
surges; and to incorporate training and commodities needed to implement 
``test and treat'' strategies that can reduce hospitalization and death 
in people with COVID-19 and risk factors for severe disease.
    To date, the United States has provided approximately 60 million 
COVID-19 doses to the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region with 
more on the way. This is more doses donated than any other country in 
the world. In addition to the President's commitment to turn the United 
States into the world's arsenal for vaccines, USAID is committed to the 
whole-of-government effort through the Initiative for Global Vaccine 
Access (Global VAX) to accelerate global efforts to get COVID-19 shots 
into arms and rapidly overcome access barriers to save lives now. Under 
the auspices of Global VAX, USAID has supported efforts in LAC 
countries to prepare countries to receive, distribute, and administer 
COVID-19 vaccines. USAID is helping countries implement national 
vaccination plans, including by supporting health ministries with 
distribution plans, training vaccinators, establishing vaccination 
sites, cold chain management, communication strategies, and data 
strengthening.
    For example, the United States has donated 6 million vaccines to 
Colombia, with USAID supporting the Ministry of Health (MOH) and 
subnational authorities to improve planning, monitoring, demand 
generation, and supply chain capacity, including providing cold chain 
equipment, to effectively distribute COVID-19 vaccines and the overall 
rollout of the National Vaccination Plan. USAID supports the 
implementation of Colombia's National Vaccination Plan in 19 
Departments (Districts), also with a focus on low income, marginalized, 
and uninsured populations.
    We have donated more COVID-19 vaccines than any other country, and 
each vaccine is free with no strings attached. USAID, beginning with 
Administrator Power and extending to USAID field missions at Embassies 
throughout the region, has aggressively messaged these donations and 
complementary technical assistance to ensure that citizens in partner 
nations are aware of generous United States support. USAID closely 
coordinates this messaging with the State Department and is committed 
to continuing these forceful communications campaigns to ensure robust 
vaccine diplomacy.

                                  [all]